



**STRATEGY
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A UNITED ARMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

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ABSTRACT

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During the Cold War the defense of the United States required posting large regular ground forces overseas. The Post-Cold War period has required global interventionism to protect America's diverse interests. In order to succeed under these conditions the Army must fully and effectively utilize all of its assets. The present Army Strategic Policy neglects to recognize the potential of its National Guard component and thus fails to utilize 60% of America's ground combat forces. This Fellowship Research Project looks at methods to improve relations between the Army National Guard and the Regular Army in order to form the "One Army" Team.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The US Army's Strategic Policy fails to plan for use of Army National Guard combat units. This intentional failure is based upon the Active Component's traditional prejudice against the National Guard. These objections to Guard combat units are based more on 100 year old bias than on actual performance of Guard units. It is remarkable that the objections voiced today, about the inability of Guard infantry and armor units to train for modern combat, are the same objections Colonel (Brevet Major General) Emroy Upton voiced at the close of the 19th Century. In Upton's day, training National Guard Combat units was the responsibility of the States. Today, the Active Component is responsible for training and mobilizing the Guard. For almost 80 years the AC has half heartedly attempted to execute this responsibility, while at the same time reporting to Congress that Guard combat units are ineffective.

Current Army Strategic Policy assumes its' Active Component force structure will be successfully in two major regional conflicts without Guard combat units. However, the Active Component force structure does not contain sufficient heavy combat power for one major regional conflict, let alone two. Army National Guard combat brigades will be required for any future regional conflict.

If National Guard combat units are to be utilized they must be adequately trained. Present training is incorrectly focused. . A National pre- and post-mobilization training plan for Guard armor and mechanized infantry units must be established. The current Mission Essential Task List (METL) is useful for Active Component training but, it does not focus the Guard because it fails to identify critical core skills to be trained with their

limited resource. The Guard's limited training time must be focused on core skills required for mobilization and deployment and not wasted on non-critical skills included in METL collective tasks..

To correct the training problems Active Component Readiness Groups, and individual regular officers and non-commissioned officers should be incorporated into the Guard. Federal law has allowed such integration since 1916. Only in 1996 has the Active Component taken advantage of this opportunity for mutual service. It was this type of mutual service that made the United States Marine Corps Reserve program so successful during the Gulf War.

Deploying Guard combat units need not meet the highest training standards prior to deployment. The utilization of United States Marine Corps Reserve combat units has successfully linked training level with assigned mission. The 24th Marine Reserve Regiment successfully accomplished the rear security mission during the Gulf War with only thirty days post-mobilization, pre-deployment, training. The 142nd and 196th National Guard Field Artillery Brigades provided corps, division and Allied brigade level fire support with only thirty days post-mobilization, pre-deployment, training. Units that back-fill or reinforce forward deployed regular units can be deployed from the Continental United States thirty days after mobilization. The Marine Corps Reserve front-line Infantry and tank battalions entered combat seventy days after mobilization as maneuver elements of assaulting Active Marine Regiments.

MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT GUARD

COMBAT UNITS

"The Army today is less integrated than any other service. It is the only service whose combat forces are less integrated than they were in the recent past, due in large part to the termination of CAPSTONE alignment program for wartime integration of Guard divisions and the elimination of Roundout brigades for active divisions."¹

The Army of the United States consists of the Active Component (AC), and the Reserve Component which consists of the Army National Guard (Guard) and Army Reserve (USAR). United States military policy states that each component constitutes a vital and integrated part of the "One Army" of "Total Force". Over 60% of the Army's ground maneuver forces (infantry and armor) are found in the Guard which comprise the equivalent of thirteen divisions. The National Military Strategy is currently based on a planned utilization of ten AC divisions and omits employment of Guard maneuver forces. The Strategy no longer contains CAPSTONE or Roundout missions which previously integrated Guard maneuver units into regional conflict war plans. The Enhanced Brigade program, which replaced the CAPSTONE and Roundout programs, does not encourage integration. The effect of this strategy is tantamount to planning for the "non use" of over 60% of the Army's ground maneuver force. This planned "non use" is irrational and irresponsible.

"[A]n Army divided against itself is intolerable."² In rhetoric there is "One Army" the "Total Force." In practice the US Army remains segregated, divided by components into opposing camps; actives and reserves. In General Bruce Clarke's book, Guidelines for the Leader and the Commander, he urged the formation of "One Army".

"The ground combat soldier is not a guardsmen, nor a regular, nor a reservist, nor a selectee. He is simply the American fighting man on the one-Army team."³

After thirty years of rhetoric, the "One Army" has never formed. The AC has consistently, if not always consciously, neglected the Guard as a matter of policy since the Guard's founding in 1903. This policy of neglect was reinforced during the Gulf War and has continued to this day. Based upon current 1997 trends, this policy will continue into the 21st Century.

The post Cold War reduction in force had not been completed prior to the Gulf War. During Desert Shield General Schwarzkopf requested two full strength heavy divisions from the United States to defend Saudi Arabia. These formations were to immediately engage in combat upon arrival in theater. Only active forces could meet the immediate deployment schedule and be ready for combat upon arrival in Southwest Asia.⁴ There were extra AC combat formations not yet demobilized. As a result the Army did not need its Guard Roundout brigades. The AC deferred the deployment of the Guard Roundout brigades on valid grounds but did so in a manner that irritated both Congress and the Guard, announcing that the Guard was not deployable because it was neither combat ready or deployable.

"It was never assumed the Roundout brigades would deploy with their parent organizations in a short-term scenario that did not involve the Soviet Union."⁵ Yet, the AC has clouded the Roundout brigades mobilization issue with reports of questionable accuracy.⁶ In this era of budget cuts and force reduction the AC and Guard are often on different sides of the fiscal battle. It must be recognized the powerful disincentive for AC leaders to acknowledge the capability and reliability of Guard units. Such an admission indirectly threatens AC funding as well as individual career aspirations. Ultimate success in the AC is dependent upon command assignments. If the AC publicly acknowledges the capabilities

of Guard combat units that are less costly to maintain, there would be increased pressure from Congress to reduce the number of AC combat units. The resulting competition for force structure is dysfunctional.

Guard artillery units and Marine reserve combat units performed admirably during the Gulf War. Their success went generally unrecognized by AC leadership. The record "indicates a lack of confidence in the ability of National Guard combat units to perform acceptably without -- and perhaps even with -- extensive periods of pre-deployment training."⁷ This attitude is merely a restatement of the habitual distrust and dislike of the AC soldier for his Guard counterpart. This AC bias is inversely proportional to the size and echelon of the Guard unit.

"The smaller the RC element, the happier the AC is to get it. There is almost universal acceptance of using individual [soldiers] or RC combat units of company size or less to augment active units. There is limited acceptance of employing entire battalions... and there is open opposition to employing RC brigades... or divisions as such. This bias results from the conviction of AC leaders that Guard and Reserve enlisted personnel [and] company grade officers... are good enough but Guard and Reserve field grade and senior officers (colonels and generals) are not. Senior regulars believe that senior reservists (and their staffs) have insufficient training time to learn how to command large combat or logistical organizations in combat. This applies particularly to combined arms organizations that require synchronization of maneuver elements and multiple fire support systems to deliver effective combat power."⁸

Senior AC leadership understands that elimination of senior RC leadership positions would result in a RC structure difficult to manage and would eliminate any incentive for junior RC officers to strive for positions of increased responsibility.⁹

The refusal of AC leadership to accept the Guard is not new and is not linked to the synchronization of maneuver elements and fire support as alleged. Upton voiced similar complaints 100 years ago:

1. Guard officers do not meet federal standards in military education.
2. Guard soldiers are useful as individuals, but could not train useful units even at company level.
3. State duties detract from training for war time operations.
4. Guard soldiers, especially older officers and NCOs, are not physically fit for field service.¹⁰

These may have been valid complaints 100 years ago, but they are not valid arguments today.

Since Upton, Congress has passed legislation to improve Guard readiness. The power to correct these problems has been in the hands of the AC since the founding of the modern Guard in 1916. The AC has been tasked with ensuring prompt mobilization of the Guard during war or emergency and pre-mobilization training. AC officers can be detailed to the Guard to serve as commanders and chiefs of staff of Guard divisions and tactical units. AC officers may be detailed as required to support pre-mobilization training or to ensure prompt mobilization.¹¹ If Guard commanders and staffs can not meet the standard for synchronization of maneuver elements and fire support it is due to the failure of AC leadership and their training methods. However, it is to the direct fiscal advantage of the AC to proclaim Guard failure.

The AC contends that Guard combat leadership cannot be trained in only thirty-nine days a year; it is therefore a readiness issue not a personnel quality issue. Readiness is a resource issue. The more time and money committed to organize, staff, equip and train commanders and staffs in peace time, the less time will be required during post mobilization training to meet deployment schedules. If the Army wants Guard combat units to meet certain pre-mobilization standards it must provide the resources. When properly resourced, the professionalism and modern combat performance of Guard and reserve combat units justifies a National Military Strategy that includes Guard combat units.

THE PROFESSIONAL ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The GUARD of today is an all volunteer professional force. It is far removed from the "rag tag" or "good old boy" force of the past. Two recent United States Army War College surveys indicated that only 2.9 % of the AC officers surveyed had ever served as Guard advisors or members of Readiness Groups. Seventy percent of officers surveyed indicated they had served as evaluators for a Guard fifteen day annual training period. The surveys clearly show that future AC senior leaders have only limited experience with the Guard.¹² As a result the AC leadership fails to recognize that the Guard has developed into a professional force with its own leadership culture and esprit de corps. The transition from amateur to professional force started with the introduction of the "Total Force" in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. There are generally five recognized characteristics of a professional military leaders corps:

1. established minimum entry level requirements;
2. promotion based on merit;
3. effective training and relevant military education;
4. an established military staff system; and

5. general esprit and competence of the leadership.¹³

The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPA), implemented on October 1, 1996, mandates the same standard for Guard, Reserve and Active commissioning and promotion requirements. Due to the various reduction in forces over the past 30 years (and the availability of veterans education benefits) many good soldiers have left the AC for college and civilian jobs and have joined the National Guard. As a result, a large percentage of Guard leaders received their commissions from the AC, not from State commissioning programs.

Guard leaders are required to complete the same level of schooling as their AC counterpart to hold command positions. Civilian academic level and performance affect Guard promotions in the same manner as AC promotions. The nature of the Guard military education system and training is more demanding than the ACs. Most AC soldiers assume Guard soldiers spend only thirty-nine days with the colors. They are unaware that the higher the rank, the more time Guard soldiers spend on duty. Overall, Guard commanders and principle staff serve sixty days a year in paid status. They must also attend, in unpaid status, twenty-four staff nights. Due to funding limitations most officers are only allowed to attend their Advance Course and Command and General Staff Course by correspondence or in USAR schools. Officers attend USAR schools in unpaid status one night a week or one additional weekend per month.¹⁴ Additional time is spent at battalion, brigade, and division command post exercise or training conferences. In some States Guard leaders drive over 150 miles, uncompensated and non-tax deductible, to reach their armories. Commanders, Command Sergeant Majors and First Sergeants spend additional time, daily, handling administrative, training , logistical and personnel issues.

The Guard military staff system is the mirror image of the AC system in the combat units. Guard leaders spend entire careers in combat arms in the same brigade or division.¹⁵ There are few, if any, breaks for administrative, school or joint staff tours. Officers attend career schools while performing duties in their units and civilian jobs. The AC contends that commanders and staffs are weak in synchronization of maneuver and fire support; a valid point perhaps but it should not be a surprise. Guard units, by doctrine, train at platoon level. Army combined arms training and tactics are company level tasks. Guard units are not provided training resources (time or money) for combined arms training. Task Force (battalion level) Battlefield Operational System (BOS) managers are normally platoon leaders in Combat Support or Combat Service Support battalions. Combined arms staff training is confined to yearly simulations when the BOS managers are free of troop leading responsibilities. Guard commanders and staff understand the basics of the Army's Battle Command System, they simply require additional training time to become proficient.

The general esprit of the Guard often surpasses its active duty counterpart. Guard leaders must recruit, train and maintain their force based upon strong leadership, unit pride, good training programs and image in the community. Officers and soldiers serve together for years. As a result, Guard units are more cohesive when compared to AC units.

The AC culture tends to emphasize decision-making and centralized response to routine events or crisis. Day to day decisions are made by the Commander. The Guard culture tends to rely on delegation of day-to-day decisions to responsible full time subordinates. The result is a downward shift of authority.

Finally, Guard soldiers are integrated in their communities emergency services. Whether combating riots, floods, or wild fires, Guard soldiers employ their individual soldier, leadership and

staff organizational skills for state missions. In many States, such as California, crisis response is a yearly mission. Contrary to AC popular belief, the State mission does not degrade the combat mission. State emergencies provide additional training of individual skills, staff functioning and flexibility.

Guard leaders and their staffs are professionals, but soldiers who train part-time, with limited resources, do not generally achieve the same proficiency as their active counterpart, nor should they be expected to reach that level until after mobilization. Only after mobilization, with the benefit of additional training and resources, will Guard professionalism eliminate the gap when performing battle tasks. If "competence" is equated to "readiness" this issue becomes more clear. The AC is expected to be deployed into combat on a moment's notice. The Guard is expected to be ready after mobilization and pre-deployment training. Comparing the two components prior to pre-deployment training is intentionally misleading.

THE PERFORMANCE OF RESERVE COMBAT BATTALION AND BRIGADES IN THE RECENT PAST

The AC is not the only component capable of successfully waging modern warfare. In the last eight years reserve combat units have successfully operated in high intensity combat, performing to the standard of their active duty counter-part. Two noteworthy examples are: (1) the United States Marine Corps Reserve during the Gulf war and (2) Guard Artillery units during the Gulf War.

USMCR COMBAT UNITS IN THE GULF WAR

The United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) proved what "Weekend Warriors" could do when staffed, equipped and led by senior AC leaders who believe in them. During the Gulf War the Marines deployed thirty-seven reserve infantry, tank and artillery companies and batteries. That

number included one tank and two infantry battalions, one infantry regiment of two infantry battalions, and four artillery batteries.

The deployment of the 4th Expeditionary Brigade to the Gulf in August 1990 detached 4,000 active Marines from the 2nd Marine Division. At the same time the 2nd Marine Division (2nd and 3rd Battalions, 8th Marine Regiment, (8th Marines) was required to maintain standing commitments in the Mediterranean Sea. The Marine Reserve was called to fill 2nd Marine Division's shortfalls. On November 15, 1990, the Marines were authorized to call up 15,000 reservists. On November 26, 1990, the first mobilized reserve units began to arrive at Camp Lejune for processing and integration into the 2nd Marine Division.¹⁶ The reservists were pushed through two intensive training programs. The course for enlisted Marines (E-1 to E-5) emphasized individual soldier skills, marksmanship, NBC, breaching operations and desert survival and navigation. The course for staff NCOs and officers added material on fire support coordination, operations orders, and combined arms operations. Additional combined arms training was conducted in theater.¹⁷ The 2nd Marine Division deployed with three reserve battalions; the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines (3/23), the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines (1/25) and 8th Marine Tank Battalion (8MTB). Four reserve artillery batteries were attached to the 10th Marines. (Artillery Regiment) Companies A-D of the 4th Light Armored Infantry Battalion and Company F, 25th Marines were attached to the 2nd Light Armored Infantry Battalion. The 4th Marine Tank Battalion provided Companies B and C to the 2nd Marine Tank Battalion.¹⁸

The 2nd Marine Division entered Desert Storm with two reinforced rifle regiments, a US Army armored brigade, an artillery regiment, reinforced light armored infantry battalion and support battalions.¹⁹ Reserve tank companies provided armor support for the 6th and 8th Marines and Task Force Breach. The 8th Marine Tank Battalion (USMCR) (minus) and 1/23 (USMCR) provided

maneuver battalions for the 6th and 8th Marines.²⁰ First Battalion, 25th Marines was detached from the 2nd Marine Division and attached to the 1st Marine Division. In anticipation of large numbers of enemy prisoners, 1/25 was assigned to handle captured Iraqis and keep mechanized regiments unencumbered.²¹

The largest reserve combat unit mobilized was the 24th Marines, which assumed the rear area security mission in January, 1991. The regiment mustered into service with 1,716 (about 50% strength) personnel, commanded by COL George E. Gernann, a regular officer. It was organized into a headquarters' company and three rifle battalions. The regiment was activated on November 13, 1990. Its officers arrived on November 22, 1990 and its enlisted personnel, many of who were college students, arrived by November 29, 1990. Some of the Inspector and Instructor Staff (I&I), some were mobilized with their units while others remained stateside. After a brief training cycle, the majority of the regiment flew into Jubayl between January 1-3, 1991. One battalion deployed to Japan. The 24th Marines (USMCR) were ready made for the security mission. Its companies were capable of independent duty and were cohesive, having trained together for years. The regiment was deployed in platoon and company positions along a 200 mile main supply route from Bahrain to Mishab.²²

Integration of reserve and regular Marines went smoothly. During the Gulf War, B Company, 4th Marine Tank Battalion was activated on December 15, 1990 as an M60A1 tank company. It was organized into two five-tank platoons. It reported to Twenty-nine Palms, California and was reorganized into three platoons of four tanks and was transitioned into a M1A1 tank company. Seventy-one days after activation, in the early morning hours of February 24, 1991 B Company engaged an Iraqi Battalion. When the smoke cleared thirty T-72 tanks, four T-55 tanks and seven Iraqi armored personnel carriers were destroyed. By the end of the war B company had destroyed fifty-nine

tanks, thirty-two armored personnel carriers, twenty-six non-armored vehicles and one artillery piece, without the loss of a single Marine. Reserve Marines, which had for years trained on the oldest and least technologically advanced tank in the American inventory, had become experts in the most advanced armored killing system in the world in less than seventy days.²³

A post-war study indicated regular commanders found reservists to be competent, bright, highly motivated, pragmatic and oriented toward problem solving.²⁴ The study examined the mobilization and integration of the Marine Corps Reserve and concluded that it was successful because of four factors. First, Marine reservists attended the same basic combat training as active duty Marines. Second, all officers and many SNCOs had prior active duty. Officers averaged 6.2 years active duty service. All reserve officers were required to serve a minimum active duty period beyond basic combat training, usually three years. Third, reserve unit training experience paralleled regular training.²⁵ Finally, the Marines acquisition policy (that equips active and reserve units with the same equipment) makes the USMCR completely interchangeable with the regular force.²⁶

Additionally, each reserve company had an I&I staff of ten active duty Marines commanded by a captain or major. With these active duty Marines, each company had extensive support to maintain an aggressive training program. The I&I staff brought fresh active duty experience into the unit. When the I&I staff members rotated back to the Fleet Marine Force, they brought back the experience of working with reservists to their new units.²⁷

The Marine experience proves that despite bad press surrounding use of the Guard Roundout brigades, reserve combat units can successfully fight as part of the combined arms team.²⁸ Marine combat companies and battalions successfully entered combat and defeated enemy forces in less than 71 days after mobilization. The tank companies and units of the 8th Marine Tank Battalion were

additionally required to reorganize at platoon level and transition from M60A1 tanks to modern M1A1 high-tech tanks. Reservists proved that they were flexible enough to master high-tech weapons systems and combined arms tactics during limited post-mobilization training time.

GUARD UNITS IN THE GULF WAR

When the decision was made to push the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait, US VII Corps and additional allied units were required to deploy to Southwest Asia. There were insufficient AC field artillery units to provide the level of support required by US Army doctrine. In addition British and French forces had inadequate corps level artillery support. The attempt to get additional artillery from NATO Allies failed. To provide the required artillery the AC had to turn to the Guard.²⁹

“ The use of National Guard artillery battalions was acceptable to the Army leadership because the units were to be used in a general support-reinforcing role rather than a direct support role. ... In effect the Army view was that the National Guard field artillery battalion and brigade staffs would be capable of performing the simpler tasks, but not the more demanding tasks.”³⁰

The 142nd Field Artillery (FA) Brigade (AR ARNG)³¹ and 196th FA Brigade (TN ARNG)³² were selected for the mission. The two brigades had very few similarities. The units of the 142nd had trained together for over five years. The 196th was a newly organized brigade. Only one of the 196th's three battalions was organic to its pre-mobilization organization.

The two brigades fought well and were accepted by the AC. COL Charles J. Linch, the ARNG commander of the 142nd FA Brigade during the Gulf War, reported that any Guard unit can be successfully deployed if:

1. The State leadership has established a no-nonsense military atmosphere to train in.

2. Unit leaders understand and believe they are training for mobilization and war.
 3. Quality personnel are recruited, retained and promoted.
 4. Training is adequately funded.
 5. Modern, compatible equipment is available for training and deployment, with special emphasis placed on Communication and automation equipment.
 6. The unit is given the opportunity to train in Combined Arms Exercises with the AC.
 7. Command , Control and Communications (C3) training must be realistic and effective. C3 is the true measure of deployability.
- “Anything less is planned non-use of Reserve Units.”³³

Prior to mobilization, the 142nd FA Brigade had completed a five year training strategy adjustment. After studying US Army training documents in 1984 it was apparent that strong battle staffs and fully functional tactical operations centers were required. It took three years of hard training to develop the battle staffs in the battalions. It took two additional years to become proficient at brigade operations. It was rediscovered that actual command and control of the 142nd's battalions was more difficult in the field than during a command post exercise. When called to active service the 142nd FA Brigade was trained to standard, had conducted realistic mobilization and deployment exercises, had tremendous support, and was ready as any “ under-equipped National Guard unit could be.”³⁴

The 196th FA Brigade proved that an "ad hoc" Guard brigade, without the benefit of the 142nd's support and resources, can also become an effective force under less than ideal circumstances. The 196th FA Brigade deployed to Fort Campbell with only one of its organic battalions. The remaining units came from Kentucky and West Virginia. It was a tremendous challenge to form this mixture of units into a team in less than thirty days. Unlike the 142nd FA Brigade, there were differences in training strategy, methods of operations and staff procedures to overcome. Communication among the four units of the brigade was hampered by a mixture of communication and fire control systems. Standardization of fire control and communication systems became a major effort during post mobilization training.³⁵

The Guard field artillery brigades did not receive simple missions in the Gulf War as envisioned by the AC senior leadership. Elements of both brigades participated in artillery raids. They provided artillery support to both the French and British Armies. When required, they provided reinforcing fires to US Army units. After the cease fire, elements of the brigades provided direct support to the screening force of the coalition.

There were some problems. AC filler personnel (bringing the units up to 102%) did not join the units until they were in the front line. Too many times the Guard units were informed by the AC "you are not authorized this item because you are "National Guard", or "under no circumstances will Regular Army soldiers be assigned to a National Guard unit." Communication and fire support equipment was not compatible with AC units. Ad hoc solutions were developed. The friction between AC and Guard personnel impeded the "One Army" effort. Once the two Guard brigades entered the line they

were not restricted to the “easy or simple” missions. While the One Army has a long way to go, the 142nd and 196th proved it can work.³⁶

The lessons gleaned from the Gulf War mobilization are summarized as:

1. Mobilization and training shortfalls are correctable if pre-mobilization and post-mobilization strategies are complementary and are implemented as a package.
2. A total commitment from AC and Guard leaders is required.
3. Pre-mobilization AC-Guard affiliation should be strengthened.
4. Commander and staff training needs to be improved and focused.
5. AC affiliated units should be charged with responsibility for pre - mobilization training standards.³⁷
6. Command, Control and Communication equipment needs to be improved to prevent training for “non use”.

CREATING A UNITED ARMY

“When the [Citizen Army Unit] command becomes vacant and there is no competent and eligible successor within the unit the vacancy should be filled by appointment . . . of a competent commander from the regular army . . .”³⁸

Mutual service is a major strength of the USMCR. The US Army's lack of mutual service opportunities is a major obstacle which hinders relations between the AC and Guard. The most effective method of team building is working together. AC officers have been authorized to be detailed to Guard divisions as Chiefs of Staff since 1916.³⁹ In addition, AC officers may serve in any other position in the Guard and accept Guard state commissions without prejudicing their rank or regular commission.⁴⁰ These statutes have been on the books for over 80 years but had not been unitized in peace time until 1996.

On October 4, 1996, at the request of the Adjutant General of Louisiana, LTC John R. Hennigan, USA, was assigned as the Battalion Commander of the 1-141st FA Battalion. (LA ARNG)⁴¹ There are specific prerequisites in this program. First the Adjutant General of a state must make a formal request for an AC officer to fill one of his Guard slots. The AC officer must be from the top of his year group and accept a state commission. Following the AC officer's tour, the slot must be occupied by a traditional Guard officer.⁴² There has been considerable opposition to this program from within the Guard. However, a number of states are considering participating in this program on a limited bases. Those supporting the program believe it will improve future relations between the AC and Guard.

The USMC I&I staff performs the same function as the AC Readiness Groups. The main difference is the Readiness Groups are outsiders looking in. They do not have responsibility for performance standards. If the Readiness Groups were incorporated into major Guard units or Guard regional training regiments, they would establish an appropriate training atmosphere. The advantage of detailing young, motivated AC company and junior field grade officers (and SNCOs) is that they are proficient in current Army doctrine and they would become familiar with Guard training plans and budget limitations. They would be uniquely situated to develop a "core skill" training strategy based upon the actual resources of the supported units. Under direct command of the State's Deputy Adjutant Army, Division or Brigade Commander, they would be responsible for developing a State-wide training strategy and be his eyes and ears to ensure it is being implemented. Upon their return to the AC these soldiers would bring a familiarity and appreciation for the Guard which would eventually manifest itself in improved relations between the AC and Guard. This program would reap great benefits and would not require additional funding. It simply realigns the command structure of units already in place.

Partnership training programs have been successful in the past. Two battalions, one AC armor and one Guard infantry, have jointly conducted at least one National Training Center rotation. The battalions not only cross attached companies, but personnel shortages in the AC unit were filled by Guard soldiers from a second Guard battalion.⁴³ Currently, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the opposing force at the National Training Center, has incorporated the 1st Battalion, 221st Armor Regiment (NV ARNG)

as one of its maneuver battalions. Guard and Active armored battalions store their tanks and armored personnel carriers at the various National Training Centers. With the support of the "Total Army's" senior leadership additional Partnership training programs can be initiated. This type of training could be expanded by exchanging staff officers, and intermixing company officers and SNCOs.

The above programs and recommendations require limited resources. They do require thinking outside the traditional "us vs. them" box. They require the AC to leave behind their "Neo-Uptonian" scorn for National Guard service or service under National Guard commanders. ⁴⁴ It requires the AC to accept responsibility for the One Army.

COMPLEMENTARY PRE- AND POST-MOBILIZATION

TRAINING PLANS

"We must develop a technique and method so simple and so brief that the citizen soldier of good common sense can readily grasp the idea."

General George C. Marshall⁴⁵

"[I]n a democratic republic the professional soldier can have no exclusive claim to the right of military command. The way must be kept open to our future Nathanael Greenes as well as to our future Sherman."

BG John McAuley Palmer⁴⁶

Planning for use of the Guard combat units requires the US Army to improve its training strategy for the Guard. Depending on the resourcing and mission, ARNG brigades and divisions can be validated ready for deployment within 30 to 90 training days.

If the US Army wants the combat units deployed within this time frame it must clearly define the certification and validation requirements prior to mobilization. Pre-mobilization training can then be focused toward the tasks required for certification and validation⁴⁷ and the Army Training Management System (ATMS) and the Mission Essential Task List process (METL) must be overhauled.

The Bold Shift training program trained seven former Roundout brigades between 1991 and 1994. It was discovered that Guard trainers were confused over which of the hundreds of mission-essential tasks they should emphasize.⁴⁸ The program required a higher standard for Guard units than their AC counter parts. A large number of the units trained on tasks that were not important for combat operations.⁴⁹ At the conclusion of the program it was recommended that Guard combat training should concentrate on three collective battle tasks: offensive operations, defensive operations and movement to contact. Considering Guard training time, this list has two tasks too many.

Army doctrine dictates that peace time training is to be focused on the requirements of a unit's wartime mission.⁵⁰ Infantry and armor battalions and brigades have only one mission in life. Their mission is to close with and destroy an enemy with fire, maneuver, and close combat. In simple terms these battalions must be able to shoot, move, and communicate. All other missions that they may be assigned utilize the skills that fall within this sole combat mission, whether it is peace-keeping, riot control, humanitarian relief or high intensity combat. The pre-mobilization training plan should focus the Guard combat formation on its sole mission in life. It should be a nation wide

training plan and it should focus on the "critical core skills" required on mobilization day for the post-mobilization training program and validation requirements.

The chief complaint of the Guard artillery and maneuver brigades mobilized for the Gulf War was the AC had failed to establish the certification and validation criterion prior to mobilization. This disconnect in the "One Army" training strategy was extremely important. The Guard field artillery brigades started deployment to Southwest Asia approximately 30 days after mobilization. They spent most of that training time revalidating tasks completed at Annual Training a few months before. To ensure that the pre- and post-mobilization training strategy is complementary requires coordination by the leadership of the AC and Guard. Only one attempt has been made to provide such a plan since the Gulf War. A Draft Enhanced Mounted Brigade Training Strategy was published by the US Armor Center in 1995. The Infantry Center published a similar plan for light brigades. These documents are comprehensive attempts to coordinate pre- and post-mobilization requirements. The AC has never issued these strategies to the field.

The primary objections of the AC to Guard Combat units focus on Guard commanders and their staffs. Each year the Guard attempts to train its commanders and staffs to acceptable levels in six weeks. If the AC requires Guard commanders and staffs equal to their AC counterparts before mobilization it must resource the training and define pre-mobilization requirements. A fully supported complementary training strategy would go a long way to remedy this problem.

Before and during World War II, General George C. Marshall believed that simplicity was the best counter to the complexity of battle. He insisted that units train to

standard on one simple task-- the holding attack. This tactic worked from platoon to division. As an officer progressed through the ranks he knew only one basic tactic, he simply made the attack on an ever increasing scale.⁵¹ This concept of critical core tasks has greater importance for Guard units than AC units due to limited training time. Like the "Holding Attack" of old the modern battle task of "Offensive Operations" contains all of the critical core tasks.⁵² A review of the battalion and brigade training matrixes dictates that even performing a hasty defense is found within the offensive battle tasks.

Command, Control and Communications training is the real measure of deployability. It does not matter how proficient a unit is at the core platoon battle skills, if they can not communicate with the rest of the Army. Focusing a command and staff training program on one set of synchronization problems would, over time, correct Guard commanders and staffs lack of understanding of Army Battle Doctrine, knowledge of basic combat tactics and experience in effectively planning, synchronization and execution of combat missions. This requires a complementary pre- and post-mobilization commander and staff training program. If Guard commanders and staffs have a complete understanding of Offensive Operations, and can synchronize combat power in its sub-tasks of Meeting Engagement, Assault, Hasty Defense and Consolidate and Reorganize, the problem will have been corrected. Defensive synchronization skills can be developed during post-mobilization training.

COMBAT MISSIONS

The Army must be prepared to engage in a wide range of conflict. It is projected that most of the Army's missions over the next twenty years will be peace-operations and low intensity conflict. Short term deployments, two to four weeks, are well within the capabilities of organic Guard battalions and brigades. Ad hoc battalions, as used in the Sinai Peace Keeping Operations, can be mobilized for up to a year. Limited mid-term deployments for detachments or ad hoc units can be sustained by assigning the missions to States in rotation. A heavy use of Guard units in routine peace-operations will undermine popular support for such programs as it takes citizen-soldiers from careers and families. Over reliance on ad hoc volunteer units will eventually undermine popular support.⁵³ Routine peace-operations for longer than two to four weeks should be given to AC units and the AC force structure should be adjusted accordingly. Guard units are more useful during a high intensity conflict because an easily identifiable national interest would be involved, thus popular support would be ensured. The missions at this end of the spectrum include front-line, rear area security, back-filling forward deployed units and support for other services and coalition forces.

For high intensity conflict the Army of the United States currently fields the equivalent of twenty -three divisions. Only ten of those division are AC. The remaining thirteen are Guard divisions. Only the ten AC divisions are utilized in the war plans. This force is far greater than needed to control the western hemisphere, yet insufficient to operate unsupported in the eastern hemisphere. Of its twenty-three divisions, the Army plans to commit only five AC divisions to a major regional conflict. It is fairly obvious

that any opponent the United States faces in the future will have numerical superiority.⁵⁴ The United States is only marginally capable of engaging in a major regional conflict with its AC ground combat force alone.

Use of Guard battalions, brigades and divisions as front line units is an issue of power projection as well as readiness. Sealift is required to project the American continental based heavy army. The AC's forward deployed divisions can not be moved to a major regional conflict outside their deployment area. Even with future pre-positioned brigade sets it will still be difficult if not impossible to deploy the American continental based heavy field army in less than seventy-five days.

Strategic movement involves transporting forces and supplies from the United States and other locations to the theater of operations. The Army Strategic Mobility Program establishes critical deployment times for one major regional conflict. The Army's lead brigade must be on the ground in four days. The first light division must be operational by the twelfth day. Two heavy divisions must be in place by the thirtieth day. A full five division corps must close by the seventy-fifth day.⁵⁵ The program assumes that the Naval services and Air Force will procure the required additional transport. These goals are major improvements over the performance during the Gulf War, where it took one and a half months to get the first heavy division into place. It took seven months to deploy a sustainable force capable of offensive operations.⁵⁶

Even if strategic mobility improves, the Army does not have five AC heavy divisions to shift into the first major regional conflict, let alone the second. The Army's Two Major Conflict Strategy assumes that all of its AC divisions will be available for

deployment. The strategy divides the AC into two field armies of five divisions. On paper (and in theory) the two field armies are supported by fifteen Guard E-brigades. In the event of one regional conflict only AC combat units will be deployed. There are two major flaws in this strategy. First, it assumes that five AC divisions will be sufficient. During the last major regional conflict, the coalition fielded fourteen heavy divisions (5 US Army and 2 US Marine) and two American light divisions.⁵⁷ The US Army no longer contains the combat force structure to refight this scale of regional conflict with the AC alone. A contemporary Gulf War, one major regional conflict, would consume the four deployable continental US based AC heavy divisions. The remaining two heavy divisions are required in Korea and Europe. Both locations require Guard combat units to back-fill AC units if they are redeployed. Second, AC light divisions require heavy reinforcing with armor and artillery battalions, to be a viable force in a major regional conflict. The heavy forces to perform this mission are no longer found within the AC force structure. Deploying the field army requires sealift. Even light divisions, which are air transportable, require sealift when logistical support and reinforcing heavy battalions are included.⁵⁸ Thus, deployment times between heavy and light forces become less pronounced. Pre-positioned equipment shortens the time required for heavy brigades reinforcing a light division defensive force. However, it is not financially feasible to pre-position the equipment and supplies of the continental US based heavy field army.

Within sixty days of a crisis the Army will require four Guard combat brigades or a division and one brigade. The brigade will be required to reinforce the light division deployed into theater. The division will be required to back-fill the AC division in Europe

or three brigades used to form an ad hoc division in theater. If the Guard brigades are going to be used to reinforce light divisions or form a combat division they do not need to be E-Separate brigades. Divisional brigades will be sufficient.

During the Gulf War, even the modern armies of Britain and France required reinforcing for high intensity combat. Britain and France required only artillery. The Arab coalition armor heavy forces were equipped with second-rate equipment but it was sufficient for the mission they were assigned. The US 2nd Marine Division needed additional armor and was reinforced with a AC armor brigade. In a future conflict the coalition forces may not be as well-equipped. The reinforcing of coalition or Marine forces is a mission that Guard combat brigades can perform. The use of Guard brigades will not reduce limited AC brigades from the field army's main striking force.

Guard heavy combat units are located near the 1st and 2nd Marine Division home bases in California and North Carolina. These Guard units could be given the mission of reinforcing Marine units and could train with them on a regular basis. Guard combat units with back-fill missions could be mobilized and deployed within 30 days. They would conclude their combat training in theater while performing their mission.

Back-filling Europe could be accomplished with two Guard divisions. They would be designated and trained in advance by restructuring a mission alignment program. These divisions would perform their post mobilization training in Europe.⁵⁹ This plan could supplement the Partnership for Peace Program already operating between some States and new European nations.

The 21st Century American method of war requires secure areas from which to launch precision strikes. These weapons are vulnerable to small low tech commando units. The British Special Service during World War II and the Vietnamese Communist Guerrillas during the Vietnam War demonstrated the effectiveness of small units against rear echelon air bases and supply centers. Rear area security is an overlooked mission. Guard brigades are natural formations for this mission.⁶⁰ Guard units have high unit cohesion at all echelons due to years of service together. They have organic fire support and mobility. As the 24th Marines demonstrated during the Gulf War, within 30 days of mobilization Guard units can be deployed into theater to perform the rear area security mission.

Guard combat units provide the most readily available and viable combat units reconstitution capability available at division, corps and theater army levels. One historical feature of the American method of war is once a division is committed to battle it is seldom withdrawn. As a result US divisions remain in the line much longer than allies or enemy units.⁶¹ One of the reasons for our limited casualty rate during Desert Storm was the Iraqi's incompetent leadership at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. Their tactical leaders' poor combat skills was as much responsible for the low Coalition casualties as US technology.⁶² Guard battalions and brigades are the only source of replacement combat units for relieving depleted AC combats without reducing the field army's offensive capability.

STEUBEN'S LEGIONS

In the Spring of 1783 Alexander Hamilton, Chairman of a Congressional Committee, made the following request to General Washington:

“The Committee wish your Excellency’s sentiments ... for the ... defense of these States as may be best adapted ... [to] the principles of our governments.”⁶³

Upon receipt of this letter, Washington requested that his generals submit their “sentiments” on the subject. The officers consulted were Generals Steuben, Knox, Huntington, Pickering, Heath, Hand and Rufus Putman. With one exception, they all agreed that a well-regulated militia, given uniform organization and effective training, would be sufficient for an effective national defense. They also agreed that a small regular army should be formed for other duties that could not be performed by citizen soldiers in time of peace.⁶⁴

General Steuben’s comments are of particular interest for the modern military establishment. It is remarkable that his plan anticipated the essential features that were embodied, independently, 136 years later in the National Defense Act of 1920. Steuben divided the nation into geographical departments similar to our five continental armies today. He proposed a “organized militia” similar in essentials to our modern Guard. This force was composed of volunteers from the unorganized militia who enlisted for three years and received 30 days training each year. The force was organized into small combined arms divisions, each numbering 1,000 men, called legions. He proposed military schools in each geographical area, to train leaders for this citizen, army which correspond to the Reserve Officer Training Course, found on many colleges campuses

today. Steuben also proposed a small regular army for missions that could not be performed by citizen soldiers in time of peace. The "Organized Militia Legions" were to be the war fighting force of the New Republic. The regular Army handled the Indian wars and other duties which today we have entitled low intensity conflict or peace operations.⁶⁵ In Steuben's and Washington's system there was still a non-federally connected State Militia. This Militia was left to defend the geographic region when the legions were mobilized for an offensive campaign.

After the demise of the CAPSTONE and Roundout programs, the E-brigade program was initiated to fill the void. Unlike the earlier programs, the E-brigade program does not encourage integration of the AC and Guard. Many E-brigades are located in rural agricultural states with low population densities. This allotment is politically motivated. It is clearly not based upon a State's educational opportunities, population or available training areas. Unlike Steuben's plan, which had the potential to mobilize a percentage of each geographic region, the current E-brigade placement finds the majority of these units (9 of 15) in the South or the low population regions like the Pacific Northwest (3 of 15). In time of peace this political allotment may seem sound. However, in time of conflict it could lead to disaster. In many States the E-brigades contain most or all of their Guard units. These states are disaster prone and depend on the Guard for emergency support. The current E-brigade allotment leave many States defenseless against annual natural disasters.

If Steuben's plan was implemented, each State would contribute one third of its units to the Enhanced Program. Single brigade States would provide combined arms

battalions. Divisional States would provide brigade combat teams. On mobilization all units could be cross-leveled, within their State, to ensure that they comprised 100% qualified personnel and equipment. When the "E" units left the States, there would still be Guard units left for home defense and training of follow on forces. This plan would provide a force of thirteen to fifteen brigades combat teams for expeditionary service.

A viable alternative to E-brigades is found in the training strategy of the Institute for Defense Analysis' study entitled Reserve Component Roles, Mix and Employment.⁶⁶ This study outlines a three year training program for Guard brigades. The strategy argues that one third of the Guard's forty combat brigades could be validated and deployed within sixty days of mobilization. It does not single out fifteen E-brigades for long term extended readiness. Instead it takes advantage of the full forty brigade Guard force. Thirteen brigades could be deployed within sixty days of mobilization. Each year a different thirteen brigades would have the mission. The burden of individual Guard soldiers, their families and their employers would be reduced. The heightened training requirements, extended training periods and resources of "E" status would be shared by the entire force. The mission assigned to the brigade would depend on its weapons.

A third solution would be to assign half of the E-brigades to Guard divisions. There is no need for fifteen Separate E-Brigades if they are going to reinforce light, Marine or coalition divisions. Divisional E-brigades have major advantages over single state or regional E-brigades. First, on mobilization day a divisional brigade would be brought up to 100% strength and staffed with fully qualified personnel by cross-leveling soldiers within the division. Second, due to the higher operational requirements it will be

difficult to keep rural E-brigades up to strength. Under this proposal a division with an E-brigade can treat E-brigade service as a hardship tour. Proper placement of E-companies and battalions would insure "E" service opportunities for all divisional soldiers. Third, two Guard divisions (40th and 49th) presently train and have their equipment staged at the National Training Center and Fort Hood. These units could mobilize faster than current E-brigades because they already have equipment at these training areas. When mobilized, these brigades could load their war fighting equipment on ships for deployment and conduct post-mobilization training on another brigade's equipment. When their equipment reaches the theater the personnel can fly in and take delivery at the port of entry.⁶⁷

CONCLUSIONS

During the Cold War the defense of the United States required posting large regular ground forces overseas. The Post-Cold War period has required global interventionism to protect America's diverse interests. In order to succeed under these conditions the Army must fully and effectively utilize all of its assets. The Army Strategic Policy neglects to recognize the potential of its National Guard component and thus fails to utilize 60% of America's ground combat forces. This Fellowship Research Project has suggested methods to improve relations between the Army National Guard and the Regular Army in order to form the "One Army" Team.

Any force created must be based upon the national interests of the United States and be able to engage successfully in the full spectrum of conflict. To serve the Nation to its full potential, the US Army must set its house in order. "An Army divided against itself is intolerable." As long as the AC refuses to fully utilize the Guard the Army will never achieve its full potential.

The bias against the use of Guard combat units is unreasonable. The bias is based upon out dated perceptions of Guard soldiers. Since few AC soldiers have served with the Guard the bias is based upon institutional perceptions not personal experience. Creating a "United" or "One Army" requires mutual service. The AC can not be allowed to disavow responsibility for the readiness of 60% of the US Army's combat units. The success of the Marine program is founded on the regular personnel integrated in training support, administrative and logistical services. The law creating the modern Guard envisioned this type of mutual service to create "One Army." The "One Army Team" must be formed. It

will require a total commitment from both the AC and Guard leadership. The only issue that remains is whether we have the character to accomplish the task.

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