U.S. Involvement in Vietnam, 1964-1968.
Abstract
The Vietnam War is unique in the evolution of United States National Strategy following World War II. The Strategy of Containment of Communism and the concept eventually known as the Domino Theory governed United States National Policy in Vietnam. The United States had to resist communist expansion in the world because this expansion had as its ultimate expression the destruction of freedom loving democracies world wide. This paper will examine the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1964-1968, particularly the evolution of national policy and objectives. The paper will also identify and analyze the major concepts and principles guiding U.S. policy in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968. It will begin with the period immediately before President Johnson 5 decision to increase U. S. military involvement in the war in 1965. The paper will end with Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam following the February 1968 Tet offensive. Linkage to the containment strategy largely dominated the initial decisions to escalate the war. Bureaucratic politics and counterbalancing national objectives influenced continued involvement through March 1968. Finally, the paper demonstrates that the Johnson Administration could not discard the original containment paradigm in Vietnam. The cost for this unchanging policy was the administration's end.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA328717
Entities
People
- Ray T. Garza
Organizations
- Air War College