




TRILATERAL NAVAL COOPERATION: JAPAN US KOREA

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The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) was founded in 1979 as an organization affiliated with the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) to provide the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) with policy alternatives. Following a steady expansion of the capacity and scope of its contributions to national defense policy, the institute separated from the ADD and became an autonomous, non-profit research organization, fully sponsored by the government, in March 1987. The institute is devoted to research on the strategic environment, security policy, national defense strategy, force development, defense economy, weapon system acquisition policy, defense automation, and arms control. KIDA's involvement in this workshop was under the auspices of the Force Development Division of KIDA, directed by Dr. Eun-Sang Won. The KIDA project director was Captain Kye-Ryong Rhoe, then director of KIDA's Military Strategy Directorate.

THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES

The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) was first founded in Japan as the National Safety College on 1 August 1952 by the National Safety Agency Establishment Act and then renamed the National Defense College as the Defense Agency Establishment Act came into effect on 1 July 1954. Since then, the College, the highest institution for research and education of strategy in the Defense Agency, has greatly contributed to Japan's effort of maintaining national security. The National Institute for Defense Studies has three missions: basic research and study on the management and control of the three Self-Defense Forces; training and education of selected senior officials of the Self-Defense Forces and of governmental officials who have the opportunity to study problems of national defense; and research and study on military history. The NIDS project director was Professor Hideshi Takesada, assisted by Associate Professor Tomoyuki Ishizu.

THE CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is a private, non-profit, federally funded research and development center that performs independent analyses for the U.S. Department of the Navy. CNA's participation in this workshop was supported by the Regional Issues Team, directed by Jerome Kahan; the team is a component of the Policy, Strategy, and Forces Division. The CNA project director for the conference was Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld, senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses. CNA is part of The CNA Corporation, which also includes the Institute for Public Research.

TRILATERAL NAVAL COOPERATION: JAPAN-US-KOREA

A Workshop Report

Jointly Sponsored by:

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

KOREA INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES

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FOREWORD


In February 1997, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of Japan, and the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) of the United States held a workshop in Tokyo to consider the prospects for future trilateral naval cooperation among the three countries. KIDA and CNA had met earlier, in October 1994 and December 1995, to discuss prospects for bilateral naval cooperation between the ROK and the United States between now and 2010. Specialists in naval affairs and Asian defense issues were invited to present papers at the Tokyo meeting. The workshop was also well attended by naval representatives from all three countries. Although discussions were not for attribution, papers presented at the conference are available from KIDA, NIDS, and CNA.

Participants in the Tokyo workshop examined the security environment, likely naval missions for all three navies, and specific areas of likely (and desirable) cooperation for the three navies in the time frame between now and 2010. In the course of the exchanges that followed the presentations, participants discussed the likely future U.S., Japanese, and Korean force structures and strategies, and the potential contributions that multilateral security frameworks can make to naval relationships.

The sponsoring institutions gratefully acknowledge the valuable support provided by the NIDS, KIDA, and CNA staffs in preparing for the conference in Tokyo, and in writing this report. They extend special thanks to representatives of the three countries' navies, many of whom traveled long distances to attend this workshop at NIDS.

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In light of the evolving security environment in Northeast Asia and potential changes that may occur over the next decade, the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of Japan, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), and the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) of the United States held a workshop in Tokyo, Japan, from 13 to 14 February 1997, to examine the prospects for Korea-Japan-United States naval cooperation between now and 2010. The purposes of the workshop were to identify factors in the Asia-Pacific security environment that would affect the cooperative relationship, including roads to Korean unification; identify possible roles and missions for the Korean, Japanese, and American navies; explore current and future trilateral naval relations between the three countries; and examine the role of multilateral organizations and cooperation in shaping U.S.-Japan-Korea naval cooperation.

Twelve papers (four from each participating institute) were presented on these topics. They were followed by commentary and discussion. The presentations stimulated candid expression of views and highlighted the differences and similarities of outlook among participants. Appendices A through C contain lists of participants and observers.

OVERVIEW

The conference began with an examination of security trends in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) over the next 15 years. Issues examined included projections of the security environment of the APR in 2010; Chinese attitudes toward Korean unification and closer U.S.-Japan-Korea naval relations; alternative pathways toward Korean unification, and their potential impact on Asian security; defense relationships between Korea, Japan, and the United States, and how China fits in; and whether Korean unification implies changes in naval force structure for Korea or Japan.

Workshop discussion then turned to missions of the three navies after Korean unification. Key subjects included future roles and missions of the Japan

Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Unified Korean Navy; the continued importance of U.S. forward presence in East Asia as a mission for the U.S. Navy; U.S.-Japanese naval relations, and the maritime missions these imply for the JMSDF; the effects of domestic politics on Korean and Japanese maritime missions; emerging areas of operations other than war (OOTW), peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations; and the importance of surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance for future maritime missions.

Discussion of opportunities for trilateral naval cooperation focused on the preliminary and limited extent of Japan-ROK naval cooperation to date; the role of the U.S. Navy as the bridge for facilitating cooperation between the JMSDF and the ROKN; the implications of trilateralism for the solid bilateral naval relationship Japan and Korea now enjoy with the United States; the effects of such trilateral cooperation on China; the nature of broader bilateral security relations between the United States and its Japanese and Korean allies; and the importance of building transparency and confidence through trilateral naval cooperation.

Finally, the workshop turned to prospects for multilateral security initiatives and their possible influence on trilateral naval cooperation. Participants considered a number of models, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to examine whether existing multilateral frameworks can advance naval cooperation. They also discussed whether and how to involve China and Russia in security and naval cooperation arrangements with the United States, Japan, and a unified Korea.

MAJOR THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS

Most participants agreed that trilateral naval cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Korea was desirable and necessary, for reasons ranging from declining defense budgets in the face of continued security challenges, to the unique contributions that naval interactions can make in generating

confidence and stability. Nevertheless, most participants believed that trilateral naval cooperation had to be pursued carefully, to avoid giving China major concerns about being the object of a “containment” strategy.

There was general agreement on several key propositions. Bilateral defense relationships between the United States and its allies—Japan and the Republic of Korea—were seen as the foundations of future trilateral and multilateral security cooperation. How Korea unifies—the timing, whether it has a hard or soft landing, and what major powers are involved—will shape the nature of future trilateral naval cooperation. Transparency and information sharing are starting points for trilateral cooperation, which can proceed at the right time to training and exercises, enforcement of Law of the Sea provisions, humanitarian operations, environmental protection, anti-narcotics operations, and prevention of illegal immigration. Eventually, more traditional forms of naval military activities could be envisioned.

Korean and Japanese participants concluded that the existing force structure of their navies need not be changed radically (even with a unified Korea), but should be reshaped to address a wide range of contingencies including OOTW and other multinational maritime missions. Participants also noted that the history of Japan-Korea relations, and constitutional issues in Japan, continue to be factors inhibiting trilateral cooperation.

Divergent views emerged as well over the two workshop days. Japanese participants speculated that a unified Korea would be likely to lean toward the People’s Republic of China, or even develop an alliance with that country—an idea that Korean participants denied. There was some disagreement between Asian and U.S. participants over the staying power of U.S. military presence in Asia. Some advanced the view that U.S. withdrawal was likely, and that the consequent power vacuum would be filled by either Japan or China. No consensus was reached on whether China saw its interests served by a relatively smooth unification of the Korean Peninsula, or whether China viewed a smooth unification of the peninsula as the loss of a buffer state more or less influenced by Beijing.

Some participants argued that freedom of navigation and the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) remain important maritime missions for the navies of Asia. Others argued that most, if not all, Asian nations have an interest in keeping SLOCs open, and that it therefore is less important that Asian navies prepare for SLOC protection as a maritime mission. There was some disagreement over how useful multilateral fora were for resolution of significant security disputes. Skeptics pointed to alternative bilateral mechanisms that exist for this purpose. Finally, there was some disagreement over the pace and direction of Korean unification.

OTHER THEMES

There was general agreement that navies can take the lead in strengthening defense relations of the three countries. Although the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea “legs” of the trilateral relationship are strong, the Japan-Korea leg is weak, and naval cooperation between the two can help. U.S. naval presence enables the United States to be a “bridge” in facilitating this cooperation.

Korean participants were surprised at the apparent absence of articulated U.S. plans or policies with respect to a unified Korea, an absence that in Korean minds represented a sharp contrast with recent formulations expanding the post-Cold War security relationship between the United States and Japan. At the same time, Korean participants acknowledged that the ROK needs to accelerate planning for the post-unification era. Japanese participants also expressed interest in U.S. security policies and objectives vis-a-vis a unified Korea.

Korean participants expressed concern that U.S.-Japan defense planning under new guidelines reportedly included planning for a Japanese role in a Korean contingency, without reference to or participation from the Republic of Korea. Other participants said the issue would be discussed among the three governments.

Differences of emphasis emerged over how to take China’s reactions into account in shaping trilateral cooperation. Korean participants were relatively

optimistic about China's emerging role, and expressed concern about the need to avoid provoking negative Chinese reactions. Some Japanese participants expressed the view that China would build up its forces whatever we do, and that we should not be overly concerned with its short-term reactions. U.S. participants noted that China would probably not take an aggressive, expansionist stance toward its neighbors unless it perceived that they were allying against it.

THE ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 2010

CHINA AND KOREAN UNIFICATION

How workshop participants envisaged the future security environment in Northeast Asia depended in part on how they perceived Chinese interests in Korean unification. One American participant argued the following points: (1) The Chinese have an interest in avoiding a hard landing on the Korean Peninsula. (2) The Chinese want to see a unification process that brings North and South together slowly. This preference, the American participant said, could militate in favor of the continued existence of an autonomous regime in Pyongyang. (3) China can live with a unified Korea because this avoids destabilizing Northeast Asia. (4) China sees itself as needing several decades—perhaps to 2015—to develop enough power to deal with major conflicts. (5) If there is a hard-landing scenario, the Chinese hope that whatever South Korea does, it will not surprise them. Otherwise, China is not an expansionist, aggressive state, but one whose interests can be accommodated. China therefore need not be seen as a destabilizing factor in security in Asia; nor should the process of Korean unification necessarily lead to disputes between China and the United States, a unifying Korea, and Japan.

A Korean participant had a different perspective. He pointed to China's interest in continuation of some form of "buffer" state between Chinese borders and those of the Western powers and their allies. China would therefore look with some alarm at a unified Korean state aligned with the

United States right at its border. This suggested that China would seek to obstruct a “soft landing” on the Korean Peninsula. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, therefore, need to watch China as a potential destabilizing factor in bringing about a peaceful unification, the Korean participant said.

Other participants added that China’s role as a permanent UN Security Council member might nullify effective UN efforts toward Korean unification unless China’s views were taken into account.

The future security environment will also depend on how China perceives trilateral relations between Korea, Japan, and the United States. It could feel threatened and behave in a hostile manner toward the three powers, or it might be enticed to cooperate with them. One American participant noted that while there is little concern that China is an expansionist power, there are many actions short of expansion that China could take that would concern Asian defense planners. He noted a distinction between being expansionist and being aggressive. China has shown itself to be both opportunistic and aggressive. The Chinese try something militarily in the region, fail at it, then come back and try again. For example, the Chinese first started sending ships to the Spratlys in the 1970s; now they have virtual sovereignty over many of those islets.

One participant posited that if the U.S. military withdrew from the APR, it was conceivable that a unified Korea, surrounded by powerful Asian neighbors, might align itself or even ally itself with China against Japan. Others thought this was highly unlikely, but possible because of past relations between Japan and Korea. Still other workshop participants noted that although formal alliance relationships between Korea and China are not very likely, a unified Korea and China might sign an agreement on non-use of force. Most conference participants agreed, however, that the United States was likely to remain forward-deployed even after unification, and thus, that the most likely defense arrangement between a unified Korea and another major power would be continuation of the U.S.-Korea security relationship.

Japanese participants noted that the single most important guarantor of Asian security over the next few decades would be a strong U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. As long as the United States has an alliance with Japan that allows U.S. forces to stay there, a wide range of possible security problems (e.g., Asian arms races, Asian nuclear acquisition) would not arise. Most participants thought the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty would continue into the next century. One noted that it would not be inconsistent for Japan, like Korea (above), to sign a non-use of force agreement with China. Such agreements would not be inconsistent with a close security relationship with the United States.

Russia

Conference participants agreed that Russia would not be a major player in the APR for some time because Russia would be internally focused. Russia would place European and Central Asian concerns over the Asia-Pacific region, and its economy is likely to remain crippled for years. At the same time, Russia is a nuclear power, its military forces may eventually grow, and under nationalist leadership it would be dangerous to contend with. This suggests that it is important to keep Russia engaged in security dialogues, and to involve it in issues that affect Northeast Asian security. In short, it is important not to isolate Russia, even though limits on its economic and military power imply that it will not become a security concern or take major security initiatives in this region for some time.

Complicating Factors

Workshop participants also noted a number of possible complications in the regional security outlook. Some Korean participants voiced their concern that U.S. forces would totally withdraw from the region, and believed that such a move would reflect a U.S. decision to leave management of Asian security to Japan. Such a development would upset a number of APR nations, including Korea. One Japanese participant noted that from Beijing's perspective, this possibility would be even more unsettling if the United States

and Japan cooperated on technological projects such as theater missile defense (TMD). Korean participants cited Taiwan and human rights as additional complicating factors. It would be more difficult for China to participate in multilateral security fora or simply accept U.S.-Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation so long as the Taiwan issue remains unresolved and human rights disputes continue to rankle.

An American participant noted a fundamental restructuring of military power relationships over a long period. In earlier times, the United States was the strongest military power, along with the nations of Europe. Today, the European powers are declining in terms of military power. Thus, the United States would find it difficult to put together an equally effective coalition with the same allies as that formed for Operation Desert Storm. Therefore, future innovations in warfare are more likely to emerge from, or be applied to, situations in Asia. The revolution in military affairs, the arsenal ship, and information warfare are all the more relevant to operations in Asia than to Europe.

Another American participant mentioned that perception tends to lag reality. Change takes place, but national perceptions lag behind. Slow change is easy to ignore for a few years. Policy makers can always address its consequences later. Defense planners tend to take strategic snapshots without noting the significance of changes between the times those snapshots are taken. Over the last 20 years, for example, North Korea has changed dramatically from being a diverse ground force to emphasizing armor, to fielding a missile force. North Korea also progressed from a local force to a regional force (that can harm Japan). This process of lagging perception suggests that we move away from consideration of military strategies and focus more on the institutions that support them. It takes a long time to build ships, and longer to organize the institutions that authorize, build, operate, and support them. In assessing what the security environment will be like in 2010, it is becoming more important to look at institutions supporting forces than at the forces themselves.

KOREAN UNIFICATION PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES

Finally, the most significant shorter-term factor influencing security in Northeast Asia is the path to Korean unification. One Korean participant noted three scenarios for the next 10 to 15 years: (1) the status quo, (2) a "hard landing," and (3) a "soft landing." In the first scenario, North Korea somehow manages to survive and continues to play South Korea off against the United States. In the second scenario, food shortage, power struggles, and other internal problems lead to the North Koreans either lashing out across the Demilitarized Zone or "inviting" South Korea up north to re-establish authority as the North Korean polity collapses. The last scenario has North Korea adhering to the Framework Agreement of 1994, a reduction of conventional forces along the DMZ, and the eventual creation of a South-North Korean commonwealth.

How unification happens is important for determining the security environment of Asia, because of the spill-over effects of the different paths. If there is a "hard landing" or unification is achieved through conflict or prolonged violence, one participant noted, it will be difficult for the unified Korean state to substantially reduce the size of its military.¹ If there is a "soft landing," it is likely that the Korean armed forces will be reduced. However, even if there is a "soft landing," a unified Korea will have to endure tremendous "unification fatigue." After 40 years of separation and confrontation, North and South Korea will need at least 10 years to educate citizens into a new way of life, develop a new social identity, and restructure the economy to accommodate unification. There is even the possibility of a North Korean government in exile, located someplace such as Cuba or Cambodia, after the collapse of the North Korean state. The existence of such a government might allow China to play the Korean governments off against one another in its own interest.

¹ The participant did not clarify why this would be the case. We presume he might mean that extended conflict on the Korean Peninsula leading to unification would risk drawing major powers in Northeast Asia into the conflict on different sides. Under such unstable conditions, the Korean military might have difficulty reducing its size.

A Japanese presenter focused on the specific potential paths to Korean unification. He believed that whether the peninsula unifies peacefully or violently can be traced to factors now observable in North Korea. These factors include the health of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, the degree of factionalism in North Korea, the severity of the North Korean food shortage, the orientation of North Korean conventional forces (e.g., regime survival or offensive power for unification), and the extent of North Korean compliance with the Agreed Framework. These factors need to be carefully examined before any intelligent judgment can be made about which path Korean unification will take.

MARITIME MISSIONS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION

THE JAPANESE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

One Korean participant noted that as the regional security environment changed with the ending of the Cold War, Japan took steps to enhance its international status in conformity with its position as the world's second economic power. At home, Japan has readjusted its force structure away from defense against the Soviet threat to cope with a broader range of threats and contingencies, including UN peacekeeping operations. Japan, he said, is likely to increase its own defense capability over the foreseeable future. He predicted that Japan will concentrate on the U.S.-Japan security alliance along with its own defense capabilities. Geographically, Japan's defense orientation has shifted from the north to an omnidirectional emphasis. Japan will therefore seek greater operational flexibility, he added.

The same participant noted that according to Japan's defense strategy, its adjacent seas are divided into two areas of tactical depth. One has a radius of some 200 n.mi., defended by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) from Japanese territory. The other, defended by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), has a radius of some 1,000 n.mi. from the coast. The JMSDF's main missions remain anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures. The JMSDF relies on its considerable surveillance capability

to protect its sea lanes and to operate with the U.S. Navy. These JMSDF missions will continue even if the Korean Peninsula is unified. However, after unification the roles and functions of the JMSDF will become more varied and flexible. This means that the JMSDF's missions will grow, and the JMSDF may become more autonomous in its operations. Another Korean participant noted that if the U.S. Navy withdraws its forward presence or reduces that presence to a token size, Japan may build up its military force, including its maritime forces.

A Japanese presenter argued the following points: the number of conflicts over sovereignty and territorial issues will grow; the U.S. commitment to the region will continue; as long as Japan remains an ally of the United States, Japan need not increase its military capabilities or expand its forces; and future missions of the JMSDF will require interoperability with other navies—particularly the U.S. Navy. Thus, he argued, Japan will have the following six categories of roles and missions: (1) homeland defense; (2) protection of sea lanes within 1,000 n.mi.; (3) non-combatant humanitarian activities abroad; (4) rear-area operations abroad; (5) protection of sea lanes beyond 1,000 n.mi.; and (6) peace-enforcement operations abroad.

HOMELAND DEFENSE, HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES, REAR-AREA OPERATIONS, AND SLOC PROTECTION

The presenter said that homeland defense includes resistance to aggressors, air defense, defense of territorial waters around Japan, and the deployment of TMD. He added that the mission of protecting sea lanes within 1,000 n.mi. of Japanese territory had been in place since 1981, when Prime Minister Suzuki pledged the JSDF to perform this mission. Since then, the Japanese defense forces have built up a significant capability to carry out this mission, particularly in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and air defense. As for non-combatant humanitarian activities, Japan in 1992 enacted legislation that authorized limited participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) under UN auspices. Since then, Japanese participation in PKO has become more accepted by the Japanese public. Japanese peacekeepers have deployed to

Cambodia, Africa, and the Middle East. Although Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been modest, Japanese personnel have participated in non-combatant evacuation and disaster relief operations; and the Japanese government has shown a willingness to play a meaningful role in missions abroad outside East Asia.

With respect to rear-area operations abroad, the presenter said, Japan's wealth and constitutional limitations on involvement in direct combat suggest that Japan could be expected to provide significant logistic support to the United States and could be asked to conduct minesweeping operations in international waters or even inside the territorial waters of another state. He doubted the availability of *timely* support for any U.S. action abroad unless Japan lifts the "self-imposed" constitutional interpretation that prohibits it from exercising the right of collective defense.

The presenter added that Japan's heavy dependence on imports of energy and other strategic commodities implies a need for Japan to protect its sea lanes *beyond* the current limit of 1,000 n.mi. He justified this large circumscription by Japan's dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which moves through the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. Thus, the waters in and around the Persian Gulf are vital to Japan. Japan has no direct stakes in territorial disputes in the South China Sea, but has considerable interest in ensuring free passage of shipping through that area. Therefore, it is in Japan's interest to conduct surveillance of this region. Finally, the Gulf War brought about one of the severest strains on the U.S.-Japan alliance. In spite of contributing \$13 billion to the coalition, Japan was severely criticized for failing to send any forces to a region on which so much of its well-being and prosperity depends. The current JSDF force structure remains insufficient to carry out the new defense role of SLOC protection beyond 1,000 n.mi. without American assistance.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Finally, the presenter suggested that Japan should take part in "peace enforcement operations" abroad. "Peace enforcement," he said, involves not

only UN-organized peacekeeping operations, which Japan has participated in, but also events such as the U.S. response to Chinese missile firings around Taiwan. It was unfortunate that political constraints on Japan prevented it from demonstrating its willingness to act as an “ordinary nation” sharing America’s burden by sending JMSDF assets to escort USS *Independence* to and in the waters around Taiwan. By doing so, Japan could have sent a clear message to all nations that it is committed to preventing a regional hegemon from emerging and to ensuring freedom of Pacific sea lanes.

OTHER MISSIONS

Some Japanese participants noted that specific future MSDF missions could be derived from these broad JSDF missions². These were: coastal defense in adjacent waters, mine warfare, surveillance, TMD, sealift, and logistic support. In addition, one participant suggested that Japan should provide a supply ship (AOE) from the JMSDF to support American carrier battle groups homeported in Yokosuka, and minesweepers to fill the void in U.S. naval capabilities throughout the Seventh Fleet AOR, including the Indian Ocean. Such a combination of U.S. and Japanese assets would show Japanese willingness to support peace and stability in a meaningful way. This might also prove acceptable to the Japanese public, because a supply ship is by definition a naval support vessel rather than a combatant.

A Japanese participant suggested that the United States and Japan should start bilateral discussions on the desirability of U.S.-Japan combined operations involving the front-line units of the JMSDF to promote deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region³ and, if necessary, to conduct peace enforcement operations in times of crisis. This participant also suggested overseas deployments of Japanese destroyers and P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. He acknowledged that such deployments are more controversial than those of

² Which we noted earlier as homeland defense; protection of sea lanes within 1,000 n.mi.; non-combatant humanitarian activities abroad; rear-area operations abroad; protection of sea lanes beyond 1,000 n.mi.; and peace enforcement operations abroad.

³ Against whom, the Japanese participant did not specify.

supply vessels and minesweepers. Nevertheless, he claimed that these are still defensive naval capabilities rather than power-projection assets. He added TMD inter-operability with U.S. forces to this category of combined operations.

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

When questioned on the acceptability of TMD integration into the JMSDF, the same Japanese participant noted that if the United States supports the idea, and there is support from the Japanese Diet,⁴ then it would be possible to incorporate theater missile defense into operating Japanese units. As to whether China would find Japan's possession of TMD acceptable, another Japanese participant noted that TMD should be acceptable to everyone in the region because it is a defensive weapon, aimed at no one "except for those trying to get into one's house." An American participant thought Japanese acquisition of TMD might inspire China to increase the number of its offensive missiles. The Japanese participant accepted the view that China would have a strongly negative reaction to a JMSDF supply ship and Japanese logistics support for the U.S. Seventh Fleet during a Taiwan crisis. He noted, however, that beyond a strong Chinese outburst, China is not in a position to do anything about such a "positive" development. Some of the conference participants pointed out that the current inability of the Chinese to "do anything" about U.S.-Japan joint operations might lead them to develop the ability to "do something" about their helplessness. The Japanese presenter responded by saying that China is set on developing its naval capabilities regardless of what the other countries of the region do.

FUTURE JMSDF SURFACE FORCES

Japanese participants commented that with the end of the Cold War, and with the socialists exerting significant influence in Japanese politics, there is political pressure to reduce the number of ships and aircraft in the JMSDF.

⁴ Clifford Krauss, "Japan Hesitant About U.S. Anti-Missile Project" in *The New York Times*, February 15, 1997, Final Editorial, Col. 1, p. 3.

For example, one participant noted that the 100 P-3Cs in Japan's inventory are to be reduced to 80. The 60 surface combatants in Japan's inventory are to be reduced to 54 or 55.

When asked how either the current inventory of JMSDF ships or an even smaller future force could perform the six missions the paper has mentioned, a Japanese participant said that numbers are less important than the niche capabilities and core competencies. For example, mine warfare will grow in importance. The JMSDF should play a greater role in dealing with the proliferation of sophisticated Russian mines. Shallow-water ASW is another area in which the Japanese could bring comparative advantage to a Western coalition.

A U.S. participant queried whether the proposed Japanese participation in missions out of area would be under UN auspices. The previous presentation had mentioned Japan providing logistics and supply support to the Seventh Fleet for another Taiwan contingency—a mission in support of a U.S., not UN, operation. The Japanese presenter answered that Desert Storm was the model he had in mind. JSDF participation would proceed gradually and preferably in response to a UN resolution. Ideally, the presenter pointed out, the JMSDF should be able to support the Seventh Fleet over Taiwan, but Japan's political constraints would slow Japan's involvement until it was too late to participate in the operation in any meaningful way.

THE KOREAN NAVY AFTER UNIFICATION

A Korean participant noted that the missions of the ROK Navy have been influenced by specific historic situations and by the strategic environment. Its mission, therefore, will change when Korea is unified. He predicted the following trends: (1) The U.S. military will take reductions, commensurate with the requirements of a new global security environment. (2) The level of American ground forces deployed in the region, especially on a unified Korean Peninsula, will probably be reduced to a token size. (3) The U.S. Navy may substitute for the departed ground force presence in a unified Korea. (4) Korean naval operations will be focused on the littorals, in particular

ASW in shallow-water, mine warfare, and support operations for ground forces. (5) Sea control will remain a core mission of the U.S. Navy, although its diminished size will reduce its ability to perform this mission. (6) The United States will see protecting the sea lanes and maintaining access to energy resources as a vital mission.

The same participant noted that future unified Korean navy's missions will be influenced decisively by future U.S. security strategy in the APR, and the strategic environment around the peninsula. Were the United States unable to play the role of balancer and moderator, there would be a rapid and destabilizing arms race among the major powers in this region, especially between China and Japan. In this case, a unified Korea would have to protect itself, and, consequently, the unified Korean navy's missions and roles would grow.

Another determining factor, the Korean participant said, is whether a multinational security cooperative regime and confidence-building measures (CBMs) can be introduced and established. If a security regime is created for the Asia-Pacific region and CBMs are introduced, the missions of the unified Korean navy will focus on regional maritime security cooperation within this structure. At a minimum, that would imply an increased size for a unified Korean navy, over the present ROKN. A unified Korea's national economic capability and its future military technology development will also influence Korea's defense posture and force structure, and the unified Korean navy's capability to cooperate with the USN, the JMSDF, and other navies in the region.

The same Korean participant noted that most of the ROK Navy's ships are small craft; thus, its operational capability in the open ocean is limited. The ROKN can do coastal defense and limited "green-water" operations in cooperation with the U.S. Seventh Fleet. A unified Korean navy will have to improve its "green-water" and open-ocean operational capabilities to cooperate in naval missions with allies or other nations abroad. The unified Korean navy would not only have to improve its weapon systems and increase the

size of its platforms; it would also have to improve its inter-operability, especially in C4I, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In addition, the ROKN needs mobile resupply capability to increase sustainability. It has only one UNREP-capable ship.

Participants noted that after Korea overcomes the chaos of the unification process, there will be opportunities to participate in UN peacekeeping, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. In particular, the participants said, the unified Korean navy could transport peacekeeping forces, provide logistic support to deployed ground units, help with refugee evacuation, take part in emergency evacuation of Korean nationals, and participate in minesweeping operations.

NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

An American participant said that power projection remains an important mission for American military forces. The U.S. Navy has three ways to project power: the aircraft carrier, by launching aircraft for airstrikes; the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM); and amphibious forces. These three forms will remain important for some time, but it has become increasingly difficult for the United States to perform this power-projection mission alone. This is partly because ship and force structure development is moving toward fewer platforms and lower staffing, in response to advances in technology and a decline in resources. To give an example from amphibious warfare, the former LST class of amphibious ships absorbed 13,000 personnel whereas only 5,200 personnel are needed to operate all the LPD ships.

The same participant said that beyond the missions of forward presence, crisis response, protection of sea lanes, assurance of freedom of navigation, and assurance of access to energy commodities, two areas of growing importance for the U.S. military are OOTW and peacekeeping missions. A portion of the U.S. defense budget should be dedicated to a multinational peacekeeping force centered around the major nations of East Asia. Countries of Asia have the commercial and industrial capacity to develop a potent

multinational force for OOTW and peacekeeping. Since the end of the Cold War, the participant noted, the United States and Asian countries have developed similar technological bases, and have common bonds arising from alliance relationships. The participant coined the phrase “Assistance Projection” to capture this type of mission.

Because most of the defense budgets of the Asian powers (and that of the United States) are likely to decline, the American participant observed that it will be increasingly difficult to maintain current force levels in the region. This is no disaster since the likelihood of conflict in Asia will be low if the United States, in cooperation with other nations of the APR, will “maintain forces for preventive defense.” These combined forces can be used to protect SLOCs, fishing stocks, coastal waters, and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). The American participant also noted a number of negative factors that could affect American and Asian security. The continuation of Russian arms sales and the pattern of Chinese arms purchases and sales tend to be worrisome. However, information sharing, surveillance, and transparency should help eliminate misunderstanding and miscalculation by the countries of the region. The U.S. military must bring itself to share information and intelligence with its friends and allies in the APR.

A Japanese participant noted that the future missions of the three navies (Japan, unified Korea, and the United States) will depend to some extent on China’s strategy and attitudes. If China is belligerent and aggressive, and “containment” is required, then tight defense cooperation between the three countries is needed. But if China proves to be no threat, the navies of the United States, Japan, and unified Korea could emphasize maintaining regional stability and perform peacetime operations.

THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

An American participant commented that the initial workshop session on the security environment of Asia left the impression that a worst-case scenario for the unification of Korea is a North Korean collapse. The participant suggested that instead of wringing our hands about soft landings or hard

landings, the three navies begin trilateral contingency planning, because humanitarian operations, NEOs, and “assistance projection” to the Korean Peninsula is already a reasonably deduced mission for all three navies. He added that the first Korean War involved massive refugee migrations and clogged roads. It is safe to say that if the next Korean crisis is triggered by a hard landing, the militaries involved will have to move people from villages to safe locations offshore for medical treatment, for example. Korean participants reminded the audience that it should not be assumed that a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would automatically call for multilateral security cooperation by outside powers.

One Korean presenter noted that unified Korean defense planners might worry most about a situation in which Japan is involved in unified Korean security matters. A Japanese participant replied that Japan is already involved in Korean security matters. Prior to unification, he added, Japan’s security and defense thinking must take into account a future Korean conflict scenario. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty commits Japan to supporting U.S. defense of Korea, and Japan itself is committed to the defense of the Korean Peninsula. On the divergence of Japanese and Korean views of World War II history, the Japanese participant said that Japan can apologize from day to night but the most important consideration should be Japan’s deeds since then. He said that he didn’t mean to downplay words, but he hoped that Japan’s actions over the last 50 years have demonstrated Japan’s commitment to stability and security in the region.

A Korean participant acknowledged Japan’s efforts to promote defense of the Korean Peninsula, and acknowledged that some of the Japanese Self-Defense Force officers in the room had helped formulate Korea-Japan guidelines to manage different contingencies. The Korean participants recommended that the two countries focus on increased cooperation to deter a North Korean attack. It was also important, from a Korean point of view, to get the ROK more involved in Japanese defense planning so Koreans can understand what Japan would have in mind with respect to the defense of the peninsula. Failing this, the Korean participant said, Koreans should at least be consulted.

Opportunities for Trilateral Naval Cooperation

A Korean presenter commented that before he could assess the opportunities for trilateral cooperation, he had to make a few basic assumptions. The first was that the timeframe was 2010 and that Korea was already a unified state and had recovered economically from unification. The second was that economic growth in the region was going to continue. (He cited experts who argued that Asia's economies could grow by 23 to 30 percent by 2010.) The third was that trade and economic interactions among the three should continue to be significant parts of each country's GNP. Finally, he assumed that declining defense budgets would inspire the militaries of all three countries to cooperate.

The Korean presenter noted that past naval cooperation between the three navies has been uneven. ROK-U.S. naval cooperation is well known and well documented. ROKN-JMSDF cooperation, however, is just beginning. Lower-level contacts between the navies did take place in the late 1960s, but high-level exchanges began only in 1979. In the 1990s the ROK Chairman of the JCS has visited Japan; a Korean training squadron has visited Japan; and in return, a Japanese training squadron has visited Korea. In 1994, a Japanese ship visited Korea, and in February 1997, a JMSDF ship visited Inchon. But even though the relationship between the Korean and Japanese navies is good, it is still in its infancy.

The Korean presenter added that three-way cooperation benefits all three countries. The United States can contribute through its nuclear umbrella and by maintaining a strong hold over nuclear proliferation. The Japanese and Korean navies can contribute to regional security in areas where the U.S. Navy has shortfalls, such as mine warfare or shallow-water ASW. The three nations' efforts can complement each other. The danger, said the Korean presenter, is that China or Russia may misperceive the purpose of trilateral cooperation, and react negatively.

INITIATING Trilateral Cooperation

The best way to bring about trilateral naval cooperation is the building-block approach, the same presenter said. A trilateral naval relationship can be formed from the foundation of two solid bilateral naval relationships. The first step in bringing this about, he said, is to define objectives for the trilateral relationship. The United States is key in setting the objectives of this structure. It should act as the planner and the “conduit” for the three-nation naval forum, to build confidence and transparency among them.

The second step, the Korean presenter said, is for the three navies to increase three-way transparency by expanding existing naval cooperation to include three navies, arranging personnel exchanges, visiting one another’s ships, participating in the WESTPAC naval symposium, informing the other parties of training plans, conducting three-way command post exercises (CPXs), and, eventually, sharing research and development projects and research plans among all three parties. The trilateral relationship can then evolve to more advanced forms of cooperation such as maritime search and rescue (SAR), three-way participation in disaster relief operations, and trilateral peacekeeping. Trilateral naval cooperation can also begin with informal consultations such as this conference. To repeat, the Korean presenter said, trilateral naval cooperation begins with increased confidence in one’s partners, followed by increased transparency.

CONSTRAINTS TO Trilateral Cooperation

The Korean presenter then noted a number of factors that could limit trilateral cooperation. The first is the possible withdrawal of the United States from the region after Korea unifies, and the possibility that America turns over regional security management to Japan. This would upset a number of countries in the region, and might dissuade Korea from trilateral security cooperation. Second, there remains the issue of “divergent views on the behavior of Japan during World War II.” The Korean presenter commented

that Japan has a different understanding of what transpired during the war, which inspires negative emotions in the Korean public psyche. This feeling could impede naval cooperation.

A Japanese participant noted yet another limitation to three-way naval cooperation: one of the foundations of security in Asia over the last half-century has been the bilateral relationship (whether of Japan, Korea, or another Asian nation) with the United States. An overemphasis on three-way naval cooperation de-emphasizes the importance of bilateral security relations. In addition, the Japanese participant commented that while domestic political considerations were important limiting factors in Korea, so too were they limiting in Japan. In the public's view, collective defense is not permitted; therefore, trilateral or multilateral military cooperation would be difficult to undertake.

POST-UNIFICATION SECURITY

An American participant noted the Korean participant's concern that the United States might delegate responsibility for Asian security to Japan. He said that his first reaction to this idea was one of disbelief, but his next reaction was that the concern apparently needed some examination. He wondered whether this belief was widespread in the Republic of Korea. In response, Korean participants noted that although not widespread, there is a significant concern among Koreans who worry about security and foreign policy that: (1) after unification there will be a trilateral game played between China, Japan, and the United States to the exclusion of Korea; and (2) the United States will withdraw from the region and leave a vacuum to be filled by either Japan or China.

Mixed in with these Korean concerns is the perception of some Koreans that the involvement of outside powers interferes with the unification process. One Korean participant noted that many Koreans believe that because Korea is surrounded by major powers, unification will take too long. He added that they want less interference by outside powers. Another Korean participant

noted that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has signed a Joint Communiqué on defense with Japan but never with the ROK. The United States appears to emphasize the role of Japan and pays less attention to the prospects for a unified Korea. Korean participants also commented that three-way naval cooperation should in no way de-emphasize the bilateral security relationships between the United States and its friends in the region.

An American participant noted that there is currently no clear conceptual sense of what U.S. policy would be or should be with regard to the defense of a unified Korea. In the context of a unified Korea, would the U.S. policy be the same as now? Another U.S. participant disagreed and noted that the American defense establishment has begun thinking about defense implications for a post-unified Korea. The possible disappearance of one major regional conflict (MRC) if the Korean situation is resolved has led to some thinking about the strategic and institutional implications for American defense. The participant noted that no one in the U.S. defense community has said that after unification the United States is leaving. The question is “What gets left behind—how much and who?”

ROLES AND MISSIONS FOR TRILATERAL COOPERATION

Taking the discussion in a new direction, the Japanese presentation on opportunities for trilateral naval cooperation focused on new cooperative missions for the three navies. The presenter noted that the security environment has evolved since the end of the Cold War. There is a trend toward “globalization” of ocean security brought about by the ever-increasing borderless economic activities, an increase in demand for resources and energy, and a trend toward naval growth in Asia. These trends lead to the natural missions of: (1) keeping the seas and oceans open for use by the “Western alliance”; (2) protecting access to raw materials, energy commodities, and ocean resources; and (3) controlling and suppressing transnational crime. Because these missions are too complex and cumbersome for one nation, naval cooperation can be a way to address them. In a related note, the

participant said that the National Institute for Defense Studies had been trying to develop a concept of "ocean peacekeeping."

This Japanese presenter said that it is possible for the three countries to cooperate in several areas: (1) humanitarian operations (e.g., search and rescue, refugee relief); (2) constabulary operations (e.g., environmental protection, protection of natural resources and fisheries, anti-piracy, drug interdiction); (3) preventive deployments (e.g., establishing military exclusion zones in unstable maritime areas); and (4) compulsion operations (e.g., enforcement of maritime agreements, imposition of international sanctions).

The Japanese presenter noted that each of these operations can be divided into a number of phases, some of which emphasize early warning and fact finding, followed by later missions that emphasize enforcement and punitive actions. The Japanese presenter commented that with Japan's sensitivity to out-of-area operations, Japan should take the lead in early-warning and fact-finding missions, and place less emphasis on punitive action and constabulary ones. He commented that it was possible to conduct the above missions trilaterally or multilaterally. The first phase was to conduct trilateral or multinational coordinated operations in one large area, and the second is to conduct individual operations in assigned areas.

There was some debate over the appropriateness of naval forces conducting law enforcement missions. Are these missions for navies, or are they more for coast guards and/or law enforcement agencies? For example, one American participant noted that in the Bering Sea "Donut Hole," the U.S. Coast Guard, not the U.S. Navy, does all the patrolling to ensure that no fishing occurs there. Also he pointed out that most so-called piracy takes place in territorial waters. The Japanese presenter acknowledged that other agencies have played a greater role in some of these missions than navies; however, throughout history most naval services have participated, at various levels, in military operations, diplomacy, and constabulary/law enforcement operations. He claimed furthermore that the boundary between strictly maritime military operations and maritime police functions is starting to blur.

An American discussant pointed out that the practical aspects of doing this type of mission might be overwhelming. He suggested looking at Joint Task Force Four (JTF-4) in the Pacific, which does counter-drug operations, among other missions. The enormous information requirements of conducting counter-drug operations alone suggest that the early-warning aspects of doing "ocean peacekeeping" might be overwhelming too. At a minimum, conducting operations such as those the presenter described would take a massive infusion of new technology, vast organization changes, satellite monitoring, better international communications linkages than we have today, and better ship connectivity than we have today. There are also platform issues to resolve and jurisdictional issues to work out. Who does what and when?

Another American participant noted that Japan's role in early warning and fact finding for "ocean peacekeeping" would require heavy investments in sensors and information technology. Other discussants saw a distinction between ocean peacekeeping and multinational naval cooperation. The former is a much more expansive concept, possibly requiring an expanded naval force for Japan and Korea, while the latter suggests that the two navies can make do with what they have in cooperation with the United States. The Japanese presenter noted that he did not believe that the navies of Japan and Korea need to be expanded to conduct the missions he had mentioned.

The Japanese presenter acknowledged the continued importance of traditional maritime missions of power projection, sea control, and SLOC protection. He supposed that the strongest of the three navies, the U.S. Navy, should continue focusing on these to deter—and, when necessary, thwart—possible military aggression. Another participant agreed and noted that one of the most important naval missions affecting the United States, a unified Korea, and Japan will be that of protecting the sea lines of communication. For both Japan and Korea, it is vital to keep the Straits of Malacca open to ensure access to Middle East oil. He assumed that China would have similar interests. An American participant asked, "If in the long run everyone has an interest in maintaining SLOCs, then from whom do we need to protect the SLOCs?"

If we look at the countries of Asia, he said, no government wants to close the SLOCs. As the previous Japanese commentator noted, the Chinese are just as concerned about SLOC protection as the Japanese.

FRAMEWORKS FOR MULTINATIONAL MARITIME COOPERATION

The final workshop session focused on the possibilities for advancing naval cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region through multilateral security frameworks. An American presenter began by noting that this topic goes beyond the issue of trilateral naval cooperation between the three workshop countries. It requires us to consider the broader effects on security in Northeast Asia and whether and how to engage China and Russia in the effort. He offered the opinion that Korean unification, when it happens, will create more incentives for structured security cooperation among these five countries in Northeast Asia. At the same time, he emphasized that a multilateral security organization in Northeast Asia would be based on, and not replace, the bilateral alliances, cooperation, and forward deployments that characterize U.S. relations with Japan and Korea.

Models of Multinational Cooperation

The presenter reviewed a range of existing or conceptual security frameworks that might offer means for expanding military, especially naval, cooperation. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) has been mentioned as a region-wide possibility, but has serious liabilities, including its full trade and investment agenda and China's unwillingness to discuss security matters in a forum that includes Taiwan. A new organization on the model of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been proposed. The European model has become less encouraging in recent years, however, and there is little support for a new "OSCA." A formal military alliance on the NATO model would presumably be aimed at a clearly identified security threat. But by excluding China, it would be seen as formalizing a

policy of containment—a policy that none of our governments believe is now necessary or justified—and would polarize, not broaden, security cooperation in the region.

This presenter noted that some have suggested that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could be a framework for encouraging regional naval cooperation, because it already includes China and Russia. He observed that the ARF, however, is more focused on preventive diplomacy and confidence building than on on-the-ground security cooperation. Further, the ARF may not be well suited to dealing with Northeast Asian issues, given its Southeast Asian chairmanship and focus. It might more appropriately serve as an umbrella organization to which sub-regional security structures might report.

Finally, the presenter discussed ways that cooperation could be furthered by using existing or nascent building blocks. As an example he asked workshop participants to consider the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) that has emerged over the past five years as a potential framework for more practical military cooperation. Although it is a non-governmental, “Track II” organization, it includes defense officials and appears to be evolving toward a more official framework. It could be especially promising when Korean unification occurs, because it could give the governments directly involved a forum for solving the numerous practical security issues that unification will raise. Maritime issues would naturally find a place on this agenda.

CHINA AND MULTILATERAL SECURITY FRAMEWORKS

The American presenter noted that China has traditionally been reluctant to participate in multilateral security frameworks of any kind. One reason is that, as a very large and potentially powerful country, it has an advantage in bilateral dealings with smaller neighbors. In Indonesian-sponsored workshops started in 1990, China refused to discuss sovereignty issues in the Spratly Islands and agreed only grudgingly to participate in the ARF. More recently, however, China has appeared to modify this traditional stance. Beijing has even agreed to co-chair an ARF workshop on confidence-building measures

(CBMs) this year. This may indicate a trend in Chinese policy toward regional security engagement. China can be expected to use multilateral security forums to pursue its own ends, of course, and one reason for its decision to be involved is certainly the desire to shape agreements and decisions to its own purposes. But if converging security interests persuade Beijing that it has more to gain than to lose by taking part in regional naval cooperation, the other states involved in Northeast Asian security should encourage it to do so.

Russia and Multilateral Security

The American presenter noted that Russia probably will not be a major player in the Asia-Pacific region for some time to come. It does not have the economic resources to be a major partner in Asia's rapid economic growth. Moscow, he said, is more focused on internal problems and on the former Soviet states and Europe. Nonetheless, Russia is a Pacific power, a nuclear weapons state, and a country with great potential. We all have an interest in engaging Russia rather than excluding it.

Cooperative Security Involving China and Russia

The presenter suggested that no matter what forum emerges as the best means for encouraging naval cooperation and including China and Russia, the agenda might include:

- Maritime issues, including those arising from implementation of the Law of the Sea convention and demarcation of maritime zones, and the implications of these developments for regional security.
- A range of peacetime naval tasks, including safety at sea, humanitarian operations, and other "operations other than war."
- Standard operating procedures at sea, to minimize the possibility of misunderstandings between navies.
- Establishment of a forum for discussing both naval cooperation and naval concerns. This could be similar to the forum set up under the

U.S.-Russian Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), although a formal INCSEA-type agreement is probably inappropriate for a region that is not characterized by the adversarial, Cold War U.S.-USSR type of relationship.

- Exchange visits between naval commands and other structured contacts, leading to multilateral exchanges.

NAVAL ARMS CONTROL, TRANSPARENCY, AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

The U.S. presenter observed that some might argue that naval arms control should be another candidate agenda item. Confidence building and transparency could well be discussed if participants agreed. On the other hand, this presenter noted that some participants (including the United States) have traditionally opposed measures that would go beyond CBMs to impose formal arms control constraints on navies, because they believe that naval forces must retain their mobility and ability to deploy anywhere in the world to respond to crises.

A Japanese participant asked the presenter whether his reluctance to include naval arms control extended to measures intended to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula, such as CBMs between the two Koreas. A Japanese presenter noted that Japan took seriously possible benefits from multilateral security fora such as the ARF. Japanese Foreign Minister Kono expressed the necessity to promote Mutual Reassurance Measures (MRMs) at the first meeting of the ARF in 1994. He proposed three categories of reassurance measures: (1) information sharing to increase the transparency of national defense plans of all nations involved; (2) personnel exchanges to increase mutual understanding and reassurance; and (3) "cooperation toward the promotion of global activities." Under ARF, several MRMs have been proposed: search and rescue cooperation, traffic monitoring operations, cooperative relief, and assistance forces for maritime safety. A Korean participant doubted that the NEACD could be used to get China and Russia to cooperate in shaping Korean unification.

The American presenter responded that he did not mean to imply that CBMs in Korea were excluded from discussions in a proposed NEACD. Since the primary goals of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan were to get Russia and China involved in multilateral security organizations, we should start off with modest goals for a Northeast Asian organization. Finally, he shared the Korean participant's skepticism that an "NEACD" would be able to take concrete steps toward Korean unification as long as North Korea refuses to participate.

One Korean discussant thought that talking fora could help integrate China; dialogue, he said, would help China learn how to behave in international fora. He also agreed that getting Russia involved is important because Russia is likely to remain an important arms supplier. Some Korean participants also saw great potential for Chinese and Russian participation in multilateral organizations. The Chinese, in particular, know that much is at stake in resolving some of the outstanding disputes China has with other countries in the region. Furthermore, as China's economy becomes more dependent on the world economy, China will see the value in getting involved in multilateral discussions and organizations. Russia has been out front in recommending the formation of multilateral organizations. Unless Russia is suffering from severe financial burdens, it will be willing to participate.

A Korean presenter thought multilateral cooperation should take place within a web of bilateral relations. The U.S.-ROK, U.S.-Japan, Japan-ROK, U.S.-Australia relationships should anchor improving relations among all three parties. He suggested gradual expansion once bilateral relations are solid. He noted that good U.S. relations with China should also become a foundation for good trilateral relations between the United States, Japan, and Korea. If these two conditions exist, one participant noted, then good multilateral cooperation is possible and likely.

The Korean presenter said there is also no reason to doubt that actual multinational naval cooperation operations would eventually take place. Operations other than war and other naval missions can certainly involve

many parties. Assuming that the Chinese and Russians are interested in participating in multilateral security discussions, there is no reason to believe that they wouldn't ultimately be interested in also participating in some multilateral naval operations.

Some participants wondered whether close U.S.-Chinese relations might diminish the close relations the United States has with Japan and with Korea. Other participants pointed out that the United States focused on its bilateral relationship with Russia (an adversarial relationship) with no detrimental effects on its bilateral relations with other countries. A Japanese participant said that Japan does not overly worry that American-Chinese relations would harm U.S.-Japanese relations; however, he said that Japan expects to be consulted when U.S. officials hold discussions with the Chinese. This consultation usually takes place when DoD officials debrief the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) on their way home from Beijing. As a final note, he cautioned Americans that they should not lead the Chinese to believe that they need to deal only with the United States. American officials need to encourage the Chinese to consult Seoul and Tokyo as well.

THE LIMITS OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

An American participant recalled a body of opinion in the United States that resists placing too much emphasis on confidence-building measures, transparency, and arms control to promote security. This school of thought is skeptical as to whether these instruments could change the behavior of emerging powers such as China. If proliferation of arms control discussions were held and had no effect on Chinese behavior, the countries in the region would have less confidence in such measures thereafter.

In the discussion on the limits of multilateralism, an American participant noted a number of key issues that China would be extremely reluctant to raise multilaterally. The first is Taiwan. As long as Taiwan's future remains unresolved, the Chinese will be strongly reluctant to agree to multilateral activity that constrains their freedom of action. The second is human rights.

The People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) past performance and that of the police have raised hackles in the human rights communities. It is also possible that Hong Kong reversion might go badly. The PLA might become involved and have difficulty managing demonstrations and dissension. The result could be another Tiananmen Square incident, which would dash hopes for multilateral cooperation that includes China.

Other participants noted that territorial conflicts—Senkaku/Diaoyu for example—would be particularly difficult to “multilateralize.” One participant said that such territorial issues were likely to arouse negative sentiment, which would get in the way of practical agreements useful as steps toward multilateralism. Participants believed it might be best not to multilateralize territorial issues.

THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS

A number of themes emerged from the discussion at this first NIDS-KIDA-CNA workshop on naval cooperation among the three countries:

- Trilateral naval cooperation is necessary and desirable, for reasons including the changing security environment, the unique contribution naval cooperation can make to closer understanding and coordination among the three countries, and the likely decline in defense budgets.
- In the process of developing trilateral naval cooperation, Japan, Korea, and the United States need to take account of the impact on the People's Republic of China.
- The foundation of future trilateral and multilateral cooperation is the bilateral relationship between the United States and its allies, Japan and Korea. Good U.S.-China relations will also be very important.
- Transparency and information sharing are starting points for trilateral naval cooperation. At the right time, they can proceed to operations other than war and, eventually, to more traditional forms of naval military cooperation aimed at stability.

- Navies can take the lead in strengthening defense relations of the three countries. Although the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea “legs” of the trilateral relationship are strong, the Japan-Korea leg is weak. Naval cooperation between the two can help. U.S. naval presence will enable the United States to facilitate such cooperation.
- The Japanese participants assumed continued American presence in the region, and posited that any future Japanese naval role would be as a niche force within a U.S.-led bilateral, trilateral, or multinational coalition.
- Korean participants said it was possible to assume continued American presence, although defense planners had to hedge against possible U.S. withdrawal. In a scenario in which the United States was no longer militarily present in Asia, a unified Korean Navy would have to take on many of the missions performed by the USN.
- The prospects for trilateral and multilateral naval cooperation are affected by what happens on the Korean Peninsula, when and how the peninsula is unified, and how the outside powers react as the peninsula moves toward reunification.
- Korean participants expressed surprise at the apparent absence of articulated U.S. plans or policies with respect to a unified Korea. This absence seemed to represent a sharp contrast with recent formulations expanding the post-Cold War security relationship between the United States and Japan.
- The Koreans were also concerned that U.S.-Japan defense planning under new guidelines reportedly included planning for a Japanese role in a Korean contingency, without reference to or participation from Korea.
- Korean domestic politics will limit trilateral cooperation, as will emotional issues linked to the past and divergent views on the historical record. Limitations on expanded military operations, established in Japan’s constitution, will also constrain cooperation.
- Multinational naval cooperation is possible. The United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia may

be able to use the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) as a framework for initiating such cooperation, if they form an intergovernmental organization. Whatever the framework, there are important maritime security issues to be addressed.

- Differences of emphasis emerged over how to take China's reactions into account. Korean participants were relatively optimistic about China's emerging role, and expressed some concern about the need to avoid provoking negative Chinese reactions. Some Japanese participants expressed the view that China would build up its forces whatever we do and that we should therefore not be overly concerned with its short-term reactions. U.S. participants noted that China would probably not take an aggressive, expansionist stance toward its neighbors unless it perceived that they were combining against it.
- One Japanese participant expressed concern that a unified Korea might be inclined to accommodate Chinese interests, or even ally itself with China. Korean participants countered this argument, noting that it was based on a misunderstanding of Korean perceptions.

Possible Topics for Future Workshops

In summing up, the co-chairmen and others suggested that the following ideas might be considered as possible topics for the next trilateral workshop:

- Institutionalizing trilateral security cooperation
- Contingencies that could involve operations other than war, e.g., peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, or refugee flows
- Information sharing
- Roles for the three navies in regional security after Korean unification: how tasks can be divided
- Maritime CBMs
- A building-block approach to regional naval cooperation.

All three co-chairmen agreed on the importance of discussing ways to take China's concerns into account.

Overall, participants considered the workshop a success, and found the opinions expressed in it useful and revealing. They look forward to the next workshop, tentatively planned for Honolulu in late spring 1998.

Appendix A

CNA PARTICIPANTS AND GUESTS

NAME	PAPER PRESENTED OR ROLE
Mr. Thomas J. Hirschfeld CNA	Co-chairman
Mr. M. Lyall Breckon CNA	"Frameworks for International Cooperation To Increase Regional Security: How To Involve China and Russia"
Prof. Paul Bracken Yale University	"Naval Cooperation in Northeast Asia"
Mr. Paul Kreisberg Woodrow Wilson Center	"Strategic Environment in and Around the Korean Peninsula: Paths to Reunification and Defense Requirements for a Unified Korea"
LtGen Henry Stackpole, III, USMC (Ret.)	"One Korea, Three Navies, Multiple Missions"
Mr. Christopher D. Yung CNA	Rapporteur
CAPT Robert Conrad, USN JUSMAAG, Republic of Korea	Observer
LtCol Brendan Kearney, USMC USCINCPAC Staff	Observer
CDR Lendall S. Knight, USN Assistant Naval Attaché, Tokyo, Japan	Observer
Mr. John Niemeyer Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan	Observer
CDR Patrick Doyle, USN Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan	Observer
CDR Stephen Tagariello, USN U.S. Naval Attaché, Seoul, ROK	Observer
CDR David Christie, USN N5, U.S. Naval Forces, Korea	Observer

Appendix B

KIDA PARTICIPANTS AND GUESTS

NAME	PAPER PRESENTED OR ROLE
CAPT Kye-Ryong Rhoe, ROKN (Ret.) KIDA	Co-chairman and presenter, “Missions of a Unified Korean Navy”
Dr. Chang Soo Kim KIDA	“A Framework for Multilateral Cooperation” and rapporteur
Dr. Kang Choi KIDA	“Strategic Environment in and Around the Korean Peninsula: Paths to Unification”
Dr. Sung Hwan Wei KIDA	“Naval Cooperation in the Unified Korea Era” and rapporteur
CAPT Tae-Ho Won, ROKN ROK Joint Staff	Observer and discussant
Dr. Chung-Min Lee RAND Corporation	Observer

Appendix C

NIDS PARTICIPANTS AND GUESTS

NAME	PAPER PRESENTED OR ROLE
Prof. Hideshi Takesada NIDS	Co-chairman and presenter, “Scenarios on Korean Unification: A Japanese View”
CAPT Kamine Akimoto, JMSDF	“Opportunities for Maritime Cooperation”
COL Noboru Yamaguchi, JGSDF	“Multilateral Approach Towards Asian Security: Why We Need It and How It Works”
RADM Sumihiko Kawamura, JMSDF (Ret.) NIDS	“JMSDF Missions After the Unification of the Korean Peninsula”
RADM Masaji Takayama, JMSDF (Ret.), Defense Research Center	Discussant
MGEN Minoru Senda, JGSDF Vice President, NIDS	Opening speaker
Mr. Ryu Yamazaki Director General for International Affairs, JDA	Discussant
RADM Takayama, JMSDF (Ret.) Defense Research Center	Discussant and observer
RADM Ikawa, JMSDF (Ret.) Defense Research Center	Discussant and observer
Mr. Naruhiko Ueda Executive Director Defense Research Center	Observer
Prof. Susumi Takai Prof. of International Law	Observer
LCDR Naoki Sakai, JMSDF Plans and Programs Division	Observer
Dr. Tomoyuki Ishizu Associate Professor, NIDS	Rapporteur

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