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FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE FOUNDATION OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMY OPERATIONS

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Brent A. Cornstubble
Infantry**



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
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
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
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First Principles: The Foundation of Twenty-First Century Army Operations

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ABSTRACT

FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE FOUNDATION OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMY OPERATIONS by MAJ Brent A. Cornstubble, USA, 48 pages.

This monograph discusses the proposed principles of Army operations found in the coordinating draft of the revised 1998 FM 100-5, *Operations*. It centers on determining whether the proposed principles form the fundamental base for Army operations of the twenty-first century.

The monograph first examines the current principles of war and operations other than war found in the 1993 version of FM 100-5. Then, it presents a brief description of the proposed principles as well as changes to the 1993 definitions. The analysis compares the proposed principles to the imperatives of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations found in the coordinating draft of FM 100-5 to determine whether the proposed principles form the fundamental base for Army operations. The analysis concludes with observations concerning two new principles, *exploitation* and *morale*.

The principal findings of this study indicate that the proposed principles form the fundamental base for many Army operations. However, the new principle of *exploitation* provides nothing towards Army operations not encompassed by the principles of *offensive* and *maneuver*. The new principle of *morale* is subordinate to leadership, a component of the defunct dynamics of combat power, and should not be included as a first principle. The proposed principles neglect the concepts of *legitimacy*, *perseverance*, and *restraint* to the detriment of stability and support operations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR	3
	The Principles of War	3
	The Principles of Operations Other Than War	8
III.	THE PRINCIPLES OF ARMY OPERATIONS	11
VI.	ANALYSIS	18
	Comparison of the Proposed Principles and the Offensive Imperatives	19
	Comparison of the Proposed Principles and the Defensive Imperatives	22
	Comparison of the Proposed Principles and the Stability Imperatives	24
	Comparison of the Proposed Principles and the Support Imperatives	28
	Analysis Observations	30
VII.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	33
VIII.	SUMMARY	37
	Endnotes	38
	Bibliography	45

I. Introduction

When Carl von Clausewitz compiled a “shapeless mass of ideas” from which he hoped to form a scientific theory for the art of war, his efforts clearly represented a close parallel to the most basic science, that of physics.¹ Newtonian mechanics and Euler’s mathematics governed the science of physics in Clausewitz’s day, and Clausewitz described war using terms such as *force, energy, friction, tension, inertia, polarity, interactions, equilibrium, positive and negative purposes, impetus-impulse, and center of gravity*. The principles laid down by Newton in his three laws of motion are the foundation for classical mechanics. From these first principles one can derive the equations of motion for any macroscopic body, completely describing the body’s motion. In a similar vein, Maxwell’s equations are the foundational principles for electromagnetism, completely describing electromagnetic interactions.

If Clausewitz felt that war was much like science, then perhaps there are principles from which one can derive the “equations” that describe the endeavor known as war. Surely, the Army has determined this to be true. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, states that the principles of war are “the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine” for strategic, operational, and tactical warfighting.² Similarly, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, speaks of the principles of war as part of the foundation for Army operations.³ The question for the twenty-first century Army is, “Do the current principles of war still form the foundation for the entire spectrum of conflict in which the Army operates?” Put another way, “Can the Army derive its ‘equations’ for conflict from these first principles presented in the revised FM 100-5?”

The FM 100-5 revision team published the coordinating draft of the 1998 FM 100-5, *Operations*, on 14 January 1997. The drafting team requested that advanced military studies students conduct a critical analysis of the draft before it is released to the field Army in April 1997.⁴ The set of principles of operations is one area that must be analyzed. This study will fulfill that request.

Soldiers have debated the United States Army's principles of war for a long time, since the principles first appeared in U.S. Army doctrine in a 1921 training regulation.⁵ With the realization that modern Army operations were involving more constabulary missions, the principles of operations other than war were introduced into the 1993 FM 100-5.⁶ The revised *Operations* seeks to incorporate the full spectrum of Army operations to include war and everything else: operations other than war. Four types of Army operations describe this full spectrum: offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. The principles that govern these operations are the synthesis of the principles of war and operations other than war – the principles of Army operations.

Of primary importance is the determination of what *principle* means in this study. A basic dictionary meaning of principle is “a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or assumption”⁷ or “a basic truth, law, or assumption.”⁸ Others have debated the meaning of principle. Some have stated that the straightforward dictionary meaning is “simplistic,” some that the principles form the “art” of war, others still that they are “science.”⁹ For this study, one finds the best meaning of principle in the idiom *in principle* – “with respect to the fundamentals” or “with regard to the basics.”¹⁰ This study views the principles of Army operations as forming the fundamental basis of Army operations.

It is not the purpose of this study to debate the merits of the principles of war, operations other than war, or Army operations. Rather, the purpose of this study is to determine whether the principles of Army operations in the revised FM 100-5 do indeed provide the basis for operations in the 21st century. Primarily, the study answers one question: do the proposed principles of operations form the foundation for the entire spectrum of conflict in which the Army operates? In answering this question, the study will provide a brief synopsis of the current principles of war, operations other than war, and Army operations. Then the principles of Army operations will be analyzed with regard to the imperatives of offensive, defensive, stability, and support

operations to determine whether the principles presented in the revised FM 100-5 form a fundamental basis for Army operations of the next century.

II. Principles of War and Operations Other Than War: Current Doctrine

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the principles of Army operations in providing the fundamental base for twenty-first century Army operations it is necessary to define and briefly describe the principles of war and operations other than war as they are currently portrayed in U.S. Army doctrine. Chapter Three will then define the proposed principles of Army operations and describe the differences between the current and proposed principles.

The Principles of War

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.¹¹

This principle provides connectivity between different echelons and levels of war. Without it, the other principles are meaningless.¹² *Objective* is as simple as having a clear target for a rifle marksman. Without a clearly defined target within the range of his weapon, the marksman is bound to miss every time. Traditionally, the strategic objective of the “American Way of War” has been the destruction of the enemy and his will to fight.¹³ In twenty-first century Army operations, the strategic objectives may be much different,¹⁴ but victory will still be the main object of Army operations.¹⁵ The underlying concept of *objective*, however, requires clearly defined, decisive, and attainable endstates, allowing commanders and their forces the freedom to *maneuver* and maintain an *offensive* spirit. *Objective* enables subordinate commanders to develop subordinate objectives that “economically contribute, directly or indirectly, to the purpose of the ultimate objective.”¹⁶

Offensive

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.¹⁷

Throughout history, there seems to be one idea that stands out about war when all else is forgotten – “when in doubt, hit out.”¹⁸ The spirit of the *offensive* is in taking the battle to the enemy, maintaining pressure on his forces, keeping him off-balance, and forcing him to react rather than act.¹⁹ Only in this way can decisive results and freedom of action be gained.²⁰ Clausewitz claims that in *offensive* battle “the main feature . . . is the outflanking or by-passing of the defender – that is, taking the initiative,” and the commander’s aim is to expedite a decision.²¹ Sun Tzu said that the most important thing to do in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy, then divide his alliances, and then attack his army.²² Even in the defense, the *offensive* mind set is necessary to gain and maintain the initiative. Napoleon summarized *offensive* in this manner: “The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack.”²³

Maneuver

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.²⁴

Maneuver has often been mistaken for movement or mobility. In fact, military writers have used these terms in the past to define “maneuver.”²⁵ Indeed, movement and mobility are expressed in the concept of *maneuver*. To gain positional advantage, an Army force must be able to move and react quicker and more efficiently than the enemy, but the term *maneuver* embodies much more. *Maneuver* is not just moving troops around the battlefield, but includes positioning military resources – fires, logistics, political force, etc. – to favor the accomplishment of the mission.²⁶ *Maneuver* includes flexibility of thought, plans, and organization as well as maneuverability of forces, focusing maximum strength against the enemy’s weakness.²⁷ Sun Tzu

described the art of *maneuver* as the most difficult aspect of war, stating that the difficulty is in making “the devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune to advantage.”²⁸ Clausewitz stated that the aim of *maneuver* is “to bring about favorable conditions for success and then to use them to gain an advantage over the enemy.”²⁹ The idea of *maneuver* is to place the enemy at such a relative disadvantage as to limit friendly losses.³⁰ *Maneuver* allows a commander to “engage at the proper times and with ample energy.”³¹ The principle of *maneuver* continually presents the opponent with new problems, forcing upon him a “dynamic warfare that rejects predictable patterns of operations.”³²

Mass

Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive time and place.³³

Mass is an often misunderstood principle. This stems primarily from Clausewitz’s writings which emphasized “superiority of numbers.”³⁴ In Napoleonic warfare, the elements of combat power – leadership, maneuver, firepower, and protection³⁵ – all came together at the decisive time and place in the form of superior numbers. Jomini echoed his Prussian counterpart by calling the fundamental principle of war the massing of an army upon the decisive point.³⁶ In essence, what Clausewitz meant when he wrote “concentration of forces” was for commanders to focus the effects of combat power at the decisive time and place, which armies accomplished through superiority of numbers.³⁷ As time and technology have changed the battlefield, so too has the ability to focus the elements of combat power at the decisive point. By the 1970’s, the term *mass* had come to mean the achievement of superiority in combat power, including “all available facilities and superiority of firepower, combat service support, fighting skill, resolution, discipline, courage, administration, and leadership,” as well as superiority of numbers.³⁸ In modern warfare, “superiority results from the proper combination of the elements of combat power at a place and time, and in a manner of the commander’s choosing, in order to retain the

initiative.”³⁹ Today, massing effects means more than just massing numbers. Numerically inferior forces with superior weapons platforms coupled with initiative and operational flexibility can achieve decisive results.⁴⁰

Economy of Force

Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.⁴¹

COL Harry Summers called *economy of force* the reciprocal of the principle of *mass*, defining it as “allocating minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.”⁴² This principle calls for a commander to dedicate maximum combat power to the main effort while minimizing combat power to supporting efforts, ensuring that “all forces are used to the best advantage.”⁴³ *Economy of force* does not refer just to economical use of force, but also to the “judicious employment and distribution of force.”⁴⁴ This implies that the entire force is actively engaged, allowing no portion to sit idle.⁴⁵ The proper application of *economy of force* involves risk – accepting it at certain times and places to minimize it at the decisive point.⁴⁶ *Economy of force* ensures that “when the time comes for action,” all parts act.⁴⁷

Simplicity

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.⁴⁸

Simplicity is the principle that enables Army forces to minimize confusion and misunderstanding.⁴⁹ Subordinate leaders and soldiers who understand their commanders' expectations are more likely to accomplish missions successfully. The common KISS maxim, “Keep It Simple Stupid,” captures this concept. *Simplicity* allows commanders to reduce friction, the term Clausewitz developed to describe the condition that “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”⁵⁰ Simple plans and orders are easier to develop and

coordinate, facilitate flexibility and control,⁵¹ and “other factors being equal, the simplest plan executed promptly is to be preferred over the complex plan executed later.”⁵² In essence, “simple and direct plans and methods make for foolproof performance.”⁵³

Surprise

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.⁵⁴

Surprise is the principle through which an Army steals the initiative from the enemy.

Surprise does not entail taking the enemy completely unaware, but in preventing him from being able to respond quickly enough to friendly actions.⁵⁵ Johnsen *et al* defined *surprise* as “accruing disproportionate advantage through action for which an adversary is not prepared.”⁵⁶ Through *surprise* an Army can shift the balance of combat power and gain a great advantage with less effort.⁵⁷ It involves speed as well as secrecy and is “the means to gain superiority.”⁵⁸ Deception is a key component of *surprise*, enabling an Army to confuse the enemy commander and demoralize his force.⁵⁹ It “influences the enemy’s sense of self-confidence, mental stability, and competence.”⁶⁰ *Surprise* is usually decisive and “a master key to victory.”⁶¹

Unity of Command

For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.⁶²

This principle emphasizes the importance of designating one commander for a mission, providing him with the authority and forces to accomplish the mission, and assigning him responsibility for accomplishing the mission. *Unity of command* should ensure unity of effort and the application of maximum combat power at the decisive point.⁶³ It ensures that “all efforts are focused on a common goal.”⁶⁴ *Unity of command* includes the concept of *unity of effort* – the coordination and cooperation of all forces towards a common objective.⁶⁵

Security

Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.⁶⁶

Security is the principle that negates *surprise*, allowing the commander to maintain freedom of action.⁶⁷ It requires the implementation and maintenance of protective measures for resources – soldiers, material, and information – denying the enemy any insight into friendly intentions, plans, and capabilities.⁶⁸ However, these security measures must not inhibit flexibility and freedom of thought that might lead to yielding the initiative and being surprised by the enemy.⁶⁹ *Security* is often enhanced by “bold seizure and retention of initiative which denies the enemy the opportunity to interfere.”⁷⁰ Fuller claimed that *security* is “the base of all offensive action,” implying that it is inherent in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.⁷¹ As such, *security* does not imply over-cautiousness, but application of well-reasoned risk.⁷² *Security* reduces the vulnerability of friendly forces to “hostile acts, influence, or surprise.”⁷³

The Principles of Operations Other Than War

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.⁷⁴

In operations other than war, the principle of *objective* is just as important, if not more so, as in war. Historically, objectives in these types of operations often have been poorly defined, indecisive, and unattainable. COL Harry Summers wrote an entire analysis of the Vietnam conflict, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, that spoke to a national violation of this principle. The results of recent operations in Somalia demonstrate the difficulty in defining clear, decisive, and attainable endstates in operations other than war. Even so, political and military leaders must make every effort to clearly define a decisive and attainable objective.

Twenty-first century Army operations are certain to be more akin to those in Vietnam and Somalia rather than those in Operation DESERT STORM.

Unity of Effort

Seek unity of effort toward every objective.⁷⁵

In operations other than war, *unity of command* is often hard to achieve. Army forces often are subordinated to other agencies, such as the United Nations or Federal Emergency Management Agency, negating the ability to assign one commander the responsibility for accomplishing the mission. In such cases, the spirit of *unity of effort* found in *unity of command* becomes superior. *Unity of effort* relies on coordination and cooperation, rather than command, to accomplish a common objective. Command arrangements are often loosely defined, and commanders must “consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic, and psychological in nature.”⁷⁶ *Unity of effort* in operations other than war requires commanders to rely on consensus building.⁷⁷ Gaining and maintaining *unity of effort* is a policy, rather than a command, function where the unity is in intent and purpose, not command.⁷⁸

Security

Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.⁷⁹

The difference between the definition of *security* in operations other than war and that in war is the replacement of “the enemy” by “hostile factions.” This difference speaks to the often frustrating inability to determine who the true enemy or enemies are in operations other than war. Belligerents, terrorists, criminals, and looters may all compose hostile factions.⁸⁰ Physical measures of protection are not the only concern in these operations, however. The “perceived legitimacy and impartiality, the mutual respect built between the force and the other parties involved, and the force’s credibility in the international arena” all contribute to the *security* of

Army forces in such environments.⁸¹ Operations other than war require commanders to protect their forces at all times, prepared to transition to combat operations at any time, enabling their forces to use their “intrinsic right to self-defense.”⁸²

Legitimacy

Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.⁸³

This principle of operations other than war deals with perceptions. The “legality, morality, and correctness” of Army operations in the eyes of the U.S. public, U.S. political leaders, indigenous parties, and international community is key to success in these type operations.⁸⁴ *Legitimacy* is the willing acceptance of the right of a government, group, or agency to make and enforce decisions.⁸⁵ Adherence by Army forces to international norms and humanitarian principles is essential for establishing and maintaining *legitimacy*.⁸⁶ *Legitimacy* is maintained when deployed Army forces do no harm to the legitimate government or its policies⁸⁷ as well as not legitimizing disputing factions when no clearly legitimate government exists.⁸⁸ Army forces cannot create *legitimacy*, but their actions can easily destroy it.⁸⁹ With accelerating communications and media technologies bringing the global community closer together, future Army operations will necessarily require world consensus, making legitimacy a prerequisite for most offensive, stability, and support operations.

Perseverance

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.⁹⁰

Recent Army operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia may provide a window to operations of the future. Many situations requiring Army involvement will be nebulous, containing conflicts that are deep-seated, without clear beginnings and with no clear solutions.⁹¹

Perseverance is the principle that requires commanders, soldiers, and policy makers to employ persistent patience. Such situations will require application of all forms of U. S. power – diplomatic, economic, and informational – as well as military. Army commanders will need to measure short-term objectives of courses of action against long-term national goals.⁹² While decisive action is not precluded by *perseverance*, this principle requires judicious application of combat power.⁹³

Restraint

Apply appropriate military capability prudently.⁹⁴

Restraint is the principle derived from an understanding that operations other than war by definition do not center on destruction of the enemy. In an Army operation, *restraint* requires commanders and soldiers to use the minimum violence necessary to accomplish the stated objectives or mandate that has established the legitimacy of the operation.⁹⁵ Leaders manage *restraint* through rules of engagement which discipline the use of force.⁹⁶ The principle of *restraint* does not preclude the use of violence, but requires commanders and soldiers to attempt de-escalation and resolution of conflict via non-violent methods such as mediation and negotiation, if possible.⁹⁷ When violence is necessary, minimization of non-combatant casualties and collateral damage are the touchstones of *restraint*. Sensitivity to the political implications of excessive violence, such as the media perception of the “highway of death” out of Kuwait into Iraq, is an aspect of *restraint* woven into twenty-first century offensive operations.

III. Principles of Army Operations: Proposed Changes

Chapter Two discussed the principles of war and operations other than war as defined and described in the 1993 FM 100-5, *Operations*. This chapter defines and discusses the proposed principles of Army operations. The chapter presents the similarities and differences between the

1993 FM 100-5 and the proposed 1998 FM 100-5. Two new principles, *morale* and *exploitation*, are introduced while three former principles, *legitimacy*, *perseverance*, and *restraint* are deleted.

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal.⁹⁸

The principle of *objective* remains the same conceptually, and the word *goal* has replaced the word *objective* in the definition. *Objective* “drives all military activity” and requires a clear vision of the desired endstate to Army operations.⁹⁹

Offensive

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.¹⁰⁰

Offensive is still the key to decisiveness, and the definition remains unchanged. The principle of the *offensive* dictates the means by which we impose our will on the enemy and is “the essence of successful operations.”¹⁰¹

Maneuver

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.¹⁰²

The concept of *maneuver*, as well as the definition, has not changed in the revised FM 100-5. *Maneuver* is still “the principal means by which we gain and preserve freedom of action, reduce vulnerability, and exploit success.”¹⁰³

Massed Effects

Mass the effects of combat power in a decisive manner in time and space.¹⁰⁴

Concentrate the effects of combat power in a decisive manner in time and space.¹⁰⁵

The new term *massed effects* replaces the former term *mass* to help eliminate the confusion that surrounds this concept, though the basic concept itself remains unchanged. *Massed effects* still requires commanders to “mass the effects of combat power to overwhelm opponents and gain control of the situation.”¹⁰⁶ “Place and time” have been replaced with “time and space,” with the terms not necessarily linked as before. In terms of space, *massed effects* includes the concentration of combat power effects against combinations of physical points, shattering the enemy’s coherence.¹⁰⁷ In terms of time, *massed effects* mandates the simultaneous application of combat power in distributed operations, achieving “mass in time.”¹⁰⁸

Economy of Force

Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.¹⁰⁹

Allocate combat power so that every capability effectively supports the main effort; minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.¹¹⁰

Economy of force remains unchanged in the revised FM 100-5. It still ensures that “no effort is wasted.”¹¹¹

Simplicity

Prepare uncomplicated concepts and plans and direct, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.¹¹²

Simplicity remains the concept for minimizing misunderstanding and confusion. The revised definition removes the term “clear” and adds the terms “concepts” and “direct.” The spirit of the definition remains unchanged, but something has been lost. Direct means “straight-forward and frank” while concise means “clear and succinct.”¹¹³ The addition of direct as an adjective for orders enhances the idea of keeping orders simple, but the removal of the adjective “clear” has the opposite effect on “concepts and plans.” Clear means “plain or evident to the mind; unmistakable,” while uncomplicated means “simple.”¹¹⁴ Uncomplicated concepts and

plans do not necessarily mean that they are unmistakable in the minds of subordinates. The definition still should include the adjective “clear” for concepts and plans if the principle of *simplicity* is to “minimize confusion and misunderstanding.”¹¹⁵

Surprise

Achieve effects disproportionate to the effort by taking unexpected action.¹¹⁶

The concept of *surprise* is a timeless one and basically remains unchanged in the revised *Operations*.¹¹⁷ However, the definition has been changed. “Achieve effects” has replaced “strike the enemy” with the emphasis on the imbalance of effort to effects rather than on time, place, or manner. Additionally, “unexpected action” replaces “for which he is unprepared.” Information dominance becomes the “key to *surprise*.”¹¹⁸

Unity of Effort

Achieve common purpose and direction through unity of command, coordination, and cooperation.¹¹⁹

With a clear recognition that Army operations of the twenty-first century will most likely be coalition operations, the revision team has changed the principle of *unity of command* to *unity of effort*. The former term embodied the concept of *unity of effort*, but stressed *unity of command*. In coalition warfare, it is often politically untenable to designate one overall responsible commander.¹²⁰ *Unity of effort*, however, is of paramount importance despite the command relationships. The revised *Operations* states that “whenever possible, *unity of effort* should be achieved through unity of command,” and when it is not possible, then *unity of effort* should still be achieved “through coordination and cooperation.”¹²¹

Security

Never permit an enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.¹²²

The concept of *security* remains the same as it has throughout time, and the revised FM 100-5 makes only one change in the definition. By replacing “the enemy” by “an enemy,” the new *Operations* emphasizes the ambiguity of hostile parties in twenty-first century Army operations. *Security* is “essential to protecting and preserving combat power” and is often more difficult to implement and maintain in stability and support operations.¹²³

Exploitation

Take advantage of and make lasting the temporary effects of battlefield success.¹²⁴

This principle requires commanders to “secure the results of successful operations.”¹²⁵ Key to *exploitation* is planning and preparation for taking advantage of opportunities that present themselves. Rapid and decisive actions are necessary for effective *exploitation*.

Morale

Build, maintain, and restore fighting spirit.¹²⁶
Build, maintain, and restore the fighting spirit of the force.¹²⁷

Few professional soldiers would argue the importance of *morale* in Army operations. Throughout history, society has viewed high *morale* as a prerequisite for victory, and this is no less true in stability and support operations as in offensive and defensive operations.¹²⁸ Clausewitz said that the principle moral elements were: “the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit.”¹²⁹ Consequently, building the fighting spirit of the force involves skilled and effective leadership that ensures “the troops” become experienced through aggressive and challenging training. Maintaining the fighting spirit of the force involves “exciting their enthusiasm, ... honoring courage, punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice.”¹³⁰ Restoring the fighting spirit involves alleviating the effects of fear and providing opportunity to recover from extended periods of danger, fatigue, and deprivation.¹³¹ Commanders must constantly monitor the *morale* of their force, providing ample food and rest.

During periods of low-paced operations, commanders maintain *morale* through meaningful activity – providing realistic training and legitimate missions. During periods of stress and fear, activity can also provide maintenance and restoration to *morale*. The post-World War I book, *Infantry in Battle*, makes the point that inactivity is dangerous to *morale*: “Action, physical and mental, is an efficacious antidote for battlefield nervousness.”¹³²

Table 3-1 presents the definitions of the principles of war, operations other than war, and of Army operations in comparison. Chapter Four will discuss the principles of Army operations with respect to the imperatives of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.

War	Operations Other Than War	Army Operations
<u>Objective</u> Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.	<u>Objective</u> Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.	<u>Objective</u> Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable <i>goal</i> .
<u>Offensive</u> Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.		<u>Offensive</u> Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
<u>Maneuver</u> Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.		<u>Maneuver</u> Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
<u>Mass</u> Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive time and place.		<u>Massed Effects</u> <i>Concentrate</i> the effects of combat power in a <i>decisive manner in time and space</i> .
<u>Economy of Force</u> Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.		<u>Economy of Force</u> <i>Allocate</i> combat power so that <i>every capability effectively supports the main effort</i> ; minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
<u>Unity of Command</u> For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.	<u>Unity of Effort</u> Seek unity of effort toward every objective.	<u>Unity of Effort</u> <i>Achieve common purpose and direction through unity of command, coordination, and cooperation.</i>
<u>Security</u> Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.	<u>Security</u> Never permit <i>hostile factions</i> to acquire an unexpected advantage.	<u>Security</u> Never permit <i>an</i> enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
<u>Simplicity</u> Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.		<u>Simplicity</u> Prepare uncomplicated <i>concepts</i> and plans and <i>direct</i> , concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
<u>Surprise</u> Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.		<u>Surprise</u> <i>Achieve effects disproportionate to the effort by taking unexpected action.</i>

Table 3-1: Comparison of Principles – War, Operations Other Than War, and Army Operations

<p><u>Legitimacy</u> Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.</p>
<p><u>Perseverance</u> Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.</p>
<p><u>Restraint</u> Apply appropriate military capability prudently.</p>
<p><u>Morale</u> Build, maintain, and restore the fighting spirit of the force.</p>
<p><u>Exploitation</u> Take advantage of and make lasting the temporary effects of battlefield success.</p>

Table 3-1(cont.): Comparison of Principles – War, Operations Other Than War, and Army Operations

IV. Analysis

Part II of the revised FM 100-5, *Operations*, describes the fundamentals of Army operations. Simply stated, the principles of Army operations guide and instruct the combining of Army functions by means of Army operating systems to execute categories of operations. These combined fundamentals demonstrate the characteristics of Army operations.¹³³ The fundamentals of Army operations are represented in Figure 4-1. The principles reside at the base of the fundamentals, a foundation for providing guidance and instruction for the building of Army operations doctrine. As such, there is a connection between the principles and the categories of Army operations. The principles are not a checklist, nor are they applied equally to all situations.¹³⁴ If, however, each is truly fundamental, its influence should be seen in some fashion in the categories of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.




Figure 4-1: The Fundamentals of Army Operations¹³⁵

This chapter provides the analysis for comparing each of the proposed principles to each of the four categories. Specifically, the study uses the imperatives of each category of operation to determine the appropriateness of each principle in forming the fundamental base for Army operations of the twenty-first century.¹³⁶ Since it is possible to trim, mold, and even bend each principle to fit each imperative, the study addresses only the key principles that have realistic and obvious application to each imperative.

Comparison of the Proposed Principles and the Offensive Imperatives

There are six offensive imperatives that guide commanders in applying the core functions, operating systems, and offensive fundamentals. They are:

- (1) Place the defender in a weak condition and position.
- (2) Attack weakness, avoid strength.
- (3) Strike with extraordinary violence.
- (4) Press the fight – never let the enemy recover from the initial blow.
- (5) Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.
- (6) Plan for and resource the exploitation.¹³⁷

Place the defender in a weak condition and position. *Maneuver* and *surprise* are the key principles that allow Army forces to do this. By using *maneuver*, Army commanders can shape the battlefield, placing the enemy at a disadvantage and gaining favorable conditions upon which further offensive operations may proceed. Coupled with the shock gained through *surprise*, maneuvering Army forces can force a defender to fight from a position or in a manner not of his choosing, negating the strength of the defense.

Attack weakness, avoid strength. *Massed effects*, *maneuver*, and *surprise* are the operations principles best applied here. Army forces use *maneuver* to gain the positional advantage with respect to the enemy's weakness allowing for the concentration of combat power effects on the weakest part of the enemy's defense. By striking at his weakness, the Army commander strikes at the portion of the enemy's defense for which he is unprepared, gaining *surprise*.

Strike with extraordinary violence. The principles of *offensive*, *massed effects*, and *surprise* are the basis for striking with extraordinary violence. Short, intense outbursts of friendly combat power focused on an enemy is often required to impose friendly will and enables Army forces to seize the initiative. The unexpected nature of extraordinary violence catches the opponent unaware, resulting in shock and *surprise*.

Press the fight – never let the enemy recover from the initial blow. Numerous principles help Army forces and their commanders press the fight. *Offensive*, *maneuver*, *massed effects*, *unity of effort*, *security*, and *exploitation* all speak to keeping the enemy off balance. After Army forces seize and maintain the initiative, exploiting uncovered opportunities allows the Army commander to press the fight. By using *maneuver* and *massed effects*, the attacking force keeps

the defender off balance, striking him with overwhelming combat power from positions of relative advantage. Army forces must coordinate among themselves to ensure maintaining pressure on the enemy while implementing *security* measures to prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage, possibly leading to his recovery.

Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort. An understanding and application of *objective*, *unity of effort*, *economy of force*, and *simplicity* assist the commander in designating, maintaining, and shifting the main effort. The commander directs the main effort toward accomplishing the *objective* of the operation, and he ensures that all supporting efforts enhance the accomplishment of the main effort. Uncomplicated plans focus on the main effort, minimizing the forces designated to supporting efforts, and unifying the total force on the ultimate goal.

Plan for and resource the exploitation. *Objective*, *offensive*, *exploitation*, *economy of force*, and *simplicity* are principles necessary for preparing Army forces for capturing opportunity. By keeping Army forces focused on the ultimate prize, Army commanders allow subordinates the freedom to seize opportunities to exploit the initiative. Planning that anticipates *exploitation* must be clear and direct, economizing the force to ensure that sufficient combat power is available when opportunity presents itself.

Table 4-1 lists the offensive imperatives and the key principles of Army operations that apply to each.

Offensive Imperative	Principles
Place the defender in a weak condition and position.	<i>Maneuver and surprise.</i>
Attack weakness, avoid strength.	<i>Massed effects, maneuver, and surprise.</i>
Strike with extraordinary violence.	<i>Offensive, massed effects, and surprise.</i>
Press the fight – never let the enemy recover from the initial blow.	<i>Offensive, maneuver, massed effects, unity of effort, security, and exploitation.</i>
Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.	<i>Objective, unity of effort, economy of force, and simplicity.</i>
Plan for and resource the exploitation.	<i>Objective, offensive, exploitation, economy of force, and simplicity.</i>

Table 4-1: Application of Army Operations Principles to the Offensive Imperatives

Comparison of the Proposed Principles and the Defensive Imperatives

The six imperatives that guide commanders in conducting defensive operations are:

- (1) Maximize advantage through preparation.
- (2) Conceal and protect weakness.
- (3) Disrupt attack preparations.
- (4) Disrupt momentum of the attack.
- (5) Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.
- (6) Complement and follow the defense with offensive action.¹³⁸

Maximize advantage through preparation. Preparation is key to successful defensive operations. *Objective, massed effects, simplicity, unity of effort, and economy of force* are the key principles used in gaining maximum advantage through preparation. The Army force must know what needs to be accomplished and every defender must know what the *objective* of the defense is. Planning for the defense unifies the purpose of each subordinate force, concentrates the effects of combat power at the decisive point, and minimizes forces designated for secondary

efforts. The plan must be as simple as possible, maximizing the efforts of the defending force within a limited time.

Conceal and protect weakness. *Security* and *economy of force* guide commanders in this imperative. Preventing the enemy from gaining an advantage through the discovery of the defender's weakness is key to a successful defense. By assigning the minimum forces required to protect his weakness, the Army commander can confuse the attacker as to the orientation of the defense.

Disrupt attack preparations. *Offensive* and *surprise* are the principles of Army operations that spark Army forces to preempt enemy attacks. Though conducting defensive operations, Army forces continually seek to gain and maintain the initiative. Unexpected operations such as spoiling attacks and limited objective offensives can offset the attacker's offensive advantage, striking at the enemy when is preparing to attack rather than defend.

Disrupt momentum of the attack. The imperative to disrupt enemy attacks is derived from the principles of *offensive* and *security*. Once again, friendly *security* forces that seek to seize the initiative can severely hamper the enemy's advantage, blunting his offensive strike. By continually maintaining an *offensive* mindset, Army forces seek opportunity for defeating the enemy.

Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort. As in offensive operations, an understanding and application of *objective*, *unity of effort*, *economy of force*, *maneuver*, and *simplicity* assist the commander in designating, maintaining, and shifting the main effort.

Complement and follow the defense with offensive action. In essence, all the principles that guide the imperatives of the offensive apply here since this imperative emphasizes assuming or resuming offensive operations. *Objective*, *offensive*, *maneuver*, *massed effects*, *economy of force*, *surprise*, *simplicity*, and *exploitation* all apply. The principle of the *offensive* guides the

application of the other principles as Army forces seek to seize the initiative through local counterattacks and the eventual prosecution of offensive operations.

Table 4-2 lists the key principles of Army operations that apply to each imperative of defensive operations.

Defensive Imperative	Principles
Maximize advantage through preparation.	<i>Objective, massed effects, simplicity, unity of effort, and economy of force.</i>
Conceal and protect weakness.	<i>Security and economy of force.</i>
Disrupt attack preparations.	<i>Offensive and surprise.</i>
Disrupt momentum of the attack.	<i>Offensive and security.</i>
Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.	<i>Objective, unity of effort, economy of force, maneuver, and simplicity.</i>
Complement and follow the defense with offensive action.	<i>Objective, offensive, maneuver, massed effects, economy of force, surprise, simplicity, and exploitation.</i>

Table 4-2: Application of Army Operations Principles to the Defensive Imperatives

Comparison of the Proposed Principles and the Stability Imperatives

The coordinating draft of FM 100-5 describes seven stability imperatives which are:

- (1) Stress force protection.
- (2) Emphasize information operations.
- (3) Maximize interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation.
- (4) Display capability to apply force without threatening.
- (5) Understand potential for disproportionate consequences of individual and small unit actions.
- (6) Apply force selectively.
- (7) Act decisively to prevent escalation.¹³⁹

Stress force protection. *Security, offensive, morale, simplicity, and massed effects* are the principles of Army operations whereby commanders and soldiers ensure the protection of Army forces. This imperative is essential in stability operations, and Army forces must diligently and relentlessly prevent hostile factions from gaining an advantage. The *offensive* mindset assists commanders and soldiers in maintaining the initiative while bolstering *morale*, which can sag with the extended time factors associated with stability operations. Commanders employ the *massed effects* of combat power in a detailed, yet simple plan to keep belligerents off balance.

Emphasize information operations. Information operations enhance accomplishing Army objectives, and *maneuver, surprise, security, and exploitation* are the principles that guide information operations. The principle of *maneuver* applies to information operations in that the flexible application of media, communications, and psychological assets generates non-lethal combat power, which can be used to deceive and preempt hostile factions. This can assist in protecting Army forces, preventing the belligerents from using the media for their purposes, and providing opportunities subject to *exploitation*.

Maximize interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation. *Unity of effort* is the principle that governs cooperation, but *simplicity* and *economy of force* are valid principles as well for this imperative. Stability operations almost universally involve non-Army agencies as well as joint U.S. and foreign nation armed forces. In such an environment, the Army commander must ensure that he integrates Army forces into basic plans that facilitate cooperation and coordination. The Army commander employs sub-components of the Army force in the most effective manner possible, utilizing their capabilities as part of a unified effort. Additionally, clear, concise plans and orders are essential for minimizing confusion that could jeopardize cooperation between Army forces and external agencies.

Display capability to apply force without threatening. *Offensive, security, and surprise* are the principles of Army operations that guide the display of capabilities in a non-threatening way.

By seizing and maintaining the initiative, Army forces usually demonstrate their capabilities and indicate a willingness to apply force. This can influence the mental models of hostile factions, provoking them to think twice before acting against stability forces. The presence of Army security forces, sometimes quiet and rarely seen, also demonstrates response capability. When employed rapidly and decisively, Army capabilities *surprise* hostile forces. This in turn reinforces their mental model of Army capability and willingness to apply force.

Understand potential for disproportionate consequences of individual and small unit actions. Disproportionate consequences, especially in politically sensitive operations, can be minimized with the skillful application of *objective, unity of effort, and simplicity*. Having a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable *objective* that every commander and soldier understands provides the best method for limiting disproportionate consequences. Keeping the operation as simple as possible also minimizes the opportunities for ignition of individual matches that can burn the entire operational forest. Constant cooperation and coordination, internally among Army forces, and externally between other agencies, assist in maintaining extinguishers for small fires.

Apply force selectively. The principles of *objective, security, surprise, and economy of force* all provide instruction for selectively using force in stability operations. Understanding the ultimate goal of the stability operation assists Army commanders in determining when and how much force is required to attain the *objective*. While maintaining *security*, force is only used to prevent the hostile factions from gaining an advantage over Army forces. The unexpected use of force, rather than the continual use of force, keeps the belligerent forces guessing. This, combined with the proper employment and allocation of response forces, ensures that only the proper force is used at the appropriate place and time.

Act decisively to prevent escalation. At the heart of decisive action lie the principles of *objective, offensive, surprise, massed effects, unity of effort, security, and simplicity*. As always,

the ultimate goal enables decisive action. The *offensive* mindset cements resolve while seeking opportunities to decapitate any escalation. Using the concentrated effects of combat power in an unexpected manner, the Army force can overwhelm hostile efforts to increase hostility. Unified efforts in monitoring the situation as well as continuous security operations can detect fledgling conflagrations in their infancy, allowing Army forces to respond rapidly and decisively with clearly planned and directed contingency operations.

Table 4-3 lists the stability imperatives and the corresponding key principles of Army operations.

Stability Imperative	Principles
Stress force protection.	<i>Security, offensive, morale, simplicity, and massed effects.</i>
Emphasize information operations.	<i>Maneuver, surprise, security, and exploitation.</i>
Maximize interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation.	<i>Unity of effort, simplicity and economy of force.</i>
Display capability to apply force without threatening.	<i>Offensive, security, and surprise.</i>
Understand potential for disproportionate consequences of individual and small unit actions.	<i>Objective, unity of effort, and simplicity.</i>
Apply force selectively.	<i>Objective, security, surprise, and economy of force.</i>
Act decisively to prevent escalation.	<i>Objective, offensive, surprise, massed effects, unity of effort, security, and simplicity.</i>

Table 4-3: Application of Army Operations Principles to the Stability Imperatives

Comparison of the Proposed Principles and the Support Imperatives

The six imperatives of support operations are:

- (1) Always stress force protection.
- (2) Provide essential support to the largest number of people.
- (3) Coordinate actions with other agencies.
- (4) Hand off to civilian agencies as soon as feasible.
- (5) Establish measures of success.
- (6) Conduct robust civil affairs and information operations.¹⁴⁰

Always stress force protection. As in stability operations, force protection is extremely important, and the principles of *security, offensive, morale, simplicity, and massed effects* apply. The U.S. Army conducts support operations to assist civil authorities or to relieve suffering through humanitarian assistance. As such, Army forces conduct security operations to prevent non-hostile injuries and property protection. Even when the opponent is nature, seizing the initiative, developing a simple plan of action, and concentrating the effects of non-lethal combat power enable Army forces to accomplish the mission rapidly and successfully. The *morale* of the force is maintained and often enhanced through assistance rendered to victims of natural or man-made disasters, but the principle of *morale* is most essential for those victims. Improving the *morale* of the indigenous population assists in smoothing relief operations and speeds recovery of the area, in turn allowing Army forces to disengage from support operations.

Provide essential support to the largest number of people. *Objective, economy of force, massed effects, and simplicity* are the principles that best guide Army forces in providing essential support. An uncomplicated and unambiguous plan that focuses on a well-defined *objective* allows Army forces to meet the needs of the majority of disaster victims. By employing the proper forces, in light of their capabilities, and massing non-lethal combat power, commanders can assist the largest population possible.

Coordinate actions with other agencies. In support operations, Army forces are most usually placed in support of other agencies. Even so, *unity of effort, economy of force, simplicity,* and *security* are the principles that Army forces and commanders must bear in mind. Simple plans and cooperation with external agencies reduce misunderstanding and inter-agency tension. Using Army personnel and units with special skills in support of these agencies enhances agency appreciation for Army forces. Providing security for agency personnel, either directly or indirectly, also can endear external agencies to the Army force, enhancing *unity of effort*.

Hand-off to civilian agencies as soon as feasible. *Unity of effort, economy of force,* and *simplicity* are key principles to consider in planning and executing the transfer of operational responsibility to civilian agencies. In support operations, civilian agencies tend to be on-site sooner and remain later than Army forces. As such, it is necessary for Army commanders to develop clear and direct plans that are easily integrated into existing civilian plans and that facilitate eventual return to civilian control. Once again, proper employment of Army assets with the appropriate skills and capabilities enhances cooperation and transfer of control to civilian agencies.

Establish measures of success. The Army principles of *objective, offensive,* and *simplicity* all help a commander establish effective measures of success. Having a well-defined goal for the support operation provides a target around which the force commander can focus all efforts. Meeting the *objective* is the standard upon which success rests. By using an *offensive* mindset, Army planners forecast the standards that will allow the Army force to gain and maintain the initiative. Keeping the standards unambiguous allows the Army force to realize when it has achieved individual measures on the road to success.

Conduct robust civil affairs and information operations. The vital term in this imperative is robust, which demands the principles of *offensive, maneuver, massed effects, surprise, unity of effort, security,* and *exploitation*. As in stability operations, conducting effective information and

civil affairs operations allows the commander to maintain the initiative, mass the non-lethal effects of combat power, enhance cooperation and coordination among support agencies, prevent unforeseen circumstances from gaining the upper hand, and keep detractors of the support operation from gaining media exposure.

Table 4-4 lists the imperatives of Army support operations and the key principles that apply to each.

Support Imperative	Principles
Always stress force protection.	<i>Security, offensive, morale, simplicity, and massed effects.</i>
Provide essential support to the largest number of people.	<i>Objective, economy of force, massed effects, and simplicity.</i>
Coordinate actions with other agencies.	<i>Unity of effort, economy of force, simplicity, and security.</i>
Hand off to civilian agencies as soon as feasible.	<i>Unity of effort, economy of force, and simplicity.</i>
Establish measures of success.	<i>Objective, offensive, and simplicity.</i>
Conduct robust civil affairs and information operations.	<i>Offensive, maneuver, massed effects, surprise, unity of effort, security, and exploitation.</i>

Table 4-4: Application of Army Operations Principles to the Support Imperatives

Analysis Observations

The preceding analysis demonstrates that each principle of Army operations influences in some fashion the categories of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Most of the principles, in turn, are appropriate for forming the fundamental base for Army operations of the twenty-first century. Though it is not the purpose of this study to debate the merits of the principles of Army operations, two of the principles are newly introduced and have not been

subjected to extensive and spirited dialogue. As such, observations garnered from this study are warranted.

The first new principle that one encounters while reading the revised *Operations* is the principle of *exploitation*. This principle espouses taking advantage of and making lasting the temporary effects of battlefield success. In order to be fundamental to Army operations, *exploitation* must provide something unique, not found in the other principles. Unfortunately, *exploitation* does not pass this test.

In a sense, *exploitation* deals exclusively with mindset. BG Avraham Ayalon of the Israeli Defense Force said this about the principles: “If I were asked to sum up the contribution of the principles of war package to express a kind of superprinciple, I would use the expression ‘maximal exploitation of force.’”¹⁴¹ When Army forces gain temporary battlefield success, typically the initiative has passed from the enemy or hostile faction to friendly forces. The principle that governs “exploiting the initiative” is the *offensive*, not just in the sense of an action, but a mindset. The *offensive* mindset, when properly understood and applied, provides the impetus for taking advantage of battlefield success. The idea of *exploitation* is inherent in the *offensive* by definition, and Army doctrine even terms one type of offensive operation as “exploitation.”¹⁴² Embedded in the principle of *maneuver*, one can find the method for taking advantage of battlefield success. Commanders and units that continually seek to place the enemy in a disadvantageous position will naturally exploit any uncovered opportunity to do so.

With the introduction of *exploitation*, the FM 100-5 revision team is attempting to address an institutional problem with the principles of war and operations other than war. The debate over the applicability and usefulness of the principles found in professional journals and Army schools indicates that many soldiers do not understand the principles.¹⁴³ Adding another “principle” to solve the Army’s inability to communicate the mindset that *offensive* and *maneuver* should develop in its members is not contributing to the fundamental base of Army operations.

In short, *exploitation* provides no additional basic ideas for Army operations in offensive, defensive, stability, or support operations.

The second new principle is *morale*. Few, if any, professional soldiers would disagree that building, maintaining, and restoring fighting spirit is an important and perhaps key aspect of Army operations. Is it fundamental to Army operations, however? The analysis presented in this study indicates that it is not.

If *morale* is an important basic of Army operations, then is not leadership more so? Leadership is superior to *morale*; the former is a key element in the creation of the latter. Few instances in history indicate that excellent, or even good, morale exists in an army with poor leadership. FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, urges Army leaders to “develop morale and esprit in your unit” as one of the principles of motivation.¹⁴⁴ The principles of leadership found in FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, provide the “cornerstone for action” in developing proficient leaders and units with good morale.¹⁴⁵ No fewer than eight of the eleven principles of leadership speak to the leader’s responsibility for building and maintaining the fighting spirit of his or her unit. Even in arguing for *morale* as the tenth principle of war, COL Thomas B. Vaughn states that “... morale is a function of leadership. In short, good leaders create and sustain spirited units.”¹⁴⁶ Clearly, *morale* follows from leadership. Thus, should not leadership be the eleventh principle of Army operations rather than *morale*? The answer to this question is also no.

Unarguably, leadership has been very important to Army operations, and will continue to be so in the twenty-first century. In the past, leadership was considered as the most important element of combat power, followed by maneuver, firepower, and protection.¹⁴⁷ In the discussion about “the most essential dynamic of combat power” in which “leaders inspire soldiers with the will to win,” it is obvious that the authors of the 1993 version of *Operations* believed that *morale* is a subset of leadership, contributing to the combat power of an Army.¹⁴⁸ Unfortunately, the FM

100-5 revision team has discarded the dynamics of combat power, consequently ejecting the elements of leadership, and subsequently, *morale*. The idea of combat power is still present in the revised FM 100-5 as indicated by its inclusion in the definitions of maneuver and massed effects. However, the “core functions” have replaced the dynamics of combat power. MOVE replaces maneuver; STRIKE replaces firepower; SHIELD replaces protection; and SEE with SHAPE replace leadership in a nebulous manner. Insertion of *morale* as a principle of war seems to be a poor remedy for neglecting the elements of combat power.

Morale stems from well-trained, caring leaders who understand and apply the principles of war, the fundamentals of their profession. It is not a first principle from which the equations of Army operations are derived and documented in Army doctrine. As such, *morale* should not be included as one of the principles of Army operations.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

This study evaluated the eleven principles of Army operations against the imperatives of the four categories of operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support. The analysis demonstrated that each of the eleven principles can be applied in some respect to the imperatives. Table 5-1 provides a numerical assessment of key principles involved in the imperatives of each category.

The first nine principles, the traditional principles of war, have great utility in forming the fundamental base for Army operations. The two new principles, *exploitation* and *morale*, have less utility. When coupled with the arguments of Chapter Four, this eliminates these two principles from consideration as principles of Army operations.

Principles	Occurrences				Total
	Six Offensive Imperatives	Six Defensive Imperatives	Seven Stability Imperatives	Six Support Imperatives	
Objective	2	3	3	2	10 (40%)
Offensive	3	3	3	3	12 (48%)
Maneuver	3	2	1	1	7 (28%)
Massed Effects	3	2	2	3	10 (40%)
Economy of force	2	4	2	3	11 (44%)
Simplicity	2	3	4	5	14 (56%)
Surprise	3	2	4	1	10 (40%)
Unity of Effort	2	2	3	3	10 (40%)
Security	1	2	5	3	11 (44%)
Exploitation	2	1	1	1	5 (20%)
Morale	0	0	1	1	2 (8%)

Table 5-1: Occurrences of Each Principle of Army Operations Within the Imperatives of Army Operations

In revising FM 100-5, *Operations*, the revision team has done an admirable job in its attempt to cull the framework for Army operations from the frameworks of war and operations other than war. Integrating the spectrum of Army operations into four encompassing categories removes the distinction between preparing for war and supporting peace. By combining the principles of war and operations other than war, the revision team has set the course toward re-defining the balance between warfighting and everything else the Nation charges the Army with. As demonstrated in Table 5-1, the principles of Army operations that govern war continue to demonstrate their applicability to combat operations, and can greatly assist in non-combat operations. However, certain aspects of operations other than war that the nine traditional principles of war do not govern are certainly not represented by the addition of *exploitation* and *morale*. Those aspects of operations other than war that the 1993 version of *Operations* dealt with through *legitimacy*, *perseverance*, and *restraint* are left naked in the revised version.

The conclusion of this study leaves one wondering why the principles of war and operations other than war presented in 1993 were not simply combined to produce the principles of Army operations. The purpose of the revision team seems to have been to form one set of principles for the entire spectrum of Army operations. If the principles presented in Chapters 2 and 13 of the 1993 *Operations* formed the foundational basis for war and operations other than war doctrine, why not combine the two lists? Certainly, the projected environment for Army operations is not so different from 1993. Three of the six principles of operations other than war were common with the principles of war. By incorporating the three non-intersecting principles of *legitimacy*, *perseverance*, and *restraint* with the traditional principles of war, a fundamental base for Army operations becomes possible. These three principles have application across the spectrum of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. At the very least, their inclusion would be much more useful than the principles of *exploitation* and *morale*. Rather than eleven principles, there would be twelve. Table 5-2 presents recommended definitions for a set of principles for Army operations.

The purpose of this study was to determine whether the principles of Army operations in the revised FM 100-5 do indeed provide the basis for operations in the twenty-first century. One question was answered: do the proposed principles of operations form the foundation for the entire spectrum of conflict in which the Army operates? The answer is no. As presented by the revision team in FM 100-5, the principles of Army operations form the foundation for most aspects of Army operations, but those aspects requiring gaining and sustaining the willing acceptance of nations and peoples, preparing for the measured, protracted application of military capabilities, and applying appropriate military capability prudently are neglected. Therefore, the principles of Army operations presented in the revised FM 100-5, *Operations*, do not provide a fundamental base for Army operations of the twenty-first century.

Principle	Definition
Objective	Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal.
Offensive	Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Maneuver	Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
Massed Effects	Concentrate the effects of combat power in a decisive manner in time and space.
Economy of force	Allocate combat power so that every capability effectively supports the main effort; minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
Simplicity	Prepare clear, uncomplicated concepts and plans and direct, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
Surprise	Achieve effects disproportionate to the effort by taking unexpected action.
Unity of Effort	Achieve common purpose and direction through unity of command, coordination, and cooperation.
Security	Never permit an enemy or a hostile faction to acquire an unexpected advantage.
Legitimacy	Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
Perseverance	Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
Restraint	Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

Table 5-2: The Twelve Proposed Principles of Army Operations

VI. Summary

Military historians and theoreticians developed the principles of war through the study of battles and conflicts of the past. If the past is a window to the future, the principles of war will continue to form the foundation for warfighting doctrine in the next century. The past also

indicates that the Army of the future will have to concern itself with much more than fighting the Nation's wars. War, and everything else, requires the Army to focus on Army operations. Hence, the Army requires a new set of principles to form the fundamental base for Army operations doctrine, the principles of Army operations.

The revised FM 100-5, *Operations*, to be published in 1998 addresses the principles of Army operations. This study evaluated the proposed principles by providing a synopsis of the principles of war and operations other than war found in the 1993 version of FM 100-5; comparing the 1993 principles to the proposed principles of Army operations; and analyzing the proposed principles in light of the imperatives of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations found in the revised FM 100-5. The purpose of the study was to determine if the proposed principles do indeed form the fundamental base for Army operations of the twenty-first century. The study found that the principles of Army operations, as proposed in the revised FM 100-5, do not meet the requirements for forming the foundation for twenty-first century doctrine. Certain aspects of the full spectrum of Army operations, particularly of establishing *legitimacy*, maintaining *perseverance*, and applying *restraint* were omitted from the coordinating draft of FM 100-5 dated 14 January 1997. This was at the expense of two new principles, *exploitation* which duplicates the function of *offensive* and *maneuver*, and *morale*, twice removed from the true principles. Consequently, the proposed principles fall short of providing the fundamental basis for Army operations of the twenty-first century.

NOTES

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 70-71.

² *Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), A-1.

³ *Operations, FM 100-5* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 2-4.

⁴ LTC Michael L Combest, *Revised FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Address to School of Advanced Military Studies, 8 January 1997).

⁵ Harry G., Jr Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: The Presidio Press, 1982), 197.

⁶ *FM 100-5* (1993), 13-0.

⁷ *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1977), 915.

⁸ *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition* Microsoft Bookshelf Electronic Version licensed from InfoSoft International, Inc. (: Houghton Mifflin company, 1992).

⁹ MAJ John A Graham, *An Historical Analysis of the Principles Employed by Frederick the Great and Joseph E. Johnston in the Conduct of War at the Operational Level* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 14 May 1985), 5, 6.

¹⁰ *Webster's*, 915, and *American Heritage*.

¹¹ *FM 100-5* (1993), 2-4.

¹² *Theory and Dynamics of Tactical Operations, ROTCM 145-60* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 10 March 1972), 227.

¹³ Russell F Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), 213.

¹⁴ William T., Douglas V. Johnson II, James O. Kievit, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Steven Metz Johnsen, *The Principles of War in the 21st Century: Strategic Considerations* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 August 1995), 4-6.

¹⁵ Samuel B Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 73.

¹⁶ Summers, 198.

¹⁷ *FM 100-5* (1993), 2-4.

¹⁸ COL J.F.C Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Command and General Staff College Press (Reprint), 1993), 335.

¹⁹ Summers, 199.

²⁰ ROTCM 145-60, 228.

²¹ Clausewitz, 530, 531.

²² Griffith, 77, 78.

²³ Fuller, 335.

²⁴ FM 100-5 (1993), 2-5.

²⁵ Fuller, 218.

²⁶ ROTCM 145-60, 229-230.

²⁷ Summers, 200.

²⁸ Griffith, 102.

²⁹ Clausewitz, 541.

³⁰ Weigley, 214.

³¹ Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art of War* Condensed version published in Roots of Strategy Book 2 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 461.

³² FM 100-5 (1993), 2-5.

³³ FM 100-5 (1993), 2-4.

³⁴ Clausewitz, 194.

³⁵ FM 100-5 (1993), 2-9.

³⁶ Jomini, 461.

³⁷ Clausewitz, 204.

³⁸ ROTCM 145-60, 229.

³⁹ Summers, 200.

⁴⁰ FM 100-5 (1993), 2-5.

⁴¹ FM 100-5 (1993), 2-5.

⁴² Summers, 200.

⁴³ ROTCM 145-60, 229.

⁴⁴ Weigley, 214.

⁴⁵ Clausewitz, 213.

⁴⁶ Summers, 200.

⁴⁷ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-5.

⁴⁸ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-6.

⁴⁹ Weigley, 214.

⁵⁰ Clausewitz, 119.

⁵¹ *ROTCM 145-60*, 228.

⁵² Summers, 204.

⁵³ *Infantry in Battle* (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal Inc., 1939), 35.

⁵⁴ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-5.

⁵⁵ Summers, 203.

⁵⁶ Johnsen *et al*, 20.

⁵⁷ Weigley, 214.

⁵⁸ Clausewitz, 198.

⁵⁹ Griffith, 53, 54.

⁶⁰ Robert J. (General Editor) Spiller, *Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Command and General Staff College Press, 1992), 231.

⁶¹ *Infantry in Battle*, 107.

⁶² *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-5.

⁶³ *ROTCM 145-60*, 229.

⁶⁴ Summers, 201.

⁶⁵ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-5.

⁶⁶ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-5.

⁶⁷ Weigley, 214.

⁶⁸ Johnsen *et al*, 22.

⁶⁹ Summers, 202.

⁷⁰ *ROTCM 145-60*, 230.

⁷¹ Fuller, 314, 315.

⁷² Summers, 202.

⁷³ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-5.

⁷⁴ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-3.

⁷⁵ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁷⁶ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁷⁷ *Peace Operations, FM 100-23* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 16.

⁷⁸ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-5.

⁷⁹ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁸⁰ *FM 100-23*, 16.

⁸¹ *FM 100-23*, 17.

⁸² *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁸³ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁸⁴ BG Morris J. Boyd, "Peace Operations: A Capstone Document," *Military Review* 65, no. 3 (May-June 1995): 24.

⁸⁵ *Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 5 December 1990), 1-6.

⁸⁶ *FM 100-23*, 18.

⁸⁷ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁸⁸ *FM 100-23*, 18.

⁸⁹ *FM 100-20*, 1-6.

⁹⁰ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁹¹ Boyd, 24.

⁹² *FM 100-20*, 1-6.

⁹³ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁹⁴ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁹⁵ Boyd, 25.

⁹⁶ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 13-4.

⁹⁷ *FM 100-23*, 17.

⁹⁸ *Operations, FM 100-5 (Coordinating Draft)* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: FM 100-5 Team. 14 January 1997), II-2-2.

⁹⁹ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-2.

¹⁰⁰ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-2.

¹⁰¹ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-2, 3.

¹⁰² *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-3.

¹⁰³ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-3.

¹⁰⁴ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-4.

¹⁰⁵ Combest Briefing. *Massed effects, economy of force, and morale* each have two definitions in this paper. The first is that from the coordinating draft of FM 100-5. The second is from the 5 January 1997 briefing by LTC Combest. These have been included to show the reader that the definitions are not settled and provide broader scope for discussion.

¹⁰⁶ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-4.

¹⁰⁷ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-4.

¹⁰⁸ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-4.

¹⁰⁹ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-4.

¹¹⁰ Combest Briefing.

¹¹¹ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-4.

¹¹² *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-5.

¹¹³ *American Heritage*.

¹¹⁴ *American Heritage*

¹¹⁵ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-5.

¹¹⁶ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-5.

¹¹⁷ *Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939*, 231.

¹¹⁸ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-5.

¹¹⁹ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-6.

¹²⁰ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-5.

¹²¹ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-6.

¹²² *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-7.

¹²³ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-7.

¹²⁴ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-7.

¹²⁵ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-7.

¹²⁶ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-8.

¹²⁷ *Combest Briefing*.

¹²⁸ *Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939*, 181.

¹²⁹ Clausewitz, 186.

¹³⁰ Jomini, 459.

¹³¹ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-8.

¹³² *Infantry in Battle*, 355.

¹³³ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-overview-1. The eleven principles are those discussed in Chapter Three. The five core functions Army forces take to apply military power are: see, shape, strike, shield, and move. There are two types of operating systems: engagement systems and integrating systems. The six engagement systems that apply effects to achieve objectives are: information dominance, maneuver, air defense, reconnaissance/surveillance/intelligence, mobility/survivability, and fire support. The two integrating systems that enable the application and orchestration of engagement systems are command and control and combat service support. The four categories of Army operations are: offensive, defensive, stability, and support. The coordinating draft posits that effective operations combine the principles, functions, operating systems, and categories and demonstrate the five characteristics of Army operations: agility, versatility, orchestration, initiative, and depth (AVOID).

¹³⁴ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-2-1.

¹³⁵ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, II-overview-1.

¹³⁶ The coordinating draft states that the imperatives are applied by combining core functions and operating systems (IV-1-2), guiding commanders (IV-2-2), and helping forces develop concepts and schemes (IV-3-2).

¹³⁷ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, IV-1-2.

¹³⁸ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, IV-2-2.

¹³⁹ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, IV-3-2.

¹⁴⁰ *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, IV-4-2.

¹⁴¹ BG Avraham Ayalon, "Advantages and Limitations of the Principles of War," *Military Review* 67, no. 7 (July 1987): 43.

¹⁴² *FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft*, IV-1-17.

¹⁴³ The reader is directed to the bibliography, which represents only a small portion of the professional debate over the traditional principles of war. Of particular interest is the school of thought which believes that principles based on historical study should not, and even can not, be applied to today's intricate conflicts. This reminds one of King Solomon's admonition in Ecclesiastes 1:9, "That which has been is that which will be, and that which has been done is that which will be done. So, there is nothing new under the sun."

¹⁴⁴ *Military Leadership, FM 22-100* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31 October 1983), 228.

¹⁴⁵ *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, FM 22-103* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 21 June 1987), 81-83. The principles of leadership are:

1. Know yourself and seek self-improvement.
2. Be technically and tactically proficient.
3. Seek and take responsibility.
4. Make sound and timely decisions.
5. Set the example.
6. Know your soldiers and look out for their well-being.
7. Keep your soldiers informed.
8. Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates.
9. Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.
10. Build the team.
11. Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities.

¹⁴⁶ COL Thomas B Vaughn, "Morale: The 10th Principle of War," *Military Review* 63, no. 5 (May 1983): 26.

¹⁴⁷ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-10 - 2-12.

¹⁴⁸ *FM 100-5 (1993)*, 2-11.

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