Intelligence Planning for Airborne Operations: A Perspective from Operation Market-Garden,
Abstract
This monograph discusses the complex relationship between intelligence and operational planning from the perspective of a World War II combined and joint operation, Operation Market-Garden. Operation Market-Garden was the largest airborne operation in history and is an excellent example of the use of airborne forces in an operational role. This monograph first examines the uniqueness of airborne operations and the added complexity of planning and executing these operations. The operational setting in which Market-Garden was executed is also discussed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the causes and effects behind the failure of this operation. It also investigates the importance of the effects of terrain and weather on airborne operations and specifically how they effected Market-Garden. Next this monograph investigates the widely held "myth of an intelligence failure" in Operation Market-Garden. The use of intelligence for Market-Garden planners and decision makers is evaluated using the intelligence cycle found in U.S. Army Field Manual 34-3, Intelligence Analysis. This monograph also examines why Allied leaders made decisions that in retrospect seem senseless based on the information available to intelligence planners and decision makers. Finally, this monograph discusses the linkage of World War II airborne planning to XVIII Airborne Corps intelligence planning, and provides insight on the differences in planning for airborne operations since Operation Market-Garden.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 22, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA331290
Entities
People
- Arnold C. Piper
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College