

**STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW THE UNITED STATES
ARMY EUROPE DEPLOYED VII CORPS TO SOUTHWEST ASIA AND THE 1ST
ARMORED DIVISION TO BOSNIA**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW THE UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE DEPLOYED VII CORPS TO SOUTHWEST ASIA AND THE 1ST ARMORED DIVISION TO BOSNIA by MAJ Bruce E. Akard, USA, 84 pages.

This study investigates the effectiveness and efficiency in which the United States Army Europe has strategically deployed forces from Germany. As the United States Army Europe decreases in size and the United States looks to a continental-based military force, how does Europe fit into the strategic deployment of forces throughout the world? For this reason it is imperative that there is an understanding of how United States Army Europe deployed and interacted with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and how they will deploy should the need arise in the near future.

The study first analyzes two recent United States Army Europe deployments. These two deployments VII Corps mission to Southwest Asia and Operation Joint Endeavor provide an anatomy of a strategic deployment from a transportation point of view. The study delves into the doctrine that encompasses a strategic deployment and also looks at North Atlantic Treaty Organization's doctrine for strategic deployments. The study then compares the two recent deployments to determine any similarities and identify the differences. This comparison provides the means to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of each deployment and to identify the shortfalls that occurred. The study concludes by providing recommendations for improvements to the United States Army Europe's strategic deployment system that will allow it to better serve the commander.

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ACRONYMS

ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
AD	Armored Division
ADAMS	Allied Deployment and Movement System
ADANS	Airlift Deployment Analysis System
ADL	Allied Disposition List
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces South
AMC	Air Mobility Command
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
ATO	Air Tasking Order
AUEL	Automated Unit Equipment List
BENELUX	Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg
CAB	Combat Aviation Brigade
CALM	Computer Aided Load Manifest
CAP	Crisis Action Plan
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CENTCOM	Central Command
CINC	Commander-In-Chief

CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMMC	Corps Movement Control Center
CMOS	Cargo Movements Operating System
COA	Course of Action
COMMZ	Communication Zone
COMPASS	Computerized Movement Planning Status System
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
CRAFT	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSC	Convoy Support Center
DACG	Departure Airfield Control Group
DAT	Deployment Action Team
DB	Duetsches Bundesbahn
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff Operations
DDP	Detailed Deployment Plans
DEL	Deployment Equipment List
DOD	Department of Defense
DTO	Division Transportation Office
EUCOM	European Command
FM	Field Manual
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
GTN	Global Transportation Network
ICFY	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

IFOR	Implementation Force
ISB	Intermediate Support Base
ITO	Installation Transportation Office
ITV	Intransit Visibility
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMCC	Joint Movement Control Center
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning Execution System
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
LOC	Line of Communication
LOGMARS	Logistical Application of Marking and Reading Symbolology
LOI	Letter of Instruction
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACOM	Major Command
MCC	Movement Control Center
MCT	Movement Control Team
METT-T	Mission Equipment Terrain Troops-Time
MPS	Military Pre-positioned Ships
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTMC-E	Military Traffic Management Command Europe
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
NSE	National Support Element

OCONUS	Outside Continental United States
OJE	Operation Joint Endeavor
OPLANS	Operational Plans
OPORD	Operations Order
POD	Port of Debarkation
POE	Port of Embarkation
RAMCC	Regional Air Movement Control Center
RDD	Required Delivery Date
REFORGER	Return of Forces to Germany
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SETAF	Southern European Task Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SPOD	Sea Port of Debarkation
SOR	Statement of Requirements
STACCS-E	Standard Army Command and Control System Europe
STANAG	Standardization Agreement
SWA	Southwest Asia
TAACOM	Theater Army Area Command
TAMCA	Theater Army Movement Control Agency
TC-ACCIS	Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System
TCC	Transportation Component Command
TCMD	Transportation Control Movement Document
TCN	Transportation Control Number
TEA	Transportation Engineering Agency

TFE	Task Force Eagle
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time Phased Force Deployment List
ULN	Unit Line Number
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
U.S.	United States
USAFE	United States Air Force Europe
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USCINTRANS	United States Commander-In-Chief Transportation
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VOPP	Vance Owen Peace Plan
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Strategic deployment is the strategic relocation and concentration of forces and their support base (manpower and logistics) from CONUS into a theater, from CONUS to CONUS, from OCONUS to OCONUS, or from OCONUS to CONUS in response to a military need or crisis.

Deployments may take the form of a forcible entry for crisis response or unopposed entry for natural disasters or humanitarian assistance.¹

U.S. Army, FM 100-17

The deployment of United States (U.S.) forces for Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) started on 9 December 1995, when the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) deployed the 1st Armored Division (AD) to Bosnia, as well as additional support forces to Hungary and Croatia. The deployment was the first strategic movement of U.S. forces for USAREUR from Germany since VII Corps deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA) in 1990.

The 1st AD briefed their initial deployment plan for Bosnia to V Corps Commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) John Abrams, in August 1995.² The deployment concept employed a national support element (NSE) package, which contained the V Corps engineers that would span the Sava River. The NSE package also contained the combat service and service support elements necessary to open the intermediate staging base (ISB) in Zupanja, Croatia and Taszar, Hungary and the lines of communication (LOC) in Tuzla, Bosnia. The plan was for minimum essential force to be deployed early and the ground forces to follow later.

In October 1995 V Corps, Southern European Task Force (SETAF), and the 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) sent planning personnel to Grafenwoehr, Germany, to finalize

deployment plans for sending troops to Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia. The deployment planning process increased significantly with the peace talks set for Dayton, Ohio, on 5 November 1995. The former warring faction commitment to sign a peace accord developed a sense of urgency within USAREUR to deploy forces from Germany to Bosnia.

A strategic deployment scenario, as outlined in Field Manual (FM) 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, is the relocation and concentration of forces and their support base from the continental United States (CONUS) into a theater, from CONUS to CONUS, from outside continental United States (OCONUS) to OCONUS, or from OCONUS to CONUS in response to a military need or crisis.³ The deployment of U.S. forces and their support base from Germany to Hungary, Croatia and Bosnia falls into the doctrinal definition as prescribed in FM 100-17 for a strategic deployment.

An advance team deployed on 26 November 1995 to Taszar, Hungary, to open the ISB. The deployment of the main body of U.S. forces from Germany began on 9 December 1995, five days prior to the peace accord signing on 14 December and thirteen days after the advance team had been sent to Hungary. For this deployment, air, rail, and road would transport personnel and equipment. The majority of personnel and equipment were deployed by road and rail to the ISB in Taszar, Hungary. There the troops and equipment were task organized and convoyed by road to Bosnia.

The deployment was the first time that the U.S. forces and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces ever deployed out of sector together. The 1st AD, as part of the Dayton Accord mandated Implementation Force (IFOR), was under the operational control of NATO. The deployment of other NATO forces (i.e., Germany, Great Britain, France, and Norway) as well as non-NATO forces (i.e., Russia) created a new set of considerations for the integration of the U.S. forces (i.e., 1st AD) into the NATO deployment system.

Both NATO and the U.S. Army developed doctrine to use as an instrument to deploy forces throughout the world. To provide an understanding of how USAREUR deployed its forces, this study must also examine the pertinent U.S. Army doctrine. Since the deployment was also a NATO operation, the study must also examine how NATO deployed and examine its systems used for management. Looking at these two systems should give insight into how both USAREUR and NATO deployed and how the systems were integrated.

Primary Research Question

The background and situation as described above led to the following primary research question: How did USAREUR deploy its forces to Bosnia for OJE? The thesis will focus on how USAREUR deployments evolved with the addition of NATO as a participant in Operation Joint Endeavor. The first case study will examine how USAREUR deployed VII Corps from Germany for Operation Desert Shield/Storm. This deployment was strictly a U.S. operation. The second case study will examine how USAREUR deployed with NATO for OJE. Then a comparative analysis will be done on how the two deployment systems, U.S. and NATO, are used to deploy the force.

The final analysis will then compare the two deployments and focus on the evolution of U.S. deployments, working more closely with NATO. It is important to look at the NATO system to see what impact it had upon the U.S. doctrinal deployment system and the evolution of future combined deployment systems. Some of the principal subordinate questions that must be answered in this project include questions of doctrine, strategic deployment systems, and forward-deployed forces.

Doctrine. What constitutes a strategic deployment? How does USAREUR conduct a strategic deployment? How is strategic deployment linked to the NATO system, and how is it important to U.S. doctrine?

Strategic Deployment System. Can the U.S. deployment system be integrated with the NATO deployment system?

Forward Deployed Forces. Do forward-deployed forces fit in the realm of strategic deployment as described by doctrine?

Research Method

A comparative analysis approach will be used to complete this research project. It will examine the way in which a force deploys over time. The comparison will be accomplished by researching two different USAREUR deployment scenarios. The first case study will focus on how USAREUR deployed the VII Corps to SWA. The second will focus on the USAREUR deployment of forces with NATO to Bosnia for OJE. The comparison will show the differences, if any between the two strategic deployments and how they have evolved in USAREUR. The study will further discover what effect the NATO allied deployment and movement system (ADAMS) had, if any, on the U.S. joint operation, planning, and execution system (JOPES).

The research of these two case studies will examine how the variables of JOPES and ADAMS were being utilized by these deployments and if U.S. doctrine is still applicable. A case study shows that solutions are dependent on the problem, the commander's intent, and the resources available.⁴ This approach allows for the application of doctrine and the utilization of the deployment tools for each case. Both case studies involved large forces from Germany, but only the OJE mission was linked to NATO. By analyzing how USAREUR deployed VII Corps and comparing this to the USAREUR deployment of forces to Bosnia, a determination of what effects NATO had upon JOPES can be made. The effects that are of concern are NATO's deployment planning and the interaction of ADAMS to JOPES.

The deployment process includes five phases; predeployment activities, movement to port of embarkation (POE), strategic lift, theater reception, and theater onward movement. The first three phases are considered strategic deployment while the other two were considered to be operational and tactical. This thesis will examine the strategic phases of this process and how USAREUR utilized them during this two case studies deployment.

Phase I: Pre-deployment Activities. This phase includes the deliberate/crisis-action planning; task organization; echeloning; tailored units; and mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time (METT-T). This phase will develop the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), automated unit equipment list (AUEL), and the deployment equipment list (DEL).⁵

Phase II: Movement to the Port of Embarkation (POE). This phase includes the unit movement instructions from the transportation component commands (TCCs). Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) specifies the movement directive when unit equipment is required at the POE for loading aboard strategic lift.⁶ The air mobility command (AMC) specifies, through the air tasking order (ATO), using the airlift deployment analysis system (ADANS), when unit equipment is required at the POE.⁷

Phase III: Strategic Lift. This phase begins with the departure from the POE on strategic lift assets. The TCCs are responsible for strategic transportation of forces. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for intransit visibility (ITV) of forces. The ITV data, coupled with the movement coordinators provide the force tracking required by the supported combat commanders.⁸

Phase IV: Theater Reception. This phase involves the arrival of forces and sustainment at the point of debarkation (POD) in the theater and ends with the departure of the forces or sustainment from the POD.⁹ This would then become the responsibility of the theater.

Phase V: Theater Onward Movement. This phase begins with the link up of equipment and personnel. Forces are reconfigured at designated marshalling areas, and it now becomes a supported commander's responsibility.

Assumptions

1. Access to sufficient information, operational plans (OPLANS), reports, lessons learned, and other data, both classified and unclassified with which to accurately depict, describe, and analyze deployment during Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation Desert Shield.
2. The phases selected to critique are appropriate and valid; therefore the findings of this research will be applicable for other operations.
3. Delimitation of the research model to the strategic deployment phase of the operation is appropriate to the project and will be useful for future planners.

Scope

To answer the basic research question and inherent subsequent questions, the scope of this thesis will include a review of Army doctrine. A review of the strategic activities that occurred from November through December 1990 for the deployment of VII Corps to Southwest Asia and from October 1995 through January 1996 for Operation Joint Endeavor. This project will conclude by determining the effective uses of deployment.

Significance of the Study

The research that strives to answer these questions is important because of the shrinking military force, budget, and increasing military missions. Commanders and staff must have the information and doctrine available to them to plan and project U.S. forces around the world. This research project will help future commanders correctly apply or modify doctrinal strategic deployment

phases to support their future missions. In addition, this project may reveal doctrinal shortfalls in the strategic deployment system, which may give rise to new techniques or procedures.

¹U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 October 1992), 4-1.

²U.S. Army, V Corps, Task Force Eagle Deployment Assessment. Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, February 1996. 2.

³U.S. Army, FM 100-17, 4-1.

⁴Roy D. Shapiro and James L. Heskett, Logistics Strategy, Cases and Concepts (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1985), viii.

⁵U.S. Army, FM 100-17, 4-16.

⁶*Ibid.*, 4-13.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*

CHAPTER TWO

ARMY DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

Introduction

There are two purposes of this chapter: first to examine U.S. Army doctrine that pertains to planning processes, data processing systems, and the three phases of strategic deployment and second to examine how NATO handles strategic deployments. The first part of the Joint Operation Planning Execution System (JOPES) includes the deployment planning process. This process prepares units for crisis action and force-projection missions.¹ Particular procedures of the deployment planning process depend on the time available. When time is not the crucial factor, deliberate planning is used. When time is short and there is an expected deployment or employment then crisis action planning (CAP) is used.

The second part critical to the deliberate and crisis-action planning process is the data processing systems. Those systems integrate the developed plans into JOPES. JOPES functions to support the commanders and staff by working to streamline the operational processes for the strategic deployment.

The third part critical to deployment is the three phases of strategic deployment. Phase I is the pre-deployment activities. These activities include task organizing, echelon, tailored units, automated unit equipment list (AUEL) and deployment equipment list (DEL). Phase II is the movement to the port of embarkation (POE). Phase II begins with receipt of the movement directive. The directive specifies the dates the unit is to arrive at the seaport of debarkation (SPOD) /airport of debarkation (APOD). The movement directive is linked through JOPES to USTRANSCOM and their availability to provide


strategic lift within a given timeframe. The units are then validated and configured for movement, which is the tailoring process.² Phase III will examine the strategic lift from the SPOD and APOD. See figure 1 for an outline of the strategic phases and how the deployment planning process is developed within those phases.

The final part of this chapter will examine the Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS). ADAMS is NATO's operational system for planning and executing deployment functions. ADAMS supports the planning and management of the movement and transportation of forces and supplies from the NATO nations.³ The system was developed to exchange background mobility data and plans of the detailed deployment plans (DDP). ADAMS is linked between all NATO countries, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH). The communication link between countries allows ADAMS to deconflict countries DDP with other nations and the allied movement staff. ADAMS main functions are database management, force planning, movement and transportation planning, sustainment planning and mobility simulation and force tracking of all modes of transportation (i.e., sea, air, road, rail, and inland waterways).

Deployment Planning in Predeployment Activities

Deliberate Planning

JOPES was developed to translate policy decisions into operation plans or orders in support of national security objectives.⁴ The deliberate planning process is used when time permits the total participation of the commanders. Deliberate planning method was utilized in the development of the plan for the Persian Gulf conflict. Central Command (CENTCOM) had prepared a concept plan (CONPLAN) for addressing the Iraqi threat in the spring of 1990.⁵ GEN Schwarzkopf, the CENTCOM Commander, had arranged to conduct an exercise, INTERNAL LOOK 90, in July to test



¹ Mobilization, deployment, and employment

² Cross-level personnel/equipment, order logistics, train, POM, and validate.

Figure 1

Source: U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-17, 4-16.

certain aspects of the plan. The deliberate planning process used during this timeframe (spring-summer 1990) enabled CENTCOM to have the needed edge to deploy forces into SWA.

Deliberate planning develops a plan to support a specific commander-in-chief (CINC) contingency within his area of responsibility (AOR). The deliberate planning process will result in either an OPLAN or a CONPLAN and is continuous from the initial task assignment until the task is canceled or completed.

The deliberate planning process is conducted in five phases. Phase I begins when the CINC is assigned a task by the National Command Authority (NCA). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) apportion the major forces to the CINC for planning purposes. This process is fluid and will continuously overlap into the different phases. Deliberate planning is an ever-evolving process as was seen in the development of Operations Plan 90-1002. "Ten-oh-two," as it was called, had been developed in the early 1980s, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had drafted a battle plan to fight the Soviet Union or Iran.⁶

Phase II begins when the CINC approves a mission statement and determines a concept of operation for the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) approval. The mission statement and initial concept of operation is then sent to the subordinate and supporting commanders for them to begin planning. CONPLAN developed in this system, by the subordinate and supporting commanders are constantly modified and redeveloped to meet new requirements as time progresses. OPLAN 90-1002 was modified and evolved into the plan for the defense of Saudi Peninsula.

If the purpose is to develop an OPLAN, then Phase III of the deliberate planning process will begin. Subordinate and supporting commanders determine the required support and sustainment for the operation. The CINC has the supported commander conduct a gross transportation feasibility study to insure the plan is supportable. If the plan is determined to have transportation deficiencies it is sent back with the rationale and recommendation as to what is required. Once the plan is determined supportable, the services identify actual units to be used in the plan. OPLAN 90-1002 developed a detailed transportation and logistic plan, which included the shipment of ammunition, supplies and equipment from military pre-positioned ships (MPS) at Diego Garcia.⁷

The TPFDD is developed through force planning based on CJSC and Service guidance and doctrine. The forces apportioned to the CINCs for operation planning are designated in the Joint Strategic Planning Community (JSCP). The forces specified in the OPLANS will be those projected to be the resources available. The TPFDD will include the assigned, augmentation, and supporting forces

to be deployed to the area of operation and the forces stationed within the area of operation. The time phasing of the TPFDD is prepared using backward planning which begins with the geographic location where the force is to be deployed.⁸ The TPFDD will have the required delivery date (RDD), assigned by the CINC, which determine interim dates for arrival at POD, ISB, POE, and origin of departure.

Units requiring two or more transportation modes will be split into two or more TPFDD force records to ensure proper scheduling, manifesting and tracking in JOPES.⁹ The splitting of units was utilized when VII Corps deployed to SWA. The VII Corps equipment was split into several different ships and the personnel were flown into country. Unit equipment alone was dispersed among as many as seven different vessels for shipment to SWA. The splitting of equipment and personnel into several different modes of transportation requires more than one entry into JOPES to ensure proper force tracking.

Crisis Action Planning (CAP)

Crisis action planning procedures are similar to those of deliberate planning except when time constraints are the dominant factors. See figure 2 for the process development. Deliberate planning supports CAP by anticipating potential crises and operations, developing contingency plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of courses of action and execution planning during crisis.¹⁰ The availability of planning time is greatly reduced (hours/days vs. 18-24 months); the NCA approves the course of action and crisis action planning results in an operation order (OPORD) rather than an operation/contingency plan (OPLAN/CONPLAN).

In the first case study, Desert Shield did not have either an OPLAN or CONPLAN for the deployment of VII Corps troops to SWA. Planners had not foreseen a potential mission to deploy Germany-based troops out of theater, so they had not used the available time to utilize the deliberate planning process. The use of the CAP allowed USAREUR and VII Corps to quickly develop an




Figure 2
Source: U.S. Army, FM 100-17, A-1

OPORD to control the deployment to SWA. The second case study of USAREUR deployment of forces to Bosnia for OJE had an OPLAN/CONPLAN to draw from. Because of prior political conditions, USAREUR had been given the mission since 1993 to have a contingency plan for Bosnia and thus had utilized the deliberate planning process.

Because crises are fluid and involve dynamic events, planning procedures must be flexible.¹¹ Our planning procedures describe a logical sequence, beginning with the crisis and progressing through

the employment. Key points, which require decisions, are identified in the sequences. These key activities and phases of crisis action planning are described below.

The beginning of Phase I starts when a situation develops that involves our national security interests or has implications on U.S. policy. The NCA and the CJCS receive an assessment from the CINC. This assessment report provides as much information as possible about the nature of the crisis, forces available, major constraints to employment, actions being taken, if any, within the rules of engagement (ROE). The CINC's report will contain discussion on various COAs under consideration or recommendation.

In the Persian Gulf crisis, President Bush decided to build up the forces further so that the coalition forces could go on the offensive, if they so desired. GEN Powell then unveiled GEN Schwarzkopf's request to double the size of the force. VII Corps became the central feature of the deployment.¹² The notification by the JCS to EUCOM of the possible deployment of the VII Corps to SWA caused the USAREUR and VII Corps staff to begin the crisis action planning process.

Phase II begins when the JCS and the NCA receive assessments/reports from the supported commander and ends when a decision has been made that a military course of action must be developed. The JCS reviews current strategy and OPLAN data in JOPES and evaluates reports from the CINCs. The responsible CINC continues to issue reports and evaluate the crisis and the disposition of assigned and available forces. The assessment of the situation in SWA and reports submitted by the supported commander, which was CENTCOM, allowed the JCS and NCA to decide what military course of action was to be developed.

Phase III begins with the development of the course of action. It can be an existing OPLAN/CONPLAN or it may be a completely new plan. During the development and evaluation of this course of action the CINC assigns tasks to subordinate commands. Concurrently, USTRANSCOM prepares deployment estimates of required lift assets and the JCS reviews the CINC's estimate that was

submitted in Phase I of the situation development. USCINCTRANS reviews the status of strategic lift assets and port facilities. The review of the strategic lift assets to be utilized is required to ensure the proper amount of air and sea assets are available to move the expected requirements. The review of the air and sea facilities is required to ensure the strategic lift assets can be utilized in those facilities and at what rate the assets can flow into them. The rate of flow of forces through a facility is essential to determine the validity of the TPFDD.

The review of strategic lift and port facilities was essential before VII Corps deployed from Europe. The estimation of space requirements by MTMC-E was critical before requesting the ships necessary to move a corps. The estimation of equipment and ships required moving the VII Corps was essential in the decision to open more than one port.

If an OPLAN is used, then a TPFDD may exist that allows a deployment estimate to be computed from thus giving a base to start from. The OPLAN TPFDD expedites the planning process but must be flexible to meet the current contingency situation. Planning and execution can also be accomplished concurrently and execution started without a plan as was the case in Operation Desert Shield.¹³ The deployment plan was developed during the CAP but there was no OPLAN/CONPLAN from which to modify the deployment.

Once the CINC determines the requirements and the plan is agreed upon by the NCA, the JSCP places resources against the requirements. Units are then mobilized in order to deploy the main force. Deployments such as those required in crisis action planning create problems when the units required to deploy the force are not available. The deployment of V Corps forces to Bosnia depended upon the ability of units to open and run the Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG). The unit that was tasked to operate that facility had also been committed to operate line haul operations from Kaiserslautern, Germany to Taszar, Hungary. Vital truck assets were diverted from the line haul operation to operate the DACG at Rhein Main and Ramstein Air Base.

Phase IV begins with the selection of the course of action. The CJCS presents the course of action to the NCA for approval. The NCA will then approve the recommended course, modify an existing course or develop a new course of action. The CJCS will release a Planning Order to the supported commander and the rest of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The order allows formal planning to begin before a COA has been selected by the NCA. The Planning Order will describe the specific COA, direct execution planning activities, and provide combat forces, strategic lift, and information in lieu of the Warning Order.¹⁴

The Alert Order is approved by the Secretary of Defense and released to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to announce the COA selected. The Alert Order contains guidance or changes from the Warning Order. In extreme time-sensitive situations the Alert Order may be omitted or issued in lieu of the Warning Order. Phase IV is complete when the NCA has a course of action and the CJCS publishes it in an Alert Order. The deployment to Bosnia by U.S. forces was initiated with an Alert Order from the Secretary of Defense. The deployment of forces to Bosnia was accomplished through an Alert Order and an Execute Order.

Phase V begins when a Planning or an Alert Order is received and ends when an OPORD is developed and approved for execution by the NCA. The deployment plans and schedules are developed, movement requirements and shortfalls identified and the OPORD is published. The availability of strategic airlift and sealift will drive the deployment flow. The supported CINC will develop a clear definition of the desired end-state as best as possible, with his headquarters determining the tailored force, proper sequence of arrival in theater, and the movement of other forces or services into the theater.¹⁵

During the execution-planning phase the supported commander publishes a TPFDD letter of instruction (LOI) that provides procedures for the deployment. The LOI provides instructions and directions to the CINC's components, supporting CINCs and other JPEC members. The LOI signals

force-providing organizations and supporting commands and agencies to provide or update specific unit movement data in JOPES for the first increment of movement.¹⁶ The supported commander will review the TPFDD and notify USTRANSCOM when the movement requirements are ready for lift scheduling. USCINCTRANS will provide effective air, land and sea transportation to support the approved COA or OPORD through USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM, a multi-service transportation organization, provides available transportation assets against requirements identified by the supported commander and develops feasible airlift and sealift transportation schedules.

Phase VI begins with the decision to execute an OPORD. The CJCS then transmits an Execute Order to the CINC. The Execute Order directs the CINC to deploy his forces. The Execute Order will contain certain information that was provided in the Warning and Alert Orders. The supported commander executes the OPORD and utilizes JOPES to monitor the force deployment. USCINCTRANS will manage the deployment process in accordance with the supported commander's force priorities.

Movement to the Port of Embarkation (POE)

The second phase of strategic deployment is the movement to the POE. The movement begins once a movement directive is received. The directive will specify the dates units are to arrive at the POE. The various TCC's will specify through the movement directive when equipment will be required at the POE. Once the deployment begins, installation and divisional transportation officers coordinate with the movement control teams (MCT) within their area of operation for transportation of unit equipment from home station to the railhead, airhead, or seaport of debarkation. The units are then configured and validated for movement. The unit's equipment is inspected, shipping documents are verified, and a Logistics application of automated Marking and Reading Symbols (LOGMARS) label attached. The

LOGMARS label ensures the transportation control number (TCN) reflects the unit's planned shipment on the AUEL and DEL.¹⁷

Strategic Lift

The strategic lift phase begins with the unit's departure from the POE. The TCC's are responsible for the strategic transportation of the forces and their support.¹⁸ USTRANSCOM ensures ITV of forces and supplies through JOPES. ITV is the near real-time tracking of unit and non-unit cargo and personnel from origin to destination.¹⁹ Also, USTRANSCOM provides the needed force tracking required by the supported commander. MTMC coordinates with the Military Sealift Command (MSC) to obtain the shipping necessary to move the unit's equipment from the original theater to the theater of operation. AMC will specify through an air tasking order when equipment is required at the APOE.

Theater transportation in Europe is controlled at three levels; at the communications zone (COMMZ) by the Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA), at Corps level by the Corps Movement Control Center (MCC), and at the division level by the division transportation office (DTO). The TAMCA performs the inland transportation functions that would normally be accomplished by the MTMC within CONUS.²⁰ The TAMCA has MCT's that are forward-based throughout Germany, Italy and the Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (BENELUX) region of Europe.

The supporting MCT's identify rail and highway transportation requirements and then work directly with the host nation to secure those assets. The TAMCA will work with the USTRANSCOM to identify vessels through MTMC/MSC and air resources through the AMC. After placing resources against requirements TAMCA coordinates among the shippers (i.e., units) and the transporters (i.e., military or civilian) to create a schedule that will meet the plan. It will then monitor the movement and adjust as required.

The strategic mobility support systems are an integral part of the transportation deployment management system. The system used in strategic deployments is the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) which is part of the JOPES automatic data processing (ADP). WWMCCS provides the means for operational direction and technical administration support needed to command and control military forces.²¹ WWMCCS brings many systems together ranging from the national to the theater level.

The Global Transportation Network (GTN) is key to USTRANSCOM's mobility management system and ties together existing transportation databases. The GTN system can be divided into three functional categories:²²

1. Systems required by supporting planners as they gather transportation requirements.
2. Systems for command and control that support deployment
3. Systems that support ITV.

Through the use of the JOPES system, commanders are able to obtain both standard and tailored reports. An example of the reports available to assist the deploying commanders include:

1. Movement Schedule Report
2. Movement Allocation Report
3. Channelized Requirements Report
4. Scheduled Flow Analysis Report
5. Scheduled Port Movement Work Load Report
6. Deployment Summary Report
7. Force Module Movement Summary Report

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Deployment System

The signing of the Dayton Peace Accord allowed for the first time the deployment of NATO forces outside of Central Europe. NATO would also activate for the first time their Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC) (Fig 3) and use the Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS). The JMCC had the responsibility of overseeing the deployment and management of the forces that deployed into Bosnia. The JMCC controls all movements into and out of a NATO theater of operation.

MOVEMENTS CONTROL ARCHITECTURE




Figure 3

Source: Command Briefing Slide for Supreme Allied Command Europe

The NATO deployment system relies on each individual nation to deploy its own forces to the theater of operation. Each nation provides their deployment data to the JMCC, which places the data into the ADAMS system and is able to provide critical information to the NATO commander for deployment decisions. For OJE the information went to Admiral Smith, the Implementation Force (IFOR) commander. The JMCC provided information to MG Nash, 1st Armored Division commander, on which forces were available to deploy into Bosnia. This allowed MG Nash to set priorities on which forces were required first and where the other countries were in deploying into Bosnia.

ADAMS brings together the NATO deliberate and crisis-action planning system. NATO uses deliberate and crisis action planning to develop OPLANS/CONPLANS and OPORDs just as the U. S. system accomplishes this in JOPES. NATO developed ADAMS to plan and execute their deployments as JOPES was developed for the U.S. deployments. ADAMS can be used in a stand-alone mode, but its key is multi-national deployment coordination in a crisis with the ability to rapidly exchange both background mobility data and the deployment plan.²³

The basic activities in the deployment management process are the same as in the crisis response situation. The urgency of need will compress the timeline to hours and days rather than weeks and months. The starting point for the movement and transportation planning is the operational requirement. NATO deployment managers need to know the operational force requirements and what countries will deploy. Based on the mission and political guidance, a force requirement is developed by NATO and organizations and disposition of forces are determined.

The result of the force planning process as it relates to ADAMS is the list of units, their destinations, the priorities and the arrival times required to meet the operational objective. The list is referred to as the statement of requirements (SOR) or the allied disposition list (ADL). At the start of the planning process the SOR is generally expressed in generic terms. NATO will begin by placing generic

forces that are available against a requirement. This will change as real units are committed by nations that will turn the SOR into the ADL.

Summary

Strategic deployment is an important process to both the United States forces in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each organization has a similar process to develop a course of action through deliberate and crisis action planning. The use of deliberate and crisis-action planning are an integral part of each staff's methodology in developing a plan.

In deliberate planning there is enough execution time to create detailed plans, coordinate with other staffs, conduct rehearsals, and even mobilize forces in time to conduct the plan. Crisis-action planning is utilized for emergency situations that either have an OPLAN/CONPLAN or no plan in existent. The TPFDD will require extensive modification, if available, or will require the establishment of one for the plan. The execution of the plan will normally also require additional management because of lack of rehearsals, coordination and plans.

The ability to efficiently deploy will rely on the systems available to them. The use of JOPES for the United States and ADAMS for NATO are two such systems that are integral for commands to properly manage and execute a deployment.

¹U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 October 1992), 4-1.

²U.S. Army, Field Manual 55-65, Strategic Deployment (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 3 October 1995), 1-4.

³Hakon, Thuve. ADAMS in NATO Peace Support Operations. Brussels: NATO C3 Agency., 1996.

⁴Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Planning Policies and Procedures, Vol. 1, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), II-6.

⁵U.S. Army, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), xxvii.

⁶Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, Inc. 1991). 200-201.

⁷*Ibid.*, 201.

⁸U.S. Army, FM 55-65, 1-6.

⁹Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Planning Policies and Procedures, Vol. 1, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), III-15.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, V-1.

¹¹*Ibid.*, V-2.

¹²Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster Inc. 1991). 305.

¹³"Surface Transportation-Linchpin to Projection," Defense Transportation Journal, Vol. 47, and No. 6 (December 1991): 24.

¹⁴Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Planning Policies and Procedures, Vol. 1, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), V-13.

¹⁵U.S. Army, FM 100-17, A-2.

¹⁶Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Planning Policies and Procedures, Vol. 1, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), V-14.

¹⁷U.S. Army, FM 55-65, 1-4.

¹⁸U.S. Army, FM 100-17, 4-13.

¹⁹U.S. Army, FM 55-65, 2-2.

²⁰U.S. Army, FM 55-1, 1-6.

²¹U.S. Army, FM 55-65, 2-1.

²²*Ibid.*, 2-2.

²³Hakon, Thuve. ADAMS in NATO Peace Support Operations. Brussels: NATO C3 Agency., 1996.

CHAPTER THREE

VII CORPS DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTHWEST ASIA

Introduction

To understand how USAREUR and NATO deployed forces from Europe in 1996, the first deployment from Europe that occurred in November 1990 must be analyzed. The study of how VII Corps deployed from Europe will demonstrate how a large unit moves into a theater of operation. That deployment can then be compared or contrasted to USAREUR's deployment to Bosnia. This may give insight as to the deployment intricacies of the European Theater and any anomalies that would cause a deviation from the normal deployment system. It will also highlight the impact of NATO involvement in the Bosnian deployment.

This chapter will be a case study in how USAREUR deployed the VII Corps from Europe in 1990. The actual deployment will be broken down into the planning process, data processing systems and the phases of strategic deployment that were utilized or not utilized. These steps are fluid and are at times accomplished simultaneously. Certain key strategic deployment process events will be organized sequentially to present a more accurate picture of what was evolving during the deployment.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. By August 7, 1990, the United States, based on the invitation of the government of Saudi Arabia, had determined that it would be necessary to deploy U.S. forces. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with General Norman H. Schwartzkopf, Commander, Central Command in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the weekend of October 6-8, 1990. It was at this meeting that General Powell asked General Schwartzkopf what forces he would need to mount an offensive operation. General Schwartzkopf at this time requested VII Corps, as it was

the most combat ready armor force in the U.S. inventory.¹ General Crosbie E. Saint, Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR, was notified in August 1990, of the possible deployment of forces from Europe to Southwest Asia. General Saint directed that Major General John C. Heldstab, USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS), and Major General J.S. Laposata, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG), began contingency planning for deployment of a corps-sized element to Southwest Asia. General Saint then notified Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, VII Corps Commander, to begin planning for the possible deployment of the Corps to Southwest Asia.²

Planning

General Saint approved the formation of a USAREUR planning committee to be chaired by MG Laposata. The planning committee consisted of: Joseph L. Lowman, Assistant DCSLOG; Colonel P.G. Phillips, DCSLOG Plans, Operations and Logistics Systems Division Chief; Colonel Robert Fear, DCSLOG Troop, Energy and Transportation Division Chief; Colonel. The following commanders, Richard Barnaby, Commander, MTMC-E and Colonel H. Carl Salyer, Commander, 1st Theater Army Movement Control Agency (1st TAMCA) were also brought into the planning cell. Of importance, however, was that VII Corps staff planners were not invited to be part of the planning committee. Their absence has significant operational consequences that will be explained later in this paper.

In late September the Corps Commander, at the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), European Command (EUCOM) and the Army component of EUCOM (USAREUR) convened a planning cell to examine the deployment of the 1st AD.³ The planning cell was then to examine the deployment of the Corps in early October as another option to consider. The planning cell mission was to track the war, monitor all the traffic and intelligence messages to insure that the planners were up to date on the current situation. The cell was also to examine options for VII Corps should they ever be asked to deploy in total or to send individual units.⁴ The planning cell was a sizable effort for the Corps,

involving a number of staff and the Major Subordinate Commanders (MSC).⁵ The cell consisted of the VII Corps Chief of Staff, Deputy Commanding General, G2 planner, G3, G3 planner and the G4 planner. The planning exercises went so far as to draw up troop lists, develop the crisis-action plan by task organizing, and determine the nature of the mission. The development of the troop list and the task organizing for the deployment was vital for the development of the TPFDD for JOPES.

General Saint and LTG Franks discussed which two divisions should go and the nature of the mission.⁶ The decision was made that the 1st and 3rd AD, along with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) would comprise the VII Corps. The decision was based on the nature of the suspected mission. GEN Saint and LTG Franks agreed that it should be two-armored divisions, as opposed to the two divisions out of VII Corps.⁷ There had been discussion about which ACR would deploy (2nd or the 11th) but it was decided to keep the habitual ACR relationship with the VII Corps. The VII Corps began tailoring their force after they had accomplished a reconnaissance in Saudi Arabia. The 2nd ACR was identified as the lead unit to be followed by the 1st AD. LTG Franks applied METT-T and decided to add an eight-inch artillery battalion to each brigade due to the expected enemy fortifications. The constant addition and deletion of units would in the end, plague the deployment process.

USAREUR set about identifying and estimating the amount of lift required to move VII Corps to the POE. Using gross planning factors, based on the amount and type of equipment being shipped, it was estimated that it would require 585 trains to move the units to port and 60 ships to deploy the Corps.⁸ It was also decided that based on the volume of equipment it would be necessary to deploy from multiple ports. Transportation assets were identified throughout Europe that was available to move units to the ports. It was determined that the commercial sector could provide air, rail, barge, and highway assets.

USAREUR planners identified that it would be necessary to deploy to the POE using multiple transportation modes. The convoying of all vehicles to the port would be too resource intensive and

create a traffic problem for the German population. There was also the question of readiness of equipment if they road marched the considerable distances involved. Military line-haul was considered, but was already tied up in sustainment operations. Commercial line-haul was cost prohibitive and required too much time.

Rail was the logical choice, being available at most installations. The rail cost per ton was lower than commercial highway transport and the transit time to port was between 24 to 36 hours. There were problems with rail due to the movement of other nations (i.e. Great Britain) and commercial commitments for engines, cars and track space. Rail also had its drawbacks due to the number of special cars that could haul outsized cargo and special routes that could handle restrictive cargo. There was also a problem at the port in that only a certain number of trains could arrive and be processed each day.

Barge transport was also an option in that canals and rivers were within convoying distance from many installations. The Rhein River Terminal at Mannheim, Germany, operated by MTMC-E, could easily control the flow of equipment into the ports and there was less chance of an accident enroute. The use of barge was necessary to ship outsized vehicles to the port. This mode of transport had its drawbacks. One drawback to barge shipping was that the equipment would have to be handled twice instead of moving directly to the port. Another drawback was the time required to ship the equipment. It would require an extra 72-96 hours to get the equipment to the port. The decision was made that outsized equipment would be sent by barge. This would include shop vans, heavy equipment transports and engineer equipment.

Air deployment for the entire corps was not practical. The decision was made to deploy all aircraft to the port. This would expedite the deployment and ensure a steady flow of equipment to the port. Units that were critical to the operation were flown directly into theater. This had already been tested when the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) self-deployed to SWA as a precursor to the VII

Corps deployment. The 12th CAB flew their fixed wing aircraft and helicopters to SWA, while their equipment was railed to Italy and placed aboard a ship. Other critical pieces of equipment were flown into SWA, such as, logistic automation vans and command and control vehicles.

VII Corps required great flexibility in its deployment and could achieve that only by combining the capabilities of all transportation modes. The contracting of carriers and crossing of borders slowed the deployment which required the use of host nation support to expedite the process. In addition, the decision to use more than one port allowed multiple routes on which units could deploy and aided in reducing road and rail congestion.

Movement to the POE

On November 8, 1990 President Bush, in Washington, D.C., made the decision to deploy the VII Corps to Southwest Asia. Though Central Command (CENTCOM) had planned for a Middle East scenario since the early 1980s there were no OPLANS calling for the use of USAREUR forces. European Command (EUCOM) had no responsibility for SWA because that AOR belonged to CENTCOM. Therefore, EUCOM had not been required to have an OPLAN /CONPLAN for that AOR. General Franks reconvened those who were in the small planning cell to plan the deployment of the Corps. LTG Franks said, "We knew we would have to get a TPFFD together. So my immediate concerns were to assemble the commanders involved and to talk to them directly about what I knew about the mission and timing, to set the tone since we were joining the XVIII Corps who already been down there for three months."⁹

General Saint, the USAREUR Commander, gave VII Corps the mission to deploy. This meant that VII Corps would oversee all units that were deploying to SWA from Europe, including those from V Corps. MG Laposata advised the USAREUR commander that VII Corps did not have the resources to handle the mission and that such a deployment should be centrally managed.¹⁰ By giving VII Corps the

mission to deploy, GEN Saint took away the ability of USAREUR to centrally manage the deployment. Saint's decisions therefore created a planning disconnect between USAREUR and VII Corps that resulted in two separate plans. USAREUR developed a deployment plan that encompassed the operational and strategic level. VII Corps, who had not been part of the original planning committee, developed their own plan separate plan.

The challenge facing USAREUR, that VII Corps was not able to manage, was the deployment of an armored cavalry regiment, two armored divisions, a separate armored brigade, corps combat service support units, corps combat service units and a corps headquarters. The European Theater was transformed from planning and rehearsing the reception and onward movement of forces for conventional war into a theater that deployed forces to SWA.¹¹ The deployment to SWA would be executed as a Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) deployment exercise, only this time it would be executed in reverse.

The USAREUR staff, 229th Corps Movement Control Center (CMCC) and VII Corps staff began to plan the deployment about November 5, 1990. 1st TAMCA had the lead in providing augmentation to the 229th CMCC as that unit deployed. 1st TAMCA also worked with the VII Corps in establishing the initial priority of movement. The deployment could not have succeeded without the help of host nation support. USAREUR was dependent on them for the use of roads, rail, rivers, airports and seaports. These operations would run twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Coordination between USAREUR, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg resulted in the granting of waivers for shipment of equipment and ammunition. The use of Standard NATO Agreements (STANAGS) expedited the movement and ensured all the U.S. forces were in compliance with all countries regulations that they were to transit.

On November 11 1990, LTG Shalikashvili and MG Laposata met with Herr Weidemann, a member of the Duetsches Bundnesbahn Board of Directors and head of the Production Department.¹²

USAREUR estimated 585 trainloads for the deployment, an average of twenty trains per day. Herr Weidemann promised total support once all the requirements were determined.¹³ Supporting the deployment soon turned into chaos and frustration for the Duetsches Bundesbahn because USAREUR and VII Corps could not determine how many cars were required. The deployment required special rail cars for outsized loads like the type used for M1A1 tanks and shop vans. The Duetsches Bundesbahn therefore had marshaled large quantities of rail cars to accommodate USAREUR. The Germans however could not meet the requirement, as they were not given the required requisition time of twenty-one days. The result of the lack of lead time was a delay in rail car arrival due to the shortage of assets. To overcome the rail delays, USAREUR set up a management team to centrally control the rail assets within the theater.

USAREUR designated the 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) to run the Convoy Support Center's (CSC) while V Corps provided the personnel for the port support activity (PSA). The 1st TAMCA centrally managed the transportation movements for the deploying units (Fig. 4). The centralization of movements would provide control of the priority of movement and manage the flow of requests. A problem occurred when the VII Corps G-3, who was the unit moves manager for the deployment, failed to manage the V Corps assets that were also deploying. That oversight caused competition for rail assets and congestion at the SPOE as units arrived early.

After the initial notification for deployment, VII Corps set up a task organization that started the creation of a TPFDD. However, VII Corps failed to supply accurate data to JOPES to develop a TPFDD. That was caused by VII Corps inability to accurately determine the force organization. VII Corps attempted to compensate for the lack of a TPFDD by developing a Time Phase Force Deployment List (TPFDL). A TPFDL define the unit's priority of deployment but does not provide the Level IV data required of JOPES. VII Corps, however, now had the ability to change unit priority of movement they would not have had (if inputted into JOPES).




Figure 4
Source: VII Corps, Planned Unit Movements Chart

USAREUR based units comprised only 60 percent of the VII Corps with the remainder coming from CONUS.¹⁴ The lack of a TPFDD or firm TPFDL denied the VII Corps the ability to manage the deployment of units from theater. Compounding the problem was the deployment of the 229th CMCC on the 16th and 17th of November.¹⁵ VII Corps no longer had a movement control center to manage the deployment and translate the commander's intent and priorities into a working plan. The link between the commander, operator and movement control organization for VII Corps was removed when the 229th CMCC deployed. 1st TAMCA placed MCT's of the 39th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control) into the now vacant 229th CMCC AOR. The placement of these MCT's was essential to provide the link between theater and VII Corps for the duration of the deployment.

VII Corps activated a Deployment Action Team (DAT), an ad hoc group whose mission was to replace the 229th CMCC. Their mission was to develop the TPFDL. Without the CMCC, the VII

Corps DAT had to intensively manage the transportation system in order to provide leaders the information needed to make critical decisions. The DAT was also to perform the same functions as the CMCC. However, the DAT lacked the knowledge to manage deployment movement directives. This caused a problem in the transportation community in that units were ordering trains without proper movement directives. There was additional confusion during the initial deployment period over whether the, G-3 or G-4, controlled the TPFDL. The G-3 Operations developed movement priorities while, the G-4 oversaw the execution of the G-3 priorities. The DAT was the executor of the priorities through the movement control community.¹⁶

USAREUR had intended for the VII Corps to use STANAG procedures for the deployment. However, when the 229th CMCC deployed, VII Corps delegated the CMCC responsibility down to unit level. The DAT was soon overwhelmed with the TPFDL and did very little to correct delegating CMCC functions to subordinate units. On November 12, 1990, MG Laposata and LTG Shalikashvili, met with the VII Corps leadership and the DAT to de-conflict the problems with the deployment and the TPFDL.¹⁷ MAJ Chambers of the DAT briefed the following:

1. VII Corps had developed a TPFDL but it was changing hourly.
2. TPFDL's were faxed to units but due to confusion in the sequence some units were not prepared to move.
3. Movement orders had not been generated, as the TPFDL had not been finalized.
4. Since the TPFDL had not been finalized, it was not passed to MTMC-E. This caused a delay in the ordering of ships and publishing of the call-forward lists.¹⁸

LTG Shalikashvili instructed VII Corps to publish the TPFDL. It should be noted that a finalized TPFDL was never published and it remained a living document that continued to change up until the end.¹⁹ LTG Shalikashvili instructed MG Laposata to deploy to Stuttgart, Germany to direct the deployment operations.²⁰ MG Laposata deployed to Ludwigsburg, Germany and was co-located with


the 39th MC Battalion's MCT at Grenadier Kaserne. They also stationed a cell at each Major Command (MACOM) to handle movement requests and provide information to the deploying MACOM.²¹

The collocation of USAREUR with VII Corps brought together every transportation traffic management function at one site. The USAREUR DCSOPS was given the responsibility for unit personnel deployments from Europe.²² The theater, upon a recommendation from the 1st AD DTO, formed a "911" response team from the 1st TAMCA to go down to the division level and work with the commanders and staff. The response team worked air, rail, road and barge movement clearances through 1st TAMCA. The team worked within the same kaserne, as its customer unit, ensuring that convoy clearances and rail load planning was properly completed.

Strategic Lift

MG Laposata coordinated for support with MG John R. Piatik, Commanding General, MTMC and MG Samuel N. Wakefield, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Transportation Center. It was Laposata's desire to accelerate the fielding of the Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System (TC-ACCIS) in USAREUR.²³ TC-ACCIS, a deployment management tool, automated the unit and installation transportation office (ITO) movement functions for strategic deployment. In Germany the system was located only at the 1st TAMCA. Figure 5 depicts the flow of information into and out of TC-ACCIS. Key to the system was the input of on-hand equipment data by units, which then updated the Computerized Movement Planning Status System (COMPASS) that fed JOPES. This allowed MTMC to take the data and generate rail and ship space requirements. The TC-ACCIS data also fed the Computer Aided Load Manifest (CALM) and Cargo Movements Operating System (CMOS) which ordered aircraft and track personnel deploying from Germany.

TC ACCIS FUNCTIONS



MTMC FUNCTIONS

- *Unit Movements Automated System for Processing Unit Requirements (ASPUR)
- *Domestic Routing Requests (DRR)
- *Export Traffic Release Requests (ETR)
- *Passenger Transportation (PAX)

JCS FUNCTIONS

- *Receive/Update movement data
- *Coordinate with other services and war fighting CINCs

FORSCOM FUNCTIONS

- *Alerts units for deployment
- *Receives updated unit movement data

Figure 5

Source: Transportation Corps Professional Bulletin, April 1991, 32-33

All unit representatives had to drive to the vacant 229th CMCC facility in Stuttgart, Germany to input their unit's data into the system.²⁴ The directive to input the data into TC-ACCIS at Stuttgart, Germany caused confusion and delay in the deployment. Once the data was put into the TC-ACCIS system a LOGMARS Label was produced that would be used on each of the unit's equipment for tracking. The label allowed for the equipment to be electronically scanned at the railhead, APOD or SPOD and then transferred into a database that would update JOPES. The Corps centrally located the operation to ensure compliance and expeditiously transmit the data to MTMC. The fielding of a new system caused confusion within the transportation community. The same data that was being inputted into TC-ACCIS was the same Level IV data that was required in JOPES. The benefit of TC-ACCIS was it produced a LOGMARS label where JOPES did not. TC-ACCIS required contractors to train

personnel while the deployment was in progress, which was why the 1st TAMCA had the input of data completed at one central location.

Once the TC-AACIS database was complete and inputted into the system, the units could be called forward to the railhead, port or airhead. The TC-ACCIS data drove MTMC routing, port calls and generated the transportation documentation. The data also generated the unit equipment list (UEL) of equipment and vehicles. This identification of the UEL set the foundation upon which all the modal decisions were initially made.²⁵ The VII Corps unit's completion of the UEL was essential for the theater movement control agency to accurately and efficiently coordinate and order the external transportation assets that moved the equipment and vehicles to the SPOE/APOEs.

TC-ACCIS, being newly fielded, was not perfect. The program's output required hand manipulation to make it work and it did not accept equipment data other than major end items. The system also could not generate a backup copy in case of system failure. Basically, no containers could be placed into the system. This added to the problem of tracking the containers that left Europe. The inability to place the container data in TC-ACCIS meant that the containers could not be tracked. The only option was the manual paper tracking with a transportation movement control document (TCMD). The tracking was available if VII Corps/TAMCA had inputted the Level IV data into JOPES. However, the lack of a control mechanism for tracking the containers hampered the timely delivery to the units, once the containers arrived in SWA. In effect, the containers were backlogged at the port due to a lack of documentation or unit identification. In some cases, the containers lacked a LOGMAR label or TCMD to identify its owner. The only option was to open the containers and try to identify the owning unit.

While the system was a great contributor to the deployment if the system had failed the deployment could have been seriously delayed.²⁶ The 1st TAMCA placed the entire success of the deployment on the TC-ACCIS system. The desire to field TC-ACCIS by the transportation community

further hampered the use of JOPES, as it was just another system that fed Level IV data. The main contribution from TC-ACCIS was fluidity in manipulating the data before inputting it into JOPES. JOPES is a rigid system that is not flexible to changes within the database.

The input of data into the TC-ACCIS system began to drive the deployment of the VII Corps. The 2nd ACR arrived in Bremerhaven, Germany only four days after notification.²⁷ The rest of the units from the theater (i.e., corps combat service support) were also moving to the port. However, once again VII Corps failure to take into account the rest of the theater units caused congestion at the ports and competition for rail and road assets. The timing of units that followed changed constantly during the rest of the deployment.

Since USAREUR and VII Corps had always been focused on the Fulda Gap, those headquarters experienced a period of change to adjust to the deployment. The move to air and seaports of embarkation in Germany alone involved 465 trains, 312 barges, and 119 convoys.²⁸ VII Corps would also require 578 aircraft and 140 ships to complete this strategic move.²⁹ The development of the TPFDL and the input of TC-ACCIS data drove the building of the trains, ships, barges, convoys and aircraft needed to deploy. The 1st TAMCA managed the transportation assets for the deployment from Germany to the seaports, barge sites and airheads. Once the deployment process was set in motion, it was extremely sensitive to change there was precious little margin for error and few alternative courses of actions existed.³⁰

Initially rail and barge were planned as the main modes to move equipment to the port. This was due partly to the bad weather, which normally occurs during this time of year. Due to the lack of railroad cars available, 1st TAMCA had to secure other means to move the units to the ports. The Duetsches Bundesbahn (DB) or German Railway System was cooperative and responsive, but did not have enough cars readily available. The only alternative was to deploy the units by convoy to the ports

and barge sites. The German movements control agency, VerK 740, was deployed to ensure strict movement control from home station to the port and barge sites.³¹

Another problem with rail was the tarnished U.S. reputation with the DB because of USAREUR's inability to centrally manage the rail movements. Units had ordered trains without regard to the ever-changing deployment schedule. This caused a shortage of rail assets and required moving by other modes (i.e., highway, barge). The operational deployment began to break down causing units to arrive before their scheduled time. The breakdown of who (VII Corps or USAREUR) was controlling the deployment helped to initiate this problem. The lack of central management, in the beginning, allowed units to order transportation assets on their schedule contrary to VII Corps or USAREUR plan. This caused the ports to become congested, which required MTMC to load ships with partial units to relieve this equipment blockage. In thirty-eight days (November 14 through December 22, 1990) the DB pulled 339 trains, 41.8 percent of the total requirements, from various railheads around Germany to the ports of Amsterdam, Bremerhaven and Rotterdam.³²

MTMC-E, controlled the ports of embarkation, barge site, time or window of departure and the transport mode from Europe. MTMC-E was in charge of shipping the Corps equipment from Germany to Southwest Asia. Originally they did not expect to play a major role in Desert Shield with their only support being resupply. The beginning of Phase II of Desert Shield forced Europe play a major role in sustaining the forces in SWA as well as deploying VII Corps.

MTMC-E had to address the TPFDD issue. The original JOPES database had the listed requirements at 12 to 14 million square feet.³³ MTMC-E found this figure to be exceedingly high. This square footage figure would generate the requirement for the number of ships needed. MTMC-E could end up ordering too few ships, or too many, when sealift was already in short supply.³⁴ MTMC-E compared these square footage requirements to the unit equipment list to see specifically what they had to move. They then had to turn to the transportation engineering agency (TEA) to run it on a special

program to estimate the required square footage to move the corps. This turned out to be 7.4 million square feet.³⁵ The data that was originally placed into JOPES was inaccurate, which caused the estimate of space needed to move the corps to be false. The USAREUR and VII Corps inability to place the required Level IV data into JOPES caused MTMC-E to establish ship space requirements through other means (i.e., TEA).

Originally, two barge sites were considered at Aschaffenburg and Mannheim. Due to heavy rains and snow only the site at Mannheim on the Rhine was available. Wheeled vehicles, containers and outsized equipment (i.e., heavy transports, shop vans, engineer equipment) were the only pieces shipped by barge. Transit time was anywhere from 55-67 hours depending on the destination of choice. Some 387 barge loads were shipped to the three separate ports, roughly equivalent to 140 trainloads.

Convoy operations to the seaport originally were not to be conducted; however, as has been noted, it became necessary. Convoy routes were the same as those that had been used for REFORGER. Convoy operations were able to begin within 34 hours after notification to the German government. 21st TAACOM, V Corps, German police and the Dutch, Belgium and German Armies had opened the LOCs. The MCT's located throughout Germany submitted the requests for unit convoys. Initially the requests went to the German Authorities who would approve the clearance. This caused confusion in that units were moving to the ports without a movement directive. This caused 1st TAMCA to order that no units could move until the MCT had received a movement directive from Corps. After the initial debacle the convoy operation proceeded without interruption. Seventy-two convoys moved in twenty-three days during the deployment.

USAREUR did not have much experience working with the Military Airlift Command (MAC). The speed and quantity of aircraft that was required to deploy VII Corps brought about problems that they had never dealt with before. Scheduling of aircraft from CONUS to Europe for REFORGER exercises had previously been transparent to USAREUR, but now it was a different matter. USAREUR

DCSOPS was designated as in-charge of this operation. The problem that consistently plagued the entire operation was the issue of who was in-charge. The air operation was no exception; VII Corps centrally managed the allocation of seats to each command through the G-1/S-1, which worked well for their deployment.³⁶ USAREUR would manage the rest of the theater.

The VII Corps self-deployed its helicopter fleets with the exception of the 12th CAB to the port in Rotterdam. Critical air assets that were needed early were flown from Germany to SWA. This included the 12th CAB, which had air evacuation assets, and Mohawk aircraft that were used for intelligence gathering. This accounted for about ninety-six pieces of equipment. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAFT) was activated by presidential order. This allowed the majority of personnel to be airlifted by commercial aircraft instead of military.

Summary

The first concern about the deployment of VII Corps from USAREUR is the coordination between the major commands (i.e., V, VII, 21st). USAREUR had developed a planning committee to deploy the VII Corps and failed to bring them into the deployment planning process. Then the decision by GEN Saint to give VII Corps the mission to deploy themselves to SWA this seemed to contradict what the planning committee was set up to accomplish. VII Corps set about to plan the deployment, but failed to coordinate with USAREUR or plan for the deployment of other theater assets that would accompany them to SWA.

The lack of coordination between the commands had an impact on the ability of USAREUR to supply the needed data for JOPES. The data that was initially inputted into JOPES was incorrect, which gave false planning data to USTRANSCOM. Accurate data is imperative for the estimation of ship space and strategic airlift. This coupled with the VII Corps' and USAREUR inability to develop a TPFDD that would drive the deployment caused mismanagement of transportation assets.

The misinformation and lack of data in JOPES caused USAREUR to request that the TC-ACCIS system be fielded immediately. The transportation community believed that with this system the proper data would be inputted into JOPES. TC-ACCIS was also going to help with all movements within the theater. Though TC-ACCIS did prove useful there were flaws within the system. For example, the system could only take major end item data (i.e., truck, tank etc.). The inability of TC-ACCIS to handle secondary load and container data proved to have enormous consequences. The container situation was out of control. Having no ability to track them within the system, containers arrived in SWA with no way of knowing to whom they belonged. Coupled with the lack of proper paper documentation (i.e., TCMD) the only option was to open the containers and try to identify the owning unit.

The decision by VII Corps to deploy the VII Corps MCC to SWA prior to the corps deployment was paramount. The main structure that was meant to manage the Corps movement was taken away before the operation ever got underway. The Corps had to compensate for the loss of this management structure and a DAT was developed. This was put together as an ad hoc group which lacked the cohesion and knowledge that the CMCC already had. This decision also impacted the flow of communication, which already had established procedures that the DAT knew nothing about.

Among all of this, USAREUR was still deactivating units and returning equipment to CONUS. It was also supplying the sustainment portion of Desert Shield, which added to USAREUR's need to be involved with the deployment and manage the assets so the system would not overload the transportation structure. In all, VII Corps deployed its corps troops, support command, an armored cavalry regiment, an armored brigade, and two armored divisions in 110 days. This is a testament to the ability of USAREUR and VII Corps to adapt without maintaining the command structures and relationships.

¹Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1991) 307.

²Peter S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Deployment and Preparation for Desert Storm," Military Review (January 1992): 2-16.

³GEN Fredrick Franks, interview by LTC Peter S. Kindsvatter, tape recording, 2 April 1991, VII Corps Historian, Iraq.

⁴Ibid., 1.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., 2.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Richard J. Barnaby, "MTMC Europe's Contribution to Operation Desert Shield," Cargo Hook, Summer 1991, 6.

⁹Ibid., 4.

¹⁰Harry S. Hamilton, "The VII Corps Deployment to Saudi Arabia: An Analysis of Deployment Transportation Planning and Management," Thesis, Master of Military Art and Science. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, 1993) 47.

¹¹Richard J. Barnaby, "MTMC Europe's Contribution to Operation Desert Shield," Cargo Hook, Summer 1991, 6.

¹²Harry S. Hamilton, "The VII Corps Deployment to Saudi Arabia: An Analysis of Deployment Transportation Planning and Management," Thesis, Master of Military Art and Science. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, 1993) 49.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Gulf War Collection Group VII Corps SG Historian, "Part 1 (Executive Summary and Historical Narrative)," Volume 1, Executive Summary and Historical Narrative: Part 1A, Executive Summary, 5.

¹⁵VII Corps, Planned Unit Movement Chart, 12 November 1990.

¹⁶Kenton L. Ashworth II, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 13 February 1997.

¹⁷Harry S. Hamilton, "The VII Corps Deployment to Saudi Arabia: An Analysis of Deployment Transportation Planning and Management," Thesis, Master of Military Art and Science. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, 1993) 51.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Interview with GEN Fredrick Franks, 2 April 1991, VII Corps Historian, Iraq..

²²Ibid., 2.

²³"Automated System Proves a Powerful Tool," Translog, Second Quarter 1991, 2.

²⁴Ibid., 6.

²⁵"Deploying a Forward-Deployed Force, A Movements Control Challenge," Transportation Corps Professional Bulletin, April 1991, 8-9.

²⁶Joint/Unified Lessons Learned #60752-81250 (00024), submitted by HQ, USAREUR & 7A, ODCSLOG, Operation DESERT STORM PHASE II conducted by JCS on 03/13/91, "Unit Movement Plans" located in VII Corps Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

²⁷Richard J. Bamaby, "MTMC Europe's Contribution to Operation Desert Shield," Cargo Hook, Summer 1991, 6.

²⁸Gulf War Collection Group VII Corps SG Historian, "Part 1 (Executive Summary and Historical Narrative," Volume 1, Executive Summary and Historical Narrative: Part 1B, Historical Summary, 2.

²⁹Ibid., 2.

³⁰Gulf War Collection Group VII Corps SG Historian, "Part 1 (Executive Summary and Historical Narrative," Volume 1, Executive Summary and Historical Narrative: Part 1A, Executive Summary, 5.

³¹"Deploying a Forward-Deployed Force, A Movements Control Challenge," Transportation Corps Professional Bulletin, April 1991, 8.

³²Harry S. Hamilton, "The VII Corps Deployment to Saudi Arabia: An Analysis of Deployment Transportation Planning and Management," Thesis, Master of Military Art and Science. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, 1993) 51.

³³MTMC 1990-92, "Annual Historical Review," MTMC Europe: Deploying the: Already Deployed, 31.

³⁴Ibid., 31.

³⁵Ibid., 32

CHAPTER FOUR

1ST ARMORED DIVISION DEPLOYMENT TO BOSNIA

Introduction

In January 1993 Cyrus Vance and David Owen introduced a peace plan to end the Bosnian civil war. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan, or VOPP, consisted of a three-part package comprising ten constitutional principles, a detailed cessation of hostility agreement and a map.¹ In February 1993, in response to, EUCOM notified USAREUR, to develop a contingency plan that supported the VOPP. USAREUR then developed CONPLAN 40102, a plan that called for USAREUR to assist in the withdrawal of United Nation Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) from Bosnia and establish a multi-national peace force within the region.

The election of Bill Clinton in 1994, as the new U.S. President, brought about change in Balkan foreign policy. President Clinton nominated Warren Christopher as his Secretary of State. The subsequent appointment of Christopher as Secretary of State denied unison between him and Vance. The uneasiness was due in part to Christopher's having worked for Vance when he was the Secretary of State under President Carter. Christopher found it unpleasant to have Vance in such a prominent foreign policy role in his first few months as Secretary of State.² As soon as Vance left the Co-Chairmanship of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) Christopher abolished the VOPP.

The Clinton Administration determined that the VOPP would be too high a price to pay for the placement of U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia. The U.S. was unwilling to stand up to the Bosnian Serbs due to their Muslim connections. The Clinton administration wanted to assert power in the region but not accept the responsibility of being the leading nation in Balkan politics.³

In the summer 1995 U.S. foreign policy dramatically changed due in part to the work of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and Special Envoy Robert Frasure. The Clinton administration began to accept the responsibilities of U.S. political leadership within the former Yugoslavia.⁴ Though the Clinton Administration professed finding peace through dialogue, it would be the military that would bring the warring parties to the peace table.⁵ NATO, under UN direction, began bombing key Bosnian Serb positions and Banja Luka's command and control systems with cruise missiles. The NATO air attacks allowed the Croats and Muslim Federation to retake territory that approximated a 51 percent federation-49 percent Serb split.⁶

The Croats and Muslims offensive brought about increased military attacks from the Bosnian Serbs on UNPROFOR. The safety of the UN forces soon became paramount for the U.S. and the peace process. EUCOM directed USAREUR to develop OPLAN 40103 for the possible extremis withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the Balkans. The 1st Armored Division (AD) was tasked to provide the forces to oversee the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia. SETAF, however, was also directed by USAREUR to develop their own plan for the withdrawal, which became OPLAN 40104.

While USAREUR developed various military options, U.S. representative Richard Holbrooke began a "shuttle diplomacy" mission with the Bosnian warring factions. Those diplomatic efforts caused AFSOUTH and EUCOM to begin planning for a potential peace mission within the Balkans. In October 1995 the staffs of V Corps and 21st TAACOM met in Grafenwoehr, Germany to plan the deployment. EUCOM and USAREUR each sent representatives who monitored the planning effort but were not part of the planning staff. The planning effort revised in the development of OPLAN 40105. That plan called for the deployment of a multinational force that would separate the warring factions and add stability within the region. Because of the nature of events that were occurring in Bosnia, OPLANS 40102, 40103, and 40104 were no longer compatible for the mission. Therefore, V Corps developed OPLAN 40105 for USAREUR.

The U.S. succeeded in pressuring the three warring factions to meet in November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. The now former warring factions agreed in principle to a peace agreement on November 21, 1995. Two days later USAREUR deployed an advance team to Taszar, Hungary to begin opening an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) for the deployment to Bosnia. Hungary was decided upon as a support base of operation due to its proximity to the northeastern sector of Bosnia that U.S. forces would occupy. The British and the French were using the other possible areas for U.S. forces to deploy into Bosnia (i.e. Split and Ploce). On December 14, 1995 the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in Paris, France. The JCS then transmitted the Execute Order to EUCOM to deploy the 1st AD from Europe to the former Republic of Yugoslavia. That deployment marked the first time that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had deployed forces out of sector.

Planning

In October 1995, MG James Wright, the Commanding General, 21st TAACOM deployed a deployment and ISB planning team to Grafenwoehr, Germany for the 1st AD mission into Bosnia. The V Corps staff, under the command of LTG John Abrams, also deployed to Grafenwoehr to develop and coordinate the deployment of the 1st AD. The 1st AD and SETAF were also at Grafenwoehr undergoing training for the possible deployment.

NATO also sent a representative to Grafenwoehr, Germany whose purpose was to contact EUCOM staff members in an effort to gain information of the U.S. deployment. NATO, from October 1995 until the dates of port was assigned in early December 1995, attempted to plan the deployment with EUCOM/USAREUR.⁷ However, the United States was unwilling to politically formally neither commit military forces nor indicate that they would do that until a peace accord had been signed.⁸ The JCS further restricted EUCOM from cooperating with NATO because U.S. forces were still under national control. During the NATO formal planning sessions, EUCOM would primarily have no comment, but

in the informal sessions EUCOM told NATO what they were planning and who was going to do what. Even then, EUCOM was very restrictive in the kinds of information they provided to NATO.⁹ The restriction of information was partially due to the way the U.S. and NATO classified and accessed information. An example of the lack of information sharing evidenced itself when NATO surprisingly discovered that USAREUR was deploying forces to Bosnia the first week of December 1995.

During the first week of December, the USAREUR DCSOPS, Major General Dan Petrosky and MG Wright, went to Naples to brief the USAREUR deployment plan to Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) and the Implementation Force (IFOR) Commander, Admiral Leighton Smith. Their briefing showed that the USAREUR initial deployment concept plan, was to place all forces initially in Hungary, then task organize them with weapon systems and combat equipment necessary to conduct a tactical road-march through Croatia to the Bosnian border. Admiral Smith noted that Croatia was not a belligerent nation "You will not invade the sovereign nation of Croatia which is a signature to the Peace Accord and a supporting ally of this operation."¹⁰ Admiral Smith's comment forced USAREUR to go back and reassess the strategic environment and their plan. The plan was soon changed to bypass Croatia by road march and instead rail a battalion into Zupanja, Croatia vice transiting through the ISB.

The strategic ambiguity of the deployment was further confused by the demanding timelines of The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).¹¹ USAREUR did not know the actual requirements of the GFAP until after the announcement of the Dayton peace agreement. That lack of knowledge caused USAREUR to again modify their plan. In fact, the USAREUR plan would now entail both simultaneous deployment and employment of forces. The V Corps' 1st AD (Task Force Eagle) had originally developed seven force "packages" for the deployment concept (Fig 6). The seven force packages were each tailored to support a different phase of the initial deployment. The "packages" were individually tailored with the right mix of force to accomplish a given mission.¹² The force package called for Task Force Eagle's (TFE) lead package augmented by the Corps National Support Element




Figure 6

Source: U.S. Army, Task Force Eagle Initial Operations, May 1996.

(NSE) that would establish the ISB. TFE would then move engineer assets to cross the Sava River and open the theater Lines of Communication (LOC). The fifth force package consisted of the main combat force. While the force-tailoring concept plan was understood at the division and corps level, it was not that well understood at EUCOM.¹³ In essence, the concept plan was not well understood at EUCOM because they had been developing their own plan without regard to USAREUR's plan. Thus, there were two planning processes going on, one for a U.S. only operation being done at EUCOM and a multinational NATO operation being done at AFSOUTH.¹⁴ Moreover, USAREUR was developing another plan through V Corps and 21st TAACOM. Despite NATO and EUCOM being led by the same common commander, neither headquarters coordinated their plans.

The signing of the GFAP and the implementation requirements of the peace agreements required the immediate entry of a sizable combat force.¹⁵ To meet the demands of the GFAP the deployment package was restructured to consist of a mix of employment capabilities and minimum logistic assets. The deployment package was comprised of Cavalry, Armor and engineer assets, which caused the deployment force flow to be resequenced. The restructuring of the forces that were to deploy into Hungary and open the ISB were placed further back into the deployment schedule. The ability to open the ISB had been degraded and the 29th Area Support Group (ASG) that had the mission to run the ISB had to deploy by road in order to be in place when the forces arrived in Hungary.

The reconstruction of the deployment packages to meet the demands of the GFAP also caused the deployment activities to become desynchronized. A key aspect of this desynchronization was that the transportation deployment data had not been entered into TC-ACCIS, which in turn fed JOPES. The reason why the Level IV data had not been loaded into TC-ACCIS was that the V Corps and 21st TAACOM Commander's saw the deployment as an operational not strategic deployment. For example, MG Wright determined that since no strategic air or sea assets were being used from the United States, and that the deployment was over land, it was not strategic.¹⁶ JOPES therefore could not be used. Had data been placed into TC-ACCIS which would have fed JOPES then the forces could have been resequenced into the proper order and strategic requirements known for the deployment.

USAREUR had been issued the Execution Order from EUCOM on December 4, 1995. The order stated that JOPES would be used so that the JCS could monitor the deployment.¹⁷ The decision by the operational/tactical commanders (i.e., V Corps, 21st TAACOM and USAREUR) ignored the JCS Execute Order issued from EUCOM. Furthermore, 1st TAMCA determined that due to the compressed deployment timeline there was not enough time to input the Level IV data into the TC-ACCIS system.

Deployment

On December 9 1995, President Clinton directed the deployment of U.S. forces as part of a NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). USAREUR would deploy the 1st AD under the command of MG Nash into Bosnia. LTG Abrams, the V Corps Commander, was given command of the NSE that deployed into Hungary and Croatia to support the 1st AD. MG Wright, Commander, 21st TAACOM, provided theater support from Germany and the units required for operating the ISB in Hungary.

Enhanced and assured communications allow selected logistics management functions to be accomplished from a forward-presence location, deploying only those functional capabilities absolutely necessary, this is split-based operations.¹⁸ The lines of command became confused due to split-based operations, the number of headquarters deployed and the responsibilities that USAREUR had delegated to the V Corps and 21st TAACOM. The V Corps commander, although given command of the NSE, also had elements from the theater's 21st TAACOM running the ISB. USAREUR also deployed a forward element that was part of the NSE. The 3d Corps Support Command (COSCOM) commander, a V Corps asset, also deployed his staff, which initially was placed in charge of the ISB. The 21st TAACOM commander replaced him for political reasons.

The problem of command lines was further complicated in that USAREUR FORWARD (V Corps Staff) and the USAREUR Headquarters in Germany would issue conflicting guidance. An example of that was the deployment of a team to reconnoiter the Serbian transportation network. USAREUR sent a team from Germany to Belgrade, Serbia to study the road and rail network while USAREUR FORWARD sent a team from Hungary to accomplish the same mission. Since command structure was ad hoc, the command structure was convoluted and dependent upon the situation, not as conceived by doctrine.

As previously stated the JOPES system was ignored during the initial stages of the deployment. Due to the time constraints no OPLAN or OPORD were ever formally submitted to the NCA by

EUCOM for approval.¹⁹ Instead, the planning was done by a series of "PowerPoint" briefings that were presented to USAREUR by V Corps and 21st TAACOM. In effect, V Corps was doing USAREUR's job. The detailed planning that a theater army should be doing regarding deployment, employment and sustainment was passed to an army corps and was not readily available to EUCOM.

Both LTG Abrams and MG Wright monitored the deployment using operational management tools to track the movement. That meant that the Standard Army Command and Control System-Europe (STACCS-E) would be the primary means of controlling the deployment. The problem with STACCS-E is that it is a theater level command and control system, therefore it could not give the required deployment visibility that EUCOM would demand.

The 1st TAMCA was responsible for providing the link between EUCOM and the NATO Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC) and the ACE Mobility Command Center (AMCC). EUCOM had set up a Joint Movement Cell (JMC) within their J4 cell to provide a conduit for information to flow from 1st TAMCA to NATO. The JMC mission was to receive the JOPES data from USAREUR, convert it to ADAMS format it and submit it up to the AMCC and vice versa. In turn, AMCC would put it into the computer and send it down to the JMCC.²⁰ The formal national clearances between countries were accomplished through EUCOM although 1st TAMCA actually did the clearances for movement in and around Germany.

The EUCOM and SHAPE (NATO) headquarters were at the same level of command; therefore they shared some information. However, the formal communication of movement requirements and instructions was done from NATO AMCC to NCA and then to EUCOM as a U.S. national command channel. The deployment channel was complex in that the unit deployment requirements, which both NATO AMCC and 1st TAMCA identified, were not available in JOPES. NATO, therefore, could not track the U.S. deployment data in ADAMS.

NATO used ADAMS as their means to plan and execute its deployment. ADAMS does not have the capability of real time updating of data based on execution. ADAMS system, however, relies on the NATO countries to periodically update the planning data through their national systems.

ADAMS has a U.S. interface system, written by the SHAPE Technical Center, which takes JOPES Level IV data and converts it to ADAMS format for planning purposes. However, the interface within the system did not work at the execution level.

NATO, therefore, tried to discover a way to use JOPES as an execution system for the entire NATO operation. The NATO classification system soon created another problem. JOPES is a U.S. classified system only and cannot interface with the NATO system directly. EUCOM was forced to produce a file from JOPES and hand carry it over to the ADAMS system where it was then inputted by hand.

The main tools for monitoring the NATO deployment was pencil, telephone and fax. EUCOM's best deployment came from a German Lieutenant Colonel who was a rail movement specialist. He and his fax machine were in direct link from the JMCC to the Duetsches Bundnesbahn.²¹ Despite the data that was in ADAMS and in JOPES, it was a Lieutenant Colonel at the Duetsches Bundesbahn that controlled the movement of trains and rail cars.²²

MG William Farnen, IFOR Commander for Support in Zagreb, controlled the JMCC. The JMCC worked with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which was IFOR's ground component command for the operation. The ARRC Commander set the priority for his units to come into the theater and the JMCC converted his priorities into movement times. The movement information was then passed back up through the JMCC to EUCOM and USAREUR.²³ The formal channel was 1st AD to ARRC to JMCC and then up to NATO. The informal channel was 1st TAMCA to the JMCC. When the U.S. wanted to move or USAREUR identified a requirement, USAREUR passed it through EUCOM to AMCC who passed it through the JMCC.²⁴

The air movement clearance worked the same way as the rail clearance to a point. However, the Regional Air Movement Control Center (RAMCC) controlled that operation. This was an U.S. operation that became seconded to NATO when Joint Endeavor was declared. USTRANSCOM worked through EUCOM in helping NATO with the deployment. USTRANSCOM's major role was in air movement; they also provided the manning of the Regional Airport Movement Center (RAMC). They also provided the force director of movement forces that was also the RAMC commander.

The JMCC had to control areas that U.S. nationally controlled units were also trying use. NATO forces deployed through Hungary after setting up operations in Pecs. Yet, the Nordic Brigade who was under NATO command had their priority of movement set by MG Nash's staff. Nash, as a NATO commander, had to go back to his U.S. command USAREUR counterparts for movement priorities. Nash said, "I don't care how fast you want to flow our own forces in, I need these Nordic assets at this time".²⁵ MG Nash's desires required USAREUR to re-sequence units in the deployment window so that the forces he desired could get in".²⁶ The JMCC established those movement priorities by going to MG Nash through the ARRC, but in Nash's capacity as a NATO vice U.S. Commander.²⁷

The lack of movement control teams with adequate communications between the U.S. side and NATO forces also created problems. Movement control information did not flow well from ground observers to higher movement control nodes due to the lack of data and the initial non-use of JOPES. The missing communication link between JOPES and ADAMS hindered that information flow. The AMCC did send a team on their own initiative to supplement the MCT from USAREUR (i.e. 1st TAMCA) to make up the lack of information.

Movement to Port of Embarkation

V Corps and 21st TAACOM were overwhelmed with movement requests within the first three weeks of the deployment. The Execute Order from EUCOM directing USAREUR to place Level IV

data into JOPES caused 1st TAMCA to recreate the first two weeks of the deployment.²⁸ The accelerated timeline and subsequent reconfiguration of the deploying units caused uploaded rail cars to be down loaded and new units to replace the first ones. Bad weather grounded aircraft at Rhein Main and Ramstein airbases causing a backlog of equipment at the airport. Furthermore, the ability to provide the required deployment data to EUCOM caused the movement flow to the APOD and Hungary to become more confused.

The movement of units to the POE and I SB became congested because units were moving at their own command's directive. The compressed time schedule and inability of USAREUR to use JOPES caused units to order trains and deploy them to the APOD before their required delivery time. USAREUR therefore could not control the deployment, which soon led to the misuse of the transportation network. For example, USAREUR ordered trains from Germany to go to Hungary, but instead the equipment ended up in Zupanja, Croatia. The rail misdirection was caused by the constant revision of the sequencing of units into theater. The use of new technology such as Intransit Visibility (ITV) seemed to ease the confusion, but the lack of functional movement control units hindered the deployment from the beginning.²⁹

The German Rail System was the major mode of transportation for the Bosnia deployment. Rail was the most direct route to Bosnia and provided the fastest means to put large quantities of equipment on the ground. Rail was also seen as the safest mode considering that forces were deploying during the winter months. The movement planners allocated twenty trains a day out of Germany but the reception capability in theater was substantially less than that. For example, the reception capability at Zupanja, Croatia, was three to five trains a day, Slavonski Brod, Croatia three to four per day and in Hungary six to eight trains a day. The highest number of trains that would possibly be handled in Hungary and Croatia was eighteen. The Duetsches Bundesbahn eventually slowed the rail deployment

down to six trains a day primarily due to the fact that the Eastern European rail network was not up to German standards.

The 1st TAMCA used a spreadsheet to track unit equipment and vehicles per the Standardization Agreement (STA NAG) that the units had submitted earlier through their MCTs.³⁰ The Level IV data was taken off the STANAGs so that the data could be inputted into JOPES. USAREUR had originally planned to track unit movements through the Standard Army Command and Control System-Europe (STACCS-E). However, STACCS-E is a theater level operational system and not a strategic system like JOPES. Furthermore, the STACCS-E is not capable of interfacing with JOPES.

Highway movement was initially considered by the movement planners as an unlikely option due to difficulty in gaining country clearances for routes. Also, USAREUR had problems sustaining convoys over such a long distance. However, USAREUR decided to deploy units by road due to increased rail congestion and the poor weather conditions for aircraft flight. The late decision to deploy by road caused great confusion. The 21st TAACOM commander disrupted the now required country clearance process by removing it from the 1st TAMCA system and giving it to the 37th Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).

The initial road movement plan was to use convoy operations as a means of re-supplying the ISB in Hungary. The 37th TRANSCOM would handle the line haul operation with the 1st TAMCA issuing the road clearances. Placing the 37th TRANSCOM as central manager for convoys throughout USAREUR was quite extraordinary and against doctrinal procedures. Though staffed with transportation personnel, 37th TRANSCOM was not prepared to handle this type of operation.³¹ However, 37th TRANSCOM by default became the convoy operation center for USAREUR where they scheduled and gave road clearances to deploying units. The 37th TRANSCOM also coordinated road clearances through the 1st TAMCA for Germany moves, while Austria posted a liaison with the 37th TRANSCOM to expedite the necessary paperwork.

Strategic Lift

Despite the movement of units and supplies by road and rail, USAREUR could not deploy forces fast enough to meet the schedule that the GFAP had imposed on the IFOR. USAREUR then had to rely on air transportation. The only aircraft that USAREUR had at its disposal was intra-theater C-130's that belonged to the United States Air Force Europe (USAFE). USTRANSCOM, the strategic air schedulers had not been a part of the planning process. Therefore, USTRANSCOM had not developed a plan for strategic airlift. USTRANSCOM tried to become involved in the deployment planning earlier but USAREUR told their liaison cell that it was going to an operational deployment thus no strategic lift was required.³²

By the first week of the deployment it became obvious that strategic lift was necessary if the forces were going to close in theater in the required time. EUCOM then worked with USTRANSCOM to allocate the strategic lift assets to deploy the remaining units. EUCOM, however, could not get valid air transportation requirements from USAREUR. That situation caused consternation at USTRANSCOM because they were unable to schedule airlift assets against movement requirements.³³ USTRANSCOM's inability to coordinate airlift needs against valid requirements was due to the lack of current data in JOPES. The data that was available, however, was not updated or valid due to the restructuring of the deployment schedule. GEN Crouch and LTG Abram's decision that Bosnia was an operational deployment coupled with MG Wright's decision not to use TC-ACCIS due to the time required to input Level IV data into the system, meant there was no way to validate requirements within the automated system.³⁴

The TC-ACCIS data would have allowed the supported commander to build a detailed Deployment Equipment List (DEL) for JOPES. The JOPES DEL data could then have been used by USTRANSCOM to place airlift against valid lift requirements. EUCOM's requirement to place all

deployment data into JOPES did not help USTRANSCOM overcome their scheduling dilemma for identifying valid airlift requirements. EUCOM's decision meant that 1st TAMCA was further behind in inputting data into a system that could not recover.

EUCOM failed to integrate the airlift requirements system between the tactical and strategic levels of operation. The EUCOM J4 sought out USTRANSCOM for airlift support while the EUCOM J3 would look to United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) for the same information.³⁵ In effect, neither staff section coordinated air requests amongst themselves.

EUCOM then decided to initiate a nondoctrinal deployment board to review units in the deployment window.³⁶ The board became the authority to direct unit air deployments with priorities reviewed each day. EUCOM would then forward the validated air movement requirements to USTRANSCOM. Figure 6 depicts how the air transportation requirements flowed for Operation Joint Endeavor. The board sought to maintain visibility over the deployment because the changes rapidly became unmanageable.

Even with the deployment board it was virtually impossible to accurately depict what units were ready to deploy or what units were available for deployment. The deployment schedule was now so confusing that USAREUR did not know which units had deployed or which ones were still waiting for movement orders. To help USAREUR, USTRANSCOM placed eleven C-17 aircraft under the Operational Control (OPCON) of EUCOM.³⁷ The decision to put strategic air under an operational command was against all doctrinal procedures but seen as the only available option to reverse a very bad commander decision to view the deployment in the operational terms.

USAREUR then initiated a call forward procedure for deployment through its Crisis-Action Team (CAT) once EUCOM cleared a unit to move. USAREUR would then set the order of deployment while EUCOM validated the Unit Line Number (ULN) that was given to the deploying unit. The ULN is normally derived from the JOPES process, but since JOPES was not being used, EUCOM used the




Figure 7

Source: USTRANSCOM Briefing Slide, December 12, 1995.

ULN as a means of disciplining the deployment system.³⁸ The ULN method was used for both air and rail movements to Hungary and Bosnia.

Summary

The deployment of forces to OJE was linked together by a series of miscommunications that involved all levels of command. The inability of EUCOM and NATO to communicate and work together on the OPLAN development was instrumental to the misunderstanding on how the deployment was accomplished. The miscommunication filtered down further in EUCOM's understanding of what

USAREUR was planning and how they were going to deploy. The aggregate miscommunication led to multiple planning processes that were not coordinated between any of the commands.

The decision by the LTG Abrams and MG Wright that Bosnia was an operational not strategic deployment was contrary to how GEN Joulwan at EUCOM saw the deployment. EUCOM simply did not know what USAREUR was planning and USAREUR failed to keep EUCOM abreast of what was planned. The operational deployment decision also laid the groundwork for the total collapse of the transportation management system. Even though EUCOM had directed that JOPES would be used, thus making the deployment strategic, the USAREUR and V Corps commanders ignored that directive.

The decision by MG Wright not to enter data into TC-ACCIS meant that the system was unable to be used to process data into JOPES. The Level IV data was critical for building the DEL, which would have been inputted into JOPES. The restructuring of the deployment flow became impossible to manage due to the lack of a system to manage it.

MG Wright's decision to centralize all road movement requests through the 37th TRANSCOM was completely against the doctrine. Moreover, the inability of JOPES to interact with ADAMS added confusion as to what units were deploying and when they were deploying. Unit moves were impossible to track due to the lack of data input and the two systems incompatibility. The two systems were also ineffective because the data was entered into JOPES too late to impact upon the deployment. Regardless, JOPES does not interact with ADAMS even if the system operated as designed.

EUCOM's inability to use JOPES led to the use of a non-doctrinal deployment board to validate units for movement. Without JOPES to identify the requirements to USTRANSCOM, the board was unable to place aircraft against valid lift requirements. Even with the deployment board EUCOM had difficulty validating the airlift requirements. The combination of restructuring the deployment sequence and no workable system to track requirements led USAREUR and EUCOM to lose control of which units had deployed and which had not. USTRANSCOM then decided that in order to ensure EUCOM

received the needed aircraft at the proper time they would have to OPCON a portion of the nation's strategic lift assets to EUCOM in order for the deployment to succeed. USTRANSCOM eventually placed eleven C-17 aircraft under the operational control of EUCOM in order to ensure that the United States would meet its strategic requirements in support of Operation Joint Endeavor.

¹David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995) 89.

²Ibid., 184.

³Ibid., 366.

⁴Ibid., 366.

⁵Paul Harris, Cry Bosnia, (New York: Interlink Books, 1996) 15.

⁶Ibid., 15.

⁷COL Ralph Feneis, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 January 1997.

⁸Ibid., 7 January 1997.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Operation Joint Endeavor, "Task Force Eagle Initial Operations". Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, May 1996. This document contains Lesson Learned.

¹²Ibid., 10.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴COL Jack Curran, interview by Dr. William Matthews, tape recording, 8 February 1996, United States Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base.

¹⁵Ibid., 8 February 1996.

¹⁶MG James Wright, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 March 1997.

¹⁷Ibid., 7 March 1997.

¹⁸U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993), 12-8.

¹⁹MG James Wright, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 March 1997.

²⁰COL Ralph Feneis, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 January 1997.

²¹*Ibid.*, 7 January 1997.

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸COL Bruce Laferriere, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 10 January 1997.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 10 January 1997.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹COL Robert Kubiszewski, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 10 January 1997.

³²COL Jack Curran, interview by Dr. William Matthews, tape recording, 8 February 1996, United States Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base.

³³Operation Joint Endeavor, "USTRANSCOM". Archives, Research Library, Scott AFB, IL, May 1996.

³⁴COL Ralph Feneis, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 January 1997.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 7 January 1997.

³⁶Operation Joint Endeavor, "Task Force Eagle Initial Operations". Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, May 1996. This document contains Lesson Learned.

³⁷MG James Wright, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 March 1997.

³⁸COL Bruce Laferriere, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 10 January 1997.

CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter analyzes how USAREUR deploys units from Europe. The analysis will compare and contrast the way USAREUR deployed VII Corps to Southwest Asia for Desert Shield to the way it did for the 1st Armored Division for Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. The comparison will show how and why USAREUR used the deployment mechanisms to deploy their forces as they did. The areas that will be analyzed will be the Joint Operational Planning Execution System (JOPES) in Pre-deployment Planning Activities, Movement to the POE and the Strategic Lift in the transportation system. By comparing and contrasting these systems then it will be possible to see how USAREUR utilized them and why they chose to use them as they did.

The premise for the analysis is that the United States Army established doctrine that provides guidance and systems to deploy units. These guidelines and mechanisms, if adhered to, will efficiently and effectively deploy our forces throughout the world. These guidelines and mechanisms have been developed over the years to ensure that a structured procedure is available on how units should deploy. The analysis of these two case studies will provide insight into how doctrine was applied in the USAREUR deployments and reasons for its use or why it was not used. The reasons why doctrine was not used will be analyzed as to either the lack of doctrine or the disregard for doctrine in the given situation. The analysis will also discuss the way in which doctrine is manipulated to meet the needs of the commanders.

Predeployment Activities

The first part of the analysis will be concerned with the deliberate and crisis-action planning process which evolves in the Predeployment Activities Phase. In the first case study, the deployment of VII Corps from Germany will be compared with how USAREUR deployed forces to Bosnia and their use of the deliberate or crisis action planning process.

The EUCOM CINC never had any requirement to develop a CONPLAN/OPLAN for Southwest Asia because that AOR came under the command of Central Command (CENTCOM). So when EUCOM was informed that VII Corps would deploy, they had to develop a deployment plan. The decision to deploy the VII Corps from Europe to Southwest Asia caused the USAREUR and VII Corps staffs to use crisis-action planning. USAREUR and VII Corps started the crisis-action planning as early as September of 1990.¹

The deployment of forces to Bosnia had been planned for by EUCOM using the deliberate planning process, which had been used in developing OPLAN 40102, 40103 and 40104. USAREUR however could not use the OPLANs that had been developed because those plans did not fit the scenario for Bosnia. USAREUR had directed V Corps and 21st TAACOM as early as 1993 to develop contingency plans for a possible UN support mission for the VOPP. The Dayton Peace Accord setup new requirements that had not been foreseen in OPLAN 40102, 40103 and 40104. A new OPLAN 40105 was developed to support the peace agreement.

These two case studies have comparisons that are strikingly similar. The deployment to SWA used crisis action planning while the Bosnian deployment had used deliberate planning. Though both deployments, it could be argued, utilized crisis action planning process to develop a plan. The Bosnia deployment did not use any of the OPLANs, which required the development of a new plan. Each deployment was misdirected in the planning process due to the guidance or lack of it from higher headquarters. USAREUR had caused confusion in the deployment of VII Corps from Germany when

GEN Saint gave the mission to deploy from Europe to VII Corps.² GEN Saint then put a team together, headed by the DCSLOG to plan the deployment of units from Germany.³

The deployment of USAREUR forces to Bosnia also had an ominous beginning. EUCOM had USAREUR developing a course of action that had been shelved months prior to the deployment. USAREUR then directed V Corps and 21st TAACOM to develop a plan for an obsolete course of action. The course of action was OPLAN, 40103 and 40104 which was for the extraction of UN forces from a hostile environment in Bosnia. EUCOM was working on a U.S. only deployment while AFSOUTH was developing a multi-national force deployment, which came about because the EUCOM commander was dual-hatted as the commander of NATO forces, of which AFSOUTH is an element. The development of three separate plans without the coordination between any of the staffs led to confusion and an inability to know what direction higher headquarters wanted to go.

USAREUR had made the same mistake with VII Corps in developing their deployment plan. Though EUCOM and USAREUR had not been developing separate plans, GEN Saint's directive giving VII Corps control of their deployment added confusion. The DCSLOG had initiated a deployment cell, but failed to include any representative of the VII Corps staff within the cell. The absence of a VII Corps member added to the problems in that neither USAREUR nor VII Corps knew what the headquarters had planned.

There was disagreement over the decision to give VII Corps the mission from MG Laposata, DCSLOG USAREUR. He believed that this exceeded the capabilities of VII Corps.⁴ USAREUR, even though they delegated the mission to VII Corps, still developed the transportation analysis to the deployment plan. They set about identifying and estimating lift requirements. USAREUR also established the links for Host Nation support and commercial transportation availability. The USAREUR planners determined over 585 trains and 60 ships would be required to deploy the Corps.⁵ This would signal the need for multiple ports, a decision that should have been made at the EUCOM level but was determined at USAREUR Level. The development of this was all accomplished without

any input from VII Corps, which was developing the troop list that would drive the requirements for the deployment. A clear case of the USAREUR and VII Corps staffs each moving in their own direction without talking to the other.

The development of the TPFDD was one of the most critical aspects in each of these two case studies. For VII Corps the development of a TPFDD was never completed due to the constant change of units. For the Bosnia deployment a TPFDD was never developed due to the decision of the V Corps and 21st TAACOM Commanders not to use JOPES. USAREUR had delegated the responsibility to build the TPFDD to VII Corps. Due to the time constraints and constant changing of units and priorities no TPFDD was ever developed. Instead a TPFDL was established. The establishment of the TPFDL set the priority of what units were going to deploy and in what order. The problem that kept re-occurring was the changing of units. This caused the TPFDL to be delayed in publication, which it never was, but instead it became a living document.⁶ The delay in publishing the TPFDL caused MTMC-E to delay the ordering of ships and the call forward dates for units.

The V Corps and 21st TAACOM Commanders saw the deployment to Bosnia as an operational deployment not a strategic one.⁷ The decision that this was an operational deployment allowed the commanders to avoid the use of JOPES and the need to input data into the system. The decision that this was an operational deployment was contrary to what EUCOM had stated in the execution order. EUCOM required in the Execution Order, published on 14 December 1995, that JOPES would be utilized.⁸ Again in both deployments there was disregard for what was happening at higher headquarters. USAREUR's planning of the VII Corps deployment while not talking to VII Corps, who was building the troop list, and USAREUR's disregard of the EUCOM directive that JOPES would be utilized.

Another development in the planning process was the fielding of the TC-ACCIS system. USAREUR decided to field the system as a means to actively provide force tracking during the VII Corps deployment. TC-ACCIS provided the needed database for JOPES. VII Corps was unable to

provide current data into JOPES and with the ever-changing troop list TC-ACCIS was seen as a new tool that would get control of the deployment. USAREUR never planned on using TC-ACCIS for the Bosnia deployment, but instead was going to use the STACCS-E system to track it. The problem with this was that STACCS-E had only been used when USAREUR had simulation exercises and had not been tested during an actual deployment.⁹

The decision not to use TC-ACCIS added other implications into the deployment planning process, as did the implementation of this system for the deployment of VII Corps. Since there was no CONPLAN/OPLAN available during either deployment the Level IV data that is in a TPFDD was not in the planning. VII Corps used TC-ACCIS as a tool to get the required Level IV data necessary to deploy the units using JOPES. The TC-ACCIS system allowed the use of a TPFDL to identify what units would deploy and in what order, but no TPFDL was ever built or published.¹⁰

During the first two weeks of the USAREUR deployment to Bosnia JOPES was not used. USAREUR had intended to use data from the STANAGs in the STACCS-E system to track the deployment. When EUCOM directed USAREUR to use the JOPES system the data that was used for STACC-E was not detailed enough for JOPES. With the decision to use STACC-E, data was not inputted into the TC-ACCIS system. This left USAREUR with no ability to provide data into JOPES. VII Corps, which had inaccurate data in JOPES, was able to use TC-ACCIS as a means to get control of the planning and deployment process while USAREUR was unable to control the Bosnian deployment due to the decision that it was an operational not strategic deployment.

The deployment to Bosnia was also affected by NATO, which had no effect on the SWA deployment. The NATO staff had been planning for the deployment of a multi-nation force from Europe. NATO had tried early in October to establish contact with EUCOM concerning the deployment. The problem was that EUCOM was being very restrictive with the type of information that was being released. In fact, EUCOM would not even comment on what forces, if any, would be deployed due to political considerations.¹¹ This caused problems for the NATO planning staff in trying

to put their plan together. The fact that EUCOM, NATO and USAREUR were all working on different contingency plan lead to major disconnects on how the deployment was to occur. Even though the EUCOM commander was dual-hatted the plans were not coordinated or sequenced together.

NATO saw its function as the manager of the deployment. But its ability to function as such was compromised due to NATO's lack of information and deployment systems compatibility. EUCOM informed NATO off line which forces would deploy but had a stance of, "no comment," when asked in formal sessions.¹² The information that EUCOM gave NATO was not enough to plan for the management of the deployment or allow them to link into what the U.S. was doing. The lack of information led to consternation between the EUCOM and NATO staffs. The communication was incomplete due to the classification of information and NATO could not get the proper classification clearance that would enable them to properly plan for the deployment.

EUCOM did not let NATO know any of the detailed plans until the first week of December 1995.¹³ EUCOM and NATO were ill prepared for the deployment because of the lack of communication between their headquarters and also due to the lack of coordination with USAREUR. EUCOM not only left NATO out of the plan but they did not fully understand how USAREUR was planning on deploying. NATO had planned on using a newly developed deployment system for the first time. EUCOM was aware of the system but was unaware that USAREUR had planned for an operational deployment.

The ADAMS system, which is a deployment planning and force-tracking program relies on each country to provide input data for it to operate. The U.S. did not provide NATO any of the data because USAREUR could not provide the data to EUCOM. The fact that EUCOM was being restrictive with their information and that USAREUR was not utilizing JOPES led to a breakdown in EUCOM and NATO abilities to manage and track the deployment.

USAREUR, which had no intentions of using JOPES and therefore had no data developed, could not pass data to EUCOM which was the only headquarters that could not relay the needed data to

the NATO ADAMS system. 1st TAMCA frantically tried to input data from the STANAG's, thereby creating some data to place into JOPES. The problems that ensued were centered on the fact that the NATO ADAMS system was not compatible with the JOPES system due to the classification system for JOPES. NATO did not have the security clearance to get access to the JOPES system. The solution was for 1st TAMCA to take data fields out of JOPES and hand carry it over to the ADAMS system and input it in manually. The deployment system was doomed to failure from the start due to the inability of the different staff levels to communicate and coordinate together.

Movement to POE

The USAREUR deployment of forces to SWA had to overcome the initial mistake of giving VII Corps the mission to deploy itself. The Corps was not equipped or staffed to accomplish it alone and doctrinally it was not their mission.¹⁴ VII Corps compounded their inability to deploy efficiently and effectively by allowing the CMCC to deploy early and thus left a void between VII Corps and the theater movement community.

The VII Corps realized that without the CMCC available to manage the movement of corps units they would lose the ability to control the deployment. The answer was for the VII Corps to stand up a non-doctrinal Deployment Action Team (DAT). The 1st TAMCA was then linked to the DAT who passed the priorities forward and coordinated the transportation assets needed. 1st TAMCA eventually sent teams down to the divisions to centrally manage requirements due to the VII Corps inability to publish a movement plan. The lack of a movement plan stemmed from two problem areas; the inability of the commanders to stand firm on the deployment list and the lack of a TFPDD.

The deployment of forces to Bosnia had some of the same trapping that was seen in the initial movement of VII Corps. There was nothing doctrinal about this deployment. The lack of a TPFDD meant there was no input into JOPES. Unlike the VII Corps deployment USAREUR had not inputted the data into TC-ACCIS so it could not be used. USAREUR developed a non-doctrinal board that

would validate unit movements before they would issue the movement directive. This process was a direct result of EUCOM and USAREUR not having the visibility to monitor the deployment. The absence of data in JOPES caused delays and confusion on the priority of movement. Units began to move to the railheads and APOD without a movement directive. The result was a train being allocated to units who had a lower priority in movement. The trains became unavailable due to demand, which caused units to be downloaded so that units with a higher priority could be uploaded. The rail lines then became jammed due to the restricted volume of trains that Hungary and Croatia could accept. Units continued to request trains due to the lack of guidance from USAREUR. The result was that rail cars soon were in short supply and units were loaded onto rail cars earlier than they were required.

The deployments seemed to work extremely efficiently for VII Corps and the forces deploying to Bosnia when it came to Host Nation Support (HNS). EUCOM, USAREUR and the foreign ministries worked the coordination together in attaining the waivers and assistance where needed to cross the different country borders. MTMC had coordinated closely with USAREUR to insure units would arrive at the ports in a timely manner. MTMC had fielded the TC-ACCIS system early to USAREUR for the VII Corps deployment but in the Bosnia deployment it did not matter because of USAREUR's decision not to use JOPES. The HNS and commercial partnerships were of equal importance. These partnerships were essential to both of the deployments. Further cooperation with the Dutch, Belgians and Germans allowed USAREUR to move equipment loaded with ammunition through the Netherlands. This allowed for maximum use of space and the synchronization of equipment and cargo.

The STANAGs worked exceptionally well for both movements and expedited the deployment process. The original plan for the deployment of forces to Bosnia called for the use of STANAGs along with the STACCS-E to provide the clearances and force tracking capabilities by rail and road within Europe. The STANAGs were a vital link between the movement control community and the mode operators. 1st TAMCA had to take the data off these STANAGs and convert it into JOPES data.

The decision to try and salvage some of the deployment control led to even further problems in that 1st TAMCA was unable to keep up with the deployment movements and this caused further delays. The deployment was already too far along. The delay at the airports due to weather and the congestion at the railhead in Hungary and Croatia had caused a backlog in Germany. The only option available was the deployment of units by road. MG Wright, 21st TAACOM Commander, decided to put the 37th TRANSCOM Commander in charge of all highway movements and clearances. This was an attempt to get centralized control over the movements. Units would have to go through the 37th TRANSCOM instead of going through the 1st TAMCA to get their clearances. In effect the 21st TAACOM had placed another barrier in the doctrinal process of requesting movements.

The Bosnian deployment had to also take into account the interaction of NATO. The injection of NATO into a U.S. deployment had never been attempted before and there were considerations on how flow would occur and how it was to be tracked. Though the process had been developed on paper it had not been tested through a deployment. The process ran into trouble from the start because of the planning process. In the multiple plans that were developed only NATO and EUCOM had envisioned the use of ADAMS. USAREUR had developed an operational deployment and had not planned for a TPFDD. Therefore the ability to try and link EUCOM to NATO for the strategic deployment had been derailed from the start. EUCOM did forward U.S. information to SHAPE via diskette, but the majority of information that SHAPE received on the deployment was either telephone or facsimile from individuals located throughout Germany.¹⁵

To manage the deployment, NATO stood up for the first time the Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC). The fact that NATO had never deployed meant that there was really no reason for them to ever utilize the JMCC. The JMCC was supposed to monitor all movements of NATO countries deploying from Europe and control the movement of units into the theater of operation. The overall operation went exceptionally well, except for the initial start. Again the lack of data into JOPES and the access of JOPES data with ADAMS kept the process slow. They initially had to use phones,

facsimile, pencil and paper to monitor the deployment.¹⁶ EUCOM would eventually force USAREUR to use JOPES, which would put data into the system. This would allow the JMCC to monitor some of the deployment traffic. The problem with this was that it was not very accurate or timely.¹⁷ Another problem was that the link between JOPES and ADAMS should have been perfected before the operation was started.

Strategic Lift

The use of strategic lift was a problem for each of the two deployments. VII Corps had problems early due to the inaccurate data that was available in JOPES. The inaccurate data gave false space requirements, which led to the scheduling of extra ships to move the corps. The false data was also linked to the fact that USAREUR did not have the proper troop list and failed to communicate with VII Corps on which units were going to make up the corps. The VII Corps deployment was able to recover from the lack of data by using TC-ACCIS as a means to capture the data that was needed. TC-ACCIS enabled USAREUR to submit accurate requirements that reflected what type of lift was required to lift the corps.

MTMC and MSC worked closely with USAREUR to ensure the VII Corps would have the required lift available. MSC developed contracts for shipping and scheduled ships for the deployment. The development of the TC-ACCIS data and TPFDL led to MTMC and MSC being able to dedicate ships to the deployment more effectively. The doctrinal process of identifying unit equipment and placing the data into JOPES allowed the system to work in this area. Though initially there was a delay due to confusion and delegation of responsibilities in the end USAREUR made the system work.

The same could be said for the deployment by air. Though mainly a troop deployment, AMC was able to identify requirements through JOPES. This allowed the allocation of aircraft to be assigned this mission. It was of utmost importance due to the fact that the aircraft used during this deployment was mainly from the Civil Reserve Aircraft Fleet (CRAFT).

The Bosnia deployment was a debacle when it came to the use of strategic lift and the doctrine that drives the process. The decision by USAREUR, V Corps and 21st TAACOM Commanders that this was an operational deployment from Germany to Bosnia and did not require strategic lift made it impossible for the system to recover in the doctrinal sense. One of the reasons for this was that EUCOM only had C-130 cargo transports planes available within theater. Another reason was that the decision that this was an operational deployment meant that no data had been placed into TC-ACCIS and JOPES was not planned for use.

The other aspect of this was that USTRANSCOM had not been involved in any of the planning for the deployment. Even though EUCOM knew it was going to be a strategic deployment they still did not involve USTRANSCOM in the planning. USAREUR had no intention of this deployment being strategic so they had not let any EUCOM representative in on their requirements. The inability of EUCOM and USAREUR to coordinate and communicate was a leading cause of the inability to forecast requirements for strategic lift.

The weather and rail constraints caused USAREUR to look for strategic lift. There was only way that USAREUR could deploy in time to meet the Peace Agreement Mandates. This would require USTRANSCOM to play in the deployment. USTRANSCOM was unhappy with their lack of participation in the operation.¹⁸ The inability of USAREUR to manage the deployment caused EUCOM to be unable to validate true lift requirements to USTRANSCOM. EUCOM's inability to validate the lift requirements caused the creation of a non-doctrinal validation board to review lift requirements.

The validation board that EUCOM developed was still unable to provide accurate lift requirements to USTRANSCOM. The deployment had gotten so far out of control that neither USAREUR nor EUCOM had a handle on what units had deployed. USTRANSCOM decided that in order to give EUCOM the flexibility to meet the mandates they would place eleven C-17 aircraft under their operational control.¹⁹ The doctrine that was developed had to be discarded to save the

deployment. EUCOM's inability to provide accurate lift requirements in a timely manner caused USTRANSCOM to release control of their strategic aircraft in order to ensure that the deployment was a success. Though wanting to prove the capabilities of the aircraft the decision to allocate them to one CINC was non-doctrinal. The larger implications are that these aircraft are a strategic resource of which there are only a limited number. The placement of any number of them under one CINC could have far-reaching consequences if another contingency would have erupted somewhere else in the world.

Summary

There are comparisons and contrasts between both of these deployments. The fact that EUCOM and USAREUR delegated their responsibilities down to the Corps level rings loud in each deployment. The saving grace for VII Corps was that USAREUR took back part of the responsibility in managing and controlling the deployment. EUCOM and USAREUR never took control of the deployment to Bosnia until after it had gotten out of hand.

In the VII Corps deployment, USAREUR was able to recover from the lack of a TPFDD by developing a TPFDL and using TC-ACCIS data to input into JOPES. This allowed them to follow doctrine by using JOPES, which would then be able to identify requirements for ships and planes. USAREUR was even able to apply new technology to integrate into the deployment. Though they did not have a complete TPFDL that was published they were able to use it to their benefit.

Operation Joint Endeavor was completely the opposite of the previous deployment in that respect. The bottom line was that LTG Abrams, V Corps Commander, and MG Wright, 21st TAACOM Commander saw this mission as an operational deployment. They were going to use STANAGs and STACCS-E to deploy the force. The use of STACCS-E, which is an operational deployment tool, not a strategic one, restricted the U.S. Army's ability to adequately track the deployment.

EUCOM and USAREUR were not communicating on how the forces would deploy.

EUCOM directed that JOPES, a strategic system be utilized, but USAREUR ignored the directive. The EUCOM CINC was directing the deployment on a strategic level where as USAREUR was managing the deployment as an operational one. This caused a lapse in the ability of the transportation system to identify requirements and provide force tracking.

NATO was also unable to communicate and get information out on how EUCOM was going to deploy. The restrictive nature in which EUCOM released information did not allow NATO time to respond to their actions. The inability of EUCOM to coordinate and communicate with NATO led to both headquarters planning separate operations, even though the same person commands them both. There was also the communications link between JOPES and ADAMS that was not identified until after the deployment had begun, which left the systems unable to communicate due to clearance requirements.

USTRANSCOM was yet another link that was left out until required. EUCOM failed to bring USTRANSCOM into the planning until after the deployment had begun. This goes back to the Corps Commanders decision that this was an operational deployment. The answer from MG Wright, 21st TAACOM Commander, was that each CINC should have strategic assets within their command.²⁰ That is contrary to what doctrine dictates. This led USTRANSCOM to allocate 11-C17 to EUCOM for them to use. EUCOM and USAREUR developed a deployment board to issue movement directives and validate lift requirements. Both of these types of boards are against all doctrine procedures. It must be noted, that the placement of these strategic aircraft under one CINC could have grave consequences if there had been another contingency arisen somewhere else in the world.

The VII Corps deployment was also dependent upon a non-doctrinal deployment team to oversee the deployment. The commanders have allowed the transportation procedures and structure to be ignored and misused in order to meet their needs. It is important that communication, coordination

and adherence to guidelines/doctrine are kept intact so that the deployments will run efficiently and effectively.

¹GEN Fredrick Franks, interview by LTC Peter S. Kindsvatter, tape recording, 2 April 1991, VII Corps Historian, Iraq.

²Harry S. Hamilton, "The VII Corps Deployment to Saudi Arabia: An Analysis of Deployment Transportation Planning and Management," Thesis, Master of Military Art and Science. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, 1993) 47.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Military Traffic Management Command 1990-92, "Annual Historical Review," MTMC Europe: Deploying the Already Deployed, 31.

⁶Harry S. Hamilton, "The VII Corps Deployment to Saudi Arabia: An Analysis of Deployment Transportation Planning and Management," Thesis, Master of Military Art and Science. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, 1993) 47.

⁷MG James Wright, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 March 1997.

⁸Ibid., 7 March 1997.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰Harry S. Hamilton, "The VII Corps Deployment to Saudi Arabia: An Analysis of Deployment Transportation Planning and Management," Thesis, Master of Military Art and Science. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, 1993) 47.

¹¹COL Ralph Feneis, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 January 1997.

¹²Ibid., 7 January 1997.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴US Army, FM 55-1, 1-6.

¹⁵COL Ralph Feneis, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 January 1997.

¹⁶Ibid., 7 January 1997.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸COL Jack Curran, interview by Dr. William Matthews, tape recording, 8 February 1996, United States Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base.

¹⁹MG James Wright, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 March 1997.

²⁰Ibid., 7 March 1997.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Introduction

Contingency deployments are complex and allow for little if any planning. The contingencies often require multiple modes of transportation and deployment from different locations throughout the world. U. S. Army doctrine has established guidelines that provide systems that a commander may use to conduct a deployment. How the deployment is conducted will depend on the problems that arise and the commander's intent and resources available.¹ To make doctrine work more effectively and efficiently, commanders must pay more attention to strategic planning and execution management.

The USAREUR deployment of the VII Corps to SWA and the 1st AD to Bosnia are examples of how commanders interpret doctrine and determine the validity of its use or the decision not to use it to meet their intent. It provides evidence that some doctrine works, when it is followed. It also provides evidence that planning, coordination and management require a far greater amount of attention during pre-deployment planning.

One should not take away from this thesis that USAREUR failed in its mission to deploy its forces. USAREUR met its requirements and employed a force that brought stability in SWA and in Bosnia. Mistakes were made at all levels in both deployments. EUCOM did not provide adequate planning guidance but USAREUR was also guilty of not providing feedback to EUCOM. LTG Abrams, V Corps Commander, and MG Wright, 21st TAACOM Commander, made the decision that the Bosnia deployment would be an operational not strategic one contrary to what the EUCOM commander published in the execute order.² Perhaps there was a misunderstanding or a lack of

communication but this led USAREUR down an opposite path from EUCOM and NATO. This caused USAREUR to institute non-doctrinal procedures so that the deployment could continue.

Doctrine

The deployment of VII Corps and the 1st AD from Germany showed that certain aspects of doctrinal procedures are essential if the deployment is to run smoothly. The time sensitive situation in which both operations incurred caused the elimination of some phases.³ The elimination of certain phases or procedures in doctrine is the commander's prerogative. The problems that arise from these decisions must be clear to the commander during the decision-making process.

Doctrine for strategic deployment has become complicated with the addition of new automated systems, which are supposed to make it easier for the commander. The commander must know what the systems can do for him to be able to make the correct decisions. The problem with the current transportation deployment system is that there are too many different systems within the DOD. An example is the TC-ACCIS system that the Army uses is not the same as the U.S. Air Force uses. Another problem is that TC-ACCIS has difficulties talking with JOPES, which degrades its ability to function as a transportation management tool.

Doctrine was written after years of study and research. The DOD has put a lot of money and manpower into developing it. Though the commander has the ability to use doctrine as he sees fit he should not be able to decide which command and control system that he will use. USAREUR has developed their own command and control system (STACCS-E) that does not have the interface capabilities with JOPES. The ability to develop a system at this level (i.e., theater) has allowed USAREUR to become its own CINC. It became apparent in the Bosnian deployment when USAREUR planned on using their system (STACCS-E) and not the doctrinal system (JOPES).

FM 100-17; Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization has made it very clear what constitutes a strategic deployment. Clearly, the movement of forces from Germany to Bosnia,

U.S. to Bosnia and U.S. to Germany was strategic. There needs to be established guidelines that even commanders cannot cross when it comes to strategic deployment systems. With the downsizing of the U.S. forces in Europe there is a greater chance that these forces will be deployed somewhere else in the world. Wherever, they deploy too, it is going to be a strategic move thus they must adhere to the systems that are in place (i.e., JOPES).

Another concern is with doctrine itself. A problem that was discovered during the research of this thesis was that there is conflicting guidance between Joint and Army deployment doctrine. The DOD has placed importance that the military is a joint system but it allows each service to develop its own doctrine. There needs to be a concerted effort to bring each of the services together and utilize the one joint publication on how the military will deploy. The use of the Joint Publication would decrease the chances of commanders misinterpreting or disregarding doctrine.

Predeployment Activities

The two case studies have shown a major disconnect in how planning is conducted in the European Theater. Whether it is deliberate or crisis action there is a pattern of miscommunication between the various headquarters. These patterns are at all levels of command within USAREUR. EUCOM and USAREUR's inability to give guidance to V Corps and 21st TAACOM lead to multiple errors that can only be corrected by ad hoc non-doctrinal procedures. The same can be said for the V Corps and 21st TAACOM in their inability to communicate what they were planning.

The problems of miscommunication and misdirection of planning effort stems from the leadership. The question of who is in charge in Europe is what needs to be asked. Obviously, the EUCOM Commander is the overall commander but that does not get to heart of the problem. In both of these deployments there has been an underlying theme of who was responsible. The lack of guidance from EUCOM in both deployments led to miscommunication and misuse of the deployment system (JOPES).

In the VII Corps deployment USAREUR gave conflicting guidance which led both headquarters into their own planning process without communicating with each other. The decision by GEN Saint to give VII Corps the mission to deploy themselves conflicted with USAREUR deploying other theater assets. It allowed VII Corps to be placed in a position to make decisions about the deployment process that they did not have the ability to make. These decisions were in reference to the development of a TPFDD and the deployment of their CMCC before the corps was deployed.

The Bosnia deployment was a complete breakdown in communication between all levels of command. EUCOM was again the commander in chief but did little to lead their subordinates through the planning process. EUCOM allowed USAREUR and AFSOUTH headquarters to make contingency plans without providing guidance and feedback as to what each of those subordinate commands were planning. It was also negligent of USAREUR to not provide feedback to EUCOM as to what they were planning. Knowing the operation would involve more than the just USAREUR troops and that the deployment would be out of USAREUR's theater of operation it is inconceivable that they could imagine an operational deployment.

The planning guidance must start at the EUCOM level and be directed down the chain of command. USAREUR must not be allowed to think that they are their own CINC and thus disregard how the planning process works and the deployment mechanisms that are in place to plan the deployment. EUCOM must also bring NATO into the planning process if there is to be a lasting relationship. The EUCOM Commander is also dual hatted as the NATO Commander and as such has an obligation to ensure that the right information is passed to the NATO staff in a timely manner. The Bosnia deployment highlighted the inability of EUCOM to coordinate with NATO on what plan would be executed. The deployment has brought forth concerns on how NATO receives the required information when its classification prevents release. That is a problem that must be addressed before the next deployment.

Movement to POE

Both of these deployments have shown that if commanders disregard JOPES, then in order for the deployment to succeed some other form of command and control must be implemented. The VII Corps deployment, which never developed a TPFDD for JOPES, had to rely on the fielding of TC-ACCIS as a means of getting the data. TC-ACCIS did help in developing the Level IV data required for JOPES but there were still problems in the system that would later plague the deployment (i.e. containers). There must be a TFPDD developed and placed into JOPES or there will always be a repeat of these deployment problems.

Commander's decisions will always have a major impact on deployments. The decision to deploy the VII Corps CMCC ahead of the main body resulted in the inability of the corps to control the deployment. That void caused the commander to delegate the movement of units down to his subordinate commanders, which caused even more problems. Then, in order to gain some control over the deployment VII Corps instigated a DAT. This problem illustrates what happens when a command decision is made without an understanding of how the transportation system works. The only way to gain control was to develop a non-doctrinal board to control the movements.

The same problems arose in OJE, only at a much higher level. The decision that OJE was an operational not strategic deployment by USAREUR hindered it from the start. Even though EUCOM had directed that JOPES be used, USAREUR disregarded the directive. MG Wright then made the decision that TC-ACCIS would not be used. These decisions drove USAREUR and EUCOM to develop deployment boards that were necessary in order to gain control.

Even these non-doctrinal boards were not totally successful in controlling the movement of units into the theater. The units that had already left were not placed into the system and because of this USAREUR could not tell which units had or had not deployed. The decision by MG Wright to make the 37th TRANSCOM the central manager for all road clearances went against doctrine and was another non-doctrinal method used to try and gain control of the deployment.

These decisions by commanders were made at a level that EUCOM should have never allowed. It was up to EUCOM to control the deployment and they had given that responsibility up prior to the deployment commencement. The deployment also points out problems in the use of a non-doctrinal command and control system (STACCS-E) being developed at theater level. STACCS-E may be effective to control operational movements of a corps, but this was a strategic move that involved more than just USAREUR.

Another issue that must be of concern to EUCOM is the ability to interface with the NATO deployment system ADAMS. The deployment showed that JOPES and ADAMS are not able to interface, which forced much of the deployment management to be done by hand. The problem of how to flow classified information from JOPES into ADAMS has not been resolved. If the U.S. and NATO are to work together in the future there must be resolution of this matter.

Strategic Lift

The area of strategic lift was probably the most affected by the decision to make this an operational not strategic deployment. The disregard of JOPES by USAREUR halted any ability of EUCOM to properly use strategic lift. This problem with strategic lift can be traced back to the initial planning when USTRANSCOM was not allowed to participate. Again, because USAREUR and EUCOM were not communicating on the deployment plan, strategic lift did not seem to be a matter about which either command was concerned.

Weather was a determining factor that was not calculated into the deployment picture. The bad weather and the mandate of the GFAP made strategic lift a vital part of the deployment in order to deploy the troops in time. USAREUR could not tell EUCOM what units had or had not deployed. Without the data in JOPES and no way of controlling the deployment USAREUR and EUCOM developed validation boards to determine when a unit would deploy. The problem was still who or who had not deployed and USAREUR was still unable to give EUCOM valid lift requirements.

USTRANSCOM was allocating strategic airlift for which there was no valid requirement. In frustration, USTRANSCOM allocated eleven C-17 strategic aircraft OPCON to EUCOM for the duration of the deployment.

The placement of strategic airlift under the operational control of a CINC is setting a dangerous precedent. These aircraft are a national asset that can not be placed under the control of a CINC. They must be kept at the national level in case of a national emergency. JOPES must be used in order for these problems not to occur again. EUCOM must become more involved in the planning process and be concerned with the TPFDD in JOPES.

Summary

The deployment doctrine that is already developed needs to be used, while the DOD improves on what is available. Each service component has its own deployment doctrine and there is a Joint Doctrine as well. There needs to be only one encompassing deployment doctrine that will work for all of the services. The development of different service component management systems (i.e., TC-ACCIS) must benefit all if they are to be productive. Commands cannot be allowed to develop their own systems (i.e., STACCS-E).

It should be understood within the European Theater that any deployments are strategic and thus will require the use of JOPES. The commands must develop TPFDD's within their contingency plans so that a repeat of OJE does not occur. The pre-planned input of unit data into TC-ACCIS would have helped USAREUR overcome the lack of data in JOPES. The commands must understand the importance of the systems and how they interact with JOPES.

Non-doctrinal boards are not the way to deploy our forces out of theater. These boards are only quick fixes to a systemic problem that is inherent to USAREUR. The lack of proper guidance and communication give way to commanders planning their own deployments and staffs failing to

understand the entire picture. The EUCOM Commander must take the lead in directing his subordinate commanders to ensure they understand what is required.

NATO has proven that it will be an integral part of future deployments. There must be a resolution of NATO's ability to interact with EUCOM for future planning purposes. There is also a need to evaluate how JOPES and ADAMS interface with each other. The problem with ADAMS' ability to interface with JOPES due to the classification requirements must be addressed.

Through all these deployments the U.S. has been able to meet its requirements. It is hoped that by addressing these shortcomings future deployments will not have to endure these types of abnormalities. Each deployment is different and due to the commanders involved will take on its own personality. This historical analysis sheds light on future deployments and will enable commanders to avoid the same mistakes that were made in these two deployments.

¹Roy D. Shapiro and James L. Heskett, Logistics Strategy, Cases and Concepts, (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1985), viii.

²MG James Wright, interview by author, tape recording, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 7 March 1997.

³U.S. Army, FM 100-17, A-3.

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


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
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