

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL: ATTITUDES OF
AIR FORCE PERSONNEL ATTENDING
EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY


10-97

by


Michael Eric Boyd

This Graduate Research Project was prepared under the direction of the candidate's Research Committee Member, Dr. James Schultz, Associate Professor, Extended Campus, and the candidate's Research Committee Chair, Dr. Marian Schultz, Associate Professor, University of West Florida, and has been approved by the Project Review Committee. It was submitted to the Extended Campus in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Aeronautical Science

PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE:


Dr. James T. Schultz
Committee Member


Dr. Marian C. Schultz
Committee Chair



DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

19971121 029



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 53 WING (ACC)
203 WEST D AVE, SUITE 400
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542-6867


29 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR DTIC

FROM: 53 WG/PA

SUBJECT: Clearance for Public Release

1. The attached thesis, "United Nations Command and Control: Attitudes of Air Force Personnel," has been submitted by Michael Boyd for publication.
2. This material has been determined to be unclassified, and is releasable to the general public.


CAROLE J. PFEIFFER, SSgt, USAF
NCOIC, Public Affairs

Global Power for America



GRADUATE RESEARCH PROJECT STUDENT RELEASE FORM

Student's Name: Michael Boyd [Redacted]

PII Redacted

Resident Center: Eglin

Degree Program: Master of Aeronautical Science
 Master of Business Administration in Aviation
Other: _____

Title of Project: United Nations Operational Controls: Attitudes
OF United States Air Force Personnel Attending
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

The Extended Campus of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University *has my permission* to use my graduate research project as an example of acceptable work. Included in this authority is the right to duplicate the final product in its entirety and to check the final product out of the resident center or university library.

Signature: Michael Boyd Date: 11 Sep 97

The Extended Campus of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University *does not have my permission* to use my graduate research project as an example of acceptable work. The final product of my research project may not be duplicated or circulated. However, its title and abstract may be released!

Signature: _____ Date: _____

SUBMISSION OF A COMPLETED AND SIGNED COPY OF THIS FORM WITH THE FINAL PRODUCT OF A GRADUATE RESEARCH PROJECT IS MANDATORY.

Distribution: WHITE: Resident Center
YELLOW: Academic standards
PINK: Student



GRADUATE RESEARCH PROJECT
EVALUATION CHECKLIST

Title of Project: UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Student's Name (Print or type): Michael Eric Boyd

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECT

- A. Is the subject developed adequately?
- B. Is the subject developed logically?
- C. Is the report free of extraneous materials?

2. USE OF EVIDENCE

- A. Is adequate support provided for the arguments presented?
- B. Were facts, opinions, and assumptions organized and not confused?
- C. Were the available sources on the subject covered?
- D. Were acceptable source materials (primary and secondary) used?

3. ORGANIZATION

- A. Does the report have unity and coherence?
- B. Are the main points and supporting sub-points clear?
- C. Are the transitions clear?

4. MECHANICS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPRESSION

- A. Is the choice of words good?
- B. Are sentences and paragraphs well constructed?
- C. Are punctuation and spelling correct?
- D. Are grammatical rules consistently observed?
- E. Is the report straightforward and easy to read?

5. RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION (THE PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION MUST BE UTILIZED UNLESS PERMISSION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE TO USE ANOTHER GUIDE.)

- A. Are the citations in proper form?
- B. Is the references list adequate?
- C. Is the references list in proper form?

6. FORMAT

- A. Does the report follow the format prescribed in the *EC Guide to the Graduate Research Project*?
- B. Are all necessary elements (e.g., abstract, list of tables, list of figures, etc.) included?

7. SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT

- A. Has the report been thoroughly proofread, and have ALL necessary corrections been made?
- B. [COMMITTEE CHAIR ONLY] Has a Pass ("P") grade been withheld until ALL ITEMS listed above have been satisfactorily completed? (CENTER DIRECTORS CANNOT PROCESS A "P" GRADE IN ABA/MAS 690 WITHOUT A CAMERA-READY GRP IN HAND.)

Check One:

Committee Chair _____ Committee Member _____

Name (Print or Type): Marian C. Schultz

Signature: Marian C. Schultz Date: September 25th, 1997

Distribution: WHITE: Resident Center YELLOW: Committee Member/Committee Chair
PINK: Academic Standards GOLD: Student



GRADUATE RESEARCH PROJECT
EVALUATION CHECKLIST

Title of Project: UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONAL CONTROL
Student's Name (Print or type): Michael E. Boyd

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECT

- A. Is the subject developed adequately?
- B. Is the subject developed logically?
- C. Is the report free of extraneous materials?

2. USE OF EVIDENCE

- A. Is adequate support provided for the arguments presented?
- B. Were facts, opinions, and assumptions organized and not confused?
- C. Were the available sources on the subject covered?
- D. Were acceptable source materials (primary and secondary) used?

3. ORGANIZATION

- A. Does the report have unity and coherence?
- B. Are the main points and supporting sub-points clear?
- C. Are the transitions clear?

4. MECHANICS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPRESSION

- A. Is the choice of words good?
- B. Are sentences and paragraphs well constructed?
- C. Are punctuation and spelling correct?
- D. Are grammatical rules consistently observed?
- E. Is the report straightforward and easy to read?

5. RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION (THE PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION MUST BE UTILIZED UNLESS PERMISSION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE TO USE ANOTHER GUIDE.)

- A. Are the citations in proper form?
- B. Is the references list adequate?
- C. Is the references list in proper form?

6. FORMAT

- A. Does the report follow the format prescribed in the *EC Guide to the Graduate Research Project*?
- B. Are all necessary elements (e.g., abstract, list of tables, list of figures, etc.) included?

7. SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT

- A. Has the report been thoroughly proofread, and have ALL necessary corrections been made?
- B. [COMMITTEE CHAIR ONLY] Has a Pass ("P") grade been withheld until ALL ITEMS listed above have been satisfactorily completed? (CENTER DIRECTORS CANNOT PROCESS A "P" GRADE IN ABA/MAS 690 WITHOUT A CAMERA-READY GRP IN HAND.)

Check One:

Committee Chair _____ Committee Member

Name (Print or Type): Dr. James T. Schultz

Signature: James T. Schultz Date: September 25th, 1997

Distribution: WHITE: Resident Center YELLOW: Committee Member/Committee Chair
PINK: Academic Standards GOLD: Student

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Committee Member and Committee Chair whose guidance and instruction proved to be invaluable. I would also like to thank my wife who was extremely patient with me during the project. Furthermore, I would like to thank Thomas Burzynski and the research staff at the John Birch Society, and the personnel at the Eglin Air Force Base Technical Library who provided much research into this subject. Finally, I would like to thank my uncle whose insight was the inspiration for this study.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

ABSTRACT

Writer: Michael Eric Boyd
Title: United Nations Operational Control: Attitudes of United States Air Force Personnel Attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Degree: Master of Aeronautical Science
Year: 1997

Since the Gulf War, the authority granted to the United Nations has substantially increased. One such major authority has been the increase of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The purpose of this study was to investigate perceptions of United States Air Force personnel concerning United Nations/NATO control over our Armed Forces. Using a causal-comparative study, it was found that there was no significance between the four groups tested: enlisted members (n=59) and officer members (n=56); and those who have participated in a United Nations peacekeeping operation (n=72) and those who have not (n=43). It was determined that all of the tested groups had negative perceptions of serving under United Nations command. There was less apprehension among those surveyed to serve under NATO command. The data did show that those surveyed did perceive serving in a U.N. operation, under U.S. command, favorably.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	x
Chapter	
I INTRODUCTION	1
The United Nations	2
The United Nations Charter	5
The United States Constitution	7
Presidential Decision Directive 25	8
The Future of the United Nations	9
Statement of the Problem	10
Purpose of the Study	10
II REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH	11
American Forces in the United Nations	11
Rapid Deployment Forces	18
Presidential Decision Directive 25	23
Morale in Peacekeeping Operations	24

Attitudes of American Troops	25
Summary of Relevant Data	29
Statement of the Hypothesis	30
III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	31
Research Techniques	31
Research Design	31
Survey Population	31
Sources of Data	32
The Data Gathering Instrument	32
Pretest	32
Distribution Method	32
Reliability	33
Validity	33
Delimitations	33
Limitations	33
Assumptions	34
Definition of Terms	34
Treatment of Data and Procedures	36
IV RESULTS	38
V DISCUSSION	51
VI COCLUSIONS	55
VII RECOMMENDATIONS	57
REFERENCES	58

APPENDIXES

A. SAMPLE SURVEY	62
B. CHI SQUARE DATA	65
C. FREEDOM FROM WAR	87
D. THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CONNECTION	102
E. AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY RESTORATION ACT OF 1997	107

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1 Question 3: U.S. Military Under U.N. Command	40
2 Question 4: Taking Orders from a U.N. Commander	41
3 Question 5: U.S. Providing U.N. with Military Personnel	42
4 Question 6: Wearing U.N. Uniform and Carrying U.N. ID	43
5 Question 10: U.S. military Participating in U.N. Operation Within U.S.	44
6 Question 3: U.S. Military Under U.N. Command	46
7 Question 4: Taking Orders from a U.N. Commander	47
8 Question 5: U.S. Providing U.N. with Military Personnel	48
9 Question 6: Wearing U.N. Uniform and Carrying U.N. ID	49
10 Question 10: U.S. military Participating in U.N. Operation Within U.S.	50
B-1 U.S. Military Should Not Participate in any U.N. Exercise	67
B-2 U.S. Military Should Participate in U.N. Missions Under U.S. Command	68
B-3 U.S. Military Should Participate in U.N. Missions Under U.N. Command	69
B-4 No Difference in Taking Orders From a U.N. Commander Than From a U.S. Commander	70
B-5 U.S. Should Provide to the U.N. Military Personnel; Rapid Reaction Force	71
B-6 Wearing the U.N. Uniform and Carrying a U.N. Identification Card Would Have Effect on Your Morale	72
B-7 Limited Presidential Powers	73

B-8	U.S. Personnel Should Wear the NATO Uniform and Take Orders From a NATO Appointed Officer from a Foreign Country	74
B-9	Conviction of German Officers at the Nuremberg Trials	75
B-10	U.S. Military Participating in a U.N. Operation Within the U.S. and Under U.S. Command	76
B-11	U.S. Military Should Not Participate in any U.N. Exercise	77
B-12	U.S. Military Should Participate in U.N. Missions Under U.S. Command	78
B-13	U.S. Military Should Participate in U.N. Missions Under U.N. Command	79
B-14	No Difference in Taking Orders From a U.N. Commander Than From a U.S. Commander	80
B-15	U.S. Should Provide to the U.N. Military Personnel; Rapid Reaction Force	81
B-16	Wearing the U.N. Uniform and Carrying a U.N. Identification Card Would Have Effect on Your Morale	82
B-17	Limited Presidential Powers	83
B-18	U.S. Personnel Should Wear the NATO Uniform and Take Orders From a NATO Appointed Officer from a Foreign Country	84
B-19	Conviction of German Officers at the Nuremberg Trials	85
B-20	U.S. Military Participating in a U.N. Operation Within the U.S. and Under U.S. Command	86

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1 Percentage of Support for U.N. Command for the Analyzed Questions; Primary Hypothesis	39
2 Percentage of Support for U.N. Command for the Analyzed Questions; Secondary Hypothesis	45
B-1 Frequency of Enlisted Personnel	66
B-2 Frequency of Officer Personnel	66

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the devolution of the former Soviet Union and the destruction of the Berlin Wall, there is no longer a perceived cold war between the former Warsaw Pact nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As a result of this change in global affairs, there has developed a sense of confusion. This confusion has led people to conjecture what the world will look like as we near the twenty-first century. President George Bush announced that, "I think that what's at stake here is the new world order. What's at stake here is whether we can have disputes peacefully resolved in the future by a reinvigorated United Nations" (Walsh, 1991, p. 34).

Out of this new world order there has been much disorder. Republics in the former Soviet Union struggled to break away in independence and proliferation of nuclear arms to third world nations made for a tipping of scales in the global balance of power. Moreover, civil conflicts increased as the tight grip from the Soviet Union disappeared. The new upheaval around the globe certainly caused disorder, what was needed was leadership.

A glaring example of this new world upheaval occurred when Iraq decided to invade Kuwait. Out of these troubled times, the United Nations stepped forward and took a leadership position. In a swift blow, the countries from the United Nations led by the United States, constructed Operation Desert Storm and destroyed a powerful Iraqi

military force. Since the success demonstrated by Operation Desert Storm, the United Nations has further increased its authority. Operations other than war (OOTW) such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping, are the clearest examples of the enhanced authority by the United Nations.

The United Nations

The creation of the United Nations was consecrated in 1945 for the stated purpose of: "...to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind..." (United Nations Charter, 1997, p. 1). Furthermore, Article I of the United Nations Charter states that, "1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression..." (United Nations Charter, 1997, p. 2). These are daunting tasks for the United Nations, especially in a new world order, where actions of rogue nations can be unpredictable.

The establishment of the United Nations did not come without controversy. The first acting Secretary-General at the founding United Nations conference in San Francisco was Alger Hiss. History has proven that Alger Hiss, agent of the U.S. State Department, was a communist agent. "In the summer of 1995, the National Security Agency began to release the Venona traffic, a total of more than two thousand cables sent from U.S.-based Soviet agents to the home office in Moscow....Among those implicated were Harry Dexter White, Victor Perlo, Laurence Duggan, and Alger Hiss....a communist (Tanenhaus, 1997, pp. 519-520). Controversy, like the Alger Hiss involvement in the

Although the United Nations has been involved in many projects from acting as a buffer between disputing states (United Nations forces in the Sinai) to sponsoring many workshops and studies, support for the United Nations may be on the wane. For example, in 1995 the United States House of Representatives sponsored H.R. 7, the National Security Revitalization Act, "...to deduct our voluntary contributions in support of international peace....such a proposal would eliminate all U.S. payments for UN peacekeeping" (Christopher, 1995, p. 4). Despite controversy in the past and continuing debate on the roles of the United Nations, the UN has continually taken action in an attempt to further its mandates.

Two realms in which the United Nations has taken action is in collective security and peacekeeping. Collective security is defined as, the members of the United Nations joining in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. Measures such as economic retaliation or the use of armed forces is usually involved in collective security. There are only two instances in which the United Nations used military means through collective security. One, five years after the formation of the United Nations in 1945, the Security Council voted to use its military force to thwart an act of aggression. The use of "...air, sea, or land forces..." for enforcement is specifically foreseen in Chapter VII of the Charter (United Nations Charter, 1997). On July 7, 1950 the Korean conflict was formally brought to the Security Council's attention. In the mysterious absence of the Soviet Union, which was boycotting the Security Council as a sign of protest against the admission of the nationalist government in Taiwan to China's seat, the Security Council passed a resolution calling on member states to assist South Korea in resisting the communist forces from the north.

The only other collective security operation involving military action, was under the new world order in the Persian Gulf War. When the old bipolar system (the Soviet Union and the United States) disintegrated during the early 1990s, it provided for unprecedented cooperation within the United Nations. After months of U.N. sanctions placed upon Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council called upon member states to join in a coalition force led by the United States. The Security Council, with the United States and Russia acting in partnership, passed U.N. Resolution 678 authorizing the use of military force to counteract Saddam Hussien's act of aggression. The collective security measure in the Persian Gulf War proved to be monumental, not only for the cooperation between Russia and the United States, but also because it set into motion future peacekeeping operations which have become the focus of a polarized debate questioning the roles of the United Nations.

Although collective security remains a valuable tool to the United Nations, its authority has expanded the most in the realm of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, although not specifically spelled out in the United Nations Charter, derives its justification from Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. Since the first peacekeeping operation to address the "...post-World War II boundary disputes between Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia.... which lasted from 1947 to 1954," to the Gulf War, the growth of peacekeeping was relatively minimal (Glahn, 1992, p. 679). However, since the Persian Gulf War, peacekeeping has grown tremendously. For example,

Peacekeeping is the United Nations' fastest growing industry. In 1988, the total cost of UN peacekeeping operations around the world was just \$230 million; in 1994, it was \$3.6 billion. Of that, the United States was directly assessed....

roughly \$1.7 billion (all of which was skimmed off the U.S. defense budget). (Helms, 1996, p. 6)

Moreover, "...at the beginning of 1994 there were 18 active U.N. peacekeeping operations underway. In recent years, the number of deployed peacekeepers has increased from 10,000 to over 77,000 troops....U.S. troops furnish 5.4 percent of the totals of UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide" (Donovan, 1995, p. 69). "Since 1945, there have been 42 U.N. peacekeeping operations. There are currently 16 under way, 29 peacekeeping operations were created by the Security Council in the years between 1988 and 1996" (U.N. Department of Public Information, 1997).

A principal area of interest for the United States is the expanding field of U.N. peacekeeping. "In congressional testimony in March 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher spelled out the administration's commitment to enhancing UN peacekeeping capabilities" (Berdal, 1994, p. 32). The expansion of U.N. peacekeeping has called for "...the optimal solution to employing US forces in peace operations may be found anywhere from placing them in support of the UN...to totally merging them with the UN..." (Killebrew, 1995, p. 35). The roles of the United Nations, including collective security and peacekeeping, have evolved into increased authority and expansion. What will develop will be a debate on how far the United States military should be placed under United Nations control.

The United Nations Charter

The legal basis for the United Nations and its actions can be found in the Charter of the United Nations. The binding norms and regulations set forth by the U.N. Charter was upheld by the California Supreme Court, which said in part:

The humane and enlightened objectives of the United Nations Charter are, of course, entitled to respectful consideration by the courts and Legislatures of every member nation, since that document expresses the universal desire of thinking men for peace (Glahn, 1992, p. 135)

When considering the United Nations Charter, as with its actions, its authority can be branched into two areas: collective security and peacekeeping. "The authority of the United Nations to create armed forces is found in the U.N. Charter in Articles 1(1), 39, 41, and 42" (Glahn, p. 679). According to Article 42, the Security Council "...may take such action by air, sea, land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (U.N. Charter, 1997, p. 2). Article 42 is cited as being the authority for United Nations collective security.

The authority for peacekeeping is not such a clear issue. In the U.N. Charter, nowhere can be found an authorizing article for peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is an idea that evolved over the years. A cited source in the Charter authorizing U.N. peacekeeping is Article 14, which states: "...the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare ...among nations" (U.N. Charter, 1997, p. 4). Though the Articles cited for collective security and peacekeeping are extremely important in enhancing the mandates of the U.N., there is one very important Article, which may conflict with current U.N. operations.

Article 2, section 7, of the Charter implicitly states: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state..." The "domestic

jurisdiction” clause embodies the basic limitation on the United Nations, and is the founding principle of international law. National sovereignty—supreme authority unrestrained by any other law or authority—is the basic concept of U.N. collective security and peacekeeping. However, in a new world order the “domestic jurisdiction” governed by national sovereignty is being redefined, and therein lies a serious problem.

The United States Constitution

The primary distinction between monarchies, dictatorships, and tyrannies, and our American system is the U.S. Constitution. “The Constitution is the embodiment of the thunderous assertions in the Declaration of Independence that men’s rights come from the Almighty, and that governments are formed solely to protect those rights” (McManus, 1996, p. 44). The protection of our rights, as spelled out in the Constitution, is specifically limited to the Congress, the President, and the Judiciary.

The U.S. Constitution implicitly states in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11: “The Congress shall have the power to....declare War....To raise and support Armies....To provide and maintain a Navy....” (The Constitution, 1994, pp. 37-38). Moreover, in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, it states that, “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States....” (The Constitution, 1994, p. 42). Nowhere stated in the U.S. Constitution is there any reference authorizing Congress or the President to place troops in a Peacekeeping operation, or under foreign command.

A major problem arises: Can the President of the United States commit troops to a war without getting express permission from Congress? Also, can Congress or the President commit troops under the command of the United Nations? Moreover, if the United States decides to place troops under U.N. command, does our Constitution

become null in void? These are all serious questions, which must be addressed during this tremendous era of change.

Presidential Decision Directive 25

On May 3, 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) was signed by President Clinton. PDD 25 amplifies the Clinton Administration's goal for reform in multilateral peace operations. The primary aims of PDD-25 include: "1) Make disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support; 2) Define clearly the policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations" (Donovan, 1995, p. 70). PDD 25, along with Article II, Section 2 (1) of the U.S. Constitution, have been primary cited sources for placing American troops under U.N. command.

An example of PDD 25 and its authority occurred when Army Specialist Michael New refused to display the insignia of the United Nations on his uniform and wear the U.N. blue beret. New, believing this was in direct contrast with the oath to defend and uphold the Constitution refused to wear the uniform of the United Nations and take direct orders from U.N. appointed officers from a foreign country. For this, New was court martialed and found guilty of bad conduct. What makes this interesting is that PDD 25 remains classified secret, so Michael New was found guilty for refusing to obey an order based on a document he has never seen. Although Michael New became a hero to many, those favoring enhanced roles of the U.N. disapproved of New's actions, saying he simply disobeyed an order (New, 1996). Again, there are basic problems that arise from PDD 25. First, if Congress has power to "...make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," as stated in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 14, of the U.S.

Constitution, how can the President issue a law placing troops under U.N. command? Further, if the Supreme Court rules that it is illegal to place American troops under a foreign command, then will it justify American troops to disobey an order to wear the uniform of the U.N. and receive orders from a foreign officer?

The Future of the United Nations

Due to the expanding roles of the United Nations in peacekeeping, several items have been offered as possible solutions for the new world order. One, the development of rapid deployment forces to swiftly contest global crises at a moments notice. Two, the placement of United States military personnel under the direct command of the United Nations. If these two prescriptions are implemented several concerns will come to the fore. First, if a rapid deployment force is instituted, then will the United Nations have a global army? Some will argue that in fact the U.N. will become a *de facto* world government. Former Ambassador to Romania under the Ceausescu Regime and former Congressman, David Funderburke, notes: "Bush's New World Order is clearly the first major step on the road to one world government...It is the idea of collective security with the Soviets and Americans leading the way under UN auspices. This despite the fact that the UN as a whole votes against U.S. interests 61% of the time" (Funderburke, 1991, p. 113). Moreover, if the U.N. forms a standing global army, will the Security Council authorize a global tax on all nations to support such an endeavor? Will the strategic planners of the military—the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—implement military policies to coincide with expanded U.N. mandates? Finally, how will the issue of "domestic jurisdiction" and national sovereignty be handled? These are all pressing issues that must be dealt with in the age of the new world order.

Statement of the Problem

The problem to be researched is the effect that United Nations operational control has on the military. Specifically, the study will delve into the perceptions that U.S. Air Force enlisted and officer personnel have concerning the command and control by U.N. officials.

If military personnel are willing to be placed under U.N. control, then the problem of policy is reduced, however, the problem over national sovereignty and Constitutional authority arises. If, on the other hand, military personnel have negative attitudes about being placed under U.N. control, then the problem of morale surfaces.

Other problems will be researched as well such as, attitudes of military personnel participating in a rapid deployment force under United Nations control. Moreover, the problem of constitutional authority to place troops under U.N. command will be researched to determine perceptions Air Force personnel.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to assess whether negative attitudes exist among Air Force members, to serve under the command of the United Nations, and if a negative attitude exists, will it be significantly higher among officer or enlisted personnel. Furthermore, perceptions were analyzed concerning foreign control by a NATO commander. Additional purposes to this study are to determine general perceptions of presidential authority and willingness to disobey an illegal order. The foundation of this study is to determine if the policy of placing U.S. troops under U.N. command has a negative morale effect on United States Air Force personnel.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH

American Forces in the United Nations

In a major study published by The Center for Strategic and International Studies (1992), the authors examined the roles of missions for the United Nations and options that the United States can take in support of the U.N. The authors assert that although the cold war has ended, there is much confusion to the new world order. The dismantling of the Soviet Empire, which has eased its tight grip on its proxies in the Third World, has caused for many ethnic and religious conflicts. If not confined, some conflicts may consume regions in war.

As a result of this new shift in balance in global affairs, the authors have recommended several actions to the U.S. Department of Defense. First, establish a U.N. Peacekeeping Training Center at the United Nations Headquarters, to be coordinated with the United States. Second, the U.S. should provide the U.N. with a high technology training facility. Third, schedule a portion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises around U.N. scenarios. Fourth, prepare U.S. military forces to lead enforcement power of U.N. rapid deployment forces.

In a roundtable discussion sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute, experts from both inside and outside government debated on the future of the United Nations. Conclusions were deduced about how far the U.S. should empower the United Nations.

All of the roundtable participants "...saw at least some degree of utility in the United Nations, but none considered it a panacea" (Metz, 1993, p. 24). The ultimate conclusions, however, were attempting to make the "U.S. Army a more effective tool for the support of U.N. operations" (Metz, 1993, p. 26). A serious question that emerged from the experts assembled at the roundtable was, how much should the U.S. empower the U.N.?

Another example of the questioning of American roles in the new world order materializes with an article titled, "A U.N. Army for the New World Order?" In this piece, ideas such as the U.N. creating a rapid deployment force and a standing global army are examined.

The new world order has given the U.N. new opportunities to act, for example, expanded powers to create a global army. Quotes taken from Representative John Lewis (D-GA), Senator David Boren (D-OK), Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), and Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) all call for a United Nations army. Proposals such as, "...40 to 50 U.N. member nations contribute to a rapid deployment force of 100,000 volunteers" (Gerlach, 1993, p. 224). Furthermore, "President Bill Clinton, in a major foreign policy address of his campaign, pledged his support for the creation of a U.N. military force" (Gerlach, p. 224). Former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush also suggest the call for a standing U.N. army, through a rapid deployment force. For example, in a speech, Ronald Reagan said he endorsed the idea of a standing U.N. Force (Gerlach, 1994).

Support for a U.N. army is strong within the media, academic, and policy communities. "An editorial in the New York Times stated: With a force capable of responding quickly, the United Nations could save lives, check massive tides of

refugees and discourage warlords. Furthermore, Harvard University's Joseph Nye, Jr., "...has suggested a rapid deployment force of 60,000 troops built around a professional core of 5,000 U.N. soldiers"(Gerlach, 1994, p. 225). Gerlach states that these views are not the minority, but represent the thinking of many analysts.

Gerlach shifts to opposing reasons why a U.N. army would be difficult. First, a United Nations army may run counter to U.S. national interests. Second, the proposal is for the Secretary General of the U.N. to ask the President of the United States for the authorization to "...make available American troops for U.N. activities" (Gerlach, 1994, p. 226). This would indeed be a problem, especially when considering the authority given Congress to declare war granted by the Constitution of the United States. Finally, under the plan of a U.N. army, U.S. troops would probably "...be placed under the command of foreign officers" (Gerlach, 1994, p. 227). This would cause for tremendous concern for military enlisted and officer personnel. Major problems surface such as the U.N. imposing a tax to fund the global army, Constitutional authority given over American Forces, and morale of our troops if they are placed under the control of the U.N.

Gerlach further goes to say that perhaps the greatest failing of a U.N. army is that it nourishes "collective internationalism." The idea is that a U.N. superpower could emerge with real teeth. For example, Alan Henrikson, Director of the Fletcher Roundtable on a New World Order at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, stated: "The Standing Reserve Peace Force would be a standing military reserve of...500,000 troops equipped with modern weapons...and conducted at the superpower level" (Gerlach, 1994, p. 232).

In conclusion, Gerlach admits that the United States does not need a United Nations for supplying all of the answers for peace. Moreover, if U.S. vital interests are threatened, then the U.S. should act unilaterally, not wait for directives from the United Nations (Gerlach, 1994).

In an article titled, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and U.N. Peacekeeping," the author states that the "Clinton Administration was prepared to accept UN command over American soldiers serving in peacekeeping operations" (Berdal, 1994, p. 33). This represented a significant shift in policy. This new shift was presented as ways of spreading risks and keeping funds in the defense budget, but also was a philosophical shift. The idea of collective internationalism to solve problems could best be served within the constructs of the United Nations. To this end, the U.S. must be willing to place our military personnel under U.N. operational control. American troops in 1993 who served in Somalia—2,700—were under United Nations operational control. However, support of U.N. control waned when warring factions killed 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993.

The author further goes on to say that although the complete operational control of U.S. troops under the United Nations should be met with caution, there are some "...areas which American efforts should concentrate" (Berdal, 1993, p. 45). The author summarizes some suggestions, which he claims should include the assistance with money and expertise in strengthening the planning processes at the U.N. headquarters. Further, the U.S. should contribute specialized forces to a rapid deployment force. Berdal concludes by suggesting that the new world order may look like the U.S. acting within the United Nations, according to its own agenda.

In September 1994, Marine Corps Gazette contained an article written by Colonel James Donovan, United States Marine Corps (Retired) entitled, "The United Nations—Its Roles and Missions for American Armed Forces." According to Donovan, because there is no longer a bipolar order, the world has given way to bloody regional or local conflicts. As a result of this conflict, America should consider alternative multilateral measures to resolve these disputes. Of these alternatives, the one being promoted most frequently is the use of United Nations peacekeeping forces to quell hot spots around the globe. According to Donovan, one of the many actions the United States could take to improve United Nations effectiveness is to,

be prepared to have U.S. forces serve under qualified and organized UN commands if the U.S. Congress approves. Combined UN commands need not always be led by a U.S. flag officer unless the United States is furnishing over 50 percent of the military forces and logistics support. (Donovan, 1994, p. 71)

Donovan also delves briefly into the call for a United Nations rapid deployment force. Donovan quotes former U.N. Secretary General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali as saying, "...the ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring beaches of the peace..." (Donovan, 1994, p. 70).

Reservations concerning the involvement in the United Nations were pronounced when Senate Foreign Relations Chair, Jesse Helms (R-NC) contributed an essay in *Foreign Affairs*. Helms offered a clear argument why many in the United States Congress oppose the expansion of power by the United Nations. Citing a clear signal of his disapproval, Helms stated:

As it currently operates, the United Nations does not deserve continued American support. Its bureaucracy is proliferating, its costs are spiraling, and its mission is constantly expanding beyond its mandate—and beyond its capabilities....the United Nations is being transformed from an institution of sovereign nations into a quasi-sovereign entity itself. That transformation represents an obvious threat to U.S. national interests. (Helms, 1996, p. 2)

Helms further states his disapproval for Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali's policy of a standing U.N. army and the proposal for the U.N. to directly collect taxes from member nations. The idea of the United Nations becoming a *de facto* world government is further documented in Helms' statement that the "...international elites running the United Nations look at the idea of the nation-state with disdain" (Helms, 1996, p. 3). In conclusion Helms says there must be a 50 % cut in the U.N. bureaucracy, and peacekeeping must be overhauled. If not, Helms states, "I, for one, will be leading the charge for U.S. withdrawal" (Helms, 1996, p. 7).

The controversy over the United Nations and its influence over the U.S. military has caused for Congress to examine this issue. When the Republicans took control of the House of Representatives following the 1994 elections, many Bills were put forward to stymie U.N. control of our military. House Resolution (HR) 3308 was "...on Sept. 5 overwhelmingly approved legislation to limit the president's ability to place U.S. troops under U.N. command....81 Democrats joined 218 Republicans in supporting the measure" (Doherty, 1996, p. 2537). Other measures such as, S.2106, sponsored by Senator McConnell, was to "...amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to prohibit the placement of United States Armed Forces under the command...of the United

Nations...” (S.2106, 1997, p. 1). Another Bill, S.1370, would “...prohibit the imposition of any requirement for a member of the Armed Forces of the United States to wear indicia or insignia of the United Nations...” (S.1370, 1997, p. 1). Furthermore, an important Bill was put forth known as House Resolution (HR) 7. Title IV of HR 7 would “...limit funding for United States forces placed under United Nations command or control...” (Title IV, 1997, p. 1). The distrust by Congress for U.N. control of American forces was even more evident when Representative Joe Scarborough (R-FL) proposed HR 2535 (The United Nations Withdrawal Act of 1995). Essentially, Representative Scarborough’s Bill would “Repeal—Effective 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945” (HR 2535, 1997, p. 1). In 1997, Representative Ron Paul (R-TX) introduced a Bill to get the U.S. out of the U.N. (See Appendix E). Although distrust is brewing in Congress toward the United Nations, some like Representative Eshoo are in favor of expanding U.S. commitment to the U.N. For example, Rep. Eshoo offered HR 225, “A resolution expressing the commitment of the Congress to continue the leadership of the United States in the United Nations...” (H.Con.Res 225, 1997, p. 1).

Opposition to the expanding powers of the United Nations is even more salient in a report issued in 1996 by the American Sovereignty Action Project. This report goes further than any of the other literature reviewed, in that it makes the claim that the agenda of the United Nations is clear: “World government with a world army and a world criminal court, financed by global taxes” (Kincaid, 1996, p. 2). Of interesting note, the report examines an article in *U.S. News & World Report*, stating that, “A recent study commissioned by the German Defense Ministry showed that 85 percent of Germans believe the country needs its own army, and 69 percent want to see that army serve

in U.N. peacekeeping operations" (Kincaid, 1996, p. 6). This point is engaging because, the movement to expand U.N. peacekeeping operations may have broad support worldwide.

In Part IX, "The U.N. World Army," the report concludes that, "...the pressure on the military to participate in U.N. operations has to be having a drastic impact on our soldiers who swear an oath to the Constitution. Whose interests are they serving? Does the oath of allegiance to the U.S. Constitution mean anything anymore?" (Kincaid, 1996, p. 14).

Rapid Deployment Forces

Since the recent United Nations missions into Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, the United Nations has been the focus of considerable criticism. Notwithstanding Constitutional arguments against such missions, explanations levied against peacekeeping missions include the United Nations' slow response. As a result, the U.N. wishes to expand its mandates and develop U.N. rapid deployment forces. In the new world order, many people believe that a standing United Nations Army in the form of a rapid deployment force is the answer. The question for the United States is: should American forces be placed in a rapid reaction force under U.N. control? Of importance as well, are the perceptions of U.S. military personnel being placed under U.N. authority.

Samuel Francis illustrates the fears of the U.N. eventually forming into a world army. "What Boutros-Ghali proposes is closer than anyone on the planet should ever want to get to a transnational military force that could override and eventually abolish national sovereignty" (Francis, 1992, p. 24). Francis points out a quote from Boutros-Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*: "...the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has

has passed" (Francis, 1992, p. 24).

In studies conducted by the U.S. Naval War College (1994) and the U.S. Army War College (1996), the assertion that the United States would benefit from participating in a rapid deployment force is examined. In search of more effective multilateral means to preserve peace, the idea for a standing U.N. military force has come to the fore. For instance, "...recent history has demonstrated that quick response to crises and conflicts can be beneficial; and inaction and procrastination bring with them high costs" (Murphy, 1994, p. iii).

The intended rapid deployment force would consist of earmarked security units from member nations of the United Nations. "The proposed U.N. quick response force complements U.S. policy. It adds efficiencies to U.N. peacekeeping operations by providing a rapid reaction military capability to support diplomatic initiatives" (Murphy, 1994, p. v).

The study further explores the real concepts of national sovereignty and the United Nations' domestic jurisdiction clause. For example:

A key aspect of this standby forces concept and potential of contributor nations is the command and control of national forces under the U.N. flag.... In the field, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have direct oversight over all aspects of the mission and convey U.N. policy emanating from New York Headquarters. (Murphy, 1994, p. 81)

Under these pretenses, "When it is appropriate or advantageous to do so, the U.S. command authorities could relinquish operational command to foreign commanders" (Murphy, 1994, p. 92). Murphy does discern that if American interests are at risk

under foreign command, then the commanders, consulting with the President, has the right to terminate U.S. participation.

The formation of a rapid reaction force can be summed up in this statement:

The rationale behind these calls for a permanent U.N. military capability is that the U.N. needs a force that can immediately respond to an international crisis....The political concern can be effectively summarized, States guard their sovereignty jealously. (Kerns, 1996, pp. 8-10)

In another study by the U.S. Army War College (1996), the reasoning behind rapid forces is because, "Rapid deployment of forces is critical to a mission's success..." (Kilpatrick, 1996, p. 2). The study contends that the U.N. Secretariat does not possess an appropriate, institutionalized political-military organization. As a result, the author points out that "...United Nations response to the Rwanda crisis was a stark example of the need for a rapid reaction capability....it took several months for the Security Council to authorize the United Nations Mission for Rwanda" (Kilpatrick, 1996, p. 4). The author further asserts "...that although the U.N. is not a global government, the Secretariat performs many of the customary activities of a government" (Kilpatrick, 1996, p. 6). According to Kilpatrick, "...if the U.N. is to have the capacity to respond rapidly it must have an inter-agency organization incorporating an institutionalized political-military planning process....to assist in the framing of resolutions under Chapter VI or VII.... (U.N. Charter)" [Emphasis by Author] (Kilpatrick, 1996, p. 6).

Though the construction of a rapid deployment force under U.N. command may be a means to save costs and to advance the concept of burden-sharing among the global nations, there are some real concerns. First, the U.N. Charter states in Article II,

Section 7, the domestic jurisdiction clause that is meant to protect national sovereignty from unauthorized U.N. intervention. Second, the United States Constitution implicitly states that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. If there is a rapid deployment force under U.N. command, then this will be a case for congressional oversight and possible Supreme Court deliberation.

In a personal interview conducted with Herb Titus, a Constitutional scholar and practicing attorney, the question of Constitutional authority over U.S. forces was examined. The central question surrounding this issue is centered on the control of the legislature (Congress) and the control of the executive. According to Titus, in Alexander Hamilton's *Federalist* No. 24, the Constitution did not vest the executive with the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the Legislature. Rather, the Constitution lodged the whole power of raising armies in the legislature, not in the executive. Titus further asserted by vesting in Congress the authority to raise and maintain a standing army, Hamilton naturally assumed that Congress would also set the rules governing the use of that army. Its deployment would be subject to the prudence and discretion of the legislature, not the unfettered discretion of the President. Titus also stated Hamilton's *Federalist* No. 28. Essentially, according to Titus, Hamilton observed that the resources of the country must in all events, regulate the extent of the military force. With Congress in charge of the purse, Hamilton expected Congress to scrutinize very closely any proposal by the President to use the nation's standing army. Titus claims that in the twentieth century, Congress has simply abandoned this constitutional responsibility on the assumption that the President has the power to

commit American troops in pursuit of a foreign policy that he, and he alone, has the right to formulate—this was not vision of the nation's founders.

Herb Titus then superimposed the constitutional authority of Congress on the case of Army Specialist Michael New. On January 24, 1996, Michael New stood before a military court in Germany convicted of failure to obey a lawful order to wear the uniform of the U.N. in violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). New was released from the Army with a bad-conduct discharge. "From the beginning, and throughout his ordeal, New explained his refusal on the ground that he had enlisted in the Armed Services of the United States, not in the peacekeeping service of the United Nations" (Titus, 1996, p. 6). Those opposed to New's actions claim that soldiers do not have the right to say no to an order, even if it be illegal. "This is remarkable! From the Nuremburg trials to the Watergate break-in, persons charged with crimes have interposed the defense that they were following orders of their superiors. In every instance the defense has been rejected" (Titus, 1996, p. 6). According to the soldier's oath, he has sworn to follow lawful orders, not ones that are illegal. Michael New's military lawyers summarized their client's position in four motions:

- (1) Federal law, regulations and the Constitution forbade the wearing of any insignia from any foreign government, including the United Nations without the specific authorization of Congress;
- (2) Federal law and the Constitution forbade the deployment of United States Armed Forces under United Nations command;...
- (3) Deployment of Michael New as a United Nations soldier under foreign command breached New's enlistment contract;...
- (4) The Constitution forbade as, involuntary servitude, requiring an American soldier to serve as a

United Nations (peacekeeper), thereby denying him legal protection as a soldier under international law. (Titus, 1996, p. 7)

The case of Michael New is pivotal in the issue of placing American soldiers under foreign command, for it represents a dramatic shift in policy. Questions presented in this study are, how will U.S. military personnel perceive Constitutional authority for the expansion of U.N. power, and the formation of a rapid deployment force under U.N. command?

Presidential Decision Directive 25

As a forerunner to Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), the Clinton Administration completed Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD 13). This directive "...has been at the center of the inter-agency debates about the basis for and modalities of American participation in UN peacekeeping" (Berdal, 1994, p. 33). Essentially, PRD 13 was a shift in policy which "...envisaged that American troops would be placed under the operational control of UN commanders on a regular basis" (Berdal, 1994, p. 34). However, after public releases of the unclassified portion of PRD 13, Congressional disapproval followed. As a result, the Clinton Administration re-tooled the new policy into PDD 25, which is the official policy on peacekeeping.

A study by Daniel (1994), explains the reasons behind Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). Essentially, PDD 25 amplifies the Clinton Administration's favor toward peace operations involving American military forces. What makes PDD 25 interesting is that there are two sections, unclassified and classified. Daniel's study deals, of course, only with the unclassified portion. Daniel makes the following observations on PDD 25. First, "U.N. involvement advances U.S. interests and there is an

international community...for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis" (Daniel, 1994, p. 1). Second, there is "...even more rigorous standards are laid out when there is a possibility of significant American participation in enforcement missions where combat will likely occur" (Daniel, 1994, p. 3). Although American troops are not directly ordered to serve under U.N. command in PDD 25, this directive does lay "...open the possibility of operational control of those forces by a non-American competent UN commander" (Daniel, 1994, p. 3). Daniel goes on to deduce that peacekeeping mission should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command or through NATO.

Furthermore, The study offers a good contrast to the Clinton Doctrine and the Weinberger Doctrine; named after the Secretary of Defense under the Reagan Administration. The Weinberger Doctrine held that the U.S. should not commit combat forces overseas unless the engagement is deemed vital to our national interests or that of our Allies, and that there should be clearly defined military objectives. The Clinton Doctrine of Foreign Policy, is a departure away from traditional military roles. For example, in PDD 25 there is shift toward developing "...quick-reaction teams and capabilities (such as airlift) and establishing as well a Peace Operations Training Program" (Daniel, 1994, p. 4).

It appears that there is a dramatic shift in defense policy to support U.N. peacekeeping operations. What has not been examined in great length, is what the effect of serving in a U.N. operation has on soldier stress, and consequently on soldier morale.

Morale in Peacekeeping Operations

In a study by Bartone, Adler, and Vaitkus (1994), a U.S. Army task force of about 300 soldiers in Germany was selected to test stress levels in the U.N. peacekeeping force

in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). Data collection with this unit began in the pre-deployment phase, during which 74 interviews and 188 surveys were conducted.

Furthermore, the study looked at early-, mid-and late- deployment phases and measured stress levels. There was a mid- deployment survey administered to 128 soldiers along with 37 interviews, and 81 surveys given to soldiers in the late-deployment phase of the mission.

During early- and mid-deployment phases, "...a critical stress factor was the lack of meaningful activities in which soldiers could engage....described as boredom" (Bartone, 1994, p. 7). In the late-deployment phase "...key stressors...involved uncertainty and ambiguity" (Bartone, 1994, p. 8). In conclusion, "...during the mid-deployment, 15.2% rated UN support for the mission as bad or very bad. By the late-deployment, dissatisfaction rose to 23.8%" (Bartone, 1994, p. 10).

When measuring unit morale the survey found that in the pre-deployment phase low morale measured at 19.1%. In the late-deployment phase, the unit-low morale measurement increased to 27.3%. Individually, 14.3% claimed to have low morale in the pre-deployment phase; in the late-deployment phase, the number of troops with low morale increased to 21.8%. While these numbers do not conclusively prove that the Army unit suffered from morale breakdown, the findings do suggest that as these U.S. Army troops served over a period of time in the U.N. peacekeeping operation, morale deteriorated.

Attitudes of American Troops

In a study by Harman (1994), the attitudes involving 518 Somalia veterans at Fort Drum, New York were evaluated to determine the effect of the peacekeeping operation in Somalia. On December 3, 1992 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 794. The U.N. Resolution stated that "...the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to

international peace and security" (Harman, 1994, p. 1). The mission in Somalia is significant because, U.S. troops were placed under the direct command of a United Nations officer. In the United States, there was not much debate about our troops acting under U.N. control, until 18 American soldiers were killed while on patrol. This incident sparked a polarized debate about how far our military should be placed under U.N. operational control. The Harman study looked at a wide range of effects on American troops serving in Somalia.

When soldiers were asked to rate the overall performance of the U.S. Army in Somalia, 68% were favorable. "When asked whether any problems were encountered because of participating with a joint United Nations force, 61% answered yes" (Harman, 1994, p. 4). Moreover, troops mentioned that U.S. forces should act independently of the United Nations.

Key survey questions were analyzed as indicators that U.S. Army forces may encounter morale problems under U.N. operations, and that missions should remain under the direct command of a U.S. officer. When asked whether the U.S. Army should participate in U.N. peacekeeping, 45% said yes, 26% said no, and the remainder were ambivalent. Furthermore, when "...asked whether respondents would volunteer for another mission like Somalia, 61% said no. Those who offered reasons said that the mission was not in defense of family or country" (Harman, 1994, p. 6). The Harman study further points out that U.S. Army troops surveyed were overwhelmingly against participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions outside of the United States (Harman, 1994).

Not only are the respondents against participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations,

there are also indicators that troops may suffer low morale because of the mission under U.N. control. For example, the most significant factor in the soldier's dissatisfaction with events that occurred during the Somalia deployment, were the decisions made by top U.N. military officers.

Although most soldiers were dissatisfied with United Nations control in Somalia, and said that the military should be kept separate from the U.N., there were some key questions, which may indicate that soldiers could possibly become willing to participate under U.N. control. For example, 77% of respondents "...believed that the Army should participate...in drug interdiction, but only if it is in the United States" (Harman, 1994, p. 5). Further, 70% of respondents answered favorably to participating in counter-terrorism exercises, but usually only as a last resort.

The areas of drug interdiction and counter-terrorism are becoming hot issues in the American society. Couple this with the fact that the role of the military has been changing during the new world order, and one can possibly see the utilization of American troops, under a U.N. controlled operation, in these two domains.

In the study by Cunningham (1995), "Peacekeeping and U.N. Operational Control: A Study of their Effect on United Cohesion," the most related research was accomplished. This study surveyed 300 Marine Corps soldiers at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, to measure attitudes of U.N. peacekeeping operations. In examining the perceptions of Marines toward U.N. control of American forces. Present in the Cunningham study, four statements are focused upon to measure attitudes of American soldiers in the participation in expanded United Nations roles.

First, when asked for opinions to statement 34, "U.S. combat troops should

participate in U.N. missions under United States command and control," responses were in agreement. For example, in the enlisted ranks, 211 responses were in favor of statement 34; 49 disagreed. Officers who agreed with question 34, totaled 5 responses, to only 2 responses against (Cunningham, 1995).

Second, when asked for opinions to statement 35, "U.S. combat troops should participate in U.N. missions under United Nations command and control," responses were decidedly negative. Two hundred-one enlisted were against this statement; 59 were in agreement. In the officer ranks, 5 were against placing U.S. troops under U.N. command; 2 were in favor (Cunningham, 1995).

Third, when asked for opinions to statement 38, "It would make no difference to me to take orders from a U.N. company commander," responses were tilted heavily in the negative. Two hundred-nine enlisted were against taking orders from a U.N. commander; 59 agreed. Six officers were against; 1 agreed to taking orders from a U.N. commander (Cunningham, 1995).

Fourth, when Marines were asked for their opinion on statement 44, "I would like the U.N. member countries, including the U.S., to give the U.N. all the soldiers necessary to maintain world peace," responses tilted slightly in the negative. It does appear that Marine troops may have less apprehension about supplying troops in a rapid deployment force (Cunningham, 1995).

The Cunningham study proves that Marines have negative attitudes about being placed under U.N. command. However, Marine troops may have less apprehension about supplying troops in a rapid deployment force. The Cunningham study did not, however, give a clear indication of perceptions for those who have participated in a United

Nations operation.

Summary of Relevant Data

The review of relevant literature suggests that there are two distinct thoughts. One thought contends that the United States should participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations as a means to cut costs in the American defense budget. The concept of burden-sharing among those in policy-making positions is one of the reasons why the United States should not only participate in U.N. missions, but should also be willing to be placed under U.N. command by a foreign commander. The other school of thought holds that the while participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions may be debatable, the operational control of American forces is illegal. The United States Constitution is the *supreme law of the land*, and as such the Constitution should be the model by which we decide to participate in U.N. missions and under U.N. command and control.

Furthermore, it appears as if the United Nations wishes to form a world army in the form of a rapid reaction force, capable of interposing itself in hot spots around the globe in a moment's notice. Those who dictate policy, whether Congress or the White House, also appear willing to place American troops under U.N. command, if necessary. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) is the Clinton Administration's official policy toward U.N. peacekeeping operations; PDD 25 does stipulate that American troops may be placed under U.N. command.

When examining the studies by Bartone (1994), Harman (1994), and Cunningham (1995), one can clearly see that American forces serving under U.N. command cite morale problems and pointed disgust being forced to serve under United Nations Command. This study will build upon these three studies in that, attitudes among Air Force personnel will

be examined in the enlisted and officer ranks. Moreover, this study, when combined with the Harman and Cunningham study, will form a clearer picture of perceptions and attitudes of American Armed Forces toward U.N. operational command and control.

Statement of Hypothesis

The primary hypothesis states there is a significant difference between enlisted and officer personnel on their perception of United Nations operational command and control of American military forces. The null hypothesis states that there is no significant difference between enlisted and officer personnel on their perception of United Nations operational command and control of American military forces.

The secondary hypothesis to be tested states there is a significant difference between Air Force personnel who have served in a U.N. peacekeeping mission (including Operation Desert Storm), and Air Force personnel who have not served in a UN peacekeeping mission. Operation Desert Storm is included as a U.N. peacekeeping mission because, President George Bush first went to the Security Council of the U.N. for authorization to act against Iraq, then went to the U.S. Congress. Furthermore, it was the Security Council that issued Resolution 678 to act militarily, not Congress. The null hypothesis states that there is no significant difference between Air Force personnel who have served in a U.N. peacekeeping mission, and those who have not participated in a UN peacekeeping mission, as measured at the $\alpha=.05$ level of significance.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH MEHTODOLOGY

Research Technique

The research technique utilized in this study is causal-comparative. The study attempts to show if: a) there is significant difference in the perceptions of enlisted and officer Air Force personnel as to United Nations operational control of American Armed Forces and; b) significant difference in the perceptions of Air Force personnel who have participated in a UN peacekeeping mission, and those who have not participated.

Research Design

Research for this study consists of an author developed survey which was administered to enlisted and officer Air Force personnel—attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU)—stationed at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Hurlburt AFB, Whiting Field, and Tyndall AFB, all located in Northwest Florida. This data is statistically analyzed to determine if there is a significant difference.

Survey Population

The survey population consists of a wide cross-section of Air Force enlisted and officer personnel, employed in either an operational (pilot/navigator) or non-operational career field (mission support). The surveys were distributed to Air Force personnel attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Northwest Florida.

Sources of Data

The primary source of data was the author-developed survey. Other sources of data for this study included: previous research studies and surveys; technical reports and theses; previous, personal research; personal interviews; books; and articles from major journals that related to this topic.

The Data Gathering Instrument

The primary data gathering instrument was an author developed survey which was distributed to each of the participants. Tremendous amounts of information and data were collected from libraries, personal interviews/communications with those who have expertise in this field, and the Internet.

Pretest

A pretest of the survey was conducted among 5 randomly chosen Air Force personnel to determine if the questions were clear and concise. Participants provided the researcher feedback on any additional questions that should be omitted or added.

Distribution Method

The author-developed survey was distributed to Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University students enrolled in either an undergraduate or graduate degree program. This method ensured that respondents were represented in the enlisted and officer ranks. Surveys were administered and collected the same day at Eglin AFB and Hurlburt AFB. Surveys were mailed to the ERAU office at Tyndall AFB and Whiting Field and were administered by the center director of the respective campuses; the completed surveys were then mailed to the author. The number of surveys administered was 115; the return rate was 100%.

Reliability

The participants in this survey are students attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, who represent a wide variety of career fields in the Air Force. It is therefore reasonable to assume that another survey composed of Air Force Embry-Riddle students would duplicate the views held by the participants.

Validity

The survey is deemed valid because it surveyed the intended groups for necessary analysis. Also, because military personnel are deployed worldwide, study military history for promotion tests, and are briefed on potential missions and current events, it is reasonable to conclude that military personnel are familiar with the United Nations and its missions. Moreover, the test is valid because participants come from various career fields such as, pilots, navigators, administrative, medical, and maintenance; this will provide some insight of Air Force personnel attitudes. It was made clear that an individual's response to the survey was in strictest confidence and will therefore not impact judgment from peers.

Delimitations

Due to the wide variety of missions and personnel who attend Embry-Riddle, and who are stationed at the three Air Force bases and Whiting Field, the survey population will be deemed representative of the overall population of Air Force enlisted and officer personnel.

Limitations

Survey participants for this study are limited to Embry-Riddle Aeronautical students stationed at Eglin AFB, Hurlburt AFB, Tyndall AFB, and Whiting Field.

Ideally, participants should be surveyed from the various career fields in the Air Force to gauge attitudes of the entire Air Force population. Moreover, participants should be surveyed from the various United States Air Force bases. This study, however, did not test every career field. Furthermore, since the sample population was derived from Air Force students attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, participants will, at a minimum, be working toward a Bachelor Degree, and at the highest level, a Masters Degree. A representation of enlisted personnel with very little or no college is therefore dramatically decreased. Finally, the test is limited in its responses from the very top officer personnel; that is, Colonels and Generals.

Assumptions

It is assumed that because respondents have at minimum some college experience, the sample population will be familiar with the United Nations and some of its missions. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that officers are less likely to have favorable opinions about U.N. control. The reasoning is because officers are considered managers, while enlisted are primarily the workers. This assumption, however, does have some flaws. For example, Senior Non-Commissioned Officers of the enlisted ranks are considered managers of lower ranking enlisted. However, it is the officer ranks that ultimately have the higher authority to control processes, and as such, officers are less likely to give up control. As a result, the assumption is that officers will have less favorable opinion to be placed under the command of the United Nations.

Definition of Terms

Enlisted

Those participants whose military grade fall between E-1 and E-9. However, at

the grade of E-5, Air Force personnel test for promotion and are considered Non-Commissioner Officer (NCO) status; grades E-7 through E-9 are considered senior NCOs. Senior enlisted members are essentially managers of lower ranking individuals in the enlisted ranks.

Officer

Those participants whose military grade fall between O-1 and O-10. Moreover, at the O-4 grade, personnel go before a promotion board and are considered field officers, enshrined with greater responsibility.

Command and Control

“According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub 1-02, Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission” (Hodges, 1995, p. 15). The command and control over American Armed Forces is a focal point to this study.

The New World Order

The euphemistic phrase the new world order, has been defined in many different interpretations. However, for the scope of this study, the new world order simply means the change in the global balance of power. Specifically, the time after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the Persian Gulf War—the United States and Russia acting as interdependent partners. Moreover, the subsequent shift away from bipolar politics and the reliance upon the United Nations apparatus to solve international crises marked a new order in world affairs.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

There are wide and varied roles for U.N. peace operations. Essentially, operations

are divided into peacekeeping and peace enforcement. "Peacekeeping includes observation and interposition conducted under Chapter VI [*U.N. Charter*]" (emphasis added by author) (Pirnie, 1996, p. xiii). Observation involves monitoring compliance with agreements and mediating resolutions. Interposition requires the peace force to control a buffer zone between opposing parties. Peace enforcement is when the Security Council decides that violations are too serious to be ignored, and the use of force may be necessary. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is the legal article cited for peace enforcement (Pirnie, 1996). For the sake of simplicity in this study, peacekeeping will involve any mission authorized by the United Nations.

Operational Career Field

Any career field which is rated, that is pilots and navigators who are capable for contingencies or combat, or a field that is directly related to operations of combat-ready pilots and navigators. For example, personnel in maintenance who work directly on the aircraft which is designated for contingencies or combat is considered operational.

Non-Operational Career Field

Any career field which is not operational and generally in support of missions. For instance, testing and evaluation, administration, and medical fields all comprise a support element; these career fields are usually referred to as support fields. At Eglin AFB, Tyndall AFB, and Whiting Field there is a strong mix of both operational and non-operational career fields. Furthermore, at Hurlburt AFB (Air Force Special Operations Center) there is primarily operational squadrons, with support elements.

Treatment of Data and Procedures

For the primary hypothesis, the population is divided into two main groups,

enlisted and officer personnel. The dependent variable is the perception of enlisted and officer serving under U.N. command. The secondary hypothesis is divided into two groups of Air Force personnel who have participated in a U.N. peacekeeping mission and those who have not participated in a U.N. peacekeeping mission. The dependent variable is the perception of those who have either participated in a U.N. peacekeeping operation or have not participated. Levels of perception by the sample population are determined by the applicable responses from the administered survey.

Data analysis involved inferential statistics. A two-dimensional, non-parametric Chi Square test was used to determine if there is significant difference at a 95% confidence level ($\alpha=.05$) among the means of the four tested groups from the two tested hypotheses. The software program, KWIKSTAT, performed the data analysis.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

A total of 115 surveys were distributed throughout the classrooms of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University at Eglin AFB, Hurlburt AFB, Tyndall AFB, and Whiting Field; responses were from Air Force personnel.

Statistical analysis was aided by the use of the KWIKSTAT computer program. KWIKSTAT analyzed the frequency data and computed a Chi Square value for each question. This value was compared against a value in the Chi Square Table, at the $\alpha=.05$ level of significance, with 4 degrees of freedom. If the computed Chi Square value is larger than the value equals or exceeds the value in the Chi Square Table of 9.488, then a significant difference could exist (Gay, 1996).

Questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 of the survey were statistically analyzed to determine if there was a significant difference between the means of the four tested groups. The primary hypothesis tests the mean between enlisted and officer personnel. The secondary hypothesis tests the mean between those who have served in a U.N. peacekeeping operation and those who have not. A summarized graphical display depicting the frequency of responses for the analyzed questions are shown on Figures 1 and 2. Responses that are in rows 1 and 2 demonstrate agreement with U.N. command and control; conversely, responses in rows 4 and 5 reveal disagreement with U.N. control over Armed Forces.




Figure 1. Percentage of support for U.N. command for the analyzed questions; primary hypothesis.

The following Chi Square Tables are coded for the primary hypothesis: Rows (2) 1-Enlisted, 2-Officer; Columns (5) 1-Strongly Agree, 2-Agree, 3-No Opinion, 4-Disagree, 5-Strongly Disagree.

Table 1

Question 3: U.S. Military Under U.N. Command

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	3	12	4	21	19	59
	2.1	13.3	4.6	20.0	19.0	51.3
	2.6	10.4	3.5	18.3	16.5	
	5.1	20.3	6.8	35.6	32.2	
	75.0	46.2	44.4	53.8	51.4	
2	1	14	5	18	18	56
	1.9	12.7	4.4	19.0	18.0	
	0.9	12.2	4.3	15.7	15.7	48.7
	1.8	25.0	8.9	32.1	32.1	
	25.0	53.8	55.6	46.2	48.6	
TOTAL	4	26	9	39	37	115
	3.5	22.6	7.8	33.9	32.2	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	1.45	with DF=	4		

Table 2

Question 4: Taking Orders From a U.N. Commander

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	3	15	3	23	15	59
	1.5	16.4	3.1	21.0	16.9	
	2.6	13.0	2.6	20.0	13.0	51.3
	5.1	25.4	5.1	39.0	25.4	
	100.0	46.9	50.0	56.1	45.5	
2	0	17	3	18	18	56
	1.5	15.6	2.9	20.0	16.1	
	0.0	14.8	2.6	15.7	15.7	48.7
	0.0	30.4	5.4	32.1	32.1	
	0.0	53.1	50.0	43.9	54.5	
TOTAL	3	32	6	41	33	115
	2.6	27.8	5.2	35.7	28.7	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	3.93	with DF=	4		

Table 3

Question 5: U.S. Providing U.N. with Military Personnel

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	7	21	9	19	3	59
	5.6	26.7	8.2	14.4	4.1	
	6.1	18.3	7.8	16.5	2.6	51.3
	11.9	35.6	15.3	32.2	5.1	
	63.6	40.4	56.3	67.9	37.5	
2	4	31	7	9	5	56
	5.4	25.3	7.8	13.6	3.9	
	3.5	27.0	6.1	7.8	4.3	48.7
	7.1	55.4	12.5	16.1	8.9	
	36.4	59.6	43.8	32.1	62.5	
TOTAL	11	52	16	28	8	115
	9.6	45.2	13.9	24.3	7.0	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	6.99	with DF=	4		

Table 4

Question 6: Wearing U.N. Uniform and Carrying U.N. ID

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	8	12	12	15	12	59
	5.1	17.4	9.7	15.9	10.8	
	7.0	10.4	10.4	13.0	10.4	51.3
	13.6	20.3	20.3	25.4	20.3	
	80.0	35.3	63.2	48.4	57.1	
2	2	22	7	16	9	56
	4.9	16.6	9.3	15.1	10.2	
	1.7	19.1	6.1	13.9	7.8	48.7
	3.6	39.3	12.5	28.6	16.1	
	20.0	64.7	36.8	51.6	42.9	
TOTAL	10	34	19	31	21	115
	8.7	29.6	16.5	27.0	18.3	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	8.25	with DF=	4		

Table 5

Question 10: U.S. Military Participating in U.N. Operation Within U.S.

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	11	32	9	1	6	59
	11.3	31.8	6.7	3.6	5.6	51.3
	9.6	27.8	7.8	0.9	5.2	
	18.6	54.2	15.3	1.7	10.2	
	50.0	51.6	69.2	14.3	54.5	
2	11	30	4	6	5	56
	10.7	30.2	6.3	3.4	5.4	48.7
	9.6	26.1	3.5	5.2	4.3	
	19.6	53.6	7.1	10.7	8.9	
	50.0	48.4	30.8	85.7	45.5	
TOTAL	22	62	13	7	11	115
	19.1	53.9	11.3	6.1	9.6	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	5.58	with DF=	4		




Figure 7. Percentage of support for U.N. command for the analyzed questions; secondary hypothesis.

The following Chi Square Tables are coded for the secondary hypothesis: Rows (2) 1-Served in a U.N. Mission, 2-Not Served in a U.N. Mission; Columns (5) 1-Strongly Agree, 2-Agree, 3-No Opinion, 4-Disagree, 5-Strongly Disagree.

Table 6

Question 3: U.S. Military Under U.N. Command

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	2	18	4	23	25	72
	2.5	16.3	5.6	24.4	23.2	
	1.7	15.7	3.5	20.0	21.7	62.6
	2.8	25.0	5.6	31.9	34.7	
	50.0	69.2	44.4	59.0	67.6	
2	2	8	5	16	12	43
	1.5	9.7	3.4	14.6	13.8	
	1.7	7.0	4.3	13.9	10.4	37.4
	4.7	18.6	11.6	37.2	27.9	
	50.0	30.8	55.6	41.0	32.4	
TOTAL	4	26	9	39	37	115
	3.5	22.6	7.8	33.9	32.2	100.0

CHI SQUARE = 2.64 with DF= 4

Table 7

Question 4: Taking Orders From a U.N. Commander

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY							
EXPECTED							
TOT PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL	
ROW PCT	1	2	3	4	5		
COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5		
1	1	19	3	26	23	72	
	1.9	20.0	3.8	25.7	20.7		
	0.9	16.5	2.6	22.6	20.0	62.6	
	1.4	26.4	4.2	36.1	31.9		
	33.3	59.4	50.0	63.4	69.7		
2	2	13	3	15	10	43	
	1.1	12.0	2.2	15.3	12.3		
	1.7	11.3	2.6	13.0	8.7	37.4	
	4.7	30.2	7.0	34.9	23.3		
	66.7	40.6	50.0	36.6	30.3		
TOTAL	3	32	6	41	33	115	
	2.6	27.8	5.2	35.7	28.7	100.0	
CHI SQUARE	=	2.37	with DF=	4			

Table 8

Question 5: U.S. Providing U.N. with Military Personnel

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	6	34	9	18	5	72
	6.9	32.6	10.0	17.5	5.0	62.6
	5.2	29.6	7.8	15.7	4.3	
	8.3	47.2	12.5	25.0	6.9	
	54.5	65.4	56.3	64.3	62.5	
2	5	18	7	10	3	43
	4.1	19.4	6.0	10.5	3.0	37.4
	4.3	15.7	6.1	8.7	2.6	
	11.6	41.9	16.3	23.3	7.0	
	45.5	34.6	43.8	35.7	37.5	
TOTAL	11	52	16	28	8	115
	9.6	45.2	13.9	24.3	7.0	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	0.79	with DF=	4		

Table 9

Question 6: Wearing U.N. Uniform and Carrving U.N. ID

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	5	19	15	18	15	72
	9.4	22.5	11.9	16.3	11.9	
	4.3	16.5	13.0	15.7	13.0	62.6
	6.9	26.4	20.8	25.0	20.8	
	33.3	52.8	78.9	69.2	78.9	
2	10	17	4	8	4	43
	5.6	13.5	7.1	9.7	7.1	
	8.7	14.8	3.5	7.0	3.5	37.4
	23.3	39.5	9.3	18.6	9.3	
	66.7	47.2	21.1	30.8	21.1	
TOTAL	15	36	19	26	19	115
	13.0	31.3	16.5	22.6	16.5	100.0
CHI SQUARE	= 11.80 with DF= 4					

Table 10

Question 10: U.S. Military Participating in U.N. Operation Within U.S.

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	13	37	9	6	7	72
EXPECTED	13.8	38.8	8.8	5.0	5.6	62.6
TOT PCT	11.3	32.2	7.8	5.2	6.1	
ROW PCT	18.1	51.4	12.5	8.3	9.7	
COL PCT	59.1	59.7	64.3	75.0	77.8	
2	9	25	5	2	2	43
EXPECTED	8.2	23.2	5.2	3.0	3.4	37.4
TOT PCT	7.8	21.7	4.3	1.7	1.7	
ROW PCT	20.9	58.1	11.6	4.7	4.7	
COL PCT	40.9	40.3	35.7	25.0	22.2	
TOTAL	22	62	14	8	9	115
	19.1	53.9	12.2	7.0	7.8	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	1.77	with DF=	4		

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Although statistical analysis of the five pertinent survey questions does not support the primary and secondary hypothesis, it does reveal information worthy of note.

Primary Hypothesis:

Question 3: Although the data suggest that there is no significance, 66.1% of respondents are against participating in U.N. missions under U.N. command and control. Interestingly, 26.1% of respondents 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' with participating under U.N. command.

Question 4: The data suggest that 64.4% of respondents perceive a difference in taking orders from a U.N. commander than from an U.S. commander. Of note, 30.4% of respondents perceive no difference.

Question 5: Although there was no significance, the data suggest that officers have a more favorable perception of contributing U.S. military personnel to a United Nations' rapid reaction force.

Question 6: Although there was no significance, the data suggest that officers have more positive perceptions in wearing the uniform of the United Nations and carrying an identification card of the U.N. The percentage of 38.3% of total respondents had positive perceptions in wearing the uniform of the U.N.; 45.3% had negative perceptions.

Question 10: Although the data suggest that there was no significance, 73% of respondents 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' with participating in a U.N. operation, within the United States and under U.S. command.

Secondary Hypothesis:

Question 3: The data suggest that there was no significance; 26.1% 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' with serving in a U.N. mission under U.N. command and control.

Question 4: The data suggest that there was no significance; 30.4% of respondents perceive no difference in taking orders from a U.N. commander than from a U.S. commander.

Question 5: The data suggest that there was no significance; 54.8% of respondents 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' with providing U.S. military personnel to a U.N. rapid reaction force.

Question 6: The data suggest that there was significance; 33.3% of those who have served in a U.N. peacekeeping operation 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' with wearing the uniform of the United Nations. A percentage of 62.8% of those who have not served in a U.N. peacekeeping operation 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' with wearing the uniform of the U.N. A possible reason for this significance is that those who have served in a U.N. peacekeeping operation may have had negative experiences, which led to low morale. This view is supported by Bartone, Adler, and Vaitkus (1994), which suggest that the longer Army troops served in the U.N. peacekeeping force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), morale deteriorated.

Question 10: Although the data suggest there was no significance, 73.7% of respondents 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' with serving in a U.N. operation, within the

United States and under U.S. command.

Other Observations:

A percentage of 14.8% of the responses from the four groups, either 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' that the U.S. military should not participate in any U.N. exercise.

Respondents were heavily in favor of keeping U.S. military under United States command and control, rather than under U.N. command. This view is supported by the studies of Harman (1994) and Cunningham (1995).

Of the four tested groups, the group never having served in a U.N. peacekeeping operation had the most favorable perception wearing the uniform of the U.N.

A percentage of 47.8% of respondents from the four groups believe the President of the U.S. should have a limited role; 34% of respondents believe the President should have expanded roles.

A full 52% 'Disagree' or 'Strongly Disagree' with having to take orders from a NATO appointed officer from a foreign country; a full 32% either 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree'. The issue of American troops serving under NATO command will come to the fore as we near the Twenty-first century. Since Russia agreed to join the newly expanded NATO configuration, concern over whether U.S. military personnel will have to serve under Russian command in a NATO operation will surface. What will be of primary concern, however, is whether the expansion of NATO evolves into the global army for the United Nations. NATO was created under the authority "...as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations" (NATO Treaty, 1997, p. 1). Furthermore, the NATO Treaty points to "...Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations..." for authority to act militarily (NATO Treaty, 1997, p. 2).

A full 63% of respondents either 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' with the conviction of German military officials at the Nuremberg Trials. This could possibly mean that respondents are willing disobey an order considered illegal. Under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, military personnel are required to "...obey a lawful order..." (UCMJ, 1994, p. 45). This is an important crux to the issue of placing U.S. military under the command of the United Nations.

A full 63% of respondents either 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' to participating in a U.N. operation within the United States, under U.S. command, to restore order to a national emergency; a full 17% were in disagreement of this type of mission. This result is intriguing because, while the U.S. military has participated in U.N. training missions within the United States, the U.S. military has never participated in a U.N. peacekeeping-type mission within the United States. Moreover, with help from the U.S. military, National Guard, state and local police units, and various volunteers, it seems reasonable to conclude that the United States has ample resources to care for our own national emergencies. However, in the time of redefining domestic jurisdiction and national sovereignty, and changing roles of the military, it is feasible that in the future a U.N. peacekeeping force could be invited into the United States to help with a national emergency. If U.N. peacekeepers do enter into the U.S. it will surely mark a dramatic shift in policy and will raise much alarm to those who already question the constitutionality of U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations overseas.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The results of this study do not support the research hypothesis that a significant difference exists between enlisted and officer Air Force personnel on their perception of U.N. command and control of the U.S. military. The null hypothesis was not rejected for any of the five survey questions, which were statistically analyzed. This indicates that there is no significant difference in enlisted and officer perceptions at the $\alpha=.05$ level of significance.

One explanation for this result is that all Air Force enlisted and officer personnel wish to keep the U.S. military autonomous from U.N. command and control. Many of the respondents have participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations and possibly have witnessed poor communication through the chain of command and deteriorating morale. Moreover, as a member of the American Armed Forces, respondents see themselves as individuals, working within the world's finest military force, defending the world's greatest country—patriotism. Although respondents wish to remain under U.S. command, most do not wish to completely withdraw from the United Nations. Furthermore, a majority of respondents would agree to serving in a U.N. peacekeeping operation within the United States and under U.S. command.

The results of this study do not support the research secondary hypothesis that a significant difference exists between those who have served in a U.N. peacekeeping operation, and those who have not, on their perception of U.N. command and control of

the U.S. military. The null hypothesis was not rejected for four of the five survey questions, which were statistically analyzed at the $\alpha=.05$ level of significance.

Question 6 was the only one to be considered significant. One possible explanation for this is that those who have served in U.N. peacekeeping operations may have had negative experiences, which led to low morale. This group perceives that wearing the uniform of the U.N. will adversely affect their morale. While it is significant that those who have served in a U.N. peacekeeping operation oppose wearing the U.N. uniform, and carrying an identification card of the U.N., there is not enough evidence to suggest that this group has more negative perceptions than those who have not served in a U.N. peacekeeping operation. Both tested groups for the secondary hypothesis have negative perceptions in participating in a U.N. peacekeeping operation under U.N. command and control.

When coupling this study with the Harman (1994) and Cunningham (1995) studies, one can begin to see overwhelming evidence that U.S. military personnel do not wish to be placed under United Nations command and control. Moreover, placing U.S. military personnel under U.N. command will have a deteriorating effect on morale. Also, U.S. Air Force personnel may have less apprehension about being placed under NATO command; this is intriguing because the enhanced NATO framework will be taking on a more *interventionist* role as the turn of the century nears. It is clear that a majority of respondents do not wish to be under foreign command. However, it is clear according to the data in this study that Air Force personnel are willing to participate in U.N. operations—foreign and domestic—so long as it remains under U.S. command.

CHAPTER VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the results and conclusions of this study, the following recommendations are made:

This study should be replicated using a larger survey population. Specifically, the survey population should be randomly chosen from the many Air Force bases throughout the United States.

There should be an encompassing study, surveying military personnel from all five branches of the Armed Forces. Specifically, the study should survey those who have participated in a U.N. peacekeeping operation and those who have not; the study should survey a wide cross section, including both enlisted and officer personnel.

The survey should test perceptions concerning Russian command within a NATO configuration.

The Defense Department should review U.N. peacekeeping and NATO operations, and their affect on U.S. military morale.

The Defense Department should consider incorporating constitutional studies in Professional Military Education, Basic Training, and Officer Training School.

REFERENCES

Bartone, Paul, Amy Adler, & Mark Vaitkus (1995). Social psychological issues in the adaptation of US Army Forces to peacekeeping & contingency missions (Technical Report #ADA301643). Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).

Berdal, Mats (1994, Spring). Fateful encounter: the United States and U.N. peacekeeping. Survival, 36, 30-50.

Cunningham, Ernest (1995). Peacekeeping and U.N. operational control: A study of their effect on unit cohesion (Technical Report #ADA293790). Ft. Belvoir: DTIC.

Christopher, Warren (1995, January 30). American leadership and effective UN peace-keeping. U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 6, 4-6.

Daniel, Donald (1994). U.S. Perspectives on peacekeeping: Putting PDD 25 in context (Technical Report #ADA288845). Ft. Belvoir: DTIC.

Doherty, Carol (1996, September 7). U.N. command of U.S. troops restricted by House again. Congressional Quarterly, p. 2537.

Donovan, James (1995, July). "The United Nations—Its Roles and Missions for American Armed Forces. Marine Corps Gazette. pp. 70-75.

Francis, Samuel (1992, August 24). "U.N. Military Plan a Threat to Sovereignty" Insight. p. 24.

- Funderburke, David (1991). Betrayal of America. Dunn, NC: Larry MacDonald Foundation.
- Gay, L.R. (1996). Educational Research: Competencies for Analysis and Application. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Gerlach, Jeffery (1993, Spring). A U.N. Army for the new world order? Orbis, 37, pp. 223-236.
- Glahn, Gerhard von (1992). Law among nations. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
- Harman, Joan (1994). Peacekeeping in Somalia. (Technical Report #ADA284066) Ft. Belvior: Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).
- Helms, Jesse (1996, September/October). Saving the U.N: A challenge to the next Secretary-General. Foreign Affairs, pp. 2-7.
- Hodges, Amy (1995, June). Command and control in peace operations: A case study of U.S. military operations in Somalia. (Technical Report #ADB204650) Ft. Belvior: DTIC.
- H.CON.RES.225 (1997). Bill summary status. [On-Line]. Available: <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>.
- HR 2535 (1997). United Nations withdrawal act of 1995. [On-Line]. Available: <ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/c104/h2535.ih.txt>.
- Jasper, William (1992). Global Tyranny...Step by Step: The United Nations and the Emerging New World Order. Appleton, Wisconsin: Western Island.
- Kerns, Melvin (1996). At a crossroads: UN peacekeeping policy (Technical Report #ADA309529). Ft. Belvior: DTIC.

- Killebrew, Bob (1995, October). Combat peacekeeping. Armed Forces Journal, pp. 34-35.
- Kilpatrick, Peter (1996). The first step to developing a United Nations' rapid reaction capability. (Technical Report #ADA309472). Ft. Belvoir: DTIC.
- Kincaid, Cliff (1996). The 50th anniversary of the United Nations: A time for celebration or a wake-up call for America? Report submitted to the American Sovereignty Action Project, Fairfax, VA.
- McManus, John (1996, April 1). Ignoring the obvious. The New American, p. 44.
- McManus, John (1996, September 16). CFR Members in each branch of government/media/foundations. The New American, pp. 16-21.
- Metz, Steven (1993). The future of the United Nations: Implications for peace operations (Technical Report #ADA274404). Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).
- Murphy, George (1994). International quick response forces (Technical Report #ADA290935). Ft. Belvoir: DTIC.
- NATO Treaty (1997). The North Atlantic Treaty. [On-line]. Available: <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>.
- New, Daniel (1996). Good conduct: The story of Michael New [Video]. Michael New Defense Fund: Conroe, Texas.
- Pirnie, Bruce & William Simmons (1996). Soldiers for peace: Critical operational issues (Technical Report #19961114 077). Ft. Belvoir: DTIC.
- Ray, James L. (1990). Global Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

S.1370 (1997). Bill Summary & Status for the 104th Congress. [On-Line].

Available: <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>.

S.2106 (1997). Bill Summary & Status for the 104th Congress. [On-Line].

Available: <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>.

Schlafly, Phyllis and Chester Ward (1975). Kissinger on the Couch. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House.

Schulzinger, Robert (1984). The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press.

Title IV (1997). Command of United States forces. (Received from Representative Joe Scarborough's office: 127 Longworth Building, Washington, D.C.).

Tanenhaus, Sam (1997). Whittaker Chambers. New York: Random House.

The Constitution (1994). The Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Independence. Vienna, VA: U.S. Taxpayers Party.

U.N. Charter (1997). The United Nations. [On-Line]. Available: <http://www.un.org/charter>.

U.N. Department of Public Information (1997). The United Nations. [On-Line]. Available: <http://www.un.org/peacekeeping>.

Titus, Herb (1996, February). Michael New. The Forecast, pp. 6-10.

Walsh, Kenneth (1991, January 7). Commander in chief. U.S. News & World Report, pp. 32-35.

APPENDIX A
SAMPLE SURVEY

SURVEY CONDUCTED FOR GRADUATE RESEARCH

This survey is to be conducted by Michael Boyd (Tel # 609-0970) to gather data concerning the attitudes of Air Force personnel with regard to United Nations peacekeeping operations. It is being conducted in conjunction with an Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University graduate class. All of your responses are confidential. Please indicate your answers directly on this sheet. Select only ONE choice for each response.

Part I. Demographics (Circle One)

1. What is your rank? _____
2. Have you ever performed any military duties in a foreign country?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
3. Did you serve in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
4. Have you served in any Peacekeeping Operation, to include Haiti, Somalia, and/or Bosnia?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

Part II. Attitudes (Mark One) * Read Carefully before responding*

1. The United States military should not participate in any United Nations exercises.
 Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree
2. U.S. military should participate in United Nations missions under U.S. command and control
 Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree
3. U.S. military should participate in United Nations missions under United Nations command and control
 Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree

4. There is no difference in taking orders from a **United Nations** commander than from a **U.S.** commander when performing an assigned duty in a peacekeeping operation.

Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree

5. **United Nations** member countries, including the **U.S.**, should provide to the **United Nations** military personnel to be able to quickly resolve international contingencies.

Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree

6. Wearing the patch of the **United Nations** on your military uniform, the **UN** blue helmet, and being required to carry an identification card of the **UN** would have no effect on your morale to perform your duties.

Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree

7. U.S. Constitution designates the President as "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." Many constitutional scholars hold that this designation applies only when the nation engages an enemy in a war declared by Congress—with the only exceptions being the use of the military either to repel a sudden attack or to rescue American citizens caught in a conflict overseas. Do you

Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree

8. The 1949 NATO treaty states that the NATO military alliance was created under the authority "as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations." It further points to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations" for authority to act militarily.

Due to the provisions of the treaty, when ordered, U.S. personnel should wear the patch of NATO on uniforms, and take orders from a NATO appointed officer from a foreign country.

Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree

9. At the Nuremberg trials at the end of World War II, German military officials, who carried out orders from their superiors, were convicted for not **disobeying** what they should have considered illegal orders. Regarding their conviction, do you

Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree

10. Suppose there was a declared national emergency in the United States.

By executive order, you were ordered to participate in a **United Nations** operation, within this country under **U.S.** command, to restore order. Do you

Strongly Agree | Agree | No Opinion | Disagree | Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX B
CHI SQUARE DATA

The data was collected from a range of Air Force personnel ranking from Airman First Class (E-3) to Major (O-4). Figures B-1 and B-2 depict the frequency of rank. Also, of the 115 respondents, 99 have served in missions overseas.




Figure B-1. Frequency of enlisted personnel.




Figure B-2. Frequency of officer personnel.

Table B-1

U.S. Military Should not Participate in any U.N. Exercise

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	3	6	8	34	8	59
	4.1	4.6	6.2	31.3	12.8	
	2.6	5.2	7.0	29.6	7.0	51.3
	5.1	10.2	13.6	57.6	13.6	
	37.5	66.7	66.7	55.7	32.0	
2	5	3	4	27	17	56
	3.9	4.4	5.8	29.7	12.2	
	4.3	2.6	3.5	23.5	14.8	48.7
	8.9	5.4	7.1	48.2	30.4	
	62.5	33.3	33.3	44.3	68.0	
TOTAL	8	9	12	61	25	115
	7.0	7.8	10.4	53.0	21.7	100.0

CHI SQUARE = 6.80 with DF= 4

Table B-2

U.S. Military Should Participate in U.N. Missions Under U.S. Command

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	26	23	3	6	1	59
	23.6	23.6	3.6	6.7	1.5	51.3
	22.6	20.0	2.6	5.2	0.9	
	44.1	39.0	5.1	10.2	1.7	
	56.5	50.0	42.9	46.2	33.3	
2	20	23	4	7	2	56
	22.4	22.4	3.4	6.3	1.5	48.7
	17.4	20.0	3.5	6.1	1.7	
	35.7	41.1	7.1	12.5	3.6	
	43.5	50.0	57.1	53.8	66.7	
TOTAL	46	46	7	13	3	115
	40.0	40.0	6.1	11.3	2.6	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	1.26	with DF=	4		

Table B-3

U.S. Military Should Participate in U.N. Missions Under U.N. Command

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	3	12	4	21	19	59
	2.1	13.3	4.6	20.0	19.0	51.3
	2.6	10.4	3.5	18.3	16.5	
	5.1	20.3	6.8	35.6	32.2	
	75.0	46.2	44.4	53.8	51.4	
2	1	14	5	18	18	56
	1.9	12.7	4.4	19.0	18.0	48.7
	0.9	12.2	4.3	15.7	15.7	
	1.8	25.0	8.9	32.1	32.1	
	25.0	53.8	55.6	46.2	48.6	
TOTAL	4	26	9	39	37	115
	3.5	22.6	7.8	33.9	32.2	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	1.45	with DF=	4		

Table B-4

No Difference in Taking Orders From a U.N. Commander than From a U.S.Commander

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	3	15	3	23	15	59
	1.5	16.4	3.1	21.0	16.9	51.3
	2.6	13.0	2.6	20.0	13.0	
	5.1	25.4	5.1	39.0	25.4	
	100.0	46.9	50.0	56.1	45.5	
2	0	17	3	18	18	56
	1.5	15.6	2.9	20.0	16.1	48.7
	0.0	14.8	2.6	15.7	15.7	
	0.0	30.4	5.4	32.1	32.1	
	0.0	53.1	50.0	43.9	54.5	
TOTAL	3	32	6	41	33	115
	2.6	27.8	5.2	35.7	28.7	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	3.93	with DF=	4		

Table B-5

U.S. Should Provide Military Personnel to the U.N.: Rapid Reaction Force

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	7	21	9	19	3	59
	5.6	26.7	8.2	14.4	4.1	
	6.1	18.3	7.8	16.5	2.6	51.3
	11.9	35.6	15.3	32.2	5.1	
	63.6	40.4	56.3	67.9	37.5	
2	4	31	7	9	5	56
	5.4	25.3	7.8	13.6	3.9	
	3.5	27.0	6.1	7.8	4.3	48.7
	7.1	55.4	12.5	16.1	8.9	
	36.4	59.6	43.8	32.1	62.5	
TOTAL	11	52	16	28	8	115
	9.6	45.2	13.9	24.3	7.0	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	6.99	with DF=	4		

Table B-6

Wearing the U.N. Uniform and Carrying a U.N. Identification Card Would Have
No Effect on Your Morale

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	8	12	12	15	12	59
EXPECTED	5.1	17.4	9.7	15.9	10.8	
TOT PCT	7.0	10.4	10.4	13.0	10.4	51.3
ROW PCT	13.6	20.3	20.3	25.4	20.3	
COL PCT	80.0	35.3	63.2	48.4	57.1	
2	2	22	7	16	9	56
EXPECTED	4.9	16.6	9.3	15.1	10.2	
TOT PCT	1.7	19.1	6.1	13.9	7.8	48.7
ROW PCT	3.6	39.3	12.5	28.6	16.1	
COL PCT	20.0	64.7	36.8	51.6	42.9	
TOTAL	10	34	19	31	21	115
	8.7	29.6	16.5	27.0	18.3	100.0
CHI SQUARE	= 8.25 with DF= 4					

Table B-7

Limited Presidential Powers

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	6	17	11	23	2	59
	4.1	15.9	10.8	25.1	3.1	
	5.2	14.8	9.6	20.0	1.7	51.3
	10.2	28.8	18.6	39.0	3.4	
	75.0	54.8	52.4	46.9	33.3	
2	2	14	10	26	4	56
	3.9	15.1	10.2	23.9	2.9	
	1.7	12.2	8.7	22.6	3.5	48.7
	3.6	25.0	17.9	46.4	7.1	
	25.0	45.2	47.6	53.1	66.7	
TOTAL	8	31	21	49	6	115
	7.0	27.0	18.3	42.6	5.2	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	3.11	with DF=	4		

Table B-8

U.S. Personnel Should Wear the NATO Uniform and Take Orders From a NATOAppointed Officer From a Foreign Country

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	2	14	11	17	15	59
	1.0	18.0	8.7	20.0	11.3	51.3
	1.7	12.2	9.6	14.8	13.0	
	3.4	23.7	18.6	28.8	25.4	
	100.0	40.0	64.7	43.6	68.2	
2	0	21	6	22	7	56
	1.0	17.0	8.3	19.0	10.7	48.7
	0.0	18.3	5.2	19.1	6.1	
	0.0	37.5	10.7	39.3	12.5	
	0.0	60.0	35.3	56.4	31.8	
TOTAL	2	35	17	39	22	115
	1.7	30.4	14.8	33.9	19.1	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	8.35	with DF=	4		

Table B-9

Conviction of German Officers at the Nuremberg Trials

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	11	23	5	15	5	59
EXPECTED	12.8	25.1	5.6	11.8	3.6	
TOT PCT	9.6	20.0	4.3	13.0	4.3	51.3
ROW PCT	18.6	39.0	8.5	25.4	8.5	
COL PCT	44.0	46.9	45.5	65.2	71.4	
2	14	26	6	8	2	56
EXPECTED	12.2	23.9	5.4	11.2	3.4	
TOT PCT	12.2	22.6	5.2	7.0	1.7	48.7
ROW PCT	25.0	46.4	10.7	14.3	3.6	
COL PCT	56.0	53.1	54.5	34.8	28.6	
TOTAL	25	49	11	23	7	115
	21.7	42.6	9.6	20.0	6.1	100.0

CHI SQUARE = 3.98 with DF= 4

Table B-10

U.S. Military Participating in a U.N. Operation Within the U.S. and Under U.S.Command

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	11	32	9	1	6	59
	11.3	31.8	6.7	3.6	5.6	
	9.6	27.8	7.8	0.9	5.2	51.3
	18.6	54.2	15.3	1.7	10.2	
	50.0	51.6	69.2	14.3	54.5	
2	11	30	4	6	5	56
	10.7	30.2	6.3	3.4	5.4	
	9.6	26.1	3.5	5.2	4.3	48.7
	19.6	53.6	7.1	10.7	8.9	
	50.0	48.4	30.8	85.7	45.5	
TOTAL	22	62	13	7	11	115
	19.1	53.9	11.3	6.1	9.6	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	5.58	with DF=	4		

Table B-11

U.S. Military Should not Participate in any U.N. Exercise

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY						
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	7	7	4	39	15	72
	5.0	5.6	7.5	38.8	15.0	
	6.1	6.1	3.5	33.9	13.0	62.6
	9.7	9.7	5.6	54.2	20.8	
	87.5	77.8	33.3	62.9	62.5	
2	1	2	8	23	9	43
	3.0	3.4	4.5	23.2	9.0	
	0.9	1.7	7.0	20.0	7.8	37.4
	2.3	4.7	18.6	53.5	20.9	
	12.5	22.2	66.7	37.1	37.5	
TOTAL	8	9	12	62	24	115
	7.0	7.8	10.4	53.9	20.9	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	7.40	with DF=	4		

Table B-12

U.S. Military Should Participate in U.N. Missions Under U.S. Command

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	30	30	3	7	2	72
	29.4	30.1	3.8	7.5	1.3	
	26.1	26.1	2.6	6.1	1.7	62.6
	41.7	41.7	4.2	9.7	2.8	
	63.8	62.5	50.0	58.3	100.0	
2	17	18	3	5	0	43
	17.6	17.9	2.2	4.5	0.7	
	14.8	15.7	2.6	4.3	0.0	37.4
	39.5	41.9	7.0	11.6	0.0	
	36.2	37.5	50.0	41.7	0.0	
TOTAL	47	48	6	12	2	115
	40.9	41.7	5.2	10.4	1.7	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	1.73	with DF=	4		

Table B-13

U.S. Military Should Participate in U.N. Missions Under U.N. Command

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	2	18	4	23	25	72
	2.5	16.3	5.6	24.4	23.2	
	1.7	15.7	3.5	20.0	21.7	62.6
	2.8	25.0	5.6	31.9	34.7	
	50.0	69.2	44.4	59.0	67.6	
2	2	8	5	16	12	43
	1.5	9.7	3.4	14.6	13.8	
	1.7	7.0	4.3	13.9	10.4	37.4
	4.7	18.6	11.6	37.2	27.9	
	50.0	30.8	55.6	41.0	32.4	
TOTAL	4	26	9	39	37	115
	3.5	22.6	7.8	33.9	32.2	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	2.64	with DF=	4		

Table B-14

No Difference in Taking Orders From a U.N. Commander than From a U.S.Commander

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	1	19	3	26	23	72
	1.9	20.0	3.8	25.7	20.7	62.6
	0.9	16.5	2.6	22.6	20.0	
	1.4	26.4	4.2	36.1	31.9	
	33.3	59.4	50.0	63.4	69.7	
2	2	13	3	15	10	43
	1.1	12.0	2.2	15.3	12.3	37.4
	1.7	11.3	2.6	13.0	8.7	
	4.7	30.2	7.0	34.9	23.3	
	66.7	40.6	50.0	36.6	30.3	
TOTAL	3	32	6	41	33	115
	2.6	27.8	5.2	35.7	28.7	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	2.37	with DF=	4		

Table B-15

U.S. Should Provide Military Personnel to the U.N.: Rapid Reaction Force

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	6	34	9	18	5	72
	6.9	32.6	10.0	17.5	5.0	
	5.2	29.6	7.8	15.7	4.3	62.6
	8.3	47.2	12.5	25.0	6.9	
	54.5	65.4	56.3	64.3	62.5	
2	5	18	7	10	3	43
	4.1	19.4	6.0	10.5	3.0	
	4.3	15.7	6.1	8.7	2.6	37.4
	11.6	41.9	16.3	23.3	7.0	
	45.5	34.6	43.8	35.7	37.5	
TOTAL	11	52	16	28	8	115
	9.6	45.2	13.9	24.3	7.0	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	0.79	with DF=	4		

Table B-16

Wearing the U.N. Uniform and Carrying a U.N. Identification Card Would Have No
Effect on Your Morale

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	5	19	15	18	15	72
	9.4	22.5	11.9	16.3	11.9	62.6
	4.3	16.5	13.0	15.7	13.0	
	6.9	26.4	20.8	25.0	20.8	
	33.3	52.8	78.9	69.2	78.9	
2	10	17	4	8	4	43
	5.6	13.5	7.1	9.7	7.1	37.4
	8.7	14.8	3.5	7.0	3.5	
	23.3	39.5	9.3	18.6	9.3	
	66.7	47.2	21.1	30.8	21.1	
TOTAL	15	36	19	26	19	115
	13.0	31.3	16.5	22.6	16.5	100.0

CHI SQUARE = 11.80 with DF= 4

Table B-17

Limited Presidential Powers

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	5	20	13	30	4	72
	5.0	19.4	13.1	30.7	3.8	
	4.3	17.4	11.3	26.1	3.5	62.6
	6.9	27.8	18.1	41.7	5.6	
	62.5	64.5	61.9	61.2	66.7	
2	3	11	8	19	2	43
	3.0	11.6	7.9	18.3	2.2	
	2.6	9.6	7.0	16.5	1.7	37.4
	7.0	25.6	18.6	44.2	4.7	
	37.5	35.5	38.1	38.8	33.3	
TOTAL	8	31	21	49	6	115
	7.0	27.0	18.3	42.6	5.2	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	0.13	with DF=	4		

Table B-18

U.S. Personnel Should Wear the NATO Uniform and Take Orders From a NATO
Appointed Officer From a Foreign Country

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY EXPECTED TOT PCT ROW PCT COL PCT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	1	23	8	24	16	72
	1.9	21.9	10.6	23.2	14.4	
	0.9	20.0	7.0	20.9	13.9	62.6
	1.4	31.9	11.1	33.3	22.2	
	33.3	65.7	47.1	64.9	69.6	
2	2	12	9	13	7	43
	1.1	13.1	6.4	13.8	8.6	
	1.7	10.4	7.8	11.3	6.1	37.4
	4.7	27.9	20.9	30.2	16.3	
	66.7	34.3	52.9	35.1	30.4	
TOTAL	3	35	17	37	23	115
	2.6	30.4	14.8	32.2	20.0	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	3.55	with DF=	4		

Table B-19

Conviction of German Officers at the Nuremberg Trials

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
EXPECTED						
TOT PCT						
ROW PCT						
COL PCT						
1	16	29	6	16	5	72
	15.0	30.7	6.3	15.7	4.4	
	13.9	25.2	5.2	13.9	4.3	62.6
	22.2	40.3	8.3	22.2	6.9	
	66.7	59.2	60.0	64.0	71.4	
2	8	20	4	9	2	43
	9.0	18.3	3.7	9.3	2.6	
	7.0	17.4	3.5	7.8	1.7	37.4
	18.6	46.5	9.3	20.9	4.7	
	33.3	40.8	40.0	36.0	28.6	
TOTAL	24	49	10	25	7	115
	20.9	42.6	8.7	21.7	6.1	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	0.70	with DF=	4		

Table B-20

U.S. Military Participating in a U.N. Operation Within the U.S. and Under U.S.Command

2-Way Contingency Table

FREQUENCY	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1	13	37	9	6	7	72
EXPECTED	13.8	38.8	8.8	5.0	5.6	
TOT PCT	11.3	32.2	7.8	5.2	6.1	62.6
ROW PCT	18.1	51.4	12.5	8.3	9.7	
COL PCT	59.1	59.7	64.3	75.0	77.8	
2	9	25	5	2	2	43
EXPECTED	8.2	23.2	5.2	3.0	3.4	
TOT PCT	7.8	21.7	4.3	1.7	1.7	37.4
ROW PCT	20.9	58.1	11.6	4.7	4.7	
COL PCT	40.9	40.3	35.7	25.0	22.2	
TOTAL	22	62	14	8	9	115
	19.1	53.9	12.2	7.0	7.8	100.0
CHI SQUARE	=	1.77	with DF=	4		

APPENDIX C
FREEDOM FROM WAR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7277

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy presented his plan for national disarmament to the United Nations in a State Department Document known as, *Freedom From War: The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World* (Department of State Publication 7277). The *Freedom From War* publication "...presented a three-stage program for the gradual transfer of U.S. arms to the United Nations" (Jasper, 1992, p. 13). The three stages presented a dramatic shift in foreign policy; it was a policy that would enhance the power of the U.N.

"During Stage II (the stage we are currently in), the document mandates: (The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened...to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations" (Jasper, 1992, p. 13).

Stage III concludes as follows:

In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament...would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force... ("Freedom From War...", 1997, p. 10)

Freedom From War was superseded in 1962 by yet another disarmament document entitled, *Blueprint for the Peace Race: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World*. This government-sponsored document was very similar to the *Freedom From War* document; both called for increased United Nations authority through a U.N.-controlled global army.

The argument can be made that these documents were presented long ago, and as such they are null in void. However, when examining a little closer one can see the policies outlined in the two previously mentioned documents have been used in modern

times. For example, "On May 25, 1982, Congressman Ted Weiss (D-NY) called for the implementation of *Blueprint for the Peace Race* and entered its entire text into the *Congressional Record*. He also pointed out that this disarmament proposal had never been formally withdrawn by the United States government" (Jasper, 1992, p. 14). Furthermore, "In January 1991, William Nary, the official historian of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, confirmed again that the proposal has not been withdrawn" (Jasper, p. 14).

Although the *Freedom From War* formula has never been formally withdrawn, the flux of global politics have caused for a new strategy—the expansion of NATO. As stated previously in this study, NATO does receive its authority to act militarily from the U.N. Charter. However, NATO is taking on a life all of its own. Recently, three former Soviet bloc countries agreed to join NATO. Moreover, Russia now has concrete ties to this once defensive organization designed to combat communism. When looking observantly, one can see the shift away from the United Nations, to the newly expanded NATO configuration.

In a personal communication with United Nations/Foreign Policy expert, Cliff Kincaid, the shift from the U.N. to NATO for *collective security*, was of concern. Mr. Kincaid agreed that it is very possible that in the near future American troops may in fact be ordered to serve under Russian command within the NATO arrangement. Mr. Kincaid also claimed that while *The Freedom From War* document may not have been withdrawn, it is NATO that will assume the security role that the United Nations once had. Mr. Kincaid believes it is likely that there will be no more embarrassments like Somalia. Rather, the new order will be under the expanded authority of NATO.

FREEDOM FROM WAR

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM
FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7277

Disarmament Series 5

Released September 1961

Office of Public Services

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. - Price 15 cents

INTRODUCTION

The revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences has produced a crisis in human history. In order to overcome the danger of nuclear war now confronting mankind, the United States has introduced, at the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations, a Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.

This new program provides for the progressive reduction of the war-making capabilities of nations and the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions to settle disputes and maintain the peace. It sets forth a series of comprehensive measures which can and should be taken in order to bring about a world in which there will be freedom from war and security for all states. It is based on three principles deemed essential to the achievement of practical progress in the disarmament field:

First, there must be immediate disarmament action:

A strenuous and uninterrupted effort must be made toward the goal of general and complete disarmament; at the same time, it is important that specific measures be put into effect as soon as possible.

Second, all disarmament obligations must be subject to effective international controls:

The control organization must have the manpower, facilities, and effectiveness to assure that limitations or reductions ta

place as agreed. It must also be able to certify to all states that retained forces and armaments do not exceed those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process.

Third, adequate peace-keeping machinery must be established:

There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peace-keeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds

There follows a summary of the principal provisions of the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. The full text of the program is contained in appendix to this pamphlet.

FREEDOM FROM WAR

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

SUMMARY

DISARMAMENT GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

The overall goal of the United States is a free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world which has achieved general and complete disarmament under effective international control; and a world in which adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

In order to make possible the achievement of that goal, the program sets forth the following specific objectives toward which nations should direct their efforts:

- * The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contribution to a United Nations Peace Force;
- * The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nation

Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

- * The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principle of the United Nations;
- * The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.

TASKS OF NEGOTIATING STATES

The negotiating states are called upon to develop the program into a detailed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved. To this end, they are to seek the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date. At the same time, and without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program, they are to seek agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form part of the total program.

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

The program sets forth a series of general principles to guide the negotiating states in their work. These make clear that:

- * As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- * Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed, in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;
- * Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the next stage have been made;
- * Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process; and
- * Disarmament must take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state.

DISARMAMENT STAGES

The program provides for progressive disarmament steps to take

place in three stages and for the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions.

FIRST STAGE

The first stage contains measures which would significantly reduce the capabilities of nations to wage aggressive war. Implementation of this stage would mean that:

* The nuclear threat would be reduced:

All states would have adhered to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons.

The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be stopped and quantities of such materials from production would be converted to non-weapon uses.

States owning nuclear weapons would not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and would not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture.

States not owning nuclear weapons would not manufacture them or attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states.

A Commission of Experts would be established to report on the feasibility and means for the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

* Strategic delivery vehicles would be reduced:

Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles of specified categories and weapons designed to counter such vehicles would be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps; their production would be discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted.

* Arms and armed forces would be reduced:

The armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would be limited to 2.1 million men each (with appropriate levels not exceeding that amount for other militarily significant states); levels of armaments would be correspondingly reduced and their production would be limited.

An Experts Commission would be established to examine and report on the feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

* Peaceful use of outer space would be promoted:

The placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction would be

prohibited.

States would give advance notification of space vehicle and missile launchings.

- * U.N. peace-keeping powers would be strengthened:

Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law, and for the establishment in Stage of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.

- * An International Disarmament Organization would be established for effective verification of the disarmament program:

Its functions would be expanded progressively as disarmament proceeds.

It would certify to all states that agreed reductions have taken place and that retained forces and armaments do not exceed permitted levels.

It would determine the transition from one stage to the next.

- * States would be committed to other measures to reduce international tension and to protect against the chance of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack:

States would be committed to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

A U.N. peace observation group would be available to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

States would be committed to give advance notice of major military movements which might cause alarm; observation posts would be established to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

SECOND STAGE

The second stage contains a series of measures which would bring within sight a world in which there would be freedom from war. Implementation of all measures in the second stage would mean:

- * Further substantial reductions in the armed forces, armaments and military establishments of states, including strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and countering weapons;
- * Further development of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes under the United Nations;
- * Establishment of a permanent international peace force within

the United Nations;

- * Depending on the findings of an Experts Commission, a halt in the production of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons and a reduction of existing stocks or their conversion to peaceful uses;
- * On the basis of the findings of an Experts Commission, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons;
- * The dismantling or the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military bases and facilities wherever located; and
- * The strengthening and enlargement of the International Disarmament Organization to enable it to verify the steps taken in Stage II and to determine the transition to Stage III.

THIRD STAGE

During the third stage of the program, the states of the world, building on the experience and confidence gained in successfully implementing the measures of the first two stages, would take final steps toward the goal of a world in which:

- * States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.
- * The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.
- * The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.
- * The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

APPENDIX

DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The Nations of the world,

Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divide by serious ideological differences;

Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;

Declare their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural and spiritual advance;

Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

- (a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;
- (b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;
- (c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;
- (d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principle of the United Nations.

Call on the negotiating states:

- (a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;
- (b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;
- (c) Also to seek - without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program - agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program.

Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the

following principles:

(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.

(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.

(d) As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuous and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.

Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:

STAGE I

A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:

(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.

(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and financial resources adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.

(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for

the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.

B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2 million each for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.

(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.

(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapon purposes.

(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.

(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.

(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representative of the nuclear states shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted.

E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of Outer Space:

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack:

(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the IDO of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasure. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.

(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations.

on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

G. To Keep the Peace:

(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force including nuclear, conventional, or CBR - contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the codification and progressive development of international law.

(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a U.N. Peace Force.

(e) A U.N. peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to breach of the peace

STAGE II

A. International Disarmament Organization:

The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Levels of forces for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and other militarily significant states shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.

(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on CBR weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.

D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

E. To Keep the Peace:

During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations:

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able effectively to protect states against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in process for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the state of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a

APPENDIX D
THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CONNECTION

In the years since the United Nations was founded in 1945, there have been a consistent cycle of members from the United States' delegation to the U.N. belonging to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The CFR, an establishment of elites, consisting of bankers, lawyers, educators, journalists, and politicians, has convened over the years to discuss and implement major policies affecting America and the world.

Although the Council's birth was in 1921, its origins actually began in 1917, at the end of World War I. Following the *Great War*, President Woodrow Wilson's confidant and *alter ego*, Colonel Edward Mandell House, "... who always had wanted to explain to the mighty what the world should look like, found his chance... House assembled about 100 well-educated and well off men with some knowledge of the rest of the world to draw up peace plans"; this group was known as the Inquiry (Shultzinger, 1983, p. 2). Members of the Inquiry, and other United States internationalists, gathered in Paris to meet with the French and British delegation to hammer out a post-war world, with a new form of international order—The League of Nations. In House's book entitled *Philip Dru: Administrator*, written in 1912, a plan for a League of Nations was explained. "The novel's hero, Philip Dru, opines that American society is a miserable travesty and believes in Socialism as dreamed of by Karl Marx... Dru leads a military coup, establishes himself as dictator of the United States, abolishes the constitution and institutes Marxist reforms" (Jasper, 1992, p. 51). House admitted the book "was not much of a novel, but that fiction was the best format for disseminating his political ideas.... Many of Administrator Dru's 'reforms' would later be adopted by President Wilson" (Jasper, 1992, p. 51).

Apparent that the United States Senate would not ratify the League, House along

with some members of the British delegation held a series of meetings. On May 30, 1919, at the Majestic Hotel, it was resolved that the Institute of International Affairs would be formed. The Institute would have two branches—one in Great Britain and the other in the U.S. The British branch became known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the American branch known as the Council on Foreign Relations. Its mouthpiece, *Foreign Affairs*, a heavy weight journal on foreign politics, has trumpeted ideas such as *containment*, *interdependency*, *functionalism* (limited nuclear war), *free trade*, and the United Nations (Shultzinger, 1983).

Another key area of concentration for the CFR is the convergence of Russia and the United States into the global economy. The *convergence theory* was first argued by American scholar W.W. Rostow in 1960, where the Soviet Union's economy would become more like the United States'. Along the same theme of convergence, American economist John Kenneth Galbraith believed, "... the United States would become more like the Soviet Union" (Ray, 1990, p. 380). With the Russia recently joining the G-7 Summit in Denver, and agreeing to belong to NATO, the prospect of real convergence between Russia and the United States is now closer than ever before. The CFR has been at the center of promoting the convergence theory.

Many members of the founding conference of the U.N. were also members of the CFR. Author James Perloff outlined the plan of the United Nations:

In January 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull formed a steering committee composed of himself, Leo Pasvolosky, Isaiah Bowman, Sumner Welles, Norman Davis, and Morton Taylor. All of these men—with the exception of Hull—were in the CFR. Later known as the Informal Agenda Group, they drafted the original

proposal for the United Nations. It was Bowman—a founder of the CFR and member of Colonel House's old *Inquiry*—who first put forward the concept.

(Jasper, 1992, p. 46)

Although most would claim the CFR to be harmless, populated by a bunch of educated elitist, one must look further. For example, Admiral Chester Ward, "... a former Judge Advocate General of the Navy, who was himself a member of the Council on Foreign Relations for 16 years... concluded ... that the Council was formed for the purpose of promoting disarmament and submergence of U.S. sovereignty and national independence into an all-powerful one-world government" (Jasper, 1992, p. 49).

Moreover, Admiral Ward charged "... this lust to surrender the sovereignty and independence of the United States is pervasive throughout most of the membership..." (Schlafly & Ward, 1975, p. 146).

The CFR's globalist bent was never more evident than its promotion of the United Nations. "What historical record shows, and what is essential for all good people of good will to understand, is that the United Nations is completely a creature of the Council on Foreign Relations.... The list of those in the U.S. delegation to the U.N.'s founding San Francisco Conference reads like a CFR roll call" (Jasper, 1992, pp. 47-48). Forty-three members of the U.S. delegation were members of the CFR; these men came from one organization, with one common world-view—internationalism created by elites.

Since the creation of the United Nations, 18 out of 21 U.N. Ambassadors from the United States have come from the CFR. All 21 Ambassadors to NATO have been CFR members. Seventeen of 23 Secretary of Defenses, 13 of 16 Secretary of States, and every Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman since the Carter Administration have all come from the

CFR ranks. The primary policies promoted by the Council are global free trade, interdependency, and United Nations enhancement through peacekeeping and a rapid deployment force (McManus, 1997).

On one final note, it should be stated that the CFR by itself is not leading the United States into a global government. Furthermore, the members of the CFR do not always monolithically agree. For example, during ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the summer of 1997, members of the CFR both agreed with and disagreed with the CWC. What the Council is, is an elite organization with direct influence over Public Policy whose members also control many multinational corporations and media outlets.

APPENDIX E
AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY RESTORATION ACT OF 1997

FILE h1146.ih

HR 1146 IH
105th CONGRESS
1st Session

To provide for complete withdrawal of the United States from United Nations.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 20, 1997

Mr. PAUL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL

To provide for complete withdrawal of the United States from United Nations.

[Italic->] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, [<-Italic]

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the 'American Sovereignty Restor Act of 1997'.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT.

(a) REPEAL- The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Law 79-264) is repealed.

(b) CLOSURE OF UNITED STATES MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS- E Within 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act the United States Mission to the United Nations shall be closed and remaining functions of such office shall not be carried out.

(c) NOTICE- The Secretary of State shall notify the United Nations of the withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. REPEAL OF UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT ACT

(a) REPEAL- The United Nations Headquarters Agreement Act (Law 80-357) is repealed.

(b) WITHDRAWAL- Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act, the United States withdraws from the agreement between the United States and the United Nations regarding the headquarters of the United Nations (signed at Lake Success, New York, on July 1947, which was brought into effect by the United Nations Headquarters Agreement Act).

(c) NOTICE- The Secretary of State shall notify the United Nations that the United States has unilaterally withdrawn from the agreement between the United States of America and the United Nations regarding the headquarters of the United Nations as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 4. UNITED STATES ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS.

(a) TERMINATION- No funds are authorized to be appropriated otherwise made available for assessed or voluntary contributions to the United States to the United Nations.

(b) APPLICATION- The provisions of this section shall apply to all agencies of the United Nations, including independent and voluntary agencies.

SEC. 5. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

(a) TERMINATION- No funds are authorized to be appropriated otherwise made available for any United States contribution to United Nations military operations.

(b) TERMINATIONS OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS- No funds may be obligated or expended to support the participation of any member of the Armed Forces