Iran's Sea Power Strategy: Goals and Evolution.
Abstract
This thesis examines the intent of Iran's sea power strategy using a multipart analysis including a historical review of the transition of Iran's naval power through the Iranian Revolution, Iran-Iraq War, and post-war buildup; an analysis of Iran's strategic decision-making processes; and factors that dictate this process. The study discovers that Iran's sea power strategy is a definitive component of a coherent national security strategy of Iranian self-defense and strategic deterrence. Iran's uses its credible sea denial capability to threaten the Gulfs oil flow. While not in the Islamic Republic's direct economic interest to actually carry out, the threat of Gulf oil disruption gives Iran significant deterrent and coercive leverage over its competitors. Four factors limit Iran's sea power strategy; its current sea power capability (resident in its naval and air forces), its political construct, domestic socioeconomic pressures, and Iran's historical sense of superiority and isolation. Iran's sea power will contribute to its probable retum as the dominant power in the Gulf and the reassertion of its perceived role as a Pan-Islamic leader in the region. Of significance, Iran is not interested or capable of directly challenging the United States military.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 06, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA331747
Entities
People
- John G. Walker
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College