

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO
THE 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION UNITS EMBARKED
ON THE USS *DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER* (CVN 69),
14-21 SEPTEMBER 1994

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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The study reviews and compares US Army, US Navy, and Joint intelligence support doctrine, both pre-September 1994 and post-September 1994. The intelligence support capabilities of the embarked 10th Mountain Division units and the *Eisenhower* are examined. Interviews provided background on planning activity, operations, and intelligence support conducted between the embarkation and debarkation of the 10th Mountain Division units.

The study concludes that the naval intelligence support provided by the *Eisenhower* to the embarked 10th Mountain Division units was very effective.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
APPROVAL PAGE.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iv
LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	vii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	1
2. DOCTRINE.....	24
3. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CAPABILITIES.....	37
4. OPERATIONS.....	44
5. ANALYSIS.....	54
6. THE FUTURE AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	65
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	70
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	75

TABLES

<u>Table</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Characteristics of Effective Intelligence Prior to September 1994	27
2. Intelligence Tasks Prior to September 1994	28
3. Principles of Intelligence Post-September 1994	29
4. Characteristics of Effective Intelligence Post-September 1994 and Navy Attributes of Intelligence Quality	31
5. Primary Army Intelligence Tasks and Functions of Naval Intelligence Post-September 1994	32

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After-action report
AIC	Atlantic Intelligence Command
AJFP	Adaptive Joint Force Package
AO	Area of operations
AOR	Area of responsibility
APS	Afloat Planning System
ASARS	Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System
ATTP	United States Atlantic Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
BDA	Battle damage assessment
BGPHESES	Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System
C2W	Command and control warfare
C3I	Command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4I	Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CHBDL	Common High Band Data Link
CI	Counterintelligence
CINC	Commander-in-chief
CINCLANTFLT	Commander-in-chief, Atlantic Fleet
COA	Course of action
COMNAVAIRLANT	Commander, US Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force

CNN	Cable News Network
CSP	Contingency support package
CT	Cryptologic technician
CV	Aircraft carrier
CVIC	Carrier intelligence center
CVN	Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
CVW	Carrier air wing
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISNET	Defense Information Systems Network
DOD	Department of Defense
DS	Direct support
DSN	Defense Switched Network
EW	Electronic warfare
FM	Field Manual
FRAPH	Front for the Progress and Advancement of Haiti
GOB	Ground order of battle
GRG	Gridded reference graphic
GS	General schedule
HUMINT	Human intelligence
I&W	Indications and warning
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
IEW	Intelligence and electronic warfare
IMINT	Imagery intelligence
INTREP	Intelligence report

IPB	Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IS	Intelligence specialist
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JMCIS	Joint Maritime Command Information System
JOA	Joint operations area
JP	Joint Publication
JSIPS-N	Joint Services Imagery Processing System-Navy
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance and Targeting System
JTF	Joint Task Force
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LHA	Amphibious Assault Ship
LHD	Amphibious Assault Ship
LOCE	Linked Operations-Intelligence Center Europe
LZ	Landing zone
MASINT	Measurement and signature intelligence
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MI	Military intelligence
MMAS	Master of Military Art and Science
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOS	Military occupation specialty
MSR	Main supply route
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	Naval Doctrine Publication

NIEWS	Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat Imagery Exploitation Work Station
NTSC-A	Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat
OAS	Organization of American States
OpIntel	Operational intelligence
OPLAN	Operations plan
OPORD	Operations order
OSINT	Open source intelligence
PIR	Priority intelligence requirement
RFI	Request for information
ROE	Rules of engagement
SCI	Special compartmented information
SIGINT	Signal intelligence
SITREP	Situation report
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSCTV	Ship's closed-circuit television
SSES	Ship's Signal Exploitation Space
STIC	Strike tactical intelligence cell
Supplot	Supplemental plot
T-MDS	Tomahawk mission display system
TAC	Tactical analysis cell
TAMPS	Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System
TECHINT	Technical intelligence

TOC	Tactical operations center
TOPSCENE	Tactical Operational Preview Scene
TTP	Tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle
UN	United Nations
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
VLDS	Very large data storage

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW,
AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis concerns US Navy aircraft carrier-based intelligence capabilities and their capability to support US Army operational and military intelligence units during contingency operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Specifically, this research project will attempt to answer the following question: Did the 10th Mountain Division units embarked on the USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69) en route to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY receive satisfactory tactical intelligence and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) support from the *Eisenhower*'s carrier intelligence center (CVIC) to perform their initial missions after debarkation?

Background

On 18 April 1942, Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle's B-25s made history as they launched off the pitching deck of the USS *Hornet* (CV 8) to conduct a bombing raid on Japan. That historical event was the first US Army Air Forces assault to launch from a US Navy ship. Over 52 years later on 19 September 1994, elements of the 10th Mountain Division also made history as they launched off the deck of the USS *Eisenhower* to conduct a brigade assault on objectives in Haiti. This event was the first Army air assault force to be launched from a Navy ship in a real-world contingency.¹

This innovative pairing of Army and Navy assets for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was a result of a two-year experimental history.² In the 1992 *National Military Strategy*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, USA, laid the foundation for a US military strategy that did not need to address containment of the Soviet Union, but had to address the uncertainty and instability of a rapidly changing world with a much smaller force.³ He further called for regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) to form “appropriately tailored joint task forces [JTFs]” to respond to crises.⁴ These JTFs must bring to bear unique and complimentary capabilities of each of the services at the right time and right place to be successful.⁵ The US Armed Forces developed an adaptive joint force package (AJFP) concept to help meet the success requirements. The object of the AJFP concept is to maintain a sizable forward presence by drawing upon forces based in the continental US from all the services for rotational overseas deployments. Each AJFP is tailored to meet the needs of the supported regional CINC. The full-force package includes backup “surge” units that train with the deploying element of the force prior to its deployment and then remain stateside unless ordered to deploy by the regional CINCs for exercises or crisis response.⁶

United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) experimented with the concept by putting different capabilities aboard US Navy aircraft carriers on four separate occasions prior to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The first two experiments with the AJFP involved embarkation of Marine units aboard deploying aircraft carriers. The third and fourth experiments involved embarkation of small US Army units during predeployment training exercises. A 200-Marine-reinforced rifle company and ten helicopters (600 Marines total) embarked on the USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN 71) for a Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Gulf deployment in March 1993. To accommodate the marine units, *Roosevelt* displaced its F-14 and S-3 squadrons. Later in 1993, USS *America* (CV 66) deployed to the Mediterranean Sea with a portion of the Marine

Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The third experiment involved a special operations forces (SOF) command and control element and a Space Command support team embarkation on the USS *Saratoga* (CV 60) to conduct predeployment training prior to the *Saratoga*'s deployment. In March 1994, a US Army Ranger company and its support helicopters conducted training missions aboard the USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) prior to the *Washington*'s Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Gulf deployment.⁷

The initial full test of the AJFP concept was scheduled to be JTF 95, which was centered on the *Eisenhower* and its air wing, when it deployed in October 1994. Air Force and Army Ranger units were scheduled to deploy to overseas bases during the *Eisenhower*'s deployment. As part of the AJFP concept, the *Eisenhower* Battle Group exercised with Air Force B-1 units and the 82d Airborne Division's ready brigade during its predeployment work-ups during the spring and summer of 1994. The battle group was in the initial phases of its last predeployment exercise when the *Eisenhower* was called upon to participate in what became Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

By the summer of 1994, the situation in Haiti suggested military force might be required to achieve US strategic objectives in the region. The Haitian crisis provided the requirement to operationally test the new AJFP concept before JTF 95's deployment. The previous AFJP concept experiments and the fact that Haiti was in USACOM's area of responsibility, heavily influenced the pairing of the *Eisenhower* and the 10th Mountain Division and SOF and the *America*. In response to the possible requirement for military force, USACOM directed 10th Mountain Division to create JTF-190 and develop a contingency plan for the deployment of several thousand soldiers into Haiti to provide an environment conducive to the return of Haiti's legitimate government and for US government agencies, nongovernment agencies, relief organizations, and coalition forces.⁸ The proposed entry plan was Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370

named Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY and the unopposed entry plan was OPLAN 2380 called UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.⁹

For the initial phase of JTF-190's plan to be successful, the immediate presence of overwhelming US ground forces was required. In order for these forces to quickly respond en masse, a unique marriage between the Army and the Navy was consummated as part of the AJFP. The plan called for a large number of US Army helicopters from the 10th Mountain Division's Aviation Brigade to be positioned on a Navy aircraft carrier in order to air assault an infantry brigade combat team into Haiti. The aviation brigade received the warning order during the first week of August 1994 and immediately initiated deck-landing training qualifications on the *Roosevelt*. The brigade's UH-60, AH-1, and OH-58 pilots had been trained for ships with a single helicopter spot, such as cruisers, destroyers, or frigates. The pilots trained on *Roosevelt's* deck for four days and nights, resulting in more than 1,200 landings, one-half of which were night-vision goggle assisted night landings. As that training was ongoing, a team established liaison aboard the *America*, which had been initially identified as the assault launch platform. By the end of August, the launch platform was identified not as the *America*, but the *Eisenhower*. The SOF would launch from the *America*. The brigade was alerted on 10 September to self-deploy to Norfolk, Virginia to embark on the *Eisenhower*. On 11 September, all of Carrier Air Wing THREE's fixed-wing aircraft flew off the *Eisenhower* to make room for the alerted Army units. The *Eisenhower* moored at Norfolk Naval Base on the following day. Once moored, the *Eisenhower* immediately began to off-load air wing material and on-load 10th Mountain Division material. On 14 September, the 10th Mountain Division's Aviation Brigade, elements of the 57th Medical Evacuation Company, a contingent from the Army Component Headquarters, 1-87th and 2-22d Infantry Battalions, and the 10th Mountain Division's 1st Brigade Headquarters departed

Norfolk aboard the *Eisenhower* en route to Haiti to execute Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY.¹⁰

While embarked, the 10th Mountain Division units were unable to use their organic intelligence support assets. They required intelligence support from the *Eisenhower*'s CVIC to provide IPB data, mission planning, and tactical intelligence to their commanders. Since Operation DESERT STORM, naval intelligence shipboard capabilities have been significantly improved and continue to improve with the addition of several new mission planning, communications, and intelligence systems. Shipboard intelligence capabilities to support embarked or ashore US Army units are infrequently tested.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

An understanding of the background of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is also needed to answer the research question. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is the catch-all reference to the US government's interventions into Haitian affairs, which resulted in President Jean Bertrand Aristide's resumption of power and humanitarian relief to the Haitian people on 15 October 1994.¹¹

Haiti occupies one-third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola (which it shares with the Dominican Republic) and several offshore islands. It has a long history of political, economic, and military chaos. The United States has frequently been involved in this tiny nation's affairs since its independence in 1804. Between 1849 and 1913, US Navy ships entered Haitian waters 24 times to protect US lives and property. United States Marines were next to serve in Haiti. They were sent to stabilize the tiny nation and enforce foreign debt obligations in 1915. President Franklin D. Roosevelt withdrew the forces in 1934. During their 19-year occupation, the Marines assisted with road improvements, formed a National Guard,¹² and witnessed two civil wars between two competing factions in Haiti.¹³

In 1957, a black nationalist Dr. Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier was elected President, where he remained until his death in April 1971. Duvalier resolved to end the mulatto minority's political and economic power, which they had firmly held since the US occupation. He also sought to limit the traditional influence of the military, the Roman Catholic Church, and the US on the Haitian people. He created the National Security Volunteers (popularly known as the Tontons Macoutes, a Creole expression for "Bogeymen") to undermine the power-hungry Army. Duvalier later purged the Army. His rule degenerated into violence and killings, particularly of mulattos.¹⁴

Upon his death in April 1971, Duvalier bequeathed his power to his son Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier. Rival factions kept him in office as a pliable arbiter of their quarrels. The US supported his rule for anti-Castro interests. Repression, food riots, political revolts, and condemnation for more reprisal killings by the Tonton Macoutes combined to end the Duvalier's reign of power in Haiti. In February 1986, the US assisted President Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier to flee Haiti after a series of popular uprisings.¹⁵

Upon Duvalier's departure, a military junta led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy assumed control with US and leading Duvalierists approval. Namphy disbanded the Tonton Macoutes and restored freedom of expression. However, repression and mass killings returned to Haiti under Namphy. Elections were held in January 1988, Leslie Manigat became president. Namphy resumed control in June 1988 after Manigat attempted to dismiss Namphy as the commander of the Army. Namphy, himself was overthrown by the Army in September 1988, bringing Lieutenant General Prosper Avril to power. In March 1990, Avril was forced to resign by the US and a united opposition and Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal-Trouillot was the leader of the interim government.¹⁶

Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected president in Haiti's first fully free elections in December 1990. In February 1990, Aristide became president and vowed to make many changes, including putting the military under civilian control. He named Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras as commander in chief of the army. Aristide was ousted by a Cedras-led military coup in September 1991, resulting in an Organization of American States (OAS)-imposed trade embargo on Haiti.¹⁷ By 1992, the impact of the deluge of Haitian "boat people" and Haiti's use as a drug transshipment country began to concern the US President George Bush's administration.¹⁸ In July 1993, Aristide and Cedras signed a United Nations (UN)/OAS-brokered agreement calling for Aristide to return as President in Haiti by 30 October 1993, early retirement of Cedras, and the lifting of UN and OAS sanctions. USS *Harlan County* (LST 1196) with 200 US troops of a UN peacekeeping force onboard was prevented from landing in Port-au-Prince by Haitian military supporters in October 1993. The ship's departure was interpreted by Cedras as a major victory.¹⁹ Following this event, Cedras reneged on his agreement²⁰ and the UN authorized a blockade of Haiti by US warships. By the summer of 1994, the "boat people" issue, a sense of humanitarian obligation, and the President Bill Clinton's administration's national strategy objective of strengthening democracies²¹ called for military action. The UN Security Council authorized use of force on 31 July 1994, clearing the way for a US-led invasion.²²

On 18 September 1994, Clinton signed the order authorizing the execution of Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, and combat troops of the US Army's 82d Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, North Carolina for opposed-entry operations into Haiti. Eleventh hour diplomatic and political maneuvering by an ad hoc negotiating team, including former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and retired General Powell, convinced Cedras to step down and permit President Aristide to return to take his rightful position as president, thereby preventing armed conflict. The commander-in-chief USACOM ordered the already airborne 82d Airborne

Division troops to return to Fort Bragg and ordered the 10th Mountain Division to conduct unopposed air landings at the Port-au-Prince International Airport and Port-au-Prince Port Facility under Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY's military mission has been correctly classified as an MOOTW and characterized by peace enforcement operations.²³

Intelligence

Intelligence is defined as the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.²⁴ "Commanders require intelligence as a tool to evaluate the feasibility of, or determine risk factors associated with, objectives, plan and direct operations, and evaluate the effects of their actions."²⁵ "The commander and his forces must have a clear understanding of what intelligence can and cannot provide, and how it will support the operation."²⁶

As with the levels of war, there are three levels of intelligence support: strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic intelligence supports the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. Operational intelligence supports campaign planning and operations to accomplish strategic operations within regional theaters or areas of operations. Tactical intelligence supports planning and operations at the component or unit level.²⁷

Intelligence sources are the means or systems used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events. There are seven primary intelligence source types: imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), and counterintelligence (CI).²⁸

“Intelligence operations are the organized efforts of a commander to gather and analyze information on the environment of operations and the adversary.”²⁹ During an MOOTW such as Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, intelligence assists commanders to decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost.³⁰

The effectiveness of intelligence is measured against the following standards: timeliness, objectivity, usability, readiness, completeness, accuracy, and relevance.³¹ Intelligence must be available and accessible in time to effectively use it. Next, it must be unbiased, undistorted, and free from political influence or constraint. The form in which intelligence is provided to the commander must be suitable for application upon receipt without additional analysis. Intelligence organizations must anticipate and be ready to respond to the existing and contingent intelligence requirements of the commanders, staff, and forces at all levels of command. Commanders, staffs, and forces must receive all the intelligence available to meet their responsibilities and accomplish their mission. Intelligence must be factually correct and convey the situation as it actually exists. Finally, it must contribute to an understanding of the situation, to determining objectives that will accomplish the commander’s purposes and intents, and to planning, conducting, and evaluating operations.

Scope

In order to answer the primary and subordinate research questions, the scope of this thesis project will include a review of pre- and post-Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Joint, US Army, and US Navy doctrine; a review of the embarked 10th Mountain Division unit’s and the *Eisenhower*’s intelligence support capabilities and activities during the specified time; a review of operations conducted by the 10th Mountain Division units that were embarked on the *Eisenhower* activities during the specified time; a comparative analysis of the existing intelligence support

doctrine and capabilities versus operations; and a review of present and future deployable US Army and US Navy intelligence support capabilities. The project will conclude with a determination of the effectiveness of the *Eisenhower*'s intelligence capabilities to support the embarked 10th Mountain Division units en route to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. This project will examine the seven days that the 10th Mountain Division units were embarked on the *Eisenhower* and the first day of deployed Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY operations (14-21 September 1994).

Importance

This research is important because it seeks to identify positive and other feedback on the naval intelligence support to embarked and disembarked US Army units during the first operational US Army and US Navy AJFP. The embarkation of units from the 10th Mountain Division on the *Eisenhower* en route to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY during September 1994 was a historic first. It also provides an excellent opportunity to examine the effectiveness of post-Operation DESERT STORM naval intelligence systems and capabilities to support US Army units deploying in military contingency operations and MOOTW as an AJFP. Additionally, this project may reveal differences in US Navy and US Army intelligence support doctrine and in application of that doctrine and may suggest new intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures. This thesis will also assist planners and decision makers in tailoring future AJFPs.

Primary Research Question

The background and situation as described above lead to the following primary question: Did the 10th Mountain Division units embarked on the *Eisenhower* en route to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY receive satisfactory tactical intelligence and IPB support from the *Eisenhower*'s CVIC to perform their initial missions after debarkation? Some of the principal

subordinate questions which must be addressed in this thesis include questions of doctrine, capabilities, operations, and the future.

Doctrine: What were the doctrinal differences or application variations between US Army and US Navy intelligence support to their respective warfighters? Was there a culture clash? What doctrinal changes have been implemented in US Army and US Navy intelligence support to their respective warfighters?

Capabilities: What were the embarked 10th Mountain Division units' intelligence support capabilities 14-20 September 1994? What were the *Eisenhower* CVIC's intelligence support capabilities 14-20 September 1994? Were the embarked 10th Mountain Division units' and the *Eisenhower* CVIC's intelligence support capabilities tasked 14-20 September 1994?

Operations: What intelligence support was required by the embarked 10th Mountain Division units en route to Haiti 14-20 September 1994? What intelligence support was provided to the embarked 10th Mountain Division units en route to Haiti by the *Eisenhower* CVIC 14-20 September 1994? What military operations did the debarked 10th Mountain Division units conduct in Haiti 19-21 September 1994? Did the *Eisenhower's* CVIC support the debarked 10th Mountain Division units after 20 September? What was the key(s) to success or failure of the support provided?

Future: How does the answer to the primary research question affect future operations of this type? Have current or will future budgeted intelligence support capabilities affect future operations of this type?

Key Terminology Definitions

The terms listed below require definitions to ensure a clear understanding of this thesis.

Anaglyph. An anaglyph is a computer-generated, three-dimensional (3-D) image produced from a single image. It is viewed through 3-D glasses.

Collection Management. Collection management is the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing, tasking, or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as required.³²

Contingency Support Package (CSP). A CSP is a detailed imagery and textual data product that supports counterterrorism operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). These packages are produced to support regional CINCs' contingency plans.

Front for the Progress and Advancement of Haiti (FRAPH). The FRAPH was a paramilitary organization allied with the Cedras Regime.³³

Fusion. It is the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity.³⁴

Gridded Reference Graphic (GRG). A GRG is an unrectified image with an arbitrary grid on top with alphanumeric to allow open discussions of an operations area.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The IPB is the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support the staff estimate and military decision making process. Most military intelligence requirements are generated as a result of the IPB process and its interrelation with the decision-making process.³⁵

Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). A JDISS is a division and corps level intelligence data processing and dissemination set. This set allows analysts to import, export, and manage SIGINT, topographic, collateral, and national systems data bases and messages through various workstations.³⁶

Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). A JIC is the intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The JIC is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to

support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community.³⁷

Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS). The JMCIS provides a single integrated, scaleable command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system through: a standardized human machine interface; reduced proliferation of special purpose equipment; standardized logistic support; and the availability of a universal computer program for all locations onboard. Applications include: intelligence; imagery; tactical information management; message handling; track database reporting; mapping, charting, and geodesy; tactical decision aids; track correlation; electronic warfare support; employment scheduling; environmental support; combat support information management; and navigation support.³⁸

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS). A JWICS provides a secure, high-speed, multimedia capability including video teleconferencing.³⁹ Each node can create, receive, transmit, and store video images, as well as voice, text, graphics, and data. It is an integral part of the sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information Systems Network (DISNET).⁴⁰

Mensuration. It is the application of geometry to the computation of lengths, areas, or volumes from given dimensions or angles.⁴¹

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). They are military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.⁴²

Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A). It is the Navy's primary afloat command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) tactical information management system within the JMCIS architecture.⁴³

NTCS-A Imagery Exploitation Work Station (NIEWS). It is the hardware and software within NTCS-A designed to support strike planning, intelligence analysis, battle damage assessment (BDA), etc.

NIEWS provides a softcopy workstation with the capability to perform detailed mensuration on displayed image products, provides selective expansion of images from magnetic media (VLDS [very large data storage] cassettes, 8 millimeter tapes, etc.), and enables graphic overlay and annotation in the NTCS-A (JMCIS) architecture. NIEWS serves the purpose of providing: a transition of the precise mensuration capability from hardcopy film to the digital workstation; image library functionality for database image products and associated image support data; and preparation of registered image products for use in image exploitation and all-source analysis.⁴⁴

Operational Intelligence (OpIntel). It is the intelligence required for planning operations within regional theaters or areas of operations. It concentrates on intelligence collection, identification, location, and analysis to support the operational level of warfare, which includes identifying an adversary's operational critical vulnerabilities. Further, it assists the commander in deciding how best to employ forces while minimizing risk.⁴⁵

Opposed Entry. An opposed entry is the deployment of military forces into an area that requires combat operations to land the forces.⁴⁶

Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR). A PIR is an intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will affect the overall success of the command's mission.⁴⁷

Strategic Intelligence. It is the intelligence required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels.⁴⁸

Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS). A TAMPS is a mission planning system that utilizes preloaded data bases to determine geography, aircraft types, and current

threats to develop a planned route for US Navy and Marine Corps fixed and rotary wing aircraft to fly to accomplish its assigned mission.⁴⁹

Tactical Intelligence. It is the intelligence required for planning and conducting tactical operations at the component or unit level. It focuses on a potential adversary's capabilities, his immediate intentions, and the environment. It is oriented more toward combat than long-range planning.⁵⁰

Tactical Operational Preview Scene (TOPSCENE). A TOPSCENE is a mission rehearsal system that uses two-dimensional imagery and digital terrain data to present a realistic two- or three-dimensional scene of potential combat area.⁵¹ It gives the pilot an opportunity to become familiar with the terrain associated to a mission area, designate targets, and fly routes to the target.⁵²

Target Materials. They are graphic, textual, tabular, digital, video, or other presentations of target intelligence, primarily designed to support operations against designated targets by one or more weapons system(s). Target materials are suitable for training, planning, executing, and evaluating military operations.⁵³

Unopposed Entry. It is the peaceful deployment of military forces into an area with the assistance of the host nation.⁵⁴

Literature Review

No works that specifically addressed the primary research question were found. However, several publications were helpful in regard to the thesis subordinate research questions. Those publications include: doctrine (Joint, Army, and Navy), operational documents (Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), USACOM, and JTF-190), interviews, a scholarly work (MMAS thesis), books, magazines, and periodicals.

Doctrine

The first research step required a thorough review of Joint, US Army, and US Navy operations and intelligence doctrine. This focused on several doctrinal publications: Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, provided a foundation for joint operations and MOOTW. The 1993 and 1995 versions of Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, and USACOM Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (U) provided a joint intelligence foundation. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, provided a basic foundation for offensive operations, MOOTW, and intelligence requirements. Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, provided the foundation for the US Army IPB. The 1987 and 1994 versions of Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, provided the foundation for US Army intelligence doctrine. The Army made significant changes to FM 34-1 to better mirror joint intelligence doctrine. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, provided the basic foundation for naval offensive, MOOTW, and intelligence requirements. The Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence; Naval Component Intelligence Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NCITTP); Commander, US Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force Instruction 3800.4B, Organization, Duties and Training of Intelligence, Cryptologic and Photographic Personnel, USS Theodore Roosevelt Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TRTTP): A Consumer's Guide to the Intelligence Support from the CVIC Aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt; and Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE Instruction 3800.1F, Carrier Air Wing THREE Intelligence Team Organization and Responsibilities, provided the foundation for US Navy intelligence doctrine and IPB.

Operational Documents

The CALL provided the majority of source material for this category. These sources included logs, facsimiles, and digitized OPLANs, operation orders (OPORDs), situation reports (SITREPs), after-action reports (AARs), commander's briefing slides, graphic operational overlays, and intelligence reports (INTREPs). Much of the data was classified information; however, there was a sufficient amount of data at the unclassified level to conduct provide excellent source material for this project.

The CALL-produced Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions, Volume I, provided a historical chronology of Haiti as well as information concerning US Army assessments of and lessons learned from military actions en route and in Haiti. Volume I of the three volume set contained D-20 to D+40 information. This volume contained all of the *Eisenhower*-related data and all of the data applicable to this thesis. Volumes II and III were not applicable to this thesis and were not used.

Related Scholarly Works

The Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis "The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY" was invaluable during the early stages of this project. Its parallel theme assisted with the background information, a research model, and the bibliography development.

Books, Magazines, and Periodicals

In this media category, professional periodicals were the most fruitful. Several magazine and periodical journal articles provided background in operations and intelligence in general, as well as others that documented other aspects of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Several periodical articles addressed future intelligence capabilities and doctrine, and intelligence support

assessment criteria. The 1992 and 1995 versions of the National Military Strategy provided insight into the Department of Defense's vision on MOOTW and force projection. Jane's Simulation and Training Systems and Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center's Afloat Intelligence Systems were beneficial for intelligence support system references.

Interviews

Interviews were the key to the success of this project. They filled the many gaps in research requirements left by the limited published material on the subject matter. The former 10th Mountain Division Aviation Brigade commander, executive officer, and S2, who were Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY participants, furnished essential Army aviation operations and intelligence support capabilities, reviews, insights, and assessments. The former 10th Mountain Division 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team commander and S2 also provided valuable ground element operations and intelligence support capabilities, reviews, and assessments. The former *Eisenhower* intelligence officer and reservist, who were Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY participants contributed essential naval intelligence support capabilities, reviews, and accounts. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel provided valuable information on the type and amount of national support that DIA afforded the *Eisenhower* and the 10th Mountain Division units. They also provided valuable insight on request for information (RFI) problems that were experienced during the transit.

Research Methodology

A five-part plan was used to complete this research project. Part one consisted of a review of scholarly works, periodicals, and operational documentation; interviews of US Navy and US Army personnel involved with the initial 10th Mountain Division Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY operations and the *Eisenhower* intelligence support; and a comparative review of

intelligence support doctrine. Part two consisted of a review of the full range of intelligence support capabilities onboard the *Eisenhower* and within the embarked-US Army units. Part three was concerned with the accurate recording of the initial operational missions, dispositions, and activities of the debarked units and the *Eisenhower*. Part four answered the primary research question with a comparison analysis of intelligence support doctrine, available intelligence support capabilities, and operations of the debarked units. Finally, part five consisted of a review present and future deployable US Army and US Navy intelligence support capabilities.

Part One

The broad questions were: What were the doctrinal differences among Joint, US Army, and US Navy intelligence support to their respective warfighters? Were there any doctrinal application variations?

Part Two

The broad question was: What were the *Eisenhower* CVIC's and the embarked 10th Mountain Division units' intelligence support capabilities 14-20 September 1994, to include intelligence support systems and manpower?

Part Three

The specific questions were: What military operations did the debarked 10th Mountain Division units conduct in Haiti 19-21 September 1994? What intelligence support was requested by the embarked 10th Mountain Division units en route Haiti 14-20 September 1994? What intelligence support was provided to the embarked 10th Mountain Division units by the *Eisenhower* CVIC? What operations did *Eisenhower* conduct after the debarkation of the 10th Mountain Division units? And, what intelligence support was provided to the debarked 10th Mountain Division units by the *Eisenhower* CVIC?

Part Four

Completion of this part required the completion of the preceding steps in the research design. At the conclusion of part four, the primary research question, did the *Eisenhower*-embarked 10th Mountain Division units en route to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY receive satisfactory intelligence support from CVIC to perform their initial missions, was answered. To answer the question, the actions of the embarked 10th Mountain Division units and the *Eisenhower*'s CVIC were assessed against four criteria. First, did embarked units request valid priority intelligence requirements (PIR) from CVIC? Second, did CVIC have the intelligence support capability to provide the required intelligence? Third, did CVIC answer the PIRs? And lastly, were the embarked commanders happy with the intelligence support provided to them?

Part Five

The broad questions were: How does the answer to the primary research question affect future operations of this type? And, have current or will future budgeted intelligence support capabilities affect future operations of this type?

¹Douglas Ide, "Flying Into the History Books," Soldiers 49, no. 11 (November 1994): 16.

²Donna Miles, "Upholding Democracy in Haiti," Soldiers 49, no. 11 (November 1994): 5.

³Department of Defense, National Military Strategy (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992), foreward.

⁴National Military Strategy, 17-18.

⁵Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 14.

⁶Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Breaking the Mold: US Atlantic Command Forges New Joint Force Packages," Armed Forces Journal International 131, no. 10 (May 1994): 12.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Lawrence E. Casper, "Flexibility, Reach, and Muscle: How Army Helicopters on a Navy Carrier Succeeded in Haiti," Armed Forces Journal International 132, no. 6 (January 1995): 40-41.

⁹Department of the Army, TRADOC, Haiti History Team Chronology: 1 September-30 September 1994 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1995), 16-17. CALL data base.

¹⁰Casper.

¹¹Martin I. Urquhart, "The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY" (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 5-6.

¹²The Christian Science Monitor, 21 September 1994.

¹³Department of the Army, TRADOC, Operation Uphold Democracy, Initial Impressions, vol. I, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1994), xi.

¹⁴Greg Chamberlain, "Haiti: History," in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean 1995, 5th ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1994), 375.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., 376.

¹⁷Operation Uphold Democracy, Initial Impressions, xi.

¹⁸William W. Mendel, "The Haiti Contingency," Military Review 74, no. 1 (January 1994): 48-49.

¹⁹Chamberlain, 376.

²⁰Operation Uphold Democracy, Initial Impressions, xiii-xvii.

²¹Mendel, 48-49.

²²The Christian Science Monitor.

²³Urquhart, 5-6.

²⁴Department of Defense, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terminology (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), 223.

²⁵Department of the Navy, NDP 2, Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), 7.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Department of Defense, JP 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), vii.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., viii.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., IV-15.

³²JP 1-02, 95.

³³Operation Uphold Democracy, Initial Impressions, xix.

³⁴JP 1-02, 187.

³⁵US Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), G-7.

³⁶US Army, FM 34-10-2, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Equipment Handbook (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 1-53.

³⁷JP 1-02, 174.

³⁸John Williamson, ed., Jane's Military Communications, 16th ed. (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, Inc., 1994), 890.

³⁹Carl Dominic, "XVIII Airborne Corps Intelligence Architecture in Haiti," Military Intelligence 2 (April-June 1995): 13.

⁴⁰JP 2-0, VII-5 and VII-6.

⁴¹Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1981), s.v. "mensuration."

⁴²US Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), G-6.

⁴³Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, Afloat Intelligence Systems (Dam Neck, VA: Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, 1994), 9.

⁴⁴Ibid., 21.

⁴⁵NDP 2, 6.

⁴⁶FM 100-5, 3-10.

⁴⁷U. S. Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), G-7.

⁴⁸JP 2-0, II-1.

⁴⁹Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, 12.

⁵⁰NDP 2, 6.

⁵¹Ian W. Strachan, ed., Jane's Simulation and Training Systems, 8th ed. (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, Inc., 1995), 414.

⁵²USS *Theodore Roosevelt*, USS Theodore Roosevelt Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TRTTP): A Consumer's Guide to the Intelligence Support from the CVIC Aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (USS *Theodore Roosevelt*, 1995), E-8.

⁵³JP 1-02, 433.

⁵⁴FM 100-5, 3-10.

CHAPTER 2

DOCTRINE REVIEW

One of the essential elements of this research was to examine and compare Navy, Army, and joint doctrine. Doctrine is the starting point for developing solutions and options to address specific warfighting demands and military operations other than war (MOOTW) challenges. Doctrine is conceptual. It is a shared way of thinking. It is not directive. However, it must be uniformly known and understood to be useful.¹

The Navy for many years was chided for its lack of doctrine. However, it relied upon its command instructions, notes, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) as its doctrine. The instructions, notes, and SOPs were not uniform across the entire service. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, Naval Intelligence, was signed on 30 September 1994. Its draft form had been available to higher echelons prior to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, but not to the USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69) intelligence personnel. The Commander-in-Chief (CINC), US Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) and Commander, US Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force (COMNAVAIRLANT) are both the *Eisenhower*'s and its air wing's administrative commanders. The *Eisenhower* followed the intelligence support guidance as directed by the applicable US Atlantic Fleet and Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Commanders' instructions.

The Army has had developed doctrine for years and routinely revised it. The current version of Field Manual (FM) 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, was approved on 27 September 1994. It replaced the 2 July 1987 version that was current during the

examined time for this thesis. The 1993 version of FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations, was also applicable to the operation.

Joint doctrine has come into its own since the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, was signed out 12 October 1993. Like the FM, it was superseded on 5 May 1995. The USACOM Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) for Joint Intelligence Support produced by the Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) also served as a source of joint doctrine. It has been replaced with a newer version as well. The US Atlantic Command credited much of the intelligence success for Haiti operations to the fact that joint task forces (JTFs) used a common document like the intelligence cookbook [ATTP].²

This project required the examination of doctrine for operations and intelligence support in both wartime and MOOTW. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was a MOOTW. The MOOTW "principles are an extension of warfighting doctrine."³ Planning for MOOTW is similar to planning for war; however, nonmilitary topics, such as politics, culture, economics, and demographics, may require more focus. An appreciation for all potential threats is important to both planning processes. Force protection is the primary focus of intelligence assets in MOOTW.⁴ Military intelligence systems should be single structures for warfighting support and be able to provide intelligence support for any military operation throughout the range of military operations, including MOOTW.⁵ Intelligence and information gathering for MOOTW needs to be multi-disciplined and utilize all-source, fused intelligence.⁶

The levels of war--strategic, operational, and tactical--apply to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY as much as they do to a full-scale operation, such as DESERT STORM. The levels of intelligence are directly related to the levels of war and overlap one another like the levels of war. Operational intelligence provides the vital link between strategic objectives and

tactical employment of military force. Tactical operations are executed to achieve operational results. Tactical intelligence provides commanders with the support in order to achieve those results.⁷

Doctrine Comparison

Many of the lessons learned from Operation DESERT STORM were incorporated into that existing doctrine and the Navy's emerging doctrine in 1994. There were significant changes made to FM 34-1 to better conform to joint doctrine as well as in the FM's format. Due to the doctrinal transition period, this research project examined both the doctrine that was in effect prior to September 1994 as well as the post-September 1994 doctrine. As a review of the Army and Navy intelligence support doctrines, a comparison of missions, intelligence principles, characteristics and attributes of effective intelligence, and primary intelligence tasks and functions was made. It was also important to examine how each service interpreted and acted on its own and joint doctrine.

Comparison of Intelligence Support Doctrines Prior to September 1994

Neither the 1987 version of FM 34-1 nor the 1993 COMNAVAIRLANT Instruction 3800.4B, Organization, Duties and Training of Intelligence, Cryptologic and Photographic Personnel, specified any overarching intelligence principles and characteristics. The central intelligence principle in the 1987 FM 34-1, the 1993 FM 34-7, the 1993 FM 100-5, Operations, and the 1993 COMNAVAIRLANT Instruction 3800.4B was that the commander drove intelligence and Army intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) or naval intelligence supported the commander.

Mission of Intelligence

The 1987 mission of Army IEW operations was to provide the maneuver commander with intelligence, electronic warfare (EW), and counterintelligence (CI) support.⁸ The IEW mission was expressed differently in FM 34-7 (issued in May 1993). It stated that the IEW mission was "to provide timely, relevant, and accurate support to tactical, operational, and strategic commanders across the range of military operations."⁹ The COMNAVAIRLANT Instruction 3800.4B stated that naval afloat intelligence was required to provide the commander with "high standards of intelligence support to indications and warning (I&W), tactics, and command and control communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems."¹⁰

Characteristics of Effective Intelligence

The Army's characteristics of effective intelligence can be drawn from the 1993 IEW mission statement in FM 34-7 and from FM 100-5. The Navy's characteristics can be drawn from COMNAVAIRLANT Instruction 3800.4B's guidance on individual intelligence officer duties and responsibilities. Both services characteristics of effective intelligence are listed in table 1.

Table 1. Characteristics of Effective Intelligence Prior to September 1994

Army	Navy
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Timely• Relevant• Accurate• Predictive	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Timeliness• Relevance• Accuracy• Usability• Thoroughness• Availability

Sources: US Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 2-12; and Commander, US Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force, COMNAVAIRLANTINST 3800.4B, Organization, Duties and Training of Intelligence, Cryptologic and Photographic Personnel (Norfolk, VA: Commander, Naval Air Forces, US Atlantic Fleet, 1993), Enclosure 2.

Army and Navy intelligence support were measured by relatively the same standards. Navy doctrine added several other attributes. It directs that intelligence must be usable, available, and thorough, when and where needed.¹¹ Army doctrine demands predictability. Intelligence “support to the commander must be anticipatory.”¹²

Intelligence Tasks

The primary tasks of Army IEW were delineated in both the 1987 FM 34-1 and the 1993 FM 34-7. The COMNAVAIRLANT Instruction 3800.4B provided specific guidance to each command, but not any overall intelligence tasks. The Navy’s intelligence tasks can be drawn from COMNAVAIRLANT Instruction 3800.4B’s guidance on individual intelligence officer duties and responsibilities. Both services intelligence tasks are listed in table 2.

Table 2. Intelligence Tasks Prior to September 1994

Army	Navy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Situation Development or Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) • Target Development • EW • Security and Deception • I&W 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Situation Development • I&W • Targeting • Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) • Intelligence Information Management • Force Protection

Sources: US Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1987), 2-10; and Commander, US Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force, COMNAVAIRLANTINST 3800.4B, Organization, Duties and Training of Intelligence, Cryptologic and Photographic Personnel (Norfolk, VA: Commander, Naval Air Forces, US Atlantic Fleet, 1993), Enclosure 2.

There were two differences between the services. The Army incorporated electronic warfare. The Navy added intelligence information management. Security and deception and force protection were determined to be synonymous.

Comparison of Intelligence Support Doctrines Post-September 1994

The current FM 34-1 and NDP 2 specifically address the overarching concepts of the mission of intelligence, intelligence principles, characteristics and attributes of effective intelligence, and primary intelligence tasks and functions.

Mission of Intelligence

The current Army mission statement added “synchronized IEW support”¹³ to the 1993 FM 34-7 version. The 1994 FM 34-1 further states that “in MOOTW, IEW operations support the promotion of peace, the resolution of conflict, and the deterrence of war.”¹⁴ Like Army military intelligence, the purpose of naval intelligence is to support the commander and operating forces (not only naval operating forces).¹⁵ The mission of naval intelligence is to provide “a fused, all-source picture of the battlespace to support operations at sea, from the sea, and ashore.”¹⁶

Intelligence Principles

The principles of intelligence listed in table 3 provide the guidelines for effective intelligence operations.

Table 3. Principles of Intelligence Post-September 1994

Army	Navy
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Commander Drives Intelligence• Intelligence Synchronization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Know the Adversary• The Commander’s Needs are Paramount
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Split-Based Operations• Tactical Tailoring• Broadcast Dissemination	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort• Plan for Combat• Use an All-Source Approach

Sources: US Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), 1-4; and US Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), 14-16.

The initial comparison of the doctrinal principle bullets was misleading. There were more similarities once the doctrine behind the bullets was compared. Both doctrines keyed on supporting the commander during peace, MOOTW, or war. To ensure responsiveness to the information requirements, the commander must focus and integrate his intelligence system. Both identified the need for a common picture of the battlefield and the importance own-service systems that were interoperable with multiple services, other theaters, and national systems. The Army doctrine called for intelligence synchronization, while the Navy wanted to ensure unity of intelligence effort. Although the two terms are not synonymous, their intent was the same, support the commander's objectives. Not identified as a principle by Army doctrine, the all-source-fused intelligence approach was implied. Navy doctrine did not specifically address split-based operations; however, naval and littoral operations almost by definition require split-based intelligence operations.

Subtle differences existed between the doctrines. The Army doctrine did not identify knowledge of the adversary as a principle; however, it is definitely implied by Army doctrine. The Navy neither named tactical tailoring as one of its principles, nor covered it by other principles. The Navy does not provide intelligence personnel to the equivalent level as the Army does. The Navy doctrine promotes more of a multinational intelligence role than the Army's doctrine.

Characteristics of Effective Intelligence

The Army uses the term characteristics of intelligence in its 1994 version of FM 34-1. These characteristics were the same ones that were derived from the 1987 version. The Navy uses the term attributes of intelligence quality. Both terms "offer qualitative objectives for intelligence used to support single service or joint operations and standards against which intelligence activities and products are evaluated."¹⁷ These qualities can sometimes appear as competing

goals. Intelligence must strike a proper balance among the Army characteristics of effective intelligence and Navy attributes of intelligence quality listed in table 4.¹⁸

Table 4. Army Characteristics of Effective Intelligence Post-September 1994 and Navy Attributes of Intelligence Quality

Army	Navy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timely • Relevant • Accurate • Predictive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timeliness • Objectivity • Usability • Availability • Thoroughness • Accuracy • Relevance

Sources: US Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), 2-7; and US Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), 18-20.

As before, Army and Navy intelligence support is measured by relatively the same standards. Navy doctrine added another attribute. It directs that intelligence analysis must be objective, free of influence of bias, distortion, or political constraint.¹⁹

Primary Intelligence Tasks and Functions

Army intelligence doctrinally accomplishes its mission through six primary tasks which produce intelligence synchronized to support the commander's mission and intelligence requirements. The derived products assist the commander in focusing and protecting his combat power.²⁰ Naval intelligence doctrinally imparts thorough knowledge of the situation to the commander through the application of certain basic intelligence functions. The effective incorporation of the tasks and functions listed in table 5 into the intelligence process will produce the highest quality support throughout planning and execution.²¹

Table 5. Primary Army Intelligence Tasks and Functions of Naval Intelligence Post-September 1994

Army	Navy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide I&W • Perform IPB • Perform Situation Development • Perform Target Development and Support to Targeting • Support Force Protection • Perform BDA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPB. • I&W • Situation Development • Targeting • BDA • Intelligence Information Management • Force Protection

Sources: US Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), 2-7 and 2-8; and US Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), 30-37.

This comparison of primary intelligence tasks and functions strongly illustrated the fact that service doctrines were merging into a common doctrine. The Navy continued to make intelligence information management a primary function in its doctrine. It believed that intelligence must be delivered to the user on time and in a usable format. With push-pull information capability, intelligence information management ensures timeliness, availability, and usability of intelligence. It monitors the flow of intelligence from collector to customer, identifies chokepoints and single points of failure across all intelligence cycle activities.²² The Army made an insignificant change. Security and deception were changed to force protection.

Differences

The Army and the Navy agree that EW is an essential component of command and control warfare (C2W).²³ The Navy employs its EW assets differently than the Army. Naval intelligence personnel incorporate EW information and support EW missions, but do not control or manage EW assets as their Army counterparts may. The Navy's signals intelligence (SIGINT) personnel are not "intelligence" personnel. They are cryptologists and a separate community. The

cryptology community works very closely with and may sometimes work directly for the intelligence community. The *Eisenhower's* cryptologists worked for the ship's intelligence officer.

The Navy does not disseminate intelligence in the same manner as the Army.²⁴ Primarily as a result of the Walker espionage case, the Navy more stringently restricted access to classified information than was the custom of the 10th Mountain Division units. Naval intelligence officers are not assigned at each level of organization with duplicate intelligence products. They rely on centrally located intelligence centers ashore and afloat to provide them access to intelligence products. The majority of intelligence products on the *Eisenhower* are centrally located in the carrier intelligence center (CVIC) for all embarked units' use.²⁵

Implementation

The 10th Mountain Division units relied upon the four-phased, intelligence cycle. They implemented the continuous process and focused on the commander's needs and the mission.²⁶ The *Eisenhower* intelligence personnel followed the Navy's "team" concept in order to provide intelligence support to the commanders.²⁷ The primary purpose of the team concept is capitalization on its intelligence manning and organization. The aircraft carrier alone was not, and is not manned to support MOOTW or wartime operations. It relies on the integration of air wing personnel with its personnel to achieve support capability. Manning will be further discussed in chapter 3.

Joint Doctrine

The central intelligence principle, basic intelligence principles, supporting principles, and attributes of intelligence quality were unchanged between the 1993 and 1995 versions of JP 2-0. Naval Doctrine Publication 2 is more closely harmonized with JP 2-0 than is FM 34-1. Both

publications use the same central principle of intelligence and attributes of intelligence quality. The basic and supporting intelligence principles in JP 2-0 are more robust than those listed in either NDP 2 or FM 34-1. The primary intelligence functions at the joint level are more broad than those listed in NDP 2 and FM 34-1.

USACOM Doctrine

One of the major advancements in intelligence support since Operation DESERT STORM was the introduction of common architecture and dissemination systems and equipment. All of the JTFs (120/160/180/190) involved in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY had the same joint intelligence architecture; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) manual; and interoperable dissemination system and equipment.²⁸ The purpose of the ATTP is to tell intelligence officers at the theater, JTF, and component levels how intelligence support is provided in the Atlantic Theater.²⁹ It applies to all military operations within the theater and for training of force packages destined to operate in other theaters.³⁰

The ATTP provided three things to the intelligence team aboard the *Eisenhower*. It provided the team with the theater intelligence doctrine. The theater doctrine was a personalized version of the doctrine stated in JP 2-0. The ATTP also provided a broad interpretation of the theater J2's concept of intelligence operations and information management. This interpretation was very important in answering the basic questions of intelligence support. Finally, it furnished the concept for intelligence dissemination flow and flow for requests for information.

¹US Navy, NDP 1, Naval Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), ii.

²Thomas R. Wilson, "Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy," Joint Force Quarterly 7 (Spring 1995): 56.

³Department of Defense, JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1995), viii.

⁴Ibid., V-5.

⁵Department of Defense, JP 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1995), IV-4.

⁶JP 3-07, ix.

⁷Denver E. McPherson, "Intelligence and the Peacekeeper in Haiti," Military Intelligence 22, no. 2 (April-June 1996): 45.

⁸US Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1987), 1-1.

⁹US Army, FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 2-1.

¹⁰Commander, US Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force, COMNAVAIRLANTINST 3800.4B, Organization, Duties and Training of Intelligence, Cryptologic and Photographic Personnel (Norfolk, VA: Commander, Naval Air Forces, US Atlantic Fleet, 1993), Enclosure (2).

¹¹US Navy, NDP 2, Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), 18-20.

¹²FM 100-5, 2-12.

¹³US Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), 1-1.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵NDP 2, 10.

¹⁶Ibid., 3.

¹⁷JP 2-0, IV-14.

¹⁸NDP 2, 18.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰FM 34-1 (1994), 2-7 and 2-8.

²¹NDP 2, 30.

²²Ibid., 36.

²³FM 34-1 (1994), 2-20.

²⁴Department of the Army, TRADOC, Operation Uphold Democracy, Initial Impressions, vol. I (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1994), 15.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶David Tohn, former 10th Aviation Brigade S2, interview by author, 15 February 1997, Fort Drum, NY. Notes in possession of the author.

²⁷Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE, COMCARAIRWING THREE Instruction 3800.1F, Carrier Air Wing THREE Intelligence Team Organization and Responsibilities, (Oceana, VA: Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE, 1993), enclosure 1.

²⁸Thomas R. Wilson, "Joint Intelligence and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY," Joint Forces Quarterly 7 (Spring 1995): 55-56.

²⁹US Atlantic Command, USACOM Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (U) (Norfolk, VA: Atlantic Intelligence Command, 1995), I-1.

³⁰US Atlantic Command, I-2.

CHAPTER 3
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

There are three types of intelligence support: organic, attached, and supporting.¹ Organic intelligence assets or capabilities are permanently assigned to a particular command. Attached intelligence assets or capabilities are separate assets or units attached to a particular command to support a particular operation or phase of an operation. Supporting intelligence assets or capabilities are adjacent or other area of responsibility (AOR), joint operations area (JOA), theater, other command, or national intelligence assets that provide intelligence support to a particular command from outside the command's AOR or JOA.

The embarked units from the 10th Mountain Division had access to all three types of intelligence support. The 10th Mountain Division units brought their own organic assets aboard with them. The ship's signal exploitation space (SSES) provided attached signals intelligence. The USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower's* (CVN 69) Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and STU-III-capable telephone capability provided that critical link to supporting intelligence. This research focused on the *Eisenhower's* capabilities to provide these types of intelligence support to the embarked units.

10th Mountain Division

The 10th Mountain Division maneuver units embarked on the *Eisenhower* were the 10th Aviation Brigade and the 1st Infantry Brigade combat team. The 10th Aviation Brigade embarked two aviation battalions. Two light infantry battalions of the 1st Infantry Brigade combat team

embarked on the *Eisenhower*. A small headquarters staff was embarked. It was formed from the 10th Artillery Brigade staff.

Manning

The 10th Aviation Brigade deployed aboard the *Eisenhower* with one of its two authorized military intelligence (MI) officers and four of its five authorized enlisted intelligence personnel (Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) Code 96B). The 10th Aviation Brigade intelligence team had worked together during the brigade's operations in Somalia earlier that year. Only one team member had rotated out of the unit between the two operations. The Army captain S2 had functioned as a collection manager while in Somalia and gained important knowledge of intelligence availability and requirements.² As a whole, the intelligence team was very experienced in military operations other than war (MOOTW). The brigade also had the two battalion S2 staffs working for it. Both of the brigade's battalion S2 staffs were fully manned. The 3-25th Lift Battalion had an Army captain S2 and a 96B. The attack battalion had an aviator S2 and an aviation MOS enlisted.³

The 1st Infantry Brigade combat team deployed aboard the *Eisenhower* with a fully manned MI staff and a MI Company (direct support (DS)). Both of the brigade MI officers were junior for their billets. An Army captain was in the major S2 billet and a first lieutenant was in the Army captain Assistant S2 billet. All four of its authorized enlisted intelligence personnel (96B) and its one authorized counterintelligence (97B) billet were staffed. The brigade also had two Navy intelligence specialists (ISs) from the Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) attached to install and maintain the brigade's JDISS. The 1st Infantry Brigade intelligence team had also worked together during the brigade's operations in Somalia earlier that year. No team members had rotated out between the two operations. The team was very experienced in MOOTW and had worked with the 10th Aviation Brigade in Somalia. The brigade also had the two battalion S2

staffs working for it. Both battalion S2 staffs were fully manned with an Army captain S2, a second lieutenant Assistant S2, an sergeant first class infantryman (11B) and an sergeant 96B.⁴

The 10th Artillery Brigade staff deployed aboard the *Eisenhower* with two MI officers, an Army captain S2 and an second lieutenant Assistant S2. Both MI officers functioned as representatives for the 10th Mountain Division G2. The 10th Artillery Brigade Assistant S2 had previously worked with the 10th Aviation Brigade while he was deployed to Somalia.⁵

Systems and Materials

The 10th Aviation Brigade deployed aboard the *Eisenhower* with a couple of laptop computers, a VRC-46 FM radio, a JDISS terminal, smart books, and target folders.⁶ The 1st Infantry Brigade combat team also deployed aboard the *Eisenhower* with a JDISS terminal, smart books, and target folders.⁷ The 10th Artillery Brigade S2 deployed aboard the *Eisenhower* with a couple of desktop computers, a laptop computer, a VRC-46 FM radio, a JDISS terminal, and smart books. All three of the JDISS terminals were provided by the AIC and remained in their boxes until the brigades had set up their separate TOCs in Haiti.⁸ The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sent each brigade staff with contingency support packages (CSPs), gridded reference graphics (GRGs), and anaglyphs of Haiti.⁹ The Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) sent a can of U-2 imagery to the 10th Aviation Brigade for use in mission planning.¹⁰

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower

A US Navy aircraft carrier hosts a tremendous amount of intelligence support capabilities. However, all aircraft carrier intelligence support capabilities and intelligence space layouts vary. The primary dedicated intelligence spaces are the carrier intelligence center (CVIC), the supplemental plot (Supplot), and the SSES. The CVIC is the primary mission planning and administration space. The Supplot is an all-source intelligence fusion center responsible for

providing timely and accurate indications and warning (I&W) information to the embarked flag operations watch, flag staff, and ship operations watch. The SSES provides a very robust signal intelligence (SIGINT) capability. The MI Company (DS) Creole and French linguists were able to train in SSES prior to off-load. This research is focused on the CVIC intelligence support capabilities due to its principal role in support of the 10th Mountain Division units and for classification purposes.

Manning

During a typical deployment, the *Eisenhower's* and its embarked air wing's intelligence personnel form an intelligence team in order to provide the best support to the various commanders aboard the carrier as well as those off of the carrier. Supplemental plot and SSES are manned primarily by ship personnel. The CVIC is an integrated space; however, it is primarily utilized and maintained by the embarked air wing. The *Eisenhower* had five intelligence officers, one cryptologist, four Reserve intelligence officers, approximately 25 ISs, and 10 cryptologic technicians (CTs), while the 10th Mountain Division units were embarked. Ship personnel provide the majority of tactical intelligence, system, and administrative support and expertise. The air wing normally provided 12 intelligence officers and 11-12 ISs. The air wing personnel provide the bulk of the strike and mission planning manpower and expertise. Unlike the Army Military Intelligence Branch, the Navy has divided intelligence and cryptology.

Of note, one of the intelligence officer reservists was a "ringer" for operational support to the Army. Lieutenant Junior Grade Lee Hall was also a general schedule (GS-13) who worked as an action officer in the DIA Operational Intelligence Coordination Center. His day-to-day duties involved contingency support to all Department of Defense services, including CSP and GRG development. Lieutenant Junior Grade Hall had also been working on the Haiti situation for several months prior to his active duty rotation. He had experience working with an infantry

brigade during a previous active duty exercise and was familiar with the Army's intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. He was not intentionally handpicked for this operation, but simply was fulfilling his two week active duty requirement, which he had scheduled months in advance.¹¹

Systems and Materials

Most of the systems in the *Eisenhower's* CVIC support mission planning. The *Eisenhower* was able to provide the following intelligence support systems: JDISS, Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS), Naval Tactical Communications System-Afloat Imagery Exploitation Work Station (NIEWS), Tactical Operational Preview Scene (TOPSCENE), Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS), and both Defense Switched Network (DSN) and commercial telephone communications.

Photographic processing facilities were also available. These onboard facilities consist of two key workcenters, the CVIC Photographic Processing Laboratory and the Aviation (Main) Photographic Laboratory. The CVIC Photographic Processing Laboratory supports efficient flow of reconnaissance film to the CVIC, processes all black and white film exposed during organic aerial reconnaissance missions, and processes duplicate negatives and positives. The Aviation (Main) Photographic Laboratory provides color film processing and all nonintelligence photographic services.¹²

The 10th Mountain Division units were able to take advantage of the ship's closed-circuit television (SCCTV) while en route to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. This system is the primary information dissemination tool for the air wing. The system is used for both cyclic operations and alert briefings, safety stand-downs, and air wing and ship training.¹³

Aircraft carriers can operate in every ocean. This type of operational flexibility requires an aircraft carrier to have many maps and charts of various scales available to its planners and

operators. A Commander, US Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force Instruction requires a standardized chart inventory onboard Atlantic Fleet aircraft carriers. That inventory can be augmented with more charts by the ship's intelligence officer. The vast majority of charts stored onboard the *Eisenhower* were nautical and aeronautical type charts. The chart inventory covered the western Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, Europe, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf areas.

The *Eisenhower* had received hard-copy intelligence package support for possible Haiti operations from DIA prior to the brigades embarkation. Contingency support packages, GRGs, and anaglyphs had been forwarded by DIA to aid in any contingency planning. The Naval Strike Warfare Center produced and delivered a TOPSCENE optical disc database that contained a detailed three-dimensional build-up of many of the brigades' objectives in Haiti.

CVIC Spaces

Aircraft carriers may seem huge to the casual observer; however, space can become a premium once the carrier becomes inhabited by its own crew and its associated air wing or by over 50 helicopters and 2,200 soldiers. The *Eisenhower's* CVIC was relatively large when compared to other Navy aircraft carrier CVICs. It consisted of six primary areas, five secret access areas, and one special compartmented information (SCI) access area. The administrative area consisted of the *Eisenhower* intelligence officer's office, copier, foyer, and administration office and intelligence library. The strike planning space contained the TAMPS, TOPSCENE, JMCIS mainframe computers, a JMCIS terminal, and Tomahawk Mission Display System (T-MDS). This space also contained two tables for mission planning. The mission-planning space contained the SCCTV and a JMCIS terminal. This was the primary mission planning space in CVIC. It had several tables that could be used for mission planning and fold-down table space along the bulkheads for planning or desktop computers. The tactical analysis cell (TAC) contained the NIEWS, two imagery light tables, a JMCIS terminal, and several desktop

computers. The CVIC photography lab has already been mentioned. The strike tactical intelligence cell (STIC) was the sole SCI space in CVIC. It was a cramped space that contained the SCI JMCIS mainframe computer, one SCI JMCIS terminal with embedded JDISS, and a stand-alone JDISS terminal.

¹Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), II-4.

²David Tohn, former 10th Aviation Brigade S2, interview by author, 15 February 1997, Fort Drum, NY. Notes in possession of the author.

³Tohn.

⁴David Carstens, former 1st Infantry Brigade S2, interview by author, 25 February 1997, Fort Polk, LA. Notes in possession of the author.

⁵Ian Stewart, former Assistant S2 of 10th Artillery Brigade, interview by author, 3 March 1997, Fort Stewart, GA. Notes in possession of the author.

⁶Tohn.

⁷Carstens.

⁸Stewart.

⁹Lee Hall, Naval Reservist onboard USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69), interview by author, 13 February 1997, Sterling, VA. Notes in possession of the author.

¹⁰Tohn.

¹¹Hall.

¹²USS *Theodore Roosevelt*, USS Theodore Roosevelt Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TRTTP): A Consumer's Guide to the Intelligence Support from the CVIC Aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt, (USS *Theodore Roosevelt*, 1995), 3.

¹³Ibid., D-2.

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONS

The US Army embarked 51 10th Mountain Division helicopters, more than 1,900 light infantrymen, and tons of supporting supplies and equipment aboard the USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69) in order to air assault an infantry brigade combat team into Haiti for what would become Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.¹ Such an intricate, dangerous effort involving launching Army forces from a Navy vessel had not been conducted on this large of a scale since the James Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in 1942.² This chapter examines the planning factors and initial operations of the 10th Mountain Division units embarked aboard the *Eisenhower* and the *Eisenhower's* operations 14-21 September 1994. It also examines the intelligence requested and provided in order to support the planning and initial operations.

Planning Factors

The 10th Mountain Division units received the Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY warning order and began planning on 1 August 1994.³ The continuous mission analysis that was employed by all of the units generated many operational, logistical, and intelligence questions. At least four courses of action (COAs) were developed. After it had been finalized that many of the 10th Mountain Division units were to embark the *Eisenhower* for transit and use it as the launch platform, the units concentrated on two COAs based on the type of entry. These units and the *Eisenhower* became known as Task Force MOUNTAIN.⁴ Major planning factors for the 10th Mountain Division units included their recent experience in Somalia, the requirements for

opposed entry versus unopposed entry operations, and the new requirements of working with a Navy aircraft carrier. The Eisenhower had to plan for the new requirements involved with working with the Army units as well as operating within indirect fires range of Haitian belligerents.

Many of the 10th Mountain Division units that were to embark on the *Eisenhower* had recently returned from more than a year of operations in Somalia.⁵ Operations in Somalia provided the 10th Mountain Division units with valuable military operations other than war (MOOTW) experience, an excessively healthy respect for the belligerents while conducting that type of operation, and many lessons learned about the significant role that the rules of engagement (ROE) can play in a MOOTW. Equipment availability and family separation were also planning factors caused by the Somalia deployment.

The 10th Mountain Division units gained valuable MOOTW experience in Somalia. The 10th Aviation Brigade logged 27,000 flight hours and thousands of driving kilometers while deployed there. Many of the aviators and soldiers who had participated in the operation had not rotated out of their units by Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. More than 80 percent of the brigade's pilots had flown in the Somalia contingency or had recently trained at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana when the Haiti contingency planning began.⁶ Approximately 40 percent of the enlisted soldiers in the task force had also been deployed to violence-prone Somalia.⁷

The 10th Mountain Division planners, aviators, and soldiers who had been to Somalia were leery of any mission with humanitarian overtones. They also understood that a "poorly trained, poorly equipped" enemy was still lethal.⁸ Having learned from the Somalia experience, the planners made certain that their units would be prepared and have sufficient combat power to defeat any belligerent encountered in Haiti. Lessons had also been learned in regard to ROE. In

Somalia, soldiers could not fire their weapons unless they were fired upon by belligerents.⁹ From the beginning of the operation, the ROE in Haiti allowed US service members to use force in life-threatening circumstances without waiting to be fired on first.¹⁰

The short turnaround period between contingencies provided experience, but it had also worn on the 10th Mountain Division's equipment. Weapons, aircraft, and ground support equipment were just becoming fully mission capable again after the Somalia deployment when planning started for Haiti. The aviation brigade was in the final stage of a planned, five-month "recover-refit-retrain" program.¹¹ The 17th Cavalry Battalion was unable to participate in the operation. It was scheduled to undergo transition to OH-58 Kiowa Warriors in October. Its pilots and service crews were already dispatched across the US for training.¹²

Many of the 10th Mountain Division's personnel had been home for less than six months from Somalia when Operation RESTORE/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY took them on another contingency deployment.¹³ "The [aviation] brigade's families were just beginning to regain and enjoy some sense of normalcy."¹⁴ The influence of family separation on a unit's morale had to be considered during planning for the operation.

All of the valuable experience gained in Somalia did not provide the 10th Mountain Division units with the answer to their question about whether their entry into Haiti would be an opposed or an unopposed entry.¹⁵ That question would not be answered until President Clinton's executive order early on 19 September. Under Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, the units were the follow-on force that was scheduled to enter Haiti on D+5.¹⁶ Elements of the 82d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolina and special operations forces (SOF) aboard the USS *America* (CV 66) positioned a few miles off the Haitian coast were to conduct the initial entry operations into Haiti as part of Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY.¹⁷ The executive order gave Task Force MOUNTAIN less than nine hours to plan and execute its entry operations.

Luckily, the 10th Aviation Brigade had planned for the worst case scenario. Somalia was their most recent example that illustrated the prudence of planning for the worst case. One of the brigade's COAs was to conduct an air assault using the entire infantry brigade combat team against multiple objectives ashore.¹⁸

It had been over 50 years since a US Army operation of this scale had been attempted onboard a US Navy aircraft carrier. Many things had changed about aircraft carriers and about the Army since that 1942 operation. There were many planning factors that had to be considered by both the Army and the Navy. The command atmosphere and assault launch rehearsal were key to successful operations in support of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

One of the initial planning factors involved the *Eisenhower*, her crew, and the Army-Navy working relationship. Many of the staff items, such as fuel, ammunition, aircraft operations, and quartering, were worked out in late August during an initial visit by the operations officer of the *Eisenhower*'s, Navy Captain Leo Enwright, Jr.. When the *Eisenhower* was ordered to return to Norfolk to on-load the 10th Mountain Division Units, she had been involved in fleet exercises off the Atlantic coast. The *Eisenhower*'s crew was in the final phase of training with her air wing and her attached escorts prior to her 20 October 1994 deployment date. Several system modifications were pending completion and the sailors had been looking forward to a well deserved leave period prior to the six-month deployment. The potential for a long participation period in Haiti operations and working with the Army could have impacted the crew's morale and resulted in a poor command atmosphere. That type of atmosphere could have negatively impacted the Haiti mission. Navy Captain Mark Gemmill, the *Eisenhower*'s commanding officer, ensured a positive command atmosphere and that the ship and her crew would do everything necessary to make the 10th Mountain Division units' mission a success.¹⁹ An instantaneous rapport was established between the ship's and the division's staffs. An atmosphere of professionalism, competence,

courtesy, and focus on the mission eliminated any parochialism other than the inevitable good-natured kind.²⁰ The cooperation between soldiers and sailors made the mission a success.²¹

During the transit, Colonel Lawrence Casper and Captain Gemmill directed rehearsals for the airborne assault be conducted repeatedly until every soldier and sailor knew precisely what to do and when to do it.²² Everything from moving large numbers of troops up and down the *Eisenhower's* aircraft elevators to issuing ammunition had to be rehearsed. A comprehensive dress rehearsal was conducted on 16 September 1994. It consisted of an actual launch of the initial assault forces and working each soldier through their assembly point to launch point. The dress rehearsal assisted in debugging and refining the launch plan.²³ Colonel Casper stated that “the ability to conduct such rehearsals while moving toward an objective is one of the benefits of a naval launch platform.”²⁴

Initially, the *Eisenhower* had planned to be the launch platform in a permissive environment. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY quickly changed that premise and dictated that she be positioned into a possible hostile area in order to provide an optimal launch platform for the assault and follow-on off-load. Unlike the aviation brigade, the *Eisenhower* had not developed a COA for this contingency. A COA was quickly formulated that dealt with putting an aircraft carrier within indirect firing range of possible Haitian belligerents.²⁵ The threat was extremely limited; however, a single hit could have been devastating in terms of the media.

Military Operations

The 10th Mountain Division units were tasked with establishing a secure and stable environment among the chaos in Haiti.²⁶ The type of entry operation remained a question until the Carter agreement. After the agreement and as the *Eisenhower* sailed into position west of Port-au-Prince, Task Force MOUNTAIN was ordered to execute its airborne mission, but to occupy their objective areas rather than to assault them.²⁷ Task Force MOUNTAIN's initial objectives were the

Port-au-Prince International Airport for the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry and the Port-au-Prince Port Facilities for the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry.²⁸

The first assault wave launched from the *Eisenhower* at approximately 0930L and landed at the Port-au-Prince International Airport at 0950L on 19 September 1994. Within six hours the aviation brigade had deployed both of the infantry battalion task forces to their different objectives in Haiti. The aviation brigade moved the rest of the brigade task force, more than 2,200 combat troops and 204 sling loads, with 16 UH-60 Black Hawks to the airport and adjacent landing zones ground in just over two days.²⁹ The *Eisenhower* was used for refueling and major maintenance until the airport was secured.³⁰ The *Eisenhower* was released from the operation on 21 September.³¹ She departed the area of operations with a 10th Mountain Division crest painted on the bow side of the island on the carrier's deck.³²

Although the Carter agreement set the stage for an unopposed entry operation, the 10th Mountain Division units were initially prepared for a violent reception. Several AC-130 Spectre and AH-1 Cobra gunships were stationed overhead the airport as the initial UH-60 Black Hawks landed. However, the soldiers were surprised to meet with no resistance from the military, and cheers and thumbs-up from the Haitian people.³³

Intelligence Support

The 10th Mountain Division units focused on the worst case scenario. They generated priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) based on the idea of entering Haiti prior to any other military unit.³⁴ The brigades generated slightly different PIRs based on their missions, tasks, and objectives. The common highest PIRs were concerned with the expected belligerents and their expected reactions. These two PIRs were the hardest for the intelligence staffs and the Eisenhower intelligence center personnel to answer to a comfortable level. The infantry brigade also required intelligence on the expected reactions of police force in the vicinity of the airport,

contents of the shipping containers that had been placed on the airport runway, requirements to make the runway capable, and the crowd situation in the vicinity of the port facility.³⁵ The aviation brigade required intelligence on terrain and helicopter landing zones (LZs) in the vicinity of the airport and the port facility, anti-aircraft artillery in vicinity of their objectives, reaction times to the LZs, and indications of reaction.³⁶

The 10th Aviation Brigade S2, Captain David Tohn, used the carrier intelligence center (CVIC) as the brigade's intelligence planning area. The infantry brigade combat team S2, Captain David Carstens, used CVIC to gather intelligence, but planned in the combat team's TOC in ready room 3. The two brigade S2 staffs shared their gathered intelligence. The 10th Mountain Division O-3 G2 representative worked in the war room with little interface with CVIC. The 10th Mountain Division O-2 G2 representative, First Lieutenant Ian Stewart, worked in CVIC. Captain Tohn and Commander Mark Merritt, the *Eisenhower*'s intelligence officer, implemented a "port and starboard;" "12 on, 12 off," 24-hour duty cycle consisting of both Army and Navy personnel for the transit period to provide support to the embarked units. Captain Tohn and Lieutenant Junior Grade Lee Hall were in charge of the day watch, planned, performed intelligence preparation of the battlefield, tasked intelligence requirements, and gathered intelligence data via STU-III or via the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). First Lieutenant Stewart and Ensign Faith Corson were in charge of the night watch, built daily current intelligence briefs to be televised, and gather intelligence data via JDISS.³⁷

The JDISS provided the connectivity for near-real time imagery of the objective areas to be provided to the commanders. The CVIC photographic processing laboratory rapidly processed the U-2 imagery and provided numerous prints for 10th Mountain Division unit planning.³⁸ The Naval Strike Warfare Center delivered a Tactical Operational Preview System (TOPSCENE) optical disc to the *Eisenhower* on 17 September 1994. The disc and system allowed all of the

Army pilots in command to “fly” their planned routes to and from their objective areas in Haiti in the carrier intelligence center.³⁹ The ship’s closed-circuit television (SCCTV) was used to televise the daily current intelligence briefs and general information to the aviation brigade’s pilots and brigade TOCs located in the carrier’s ready rooms. Cable News Network (CNN) reporting available through the *Eisenhower*’s television system provided real time reporting and video from Port-au-Prince International Airport and the port facilities.⁴⁰

The 10th Mountain Division S2s would have liked the continued support from the *Eisenhower* during the off-load and initial MOOTW operations until they could be supported by the Army intelligence architecture. However, communication incompatibilities between the units and the *Eisenhower* once they had debarked the ship made further intelligence support impractical.⁴¹

¹Raoul Archambault III, “Joint Operations in Haiti,” *Army* 45, no. 11 (November 1995): 27.

²*Ibid.*, 24.

³*Ibid.*, 25.

⁴Douglas Ide, “Flying Into the History Books,” *Soldiers* 49, no. 11 (November 1994): 16.

⁵Archambault, “Joint Operations in Haiti,” 24.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Douglas Ide, “A Presence for Peace,” *Soldiers* 49, no. 11 (November 1994): 14.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Lawrence E. Casper, former Commander of 10th Aviation Brigade, interview by author, 18 March 1997, Washington, DC. Notes in possession of the author.

¹⁰Donna Miles, “Upholding Democracy in Haiti,” *Soldiers* 49, no. 11 (November 1994): 4.

¹¹Archambault, “Joint Operations in Haiti,” 24.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., 27.

¹⁴Ibid., 24.

¹⁵David Tohn, former 10th Aviation Brigade S2, interview by author, 15 February 1997, Fort Drum, NY. Notes in possession of the author.

¹⁶Lee Hall, Naval Reservist onboard USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69), interview by author, 13 February 1997, Sterling, VA. Notes in possession of the author.

¹⁷Miles, 5.

¹⁸Raoul Archambault III, former Executive Officer of 10th Aviation Brigade, interview by author, 3 February 97, Providence, RI. Notes in possession of the author.

¹⁹Archambault, "Joint Operations in Haiti," 26.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ide, "Flying Into the History Books," 17.

²²Archambault, "Joint Operations in Haiti," 29.

²³Lawrence E. Casper, "Flexibility, Reach, and Muscle: How Army Helicopters on a Navy Carrier Succeeded in Haiti," Armed Forces Journal International 132, no. 6 (January 1995): 40-41.

²⁴Ide, "Flying Into the History Books," 17.

²⁵Mark Merritt, former USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69) Intelligence Officer, interview by the author, 24 February 1997, Langley, VA. Notes in possession of the author.

²⁶Ide, "Flying Into the History Books," 16.

²⁷Archambault, "Joint Operations in Haiti," 29.

²⁸David Carstens, former S2 of 1st Infantry Brigade, interview by author, 25 February 1997, Fort Polk, LA. Notes in possession of the author.

²⁹Ide, "Flying Into the History Books," 17.

³⁰Miles, 5.

³¹Archambault, "Joint Operations in Haiti," 29.

³²Ide, "Flying Into the History Books," 17.

³³Miles, 4.

³⁴Carstens.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Tohn.

³⁷Ian Stewart, former S2 of 10th Artillery Battalion, interview by author, 3 March 1997, Fort Stewart, GA. Notes in possession of the author.

³⁸Tohn.

³⁹Casper, interview by author.

⁴⁰Stewart.

⁴¹Tohn.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

This research project examined US Army, US Navy, and joint intelligence support doctrine, the embarked 10th Mountain Division units' and the USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower's* (CVN 69) various intelligence support capabilities, and Task Force MOUNTAIN's operations between 14 and 21 September 1994. This chapter contains the research analysis of those three areas and answers the primary research question. Based on the findings of this project, it can be concluded that the naval intelligence support provided by the *Eisenhower* to the embarked 10th Mountain Division units en route to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was effective.

Intelligence Support Doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures

The Army's and the Navy's intelligence support doctrine were in a state of flux during the planning and initial phases of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The Army finished the 1994 revision of Field Manual (FM) 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, during the initial phases of the operation. The Navy was also in the midst of finishing the first edition of its intelligence doctrine publication, Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, Naval Intelligence. Despite the different service missions, both of the service intelligence support doctrines and their application prior to and after September 1994 were very similar and contained only minor differences. Joint and theater intelligence support doctrine was similar to the post-September 1994 service doctrines.

Although the post-September 1994 intelligence support doctrine was not available to the intelligence personnel from the 10th Mountain Division units and the *Eisenhower* in September 1994, their support more closely complied with the later doctrine than the pre-September 1994 doctrine. The intelligence team implemented the missions, principles, tasks and functions, and characteristics of effective intelligence exceedingly well. The mission was fulfilled by providing the commanders with a synchronized and fused, all-source picture of the battlespace to support their range of operations. The commander focused and drove the intelligence support with priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), which included requirements to "know the adversary." The intelligence personnel utilized an all-source approach and split-based operations. The Army member's experience in Somalia heightened the team's awareness of the need to plan for the potential of combat. The intelligence team performed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), situation and target development, provided indications and warning (I&W), and supported force protection in order to provide timely, relevant, accurate, objective, and predictive intelligence support to the warfighter.

A difference in standard operating procedure (SOP) was noted during the Army's embarkation period. The *Eisenhower* SOP for dissemination of classified material aboard the ship was more restrictive than those of the Army unit's. The SOP were not conducive to efficient Army intelligence operations or mission planning.¹ The Navy conducts most of its classified mission planning in the carrier intelligence center (CVIC). That practice allowed better control of classified information and restricted access to the information. The Army normally conducts planning in tactical operations centers (TOCs) and requires classified information for planning. The 10th Mountain Division units had set up multiple TOCs throughout the ship. The problem was quickly solved by the *Eisenhower*'s intelligence officer, Commander Mark Merritt, and 10th

Aviation Brigade S2, Captain David Tohn. Commander Merritt relaxed the requirements to a mutually agreeable level of accessibility and control.²

Intelligence Support Capabilities

The intelligence support capabilities played a key role in the effectiveness of the *Eisenhower*'s intelligence support to the embarked 10th Mountain Division units and their mission accomplishment. Task Force MOUNTAIN's intelligence support capabilities were dependent on two primary areas: personnel and systems. A team of Army and Navy intelligence personnel provided the intelligence support by the utilization of primarily Navy systems. Other than unit desktop or laptop computers, the embarked units' systems were not used. The *Eisenhower* had the same or a better system capabilities than the embarked units and most of the Army systems were impractical for shipboard use.

The embarked 10th Mountain Division units' intelligence staff were very experienced and capable compared to their rank. Like their units, they had gained valuable intelligence support experience while conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW) in Somalia. The 10th Aviation Brigade commander, Colonel Lawrence Casper, stated that his entire staff was comfortable with one another and "intuitively knew what to do" as a result on their operational participation in Somalia.³ The aviation and infantry brigade S2s and the assistant artillery brigade S2 had worked with or for one another in Somalia.⁴ Based on that evidence, the Army S2 team had a lot of potential to provide excellent intelligence support to their commanders. Unfortunately, a personality conflict between the two maneuver brigade S2s and the 10th Division Artillery Brigade S2 had the potential to degrade that intelligence support. The 10th Division Artillery Brigade S2, Captain Simpson, became G2 representative and should have coordinated the Army's intelligence effort onboard the *Eisenhower*. However, Captain Simpson was junior to both Captains Tohn and David Carstens.⁵ They perceived Captain Simpson to be inexperienced,

in a useless position without a division staff or command element to support, and in their way when he attempted to coordinate efforts. Captains Tohn and Carstens coordinated most of their intelligence efforts with one another. This conflict resulted in confusion and wasted effort within the intelligence team.⁶ Despite the conflict, the maneuver brigades' S2s level of experience and working relationship paired with the can-do attitude of the *Eisenhower's* intelligence personnel formed a highly capable and formidable team. That intelligence team was instrumental to the effectiveness of that intelligence support provided the embarked unit commanders.

The *Eisenhower* was able to provide valuable personnel augmentation to the 10th Mountain Division units' S2 staff to form the intelligence team.⁷ Four important variables influenced that capability. First, ground order of battle (GOB) and the Army form of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) are not most Navy intelligence personnel's forte. They were also inexperienced with the Army's terminology, intelligence requirements, and operations.⁸ Second, the 10th Mountain Division unit S2 staff had preconceived opinions of the Navy and the type of support they would receive while embarked. Those two obstacles were quickly overcome by cooperation, on-the-job training, and an optimistic can-do attitude. Third, like all US Navy aircraft carriers, the *Eisenhower* intelligence staff relied on its air wing to provide the bulk of the mission planning support manpower and expertise. That loss made the reservists crucial to the ship's ability to support the embarked 10th Mountain Division units.⁹ The *Eisenhower* was able to augment the S2 staff with four reserve intelligence officers and several ship's company intelligence specialists (ISs). The augmentation provided the needed manpower to form the intelligence team; however, the reservists' expertise was still limited in Army intelligence requirements as well as some of the *Eisenhower's* capabilities. Fourth, one notable exception was Lieutenant Junior Grade Lee Hall. He was not a normal Navy reservist and provided a particularly positive impact on the Navy's intelligence support capabilities. As stated in chapter 3,

his civilian job was as a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) action officer. Lieutenant Junior Grade Hall had previous experience with the Haiti situation, Army IPB and modus operandi, and numerous national-level intelligence contacts.¹⁰ All three S2 staffs and the *Eisenhower* obtained Lieutenant Junior Grade Hall's assistance at DIA after his two-week active duty rotation had ended.

The *Eisenhower's* intelligence officer ensured that the ship's intelligence support systems were at the 10th Mountain Division unit S2s disposal upon their arrival in CVIC. The two brigade S2s and the artillery brigade assistant S2 commented that they had a greater capability and better connectivity on the *Eisenhower* than an Army light division. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Tactical Operational Preview Scene (TOPSCENE), STU-IIIs with Defense Switched Network (DSN) connectivity, and Cable News Network (CNN) were the four instrumental systems for the *Eisenhower's* effective intelligence support to the embarked Army units.

The JDISS was the most lauded system by the intelligence team. The ship's JDISS' connectivity pipe was extremely good due to the importance of the crisis and units being supported. The ship's JDISS ran at 56 kilobits (kb).¹¹ As a comparison, the highest that it ran on the *Eisenhower's* JTF 95 deployment was 32kb. The team provided focused and dedicated system users to "pull" any mission-associated intelligence for the team. The system provided 12- to 24-hour time-late imagery, intelligence data to fill in blanks in target and personnel files, and multiple chatter sessions with other intelligence analysts.¹² The ship's JDISS also facilitated a useful training opportunity for the 10th Mountain Division personnel, who would soon be required to use their own JDISS once in Haiti. That opportunity "paid big dividends later."¹³

The TOPSCENE was the biggest hit among the Army warfighters.¹⁴ Once the optical disc data base was delivered by the Naval Strike Warfare Center, the system allowed many of the

pilots and soldiers to familiarize themselves with the area of operations (AO) and conduct main supply route (MSR) planning by “flying” or “driving” through the Port-au-Prince area. The aviation brigade S2 commented that “TOPSCENE was worth its weight in gold.”¹⁵

The ship’s Defense Switched Network (DSN) and commercial STU-III capability provided a valuable link back to Fort Drum¹⁶ and DIA¹⁷ for informal liaison and requests for information (RFIs). The availability of CNN provided the real-time look at the Port-au-Prince International Airport prior to the assault.¹⁸ It also allowed intelligence personnel and decision makers to watch helicopters launch from the *Eisenhower* on the ship’s platform cameras and land at the Port-au-Prince International Airport on CNN.¹⁹

The *Eisenhower* provided other intelligence support systems that enhanced its ability to provide effective intelligence support to the embarked units. Current intelligence briefs were updated daily and played over the ship’s closed-circuit television (SCCTV) system to keep the embarked units and key ship personnel informed. The CVIC photography laboratory produced prints of objective areas from U-2 imagery that the aviation brigade had brought aboard.²⁰ The ship’s signals exploitation space (SSES) facilitated training for the Military Intelligence Company (direct support (DS)) Creole linguists and electronic warfare personnel. The SSES provided connectivity to air-breather reconnaissance assets conducting missions in the Haiti joint area of operations (JOA). During the assault, intelligence gained from those assets was relayed via voice from SSES to the TOCs and the TOCs relayed it to the commanders.²¹

Although the intelligence support capabilities aboard the *Eisenhower* greatly contributed to the overall effectiveness of naval intelligence support to the embarked 10th Mountain Division units, there were several drawbacks. The focus of most of the CVIC personnel was at the political-military level. The embarked units required more refined and different analysis than the CVIC personnel were accustomed to providing. Ship intelligence personnel were unfamiliar with

the detailed Army terrain and obstacle analysis.²² They also lacked GOB weapon system knowledge. They did not have the expertise of Army intelligence personnel. Another shortfall was the ships' chart inventory. The CVIC was unable to meet several of the embarked unit's requests for charts of Haiti.²³ Aircraft carriers do not routinely stock many of the charts necessary for ground unit operations. None of that type of chart were brought aboard for the ship's chart inventory during the ship's two-day off-load and on-load in-port period.

Operations

A measure of the effectiveness of the *Eisenhower's* intelligence support to the embarked 10th Mountain Division units was the intelligence team's ability to answer the commanders' PIRs. The 10th Aviation Brigade Commander, Colonel Casper, and the infantry brigade combat team commander, Colonel Andrew Berdy, lauded the intelligence support provided by their intelligence staff and the *Eisenhower*. Both commanders felt that the vast majority of their PIRs were met by the intelligence team. The commanders and their staffs had a good impression of what to expect and what was happening in the objective areas at launch.²⁴ Colonel Casper stated that he had "everything but who the enemy really was." That PIR was never really answered.

Another measure of the effectiveness of the *Eisenhower's* intelligence support to the embarked 10th Mountain Division units was the commanders' comments. The *Eisenhower's* intelligence support was successful more due to the ship's intelligence personnel being proactive than the Army seeking their support. Due to the lean nature of the embarked units' task organization and headquarters, the embarked units were forced to rely on the *Eisenhower's* intelligence support capabilities.²⁵ Colonel Berdy was very favorably impressed by the intelligence capability and support provided by the *Eisenhower*. He thought that they were spoiled by the information that they were provided while embarked and were not accustomed to that much or that level of intelligence.²⁶

Other Intelligence Support Issues

Other intelligence support shortcomings existed that influenced the *Eisenhower's* and the intelligence team's ability to effectively support the embarked 10th Mountain Division units. The three primary shortcomings were compartmented information accessibility, RFI management, and indirect fire vulnerability analysis. The intelligence team had very little control over the first two shortcomings. The third shortcoming focused on the *Eisenhower*. Through teamwork and unrelenting perseverance, the intelligence team was able to overcome all three shortcomings.

Since the 82d Airborne Division was to have been the initial force to deploy to Haiti under Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, its units were given more and earlier access to close-hold, compartmented intelligence.²⁷ Access to much of that compartmented intelligence was still not given to the 10th Mountain Division units embarked on the *Eisenhower* after it had been determined that they were to be the initial entry force. Task Force MOUNTAIN had requested that intelligence to provide better input into its mission analysis and planning.

The RFI system also posed shortcomings for the intelligence team to overcome. The Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) was the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) responsible for Task Force MOUNTAIN's RFIs. The AIC used an automated RFI tracking system that was part of its Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS). The IDHS was accessible via JDISS and Intelink. Unfortunately, none of the team members had experience using the system and more importantly, the passwords for the IDHS. Team members were forced to send RFIs via electronic mail and telephone. The AIC did not enter RFIs sent by that means into its RFI tracking system, which resulted in poor management of Task Force MOUNTAIN's RFIs. The AIC was also unable to provide intelligence data to the level of detail that the 10th Mountain Division maneuver brigades required. The team needed measurements at the "meter level of detail, but received them in the kilometer level."²⁸ Lieutenant Junior Grade

Hall used his civilian job contacts at DIA to circumvent AIC and get the RFIs answered.²⁹ The internal RFI system was also inefficient. Four different units were sending RFIs off the *Eisenhower*. All of the 10th Mountain Division brigades RFIs were to go through First Lieutenant Stewart as the G2 representative and RFI manager; however, he only saw approximately 50 percent of them. Captains Tohn and Carstens both sent their own RFIs via electronic mail and telephone.³⁰

The embarked 10th Mountain Division units' S2 staff were able to assist the *Eisenhower's* intelligence personnel overcome the third shortcoming. When the embarked 10th Mountain Division units' mission changed, the *Eisenhower* found that she would be required to take a position 3.5 nautical miles off the Haitian beach within the possible indirect fire range of any belligerent with the capability and desire.³¹ The Navy intelligence personnel did not have any resident experience on the threats to the ship or on ship vulnerability to indirect fire. The embarked 10th Mountain Division S2 personnel facilitated threat training and assisted with the analysis of indirect firing points. The team analysis directly impacted operational planning and the *Eisenhower's* position for the assault launches.³²

Conclusion

This chapter provided analysis of intelligence support doctrine, the embarked 10th Mountain Division units' and the USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower's* (CVN 69) various intelligence support capabilities, and Task Force MOUNTAIN's operations between 14 and 21 September 1994. Although the intelligence team did not have either service intelligence support doctrine of September 1994, they executed that new doctrine extremely well while providing effective intelligence support to the warfighters involved in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The experience S2 staff that the embarked 10th Mountain Division units' provided coupled with the *Eisenhower's* intelligence support systems, can-do attitude, and a reservist from DIA made a

unbeatable combination for providing effective intelligence support. Answered PIRs and comfortable commanders also paid tribute to the effectiveness of the intelligence support effort aboard the *Eisenhower* en route to the operation. Based on the findings of this project, the primary research question can be answered that the naval intelligence support to the 10th Mountain Division units embarked on the *Eisenhower* en route to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 14-21 September 1994 was effective.

¹David Tohn, former 10th Aviation Brigade S2, interview by author, 15 February 1997, Fort Drum, NY. Notes in possession of the author.

²Mark Merritt, former USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69) Intelligence Officer, interview by the author, 24 February 1997, Langley, VA. Notes in possession of the author.

³Lawrence E. Casper, former Commander of 10th Aviation Brigade, interview by author, 18 March 1997, Washington, DC. Notes in possession of the author.

⁴Ian Stewart, former S2 of 10th Artillery Battalion, interview by author, 3 March 1997, Fort Stewart, GA. Notes in possession of the author.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Tohn.

⁷Ibid.

⁸David Carstens, former S2 of 1st Infantry Brigade, interview by author, 25 February 1997, Fort Polk, LA. Notes in possession of the author.

⁹Merritt.

¹⁰Lee Hall, Naval Reservist onboard USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69), interview by author, 13 February 1997, Sterling, VA. Notes in possession of the author.

¹¹Merritt.

¹²Stewart.

¹³Carstens.

¹⁴Raoul Archambault III, former Executive Officer of 10th Aviation Brigade, interview by author, 3 February 97, Providence, RI. Notes in possession of the author.

¹⁵Tohn.

¹⁶Carstens.

¹⁷Hall.

¹⁸Carstens.

¹⁹Tohn.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Merritt.

²²Carstens.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Andrew J. Berdy, former Commander of 1st Infantry Brigade, interview by author, 13 March 1997, Washington, DC. Notes in possession of the author.

²⁵Casper.

²⁶Berdy.

²⁷Merritt.

²⁸Tohn.

²⁹Hall.

³⁰Stewart.

³¹Merritt.

³²Tohn.

CHAPTER 6

THE FUTURE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Many lessons were learned about providing effective intelligence during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM resulting in numerous improvements. The US Armed Services will continue to modernize and enhance their intelligence support capabilities to provide the warfighter with the best intelligence available. This chapter will deal with US Navy intelligence support improvements since Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and future improvements. The US Army has made many intelligence support improvements since Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. As reported in this thesis, most of the current Army intelligence support systems could not be and were not used by the embarked 10th Mountain Division units due to communications, space, time, and environment requirements. Future improvements probably will not be used aboard ship. Some of the improvements could be accessible through Navy systems.

Post-UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

As a result of lessons learned from Operations DESERT STORM, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, PROVIDE PROMISE, and DENY FLIGHT, many new systems have been installed or are planned to be installed on aircraft carriers that will enhance their intelligence support capabilities. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) was used extensively during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. This capability is now aboard most carriers and leads to an invaluable common view of the battlefield.¹ The Afloat Planning

System (APS) with the Joint Services Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-N) has been installed on many aircraft carriers since Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The system was designed to support Tomahawk planning at sea. Another of the system's benefits is the near-real time imagery accessibility. Aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships (LHA/LHD) have been deploying to the Mediterranean Sea with Linked Operations-Intelligence Center Europe (LOCE) terminals. This system provides a voice and data link between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations and intelligence centers, and the aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. A collateral Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) has also been installed aboard many aircraft carriers and provides many of the same intelligence services as the special compartmented information (SCI) JDISS. One of the newer services available on both levels of JDISS is Intelink. Intelink is a collateral- or SCI-level internet with defense, intelligence, and other US government agency homepages which can provide access to data bases and regularly updated summary reports.

Future Intelligence Support Capabilities

The role of US Navy aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships in joint service contingency operations will become even more significant in the future. The Navy is installing an electronics system that will enable naval and joint task force (JTF) commanders to passively detect, identify, and locate potentially hostile aircraft and ships hundreds of miles away. The system is called the Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System (BGPHERS). It will monitor signals intelligence SIGINT activity at long ranges picked up by receivers on Navy ES-3A and Air Force U-2 aircraft. The ES-3A extends the signal intercept horizon for the surface ships from 30-35 nautical miles (nm) to approximately 450nm. The U-2 can extend the horizon out to at least 650nm. The intercepted signals are passed to BGPHERS workstations for analysis using the joint

service Common High Band Data Link (CHBDL). The U-2 Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS) imagery can also be sent via CHBDL to the shipboard JSIPS-N workstation. This capability will provide the JTF or battle group commander near-real time access to theater level imagery.²

New systems are being developed to enhance shipboard bomb damage assessment (BDA) capabilities. This system will be Navy system-oriented and capable of viewing, analyzing, and dubbing, 8 millimeter, VHS, and ¾ inch format weapon system camera video tape. It will also be able to capture video frames. Video clips and capture files can be “pushed” or “pulled” from the aircraft carrier via JDISS, JWICS, and LOCE to higher echelons. The system will be compatible with the Army’s OH-58 Kiowa Warrior weapon systems 8 millimeter camera system. It will not be compatible with the AH-64 Apache weapon system camera video. The Army will have to provide special VHS equipment to enable that system’s camera video to be incorporated into the ship’s BDA system.³

Live unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), such as Predator, video feed capabilities are also being incorporated into shipboard systems. This intelligence support capability will enable operators, aviators or ground troops, to view target or objective areas immediately prior to launch on their target or objective. It will also provide commanders and BDA analysts with immediate feedback on operations in order to improve restrike or reserve commitment decision timelines.

Recommendations

Two recommendations for service doctrines became evident during this research project. First, the US Army’s move to digitization and Force XXI will require tremendous amounts of information to be moved around the battlespace. Information management will become an essential task, especially for the military intelligence (MI) branch, in order to support the

commander. The Army would benefit by inclusion of intelligence information management in its next revision of Field Manual (FM) 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare, as the Army's seventh intelligence task. Second, the Army specified that effective intelligence should be predictive in FM 34-1. The US Navy implied it in Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, Naval Intelligence. The Navy would benefit from inclusion of predictiveness as an attribute of intelligence quality in the next revision of NDP 2.

The 10th Artillery Brigade S2 had a good idea as the G2 representative. The S2 attempted to centralize the request for information (RFI) management and the brigades' intelligence efforts while they shared a common operations area. The US Navy's carrier intelligence is designed around a team. Through a centrally controlled team, the naval intelligence personnel are able to accomplish many tasks with a relatively small staff. A RFI manager is designated within the team to maximize the RFI effort and reduce duplication. The circumstances of this operation required the brigades to transit together. It is doubtful that they will be regularly repeated; however, if similar circumstances arrive, recommend the Army units use a team effort to increase their efficiency and minimize duplication of effort.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and the increasing joint exercises and operations requirements highlight the necessity to incorporate ground element intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), ground order of battle (GOB), and enemy template training in the Navy intelligence personnel's basic or advanced training programs. Cross-training opportunities during joint exercises and liaison officers during joint operations would also prove mutually advantageous to both Army and Navy intelligence personnel. The *Eisenhower's* intelligence personnel and reservists would have been more beneficial to the intelligence team if they had received either type of training. This type of training and liaison opportunities would prove very

beneficial to the Navy, since new Navy doctrine is placing aircraft carriers within range of tactical indirect fire ground threats.

Lieutenant Junior Grade Lee Hall's performance during the transit was an excellent example of the crucial role reservists can play in real-world operations. Most naval reservists manage their own careers. Lieutenant Junior Grade Hall made himself available for the right reserve duty position at the right time. A system that tracked the reservists and their specialty areas and civilian jobs, and then paired those capabilities and their training requirements with operational requirements of the fleet would provide excellent support for future operations.

Two recommendations for new systems capabilities also became evident during this research project. First, the Navy and Army would benefit from a common communications capability. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the *Eisenhower* was no longer capable of supporting the three brigade S2s upon their off-load because the communications connectivity did not exist to facilitate that type of support. Second, US Navy aircraft carriers and amphibious ships would benefit from the capability to receive, manipulate, display, store, and disseminate Joint Surveillance and Targeting System (JSTARS) data in order to support future littoral contingencies and joint operations. The data and situation awareness gained by this capability would enhance the intelligence support provided to the warfighters.

¹David F. Young, "Building a Symbiotic Relationship," Military Intelligence 21, no. 2 (April-June 1995): 7.

²Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "A Long Reach Gets Longer: New Long-Range Navy Passive Surveillance System Will Boost Aircraft Carriers' Role," Armed Forces Journal International 133, no. 12 (July 1996): 14.

³Daniel J. Layton, interview by author, 17 March 1997, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Notes in possession of the author.

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

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
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