

TOWARD A UNIVERSAL SOCIETY AND  
THE UNITED STATES ARMY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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1997

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19971121 149

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved*  
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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 7 JUNE 1997	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MASTER'S THESIS, 4 AUG 96 - 6 JUNE 1997	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE "TOWARD A UNIVERSAL SOCIETY AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY"		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ALLEN B. WEST			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U. S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1352		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
<p>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)</p> <p>"Toward a Universal Society and the United States Army" is a research thesis examining social and political theories relevant to defining the post-Cold War era operationally. Two prevailing schools of thought are examined; the school of pacific union and the school of international pessimism.</p> <p>This research has found a relevance for these theories in discussion of the post-Cold War era forecasting the development of a universal society of liberal democratic states. In opposition there still exist non-democratic states that impede upon the expansion of the pacific union of the liberal democratic states much in the way anticipated by international pessimism.</p> <p>Through analysis of these respective schools of thought this research has examined how this universal society is believed to occur. Also, the research has examined how the existence of non-democratic states affects the pacific union. The research concludes that this confrontation of liberal democratic and non-democratic states has played a key role in explaining the goals of U.S. National Security Strategy in the post-Cold War era. Also, it can assist in explaining a refocusing of military strategic objectives, roles, and missions in the post-Cold War era to providing stabilization and support in pursuit of an emerging universal society</p>			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Political Theory, Immanuel Kant, George W.F. Hegel, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 68	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited

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
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
Name of Candidate: Major Allen B. West

Thesis Title: Toward a Universal Society and the United States Army


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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

TOWARD A UNIVERSAL SOCIETY AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY by MAJ Allen B. West, USA, 67 pages.

“Toward a Universal Society and the United States Army” is a research thesis examining social and political theories relevant to defining the post-Cold War era operationally. Two prevailing schools of thought are examined; the school of pacific union and the school of international pessimism.

This research has found a relevance for these theories in discussion of the post-Cold War era forecasting the development of a universal society of liberal democratic states. In opposition there still exist non-democratic states that impede upon the expansion of the pacific union of the liberal democratic states much in the way anticipated by international pessimism.

Through analysis of these respective schools of thought this research has examined how this universal society is believed to occur. Also, the research has examined how the existence of non-democratic states affects the pacific union. The research concludes that this confrontation of liberal democratic and non-democratic states has played a key role in explaining the goals U.S. National Security Strategy in the post-Cold War era. Also, it can assist in explaining a refocusing of military strategic objectives, roles and missions in the post-Cold War era to providing stabilization and support in pursuit of an emerging universal society.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and always, I give honor and praise to God and his Son our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. Without his divine inspiration, this project, nor the astute people that have assisted me, would not have been possible.

I give thanks and honor to my wife Dr. Angela Michele West, Ph.d. for her inspiration as I continue my academic pursuits. I thank God for my lovely daughters, Aubrey Elizabeth and Austen Brianna, who constantly brighten my life.

I bestow my humble appreciation to my committee chair, Dr. Richard Swain. Dr. Swain allowed me to think and provided the appropriate guidance to structure my thoughts. Sincere thanks to LTC Robert Hahn, Ph.D. and LTC Jeffrey Shadburn for their much needed supporting efforts in advancing my education.

Finally, to the person that made this project final, Ms. Linda Duree. Thank you for putting my thought to form on paper. Your professionalism and concern will never be forgotten.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The dual focus of this thesis is to define what has been termed “the New World Order” in terms of established and current social and political theories and to examine how such an international order might place demands on the U.S. Army. The world was amazed by the events of the nineteen eighties and early nineties as the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. These events led many in the free world to claim victory as the Cold War ended. To the extent that the U.S. assumed the title of the leader of the free world, it accepted the crown as the victor.

The issue is: What did the U.S. truly win? The world has shifted from a more or less bipolar structure, U.S. versus U.S.S.R., to a fragmented global system of a multipolar nature in which regional powers assume or contend for local dominance. The incidents of conflict and belligerence have risen. Armed conflict has an old face with some new wrinkles in the areas of ethnic, social, racial, nationalist, and religious strife. A changing world turns repeatedly to the United States to shape, to form, and to enforce peace. The U.S. response is as yet unclear.

Now, in a fragmented global system, the U.S. is dispatching its forces throughout the world to create peace and separate contending factions. There exists a great dilemma in this role. The U.S. military’s focus for some 45 years was on fighting potential communist aggression by the Soviet Union with a particular emphasis on conventional war in Europe. This became the *raison d’être* for the military and its need for more troops, weapons, and resources. Maintenance of a strong army was based on a policy of deterrence. Now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, whom does the U.S. Army deter? What is the argument for maintenance of a strong U.S. Army?

interpreting the post-Cold War era and what the implications are for the U.S. Army in terms of roles, missions, and force structure.

This aim and problem statement lead to the primary research question, What are the theories of the pacific union and international pessimism?

Several secondary questions must be addressed to support this thesis:

a. What is the Universal Society?

How did Kant see the clash of political ideologies and what are the promises to be fulfilled by the triumphant political system? Since World War II the world had been based on two conflicting ideas, democracy and communism. These govern two systems that, led by the U.S. and U.S.S.R., saw many indirect conflicts but never the ultimate clash. The Cold War was a distant struggle to the common man fought on the battlefields of national strategy. Kant would propose that democracy (better defined by him as liberalism) won out because it offered more to the people. Kant's theory is one of an abstract idea or a metaphysical state. This universal cosmopolitan state would not be realized by a material occurrence but rather by an internal self-actualization of man promoting perpetual peace. It is a theory that has much relevance for the world and this research.

b. What is the End of History?

Fukuyama believes that history has been defined by an intense political ideological struggle. Fukuyama uses Hegel's dialectic views of history (thesis -> antithesis -> synthesis) as a model for his end of history theory. His theory consists of liberal democracy meeting the challenges of communism, fascism, and nazism and now standing ready as the world political system. He believes liberal democracy has provided the best answer to the greatest number. The problem with Fukuyama is that he has not synthesized liberal democracy but has portrayed it as a continually victorious thesis. Fukuyama has therefore opened a door of criticism with regard to

conflict proliferation. For Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War is synonymous with the end of history.

c. What is the relevance of the theories of pacific union to the post-Cold War era?

It is imperative to lay this metaphysical occurrence on the reality of international relations and the world. Criteria must be established to examine this theory and compare it against the theories of the school of international pessimism. One must ask, what relevance does the theory of pacific union have for the U.S. Army? Is it been a visible effect?

d. What is the role of theory of international pessimism? How do Machiavelli and Hobbes relate in explaining conflict proliferation in the post-Cold War era. As classical theorists, do they form a basis for contemporary social and political theories purporting a pessimistic view of a global society and relations among states? The research will examine the ideas of Machiavelli and Hobbes as a potential means of explaining contemporary views of realism and pessimism in the global society. The purpose is to offer an explanation of theory that opposes the notions of pacific union.

e. What implications does all this have for the U.S. Army? How can the theories of these opposing schools assist in explaining the emerging of roles, missions, and structure of the U.S. Army in the post-Cold War era?

The post-Cold War era has represented many things in a dream and in a reality. In hope, it represented a belief in a true “age of peace” among liberal democratic states. In fact, it has seen the creation, or re-creation, of new independent actors with conflicting agendas for their future, often resulting in bloody conflict. Conflicts now exist along ethnic, racial, nationalistic, religious, and socioeconomic lines. Wars and conflicts are again on a smaller regional scale. But because of real-time technology they are now more visible to the general public. The perceived hegemonic dominance of liberal democratic principles has not delivered “the Idea” of

Hegel, the eradication of ideological struggle. Indeed, there is now a multiplicity of armed aggressions within states, perhaps wanting democracy but still divided by other ideological differences. Nevertheless, perpetual peace is still an international goal, a universal cosmopolitan state an ambition. The United Nations was founded to allow states to deal with collective security issues. Recent occurrences have evidenced that body lacking in financial, political, or military power. By default, the United States has been called upon to rectify these more visible global crises, but the U.S. may not answer all calls.

### Background of the Problem

It is imperative for the success of the post-Cold War era military leader to understand the political world which drive his aims and objectives. The Army is now entering a new century that offers far greater challenges than the past. The enemy is not clearly defined. Political and military leaders must understand new challenges and be able to articulate the issues involved.

The Army must remain vigilant even though it is faced with fewer resources, an increase of collective universal demands, and global national security interests. This research does not attempt to say what was or is right and wrong. The research seeks to define the international arena operationally in terms of academic political theories and then to relate those theories to military practitioners. The context of this study is the present. It uses theories from the past and present with evidence relevant to the contemporary international scene.

### Definitions

It is important to define some key terms for this analysis.

a. New World Order. A term first used by former U.S. President George Bush during a September 1992 address to the U.N. General Assembly. This term refers to the post-Cold War

international environment that resulted from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist Bloc states.

b. Universal Society. Elements of theory developed by German philosopher Immanuel Kant. This refers to a global society of man governed by a liberal political system that provides for the rights of man.

c. End of History. A modern political theory proposed by Francis Fukuyama. It suggests the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.<sup>3</sup>

d. Hegelian Historical Theory and Dialectic. George F.W. Hegel developed a theory of history in which change is the central theme. Hegel saw history advancing by the struggle of conflicting concepts. The dialectic theory was a means of achieving historical progress through struggle. History for Hegel was progressive with each new era synthesizing from the last. Hegel expected the dialectic to continue refining and improving human institutions until the idea, the predetermined goal of God, was fulfilled.<sup>4</sup>

e. State of Nature. A theory developed by English socio-political theorist Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). It proposed a time when government did not exist. In this state of nature people were free to act as they wished. No law governed them save natural law and that law had no enforcement agency.<sup>5</sup>

f. Social Contract Theory. A theory resulting from a seventeenth and eighteenth century belief that legitimate political power came from the people; the people were the source of ultimate legal and political authority. From this it was deduced that there is an actual grant of power by the people to the government. This social contract is the act of people exercising their popular sovereignty and creating a government to which they consent.<sup>6</sup>

g. Nation. A community of people bound together by a sense of solidarity, common culture, and national consciousness.<sup>7</sup>

h. State. A set of organizations in a society that interact with other formal and informal organizations. A state is distinguished by its ability to require obedience and loyalty and to institute binding rules.<sup>8</sup>

i. Nationalism. A political ideology that holds that the nation and state--namely, territorial and political loyalties--should be congruent. Nationalism can be interpreted in two ways: as a doctrine about the character, interests, rights, and duties of nations; and as a description of an organized political movement designed to further the alleged aims and interests of nations seeking independence or national unity.<sup>9</sup>

j. Democratic Peace Theory. A contemporary theory that suggests as its basic premise that democracies do not fight democracies.

k. Liberal Democracy. A system of government which promotes the freedom and rights of the citizen and is created by the represented consent of the governed.

### Limitation and Delimitations

This research focuses on post-Cold War relations between nation-states. It concerns itself with interstate conflict and only with intrastate conflict as it affects state transition. The examination of conflict pertains only to those which have implications on the international society.

This research thesis is of a theoretical and analytical nature. Therefore, it will not lend itself to the limitations experienced by the quantitative, statistical, and survey-oriented study. The only acknowledgeable issue will be to keep the study focused on the problem statement and resulting research questions. Political theory can become a behemoth if one loses focus.

Therefore, the project will keep a tight line in adhering to analyzing the stated problem and developing and answering the research question. If that intent is achieved, the thesis will be a sound document.

#### Significance of the Study

It is hoped that this research may uncover new avenues to examine military roles, missions, and employment criteria. This research aims to demonstrate the relevance of past and present political theories to the ways military forces are utilized. We study Clausewitz as a soldier-statesman who saw keenly the interrelationship of politics and war on a national strategic level. Possibly, this research will shed light on the relationship of political theory and its potential to influence military missions. Perhaps, if this project is successful, the Command and General Staff Officer Course may offer an elective on international relations, political theory, and the role of the U.S. Army. The significance of this study is to show the importance of these topics in the professional education of future combat leaders.

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<sup>1</sup>Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman. History of the Idea of Progress. Cornell University Press. Ithaca and London, 1995, 13 and 75.

<sup>2</sup>Felix Gilbert. "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War." Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986, 29.

<sup>3</sup>Francis Fukuyama. "Have We Reached The End of History?" (The Rand Corporation, February 1989), 2.

<sup>4</sup>Leon P. Baradat. Political Ideologies, Their Origins and Impact. 5th ed. (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994), 160-162.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 64.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 61.

<sup>7</sup>Phillip L. Ritcheson, "The Future of the Nation-States." Military Review, 76, (March-April 1996), no. 2, 85-86.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 86.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 87.

## CHAPTER TWO

### CONTENDING VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

The purpose of this chapter is to review some of the notions of the principal thinkers who have formed theories of pacific union and international pessimism. This will be achieved by developing and explaining key writings relating to these theories. First, the theories of pacific union will be examined. This will result in a clearer understanding of this school of thought and the notion of a universal society and End of History. Second, the theories of international pessimism will be discussed. As an opposing view, this may assist in defining conflict proliferation amidst pacific union failure. Lastly, the research will briefly examine some contemporary commentators who address the relevance of these theories to the present global society. To do this the paper will discuss classical theorists and link them to present theorists within the respective school of thought. In order to clarify the classification of the respective theories, these basic definitions are provided.

- a. Pacific Union is defined as the existence of an international society in peace under a dominant political ideology.
- b. International Pessimism is defined as a condition of realism among states with a greater propensity for conflict and war than the perpetual peace of a pacific union.

#### The School of Pacific Union

Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals. Ted Humphrey, trans, Hackett Publishing Company. Indianapolis/Cambridge. 1983.

George Wilhelm Frederick Hegel. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Cambridge University Press. London. 1975.

Francis Fukuyama. "Have We Reached The End of History?" The Rand Corporation. February 1989; and The End of History and the Last Man. The Free Press. MacMillan Inc. New York. 1992.

Bruce Russet. "Can A Democratic Peace Be Built." International Interactions. Vol 18, no. 3, 277-282.

Graham T. Allison, Jr. And Robert P. Beschel, Jr. "Can the United States Promote Democracy?" Political Science Quarterly. Vol 107, no. 1, 1992, 81-98.

Kant, Hegel, and Fukuyama share a belief in the attainment of a universal ideology. This ideology is to evolve through the course of History and result in a metaphysical state of peace. The intent of this theoretical analysis is to describe the broad idea shared by the school of pacific union. The analysis will provide an explanation relating to the primary research question and several secondary research questions.

German philosopher Immanuel Kant is the originator of the basic concept or theory for this research. Kant theorized that through history there would be a move to bring the world into a pacific union, a universal cosmopolitan state. His belief in a universal society existing in perpetual peace was written into various essays from 1784 to 1795. Kant envisioned a governmental system that would provide for the needs of all people. The state of peace would be predicated upon a liberal form of government that provided for the rights and freedoms of man. This liberalism would eventually defeat all other political ideologies and encompass the world in a pacific union.

Kant wrote in the period of the American and French Revolutions. Europe and the world were seeing a major shift from monarchy and aristocratic regimes to empowerment of citizens by way of democracy. This is why Kant's perfect form of government was, for purposes of relevance to today, liberal democracy.

In his essay, "Idea For A Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," Kant provides two theses, the seventh and eighth, which address a unified world.

One can regard the history of the human species, in the large, as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally, and for this purpose, also an externally perfect national constitution, as the sole state in which all of humanity's natural capacities can be developed.

A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accord with a plan of nature than aims at a perfect civic union of the human species must be regarded as possible and even as helpful to this objective of nature.<sup>1</sup>

Kant argues that a

. . . body politic presently exists only in very rough outline, a feeling seems nonetheless to be already stirring among all its members who have an interest in the hope that, finally, after many revolutions of reform, nature's supreme objective - a universal cosmopolitan state, the womb in which all of the human species' original capacities will be developed - will at last come to be realized.<sup>2</sup>

Kant is predicting a one world political system that is, by nature, the optimal state of existence for mankind. Kant believes that the greatest problem for the human species is, "the solution of which we are naturally driven. . . the establishment of a universal civil society administering law or justice."<sup>3</sup>

Kant felt that men are naturally driven by a love of freedom. He related this internal nature to an organic evolution or development for man. In essence, this universal cosmopolitan state or civic union, "will continually dissolve and reform, until such revolutions (like those from which our solar system arose) bring about a self-maintaining constitution."<sup>4</sup>

Kant's second thesis states,

These natural capacities insofar as they pertain to the use of reason, are destined (or determined) to develop fully only in the species. Man alone ("as the only rational creature on earth") achieves his destiny not in one life span but only over the endless course of generations.<sup>5</sup>

Kant's perspective was one of viewing this political idea of liberal constitutional government promoting man's freedom from authoritarian and monarchical regimes. As this political system won out in France and America, Kant felt this liberalism, was the natural destiny for man. Over time, or history, this idea would transform the world naturally into a universal

cosmopolitan state, a community of free, liberal, constitutional states. This civic, or pacific, union would promote peace, as man would have attained his natural end, freedom.

Kant provides a philosophical sketch as to what a perpetual peace would have as its articles. These articles are:

1. Civil Constitution of the state should be republican. This refers to a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order.

2. The Article of external peace refers to the progressively established peace among liberal republics by a means of pacific union. The pacific union is limited to a treaty of the nations among themselves which maintains itself, prevents wars, and steadily expands.

3. The third article established a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. It calls for universal hospitality and the recognition of the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility when he arrives upon the soil of another (country). The first section of this third article states, "standing armies shall be gradually abolished."<sup>6</sup>

In this universal society treaties must be established among nations and trust is a cornerstone.

The initiator of pacific union theory promotes a universal society of liberal states which by the nature of their common political ideology will live in perpetual peace. The universal society is, then, an alliance of politically liberal states. It is a society that from Kant's introduction would have evolved over history.

What this presently relates to is a theory of democratic peace that maintains liberal democratic states do not war against one another. This is a theory that writers such as Bruce Russett support. It also can be evidenced in the security strategy of the United States. If this premise holds true for the members of the universal society, then, what is the need for large military forces? Indeed, a reduction in arms was addressed by Kant in his third article for

perpetual peace. As this relates to the post-Cold War era, those who promote Kant's view would say former states of the Soviet Union will live in peace once they accept liberal democratic principles as members of this universal cosmopolitan state. Of course, the international pessimists, or often called realists, would refute this according to their belief that domestic acceptance of democracy does not guarantee conflict free foreign policies toward other states.<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, this theory of democratic peace is a contemporary view that builds upon Kant's universal cosmopolitan state. Theorists supporting democratic peace believe that perpetual peace is created by a universal existence of democratic norms.<sup>8</sup>

What these theorists promote is a contemporary universal society of liberal democracies as the means to stability in the international society. If all states transition to democracy then, by that commonality conflict is negated and stability created. Some of these theorists believe the United States can and should promote democracy in the global society. Graham T. Allison Jr. And Robert P. Beschel Jr. offer some initiatives for this process.

1. Demonstrate and communicate democratic society's superior performance.
2. Build an international security, economic, and political order favorable to democracy.
3. Promote pluralization of societies and the development of civil society.
4. Encourage the evolution of a democratic political culture.
5. Strengthen democratic institutions.
6. Assist the development of market economies.
7. Socialize the military and the security forces to respect democratic norms and values.
8. Nurture and support leaders who are building democracy.
9. Provide sustained advice and assistance about critical choices in the transition to democracy, market economies, and cooperative international relations.
10. Be sure to differentiate between various regions and countries.<sup>9</sup>

Kant, and indeed democratic peace theorists, believe in the attainment of this universal society by organic means, by growth. This view, however attractive, has not proved practically or intellectually dominant. The evolution of History, in terms of ideological development, has another means. This means is progress by struggle. The contrast here is the distinction between creation of a universal society organically (by growth) or by a dialectic process of change (by struggle). This section will now examine how liberal democracy has supposedly evolved through History and defined the "End of History."

The second research question asks what is the End of History? First, there must be a definition of what History, the reification of the collective journey of time, means in the context of this project. Hegel viewed History as progression to an unknown but fixed end state by struggle. It is the Hegelian dialectic model of struggle that relates to this research. This model, beginning with Hegel, used by Karl Marx and Francis Fukuyama has been the dominant model of progress in predicting economic and societal development. Hegel set forth a dialectic process that he believed would develop man into an endstate he termed, "the Idea." This idea was preordained by God and was an inevitable state to which the world would progress. Fukuyama feels that liberal democracy, as promoted by Kant, has survived the struggles and conflicts through History and is the basis for the universal cosmopolitan state.

Hegel's dialectic process looked like this:




Fig 1. Hegel's Dialectic Process

History, for Hegel, is the story of the development of the consciousness of freedom in the world - the development of the human spirit in time through the growth of its own self-consciousness.<sup>11</sup>

Hegel terms man's consciousness as *spirit* and states,

World history in general is thus the unfolding of Spirit in time, as nature is the unfolding of the Idea in space. If we then cast a glance at world history in general, we see an enormous picture of actions and changes, of infinitely varied formations of peoples, states, individuals - in restless succession.<sup>12</sup>

Hegel suggests that through History progress is achieved by the struggle of ideas that improve upon themselves. The end state will be a perfected and ordained state of existence for mankind.

This restless succession through History is the dialectic process. It represents a transformation of the Spirit manifesting, developing, and perfecting itself into its full realization. It is a process by which the Spirit undergoes a series of elaborations of its own self through endeavors of differing directions exercising it in an inexhaustible variety of ways.<sup>13</sup>

The process is as illustrated in Figure 1. The Spirit started as an idea or thesis. Diametrically opposed, in fact growing out of inadequacies of the thesis, an antithesis is also created. This tests the thesis through struggle to produce a new thesis. This new thesis is a synthesis of the thesis and antithesis and represents a summation of all good parts. This process continues through history until the Spirit is perfected and the Idea is attained. Hegel differs from Kant in that his evolution is by material action, struggle. Kant expounds a natural or organic transformation in the global society.




Fig 2. Marxian Dialectic Process

Karl Marx adopted the dialectic and structured it to represent his theory of political ideological development. This was Marx's dream of how he saw this revolution of reforms evolving through history driven by control over the means of production. Of course, this has not been the case, and his final endstate was not realized. Nevertheless, this notion of progress serves as a paradigm to view the development of liberal democracy through history. This model can now be redesigned to look like this:




Fig 3. Fukuyama's Proposed Dialectic Process

Democracy did meet revolutionary challenges throughout history and seemingly has emerged victorious. This is what many proclaimed as truth upon the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. Of course, this diagram is a crude

depiction but follows the same process as Hegel and Marx. If the diagram does represent truth, where are we?

Francis Fukuyama, a former deputy director of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning staff, postulates that History, defined as the ideological struggle of political systems, has drawn to, or is drawing to an end. Fukuyama argues that it has been the triumph of liberal democracy that has brought the world into an existence of a universal cosmopolitan state or, what this research has termed a universal society. This triumph of liberal democracy will be the catalyst promoting a pacific union among states as they come into the democratic fold.

Fukuyama believes that the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could never be improved upon. This is a something of a fallacy in his use of Hegel's dialectic process. Hegel's dialectic does not suggest an absolute progression but rather a progression of a thesis through a synthesizing process. Nevertheless, Fukuyama feels we have reached history's end, at least in so far as the evolution of ideology. We exist in states that are:

Liberal because, they recognize and protect through a system of law man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed.<sup>15</sup>

An operational definition of the post-Cold War world in terms of Kant, Hegel, and Fukuyama can therefore be deduced. It is a world that attempts to establish a universal society operating in pacific union, perpetual peace, and under the maxims of liberal democracy. It is an order that has developed through periodic ideological struggle and resulted in a utopia free of distrust and conflict. If this is the operational definition from those promoting the school of pacific union, have we indeed reached the end of history?

The answer is no. We have not attained the utopic universal society, pacific union, or perpetual peace. A major reason is because liberal democracy, as defined by the U.S. and other major Western powers, has not transcended the world. In opposition to Fukuyama, liberal

democracy has not synthesized over this history, and therefore there are still significant gaps in its worldwide acceptance, interpretation, and implementation. How then do we reach this universal society?

Those of the school of pacific union believe in democratic peace theory which holds as its main rule, that democratic states do not have a great propensity to war against each other. The mission now is to convert nondemocratic states, with a higher propensity for conflict, to liberal democracy. The National Security Strategy of February 1996 is entitled, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." This strategy directly addresses promoting democracy as:

A framework of democratic enlargement that increases our security by protecting, consolidating, and enlarging the community of free market democracies. Our efforts focus on strengthening democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, and other new independent states of the former Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup>

Pacific union and democratic peace theory means advancing democracy to attain the universal society. This universal society also means assuring the security of interests by way of conflict reduction, or at least reduction of perceived conditions promoting conflict, the existence of non-democratic states and controlled economies.

This national strategy of enlargement and promotion of democracy leads to the National Military Strategy. The National Military Strategy addresses the international environment in terms of regional instability, transnational dangers, and importantly, dangers to democracy and reform. One military objective is to "promote stability."

A primary thrust of our strategy must be to promote a long-term stability that is advantageous to the United States. Our strategy further promotes stability in order to establish the conditions under which democracy can take hold and expand around the world. We intend to use daily, peacetime activities of the Armed Forces to pursue this effort. U.S. forces stationed overseas, as well as those temporarily deployed, participate with allies at all levels in cooperative and defensive security arrangements that help preclude conflict and foster the peaceful enlargement of the community of free market nations.<sup>17</sup>

Herein lies the ironic implication for the military, for this research, the U.S. Army, from the school of pacific union. The universal cosmopolitan state promotes peace, the dissipation of conflict, and the eventual eradication of standing armies. The post-Cold War era has meant a reduction in military personnel and resources. The irony is that examination of Cold War versus post-Cold War Army Green (the annual status report of the Association of the United States Army) reveals an enlargement in military roles and missions in the emerging global society. In short, forces are down but demand has not withered away.

The apparent consequence of the triumph of the views of the school of pacific union is that the composition of the Army has changed and the nation has reexamined its size. At the same time, the roles and missions of the Army have expanded. These issues will be further expounded upon later in this research.

In conclusion, the school of pacific union was established by the philosophy of Kant in his belief in an emerging universal cosmopolitan state. Presently, democratic peace theorists have embraced this philosophy and support the creation of a universal society of liberal democracies to promote global stability. There are, however, two means to achieve this end, organic transition or dialectic struggle. In the examination of contemporary theorists and administration strategies the former is preferred. This has become a strategic objective for the U.S. in the post-Cold War world. However, the task will not be easy, for conflict continues to dominate the global society.

The next task for the project is to review the relevant literature of the international pessimists. If liberal democracy was to have won over the global world, why are there still conflicts and nondemocratic states?

## The School of International Pessimism

Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. The World's Great Classics. Grolier Inc., New York, 1978.

Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. New York, 1950.

Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1981.

John J. Mearsheimer. "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War." The Atlantic Monthly. August 1990. 266, no. 2, 35-50.; "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War." International Security, Vol 15, No. 1, Summer 1990, 5-56.

In opposition to those subscribing to Kant's notions of pacific union and perpetual peace are theorists who address the nature of conflict. For the purposes of this study they are called international pessimists. These writers and theorists are also called realists. For these writers, perpetual peace is not an attainable goal. Four theorists and their ideas will be examined here: Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Robert Gilpin, and John J. Mearsheimer. These theorists, by no means, represent the entire school of international pessimism. These writers do, however, form a basis to examine theories on conflict proliferation and its impacts in the post-Cold War era.

Niccolo Machiavelli is credited with revolutionizing military thought and practices of war during the Renaissance of late fifteenth and early-to-mid-sixteenth centuries.<sup>18</sup> It is not his theories on the art of war that interests this project, rather his theories on war and the state. In his book The Prince Machiavelli ensures fame to a new ruler who would introduce new laws of warfare. These new laws of warfare greatly resembled the old laws of Roman military order. Machiavelli believed

Because the life of the state depends on the excellence of its army, the political institutions must be organized in such a manner that they create favorable preconditions for the functioning of the military organization.<sup>19</sup>

Machiavelli did not see perpetual peace or pacific union as a natural state for man. For Machiavelli,

It is very natural, therefore, for states and their rulers to wish to expand and to conquer. War is the most essential activity of political life.<sup>20</sup>

Machiavelli assumed the continuing existence of struggle. There was never to be an “age of peace” as pacific union theorists would use the term but rather various periods of peacetime. Peacetime was only a period before the next war and that is how the true ruler or the Prince should view the world. Machiavelli states, “A wise leader should keep the necessity of training always in mind and insist on it in peacetime as well as in wartime.”<sup>21</sup> As quoted from The Prince,

A Prince, therefore, ought never to allow his attention to be diverted from warlike pursuits, and should occupy himself with them even more in peace than in war.<sup>22</sup>

Machiavelli characterizes the wise Prince as one who

... pursues such methods as these (war), never resting idle in times of peace, but strenuously seeking to run them to account, so that he may derive strength from them in the hour of danger, and find himself ready should Fortune turn against him, to resist her blows.<sup>23</sup>

Unlike pacific union theorist Immanuel Kant, Machiavelli believed military might and power through conquests prove the worth of the state and its ruler. Peacetime is a period of interlude between wars to improve upon, to use a modern lexicon, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Peacetime is not a time for reduction, but rather “re-loading” to maintain the strength of the state. International relations are to be negotiated from a position of power.

In a chapter titled, “Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States,” Machiavelli says, “. . . States powerful enough to keep an army in the field are never overthrown.”<sup>24</sup> As Felix Gilbert observes,

Machiavelli was one of the first to grasp the competitive nature of the modern state system - that as his reluctant follower, Frederick II of Prussia, wrote “s’agrandir” is the “Principe permanent” of the policy of state and to conclude that the existence of a state depends on its capacity for war.<sup>25</sup>

Machiavelli first put forth a thesis, later to be used by Clausewitz, that the aim of war is to subject the enemy to your will.<sup>26</sup> The interwar period represents a time of review and preparation for the next inevitable conflict, or, as John F. Kennedy once stated, “Absence of war is not peace.”<sup>27</sup>

The pacific union theorist believes in a predestined, natural, and metaphysical state of man in peaceful habitation. If they are wrong what is the nature of man? Can the world be as Machiavelli states, “For with contempt on one side, and distrust on the other, it is impossible that men should work well together.”<sup>28</sup>

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an English sociopolitical writer who gained fame as an early political theorist of the realist perspective on international relations. In his writings he evolved as one of the foremost theorists on the state and the nature of power. Leviathan is his most famous work. It was written against the backdrop of the English Civil War. Hobbes’ impact on realist perceptions on international relations emanates from two topics--the “state of nature” and natural law. For Hobbes this state of nature compares to an anarchic international system, a world without central authority. Hobbes, like Machiavelli, believes that security and order in the state are of supreme importance. Hobbes leaves little hope either for international cooperation among states or for the resolution of the effects of the international system’s anarchic structure.

Hobbes never actually claims that this “state of nature” existed but rather imagines this as the existence of man prior to the birth of civil society. It is really an attempt to force thought on what the world would be like without governmental authority. Hobbes believes that in the nature of man there are three principal causes of quarrel; competition, diffidence, and glory.<sup>29</sup> As these characteristics of man are manifested in the state the global society becomes one of contention.

Hobbes view of human nature is that,

Men naturally seek their own preservation, but being naturally apprehensive of danger from all sources and distrustful of each other, they are driven on to seek power and control

over others. All passions may be reduced to the desire of power. The object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time but to assure forever the way of his future desire.<sup>30</sup>

The sad deduction from this restless desire of man for assurance is complete insecurity. The desire for complete security for one, must in the end result in insecurity for others. These feelings of security and insecurity for man propagate themselves as man creates the state, a society.

In this state of nature men are roughly equal, though some may be stronger than others, and hope for attaining some desired end. This state of nature does not suggest constant fighting, but rather a constant disposition or inclination for war. Hobbes feared that this feeling of insecurity and uncertainty would retard advancements in industry, culture, trading, cumulative knowledge, or arts because the focus is on continual fear.<sup>31</sup>

In comparing this theory against the international system, some deductions can be made. As in the state of nature man is alone, in the international system states work to maintain their independence. In the state of nature, individuals have a predisposition toward war; in the international system, there is marked tension and the possibility of conflict. Hobbes is attempting to frame man, and the personified state, as naturally selfish, distrusting, and suspicious. They are entities which have a proclivity for conflict to secure their ends. Hobbes concludes that this condition of anarchy can only be abated if some common superior power is created.

Hobbes theorizes a "Leviathan" as a supreme sovereign power. The Leviathan is part of a social contract with the players and is empowered and charged to ensure players, states, fulfill their aspects of the alliance. The Leviathan is tasked with providing citizens not only peace at home, but also mutual aid against enemies abroad. The state is the supreme political organization. Unity is enforced by the Leviathan who should regulate factions and deal with the world beyond the borders.

In his time Hobbes believed in the monarch as Leviathan. To relate this to international society in the post-Cold War era, suppose that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. represented two world class Leviathans, in a bi-polar world. Under these superpowers were states or players allied or aligned to one Leviathan or the other. The Cold War also showed that this social contract can be implemented by coercion as well as consent.

Some, like John J. Mearsheimer, would say this arrangement in fact fostered a reduction in conflict as it prevented states from acting within their "state of nature."<sup>32</sup> perhaps offers the most direct theory on the nature of the post-Cold War era. Mearsheimer's article is totally pessimistic about what this era will bring to international relations, especially Europe.

Mearsheimer offers insight into the U.S. dilemma in his article, "Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War." He does not wish to advocate a return to the Cold War xenophobia but realizes how simple things were. He suggests that we may one day lament the loss of the Cold War as it gave order instead of anarchy to international relations. Mearsheimer says that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc has returned Europe, and indeed the world, to a multipolar system, that between 1648 and 1945, gave the world some extremely destructive conflicts.

Mearsheimer offers validation to Hobbes' state of nature theory by stating:

Without a common Soviet threat or an American night watchman western European states will do what they did for centuries - look upon one another with suspicion.<sup>33</sup>

For Mearsheimer the point is that Europe is reverting to a state system that, in the past, created powerful incentives for aggression. He simply does a comparison/contrast between bipolarity (U.S./U.S.S.R.) and multipolarity as a means to examine conflict. By deduction, Mearsheimer concludes a bipolar system to be more peaceful, for the simple reason that under it only two major powers are in contention. Furthermore, these great powers generally demand allegiance from minor powers in the system and this is likely to produce rigid alliance structures.

This then tends to substantiate Hobbes' theory on a Leviathan and its necessity. As long as the social contract of the alliance of states exists, conflict is managed and contained.

If the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact is analogous with the demise of a Leviathan, what of the subscribing states? Hobbes perhaps would say that these new independent states would revert to a state of nature until another Leviathan arrives to guarantee their security, reduce their fears, and incorporate them into a new social contract. In promoting democracy, as the National Security Strategy aims to do perhaps the remaining Leviathan is attempting to expand its notion of a peaceful order by consent. As pacific union theorists might say it is a goal to secure global peace by expanding the universal society.

The end of the Cold War represents the demise of one Leviathan and the reduction of another. The United States no longer is in the power position to dominate its alliances as completely as the Cold War afforded it that opportunity. The post-Cold War era represents a shifting in roles for the United States. Although still regarded as a "superpower," or Leviathan, it is no longer able to dictate world policy. Neither is it able to withdraw from the world. The U.S. is now a lesser Leviathan which is called upon to provide its resources as an integral partner in international stability. Nevertheless, the U.S. does realize the necessity to secure interests abroad to prevent the return of global conflict or even another bi-polar world. The U.S. is no longer a militarized Leviathan but rather seeks to be a diplomatic Leviathan as the premier liberal democratic state.

But, if Hobbes were right, as well as Machiavelli, the remaining Leviathan has some major challenges in the post-Cold War era. It must attempt to engage itself with non-democratic states and extend the already existing democratic social contract. This must be done with states that are distrustful, fearing sovereign infringement. Furthermore, the remaining would be Leviathan must remain vigilant against militaristic and competitive states which seek glory with unrestrained

diffidence. If so accepting of the role as a remaining Leviathan, the U.S. will find itself quite busy with foreign policy and international relations.

Robert Gilpin is a professor at Princeton University and has written, War and Change in World Politics, where he examines several theories on change in the international system. He offers insight to the most dangerous challenge for the post-Cold War Leviathan, hegemonic war. Gilpin believes that hegemonic rise and decline is a plausible explanation of cyclical change in the international system.

In his book, What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict, Greg Carbanan summarizes several theories on cyclical change, one of which is Gilpin's. Carbanan concisely explains Gilpin's theory of cyclical hegemonic confrontation as a means of change in international politics.

Gilpin's theory addresses wars fought between major powers for leadership in the international system, what he calls hegemonic wars. In this theory there normally exists a dominant state in the international system, the hegemon. This state's leadership position has been achieved by military victory. The hegemon's leadership role is based on military and economic dominance and on its ability to provide certain public goods to system members: military security, investment capital, an international currency, a secure environment for trade and investment, a set of rules for economic transactions and the protection of property rights, and the general maintenance of the status quo. In return for the provision of these collective goods, the hegemon receives revenues and other benefits.<sup>34</sup> Hegemonic war, as Carbanan interprets Gilpin, is a direct contest between the dominant power(s) and a rising challenger over the governance and leadership of the international system. Gilpin also believes that this clash between major powers is not primarily economic, it is rather a fundamental clash of strategic and national interests: it is a power struggle, not an economic struggle.

Carbunan summarizes Gilpin's conditions for hegemonic war:

- a. The rising costs of maintaining dominance in the system which include military expenditures, aid to allies, and provision of collective economic goods necessary to maintain the global economy;
- b. The loss of economic and technological leadership to other states owing to uneven rate of growth, decreasing innovation and risk taking in the hegemony, and the tendency for the hegemonic state to emphasize consumption at the expense of investment;
- c. The "advantage of backwardness" and the diffusion of military and economic technology away from the center (hegemonic center);
- d. The erosion of the hegemon's resource base; and
- e. The tendency for power to shift from the center to the periphery as fighting among states in the central system weakens them all.<sup>35</sup>

In Gilpin's theory the culprit is expected to be the rising challenger as the initiator of the war. The hegemon can attempt to weaken or destroy the challenger by initiating a preventive war to delay its loss of position. The concluding implication of Gilpin's theory is that a half-century of peace after World War II was brokered by continued hegemony of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. But, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and a perceived decline of American preponderance could usher in a new era of global warfare.

As more players enter the international arena, these states and their alliances, if nondemocratic and warlike, present a threat not only to perpetual peace but to the hegemonic expansion of democracy.

To conclude, the pessimists offer accounts of states that will oppose either the organic or dialectic expansion of the universal society. These states are left in the global society with a distrusting and competitive nature. This nature may also drive them toward a Machiavellian idea

of militarization as a means of guarding sovereignty and furthering their security aims. The existence of these type states, as defined by Machiaveli and Hobbes, are in direct opposition to those as defined by Kant and Fukuyama. Gilpin suggests that another dialectic struggle may lay in the future under the guise of hegemonic war, perhaps not in a war for world dominance but rather ideological expansion and survival. Nondemocratic states, in opposition to the universal society, may seek direct hegemonic conflict to thwart the attempt to organically transform their existence. Nevertheless, the demise of the Soviet Union, an organic transformation, has left many states which will either enter the universal society, revert to a state of nature, or ally with other nondemocratic states. As Hobbes has suggested, this multiplicity of independent actors promotes conflict proliferation.

#### Contemporary Commentators

Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 12, no. 3 and 4. Summer/Fall 1983. 205-235 and 323-353.

Ted Robert Gurr. "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 38. 1994. 347-377.

Stanley Hoffman. "Delusions of World Order," The New York Review of Books. (9 April 1992). Vol. 39, no. 7 37-43.

Samuel P. Huntington. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3. (Summer 1993); The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of The World Order. Simon & Schuster. New York, 1996; and The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press. Norman, 1991.

Robert Kaplan "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2.(February 1994); The Ends of the Earth. Random House. New York, 1996. 44-45.

The above listed contemporary wrtitors do not specifically align themselves with either school of theory. These writers do however provide supporting commentary that creates the relevance of the theoretical schools to the contemporary global society, the post-Cold War world.

Michael W. Doyle offers a correlation of Kant, liberalism, and the international arena.

Doyle presents an explanation as to why there is the belligerence in the world. Doyle sees liberalism as having a commitment to a threefold set of rights as its foundation. These rights are:

a. Freedom from arbitrary authority, which includes freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech, equality under the law, and the right to hold, and therefore to exchange, property without fear of arbitrary seizure.

b. To protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom. Such social and economic rights as equality of opportunity in education and rights to health care and employment, necessary for effective self-expression and participation, are thus among liberal rights.

c. Democratic participation or representation, necessary to guarantee the other two.<sup>36</sup>

The dilemma Doyle eventually presents is the question of how can liberalism reconcile the three sets of liberal rights? This is an explanation of the conflict in the world. Internally, liberal democracy offers rights and freedoms that are in conflict and are not guaranteed to all. There are groups of structurally disenfranchised persons in a liberal democratic state. Even the U.S. must admit this. On the international level the problems in reconciling these rights have revealed themselves in ethnic, nationalist, religious, racial, and socioeconomic strife. Nevertheless, the universal society of liberal states has grown over history and seeks to expand. Doyle's article documents the evolution of the universal society by showing the expansion in its membership of states. Doyle also acknowledges that externally, on an international level, there exists Thucydides' trinity of "security, honor, and self-interests," as well as Hobbes' "diffidence," "glory," and "competition," that drive states to conflict.<sup>37</sup>

What Doyle seems to offer is that an emphasis must be placed on internal democratic norms and stability in order to promote external democratic transition. Doyle's article does

recognize the theory of pacific union but he feels that any state has a proclivity to war. If internal struggles can be resolved, perhaps a state reacts more peacefully externally.

Ted Robert Gurr believes that these internal conflicts, ethnopolitical in nature, are the areas for concern. He does not believe that the rise of belligerence is a direct result of the end of the Cold War. He suggests that the post-Cold War era has contributed to the trend of increasing the number of states with power transitions. Gurr sees ethnopolitical conflict as the prevalent form of belligerence in the post-Cold War world. In order to promote international stability engagement must be focused on supporting states undergoing political transitions. The main issue lies in the contention for state power among communal groups in the immediate aftermath of state formation, revolution, and efforts to democratize autocratic regimes.<sup>38</sup> Gurr feels that two regions will present the greatest instances for ethnopolitical conflict, Africa and former Soviet and Yugoslav successor states.

Gurr does offer several international strategies to restrain future ethnopolitical conflicts:

1. International law and policy about the rights of communal groups to autonomy need to be clarified.
2. International law and policy about protecting the rights of communal groups within states should be consistently enforced.
3. Systems should be established for gathering information about and issuing early warning of impending communal conflicts and humanitarian crises.
4. Guidelines and instrumentalities for preventive diplomacy in cases of emerging ethnopolitical conflict need to be established and widely employed by the U.N., by regional organizations, by the United States, and by other powers.
5. The peoples and governments of the South (Second and third tier nations or states) need to be actively engaged in identifying and responding to emerging ethnopolitical crises.

6. Finally, international doctrine, early warnings, and the practice of preventive diplomacy need to be backed up with established doctrines of humanitarian intervention.”<sup>39</sup>

Gurr seems to imply that much of the efforts should come from outside the involved state. This idea of intervention by external actors to create order leads to Stanley Hoffman.

The post-Cold War era has been referred to as a “New World Order” by some. In his seminal article, Hoffman refutes this notion by saying it is a world without order. The Cold War, through threat of nuclear war, maintained a semblance of peace and order. The post-Cold War era ushers in a time of an expanding number of independent states, this leaning toward a sense of Hobbesian disorder.

Hoffman asserts that stable world order has four principles upon which all discussions are based;

1. State Sovereignty
2. Self-Determination
3. Constitutional Governments
4. Universal Protection of Human Rights

These four goals for world order are often not easy to pursue simultaneously. Hoffman believes that the key to international relations in the post-Cold War era is prevention and not coercion. It seems Hoffman advocates preventive as opposed to a coercive diplomacy. Hoffman does not believe it is possible for a nation like America to enforce its will except against tiny states or major regional aggressors, i.e., Iraq. Hoffman believes a “new world order” requires collective international and regional organizations that are able to place forces for peacekeeping and enforcement in spite of general notions of state sovereignty and self-determination.

Hoffman epitomizes the paradox of pacific union and international pessimism. He refutes the existence of order but argues peace must be attained through cooperative measures, regardless

of the aims of any respective state. Hoffman feels that an announced long-range goal is the reduction of each state's forces and arms to the lowest levels comparable with security needs. But who will determine a state's security needs? It seems that Hoffman suggests empowerment of the United Nations as a Leviathan, but that may not be feasible. But can external intervention resolve every instance of regional conflict? Can democratic states effect transformation in the global society and erase the existence of conflict by creating normative liberal democracies?

Samuel P. Huntington and Robert Kaplan offer an alternative understanding of the new face of conflict. In his article "The Clash of Civilizations." Huntington states:

It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.<sup>40</sup>

In other words a divisive cultural playing field is developing. A civilization becomes a cultural entity. New conflicts will occur along cultural fault lines separating civilizations. In the world Huntington says there exist seven or eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American, and possibly African.<sup>41</sup> Their lines of contact define the frontiers of future conflict. Future conflicts that will be based on six factors:

1. Differences among civilizations.
2. That the world is becoming a smaller place.
3. The process of economic modernization and social change throughout the world is separating people from long-standing local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity.
4. The growth of civilization consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, western, usually American, cultures, styles, and habits become more popular among the mass of people. At the same time, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among nonWestern civilizations.

5. Cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones.

6. Finally, economic regionalism, if successful, will reinforce civilization consciousness.<sup>42</sup>

What is the bottom line? The fault line between civilizations is replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. Commonality or cultural identity is becoming the new basis for the establishment of alliances, or perhaps, a global Leviathan. Identity is now being defined along ethnic and religious lines. A world once polarized by communism and liberal democracy now is polarized along lines of ethnicity, race, and religion, lines that are commonly reduced to as an "us vs. Them" condition. At the microlevel, adjacent groups struggle violently over the control of territory and each other.

At the macro-level states compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.<sup>43</sup>

Huntington believes that a new axis of Confucian-Islamic connections may emerge to challenge Western interests, values, and power. This is an alliance that will seek to have military parity with the U.S. in nuclear, chemical, and missile weapons capabilities.

The potential conflicts of a new universal society could be classified into three tiers:

Tier 1: Internal State Conflict.

Tier 2: External State Conflict.

Tier 3: Global Conflict.

Tier one conflicts are those which resemble Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda. These are conflicts which must be contained and prevented from spilling over into neighboring states. These are extremely sensitive conflicts to enter into because they guarantee no real clear-cut objective or chance for victory. This is a conflict that can become the "old gray horse" which never seem to be resolved.

Tier two conflicts are those between states and may require large military intervention and deterrence. Tier two conflicts may be regional in nature and possibly threatening to U.S. interests. In hindsight this is where a Desert Storm would probably fit. Iraq's annexation of Kuwait was seen as a potential threat to U.S. interests, the free flow of oil to western economies. This was a contained war in that it never left the desert and stayed in the Gulf region. It was conflict of mid-to high intensity but will probably not be lasting in duration. As in the Persian Gulf, however, the results of this limited type of war can mean lasting commitments. What is peculiar is how this conflict also possesses a tier one quality. In the post war years we find ourselves dealing with an internal state conflict between Saddam Hussein's Sunni faction and the Northern Iraq Kurdish rebels. The forty-five year old mission on the Korean peninsula could also fall into this category.

Tier three conflicts would represent all-out global war. Here is where the possible Confucian-Islamic alliance comes into being. If, as Huntington suggests, China, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria, were to ally themselves against Western interests, there would be a plethora of battle fronts. The problem is, how would this alliance be fought if forces are already committed to tier one and two contingencies? The danger of unlimited war is especially sharp here because of the clear cultural differences along lines of ethnicity and religion. If strategists adopt this model of the global order, where must our future forces structure lie? Huntington does not predict an inevitable major conflict but he urges Western powers, liberal democracies, to maintain their military strength. Conflict proliferation is a major issue in the post-Cold War era.

Robert Kaplan first published his theories of the nature of the "new world order" in the article "The Coming Anarchy." His travels through third world nations, especially in West Africa, are the basis for his recently published book. Kaplan is another theorist who refutes the notions of a coming pacific union. He, like Huntington, theorizes a conflict proliferation rooted in

environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clashes, geographical destiny, and the transformation of war from state warfare to, familiarly termed, low intensity conflict. Kaplan feels that surging populations will place such pressure on basic survival resources and disease as to incite continuous group conflicts.

In direct comparison with Fukuyama and Hobbes, Kaplan speaks of a First Man typified by Hobbes as poor, nasty, brutish, and short. On the other hand, there is Fukuyama's Last Man, who is healthy, well fed, and pampered by technology. The Last Man will adjust and survive the threats from resource scarcity, but the First man will not and will align himself, as Huntington has suggested, for survival.<sup>44</sup>

In Kaplan's theories the greatest challenge for the twenty first century will be tier-one and possibly tier-two conflicts. It will be difficult for the U.S. to "promote democracy" at this level because of the differences between first and last men. If there is a post-Cold War model for this and Kaplan's theory, it must be Somalia. The scarce resource was food, but as the U.S. and the U.N. became more involved in the country, there was an attempt to establish a legitimate, democratic government as a means to the end, stability. This again follows the premise of expanding the pacific union of liberal democratic states. Unfortunately, the clan principles of the first man could not be overcome, and Somalia was left as it was. This then begs the question of the finite expansion of liberal democracy. Is there a limit to the anticipated pacific union? If this is so, and some states never enter the union, then without another balancing Leviathan will the world exist in conflict and anarchy be its dysfunctional order? These contemporary writers all speak of conflict, the spectrum of conflict, and ideals that will polarize states in the post-Cold War world. These events are occurring in the midst of a desire to expand democracy in a universal society in hope of attaining global peace and stability.

## Conclusion

What we learn from these opposing views of international society is this. The school of pacific union wants to expand its union of liberal democratic states promoting global peace. The school of international pessimism does not believe that states, whether or not they are democracies, will be moved to join in a perpetually peaceful union. The United States is caught in a “riptide” of being the potential liberal democratic Leviathan that wants to believe in an age of peace but also must remain vigilant in guarding its own global security interests.

The dilemma is that the U.S. is a major global actor in a global society where independent states value sovereignty and self-determination. If realists are right, then some of these states, also value military power as a means for resolving disputes. If cyclical theorists, such as Gilpin, are remotely correct, at a point in the future, the implications for the U.S. may be great.

The thesis now will examine these theories comparatively against two criteria to further clarify their position. The criteria to be utilized are:

- a. International Relations Among States - Defined as how would these respective theories posture states in foreign policies toward other states.
- b. Structure and Roles of Military Forces - Defined as how would states develop forces and dictate functions and missions to support the state.

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<sup>1</sup>Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, Ted Humphrey, trans., Hackett Publishers, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1983, 37-38.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 38.

<sup>3</sup>Susan Shell. “Kant’s Idea of History.” History and The Idea of Progress. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995, 84.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 85.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 82.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 108.

<sup>7</sup>Christopher Layne. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace." International Security. Vol. 19, no. 2, Fall 1994, 8-9.

<sup>8</sup>Bruce Russett. "Can a Democratic Peace Be Built." International Interactions. Vol 18, no. 3, 277.

<sup>9</sup>Graham T. Allison Jr. And Robert P. Beshcel Jr. Can the United States Promote Democracy." Political Science Quarterly Vol 107, no. 1, 1992, 90-97.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 161.

<sup>11</sup>George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Introduction to the Philosophy of History. Leo Rauch, trans., Hackett Publishing. Indianapolis. 1988, viii-ix.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 75.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 77.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 164.

<sup>15</sup>Francis Fukuyama, "Have We Reached The End of History?" (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, February 1989), 4.

<sup>16</sup>The Clinton Administration, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. (Washington, D.C.: White House, February 1996), 12.

<sup>17</sup>John M. Shalikashvili, Gen, National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement. (1995), 4.

<sup>18</sup>Felix Gilbert. "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War." Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 11.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 25.

<sup>22</sup>Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. The World's Great Classics. (New York, NY: Grolier Inc. 1978), 71.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 73.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 117.

<sup>25</sup>Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War." Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. (Princeton, NU: Princeton University Press, 1986), 29.

<sup>26</sup>Thomas Hobbes. "Leviathan." Great Political Thinkers: Plato To Present. Fourth Edition. (New York, NY: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston Inc., 1969), 373.

<sup>27</sup>Adm. Paul David Miller. "In the Absence of War: Employing America's Military Capabilities in the 1990's." The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Winter-Spring 1994, 1.

<sup>28</sup>Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. The World's Great Classics. (New York, NY: Grolier Inc. 1978), 71.

<sup>29</sup>Thomas Hobbes. "Leviathan." Great Political Thinkers: Pluto to Present. Fourth Edition. (Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, Inc., New York 1969), 373.

<sup>30</sup>Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1950), xxiii

<sup>31</sup>Samuel P. Huntington. "The Clash of Civilization?" Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 56.

<sup>32</sup>John Mearsheimer. "Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War." The Atlantic Monthly. August 1990, 266, no. 2, 35.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 36.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid, 255-256.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 256.

<sup>36</sup>Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Summer/Fall 1983, 206-207.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 346.

<sup>38</sup>Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System, International Studies Quarterly, 1994, 347.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 367-368.

<sup>40</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3, (Summer 1993): 55.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 56.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 56-57.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 59.

<sup>44</sup>Robert Kaplan. "The Coming Anarchy." Atlantic Monthly, 273, no. 2 (February 1994),  
60.

## CHAPTER THREE

### ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to define the international arena operationally in terms of the two competing theories and relate the results to military practitioners. This will be done by comparing these competing explanations of global conditions against two issues; relations among states and structure and roles for armies. These criteria are critical because they can offer insight into state and/or national foreign policies and objectives. From this strategic level some understanding may be deduced as to how the military, an element of national power, may be used to secure these objectives. The aim is to examine how these theories offer relevant explanation for the events of the post-Cold War world. After examining the theories according to the respective issues a conclusion will be drawn as to the relation of these theories to each other in terms of interest to military practitioners. The end result of this chapter is to have outlined a framework of the post-Cold War world in which the U.S. Army will operate. The overall implications resulting from this research will apply to the military establishment but there are unique issues which confront the Army.

#### Relations Among States

##### Pacific Union Analysis

To understand how a pacific union theorist may view the post-Cold War world we should briefly revisit what the Cold War involved.

Fukuyama saw the Cold War as an ideological struggle for the principles of liberal democracy as part of the global evolution called History. It was a struggle that involved a polarization between communism/socialism and western liberal democracy. The world was aligned under two more or less dominant superpowers, or for the sake of consistency with Hobbes, Leviathans. A pacific union theorist might propose that the Cold War drew to an end because of the attractions of the freedoms, values, and principles of democracy. As the world witnessed the defeat of another authoritarian system and the collapse of a Leviathan, a great opportunity appeared to present itself. That opportunity, was the possibility of expansion of the democratic pacific union to include former states of the defeated alliance. The current administration has sought to pursue this logic through its effort to promote democracy and to seek expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A critical premise supporting the importance of pacific union expansion is the democratic peace theory as articulated by Bruce Russett, Graham T. Allison, Jr., and Robert P. Beschel, Jr.

Kant spoke two centuries ago of the development of a universal cosmopolitan state or society.<sup>1</sup> What Kant believed in was not so much the dialectic struggle, Hegel later proposed, as an organic evolution driven by a sort of internal logic of the human race. It would be a natural process for man to evolve to a system that promoted his freedom and his rational good.<sup>2</sup> Kant proposed that the global society of his day would transition to this universal society as a natural process. Kant would suggest that states, regimes, or governments not promoting man's ideological freedom will be overcome by naturally evolving events. Kant assumed that within any society all members would finally subscribe to the principles of one ideology. In the international sphere this ideology would link liberal states together forming a bond that would promote perpetual peace or, in present terms, international stability. Today, this is termed democratic peace theory and the notion is a prevalent belief as to the means of reaching as an end, international peace and stability.

Democratic peace theory holds as its basic premise that democracies do not fight democracies.” Some would say this is a proposition or a hypothesis, but a pacific union theorist might call this a theory that history has confirmed. Bruce Russett, one of the leading democratic peace theorists, writes,

The evidence is now overwhelming . . . that democracies never, or almost never, go to war with each other, as is evidence that they infrequently even engage in militarized disputes with each other, and are less prone than other states to escalate disputes with other democracies.<sup>3</sup>

If this is a theory that gains momentum and support, then the deduction is clear, promote democracy. Christopher Layne, a skeptic of this view, observes,

Democratic peace theory has also come to have a real-world importance as well: Policymakers who have embraced democratic peace theory see a crucial link between America’s security and the spread of democracy, which is viewed as an antidote that will prevent future wars.<sup>4</sup>

The pacific union theorist believes that the best way to have good relations among states is to have them operate within a common ideological framework. The preferred framework is democracy. Relations among states are thought to be better when the preponderance of the states are democratic because such states are less prone to violent actions towards one another. Russett represents the pacific union theorist thought process as he states,

If history is imagined to be the history of wars and conquest, then a democratic world might in that sense represent “the end of history.” Some autocratically-governed states will surely remain in the system. But if enough states become stably democratic--as may be happening in the 1990s--then there emerges a chance to reconstruct the norms and rules of the international system to reflect those of democracies in a majority of interactions. A system created by autocracies several centuries ago might now be re-created by a critical mass of democratic states.<sup>5</sup>

The aim for a pacific union theorist is not to crusade for democracy but rather assist in its stabilization. Thus, it is not necessary to struggle against nondemocratic regimes because the belief is that they will eventually transition to democracy. Although he is surely an international pessimist, Samuel Huntington addresses several indicators or conditions that lead to an organic

transition. In his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Huntington speaks of five changes in the world that have initiated democratic transitions:

1. Deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian governments unable to cope with military defeat and economic failure;
2. Economic growth that has raised living standards, educational levels, and urbanization;
3. Changes in religious institutions that made them less defenders of the status quo than opponents of governmental authoritarianism;
4. Changes in the policies of other states and international organizations, to promote human rights and democracy; and
5. "Snowballing" or demonstration effects, enhanced by international communication, as transitions to democracy in some states served as models for their neighbors.<sup>6</sup>

Huntington later identifies a list of conditions that have favored or are favoring the consolidation of new democracies:

1. Experience of a previous effort of democratization even if it failed;
2. A high level of economic development;
3. A favorable international political environment, with outside assistance;
4. Early timing of the transition to democracy relative to a worldwide "wave," indicating that the drive to democracy derived primarily from indigenous rather than exogenous influences;
5. Experience of a relatively peaceful rather than violent transition; and
6. The number and severity of the problems confronted.<sup>7</sup>

The point to be deduced is simple. Crusades for democracy are not warranted. The pacific union theorist does not desire democratic transition by war.<sup>8</sup> The focus for the strong and

existing liberal democratic states is to provide support and provide stability for evolving democratic governments.<sup>9</sup>

For the pacific union theorist, the collapse of the Soviet Union would be used as evidence of the organic evolution that Kant previously proposed. Furthermore, the success of liberal democratic alliances such as NATO mean stable democracies reduce conflict proliferation in the global society. If these are two basic premises with strong examples, then pacific union theorists rely upon peaceful transitions of states to their preferred political ideology, liberal democracy. The greater the existence of liberal democratic states the better the relations among those states.

#### International Pessimist Analysis

If the pacific union theorist believes the key to international peace and stability is for states to be liberal democracies, what does the international pessimist say? First, he or she would say the pacific union has a finite limit to its expansion. Second, he or she would say the domestic acceptance of democratic principles does not extend to foreign policy interpretation. Third, they would argue that liberal democracy is a western ideal and does not transcend other lines of separation.

In the first instance, and even Russett admitted this, some nondemocratic, he termed them "autocratically governed," states will exist. True, the critical mass of international players may move to a democratic base but "rogue" states will still occupy a place in the order. These states will probably view the expansion of the pacific union as a growing threat to their survival. They may possess a Hobbesian type of distrust and fear for their sovereign security. As the pacific union does not seek to fight, but rather weaken authoritarian states, the use of sanctions and other provocative actions may be viewed by authoritarian parties as equivalent to acts of war. A recent example of this was provided by North Korea during the nuclear reactor crisis. Western powers

thought internationally imposed sanctions would set the conditions for internal failures hastening the collapse of this nondemocratic state. Instead, the rogue state viewed sanctions as an act of war and threatened open war in response.

In many cases the nondemocratic state possesses Machiavellian thought process that will ensure its survival. In this post-Cold War era where the democratic states, such as the U.S. and U.K., have reduced their forces, the nondemocratic states, such as Iraq, China, or North Korea, have maintained or enlarged theirs. So, during this siege period of what amounts to warfare using international sanctions, the nondemocratic states can threaten war to relieve immediate pressures. Another difficulty is that, just as democratic states seek alliances, so have nondemocratic states. It is hard to succeed in siege warfare when the necessary goods and services can be acquired somehow and from somewhere. The perceived Iraq-North Korea alliance exchanging oil for technology is an example. Nondemocratic states will bond for survival against democratic states. They will use the threat of armed aggression as a means of maintaining their status quo in the global society, much as the former Soviet Union did during the Cold War.

Nondemocratic states have resorted to a "circle your wagons" philosophy and remain as vigilant as ever, even if their numbers are shrinking. Nondemocratic states relate to democratic states out of fear and suspicion knowing that the goal of the latter is the eventual demise of the former in the name of securing global peace. These nondemocratic states therefore hold fast to the Machiavellian maxim that the power of the state lies in its ability to make war. This power can be expected to be used to limit expansion of the pacific union and buy time to strengthen the alliance of autocrats.

The international pessimist may also express the fact that state sovereignty and uniquely determined agendas are vital. The domestic acceptance of democratic principles does not guarantee democratic foreign policy. The assumption of the democratic peace theorist is that:

The democratic norms explanation holds that the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries.<sup>10</sup>

Probably, the best example of this in the post-Cold War era is Russia and the expansion of NATO. Russia is of course moving toward a more democratized state of existence but too great an expansion of NATO, democratic states, is viewed as a threat to its sovereign existence. Even the inclusion of Russia itself into NATO is an issue. As Hoffman would suggest, the problem is that this belief interferes with state sovereignty or the perception thereof. In the former Yugoslavia, extension of democratic practices in Serbia may not necessarily extend to Muslims and Croats living in Bosnia. Domestic democratization does not guarantee democratic relations among states.

Lastly, definitions and interpretations of what democracy is can cause problems. East Germany was called the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and North Korea is called the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Perhaps the real hurdle is to get states, domestically and internationally, to define democracy in Western liberal lexicon, but that also would be an infringement upon sovereignty.

In much of the world liberal democracy is considered a Western ideal and this will have difficulty transcending the many forms of cultural, racial, ethnic, social, and religious separations dominating the rest of the world. The pessimistic view would be that these forms of separation will polarize people, rather than contribute to their democratization. In many cases transitioning states contain power struggles among these polarized groups that want democracy but understand a basic principle, Majority Rule. Russett openly admits,

An irony is that the initial creation of democratic institutions may contribute to the explosion of ethnic conflicts, by providing the means of free expression, including expression of hatred and feelings of oppression.<sup>11</sup>

Of course, this does not mean that the effort is futile, but it does offer a contradiction for developing democracies. It is a dangerous contradiction when deeply rooted lines of separation

along ethnicity, religion, race, or socioeconomic status represent group politics as opposed to political party separation.

Huntington referred to these sorts of separations on a larger scale. If liberal democracy is seen as Western, then it will meet resistance against Confucian and Islamic ideals. The political ideology of democracy itself is not as important as the foreignness of the people who promote democracy. In other words there will be a reluctance to accept a western political theory because it seems to pit Anglo-Saxon ideas against Muslim or Asian values. The basic difference in people, color, values, and social norms will restrict the expansion of the pacific union and keep some states nondemocratic or in opposition.

#### Concluding Comparison

In evaluating these theories together on the issue of relations among states the deduction is one of an inherent conflict of expansion versus survival. One camp believes relations among international actors is enhanced by the common ideological bond of liberal democracy. This camp seeks to engage the newly created or re-created states of the post-Cold War era and promote democratic expansion. The opposing camp remains fearful and distrusting of this ideological expansion. This camp seeks to survive as a sovereign entity in the global society amidst the strategy of democratic enlargement. The pacific union theorist desires international stability and believes the best means to that end is a democratic transition of states. If, as Kant proposed, a universal society is created by the common liberal ideology perpetual peace results. The problem for the pacific union theorist is that war, or as Hegel constructed, the dialectic process of struggle, is not the desired means to reach that end. The preferred method is by Kant's organic transformation. This favors the increased usage of diplomatic, informational, and economic means

to lead states to democracy. The military means of national power has a purely supportive position in this game of global siege warfare.

On the other hand, the nondemocratic states have history on their side and military power. They are aware that their extinction or transformation is the goal of democratic states. This therefore places them in a Hobbesian state of nature being fearful, distrusting, and paranoid. Recent history has shown them the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps this is the reason why China places emphasis on economic viability. China, like other nondemocratic states, knows that the Machiavellian theory of state power can neutralize liberal democratic influence. For nondemocratic states survival will depend upon their own alliances, economic development and strength, and military power.

As we enter the 21st century international relations may become polarized between liberal democracies and the others. Liberal democracies are in a race to draw as many transitioning states as possible into the fold. This means that nation assistance becomes the primary focus for a pacific union theorist. Nondemocratic states will be seen as rattlesnakes. They will coil tightly and signal their intent to strike, and if not heeded, perhaps they will strike.

In conclusion, the focus is on further expansion of the pacific union as the means to perpetual peace and international stability. Several hurdles still remain to be confronted; the continued existence of nondemocratic states, the internal and external transition of states to democracy, and the defining of democracy against ethnic, socio-economic, racial, cultural, and religious polarization. One camp is sternly aimed at peaceful expansion while the other staunchly defends its continued existence. How then does the military element of power fit into the international system?

## Structure and Roles for Armies

### Pacific Union Analysis

The pacific union theorist will not focus on maintaining a large standing military force. That is made explicit by Kant under his third definitive article for perpetual peace.<sup>12</sup> A liberal democratic state is not going to war with other liberal democratic states and does not have a proactive stance of war toward nondemocratic states. The funding provided for a large military would be better utilized improving the domestic welfare. Also, as the union of liberal democracies grows, the realization of the need for allied cooperation to thwart aggression also grows. Russett has already been quoted as speaking against unilateral approaches and the issue of legitimacy.<sup>13</sup>

If the end of the Cold War represented the “end of history” for a pacific union theorist, then there is no need for a great military. The move now is to stabilize and support developing democracies against internal factions and possible external intervention. To this end, as this pacific union has grown, allied military assistance has become a necessity.

In the post-Cold War era the pacific union theorist will rely upon diplomatic, information, and economic means to confront nondemocratic states. The reliance will be upon Huntington’s aforementioned changes and conditions to cause the collapse of nondemocratic states organically. Military power is not heavily relied upon. The aim of maintaining an army as a deterrent is no longer a necessary option.

### International Pessimist Analysis

From the pessimistic view, nondemocratic states can easily see and understand the pacific union reductionist approach. These states, in opposite of democratic states, place more effort to the military aspect of power. This of course is what democratic states believe will lead to internal economic failure. But what if nondemocratic states see this, as the former Soviet Union was an example of failure, and seek economic alliances with other nondemocratic states? The means to

block these alliances would be to enact diplomatic or economic sanctions. What nondemocratic states are able to counter with is the threat of armed aggression.

In the days of the Cold War such threats could be matched by an able deterrent force of democratic states. Now in a period of reduction and restructure the nondemocratic states may possess a regional upper hand until strong democratic military alliances can be formed.

Another key aspect to the structure of nondemocratic state forces is their fundamental aim. They see themselves as existing for the survival of their state. This provides them with one sole focus and not competing missions, for example, see the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA). This becomes an issue for a multipurpose force projecting military, such as the U.S. is becoming, when confronted with a struggle whose outcome represents the survival of a state. The leveling of the playing field in the areas of weapons technology and sheer numbers plays a key role. Nondemocratic states may yield in certain areas of military technology but they still believe with Lenin that "quantity has a quality all its own." To combat Western military technological advantages, nondemocratic states are developing weapons of mass destruction technology (WMD) and generally still field mass armies. This is seen as a means to offset Western technological advantage or at least inflict enough pain to cause democratic states to abandon policies promoting war.

The bottom line is that if nondemocratic states think in Machiavellian and Hobbesian terms they live in militaristic states and under constant suspicion and paranoia. This is justified because pacific unionists seek their political extermination as the means to attain international peace and stability. These nondemocratic states, however few, have themselves postured militarily to threaten war for their survival. They do so knowingly in the post-Cold War era because of a diminishing military deterrent on the part of liberal democratic states.

### Concluding Comparison and Critique

In a side by side comparison of armies the advantage seems to go to the non-democratic states. As pacific union theorists restructure and refocus their forces away from prosecuting wars the international pessimists rearm for the next conflict. Forced into a corner, nondemocratic states will use their forces not for expansion but to protect their state or even regional sovereignty.

The expansion of the pacific union will mean projecting force into regions oft time far from home shores to support states in transition. This means projecting a reduced if highly sophisticated military force into the rattlesnakes hole. Nondemocratic states with capable military forces, closer to regional lines of communication, can deliver potent first strikes. To counter this ability, liberal democracies find themselves trading the soldier for technology. Unfortunately, weapons proliferation has become an issue in this post-Cold War world as the military-technological playing field levels, either by legal or illegal means.

During the Cold War the deterrent ability of liberal democratic states was strong and it supported the siege warfare tactic employed against the Soviet Union. This led to an eventual, organic, economic collapse. Pacific union theorists are postured to enhance their democratic, free market society. Today's problem is that a smaller force, heavily deployed to areas of regional instability, and often conventionally outnumbered, cannot appropriately deter the antagonist states. If that is the case then diplomatic, informational, and economic siege warfare may not succeed. This is especially so as pacific unionists move too close in expansion and risk being the recipient of a potent and venomous strike.

The pacific union theorist in the post-Cold War world will task a smaller force with reduced resources to accomplish much across the global spectrum. Nondemocratic states grow stronger militarily, and possibly even economically, and present themselves as fundamental regional powers that will strike to survive.

In conclusion, the global society of the post-Cold War era is similar to a chess game. Liberal democratic states look to expand their domain by diplomatic, information, and economic means to set the conditions for a nondemocratic state collapse. Nondemocratic states arm themselves more militarily to threaten global conflict as a means to maintain their status quo and thwart democratic expansion. Liberal democratic states must be ready to “carpe diem” to promote and protect democracy and its development in the global society. Nondemocratic states realize that their mere survival is at stake and posture themselves accordingly.

The United States of American is viewed by many as the world’s last remaining superpower, Hobbes’ Leviathan of democracy. It has been turned to to accept an engaged role in the post-Cold War era. Former Secretary of Defense Dr. William J. Perry states,

In the post-Cold War security environment, U.S. strategy for managing conflict rests on three basic lines of defense. The first line of defense is to prevent threats from emerging; the second is to deter threats that do emerge; and the third, if prevention and deterrence fail, is to defeat the threat using military force.<sup>14</sup>

The U.S. focus is initially to prevention as a means of conflict resolution. This means that isolationism is not an option, but selective global engagement to secure national, and possibly, collective interests is the aim.

Dr. Perry provides a concise summation for this analysis:

The Cold War is over, but the peace is not yet secure. While the world does not need another Marshall Plan, the United States is building on Marshall’s core beliefs that the United States must remain a global power and that the best security policy is one that prevents conflict. The U.S. program of preventive defense rests on the premises that fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands makes America and the world safer; that more democracy and more free-market economies in more nations means less chance of conflict; and that defense establishments have an important role to play in building democracy, trust, and understanding in and among nations.<sup>15</sup>

#### FINAL COMPARISON AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

This could easily be termed the “so what” portion. The aim of this section is to conclude this research by briefly discussing the implications for the U.S. Army. “Toward A Universal

Society and the United States Army” has been an attempt to define operationally the post-Cold War era in terms of several social and political theories. The conclusion is to articulate what these theories have to do with the U.S. Army.

First, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan had to begin the transition, or reduction, of the Army into the post-Cold War era. General Sullivan stated,

While we cannot know or predict with certainty where the next conflict will emerge, the character of these conflicts poses at least some knowable challenges for the Army.<sup>16</sup>

General Sullivan alluded to three basic frameworks for missions in the post-Cold War era, provision of observers or lightly armed interposition contingents, conflict containment, and peace imposition (U.N. refers to as Chapter VII peace enforcement i.e. war). These three frames are congruent with former Defense Secretary Perry’s strategy of prevent-deter-defeat. During the Cold War, America’s military strategy was one of deterrence and containment.<sup>17</sup>

The change in the strategy has been the idea of preventive defense. Former Secretary Perry asserted,

A renewed emphasis on the first line of defense - preventive defense - is appropriate in dealing with the post-Cold War dangers and is a significant departure from our Cold War defense policies, where the primary emphasis was on deterrence.<sup>18</sup>

What this first line of defense relates to is the idea of supporting and stabilizing developing democracies. What the U.S. Army must now contend with is exploding local and regional conflicts rooted in ethnic and religious hatreds. These conflicts may not threaten the survival of the U.S., as the Cold War did, but can threaten allies and vital interests.

The National Security Strategy of February 1996 is focused toward “Engagement and Enlargement.” This means,

Our national security strategy is therefore based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.<sup>19</sup>

Simply put, the strategy is to expand (enlarge) the pacific union of liberal democratic states (community of market economies) to secure perpetual peace (the safer our nation. . . .). Also, the strategy maintains a vigilance against non-democratic states (detering and limiting a range of threats). The engagement is of course the U.S. military in global deployments as the means to secure the end. To support this strategy the National Military Strategy has as its objectives: (a) Promote stability and (b) Thwart Aggression. The components of the National Military Strategy are: (a) peacetime engagement; (b) deterrence and conflict prevention; and (c) fight and win. These are in direct alignment with former Defense Secretary Perry's "Prevent-Deter-Defeat" strategy.

The pacific union theorist, believing in an end of history, does not view large wars as a threat to democratic expansion. The threat lies in the inability of new democratic states to develop and enhance the pacific union. The focus for the pacific union theorist in the post-Cold War era is to promote and strengthen developing democracies. "In turn, a stable and less menacing international system can permit the emergence and consolidation of democratic governments."<sup>20</sup>

What the U.S. Army finds itself operating in is a dichotomous state of pacific union and international pessimism theory. The Army must support and indeed work to stabilize regions where democratic principles are being promoted. This is to be done under the guise of nation and security assistance, humanitarian operations, counterdrug, and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. Also, in-between this is the mission of deterrence. This was much easier during the Cold War because it was the primary mission. Lastly, the Army must defeat--fight and win--its nation's wars through fighting, combined and joint, in one or two major regional contingencies. Not only does this represent a serious expansion in roles and missions but a great diversity in context and dispersion throughout the globe.

This can be a potential problem if a siege warfare tactic is used against nondemocratic states. Unable, or not disposed to act unilaterally, democratic states must rely upon strong military alliances not only to confront aggression but also to promote democratic stability and support.

The post-Cold War era provides a dangerous stage on which the U.S. Army must act. As a downsized force projection platform the Army must do as it always has, fight and win, and also secure a perceived enlarging universal cosmopolitan state or society of liberal democracies. The U.S. Army is not tasked to execute this strategy alone. As mentioned, the Army must operate in combined and joint environments. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a large, and perhaps even disproportionate, burden in terms both of troops and responsibility will fall in the end upon the U.S. Army. For forces of liberal democracies, the post-Cold War era means both reductions and dual focus. These forces must prepare both for fighting potential wars and also in supporting transitioning states. The Persian Gulf War and operations in Bosnia are indicative of the range of operations to be undertaken. The issue is that the large deterrent force no longer remains a major part of democratic state power.

In conclusion, this study proposes that Kantian philosophy has played a part in explaining the post-Cold War era. The assumptions resulting from his belief in a universal cosmopolitan state of liberal states permeates U.S. security and military strategy. His organic transformation of the global society is accepted by many contemporary pacific union theorists. Although Hegel's dialectic process of History may have a similar result in its end, the notion of struggle as the means is unwelcome. Liberal democracy has indeed weathered several struggles through History but unlike Hegel's model has not synthesized. Therein lies another reason why Kant may be preferred because it promotes purity of liberal democratic ideology.

In opposition to Kant are the theories of Machiavelli and Hobbes that do not offer a peaceful future for the global society. Their notion is one of astute militarization combined with

fear and distrust, a recipe for conflict proliferation. Moreover, such fear and distrust is warranted by nondemocratic states who are viewed by democracies as the proponents of international instability.

Perhaps the end of the Cold War takes us into a hidden war of democratic and free market expansion. It is also a period where new states in transition struggle for political identity and the desire is to have them identify with democracy. In the midst of this hidden war are ethnic, racial, religious, and socio-economic strife threatening the transitions of these states and regions. It then becomes the objective of this hidden war to prevent conflict, stabilize transitioning states, and support the spread of democracy.

This hidden war is markedly different in that it is not a traditional military struggle but one for diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power primarily. The military is in a supporting role to promote the transitioning and stabilize where there is a need.

But, in viewing the Cold War as an "End of History" in Hegelian terms, the valid need for large armies in liberal democracies has dissipated. The result is a smaller force with a greater and ever expanding task. This exists in light of those Machiavellian and Hobbesian type states well aware that they are the objective in this hidden war. Now with regional strength and maybe military parity nondemocratic states pose a threat to pacific union expansionism.

This research was done for the purpose of possibly explaining the predicament for the U.S. Army. These theories offer some explanation to the National Security Strategy and Maxims of the Secretary of Defense. This idea of democratic expansion is not new. As policymakers shift focus in the global society and the military is reduced some military historians may claim "deja va."

The complexity of the post-Cold War era is enormous. It comprises the advancement of democracy and the possible hegemonic confrontation of states. Both of these missions rest in the hands of the U.S. Army, as well as others, to be executed with success. Certain U.S. policymakers

may have viewed the end of Cold War as the “End of History.” Also, some of the same policymakers may place credibility in the theory of democratic peace and the pacific union of liberal democracies. Yet, there still exists a militarily strong contingent of nondemocratic states that may never collapse and join a pacific union. If the expansion of liberal democracy has a finite end, then have the policymakers found the right balance for preventing, deterring, and defeating?

It may be a hard sell to deter a state with a formidable army while your downsized army is spread out supporting, securing, and stabilizing liberal democracy. Therefore, there is only one recommendation that this research can offer. That recommendation is to not overcommit the Army and truly be selective in engagements. Whether one or two MRCs is of no consequence, the issue is what can be deployed and employed. The U.S. cannot go back and recreate divisions so the emphasis must be on force protection.

The U.S. has moved from a threat-based to a capability-based force. It still is in the best interest of the U.S. to determine what force is necessary to prevent, deter, defeat a specific operation or enemy. It may become necessary to include reserve combat forces as part of six-month deployments in tier one, preventive defense, operations. Nevertheless, if, as former Secretary Perry suggested, our main effort should be the prevent line of defense, then the situation may worsen.

The U.S. Army is a capable and quality force but in light of reduction and reduced resources may be constrained not in ability but in capability. The primary function of the Army is:

To organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.<sup>21</sup>

The Army’s capability, as Title X mandates, is to be focused on fighting and winning the nation’s wars. The post-Cold War era challenges the Army’s capability to support and stabilize a universal society.

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<sup>1</sup>Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays Ted Humphrey, trans., Hackett Publishers. Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1983, 37-38.

<sup>2</sup>Susan Shell. "Kant's Idea of History." History and the Idea of Progress Cornell University Press. Ithaca. 1995, 82-85.

<sup>3</sup>Bruce Russett, "Can a Democratic Peace Be Built," International Security 18, no. 3, 277.

<sup>4</sup>Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 5.

<sup>5</sup>Bruce Russett, "Can a Democratic Peace Be Built," International Interactions 18, no. 3, 281.

<sup>6</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1991, 45-46.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, 270-279.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 279.

<sup>9</sup>Bruce Russett, "Can a Democratic Peace Be Built." International Interactions. Vol. 18, no. 3, 280.

<sup>10</sup>Christopher Layne, "Kantor Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace." International Security. Vol 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994), 9.

<sup>11</sup>Bruce Russett, "Can a Democratic Peace Be Built." International Interactions. Vol. 18, no. 3, 279.

<sup>12</sup>Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Ted Humphrey, trans., (Hackett Publishers, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1983) 108.

<sup>13</sup>Bruce Russett. Can a Democratic Peace Be Built?" International Interactions. Vol 18, no. 3, 280.

<sup>14</sup>William J. Perry. "Defense in a Age of Hope." Foreign Affairs. November/December 1996, 65.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>16</sup>Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The United States Army: Challenges and Missions for the 1990s (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1991) 27.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>18</sup>General Dennis J. Reimer, "The U.S. Army: The World's Premier Force," Army, October 1996, 20.

<sup>19</sup>William J. Perry, "Managing Danger: Prevent, Deter, Defeat," Defense Issues 11, no 13, 4 March 1996, 2.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 280.

<sup>21</sup>The White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. (Washington, DC: February 1996), 2.

<sup>6</sup>DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. 25 September 1987.

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