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Ponomarev Assails U.S., NATO Arms Policies
91WC0129A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 11 Jul 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by B. Ponomarev, academician: "Defense of Peace and Disarmament"]

[Text] We have commemorated the 50th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War. This date was a powerful reminder of the problems of war and peace in our own time. The broad masses of the people everywhere have greeted with tremendous satisfaction and approval events occurring in the international arena which have led to the end of the "cold war" and to a situation in which nuclear antagonism between two different social systems is becoming a thing of the past.

The principal foundation of these remarkable changes is improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The USSR's foreign policy, based on new thinking, was met with understanding across the ocean and in other states in both West and East. Specific and serious results have already been achieved with regard to arms reduction, including nuclear arms reduction. Medium-range and lesser-range nuclear missiles have been eliminated. Negotiations on strategic missile reductions are underway.

We are also witnessing a major shift in the political realm through the creation of a new concept of international relations which should have no place for a policy of force or dependence upon nuclear arsenals.

However, unfortunately arms proliferation continues. This is primarily true of the NATO countries. Eloquent testimony of this is provided by expenditures for arms and armed forces. In the United States, England and France those expenditures in 1991 remained at virtually the same level as in the preceding five years, a period when a genuine arms race was underway, motivated by the "Soviet military threat." Total U.S. military expenditures for 1992 are planned at \$295.2 billion, i.e. will remain at the "cold war" level.

The U.S. Department of Defense is drawing up plans for military building in the 1990's which emphasize gradual modernization of proven weapons systems and military equipment.

Nor are the other NATO countries and Japan lagging behind. Japan's 1990 military budget was over \$40 billion, surpassing the defense expenditures of Great Britain and France. The percentage of military production in Japan's economy is growing. Its Cabinet of Ministers has approved a new five-year program for a buildup of its forces in the 1991-95 period. There are plans to allocate \$175 billion for this program, or \$33 billion more than in the preceding five-year period.

Special note should be made of nuclear weapons. It is a well-known fact that enough nuclear weapons have been stockpiled to destroy all of humanity and all life on Earth if they were ever used. Yet nonetheless they continue to be perfected. New types are being tested.

As far back as 1986 the Soviet Union proposed to the United Nations a ban on all nuclear weapons testing, and has on many occasions spoken out in favor of this during talks with the NATO countries. Yet the testing continues. In 1990 and the first five months of this year alone the United States conducted 12 nuclear tests. France and England also continue to carry out test detonations.

Since other states have not given up their testing despite repeated proposals by the Soviet Union to ban such testing the USSR is also conducting a minimal number of tests. In 1990 there was only one underground nuclear test. In the West politicians and military men are saying quite frankly that "nuclear tests will continue to play an important role for the foreseeable future."

At the same time as the Soviet Union is withdrawing its forces from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, by NATO decisions U.S. and British forces are supposed to remain in the territory of the FRG, though in a somewhat reduced form.

In order to justify arming and keeping armed forces in the center of Europe, NATO is once again using the worn-out assertion of a Soviet military threat which it used during the "cold war." In an interview published in the German weekly WELT AM SONNTAG in late May, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney stated that "the USSR still presents the greatest threat to European security."

In particular it should be noted that in November 1990 a treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and the FRG "concerning good-neighborly relations and cooperation," which serves the cause of strengthening of peace throughout Europe and, of course, removes the issue of a "Soviet military threat."

However, despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and despite the new Soviet-German relations NATO continues to exist and to function, allegedly in order to protect Europe's security. Yet in Paris at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) another means of ensuring that security was outlined and set in motion. That means is the creation of organs and institutions to regulate conflicts and prevent war. This approach envisions meetings between heads of states and governments, convening of a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (at least once a year), and establishment of a committee of senior officials to make preparations for the council, implementation of its decisions, drafting of recommendations, establishment of a center to prevent conflicts and to help the council reduce conflicts, and formation of a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly comprised of members of all the member states' parliaments. A recent meeting of ministers of foreign affairs from European countries which participate in the CSCE made significant progress in this direction.

Nevertheless, North Atlantic circles are in no hurry to take that path. A session of the NATO Council held in June 1991 simply avoided the arms reduction issue, even though quite a few general statements on security were made there.

NATO documents and speeches by its leaders continue to refer to the USSR's great military potential. Yet no reference is made to the fact that, firstly, the Soviet leadership has proposed a principle of "reasonable defensive ability" or that, secondly, it has proposed many times in the past and continues to propose reductions in all countries' military potential, arms reduction, including nuclear arms reduction, and a ban on nuclear testing.

A new comprehensive concept for moving toward a nuclear weapons-free world has been developed on the basis of the principles of new political thinking which exist in the Soviet Union and an understanding of the world community's priorities. This concept for the creation of an all-encompassing system of international security was outlined at the 28th CPSU Congress. At the heart of this concept are efforts to ensure the survival of humanity. It includes not only military-political aspects, but economic, ecological and humanitarian aspects as well.

The program for nuclear disarmament set forth in a communique issued by M. S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 has also been developed and presented to the world community.

It must be noted that realistically-thinking high-level government officials are also talking about the need for arms reduction. For example, G. Andreotti, Italy's prime minister, recently declared: "We express the hope that a favorable climate will be reestablished with regard to efforts toward further arms reduction, efforts which laid the groundwork for ending the 'cold war'."

Much attention has been attracted by Francois Mitterand's arms reduction plan. While affirming the general position that it is essential to ban bacteriological weapons and destroy chemical weapons, the French president has also proposed a number of other measures in the realm of security and disarmament.

For his part President George Bush has called on Israel and all the Arab states to ban the production or acquisition of materials for nuclear weapons and the proliferation of such weapons in their region. What the response of those countries will be is as yet unknown. Thus far the region continues to become ever more saturated with all types of arms.

Instances of arms proliferation which hamper disarmament processes cannot fail to cause justified alarm among the masses of the people, those who would be the first to suffer from rising military expenditures. "Militarism is one of the greatest dangers which threaten the freedom and rights of every human being," warns the General Conference of Labor, which has over 15 million workers, primarily Christians, as members. The most important task facing every human being and the world community is in the Conference's opinion efforts to "put an end to the arms race."

Largely similar demands have been put forward by such a major workers' organization as the International Conference of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). On behalf of 90

million workers it is insisting on substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and is demanding a complete ban on nuclear testing.

The World Trade Union Federation, in turn, feels that its priority task is to step up antiwar activism. The 12th World Trade Union Congress, held on 13-20 November 1990 in Moscow, emphasized the huge damage done to the world economy by military expenditures. During its consideration of military-to-civilian conversion the congress noted that the beginning of practical disarmament will cast this issue in a new light. The complexity and scale of conversion processes will increase. They "will require appropriate planning and preparation, as well as the development of practical conversion programs containing measures aimed at preserving jobs, maintaining workers' standard of living, arranging retraining when necessary and ensuring economic efficiency."

The programmatic documents adopted by the 18th Congress of the Socialist International as well as contacts with social-democratic and socialist parties and trade unions of various orientations indicate the possibility of arriving at a common view of the modern world and a largely common understanding of our tasks. Transformation of this possibility into a reality would be a major landmark in the cause of disarmament. We all have a major stake in increasing the role of the working class in social processes and in using its tremendous potential in the transformations which are taking place in our country and around the world on the basis of humanistic and democratic values.

On behalf of the 486 international, regional, national and local organizations it represents the 12th World Trade Union Congress put forward "a trade union alternative" to the present situation in the realm of disarmament, a situation which the congress found unsatisfactory.

What does the mass workers' movement propose as a "trade union alternative"? "Being guided by the goal of entering the next millennium without wars and violence." In order to accomplish this it will be necessary to encourage "development of new political thinking in international relations" and achieve "real influence by workers and the world public on the disarmament process in order to ensure "substantial progress along the path toward radical reduction in and consistent elimination of nuclear missiles, chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, substantial conventional arms and armed forces reduction and a ban on the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction."

The "trade union alternative" devotes considerable attention to the struggle to create an economy of international cooperation in place of the "economy of armaments." It insists on "simultaneous dissolution" of military blocs and a ban on the creation of new blocs which could lead to heightened international tension.

Much work on behalf of disarmament is being done by Soviet public organizations: trade unions, friendship societies, peace committees, women's organizations, youth organizations and other organizations. In June the Soviet

Union was the scene of an international meeting sponsored by the Soviet Peace Fund and a U.N. department under the motto: "Into the 21st Century Under Conditions of Lasting Peace."

All this activity attests to the fact that anyone who does not want to fall victim to the inferno of nuclear war is being called upon to step up the struggle to halt the arms race and bring about decisive reductions in armed forces and ban nuclear testing. It is a well-known fact that today the world possesses more weapons than have ever existed in the history of humanity. Expanding weapons even further would be to strike a blow at the very existence of society. And in our opinion a major role should be played by the workers' movement acting in concert with other peace

movements. It is precisely the working class in league with those movements which can achieve adoption of new major decisions in the field of arms reduction and then achieve practical realization of those decisions and demand full implementation of the decision set forth in the Paris Charter.

In view of the vital importance to all humanity of stopping the production of weapons and allocation of colossal sums to military expenditures, it would be appropriate to hold a special U.N. session which would not be limited just to words, out which would also approve more realistic plans for stopping the production of weapons or their modernization.

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Priorities Given

91UN1766A Kiev URYADOVY KURYER in Ukrainian No 10, May 91 p 7

[Interview with A.M. Zlenko, Ukrainian SSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, by URYADOVY KURYER correspondent V. Dzhyhun: "Diplomacy in the Ukrainian Language"]

[Text] *Over the decades multifaceted diplomacy has been a determining direction of all the work of the Foreign Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR. Ukraine is a member of 15 international organizations and participates in more than 60 permanent or temporary bodies of these organizations. Our republic is one of the founders of the organization of the UN. The Ukraine twice - in the periods of 1948-1949 and 1984-1985 - was elected to the Security Council of the UN. Because of the participation of the Ukraine in numerous international organizations, the Ukraine is well known in the world, and its diplomats are respected as experienced and qualified professionals. Following the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, a reexamination of the Ukraine's place and role in international affairs has been taking place. The question of the development of bilateral relations with other countries has emerged. This is also intensified by the new tendencies that are appearing in the sphere of external economic affairs. This is an interview with A. M. Zlenko, Ukrainian SSR foreign minister, about the above matters by an observer of UTYADOVYY KURYER, V. Dzhyhun.*

A. M. Zlenko - professional diplomat. 52 years of age. A graduate of the Taras H. Shevchenko State University in Kiev. Knowledge of foreign languages: English, French and Spanish. Some knowledge of Portuguese, Italian, German. Held the post of the permanent representative of the Ukrainian SSR to UNESCO in Paris. Interested in sports, especially in volleyball and tennis. Since July 1991 - Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Correspondent] It would be interesting to hear from you about recent developments in the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and about structural changes within it.

[Zlenko] The reexamination and reorientation of external political activity in the Ukraine requires changes of the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in accordance with the tasks of our external - political department. New departments have been created such as bilateral relations and regional cooperation, treaty and legal and other subdivisions. They are fully concentrating on bilateral relations, on the preparation of appropriate agreements, protocols and the various documents that are necessary to create a legal basis for the initiation and development of general relations with this or that country. The activity of our ministry is changing fundamentally in other directions as well. In addition to that, an independent governing body has been added to the ministry: the committee on relations with Ukrainians living outside of our republic. This means more work for us, but I think that the government should devote more attention to those who reside outside of the Ukraine—to all those who wish to maintain ties with the Ukraine, to cooperate, and to wish her well. Thus, in the

new structure of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be represented in an entirely new light.

[Correspondent] What priorities can be delineated in the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of the Ukrainian SSR?

[Zlenko] If one is designating priority directions in the broad sense, then that would be the development of bilateral relations with other countries, more active participation in the activities of international organizations, in general European process and European structures. Proper attention should be given to the international - contractual character of the participation of the Ukraine in various international initiatives; and on this basis bringing our national legislation into accord with international norms and agreements.

If one is speaking about priority directions in the development of bilateral relations, first of all I would like to emphasize the development of relations on a new basis with our neighboring countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania as well as our neighbors situated around the Black Sea which unites us—Bulgaria and Turkey. Together with this, we must develop cooperation with the countries along the Danube. It is dictated by the geopolitical situation of our republic. Among our priorities that we are concerned with are relations with countries where Ukrainians live—Canada, USA, Germany, Austria, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina. And certainly we shall also broaden our cooperation with the countries with which we have already actively developed economic relations.

[Correspondent] The Ukraine maintains good relations with the Italian province of Tuscany, the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Alberta, the German state of Bavaria, Upper Austria, the Chinese province of [Khubey] and others. But there is an opinion that when you maintain relations only with regions, provinces, then the Ukraine also will be considered as a province of the Soviet Union. What do you think about this?

[Zlenko] In the earlier period we were developing relations with states as well as with separately administered territorial units, and we have accomplished certain things along these lines. But prior to the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty, the situation dictated the development of relations precisely with the latter ones. I think that in the present stage of the formation of our foreign policy, it is very important for us to develop direct relations with this or that country. Together with this, one can actively develop economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other relations with separate provinces, regions and states that would benefit the Ukraine. Let's say, at this point a good example of this is the development of Ukrainian-Bavarian relations. It is precisely this that promotes a solution to numerous economic problems in our republic. They also promote the beginning of our relations on the level of the Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The recent visit of the Ukrainian delegation led by L. M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet,

showed that these relations which we developed with Bavaria facilitated our relations with Germany. In the talks with the president and the minister of foreign affairs of the FRG, the mutual interest in the development of cooperation between the Ukraine and Germany was emphasized. A good example of this orientation are the Soviet-German agreements stipulated in a package of accords that was just signed by both countries. The emphasis was on the development of Ukrainian-German relations. Germans are well acquainted with the Ukraine, exhibit great interest, possess proper information and openly point out great possibilities of our republic such as economic, scientific and other areas that, unfortunately at present, are not fully realized.

[Correspondent] As the question of our intent to visit Germany came up, one could not avoid mentioning a TV report on "Vremya" in which the Moscow correspondent ironically poked fun at the desire of the Ukrainian parliamentarians to conduct negotiations in their native language. What was the reaction of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to this report and what is your comment on this?

[Zlenko] No doubt, this report contained disrespectful treatment of our language. This, frankly, greatly surprised us and was also noticed by the German side. The correspondent himself was not present at that meeting and it is not known from what sources he obtained such biased information. On the instruction of the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our republic lodged a complaint personally with the chairman of the All-Union TV and Radio Company, L. Kravchenko, and demanded that no such behavior be tolerated in the future. Moreover, one has to add that this type of reporting will not promote a solution of our various problems in search of the most acceptable approach to the formation of a new Union of Sovereign States. If this is the official policy, it is shortsighted; if this is not the policy - such reports bring little honor or none to either an individual correspondent or the TV and Radio Company as a whole. I wish to add further that the leadership of the FRG received the Ukrainian delegation in a most good natured fashion. Frank and friendly discussions took place which reflected the mutual respect. The talks and discussions were conducted in the Ukrainian and the German languages, and did not present any problems to our partners.

[Correspondent] Ukrainian diplomacy is entering upon a new stage; it is faced with new tasks. But, is Ukrainian diplomatic experience of the 1917-1922 period being studied and properly utilized?

[Zlenko] The period of 1917-1922 was very complicated for the Ukrainian diplomacy. An open struggle for power was taking place. You know in what difficult conditions the Ukrainian republic was at that point. By the way, only recently we organized a "round table" program at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at which various phases of the Ukrainian diplomacy, including the 1917-1922 period, were reviewed in retrospect by the invited specialists. It was an interesting stage of the development; the activity of

new external-political departments had begun. Diplomatic missions were being opened abroad. The Ukraine was becoming a country with numerous international accords. On the other hand, however, the struggle among various formations went on.

We all are well aware of the fact that this was the most difficult period in the history of Ukrainian diplomacy. After the establishment in 1922, of the Ukrainian SSR, foreign affairs of the Ukraine were delegated to the appropriate Central Soviet organs. Beginning with 1944, which we call a new era, first the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was created and later the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was a period of the republic's participation in multifaceted diplomacy (membership in the UN and other international organizations). Precisely due to our participation in these organizations, the Ukraine is known in the international arena and thanks to this process, the Ukraine was established as the subject of the international law.

[Correspondent] How much is allotted for Ukrainian external-political activity? How much, for instance, does membership in the UN, UNESCO and other international organizations "cost" the Ukraine?

[Zlenko] At present, financing is our most painful problem. Especially as far as hard currency is concerned. At this moment we are still receiving some hard currency from the center, but beginning with the next year the financing of the foreign relations will be entirely the responsibility of the republic. Compared to other countries or the USSR, the expenses in this area are minimal. However, since it is freely convertible foreign currency which is sorely needed by the Ukraine in other areas, the sum designated for foreign affairs of the Ukraine may at first glance appear quite substantial. Let's say - our contribution in membership fees to the UN budget is 10 million US dollars, to UNESCO nearly \$2 million. The total membership obligation to all these international organizations which we promised to support as we joined them, does not surpass \$28 million.

[Correspondent] And what is the state of the relations with the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry? To what extent are the republican ministries dependant today upon the Union Ministry?

[Zlenko] Our relations are friendly and close. We have many friends and colleagues there with whom we have worked for a long time. We are breaking these ties. We considered them to be as useful as extensive experience accumulated from mutual interaction of the MID of the USSR and that of the Ukrainian SSR. We set this as our task to utilize this experience to the best of our ability in the promotion of our interests.

I think it is improper to raise at this point the question of our dependency on the Foreign Ministry of the USSR. We are coordinating our efforts, we are working together and are trying to develop a mechanism in our relationship that would recognize us as equal partners in the solution of a number of international problems. As an example, it was

upon our initiative that the Council of Foreign Ministries of the USSR and the union republics was organized. It is a new governmental organ, the goal of which is to coordinate the work in a such manner that on the basis of mutuality, the interests of the Union and the republics is taken into account.

[Correspondent] At the present time in Kiev many new consular offices are being opened. Will the Ukraine also be opening its own missions abroad?

[Zlenko] Yes, Kiev is becoming a sort of Geneva in its own right where more and more international interests and concerns are making their appearance. In the city various meetings are being held, general consulates and other foreign offices and missions are being opened. Only recently the US Ambassador to the USSR, J. Matlock, announced the opening of new American consulate in Kiev. And recently the governments of Great Britain and Turkey announced their plans to open their consulates in Kiev. There are similar announcements from other countries that are now being considered.

Now as to the opening of our missions abroad. You well know that the Constitution of the Ukraine, especially article 74, and the Declaration of State Sovereignty foresee direct relations of the Ukraine with foreign states, including opening of diplomatic, consular and business missions. There is already an agreement to open a Ukrainian general consulate in Poland and Hungary. But in order to open these consulates, it is necessary to prepare proper documents that have to be signed and which will serve as legal basis for future openings of such missions. At

present time, an agreement for consular conventions is ready to be signed by Hungary and Poland. The draft of a consular convention was given to Romania and Turkey. We will consider our real needs, taking into account public expenses. The cost of opening of a mission abroad is not cheap. On the other hand, one should not view this as merely a financial matter and consider the question of establishing relations with a given country as a completely secondary issue.

[Correspondent] Anatoly Myksymovych, would you share with us your own impressions of how people react abroad, especially in Europe and North America, to our aspirations to realize the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine?

[Zlenko] Contacts with my colleagues and partners abroad attest to a heightened interest by the world community in the development of events in the Soviet Union. Of course, at the same time, there is equal emphasis on preservation of the USSR as a strategic power which makes it possible to support that balance of interests as it exists. On the other hand, I also observed a considerable interest in the development of events in this or that republic. Special interest is focused on the Ukraine. People in foreign countries are closely following the how laws are being worked out by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and what structural changes are taking place in the government. They are also studying closely the development of economic opportunities in the Ukraine. I would say that there is a heightened interest in the area of Ukrainian relations to the Center and in general to the process of realization of the principles of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine.

European Restrictions On Soviet Emigration Noted

91UN2011A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Jun 91 p 3

Article by Vl. Kuznechevskiy: "The Grass Is Always Greener on the Other Side: the West on Problems of Mass Immigration from the USSR"]

[Text] In connection with the adoption of the USSR Law on Entry and Departure, the Western mass information media are discussing very actively the problems resulting from the possible mass emigration from the USSR of manpower and intellectuals. The law, as is well known, will not go into effect until January 1993; however, Soviet citizens are so active with regard to emigration from the Soviet Union that this circumstance is already making Western experts tremble. According to their estimates, in 1993 from two to 20 million Soviet citizens will want to move to Western Europe. The estimates of Soviet sociologists are more modest, but they, too, are quite striking: as of today approximately six million Soviet citizens would like to find work abroad. The numbers of those wishing to leave may indeed prove to be very large; however, some Western experts suggest that for Soviets who have dreamed all their lives about adventures abroad, the West may prove to be a cruel disappointment. The analysis which they cite in this connection forces one to conclude that in general they may turn out to be right.

In fact, there are not so many Western European countries which accept Soviet immigrants willingly. Especially in northern Europe. In all of Scandinavia, if refugees are accepted at all, there is an obvious preference for people from the Baltic republics. For example, Denmark now has about 150 people who have come from the USSR and who do not wish to go back. For the most part these are young people. They are all demanding political asylum, to which the Danish authorities reasonably reply that in their USSR homeland no one was persecuting them for their political or religious views or because of their ethnic group, and for this reason they cannot claim to be political refugees. In an interview with the BERLINGSKE TIDENDE the Danish justice minister stated that "Denmark cannot resolve Soviet economic and social problems by means of our legislation on refugees." The situation is similar in Sweden. And although on the 26th of June a group of Soviet refugees in Denmark began a hunger strike demanding that they not be sent back to the Soviet Union (they had gone there as tourists and guests), the Danish authorities do not intend to submit to pressure.

The English INDEPENDENT writes that beginning in January 1993, when foreign passports will be issued automatically in the USSR, the number of immigrants will jump sharply. Last year, nearly half a million people emigrated from the USSR, which is twice as many as in the previous year. Nearly four million went abroad and returned home. However, the English newspaper writes, the West does not need to fear an unstoppable wave of poor Soviet people fleeing their country in search of a better life. Aside from Jews and Germans, who have the right to live in Israel and Germany respectively, all the rest need to have either close relatives or a specific job offer in order to obtain permanent residence according to the laws of a majority of European countries.

Soviet citizens can no longer cite persecution by the authorities to obtain refugee status. This means that only business and professional considerations come into play. For example, every year Canada accepts 175,000 immigrants from all parts of the globe. It is prepared to consider applications from Soviet citizens, but evaluates them on the same basis—according to professional data—as all the rest. For example, there are some job opportunities for production engineers, and there are positions for physicians who are prepared to work in remote areas of the North. In 1991-1992 Australia will accept 111,000 emigrants, but it has agreed to accept only about 6,000 people from Europe over three years. That is, of course, only a drop in the bucket.

With the exception of Sweden, which grants temporary jobs to a modest number of Soviet citizens from the Baltic republics, the European countries do absolutely nothing to encourage Soviet individuals to work in their countries. Great Britain takes a very hard line, granting a person permission to work only if it is impossible to find anyone in the country who is capable of filling the job. It is true that the ministry of internal affairs in that country is worried by the prospect that Russians will come, as the Poles did in the 70's, as tourists, and when they have used up their meager savings, they will work illegally as construction workers or waiters for low wages. For those who are caught doing this the punishment has been set at a fine of up to 1000 pounds Sterling, six months imprisonment and deportation.

For all of the above reasons these Western experts project that after 1993 emigration from the USSR will increase, of course, but it will hardly reach enormous proportions. And for those Soviet individuals who do manage to emigrate from their country the West may prove to be a cruel disappointment.

(Based on "Intercept" materials).

Free Economic Zone Concept Questioned

91UN2111D Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by S. Tsyplakov, candidate of economic sciences and section chief of the Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: "Everybody Is Rushing to a 'Zone,' Not Everybody Makes It, And Not Everybody Needs It"]

[Text] There are about 150 letters on my desk, all with one single request—to grant a city or an oblast the status of a free economic zone. Had the Supreme Soviet granted even a fraction of these, Russian would find itself "ahead of the whole planet." But will it make the hopes of those who count on changing their lives at one stroke of a pen come true? In principle, the frenzied desire to "get into a zone," to establish direct foreign contacts, is quite understandable and explainable. On the one hand, it is a reaction to the overcentralization and complete absence of rights of regions that has existed for many years. On the other, it is a result of the teasing example of world experience that goes back several centuries. As of today about 600 free economic zones are operating outside of our country in a great variety of forms—multifunctional, technopolises, duty-free, and even banking...

When the process of resurrecting Russian sovereignty started, it gave a boost to the interest in creating free economic zones here as well. In July and September 1990 the RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopted two resolutions in which it granted free economic zone designation to 11 regions in Russia: Leningrad, Vyborg, Nakhodka, Zelenograd, Maritim and Altay Krays, Jewish Autonomous Region, and also Kemerovo, Kaliningrad, Novgorod, and Chita Oblasts.

In itself the Supreme Soviet decision is justified, but the choice of specific areas to be designated as zones is doubtful. For instance, preparatory work on the creation of a free economic zone had been going on in Nakhodka for several years; it included determining the future zone's specialization and searching for foreign partners. Other regions have to start practically from scratch.

Meanwhile, it became clear that this is a far from simple matter. I happened to have been rather actively involved in working out the package of documents in regard to Nakhodka; therefore I know first hand the problems that arise in the process. From the early stages of our work, we proceeded on the assumption that a preferential economic regime had to be in effect on the territory of the free economic zone.

In other words, it was necessary to create a favorable investment climate. This climate, however, is the sum of a number of components, including the level of infrastructure development, tax and other preferences, the skill level of the work force, guarantees for investors, and so on. Naturally, all of this requires serious capital investment. Therefore the number one issue is the financing of the zone. In China, for instance, this problem was resolved to a large degree through centralized financing sources; in our

circumstances it is at the very least naive to count on the resources of the republic or the Union budget. Thus, a palliative emerged—tax credit. That is, granting exemption from payments into the republic and Union budgets, and the accumulation of all taxes at the level of the zone authorities. Of course, this is far from an ideal solution. A credit is a credit—sooner or later it has to be paid back. And would this provide enough money, anyway? Plus, how are they to be provided with material resources? There are more questions than answers.

Normally no special difficulties arise when it comes to preferences for foreign investors. The problem lies elsewhere: whether they are willing to take the risk.

The situation with Soviet enterprises, especially those in the state sector, is more complicated. Aside from everything else, the free economic zone is supposed to become a test site for the economic reform, a pioneer in the transition to the market. This means that there should be no delay in taking enterprises out of the ministerial system, speedy privatization, etc. It is also necessary to think through the procedures for a customs regime, foreign currency circulation, and zone management.

Still, despite all these difficulties the creation of a free zone in Nakhodka is justified. The geographic location, its role as the Russian gateway into the Asian-Pacific region, and extensive ties with international business hold considerable promise. By the way, heated debates in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet during approval of the resolution on Nakhodka are additional proof that the project rests on a solid foundation.

Documents on the creation of a free economic zone in Sakhalin Oblast went through an equally thorough preparatory stage. Various project options were discussed more than once at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, and the State Antimonopoly Committee. When the RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution at the end of May on the creation of the Sakhalin free economic zone, it was the logical conclusion to a lengthy preparatory process. Sakhalin Oblast is uniquely situated in a geographic sense; it is very rich in mineral resources, including oil and gas, and has a well-developed fishing industry.

I will be honest: The Nakhodka and Sakhalin projects make most sense to me, while I seriously question the value of others—with the possible exception of Kaliningrad and Vyborg. Let me try to briefly summarize my reservations.

The size of the proposed zones is questionable. Let me remind you that we are talking about entire oblasts. It is not clear not only how to finance the projects but also how to form a republic budget with such a considerable outflow of capital. In addition, it is hard to provide for the regimen of a multifunctional zone—and this is what all the applicants are aiming for—on huge territories that have practically no "starting base." Also, many of them are quite removed from the borders. This means that different customs regimes will have to be established for them,

which may destroy the unified customs territory even within the RSFSR. Finally, we have to take into account possible negative social consequences. For instance, in my opinion the very idea of creating a multifunctional zone in Leningrad the way it is being envisioned is not well founded, to put it mildly. The city, in which 70 percent of industry is comprised of enterprises of the heavy and defense industries, will require enormous investment in conversion and in the retraining of the labor force. Plus, the process itself will be complex and painful.

The example of Nakhodka makes it possible to discuss other obstacles as well. First, what comes through is concealed—or sometimes unfeigned—sabotage on the part of Russian departments, first of all of the Ministry of Finance, which under various farfetched excuses is dragging its feet in regard to granting the right to tax credit.

Second, the question of the separation of powers from the Union structures in the area of customs and hard currency regimes, property, and payments into the Union budget. Although the resolution on Nakhodka was adopted in November 1990, these problems still have not been resolved. As a result, while it has extremely favorable conditions, in reality Nakhodka has not yet acquired the status of full-fledged free economic zone.

There is one more concern. When Nakhodka was declared a free economic zone it attracted considerable attention on the part of foreign firms and companies. The announcement of the creation of the Sakhalin free economic zone was also met with great interest. However, now that zones are being, so to speak, churned out as if on an assembly line, foreign investors do not take them seriously; moreover, this breeds skepticism in regard to the most promising free economic zones as well. This is only a short step away from discrediting the whole idea.

One cannot fail to overlook the fact that aside from everything else, the mass desire to “get into a zone” attests to a lack of farsighted regional policy. It is true: Many regions, for instance, the Far East, are essentially left to their own devices. Given the current economic crisis conditions, with the Russian government unable to allocate multibillion investments, would it not be better to think about how to expand the rights of the regions within commonsense boundaries, to attract foreign investment, and to activate trade and economic ties with foreign countries, rather than endlessly propagating the free economic zones. For that, carefully designed regional programs are needed. They may incorporate various forms of opening up to the outside world. Judging by all the signs the time is more than ripe to prepare a comprehensive concept of development of the RSFSR’s foreign economic ties. Without this we cannot become integrated into the world economy.

In my opinion, such a concept should encompass all aspects of foreign economic activity, first of all reform of the administrative system, means of attracting foreign capital, incentives for manufacturing goods for export and

replacements for imports, and selection of the most preferable trade and economic partners. And, of course, territorial openness. The locations where the zones will be opened and their specialization should be subordinated to the general strategy of development of Russia’s foreign economic relations. Only this comprehensive approach will produce an answer to the question: What is the benefit of free economic zones for the national economy?

I think that at this point it would make sense to concentrate on the organization of small—in regard to area—specialized zones of a technopolis type, zones of customs warehousing and of economic and technological development. They will not require substantial capital investment, while at the same time they are capable of becoming a magnet for foreign investment. Such projects already exist. One of them involves Sheremetyevo airport; the Canadian company Newbridge, which participated in the creation of a free zone in the area of Shannon airport (Ireland), is interested in this project. The zone under consideration in Sheremetyevo covers three to five square kilometers and could be focused, on the one hand, on science-intensive output, and, on the other, on warehousing and extra processing of shipments.

In my opinion, the idea of creating a small zone in the area of Blagoveshchensk—aiming at China—deserves attention. This project is interesting in that the Chinese side also wants to create a zone in the city of Heihe, located on the other side of the Amur river.

The process of the creation of free economic zones in the RSFSR is entering an important phase. The political decision has been made; what is needed is to specifically define the extent of preferences and economic status. The main point is to make the proclaimed rights and preferences work rather than remain on paper only.

The last point. I want to emphasize that by themselves, free economic zones are not a panacea and cannot pull the republic out of the crisis. They can, however, become an effective way of integrating us into the world economy—if the process of their creation and development is made more orderly and is supported by deep-reaching transformations in our economy.

Sakhalin Free Economic Zone Progress Noted

*91UN2113A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Jun 91 p 6*

[Interview with Valentin Fedorov, chairman of the Sakhalin Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA special correspondents Andrey Lekant and Oleg Rubnikovich; place and date not given: “Time Will Come, and I Will Apply Myself to Moscow”]

[Text] [Correspondent] Valentin Petrovich, the Supreme Soviet of Russia resolution of 27 May, which has approved the blueprint for creating a free economic zone in Sakhalin: In what way has it changed your activities?

[Fedorov] We have been in the process of creating a free economic zone for a year. We are moving forward like a

bulldozer. Nothing will stop us; we step over everything. This resolution and signature have simply caught up with us.

Others wait for a signature, and then begin to create a zone. There are 14 of them today. But it will not work anywhere but here. To become a zone one needs the unique geographic qualities of our region.

In general, a zone is an arm extended into the world market. It has to pull chestnuts for Russia. This is what our unique concept is about. We are developing shale oil recovery and petrogas. Soon we will conclude a deal for billions of dollars...

[Correspondent] How much of these billions will go to Sakhalin?

[Fedorov] We are not going to shortchange ourselves. We will have hundreds of millions of dollars that we will invest in the fish industry. Right now we supply 10 percent of national fish output; in the future it will be 30 percent.

Sakhalin is the only place where one can create a more or less pure model of a market economy. So that later it could be copied by other regions.

[Correspondent] For that, you will probably need substantial foreign investment?

[Fedorov] Not at all. Of course, we cannot stay isolated from the world market—this would be stupid. But the number one task is to develop our own initiative and not to let foreign capital in where domestic enterprises may do. What is happening right now? As soon as something is not going right, let us create a joint enterprise. But nothing here goes right; here, the streets are dirty. Soon we will have joint enterprises to sweep the streets...

[Correspondent] How are you going to provide incentives for domestic entrepreneurs? Is this written up in some provision of a statute or in a law?

[Fedorov] No, this is a dangerous thing—to trust a fool to bow with grace [and he will fall flat on his face]. Suppose we pass such a law, then some official will say: Let us not let foreigners in at all! Therefore, I personally both restrict and regulate. I make trips across the island from time to time and see how things are. Besides, foreigners come to me first; without me, nothing happens.

[Correspondent] Which branch is your priority now?

[Fedorov] Since the most important item is food, I have been personally involved in fishing and agriculture this year. This structure had to be dismantled with care. Then I saw that everything is done there, dismantled, put on the right track and moving. So I started to turn to construction and trade.

[Correspondent] Right now Sakhalin stores cannot enter into direct contracts with suppliers, can they?

[Fedorov] This is my dream: to give them full freedom. We need 20 private stores in the town of Yuzhnorybinsk. That is all. This will solve all the problems.

I tell these idiots—the brass at trade organizations: You do not understand that the sweetest thing in life is inspection. Put these enterprises into private hands and you will only have to inspect. You will stop by and say: "Why is it that you do not have fresh navaga? Why is there dust on your windows? You know, in a market economy they wash windows every day. They even do it with shampoo. They even wash sidewalks."

Those who do not understand this end up being removed. Others have to be nudged. I say: We are going forward; if they do not let us walk forward, we will have to crawl forward; if they start getting in the way of our crawling forward, we will crawl on our backs...

[Correspondent] Are you planning to spend all your life like this... fighting?

[Fedorov] No. It will start working on its own. I felt that for a year: Remember, we used to crank up a car manually?—I had been cranking it up for a year. Now it is going into second year, and the motor has begun to turn over. It is already getting easier.

[Correspondent] You do not have your own industrial goods, do you?

[Fedorov] This is the way the island was developed, and it is our tragedy that everything was brought in. Imports also went through Moscow...

[Correspondent] And you will not have barter trade?

[Fedorov] The Union forbade us; they do not have any logic at all. We have just had a discussion with Silayev in Khabarovsk, and came to an agreement.

However, shore and barter trade have meaning only when there is trade between private individuals. Otherwise, we are just nourishing and preserving the system that we should destroy. Therefore, for me foreign trade is an additional lever for destroying state structures here.

[Correspondent] We gather that you make a lot of unilateral decisions here. Do your activities run into conflict with existing laws?

[Fedorov] They do. I have reached a certain level and, to be completely honest, a certain celebrity that enables me to do certain things with impunity. I have permitted foreign currency to be accepted in hotels and restaurants. Because this is absurd! An American is ready to pay \$100 for a hotel room. He often does not even have rubles, it is Friday evening, and the banks are closed. I tell them: Take the \$100. This is a direct violation. Formally, I could go to jail. Who is going to touch me now? Nobody. But I commit a good deed for the benefit of society. I pump the national treasure of the United States into the Soviet Union.

[Correspondent] In your election campaign there is a promise to implement internal convertibility of the ruble in Sakhalin. Is this realistic?

[Fedorov] In time, yes, it will happen. To make the ruble convertible in Sakhalin we have to nurse the economy back

to health. When goods appear, panic buying stops, and it is possible to buy the same smoked salmon for rubles, and so on, then...

[Correspondent] Then another panic may start: People will rush to Sakhalin...

[Fedorov] We will introduce custom restrictions. This is a great honor—to live on Sakhalin. There are already many people who want to come here. We do not allow everybody to come.

If you want to come here, you may come. But the way Americans did when they were opening up the Wild West. Take tents and the land. If bears devour you, I am not responsible.

[Correspondent] One of your ideas is the creation of a "market platform" in the CPSU. But the "Communist Party Manifesto" calls for the destruction of private property. What is your attitude toward this contradiction?

[Fedorov] There is this kind of stratification inside the party right now... Take Ruts koy—"Communists for Democracy." What democracy? It is catchy. Where does their program go from there? We need to create an economic democracy. We still have a state-run economy—about 90 percent of it. It is always forcible. Therefore, we now need to forcibly implant economic democracy.

I am a party member myself. We have 40,000 communists here. I can appeal to them, and they do not attack me... I want to make the party a tool for the people.

[Correspondent] But why this party, with its Marxist dogmas?

[Fedorov] But if they are such fools that they keep me in the party, let it be. Let it be. Goebbels used to say: We despise your democracy, but if you are such fools that you let us exist, we will charge into your flock of sheep like wolves and will cut your throats!

This is exactly what they have done. I am telling them straight: Yes, we are building a market economy, which is—capitalism. They keep silent, do not expel me. I, on the other hand, am using them.

[Correspondent] How long, in your opinion, will the transition period last?

[Fedorov] We will achieve a tangible market in about 10 years. This is just another reckless undertaking being started in Moscow—fast forward to a market. It is good that the 500 Days program has not been put into action—it is absurd.

I have my own transition model: 500 weeks. There are two main principles: to create new, nonstate structures, and to cautiously destroy old ones. And the attitude should be different. Toward the old—the same strict discipline of the rod, the administrative command system. They do not understand anything else. The new structure is being born free and will develop free.

Because of the rigid attitude toward the old system, we keep production at the old level, while the new one expands and creates surplus. But we cannot tolerate it forever; after all, we are democrats and we are supposed to destroy it. How? By taking a 10 percent lease on freedom each year, and reducing state orders by 10 percent.

[Correspondent] Have you destroyed anything yet?

[Fedorov] Unthinkingly—nothing. We are transferring some enterprises and sovkhozes into an association of small enterprises now.

[Correspondent] Have you ever thought that you would shift away from science into the practical sphere?

[Fedorov] Never. I received my doctorate in world economics at the age of 37. Then what? Then a corresponding member, and then a full member of the Academy of Sciences. But I saw that they were going the wrong way, and started to propose...

People elected me deputy. Then, when they started looking for a chairman of oblast executive committee, they said: "Here is this Fedorov, he was proposing things to us... If he is so smart, let him go ahead." So I came here. I told the deputies of my program once more. They elected me: 87 votes out of 97. And, of course, "the left" voted for me. The "ultra-left" or the "rascal left"... They miscalculated.

What did they think? Well, Fedorov is a professor, and in the area of world economy at that. He does not know Sakhalin, its specific economy; we will elect him, so he will preside over it in his chair while we run the shop. Yes, we, guys! Instead, I would not even let them into my office.

[Correspondent] Who do you feel you are now—a Sakhaliner or a Muscovite?

[Fedorov] A Sakhaliner. Not a Muscovite. The time will come when we will achieve real successes; then I will apply myself to Moscow. I will go there with my Sakhalin team, take a broom and sweep all of them there aside. All of them!

[Correspondent] What was this conflict you had with Gorbachev after the joint trip to Japan?

[Fedorov] Whose interests is the president supposed to represent, let me ask? When he goes to Japan and signs a statement in which I see three miscalculations, three concessions?

The first miscalculation is about the Kurils. He mentioned four islands. On what grounds? In the 1956 document the Japanese are referring to, there are two; then he went there, and there are four!

Second. The arrangement that makes it possible for the Japanese to visit these four islands without a visa. That is fine, but what about us? Why can residents of these four islands not visit Japan without visas?

The third question is unilateral reduction. And what about them? Nothing. Draw your own conclusions.

[Correspondent] What about you—you are not planning to give the Japanese the right to visit without visas, are you?

[Fedorov] I have no burning desire to do so. Only on a reciprocal basis. At my level I have already suggested to the governor of Hokkaido: Let us suspend the visas, we are neighbors, there are only 40 kilometers separating us. What bothers you? You have nothing to lose. There are 720 of us here, and over 5 million of you on Hokkaido. You will flood us, but we are not afraid! They do not want to. All right. Next I say: We have sister cities, let us suspend visas for them. They just shake their heads: "No, first you give us back..." We do not need you! We will do everything ourselves...

The conversation ended in an unexpected way: Valentin Pavlovich gave us a fresh issue of the Sakhalin MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. On the first page is his interview: "My Stockholm Is Here," on the occasion of Fedorov being awarded a doctor of science degree at an American university; there is also a photo of the professor in a gown and a traditional mortarboard; in the centerfold—romantic song lyrics he has penned: "Live flowers—they stand and they fade..."

"Are you surprised? Now it will be put to music and people will be sending me the scores. Tomorrow the whole of Sakhalin will be singing it," Fedorov said, modestly.

Problems for Nakhodka Free Economic Zone

91UN2078A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
21 Jun 91 p 2

[Article by Lev Freynkman, member of group of experts of the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and economist Vitaliy Burtolikov: "FEZ—One More Magic Wand?"]

[Text] On the shores of the Pacific Ocean, not far from the roaring cranes of the port of Nakhodka, construction has begun on an international trade center—the first brick in the structure called the "free economic zone [FEZ] of Nakhodka." It is still difficult to imagine that within some five to 10 years a flourishing city will stand on the spot of this God-forsaken corner of the Far East, our Soviet Hong Kong or Singapore—a zone that is attractive to business, trade, and world tourism. There are already quite a few overtures and enthusiasm. But everything is not that simple.

It is true that Nakhodka is conveniently situated in a transportation sense, alongside one of the most dynamically developing parts of the world economy. It is understandable that it is very tempting to try to take advantage of these factors. But it must be realized that Nakhodka in itself is no more attractive to foreign businessmen than the Philippines, Malaysia, or Thailand. If the conditions for business in Nakhodka and Chinese free economic zones are compared, the choice clearly will not be in favor of the former. Nakhodka represents an interest only in the remote future, as part of the enormous market of the entire Soviet Union. However, whether this interest is realized

depends not so much on the forethought given to the conditions for organizing a Nakhodka zone as on how the economic reorganization fares on the scale of the entire country. But here, as we all realize, there is still nothing to brag about, although perhaps this is a unique trump card.

Therefore, in order that the free economic zone begin to function in the near future, without waiting for the full and, apparently, slow victory of market relations in our immense space, it is necessary, as stated in the Regulations on the Nakhodka free economic zone, "to guarantee favorable conditions to attract foreign capital, technology, and managerial experience and also the potential of Soviet enterprises to resolve tasks of the socioeconomic development of the zone." We will decipher this. In order for foreigners to be able to come to Nakhodka and survive in it, it is necessary to create an acceptable infrastructure for them—communications, transport, hotels; introduce favorable taxation and customs procedures; establish a developed currency-financial economy; and set up a system of foreign economic information. This will take more than a year or two. Therefore, if "everything, immediately" is expected from the zone, the ensuing disappointment is inevitable. Major investments, principally in currency, will be needed: Where they will come from is still not fully understood.

The regulations on the zone in Nakhodka stipulate specific incentives for the development of its social sphere and infrastructure, including total exemption from taxation of all profits of enterprises invested in the development of the zone; the share of taxes has been reduced up to 70 percent on profits transferred from the local budget to higher levels; and major advantages have been introduced in the use of income. The Russian Council of Ministers has also found centralized means to assist Nakhodka—favorable credit has been extended from general republic sources, a number of ministries have received specific tasks in building an infrastructure of installations, plans have been made to transfer a military airfield to civilian use, and others. But all of this is a drop in the ocean. Indeed, there has still been no noticeable movement forward.

This situation is commented on by S. Tsyplakov, RSFSR people's deputy and a member of the Committee on International Affairs: "The organization of the Nakhodka zone is moving with a great deal of difficulty. Implementation of the project is running into two types of problems. First and foremost is the question of enterprises that are Union property. In particular, in the decree on Nakhodka the zone should be granted a tax credit; that is, it was assumed that collected taxes will remain on the territory. The RSFSR Ministry of Finance can and is ready to grant every opportunity for this, but only for Russian enterprises, and the Union part is hanging in the air. A similar situation is developing also with customs privileges and with the military airfield located in the Nakhodka zone, which it was proposed to transfer to civil authorities or to use jointly.

"The second group of difficulties is associated with the fact that many Russian departments (for example, the RSFSR

Ministry of Trade), despite the decisions adopted on Nakhodka are not showing a particular desire to help the zone, and moreover, through their actions, it must be said, they are making activity in this direction difficult. But this is natural: No departments want to lose their positions."

Briefly, in the meantime, about practical matters—the founding of a trade center jointly with China, whose construction will take an unknown amount of time. Perhaps Nakhodka needs a special ukase of the president of the country.

Two characteristic tendencies are beginning to show themselves more and more clearly in the projects for the creation of a free economic zone. On the one hand, in the situation of a general backsliding of economic reform the desire of individual regions simply to try to fence themselves in and begin to save themselves by themselves is quite understandable. The special status of the free economic zone is very appropriate for this purpose: Declaring itself a free enterprise zone, the local leadership is counting on ridding itself of the center's guardianship. Not only to stop going to Moscow to get approval on every trivial matter, but finally to acquire the longed-for right to decide principal questions: tax rates, the creation of a joint venture, participation in foreign economic activity, etc. Given such an approach, free zones are new, more-developed versions of regional economic accountability, and they can be considered a kind of effective method of de-state-ization of the economy in favor of local authorities, with all of the effects of the resulting spontaneous privatization.

As a result, it will not be so much a matter of the territory opening up for the foreign market as it will be a matter of its closing to the internal market. Here there is a rather real danger that advantages for some could in fact turn into losses for others.

On the other hand, it seems that an aspiration prevails in the strategy of the center to establish islets of demonstrable prosperity, named free economic zones, and afterward to use them as locomotives that will pull the entire country out of the economic morass. It is unlikely, however, that the barbed wire that encloses a free economic zone as a territory with a special currency-financial economy can be stretched out in several pulls to encompass the whole country. World experience indicates that free zones are quite capable of quickly turning a run-down remote place into a sweet arrangement. But it is a far more difficult task to extend these achievements to the entire territory of a country.

In the final analysis it must be understood: If we break Russia down into a number of isolated territories with their own system of economic management, discussions about a single market will remain empty noise.

That is why it is so important that the process of the creation of a free economic zone is organically built into a general procedure of reorganization of the economic mechanism. A strategy is needed that rationally combines the

necessary freedom in regional administration and the mechanism of control on the part of the center.

Chevron's Lack of Response to Criticisms Viewed
91UF0995A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Jun 91 p 1

[Article by Mikhail Surtsov: "The Participants in the Tengiz Deal Are Not Surrendering"]

[Text] Chevron Is Ready To Fight for the Right To Pump Kazakh Petroleum. Scandal?

A number of Soviet newspapers, including NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, have published articles on the deal involving the development of the unique Tengiz petroleum deposit. The agreement signed on the highest level grants Chevron, an American corporation, unprecedented advantages.

Information reported in MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTY was denied by Chevron as being confused and distorted. This author guarantees the accuracy of the more detailed information carried in NG, No 65, of 4 June 1991. Nonetheless, there were no official reactions either from the Soviet or the American side. From the Soviet side this is understandable, caused by the well-founded fear of the leadership of our economic machinery to display, yet once again, its incompetence. But does Chevron have nothing to say? Whatever the case, after his visit to the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, the Chevron representative declined to meet with this author to discuss the "Tengiz matter"...

The corporation is continuing to fight on another front. The initial fear, caused by the concern that the articles in MN and NG are the official indication that the high leadership has changed its positions concerning the SP project has already passed: the corporation is now certain that no vital changes have occurred. Then, both state experts were invited (naturally, at the expense of the company) to distant San Francisco: the experts of the Gosplan who, as a whole, agreed with the suggested project (with minor exceptions) and the "independent" experts who, along with this author, favored a radical review of the organizational forms and economic conditions of cooperation in the development of the Tengiz. The objective and task of the trips were to reach a quick agreement. For the benefit of the independent group of experts, Chevron prepared an entire volume (it is being said "quite thick") of counterarguments and counteroffers.

The members of the independent commission are to be pitied: on the one hand they were dealing with brilliant and captivating Americans; on the other, there was the Union president, who badly needed the agreement of this tripartite group so that he could sign something at the rapidly approaching meeting with Bush. Would doctors of sciences succeed where ministers failed? We shall soon find out, with the return of the commission.

Let us note something else as well. Even if eventually the deal fails and Chevron loses substantial future profits, it would still gain something, for having spent \$20 million in the talks, it would be repaid by each of its seven or eight

partners in the consortium \$5 million merely for the rights to participate in the Tengiz which is allegedly a technologically risky project.... That is how one should conduct business!

After the article in NG, however, according to the latest information, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, had stayed the signing of the Tengiz project.

PRC Desire To Form Joint Venture With Soviet Labor Colonies

91UF0995B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by V. Nelyubin: "We Shall Stack Up the Goods, Give Us a Deadline"]

[Text] Three Krasnoyarsk corrective labor colonies will become the new partners of Chinese entrepreneurs in the immediate future.

All of this began with a visit by foreign businessmen to the trade and industry exhibit of goods produced in the zones of Krasnoyarsk Kray. Samples of goods made by inmates were liked by the Chinese, who expressed the desire to set up joint enterprises with some colonies.

An enterprise for the manufacturing of feather-beds will be organized in the near future in the ITK-22 [corrective labor colony] for women. The technology and the materials will be Chinese and the manpower will be Soviet. Also planned is the creation of a joint enterprise for the production of furniture at the ITK-6 and ITK-27 for men.

Prospects for cooperation are quite optimistic, for the potential of the zones is practically inexhaustible.

Germans Provide Business Education

91UN2324B Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 3 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by H. Pasternak-Taranushenko, deputy general director of the Transbiznes-Kyyiv international school, under the rubric "Unretouched Market: Business in the Ukraine": "Spring Break for the Managers"]

[Text] Last year a significant event took place: An agreement between the governments of the Ukraine and the state of Bavaria. In particular it stipulated that assistance will be granted to our republic in the training of heads of enterprises and institutes for operations in market conditions.

Now it is possible to look at some results. Here they are. The implementation of the agreement has presented the opportunity to train over 230 leaders in the "Management," "Marketing," and "General Management" programs. The training was conducted in eight seminars. The level of training was high.

Such were the conclusions of the governmental delegation headed by Mr. Lang, the minister of economics of the state of Bavaria. The delegation participated in the ceremony for the presentation of certificates to the students who had successfully finished the theoretical course of study.

The ceremony was opened by Professor L. Cherednychenko, rector of the Republic Institute for the Training of Managers under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. He expressed his thanks to the people and the government of the state of Bavaria for the assistance they had given and spoke positively about the German specialists who had conducted the training. He reminded the students that along with their skills they took upon themselves a great responsibility as the vanguard detachment of trained leaders in marketing and management.

Mr. Ch.-H. Mueller, leader of the Bavarian East-West center for training managers, gave a short speech in response. He expressed the hope that the aforementioned detachment of trained leaders would be a firm defender of perestroika and a guarantor of the development of relations between the peoples of the Ukraine and Bavaria.

Mr. Lang addressed the graduates with a short speech. He also handed out the certificates.

How should the training be evaluated? The quality of the students? The quality of the lectures? Probably not. The only way is by the real achievements of the national economy of the Ukraine. But time is needed for that. Until then we only have a "spring break." But there are some results even today. After her training and visit to Germany, Larysa Romanenko attained the position of head of the department of foreign economic affairs of the Ukrainian center of marketing and free enterprise and became one of the leading specialists of the republic on marketing. And Yuriy Kyrveyev took over the department of Ukrzovnishtrans [Ukrainian foreign transportation] production association.

In this fashion an intergovernmental agreement has influenced the fate of individual people.

Paper Mill's Cooperation With U.S. Has Ups and Downs

91UF0939A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 2 Jul 91 p 1

[Report by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Georgiy Bazhutin and Nikolay Fedoseyev: "Specialists From a Soviet-American Enterprise Came To Solikamsk To Make Paper. But Not Just For This."]

[Text] Perm Oblast—The fate of a project is decided by competence—this thought occurred to us more than once in our conversations both with the leadership of Solikamskbumprom [Solikamsk Paper Industry] Association and with the employees of the Papromak Company.

For the third week, intense work to overhaul the No. 11 and No. 12 paper-making machines and convert them to an automated system of technological process control (ASU) is going at the Solikamsk industrial complex. Evgeniy Slavinskiy, Andrey Panchenko, Dmitriy Kozlov, and other Papromak engineers, who are installing the ASU, started their work several months ago. For them, the work started thousands of kilometers from Solikamsk in Kiev, where they took part in a competition for a job at the

joint enterprise. Then the several people who passed the first round of tests, underwent eight months of on-the-job training in Columbus, U.S.

"There, we had to take another exam," says Evgeniy Slavinskiy. "They were teaching us to work with equipment like that the ABB Company manufactures and has delivered to the Solikamsk Paper and Cellulose Industrial Complex. We had to get a second engineering education in a hurry."

These guys work in a way that is completely different from ours, we were told at the plant. What does this mean? First, each one knows the entire system as a whole very well, and has the skills of several engineering and blue collar professions at once.

Still, the main point in all of this is not the pace, but the quality. It seems that both at ABB and at Papromak it has been elevated to a cult.

"How else can it be?" confirms Aleksandr Golshteyn, recently an electronics designer from Kiev and now a successful American engineer and businessman. "We are counting on many years of serious cooperation with the USSR paper industry."

Speaking again about quality. Papromak and ABB undertook to train in the United States a group of Solikamsk operators. But this is not enough. Papromak specialists will be maintaining the system installed by them for at least two years.

Still, the best guarantee for the ASU's longevity, in Golshteyn's opinion, is the reliability of the system itself and, as he puts it, the simplicity of communicating with it. All parameters of the machine's operation are on the screen; everything is graphic, visual, convincing. And probably useful.

So, the fate of the project is determined by the competence of those who carry it out. Judging by everything, the project authors took care of that. And we would like so much to finish this report on an optimistic note. But it has to be remembered that for this complex undertaking to succeed completely, competence is necessary not only on "that" side, but on "this" one as well. Otherwise, things can go astray.

To pay for the equipment, the Solikamsk Paper Industry Association sent to the United States a shipment of its best paper. From the very beginning, however, this entire operation was done senselessly. In an attempt to economize, paper was rolled on different bobbins from those ordered by the American partners. Then the rolls were bruised and crumpled when they were loaded on a ship. Then it turned out that the ship was not big enough to accommodate the quantity of paper being shipped. The paper had to be squeezed in forcibly, which rumbled it even more. And, finally, the hold was not closed tightly; water seeped in, and the paper got damaged.

It is said that the vice president of the United States, having learned about all this, said that everything possible

had been done to spoil both the goods and the business relations. As a result of this action Papromak, together with Solikamsk plant, did lose one very good customer. This is something to think about.

Lithuanian Law on Foreign Investment Restrictions Published

Law on Restrictions

91UF0966A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
17 May 91 p 1

["Law of the Lithuanian Republic: On Prohibiting and Restricting Spheres of Activity for Foreign Investments"—EKHO LITVY headline]

[Text] Article 1

This law prescribes spheres of economic activity in which the utilization of foreign investments is prohibited or for which restrictive conditions are established in this regard.

Article 2

Foreign investments are prohibited in spheres of activity related to providing for the defense and security of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 3

Foreign investments are prohibited in state enterprises which occupy a monopolistic position in the Lithuanian market, without a separate resolution of the Lithuanian Republic Government.

Article 4

Foreign capital enterprises and joint enterprises not operating as state enterprises, or operating as joint-stock companies (closed joint-stock companies), if the company founder on the Lithuanian side has less than 51 percent of the shares with voting rights, are prohibited from:

running the operation of gas and oil pipelines, communications and electricity lines, heating systems of state significance and facilities supporting their technical functioning;

running the operation of motor ways, railroads, seaports, and airports of the Lithuanian Republic in accordance with their functional designation;

establishing or maintaining gambling houses, organizing games or lotteries;

engaging in publishing activity, preparation or broadcast of radio and television transmissions, with the exception of the technical servicing of printing shops, radio and television;

engaging in health resort treatment.

Article 5

Foreign capital enterprises and joint enterprises not operating as state or state joint-stock enterprises, are prohibited from:

producing liquor, vodka, or other alcoholic beverages;
producing tobacco products;

engaging in the treatment of persons ill with dangerous or especially dangerous infectious diseases, including contagious skin ailments and venereal diseases, as well as psychological illnesses in their aggressive forms;

engaging in the treatment of animals sick with especially dangerous diseases.

Article 6

Foreign capital enterprises and joint enterprises not operating as state enterprises are prohibited from:

producing weapons or explosives;

engaging in the manufacture or sale of narcotic substances having a potent effect on the health of an individual;

engaging in the cultivation or sale of plants which contain narcotic, potent, or toxic substances;

effecting recruitment or assignment of manpower, engaging in matters of labor migration.

Article 7

In the absence of separate authorization issued in accordance with a resolution of the Lithuanian Republic Government, foreign capital enterprises and joint enterprises are prohibited from:

conducting exploration or exploitation of deposits of useful minerals;

engaging in the exploitation of natural resources;

engaging in the institution or operation of local networks of public transportation and communications;

engaging in the production or sale of toxic substances.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic

Vilnius, 2 May 1991

Resolution on Law

91UF0966B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
17 May 91 p 1

["Resolution of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council: On Implementing the Lithuanian Republic Law on Prohibiting and Restricting Spheres of Activity for Foreign Investments"—EKHO LITVY headline]

[Text] The Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic resolves:

1. That the Lithuanian Republic Law on Prohibiting and Restricting Spheres of Activity for Foreign Investments will be implemented from the day of its adoption.

2. To establish that, prior to adoption of the Law on Monopolistic Activity, enterprises occupying a monopolistic position are considered to be those enterprises whose

production comprises at least 50 percent of the volume of this type of production manufactured in the republic, and enterprises which operate existing systems of communications, electricity, gas, oil, and water supply, heating, and plumbing.

3. In the re-registration of foreign capital enterprises and joint enterprises operating prior to adoption of the Law on Foreign Investments in the Lithuanian Republic, their activity must be coordinated with the Law on Prohibiting and Restricting Spheres of Activity for Foreign Investments.

4. Prior to adoption of the Law on Land, parcels of land will be leased to foreign capital enterprises and joint enterprises:

by rayon (uyezd) or city local-government administrations—for up to 10 hectares total area in rural areas and up to 2 hectares in the city;

by the Lithuanian Republic Government—for over 10 hectares in rural areas and over 2 hectares in the city, as well as those in a 25-km wide coastal zone or in resort areas upon coordination with rayon (uyezd) or city local-government administrations.

It is prohibited to lease land parcels located in territories presently under protection of the state or in the process of being so established.

More detailed procedure for leasing parcels of land is established by the government of the Lithuanian Republic.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council

Vilnius, 2 May 1991

Ukrainian-Slovakian Bank to be Formed

91P50264A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 91
Union Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "Ukrainian-Slovakian Bank Founded"]

[Text] The leadership of the Uzhgorod, Lvov and Ivano-Frankovsk city soviets, as well as the mayors of Hungarian and Slovakian cities, took part in a meeting in Uzhgorod (western Ukraine).

The chairman of the Uzhgorod city soviet, Ye. Landovskiy, told an INTERFAX correspondent: "The holding of such an unusual meeting attests to a new tendency in our relations. In recent years our foreign neighbors focused on the West. However, today it has become clear to them that a disruption in established ties is not advantageous. Now they are seeking ways to reestablish these ties. We also support this course of action. It has already been decided that we will found the Ukrainian-Slovakian bank, which will be concerned with the exchange of hard currency, that is, the ruble into the crown. This issue is also being discussed with Hungarian businessmen.

Czech Assistance to Chernobyl Victims

91UN2305A Kiev SILSKI VISTI in Ukrainian
7 Jun 91 p 3

[Report by V. Hruzin: "At a Distance From Chernobyl: From a News Conference at the General Consulate of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic"]

[Text] Having invited journalists to his first news conference, Mr. Robert Harenchar [as transliterated], general consul of the CSFR in Kiev, began his conversation with the assurance that the government of his country had decided to renew everything that was good in the relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; it will clearly be to the benefit of the Czech and Slovak and the Ukrainian peoples.

Satisfying the interest of the journalists, the general secretary went on to speak briefly about himself. I believe the readers of SILSKI VISTI will also be interested, and so I will repeat what Mr. Robert Harenchar said. He was born in 1931 in a small village in Central Slovakia. From the age of 15 years he took an active part in the Youth Union, and at 18 years he was already heading the union's rayon organization. He obtained a higher education in the Soviet Union—at the Moscow Economic Institute, as it was then named. After that he worked as an instructor of political economy in the higher educational institutions of Bratislava and Prague. At the same time he continued his active participation in the youth organization: He became secretary, and later first secretary of the Central Committee of the Youth Movement of Slovakia. In 1968 he was among those who protested the introduction of Warsaw Pact troops on the territory of the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic], and he had to pay for that: He was dismissed from the Communist Party and prohibited from taking part in teaching or appearing in the mass media. After that, for two decades he was isolated from active sociopolitical life and worked as a clerk in a factory. After the recent revolutionary changes in Czechoslovakia, in 1990 he was elected a member of the federal parliament and began to work for the CSFR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; recently he held the post of first deputy minister. He received the offer of the post of general consul in Kiev with great satisfaction. He is married and his wife is a Russian; they have two sons—35 and 29 years old.

The general consul said the theme of the news conference was the problem of the resettlement of Soviet citizens of Czech and Slovak origin to the Czech and Slovak Republics from the territory of the Ukraine that was contaminated by the Chernobyl disaster. As a result, participating in the discussion were Mr. Tomash Hayshman [as transliterated], an envoy of the CSFR Government, and Mr. Antonin Dzhuban [as transliterated], an envoy of the government of the Slovak Republic, both of whom are

directly involved in this matter, as well as other official representatives of the CSFR.

The following picture could be sketched from their stories and their answers to journalists' questions.

As soon as the CSFR discovered (regretfully this happened after a great delay) that people of Czech and Slovak origin reside in the zone which suffered the destructive influence of Chernobyl, the government of the country decided to render them assistance. The assistance was not limited to material support. It was decided to give them the opportunity to resettle to the CSFR. Several rounds of negotiations were conducted with the USSR Government toward this end. As a result, 964 people demonstrated their desire to be resettled. The first group of 96 people has already arrived in Czechoslovakia. New groups are being prepared for resettlement.

How is the resettlement organized? Exclusively on a voluntary basis. Despite their economic and financial difficulties, the Governments of the Czech and Slovak Republics are taking upon themselves the basic expenses connected with this action. As a rule, the settlers are given the opportunity to live together in a new city. Buildings are specially equipped and housing tracts are put in order for this. As soon as a family arrives on the territory of Czechoslovakia, they are offered samples of furniture from which they select that which suits their taste. To purchase the furniture they are issued an interest-free loan of 30,000 korunas for a period of 10 years. Each adult receives one-time assistance of 4,500 korunas and 1,500 korunas for each child. New arrivals get a festive reception. Among those meeting them there should be heads of enterprises or organizations, who must give work to one of the members of the resettled family.

The aforementioned number of those desiring resettlement is definitely not the final total. The discovery of such people continues. The Governments of the Czech and Slovak Republics are counting on further cooperation from the Government of the Ukraine in this matter.

This is what I ascertained at the news conference and, having noted it here, I could end this article. But my heart tells me to go on a little more, because when I left the general consulate I recalled how the resettlement of people from the 30-km zone is being carried out here. The people have not received due attention in all the cities to which they have been moved. In short, there has not been enough of that which is called humanity and generosity. I also thought about the fact that citizens of Czech and Slovak origin are leaving the countryside as though it were a danger zone today (perhaps belatedly, but it is being done!), while others—Ukrainians, Russians, and Belorussians—are remaining. What do the latter think? What do they think about their own people and about our officials?

USSR-Spanish Friendship, Cooperation Treaty

91UF0987A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 91
Union Edition p 5

["TREATY on Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Kingdom of Spain"]

[Text] The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Kingdom of Spain,

motivated by the profound feelings of friendship and mutual respect which exist between the Soviet and Spanish peoples,

firmly devoted to the task of building a more just, humane, peaceful and democratic international order,

aware of their responsibility for the preservation of peace in Europe and in the world and fully resolved to contribute to the embodiment of the aims and principles of the UN Charter,

observing in full the commitments ensuing from the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1 August 1975 and all subsequent documents of the CSCE, particularly from the Paris Charter for a New Europe of 21 November 1990,

devoted to the task of the utmost assistance to the development of the CSCE process as the principal factor of peaceful development in Europe and the transition from confrontation to stability and cooperation on the continent,

desiring to strengthen and develop in every possible way relations of cooperation between the USSR and the European Communities,

devoted to the cause of building a new Europe which would take account of the competence of the European Communities and the prospects of their development in the direction of the creation of a political union, as, equally, the transformations occurring in the Soviet Union and also the possible development of the domestic legislation of the two countries,

and inspired by the ideas and principles contained in the Soviet-Spanish Joint Political Declaration of 27 October 1990 and, in particular, the intention to create a qualitatively new legal base for their bilateral relations recorded therein,

have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Kingdom of Spain, being friendly states, will develop relations based on all the principles of the Helsinki Final Act: sovereign equality, non use of force or the threat of force, inviolability of borders and states' territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes, noninterference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and basic liberties, equality and the right of peoples to dispose of their own

fate, cooperation between states and the conscientious fulfillment of commitments in accordance with international law.

Article II

The USSR and Spain will apply joint efforts aimed at the conclusive surmounting of the consequences of the division of the European continent and progress toward an affinity of interests in the political, economic, legal, humanitarian, cultural, and ecological spheres.

The parties undertake to strengthen in every possible way the process of security and cooperation in Europe for the purpose of promoting the consolidation of peace, stability, and security on the continent and to contribute to the creation of conditions for the progress of all European states.

The parties will cooperate in the search for paths for the adequate use of the experience of the CSCE in the interests of strengthening stability, security and well-being in other regions, in the Mediterranean specifically.

On this basis the USSR and Spain will contribute to a strengthening of the bonds of Europe's friendship and solidarity with other regions of the world, particularly with those with which one party has special relations based on long-standing historical traditions.

Article III

The USSR and Spain will contribute within the framework of the CSCE process to the universal strengthening of democracy, political pluralism, a state based on the rule of law, and the defense of human rights.

Article IV

The parties agree that the formation and strengthening of qualitatively new relations on the European continent require continuation of the disarmament process by way of negotiations on new disarmament and arms control measures subject to an adequate system of inspection for the purpose of enhancing the levels of security and stability in Europe.

The parties confirm the firm intention of complying with the confidence-building measures which have already been adopted and of contributing to the elaboration of new confidence-building measures.

Article V

The parties intend to interact actively within the framework of the United Nations in the interests of augmenting its role in the world and strengthening the mechanisms of collective security, including the regional mechanisms provided for by the UN Charter, for the purpose of contributing to international stability and preventing conflicts arising.

The parties will consistently contribute to the universal embodiment of the aims and principles contained in the UN Charter.

Article VI

In the event of situations arising which, in one party's opinion, represent a threat to international peace and security and could entail serious international complications, thereby increasing international tension, the Governments of the USSR and Spain will immediately enter into contact with one another via channels which they deem appropriate for this in order to exchange opinions concerning the actions which might be taken to ease the tension and settle the situation.

If one party considers that the interests of its security are affected, it may propose to the other party immediate bilateral consultations.

Article VII

The parties will resolve their disputes by peaceful means provided for by the charter of the United Nations and within the framework of the CSCE and will not resort to force, other than to exercise their inalienable right to legitimate individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The USSR and Spain confirm the efficacy of the principle of nonaggression as a basis for bilateral relations and relations between states.

If one party is subjected to unprovoked aggression, the other party will, without detriment to its commitments ensuing from allied treaties or other international agreements, refrain from rendering the aggressor military or any other assistance.

Article VIII

For the purpose of lending further impetus to the development of bilateral relations the USSR and Spain, guided by the Soviet-Spanish protocol on intergovernmental consultations of 27 October 1990, will provide for the more extensive and regular nature of political consultations and will to this end create the appropriate mechanisms.

Meetings at the highest political level will be conducted as necessary, but not less than once a year.

The foreign ministers will meet not less than twice a year.

Meetings between the defense ministers and other members of the government will be conducted as necessary.

A direct line of communications between the staff of the president of the USSR and the department of the chairman of the Spanish Government will be installed to enhance the promptitude of contacts.

Periodic consultations at expert level will continue to be conducted in accordance with a program which will, to this end, be agreed on annually.

Article IX

For the purpose of achieving a higher degree of dialogue and mutual understanding between the Soviet and Spanish

peoples the parties will engage in the necessary measures to facilitate all possible exchanges.

The parties will devote particular attention to an extension of ties between the parliaments of the USSR and Spain.

Article X

Taking as a basis the long-standing traditions of the cultural communication of their peoples and guided by a desire to contribute to the fuller exchange of artistic values, the USSR and Spain will develop cultural cooperation in every possible way.

The parties will contribute to an extension of ties in the field of science, education, information, and sport and also to the development of youth exchanges.

They will encourage direct cooperation between government institutions and private organizations and individuals in the sphere of culture, science, and education and cooperate in the implementation of joint projects and the creation and activity of cultural, scientific, and other foundations and associations.

The parties recognize the fundamental significance of teaching the languages and literature of the two countries and will adopt the necessary measures for the realization of agreements in this field. In this connection the parties will display an interest in the creation of cultural centers, which could undertake the teaching and dissemination of the language and cultures of their countries. Special assistance will be rendered in training lecturers and the necessary resources will be made available for access to teaching aids and special literature and also for the use of television, radio and audio-visual and computer equipment.

Article XI

The USSR and Spain will continue the current cooperation between the two countries' defense ministries for the purpose of ensuring better familiarization with each country's armed forces and in the interests of mutual confidence-building. Visits by military delegations will be exchanged and two-year programs of contact and cooperation in the military sphere will be drawn up for this purpose.

Article XII

The parties will contribute to the maximum development of mutually profitable contacts in the sphere of the economy, finances, industry, and science and technology for the purpose of the intensification of economic relations between them.

Within the framework of the corresponding national legislation the parties undertake to create favorable conditions in order to encourage on their territory the other party's investments and assure their protection in accordance with current bilateral agreements for the purpose of contributing to the effective entrepreneurial activity of economic partners of the two countries.

Article XIII

For the purpose of creating conditions conducive to the realization of joint initiatives and projects the parties will encourage new forms of economic cooperation, particularly in the sphere of investments and joint ventures, including with the participation of partners from third countries, and direct ties between Soviet and Spanish enterprises.

Article XIV

The parties will cooperate for the purpose of achieving the extensive exchange of economic information and access to information of business people and scientists of the two countries and for a broadening of cooperation between specialized organizations and entrepreneurial associations of the two countries.

Article XV

For the purpose of supporting realization of the economic reforms in the Soviet Union and, in particular, the development of the market economy Spain will render assistance by way of granting technical assistance and also training specialists and executive personnel in the economic sphere.

Article XVI

The USSR and Spain will expand their cooperation in the sphere of science and technology research, both basic and applied, paying the most attention to an increase in the number of joint developments in respect of areas which are priorities for both countries, in accordance with current national and bilateral science and technology cooperation programs.

The parties will look favorably on joint participation in both European and international science and technology programs.

Article XVII

The parties will apply efforts to expand Soviet-Spanish cooperation in nontraditional prospective fields, including industrial use of the achievements of science and technology, space research, and the conversion of military industry.

Article XVIII

The parties deem desirable the further growth and intensification of relations between the Soviet Union and the European Communities, to which Spain will contribute as opportunities allow.

Article XIX

The parties will increase cooperation within the framework of international economic organizations.

Article XX

The USSR and Spain will develop bilateral cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection and the solution of their ecological problems. They will pay particular attention to protection of the environment in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

The parties will interact in the formulation and realization of international and, particularly, European programs in this sphere.

Article XXI

For the purpose of expanding and diversifying all possible exchanges the parties will exert efforts to simplify the procedure of the issuance of visas.

Article XXII

The USSR and Spain will increase humanitarian cooperation, including assisting the expansion of contacts between the appropriate organizations.

Article XXIII

The USSR and Spain intend to increase the efficiency of legal assistance in civil, including family, cases and safeguarding the social rights of citizens of one party on the territory of the other party in accordance with the current bilateral agreements in this field.

The parties undertake to render legal assistance in respect of criminal cases in accordance with the corresponding national legislation and their international commitments.

Article XXIV

The USSR and Spain will cooperate in the fight against organized crime and illegal narcotics trafficking by exchanging experience and prompt information between their competent authorities.

The parties undertake to cooperate also in the fight against terrorism, the hijacking of sea and air transportation, and smuggling, including the illegal importation of cultural valuables.

Article XXV

This treaty does not affect rights and obligations ensuing from international bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by the USSR or Spain with third parties.

Article XXVI

This treaty will be in effect for 10 years and will be automatically extended for subsequent five-year periods unless either party announces by way of notification in writing to the other party no less than a year prior to expiration of the corresponding term its decision to terminate it.

Article XXVII

This treaty is to be ratified and will take effect 30 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Done in Moscow on 9 July 1991 in two copies, each in Russian and Spanish, both these texts being, what is more, of equal validity.

[signed] For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

M. GORBACHEV

For the Kingdom of Spain

F. GONZALEZ.

Reasons, Prospects for Developing Sino-Soviet Cooperation

91UF0917A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*
in Russian 29 Mar 91 pp 25-26

[Article by Vladimir Artemyev: "China: Ally or Rival?"]

[Excerpt] During the period of confrontation between the USSR and the PRC, a number of canards circulated about China's "treacherous plans" of taking from the Soviet Union hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of Soviet territory.

As a China expert, I believe that the real interests and objectives of PRC foreign policy, including, in particular, those concerning the Soviet Union, are entirely different.

The Sino-Soviet confrontation was unnatural; it was a period of "mental derangement" in their history; it caused tremendous harm to both sides. The historical significance of the 1989 Sino-Soviet summit, in terms of the development of relations between the USSR and the PRC, is precisely that it marked the normalizing of intergovernmental relations and opened prospects for the further extensive development of comprehensive and mutually profitable cooperation between the two countries.

The true national-state interests of the USSR and the PRC strongly urge the strengthening of relations and development of cooperation between them. This applies, above all, to their economic cooperation, for the structures of the national economies of the USSR and the PRC do not compete but, conversely, supplement each other in terms of many types of raw materials and industrial and agricultural commodities. Trade with China has always been and remains an area of foreign trade most profitable to the USSR, showing the highest possible indicators of its economic effectiveness. Our country is interested in the huge Chinese market for selling the goods produced by our industry, the machine building industry above all, as a source of "foreign currency," raw materials, minerals, and many types of agricultural commodities.

China's interest in developing cooperation with the Soviet Union is based on need for economic and political development. It can help the PRC in modernizing its national economy and expanding exports to the USSR of Chinese goods and services and obtaining a greater access to the Soviet reserves of raw materials of which China is in short supply.

Priority areas in the cooperation between the USSR and socialist China could apply to sectors in which we are interested most of all: the power industry (including nuclear), ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, transportation, agriculture, light and food industry, timber and the timber processing industry, capital construction, a number of machine-building and electronic sectors, environmental protection, tourism, and so on. The most promising areas of Sino-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation could include space research and cosmonautics, civil aviation, electronics, the nuclear power industry, the creation of

materials with desired features, biotechnology, genetic engineering, and crystallography.

In my view, the possibilities of economic and scientific and technical cooperation with the PRC should be approached not from the positions of yesterday or even of today, but with a view to the future, i.e., by taking into consideration the high pace of economic and scientific and technical development of the PRC and the fact that in the not so distant future highly developed areas, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, will become an integral part of the Chinese economy.

Unlike trade relations between the USSR and the West, trade between our country and China is truly equal and mutually profitable. The course charted by the Chinese leadership toward modernizing the country calls for developing not only the most advanced but also an average level of technology, equipment, and scientific achievements which, under China's specific conditions, could be economically efficient. On this level, the Chinese side would unquestionably be interested in obtaining from the USSR help in modernizing many enterprises, above all those in the power and metallurgical industries, the construction of new hydraulic, thermal, and nuclear power plants and metallurgical enterprises which, in terms of technological standard, are no worse than those which the United States, Japan, or their Western partners are offering China.

The completion of the railroad across Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Sinkiang is a truly historical event. The trans-Asiatic or, rather, the trans-North Asian railroad, once completed and operating on a regular basis, will open new huge transportation opportunities for economic interaction and for the powerful economic upsurge of adjacent areas, thus intensifying production cooperation between European and Asian countries.

In general, the development of Sino-Soviet economic cooperation could contribute to the stabilization and strengthening of the economic systems of both countries.

That is why in defining the overall concept of our foreign policy and the development of our foreign economic relations, we must essentially rely not on the West but on China, accompanied by corresponding foreign political and diplomatic support.

Speculations which were popular during the period of confrontation between the USSR and the PRC concerning China's intentions to "seize" from the Soviet Union significant territories north of the Amur, allegedly dictated by the "age-old Chinese desire for territorial expansion," have no serious grounds from the viewpoint of objective scientific, economic, and political analysis, common sense, and the official stance of the PRC government.

On the level of legal treaties as well this problem has been virtually eliminated. The PRC government has repeatedly and most definitely stated that all that China wants is merely having specific borders, consistent with existing treaties. This means that in the east the problem involves only a few sectors of the territory adjacent to the border (a few islands on the Amur) and a substantial mountainous

area in the western sector, where the border has still not been definitively set with a treaty. With normal, not to say friendly, relations with the PRC, the solution of such problems would exclude military methods.

Also very important is the fact that the national and governmental interests of our country and China encourage the rapprochement between them in terms of global politics as well. What matters here most, if we were to approach such problems from the viewpoint of the interests of both countries?

I believe that it is obvious, and it is something which the PRC leadership perfectly understands (as I was told by Chinese representatives) that, for example, should the Soviet Union break up into small states, i.e., should it be removed from the historical arena as a superpower, the main political and economic blow to be dealt by the United States and other Western countries would invariably shift in the direction of socialist China. The threat would appear that the PRC would find itself alone, in a state of military-political isolation, face to face with the combined economic, political, and military power of the United States, Japan, and their allies.

In the forthcoming decades, the PRC will objectively be interested not in a weak but a strong Soviet Union as a factor in world politics. That is why, despite all internal upheavals and crisis phenomena within the Soviet Union, today China continues to maintain a friendly and supportive position toward our country, systematically pursuing a line of development and cooperation and noninterference in domestic affairs.

In this context as well it is not a weak but an economically and militarily strong China that is consistent with the national-state interests of the USSR.

Naturally, a great deal depends on us in the development of cooperation between the USSR and the PRC in the international area. There is a saying in the Orient: "If you want to have a friend, be a friend yourself." Unfortunately, in my view, we have not always acted in accordance with this truth.

A good start seems to have been taken in the development of reciprocal economic relations in 1989. As to the area of political cooperation, whereas the Soviet leadership and diplomacy verbally acknowledge the importance of China as a major factor in world politics, they have clearly not displayed the same clarity and activeness as in their contacts with Western countries, the United States in particular. Our former minister of foreign affairs kept mentioning the tasks and problems of expanding cooperation with China with increasing rarity.

Unquestionably, however, it would be in the interests of both countries to make use of the favorable atmosphere prevailing in Sino-Soviet relations, and the willingness of today's Chinese leadership to hold a line of friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to achieve the systematic elimination of problems which had accumulated in the past.

In our approach to China as well a "new political thinking" must be formulated. We must pay greater attention to the real interests of the PRC as a great power. We must learn how to respect and take into consideration such interests and to anticipate the PRC reaction to some of our statements and actions in the international area, which affect China's interests. Systematic consultations must be held with the PRC on international problems.

As a whole, Russia's overall foreign policy concept must include the development of all-round cooperation with the PRC as a priority area in our foreign policy.

Soviet Delegation Studies Japanese Railway Privatization

91UF0938A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 21 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by TASS correspondent L. Bandura especially for GUDOK: "The Globe: Borrowing Useful Experience—Soviet Transportation Workers in Japan"]

[Text] Tokyo—Efficient organization of transportation is a necessary condition for effective functioning of the national economy. This would appear to be an elementary truth. Nonetheless, like other obvious concepts in economic logic, it lost its initial clarity in the twisted world of the administrative command system. Downtime, worn-out roads, accidents, theft, fatigue, poorly organized workers—all this comes to mind when the subject comes around to the railroads...

"We all wanted to push the entire infrastructure away somewhere," USSR Deputy Minister of Railways Vasily Shevandin says bitterly. The discussion started in a hotel room in one of the central regions of Tokyo during the visit of a large group of specialists who had come to Japan under a bilateral agreement for technical assistance in market reforms concluded during M.S. Gorbachev's April visit. Also participating in the conversation was USSR Cabinet of Ministers department chief for transportation and communications Konstantin Kulayev. He headed up the delegation.

Its main goal, in K. Kulayev's words, was not to study new technical equipment and technology—dozens of delegations have already visited here regarding these questions. The task was to find out everything useful that can be applied during the transition of our transportation to market relations.

The delegation included 34 people. Who were they?

"The main criterion for selection was professional position," said K. Kulayev. "Members of the delegation represent all kinds of transportation and various areas of the Soviet Union from Brest to the Far East. We have three deputy ministers with us—of railways, economics and prognostication, and the maritime fleet, chiefs of railroad divisions, deputy railroad chiefs for economics, and several head engineers. But here they are not primarily supervisors but high-level specialists."

"Are you prepared to share some of your conclusions?" I asked.

"It is still difficult to draw final conclusions. But we have managed to clarify certain things. The main thing, in my view, is that they approach transportation here with a great deal of caution, calculating each step carefully. Thus, in practice they began to introduce the conditions of the free market here after the war, but they did not begin to denationalize the railroads until 1987. But one still cannot say that they are already privatized. Private companies have been given the opportunity to conduct only the operational work independently and they have not sold a single share yet. But still some results are in evidence. While before 1987 the railroads were subsidized by the state, now no subsidies are paid. From 1980 until the beginning of privatization rates for shipments were increased four times, and since then—not once. The main thing is that all the workers are clearly aware that if they fail there will be no help from the state. Therefore everyone must be constantly thinking about how to increase the effectiveness of his work.

"And so Japan approached privatization many years after market mechanisms had already been established in the country. Does it follow from this that we have similar prospects on the horizon?

"We know that in all civilized countries market relations have been developing over centuries and, of course, we will not be able, as we once thought, to solve all the problems and change over to the market in two or three years. Today nobody will say how much time this will take. I think it will take no less than 10 years and perhaps even 15. But even this period is very brief in the span of history. In order to fit within it we will have to study all the pluses and minuses of the experience of civilized countries."

But, in V. Shevandin's opinion, we have not looked closely enough into the experience of the capitalist countries.

"I personally," he says, "having worked in economics for 10 years, learned from the press in 1987 that Japanese railroads were being turned over to private management. I thought that some owner, a billionaire or several of them, would take all this into their hands and begin to do business in their own way. But in reality we have seen something altogether different here—very rigid control by the transportation ministry over the operation under the conditions of privatization. The ministry carefully monitors the company's key positions.

"What is this—the Japanese variant of the command administrative system?

"That is not what they call it here, and they do not debase reasonable management principles as we have done in our country. Everything is within reasonable limits. And all this leads to reflection about how not to turn privatization into just another campaign. So that it will not produce negative results instead of positive ones. For example, here the ministry checks for healthy competition and it does not even permit low rates if they will destroy competing firms. Many of us have thought that privatization means creating independent enterprises, they will start competing with one another, and one will swallow up the other."

"But what about the cuts?"

This question is answered by K. Kulayev:

"Privatization of railroads in Japan began by getting rid of more than 70,000 people. These cuts were made on the basis of the number of workers employed in private railroads at the time. And there was no formal reduction; they studied the qualities of each individual and found jobs for the majority of them. Those who were retrained were given positions that suited them. We must learn something from this concern for people. And the workers, in turn, value their jobs very highly.

"Incidentally, what helps the Japanese to carry out the privatization is the workers' confidence in the policy of the government and the Transportation Ministry in this matter, since the actions of the administration are not worsening their living conditions. We have traced the dynamic of the growth of wages. And here is what we found out: While before privatization the growth amounted to one percent per year, afterwards it increased to 2.5-3.5 percent, and last year wages increased by five percent.

"Will the Japanese experience take root in our native soil?"

"It is still difficult to say. Everything will have to be properly considered and weighed. Of course, there can be no question of simply transplanting one onto the other; the systems are quite different. Our task is to try to take everything that can be used, to evaluate it critically, and to find reasonable solutions so they can be applied to our conditions.

"And what is the attitude of the Japanese; does one sense that they are really interested in rendering assistance?"

"We see nothing but a positive attitude," says K. Kulayev. "We are engaging in sincere and friendly dialogue. There are no questions which we ask to which we do not receive a clear cut and thoughtful answer."

V. Shevandin thinks that the Japanese are apparently counting not only on helping us with advice but also on further interaction of the transportation systems. In particular, they are expressing a great deal of interest in organizing a container bridge between the Far East and Europe.

Everything in the program of the delegation of Soviet transportation workers to Japan was scheduled down to the minute and there was no time to cool off. I became convinced of this in a fairly unexpected way. It is practically impossible to accidentally run into an acquaintance in the immense human anthill called Tokyo. Nonetheless the day after the interview the path of the author of these lines intersected with the delegation's route on a platform of Shinjuku station, one of the largest in the city. It was early in the morning when millions of residents of the Japanese capital were rushing to their jobs, crammed like sardines into the subways and electric trolleys. In the midst of this hubbub a group of people in conservative suits were listening attentively to the explanations of a Japanese specialist. For them the work day had already started...

Aid to Kabul Viewed Hindrance to USSR Southern Border Security

91UM0789A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 25, Jun 91 pp 24-25

[Article by Irina Lagunina: "Friendly"]

[Text] **An Afghan aircraft of Soviet manufacture released its bombs in the USSR. Can border security be achieved if there is a war going on next door?**

The bombing in Tajikistan was not the first. A similar incident occurred, for example, shortly after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. An Afghan aircraft of Soviet manufacture overflew our border at that time—just as freely, just as totally unnoticed—and dropped its bombs on the Tajik city of Khorog. A tragic accident, from which people died. Two years ago this incident was kept secret. But the press wrote about the Tajik village of Namadguti Poyen....

The Su-25 aircraft was in good shape and was being flown by an experienced pilot—deputy commander of the air force. What messed him up was the fact that the infrequent villages, scattered in the mountains on both sides of the border, are very hard to make out from the air. Such tragic accidents may happen more or less often in spite of the desires of the Afghan Government. And, consequently, our constant feeding of this war with weapons is not achieving its purpose—not safeguarding Soviet people's tranquillity. Why, then, is the Soviet Union supplying them? Proposition No. 1. It is necessary for the security of the borders.

Kabul is speaking increasingly less often about the Soviet people's fraternal assistance to the Afghan people. The ideological motives of "international duty" are becoming a thing of the past also. They are coming to be replaced by the strict demands of the two countries' state interests. President Najibullah tells Soviet journalists: "Fifteen thousand Soviet soldiers died in Afghanistan, and I sympathize with the grief of their mothers. But how much Soviet blood will be spilled if Hekmatyar raises up Soviet Muslims?"

The present Kabul government is undertaking to safeguard the stability and security of the Soviet Union's southern borders. Geopolitical, military, ideological. The bombing of Soviet territory by an Afghan pilot proves that no government of Afghanistan can guarantee the tranquillity of the Soviet southern borders while there is a war going on in Afghanistan itself.

In 1990 Soviet military supplies to Afghanistan ran to \$3.4 billion (according to figures of the U.S. State Department). This is approximately \$300 million a month. But we should not rush to conclusions as to how much Afghanistan is costing the Soviet Government and its people. There are two explanations as to why such active arms supplies are beneficial to our country. Moscow assures us that it is not giving the weapons but selling them. On credit. And some day, when the situation in the neighboring country is stable and Afghanistan itself becomes an

economically prosperous and thriving country, as was the case prior to the Soviet invasion, the Soviet Union will receive what it is owed.

The second explanation. According to Western assumptions, Afghanistan does not owe the Soviet Union anything for its weapons because it is paying for them in full. The West is saying that not all the uranium mines are under the control of the mujahidin....

Which explanation is the correct one is an official secret. But they both ultimately come to the same thing—it is beneficial to Moscow to support precisely the current government in Afghanistan. But what about the moral and ethical aspect of this support?

It would be blasphemous to write about Soviet weapons in Afghanistan only because they have accidentally been dropped on our territory. People in the neighboring country are dying from them daily.... I do not rule out the fact that, had it not dropped its bombs on us, the Afghan Su-25 would have bombed those same Tajiks, only several kilometers from the Soviet border. And it is perfectly probable that there also they would have hit not the "enemy" but the same peaceful population as with us, only even poorer and tormented by perennial starvation.

Bombing accuracy depends both on the skill of the pilot and on how far he has been able to descend. Descending is risky. A desire to drop one's bombs without descending sometimes leads to unexpected results. During an attempted military coup last year in Afghanistan on the part of former Defense Minister Tanai none of the bombs dropped on Kabul fell either on Amin's palace or on the building of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Central Committee [PDPA], at which the putschists were aiming. But two fell quite close to the Soviet Embassy....

This applies not only to Afghanistan, come to that. A French doctor once told me that, together with Soviet medical personnel, he was bombed by Soviet MiG's in Chad. Because the bombing was inaccurate, they were all spared.

But I shall leave aside the military skill of those to whom the Soviet Union sells arms and whom it trains in their use. We shuddered at the fact that an Su-25 strayed off course and dropped its bombs other than where it had been ordered. I am not speaking about this specific instance, but in principle such things involving our weapons happen not that infrequently—on account of their technical specifications. If not the aircraft, then certainly with the missiles. The Soviet Union does not supply Afghanistan with the latest arms—such trade is becoming even more profitable to Moscow for this reason. The operational-tactical Scud missiles, for example, which Afghan inhabitants call the "retribution of Allah," are in Afghanistan first-generation; Iraq, incidentally, was supplied with a more up-to-date modification. It is altogether impossible to accurately target the Scuds which the USSR sells to Kabul: the emphasis has to be put on the yield of the warhead. The monstrous fiery arrow, slicing the air with a savage roar, dislodges, when it hits, several meters of rock. Some 1,554

such missiles have been fired in Afghanistan since the withdrawal of Soviet forces. How many peaceful inhabitants have suffered?

Some people in Kabul told me about the following "amusing" occurrence. The person telling me this was in fact smiling. "Ereski" [as transliterated] would periodically be fired at Kabul from a village in the mountains overlooking the capital. The authorities became sick of this and decided to fire off a Scud. The missile did not hit the village, but elders came from the village to Najibullah and requested that he send no more such missiles, from which people could become deaf. They, in turn, promised never again to fire at Kabul or allow others to do so....

But I will return to the security of our southern borders, which Najibullah promises the Soviet people. Why was it possible for an aircraft for the umpteenth time to cross the border from Afghanistan totally undetected? The more so in that this border is a special-control zone. Was the aircraft intruder criminal negligence on the part of national air defense?

Two years ago an unmanned Soviet MiG accidentally flew to Belgium and there came down. Responding to the question of how the military authorities of what was still at that time the GDR could have failed to have spotted our aircraft, the Soviet military gave a very odd answer and revealed a monstrous military secret: The aircraft had been spotted in the GDR, but inasmuch as it was flying with the same Identification Friend or Foe identification signals as the Soviet MiG's in Germany also, the alarm was not sounded—no German Soviet MiG was missing, and Berlin thought that the radars had made a mistake. Why had the Su-25 flying past not been noticed on the Soviet-Afghan border? Was it also flying with Soviet identification signals? This is only an assumption. But it seems to me that our military should explain the odd circumstance. After all, whereas earlier we might have feared only accidental bombs from Kabul pilots, the situation has now changed. Following their victory in Khost, the mujahidin now have both their own airfield, which they did not have before, and aircraft, which they captured during the offensive. Military aircraft of Soviet manufacture. Of course, it is unlikely that they would decide to bomb Soviet territory, but it is also true that as long as the USSR is supplying Kabul with weapons, the mujahidin will hardly have particularly warm feelings toward the Soviet Union.

Demanding that we not terminate military assistance, we are being intimidated with the Islamic factor—the threat of the unification of all Muslims in the struggle for world domination—a disease which could infect our Soviet Muslims also. An argument being used one after the other by both the government in Kabul and the government in Moscow. And Moscow, it seems, is reserving it exclusively for "internal use," what is more—as a means of persuading its own people.

But why is our government so worried that Soviet Muslims might align themselves with a mujahidin jihad? Where does such total distrust of tens of millions of fellow citizens come from? Our country is practically ignorant of what is

meant by Islam in Afghanistan, which is largely dissimilar to Islam in the Near East states. When people speak of the Islamic factor, there instantly surfaces in the memory a picture of millions-strong demonstrations—crowds excitedly chanting in front of the portrait of this Great Leader or the other. I have difficulty imagining such a picture in Afghanistan with its tribal fragmentation, its small subsistence farms, and its traditional respect for elders and authorities, and where Islam is a way of life shaped down the ages of the tribe, the family, the home.... So how to explain, for example, from the viewpoint of notions current in our country the fact that several hundred mujahidin at the start of this year set off for Saudi Arabia to defend Kuwait against Iraqi aggression? In other words, we were in the same camp with them. Yet certain Soviet deputies who spoke in the Kremlin at that time are in another. After all, their calls for the Kuwait question to be solved in tandem with the Palestinian question and their references to the fact that "our Muslims will not understand or accept anything else" in fact worked against the anti-Husayn coalition. Simultaneously with the debate on Iraq in the Soviet parliament the NOVOYE VREMYA editorial office received a letter from an inhabitant of a small village in Tajikistan. He wrote: There are values common to all mankind, and the aggressor should be punished, and we should not be giving him such strange support in the form of the Palestinian question....

The war in Afghanistan and the involvement in it of the Soviet Army led to our country's estrangement from the Muslim world. This impoverished not only the country as a whole but primarily the Soviet Central Asian republics. Only now have they begun with difficulty to restore their relations with their neighbors. This development should not be hampered by strange arguments about the Islamic factor.

This very theory has emerged and gained currency precisely when all other ideological justifications of Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan have disappeared.

Both the Bible and the Koran call primarily for philanthropy, but our generals do not study the Koran. But had they done so, they would, perhaps, have understood that the differences which have been imposed on the peoples' mentality, culture, traditions, and customs by different religions are not a pretext for arms supplies to another country.

It is possible to trace stage by stage how the Soviet Government has been justifying its military supplies to Afghanistan at the international level also. Proposals that they be terminated were initially answered with a refusal on the grounds that the United States was supplying the mujahidin with weapons. Then there came from the West a proposal contained in the "negative symmetry" formula—a gradual and proportional reduction in the military supplies of the United States and the USSR to Afghanistan. To which the Soviet side responded with the devastating argument that the United States was aiding the rebels and that this aid was illegal. We, on the other hand, are helping the legitimate government on legitimate

grounds. Arms trade at the official state level is not prohibited in any international documents, and we will, therefore, continue to trade. The arguments that a civil war was being fought in Afghanistan had no effect.

This May the U.S. Congress decided that monies would no longer be allocated from the budget for support of the mujahidin. The period of official U.S. financial assistance to the Afghan resistance is over. Washington has recognized that the best method of settling the Afghan crisis is to allow the Afghans to solve their problems themselves. I can imagine what the response of the Soviet side will be: The United States is a long way away from Afghanistan, but for us it is a neighbor, and the mujahidin are receiving arms from Saudi Arabia and Iran so we cannot abandon our friends, who to a considerable extent suffered from our military presence in the past decade.

But so much has changed in recent years, particularly after Iraq. It is possible, apparently, to establish relations even with Saudi Arabia and to conduct a normal, civilized dialogue with Iran. A month ago the UN secretary general proposed a version of a political settlement in Afghanistan—a mechanism of a possible dialogue. Three weeks ago Angola showed that in any situation political methods of a solution of conflicts are more effective than military methods. Requests for the Afghans to be left alone, if the world community wants peace in this country, are ultimately being conveyed from Afghanistan. The proposal came not from Kabul, it is true, but from field commander Ahmed Shah Masood, a leader of the resistance.

The Soviet Union could increase humanitarian assistance and could develop trade with Afghanistan without completely ignoring the mujahidin here. But instead it is continuing to supply arms to Kabul, closing off to itself very many opportunities for securing its southern borders against unpleasant surprises. Perhaps the aircraft which accidentally dropped its bombs in the USSR will help us understand this.

Plight of Kurdish Refugees, Soviet Lack of Response Examined

91UF0921A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jun 91 p 3

[Report by A. Mursaliyev and I. Chernyak, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondents, and Ya. Ali-Zade, TASS correspondent, Northern Iraq-Ankara-Moscow: "Running; It Would Appear That It Is Precisely This That Is Becoming the Way of Life of Many Nations on Our Planet"]

[Text] The world is as yet to realize the entire depth and horror of the drama which was played out in Mesopotamia after Husayn's troops pulled out of Kuwait. After visiting refugee camps, meeting those who walked the terrible distance from Iraq to Turkey, and having seen video materials and documents, we can testify that this bears no comparison to even the terrible reality of our own events which, after Karabakh, South Osetia, Fergana, and Osh, may have seemed difficult to accept as something even more terrible. Sorrow, of any type, cannot be measured.

But here, in the northern part of Iraq, its scale is horrifying. A huge mass of millions of people rushed out of their homes. One of our interlocutors, a Turk, described this as yet another great migration of the peoples. It was not a migration but it was a run, in the Bulgakov meaning of the term. Running is one more result of the war in the Gulf.

The Soviet people were able to judge of the events in northern Iraq from brief newspaper reports and 15-second clips on the *Vremya* program. What was known was that in March the Kurds rose against Husayn's regime, weakened by the war. The initial victories and the euphoria, under the control of the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north, seemed to extend over 40 percent of Iraqi territory. This seemed like the long-awaited freedom.

However, after the knockout administered by Schwarzkopf, Saddam was able to rise again. The Iraqi suppression apparatus, which had been saved for it, had not been sent to the front lines. The party—the bulwark of the government in the provinces—had not particularly suffered. The Army and the Republican Guard had retained their loyalty to the president. As a result, several days later Kirkuk, the center of the uprising, fell and the Kurdish defense lines in other areas were simply swept off.

The soldiers spared no one. The rebels fled to Turkey and Iran. After some hesitation, the allies intervened. Northern Iraq was put under their control, above the 36th parallel. Now there is calm. The refugees are returning, and the problem is nearing its logical resolution.

All of this is true and yet it is not.

Apocalypse Today

From the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA file: Predating our era, the Kurds have occupied a territory from Armenia to the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates. Today there are more than 20 million Kurds. There are 10 to 12 million in Turkey, five to six in Iran, four million in Iraq, and one million in Syria.

That fatal spring everything was against them. Scuds, phosphorous shells, and napalm were merely the beginning. Husayn's aviation bombed the human streams, his artillery fired rockets at the passes. The refugees were blown up in the minefields left after the Iran-Iraq War. There was no water, and they drank melted snow which had become black from the soot after the oil wells in Kuwait were set on fire. No one paid attention to shingles or lice. Here and there there were outbreaks of cholera and typhoid fever. People died from the cold....

"I will remember this as long as I live," we were told by Zakhu Omar Halabji, a Kurdish refugee. "A mother would wake up in the morning and realize that she was hugging the stiff body of a child.... Another mother would be throwing her child in a gorge.... And the living envied the dead."

Some refugees were fleeing across mountains, following goat paths, which until then had been used only by smugglers. Others merged in a great stream which slowly

made its way along the roads to Turkey and Iran. Approaching the border, this humanity swelled. It was mixed—Muslims and Christians, members of various religious minorities, Turkmans, Suri, Assyrians, and Aramays. And one and a half million Kurds. The richer drove Toyotas and Datsuns (on the only paved highway leading from Iraq to Iran creating a traffic jam 60 km long); the poor walked, barefoot, casting on the shoulders of the road the bodies of those who had been unable to endure.

History proves that twice during the 20th century the "Kurdish card" has been played. The fate of the Kurdish people themselves was of little concern to the great powers. More than anything else, the Kurds were considered the spanner which could open the tap giving access to the petroleum deposits in Kirkuk and Mosul and 40 billion barrels of oil, or more than the entire Libyan deposits. Furthermore, the area included the biggest petroleum refineries.

Between 1918 and 1925, following the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds rose a number of times in Turkey. They were supported by England. However, the "friendship" with this powerful protector did not last long: having gained access to Kirkuk and Mosul, the British themselves began to persecute the rebels.

During World War II, like the other colonial peoples, viewing Germany as their ally, the Kurds rose against the British. In 1945, after Hitler's collapse, the British Air Force struck massive blows at the rebels and 1,200 horsemen, headed by M. Barzani, fled to Iran. There they joined the uprising against the shah. Support came from an unexpected source, from the USSR, which was controlling northern Iran. Here, that same Mustafa Barzani, who subsequently was given the rank of major general in the Soviet Army, and who is the father of today's Kurdish leader Mas'ud Barzani, played one of the leading roles. This time the uprising succeeded: On 22 January, on Chavarchin Square, in the Iranian city of Mahabad, the man dressed in Soviet military uniform, coifed with a turban, was Qazi Mohammad, the leader of the Iranian Kurds, who proclaimed the founding of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic. He thanked the USSR for its aid. Yermakov, the Soviet commissar of Tabriz, the capital of southern Azerbaijan, watched the events from his car.

Moscow's unexpected aid to the Kurds is largely explained with that same consideration of gaining access to the petroleum of Kurdistan and Stalin's wish to have a bridgehead of Soviet influence in the Middle East. However, by offering its natural gas and petroleum, Tehran demanded in exchange a free hand concerning in dealing with the Kurds. Deciding that it was better to have one bird in hand, Iranian petroleum, than two birds in the bush, for the deposits in Kurdistan which were as yet to be taken away from the British, the USSR abandoned the Kurds, who were soon afterwards defeated.

It cannot be said that refugees from Iraq were not expected. However, Western experts spoke in terms of hundreds of people. The Turkish and Iranian authorities were expecting some 100,000. Reality exceeded even the

most pessimistic projections: according to the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Alptemocin, more than one million people found themselves packing a 50-kilometer-wide area.

"When all this began, many residents of our border villages, who had relatives among the Iraqi Kurds welcomed them willingly," recalls Hayri Kozakcioglu, the governor of the southeastern Turkish provinces. "Soon afterwards, the helpers themselves began to suffer first from marauders, the cutting down of orchard trees, or the slaughtering of their cattle...."

Iran accepted more than 1.5 million people. About half a million moved into Turkish territory. A wartime-like situation developed in the southeastern parts of the country. Efforts were made to provide the people not with living but survival conditions.

We visited several camps on both sides of the border. Today Isikveren, which is located at an altitude of 3,500 meters, is empty. It was here that the greatest concentration of people could be found, over 50,000. It was like after a large and unruly fair. There were mountains of garbage, discarded children's cradles, empty cans and bottles, and lines for hanging laundry. The ground under our feet was packed. Rather hard and rocky to begin with, here it had turned into mush. It will take nature a long time to digest the vestiges of something which was not even a camp but a nomad area, for according to eyewitnesses, in such a tight space not everyone could find a place to lie down. And the fact that this was by no means any sort of fair could be seen by the small mounds nearby, which were common graves in which the dead had been buried by the dozen.

There is no way to establish how many died: many refugees have simply no concept of census, citizenship or passport. They are primitive, semi-literate, most of them poor, having lived for centuries in the mountains, unused to toilets and hygiene, experiencing endless fear of civilization. It is a nation, as defined by one of our British colleagues, which is at least a 100 years behind the rest of the world. Understandably, this was not its fault.

The camp was located in the vicinity of the Turkish village of Silopi, located at the very border. The refugees had bitter stories about their fate. Suddenly we heard a sharp sound. A few ragged boys frenziedly hurled themselves toward a journalist who was thinking of lighting up a Marlboro:

"This is what the Americans are sending us! This is our own Marlboro! You stole it! You must give it to us!"

The world press carried the picture of Turkish policemen dispersing a crowd of Kurdish refugees, who had surrounded a truck bringing supplies, using the butts of their automatics. What noble indignation this photograph caused! Yet later, we heard the explanation of the Turkish side, that fierce fights for a loaf of bread were a permanent condition and that this hungry crowd could turn over not only a truck but even a tank, and that the policemen had tried to control the distribution so that both the strong and the weak would get their equal share....

As to cleanliness, would you have liked to have such guests in your home?

American-Style Preference

The UN representatives claimed that the various countries throughout the world unwillingly responded to the appeal to set up a fund for aid to refugees from Iraq. The UN itself lacked sufficient funds. The bulk of the care for these exiled people fell on Iranian shoulders, before that country had been able to recover from the earthquake and the huge floods, and on relatively poor Turkey. Representatives of Western peace organizations, meanwhile, gave advice, much of which sensible. There were also long speeches on human rights and humanism which, in general, were of the right kind. European politicians insisted on having Turkey and Iran open their borders with Iraq. In a way, they too were right.

"My country was blamed a great deal," we were told by a Turkish customs official. "However, accusing and giving advice is the easiest thing in the world. I remember, however, that in 1988, after Husayn launched his chemical attacks, again we had an invasion of Kurds, 67,000 of them. What a stir this created! Even Mitterrand's wife came, expressing her indignation that the refugees were poorly fed and were not welcomed with sufficient warmth. Yet we had neither the manpower nor the funds. But how did sated and comfortable Europe help? That same France accepted 30 people; Sweden accepted 11, and Switzerland four. All the European countries combined offered shelter to slightly more than 100. After all this, what is all their talk about humanism worth!"

Later, in the Diyarbakir, the unofficial capital of south-eastern Turkey, where the press center was located, we witnessed an argument between European and Turkish colleagues. It dealt with the recent disturbances in Albania where, fleeing from government forces, 10,000 Albanians were begging neighboring Italy to open its border. They were coldly answered "no," for this might inconvenience the native population.

"But today the West is supplying the refugees with food and medicine, and a great deal of that," a French journalist objected.

"Then explain to us why are there caravans of aid crossing the length of Europe, polluting the air with emission gases and damaging the roads?" disagreed a local newspaper correspondent. "Why not buy everything locally? What the British eat, for example, is not always suitable to a Muslim. The Kurds do not need those canned goods, they do not eat them. And look at the trouble was caused by the medicines, for the people swallowed medicine that appeared nice, unable to read the label. Products the time limit for their sale had expired, questionable medicines, worn clothing.... Is the West all that charitable as people are trying to depict it?"

A number of articles on this subject had been published in the local press, with photographs and suitable comments. Here people are not particularly touched by the arrival of

respectable gentlemen wearing white gloves, who live in the various Hiltons and Sheratons and rarely come to the camps to be photographed with the Kurds, against a background of cases of dispatched aid. Is this skepticism perhaps justified?

The more time we spent in the border areas, the stronger was the feeling that today the allies are trying to kill several birds with one stone. To begin with, the refugees indeed need help, but it would be desirable to provide it at a lesser cost to oneself. Second, how can this be mentioned in detail without losing the support of world public opinion. Third....

Recently the Turkish press sounded the alarm: In the guise of aid, weapons were being sent to northern Iraq in far greater amounts than had been allowed for establishing a security zone. Subsequently, strict control was set up at the Khabur Control Crossing Point, on the Turkish-Iraqi border. Now the shipment of ordnance and armaments requires the approval of the Turkish general staff and the customs authorities. Some sort of control seems to have been organized on the ground. As to by air.... "As to what sort of freight is being carried by U.S. helicopters we are still frequently unaware," admitted the representatives of the local authorities.

Unquestionably, today the position of the Americans and their allies is not envious: Whatever they do becomes public knowledge and any false step is fraught with the danger of creating a major scandal. Such was the case with the crew of the helicopter which dropped a package of aid straight on the tent of a Kurdish refugee. "Six people died, totally unaware that their death would be related to philanthropy," wrote the local press. One could also ignore unpleasant facts, which is what we are doing. However, one could not help to consider the figures quoted by Ankara: 85 percent of the aid to refugees from Iraq on Turkish territory was provided by Turkey, and 15 percent by the rest of Europe.

We are flying over northern Iraq in a multinational forces helicopter. This is the peak of the operation mounted by the allies for the rescue of the Kurds, code-named "Shelter." Helicopters appear to our left or to our right, looking like huge dragonflies, going who knows where. Under us we see the dark green military trucks, looking like big bugs crawling along the road. Here is a military camp in which, naked soldiers, completely at ease, are showering themselves.... Why did they come here, and how?

We dare to submit our own version of the event. The beginning was marked by the actual appeal by the White House to the Iraqi Kurds: rise, overthrow the dictator! However, after the initial victories, it looked as though the Kurdish leaders became intoxicated: Some of them, after having mentioning independence, were already demanding income from the oil. Obviously, this was not expected of them. The allies released the Iraqi prisoners of war, who immediately were armed by Husayn and went on to crush the Kurds. Saddam's airplanes hit the rebel areas, and although the UN Security Council had forbidden Iraq to use its Air Force, the allies shut their eyes. The regular

Army was thrown at the rebels and the multinational forces were merely observing, explaining their inaction by the unwillingness to interfere in internal Iraqi affairs.

"In Kuwait Saddam Husayn pursued a policy of scorched earth. Kuwait was liberated. Now, however, when such crimes are being committed against his own people, this is considered a matter of 'internal affairs,'" said at that time K. Mezan, director of the Kurdish Institute in Paris. "Where are right and justice? What kind of victory is this if an entire nation is being subjected to destruction?"

A. Velayati, Iran's minister of foreign affairs, accused the Western countries of actually supporting Husayn. Other Arab politicians as well made such charges openly. Critical voices began to be heard in Europe as well. "As the barbaric campaign against the Kurds is increasing, so is the responsibility of the allies for this tragedy. First of all, because it is precisely they who gave the people of Iraq the false hope of the imminent overthrow of Saddam Husayn's regime. Second, because they never acknowledged the right of the Kurds to exist," wrote the French *LE FIGARO*. The view which developed in world public opinion was that the forces of the United States and its allies simply had to enter northern Iraq! It is thus that the Kurds were used as a kind of taxi with which the West entered Kurdistan and the petroleum deposits of Kirkuk and Mosul.

Let us now sum it up: If in February Bush had simply hinted of his intention to take assume control over the Iraqi north, he would have been simply booted down. But all it took was this simple operation and the world began literally to demand it. In this major American-style card game, it was once again the Kurds who were used as cards.

Emulating the West?

"Well, finally, the Soviets came along," guffawed David Healy, the bearded press officer of the British Armed Forces. "Well, better late than never."

In southeastern Turkey, at the Diyarbakir press center, we were shown a list of journalists who had visited the border area. Reuters, CNN, France-Presse, and correspondents from Poland, Pakistan, Brazil, Bangladesh, and the Seychelles. We were the first Soviet on this list, at the tail end of 700.

Understandably, our country has its own concerns: inter-ethnic conflicts, bedlam with prices, miners' strikes. However, this has not prevented our diplomats and journalists from traveling to Europe, the United States, and Japan, alone or in groups. In resolving the major problems involving the West, are we not ignoring the East? Are we not losing our reputation in the Middle East all too lightheartedly and submissively?

It seems as though in our country the Kurdish problem was raised only by the ubiquitous Sakharov. As early as 1989 he had written about the need to propose to the UN General Assembly a discussion of the Kurdish problem. He insisted on granting the Kurds autonomy and independence. But then Sakharov died. The USSR goes on pretending that to it there is no Kurdish tragedy. It would be

impossible to answer the question of why charity in our country is so selective and why our diplomats would rather discuss only the Palestinian problem, for there are 150,000 Kurds and not Palestinians, who are citizens of the USSR. Why is it that until the mid-1970s we were on the side of the Kurds and armed them, and then, after signing the friendship treaty with Iraq, we distanced ourselves and proclaimed the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani a right-wing nationalist? Why is it that our country energetically supported the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which is a terrorist organization, which does not shy at political assassinations, but remaining quite indifferent to the national liberation movement which was not communist-oriented?

In April, M. Osman, member of the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, flew to Moscow and met with Primakov. He could only sigh when discussing the results of that visit. Soon afterwards, a group of Kurds, in an effort to draw the attention of Soviet authorities to the tragedy, mounted a hunger strike directly right across the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "We also fear that in voting in the UN Security Council on the creation of a free zone for the Kurdish refugees, the USSR may use its veto," said Bave Nade [name as transliterated], the Kurdish writer and participant in the hunger strike, speaking to the journalists.

The logic is understandable: In supporting the need to preserve the sovereignty of Iraq, our diplomats feared the further expansion of American influence in the Orient. They were not bothered by the misfortune of the Kurds. Politics is politics, but could one have such a narrow understanding of state interests and abstract oneself from moral factors, the tears of children, and the suffering of the old? To this day, not a single Soviet pilot, physician or specialist has participated in giving aid to the refugees. Alas, we had no answer to the same question asked again and again in the refugee camps: "Where is the great northern neighbor?"

But what about now? A safety zone has been established in the northern part of Iraq, a territory of 120 by 60 km. Already more than 20,000 soldiers of the multinational forces, two-thirds of them American, are involved in this operation. Kurds are being removed from the mountains along the borders and resettled from Turkish and Iranian camps. Medical services and food are more or less being provided. But what about the future? The solution is much more difficult. Bringing here thousands of trucks and providing tents, warm blankets, medicines, and food is difficult but nonetheless possible. It is possible to return the Kurds to their own lands. But what then? Should they remain there? Up to what point will the world not object to the presence of the United States in northern Iraq? Will it be necessary to put inside each house a soldier of the multinational or the UN forces? And what then? The Americans seem no longer to be interested in overthrowing Saddam: better a cruel dictator than chaos in the area. But then as long as there is Saddam there is also the Kurdish problem and, therefore, the danger of a new slaughter which the world would hardly forgive the allies.

"This is known as 'I can live neither with nor without you,'" an Italian journalist sadly joked.

Leading Western political experts and analysts are sweating over finding a solution to the impasse; the biggest world institutions are puzzling over it. Probably an idea about the postwar structure in the area will nonetheless appear. But until then.... Halfway between Silopi and the Diyarbakir there is a church built by the early Christians. It is about 1,500 years old and time seems to have stopped here. A descendant of the first Christians, who had fled into these mountains from the Roman Legionnaires, Father Ibrahim, lives in one of the church's cells. We spoke with him about the future of Mesopotamia. This gray-haired priest answered:

"Tens of centuries back, the people here built the Tower of Babylon with the intention of reaching the sky. God did not allow this by confusing their languages, and they could not communicate with each other in order to complete their project. Today, the most advanced means of communications are linking the nations, having surmounted the linguistic barrier. However, today as well the discord goes on. Where is such a tower, where is that common objective which would unite the people?"

"Let those who see the solution in politics answer to God," the holy priest went on to say. "We know otherwise: This land has seen many civilizations and has repeatedly proved that it has the amazing property to self-cleanse. Therefore, our only hope rests on the Most High."

Well, perhaps we too should rely on God who, under the conditions of the new thinking, is being represented as the good will of the peoples?

Israeli Failure to Return Belorussian Chernobyl Children Viewed

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[Article by Sergey Bogatov: "Will the Soviet Children Return from Israel?"]

[Text] On February 21, 1991, the Israeli newspaper HA'ARETZ published an article by its Political Commentator Aqira Eldar which described the problems that have arisen in connection with the visit of Soviet children to Israel.

As we all know, a group of Jewish activists from Belorussia, headed by Jewish Community Chairman Ya. Gutman [name as transliterated], using a BSSR [Belorussian SSR] government appeal for assistance to other countries for help in eliminating the aftereffects of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power plant] accident, last year repeatedly appealed to various state and public organizations to send Jewish children from the affected areas to Israel for treatment and rest.

At the beginning of 1990 during an informal meeting between Sokhnut Representative D. Ben-Nayen [name as transliterated] and the republic Council of Ministers leadership, the issue about the organization of charter flights from the BSSR to Israel was discussed, however this issue was not resolved due to the lack of convertible hard currency to pay for the airline flight costs. At the meeting,

the Soviet side expressed its firm intention to form this group of children traveling to Israel not along ethnic lines but along interethnic lines. After fruitless attempts to resolve the problem on the Community's conditions, Ya. Gutman established contact with the Dutch Jewish Charitable Organization Noah's Ark and the Lubavitch Hasidim Movement (Habadniks) from Kefar Habad (Israel) who assumed responsibility for the financial expenditures for the program to provide medical rehabilitation to Jewish children from Belorussia. The Belorussian Peace Fund became a partner of these organizations.

During the summer of 1990, two groups totaling 192 children from 7-14 years of age were formed. Contrary to the republic authorities' request, groups were selected only along ethnic lines and from those families who were preparing to emigrate to Israel. Belorussian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] processed the exit documents and Romanian Airways provided the aircraft.

The program for the stay in Israel was calculated for 8-12 months and included a special medical examination, treatment at clinics, and also study of general education subjects, Modern Hebrew, Judaism, and area studies at Lubavitch Hasidim schools.

In January 1991, Moscow Manosnik SP [joint venture], on behalf of Noah's Ark and with the participation of local Jewish organizations, prepared and sent one more group of Jewish children from Mogylev and Gomel oblasts to Israel and the selection and processing for departure of the next group of children from Belorussia to Israel is being completed in June. All of this was noted by Israel's official circles. Prime Minister Y. Shamir sent a letter to the Belorussian Council of Ministers which expresses gratitude for permitting the Jewish children to leave and it expressed the Israeli government's intention to examine the possibility of granting assistance to eliminate the aftereffects of the Chernobyl AES accident.

The Israeli religious organization Agudat-Habak has assumed responsibility for the newly arrived children. In his article, A. Eldar writes that Agudat-Habak also announced its unwillingness to return the children who have been treated to the Soviet Union despite the sharp protests of the majority of the parents. Agudat-Habak leaders stated that "money and energy have been invested in educating the children in the spirit of Judaism which will be lost for the Jewish people if the children return to the Soviet Union." A. Eldar notes that the organization was acting in accordance with the Israeli government's instruction by impeding the children's departure from Israel to their Homeland on an Aeroflot charter flight (January 29, 1991). The Israeli government feared the emergence of certain political sentiments among Soviet Jews as a result of the events in the Middle East. The subject of the article and the materials, in A. Eldar's words, were presented to the author by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs leadership (personally by Minister D. Levi) for the purpose of using it in the political struggle with Prime Minister Y. Shamir who stops at nothing to support any religious organizations and movements in exchange

for sympathy for his political policies. A. Eldar, referring to a conversation with the Habad leadership, reports that they will henceforth impede the return of children to the Soviet Union even if their parents demand it.

At the end of February 1991, Israeli Citizen Rights Movement Leader Sh. Aloni in a conversation with Soviet representatives expressed extreme bewilderment with regard to the "naivete" of those parents in the Soviet Union who sent their children from Belorussia to Israel according to the Agudat-Habak line allegedly for treatment of diseases caused by the aftereffects of the Chernobyl accident. She is also troubled by the ethnic principle of selection. Sh. Aloni stressed that even among Israeli religious organizations Agudat-Habak is well known as a radical extremist organization: "This is a racist organization, Jesuits, who are prepared for any human rights violations for the sake of realizing their Judaic principles."

By turning to the Anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet Society, we received information that the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs had issued instructions to the Soviet consul in Tel-Aviv to establish contact with the Agudat-Habak leadership and to jointly take steps for the return of the children to the USSR. At the meeting, the Habak leaders refused to discuss this issue and stated that there was an agreement with the parents of all of the children who had arrived in Israel that the parents would leave the Soviet Union through emigration channels and they would meet their children in Israel. According to USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs data, nearly 270 children are in Israel. In the words of our consul, all Soviet documents have been taken from the children who arrived in Israel and they have been given to Agudat-Habak workers in Manosonik SP. The further fate of these documents is unknown.

In January 1991, the Belorussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent statements to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs that had been notarized by the parents of several

children who had left for Israel with a request for them to return home. The President of the USSR has been informed of the situation that has developed after which a decision was made to send two aircraft to Israel to bring back the children. On January 29, one aircraft flew a charter flight from Tel-Aviv and brought 149 people to Moscow. Of the total number of passengers on it, there were nine children from Belorussia, eight from Riga, and 27 from Moscow. The remaining passengers were Soviet citizens who had been in Israel on personnel business. The second flight was canceled.

Still we managed to get 180 of the 192 children who had left for Israel last summer to return to the USSR in February. Twelve have remained abroad. There were no complaints about the children's condition after treatment and the exception was Gomel Resident S.Kh. Mazurina who, while in Israel, expressed her dissatisfaction regarding the maintenance of her son and daughter to Kfar-Habbad City Israeli authorities.

How will the fate of the other children turn out who have arrived in Israel for treatment? How many are there today? Moscow Manosonik SP should know this. But attempts by USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Administration officials to contact or even to find Manosonik SP have not yielded any results. It has also been determined that the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in general does not have accurate data on the number of children who are in Israel.

The Agudat-Habak leadership has announced in the Israeli press that there were nearly 200 children from the USSR in Israel in April 1991. The next group of Jewish children from Ukraine and Belorussia will arrive there in two weeks. A Agudat-Habak representative has arrived in Moscow and, jointly with Manosonik SP, will organize the children's departure.

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