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Military Affairs

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Maj Gen Mikhaylenko on New Organs

91UM0523A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
14 Mar 91 p 3

[Major General Yu. Mikhaylenko interviewed by Ye. Guzhva: "Military-Political Agencies: A 'Change of Sign,' Or A New Essence?—Concern For Combat Readiness Above All"]

[Text] Major General Yu. Mikhaylenko, a military-political official and Deputy to the Kiev City Soviet, recently returned from Moscow, where he took courses at the Higher Academy with a group of senior military-political personnel. Our correspondent asked Yuriy Vasilyevich to tell about the status, functions, and role of the military-political agencies now being set up.

[Mikhaylenko] I'll put it this way: the difference from the old structures is a fundamental one. In effect, this is another step on the path of separating the functions of party and state. The military-political agencies are becoming a component part of military administrative agencies. They are not a part of the party structures and will be conduits of state policy in the Soviet Armed Forces. They are subordinate to the USSR Minister of Defense.

[Guzhva] The change in functions will apparently be accompanied by a transformation of establishment structures.

[Mikhaylenko] Absolutely. And this attests to the new tasks that we will be working to accomplish. For all practical purposes, the establishment changes are a mirror reflection of all the sociopolitical processes under way in society. New structures are being set up that will be directly involved in educational and social-legal work and in efforts to improve military discipline. We are putting together a group of comrades who will supervise ties with public organizations and work with the families of servicemen, young people, and various parties and movements.

[Guzhva] Don't the changes under way attest to the depolitization of the troops and the party's removal from the army?

[Mikhaylenko] No, they do not. The fact is that no armed forces can exist outside politics. Moreover, the military-political agencies are being created precisely in order to deal with politics in a professional manner and to steadfastly implement policy in the army. The CPSU structures in the army will remain in place. However, the party organizations will receive full autonomy. Henceforth, the military-political agencies will no longer supervise the activity of party organizations. That will be done by the CPSU Central Committee through the USSR Armed Forces Party Committee, which will be created at the first All-Army Party Conference, to which I will be a delegate.

That I, like other senior officers who are communists, will, as CPSU members, take part in party organizations'

work and implement the Communist Party's policies is another matter. I want to point out that the USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution and the Defense Minister has issued an order dealing with the service of military personnel who are elected to executive bodies of other public associations in the army. However, I emphasize: This applies to associations that have a socialist platform and seek to strengthen the might of our Armed Forces.

[Guzhva] Do cadres decide everything?

[Mikhaylenko] We will have workers who are to have legal knowledge and a mastery of army legislation, and there will be psychologists and sociologists. Complex tasks are arising where personnel training is concerned. As far as I know, the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate has already begun retraining political cadres in accordance with their new official functions. I said earlier that I myself recently returned from taking Higher Academy courses. We will have to reorient the departments of the V.I. Lenin Military-Political Academy, the military-political schools, and political staff courses toward the training of not party-political workers, as before, but of military-political workers.

All these are difficult issues, but they can be resolved. This will take time. Plans call for shifting to the new organization-establishment structures by the end of 1991. The military-political agencies will be charged with implementing state policy in the field of the USSR's defense and security, carrying out educational work with due regard for the political views, ethnic characteristics, and religious attitudes of personnel, strengthening military discipline, and enhancing social safeguards for servicemen. The chiefs of military-political agencies of various levels will be appointed by presidential decree and by order of the USSR Minister of Defense.

[Guzhva] Implementing state policy in the field of the national defense and security.

[Mikhaylenko] Organizational tasks and explanatory and agitation work merge into one here. Take, for example, combat alert duty. To put it bluntly, not everyone is aware that the situation in the world is heating up. And not everyone sees his place in detente. After all, events in the Persian Gulf have shown that the world situation is volatile. As a result of the termination of the activity of the Warsaw Treaty, borders have drawn closer to us. The situation in the south of the country is tense as well. The number of various types of movements and views is growing, including among servicemen. This means we need to intensify political work with all categories of servicemen.

Unfortunately, for the first time we are encountering a situation in which certain state agencies and republic leaderships are acting to destroy the integrity of the Armed Forces and having an effect on order and discipline.

At a recent conference of senior personnel, we adopted an appeal to the Supreme Soviets of the Transcaucasian republics, Moldova, and the Baltics in connection with mounting calls for their compatriots serving in the army to leave it. This is inadmissible in a great country. We haven't received a response to our appeal. It is heartening that most servicemen are not responding to these provocative calls and are faithfully carrying out their duty to the fatherland. They include Russians, Ukrainians, Moldovans, and members of other nationalities.

About a year ago, a group of young soldiers from the Baltic republics issued an appeal to their compatriots to serve in the army faithfully, as the law requires. I recently wondered how things are going for them today. I was happy to learn that senior sergeant Vidas Vigraytis, a Lithuanian, has for some time been the acting commanding officer of the best platoon in his company. Sergeant Ants Lubi and Private Andrus Liytmyae, Estonians, have received excellent ratings in combat and political training. "The army is a school," said Latvian Private Ivo Arbidan, a top-rated specialist. "There are no problems here on ethnic grounds. Why such problems exist in civilian life, I don't know." Way to go, fellows!

Even so, it must be admitted that negative phenomena have not been eliminated completely. Some young people still haven't developed an immunity and are vulnerable to the influence of extremist forces. And they lack the life experience to sort out the situation in which the republics find themselves today.

[Guzhva] Yuriy Vasilyevich, you spoke about ties with various public organizations.

[Mikhaylenko] We are prepared to have an open dialogue, and we invite all parties and movements to take part in it with a view to instilling in young people a strong sense of pride in their socialist fatherland. Ever since the times of Kievan Rus, the image of the soldier-defender has always been a source of admiration. Remember the "Ballad of the Cossak Golota":

"We have vanquished the enemy... Glory will be die, will never disappear. From now until the end of time!"

That is how the people honored the triumph of the brave and courageous Zaporozhye Cossak Golota. Why, then, have certain individuals and certain public organizations today forgotten about this as they extoll Stepan Bandera and his stooges, who left a bloody mark in the history of the Ukrainian people? In no way can we lose our sense of national pride. It is important to remember the price we paid for national unity, and the enormous progress we have made over the century. It would be useful here to take a thoughtful look at our history. Especially now, 50 years after the start of the Great Patriotic War.

The military-political agencies have now joined in the drive under way under the slogan, "The people and army are united!" The celebration of Soviet Army and Navy Day and the numerous rallies held in connection with

this demonstrated that the people support their army. The army has been and will be with its people.

[Guzhva] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution of mandatory state personal insurance for servicemen and reservists attending training camps.

[Mikhaylenko] On February 2, the USSR Minister of Defense signed an order providing necessary explanations regarding the insurance. Military-political agencies are preparing new proposals for ensuring the social and legal protection of personnel.

[Guzhva] What about the cultural field?

[Mikhaylenko] We have a lot of work to accomplish in this area. We have asked creative organizations to once again serve as sponsors of troop collectives, and we are setting up nonestablishment universities of culture. Promoting intellectual culture and the achievements of interethnic relations culture is an important part of military-political workers' activity. Incidentally, let me cite an example of successful cooperation with various public-political movements. A young soldier, Private Aleksandr Marchenko, arrived at his troop unit. He began successfully mastering the basic elements of army service. But he refused to take the military oath. Commanding officers and military-political workers spoke with him. They tried to explain the error of the youth's position. They contacted Aleksandr's father and the like-minded people with whom he associated before joining the service. He recently took the oath and continues to perform his military service.

[Guzhva] In other words, the range of tasks that military-political agencies are working to accomplish is vast but specific.

[Mikhaylenko] I would say that we are acquiring a new status with new functions. The concrete individual has been put at the center of our attention, at the center of our work. Concern for people equals concern for combat readiness. That's how the linkage is viewed.

[Guzhva] Yuriy Vasilyevich, thank you for the interview. We know that you are celebrating your 50th birthday this month. We wish you happiness as an officer and persistence and success in carrying out all the things we've discussed today.

[Mikhaylenko] Thank you. And allow me to use the pages of the respected newspaper PRAVDA UKRAINY to once again appeal to its readers and to all true patriots of our wonderful republic to say "yes" in the all-union referendum to our great, united Union of fraternal republics. The people's fate is something very dear to us. In the current difficult period of our country's history, accord and a high degree of vigilance and responsibility for the integrity of our Soviet socialist state are needed more than ever before.

As the issue was going to press, the editors learned that, by decree of the USSR President, Maj Gen Yu. Mikhaylenko had been awarded the Order "For Service to the

Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," 2nd Class, for successes achieved in combat and political training and great services in strengthening the combat readiness of troops.

We congratulate Yuriy Vasilyevich on his high award!

Speeches at All-Army CPSU Conference

*91UM0550A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
First Edition 2 Apr 91 p 2, 3 Apr 91 pp 1-3*

[Summaries of speeches by participants at First All-Army Party Conference, 30 March 1991: "Conference Participants' Speeches"]

2 Apr 91 p 2

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel V. Belyayev, motorized rifle regiment Partkom secretary (Transcaucasus Military District):

—"I served in the Transcaucasus for more than 19 years and I am in my sixth year of Party work. Therefore, I know well the socio-political situation in the region and the sentiment in military and Party collectives."

The speaker named interethnic strife in the Transcaucasus, disruptions in the lives of servicemen, and the moral terror and anti-army hysteria that have been unleashed against them in the mass media among the most acute problems. But even under these most difficult conditions, the regiment's communists are maintaining their self-control and discipline, remain loyal to their military duty, and recognize their responsibility for the fate of the native land as never before. The firmness and clarity of the communists' positions are causing sympathy among many people and are attracting more and more new military personnel into their ranks. Suffice it to say that the regimental Party organization has been noticeably reinforced.

Nevertheless the problem of Party organization prestige both in the regiment and in the military district as a whole remains acute as before.

In the speaker's opinion, its solution is being impeded by the laxity of ideological work, the absence of clear reference points and the lack of information about the situation in the country, region, Party, and on the center's decisions.

He said that we frequently stew in our own juices if left to our own devices. The appearance of various types of social movements, their programs and platforms, and the war of laws is introducing a split in peoples' consciousness and in their understanding of the essence of what is occurring. The latter-day democrats' very aspiration to divide the army according to national apartments and to actually terminate military patriotic work in the region is certainly something extraordinary. All of this is leading to disruption of the draft and desertion from the ranks of the army. What can we do? Here decisiveness and firmness are needed from the Party

Central Committee to the company Party organization. But instead of this, we often only hear appeals to climb out of the trenches and attack. So maybe there are enough drafts, enough demagoguery, and it is time to actually climb out. It is time for each communist to resolve specific matters in a specific sector of work.

In conclusion, the speaker dwelled on personnel problems. His proposal for creation of an Armed Forces Party organization printing organ was met with applause.

Colonel-General V. Rodin, chief of the military political directorate and first deputy commander-in-chief of the RVSN [Strategic Missile Troops].

The speaker said that the reports and elections to Party organizations which had occurred in the missile troops very clearly designated two communist positions with regard to the socio-political situation in the country.

The first of them is linked to attitudes toward the policy being conducted by the country's government and the perspective of its future development. Communist-missileers are convinced that we have not been provided with another path of development besides the socialist path. The idea of humane, democratic socialism and a renewed USSR is progressive in and of itself can and must serve the interests of the people. In this we support the President of the USSR and the Party Central Committee. Today every communist must thoroughly understand as never before that aggressive anticommunism has invaded our common home. The Soviet State is in danger. Soviet rule and the power of the workers is in danger.

And it is obvious that the decisive moment has arrived when we, beginning with the president and secretary general down to the rank and file soldier and communist, must act fundamentally and decisively in order to use this power and constitutional methods to stop extreme and irresponsible unscrupulous politicians who, along with the reactionary forces of the West, are attempting to take revenge for the defeat in October 1917.

And the second position. It concerns our attitude toward renewal of Party work and is associated with communists' uneasiness about the fate of the CPSU and the revival of those ideals that at one time defined the name of our party as communist.

The majority of communists have begun to show themselves to be an aggressive political force and through their efforts the existing leading Party organization structure has been preserved in all elements. The Party strata remains adequately high. It totals 80 percent among officers and nearly 98 percent among combat crewmen. Sixty five percent of missile regiments have outstanding and good results in combat training.

The Party's real strength in army collectives is seen behind these numbers.

But does all of this signify that progress for the better is occurring at full speed everywhere in our country? If we

remain grounded in reality, we must admit that perestroika of military political organ activities and new Party structures is still proceeding slowly and, in a number of cases, their formation is being drawn out. This is explained to a significant degree by lethargy of thinking and by operating in the old way. Methods and techniques that have been accumulated in the practice of past activities are frequently being mechanically transferred to the new structures with their new functions. And they are not always adequate in innovation and complexity of the tasks being fulfilled. As a result of this, the effectiveness and efficiency of military political work remains low and does not meet the demands of the day in some places.

Then the speaker dwelled on problems whose solution is capable, in his opinion, of significantly improving the activities of Party organizations. Among them are mastery of the Marxist-Leninist methodology of analysis of events that are occurring and improvement of ideological work. The speaker stressed that right now a communist must not simply be an ideological, honest, and decent man in the real political struggle with anticommunist forces for the hearts and minds of the people. Besides the highest altruism, he needs to be twice as knowledgeable and more erudite than his opponents in the eyes of the people. This will permit him to boldly seek an honest and fundamental dialogue with the people about events in the country and in the world, on problems of the history, theory, and practice of the solution of ethnic issues, and to expose the inconsistencies of unscrupulous politicians and demagogues of various hues.

In conclusion, the speaker said that: Today, it is difficult for communists under the cross fire of malicious criticism and undisguised slander. But they firmly know that only the CPSU is capable of bringing society out of the state of crisis and they sense their high responsibility in this regard.

Colonel Yu. Kozhin, Far East Air Force aviation regimental commander:

"The role of the theoretical base and ideology has currently been disparaged in the Party. The organizational foundation and daily experience is predominating. And it is very difficult to forecast events, trends, and phenomena in this situation. And we need to seriously correct this matter."

While touching on the creation of new structures, the delegate directed attention to the fact that frequently everything is reduced to the solution of purely professional issues. All of this diverts Party organizations from the spiritual sphere and that means it provides our ideological enemies the opportunity to maliciously announce the "defeat" of the communist idea.

According to Lt Col Yu. Kozhin, this situation has also become possible because a fundamental, critical analysis of Party program document provisions is lacking and

errors have been permitted on the path that society has taken. Hence the trend among some communists to admit nonexistent guilt.

Miscalculations in theory and analytical activities have cost us dearly. In our country, we have a multi-million man army of CPSU members who conscientiously pay their dues but who are not always capable of defending the ideas of Marxism.

While analyzing the causes of mistakes in ideology, the speaker pointed out that, in his opinion, on the one hand they are "desertion from the field of battle" of leading ideologists (today you can find some of them in the camp of our ideological opponents) and, on the other hand, the inability of rank and file communists to realize the precise program of their own actions.

The delegate proposed that the All-Army Partkom task the most highly-trained communists from Military VUZ [higher educational institutions] social science departments to elaborate the most important program issues and to discuss these documents in leading Party organizations.

The delegate submitted for conference review the issue on released Party workers of aviation-technical facilities and special units. In the new structure, their positions have been reduced and in units that number up to 70 communists, there is a large number of compulsory service personnel....

Partkoms of all levels, said the delegate in conclusion, cannot remain bystanders on the social issues which have been drastically exacerbated as a result of the withdrawal of units from the groups of forces. Right now nearly 40,000 officers and warrant officers in the Air Force do not have apartments. Many air bases are in deplorable condition and airfields need repair.

Air Force communists want to see the All-Army Committee as the real leader of army communists, capable of significantly activating Party work in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Major-General V. Uskhopchik, motorized rifle division commander, Baltic Military District:

"It already is not a revelation for anyone: appeals for depolitization and departyization of the army are just a convenient cover for some political figures in order to conduct repolitization and transform it into an instrument for attaining their political ambitions. We have sensed this since the January events in Vilnius. Organizations, parties, and factions of all stripes and hues are literally attacking units of our division. It is certainly time for the country's leadership to stop experimenting on people in Lithuania, including on those citizens of the USSR who wear the state uniform of an armed defender."

The time has long since passed, suggested the delegate, to legally strengthen the status of troops in the Baltic Region. "Leading Democrats" in Lithuania are pouring

all sorts of dirt and slander on the army. But I will say just one thing: they will not succeed in burying the people's faith in Soviet rule. There is a Lithuanian Communist Party. And the course of the referendum that took place in the republic once again confirmed the correctness of our position.

But there are still grounds for reflection. During the past two months while executing USSR Presidential Decrees, internal troops patrols jointly with the military and OMON [special-purpose militia detachment], have detained dozens of civilians with weapons and ammunition. However, they have not been charged with crimes in accordance with the laws of the USSR.

We take our hats off to the bravery of Lithuanian communists, today it is quite difficult for them. From the first days of the communist party's split, CPSU members of units and corps that are deployed in the Lithuanian SSR have rendered assistance to those people in the formation who remained loyal to socialist ideals.

Major-General Uskhopchik went on to say that through the will of fate the division has found itself at the center of society's attention. An assessment has been given to the country's Armed Forces as a whole and to the army's role in society through the prism of the events in Vilnius. To his great astonishment, only correspondents from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, central newspaper military departments, and just the military district newspapers from the Baltic and Turkestan military districts have visited and worked in Vilnius to provide objective coverage of the January events. At the same, we could count hundreds of representatives of the so-called independent press. And this has been reflected in the formation of public opinion in the country.

The Leninist appeal "Socialist Fatherland in Danger!" has once again acquired practical significance. Today there is no more important task for Armed Forces communists than to prevent the destruction of our socialist state.

3 Apr 91 pp 1-3

[Text] Lt Col I. Khomenko—missile corps military political department chief:

"Army communists, like the Party as a whole, are experiencing fierce pressure from so-called democratic forces. We have been threatened and we continue to be threatened with reprisals and they predict the hopelessness of the socialist choice and its rapid destruction. But we have withstood and rallied and we remain true to our oath and to the legally elected President of the USSR, to the Supreme Soviet, and to our people. Let no illusions arise among anyone, either in the country or abroad, that the missilers will leave the path selected in October 1917."

At the same time, noted the speaker, negative processes in society have made their mark on army Party organizations. Some communist leaders have faltered and have

manifested uncertainty. A trend has been noted of young officers leaving the USSR Armed Forces. Under these conditions, Party organizations have not manifested proper flexibility and purposefulness in order to effectively influence the changed situation. Instead of precisely organizing the matter, many communists have just been appealing to each other to come out of the trenches.

The delegate suggested that the CPSU Central Committee and the All-Army Party Committee pay more attention to tactical and strategic issues of communist actions. Commanders, military political organs and Party committees must act as a united front and elaborate united approaches to the solution of existing problems.

Later the speaker focused the delegates' attention on the problem of work with personnel. We must admit that in a number of cases we have become confused by those demagogues who have left the CPSU and, while remaining in uniform, have begun to defame the President of the USSR and legitimate rule and to corrupt people, he said. As a rule, all of them have serious service discrepancies. But when we began to demand exactingness from them, we heard: You are persecuting us for criticizing and for leaving the CPSU. I think that there has been enough gentle treatment of these people. If they do not want to serve, let them leave the service and not speculate on their own political convictions. This will be democratic and in accordance with the law.

Delegate I. Khomenko devoted a significant place in his speech to pseudo-democrats' discredited attempts to oppose the army with the people and to disparage the army's role in protecting the Socialist Homeland.

Col V. Sudakov, PVO [Air Defense] division military-political section chief:

"The All-Army Party Conference is occurring in new political conditions when 'masquerade costumes' have been discarded and the banners of all political forces have been unfurled. Figuratively speaking, the starting signal has been given for the political struggle. In this situation, division soldier-communists totally support the activities of the President of the USSR to prevent the collapse of the state."

The speaker described the "touching" concern that Moscow "democrats" have manifested toward them. An enormous AN-12 from Moscow delivered... leaflets with an appeal not to participate in the referendum to northern garrisons. They did not think to load a dozen tons of apples for the children along with the 17 tons of leaflets in the half-empty aircraft.

The delegate noted that the best defense is offense in the conditions of a political struggle. In this regard it is impossible to understand why a place has not been found in the new structures for the universities of Marxism-Leninism. He expressed a desire for the future All-Army Party Committee to examine this problem.

The delegate also requested that the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate and USSR Armed Forces General Staff communists accelerate the shift to the new organizational structure and that a retraining system be formed for military-political unit workers.

The speaker dwelled in detail on current military reform problems and specifically on the problem of increasing the country's defense capability and security. He stressed that today we cannot talk about the security of our borders without modern, reliable air defenses and therefore he opposed the planned PVO Forces reductions.

The fact that they are also curtailing the initial military training program also causes concern. DOSAAF schools are being closed due to a lack of financing and material resources. And the most horrible thing is that the wave of negative attitudes toward military service in general is growing.

Comrade V. Sudakov thoroughly analyzed the problem of manpower acquisition.

Comrade V. Sudakov concluded his speech with these words:

"Before flying to the conference, a momentous event occurred in our division's Party committee—we handed Party membership cards to three young officers. And no matter what they say or what political winds attempt to divert us, I see the guarantee of success of our Party work in this fact, in peoples' longing to be communists during this difficult time."

Lieutenant-General P. Kozlovskiy (Belorussian Military District):

"The complicated and contradictory processes that are occurring in various regions of our country are influencing the moral and political situation of military collectives. Many servicemen who have been drafted from the Baltic Region and the Transcaucasus have found themselves drawn into political games and crime associated with absence without leave and desertion is increasing among them."

Unfortunately, the constructive foundation in the work of individual Party organizations has been lost in these conditions. We have not totally succeeded in ensuring the organizational-political unity of Party ranks.

At the same time, the speaker noted that it is impossible to dramatize the situation. The report-back campaign that occurred showed that the overwhelming majority of Party organizations had not succumbed to the pressure of destructive forces.

Later Comrade P. Kozlovskiy dwelled on problems that face army and division level Party committees, specifically, problems of increasing military and mobilization readiness and military discipline.

The speaker noted the following fact with alarm: In the last two years, the number of officers, especially young officers, who are striving to leave the Armed Forces has drastically increased. And this is during the same time that we are standing on the threshold of serious organizational and personnel changes.

In the delegate's opinion, today we are losing the position in combat training due to the inadequate professionalism of the officer corps. And this is occurring because officers are compelled to carry out a large number of tasks that are not associated with the combat activities of their units and subunits, perform a large number of additional duties, and are often on temporary duty trips.

In conclusion, Comrade P. Kozlovskiy said:

"I think that those people who are still hatching plans for the departyization and depolitization of the army and navy are conducting an attack against the words and decisions we have adopted at the conference and against the socialist choice and are aspiring to destabilize the situation in the country and provoke the collapse of the Union and its Armed Forces."

Col I. Dedilev, General Staff group chief:

In his speech, the delegate dwelled in detail on the issue of Party discipline. Having cited the fundamental positions of the Charter adopted at the 28th CPSU Congress, he expressed a number of critical comments which concerned the elaboration of the Instructions to CPSU organizations in the Armed Forces. In the delegate's opinion, the exclusion of the Party conference from the process of elaborating the Instructions is an undemocratic act. He also cited several examples which, in his view, are evidence of violations of charter provisions, specifically, that individual communist leaders had assumed the right for themselves to interpret individual articles of the CPSU Charter "at their discretion."

Later, the speaker touched on the procedures for spending membership dues and those reasons which he thinks prevent the secretary from easily obtaining monetary resources for the needs of his own Party organization which belong to it according to the Charter.

Delegate I. Dedilev specifically designated the circle of vital issues to which he wanted to hear answers and suggested that the Central Control Commission very painstakingly investigate the questions posed and make the appropriate decision on them.

The delegate called on conference participants to fundamentally discuss what has changed in our Party organizations since the 28th Party Congress and to analyze the activities through the prism of the 2nd Party Charter paragraph which applies to internal Party democracy, to speak about such concepts as party comradeship, equality of Party members, the combination of the

interests of the Party and those of an individual communist, the power of the Party masses, the independence of leading Party organizations, the freedom to express opinions, and others.

Lieutenant-General A. Zakharov, military political directorate chief, Turkestan Military District:

"The conferences and assemblies that have occurred have shown that Party potential in the military district remains strong. Political maturity and businesslike activities of communists are remaining high in the background of difficult socio-political and ethnic problems of the regions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the unification of two military districts, the completion of the troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, and the severe climactic conditions."

CPSU organizations in the army, the speaker pointed out, will obtain the servicemen's confidence only in the event that they persistently act as the defenders of the social interests of servicemen, workers, and employees of the Soviet Army and the members of their families. There are a total of 5,794 officers' and warrant officers' families that need housing in the troops of Turkestan Military District but, as a result of the redeployment of division-sized units and units that have been withdrawn from the groups of forces, another 836 families of servicemen will be added to that number.

The delegate proposed that the All-Army Party Committee develop a program of social protection of servicemen and place the solution of the following tasks at its foundation:

- creation of special rights protection service organs with the broad enlistment of communist lawyers to do this work; and,
- creation of a special social support fund in major Party committees for communists and small Party organizations that are experiencing monetary resource difficulties.

The speaker is deeply convinced that the prestige of Party organizations in the country and the army is being preserved not only because the CPSU has certain past merits. In our days, new factors of its growth are entering into the matter, including the objectivity of analysis of events occurring in the country.

Work on strengthening ties with territorial Party organizations also serves the prestige of military district Party organizations. We, the representatives of Turkestan Military District, have access to five republic Party organizations and we have never lost our ties with them. On the contrary, we have acquired the enormous experience of joint contacts under various conditions of activities, also including extreme conditions. The selection of 178 local Party organ senior officials of the military district's military units, divisions, and corps as Party committee members has been a new step in this direction.

Sergeant A. Kulik, cadet at Samarkand Higher Military Automobile Command School imeni Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet:

"The opinion predominates in Party collectives and among the school's staff that only the CPSU is capable of leading the country out of the crisis."

Later the delegate discussed in detail the problems in the work of school communists.

It was pointed out that the events which occurred in Dushanbe, Fergana, and Osh had a negative impact on those desiring to enter the school and their numbers dropped. Nevertheless, in 1990 we managed to preserve competition among applicants. The fact that the school at the present time has opened preparatory courses is a good support in this context.

The delegate also shared this problem. Continuing disparagement of the Party and the army has caused uncertainty in tomorrow among a certain portion of the cadets. They are expressing doubts in the correctness of the profession they have selected. The number of reports on dismissal from the school for lack of desire to study has increased. And although there are not communists among them, the Party organization is alarmed by this trend.

The speaker noted with satisfaction that democratization of army life has also affected their collectives. And the school's leadership has also begun to listen more to cadet opinions and to the opinions of young communists. There are cadet representatives in all of the school's public organs, including in the school's academic soviet and they participate in the assignment of graduates.

The school's Party organization communists are concerned about the social situation of cadet families. There are more than 100 of them at the school and all of them have turned out to be, as they now say, on the verge of poverty. This situation is seriously impacting the sentiments of cadet families and is affecting the quality of their studies and service.

Col V. Podguzov, Senior Professor of the Military Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev:

"I need to remind you about the Party's primary mission—unification of the workers' revolutionary movement with scientific theory. The Party's organizing and guiding role is also possible where and when this unification has been carried out. The workers' movement simply answered this question the way it is. Thousands of noisy rallies of the enemies of Marxism fade in contrast with the threatening silence which has been established at the abandoned jobs of the striking miners."

The working class, stressed the delegate, is a powerful creative force that is being transformed into a destructive battering-ram if the consciousness of the working class if only for a time falls under the influence of

proponents of market anarchy. It is impossible for army ideological workers and Party organizations in contemporary conditions to be exclusively locked into internal army problems. Isolation from the working class is making the Party isolated from the land.

Further the speaker dwelled on other current problems. In his opinion, today the Party is nearly disarmed in the area of ideology. He expressed criticism directed at certain CPSU Central Committee departments, MGK [Moscow City Committee], and the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee....

Delegate V. Podguzov stressed the need to clearly and precisely formulate the economic laws of socialism. He thinks that no communist or academic has formulated a single law in this area during the last 35 years, that is, theory has not developed during all these years. In the speaker's opinion, this became possible for a number of reasons: The isolation of theorists from practice and the transformation of Marxism-Leninism into just an academic discipline for passing exams and the ideological betrayal of a number of leading ideologists such as Abalkin, Yakovlev, and Shatalin....

The speaker also defined the higher school's specific perestroika positions.

Col N. Satybaldiyev, chairman of an aviation division control commission (Central Group of Forces):

"The situation in the country is extremely tense and the confrontation of political forces has reached a critical phase. Historical responsibility to the country and the people has been assigned to the CPSU."

That is why, noted the speaker, the Soviet people are criticizing the Party for its errors, the indecisiveness of central organs, for the lack of a precise program to emerge from the crisis, and for marking time. And the CPSU is responsible for the activities of anti-popular forces. It is the ruling Party! It cannot transfer the blame to anyone else.

In the delegate's opinion, just what is the primary task for the CPSU and for Armed Forces Party organizations under these conditions?

First of all, it must overcome a certain confusion and acquire work habits under conditions of real political pluralism and broad glasnost and prevent a recoil from the processes of democratization. And here the role of each Party organization and the active position of each communist is great. The speaker stressed that those people who are waiting for the time to come when everything will be in its own place on orders from above are wrong. This will not happen. Today it is important that Party members are able to give and do give a rebuff to any anticommunist attack. The time has come when it is necessary to fight for each person and to convince him of the correctness of our ideas and the prospects of the selected path.

Naturally, profound political and economic knowledge are needed to do this. Serious work is needed to develop CPSU members' intellectual potential. Party committees must seriously think about Party personnel, their selection, and professional growth. Today a Party worker must be a brilliant and magnetic personality. Only then will he be able to handle people.

While speaking about the importance of theoretical work and the need to ponder the prospects of society's development, the speaker shared the thought that Party organizations must under no circumstances be locked exclusively into their internal affairs. The Party collective's prestige is determined by its specific activities. A specific matter—this is communists' most important argument in the dispute with political opponents for the hearts and minds of the people.

Lt Col S. Novikov, motorized rifle regiment chief of staff (Leningrad Military District):

The primary place in the delegate's speech was devoted to the problems of perestroika of Party work at the regimental level. In particular, he said that the reduction of the CPSU's prestige in society has also been perceived in their units. They have found those people who thought that their own presence in the Party was already superfluous and who perceived with ease the reduction of the Party's demand for an attitude toward the service and the cause as a whole.

Our own shortcomings in the regimental communists' work styles and methods have influenced the development of these negative phenomena. Many burning issues have accumulated. They have been broadly discussed but practically have not been resolved, deeds did not follow words and resolutions or everything was restricted to half-measures. Suffice it to say that 49 young officers are nurturing the thought of leaving the service. And this is under threatened under-manning of platoon commanders.

Today the regimental Party organization sees its "way out of the trenches," continued the delegate, not only in the uncompromising assertion of the socialist choice in the army environment but also in practical work directly for the people and for and in the name of a specific cause. And we have already begun this work in the regiment. Workers groups have been formed under the Party committee for detailed analysis of the sentiment among all categories of servicemen and an effective reaction has been established in theater productions, including the purely mundane issues of officers and their families.

The speaker pointed out that in our country certainly not everything will turn out the way we want it to. And here we are waiting for an impartial analysis of Party practices and aid in accumulating and disseminating leading experience from the All-Army Party Committee and from other higher Party structures.

The speaker also dwelled on work with officer personnel. He thinks that personnel work must be a priority in Party

organization activities. It is impossible to consider a personnel policy just and rational when the work load for officers is distributed unequally and when some officers grow in service like mushrooms after rain and serve in privileged garrisons, and others are in remote locales and in one and the same job for many years. Here we also need to more broadly develop the capabilities of the Officers' Assembly.

Initiation of the radical renewal of army activity, said the delegate, in many ways depends on the persistence of army communists who are united in new Party structures. The path toward efficiency and effectiveness of our efforts is at the same time the road to the affirmation of our own importance and prestige.

Lieutenant-General of Justice A. Katusev, Main Military Procurator:

"Communist officers of the military procuracy currently sense a triple pressure from the forces that stand in opposition to the CPSU: as servicemen, as workers who are supervising the execution of the Constitution of the USSR and all-union laws, and as communists."

In the speaker's opinion, army and navy Party organization prestige in this situation to a significant degree will depend on the ability to express and defend servicemen's legitimate interests and to effectively influence public opinion and the spiritual atmosphere in military collectives.

Having stressed that the moral health of the Armed Forces reflects the state of legality and military discipline, the delegate noted the troubles in this issue. So, crime significantly increased last year in the troops. The number of violations of the law increased. The primary increase is occurring due to evasion of military service and crimes entailed with it that are committed "on the run." It is understandable that this situation has been caused by not purely army causes but primarily by the negative processes in the country and the influence of anti-army sentiments and acts. Therefore, cooperation with CPSU republic, territorial, and production organizations in the matter of military patriotic education is the most timely task of Armed Forces Party organizations. The Instrument Plant imeni Khrushchev Party organization which raised its voice in defense of the army at the February 23 rally in Moscow provided a good example of this.

It is difficult to overestimate the role of the mass media in this. By way of illustration, how much dirt has been poured and continues to be poured on the army as a result of the deaths and traumatization of servicemen. Certain unscrupulous politicians have earned huge dividends on mothers' grief. And who has condemned their conduct? Who knows the actual situation on this issue? Unfortunately, just the limited audience of military press and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA subscribers. And in the meantime "noncombat losses" in the army are steadily decreasing. And this is despite the enormous troop redeployments as a result of their withdrawal from

Eastern Europe and the unprecedented scale of economic work. The Movement of Soldiers' Mothers needs the continuous support of military-political organs and the assistance of local army and navy CPSU organizations.

The speaker went on to say that the attitude toward events in Tbilisi must become a lesson for Party committees and Party organizations. Communists have been silent for almost a year and a half which has been linked with the congress' decision to cease public statements in this regard in order to prevent aggravation of the situation in society. I was also silent as a result of this decision. But lies and disinformation have raged without hindrance for a year and a half on television screens, on the pages of newspapers of magazines, and on the waves of radio broadcasts. Right now the truth is known and the army's innocence and the responsibility of unscrupulous politicians who plunged the population into tragedy have been confirmed. But the latter have already managed to scrape together dishonest political capital.

I am convinced that openness [otkrytost] and truth are working for the CPSU's honest policy. Healthy forces need glasnost but dishonorable people nevertheless do not consider the restrictions of either the law or the honest word.

At the same time, Comrade Katusev went on to say that we must see that far from all of the causes of the increase of crime are beyond the troops. Absence without leave from units and violations of regulations of interrelations, theft and criminal negligence also occur due to disorderliness in service organizations, formalism in relations, and the coarseness of officials.

In conclusion, the speaker dwelled in detail on the ability of Party organizations to conduct their work under conditions of the force of the Law of the USSR "On Public Organizations." He stressed that this law does not weaken the CPSU as it may seem but it protects the CPSU from administrative methods and unfounded interference.

Col G. Synkov, chief of the engineering work directorate:

"The destruction of the old economic ties and management structures is being painfully reflected in the situation in military construction."

The delegate dwelled on that consolidating, creative role that the new Party organs are called upon to play in this situation. Specifically, he said that, in the opinion of communists in military-construction units, the period of reform and organizational formation of these structures has been groundlessly prolonged. While solving internal Party problems, a number of Party organizations have actually remained on the sidelines from realization of the constructive political guidelines elaborated by the 28th CPSU Congress and are poorly mastering political methods to influence people and workers' and military collectives.

According to the delegate, the creation and establishment of a system of active work with people, rapt attention to the needs and requirements of Soviet Army servicemen, workers, and employees are the immediate tasks here. It is all the more important that the number of released Party workers has been drastically reduced, for example, in management by more than a factor of four.

Later, the delegate dwelled on problems in whose solution Party organizations could help the command authorities and prove themselves to be an effective political force. Among them are manning requisitions of military-construction units, ties with local organs of rule, the struggle for discipline, the introduction of leading technologies that are safe for people's health, the organization of accountability in all directions, and, well naturally, effective participation in the moral and political education of personnel.

We need to decisively reject attacks on Marxism-Leninism and the aspiration of individual "radicals" to besmirch the name and cause of V.I. Lenin. As a practical action in this regard, the delegate proposed supporting the initiative of many military and workers' collectives and Komsomol organizations soviets to conduct an April 20, 1991 subbotnik [voluntary unpaid work usually performed on Saturday] in honor of the 121st anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth. In so doing, 50 percent of the earned resources will be sent to the Fund for the Defense of the V.I. Lenin Museum and for restoration and development of Leninist museums and memorials.

In conclusion, the speaker said that with the establishment of the All-Army Party Committee we are hoping that it becomes the center of concentration of business-like energy, initiative, and creativity of communists in the matter of consolidating unity of Party ranks and strengthening the economic and defense might of the Homeland.

Lt Col F. Pugachev, motorized rifle regiment commander (Western Group of Forces):

"Time is testing our devotion to the Homeland, the ideals of socialism, and loyalty to the cause of Lenin and the Communist Party."

Today, the delegate continued, they have already provided an assessment of how various blocs of latter-day parties and movements of the clearly expressed right wing are attempting to eliminate the CPSU, disunite the Union, and change the existing system in the country. Forty three thousand communists of our group of forces said their resolute "no" to these attempts, condemned political and moral terror methods, provocations, shameless persecutions of legally elected leaders, appeals for noncompliance with the law, and civil disobedience at their report-back meetings.

The struggle for the minds and hearts of the people has been shifted to local Party organizations. It is here that

the ideas of freezing membership dues, division of Party property, elimination of the Party staff, depolitization and departyization are being thrown around.

Later, the delegate dwelled on the specific features of Party work in the Western Group of Forces which is located on the territory of a capitalist state and NATO member and is being subjected to keen ideological influence. On a daily basis they incline our personnel to not return to the Homeland and thoroughly extol the benefits of their democracy, while frightening them with hunger and civil war. This is why, the speaker continued, the role of ideological work is increasing as never before. Confirmation of social optimism, moral purity, organization, and a high spirit of brotherhood and comradeship—this is the main thing in it.

Major-General A. Domanskiy (Carpathian Military District):

"The situation that has developed in the country, the Party, and the Armed Forces has constructed a perceptible watershed between those who firmly stand on positions of the CPSU and individuals who entered the Party for the sake of benefits, and the "turncoats." The others, thinking that the process of democratization gives them the right to disregard the Party Charter, have set out on the path of violating Party discipline and noticeably reducing their activities."

In this regard, stressed the speaker, we need to improve ideological and political-educational work and persistently form the Marxist-Leninist world view among communists.

The speaker stated that ideological and organizational delimitation must become the first step. The Party Central Committee made an attempt in this direction but, if it had been totally firm, it would not have allowed Yeltsin, Afanasyev, Sobchak, Popov, and others to give up their party membership cards, the Party itself would have confiscated them. We are not demanding purges or reregistration but we think it is necessary to conduct individual ideological discussions in each Party organization. If a man has doubts about socialism, let him leave the Party. We must not be afraid of people leaving the Party—this will only purge it.

Later, the speaker dwelled on problems of consolidating ties with territorial Party organizations and effective utilization of Party moneys under new economic conditions. He expressed bewilderment with regard to the Instructions on Procedures for the Utilization of Party Dues through division-sized unit and unit finance organs: The Partkom and secretary themselves must be held accountable to communists. The delegate subjected to criticism the optional nature of the resolutions adopted by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Lt Col V. Ponkrat'yev, Partkom secretary (Pacific Fleet):

"We, like all Soviet people, must be concerned with the fact that the policy of perestroika that has been elaborated by the CPSU is being increasingly deformed by anti-socialist forces while acquiring the features of a creeping counterrevolution. The weight of responsibility for this also lies on us, army communists. We became mired in discussions on issues on which the Party had already long ago provided clear and simple answers."

By way of illustration, said the delegate, the slogan of depolitization and departyization of the Armed Forces named by the 28th CPSU Congress is theoretically untenable and politically harmful. However, soon after the conference a discussion unfolded on the pages of an army communist magazine: to leave only CPSU organizations in the Armed Forces? To allow a multiparty system or to completely departyize the army and navy?

Later, the speaker dwelled on problems of reforming Armed Forces political structures. On the one hand, the military-political leadership is constantly appealing to the opinions of communists and officers and, on the other hand, driving the matter home to the Procrustean bed of such strict provisions that bewilderment is arising among many local people.

The delegate expressed concern that the reform process is promoting the outflow of staff personnel from the Air Force military-political department and that territorial Partkoms are essentially without personnel. Naval Air Force communists propose decisively rejecting the compensatory principle of forming Party structures. Priorities and staffs must be determined locally, that is, in those places where Party organizations are being created and where they will operate.

Delegate V. Ponkrat'yev allocated a significant place in his speech to conversion issues. He is very concerned about the condition of emergency rescue systems and the naval aviation combat aircraft fleet. In the next few years, a number of aircraft models are subject to being written off in view of physical obsolescence and for now nothing new is entering the inventory. In the name of fleet Air Force communists, the delegate proposed formation of a defense industry conversion commission within the All-Army Party Committee.

Lt Col Yu. Bochkarov, unit party committee secretary (airborne troops):

The speaker said that "today's reality is that in our society perestroika has collided with the opposition of anti-socialist and nationalist forces who have set as their goal eliminating Soviet rule, tearing down the USSR, and impeding the CPSU's legitimate activities in the Soviet Armed Forces. Airborne troops communists, one of the first to stand in defense of the country, honor, and dignity of Soviet citizens, have keenly felt this. While sensing the deep gratitude of workers, women, children, and the elderly for the assistance rendered to them, at the same time we continuously hear the evil, poisonous

hissing from the corner of Fascist elements who are concealing themselves under the masks of 'democrats' of every stripe."

Airborne troops communists relate with understanding and responsibility to the fact that it is the airborne troops that the leadership of the country and the Armed Forces enlists in cases which require the protection of the lives, honor, and dignity of Soviet citizens in various regions of our country. However, the speaker stated that profound bewilderment is caused by the fact that searches for the "extreme" are conducted after each such case and questions are posed such as "Who sent them?", etc.

Later, the speaker dwelled on the issues of internal Party life. He pointed out that democratic mechanisms are being quite energetically formed in the Party and that an atmosphere of high morals, discipline, and comradeship is being established in collectives.

He particularly stressed work to ensure the communists' advance guard role. Where was this role previously manifested? In speeches at Party meetings and in plans and reports. But not many people directly answered to their Party organizations for the state of affairs in subordinate units and subunits and for work to consolidate military discipline and personal conduct while on duty and during everyday life. It is no secret that at times Party organizations manifested a heightened exactingness toward rank and file communists without noting the more serious offenses of high ranking communist leaders. Right now the situation is drastically changing. Demand is becoming just and strict.

The speaker called the problem of Party organizations' mutual relations with the Komsomol and other public organizations extremely vital. He stated that the opposition is demanding depolitization of the army. And in the meantime, they are using every way possible to get their programs and pamphlets into military collectives. There are sufficient examples of this. Even the miners are setting forth demands for departyization of the army during their strikes. The question legitimately arises: Will they really be able to mine more coal in the event of departyization of the army? But maybe we should undertake to teach them how to mine coal? What will come of this? It is no more absurd.

In conclusion, the delegate expressed concrete proposals to improve the "Instructions on the Work of Party Organizations in the USSR Armed Forces" and for cooperation with local Party organs.

Lt Col L. Tumanov, Baykonur Cosmodrome Party secretary, Baykonur Cosmodrome:

"The completed report-back campaign in the army and navy played a consolidating role in uniting communists not through compulsion but through conviction. Despite the furious attacks of anti-communist forces, we at the cosmodrome managed to nearly completely preserve the composition and structure of Party organizations and to increase effectiveness. Having completed the torturous

process of political self-determination, quite a few of our communists have remained in the CPSU. This is the trend: the murky wave of "refugees" has subsided (this is a total of four percent) and the stream of fresh replacements into the Party is gaining momentum."

Communists see the knot of serious problems, continued the delegate, in the division of functions of military-political organs and Party organizations. The very fact of delimitation has been perceived positively. But some Party organizations, while coming out from under the influence of political organs, have become confused.

And there are quite a few unresolved problems at the Cosmodrome. Work and service require the maximum accumulation of forces because the price of an error during a launch countdown or crew command and control is too great. Hundreds and even thousands of people make up crews and we need to strive to have them all act like one man.

Lt Col L. Tumanov directed the conference's attention to one paragraph of the communist program of action: CPSU members will conduct an active struggle against indiscriminate, thoughtless reduction of space units. Spacecraft launch units have to be manned from 2-3 units. Public opinion about cosmonautics' extravagance is being formed into an attack on it. But today it provides a savings of the people's resources and is beginning to return that enormous capital which has been invested in it. And if we cease or reduce space research, we will dig into the earth and, instead of reaping huge benefits, we will irretrievably squander the resources we have invested in space systems, leading technology, and unique test experience.

Senior Warrant Officer N. Strokov, platoon commander (Far East Military District):

"While analyzing past events, you come to the conclusion that we communists have begun to lose the content side of Party work to the organizational side of the matter. Until recently, Some CPSU members did not precisely clarify for themselves why and for the sake of what they began to reform political organs and to create new Party structures."

The delegate expressed concern with the fact that some people with Party membership cards are as before inert and arrive in a state of anticipation. In the delegate's view, this is explained by the fact that some people have joined the Party not for ideological reasons but in order to obtain an advantageous position or other benefits. These are random people and we need to part ways with them.

We know the model communist and we know the price of this model. Can "turncoats" from the Party, like Lopatin, Afanasyev, Yeltsin, and others really be examples? Of course not.

Today we have been placed in conditions when the question who's who is being posed and who will be

moved up. Our ideological enemies have gotten their bearings momentarily. We already know that the threads from Luzhnikov and Manezhnaya Square have also extended to military units. The goal is clear: Sow dissension and doubt in soldiers' minds and hearts. Unfortunately, some have faltered and become confused in this situation.

For us, military communists, noted Senior Warrant Officer N. Strokov, there is no more important task right now then to establish such sacred concepts as Homeland, honor, and pride of membership in the USSR Armed Forces in the troops.

Lt Col A. Fedoseyev, Partkom secretary (Odessa Military District):

"Our conference," said the delegate, "is working during a difficult time for the Party. The situation in the country must influence the mood and conduct of people, including military communists. Rethinking views on socialism, mastering the essence of the reforms being conducted, and defining our own positions requires both wisdom and courage from CPSU members.

While assessing the life of leading Party organizations as a result of this, the speaker pointed out that not all of them had added to the work and far from all of the independence that had been granted has been utilized and the 28th CPSU Congress provision on power of the Party masses is being realized. The impression is being formed that the transfer of Party power from top to bottom, to leading organizations, has gotten stuck somewhere at the halfway point. And obviously the reason is because the stereotype of Party conduct based on the center's leadership has turned out to be too durable. Communists have turned out to be not totally prepared for independent activities or to energetically influence new processes in army collectives. Therefore, today specific reference points are required from the created Party organs and, primarily, from the All-Army Party Committee. This is about a search for new forms and methods of work that are only inherent to Party organizations.

In the delegate's opinion, we must more boldly use these effective institutions of Party democracy like Party referendums, polls, and individual and group discussions. In his opinion, this will help the All-Army Party Committee to elaborate its decisions taking into account the entire spectrum of opinions of army communists and then to already implement them through Party organizations.

The speaker devoted a noticeable place to problems of internal Party life and to ideological work.

Captain 1st Rank A. Smotrov, strategic missile submarine commander (Northern Fleet):

"Today Lenin's words on the need to be on guard are very relevant. Events in the world, specifically in the

Persian Gulf, and the analysis of the processes occurring within the country once again convince us of the correctness of these words."

We must see, continued the delegate, how feverishly external forces are uniting with nationalist and anti-socialist forces in the USSR to which criminal elements are being added. And all of this is becoming an obvious factor.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Armed Forces, law enforcement organs, and the organs of state security oppose the destructive wave. And it is easy to understand why the "democrats" are increasingly attempting by any means to undermine the unity of communists and to drive a wedge between the commander and the Party organization. But how can I, a missile submarine commander, isolate myself from my crew, a third of whom are communists? Communists are people who hold views that are similar to mine. Communists are my most responsible, most educated, experienced, and reliable members of the crew.

While analyzing the complicated economic situation in the country, the delegate cited a number of alarming factors which the Armed Forces are experiencing. In particular, the problem of ship repair remains acute. Monetary resources have been allocated. However, it is not being taken into account that current prices are galloping and if urgent steps are not taken, the material well-being of ship repair will decline.

As a result of the so-called "struggle of laws," the fleet is annually under-receiving a large number of compulsory service personnel. Today undermanning in the Northern Fleet already totals thousands of men.

Issues associated with ensuring submarine explosion-proofing and fire safety and survivability are not finding proper solutions. A shortage of required combat aircraft is being experienced.

In conclusion, the delegate said: "We, communists of the Armed Forces, must make a weighty contribution to rally all of the country's progressive forces and those forces that are loyal to the socialist choice."

Col L. Ripa, chairman of the Party organization Control Commission, Kiev Military District:

"Where will the transformations of Party work in the Armed Forces lead and how much do they correspond to the interests of army communists, and will they promote the establishment of social justice, democracy, and glasnost? Kiev Military District communists, like all army communists and servicemen, expect an answer to these key questions from the conference."

There is a position to which almost everything boils down to, the understanding of what Party organizations in the army need, that army communists do not have either the political or moral right to remove the responsibility from themselves for the fate of perestroyka and the country's security.

I am certain, the delegate said, that today people must be in Party work who think keenly politically and who are sincere advocates of perestroyka and who are not adaptors who are ready to pronounce the words "democracy" and "glasnost" but in fact do not want to work either according to the new way nor according to the old way. We are also obliged to proceed from these positions when forming the All-Army Party Committee which must become the real headquarters of Party work in the USSR Armed Forces.

The immediate intensification of ideological and information-propaganda work is required. But on the contrary, we for some reason are rejecting forms of associating with people that have justified themselves and first of all those, like the conduct of united political days—there are none of them in 1991 training year documents. Many communists have become bewildered because the name of the training system for officers, the overwhelming majority of whom are Party members, has been changed: it has become political training instead of Marxist-Leninist training. Is this really an imperceptible step on the path to rejection of the theory of Marxism-Leninism? I would like to believe it is not.

The speaker appealed to the delegates to decisively dissociate themselves from those who are attempting to undermine the Party's ideological foundations and suggested indicating in the decisions of the All-Army Party Conference that participation of army communists in anti-socialist, nationalist organizations is intolerable. I would like, he stressed, the All-Army Party Committee to take a clear position in this regard.

We are awaiting the elaboration of positions from the newly elected All-Army Party Committee and Control Commission which permit us not to become involved with details, do not simply divide functions, but unite and concentrate efforts toward the solution of the tasks of combat readiness, consolidating military discipline, and educating the real defenders of our Homeland.

Colonel-General B. Pyankov, commander, Siberian Military District:

"The process of reforming political organs and creating new Party structures is occurring in a complex time for the Party and the Armed Forces. The political struggle in the country is acquiring an unusual tension and sharpness."

Later, the speaker stressed that this complex period of our lives must be assessed as a turning point in the activities of military-political organs and army Party organizations. And right now it is impossible to permit an even brief slackening of educational work with personnel and reduction of the effectiveness of the impact of organizations on all aspects of life and on the activities of military collectives.

While talking about the lessons and conclusions of the report-back and organizational meetings and conferences which have occurred, Colonel-General B. Pyankov

focused attention on various opinions of military district communists on the functions and work methods of the new Partkoms. Commanders, military-political workers, and Party activists definitely advocated preserving the accumulated experience of modern operations, the search for effective ways toward mutual assistance and cooperation, unification of common efforts to improve combat readiness, personnel education, and consolidation of discipline and law and order.

As a military district commander, the delegate said, I am pleased to point out: communists highly assess the role of the CPSU member—military collective leader. I have repeatedly heard the thought that highly professional leadership of the military collective is the main Party obligation of the commander-communist. Leaders of various ranks have been elected to the new Partkoms in the Siberian Military district: from regimental commander to commander-in-chief and officials of military-political organs.

The lessons and conclusions handed down permit us to formulate a number of problems that are most prominently highlighted in Party work.

On the main thing in the Party's organizational structure—the principle of democratic centralism. This question is the reflection of the struggle that flared at the 28th CPSU Congress. The old understanding of this principle is negated in the Congress' Program Statement and the Leninist view of it has not found proper reflection in the Party Charter. But life is already demonstrating that "limitless" democracy is creating conditions for the fragmentation of the united Party organism and is engendering the amorphousness of Party ranks.

For newly created Partkoms, the task consists of rationally combining the principles of democracy and centralism and preserving the organizational and ideological unity of our ranks.

The All-Army Party Committee must also think about conducting the socio-political efficiency ratings of communists in some form in the near future. We need to determine who is who.

The question is not one of purging Party ranks but about a search for dissidents and about elaborating precise ideas about who we are today, how our forces are allocated, helping the vacillators and attracting advocates of the socialist choice into our ranks. Young communists require special attention.

The CPSU Central Committee, as we all know, has confirmed the status of the leading Party organization secretary. But I think that we also need to think about increasing the status of army and district level Partkom secretaries. The inclusion of military district and army Partkom secretaries on the staff of military soviets is one measure. There could also be other measures. That is, the question is one of increasing the prestige of elected Party workers.

Lt Col Yu. Veretennikov, independent railroad bridge battalion commander:

"Railroad troops communists have made a simple choice: for socialism, for the program of the President of the USSR and the 4th USSR Congress of People's Deputies to withdraw the country from the crisis, for maintaining discipline and constitutional order in society, and for a united Armed Forces. Troops personnel expressed a resolute "yes" to the referendum.

"It is becoming increasingly difficult to carry out assigned tasks. From year to year, our personnel manning acquisition is falling without even talking about its qualitative characteristics. Support of practical training facility operations, provision of our own building materials, construction, and equipment is proceeding with difficulty. All of this is exacerbated by the "war of sovereignties" which has been unleashed and by ethnic conflicts and attacks by destructive forces which draw their "knowledge" about troops primarily from the so-called independent mass media who are attempting to disparage the army and pour dirt on it."

Having dwelled on a number of relevant problems of the railroad troops, the speaker stressed that Partkoms and Party organizations, while acquiring independence, must work in tune with commanders and military-political organs. As the commander of an independent battalion, I am convinced, the speaker stated, that it would be extremely difficult for me to carry out the tasks of combat readiness, personnel training, and maintenance of military discipline without the assistance of communists and the Party bureau.

In conclusion, the speaker said that our Party is experiencing a difficult period. But millions of communists have remained loyal to the Party while passing through the thorny and, frankly speaking, difficult path of political self-determination. The Party's foundation has turned out to be healthy and strong. It was and remains the most massive political organization which enjoys the support of the people. And today political and organizational reinforcement of its ranks is the most important task. In this background, the renaming of Marxist-Leninist training to political training beginning with the 1991 training year is causing bewilderment among battalion communists.

Railroad troops communists have a resolute opinion: Only the CPSU and no other force is capable of leading the country out of the crisis.

Lt Col V. Yuryev, division military-political department chief (Moscow Military District):

The delegate supported the assessment heard at the conference that the socio-political situation in the country is complex, explosive, and characterized by the opposition of various political forces. When he shifted to the problems of Party work, he paid special attention to those problems that concern Party influence on young people.

What kind of faith of conscripts, say from Western Ukraine, in Communist ideals or in socialism and what kind of pride in the heroic history of the state and the Armed Forces can this be a question of if prior to conscription into the army they have been under the influence of the divisive activities of Lvov Oblsoviet headed by thrice convicted Chernovil? If there is not one communist in oblast public education—all of them have been forced to surrender their Party membership cards. If children's teachers greetings and the response to them correspond to OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist] traditions. There are similar examples in a number of the country's other regions. As a result, the world view of young people is being changed. Young people are arriving to perform military service with a negative orientation toward everything Soviet. And so much energy and strength is being demanded from commanders and all communists to return young people to a normal political viewpoint. I think, stressed the delegate, that the time has also come for both Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak, and others to know that there is no sympathy for them in the army environment.

The delegate named further improvement of interethnic relations in military collectives, strengthening discipline and order, and creation of a healthy psychological climate under which a soldier could both serve and live well among the number of very important problems whose solution division communists urgently face.

Lt Col V. Nemezh, special unit garrison Partkom secretary:

"We understand that today as never before the President of the USSR and the Federation Council and the Cabinet of Ministers that have been formed on new principles need our Party's support," said the speaker. "This is our primary task because Soviet soldiers want to see the country a solid, united, and mighty power where order and certainty in the future reign."

The delegate sees the Partkom's primary task in thoroughly investigating the state of Party ranks and putting an end to the indifferent-passive attitude toward those people who are leaving the CPSU. Life urgently demands increasing the quality of ideological work. In so doing, one of the main tasks is to protect young people from moral degradation. For the purpose of improving ideological work, the delegate proposed once again sending issues of the CPSU Central Committee Information Bulletin to Partkoms which will help to more confidently solve issues of the organizational-political strengthening of the Party. Later, the speaker said:

"We decisively oppose the attempts of nationalist and anti-socialist forces to cause political instability and social tension in the country, slacken discipline and law and order, and destroy the unity of the army and the people."

For four years, I headed a special unit political department, said the speaker. According to the TOE, there were four officers and two Soviet Army employees in it. Right

now according to preliminary data, there will be one Partkom secretary and an instructor for Party document accounting in the territorial Partkom. Can this staff cover all units and institutions located on the territory of the two oblasts and in a system of special units where there will be no political organ? In this case, it is impossible to refer to the shortage of monetary resources: small units and institutions, especially of the rear services, and thousands of workers and employees may be left without any political influence.

The delegate proposed finding the capability and defining the staff of special unit Party committees which would effectively carry out the impending tasks.

Col A. Litvinenko, Partkom secretary, Volga-Urals Military District:

"To some people, our military district appears to be a quiet corner of Russia where people live and serve without particular problems. In fact, this is not so. We are overflowing with apartment-less people (12,000 families of officers and warrant officers do not have housing) and lack of social protection and political passions and powerful anti-army campaigns seethe."

It is bitter to admit but this is occurring in native Russia, continued the delegate. And at a time when republic leaders are vowing love for the army. The military district has been compelled to not only fulfill its direct tasks but to also develop the infrastructure, plow and sow, and feed cattle—otherwise there would be nothing to feed the people who are standing in formation today. Party organizations and communists are at the cutting edge of all of these problems.

"Just how are we solving these problems in independent structures, whom are we depending on, and to whom are we turning for help?"

While analyzing this issue, the delegate touched on mutual relations of Party organizations and reformed political organs. We need to admit, he said, that some of the military-political organs have turned their backs on leading Party organizations. Some of them, with a sigh of relief, have sent newborn Partkoms to sail independently, as they say in the navy, in many ways still unfinished and with inadequate rigging. I want to support Comrade Bochkarev who spoke here: We urgently need, in a short period of time, to create a coherent, mutual assistance system, both vertically and horizontally.

While speaking about the issues of internal Party life, the delegate submitted a proposal to not eliminate universities of Marxism-Leninism but to inject new meaning and content into their activities; to reconsider increasing the percentage of Party dues because, in his opinion, the Party is doomed to passivity without proper material resources. The delegate also supported the idea stated at the conference on creation of a massive All-Army Party

Organization printing organ and more effective utilization of the capabilities of military district newspapers in ideological work.

Captain 1st Rank A. Davydov, naval squadron military-political organ chief:

"The creation of a single Armed Forces Party organization and the current Party conference seems to us to be a unique opportunity to state the position of army and navy communists to the entire country with regard to the processes that are occurring in the country and the Party and to explain to the people with whom and why we are in this troubled time for the Homeland.

So-called democrats in a number of regions are using any methods. Slander, forgery, blackmail—everything, stressed the delegate, is being used against those who are attempting to oppose them or tell the people the truth, an amazing conglomerate of the modern Soviet bourgeoisie has taken shape and, first of all, shrewd shadow economy businessmen and political figures who thirst for unlimited power, like Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

Thanks to such leaders, millions of people have ended up in the teeth of a cruel machine called the political struggle, they believe and they suffer, they hope and wait, and not always suspect how horrible it is that they have become pawns in a foreign global game....

Separatist, nationalist, and other destructive forces, continued the delegate, have unleashed a real offensive against the center and all union structures and are blocking the President of the USSR's efforts to stabilize the political situation. The country is increasingly being drawn into chaos and into a civil war. We in the Baltic Region feel its breath particularly sharply. Those who are preparing for it have already compiled lists of communists and progressively-minded leaders as it has occurred in Lithuania, are organizing provocations against OMON [special purpose militia units] as it was done in Latvia and are spraying dissidents with assault rifle fire as it is occurring in Georgia.

In the name of fleet communists, stated the delegate, I appeal from the high rostrum of the conference to the Party leadership and to the Central Committee. Enough innuendo and, under the pretext of weighty decision-making,—passivity and indecisiveness. If we are the ruling party, then we need to rule.

As a result of this, said the speaker, the attempt to take away the execution of combat readiness missions from army and navy Party organizations appears to be disarming.

And what does the provision mean about conducting Party organization activities during non-duty time that has been written in the "Instructions on CPSU Organization Work"? Which of the authors of this document can tell me when non-duty time occurs on a ship which is on combat alert at sea for nine months?

Then the delegate raised a series of urgent problems that require solutions at the level of the leadership of the country and the Armed Forces.

Lt Col M. Devetyarov, battalion commander (Strategic Missile Troops):

"I present the communists of the Strategic Missile Troops Party members' numerous detachment leading Party organization. The Party and the people have entrusted us with the most powerful modern weapons. Within the regiment, the battalion performs alert duty at a latest generation strategic mobile complex. Among those who operate it, every fifth one is a Party member, including the commanders of all preparation and launch groups. I do not stress this by chance. The people whose interests the Party expresses have entrusted us with these weapons, educated us, and we will justify this trust to the end."

The delegate dwelled on problems which concern us. First of all, the commander's coordination with the Party organization. It seems to me: I as a commander—one man command must make decisions while taking into account the opinions of communists and Party activists, constantly know the life of the Party organization, and actively participate in executing its decisions.

Right now, continued the delegate, there are frequent attacks on the Party and on Lenin. Attempts to erase his name from the people's memory, impulses against his monuments, against his museum in Moscow, and against his Mausoleum are being perceived as part of a precisely coordinated campaign whose goal is social revenge and change of the state and social systems. I appeal to all army communists, servicemen, workers, employees, and members of their families to actively participate in the implementation of specific actions that have been proposed by many workers and military collectives:

—on April 20, 1991, conduct an All-Union Communist subbotnik in all units, enterprises, and institutions and direct part of its resources toward the restoration and revival of Leninist museums and memorials; and,

—support the idea of creating a people's fund of voluntary contributions for the defense of the V.I. Lenin Museum which would become a universal All-Union V.I. Lenin Fund and a center of study, propaganda, and development of Leninism.

Lt Col M. Devetyarov sharply focused attention on the work of the commander and Party organization to rally multinational military collectives. He said that the Law on Universal Military Obligation is losing its force in several republics and that various republic laws are interpreting in a different way the procedures for performance of service which is having a painful impact on conscription into the army.

These are summaries of the delivered speeches.

Announcement on Party Organization Public Reception Hours

91UM0605A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed item: "From the All-Army Party Committee"]

[Text] In connection with numerous appeals on the order for receiving visitors, the members of the All-Army Party Committee and the Control Commission Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces CPSU Organization have informed us about how reception of the public is to be organized. Members of the Party Committee Buro and the Control Commission Presidium will be on duty on Wednesday of the first week of every month from 0900 hours to 2000 hours in the premises of the M.V. Frunze Central Soviet Army House (Commune Square).

Telephone for reception: 281-48-83.

Museum on Forces' Withdrawal From Germany

91WC0105A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Apr 91 p 5

["Our correspondent" report: "Museum in an Office"]

[Text] In the near future one of the facilities of the [Vyunsdorf] Officers' House will be reequipped as a chamber, tentatively named the "Museum of the History of the Withdrawal of the Western Group of Troops from the Territory of Germany." Photos, video, audio and other materials and related documents will be collected here. Incidentally, unlike museum exhibits, it will be possible to use them all the time. For instance, to see how this or that Soviet military encampment looked at the moment it was turned over to the German side (And these days they not infrequently make unfounded claims on us).

Moscow Complaints about Officers' Housing

91UM0697A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 21, Jun 91 p 5

[Interview with L. Ivanov, chairman of Moscow City Soviet Housing Subcommittee, by G. Valyuzhenich: "How Good It Is To Be a General..."; first paragraph is box insert]

[Text] Each year 2,500-3,000 officers are transferred to Moscow for service.

We know a great deal about difficulties of the military's nomadic life. One of the main difficulties is the housing problem, which has become abruptly aggravated recently in connection with our forces' withdrawal from abroad.

How is this problem, which is characteristic of many large cities, being solved in Moscow? We referred this question to L. Ivanov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Housing Subcommittee.

[Ivanov] Despite the enormous amount of housing being received by the Ministry of Defense, the waiting list of officers without housing is growing rapidly and waiting time for apartments is also increasing. Now there are 10,500 on the waiting list, plus 1,500 who are waiting to improve housing conditions.

[Valyuzhenich] If the Ministry of Defense transfers an officer to Moscow for service, it is obligated to grant him housing, for an officer does not have the right to choose. The order is the supreme law for him...

[Ivanov] That is how it should be, but instead, the Ministry of Defense merely gives him partial compensation for expenditures for private housing until an opportunity presents itself for assigning an apartment, and this period often stretches out for five-six years.

[Valyuzhenich] But this ministry is placing the responsibility on the Moscow City Soviet, which is not allocating the prescribed number of apartments. You are being sued for owing 140,500 m²...

[Ivanov] According to the 1969 decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, the Moscow Gorispolkom allocated 65,000 m² of living space (or 110,000 m² of overall space) to the Ministry of Defense each year. In addition, the Ministry of Defense was allocated additional living space each year at its request. From 1969 through 1985 the Ministry of Defense was allocated 1,091,000 m² of living space. Converted to apartments, this is around 37,000 apartments (figuring an average of 30 m² of living space).

[Valyuzhenich] During 1986-1989 the Ministry of Defense had 521,400 m² of overall space (together with its own construction) plus 90,000 m² in housing construction cooperative houses. During this same time, for example, rayon soviets received an average of 84,400 m² of overall space. They gave 40,500 m² to families of servicemen discharged to the reserve.

[Ivanov] In 1990 the amount of housing allocated by the Moscow Gorispolkom dropped because of a decrease in its construction (to 2.3 million m²); nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense had more than 3,000 apartments (in two-room units).

[Valyuzhenich] Then what is the matter? A large influx of servicemen to Moscow?

[Ivanov] Each year 2,500-3,000 officers are transferred to Moscow for service, plus around 8,500-9,000 family members. During 1975-1980, for example, 4,500-5,500 were transferred to the capital together with family members.

[Valyuzhenich] But probably no fewer leave at the expiration of their term of service?

[Ivanov] By our estimates, each year up to 35,000 m² of housing should be freed up in the Ministry of Defense. But alas, this is not occurring...

"Venerable" generals or senior officers who have two-four years remaining for the required length of service are transferred to Moscow rather often. On arriving in Moscow and receiving an apartment and registration out of turn, they retire in two years and remain in Moscow.

[Valyuzhenich] We have been persuaded all the time that the Army is supported by discipline, and where there is discipline there should be order. Are there really those same housing distribution violations here about which we already wrote?

[Ivanov] Alas, there are a great many. The sequence is not observed and housing legislation is violated. For example, generals with good housing are constantly upgrading it without having legal grounds for this.

[Valyuzhenich] Subordination probably is very revered in the Army. A general cannot live in the very same apartment as, let us say, a major. But a major probably can occupy a former apartment which ceased to "suit" a general?

[Ivanov] As a rule, however, these apartments remain for the generals' children and they themselves, as a "special need" category, are provided with housing based on special orders.

[Valyuzhenich] Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense refutes rumors that the lion's share of allocated housing is taken by generals. According to its information, for example, in 1988 generals received only 8.9 percent of the allocated space, and in sequence. Are there many "special need" generals in Moscow according to your data?

[Ivanov] As you realize, this information is secret, but according to data of the Ministry of Defense Main

Billeting and Maintenance Directorate, over 300 generals received enormous apartments in Moscow during 1988-1989. The number who upgraded housing conditions in 1990 is being clarified, but 89 generals' families settled in just two houses on Rublevskoye shosse, for example. Our check showed that over 70 percent of them did not need housing.

[Valyuzhenich] Is it possible to accuse the Ministry of Defense of housing distribution abuses? It does not issue orders for the right to occupy living space. Extracts from Ministry of Defense orders as well as lists of apartment claimants are submitted to rayon ispolkoms. The responsibility should be theirs!

[Ivanov] Can you imagine what a ministry order and lists of applicants certified in the highest echelons mean for a rayon ispolkom? This is an order for action. Taking advantage of old distribution structures, the Ministry of Defense Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate is feverishly trying to provide housing to all those who have no chance to obtain it through the Moscow City Soviet. To ensure fair housing distribution, we propose that all servicemen be on a common, unified waiting list regardless of rank.

The Moscow Soviet Presidium decided to set up a quota for inviting servicemen to the capital. It was also proposed that the Ministry of Defense expand its own housing construction. I will note that according to data of Glavmosarkhitektura [Main Administration for Architecture in the City of Moscow], with a shortage of free lots in Moscow the USSR Ministry of Defense has been allocated lots for construction of houses with an overall area of more than 700,000 m².

In addition, the Moscow City Soviet allocated 10,500 m² of additional living space (compared with the 1990 plan) to help officers without apartments.

Army-Civilian Relations in Armenia

91UM0711A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian No 18,
9 May 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with Army Political Directorate Chief Colonel Mikhail Mikhailovich Sorokin by A. Safaryan, EPOKHA describes itself as the "Weekly of the Union of Youth of Armenia": "Army Political Directorate Chief Colonel M.M. Sorokin: 'We Will Not Be Another Lithuania'"]

[Text] Wild, turbulent 1990 has passed. We have calmed down. The center of gravity has crept toward the West and closer to the Baltic. We have instinctively placed Biryukov's January revelations to our sores. Everything is the same and nauseatingly familiar. A troubled time has passed for the army. What has remained from that summer are the remnants of the wire on the fence and the swarthy lad in a flak jacket with an assault rifle near the entrance. And it turned out to be not too difficult to end up at the political directorate chief's office.

[Safaryan] Mikhail Mikhailovich, the army is in Armenia. What has changed recently? How are your relations developing with the republic's new government?

[Sorokin] Well, in general friendly relations are developing. I must say that the command staff and the Military Soviet are impressed that the republic's new leadership is solving its internal problems without resorting to the army's assistance. It would be stupid to say that everything is fine with us: the crime situation is increasing and fights have become more frequent in Armenia, but this is a problem for the entire country and it is impossible to tie it to anti-army sentiments in Armenia. There is a large housing problem and we have 2,000 apartmentless families. And the government has suspended this issue for the time being. But, if you take the category of Armenian youth, the most painful issue is desertion. Here I have a list of those who have left their duty location. There are 570 men altogether. Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army V.M. Shuralev left here just the day before yesterday. He was involved with this issue and he met with the republic leadership.

[Safaryan] And how will the desertion issue be resolved?

[Sorokin] We are not resolving it alone. Here, operational investigations alone will not achieve much. Both the republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and government are helping us. Members of the newly created "Union of Officers of Armenia" have become acquainted with the situation, were at the units, and talked with the parents. But these are indecisive measures. The issue will not be totally resolved until the stick is added to the carrot. There has to be a system of subordination. What is the difference if it is Soviet rule or AOD rule?

[Safaryan] Will the government resort to the stick?

[Sorokin] Strict measures must be adopted. But we will not forget that the lads themselves are least guilty in this mass desertion. The situation in the country and in the republic and the ideological dressing down by both sides has played a definite role. And the situation....

[Safaryan] The situation of impunity?

[Sorokin] Yes. And this, of course. Therefore, I think that we need to put all of this into reverse. And not punish the deserters in a criminal manner while warping young men's lives. I think that this issue will be resolved in three to four months.

[Safaryan] The idea of creating a national army in the republic....

[Sorokin] It is hard for me to judge. Maybe it also makes sense within the framework of military reform. I only know that the creation of an army is a very complex matter. Besides, right now OMOR—operational reaction detachments—and a spetsnaz regiment have also been created. But I actually saw only one spetsnaz regiment when I investigated a weapons theft in Abovyan. Yes, the lads have been trained there. And in principle I think that there is no need to create an army with the policy Armenia is adhering to.

[Safaryan] From the moment Armenia became a part of Russia, it served as an outpost on Russia's southern borders. The Warsaw Treaty no longer exists. Close contacts are being established with Turkey. Will Armenia lose the role of this outpost with time and not remain a republic with a broken down economy face to face with a strong potential enemy as it was after the revolution of 1917?

[Sorokin] Yes right now trade, economic, and cultural ties are being established with Turkey. I think this is an entirely normal phenomenon. Armenia also needs to think about the future. We do not have the right to live for today. No matter what you say, the republic is surrounded neither by enemies nor friends. But the histories are characteristically changing. Armenia was and always will be an outpost on the southern borders of our homeland. And I think that the 300 hundred years of Armenia's friendship with Russia will still have their say.

[Safaryan] In Karabakh, the army has been assigned the role of the "stabilizer" of the situation. But right now the army is increasingly fulfilling punitive functions.

[Sorokin] We, the military, are ourselves tired of this situation in which we have to live and serve. We are people of the order. An order is like any other order. Speaking about the military.... There are not so many military personnel there. The internal troops—are the MVD system. But I do not want to isolate myself from those problems that my fellow countrymen—Russians—are resolving there. It is not a question of that. What they are demanding right now in the oblast is a just demand, we need to restore Soviet rule. But the troop presence is also necessary. It is hard for me to

judge about their very employment. We are far from there. I repeat that we need to restore the state power structures. We talked about the draft. There is that same problem in Karabakh. Who is going to manage the draft? Soviet rule and not some sort of committees or organization bureaus there.

[Safaryan] During the January events in the Baltic Region, the republic was living in anticipation that the continuation would be in our republic. Many people also do not exclude this possibility right now.

[Sorokin] Well no. This is impossible in our republic. First of all, the situation here is absolutely not like the one in the Baltic republics. Second, only 80 percent of the population in the Baltic republics is native and 20 percent is Russian-speaking. In Armenia, more than 90 percent of the population is native and the possibility of interethnic clashes is practically absent here. And then, recall what kind of rabid anti-army propaganda is being conducted in the Baltic Region. This is absent here. Servicemen of any rank feel totally safe in Armenia. We will not be another Lithuania.

[Safaryan] The May events of last year. Do you exclude the possibility that these skirmishes were provoked?

[Sorokin] No, they were not provocations. I am 250 percent convinced that no one provoked it. Soldiers simply manifested vigilance. If those who were attacking had not fired first, no skirmish whatsoever would have occurred. I speak from experience. There could not have been a provocation of that type.

[Safaryan] The dismantling of the monument to Lenin and the nationalization of the property of the Armenian Communist Party and the Union of Youth of Armenia. Will the center's armed reaction not follow after the order?

[Sorokin] Parliament made the decision. Maybe it was an incorrect decision. If this violates the constitution by which we live today, then I think this may cause some sort of reaction from Moscow if this is CPSU property. Maybe we needed to conduct an investigation to determine whose assets paid for the construction. But I once again repeat the situation in Armenia is not like the one in the Baltic Region. I think that this issue will be resolved peacefully.

[Safaryan] How is just the fact of the dismantling of the monument to Lenin being explained to soldiers in the units?

[Sorokin] We simply explain that a bourgeois-democratic system is being established in the republic. What is happening in Armenia right now is not the socialist path. It is not just the monument. The transfer of land to private ownership in and of itself is a good idea but I think that the breakdown of the kolkhozes in the current situation is incorrect. And Armenia itself senses this. Or the transfer of the entire service sphere into private hands. This in and of itself is a social explosion.

Therefore, I think that the confirmation of the foundations of a bourgeois-democratic system is occurring in the republic.

[Safaryan] During the last two years, a large quantity of weapons has been established among the population, including the Armenian population.

[Sorokin] We are continuing our searches for weapons that have been stolen at army units and at republic MVD and KGB units. More than 500 firearms and flame throwers have been stolen. This year, we have found nine assault rifles and nine flame throwers. But I repeat not we alone but with the assistance of republic organs.

[Safaryan] The rumor is that students will once again be drafted into the service.

[Sorokin] I do not know if the government of the USSR will resort to that but it would be a **major** error of the government. With the departure of the students, we lost many specialists with unique professions and it is very difficult to train these specialists.

[Safaryan] There are armed detachments on the border with Azerbaijan. How are your relations with them developing?

[Sorokin] In principle, I think that there is no great need for them. Later it will be difficult to sort out who is protecting the border and who is engaged in the bandit trade. Attacks on trains and on our posts that defend the railway section have become more frequent and we have increased the number of our subunits in Megrinskiy Rayon for this purpose. But internal troops units are guarding Goris- Kafan. Without the army, border incidents would have long ago evolved into a civil war.

[Safaryan] Where else can the army's intervention be required?

[Sorokin] I want to say that right now we are serving in a relatively calm location if you take that portion of the army that is deployed in Armenia. If I speak frankly, then obviously the processes both in Azerbaijan and in Russia are being awaited. The struggle for power has not ceased there, it is still going on, and there is a long way to go to complete calm.

Armenian MVD Vows To Stop 'Provocations' Against Army Units

*PM0406145191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 May 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Sergey Bablunyan report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "No! to Provocations"]

[Text] Yerevan—The Armenian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] has called on the republic's population to display restraint and prudence toward the military units stationed on Armenian territory.

It appears from the statement issued by the republic MVD on this subject that certain forces have recently been making attempts to provoke the population, particularly young people, to confront the Soviet Army. Such actions have taken place in various rayons of Armenia, particularly Echmiadzinskiy Rayon.

While appealing to the population for restraint, the MVD also announced its decision to stamp out the provocations and call their organizers and participants to strict account.

Georgian Defense Society Fights Republic for Survival

91UM0544C Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
5 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by VESTNIK GRUZII Correspondent David Bagaturia: "GOSA: To Be or not To Be?"]

[Text] The opening session of the Georgian Society for Assistance to the Army (GOSA) Central Soviet Plenum occurred on February 28. GOSA Central Committee Chairman Colonel Vladimir Gudadze delivered the main report to the session. He said specifically that:

"Our republic is experiencing difficult times. Our organization also faces difficulties. The Georgian Defense Society has reviewed and reorganized much of its activities. Our organization has trained more than 290,000 specialists during the period of its existence. Of late, its annual profit from economic activity totals an average of 3.9 million rubles.

The speaker further noted that as of today half of the vehicles (there are a total of 471) belonging to GOSA have been stolen by "Mkhedrioni." Naturally, this fact is one of many that reveal the true essence of this illegal armed formation whose members have called themselves defenders of the Georgian nation's interests. V. Gudadze appealed to GOSA's leading activists to take national positions and to place the interests of the Homeland above all else. He went on to note that a general inventory must be conducted in accordance with the Republic of Georgia government resolution that is directed at suspending DOSAAF Georgia activities, closing bank accounts, and transferring all movable and real property to the National Guard. Plenum participants considered this resolution to be unacceptable. The opinion was expressed that the way the question is put may have an adverse effect on the republic's defense capability in the future.

After debates on this issue, Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense, Security, and Law and Order Representative Aleksandr Vardzelashvili spoke:

"The members of our commission and also its Chairman Mr. Vazha Adamiya think that GOSA must exist. The Georgian people need this society...."

The Plenum adopted an appeal to Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Chairman Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Government Chairman Tengiz Sigua whose essence is reduced to the following: On behalf of GOSA's 4,000 collectives and the more than two million members of this society, the Republic of Georgia Defense Society Central Soviet Plenum requests the cessation and review of the Republic of Georgia government resolution on cessation of GOSA activities.

The GOSA Central Committee Plenum's work will be continued.

Georgian National Guard Publishes Newspaper

PM0306103391 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Major S. Kruzhilin article: "Good Turnout on Parade. But What About the Draft?"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The Georgian national guard has published its own printed organ, the newspaper SAKARTVELOS GVARDIYELI (Georgian Guardsman). The editorial talks about the need to regenerate the military traditions of the past in the republic, to instill a love of military matters in the population, and to aim to fill the ranks of the national guard with "talented young Georgian people". The author of one article even thinks that Georgia needs its own military airmen and proposes that special schools be opened for this purpose.

But if these dreams lift the author up to the clouds and excite the imagination of future pilots, the harsh reality on the ground is that the draft into the Soviet Army is in an extremely sorry state in Georgia. Though approximately 150,000 men marched past at a recent national guard parade, according to information from the republic's military commissariat, only 300 youths have currently been recruited to the Soviet Army, and these are from the Russian-speaking population.

Attack on Army Training Base in Georgia

91UM0566A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel V. Kaushanskiy: "Robbers in a Combat Vehicle"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The greater attention being paid to military units by the broad strata of criminal society in the Transcaucasus is well known. In Georgia unknown persons recently paid a visit to a firing range used to train tank regiments, breaking in with their own armored scout car (BRDM). Captain Yu. Burlaka and a group of his subordinates were waiting for the uninvited guests, who the day before had threatened the soldiers saying that they would be calling on them for some free goodies. The attackers did not come empty-handed: They brought a mini-arsenal consisting of an automatic weapon, a pistol, a grenade, and a bundle of explosives.

On the same day another group of unknown persons in a Niva car was arrested during an attempt to penetrate a place where tank crews were stationed. On this occasion the trophies for the military were more modest—only cylinders filled with “cheremukha” [type of choking gas]. But the details pertaining to the appearance of armed strangers in a military base need investigating.

Latvian Attitude Toward Military Disputed

91UM0566B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: “Why Politics Is In Dispute With Ethics”]

[Text] *This story began at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and specifically from the moment on 26 December when an inquiry from a number of deputies about the oppression of servicemen and their children on the territory of Latvia was answered by I. Bisers, USSR deputy and first deputy chairman of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet. And he said that there had been no instances of that.*

To judge from the reaction in the hall, Bisers' colleagues were not satisfied with his answer. One of those who spoke against this was Admiral V. Ivanov, USSR people's deputy and the commander of the Baltic Fleet.

From the speech by Admiral V. Ivanov:

“What citizen Bisers has said from this tribune is completely untrue.

“The Baltic Fleet is based on the territory of the three Baltic republics. All acts of discrimination are undertaken primarily against servicemen—the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, and soldiers and officers of the Baltic Military District. In fact a decision was reached in Latvia that supplies of electric power, food, water, and heat would be cut off for military units. More than 1,000 servicemen at the Tallinn Garrison were not registered. In Riga, more than 300 servicemen were not registered. Sums of 600 rubles [R] to R700 are being demanded from servicemen for school. In practical terms our children are being kept out of the schools.

“At a meeting with the defense minister I said that extremist elements are creating the preconditions so that at a given moment servicemen may use weapons to protect their own families, to protect their own children. How are we to regard the fact that groups of extremists are hurling stones at the young children of officers, causing them serious injuries? How can we react calmly to the fact that Molotov cocktails are being thrown from passing vehicles at warehouses containing weapons and ammunition, and that they are shooting at our guards? It is our children and yours against whom weapons are being used...”

From a letter from A. Denisov, chairman of the parliamentary commission on deputies' ethics, to Admiral V. Ivanov:

“Dear Vitaliy Pavlovich,

“A meeting of the commission on deputies' ethics took place on 15 January 1991 at which a formal communication from USSR People's Deputy Comrade I.O. Bisers relating to your speech at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies was considered.

“In order to avoid public conflicts between USSR people's deputies the commission requests that you henceforth be guided in your statements at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and congresses of USSR people's deputies by Article 3 of the Rules of Ethics for Deputies (page 3, in particular, reads as follows: “In dealing one with another... it is recommended that the form ‘Esteemed Deputy’ or ‘Esteemed Chairman’ be used”—editor's note), and also that you refrain from using unverified facts and rumors in your public statements.

[signed] A.A. Denisov, Commission Chairman.” (Admiral V. Ivanov received this letter in late February—editor's note).

An open letter from Admiral V. Ivanov to the Commission on Deputies' Ethics:

“Dear Members of the Commission,

“Dear Anatoliy Aleksyevich.

“To be candid, I doubt that you will need my response. For to judge from everything, you consider the ‘matter’ already closed, finally and unambiguously. In short, resolved. I, however, think otherwise. And I am not about to justify myself or prove the obvious once again in this example: If a person hears only one side of an argument then he has not heard (or has not wanted to hear) anything and is sure to be mistaken.

“Regrettable though it may be to state this, your commission, which is supposed to resolve ethical disputes and conflicts, has need here, you will agree, for special reflection, care, and tact; it has not managed to avoid prejudice and it has displayed discourtesy, and has essentially itself ignored the Ethical Rules for Deputies.

“How else is it possible to regard the fact that after considering the formal communication from Deputy I.O. Bisers and its content the commission did not deem it possible or necessary to hear me and take my testimony and my conclusions arguing my correctness under advisement? For I am sure that the result of your examination would be different when stripped of certain of the accusations against me, and if the esteemed members of the commission had gone to the trouble to familiarize themselves properly with the text of my statement. The correctness of the positions set forth in it, incidentally, has been confirmed by the conclusions of a commission of deputies sent to the Baltic republics by a decision of the Fourth Congress, and by the extensive

material gathered on the position of servicemen and members of their families, and other representatives of the Russian-speaking population on actual discrimination based on departmental, national, and other characteristics.

"Permit me to remind you here of just some facts that your commission, following the lead of Deputy I.O. Bisers, describes in its letter as unverified, from the field of rumors. These facts relate to the situation in Latvia.

"For those who live, work, and serve here it is no secret that the buildup of various armed formations continues within the republic. As of today their total numerical strength exceeds 50,000. The armed detachments of the 'Ayzargs' and of the 'forest brothers' and 'fiery cross' organizations, and also formations of the 'Department of Public Safety' and the 'Self-Defense Troops,' are in possession of firearms (including machine guns), ammunition, grenades, and mortars, both modern and dating from World War II.

"Formed under conditions of illegality and 'underground,' that is, in violation of the laws of the USSR, today, on the basis of appropriate resolutions and ukazes from the republic state organs, these formations have acquired legal status, which is also at variance with the requirements of existing laws and well-known ukazes of the USSR President... Their anticonstitutional and illegal practical actions are directed toward conducting reconnaissance, gathering information about the disposition, weapons, combat equipment, and personnel of Army and Navy units and subunits, and organizing their own military training, including the use of weapons.

"The increased interest of these formations in quite definite representatives of the local population is a cause of special concern. In addition to servicemen and associates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee for State Security, the armed fighting groups are gathering detailed dossiers on all party and state figures and activists in public organizations and movements who support the political platform of the unity of the USSR. The aims of this activity have been made public, and are quite cynical: Lists of 'unsuitable persons,' 'occupiers,' and other 'unreliables' (in the opinion of the armed fighting groups) are being compiled for later 'neutralization'...

"The facts—precisely facts, not rumors—prove that about the same situation exists in the other Baltic republics. And the three explosions that rocked Riga during the night of 6-7 March this year were directed against the Army and were a warning: The situation is explosive, in the very literal sense of the word.

"So how could I and how can I remain silent about this, even 'in order to avoid public conflicts'? (I refer to your letter). No, and no again. If I did, then that would be precisely when those who elected me would have a perfect right to reproach me, as would the sailors and warrant officers and officers of the Baltic Fleet. And to reproach me both as USSR people's deputy for one of the

electoral districts in the area, and as a fleet commander whose ships and units are stationed on Baltic territory.

"I also disagree with the commission's conclusions on all the other points made in my statement. On each of them I am prepared to present information that is just as reliable.

"And finally, since I consider the conclusions passed on to me by the commission as totally illegal and an affront to my honor as a USSR people's deputy, I ask you to consider this letter a formal communication designed to help in an exhaustive investigation of the matter. I hope that in this case appropriate apologies will be made to me."

Since Admiral V. Ivanov has decided to respond with an open letter through KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, we intend to inform readers how this correspondence ends.

Lithuanian Defense Chief Cited on Provocations

*PM0606142791 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
18 May 91 p 1*

[ELTA report: "At Session of Republic's Supreme Council"]

[Excerpts] The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council's Third Session continued its work 16 May. [passage omitted]

Having asked to speak, the republic's prime minister, Gediminas Vagnorius, drew attention to the fact that when carrying out the economic reform the government intends to take decisive measures to implement it. At the same time he wished that specific drafts presented for discussion to the Supreme Council could be examined more promptly. [passage omitted]

The draft Lithuanian Republic Law on International Treaties was approved at the first reading, and the date for this document's next reading was fixed.

Then the deputies listened to a report from Audrius Butkevicius, general director of the Territorial Defense Department, on the situation in the republic. He remarked that it is causing increasing concern. The general director noted that provocations by the military have increased of late. There have been five attacks on border checkpoints and customs posts; concern is caused by the information that a regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division might be transferred to Lithuania, active anti-Lithuanian propaganda is being waged in one of the Ryazan airborne regiments, and also opportunities are being taken to cause some interethnic conflicts. The speaker mentioned that the Polish regions' Communist Party leaders, who met in Moscow with high-ranking figures from the USSR parliament and government, have received instructions to create a Polish republic in the Vilnius Territory. It has been proposed that they adopt the requisite decisions at the forthcoming 22 May

congress of Vilnius Territory deputies of all levels. Other facts which are also causing alarm were mentioned.

Deputy Algirdas Patackas read a statement on behalf of 35 deputies about information which TASS disseminated 10 May about an interview given by Kazimiera Prunskiene, deputy of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, to Spanish newspapers. The statement emphasizes that the deputy's appraisal of internal and foreign policy bears no relation to reality and damages the Lithuanian Republic's interests. Prunskiene's statement on this TASS information was also read out. [passage omitted]

Vilnius Garrison Commandant Comments on Events

LD0406151191

Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Russian at 1200 GMT on 4 June carries a two-minute recording of a telephone conversation with Vilnius Military Commandant Colonel Belous. The recording is poor. Reception is very poor.

The Vilnius Radio reporter asks Belous to explain the troop movements in Vilnius on the night of 3 to 4 June. Belous does not directly answer the question, saying only that the incident was over by 0100 and was only a matter of patrols.

Asked why the patrol was being carried out on the night of 3 to 4 June and not on previous nights, Belous says that an "element of surprise" was needed. When the reporter asks if this means that the people of Vilnius will need to be on guard all the time, Belous replies that they do not need to be prepared. He states that the patrols are after hooligans. He then breaks off the conversation.

Work of Military RSFSR Supsov Deputies Viewed

91UM0565A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with S.N. Baburin, subcommittee chairman, Committee on Legislation, RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by Lt Col S. Pashayev: "A Congress of Paradoxes"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Many KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers have been overcome with sympathy for the positions stated by members of the deputies group of Rossiya as they followed the progress of the Russian Congresses of People's Deputies, which have been characterized by an abundance of political passions, sharp confrontations, and heated disputes. The members were—in the words of Major V. Orekhov—"outstanding in their adherence to the ideals of Russian patriotism, something which their colleagues clearly forgot in the heat of the arguments, and in addition in their balanced arguments, common sense, constructiveness and realism."

Our parliamentary correspondent, responding to requests made by the newspaper's readers, met with S.N. Baburin, one of the coordinators of Rossiya after the Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies completed its session. He is also a subcommittee chairman of the Committee on Legislation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Sergey Nikolayevich, the congress, the scheduling of which was so much in doubt, has drawn to a close. Did it justify your hopes?

[Baburin] In my view, it was a congress of paradoxes. No wonder—in speaking of what was accomplished—the representatives of both Democratic Russia and Communists of Russia expressed the same degree of satisfaction. Much was due to the contradictory nature of the resolutions made and probably by the fact that the congress did nothing to introduce unexpected changes into the disposition of the political forces at the highest level of the RSFSR. Just about the principal tangible result of our exceedingly drawn-out work amounted to a long-overdue more definite shaping and assumption of cardinal positions on the part of political groups and political movements. In addition, I consider that it is very good that we finally ceased pursuing the myth of unity at any price, now that we recognize an eternal truth: To unite, we must delimit our interests. We must find our positions not only in that which brings us together or should bring us together, but largely in that in which we differ. The discussion was fruitful in that sense. Also important in my opinion is the fact that there has been an approval of the second congress's resolution to prepare extensive reform of the organs of state authority and control. The pertinent set of laws should be examined by the forthcoming congress.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The well-known political statement by the closest associates of B.N. Yeltsin remained at the center of attention for the duration of the session. Do you consider it to be appropriate, timely, useful?

[Baburin] I believe that openness and sincerity are always appropriate, even if this seems to be inconvenient. The statement per se came to me as a complete surprise. Especially the persons making it; political personalities of diverse outlooks and positions, such as S.P. Goryachev, V.B. Isakov, B.M. Isayev, and R.G. Abdulatipov.

Also, the questions they raised did not come as a surprise. The problem of political leadership, you see, and that of leadership of the RSFSR in general, has for some time been on the agenda of those who work in the Supreme Soviet. This includes the style and general political course. V.B. Isakov spoke of this, first at the second congress, then later in the Supreme Soviet. In this connection, the Presidium—in the beginning of the year, before the congress was held—considered the problem of removing him from his position as chairman of the

Republic Soviet. It was a good thing that reason prevailed and the question was not submitted to the Supreme Soviet, which would have been an unprecedented act.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nonetheless, the question raised in the statement never was resolved by the congress.

[Baburin] Yes, that is nothing less than regrettable. Once more it has been driven underground. I am not even sure that anything will come of the reading of the statement by the six leaders of the Supreme Soviet and the attendant discussion.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Be that as it may, such an event did occur, for the first time in our new history. Does this not of and by itself give rise to optimism?

[Baburin] Yes, if you look at it that way. This is tangible proof that the democratic way of thinking in our country is taking hold. Also, we are no longer meekly submitting to the person occupying a high position.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] As far as I am able to judge, your group of deputies is constructively opposed to the present Russian leadership. Does it not appear to you that opposition to the official course has so far been expressed only at the level of emotions rather than of programs, concepts and ideas? Is so, what changes are under way in this regard?

[Baburin] The congress unfortunately gave no indication that changes are coming about. Emotions are still rampant; reason has a difficult time asserting itself at the tribune.

Speaking of the Rossiya group of deputies, I would say more accurately that it offers noncommunist opposition to the present Russian leadership. It includes CPSU members, former CPSU members, and persons who never were party members. In this connection, we are in declaration—and strongly at that—of a definite assertion. We are disturbed by the present destruction of statehood and the country, which took generations and thousands of years to build. In this regard, it is our view that the capitalization and socialization slogans are nothing but a mask for a nonstatehood issue. I would not go so far as to use the term "antistatehood," but the latter would be fairly precise.

It is my feeling that we must do some thinking about why democracy and democratic principles are entering our life via denial of patriotism. I believe that it is a serious matter when the words "patriot" and "patriotism" become unpopular and some people are ashamed to use the words "Motherland" and "Fatherland." Democratic traditions cannot be developed by denying patriotic traditions; without taking into account our culture, by denying our history, difficult as it may be. I think that we are so obsessed with a feeling of guilt that in our repentance before the victims we are swinging over to a complete denial of the past.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Sergey Nikolayevich, the subject of the Army and the situation in which it finds itself under the conditions of the economic and political changes was taken up by the congress a number of times. What can you tell us relative to the position of your group of deputies relative to the Armed Forces and servicemen?

[Baburin] This is a question where we are of one mind. There was a reason why I and certain of my colleagues spoke out back in the Supreme Soviet in strong opposition to any attempts to create any kind of Russian army or for that matter to psychologically prepare and accustom our fellow countrymen to the thought that such an army should exist. The tremendous volume of mail and meetings with people prove that we are not alone in that concern. We have always felt that we have one country and one state: the Soviet Union. The fundamental position of the Rossiya group is our desire for strengthening of the role of the RSFSR within the framework of a renewed Union as a federative state. In this regard, Rossiya intends to firmly prosecute—if necessary jointly with other groups of deputies, social movements, and numerous persons of like mind—a course whereby destruction of the country will be out of the question, regardless of the slogans employed, even ones most democratic.

It is unfortunate that the Army remains as one of the last threads binding us into an integral whole. There is virtually no economy; we have destroyed it. It should be understood that the Army is in dire need of reform. However, this should be handled thoughtfully, without fits and starts, without rushing.

Take the idea of depoliticization of the Army that was discussed in the congress. There is a problem here, and it has many aspects. The Army can theoretically become a place of confrontation of various political forces, something that cannot be permitted. It cannot be that political parties will be able to utilize the Army as a tool of state to further their purposes. Also, in moving away from the single-party to the multiple-party system, we necessarily must follow this up by effecting the attendant changes in the role of the CPSU in the Armed Forces. In this connection, we cannot forget the people who are serving and will be serving. Isolation and prohibition are not always the wisest course. At the same time, we must not forget something else: Ideology cannot exist in a vacuum. In our rethinking and reexamination of the role of party structures, we must be very careful to see that the state ideology, which amounted in the last few years to the ideology of the CPSU, is not supplanted by an antistate, destructive ideology. As far as I can judge, the process of change in role of party organs in the Army is in progress. However, the trouble with our modern day revolutionaries is that we again are in a hurry. It will take years to restructure the role of political organs in the Army.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In winding up our conversation about the last congress, I must ask you another question. Do you share the belief that nothing can be

accomplished if we do not take the extraordinary measures outlined for the deputies by B.N. Yeltsin?

[Baburin] I am convinced that the statements about extraordinary measures will either remain as a declaration or will have a ruinous effect on the natural course of events. They will put an end to the evolutionary progress of our reforms. We again may slip into the extraordinary situation that destroyed the New Economic Policy of the 1920s. If it were necessary to strengthen the executive powers, then it would be required to give additional authority to the government and chairman of the Council of Ministers, without mixing the duties of the government with those of the Supreme Soviet's leadership. These are different areas—the executive and the legislative. For this reason, this step is more an attempt to correct the situation after the congress's adoption of the resolution dealing with ways out of the crisis, in which all the basic ideas proposed in B.N. Yeltsin's report were in my view rejected.

'Ukraine Insurgents Army' Brotherhood Set up

*LD0906131391 Kiev Radio Kiev International Service
in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 7 Jun 91*

[Text] The Podolia [western province of the Ukraine] Brotherhood of Warriors of the Ukrainian Insurgents Army [Braterstvo Vayakiv Ukrayinskoyi Povstanskeyi Armiyi—UIA] has been created in Ternopol Oblast. (Bohdan Kohut), member of the kish [historically means

a military cossack encampment, but here is used in the sense of an organization rather than a camp], has given an interview for our program.

[Kohut] A coordination council is already being created which will combine the efforts of the Union of Political Prisoners, the Brotherhood of Warriors of the UIA, and the Memorial. And we will set ourselves the sole aim of restoring memory, spreading our national ideas, and bringing up young people in our national patriotic spirit. The Bulava [governing body] is at the head of this brotherhood. Four kishes belong to Bulava, namely the Lvov Kish named after Roman Shukhevych [commander of the UIA, killed in action in 1950 near Lvov], the kish of Podolia region, the Volhynia Kish, to which Volynskaya and Rovno Oblasts belong, and Ivano-Frankovsk, Chernovtsy and Transcarpathian Oblasts.

The kishes are subdivided into stantytshas [branches], therefore it is a rather interesting and many-sided structure and I think it will also play its positive part in our competition for liberation, in our education and in our struggle for an independent Ukraine, undoubtedly by peaceful and democratic means. In addition our brotherhood of the UIA, in common with the Union of Political Prisoners and also the Memorial, adheres to the position that one has to achieve rehabilitation of all former political prisoners, especially those who were convicted in 1944-1945 and in the 1950's and fought for our independence.

Col Gen Boyko Addresses PVO Morale Issues

*91UM0568A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Apr 91 First Edition, p 3*

[Interview with Colonel General N. M. Boyko, 1st deputy commander-in-chief, Air Defense Forces: "Pamir, the Arctic, Siberia... in Communications"]

[Text] Information from all ends of the country comes together at the Air Defense Forces Main Headquarters. On the eve of the holiday, our correspondent stood watch with Colonel V. Sadov at the long distance communications telephones, selecting from the stream of reports the most interesting facts. Colonel General N. M. Boyko, chief of the Military- Political Directorate, 1st deputy commander-in-chief, Air Defense forces, agreed to comment on them.

[Interviewer] Nikolay Makarovich, on the eve of the holiday more and more reports are coming in about radar operators, anti-aircraft missilemen, and aviators who have distinguished themselves. For example, we received calls from the "Druzhba" radar company.

[Boyko] Let us first find on the map where the company is stationed. It is in the Pamir Mountains. Captain Vladimir Vasilyevich Kozlovskiy is the subunit commander, and his deputy for political affairs is Lieutenant Oleg Nikolayevich Chumak. The company is standing alert duty under the most difficult high-mountain conditions, but the military collective deserves praise not only for its good indices in training and alert duty. The company is multinational and cohesive. Relations with the local residents are very good and business-like. The shadow of inter-ethnic conflicts, fomented by the nationalists, has not been able to darken the relations between the radar operators and the village residents in any way. And it is no accident at all that here an unambiguous "yes" to the renewed Union was expressed at the referendum.

The growing authority of the country's Armed Forces in areas of inter- ethnic tension and armed conflicts is becoming a sign of the times. Simple people, not intoxicated by the ideas of national exclusivity, are drawn toward the military, and at times find assistance only from them. I was driven to tears by the thankful letter that the elders sent to one of our units following the bloody Uzgen events. At that time several hundred Uzbeks found shelter here. They ate from the soldiers' pot, and slept in the barracks, knowing that their lives were being reliably protected. That is why workers of every nationality stand in favor of signing the Union Treaty. This must not be delayed.

[Interviewer] Some reports from local areas indicate that tension in inter-ethnic relations in the republics is also shifting into the army collectives. What effect is that having on military service?

[Boyko] I can affirm that the nationalists from the Baltic Region, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia did not

succeed in realizing their plans to destabilize the situation in the military collectives. There were many such attempts, but in the end they did not bring success to those who pushed the youth to violate the law.

Among the promising areas in the educational work to strengthen friendship in the multinational military collectives must be included the expansion of inter-ethnic stewardship relations with the republics of the USSR. Recently, for example, soldiers from the Urals received a delegation of young people from Uzbekistan. The guests took part in a discussion entitled: "How is your service going, fellow-countryman?" Yu. Mirzayev, secretary of the Chilanzarskiy Komsomol Raykom, spoke about life in the republic. The guests also took part in sports competitions. Presently the Ural soldiers are awaiting a delegation from Taldy-Kurgan Oblast, whose inductees are serving in the subunits. A meeting in one of the units with a delegation from Georgia was also useful in all respects. Measured arguments turned out to be stronger than demagoguery and nationalistic vehemence.

[Interviewer] There was a report from Siberia about the courage of military pilots.

[Boyko] Communist pilots Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatolyevich Mishin and Colonel Viktor Sergeyevich Fishchenko accomplished a heroic feat. The fighter air regiment was fulfilling a mission during exercises, and the aviators had flown out for weather reconnaissance. During the flight the left engine caught on fire. The pilots needed to and could have catapulted, but then the aircraft would have fallen onto Khatanga. They were able to avert a calamity at the cost of their own lives in those instants that remained until the explosion.

Military service, especially in the Air Defense Forces, is associated with risk to life not only for the aviators. To my great regret, last year was very alarming for radarman and missile troops in the Transcaucasus. Our units suffered losses from the fire of the nationalists. Nor has the tension declined over the past few months. I believe that the most rapid conclusion of the Union Treaty will enable us to return to the constitutional norms of life, and will make it possible to protect the air borders of the country without fearing treacherous shots in the back. And the so-called "democrats," and those with them, must recognize that defense of the state border of the USSR under the new conditions is a matter not only difficult, but also necessary, as never before.

[Interviewer] Air Defense soldiers are standing alert duty in the Arctic, on the islands of the Pacific Ocean, in the sands and the tundra, and in the Pamirs. People reconcile themselves to the inconveniences because they know that the time will come when they will be replaced. But housing troubles everyone.

[Boyko] This is the most troubling question for our troops, but I will not go into an enumeration of the large and small difficulties, but will say that today, for the first time in many decades, a concept of housing construction

has appeared in the Air Defense Forces. We will concentrate our forces and resources, and erect houses in the central and southern areas of the RSFSR. At the present time, the requirement for apartments has been defined and construction variants have been worked out. The program is calculated for more than one year. So far, as distressing as it is, those who have essentially lost their connection with the army are also living in military encampments. Resettlement and freeing up of the apartments is going slowly, with great conflicts.

If one speaks about the military-political departments that have legislatively received orientation in educational work, they are beginning to plunge more deeply into the daily concerns of the officers' and soldiers' lives, but it is still too early to speak about any major achievements. Moreover, the departments themselves must have some time for re-profiling and re-training of personnel.

[Interviewer] In the Air Defense Forces, the chief of the political department and the party committee secretary, as a rule, are people who enjoy great authority. Fears are being expressed that now, under the new structure, they will find that friendship is friendship, but their responsibilities differ.

[Boyko] That is not entirely so. The goal of the military-political department and that of the party committee is the same—the all-round strengthening of combat readiness—but their working methods differ. Of course they cooperate with one another. I believe that the party structures will strengthen the position of the CPSU in the army. Already now increased activeness in the work of the communists and party organizations has been noted. They withstood the attacks of the newly-proclaimed “democrats” and their presses, and rid themselves of opportunists and careerists. Now nothing is interfering with them.

Authority will come to the military-political bodies with their deeds. They should pay particular attention to questions of education, military discipline, and social protection of military personnel and their families. Assistants will always be found. These include the army komsomol, which is actively concentrating the young people around itself, and the party organizations, social bodies and movements. We are seeking contacts and offering cooperation. Concluding the Union Treaty will undoubtedly provide an influx of energy, and for the present we are carrying out explanatory work. Here we are relying on the history of our state and its glorious past, and are telling the people about the socialist choice and the great victory over Fascism. Our holiday will portend this bright day.

PVO Combat Training at Low Priority Level

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[Article by Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: “Will ‘Cinderella’

Turn into a Princess? Or, Why are Combat Training Priorities Being Lost?”]

[Text] The fact that of late the army has more and more often had unusual functions imposed upon it is not news. That is life. But how does such “holding of more than one office” reflect on the professionalism of the people wearing shoulder boards, and the combat readiness of units and small units? That is something to think about.

An unusual incident took place in the air defense missile regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Slipko: Sergeant V. Bashko refused to carry out an order. Of course he was roundly punished. But the most surprising thing was something else. The attitude toward him of the officers, warrant officers, and collective as a whole, hardly changed. Everyone reacted to what had taken place with a share of sympathy.

Industrious and diligent, Sergeant Bashko had for a long time, as we say, not “climbed down” from the details. On that unhappy day he had just been relieved from his post, having spent a full day without sleep on alert duty, when he was told to go to another post. One of the officers frankly stated: “We ourselves provoked our subordinate to violate the regulation where it is written in black and white that on the night preceding a detail those assigned to it must be free of all classes and work. So, did we embark upon this consciously?”

Unfortunately, there are frequently situations in the regiment when a person relieved from one detail, does not have the time to collect himself before ending up on another. Moreover, there are specialists, such as Jr Sergeant R. Idiyatulin, who serve for six months at a duty station, generally without replacement. These are unique cases, it is true, but the fact remains that the physical and psychological burdens here are frequently such that the impression of the good order and strict regulation of military service are completely destroyed. What is the matter?

Every military unit has its own authorized duty position structure. It is approved “from above” and supposedly is scientifically based. However, someone falls sick, another is toiling at the vegetable base, a third is discharged, and there are no replacements. If it pertains to a specialist whose specialty is in short supply, such as this very Jr Sergeant R. Idiyatulin, or Private Telegraph Operator M. Akhmarov, these things happen and there is no one to replace them. “And what happens is that we must not become offended at these soldiers, but must pray for them,” sighed Sr Warrant Officer V. Bulychev, communications platoon commander, recalling the incident with Sergeant Bashko.

And the officers also cannot help be conscious of this. Some of them are forced not to order the soldier, but to ask him, to take a detail. You see, the personnel shortage in the regiment is approximately 15 percent. And the number of work projects, details, and various economic measures not associated with the training process is growing. Last fall, for example, it was necessary to

allocate 50-80 men daily at the request of the local city soviet, for the potato harvest alone. Otherwise they threatened to cut off deliveries of milk and poultry to the regiment. "Naturally, one could not even talk about any combat training in those days, although the class schedule was carefully compiled," explained Major V. Kapitan, the CP commander.

And here we have arrived at the main issue: How do the lesson plans for combat training correspond to the realities of life?

I will speak plainly. Whereas in the past a disruption of the personnel from their lessons was acknowledged to some extent, today at times we keep silent about what, according to the old measures, it would long ago have been necessary to sound the alarm. Combat training is seemingly being pushed onto the back burner, and is losing its priority over the other types of troop activity.

Consider this. In 1990, in the auxiliary farms of the Ministry of Defense alone, 119,000 tons of meat, 200,000 tons of potatoes and vegetables, and 300,000 tons of grain were produced. A significant supplement, and, as the saying goes, thank God for it. When the country is in economic and political crisis, and many problems have become exacerbated, the army undoubtedly cannot help but become involved in fulfilling the food, housing, and other statewide programs. But, it is also no secret that high economic indices are achieved frequently at the expense of combat training. Thus, the army's successes on the economic front are a two-edged sword. Here everything is interrelated, as in the laws of physics. If something is added to one vessel, it is necessarily taken away from another. By winning in the number of pigs and head of cattle raised, and in the number of facilities built "through our own resources," we are undoubtedly losing in the quality of training of military specialists, and in their professionalism.

Here are other figures. Approximately 30 percent of the officers at the first All-Army Competition for Field, Air and Naval Training were evaluated as unsatisfactory in the fulfillment of weapons and firing norms. Six percent of the Air Defense Forces officers, even in the final, received "unsat." What does this indicate? It indicates a lack of professionalism. And one of the reasons for this is the imperfect authorized duty position structure of the units, which cannot help but affect the quality of the training process. Another reason is found in the increased number of economic, construction and other tasks not directly related to combat training, but for which commanders are held accountable at times more strictly than they are for combat training.

About three years ago in the Moscow PVO District they "rolled in" as an experiment a new Combat Training Program. They granted commanders much more freedom in varying classes, switching them around, and replacing them, taking into account the real personnel training requirement. The hours allotted to combat training, it seemed, were reduced to the optimal level.

This had a certain effect, which made it possible to extend the experiment. Now, for example, even the class schedule is boldly called the "Schedule of Classes and Work Projects." But today another, most important, fact has also crystallized: the opportunities for the soldier, sergeant, and officer to grow into a good specialist and professional, unfortunately, did not increase. Judge for yourself. Whereas previously 96 hours were allotted to the combat and political training of subunits standing alert duty, today it is only 48 hours. Is this too much or too little?

"In that amount of time it is not possible to train a student to become the needed specialist," says Lieutenant Colonel Slipko, the regiment commander. "In the Combat Training Department, Moscow PVO District, they recognize that 48 hours is the limit below which it must not drop. What happens is that we give that radar station operator only the minimum knowledge and skills, while demanding that he be able successfully to combat such super-modern weapons as, for example, cruise missiles, 'stealth' aircraft, etc. Where is the logic in this?"

"It must be recognized that when the Combat Training Program is shortened, the training level of the specialists and the quality of equipment maintenance also decline," agreed Major General O. Fitkulin, deputy commander for combat training, Moscow PVO District. "This is now one of our most troublesome questions."

Truly, whereas running operational checks on equipment was always entrusted to soldiers and sergeants, today they are mainly being accomplished by officers and warrant officers. That same soldier, say, of a launch battery, when he took the exam for specialist first class, in the past had to know the launch control system. Now this requirement has been removed. As has, by the way, the requirement to conduct 50 percent of tactical training classes at night, although the experience of the battles in the Persian Gulf area showed that coalition aviation made its most effective air strikes under conditions of limited visibility.

Of course, all these questions are now being studied attentively at the Air Defense Forces Main Headquarters. Lieutenant General G. Dubrov, chief of Air Defense Forces Radiotechnical Troops, and Lieutenant General Avn V. Tokarev, deputy chief, Air Defense Forces Combat Training Directorate, expressed concern about the situation that has taken shape with respect to combat training. But, to solve this problem, to find constructive solutions immediately, as I understood it, is not so simple. Much, for example, turns on the very foundations of the structure and organization of air defense and defense in general in the country. Take the number of defended installations. One can say that in the Air Defense Forces they are not declining. And every year there are fewer and fewer people.

"Yes, the combat and political training plans are poorly linked to real life. And I have a number of views on this

score," stated, for example, Lieutenant General Avn V. Tokarev, deputy chief, Air Defense Forces Combat Training Directorate. "But for now we have been given to understand one other thing: Daily combat work is also combat training."

Vladimir Aleksandrovich explained that, for example, on alert duty the soldiers are essentially engaged in combat training. And, thus, problems with training also supposedly should not arise. In part one can agree with this. But, alert duty, firing, and launches are the criteria of the training and educational level of the personnel, the end result of the training process. Trained specialists, and not students, should be standing alert duty. Therefore, it is hardly possible to solve these problems by simply equating that alert duty to combat training. I am not even speaking about the combined arms disciplines—tactics, and firing, physical and drill training—which one does not gain behind a display screen or status board.

"It is necessary to more boldly develop and use in the troop units new and more effective methods of training the personnel," adds Lt Gen Avn Tokarev. "It is necessary to employ more widely automation and computerization of the training process."

This is necessary. But for now what are needed are simply working soldiers' hands. And the forecast for the future with respect to these hands is far from happy. In that same Air Defense Forces Combat Training Directorate it is believed that in 1991 only 50 percent of required replacements will arrive in the units and subunits. Last fall the Moscow Air Defense District alone was short 3,500 young soldiers, due to the boycott of the callup.

The officers and generals with whom I spoke believe that it is necessary, finally, to do something about the manning levels, to bring them into accord with the missions being accomplished by the units, and with the psychological and physical capabilities of the individual. The working hours of military personnel should correspond to the norms of the USSR Constitution. This point, by the way, is proclaimed in one of the draft laws on the military reform.

It will also be necessary, evidently, to think about returning students to the army, believes Major General Fitkulin. On what basis is another matter. But so far the

reality is such. The honorable obligation to fulfill one's military duty is honorable, in the main, only for the children of workers and peasants. And here we are not only speaking about PVO units.

"As for the Ground Forces, there the combat training situation is no better, if it is not worse," believes Lieutenant General V. Khazikov, deputy chief, Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces. "The time for combat training in constant readiness large units was reduced from 22 days per month to 16. Due to the tearing away of personnel for work projects it became difficult to carry out even company training.

What does Lieutenant General Khazikov propose? We need new views on our military doctrine and on the structure of the Armed Forces. In particular, it is necessary to determine the optimal composition and number of troop groupings, after which it will be necessary to carry out their required reductions. On the other hand, the remaining units must fully meet the wartime organization and manning structure, have high mobility, and be able to engage in full value combat training. It is necessary to expand the number of rear services subunits and units supporting the training process. (In a leading NATO country, I was told, they comprise approximately 40 percent for combat units and subunits, while in our country they comprise three percent.—Author) Finally, it is necessary to introduce widely a system of contract-based recruitment of military personnel.

Here we have these proposals. It seems to me that they have something in common with those being advanced in the Air Defense Forces, and indicate that the problem is in large part inherent to the USSR Armed Forces as a whole. The main conclusion is, evidently, to accelerate the carrying out of the military reform, and gradually but consistently increase the share of true professionals in the ranks. Only once these concepts have been implemented will it be possible to count on "Cinderella," in the role of which today combat training has found itself, finally turning into a princess.

Today the army and navy are at the very outset of this difficult path. Nevertheless, I am convinced that constant combat readiness troops, and perhaps in first priority those in air defense, must move just a bit ahead of the others. Toward them there must be both a special approach, and requirements of the highest order, as the events in the Persian Gulf area showed.

Navy's Future Vis-a-Vis Missions Under Defensive Doctrine

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pp 3-7

[Lead article by Deputy Chief of Navy Main Staff Vice Admiral V. Zakharin under rubric "Time and the Fleet": "The Navy and National Defense"]

[Text] Heated arguments have been going on in our parliaments, in the mass media and in society lately concerning reform of the Armed Forces, particularly the Navy. The controversy which unfolded highlighted many real problems of the Navy. At the same time, polar opinions expressed in a number of instances indicate that deputies, journalists, and certain scientists are insufficiently informed relative to the course we have chosen in Navy organizational development.

With these circumstances in mind, the author deems it necessary to draw journal readers' attention to basic factors determining the Navy's strategic significance for national defense and consequently the directions and prospects of its development.

Our country often is called continental. One can agree with that judgement if we speak about the bloody ground wars in our homeland's history. At the same time, it would be incorrect to forget that in many instances not only a strong Army, but also the presence of a naval fleet was a necessary condition for our state's firm strategic position.

The fleet of Peter I "opened the window to Europe" and affirmed our presence in the Baltic Sea. And under Catherine II it was only thanks to the Navy that Russia preserved this situation, repelled the Swedes' attack in the Baltic and consolidated in the Black Sea area. It is also apropos to note that in that anxious time for Russia its naval fleet not only did much for the state's immediate defense, but also acted as a most important stabilizing factor in world politics.

One should also mention the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 in examining the role of "naval strength" in the history of the state. It is common knowledge that our fleet suffered a most difficult defeat in it which predetermined the entire outcome of the war as a whole and subsequent losses in Russia's strategic position in the Far East. But this tragic experience showed once more how great the significance of a fleet is in a clash of interests of different states and how perniciously a lack of understanding of fleet needs can end up for them.

Based on Russo-Japanese War experience, naval officer V. Diterikhs wrote in notes about the naval fleet's place in the defense of Russia in 1908: "Just as the life of plants depends equally on several factors—soil, air, irrigation, light and so on—and no strengthening of soil properties can replace the air, moisture or light necessary for a plant, so in the very same way the influence of naval strength on a state's history represents a completely

independent factor in its development, irreplaceable by any of the country's means; one can say positively that without naval strength Russia would not have existed in that form and in those boundaries as now is the case, and that it is possible to hold and strengthen Russia's existing boundaries only in the presence of naval forces."¹

Perhaps even this is an insufficiently strict opinion for today, but it is correct in principle, although we already live in another epoch and different factors largely determine conceptual views of the role of branches of the Armed Forces.

A state's policy, military doctrine and the Navy's strategic missions stemming therefrom are the fundamental conditions determining the Navy's place in national defense and directing its development.

The USSR's foreign policy course today is aimed at creating favorable conditions for society's further development under conditions of peace and freedom. Soviet foreign policy today is determined by new political thinking, originating from a recognition of values common to all mankind, the unacceptability of war as a means of achieving political goals, the senselessness of the arms race and the need for new approaches to ensuring international and national security.

Having no territorial claims on a single state, threatening no one, not striving for military superiority, and rejecting a transfer of ideological differences to relations among states, the USSR proceeds from the inadmissibility of using the Armed Forces in conflict situations if they are not directly connected with defense.

At the same time this does not mean our country has no interests at all outside its own territory. The USSR is linked with the world community and is interested, for example, in the safety of its shipping, especially now, when our economy is undergoing perestroika and shifting to equitable and mutually advantageous external trade relationships with all world states. The Soviet Union is interested in developing the ocean's mineral and biological resources. Finally, in the near future one evidently should expect global ecologic and other projects connected with man's development of the ocean. In this connection the possibility cannot be excluded that a need will arise to protect the country's interests by relying on its military potential. Events during the so-called "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf in the period of the Iran-Iraq conflict can serve as an example in this regard.

Nevertheless, in the absolute majority of cases when we speak about employing our Armed Forces we have in mind stopping aggression against our country. Under present conditions a world war can and must be prevented chiefly by political means, but it is possible to rely on them only when they are backed up by the country's sufficient defense potential.

It is common knowledge that the primary mission of the Armed Forces is to realize the military-technical aspect

of military doctrine. In studying this aspect of it, one should devote attention above all to the nature of the military threat inasmuch as different and sometimes directly opposite opinions are being expressed on this problem.

The fatal inevitability of world war really is excluded for today, but can one assert that it is entirely impossible now? The situation is not as simple and unequivocal as insufficiently knowledgeable people sometimes depict it, and to be completely frank, it must be admitted that the military danger and reasons engendering it have not yet disappeared into the past.

Yes, a large-scale conflict between East and West really is hardly possible in the next few years, but something else also is true: armed confrontation has been preserved, above all in Europe and in the Asiatic-Pacific regions. Therefore the potential military danger for our country is still an objective reality and probably will be preserved as long as nuclear arsenals and powerful groupings of armed forces exist. I believe no one today will dare assert that the process of developing new relations in Europe already has assumed an irreversible character.

An absence of substantial changes in the NATO bloc's offensive strategy and the refusal by the U.S. administration and NATO to hold talks with the Soviet Union about a balanced reduction of navies cannot help but cause uneasiness in us. True, intentions to review bloc military-political strategy have been expressed lately in statements by the military leadership of NATO countries, but measures being considered concern only ground forces and aviation, apparently not by chance. These circumstances force us to reckon with the possibility of a shift of the arms race to the ocean in the next few years. If this occurs, then there will be no transition from superarmament to reasonable sufficiency. Moreover, the potential military danger for our country from ocean and sea directions will increase.

It is also impossible to lose sight of many regional problems which predetermine the instability of the overall world political situation and which can lead not only to local wars, but even to large-scale military conflicts.

Evidently it is impossible to approach an evaluation of the Navy's role and place in national defense today without considering these realities.

Under present conditions the defensive direction of our military doctrine corresponds to the real correlation of sides in theaters, the nature of possible armed conflicts, and our strategic goals to a greater extent than its other alternative variants. This direction substantially influenced the formation of our views and approaches to resolving questions of the Navy's employment in the overall national defense system.

The primary mission of the Navy, as of all the USSR Armed Forces, now is to prevent war and, in case it is initiated by the enemy, to repel aggression, to screen the

country's installations and troops from ocean and sea directions, to deprive the enemy of an opportunity to conduct offensive operations, and to create conditions for restoring peace. To accomplish this mission the Navy is made up of naval strategic nuclear forces and general purpose forces.

Being a component of the familiar triad of the country's strategic nuclear forces, naval strategic nuclear forces serve as one of the guarantors of its security. Their task is to deter the enemy from initiating a nuclear war and, in case it begins, to inflict unacceptable damage on him in retaliatory operations.

At the present time parity in strategic offensive arms has formed and is being maintained between the leading nuclear powers, the USSR and United States. It will also be preserved in case the treaty on a 50-percent reduction in them is concluded. The potential of naval strategic nuclear forces will be lowered substantially here, but even in this case it will be sufficient for national defense. At the same time it should be borne in mind that creation and deployment of a new ABM defense system with space-based elements in the United States will disturb this balance and can lead to a qualitatively new spiral of the arms race.

The primary mission of general purpose forces in peacetime is to support a favorable operational regime, i.e., those conditions which would not permit the possibility of surprise aggression by a potential enemy. In wartime these forces must be capable of reliably supporting combat stability of naval strategic nuclear forces; repelling or weakening enemy strikes from sea directions; inflicting damage on his primary attack groupings, thereby preventing their conduct of offensive operations; and, together with other branches of the Armed Forces, creating conditions for effective conduct of a strategic defense in continental theaters.

It seems to us that the direction of Navy development and training must correspond to these missions.

From all appearances, it is apropos to emphasize here that the Navy always was considered by the leadership of the country and Armed Forces not as a certain closed, autonomous sphere, but as one of the most important elements of our state's unified defense system. Therefore assertions seem far-fetched and erroneous that the basis for the Navy's development in the postwar period was not the fleet's employment in war as a whole, but opposition only to the enemy at sea.

It is obvious that doctrines and concepts differing both in direction as well as in content can act in different periods of history. The goals and missions of possible combat operations will be changed and shaped in a like manner. This in turn can require necessary changes in quantitative and qualitative parameters determining the makeup, status and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. At such a stage it is unquestionably necessary always to bear in mind that the Navy is the most conservative branch of the Armed Forces from the

standpoint of such changes. As confirmation of this it is probably sufficient to say that a complete cycle for creating a combatant ship (from the beginning of designing to commissioning) as a rule is at least 7-10 years. As a rule it takes another 5-7 years to build a series of ships and then subsequently train them for joint operations.

This is why it is so important for the Navy to determine its tasking and strategic missions in a possible war correctly and in advance, and this is why, when goals and missions of war as a whole change, it is not so easy to "adapt" the Navy to them. Even in case of acute necessity, it is impossible to fundamentally change the ship order of battle and its combat capabilities in short time periods; hence in particular the demands for versatility of fleet personnel and equipment.

Just what kind of naval fleet do we need today for reliable defense and how should its further development proceed?

Without dwelling on the content and characteristic details of the program-specific method of fleet development planning accepted in the Navy and without being diverted to an analysis of the country's economic, financial and other capabilities determining this development, it is possible to depict in general terms the appearance of the Soviet fleet with which, according to our notions, we will enter the next century.

Above all, further development of the fleet must and will be accomplished in close connection with other branches of the Armed Forces, with maximum use of the common military-technical potential and with the unification of combat systems and equipment for joint accomplishment of missions in ocean and sea TVD's [theaters of military operations].

Strategic submarines, the sea component of the country's triad of strategic offensive arms, will be retained in the Navy's makeup. True, there will be fewer, but they will be able to accomplish combat patrols both in ocean areas that are difficult of access and in well protected coastal sea zones.

It appears that priority in the makeup of general purpose forces should be given to submarine forces, which are the basis of the fleet's strike potential and the most versatile arm capable of combating any sea enemy.

Under conditions of a defensive doctrine, surface combatants and naval aviation, together with other naval arms, will become an effective means of winning superiority in seas adjoining USSR territory and conducting operations in the course of repelling enemy aggression.

Air-capable cruisers with deck-based fighter and ASW aircraft capable of operating more effectively than shore-based aircraft having the very same purpose should hold an appreciable place in the makeup of our ocean fleets.

It probably should be added that the equivocal, often negative attitude toward these ships which has been

reflected in the mass media is based above all on an incorrect idea about their role and place in supporting combat stability of fleet forces. Studies show that employing heavy air-capable cruisers as part of ship formations increases the combat capabilities of these groupings by 1.5-2 times and leads to a significant reduction of losses in case of a combat clash with the enemy. Speaking only of the cost of retained forces, including strategic forces, it exceeds by several times the expenses for creating and operating air-capable cruisers. There simply is no reasonable alternative to these ships.

Naval aviation—missile-armed, attack, fighter, ASW and reconnaissance—also will retain its importance, although its combat makeup will be reduced substantially in accordance with the USSR's undertaking to limit the deployment of naval aviation land-based attack aircraft in the European part of the country.

Shore forces—the naval infantry and rocket-artillery and other fleet formations and units—also are an inalienable part of a balanced fleet. Great Patriotic War experience convincingly confirmed the need to have such an arm in our fleets' makeup, determined by its important role in providing for security and defense of ship and naval aviation basing areas and support to ground forces on maritime flanks.

Thus we see that the Navy is the only branch of the Armed Forces outfitted with essentially all weapons in the inventory of other branches of the Armed Forces and capable of fighting the enemy on the sea, under the water and in the air.

The fleet has become appreciably "younger" in recent years. Missile-armed submarines, called "Typhoon" in the West, new quiet nuclear-powered submarines, "Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov"-Class air-capable cruisers, "Kirov"-Class nuclear-powered cruisers, "Sovremennyy"-Class destroyers and so on have entered its makeup. The fleet is proud of these ships, but we still do not have enough of them. We are hoping that the people and society will be understanding with respect to our attempts to substantially reduce the fleet but make it effective and responsive to the requirements of modern warfare.

Finally, it is necessary to note one other aspect of discussions going on today. In viewing the Navy under conditions of a defensive doctrine, one apparently should dwell especially on the content of the term "defense." When people speak of defense, operational thinking often turns toward shore and seeks ready-made solutions for the fleet in "land" analogues. And then sentiments of the following sort arise during discussions:

"Why enter into rivalry on someone else's field when all conditions favor us on our own?"

"Their advantage lies in large ocean-going surface combatants (by 7.6 times), carriers, deck-based aircraft and landing formations. Ours lies in multipurpose submarines with antiship missiles and torpedoes (by 1.2 times),

in land-based, missile-armed naval aviation, and in small ships and boats for coastal operation (by 1.6 times). It is hopeless to break this asymmetry; it is better to place it at the service of our strategy. We will send all NATO carriers to the bottom off our shores..."²

One could agree with those arguments if they would lead to proper conclusions, specifically with respect to the Navy. It is impossible to depict a defensive naval operation as firing from an emplacement. Many of our parliamentarians and journalists associate the defensive nature of operations with a system of defensive lines and zones and a system of trenches and emplacements similar to the "Maginot line" of sad repute and they connect the offensive nature with the physical taking of specific territories. But this is correct only for land theaters, and even then only partly.

Quite a different situation takes shape at sea. Here there are no trenches and emplacements and it is impossible to take territory and establish fixed protective lines for its defense. Forces of the enemy navy can deliver strikes against targets on our territory and against naval forces while at a considerable distance from our coast. There is therefore a natural need for concentrating our Navy's forces specifically in those areas where long-range weapon platforms—missile submarines, carriers and guided missile surface combatants—will be operating.

We thus arrive at an understanding of the need for conducting conventional combat operations not only in coastal areas, but also in remote ocean and sea areas. The specifics of the Navy are manifested here, and this is not a new situation.

For example, back in 1888 Lieutenant General Bobrikov, a member of the state site selection commission for building a port on the Baltic Sea, noted: "The Navy's assistance to operations of the army in the field in a land theater of war should . . . be sought not by placing a combat squadron on the right flank of our forces' disposition along our western border, but by its independent strength on open waters and the ability to deliver surprise attacks without being constrained by place and distance."³

But people were not always guided by this fundamental thesis even earlier, and today not everyone understands that a naval force such as the Navy remains an active means of warfare even in the defense and is not intended only for coastal operations. A lack of understanding and underestimation specifically of that role of the Navy in assisting ground forces lead to polemics in the mass media and in parliaments.

We do not exclude the involvement of naval forces in immediate assistance to ground forces by providing fire support and by landing assault forces in the flank and rear of an attacking enemy. But aggressive fleet operations to defeat the enemy ship attack groupings in those areas from which they can deliver strikes against our territory remain determining, and we call such operations of the fleet an active defense.

In conclusion I would like to note that in a short article it is of course impossible to consider all aspects of the evolution and organizational development of the country's contemporary Navy, but in our view the most important ones merit the readers' attention.

The Navy's future depends on society's understanding that the fleet is not a costly whim for our country, but a necessary means ensuring security of the state and protection of its interests.

Footnotes

1. V. K. Diterikhs, "Influence of Naval Strength on Russia's History," *ZHURNAL VOYENNO-MORSKOGO KRUIZHKA CHERNOGO MORYA*, 1908, p. 6.

2. A. Arbatov, "How Much Defense is Enough?" *MEZH-DUNARODNAYA ZHIZN*, No 3, 1989.

3. M. A. Petrov, "Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoy voyne na more" [Russia's Preparation for a World War at Sea], Moscow, 1926, p. 41.

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Some Trends in Development of Electronic Warfare in Combat Operations at Sea

91UM0717A Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian* No 3, Mar 91 (signed to press 25 Mar 91) pp 19-23

[Article by Rear-Admiral V. Kalinin and Captain 1st Rank A. Lobanchuk under the rubric "Questions of Theory"]

[Text] The development level of electronic warfare [EW] equipment and its readiness for actions to maximally disrupt or hamper an aggressor's achievement of goals of a surprise attack assume very great significance today with active realization of the defensive direction of our military organizational development. EW equipment objectively demands the most careful attention, a comprehensive assessment of its capabilities in accomplishing the full set of missions that arise, and urgent steps to eliminate an identified lack of correspondence to modern requirements.

An analysis of the development of naval warfare methods, including an analysis of the course of combat operations in regional conflicts of recent times, shows that success in battle depends not only on the power of the destructive features of weapons employed, but also on technical capabilities of the electronic equipment used for missions of situation coverage, command and control of forces and weapons, guidance, issuance of target designation, reconnaissance, EW and so on. It is used both independently as well as in automated systems, and the reliability with which it functions is having an ever increasing influence on the end result of confrontation.

The ever deepening specialization of electronic equipment in recent times leads to an increase in its numbers aboard surface ships, submarines and aircraft and at ground installations of fleets. For example, while a type surface ship grouping had around 20 various pieces of electronic equipment at the beginning of World War II, its number doubled in a grouping of similar makeup in the 1950's, it approached 100 in the 1960's, and it has gone over 300 at the present time. Along with the change in numbers has come a change in quality, an expansion in capabilities, and an increase in reliability of electronic equipment.

In parallel with the upgrading of electronic equipment came the development of equipment which both hampers its operation and protects it against deliberate jamming. Gradually this rivalry developed into "warfare on the air waves." Some authors have begun to use the terms "combat for command and control" and "combat with information," but all agree on one thing: whoever has superiority in EW has an advantage in achieving the goal.

It is common knowledge that, being one of the principal kinds of operational and tactical support, EW is exerting an ever greater (and in a number of cases a determining) influence on the outcome of operations and combat clashes by affecting the operation of electronic equipment of enemy systems for command and control of forces and weapons and the operation of other supporting systems and equipment. For example, while only the one Haapsalu shore radio station was used in the Baltic during World War I (it interfered with German ships transmitting their radio reports), massive outfitting of ships and aircraft with jammers as well as the formation of special shore and air subunits began during the 1930's-1940's. For example, 262 surface ships and a large number of aircraft were outfitted with jammers during the 1944 Normandy landing operation. A considerable number of such jammers also was set up on the English coast. A special squadron of passive jamming aircraft operated on a dummy landing axis. German radars on the Normandy coast were completely neutralized as a result of such massive jamming. This contributed to the fact that only six of the more than 2,000 ships which took part in the landing were lost from enemy action.

An analysis of armed conflicts of recent times shows that in the majority of cases the attacking side attempted to carry out a set of measures to disrupt the normal functioning of enemy situation coverage systems, systems for command and control of his forces at all levels, and weapon control systems back before or simultaneous with the initiation of combat operations. That is what the anti-Iraqi coalition's multinational forces did in January 1991 when they began an operation for massive neutralization of Iraqi air defense and command and control system electronic equipment back before the beginning of combat operations. A preliminary analysis shows that such large-scale use of EW equipment permitted jamming Iraqi air defense electronic equipment

and knocking out a portion of it using missiles homing on radar emissions. This was one factor which provided operational and tactical surprise in delivering the first air strikes as well as essentially an absence of losses by the multinational forces at the beginning of combat operations.

Thus the development of electronic warfare equipment and methods proceeded from their individual use to the conduct of special operations for massive, comprehensive effect on enemy electronic equipment, hampering and sometimes even paralyzing the operation of his combat and support systems. This is what determines the importance of EW today. Up to the present time, however, there has been an opinion that EW is a secondary matter. We will attempt to change the mind of those who prefer to have more weapons than EW equipment by using an example from Royal Navy operations in the 1982 Anglo-Argentine conflict.


Ten antiship missiles were launched (6 from aircraft and 4 from shore launchers) in four instances by Argentine troops against British ships. Five ships came under fire: the carriers "Hermes" and "Invincible," the guided missile destroyers "Sheffield" and "Glamorgan," as well as the frigate "Plymouth." Of these, only one, the "Sheffield," did not use EW equipment for her protection, and she was the one sunk. At the same time, the comprehensive, timely use of passive and active jamming by the other ships made it possible to divert 8 out of 9 missiles to decoys. Only one of four missiles fired against the guided missile destroyer "Glamorgan," which employed EW equipment, hit her and damaged the destroyer. It should be noted that not one missile and not one aircraft was shot down by the weapons of all those ships.

Two directions should be singled out in examining development trends of EW in combat operations at sea: the improved organization of EW in operations [operatsiya] and combat operations [boevyye deystviya], and the furthest possible development of EW equipment itself. It should be taken into account here that despite an overall trend toward a quantitative reduction in offensive weapons on platforms, one sees an attempt to preserve and even increase their combat capabilities by upgrading reconnaissance, target designation and EW systems. In our opinion, the following factors presently influence the organization and conduct of EW.

The first is the existing structure of the system of command and control of forces and weapons. In recent years there has been a transition in the assessment of future methods of conducting combat operations at sea from the concept of "forces against forces" to the concept of "combat systems against combat systems," in which the command and control system is one of the principal elements (see Fig. 1). This in turn influenced the content of EW, one of the most important missions of which is to disrupt the functioning of that system by the effect of EW equipment on electronic equipment included in the system's makeup and by a change in properties of the

environment hampering the propagation of electromagnetic or other waves. This is done in combination with the use of weapons against all elements of this system.

Fig. 1. Structure of command and control system in delivering an attack



The second factor is the sharp quantitative leap in outfitting sea and ocean TVD's [theaters of military operations] with electronic equipment and electronic systems and the saturation of ships, submarines and aircraft with them. This in turn influences the quality of that equipment's operation, which is determined not only by its technical reliability, but also by the capability to function stably under the effect of different kinds of jamming. The more electronic equipment in the system, the more possibilities there are of affecting it by EW equipment, which means the more possibilities there are of reducing the functioning reliability of the system as a whole.

The third factor is the increasing consolidation of various kinds of electronic equipment in special systems (for situation coverage, for command and control, for issuing target designation for weapon employment and so on). Confirmation of this is the creation of a U.S. antisubmarine surveillance system (SOSUS), a space system for reconnoitering naval targets (NOSS), the global system for operational command and control of U.S. Armed Forces with the system for operational command and control of naval forces included in it, and so on. This in turn also requires a comprehensive approach to accomplishing the mission of disrupting their functioning in case combat operations begin.

The fourth factor is the increased effect of the results of EW on the end result of an operation or naval battle. In connection with this, EW equipment has begun to be taken into account in assessing combat potentials of opposing groupings.

Unquestionably, the final missions of an operation, engagement or battle are achieved by delivering effective fire on the enemy (by destroying or inflicting maximum damage on his forces), but EW is capable of considerably facilitating accomplishment of this mission by disorganizing command and control of enemy forces and weapons, reducing the capabilities of his technical means of reconnaissance, and ensuring stable operation of friendly electronic equipment. Integrated use electronic warfare equipment is dictated by the fact that effectiveness of its action against any system as a whole is achieved as the sum of results of action against the system's individual elements (detection, command and control, target designation, homing and other equipment).

Intelligence collection against enemy electronic equipment and systems holds an important place in organizing EW. In accomplishing this mission one must differentiate detecting the enemy in support of EW, and electronic intelligence [ELINT, radioelektronnuyu razvedku (RER)] as a component part of intelligence collection in a TVD. A close interrelationship exists between them, but there also are substantial differences. In the broad sense, ELINT's purpose is to collect all possible data on the enemy. Detecting electronic emitters is the mission of active reconnaissance [ispolnitelnaya razvedka] of EW and serves for issuing target designation data to EW equipment. Such reconnaissance can be compared with artillery reconnaissance, for example. Common to ELINT and to active reconnaissance of EW is that electronic equipment is used to collect data on the enemy in both instances, the differences being that the first reveals data on enemy forces (his makeup, location, status, nature of operations and so on), and the second reveals operating parameters of enemy electronic equipment for creating jamming. An interrelationship also is seen in the fact that ELINT data is used as initial data for assessing the electronic environment and organizing reconnaissance in support of EW. In a number of instances, especially at the tactical level, these two missions are accomplished by one and the same electronic equipment, permitting target designations to be provided both to weapons and to electronic equipment in the shortest possible time. Beginning at the operational level, however, the functions of ELINT and active reconnaissance of EW separate. This circumstance should be considered in upgrading the organization of EW.

Assessing the electronic environment in an area of upcoming combat operations and in the TVD as a whole is a component part of the organization of EW. An assessment of the electronic environment is performed to determine the most vulnerable elements in the enemy's electronic systems and to estimate one's own capabilities for disrupting their operation. Hence the need for determining the detail of personnel and equipment required for this. Because of the constant increase


in the number of electronic targets in a TVD and the dynamic nature of change of the environment, however, successful accomplishment of this mission is possible at the present time only with the use of modern computer technology.

At the same time, the enemy also will attempt to perform similar missions with respect to our systems. First of all, this will require ensuring their protection against deliberate jamming; secondly, eliminating or reducing a number of revealing signs with increased intensity of use of friendly electronic equipment or reducing the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance; and thirdly, precluding mutual interference during simultaneous use of electronic equipment for different purposes. All this requires precise coordination and the organization of interoperation of existing equipment in accomplishing

situation coverage was switched off due to possible interference with a satellite communications session, resulting in lack of promptness in employing air defense weapons and EW equipment for repelling the antiship missile attack.

Based on what has been said, the content of EW can be formulated as follows. Electronic warfare is a set of measures and actions of forces coordinated by objectives, place and time for detection of enemy electronic equipment and systems, for electronic countermeasures [ECM] against them, for countermeasures against technical means of enemy reconnaissance, as well as for ECCM of friendly electronic equipment and systems. EW is conducted in combination with the delivery of fire against enemy electronic targets and in close interoperation with other kinds of operational or tactical support.

Fig. 2. Content, principal objectives and missions of EW



the full set of EW missions.

The importance of proper organization of electronic counter-countermeasures [ECCM] as a component part of EW is illustrated by the consequences of omissions in this matter which led to loss of the guided missile destroyer "Sheffield." Her electronic equipment for air

The following are the principal factors which in our opinion influence further development of EW equipment:

- development of new frequency bands into which electronic detection and communications equipment under development or becoming operational shifts its operation;

- vigorous development of an element base and massive introduction of computer technology for processing ELINT data;
- use of new nontraditional situation coverage and data transmission techniques.

They entail a need for upgrading existing electronic equipment based on new technologies, introduction of more sophisticated computers and development of equipment for action against future electronic equipment.

In the first instance a trend is clearly seen toward creating multifunction on-board (individual) automated EW systems of surface ships, aircraft and submarines. The U.S. AN/SLQ-32 automated EW system for surface ships can serve as an example.

It appears to us, however, that creation of fundamentally new EW equipment will proceed not only in the direction of its use for disrupting the operation of electronic equipment in new frequency bands, but also in the direction of creating equipment of great potential capable of using new physical principles not only to suppress electronic equipment, but also to disable its individual elements. In addition, the use of new kinds of communications for data transmission also demands a revision of the very structure of jamming, which presumes not only power suppression, but also destruction of the useful signal (introducing additional components to it, "cutting out" a portion of the signal and so on).

Equipment for creating decoys also is being developed, both to mislead the enemy regarding the true makeup and combat formation of a grouping of forces as well as to divert homing weapons (antiship missiles, torpedoes,

surface-to-air missiles and so on). Its progress will proceed along the path of expanding the bands for simulating various physical fields of surface ships, submarines and flying craft. Equipment warning a target about irradiation will continue to be upgraded for successful use of decoys in individual protection.

Means of reducing the signature of aircraft, surface ships and submarines subsequently will influence the effectiveness of electronic equipment operation and conduct of EW. Stealth technology is the most indicative here.

Specialists believe that the last direction in development of EW at the present stage probably is an upgrading of antiradiation missiles and organization of their employment in combination with comprehensive use of on-board airborne EW equipment, which will permit more successful performance of missions of countering both shipboard as well as continental air defense weapons.

In summing up results of the review of development trends of EW equipment and methods in combat operations at sea, it is necessary to emphasize the increased demands on the training level of officers on staffs of various levels and of ships and aircraft in matters of their application. The ability to analyze the electronic environment that is taking shape, determine specific EW goals and missions, organize comprehensive use of existing equipment, and thoroughly understand the content of EW in modern combat operations at sea determines the successful, quality performance of assigned missions. Attaining the goals of conducting EW also largely will depend on working persistently to organize it, constantly upgrading methods of employing its personnel and equipment, and searching for new, nontraditional techniques of conducting EW.

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Lopatin's Draft Military Reform Criticized

91UM0582 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 91
(Signed to press 28 Jan 91) pp 12-16

[Article, published under the heading "The Military Reform: Problems and Judgments," by Col V. Chirvin, candidate of military sciences: "Common Sense or Dilettantism? On the Erroneousness of a Number of Provisions in the Draft on the Military Reform of the Group of USSR People's Deputies Headed by Maj (Res) V. Lopatin"]

[Text] At present, there are two alternative plans for a military reform: that by the Special Commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the other by a group of USSR people's deputies headed by Maj (Res) V. Lopatin. There is also an opportunity for the readers themselves to determine which plan derives from common sense and which is simply playing to the public, a desire in the current rather difficult situation to thereby win authority. Allow me to share certain ideas on the key aspects of the plan for a military reform of the group of V. Lopatin.

But first a few words on the draft plan for a military reform as worked out by the specially established commission. We do this in order to be correctly understood in our reflections and conclusions.

As is known, the plan of the commission sees the chief content of a military reform in establishing a mechanism to ensure national security and effective military organizational development, and for bringing the Armed Forces into accord with the level of the actual military danger and the new political, economic and social conditions. In accord with this plan there is to be an optimum organization and establishment of the troops (forces) and military administrative bodies, the Army and Navy are to be outfitted with modern weapons and military equipment, the system for the manning of the Armed Forces and the training of military personnel is to be changed, an effective system is to be established for the social protection of the servicemen and the legislative bases are to be reinforced for the USSR citizens to go through active military service.

The central element in this plan for military reform is man. At present, there are extensive review and discussion of the draft USSR laws on universal military obligation and military service, on the status of servicemen, a regulation on serving in the military as well as drafts of new combined-arms regulations. In the listed draft laws chief attention is given to guaranteeing the implementation of both the general civil as well as service rights of the servicemen as well as the rights and benefits for the members of their families.

There are also plans to provide a legislative guarantee for the right of the servicemen to receive a pension for the number of years served. The exception is instances when service is interrupted due to the fault of the serviceman

himself. The right is provided for any serviceman to contest incorrect actions by the state administrative bodies and officials to military tribunals. In the aim of encouraging and further stimulating the service activities of the servicemen, there are also plans to more widely employ the granting of USSR state decorations in assessing their military service, and there is also the intention to work out and employ a just differentiation in the pay of the servicemen proceeding from a gradation of expenditures of physical, mental and other effort. The role of the Army and Navy community is to be raised in resolving questions of military service relations as well as material and housing support. For citizens who do not wish to undergo military service with weapons in hand and out of other considerations, there are plans to introduce an alternative (nonmilitary) service.

Here briefly is the basic essence of the military reform as worked out by the special commission. Nevertheless, we feel that this provides a sufficient understanding of it. And certainly one cannot help but see that the given plan is sound, it has a practical nature, it makes it possible to take into account and consider the interdependence of the entire range of measures in the reform, their interrelationship and succession of implementation and also sets specific dates and methods of realization.

What for me, as a professional, is not acceptable in the plan for the military reform as proposed by the people's deputies?

First of all, it completely lacks such an important section as an assessment of the international military political situation (I am not speaking about a domestic political one). In other words, it lacks a starting point from which any calculations in the defense area must start. Military organizational development, as is known, does not tolerate abstractness. It should be firmly based on a thorough assessment of the real military political situation, the balance of opposing forces and take into consideration the possible tasks for the armed forces in peacetime and wartime. The lack of such a "foundation" invalidates all the ensuing arguments concerning the principles for ensuring state security and reduces all subsequent proposals to bare declaration.

One mistake leads to others. In my view, I cannot help but point out the farfetched notion of certain principles proposed in this plan as a basis for working out a military reform. Thus, one of the principles states: "Achieving supervision over the military department by the superior state bodies and society as a whole with complete glasnost and maximum possible openness." Yes, the military department should be under the supervision of the superior state bodies. But what does supervision by society as a whole mean? Certainly society as a whole means precisely the superior bodies of state power. Does not "society as a whole" conceal the attempt to put the military department under the supervision of some certain group which possesses, for example, influence in the mass information media and on behalf of the people endeavors to influence the taking of most important

decisions in the area of national defense, proceeding naturally from its own interests?

And what does "complete glasnost and maximum possible openness" mean? No state in the world adheres to absolute complete glasnost in settling the questions of its national security. For example, within the U.S. Defense Budget there is a classified part, the so-called "black budget" from which top secret military programs are financed. The right to classify programs on allocations of the Defense Department under law is given to the secretary of defense, to his first deputy and deputy for purchases (procurement) as well as to the secretaries of the services. In an official discussion of the defense budget which includes the total cost of the secret programs, at closed sessions of the congressional committees their members can be informed only of the alpha-numerical code for the corresponding program and the volume of funds to be allocated for its implementation. Paragraph 119 of Section 10 of the Compendium of U.S. Laws (Point e 1) specifically stipulates the right of the secretary of defense to refuse to provide requested information on secret programs, proceeding from considerations of national security.

Why then is full glasnost required of the USSR Ministry of Defense?

Also disputable is the principle of "the conformity of the organization and size of the Armed Forces to the level of actual military danger and to the nation's capabilities." The level of military danger is a very fluid category. At present, it is one thing and it will be different in 5 years. For this reason, it would be rash to make a complete dependency of the Army and Navy organizational structure upon it while years and even decades would be required for working out and implementing this structure. There would be virtually no time to rectify errors.

Also debatable are other principles concerning the professionalization of the army and the consideration of world and domestic experience in military organizational development under present-day conditions. For example, take the military reform of 1924-1925. Its basic idea was a sharp reduction in the Armed Forces, the organizing of nationality-based formations and the transition to a cadre-territorial system for their organization (incidentally, by the mid-1930s, life had already forced the abandonment of this). Is such a system for the organizational development of the Army and Navy applicable for us at present? At first glance, it is. Certainly in this instance the state's military expenditures for maintaining the Armed Forces are being reduced and a large amount of the male population is being released for the national economy. This undoubtedly is the chief argument for the supporters of a "small professional army" and republic territorial armed formations. But, unfortunately, the authors of such plans forget that present-day conditions differ fundamentally from the 1920s. At present, the Army and Navy are equipped with modern weapons, they are full of various electronic devices and the training of military pilots, sailors, missile

troops, air defense specialists, tank troops and artillerymen requires painstaking and careful work. And this cannot be done under "home conditions."

In my view, other principles in the plan for military reform of the group of V. Lopatin do not stand up to criticism. For example, how is it actually possible to realize a transition to a fully professional army in 4 or 5 years? During this time, according to the plan of the group of people's deputies, a fully professional army is to be organized, and the general-purpose forces, that is, the Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces and a portion of the Navy, with the exception of the strategic nuclear forces, are to be distributed between the Union republics (sovereign states), a portion of the armed services is to be reduced, there is to be a fundamental change in the system of managing the Armed Forces, beginning with the Ministry of Defense and ending with the unit staffs, while the system for the training of military personnel and reserves is to undergo reorganization. This is a far from complete list of the proposed innovations.

Very dubious, it seems to me, are the provisions on granting equal rights to all the republics in the military area. It is a question of establishing republic armed forces and a reserve with dual subordination (to the center and to the local leadership). And with the right of the republic authorities to use these formations for defending the sovereignty of their republic at their own discretion. For goodness sake, tell me who is threatening a sovereign state which is part of the Union and to which the Union has delegated the defense of its interests? Then there are the questions of what armed forces are needed by the given sovereign state (republic) and what should be their composition, structure and size? How can we calculate the required defense sufficiency? In each specific instance, what will serve as the criterion of such calculations? The proposed plan of military reform does not contain the answers to these questions.

Also unclear is the procedure for the republics to take the decision to employ their armed formations. Certainly, no provision is made for the Center to participate in the taking of decisions by the republics for the internal use of these forces. How will they provide financing and logistic support in the form of weapons and military equipment, ammunition and supplies? No one knows.

The posing of the question of converting to a completely professional army in the proposed plan of the group of people's deputies is not completely valid from the political viewpoint. Universal military service, in my view, most fully corresponds to the principles of a socialist state and to social justice and which envisage the equality of all before the law and a universality in defending the state. It is the duty of each citizen to prepare himself and be ready to defend the fatherland. But most importantly, the transition to a fully professional army would sharply reduce our capabilities in preparing and building up a source of militarily trained

reserves. Weapons and military equipment, as we have already pointed out, are constantly becoming more complex.

Although, I would point out, the Ministry of Defense does not reject the possibility of even deeper professionalization by accepting USSR citizens who volunteer for service in the Army and Navy in rank-and-file and NCO positions.

What happens if we approach the question of establishing a professional army from the economic viewpoint? It seems to me that this is nothing more than an attempt to portray the desired as the actual. As an example, we could point to the U.S. expenditures on maintaining its professional army and which make up over 50 percent of the military budget. In our country at present, this consumes around 30 percent. The estimates made by our economists show that in converting to a professional army just its upkeep would cost us 1.8-fold more. In addition, the supporters of such an army do not consider the extremely insufficient infrastructure for the professional units. It would be necessary to create an additional enormous amount of housing, an entire network of children's preschool and school institutions, polyclinics, trade enterprises and so forth. Moreover, it is essential to bear in mind pay of 500 and even 1,000 rubles would scarcely attract a young person, particularly with a family, to serve voluntarily in the remote garrisons of the Transbaykal, the Arctic, Far East and other regions with harsh climatic conditions.

So we feel the implementation of the proposed provisions for a military reform will disrupt the entire operational purpose of deploying the troop groupings on

Soviet territory and will not make it possible to establish a unified system of collective security on a Union-wide scale. More importantly, if the existing unified system of communications and military command and control were to be transferred to the use and subordination of the Union republics, this would disrupt their reliability and reduce the combat readiness and efficiency in the command and control of the troop groupings, including the strategic forces. As a consequence of differences in the very approach to the training of the nationality formations, the overall level of training, combat readiness and capability of the Armed Forces would be sharply reduced and this, naturally, would disrupt the established system of national defense. Moreover, it is not hard to see to what the establishing of nationality armies would lead under the conditions of the interethnic conflicts and disputes.

The appearance of various draft military reforms can only be welcomed. However, an analysis of a number of the examined provisions in the plan for the group of people's deputies headed by V. Lopatin indicates that these are of a declarative nature and are basically designed for the public. The absence, in my view, of clearly defined concepts and special knowledge in the area of the theory and practice of military organizational development has led the authors of the given plan to an incorrect interpretation of the role and place of the Armed Forces in the political organization of society and to not completely sound proposals on their reorganization under present-day conditions.

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Lithuanian Military Commissar on Obstacles to Spring Draft

91UM0544A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Konstantin Grigoryevich Golubev, Lithuanian SSR Military Commissariat Political Department chief, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 2nd Rank B. Gromak: "Lithuanian SSR Military Commissariat Political Department Chief K. Golubev Told Our Correspondent—"The Draft Will Nevertheless Take Place"]

[Text]

[Gromak] Konstantin Grigoryevich, the Spring draft into the Soviet Army has begun. How will it occur in Lithuania?

[Golubev] The third paragraph of the present USSR Cabinet of Ministers resolution on release for the draft orders the publication of this document in the mass media. As you have obviously pointed out, the Lithuanian Republic press has ignored this. We have been compelled to print the resolution in three languages (Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish) and distribute it ourselves.

The Spring draft will not be easy but it will take place. In the Fall, just 17.4 percent of the planned number of young men went to serve in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces. Of them, 45 percent were of the indigenous nationality.

Our opponents are also attempting to utilize this draft for their own purposes. We are already hearing from the Supreme Soviet rostrum (and the newspapers have already picked this up and are circulating it) that our military commissariats are organs of an alien government. And consequently the young men of Lithuania have better things to do.

[Gromak] Can you cite a specific example?

[Golubev] Not just one. Here is a document that every Prenayskiy Rayon conscript has received. A Valinchus Kray local defense department instructor prepared it. Incidentally, he is a former major who was dismissed from the CPSU and released from the army for systematic drunkenness. The message states: "We request that you not succumb to panic and fear and further continue your civil disobedience and quiet opposition to the illegal activities of military commissariats and the Armed Forces."

And then detailed instructions on how to evade the service go on for two pages. Well, for example, "restrict your stays on streets and in public places to a minimum and do not have documents on your person." Having received the news that military personnel have appeared in the city or in any populated area, it recommends that the person rapidly depart his place of residence and then reliably hide himself. If a person "is captured," members

of his family should report this to the internal affairs department and to the rayon self-government (four telephone numbers are provided), to the Prenayskiy Kray department of defense (a telephone number is provided), and to Lithuanian Sajudis headquarters....

Moreover, the kray department of defense has begun drafting young men into the Lithuanian army in parallel with us. They plan on placing nearly 10,000 young men under arms this Spring.

[Gromak] Will you not be envious of both the conscripts and their parents in this situation?

[Golubev] Many parents are calling military commissariats with requests to draft their sons into the Soviet Army. But they propose doing this... using force. Yes, this is so. They are afraid to be voluntarily sent because Sajudis members are threatening to burn down their houses or to use force against the parents.

But we are not planning to draft anyone into the army using force. Right now we are working in another direction. And specifically: We are attempting to disseminate the truth about the Armed Forces through the mass media, including those elements that support the positions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

[Gromak] But nevertheless this work often does not produce the desired result. Or am I incorrect?

[Golubev] At least five conditions are needed in order for us to completely fulfill the tasks assigned to us and in order for the anti-army campaign to cease in the republic. Permit me to list them.

[Gromak] Please do.

[Golubev] First. Repeal the unconstitutional republic Supreme Soviet and government laws that have been adopted since March 11, 1990.

Second. Restore the force of the Constitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR on republic territory.

Third. Repeal all discriminatory measures with regard to military units and military commissariats on republic territory.

Fourth. Disband all republic military structures that do not correspond to the Constitution of the USSR.

And fifth. Provide republic mass media pages for truthful coverage of Armed Forces and military commissariat life and combat training.

Col-Gen Arapov on Retention of Junior Officers

91UM0544B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Ministry of Defense First Deputy Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate Colonel General Vitaliy Fedorovich Arapov by Lieutenant Colonel

V. Silkin, under the rubric: "Timely Interview": "Why the Lieutenants Are Leaving"]

[Text] The Armed Forces have encountered a problem which must disturb us. Quite a few young officers are leaving the army and navy.

The editorial staff asked USSR Ministry of Defense First Deputy Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate Colonel General V. Arapov to reflect on this complex situation.

[Silkin] Comrade Colonel General, in your opinion what can explain the craving for civilian life that has recently appeared among a portion of our young officers? Is a more tranquil life style attracting them?

[Arapov] I would restrain myself from such a straightforward assessment. You also need to earn your livelihood in civilian life. Of course, the standard of living of the majority of our society's strata has noticeably increased and the formerly prestigious officer profession has imperceptibly become a low-paying job. But we do not need to look only here for the answer to the question: "Why are lieutenants leaving?", although this side of the issue is very significant.

[Silkin] Do you not want to say that the honor is great but you will have nothing?

[Arapov] Maybe it is too much to say that an officer has nothing. But I think that a state man who defends the interests of his own people must have not a living wage but everything necessary in order to completely devote himself to the military profession. It is abnormal when in a number of places people in military uniform are deprived of the opportunity to obtain the required allowances. When officers who scrape by throughout the world do not have their own corner. Some part of our society has recently turned away from our military personnel and have lapsed into pacifism. This matter is reduced to physical assaults and to the murder of officers....

[Silkin] Excuse me, Vitaliy Fedorovich, but what is preventing them from using the defensive measures prescribed by the state?

[Arapov] Today the legal mechanism is slipping. Improved legislative acts are needed. There is progress in this sphere. Draft Laws of the USSR "On the Status of Servicemen" and "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" have recently been published for discussion. Important provisions that are called upon to "stop" illegal activities with regard to servicemen are set forth in them. The USSR Minister of Defense has issued an order for officers to carry personal weapons in "hot" regions where a dirty anti-army campaign has been unleashed.

But I must say: Laws are just laws and we also need to look at the other side. There are forces in our country that are attempting to change the attitude toward the army in society and first of all toward officers. It is as if

those people who serve in the army are some sort of "aliens." And these forces have not yet encountered a decisive rebuff.

[Silkin] You have in mind the mass media that presents the army and the navy only in a bad light?

[Arapov] And them too. Although it would be unjust to blame all newspapers and magazines. But some of them are pursuing one goal—to sting a bit more painfully. With what can we oppose this pressure? How can we alleviate the trend toward falling competition at military schools? The lads in school are already beginning to master: The profession to defend the Homeland—is not the main thing. Will such young men really have the desire to wear the military uniform? And as a result—the army and navy will give up the leading element of officers. I need to point out that far from the worst people are leaving. We are frequently parting with well trained specialists and we are already experiencing a shortage of them. Confused by all possible attacks against the Armed Forces, by a lack of confidence in tomorrow, and by other social factors, young officers are breaking down morally. I could list dozens of names. But, I think the matter is not them but the phenomenon—a new and complicated phenomenon for our Armed Forces.

[Silkin] Does it not follow from this that the current generation of officers has lost its sense of duty?

[Arapov] No, I do not agree with that assertion. The overwhelming majority of officers have a high sense of duty. But I repeat the living conditions of the Soviet people have changed. But have they changed in many garrisons so that a young man's needs are satisfied? A young officer must have the opportunity to do some work to improve himself, to stay with his family, to amuse himself in a circle of friends, and to give his passions their due....

[Silkin] But reports reveal something else. Not only everyday confusion but also dissatisfaction with the service itself and seniors' inattention to their needs are causing the protest among young officers.

[Arapov] Unfortunately, we also have this. There is the boorishness and crudity of certain commanders and chiefs, the groundlessness of punishment, and delays in promotion to the next military rank. Unauthorized monetary expenditures [nachety] for lieutenants is causing a great deal of concern. We are painstakingly investigating these cases and we are ascertaining the true guilty parties. It often turns out that officers are taking the punishment for the indifference of subordinates and are being undeservedly subjected to commanders dressing-downs.

When they enter the military family, young officers must receive lessons of warm, human participation in their fate, attention, and concern. They mean a lot to yesterday's military school graduates. But it is important to bolster them with strict observance of regulations, a high

level of discipline, and combat tension at training exercises and during simulations. An officer's character, spiritual strength, and the social activity of lieutenants is really formed in just such a situation. A gradual introduction into the ranks of young officers has become the rule in leading collectives.

[Silkin] Comrade Colonel General, cases are known and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written about this when lieutenants, who have gotten a taste of the "delights" of civilian life, have requested that they be restored to their previous position.

[Arapov] There are many such officers. Among others, for example, is Reserve Senior Lieutenant A. Averyanov. He has a good job and an apartment in Sevastopol. "But I cannot forget that I am an officer," he writes. "Return me to the army: I am ready to serve in any region of the Soviet Union." I could name Reserve Lieutenants A. Poyda, G. Trubayev, Reserve Senior Lieutenant A. Luzhin, and others. Naturally, we must sympathize with them. Only it is easier to leave the army than to return. We proceed from the fact that the Armed Forces—is not a passageway: Wanted to, left, wanted to, entered. Lieutenants are mature people. If they have decided on such a step as release into the reserve, that means that they pondered everything and they have thought through everything. It is not so easy to bring an officer back during a period of Armed Forces reductions.

[Silkin] There is no article in the Provisions on USSR Armed Forces Officers' Performance of Military Service that defines release due to one's own desires. But the Ministry of Defense is resorting to release of certain officers according to reports precisely with this wording....

[Arapov] That is not quite correct. The large group of lieutenants that was released as a result of Armed Forces strength reductions were officers who had discredited themselves—according to the appropriate article. But I want to point out something. The process of democratization is occurring in the army and in the navy. There are cases when people cannot continue service for various reasons. We are meeting them halfway.

While talking about the big picture, every person who leaves acts dishonorably if he still says something more caustic with regard to his coworkers. And they need to decide—will they allow him to leave or not. The Officers' Assembly exists for this conservation. It will resolve the issue positively, in this case it is hardly worth the commander thinking about not giving the report a chance.

We also hope for additional government measures which young officers will perceive in the near future.

Military Recruitment Efforts in Lithuania

91UN1758B Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian 2 May 91 p 2

[Interview with J. Pauzuolis, the general deputy director of the Department of State Security, by Gintaras Miksiunas: "The Commissars are Planning"]

[Text] The Soviet military commissariat in Vilnius sent out letters to young men inviting them, along with their parents, to an assembly point (Kapsu Street, No. 44) on May 25. There a meeting was to take place with Commissar Visockis.

His theme: persuasion to serve in the occupation army. We, a couple of Lithuanian newspaper journalists, came along too. The soldiers did not let journalists in. Perhaps because inside there were only 10 women and a few reserve officers.

We talked about the Soviet efforts to take recruits with the General Deputy Director of the Department of State Security, J. Pauzuolis.

[Pauzuolis] According to our latest information, recently a discussion took place at the republic's commissariat where all the district commissars attended along with second section workers. There General Visockis presented plans for the call-up: during the spring to take 11,630 lads; this year, 29,600. Let's look at the last number. It is enlarged. In the past Lithuania has never given so many lads to the Soviet army. Apparently, they want to be compensated for last year's uncompleted quotas, thinking that they will be able to persuade those who boycotted last year's call-up.

Now the Soviets are sending the lads and their parents letters to their homes which describe how Lithuania is transgressing Soviet laws when it does not carry out the President's order, and trying to persuade the young ones to go and serve in the occupation army. Such letters are being sent to all the districts. Besides that, the homes are being visited by commissariat representatives. I saw for myself how in Vilnius two men entered one citizen's apartment to question him about where their son was hiding now. They were pressured to think it over and without fail come to the military commissariat. These representatives also visit work places. In other words, those refusing to serve will be sentenced for one year.

[Miksiunas] Is there any news about whether this summer the lads will be hunted by the forces?

[Pauzuolis] Last fall a few were caught. It seems to me that those were not planned actions. The results show that those lads taken by force have been very few. Those they managed to persuade is how many came out, mostly from the eastern regions of Lithuania.

There are no guarantees about whether they will use force this year. The commissars say that force will not be used. We do not have any information yet that they will act differently.

The position of the country's Security Department is clear. Those lads who acknowledge Lithuania's laws, uphold the Parliament and the Government, cannot serve in the armed forces of a foreign country.

[Miksiunas] The Supreme Council accepted all of the laws regarding service by youth in the country's security divisions. When will these lads be called to serve in the Lithuanian army?

[Pauzuolis] The laws have been passed. The law on conscription will go into affect when Parliament passes the resolution to puts it into force.

Vilnius Notes Army Deserters Fear 'Moral, Physical Terror'

*LD0806015291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
2130 GMT 7 Jun 91*

[Text] A total of 66 young men from Lithuania deserted from Soviet Army units during the five months of this year. Among the deserters are eight Russians and six Poles. The main reasons of escaping from the Army units are unbearable life conditions, moral and physical terror, and constant threat of being victimized. Most of the young men who deserted their Army units appealed for help to the national commission set up to monitor the draftees' problems.

Spring 1991 Draft in Tajikistan

*91UM0681A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 May 91 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Colonel A. Ladin: "We Have Met. Forward—the Service"]

[Text] During these days the work place of the military commissar of the Tajik SSR, Colonel Mumin Mamadzhanov, is at the republic assembly point. If one wishes to meet with the military commissar it is best to come here. One can say with total assurance that Mamadzhanov repeatedly turns up at the assembly point: in the early morning, at noon, late in the evening. And let no one think that the republic military commissar does not have other things to do. It is a simple matter of the call-up campaign easily pushing all day-to-day problems into second place. Right now the main task for the republic military commissariats is the timely dispatching of the young replacements into the ranks.

According to tradition in Tajikistan, parents, no matter how far they have to travel, accompany their sons up to the aircraft ramp or the railcar doors of the military train. And it does not stop here: the parents have to be looked after too. It is mainly with this aim that the wide area in front of the republic assembly point contains its own shady public garden, with a great number of benches among the trees. In the end the people can sit and talk with their sons. And not only talk. One can make a gift for his son, buying him things that are necessary for the trip. Food, for example. Here at your

service are a cafe and a manufactured goods shop. Shashlik is being cooked right there on the grounds. One can eat a tasty meal in the mess hall.

At the gates of the assembly point there is a daily exposition, showing the parents the personal gear with which their sons will be provided immediately upon arriving at their units. The duty officer, whose task it is to hold daily talks with the parents, answers their questions and does not leave the so-called "guest" grounds until late in the evening. He politely and thoroughly explains everything which interests the people.

I could talk for a long time about everything that pleased me at the republic assembly point. But I intend to keep the readers' attention here in order to reinforce with facts one important thought of military commissar Mamadzhanov. When we together looked over the beautiful club with its national mural, the sleeping quarters which were carefully repaired prior to the beginning of the draft, personal washing area, mess hall, stadium, and medical commission offices, I automatically felt like asking what all these preparatory expenses came to. It turned out to be not a small amount. But the republic government agreed to it. They also agreed to reduce, at government expense, the prices of food for the doctors who worked at the assembly point as members of the medical commission.

"I insist," Mamadzhanov told me, "that the very first impression of the army that the youths get at the military commissariat is bright and happy. I know from personal experience: much is forgotten, but that first contact with a new life remains in one's memory forever. How people received them, how they questioned them, in what tone they responded to them—it is all remembered. And it is from all these details that the very first impression of army life is made and the attitude toward service is shaped."

I was among the conscripts of one of the commands on the evening before it was sent on active duty. Naturally, the kids were nervous, very much wanting to get into that arm of service about which they dreamed since childhood. In the group of youths who had arrived from Nurek, almost all wanted to serve in combat units. Abduravyk Saidov had asked to be assigned to the Armored Troops; Rakhmatullo Asanov—Airborne Troops. Firyuz Abdulloyev was lucky. He wanted to be more closely associated with the latest electronic technology. He was assigned to the Communications Troops.

Is everyone as lucky? Of course not. But to the extent possible the wishes of the conscript are taken into consideration. Thus in the current year alone there has been a considerable increase in the number of young replacements assigned to combat units. If last year 72 percent of the group of draftees was assigned there, then 81 percent is planned for the spring draft this year. Moreover, approximately 75 percent of the conscripts

from Tajikistan are serving outside the Turkestan Military District today and, responding to the challenges of the unit commands, these kids are serving willingly.

While carrying out their duties as members of the medical commission, doctors G. Khodzhibayev, N. Galiyev, and L. Akramov noted that this spring the youngsters are arriving in poorer health than last year. They figure that difficulties with foodstuffs, especially in the outlying regions of the republic, are responsible for many of the future soldiers registering a weight loss, caused by a lack of nourishment.

Colonel Mamadzhanov related that in several of the republic rayons, especially Garmskiy, Ragunskiy, Komsomolobadskiy, and in Fayzabad, in the period just before the call-up, a number of youths enrolled in sports

and health camps. In the course of a month the youngsters received increased nourishment. Qualified instructors tutored them in the Russian language, basic military training, and physical training. Each year the republic spends 1.5 million rubles on such "raising" of the conscripts to the required standards.

...When these lines were being written, they were preparing to send off the first train of new fighting men in Dushanbe. At the assembly point one new command after another was being formed. As the Chief of the Military-Political Department of the Tajik SSR Military Commissariat Lieutenant Colonel A. Timokhovich said, the course of the draft shows that the armed forces will receive 100 percent of its youthful replenishment from the republic.

Col Gen Mironov on Gulf War Lessons

91UM0709A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 17,
25 Apr 91 p 6

[Reader's query and reply by Colonel General V. Mironov, USSR deputy minister of defense for armament: "What Are Western Experts Being Quiet About?"]

[Text] The Western press is presently conducting a broad campaign in praise of its weaponry—primarily American—which was employed in the war against Iraq, supposedly showing overwhelming superiority over the Soviet weaponry the Iraqi Armed Forces had at their disposal. How do they view this in the USSR Ministry of Defense?

[signed] V. Savelyev. Moscow.

Colonel General V. Mironov, USSR deputy minister of defense for armament, replies to our reader's question:

In the war with Iraq, the United States and its allies relied on achieving superiority not so much in the quantitative as in the qualitative sense. The Persian Gulf region was turned into a huge testing ground for adjusting and perfecting the newest varieties of armament. Many of these weapons systems, available only in small quantities, were deployed to the theater of combat operations on an urgent basis. In this manner the most modern, the finest combat equipment and weaponry produced in the United States as well as in other countries of the international coalition was brought out against Iraq, including space systems, aircraft carriers, cruise missiles, reconnaissance and strike systems, and high-accuracy weapons for various missions.

Iraq was only able to confront this powerful array of supermodern systems for waging armed conflict with currently obsolescent varieties, mainly, of armament and combat equipment which it purchased in the Soviet Union, as well as in France and other countries. The main bulk of weapons accumulated by Iraq was developed in the fifties and sixties. It is only natural that they were inferior to the weapons of the multinational international force in combat characteristics. Additionally, the strong and weak points of Iraqi armament were well known to the opposing side, insofar as such armament is available in other countries as well. This was used with masterful skill by military specialists of the multinational force in the planning and conduct of combat operations.

The small quantity of Soviet-produced modern combat equipment, such as MiG-29 aircraft, could not have a significant effect on the outcome of the war—indeed, such equipment was practically unused by Iraq in its combat operations. One reason for this, apparently, was the desire of the Iraqi command to hold back the most valuable types for decisive events. However, many of these were detected by space reconnaissance means and destroyed by highly accurate long-range weapon systems, to which Iraq had nothing comparable.

But the most significant reason for the lightning-strike defeat of the Iraqi Army was not armament but rather the poor morale of personnel, their lack of desire to engage in combat with the multinational forces. Almost every time coalition forces came into contact with the enemy, a great portion of the Iraqi soldiers surrendered, laying aside their arms and combat equipment. U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney acknowledges that resolving the problem of prisoners of war presented the greatest difficulty for the multinational forces during conduct of the ground offensive operation. Taking into account these specifics of the combat operations, it does not make sense to speak about a comparison assessment of the weapons effectiveness of the opposing sides. It is precisely this that all kinds of "experts" are being quiet about as they advertise the superiority of American over Soviet weapons, pushing the administration and U.S. Congress into using the results of the war with Iraq to maintain commanding positions in the world arms market and leading to yet another increase in the military budget.

French Nuclear Forces, Plans Viewed

91WC0114A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 25 May 91 p 3

[Article by I. Volozhanin of IAN [News of the Academy of Sciences]: "What is in the Nuclear Arsenal of France?"]

[Text] The changes in Europe have brought much unexpected trouble for the military planners of many countries. After signing the treaty to reduce conventional arms France, as well as other parties to it, were naturally unable to remain outside the general concerns connected with the necessity of making exceedingly substantial corrections in the national plans for military organization development. If the process of reducing confrontation on the continent can be successfully consolidated, the French parliament will, in the fall of this year, adopt a new military program for the country for 1992-96 that is more moderate in the realm of conventional forces.

The nuclear arsenal of France is not comparable to the Soviet or American arsenals in its quantitative parameters. Specialists feel, however, that it offers sufficient destructive power, allowing Paris to play an important role in the building of new security structures in Europe. The country, according to data from the newspaper LE MONDE, currently has on the order of 430 nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles (the USSR and the United States have 10,000-14,000 units each), 90 substrategic air-launched missiles and 30 surface tactical missiles. And even though the country's leaders adhere, as before, to the view that the French nuclear weapons cannot be the subject of negotiations, and first and foremost with the members of the "nuclear club," Paris cannot close its eyes to the changes that are happening in that "club." Be that as it may, the significance of that potential has already grown, allowing for the elimination

of the Soviet and American intermediate-and short-range missiles, and will increase even more in the event of the expected major reductions in the strategic offensive weapons of both powers.

The fate of the 18 S-3 missiles in silos on the Albion plateau, fitted with one-megaton nuclear warheads, is currently at the center of the debate surrounding the future national policy of nuclear force development in France. Their possible destruction by the year 2000 will actually signify the rejection of one of the components of the French strategic triad, which today also includes the ballistic missiles on submarines and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Prime Minister M. Rocard, in a letter to the mayor of the small city of Apt in the southern part of the country where the missile base is located, declared that a final decision on this issue will be made in the fall of this year.

The opponents of eliminating the base on the Albion plateau are insisting on a continuation of research work on the so-called "redeployable" S-4 missile project, which could replace the S-3. Even though their reasoning has been subject to doubts even by experts in the French Ministry of Defense, this is hardly grounds to hope that they will be cut back or, at least, frozen at the current level in the event of structural changes in the French strategic forces. On the contrary, as follows from the statements of the French minister of defense, J.-P. Chevènement, the number of warheads at the country's disposal and their aggregate power will increase significantly overall by the end of the century even with the elimination of one of the components of the nuclear forces.

At the same time as the functionally obsolete missiles in the launch silos that were developed back in the 1970s are possibly being removed from service, the chief efforts of France are proposed to be concentrated on improving the nuclear submarine fleet. This, in the expression of President F. Mitterand, "diamond crown of restraint" will be supplemented with six new underwater missile carriers, the first of which should enter service in 1994. About 130 billion francs have been allocated for the development program of this component of the strike forces through the year 2008. Another important constituent element of the French nuclear arsenal could obviously be the air-launched cruise missiles, with a launch

range of up to 1,200 kilometers, that are being developed in conjunction with Great Britain.

The problem of the development of French tactical nuclear weapons is an exceedingly delicate one from a foreign-policy point of view. Even though the USSR and the United States, after prolonged discussions, have expressed their fundamental readiness to discuss the problem of cutting back the missiles in this class, that was unable to have any effect on the decision of President F. Mitterand to produce and deploy the new Hades tactical missiles, with considerably greater range than today's Plutons—450-480 km versus 90-120. One of the main causes of confusion is the fact that these missiles are comparable in technical parameters and effectiveness to those being eliminated by the USSR and the United States. The reaction of Paris to the dissatisfaction displayed by public opinion in France and outside its borders has been manifested as yet only in the fact that the quantitative plans were reduced—the deployment of 20 launchers with 40 missiles is now being proposed, instead of 60 launchers and 120 missiles.

The sentiments prevalent in the military and political circles of France are creating the general impression that the new factors typifying the situation in Europe have added to, rather than subtracted from, the enthusiasm of the advocates of relying on a nuclear strategy. They consider this strategy, in the face of the impending substantial cutbacks in conventional arms in Europe, an important means of consolidating and, possibly, strengthening the role of France in world affairs, not only European affairs. "We will not economize on nuclear restraint," affirmed Defense Minister J.-P. Chevènement. The prestige of French policy today, in his opinion, depends to a greater extent on the country's military than on export volume or the permanent membership of France on the UN Security Council.

Paris is taking into account, at the same time, the fact that France cannot remain outside the overall disarmament process without detriment to its own prestige and the interests of security policy in Europe. Some French experts feel that if the USSR and the United States are able to agree on reducing strategic offensive arms, a very weighty argument will appear in favor of restraint and stabilization with regard to the efforts of France in the nuclear realm.

Impact of Conversion on Udmurt Economy

91UM0531A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 91
Second Edition p 3

[Article by Special PRAVDA Correspondent A. Pokrovskiy from Izhevsk: "Roll Up Your Sleeves in Order Not to Have to Tighten Your Belt—This Is How the Defense Workers of Udmurtia View Conversion"]

[Text] At first I didn't get it. It was with seeming pride that Valeriy Alekseyevich [Shutov] acquainted me with his new offspring, the brick plant. And he summed it up with a sad joke:

"And now we are called the radio-brick plant imeni Chapayev...."

Oberberghauptman Andrey Fedorovich Deryabin froze on the shore of Izhevsk Pond. The ordnance plant founded by him here in 1807 manufactured its first seven guns and six swords. But by the time of the war against Napoleon, the Izhevsk gunsmiths were held in high regard in our army. And so the grateful fatherland has perpetuated the memory of the Russian engineer with a German title.

Now the entire many-kilometer bank of the famous pond might as well be marked by monuments. In honor of the developers of the everlasting Kalashnikov assault rifle and various missiles, the means of communication and equipment for atomic weapons. Some 83.5 percent of the total volume of Udmurtia's industrial product comes from the production associations and enterprises of the Union ministries and departments, such behemoths of the nation's military industrial complex as the Minoborongrom [Ministry of Defense Industry], Minobshchemash [Ministry of General Machine Building], Minatenergoprom [Ministry of Atomic Energy] and Minradioprom [Ministry of Radio Industry]. Yes, while clearly there would be no public celebrations as secrecy prevented this, at present the defense workers of Udmurtia are troubled by something else. They, according to the local expression, have "fallen under the sentence of conversion."

Where did such drastic terminology come from? Do the famous weapons workers not realize that times have changed? Believe me, after a trip to Izhevsk I was certain that they did understand this and more profoundly so than the demonstrating supporters of conversion.

I would like to remind the zealous expositors of the military industrial complex that this term actually involves less than 60 percent of output of defense products and over 40 percent of goods for you and me, including virtually all television sets, a larger portion of tape recorders, refrigerators, washing machines and at present they are hard at work developing modern footwear equipment, hulling mills, bakery equipment and other such.

And we should say that here the people have readily perceived the present task of conversion, that is,

reversing the percentage of peacetime and military products. To put it differently, over 60 percent of the output from their hands should go for our consumption. Let me emphasize that they are morally ready for this. But as for the material and financial readiness, let us listen to the comments made at a meeting of the representatives from the labor collectives of the Udmurt defense complex enterprises, the chairman of the Association of Republic Industrial Enterprises, the very same General Director of the Izhevsk Radio Plant Production Association V.A. Shutov, whose comments began this article:

"Conversion came for us as a bolt out of the blue on a spring day in 1988. In terms of our orders the year had already been formed and the production structure as well. But then there came refusals of 35 percent of our products. Next year was another 20 percent and last year 10 percent. The actions by the ordering enterprises in the area of adjusting the contracts were spontaneous, unpredictable, with a colossal tardiness and, most importantly, unchallengeable. Our contracts for preassembled articles were repudiated by virtually all suppliers. Here arbitration was powerless and the law only worked in one direction. We were saved, if it can be so put, by increasing the output of all sorts of consumer goods (remember the brick plant!—A.P.) as well as due to the help of our home ministry which also carried a lot of weight. As a result, the microelectronics shop, our pride, was only operating at one-third its capacity. During these 3 years, not a single new technology was developed which would have raised production to a new level. At present, the plant's focus is being lost, its specialization is being lost...."

No matter how difficult the situation at the Izhevsk Radio Plant was, the fate of the collective of the Chepetskiy Machinery Plant was to be tragic. Due to its production features, the production area freed here virtually could not be employed for producing peacetime products and the personnel did not have experience in producing these. Understandably, all of this led to a drop in the profit of the enterprises being converted and, hence, to the deterioration of the social protection of the workers in the entire republic. During the current year alone, the republic lost a total of over 250 million rubles for the upkeep and development of the social sphere, while its budget lost over 30 million rubles in comparison with 1989.

For those who assume that there is a land of milk and honey around the enterprises of the military industrial complex, let me remind them that, for many indicators of the quality of life of the population, Udmurtia is at the bottom of the Russian Federation. In particular, in terms of hospitals it is in 54th place, for schools 55th and for the availability of housing in 67th place. One does not need to go far to be convinced of this. Even on the main street of Izhevsk there stand small houses clearly built during the time of Deryabin.

Alas, Udmurtia is not alone in this. Similar types of production in Khabarovsk Krai, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Donetsk and certain other oblasts have ended up in the same situation. It remains to be added that very recently at a session of the Udmurt Republic Supreme Soviet they summed up the results of the development of the social situation. It turned out that the income of one-third of the population does not provide the people with a subsistence minimum. So here we can understand how the expression "fell under the sentence of conversion" appeared!

But here also there is one inaccuracy. Conversion in and of itself is not to blame but rather its hurried, unplanned execution. The naive assumption that by the mere cutting back on the financing of the defense enterprises would make it possible to immediately organize things in the national economy has seemingly led to the reverse results. Sitting at the warehouses are unfinished products without demand but worthy of many millions of rubles. The restructuring of the production capacity has bogged down as it is impossible to produce meat grinders in the place of tanks without primary capital investments. And most importantly, the skilled personnel has begun to be disbursed over the cooperatives. From a human standpoint we can comprehend the possibly too emotional statement by one of the speakers at a conference in Izhevsk:

"In our parliament there are very many persons who take it upon themselves to speak, let us say, about management structures from the viewpoint of a composer, a writer and so forth...."

"Yes, that may be the case but there are also professionals here," I thought, when the audience clearly came to life with the unexpected statement of the next speaker:

"Gentlemen, comrades, colleagues, lords and ladies! I appeal to all political views in saying that the enemies of perestroika must not be sought in the camp of the military industrial complex. Progressive technology cannot coexist with conservative thinking...."

It was an appeal over the heads of those sitting in the auditorium for there were no "lords and ladies," just as there were none of our well known economists. And as much as I tried, I could not find any trace of their presence in Udmurtia, even for testing out their economic views. On the other hand at precisely that time one of them who in his infancy must have been bounced on the knees of Shkiryatov, related in the press how after completing his plan for economic reforms, he immediately set off for the United States and won the praise of the specialists there. But the heart of the matter is that all of us "have been bounced on the knees" of the working class and should precisely endeavor to win its praise.

As they say, the verdict is not in yet. It seems to me very noteworthy that the labor collectives in Udmurtia in the person of their representatives have decided to jointly discuss the problems which have arisen in the course of

conversion and find the ways to solve them. The Secretary of the Republic CPSU Committee M. Kozlov formulated the general attitude thus:

"The military industrial complex is not a brake on progress but rather its engine. These enterprises must be set apart in a group for breaking through to new technologies and a new quality of products. The large and extralarge enterprises comprise the skeleton of any modern economy around which are formed the muscle tissue of the medium enterprises and the nerve tissue of the small ones.

"Recently the image of the looming economic disaster has arisen and there have been appeals for belt tightening. This causes apathy and the syndrome of 'labor paralysis.' We must shatter this stereotype and regain the ability to respect ourselves, our country, our people and our society. The time has come for a great testing of the people's creative forces. Let us not tighten our belts but roll up our sleeves. Only in this is our salvation."

I have quoted the republic committee secretary so extensively because it is precisely the communists who have made the solving of the conversion problems at each plant central to the work of the council of the party committee secretaries at the republic state enterprises. Thus, the collective of the Votkinskiy Plant Production Association found itself in difficult straits due to the reduction in the production of medium- and shorter-range missiles. It was precisely with the aid of the party organization directly at the work areas that they were able to make up for the production volume. Thus, the output of milling machines more than doubled while the Feiya washing machines increased by 1.5-fold. Secondly, they organized the production of new articles such as microwave ovens, universal kitchen appliances and facilities for cooling milk. The collective trusted its party organization and achieved good results.

Thus, alas, not everything can be solved directly on the spot. And then, upon instructions of the same council for the party organization secretaries, a group of communists from the defense enterprises turned to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev. In the letter they raised a number of fundamental questions for the development and deepening of conversion. For example, that equipment for the food industry produced by the ministries of the defense complex should be sent first of all to the areas where the enterprises of these ministries are concentrated, that in selling weapons overseas the foreign exchange should be made available to the labor collectives producing it; the freed equipment and the resources with the cutback in the Soviet Army as well as the engineer units withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact countries should be directed to the restoring of villages of regions analogous to the Udmurt.

It is easy to note that it is basically an issue of the coinciding of the interests of the regions and the sectors. This was also brought up at a meeting of representatives

from the labor collectives in Izhevsk with the participation of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee O.D. Baklanov, as well as highly placed representatives of the State Commission on Military Industrial Questions and the defense ministries. It was a good thing that the matter was not limited to just speeches at the meeting. The guests visited the city enterprises in becoming acquainted with the state of affairs and, as I saw for myself, making numerous notes in their workbooks. The near future will show just what this will mean for the enterprises. But it seems as though both the guests and the bosses were unanimous in their opinion that for complete success in the matter it is essential to carefully work out a conversion program in terms of each region and on the national scale it is essential to have a conversion law which would clearly define the rights, duties and mutual responsibility of the enterprises to be converted; such a law for now has not seen the light of day in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

There was one other striking feature from these meetings. Even a nonspecialist would note that a number of the Izhevsk enterprises is setting out to produce the same type of products. But when I tried to speak about this to the representatives of the ministries, they strongly parried my doubts saying:

"As long as everything is bought up, let them produce the commodities they have chosen. And competition will show whose products are better. Of course, we must get used to living under market conditions."

That certainly is reasonable. No matter how difficult today may be, we must not forget either about tomorrow.

Plans for Converting Semipalatinsk Test Site

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[Interview, published under the heading "A Personality in the Context of the Times," with Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Chaykovskiy, by Sergey Kuts: "Semipalatinsk-21 or the Education of a Position"]

[Text]

[Kuts] The year 1938. The Donbass. Later the war, evacuation and bombings....

The Urals. A town in Orenburg Oblast. There he finished his schooling. Then came Kuybyshev. An aviation technical school. After this work at a testing station for liquid-fuel rocket engines. In Khimki. The Moscow Aviation Technology Institute. A diploma work on a fundamentally new engine. In 1968, invited to work at the Institute of Atomic Power imeni Kurchatov. In Moscow.

In 1970 he arrived here, at the range.

In listening to the quiet, somewhat melancholic but strong-willed voice of Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Chaykovskiy, I was certain that he, like each of us, in his

destiny had had days when he obeyed circumstances (the war, evacuation and bombings) and when circumstances obeyed him (the aviation technical school. The institute, in being invited to Moscow to work...).

Most likely, this was not melancholy but rather fatigue. But a strange thing: behind the fatigue there opened up an infinite energy which at one time was firmly linked to mankind and did not intend to lose contact.

[Chaykovskiy] At the range, I was first a shift chief and then the chief of a service. Then a chief production engineer. Chief engineer. Leading specialist. And then...in 1989 (completely unexpectedly) one of the subdivisions of the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry [Minatomenergoprom] proposed me as a candidate deputy. Prior to this I had never been a candidate. Naturally, I did not have any experience in soviet work. I was not even a party member.

Before the new year of 1990, the first secretary of the gorkom proposed that I speak as a candidate at a forthcoming session in order to then assume executive committee concerns. I refused. But on the second of January the military deputies came to me with the same request. Then I began to reflect: if both the civilian and the military public felt that they could be united by one individual, then in the city it would be possible to rectify things and even change them. The need for such changes had long been felt and by that moment was already present in the minds of the authorities and citizens. Semipalatinsk-21 is a military city. The city administration is military. And although a Soviet structure was introduced here some 15 years ago, it was rather truncated. There were virtually no executive structures as such.

While the level of nuclear testing was constantly maintained at one certain level, the facilities of the Minatomenergoprom were constantly being developed and the city, albeit slowly and gradually, did shift to a civilian majority.

[Kuts] A civilian status...

[Chaykovskiy] Certainly a status. If there is a majority then there is also a status. But the military administration was a military administrative structure. Including trade. It had a monopoly in our city. When the word "deficit" did not exist, everyone lived in harmony without mutual complaints. But the time of the deficit arrived and the people began to seek out and defend their own particular rights to things.... And it turned out that the military had more such rights. At that time, our friction caused by this was something like a primary protest.... Later, several other components were added to it and something like a program came into being....

[Kuts] Everything that you and I are talking about and will talk about derives from the "balance of class forces" in your diocese. In order to understand this "balance" it is essential to know what the range is. What is Semipalatinsk-21? That is, Kurchatov....

[Chaykovskiy] The range and the town of Kurchatov are not only nuclear weapons testing. Here also there are two very interesting reactors. Unique reactors of the Minatomenergoprom. It was this area which has never been handled by military specialists. I would like to say (and this should be understood by all) that in point of fact the nuclear testing was not conducted by the military. They were like a middleman cooperative. The Minatomenergoprom works on nuclear weapons but the military provides the financing. With this money the military hire civilian specialists who carry out the work, for instance, of drilling the holes and cutting the galleries.... All of them are civilians. The city does not have such a large military population although this does not tally with the word "test range." If one also subtracts from their number the soldiers in regular service, the military is in a large minority.

[Kuts] Thus, a majority protests against the minority which in essence has dictated to the majority the social conditions of life?

[Chaykovskiy] The discrepancies arose over the years. More accurately, it was the dissimilarity of the life of the military and the civilians. The military lived better and we worse.... Where could we complain? Who would protect us? It was possible to go to the gorispolkom.... But it was powerless. It was an unviable structure of Soviet power.

[Kuts] A semistructure. An undeveloped (but not to the shame of Soviet power) structure.

[Chaykovskiy] If it did have any importance, this was before, when the party-command system was still functioning. Not the administrative-command system (this certainly is inaccurate) but rather the party command one.... There was a "weighty" gorkom and there was some party discipline but the executive committee was actually a department of the gorkom. If the executive committee requested something then this was carried out albeit with enormous dissatisfaction. Otherwise, the question could arise of holding a person responsible to the party. In the new situation the executive committee was to rely on its own principles. If they (the principles) are moved from the party-command sphere into the Soviet-command one, there will be no result. In this manner (or in approximately this manner) I replied to the military deputies during their visit with me. And also to the gorkom. If the military and the civilians wanted to rectify something then I certainly would agree to take a look at the proposal.

...The session was held on the 5th of January. It was very interesting. It was preceded by a meeting of the party group. At this it was proposed that the same individual should be the chairman of the city soviet and the first secretary of the gorkom. His deputy would be the former chairman of the gorispolkom. At the party group everyone was firmly in favor! They supported the candidacy. But the candidates which had been put up and approved for the voting did not gain the necessary

number of votes. Including the first secretary of the party gorkom. Later I was to learn that the sketches for the future variations of Soviet power in Kurchatov had existed long before these events. The people were thinking....

So out of all the recommended and preprogrammed candidates I won a majority of votes. There were two against. The remainder were in favor. It was my time to speak. It was an extemporaneous program. I had no time to work on it. I explained my general ideas and approaches. I ended my comments with the words that I would try to do everything so that the slogan which for many years we had been writing in white on our red banners "All Power to the Soviets!" would be carried out and transformed.

[Kuts] Where did you begin? Usually when you begin it doesn't go according to the program....

[Chaykovskiy] That is probably so. For this reason, I did not have one. One completely formulated. But we were perfectly aware that around the test range a psychological alienation of it was developing. As a nuclear test facility.

[Kuts] In the form of the town....

[Chaykovskiy] Not only. Also its surroundings. That is the rayons around. We realized that nuclear weapons testing today is improbable. We set as our prime task the working out of a program for reorienting the town and called it the basic directions of conversion. And we proposed a year-long moratorium on nuclear testing in order to bring together all the antinuclear problems and sit down at the "negotiating table." We could calmly ascertain who had to be talked into what, who had insulted whom as well as find common solutions to the problem of the test range.

[Kuts] Your moratorium coincided with the moratorium of the Nevada—Semipalatinsk Movement.

[Chaykovskiy] Yes it did.

[Kuts] At that time, were you acting in parallel?

[Chaykovskiy] Yes we were. Still not together. We made the proposal for the moratorium at the session of 12 February. At an extraordinary session. The proposals on conversion were also made there. The documents had been approved ahead of time at the executive committee, the presidium and the gorkom buro.

The session was under way. And then the chief of the test range, Lieutenant- General Ilyenko, arrived. With a different proposal. He proposed that the session adopt a document which obliged the government in turn to adopt a draft worked out by him on the problems of nuclear weapons testing. The draft envisaged the continuation of testing at the Semipalatinsk range until 1993.

[Kuts] That was rather definite....

[Chaykovskiy] Naturally. The debates were difficult. Try to understand that a majority of the deputies were officers. And in such a case their deputy psychology was secondary.

[Kuts] In essence they were endeavoring to stop you cold?

[Chaykovskiy] In essence they were. But it was possible to persuade the session that this was the only way out and that in the near future, if the nuclear testing was not halted, half the republic would be standing by the barbed wire surrounding the range. And who could guarantee that someone would not bring a cutter to the fence instead of a poster.

The session ended more in our favor. We asked it to send three deputies (myself included) to Moscow. In order to present to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union (it began on 14 February) our proposal on the Semipalatinsk range.

We flew off to Moscow. We met with Petrushenko. We talked for more than an hour with him in his room at the Moskva Hotel. He promised to help us and do everything. But clearly after us some requests arrived from the range. Or phone calls. Petrushenko did not do anything he promised. We began to search for someone who could help us get our proposals to the USSR Supreme Soviet. This was how my first meeting with Olzhas Suleymenov happened.

I had heard that there was a Nevada—Semipalatinsk Movement. I became interested in its ideology and philosophy.... Just to what degree was it national or international? Just how democratic? After long talks with Suleymenov I realized that we could work together. This did not mean that we immediately accepted each other's positions but we had found a common direction at the given stage of the way: we requested a moratorium while Nevada—Semipalatinsk demanded a halting of nuclear testing generally. Here there was a clear coinciding. We asked that our viewpoint be passed on to the Supreme Soviet and this Olzhas Suleymenov did. Soviet power of Kurchatov, thus, moved to collaborate with the movement. From this moment on we were fighting for the common goal not in parallel but together. Our isolated contacts formed into normal collaboration. I am happy that Nevada—Semipalatinsk did not develop into a narrow professional movement but became universal. I became a member of its coordinating council.

During the same trip, we became acquainted with the VPK (military-industrial commission) in the Kremlin and with the governmental version of the decision on further nuclear weapons testing. Everything was to be found in this document. That the testing must be stopped in 1993. That it was essential to move them to Novaya Zemlya. But how much cement, vehicles and cranes would this require.... Only in this document nothing was said about the people, the specialists living in the town. Well, alright.... Let us halt testing in 1993, but what can we do with the people? Where would they

live after this? There was no answer to this question in the proposals of the USSR government. We voiced our dissatisfaction on this matter. It was explained to us that the solution to these questions related to the existence of the people had been taken over by the Ministry of Defense and the Minatomenergoprom. We went to call on both ministers and realized that they did not have any answer to this question. The idea of the possible three year testing to come lulled their concern for the 20,000 people who would have to be resettled somewhere or employed somehow. The town did not have any other structures aside from purely research or defense. (In our town over 500 of just the wives of officers and specialists are not working.)

Then, in Moscow, we said that we would prepare our proposals which would be alternative to the government ones. And such proposals were drawn up. At the beginning of March.

On 4 March, we appeared with our proposals before the Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Kuts] In January, you became the chairman of the executive committee of the city soviet and in March you already had a final version of action....

[Chaykovskiy] On 7 March, a meeting of the Defense Committee was held. Invited to it were the General Staff, scientists working in the nuclear industry and the leaders of the sectors. I described our proposals. Also the areas for conversion. Also the situation around the range. I requested very persuasively that they take into account our opinion in deciding to continue the nuclear testing.

I pointed out that if our requests were ignored, I would be forced to turn to the civilian specialists without whom the nuclear testing could not be carried out and request their civilian disobedience. Their professional disobedience. It turned out that our conversation in the Defense Committee was broadcast over Central Television. When I returned to Kurchatov, everyone had already heard and known about this. Ilyenko demanded that I speak before the officer assembly giving my antiarmy statements in Alma-Ata and Moscow. I did so....

[Kuts] They demanded that you explain yourself....

[Chaykovskiy] Not merely explain myself...the accent was on antiarmy comments.

[Kuts] So you could repent?

[Chaykovskiy] Possibly repent as well. Twice I spent almost two hours before the military. I described the conversion program, the situation existing around the range, I said that these were not antiarmy statements, that it was wrong to speak about the opposition of the executive committee to the military specialists or my opposing Lieutenant-General Ilyenko. There were two different positions, two different ideologies and one of these had a very negative attitude toward the conversion processes and the range changes. Such an attitude was

apparent on the part of the range leadership from the very first days of the rise of the conversion program. I must say that I did rather well with the officer assemblies and the warrant officer assemblies. The applause accompanying me was unexpected. There were six generals sitting on the presidium. Seemingly Kutuzov got by with four at Borodino. And there were just several hundred officers....

[Kuts] What happened then?

[Chaykovskiy] Then I tried to find allies for my program. I realized that involved in the nuclear problem were four active forces: science—industry—the military industrial complex—the republic. I set as my goal to bring together all four. Although piecemeal in order to develop some common understanding and common position. The first to respond to my request was a representative of the intellectual stratum of these forces, Academician Velikhov. Velikhov and I in September flew to Semipalatinsk to meet with the leadership of the oblast and the public. Later there was a meeting with Nazarbayev. It was a long discussion. We outlined the main areas of activity for the range under the conditions of the new ideology and its reorientation. We polished up and worked on our program. At present it has several chapters. One of them is the use of the range's scientific-technical potential and its personnel for converting Kurchatov into a center of science and culture and into a center of civilization which with its rays would warm the areas surrounding the range and which had been deprived during all the years of nuclear testing. The testing had been carried out under narrow departmental procedures. Not a penny had gone to nearby rayons. They were considered to be a zone of risky technological growth. But life is still life and the population of the rayons grew...and became impoverished.

I was able to convince the Minatomenergoprom of the need to send its representatives to the republic, to Kurchatov. Our program was approved by the ministry without detecting any contradictions with the desires of the Minatomenergoprom.

Another chapter in the program is compensation. There are three types (or sorts) of it. The range is located on the boundary of three oblasts: Semipalatinsk, Karaganda and Pavlodar. We feel that there should be single compensation for all the inhabitants of these oblasts. If it were set at an amount of 1,500 rubles, this would require 1.2 billion rubles.

[Kuts] Is this a lot or a little?

[Chaykovskiy] The budget for the military industrial complex is over 130 billion. To give one percent to the republic is realistic. There is another type of compensation in the form of permanent monthly surpayments on wages. (This would be 80 million a year.) This would be only for persons living in rayons directly bordering the range. There are eight such rayons. From 1991 there would be a surpayment of 2,000 rubles for the working

and nonworking population including students, housewives, pensioners, schoolchildren and children. Possibly this now sounds inexpensive but we drew up the program in November.

There is a third type of surpayment for rayons which were not developed because of the nuclear testing. Where the sociocultural facilities, medicine and transport are maximally poor. It would be better following the proposals of the local soviets of these regions (and not from the Kremlin walls and not from the offices of the republic government) to draw up a separate program for their accelerated socioeconomic development. Such a thing is completely feasible. This would require only about 40 million rubles.

One of the main chapters in the program is the conversion proposals. It (incidentally, according to the proposal of Nazarbayev) would provide for the organizing of the first technical university in the republic in the physics and energy area based upon scientific research subdivisions, the laboratories and intellectual potential of the scientists. Why physical-energy? Because one of the points of the conversion program is the question of the possibility of building a AES [nuclear power plant] on the territory of the test range. As strange as this might seem, the strongest opponent to this idea was the Ministry of Defense. It is not hard to figure out why. That portion of the specialists which currently determines the ideology of the ministry is perfectly aware that the construction of an AES would simply exclude in the future any testing and would never return them to developing a new generation of nuclear weapons at the Semipalatinsk range.

The program provides for establishing on the basis of the ill-famed Fourth Radiological Dispensary of the Semipalatinsk Medical Institute and a number of laboratories at other institutes of a radiological center for studying the effect of ionizing radiation on the public as a result of the nuclear testing. This is the main area. There would also be the development of diagnostic methods with the subsequent treatment of personnel under inpatient conditions at such a center. We discussed the idea of the center with the Nobel Prize winner, Dr Bernard Laun from the United States. He visited us during the Chernobyl tragedy. The doctor strongly supported the idea and promised to participate in its financing. I met with him on 6 January of this year at a UN conference. We returned to this discussion. He affirmed that he had not forgotten the idea. He has been involved in developing it and already has some capital for implementing the idea and is completing preparations for a similar center at Moscow. He will actually begin organizing a center in our Kazakhstan at the beginning of the next year.

[Kuts] A rather extensive program....

[Chaykovskiy] We have been rebuked for the varying scale of our proposals. Also for the fact that the program does not have an average state level. This is natural enough. We are talking about the conversion of a certain

region. For this reason, the program contains everything. There is the production...of piping for the...dairy industry, for the...wine industry. It is a fact that we make the piping for our scientific research. This is the highest quality product.

In the program there is to be the establishing of an agrofirma based on the existing sovkhoz, dairy, slaughterhouse, the equipping of them with sausage and cheese-making facilities, broadening our nitric acid production which will meet the needs of the region and this is already being done.

In the program there is the important part which discusses the social protection for the personnel related to the reduction in the amount of the work program at the range. This is a particular psychological aspect in the activities of the executive committee in a town of nuclear weapons testers, in a town working for defense. Prosperity and the well-being of the families residing in it were all the same determined by the nuclear testing. And when the gorispolkom now says that testing is not required, this is perceived by everyone in the same manner. But! In saying that the explosions are not needed, we are trying not to put ourselves in the position of the peasant who crosses himself after the thunder has been heard. For this reason we are at work on the program which I have described to you.

The last part of this program is the sovietization of the town. The turning over of power to the soviets. Power is not the person to whom I go to report. Whether I invite the general or myself go see him.... Power is money expressed in fixed capital, in resources and in executive structures. Viable soviet structures. Life itself impels this. The same general Ilyenko told me that the Ministry of Defense was not able to finance the construction of the radiological center or the communications center.... Let me request, he said, the possibility of participating on a shared basis in the construction. The same thing has been requested by the leader of the Minatomenergo-prom: financing has been reduced and I would like on a shared basis to build a milk kitchen in the town as well as a pharmacy.... Clearly, all of this should also be within the soviets. Only with normal financial support which can be obtained from the conversion.

[Kuts] An unexpected image of power—money....

[Chaykovskiy] Sooner or later, we will learn to call things by their real names. We are already doing so. That portion of life about which I have been speaking here and which requires strong intervention envisages not only ideological power but also a material expression. This (the expression) is money. There is no other one.

So there is our program. It has been discussed at the republic Council of Ministers. It was signed by Karamanov. A portion of it should be financed not from the republic budget (the same compensation) because this is a national undertaking. The republic has carried out its civil and patriotic duty having protected the nation with

its nuclear shield but, having ended up in a difficult situation, has the right to demand an adequate response from the Union.

Our program has not been viewed negatively by anyone with the exception of the Ministry of Defense. But the ministry has not offered any other program. In truth, voices have been heard from the range leadership of returning to before 1985. But it is impossible to go into the same river twice. I know that we will all the same build what we have planned. I know that it is impossible to give either a lot or a little of democracy. Democracy either is or it is not. We are replacing democracy by political manifestations of an anarchical sort. But this is not democracy. This is the inability to take advantage of that historical fact which life has presented us with.

At present, we are governing. I felt this when I was recently in Moscow. (I am often there.) When you are often at a place you may not notice the changes but...I stopped off at the Ministry of Defense where there are normal people the thinking of whom, let me put it this way, is more adapted to current times. They related that the position of the ministry is total defense, not to lose anyone, and particularly not to get into the soviets or any other democratic manifestations.

I stopped off at the television station to see my old acquaintances at Vzglyad. There was no Lysenko and hence no Mukusev, Listyev or Lyubimov.... I looked in at the editorial offices of NA SLUZHBE OTECHESTVU...there was no Irina Maslova who had photographed the American walk to the Semipalatinsk range. She had been dismissed. And so the tilt to the right. But the range is not on the moon but is on our earth.

[Kuts] You have not said anything about your work before the executive committee....

[Chaykovskiy] I was involved with reactor starting-up procedures. I was the chief production engineer. It went into operation on 7 March 1975. All my time was involved with reactor units.

[Kuts] A person grows up into a profession.... How do you feel now in purely soviet work?

[Chaykovskiy] Let me try to explain. Things are just like in engineering school.... Often engineering problems at first are unattainable. But almost always a solution is found. They search for a way out and they make instructions.... This engineering school is now helping me to live. I am not burdened down by the conventions of soviet bureaucratic work. I travel and look for allies although no one forces me to do this....

[Kuts] You simply do not know what is impossible and what is possible in soviet work....

[Chaykovskiy] Einstein answered the question of "how are discoveries made?" in the following manner. A novice in science does not know that something cannot be done and thus makes a discovery. I often travel back

to my own facility often to the detriment of other collectives. They, incidentally, zealously monitor my visits.

[Kuts] All the same, your soul has responded to the new occupation....

[Chaykovskiy] I have not become any richer in this job. My wages have dropped by 80 rubles. But this gives me the right to be, as it is now put, an independent deputy.

[Kuts] If you want to be an independent deputy, then be it....

[Chaykovskiy] Certainly so....

[Kuts] How is the life in the town of Kurchatov? Incidentally, where did the name come from?

[Chaykovskiy] At one time, they officially raised the question of this name. Then they put it off. They forgot...but the people did not forget. That is what they call it among themselves, although officially it is Semipalatinsk-21.

How are things doing there? We live the same as the rest of the nation. We are beset by the same problems. They have introduced ration coupons for 18 types of goods. But the worst thing (and I mentioned this at the beginning of our conversation) is trade as this is a monopoly military trade. We do not always have reliable information on military trade. In December and January they could not fill the meat ration. Now there are problems with even sugar and even matches. Industrial goods are also distributed by coupons. Once I met with some people from Semipalatinsk and they asked me: "Is it true that the residents of Kurchatov each day can purchase citrus fruit?" Yes, I had seen such a place I know. Only it was not in Semipalatinsk-21. It was not even in the Soviet Union. It was in America.

[Kuts] Incidentally, on the reason for your trip to America.... What were your impressions....

[Chaykovskiy] The U.S. towns which bear the burden of the defense industry have formed an association. One of the mayors, a Mr Lance, was elected its president. He invited me among other Soviet mayors the cities of which also are involved with the defense industry.

We make a distinction, the Americans told us, between the professional politicians and those elected by the people. They feel that the people elect our mayors. If professional politicians for the sake of politics can say that something is not so, we, the nonprofessionals, cannot do this. We have invited you, we were told at the meeting, to sit down opposite you, look you in the eyes and ask whether it is true that your perestroika is to be taken seriously and that society has turned toward democratization. Is it true that we are no longer your enemies? Is it true that you are seriously concerned with conversion?

We exchanged our understanding of those events which are now occurring in the nation and we told them about our conversion. I realized that this was very important for them. The problem is that the defense enterprises in the United States have an advantage: they are free of taxes. They are also free of land taxes. There the defense industry is not so advantageous for the state.

During the meeting we sought out some administrative agreements between ourselves, the mayors, and tried to predict further contacts. We agreed to continue contacts on the level of our professional people, the engineers, who could specifically investigate the opportunities for mutual financial involvement and the solving of common tasks.

They were very interested in the idea of building an AES in the range area. If this would be a large capacity AES, a portion of it could be shifted to China, where the United States would build industrial enterprises. They were ready to participate in the financing of construction, in the training of our personnel, that is, in the joint operation of the plant during the first 2 or 3 years in order to develop strict production discipline in operating such units. Although I would not say that we make poorer plants than America.

[Kuts] What about Chernobyl?

[Chaykovskiy] Chernobyl was not indicative. That was a freak....

[Kuts] Were there other proposals at the meeting with the mayors?

[Chaykovskiy] There were farming proposals.... For the joint processing of products and the participation of their production methods in our output. This was a move into the third dimension. This was not economic planes but volumes. I am very hopeful of a continuation. We have planned a similar meeting for 20 May here in Alma-Ata.

[Kuts] Will all the U.S. mayors be here?

[Chaykovskiy] Yes.

[Kuts] It is strange that the initiative has been taken by a militaristic power. At least, all our lives we have been fed precisely such an image of the United States.

[Chaykovskiy] Militaristic? I was in the States before 15 January, that is, before the beginning of the war in Kuwait. I spoke with the wife of a mayor from the state of New Jersey. She broke into tears as they had a draft-age son.... I saw a mass of various antiwar demonstrations. And the mayor during the day, in addition to his main duties, was able to participate in several such demonstrations.

[Kuts] Yevgeniy Vladimirovich, you have seen a different organization of society. Involuntarily, certainly, you made comparisons. After the comparison was there

not disappointment and uncertainty that in your mind everything would turn out alright in society?

[Chaykovskiy] I would put it this way: if we do not do anything, there will not be anything. But if each of us initiates something then we will change ourselves.

[Kuts] In order to change yourself, you must not change yourself....

[Chaykovskiy] America certainly is no complete paradise. In the Russian area of New York, to the question "You are from where?" and the reply "Just two days from the Union," tears poured out of the eyes of the questioners. Of course, this is a well organized and truly democratic society. It is a society of many parties. And if one of them comes to power, the first thing it endeavors to do is not to rejoice over the power but rather to immediately pass laws directed at equalizing life so that these laws "are not left" to their rival if it should replace them.

[Kuts] An unique competition between parties in the service of the people?

[Chaykovskiy] In order to remain in power you have to think about the people. To think and do everything possible for them.

[Kuts] In this regard, how are things in your city soviet? Are there like thinkers under its roof?

[Chaykovskiy] Not completely. We differ somewhat in our desires with the chairman of the city soviet, Nikolay Fedorovich Yelnikov. We had the same program up to a certain point and then he shifted toward the military. Although, as before, I respect him, there is no unanimity of thought between us. On 14 March, there is to be a session to bring the soviet structures into conformity with the law. The positions of the chairman of the soviet and the chairman of the executive committee will be reduced to one. And let us remember that of the 45 deputies a majority is military.

[Kuts] And with whom you have been fighting all year....

[Chaykovskiy] They trust me as I will work. If it doesn't come about, well then.... What we have planted, I believe, all the same will mature.

[Kuts] But why, if you are doing a good thing, should you not be given the opportunity to carry it farther?

[Chaykovskiy] Here our democracy differs from the American.... We are carrying out our cause from common humanitarian and common civil positions.... But there are also other positions.... There are more of these. And at times they are stronger.

[Kuts] Far from all our society has reached these positions. We are still very far from them. For this reason is it not so difficult for you to realize your aspirations on a common humanitarian, common civil basis....

[Chaykovskiy] If such positions are not instilled, they will never come about by themselves. At times, I envy the priest. A person leaves him with a dream about paradise. Paradise on earth is also demanded of me. Right now. Today. Immediately. I must not only tell him something but also do it. Consolation is not a question for the executive committee. This is for the church. We must work.

[Kuts] On what are you working directly now, at present?

[Chaykovskiy] Quite recently, we requested permission to exploit the coal deposits in the region of the range. It is a good deposit. With excellent reserves and high-quality coal. The quality is of interest in that it can be used in the complete processing of the raw material. Beginning with liquid fuel and a whole range of all sorts of products....

[Kuts] Unusual coal....

[Chaykovskiy] Unusual. It is even a sin to burn. There is a negligible ash content. There is high calorific value. So now we are preparing a draft republic decision on this coal. This has also been envisaged in implementing the program for the region.

[Kuts] Incidentally, do the simple people know about your program?

[Chaykovskiy] Far from all do. That is our fault. But it is not a fatal fault. They will learn. We will tell them....

[Kuts] Did you fly to Alma-Ata because of the coal?

[Chaykovskiy] Yes, because of it. In truth, not everything has turned out as we would like. We would have liked the exploitation of the deposit to be carried out in two directions: coal as an energy fuel and also the complete processing the products of which could become the property of the town of Kurchatov. This would be a permanent item (income!) in our budget. We need it greatly! All the changes proposed by us require financing.

[Kuts] Complete processing could also become a foreign exchange item.

[Chaykovskiy] Of course. If we talk about converting the range into a center of science and culture, then there must be a rich "patron" for such a center. At present, this is not the case. Only because the Semipalatinsk Oblispolkom feels for now that it has the economic right to give us so much and not to give us so much. The "reapportioning" of the range is psychologically more difficult than it is materially so. This is the oblispolkom psychology....

[Kuts] Will your program be aided by the new political position which has been assumed by the President and which the republic will follow?

[Chaykovskiy] Undoubtedly so. It merely remains to assemble everything pertinent and report our program to Nazarbayev. In a final version. At our first meeting with

the President this was presented in general outlines. At that time, he not only agreed with the reorientation of the range but also made his own proposals. And he spoke about reorientation in his recent interview over Central Television.

It is hard to humanize a test range. It is hard to turn it from a source of pollution into a source of human good. But we will do this. We are already doing it.

[Kuts] ...He flew off on a morning flight. The aircraft in its 90 minutes of flight, like a bookmark falling from a book, dropped out of the clouds over its home airport and the already read page of fate is linked with the new, just begun page. And in the meanwhile, the dweller of the skies, its entire body shaking from the effort, has carried him from the terrestrial gloom into the celestial day.

...Every time, in being in this space above the world and looking down at the earth from it, he feels how foolhardy is man in his desire to understand, to change the world, how great he is and how weak.

But like this aircraft, it is essential to break out from the low-lying gloom to the high light.

Chaykovskiy on Plans for Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site

91US0446A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 91
Union Edition p 3

[Interview with Yevgeniy Chaykovskiy, mayor of Kurchatov, by IZVESTIYA special correspondent A. Illesh: "'Chain Reaction' at the Nuclear Test Facility—When Conversion Problems are Aggravated by the Military Itself"; place and date not given; first three paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Kurchatov-Moscow—It was a strange morning. Our vehicle sped into Semipalatinsk from out of nowhere along an ideal, straight highway just like an airport runway. The flat surrounding steppe was powdered with snow. Ahead one could already make out the smoke of the oblast center, and behind—the City of Kurchatov, just yesterday a secret city that did not even exist on the maps. Also known as Semipalatinsk-21. Also known as the end-of-the-line railroad station with the symbolic name "End of the Road"...

So extremely strange—the matching proximity of super secret, underground, entirely unique reactors, which today often stand idle but are capable when loaded not only of resolving complicated nuclear energy problems, but of bringing in currency as well (foreign-requisitioned research may be conducted here), and flocks of sheep and herds of horses grazing not far from the barbed wire—something out of the cattle-breeding past of the local steppe... Rusted rails thrust deep into tunnel shafts where explosions recently rang out, and a dispirited queue waiting for ordinary pastry... The test facility. A world turned inside out, in which the same conditions are not set up for the specialists from nuclear "factories"

creating weapons of the 21st century and the indigenous population, suddenly discovering that these very weapons were tested not just on their land, but at the expense of their well-being as well...

We discuss the fate of the city, and the problems of the test facility and the highly qualified specialists living there, with Kurchatov Mayor Yevgeniy Chaykovskiy.

[Illesh] First of all—how do you manage to be working there, an engineer, a civilian, in a zone which is under the complete influence of the military?

[Chaykovskiy] Indeed, it used to be that the ispolkom [executive committee] here, in a zone closed to outsiders, had neither power nor authority. There was a party gorkom [city committee]. As for the soviets, they were like a "subsection" of the gorkom. Today we have two mutually exclusive authorities, soviet power and military power. One is a command authority, the other a democratic one. The relations we have developed with the military are complex. There is a mass of problems... I am convinced that at all levels we must pose the question of sovietization of the test facility, or else the city, its offspring, will simply perish. And it will not perish all that quietly: the tragedies faced by people here may resound in an unforeseen echo.

[Illesh] Living for decades in a state of well-being behind the barbed wire, under the wing of the all-powerful USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building, how have you now come to find yourself on the edge of bankruptcy, in the circle of social, and even ethnic problems? Isn't your "master" still rich and all-powerful?

[Chaykovskiy] It is not quite that way. In order to understand the situation today, we must take an excursion into history. First of all, the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons testing, I am convinced, is the privilege of a state with a highly organized and stable economic and political structure. Presently we have neither. With a more than sufficient arsenal for containment at our disposal, we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into an interminable, exhaustive race around the circle of nuclear rearmament.

Reorientation of the nuclear industry is a tremendous problem. This is the destiny of several hundred thousand people. Distorted development of the economy and defense branches of industry have brought the situation to an impasse. The bomb has been developed and perfected, the nature of testing has changed, the population has increased in areas adjacent to the test facility... Everything has changed! The only thing which hasn't changed is the narrow departmental approaches to relations with the surrounding world.

[Illesh] For 22 years, from 1949 through 1962, there were air and ground nuclear bursts. The damage inflicted on people's health and to the ecology of the region has been vast, as I understand it. What is the situation today?

[Chaykovskiy] Indeed, the region was always considered a zone of economic risk. Development of industry, of the villages, was restrained... But life goes on. The population grew. Grew and became poor. There was no compensation for people's health, weakened under the influence of the effects of nuclear on-site testing, no balanced or specially developed nutrition regimen. To this day no special treatment facility has been built—not in Semipalatinsk, nor Pavlodar, nor Karaganda. One unhealthy generation has given birth to another. And that, to a third. It's like a snowball! There exists today an entire people requiring special charitable attention. A people that became hostage to the nuclear parity which terminated in a "victorious conclusion."

[Illesh] As a result, the facility, as a site of nuclear testing, will not be accepted either by the republic or the local population. What is the position of the soviets?

[Chaykovskiy] The new soviet of people's deputies formed in January of last year is compelled to seek another future for the test facility—after all, it has long ceased to be a simple "field" where holes are bored for weapons testing. Over 40 years of existence it has grown into a developed scientific research complex, including a facility of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, with well equipped laboratories, highly qualified scientific and production personnel, and the original functioning reactors...

And now the ispolkom and prominent specialists have charted the main avenues for accomplishing conversion of these enterprises. We have proposed a reorientation of the facility's activity—to convert it to a science and technology center for research in the sphere of atomic energy, basic and applied nuclear physics, and the utilization of nuclear technology in the peace-oriented sectors of the economy. Based on the test facility's research laboratories, a university would be established with orientation on physics and power engineering. We have proposed the development of a substantiation for building a nuclear power station here (an idea which has found support, I would add—60 percent of those polled in a population survey advocated construction of a nuclear power facility)... We would begin the extraction and processing of coal, deposits which are located on the territory of the test facility, and would exploit the production of crushed granite...form a modern agricultural firm...

[Illesh] An agricultural firm?! Aren't you forgetting about the specific terrain we have here, and an ecology which has suffered great damage from explosions?

[Chaykovskiy] No. This too has been taken into account. Furthermore, we intend to study the possibility of using the holes and tunnel shafts bored by the military as burial sites for radioactive waste. And the main thing is to build a center based on the Semipalatinsk medical institute, the test facility's radiological laboratories, and the health clinic here, for studying the effects of nuclear testing and developing a methodology for treatment. I

talked over all the aspects of such a center with Nobel Prize laureate Bernard Laun (who ardently supported it!). We met with him recently at a United Nations conference, and the scientist confirmed his participation in financing such a center and providing instrumentation and equipment.

[Illesh] What is the final concept for transformation of the test facility?

[Chaykovskiy] To put it briefly—to humanize the facility, build a scientific and cultural center here. And it would be a contemporary, civilized center which in the final analysis would work for the benefit of peoples in the region.

[Illesh] Where's the snag? You are continually saying "We would like," "We intend"...

[Chaykovskiy] From the very outset, the military command structure of the test facility and its leadership in the USSR Ministry of Defense expressed firm opposition to our ideas. Using the adverse psychological and economic situation at Semipalatinsk-21 to its advantage—a city of test personnel whose families' well-being depends on the conduct of the tests themselves—test facility command personnel are encouraging people to oppose any new ideas. The generals state that conversion of the facility will bring unemployment to the military and civilian specialists. But they hide the fact that the proposed peace-oriented production and implementation of parallel defense programs (without nuclear weapons explosions) will not just entail reductions, but will require an additional contingent of specialists as well. A serious and competent conversion will enable Kurchatov itself to be extricated from its status as a "temporary military settlement," with its weakly developed social and community services, inadequate schools and child care facilities, primitive medical care, and wretched housing—and to be transformed into a full-fledged city.

[Illesh] Tell us briefly what Semipalatinsk-21 is today.

[Chaykovskiy] It is a city ruled by a military command leadership. Basic support—trade, the state portion of the services sphere, construction—are relegated to the military. However, let me repeat that two-thirds of the population are civilians, and they come to the ispolkom for solutions to their worldly problems. The times of no shortages, times of all-powerful departments of the defense establishment—are gone and will not return. We have introduced coupons for 16 varieties of food products. Commercial goods have long since switched over to coupons. Stocks are such that to buy a pair of ladies boots, a city resident must wait nine years; to get a sewing machine—a hundred or so (!)... Using the discontent of city residents to their advantage, the military can easily transfer responsibility for their own insolvency to the ispolkom. Here we see all assets used. Consider this—of 45 deputies in the soviet, 26 are military. Therefore you can even "change" chairmen every session...

[Illesh] Perhaps the military has its own ideas for the future which would enable the city and professionals living there to be saved?

[Chaykovskiy] Alas, the military command does not have a program of its own. That is, of course, if you disregard the calls for a return to "the good old days." Those in charge of the test facility and their leadership are proposing unpopular—to put it mildly—measures: to continue testing until 1993. Moreover, they are demanding that this decision be taken by the president of the country, thereby (consciously or not) driving a wedge between the center and the republic...

[Illesh] All the same, the main question again is—how long will the test facility remain inactive?

[Chaykovskiy] An extremely sore subject. The Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on banning nuclear weapons testing. And I believe the test facility has gone silent for good. But there is another aspect. Cessation of the testing and development of new generation nuclear weapons is the final goal. But there are two ways of resolving this: the "classical" way, using state diplomacy; and the people's diplomacy, a categorical one—stop the testing today! Classical diplomacy has its own laws, the system of inter-state negotiations. And the chief factor in negotiations for a general and total ban on nuclear weapons is the presence of reliable national means of monitoring tests that are conducted. The development of such means has been underway for some time. Specialists from the United States arrived two years ago for the first time at the Semipalatinsk facility with this aim. We did the same thing in Nevada. To complete this extremely important work, two additional nuclear experiments must be conducted here at the testing facility. These experiments are not tests. Tests presuppose a check of either new systems, or old systems taken out of storage. Here we are talking about something different. And these two experiments will involve the use of devices manufactured using well-established technologies and rigidly defined yields—20 kilotons.

[Illesh] A paradox develops—two new explosions are necessary to see to it that there are absolutely no more explosions on this earth?

[Chaykovskiy] Right. These experiments will be conducted under international control (if they are conducted at all) and in the presence of observers from the community. These efforts do not involve any technical or medical problems. But there is a sociopolitical problem—in developing nuclear weapons, the republic fulfilled its duty to the country at the price of tremendous damage and deprivation. Today people are justly posing the question of compensation payments for the purpose of organizing a normal life...

[Illesh] What do you specifically have in mind when you speak of compensation?

[Chaykovskiy] The test facility is situated in the territory of three oblasts—Pavlodar, Karaganda, and Semipalatinsk. All three are demanding compensation. Karaganda miners are talking about this as well. We have in mind the payment of 1,500 rubles [R] to every person in the territory of the three oblasts born prior to the last explosion. All told this amounts to R3 billion. It has been suggested that these payments be made over the course of three years. And the eternal question—where will we get the money? But this question never arises when funds must be found for conducting test explosions! And so this is the first, one-time, form of compensation intended for residents of the three oblasts.

Compensation to the residents of rayons immediately adjacent to the test facility should be in the form of continuous monthly payments to each worker and retired individual (not exceeding R300). In addition to monetary payments, the program envisages accelerated development of rayons surrounding the test facility. No one has put money into these rayons, including the Ministry of Defense. But people are born there, live there—all under inhumane conditions! We must begin to implement these measures without delay. In short, the problems of the test facility are emergency problems. And therefore I am convinced they must be reflected in the emergency budget. If the state does not voluntarily move toward compromise, it may witness an explosion—and this time it will be one of people.

[Illesh] How does the military relate to these plans?

[Chaykovskiy] They see them negatively. The military-industrial complex leadership believes that payments should be made only for the explosions themselves—if there was an explosion today, all right, we pay you... And then we wait until the next one... Fifteen, twenty years ago, such a practice might have been possible. But not today. Certainly there is also an understanding in the military—especially among those not burdened with large gold stars on their epaulets, that the situation is complicated and that now we need new approaches in resolving chronic problems.

The aim of the final explosions is a noble one. It is the path toward achieving a general ban on nuclear testing. Twenty-kiloton bursts will not add any additional harm to the tremendous damage which has already been inflicted. But I say again—it will only be possible to convince people of the need to endure the final nuclear experiments if compensation is awarded (guaranteed!) for damages received over 40 years of testing—to these people and this land.

Krasnoyarsk Radar Destruction Criticized on Economic Grounds

91WC0119A

[Editorial report] Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian publishes in its 11 June 1991 issue on page 2 a 400-word article by its own correspondent V. Nelyubin entitled "While the Radars Are On, Children

Sleep More Peacefully." Nelyubin discusses the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar station—to comply with the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty—and notes the cost of both constructing and then dismantling it. He criticizes the military authorities, first for launching such an expensive construction project while keeping it secret from the Soviet public, and then for being wasteful in the process of dismantling it. Nelyubin cites a figure, from the Soviet press, of 120 million rubles to construct the station, which he says is probably understated; as to "how many millions" will be spent on the dismantling, he says it is too early to tell. He goes on to assert that "housing, production buildings, communications installations and a large part of [the radar station's] equipment, judging by everything, is simply being thrown away." He asserts that local inhabitants are stealing such items from the site as "construction materials, spare parts for vehicles and tractors, and pieces of sheet metal." However, he says that since the materials in question are at least being put to use, the thefts may be preferable to the military's preferred procedure of "burying, burning, or dumping [dismantled materials] in the forest."

Nelyubin concludes by accusing the military of habitually being "a dog in the manger" in regard to deactivated military facilities, preferring to see such facilities fall into disrepair rather than be put to use in the civilian economy. However, whereas in other instances the military's attitude has cost the national economy "thousands," in the case of the Krasnoyarsk radar, "the losses are in millions."

Defense Conversion Conference Held

91UN1879B Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 11 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by I. Pogorelova under the rubric "Of Topical Interest": "Conversion, or on the Taste of Shark Meat"]

[Text] "Those who call Western industrialists 'sharks of capitalism' should remember that statistically people eat many more sharks than sharks eat people. By the way, shark meat is considered tasty and nutritious." This was a joke told by Nicholas Jaquer, representative of the UN Center for Transnational Corporations, at the conference on free economic zones in Kiev.

The same day was the final day of a joint session of the USSR and EEC commissions, which discussed the possibility of speeding up the lifting of quantitative restrictions on the trade with the Soviet Union, Western technical help for some areas of development of the Soviet industry, and credits for purchases of agricultural products.

Then, two days later, a first international conference "Conversion-91" took place in Kiev; among its participants were directors of largest military-industrial complex enterprises located in the Ukraine, and guests from the United States, Great Britain, and Canada—formerly prominent industrialists and currently theoreticians in the

area of conversion. The scientific coordinator of the conference was Harvard University Professor William Hogan, one of the authors of the program of economic reform in the Ukraine.

...By the end of the third day of the conference, the Americans had a hard time keeping their traditional "smile" on. They got tired. It is not that their fantastic ability to work hard had run into a stone wall—it simply sort of got stuck in the strange atmosphere of, on one hand, heightened attentiveness, and on the other, a seemingly slow motion reaction of the conference's Soviet participants.

The defense industry captains—whose personae had been highly classified until recently and who appeared for the first time all together (although not all invitees showed up) at such a public gathering—seemed to be mostly prepared to disrupt the perfidious plans of Western "spies." Although their presentations contained quite a lot information—well known in the West but almost unknown to their compatriots—on the products produced by their enterprises, the structure of production, financial relations, and labor resources, they all seemed to be struggling to keep some kind of a secret. Quite possibly, it was a true commercial secret, on which their future success on the domestic and international markets could be based. An outside observer, not very well versed in specific VPK [military-industrial complex] problems, could have developed this impression, though: Here is a very human but deeply hidden dream of a truly talented manager to be not a hired administrator, but a full owner of huge industrial complexes, large creative teams, high technology, and high quality goods. However, apparently far from certain that a real market can be created in our collapsing economy, far from being convinced in the permanence of the "defensive sufficiency" principle in our leaders' policies, and tormented by the war of laws and by the uncertainty in regard to tomorrow's jurisdiction and, accordingly, their future financing sources—these people did their best not to make their dream obvious.

They did their best—but still, they betrayed themselves by following the lead of "perfidious" Western teachers, who got them involved in a business game where each director played the role of exactly this kind of independent industrialist. First, of course, it was the teachers turn to sweat while they were explaining to the players elementary rules of market competition. Neither was it accidental that for some reason the game itself, despite its foreign origins, time and again turned out to be very realistic in Soviet terms: the "government" (which, by the way, was played only by foreigners) would not fulfill its obligations; or "buyers" on the market would line up to the "producer," although it should be the other way around... Still, even such an imitation lit up with a completely different—venturesome, young, cheerful—light the faces of our directors, who only yesterday looked concentrated, tense, and tired. By the way, perhaps it was this psychological reconnaissance, which showed that even the people who are far removed from the real market, who are simply state

hirelings, can still get their bearings quickly and become worthy competitors, despite objective difficulties—perhaps, this also reduced the degree of smile of our nice colleagues from the West.

Anyway, for now the real cooperation of the parties did not go beyond the game. The entire course of other sessions at the conference only highlighted more vividly the depth of the abyss that divides even the problems faced by the VPK's of former political and strategic opponents. Only those who arm themselves do it in a similar way; those who disarm do it each in their own way.

It does not matter how much wonderful, wise, practical advice we get from people who themselves implemented conversion after World War II, in the 1960's, such as K. Abt and F. Lindsay; it does not matter how many times former politicians—Sh. Williams and M. Brown—repeat that a peaceful road of development for the humanity is irreversible, and for that we need to create a certain common world architecture on the basis of the market and mutual political openness and predictability; or how unbeatable was the iron logic of scientists V. Hogan and D. Twigg—our internal problems remain stronger than that.

It is not over—the harsh political struggle between those who guarantee the VPK a problem-free and trouble-free (in our sense, of course) existence forever, and those who want to finally open these “strategic reserves,” created over decades, in order to meet the current needs of the people.

It is good to know that the conference organizers—the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, the commissions on economic reform, basic industries, and others, and the Cabinet of Ministers represented by V.I. Antonov—are on the side of the latter. In the situation where social tension becomes more dangerous than a military threat, the VPK not only has an obligation, it has an objective interest in the diversification (changing the product line), commercialization, and—albeit not any time soon—privatization and demonopolization. Having in front of them a practically boundless and bottomless domestic market, enterprises specifically risk going bankrupt if they return to the old track. To go bankrupt themselves and to bankrupt our entire economy, because state subsidies for them will lead to a hyperinflation.

I must confess that the position of most directors in this respect was of a wait-and-see kind. First figure it out with the center as to who will finance us (the center would be better), and if it is the Ukraine, then create an appropriate legal base. In short, do not teach us how to live—rather, give us material help. The same, by the way, goes to our foreign friends—they are quick with advice, but what about money... Of course they have an interest in us creating a market here, or, even more importantly, infrastructure (this is exactly what our technologies are good for). Then they will overwhelm our citizens with their goods (as happened with computers), which will bring all of our industry branches to an end.

Of course, nobody delivered this monologue, but the meaning of many presentations was precisely this. Can we really blame these soberly thinking directors who already

have insulting nicknames—such as “dinosaurs”—tacked on them? “We are not ‘dinosaurs,’” said Ya.L. Avgustinov, general director of a microelectronic scientific-industrial complex and chairman of the Ukraine Association, after the conference. “We are hired employees, on whose shoulders are huge workers collectives doomed to unemployment, and behind whose backs are the production of up to 70 percent of goods that are today shamelessly taken abroad and sold for peanuts.”

Yes, our “dinosaurs” do not brag about the taste and nutritiousness of their meat, and they are absolutely right. And no “shark” can accuse them of being attached to the center as a source of financing and the subject of good management. It is the government of the republic that has to make it a priority to change its thinking, to create a literate conversion program and a truly clearly defined legal basis to get the “dinosaurs” interested.

Alas, it is the same Ukrainian Government that still does not dare to say its competent—not a declarative one as it did at the conference—word. A jurisdiction over the republic's industry has become a reality, but it is still far from being a property right.

All the while unpredictability persists, and this is what Western partners are afraid of most. That is why Shirley Williams, formerly a minister in the British Government, was so firm in her assertion that realistic steps on the part of the West are only possible after constitutional changes are made in our legislation. And although she, while trying to avoid in her statements an appearance of interfering into domestic affairs, still mentioned that she was not certain whether it was correct to call this big country a Soviet Union today, she was not giving any advice to our politicians. Except for one simple and universally known recommendation—one should not waste time on the road to a market. Conversion is that space and time of a market being born...

...At one point during the game Soviet participants came up with a question: If the government does not fulfill undertaken obligations, what can and should an entrepreneur do? The answer was: Complain to the press.

Our letters to the editors bring a lot of complaints from cooperative businesses. When it comes to the absence of a conversion program and nonsensical legislation, however, directors of defense giants choose to complain to their foreign friends-competitors instead of going to their own press. We are waiting for your complaints, dear “dinosaurs!” We are waiting for a market...

P.S. To conduct a more substantive conversation on cooperation in the area of civilian production (60 percent of the Soviet VPK), our managers will probably be able to meet with representatives of the Committee for U.S. Economic Development and the National Association of American Industrialists, which are already interested in the subject. The organizers of the current conference—Kiev-Reforma and Demokratizatsiya Ukrainy Funds—will render assistance in such meetings.

Space Units Functions Described

91P50237A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*

VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 91
p 89

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Press-Courier—In One Paragraph": "What Do the Space Units Do?"]

[Text] Answering this question, the weekly GLASNOST (No 8) writes that they develop and perfect rocket and space technology, carry out launches and direct in orbit practically all satellites, interplanetary stations and spaceships. In the opinion of specialists, the unique qualities of contemporary space travel make it possible to raise the combat capabilities of our troops by from 1.5 to 2 times over. Unquestionably,

in the first place this includes operational evaluation of the situation in the world and timely warning of a possible nuclear-missile attack; it also includes reliable global communications with and control of troops, as well as navigational and meteorological services. No less important are the tasks carried out by the Space Units in the interests of the national economy. Space-borne communications make it possible to save more than 700 million rubles every year. The effectiveness of satellite-assisted ecological and meteorological studies is as much as 850 million rubles a year, and that of long-range sensing of the Earth's surface to reveal natural resources is more than 800 million rubles.

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Chief of GRU on Responsibilities, Relations with KGB

91UM0515A Moscow SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 22 Feb 91 p 2

[Abridged translation by Aleksey Vasilivetskiy, IMA-press, of interview with GRU chief, Colonel General Vladlen Mikhaylov, from the British journal JANE'S SOVIET INTELLIGENCE REVIEW: "The Country's Chief Intelligence Officer"]

[Text] The Soviet people learned not long ago that military intelligence exists in the USSR—the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. However, the name of the chief of the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate], Colonel General Vladlen Mikhaylovich MIKHAYLOV, does not mean anything to anyone in the Union, except for employees of the "organs." Meanwhile, it is very well known in the West. This is indicated, in particular, by the interview given by Mikhaylov to the British journal JANE'S SOVIET INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, an abridged translation of which is presented below.

[JANE'S] Please tell us about yourself.

[Mikhaylov] I am a military professional. I was born in 1925 in Smolensk Oblast into a peasant family. I went into the army in 1942 and became an officer in 1944 after graduating from an officer school in Vladivostok. I served for a long time afterwards in the Far East. This region is somehow dear to my heart. I completed the Frunze Military Academy in 1954. I commanded a division, and for some time I was chief of staff of the Turkestan Military District.

[JANE'S] Then how did you, the commander of a large motorized rifle unit, end up as the chief of military intelligence?

[Mikhaylov] A decision was made in 1987 to reinforce the GRU with workers who have gone through field training. I never worked in intelligence before and naturally I had difficulty at first in coping with my duties, but now I feel at home.

[JANE'S] How do the functions of your directorate and the analogous KGB directorate differ?

[Mikhaylov] Comrade Kryuchkov has talked about the tasks the KGB works on in his speech at a session of the Supreme Soviet when he was being confirmed for the position. As for the GRU, we are responsible solely for military intelligence. We are engaged in radio intercept, electronic, and air intelligence. The GRU has appropriate military subunits for this. Moreover, I have "special purpose" units under me—spetsnaz (similar troops under different names exist in the armies of Western countries—the United States, Great Britain, and Germany). They must conduct reconnaissance at the front in the event combat operations are initiated. We prepare them for war which, however, we hope will never come.

[JANE'S] The GRU today and 20 years ago—is there a difference?

[Mikhaylov] Unquestionably. Soviet military doctrine has turned from an offensive one to a defensive one, which could not help but have an effect on intelligence as well. Our main task today is to warn the Ministry of Defense and the leadership of the country of possible or imminent military aggression against the USSR.

[JANE'S] Is the GRU able to process all of the information it receives?

[Mikhaylov] This is a complicated problem. The information flow is increasing with each year, and we are trying to process the information efficiently, involving a minimum number of people for this.

[JANE'S] Is conversion threatening the Intelligence Directorate?

[Mikhaylov] Up to the present time, GRU staffs have not been cut. And I am personally convinced that it would be inadvisable to economize on intelligence in the near future.

[JANE'S] How frequently do you report information to the chief of the General Staff?

[Mikhaylov] A three-four page summary under my signature is placed on his desk every day. If it is required, I give additional explanations.

[JANE'S] The KGB protects military secrets in the army on the whole. Does this mean that your directorate of the General Staff is also controlled by this department?

[Mikhaylov] There are no employees of the Committee in the GRU, this I guarantee you. We check our own people, no matter where they are, and we take care of our own security ourselves.

[JANE'S] But is it true that the confirmation of the GRU chief occurs only with the approval of the KGB?

[Mikhaylov] At that time, when I became head of intelligence, Marshal Akhromeyev was the chief of the General Staff, and Marshal Sokolov was the minister of defense. It was they who recommended me for this post. The Committee had absolutely nothing to do with this. I became acquainted with Comrade Kryuchkov only after my appointment—we did not meet one time before that.

[JANE'S] A story is making the rounds in the West that one of the Intelligence Directorate workers, a certain Popov, who passed secret information to foreign intelligence, was burned alive in a crematorium after being exposed. The execution allegedly was recorded on movie film and shown to junior KGB officers—for their edification. To what extent does this correspond to reality?

[Mikhaylov] I personally am not familiar with the name you gave. I have been here since 1987, and it goes without saying that no such film has been shown during

my time. And it is doubtful in general that such a film was made at any time and shown to employees of the directorate.

[JANE'S] Even in the atmosphere of the '50's and '60's?

[Mikhaylov] I am convinced that even if such a film were made, which is highly unlikely, it would not make the slightest sense to show it. Our officers know well: In the event of treason, according to Soviet law, severe punishment awaits them, as happened, for example, with Penkovskiy, who was shot in accordance with a sentence of the court.

[JANE'S] Do you not think that glasnost has gone too far?

[Mikhaylov] Well, glasnost has spread far, especially in the last two years—perhaps, even too far. The people are not pleased with all aspects of our life. They very much like to criticize the army. But name me an army where it is impossible to find shortcomings?

[JANE'S] Which Western intelligence do you consider to be the best?

[Mikhaylov] The most proficient and experienced are the English; however, the Americans have the largest and best-equipped intelligence service.

[JANE'S] Where do you live in Moscow?

[Mikhaylov] In Sivtsev Vrazhek Lane, a walk of several minutes from the Arbat.

[JANE'S] Do you have a hobby?

[Mikhaylov] Speaking frankly, I am content when I am able to get out in the woods for an hour or so.

Maj Gen Sanin on Political Work in Ukraine

91UM0564A Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
20 Mar 91 p 4

[Interview with Major-General V.N. Sanin, People's Deputy of the Ukrainian SSR, Chief of the Military-Political Section of the USSR MVD internal troops for the Ukrainian SSR and the Moldovan SSR, by V. Korkodym, *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* correspondent. Place and date not given: "Perestroyka Among the Troops: 'Tell Us, Comrade General...' Military-Political Organs Replace Political Sections."]

[Text] The decree of the President of the USSR on reforms of the political organs of the Armed Forces, KGB troops, and internal and railway troops has generated a great interest not only among military people. Fathers and mothers of future soldiers, as well as the inductees themselves, have a great concern about the changes that will occur in the army in the course of military reform and how many obstacles will have to be overcome. Our correspondent asked Major-General V.N. Sanin, People's Deputy of the Ukrainian SSR and Chief of the Military-Political

Section of the USSR MVD internal troops for the Ukrainian SSR and the Moldovan SSR, to tell us about this matter.

[Korkodym] Vasilii Nikiforovich, I would first like to establish the main point: What engendered the restructuring [perestroyka] of party-political work in the army?

[Sanin] Naturally, it was engendered by the process of democratization going on in our country. In this process the resolution passed by the XXVIII CPSU Congress, "On the Basic Directions of the Party's Present-Day Military Policy," played an important role. In the myriad tasks on adopting broad military reforms, the party forum proposed the adoption of a radical restructuring of the organization and the system of party-political organs in all component units of the military establishment of the Soviet state. This initiative of the CPSU received its legislative backing in the Decree of the President of the USSR. In accordance with this decree, the functions of political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations have been defined more precisely.

[Korkodym] What, then, is the essence of the concept of reform of these political organs?

[Sanin] The essence is that these organizations have been reoriented from being organs of the Communist Party to being constitutional-state organs. Consequently, their functions have also been better defined: The first priority is training the servicemen and providing social protection for them and members of their families.

The activities of the military-political organ of our forces are based on official state policy in the area of defense, provisions of the Constitution of the USSR, decrees of the country's President, laws and decisions made by the Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Security Council of our country, the orders and directives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the commander-in-chief, and the chief of the military-political directorate. A statute on military-political organs has now been developed.

[Korkodym] A brief announcement on television and in the press stated that political sections will be abolished altogether in operational units of motorized infantry...

[Sanin] That is the way it will be because, for example, there are no political sections in Soviet Army regiments. Instead of a chief of a regimental political section, we are introducing the position of deputy commander for military-political work. He will, of course, have responsibility for both the political attitude and morale of personnel, and their readiness to fulfill their military duties.

[Korkodym] Will there be a decrease in the number of political workers in the armed forces?

[Sanin] I am not sure. I think their numbers are based on realistic needs. But, of course, once the political organs are taken out of the party structure, the people who are

engaged in organizational-party work will no longer be there. This work will then be the prerogative of the Party Committee, which will function independently of the party organ. It was elected at the March 1st party conference of our troops.

[Korkodym] Specifically, then, what will the officials of military-political organs be doing?

[Sanin] I want to emphasize once again that I believe our main task is to train servicemen. Fellows come into the army when they are 18 years old, and they are all different. How much time will be needed to make a real soldier out of a recruit, train him, make him physically and morally strong, and make him ready to defend his Fatherland! I believe that regiment deputy commanders for military-political work should first and foremost become real teachers and educators who are needed not only in educational institutions, but in the army as well, so that the soldier can receive not only a political, but a moral and legal education.

And to achieve this, all of us have to make the educational process a real learning adjustment. That is, we must concern ourselves with analyzing and forecasting the socio-psychological processes now going on in military collectives. It is also necessary to reexamine the direction of our information-propaganda activities, and we have to be more active in studying and forming public opinion and the consciousness of servicemen. And can the new organs omit strengthening military discipline and law and order?

It is now clear that a variety of socio-political organizations can spring up among the troops. So I would see the role of a military-political section as one of coordinating their efforts and fostering cooperation in implementing the military and law-protecting policies of the state.

[Korkodym] To do this, wouldn't you also have to change the organizational structure for military-political work?

[Sanin] This organizational structure has been radically changed. It closely unites the direction of ideological, organizational-political, socio-legal, and information activities of each such organ. The principal point I see is that political organs are not organizationally subordinate to party authority, but to the state, and are established by the ministry of internal affairs. With regard to party committees, we shall foster business-like cooperation with them within the entire structure of internal troops.

[Korkodym] What is the timetable for the reorganization?

[Sanin] This will be the year for transferring the political directorate of the troops and all political organs to the new organizational structure and staffs. And after that they will begin participating in the program of reforms for the country's internal troops.

[Korkodym] Tell me, Vasilii Nikiforovich, how much is it going to cost to support the political organs?

[Sanin] I cannot give you an exact figure right now, but I can say that political officers, same as all officers, fulfill the tasks of combat duty. Moreover, their work in educating and training personnel cannot be considered superfluous. It is simply that it is difficult to measure it in terms of rubles. And the political worker will be the representative of the state in the future as well, and will carry out its policies. With regard to party workers among the troops, it has been decided that they will receive their duty pay from the dues paid by communists.

[Korkodym] What are the principles on which the restructuring of party work among the troops is based?

[Sanin] In all elements, from the primary party organization to the troop committee, elected party organs were created in January-February with appropriate rights and obligations analogous to district, city, and oblast committees, but with consideration of army requirements. I think that it is important for primary party organizations to be strengthened and that workers who have been freed from duties be kept in place. But with regard to higher organizational units, there does not seem to be a need for creating organizationally large party committees.

[Korkodym] What kind of conditions are there for party organizations working among the troops and what is needed for them to do their work successfully?

[Sanin] Party organizations among the troops are established by the CPSU in the interest of guaranteeing the party's influence on the lives of the troops. This means that through political means they win the right to leadership in military collectives. Their tasks and types of activities have to be attractive: Party organizations have to learn to create an atmosphere of comradeship in their midst and know how to defend communists, servicemen, and members of their families.

[Korkodym] What is new, Vasilii Nikiforovich, in the activities of Komsomol organizations among the troops?

[Sanin] There is much that is new here, too. First of all, the independence of Komsomol organizations. They no longer function within political sections, as was the case before. They have elected their own council and exist on their own resources. Difficulties will come up in this regard, because there is not enough money from dues to support even a small number of surplus workers. Thus, the Komsomol activists have something to think about in order to find a way out of this situation and not weaken their effort in working with young people among the troops.

Thus, the entire restructuring of political organs in the army is directed toward increasing the combat readiness of troops and of every individual soldier, sergeant, warrant officer, and officer, and toward having each person fulfill his constitutional obligation. And it is directed toward training personnel and caring about them. Military-political organs are aiming at working

with real people and offering them assistance and social protection of their interests.

Narcotics Trafficking in Soviet Construction Battalions Examined

91WD0819A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 May 91 p 4

[Article by L. Kislinskaya: "Is There a Drug Mafia in the Construction Battalions?"]

[Text] Today in our country there are all the prerequisites for the flourishing narcotics business to grow into a drug mafia. That is the disconcerting conclusion of specialists in criminology. This is why the report that drugs are finding their way into the army was perceived with particular alarm at the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Main Administration on Combatting Dangerous Crimes, Organized Crime, Corruption and Drug Dealing.

Up until recently, the army has remained a "terra incognita" for criminal investigators. As a rule, violations of the law among military servicemen are dealt with by the army services. Yet it has turned out that there are no specialists in combatting drug addiction among the investigators in the military procurator's office. Moreover, the command headquarters of military units do not like to "air their dirty laundry". As a result, this has led to the situation where, figuratively speaking, the boil which has come to a head has been treated with useless compresses, in an attempt to avoid resorting to the aid of surgical intervention.

Let me explain. We are speaking here, naturally, not of the entire army. It just so happened that the primary drug users have become concentrated in the construction battalions. And this is readily explainable: There is a certain contingent here—there are persons who have prior convictions, there are those who have suffered from alcoholism since childhood, and then there are simply those who came from unfortunate families and who have been "programmed" for lawbreaking from their early years.

And so, the work on exposing the drug mafia in the construction battalions began back in December of last year. After some time, the associates of the USSR MVD 6th Administration and one of the subdivisions of the USSR KGB breathed a sigh of relief: Although in the construction battalions, where drugs are used, there are many elements of organized crime, thank God it is still a far cry from a drug mafia. Not a single case of corruption was exposed. Only three criminal cases were filed, and 12 persons were brought to trial. This was the result of an investigation of numerous military units stationed in Moscow oblast. However, an anonymous medical investigation of the military servicemen of three units yielded a discouraging result—one-third of the soldiers were addicted to drugs.

Locating the stashes of the drug addicts, which as a rule were located not in the barracks but at the construction sites, had to be done as in the best detective stories. [The investigators] came to the construction site during the lunch break, and in sports bags they brought with them... spaniels, dogs which were well trained to sniff out drugs. With their help, they found 15 stashes. It turned out that drug addicts in uniform usually prefer hashish. Ampules of medical origin were found quite rarely. Identifying the dealers and users turned out to be more difficult. I will not expose all the professional tricks which the investigators had to use (things did not go without undercover tricks), but the chain of "dealer-user" was finally exposed.

It turned out that the hashish comes to the military units in... packages sent to the soldiers by their relatives and friends. Generally, the drugs come from the Transcaucasus republics—most often from Azerbaijan. This was nothing new to the investigators. After all, it is a well-known fact: The so-called Azerbaijani "associations of countrymen" (in fact a criminal contingent coming to the capital to commit crimes) have organized cooperative cafes in Moscow, where dirty money is "laundered". These have become the centers for buying and selling dope. Among the regulars of these Moscow drug dens there are also the "graduates", who have passed the school of the construction battalions.

Thus, the Moscow world of drug dealing is replenished from the former military servicemen. Moreover, the data of specialists testify to the fact that it is specifically in Moscow that the biggest deals for drug deliveries are made. Considering the expanding contacts with foreign countries, we may predict the probability of our much-suffering city being turned into a center of communication with the international drug mafia.

We might add that while before the soldiers drowned their sorrows and their longing for the free life with alcohol, today due to well-known reasons they have had to switch to drugs, even though this "pleasure" is costly. Thus, a matchbox full of hashish "pulls in" 50 rubles. Naturally, those who have a "high stash" treat those who do not, expecting that they will settle up with them. The have-nots work for the dealers merely to get a smoke. Little by little, those who become dependent turn into "pushers". And then they begin to spread the drugs among others—and not just soldiers. They draw the residents of nearby villages, as well as Moscow residents, into the circle of crime.

The investigators uncovered many hashish buyers who came specially to the military unit in order to get the drugs. There were the traditional clever dealings and tricks—as we know, criminal responsibility sets in only if a detainee is found to have more than 10 grams.

The work performed by the USSR MVD 6th Administration is only a small part in exposing the drug networks which have entangled the construction battalions. Naturally, they cannot get along on their own efforts alone

(not because of the complexity, but because of the manpower shortage). Their colleagues from the USSR KGB have passed a "special course".

"Yet the difficulties still remain," says militia Colonel M. Averkov, section chief of the USSR MVD 6th Administration. "We need to have specialists for combatting drug addiction in the military procurator's office. Otherwise, it turns out that we expose the drug addict, the expert gives the conclusion that the substance found

on the soldier is hashish, which is classified as a narcotic, and the commander of the military unit (he is also the prosecutor) suddenly draws exactly the opposite conclusion: For some reason, from his point of view, this is not a narcotic..."

We need legal regulation of our work in the military units. The guard-house can hardly serve as an effective means of re-educating construction battalion drug addicts.

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