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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Extraordinary Plenum of All-Union Veterans' Council Held

91SV0123A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 39,
Sep 91 pp 1-2

[Article by A. Pozdnyakov: "Accounting for the Demands of the Time—Extraordinary Plenum of the All-Union Veterans' Council"]

[Text] As has already been reported, on 2 September in Moscow in the Central House of the Soviet Army imeni M.V. Frunze there was a extraordinary plenum of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces.

The first point on the agenda was the situation in the country's veterans' organizations. Information on this subject was presented by B.T. Shumilin, member of the presidium of the all-Union Council and chairman of the working group for preparing for the extraordinary plenum.

Our state and people, he said, are experiencing a most difficult period as a result of the 19-21 August coup d'etat and its consequences. The failure of the conspiracy created historical opportunities for the country's democratic renewal and emergence from its political and economic crisis. The Extraordinary Fifth USSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Law on Organs of State Power During the Transition Period and decided to accelerate the preparation and signing of the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States.

Discussing the situation that has developed in the country's veterans' organizations, B.T. Shumilin emphasized that significant moral harm was done to the veterans' movement by the fact the on 19 August the presidium bureau, on behalf of the all-Union Council, supported the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency and the measures presented in its appeal to the people. At the 26 August presidium meeting this decision was fundamentally assessed as profoundly erroneous and it was condemned and abolished. The presidium accepted the resignation of council Chairman N.V. Ogarkov and other bureau members.

The mistake made by this small group of people was used to accuse the veterans' organization of complicity with the putschists. But the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency was actually supported by only five oblast and kray veterans' organizations in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and three oblast organizations in the Ukraine. According to information from the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, only four of the 50 sections voted in favor of it. And all this was done in haste, the people had not figured out what was what, and by 20 August they were already repudiating their statements. All the republic and the majority of kray and oblast veterans' organizations took the correct position: They did not support the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency and they condemned the actions of the conspirators. And this

shows convincingly that the decision of the presidium bureau of the all-Union Council in no way expressed the position of the veterans' movement. One must also take into account the fact that no practical actions in support of the State Committee for the State of Emergency were taken anywhere.

One may ask how the bureau could have made such a decision. This is explained by the fact that the decision was made without an in-depth analysis or substantiated political assessment of either the very fact of the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency or of its documents, which at that point had not even been published and were perceived only from hearsay.

B.T. Shumilin noted that the bureau is merely the working organ of the presidium, which is not envisioned by the regulations. It was created for ad hoc resolution of internal issues related to the work of the council and its apparatus. The idea was that this would be a development of forms of collective leadership and would prevent possible subjectivism. But in practice in a number of cases the bureau has issued statements on behalf of the All-Union Veterans' Council concerning issues which required discussion by the presidium. The decision of 19 August has no legal basis or juridical force, and it has caused immense damage to the veterans' movement.

The council leadership did not take into account that it was dealing with a new veteran environment, that the democratic transformations in the country and society had changed the views and positions of a considerable share of the people, or that the veterans' movement, like the entire country, had departed from uniform thinking, it had become multidimensional, and that drawing conclusions about its position now was more complicated and also carried more responsibility. As a result there was conservatism, a lagging behind the realities of life, and with the sharp turn of events the presidium bureau was unable to attain the proper level.

The first and most important conclusion that veterans' councils at all levels have drawn from what happened is always and in all things to be guided by the Law on Social Organizations, its letter and spirit, and in their actions not to exceed the limits of the goals and tasks determined by the regulations. Of course, each of us has a right to his own view regarding the events taking place in the country, but we must not make this view the only one, and a small group of individuals must not make statements on behalf of all veterans.

These are lessons for the future, but at the present time the position of the veterans' organizations is difficult, and in a number of places they are in crisis. But still, in spite of the turns of events, on the whole the veterans' movement even under the difficult conditions has demonstrated its viability and the objective need for it as one of the most important structures of our society.

Having reminded those in attendance that the Second Conference of the All-Union Veterans' Organization was scheduled for December, B.T. Shumilin expressed the

opinion that it could be a turning point if it proceeded, taking into account the demands of the time and the changes that have occurred in society. This has to do with the change in the perceptions of the purposes and tasks of the veterans' movement, the forms of its organization, and the style and methods of its work.

It is now necessary to take immediate organizational-practical measures arising from the situation that has developed. Work should begin with a profound assessment of the events of those three tragic August days, the changes that will develop henceforth, and, undoubtedly, the decisions of the Extraordinary Fifth USSR Congress of People's Deputies. We must find our place in this turbulently self-renewing society. Both attitudes toward veterans and the country's concern for the older generation will depend on how clearly we determine the line of our actions and our position regarding fundamental issues of social restructuring, taking into account the realities of the day.

I think we must preserve the All-Union Veterans' Organization. For which goals and tasks? For coordination and unification of our efforts to protect the social interests and civil rights of all veterans, regardless of where they live, particularly the frontline soldiers and workers in the rear services. These problems will have to be solved not only at the level of the sovereign republics but also at the general state level.

There is also the crucial question of veterans of the Armed Forces who have served in various regions of the country and have remained there to live, and their protection should be ensured everywhere.

On the scale of the entire country the organization is also needed as a consolidating force for all citizens of our sovereign states—of the new Union. In particular, veterans have many common traditions and common historical values and interests for the organization of joint measures and broad exchange of experience. This can be done if we have our own newspaper and our own publishing house.

Since a unified economic space is being maintained, there will also be common veterans' problems. It is necessary to provide the most favorable conditions for the labor activity, including entrepreneurial activity, of elderly people, veterans' cooperatives, and small enterprises.

The all-Union organization should be responsible for problems of the development and strengthening of ties and cooperation with international veterans' organizations and the fulfillment of agreements signed with them.

B.T. Shumilin continued, against the backdrop of recent events, our organization is being criticized for being taken in by statements and declarations that are political in nature. No, we have not always been principled and persistent in our main job—protection of the vital interests of the elderly. We must sharply change the focus of our work.

We must also arrange relations among subjects of the Union organization in a new way. Fundamental changes in the functions and structure of our organization and its relations with the republic organizations will be registered in the new regulations. The name of the organization will apparently change as well. Most likely it will be the Union of Independent Veterans' Organizations on a Federative Basis. Even now it is clear that we must get away from strict centralization. The main thing is that all our organizations should have their own regulations or rules and independently resolve problems of membership, their material base, and other things. Then we will have more in common with the international work experience of veterans and their associations throughout the world.

Now it is important to make changes and additions to the existing regulations and submit them for registration by the USSR Ministry of Justice. At the same time I think we should prepare and discuss a draft of our new regulations and adopt it at the forthcoming conference.

Millions of pensioners, said B.T. Shumilin, have been tormented to the extreme by the deterioration in living conditions. In the future we expect turbulent changes during our transition to the market. This will entail an even more painful drop in the standard of living of the older generation. Somehow we must ease and alleviate this difficult pressure of the transition period. We must achieve for veterans guaranteed pensions and stipends that are not below the subsistence level; insist on unwavering provision throughout the territory of benefits granted to them previously; contribute in all ways to expansion of the sphere of pensioners' labor activity, especially veterans of the Armed Forces; strengthen veterans' cooperatives and small enterprises; and maintain and expand positions won for veterans in medical service and the provision of housing.

B.T. Shumilin recommended that at the plenum we elect deputy council chairmen, who would take responsibility for preparing for the conference, and that at the conference we elect a completely new set of leaders, including the council chairman. He expressed confidence that the veterans' movement would survive and become stronger under the conditions of the deep democratic transformations taking place in the country.

Participating in the discussion of B.T. Shumilin's presentation were A.I. Golyakov; A.P. Silantyev, chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans; N.V. Bosenko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Affairs of Veterans and Disabled Persons; republic council chairmen M.P. Trunov (Russia), S.K. Nurmagambetov (Kazakhstan), A.Ye. Andreyev (Belorussia), A.V. Kazaryan (Armenia), V.I. Klovov (Ukraine), and M.D. Nasirov (Azerbaijan); republic council deputy chairmen M.F. Kupchishin (the Ukraine), G.I. Skorobogatov (Uzbekistan), and others. All of them spoke about the fact that the common veterans' organization for the whole country definitely

had to be preserved in the form of a Union or Federation of Veterans' Organizations. V.I. Klovov said:

"It would be a fatal blow to the veterans of each republic to fail to have a unified veterans' organization of the Union which is now being defined. Since veterans are united throughout the world, it would be wrong for us to fall apart, and the national peculiarities will be taken into account in the specific republic regulations. I think we should create a Federation of Organizations of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces, which would include the republic organizations with their regulations. This could include the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, with its international functions and its functions of promoting patriotism.

In the decree adopted regarding the first question, the plenum resolutely condemned the attempt at a coup d'etat undertaken by the conspirators and expressed satisfaction with the fact that, because of the rebuff by democratic forces, the conspiracy was broken up and constitutional order was restored in the country.

The plenum decreed: To consider the appeal of the presidium bureau to veterans adopted on 19 August to be erroneous and illegal. To approve the 26 August decision of the presidium concerning the resignation of bureau members. The presidium bureau was abolished as an organ not envisioned by the regulations of the organization.

The presidium was instructed to make changes and additions in the existing regulations and submit them for registration in the USSR Ministry of Justice.

They went on to consider organizational issues. They expelled the following from the presidium and relieved them of their duties: Council Chairman N.V. Ogarkov, First Deputy Chairman A.I. Golyakov, and Deputy Chairmen V.I. Dolgikh and P.I. Kravchenko; acting Deputy Council Chairman A.P. Biryukova was relieved of her duties. N.Ya. Sychev was removed from the presidium. The requests of Ye.F. Ivanovskiy to be relieved of his duties as a member of the presidium and deputy chairman of the council and the application of N.V. Bosenko to be relieved of his duties as a member of the presidium were granted.

N.V. Shapalin was elected first deputy chairman of the All-Union Veterans' Council and N.V. Naydenko—deputy chairman.

M.P. Trunov, chairman of the All-Russian Veterans' Council, was added to the presidium of the All-Union Council.

The plenum approved the commission for preparing the draft regulations of the Union of Veterans' Organizations of the USSR, taking into account the requirements of the Law on Social Associations, and the commission for preparing for and conducting the Second Conference of the All-Union Veterans' Organization.

In conclusion the plenum adopted a declaration which discusses support for the decisions of the Extraordinary Fifth USSR Congress of People's Deputies and expresses the hope that their implementation will make it possible to bring the country out of its crisis, accelerate the signing of the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States, and guarantee the observance of rights and freedoms for each Soviet person.

It says in the declaration that the plenum considers it impermissible to take illegal actions to restrict, not to mention ban, the activity of individual veterans' organizations or to persecute or victimize veterans because of their convictions. The older generation of Soviet people has always lived with the interests and concerns of their native country. This generation has withstood the harshest ordeals and adversities for the sake of its well-being. When that fatal threat hung over our country's very existence, the older generation rose to the defense of the homeland and won a great victory over the black forces of fascism. Even today veterans are filled with the greatest sense of responsibility and concern for the fate of our homeland and its future, and they are doing everything they can for its well-being.

In the current situation, when the living conditions of the Soviet people, particularly the older generation, are continually deteriorating, veterans themselves are in need of attention and support. The plenum appeals to the USSR president, the State Council, and other power organs with an insistent appeal to provide reliable social protection for elderly and disabled people and not to allow their further impoverishment.

We appeal to the leaders and labor collectives of enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, firms, and institutions and urge them not to forget about the preceding generations of workers and to constantly search for additional means and possibilities of raising their standard of living. We must not forget about the fact that even today veterans are an indispensable organic part of the labor collectives.

We have been enjoined by duty and conscience to appeal to the whole public and populating the Soviet Union to never in the future lose their fraternal ties, to always be true to our frontline and labor friendship and mutual gain, and to come to one another's aid during this difficult time of life. We shall always be true to the best traditions of friendship and brotherhood.

Participants in the plenum, the declaration says, were in favor of preserving and strengthening the country's veterans' organization, taking into account the changes taking place in society.

The plenum of the All-Union Council called for veterans' organizations and all veterans, under the conditions of the transition period, to be supportive and calm, to engage actively in the work to consolidate all healthy forces of society to emerge from the economic and political crisis, and in all ways to step up the activity of the veterans' councils directed toward the protection of

the social interests of the older generation, civil rights, and the honor and dignity of veterans.

Col-Gen Novozhilov on Need to Avoid Union Disintegration

92UM0047A Moscow GOLOS in Russian No 37, 23-29 Sep 91 p 11

[Interview with Colonel General Viktor Ivanovich Novozhilov, commander, Far East Military District, in Khabarovsk Headquarters by GOLOS special correspondent, occasion and place not specified: "I Do Not Love Socialism, But There Must Be a Union"]

[Text] Our special correspondent in Khabarovsk met with General Viktor Ivanovich Novozhilov, who heads the largest group of forces in the eastern part of the Soviet Union, in a majestic red brick building of prerevolutionary construction in the center of the city, where the headquarters of the Far East Military District is located. In the military hierarchy this post represents a kind of springboard to the highest posts: General Novozhilov's predecessor was General Moiseyev, former chief of the General Staff, and before him this post was held by Marshal Yazov, former Minister of Defense and a member of the junta which attempted to seize power on 19 August. In a conversation with a correspondent of the French newspaper LE MONDE, General Novozhilov stated that he had refused to obey the putschists, but that half of his people approve the coup d'état.

Being tens of thousands of kilometers from Moscow, the generals who head this important strategic district traditionally have enormously greater autonomy than military district commanders in the western part of the country. General Novozhilov demonstrated this independence by refusing to carry out instructions from the junta. This 52-year-old officer of the Armored Troops, who completed the General Staff Military Academy and is a member of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee (the activities of which were suspended after the putsch), travelled to Japan in June of this year. In answering questions of French correspondents on 2 September, he spoke about strategic problems of the Far East as well as about the USSR's further destiny and the role of the Armed Forces.

[GOLOS special correspondent] What conclusion do you draw from the coup d'état of 19 August?

[Novozhilov] Even today it is difficult to say that the Army supported the junta or, conversely, that it fully took the side of President Yeltsin. The reaction was varied and often ambiguous. With respect to myself, I clearly informed Moscow that I refused to involve my troops in a political adventure and I ordered all commanders subordinate to me not to take any initiatives.

Some of my officers took a different position and expressed their support for the junta. This was their right as private persons, but in no instance should they have activated their troops. Over the telephone I personally

cautioned the commander in the Komsomol-on-Amur area, who was attempting to exert pressure on local authorities and set up a state-of-emergency committee, warning him that he would be dismissed immediately if he did not cease such actions on the spot.

[GOLOS special correspondent] Did you receive any orders from the junta?

[Novozhilov] Yes, orders came from Marshal Yazov according to which I was supposed to act as district military commandant. I was assigned to shut down the mass media and move troops to strategically important points in the city. I informed Moscow that these missions were not part of my duties and that the situation in Khabarovsk in no way demanded such measures.

[GOLOS special correspondent] In other words, you refused to obey?

[Novozhilov] I think that on 19 and 20 August the forces of both camps were practically equal. Junta supporters were chiefly in Army political entities, but the correlation of forces gradually began to change after Communist Party activity was suspended. Political commissars in the Armed Forces were removed from their posts and all entities which they directed were disbanded.

[GOLOS special correspondent] Do you think that the Army will have to play a political role in the future and that a new putsch is possible?

[Novozhilov] In no instance should the Army be mixed up with political matters. I personally do not think a new putsch is possible. Such attempts are doomed to failure and the 19 August coup d'état served as a lesson for those officers who might experience the temptation of letting themselves in for such an adventure.

It was after the events in Tbilisi in 1989 and then in Vilnius last year that the prestige of the Army suffered greatly. Now dissatisfaction with the Army has become even more obvious. And although it seems to me that the possibility of a new attempt at a putsch can be precluded, on the other hand we are awaited by a buildup of tension and clashes as a result of the process of the Union's disintegration now going on: conflicts between peoples, ethnic conflicts, border disputes.

[GOLOS special correspondent] Do you have any impression that you will be present at the demise of socialism and the final disintegration of the Soviet Union?

[Novozhilov] They are different things. For a long time now I have entertained no illusions with respect to socialism, but the Soviet Union has not yet died. On the other hand we must do everything possible to avoid its disintegration, which can lead to destabilization of the entire country if this process is not stopped or taken under control. Disintegration of the Union in particular will entail serious problems in the area of security.

KGB Officer Joins Review of ANT Case
LD1910140891

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian AT 1837 GMT 15 October carries a 15-minute recorded 'Vesti' production by Aleksandr Gurnov entitled "ANT - Life After Death".

The program consists of two intercut interviews by Gurnov, with additional video material. Gurov conducts one interview with B. Pogorelov, caption-identified as an investigator for important cases under the USSR Procurator General, and V. Rats, caption-identified as the deputy chief of the investigation management department of the USSR KGB. Gurov conducts the second interview with Vladimir Ryashentsev, caption-identified as the "former leader of the ANT concern", in Ryashentsev's Budapest office.

Gurnov begins the program with a Pogorelov comment on the current state of the ANT cooperative concern:

"The investigation is at the stage of—let me put it like this—at the stage where fundamental decisions are being made. The investigation of the basic element is still going on. That is, the delivery of tanks to the ANT concern with the subsequent consignment overseas of these twelve tanks. Several other elements are at the completion stage, ones involving some large branches of ANT. It was a ramified system. But as far as the majority of the small branches of ANT are concerned, the decisions have already been made. The investigation group has concluded that there have been certain violations in the activities of these branches but that they are not criminal in character."

Gurnov later asks Pogorelov if anything is preventing reaching fundamental decisions. Pogorelov responds:

"Yes, I think something is hindering this. First and foremost, it is the stance of the former leaders of ANT that is getting in the way. The ANT concern, as such, was closed down by a decision of the government in January, 1990."

Video next shows Gurnov in Budapest, where he has gone to interview Vladimir Ryashentsev at the headquarters of the Russian Home [Rossiyskiy Dom] organization, the commercial structure organized by Ryashentsev following the effective closure of ANT. As Ryashentsev describes the scale of his enterprise, video shows warehouses stocked with canned meat, hosiery and technical equipment.

Later, Gurnov asks Rats:

"Do you now have the enough documents proving that ANT did indeed try to sell tanks?"

Rats responds: "I don't think any question of that arose at the initial stage of the investigation. It certainly doesn't arise now. It has been proved convincingly that ANT acquired and sold tanks."

Gurnov interjects: "That it tried to do so or that it did sell them?"

Rats: "It conducted talks. It took those talks to the point of implementation. The complicated part of the investigation of this case was the fact that it had to establish, and establish very exactly, if these were the actions of Ryashentsev or if they were sanctioned by superior organizations."

Gurnov: "And what conclusion did you reach"

Rats: "As things stand today, we have gathered exhaustive proof that there was no decision by the government for the sale of such weapons via ANT, nor was there any decision by any other bodies, which incidentally would not be competent to make one."

Cutting to the interview with Ryashentsev in Budapest, Gurnov asks:

"Did you sell tanks or did you not sell tanks?"

Ryashentsev answers: "That's the biggest paradox in the entire affair, because from the very beginning we did not sell any tanks. We have all the documents confirming that there were no tanks. This is a very interesting, large-scale provocation."

Gurnov: "But, there were tanks. What you mean is that there were none of the things that were blown up around this."

Ryashentsev: "Let me put it like this. You have the documents in front of you. [video shows typewritten documents] They say it all in precise terms. There was an agreement concluded with the Vzlet scientific production association for the tanks to be reequipped and converted to tractors. We had nothing at all to do with the Nizhniy Tagil works. I knew neither its boss nor the people from there. We transferred at least 4 million rubles to them. Then, without any notice, and doing absolutely nothing, they quite simply dispatched the tanks to the port, without naming a consignee. They dispatched them to the Port of Novorossiysk. They spent several days sorting out who owned the tanks. We were simply faced with a fait accompli, that the tanks had arrived."

Gurnov: "In what form had they arrived? With or without their guns?"

Ryashentsev: "To be quite honest, I never saw them, only what was shown on television, because we couldn't travel anywhere. As far as what we were told and what I have seen, they arrived without their guns, but following them there were trains with trucks carrying these armaments. The equipment on top had been removed, the machine guns and the gun barrels were removed, but these were carried by a separate train. Effectively, therefore, we were sent not what we had ordered and paid for."

The feature then returns to the interview with Pogorelov and Rats.

Gurnov asks: "These papers don't convince you in any way?"

Pogorelov responds: "We are familiar with these papers. We discussed them a long time ago. Take this approach to Ryashentsev: [video shows Pogorelov reading from a handwritten document] Urgent. We request... various specifications, and so on. On Monday we also intend to hand over a letter: On the strength of that letter please prepare a contract for twelve of the 72-M1-M's within a week. Please confirm. There are also appeals to firms. We have testimony, testimony from witnesses, about this document. [video shows Pogorelov turning to Rats] I think we can show another document, Vitaliy Aleksandrovich? Here's the signature of Vladimir Igorevich. Here's an approach to a company. Here's his signature. On the T-72's I'm having a meeting on 23 October and I think this issue will be perfectly clear."

Rats explains that the type of tank in question was widely exported and no military secrets were involved. He says the point is that export deals can only be carried out following a government decision.

Gurnov asks: "But didn't ANT enjoy very considerable support from above, including support directly from Ryzhkov. In other words, could we say that Ryzhkov used the concern as a kind of testbed for checking out certain new economic structures?"

Pogorelov answers: "I think that perhaps we could say this: as a testbed, as an experiment."

The program then returns to the Ryashentsev interview:

Ryashentsev: "We got into a situation of political intrigue. You have to pick out two situations here. I'm not frightened of saying so. The blow against us was simultaneously intended to be a blow against Ryzhkov and against Gorbachev, too. It was just after February, if you remember, the Central Committee plenum, that very gloomy February, 1990 plenum, when anything at all could have happened. Those respected forces which were to conduct the August putsch had to find an organization, no matter what the cost, against the background of which they could act. But there were people, when this tank scandal broke, who ran to Ryzhkov saying: we told you, there's something dirty there, suddenly it'll be bribes, don't protect them. Ryzhkov took fright. By the end of February we were due to market goods worth 6 billion rubles and you know prices were quite different then. That would naturally have stabilized the situation. It was to someone's very great advantage that that stabilization should not take place under any circumstances and that this should go on."

Gurnov: "You mean that as long ago as the end of 1989 you were prepared to rescue the Soviet economy?"

Ryashentsev: "Effectively, that is the case. But I can tell you one thing today. I am very glad that this happened, that we did not save that old structure."

In the final part of the program, Gurnov speaks to Ryashentsev about his personal circumstances and then to Ryashentsev, Rats and Pogorelov about the extent of their personal emotional involvement in the contest between them.

Tactics in Light of Lasers

91SV0067A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 2, Feb 91 pp 12, 34-37

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Murakhovskiy under the rubric: "School of Combat Skills": "Tactics in Light of Lasers"]

[Text] The enemy does not forgive mistakes. The threat of becoming disabled or of letting down comrades forces soldiers to wholeheartedly operate as in an actual engagement. Read the report about the field training exercise in this issue.

Reporting on a Two-Sided Tactical Field Training Exercise Using Laser Firing and Weapons Imitators

If positive articles about the army rarely appear in the "civilian" press today, they are dedicated to large-scale events: to a soldier's participation in gathering the harvest, to the elimination of the aftereffects of the latest natural disaster, and sometimes to maneuvers. Actually, thousands of participants and hundreds of pieces of equipment permit them to colorfully describe battle scenes. What can you say here about the training of battalions and companies!

In my opinion, major field training exercises are not very effective. Say, what is the use of the sides opposing each other if the leader "designates" the victor at his own discretion? What is the benefit from a commander's unusual decision if it is impossible to objectively assess it in practice?

It is no wonder that live fire exercises, where a more or less real criterion exists—a hole in a target, are considered to be the most serious examination for the troops. Obviously, that is why all echelons, from squads to division-sized units, attempt to include them. However, even here we cannot get by without shortcomings. The primary shortcoming—the lack of a "live," that is, a thinking and acting enemy—outweighs all of the advantages.

Many military experts, having rejected large-scale exercises, think that it is possible to permit a contradiction between the requirements for the quality of combat training and the limitations that are imposed by existing training methods. They propose to concentrate their efforts on training the company and battalion while using the most modern training facilities.

In this sense, a two-sided battalion tactical field training exercise that occurred on the Carpathian Military District range (see the photographs on the color insert) is extremely indicative in my view. While anticipating a discussion about exercises, I want to qualify my statement by saying that I consciously did not place quotation marks on terms that relate to the enemy, losses, etc. The fact is that the troops operated with laser firing and destruction imitators (LISP) and the engagement itself

was so close to an actual engagement in nature that I would have had to place the entire article within quotation marks.

If I briefly set forth the concept of the experts from the Ground Forces Main Directorate of Combat Training (GUBP)—Lieutenant-General V. Khazikov, Major-General A. Arsenyev, Colonels V. Krivov and A. Stepanov, and Lieutenant Colonel A. Ryabov, it is reduced to the following.

First of all, the range is called upon to support effective training of reinforced motorized rifle and tank battalions. The appropriate authorized staff structure, training methodology, and typical two-week cycle have been developed to do this. A set of combat training equipment and weapons is gradually being formed and improvement of the laser imitators is continuing. As one of the experts jokingly remarked, a soldier must enter the range with his field pack and leave in a tank.

Second, the range workers, highly skilled officers, provide an objective assessment to the activities of subunits in two-sided field training exercises using LISP. Essentially, an independent analysis is conducted of the state of the most important components of the battalions' combat readiness. In the future, after the development and introduction of an automated control system, the objectivity of the assessments will increase even more.

Third, the range is capable of supporting full-fledged coordination of command and control organs at the battalion—regimental—division level in the background of the actual operations of a minimal number of troops. In the future, this can become the primary task among the tasks mentioned above.

In short, there are technical training systems and there are new effective methodologies. Why then is the quality of proficiency increasing more in words than in deeds? There is a simple explanation—there are no people to train. The draft is being disrupted and those soldiers that we have are either engaged in economic work or gathering the harvest. All of this threatens to paralyze the combat training process. Even during our demonstration exercise, one of the battalions (on paper—at full strength) was compelled to bring itself up to full strength using soldiers from other subunits. Many officers with whom I had the opportunity to chat on the range think that the army's combat capability is declining so much that it cannot be compensated for by the increase of other parameters (quality of equipment, organizational changes, etc.) due to a growing lack of professionalism and poor training.

Both sides underwent a full training cycle with LISP: driving combat vehicles, battle drills and other exercises, and company tactical field training exercises. I had the opportunity to observe them in the 2nd Tank Battalion which is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel M. Usoltsev. At first, I got the impression that the tank troops had put on their uniforms only yesterday—they were hopeless. The crews did not have the skills to operate weapons

and equipment and the officers vaguely presented the training methodology. Add organizational confusion to this. By way of illustration, combat artillery fire was planned simultaneously with the subunit going out into the field which cut short many exercises on tactics because a large part of the range ended up being within the danger zone.

It seemed that such substantial shortcomings could not be eliminated even in six months. Frankly speaking, I became convinced that 2nd Battalion would be routed in the impending engagement. All the more so since its competitor was a tank battalion (commander—Major G. Savchenko) from one of Samaro-Ulyanovsk Motorized Rifle Railway Division's units that, in my opinion, had been quite well-trained by Senior Commander Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Karasev.

Imagine my surprise when, just a week later at the exercise, Usoltsev's subunit presented itself as a coordinated and controlled unit that acted boldly and decisively! The training methodology developed by Main Directorate of Combat Training experts multiplied by the LISP's capabilities and the personnel's labor, simply created a miracle—transformed a conglomerate of people and vehicles into a powerful combat unit. Anticipating events, I will say that the engagement occurred on an equal basis, based upon the platoons' and companies' smooth teamwork and coordination. The creativity of the commanders and non-standard tactical methods played a major role in its outcome. (The magazine partially described how one two-week field training exercise manages to substantially improve the battalion's proficiency in Lt Col A. Ryabov's article "Shag k vozrozhdeniyu taktiki" [A Step Toward Reviving Tactics]¹ and we plan to publish more articles on this theme—The editor).

With the initiation of the exercise, the battalions at the staging areas began to prepare weapons and equipment for combat use. The leadership's concept provided for "West" (tank battalion, motorized rifle regiment, artillery battalion, motorized rifle company, surface-to-air missile/artillery battery, combat engineer platoon, and a radiological and chemical reconnaissance platoon. Tanks—28, BMP's [Armored personnel vehicle]—10) and "East" (2nd Tank Battalion, artillery battalion, motorized rifle company, surface-to-air missile/artillery battery, and a radiological and chemical reconnaissance platoon. Tanks—25, BMP's—10), while carrying out the tasks, respectively, of a forward detachment and advance guard, to clash in a meeting engagement. Its victor and outcome totally depended on the sides' actual operations and the losses they suffered. And that is how it occurred (see the diagram).

Thanks to skillfully organized reconnaissance, East seized the initiative from the very outset. Its separate reconnaissance patrol detected the advance of West's columns in a timely manner and immediately transmitted the information to the commander. Lt Col Usoltsev decided to anticipate the enemy deployment and to

seize the Hill 358.2—Blindazhnaya Line. The battalion's GPZ [advance party], 5th Company, destroyed West's forward patrol, reached the indicated line, and inflicted heavy losses to West's advance party through fire on the flank. On the battle field, combat vehicles burst into flame and began to emit thick smoke one after another. At this time, West's main forces experienced difficulty while negotiating a deep ravine along narrow crossings. A dangerous gap was formed in its combat formation.

2nd Tank Battalion commander skillfully exploited this: he ordered a company from the main forces to occupy a line on the western slope of Hill 358.2. The other company came out on West's flank from the south at the moment of its deployment into combat formation. Here, it seems to me, Major Savchenko permitted a serious error. While obviously thinking that the enemy would more seriously advance—through a wooded area and deploy, he selected an axis of offense to the northeast and did not pay attention to his right flank, while relying on the line seized by the advance party. It was from there that East's 4th Tank Company opened devastating fire. Within several minutes, West lost 15 tanks and BMP's. The columns of smoke from the burning vehicles were clearly visible from the observation tower (I will note that it would be better to make the smoke colored—red, blue, or green). You would be able to correctly determine whose side was victorious without waiting for the losses to be calculated.


The exercise's leadership was not able to compare decisions while estimating on their "fingers" who had won. I think that even the untrained reader is capable of doing that by looking at the summary in the diagram.

At the next stage, East had to attack jointly with the main forces. West went over to defense. One defensive position reinforced by a tank company was created in the area of the defense with a research goal. Combat security consisting of a motorized rifle platoon was ahead of it. Nearly 14 hours was allocated for battle preparation.

In the morning, while located nearly 1.5 kilometers from the forward edge of the defenders, your correspondent, using only binoculars, experienced difficulty detecting two tanks and one BMP in the combat formation. I did not manage to discover the remaining elements of the defense—the camouflage was outstanding. Obviously, the attackers also encountered this problem.

Lt Col Usoltsev rejected the "classical" structure of the combat formation. Companies operated outside a single combat line and totally independently. West's combat security, having detected the advance of the attackers' first echelon subunits in columns, opened fire from the maximum distance, destroyed two BMP's and a tank, and then withdrew along the glen to the defensive position.

Despite the losses, 2nd Tank Battalion continued to advance. 4th Company's operations on the right flank are particularly noteworthy. At first, one platoon appeared and two others 500-700 meters behind it. The terrain on the axis of advance was exposed and it seemed that no one could manage to come up to the forward edge



Key:

1. tank company with motorized rifle platoon, combat engineer squad, and radiation chemical reconnaissance platoon
2. motorized rifle company
3. tank battalion
4. tank company
5. artillery battalion
6. advance party
7. tank company with motorized rifle platoon
8. separate reconnaissance patrol
9. West—exercise tank battalion, motorized rifle company, artillery battalion, surface-to-air missile/artillery battery, and a radiological and chemical reconnaissance platoon. Tanks—28, BMP's—10
10. East—exercise tank battalion, motorized rifle company, artillery battalion, surface-to-air missile/artillery battery, combat engineer platoon, and a radiological and chemical reconnaissance platoon. Tanks—25, BMP's—10.
11. Burakova Niva
12. Blindazhnaya
13. Zavodskaya
14. Lutova
15. The sides' losses (tanks/BMP's): West—tank battalion 1/0; 1st Tank Company 9/0, 2nd Tank Co 8/1, 3rd Tank Co 2/0, motorized rifle company 0/3, Total 20/4; East—2nd Tank Battalion 0/0; 4th Tank Company 1/0, 5th Tank Co 6/2, 6th Tank Co 0/0, Total 7/2.
16. Position of the sides at: 10:15, 10:45, 11:00, 11:15.

of the battle area. However, the forward platoon's tanks fired a salvo of smoke grenades and the entire company rushed ahead under the cover of this screen. Then the other platoon overtook the rest and once again—a salvo of smoke grenades.

I saw something familiar in the subunit attack technique. We described this variation in our magazine in the article "Atakuyut boevyye gruppy!" [Combat Teams Are Attacking!].² Actually, different teams (platoons) tank—BMP—tank could be precisely differentiated on the

battle field. Using smoke, terrain irregularities, and shrubs, they reached the enemy defensive position. Opposite, 5th Tank Company, which had attacked the left flank, suffered serious losses and did not have much success. The battle run-through was terminated for safety reasons at that point.

Several experiments were conducted later. I will describe two of them. In the first, the situation precisely corresponded to the beginning of the attack (defense) battle rehearsal. Only the battalion commander was ordered to attack in a single echelon formation, in a single combat line (the model—a drawing from BUSV [translation unknown]). And the rumbling avalanche of tanks and BMP's rushed forward. Frankly speaking, they looked extremely threatening. The combat effect from the numbing spirit of the picture turned out to be zero: the defenders burned more than 20 tanks and all of the BMP's without themselves losing a single vehicle! You do not need to agitate officers and soldiers to study tactics or demand initiative and creativity from them after this—the situation compels them to act as in a real engagement.

The results of the second experiment demonstrated the poorly designed equipment provided by industry. One tank, having fired a single projectile along a standing company column, destroyed... eight vehicles. So, the manufacturing plant is "justifying" the people's money. It receives tens of thousands of rubles from the Ministry of Defense for each LISP. Of course, not only the manufacturer but also the customer are at fault for that

since confusion that suits the manufacturer reigns in the customer's camp. In fact: Main Directorate of Combat Training SV [translation unknown] uses LISP, NII [Scientific Research Institute] prepares the requirements, URUPO [translation unknown] orders it, and GRAU [Main Missile and Artillery Directorate] pays for it. According to experts, we should cease production of existing LISP models, seize the money remaining at the plant, and transfer it to enterprises that are capable of supporting the needed level of development and production. The suggestions have merit. Incidentally, we will continue the conversation on the problem of relations with the defense industry.

While concluding the discussion on the field training exercise, I would like to express the hope that the matter will not be limited to experiments. We can begin full-fledged and on "line" battalion training already right now on the Carpathian Military District range. For now in one military district, and we must introduce this system in all Ground Forces formations in the future. The editorial staff intends to constantly inform our readers about progress in this direction and about the difficulties and barriers encountered en route.

Footnotes:

1. 1990—No. 11
2. 1990—No. 5

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'Kaitseliit' Controversy Continues

92UN0017B Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 29 Aug 91

[Article by Enno Tammer: Government tries to Free Itself from the "Kaitseliit"]

[Text]Government Tries to Free Itself from the "Kaitseliit"

There is no doubt that the initiative right now lies with the government and with Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar. More power to them for taking action, for striving, for making an effort. Moments of transition have always revealed the true substance (or lack thereof) of some instance, or of some or another individual. It goes without saying that at present, the government has the Supreme Council on a string, one could even attest that the Supreme Council is trailing in the government's wake.

The recent days have also shown that the government and the Prime Minister know how to take advantage of the situation. Everything is being done to free us from the strains and pressures that have troubled us since the transition was proclaimed. Everything is also being done to free us from those reactionaries who up until now have managed to obstruct the path to independence. Right now there is a strong justification for this: assisting "putschists, long-term activity against the Republic of Estonia. Again, one cannot fault the government. The public has waited this entire time for something to be done about Lõssenko and the workers brigade, Yarovoy and the northern Estonian functionaries.

Even when skillfully taking advantage of the situation, there must be some limits. Taking skillful advantage of the situation should not require stirring things up anew. That something was up, was clear from the news media the day before yesterday and from the atmosphere at Toompea. It was also clear in yesterday's "Rahva Hääl" in which Eve Osa, reporter for "Ohtuleht", bluntly opens verbal fire on the Kaitseliit. In fact, it is so blunt that the question arises: Who wrote this article? Who arranged for it to be printed? That's that. However, yesterday's government session demonstrated that evasive tactics towards the Kaitseliit had been adopted. This, because apparently it is difficult to pin guilt on the Kaitseliit as far as being party to putsch and acting against the Republic of Estonia. However, one can blame the Kaitseliit for being active, for supplementing acknowledged defense forces and police units during the time of crisis. It really seems pointless at this time to try to determine who set up the better defense. In reality they all had to contribute. Similarly, the government's current efforts to shun the Kaitseliit seem pointless as well. And not only to shun, rather the government's decisions yesterday indicate a desire to sever its ties with the Kaitseliit.

Excuse me, but I cannot understand which Estonian institution is supposed to become the ESTONIAN SECURITY RESERVE FORCE. That does not have an Estonian ring to it. Unfortunately, there was no one to

talk to who could clear up these details since the usual post-session press conference was cancelled. Press releases were confined to the official report by the government's Chief of Press, Juhan Hindov.

Estonian Defense Forces To Be Reorganized

92UN0017A Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 29 Aug 91

[Article by Juhan Hindov: "Defense Forces to be Reorganized"]

[Text]Proposal to Reorganize Estonian Defense Forces Raised at Government Session

The Estonian government sat in session yesterday at Toompea under Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar. Minister of Economics Jaak Leimann informed members of the government regarding economic deliberations currently taking place at Suurup, near Tallinn. The direction to be taken in Estonian economic reform during coming months as well as strategies for economic changes are under discussion.

Questions regarding the continuing dismantling of Soviet armaments were discussed. Rural leaders and town mayors received official instructions to take over review of local regular, reserve, and ranking forces from the respective commissariats. Discussions with leaders of the Soviet Ministry of Defense will begin soon to determine dismantling procedures for the military units concerned.

The government passed measures to satisfy Estonian security requirements with the formation of a regular reserve force. The decision was made to convert the State Department of Customs and Border Control to the Estonian Department of State and Border Defense. This department was given one week to register all those able-bodied men between 18-30 who express a desire to serve in the Estonian regular reserves.

The government proposed that the Estonian Supreme Council establish an Estonian Defense Force and place it under the jurisdiction of the Committee of Emergency Situations. A proposal to enact a bill to establish a Ministry of Defense will also be presented to the Supreme Council.

Yesterday morning Edgar Savisaar signed a statute placing all firearms currently belonging to Republic of Estonian undertakings, establishments, and organizations under the regulation of the Ministry of the Interior. All weapons, firearms, explosives, and related materials belonging to Soviet establishments and organizations are to be turned over to the Estonian Ministry of the Interior. The possession and use of any other weapons or related equipment (cudgels, gas-balloons, etc.) is only permissible in accordance with the regulations of the Estonian Ministry of the Interior. Violators will be charged and penalized according to law.

Estonian Draft To Begin This Fall*92UN0226B Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
28 Sep 91*

[ETA Release by Indrek Lindsalu: "First Draftees To Be Called Up This Fall"]

[Text] Toomas Puura, head of the state and border defense department of the Republic of Estonia's chancery, told ETA [Estonian Telegraph Agency] that formation of a supreme command for Estonian defense forces will be discussed by the government, probably as early as next week, and that the Republic of Estonia's first draft for recruits will be announced some time this fall.

"A number of young men will be needed urgently for certain services, especially for border guard duty," Puura said. "An independent state will not be asking the boys whether they want to serve or not, as was done during the recruiting process for labor service. If necessary, certain coercive methods will be used."

It is not clear yet where the drafted recruits will be housed. Toomas Puura thinks that one possibility would be to use the military bases being vacated by the Soviet troops, provided they will not be demolished totally in the course of moving out. In Nursi, for example, where the paratroopers are about to leave, some 600 men could be accommodated.

The progress of forming defense forces, according to Puura, depends to a great extent on how well we do finding leadership staff and other specialists. "Quite a few Soviet officers serving here have expressed a wish to stay and help out. We will probably make our choice from among these, too," Puura said.

The department head for state and border defense emphasized that, in all probability, it will not be the RE state and border defense office headed by Andrus Oõvel that will be dealing with the formation of defense forces and their supreme command. This office has enough to do already, and in the future, it should be concentrating on border issues exclusively, Puura thought.

GRU Unit in Viljandi Described*92UN0198G Tallinn SAKALA in Estonian 14 Sep 91*

[Article by Toomas Mattson: "The Task of Viljandi's Special Unit Is Intelligence and Diversional Activity Abroad"]

[Text] The Soviet military unit based in Viljandi is not an ordinary one. It is part of the special purpose units. The task of Viljandi's special unit is intelligence and diversional activity behind enemy lines. There are fewer than 10 such units throughout the Soviet Union. A small diversionary group sent behind the enemy lines has to establish the exact coordinates of nuclear weapon carriers, and destroy the dangerous objects. The equipment of the unit ranges from special mines and automatic weapons to apparatus for doing radio-electronic battle.

Some of the Viljandi sub-units have even better training, by some standards, than KGB's special unit Alpha. However, where Alpha is meant to operate internally, the Viljandi special units are trained for foreign countries. Many officers of the Viljandi unit have had special preparation in languages at their military schools, with a mastery of either German or English (two thirds of the officers have a German orientation, while one third of them have an English orientation). Compared to regular military units, there is an unusually high number of officers in Viljandi. The unit is part of the Soviet Union's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Undoubtedly, such a special unit will also attract attention abroad. The Viljandi unit is within monitoring distance of at least two reconnaissance satellites. They fly over every two hours and 30 minutes. One of them works on the principle of measuring infra-red radiation, the other is equipped with remote control devices. The unit also has special equipment for tracking the flight of the satellites. These data are obtained from reliable sources.

Russian Reservists Unite To Defend 'Officer Corps'*PM2410134591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Oct 91 First Edition p 5*

[Interview with Major General of the Reserve Fedor Khalturin by unnamed TASS correspondent; in Moscow, date not stated; under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Creating the Russian Union of Reserve Officers"]

[Text] Moscow—The Russian Union of Reserve and Retired Officers, Generals, and Admirals is the name that has been given to yet another voluntary nonparty social formation embracing those linked by destiny to the Army and Navy. The idea for creating the organization was approved by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Committees for Security; for the Affairs of the Disabled; for War and Labor Veterans; for the Social Protection of Servicemen and Members of their Families; and the RSFSR State Committee for Questions of Defense. Major General of the Reserve Fedor Khalturin, leader of the working group on creating the union, tells a TASS correspondent about the tasks this organization will tackle:

[Khalturin] Our aims are threefold: to realize and defend union members' rights and freedoms, to guarantee their participation in governing the state, and to comprehensively develop their social activeness. We will help to reinforce the sovereignty of the Russian State and the defense capability of the Fatherland. During the transition to market relations and given the sharp fall in reserve and retired officers' living standards there is nobody to rely on but ourselves: We must fall back on traditions of officer camaraderie, mutual aid, and our capacity to stand our ground in the battle with everyday problems and adversity, while remaining loyal to the moral ideals of the Russian and Soviet officer corps.

This is why one of union's tasks will be to provide social, judicial, and material support for entrepreneurial activity by union members and every form of encouragement for their ideas and initiatives aimed at furthering the national economy's integration into the market structure. There are plans to create an officers' fund: It is proposed that the money in this fund be spent on grants for military institute undergraduates; on material aid for union members' elderly parents, widows, minors, and children unable to work; and on other needs.

Our own flag, emblem, badge, and other attributes necessary to fulfill the tasks specified by the statutes will become our organization's "trademarks."

The working group has already approved the "Russian Union of Reserve Officers Regulations." Many reserve and retired officers are familiar with its aims and tasks and are submitting their own proposals and observations. The union's primary organizations—departments and sections—are currently being set up in Russia's cities and rural regions according to place of residence or work. This work is progressing particularly vigorously in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, Irkutsk, and other republic cities. The editorial team has been selected for our newspaper OFFITSERKAYA CHEST [OFFICERS' HONOR].

The creation of the Russian Union of Reserve Officers will culminate this November in a constituent conference, which will adopt the statutes and elect the main board.

Tatar Prosecutor Aide Hits Formation of Armed Militia

*PM2410145791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Oct 91 First Edition p 1*

[TASS correspondents V. Dzhibuti and N. Sorokin report: "And What If the Philatelists Arm Themselves?"]

[Text] Kazan—Marat Musin, deputy prosecutor of the Tatar SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], called the actions of the Tatar Social Center [TSC] a direct violation of the law. At the request of your TASS correspondents, he commented on the Decree on Banning the Activity and Creation of Militarized Units and Formations on the Territory of Tataria issued by republic President Mintimer Shaymiyev.

"In violation of the law on social organizations, the TSC has busied itself with the creation of a paramilitary formation—a volunteer people's militia to which several thousand people already belong," Musin said. "What would happen if trade unions, parties, and unions of writers and philatelists start arming themselves and forming their own military detachments?"

The TSC resolution, according to Musin, makes out that the volunteer militia is an unarmed formation. It says that it is designed to defend citizens' rights, public order,

and the republic's installations and borders. So what do the members of the volunteer militia intend to defend them with? Sticks and plywood shields? No, there is no point in being naive here, the prosecutor stressed. The same document speaks of armed protection of the republic's interests.

RSFSR Guard Formation, Mission Viewed

92UM0037A Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Oct 91 p 2

[Interview with Major General Arkadiy Georgiyevich Baskayev by A. Drognev, occasion, date and place not specified, under rubric "Pertinent Interview": "Guardsmen for Russia"]

[Text] A session of the parliamentary Committee on Security was held in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet which examined the concept of the purpose and formation and the legal foundations for employment of the Republic Guard—public security troops of the Russian Federation. We offer a record of a talk with Major General A. Baskayev, a participant of this session.

[Drognev] Arkadiy Georgiyevich, could you substantiate in a general way the need for establishing the Republic Guard of Russia?

[Baskayev] Conclusions drawn by the special session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet from lessons of the coup d'état attempted in August were the principal starting point here. In addition, that is the will expressed by peoples of Russia fixed in the Declaration on State Sovereignty and aimed at protection of constitutional order by all lawful means and maintenance of public stability and the safety of citizens.

Based on this, we drew up a concept of the Republic Guard, which is to become a component part of the RSFSR's law protection system.

[Drognev] On what legal basis is it planned to form and then employ the Republic Guard of Russia?

[Baskayev] This must be incorporated in a special RSFSR Law as well as in a Statute approved by the President of Russia.

[Drognev] If possible, please tell about the missions to be assigned to the republic guardsmen.

[Baskayev] Above all it is to stop any actions by antigovernment forces aimed at removing from power a legally elected President of the RSFSR and other entities (legislative, executive, judicial) of republics, krais and oblasts that are part of the Federation. In addition, they must give assistance to law protection entities in normalizing the situation in regions gripped by social, ethnic and other conflicts, in stopping mass and group violations of the public order, and in fighting terrorism and organized crime. The guardsmen also will be used to give assistance in mopping up in the aftermath of natural disasters and major accidents and in ensuring quarantine

measures with the outbreak of epidemics and epizootics and with terrain contamination by toxic and radioactive substances.

[Drognov] What system of leadership of the Republic Guard is seen?

[Baskayev] Public security forces of the Russian Federation must be directly subordinate to the RSFSR President, but immediate leadership of them will be exercised by a commander in chief and military council appointed by presidential ukase. It is advisable to assign operational control of guardsmen locally to ministers of internal affairs of republics and chiefs of internal affairs administrations of krays and oblasts to the extent of their powers.

[Drognov] Reports have flashed in the press to the effect that active registration of volunteers for the Russian Guard already is under way, organizational structures are being established, and the question of arming, clothing and paying people for their service is being decided. What can you say on this account?

[Baskayev] At the session in the Supreme Soviet of Russia Pavel Grachev, chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense, emphasized that any independent action in establishing particular armed formations can lead only to subsequent destabilization of the situation in cities and communities of the Republic and is absolutely inadmissible. There is no question that this must be handled by professionals and on the basis of appropriate legal documents.

[Drognov] How will formation of the Republic Guard take place in practice?

[Baskayev] In the initial stage it is proposed to form it from RSFSR citizens who took a personal part in stopping the coup d'état of 18-22 August, who join the Guard on a voluntary (contract) basis, as well as from personnel of operational and special motorized units of the USSR MVD Internal Security Forces militia which are stationed on the territory of the Russian Federation and who did not taint themselves by executing criminal orders and instructions of the plotters and other illegal actions.

[Drognov] Does this mean that Internal Security Forces units and subunits presently on RSFSR territory will become the base for forming the Republic Guard?

[Baskayev] Without question, that proposal is fully justified. This is dictated by the fact that operational and special units of the USSR MVD Internal Security Forces militia are located in the majority of capitals of autonomous republics, oblasts and kray centers of Russia, have the necessary material-technical base and housing, and are manned by well trained officers, warrant officers and first-term servicemen who for the most part were called up by RSFSR military commissariats. In addition, the

personnel of these units have great experience in performing special missions and a rehearsed methodology of actions in extreme situations.

Thus an integral combination of the existing contingent of servicemen and of volunteers joining the Republic Guard on a contract basis will permit forming a Guard in the shortest possible time periods and with minimum material expenditures which will be ready at any minute to perform missions assigned it by direction of the USSR President.

[Drognov] Many probably are interested in what requirements will be placed on Republic Guardsmen candidates as well as the procedure for performance of duty and pay therefor."

[Baskayev] During 1992-1993 all Republic Guard force elements are to be transferred to a contract basis after legislatively incorporating the right of RSFSR citizens to join it on a voluntary basis from age 18. Service in the Guard will be equated to service in the country's Armed Forces and apparently will be three years; for 18 months of this time the guardsmen will be in a barracks situation with the granting of a guaranteed weekly day off and annual 30-day leave. Increased pay and other benefits are stipulated. For the next one-and-a-half years enlisted men and noncommissioned officers will be permitted to live in an apartment (at home or near the unit).

Those who have performed first-term service in the Armed Forces will be granted the right to conclude a contract for service in the Republic Guard from age 20.

All those joining the Guard will have to go through competition and pass a thorough medical examination and special testing, after which they will take the oath of allegiance to Russia and its President. A special uniform with symbolics of the Russian Federation is being developed.

I think it is advisable to assign training of officer cadres to one of the higher military schools of the USSR MVD after its special reprofiling, and the training of junior commanders and specialists can be organized on the basis of Internal Security Forces training units.

With respect to financial support, it must come from the budget of Russia. In the initial stage it will be necessary to demand and obtain funds from the Union budget which now go for the upkeep of operational and militia units of the Internal Security Forces, and also to attract voluntary donations of public organizations, commercial structures and individual citizens.

[Drognov] And the last question: How soon can we expect a final decision on the matter and essentially begin forming the Republic Guard of Russia?

[Baskayev] The necessary packet of documents has been drawn up and presented to the RSFSR President for approval. Now it is up to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

**Kravchuk Says Cabinet Must Approve Troop
Redeployment**

92UM0050A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
10 Sep 91 p 1

[Instruction issued by L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, "On the Procedure for Redeploying Military Formations and Military Educational Institutions Within the Territory of the Ukraine and Beyond its Borders"]

[Text] Kiev, 7 Sep 91—In accordance with the decree passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine on 24 August 1991, "On Military Formations in the Ukraine":

1. No military formation or military educational institution located on the territory of the Ukraine is to be

redeployed and no military equipment or weapons system is to be removed beyond its borders without the consent of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine.

2. Military formations may not be redeployed within the borders of the Ukraine and military units located in other areas may not be redeployed into the Ukraine without the consent of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine.

3. The Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine, the State Security Committee of the Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukraine and the Commission on Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine are charged with monitoring the implementation of this instruction.

Ethnic Groupings Dangerous Problem in Military
91SV0079A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Maryukha: "Ethnic Groupings as Dangerous as 'Dedovshchina': A New, Alarming Phenomenon in Military Collectives"]

[Text] Of all the letters on this topic received by the editors, this one differed in one respect. Of the two military construction units located near Moscow that were the brief duty stations of Turdybek Nurpolatov's son, the father described one of them as more or less the best subunit in the entire Armed Forces, referring to the other one as a collecting point for all kinds of vices. Nurbek Nurpolatov, as a member of the latter unit, experienced such heavy psychological pressure and outright violence that he could no longer withstand the humiliation and, as described by the father, was "forced to leave his unit and wander like a vagabond, winding up at his home."

The following day, I managed to locate the military construction detachment which N. Nurpolatov left without authorization, in city outskirts, close to a plant known throughout the nation. The letter led me to believe that I would find decrepit barracks, semi-intoxicated military builders looking for a fight with the first person they come across, and indifferent commanders who would have nothing to do with subordinates. However, no matter how closely I looked, I could not see the outrages the letter told about. By the same token, I would not go so far as to say that the unit was the best I had ever seen.

Major V. Perestoronin, the deputy commander of the military construction detachment, did not conceal the fact that the state of affairs in the detachment left something to be desired. It turned out that military builder N. Nurpolatov was certainly not the only person who had committed AWOL. In the second quarter of this year alone, the detachment listed 11 men as fugitives, one of which was given an early discharge; he should not have been inducted in the first place, because of, shall we say, the level of his mental development. Another one was a patient in the Hospital imeni Yakovenko for the same reason. Some of the fugitives are at large. Their homes are located in areas racked by interethnic conflicts. The men who either returned to their unit or were picked up by the provost service and subjected to disciplinary action have returned to duty. That included military builder Private Nurpolatov. It is true that a dispensation was made in his case by permitting him to remain in a unit located close to home.

Let us return to his previous duty station. Why did a young soldier who was transferred to a unit new to him leave this unit the following day, receive punishment for the first violation, only to turn around and commit AWOL a second time? It bears mentioning here that the latest case of humiliation of a man by a fellow serviceman occurred last year in the unit, after which the

guilty soldier was appropriately disciplined. Other barracks hooligans are kept in check by considerable pressure applied by the military procuracy and by the increasing interest in state of affairs in the unit exhibited by parents. Quite a bit has also been done by commanders—from effecting some improvement in routine garrison duty (something that "suffers" in the case of builders, for subjective and objective reasons) and in normal living conditions on the one hand, to the provision of additional feeding on the basis of subsidiary farm and greenhouse operation on the other.

"Nonetheless, we still receive reports of 'weak' rights violations from time to time," said Vladimir Vladimirovich Perestoronin. "They are 'quiet,' largely because there are no witnesses to the offenses, and also due to hesitation to lodge complaints on the part of the victims. There is little chance to spot rights violators some other way, since the victims as a rule can show no bruises or abrasions on their bodies."

Incidentally, those who dare to assault their fellow servicemen for no reason at all are known to command personnel, who take swift action against them. In addition, if one realizes that Nurpolatov himself had nothing against serving in his previous unit, in fact insisting on doing so, we must seek an explanation for his behavior somewhere else, in something other than hazing of recruits by older servicemen or lack of responsibility on the part of command personnel.

I would be less than honest if I were to say that the true cause came upon me all of a sudden or that I have never experienced anything of the sort. When I was starting my military service, I heard men use the word "fellow countryman" and its affectionate form "zema." The term "fellow countrymen" was employed by inductees in referring to men from the same rayon, region, or republic, naturally in the context of ethnic origin. The geographic principle was decisive in selection of friends; even length of service did not have any particular influence on this thinking among fellow countrymen. Protection of the weak and helping fellow countrymen were considered to be a matter of honor; the particular ethnic grouping involved did not show its "unconsecrated" side for some time.

Nonetheless, as it so often happens, righteous matters are often followed by immoral ones. Looking backward, it is difficult to pin down the beginning, the time when a community of fellow countrymen decided to take on another community, or an entire military collective, for that matter; the time of appearance of some kind of "Mafia of fellow countrymen," which has the strong prevail over everyone else in an attempt to facilitate the tour of duty of their fellow countrymen. There is this kind of "unofficial" structure in the unit abandoned by Nurpolatov, also. This kind of structure also exists in other military collectives, such as the one the unfortunate fugitive took a liking to, for example. There was a reason for this liking. With all conditions equal, the two units differed in one respect: In the second military

construction detachment, an ethnic grouping of Chechen held the upper hand, while in the first detachment Nurpolatov's fellow countrymen held sway. It goes without saying that the new location alone—even ignoring humiliation by fellow servicemen—frightened Nurpolatov out of his wits. On top of that, there is no real cause to bring charges against members of ethnic groupings. This is merely the initial manifestation of their inherent self-discipline, something that metes out punishment to those who dare to set their doubtful preferences above common interests. The grouping attempts to install its candidates in junior command assignments and endow them with unquestioned authority over other servicemen. In this connection, it sees no need for violence: The use of implied threats is sufficient. Discord arises only with change of personnel, a time when there is a struggle for influence in the unit or subunit. Thus, apparent calmness in a unit in which an ethnic grouping takes root is followed by domination of some servicemen by others.

Of course, hazing of recruits by older servicemen as a phenomenon manifested by individual hooligans still exists. It was the subject of a complaint in a letter written by the mother of Private Golubev, who is serving in Saratov Oblast. A telegram expressing alarm was sent by reserve officer Boronilov, whose son has also suffered from actions in violation of regulations in his tour in Zavitinsk, Amur Oblast. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to fail to take notice of a phenomenon as dangerous as the ethnic grouping.

There is no doubt about the pain caused us—military people—by the fact that the great, labor-intensive and, more than anything else, necessary and noble work that was being done to bring about ethnic harmony among personnel of the Army and Navy was not permitted to stand the test of time, in that it has suffered damages from the blows inflicted by the centrifugal ethnic trends existing in the country. Of the many concepts compromised by the propaganda that was in the service of the old administrative command system, I believe that the concept of internationalism is least deserving of this. A person asks himself again and again: Is it possible to draw boundaries between multi-ethnic families or set up demarcation posts on millions of pieces of land and postage-stamp size apartments housing representatives of nations and peoples? Is it possible to organize in any place of your choosing—let alone in unified Armed Forces—companies, battalions, and regiments, along the lines of “pure blood?”

Therefore, the concept of internationalism is now infused with a new meaning, a mutual show of respect for traditions, customs, and a right to exercise genuinely equal rights. This in my view has been most fully understood by persons who have gone through Osh, Fergana, Nagornyy Karabakh, and other “hot spots.” This kind of understanding is even showing up in the Armed Forces. There is a reason why a position of priority importance is attached in the Ministry of Defense Collegium's appeal to Armed Forces personnel

to problems of internal unity of military collectives, strengthening of military comradeship and soldierly friendship, formation of internationalist qualities among youth, and consolidation of age-old traditions of friendship between peoples. These problems must be resolved by the renewed agencies involved with combat training, with military, moral, and psychological education, and by all Army and Navy command and enlisted personnel working in close harmony with all nations and peoples whose representatives will be serving in the Armed Services of the renewed Union.

Critique of Military Judicial System

91SV0121A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 17 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by V. Sanatin: “A Uniform Does Not Become Themis. Military Tribunal Chairman Warns: Military Justice Is Dangerous for Society”]

[Text] Sverdlovsk—Our life changes abruptly indeed! Yesterday, they were preparing for arrests and interrogations, and today they are preparing a draft for a reform from the inside. A semi-closed system of military justice has never liked civilians, especially the mothers of soldiers, deputies, and journalists. This time, however, I was invited for a frank conversation by a military tribunal chairman, no less.

On 19 August 1991, Volga-Ural Military District Commander Albert Makashov ordered that cosmopolitans, emissaries, and generally all who happened by in the heat of the moment be detained, interrogated, and handed over to the justice organs. This was an occasion for military lawyers to raise a cry about the Constitution! Do you think that Judicial Service Colonel V. Yarovikov, military procurator of the Volga-Ural Military District, protested the punitive plans of the commander? You are mistaken. On the contrary, he even sent dispatches, from Samara across the Urals Range, in which he ordered that, if the situation deteriorated, operations teams be created to investigate cases of opposition to the regime proclaimed by the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency].

Now, after the fact, they might say that these orders did not apply to the civilian population, that they intended to apprehend the “cosmopolitans” in active units from among soldiers and noncommissioned officers... However, it is obvious that during the days of the coup, the Army was on a heightened combat readiness status. In this case, a choice had to be made whether to issue dry rations and crank up the tanks, or look for the unreliable ones among the personnel.

In the age of automatic, chemical, and nuclear weapons, what kind of an obscurantist does one have to be in order to demand from the Army new “revolutionary consciousness” and a new civil war? I cannot imagine what could have happened on 20 August in pro-Yeltsin Sverdlovsk. The revolutionary court panels of three, or five, or 10 (I do not know how Makashov envisaged this)

would have had to flush "cosmopolitans" out of virtually every apartment, every attic, plant, factory shop, and suburban gardening shack.

Now that the putsch has failed, we would like to ask the servicemen with revolutionary consciousness: Had you run in and interrogated all of us, what would have followed? Did you have camps for millions of dissenters, or would an open Russian field have been good enough? How did you interpret the word "cosmopolitan" and what did you count on? Would you have grabbed just anybody, or would you have asked the KGB for lists? After all, were not at least some grounds required to have civilians apprehended by the military procuracy and the Army?

The putsch has failed. It is quiet, but for how long? Military justice has not suffered from the timid protests of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies. They have the same cadres there, and the same contempt for the Constitution and human rights. Previously, they meted out punishment in the name of the revolutionary military tribunal, and now in the name of the commander!

No matter how they now substantiate the need to preserve the military procuracy, it protected the rights of soldiers poorly or not at all. The system was well suited for safeguarding the ambitions and schemes of the supreme command personnel. Why on earth would we preserve its right to its old, behind-the-scenes existence?

Now let us move on to specific people, those who have acquired the colonel's insignia within this system, and have seen and lived through a lot. I have a confession by Justice Service Colonel V. Bozrov, a military tribunal chairman, in my notebook.

He served honestly. Naturally, he sent people to disciplinary battalions. On many occasions, he issued death warrants for accused privates. He knew that procurators would support any guilty verdict. However, he noticed more and more often that serving honestly necessarily meant filing charges. To be sure, I did not believe Bozrov at first. I have hundreds of letters from the Army; half of these letters are about the reluctance of the prosecutors to look for those guilty. A crowbar fell on a soldier "inadvertently," an armored personnel carrier ran a soldier over "involuntarily," or a wire noose got tangled around a soldier's neck accidentally. There are no crimes in the unit, and everything is fine and dandy...

I was bewildered: How could it be? Here is Bozrov filing charges, putting people in prison, and cleansing the troops of all kinds of filth, but there is still tyranny in the Army... It came to me as an absolute revelation that the chairman of the garrison military tribunal has the right to file charges against privates, sergeants, and junior officers, but has to keep his hands off his brethren the colonels!

However, on one occasion Bozrov's patience ran out, and he crossed this banned line. Of course, he knew that Makashov's fist is heavier than the RSFSR [Russian

Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Code. However, he had had enough.

Commander of Military Unit 35474 Colonel Miroshnichenko "got into hot water" because of soldiers "going over the hill." He concealed some of the "runners" from lawyers. However, they deserted often, and everything could not be concealed. Soldiers began to recount such horrors during court proceedings... They are afraid of their unit. In the unit, those at fault were "hobbled," that is, bound hand and foot by using a board and a rope. A soldier may not be without sin before the law, but he felt like a calf in the slaughterhouse rather than a person under investigation. The command personnel of the unit did not find this to be a crime against a person. The person was, after all, a private.

This is how the criminal cases of soldiers spawned a new case, that against Colonel Miroshnichenko, in the outraged mind of Bozrov. Initially, Bozrov issued an interlocutory order. He was being cautious. They reported to the commander of the district Albert Makashov "for necessary measures to be taken" about Miroshnichenko's deeds.

The commander did not even respond. All kinds of people complain about a whole lot of things... However, in February 1991, it so happened that the chairman of the military tribunal had to revisit Military Unit 35474. The case of Private Shcherbinin was on the docket. The misdeed was the same: "going over the hill." For the duration of the investigation, the guy was left "under observation by the unit commander," that is, the already mentioned Miroshnichenko. What happened? On his own authority, Miroshnichenko confined Private Shcherbinin to a solitary cell at the guardhouse, and kept him there... for four months.

The man was smothered by dirt in solitary confinement. Scabies and a hernia almost did him in. God knows how Shcherbinin managed to flee from the guardhouse. However, he went to the militia thousands of kilometers away, in Novosibirsk, rather than in Sverdlovsk!

This time around, Bozrov was not too cautious. The court found the actions of Miroshnichenko to be criminal.

They would have preserved the honor of both the law and the common soldier but Bozrov's telephone started ringing. District Commander Albert Makashov was on the line:

—Are you Colonel Bozrov?

—Correct!

—What quarrel do you have with Colonel Miroshnichenko?

—There is nothing for us to quarrel about. I am head of a military tribunal, and he is a unit commander...

—Do you have a Captain Gaysin there.

- He is the judge who presided over the case?
- Is he an informal or what? Does he wear uniform or not?
- He is a judge...
- Straighten him out! Why would the captain make the commander report to him? He institutes some kind of case against colonels...

...On 20 August 1991, as they awaited a tank assault on the "White House" in Moscow, a rumor spread in Sverdlovsk that Albert Makashov flew to the oblast. I do not know whether the commander intended to fly to a Sverdlovsk wrapped up in rallies. However, I will definitely say that even had any of the supporters of the military regime succeeded in landing in Sverdlovsk Oblast, somewhere in Verkhnyaya Salda which is off limits, and organized a tank march toward the oblast seat, the military junta would have run into the stubborn sabotage of the persecution of the civilian population on the part of "their own people." Why? On 19 August, Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the Sverdlovsk Garrison Vladimir Bozrov gathered his colleagues together and said: "We will not do this. This is arbitrariness, bloodshed, and self-destruction! The plotters will be tried by the people!" At the civilian airport of Koltsovo, the going would have been particularly tough for Makashov: He could have been arrested there by armed forces loyal to democracy and the Russian Government, not necessarily the forces of the Army...

At present, the organizers of the coup d'état and their accomplices have plenty of time to think about what they failed to take into account. They failed to take into account the fact that after 70 years of barracks-style socialism, the generals with their epaulets ultimately pitted themselves against the enlisted men of the Army. They raped military Themis. They trampled on their gilded power which rested on "the most miraculous force in the world," the credulity of workers and peasants.

However, let us go back to Chairman of the Military Tribunal Bozrov. When Makashov in person upbraided him, his hands did not tremble. Later, in his quest for the truth, Bozrov got through to Yazov. They say that the minister of defense called unit commander Miroshnichenko himself and even referred to the fact that such people are popularly called "tyrants." For a future errant putschist, this was a surprisingly clear-cut view, provided, of course, that this is not a new army joke...

Apparently, at the time, the hands of Volga-Ural Military District Military Procurator V. Yarovikov, who was entirely devoted to the commander but hardly to the law, began shaking. The procurator, whose duty it is to uphold the law, did everything the other way around. He asked for records concerning Colonel Miroshnichenko, and found no "grounds to press criminal charges."

Albert Makashov continued to command the troops, the procurators, and the judges all at the same time... This was the time for Bozrov to lie low. Instead, he messed things up again.

Bozrov narrates: "I acquitted two privates. They wanted to press criminal charges against them for mutilation. They served in a construction battalion, Military Unit 49926. It turned out that they were worked 18 to 20 hours per day. They slept for five hours at best. Privates Bakov and Kolchenkov, whom I acquitted, repeatedly appealed to the command of the unit. Bakov had chronic asthma, and yet he did not part with a crowbar. He was losing his breath and asking to see a doctor, and they were telling him: "Apply yourself and cut out the grumbling!" At that time, Kolchenkov was the only bulldozer operator in the unit; he likewise worked on the production line day and night. He kept falling asleep right over the steering levers. It was not for sabotage purposes that these men came down with grave cases of pneumonia. They should have been given some time to restore their health after their discharge, but no, they were sent to do hard work again. The men gave in to despair. Older servicemen told them to rustle up a syringe and inject saliva into their feet. This is how they ended up in the hospital again. Of course, criminal proceedings were initiated later."

The ever-vigilant gaze of the procurator came to life: No acquittals, sentence them to a disciplinary battalion! Where was the procurator when the unit trampled on labor legislation? Military construction workers must work eight hours and not a minute more—this is the law!

Bozrov went on to say: "I keep wondering why our system has this kind of hatred for the soldier, this desire to smother and obliterate personality. For the office of a military procurator, the acquittal of a soldier is an emergency. The honor of the prosecution and of the uniform is besmirched. These are Yezhov's principles in a way: You start a case—you send him to the slammer! I thought about it a lot previously, and I have now come to the conclusion that military justice in its present form is dangerous for society. The army discharges intimidated and broken individuals into civilian life. The days of the putsch showed that military justice was an obedient rein in the hands of dyed-in-the-wool reactionaries. It turns out that, if ordered, we must arrest, interrogate, and haul off to the camps, anybody who is in the crowd on a square, who hides in his own apartment from the sacred 'revolutionary punishment,' or who has run away to the forest to avoid a burst of automatic weapons fire. This is madness!"

...So much for the confession of Military Tribunal Chairman Bozrov. However, what is the way out? Is there really no opportunity for changes? Let us level with each other while our conscience is still burning.

—You maintain that in the system of military Themis, 90 percent of the people are subjectively honest. It is quite likely. As early as 22 August, Makashov's

encrypted messages were handed over to the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet and went further on, to the Russian Government, from there. The Military Procurator's Office of Sverdlovsk was not silent either... However, do you think that this is enough for a reform of military justice to begin?

—After all, the curtain has been torn away! A call to disband military procurator's offices and tribunals was voiced even at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. However, this is not a way out but rather a left-wing onslaught. Only well-trained military lawyers with diplomas know the peculiarities of military service.

—That is to say, hands off military tribunals... Do you think that the mentality of military lawyers will change just because Sergeyev became district commander instead of Makashov?

—In this case, the system should be broken down. Military panels should be created at oblast and republic courts which have a civilian status. Perhaps, procurators and judges should get out of uniform altogether. Let us serve only the law! Those who are in favor of justice may wear any suit, as long as they carry the diploma and credentials of a military lawyer in the pocket...

—Do you propose to preserve military tribunals at the garrison level because Colonel Bozrov himself serves at this level?

—I am not concerned about myself. The word "tribunal" should not be in circulation at all. There should be courts instead of tribunals.

—I do not believe that garrison courts will stand alone... You are dead bolted to the district!

—This is what the government of Russia should urgently give some thought to. If the state wants to make courts independent it should build offices and residential buildings and provide transportation for lawyers. A cheap court system costs our fellow countrymen very dearly. Here is another point: Do you think that it is proper for me to pronounce a sentence "in the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics?" We conduct trials in keeping with laws in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Code, but pronounce sentences in the name of the Union. Why?

...Here we have military advocates of rights also taking their case to Russia. As the people now say, "We did not take you then, so you take us now!!"

Perhaps, they should be taken while the consciences of the honest people hurt and before they are quietly retired. Any punitive system has the capability to cleanse itself and regroup in order to strike another blow. What is Bozrov running away from? From the revolutionary-conscience, blindly furious past to a society of constitutional freedoms and individual rights. Do not stop him, and do not call him a "Pavlik Morozov."

Others repent in their kitchens. How is that better?

P.S. After this article was prepared for publication, it became known that president of the country M. Gorbachev issued a directive according to which the Ministry of Justice, the USSR Supreme Court, and the USSR Procuracy, together with the Ministry of Defense, were instructed to review within two months the issue of the feasibility of further operations by military tribunals, organs of military justice, and procurator offices within the USSR Armed Forces.

Ambassador to Poland on Morale, Conditions Among NGF

92UM0038A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Oct 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Poland Yuriy Borisovich Kashlev by Supernumerary KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain A. Maksimchuk, Northern Group of Forces: "Yu. Kashlev: We Will Defend Our Position"]

[Text] USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Poland Yu. Kashlev recently visited several Northern Group of Forces [NGF] garrisons. He and NGF Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General V. Dubynnyy met with servicemen and acquainted themselves with their living and service conditions. Our Supernumerary Correspondent Captain A. Maksimchuk conducted an interview with the Soviet ambassador.

[Maksimchuk] Yuriy Borisovich, what caused your trip through the military garrisons?

[Kashlev] The Soviet Embassy in Poland is attempting to maintain the maximum working contacts with the NGF command staff and servicemen. This is primarily caused by the fact that we are working together on one of the most important political problems that exists between the USSR and Poland. And it is—the problem of concluding a treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Republic of Poland. To a certain degree our embassy considers itself responsible for the fate of the large military contingent that is located abroad.

I need to say that right now the problem of concluding a treaty on the troop withdrawal has the most important place in the total complex of Soviet-Polish relations. The solution of the other problem—also very important—conclusion of a new inter-state treaty between the USSR and the Republic of Poland—is approaching a logical end. The texts have been approved. But unfortunately we have not been able to achieve a complete mutual understanding in that portion where it discusses the NGF withdrawal. Everything comes down to not only such important details as the time periods of the withdrawal and the number of servicemen remaining in Poland in 1993, that is, for the time to support the transit

of Soviet troops from Germany, but also the fact that our society and our Supreme Soviet consider the solution of the issue of NGF property, the cost of which is measured in billions of rubles, to be extremely important. Our people and parliament cannot permit this property to be left behind and abandoned. Mutual rational steps from both sides are needed here to achieve a compromise.

[Maksimchuk] What perceptions did the meetings with the servicemen leave with you?

[Kashlev] Today the Army is going through those same processes that our society is. As far as I understand it, servicemen are very seriously pondering not only about their own futures. They are pondering the future of the state. Judging by the questions they asked, our officers are increasingly interested in how the country will develop further, not so much in a purely military sense but, in the universal context: how we will enter the world economy and how we will prevent the total collapse of our state which will inevitably have a negative impact on the world situation. This is the circle of problems that concern servicemen.

Of course, they are also very concerned about the problem of where and how to return. This is already an issue, as the English have said, a bread and butter issue. That is, where they will live in the future and how they will feed themselves. I need to say that there has been

insignificant progress along the path of resolving these problems. Therefore, along with the grand politics which undoubtedly interest NGF servicemen, they are sharply faced with purely mundane problems. I think that our state is applying inadequate efforts to eliminate the concerns of military people with regard to the difficulties associated with the impending return to the Homeland.

[Maksimchuk] Yuriy Borisovich, I would like to hear your opinion with regard to the time periods for the withdrawal of our troops from Poland. What do you think, will our diplomats manage to defend their compromise proposal on this paragraph of the treaty?

[Kashlev] We are occupying a firm position which consists of the fact that, not due to political and military considerations but, due to socio-humanitarian considerations—we need to withdraw the main strike forces—NGF combat units—prior to the end of 1992. But a substantial number of troops must remain on Polish territory until 1993 to support the transit and execution of other missions associated with the elimination of the NGF. On this issue, both of our ministries—both defense and foreign affairs—occupy a single position. They are also defending it at the negotiations. We hope that our Polish colleagues will understand our concern. All the more so since it has been caused not by some sort of anti-Polish sentiment but by purely economic and socio-humanitarian matters.

Permission Sought to Sell 4,000 Far East Tanks

LD2310230491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2150 GMT 23 Oct 91

[from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] According to a KOMMERSANT magazine report, 4,000 tanks from the Far Eastern Military District would be prepared to make a move abroad, somewhere to Southeast Asia, if permission to sell them was available. The idea of leaders of the district was to conclude a currency deal, the first one in its history, to sell the tanks to the (Cohab) South Korean firm. But, in their words, Defense Minister Shaposhnikov forbade the dispatch of the combat vehicles until the status of the Far Eastern Military District is finally clarified. [Video shows tanks on open railroad cars]

Commander of Taman Division Relieved

92UM0045A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Oct 91 p 3

[Interview with Major General Valeriy Ivanovich Marchenkov by Sergey Kornilov under the rubric "The State Committee for the State of Emergency: Who's Who": "Commander of Taman Division Relieved of Position for... Preventing Bloodshed"]

[Text] On 13 September Major General Valeriy Marchenkov, commander of the Guards Taman Division, was relieved of his command. The fact was made public almost two weeks later. And this occurred because of a group of officers of the Taman Division who undertook a campaign in defense of their commander.

Obeying an order from the State Committee for the State of Emergency, the Taman Division, with 700 combat vehicles and more than 2,000 soldiers, entered Moscow on 19 August.

[Kornilov] Valeriy Ivanovich, I learned in a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Chistyakov, your deputy commander, that you were relieved of your position by an oral order. Who issued the order?

[Marchenkov] The district commander telephoned me on 13 September and said that I was relieved of my position by order of the minister of defense.

[Kornilov] Without giving the reasons?

[Marchenkov] Yes. And I was required to turn over my position temporarily to the division chief of staff.

[Kornilov] Almost two weeks have gone by. Has there been any information from the ministry?

[Marchenkov] No, there is still no written order.

[Kornilov] Have you yourself spoken to Shaposhnikov about it?

[Marchenkov] I do not have the right to go over the head of my immediate superior. On Monday, 16 September, I saw district commander V. Toporov. I had a long conversation with him and had his support. With his assistance I arranged a meeting with V. Semenov, commander in chief of Ground Forces. The commander in chief sent a commission to our division. After studying the matter the commission's conclusions coincided with those of the Moscow Oblast Soviet. They were positive.

[Kornilov] What do you think is behind this? You are apparently being accused of taking part in the putsch?

[Marchenkov] That appears to be the case.

Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Chistyakov entered into the discussion:

A commission should obviously have been involved in the removal of a division commander, certainly a division such as ours, known to the entire world. But this was done by telephone. Just like that! The officers received the news with surprise and anger. There should be some sort of social protection for people. Civilian or military. That makes no difference. On 18 September we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the awarding of the Guards title to the division. Official representatives and representatives of the ASKO firm attended. They rewarded a large group of officers and enlisted men for their heroic defense of the White House. After all, it was due to the division commander that there was not more bloodshed on the night of the 20th.

We entered the city at the order of the State Committee for the State of Emergency but took no initiative after that. It was clear that even if it became necessary to declare a state of emergency, there was no need to bring in tanks. Upon entering the city our concern was to prevent bloodshed. Incidentally, even the incident in which a man was crushed occurred because the battalion commander had been removed from action. He was replaced by a platoon commander, a long-timer. You can imagine how much he wanted to justify the confidence. At any cost! He needed to set up the posts. And he did....

[Kornilov] Valeriy Ivanovich, time has passed. How would you personally assess your actions during those days? If, God forbid, there should be another such situation, what would you do today?

[Marchenkov] An interesting question. From the standpoint of the army, however, whoever issues an order must bear responsibility for it. This is the army, and there can be no vagueness in the army. It must be controlled. Otherwise it will disintegrate. In emergency situations such as this the decisions must be collective, issued in the name of the Supreme Soviet. After all, if the minister of defense issues an order, all the armed forces must obey it. It is time for us to learn, however, that actions against the civilian population are out of the question. We need to rule out shooting and breakthroughs by combat or wheeled vehicles. Once and for

all. The army should not take part in political games in general. It has no place there.

[Kornilov] What do you think? Would it not be a good thing to include this proposal in the military regulations?

[Marchenkov] Of course. Incidentally, until 1937 the Red Army regulations contained the concept "criminal order." It was later removed from the regulations.

[Kornilov] Are you in favor of putting it back in?

[Marchenkov] Absolutely. We need to do so.

[Kornilov] One last question. Let us assume the worst, that those who are deciding your fate today are incapable of considering the situation deliberately, calmly and thoroughly. What will you do?

[Marchenkov] As far as I know, a positive opinion is taking shape at the top. Otherwise, let a court decide. There are many witnesses to my positions and actions in that situation.

Profile of Air Defense Forces Survival Training Center*91SV0115A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Sep 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent N. Astashkin: "Some Pilots Go to the Air Defense Forces Survival Training Center As if It Were a Picnic"]

[Text] The only station for psychological and physiological training of the flight personnel of the Air Defense Forces is located in a picturesque spot, amid mountains, right on the shore of the Black Sea. About 1,200 people are taught survival skills here between May and October annually. Within one week (this is precisely how long the program is), aviators, as a rule, parachute twice over water and spend a day trekking through the mountains where they refine survival techniques, learn to build a fire, put up a shelter, procure food, give first aid, and so on.

It is self-evident how important such practices are for all servicemen, to say nothing of the pilots of the Air Defense Forces. After all, it is no secret that their spheres of responsibility frequently lie along our borders, which means mountainous and forested areas, deserts, tundra, taiga, and the expanse of the sea. You would agree that a pilot who ejects and faces extreme conditions will not necessarily come out of this on top.

In the center, they teach the pilots not to be at a loss in critical situations.

L. Kolyada, a serviceman of the Soviet Army and a mountain climbing instructor, shared his thoughts: "Survival techniques are as much a part of combat training as, for example, weapons training or hand-to-hand combat. Our objective is to teach the people to overcome circumstances, to survive when it appears that there is no way out of the embrace of death. It is another matter how much one can learn in one week."

Food for thought: The American army has 36 similar survival training centers. In our country, there are only seven, out of which only four are in operation: three in the Air Force and one in the Air Defense Troops. It appears that the Americans do not have to worry about many of the problems which exist in our centers and interfere with the proper organization of instruction.

Observing preparations by pilots for parachute jumps, I noticed the following detail: Almost all of them headed for the helicopter wearing swimming trunks. I asked the chief of the station, Major P. Kabalnov, why?

Pavel Leonidovich replied: "Pilots should parachute wearing overalls and special suits in order for the situation which we simulate to be close to the truth. However, the trouble is that we cannot provide clothing for them for jumps over water. As far as their own overalls are concerned, many people are simply reluctant to use them. They turn into rags after you jump twice into salt water. We do not have special footwear for our trainees

either. Meanwhile, if you wear our boots for a day walking through the forest, over the dew, they come apart."

Other simplifications also perceptibly reduce the quality of training of the flight personnel. Thus, relevant documents which regulate the operation of the station do not provide for the use of pyrotechnics. The officers do not have an opportunity to perfect their skills by firing their personal firearms. Is this not the reason why many of them come here as if it were a recreational picnic, frequently with their wives and children?

Kabalnov said: "On the one hand, we can understand them. It is not every year that a pilot manages to get away to the sea shore for a week, so they take their entire families along. On the other hand, we have no facilities to put up family members, and we have to plead with the managers of tourist hotels which are located nearby. Even when we do get an opportunity to put them up, we cannot charge them for their beds because later there is nowhere to enter the receipt of these funds. So, they live free of charge for a week."

On occasion, "dead souls" arrive at the survival center. In other words, people far removed from aviation are referred here from air force units. Thus, some time ago Medical Service Lieutenant V. Ziyangirov, who had no business at all being here, was sent to the station from Sverdlovsk for psychological and physiological training. Likewise, there was no point in the chief of the landing zone, Captain S. Stratenko, and the regimental engineer, Major K. Bryazgalov, coming here. Major Kabalnov explained how they end up in the center as follows. In all regiments, there is a shortage of flight personnel. At times, there is nobody to go on duty, practice flight assignments, or ferry planes. This is why some zealous bosses, when they receive orders to send a pilot to the station, grab the first officer they can find, who at times is far removed from flying and even aviation, and dispatch him to the Black Sea. On occasion, some of them stop over en route where their relatives or loved ones live, and later come here and ask that a mark be placed on their travel orders. How can we call this approach to training serious?

It is easy to appreciate the pain heard in the voice of Major P. Kabalnov. After all, in the not-so-remote past he was a fighter pilot, a Category 1 military pilot. He has 20 years of service in the Armed Forces under his belt, out of which he flew fighter aircraft for eight years over the Pacific, getting hundreds of kilometers out to sea. Pavel Leonidovich recalls that in all this time, he practiced parachute jumps over water just once.

Here, all the necessary conditions are available to perfect one's combat training. Alas, individual pilots do not understand this. For example, last year 15 officers refused to take the mountain trek. You would agree that this is an alarming symptom.

Lev Kolyada, a climbing instructor, explained: "Here, we teach the pilots only the basics of the survival science.

We actually teach them to walk, like you do little children. Indeed, we teach them simply to walk the land. It is not the instructor that teaches them but rather the mountain, the slope. Of course, I can demonstrate techniques in the athletic facility of the station, too. However, you would agree that one would not grasp a technique until he feels it himself, having gone over a mountain side or negotiated a particular obstacle. This is why we teach pilots survival skills element by element. Primarily, we teach them how to use survival gear. For example, the gear includes a halyard which is 14 meters long and can help in going up or down a mountain slope. The halyard may also be used to secure oneself. We also teach officers how to obtain food by using plants, how to sleep on stony surfaces where neither branches nor other

improvised means are available. In a word, we teach them to survive under any conditions..."

As I was leaving the station for psychological and physiological training, I asked Major Kabalnov: "How many times can a pilot of the Air Defense Forces practice at the survival center?"

Having thought for a moment, he replied:

"Not more than once in five years."

Well, it is not too often. If we take into account the reserved attitude of some pilots to this segment of combat training the picture will appear altogether grim.

Indebtedness for Ropukha Order from Polish Firm

91SV00119A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by TASS correspondent Petr Cheremushkin for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA under the rubric "Russia and the World": "Instead of Tanks for the Arabs—Overcoats for NATO"]

[Text] Over the decades the Bumar mechanical engineering combine in Labedy has been one of the most privileged in Poland. The enterprise's collective has been granted privileges in the distribution of apartments and houses of recreation. The workers have received high wages. Combat vehicles coming off the combine's conveyor have been delivered mainly to the Arab countries. Some of them even have ended up in the Polish Army.

The difficulties the enterprise is experiencing now are typical of all Polish heavy industry and its basic branches, and, unfortunately, they are unavoidable. Since the beginning of the implementation of the program for strict economy, which has been given the name the Balcerowicz plan, workers in the defense sector have been forced to deal with such forgotten concepts as the combination of supply and demand.

As a result of the restructuring of the enterprise, about 2,000 people have left it. There was not enough money to pay for sabbaticals for workers engaged in mental labor either. The wages of the production sector were threatened.

The newspaper ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE reported that in 1990, by a decision of the government, the level of products produced at the combine was set at 160 units. But by that time the budget of the Ministry of the Defense industry had been almost used up. The government gave permission to export tanks, and then an agreement was signed for the delivery of 625 artillery prime movers to the Soviet Union. But, as the local press writes, after the war in the Persian Gulf, the USSR refused to buy these machines.

Not long before the beginning of the combat operations in the Persian Gulf, the signing of a new contract for the delivery of tanks to Syria was made public. This promised the enterprise a comfortable future. But during the Gulf war the government canceled it. At that time Czechoslovakia took over the transaction and Bumar lost the order.

Credit was needed in order to prevent the enterprises' last signs of life from being snuffed out. The Bumar

board of directors asserts that all it wanted was guarantees of credit for the next couple of months, but the enterprise needed about 200 billion zlotys. In the opinion of the leaders of the production association, this sum would make it possible to live through the most difficult period. At the end of the third quarter, as a result of cooperation with Krupp, the money should appear. Bumar hopes that by that time it will be able to realize contracts with factories in Czechoslovakia and also, through intermediaries (an enterprise in Swidnica), with the Soviet Union.

And recently the GAZETA WYBORCZA referred to the fact that the Soviet Army owed \$36 million (400 billion zlotys) to the Northern Shipyard in Gdansk for building a ship like the Ropukha, an amphibious warfare ship with a displacement of 3,600 tons. A special brigade arrived from the USSR to receive the ship, but so far not a single dollar has been paid, the newspaper reports. They owe the ship building enterprise 500 billion zloty and it does not have enough money to pay the wages of its workers.

Ways of extricating the defense industry from its crisis were considered at a meeting of the Polish Council of Ministers. The directions and priorities for development should ensue from the long-term programs pertaining to modernization of arms and the creation of new models of arms were discussed at the meeting. The implementation of these programs will be based on government orders to self-financed enterprises. Enterprises of the defense sector will function on a concession basis and be oriented toward market activity.

The weekly SPOTKANIA reports that 10 of the 82 enterprises of the Polish defense industry will not be subject to privatization. The conditions for privatization of another 17 will be determined by the Republic Council of Ministers. To a question about their desire to remain under the jurisdiction of the defense sector, the leaders of 81 firms answered in the affirmative and only one in the negative.

People in the Ministry of Industry think that there is nothing barring the creation of joint stock companies, with the state retaining 51 percent participation, to replace state enterprises. The creation of joint ventures and the participation of foreign capital are welcomed. Western firms have already expressed interest in cooperation with Poland in such branches as radar equipment and the aviation industry.

When arms are purchased abroad the importation of ready made products will be combined with collaboration and production cooperation. This will make it possible to find new technologies and also take advantage of technical and financial assistance in the introduction of new models. And for now Poland is making uniforms for servicemen in NATO armies.

Supply Cutbacks Impact on Naval Training

91SV0069A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Sep 91 First edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Maryuka, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Everyday Life of the Navy": "Priority—for Base Training"]

[Text] When I asked Vice Adm A. Kuzmin, chief of Navy Combat Training, to tell me about problems in organizing the training of naval personnel, Anatoliy Alekseyevich suggested that I talk with officers in the leading Combat Training sections. Much of what I was told has already been the subject of repeated articles in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Who, for example, is not aware of the cut in funding for defense, which has produced a growing wave of problems. The Navy was not pampered even in the past with ship repair services, let us say, and periods between repairs have now increased even more. There is not enough oil, fuel or paint. The entire fleet was barely able to scrape up 30 kilograms of alcohol for testing the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuzu Kuznetsov, for example, while ten times that amount is needed on the ship. They have to worry even about emery paper, not to speak of sets of spare parts, instruments and accessories, targets, simulators and different technical and other equipment essential for the combat training.

"But this is just the visible part of the iceberg," Rear Adm O. Chefonov said, and added to the list. "What I mean is that these are problems of the individual ship, submarine or fleet force. The Navy uses diverse forces for carrying out its missions, and there are serious problems here as well, having to do with the organization of interaction and the exercise of precise control. Standard command and control systems for all the arms of naval forces have been under development for a long time, but their completion, once again, is being held up by lack of financing."

"This is why, when surface ships and submarines interact, communication is effected in the old way: 'One, One, this is Two...,'" Capt 1st Rank A. Pozdnyakov entered the conversation to say.

"And what a lot of work we have to do to neutralize the negative influence of design defects upon the combat and technical readiness of the ships," added Capt 1st Rank V. Dobrovolskiy, his colleague and a candidate of military sciences. "What is more, this is done by the seagoing officers and seamen during the time designated for combat training, frequently at the expense of their rest. We also have to rearrange the organic schedule, posting watch at the most unreliable assemblies and mechanisms, which is also an extra load on the seamen."

So what? It has been known for a long time that people whose devotion to their chosen occupation is due not to material incentives but to genuine enthusiasm and selfless devotion serve in the navy. But this is true almost universally in the Armed Forces. What is the effect, for

example, of the introduction of two "cabbage" days in the rations of submariners on Kamchatka. But the personnel continue to serve, although even in an impoverished cooperative they could provide themselves and their families with a normal "meat" week. Furthermore, they do not simply serve but strive to perform their duty in the best possible manner. More than 80% of the year's combat training plan has been completed, and numerous new tactical training techniques and methods have been worked out. With respect to the departures of ships to sea in general, their scheduled numbers have been cut in recent years for purely economic reasons. Despite this, however, the intensity of the combat training has increased 1.5- to 1.7-fold. This is due first of all to the fleet's conversion primarily to qualitative indicators.

"In addition," Capt 1st Rank V. Dobrovolskiy continued, "the conversion of the navy to a 2-year service term made it necessary to revise the combat training system. On the surface ships we switched to simultaneous-cycle combat training. This means that the combat training programs designed to take a year will now be "compressed" to fit into the training period, that is, twice a year. And in order to squeeze some time out of the schedule and save on motor life, the missions involving joint sailing are being practiced simultaneously with the training of individual ships. If we had a professional navy, this problem would not exist. With the 2-year service term and the replacement of 27-29% of the personnel twice a year, however, which in turn results in a shifting of more than half the crew, we lose the level of combat readiness we have achieved, and we have to start the training from scratch every time. For professional seamen, however, it would be enough to work through things with a crew once and add it to the permanently ready forces, and, with regular activities on a specific schedule, to monitor and maintain the skills acquired. This would be easier for the trainees and economically advantageous. And so there are no opponents of a professional navy in the Navy's Combat Training.

But we need to look at things realistically. In my opinion, it is not realistic at the present time to think of switching from the draft to the contract manning system. Warrant officers are professionals, for example, and they enter the navy on a volunteer basis. For more than a decade now, though, the Navy's ships have been at only slightly more than 43% of normal manning with warrant officers. Why? Because it is more than just high wages which determines a professional's willingness to serve in the navy. An entire group of problems must be solved in order to fulfill the reciprocal commitments.

"We recently visited a force of the Northern Fleet, which is conducting an experiment with contract service," Anatoliy Alekseyevich Pozdnyakov said, continuing with his thoughts. "And the force commander immediately 'barraged' us with questions. What do we do with those wanting to sign a contract? How much are they to be paid, and out of what funds. What benefits do we establish for these people? Where are we to find even the

dormitories for the future professionals? Once again, a good decision was made, but there is no economic foundation, no reliable 'logistics.'"

The Navy, I was told by these men, with figures in hand, has introduced a regimen of strict conservation of fuel and motor life. The ships are no longer "dispatched" to sea to practice some individual combat exercise. This means that we must raise the level of the combat training by at least an order. Significant changes have been effected in it, of course. A system of in-base exercises has been introduced, for example. This has made it possible to work out the entire set of actions for a specific practical mission at an organically equipped site with all the force's personnel, from the commander down to the last operator. The advantages include a higher level of direction of the exercise and simultaneous training of personnel and staffs, along with the testing of their readiness to go to sea and carry out on one cruise an entire group of missions involving mutual support. There is a shortage of simulators at the bases, however, and the shipboard equipment has to be "pushed." Nor are there enough training centers where good specialists can be trained rapidly and on modern equipment.

"The submariners have several centers where the crews train," A. Pozdnyakov said. "But then the equipment

there became obsolete a long time ago, and there is no housing for the trainees. We need to train several dozen missile specialists, for example, but there is nowhere to house them at the training center."

"I wish I had your problems," Capt 1st Rank V. Dobrovolskiy parried. "We in the surface fleet do not have this possibility. We simply cannot train specialists centrally because of differences in the technical equipment on the ships, and experience has shown that training right on the ships is ineffective. This means that we have to think about creating standardized systems to replace the 400 different types of equipment comprising the radioelectronic armament on surface ships. For now we are making do by working up new training methods and incorporating them into documents for the future. This is only buying time, however, and in the future the need to automate the training systems and improve the material and technical support for the combat training will grow even more acute."

The Navy understands the difficulties of the times in which the nation finds itself, just as they understand (but better, perhaps, than others) the need for changes in the qualitative state of the navy. It is therefore all the more important for those things about which I was told to be heard.

Reflections on Size of Officer Corps

92UM0054A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 39,
Sep 91 pp 15-16

[Article by Anatoliy Kravtsov: "Bee Glue or How Good it Is To Be a General"]

[Text] This material was prepared for publication prior to the coup d'etat and much of what is discussed here was perceived as a warning of what perhaps would not come true. But it did come true. Everything that had been languishing in society's pores and in the depths of the apparat manifested itself during the course of those three August days.

Do we have many military people in the USSR? And among them, are there many generals? Are there many generals and officers among civilians? The question is not quite as strange as it may appear at first glance. And, in general, how militarized is our society?

Let us observe various all-union meetings. How many different colored trouser stripes and large stars on shoulder boards! From time to time, it seems that this is not a Party congress, not a deputy's meeting, but a conference of generals. A USSR Supreme Soviet session provides some sort of impression on the degree of militarization of our society. Recall how the fate of political organs in the Armed Forces was resolved during a discussion of the law on public organizations. Troubled generals formed up in lines at the microphones. They defended: They got by with only renaming the main political directorate.

Name just one non-military union ministry that has delegated 13 deputies of the first rank to the people's deputy corps as the Ministry of Defense did. Indeed, the minister also had quite a few deputies—15. There not being a constitutional prohibition on the deputation of ministers, they could all be deputies, even the minister of defense, of course, like in the good old days.

Yes, why do they have to take it so high? Look into Moscow's morning crowd. Nearly every tenth man is in uniform and wearing stars. Many people have other military signs: some have—trousers with piping and others have specially-cut boots and practical cloak-capes. Besides this, many people change clothes and look just like civilians in a crowd.

Take a military representative. Until 1964, they went to work in uniform and later they camouflaged them: passers-by met what seemed to be totally civilian people but with traces of cockades on their hats, in trousers with piping, but wearing jackets without shoulder boards. Now you will not notice such sins.

But how many of them, military representatives, are there? There is a military acceptance office at each defense enterprise. There are two or even three at some enterprises. Each mission is headed, as a rule, by a colonel. But lieutenant colonels and majors sit in the shops and departments. A major in the Armed Forces is a battalion commander with

more than a hundred subordinates as a minimum. At a plant, a major is most often not especially burdened with subordinates.

Sometimes you walk along the plant grounds and you see: a group of officers is sedately walking into their shop and an element of three majors is walking toward the design department. Both those and the others are indistinguishable in dress from production engineers and skilled craftsmen or from inspectors and designers, everyone is wearing civilian clothes. Indeed, people in uniform also end up in the plant stream. Here are soldiers from a military construction detachment attached to the plant and they are walking with shovels and pick axes to dig a ditch. And there a group of builders-soldiers is loitering with nothing to do.

But there an officer from Kotlonadzor [boiler inspection] is sedately stamping his feet toward his high pressure boiler. Impeccably dressed lieutenants and captains are slowly walking at a measured pace. This is the fire supervision. The inspector general officer from the intelligence service that watches over the plant has walked by....

This picture is an ordinary photograph of an ordinary work day of an ordinary civilian enterprise. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the entire economy in our country is literally permeated with military personnel and controlled by them. And not only the economy. There are military personnel with conductors' batons. There are military personnel with artists' paintbrushes. Hundreds of officers sit in the editorial offices of military newspapers and magazines in Moscow. Yes and, it would seem, there are active duty military personnel in the purely civilian mass media.

Besides active duty military personnel, retired and reserve officers are having an impact on administrative, public, cultural, and other life. It is no secret that they fill many civilian jobs as the heads of enterprise and institution cadre departments, active and mobilized subunits, secret departments, passport bureaus, guards, and many other services. While being discharged into the reserves or when retiring, officers and generals do not go to lathes, coal mines, or tractors, but fill altogether different cells of the economic organism, imparting to it a metastasis of bureaucratism, inertness, dogmatism, and overcautiousness that is inherent to army people and with which they have been reliably saturated during their service time.

In no other country in the world, not even the most militarized, is there such dominance of military personnel or such influence by them on the entire political, public, economic, and spiritual life.

In our country, we are accustomed to speaking about the military-industrial complex but it would be more correct to have in mind the military-industrial-Party complex.

Let us turn to such a phenomenon as temporary duty assignments of active duty servicemen from the Ministry of Defense to other departments. This phenomenon has acquired an unprecedented scale so that we have had to

reflect this phenomenon in the draft military reform concept. This mission is contained there: "...to examine the possibility of reducing... nearly 50 percent of the officers who have been on temporary duty assignments to civilian ministries and departments to carry out work of a defense nature."

Fifty percent is a relative indicator. Let us name absolute figures. According to the situation as of December 1990, there were 3,111 men (82 generals, and 3,029 officers) on active duty military service outside the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Active duty officers and generals work in 45 departments, ministries, and organizations.

You can find more than one large military unit with generals and colonels who are performing service in the military-industrial complex. For example, 404 officers and seven generals serve in Minradioprom [Ministry of the Radio Industry]. Thirty generals and 540 officers serve in Minaviaprom [Ministry of the Aviation Industry], Minradioprom [Ministry of the Radio Industry], Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry], and other Ministry of Defense industrial sectors, taken together. But it would seem that the Minavtoselkhoz mash [Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building] is an entirely civilian department. One general and eight officers are serving there. And totally civilian ministries also cannot get by without military personnel—foreign affairs, public health, and the medical industry. There are a total of three generals and 191 officers serving there.

And why are one general and 17 officers performing temporary duty in the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases? Why are they at the Minrybkhkh [Ministry of the Fish Industry] and USSR Goskino [State Committee for Cinematography]? The Ministries of Foreign Economic Relations and Finance, USSR Goskomgidromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology], USSR Gosavianadzor [State Committee for Supervision of Aviation], and even the USSR Academy of Sciences also have their military personnel.

The CPSU Central Committee and the VLKSM [Communist Youth League] Central Committee have had a solid link to the Ministry of Defense. The 29 staff bureaucrats there received an allowance according to military rank (for a colonel, it totaled 180 rubles and for a major-general—R300) in addition to their salaries.

A poor old lady from an out-of-the-way area of Vologda, who found herself in a Pavlov's snare on January 23, not having the opportunity to leave for her village to exchange two hidden hundred ruble notes, would never have guessed that these savings of hers are simply child's play, they are one and a half times less than the monthly allowance for a general who "serves" at the CPSU Central Committee.

Seven officers and three generals were on temporary duty to the CPSU Central Committee (plus another 17 generals and

officers on a voluntary basis). There are another two generals on temporary duty to the CPSU TsKK [Commission of the Central Committee] and a colonel is also there. Republic Party structures also have active duty military personnel. Did they not compose the military portion of the Committee of National Salvation and did they not elaborate a clumsy, bloody scenario for the seizure of Vilnius Television Center?

When the military department at the CPSU Central Committee was disbanded under pressure from without, its workers did not "go to the people" but wandered into management and state structures. A former CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, who was responsible for military matters, although he did not wear shoulder boards or piping on his trousers and who did not end up in the new composition of the CPSU Central Committee, was calmly assigned to the Ministry of Defense staff of general inspectors.

There were also enough generals and general directors on the parliamentary committee on defense affairs and state security (now already disbanded). This committee was also "reinforced" by seven CPSU Central Committee members and a CPSU Central Committee Politburo member—an All-Army Partkom secretary. And a former CPSU Obkom secretary headed it.

Knowing all of this, should we be surprised that laws on conversion, defense, the status of servicemen, and other laws on military reform did not appear during two years of legislative work. Even the military reform concept itself has not been approved.

As we see, the Ministry of Defense with which the CPSU shared cadres, having manned the main military-political directorate, did not remain in its debt and transferred some of its own cadre to the CPSU and to the hottest work sectors. All of these general directors, chief designers, and other civilians generals from industry, along with military personnel, permeate all of our society. This strata, like bee glue in a beehive, sticks to everything that must be stuck. But in contrast to a beehive, where the number of drones is self-regulated by the bee family and cannot exceed a certain biological need of critical significance, our Soviet family, despite all of the reductions and reorganizations, can in no way avoid excess drones or excess "bee glue." And all because the "beekeeper" is that very same CPSU.

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Former Servicemen Asking to Rejoin Armed Forces
91SV0081A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Sep 91 First edition, p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Poroskov: "'Return Me to the Service'"]

[Text] The newspaper has repeatedly returned to the topic of the discharge of officers from the Armed Forces. Twice we conducted analyses of the letters of officers desiring to

leave the army. ("I am Writing With Pain and Hope," 25 January 1990; "I Ask Assistance," 5 January 91). From their number, and at times insistent tone, it was possible to judge the breadth and strength of "emigration" frames of mind among the officers, especially the young officers.

Nor has this stream run dry today. But, recently an opposing stream has also appeared. What has prompted people, after a rather short time, to request reinstatement? This is the subject of the notes by our correspondent, who became familiar with many applications in the cadres directorates of the various armed services.

Several days were enough for construction engineer, Lt Ruslan Makashov, to go home, look around, and return along with his mother to ask the command for reinstatement in his position as a training brigade engineer. For his entire life a strange entry will remain in the officer's personnel file: discharged on 7 February; reinstated on 27 March 1991.

Ruslan's destiny was taking shape rather well. He had a position with promise, a captain's position, a separate apartment, and a decent location. But, he decided that he would "be of more benefit in the civilian economy," as he indicated in the application. He wanted to earn more, and have a regular work day.

These reasons, formulated in one way or another, run like a refrain through the applications of many officers. For some a prosperous proprietor of a cooperative enterprise served as the guiding star, for others it was unbearable to live in a "god-forsaken hole," and still others wanted freedom and anarchy. One perceives that he had made an error in his choice of profession. But today, after the fact, the overwhelming majority of those desiring to return speak about their "hasty decision, rash deed." "The application was a fatal error in my fate," writes Reserve Capt A. Olshannikov, for example. It is amazing, but the applications requesting to be returned to the service were written just as forcefully, with passion and ardor, as were their applications for discharge, and are permeated with the same insistence. Reserve Officer S. Zenkin from Altay Kray, today a truck driver at an inter-rayon base, sent a letter requesting reinstatement in the ranks of the Armed Forces to two addresses: the chief of the Ground Forces Cadres Directorate, and the American Embassy. He also attached a reference from his place of work indicating that he was conscientious and hard-working. It is difficult to understand this man's logic. Apparently, he wanted to raise his personal problem to the international level and thereby achieve his desire.

The majority formulated the first and main reason for wanting to return in this way: "I cannot conceive of myself without the army." One might have a skeptical attitude toward the high-flown style, and say that the writer is pressing on patriotic feelings. But, this phrase is encountered in practically every application. The majority of them seem to be candid and sincerely repentant.

"I understood that my place is only in the army." "Give me a chance to correct my mistake." "At age 23 I found myself

in a moral blind alley." These lines are from the letters and applications written by reserve officers D. Livitskiy, S. Tarasov and N. Polyuk. "I dream about my home squadron. It was a happy day when I entered school; will there be a second happy day when I return?" How can one not believe in the candor expressed by Reserve Lt. V. Volkov, especially since his desire to return, and that of the first three, were dictated in no way by mercantile considerations. They like their new work, the pay is entirely suitable, and two of them are studying by correspondence in institutes.

Sr. Lt. A. Prokhorov is currently serving in the MVD in an officer's position, but "my heart is troubled, I recognize with sadness that I made a mistake, and I want to look into the eyes of my comrades not as a traitor."

No doubt there is something that is authoritatively attracting reserve officers back into the service. In my view, Reserve Sr. Lt. Yu. Mityayev expressed this "something" rather precisely: "There remained in me a feeling of loyalty to my chosen profession of officer, and a feeling for the moral climate of the army collective."

Reserve Maj R. Goloviya, a former battery commander, was more prosaic: "Out of my 35 years I have spent 18 in the army. What kind of a civilian would I make! Help me to return to my home collective." Roman Nikolayevich is not requesting an easy job. He remembers that he "worked until he was utterly exhausted, without sleep or rest, and was at the range 12 times." And he is returning, as are many others in his position, because "I was and in my heart remain an officer."

One's environment and surroundings shape an individual. And they do so even more successfully if he himself strove from youth to join precisely that environment, was inclined toward it. And it is difficult for him, and frequently even impossible, to shift to another state. From this he experiences gnawing nostalgia, lonely repentance, and a desire to return. To some they are delayed, to others they come in a few days, as they did to Lt. Oleg Vysotskiy: "One's conscience is his main judge in life. After I submitted my application I apologized to the regiment commander and the division commander, and asked them to stop the discharge. I was two days late. Yes, sometimes one must lose something in order to understand what is most important in his life."

Reserve Capt V. Dovgan is experiencing the same thing: "My feeling of loss does not let me rest, no matter what I do. It is sad to realize that I am already out of the service." And S. Ovcharov, a former crew chief, says: "I simply cannot find myself in the civilian environment. As I was being discharged, I did not consider the most important thing. In my heart I am an officer, and I will remain so." And former Military Doctor V. Baramashkin writes, among many more comments: "My discharge became a real tragedy in my life. I cannot imagine life in another capacity."

But it would be incorrect to fail to note other motivations as well. "My family is on the brink of disintegration, and I cannot provide even a roof over our heads, or

find a profession that suits me. Help me to preserve my family, return me to aviation, even on the ground." These are lines from the application of former military pilot V. Demyanenko. Nor can O. Grin find a job in his specialty. He says, "I went to work as a simple worker," and, for some reason, "remained without means of existence." Nor was Reserve Maj N. Davydkin employed in his specialty: "Workers are needed everywhere, but no one needs economists. The government's decision to give priority placement to those discharged is not being fulfilled under all kinds of pretexts."

Reserve Lt. Oleg Istomin also did not think about his future life: "There is no housing, I stay with my mother temporarily, but she also wants to get her life in order, and she had a negative attitude about the arrival of my family. I am prepared to serve in any unit. I promise to repay all of the expenses associated with my discharge."

Difficulties in civilian life prompted former pilots V. Dorofeyev, I. Shchegolev and D. Kirpichnikov, and several others to write (Kirpichnikov changed jobs six times in two years, but still was not able to find satisfaction). As the poet would say, these people "ran up against every day life."

One can understand them on a human level. And to understand means to forgive, if this word is appropriate to the situation. The cadre organs and the command also relate to these people with understanding. But, they return few of them. Frequently, following study of all the circumstances there comes a summary: It is not possible; there are no bases for reinstatement; in connection with the reduction of the armed forces we cannot satisfy the request. The officers are not subject to reinstatement in the cadre forces unless there were violations of law committed in their discharge. And what violation can there be if the individual departed voluntarily, or even insisted?

Rejections are also associated with the large number of officers who are now not on the rolls, and do not have a prolonged length of service or housing. But, there are also exceptions. Reserve Sr. Lt. S. Ovcharov, for example, receives a hopeful response from Lt Gen P. Zakharov, chief, Cadres Directorate, Troops of Air Defense: "To decide your question, I request that you come in for a talk." Or, here is the proposal made by the cadres organ chiefs to the application by Reserve Capt V. Sinenkiy: "Taking into account his frank repentance, I would consider it advisable to rescind the discharge order and limit our action to the imposition of a fine." To myself personally, all of the letters and applications that I read seemed frank. Why are some believed and others not?

"It would be desirable, of course, to see the individual and talk with him," I was told in the Ground Forces Cadres Directorate. "Then it becomes clearer who is who. We try to return to service those who really did err. But, we also cannot make a revolving door out of the army. This damages many people."

When applications are examined today, the opinion of the officers' collectives where the dischargée previously served,

and the local area command, are taken into account. Sometimes the opportunity is granted to serve in another branch of service, for example, in the road construction units, where there is a shortage of officers. The Troops of Air Defense took several aviation specialists who previously served in the Air Forces. Half the applications included an agreement to serve anywhere in the country.

Cadre organ workers have a dual attitude toward the "emigres in shoulder boards." On the one hand, instability once manifested may turn into unreliability at a difficult moment. On the other hand, one experienced man is worth two greenhorns. Therefore, every case is looked into personally and carefully.

Here are some statistics. In the Ground Forces, out of 1,415 young officers discharged last year, 190 were returned to the service. This is true, although, as this same O. Vysotskiy believes, "the dischargées are afraid to admit their mistake publicly and even one on one; pride gets in the way."

The statistics are similar in the Air Forces. Take the data for one of the quarters. There were 308 applications for discharge and 10 for reinstatement. Primarily ground specialists are being returned; there is no shortage of pilots.

There were 1,444 applications for discharge submitted last year in the Troops of Air Defense, and those returned to service number several tens of individuals. But, as Col A. Ivanov, a Cadres Directorate department chief, stated, the number of applications for discharge is decreasing.

The motivations of the returnees have become more diverse, and, moreover, argumentation appeared in the application, as to why it is necessary for one or another officer to return to the service.

Reserve Lt. O. Grin recalled the resources spent by the state on his training. D. Guseynov emphasizes the shortage of cadres. A. Nesolenov believes that "some are serving worse than he did, and they are not being discharged." Some recall their fathers, army veterans, and their garrison childhood and ruined dream; others make reference to their past services, sending along with the applications certificates and newspaper clippings. Still others put forward their rare specialty as an argument.

V. Deyev, today an aerial club instructor pilot, wrote: "I hope that events in the Persian Gulf will cool the 'conversion' heads." And the father of Reserve Maj A. Vakulenko, Semen Vladimirovich, called the discharge of the officer the highest measure of punishment. Reserve Maj V. Polyakov came to a unique conclusion: "Traitors who shifted over to the side of the enemy in Afghanistan are being rehabilitated. But I am no traitor."

I in no way wish to persuade those who have decided to break with the army. That is their choice. And soon the right to this choice will be set down in law. But, it would not be out of place to listen at least to the warning given by Reserve Maj N. Davydkin: "I wish to say to those who desire to be

discharged before they have completed their years of service: Think what awaits you. You will be pulled, just the same, toward the military collective, you can believe my words. We are brave men when we write the application. However, when it turns out that no one needs you in civilian life, and when your wife also cannot find work, there is little left of our past assertiveness and resoluteness."

And there are many such warnings contained in the letters from people who have been burned. It is hardly a good idea to brush them aside.

Grounds for Medical Exemptions Detailed

91SV0116A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Sep 91
Union Edition p 3

[Interview with Professor E. Nechayev, MD, chief of the USSR Armed Forces Medical Service and Lieutenant General of the Medical Service, by V. Litovkin; place and date not given: "What Illnesses Disqualify People for the Army"]

[Text] As IZVESTIYA has already reported (No. 221), on 12 September 1991 the USSR defense minister published order No. 436 "On Amending the Provisions on Medical Examination in the USSR Armed Forces." This document changes 44 items in the list of illnesses which justify release from the draft.

What are these illnesses? Our correspondent's questions are answered by Professor E. Nechayev, MD, chief of the USSR Armed Forces Medical Service and Lieutenant General of the Medical Service.

"From the very beginning I wish to emphasize," said Eduard Aleksandrovich, "that this order from the Ministry of Defense was a natural development of order No. 317 of 1989 which as early as two years ago made essential changes in the Provisions on Medical Examinations for the Army.

"Each year almost 80,000 young people, who were previously considered to be fit for noncombatant service and were sent mainly to military construction and other units, have been granted the right not to serve at all. Among them are those suffering from bronchial asthma, feeble mindedness, slight mental retardation, nocturnal bed wetting, diseases of the endocrine system (thyroid glands, sugar diabetes even in a mild form), consequences of injury to the brain and spinal column, and those with myopia of more than six diopters...

"Military medical specialists, in conjunction with civilian ones and head specialists of the Ministry of Health, have conducted work on a draft of new Provisions on Military Medical Expert Evaluation which envisions a considerable increase in the requirements placed on the health of draftees, military servicemen on active duty, and military construction workers. It was to have been approved by the country's Cabinet of Ministers by the beginning of the fall

draft. But because of factors beyond the control of the military, there are still no state documents regarding questions of defense, and our minister was forced to make the decision himself.

"The new order essentially reflects the main positions of the draft that was developed. It excludes the previously applied formula for medical exemption 'fit for noncombatant duty.' Now a recruit may be deemed only 'fit' or 'unfit' for service. We hope that in practice this will relieve the social tension related to recruitment in society.

"More than 50 percent of the items on the list of illnesses from which fitness for military service was determined have been changed. They include a large group of diseases of the central and peripheral nervous system, the locomotor apparatus, the cardio-vascular system, the digestive organs, and many others which are accompanied by a disturbance of their functions."

[Litovkin] Which illnesses specifically?

[Nechayev] I am afraid that to list them would take up quite a bit of space. Here is the List of Illnesses of USSR Ministry of Defense Order No. 260 of 1987; it contains 340 pages of fine print and 116 articles. A newspaper does not have enough space to print it. And, incidentally, that is not necessary. It is available in any military commissariat and anyone who wants to may look at it. But I will name a couple of the illnesses.

They include the consequences of infectious diseases and injuries to the central nervous system with insignificant disturbance of functions, hypertension, all congenital or acquired diseases of the heart, duodenal ulcers (ulcer patients were not recruited into the Army previously either), chronic or ordinary dislocation of the large joints, the absence of a thumb on the right hand, prolapsed hemorrhoids, chronic polypous or purulent sinusitis, generalized and local baldness and depigmentation...

[Litovkin] Where can a young person or his parents go if they suspect the presence of one disease or another?

[Nechayev] To the military commissariat. They will send the person to the medical commission.

I deliberately mentioned disturbances of certain functions of the body. For example, with a minor curvature of the nasal septum one can be a flier and fly on a supersonic fighter. But if this curvature makes breathing considerably more difficult, the individual may be unfit for military service in general.

Only a medical commission can make a decision in each concrete case.

[Litovkin] But where is the guarantee that people with the diseases you mentioned will not end up in the military because of an oversight on the part of the rayon physician or for some other reason?

[Nechayev] Of course, nobody is insured against cases like that. And each year we release into the reserve up to 1,500 patients who have "slipped through" the medical recruiting commissions at the military commissariats.

But the Army is interested in healthy people, especially today, when the physical and psychological burdens in the Army have increased and when significant amounts

of insurance are paid to patients. And here we have one path—to stiffen the requirements placed on the health of the young replacements.

The only guarantee against mistakes here is the professionalism and exactingness of the military physicians.

[Litovkin] When will Order No. 436 go into force?

[Nechayev] On 1 October.

U.S. Preparations To Destroy Chemical Weapons Assessed

92SV0001A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Sep 91 First edition p 3

[N. Akimov article: "First a Law Was Passed... How Preparations Are Being Made in the United States To Destroy Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] Great experience has been gained in the U.S. Armed Forces in destroying toxic agents and chemical munitions. Immediately after the end of World War II the elimination of captured chemical weapons was carried out. In subsequent years batches of their own chemical weapons that were no longer fit for use or that were obsolete were constantly being destroyed. Thus, during the period 1972 through 1986 a total of 15 major operations were carried out to destroy various kinds of formulas for toxic agents with a total weight of 6,500 tons.

During the mid-1980's certain progress was noted in international negotiations on a total ban on chemical weapons. In this connection purposeful activity was initiated in the United States, and continues still, to make preparations for the large-scale destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons. In particular, in 1986 Public Law 99-145 was passed, under whose provisions the Army was assigned the task of drawing up a comprehensive plan to carry out this operation.

Taking into account the large scale of the work and the technical complexity of the task assigned, the U.S. Defense Department set up a special body headed by General D. Needham. Its mission was to select the latest technologies and analyze all possible scenarios from the standpoint of cost and actual technical feasibility within the periods set by the law. The most important condition set here was to insure safety and protection against terrorist activity.

Three possible scenarios were analyzed: setting up a single national center to destroy chemical weapons, two regional centers, and finally, carrying out the destruction directly at the sites where toxic agents were stored. From both the standpoint of prime cost and risk to people, the idea of concentrating stocks of chemical weapons in one or two centers was rejected. It would cost almost \$300 million just for transport. It would be necessary to make 2,700 flights, or 820 convoys of motor vehicles, or 70 railroad trains.

In terms of the choice of technology for the destruction process itself, up to 300 methods were considered. Methods involving burning them in the open air, blowing up munitions at a testing ground, dispersal in the atmosphere, all methods of burial, and also burial on the sea bed, were all rejected since they failed to meet ecological requirements. The U.S. Army studied the

method of chemical neutralization experimentally. Some 3,800 tons of munitions were destroyed using this method.

An evaluation was also made of the possibility of using underground nuclear explosions, but this was rejected. It is curious that it was rejected not because these kinds of explosions would not destroy the toxic agents, or that they would serve as a source of additional danger. The fact is that in the law that sanctioned the destruction of chemical weapons no mandate was given for using nuclear explosions. Moreover, problems arose connected with proving that no quantities of nondegraded toxic agents would remain after an explosion.

On the recommendation of the National Research Council the method of combustion in special furnaces was chosen as the main method for destroying the chemical weapons. At the same time the search continues for more efficient methods of destruction. Thus, a study is being conducted of the feasibility of using plasma (high-temperature) combustion of toxic agents. A study is also being conducted of the merits of the method of destroying munitions in a unit based on deep freezing using liquid nitrogen, as a result of which both the steel housing and the other elements of the munitions turn into a brittle vitreous substance and detonation of the explosive charge is eliminated. This method does not require the dismantling of the munitions or discharge of the toxic agent since it is destroyed in a press.

One typical feature of the destruction program is the very high level of the safety requirements. During transport even of munitions in perfect condition provision has been made for use of a special transport container that would eliminate all possibility of any toxic agent escaping into the atmosphere even in the event of an accident. Very low maximum permissible concentrations of toxic agents have been set both for the working zone and outside it. These concentrations are one thousand times lower than those at which the appearance of even the very first signs of any effect on the body can be seen. The military instruments used in chemical reconnaissance to detect toxic agents at low concentrations are unsuitable for this. Therefore, especially sensitive detection methods based on chromatographs are used.

Attention is drawn to the fact that one mandatory requirement has been extensive discussion of the plan with the public. It must be subjected to examination by experts and agreed with by the Department of Health and federal agencies that deal with emergency situations and with environmental protection matters. Moreover, the plan has had to be agreed by a dozen and a half national nongovernmental societies. For example, those engaged in the protection of archaeological and historical monuments and that provide protection for wild animals.

Almost every addressee has submitted its own proposals, requests, and comments to the Department of the Army. In what was the public most interested? Data were

requested on how dangerous the actual storage of toxic agents is, how they would be transported, and vulnerability to acts of terrorism. Clarifications were requested with respect to the effect on people of the toxic agents at the concentrations adopted as permissible. The question was raised of trusting the facts and conclusions presented in the document. Interest was shown in what measures had been envisaged by the Army in the event of an accident. The opinion was expressed that there was no need to agree to such rigid time tables for completion of the work under the program because that would increase

costs. The Army's responses to all the issues of a technical and medical nature raised were thorough and well-argued with scientific data.

As a result a draft was drawn up according to which about 8,000 tons of toxic agents stored in 15 kinds of munitions, and also in storage facilities and on transport, are to be destroyed. Some 2,690 people will be involved in the work to destroy stocks. It is being suggested that it will cost \$2 billion to complete all the work, because the destruction of 1 kilogram of a toxic agent costs \$66.

Balashov Discusses Problems of Conversion

91SV0059A Moscow *LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA*
in Russian 14 Aug 91 p 2

[Article by B. I. Balashov, 1st Secretary, Moscow Committee CPSU: "Conversion—In the Grip of Economic Uncertainty"]

[Text] The arrival of U. S. President George Bush in the Soviet Union, and his meeting with USSR President M. Gorbachev, according to the comments made by the majority of Soviet and foreign publications, was a major step on the path to achieving mutual security and ensuring peace on earth. The voluntary reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the U. S. and the USSR, unprecedented in scale and objectives, is evident. The world is gradually getting rid of the mountain of weapons on which it sits, as on a powder keg. And we must be happy about this. But, the elimination is engendering a mass of problems, and especially in the Moscow region where, as we know, a large number of defense industry enterprises is concentrated.

I have written in the paper both in the past and this year about the problems of conversion. Unfortunately, I must say that the negative consequences about which I wrote in the articles as possibilities, have today become sad reality. Production volume in the last six months alone has fallen by six percent as against the level of 1990. Labor productivity has declined. The number of workers has decreased by five percent. Opponents will say to me: "Well, so what. A natural process is underway. The level of militarism of the economy is declining, market relations are coming into force, and the production of these enterprises is simply not needed." This would seem to be so. But the fact is that these are all generalities, and in practice everything looks somewhat different. In six months alone in the oblast the branch lost such a numerically large factory as, say, the Elektrostal factory. Every month jobs are disappearing in practically the majority of rayons in the oblast. Production volumes are declining, profits are decreasing, and consequently so are deductions into the local budget. The social program is going to its grave—there is no other way to put it—and housing construction is stopping. The intrepid politicians talk about privatization of housing, and it may happen that in a number of cities soon the deputies will count the number of apartments being turned over one-by-one. Perhaps the funds being saved on "defense" [ironic diminutive form used] are at work in other branches? No, this is not being done either. Additions to the sales counters in 1990-1991, when conversion processes developed actively, cannot be seen. This money simply disappears in the all-union and republic budgets, partially covering up our bad management and the economic chaos that reigns in the country.

But many people today note these negative tendencies in the country. Something else is much more serious. The country, our great power, is gradually slipping into the ranks of third-rank states in its technical level as well. I

do not believe that today it is a secret to anyone that the fundamental might of both basic and applied science was organizationally established within the framework of the defense industry. The world renowned Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, essentially an international organization, was placed in the most closed ministry, Minsredmash [Ministry of Medium Machine Building]. The Serpukhov accelerators of the Institute for High Energy Physics were located there. These organizations conduct basic research, and, I must say, in addition, within the framework of the worldwide division of spheres of research. And they were also put under the same roof—defense [ironic spelling]—and that was that. Now these organizations lack sufficient funds not only for further development, but merely to pay for electricity to carry out experiments.

One finds specialists, even at the level of the leaders of the republic's Council of Ministers, who propose to the collectives of such organizations the sea of economic freedom, and redemption of fixed capital. This would be very funny, were it not for the scandalous position of such scientific collectives. You see, one of the aerodynamic pipes at TsAGI [Central Institute of Aerohydrodynamics imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy] costs more than 150 million rubles, and the collective that works there numbers only 200. Merely in order to redeem the fixed capital, every one of them would have to be a millionaire, and to talk here about denationalization, or even more so about privatization, is simply economic, and even political idiocy. Everywhere, throughout the world, the activity of such organizations relies upon national programs and financial assistance from the state, frequently centralized.

Some may take exception. At this time we are not up to nuclear research, not up to aerospace programs, but need the simplest things. There is a crisis in the country.

Yes, this is so, although to a great extent it arose, in my view, due to thoughtless experimentation with the economy, and to political and social instability. But, by approaching the problems of conversion purely arithmetically, and taking away financing without being knowledgeable of the essence, we deprive the applied institutes and design bureaus of the opportunity to operate normally, and in the end we halt technical progress at the series production factories, both in "defense," and in general civilian branches that are producing those very consumer goods. We deprive not only ourselves, but also our children, of a future. Today we can still speak about parity in the field of aerospace equipment, and about individual achievements in specialized materials technology and even electronics, where our products are competitive, and under conditions of the development of world market relations may bring the country substantial currency receipts, and maintain her in the ranks of the technically developed countries. By carrying out, for the benefit of political bombast, a policy of breaking down the defense branch, we are depriving ourselves of this capability, most likely forever, as decades will be required to make up for the lost technical equality. The

outflow of people from the branch is taking place most of all from the category of high-class workers, specialists and scientists, who are not afraid to change their place of work. People go to new jobs for better pay, but there are also many who are already tired of the uncertain position of a defense enterprise, and the lack of a clear future.

Many of those who advocate sharply reducing the "defense" budget have changed tactics today. They say that all of this is fair enough, but that we cannot maintain entire branches that do not provide consumer goods. This, I will say frankly, is a recurrent lie. At defense industry enterprises in the oblast, even under conditions of economic chaos, the output of consumer goods, those awaited at the counters, not to mention civilian production, is steadily increasing. The defense industry has long been producing goods for amounts significantly greater than the wage fund. At the Krasnogorsk Machine Factory, for example, such products worth five rubles are produced for one ruble of the wage fund; i. e., the workers of the collective exceed their wages five times over in terms of goods produced. What is happening here? Everything, in general, is simple: **The enterprises being converted have the same taxes as do other state enterprises.** They are supporting the mighty social sphere, and are required to invest money in modernization of production, and to compensate for the substantial costs associated with conversion. **The cooperatives and small enterprises do not have any of these expenses.** The prices for raw materials and components, where previously there were benefits for these enterprises, have actually become free. That is also why such an outrageous difference in pay is occurring, which is contributing to the disintegration of stable collectives.

The output of a large quantity of goods, and the profitability of many factories in the defense industry that are producing civilian products, has also been noted in the corridors of the new government. It is not without reason that some authors of the republic government program came up with the truly Jesuit thought of separating in the branch the production of specialized and civilian products. They would take the latter under their own jurisdiction, and privatize the capacities that are being freed, where military equipment was manufactured. It is proposed that a number of problems be solved at one stroke: replenish the republic treasury, deprive the center of its economic bulwark, and escape, to some extent, general state expenditures for the defense industry. Simply and tastefully. Well, and let him who so desires worry about our scientific and technical level, and ultimately about the defense capability of the country. And this is written in an official document and published in the official newspaper of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. **I hope that the elected president of the republic in his specific activity will not embark upon such a step all the same, but in this case will more farsightedly defend the interests of the people.**

And what is the party obkom doing in order somehow to stabilize the situation? Is it supporting the party committees and leaders? What is the position of the CPSU MK [Moscow Committee] bureau?

I must say that the situation in the economy is directly affecting the political atmosphere. The position of the obkom bureau is clear: Yes, conversion of the defense industry is an objective reality. But today workers in the branch need certainty and assistance. If we speak about the state level, **the arms program, the Law on Conversion, and signing the Union Treaty are necessary as much as the air we breathe.** These questions have also been raised repeatedly in the obkom bureau. They resounded when the situation at the Dubna Machine Building Factory was discussed, and when the work of the party committees and communist leaders of enterprises in Krasnoarmeysk was examined.

Apropos of this, I would like to say a few words about these issues. The state of affairs at DMZ [Dubna Machine Building Factory] was nearly catastrophic. Order quantities declined by half, and the enterprise, and the branch as well, lacked a clear program of action. All proposals about compensation for losses, although attractive, were worked out only on an intellectual level. Conversion also struck the Geodeziya Scientific Research Institute a hard blow; in a number of areas work declined by 40-60 percent. But here they worked to retain people and prevent massive discharges. Director V. A. Kovshov, it must be said, was the prime initiator. The institute began to assemble powerful transistors; construction of a brick factory is in full swing; and even candy is being produced in its sector. A textile equipment research base has been created. This, in my view, is precisely the correct approach to the conversion processes. By also using the equipment and area to look into specialized technology, here they were able to make technical improvements to textile equipment. And they are conducting studies that textile machine builders have never conducted. A real opportunity appeared to make the machine tools less noisy and more stable in operation. Unfortunately, here as well the "defense types" confronted today's grimaces of economic folly. In plugging holes in the budget, appropriations for the development of new equipment, including textile equipment, were curtailed, and now something that is giving real results has again come into question. An opportunity to increase the volume of production of cloth, increase reliability, and thus productivity, and improve working conditions, was again pushed back to an indefinite time.

Using these examples, I would like to direct attention to the main point, the two differing approaches: some are only complaining, while others are trying to solve these problems.

A soviet of secretaries of defense industry enterprises is active in the oblast. To a considerable degree on its initiative, and with the active support of the obkom bureau, a meeting was held with USSR Prime Minister V. S. Pavlov and the leaders of the union bodies. Talks have been held at the request of the party committee secretaries with the leaders of a number of union ministries. Here, I must say, the exchange of opinions was

informal, and at the meeting of the Minaviaprom [Ministry of the Aviation Industry] leaders and party committee secretaries it was even, perhaps, excessively emotional. The obkom bureau believes that **such talks make it possible to clarify better to the party committee secretaries, trade union workers, yes, and even the leaders, that the tasks facing them are common tasks, that there is nothing to divide them, and that it is necessary to determine the future destiny of the collective and to seek their place in the new sphere of market relations.**

At our initiative, meetings were held of leaders of defense industry enterprises at the Moscow Oblast Ispolkom, RSFSR Council of Ministers, and a number of other union bodies. Specific proposals were prepared, which will be sent to the USSR president and the RSFSR president. It is necessary to bring the process of economic uncertainty to an end. Rules of the game are needed. Every economic and political leader must know precisely what he must do within the framework of governmental requirements, and where he can and must display his own initiative, oriented on the logic of market relations. Finally, the ministerial apparatuses, both union and republic, must also begin to work precisely, for it often seems that, although they exist, the enterprise does not receive real support, advice, or, ultimately, needed information. Unfortunately, thus far, instead of assistance the enterprises received from above the 20 July Edict of the RSFSR President on departization, which is undermining the existing structure and introducing into the collectives new problems, turmoil and nervousness.

Work at the oblast level is, undoubtedly, necessary, and we will continue it, but all the same, the main work is in the labor collectives. It is namely there and nowhere else where it is determined how one or another worker will live, what pay he will receive, and whether he will have an apartment and needed social security. I believe that it is from here that the main line of work of communists should be built. Given all the political muddle and unjustified accusations, **the workers will support, first of all, those party committees, secretaries and leaders who will take specific steps to stabilize the situation.** It is necessary not to avoid any work, to make contacts with the villages, and through direct negotiations to secure additional delivery of agricultural products. It is necessary to contribute actively to the formation of factories and sectors for the production of consumer goods, and to the retraining of released workers. It is necessary for party workers to go into the specifics of market relations, and where necessary even to take part, within the framework of existing laws, in commercial activity. It is necessary for them to coordinate persistently their activity with enterprise trade union committees and soviets. Apropos of this, the latest meetings by branches showed again that our goals are the same. But the trade unions, one gets the opinion, were carried away by the desire to distribute tasks, and many party committees, getting involved in the problems of the political struggle, are getting away from production tasks. I think that it is

time to understand that the manager and the party committee secretary have a common task, and that if certain economic officials try to shut themselves off from the party committee they will only lose, and also that communists must more actively influence the production processes. There is nothing to be bashful about here. There is not a single law, neither union, nor republic, which prohibits going to the collective with proposals, including concerning production activity. And no one is doing this from above; what is to be done at the factory can only be decided on the ground.

Today a main task of the party committees, especially at defense enterprises, is to preserve the collectives and specialists, and not give mass unemployment an opportunity to arise. We do not have the right as a country, as a power, to lose our face. We must not allow the technical and cadre potential created by generations of people to disintegrate, and all the best things that were created to slip quietly abroad. And no matter what our political opponents say, we must prevent with all of our strength the elimination of man's right to work, to education, and to housing.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Series Examines Conversion

91SV0096A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Sep 91 p 2, 13 Sep 91 p 2, 14 Sep 91 p 2

[Series of articles by Yevgeniy Panov and Aleksandr Osipov: "Conversion—From the Zone of Militarism to the Free Zone"]

[12 Sep 91 p 2]

[Text]

1. Conversion is already underway, and it is not so terrible.

In Leningrad there is more than one Kirovskiy Plant which used to be the flagship of the military industry, and which has now become, they claim, the flagship of conversion. We might add that to say "more than one" would be an understatement. The city's defense enterprises employ almost a million people. Nowhere else is there such a concentration of military-industrial complex facilities, and the fate of every second Petersburg resident is tied to this complex in one way or another.

So believes the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet Commission on the Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion, Oleg Gapanovich. There too, in the Leningrad Soviet, one may hear a different opinion: Only 30 percent of industry has been militarized. And Valentin Zanin, general director of the LPO [Leningrad Production Association] Signal, who is well known for his extraordinary statements in the press, insists that the number of persons employed in the defense complex comprises 41.3 percent of the overall number of workers, while the relative share of military orders does not exceed one-fourth of the total volume.

Evidently, no one has the exact data at their disposal. These data are simply not available. It is clear only that the Leningrad economy has been thoroughly militarized. And with this burden we must step into the zone of free enterprise? It would seem that this is impossible. Conversion as such is not enough here. We need a turnaround in minds and souls, a transition from gloomy secrecy to benevolent openness, from a psychology of dependency to a philosophy of business, from... Well, from the old life to the new. Will the generals from the artillery and infantry, as well as from science, economics and ideology allow it?

This is why the skepticism by part of the Leningrad Soviet deputies is not surprising. They told us: "Sobchak himself understands that the idea of a free zone is unrealistic. He needs it as a clear political action." And, with a sigh, they added: "However... we have to work."

That is true. Man by his nature is an active creature, and the deputy is certainly not the worst representative of homo sapiens. Then again, who has proven that "the idea is unrealistic?" Maybe it is just the other way around? A free enterprise zone is unthinkable without advanced technologies, and it is not hosiery factories which have these at their disposal, but rather the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. The VPK [military-industrial complex] enterprises undergoing conversion need capital, the influx of which into a closed zone is impossible, but into an open one—is more than probable. So the process of demilitarization of the Leningrad economy will at the same time be a process of formulation of the free economic zone's economy. Conversion and the development of enterprise are in essence one and the same task. A two-sided one. Which side is closer today? Obviously, conversion.

In the opinion of Oleg Gapanovich, there is no such thing as conversion "in general." There is conversion in the sectors of missile and shipbuilding, in metal processing and electronics, in industry and science. If we take industry, we see that the worst situation is at the missile plants. Huge shops equipped exclusively for the assembly of the "goods" are difficult to adapt to something else. They are ready to work for civilian space, but the customers are in no hurry.

On the contrary, shipbuilders are changing over to peacetime production without any difficulty. Their chances of gaining a foothold in the international market are considerable, since almost all the shipbuilding companies in Europe have closed down. The suppliers of maritime equipment are flooded with orders. Because, for example, one missile cruiser is one propeller screw, while five civilian vessels are five screws. Each one is, perhaps, cheaper, but the volumes are greater. The metal processing enterprises are adapting easily to conversion, says Gapanovich. It is only a matter of quality. However, these, you must agree, are intra-plant problems, and can be resolved. Electronics workers and radio technologists, those who manufacture scientific-intensive production—with a creak. It would seem to be a paradox: To

supply for some "business planes" that which they previously supplied for fighters. There is nothing to supply. There are no electronics because there are no components. And they are absent because there is no currency. It is not allocated for "business planes."

It is also not easy for the engineers of specialized design bureaus. When the production changes at a plant, it is possible to replace the machine tools, but at a design bureau—it is only the people who can be replaced. We have not yet lived to see the day of such luxuries as recreational submarines, so what should we do with the planners of the missile-carrying submarine cruisers? Conversion cuts these once super-prestigious companies at the root. In the spring, almost 1,000 developers of atomic submarines from the Rubin design bureau were laid off in Leningrad. Eight hundred of them have now found work. No sooner had the winds of change begun to blow than the Rubin administration organized the retraining of engineers, who were to become obsolete. The women were retrained as bookkeepers, and all of them are in high demand now.

Of course, we cannot shrug off the threat of unemployment, the inevitable fellow traveler of conversion. Its peak, in Gapanovich's opinion, will come in the fall, when the time won by the trade unions for forestalling the layoffs will be up. However, the Rubin example demonstrates: The devil is not as terrible as he is made out to be. After all, aside from bookkeepers (and they, we must note, will be in greater demand as enterprise develops), the city also needs mathematics, physics and chemistry teachers. Mathematicians, physicists and chemists from the military-industrial complex who have a propensity toward instructional work may be retrained in special courses and invited to work at schools. And in general, if the best people have long been selected for the defense industry, then we must use some thought in placing them in their new jobs. In the United States the companies that flourish are the ones that bring together former workers of the military-industrial complex. Aside from bookkeepers and teachers, the city needs hundreds of municipal services workers. The earnings here are today respectable, and if disciplined and responsible defense workers edge out the random, unqualified people, how much the level of our city management will be improved!

This idea was expressed long ago, but encountered the skillful rejection of the working ispolkoms. The mayor, Gapanovich hopes, will be able to implement it. There are plans to create a committee on public employment, as well as an employment fund. By order of the mayor, enterprises will contribute a deduction of one percent of their wage fund to this employment fund. This money, obviously, will not be enough to support the temporarily unemployed or those undergoing retraining. Two or three times more money will be needed than can be collected from the enterprises, and this money will have to be earned. How? By providing paid services at

consultation centers, for example, in laboratories for determining a person's psychophysiological peculiarities and tendencies.

To make money on unemployment—isn't that going too far? Yet what are we to do if the departments of the military-industrial complex are indifferent to the fates of their former workers? And it is not on unemployment, but on services to the public, clarifies Gapanovich. This in no way contradicts the concept of a market economy or the principles of a free enterprise zone. Yet certain global or regional concepts of demilitarization in the zone, it seems, will not take root. As we know, there is no state program of conversion, and this, perhaps, is for the better. The effort to develop a regional program has failed. With very rare exceptions, the directors of the defense enterprises had no general proposals. And this is natural. Conversion, as we have seen, is a variegated, nonuniform process which takes place at different rates. There are just as many models for it as there are plants, design bureaus and institutes. A special regional or city service could assume the task of coordinating, mediating, and keeping statistics. Yet the development of a specific model is the work of the specific collective. More precisely, a group of enthusiasts inspired by the task of demilitarization.

Valentin Zanin, director of the LPO Signal, whom we mentioned at the beginning of this article, is also a director and enthusiast. Although, as concerns his enthusiasm, this is an enthusiasm necessitated by the circumstances.

[13 Sep 91 p 2]

[Text]

2. Conversion is being stifled by debts. Will the West help?

The dream of every Soviet director is economic and legal stability. Valentin Zanin, general director of the Leningrad Production Association [LPO] Signal is no exception. Nevertheless, today stability remains a dream. Primarily because of conversion.

Too much is said about it, and unjustifiably so, in Zanin's opinion, because most enterprises do not encounter any specific difficulties. The problem of demilitarization of the economy in the form in which it is represented simply does not exist.

If this is so, then life immediately gets simpler. So Zanin assures us. Here are his arguments. First of all, civilian orders are more profitable than military, because there has always been a policy of cheap military technology implemented in the country. Second, at a normal plant the orders are sought out ahead of time, and not when the rooster pecks. We buy the raw materials ahead of time and work with the "messengers" who fly in from all parts of this vast country. That is what we keep a large staff of people for. Third, the technology itself is convertible. What is the difference—a military teletype or a

civilian one? The military one is more durable. It is made with a metal cover. We will put a plastic cover on the civilian one. "If funds are needed for retooling, I will take out credit—using as collateral that product which will be sold. If they cancel next year's military orders, and the components have already been ordered—I will sell the remainder, take the turnover capital, settle accounts, load up the designers, and buy components." In general, there are no problems? No terrible ones. Except for instability.

But what about debts? Yes... debts. Zanin becomes gloomy. They have been left over from the programs of arms modernization to the year 2000. In anticipation of the fact that by 1995 the output of military technology would increase by 2-2.5 times, new units were built, and scientific research and experimental design work was performed. Part of the money was received from the budget, and part taken on credit, and when even this was not enough, the state gave nonrepayable credits to replenish the turnover capital.

"One fine morning, a memo arrives: The nonreturnable credit has been canceled, interest rate—6 points," says Zanin. "Several million was left hanging. On another fine morning, they set the interest rate at 15 points. We fought for half a year and got them down to eight. The term of payment was six years. But then there was the last memo: The debt must be paid immediately. For what are we paying for? For the building, which we do not need? We were working on solving the state problem, but what we earned was personal debt."

It turns out that the government also did not stand on ceremony with the military-industrial complex, its favorite child. And it is not standing on ceremony now. In Zanin's words, "at the top" no one intends to deal with debts. Oleg Gapanovich, chairman of the Leningrad Soviet Commission on the Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion, has the same impression. Half of the city's defense enterprises have debts numbering in the tens of millions of rubles [R], and such a giant as the Kirovskiy Plant (which is, as they assure us, the flagship of conversion!) has a debt of R250 million.

And to step with such a burden into the zone of free enterprise, into the market? That is exactly impossible. Most likely, the state will not write off the debts. So that Zanin's "no problems" is desirable, but not realistic. Conversion is an expensive process. The changeover of production for the output of peacetime products requires considerable means. Nevertheless, these are the rudiments. We repeat them for the sake of the obvious conclusion: In the near future, the debts of the "defense industry" must increase. And then what? Will the demilitarization which has barely begun come to a halt?

So what should we do? Should we grant the debtors privileges, give them permission to raise their prices? To the Kirovskiy Plant, for example, on the minitractors which they intend to manufacture there? Yet this is a

double-edged sword: The farmer will not buy a mini-tractor at the price of a mighty K-700. Or should we break up the giants in order to then turn them into joint-stock companies? Or, finally, should we place them on foreign capital?

Evidently, we cannot do without, but... Valentin Zanin, for example, does not know how to work correctly with the foreigners. He is sure only that we must do so with extreme caution, because the entire world is playing for reduction of the ruble. Its rate of exchange in relation to the dollar is "simply monstrous" (a real rate of exchange, in Zanin's opinion, would be two to three dollars per ruble).

"We have a distorted understanding of values," he believes. "Because of this, today it is practically impossible to evaluate the quality of deals. We are forced to deal with foreigners in the following manner. I say to them: We are performing all accounting in Paris prices, for example. We invest in the joint production of a Soviet chair for R18. How much does it cost in Paris? \$16? We write down: \$16. You invest a Mercedes. No, you do not write a million rubles. You write down the Paris price..."

It is far from every director who can allow himself to dictate to the foreigners—"write this, write that..." Let us take for example the Leningrad Optical-Mechanical Association (LOMO), which at one time was world famous. Today even the most desperate optimists do not dare say a word. The attitude toward our current Soviet photo technology on the international market was quite definitely expressed in the well-known journal MODERN PHOTOGRAPHY, in the article with the catchy title "Whom Have the Russians Become Now? They Are Copying Japanese Cameras!" In the journal's opinion, our "innovations" are poor quality copies of asystematically developed foreign prototypes. This leads to embarrassment. In England they were planning to sell Zenith-35F photo cameras, which had been intended only for export. The special journal AMATEUR PHOTOGRAPHY explained the definite demand for them as follows: "...We must not forget that you can buy this full-format, reliable photo camera for the same money which you had to pay for three rolls of Kodachrome film..." However, it became clear that low price today is not the most serious argument on the Western market. Of the 100,000 Zeniths which had been offered for sale, only 19,000 found buyers.

Let us forget about the international level and the international market. After all, there is a vast domestic market. We can work toward it without experiencing any detriment. This thesis was approved and included at LOMO into the association's integrated target program for development. It was proposed that it reorient itself "toward expanding the production of highly profitable directions which are extremely necessary to the national economy..." Yet it is simpler to—change over to a deficit.

Nothing came of this, either. The end of the many-year history of development of the Vika video camera is not

in sight. The subcontractors cannot seem to bring the elemental base at least up to the level of the model which even several years ago would have been considered hopelessly obsolete in the West. Twenty million "wooden" and 15 million foreign currency rubles have already been spent on video cameras. Equipment for cooling fat, a machine for packaging refined sugar... All this is expensive, undeveloped, and has nothing to do with LOMO's profile description. It is a good example of "mongrel" conversion, in Gapanovich's expression.

It has a unique coloration within the association. The orders placed by the Ministry of the Defense Industry—the owner of LOMO—take up 27 percent of its capacities. Almost three-fourths are free. The shops, in the words of trade union committee chairman Vyacheslav Grechkin, beg: "Give us work!" They take on any kind of work. As long as there are materials, as long as the above-norm reserves have not yet been eaten up, and as long as the low completion rate bails them out. But all this will ultimately come to an end.

"And what will be left?" asks Grechkin. "An empty briefcase of orders, a neglected social sphere, and 150 million in debts—one-fourth of the fixed capital."

We are not exposing or criticizing. We are simply stating the way things are. It is not a question of the collective's ineptness or the management's mediocrity. It is a question of the system, which has brought one of the largest plants in the world to a sorry state. It is clear that LOMO will not be able to develop without significant currency investments. Without them it may perhaps not even be able to survive. However, today it is unrealistic for the enterprise to earn currency or to take it on credit. The only way out is direct investments by foreign firms.

That is what many of those with whom we spoke at the association believe. But what do the company men think? Do they want to save LOMO by directly investing dollars into production capable of producing a nomenclature of goods? Judging by the fact that efforts to create a joint enterprise with the Americans for manufacture of spectral instruments has failed—they are not too eager to do so. Therefore, we must note, we should not be concerned that the "world bourgeoisie" is literally buying up Mother Russia at the root. First we must bring it to order, and then serious capital will come. In what forms is it ready to participate in the modernization of our industry, in conversion?

We will tell about one of the possible variants of participation in our concluding article.

[14 Sep 91 p 2]

[Text]

3. The West will help us, if it does not confuse business with politics

In September of last year, a conference on conversion was held in Boston, organized by USSR and U.S. official

circles. The idea of creating a fund for investing in Soviet enterprises, called upon to facilitate the demilitarization of our economy, was presented at this conference. Joint sponsors of this fund might be the State Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers (currently the Cabinet of Ministers), and the American Batterimarch Financial Management Company.

Events were developing rapidly. The Batterimarch research group, headed by LeBaron, is coming to Moscow in early October to sign the agreement letter. The company will become the fund's financial adviser. The Credi Swiss Bank in Luxembourg has been elected to be the executor. There, in the Great Dukedom, the fund is registered as a joint stockholding company of the open type. In the West, a massive advertising campaign for the project is being organized—including a presentation at the UN.

In the USSR it is hidden by a veil of silence. The Leningrad Experimental-Mechanical Association is one of the participants in the project, but after preliminary, rather open studies, the circle of those devoted to it was sharply curtailed.

Secrecy where there are no secrets is suspicious. Obviously, if this is not a pathology, which is also a possibility. But what if it is not? That means secrecy is beneficial to someone. But to whom? In Leningrad we have listened to several subtle versions concerning the game of interests. For example, the following: The CPSU Central Committee and the top of the military-industrial complex are one and the same. The party, under the cover of the fund, secretly invests capital under privileged conditions, quietly privatizing the choice pieces of the military-industrial complex. Rumors about the participation of the CPSU Central Committee bank in the fund have been exaggerated.

These rumors were decisively refuted by Vladimir Sidorovich, USSR Cabinet of Ministers expert and head of the Soviet side of the project, or more precisely, the military-industrial commission's side. In his words, the silence is necessitated protection against stupidity and indecency, of which there is more than enough at the stage of "wild" capitalism. The CPSU Central Committee bank has not been allowed into the circle of fund participants. But why Luxembourg? That is very simple: It is a "tax haven."

Let us recall that LOMO, like tens of other defense plants, is in acute need of currency, but none of the Western businessmen will "buy" this backward giant as a whole. At the same time, its structure contains an element which manufactures products capable of competing quite well on the market—high precision microscopes and flexible medical endoscopes. It is here that currency investments are possible and profitable. But in order for them to get here specifically, and not be dissolved without a trace in the flaccid body of the giant, the competitive element must be isolated and turned into a stockholding company. The mother company invests *aktivs* (shops, equipment, the right to lease land, manpower, rubles) in the filial branch, controls its activity,

and receives the lion's share—up to 70 percent—of the dividends in rubles as well as in currency. Part of the stock is sold directly to the workers of the parent enterprise. The local authorities also become one of the stockholders. The holder of the remaining portion of stock is the Luxembourg investment fund. Its founders are Western banks and pension funds on one the hand, and international industrial corporations on the other. The former invest money into the fund, and the latter—technology, management, experience, authority in the business world, connections and status on the world market. The investors receive shares in Soviet companies from the fund for a period of five years, without the right of resale. This must ensure the stability of the organization and the interest of the investors.

Where does this interest lie? Understandably, it lies in the dividends, although the lion's share, we repeat, will go to the Soviet companies. After five years the stock may be sold at its market value on the London and New York exchanges, where its trading will begin, according to plan. But it is not just a matter of profit, emphasizes Vladimir Sidorovich. It is possible that the strategic interest of the investors is the formation of the Russian market, in which they are pioneers, as well as an intellectual and technological partnership for the purpose of creating a superproduct. However, our interest is also not confined merely to currency and profit. The filial enterprises will become the "window to Europe" for the parent companies.

The balance of interests has been maintained. Legally the project is irreproachable and does not give the slightest grounds for suspecting anyone of impure intentions. Yet it is proceeding, in Vladimir Sidorovich's words, with difficulty. And we may guess that this is our fault. Batterimarch FM provides the selection of Western investors and the military-industrial commission of Soviet defense plants whose competitive sectors may be isolated and turned into joint-stock companies. Moreover, in different sectors, the spectrum of companies (altogether there will be 15-20 of them) must guarantee the investors the necessary degree of diversification.

The compilation of specific projects for joint-stock companies is also going poorly, especially in regard to the precise detailing of business plans. And this is despite the qualified and persistent aid of experts from Batterimarch. The specifics of the "defense industry," which has never had any market experience, is becoming apparent. Therefore, the personnel of the future filial companies have to learn as they go along. Here it becomes readily apparent who is who. Western pedagogs are not concerned about the duties, the past achievements, the party affiliation, or the political views of their pupils. In principle, they do not mix politics with business.

Yes, but we do mix the two... In the opinion of Batterimarch analysts, LOMO General Director Dmitriy Sergeyev and joint-stock company director Aleksandr Kuznetsov meet the project's requirements. However, people remember their reports on "intensive shock labor," reinforced by clearly inflated figures. They know

the director to be obedient to the will of the ministry, and the party organization secretary to the will of the obkom. According to the evaluations of Western specialists—LOMO is the leader of the project. According to the evaluations of leading specialists of the association, it is not tied in with the general conception of development, since such does not exist—and largely, we must assume, at the fault of Sergeyev and Kuznetsov...

When people do poorly and for the sake of which they gather into a collective, community passions within that collective begin to flare. At LOMO they are seething over the collective agreement and the enterprise charter, and over the transition to Russian jurisdiction. The change-over, believes trade union committee chairman Vyacheslav Grechkin, will make it possible to turn the entire association into a joint-stock company, and not just the most appetizing piece of it.

Then there are also the torments of social fairness. Nine hundred people will go away not simply to the filial company. They will go away to isolation. They will have different wages, different labor conditions, different contacts, and different capacities. For the remaining 24,000 (!) persons, nothing will change. Nine hundred people represent the white die, and 24,000 the black. Who and by what indicators will separate the "whites" from the "blacks?"

Such questions cannot be discounted. They will begin to arise on a daily basis at LOMO, at all the plants involved into the orbit of the fund, and at all facilities of the Leningrad free enterprise zone. The economic and legal order which is being created must, of course, ensure social fairness and protection of man. Not the protection of an ant in a totalitarian ant hill, in which politics reigns supreme over economics, but rather the protection of the individual. And the individual feels safe when politics does not suppress and does not replace economics.

It is true, we still have far to go to reach this point. However, let us at least not confuse politics with business. Fairness is the sphere of politics. Business has its own sphere. This is why the Batterimarch specialists working at Soviet enterprises are absolutely indifferent to the property disputes between Russia and the center. This is why the West has stopped giving money to its favorite political leader, even though it is ready to finance specific business projects.

Of course, in time business creates well-being and wealth in society, thereby facilitating the affirmation of social fairness. But only by such means, in a mediated fashion. And only in time. It is a shame to waste it on empty passions, when we have the chance to step from the zone of militarism to the free zone.

Spanish Aid for Military Housing, Conversion Detailed

*PM2510141991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2*

[V. Litovkin report: "Spanish Houses for Soviet Officers"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA (No. 250) has already reported the end of the visit to Spain by Army General K. Kobets, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic state adviser on defense and chairman of the USSR State Council's Committee for Preparing and Implementing Military Reform, and also the talks that were held there regarding cooperation in implementing conversion in Russia. What agreement has been reached?

"We concluded an agreement with 30 Spanish firms that form part of the 'Sinkan' [name as transliterated] association," the army general tells us. "First, to build housing for our officers. The conditions are very good. Over the next two to three years the Spaniards will build us 45,000-50,000 apartments, 20 percent of which will belong to them and the rest to our people.

"Second," Kobets continued, "we have reached agreement on the construction of 3,000 km of roads in a rural area of the nonchernozem zone that our units and combined units are going out to from the group of forces. The sort of roads, moreover, that will help foodstuffs, vegetables, and fruit to be delivered quickly and without waste from village warehouses and storage depots to stores in the city. Incidentally, the Spaniards have also pledged to set up agricultural produce storage and processing facilities for us in the countryside using their technology.

"They will provide assistance in converting 30,000 army trucks that have been taken out of storage as a strategic reserve into freezer and refrigerator trucks to transport this fruit and vegetable produce. From the field to the counter.

"The task of transporting from Spain to the USSR and Russia foodstuffs allocated to us under long-term Spanish credits and EEC funds will also be borne on the shoulders of the military, or to be more exact on the wings of military transport aircraft. For the time being these products will again be stored at army warehouses and depots under military guard. So there are definite guarantees that not very many Spanish products will be looted at this stage.

"I am sure," the army general said in conclusion, "that our country's economic potential, and the potential of the military-industrial complex in particular, is enormous. We can implement its conversion through a rational and commonsense approach without major losses or social upheavals. All the republics have agreed to take part in this work. And then we will have the wherewithal to pay Western partners for their help and technology and support our people at a difficult stage of their development."

The general is convinced that the results of this cooperation will be not long in coming.

Options for Reforming Border Guards Viewed
PM1410133191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor G.M. Minkovskiy, RSFSR honored scientist, and A.I. Plyushchuk, senior lecturer at the All-Union Institute for Raising the Qualifications of the Border Guards Officer Corps: "What Should We Do With the Border Guards?"]

[Text] Recognizing that, following the putsch, we have become a "different country," we should give some thought to just what that country's state border should be, how it should be protected, and by whom.

The proposals voiced at various levels with regard to placing the Border Guards under different jurisdiction reveal a sensible desire to dismantle as quickly as possible the law-enforcement organs' repressive police system. But, unfortunately, this is to the detriment of the search for the optimum new way to organize protection of the state border.

There is no doubt about the need to remove the Border Guards from the jurisdiction of the USSR KGB, where they were placed as a result of the ideologized concept of the defense of the state border as a "most important and inalienable aspect of the defense of the socialist fatherland." The ideological dogma in that formula was enshrined in the 1982 Law on the USSR State Border. As a result of this the Border Guards were organized and equipped like a branch of the Armed Forces. Protection of the border gradually acquired the overblown form of the iron curtain, which was intended first and foremost to limit exchanges of information and human contacts. At the same time, it proved extremely inefficient and a drain on the budget to use tanks, large ASW ships, and mortar batteries to counter organized smuggling on the border or the embezzlement of natural resources in border regions and the economic zone. The transition from specific border service to patrolling the barbed-wire fence along the entire border led to a deterioration in the Border Guards' professional qualities. The listing of the Border Guards as part of the "USSR KGB Special Forces" and the inclusion in them of airborne assault and motorized rifle combined arms units was a result of the totalitarian system's desire to have an armed force to tackle police missions inside the state. At the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet S. Alekseyev, chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Committee, appealed for the Border Guards to be reassigned to the Defense Ministry.

This should not be done under any circumstances! Let's look to the experience of history. In the revolutionary period a separate border guard corps which was not part of the Army or the police was set up and proved its effectiveness. And even the cossack units attached to it

underwent special training. The Civil War demonstrated the futility of using Red Army units to protect the border.

First and foremost, we should proceed on the basis of the legal concept of the state border as a result of international agreements about the limits of contiguous states' sovereignty. On this basis, border protection should be seen as activity to maintain on the border the treaty law expressed in the normative provisions of the regulations governing the state border and border crossing points, as well as the regulations governing border strips and zones, should any of the latter be established.

The basis for the protection of the state border should be border monitoring of the observance of the state border regulations on land, in the air, at sea, and on rivers, lakes, and other waters. Inalienable components of border protection are customs and ecological checks on the state border and at border crossing points.

The republics have declared state independence. This means that there is a need to set up an organ to ensure that their sovereign rights are implemented in social relations on the state border—naturally, preserving the status of the border in international law as an inalienable sign of state unity.

Thus, in our view, each sovereign republic could appoint a border representative for the section of the state border between that republic and the contiguous state. The representative would be tasked with implementing border policy. It would be expedient to have border representation, treaty, and legal services, customs, ecological control services, and services to collect and process information directly subordinate to the border representatives.

Border Guards subunits deployed within a republic should be operationally subordinate to the border representatives. On the whole, the Border Guards should remain centrally administered and supplied. But there are two options for jurisdiction—the country's president or a collegial Union executive organ set up from among republic representatives. The Border Guards should probably be renamed the Border Security Guards [pogranichnaya okhrana].

Given that criminal activity linked with the violation of the state border is implemented in illegal forms, we should enshrine in legislation the border security guards' right to conduct operations using secret forces and weapons. It would be expedient to define the border security guards as an organ for investigating cases of the violation of the state border. And the tried and tested system of prosecutorial oversight of border security activity by the relevant territorial prosecutors and the examination of criminal cases by local courts should be maintained. Defense of the state border in the air should be carried out by the country's Air Defense Forces.

Quality of Latvian Border Guards Discussed

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23 Oct 91 First edition p 5

[Article from Riga by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh: "Quiet on the Border for Now"]

[Text] "If there is no unforeseen delay, Border Guards will begin to be stationed at duty locations late this year or early next year," was the press statement made recently by V. Sviklis, chief specialist of the Latvian Department of Public Security.

The USSR Border Guard Troops main training center in the environs of Ventspils presently is being transferred. Five hundred persons will be able to train there at the same time. According to experts' estimates, the Border Guard Troops need a total of 5,000-6,000 persons.

As of today statistics have been summarized on 370 persons who signed up as Border Guard volunteers in Riga: 113 served as privates in the Soviet Army, 60 are NCO's, 21 are warrant officers, 51 are officers, and there are 125 young men who have not served in the Army and who, according to the law "On State Service," should be called into the Army on a compulsory basis...

Well, here is the opinion on this matter of Lieutenant Colonel A. Kirilenko, an officer of the Ventspils Border Detachment, which has been given the mission of

guarding the state border together with Latvian Republic Border Guard personnel and helping them train cadres:

"We are troubled by the fact that incompetent people are going to serve in the Latvian Republic Border Guards. A person who previously was a construction battalion driver has been appointed chief of the training center for training Latvian Border Guard personnel in the city of Ventspils. He has neither officer nor NCO rank. Another comrade in the leadership at one time served as an enlisted man at a technical surveillance post. When you speak with such officials you see that they have a vague impression of what they are to do and what problems they are to resolve. We have been committed to help and give all possible support to the Republic Border Guards in training qualified cadres. But as of today they have not developed a concept for guarding the border of a sovereign state, and it is only based on the concept that one can resolve questions of training specialists. We should have begun training Latvian Border Guard personnel at the training center already this month, but it turned out they have very few people."

To this should be added that Baltic Border District personnel have found themselves in a very ambiguous situation. They do not completely understand which state's border they are guarding today, the USSR's or that of sovereign Baltic states? It is also impossible to understand how the further destiny of the Border District will be decided.

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