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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-91-032

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17 December 1991

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Yeltsin Visits Western Group of Forces

PM2711102591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Correspondents Colonel V Markushin and Lieutenant Colonel V. Khabarov report: "B.N. Yeltsin's Visit to Western Group of Forces"]

[Text] Concluding his three-day visit to the FRG, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] President B. Yeltsin visited the Western Group of Forces [WGF]. He was accompanied by German Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher. The two had a meeting with Soviet servicemen at Wuensdorf Garrison Officers' Club.

In his speech B. Yeltsin stressed that this is his first visit abroad since the events of August, and he assessed it as successful. Above all in the sense that interest in developing cooperation with Russia was demonstrated on the German side. This cooperation, in B. Yeltsin's words, will be formalized in the near future in an all-embracing Russian-German Treaty.

B. Yeltsin gave a high assessment of the fact that Germany had been one of the first to sign agreements directly with Russia, calling it a wise, farsighted, and bold step. Seeing that, he said, the situation in Russia is changing drastically and Russia is entering on the road of radical economic reforms, fixing free prices, removing customs barriers, and simplifying all relations with foreign countries. We will create conditions which will be advantageous for German entrepreneurs who invest their capital in the Russian economy, the president stressed.

Dwelling on problems connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, B. Yeltsin said that in conditions where the Ukraine and Belorussia have put restrictions on acceptance of WGF units, Russia is assuming the entire responsibility itself. He announced to those present in the hall that it is planned to construct 47,900 apartments in Russia over the next few years, including 27,000 paid for by the FRG. The largest housing units will be built in the vicinity of Kursk, Tambov, Nizhniy Novgorod, Voronezh, Greater Moscow, Krasnodar, Novosibirsk, and Kemerovo. We are prepared to provide all servicemen discharged into the reserve with housing and plots of land for private or individual farming, B. Yeltsin stressed.

He went on to speak about measures aimed at socially protecting servicemen. In particular about how as of 1992 it is planned to double their monetary support. Moreover, Russia is to assume the expenses of maintaining the Soviet Armed forces in all the republics.

Expounding his views on some of the current problems in the country, B. Yeltsin expressed himself in favor of the unity of all the former union republics, including in the sphere of military construction. As Russia's president, Boris Nikolayevich stressed, I affirm that Russia will not be the first to create its own Armed Forces, and

we call on the other sovereign republics not to do so either. We also favor united nuclear forces, including not only the Strategic Missile Forces, but also Air Force and Navy nuclear forces. They should definitely be under a single command.

We are prepared to support new initiatives on further reductions in nuclear weapons and subsequently, in the framework of the military reform process that is just beginning, on reductions in conventional arms as well. It is time to give serious thought to specific steps toward integration into an all-European security system, and then, perhaps, into a similar worldwide system.

Much is being said and written at the present time about Russia's National Guard. "Hotheads" are here and there carrying out do-it-yourself-style recruitment of guardsmen. The Russian guard will be drawn primarily from the existing internal troops. And it will be numerically extremely small.

Of course, all these problems cannot but be of concern to you too. Our servicemen and their families are in a complex position in Germany. It is no secret that there has been a marked upsurge of hostility toward them. The fate of Soviet property on German territory is a cause for alarm, especially military property. All these questions were raised by us and discussed during talks with the German leaders. There has been noticeable progress, the Russian president stressed.

H.-D. Genscher, who spoke next, gave a highly favorable assessment of the fact that the first Russian president to be elected by the people in free elections had visited Germany. He said that this visit opens a new chapter in relations between Germany and Russia. That the Germans, who remember all the good and all the bad in history, are ready to be reliable partners.

To conclude his visit to Wuensdorf, B. Yeltsin had a conversation with the command of the WGF.

Army General on Possible New Coup Attempt

PM1911165391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Nov 91 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report under the "Russian Agency Reports" rubric: "Another Putsch Still Possible"]

[Text] The possibility of a repetition of the putsch, albeit minimized, is not ruled out. Army General Konstantin Kobets, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] state counselor on defense and chairman of the USSR State Council Committee for the Preparation and Implementation of Military Reform, voiced this opinion on arriving in Paris on a private visit. In his opinion, the old military-political structures and the former party apparatus must be "removed from spheres of energetic activity" so as to preclude the possibility of another putsch. "It is very important today to feed and reassure the people so that they realize that government

in Russia is sufficiently stable and that there is confidence in the future," Konstantin Kobets observed.

Startup Activities of DOSAAF Successor Group

UDSTO Central Committee Plenum

92P50055A Moscow *SOVETSKIY PATRIOT*
in Russian No 48, Nov 91 (signed to press
26 Nov 91) p 6

["In the Central Council of the USSR Union of Defense Sports-Technical Organizations"]

[Text] On 14 and 15 November of this year a conference of leaders of defense and sports-technical societies and organizations of the sovereign republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the RSFSR, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Ukraine and Estonia was held in Moscow.

A protocol, signed by all the conference participants as well as by Col Gen Ye. I. Krylov, chairman of the Central Council of the Union of Defense Sports-Technical Organizations [UDSTO], confirmed their readiness to energetically carry out the decisions of the VII DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum on the reorganization of DOSAAF into a strong, active interrepublic defense organization—the Union of Defense Sports-Technical Organizations (Societies) of sovereign states (Union of DSTO's).

It was decided to create a commission to work out a compact on mutual obligations of the defense organizations of the sovereign republics. It consists of two representatives from each defense organization.

It is proposed that the compact reflect the whole range of relations between the center and the republic organizations, above all economic and legal. After confirmation of its text by the Presidium of the UDSTO Central Council, the compact will be signed by the leaders of the defense organizations and societies of the sovereign republics.

Registered in Russia

92P50055B Moscow *SOVETSKIY PATRIOT*
in Russian No 49, Dec 91 (signed to press
3 Dec 91) p 1

["New Union Registered"]

[Text] The Charter of the Union of Defense Sports-Technical Organizations [UDSTO] (Societies) of the Sovereign Republics (States) has been registered in the RSFSR Ministry of Justice. The new interrepublic organization is the legal successor of the USSR DOSAAF—the country's oldest defense organization. The basic goals of UDSTO's activities, as inscribed in the Charter, are the patriotic upbringing of the toilers and young people and their training for labor and the defense of the Fatherland, as well as the development of technical and useful types of sport.

Their inclusion in the Union of Defense Organizations was confirmed by extraordinary republic congresses of the DOSAAF's of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Representatives of thirteen republics of the former USSR (including Ukraine and Estonia), who had recently signed the protocol on joint action in connection with the reorganization of the USSR DOSAAF, expressed agreement on the necessity of a compact on mutual obligations of the defense organizations of the sovereign states and UDSTO.

Further Report

92P50055C Moscow *SOVETSKIY PATRIOT*
in Russian No 49, Dec 91 (signed to press
3 Dec 91) p 2

["In the Central Council of the Union of Defense Sports-Technical Organizations"]

[Text] In the Central Council of the country's Union of Defense Sports-Technical Organizations [UDSTO], Col Gen Ye. Krylov, chairman of the USSR UDSTO Central Council, held a meeting with a group of USSR people's deputies, elected from DOSAAF. People's Deputies M. Zokirov, P. Klimuk, N. Kotlovtssev, P. Lushev and L. Nemkova, as well former USSR DOSAAF Central Committee chairman Fleet Admiral G. Yegorov, participated in the meeting.

Ye. Krylov acquainted the people's deputies with the results of the recent VII DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum, as well as the conference of leaders of the defense sports-technical organizations and societies of the sovereign republics, and told them about the complex problems now facing the country's UDSTO, on whose solution depends its further activity.

In addition to the report "In the Central Council of the Union of Defense Sports-Technical Organizations," published in *SOVETSKIY PATRIOT* No 48, we report that Maj Gen Shakhmardanov, chairman of the Uzbekistan DOSAAF Central Committee, also participated in the conference of leaders of the defense-sports organizations of the sovereign republics (14-15 November).

New Fund To Aid War Veterans in Trouble

92P50050A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 4 Dec 91
Union Edition p 7

[V. Litovkin report: "The Aid Fund Is Looking for Aid"]

[Text] A Fund, to aid veterans of all wars and military conflicts in which our country has participated abroad, has been created under the President's Committee for Veteran-Internationalists' Affairs. USSR People's Deputy Aleksandr Kolodeznikov has been appointed its president.

"Our goal," Aleksandr told the *IZVESTIYA* correspondent, "together with other state and public organizations, is to support war veterans in market economy conditions and to help their social rehabilitation. In this,

our method will be, to use a well-known metaphor, not to feed starving front-line fighters with free fish, but to give them fishing rods. So far, our fund has on its books only 100,000 rubles, which was given by the Fatherland Union of Afghanistan veterans. Other state and public organizations and banks, commercial structures and associations are now promising material support. But promises are still not money. And 100,000 rubles, divided among millions of internationalists—this is small change.

“What do we need money for? To give prosthetic, orthopedic and medical help to invalids, to train former soldiers in new professions and specialties in areas where there are shortages in market economy conditions, to build housing for veterans, and to give material support to the families of the fallen. Also to ransom Soviet prisoners of war held by the mujaheddin.

“There is an idea,” continued Kolodeznikov, “to set up joint programs by agreement with republic organs, since we have common goals, but the financial capabilities of various organizations are often limited. United, we can, for instance, direct a part of our earned funds to a worthy cause—the social support of private farms which are springing up and of veterans’ groups’ economic activities. We are ready to serve as an intermediary for them, to provide them with legal consultations, and to share with them the experience we have of how we are getting richer. We are also ready to held with credits.”

But for now the aid fund for veteran-internationalists, “Life Without Wars,” is itself in need of financial help. Its account in the Zolotobank Commercial Bank of Moscow is number 700906. Correspondent account number 161613 is at the USSR State Bank TsOU [central oblast administration]. MFO [Moscow financial department] 299 112. Telephone 923-05-00. Address: 5/6 Pushkin Street, Moscow 103009.

Modern War and Electronic Warfare

92UM0137A Moscow VESTNIK

PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian No 9, Sep 91 (signed to press 10 Aug 91) pp 28-29

[Article by Colonel V. Silkin]

[Text] Radio warfare, radio countermeasures, electronic countermeasures and, finally, electronic warfare... In my view the changes in terminology here are the result not only of subjective, but also objective reasons.

Let us compare two definitions of EW cited in the first and second editions of the "Voyenny entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary]. The first treats it as "a set of measures carried out for the discovery and subsequent jamming of enemy electronic equipment and systems and for electronic protection of friendly electronic equipment and systems." The second edition treats it as "the aggregate of measures and actions by forces interrelated by purpose, missions, place and time for discovery of enemy electronic equipment and systems and their destruction with all kinds of weapons, their capture (disabling), or their electronic suppression, as well as for electronic protection of friendly electronic systems and equipment; a form of operational (tactical) support."


Both definitions consider EW as warfare against enemy electronic equipment and systems, in the first instance using electronic equipment and in the second also using weapons and capture, i.e., it is aimed at reducing the enemy's command and control effectiveness and supporting the stable functioning of our similar systems.

It is common knowledge that a distinguishing feature of EW is the energy with which this warfare is waged. In particular, electromagnetic waves are the primary source of electromagnetic energy in armed opposition. They are differentiated according to the following kinds: radio waves ($\lambda > 10^{-4}$ m); optical waves (10^{-3} m $> \lambda > 10^{-9}$ m); x-rays (10^{-3} m $> \lambda > 10^{-12}$ m [sic]); gamma rays (10^{-10} m).

If wavelength $\lambda > 10^{-4}$ m, the electromagnetic waves are called radio waves, and if the wavelength is less than this parameter, then it is already a matter of radiation. This involves the dual nature of radiation in the optical band, where corpuscular properties of light also are manifested together with waves.

Electromagnetic weapons are divided into radiowave, electro-optical, x-ray and gamma weapons depending on wavelength.

Fig. 1



In this classification, EW can be viewed as an engagement using electronic weapons.

Since the majority of air defense weapons emit electromagnetic energy, all of them also participate in electronic warfare. For example, surface-to-air missile systems use electromagnetic energy throughout an air defense battle, and it is employed in aviation in vectoring a fighter to a target and controlling a missile's flight.


And not only this. A method was used in Vietnam, for example, which consisted of switching on a command radio transmitter to a missile without a missile launch. On receiving a signal from onboard ELINT equipment that a command radio transmitter had been switched on, a pilot would begin a missile-evasion maneuver, drop bombs at random and abort the mission. Or a manipulative jammer would disrupt aimed bombing by suppressing the strike aircraft's onboard radar. Electromagnetic energy was the primary means of opposition in both the first and second instances.

If such missions are accomplished using electronic equipment and electromagnetic energy, then evidently it is possible also to introduce the concept of "electronic engagement," i.e., a component part of an operation, the aggregate of the most important electronic battles joined by a common concept, carried out by specific force groupings and aimed at performing an operational mission.

Thus, by considering EW an inalienable part of combat operations, it is possible to establish mutual ties among its components as well as among elements of armed opposition by air defense personnel and equipment to enemy offensive air forces and weapons. (Fig. 1 shows a block diagram of a model of such armed opposition. Fig. 2 shows the system of interworking of a number of structures when the Air Defense Forces take measures to increase the effectiveness of one of the elements of armed opposition—electronic reconnaissance.)

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Fig. 2



Belorus Military Draft Law Published

925D0022A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 26 Oct 91 pp 1-2

[Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, No 392, October 24, 1991, Minsk, signed by V. Kebich, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus and N. Kavko, charge d'affaires of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus: "On the Regular Call-Up of Citizens for Active Military Duty in October-December 1991"]

[Text] In accordance with the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus: "On the State Sovereignty of Belarus" and the decree of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus: "On the Procedure for Conducting Military Call-Ups and Mandatory Military Duty for Persons Conscripted From the Territory of the Republic of Belarus," the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus hereby decrees that

1. Executive committees of oblast, municipal, and district Soviets of People's Deputies and military commissariats ensure that:

—there will be a call-up to active military duty in the armed forces, border, internal, or railway troops in October-December 1991, of citizens of the male gender living within the territory of the Republic of Belarus, who will be 18 years of age as of the date they are conscripted, and who do not have the right of deferment from active military duty, as well as citizens of older draft age, who have forfeited their rights to a draft deferment;

—the assignments of conscriptees who were victims of the consequences of the catastrophe at the Chernobyl atomic power station during their military service in military units, not be connected with any nuclear facility or any other source of ionized radiation, ultra-high frequencies, or components of missile fuel, and not be assigned to territories that have been contaminated by radioactivity;

—conscriptees who work permanently in agriculture be sent to their military units no earlier than December 1st;

—medical personnel fully meet the requirements of the conscription committees, which have to certify as to the state of health of the conscriptees.

2. Military commissariats and the staff of the Belorussian military district provide for the assignment of conscriptees to active military duty and that first priority be given to assigning youths to fill vacant slots of formations, units, and subunits stationed on the territory of the republic, including internal, railway, and border troops, military construction battalions, which are under the jurisdiction of civilian ministries and departments, as well as formations and units subordinate to the Belorussian military district.

3. The staff of the Belorussian military district take measures to ensure that youths who are conscripted from the territory of Belarus and receive their military specialties in various military training units and centers, carry out any future military duty on the territory of the republic.

4. Executive committees of oblast, municipal, and district Soviets of People's Deputies, directors of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and military commissariats will ensure the timely arrival of conscriptees to call-up and assembly points, and will assign necessary personnel and transportation to service these points, will establish proper conditions for everyday needs, and will maintain order and organization, as well as safety rules while transporting the conscriptees.

5. The staff of the Belorussian military district will provide the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus with information on the results of the call-up by January 15, 1992.

Army Property Claimed by Baltics

92UM0126B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Nov 91 p 3

[I. Litvinova report: "Latvia Appropriates Army Real Estate"]

[Text] Riga—The block of issues for interstate negotiations between Latvia and Russia and the USSR has been noticeably reduced. For example, the thorny issue of army property no longer "exists."

Latvia has unilaterally decided to assume ownership of all real estates belonging to the USSR Ministry of Defense and border troops. The debate on this subject in the Latvian parliament took no more than half an hour. After that a resolution was adopted declaring all buildings, installations, and communications, both civilian and military, to be the property of the Latvian Republic.

It was also suggested that the intergovernmental delegations would have nothing to negotiate if the "solution to problems" moves at this kind of pace.

Estonian Draft to National Army Begins

LD1611125991 Moscow Central Television Vostok
Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1630 GMT
15 Nov 91

[Video report by correspondent H. Lenk; from the "TV Inform" newscast]

[Text] The first draft campaign to Estonia's own national army has started in the republic. The draft law on defense forces was passed at its first reading. According to the draft, there is to be an 18 months' service period and the army will be a few thousand soldiers' strong. According to preliminary calculations, the young republic will be spending around 6% of its state budget on defense needs.

But here is another question, to which there is no answer yet: whether Estonia should become a neutral country or should it join a military bloc in order to guarantee its security? Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri recently met NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner and received an invitation to take part in the work of the NATO council.

According to Minister Meri at a news conference in Tallin, for NATO the Baltic states are now the same kind of partners in cooperation as everybody else. However, there has not been any talk so far of Estonia actually joining the alliance.

Lithuanian Military Production

LD1111184591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0200 GMT 10 Nov 91

[Talk by Roma Pakieniene]

[Text] Not too long ago, many of Lithuania's industrial enterprises were part of the Soviet Union's military-industrial complex. Audio tape-recorders, radio-measuring devices, calculators and other electronic equipment, television tubes, televisions, machine-tools, and even certain submarine parts, manufactured in Lithuania, were and still continue to be used for military purposes.

[Words indistinct] military ammunition, while food processing enterprises manufacture products which used to and continue to be eaten even today, by soldiers of the Soviet Army.

It is estimated that every second individual employed in Lithuania's industry has touched or produced goods that were subsequently used for military purposes.

For the time being, there are no exact figures to indicate what part of the general production output in Lithuania constitutes goods earmarked for the Soviet Army.

In the opinion of the Deputy Economy Minister Klementas Seputis, a rough estimate would amount to only two percent. Such estimates are vague because Lithuanian enterprises do not engage in exclusively military production. Identical electronic and radio equipment, machine tools, and a multitude of other goods are being used for various purposes. [Word indistinct] Vilnius Instrument Enterprise, Vilma, is the only one in the former Soviet Union to be manufacturing the so-called black boxes used in aviation. These Lithuanian recorders have been installed in thousands of Soviet civilian and military aircraft.

Often, the manufacturers themselves did not know for what purposes their products will be used, since these were usually ordered through various Moscow ministries. The Defense Ministry sent requests only rarely.

It is possible to identify only a few Lithuanian firms that made a very small part of exclusively military production.

The Panevezys Television Tube Manufacturing Plant is among them; it currently continues to produce special television tubes for the Soviet military industry. Its annual output has only amounted to 501 units, which equals less than 0.1 percent of the enterprise's production volume. Forty individuals are engaged in the manufacture of the military television tubes in the giant enterprise. According to the enterprise director, [name indistinct], their manufacture in the future depends solely on economic worth. In the absence of this, the contract may be broken at any time.

Several years ago, yet another enterprise, the Kaunas Ship-Building Enterprise, used to produce steering columns and refrigeration devices for submarines. Currently, it sells the very same refrigeration devices to dairy enterprises.

[Word indistinct] that furnish information concerning enterprises in Lithuania which are engaged in military production often fail to agree on whether the enterprise is to be considered a part of the military-industrial complex or not. Let's consider the Klaipeda Ship-Building Enterprise. In the opinion of some, it was also semimilitary, since it was engaged in military ship-building. However, the administrators of the building enterprise claim that only four transport ships ordered by the military have been built here over a 40-year period. However, according to the designation, they are not considered military. The last one of these was constructed in 1987. At any rate, Moscow considered all such enterprises as semimilitary. Their popular appellation was post boxes, since a number was given. Instead of an address, a number was provided. Also, they had a name, thus differing from the real military enterprises. The majority of Lithuanian enterprises relinquished the post box numbers already at the beginning of last year. Otherwise, former semimilitary enterprises did not differ in any manner from all the other enterprises. They were not guarded by the military and internal discipline was neither more strict nor more military. However the public was under the impression that these enterprises were enveloped by a certain cover of secrecy.

Edmundas Pulgava-[name indistinct], senior engineer of the former post box Vilnius Instrument Enterprise, Vilma, asserts that there has been no secrecy. The enterprise has been and continues to be open to foreigners. Contracts are being drawn up with western firms. The myth that these enterprises are either semi- or even totally military was fabricated intentionally to keep real military enterprises secret.

Today, it is also difficult to answer the question of how many such post boxes existed in Lithuania. Some information sources indicate that all Lithuanian enterprises which had been under Moscow's jurisdiction were semimilitary. Over 100 of these can be counted in this fashion.

Other sources inform us that only the electronics and radio instrument firms were semimilitary. Moreover,

there are only between 10 and 12 such firms in Lithuania. The military [words indistinct] production used to amount to approximately 10 to 20 percent of total production output.

However, some true military enterprises also exist in Lithuania. There are few of them—only three. They include the helicopter and tank repair enterprises, located in Kaunas, and the aviation repair enterprise in Panevezys.

Changes in Moldova's Military Planned

92UN0384A Kishinev MOLODEZH MOLDOVY
in Russian No 88-89, 9 Nov 91 p 8

[Interview with Major General V. Nazarov, military commissar of the Republic of Moldova, by G. Aleshin; place and date not given: "Where Should the Young Men of Moldova Serve?"]

[Text] There is a bronze model of a tank in the office of Major General V. Nazarov, the military commissar of the Republic of Moldova. Catching my glance, Viktor Ivanovich explained that it is the challenging prize of the USSR Ministry of Defense for the best training of youth for service in the armed forces. The republic military commissar was presented this award three years in a row. As a result, the prize remains in Kishinev permanently.

[Aleshin] Viktor Ivanovich, as I understand it, both the prize and the plan for the call-up of youths into the armed forces conducted in previous years is now a thing of the past. What are the realities today? What is happening with the autumn call-up which, judging by everything, threatens to become a wintry one?

[Nazarov] The situation in the Republic of Moldova cannot be viewed in isolation from the situation in the country. And it is developing in the following way. In the present situation, the Ministry of Defense has submitted proposals for reform of the call-up and manpower acquisition systems of the armed forces.

The autumn call-up is taking place in the country according to still active legislation that takes into account the proposals of the governments of the Union republics.

It is well known that the republics of Moldova and Georgia came out against the call-up of their youths into the USSR Armed Forces. Armenia and Azerbaijan [words missing, apparent line drop] about a number of peculiarities of this year's autumn call-up. Conscripts who will be assigned to the Navy will now serve not three but two years. An order of the USSR Minister of Defense exempts youths from service who previously were considered fit for noncombatant service. Those of this group who are still serving are subject to discharge into the reserve.

[Aleshin] Does it not seem to you that the situation is reaching the point that the country can be left without an army entirely? If it does remain, what kind will it be?

[Nazarov] There will be a country—and there will be an army. The future of the armed forces and the conduct of military reform are now directly tied to the signing of the Union treaty. Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, USSR minister of defense, announced on 5 November that the State Council had made a decision on the unity of the army. It is simply unreasonable to divide up the armed forces under current conditions. But, at the same time, changes in the army are inevitable, since changes have occurred and are occurring in society. In this connection I cannot help but recall the words of the remarkable military commander, a son of the Moldavian people, M.V. Frunze, about the fact that the army is an exact copy of society.

What changes are expected in the army? The proposals of the Ministry of Defense to the legislative organs of the country envisage a reduction in the period of service to 18 months. There will be a more widespread introduction of voluntary service for soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and warrant officers. In this case, it is a question of the professionalization of the army, which will lead to an increase in the level of combat readiness of servicemen. The Ministry of Defense proposals envisage the signing of contracts for 2.5-3 years. Of course, if requested, this time can be extended. It is planned to introduce contract service, along with conscript service, starting 1 January 1992. Incidentally, the contract system is already employed in the navy. Who can aspire to signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense? Soldiers of the reserve up to 35 years of age, men who are completing compulsory service, and conscripts who have gone through a half year of training in a military specialty. If desired, women can also serve on contract.

At the same time, universal military service will be maintained; i.e., the system for keeping the army up to strength will be a mixed one.

[Aleshin] The governments of a number of sovereign republics announced a desire to have their own armies. How does this blend with the present concept of the defense of the country?

[Nazarov] It seems to me that the establishment of armed formations in the republics should be based on a clear legal status. Because, after all, in some places they operate with partisan methods: Attacks are made on army depots and posts with the aim of acquiring weapons. Recently in Azerbaijan, OMON [special purpose militia detachment] personnel detained five vehicles with ammunition that belonged to one of the military units. Speaking of the future army, I will refer to a recent speech by General of the Army V. Lobov, chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In particular, he noted that structurally the Armed Forces of the country should include only those components that directly form the defense system capability. These are the services and

arms that are financed from the state budget. All the remaining "noncombat" militarized elements—civil defense, military commissariats, military sports and defense societies, internal and border troops, and construction and railroad troops—should be removed from the Armed Forces and redistributed between a new center and the Union republics. The chief of the General Staff believes that at the republic level, apparently, there will be a State Defense Committee and a commander of forces that are located on the territory of the republic.

[Aleshin] There is a lot of talk today about alternative service. What is the gist of it?

[Nazarov] A conscript who desires to enter alternative service must submit a justifying application to the rayon (city) draft board with documents giving him the right to refuse military service. The following could be justification: poor state of health, religion, or pacifistic convictions. I want to emphasize that only the commission can decide the question of whether a youth has the right to alternative service. Those who are given this permission will engage in socially useful work in the republic. The call-up for active alternative service will be conducted twice a year for two months prior to the general call-up of citizens. The law "On Alternative Service" also envisages the deferment of active alternative service for reasons of health, for continuation of education, and for family and other circumstances.

Readers of MOLODEZHKA will probably be interested in knowing what the conscripts themselves think of alternative service?

Sociologists conducted a poll of more than 12,000 youths in our republic. Of these, 5,594 want to go through alternative service, and 7,000 conscripts prefer to serve in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces. In addition, 60 percent agree to perform their duty in any spot in the country, and the remaining 40 percent intend to serve only on the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

The government of the republic does not object to the service of our countrymen in the Soviet Army and Navy beyond the republic's borders, but only on the basis of written statements addressed to special draft commissions under rayon and city executive committees. This is written in black and white in the Republic of Moldova Decree No. 325, signed by Prime Minister V. Muravskiy. However, the state department for military questions, with its arbitrary decision, prohibited youths from serving outside the borders of the Republic of Moldova. As they say, any commentary is superfluous.

Recently the leaders of the republic announced that they do not object to the service of youths from Moldova on contract. I especially want to talk about deserters. There are already hundreds. In addition, they all unanimously cite dedovshchina [hazing], humiliation, and beatings on the part of colleagues. But a careful check indicates that in a majority of cases such statements are simply fabrications. In addition, a number of checks were conducted in the presence of representatives of the state department

on military questions. The facts indicate that, by inciting desertion, the strong uncles are rendering a doubtful benefit not only for the youths but for society as a whole. The military commissariat of the Republic of Moldova and the military procuracy have dozens of examples where deserters and conscripts who evade service very frequently break the law and commit crimes.

In this connection I want to mention the law on amnesty, which was adopted by the Soviet of the Republics and the Soviet of the Union on the initiative of the president of the country. This is the first legislative act affirmed by the Union parliament of the new convocation. The law "On the Amnesty of Servicemen who Evade Military Service" was signed by the president on 1 November. This document is subject to implementation in the course of three months.

I also cannot fail to talk about something else. I am convinced that the absence of army schooling will not affect 18- to 20-year-old youths in the best way. Many of them are now left on their own, but, after all, unemployment looms ahead, and the harsh realities of the market are in the offing. A lot of accusations are made against the army today. There is no argument that some are justified. But it is unlikely that anyone will deny that only in the armed forces can a young man go through the school of courage, civic formation, and maturity, and develop as a person.

[Aleshin] Viktor Ivanovich, starting in January of this year, state compulsory personal insurance was introduced in our country. Explain in some detail how it is implemented in practice?

[Nazarov] The insurance applies to all servicemen and also to those reservists who are called up for training courses. A youth who is called to active military service need not personally undertake any kind of action for his own insurance. It will be done automatically, beginning with the day of call-up for military service or for undergoing training courses. The serviceman does not pay any kind of fees.

I will speak briefly about the insurance sums. The largest of them—25,000 rubles [R]—is paid out to the beneficiaries of the serviceman who died while on active duty or undergoing training courses. In the event of a determination of disability—from R5,000 to R15,000 is paid, depending on the group.

A serviceman who is seriously injured is paid R1,000, and slightly injured—R500. I invite your attention to this point as well: If, as a result of a medical finding it is established that a compulsory service serviceman and a reservist (during training courses) was unfit by virtue of his health to perform his duties, he is paid an insurance sum of R1,000. I will note that every case of the death of a serviceman is considered an emergency situation and is carefully investigated. And if the investigative organs and the court establish that the young person perished because of his own negligence, or as the result of obvious carelessness, and also because of alcohol, narcotic, or

toxic intoxication, in this case the insurance sum is not paid. Strict accountability is stipulated for servicemen and reservists called up for training courses who are guilty of the loss (death) or damage to the health of servicemen and reservists. Moreover, the insurance sums that are deducted because of their guilt are exacted from the guilty parties.

[Aleshin] God forbid that the young fellows and their dear ones would have to resort to this insurance. Let them serve with honor and return alive and healthy to their paternal homes. But, nonetheless, if the unforeseeable happens, to whom should they turn?

[Nazarov] A serviceman or a reservist called up for training courses must submit a statement in an established form to the state insurance inspectorate at the place of residence (registration) concerning the payment of the insurance sum. In the event of the loss (death) of the insured, the money is paid to his beneficiaries. They must present a certificate on the right of inheritance.

Military commissariats are obligated to render all necessary assistance in obtaining and drawing up documents.

RSFSR Official Outlines National Guard

92UM0192A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by Natalya Gorodetskaya: "The Republics Will Have a National Guard"]

[Text]

In any case, the second revised version of the bill on the Russian National Guard is on Rutskoy's desk for presentation to Yeltsin.

The Moscow Brigade will have already been created two months after the Supreme Soviet's ratification of this bill; four more years are being allotted for the formation of the Russian National Guard. Then the constitutional authorities in the center and at the local level can be comfortable: the members of the guard will protect them from social and ethnic conflicts and terrorist acts. The guard will also assist in combating organized crime, indeed, it will only participate in large-scale operations at the request of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and KGB [Committee for State Security] and at the direction of regional administrations.

The National Guard's functions include rendering assistance during natural disasters. "Because," explained Colonel Anatoliy Tsyganok, deputy chairman of the Commission for Development the Concept of a Law on the Russian National Guard, "the Russian Rescue Corps exists only on paper." Indeed, we have anguished memories of our rescuers, which were recounted on television screens after the 1986 earthquake in Armenia, about how they sat in airports at full combat readiness for days with tents, provisions and dogs and were unable to fly to the stricken area where the Italians and French were already working as fast as they could....

An emergency-rescue work battalion is envisioned in each brigade, and there will be a total of 11 brigades in the Russian National Guard. Each brigade will also consist of a security battalion, a battalion of BTR's [armored transport vehicles] or BMP's [armored personnel vehicles] and, depending on climatic conditions, helicopter-transport units. A battalion of small naval combatants will be deployed in the north of Russia and they propose deploying an anti-tank artillery battalion in the Caucasus.

New information subunits will be created in the Russian National Guard. "In the event of localized ethnic or social conflicts, we propose using the mode of operations that was tested during the three days in August," says Anatoliy Tsyganok. "Analyze the situation and be informed about the population's state of affairs before issuing the order to use troops. We will need information subunits to do this. It will be a sort of sociological, psychological service. If need be, we will place a press center and radio-television center there. We need feedback from the population. We want to have a religious department where specialists, i.e., Muslims, Catholics and Protestants, etc., would work."

Membership in political parties will be suspended during time of service in the guard. "The sole criteria for selecting guard members are intelligence testing and physical capability tests that are mandatory for everyone, even for the command staff," Tsyganok stresses. "We need professionals. The Russian Guard should be loved and respected by the people."

They propose creating appropriate living conditions for the guard members: each brigade will have a training center, a swimming pool, a firing range and a driver training area. Officers and soldiers will live with their families in separate quarters. They already have a contract for construction of guard members' homes in Reutov.

Clearly, the poor Russian taxpayer will have to tighten his belt: it will also have to feed its own KGB and the USSR MVD is threatening to transfer to the republic the internal troops who guard corrective-labor institutions and who escort criminals. And who does not know that a large number of these establishments are located on Russian territory? Now to this we will add the National Guard, the people's favorite, with living conditions like in civilized countries, and with normal salaries by our standards: a private will receive 700-800 rubles, junior officers R1,200-1,500, and senior officers up to R2,000.

"We have calculated," Tsyganok asserted, "that R31,686,000 is needed for uniforms, transportation and other economic needs. They announced in many areas that they will collect voluntary donations. In addition, MVD strength is being reduced and part of that budget will be allocated to us. But precisely because of inadequate resources, we are forming the Guard based on MVD special units, but the Moscow Brigade is based on

the OMSDON [separate special-purpose motorized rifle division] imeni Dzerzhinskiy."

The Shchit Union is of the opinion that the Guard is a prototype for a new army and its image should be pure, whereas the Division imeni Dzerzhinskiy tainted itself by participating in the bloody events in Tbilisi, the Baltic Region and Central Asia.

To which Colonel Tsyganok objects: "The base is important to us, but the personnel will be selected on a competitive basis from soldiers and officers of the MVD and KGB, the active army and reserve. We have found a common language with Shchit and Urazhtsev has admitted that they are assisting us to recruit people. We will certainly take advantage of their data base. We will have small subunits, up to 3,000-5000 men per brigade in each region, but no more than 100,000 in all. Although we have much in common with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the image of the internal troops is not suited to the Guards."

Ukrainian Defense Minister Interviewed

92UM0180A Kiev VECHERNIY KIEV in Russian
29 Oct 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Petrovich Morozov by Anatoliy Smetanin: "Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K.P. Morozov: 'People Must Believe in the Rightness of our Cause'"]

[Text]

[Smetanin] Konstantin Petrovich, on behalf of VECHERNIY KIEV readers, permit me to congratulate you on your high military rank and wish you, as they say, a marshal's stars on your tie!

[Morozov] Thank you and I will attempt to justify this high trust of the Ukrainian people.

[Smetanin] We wish you success in everything. But, now on to everyday matters. Many readers have noted with uneasiness that for the time being, legally, you alone are in the Ministry of Defense. You are the full-fledged occupant of this office, but there are people in neighboring offices who, as they say, are non-residents: their "chairs" are registered with another department. Tell me, has your team somehow already found its own identity and is it working on any specific problems?

[Morozov] Yes, of course, we can say that it is acquiring its own identity. But it is gratifying that this situation of somewhat uncertainty troubles your readers. Thank you. Many Ukrainian citizens are asking that question. They ask about it not only at the session, but also in letters and in personal conversations. People want to see the actual implementation of the very idea of establishing the ministry and forming the armed forces. I regard this with a great deal of responsibility. As of today, I am the only one who has actually been officially assigned. But the

staff is being chosen and the people working alongside me will be assigned to these positions. Right now, they are drafting laws. Several of them have already been officially detached to serve under me.

[Smetanin] Clearly, the majority are from Kiev Military District headquarters, your army headquarters?

[Morozov] These people, from the army headquarters that I commanded, have been with working me since the very first hours. But I would not want to take people only from the army headquarters. All specialists and all branches of service should certainly be represented here at the highest level. And I am very carefully tracking that. Officers from Kiev Military District Headquarters work here and people are already on temporary duty here from the Union General Staff. We just have not yet assigned anyone to positions because right now the Ministry of Justice is developing the provisions on the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance is calculating our proposals for financing. And the republic Cabinet of Ministers will approve these documents in the next few days. We will have our own money and that will enable me to assign those people whom I myself can assign to positions. We will already be able to pay people. But I will also submit those people who will be appointed by a Cabinet of Ministers' decision after which the candidates will be approved for these positions. That is, these are already practical matters for the next few days.

[Smetanin] Comrade Minister, you and the Supreme Soviet have aroused the hope of being transferred to Ukraine in the hearts of thousands of officers and warrant officers who are serving outside the borders of Ukraine, especially in Turkestan, Transbaykal, and Transcaucasian Military Districts, etc. Since I know about their living conditions, I can imagine the kind of "suitcase" frame of mind that has seized these people and their families. But at the same time, I feel that the transfer dates will be stretched out for a long time. But you know how hard it is to wait! Maybe it was not worthwhile to have announced it so openly, but it would have been necessary to initially calculate how many of them, applicants to return, there are, how many we need and how many will leave us; after all, it is no secret that there will be such people. And then it would have been possible to say to people: We are waiting for you. But there have already been cases where people are beginning to serve listlessly, confident that they will nevertheless return to Ukraine. But not everyone will be so lucky. And for now Moscow categorically does not want to release them.

[Morozov] Yes, these are very serious questions and very important problems. They affect people's fates and concern them. You are saying that some people are already beginning to serve unconscientiously. The Supreme Soviet has once again adopted an appeal to servicemen on this score in which it has also warned about thoughtless acts and any unforeseen circumstances and it directed the officer corps and all categories of servicemen to perform their duties in those structures in

which they are located and to carry out their missions in accordance with the military training plan.

But all these problems.... Yes, we are facing them. You say: it is not necessary to advertise. We are doing the legal and right thing. How could it have been decided in secret from the people and in secret from the officers? For example, I did not consider that.

[Smetanin] But, after all, you will not accept of all them under your command.

[Morozov] We will not accept them and people understand and they know quite well that we will not accept them all. And not only will we not accept them all but at this time we cannot even begin to do it and do not know precisely when we will be able to.

The problem of providing housing is one of the most important problems. Legal protection has already been provided. But social protection is the determining factor. Right now, the delay of transfers is not due to a shortage of jobs but it is due to the difficulty of creating the social facilities to support our decision.

There are very many officer appeals, we are registering them and we are keeping them under consideration. If agreements are reached among the republics and among the independent armed forces, then we can conduct a direct exchange of officers. But, I stress once again that the question of providing housing will nevertheless be important here. Very important.

[Smetanin] "The Black Sea Fleet is indivisible!"—these are the words of its Commander Vice-Admiral Kasatonov. And what does Colonel-General Morozov say in this regard?

[Morozov] Everyone is talking about indivisibility. At one time they said the Union was indivisible and now they are saying the armed forces are indivisible, including that the navy is indivisible. I will not deny that I think that the experts will defend their own views and skillfully substantiate them. But our military concept provides for Ukrainian naval forces based on the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine is a naval power and it must be concerned about its naval borders. Therefore, I would not begin to speak unequivocally, but I think that this question is subject to serious study and not from one side.

[Smetanin] Konstantin Petrovich, there are cases when equipment is being sent to Russia from our districts for repair but it never returns from there. Kiev Military District PVO [Air Defense] troops officers told me that. Evidently examples can also be found from other directorates. This undermines unit combat readiness!

And one more thing. As we all know, a weapon is not produced from beginning to end in Ukraine, it is only assembled here. But in order to have an army equipped with the latest word in equipment we need to have the appropriate facilities to do this. The Persian Gulf War

demonstrated that the decisive word in such clashes is leading technology. How will this issue be resolved?

[Morozov] On not returning equipment from repair. There have been such cases and they have been reported to us. And we are taking steps, right up to personal discussions with these commanders. They are obliged to carry out the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decision dated September 7, 1991. The person who ships equipment for repair or to exercises bears personal responsibility for arranging for its return. Of course, these are general provisions, but in every specific instance, the specialist and every commander knows how to approach this question in practice. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is adopting appropriate measures.

I want to state precisely: Russia is also not returning. We do not need to raise this issue between such major republics. The Union Ministry of Defense is not coming back and the department that manages such matters is independent. We need to find a common language with it and resolve problems that have arisen with it.

As for expanding industrial facilities in the republic to develop new models of weapons, perhaps Ukraine, as no other republic, has a powerful industrial complex and the serious scientific potential which are already being directed right now toward developing new approaches, including reforming its subunits.

[Smetanin] There are the "Afghan Vets" and the Union of Ukrainian Officers and now an alternative association to them has been formed in Vinnitsa... How do you think you will get along with them: will you cooperate constructively and complement each other? What did Colonel Martirosyan's recent speech, with the hint of iron in his voice, signify at the republic Supreme Soviet session?

[Morozov] I do not oppose the formation of social organizations that pursue a humanitarian goal—the defense of people's interests. Obviously, they do not arise from the good life, including in army structures. The Union of Ukrainian Officers has been founded and is directed at the social protection of servicemen and the members of their families. And the constituent assembly of the organization that took place in Vinnitsa also has the goal of providing social protection of officers. I met with the organizing committee of this future union, we found a common language, and we discovered that we have common goals. I expressed my view of the problem. What is it? Right now we are creating those structures in the armed forces in which each commander will be the unifying organ in carrying out the missions facing the army, including questions of defending people's interests. Democratization and consideration of people's interests is being introduced into the framework of official relations. Therefore, I think that these unions will not be needed in the future.

As for Colonel Martirosyan's speech at the Supreme Soviet session which you mentioned, I do not share these approaches. And not only in the context of the way in

which he conducted himself, but also in the essence of what he said. Right now, no officers associations exist that would depart from legal military formations and would have weapons. Thank God that we do not have them so far. This was a groundless, totally irresponsible statement which merits serious condemnation.

[Smetanin] Not long ago, a military delegation from Moscow visited us. You conducted talks with it. This was not the first and we hope not the last such meeting. I think that your conversations proceeded on a level of equality and dignity. Did you sense that in everything you did? Were representatives of sovereign states at the table?

[Morozov] Yes, and this was neither the first nor the last time that we have met with USSR Ministry of Defense representatives. The meetings were distinguished by mutual respect, mutual openness and mutual honesty in the way questions were posed. But I would hope that the talks would quickly be transformed into practical matters. As for observing protocol, it will never become a question of that. No one intends to quarrel with anyone else, no one is being threatened, and no one is being disappointed. We are disposed toward solving all issues in a civilized manner. Of course, the aspiration of both parties is needed to do this.

The main thing is that we have the honor of feeling a responsibility to our own people and they must soberly assess the political realities on the territory of Ukraine and also assume responsibility so that all of these processes are conducted in a civilized and evolutionary manner.

[Smetanin] I was at the 48th Motorized Rifle Division in Chuguyev a short time ago and I talked with the people about whom the newspaper had written. Konstantin Petrovich, nevertheless what will the fate of this unit be? Has a final decision been made and have the desires of its soldiers to serve in Ukraine been considered?

[Morozov] The division is now subordinated to Kiev Military District. The decision which was previously discussed and which created a tense situation there has been repealed.

[Smetanin] And what will happen to its two regiments that are located in Volograd?

[Morozov] They already have no relations whatsoever either with the division or with us.

[Smetanin] And the last question, comrade colonel-general. What would you wish to say to those military people who avidly seek your every word and your every thought that you have either expressed publicly or in private conversation? I dare say that the fates of many people stand behind your words. And they believe you and they are counting on you.

[Morozov] I will say one thing: continue to believe. I sense that people believe the Supreme Soviet, that Ukraine's statehood will be constructed and they believe

in those acts on social issues which are directed at guaranteeing the interests of officers and servicemen as a whole. They believe me when I speak and report on how issues will be resolved. People must believe in the rightness of our cause. I experience an exceptionally high responsibility in my attitude toward them because of what has been entrusted to me. And I think that I need to exert a great deal of effort and to expend enormous labor in order to justify this trust. I want to assure them that I will not disappoint their trust in me.

[Smetanin] Knowing what this will cost, Konstantin Petrovich, I once again want to wish you robust army health, vigor, strength of spirit and perseverance in all of your duties of enormous importance. Thank you for the interview.

[Morozov] Thank you for your support.

Commentaries on Creation of Ukrainian Armed Forces

*92UM0155A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Nov 91 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Air Force Major General Aleksandr Tsalko, deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee on Defense, by Pavel Felgengauer; and interview with USSR Minister of Defense Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov by Sergey Parkhomenko; places and dates not given; published under the general heading: "Russia, Ukraine, and the Union: Armed Forces as a Bone of Contention"]

[Text] The All-Union Army in Ukraine Will Resist "Ukrainization," Says General Tsalko

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is soon expected to pass a final resolution on the creation of Ukrainian armed forces. The Ukrainian minister of defense, Air Force Major General Konstantin Morozov, has been promoted directly to the rank of colonel general by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. It is possible that soon the Ukraine army will have many more officers and generals; however, a real, battle-worthy army can only be created on the basis of units and formations of the all-Union armed forces currently stationed in the Ukraine (over 1.2 million military personnel of various nationalities). Army General Konstantin Kobets, Russian state adviser on defense matters and chairman of the Committee on Military Reform, said in Kiev on 30 October that Russia has no objection to the Ukraine creating its own army on the basis of Soviet troops stationed in the republic. Not everybody in the Russian leadership shares this point of view, however.

By decision of the coordinating council of the Military For Democracy movement, where he is currently acting chairman, deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee on Defense, Air Force Major General Aleksandr Tsalko signed a petition to Commander in Chief of the USSR Armed Forces Gorbachev. The petition says, in particular: "A split among officers and petty officers into supporters of the national army and those who stand for

unified armed forces has already started in Ukraine. The continuing impoverishment of officers, their complete social and legal unprotectedness, and the threat of mass discharges from the armed forces are aggravating the situation and making it explosive. Under these conditions, actions on the part of the military are possible and would have serious consequences."

No matter how unexpected it may sound to some, the president of the former Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, is still the commander in chief. And the armed forces subordinate to him retain—unlike other Union structures—their unity, manageability, and considerable battle-worthiness. But the army is not very politicized, and it is unlikely that anybody knows the true opinion of the officer corps on what is happening in the country. So far, the army remains silent, follows orders, and obeys the authorities.

[Felgengauer] What is the reaction in the officer ranks to the attempts to split the army?

[Tsalko] Many of those who are currently serving on Ukrainian territory say that they do not want to serve in the Ukrainian army. Besides, it had been envisioned that 3.9 billion Deutsche Marks worth of housing for the troops being withdrawn from Germany would be built in Ukraine. Some buildings are ready, but are being taken over by local soviets (for instance, in Kirovograd). "Privatization" of the army is not only being proclaimed but its property is already being privatized. Cash paid to troops located in Ukraine has been held up. A situation like that may lead first to small local conflicts, and in the end to something more serious.

Everyday problems can be resolved in the final count, but there are also more substantive problems. Officers understand that the army is created for the purpose of resolving political arguments through military force. And they would like to know who they will be sent to fight. At this point, the troops are oriented towards the West: The Carpathian Military District is the strongest one. But there is no enemy there today. If the deployment pattern is to be changed and, for instance, military bases relocated, it will require immense expenditures by Ukraine (and possibly the neighboring republics), and at the same time will diminish rather than increase their security.

[Felgengauer] The Military For Democracy movement's appeal says that a split along nationality lines has already started in the armed forces. But how realistic is a serious confrontation between people armed with modern arms?

[Tsalko] There are objective preconditions for the split. There is great anxiety among the officer corps. People do not know what to expect in the future. It is one thing to defend Ukraine, at the same time defending Russia and the entire Union; it is quite another to fight against their own people, against one's former comrades in arms.

Right now it is impossible to split off the troops located in Ukraine from the rest of the army, even if all Ukrainian draftees stay in Ukraine. There are no more than 30 percent Ukrainians in the officer corps, and even less than that in the Air Force, Navy, and Rocket Forces. Even if a split takes place, it will not be split into equal parts.

[Felgengauer] It is far from evident, though, that a person whose passport says "Ukrainian" will carry out the Ukrainian leadership's orders to the letter. Just as we cannot assume, either, that a "Russian" will necessarily obey Moscow. Major General Morozov (a Russian) has accepted a rank of colonel general from the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (bypassing the rank of lieutenant general). By the way, did he have a right to do so by the rules?

[Tsalko] The military rank of colonel general may be given only by the USSR president and then announced to the troops by order of the minister of defense. To my knowledge, none of this has taken place. Although he remains a major general in the all-Union Armed Forces, in his uniform Comrade Morozov looks like a USSR Air Force colonel general. He should probably invent some sort of Ukrainian uniform for himself, since Ukraine gave him this rank.

[Felgengauer] Is it possible that there will be a more or less mass crossover of other generals and officers into the service of Ukraine, with either regular or out-of-sequence promotion in rank for each of them?

[Tsalko] I think that on a massive scale it is unlikely.

[Felgengauer] Ukraine is a very large republic with considerable resources. A certain competition may start—who will offer more to a poor unsettled Soviet officer.

[Tsalko] A purchased army will hardly be very battle-worthy, especially against its former comrades. Otherwise—well, let people put their lives together; let them resolve their problems the best they can and know how.

[Felgengauer] General Konstantin Kobets, chairman of the Committee on Military Reform, underlines the idea of unified armed forces consisting of national armies, with unified command of the nuclear deterrence forces. Do you believe that such forces are a sufficiently real and battle-worthy alternative to the present army?

[Tsalko] Strategic forces deployed on a territory controlled by some other national army can be easily taken over by it. Such an arrangement is unstable in principle. Yugoslavia is a regretful example of where combining battle-worthy national armies in each republic with the all-union armed forces can lead. I hope we will not reach the point of a Yugoslav situation.[end Tsalko]

We Are Dividing the People, Not the Army: USSR Minister of Defense Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov Searches for Understanding With Ukrainian Leaders

[Parkhomenko] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, how realistic does the prospect of dividing the USSR Armed Forces between the republics seem to you now? It appears that Ukraine and Russia have already made enough effort to make this issue more than academic...

[Shaposhnikov] I will say at the outset: Please, do not mix Russia and Ukraine on this issue. Russia has not taken any such steps and so far does not intend to. It seems to me that its leadership made it very clear that the republic will create its own armed forces only as a last resort, only in response to such actions in other republics, and it will not be its choice.

So far I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of such claims that Russia truly is for the unified armed forces. I can say the same for the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia. The problem is with Ukraine, and only Ukraine.

The Ukrainian leadership often explains the idea of creating its own army with two considerations: that it is necessary to have the ability to "defend against a new State Committee on the State of Emergency" and, on a more general level, that it has to have guaranteed control over the armed forces on the territory of the republic.

First, I do not see any volunteers to start a new coup in the foreseeable future. Second, when it comes to republic control—this is a more serious matter—I am ready to offer very specific steps which, in my opinion, will satisfy all interested parties.

Organizational measures: For instance, it is necessary to make the commander of troops of a respective district or an army a member of the republic's defense council. And vice versa, a representative of this council should become a member of the military council of the district or the army. Then an exchange of opinions will be possible, and access to reciprocal information will be greatly simplified.

Legislative measures: We now need to adopt laws on the status of military servicemen on republic territories. In accordance with these laws on a republic and all-Union level, coordinated as they are being developed, the Center and the sovereign states must take upon themselves mutual and equal obligations in regard to the armed forces.

We ourselves can help the republics to create national guards—on the basis of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops.

Finally, we are willing to voluntarily transfer certain parts to republics. For instance, the civil defense system, military draft offices, military chairs in institutions of higher education, etc.

[Parkhomenko] Have you had preliminary contacts or consultations with the Ukrainian leadership in this respect? How do you explain the fact that disagreements have emerged with Kiev only? Is their position final?

[Shaposhnikov] I met, of course, with Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet and candidate for the Ukrainian presidency. I feel that his point of view is influenced by several factors. First of all, the election campaign plays its role. Also, the opposition to the republic's current leadership in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is very strong. It is this opposition, to my knowledge, that inflames this tension: It is accusing the USSR military leadership of being antidemocratic and saying that we are again trying to put the republics in a yoke.

I have only one request: Let us not rush this. I think that very soon it will become clear to everybody that there are certain things that simply are impossible to divide. The military-strategic space remains the same, as does the air space. Operational planning issues—general ones such as armed forces deployment, and more specific ones such as protection of borders—probably do not lend themselves to being spread over several centers.

Most importantly, we keep forgetting that the army is, in the final count, the people. We think that we are dividing the army, but in reality we are dividing the people. And we have got into all this at a time when they are facing a possibly rather hungry winter...[end Shaposhnikov]

P.S. Ye. Shaposhnikov announced yesterday at a press conference that resulting from discussion at the State Council consensus has been reached, after all, on the issue of unified armed forces.

Ukrainian Resolution on Defense Industries

92UM0189A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
21 Nov 91 p 2

[Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium Resolution signed by Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman L. Kravchuk, Kiev, October 25, 1991: "Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium Resolution"]

[Text] On the organization of state statistical accounting at defense-industrial complex enterprises located on the territory of Ukraine which have become its property as a result of the adoption of the Law of the Ukraine "On Union-Subordinated Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations Located on the Territory of Ukraine."

In accordance with the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet resolutions "On the Proclamation of Ukraine's Independence," "On Military Formations in Ukraine," and the Law of the Ukraine "On Union-Subordinated Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations Located on the Territory of Ukraine," the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

1. To establish that enterprises, organizations, and institutions that are subordinate to USSR Minaviaprom

[Ministry of the Aviation Industry], USSR Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry], USSR Minradioprom [Ministry of the Radio Industry], USSR Minelektronprom [Ministry of the Electronics Industry], USSR Minoboronprom [Ministry of the Defense Industry], USSR Minobshchemash [Ministry of General Machine Building], USSR Minatomenergoprom [Ministry of the Atomic Power Industry], USSR Minsvyazi [Ministry of Communications], and the USSR State Committee for Computer Equipment and Information Systems, and other ministries and departments that manufacture products for the defense complex, formations of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Committee for State Security, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs located in Ukraine and also for Ukrainian Ministry of Defense subunits, the Ukrainian National Security Service, and the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs are obliged, beginning with the report for September, for the third quarter, and for the nine months of 1991 to submit actual statistical reports on their primary activities to the Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics.

2. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers determines the list of organizations to which secret information must be sent with regard to the activities of defense-industrial complex, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Ukrainian National Security Service, and Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs enterprises, organizations, and institutions.

3. To grant the Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics the right, if necessary, to establish statistical accounting for enterprises, organizations, and institutions and military formations of the ministries and state committees listed in paragraph one of this Resolution.

4. Leaders of defense-industrial complex, defense, national security, and internal p73 affairs enterprises, organizations, and institutions insure the completeness, reliability, and timely submission of statistical reporting.

5. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers is tasked to monitor the execution of this Resolution.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman L. Kravchuk

Kiev October 25, 1991

Center 'Plans' To Intimidate Ukraine

92UM0175A Kiev KOZA in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Reporting the Details: Is the Defense Ministry 'Banking'?"]

[Text] As Ukrainian parliamentarians, content with themselves and their decisions, take another extended vacation, the notorious "center" continues to pursue its imperial policies.

Colonel Vilen Martirosyan, chairman of the Ukrainian Officers Union and a USSR People's Deputy, has issued an appeal to all servicemen who are citizens of the Ukraine.

It says that the proponents of a totalitarian regime, having joined forces since the events of August, are again making plans to use the army against the people. Specifically, contrary to the decision approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on subordinating Soviet Army troops stationed in the republic to the Ukrainian government, the USSR Ministry of Defense is ignoring the parliament's decision and is planning to hold, between November 11 and November 28, an inspection of the troops' combat and mobilizational readiness by several military commanders who previously carried out the orders of the notorious State Committee for the State of Emergency. The appeal of the Ukrainian Officers Association states that such actions ignore the Ukraine's sovereignty, seek to undermine the December 1 referendum, and could cause division and confrontation among servicemen. The Ukrainian Officers Union categorically opposes these political actions and considers it necessary to use to use the funds allocated for the inspection to meet the social, legal, and material needs of servicemen and members of their families. Members of the Ukrainian Officers Union call on the USSR Minister of Defense not to exacerbate the situation, but rather to do everything in his power to unite the army with the Ukrainian people. The union calls on all servicemen to say yes to Ukrainian state independence on December 1.

The appeal is addressed to USSR President Gorbachev, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Kravchuk, the USSR and Ukrainian Ministers of Defense and Internal Troops, and military district commanders.

Ukraine Seeks Air Defense System

92UM0201A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 26 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Ravil Zaripov: "Do Not Seat the Rust [Unpolished Stone] in the Kreshchatika: Ukraine is not Claiming Control of the Nuclear Button, but...."]

[Text] We have learned from well-informed sources that the republic, which is announcing its sovereignty and independence, does not at all intend to limit itself by declarations. Its claims to its own well-armed army are more than serious.

Approximately one week ago, talks took place between the leadership of Ukraine and representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The desire was expressed to purchase 10 PVO [Air Defense] systems that have the designation S-300. This equipment is not the latest achievement of military thought. Moreover, this system is capable of controlling a sector with a 400 kilometer strip and of detecting both high-flying (right up to space) and low-flying targets. They think that the S-300 PVO system will be installed along the entire length of the republic's border.

Of course, this type of purchase will cost Ukraine a pretty penny that is measured in tens of millions of rubles. This evidently does not embarrass the republic leadership. What is more, the desire to acquire an aircraft carrier was expressed at the meeting. For prestige. The idea of strengthening the maritime borders will cost R8 billion (R4 billion is the cost of the aircraft carrier and approximately as much will be spent for its maintenance).

There are always two sides of a coin. The appearance of this serious order has caused, if not euphoria, then joyful animation among the leadership of a Moscow plant. (Without revealing its name, we will say: one of the components of the S-300 system is manufactured at this plant). Such a reaction is understandable. Military-industrial complex plants are in a disastrous state and the desire of any republics to follow the path of militarization pours balm on the military-industrial complex's financial wounds.

And, finally, one paragraph on the union parliament. Yesterday, deputies adopted a USSR Supreme Soviet appeal to the people and to the Supreme Soviets and leaders of the independent states. It discusses the sovereign republics which have not yet signed the economic treaty and have not formed delegations of their representatives for work in the union parliament. An appeal was heard to "come to an understanding of the need for these steps" because the uncoordinated disintegration of the former Union will result in further destabilization of the situation and worsening of inter-republic relations.

Ukrainian PVO Commander on Air Defense

92UM0166A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
2 Nov 91 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General M.A. Lopatin, commander of a Ukrainian air defense formation, by Aleksandr Gorobets; place and date not given: "Look After Combat Readiness"]

[Text] What will the air defense troops be like in the Ukrainian armed forces structure that is being created? This is the question that started our correspondent's interview with Lieutenant General M.A. Lopatin, commander of a PVO [Air Defense] formation on whose basis a system for the air defense of Ukraine will be formed.

[Lopatin] In order to show the role and significance of PVO today, I will cite the events in the recent war in the Persian Gulf. Iraq's obsolete air defense system did not make it possible to guarantee a reliable defense of important installations, and, what is most important, the civilian population. Thus, the conclusion grows—it is impossible now to do without a modern reliable and mobile air defense system.

We envision establishing a Ukrainian air defense zone that consists of rayons which in turn are divided into sectors. I believe, and the minister of defense of Ukraine

agrees with me, that all fighter aviation should be subordinate to the command authority of this zone. I have in mind the fighter aviation that was subordinate to an air army and naval aviation. The entire system of air traffic control requires rigorous improvement. At present, the air army is responsible for the organization of traffic, but control over it is entrusted to the PVO formation. But when these two services are combined into one, there will be a chief who will answer for one and the other. Air traffic control itself requires serious improvement.

Today, more than 3,000 aircraft are in the skies of Ukraine daily. And to track each of them, of course, is a very complicated and expensive task. It is necessary to entrust part of these measures to civil aviation. I have in mind dispatcher flight control. And leave it to the air defense troops only in border areas. Control over especially important flights—lettered for security and military flights—this is a separate question. It is part of our functional duty, and we will execute it.

Of course, it is necessary to make reductions in the PVO system. But this does not mean that the reliability of covering the republic from the air will be decreased. It is necessary once again to examine carefully all installations and to determine which of them need protection. First of all, we are covering those installations that, if put out of commission, are dangerous to people's lives. For example, such as enterprises of the chemical industry. Thus, by decreasing the quantity we should achieve increased quality. Undoubtedly at the same time, we cannot do without improving armaments. Now, outstanding fighter models and fourth-generation radars have been created. They have to be acquired, and reequipping has to be conducted everywhere.

[Gorobets] You say, acquire. What do you have in mind in saying this?

[Lopatin] Unfortunately, Ukraine produces few arms for the PVO system. In the main, we receive our military equipment from Russia, and some models from Armenia and the Baltic countries. Until arrangements are made for the production of the necessary arms in Ukraine, it will be necessary to purchase them. To purchase them now according to free prices, and not according to those that existed earlier.

[Gorobets] Mikhail Alekseyevich, in the conversation, you touched on questions of supply, and, in particular, fuel supplies. What is the situation today with units that are subordinate to you? If, of course, this is not a military secret.

[Lopatin] There is no secret here. Two air regiments are already not receiving fuel according to current allowances. Those reserves that are established remain for emergencies. But there are no new shipments of fuel now. All of my telegrams and inquiries have not been answered yet. I have met with the chief of staff of rear services of the PVO troops of the country. He promises that the question of deliveries, however, will be resolved.

[Gorobets] In what direction should the formation of the structure of the future Ukrainian Army head, and what kind of force level is contemplated for it?

[Lopatin] Regarding the structure of the Air Defense Troops, I have already partly talked about this. Fundamental changes are expected in the ground forces. And, of course, it is necessary first of all to start with a reduction in the enormous administrative apparatus. It is necessary to utilize the positive experience that has been accumulated in military construction by other countries, including the NATO bloc.

A lot of discussions are going on now about what the numerical strength of the armed forces should be. Let us take, for example, France. Its army constitutes approximately nine-tenths of a percent of the population. Approximately the same ratio will be maintained here, if the numerical strength of the army is like what is being examined by the Supreme Soviet. This is about 400,000 persons, but the prospect is that it might turn out to be less. In establishing a national army, it is necessary to proceed from the tasks that it will be called on to resolve. It is obvious that by itself an army of any state will not be able to withstand a military bloc. In any case, it is impossible to get by without a system of collective security. Personally, I have nothing against this system including, for example, such states as Bulgaria and Romania.

[Gorobets] Who, in your opinion, should be occupied with these questions—the Ministry of Defense or the Cabinet of Ministers?

[Lopatin] The appropriate structures have not been established yet. In the armed forces of the Union, the military were concerned with these questions. Now, already even there a proposal is being examined for the resolution of organizational tasks by a semimilitary department. That is, it is contemplated making the Union Ministry of Defense half civilian. And according to plans, this, the second half, will manage finance-budgetary problems. I do not find an answer to this question even in what is only a concept set forth by Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel General of Aviation Morozov and in the speeches of deputies. Although there was this phrase that organizational questions will be handled by the Cabinet of Ministers. It is very important to be specific about this.

In my opinion, it is already necessary to form now a working nucleus in the Ministry of Defense. This group should start to work today where there will be directorates in the future. After all, nothing will emerge in an empty spot.

I should say that a delay of this question is intolerable. We cannot drag out the formation of a budget, the determination of the mechanism for transferring subunits from the Union to the republics, and the creation of a Ministry of Defense. I can compare this to the situation that took place in the country. We procrastinated somewhere, and we adopted legislative acts, but

the end result was that we ruined the economy. If we do not undertake specific actions in a short time in the army, then a complete breakdown will also start here.

It is necessary right now to establish a list of officers who will begin to form the republic Ministry of Defense, and to appeal to the Union Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov to transfer them to the subordination of the Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers. After all, it is not possible by one's own will to leave one armed forces organization to begin service in another.

[Gorobets] What do you think of the troops of your formation rendering assistance to the economy of Ukraine?

[Lopatin] I think that assistance should be given where possible. This should be done especially by those subunits that are deployed in agricultural rayons. Such cooperation will serve to strengthen ties with the local population. Moreover, if it is well-organized and ends up, for example, with a concert or a timely cultural event in the same populated area. The army's prestige only grows from this. Based on these ideas, I think that prohibitions are inadvisable. If, of course, we are talking about Ukraine. But the practice when we sent echelons with equipment to other republics has to be discontinued. This does more harm than good. Moreover, the last crop harvest provided numerous examples where farms simply refused assistance. And columns of equipment, and subunits along with it, were forced to stand idle, thrown to the whims of fate. And I will also add that such relations should be based on voluntary assistance, and not on commerce.

Arguments for Ukraine Nuclear Weapons

92UM0158A Kiev *NARODNA HAZETA* in Ukrainian
No 10, Oct 91 p 5

[Article by Ihor Herashchenko, London: "A Non-Nuclear Ukraine: Pro and Con"]

[Text] We can't forbid other countries to have nuclear weapons, threaten them overtly or covertly and make it stick if something happens. If we can't live in a nuclear-free world, however much we might wish to, let's consider how to live more safely in the world. Remember that the Chernobyl disaster happened when the Ukraine didn't even have its own army, let alone weapons, and in general couldn't decide for itself what to build on its territory, or how. What now, then? To have or have not?

The military aspect

So far no state having its own nuclear weapons has suffered a serious attack. We can hardly call the Falklands crisis a serious attack against Great Britain by Argentina. Having nuclear weapons is not only a deterrent but also enables a country to reduce its defense spending. Great Britain, a nuclear power, has an army of only 320,000 men. That's not very many for a country of

57 million, and there are plans to reduce the army by 40,000 men. Without nuclear weapons, that would be impossible.

Not having nuclear weapons has never saved any country from attack. Consider: which countries have been attacked since 1945? Japan was a non-nuclear country in 1945, but that didn't avert Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Let's imagine for a moment a scary future in which, 20 years or so down the line, some Moslem state has its own nuclear weapons. And that, God forbid, some religious fanatic like Khomeini is in power. Wouldn't a non-nuclear Ukraine then have to ask its "Big Russian Brother" for help? Bohdan Khmelnytsky did that once, and the help came with a heavy burden.

In a certain sense the call to reject nuclear weapons is like a call to remove all locks from the door—everyone is so touched that even burglars stay away from the house.

The economic aspect

The Ukraine has abundant uranium ore and will certainly trade in it. Undoubtedly the Western countries will try to impose certain restrictions on that, perhaps even an embargo. To some extent that will apply to all types of the Ukraine's future foreign trade. Of course: a new competitor in the world market. And if the Ukraine wants to join the Common Market, it won't be able to in 20 years without nuclear weapons. No one dictates military or economic conditions to nuclear powers. It's just not done. They're not so polite to non-nuclear states. Sad but true.

The legal aspect

A large portion of the USSR's nuclear arsenal was made from Ukrainian ore mined in Zheltyye Vody, and Ukrainians made both labor and economic contributions to the direct manufacture of nuclear warheads. Hence, the Ukraine's claim to a portion of the nuclear legacy left by the defunct Union would be entirely justified. That legacy has not only destructive potential but also substantial value—hundreds of billions of dollars. We should keep in mind that the Western countries will pay big money to reduce the nuclear potential. How about first taking our share of the nuclear potential and then decide how to dispose of it at leisure?

The political aspect

It is axiomatic that it is advantageous for countries to have political influence in the world. The Ukraine's position is pathetic in that regard. Most people in the world don't even know about it, or else they think that Ukrainians are just Russians. That's the case with the philistines, of course. When it comes to politicians, they would rather not know. How does having a nuclear potential weigh on a country's "political scale?"

Here's an example. Compare Great Britain and Italy. They have almost equal populations. Italy's national

income and standard of living are somewhat higher. In a number of countries there are more Italians than Britons. Italian goods are much more widespread in the world than British goods. It's difficult to compare contributions to world culture and the arts, but I bet the Italians aren't behind there either. There can be hardly any comparison in the religious sphere. To be sure, there is one counter-argument: the international importance of the English language. But that argument is obsolete; it's American English that is international, and the difference between them is substantial. If you doubt this, ask any Englishman and he'll explain the difference. Hence the advantage here goes to the U.S., not Great Britain.

Hence, in practically all indicators Italy is ahead, but it lags appreciably behind when it comes to political influence in the world. Why is that? It's all very simple: Great Britain is a nuclear power, and Italy is not.

In regard to these factors, then, the actual situation in the world is this: A country that is capable of creating nuclear weapons will do so sooner or later. If the present leaders of the Ukraine reject our legitimate share of the nuclear potential—and in Russia's favor at that—then either we or our children will have to create it from scratch, at the cost of billions.

Such is the world we live in.

Ukrainian Statement on Nuclear-Free Status

92UN0272B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
26 Oct 91 p 1

[Statement of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet: "On the Nuclear-Free Status of the Ukraine"]

[Text] Reaffirming the Ukraine's intent, expressed in the Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty of 16 July 1991, to adhere to three nonnuclear principles: not to receive, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons,

Being conscious of the need to strictly observe the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968,

Striving to make a contribution to the strengthening of the international regime of nonproliferation of nuclear arms,

The Ukraine Supreme Soviet declares:

1. The presence of nuclear arms of the former Soviet Union on the territory of the Ukraine is temporary.
2. At present, these arms are under the control of appropriate structures of the former Soviet Union.

The Ukraine insists on its right to exercise control over the nonuse of the nuclear arms located on its territory.

3. Ukraine will conduct a policy aimed at the complete destruction of nuclear arms and the components of their deployment located on the territory of the Ukrainian state. It intends to accomplish this in a minimal period

of time, based on legal, technical, financial, and organizational capabilities, with an appropriate provision for ecological safety.

The Ukraine will undertake an extensive program of defense industry conversion and of shifting the focus of parts of the military-industrial complex to meet the needs of economic and social development.

4. As one of legal successors to the former Soviet Union, the Ukraine will adhere to the provisions of the U.S.-USSR Treaty on Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1991 in the part involving nuclear armaments located on its territory.

The Ukraine is ready to start negotiations with the Republic of Belarus, the Kazakh SSR, and the RSFSR, with the participation of appropriate structures of the former USSR, in regard to the destruction of strategic nuclear arms falling under the provisions of this Treaty.

5. The Ukraine will take steps in the direction of destroying all other nuclear armaments located on its territory, and for this purpose is ready, if necessary, to hold talks with all interested parties, including acting through existing multilateral mechanisms in the area of disarmament.

6. The Ukraine will take appropriate steps to ensure the physical security of nuclear arms located on its territory during the entire period of time until the complete destruction of such arms.

7. The Ukraine intends to join the Treaty on Nuclear Nonproliferation as a nonnuclear state, and to enter an appropriate agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in regard to guarantees.

Ukraine Official on Nuclear Arms

92UM0126A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 45, Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission on Defense and State Security Chairman Lieutenant General V.V. Durdinets, by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT parliamentary correspondent Georgiy Chernomorskiy; place and date not given: "We Do Not Want Our Fingers on the Nuclear Button"]

[Text]

[Durdinets] Let me remind you that the Declaration on State Sovereignty for Ukraine adopted a year ago clearly stated that Ukraine does have the right to its own armed forces, internal troops, and organs of state security. And the events in August of this year convincingly showed that a republic cannot get by without its own armed forces. What is the worth of a state's sovereignty if it can in no way defend it?

The act declaring the independence of the Ukrainian state has again raised this issue in a very acute way.

[Chernomorskiy] Vasilii Vasilyevich, what will be the structure and numerical strength of the Ukrainian armed forces?

[Durdinets] Ukraine will have ground forces (which will include the railroad troops), air forces, and naval forces. The formation of a national guard has already been started on the basis of the internal troops.

Creation of the main groupings of Ukraine's armed forces will be done by a staged cutback and consistent re-forming of the troops of the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian military districts, with a separate army for air defense, air armies, and a Black Sea fleet.

If we take into account that a collective system will be set up for strategic defense, along with a unified command that will include representatives of our republic, this will be quite adequate to guarantee the sovereignty of the republic.

[Chernomorskiy] And how do you envisage collective strategic defense?

[Durdinets] Naturally the backbone will be the nuclear forces under the joint command. However, no question relating to their day-to-day life can be decided without the agreement of the representatives of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and, naturally, our republic. We are categorically against moving nuclear forces to the territory of any state. And not only because of political-strategic considerations; taking the missiles out of their silos is not like taking a cigarette out of a package, and it is better not to touch nuclear warheads too often.

There is more. Ukraine, which has suffered from Chernobyl, has the moral right to raise the issue of total destruction of nuclear weapons, and it is raising that issue. Meanwhile we shall scrupulously comply with all international agreements connected with the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction. Naturally, Ukraine will participate on an equal footing with the other powers in the negotiating process to reduce and subsequently destroy nuclear weapons.

[Chernomorskiy] You have said that representatives of Ukraine will be part of the leadership of the collective strategic defense, and that all associated issues will be resolved with the agreement of the leaders of the republics that make up the former Union. And suddenly we learn that a meeting has taken place in Nakhabino on questions of nuclear security. It was attended by representatives from the center, the Committee for State Security, and the CIA. But no representatives from the republics were there. Does it not seem to you that this can to some extent be regarded as infringement on the sovereignty of Ukraine?

[Durdinets] I would not put the question so categorically. There are circumstances in which a decision must be reached immediately. I would like to believe that M.S.

Gorbachev was guided here primarily by a desire to lower the plank of the nuclear opposition as much as he can.

[Chernomorskiy] Let us return to the question of the republic's armed forces. We have still not answered the question of their numerical strength. The taxpayers will be interested in knowing what kind of spending will be involved in maintaining the army and the republic guard.

[Durdinets] Something on the order of 52 million people live in the Ukraine. The experience of civilized countries shows that with those kinds of numbers, in order to provide for the principle of reasonable and adequate defense it is necessary to have an army of 400,000 to 420,000 men, which is less than 0.9 percent of the population.

It is being suggested that length of service will be no more than 18 months.

Military reform, the creation of our own armed forces, and the transition to market relations will require new approaches to the formation of the military budget. During the transitional period the system of financial and economic backing will be built giving due consideration to the coexistence of our own troops and troops subordinate to the center in Ukraine. The armed forces of the Ukraine will be financed from the republic budget. Giving due consideration to world experience and the economic situation in Ukraine, we believe that military appropriations should not exceed 3 percent of GNP.

[Chernomorskiy] In general that is not such a lot, and those defending the republic will not have to go about in patched trousers, while on the other hand, if this percentage increases it is the entire people who will go about in patched clothes. What is the solution?

[Durdinets] In fact, finances are still rather thin. However, all the advantages that servicemen had in the USSR will be preserved. This also applies to pensions from the USSR Ministry of Defense. In all garrisons, institutions empowered by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet are being set up to protect the constitutional rights of servicemen, and in the Ministry of Defense a structure is operating to provide social protection. Provision has also been made for only officers and warrant officers who have been provided with housing and have a right to a pension being retired to the reserves. For those serving under the terms of a contract permission will be given for them to engage in entrepreneurial activities and work the land on a personal basis during their free time, that is, they will be able to take full advantage of their rights as citizens of Ukraine. The right of servicemen to defend their personal dignity and honor will be underpinned legislatively.

[Chernomorskiy] We still have to learn when a law on defense will be passed in our republic.

[Durdinets] The Ukraine Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense and State Security together with scholars of local conditions, internationalists, and the military people have prepared an entire package of resolutions and draft laws. They include laws "On the Defense of Ukraine," "On the Armed Forces of Ukraine," "On the Republic Guard of Ukraine," "On the State Borders of Ukraine," "On the Border Troops of Ukraine," and the draft law mentioned above "On Social and Legal Protection for Servicemen Who Serve on the Territory of Ukraine, and the Members of Their Families." The parliament has approved the concept for defense and development of the armed forces of Ukraine and has confirmed the composition of the republic Defense Council, which is led by chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet L. Kravchuk. All drafts are to be published. I am sure that giving due consideration to the amendments that voters will make to them, these documents will work well for our Ukrainian state and for its prosperity and independence.

In conclusion I would like to say that the entire process of creating our own armed forces for Ukraine, including the economic basis for them, should be completed in 1994-1995.

Ukraine Nuclear Weapons, Accidents Viewed *92UM0202A Kiev KOZA in Russian 20 Nov 91 p 3*

[Article by Vladimir Boreyko: "Nuclear Weapons in and Around the Ukraine"]

[Text] There are no more vulnerable people than victors. Have turned World War II in our favor, we were drawn into the deadly whirlpool of the arms race. They gave the best and most expensive things to the army—the life of the children, natural resources, and minds—and they economized on ecology and the health and well-being of the people. "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" And so they created a state within a state, the Soviet Army, and they raised a wild monster: the military industrial complex, invulnerable to criticism, hidden from the people, and with all-powerful defenders. Researchers will yet write its story full of the black stains of crimes: against their own people, against other countries, and against nature. The task of our antimilitaristic commission recently established by the Ukrainian Ecological Association "Zeleniy Svit" and the Ukrainian Peace Council is simpler: investigate only the ecological crimes of the military-industrial complex.

The Atomic Bomb—No, Thanks!

"Every important public event in the USSR," Solzhenitsyn wrote, "has one of two fates: either it will be ignored or it will be slandered." How many nuclear weapons does the Ukraine maintain? We did not find this out even when it became sovereign. It is as though sovereignty does not extend to the nuclear warheads, strategic missiles, and bombers hidden in our land. So

one has to resort to the information of Western intelligence services and the "greens."

It is believed that 27,000 nuclear weapons, including 12,300 strategic weapons, are stockpiled in the former USSR. We have somewhere around 10 percent of this property. This is 2,410 units, including 920 strategic nuclear warheads. The Ukraine was not shortchanged with nuclear weapons of all Soviet service branches: strategic missile forces, air forces, naval forces, ground and air defense forces.

It is supposed that nuclear weapons are stored here apart from the launchers, where they are guarded by special subdivisions of the KGB. The military people are permitted only to press the "launch" button.

The Ukraine has approximately 116 strategic nuclear missiles with 920 nuclear warheads. The number 200 (latest figure: 176 strategic missiles) is now circulating in the newspapers. This is probably not quite right, for it includes tactical missiles of the ground forces and long-range cruise missiles installed on medium-range bombers.

The nuclear missiles are buried at two places in the Ukraine. There are 560 nuclear warheads on 56 "SS-24" missiles in vertical launch silos at Pervomaysk (a little above Nikolayev) and there are 360 nuclear warheads on 60 "SS-19" missiles near Derazhnya (Khmelnitskiy Oblast). The "SS-24" can carry 10 nuclear warheads but the "SS-19" only 6. Nevertheless, the latter has a force of 1 megaton and a range of more than 6,000 miles.

The base for the nuclear weapons of the air forces found refuge in the locality of Oktyabrskoye to the south of Nikolayev and two air fields for strategic bombers are located to the northeast of Kiev and in the region of Yzin near Belaya Tserkov.

Still hidden in the Ukraine are 6 bases for medium-range bombers, about 11 bases for tactical fighters, and 7 bases for air defense fighters. There they can give refuge to aircraft that are not squeamish about nuclear warheads—the "TU-95," "SU-24," "MiG-27," and "SU-17." They are capable of taking on atomic bombs and air-launched cruise missiles and missiles of the "air-to-ground" class.

Western intelligence services believe that the USSR has 2,630 aircraft and 4,000 nuclear warheads intended for them. It is possible that several hundred liners and approximately 400 nuclear warheads reside in the Ukraine. Oh yes, I completely forgot: another three bases for nuclear bombs have dug in in the immediate vicinity of the northeast part of the Ukraine. One is in Bobruysk in Belorussia and two are a little farther away, in Russia.

And what sort of interesting things has our glorious Black Sea Fleet hidden away? An international convention obligates it not to have nuclear submarines but it is not forbidden to keep nuclear toys here.

It is well known that 120 large and small ships equipped with cruise missiles, submarines, and 230 naval aircraft are on combat watch near Sevastopol, Feodosiya, and elsewhere.

It is still difficult to give a precise number of ships and planes loaded with nuclear death. But we know that there may be some submarines with nuclear torpedoes and ships with nuclear antisubmarine and antiair rockets, depth charges, cruise missiles, and torpedoes. This can also be applied to the naval aircraft "TU-26," "TU-22," "TU-16," "TU-95," "SU-24," "SU-17," and "MiG-27" and to military helicopters.

The Soviet naval armada stocked up with 3,400 units of nonstrategic nuclear arms and 340 of them may be attributed to the Black Sea Fleet.

The infantry also got a nuclear arsenal. Nineteen motorized rifle and 10 tank divisions in the Ukraine have medium-range (from 70 to 300 km) tactical missiles—"SCUD-5," "SS-21," "Scarab," and "Frog-7." According to Western estimates, the ground forces in the USSR are equipped with about 4,800 nuclear warheads. If this is so, then approximately 480 must be based in the Ukraine; 280 of them may be installed on short-range missiles and 200 on artillery.

The Ukrainian air defense forces have three types of nuclear missiles for firing at air targets with 270 warheads. Thus, the Ukraine occupies third place in nuclear capability after the United States and Russia.

I do not want to bore the reader but I will note that medium and shorter-range missiles are deployed in Lutsk, Brody, and Chervonograd in Lvov Oblast, Slavuta in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, Belokorovich, Vysokaya Pech, Lipniki, and Korosten in Zhitomir Oblast, Glukhov, Akhtyrka, and Lebedin in Sumy Oblast (or Shopylanskiy Rayon of Cherkassy Oblast). As for auxiliary missile facilities, those wishing to familiarize themselves with them may do this in Lutsk, Belokorovich, Lebedin, and Sarny in Rovno Oblast and in the locality of Zherebkovo in Ananyevskiy Rayon of Odessa Oblast.

And this entire nuclear missile armada, raised with love in the Ukraine, threatens not only the "Swede," as some of our politicians suppose, but also the people and nature of the Ukraine. It is a matter of the undependability of Soviet military (and not just military) equipment, the lack of ecological control over it, and the general disorder, inconsistency, and theft in the army. Military aircraft fall from the sky no less frequently than civilian planes—God forbid with an atomic bomb. Submarines sink and missiles blow up.

In the fall of 1991, through a mistake of operating personnel, a combat missile of the "ground-to-air" class took off from an air defense missile launcher in Svetlovodskiy Rayon of Kirovograd Oblast. After flying about a kilometer, it fell on an intersection of a road leading to Kremenchug. Several soldiers were severely injured.

On 28 December 1984, during live firing in the Barents Sea, a Soviet missile did not want to hit the target and turned toward Finland. On 11 September 1986, the USSR accidentally fired a missile without a warhead at its uneasy neighbor China. It was launched from a submarine near Severomorsk. At about the same time, another "stray" missile of the "SS-8" type was launched from a "Delta-P" submarine and it likewise flew to China not far from Khabarovsk Kray. God was watching over them—there was no nuclear warhead on it.

All of us were on the verge of a colossal tragedy when in May 1984 a fire occurred at the strategic bomber base in the region of Bobruysk (Belorussia). The depots with "ground-to-air" missiles rumbled and the administrative buildings burned. And there were no fewer than six such major accidents at Soviet military facilities from 1984 through 1990.

And that is not all. The Soviet Army had begun to leave the land of independent Estonia and suddenly it was revealed that more than 50 missiles and 8 launchers were missing at the Tallinn artillery base. And tomorrow they might steal (if they have not done so already) a cruise missile or an atomic bomb. And a tactical nuclear weapon can simply be taken out in a diplomat's case. Theft is an absolutely ordinary phenomenon for our society.

So far we have very little information about the influence of nuclear military installations on the environment and on the health of people. Deep silos for missiles do not have the best effect on the level of the ground water and the ejection of rocket fuel may have serious consequences. The environment is also polluted through the leakage of nuclear military wastes. In Hanford (United States), such leaks occurred 16 times from 1958 through 1973. I think we also have something to "brag about." Only we do not yet know about it.

And "mailboxes" "working" for the "military" atom also do significant damage to the environment. At Zheltyye Vody, for example, they enrich ore for nuclear warheads. I do not think that such proximity benefits the local inhabitants.

Let us finish our nuclear count. In the territory of the former USSR (according to the English journal ECONOMICOMIST), there were: 20 nuclear power stations (13 in Russia, 5 in the Ukraine, 1 in Kazakhstan, and 1 in Lithuania), 2 plants for nuclear weapons (both in Russia), 9 bases for nuclear bombers (5 in Russia, 1 in the Ukraine, 1 in Kazakhstan, and 2 in Belorussia), 5 bases for nuclear submarines and ships (all in Russia), 2 bases for antiballistic nuclear missiles (both in Russia), and 17 bases for nuclear missiles (13 in Russia and 2 each in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan).

God, what can be done with all of this?!

Siamese Twins and Nuclear Terrorism

Five nuclear power stations in the Ukraine, five factories for nuclear weapons—Chernobyl, Zaporozhye, Rovno, Khmelnytskyi, and South Ukraine. They have been involved in the secret military program and can produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Not only the Ukrainian but all nuclear power stations of the USSR have dual-purpose production and are potentially used for military purposes. Thus, the spent fuel elements of the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Station] pass through intermediate storage to military installations for reprocessing, where they extract from them plutonium—the "bread" of nuclear weapons. Whereby the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress provided for work not only with plutonium elements but also with enriched uranium.

The cassette reactor RBMK (such as in Chernobyl), in contrast to VVR [water-moderated water-cooled reactors], is dual-purpose. The coefficient of plutonium decomposition is higher and the reactor design permits not only civilian use but also the simultaneous production of military material.

So are not army intrigues the reason for the Chernobyl explosion and does not the rabid pressure of the military-industrial complex explain the unwillingness of the government to close the Chernobyl and other AES that were constructed haphazardly?

But without abandoning nuclear energy it is impossible to eliminate nuclear weapons, just as it is senseless to abandon nuclear energy without eliminating nuclear weapons. For the "peaceful" and "military" atom are brothers, Siamese twins.

As long as nuclear power stations are operating in the Ukraine and vicinity, we will be their hostages. And it is not just a matter of endless accidents. An AES is a prize target for saboteurs, terrorists, and extremists of all kinds. The possibility of blackmailing the government may encourage many to seize a nuclear power station. And the objectives may differ—from the desire to become rich to the proclamation of the full independence of a region. Everything is possible in our society afflicted with mass psychosis. And it is not necessary to blow up a nuclear device at an AES. It is sufficient simply to threaten to do so.

There are precedents in world practice. In the 1970's, the Italian "Red Brigades" made serious preparations to seize a nuclear power station, as did Sikh extremists in the 1980's. Such a situation developed not so long ago in the FRG (the AES in the town of Kebrt) and in the town of Grossstadt, when an Armenian group decided to explode three small nuclear device to take revenge on the Turks for the mass killings of Armenians during the years of World War I.

And it is quite likely that here as well there will be a lone suicide who in a truck loaded with explosives will try to

break through the defense of an AES and explode them in the necessary place. Or who will crash into a reactor in an aircraft.

Another variant is the manufacture of a homemade "pocket" atomic bomb. According to the calculations of the Americans, this requires 5 kg of metallic plutonium and just \$30,000.

Terrorists can achieve their goals more simply. It is sufficient to acquire radioactive materials at an AES or in the Chernobyl zone and then to disperse them.

The question is not whether such an action is possible using the "peaceful" atom but only when and where it will be carried out.

Swimming "Chernobyls"

Soviet nuclear submarines sink. And they burn. Rather often.

1955. The destroyer "Kit" that took part in the testing of nuclear weapons was sunk in Lake Ladoga.

End of the 1950's. A Soviet diesel submarine of the Northern Fleet sank. It was being prepared for tests of cruise missiles.

4 July 1961. A breakdown of the nuclear power unit of a Soviet submarine of the "Otel" Class with ballistic missiles on board. It happened along the English coast. Twelve members of the crew died. Those who were saved were met by Adm. I. Baykov: "So, you consider yourselves heroes? We also have breakdowns of streetcars in Leningrad."

1966-1968. A leak in the protective casing of the reactor of the Soviet submarine "Leninskiy Komsomol." The accident took place not far from the North Pole. Part of the crew perished.

11 April 1968. A Soviet diesel submarine with ballistic missiles on board sank near the Hawaiian Islands. Eighty crew members perished.

31 December 1968. A Soviet nuclear submarine sank in the region of Severomorsk. It carried nuclear weapons. Ninety crew members died.

12 April 1970. A Soviet nuclear submarine remained on the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean 300 miles northwest of Spain.

End of August 1970. A Soviet ship full of electronics sank in the North Sea.

December 1972 to January 1973. A Soviet nuclear submarine broke down during military maneuvers in the Atlantic.

10 October 1976. A fire broke out in a missile launch tube on one of our nuclear-powered vessels. The ship was sailing in the Atlantic Ocean. Three officers perished.

1977. Fire on board a Soviet nuclear submarine in the Indian Ocean. They were just able to put it out.

19 August 1978. A Soviet nuclear submarine with cruise missiles began to sink to the northwest of Scotland. A nuclear reactor failed. They towed it home with great difficulty.

21 August 1980. One of our nuclear submarines lost power 85 miles from Okinawa (Japan). Ten members of the crew perished. The Japanese, fearing radioactive contamination, prohibited its transport through their territorial waters. Soviet admirals swore that it carried no nuclear weapons and that it was not nuclear at all. The Japanese believed them and gave their approval. An analysis of the sea water showed significant radioactive contamination.

June 1983. A Soviet nuclear submarine armed with cruise missiles sank to the east of Petropavlovsk. Ninety sailors died.

October 1986. A fire broke out on a Soviet nuclear submarine in the region of the Bermuda Islands. No one could be rescued.

7 April 1989. A Soviet nuclear submarine (the "Komsomolets") loaded with nuclear weapons sank near Norway.

June 1989. Emergency dumping of rocket fuel from a Soviet submarine in the White Sea.

27 September 1991. Again the White Sea. An accident on board a Soviet nuclear submarine of the "Typhoon" Class. Solid rocket fuel ignited in a ballistic missile tube. The explosion blew off the tube cover and ejected a burning mass on the deck. Inspectors from Goskompriroda [State Committee for the Protection of Nature] were not permitted to take samples for analysis. The top seaman Admiral Chernavin reacted with humor to the concern of local authorities: "You do not report to me if one of your irons breaks. The "iron" of the "Typhoon" Class had 18 missiles with nuclear warheads on board.

As a result of accidents, more than 40 nuclear warheads and about 10 reactors ended up on the bottom of the sea. And this does not count the nuclear missiles that Soviet seamen have lost during exercises. It is impossible to calculate the damage to the sea and man. We do not yet have any information about submarine accidents of the Black Sea Fleet.

A nuclear submarine does not survive for long. Its fate is to last just 25 to 30 years. And even if it does not sink, it still poisons the seas. Radionuclides get into the water at the moment of the release of cooled waters and even more so during the refueling of the submarine with nuclear fuel.

Eventually the submarine is written off, adding to nuclear wastes loaded with the raging atom. In 1991-92, 45 of 350 operable nuclear submarines are supposed to be written off in the USSR.

Not only nuclear-powered vessels consigned to the burial grounds are "crackling" from radiation but also the military ports like the infamous Avachinskaya Bay on Kamchatka—bases for the most exhausted submarines. Or its "luminous" neighbor, the "Gornyak" repair plant.

But this is just half of the problem. The inhabitants of Severomorsk were frightened out of their wits on 13 May 1984, when stockpiles of the missiles "SA-6," "SA-7," "SA-1," "SA-3," and "SS-22" capable of carrying nuclear warheads began to explode at this very large naval base of the Northern Fleet. Hundreds of soldiers were killed. The Northern Fleet lost its combat capability for several years. The fires continued for 5 days. Black smoke concealed the sky for a long time. Nothing like that had ever happened in the history of the Soviet Army.

Apocalypse

It is naive to think that, having eliminated its nuclear weapons and separated itself from the former fraternal republics, the Ukraine will free itself forever from the danger of the "military" atom. It knows no boundaries. There were 1,165 nuclear explosions in the world from 1945 until 1978. The contamination spreads over long distances at a significant rate. It is no joke that when the Chinese exploded a nuclear bomb on 16 October 1980 a radioactive cloud covered North America within 4 days. Sea currents are slower, spreading nuclear contamination in 2 or 3 months. Radionuclides are accumulated by fish and sea organisms and are concealed on the bottom.

There was a time for explosions and a time to find out about them. In 1954, there was a nuclear explosion at the secret South Urals test range with the participation of troops, equipment, and Marshal Zhukov. In the 1970's, there were about 100 underground nuclear explosions in Yakutiya for peaceful purposes. They planned to build a dam for a hydroelectric power station or tried to turn the northern rivers toward the south.

The Semipalatinsk Test Range. It was in operation from 1949 until 27 August 1991. There were more than 500 nuclear explosions (open blasts until 1963). And even if Colonel Petrushenko publicly bathes in nuclear lakes, the people do not now want to live on this "luminous" land.

The test range on Novaya Zemlya. It was in operation from 1955 until October 1991. There were 132 explosions (87 in the atmosphere, 3 under water, and 42 under ground). In 1958, there were 26 blasts in the atmosphere and under water. The most powerful explosion was one of 58 megatons on 30 October 1961. Before the test, they drove the people of Novaya Zemlya from their houses to

the stadium: "There was concern that they would mine rock at the quarry! Even though everyone had long known what kind of "rocks" are mined.

Because of the nuclear crimes on Novaya Zemlya, the peoples of the north have cancer twice as frequently as the average for the USSR. Strontium-90 is 20 to 40 times the norm in the bodies of reindeer breeders. In the summer of 1990, "Greenpeace" activists landed on Novaya Zemlya. Their radiation meters immediately went off the scale.

29 September 1957. An explosion in a depository for wastes from the production of atomic bombs at the locality of Kyshtym in Chelyabinsk Oblast. The radiation contaminated 23,000 square km. The neighboring Karagay Lake held more of it than the Chernobyl zone. Decontamination will cost 67 billion rubles. There is no place to obtain that money. The winds of the Urals continue to disperse the furious atom.

White Sea, Barents Sea, Kara Sea. For decades the Murmansk Steamship Line secretly buried military nuclear wastes at a shallow depth. They fired guns at 11,000 containers that would not sink. Fragments still line the shores. They handled liquid radioactive wastes more simply—they poured them into the Barents Sea, where trawlers customarily caught fish.

And one should not forget about the marine lighthouses and countless other military facilities with nuclear power. Who has measured the background around them?

It is naive to think that we will make ourselves safe from the "military" atom by renouncing nuclear weapons and closing AES. The radiological group of Prof. A. Marey worked in the wooded district in the 1950's through the 1970's. Its conclusions are not very comforting: the nuclear explosions on Novaya Zemlya and at the Semipalatinsk Test Range (and possibly others as well) contaminated the homeland of Ukrainian and Belorussian inhabitants of the wooded district. Scientists have determined that as early as the 1960's (a quarter century before Chernobyl) the contamination of milk in cows of the wooded district with cesium-137 exceeded the average value by a factor of 50 (!) and the meat of cattle was contaminated at four times the norm. Mushrooms, fish, and game "glowed." It is interesting that the configuration of the radioactive spot looked like it did after the Chernobyl explosion. But no preventive measures were taken. The people did not know anything about the investigations of the scientists....

For 70 years, the USSR succeeded in bringing forth talents, which it later successfully buried. The "military" atom is another matter.

Leningrad MD Chief of Staff on Prospects of Fall Draft

92UM0143A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Interview with Leningrad MD [Military District] Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sergey Pavlovich Seleznev by Colonel V. Streltsov under the rubric "The Fall Draft": "In the Mirror of Overall Crisis"]

[Text] *The picture for the fall draft for service in the armed forces of the USSR in the northwest is perhaps not the most depressing if one takes into account the situation in other regions. But there are no few problems here as well. Our correspondent discussed some of them with Leningrad MD [Military District] Chief of Staff Lieutenant General S. Seleznev.*

[Streltsov] Sergey Pavlovich, the first question is understandably about the reasons for the shortfall of conscripts for the units.

[Seleznev] A few statistics to start with. The spring induction plan for Saint Petersburg was only 94.7-percent fulfilled. The threat of failure to fulfill the plan is preserved today as well. What is keeping us from overcoming this unfavorable trend? First, the evasion of the draft by a certain portion of the youth. Second, the increased quantity of chronically ill young people. And third, the outright refusal to serve with reference to affiliation with some faith (even though that is frequently not confirmed).

Hundreds of youth are evading the call-up today in Saint Petersburg alone. More than half of this category are not working anywhere and are not in school... Fourteen percent of the draftees are not ready to fulfill their constitutional duty, according to medical depositions. About 70 percent have various restrictions for service among troops with enhanced requirements for the state of health. Almost 20 percent of those deemed unsuitable for service have psychic or nervous disorders.

Now the deeper reasons. They are concealed in the crisis state of our society. The war of laws has given rise to legal nihilism. Whereas the bodies of executive authority, executives of enterprises and educational institutions and other organizations used to take part in the draft along with the military commissariats, today all of those structures frequently ignore the fulfillment of the state tasks entrusted to them.

[Streltsov] But do we need to lump it all on legal nihilism?

[Seleznev] Undoubtedly not. As the statistics show, patriotic sentiments have declined appreciably in the youth environment, while ethnic and dependent ones are growing stronger. Drug and substance abuse are spreading across a broad front, and criminal habits are being cultivated. I'll refer to the figures once again. One out of every five draftees in the city (this is not typical of the towns) had police arrests or was on the rolls of a drug

clinic in the period before the army. Five percent of the draftees have legal convictions. And the statistics do not show how many of the draftees were engaged in street dealing or trafficking...

[Streltsov] That is more a description of the qualitative aspect of the draft.

[Seleznev] I agree. I would add that the circumstance that the schools have almost rid themselves of preparing youth for the service is also inflicting great harm on the quality of the draft contingent. Exercises in basic military training, for example, are not being conducted at more than 240 schools in Saint Petersburg. Just 35 hours have been instituted at the rest, and even that is elective. There are some 200 too few military training officers in the city. I see, for example, a violation of the constitutional right to labor in the situation that has taken shape with pre-draft training. Judge for yourself. An industrial course exists in the schools, even though far from all of the young people will be working at plants. There is an agricultural course, while few of them will be farming either. The schools, it is true, should give the young an idea of many professions. So then why deprive them of the opportunity of receiving an idea about the profession of protecting the homeland? I am in no way calling for the militarization of the schools. Far from that idea. But there is a tradition, after all. The younger generation has been trained for the defense of its Motherland for centuries. Not always legitimately, perhaps, but those youth who had not served, who were physically weak, who did not know how to handle a weapon were considered to be inferior. Have we really reached the point where the nation is losing the ability to defend itself?

The Zarnitsa and Orlenok military sports games are now being abolished in the schools. The military had supposedly foisted them on the schools. That is a conclusion out of ignorance of history. The fact is that the progressive ideas of the scouting movement were taken right from the system of civilian education. They live today in a number of countries around the world.

[Streltsov] Tell me, Sergey Pavlovich, how is the process of sovereignty in the republics affecting the acquisition of manpower for units in the district today?

[Seleznev] The difficulties are being aggravated. There has been, true, a corresponding reaction from the General Staff with a regard for the situation that is taking shape in the country. We will send fewer recruits to other republics, and leave more at home in the district. This issue has not been conclusively resolved yet. We will have to coordinate at the level of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the leaders of the sovereign republics.

[Streltsov] Do you see any prospects for abolishing the reasons that are having a negative effect on the draft?

[Seleznev] First of all, understandably for everyone, a stabilization of the situation in the country and the region is essential. I have in mind both economic and socio-political stabilization and moral stabilization.

Neglecting the fulfillment of the constitutional duty to defend the homeland, after all, however it may be camouflaged, is nothing other than immorality. The prospects are less hopeful for the practices of the draft. We are finding almost one-hundred-percent mutual understanding without exception with the leaders of all of the oblasts, the Karelian Republic and the municipal council of Saint Petersburg. We have had a positive reaction to our requests that the alienation from the draft of bodies that should be occupied with it be overcome. Shifts are projected in improving the technical sophistication of the draft stations...

New Central Finance Directorate Chief Interviewed

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[Interview with USSR Ministry of Defense Central Finance Directorate Chief Major-General Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin under the rubric "New Assignments": "Money for the Army"]

[Text] *Major-General Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev has been designated chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense by order of the USSR Minister of Defense.*

Major-General Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev was born on 11 May 46 in the town of Gidrotorf in Balakhninskiy Rayon of Gorkiy Oblast. He completed the Yaroslavl Military Finance School imeni General Army A.V. Khrulev with distinction in 1966, and the Military Department of the Moscow Financial Institute in 1974. He has completed service over 20 years among the troops in the Siberian and Far East military districts in the positions of chief of the financial service for a unit, large formation and army. As of 1982 he was deputy chief of the financial service for the Southern Group of Forces, 1986 the chief of the financial service for the Ukrainian Military District and 1987 the Far East Military District.

He was designated the first deputy chief of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense in June of 1990.

He is married with two children.

Major-General V. Vorobyev granted his first interview at the request of the editors.

[Altunin] What sort of "agitated operation" have you taken over?

[Vorobyev] Changes are occurring in the financial service, as in all of the armed forces. Improvements are being planned in the organizational structure, cadres are being renewed and the planned discharge of members of the officer corps and warrant officers who have served out their stipulated terms of active military service is

proceeding, with energetic steps being taken to provide appropriations for the measures being pursued by the armed forces. There are problems, of course.

[Altunin] Such as?

[Vorobyev] The chief difficulty is the fact that many issues have not been resolved at the state level. The financing of all-union structures has effectively ceased. Whereas we used to know precisely the amount of appropriations for defense for the coming year by November, today we cannot say anything definite not only about the military budget for 1992, but even about how we will make it to the end of this year, and whether we will be able to provide for at least the minimal requirements of the army and navy.

[Altunin] Readers, officers in particular, are interested in how social problems are going to be solved.

[Vorobyev] It is totally impermissible that the social problems of the army be solved today, as they used to be, by the "whatever's-left-over" principle. Can it really be fair that military service, which presupposes a high level of education and entails a great many difficulties, deprivations, frequent moves and a lack of everyday amenities, and frequently with a risk to life, is materially rewarded in the same way—and sometimes even worse—than the work of a bus or trolley driver, a stock clerk in a store or a fitter in a shop? That situation, unfortunately, is reality.

We are therefore planning to do some serious work to improve the whole system of base pay and allowances, devoting particular attention to suitable incentives for high stress and professionalism in the service, a more complete regard for the climatic and geographic conditions under which it is carried out and the family status of the servicemen.

Among near-term prospects, a one-time monetary bonus of a new size for 1991 will be paid to servicemen in accordance with a decision made not long ago (twice base pay and allowances). The formation of a special fund to render material assistance to servicemen, with the direction of funds into it equal to the base pay and allowances for each serviceman, is envisaged starting next year. The wages of all manual and office workers in the army and navy, without exception, will be increased in November of this year.

[Altunin] Are you experiencing difficulties in "pushing through" this or that decision?

[Vorobyev] Things were—and currently are—very difficult for the proposals of the USSR minister of defense in the country's central economic structures. It is no secret that even the extension of the benefits and privileges that are already stipulated for other categories of citizens to servicemen is often pushed back for contrived reasons. We were for a long time unable, for example, to provide for the making of decisions on the long-urgent

problem of improving material incentives for servicemen who complete their service in the Far North or other remote areas. The legislation here is favorable toward civilians.

[Altunin] What does the market promise for the armed forces, in your view?

[Vorobyev] Work is being completed within the USSR Ministry of Defense on drafts of a conceptual framework and program for the entry of the armed forces into the market economy. The creation of new and primarily economic structures is envisaged along with other measures to improve the financial and economic activity of the troops, especially foreign economic activity.

The solution of problems of social support for the personnel occupies a special place. We are considering indexing the base pay and allowances and the state pensions of servicemen, along with the salaries of manual and office workers of the army and navy, as a basic mechanism. The drafts of the corresponding standard documents on these issues have been prepared and are currently being considered at the country's economic bodies.

[Altunin] Whom would you like to address, and with what, through KRASNAYA ZVEZDA?

[Vorobyev] First of all the commanders of the military units. Their role will increase as never before in solving the social problems of the troops and naval forces—as doubtless will their responsibility for the efficient utilization of the appropriations allocated for defense—under conditions of the transition to market relations. They have already been granted broad rights in financial and business activity, and they will be expanded in the future. It is important to dispose of those rights properly. It cannot be permitted that independence is perceived as a free-for-all, with the opportunity to sell off all and everything on the cheap. The considered nature of decisions and ability to dispose of what is at the disposal of the armed forces, along with concern for the person, is what should always be present in the activity of the commander.

Rush To Create ABM Systems Decried

PM0612164591 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 48, Nov 91 (signed to press
26 Nov 91) pp 18-20

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, under "Security Problems" rubric; first paragraph is boxed item accompanying article: "SDI: Roof Will Be Locked, But Door Wide Open. Moscow Has Clearly Been in a Hurry To Reconsider Its Position on U.S. 'Star Wars' Program"]

[Text] Dangerous Project

"As for an assessment of the 'star wars' program, we cannot take seriously the claims that SDI will ensure invulnerability against means of nuclear attack and

thereby lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons... Even on the far more modest scale on which, in the opinion of specialists, SDI is feasible as an ABM system of limited potential, it is very dangerous. This project will undoubtedly urge on the arms race in all areas, which means that the threat of war will increase." From M.S. Gorbachev's replies to the U.S. TIME magazine.

In October 1991, Moscow sharply changed course in midstream on one of the most fundamental questions of security and disarmament. Responding to George Bush's initiatives, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed readiness "to discuss the U.S. proposal on nonnuclear ABM systems," in addition to measures on tactical and strategic nuclear arms.

'Brilliant Pebbles' Against Husayn

Since 1983, the United States has been developing and testing ground-, air-, and space-based nonnuclear ABM systems, including lasers and "ground-to-space" and "space-to-space" missiles designed for direct hits (the Strategic Defense Initiative program—SDI). Throughout this time Washington insisted on revising the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, which allows each of the two sides to have just one ABM defense region, but only ground-based and comprising no more than 100 antimissile missiles.

In recent years, the United States has propagandized the idea of creating a joint defense system against ballistic missiles and also revised the SDI tasks at the beginning of 1991. Instead of defense against a massive Soviet missile strike, SDI was reoriented toward creating a system of "global defense against a limited strike." Its purpose is to act as insurance against an accidental missile launch or against a provocative strike by a regime of the Iraqi, Iranian, or Libyan type.

The new system provides for the deployment in the United States of 750-1,000 ground-based interceptor missiles and approximately 1,000 space-based homing projectiles of the "brilliant pebbles" type, as well as for mobile ABM defense against tactical missiles (the next generation of Patriot-type systems, which were used in the war against Iraq). The entire global defense system is costed at approximately \$50 billion, on top of the \$20 billion already spent on SDI since 1983. It is to be ready in 10-15 years' time.

Moscow maintained until recently that the creation of large-scale ABM systems would deprive each side of confidence in the reliability of its own deterrent potential. The race for offensive and defensive systems would be resumed as a result, strategic stability would be destabilized, and the process of reducing offensive strategic arms would be derailed.

And then, in a style very typical of Gorbachev, this position was radically revised overnight, to the considerable amazement of even the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks. Although the president did not deem it necessary to explain the motives for such an abrupt

change of policy (a policy which, incidentally, he himself had committedly championed for the past five years), the following were the arguments in favor of changing course.

First, fundamental changes occurred in relations between the two powers after the August events. They no longer regard each other as enemies and are undertaking unilateral measures to reduce their nuclear forces. So the logic of mutual deterrence no longer applies. And this means that an ABM system, particularly a joint one, will not now undermine stability and security.

Second, the economic and political chaos in the USSR is giving rise to doubts about the reliability of centralized control over its nuclear weapons. In this situation a global system of ABM defense could act as a safety device in the event of an unsanctioned launch.

Third, advocates of the new concept of ABM defense refer to the rapid spread of ballistic missiles and missile technology in conjunction with the proliferation of nuclear materials around the planet. This could in the very near future place a means of nuclear blackmail into the hands of a multitude of Husayns and Al-Qadhdhafis.

To Assemble a Mercedes Instead of a Dump Truck?

At first sight, these are weighty arguments in favor of revising Moscow's position—which is what certain Soviet military and civilian specialists are calling for now. But we should not be in a hurry.

From the viewpoint of the likelihood of an unsanctioned launch, ground- and sea-launched strategic ballistic missiles are the least dangerous of all the existing kinds of nuclear weapons. The missiles are reliably locked by electronic and technical means, and not even the teams and crews which service them, nor the command at all intermediate levels, can carry out a launch without encoded and repeatedly duplicated sanctions from the top military-political leadership. The entire system of missile forces control is rigidly centralized. It is no less difficult to accidentally launch a missile than to accidentally assemble a Mercedes instead of a dump truck at the Likhachev Plant.

Nevertheless, the August putsch increased fear at the possibility of an unsanctioned launch. However, if you think about the question, such a scenario is fraught not with that threat but with the danger that centralized control over nuclear arsenals will be handed over to the usurpers of power. A limited ABM defense is powerless against this. Particularly if, as Soviet experts propose, it were deployed and controlled jointly by Washington and Moscow. So it was no coincidence that U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney unequivocally rejected the possibility of handing over technology and joint control of such a system to the Union.

Only political and constitutional measures ruling out August relapses can act as a guarantee against the threat of the loss of nuclear control. In addition, the "button"

must be only in the hands of the lawfully elected leaders of the Union and its constituent republics. The use of nuclear weapons must be technically impossible without their unanimous sanction.

The danger of an unsanctioned launch applies more to tactical nuclear weapons—tactical missiles, aerial bombs, shells, mines. However, the proposed ABM system is technically incapable of neutralizing such a threat.

What is needed in order to reduce to the absolute minimum the likelihood of an unsanctioned launch of strategic missiles is not a new ABM system but quite different measures. It is necessary to combat not the effect but the causes of the problem. I mean a rapid and far deeper reduction of strategic arms than that provided for in the START Treaty and the Bush-Gorbachev fall initiatives (Footnote) (See "Finale Is Important, Not START" by A. Arbatov and T. Cochran, *NOVOYE VREMYA* No. 45, 1991); mutual steps to reduce the level of combat readiness of these arms (including sea-based missile forces); an improvement in the systems for warning of and preventing unsanctioned use (even including the fitting of self-destruct devices to missiles, as on space launches). There is a wide field here for an exchange of technology and for joint developments by the two powers.

Suitcase Bomb

Now about the threat of the spread of ballistic missiles in the "Third World." The chief threat here is not the missiles but the warheads for them. Unless a reliable obstacle is put in the way of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist regimes will find other means of delivering such weapons—aircraft, torpedoes, cruise missiles, the "suitcase bomb." Incidentally, strategic ballistic missiles are the most expensive type of carriers and the hardest to obtain. They cannot be built and deployed in secret. On their launch positions they are vulnerable even to conventional weapons, as demonstrated by the war in the Persian Gulf. You cannot hide strategic missiles the way Iraq did with tactical missiles obtained from the USSR.

In this case too it is necessary to combat not the effects but the causes. An uncompromising unified policy on the part of the United States, the Union, and other civilized states must be aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons, missiles and missile technologies, and long-range offensive arms in general in the "Third World." Even including direct sanctions and preventive military measures.

But to create global systems of ABM defense is the same as—fearing a burglary—strengthening the roof of a house while leaving the doors and windows open.

In addition, a revision of the ABM treaty would create a mass of difficulties and problems because of the geostrategic and technical differences between the USSR and

the United States. In particular, whereas 1,000 ground-based antimissile missiles are sufficient for the United States, the Union might need far more because of the extent of its territory and the proximity of the threat from the south. If Moscow is unable to create effective nonnuclear interception systems, how will the United States and neighboring countries look upon the equipping of many thousands of antimissile missiles with nuclear warheads? How can this be combined with the deep reduction in nuclear arms announced by the two presidents, including anti-aircraft missiles?

Possible Consequences

Until the United States and the Union have reduced their strategic forces to very low levels, the essence of their strategic relations will remain mutual deterrence. The deployment of defensive systems (which, incidentally, have a habit of growing rapidly) will inevitably hinder the reduction of offensive arms. And this in turn will perpetuate strategic relations between the two powers as opponents, despite their desire to become political partners and even allies.

For the other nuclear powers—Britain, France, and China—a limited ABM system capable of intercepting up to 200 warheads will look like a large-scale ABM defense which reduces to naught the weight of their nuclear forces, which, although small, were built at a high price. Seeking to preserve their status as great powers, Britain and France might in that case decide to combine their nuclear missile efforts. And will the FRG's position remain unchanged?

China will end up worst off. Its nuclear means are designed to deter both the United States and the Union. Beijing will most likely build new missiles. How will this influence the policy of Japan, North and South Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq? How will Beijing behave on the question of the nonproliferation of missile and nuclear technology and materials—its chief trump card in relations with the other great powers?

Enthusiasts for new ABM systems in the United States and the USSR must answer all these questions right now, for later it will be too late for head scratching.

Somebody Else's Headache

The Americans' position is understandable. The declared aims of global defense against a limited strike are not new tasks. Defense against unsanctioned launches and against "Third World" missiles was always included in the SDI program as a secondary task along with the repulsing of a massive strike. For economic, political, and technical reasons the maximum task has fallen away. Having spent \$20 billion on SDI over eight years, the Republican administration finds it somehow awkward to tell the taxpayers that it turned out a mistake. Congress is also threatening to cut the appropriations for the new system, and so Washington is in great need of different arguments: for example, the USSR's consent to a joint development.

But what reason has Moscow to seek somebody else's headache? The Soviet military-space complex is understandably seeking to provide its design bureaus and enterprises with orders and is counting, albeit quite groundlessly, on access to U.S. technology (incidentally, allies of the United States have gotten practically nothing out of their cooperation within the SDI framework). But can the country afford, in the present economic situation, to throw funds estimated at tens of billions of dollars into a "limited" ABM defense against imagined threats in the next century? And can it, in addition to the nuclear problem, also draw the ABM system into the maelstrom of its national conflicts? I will remind you that half of the Soviet radars to warn of a missile attack have ended up on the territory of republics which have seceded or are considering seceding from the Union.

People say that even a broken clock shows the right time twice every 24 hours. The Soviet stand on the question of ABM defense was correct in the eighties, even though it was dictated by incorrect considerations. Moscow was opposed not because it was campaigning for strategic stability but because it was afraid of lagging behind the United States in this sphere of military-technical rivalry.

While opposing strategic defense and the militarization of space, the USSR built the Krasnoyarsk radar in violation of the ABM Treaty and maintained the world's only operational ABM system around Moscow and an antisatellite system at Tyuratam. It created the most powerful strategic air defense, carried out through space [cherez kosmos] the largest number of ballistic missile test launches, and put most military satellites into orbit. This was what was flawed in Moscow's policy, and precisely this caused the inconsistency and ineffectiveness of Soviet diplomacy at the Geneva talks on defense and on space.

They now want to set the "broken clock" going, as it were, but seemingly in reverse.

Under the new conditions, of course, we should not continue speaking with the United States in the language of ultimatums and, at the slightest provocation, threatening to tear up the strategic arms treaty. All questions, including the expediency of preserving the ABM Treaty, can and must be discussed in a calm and businesslike manner. But to rush to the other extreme and urge antimissile programs is unreasonable and even dangerous. Including for future Soviet-U.S. strategic and political relations and for the joint use of space for purposes of ensuring stability, communications, and ecological monitoring [kontrol].

Review of Complaints About Treatment of Servicemen

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[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major A. Stasovskiy, under the rubric: "While Reading November's Mail": "This Necessary-Unnecessary Army"]

[Text] First, two short excerpts from different letters. "I think that none of our republics, that have set out on the path of independence, will be free without their own armies," wrote Reader P. Karutskiy from Grodno. "The only force on which we can rely and where there is still any kind of order is the Armed Forces. And they can only be united," this is the opinion of L. Zotenko, a veteran of labor who lives in Kharkov.

Opinions, as we see, differ. But there is something common in them—hope for the army.

Many people are counting on the army today. Both those who see the army parceled out by ethnic group and those people who do not permit division even in thought. There is nothing surprising here. After all, you feel confident when you are backed up by tanks, not banners, and by missiles, not leaflets. But right now they are ascertaining just who needs the army, the people, those very same people who comprise this army and who have been left to their own devices.

"Today, servicemen in all the sovereign republics, without exception, are in a very deplorable situation. Without rights and humiliated. Who prepared such an unenviable fate for us," asks Senior Naval Warrant Officer Yu. Boytsan from Belgorod.

N. Chernyakh from Moscow, V. Roslov from Svetogorsk, Leningrad Oblast, and many other readers in their letters set forth these questions, which alas, have already been reduced to the rhetorical.

Well, all right. Will they decide to divide quickly or decide to keep everything as it is and be done with it. But then it is as in the fable of the swan, the crawfish and the pike. In a word, everything is as it was. But at that time, some kind of weapon was needed to resolve "vitaly important questions" and they "borrowed" at military units, an officer looked at someone "wrong" and they cut his throat and seized the military man's children as a guarantee.... And the main thing is that no one has done anything about it. And what about the army? It endures. No matter where it goes; it will not move against the people. Exactly, it will not move. But if it nevertheless begins to defend itself? "In Lithuania they beat a tank officer's wife," writes Captain M. Mishin to the editor's office, "so he, without a moment's thought, was at the controls of a tank. They barely had time to stop him near the KTP [tank regiment commander]. He scrambled out in tears. Just a little more and he would have broken...."

Today they also managed to stop a tank officer and that battalion which, they say, was ready to go to the last man for their officer, Major V. Berilov, who was brutally murdered in Tbilisi. And it is increasingly difficult to restrain those people who have their hands on tank controls, the triggers of assault weapons, or the launch buttons of missiles. Rage is blind. Who wants to blind these already worn out and harried people whom we call our army?

There was a chance for everything to proceed along a normal, predictable path. After the collapse of the coup, when the army was being called defenders and pillars. A stormy development of events followed: departyization, depoliticization, and loud words that in the future the army would not be used for political purposes. The military gathered a little more air to make sighing easier, but we did not permit them to exhale. "We categorically oppose dragging officers into the political struggle," resolutely intoned Lt. Col. S. Starykh, from Vinnitsa, chairman of the Independent Officers Association Republic Coordinating Committee. But what is the use if other officers organizations have already become thoroughly involved in political affairs.

By way of illustration, take the Union of Ukrainian Officers [SOU]. SOU is increasingly demanding that assignments, especially to high positions in divisions and smaller units stationed in Ukraine, occur only with the approval of the officers union. "That is to say political orientation and ideological devotion have been put back in first place, and then professionalism, competence and experience," Captain 1st Rank N. Likh, Captains 2nd Rank O. Protsenko and V. Uslugin, and Captain 3rd Rank A. Deltsov, officers of the Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering School muse in their letter. "It is a pity that some officers have openly been drawn into unscrupulous politics. We consider this a shameful thing for people who have weapons in their hands. Let he who dreams of a political career be released from the ranks of the Armed Forces."

It is said that the opportunity was lost. And today the army, flesh of the people's flesh, instead, as they say, of being on the road to recovery, is more often subject to operational interference. They are cutting vital organs, without anesthesia. They cut as if they do not think about what they are creating.

"I think the most important event in Ukraine is the creation of a national army," writes Ye. Turchin, an historian from Khmelnytskyi Oblast. "Otherwise, after all, after two years service in the Soviet Army Ukrainian lads will forget their native tongue and will serve heaven knows where and whom. The Dnepr is the native river of the Ukrainians, the Carpathian Mountains are dear, and the Volga and Urals mean as much to them as the Alps and the Rhine." Allow me to disagree, dear gentleman or Pan historian. The Volga is not foreign to the Ukrainian. Tens of thousands of them fell in battle around it while saving the country from the Fascist plague and the Dnepr is also dear to the Russians. How many Russian soldiers' graves are on its banks? As an historian, you could not have forgotten about this so quickly. Just like you cannot forget that unity and not the breakup of the army helped us to withstand the struggle with the enemy.

"We, three friends, Makar Polynov—a Russian, Ivan Kostenko—a Ukrainian, and I, Ravil Khalilizov—an Uzbek, made it through the entire war." We saved each other from death more than once. Our brotherhood was

sealed with blood," R. Khalilzov of Chimkent said warmly of his brother soldiers. Can people strike this from their lives?

The USSR's Armed Forces' past "is being forgotten" and mired in dirt, and we are self-consciously silent about the army's current situation. And the veterans, who have seen and experienced a lot in their time, are confused about what is occurring. "What a disgrace," M. Vinogradov, a Great Patriotic War disabled veteran and resident of the city of Strunino in Vladimirskiy Oblast, is righteously indignant, "it is not enough that soldiers are being driven out of the Baltic Region like some sort of street urchins but they even want to take their weapons away. Since time immemorial, a soldier has either been standing behind his shield or has been carried off on his shield."

"Only strict discipline and unity will save the army," Yu. Vanyushkin, a resident of Tomsk, said flatly. "If they are going to break up the army today, then tomorrow they will begin to shatter the republics' armies so that every district and oblast will have their own armed formations. Is it really difficult to miscalculate? Really, will I, who devoted my entire life to the army, live to see the day when my officer-sons fight one another?"

And a few lines of a letter from Retired Major D. Banin, a resident of Berdyansk, "I indignantly observe how officers, instead of devoting service time to duty, stand in lines from early morning. It seems that they will soon only go to the unit to get paid. Today, some officers and warrant officers have worked out a trade network and

commercial structures. Instead of duty, they are involved with business. And really, they judge the entire army by the actions of these few servicemen. When will order and justice be established?"

How can we not understand the veteran's indignation? But one can certainly look at the stated facts quite differently. What would it be like for the soldiers when they are not paid money now and then, when the housing designated for them is auctioned off for a large sum, when everyone in the "liberated" region has ration coupons for food and the officers and warrant officers, excuse me... Without justifying themselves and without being justified, one wants to ask once more, how can it be?

It will be worst of all if the army itself searches for a way out of all the hopeless situations mentioned above.

"How long will the army endure all the jeering at them and at the people," asks O. Voropayeva, a veteran of labor from Saratov. "For the time being, the power is on your side, do not waste time..." Similar "advice" arrives at the editor's office by the dozen every day.

Oh, to be sure, this is the necessary-unnecessary army. You are the guarantee of freedom and a hateful usurper, you are the hope of the people and the hostage of political games... You become needed when it is necessary to "reconcile" with someone or a reliable support is required in politics, and no one needs you when the discourse is about your misfortunes. How will it go with you tomorrow? One thing is clear, to put off all these problems "until tomorrow" is not a worthwhile policy...

Progress in Providing German Aid for WGF Reviewed

*92UM0198A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Interview with Colonel V. Strelnikov, deputy chief of staff of the WGF, by Colonel V. Markushin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Conversation With One Qualified to Speak": "On the Distant Approaches to 200 Million"]

[Text] **The Soviet-German Agreement on Transitional Measures, signed in October of last year, called for the Germans to allocate 200 million marks to help with the training and retraining of Soviet servicemen released into the reserve and their families from the Western Group of Forces. Our correspondent interviewed Col V. Strelnikov, deputy chief of staff of the WGF, on this subject.**

[Strelnikov] A Soviet-German working group was set up to implement a project of such importance to us. F. Kovriga, first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, was appointed to head the Soviet half of the group. It was assumed that the training and retraining of Soviet citizens would be conducted at training centers within the USSR. Without going into detail, I shall be so bold as to say that this government group was not just negligent in the performance of its job; it did not perform the job at all. No sort of strategic line was defined. And attempts to undertake something specific on this level were not consistent with the realities surrounding the redeployment of the WGF units. One wonders, for example, for whom the construction of training centers in the Baltic area was planned. And what would be the benefit of a training center in Ramenskiy, near Moscow, where it was planned to train specialists in programs designed for 15- and 16-year-old boys?

Ok, so that is a thing of the past. Soviet structures fell apart following the October events, including our government group. The work has to be started over again.

[Markushin] But a great deal has already been done: proposals from firms have been reviewed, trial courses have been set up....

[Strelnikov] Many firms and organizations expressed an interest in participating in this undertaking. Specific proposals came in from more than 20 firms: training of specialists in computer equipment, drivers for hauling dangerous cargo, advertising specialists, managers, computer operators, environmental protection specialists, bodyguards and so forth.

A large number of proposals were accepted for consideration and testing. The Helle firm, for example, trained 20 men to assemble and work with computer systems. It is prepared to conduct training in all the East German states, setting up the equipment for this and subsequently transferring it to the Soviet side. The training is conducted 6 hours a day for 6 weeks. The (Siskoplan)

firm has trained 25 specialists in the economics of enterprises and management and is prepared to continue this training. The training period is 200 hours and lasts 1 month. The IPM firm has set up courses for managers.... All of this work—I want to stress this fact—is presently being done on a philanthropic basis, that is, with German funds other than those 200 million allocated under the agreement. The principle is this: If you want to receive something, prove yourself. By the way, this is the normal approach according to Western standards, because no one there is accustomed to "laying out" money casually. Incidentally, not a single Soviet organization has yet proved itself at this level, with the exception of the Moscow Aviation Institute, whose representative, Professor Vl. Kuznetsov, is working vigorously in this area.

Representatives of the Bundeswehr have taken a positive role. Gen H. Ferch's section for communications with the WGF, for example, which deals primarily in the evaluation of German firms for recommendation.

[Markushin] Vladimir Vasilyevich, where are those 200 million being kept?

[Strelnikov] In a safe place, a bank in Frankfurt.

[Markushin] There have been rumors, though, that the Pavlov government has already transferred them to the state budget and released them for other needs.

[Strelnikov] There was some confusion, including some in the Central Finance Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. It is therefore not surprising that people began to have bad thoughts. The money was gone, they thought. This time too, it turned out, the Germans had remained Germans. Not a single mark had been spent. Those in charge of the fund explained that the money would be paid out not for projects but based on the end result. If someone announces that they have trained 100 specialists, the fact will be thoroughly verified. Only then will the organization receive what it has earned.

[Markushin] Just where are the training and retraining to take place?

[Strelnikov] Part of it will be here, in the GWF. We estimate that financially this could account for a significant portion: on the order of 50 million marks. It is planned to use the remaining 150 million for setting up training at a number of military academies, schools and garrisons, where it is easier to house and feed the trainees.

[Markushin] And whom are we going to train?

We are interested in preparing specialists in the area of a market economy, particularly small and middle-size businesses. After that, specialists who will then work in joint enterprises. I want to stress this important factor. The training and retraining will be based on the educational and professional level of the trainees.

[Markushin] Specifically, who is dealing with this at the headquarters of the WGF?

[Strelnikov] After Col Gen M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the WGF, took the initiative in this matter into his own hands, we formed a small but active group of officers. Colonels N. Kononeko and A. Baranov and Maj V. Lomakin are members.

[Markushin] Have you designated the garrisons where the training centers will be established?

[Strelnikov] We are focusing on those garrisons which will be around until 1993 or 1994, of course. Primarily Berlin, Potsdam and Wunsdorf.

[Markushin] When will the training begin?

[Strelnikov] That is difficult to answer. Things are being held up because there is no government group. The bank will issue the money only through an intergovernmental group. It is important for us to define our half of the Soviet-German group in the immediate future and for its representative to come here.

[Markushin] To whom are you appealing?

[Strelnikov] To the government of Russia. I know of nowhere else to turn.

History of ZSU-23-4 'Shilka' Anti-Aircraft System

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[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Our Defense Arsenal": "The 'Shilka' Will Still Serve"]

[Text] The NATO experts became interested in the Soviet ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled antiaircraft system as soon as the first information on its capabilities appeared in the West. In 1973 they were already "checking out" a Shilka captured by the Israelis during the Middle East War. In the early '80s the Americans began an intelligence operation to acquire one more Shilka, turning to the friends of Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. What was it about the Soviet self-propelled system that so interested the NATO experts?

Did they have a great desire to learn whether there were any important changes in the modernized Soviet ZSU [self-propelled antiaircraft artillery piece]? The interest was understandable. The Shilka was a most unique weapon which held its primacy in its class for two decades. Its outlines took shape in 1961, when Soviet science was celebrating the victorious Gagarin flight.

So just what was unique about the ZSU-23-4? Colonel (Reserve) Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Dyakov, whose career was closely linked with this weapon, tells us. He now works in the Directorate of Air-Defense Troops of the Ground Forces.

"The most important thing is that for the first time we began systematically destroying air targets with the Shilka. Until then antiaircraft systems armed with 57-mm guns, the ZU-23 and ZP-37, hit high-speed targets only by chance. The shells were small-caliber, that is, they had only an impact effect and no explosive device. A direct hit was required for them to destroy the target. The probability was minuscule. In short, previous anti-aircraft weapons had only created a barrier to an aircraft, forcing the pilot to drop his bombs a long way from the designated site.

"The unit commanders were thrilled when they saw the Shilka not only destroy targets before their eyes but also advance behind the subunits, in the battle orders of the troops they were covering. It was a real revolution. Imagine, the guns did not have to be wheeled up into position.... It was a torturous process to set up an ambush with an S-60 battery, difficult to conceal the enormous guns. And how much work was involved in forming the battle order, "fitting into" the terrain, linking all the sites (power units, guns, the gun-laying station, fire control instruments) with all the cables! What large crews...! Now they had this compact, mobile unit. It could move in, fire from ambush and move on. Just try to find it. Today's officers, those who think in terms of the '90s, regard the term "self-contained system" differently. What is so unusual about it? they ask. In the '60s, however, it was a design feat, the pinnacle of engineering."

The self-propelled Shilka truly has many advantages. Its chief designer, Doctor of Technical Sciences Nikolay Aleksandrovich Astrov—not a full-time antiaircraft man, so to speak (he had designed running gear prior to this)—succeeded in designing a machine which has proved itself in many local wars and military conflicts.

To explain what we are talking about, let us describe the purpose and the structure of the 23-mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled, quad antiaircraft system (fanciers of military equipment will simply find the information of interest). It was designed for protecting the battle orders of troops, columns on the march, stationary facilities and trains against air attacks from aircraft flying at speeds of up to 450 m/s and altitudes of 100 to 1,500 meters, at ranges of 200 to 2,500 meters. The Shilka can also be used for destroying mobile ground targets at ranges of up to 2,000 meters. It can be fired in place or on the move and has equipment for circular or sector target scanning, tracking, ascertaining laying angles and controlling the gun.

The ZSU-23-4 consists of a 23-mm AZP-23 self-propelled, quad antiaircraft gun and drive systems for laying the gun. The next most important component is an RPK-2 radar instrumentation system. Naturally, it is for directing fire. A GM-575 tracked vehicle gives the ZSU great speed, mobility and improved off-road capability. It has a primary electric power supply system (SEP) which provides all the system's power consumers

with direct and alternating current. Day- and night-vision devices enable the mechanic/operator to monitor the road and the surrounding area at any time of day or night, and its communication equipment provides for external communication and communication among the crew members. The Shilka has tank navigation equipment for continuous ascertainment of the ZSU's coordinates and the grid bearings of the unit's longitudinal axis. What else? The Shilka was designed at a time when the troops were preparing to fight in a situation involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. An antinuclear protection systems therefore protects the ZSU crew when moving through contaminated areas.

I would also mention that a transport and loading vehicle (TZM) is attached to the ZSU to supply it with ammunition. It has four ammunition boxes, each of which contains a 1,000-round belt. The self-propelled unit has a crew of four: the commander, a scanner/gunner, a range operator and a mechanic/driver.

The Shilka was born with a silver spoon in its mouth, so to speak. Its development was begun in 1958. The first unit was ready in 1961. The order for its acceptance into the arsenal was issued by the USSR minister of defense on 16 October 1962, and its mass production was begun 3 years later. A little later it was tested in combat, in Vietnam. How did the Shilka perform? First, a quote from the prestigious American reference book *War Machine*.

One of the main missions of the American Air Force during the war was to destroy bridges and crossings on the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail. The targets could be approached from two directions. At low altitudes the aircraft were frequently struck by an avalanche of fire from the ZSU-23-4 Shilka.

This flattering assessment was not surprising. Radar was given new life in the '60s. Approaching a target at high altitude was a disaster for aircraft. And so the American pilots preferred to approach targets at low altitude, outside of radar coverage. This is when the crews of the deck-based attack aircraft were met with fire from Shilka crews in ambush.

The Shilka could operate with radar or a conventional, visual optical device. Radar is a good thing, of course. It provides for scanning, the detection and automatic tracking of targets, and determining their coordinates. However, the Americans began installing missiles on the aircraft which could locate and destroy radar facilities by their beam. A sighting device is a different matter, however. It can be concealed and detect a target, and fire can begin immediately.

After suffering losses, the Americans began bombing from high altitudes without entering the danger zone. In such cases, however, antiaircraft teams armed with Soviet S-75 antiaircraft missile systems would enter the battle.

The Vietnam experience was later used in wars in the Near East, in Afghanistan.... Let us return to reserve Lt-Col Dyakov.

"In 1982, when the Lebanese war was underway, I was on TDY in Syria. At that time Israel was engaged in a serious effort to strike forces located in the Bekaa Valley. I recall how, immediately after an attack, the Soviet specialists were brought the wreckage of some F-16s, the most modern aircraft of that time, shot down by the Shilka.

"I was glad to see the still-warm wreckage, so to speak, but I was not surprised. I knew that the Shilka could open fire without warning in any terrain. I myself had engaged in electronic duels with Soviet attack aircraft at a training center near Ashkhabad, where we were training specialists for one of the Arab countries. And the pilots never located us once in the desert terrain. They were nothing more than targets. Just open fire on them...."

It should be mentioned here that as early as 1973 Israeli intelligence had ferreted out the fact that Arabs had begun using the Shilka. They immediately planned an operation to capture a Soviet-made ZSU, and successfully carried it out. It was primarily NATO experts who studied the Shilka, however. They wanted to learn how it was more effective than the American XM163 20-mm Vulcan ZSU and whether its best design features could be incorporated in the finishing stage in the West-German 20-mm Gepard self-propelled dual system, which was just beginning to join the forces.

The reader will no doubt wonder why at the later date, at the beginning of the '80s, the Americans needed yet another Shilka. The experts rated the Shilka very highly, and when it became known that updated versions were being produced, the people abroad decided to acquire one more of the units..

Our self-propelled piece was indeed continuously modernized. One of the versions was even given a new name, the ZSU-23-4M Biryusa. It was not fundamentally altered, however, with the exception that in time a commander's instrument was added for convenience of laying and shifting the turret toward the target. The assemblies were improved and made more reliable by the year. The radar, for example.

And the Shilka's reputation grew in Afghanistan, of course. No commander there was indifferent to it. When a column moved along a road and was suddenly fired upon from ambush, how could they set up a defense. All the vehicles had been ranged upon. The only hope was the Shilka. A long round at the enemy's camp and a rain of fire against its positions.... People there called the self-propelled system the "devil-wagon." They could tell immediately when it went into action, and a withdrawal would begin at once. The Shilka saved the lives of thousands of Soviet soldiers.

In Afghanistan the Shilka also fully realized its capability for firing at ground targets in the mountains. In addition, a special "Afghan version" was designed. The radar instrumentation system was removed from the ZSU. This made it possible to increase the basic ammunition load from 2,000 to 4,000 rounds. A night sight was also installed.

Here is an interesting note. Columns accompanied by the Shilka were rarely attacked not just in the mountains but even near populated areas. The ZSU posed a danger to personnel sheltered in pise huts. The shell's "Sh" detonator was activated upon striking a wall. The Shilka was also effective against armored targets such as armored personnel carriers and other armored vehicles.

Every weapon has its own fate, its own life. Since the war many types of weapons have become obsolete. After 5-7 years a more modern generation would appear. Only the Shilka has been in the arsenal for more than 30 years now. It proved itself also in the Persian Gulf war, where the Americans employed various airborne weapons, including the B-52 bomber made famous in Vietnam. There were extremely confident assertions that they would blow the target to bits. Then the next, low-altitude run. The Shilka ZSU opened fire together with the Strela-3 system. An engine on one aircraft immediately caught fire and had to be separated. The Group of B-52s returned to base. Soon thereafter another aircraft was also shot up. Try as it might, the B-52 was unable to penetrate to the base.

Here is one more indicator. How many armies have the Shilka in their arsenals, respected reader? A total of 27. Furthermore, not just the USSR's allies in the Warsaw Pact have purchased it, but also India, Peru, Syria, Yugoslavia.... These are the reasons. The Shilka is not

inferior to similar foreign systems in its fire effectiveness and maneuverability. This includes the well-known American Vulcan system.

The Vulcan, which entered the arsenal in 1966, has a number of advantages but is inferior to our Shilka in a number of respects. The American ZSU can fire at targets traveling no more than 310 m/s, whereas the Shilka can be used, I repeat, against targets traveling at speeds of up to 450 m/s. In our conversation, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Dyakov said that he has operated a Vulcan in a training battle in Jordan and cannot say that the American weapon is better, even though it entered the arsenal later.

The Gepard ZSU (FRG) has a basic difference from the Shilka. The large-caliber gun (35-mm) can accommodate an explosive device and therefore has a greater destructive effect, destroying the target with fragments. The West German ZSU can destroy targets at altitudes up to 3 kilometers and flying at speeds of up to 350-400 m/s. It has a range of up to 4 kilometers. The Gepard has a slower rate of fire, however, 1,100 rounds per minute compared to 3,400 (the Vulcan fires up to 6,000 rounds per minute) and weighs more than twice as much, 45.6 tons. I would note that the Gepard was accepted into the arsenal 11 years later than the Shilka and is of a newer generation.

The French AMX-13 Turren anti-aircraft system and the Swedish BAAK40 Bafors are known in many nations. They are not superior to the ZSU built by Soviet scientists and workers, however.

Even today the Shilka is in the armament of ground units of many of the world's armies, including ours. It has been taken out of production, however, a more modern system is on the assembly line. This account is an expression of gratitude for a defense weapon which has served the nation and our soldiers well, and will serve them yet.

Interview with Deputy Commander of Air Defense Aviation

92UM0162A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Nov 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with Deputy Commander of Air Defense Forces for Aviation, Lieutenant General of Aviation Vladimir Ivanovich Andreyev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel A. Andryushkov, candidate in Cosmonautics from the USSR Union of Journalists: "We Need To Know the Threat by Sight: Our Correspondent Talks with the Chief of Aviation—Deputy Commander of the Air Defense Forces for Aviation"]

[Text] Vladimir Ivanovich Andreyev was born in 1942 in Vologda. He graduated from Armavir Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots. He has served in various positions and is an honored military pilot of the USSR. In 1987, he was designated commander of Air Defense Forces [PVO] for Aviation. On September 4, 1990, he was released into the reserve at the age of 48.

He was restored to his position on September 2, 1991.

[Andryushkov] Vladimir Ivanovich, while I was still a cadet at Armavir, I heard about you as about a competent fighter-pilot. I know that among military aviators you have the reputation of being a man who is dedicated to the aviation profession and of being an innovator. Permit me to congratulate you with the victory of justice. Please tell me, how did this imposed year-long break in your flying work occur?

[Andreyev] Thank you for the kind words. It is somewhat awkward to talk about myself but I became an inconvenient man on the staff of the former Commander-in-Chief of Air Defense Forces General of the Army Tretyak, although the thought never came to me that I could be "convenient" or "inconvenient" for anyone. I understood that I must honestly do the work that had been assigned to me and I understood that I must speak only the truth on the state of PVO Aviation. You are a pilot and you know: if you start to practice deceit in aviation, the consequences will be tragic. Therefore, I always reported the situation with maximum objectivity to the PVO Troops command authorities and personally to General of the Army Tretyak, based on the analysis of experienced troop aviation directorate experts and utilizing the experience of the Air Force, Naval Aviation, and foreign aviators.

But it turned out that the leadership did not need these reports. I saw that the opinion of the people of our directorate was not taken into account and that General of the Army Tretyak was making decisions contrary to our suggestions. He issued orders which caused aviators in the units to clutch at their heads.

[Andryushkov] Vladimir Ivanovich, what specifically in your reports did not suit the commander-in-chief?

[Andreyev] Maybe you should not pose the question like that: what specifically did not suit him? I think that Tretyak was far able to comprehend the problems of aviation and he compelled aviators to live and work according to his standards using the force of the power and ambitions given to him.

[Andryushkov] Is this not associated with the accident rates at PVO Aviation units?

[Andreyev] By the time of the military soviet session at which my fate was decided, we had two times fewer flying accidents than in the previous year. And at the end of 1989, the commander-in-chief personally wrote in my performance report that I was appropriate for the position. Things were improving in PVO Aviation and human logic demonstrated that there were no grounds to remove me from my position based on the accident rate. Therefore, there were other reasons. I already talked about one of them. The second reason. According to my position, I think that I was obligated to defend my subordinates from the unsubstantiated attacks and even insults to which the commander-in-chief subjected them. I could not obsequiously say yes to the commander-in-chief, I was not afraid of losing my position, but it would be too bad to lose the work. I gave an objective assessment to my subordinates. The commander-in-chief perceived this with pain. Unfortunately, he practiced using informers. In general, he needed another man.

I do not want to talk about him anymore. The main thing is that there will be fewer of these military leaders in the future.

[Andryushkov] Vladimir Ivanovich, how did the commander-in-chief's political workers conduct themselves in this situation?

[Andreyev] Here I can only talk about specific individuals. Many political workers conducted themselves fairly well but certain lackeys began executing the order: "Assemble a kompromat [not further identified] for Andreyev." (I recall how at that time a journalist-colleague approached me and said that the PVO Troops political directorate had "recommended" to him that he prepare an article for publication that compromised the general. I advised him to talk to aviators about Andreyev. The article did not appear in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Although, I must admit that the newspaper also did not come out in his defense.... A.A.).

Yes and not only political workers. It is alarming that there are generals who are capable of attending but not of serving. By way of illustration, Colonel-General of Aviation Tsarkov was tasked to make the appropriate report. And he did it.

That is how former PVO Troops Military Soviet Member Lieutenant-General Boyko and a number of other members of Tretyak's "retinue" acted.

The fact that the army primarily does not consist of such people inspires optimism. I am very grateful to the collective which supported me for a year. They turned out to be honorable people. It is precisely on these people that we must count on while conducting military reform.

Right now, the morality of leaders must be given priority, even ahead of service experience, when assigning them to positions.

[Andryushkov] In conversations with PVO Troops Aviation pilots, I often hear about the innovations which you are attempting to introduce into teaching methods. What is their essence?

[Andreyev] All of the innovations are the result of the collective work of the aviation directorate. Many suggestions have come from military units. The retraining that has been verified by the center's specialists in teaching methods has been recommended for use in the units. My role as leader is to insure that the principle is proven and introduced: It is impossible to teach people the old way in the SU-27 and MiG-31. A man must know how to use everything that the designers have put in the aircraft. It is not easy to teach that. But if you want to have a good and steady result—constantly teach people. And I will never understand military leaders who structure all work with cadres on dressings down for visually observed shortcomings: did not clean up, did not sweep....

Everyone has to become involved but the profession is nevertheless the main thing. Unfortunately, not everyone thinks that way for now.

[Andryushkov] But how can this be reconciled with demands to increase aviation's combat readiness and flight safety?

[Andreyev] First of all, I will express my opinion that for nearly 30 years people at all levels have primarily been involved in conversations about flight safety while solving flight safety problems. However, you cannot correct the matter with words or with threatening directive papers. This is a self-deception which is advantageous for many people. Once you say it,—that means you work, more precisely, you create the appearance of work. An aircraft demands from an aviator the specific knowledge that is required to operate the aircraft.

I will cite an example. I tasked the specialists in teaching methods to develop a list of questions which MiG-31 pilots must constantly know. And they prepared ... a 900-page book! It immediately became clear to me that our callousness toward aviators has already been set forth in this "work:" a normal person is not capable of mastering this amount of information. Yes and he does not need it! You need to give a pilot the minimal amount of knowledge permissible that permits him to reliably fly the aircraft. And then—let him improve himself. Here there is no limit.

They have redone the "work." We have stopped pursuing gross output in the exercises being conducted from

which it plowed a "fake" verst. If a pilot has mastered the minimal amount of knowledge, we will not torture him with any more theory. We will give him a clearance for three months and let him fly with God. And later we will check if the man has grown or settled down. As a rule, self-improvement occurs. A normal man has a natural craving for knowledge of something new. After the examination—some recommendations and once again—fly to your heart's content. We need to place an aviator's knowledge on real ground and not on paper. Therefore, I rescinded the commander's signature in the workbook on preparation of a subordinate for flight.

[Andryushkov] Was this really done more due to excessive caution for the procurator?....

[Andreyev] Well, of course! And we need to understand that trust in a pilot in his personal preparation increases his responsibility. The commander is responsible for his people even without the additional signature.

Now specifically on the problem of flight safety. The word "safety, in its foundation and in life, has the root "danger." So, in order not to end up in danger, you need to know it very well, as they say, by sight, and know how to act to not end up in danger and to know how to deal with it. The aviation directorate has developed variations of dangerous situations which a pilot may encounter on the ground or in the air for each type of aircraft, while considering its specific features. This helps us to quickly assess a dangerous situation and to avoid it or to move away from disaster.

Work on introducing this method of teaching pilots has not gone very smoothly. Rumors have circulated that PVO Aviation pilots are studying "some sort of dangers." Our opponents have not seen that we, while teaching knowledge of danger, are attaining the main thing: a pilot, I repeat, must know how to emerge as the victor from an encounter with a non-standard situation. We have conducted this work, beginning with flight school cadets up to the PVO Aviation directorate staff, inclusively. It is being conducted continuously. And our critics have become convinced that we have selected the correct path.

[Andryushkov] I think that this is what many people lack—performance of the assigned task in a highly professional manner.

[Andreyev] My deep conviction is: to be called professional, we the military first of all need to rid ourselves of formalism, bureaucratism, deception, and padding the figures in every way. Professionalism—is one of the most important conditions to improve our army. This concept is significantly deeper and broader than they ever imagined. Lack of professionalism—is a horribly destructive force.

We need to train and respect professionals. The position of the previous minister of defense, who could become enraptured with the mastery of foreign pilots when I do

not remember him once saying a kind word about our own pilots, was totally incomprehensible to me.

[Andryushkov] Tell me, does the number of flying hours that PVO pilots receive during a year promote the growth of their professionalism?

[Andreyev] You and I remember the repeated demands "from above" about increasing flying hours for each pilot. But once again all of this is a paper storm: there is no aviation fuel, there are not enough new aircraft, and the service life of engines is low. And pilots fly into the air just so they will not lose their skills.

We are searching for a solution through work in simulators and through a broad series of flight tasks.

Under these conditions, the role of commanders is increasing. Previously, it was thought that the commander only tests his subordinates who are required to carry out his orders. Not everyone accepted with delight my point of view that commanders first of all must serve for their subordinates and not they him. But today when our pilot-examiners arrive at a unit, they are already not acting in the role of examiners but in the role of instructors: teach everyone what you yourself know. If you need to, first of all you need to teach.

[Andryushkov] And how did the subordinates themselves perceive the new work style in the work of aviation commanders?

[Andreyev] When we began to introduce this principle in 1988, I was interested in finding out: and are we doing it? During the autumn of that same year, I sent a telegram to the troops that contained the following: "I request that you express your opinion on the work of PVO Aviation Directorate officers." Responses began to rapidly arrive. The authors described instances of certain officers' arrogance. But in the majority of the responses, we clearly saw: they had begun to work with people without formalism, training was closely reconciled with the life of the troops, and there began to be more goodwill in mutual relations.

[Andryushkov] And now let us talk about the social protection of aviators. In PVO Aviation, are there many people who do not have a roof over their heads?

[Andreyev] Very many. Including pilots. This problem will not be resolved in 2-3 years. It will not be easier. And we need to honestly talk to people about this. But even in this situation, it is important that each person be conscientiously involved with his work. This will help to restore discipline in the army, comradesly relations, and to strive so that everyone is satisfied with their work. All of this depends on commanders.

And one more thing: there must be specific responsibility for acts. Until now, alas, it still occurs that they remove a regimental commander from his position if a soldier has violated discipline. This is a wanton practice. And the desire of everyone to receive by means of a paper order: "check, punish, and report within some time

period" does not provide anything. My opinion is that it is impossible to organize the work of untrained people. Commanders must take responsibility for this.

[Andryushkov] Vladimir Ivanovich, I have had the opportunity to hear that the military profession, including aviators, is losing its prestige. What will this lead to and what does history teach us....

[Andreyev] When you entered flight school, what was the competition like?

[Andryushkov] In 1966, they only accepted people from aeroclubs at Armavir Higher Flying Aviation School. I had flown more than 40 hours at the Lugansk DOSAAF Aeroclub in a Yak sports aircraft. And the competition was seven people per position.

[Andreyev] Right now there is a maximum of 1.5 people competing for one position. The attractiveness of the pilot profession has declined. And of aviators as a whole. This problem is quite complicated but we nevertheless need to solve it. The main thing is to get to where people understand: their labor is needed and it is valued. This has already been written about many times. Therefore, I will only add that, say, an aircraft technician works 12-14 hours per day and the group of flight leadership—10 hours. By what standards has this been determined? But unemployed wives at aviation garrisons and children who receive fragmentary knowledge in various schools due to their fathers' transfers? Only, you know, I am an optimist. And I believe that a military man in our Homeland was and will be respected.

[Andryushkov] Vladimir Ivanovich, what did you do during the year that you could not fly?

[Andreyev] I do not consider that year as lost. First of all, I had the time to analyze my entire life. The conclusion: I did not want to live any other way. Second, I met many people. As Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's representative, I met workers and kolkhoz workers, the intelligentsia, and the military and I saw—people feel for the Homeland. This instills hope for changes for the better in our country.

[Andryushkov] And the last question: your opinion on the prospects for native aviation?

[Andreyev] Our aircraft and international air shows convince me that we are not lagging behind foreign aircraft. The world's best pilots are teaching our pilots their skills. And I once again stress: I am an optimist and I hope for the best but I prefer to strive for everything through work. It is time for us to stop believing in a miracle. Changes in the army will only come with persistent labor and great patience. I am certain that the army and our aviation will be different and modern.

Support for VTOL Yak-141 Linked to Gulf War

92UM0203A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by Colonel (Retired) P. Lisitskiy, doctor of technical sciences, under the rubric "Returning to What Has Been Printed": "Do We Need Such Aircraft?"]

[Text] The 17 August issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA this year carried a report titled "The Yak-141: The Aircraft, People, Problems," which discussed the fate of a new Soviet supersonic VTOL aircraft and difficulties involved in the program. The editors are still receiving letters from readers on the matter. We are presenting one of them for your attention.

The question which I used as the title of this article reflects the attitude of some individuals in the highest positions. And, unfortunately, it has to be said that the opinion of those who feel that we do not need aircraft like the Yak-141 is prevailing. This is confirmed by the fact that financing for the program for developing this aircraft, which has received most favorable comments from foreign aviation specialists, was halted.

Certain facts must be taken into account for assessing the potential of the Yak-141, however, and of VTOL aircraft in general. In the first place, in the absence of aircraft carriers these airborne systems enlarge the scope of employment of deck-based aircraft through the use of non-aircraft-carrying ships. In the second place this type of aircraft is highly effective when based on land.

A comparison of the effectiveness of groups of VTOL aircraft and conventional aircraft of identical cost and performance shows that the combat effectiveness of the former is several times greater.

The fact is that at the present time the airfield, its runways, the taxiways and other components are the most vulnerable part of a combat air complex. Damage to them drastically reduces the effectiveness of the aircraft with conventional takeoff and landing even when the aircraft are in shelters. It takes a considerable amount of time to repair and restore damaged airfield components, after all, during which the aircraft are idled. These conclusions were fully confirmed by the experience with the employment of aircraft of the combined armed forces in the Persian Gulf area.

If our aircraft are not to find themselves in a situation similar to that of the Iraqi air force, there can only be one answer to the question posed in the title: VTOL aircraft are essential. And the more intensely we develop our

achievements in this area, the more effective will our defense allocations be utilized.

I also want to say that the problems of our aviation are not simply a matter of reduced financing for the program for developing the Yak-141 VTOL aircraft. They are more extensive, profound and urgent than that. They are truly blatant problems. They can briefly be described this way. There is nothing to fly on, nothing with which to fuel the aircraft, nothing to fly in and nothing with which to feed the flyers. In addition, one hears certain of our activists asking in the press, on radio and television why we need aviation and space exploration at all. We could save money on them and begin to live well, they say. They appeal to the celebrated common sense.

Events in the Persian Gulf area, however, demonstrated the greatest degree of effectiveness—combat and economic—for aviation and space endeavor. This was expressed in concentrated form in the minimal losses suffered by the personnel. This should give pause for thought to those who reproach the older generation for the large losses incurred in the Great Patriotic War while simultaneously calling for "economizing" on that which forms the basis for saving the lives of people in a war.

A high level of effectiveness can only be achieved for the aviation when its arsenal contains high-precision airborne combat systems based on the latest achievements of aviation science and technology. With the employment of conventional weapons these systems compare in effectiveness with nuclear weapons. At the same time they are ecologically safe and can be used in a targeted manner exclusively against military facilities.

In addition, combat operations in the Persian Gulf demonstrated the poor effectiveness of ground-to-ground missiles. In view of this, U.S. President Bush's proposals for reducing short-range nuclear missiles (tactical missiles with nuclear warheads, and others) is not surprising. Modern and more promising airborne combat systems employing conventional weapons are preferable. Furthermore, they can also employ nuclear weapons—but with greater flexibility. Obviously, the theory that it is technology which forms the basis of tactics, strategy and military doctrines remains unshakable.

I would like to note in conclusion that it has become fashionable of late to discuss problems pertaining to social protection for servicemen. We should not forget, however, that the main protection for servicemen is their provision with the most advanced equipment and the most modern weapons. There should be no economizing in this area, and we should not mislead the people by pontificating about possibilities for "economizing" here.

Delays Selling, Scrapping Decommissioned Ships Criticized

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[Article by Lieutenant P. Umanets of the Pacific Fleet: "Troubles With Salvage—Or, Why Decommissioned Ships Wait Years for Cutting Up Into Scrap"]

[Text] *They huddle miserably along the shores of the bay, once standing tall and warlike, but today written-off and already fairly rusted ships. There are about thirty of them. Submarines, large ASW ships, patrol ships, cruisers... There are vessels from the auxiliary fleet here as well. How many years have they been rusting in the harbor at Sovetskaya Gavan, awaiting their fate? While each of them, after all, is hard currency, gold, in the literal sense of the word. Why are they wasting away here for nothing, in the face of our poverty?*

The condition of the decommissioned vessels is depressing. Some of them are leaking. The subunit of the search-and-rescue service [PSS] in which Lieutenant Captain Yu. Dmitriyenko serves dispatches two fireboats daily to pump out the water and keep them from going to the bottom. And that means that motors are used up, fuels are burned, funds are spent and sailors of the subunit are taken away from the fulfillment of their basic tasks. They should, after all, be ready at any moment to render assistance to those stricken by disasters and to ships and vessels with emergencies at sea...

But who should be providing for the viability of these ships? They have been here like this for years, after all... According to a directive of the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, responsibility for ensuring the viability and watertight integrity of the ships and other vessels is borne by the commanders of the units and subunits to which they used to belong. It is namely those subunits that should convert them, seal them and prepare them for long-term storage afloat without a crew.

That is as it should be. But unfortunately, it is not being done at all or is being done in wretchedly bad fashion. How else to explain the fact that the boilers have not only not been cleaned on many of the ships, but the fuel has not even been drained? Their "native" subunits moreover also strip off all of the fittings, doors, hatches and everything they can get hold of. Why? This is why.

Every year the higher command hands down a plan for scrap metal that simply cannot be managed. Four thousand tons (according to the plan for the current year) are distributed proportionately among all of the subunits in the command. And if you cannot manage the plan... That is when the sailors begin "extracting" the necessary quantity of scrap by hook or by crook. They gather it bit by bit, sometimes knowingly doing what they shouldn't.

This was related with passion by the chief of the engineering department of the command, Captain 1st Rank G. Sizonenko: "The sailors themselves take everything

that aids solid watertight integrity off the decommissioned ships. And after a while the subunit of the PSS is expending all of its efforts to keep those ships from sinking..."

The fire boats are pumping water out of five ships today. And with difficulty, as was noted by the deputy commander of the subunit for rescue operations, Lieutenant Captain Yu. Dmitriyenko. And what if the rest start leaking?

But all that is just the tip of the iceberg. Grigoriy Naumovich Sizonenko also told me about a second and less visible part of it. It turns out that the active ships are suffering from all of this to no small extent as well. The PSS subunit is not able to ensure fully the safety of the decommissioned ships. It cannot handle many types of work for that purpose—the installation of caissons and underwater welding, for instance. They do not have the appropriate specialists or the proper technical equipment. But the ships have to be kept afloat.

All of these and other types of work were therefore being performed by the engineering department with the aid of ship-repair enterprises and manpower from the subunits of officer A. Sukhanov, who is, by the way, only at 60 percent personnel strength. And they, after all, should be occupied with drydock work on naval ships and auxiliary vessels and the fulfillment of separate orders for ship repairs, and not patching up decommissioned ships. The funds for the conversion of the decommissioned ships are moreover being taken from combat vessels that need them no less. And that is no small amount. The engineering department of the command has been forced to allocate 414,000 rubles just for the five ships they are working on today. And that is repeated year after year. Can you blame the engineering department? It's not their fault...

The best way out of this situation, many in the fleet feel, is to take the decommissioned ships away and cut them up for scrap, which is what they are essentially intended for anyway. But here is the bad luck—there is no enterprise in the entire fleet for cutting them up. It does not seem possible to cut them up using their own manpower, in primitive fashion. Could they sell them abroad? Not a bad solution; they would get some hard currency, and save some money for the fleet. The money going today for the senseless storage of salvage...

But there is one almost insurmountable obstacle. They say the country needs scrap metal as well as hard currency. So an order exists banning large sales of metal (including scrap metal) abroad.

The ships, meanwhile, could be cut up at Komsomolsk-na-Amure. Such a major enterprise as Amurstal could handle it. And it would not be very hard, Captain 1st Rank G. Sizonenko assured me, to tow the decommissioned ships there. But that solution is outside the authority of the command.

Where is the way out? And what could we do today, proceeding from our actual capabilities, so as not to waste hundreds of thousands of rubles to maintain the viability of decommissioned ships? Perhaps just one thing—convert them thoroughly, not permitting them to be barbarically plundered. Although... The plan for the procurement of scrap metal handed down “from above” is merciless. Perhaps the fleet could acquire its own yard for cutting up the ships? A great many specialists are inclined toward that. Even just one for the fleet. Let it even be built using hard currency proceeds from the sale of one or two ships sold abroad.

Such a proposal, by the way, has already come in from a foreign firm. It proposes building a ship-scraping yard and storage facilities in exchange for our metal. Foreign businessmen feel that it is a profitable matter. Can it really be that our own officials cannot understand that?

Benefits Seen for Navy Working with Commodity Exchange

*92UM0161A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Gladkevich: “Not Listed in Commodity Exchange Quotes... Why the Navy Is not Resorting to Cooperation with ‘Konversiya’ Commodity Exchange”]

[Text] Today the Navy is one of the largest holders of so-called non-disposable items, property that has been stored in the warehouses of our Armed Forces. It has everything—from canvas that is currently a shortage item to steam generators for submarine nuclear reactors for which there is hardly any demand. The storage of this property and its maintenance under conditions of the fleets’ reduced demand for them is becoming a direct loss for the Navy. However, the navy is not hurrying to part with its stocks....

“Konversiya” Commodity Exchange could help to sell this property under conditions that are profitable for the navy. In a conversation with our correspondent, “Konversiya” Commodity Exchange Joint-Stock Company Vice President and Candidate of Technical Sciences Vadim Nikolayevich Ivanov stated that the exchange is carrying out a protectionist policy with regard to the defense sectors of industry and the Armed Forces while offering them the opportunity to acquire stock and brokerage sears not at market prices, but for a nominal fee. Nevertheless, the navy is so far not participating....

“Konversiya” Commodity Exchange could become a reliable partner for the navy in the sphere of organizing production in the interests of the Navy and in search for investors for navy programs....

Vadim Nikolayevich Ivanov thinks that “with the lack of adequate amounts of budget financing of Ministry of Defense structures, you cannot call their prospects of supporting daily activities rosy. I think that under these

conditions, they, including the Navy, need to be concerned about creating a unique self-financing mechanism. In other words, we need to become actively involved in market structures while using existing outposts to do this—specifically ‘Konversiya’ Commodity Exchange. As we all know, it is ready to protect....”

Well, you can hardly dispute the fact that the exchange could very well become an element of the navy’s unique self-financing mechanism during its transition to new living conditions. The arguments “for”: it will help the navy to rationally, with maximum effectiveness, sell the non-disposable items that it has at its disposal, having established the true price for each element of property, equipment, and so on. Second, since “Konversiya” Exchange—is also an attempt to maintain close ties between defense complex enterprises and scientific institutions who work on defense under market conditions, cooperation with it will permit the navy to seek investors for naval programs on a commercial basis and to form new production-technological links in its own interests. But today, under conditions of free price formation, the possibility of maintaining a common economic space with enterprises and institutions where the defense sector’s intellectual and production capacity are concentrated is really worthwhile.

So, why has the Navy so far not manifested any interest in “Konversiya” Exchange where today many of the representatives of the former military-industrial complex who had lost each other meet?

“It is much more advantageous for us to complete barter deals,” thinks Captain 1st Rank N. Yakushov, chief of the Navy’s Main Operations and Repair Directorate Logistics Service. “We are not really interested in the money that we could earn from the sale of property through the exchange or through some other means because, as before, it almost totally goes in the “grain bin of the Homeland” and the navy does not see it. As for the assets for the purchase of a brokerage seat at the exchange—and how else can you conduct your activities at it?—that expenditure item has not been provided for in the navy’s budget....”

“Today we are just as far from exchange activity as we were many years ago,” Captain 1st Rank F. Koyfman says in support of his Pacific Fleet technical directorate section chief. “The Navy is not the owner of the property that has accumulated at its depots. In accordance with guiding documents, it is regarded as part of the state property fund. But, excuse me, this is a myth. I think that the Navy has spent just as much assets from its own budget and the labor of seamen for these purposes during its use and also storage that it has totally settled accounts with the state. That property that we receive for the maintenance of ships must be the property of the Navy. At that time, we will also go out onto the market as the owner....

“Radical changes of guiding documents, especially financial guiding documents, are also needed. What

interest is there for collectives of units, bases, and depots to sell property at prices that are profitable for the Navy if no one at these collectives has the slightest vested interest in these deals? Or: today how can you attempt to purchase something for the needs of the navy if the seller's price is the market price and we can purchase things only at fixed prices? Or: why can a unit, having sold non-disposable property, not receive payment in kind—bring into the unit at the customer's expense, say, a storage area for equipment—instead of money that is frequently useless today?

"It turns out to be some sort of closed circle: access to the market for the navy—is a vital need and all sorts of obsolete regulations continue to be in force and interfere with us taking the needed step toward accommodating the market. It is obvious that this is precisely why, despite the authorizing circulars that we already have, the creation of commercial structures that are capable of becoming full-fledged navy missions on the market is moving extremely slowly in the Navy."

Captain 2nd Rank S. Ulayev, Navy Rear Services military-technical property sales group commander, thinks that "these structures could be an alternative commercial network to exchanges and permit the navy to reach the consumer without intermediaries. Although, naturally, it has not been excluded that some or other fleet or unit that has earned resources using its own commercial structures, could use them to purchase brokerage seats on exchanges or for payment of brokerage office services. But it seems preferable to me to have independent market structures...."

It is understandable why Sergey Aleksandrovich prefers those structures. As we all know, "Nevikon" Joint-Stock Company, which has successfully begun its commercial activity, has already been founded in the navy, more accurately, with the participation of the navy. Having received a unique carte blanche from the Navy and Ministry of Defense leadership, "Nevikon" sells navy non-disposable assets to consumers and carries out activity on the Russian Commodity-Raw Material Exchange. A portion of the assets it earns goes into the navy's account as one of its founders and goes into investments in navy programs and the creation of a pension fund for seamen. And nevertheless this hardly removes from the agenda the search for other ways for the navy to access the market, including through "Kon-versiya" Exchange.

All the more so that it turns out that "Nevikon's" activities do not cause enthusiasm among everyone. So, according to Captain 1st Rank N. Yakushov, it is impossible to have an approving attitude toward the fact that "Nevikon" is attempting to monopolize the sale of navy property. In the case with it, thinks Nikolay Alekseyevich, the union of commercial and the Navy's command-administrative structures has occurred which could result and is already resulting not simply in protectionism but to direct pressure on the fleets in "Nevikon's" interests.

I would not like to lapse into existing contradictions. This may put the primary task that I have assigned myself in this article in the background. And it consists of disseminating the idea to the Ministry of Defense leadership which was expressed by practically everyone with whom I had the chance to talk with on this topic. The navy, during the period of its entry into the market, must receive definite economic freedom and the opportunity to utilize all legal paths for access to the market and to carry out commercial activity under market conditions.

The concept of Armed Forces entry into the market economy, as we all know, is already being prepared. Its essence, in the words of USSR Armed Forces Rear Services Chief General of the Army V. Arkhipov, is a gradual transition to primarily economic methods of supplying the army and navy. The end goal of the transformations is reduced to the formation of a new system of supplying the troops that has been adapted to the market economy. But nevertheless is this founding work not moving too slowly and it is not once again lagging behind the real situation in the country and the real needs of the troops?

Moreover, will it not turn out that the Ministry of Defense in the best traditions of past years will once again count on rigid centralization? So, they plan to create in the USSR Ministry of Defense a powerful commercial center for the transfer, sale, and utilization of military-technical property that has been freed up as a result of army and navy reductions and this center will manage these processes. That is, the capabilities of local military directorate organs can be once again restricted to some degree or other.

Yes, both the Armed Forces as a whole and the Navy in particular certainly need a single, well thought-out, economic policy. However, in the opinions of many unit commanders and rear services institution chiefs, the economic initiative must nevertheless be delegated to local units and central organs must assume the function of coordinator and manage this process using economic methods so that the interests of the Armed Forces are not infringed upon.

And in this regard, there is hardly any sense in waiting until the entire packet of reforms for the army and navy to enter the market has been worked out. As a first and urgent step, we must conduct liberalization of the guiding documents which would permit military collectives already tomorrow to become involved as equal partners in the activities of exchanges and other market economy structures. And as we know, maybe the appearance of army and navy commodities in exchange quotations will permit the majority of military collectives to enter the new living situation with fewer losses and to resolve extremely important social tasks right now at the time of greatest tension.

Navy Aides on Mediterranean Squadron Future

PM0912163991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Dec 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Rear Admiral I. Semenov, deputy chief of a Navy Main Staff directorate, and Captain First Rank N. Cherey, chief of a Navy Main Staff sector, by Captain Third Rank V. Maryukha; date and place not given: "Soviet Ships To Leave Mediterranean? As Usual, Rumors Proved Slightly Exaggerated"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] For a long time now the mass media have been discussing questions of the possible transfer of Navy ships from bases on the territory of the proclaimed sovereign republics to Russian ports. It is now the turn of the Navy's operational elements [operativnyye formirovaniya]—our Black Sea Fleet correspondent reported the alleged preparations to axe the Mediterranean squadron (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 December this year). The editorial office asked the Navy Main Staff for clarifications, and our correspondent talked to Rear Admiral I. Semenov, deputy chief of a directorate, and Captain First Rank N. Cherey, chief of a sector.

[Maryukha] Ivan Aleksandrovich, what is the nature of the task group [operativnoye soyedineniye] in the Mediterranean today and can it be said that it will be abolished shortly?

[Semenov] Our ships have been on combat service in the Mediterranean for more than 20 years. This was brought about by the presence of the U.S. 6th Fleet battle group [udarnaya gruppirovka] there. At various times the squadron numbered dozens of warships, whose number fluctuated depending on the tasks they were performing. The composition of this squadron was never permanent and, especially of late, the number of ships under its command has constantly dropped. This was due both to the "thaw" in international relations and to some extent to our economic difficulties. But this does not at all mean that the cutbacks in the fleet and our economic difficulties, even in view of the shortage of foreign currency to pay the crews, will inevitably entail the elimination of the Mediterranean squadron today.

[Cherey] Some of the squadron's ships are actually not in the Mediterranean but in the Black Sea. But it must be realized that it is only a matter of a day's transfer to the destination points and ships and crews need rest, technical servicing.... And this is just part of the squadron. It has under its command ships commuting between fleets [sovershayushchiye mezhflotskiye perekhody], along with hydrographic and auxiliary ships that have spent a long time in the Mediterranean. So, no one has abolished the squadron.

[Maryukha] So, are there possibly some plans enabling us to say that the Mediterranean squadron will be cut back and then eliminated?

[Cherey] The political situation in the region is making it possible to reduce the numerical strength of the squadron's ships. This will also occur due to cutbacks in the Navy as a whole. But the question of eliminating the squadron is not as yet on the agenda.

[Semenov] Moreover, I would not like to even guess about the future since making forecasts in our time of unpredictable decisions is a thankless task. The absence of political solutions to many issues considerably complicates our service, but this does not mean that we are not trying to settle these issues at our level. For example, the decisions adopted by the authorities that have emerged on the former territory of the Union of Sovereign States, in particular Georgia, naturally affect the effectiveness of the fleet's forces. In our plans we are trying to take the prevailing situation into consideration so as to prevent unplanned, unauthorized actions on both sides. We are trying to resolve all the questions and conflict situations that arise through negotiations. Thus, for example, representatives of Georgian armed formations detained and disarmed an officer in the Zugdidi area, who had been detailed to escort a pay shipment to servicemen. With the assistance of the Poti Prefect's Office, the brigade command succeeded in settling the conflict, but what guarantee is there that something of the sort will not happen again?

[Maryukha] Ivan Aleksandrovich, are we to understand that, by making contact with the new military officials in the sovereign republics, the Navy has recognized Georgia's right to have its own navy?

[Semenov] It is up to politicians whether or not to grant recognition. We are military men and must perform the tasks that we have been set. There have been no claims to Union fleet property from the commander of the Georgian naval forces; according to our information, he himself wants to resolve all problems via talks and condemns any unauthorized attempts to "share out" property.

[Maryukha] Do these contacts presuppose discussion of questions of redeploying ships from Poti?

[Semenov] The fleet has not been confronted with the task of moving the base point from Poti and, naturally, this has not been discussed with anyone. The planned operation to remove ammunition whose storage date had expired—we have no facilities for utilizing it on site—may have been the reason for the rumors about redeployment. No one has given any orders for other property to be removed or for servicemen's families to be evacuated, as happened during the well-known events in Baku. Until a political decision is made, Poti will remain the fleet's base.

USSR Military Reform, RSFSR Defense Viewed
92UM0171A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Professor Ivan Vyrodov under the rubric "The Military Reform": "The Guards Syndrome"]

[Text] The military reform in the USSR has fallen hopelessly behind other areas of reform and is hampering the restructuring. It has in fact not even been started in Russia. The main problems lies in the "Guards bane."

The current military reform began in a very strange way. In the first place, the nation's military-political leaderships did not work out a precisely defined concept. But then, how could there be one, when the legal principles conforming to the new Union statehood have not yet been adopted?

The USSR Ministry of Defense is presently considering three versions.

It is therefore not surprising that the measures being implemented are becoming somewhat spontaneous—even chaotic, I would say. They are all very poorly coordinated with one another. A committee is only now being formed, but the Union has already become entirely different. Its economic structure is changing. It is not clear who will finance the armed forces, or how, and who will replenish their ranks even in the immediate future. What kind of military organization should there be for a reformed Union of Sovereign States which have decided to form their own, national armies? What kind of military industry do we need?

Among the republics Russia particularly lags behind in the formation of its military system, even though its president has already served as the commander in chief during the quelling of the putsch. All the members of the reformed Union have already defined themselves somewhat by their choice of this or that military organization within the framework of the USSR. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova have announced their intention to privatize the weapons, military equipment and supplies of Soviet troops stationed on their territories for deploying their own, national armies. The Baltic Military District is being redeployed. The Ukrainian government has prepared a law on the establishment of its own armed forces. Their structure and strategic leadership system have been announced.

I am certain that Russia has an equal if not an even greater need for this. It is on Russia's territory where the main grouping of Soviet armed forces is located (as many as three million men). The central strategic nuclear missile forces are concentrated there. The economy is up to 70% militarized.

It seems to me that all of the other members of the Union should participate along with the center in the reform of the armed forces. The center has an obligation to provide them with direct, coordinated assistance in the development of their military organizations.

After proclaiming their sovereignty, the republics were no longer merely passive observers in the area of military organizational development but its main "contracting agents," since all the materiel and facilities actually came under their jurisdiction. There was a question of how to dispose of a military capability built up by the people over the centuries. On what legal basis? What military structures should the Union and republic military organizations have?

These are complex, urgent and supremely important issues. They are being resolved in an extremely strange manner, however. The starting points involve not the main issues but secondary matters.

A fuss has been made about Guards and Cossacks.

The sooner the Russian leadership rids itself of this, the more successfully the military reform and the restructuring in general will Proceed.

With respect to guarding the Russian administrative structures, it would be more logical (and more patriotic) to draw upon one or two of the existing Guards formations. Why create something which already exists?

Foreign political conditions permit the reformed Union significantly to reduce its nuclear capability, to effect a basic reorganization and a reduction of the armed forces, to carry out the military reform rapidly and drastically cut military outlays.

I believe that the army's main functions should be the following: armed protection of the interests of the Union and its members, participation in decisions of the UN Security Council to conduct combat operations as part of a coalition forces outside the nation to maintain international security, and participation in the system of collective European security—and this should be done in close cooperation with NATO.

The Union's military doctrine needs major clarification based on this. It can only be based on a coalition, on observance of the reformed Union's national interests and the maintenance of peace on our planet (under the aegis of the UN).

Preliminary calculations have shown that, after reorganization, the numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR should not exceed 1 million men. They should be maintained on a shared basis by members of the Union. They should be managed on a coalition basis. The President of the USSR should be the supreme commander in chief.

The center's unified armed forces should comprise the main component of the Union military organization and form the first level of the common armed forces. They should include strategic restraint (nuclear missile) forces, air defense and antimissile defense forces, strategic air and naval forces (mainly airborne troops and naval infantry). They should be manned on a contractual basis. It would be expedient to leave their operational control in the hands of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The second level of the unified armed forces would consist of national-territorial formations of members of the reformed Union. They are already being formed with various names (mainly "national" armies) in the republics. The thing that surprises one is that the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Commission on Military Reform continue to take positions of unitarianism, do not acknowledge the developing realities and try to ignore the sovereignty of the republics. This is hampering the reform. I feel that it is incorrect to refer to the Union armed forces as "unified." They are actually becoming joint forces.

It is the prerogative of each sovereign republic to be or not to be the recipient of the spiritual strength of the former USSR, that is, the legacy of the authoritarian Bolshevik regime. They are all the legal heirs to their portion of the material assets of the former Union within their own borders, however.

The peoples of the RSFSR will not accept the unitarianism or the legacy of Bolshevism. They want to be the true masters on their land, to have truly popular institutions of power. I therefore find very strange a recent statement by the Russian state secretary that "Russia is the only republic which could and should be the legal successor to the Union with all of its structures." Is this perhaps not why Russia has still not set about reforming its military organization?

The August putsch demonstrated that without a military organization of its own, the state sovereignty of the RSFSR is not protected. Furthermore, Russia's weak economic situation is making it impossible to put off resolving this problem any longer. I believe that the Russian parliament must urgently ratify the legal basis for the reform and commit the government immediately to begin working out and implementing a program of federal military organizational development.

At the contemporary stage, in my opinion, the Russian military organization should include a military administration, a mobilization system (military commissariats), civil defense subunits, a Cossack system, DOSAAF, national-territorial formations consisting of ground troops and other forces stationed within the RSFSR. The total numerical strength of the Russian formations should not exceed 250,000-300,000 men.

The district system will undergo major reorganization. One simply cannot agree with the "republic-military district" concept advanced by the General Staff. This is absolutely unacceptable for Russia. Behind this concept lies a new attempt by the center to establish a governorship-general over the nation called the RSFSR.

Author's postscript: The situation in the nation has continued to develop rapidly while this article was being readied for publication. It is unthinkable to delay the military reform. Continued desecration of our armed forces is intolerable. Degraded troops are arriving in Russia from other territories. The financing of Union defense structures is in effect being halted due to lack of funds.

The direct disintegration of the Union military organization is about to begin. It can only be prevented with immediate, joint action by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the republics. The latter should bear the main concern for the army. This is not yet being done, however. The ambitions of Union agencies and the insolvency of the center are the main reason. I believe that the Russian leadership also bears some responsibility. But is this really the time to discuss what kind of uniform to design for the Guardsmen? And the attempt to set higher pay rates for the Guardsmen than for personnel of the current army is a step toward confrontation, if not something worse.

Claim of Wasteful Tank Production, Storage Clarified

92UM0147A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Nov 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain S. Nazarov, staffer at the SibMO [Siberian Military District] press center: "What They Write Us... From Siberia"]

[Text] ARGUMENTY I FAKTY recently published a note under the heading "Siberian Tank Battle?" (No. 42 for October 1991). The "shot" fired by the popular weekly in this case missed the "bulls-eye," first and foremost because the author based the feature more on supposition than on actual facts.

The discussion in the note concerned the thousands of "ownerless" tanks that are concentrated in the woods near Omsk and "stand fully armed almost without guard." The author further makes the unsettling forecast that the quantity of vehicles "could soon increase considerably, since their successful production continues at a plant not far away, in Omsk..." The "secret desire" of the chairman of the Omsk Oblast Ispolkom to find buyers for the combat vehicles and earn a few billion dollars for the oblast is advanced for the readers' judgment in conclusion.

This feature took up just 40 newspaper lines, but it seems to have made quite a bit of a stir. The armed forces and the defense industry have been offered up as a source of danger once again to a reader unversed in military matters.

We turn to the officials responsible for elaboration in order to dispel the readers' alarm. Here are the comments of an officer from the Arms Directorate of the Siberian Military District, Col I. Malakhov: "Only two of the facts listed by the author correspond to reality. These are that a tank base is located near Omsk, and that one of the plants in the oblast center is set up to produce them. The number of vehicles concentrated here has been overstated by many times. The accusation that the tanks are standing there fully armed and unguarded is completely unfounded.

"The vehicles, according to the established rules at the base, are stored without batteries, weapons or, of course, ammunition. Their unsanctioned use is thus ruled out. Even if an attempt were made on, say, a gun barrel, however, it could not be carried out successfully.

"The parking grounds are guarded by two rows of barbed wire, and a ditch 1.5-2 meters wide has been dug for greater security from the outside. A sentry system has been set up and is operated around the clock by soldiers from a special subunit. The manning of this base was completed in 1990. It is difficult to say whether the quantity of tanks being stored near Omsk will be increased in the future. That does not depend on the command of the district, and neither does the resolution of the issue of selling the combat vehicles. The sanction of the government is needed for that. One thing is known with certainty—the output of the local plant, engaged in the production of armored vehicles of the latest generation and needed by the troops, does not come here.

"As for the output of the Omsk plant, the pace of conversion is gaining at that enterprise. The program for the output of tanks has been cut back considerably."

Creation of Cooperatives For Veterans Proposed

92UM0177A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Nov 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Major General O.D. Gotsiridze, retired, chairman of the Board of the Interrepublican Veteran Cooperatives Association, by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Rubtsov: "Social Panorama: What Can be Done? Set Up Cooperatives"]

[Text] What can be done? Set up cooperatives—that's the opinion of Major General O.D. Gotsiridze, retired, member of the All-Union War and Labor Veterans Council and chairman of the Board of the Interrepublican Veteran Cooperatives Association.

[Gotsiridze] Indeed, what else is there to do? According to our calculations, given the ailing economy and unbalanced budget and despite the adopted pension law, the state will not be able in the coming years to provide veterans with even the minimum essential standard of living. And yet we war, labor, and Armed Forces veterans now number more than 50 million. In the near future, almost 12 million people who have reached pension age but continue to work or are being discharged from the Armed Forces in connection with the personnel reductions could find themselves jobless.

Who will look out for them? The labor exchanges, those accompaniments of the market economy, will most likely be preoccupied with finding jobs for people who do not have pensions. So we have to look out for ourselves. The establishment of veterans cooperatives, associations of cooperatives, and small and joint enterprises is one way to do this.

[Rubtsov] Otar Davidovich, it's hard to get used to the thought "help yourselves" when it's addressed to people over 60. Your obedient servant tried to make the same point in the pages of this newspaper and was promptly rebuffed by war veteran and invalid second class N. Mikhaylov of St. Petersburg, who said that asking pensioners to engage in productive labor is blasphemy. Moreover, our reader added, given our unemployment, veterans who served on the front lines "aren't needed by either state or cooperative enterprises."

[Gotsiridze] That's a misconception rooted in the fact that some people are poorly informed. There are, of course, a quite a few sick and ailing people among our fellow veterans. But more than 70 percent of them are still able to work, and half of them don't even require easier working conditions.

[Rubtsov] In other words, there's still powder in the powder flasks.

[Gotsiridze] Without a doubt. Furthermore, do enterprises need veterans? Maybe not "other people's" enterprises. But that's just the point: At the initiative of the All-Union Veterans Union, we have set up "our own"

cooperatives, associations, and small and joint enterprises. They produce consumer goods and provide various services to the public. There are now more than 1,000 such cooperatives, employing over 18,000 veterans, including 4,500 former servicemen and people who fought in the Patriotic War. This allows these people to obtain a sizable supplement to their meager pensions.

And I'd like to call readers' attention to something else. Part of the money earned by the cooperative employees is used to provide assistance to their comrades who can't work.

We have drawn up model statutes for veterans' cooperatives and production enterprises and all the basic documentation pertaining to their organizational principles. In this connection, I would like to give the address of our interrepublican association of veterans' enterprises: "Veteran," 129090, Moscow, Shchepkin Street, 8.

[Rubtsov] I hope we have persuaded comrade N. Mikhaylov and our other readers that veterans' cooperatives and enterprises are a needed and real thing. But can they compete with ordinary cooperatives that employ healthy workers and young people?

[Gotsiridze] In view of the humanitarian aims of veterans cooperatives, the state has given them a number of privileges and benefits. If at least 70 percent of a cooperative's employees (in Uzbekistan, at least 50 percent) are pensioners, the cooperatives are completely exempt from profit taxes. And if they use local materials and production wastes, they are also exempt from the turnover tax. The premiums they pay for state social insurance are not subject to increases (and in Russia they don't have to pay such premiums altogether).

So they could compete, were it not for artificial obstacles being put up by certain departments and bureaucrats.

[Rubtsov] Can you give some examples, Otar Davidovich?

[Gotsiridze] For instance, some rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies in the RSFSR and Ukraine are demanding 5,000 to 8,000 rubles to register a veterans cooperative and charging 1,400 rubles to install a telephone, if the cooperative is lucky enough to get one.

Especially adept at this are financial agencies and their tax inspectors, and even officials of pension and insurance funds. They are issuing directives to the effect that cooperatives that have hardly begun operating and whose average pay still fluctuates, as a rule, around 200 rubles per person, use wage funds, which they don't yet have, to pay their veterans compensation in the amount of 60 rubles, and that they even pay them pensions. But to do that the cooperatives would have to earn an average of at least 600 to 700 rubles per month for every cooperative employee.

A.G. Solovyev, acting director of the USSR Pension Fund, is demanding the payment of insurance premiums in the amount of 26 percent of wage funds, despite the

fact that this is at variance with adopted laws and resolutions. The USSR Ministry of Finance Tax Inspectorate has ordered its local agencies, when calculating the percentage of pensioners working at veterans' cooperatives (a mandatory condition for receiving benefits, I remind you, is that 70 percent of the cooperatives' employees be pensioners), they are not to include in that figure servicemen who are receiving pensions based on years of service until they reach the age of 60. These bureaucrats are no doubt unaware of the fact that no pension age has been set for servicemen, and that pensions are set on the basis of years of service.

[Rubtsov] Does the USSR Ministry of Defense support your activities?

[Gotsiridze] It can be said bluntly that neither the Defense Ministry, nor military unit commanders, nor military commissariats have done virtually anything to provide assistance to Armed Forces veterans in setting up cooperatives and production enterprises.

For example, the Defense Ministry Main Motor Vehicle Directorate "provided assistance" to cooperatives in Kyrgyzstan by turning over to them, after the completion of harvesting work, five 1982-model Ural-375 trucks and, in the process, presenting them with a bill for 53,000 rubles for each one. Meanwhile, a new truck costs 25,000 to 30,000 rubles. And this is not an isolated incident.

We are sometimes seen as a burden—wrongly, I assure you. If they were to receive equipment, materials, and vehicles from units and institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, cooperatives of former servicemen and their small enterprises could organize, for example, the construction of housing for servicemen. The benefit would be mutual.

Here's just one example. The Interrepublican Veteran Cooperatives Association and a Chinese company known as International Enterprises Cooperation have now signed a protocol of intent to set up a joint enterprise. One of its activities will be to produce materials and structural elements for housing construction. Our

partners already have the needed equipment, construction materials, and plumbing and sanitation supplies to build up to 20,000 to 30,000 small detached houses for servicemen in 1992-1993. The Ministry of Defense could provide great assistance to the development of our cooperatives and to efforts to provide employment for a sizable number of former servicemen by resolving the question of awarding us a contract to build military compounds with complete infrastructures, to be financed with the funds provided by the FRG.

Unfortunately, the ministry hasn't even supported our modest proposal for setting up a group of two or three people there to coordinate our joint work.

[Rubtsov] Otar Davidovich, what, in your opinion, should be done today to assist veterans' cooperatives and veterans' productive organizations?

[Gotsiridze] The sovereign republics should consider and resolve in a positive way the question of setting up and developing veterans' cooperatives, associations, and small and joint enterprises and of giving them preferential treatment with respect to material and technical supplies.

In carrying out denationalization and privatization, it would be right to allocate a corresponding share to veterans organizations. After all, state property was created primarily through the labor and funds of the older generation, and it is fully entitled to receive at least a part of the country's accumulated wealth.

Finally, we must ban the distorted interpretation and promulgation of various directives and illegal acts with respect to adopted laws, decrees, and resolutions on the development of veterans' cooperatives.

We have issued an appeal to the USSR President and members of the State Council with regard to all these issues. We hope that M.S. Gorbachev's call for a study of the issues pertaining to the development of veterans' cooperatives that are set forth in our appeal will find support and result in a decision in the relevant legislative and executive bodies. This will expand the possibilities for placing veterans in jobs and improving their material, social, and consumer-service situations and serve the noble cause of extending veterans' active service.

1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Laid to Military

924P0029A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Nov 91
Union Edition p 8

[Report by IZVESTIYA staff correspondent A. Pashkov: "How We Got 'Inoculated' for Anthrax: Military People in White Coats Still Are Potentially Dangerous for the Society"]

[Text] Yekaterinburg—A reprint from the American newspaper THE WALL STREET JOURNAL in IZVESTIYA (No. 259) once more brought to mind a 12-year-old event—the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk. A lot of time has passed, but the topic remains current to this day: The military has never told the truth, which means that a potential danger remains. Actually, the Urals region is full of mysteries: There is still no complete clarity in regard to the Chelyabinsk-65 explosion in 1957; we know little—in practical terms—about the fire on the Belayarsk nuclear station in 1978; and for several seasons now the students who taste the "potatoes" in the fields near nuclear waste dumps become disabled for life...

Our society has done everything to give the people with shoulder boards an immense power and authority. Only the truth and the law can destroy it.

It is shameful when colonels and generals lie. It is frightening when they consider their lying a fulfillment of their duty to the Motherland. Anyway, let us take things in order.

On 13 April 1979, hospitals in Sverdlovsk's Chkalovskiy Rayon started receiving people who had looked perfectly healthy that same morning and by the evening ended up in the morgue... An explanation appeared in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA: People had been infected by anthrax. The cause: sick cattle. Many years later, first doubts in this regard have been published; it was maintained that the anthrax was of artificial origin and had been developed in the microbiology center (19th Military Base), which is a structural subunit of the Scientific Research Institute for Microbiology of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Something that, in my opinion, nobody had ever doubted in Sverdlovsk, was finally made public.

To this day, I am surprised at a certain apathy on the part of the city residents who elected A. Kharechko, the current chief of the 19th Military Base, a deputy to the city council. I think he could have told a lot about the outbreak of that disease—had he valued their trust more than he valued his military rank. I would not even mind if Anatoliy Trofimovich sued me after this publication. Perhaps, this may provide a way to push the Soviet Themis in the direction of investigating the activities of the military in those days.

The object behind the barbed wire is indeed situated in Chkalovskiy Rayon. And it was the people who lived and worked near the base that were dying at that time. The official count of anthrax casualties is 64. But here is a

fact that had not been previously made public: one person died in the city of Nizhniye Sergi. Another—in Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon, located far from Chkalovskiy Rayon. In April, they had been called up from the reserves for active duty in the 32d Military Base—a neighbor of the 19th...

Journalists have conducted an immense amount of work that should have been done by the procuracy. The latter, however, has only been fine-tuning the official version—kept initiating criminal proceedings against old men and women who, in its understanding, had been selling infested meat.

The convenient "meat" version has been traveling the world for a long time. In one of the issues of V MIRE NAUKI magazine, there is an article by an American, B. Bernstein, on the topic of developing bacteriological weapons in the United States. In particular, it said: "In the beginning of the 1980's, there was talk in the United States that the Soviet Union was actively conducting a program of developing bacteriological weapons. The suspicions in regard to the USSR were partially precipitated by the instances of anthrax infection in Sverdlovsk in 1979, caused by a leak of the disease's pathogenic organisms from the lab in which, as rumors had it, bacteriological weapons were being developed."

The man who brought me this magazine had been called at the time to the Sverdlovsk KGB, where he received a strict warning for attempting to pass to the West a letter with some thoughts in regard to the 1979 events.

So why is it so hard today to determine whether the anthrax origin was natural or artificial? For the very simple reason that almost all primary medical documents... have disappeared. Can one really take seriously a reassuring answer by former Minister of Defense D. Yazov, who maintained that something like this simply could not have happened. Then why is it that after that story a considerable number of specialists and equipment were indeed moved out of the oblast?

Only primary documents can provide a key to the appearance of anthrax in the Urals. I have spoken with a person who had held in his hands the papers proving an artificial origin of the disease. He told me: If the newspaper locates the two sacks of documents that three comrades from the KGB confiscated from me, I will provide a respective commentary. Then I called those who had confiscated the documents...

But first—a conversation with a direct participant of the tragic events of April-June 1979. There were several people in Sverdlovsk who had been kept "in" on the matter. First Secretary of the CPSU obkom [oblast committee] B. Yeltsin; oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] chairman A. Mekhrentsev; F. Morshakov, a party functionary—he is now on the staff of the president of Russia; KGB General Yu. Kornilov, currently at the USSR Ministry of Communications. And V. Zadorozhnyi, chairman of the Chkalovskiy Rayon Executive

Committee, and currently a soviet functionary on the oblast level. All the heavy work at that time went through Zadorozhnyi.

Vasiliy Iosifovich agreed to the conversation reluctantly; he explained that it is still hard for him to think of those spring months.

"Every morning after the 13th, we received news: died, died, died... I saw many dead. Remember the feeling of total helplessness. At first we blamed the raw materials from Central Asia destined for the ceramics plant. Then it turned out to be wrong. Then we turned our attention to cattle. People in Rudnyi settlement had been throwing the animals into old mine shafts. We were recovering them, burning them with napalm... Closed the road to Chelyabinsk. Tightened controls at farmers markets. The disease does not subside! Doctors say: We need to vaccinate the population. We treated sidewalks, roofs, buildings—it is believed that this was on advice from the military. Actually, they were keeping a rather low profile at the time. We were the ones who made the decisions in coordination with the oblast, city, and rayon hygienists. The disease still would not subside. Rumors started—the infection had come from the 19th Base. As an executive committee chairman, I had no notion what the military was doing there: Someone in my position was not, as they said in those times, authorized to know. Nevertheless, we asked the base commander, General Mikhaylov, at the commission meeting—could there not be some fault on the part of the military? He categorically denied it. In short, we were fighting the disease by the "try this" method—the doctors noted many hard-to-explain things about that anthrax.

Indeed, relatives of the deceased and the doctors isolate three circumstances: The entire family consumed meat, but anthrax, as a rule, struck men in the prime of life. The infection most often was contracted through the respiratory tract, and it developed extremely swiftly. But if the official explanation is correct, why did documents disappear—for what vanished were the medical files of the deceased and transcripts of the meetings of commissions working in Sverdlovsk...

Now I can quote the words of my first interlocutor. I deliberately omit names and positions—the investigation is not over.

"I was visited by three members of the Sverdlovsk KGB; the senior one talked to me for more than an hour," says N. "The Committee hack was trying to convince me: The situation in the world is complex; there are certain forces who want to use anthrax to derail very important international agreements. It is necessary to move the documents where outsiders would not see them. I was arguing that they were an invaluable source for scientific and practical work. But when had the "organs" ever listened to anybody? Andropov's deputy Pirozhkov lived in Sverdlovsk for almost a month at that time—a very cultured general. Nevertheless, after discussions with him, I had little desire to defend any version other than

the official one. In short, the documents were confiscated. I never saw them again. There are some abstracts left in some people's hands—there were many docents and graduate students 'visiting' to study anthrax. By the way, among them was the son of Academician Burgasov, the head of the government commission. The academician himself would not go an inch outside of the official version. They said he valued his trips abroad a lot—he flatly rejected even the slightest connection with the 19th Base.

"I did not confiscate any documents," objected my second interlocutor. "Yes, we were familiarizing ourselves with medical files, and asking specialists to provide an expert opinion of what we had encountered. By the way, nobody said anything that made much sense. We were getting rounded, equivocal answers. However, after that incident part of the laboratory was moved from the base outside of the oblast boundaries. This decision was made at the Politburo level, so perhaps you will find the information you need in the highest level archives..."

And then, suddenly:

"Actually, I do know the truth. But this is a special topic..."

I am convinced that many people today know the truth. For instance, special branch officers of the former Urals military district. The editors have their names, but would prefer these people to call us on their own. Certainly many staff members of the lab, which was transferred to an area near Moscow, also know. It is possible that those who guarded the 19th Base know something. In short, IZVESTIYA is not putting the final dot in this matter.

Chelyabinsk Radiation Contamination Probed

PM2711100591 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1545 GMT 21 Nov 91

[From the "Ecology, Society, Man" program: Report over video on ecological disaster zone in Southern Urals, Mayak production association and related topics broadcast as part of a studio discussion on ecological issues anchored by Dilbar Klado, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Excerpt] [160317] [Unidentified male voice] [video opens with a shot of a road sign reading "Chelyabinsk" above a panel with the inscription: "Southern Urals—the Country's Backbone"] Southern Urals, the country's backbone, is now a national ecological disaster zone, created not just by the tonnes of industrial toxins disgorged by the giants of the chemical and metallurgical industries for decades.

The construction of a top secret enterprise in the Urals in the second half of the forties has turned into a calamity for the region. This is where the first Soviet atomic and

hydrogen bombs were developed, and where the first experience in nuclear waste storage was acquired.

In 1957 a nuclear waste storage tank exploded here. This is the site of the explosion.

[Unidentified correspondent] There is a "Red Book" in which the radiation doses which people absorbed while working here are recorded. What was your dose?

[V.F. Turusin, Mayak Production Association veteran, subsequently identified by caption] Do you mean me, personally?

[Unidentified correspondent] Yes.

[Turusin] Some 198 roentgens, of which 56 were accounted for during 1957.

[Unidentified correspondent] And you?

[E.S. Kotov, Mayak Production Association veteran, identified by caption] Some 250 roentgens in total, and 148 during the period of the elimination of the consequences of the accident.

[Unidentified correspondent] Overall, some 30,000 people took part in the elimination of the consequences of the 1957 accident.

We are now heading for Lake Karachay, one of the world's largest nuclear waste dumps. It is not safe to stay more than two minutes on the water's edge. In 1967 the lake dried out around the shore and the radioactive silt turned into dust which rose into the air. Now people equipped with special equipment are covering it up with uncontaminated earth.

[Ye.G. Drozhko, deputy chief engineer Mayak Production Association, identified by caption] Originally, the lake covered an area of 45 hectares. Now, as you can see, the work which is being carried out here, has enabled us to reduce this area to 20 hectares. This work is necessary primarily because this type of nuclear waste dump is potentially dangerous due to radioactivity being spread by the wind, among others as a result of atmospheric phenomena such as sandstorms and so forth.

[Unidentified correspondent] How much of it [radioactivity] is there under our feet?

[Drozhko] Under our feet? I have no idea, (?but whatever it is), the water reservoir as a whole contains 120 million curies.

[Unidentified correspondent] How much is that compared with Chernobyl again?

[Drozhko] I am loath to draw comparisons. But in Chernobyl there were 50 million, including short-lived nuclides, and here there are 120 million long-lived radionuclides.

[Unidentified official] That is 100 Chernobyls.

[V.I. Fetisov, director of the Mayak Production Association, subsequently identified by caption] During the years of the development of the Mayak Production Association, that is between 1948 and 1960, this is stated in a letter, occupational radiation sickness was diagnosed in 2,089 workers of the Mayak Production Association and allied organizations; 6,000 people received radiation doses totaling more than 100 rems, of which at least 25 rems in the course of one year, which is regarded as particularly harmful to health....

[Unidentified speaker] This has been established by medics?

[Fetisov] Yes, this has been established by medics. More than 2,000 people today have plutonium levels exceeding the maximum permissible lifetime dose—that is more than 40 nanocuries.

[Unidentified speaker indistinct sentence about (?retirement and leisure)]

[Unidentified correspondent] This is Muslyumovo. Just like most of our villages it is located on a river. But this river, the Techa river, is that very river into which radioactive waste was allowed to flow unimpeded between 1949 and 1952. And therefore the problems which beset all our villages at the moment are multiplied ten-fold here as a result of the ecological disaster. In the past 40 years it has claimed several hundred human lives.

[A.N. Penyagin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and EKOS journal consultant, subsequently identified by caption] This is a strict-regime radiation exclusion zone. The barbed-wire fence which you see on both banks of the river means that it is categorically prohibited to use this territory due to radioactive contamination.

[Unidentified correspondent] When did people begin to understand, when did they learn the truth about this territory? I have heard various figures. I would like to establish, was it two years ago, or...?

[Penyagin] You know, the truth probably began to dawn on them when they began to die early, when people became sick and started dying. But as to the actual situation, as to what had happened here, and why the river has been fenced in—all this people began to learn no more than two years ago.

[Unidentified correspondent] Kids, which of you has bathed in the Techa, and when was it for the last time?

[Unidentified youth] I did, last summer.

[Unidentified correspondent] You did? Last summer? And are there any fish in the Techa?

[Several voices] Yes, yes, several types of fish.

[Young girl] People usually catch the fish, and then sell it to someone else...[160818]

[passage omitted local women clamoring for help and studio discussion]

[161025] [video shows countryside, a "Keep Out! Radiation!" sign, and shots of Lake Karachay with a caption reading: "4 October 1991 a fire and a mushroom-shaped plume of smoke were seen in the area of the Mayak Production Association industrial site. An independent expedition of the socioecological union is conducting an investigation. The contact telephone number in Moscow is: 205-53-54." [161131]

Figures on Battle of Moscow Casualties

92P50051A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 49, Dec 91 p 8

[Reader's letter and article in answer to letter]

[Text] On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Moscow, I would like to finally find out an objective figure of our losses in that conflict. It is no secret that

thousands of raw recruits and home guards were thrown under the tanks. [signed] A. Paramonov, Moscow

Colonel V. Yeliseyev, chief of a department in the USSR Ministry of Defense Military Historical Institute and candidate of historical sciences, answers the question:

According to the estimates which the employees of the institute have recently worked out, within the bounds of the Battle of Moscow (from 30 September 1941 to 20 April 1942) we lost 2,200,000 men. This figure also includes our encircled troops, who fell into such "pockets" as, for instance, the ones at Vyazma and Bryansk. The enemy, according to G.K. Zhukov's memoirs, had losses amounting to 500,000 men. But these are outdated data; new data are now being prepared. From many sources, including foreign ones, it is becoming clear that the enemy, in totalling up losses, counted those killed, wounded, missing in action and captured, while at the same time our reports also included those frostbitten and ill.

Decision Process for Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

92UM0140A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Nov 91 First Edition p 3

[From the "From Competent Sources" column, a reply from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces to a reader's question: "How the Nuclear Button Is Pushed"]

[Text] *"How are decisions made for use of American nuclear weapons in Europe?"—V. Khrapunov, Tula.*

There are two basic options for making a decision on the use of nuclear weapons in Europe and passing it down to the executing entities.

The first option is marked by a high degree of centralization. The U.S. President may give an order for the use of nuclear weapons, having first secured the consent of the heads of the NATO countries. This decision is passed to the main command center of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where it is coded and sent as a circular order in the form of a coded cable by all systems and the highest priority network at the disposal of the main command center of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The commander in chief of the NATO Joint Armed Forces, who is an American general, receives this order, verifies its authenticity, recodes it, and then sends it through automated control systems to subordinated troops (commanders of Air Force bases

with tactical aircraft which carry nuclear weapons, commanders of operational-tactical missiles, aircraft carriers, and nuclear ammunition depots, and directly to commanders of nuclear artillery units through commanders of Army corps). The executing entities, having received such an order through the automated control system, conduct preparations for the use of nuclear weapons. After the order is confirmed over the telephone, the order received through the automated control system and the one received over the telephone are compared and must be found identical; then aircraft carriers take off for a combat mission, missiles are launched, and nuclear artillery commences firing in accordance with plans developed in advance. The second option envisages the initiation and the final decision in decision-making for use of nuclear weapons by the commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. In this case, on the basis of requests for the use of nuclear weapons that may be submitted only by commanders of Army corps, through the commander of the central group of troops and the commander in chief of the NATO Joint Armed Forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations, to the staff of the commander in chief of the Armed Forces in Europe, through the main command center of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **requests permission** for the use of nuclear weapons from the top U.S. military-political leadership. Having received permission, the commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe takes the same sequence of actions as in the first option. Thus, only the top military-political leadership of the United States, with the consent of the NATO countries, may make a decision for the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

Deputy Minister of Justice on Reorganization of Military Tribunals

92UM0142A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Nov 91 First edition p 3

[Interview with USSR Deputy Justice Minister, Military Tribunals Directorate (UVT) Chief, Lieutenant-General of Justice Anatoliy Muranov by TASS Correspondent R. Zadunayskiy: "Around Reform of Military Tribunals"]

[Text] USSR President M.S. Gorbachev has directed that a document be prepared on ways to reform the structure of military tribunals. It is possible that the Union State Council will soon examine it, USSR Deputy Justice Minister, Military Tribunals Directorate (UVT) Chief, Lieutenant-General of Justice Anatoliy Muranov stated during an interview with a TASS reporter. He noted that the demand to immediately disband military tribunals that has been heard frequently at forums of the Movement of Soldier's Mothers, stems from a lack of understanding of the essence of the work of this type of court. For some reason, they think that the punishments handed down by military tribunals are more severe than those handed down by people's courts. But military judges are guided by the same laws as "civilian" courts and only 21-23 percent of servicemen were sentenced to imprisonment at ITK's [Corrective Labor Colonies] and the remainder were sent to disciplinary battalions or received suspended sentences. Let us compare: people's courts sentenced 33-36 percent of all those guilty to serve terms at ITK's. A. Muranov also stressed that soldiers and seamen at disciplinary battalions are in a normal army environment, although at a stricter regime, that practically excludes the "school" of the criminal world and are not considered as having a conviction after their release. They are hoping in vain if they think that, with the elimination of military tribunals, the territorial people's courts will be qualified to deal with the 15,000 specific cases of servicemen that are heard annually. And they will be added to the tens of thousands of "their own" cases. Let me point out: women comprise 30 percent of the workers at people's courts.

They propose including within the jurisdiction of military tribunals: hearing servicemen's complaints against illegal acts of military directorate organs and officials, cases on soldiers' administrative law violations, and also cases as a result of civil law violations when both parties are servicemen, military units, institutions, or organizations. Therefore, I am convinced, stressed A. Muranov, that only appropriately trained military judges are capable of hearing these complaints and cases.

Interview with New Defense Ministry Main Trade Directorate Chief

92UM0178A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Aviation Lieutenant General G. Karakozov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P.

Altunin and by V. Korzhavykh; place and date not given: "First Interview in the New Post: On the Approaches to the Market"]

[Text] By an order of the USSR defense minister, Aviation Lieutenant General G. Karakozov has been appointed chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Main Trade Directorate.

Avn. Lt. Gen. Grigoriy Aramovich Karakozov, born 21 April 1941 in Kirovabad of the Azerbaijan SSR to a serviceman's family. Graduated in 1964 from the Ryazan Military Automotive School, and in 1980, from the Yu.A. Gagarin Air Force Academy. Made his way up all levels of command and rear-service assignments—up to deputy commander of rear-service long-range aviation. Married with two children.

The editorial office requested of Lt. Gen. G. Karakozov an interview for our readers.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Grigoriy Aramovich, the question could arise of your having served in the regular forces. Will the new appointment not be "out of profile" for you?

[Karakozov] Whatever rear-service assignment I held, military trade was a most important component of my work, and in recent years, when commodity shortages have developed to the utmost, the army has been involved not only in their distribution but also, within the law, in the most diverse deals. We have been in touch with factories, sovkhozes, subsidiary farms—just as long as the shelves are replenished. In addition, I have always been profoundly interested in economic work.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It may be added, obviously, that a person who has joined the administrative system from the regular forces sees people's needs not from above but from within?

[Karakozov] This is true also. But, nonetheless, I feel excited by my new assignment and, to an even greater extent, the responsibility. For what is the situation in trade? Unprecedented strain, the store shelves are bare, and people, unwilling to investigate what, how, and why, are at times directing critical barbs at the leaders of trade.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Some barbs are, perhaps, striking home also?

[Karakozov] I agree. There are in the trade system people who are both dishonest and light-fingered. I fought against this sort of thing earlier also. But the objective aspect has to be recognized also: Military trade reflects the general situation in the country. Here are just a few figures. Compared with last year, supplies of leather footwear have declined by 93,000 pairs; fur items, to the extent of 20 million rubles; washing machines, by 50,000; motor vehicles, by 3,000; and so forth. Imports have declined by almost one-third.

Many Union republics (or, now, states) have banned exports. In just nine months of this year alone there has been a shortfall in supplies to us of 200,000 meters of cloth, more than 1 million pairs of socks and 60,000 television receivers, radios, and tape recorders.

The situation regarding the provision of foodstuffs to the military garrisons is even more difficult. In eight months in the RSFSR alone there was a supply shortfall of 7,000 tons of meat, 43,000 tons of dairy products, and 5,000 tons of confectionary.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And what are you doing about it?

[Karakozov] In the center and locally we are adopting the most vigorous measures to ensure the full delivery of allocations in accordance with contracts and commercial deals. As a result we have received by way of imports 10,000 tons of meat products, including an extra 2,000-plus tons in accordance with barter deals, and also 1,000 tons each of vegetable and animal oil, and 500 tons each of dried milk and cheese. A contract has been concluded for the supply of 60,000 tons of apples from Hungary, Bulgaria, and China. We are obtaining industrial commodities from Syria and Algeria.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And do you have your own production?

[Karakozov] Yes. And, as I have already seen for myself, it is expanding. We plan to commission within two years two plants for the manufacture of canned fruit and vegetables with a capacity of 5.5 million cans, a shop for processing fish in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk with a capacity of 4,000 tons a year, and 10 lines to manufacture bakery products.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Now, following the well-known decrees, there will essentially be complete freedom of external economic activity. What will it be like with you?

[Karakozov] Following their receipt of a registration number, the military trade authorities will be accorded the right to independently decide questions of external economic activity in the interests of the purchaser.

We intend to considerably step up barter work and to help the trade directorates strengthen business cooperation with associations, enterprises, and other of our organizations engaged in foreign trade activity, and with firms and organizations of foreign countries.

The question of subsequently acquiring fruit and vegetable products (primarily for areas of the Far North, Far East, and the Transbaykal region) in accordance with direct contracts straight from the participants in the

Semako-Agro and Moscow Agroprombart associations, of which the USSR Defense Ministry Main Trade Directorate is a founder also, is being worked up.

We are in the very near future to analyze the work of joint ventures, keeping only those which operate in the interests of the military purchaser.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But in developing the market you most likely not only purchase but sell things also?

[Karakozov] Yes, we offer our own products through retail, wholesale and auction trade and will create wholly-owned stores and sale rooms and organizations for maintenance and services for freely convertible currency.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And what are military trade's relations with the co-operators?

[Karakozov] We should, I believe, support only the cooperatives which are engaged not in profiteering but in the production of consumer goods and agricultural products for military purchasers.

In connection with the transition to market relations in military trade the creation of new market-type structures, but based on the state form of ownership ensuring preference for the work force, cannot be ruled out.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You recently visited the Western Group of Forces. What kind of assets did you bring back with you from this trip?

[Karakozov] First and foremost, I saw with my own eyes how trade in Germany is organized. We need to study and learn. I had meetings with representatives of overseas firms, including the president of the Montana Company. We reached an agreement on cooperation. As far as the Western Group of Forces is concerned, what struck me here? Taking advantage of the inexperience of our military trade officials, some firms, middlemen primarily, are attempting to dictate conditions for acquiring commodities with which the Western market is glutted only for hard currency. We, however, have set as our terms: 30 percent for Soviet rubles, 70 percent for hard currency.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Grigoriy Aramovich, what would you like to say at the conclusion of our interview?

[Karakozov] I have only just begun work in my new assignment. There is nothing to brag about yet. I see a mass of complications and difficulties in trade. I will take a fresh look at everything. There is in the directorate an experienced, able work force, on which I rely. I believe that we will do everything within our power to improve the trade and social support of servicemen and their families.

Internal Troops Aide on Desertion, Amnesty

92UM0187A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Dec 91 First edition p 1

[Interview with USSR MVD Internal Troops Commander Main Administration Deputy Personnel Administration Chief Major-General A. Chaykovskiy by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major A. Petrov: "The Internal Troops Are Waiting for... the Deserters"]

[Text] The amnesty period for servicemen who have been evading military service expires on December 4, 1991 and therefore our correspondent's first question to USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops Commander Main Administration Deputy Personnel Administration Chief Major-General A. Chaykovskiy was:

[Petrov] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, how many deserters have there been in the internal troops?

[Chaykovskiy] 964 men were listed as under investigation when the USSR Law "On Amnesty for Servicemen Who Have Evaded Military Service" went into force.

[Petrov] Could you not compose some sort of social snapshot [fotorobot] of a man who has set out on the path of evading military service?

[Chaykovskiy] They are mainly compulsory service servicemen, as a rule, first year soldiers. Seven warrant officers and four officers are listed as under investigation.

I admit that the flow of deserters increases each year and it is becoming increasingly difficult to restrain it. Judge for yourself: if there were 942 such cases in 1990, as of today there are already 2,205 this year. As you see, the situation has worsened.

[Petrov] Is it really that easy to leave a military unit?

[Chaykovskiy] That is just the point. A person rarely deserts right in front of his fellow servicemen. They wait and seek the moment—they desert from medical treatment facilities, especially from civilian hospitals. They leave their posts, they do not return from official temporary duty assignments, liberties, or leaves both through encouragement and for family circumstances. Parents and relatives hide a significant number of soldiers and they do not return, although they solemnly promise: "We will not let you down!"

[Petrov] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, are they also deserting from "hot spots"?

[Chaykovskiy] They are also deserting from "hot spots." For the same reasons. The appeals of the governments of the sovereign states to return to the homeland and to enter their own armies. We are obliged to release a soldier for family circumstances but there is red tape, they prolong the decision, and there is "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts]. But, at the same time, they also have their own specific circumstances. For example—in NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]—it is the attitude of the local population. Internal troops soldiers increasingly hear directed at them both from Armenians and Azerbaijanis: "Occupiers!" They accuse our lads of all types of sins! And what are service conditions like? It happens that there is neither water, bread, nor light. Yes and they still sometimes wound or kill our troops.

[Petrov] But how many guilty servicemen have returned since the law entered into force?

[Chaykovskiy] 71.

[Petrov] Far from everyone. How do you explain this—is there a legal vacuum in our society? Maybe in the troops they counted on the magical force of law too much?

[Chaykovskiy] Unfortunately, the law on amnesty did not have the intended effect. Yes and who is surprised, ignorance of legislative acts—is a characteristic trait of our society and of the times in which we live.

It would be incorrect to say that we sat idly by while our deserters, having heard about the amnesty, rushed to the nearest military directorate organs. We disseminated the content of the law to all unit personnel. We organized cooperation with committees for the affairs of servicemen and the members of their families in internal troops directorates by regions, in large formations and military units, we created working groups to collect information on the locations of soldiers and sergeants who were absent without leave from their units, and we informed their relatives about the amnesty that had been proclaimed and the procedures for its realization....

[Petrov] Therefore, the deserters are afraid to return to their units?

[Chaykovskiy] This factor is provided for in the USSR MVD Armed Forces commander's order—the order has been issued to not send guilty soldiers who have arrived to the military units where they previously served. Servicemen who have left their duty location and who were on temporary duty to internal troops or Ministry of Defense military units are excluded from personnel lists for inquiries of military unit commanders and military commissariats.

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