



JPRS-EER-92-061
16 MAY 1992



JPRS Report

East Europe



19980112 005

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Possible Effects of Withdrawal From Ukraine Plant

LD1105204592 Prague CSTK in English 1127 GMT
11 May 92

[Text] Bratislava May 11 (CSTK)—The Slovak daily NARODNA OBRODA today likened the Czechoslovak Government's decision of April 16 to stop work at the construction of an ore dressing plant in Ukraine to Czechoslovakia's dispute with Hungary over a joint twin-dam system on the Danube.

"The only difference is that now it is us who are in the role of Hungary," the paper says. (Hungary stopped work on its part of the project in 1989 and last week decided it would abrogate the agreement.)

The paper refers to the plant at Krivoy Rog, into which Czechoslovakia has so far invested 10,000 million crowns (about \$340 million). It writes that the current talks in Ukraine on the level of government commissioners are very complicated as the 1986 bilateral agreement with the former Soviet Union cannot be abrogated.

The paper also quotes an unidentified official in the Czechoslovak Economics Ministry as saying that it is not clear with whom the talks will be conducted in the future as the commitments of the former USSR are taken over by Russia, but that the plant is in Ukraine.

The East Slovak Iron Works (VSZ) in Kosice, which is to be the largest buyer of the ore from Krivoy Rog, has said that if Czechoslovakia stops work on the project and unilaterally withdraws from it, relations with Ukraine can be expected to be seriously aggravated. The amount of demanded compensation by Ukraine can now be hardly predicted and retaliatory measures in the form of halting ore supplies to Czechoslovakia cannot be ruled out, the paper quotes VSZ Kosice as saying.

Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the project will affect Slovakia, which is likely to lose about 600 jobs for people who would work at Krivoy Rog for ten years, Dionyz Kunder, director of the strategy department at VSZ Kosice, told the paper.

Alleged Intentions in Gabcikovo Interpreted

92CH0526A Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Mar 92
p 3

[Interview with Zoltan Valentovic, chairman of the Department of International Law and Policy, Komensky University in Bratislava, by Milan Rusko; place and date not given: "The Boundary Is a Matter of Concern—Legal Aspect of Danube Waterworks"]

[Text] In recent days it was reported that the Hungarian parliament had authorized the government to rescind the Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreement on the construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros waterworks system if the CSFR does not stop by 30 April 1992 operations

connected with the interim technical plan. This unequivocally expressed standpoint put finally an end to the efforts of the Hungarian government over several months to change the Czechoslovak position. We interviewed the chairman of the Department of International Law and Policy at the Comenius University's Department of Law in Bratislava, lecturer Dr. [Zoltan Valentovic]:

[Rusko] What do you think about this new situation?

[Valentovic] I welcomed the statement from the Hungarian side because at long last, after almost three years of controversies about the waterworks and in particular, about the 1977 agreement, Budapest clearly defined its position as we had anticipated from the beginning, since 1989 when it first started to make obstructions. With this decision it confirmed that above all, it always intended to abrogate the agreement of 1977.

[Rusko] But always using ecological arguments....

[Valentovic] Despite many appeals by the CSFR, despite our willingness and readiness to let an independent international commission assess the ecological impact of the waterworks on natural conditions, to this day the Hungarian partner has not shown any interest in such cooperation. However, then all of a sudden it declared its compliance and what is more, presented it as its own initiative, only to renege after a few weeks. By having authorized the government to repeal the agreement unilaterally, the Hungarian parliament in fact confirmed that this was its objective of long standing. Actually, it is not so much concerned about any ecological problems as solely about political and power issues.

[Rusko] What specifically do you mean by that?

[Valentovic] If we consider the well-known statements by top Hungarian constitutional and governmental officials, it becomes evident that certain forces in the Hungarian political center are striving to restore the Great Hungary and it is obvious that the 1977 agreement stands in the way of their ambitions. However, those are already issues of international politics which should be of interest to the European Community as a whole, because the current policies on the Hungarian side justify fears that they are intended to prepare the ground for a revision of the existing system of borders as stipulated by the 1947 Paris peace treaties. It seems that in this case Budapest attaches little importance to the conclusions of the Helsinki Conference and its Final Act. Europe should realize that because it completely changes correlations of problems stemming from the 1977 agreement.

[Rusko] Let us assume that the Hungarian side revokes that agreement. In terms of international laws, what consequences would ensue?

[Valentovic] Basically, this is a dispute between states. In essence, one of the parties to the agreement refuses to fulfill the obligations it has adopted. Because so far

Hungary itself has not questioned the validity of the 1977 agreement, its failure to meet its obligations means a serious violation of international laws. In terms of international law, that constitutes a responsibility with all its consequences for the Hungarian party, while it entitles the Czechoslovak party to take whatever measure may be necessary to fulfill the objective of the agreement, including enforcement of the right to demand compensation for potential damages which the non-fulfillment of contractual obligations by the Hungarian partner might cause the CSFR.

[Rusko] What about the Hungarian charge that we intend to violate the agreement?

[Valentovic] Such charges have no basis in international law. According to the norms in force, any state may take steps to improve conditions for navigation on the Danube; I should like to point out the Treaty of Trianon as well as pacts concluded in Paris in 1947 and in Belgrade in 1948. From that it follows that the CSFR has not violated any norm of international law. On the contrary, its actions in conjunction with Variant C conform with international laws. If we implement Variant C on our territory and thus, in our sovereignty, we do not encroach on the border stipulated by the agreement of 1977. The Czechoslovak side is prepared to meet its obligations in their full extent. Alas, although our approach to the fulfillment of that agreement is in agreement with the international law in force, the same cannot be said about the approach by the other side. For instance, I can find no explanation for the statement made by G. Tatar, representative of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, at a press conference last Friday, in the sense that the Hungarian side would not accept any potential violation of the territorial integrity of the Hungarian Republic nor any substantive changes in the character of the border between both republics.

After all, there is no such danger! Irrespective of any change of the navigation route, the borderline will follow the old Danube river bed in conformity with the treaty concluded in 1977. At this moment I cannot predict the reaction of our official foreign policy to the latest development and to the Hungarian attitude. In my opinion, however, it should advance to a constructive offensive because the right and truth are on our side.

Another Option for Danube Dam Suggested

92CH0509B Prague DOKUMENTACNI PREHLED
in Czech 12 Mar 92 pp H/11-12

[Unattributed report: "Variations for Completing Construction of the System of Water Management Projects on the Danube River"]

[Text] In solving the completion of construction involving the system of water management projects on the Danube River known as the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, six variations were considered in 1991. On 21 May 1991, the government of the Slovak Republic approved Variation C. On 22 January 1991, J.

Vavrousek, minister-chairman of the Federal Committee for the Environment, presented a new variation which modifies Variation D, in view of the status of work at the Hrusov impoundment.

Variation A—completing the system of water management projects at Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros in accordance with the interstate agreement of 1977.

The Gabčíkovo water management project, with the following principal facilities—the Hrusov-Dunakiliti impoundment with a volume of 200 million cubic meters of water, the Dunakiliti weir with its auxiliary lock chamber, an intake conduit which is 17 km long, the Gabčíkovo stage with the hydroelectric power plant (installed capacity 720 MW) and lock chambers, and an 8.2-km-long drainage conduit.

The Nagymaros water management project, with the following principal facilities—protective facilities on Czechoslovak territory, protective facilities on Hungarian territory, the Nagymaros stage with the hydroelectric power plant (installed capacity 158 MW) and lock chambers, dredging of the Danube River bed beneath the Nagymaros stage.

Variation B—completing the Gabčíkovo water management project in accordance with the 1977 interstate agreement, without the concurrent completion of the Nagymaros water management project. Initiation of operations in the flow-through mode.

Variation C—building the Gabčíkovo water management project only on Czechoslovak territory with a smaller impoundment facility, without the Nagymaros water management project.

Variation D (1991)—completing the Gabčíkovo water management project without the Hrusov impoundment and without completing the Nagymaros water management project.

Variation D (1992)—completing the Gabčíkovo water management project without completing the Nagymaros water management project. Return the Danube River bed to its original state in that portion of the Hrusov impoundment which has already been constructed; build an electric power plant in the area of the Hrusov dam, which would be used to return 400 to 1,350 cubic meters of water to the original Danube River bed (in place of the original 50 cubic meters). The intake and outflow conduits and the other facilities of the hydroelectric power plant at Gabčíkovo would be retained and would be utilized in accordance with the original proposals without additional construction modification.

Variation E—utilizing the Gabčíkovo water management project for navigation purposes, for flood control, and utilizing it, in part, for purposes of energy production.

Variation F—halting all work on the system of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros water management projects and mothballing existing construction.

Variation G—utilizing some of the facilities, particularly the dams, in support of flood protection; gradually dismantling the other facilities of the Gabčíkovo water management project and reclaiming the countryside.

Journalists Query Politicians on Constitution

92CH0486A Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 6 Apr 92 p 2

[Report by (vk): "Statism Versus Liberalism"]

[Text] Last Wednesday evening there were discussions for journalists with representatives of the leadership of the CNR [Czech National Council] and the SNR [Slovak National Council] held at the Brno Press Club. The subject of the evening was an evaluation of the process of determining the legal basis for the state in the CSFR. Vice-chairmen Jiri Vlach (ODS [Civic Democratic Party]) and Jan Kalvoda (ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance]) participated on the Czech side and Jan Klepac (SKDH [Slovak Christian Democratic Movement]) and Milan Zemko (independent) were there for Slovakia.

Jan Klepac (SKDH) stated that there were places in the Milovy treaty where it should have spoken to the question of who is a participant in the treaty to replace the long-winded formulations about people. The text in this form is not a treaty between the republics, but a legislative initiative of the national councils. The Milovy document, in his opinion, does not mean a shift in Czechoslovak relations and in many areas it is less than the current constitutional relationship.

Jan Kalvoda (ODA) replied in response to this that the text from Milovy was not actually a proposal for a treaty between republics. A treaty between republics would in fact have meant ignoring the constitution at the price of an agreement. According to J. Kalvoda, however, that is the path which the developments in Yugoslavia have taken.

In his view the group of politicians participating in the negotiations about the state legal arrangement has not succeeded and will bear the responsibility for their actions before the voters in the elections.

The conflicts arise from the fact that the Slovak political scene is tending toward the left, toward maximizing the role of the state, which will also become the guarantor of national development. However, the state cannot be such a guarantor. The Czech political scene is leaning toward the right and therefore a conflict arises between the Slovak idea of a state which manages everything, that is, statism, and the Czech concept of the free citizen, that is, liberalism. J. Kalvoda feels that the developments are leading toward an independent Slovakia.

After that, he stated that it is necessary either to accept a joint states with all the limitations resulting from it or it is better to split up into two independent entities. J. Klepac questioned whether it was necessary to accept even such limitations as, for example, the FS [Federal

Assembly] abolishing majority rule. J. Kalvoda responded affirmatively, to which M. Zemko said, "Then the matter is clear."

On the question of privatization, J. Kalvoda stated that the Czech government displayed questionable responsibility when it did not accept the different processes of privatization in the Czech lands and Slovakia. That proposal was submitted by minister T. Jezko. In his words, any eventual separation would take place in a reasonable manner. The expenses for separation would correspond to the method in which it was carried out.

Milan Zemko (independent) stated that the Slovak citizens have other interests than do the Czechs. J. Kalvoda added to this that as far as the Slovak population thinks that it needs more support from the state, more concern and less independence than the Czechs, then it will be necessary to divide the state.

According to Jiri Vlach (ODS) it is not possible to preserve the joint state if the unified economic area or the unified banking system is not preserved. Moreover, the SKDH is talking about the fact that it is necessary to declare an independent Slovakia. J. Klepac commented on this that the SKDH is really after an independent Slovakia.

On the question of a federal arrangement, J. Vlach expressed himself to say that a multimember federation is a more stable unit. According to M. Zemko, however, this is unacceptable for the Slovak side because the CSFR is made up of two peoples.

J. Vlach stated that one cannot imagine postelection cooperation of the ODS with the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia]. The ideas of the HZDS on economic reform are unacceptable for the ODS, particularly some of the socialist views on the third path held by some HZDS economists.

Preelection Change in SNR Presidium Viewed

92CH0510B Bratislava NOVY SLOVAK
in Slovak 11 Apr 92 p 4

[Commentary by Jaroslav Bartl: "Huska's Selection"]

[Text] Because of its large membership and vigorous political activity, the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] exerts more and more influence on our preelection political scene. It may seem that the nationally oriented political subjects within it have been overshadowed. However, the meetings of prominent HZDS leaders with citizens have confirmed that the HZDS also increasingly inclines towards a nationalistic orientation. According to statements made in recent days particularly by A.M. Huska, Milan Knazko, Rudolf Filkus as well as Roman Kovac, the HZDS will not join any preelection coalition with nationally oriented parties but will continue to promote the formation of a nationalistic bloc in the Slovak parliament. It should consist, in addition to the HZDS, of the SKDH [Slovak Christian Democratic

Movement], the SNS [Slovak National Party], and the SNDH [Slovak National Democratic Movement].

The HZDS's deputy chairman and deputy of the Slovak National Council [SNR] A.M. Huska in particular made an unusually straightforward and courageous pronouncement at the last meeting of the movement's leaders with Bratislava's citizens, stating verbatim: "The HZDS, SNS, and SKDH are enough for Slovakia; in her national interest, even after the elections the Slovak Republic will not need any additional political parties. Those three parties are absolutely sufficient to enforce Slovakia's national interests."

The leaders of the HZDS are unusually unanimous as concerns the issue of cooperation with clear-cut nationally oriented political entities. In fact, at this time the Slovak National Party is the closest to the HZDS with which it advocates certain joint actions in the Slovak parliament. One of them will be their proposal for a revamping of the Presidium of the SNR even before the coming elections. A.M. Huska, M. Knazko and R. Filkus explained their latest political initiative as follows: "The Slovak parliament will soon cease its operation, but the work of the SNR Presidium will continue practically unrestricted until the first day of the elections. By the same token, this particular institution has the authority not only to adopt but also to reject many legal measures. For Slovakia the current "nomenklatura" composition of the SNR Presidium is extremely unfavorable and in its executive steps, very harmful." Nevertheless, the HZDS leaders maintain that a substantive change in this respect may take place at any time because of the already existing relations of nationally oriented parties with the HZDS.

Duray Interviewed on Minority Rights

*AU1305154592 Prague RUDE PRAVO
in Czech 7 May 92 p 13*

[Interview with Egyutteles-Coexistence Chairman Miklos Duray by Jan Zizka; place and date not given: "We Are in Favor of Territorial and Cultural Autonomy"]

[Text] The Czechoslovak political movement, Egyutteles-Coexistence-Wspolnota, is the largest organization of ethnic minorities in the CSFR. Egyutteles Chairman Miklos Duray responded to questions regarding the movement's objections to the Czechoslovak Polish treaty, and the movement's objectives with regard to ethnic issues and the status of ethnic minorities within the CSFR.

[Zizka] You have said recently that the signed Czechoslovak Polish treaty—and the Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty that is under preparation—do not anchor the rights of ethnic minorities. What did you mean by that?

[Duray] I had mainly in mind the Czechoslovak-Polish treaty, which does not pay attention to the protection of interests of minorities provided by their mother nations.

The treaty does not deal with the obligations of the mother nation toward its minorities abroad. This applies to Czechs and Slovaks living on Polish territory and to Poles living in the CSFR. We do not want this obligation to be understood as activity aimed against the majority nation of the country in which the minorities reside. Moreover, we see a flaw in the fact that the treaty does not provide for sufficient incentives for bilateral cooperation in the border regions and that it does not outline solutions to environmental problems in Upper Silesia. In recent decades, urbanization destroyed the structure of settlement of the Polish minority there. International documents, however, provide for the principle of the protection of ethnic structures in the regions inhabited by minorities. In the Silesian regions, no sufficient prerequisites have been created for that. As far as the education system is concerned, additional objections have been raised regarding mutual assistance with the completion of the education systems for minorities in both countries. We did not want the treaty to be changed, since it had been initialed already. Yet, in the spirit of this treaty that provides for the possibility of concluding additional sub-treaties and supplements, we pushed for an agreement between the Czechoslovak and Polish Governments on the protection of, or assistance to minorities.

[Zizka] Does this also apply to the Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty that is under preparation?

[Duray] No, we have not spoken about it. However, it is a well-known fact that the Czechoslovak-Polish treaty is also the basis for the Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty. We do not want the said flaws and weaknesses to reappear in this treaty, too.

[Zizka] How would you describe the main goals of your movement regarding the ethnic policy?

[Duray] Above all, we are concerned with the fact that the minorities rights should be guaranteed by law. The constitution—or a constitutional law—is not enough. The rights must be spelled out in a more specific way. Apart from this, we want certain autonomy to be respected in the sphere of education and culture. Rights and claims of the minorities should be respected according to the needs of minorities, irrespective of whether someone permits it or not. It is a certain type of paternalism if someone decides whether minorities' rights are justified or not.

[Zizka] What about administrative and territorial autonomy?

[Duray] It is necessary to distinguish according to the principle of adequate enforcement of the rights and grant rights to citizens, or groups of citizens in the country [as published]. However, we should speak about self-administration rather than about autonomy. Autonomy is quite a general word. Local self-administration is a certain form of autonomy. Autonomy is a generally declared identity, while the self-administration is a specific form thereof. Cultural self-administration can be

applied to minorities who live as a compact group and scattered minorities. Territorial self-administration can be applied to compact groups of minorities.

[Zizka] Territorial self-administration would be adequate for the Hungarian minority, then. Is that your movement's official demand?

[Duray] Yes. However, we have never said that we demand self-administration for the Hungarian minority. We are in favor of solving problems of minorities by establishing cultural or territorial self-administration, which would be based, if possible, on [smaller units of] local self-administrations. We are not speaking exclusively about the Hungarian minority but about other minorities, too. Our movement does not represent only the Hungarian minority.

[Zizka] What is your specific idea about self-administration? Does it provide for the existence of elected bodies for the entire region?

[Duray] Self-administration should be built from below, that is, on the basis of municipal and local self-administration—in the form of regional groupings—and should be based on their own decision. Territorial self-administration can be established only on the principle of regionalism.

[Zizka] Do you prefer the word "self-administration" to the word "autonomy" because autonomy is perceived as having a more radical meaning than self-administration?

[Duray] We are not using the word because it is more convenient to us, but because it says better what we want to achieve.

[Zizka] As a dissident, you spoke strongly against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's ethnic policy. Do you think that the situation has changed now and that the ethnic problems are being solved?

[Duray] Something has changed. Minorities can express their opinions within the framework of their political organizations and on various occasions. An improvement in the solution to the problems of minorities has not been achieved, however. The constitutional law of 1968 on minorities' rights has been abolished, and the constitutional Charter on Basic Human Rights and Freedoms has not fully replaced it, because it devotes less space to the rights of minorities. In this sense, it was a step backward.

[Zizka] You have spoken about the education system. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia has its own education system, its own schools. Is that status?

[Duray] It is true that it has its own schools, but we must say that its full needs are not met. In the past 40 years, more than 60 percent of Hungarian schools disappeared, or were abolished, as the case may be. There is no possibility of their revival. The system of elementary and high schools is not sufficient, and neither is the teachers' training. By the end of the decade, there will be a

shortage of more than 2,000 teachers in Hungarian schools. This means further disappearance of schools and the drop in their level.

[Zizka] How would your movement react to a possible disintegration of Czechoslovakia?

[Duray] We are an all-Czechoslovak movement. A disintegration of the CSFR would definitely weaken our movement and diminish its international character. We have shown several times that we consider the preservation of the continuity of Czechoslovakia as an element of stability in Europe. Despite the political situation in Slovakia, we have arrived at the opinion that Czechoslovakia will probably not disintegrate—if something unexpected does not happen, or if the present policy does not change radically.

[Zizka] Would separatist trends arise among the citizens of Hungarian nationality?

[Duray] I cannot answer that because it will become clear only after the disintegration takes place—if it does. For the time being, there are not even signs of separatism. It is difficult to foresee the reaction of the people.

[Zizka] A large part of your movement involves the Hungarian minority, which is the largest in the CSFR. What are your relations with other Hungarian parties and movements in Czechoslovakia? Do you believe that you will remain the most influential organization protecting the interests of this minority?

[Duray] For the time being, we are really the largest organization of this type. Based on the results of local elections, we can say that our movement has the support of 65 percent of Hungarian voters. Relations with other parties and movements are balanced. Relations with the Hungarian Civic Democratic party are not the best. This is probably mostly because they are members of the government coalition and we are not. Well, we have general disagreements, as is usual between government parties and opposition parties.

[Zizka] The Polish paper GAZETA WYBORCZA wrote that you are an organization representing mostly Hungarians and that other minorities are only a veil disguising the Hungarian character of your movement.

[Duray] It is not our fault that the Hungarian minority is the largest one. Even if all the Poles, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, and Germans backed our movement, we would still be the majority.

'Text' of Bill on Publication of StB Files

*AU1005174492 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 6 May 92 p 3*

[“Draft Law on Publishing a List of Citizens Registered in the Files of the State Security Corps,” approved at an extraordinary meeting of the Czech Government on the night of 4 May]

[Text] At an extraordinary meeting on the night of 4 May, the Czech Government approved a draft law on publishing a list of some citizens registered in the files of the now defunct State Security Corps [StB]. We publish the full text of this draft law, which has been submitted to the Czech National Council:

The CSFR Federal Assembly has passed the following law:

Preamble

The purpose of this law is to contribute to knowledge about our past, to eliminate the influence of former StB structures, and to prevent the spreading of misinformation about the cooperation of some citizens with the former StB.

Article 1

This law lays down the conditions for and the method of publishing the names of citizens entered in the register of files of the former StB from 25 February 1948 to 17 November 1989 as StB resident agent, agent, holder of a leased or conspiratorial apartment, informer, or ideological collaborator (Footnote 1), their StB steering officers, and some employees of the Federal Ministry of Interior (hereafter referred to only as "list").

Article 2

(1) The list will be compiled by the Federal Ministry of Interior (hereafter referred to only as "ministry") in alphabetical order. The list will include the name, surname, date and place of birth, and code name of individual citizens registered in the files and of their steering officers. Regarding individual citizens, the list will include the period during which they were registered as persons performing activities listed in Article 1 and regarding steering officers the period of their contract of employment.

(2) Furthermore, the ministry will include in the list, commensurately with all data according to Article 2, employees of the ministry who operated, in the period specified in Article 1, in those constituent parts of the former StB that were involved in the struggle against the internal enemy.

(3) The list must be compiled in such a way as to render it impossible to carry out changes in it and to supplement it; the pages of the list must be numbered throughout, verified by the ministry's round stamp with the state emblem, and firmly bound. Each part of the list can be arranged in several volumes. Once the list has been sent out, no supplements or changes to it may be carried out.

Article 3

(1) The ministry will publish the list in an appropriate manner and will send it, in particular, to the CSFR Federal Assembly, the Czech National Council, the Slovak National Council, district offices, and, in Prague,

to the Municipal Office of the Capital City of Prague and to the municipal district offices of its boroughs, no later than

(2) For the purpose of this law, the day of publication of the list is understood to be the 15th day after the ministry sends the list to the bodies listed under section (1).

(3) Official extracts from the list can be made only by the ministry for the needs of courts.

Article 4

As of the day of publication of the list in accordance with this law, the provisions of Article 19 of Law No. 451 of 1991 Laying Down Some Additional Prerequisites for the Execution of Some Posts in CSFR, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic State Bodies and Organizations will not apply to the data contained in the list.

Article 5

The publication of a list of citizens identified as persons listed in Article 1 by anyone but the ministry will be treated as a criminal act and will be punished by a jail sentence of six months to three years, or by a financial penalty.

Article 6

This law goes into force on

Footnote

Article 2, section 1 of Law No. 451 of 1991 Laying Down Some Additional Prerequisites for the Execution of Some Posts in CSFR, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic State Bodies and Organizations.

Pittner Views Credibility of StB Files

AU1105090392 Bratislava PRAVDA
in Slovak 6 May 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Slovak Minister of Interior Ladislav Pittner by Frantisek Melis on 5 May in Bratislava: "Each of Us Could Be in the Register"]

[Text] [Melis] Mr. Pittner, could you tell us your opinion on the so-called screening law?

[Pittner] This law has shortcomings that it need not have, had there been consultation with individual prime ministers and their interior ministers prior and during the discussion of the bill in parliament. Representatives of the Slovak Republic demanded, for example, individualization [individualizacia] of this law to prevent its blanket application to individual categories. They wanted the law to apply only to those StB [secret police] members and to the network of StB agents involved in the so-called struggle against the internal enemy. The Federal Assembly did not accept these comments, however, so the law acquired dimensions that are precarious, to say the least.

[Melis] It is generally known that within your department you approach the enforcement of this law, if not with outright indifference, then at least with detachment.

[Pittner] On no account do I approach the law indifferently. Quite the contrary, from the very beginning I have regarded it as essential from the viewpoint of the security of this republic. As we understand it, however, the screening law applies only to those [StB] members who worked against the internal enemy. On the other hand, we have extended its application to the intelligence component of the Border Guards, which proceeded in a highly inhuman fashion, particularly in the struggle against the internal enemy. Ever since I took up the post of interior minister, we have not hired anyone who formerly worked in that field, even if he successfully passed screening by the civic commissions.

[Melis] Could you give us a brief description of individual categories of StB collaborators? What conditions did, for example, an informer [dovernik] have to meet?

[Pittner] I can say, based on the knowledge that I acquired while working in the intelligence service in 1990, that StB informers were people who were important as a potential source of information, as is the case everywhere in the world. They did not even have to know that their information was being used by the StB because it used to contact them under various pretexts and these people served it only as valuable sources of information. They did not have to know that.

[Melis] Does that mean that any citizen of this republic could belong to that category, or only people whom the StB selected?

[Pittner] Anyone who was interesting for the StB from the viewpoint of information could be registered in that category.

[Melis] Does that include, for example, people who used to travel abroad on business?

[Pittner] Of course. This category also includes, for example, athletes and priests who were pinpointed by the StB as important sources of information. The StB misused them without their knowledge.

[Melis] What is concealed behind the term "candidate of secret collaboration"?

[Pittner] This was someone who was not just pinpointed as a source of information that was of interest to the StB but someone whom the StB considered a potential collaborator. Again, he still did not have to know that the StB kept him on file as a candidate for secret collaboration. Many people in those categories, however, were consciously providing the StB with information because the StB, too, had to test these people. That does not mean that they automatically became secret collaborators. Certain criteria played a role here that are applied by every intelligence service with regard to its sources of

information. Only from the dossiers is it possible to determine whether the information was provided unconsciously or consciously.

[Melis] In other words, no one registered in those categories had to pledge in writing to cooperate with the StB.

[Pittner] The so-called act of commitment was not set as a condition for the activity of either an informer or a candidate of secret collaboration.

[Melis] Let us now move to the categories that required written consent to cooperate. I am thinking of holders of conspiratorial apartments and agents.

[Pittner] Those are broader categories. We used to refer to them in our slang as *Therasas* [terezky], that is, secret collaborators, which comprises holders of conspiratorial apartments, agents, and resident agents. In these categories it was necessary to carry out a so-called recruitment operation [verbovka] and, on the basis of its outcome, to file an act of commitment. In the absolute majority of cases, this act took written form. The relevant person pledged in writing to consciously collaborate with the StB, either as holder of a conspiratorial apartment, agent, or resident agent, with the last applying only to the most successful individuals.

[Melis] Was the StB content with a mere written consent to cooperate?

[Pittner] There did not have to be written consent. For several years it sufficed to conclude the so-called recruitment operation with an act of commitment, which meant giving oral consent to collaboration in front of two StB officers. Such a commitment to collaborate carried the same weight for the collaborator as a commitment in writing.

[Melis] Based on what you have just said, is it possible to regard the list [of Czech and Slovak journalists identified as StB agents] published in *TELEGRAF* and *METROPOLITAN* as credible?

[Pittner] I did not have the register of files at my disposal. If these people are featured in the register of files, then the list can be regarded as credible. It is possible, however, as I have learned from newspapers, that errors occurred when retyping the names. Even so, I regard the argument that the list is fake as not credible, because at the time when the registers were produced, no force in our country, including the StB, could assume that the regime would fall and that it camouflaged certain things [as published]. Therefore, I believe that these lists are credible.

[Melis] Do you think that these lists are the last word of the Federal Security and Information Service or can we expect it to come forth with more?

[Pittner] Reporters from a certain periodical came to see me on Tuesday [5 May] with a piece of paper in which they demand that individual members of the government and other constitutional officials make the results

of their screening available to the public. It was a mistake to make the lists of journalists public. It was not a mistake from the viewpoint of TELEGRAF because journalists have an obligation to search for information of interest to the public. It was irresponsible of those who provided this report, marked top secret, to the newspaper. What happened cannot be undone, but now it would be necessary to find out who provided the report to the press. As privacy was intruded upon in this case, to say the least, I do not regard the situation as desirable. It is up to each one of us whether he is willing to disclose such private matters to the public. As far as I am concerned, I have no reason not to make public the results of my own screening.

Dienstbier Presents Rationale for Centrist OH

92CH0480A Prague LISTY in Czech
No 1, 1992 pp 34-40

["Text" of speech given by Jiri Dienstbier, federal minister of foreign affairs, at the First Congress of Civic Movement on 16 November 1991 in Prague: "We Are Not Seeking Adversaries, Enemies"]

[Text] Though we are publishing the speech given by the chairman of the Civic Movement at the first republican congress of the OH [Civic Movement] on 16 November 1991 in Prague, we are not doing so because we wish to provide an indiscriminating advertisement for one of the political currents. We believe it is a pity when an important successor of the Civic Forum and the traditions of the Czech and Moravian dissident movement does not have his own press platform and his thoughts on a program remain exclusive property of his activists. The Civic Movement has been criticized that its political profile is vague and lacks clear definition. Judge for yourselves whether this is true.

Masaryk believed that it would take 50 years before democratic principles and customs became firmly established. We have experienced 50 years of anti-democratic regimes. Thus extremism in our politics should be interpreted in this context. It is becoming apparent that even aversion to foreign supremacy and a common struggle against a totalitarian regime do not create love of freedom that recognizes the freedom of others, nor does it create social justice.

It is up to us to make the public aware that the dividing line is not between extremes, but that it runs between democratic, tolerant, and decent citizens who desire cooperation, irrespective of the party they belong to, and those citizens who succumb to the restricting ideologies of the left and right wings. It has often been demonstrated that extremes closely resemble each other, regardless of the difference in their ideologies. They resemble each other in one most important point, namely, the means they choose to attain their ends.

Under the present conditions in Czechoslovakia we may be setting ourselves an extremely difficult task. Because there seems to be no sense of moderation anywhere.

Petty-mindedness and megalomania, egotism and collective zeal, political and nationalistic frenzy attract one another and mutually strengthen each other.

Freedom that does not apply to everyone is a lethal fairy tale. When we succeeded in regaining our freedom, we discovered that democracy survives through democrats but, coming from a situation where there was no freedom, we still tend to define freedom in some abstract form that is far removed from reality. Therefore we are seeking principles on which to found a political movement, which would provide a guarantee that we will succeed in preserving democracy. We have learned that individual freedom is unthinkable without the guarantee of human rights, a rule-of-law state, and without pluralism and competition among individuals transacting business. We had and still have plenty of parasitic redistributors of public welfare.

Social peace, if it is not to become a dangerous slogan of demagogues, is anchored in honest competition among creative citizens who own workshops, factories, and stores; of the people working in them, and of those who increase our educational and cultural values. In short, individuals who work honestly and who simultaneously serve not only their own interests but those of others.

If we really wish to be successful, we must implement free thinking and liberal policies. Policies that will not ask whether we are rightist or leftist but whether we are free; whether we have been successful in liberating ourselves from the black-and-white perspective instilled in us since childhood. Above all, we must all de-Bolshevize and de-totalitarianize ourselves.

Individuals who favor the right wing-left wing formula in politics sometimes consider liberal parties and movements to be rightist in economics and leftist in their respect for the freedom of the individual, human rights, collective autonomy, and social matters. This is not an absurdity as far as facts are concerned but an absurdity in respect to the concept of rightist and leftist. This century should have made us come to the tragic realization of what such separation leads to. It drove millions of people into the arms of fascist or nationalistic totalitarian regimes and others into the arms of communism. If freedom is to prevail, it must equally be political and civil liberty, national and cultural freedom, and freedom of enterprise. In other words, it must be human freedom. Only the understanding of the mutual interaction of all aspects of life, people and nature, can lead not to false freedom, not to anarchic freedom, but to responsible freedom.

However, we are not concerned with the tradition of rightist and leftist. But if someone should insist on this terminology, we will say that we are in the center. The pragmatic center. This center must spread as much as possible in both directions so as to leave as little room as possible for extremes.

Center Does Not Mean Mediocrity

However, the center does not mean amorphousness or mediocrity. It is a sense for moderation as one of the basic not solely political but also European virtues. Furthermore, as a human virtue. Such a center means equilibrium. Therefore we are not seeking adversaries or enemies on the other side of the barricade. We want to bring down the barricades. To the contrary, we are seeking those who wish to contribute to the creation of a free, democratic Czechoslovakia. We do not wish to defeat anyone. We wish to win them for a common cause. Our only enemy is totalitarianism, including the elements of totalitarianism that have remained in each of us.

There was a reason why Ferdinand Peroutka wrote many years ago that a lack of liberality is a lack of humanity. A liberal viewpoint is a practical viewpoint, and liberalism is primarily concerned with the issue of freedom. The leader of the British Liberal Party, Paddy Ashdown, recently defined a good liberal party as one that is effective and stable, responsible and loyal to a free market in the economy, dedicated to civil liberty, social justice, and human rights, and international in its outlook.

Not long ago you received proposals for our movement to join the Liberal International. I believe that it is our most natural ally. Apart from it, only the Conservative and Socialist Internationals exist. The Liberal International was founded in 1947 in Oxford. Its Liberal Manifesto of 1981 elaborates its primary principles in the political sector. These are the legal protection of the individual and of human dignity, the decentralization of power, the improvement of the effectiveness of executive power and its parliamentary control. The leading liberal parties are, for instance, the German FDP and the Danish Venstre headed by Uffe Elleman Jensen. Perhaps you remember how, during his official visit to Czechoslovakia at the beginning of 1989, he invited not only the dissidents who were free to lunch, but also Vaclav Havel who was in prison. Salvador da Madriaga, one of the presidents of the Liberal International, stated shortly after the war that "the world never had a greater need for liberalism, and the liberals never had a greater need for mutual support, because the ideas and ideals that personify modern civilization are now threatened more than ever before by slogans and dogmas that are much more dangerous than those in the past." Communism and many fascist, nationalist, religious and other dictatorships have repeatedly confirmed his words to the present day.

Simple civic virtues, the love of truth, honest work, and, above all, respect for the opinions of others and national, racial, and religious tolerance, are never guaranteed permanently. This is particularly true in our country. Thus it is natural for the liberal parties of the world to unite in order to provide each other with information, to coordinate their activities, and to help each other.

The chairman of the International, Otto von Lambsdorf, invited me to an executive session, which will take place at the end of November in Warsaw. If you give me the mandate to do so, I would like to discuss the methods of and options for cooperation there, and obtain information on the steps that must be taken for us to be admitted before the set deadline.

Need for Citizens' Consensus

The Civic Movement is sometimes accused of retaining the positions of the Civic Forum. To a certain degree this is true, but I do not believe that it is something to be ashamed of. It certainly was not possible to preserve the OF [Civic Forum], since it really did include too broad a spectrum of opponents to totalitarianism. In fact, it would not have been healthy to do so, although I still believe that we split up sooner than we should have. We had not yet finished establishing the foundations for a democratic, rule-of-law state, we had not realized the economic reform, and had not ratified our common state. Many people feel this way, and with the elections drawing near they are, in fact, appealing to us to re-unify. Well, we were not the ones who decided to leave the broad current of citizens' consensus. It was those individuals who wanted something special, who thought they had a better formula for success than was offered by a joint approach. However, this does not mean that we are remnants. To the contrary, we are the ones who are convinced that cooperation is more important than enforcing one's own special ideology. We will naturally fight to attain the greatest possible success in the elections. But we are not trying to get power at all costs. We are not concerned with winning the elections for ourselves, rather we desire the victory of an open political culture.

The innate logic of liberalism points toward a movement, even if it is organized as a party. Furthermore, we are beginning to realize that this is a rather scholastic argument. We are a party of political conflict anyway, and everyone considers us as such. Perhaps we will arrive at some formal changes at some point. Perhaps we will even change our name if it proves to be expedient. At this time, it would merely be a forced action, which would hinder us in our objectives. But this does not preclude us from calling ourselves a liberal forum or free democrats if necessary.

However, it is not sufficient simply to adopt principles. They must be clearly included in our everyday policies.

The screening law can serve as an example. We, the Civic Movement, initiated it. The democratic version was approved unanimously by the federal government. I emphasize unanimously. But it was adopted in a form that is counter to international agreements on human rights. The individuals who advocated this form and who voted for it generally had good intentions. In reference to it, Adam Michnik said that this dispositional, Jacobin-like legislation hurt him and other

friends who had dedicated their whole lives to the struggle against totalitarianism.

Many of us abstained from voting, and the two youngest members voted against it. Again, we were accused of voting with the communists. But that was not the mistake we made. Our mistake was that we could not even keep an eye on each other well enough to oppose this concept of the law in a determined and unified manner.

Obviously we must get rid of disloyal individuals at the beginning of our development. I myself have been conducting screenings at my ministry for over a year. I do not merely remove proven agents from their official positions. I fire them altogether. But I do not hide behind the law. I take personal responsibility for my actions.

It may not seem to be much. Certain categories of people will not be permitted to hold specific offices for a number of years. That is nothing compared to the way they treated us.

However, this law contains some dangers. Primarily, it will not fulfill the hopes that old structures will be eliminated. Therefore it will be a big disappointment, and this could result in an even greater public depression and an increased lack of confidence in societal change. This is because the true mafiosi were seldom stupid enough to waste precious time, for instance, in people's militias.

The classification of entire groups does not recognize historical events. As a result, it leads to paradoxes such as that a public prosecutor, who was in the LM [People's Militia] but refused to go into Wenceslaus Square to suppress the demonstration and was instantly thrown out because of it, is now about to be thrown out again; or that Alexander Dubcek may be an employee, but not the head, of his own office. If we wish to establish a democracy and a rule-of-law state, we must not diverge from this aim, even if we feel a strong urge to do so. In short, justice must be blind. And each case must be judged individually. I will not allow the idea of permitting yesterday's members of the StB [State Security] to decide on the fate of their former victims today. I know for sure that many, without justification, entered citizens in their records who never were agents.

People, Do Not Be Afraid!

One of the most dangerous concomitant phenomena—and this does not only apply to the screening law—is the continuing expectation of a large sector of society that the state will again resolve everything for us. Critics state that people live in fear again. We say: People, do not be afraid.

Last week Gonzales, the Spanish prime minister, was here on a visit. He was asked how they had solved this problem. They did nothing at all. They realized that if democratic awareness was to evolve, democracy could not be installed from above. And this proved to be correct. Almost no ex-Franco mayors were voted for in

free elections, and we, too, know which individuals in which villages violated human rights, denounced their neighbors, and misused political IDs to obtain benefits they were not entitled to through their work. Simply put, we will no longer vote for these people, we will not permit them to steal from the enterprises entrusted to them, or to fire those who fought against totalitarianism and thus also against their supremacy in the enterprise or in the community. It is this kind of political struggle that can obtain for all of us, every member of the Civic Movement and for our local organizations, unprecedented authority.

The struggle against the consequences of totalitarianism and for human rights must be a very practical activity.

One of the basic human rights is the possibility for an individual to freely walk down the street without fear of being attacked or killed. Therefore we are striving to ensure that our Minister of the Interior, Tomas Sokol, has sufficient means to guarantee us this human right. We would like our ministers Richter and Spacek equally to have the means to accelerate the legal and extra-legal rehabilitation of thousands of prisoners from concentration camps. In many cases there is a risk that they will not live to receive a decent pension or restitution. This policy is different from that of the individuals who gather in the squares and shout for de-Bolshevization. But doing the latter is easier than offering their work and their time to state agencies that cannot keep up.

As a result of our aversion to the benefits received by the former powers that be, we abolished personal pensions. The granddaughters of President Masaryk and many former prisoners find it difficult to eke out a living. Even if other solutions are too complex, let us at least reinstitute personal pensions for them.

In every community it is possible to work toward asserting the most basic and half-forgotten human right—the right to be a citizen of one's own community. The loss of the feeling of belonging to a community, alternating with isolation in front of a television screen, is one of the most serious consequences of totalitarianism. Communal politics start with flowers in the gardens and white-washed facades for all to see, as used to be customary here a hundred years ago. It is up to the governments and parliaments to create legal prerequisites for this. But even in this case, the law and governmental decisions will not create a community for us and they will not make us become aware of the fact that if we throw a can into our neighbor's yard, we are throwing it into our own.

Economic and Spiritual Reform

Economic transformation is not a program that belongs to one party or another. It is the absolute necessity to return to the present, modern form of the rules by which an economy functions, rules that have evolved over many thousands of years.

But if we wish to succeed, we cannot simplify the reform solely to its economic and technical aspects. And certainly not to the realization of its new, this time economic, ideology. We can neither return to F.L. Veka's grocery store, nor to the barbarity of the first capitalists from a totalitarian economy. Neither social justice nor clean air are the icing on the cake; they are not the reward for produced wealth. They are integral parts of it. The reform will be successful if it will become everyone's cause. And we must work our way up to prosperity. Modern society has nothing in common with economic or with social Darwinism.

Not long ago, almost the whole present generation of Rockefellers came here on a visit. Steve, the son of the late governor of New York and Republican presidential candidate, Nelson Rockefeller, made a very clear statement. It is not a matter of the economy but of democracy, including democracy in the economy. He said that Darwinistic capitalism, which rejects the environment and social issues, cannot work. One must have an honorable government that is concerned with the good of the people.

We not only need to have political analysis but political will.

However, this means more that statements about loyalty to the reform, it also means the acceptance of responsibility for its realization. This is all the more true since we are a governmental party that entered the elections and the governments with the promise that it would do everything it can to implement it. Therefore we must not only constantly monitor its development and continually fine-tune it according to the findings we obtain during its realization. We need to find partners among businessmen and employees. We do not want to be a party solely for the rich or solely for the poor. We want to be a party for free and responsible citizens, who will contribute, each in his own way but together, to the development of democracy and prosperity.

There is no such thing as an abstract economy. An economy exists when people using their abilities and skills unite to perform an activity in order to make a living, be comfortably off, and fulfill their desires. Thus economic policy is also a very practical activity and screaming or beating the table with one's fist is out of place.

Yesterday's commentary in *MLADA FRONTA DNES*, for example, shows how attempts are constantly being made to ideologize the economy. The author criticized the OH's economic policy, saying that it is contradictory because it agrees with what is called Klaus' reform but modifies it in a way that he would allegedly reject. In order to be more explicit, he gives an example. According to him, the issue is: should we have a surplus or deficit budget? At this time, I am not concerned with the fact that the author apparently never read our program. After all, we stated that we support all the major pillars of the reform, including a surplus budget.

That is not the irony. Our colleague, Klaus, does not have the freedom to ideologize in this way. He is the one who sets the financial policy and therefore he knows that we will have a deficit budget in almost all items next year, irrespective of the fact that both he and we support a surplus budget. Privatization, including coupon privatization, should also not be politicized. We cannot afford to disrupt the economy to such an extent that we have nothing left to privatize. We need to proceed as quickly as possible but not precipitately. We also must not zero in on old structures to the detriment of our businessmen who need sufficient time to submit competitive plans. After all, our aim is to ensure that as many free Czechoslovak businessmen as possible can become modern captains of our industry. Also, considering the inflow of so much necessary foreign capital, we should make sure that the largest possible number of our businessmen, experts, and employees participate in its realization. The radical sector of our right wing would like to replace totalitarian socialization with totalitarian desocialization. This would not be possible, anyway. Mexico is executing an extremely successful reform and is privatizing 75 percent of its formerly nationalized economy. It obtained 60 billion in investments. Nevertheless, President Salinas, one of the most modern economists, told us that it will take a long time to privatize the largest enterprises, smelters and mines, which are inefficient and pollute the environment. Therefore we must also have the necessary tools with which to integrate such enterprises into a market economy.

Fundamentalism in privatization is most dangerous in connection with agriculture. We must not destroy the present cooperatives but must turn them into cooperatives of real owners based on the principle that values can only be created through the melding of work and soil. It is not by chance that the law on the transformation of cooperatives has still not been adopted, although the federal government finally approved it yesterday. Even the strongest ideologists opposing the privatization of cooperatives know that they cannot be responsible for depriving us of food. Has there been a reasonable and considered approach, villages could have known where they stood long ago. They could have freely decided whether the farmers wanted to work alone or in some form of cooperation, such as was customary in this country already a hundred years ago. Not to mention the damage caused by the unnecessary preservation of the monopolies held by purchasing and selling cooperatives. It is becoming clear that the most effective form of screening would be through laws that break the monopoly of the mafia through free business activities. However dedicated we are to economic reform, we did not freeze in the town squares two years ago for a value-added tax, although we do not doubt the importance of this transformation tool. We froze so that we could be free and could live the life of civilized people.

We do not merely need an economic transformation, we also need spiritual and moral transformation. Despite years of totalitarianism, we preserved a relatively high

standard of general education. We have no illiteracy, and we have one of the best qualified labor forces. Despite everything, we preserved enormous cultural wealth. Therefore, when we now read headings such as "Take a pitchfork to the Books," we become enclosed in a circle of utter contempt for cultural values. The last time books were treated this way was after 1948 and, to a lesser degree, after 1968. At that time, it was for ideological reasons, today it is for financial ones. Our Achilles' heel is the development of science, technology, and education. As if we did not know that investing in education is the most effective form of investment.

What is incredible is the looting of our cultural monuments and their export abroad. The argument that the International Monetary Fund refused to include them in the list of goods that may not be exported does not hold water. Appropriate legislation is not sufficient to deal with this. What is needed is the initiative of citizens throughout the republic who will guard our cultural heritage. Our organizations can play a considerable role in attaining this.

Many theaters and other cultural institutions are crumbling, our education system is stagnating. If we save excessively in this sphere, we will pay dearly in the future. This, too, is an area for our activities.

Organization of the State, Stability of the Regions

You know the condition of our legislative state organization. The temptation of nationalism is confronting juridical fundamentalism, which, however, is merely a cover for a profound lack of understanding of the need to create a truly democratic common state after having had a unitarian state and federalized totalitarianism.

A common state is an economic and security necessity. At this time, no one can calculate the real economic losses that would be caused by disintegration or separation. No one can assess the extent to which economic reform would be slowed down. Although we may suffer less in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, we would still suffer considerably.

But I would like to point out a fact that is seldom considered. A separation would totally change our geopolitical situation.

Slovakia would fall into the area of instability that stretches from Russia to Yugoslavia. The present Hungarian government as well as the opposition unambiguously reject any questioning of European borders, including borders with their own neighbors. But the logic of disintegration is guided by its own rules—as we can see in Yugoslavia—and the reaction cannot always be controlled. Mayor Komarna has already stated that the Hungarian citizens are totally loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic, but should a nationalistic principle be implemented, they will demand the implementation of the same principle for those of Hungarian nationality.

We also know that the democratic development in the Soviet Union is by no means assured. Alexander Yakolev told me himself that the fate of Soviet democracy is dependent on this winter. To the east of our borders lies the Ukraine. It is in our interest that the people of the Ukraine successfully develop their democratic state. However, we also know that there are extremist forces in the Ukraine. The country is about as large as France, has about the same size of population, has nuclear weapons on its territory, and has a potential army larger than that of Germany. If the democratic development were to be reversed and some nationalist dictatorship were to come to power, it is easy to calculate what that would mean for our security. If anyone were to take comfort in the idea that such a Ukraine would border on Slovakia, it is false comfort. A wild zone of instability on the border would be a tragedy for the Czech Republic, too. It would be easier to face such a potential danger together; what is more, it would be easier to prevent such a danger together. The whole European strategy today depends on how successfully and quickly it will be possible to consolidate democracy and create potential prosperity in those places where it is most promising within a relatively short period of time, and on the extent to which this zone can be pushed farther east. The stronger and larger a stabilized Europe will be, the greater the possibility of establishing democracy in those places where it is still questionable.

Thus our greatest security is a common state, and it is in our interest to defend it.

Modern European political and economic development is oriented toward strengthening personal, group, and cultural national identity. However, not as an isolated and isolating phenomenon, but as a creative element of European integration. As a consequence, the expression of the national identity by Slovaks and Czechs is still far from being the creation of their own national states. Our nations will be known to and respected by others depending on the size of their contribution toward implementing the values of European civilization. So we must now decide whether we will be a weak or shrinking factor of disintegration or, though temporarily still weak, an element of a stabilized democratic Europe; whether nationalist and party egotism will prevail over mutual interests or whether we will create a democratic society that is strong due to its cohesion.

If we wish to be a party of citizens' consensus in the political spectrum, we must also assert this in the problems of establishing a common state.

About the Czech Prime Minister's Speech

I would like to take this occasion to comment on a speech by the prime minister of the Czech government and the vice-chairman of our movement, Petr Pithart. I have been familiar with his opinions and the way he thinks for a long time. Therefore I know he is true to himself, that his views are not purely opportunistic. He was speaking to the Slovak nation. He was relying on the

fact that the other half of the truth—about Czech help to the Slovaks—would be stated by the other party. We will see whether and how this will happen. Jan Carnogursky is to speak on television today. A politician's speech can certainly never be personal, even if he were to repeat it a dozen times. But I would like to emphasize again that this speech was motivated by profound anxiety about the fate of a common state. And it was also a necessary demonstration of accommodation toward those Slovaks who would like to live with us but are seeking to calm their fears that they will again feel like second-class citizens in this common state. We may consider these fears to be irrational and unfounded. However, we know that in politics feelings are as important as, if not more important as than, any arguments.

A common state can only exist on the basis of the free will of both nations and other nationalities. So we must be sufficiently flexible in the method and manner in which this free will is expressed. But when we say "common state," we really do mean a state and not some kind of hodgepodge where we will constantly be arguing about jurisdictions. A common state must be sovereign, must have all the necessary features to be able to ensure external and internal security, take a stand on the international scene, create a unified monetary and economic policy, and ensure the same standard of human rights and social securities. It is impossible to simultaneously have and not have a common state. Of course, we could also agree on some other form of being neighbors, on a confederation, or an even looser union; whatever happens, we must remain friends. But we have no illusions that this could benefit any of us. Therefore the Civic Movement is prepared to do everything it can to preserve a common state.

Our Foundations

Yesterday on television President Havel said that a sense of responsibility toward the whole and for the whole is being lost as a moral value. It is customary to separate politics and morals. Our revolution was founded on Charter 77 and the manifesto "Democracy for All." It was the result of asserting morality as the most effective political tool. All the more effective because it did not strive for power, but for the victory of truth and justice. That, too, is our positive vision of the future.

Politics is making a vision come true. Practical politics is its realization. It is not important to shout that we are free-thinking and liberal. What is important is to be liberal.

Conflicts between parties should never grow to a stage where the interests of the party are more important than the interests of society. Therefore we offer friendly, tolerant cooperation to anyone who wishes to complete the democratic development and social transformation of society. Once again, this is not a dispersion of the center but our experience of freedom.

Lately there has been much talk about electoral coalitions. We would like to work with anyone who shares the

same values. We will not succumb to the unscrupulousness of the pre-election fighting. We want to win, in other words to obtain a result that will enable us to make sure that liberal values will not be neglected. Considering the growing extremism in political life, we must give the citizens a guarantee that decency, a sense of moderation, equilibrium, human dignity, recognition of the rights of every individual, regard for his social and cultural needs and for the environment in which he lives will be preserved.

Today, just as after World War I, we are facing the fundamental question of whether the gregarious, authoritative extremes of the right wing and the left wing will prevail, or a free-thinking, liberal concept of the world. Through the lessons learned from the history of totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century we have a much greater chance of winning today. There have been more than enough social illusions and mass uprisings. We also have support in the democratic part of Europe and the world, where the principles of liberalism have been integrated into parties with conservative or socialist origins. In our country they were brutally suppressed, and many individuals who reject communism often behave like rightist Bolsheviks. Thus the free democrats have a blank sheet of paper in front of them. But this paper must be written on if democracy is to prevail in this country.

Klaus Discusses Civic Democratic Party's Future

AU1305082192 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 8 May 92 p 3

[Interview with Vaclav Klaus, Civic Democratic Alliance chairman and federal finance minister, by Bratislav Janik; place and date not given: "Powerlessness of the Pragmatic Klaus"]

[Text] [Janik] Mr. Chairman, which form of constitutional arrangement will the Civic Democratic Party endorse after the elections?

[Klaus] It is clearly stated in the Civic Democratic Party electoral program, Freedom and Prosperity, that we will endeavor to refine the present model of the federation. A two-member federation with the republic right of veto is constantly in danger of an insoluble constitutional crisis. We are concerned with certain attributes that make a federation a federation—indubitable federal laws and their validity throughout the entire territory. The federation should have its own irrevocable powers. We consider a common federal state—a multi-member one, if possible—to be the most expedient.

[Janik] What could split the common state?

[Klaus] Certainly, Slovak impatience. We are in a difficult period of transition and have numerous reasons for dissatisfaction. That only means more reasons to do something about our problems. Our difficulties can be compared to joint vessels and to me it seems shortsighted and erroneous to concentrate on one of them—

the constitutional arrangement or social politics, for instance. The same applies to building an electoral program on such a basis. We are convinced that none of the feasible solutions is the worst-case one. Democracy means a quest for an accord, and the elections provide an opportunity to find the best representatives. If the state is to be preserved, legal and economic integrity must be maintained. Only if this proves impossible will the Civic Democratic Party accept the division of the state.

[Janik] The present form of the economic reform is certainly an inseparable part of the Civic Democratic Party's economic policy. What are your ideas regarding the role the state is to play in economic development?

[Klaus] In a regularly running economy, the role of the state must be marginal. The state must select several specific areas in which it has to help—ecology, for instance, conversion of entire sectors, education, health care, public transport, etc. Other than that, it should only minimally interfere with the everyday operation of the economy. [The claim that there is] any central organization from above is a mystification by the antireformers in both Bohemia and Slovakia. The state should formulate basic rules, and line the field, no more, no less.

[Janik] Today, the Civic Democratic Party, born from the womb of the Civic Forum, presents itself as a conservative right-wing party endorsing parliamentary democracy and the civic principle. Has the party passed through some internal stage of development?

[Klaus] We do not have any internal conflicts, the Civic Democratic Party is currently the most stable party. The passage of the Civic Democratic Party is wide enough to accommodate a whole range of ideas, and sufficiently narrow to clearly differentiate the Civic Democratic Party from other parties. Neither as party chairman nor as an independent observer can I see any significant shift in the party's views.

[Janik] Which parties or movements are acceptable to the Civic Democratic Party in the event of forming government coalitions, and which—in spite of your pragmatism—are not?

[Klaus] In Bohemia, there could be a coalition with the Christian Democratic Party of Mr. Benda, and we are also close to the Club of Non-Aligned Activists. We made a non-aggression pact with the Civic Democratic Alliance and are friendly with the Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party of Mr. Lux. This covers the Czech right wing, except for some marginal parties. Communication with the left wing and with the Civic Movement—which claims center but in fact is left—is difficult. In Slovakia, we have a coalition relationship with the Democratic Party. We are also close to those Civic Democratic Union representatives who come to terms with the past of the Public Against Violence as a broad civic movement. We are closely watching developments in the Christian Democratic Movement as a constructive relationship between our parties is possible. In addition, we are on good terms

with the Hungarian Civic Party. Those that are unacceptable for us are the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Party of Democratic Left, the Social Democrats, and the Liberal Social Union. It is clear to me, however, that compromises must be made in the interest of more important matters.

[Janik] This attitude results in what I would term your down-to-earth approach—in comparison with other Czech parties—to the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia?

[Klaus] On the Slovak political scene an electoral coalition of the Civic Democratic Party with the Slovak National Party, the Party of Democratic Left, the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, or the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia is out of question. Regarding the federal political scene and the participation here of Slovak politics, however, I can only say that the victorious Czech parties will have to talk with the victorious Slovak parties. The composition of the Federal Government and filling of the ministerial posts will be decided in coalition negotiations. Whether, and how, it will help to maintain the federation is another question. As a pragmatist, I consider any speculations in this respect almost useless. This of course does not mean that I do not think about it.

[Janik] Are you also fighting for Slovakia? Is there any point in doing so?

[Klaus] Certainly.

[Janik] The media have frequently attacked you with accusations of longing for power and an obsession with power. What do you say?

[Klaus] I smile. I feel completely powerless. The jurisdiction arguments forced the economic reform out of my hands, and I cannot manage even the macroeconomic policies alone, interfere with the privatization process, or push something through the parliament. In the government, where I face a closed file of seven Civic Movement ministers, I lose every vote, and as one-sixteenth of an extremely politicized government, I really cannot have any feelings of sovereignty—you must believe that! It is often quite depressing. I hope that the elections will establish who will have what—not power but rather the strength to push through this or that. I am considering it from the aspect of the rational management of such a complex process as the one we are passing through, and not from the point of view of personal sentiments or longing for power.

ODS, ODA Negotiate Preelection Truce

92CH0486B Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 6 Apr 92 p 2

[Report by Dusan Sramek: "A Truce on the Right"]

[Text] In a joint announcement of 2 April, the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] and the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance] committed themselves to a preelection

pact not to attack each other and to a willingness after the elections to form a joint government coalition. This unambiguous announcement answer, perhaps once and for all, the various queries on the subject of a possible conflict between these two political entities and spoiled the happiness of all the parties on the left side of the barricades.

Despite the fact that it was preceded by a certain turn of events which more than once threatened to grow into a conflict, stemming more from misunderstanding than from any true jealousy. Many misunderstandings also arose in regard to searching for their own identities and finding a spot on the right of the political spectrum. Recently there were certain warnings on the part of the ODA which clearly rejected going into a preelection coalition with the Slovak HZDS [Movement For a Democratic Slovakia]. Even though the possibility of such an ODS coalition was implanted by outsiders and the ODS never announced anything like that nor took any steps in that direction, the suspicion existed here. Until the specific statement of Vaclav Klaus on the unreal nature of such a step, the leadership of the ODA was furrowing their brows and so an agreement was finally reached.

Today the ODS and the ODA unquestionably are among the strongest parties of the Czech right. The ODS moreover gained an advantage, even if a tardy one, with its entry onto the Slovak political scene where it intends going into the elections with the KAN [Club of Non-aligned Activists] and the Democratic Party. Another significant advantage consists of the finally concluded coalition with Benda's KDS [Christian Democratic Party], which has the value of pure gold for the ODS in the form of the Christian-oriented voters who are unwilling to give their votes to the CSL [Czechoslovak People's Party]. Not the least of advantages is also the fact that the image of Vaclav Klaus, who is one of the few politicians maintaining a stable position on the ladder of political popularity, is also a plus with the voters. The ODA, which in the last public opinion survey crossed the imaginary Rubicon of the 5 percent clause, looks mainly for generally known personalities, of which it has, as Daniel Kroupa announced with pride at the Congress before last, 500 or exactly as many as it needs to cover the entire list of candidates. For the Czech votes, it will also undoubtedly be an important motivating factor that first deputy chairman of the CNR [Czech National Council] Jan Kalvoda was elected chairman of the party. He is just the one who is today becoming a classic representative and symbol of the interests of the Czech Republic. Both parties thus today have taken on perhaps all the attributes of consolidated, progressive conservative parties and, what is more important, they can suitably supplement each other. It is therefore now more advantageous that they do not merge. The fact that both parties are aware of their own responsibility for the process of radical economic reform and the reform of the entire society, which would remain just on paper without their participation in a decisive share of the power,

moreover also plays its unquestionable role here in the form which the preelection agreement takes.

Prokes Explains SNS Intentions, Orientation

92CH0513A Bratislava LITERARNI TYZDENNIK
in Slovak 4 Apr 92 pp 1, 11

[Interview with Jozef Prokes, chairman of the Slovak National Party, by Milan Augustin; place and date not given: "Let's Get Going"]

[Text] Jozef Prokes (born in 1950 in Nitra), a scientist and a politician. After graduating from the Slovak College of E. Gudern in Nitra, he graduated in 1973 from the Department of Natural Sciences of the Komensky University in Bratislava with the degree of Doctor of Natural Sciences. After finishing his studies, he became a visiting research student and later obtained a research fellowship at the Institute of Physics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences [SAV]. He worked in a group studying the physical properties of solid matter and conducted measurements in the environment of helium temperatures. His dissertation, "The Influences of Heat Treatment on the Heat Conductivity of Monocrystalline CaF_2 ," which he defended in 1983, was based on this work. In 1981 he began working in the Enterprise for Heavy Current Electrotechnics, Louny plant 05 Cab as an independent R&D worker. In 1986 he returned to the SAV Institute of Measuring Technology. Together with other colleagues he established in December 1989 a group called the Forum of Coordinating Committees Working in Slovakia, which became the representative of new trade unions in Slovakia and was recognized both by the Federal and the Slovak Governments. Prokes was one of the initiators of the Independent Slovak Trade Unions, and became their first elected chairman. In February 1990 he was coopted into the Slovak National Council. In the June parliamentary elections he was a candidate for deputy for the Slovak National Party. At present Jozef Prokes is the chairman of this party.

[Augustin] You are actually a scientist by profession, a specialist who has been concerned with questions of the physical properties of some materials under extremely low temperatures. If I extrapolate this fact into our present political events, I must say that our political climate exhibits very similar conditions as the materials you study. Their characteristics naturally change in such an environment, as do similarly, and also naturally, the conditions in our political spectrum, which, moreover, today probably no longer fully represents the views of eligible voters. But this problem will be solved by the upcoming elections. What developments do you expect in our political scene in the near future?

[Prokes] The present political developments in Slovakia indicate that the political scene will be becoming more sharply splintered. On one hand there is an increasingly ferocious effort to maintain the status quo, or possibly an even stronger unitary form of the CSFR—and on the other hand an ever more vigorous movement for the

fulfillment of the nation's right to self-determination. Increasing numbers of citizens of the Slovak Republic are coming to realize that if we are to develop further as a nation, as citizens, as a country, we must make our own decisions about ourselves and bear responsibility for ourselves. The motive behind the effort to secure our national identity by means of state sovereignty is not some hostility toward other nations, on the contrary, the motive is cooperation with all nations of the world directly, as an equal partner on the basis of mutual benefit. The national emancipation process is not some result of backward thinking brought on by socialism, as the opponents of sovereignty are trying to persuade us, but a natural process which is affecting all of Europe, in fact, the whole world. We only need to think about Flanders in Belgium, Catalonia in Spain, Scotland in Great Britain, or Quebec in Canada.

Everywhere people are striving for the same thing—to establish their national identity by means of state sovereignty. The programs of the Scottish national party or the Flemish national party are practically identical with the program of the SNS.

The reality therefore is that national states are not an anachronism, but precisely the opposite, and the effort to stop this process is a struggle against a natural development, it is the same kind of flagrancy as an effort to prevent a maturing person from becoming independent, from being his own self, from being an equal member of human society. To refuse one's own statehood is in fact the same thing as when an adult child refuses to get his own house and continues to let somebody else make his decisions. It is unnatural!

Peace in the world, but also in an integrated Europe, can be achieved only if the individuality and identity of each nation is secured. But we must think of a state as the house of a sovereign owner who decides about its interior arrangement according to his own taste and needs, and who also chooses his own friends, and not as a prison surrounded by barbed wire. If we think of state boundaries as the boundaries of the validity of certain legislative norms and not as a barrier to the movement of people, transportation of goods, or cultural ties, we shall find that the basic arguments of the proponents of a common state are refuted. If we also refuse to be scared by our neighbors (our borders are internationally guaranteed even if we become independent), we shall find that there is nothing left that could not be settled by international treaties. No problem travelling to Prague.

What is left, is a thus far unanswered question: What is the advantage for Slovakia in staying in the common state? Let's stop thinking naively that another state would keep us only so it can spend money on us. Enterprises in the Czech Republic [CR] and the Slovak Republic [SR] will do business with each other if it is economically advantageous for them, regardless of whether we are one state or two. To put it another way, in a market economy each enterprise is concerned first

and foremost with its own prosperity and seeks the most advantageous (in the economic sense) partner.

If, therefore, we cannot state what the advantage to Slovakia in a common state would be, it is, to my mind, irresponsible to talk about a treaty between CR and SR. I cannot imagine that in a market economy two enterprises would conclude a contract between themselves if they were not clear about what benefit it will bring them. And so negotiating a treaty between SR and CR before we are first clear what we imagine the future relationship to be and what we expect from it, is to stand logic on its head. The same applies to the drafting of the SR constitution. Instead of the Slovak National Council first deciding on its conception, after 9 months of discussions several conceptual alternatives of the SR constitution were drafted. And so we are practically where we were in March 1991. The only "substantial" difference is that a year ago in March the variously conceived constitutions were each in a separate document and now they are all in one.

[Augustin] In the daily PRACA writer Lajos Grendel wrote on 31 October 1991: "As a Hungarian I became accustomed a long time ago to the fact that I am a small player in a large drama about political power where a politician professes to be the savior of the nation—almost without exception. According to them, I am one of those who want to conquer Slovakia, repress the Slovaks (also almost without exception), and restore St. Stephen's empire. For the politicians of the Slovak National Party, but occasionally also of the Slovak Democratic Left and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, I am something of an odd man out. When a politician from these parties wants to gain cheap popularity with the "audience" he only needs to pull out the "Hungarian card." Success is guaranteed. To frighten Slovaks with the Hungarian bogey is, you see, in fashion and very popular. It will gain votes in the upcoming elections...." And so this next question was actually raised by Grendel.

[Prokes] An old Slovak proverb says that we judge the other person by ourselves. It seems that Grendel is doing just that.

It is primarily Calfa who frightens Slovaks with the Hungarian bogey. As the SNS chairman, I beg to emphasize that Calfa is not a member of the SNS. I think that it is not proper for Grendel to insist that SNS is looking, even zealously, for confrontation. Or are Slovaks to judge all Hungarians in Slovakia by Duray?

It is the SNS objective that the Slovak Republic as a sovereign state be the home of all its citizens without regard to nationality, race, or religion. An independent SR will be able to provide even better conditions for the development of national minorities than they have now (although even these are much higher than the European standard), because then Slovaks will no longer have to struggle to maintain their identity and will become the hosts. Today, the situation is different. Today we are in

fact rivals, because even Slovaks are de facto at the level of a national minority in the CSFR, and, moreover, in a less than advantageous position. Their identity is not established by any national state, whereas for the Hungarians it is established by the Hungarian Republic. The decimated Slovak minority in Hungary is indeed a clear testimony of that. It has not had, and still does not have, anyone to support it.

[Augustin] SNS did not begin its political activity on the Slovak political stage in exactly the most auspicious way. Many of its protagonists discredited the SNS political goals by their unqualified, but above all politically uncivilized, pronouncements. You certainly know that, but perhaps most of all feel it. If the other parties will view you, as the political representative of a certain part of our eligible voters, through this prism of distrust, disgrace, but also political envy, and take a position toward you accordingly, you will have to mend such relations, or to put it better, improve the reputation of your party even before making preparations for the election campaign. What steps are you taking in this matter?

[Prokes] SNS came into being spontaneously, when it became obvious that leaders of the "velvet revolution" will change many things, but that they consider the neo-Stalinist relations between Slovaks and Czechs good, even outstanding. They were satisfied with just painting over one S—Socialist on their company logo, and off they went! The party was born out of the sheer will of ordinary people, without financial backing, but literally almost against the liking of all the media oriented toward the new power. Obviously, waves will bring to the surface even dirty foam. Today it is clear to everybody that around every political entity there are various swindlers, exhibitionists, people whose own ego is the thing most sacred to them, people who are out for their own benefit. Everything is a matter of time, of gradual crystallization. People are best tested, even in politics, in their work. There they reveal their inner self, their character and talent. I do not think that SNS has been, or is, worse off in that respect than the other parties. They also had their scandals, big and small, different people and different levels of behavior and political culture. The spotlight is shining on us more sharply—our program makes us an oddity among the other parties. We refuse to take part in politicking and we reject engaging in games with the voters.

The situation is entirely different than the persistent view of us indicates. The intolerant have eliminated themselves. SNS before the elections is consolidated, and attacks against us can come only from the outside.

[Augustin] The main political goal of your party is a politically independent Slovakia, you even allowed the possibility of coexistence of our two states. If I understood correctly, probably in the form a "semi-detached house" as it was styled in the statement of the CR Prime Minister Pithart. Let us say that the Slovak Republic becomes independent and will have to deal with the political and economic consequences all by itself. Can it

attempt to handle this situation from the standpoint of political relations in the Central European region on the one hand, and on the other from the standpoint of its economic possibilities as well as other aspects?

[Prokes] For us, the independence of the Slovak Republic is an internationally proven means that makes it possible to create conditions for an all-around development of Slovakia as a country, as well as of all its citizens. The very fact that its independence as a state will establish internationally also the identity of the Slovak nation will create conditions for a conflict-free development of national minorities living in Slovakia. Their mutual relations with the Slovak nation will lose their character of rivalry by a natural process and be transformed into mutual cooperation, because we shall, as one unit, compete with, for example, Hungary for our status on the international stage. And therein lies the fundamental difference, that on the international stage we shall then compete with others for our status, but no longer for our place or seat. Today we are fighting among each other within our state, and there the Slovak nation is at a disadvantage, because for the time being—while, for example, the Hungarians have their national identity established by the independence of the Hungarian state, the Slovaks do not have it established anywhere and must still fight for it. This struggle is taking place within the CSFR, and we do not have enough strength left to compete on the international stage. Everybody can reach their own conclusion as to who profits by this. It is a continuing and exhausting struggle on the "district" level, which can end in two ways. Either we shall give up our national identity and the natural desire to have a presence on the international stage, or we shall guarantee that participation by having Slovakia a subject of international law. Surely, we must not give up our national identity.

Arguments, used by the proponents of the common state and the civic principle in a multi-national state, were valid even in 1918: why then are they celebrating the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the birth of the CSR [Czechoslovak Republic]? After all, the argument for the establishment of the CSR before the international forum was precisely the right of nations to self-determination. And there are literally even drawbacks for us in the common state, which are not balanced by anything else. A Czech emigre claims Czechoslovakia as his homeland not because he is a Czechoslovak but because he thinks of it, as does the whole world, as the state of the Czech nation: The predilection for abbreviations is not the reason why we are known as "Czech" around the world. It is the result of a deliberate, long-lasting propaganda. But there is no sense in blaming the Czechs. It is entirely natural that the dominant nation in a multi-national state wants the state to establish its identity. That, looking from the outside, is also the case of the Scot or the Breton, Catalan, Basque, and our case as well. Today we all know that the greatest profits do not go to the producer but to the middleman, and we communicate with the world through a middleman under the foreign

trade-mark "Czech." By declaring our state independence, we shall open up a direct route. The goal, therefore, is an all-around development of the citizens of the Slovak Republic as well as Slovaks as a nation, not at the expense but in cooperation with the national minorities living on SR territory. It will be made possible only by a direct cooperation on equal terms with all the nations of the world, integration into Europe as an entity with equal rights; and all that will be possible only when we have a democratic, politically pluralistic, independent state that guarantees civic equality to all its citizens and enables minorities to develop naturally in accord with international agreements.

Today we are not discussing which form of economy to introduce, because market economy has proven itself all over the world. Since our goal is an all-around development, we shall reach out for a national state linked directly into cooperation with all other states. That is no anachronism, but a proven means substantiated by the entire history of the human race as well as by the current developments around the world. Practically all multinational states have the same problems we have. Whether it be Great Britain, Spain, France, Belgium, or Canada.... If Pithart's semi-detached house is to be stable, it must show what kind of advantages it has for us in comparison with our independence, and at the same time explain why the Scots, Welsh, Catalans, Basques, Flemish, etc., are striving to achieve their statehood.

We have experimented with a common state for 70 years. It did not have a good record. We experimented with socialism (by the way, it came to us from Prague). It did not have a good record. Therefore we shall now reach out for something that has proven itself around the world. A national state and a market economy. If there exists some positive synergy for us in a closer link with somebody in fulfilling the goal we set for ourselves, that is, an all-around development of Slovakia, it will show up pretty quickly and naturally in the cooperation of two independent states. Let us part then before we have a falling out, and let us cooperate on the basis of mutual benefits and leave our future relations to a natural process. Let's not be afraid of parting. People associate together if it is to their advantage. As soon as it ceases to be advantageous, the association breaks up. Nobody, after all, remains a member of a club only so that the chairman can be a chairman. Proponents of a common state have been unable since the summer of 1991 even so much as to formulate the real advantages of a common state. Let us not stay in the common state just so the federal bureaucracy can continue to exist or that somebody can spend money on us. We are not, after all, parasites. We are living at a time when it seems as if history has awakened. Everything is changing, what until recently was substantive has turned to dust, and the glory of the pompous regimes has gone with the wind. A nation-emancipating movement is visible all over the world. We shall not sleep through these times, we shall get up and act. Otherwise, we might close the door on ourselves forever.

We cannot move an independent Slovakia elsewhere, we cannot change geopolitical realities. Therefore we must take them into consideration. The fundamental reality is that we live in a very small and sensitive territory that lies on the fraction-line between Germany and Russia, we live in a territory beyond which a new culture of power begins. We have been from time immemorial the central-European dividing line between cultures and politics. It is literally a politico-seismical dangerous territory. Especially for those who cannot get on with their closest neighbors. The first substantial group of issues is connected precisely with our neighbors—Ukraine, Hungary, Poland, Austria, and the Czech Republic. We have no doubts that we could be good neighbors with them and have excellent economic, political, and cultural relations. Most of the problems, it seems, judging by the political ferment, will be with the Czechs. The sooner we separate culturally, the better relations we shall have in the future. Then there is a certain impediment, especially in the historical sense, in the relations with the Hungarian Republic. Even here there are ways, on both sides, to find mutually good relations. Slovakia needs from Budapest a clear word, a clear guarantee, which will erase the shadow the past is casting on the present. And we, after proclaiming state sovereignty, will gain, as a nation, a certain psychological disposition for looking differently at the problems of the Slovak south, not as a danger but as an individual part of a single entity. This entity should and must be respected in Budapest. Beyond this point our relations will certainly become better.

We could talk for hours about economic relations and possibilities, but as long as we do not have the foundation in our hands—political sovereignty, it is still somewhat up in the air. We have an idea about strategic, close, more or less important sources, possibilities, about what we need and what we can offer. We are also taking practical action, making contacts abroad with political representatives and entrepreneurs. This should be done basically by the government. We realize what the present government will leave for the new one, and so we are doing a few things ahead of time.

[Augustin] In case of an absolutely unsatisfactory situation, if the nonfunctional federation were to stay in force, secured firmly by the presidential regime or even by the bureaucratic government, with strict security measures in place, how would you, as an SNS representative, react to such a situation?

[Prokes] As a politician, I would turn to international institutions. As a deceived citizen I would go out and demonstrate. Politicians, that is, the parliaments, governments, as well as the president do not own power, they are merely its executors. The power belongs to the citizens of this country. Even the constitution of the United States gives to the sovereign, that is the voter, the right not only to protest but also to act if someone usurps power. We are a party that is represented in the parliament, albeit as an opposition party, but one that respects

to the last moment the possibility of finding a parliamentary way out of any kind of situation. Moreover, from my personal experience as a deputy I believe that this eventuality is more unlikely than likely. It is true, of course, that the new power is well entrenched and is holding on tooth and nail, but on the other hand, it can add two and two together and therefore knows that our people are very knowledgeable politically and continue to follow political developments. I do not think that the citizens of Slovakia will allow themselves to be tricked this way again. And if they do, then as a nation we do not deserve anything else but that somebody else rule over us....

[Augustin] We have attempted a kind of political futurology, even though not in a very broad time-span. Let's now drop this speculation and go from the domestic scene over to our surroundings: try to predict, or to put it better, give us a scenario how our neighboring states will react to our situation and what would be the consequences of their reaction for us.

[Prokes] It would be a mistake to wait and see how the neighboring states would react. We must know that at the time we proclaim our sovereignty, we must have a certainty of sorts. That is the task for the diplomats before we have that state. Why does Minister Dienstbier show so much indignation toward our Slovak minister of international relations, why so few Slovaks and so many Baksys in the diplomatic service and foreign trade? Foreign trade goes, after all, hand in hand with diplomacy, because a political interest is a transmuted interest of another kind—most often business or entrepreneurial interest. That is also the root of the response to the relations of others toward us. What we are offering them and what they want from us. We are in the position of a crossroads, a bridge, a buffer zone. Today, the biggest markets of the 21st century are opening up for the West in the East, especially in Russia. That is a megatrend which we must exploit, build our prosperity on it, and not put up obstacles to it. Even not unintentional ones, for example, by not building efficient railway lines, roads, telecommunications. The world will by-pass us, and ignore us economically and thus also politically. It will do us no good to whine at home about a conspiracy against Slovakia and I don't know what else. Capital goes where there are communications and information.

There is no threat of a crisis in this region. It would be too dangerous even for West Europe. Calfa's casting of doubt on the stability of the frontiers has only one goal—to foment a confrontation between the minorities and the Slovak nation, that is, the classic "Divide and conquer!"

[Augustin] Let's also talk about the arts, literature, and culture as a whole, which are linked directly or indirectly to politics, and therefore with you. We all know how bleak the cultural situation is from the economic point of view, but in spite of that there appears now and then a good book, a good movie or a play. Tell us which books, movies or plays interested you most recently and why?

[Prokes] If only a day were elastic and inflatable.... Recently I came across a book by Dusan Slobodnik—*Paragraf: polarny kruh* [Paragraph: The Polar Circle]. It interested me because of its treatment of people's lives during a period that should forever stay with us as a reminder. Even today you can find people who create only a semblance of democracy instead of creating conditions for democracy and subordinating themselves to it. After all, in a democracy it is not possible to threaten people with the penal code for holding views in any way different from the government's, in a democracy it cannot happen that a deputy chairman of the parliament refuses to put a deputy's proposal to vote and keeps his position. Because this, too, is a part of society's culture. Democracy means that everyone respects the rights of others. When a minority subordinates itself to a majority and the majority respects the specifics of the minority and does not try to suppress it. Political maturity of a citizen (but also a politician) means that he respects the rights of others not because he is afraid of the law, but because he considers it the right thing to do, because it is natural for him to do so. Permanently good are only mutually advantageous relations. An effort to gain advantage at the expense of the others, to "get the better of them," inevitably leads to a breakup.

The conception of SNS policy is based on the sovereignty of the citizen, from which devolves the sovereignty of a community, region, as well as the state. We are offering citizens for their consideration a program for creating conditions conducive to their all-around development.

Czechs Accused of Causing Bajanek's Resignation

92CH0510A Bratislava NOVY SLOVAK
in Slovak 17 Apr 92 p 3

[Commentary by Milan Horcicak: "Fishing With a Net in the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia"]

[Text] Although the representatives of the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) have never denied that a considerable political and ideological spectrum exists in their movement, they have never as much as alluded to serious controversies within it. Our Slovak public gradually accepted it as a "broad-based centrist movement" unified by Vladimir Meciar's personality. Nevertheless, some malicious voices also allege that the only thing that holds all together is their desire to win the elections....

That was one of the reasons why the news that the chief of the HZDS election campaign, Jan Bajanek, had resigned his post came last Wednesday as a lightning out of the blue. The correspondents of the CSTK [Czechoslovak Press Agency] announced that an "overwhelming number" of members of the central election team had also submitted their resignation because "the political leadership of the movement had been dealing with problems from the position of ideology rather than objectivity."

However, when we called on Mr. Bajanek yesterday and asked him to explain and justify his decision, he refused to make any comments because, as he said, he had to discuss it with the political leadership of the HZDS first and only afterwards would he consider giving the press more specific information...

It is no secret that for quite a while the current Czech political representation has been pursuing its objective to split the Slovak political scene apart. It gained some ground not only because several nationally oriented forces were unable to find a common language during the process of Slovakia's emancipation, but above all because they were promoting their own narrowly partisan interests and goals. The Czech politicians know full well that a split in the HZDS would even more disorient Slovak citizens.

Thus, Prague would enjoy seeing itself riding the Slovak horse forever. For that reason, it is doing everything possible so that the federal government may grasp the reins in its hands even more firmly.

Contents of Idea of Czechoslovak State Examined
92CH0501A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK
in Czech 12 Mar 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Zdenek Eis: "Correlation and Conflicts—On the Philosophy of Slovak History"]

[Text] I am deeply convinced of the fact that today's Czech democrat who speaks of, and expresses himself on, Slovak affairs must virtually always begin with the following words: "I am convinced that the Slovaks are a quintessential, mature, and independent nation with their own intelligence and, as such, they have the right to not only national independence, but naturally also state independence, provided they evince an interest in it and will wish to realize it themselves." This is also my belief.

In short, the Slovaks have the right to be independent all the way through secession—this is the language of the fundamental democratic law which is involved in any kinds of considerations of coexistence between Czechs and Slovaks. I will say it honestly: I cannot tolerate it when Czechs speak of Slovaks as though they were separatists. This is unbecoming and insulting for Slovaks. They, and only they, have the right to decide freely about their political fate on the map of Europe. So what kind of separatism is this! Surely, following the historical experiences of the first republic, we will not today return to making the old mistakes, when the label of "autonomist"—let alone "separatist"—was the same as the mark of Cain.

Czech specialized essayists really did forget a little bit about the 100th anniversary of the fundamental discussion on the philosophy of Czech history, as was so aptly pointed out by J. Juricek (LITERARNY TYZDENNIK, No. 6, 1992). All great Czech spirits returned to the problem of the philosophy of Czech history and its meaning and each of them wrote a book on this topic or

at least an important article. Until, in the end, the search for the meaning of Czech history became—a disease; a typically Czech disease. Within the framework of this illness, we constantly—often unto weariness—sought our identity and our function in European history, until this tended to lead other countries to not understand why we are so constantly returning to our roots when time has long since advanced and far more important matters than the search for the meaning of Czech history were appearing on the program—for the Czechs.

More than 20 years ago, Karel Kosik returned to deal with this problem in conjunction with the Slovaks. He wrote something about the Czech-Slovak condition which I have personally adopted as an "expression of faith" and something to which I adhere to this day. Kosik stated:

"The 'Czech question' is a world question, but the practical test for this worldliness is the Slovak question. In a certain sense, we can even say that the essence of the Czech question is made up of the Slovak question.... Disparagement or indifference with regard to the program of federalization is not only an act of indolence and tactlessness toward a closely related nation, but is, primarily, a manifestation of immaturity of and weakness in political thinking.... The Czechs and the Slovaks are fraternal nations, but, politically, they are primarily two founding nations with equal rights, nations which are establishing a state, nations which are maintaining a state, nations which determine the character of the state."

The Slovaks never experienced such a tortuous discussion regarding who we are—we Czechs—and whither we are bound. For the Czechs, this discussion began 100 years ago and in one or another form continues on the program to this day. The well-known polemics of Milan Hodz and Jozef Skultety, dating back to 1920, never assumed such dimensions and depth and mainly such a repetitive amount of heart-rending as did the Czech discussions. Maybe the Slovaks were able to discuss many things much earlier than the present moment. Let it be said that not even the Slovak articles and polemics on the meaning of the Slovak nation give rise to comfort. I have in mind here particularly the Slovak writers. Let us recall, at random, such people as Matuska, Tatark, and a number of others and their efforts to grasp the Slovak identity.

It would seem that the approach used by J. Juricek, in those articles on the philosophy of Slovak history which deal with the proclaimers of and the idea of Czechoslovakness, which, unfortunately, frequently became degraded into Czechoslovakism, will give rise to polemics.

I have the fear that it is easy, from the pedestal of the year 1992, to criticize the proclaimers as well as the Czechoslovakist concept and, at the same time, disregard the status of events in Slovakia. As for myself, I must add that I am far from being a defender of

Czechoslovakism. This is attested to, among others, by my work from the 1960's, when I was still "permitted" to deal with Slovakistics.

Those who proclaimed their Slovakness were born as a result of a certain intellectual and spiritual disconsolation of Slovakia at that time, based on the Hungarian nationalities oppression of the Slovaks, as a result of the search for a way out from the spiritual times of need which existed, as a result of the fears regarding the fate of the Slovak people, and as a result of the search for natural allies. Those willing to acknowledge their Slovakness were receiving spiritual assistance, it is true, from Bohemia. But, in and of itself, this cannot be objectionable. And anyway, let us remember the status of events in Slovakia from the nineties of the last century until World War I on this point.

In 1918, as Monsignor Okanik wrote in 1919, when the Slovaks were allying themselves with the Czech Lands, they were in a catastrophic situation. At that time, Slovakia did not have a single district administrator or an established notary who would profess to be a nationally conscious Slovak. In those days, the majority of the establishment in the state offices did not know Slovak language. Among thousands of railroad officials of the day, there were six secret Slovaks; four nationally conscious Slovaks were among the postal clerks of the day. Of all the lawyers in Slovakia, a total of 40 acknowledged Slovak nationality, and there were 10 physicians who did so; of the Catholic clergy, a mere 10 percent acknowledged their Slovak origin and 80 percent of the Protestant ministers acknowledged their Slovakness.

In 1918, Slovakia only had Hungarian gymnasiums; there was a total of 50 gymnasiums and junior high schools employing 800 professors. Of the number of professors, only 12 acknowledged their Slovak mother tongue.

Under such conditions, it was impossible for any kind of state administration other than the Hungarian state administration to operate in the territory of Slovakia in 1918.

The Slovaks did not have sufficient forces and an appropriate number of people from the intelligentsia to fully handle their own state administration.

At that time, Slovakia required urgent assistance. The most natural assistance was being offered from Bohemia. For reasons of linguistic closeness on the one hand, as well as for reasons of sympathy which the Slovaks enjoyed in Bohemia as an oppressed people. Thousands of Czech teachers, professors, officials of all types of qualifications, were leaving for Slovakia to help create or possibly rejuvenate the Slovak intelligentsia and to educate the young generation of Slovaks which would subsequently take over the administration of their affairs. Many young Slovaks at that time were leaving to study in Bohemia and in Moravia. In 1918-38, the Czechoslovak

Republic succeeded in renewing and elevating Slovakia, in educating a new intelligentsia which was not burdened by Hungarianism.

The Slovak intelligentsia gradually recovered and strengthened; and so, political, economic, and cultural institutions began to be formed which the Slovaks never before possessed (scientific disciplines, the legal system, the Slovak National Theater, and many other national institutions). This is a historically documentable fact in the mutual relationships between Czechs and Slovaks.

And, moreover, in these connections, we should historically "forgive" those Slovaks, including M.R. Stefanik, who entertained some doubts regarding the vitality of the Slovak people and who wished to quickly ally themselves with Bohemia, lest it be too late. We Czechs also had the writer H.G. Schauer (1862-92), who doubted the justification for creating a Czech culture when we could be creative in another "happier" culture which has an open door in Europe while we, Czechs, were "bragging" at the time that we were the ones making the opening toward Europe.

As far as the much-discussed and criticized Czechoslovakism is concerned today, it is, of course, fully unacceptable and even contemptible in its most aggressive form—that is to say, in the image which is predominantly Czech. I have in mind, for example, the discussions surrounding the first rules of Slovak orthography in 1932 and perhaps the debate surrounding that which the Czech philologist Travnicek and a number of others wrote about the Slovak language.

As far as Czechoslovakism is concerned, it is a pity that a certain historical experiment which was accomplished years ago has been lost. First of all, we should regret the unelaborated nature of the Czechoslovak political idea which recognizes two sovereign nations—the Slovaks and the Czechs. The idea of Czechoslovakness never matured to the point that it became acceptable to both nations and, mainly, never matured into a carrying political idea, as was and is the case in Switzerland where anyone who speaks German, French, Italian, or the retoromance language acknowledges his Swissness.

The political idea of Czechoslovakness, which would not suppress national equal rights, the quintessentiality and the sovereignty of the Slovaks, both politically and otherwise, did not take hold in our country at the present time and did not fully assert itself.

In his article, Juricek wrote that "there can be no doubt that our national existence and future, just like that of the Czechs—is most reliably secured in a state bond with the next-of-kin Czech people." This virtually calls for a new working out of the idea of Czechoslovakness based on the phenomenon of closeness, but also on the basis of the full equality of rights of both nations. Of course, today's political representation—both the Czech and also the Slovak—is building more on the material advantages of state coexistence among both nations. I want to

point out that no advantage—let alone a material advantage—is a sufficient support for and foundation of political coexistence between the Czechs and Slovaks in a single state.

None of today's politicians—neither Czechs nor Slovaks—have come up with a new political idea of state coexistence between both nations (let us already stop using the term federal coexistence—it has, in the end, become something defective, something unacceptable to Slovaks). Personally, I do not wish for Slovaks to feel like tenants in their own state, as Juricek said it, in a future possible (but not certain) state of coexistence with the Czechs.

The Czechs and Slovaks are two state-forming nations, as Kosik at one time contemplated. Let us tighten up, let us newly formulate the present idea of Czechoslovakness and, mainly, let us take that which unites us from the spiritual area. Let us never again be deceived into thinking that the correlation of Czechs and Slovaks can be circumvented without conflict. The numerous compendia on the brotherhood of Czechs and Slovaks, dating back to the time of totality, were and are a camouflage used to conceal the actual relationship between the two nations.

The relationship between Czechs and Slovaks in state coexistence cannot be based only on material advantages for both nations. An open problem, because it is a problem which has not been fully formulated, remains in the form of the mental and moral problems of the political and state coexistence between Czechs and Slovaks. Thus far, we are hearing very little about this aspect from the politicians—both on the Czech and also on the Slovak side.

Overview of Ruthenia's Past, Present

92CH0512A Prague DOKUMENTACNI PREHLED
in Czech 19 Mar 92 pp H/13-17

[Text]

Facts—CSFR/Regional Problems 1—Ukraine/Regional Problems

Subcarpathian Ruthenia

Subcarpathian Ruthenia is the historical name for what is now the Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine; it was officially established by the Treaty of Saint-Germain in September 1919, which designated this territory as a part of the Czechoslovak Republic.

In old Zalitavsko [Trans-Litava region], during the rule of Austria-Hungary, the name for this region was "Upper Hungary," after World War I, the Hungarians called it the "Russian Country," Russians called it "Transcarpathian Ruthenia," and the Ukrainians, who believed they had a claim to it, called it Transcarpathian Ukraine or Transcarpathia.

History

This country's oldest historical period is linked with the Scythians, Celts, and Dacians. Up to the thirteen century, various nomadic Russian tribes constantly travelled this region, but the *Marchia Ruthenorum*—the Ruthene Country—already existed by the end of the first millennium. Under Prince Laborec, however, it was broken up by the advancing Magyars who founded royal castles—Uzgorod, Bircova, and Chust. Starting in the twelfth century, they began to establish administrative units—comitias—from the herdsmen who had settled around them. The Czech historian, Dr. Kamil Krofta, tried to determine whether the Ruthenes had formed a part of the Greater Moravian Empire. Probably not, although they traded vigorously with it, primarily in salt.

In the thirteenth century, the region was subjected to a wave of German colonization, which reached the banks of the Uh river via Bohemia and Moravia. The area remained isolated up to the Hussite movement. The domain of the Czech Duke, Jan Jiskra of Brandys, included Kosice, Bardejov, Levoc, Presov, and the western portions of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. At that time, the first literary works in the national language appeared in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. However, this did not last long as all national sentiments were stifled by the Hungarians. This territory remained under Hungarian, then Austrian, and later Austro-Hungarian supremacy for the next 600 years. During the reign of the Habsburgs, the Turkish Wars and the uprising of the Hungarian nobility took place. The entire territory suffered greater poverty and hardship than any other part of Europe. The Ruthenes were the only nation in this region that did not create its own nobility or middle class over the centuries. In the nineteenth century, the country began to revive—and its representatives participated in the Slavic Congress in Prague and held talks with Frantisek Palacky. Their aspirations for freedom culminated at the end of World War I. Woodrow Wilson, the President of America, played a significant role in this process, as he outlined a plan for a common state with the Czechs and Slovaks to the spokesmen of the American Ruthenes and Ukrainians.

Integration of Subcarpathian Ruthenia Into the Czechoslovak Republic

After the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I, Subcarpathian Ruthenia became a part of the newly created Czechoslovak Republic. Hungary's attempts to retain a state union with this region failed. During World War I, Ruthenes who had emigrated to America (rather like the Slovaks) tried to break away from the Hungarians. Some of them believed the future of the nation and of their countrymen at home was in a union with Russia, but after the Bolshevik revolution, the predominance of the russophile attitudes was lost and the orientation turned toward the West. On 12 November 1918, the National Council of the Ruthenes in the United States decided on the union of Subcarpathian Ruthenia with Czechoslovakia. This attitude

was not unanimous even the representatives of the Ruthenes and Ukrainians at home, but ultimately they, too, accepted the decision of the emigrants at a meeting of the National Councils in Uzgorod, where autonomy within the framework of Czechoslovakia was proclaimed. In the United States, T.G. Masaryk and the Ruthene representative, A. Zatkovic, drew up an agreement on future coexistence. The conflict between Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania (which had occupied the eastern part of the country) was resolved by the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919 and the Treaty of Saint-Germain on 10 September 1919, which designated Subcarpathian Ruthenia as an autonomous part of Czechoslovakia. The Treaty of Trianon confirmed this status on 4 June 1920. The border with Romania was established by the Treaty of Sevres on 10 August 1920.

According to the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which stipulated that "Czechoslovakia undertakes to establish the territory of East Carpathian Ruthenes as an autonomous unit within the framework of the state of Czechoslovakia," Subcarpathian Ruthenia was to become a self-governing unit with the broadest possible autonomy, it was to have its own parliament and its own governor. Despite the fact that these provisions were anchored in the 1920 Czechoslovak constitution, these constitutional and international obligations were ignored for almost twenty years.

Autonomy of Subcarpathian Ruthenia and Vienna Award

During the First Republic, Subcarpathian Ruthenia was beginning to move from Medieval backwardness to the civilization of the twentieth century in many respects. However, it only succeeded in approaching it in a few areas over almost two decades.

During the second half of the 1930's, tension began to increase in this region, too. Hungary began to make territorial claims both in relation to Slovakia and in relation to Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The Czechoslovak-Hungarian talks in Komarna in October 1938 were an attempt to resolve these problems peacefully. But no agreement was reached.

It was not until pressure was exerted by Ruthenian and Ukrainian nationalists in the second half of 1938 that the Czechoslovak Government started to meet its obligations in regard to Ruthenian autonomy. On 11 October 1938 the first autonomous Ruthenian government, headed by Andrej Brody, was appointed (on 26 October 1938 Augustin Volosin replaced him as the head of the autonomous government). Then, on 19 November 1938, the National Assembly approved the constitutional law on the autonomy of Subcarpathian Ruthenia and, on this foundation, elections were held for the Ruthenian Provincial Autonomous Parliament.

After the failure of the talks between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Vienna Award decided Hungary's territorial claims and, as a result, the CSR [Czechoslovak

Republic] was forced to cede 1,523 km² of Subcarpathian Ruthenian territory, with a population of 173,000, to Hungary on 2 November 1938. Following these territorial changes, the size of Subcarpathian Ruthenia decreased to 11,094 km² and the population dropped to 552,000. The secession of this territory was a great loss for Subcarpathian Ruthenia, because it was made up of fertile plains, the railroad connection with Slovakia passed through it, the capital city of Uzgorod as well as the largest city, Mukacev, were located there. The autonomous government moved to Chust.

After Slovakia broke away and the other Czech countries were occupied by Nazi Germany, the Provincial Autonomous Parliament in Chust passed a resolution on 15 March 1939 declaring Subcarpathian Ruthenia to be an independent state called Carpatho-Ukraine. Shortly after this, on 16 March 1939, the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine began, and after two days of fighting with the Home Guard and the remnants of the Czechoslovak army, it was annexed by Horthy's Hungary as an autonomous territory called Carpathia.

Annexation by the Soviet Union

At the end of World War II, the superpowers were not only fighting a common enemy, but also increasingly fighting for the future structure of postwar Europe. The Soviet Union's interest in the political and power status of Central Europe was projected into its activities in relation to Subcarpathian Ruthenia, whose territory would enable Stalin's USSR to have strategically important access to the Carpathian basin. In October 1944 Subcarpathian Ruthenia was liberated from the Hungarians by the Soviet Army, but the Horthy occupation was merely replaced by Soviet occupation. Many interests were interwoven in this region—those of the Soviet political leadership, the Red Army, security, the Ukrainian government, local functionaries, the citizens, as well as of the Czechoslovak Government representatives. In October 1944 Subcarpathian Ruthenia was divided into two zones. The developed, solidly established, central and western portions were declared to be the Soviet army's theater of operations, although they could not de facto be so since the front was located 40 kilometers to the west of the country's borders at the time. No official Czechoslovak representatives were permitted to enter this zone, and no Czechoslovak agencies were permitted to be established there. On the other hand, full freedom was given to local communists and their activists who organized so-called national committees. The southeastern, very backward, mountainous region of Subcarpathian Ruthenia remained under Czechoslovak administration. In November 1944 the First Congress of National Committees met in Mukacev under the supervision of the NKVD and it passed a manifesto that directed the executive organ of power, i.e., the National Council, to "reunite Transcarpathian Ukraine with its great mother, the Soviet Ukraine." This proclaimed reunification with the Ukraine was not justified historically since Subcarpathian Ruthenia and the

Ukraine had never been united in the past. The advocates of the union easily controlled the political life of the region because they had all the tools of power in their hands as well as the support of the Red Army. They did not allow the opponents of the union to voice an opinion, and they forced the Czechoslovak representatives, i.e., the Czechoslovak military mission and representatives of the Czechoslovak administration, to leave the occupied territory. Under these conditions, the Czechoslovak Government and the president were deprived of the possibility to implement their power in the occupied territory and thus prevent the enforced annexation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Ukrainian SSR—and the local population was never asked what it wanted.

Under the coercion of the Soviet Union and counter to the CSR constitution, an agreement was signed between the USSR and CSR in Moscow on 29 June 1945 about handing Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the USSR, that is, to the Ukrainian SSR. On the insistence of Moscow, it was hastily ratified by the provisional CSR National Assembly on 22 November 1945, although the resolution of constitutional matters, which include changes in borders, did not fall under its jurisdiction. The agreement went into force on 30 January 1946.

One subsection of the above-mentioned agreement states that this was done according to the wishes of the people of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. In fact, all this occurred without the participation of their true representatives and merely on the basis of the manipulated Mukacev Congress of National Committees. The agreement also defined new borders between the CSR and USSR because of an important railroad station in the east Slovak town of Cop; thus Czechoslovakia lost additional Slovak territory with 13 communities (including Cop), an area of 141 km², and more than 10,000 inhabitants. As a result of this shift in the border, the CSR had to build a new railroad station in Cierna nad Tisou. Subcarpathian Ruthenia was then integrated into the Soviet Ukraine as the Transcarpathian oblast in January 1946 through a decree passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

After 1945 Subcarpathian Ruthenia was subjected to a period of arrests involving clergymen, teachers, intellectuals, members of former political parties, and students as well as a period of extraordinary, so-called people's trials. About 25,000 citizens were deported to Siberia and all civic democratic organizations were abolished.

Data

Subcarpathian Ruthenia encompasses an area of 12,800 km² and has a population of 1.25 million: 78 percent Ruthenes, 14 percent Hungarians, 4 percent Russians, 2.4 percent Romanians, 0.7 percent Slovaks, and 0.3 percent Germans. At this time, outside the territory of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, about 700,000 Ruthenes live in the United States, and an additional 200,000 in Canada. The administrative center of the region is Uzgorod.

The following industries have been developed in the region: wine making, canning, meat industry, machine industry, timber and wood working industry, shoe industry, and the textile industry. Vines, fruit, cereals, potatoes, tobacco, and sunflowers are cultivated in the region. Beef cattle raising and sheep breeding have been developed.

Philosopher Looks at Czech-Slovak Relations

92CH0523A Bratislava KULTURNY ZIVOT in Slovak
9 Apr 92 p 7

[Interview with Professor Erazim Kohak, Boston University and Charles University, by Sona Cechova; place and date not given: "Let Us Free Ourselves From the Anger"]

[Text] Erazim Kohak, born 1933, is one of those about whom so-called practical people would shake their heads in incomprehension. As a 15-year-old boy, he went into exile with his parents. He completed his studies in philosophy at Yale University and made himself a worldwide reputation based partly on his many years of activities in the field and partly by literary works, among others his successful ecological study "The Embers and the Stars." After the events of November [1989] he returned to Prague, reduced his obligations to the Boston university to a minimum, and is lecturing most of the school year at Charles University so that he can contribute to the renewal of our homeland. He has an personal relationship to Slovakia, but he can best tell of this himself.

[Cechova] Recently it was the 7th of March, the birthday of President Masaryk, something about which no person of good will in Czecho-Slovakia can be indifferent. Even people of less good will are not indifferent. After 40 years of discrimination against Masaryk, it is in fact a paradox.

[Kohak] I think that the doubts about Masaryk actually do not concern him as a person, but rather all the undeniable weaknesses of the First Republic. Only, the First Republic was not what Masaryk had in mind. It just happened to him. When we read over, for example, the records of the Imperial Council which include Masaryk's speeches, we see that Masaryk was not against Austria, but always stood against any kind of advantages that one nationality took of another. He stood for a state which as much as possible would support the growth of all its citizens, of all the peoples and nationalities to full development of their human nature. He did not want to destroy Austria, but rather to destroy injustice, intolerance, and opposition to democracy; in a word, to destroy totalitarianism. This is what he was concerned about. He assumed that we would be living in a multinational state. He had no illusions that nations of our size, located at the crossroads of Europe, could actually be self-sufficient. He counted on cooperation within the framework of Austria. When Austria later fell under Berlin's influence and into that tragic war, it was clear that if it won the war, Austria would become an offshoot of the

Greater Germany movement and if it lost the war, our individual nations would be thrown upon the mercy of the existing strong national units. The Czechs on the mercy of the Germans and Slovakia on that of Hungary. Even at that time it was clear to Masaryk that if our nations were to develop any further, we would have to find a replacement for Austria.

[Cechova] Do you think that there is some kind of analogy here with today's tendency to create national states?

[Kohak] I think that is very clear. Any time that a people loses its cultural consciousness, it looks for support and a crutch in nationalism. I know that very surely applies to us Czechs. Always, when we were not sure of ourselves, we have turned to this position, but of course it did not lead to any solution to the problems. For example, the tragically shortsighted Czech policy rejected participation in the Austrian parliament in the so-called Imperial Council. For 17 years, when we needed to be building up education and the economy, developing our nation, we instead played truant. Certain Czech politicians of that time said that the less we went to the Imperial Council, the stronger we would be. And this was a great mistake. Masaryk's realism is based on just this idea that he recommends proceeding in a practical and realistic way, instead of theoretically by saying that we reject participation in the Imperial Council on the basis of national rights. By participating in the Imperial Council we can serve ourselves by transforming the joint Austrian state in which we will be able to live and we will build up the basis for culture. Masaryk was primarily after a second Czech university in Brno. But he also many times came to the defense of the Slovak people against the Hungarians, which at that time Vienna was very unhappy to hear because the Hungarian kingdom did not belong within the jurisdiction of the Imperial Council after the Austro-Hungarian settlement of 1867. At that time Masaryk was not concerned with building a Czech state, but rather with a good and just state, neither Czech nor German, a state for all nations and a state in which no nation—not Germans, nor Hungarians, nor Czechs—was supreme, but one in which the idea of justice was supreme.

[Cechova] So Masaryk anticipated something like this.

[Kohak] If Masaryk had been born in 1950 and if he had developed in the same way through his philosophical and life experiences, I am convinced that today he would not be a supporter of Czechoslovakism. After all, his entire career he emphasized respect for the unique nature of all peoples. In 1918 it was desperately necessary to create from nothing a state which would protect the Slovaks and Czechs. I think that even at that time Czechoslovakism was a mistake, but I understand that it could have appeared to be the sole path to accomplish the goal. But even at that time Masaryk was going against his lifelong approach to questions of nationality. It is possible that today he would think that we spend too much time on the questions of the state legal arrangement and too little

time on questions of education, that is, too much on building the state and too little on building the nation.

[Cechova] In your opinion, what would he have said about the problem of centrism, or rather Prague centrism?

[Kohak] One can best fight against Prague centrism in Prague. There one has the opportunity to act also on such a formality, although one which I consider very important, as moving the capital city of the federation from Prague in the Czech lands to somewhere on the border between Slovakia and the Czech lands. The majority of the countries that have our problem have resolved it by building the capital on neutral territory like, for example, Washington. For the moment, however, we cannot allow this. Now it is a matter of us clearly pointing out that Prague centrism is a problem. However, it is not enough just to react to the problem by stamping our feet and getting angry. This will only cause us ulcers and will not change the situation.

[Cechova] There have also been proposals, and not totally without any basis, that the seat of the parliament should be Prague and the seat of the Federal Government should be Bratislava.

[Kohak] I think that is a very good proposal. It is of absolutely no importance whether we will have the congress of deputies in Prague or not. With the current level of technology, it does not matter if the senate is in Bratislava or on Mala Strana Street. The communications in any case are electronic and the idea that the Federal Government would be based in Bratislava appears to be a very positive one.

[Cechova] In Slovakia I also heard the view expressed that good Czecho-Slovak relations will not be achieved by building two independent entities. As you say, one can best fight for the rights of the Slovaks in Prague itself. A lot of blame is placed on the Czech representatives for always putting a majority of Czechs in the best locations in the diplomatic service, especially during the First Republic, and it is entirely forgotten that the Slovaks have had their own representatives in the three most important embassies; Hurban in Washington, Slavik in London, and Osusky in Paris.

[Kohak] And after 1945, Papanek was assigned to the United Nations Organization and he was also a Slovak. The problem arose in part after the war because many of the Czechoslovak diplomatic representatives at that time had gone over to the service of the Slovak state and the restored Czechoslovak Republic could not include in its diplomatic service those people who had represented an ally of Hitler. I do not think, however, that there was any intention to deal unfairly, but even if there had been, it is now necessary to end it once and for all since this must be a truly Czecho-Slovak state.

[Cechova] You have said that after a certain trauma to the identity, the people and the individual look for their identity in some kind of group aggressive act. Our

peoples have lost this identity for quite a long time. Two totalitarian regimes, one after the other, with a brief pause from 1945 to 1948. Can one say that the explosion of nationalism in Central Europe is necessarily a consequence of this loss of cultural identity?

[Kohak] Unfortunately, that is happening everywhere, with tragic results in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia could have been a fully recognized player in the new game in Europe, but Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia as individual members will only provide a reservoir of cheap labor. We are also struggling with this, but much more successfully; we are much more mature and we do not succumb to instinctive reactions as we have seen in Yugoslavia.

[Cechova] It has already been said more than once about us, but we still want to emphasize this point: in contrast to Yugoslavia, there has not been a single drop of fratricidal blood spilt between the Slovaks and the Czechs.

[Kohak] Let us hope that it stays that way! But it should stay that way because we are civilized nations and we have a tradition of working together. For God's sake, where would the Czechs be today if Slovakia had not preserved the Czech language for them?

[Cechova] That is the first time that I have ever heard that Slovakia preserved the Czech language!

[Kohak] You preserved it for us in the Kralicka Bible and the builders of our country—I have in mind Palacky in particular, who grew up in Bratislava—when they returned to the Czech lands found that they had forgotten how to speak Czech there. Safarik, Dobrovsky—these were all people influenced by the Slovak culture. After all, Bratislava at the beginning of the 19th century was a city of culture where several cultural influences intermixed. Prague was the heir to this. Palacky and Masaryk both commented on this after their arrival in Prague. The tradition of mutual cooperation is also indisputable and we are also close economically. We can each mean to the other the capability of competing in Europe, but we also open up new horizons for each other culturally. The Czechs have new horizons opened up for them when they read, let us say, SLOVENSKÉ POHLADY, which we consider truly the best magazine of its type in the Federal Republic. So, we have economic reciprocity, cultural reciprocity, and the future of the unification of Europe. After that occurs it will be vitally necessary for us to get into that Europe as a unit capable of competing and not as fragmented pieces.

[Cechova] In a word, the best chance for Slovakia is an equal, thriving federation, which Czecho-Slovakia can in fact be in the stormy seas of Central Europe, and we can hope that it might moreover be a model of a reasonable solution to matters for all of postcommunist Europe.

[Kohak] Yes, certainly, if we are able to free ourselves from anger. It makes no difference whether it is justifiable anger. For 40 years we have truly accumulated

enough offenses, humiliation, and justified reasons for anger, but when we act out of anger, then we are no longer free. When I come home from work dead tired after 12 hours on my feet and I need to catch up on my sleep and someone rings my telephone seven times, I have every right to rip it off the wall. I have the right because he has offended me, but then I cannot make any telephone calls. Yes, the Czechs have offended the Slovaks in many ways and I understand the justification for the Slovak hatred of the Czechs.

[Cechova] Hatred is never justified. No anger is sacred.

[Kohak] Even if that anger is justified, it still does not present any change for Slovakia, but reminds me of that broken telephone. What we need to be concerned about today is the need to learn to listen to each other. So far we are not willing to hear each other out. The basis of democratic discussion is always that the first step is to try to understand the other's position and to feed it back. In other words: I do not agree, I will not buy it, but I know how to empathize with it. That is the first prerequisite, for us to understand why and how a person looks at things, because a discussion begins with listening and there is far too little of that here. We either do not listen at all, eagerly waiting for the other person to shut up so that we can put forth our views, or we listen to the other side only so that we can find arguments against them. We do not listen so that we can understand someone. Secondly, we must learn to have good will. To listen things through, not to press your own position no matter what it costs, but to look for a compromise solution which would represent the maximum implementation of my partner's justified hopes and demands, as well as mine. Obviously, it will not be one hundred percent for anyone, but after all it is very important that we be generous and broadminded with ourselves. Generosity has been lost here, but after all we do not have to push for everything to which we have a right. Sometimes we can say, "Well, I could get more out of this, but I will not because I am capable of generosity." I look at the Czech attitude toward Slovakia. This great unwillingness to listen! By this I do not mean the Czech nationalists who are not my kind of people, but the many Czechs of a Czechoslovak orientation. They want their own kind of Czecho-Slovakia. Nevertheless, if we want to build a Czecho-Slovak state, the first thing that I have to find out as a Czech is what the Slovaks are concerned with, not what I am concerned with. I think that we are not willing to listen, that there is not enough good will, and that there is a desperate lack of generosity.

[Cechova] Let us get back to the present; your article "Limping on the Right Foot" elicited an interest in the Slovak cultural community in discussions, as well as polemics. We published, for example, the article by Petr Zajac "On What Is Slovakia Limping?". How did you react to that?

[Kohak] The author thinks very precisely and I am always glad to see the subject begin to develop. Of course, he is entirely right. In the article I spoke of the

overall cultural situation in Central Europe, of Hungary, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia. But the Slovak situation is different and the author very precisely demonstrates that what is put out as the left wing in Slovakia is the echoes of totalitarianism. And he documents it with a nice final sentence: "Slovakia is limping along on the devil's hoof of postcommunism." That is it exactly. I say it differently because I do not consider totalitarianism as the left or the right. I do not know how to determine whether national socialism during the war was more "national" or more "socialist." I do not know how to determine whether the KSS [Communist Party of Slovakia] was of the left or the right persuasion; it had features of both. It was a totalitarian party. I think that the concepts of left and right can be used meaningfully only within the framework of a democratic center. Petr Zajac is totally right. It is not right to use the concept of the left to mean the remnants of the totalitarian regime. It is better to speak about social responsibility. I am concerned that we do not limp along on a lack of social responsibility. And when I speak of the inadequacy of the left, I should speak more precisely about the lack of social responsibility.

[Cechova] The concept of the left and the right has, over time, become thoroughly mixed up. The heretics in 1968 were called "right-wing opportunists." In what way were they right-wing? After all, those who had the power at the end and who would not be moved by anything had absolutely nothing in common with the so-called left wing.

[Kohak] According to the traditional meaning of the left, it is those people who want change and the right is those who want to maintain the status quo. And I therefore think that the communist party was definitely a right-wing power. In the article "Limping on the Right Foot" I wanted to demonstrate that this country lacks a Western-type social democratic party. We do not have a party that would take care of social responsibility. This is what I was concerned about. Even in Slovakia, so far there is no political force which would commit itself to social responsibility. And I do not think that the communists will do that since they are committed to their own power.

[Cechova] Recently hope has arisen that our social democracy could head in the direction about which you are speaking. Alexander Dubcek by his participation has prevented a dominance in the movement by those elements which we can rightly consider to be only after power. But one thing is clear: as long as our politicians think in terms of a humanistic philosophy, there should be no reason for the citizens to take the initiative.

Slovak Parliament Approves Public Interest Law

*AU1205134492 Bratislava PRAVDA
in Slovak 8 May 92 pp 1-2*

[Article by Antonia Vymazalova, Ivan Bielik, and Stefan Hrecko: "The Declaration of Sovereignty Was Not Approved"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Martin Krajcovic (Civic Democratic Union [ODU]) initiated on behalf of a group of deputies the promulgation of a Slovak National Council [SNR] law on certain measures associated with protecting the public interest. The law should follow up on the 1924 law on incompatibility, that is, incompatibility of interests. It amends the conditions for protecting the public interest and relates to SNR deputies, Slovak Government members, and officials and staff in the Slovak Government Office, the SNR Office, and central bodies. Comments by many deputies underlined the importance of the law. Eduard Barany (Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]) said that the submitted draft only defines very vaguely what is prohibited for deputies. Mikulas Huba (independent) stated that tougher rules should also be introduced for deputies as they had adopted them for others. Roman Hofbauer (Movement For a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]) expressed his regret that this law was not adopted at the beginning of the electoral period. This would have prevented the formation of Sicilian-Corsican family mafias. Deputy Robert Brestensky (Slovak National Party [SNS]) suggested that public officials submit their tax returns every year; this supplementary proposal was adopted by the deputies. The law was approved as a whole after the lunch break. [passage omitted]

Voting on the Declaration

SNR deputies are grouped into 11 clubs. Three deputies do not belong to any club. The following is a summary of the voting on the draft declaration of Slovak sovereignty according to the individual clubs:

ODU—all 23 members voted against the proposal;

Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]—of the 20 members, 13 voted against, three abstained, one did not vote, and three were not present;

Slovak KDH—all 16 members voted in favor;

Democratic Party—of the five members, four voted against and one did not vote;

Hungarian Civic Party—of the five members, four voted against and one was not present;

SNS—of the 17 members, 16 voted in favor and one was not present;

HZDS—of the 20 members, 18 voted in favor and two were not present;

SDL—of the 22 members, 18 voted in favor, three voted against, and one abstained;

Hungarian KDH—all eight members voted against;

Egyuttes—of the six members, two voted against, one abstained, and three were not present;

Slovak Green Party—of the five members, four voted in favor, and one voted against;

Independents—one voted in favor, one voted against, and one was not present.

Czech Parliament Approves Laws on Notaries

*AU1305114392 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY
in Czech 8 May 92 p 3*

[CSTK report: "New Rules, New Offices"]

[Text] Prague—The Czech National Council approved yesterday the laws on notaries and their activities, on real-estate registration, and on landsurvey and registry bodies.

The notary order, which will come into effect on 1 January, redefines the position of notaries and the subject of their activity in the context of the privatization of the state notary offices. It also regulates the establishment and position of the Notary Chamber. The law relieves notaries from all decisionmaking; it will be transferred to the state bodies—courts, financial offices, and registries. Another two landsurvey bills are to provide conditions for a flawless settlement of real-estate registry agenda. The name real-estate records [evidence nemovitosti] is being changed to the Czech Republic real-estate register [katastr nemovitosti CR], and the geodesy centers are renamed real-estate registries. The law abolishes the registration of contracts on transfer of real estate formerly conducted by notaries, and transfers this agenda to the real-estate registries. They will also assume the records from the land registers. The Czech Land Survey and Registry Office is established as the central body for the state administration of geodesy and cartography. The regional geodesy and cartography administrations are abolished, as are the land-registry agency and territorial registries.

The Czech National Council debate with S. Bacinsky, Federal Security Information Service director, on the screening of journalists did not take place yesterday. The Federal Security Information Service director did not come.

Czech Parliament Approves New Tax System

*AU1105090592 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 6 May 92 pp 1-2*

[Report by "st": "The Way Toward Economic Chambers"]

[Text] "I consider the burden on taxpayers within the context of federal and Czech taxation laws to be tolerable," said Czech Finance Minister Karel Spacek to HOSPODARSKE NOVINY following the approval of the Czech Republic's new taxation system at yesterday's 35th Czech National Council [CNR] session. According to him, overall tax revenue will correspond roughly to what is currently being collected.

First of all, the session approved a road tax that exclusively concerns vehicles used for business purposes. It

rejected a proposal put forward by some deputies to tax (1,000 korunas per annum) all other vehicles if they are not equipped with a catalytic converter by 1 January 1994. Taxation rates for private cars range from 1,200 to 3,000 korunas and are calculated according to the size of the engine's cylinders. The rates for trucks, trailers, tractors, and buses range from 1,800 to 58,000 korunas depending on the number and weight of their axles. The revenue will flow into a road fund and will be used to construct and maintain roads. Revenue could amount to approximately 4 billion korunas per annum and some 500 million korunas (as long as there are no larger-scale mutual interstate concessions) could accrue from international traffic.

Other taxes—death duty, gift tax, and property transfer tax—replace the current notarial fees, which means a return to the principles of the years 1921-57. These taxes have incremental sliding rates according to the value of the property inherited. Following a proposal from Ivo Svoboda (Civic Movement [OH]), it was decided that for a period of two years from the first transfers and bequests of personal property and real estate a tax corresponding to the rates applicable as of 31 December will be levied—in accordance with specific regulations—if it is more advantageous for the taxpayer. This means that property transfers made in connection with restitution will not be burdened by excessive taxation.

Classification into three groups according to relationships is important for calculating the tax. For example, spouses belong to the first group, siblings belong to the second group, and other persons belong to the third group. The more distant a relationship and the higher the value of the property, the higher the taxation rate. Personal property used for personal purposes and not utilized for business is exempt from death duty and gift tax if the value of the property does not exceed 500,000 korunas for people in the first group, 60,000 korunas for people in the second group, and 20,000 for people in the third group. Otherwise, the tax is payable within 30 days of the decision on the amount being made.

The amendment to the law on legal fees and fees for extracts from the criminal record has established that in business matters legal fees are payable within three days of their submission, if they have not been paid by duty stamps. It is possible to pay amounts up to 5,000 korunas by duty stamps.

The law on administrative fees—the aim of which is to fix charges for various operations associated with the state administration's activity—contains an extensive table of tariffs in its appendix. For example, consulting the business register and records will cost 20 korunas. Issuing duplicates of school records will cost 50 korunas, a business document 1,000 korunas, a license 2,000 korunas, and a firearms permit 1,000 korunas.

The law on administering taxes and fees lays down the specific rights and obligations of taxpayers and financial offices. It significantly increases restrictive measures

against tax evasion attempts and it penalizes businessmen for not keeping proper records. A fine of up to 2 million korunas can be imposed for repeated serious shortcomings of this kind.

The 36th CNR session began in the afternoon. The deputies did not include on its agenda a proposal from the Civic Democratic Party Club to adopt a resolution on Federal Security and Information Service reports and on dealing with them.

By amending the Czech laws on small and large-scale privatization the CNR decided to increase community budgets by 1.2 billion korunas from the revenue from small-scale privatization. (So far, this account contains 22 billion korunas). The money is intended for those communities that lost small businesses and other sources of income in the privatization process. It will also be possible to utilize money from the National Property Fund to pay for the costs associated with eradicating the ecological damage caused hitherto by entrepreneurial activity. It is possible to transfer property from the Fund (shares) to foundations.

A draft law on the establishment, status, and operation of Czech Republic Economic and Agricultural Chambers was also on the agenda. The deputies' proposal proceeds from obligatory membership and establishing the chambers from below. According to the proposal, district chambers in the regions may merge and special interest and other societies could become associations on the basis of their own decision.

The law, affecting 2 million entrepreneurial entities, was approved and an Economic Chamber based in Prague will come into operation on 1 July 1992 and an Agricultural Chamber based in Olomouc will come into operation on 1 January 1993. The chambers should give advice and provide consultative services, cooperate with state bodies in helping to requalify staff and resolve unemployment, show an interest in the professional standard of business, issue—according to specific regulations—statements and expert points of view, and so on. The chamber's supreme organ is its assembly of delegates.

The CNR recommended the Czech government to devise a legislative initiative to deal with the situation in the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry [CSOPK]. The Federal Assembly Presidium should adopt a law or legal measure to abolish—in particular—the stipulations on the CSOPK's economic contacts with foreign countries. The CSOPK should cease to exist on the day the joint body involving the Czech Economic Chamber and the Slovak Chamber of Industry and Commerce is established. It was proposed that CSOPK property be divided on a 2:1 ratio (Czech Republic:Slovak Republic).

The Czech parliament also adopted an amendment to a 1979 government regulation on water management charges. The basic charge for waste disposal will be doubled by law. During the course of the day, a draft

law—drafted by the Czech government—on publishing a list of certain citizens listed in the register of former State Security [StB] files was submitted to the CNR. The CNR Political Board and clubs held meetings during the evening to discuss it.

Following the Political Board's meeting, CNR Chairwoman Dagmar Buresova (OH) told journalists that she had personally proposed an amendment to Paragraph 19 of the Screenings Law so that senior StB officers and those representatives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia who supervised the StB in the department dealing with the struggle against the internal enemy could not be protected by the ban on publication. According to her, the OH Club in the CNR is opposed to blanket publication without giving individual consideration to every person involved. This was confirmed by OH Club Chairman Martin Bursik. "We do not want to catch the small fry, but the really guilty parties," he emphasized.

CNR Deputy Chairman Jan Kalvoda (Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA]) described the government draft as "very flawed." The ODA is in favor of codifying the principles for public information about public people. "I do not consider the fact that every tobaccoist will be screened to be important for society's security interests," added the ODA chairman.

Slovak Parliament Approves New Taxation Law

*AU0805162192 Bratislava PRAVDA
in Slovak 5 May 92 pp 1-2*

[Report by Antonia Vymazalova and Ivan Bielik: "The Level of Responsibility Is Different"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—The 24th Slovak National Council [SNR] session continued yesterday following the May Day holiday weekend. The fifth day began with a Presidium session. It made a decision on the course of action to be pursued in debating the points on parliament's agenda. At the start of proceedings the plenum commemorated the 73d anniversary of the tragic death of Milan Rastislav Stefanik.

The deputies then put the finishing touches on the government SNR bill—"left over" from Thursday [30 April]—on death duty, gift tax, and property transfer tax. Following a debate involving 81 deputies, 79 voted in favor of the law. The law replaces the current notarial fees from inheritance, gifts, and property transfers. It reintroduces the tax classification since the acquisition of property by inheritance or by gift is involved. To facilitate calculation of death duty, gift tax, and property transfer tax, people are categorized into three groups according to the extent of their relationship or other personal attachment to the person granting or transferring property. (Overall revenue from notarial fees in 1990 amounted to 106.7 million korunas) According to Paragraph 17 of the law, personal property for the personal use of individual persons not utilized for business or other profitmaking purposes is exempt from

death duty and gift tax if the value of this property does not exceed 300,000 korunas for the first tax paying group, 60,000 korunas for the second tax paying group, and 20,000 korunas for the third tax paying group. Only the amount exceeding the aforementioned sums will be taxed. (The rates are the same as in the Czech Republic.)

Following this law's approval, Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky (Christian Democratic Movement) presented a report on the fulfillment of the Slovak government's Policy Statement. He said that the report assesses the government's activity during the 1990-92 electoral period, the period that followed the first free and democratic elections. The president has called the governments elected by these elections the governments of national sacrifice. Carnogursky described this expression as appropriate and to the point. He stated that the fundamental problem encountered in transforming our society—which this government highlighted as its principal goal—is its complexity and wide-ranging nature. It was necessary to prepare and commence across-the-board transformation of the planned economic system into an economy based on market principles. Working out the preconditions for establishing justice, especially in the rehabilitation sphere, was a no less demanding and important task. He also mentioned the foreign and domestic conditions under which transformation took place. [passage omitted]

Peter Weiss (Party of the Democratic Left) delivered a meaningful speech in which he outlined starting points aimed at reversing the recession and at launching economic development and restructuring the economy. He emphasized the following: "After this two-year performance, I have to say that the political polarization following the formation of the new government and the government's inability to fulfill its policy statement are responsible for the overall social and economic situation. It is preposterous for representatives of the governing parties and movements to place all the blame for our problems on the opposition, an opposition with whom they will not cooperate.

"We do not agree with explaining away massive economic decline as an unavoidable tax for the transition to a market economy. First and foremost, the results of the government's economic policy are to blame for this.

"The government has not achieved the fundamental aim of its economic policy—reversing decline and reviving the economy in 1992—and there are no signs that this will be achieved by the end of the year. Economic results for the first two months of 1992—compared to the same period last year—show clearly that industrial output has declined by 47.2 percent (by 31 percent in the Czech Republic), productivity of labor has declined by 35.5 percent (17.6 percent), industrial sales have fallen by 56.5 percent (28.6 percent), exports have declined by 1.0 percent (they increased by 5.0 percent in the Czech Republic), and average wages have increased by only 18.5 percent, while they increased by 21.5 percent in the Czech Republic. The government has not presumed to

make any changes to its economic policy following the considerably worse results in Slovakia." [passage omitted]

Economic Turnaround 'Postponed' to 1993

92CH0495A Prague EKONOM in Czech

9 Apr 92 pp 24-25

[Article by Dr. Zdislav Sulc, Institute of Economic Policy, College of Economics: "Is It Realistic To Look for a Turnaround as Early as This Year?"—first paragraph is EKONOM introduction]

[Text] Some representatives of the economic life have already several times postponed the announced deadline when the economic decline is expected to reach its "bottom" and begins to return to the "above-water" level: First, they pushed the date forward to 1992, then to the first half of that year, and gradually toward the end of that year, or the beginning of the next year. However, this was more an expression of faith or a conviction without argumentation and justification.

Toward the end of January 1992, however, the weekly EKONOM, No. 4, printed a study by the chairman of the Federal Statistical Office, Eng. Ivan Suján, in which he speaks of an attempt by this institution, in collaboration with the Bratislava-based INFOSTAT organization, to work out an actual prognosis covering the development of basic macroeconomic indicators for the year 1992, with an outlook for 1993. The reference to the use of a "new short-term model of the Czechoslovak economy for the transition period" and references to quantification by combining econometric estimates derived from quarterly time segments in the Czechoslovak economy with information obtained from the models of several West European countries indicate that this is not "guesswork based on reading the tea leaves," but a serious attempt, based on a scientific methodological approach.

The forecast, which is worked out in four variations, ranging from the optimistic to a significantly pessimistic one, the latter combining the unfavorable developments of internal and external conditions, agrees on one fact in all four cases: the economy will begin to turn around from the bottom it has reached (the current level of the gross national product) as early as the first two quarters of this year. From that point on, all four variations (including the most pessimistic one, which extends this time period to the end of the third quarter of 1993) are showing a rising trend which is interrupted for a short time only at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, even though the growth rates shown differ.

A delay occurs (toward the end of 1992), in contrast to the development of the GNP, in the turnaround of unemployment which, during that time, peaks at 700,000 to 900,000 individuals, as well as in the development of inflation, when consumer prices are expected to outpace the level of December 1990 by 70 to 80 percent.

What Did Last Year's Developments Show?

The key question with respect to the success of the forecast is whether and to what extent it is able to capture and quantify precisely those factors which are decisive for the period under consideration. In established market economies, these are factors which are relatively stable from the midterm standpoint, as long as we do not anticipate a more express influence being exerted by exogenic, extraeconomic factors. Consequently, forecasting here is relatively more reliable and the prolongation of time frames from the previous period has a certain indicative capability with respect to the expectations of future development.

However, for an economy which is transforming itself, forecasting is highly problematic, if not actually misleading, particularly in the first phase. Those factors which determined the development of the GNP and other macroeconomic aggregates last year in the CSFR will be significantly different this year.

The determining factors for the level and pace of the gross national product in 1991 were the liberalization of prices and the rates of exchange (limited internal convertibility), as well as the disintegration of markets in the former socialist countries. The cumulative effect was a substantial reduction in aggregate demand and a general devaluation of money—both of cash and also savings. And this occurred both in the sector of households, in the enterprise sphere, and also in the state budget, where the purchasing power of expenditures declined by at least one-third, although these expenditures remained at their nominal levels.

The enterprise sphere, which, for the most part, continues to be represented by uncaptialized and therefore thoroughly uncommercialized state enterprises, adapted only passively: It restricted production, employment (even though it did nothing with regard to overemployment as yet), and investments. These factors were, for the most part, exhausted during the course of the year. A new balance formed in the economy at a substantially lower level than the potential level of the GNP. The drop in the GNP by virtually 15 percent does not characterize this deviation of real production from potential production with sufficient accuracy, because it compares annual averages which conceal developmental trends which occurred within the turnaround year. Consequently, data on the development of industrial and overall construction activity, which is obtained on a monthly basis, is closer to reality. In December 1991, this decline, according to preliminary data provided by the Federal Statistical Office, amounted to 36.3 percent, compared to the same period of the previous year for industrial production, and 34.2 percent for construction activity.

This Year, Different Factors Will Be Decisive

The actual bottom, to the extent to which it has already been reached, is somewhat lower at the beginning of 1992 than it would seem, based on GNP developmental data. At that, certain reserves with respect to its further

decline, on the basis of last year's determining factors, continue to exist. The continuing disintegration of eastern markets and the inadequate ability of the supply situation to compensate for the "impact of this disintegration" upon the aggregate demand of export expansion with respect to Western markets remains the principal risk factor.

The factors which will have a decisive influence upon the movement of the GNP in 1992 will be substantially different from the ones of last year and the prognosis of their effects is connected with a still greater measure of uncertainty than was the case regarding the liberalization of prices and exchange rates in the first year of transformation. These are predominantly exogenic factors—external factors from the standpoint of the actual mechanism of economic functioning, but, in all cases, they have far-reaching consequences with regard to the movement of the gross national product. They particularly include the following: large-scale privatization, with the predominance of coupon privatization, the results of the elections upon the orientation and stability of the new government, the realistic results of the state budget, and—last, but not least—the development of expectations by the population and by the management of newly forming entities in the business sphere, regarding the future developments of the economy.

The year 1992 is the year of coupon privatization in which, in two waves, one-half of the hitherto anonymous state-owned facilities is to find its specific and fully responsible owners. A substantial portion of enterprises will, in the course of the year, be defined in terms of capital, including the possibility for movement of this capital through a capital market. This market will experience a virtual explosion if millions of securities of the privatized enterprises are added to the current three waves of bond issues, virtually overnight.

How will this method of mass privatization influence the actual economic process, the dynamics of the GNP? Potentially, it contains both positive and also risk elements. Of the positive ones, the decisive one is the expectation that constituting new real owners will change the conduct of enterprises in a cardinal manner, and will unequivocally stimulate them in a direction leading to prosperity. Even if we were to admit the full success of this expectation, its realistic application can hardly be expected as early as 1992. It is far more likely that, from this short-range viewpoint, the existing pre-privatization agony will be replaced, for the time being, by feverish privatization power-administrative activities on the part of management, striving more to gain a place in the sun rather than to achieve extraordinary production efficiency. And this is so without consideration as to whether the result of two waves of coupon privatization will be a predominance of scattered ownership or, on the contrary, its concentration into a small number of privatization funds. The new owners will have no influence on this year's pace of production. The positive influence of coupon privatization—to the extent to which it will

occur—may be realistically expected only over the longer-term horizon of several years in the future.

In the short term, it is more likely that the influences will conspire to further depress the GNP. And this is so not only as a result of the “privatization chaos” which is spreading over the entire period of 1992, but also—and perhaps primarily because—barriers which have hitherto prevented the bankrupting of enterprises will fall. If the banks did not assist enterprises threatened in this manner by issuing convertible bonds of the Fund of National Property worth 50 billion korunas [Kcs] prior to their privatization, no one will be saving these enterprises after privatization.

The risk that 1992 will not become the year of turnaround, however, is not only based on the new factors operating to intensify the recession. A key question with respect to renewing economic growth involves the extent to which the investment capability of the enterprise sphere, and the related ability to restructure, can be asserted in this year. In 1992, the Czechoslovak economy is not confronted with the traditional role of a short-term stabilization policy stemming from functioning market economies, where the deviation of real production from the potential production (the deflationary or inflationary gap depending on whether the deviation is downward or upward) is solved within the framework of the given production function. In other words, through a greater or lesser utilization of existing capacities and by increasing or reducing employment. If this were the case, it would be worth considering the “application” of some traditional instruments of fiscal and monetary policy to support the growth of aggregate demand. However, such a step would only prolong the agony of many enterprises if it were to facilitate a certain growth for them on the basis of existing capacities and technologies. The key to revitalizing and renewing the growth of the Czechoslovak economy does not lie in stimulating demand, but in stimulating structural changes regarding the supply. For the present, the technological and assortment image of the supply situation reflects mainly the “requirements” of a centrally planned economy. It does not reflect, however, the “needs” of any effective demand, produced as a result of a liberalized domestic market, let alone a foreign market. This is the only way in which multiplying effects can be brought about in aggregate demand without the risk of inflation, be it through maintaining and creating new jobs, increasing exports, etc. However, this is not possible without available capital, without investments.

And here is the first weak spot regarding the predominance of coupon privatization in 1992. It does not in and of itself provide new capital. However, its chance lies in the fact that enterprises so privatized attract new capital (obviously, this is more likely to be foreign capital rather than “short-supply” domestic capital). The magnitude of this opportunity cannot be reliably estimated today. Findings regarding privatization on the territory of the new federal states of United Germany tend to invite more reserved rather than overly optimistic expectations

in the short term. What is virtually certain is that, realistically, this influence will be felt, at the earliest, during 1993.

Another problem involves the potential conduct of new stockholders. The signal emanating from the course of the registration of coupon booklets following the entry upon the privatization scene of the Harvard Fund, underscored the seriousness of the risks which the conceivers of coupon privatization were not admitting, even in the face of warnings by numerous critics. The extraordinarily low interest on the part of the public persisted for virtually the entire two-month period set aside for coupon privatization registration. By Christmas, instead of the anticipated two to four million holders of investment coupons, only a little over 500,000 registered. However, in the month of January, which was added, there was an explosion, with the number of individuals registering exceeding eight million.

And all of this occurred basically because one investment fund (and following its successes, there were a number of others playing catch-up and overtaking it) made an offer to citizens indicating that a deposit of Kcs1,035 would be worth 10 times that amount in cash a year later. This transformation of coupon privatization from a threatening debacle into an unexpected “colossal” success immediately presented two extreme risks with regard to the fulfillment of its very spirit and goals.

The first risk consists of the fact that the majority of citizens do not feel qualified to play the role of a stock exchange investor doing business on the capital market and, therefore, entrust this role to the privatization funds, clearly to those few which are the “most generous.”

The second risk lies in the fact that the coupon method provides the opportunity of transforming investment money (capital) into consumer money, or, in other words, provides the opportunity of living off substance. And this is not only a question of the promises of investment funds to pay out Kcs10,000 to Kcs15,000 in cash after a year for a citizen's coupon booklet. The question is what will happen in the securities market if a substantial portion of the populace manages to avoid the privatization funds, whose credibility declined somewhat during the course of January, and deposits their coupons directly with the enterprises involved? This question cannot be reliably answered today. Everything depends on the expectations which will prevail in society after a year: whether realistic developments will give rise to confidence that the economy is reviving or, on the other hand, whether there will be fears of a continuing recession and inflation.

In the former case, there is the hope—and in the interest of things nothing other than the fulfillment of this hope can be wished for—that it will prove possible to convince a substantial portion of the newly baked stockholders not to hurry to convert their investment moneys into consumer money. In the latter case, however, it is virtually

certain that their conduct will be determined by the rule that it is better to have a bird in the hand rather than in the bush. And then some kind of image of "black Friday" need not be a picture out of science fiction for the Czechoslovak economy. Instead of a capital injection stimulating economic growth, there can be further decapitalization of the economy. And this would undoubtedly be an impulse which would accelerate and intensify the recession far beyond the limits of the year 1992.

What Can Short-Term Stabilization Policy Accomplish?

Even though the central bank has already terminated its harsh restrictive policy in the monetary area, its opportunities—if the economy is not to be exposed to the risk of inflation—are minimal. A more express lowering of the interest rates is, for the time being, not possible as a result of the high interest rates paid on the deposits of the population, which form the foundation for the credit coverage of the commercial banks. The need for liquidity compels the banks to restrict long-term credits (over three-quarters of last year, the share of short-term credits rose from 26 to 32 percent). This trend will obviously strengthen in conjunction with privatization, because the opportunity for making direct commercial loans among enterprises who account for a substantial portion of so-called insolvency among state enterprises is reduced as a result of privatization and will be shifted to the sphere of the commercial banks. Also, a more express lowering of the obligatory reserves (the existing credit limits), as well as the issuance of additional state bonds, can hardly be realized in the present situation without strong inflationary risks.

As far as the state budget is concerned, a budget which even last year failed to purposefully create any resources for a selective structural policy, it continues in the same direction even this year. Although fiscal policy abandoned the so-called restrictive line, which failed last year anyway when the cumulative budget showed a deficit of Kcs12.3 billion in place of a planned surplus of Kcs8 billion, it is counting on a balance between revenues and expenditures for this year. The Achilles' heel of the state budget during economic recession, however, is the realistic attainment of planned revenues. Let us recall last year, when, for example, in January, the enterprises in the Czech Lands were showing a profit of Kcs12.7 billion, in November, however, they were only showing Kcs1.3 billion in profits. This trend in the development of profits also indicates the limitation of the potential resources to be devoted to investment expansion. Even though the budgets are expecting a certain decline in the GNP, it can hardly be expected that the realistic tax proceeds would provide any kind of new resources to stimulate structural changes in enterprises which have any hopes of prospering.

That leaves foreign capital, the existing influx of which has not been overly significant for the time being. To anticipate that its hitherto predominantly cautious wait-and-see position will undergo some kind of express change particularly in the year of "great privatization confusion" would represent exaggerated optimism which would, clearly, be hard to justify.

If we aggregate all the principal factors which will exert an influence on the level and the dynamics of the gross national product this year (we did not have the courage to include the results of the elections or the constitutional arrangement in our calculations), we must realistically state that only a convergence of these most favorable variations of development pertaining to all relative factors, which is likely to occur only as an exception, would make it possible for the economy to rebound from the bottom it had reached and to begin returning to the original level in the course of next year. The possibly positive influence of the principal factors which influence the level and pace of the GNP for this year is long-range in character. Potentially favorable effects can show up in a more express manner at the earliest during the course of 1993.

Updated Outline of Small, Large Privatization

*92CH0509A Prague DOKUMENTACNI PREHLED
in Czech 12 Mar 92 pp H/1-4*

[Unattributed report: "The Method of Privatization in Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] Privatization in Czechoslovakia is the combination of returning property to original owners and their heirs (authorized individuals), the sale of property to domestic as well as foreign capital, and a property "giveaway" through the means of investment coupons. For the present, it is possible to estimate the overall scope of the accomplished privatization only indirectly and very approximately, by using data on growth of the private sector which shared in the creation of the gross domestic product to the extent of 8.4 percent by the end of 1991 and in which employment exceeded 10 percent of total employment.

Small-Scale Privatization

The law on small-scale privatization, more precisely Law No. 427/1990 Sb. on transferring the state's ownership of certain items to other legal entities or physical individuals, was approved on 25 October 1990. It is based on only one privatization method—public auction—and is intended to be used in the privatization of property, the character of which makes it fall under small or medium-size business activities. The region for the application of the law is particularly the tertiary sector, primarily trade and services, as well as small production programs. The first public auction was held on 26 January 1991.

Number of Operating Units Sold at Auction Under Small-Scale Privatization, Including the Realized Auction Prices

Month	Number of Units Sold (Cumulative Value)	Auction Price in Millions of Korunas [Kcs] (Cumulative Value)
1991		
February	—	—
March	228	88
April	1,349	914
May	2,948	1,525
June	4,749	2,696
July	6,478	3,898
August	8,016	5,288
September	9,514	6,879
October	1,201	9,790
November	12,911	10,130
December	13,230	15,621
1992		
January	13,935	16,869

Thus, over a period of not quite one year since the law on small-scale privatization went into effect, approximately 14,000 operating units have been sold at public auction, with the state realizing virtually Kcs17 billion from the proceeds. In approximately 75 out of 100 cases, the auction involved the rights to a time-limited rental (at first, for a period of two years, and, after the law was amended, for a period of five years); in the remaining 25 cases, real estate was the subject of the auction and, thus, involved auctioning off ownership rights. The average auction price for an operating unit in small-scale privatization amounted to Kcs1.2 million and, in approximately 60 percent of the cases, was higher than the starting price. A total of 2,100 operating units were sold under terms of a so-called Dutch auction for lower starting prices.

A fundamental problem which small-scale privatization encountered from the very beginning involved the immediate economic interests of the enterprises being privatized and of their managements, which devised very inventive ways and methods of defending "their" operating units against privatization by public auction, ways of slowing down the process. An unappreciated role in the process of small-scale privatization was played by the okres privatization commissions which frequently struggled with the enterprises involved for every operating unit.

Large-Scale Privatization

The law on large-scale privatization, that is to say, Law No. 92/1991 Sb. on conditions for transferring state

property to other individuals, was approved on 26 February 1991. The fundamental building block of large-scale privatization is the privatization project. The law states that a privatization project is, as a rule, a workout by the enterprise to be privatized and, thus, allows it to be worked out by any private individual or legal entity for any kind of property intended for privatization. Every privatization project must be evaluated by the founder, that is to say, by the appropriate ministry or the local organ of state administration. In the majority of cases, the approver of a privatization project is the Ministry for the Administration of National Property and Its Privatization, where the property is to be sold to a previously identified owner and in all cases in which the appropriate government reserves this right unto itself.

The law on large-scale privatization expanded the spectrum of privatization methods, presented each processor with the opportunity of selecting that method which was most advantageous from the standpoint of the business intentions. These methods include public auction, public competitions, direct sale to a previously identified owner, transforming the enterprise into a stock corporation which would then make possible seven different ways of acquiring securities, and a cost-free transfer of property to communities, to health insurance funds and social security funds, and to banks and savings institutions.

By 15 January 1992, the Ministry for the Administration of National Property and Its Privatization of the Czech Republic had been presented with a total of 5,701 privatization projects for approval (including 2,573 basic projects and 3,128 competitive projects).

Breakdown of Privatization Projects Submitted to the Ministry for the Administration of National Property and Its Privatization of the Czech Republic for Approval by 15 January 1992, According to the Proposed Privatization Method

Proposed Methods of Privatization	Number of Projects	In Percent
Public auction	701	11.8
Public competition	475	8.0
Direct sale to a previously identified owner	2,076	35.0
Transformation of enterprise into a stock corporation	1,887	31.8
Privatization of state property portion in an existing stock corporation	33	5.6
Free transfer of property	460	7.8
Total	5,934	100.0

All privatization methods listed in Law No. 92/1991 Sb. are of equal importance in the eyes of the law, the law does not set any priorities in this regard. Particularly, the few which are widespread primarily among the lay public that coupon

privatization has a fundamental priority over all other methods does not apply. Nevertheless, coupon privatization will play a key role in the process of complying with the law on large-scale privatization. According to preliminary estimates, this method is to be used to privatize property valued at approximately Kcs160 billion in the Czech Republic and Kcs80 billion in the Slovak Republic. The final number will not be known until the results of the approved privatization projects are in. The deferring of the starting date for coupon privatization from the original January target date to March 1992 gave rise to the most varied conjectures. From the standpoint of safeguarding the offering side of coupon privatization, the acquisition of guarantees that securities will be issued backed up by real property which has been purged of all restitution claims and has been properly valued, the deferral of coupon privatization was completely indispensable. Some 8,565,642 citizens participated in registering for the first wave of coupon privatization (1 November 1991-29 February 1992).

Results of Large-Scale Privatization in 1991

By 31 December 1991, the Fund of National Property in the Czech Republic received 27 approved privatization projects, only six of which have thus far been realized by the fund. Five privatization units were auctioned off at public auction (although 10 were being auctioned off) for a total price of Kcs74 million, with the starting price amounting to approximately Kcs69 million. The influence of a new decree on valuing land parcels and real estate, which makes some projects virtually unsalable, turned out to be a negative factor at auction. Two operating units were privatized through public competition at a price which totaled Kcs5 million. In eight cases, the sale of the state's property participation (securities) was accomplished involving an existing stock corporation and the profits from the proceeds amounted to approximately Kcs4.8 billion. Five direct sales of property to previously identified owners were made and yielded Kcs1.7 million.

Center Accord Leader Reprimanded by Party Tribunal*AU1505083192 Warsaw NOWY SWIAT
in Polish 11 May 92 p 2*

[Report by "MK": "A Reprimand for Kaczynski"]

[Text] The Chief Disciplinary Court of the Center Accord, acting on a motion submitted by a group of Center Accord activists in Krakow and 18 members of the party's Supreme Political Council, has decided to issue a reprimand to Center Accord leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski for failing to convene a single meeting of the Supreme Political Council over a six-month period last year.

Court President Jerzy Jackl said that the failure to convene the Supreme Political Council made it impossible for it to approve the list of Center Accord parliamentary candidates in time for the elections. According to the Center Accord statute, only the Council can approve parliamentary candidates.

The court also recognized the Main Administration's decision to dissolve the Forum of Christian-Democratic Thought [FMChD] as a breach of the party statute. Again, only the Supreme Political Council is entitled to make such a decision, said Jackl. The Council is the Center Accord's highest body, but the Center Accord statute does not deal with these matters in detail.

The court also viewed the Center Accord Parliamentary Club's suspension of four deputies belonging to the FMChD and reprimands issued to three others as a breach of the statute.

"Other charges concerning current party affairs should be, and no doubt will be, examined by the Second Congress of the Center Accord," said Jackl.

Commenting on the court's verdict, Kaczynski said: "The matter is a purely political one. The court has been exploited as a party to the political dispute going on inside the Center Accord. That is very bad. We decided that the court would not decide on these matters because further court cases might cause the Center Accord nothing but harm. It is the Congress' task to examine these matters, and that is why we have brought it up in time.

"I have been reprimanded on only one count in the charge, for not convening the Political Council. In a formal sense, that is a violation of the statute. I will bear the responsibility for this because it is the party chairman's duty to convene this body, even though the decision not to do so was taken by the electoral staff. We were convinced we were acting in the party's interests by not convening the Council.

"Despite everything, I would accept this disciplinary measure were it not for one thing. I am the first person to have been punished by the Disciplinary Court, yet there have been many other episodes earlier, clearly caused by

maliciousness, that have very much harmed the party's interests, yet no one was punished. I am the first person to be punished in this way. I find this scurrilous, and not just because I am party chairman. Therefore, I cannot accept the court's ruling, because it is a political move."

"Besides," Kaczynski continued, "the manner of presenting the issue is very significant. It was released to the press. Someone quite simply wanted to create a sensation out of it, and yet this is an internal party matter that should be handled with discretion. Once again someone has shown that he cares nothing for the party's interests. I hope the Congress will judge this in the interests of the Center Accord and Polish democracy. There are parties that act in a democratic way and observe internal discipline at the same time. I hope the Congress will reach the appropriate decision."

Scenarios for Political Developments Noted*AU1405080092 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA
in Polish 11 May 92 p 20*

[Unattributed article: "Scenarios of Strength"]

[Text] After the latest Sejm session, a major change to the Polish political situation is likely. There seem to be four possible scenarios likely to come to pass over the next few weeks.

In one of them, which one can describe as a government scenario, Jan Olszewski's cabinet will survive because the Sejm will be too scared to give the president the powers he wants, and the president will withdraw his sympathy for the small coalition once the debate on the small constitution starts. The politicians gathered around Jan Olszewski have launched a programmatic declaration, and shamelessly say that the government's greatest strength lies in the weakness of its opponents. But the government itself is weakening. Having voted against the decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Polish Peasant Party has virtually ceased to be a government ally. The Confederation for an Independent Poland has openly dismissed the government and said it does not wish to belong to a doomed alliance. In the present nervous atmosphere, the Christian-National Union has produced ideas about a government restructuring and reshuffle, though the government cannot even cope with current state matters.

None of this will be much help, it seems. The idea of giving the prime ministerial post to a public figure not linked to any political setup also fails to provide much room for maneuver. Such a prime minister would be controlled by the political government presidium.

According to a second scenario, the parliamentary scenario, the small coalition would form a council, which would pass a vote of no confidence in the prime minister and conduct hard talks with the president on the extent of his powers, which would clearly be less than the powers of the French Presidency. The small coalitions' proposals might appeal to the parliamentary clubs of the

German Minority Party, Solidarity of Labor, and perhaps the Christian-Democratic Party. Rumors in the corridors of the Sejm suggest that the Polish Peasant Party might also be interested. The Democratic Left Alliance might consider this an opportunity to emerge from its political isolation, so it, too, would be compelled to accept these proposals. However, the parliamentary scenario contains a major fault. There is no sign of any prime ministerial candidate acceptable to all parties.

If the Sejm fails to produce a grand coalition and discharge one of its basic duties, the adoption of a budget, it will be forced to hand over power to the president. That is the point of departure for the next scenario, the small constitution scenario. This scenario calls for two things at the same time; work on a small constitution, which would seriously increase the president's powers; and the Sejm's acceptance of a supraparty government, a government of specialists, which might break the former opposition's reluctance to see anyone not originating from Solidarity becoming prime minister.

Finally, there is the April scenario, whereby the president favors not so much the French style of Presidency as the provisions of the April 1935 constitution of the Second Republic, which he mentioned with fondness in his Sejm speech last Friday. The strong Presidency advocated by that constitution would antagonize every party in parliament, and everyone would begin to fight everyone else. The parties would fight for the best possible starting position prior to a new accelerated Sejm election, and the president would fight to create his own political base quickly.

According to what politicians have been saying, it seems as if a scenario somewhere between the parliamentary one and the small constitution one might come to pass. That is good, because it shows that common sense is triumphing.

Szeremietiew Discusses Prague Visegrad Summit

AU1405121092 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
11 May 92 p 1

[Article by "R.Ch": "Minister Szeremietiew Talks to POLSKA ZBROJNA"]

[Text] Acting Defense Minister Romuald Szeremietiew has returned from the Prague working meeting of the defense ministers of the so-called Visegrad three. On his arrival at Warsaw Airport, POLSKA ZBROJNA asked him for an assessment of the meeting from the point of view of Poland's interests.

"I am pleased to say that the defense ministers of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have a joint stance on matters that concern us," said Minister Szeremietiew. "The French defense minister, who also attended, was even surprised by the fact that we all hold a joint stance. I am especially pleased because this joint stance took shape after my speech. What did we talk

about? We made it clear that we are interested in cooperation that consolidates our security. First of all, this security must take into account the reality connected with the presence of NATO. Second, the West must realize it cannot establish European security without the countries of Central Europe.

"We realize that Western Europe is a little helpless in view of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism and that this helplessness could affect our security. We want to tell every center, force, group, and person on the western side that they should bear this in mind."

In a communique adopted at the meeting, the representatives of the "three" agree that European security is chiefly the responsibility of those European and North American countries that allied themselves in NATO to defend the common values of democracy. At the same time, says the communique, one should consider the further possibilities to be furnished by the creation of an effective system of security. It is expedient to take part in all joint talks on the subject of security, including West European talks on the formation of European military structures. The French defense minister said one should display an interest in the holding of talks on the subject of new European security structures.

"I think the West appreciates the value of cooperation within the framework of the 'three.' We must bear that in mind," said Minister Szeremietiew. "I said that the Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian peoples did not always know how to cooperate with each other in the past. I said that communism has taught us the value of such cooperation. We are drawing conclusions from this. It will have a positive bearing on our national security."

In R. Szeremietiew's view, meetings like this and cooperation between the Visegrad three is a very strong signal to NATO structures to consider our expectations.

Compromise on 'Small' Constitution Viewed

AU1405073492 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA
in Polish 11 May 92 p 4

[Article by Krzysztof Kotowski: "Chance of a Break-through"]

[Text] Walesa's Sejm speech last Friday was his most spectacular gesture so far in his desire to assume the political initiative. The significance of the small coalition is also increasing. Will both these power centers reach a compromise?

Since Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski's departure, the Sejm has also accepted the resignation of Artur Balazs, the minister responsible for contacts between the political parties. The Sejm vote on this resignation, preceded by a lengthy debate and an explanation by the prime minister, diminished the cabinet's prestige even further because the number of yes votes was only one

above the required minimum. The Christian-Democratic Party's exit from the ruling coalition is of rather symbolic significance, considering the minimal strength of that group.

Deputy Ryszard Czarnecki (Christian-National Union) told NOWA EUROPA that the latest events show that the ruling center has been shaken. Politicians in support of the government are even prepared to see a new prime minister as long as power does not go to Walesa.

Nevertheless, none of the progovernment coalition's recent efforts to strengthen their position in parliament seem likely to break the deadlock. Krzysztof Krol of the Confederation of Independent Poland [KPN] told NOWA EUROPA that the KPN does not think its entry to the government would help improve the psychological situation. "Unless such an improvement occurs, the KPN will share the government's fate," he said. "The government's life might be prolonged by another three months, that is all. In such a situation, there is no point in us joining it," concluded Krol. He suggested that Jan Olszewski might step down without a vote of no confidence.

What the President Wants

Lech Walesa has been making it increasingly clear that he wants an alliance with the small coalition, provided it supports his call for greater presidential powers. Yet it is mainly the Democratic Union and Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD] deputies who pressured the Sejm extraordinary commission to reject the Belvedere's proposed small constitution at the end of last year. In fact, the Democratic Union Deputies Club will shortly present to the Sejm its own plan of a small constitution, with narrower presidential powers. Most Sejm groups have supported the Democratic Union plan.

So if the Sejm agrees to increase the president's powers, will it also agree to all his demands? Will Lech Walesa agree to a compromise? It looks as if this issue will be a bone of contention on our political scene for the next few weeks. "In the political dimension, the president has presented one well-known demand, a radical increase in his powers, which is supposed to be a panacea for Poland's problems but is not," said Deputy Jan Maria Rokita (Democratic Union) commenting on Walesa's Friday speech. Andrzej Zarebski (KLD) generally agreed with the president's present line. "Whether the next government will merely be a reconstructed government in its present form or a presidential government is not so important. What is important is whether or not the next government emerges as a result of cooperation between parliament and the president."

What Kind of Small Constitution?

The draft small constitution prepared by the Democratic Union calls for a balance of power between the president, parliament, and government, and gives the president the right to appoint a prime minister. The Sejm commission examining this draft has only met once so

far. Says Minister Lech Falandysz from the Presidential Chancellery: "The president's original draft of the small constitution represents the very minimum of change. The maximum change is represented by his wish for a presidency in the style of De Gaulle. The president is mainly interested in being able to shape the government any way he wants." Nevertheless, Minister Falandysz said there is a good chance for a compromise between the president's wishes and those of the Democratic Union.

Representatives of various Sejm groupings are also declaring their readiness to participate in work on the new document. Says Marcin Przybylowicz of the Center Accord: "There are two alternatives, either to adopt our own draft small constitution, and the ruling coalition has no firm ideas about this, or try to modify the Democratic Union's draft. I think the second alternative is more likely." Krzysztof Krol from the KPN does not rule out the possibility of his KPN participation in work on the small constitution, provided that a new election code is passed at the same time. "We do not know which of the two, the small constitution or a new election code, will be needed first," he said. "If the Sejm chooses the Democratic Union's draft as the only one to be considered, the Christian-National Union will propose a series of amendments," said Ryszard Czarnecki. "We believe it necessary to look for something in between the French and German types of presidencies."

So for the time being, there seems to be a climate of compromise on the subject of the small constitution and the president's plans on how to dispel the current crisis, but no one knows if this climate will last once the debate on concrete solutions starts.

Central Bank Chief Considers Budget Issues

AU1405092392 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
(ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)
in Polish 7 May 92 p 1

[Interview with Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, president of the Polish National Bank, by Piotr Aleksandrowicz on 6 May; place not given: "The Bank Will Maintain the Value of the Currency"]

[Text] The Sejm approved the Constitutional Tribunal ruling on public sector employees pay and rejected most of the Tribunal's ruling on the pension law. Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski has submitted his resignation as he sees no possibility of meeting the budget obligations stemming from the Sejm decision. As inflationary pressure may increase, the stance of the Polish National Bank is of particular importance. RZECZPOSPOLITA asked the bank's president, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, to comment on these issues:

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The Sejm decision does not effect the realization of monetary policy objectives. The increase in the money supply cannot exceed 127 trillion zlotys [Z] and that can figure cannot be changed under any circumstances. The way in which the budget is financed will also remain unchanged. The banking

system will finance the budget deficit to an amount not exceeding Z52 trillion, as we envisaged. Then, the Polish National Bank will not raise the direct purchase of treasury bonds to over Z20 trillion.

How we deal with this problem is an internal budget issue. We are not going to go into the question of the structure of the budget, and we are not going to suggest whether budget revenues should be increased or expenditures reduced.

But it has to be borne in mind that the bank will not finance a deficit that will exceed the level contained in the draft budget law. That is our position, because the central bank's main task is to safeguard the value of the currency.

[Aleksandrowicz] We have been talking about what course events will take this year. What will happen if the option that is chosen for implementing the rulings will have inflationary consequences for the next few years?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The bank will steadfastly maintain the value of the currency. Our goal is to gradually reduce inflation in a harmonious way that takes account of economic facts.

[Aleksandrowicz] What was your reaction to Minister Andrzej Olechowski's resignation?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] For me, as president of the central bank, the decision was a bad one, because we cooperated very well with Minister Olechowski. I can only say that I regret that it has happened.

[Aleksandrowicz] An IMF mission is visiting Poland, and whether an agreement can be reached with the IMF remains an open question. In your opinion, will what has happened today have an impact on the course of the negotiations?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] We still do not know whether parliament will accept the resignation. On the other hand, I assume that what has happened will undermine the declarations that our representatives made, namely, declarations concerning a certain measure of stabilization, the possibility of longer-term planning, and the political will to maintain a course that we can describe as reform oriented. Minister Olechowski stated this, I did so on various occasions, and so did the prime minister. It is unfortunate that this has happened at this time, especially as the first round of talks provided grounds for optimism, and IMF representatives were responding positively to what we put forward, to the question of a budget deficit level that will not exceed 5 percent of the gross domestic product. No comments were made about the level of the money supply.

Iliescu Receives Jordan Parliamentary Delegation

JN1505073992 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic
15 May 92 p 24

[Text] Bucharest—Romanian President Ion Iliescu last night received a visiting Jordanian parliamentary delegation headed by Senator Bashir al-Sabbagh.

During the meeting, the delegation conveyed an oral message from His Majesty King Husayn to the Romanian president, in which his majesty expressed Jordan's firm desire to enhance bilateral cooperation in the service of the interests of the two friendly peoples.

For his part, the Romanian president expressed his country's desire to develop relations between the two countries, and asked the delegation to convey his greetings to his majesty the king.

The Romanian president underscored the big possibilities for bolstering bilateral relations in all fields in the service of the two peoples' interests, peace issues, and international cooperation.

The Jordanian delegation, currently visiting Romania at the invitation of the Romanian Parliament, also met with the speakers of the Romanian Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

The Jordanian delegation comprises House of Representatives members 'Isa al-Rimuni and Ibrahim al-Ghababishah, as well as Sufyan al-Hasan from the House of Representatives General Secretariat.

CD Condemns 'Undemocratic' Electoral Bill

AU1505113092 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 8 May p 1

[Unattributed article: "What Kind of Electoral Law?"]

[Text] The Executive Committee of the Democratic Convention [CD] that met in Bucharest on 6 May noted that the electoral law that is being prepared in the Romanian Parliament is meant to hamper the correct unfolding of the parliamentary elections. The bill, worse than the previous electoral laws, ignores democratic provisions such as the proportional representation, the presence of national observers during the voting, the ban of the members of the repressive communist regime to run in the elections, and so on and so forth.

When it reached the stage of being discussed by Deputies' Chamber, this draft became even more undemocratic through the effect of proposals such as: a) the amendment that is still being discussed and that attempts to deprive the united opposition of the name the Democratic Convention and the electoral sign—the key—that have penetrated people's awareness; b) the interdiction for independent candidates to run in the elections on the lists of certain parties or party alliances; c) the act of limiting the number of neutral national observers present at a polling station to only one person,

as well as other restrictions imposed on these observers; d) placing party alliances in a disadvantageous position by requiring them, to be admitted to the parliament, to obtain a higher percentage of votes than the 4 percent limit requested from parties.

The Executive Committee of the Democratic Convention forcefully protests such undemocratic stipulations of the electoral law and alert the public to the fact that they can have serious consequences both on a domestic and international plane.

'Slander' by Hungarian in German Press Decried

AU1305133692 Bucharest DIMINEATA
in Romanian 7 May 92 pp 1, 6

[Article by N. Milea: "The Enormous Slander"]

[Text] It does not surprise us when a Hungarian signs a slanderous and hostile article, such as the one entitled "On the Verge of War," published by Boris Kalnoky in the daily DIE WELT. What surprises us, however, is the fact that that German newspaper publishes lies: "While in South-East Europe ethnic conflicts turn, one by one, into wars, the tension between the Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania has not yet reached an explosive stage. But, for the first time influential voices can be heard within the Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania [UDMR] foreseeing even an explosion if Bucharest does not rapidly come up with a favorable legal status for the Hungarian minority. Along with this, differences between UDMR factions are intensifying."

Reversing the roles, Kalnoky writes: "The reserved attitude of the UDMR in the past two years was not rewarded by the government in any way. The basic request for creating Hungarian high schools and colleges is taboo for Bucharest as it used to be. At the same time, repression has gained tremendously in scope following the success achieved in the elections in Transylvania by the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], a party that emerged from the cultural organization Vatra Romaneasca." The lies just continue to flow: "Cluj now has a PUNR mayor. It is an act of courage for young Hungarians to be in the street at night because of constant attacks by the police. Before the elections, the Hungarian candidate in Tirgu Mures was stopped from running in the elections on the basis of invented accusations. When, however, the UDMR scored a victory, new elections were announced. 'We will vote in peace and quiet and we will win until they understand this,' Imre Borbely, UDMR Presidium member, said. This chemist from Timisoara is part of the faction around Geza Szocs who is not inclined toward compromise; this group demands the status of co-nation for the Hungarian minority." Proceeding to overt threats, Boris Kalnoky writes: "If such a legal status is not approved soon, 'then one should reckon with the use of force and a similar situation like that in Yugoslavia,' Borbely clearly declares. In this respect, he invokes a continuous exodus

to Hungary: 'Those who stay behind are the most determined. The increasing pressure by Romanian nationalists has led to reactions among the Hungarian population. Mass exoduses increase social problems in Hungary and lead to an increasingly hostile attitude toward Romania the consequences of which are unforeseeable.' Borbely's fears are also shared by other presidium members like Miklos Patrubany."

It is surprising that he also comes up with a few true things: "The struggle for power is fierce: Because of protests against the law on national security, Vice President Szocs was replaced as chief of the parliamentary group in the Senate by the majority group around President Geza Domokos, which favors a compromise." He says a few other true things like the following: "The sensitive nature of the situation is also demonstrated by the attempt last year to proclaim autonomy in the area that is densely inhabited by Szeklers. Then, a mass meeting was to be convened in accordance with a traditional custom. The Romanian Army moved forces to the area where the said mass meeting was going to be held and ordered the holding of maneuvers on the basis of a civil war scenario. The meeting was postponed." In principle, Borbely supports such projects: "What is at stake is the principle of peoples' self-determination, only the conditions have to be better ones."

Borbely hopes for an autonomous state structure for Transylvania, Banat, and other regions—a "federation based on common outlook." In his view, Bessarabia (the former Moldavian Soviet Republic) could play a forerunner role, because it would like to reunite with Romania only by preserving comprehensive independence. If such an independence was stipulated in the Constitution, it would create a precedent that could be followed by other regions on the basis of a certain people's decision. The leadership in Bucharest is aware of this. It could be tempted to prevent such a development in Moldova; this would be possible only "through war in the border area against the Russians in the Dniester region."

The aggressive and slanderous impertinence of this Russo-Hungarian, Boris Kalnoky, really exceeds all limits!

If he was accredited to Romania, then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should withdraw his accreditation. Otherwise this reprobate will continue slandering our country in the eyes of the German readers.

Agrarian Party Discusses Political Platform

*AU1405081992 Bucharest ADEVARUL
in Romanian 7 May 92 p 3*

[Report by Constantin Lupu: "The Minicongress of the Agrarian Party"]

[Text] A very important meeting of the National Coordinating Council of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania [PDAR] concluded yesterday, 6 May. First, the

participants examined the drafts of two basic party documents: the political program and the government program.

According to the PDAR leader, Dr. Victor Surdu, the political program that he presented is a "new stage on the path of the party's maturation" and a "crystallization of its identity in the political scene." The need for such a doctrine derives from the "support of the electorate." Let us not forget: the Agrarian Party is the only party that increased the number of votes obtained in the last elections four times (compared with the 20 May elections), and it has thus become the third national political force.

The ideology of the PDAR, Mr. Surdu stressed, has its origins in Adam Smith's thinking ("the personal interest of the individual is the motor for society's development"). Being a fan of the "capitalist-type of market economy with strong social protection" the party has made "an unequivocal breach with communist ideology."

An essential thesis of the doctrine-type program is "to ensure the food supply for the entire population," which is something that can be achieved by "forcefully turning toward agriculture."

In his report, the PDAR leader made an extensive analysis of the domestic and international economic-political situation and stressed the options of the Agrarian Party members in the crucial issues confronting the country. Sometimes both Mr. Surdu's report in connection with the political program and the speech delivered by Mr. Ion Stanciu, vice president of the party, who presented the government program, but mostly the interventions of the participants, seemed to be exclusively agrarian economic discourses. One of the speakers, the president of the Prahova County branch, trying to explain the situation, made a simple electoral calculation: "If we ensure bread, we lower the social tension by 70 percent; thus we will have 70 percent of the electorate on our side!"

These were not the only important points of the meeting. The participants also discussed the way in which the PDAR will act in the general and presidential elections. In conclusion, it was agreed that, within certain limits, the opportuneness of possible political alliances should be left to the judgment of county branches. The participants also discussed the issue of backing Mr. Victor Surdu as the PDAR's candidate for the office of Romania's president. There were arguments in favor ("so that nobody can say any longer that we are an auxiliary party or a branch of the National Salvation Front") but there also were opinions against it. In the end, Mr. Surdu "found an immediate solution" by deciding not to run for the presidency but to wait instead because his dream is to have the position of deputy prime minister responsible for agriculture. Likewise, the participants suggested that the members and sympathizers of the party should vote for the position of the president, "according to their own judgment."

As far as the programmatic documents are concerned, the National Coordinating Council decided that they should be discussed within the branches and be finalized after a two-week period. In fact, to comply with the PDAR representatives' request, we will carry excerpts of those documents in tomorrow's issue of our paper.

UDMR's Maneuvers, Possible Alliances Viewed

*AU1505082092 Bucharest AZI in Romanian
7 May 92 p 2*

[Article signed I.R.: "Concern, Maneuvers by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania"]

[Text] The Attitude of the National Liberal Party toward the Democratic Convention and especially toward the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] has considerably reduced the Hungarian organization's capability and freedom of action. In this election campaign period, the UDMR is thus facing an exceptional situation and, somehow, without any solution since the Hungarian Embassy itself has become involved in the domestic affairs of the Union. This involvement consists of giving "unofficial dinner parties" to which not necessarily political figures are invited but rather their counselors. The subject of discussions is the following: What should the UDMR do about such matters as alliances to ensure the best permanent representation. The concern stems from the fact that in the next legislature the number of parliamentarians representing the Hungarian minority will be, it seems, cut in half. The solutions thought of by the Hungarian analysts (one cannot specify the exact percentage of those in the embassy and in the UDMR) are as follows: a) a coalition with the Civic Alliance Party or National Salvation Front (something that does not seem to please Budapest); b) an opportunist policy to achieve the desired mandates (and this would imply the strategy of supporting Mr. Ion Iliescu's candidacy for the country's presidency); c) a "wait-and-see" policy about the claims for autonomy by the UDMR. It seems that the chain of "unofficial dinner parties" will continue.

SRI Director Criticized for Airing Files

*AU1505095692 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 9-10 May 92 p 1*

[Interview with Civic Alliance Party leader Nicolae Manolescu by Tia Serbanescu; place and date not given: "The Most Terrible Thing of All Is That Mr. Magureanu 'Took Revenge' by Circulating Certain Files"]

[Text] [Serbanescu] Mr. Manolescu, if you were to examine the activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] and its director, Mr. Virgil Magureanu, which of their mistakes would you consider the most terrible?

[Manolescu] The most terrible thing of all seems to me that the SRI director took revenge by circulating certain files [belonging to the former secret police Securitate]. Can you imagine what would happen if all heads of such

important offices as the SRI would act in such a way? It seems to me that—by doing so—Mr. Magureanu has violated the law, so this time there is more to it than merely the question of his remaining in office or not. If evidence is found that it was really Mr. Magureanu who released the files, he will have to face the full severity of the law for his actions. Because it is but a small step between using such files as if they were his own property and forging files.

[Serbanescu] Would you favor making all Securitate files public?

[Manolescu] I would favor taking two different steps at the same time. Each citizen should be allowed sight of his or her file—but no one else's—if he or she is interested. Secondly, a specially appointed commission should warn people holding important offices—such as parliamentarians or ministers—that incriminating evidence has cropped up, so they had better resign within a certain time, or else their files would be published.

[Serbanescu] If those persons were journalists, would you have them fired or not?

[Manolescu] I would have them fired only if they had executive positions, otherwise not. After all, people should be allowed to have their showdowns with their own consciences. They should be allowed to decide—because they are able to—whether they confess their culpability or whether they try to hide it and whether such a burden makes it possible for them to judge other people.

Police Chief Nitu Terms U.S. Visit Fruitful

*AU0905194492 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER
in Romanian 5 May 92 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Major General Nicolae Nitu, chief of Bucharest Police and deputy chief of the General Police Inspectorate, by Sorin Ovidiu Balan; place and date not given: "The Americans Say That We Are Among the Best in the World"]

[Text] [Balan] General, recently you returned from a visit to the United States, together with Mr. Crin Halaicu [Bucharest mayor]. Thus, should we understand that Bucharest's police are subordinated to the Town Hall?

[Nitu] Not at all. Mr. Crin Halaicu invited me to be part of the delegation he was heading. The condition for accepting this invitation was that I strictly deal with police affairs. This is the condition on which I went to the United States, where I met with mayors and police chiefs in some American cities, including New York, Washington, Atlanta, and others.

[Balan] What will the visit paid by the police chief to the United States mean for the residents of Bucharest?

[Nitu] A very fruitful exchange of opinions took place between me and the American policemen. I have to tell you that we did not go there as poor relations and were not treated like poor relations either. On the contrary. I noted that the Americans know many things about us and the professional skills of the Romanian policemen, whom they rank among the best in the world, despite the fact that—as you know—we lack equipment. And when I say equipment, I am not referring to the latest equipment, but to what is strictly necessary, because without it we are unable to do our work.

[Balan] By way of equipment, are the Americans helping in this respect?

[Nitu] Before answering this question, I want to make a remark—which you probably suspect. The American police, whose rate of apprehending criminals is lower than that of the Romanian police, have the latest equipment at their disposal and there are a great number of policemen: One policeman per 200 citizens. During the meetings I had with mayors and police chiefs, I also raised the problem of the material assistance they may be able to grant and they said they wanted to help us. How this assistance will materialize remains to be seen. Anyhow, we agreed on cooperation in the area of certain violations which are—so to say—“traditional” in their country, but with which we have been confronted only now, after the revolution. I am especially referring to drug trafficking, arms deals, organized crime, and international terrorism. We have a lot to learn from them in these areas.

[Balan] You said that you were not treated like some poor relation. But was there any allusion or hint to the fact that Romania's current police was actually Ceausescu's militia wearing different uniforms, but with the same habits?

[Nitu] Not at all. I have told you that they were very well informed about us. They knew that it was our mission—formerly as it is now—to protect people's lives, private and public property, and public peace and order.

[Balan] Briefly put, to catch thieves!

[Nitu] Not only. We do have to catch those who commit violations, but we also have to prevent antisocial acts. For example, I remember the episode last year in Mogosoaia, where, without any compliments, and TINERETUL LIBER was present, we were able to defuse an explosive situation that could have degenerated into a bloody conflict, more serious and more harmful than the one at Bolintin [involving clashes with Gypsies].

[Balan] General, in conclusion, a thought for the readers of our paper.

[Nitu] I want to tell the readers of your paper and all residents of Bucharest that the police are doing their duty, that the policemen within the sections are—24 hours out of 24 hours—at the disposal of the residents in this big city. And I also want to tell them that no matter how dangerous or difficult their task, they will defend peoples' lives, their property, and public peace and quiet even by sacrificing their lives. We want a strong police force, which is ready to intervene whenever a violation is committed. We want a police force that will master the street in the positive sense of the word.

[Balan] Thank you General.

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