




JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military Affairs



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Future Structures To Work with Young Servicemen

92UM0021A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Oct 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Roman Zadunayskiy, TASS correspondent:
"Who Will Work with Army Youth?"]

[Text] The majority of servicemen are young people and, as we know, problems overcome young people. Before, mainly the Army and Navy Komsomol dealt with them. But the Komsomol, having disbanded itself, left no successor. Thousands of former Komsomol secretaries and other workers who were part of the staff of military-political bodies are nervous, essentially without a job. What kind of fate awaits them?

A subgroup for forming in the USSR Armed Forces structures for working with young people has been created in the USSR Ministry of Defense commission for abolishing military-political bodies, Captain Andrey Nemchaninov, a staff member of this subgroup, told a TASS correspondent in an interview.

He noted that at the 22d Komsomol Congress, the one that abolished the Komsomol, the decision was made to appeal to the USSR President, the country's Parliament, and leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB with proposals to ensure social protection for young servicemen by creating within the framework of staff structures an officer institution for work among young people, excluding any political activity. In addition, it is envisioned that organizational-material and personnel support will be given to funds of social protection of young servicemen and their family members, youth associations of the armed forces, and other Army, Navy, and public youth associations not having a political orientation.

Our subcommission is now drafting a package of documents that stipulate for the transition period (about two years) the need to have an officer assistant to the commander for work with young people and organizing leisure time for direct work with personnel in battalions, regiments, and large units [soyedineniye].

Army and Navy youth organizations have always had well-organized ties with "civilian" public youth organizations. In order to develop them in the districts, fleets, and groups of forces, a quite extensive informational, military-sociological, and social-legal service will be created. Through the assistant USSR minister of defense for information and ties with the public, it will promote contacts with state services for youth affairs, public youth organizations, and the mass media. Scientific elaboration of concepts for solving youth problems in the Army and Navy will be accomplished on the basis of the information-analytical laboratory (group) at the Center for Military-Sociological and Psychological Research of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Who will fill the openings in these newly created structures for working with young people? I think there are

quite a few talented people among the former Komsomol and youth workers of the Army and Navy who are able to find the "key" to the heart of the young soldier, A. Nemchaninov said in conclusion.

Moscow MD Chief Hits Army's Use for 'Political Games'

PM2210143791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Oct 91 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General L. Zolotov, chief of staff of Moscow Military District, by correspondent A. Golovenko; date and place not specified: "Army Is Not Small Change"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Golovenko] I think that the underlying cause of the tragedy on the Sadovoye Koltso was the fact that our top leaders continually used the Army to maintain public order. You have already referred to the 28 March confrontation, which was viewed unequivocally by Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Then no authorization had been given for the rally on Manege Square, and young soldiers stood on Pushkin Square while cries of "fascists!" were hurled at them by a mob.

Can you tell us if there are any guarantees after the tragedy on the Sadovoye Koltso that troops will no longer be used for the wrong purpose?

[Zolotov] It is hard to guarantee that in our troubled times. Although I do of course agree with the way you put the question. Why are there troops in Moscow? I have said that the militia is enough here.

[Golovenko] Here is a new example: A month after that tragedy we saw servicemen again—at the "Monsters of Rock" festival at Tushino...

[Zolotov] That's right. We received orders from the defense minister who, at the Moscow government's request, ordered 2,000 men to be put at the disposal of the Moscow Internal Affairs Administration to ensure order at Tushino Airfield. They were supposed to cooperate with the militia; they were to be at the front and the cadets and soldiers behind. However, on the spot the cadets and soldiers ended up facing a howling mob, who at times simply ran wild. Many "spectators" armed themselves with various objects beforehand—ranging from sharpened steel bars to brass knuckles. These bandits—what else can you call them?—went there deliberately to beat up officers, soldiers, cadets, and militiamen. The casualty figures have already been published. The injured typically suffered fractures, head injuries, concussions, and other serious injuries. The mothers came along once again, and once again there were tears, apologies, and insults.

[Golovenko] The opinion is being cultivated in some places today that the Army was supposedly incapable of taking the "White House" and that was why the "putschists" failed.

[Zolotov] Let me repeat once again that we were not set that task. Neither our enlisted men, nor the Muscovites around them felt themselves enemies. There were sober, serious people among the various "agitators" constantly chasing a drunken rabble away from their vehicles. But someone did after all turn out the report that they were going to "take the 'White House.'" Who were these rabble-rousers? I hope that an investigation tackles this. We must know the truth about these people too. Let me say once again that the Army is not to be used for political games.

Tank General Recounts Role in Coup Failure

LD1810165491 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 18 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—"The armed forces did not obey orders by the 'State Emergency Committee' and sided with the people," Major-General Vladimir Chuzhikov, commander of the Kantemirovskiy Tank Division, told TASS, explaining reasons for the failure of the August coup in the Soviet Union.

On August 20, the second day of the putsch, the division was sent to Moscow together with other army units "to ensure order in connection with the introduction of a curfew".

According to the general, on that very morning, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's representatives visited him at the division temporary command post at Vorobyeviy Hills in Moscow and explained the situation resulting from the putschists activities.

"This information was extremely important for me, as on August 19 I was on vacation with my family in Yalta and returned to Moscow only in the morning of August 20," Chuzhikov said.

Chuzhikov then told officers that the division will not take part in illegal actions and its command will not send tanks against its own people.

At the night of August 20, Chuzhikov ordered the pullout of tanks from Moscow. "By the morning of August 21, only a few units still remained in the capital. They left the city before noon," Chuzhikov said.

Defense Ministry Information Directorate Outlines Services

PM1610145191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[Untitled "USSR Defense Ministry Information Directorate Announcement"]

[Text] The USSR Defense Ministry Information Directorate organizes and coordinates the dissemination in

the country and abroad of all types of information on defense development and the life and activities of the Armed Forces and liaisons between military structures and Soviet and foreign media, union and republic state organs and public organizations. It has the exclusive right to organize meetings, conversations, and interviews between representatives of the media and the USSR Defense Ministry and other top people in the Armed Forces.

The USSR Defense Ministry Information Directorate plans and organizes prearranged visits to military units and institutions and trips to exercises and test sites and the provision of other types of information services, some on a commercial basis.

Requests and applications can be made to the USSR Defense Ministry Information Directorate, Moscow K-160, 103160.

The telephone numbers are 293-39-14 for Soviet journalists and 296-03-65 for foreign journalists.

[Signed] USSR Defense Ministry Information Directorate

Defense Commission Comments on Proposed Reforms, Restructuring

92UM0031A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by TASS correspondent R. Zadunayskiy: "In the USSR Ministry of Defense Commission: Reform Concept Is Ready"]

[Text] In the nearest future, the USSR Ministry of Defense collegium will consider proposals on abolishing military-political organs and creating organs of combat preparedness and structures for personnel work in the USSR Armed Forces. They have been prepared by the USSR Ministry of Defense commission on abolishing military-political organs, headed by Colonel General Dmitriy Volkogonov.

According to the commission's press service, which prepared a brief summary of the concept, the purpose of proposed reforms is strengthening the combined command on a law-based foundation, enhancing the interconnection between combat training and military personnel upbringing, democratization and humanization of military service relations, increasing social and legal protection of servicemen and their families, and achieving a new level of quality in the combat and the moral and psychological training of the troops (forces). The foundation for building the structures of military personnel work rests on the principles of cutting numeric strength, decentralization, and deprivation of administrative command powers, taking into account the separation of functions between the Ministry of Defense (civilian) and the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

These structures are part of the state-military command organs and consist of a number of self-contained organs and services that in combination provide an effective influence on a serviceman's personality. Organizationally they represent the system of organs of information and liaison with the public, social-legal work, culture and organization of leisure, as well as certain services: military-sociological, social-psychological, and professional orientation.

For the purpose of organizing sociological research in the Armed Forces, studying public opinion, and preparing proposals to the state and military leadership of the country and the republics, it is proposed to transform the Center for the Studies of Social and Psychological Problems of the former Main Military-Political Administration into the Center for Military Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Studies of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Organs of combat and morale-psychological preparedness are to be created through a reorganization of existing combat preparedness structures. Subunits (staff personnel) for moral, psychological, and military humanitarian training, training of reserves, and safety of military activities will be included in their structure.

It is proposed to accomplish the manning of the said structures by using military personnel from eliminated military-political and party structures, existing organs of combat training, information, and other subunits, taking into account the changes and redistribution of functions. Numerically, the new organs will be smaller than the existing ones by one-third. Should placement turn out to be impossible for officers who have a right to retire on the grounds of length of service (20 years or more), but have not reached the maximum age for staying in the active military service, they will be put on the list for transfer to reserves under personnel cuts provisions, with all benefits stipulated for personnel cuts in the Armed Forces. It is also envisaged that officers who do not have an appropriate length of service will be placed on transitional lists under the command of respective commanders and superior officers for a period of up to one year, while retaining their monetary pay in accordance with the latest position occupied for the entire time of this transitional period, but for no more than the period specified above. This issue will be decided on individually. Also, the possibility of providing priority housing for officers discharged through personnel cuts will be studied; should this issue turn out to be unsolvable, appropriate monetary compensation for them is envisaged.

The commission offers to give students of higher military-political schools subject to reform the right to voluntarily demobilize from the Armed Forces in accordance with established procedures, to continue their study in other military education institutions, or to transfer to positions of sergeants (petty officers) in order to continue service on a contract basis. It is proposed to liquidate the Military-Political Academy imeni Lenina, and to establish on its basis the Academy for Humanities of the USSR Armed Forces. The issue of the prospects

for the Kiev, Simferopol, Donetsk, Lvov, and Minsk military-political schools and their possible utilization in the interests of the USSR Armed Forces will be decided jointly with the governments of the Ukraine and the Republic of Belorussia. The Riga and Tallinn military-political schools will graduate students before full term, after which the schools will be disbanded. Social science cadres of the higher schools will be reorganized on the basis of the principle of de-ideologization of teaching and humanitarization of the military education.

It is also planned to implement measures aimed at further expansion of organizational-economic self-sufficiency of military cultural institutions and their self-management. It is proposed to transform officers and privates clubs into culture and leisure centers, and garrison officer clubs into garrison officer assembly clubs. Central culture institutions will remain after the reorganization as anchor organization and methods centers for cultural and leisure work in the troops.

It is envisaged bringing the activity of the military mass media in compliance with the laws of the USSR and the republics, on whose territory organs of the military print media, radio, and television are located. Necessary conditions will be created for them to distribute objective information inside the Armed Forces and the society, and their organizational and creative independence will be ensured. It is planned to conduct the operation of mass military publication on the cofounding principle.

Official on Structures to Replace Military-Political Organs

92UM0030A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Oct 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel Vitaly Fedorovich Kovalevskiy, one of the leaders of a group to develop new organizational and personnel structures, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel G. Barnev under the rubric "Topical Interview": "A Place Will Be Found for the Competent"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already familiarized readers with the work of a commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense to abolish the military-political organs and create organs for combat training and structures for working with the personnel in the armed forces of the USSR. It has also related the work of various groups of that commission. We offer the reader a discussion by our correspondent with one of the leaders of the group to develop new organizational and personnel structures, Col V. Kovalevskiy.

[Barnev] Vitaliy Fedorovich, a few words about yourself, if possible. Strictly speaking, why was it namely you who was entrusted with such a serious area of the commission's work?

[Kovalevskiy] I have been in the armed forces since 1957. I served in the missile troops. I was recently a

senior instructor at the Military Academy imeni Dzerzhinskiy. I am a doctor of philosophical sciences and a professor.

[Barnev] You say "was." Why?

[Kovalevskiy] Because I was discharged into the reserves not long before the events of August. Various reasons were naturally put forth. But the main one, in my opinion, was the fact that I came forward with an alternative concept for military reform. I permitted myself inconceivable impertinence—I had my own opinion. And my military superiors at the time perceived that as an attempt on the absolute truth known only to them. The problems of professionalization in the armed forces, aside from everything else, are within the circle of my scholarly interests. Whence, I assume, the choice of my candidacy to take part in the work of namely this working group.

[Barnev] It would seem convenient here to become familiar with the conceptual framework of the work of the group and the principles of its approach to the creation of new indoctrination structures...

[Kovalevskiy] If you like. Well, I hope the readers of this newspaper are completely clear on the causes for dismantling the military-political organs. They were unreformed, as it were, and continued to reflect the ideology of a single party, the CPSU. They were essentially conducting the forced indoctrination of the personnel in the spirit of their ideology. They were also organs of authority therein. It is enough to say that there were as many as 345 generals alone in their structures. No army in the world is so top-heavy. Isn't it absurd—a general of propaganda, of philosophy? Generals of the human soul?! And these structures were forming the "new man" according to their own crude schemes, monitoring his political behavior, grossly interfering in moral life. It is not difficult to figure out that there was no choice of what to believe in for the man in uniform.

Our concept is to recognize the right of the individual to choose his world view, way of life and ideological preferences. Not foisting some dogmas, but namely a spiritual orientation based on the broadest and most diverse information on affairs in the country and the world, in economics and politics, a cultivation of loyalty to the country's constitution, parliament and president—that is our approach. Access to practice and the principles for organizing matters follow from it.

I would single out, among those principles, these. The first is the demonopolization and decentralization of structures for working with personnel. What do we have in mind here? Whereas the departments and administrations that existed under the Main Military-Political Directorate were exclusive to one person—the chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate—and were subordinate to him, we intend to create a series of services independent from each other. Legal, socio-psychological and military-sociological, for instance. That is, a whole

series of services with narrow, specialized functions will appear in place of the pyramid of joint subordination to a single supervisor.

[Barnev] And just what will that provide? Won't new chiefs just multiply, won't it turn into a kind of parade of sovereignties, just this time in the area of indoctrination work?

[Kovalevskiy] Your apprehensions would perhaps not be devoid of foundation if you proceed from the experience of prior reforms. But the fact is that all of the services and officials will be deprived of authoritative functions. That is our second principle in creating the indoctrination structures. Its practical implementation creates realistic preconditions for the introduction of complete unity of responsibility for commanders in the armed forces. The services for psychological, social and legal assistance will facilitate this, and ensure the dignified status of the citizen in military uniform. A significant reduction (by no less than a third) of the apparatus portion of these new structures is being envisaged as well.

[Barnev] The new structures will require new people. With new knowledge and practical skills...

[Kovalevskiy] Naturally. The political officers should give way to specialists in psychological support for the combat behavior of the personnel. Sitting in the Lenin rooms in the companies should give way to drills using psychological-training simulations and exercises on psychological fields. Competent consultants—psychologists, information officers—who will be developing and implementing various types of indoctrination programs will be required in the regiments and higher up. On military history, say, or the traditions of the Russian Army or cultural programs. Legal and cultural scholars will be required. The creation of a service for professional orientation and professional selection from the large-unit level and up will be required in connection with the expansion of the contract system of manpower acquisition.

[Barnev] Our readers are expressing anxiety in their letters regarding the fate of the former political officers. They won't simply be tossed out of the army, will they? Can't a place be found for each of them in the new structures?

[Kovalevskiy] Yes, such ideas can be heard. The anxiety is also understandable, but we should not overdramatize the situation. The institution of the position of assistant commander for personnel work is being proposed at the company—battalion level for the transitional period. There should be about thirty thousand such positions. What about the rest? It is thought that a significant portion of them, after the appropriate retraining, will be able to learn new specialties. But to promise complete employment would signify giving unfulfillable obligations and deceiving people nonetheless. We need have no illusions here. And the officials in the apparatus and the former party *nomenklatura*—

those who would like to keep their leadership positions without actually knowing anything or answering for anything—should be the first not to have any illusions.

It should be stated unequivocally, at the same time, that we are fundamentally opposed to any oppression whatsoever against these individuals. The same benefits as for other officers who were discharged under personnel cutbacks will moreover extend to them upon their discharge from the armed forces as well. Any unlawful actions here in the spirit of neo-Bolshevism will be cut short in the most decisive manner.

[Barnev] Judging by the large number of scholars on the commission, apprehensions are arising concerning the excessively theoretical nature of your structures. And what about ties with the officers' community, with military practice?

[Kovalevskiy] Our connection is a close one. Telephone, mail... Several dozen letters alone have come to the group recently. We analyze them carefully and take them into account. USSR People's Deputy Guards Colonel V. Pavlov, for example, proposes having psychologists, sociologists, legal scholars and the like in the new structures. We have, as you see, taken that suggestion into account. Major V. Soldatenko from the Baltic Military District has a whole series of proposals on the creation of groups for socio-psychological diagnosis, professional orientation and professional selection in the units and larger formations. Officers of the Kurgan Aviation School, comrades Chumureven and Dudan, make suggestions regarding the creation of a service for moral and psychological training and social protection. Some officers are proposing the institution of military-humanities training...

Our approaches, as you can see, are far from based on unadorned schemes alone. They include the collective experience and collective thought of very many officers.

[Barnev] This feature will obviously elicit the desire of our readers to give direct advice to the group. How can that be done?

[Kovalevskiy] They can write. They can also call. Our phone numbers are 293-42-78 and 293-40-15. We will be grateful for any well-founded advice.

Changes, Future Plans for 'Armiya i Kultura' Outlined

92UM0027A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Oct 91 First edition p 4

[Interview with Colonel V. Kalinkin, ARMIYA I KULTURA chief editor: "The Regiment of Monthlies has Grown: Twelve Issues of ARMIYA I KULTURA a Year"]

[Text] Under a 5 September 1991 order of the USSR Minister of Defense the magazine ARMIYA I KULTURA, which had been published quarterly, became an illustrated monthly.

We asked Colonel V. Kalinkin, the magazine's chief editor, about the changes in its functioning.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How do you assess the positive changes occurring in your publication?

[Kalinkin] As an indication that even in our troubled times, when we sometimes cannot seem to get around to army culture, life gets its way and forces us to deal with areas related to the individual's spirituality. Responding to the demands of the readers, our team of journalists is attempting to restructure their work and depart from the pseudomethodological sermonizing from which it suffered quite a bit.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How do you hope to gain the reader of '92?

[Kalinkin] The same as the others: with a quest for the interesting, the unusual, the topical, for information on specific problems.

I can say that the group of authors lined up—and they include well-known figures in culture, religion and science—should by itself be of definite interest. I understand, however, that just a name in and of itself is not enough. We shall try to entice the reader with articles about those things which are constantly on his mind. We shall argue with him about the prospects for reform and ways of reforming the area of military culture. We shall teach him to play musical instruments by an interesting method, not yet published anywhere, and thus help him to "find his place" in his circle of friends and acquaintances.

For those who might wish to become a writer for our magazine, I shall say in particular and stress that which people were for some reason afraid to stress until recently: the editorial board is now financially able to appreciate the value of and pay for literary contributions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Let us change the subject temporarily. I recently heard the song "The Officer's Honor" on All-Union Radio's first channel. You are the author of the lyrics. Is it just a hobby?

[Kalinkin] You know, the poet might say this: "I am a poet. That's what makes me interesting. I don't want to be interesting for my journalism, my editorship, my magazine. This is how I make my way onto the air and onto the screen—with my song, my poem, my humorous. I make my way there so that the entire nation can hear: 'ARMIYA I KULTURA' is our guest." I need nothing more."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is it true that at ARMIYA I KULTURA today you are one man wearing seven hats: chief editor, coordinator and adaptor of the material...? A one-man magazine, so to speak?

[Kalinkin] Yes, and this is better than suffering subservience to people who feel that for the small wages one does not need to work. But that was the way it was.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And now?

[Kalinkin] The authorized establishment now has 13 officers and around three dozen [civilian] employees. I

do not want to offend the latter, but I shall still underscore the fact that the success of a military publication is around 90-percent determined by the efforts of the military writers.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It seems to me that the readers could be compared with people sitting around a samovar. What would you say about that samovar?

[Kalinkin] "Dear friends," I would say, "you are drinking tea right now, whose leaves, the publication, are made up of seven herbs. Tea out of seven is good, but eight is even better. To get the full flavor you need an addition from ARMIYA I KULTURA."

Personnel Changes, Plans for Reform Reported at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA

924B0026A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Sep 91 p 2

[Information by Natalya Dvoynishnikova: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Continues To Fight for Its Independence"]

[Text] Reliable sources report that two colonels from the disbanded Army and Navy Main Political Directorate have been put at the disposal of the editor in chief of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. One of them is Colonel Lukashenya; the other is Colonel Baranets, former consultant to General Shlyaga, former chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council. After the fate of the Main Political Directorate had been determined, Baranets was initially made editor in chief of the journal ARMIYA. However, the journal's collective succeeded in pleading with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense to retain its former editor in chief.

A meeting was held at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA at which the new statutes of the newspaper and a draft for a reform were approved. However, apparently the implementation of the planned reforms will not be easy. Rumor has it that the Ministry of Defense has its own views on the future of the newspaper. It is apparent that a similar situation is developing in the case of the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN.

A Battalion Offensive in the Desert

91SV0056A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY
ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 91 (Signed to press
20 May 91) pp 89-92

[Article by Colonel Ye.A. Lebedev, candidate of military sciences, under the rubric: "Scientific Reports and Information": "A Battalion Offensive in the Desert"]

[Text] Deserts—the most arid portion of the earth's surface. They occupy approximately 15-20 million square kilometers of the earth's surface and are characterized by severe climactic conditions with abrupt annual (up to 90°C) and daily (up to 40°C) temperature fluctuations, very dry air and an acute shortage of water, faintly broken, flat relief, a nearly total lack of vegetation and clearly defined orientation points, strong winds that cause sand storms, and impassable sandy, rocky, and shale sectors and salt marsh; with oases and inhabited areas that are located far from one another and a poorly developed road network; a small quantity of fuel, building materials, and other local resources, and also an unfavorable sanitary-epidemiological situation.

Not only historical experience but also the practice of combat troop training indicate that the desert's physical-geographical conditions have a complicated impact on the preparation for and conduct of a battalion offensive. The open, flat terrain has both positive and negative aspects. So, it reveals the opportunity for rapid movement and broad maneuver but impedes attainment of concealment and surprise. Its flat relief favors timely detection of enemy aircraft and their destruction at the maximum range of anti-aircraft weapon systems, thereby increasing their effectiveness for covering subunits from air attack. At the same time, enemy aircraft that are operating at all (including at extremely low altitudes) altitudes can more rapidly detect PVO [Air Defense] subunits and the targets covered by them.

In this article, we will not examine the specific features of preparing an offensive in the desert; this is a topic for a separate article. I would just like to note that the desert's specific conditions require that the commander and battalion headquarters conduct a whole series of additional measures directed at maintaining the high combat capability of personnel.

A battalion offensive against a defending enemy in the desert is carried out, as a rule, on the move on a wider than normal front and along one of the most accessible axes. Terrain conditions and the nature of enemy defenses provide a broad possibility for employing close envelopment and outflanking exposed flanks and attacking from the rear. This also confirms the experience of past wars. So, for example, in the Manchurian Operation (August 1945) 39th Army 124th Rifle Division 662nd Rifle Regiment subunits, while operating in the direction of a salt marsh, boldly outflanked Japanese defensive positions and attacked where they were not expected. The defensive position garrisons, which had been caught unaware, could not render the required

resistance and were destroyed. Our troops seized all of the weapons, ammunition, and provisions and they themselves suffered insignificant losses.¹

The method of shifting to the offensive on the move with an advance from a staging area not only allows one to achieve operational surprise but also to insure concealment of preparations for an offensive to the greatest possible degree and the main thing—the least possible vulnerability to enemy air and artillery attack which is especially important during operations on open, flat terrain.

Western military experts think that, due to the restricted nature of camouflage conditions in the desert, battalion movement and deployment are subject to completion at a high rate of speed. In so doing, the interval between vehicles in a column must be increased because the dust and sand they raise impede visibility and orientation.

However, on terrain with a predominance of shifting sands, sand dunes, and sand marshes, low vehicle travel speeds do not always permit the battalion to advance from the staging area to the final coordination line in a timely and organized manner. As exercise experience has shown, 1.5-2 times more time is expended under these conditions than under normal conditions. Having taken advantage of this, the enemy can conduct a series of consecutive conventional weapons deliveries on an advancing battalion and disrupt its organized transition to the attack. Therefore, in order to reduce the degree of enemy fire effect, we need either to bring the offensive staging area closer to the final coordination line (if the conducted camouflage measures and terrain masking features permit this to be done), or to begin delivery of conventional fires with the initiation of the battalion advance from the staging area occupied at a greater than normal depth and to the side from the direction of the offensive.

Because movement of columns and even of individual vehicles in the desert is easily detected by the cloud of dust that they form from ground-based observation posts that are located up to 30 kilometers away and because the dust does not settle for a long time during windless conditions, we can use this specific feature to deceive the enemy. In a number of cases, we suggest deploying several vehicles with special dust-making equipment on a false axis to create the impression of the advance of a large column.

Another variation is also possible. In order for dust raised by a vehicle to serve as a sort of camouflage screen, it is advisable to conduct the battalion advance using small columns and on a large number of routes under favorable weather conditions. The dust screen raised by the vehicles provides the opportunity to conceal elements of the advancing battalion's combat formation and to reduce personnel and vehicle losses from enemy conventional weapons deliveries while advancing to the final coordination line and to reduce the duration of preparation fire. However, in this case we must

indicate the azimuth and time movement indicators to each column otherwise confusion of subunits in the dust is unavoidable. In both cases, fire suppression and blinding enemy command and observation posts using smoke is mandatory. A combination of the listed variations has also not been excluded.

On the axis where subunits are carrying out a flanking movement or a close envelopment of the enemy, defensive positions that are located on exposed flanks are primarily suppressed during the period of preparation fire. The duration of preparation fire in this case must insure that the flanking subunits reach the final coordination line.

Clearing lanes through enemy minefields presents a definite difficulty. This task is especially complicated on sectors of shifting sands where mines may be become covered with sand, therefore making it practically impossible to utilize minesweeping gear or mineclearing linear charges on hilly terrain.

In these cases, lanes in mine fields are cleared by hand and detected mines are destroyed in place using strap charges [nakladnyy zaryad] or are dragged beyond the borders of the lane using grappling hooks.

Foreign military experts assert that it is advisable to begin the attack of the forward edge of the battle area [FEBA] under the cover of preparation fire with the advance of battalion subunits and their subsequent deployment on the final coordination lines. In so doing, the attack must be conducted rapidly at a high rate and be carried out in armored combat formation because the slightest delay or sluggishness of the attackers on open terrain can result in huge losses and even to disruption of the attack. This assertion is legitimate under the condition of reliable suppression of enemy antitank weapons. So, the experience of combat operations in the deserts of the Sinai Peninsula have shown that **"during the conduct of offensive operations by both sides, the primary role is assigned to division-sized tank forces that compose the main strike force of the ground troops formation.... Tanks have attacked the first echelons of combat formations in mass, frequently without the support of infantry subunits. That is precisely why the belligerents suffered huge equipment losses"**² (the emphasis is mine—Ye.L.).

Analysis of exercises demonstrates that the battalion achieves its greatest success while attacking a portion of the forces from the front while rapidly attacking the enemy flanks and rear. This permits us to confuse the enemy and divert his forces from the axis of concentration of the main combat effort.

Deep close envelopments and flanking of enemy exposed flanks results in the greatest success but unfortunately this maneuver cannot always be used because individual sectors of terrain are impassable. In the event that it is impossible to use this maneuver, the attacking battalion will be compelled to breach the enemy defenses from the front. Under these conditions, it is advisable for motorized rifle companies to march on foot behind the tanks

while breaching the defenses and for BMP's [armored personnel vehicle], having assumed firing positions, to conduct fire on enemy personnel and weaponry that are located on the forward edge of the battle area in the gaps between subunits. In contrast to ordinary conditions in the desert, motorized rifle subunits must use BMP's or armored transport vehicles at the first opportunity for rapid advance into the depth of enemy defenses.

Having breached the defenses, subunits operate, as a rule, in combat vehicles. Offensive combat in the depth of the defense is highly maneuverable in nature and is conducted along axes that are sometimes at significant distances from each other.

After the elimination of the enemy at a defensive position, motorized rifle subunits normally form up in columns and in pre-combat formations, outflank heavily reinforced pockets of resistance and, while attacking a portion of the enemy forces defending them on the flank and rear, destroy the enemy. In so doing, the operations of subunits on foot and in combat vehicles is boldly combined.

The primary tasks of attacking subunits is to prevent enemy withdrawal to an oasis or to a new line and to surround and destroy the enemy in the desert.

During an offensive, the artillery attached to the battalion can be partially resubordinated to companies. The exposed flanks of attacking subunits are supported by conducting reconnaissance and by increasing surveillance on threatened axes and also by advancing the battalion reserve closer to the threatened flank.

Well-organized reconnaissance plays an important role in the successful development of an offensive and fulfillment of a combat task by the battalion. It provides the battalion commander with the capability to make timely decisions that best respond to the developing situation.

The battalion rate of advance in the desert is extremely uneven. The experience of exercises and combat operations during the course of the Arab-Israeli War are evidence of this. So, as foreign military commentators point out, during combat operations in the Middle East an offensive was normally planned "with an average daily rate of advance of 20-25 kilometers, but it actually was significantly lower, 10-15 kilometers per day....

"Those division-sized and smaller units, that acted in a decisive and non-patterned manner, broadly used maneuver of forces, and avoided frontal attacks, achieved the greatest operational-tactical success. During the course of an offensive by one side or the other, sabotage detachments and teams were often sent into the rear to disrupt command and control and to disrupt logistical support."³

Of course, maneuver is not a simple matter and, in order to conduct it, you need to know the terrain well, skillfully use a map, and constantly maintain communications

with the senior commander along with everything else. Otherwise, maneuver may not achieve its goals.

During an offensive, the combined-arms reserve is deployed in a more dispersed manner along the front and in the depth which reduces the probability of its detection and destruction. The combined-arms reserve's entry into an engagement is conducted just like under ordinary conditions.

If necessary, a new flanking detachment can be additionally detached from the battalion during development of an offensive in depth after the battalion carries out its combat mission.

A battalion offensive in the desert is differentiated by its complexity and distinctive quality. This requires employment of appropriate methods to prepare for and conduct an engagement and also special measures for

supporting subunits. A battalion commander's underestimation of these specific features can result in incomplete or unsuccessful use of the battalion's combat capabilities and can have a negative impact on the outcome of the engagement. In order to make a well-grounded decision and to organize an engagement in the shortest period of time, he must possess comprehensive knowledge, in detail in each separate instance, and he must study the physical-geographical conditions of the combat operations area to the smallest detail.

Footnotes

1. I.I. Lyudnikov, "Cherez Bolshoy Khingan" [Across Xiao Hinggan], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, p 75.
2. VOYENNAYA MYSL, 1974, No 3, p 83.
3. Ibid, pp 83-84.

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Republics' Progress Toward Creation of Separate Armed Forces

91SV0122A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 18 Sep 91 pp 2, 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writers and correspondents A. Ganelin, O. Yegorova, L. Krutakov, K. Markaryan, O. Safirova, S. Romanyuk, and A. Khokhlov: "A President Who Does Not Dream of Becoming Commander In Chief Is Not Worth His Salt"]

[Text] *The newly acquired state sovereignty of yesterday's "brotherly" republics of the Soviet Union starts with the massive arming of the peoples.*

The ink on the acts adopting independence or proclaiming sovereignty hardly has time to dry before the formation of armed forces begins. Actually, they have already been in existence, unacknowledged by the center but conducting real-life combat operations in the Transcaucasus republics long before today. Now the Ukraine Ministry of Defense has been created, the sign-up for the National Guard of Russia is underway, and military structures are being formed by Moldova and Lithuania—who else?

A gun hanging peacefully on the wall in the first act of a play usually produces a shot in the last act. Will we all escape this classic theatrical formula? Or will we soon talk about other theaters—those of combat operations? Lebanon and Yugoslavia—we can see them with our eyes. The still shaky democracies are in a hurry to busy their hands with machine guns. Will there be enough hands for shovels?

NATIONAL ARMIES: THE KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA DOSSIER

RUSSIA: There Is No Uniform Yet. Handicap Is Provided

The creation of republic national guards at least can be explained somehow by the growing role of Russia in the former Union and the gradual usurpation of its functions, including defense. As R. Khasbulatov gently stated during his recent visit to Japan, Russia has filled the vacuum that appeared as a result of the collapse of the empire. A careless statement about potential territorial claims aggravated the situation even further and gave a push to the process of guard-ization of the country.

The successor to the empire is not standing idle, either. G. Yankovich, staff member of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Vice President A. Rutskoy's secretariat, under whose guidance the statute on the national guard in Russia has been developed, was more than modest:

"Until the statute is signed by the president, I cannot tell you anything."

All attempts to find out at least some of the conceptual points were deflected by G. Yankovich's two phrases: "I have my own bosses" and "Do not try to catch me off

guard—I have read Carnegie, too." The only thing we managed to fish out of Gennadiy Savelyevich in regard to the guard was the existence of an issue long under consideration and still undecided: Should the guard be of Russia or of the people. We penetrated the veil of secrecy by turning to one of the public centers which participated in the development of the package of documents relating to the guard formations.

The National Guard of Russia will consist of eight brigades, one for each RSFSR economic region; the brigades will be structured according to the paratroop—storm troop principle, which means that each will be manned by about 10,000 servicemen. The backbone will be provided by regular units (in all probability the Dzerzhinskiy Division, Internal Troops units, and the USSR KGB troops) that have been transferred to the command of the president of Russia. Civilians wishing to serve in the guard will be selected through competition on the basis of tests; former defenders of the "White House" get a 70 point handicap in advance, as a bonus for their firm civic stand during the putsch.

Guard units will be formed entirely on a contract basis (a contract is signed for a minimum of three years); the pay is between 600 and 2,000 rubles. The tasks of the guard are not yet clearly defined—it is envisaged as something in between the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs Troops. The guard uniform has not yet been designed.

UKRAINE: The Lady Wants To Take a Shot. For real...

I was not able to sign up for the national guard. Vitaliy Chechilo, head of the Rukh Collegium on Military Affairs and first deputy chairman of the Union of Ukrainian Officers, talked me out of it. He gave me the word of an officer—we have enough able-bodied men, he said, aged 18-20, to defend our constitutional system. Although, if the lady really insists and if she is subject to military draft, she can participate in a competition for the position of physician, nurse, or clerk... But even this is only in the future. Right now they are not accepting into the guard yet. Its statute, developed by the Union of Ukrainian Officers, is in the process of expert evaluation at the Cabinet of Ministers. Also, a whole package of laws is needed—this is business for the parliament and the republic Ministry of Defense.

"Only then can we realistically speak of a serious personnel structure," Chechilo believes. "Playing army and playing with the army is dangerous."

The size of the Ukraine Guard will be no more than 50,000 people. Its skeleton will be provided by the Internal Troops based on Ukrainian territory, and a KGB division. In Chechilo's opinion, only the officers selected through competition should be required to take an oath; the soldiers—draftees and volunteers—should simply sign a contract with clearly defined rights and duties. And no politics!

"The guard is subordinated to any legitimately elected power, to any legitimately elected republic president, and carries out any orders from him."

Opinions still differ on the uniform. So far, it is agreed that boots are a thing of the past and it is better to emulate Europe in this. It is unlikely, however, that they can dispense with yellow-and-blue stripes or something of that kind for the sake of national spirit...

While some wait for laws, others do not expect anything good from the authorities. This is what we were more or less told in the Ukraine National Assembly (former Interparty) as a motivation for their own "draft," which has been going on for two weeks now. They are forming self-defense brigades here. According to Sergey Grinchuk, the man in charge of this action, about 200 people signed up in Kiev and its suburbs, including several women, who are, Grinchuk maintains, burning with desire to throw Molotov cocktails. At whom?

"We have to be ready for expansion and militarize the population," Sergey replies diplomatically.

Organizations are being formed by rayon, under the supervision of instructors; they conduct "open air practice"—learn how to make and use "incendiaries," as well as whatever else is at hand, since it is hard to get real weapons. Acceptance into the "guerrillas" does not require any formalities...

Is this not too many armies for one Ukraine?

...while gentlemen try on "Mazepa caps"

It was only a short time ago that the Ukrainian parliament adopted the decision on the creation of the national guard, but several thousand people had already gathered at the "draft office" in Lvov. A special account was opened in the bank, where contributions from the populace were deposited. There were mishaps as well, of course. Mr. Stetz, a Canadian tourist, decided to contribute \$500 to the national guard. The bank does not accept hard currency, however. A special deed had to be written for this purpose.

The staff quarters in charge of forming the guard were created on the basis of the Committee for the Establishment of the Ukrainian National Army, which has been functioning in Lvov for more than a year. Local branches are being hurriedly created. They have certain experience, plus the Lvov organization is rather well known. It is possible that this is the way the forming of not only the national guard but also the national troops will be conducted. Those in Lvov believe that each oblast should have no less than 2,000 guard members. The service is based on a three-year contract which may be extended. The plan is to dress the guards in the uniform of Cossack host riflemen—blue regimentals, top boots, and Mazepa caps.

BY THE WAY

The commanders and almost the entire personnel of a motorized rifle division of the former USSR KGB special troops deployed in Kharkov Oblast decided to join the republican guard of the sovereign Ukraine.

BELORUSSIA: A Square. A Drill Square. A Bridgehead?

At a large rally in front of the House of Government in Minsk on 20 August, at the height of the coup, something the Popular Front had not been able to achieve for two years—to spur the "frozen" conscience into action—finally started to take place.

Lt.Col. Nikolay Statkevich addressed the people and said something like this: We should stop being afraid, he said. We no longer want to be afraid of people in military uniform. Therefore, we are going to create our own national guard. Right now, here, on the square!

And they started signing people up...

By now the Belorussian national guard has almost 1,000 young people. An organizing committee has been created. Symbols and uniforms are being designed. Even a Union of Military Servicemen of Belorussia has been organized—they accept anybody wishing to join, in the country and abroad.

MOLDOVA: A corps in Kishinev...

Nikolae Kirtoaku is director-general of the state department on military affairs of the Republic of Moldova. He is 38, a former major, and speaks four foreign languages.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Nikolae, what does your state department do?

[Kirtoaku] It performs the functions of the defense committee.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How long have you been director-general?

[Kirtoaku] One year. I was officially appointed in October of last year.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Was it not a year ago that the decision on the creation of a national guard in Moldova was made? It was perceived as a threat in Gagauz and the Dnestr Area...

[Kirtoaku] It was a volunteer movement, a sort of a popular volunteer force [opolcheniye], which already numbered 60,000 then. After Gorbachev's ultimatum-style decree, the national guard was disbanded. Now the situation has changed. Since the proclamation of the Declaration of Independence, I am a member of the higher Security Council of Moldova—a consultative organ attached to the president of the Republic of Moldova—tasked to secure the state borders and, to the extent possible, prevent an invasion of the territory of

Moldova from the outside. To deal with internal issues, however, we need internal troops—carabinieri.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Where does this stand now?

[Kirtoaku] The situation has changed. We presented a concept based on the idea of independence at the consultations with the USSR Ministry of Defense. Based on this concept, we need troops for border and customs service.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is it perhaps that little Moldova is being guided by own ambitions?

[Kirtoaku] Our ambitions go only to the point of having nobody attack us. We understand that the main source of Moldova's security is a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, first and foremost with Russia, Ukraine, and Romania.

If the republic feels it necessary to bring order to its own territory, there are internal troops for that. We can bring them up to 10,000 people, but this is not needed because we still have a considerable reserve of political methods for settling internal conflicts in Moldova. Even in the Dnestr Area.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What is the planned numerical strength of the Moldovan army?

[Kirtoaku] It will be perhaps two or three regiments, or maybe a corps. We will see; if necessary, we will form five brigades.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But what can two or three regiments do if someone attacks Moldova?

[Kirtoaku] Let us figure out first: Who is going to attack? From which side? We are creating an army in order to forestall a real enemy, not an image.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Will all republic citizens serve in the Moldovan army?

[Kirtoaku] This will be decided by the government and the parliament. We believe that if a real outside threat appears, all the male population of the republic should take part in defending it. For this, it is necessary to create a small professional army on a free contract basis.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Can Moldova afford to allocate money from its budget to maintain an army and reserve training? An army is an expensive item...

[Kirtoaku] This is the most delicate issue that is being constantly played up. In the past, all the republics continuously shelled out immense amounts which they gave to the center for defense. This included the space program, nuclear arms, and the maintenance of the 4.5 million Soviet Army in peace time. It is undoubtedly much cheaper to have our own army.

...while in Tiraspol, there is a battalion

In Tiraspol the congress of people's deputies of all levels ratified the Declaration of Independence and adopted the Constitution of the Dnestr Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. The plan here is to form a national guard in the shortest possible time. Popular militia detachments are being actively created, and a Dnestr Battalion is being formed in Tiraspol.

GEORGIA: Both the Service and the Beret Are Pure Raspberry

Georgia started to form its national guard at the beginning of this year. As of now, it has about 8,000 people. Guard members are wearing the field uniform of the Soviet Army and raspberry (the color of the national flag) berets with the seven-pointed state symbol of the Republic of Georgia. It is equipped with armored personnel carriers, helicopters, antitank guided missile systems, free-flight rocket systems, and air defense systems... The Georgian army's arsenal was mostly put together from materiel and supply expropriated from the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Collaboration with the Army, Air Force, and Navy] and militia, and purchased with money from several public funds.

In accordance with a decree of President of Georgia Z. Gamsakhurdia, a republic ministry of defense has been formed. It is empowered to form the national army and take upon itself the material and technical supply of the troops. N. Giorgadze, chairman of the Union of Afghan War Veterans of Georgia, has been appointed acting minister of defense of the Republic of Georgia.

AZERBAIJAN: The OMON "bone"

In accordance with a decree of President of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov, a republic ministry of defense has been formed. Lt.Gen. Barshatly Valeg Eyub-ogly was appointed Azerbaijan's minister of defense.

Upon his appointment, the minister said that if the Soviet troops leave Azerbaijan the republic will encounter serious difficulties but will not be in danger, since work on the creation of national self-defense is already underway. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense demanded that the Soviet command provide the Azerbaijan national armed forces with military equipment if the latter are recognized as an integral part of the Soviet Army.

The backbone of the national forces will probably be OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] units, which already have combat operations experience in Nagornyy Karabakh.

THE DAILY LIFE OF FOREIGN ARMIES

ESTONIA: And Even Negroes of Advanced Age...

In Estonia the Supreme Council adopted a resolution on the restoration of defense forces. By 1 October, the republic government must produce a draft project on the

creation of the Ministry of Defense and start developing the draft law on general defense service duty. Recently, an officers' union was established here, which will participate in the restoration of the republic defense forces. Any officer, even retired or in the reserve, may become a member, regardless of nationality or the country where he received his rank.

LATVIA: Zigfrida Goes To War

I saw this woman in a home-made dark blue uniform resembling Soviet naval officers' jackets many times in the Supreme Council of Latvia during the time of the putsch. Zigfrida Tejkmane is an activist in the working group to establish a popular volunteer force [opolcheniye], a law on which was recently passed by the Latvian parliament. In the past she was an employee in the tram-and-trolleybus administration and the leader of its Popular Front cell.

The Latvian popular volunteer force is at this point in the stage of formation. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet is nominally its commander in chief. There is no chief of staff yet. This duty is temporarily being performed by Sr.Lt.(Reserve) G. Kristovskis. He told me how the popular volunteer force will be structured. Citizens of Latvia who have reached the age of 18 will be able to join. Each rayon will have its own coordinating staff of several people who, when needed, will raise volunteer force members on alarm. The latter, much like the Don Cossacks, will have personal arms and ammunition at home, and will bring them to the gathering point. During peace time members of the defense force will engage in their regular occupations.

Belorussian DOSAAF Reorganized, Renamed

92UM0028B Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 40, Sep 91 p 4

[Report by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent S. Aslezov: "A Hand for the Defense Technical-Sports Society of Belarus"]

[Text] Minsk—Quite recently people were asking the question: Should Belarus have a defense society or not? Leaders of the opposition in the Belorussian Popular Front proposed, in violation of the law, that DOSAAF be eliminated altogether.

Common sense won out, however. The republic's Supreme Soviet voted, with only one abstention, that Belarus would have a defense society. A plenum of the BSSR DOSAAF Central Committee at which P. Maksimov, its chairman, presented a report on the changes taking place, unanimously approved that henceforth the—now former—BSSR DOSAAF would be called the Defense Technical-Sports Society (OSTO) of the republic of Belarus.

There will be an extensive discussion of further activities and the specific features of working in the new situation at a special congress of the defense society of Belarus set for 16 October of this year.

Georgian Guard Units to be Subordinate to Supreme Soviet

LD2010225191 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 20 Oct 91

[Telephoned report over video by Iprinda correspondent Tengiz Ablotia on situation in Georgia; from the "Vesti" newscast presented by Ye. Kisilev]

[Text]

[Kisilev] Now for news of the situation in Georgia. Tengiz Ablotia, a correspondent from the Iprinda Agency reports by telephone.

[Ablotia] [Video shows stills of street rallies, Gamsakhurdia greeting crowd, National Guard at street rally and another meeting] The past week has not brought any special correction to the political life of Georgia, and an air of stability and calm which is perhaps unusual for the current period has been noted. The Supreme Soviet declared a pause in its work, without however giving a precise time for its resumption.

This week talks continued between the opposition and the Government on the status of the National Guard units which are no longer subordinate to the republic's leadership. Basically, agreement was successfully reached on a number of issues, in particular that Kitovani's guard will become part of the official structure as a special purpose sub-unit subordinate to the republic's Supreme Soviet and financed by it. In the event of acts of aggression against the republic, this sub-unit will be directly subordinate to the president.

The main differences revolved around the declaration of political loyalty, which President Gamsakhurdia is insisting will be signed. However, Tengiz Kitovani is categorically rejecting this as he considers the signing of such a declaration unacceptable.

On the whole, I would like to repeat once again that the situation in the republic remains stable, although internal tensions can be felt. Tengiz Ablotia, from the Georgian Iprinda News Agency, especially for the news service.

Grachev on Role of Airborne Forces in Vilnius Events

92UN0170A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Oct 91
Union Edition p 8

[Interview with Colonel General P. Grachev, USSR first deputy minister of defense, by IZVESTIYA special correspondent Nikolay Lashkevich at the USSR Defense Ministry; date not given; published under the rubric

"IZVESTIYA Investigation": "A Conspiracy Against Lithuania: Why Airborne Troops Flew to Vilnius"]

[Text] New details and nuances of the January events in Vilnius are coming out. When we compared and analyzed facts we became interested, in particular, in a report which stood out in the conclusion of independent military experts of the public organization Shchit to the effect that the commander of the Airborne Troops at the time and current USSR first deputy minister of defense, Colonel General P. Grachev, was in the Baltic area on the eve of 13 January. While there he allegedly stated that the troops reporting to him should not take part in political processes in the Baltic republics.

Let us agree that this statement would have been without precedent at the time. Supposedly, he was immediately recalled to Moscow after this demarche. Let me recall that a group consisting of five military experts stayed in Vilnius between 3 and 12 February and evaluated the events in Vilnius. It is also known that units of the Airborne Troops commanded by P. Grachev were in Vilnius in January. Incidentally, rumors about a recalcitrant Airborne Troops commander circulated in Lithuania as well.

What actually happened? Was the commander involved in a conflict and with whom? What was the goal of P. Grachev's visit to the Baltic area? How does he evaluate the events of 11 through 13 January and the actions of the Airborne Troops entrusted to him? Pavel Sergeyevich has kindly agreed to answer questions put by an IZVESTIYA correspondent.

During our conversation at the USSR Ministry of Defense, he said:

[Grachev] I have to disappoint you. I was not in Vilnius. Indeed, I am aware of the suppositions concerning my refusal to carry out the orders of the supreme military leadership of the country which were received in Vilnius during these days. I am grateful for the honor, but I could not have done it precisely for the reason indicated above. This is what transpired. On 26 December I was appointed commander of the Airborne Troops, replacing Colonel General Achalov, who had become USSR deputy minister of defense and was involved in the operational command and control of troops in all the "hot spots" of the country. As they say, I took over the office from the beginning of the new year: first at the administration of the commander, and subsequently, between 3 and 8 January I was in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. I arrived in Moscow as late as 9 January. By this time the events in Lithuania were already vigorously underway. Frankly, I did not expect that such a tragic result was possible. If I were to be frank to the end, the business trip was very convenient for me. Fortunately, I was not drawn into directly organizing and carrying out this venture.

[Lashkevich] However, Pavel Sergeyevich, it was precisely the Airborne Troops (I mean two regiments of the Pskov Airborne Division deployed by plane to Vilnius)

that they wanted to use in the course of the operation to seize state facilities in the capital of Lithuania...

[Grachev] Indeed, they arrived in Vilnius on 8 January on the orders of USSR Defense Minister Marshal D. Yazov. An encrypted message to this effect, no. 312 dated 5 January, was sent to me, to the commander of the Baltic Military District, and to the commander of military transport aviation. It directed us to enforce an ukase of the USSR president and render assistance to military commissariats in the course of compulsory enlistment of those evading the draft in the Army. We certainly could not fail to carry out the orders of the USSR minister of defense. However, no specific instructions for the actions of Airborne Troops, to say nothing of capturing facilities, were received at the time.

[Lashkevich] Still, Pavel Sergeyevich, I believe that you will not deny that "assistance to military commissariats" was not at all the goal of redeploying paratroopers to Lithuania. This is too naive a statement to be believable...

[Grachev] I agree. Why were the Airborne Troops drawn into this unworthy game? First of all, this is a highly professional combat service; second, it is exceptionally mobile when in cooperation with military transport aviation; third, the Airborne Troops, alas, had already had a sad experience in solving interethnic problems and participating in conflict situations. The supreme military leadership counted on the Airborne Troops to do anything whatsoever, and quite effectively at that. The paratroops (I have been serving in the Airborne Troops for 25 years) have to a degree become hostages to the political ambitions of some of our leaders, especially recently. Involving the Airborne Troops in solving political conflicts is an absolutely unfit practice. These troops have a completely different mission. They should not interfere in the state's internal affairs, no matter how acute. Whether certain political forces within the republic itself and the center liked the government and the parliament of Lithuania or not, the latter were legitimate representatives of power. This was a reality we should have reckoned with. Unfortunately, a different opinion prevailed in the Ministry of Defense, as a result of which the tragedy occurred.

I have always been tormented by the issue of resolving internal conflicts through the use of military force, which was what the previous military leadership of the country emphasized. We now firmly insist on not carrying out any order directed against the people. The use of the Armed Forces in specific situations is only possible if there is an appropriate decision of the government or Supreme Soviet, a decision in writing. All "telephone" orders under similar circumstances should not and will not be the basis for action by the troops.

[Lashkevich] Could the paratroopers have circumvented the order in the tragic days of January, could they have mitigated its harshness somehow, as was done during the August coup?

[Grachev] Any military man will tell you that orders are orders, and they must be carried out. Everything depends on the commanders in the field, on those who directly carry out orders. If a commander figures out the situation and understands the negative consequences he can cause, for example, bringing about bloodshed, he can somehow circumvent orders and, as you put it, mitigate their harshness and force. However, in such cases the commander always exposes himself to tremendous danger. There is a double pressure in this case. This is why we should now revise many provisions of our regulations and submit proposals to perfect legislation on the Army. The paratroopers were not actively engaged in Vilnius. Assertions, all the more, that the paratroopers allegedly crushed people with tanks and so on are absolutely groundless. As is known, tanks are not in service in the Airborne Troops.

[Lashkevich] Are there grounds to count for the most part on the common sense of commanders who execute immoral orders? As the events of 11-13 January in Vilnius showed, these executors carried out all the instructions and orders of the organizers of the January putsch with particular zeal and even showed initiative...

[Grachev] I would not ascribe that much significance to the actions of those who carried out the order. For example, they write: Let us condemn Major General Uskhobchik, commandant of the Vilnius garrison. He is to blame for everything, they say: He led the troops to storm the TV tower and the Television and Radio Committee at the request of some Committee for National Salvation, he ordered that a curfew be imposed, and so on. They saddle him with all the woes now. This is incorrect in principle. Could you really believe that a garrison commandant is able of sending in the troops to participate in armed action? All commands came from higher up: from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. This is who should be held accountable now, not the executors. As is known, an operational group of the Ministry of Defense consisting of supreme military commanders was in Vilnius. It coordinated all issues and developed specific plans. It was precisely the group that was in contact with Moscow, including Old Square. That D. Yazov denied his direct participation in the events the day after 13 January from the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet should be on his conscience. He actually made those who carried out his order the fall guys. Therefore, let us not blame officers and soldiers who took part in seizing Lithuanian facilities for everything...

I will stress once again: The army should not and will not take part in actions against the peaceful population in the future. You should not think that everybody in the army, including those among the generals, was prepared to, as they say, always reach for weapons in solving internal state problems. The August events when, in essence, it was the army that succeeded in preventing the bloodshed which could have occurred on the night of 20 to 21 August, once again confirmed this. As we can see, the army learned a lesson during the Vilnius events as well.

* * *

There was a reason why our conversation turned to the organizers and executors, and the degree of their responsibility. As the materials of the investigation indicate, the paratroopers were assigned one of the main roles in the operation to seize the House of the Press and the TV and radio complex. For the moment, it is premature to say how active their participation in the assault on the facilities was. However, they obviously carried out the orders received. Under the circumstances they could not have acted otherwise, and were thus involved in spilling blood. This is why the responsibility of those who gave the criminal orders and who played the "Lithuanian card" with the hands of soldiers and officers is doubled.

The investigation of the case of an attempted coup d'etat in Lithuania has already moved from the level of immediate participants in the armed action of 11-13 January to the specific organizers of the January plot. A large group of investigators from the Lithuanian procuracy headed by Juozas Gaidutis, chief prosecutor of the Department of Criminal Investigations of the Republic of Lithuania General Procuracy, has now been working in Moscow for more than a week. Some of the organizers of the Vilnius putsch are now behind bars, including the well-known Colonel General Varennikov, perhaps the most active "architect" of the January putsch. However, as J. Gaidutis admitted, the Lithuanian investigators have run into quite a number of organizational problems in Moscow associated with interrogating individuals privy to the putsch and the investigation of other circumstances of the case. Despite the cooperation of their colleagues from the Union and Russian Procuracies, who appreciate the significance and complexity of the tasks facing the Lithuanian investigators, many representatives of other organizations and departments are not particularly eager to communicate with them and are making every effort to avoid all contacts. For example, the argument "you are from another state" is used.

Here is perhaps the most entertaining point: IZVESTIYA publications on the January events are used... as a pretext to refuse to take part in the planned meetings. There is no guarantee that the staff of the Lithuanian procuracy will not tell journalists the details of the investigation, they say. I believe that the Lithuanian prosecutors are competent enough specialists to figure out which information may be given to the mass media and which may harm the case.

It appears to us that the issue of the confidentiality of the investigation is clearly far-fetched in this case, and is exploited by those who would like to avoid responsibility in any way, including criminal penalties. It is not ruled out that the "small fry" will be punished yet again, and that the already mentioned Uskhobchik will pay for everything if the investigation does not succeed in fully picking up the scent in Moscow. The Lithuanian investigators understand this well. Therefore, we cannot allow this information to be secreted away in Moscow desks

and safes, or allow people to capitalize now on the "foreign state" motif. However, this tendency is now emerging quite clearly.

We will keep our readers informed about the results of the work of the Lithuanian investigators in Moscow.

RSFSR Union of Reserve Officers Organizes

*92UM0028A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 40, Sep 91 p 4*

[Interview with Fedor Nikolayevich Khalturin, head of the Russian Union of Reserve Officers, by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent N. Zhichkin: "So That Our Flame Does Not Go Out"]

[Text] "So That Our Flame Does Not Go Out" is the motto with which the Russian Union of Reserve Officers will exist and function. A Moscow working group has taken on the job of establishing it. Our correspondent met with its leader, Major General (Reserve) Fedor Nikolayevich Khalturin.

[Zhichkin] Various public organizations—unions, societies, associations, parties and so forth—are now springing up in the nation like mushrooms after a rain. The people are getting absolutely nothing from some of them, however. Nothing more than arrogant demands: for attention, for financial help from citizens and the state, for power. Will the new union not become just another such organization?

[Khalturin] Not at all! For a number of reasons. Our union is not starting from scratch. We have strong roots, so to speak. Russian officers have a history going back hundreds of years and most noble traditions of serving the Russian state and the people. We represent their heirs.

[Zhichkin] But that heritage includes all sorts of things, including this....

[Khalturin] We shall take all of the best things from the past. No one would disagree that most Russian officers have sacredly upheld the honor of their profession and remained loyal to their duty. The union will sustain these qualities in its members. We shall exert our influence upon those already in the officer ranks and those who want to become officers. The specific ways and means of accomplishing these tasks will be reflected in the union's charter. It will be ratified at a constituent congress planned for November.

[Zhichkin] Will you have time?

[Khalturin] We actually began the preparations back in May. Union branches have already been set up in many of the nation's cities. They exist in Moscow, Vladivostok, Omsk and Tomsk, more than 50 cities. We receive suggestions from them on the union's charter, on how the union should exist and function....

But let us return to the question of whether our union will become like certain other organizations of no benefit to the people. I do not think so. Reality has shown a very urgent need for such a union, recognized by many thousands of retired and reserve officers. Market relations are imminent. We know that it is the officers who are least prepared for this. Not because they are less energetic or less capable. These are generally people with a higher education. They include many engineers, medical workers, construction workers, airmen and sailors. They have a great deal of experience in life and in their profession. It is particular experience, however. They have spent most of their aware lives under particular circumstances, in which everything was determined not by their personal initiative or their personal desires but by orders. Now they find themselves one on one with a life which could not be called easy. No housing, no civilian specialty.... Most important, the mentality is different! Right now we are talking a great deal about conversion and the defense industry. I therefore believe that we are justified in talking about a conversion of the individual, about how every reserve officer will have to change himself and his attitude, born of those circumstances in which he found himself in the military service. He will have to find his place in the very complex, confusing new life of the present. It is very, very difficult to do this alone. It is easier when we do it together. That is why we want to unite.... The union will help the reserve and retired officers find their place in life.

[Zhichkin] These are good intentions, Fedor Nikolayevich, but not so easy to carry out. After all, certain conditions are required. First of all, by the way, you need money. Where is it going to come from? As you very well know, no matter how much it is willing to do, the state cannot provide it all. Appealing to rich sponsors is also not a very reliable source.

[Khalturin] We realize that we have a difficult job ahead. We have a well conceived plan, however. It is based on perfectly realistic possibilities. At first we will need a certain amount of money, to be sure, and we hope that the Russian government will help us get on our feet. Only in the beginning, though. After that we intend to achieve a situation in which we can exist, develop and perform our work exclusively with our own funds. What are the sources? I shall name just a few. Initiation fees and membership dues. Income from business and publishing operations. Incidentally, we plan for the union to publish its own newspaper. Deductions from the profits of joint-stock companies, small and private industrial and agricultural enterprises set up with the union's help. We do not rule out assistance also from individuals and separate organizations, of course. After all, we will be spending the money not on a bureaucratic agency but for essentially charitable purposes.

[Zhichkin] Could you be more specific?

[Khalturin] Take the matter of housing, for example. It is already clear that the state cannot provide all the reservists and retirees with apartments. We shall promote the

establishment of housing-construction cooperatives. The union will take on the job of dealing with local authorities and will also find a way to provide financial assistance. There is more. We already have plans for establishing officer settlements at so-called villages without a future. Yesterday's company and battalion commanders will be able to take up agriculture and become farmers. With their military qualities, education and discipline and with the union's support they can make these settlements exemplary islands in the Russian interior with respect to both production and culture.

[Zhichkin] It sounds like fantasizing, Fedor Nikolayevich.

[Khalturin] Why is it fantasizing, when it all comes out of common sense and is based on calculation. Life, of course, particularly life today, and the rapidly changing situation can bring anything at all. We hope, however, that everything will be the way it has been conceived by the union's initiators and those who have supported its establishment.

[Zhichkin] Could you name them?

[Khalturin] I would be glad to. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Security Committee, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for the Disabled, War and Labor Veterans, and Social Protection for Servicemen and Their Families, and the RSFSR's Defense Committee....

Housing is not our only expense, however. We shall take steps to set up courses in which officers discharged into the reserve can acquire civilian specialties. The union will begin looking after elderly parents, widows, small and handicapped children of union members. We will need funds to establish stipends for students at military schools, to take care of memorials to officers who lost their lives protecting the homeland, for the burial of retired and reserve officers.... In short, there are things on which to spend money. I repeat, however, that we shall earn it and establish an officers' fund.

[Zhichkin] Fedor Nikolayevich, the economic and financial aspect appears clear. If you could, please tell us about the political and social aspect of the union.

[Khalturin] It is open and simple. The union is a volunteer nonparty social formation. It—and I quote from the draft Statute on the Union—"solemnly proclaims its steadfast loyalty to the sacred interests of a sovereign Russian state within the USSR and of its peoples, its readiness loyally and devotedly to serve the great principles of a democratic rebirth of the homeland and the affirmation of its honor, freedom and independence. Unity and prosperity for the homeland—this is the main objective of the Union of Reserve Officers. To this end it takes under its banner, monitors and unites thousands and thousands of like-minded individuals and true patriots, all of those who value the honor and glory of the homeland, those who are prepared today and those who will be prepared in the future to repeat the oath of the Russian princes and members of their men-at-arms, the

consolidators and preservers of the land of our fathers and grandfathers: 'So that our flame does not go out'!"

[Zhichkin] Could you tell us in passing who uttered those words?

[Khalturin] More than six centuries ago, on his deathbed, Grand Prince Simeon Gordyy, uncle of Dmitriy Donskoy, commanded his heirs solidly to stand up for the Russian land, to be unanimous in their work and concern for its prosperity, and guard it as their most treasured possession. "So that our flame does not go out," he bequeathed to his descendents.

[Zhichkin] Just what will be the future union's attitude toward those who advocate breaking the army up among the sovereign republics?

[Khalturin] The nation's Armed Forces must be unified. While participating in the democratic reform of the society and strengthening Russia's sovereignty, the union will do everything possible to see that the nation has its unified and strong Armed Forces. While taking the interests of the sovereign states into account, of course.

[Zhichkin] Are you not troubled by the fact that this will evoke a negative attitude on the part of those who are trying to prove that we do not actually need a powerful army, that no one is planning to attack us, to take anything from us, and so forth? Plebeian pacifism is spreading more and more....

[Khalturin] I do not know who is going to attack Switzerland, but it has a well-outfitted army. Or take Sweden. It has maintained its neutrality for more than 100 years now, but its army has extremely up-to-date weapons.

[Zhichkin] Fedor Nikolayevich, who may become a member of the new union.

[Khalturin] Reserve or retired officers, generals and admirals of the Soviet Army and Navy, Internal, Border and Railway Troops, regardless of ethnicity, religion, age, party membership or place of residence. We hope that, in addition to veterans, many of the young officers to be released into the reserve in connection with the military reform will join the union.

[Zhichkin] The last question: What sort of relations can be developed with other public organizations whose functioning has a great deal in common with your program? I have in mind veterans' and DOSAAF organizations. Will there not be duplication and perhaps even some rivalry?

[Khalturin] We shall work together. We have nothing to divide up. By working together we can benefit the homeland greatly. We shall maintain operational ties with the officers' unions of other states.

[Zhichkin] Thank you very much, Fedor Nikolayevich.

RSFSR NATO Membership Considered

92UN0128A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 8 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by correspondent A. Vasilyev: "Will Russia Be Admitted to NATO?"]

[Text] Brussels-Moscow—Having bested the State Committee for the State of Emergency, the Russian leadership has set itself the task of making Russia a member of the civilized community as quickly as possible. It is anticipated, by all accounts, that membership in this gentleman's club will strengthen democracy in our country and protect it against new surprises. Russia's present foreign policy, specifically, the steps which it has been taking of late to join NATO, is geared to achievement of the set goal. Only a few people here, evidently, are asking: Will NATO want to accept us?

Previously when NATO was mentioned, the image was, as a rule, of multitudes of soldiers armed to the teeth, tanks and aircraft ready to surge toward Moscow, missiles equipped with nuclear warheads and blood-thirsty generals mysteriously engaged in deep bunkers over top-secret maps... What is NATO actually like?

NATO is first and foremost a well-oiled mechanism of consultations on political, economic, and military issues uniting the representatives of 16 states. When something out of the ordinary happens in the world—like, for example, Iraq's attack on Kuwait, the State Committee for the State of Emergency, or the start of combat operations in Yugoslavia—it takes the representatives of the NATO states permanently stationed in Brussels a couple of hours to assemble at the oval negotiating table in the headquarters of this organization. As far, however, as armed forces are concerned, NATO does not have such in practice. They belong to the states which are a part of this bloc.

NATO is not a supranational organization. It is a coalition of 16 independent states, decisions in which are adopted on the basis of consensus. All decisions! For this reason one dissenting voice is sufficient to block any serious action. This is not to the liking of some people, incidentally, but there is nothing they can do about it: the NATO Charter is sacrosanct. On the other hand, you can understand how erroneous the combination "aggressive NATO bloc" sounds. Sixteen independent states would never agree to aggression inasmuch as their interests differ. They could unite only in one instance—in the event of the necessity for defense against outside aggression. Of course, any member of NATO could engage in some actions on his own initiative, but this would not then be NATO.

So here is the first obstacle facing a Russia endeavoring to join the bloc: the reluctance of NATO members to admit to their ranks one further state, which could by its vote block the organization's activity.

The second obstacle is connected with the fact that NATO is an alliance of states which are of the same type in terms of their political and economic foundations. It is now customary to call such states "Western democracies." Could Russia be ranked with them at this time?

In the third week of August some Muscovites and Lenin-graders proved their devotion to the ideals of democracy. But only some. And the others? And in other cities? And in the Russian heartland? Now, however, the Russian leadership itself is being forced to prove its fidelity to democratic principles, after having adopted a large number of decisions failing to conform to these principles.

As far as the economy is concerned, everything here is perfectly clear. It is sufficient to say that in the time that has elapsed since the putsch the supply of foreign investments in Russian has halved compared with July-August. Businessmen and politicians have little interest in declarations rich in promises. They are interested in actual steps pertaining to creation of the conditions for normal entrepreneurial activity.

A third factor hampering our country's membership in NATO is territorial. In order to admit Russia to the bloc, it is necessary first to admit the East European states separating our country from West Europe. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia would very much like to join the "aggressive bloc," but NATO does not want to accept them. For the reasons which I have listed above.

Thus there can be no question even of Russia's joining the North Atlantic bloc. What, however, in place of this?

NATO is prepared in principle to expand cooperation with the East European countries and Russia. This is being championed particularly actively by the United States and Germany. A recent meeting between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed making consultations with NATO's eastern neighbors a regular occurrence, encouraging exchanges of military and civilian representatives and so forth. The final decision will be made at the November meeting of leaders of the NATO countries in Rome, to which, by all accounts, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin will be invited.

And this is what S. Mikhalkov wrote about NATO membership:

*A leveret an invitation
From Mr. Wolf received
With his spouse at his place
A banquet to attend...
While in the anteroom the leverets were abiding
The host a wink to the large-toothed cooks gave...
...A dish was brought to the table.
And this was... hare ragout!
My comparison is, perhaps, somewhat of a tomato,
But I had in mind the little hares
Which had joined up with NATO.*

("The Diplomat Wolf," 1957).

Moscow National Guard Recruitment Begins

92UM0011C Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Sep 91 p 1

[Unattributed, untitled statement by Commission for the Establishment of the Moscow National Guard Brigade Chairman Vladimir Bokser]

[Text] Vladimir Bokser, chairman of the Commission for the Establishment of the Moscow National Guard Brigade, has refuted information that the recruitment of guards has already begun. "We will not recruit people into it until the appropriate legal basis has been prepared," said Bokser at a press conference on Thursday at the Mossovet [Moscow Soviet].

National Guard Formation Viewed

92UM0028C Moscow KURANTY in Russian
21 Sep 91 p 3

[Report by A. Poret: "Rutskoy, the Moscow Stock Exchange and Zaytsev"]

[Text] A press conference in Moscow by the Shchit union described how the National Guard of Russia will be formed.

The idea of forming a guard was first expressed by A. Rutskoy upon arriving from the Crimea with the President of the Union following the failed coup. Work on the plan for establishing the new military formation has now been completed. It is planned for the guard to have as many as 40,000 members. They will be selected from volunteers from among the predraft youth, reserve officers and personnel on active duty. There will be a rigid selection process for those wishing to join. Consideration will be given not just to the physical condition of the candidates, but also to how well they understand the great mission of a guardsman. He not only guards the President's life but also protects Russia's sovereignty.

It appears that the guardsmen will have few problems. Just as in the good old days, merchants in Rus contributed money for the home guard, the Moscow Stock Exchange today has "forked out" 200,000 rubles to outfit the guard and has also offered to provide all the members with Uzi semiautomatic weapons. Supporters of the idea of establishing a guard were found also in the USA. Some kind Americans have expressed a willingness to provide uniforms for our guardsmen absolutely free. America apparently cares about Russia's best sons.

In addition to everything else, the Zaytsev Fashion House and the Lyuks company store have announced a competition for best uniform and emblem for the guardsmen. The winner will receive 50,000 rubles.

Nevzorov Approached To Head Pechora Home Guard

PM1510091991 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Oct 91 First Edition p 4

[Item from "RUSSIAN AGENCY Reports" column: "Nevzorov Is Thinking About it for the Moment..."]

[Text] A home guard is forming spontaneously in Pechora in Pskov Oblast in case the Russian government gives up these ancient Russian lands to Estonia. The home guard members have proposed to Aleksandr Nevzorov, presenter of the "600 Seconds" program, that he head the movement.

The television journalist sent his reply by fax: "I'm thinking about it. And I'm holding back." However he did not specify who he was holding back—the home guard members or himself.

Kobets Denies Russia-Ukraine Nuclear Exchange Rumor

LD1910220391 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Oct 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] According to the Russian Information Agency, Russia's state councillor for defense, Army General Konstantin Kobets has dismissed as nonsense reports published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI to the effect that there was behind-the-scenes discussion in the Russian Government last week about a possible exchange concerning nuclear strikes between independent Ukraine and Russia.

Ukrainian Military Take Exception to Shaposhnikov Letter

PM1510102391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2

[Sergey Tsikora report: "Military Show Their Morals"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian Armed Forces delegation which had been expected to attend the consultative conference at the USSR Defense Ministry did not arrive in Moscow. The reason was a letter from Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, the country's defense minister.

Your correspondent has learned that the Ukrainian Armed Forces leadership considered that the marshal's tone was unacceptable and that his points about the rights of sovereign republics were incorrect. This applies first and foremost to the right to independently decide questions of military building.

You correspondent has been told that the letter also calls into question the legality of the orders issued by the recently formed republic defense ministries and the

practice of their involving military specialists from districts and fleets in elaborating legal acts and resolving other questions of military building locally.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet deputies will be familiarized with the marshal's letter in the next few days. It is assumed that the republic's parliament will adopt its own decision on the matter.

Ukraine Defense Minister Interview

92UM0011A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Sep 91 p 3

[Interview with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Major-General of Aviation Konstantin Petrovich Morozov by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Correspondent Yuriy Romanenko: "And I Am Prepared To Take an Oath of Loyalty to Ukraine: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Interview with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Major-General of Aviation Konstantin Morozov"]

[Text] Konstantin Petrovich Morozov was born in 1944 in Luganshchina, his mother is Ukrainian and his father is Russian. After completing school, he entered Kharkov Higher Military Aviation School for Fighter Pilots. He has passed through all stages of a military career from cadet to major-general. He commanded a fighter aircraft division. His last position was air army commander. He is a personal friend of USSR Minister of Defense Ye. Shaposhnikov.

Ukraine

[Romanenko] How do you visualize the concept of development for Ukraine's national armed forces? Will they act independently or will they become an adjunct to the Soviet Army?

[Morozov] I think that those structures which are now called the republic guard must be directly subordinate to the Armed Forces of the Ukraine and to the republic president. The remaining armed forces that are deployed on the territory of Ukraine, will, in my opinion, be part of some formation or other according to their function. I think that those formations that are now in Ukraine must be involved in planned combat training and be subordinated to the same commanders to whom they are now subordinate. In the future, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet must very carefully study and examine the issues associated with the national armed forces; the deputies must make the decisions. After the officers obtain legal acts and the legal bases for their activities, they will act in accordance with these documents.

[Romanenko] What is your attitude toward professionalization of the army?

[Morozov] I have a positive attitude toward that.

[Romanenko] Can Ukrainian students be assured that they will not be deprived of deferments and that they will not be drafted for military service this year?

[Morozov] I cannot immediately solve this. But this decision must be made in the Armed Forces.

[Romanenko] Will you reduce the armed forces in Ukraine where their strength totals 1.5 million men? Is this real sufficiency or is this excess?

[Morozov] This is excess. And, I think that we will certainly examine all issues on reduction. Moreover, I know that both the General Staff and the USSR Ministry of Defense have also targeted this issue right now.

[Romanenko] Do you know the Ukraine Ministry of Defense budget right now?

[Morozov] No, it is too early to talk about this right now.

[Romanenko] A Ukrainian officers founding congress recently occurred in Kiev. How do you regard this and are you prepared to cooperate?

[Morozov] I think that this social organization promotes the elimination of tension and the resolution of social issues. I support them and I certainly need to cooperate with them.

[Romanenko] Are you prepared to take a loyalty oath to Ukraine?

[Morozov] If it is proposed, I do not object in principle. Of course, I am ready.

[Romanenko] How do you regard the shift in the army to the Ukrainian language for commands, regulations, and documents?

[Morozov] I regard this with caution. It is impossible to immediately introduce the Ukrainian language and to place a large number of officers and warrant officers, soldiers and sergeants in an uncomfortable position. I think that we need some sort of transition period to do this during which this issue will be resolved.

Ukraine Officers Union Chair Interview

92UM0011B Moscow KURANTY in Russian
29 Aug 91 p 1

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Vilen Martirosyan by Vladimir Ivanov: "What is Happening in Ukraine?"]

[Text] A KURANTY correspondent posed that question to USSR People's Deputy Colonel Vilen Martirosyan. This is how he answered.

[Martirosyan] As chairman of the Officers Union—of citizens of Ukraine, I will say: Ukraine must have the capability to defend its sovereignty. And right now we are proposing that the ground forces be subordinate to the republic Supreme Soviet and at the same time and in parallel create a national republic army. It is not a question of strategic forces—let them be subordinate to the Center.

[Ivanov] Will this be a dual subordination: to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and to the USSR Ministry of Defense?

[Martirosyan] Only to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet during peacetime. But in wartime, they will be in a single union system and subordinate to the Center. While considering the situation which has developed and while considering that a new putsch may arise, I think that we are acting appropriately. The conservative forces are uniting and are studying the peoples' moods. And they will act at the needed moment. Today it is impossible for us to calm down. And in order for Ukraine to live peacefully, it needs troops in order to defend itself and not in order to violate anybody's borders or to oppose the Center's troops. God forbid.

[Ivanov] Will the Navy also be subordinate to Ukraine?

[Martirosyan] A part of it—yes.

[Ivanov] Which part?

[Martirosyan] That part which does not have a strategic mission. But this issue is very serious. We will look at it again since it will be resolved at the congress. I will personally do everything, while a threat to sovereignty exists, in order to create such an organization which will defend the interests of the citizens who live on the territory of the republic. Today I personally do not trust our military commanders.

[Ivanov] Did they reveal themselves during the putsch?

[Martirosyan] I showed the coded messages at the session. I gave them to M.S. Gorbachev. They will be published. All of the command staff in the Armed Forces actually totally supported the putsch organizers. We suggested to them that they be so kind as to write a report and leave the posts they occupy. If not, we are still capable of raising the people's anger and the people's anger will relieve them. But right now the people are in a state that they will support us. Because they have already begun to sort out what is black and what is white and they know who is for them and who is against them. Therefore, I think that we will relieve all of them without a doubt.

[Ivanov] In which public organs and organizations in Ukraine do you participate?

[Martirosyan] I am a member of Rukh Ukraine People's Movement politsovet [political council]. I am responsible for rendering aid to officers and servicemen. In the Officers Union, I am responsible for the creation of the republic army. Yes, I do not reject this. I have, just like the union chairman, a deputy UKGB, deputy for MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and a deputy for the armed forces. There is a chief of staff.

[Ivanov] And how many people does the officers' union unite?

[Martirosyan] We have actually founded unions at all oblast centers.

[Ivanov] And how do the people regard the creation of a national army?

[Martirosyan] Polls on this topic have been conducted in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast in 14 cities, in several villages, and at major enterprises. Of those polled, 86 percent advocated Ukraine creating its own army. And only 14 percent were opposed. That is, the people support us everywhere. We are not creating a national, purely Ukrainian army. We are creating a republic army.

[Ivanov] And are the military units supporting you?

[Martirosyan] Even at army headquarters. I have documents with officers signatures. Everyone has come over to our side and they have already understood who is who and who wants good and who wants evil.

[Ivanov] Your Union is already forming a Ministry of Defense?

[Martirosyan] We are not yet forming it but we will. We will form all required organs in order to insure sovereignty. I still do not know what we will call these organs. Our primary goal is to insure sovereignty and to create normal conditions for the lives of the peoples who live on the territory of Ukraine.

Kravchuk Views Independent Ukrainian Armed Forces

LD1910180991 Kiev Radio Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 16 Oct 91

[Text] Ukrainian Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov has held a news conference in Lvov. He acquainted journalists with the concept of development of the armed forces in the independent Ukrainian state. It is planned to form them during the next two years. It will be a fully standard army in all respects and capable of defending the republic's national interests in a reliable way. It will be based exclusively upon a doctrine of defense. In time this tendency will take the form of transforming the territory of Ukraine into a non-nuclear zone.

Kostyantyn Morozov stressed that the national army would be free from influence of any party and under no circumstances would it be used to resolve any internal conflicts.

Kiev Ukrainian DOSAAF Conference Reported

92UM0029A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian No 40, Sep 91 p 2

[Report by Georgiy Chernomorskiy under the rubric "DOSAAF": "We Believe That the Ukraine Needs Us"]

[Text]

7th, Special Congress of the Ukrainian DOSAAF

There was not the traditional placement of flowers nor the usual slogans and appeals. There were only flags and the emblem of the Society for Assistance to Defense of the Ukraine.

Twenty minutes or so before the 7th, special congress of the defense society opened, I had a brief talk with F. Mironenko, chairman of the Khmelnik City Committee of the Vinnitsa Oblast DOSAAF Committee. When I asked him what he expected from the conference, Fedor Leontyevich's answer was brief and to the point:

"I would like to gain the belief that we are needed. We cannot do our job without that. It is time at last to define who we are and what we are here for."

The congress discussed the following topics: The Reform of the UkSSR DOSAAF and the Society for Assistance to Defense of the Ukraine, and the Draft Charter of the Society of Assistance to Defense of the Ukraine.

The report presented on the first topic by Major General B. Kharchuk, chairman of the UkSSR DOSAAF Central Committee did not abound in figures. Each of those presented said a great deal, however. More than five million members have left the society in the past two years, the number of primary organizations has dropped by 10,000, 15,000 technical groups and sections have broken up.... As a result of all this thousands of youths have left the gymnasiums, the equestrian grounds and airfields for the streets.

It was naive to expect anything else. The upheavals shaking the society today could not but affect the stability of its structures. I am confident that in time the roses of the market economy will blossom in the Ukraine. But who knows when? For now we are only encountering the thorns, and B. Kharchuk said so with complete candor.

Even in this situation the defense organizations of Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Nikolayev, Ivano-Frankovsk, Lvov, Ternopol and certain other oblasts have succeeded in demonstrating that they are needed, to be sure. Despite certain losses, they have retained their ability to function.

As the speaker pointed out, however, the situation is growing worse. There are around 200 motor-vehicle, technical, radiotechnical and naval schools, and aviation training and sports organizations in the Ukraine. The new training year begins in October, and financial matters have still not been worked out....

The address by Major General of Aviation K. Morozov, Ukrainian defense minister, had a noticeable calming effect. Konstantin Petrovich not only explained the concept of the Ukrainian state's defense doctrine but also described fairly clearly the role which the republic's defense society is expected to play in its implementation. The minister said that it would possibly be necessary to reduce the number of schools somewhat. All training

organizations preparing cadres for the army will have the support of the Ministry of Defense, however.

The general expressed one other, very important thought. Upon completing their service term, the youth return home, and the civilian economy receives specialists whose training has not cost it a cent. Would it not be fair, then, for the departments which receive the specialists at least partially to finance their training?

The delegates enthusiastically received the statement by V. Martirosyan, people's deputy of the USSR and chairman of the Ukrainian Officers' Union, that the Officer's Union would support the republic's defense society in every way. Also, that it would do whatever it could to help resolve problems related to the provision of social protection for its regular workers. Vilen Arutyunovich said that amazing changes are taking place. Party bureaucrats are turning into democrats, and democrats are becoming bureaucrats. Instead of legal protectionism, we have leftist protectionism. We can talk all we want about the cadres, but until we have a competitive system for selecting leaders, the situation will not improve. One other thing he said received absolute support: "It is not so important what language a person speaks. What is important is what he does for his people, for his state, the Ukraine."

V. Durdinets, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's Permanent Commission on Defense and Security, informed those present how the republic is establishing its own Armed Forces on a legal basis. At the same time, he said, the Supreme Soviet supports the establishment of a single, collective system of strategic security with a single command element. Noting the role of the defense society's training organizations, Vasiliy Vasilevich Durdinets advocated preserving them as centers of mass defense work, as producers of specialists for the civilian economy and the Armed Forces.

A. Kasim, chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk DOSAAF Obkom, briefly described his position. Anything can be torn down, but it is far more difficult to build something. One has the impression that we have completely forgotten the wisdom of the folk saying and have picked up the scissors without bothering to measure first. We cannot destroy the base we have built, nor can we completely abandon the training system we have developed. Naturally, we need to leave behind many premises pertaining to the party's former monopoly and its proclaimed slogans. We must not reject the rational core, however.

It is not seditious to love the homeland. Recently, unfortunately, certain populist politicians have practically made the word "patriot" a swearword. But then this word was not thought up by Lenin, by Sverdlov or Dzerzhinskiy, whom it is so acceptable to curse today. At the risk of sounding trite, I shall repeat the eternal axiom that it is just as immoral not to love one's homeland as it is not to love the mother who gave one life.

Now we have to ask the question: What homeland should we love? I feel that we have become like a person straddling two ice-floes. We cannot balance ourselves on them for long. We need to make a decision. For decades we were taught that our homeland was the Soviet Union, but today the situation is entirely different. One cannot erase 70 years of history, however, no matter what they were like. Respect for history does not prevent us from taking the current realities into account. Only a blind person could fail to see that the former union no longer exists. And a new one, should one arise, will not be a state formation.

And the DOSAAF members of the former UkSSR made their choice. It is set down in both the society's name and the charter approved by the congress. The latter states the following, among other things: "The Society for Assistance to Defense of the Ukraine (OSOU) is an independent patriotic defense and technical sports organization of citizens. It is governed in its functioning by the Constitution of the Ukraine, current laws and this Charter. The Society's main mission is to prepare the population for work and for defense of the homeland." The society does not reject its past. And this is also set forth in the Charter: "OSOU is the legal successor of the UkSSR DOSAAF."

With this in mind, the republic's Supreme Soviet is preparing to pass a package of laws on defense matters, and the congress decreed that the authority of the delegates be extended to enable them effectively to make necessary amendments and changes in the Charter.

A new flag was approved for the society. It is a tricolor banner. Yellow and pale blue are mandatory aspects of the national symbolism. The crimson goes back to the Zaporozhye Cossacks, one of their main banners being crimson. But crimson is not so very different from red. This is no doubt proof that we do not reject either our history or ourselves. The emblem is the same, but the inscription is different: "TSO Ukraini."

Although the new charter was approved almost unanimously, the congress was fairly turbulent. It surpassed other parliamentary sessions in emotional intensity. This was not the defense forum's main distinction, however. The delegates were able to focus on the main objective: to serve the Ukraine and its people. They rose above personal ambition and pride. In short, some parliamentarians could not even dream of the effectiveness of the congress and the specificity of its decisions.

Biography of Chief of Staff Lobov

91SV0126A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 37, Sep 91 (signed to press 10 Sep 91) p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Antonov: "Soldiers' Roads (Strokes for a Portrait of the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces)"]

[Text] *Army General Vladimir Nikolayevich LOBOV, 56 years old, born in Bashkiria. Began his army career as a rank-and-file soldier in Tajikistan. Served in Transbaykal, the Polar region, and Central Asia. Was in Afghanistan, participated in the work of cleaning up after the Chernobyl disaster. Was one of the developers of documents for reducing troops and arms and strengthening measures of confidence. He is presenting his program for reform of the Armed Forces.*

The year 1954. Dushanbe. Drafted into the Army. Before this, after graduation from the eighth grade, worked as a stevedore.

The year 1956. Ryazan. Artillery school...

First sergeant of trainee battery Vladimir Lobov, having left his wards in the barracks, hurries to night school classes. Then he will spend half the night studying. And that is the way it goes almost every day, without a break. He must keep the promise he made to the head of the school when he entered that he would take his examinations for secondary school as an extern in the second course.

December, 1986. Alma-Ata.

The people are gathering on the square. The bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is in session. Fiery speakers are insisting on bringing the troops in immediately. Central Asian Military District Commander Colonel General Lobov announced that the Army would not be used in any case.

1987. Moscow. The position of first deputy chief of the General Staff. The work day lasts 10-15 hours and there are no days off. Such was his work style at the time. There were combat activities in Afghanistan, another military crisis in Ethiopia, they were at the height of negotiations on elimination of medium- and short-range missiles, reducing troops and arms, and establishing measures of confidence.

The first months of hard work had taken their toll. He had a bloody nose which was difficult to stop... And during that time he was defending his doctoral dissertation—an unusual phenomenon for leaders in the Ministry of Defense! Later Yazov was to place the blame on the chief of the General Staff Academy for allowing this defense. The minister could not see why a person had to work on scholarship when he had attained such a high position. And this was in a situation where the General Staff Academy, the so-called forging ground of military-science personnel, had for years not been able to produce a single doctor of military sciences.

The defense of his dissertation was difficult. The subject was unusual: It pertained to problems of achieving strategic goals with the least expenditures of forces, funds, and time. The concept proposed by Lobov received the support of military scholars and leading specialists of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences. The defense was successful.

1988. Semipalatinsk Oblast. The Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement is gathering force. The public in the oblast is demanding the closing of the nuclear testing ground. In this difficult situation General Lobov is nominated as a candidate people's deputy for Ayaguzskiy Territorial Okrug. Stormy meetings of the kolkhoz [collective farm] workers and rural intelligentsia. A struggle of opinions and a polarity of views. And as a result—unanimous support: Stay on the voting list. The results of the election: More than 90 percent of the voters cast their votes for Lobov.

1989. Rome. For the first time at a session of the NATO parliamentary organization—the North Atlantic Assembly—the speakers are the American General Glevin and the Soviet—Lobov. The meeting hall is packed. Many are expecting a sensation. What will the first deputy chief of the General Staff say? Will it be another challenge to a confrontation or a repetition of well-known Soviet initiatives? And suddenly the general sets aside the text of his report and begins in an almost comradely way to explain to the audience his understanding of the problem of the opposition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and his vision of the coexistence and cooperation of the military structures of the two different blocs.

The Italian newspapers during those days wrote that "the Soviet general has won everyone over with his sincerity, his benevolence, and his desire to find a common language with his partner."

1990. Berlin. A hard day of signing the document concerning the withdrawal of the GDR from the Warsaw Pact. He recalls his service in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, warm meetings with his German comrades, and toasts to friendship and cooperation. How could it be? Why? It would be easy to be consumed by great-power wrath in response to these questions. It was difficult to rise above these experiences and above emotions in the name of understanding the political realities of the present day. At that time a few military leaders managed to find in themselves the courage of a politician and the tact of a diplomat. Lobov was among these people.

1991. Moscow. The Warsaw Pact no longer existed. Dozens of generals and staff officers of the Warsaw Pact staff were demobilized. Suddenly the Army no longer needed skilled personnel with experience in military-diplomatic work. The situation of Lobov was absurd: There was no place to assign a 55-year-old general because all the worthwhile positions were filled by 67-year-old generals who were not contemplating retirement. On instructions from Yazov, Vladimir Nikolayevich is

released from the position he held "because of a transfer..." nowhere. That was precisely it since he was offered no position. Soon would come the instructions from the minister: Head a small apparatus of military advisers in distant Vietnam. The army general categorically refuses.

It is tormenting to spend long months waiting in silence. In July Lobov was appointed chief of the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze. Vladimir Nikolayevich took this obvious reduction in the service stoically. It was still not essentially a matter of ambition but of the cause he swore to serve. One had to have enough patience and strength.

...19 August 1991 was an ordinary Monday, students in the first course were being received, and the general was going to the training center. The conspirators did not let Lobov in on their plans: He was an alien person to them...

The appointment of Army General Lobov, V.N. is linked in the General Staff to the reformation of the entire brain center of the Army, new directions in the development of military matters, and the possibility of fresh force flowing into the central administrative organs. On behalf of the readers we wish Vladimir Nikolayevich success in his new state post during this time which is so difficult for the destiny of our homeland.

Details of Broadened Medical Draft Exemptions Outlined

*91SV0103A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Sep 91 First Edition p 5*

[Article by Yelena Agapova: "Sick People Will Not Serve"]

[Text] This is discussed in an order of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

On 1 October thousands and thousands of soldiers' mothers will breathe a sigh of relief, and they are not the only ones. This is the day Order No. 436, which was signed on 12 September by USSR Defense Minister, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, goes into force.

"We are speaking about making changes in the so-called list of illnesses or, more precisely, the well-known order No. 260 of 1987 concerning medical examinations of recruits," we were told on the telephone by the chief of the Central Military Medical Commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense Colonel of the Medical Service Valeriy Zolotov. "Taking into account the opinion of specialists and citizens, as well as on our own initiative, changes have been made in 44 articles in the list of illnesses. People whom the military medical commissions previously declared fit noncombatant duty, in other words, those who had health restrictions, beginning 1 October of this year will be declared unfit for military service during peace time.

This long-awaited order will affect many people. For example, people who have defects in their locomotor system, curvature of the spine, chronic diseases of the bones, cartilages, muscles, tendons and joints, and also patients with diseases of the peripheral and central nervous system with minor disturbances of functions, hypertonic disease in the first stage, ulcers, active rheumatism and its consequences, and diseases of the joints. Anyone can get a complete list of the diseases.

Order No. 486 will be made known not only, as before, to military commissariats and commanders but also committees of soldiers' mothers, schools, and the entire public. As for those who are serving now and come under this order because of their health, they will be released from active duty.

Deputy Chief on Problems Facing Army Aviation

92UM0010A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Oct 91 First edition pp 1,2

[Interview with Hero of the Soviet Union, Deputy Chief of Army Aviation, Lieutenant General of Aviation Vitaliy Yegorovich Pavlov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major S. Prokopenko, under the rubric: "Timely Interview": "Army Aviation: One More Change of Bosses?"]

[Text] Quite a few letters arrived at the editorial offices after publication on the pages of our newspaper of the article "Poka grom ne graynet?" [Until It Thunders?] (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, June 13, 1991), which discussed the problems of army aviation. Our correspondent met with the article's author—Directorate Chief, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces for Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant-General of Aviation V. Pavlov and asked him to answer the readers' questions.

[Prokopenko] Vitaliy Yegorovich, during recent decades, army aviation has undergone quite a few changes: first it was subordinated to the Ground Forces command staff, then it was part of the Air Force. The structure that has been established right now—is it the next change of the signboard or is it something new?

[Pavlov] Actually, in 1978 some of the combat helicopter regiments were transferred to the operational subordination of combined arms and tank armies. Ten years later these units were once again resubordinated to the Air Force. I think this decision was totally unjustified. Thus the already existing command and control and coordination structure collapsed: helicopters were assigned to support Ground Forces on the battlefield. This is the army aviation pilot's predominant mission and its tactics dictate this. As a result of the reorganization that has occurred, army aviation has found itself to be artificially cut off from its vital mission. The commanders of large air units have found themselves to be too busy to become involved with it for objective reasons. Frontal Aviation primarily carries out operational missions. And this already assumes totally different conditions of employment.

Therefore, laborious work to seek the most optimal solution to this problem has been occurring during this entire time. The experience of combat operations in the Republic of Afghanistan has not played the last role here. And I think that the formation of a new branch of the Ground Forces—Ground Forces aviation—is the logical conclusion of this search. Right now, its formation is occurring and aviation is becoming accustomed to the new structure. Naturally, this is a complicated matter and it will not occur without difficulties. Right now, we are conducting a search for optimal, approved organizational structures and effective command and control and coordination methods that meet the requirements of the times.

[Prokopenko] We all know that the organization of coordination with ground subunits primarily determines the successful activities of Ground Forces aviation.

However, it is no secret that today not all combined arms commanders have this experience and they do not have the skills of joint operations with aviation. How do you propose filling the gap?

[Pavlov] Coordination is certainly one of the most complicated types of activities for any commander and its precise organization is a key condition for success. All the more so when it is a question of Ground Forces and aviation joint operations.

Quite a bit is being done right now in the context of developing skills for joint operations. For example, courses have been opened to train group control specialists. In the future, with the development of a command and control system on the battlefield, we intend to train target designation specialists from among officers or junior battalion-level commanders. Target designation is the simplest form of command and control. Guidance which requires special training, knowledge of a helicopter's tactical-technical specifications, its capabilities, and many other things—will remain within the purview of the specialists. A forward air controller combat vehicle (BOMAN), equipped with everything necessary, has been developed and is undergoing testing right now. They propose equipping motorized rifle regiments with this vehicle and, in the future if the results are good, battalions.

However, much will depend on commanders' strivings for mutual understanding on the resolution of common tasks, both combined arms and aviation. That is, both one and the other must be competent people. They need to know both command and control and the organization of a combined arms battle, skillfully link them with the specific features, tactical-technical specifications, and tactics of aircraft. Here we are faced with learning much from each other.

[Prokopenko] Vitaliy Yegorovich, there have been cases in army aviation when incompetent people, although entrusted with more authority than the appropriate aviation commanders, have interfered in the command and control of crews and subunits. Such voluntarism has resulted in tragic consequences. Is there a guarantee that we will manage to avoid previous mistakes in the new structure?

[Pavlov] Yes, such things have actually occurred. But accidents and catastrophes have occurred, as a rule, not during combat employment, but due to the utilization of helicopters for other than their designated purpose, such as when a combat aircraft has transported passengers, cargo, and the like. Higher-echelon commanders have not always considered meteorological conditions and the level of crew training where there has been a need for transport or passenger airlift.

I think that only the honesty of the person who issues the order and of the person who receives it can be the most reliable guarantee in these situations. They must remain with the commanders. For example, the same pilot and crew commander has adequate authority provided by guiding documents to convince the higher-echelon commander not to resort to a violation.

I also want to point out that military district commanders are currently paying a great deal of attention to the concerns and problems of aviators. Today I cannot cite a single example when higher-echelon commanders have interfered in the direct command and control of combat sorties during exercises or flights. I hope that this will be so from now on.

[Prokopenko] Vitaliy Yegorovich, you already said that Ground Forces aviators have quite a few problems right now during the formation period. Which of them are the most acute?

[Pavlov] In my opinion, the primary cause of the current state of affairs has consisted of the fact that this branch of the armed forces was transferred to the ground forces and then once again made a part of the Air Force. But it essentially did not become "a relative" to either the one or the other. And this despite the titanic amount of work and those most difficult missions that were carried out using helicopter pilots. There has not been one major accident or natural disaster where army aviation has not been involved in the clean up. They include Chernobyl, Armenia, and the tragedy in Bashkiriya.... For example, the pilots of one squadron from the Ufim VVAUL [Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots] Combat Training Regiment flew more than 200 hours 18 hours after the start time. Each of them spent more than 10 hours in the air while evacuating the injured from the scene of the rail catastrophe.

The chaos and confusion that is being manifested in the country's life are also having an impact on many aspects of army activity. For example, last year due to the great amount of isolation MI-6 and MI-26 heavy helicopter crews experienced during the work to clean up after the earthquake in Armenia, some pilots, who have enormous numbers of flying hours, could not carry out standard exercises for certification of their flying class qualifications. They had neither the time nor the opportunity to do this. But right now the Ground Forces command staff is not only concerned with these issues. For example, nearly half of the airfields that are within our jurisdiction are dirt fields. And this creates additional complications.

Today, there are more than 6,000 officers in Ground Forces aviation, of which more than 2,000 are pilots, who do not have apartments. And this situation is being worsened by units that are being withdrawn from the East European countries.

Right now, we are particularly concerned about units that are deployed in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Baltic Region. People are very unwillingly to go there and the outflow of personnel from these units is increasing.

We need not forget that our directorate as a branch of the Ground Forces and the appropriate structures in military districts are being formed right now. There are also difficulties here.

However, I would not like our readers to get a feeling of hopelessness. There are also positive trends. Indeed, it is still premature to talk about a perceptible success but there has been progress.

Say in the processes of combat training. With the transfer to the Ground Forces, the intensity of flights for combat employment has increased for us by approximately 3-4 times. Actually, during the past six months we have conducted as many exercises and measures jointly with Ground Forces subunits as were conducted during all of 1990. Right now we consider participation in each exercise to be a vital matter. And in this context, pilots are receiving great moral and professional satisfaction.

Right now we are doing everything possible to strengthen the army aviation combat training center. It will be involved with scientific-research work which will help to resolve many problems, develop an army aviation combat training course, develop new structures, and work out methods of new techniques for employment of various types of equipment.

Right now tests are being conducted at the center on the Imitator Ground Forces command and control combat training equipment that has been transferred to us. It will significantly increase the quality of combat training and in so doing save a great deal of resources.

There has also been some progress in resolving the problem of unit infrastructure and housing. Of course, we are not satisfied with their rates for the time being however, they are being conducted. Right now I would not want to promise or assure anyone that everyone will have shelter by this date or by that year. The only thing that I can say with certainty is that the command staff is doing everything to resolve these problems. Right now we are in dire need of dynamics and the development of any processes. Say if people see, for example, that this building under construction has grown by another floor after a week, they will wait, hope, and believe.

[Prokopenko] Right now radical transformations are occurring in the Armed Forces. How will they impact Ground Forces aviation and will the next resubordination not occur?

[Pavlov] In the current situation, I would like to avoid hastiness, rashness, and incompetence in the conduct of reform. Actually, already right now some commanders, even on the staff of the General Staff, are proposing working over the issue of the possibility of transferring Ground Forces aviation to the Air Force structure. I am convinced that, while frequently changing views on some problem or other, we are only putting off its solution. To change convictions is generally reprehensible. A return to the old structure will cause harm to helicopter-aviator combat training. Then army aviation subunit commanders will be compelled to become involved with demonstration with the withdrawal of aviation to the range only for "strike" or play, instead of everyday, routine combat work with Ground Forces troops. As a result, we will lose the first growth of coordination. I am convinced that we cannot permit this to occur.

Development of Soviet Aircraft-Carrying Cruisers

91SV0058A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 7, Jul 91 (Signed to press 30 Jul 91) pp 60-64

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Kuzin, candidate of economic sciences, under the rubric "Modern Ships of the Navy": "Aircraft-Carrying Cruisers"]

[Text] The history of the Russian fleet's development has been described repeatedly and in fairly great detail on the pages of MORSKOY SBORNIK. Despite the fact that a great deal has been written on the reconstruction and development of the Navy during the Soviet era, however, the subject still awaits a meticulous, honest and dispassionate study. Among other things, military, domestic and foreign political, economic, technological, social, personal and other factors are interwoven to an extremely great degree into the history of the establishment and development of Soviet aircraft-carrying ships. The author does not claim to be providing a complete and substantive explanation of each of them in this brief article, particularly since this complex and frequently dramatic history contains many blank spots and unanswered questions. Nonetheless, it is highly instructive and important, especially in light of the unceasing thoughtless questions and even attacks on our army and navy on the part of certain "chosen ones" and "friends" of our much-suffering people.

To begin with, contrary to fairly widespread views that there was an imbalance in prewar programs for construction of the oceangoing fleet, it should be firmly stated that in general in the past our naval science correctly assessed the role and importance of deck-based aircraft in future warfare at sea.¹ This is confirmed by, among other things, the development of the rough draft for Project 71, actually the first Soviet aircraft carrier, which was included in the first postwar program for building an oceangoing fleet. As we know, the war prevented its implementation, and the design for Project 71 became obsolete fairly soon. The draft design for a new ship with the number 72 was therefore produced as early as 1944.

To give an idea of the breadth and the degree of perfection of both projects, one should obviously explain that the designing of combat ships ordinarily includes the following stages:

design research, whose purpose is the technical and economic, operational and tactical-technical validation of the feasibility of building the ship;

advance design (or technical proposal), which specifies the basic technical concepts and the principles of the ship's design, which assure that the desired tactical-technical elements (TTE) are achieved; the preliminary specifications (TTZ) for the project are worked out from the results of these two stages;

draft design, which specifies the ship's basic tactical-technical elements and selects the optimal version;

technical design, which finalizes the basic tactical-technical elements and completes the creative exploratory work;

working draft, on the basis of which the ship's construction is begun.

The initial stages, up to the working draft, are performed by scientific research organizations of the Navy. The subsequent work is performed by the industry's planning and design offices under the observation of associates from the Navy's Scientific Research Directorate and military representatives of the Navy in the Central Design Office.

The results of the naval warfare during World War II affirmed the leading role of aviation in the accomplishment of almost all the navy's main missions, above all in the destruction of enemy ships. Aircraft of the warring parties (not including the USSR) sank 55.3% of the total number of aircraft carriers lost, 51.5% of the battleships, 32.3% of the cruisers, 33.2% of the destroyers and 31.2% of the submarines. This is how effective our aircraft were in operations against fascist Germany's navy: 66.2% of all the combat ships and auxiliary vessels lost by the Kriegsmarine were sunk or destroyed. As a comparison, the Germans lost 16.8% of their ships to mines, most of which were laid by aircraft, 8.6% to surface ships, and 5.5% to submarines.² The conclusion was obvious: It was impossible even then to accomplish any mission without gaining air superiority or without at least having satisfactory air cover. The naval command element at that time understood this very well, but the nation's political leadership, primarily I.V. Stalin, did not want to hear of aircraft carriers. A prolonged hiatus thus ensued in the development of aircraft carriers.

The designing of a light aircraft carrier, with a capacity of 40 aircraft, was not renewed until 1953, and the draft design was worked out in 1955. In their study of the development of aircraft carriers abroad, our specialists did not ignore the appearance of the super-aircraft carrier Forrestal, and in 1959 they performed the design work for a strike aircraft carrier for 60 and 100 deck-based aircraft (LAK).

These projects remained in the domain of history, however, since military shipbuilding was invaded once again by the views not just of political leaders, but also of "theoreticians" who attached absolute importance to the new weaponry: nuclear weapons, missiles, nuclear-powered submarines. The scientific and technological revolution begun in the navy was unquestionably a dictate of the times, but it entailed extremes and distortions in many cases. The naval aviation officially continued to be one of the main arms of naval forces, but the fighter aviation was withdrawn from it. The matter of providing air cover for ships even near the coast remained open or was simply hushed up.

During that period great hopes began to be pinned on deck-based helicopters. The helicopter was established on ships relatively rapidly and was assigned one of the

main missions, that of seeking and destroying enemy submarines. With the triumph of ASW's priority in the construction of surface ships, the designing of the first Soviet ships with multiple helicopter basing, long-range ASW cruisers, was begun at the beginning of the '60s, followed by their construction. The lead ship, named the Moskva and officially classified as an antisubmarine cruiser (see photo on colored insert between pages 32 and 33 [photos not reproduced]), was turned over to the navy in 1967. This was indeed a fundamentally new ship for our fleet. With a structural arrangement carried over from the '30s (the stern was for aircraft³), our team of designers, headed by A. Savichev, had to develop a new shape for the hull (double-bow), solve complex aerodynamic problems, design in a long deck hangar and aircraft facilities and fashion a runway.

In accordance with its antisubmarine defense missions a complete ASW armament system was installed on the cruiser: a missile system with twin launchers for homing missiles, two five-tube torpedo launchers (subsequently dismantled), two launchers for depth-charge rockets, an automated sonar system and a towed sonar unit. Two antiaircraft rocket systems and two twin-gun 57 mm antiaircraft weapons with automatic control systems were installed on the ship (for the first time) to provide protection against air attack. Two radar sets provided coverage of the air situation. Fourteen Ka-25 ASW helicopters were housed in hangars beneath and above the deck, and four runways were engineered for their takeoff and landing. The ship had a displacement loaded of around 15,000 tons.

Two years after receiving the lead ship, the Leningrad, a cruiser of the same class, was turned over to the navy. For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that the technical specification calling for the deployment of 14 helicopters on these ships was faulty. Experience rapidly demonstrated the main shortcoming, which was that the limited number of aircraft did not fully provide for accomplishing the assigned missions. In addition, the ship was inadequately seaworthy in heavy seas, a result of too full stern lines and the Y-shaped design of the transverse frames. (Incidentally, this very shortcoming had been found in the Project 7 prewar destroyers, a fact which was somehow forgotten). The ship was clearly not long enough, a fact obvious to the naked eye, as they say. During the second half of the '60s, when views on the surface fleet began to improve, this was immediately reflected in a modified design of the ASW cruiser Moskva.

The third ship was longer by 12 meters. This was done to increase its unsinkability, improve its seaworthiness and habitability, and most important, to accommodate a larger number of aircraft. The increased number of helicopters created a new problem, however, the need to increase the number of runways from four to six and also necessitated the addition of a separate runway for an alert search and rescue helicopter. This simple increase in the ship's size brought out all the design's former defects once again, and it had to undergo a major

reworking. There was only one optimal solution: to arrange seven runways in a single line, that is, to create a "strip" flight deck (called a "through" flight deck abroad), which, for purposes of economizing on the ship's overall length, would abut the prow, occupied by weapons, at a slight angle of 4-5 degrees.

The new design (lead ship, Kiev; see colored insert between pp 64 and 65) retained the basic armament plan of the Moskva-class ASW ship. Nor did they "try to do anything clever" with the power plant, merely "doubling" it to preserve the navigating features with the displacement increased to 40,000 tons. On the new ship it was possible to beef up the defensive weapons, something they had wanted very much to do on previous models but which had not been possible. They therefore added two antiaircraft self-defense missile systems, eight 6-barrel 30 mm automatic guns with four fire-control radar units, replaced the 57 mm guns with 76 mm guns and replaced the air-cover radar with an improved model (for a more detailed description of the tactical-technical elements see MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 5, 1989).

Outwardly the Kiev had a very substantial resemblance to an aircraft carrier, particularly because of the cantilever counter of its angled deck, but in concept essentially had little in common with one. I want specially to stress the latter fact because of attempts to compare or even match these ships against aircraft carriers of NATO's naval forces. After all, the Kiev-class aircraft-carrying ships were neither conceived nor built as an alternate or "original national" version of the aircraft carrier. In the draft design stage attention was directed to the fact that, while carrying developed ASW armament and with fairly good air defense capabilities, this ship had practically no protection against enemy surface ships. The specialists therefore initially worked out an arrangement for the installation of antiship missiles, which were already installed on small missile ships, then replaced these with longer-range and more powerful missiles, which are carried also on the Kirov- and Slava-class missile cruisers.⁴ In essence the new ship thus mechanically combined the features of a missile cruiser, a large ASW ship and an ASW helicopter-carrier.

The Yak-36 VTOL aircraft was displayed in an air parade in Domodedovo in 1967. As chief designer A. Yakovlev wrote in his memoirs, the pilots did not like the aircraft, but it did interest naval personnel. The idea arose of placing the aircraft onto a ship, since its takeoff and landing mode would not necessitate fundamentally new design features. The Yak-36, after additional work to bring it into conformity with naval needs, was renamed the Yak-38 and included in the air armament of a ship being designed. The latter initially had the rather "exotic" classification of "ASW cruiser with air armament."

Construction of the lead Kiev was begun in July 1970. Prior to its construction a third, unfinished antiship-missile ship of the Moskva class was dismantled. While the Kiev was being built, tests were conducted on the Yak-38's takeoffs and landings in a realistic area on land

with the section containing the runway of the future cruiser and then on a modified runway of the ASW cruiser Moskva. Its effect upon the heat-resistant surface and on the premises beneath the flight deck were studied, and other attendant problems were resolved. The first takeoff of an aircraft from the deck of the cruiser Moskva took place on 18 November 1972. This date can with complete justification be considered a remarkable event, one with few equals in the history of our navy. Construction of the cruiser proceeded fairly rapidly. This was due in great part to its design standardization with the preceding ship, the practical experience acquired with the Moskva and Leningrad, and most important, the start already made on the armament and equipment ordered and produced for the third helicopter-carrier under construction and dismantled. The Kiev was launched in December 1972, and construction of a second ship of the same class, named the Minsk, was begun immediately. The Kiev was completed and testing began in the summer of 1975. Changes had been made in the ship's classification by that time, and it was officially designated an aircraft-carrying cruiser.

Various circumstances determined how Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Navy at that time, viewed the classification of ships, a matter of far from secondary importance. First of all, there were foreign political considerations. At that time aircraft carriers were branded as "weapons of the aggressor," and we did not want to disturb the world community with something which we did not actually have. In the second place, there were domestic political factors. Few people in the government at that time knew anything about the navy, and everything not called a submarine or an ASW ship was difficult for them to grasp. Then there was the third, perhaps the main factor. With all his virtues, Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov was strong-willed when it came to decision-making, rigidly applying the sole-command principle even in such extremely complex matters as development of the navy. The "theory of the national path" of naval development was used to justify certain controversial, sometimes incorrect, views and decisions, according to which it was possible to manipulate the general laws of development of military equipment, recognizing them as "ours" or "theirs," depending upon which was convenient.

But let us get back to the ships. Certain adjustments were made in the design of the Minsk during its construction. A change in the requirements for arranging the aircraft in the hanger made it possible to increase the overall number of aircraft more than 1.5-fold. The torpedo tubes were removed. The sonar units were replaced with an improved system, and the same was done with the electronic warfare equipment. Construction of a third ship, named the Baku, was begun in the altered version in September 1975, immediately after the launching of the Minsk, followed by the Novorossiysk.

Time passed, and the more practical experience we acquired, the clearer it became that the aircraft with vertical takeoff were inferior to conventional aircraft

with respect to combat capabilities. Everyone was beginning to understand that the navy needed primarily fighter aircraft. The Yakovlev Special Design Bureau worked toward this goal by developing a VTOL interceptor, which was to be deployed on the fourth ship. Running ahead, it should be noted that A. Dondukov, general designer at the Special Design Bureau imeni Yakovlev, did not report the imminent completion of the work on this aircraft until March 1991, in the television program Radar.

More than a decade had passed since work was begun on the Kiev project, and more significant changes were made in the fourth ship than in the third. This involved primarily the radar system, which was to support the fighters' operations. Among other things, it called for the installation of a new radar system with a phased antenna array and fighter control and guidance systems. The number of main missile launchers was increased to 12 in order to enlarge the salvo, and, as on the first ships, there was no reloading capability. The self-defense weapons were reinforced. The old antiaircraft systems were replaced with four new ones with vertical-launch antiaircraft guided missiles. The traditional launchers for depth-charge rockets were replaced with two new anti-torpedo-defense systems. The dual-purpose artillery was retained, but the 76 mm guns were replaced with 100 mm pieces. The ship's architecture was also altered somewhat. The forward sponson before the angled deck was eliminated, and the "superstructure frame" was made "more dignified." Construction of a fourth ship, named the Baku, was begun in December 1978.⁵

Looking at the outward aspect of the development of aircraft-carrying cruisers, one might get the impression that we groped our way, made our way with an evolutionary tread, sometimes by trial and error, toward the aircraft-carrying ship—more simply put: toward the aircraft carrier with aircraft with horizontal (commonly called "normal") takeoff and landing. The logical result, as it were, of this was the production of a fifth, fundamentally different ship, a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (TAKR), which went through four names: the Riga, Leonid Brezhnev, Tbilisi and finally, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov. In fact, however, the independent history of the birth of this ship, which could have come into being at least 10 years earlier, is far more dramatic, intricate and complicated than might appear at first glance, and it requires a separate account (in the plans for issues in the immediate future—Ed.).

For all that, the development of the Kiev-class ships marked the beginning of a totally new phase of our military shipbuilding. The fleet "got a feel for" deck-based aviation, and we accumulated extensive technical and practical know-how, invaluable in view of the fact that no one would ever have passed it on to us. The production of aircraft-carrying cruisers is not the merit of individuals alone, or even of design or plant teams, but an achievement of practically the entire nation. Nonetheless, the author does not feel that he has the right not to mention for the first time in the open press

the names of chief designers A.S. Savichev, A.V. Marinich, N.F. Zhukov and V.F. Anikiyev, chief builder of the cruisers I.I. Vinnik, and main observing officers V.F. Fedin, I.S. Platonov (the Moskva), O.T. Sofronov (the Kiev), A.T. Kazakov (the Novorossiysk) and A.A. Borisov (the Baku). Admirals and officers of the Navy's directing bodies took a most direct part in the creation of these ships, first and foremost, S.G. Gorshkov, Yu.V. Dmitriyev, I.V. Chistozvonov and V.N. Gorbachev, and many others.

Footnotes

1. Even during the distant '20s there were plans for converting the unfinished battle cruiser Ismail into an aircraft carrier with a capacity of 40-50 aircraft.
2. A.V. Basov, "Flot v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. 1941-1945" (The Navy in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945), Moscow, Nauka, 1980, pp 270-271.
3. The Swedish aircraft transport Gotland (1934), the converted Japanese aircraft-carrying battleships (Ise) and (Khyuga) (1938), the French helicopter-carrying cruiser Jeanne d'Arc (1963) and the Italian cruisers Andrea Doria and Cayo Duilio (1964).
4. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 9, 1990 and No 1, 1991.
5. The ship was recently given the totally deserved name Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Gorshkov, since Sergey Georiyevich took a most active part in the development of aircraft-carrying ships.

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Article Ponders Future of Navy Shipbuilding Program

92UM0025A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Oct 91 First edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Gladkevich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Course to a Peaceful Harbor?"]

[Text] This "course plotting" is becoming an ever increasing reality for the Soviet Navy because of the sharp cutback in budgetary sources for purchasing arms and combat equipment.

The widescale reforms taking place in the country are quite naturally accompanied by economic, political and social complications. However painful today's problems may be, from economic recession to social shocks, we are going, we like to believe, toward stabilization and then toward a rise upwards. In the present feverish activity, though, are we not sometimes intensifying our future, trying to break down "to the ground" that which will inevitably have to be restored, revived tomorrow? And at great expense, both material and spiritual....

Not very long ago, a report flashed through the foreign press about the progress in realizing the American program to create the "ship of the future". According to some data, this will correspond fully to the status of a ship of the 21st century, a United States Navy destroyer of the Orly Bork type (there will be 29 units in the series). The rate of construction is to be rapid—five destroyers a year. The main thing is still, however—the quality of the new ship.

The Aegis multi-functional system is to be installed on it, ensuring the detection and tracking of the targets, determining the priority of the targets and automatically opening fire at the most dangerous time at a given moment. Taken into consideration in developing the destroyer were the extremely important lessons learned in the Anglo-Argentine conflict and other modern-day conflicts at sea and the predictions of specialists, resulting from model-studies of modern military actions on the sea and in the ocean. The most valuable systems and equipment are reserved and dispersed throughout the ship, and this will on the whole increase its stability and battle readiness. The vitally important stations within the hull are placed below the main deck and magazines, and the compartments, which do not have sufficient structural protection and are not duplicated, are armor-plated. Hundreds of other improvements and variants of the armament of this destroyer make it a truly formidable ship, joining fully into the military and military-technological conditions of the first decades of the 21st century.

The nuclear submarines of the United States and other large capitalist powers are also ready to enter the 21st century. The United States has virtually developed the SSN-21 nuclear-powered submarine (Sea Wolf). True, it is considered as excessively expensive, and, sparing no funds, the Americans will develop an alternative design, the Centurion....

In a word, the naval forces of the major world states are ready to enter a new millennium, qualitatively updated, with the necessary complement of forces to solve the tasks set for them.

What about the Soviet Navy? Will new warships be put into the waters of the third millennium under the flag of our country, or will old, but still serviceable ships, cruisers and destroyers of post-pension age, which retain their buoyancy despite all the laws of physics, be pulled into these waters?

"Right up until recently, we felt that we could fulfill the long-term shipbuilding programs, aimed at creating the fleet of tomorrow," said Captain 1st Rank M. Barskov, deputy chief of the Shipbuilding Main Administration of the Navy (GUK VMF). "The task was already difficult, considering the economic problems that have accumulated in the last few years. Today, however, it is becoming virtually unfulfillable. The funds to carry out

the programs have already been cut more than once, and today new cutbacks are coming for the fleet programs to endure...."

Rear Admiral V. Bocharov, chief of one of the GUK VMF administrations, asserts:

"If you take as a model the main power unit developed by the Americans for the Sea Wolf submarine, we have not lagged behind with similar units. Now, it would appear, we will not be able to keep up with the Americans and will have to use one of the already developed standardized units on all the designs of our submarines under construction...."

To tell the truth, this would be no misfortune if the parameters of the existing standardized units could be changed to meet the needs of a ship of a certain specific design. After all, though, its modernization potential is not unlimited, and fewer and fewer funds are being released to develop new YaGEU [nuclear-power units].

It is no secret to us that the cutback in the military budget has already dealt a sizable blow to the qualitative composition of the VMF forces. Construction of cruisers of the Kirov and Slava type was restricted to four units. Submarines construction at the Admiralty and Krasnoye Sormovo yards has virtually stopped. Due to the lack of necessary allocations, extremely important work on improving the radio and electronic devices for the fleet has been curtailed. Up until now these devices had left us the hope of at least maintaining, but not increasing the noticeable lagging behind the "competing firms" in this sphere. There is a real danger of losing the first place that we have held up to now in the sphere of developing power engineering and mechanics for the ships....

"Mar Avn Ye. Shaposhnikov, USSR Minister of Defense, stated that he is not an adherent of a sharp cutback in the military budget as a whole," says Mikhail Konstantinovich Barskov. "He feels, however, that it is possible to redistribute the funds: having withdrawn them from the clause on purchasing armament and military equipment, to transfer them to maintain the Armed Forces. There is, of course, a definite reason for this. All the same, I think that the funds allotted to the fleet should be regarded in a somewhat different way than those that have been allotted to other forms of Armed Forces and types of troops...."

What reasons does Captain 1st Rank M. Barskov give for this calculation? In his opinion, the shipbuilding programs that are of a long-term nature (for example, it takes about 20 years from development to the Navy's putting the new ship into operation), if they are cutback considerably, will not only fail to bring the expected saving of funds, but will contribute to new expenditures. According to the calculations of GUK VMF specialists, a 30-50 percent cutback in allocations for these needs will mean the virtual breakdown of even the delivery programs. In this case, it will be necessary to stop almost all construction of new ships and to put out tremendous

funds to pay for the actual expenditures of the enterprises of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry. This will "eat up" the entire saving which the adherents of sharp cutbacks in the fleet budget hope to obtain, and will take the fleet to a remote harbor, where in time it will virtually cease to exist.

Such budget cutbacks are also fraught with new social complications. In the first place, catastrophic losses in the sphere of creating and developing defense equipment and technology will be inevitable. Already the enterprises of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, as the result of the cutback in financing shipbuilding programs, are losing every year... with respect to the yard. A number of workers, engineers and designers are leaving the building berths, the covered shipways and the shipyard design bureaus every year.... Moreover, it is the best ones who are leaving, those who feel in themselves the strength to compete in the market of working hands that is springing up, and moreover find themselves quite highly paid jobs. It is clear that yesterday's "petzushnik" [student of vocational-technical school] cannot rely on this for the time being.

In the second place, losses of scientific personnel are inevitable. In addition to the fact that the cutback in the fleet budget will strike at the fleet's future, it is already washing hundreds of scientists and designers from the structures of fleet science. For example, the well-known Central Design Bureau for maritime equipment, Rubin, has already been forced to discharge about 700 associates. In all the scientific-research and planning-design institutions of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, personnel cutbacks are taking place, according to some data, at a level of at least 10 percent. These are the scientific forces that the defense sector is essentially throwing overboard.

This is the key point. Scientific-research and experimental design work is the outlook, the future of the fleet. If cutbacks strike a blow at this item of the military budget, a radical reform of the fleet and its professionalism will obviously run into extraordinary difficulties. Can we count on a qualitative leap, on the determining factor of this leap—scientific research and experimental design work—while actually on starvation rations?

In the third place, we should give up hope that the cutback in allocations for ship construction will create conditions favorable for production conversion at the enterprises. Let us say, if there is a sudden refusal to build certain orders at the Northern Machine Building Enterprise, it will be forced to dismiss a huge number of people. At the same time, it will not be possible to find orders for the capacities released until the Northern Shipping Company invests colossal funds in rebuilding production. As a result, the scientific, design and working potential of a unique enterprise will be undermined, and we will not receive the expected dividends.

In the fourth place (this is directly related to the future quality of our fleet), under the conditions of a radical

cutback in the financing of fleet programs there is a real danger of losing the possibility of modernizing the ships. There are scarcely enough funds to repair them, to keep our fleet, as they say, afloat.

As a military man, I cannot help but share the alarm of the directors of the GUK VMF for the future of the fleet. As a citizen, however, I cannot help but realize that the country, burdened with economic problems, is no longer able to spend colossal funds on the fairly inflated Armed Forces. What is the way out?

It can be seen in a considered, well thought-out approach, not distorted by zeal, to carrying out reforms. Why did we, the people of the fleet, even in the years of open and keen confrontation with the United States of America, have so much respect for the American fleet and those who determined policy in this sphere? Because our "probable adversary" always knew quite precisely how many—and precisely which—submarines, surface ships and auxiliary ships were needed and sensibly, without hysteria, invested funds in their construction. This approach at all times provided the United States fleet with timely quantitative and qualitative updating. At the same time, in consideration of the rise in quality of the new ships, the composition of forces of the United States Navy can even be quantitatively reduced. It is important, after all, that the structure of forces has already been created and is in operation on the basis of these ships. The next confirmation of this is the recent initiative of George Bush, the President of the United States, pertaining to the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. They will be removed, as the head of the United States administration stated, from all Navy ships, attack submarines and aircraft. The Americans can allow themselves to do this quite easily, considering the achievements in the sphere of developing ordinary armaments and military equipment.

It is obvious that our country is not at present in any condition to compete with the United States in the sphere of increasing its military muscles. The ill-considered cutbacks in allocations will cost us dearly, though. Consequently, we must determine just what is

within our power which we cannot for the time being do without. In other words, we must determine precisely—in consideration of the world political and military situation, our defense doctrines and our economic potentials, and finally—what fleet we do need and how many different classes of submarines, ships and auxiliary ships there should be in it. Let our fleet become smaller as a result, let it even become weaker, but let it receive as much as it needs in order to have the appearance prescribed at the level of the national program.

Yes, it will take more than a day to determine. Yes, expenditures are needed. All this, however, is an objective conformance to principle, and is not to be canceled either in the Cabinet of Ministers nor in the parliament nor in the office of the Most High. If we begin to make a drastic curtailment, I can choose no other words, in the shipbuilding programs calculated for several years, and carelessly cut the items of the fleet budget, then in the not too distant future our domestic fleet will quietly and resignedly cease to exist. Do we need yet another such historic mistake?

DOSAAF Courses To Train Naval Reservists

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 91
First Edition p 4*

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent
Colonel N. Astashkin: "New Forms of Training"]

[Text] DOSAAF officers courses for the preparation of naval reservists have been established at the DOSAAF aviation training center at the Rostov base by order of the USSR defense minister, Marshal of the Air Force Ye. Shaposhnikov, and the chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee, Colonel General N. Kotlovtssev.

"The courses are intended to prepare reserve officers for naval aviation," the chairman of the Rostov Oblast DOSAAF Committee, Colonel V. Nazymko, said. "The classrooms will have the very latest equipment, including computer technology. We will be able to prepare a reliable reserve for the Armed Forces in a short period of time."

Supply Problems Of Troops In Germany

92UM0013A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Sep 91 p 2

[Unattributed article: "How People Are 'Warming Their Hands' on Army Supply"]

[Text] Chaos in the supply of the Soviet Army in Germany. Food is getting spoiled while the black market is flourishing.

With a red nose and slightly cocked cap, commander Vasiliy Ivanovich Gulivati paced seriously through the grounds of the Soviet high command warehouses in Wunsdorf. Together with fair-haired Natasha, he was checking to see how the beer had been stored. In excellent spirits, he opened a can of beer and pronounced: "No problems!"

Gulivati is an optimist. Sixteen entire trucks had recently delivered a shipment of Dutch beer to him. And now 1.1 million cans are being stored in unheated warehouses and huts made of planks. The entire shipment of beer has already been exposed to freezing weather. "We really got in a jam on this one," said a German woman who works at the warehouse.

Meanwhile, two trucks stop outside the gates: One is fully loaded with broiler chickens, and the other with cucumbers. There's no room in the warehouse for these food products, since piled alongside Gulivati's frozen beverages are thousands of tons of scarce goods of every conceivable type.

Everything is literally upside down at the Wunsdorf arsenal: In one area a million packages of chewing gum are stored beside an immeasurable quantity of yogurt with expired consumption dates; 14,000 pairs of cloth shoes from Indonesia have sat on the shelves for some time now, alongside mountains of Thuringian Christmas tree decorations. Two thousand rugs and 120,000 videocassettes have been exposed to the cold and humid air. Plastic windbreakers hang alongside mink coats, and cardboard boxes containing Sony television sets have been exposed to the damp conditions. In the last quarter alone, 80,000 bottles of cognac and 120,000 bottles of vodka were delivered to Wunsdorf for the needs of the army of antialcohol crusader Gorbachev.

Strictly speaking, the goods are intended for distribution to the Soviet Army stores in the Brandenburg area. But only a few large army trucks were loaded with goods and driven away from the warehouse.

Nevertheless, there are lots of things in the yard. "As of yesterday, we began dealing in used cars as well," said

Handelsunion manager Wilfried Mueller, who is responsible for the warehouse on the German side. "Colonel Gulivati gave orders to unload onto the already jammed grounds a shipment of old BMW's and Nissans imported from Belgium."

Mueller does not know where the foreign currency for the purchases comes from, or what ultimately happens to the goods. "Before, this warehouse was used to supply the soldiers. But nobody cares about that any more," said Mueller. Together with VEB Spetsialhandel, Handelsunion's predecessor, Mueller, an honored comrade of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany in the recent past, used to supply the army. Since unification, the Russians have been placing orders themselves, no doubt using money from Bonn's treasury. The Soviet troops are to receive three billion German marks in installments up to 1992—under the terms of the Soviet-German agreement.

Part of the goods stored at Wunsdorf obviously disappear into the military's internal black market. One sees many civilians carrying boxes and bags around the warehouses.

Presumably, the expensive goods make their way to profitable markets: A classy limousine with West Berlin license plates, driven by civilians and loaded with 80 mink coats, moves down the lane; the guards open the checkpoint for them. "That's the mafia of former Russians, going about their business," said Mueller spitefully.

The Moscow police also view "Soviet emigres as criminals" for being involved in the flourishing illegal trade between East and West. German customs officials think that the suppliers and middlemen split their commissions with suppliers from the Soviet Army. However, apart from the recent suicide of an army driver suspected of corruption, Germany agencies know nothing definite about criminal dealings involving military personnel.

Anyone who speaks Russian and has a couple of useful acquaintances can easily make money in Wunsdorf with criminal zeal. This is doubly true of suppliers. Bottles of Italian champagne which, according to the invoice, were delivered by one firm to Schekeberg (Berlin) cost 90 pfennigs and 40 pfennigs for delivery. The champagne was then delivered to Wunsdorf at a cost of 2.4 German marks a bottle. In this way the commissions increase.

Nor are buyers in Soviet stores at a loss: The goods are both tax-and duty-free. Ever since border controls were lifted, Soviet soldiers or financially well-to-do people behind them have been able to sell large contingents of goods on West German shelves without risk. After visa requirements were introduced for Polish citizens, it became clear to the authorities just where some of the cheap goods remained: Turnover in West Berlin export-import shops selling electric appliances quickly dropped

off, while stocks in army arsenals simultaneously increased.

Even the small number of army trucks that leave Wunsdorf for the stores and cafeterias of the Soviet garrisons, according to Mueller, often fail to reach their destinations: Much is siphoned off without a trace along invisible routes from the central warehouse to intermediate warehouses for ultimate sale in the Soviet Union.

The auditing service is far away. Only once in a while do auditors from the Army Trade Enterprise No. 147, located on Lumumbastrasse in Leipzig, come to Wunsdorf to inspect the flow of goods. But even then the auditors cannot do everything: "They are shown only what they need to see," said a warehouse manager.

After that, it is hardly surprising if the swindlers act with even greater confidence.

Maj Gen Bochayev Discusses Fall Draft

92UM0051A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Oct 91 p 1

[Interview with Major General G. Bochayev, chief of the General Staff directorate, by "RT" [not further identified] military correspondent Sergey Doronin: "Don't Cry, Little Girl, the Rains Will Pass..."]

[Text] Yes, it is fall once again, time once again for the draft-age youth to switch to the military drabs. And the "old-timers" are returning home to the joy of mothers and fiancées.

I dare say that this presidential ukase was awaited with eagerness. Particularly by those whose military service has come to an end. At last, the well-known saying that "demobilization always comes" assumed a concrete time frame for them: October-December 1991.

The ukase was greeted with less enthusiasm by those for whom it is time to take their place in the combat formation. Verily, one cannot escape his fate. Now serve out the two years....

Just what will the fall induction be like? Major General G. Bochayev, directorate chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, talked about this with an RT correspondent.

[Doronin] First of all, Gennadiy Nikolayevich, how is the current induction different?

[Bochayev] The difference is that it was initiated for the first time by the President. The situation in which the induction and release into the reserve were handled first by the Ministry of Defense and then the Council of Ministers is a thing of the past. The republics are now empowered to make decisions in the area of defense.

We have an agreement with them that units of internal, border and railway troops, and subunits of military construction units and civil defense deployed in the republics will be manned mainly with local youth. The Ukraine, for example, retains approximately 50% of the draftees for itself, Belarus 65%. The rest are to be sent to other areas of the nation.

Those who are classified as "fit for non-line duty" for reasons of health will not serve. The service term in the navy was reduced to two years this spring.

[Doronin] During the past several years the leadership of the Ministry of Defense has sounded the alarm about the undermanned status of the armed forces. Has this changed in any way?

[Bochayev] No, the underrecruitment trend continues. The army and navy have not yet been reduced numerically, you see. In addition, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia refuse to send personnel beyond their borders.

These are the problems of today. New difficulties await us tomorrow. In the spring of 1992 personnel who have served two and a half years will be released into the reserve, so the manning shortage in the military will remain.

[Doronin] Do some of the republics perhaps have small "youth reserves"?

[Bochayev] The Central Asian republics, for example, could provide three and a half times the number of draftees required by the local units. And the others are not any poorer with respect to men.

We need to be thinking about something else, about how to employ the youth who remain at home, who do not enter into training and cannot find jobs. After all, no one in the republics has seriously studied this problem.

[Doronin] And just what can the Armed Forces offer those who join in the future?

[Bochayev] The youth spend six months mastering a specialty in training subunits, followed by service in line units. Prior to being released into the reserve, those who so desire may sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense for three to five years of service as professionals. For corresponding pay, of course. Other versions of service by contract are also possible, however.

[Doronin] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, what can you tell those parents who have lost a son in the military and are now faced with sending in another?

[Bochayev] The minister of defense has issued instructions that if a family has lost one member, its next draftee is exempted from the service. The military commissariats are well aware of this. Although there could be misunderstandings, I admit. If something comes up, one should go to the local authorities. The induction commissions are also in a position to help such families. There was a reason for the presidential ukase to include representatives of public organizations and movements in their bodies. Who, if not they, should help a draftee, should the need arise.

Postscript to interview:

The editorial board of RT is prepared to assist the parents and families of future soldiers and sailors who have suffered an injustice.

Emergency telephone numbers to call: 257-27-08 and 257-25-20.

Suvorov Military Schools Established

92UM0018A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Oct 91 First edition p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:
"Ulyanovsk and Bishkek Will Have Their Own Suvorov
Schools"]

[Text] In 1991, by order of the USSR Minister of
Defense, the Ulyanovsk Guards Double Order of the
Red Banner, Order of the Red Star Higher Tank Com-
mand School imeni V.I. Lenin is to become the Uly-
anovsk Guards Suvorov Double Order of the Red
Banner, Order of the Red Star Military School imeni V.I.
Lenin.

In 1992 the Bishkek Suvorov Military School will be
formed out of the Bishkek Special Boarding School for
Intensive Russian Language Study and Physical Culture
Training.

At the present time the projected organization and
establishment are being worked out for the new schools,
their financial, medical, personal goods and services
support is being arranged, and the training facilities are
being converted.

Training at the Ulyanovsk school, which will have a
regular student body of 900 Suvorov students, will begin
on 15 November 1991; at the Bishkek school (600
Suvorov students), on 1 September 1992.

**Military-Technical Review of New U.S.
AGM-129A**

92UM0023A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel E. Baykov, candidate of military sciences, under the heading "Military-Technical Review": "New Types of Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] World public opinion welcomed with satisfaction the signing of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, new initiatives in the area of disarmament advanced by President G. Bush, and USSR proposals in response. But American military experts proceed from the fact that as strategic offensive arms and a considerable portion of tactical nuclear arms are reduced, the role of long-range, dual-purpose, high-precision weapons increases. These weapons may replace some weapons that are subject to elimination. A special place here is given to a new type of long-range air-launched cruise missiles.

Cruise missiles are guided missiles with lifting surfaces (wings) which create aerodynamic lift during flight in the atmosphere. They possess a number of advantages over ballistic missiles. Their comparatively small weight and size makes it possible to carry up to 20 or more of these missiles on one platform. A combination guidance system, including inertial and correlation systems, ensures high accuracy. The difficulty in combating cruise missiles is caused by the small dimensions, small radar cross section as a result of using composite materials and radar-absorbing coatings in making them, and the low flight altitude (30-60 meters or less).

According to American press, while final work was being completed on points of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the American Department of Defense approved a program of full-scale production of AGM-129A advanced cruise missiles, designed to be carried on strategic bombers. The program calls for purchasing 1,000 missiles, 880 with a

single 200-kt nuclear warhead and 120 with a conventional warhead. Plans are to purchase about 100 of these missiles already by the end of 1991.

The new AGM-129A cruise missiles have a number of significant advantages over the AGM-86B (ALCM-B) missiles. An improved aerodynamic shape and new engine increased the launch range to 4,400 km. Production of the missiles using Stealth technology and decreasing the thermal background of the engines have reduced their radar and infrared signature and considerably increase the capabilities to overcome countermeasures by air defense weapons. Increasing engine thrust resulted in an improvement in the missiles' maneuvering characteristics and made it possible to realize the capability of flight not by a "staggered" trajectory bypassing the main obstacles but by the terrain-following mode, which in turn made their detection and intercept considerably more difficult.

An improved guidance system using an active laser in the terminal flight phase has made it possible to increase the guidance accuracy, which is estimated to be a circular error probable [CEP] close to five meters, and with a guidance accuracy of eight meters the effectiveness of cruise missiles with a conventional warhead becomes comparable to a low-yield nuclear weapon.

The United States is striving to step up the pace of developing programs for creating and putting into service not only AGM-129A cruise missiles but also other, still more dangerous types. Making maximum use of scientific and technical achievements based on the latest technology, they are developing cruise missiles with a conventional warhead (under the LRCC Program) with a high-precision radar (laser radar) guidance system, which ensures a CEP of about three meters; supersonic cruise missiles with a launch range of about 5,000 km, a guidance accuracy in the range of 10 meters, and the ability to carry nuclear or conventional warheads; intercontinental glide missiles, which in their design characteristics are between ballistic and cruise missiles.

In essence, improving the cruise missiles currently in service and developing advanced ones signifies a continuation of the arms race in a new, more disguised form. In essence, mankind remains a hostage of chance.

Military-Industrial Conversion Problems Discussed

924A0051A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by Oleg Rosnitskiy: "Successful Reform Impossible Without Conversion"]

[Text] Exactly two weeks prior to the events of 19-21 August, in an article entitled "How To Carry Out the Conversion" (Issue No. 92 of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, dated 6 August 1991), the leadership of the VPK [military-industrial complex] was referred to as a force for resisting the conversion and also one which is blocking structural improvements in the economy and the carrying out of radical economic reforms. On 19 August, this force was manifested in an extremely illegal form: four of the eight members of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] were high leaders of the VPK. This circumstance obligates us to return to the conversion problem.

Over an extended period of time, including the years of perestroyka, we were persistently informed that our defense expenditures were expressed in very humble figures, on the order of several tens of billions of rubles. The last of the officially mentioned figures was 96.5 billion rubles in the 1991 budget. However, it long ago ceased to be a secret that this was only a small portion of the actual expenditures which the VPK is carefully concealing. Thus neither the scientists nor society have reliable information at their disposal and therefore they can operate only on the basis of certain estimates.

Strange as it may seem, the initial breach in secrecy obviously occurred as a result of carelessness. One of the leaders of the GKChP, a former premier, on 22 March of this year, based upon the need for parity with the U.S.A., estimated our military expenditures to be roughly equal to those of America—300 billion dollars annually. Compared to this fantastic figure for our economy is the very humble and yet more convincing sum of 480 billion rubles, obtained by V. Pervyshin, which exceeds the official figure by a factor of five! Many specialists estimated our military expenditures as that proportion of the national income that is senselessly swallowed up by the VPK and they obtained a huge figure—from 50 to 70 percent!

The VPK passes over this delicate situation in silence. On 13 August, the former premier, during a RAB-OCHAYA TRIBUNA interview that involved an extensive discussion of the private and public realities of our socio-economic life, ignored the question of military expenditures, and the word "conversion" generally was not even mentioned. And the spirit of the declaration by the GKChP conformed fully to this position, with the populist slogans not being reinforced by any economic considerations. And the character of those participating in the junta left no doubt but that the coup was undertaken to please the VPK.

Now, once again, the creators of the program "500 Days," Ye. Yasin and G. Yavlinskiy, find themselves in the orbit of the radical economic reform. But indeed this program also has made no provision for a complete and decisive conversion. Is a change taking place at the present time? As yet, no signs of a radical change in the approach to the problem are visible. Although many competent scientists assume quite fairly that only a comprehensive and rapid conversion of the VPK can ensure a deceleration in the "free fall" in which our country now finds itself. Moreover, it should not be a "general" type of conversion in which, for example, the Soviet VPK becomes intent on modernizing the Chinese VPK in exchange for consumer goods. We still do not have any reaction by the new leaders to the old alarms of specialists, alarms which have been triggered constantly in recent years in connection with the carrying out of the pseudo-conversion.

The question of foreign assistance in carrying out our conversion is of extreme importance. The most outspoken defenders of the VPK persistently inspire us with the thought that this assistance is in pursuit of one single goal—to disarm our country—and that we, like it or not, will be forced, just as in the past, to wage an exhausting struggle for parity. I dare say that this is not so. The rich country of the U.S.A. is also interested in carrying out the conversion of its own VPK, since excessive military expenditures, which have a zero effect on economic effectiveness, weaken the U.S.A. in its competitive struggle against such countries as Japan, the military expenditures of which are negligible. In addition, such expenditures limit investments in the creation of new technologies. It is by no means an accident, even in such militarized firms as the Rand Corporation, that the scientists are developing concepts for a simultaneous conversion in the U.S.A., the USSR and China. It is advantageous for the Americans to invest definite resources in our conversion and to release funds for their own conversion and also for solving other problems. It is worth noting that the Pentagon is displaying initiative directly in reducing the armed forces, abolishing military bases and carrying out the conversion.

We are constantly referring to the restrictions imposed by COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] in connection with supplying the USSR with the newest dual purpose (military and civilian) technologies, as though today, with the production of elementary human blessings almost lacking completely, there is nothing more important than these very dual technologies. And from both the West and the East, we are told over and over again: we will aid you in both word and action and we will give you money, but only for converting the VPK and not for nurturing it. Perhaps international negotiations should be carried out on conversion, similar to the negotiations on reducing armaments? Indeed, is this not essentially one and the same?

In the process, we will be confronted with the question of the defensive adequacy of our armed forces. And here the idea arises concerning the creation of a system of

collective security on a global scale, with the participation of many countries—both those possessing great economic potential (the “Big Seven”) and those with large populations and territories (China, India). In view of the fact that with the disintegration of the OVD [Warsaw Pact Organization], we became dangerously alone, our politicians and military strategists do not view collective security with USSR participation as a sin.

Mention must necessarily be made of today's practical problems that are concerned with conversion, problems which touch upon the interests of many millions of defense industry workers. We must encourage the organization of open sectors of production involving foreign partners, we must ensure freedom for foreign economic activity and we must further the use of a portion of our excessive mobilization reserves for stimulating civilian production. In the process, it should be borne in mind that the command-administrative system was realized most fully in the defense industry, which deprived its workers of economic independence and entrepreneurial activity almost completely. In order to overcome this barrier, a type of conversion committee should be created at the defense enterprises consisting of capable and enterprising workers with good foresight and vision. By studying market conditions, developing contacts and holding negotiations with domestic and foreign partners, they will gradually form a definite intellectual environment that will lend itself to effective action in a market economy. In order to realize these conditions and a confident future, there must be agreement with regard to the possibility of denationalizing the defense enterprises and encouraging joint stock company operations and their purchase by the labor collectives. Who knows, perhaps these conversion committees will become genuine rescue committees—for rescuing our economy!

A priority task in this regard is considered to be that of creating a bank for information on production capabilities, intellectual potential and the financial status of converted enterprises, similar to firms found extensively in the West, firms which deal in such information. We must overcome our inclination towards all types of secrecy. In order to include state enterprises, new domestic structures of the market economy and sound foreign firms in this conversion work, a broad information network must be created within the country, with the republics, individual regions, enterprises, exchanges and their associations being included in this network. This was noted in a question directed at B.N. Yeltsin during a recent television broadcast involving the two presidents and the U.S.A. It bears mentioning that the response by B.N. Yeltsin was extremely puzzling, since, in his words, we are again preparing the next “breakthrough” in the field of electronics. We must reconcile ourselves with the understanding that at the present time we are unable to realize such “breakthroughs.” This network must be created jointly with foreign partners: take perhaps not the most modern equipment “at the lowest price” and through joint efforts create an information network which will ensure a systematic

approach. For it is precisely the absence of a systematic approach and, assisted by various cooperatives, the saturation of our domestic market with various types of poorly compatible information equipment that is continually confusing and complicating the problem of information, needed for facilitating the inclusion in an economically effective conversion both state and domestic enterprises as well as foreign industrialists.

The foreign political association includes as one of its tasks that of furnishing maximum assistance in carrying out the conversion. All of us, from presidents down to the rank and file workers, must realize that the tremendous scales of a military economy, which are so wasteful so far as man is concerned, preclude the possibility of improving the life of the people. The only path for such improvement—“humanization” of the VPK by means of extensive conversion. Resistance to such conversion constitutes an anti-national policy.

Conversion's Effect on Nuclear Research, Development Examined

92UM0052A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Oct 91 p 1

[TASS interview with A. Gagarinskiy, executive secretary of the Nuclear Association of the USSR, and V. Subbotin, academician, scientific director of the Physics and Power Engineering Institute: “Nuclear Specialists to Become ‘Hirelings?’”]

[Text]

Conversion Leading to Disintegration of Nuclear Science in USSR

The Western press is expressing alarm about the fate of Soviet nuclear science as a result of the conversion. It points out that tens of thousands of physicists, engineers, technicians and highly skilled workers are employed in nuclear science and technology in the USSR, a considerable portion of whom will be left without jobs. We must not permit them to become a group of “hirelings” for the Iranian, Iraqi, Pakistani or any other market. Foreign nuclear scientists believe that close cooperation needs to be established among the Western nations, the USSR and the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to use these specialists for other purposes.

At the request of a TASS correspondent Moscow nuclear physicists expressed their thoughts on this matter.

A. Gagarinskiy, executive secretary of the Nuclear Association of the USSR:

The conversion underway in the nation involves a reduction in research involved in the race for new weapons. This process should unquestionably be welcomed. As it reduces outlays for defense, however, the state has an obligation to make effective use of the great scientific capability built up in the military sector for the development of civilian nuclear power engineering.

The conversion being carried out from the top is being accomplished mainly by cutting allocations for civilian projects. This is the latest news. All scientific research institutes in the nuclear industry have received notification that their financing is being cut by 40% as of the fourth quarter of this year. This will result in the curtailment of laboratory projects, a loss of talented scientists and specialists, and increased unemployment among the scientific and technological intelligentsia.

In this situation the Nuclear Association of the USSR and the institutes were forced to turn to the world community with a request to provide Soviet nuclear science with orders and preserve the scientific capability built up over decades in nuclear technology. Incidentally, Soviet scientists have something to offer the West. Our nuclear power plants for ships, our nuclear heating plants, our production processes for processing and enriching uranium and many other developments are recognized as advanced.

V. Subbotin, academician, scientific director of the Physics and Power Engineering Institute:

I would like to mention three factors. First, there is no alternative to nuclear energy. Unless we build up its potential we cannot speak seriously of scientific and technological, economic or social progress for our society. In the second place, science has reached a level at which it can produce nuclear power plants with maximum safety. This requires preserving the scientific capability, however. If we lose it, the nation will not emerge from its energy crisis. In the third place, the conversion in the military research system, in my opinion, must be accompanied by the expansion of civilian projects, by their financing and centralized provision with materials and equipment. Instead of the approach taken in the civilized world, we are systematically reducing the financing. If this continues, the most highly skilled people will leave the defense industry. They will not, of course, supplement the group of "hirelings" for the Iranian and other markets. Soviet nuclear physicists enjoy a fairly high level of prestige in the world. The best laboratories and scientific centers of the West are glad to get them. But what will the nation do then? It will have to restore its scientific capability with enormous financial outlays and with a large lag behind world technology for many years to come. To prevent this, we should not focus on momentary benefits but be guided by common sense on the state level.

Kazan Defense Industry Plant Looks to Foreign Cooperation

PM1810091391 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1630 GMT 14 Oct 91

[From the "TV Inform" newscast: Report by I. Latypov, V. Bezmenov, identified by caption, from Kazan]

[Text]

[Latypov] It seems likely that foreigners' visits to Soviet defense industry plants will become commonplace. In the course of conversion Kazan's "Terminal" production association has started producing equipment which is on a par with top world standards.

Chinese partners are particularly interested in graph plotters and printers made in Kazan which produce information in Tatar and Russian, and also Chinese.

However, conversion has involved costs. During the most difficult period quite a few top specialists left the enterprise. They were attracted by higher pay offered by cooperatives. That's the market. Despite everything, Mansur Raimov, the association's general director, is still hoping to win these people back. And this is how:

[M.A. Raimov, "Terminal" general director, identified by caption] One of the ways of doing this is through cooperation with specialists from foreign companies. I have another meeting after lunch with representatives of a German company. Again, we will be talking about the organization of joint production—we are not talking about joint ventures yet—the production of goods for which there is a demand, but on one condition. I want to propose to them returning to payment in hard currency, paying our workers in hard currency, be it in Deutschmarks or yuans, in order to get top specialists back to the plant in this way, creating economic competition for the cooperatives.

Military Industry Workers May Be Sacked in St. Petersburg

OW1610004791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1915 GMT 15 Oct 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to experts from the Labor and Employment Committee of St. Petersburg, some 500,000 workers may be sacked from the city's military factories within the next year.

IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent reports from St. Petersburg that a number of research institutes in the city have developed a set of basic measures to be taken to eliminate or reduce the negative social consequences of the conversion of military factories to civilian production. The measures, which will soon be discussed at the Mayor's Office in St. Petersburg, above all include the retraining of personnel for work in the food and textile industries, and in the service sector.

The retraining program is to be financed from the city budget and the Employment Assistance Fund. The expenditures to be made during the coming fiscal year are estimated at 30 million rubles.

Central Food Directorate Chief Interviewed

91SV0080A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General N. Kozlov, chief, Central Food Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin: "How to Feed the Army and Navy?"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] One of the most difficult problems the country faces today is that of food. What is being done to resolve it in the Armed Forces? How are enlisted personnel, NCOs, and officers being issued rations so that they are adequately fed?

The above is the subject of discussion in our interview with Lieutenant General N. Kozlov, who is the chief of the Central Food Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Altunin] Nikolay Borisovich, all of us are aware of the troublesome events our country is experiencing, and this includes the Army and Navy. Nonetheless, we cannot escape from an eternal truth: Soldiers must be fed.

[Kozlov] Every day, three times a day. And adequately, at that.

[Altunin] In this connection, we hear with increasing frequency that hunger may descend on the country. Is that true?

[Kozlov] It is difficult to predict that with any degree of accuracy, since our country is beset by a very complex socio-economic situation. I do not think that we will see hunger. The harvest is indeed poor in some areas. However, if we gather that which we have and effect proper distribution, we will overcome the difficulties, providing oblasts and krays help each other out and we employ foreign grain purchase (which is in progress). Nonetheless, this is no time for any of us, including the military, to let up in our efforts.

[Altunin] What do you mean by that?

[Kozlov] The grain harvest is now nearing completion. Servicemen are again doing their part, as they have in past years. Dozens of motor transport battalions are laboring in the country's fields. This year, as we all know, this is not a simple matter of patronage assistance, but rather of contract arrangement, with payment for the work in food items and money.

[Altunin] How has that come about?

[Kozlov] It is no secret that the disruption in economic ties has caused a severe breakdown in deliveries of foodstuffs to the Army and Navy. Barter predominates, with some suppliers giving an ultimatum: We will unload the foodstuffs, if you give us machinery, construction

materials, etc. Prohibitions imposed on hauling of foodstuffs over the boundaries of localities are having a telling effect. As a result, we must adapt to the situation.

The Central Directorate practices an active food ration policy. We have sent out representatives to all areas to arrange for year-end food deliveries, including the matter of amounts required in 1992. For the present, problem No 1 is laying in of potatoes and vegetables. We intend to assist kolkhozes and sovkhozes in this regard by assigning 92,000 servicemen and 11,000 vehicles. We have prepared a material base to store the foodstuffs.

We are especially troubled by food deliveries to military posts located in the Far North. There is much mismanagement, a lack of special packaging, and insufficient wrapping materials to make up complete meals for personnel on duty in a harmful environment.

This year, following the Armed Forces reductions, the government has already reduced funding for many types of food items by 9 to 10 percent as compared with last year. For example, sugar deliveries have been cut by 9 percent; meat, by 10 percent; groats, by 12 percent; flour, by 36 percent. The Armed Forces consume an average of less than 2 percent of the total for the country.

[Altunin] A decision was made to improve the soldier's food rations. To what degree have the troops benefited?

[Kozlov] Improvement of the food rations, especially at such a difficult time for the country, is a definite indication of the concern the people exhibit for their defenders. What specifically was done? First, we standardized the rations by increasing the included amounts of biologically valuable foods, i.e., meat, fish, and eggs. Second, we added to the rations something that was previously missing: milk, fruit juices, and multiple vitamins.

We in improving the makeup of the food rations made no major changes in caloric content. The latter even now amounts to 4,056 kilocalories; taking into account four eggs added per week, the total is 4,099 kilocalories. Nonetheless, the energy value of the rations has risen substantially. Thus, in the previous rations, the greater part (up to 70 percent) consisted of grains and groats, while in the new rations the latter amount to a mere 55 percent. Protein content is now 109 grams; fat, 108 grams; carbohydrate, 639 grams. The military ration in its caloric content is in the highest category available, belonging to the fourth energy requirement group.

Now about the rations getting down to the troops. Does the soldier get what he is supposed to? Alas! there are cases where he may not. There are outrages committed, something that should be combatted with all the legal means at our disposal. I would like to mention one of them, a very simple device: weighing scales. They, along with placards listing every gram of the ration, should be posted in the most prominent location of each mess hall. We have instituted self-service lines in mess halls, with meals pre-assembled. Anyone is free to check on this for himself.

[Altunin] Nikolay Borisovich, a USSR Ministry of Defense Collegium was called two years ago to discuss food rations. What changes has that brought about?

[Kozlov] Discussion of the problem at the collegium served to stimulate development of the material base for food supply. The main effort here is industrialization. In operation on military posts located in the Carpathian, Kiev, Volga-Ural military districts are shops involved with primary processing of potatoes and vegetables and preparation of semi-processed meat and fish products; they also supply all post mess halls. This affords tremendous advantages: smaller work details for primary processing of potatoes and vegetables in each mess hall; waste abatement; less time required to prepare food; improved food quality. In addition, this results in a substantial increase in cleanliness in mess hall food preparation areas.

I could add the following: Elimination of the "pot" method of serving the tables and the introduction of self-service lines, with issue of complete meals, have done much to expose the men to aesthetic table manners and render food dispensing more modern, but the principal advantage lies in improvement of food quality.

[Altunin] What else is new at the feeding level? Is there variety?

[Kozlov] We have undertaken two efforts in organizing the feeding level. First, we have employed new standard designs in building modern mess halls for troops, while refurbishing existing ones by installing new technological and refrigeration equipment that makes it possible to prepare and subject semi-processed foods to heat processing in a short period of time and prepare a variety of dishes, including fancy ones. Second, we have expanded the variety of dishes by introducing non-traditional, dairy, and ethnic selections, with improved taste qualities.

We attach a high degree of importance to post mess conferences, at which a wide variety of cold cuts, first course and second course dishes are displayed. They attract the participation—in addition to cooks—of a wide circle of rear services personnel and supervisors, up to district commanders.

Now for variety. It is encouraged. For example, in the Kiev Military District, where Colonel A. Tebenkov is the food service chief, troop mess halls feeding up to 200 men employ the meals-by-order system, thus making it possible to prepare okroshko, beef steaks, shashlyk, etc. This method of feeding the men is new, and it is being adopted in military districts and fleets.

[Altunin] The problem of feeding of commissioned personnel has surfaced in all its vigor. We receive letters pointing out that officers sometimes do not eat as well as enlisted personnel, and that officers are unable to purchase groceries. What is being done about that?

[Kozlov] This is indeed problematic. Something has been done, however. Thus, as of 1 January 1991, in effect

is cost-free issue of food rations to officer personnel on duty in areas judged to be in the same category as the Far North (Komi ASSR, Arkhangelsk, Tyumen, and Tomsk oblasts). I also know that the "mess" ruble allotment of 20 rubles has been increased by 30 rubles. As of 1 July, a government decision requires that retail food packs be made available throughout the USSR. Due to the difficult situation in Baltic and Transcaucasian republics, as of 1 January, retail food packs issue will be extended to servicemen's dependents.

The Central Food Directorate has drawn up a draft government decree making food rations available to all commissioned personnel, at government expense, starting on 1 January 1992.

[Altunin] You have spoken of market arrangements showing up in the Army food service and of trusting in the state, but relying on yourself. Can you be more specific about that?

[Kozlov] To improve availability of fresh food items to personnel and to military subunits stationed in the Far North, Arctic, and Central Asia, the Army and fleets are operating 87 military sovkhozes, four cost-accountable subsidiary farms, 52 specialized dairy farms, and more than 9,000 other subsidiary farms. Their output makes it possible to supply Armed Forces personnel with meat on the hoof for three months; milk for six months; eggs for three and one-half months; potatoes and vegetables for four months.

I might add that food production by military sovkhozes and subsidiary farms is rising at a very slow rate, but nonetheless it is rising. However, the country's difficult food situation renders that insufficient. That is why an order came down to the troops in the beginning of the year directing them to provide personnel with meat for four and one-half months, potatoes and vegetables for six months, and milk and eggs in the usual ration amounts.

[Altunin] What reserves are being employed to effect that?

[Kozlov] By strengthening and improving the material and technical base of existing production facilities, and by creating new sovkhozes and subsidiary farms.

[Altunin] Now for another question that disturbs many commanders and managers: the labor force used on subsidiary farms. Specifically, it often happens that enlisted personnel work there more or less "on the sneak," in that they are pulled away from combat training.

[Kozlov] Yes, everyone is aware of the problem. We are presently looking at organizing military support subunits in regiments, platoons, separate battalions, detachments. They will consist of voluntary enlistees or personnel inducted for alternative service. We are certain that they will be effective.

[Altunin] Nikolay Borisovich, what will troop provisioning be like in the future? Will it be centralized on the state or by direct arrangement, bearing in mind that the Armed Forces must be mobile and autonomous?

[Kozlov] I will give my personal opinion: centralized, only. Provisioning for the Army should be included in a state order, with food production and delivery encouraged as much as possible, by means of credits at low interest, a low rate of tax on profits, a high order of raw material delivery, etc.

The Armed Forces are carrying out their mission for the benefit of society, and the state is obligated to exhibit as much concern for them as possible. To my mind, only in this manner will the country's defensive capability and troop combat readiness be maintained at a suitable level.

Discussion Of Future Of Military Procurator's Office

92UM0012A Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Oct 91 p 3

[Interview with A.P. Korotkov, deputy chief of the Main Military Procuracy Investigation Directorate, and Yu.N. Zhdanov, instructor of the legal department of the USSR Ministry of Defense Military Institute and candidate of legal sciences, by unidentified TRUD correspondent; place and date not given: "Themis Awaits a Decision"]

[Text] On the morning of August 20, Anatoliy Korotkov, deputy chief of the Main Military Procuracy Investigation Directorate, held a conference of the staff at which it was unanimously decided to ignore the directives of the State Committee for the State of Emergency and to order the chiefs of district and fleet military procuracy investigation departments to be guided solely by USSR and republic laws in effect. This was at a time when the Main Military Procuracy, as we know, conveyed an order from acting USSR Procurator General A. Vasilyev to support the State Emergency Committee and on August 19 sent corresponding orders to the military procurators.

Today Anatoliy Pavlovich Korotkov and Candidate of Legal Sciences Yuriy Nikolayevich Zhdanov, an instructor of the legal department of the USSR Ministry of Defense Military Institute, are the newspaper's guests. They return to the topic raised in our commentator's article entitled "Is Themis Removing Her Shoulder Boards?" concerning the military procuracy's future.

[TRUD] Anatoliy Pavlovich, isn't there a contradiction in that people called upon to enforce the law in the Army are themselves committing a dual failure to obey orders—from the procuracy and from the defense minister—and, moreover, are calling on their associates to do likewise?

[Korotkov] We are against anarchy in general, much less in the Army. Orders are orders, and you have to execute them or resign if you do not agree. But it is precisely because military jurists must safeguard the law that we

had no hesitation during those days. The unconstitutional pretensions and actions of the coup plotters were obvious to us as professionals. And it was the professionals in us who prevailed over the soldiers in us, although, had the coup had a different outcome, the State Emergency Committee would not have been long in taking repressive measures. I must say that this is not the only situation in which military jurists have found themselves responsible to two authorities. Let us start with the fact that we, while charged with monitoring the activities of ministry officials, were until recently on the party register of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the defense minister conferred military ranks on us and set our salaries.

[TRUD] So it's something like this: "Comrade Marshal: Allow me to report that we are forced to arrest you."

[Korotkov] Things have not reach the point of marshals yet, I admit, but we do try to work without regard for office and rank. In recent years, investigators from the Main Military Procuracy have investigated a number of major criminal cases that culminated in legal sentences against high-ranking officials in the Army as well as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Committee. General V. Kalinin, former chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Economic Department, was sentenced to 12 years for theft on an especially large scale. Rear Admiral V. Karavashkin also got 12 years under the same article. Lieutenant General Bondarchuk was sentenced to seven years' deprivation of freedom for murder. In the spring of this year, Captain of Justice S. Bedin, senior assistant to the Moscow garrison military procurator, completed an investigation of a criminal case against State Security Committee officer V. Sharovarov, who had been charged with a traffic violation that resulted in several deaths. Despite the fact that Sharovarov never admitted guilt, a military tribunal believed that guilt had been proven and sentenced him to six years' deprivation of freedom. Among high-ranking military officers who fail to see the line between what belongs to them and what belongs to others or between good and evil, the existence per se of the institution of military jurists elicits a very definite reaction.

[TRUD] Isn't that what accounts for recent calls that the institution of military jurists be abolished? In particular, a number of USSR people's deputies recently made such a demand.

[Zhdanov] That is partly true, no doubt, but the question is a broader one. Like the Army as a whole, military justice needs reform. Above all, military procuracies and tribunals must be made completely independent of the Defense Ministry. They must be subordinated directly to the USSR president and the national Supreme Soviet's Legislation and Law and Order Committee, which will appoint officials of military-legal agencies. Military justice has always fought for its independence and subordination solely to the law. Two years ago, we managed to bring about an end to the practice of concurrence, under

which a commander had the power to exempt a subordinate from criminal liability for a military crime. Incidentally, in doing this we were ahead of the armies of the United States and Great Britain, where a commander decides to convene a court and who will sit on it and confirms the court's sentence. In addition, it is necessary to separate the procurator's oversight from preliminary investigation.

[TRUD] How do you regard the new defense minister's recent statement on the Armed Forces' possible transfer to the oversight of civilian procurators?

[Korotkov] As of today, military procuracies are staffed by nearly 3,200 men. Only 2,000 staff members of these agencies are engaged in monitoring legality in the activities of 10 million people serving in the Armed Forces and other military formations. Staff members of military procuracies alone investigate nearly 26,000 criminal cases each year. All these people are well trained professionally and know the unique features of Army life, the structure of the Armed Forces, State Security Committee, and Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the normative acts regulating their activities.

It is obvious that allowing the Armed Forces, State Security Committee, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other military formations to exist without procurator's oversight is a utopia that would nullify the already weak legal foundations of our state. It would be easy to destroy this structure, but what do we build in its place? If, as you say, we were to transfer all our work to territorial law enforcement agencies, the situation would not improve but, on the contrary, would worsen. Those agencies are already unable to cope with their work loads. It takes a long time for investigators, procurators, judges, and legal consultants from the civilian justice system to master military law and military and other specialized disciplines. Without this knowledge, they cannot appreciate the unique features of military-service relations and carry out their duties. These disciplines are studied only in the legal department of the Military Institute, a unique institution of military justice and the only one in our state.

In addition, there is the problem of providing manpower for law enforcement agencies at remote sites and garrisons (Olga Bay, the Kurils, and others).

Another aspect of the question is this: If united Armed Forces are retained in our country, we cannot charge republic procurators and court chairman with administering justice in the Army and Navy for the reason that each one of them would proceed from local interests in doing so. Consequently, we need a strictly centralized system all the same.

[Zhdanov] It is clear that we must also reform the system of training military jurists. Unfortunately, in all our higher legal institutions, and especially department-operated ones, the dominant discipline is criminal education, which reflects a punitive-administrative approach. By eliminating party disciplines, which used to eat up a massive amount of academic time, we must increase instruction in general theoretical and international-legal disciplines. This will make it possible, beginning with the first year of legal study, to educate and train legal specialists on the basis of universal democratic and universal human values.

Instead of closing our department, as some demand, we must step up the training within the Military Institute's walls of legal instructors for military academies, institutes, and schools that would teach legal disciplines to the entire officer corps. It is essential that military justice agencies, and especially military tribunals, be transformed into institutions of positive jurisdiction and not only punish criminals but also protect the interests of servicemen against arbitrary actions by commanders. It would be good if every regiment had a legal consultant. Today we are forced to admit that the great majority of servicemen find themselves in a legal vacuum, as it were.

Legal nihilism on the part of top military leaders has led to a situation in which the USSR General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate does not have a single military jurist on its staff. Yet that directorate's responsibilities include, for example, the entire negotiating process with respect to arms reduction and limitation and confidence-building and security measures. Nor are there any international-law military specialists in the Soviet Army and Navy External Relations Directorate.

All these examples, as well as the 270-year experience of training military jurists in Russia, are persuasive proof of the urgent need to reestablish a military legal academy.

Military justice is an offshoot of the objective processes involved in the Armed Forces' development. It performs two functions: It ensures the required level of legality and law and order among the troops, and it protects the interests of servicemen and members of their families. Whether or not there will be a military justice in shoulder boards is not the fundamental question. The important thing is that there be special agencies and specially trained personnel to create real (material, organizational, and legal) guarantees of independence and to provide the needed personnel and research support for this work.

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