


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PLA Cited on Chemical Weapons Cuts Verification

*HK0303094392 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE
in Chinese 0845 GMT 2 Mar 92*

[By correspondent Jing Houyin (2529 0683 1377)]

[Text] Beijing, 2 Mar (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—The Chinese People's Liberation Army [PLA] Antichemical Corps Department today announced at a news conference: At the third round of comparative tests of chemical weapons cuts in the international laboratory ("International Joint Test" in brief), China's verification rate was the highest, precision rate was the best, analysis method was the most perfect, and result was the finest. China ranked first again after the second round of the international joint test. The results of the two rounds indicated that China's technology for inspecting and verifying chemical weapons cuts has already joined the world's advanced list.

After the signing of the international treaty on chemical weapons cuts, verification of chemical weapons cuts is an important means to supervise the situation of the implementation of the treaty. In order to have effective inspection and verification, it is necessary to have a standard inspection and verification procedure and method, and to choose some countries with corresponding ability to establish an international laboratory for inspection and verification of chemical weapons cuts. In order to express China's positive position toward the talks on the treaty banning the use of chemical weapons, the Chinese Army's Antichemical Command and Engineering Institute accepted an invitation and took part in the second and third rounds of the international joint test on behalf of the country.

The second round of the international joint test took a mock inspection of a chemical factory in a certain country as the background; it took samples of active carbon from the production line's raw materials cans, reaction cans, pipes, waste water (gas), and the protective masks used by workers. By independent effort, the participant countries have to complete an analysis report on the result of the test in one month from the time they received the samples. Knowing nothing about the background of the samples, the Antichemical Command and Engineering Institute organized teaching staff and scientific research personnel to work hard closely day and night, smoothly fulfilling the duty. In March 1991, at the international meeting of the experts on the joint test, a UN official working for chemical weapons cuts announced that among the 15 countries taking part in the test, including China, the United States, France, Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Australia, and India, China's precision rate in the test was high, ranking first.

In August 1991, the Chinese Antichemical Command and Engineering Institute was again entrusted with the mission of participating in the third round of the international joint

test. This time, it was a mock inspection of a military installation in a certain country, involving three kinds of sample: Rubber, concrete, and paint. Compared with the second round of tests, the content of chemical compound was even less and the difficulty was greater. But China again scored a result even better than the second round; its total mark ranked first among other countries.

SDI ERIS Ground-Based Interceptor Fails Test

*OW1703052092 Beijing XINHUA in English
0510 GMT 17 Mar 92*

[Text] Washington, March 16 (XINHUA)—A ground-based missile failed to intercept a mock warhead in space in a test of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) systems, it was reported today.

The interceptor project is central to the Pentagon's plans to deploy 100 ground-based interceptors near Grand Forks, North Dakota, as early as 1996, as the first phase of the anti-missile "Star Wars" program, according to the ASSOCIATED PRESS.

The testing interceptor, known as exoatmospheric re-entry vehicle interceptor system, or ERIS, was launched last Friday from the Kwajalein Atoll in the South Pacific to intercept a mock warhead carried by a Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

But the ERIS "kill vehicle," designed to destroy enemy warheads by smashing into them at high speed, did not hit the target, the AP quoted Pentagon officials as saying.

This has been the second ERIS flight test since the first one conducted successfully on January 28, 1991. The second test was initially scheduled for last May but scratched at the last minute due to technical problems.

Vice Foreign Minister Addresses Asia-Pacific Disarmament Conference

*OW2303040892 Beijing XINHUA in English
0345 GMT 23 Mar 92*

[Text] Beijing, March 23 (XINHUA)—A conference of security and disarmament research institutes in Asia and the Pacific opened here this morning with some 40 experts and diplomats of over 20 countries attending.

The conference, which will last three days, was initiated and sponsored by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament and the UN Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and was presided over by UNIDIR Director J. Dhanapala.

Addressing the opening ceremony, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu said the present-day world is at a historical period of major changes, adding that the factors for world turbulence have increased while the Asia-Pacific region is enjoying relative stability.

Generally speaking, Liu went on, arms reduction and control have just started in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large, and the security situation remains grave in this region.

He noted that promoting the regional disarmament and security is a necessity for maintaining peace and development in the region.

Liu stated that China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, persists in developing friendly relations with all neighboring countries and has made unremitting efforts to ensure peace, stability and disarmament in the region and the world as a whole.

China serves as an unswerving force in maintaining world peace, he stressed.

NORTH KOREA

Withdrawal of 'Concealed' Nuclear Weapons Urged

SK1303055392 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0445 GMT 13 Mar 92

["United States Must Not Kick Up 'Nuclear Threat' Row"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 13 (KCNA)—The United States must not raise outcries over the "threat of nuclear development" by the DPRK but withdraw its nuclear weapons concealed in South Korea without delay and do things helpful to the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, says NODONG SINMUN in a commentary today.

The news analyst says:

The U.S. military circles are now resorting to military threats to us, crying that the DPRK would make "nuclear explosion device" within a few years and its "nuclear development program" is a "threat" to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. This is a nonsensical racket.

As the world recognizes, we do not need nuclear weapons and have neither will nor capacity to make them. We declared this more than once.

Nevertheless, the U.S. brasshats continue raising a dust over our "nuclear development program," a total fiction. No one can regard this as an act of those with sound thinking power.

Their allegation that we are stepping up a "nuclear development program" is a groundless charge and a vicious challenge to us. By misleading public opinion by all means to believe that we continue developing nuclear weapons, the U.S. military circles seek to incite distrust and hostile feelings against us among the people and thus impair the peaceloving image and international prestige of our Republic and isolate it. And they intend to maintain confrontation by throwing a wet blanket over North-South dialogue and spoiling the new atmosphere of reconciliation which is being created on the Korean peninsula. By inventing another fiction of the threat of "nuclear development", they seek to use it as a pretext to keep the U.S. forces in South Korea and ignite another war against the North by creating tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The U.S. persistent resort to the policy of confrontation of strength will not be good for world peace and for the United States itself.

U.S. 'Secret' Nuclear Depot Denounced

SK1303110092 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0958 GMT 13 Mar 92

["True Color of Nuclear War Servant Cannot Be Veiled"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 13 (KCNA)—After former honorary president of the Hyundai Business Group Chong Chu-yong stated that he had undertaken the construction of a secret nuclear arsenal, it has become needless to argue as to the fact that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities have brought large quantities of nuclear weapons into South Korea and are keeping them in secret arsenals, says NODONG SINMUN.

In a by-lined article titled "True Color of Nuclear War Servant Cannot Be Veiled" the paper says the recently revealed secret is no more than the tip of the iceberg.

It further says:

The fact that U.S. nuclear bases and nuclear arsenals had been built in secrecy in different parts of South Korea and many nuclear weapons stockpiled there had been exposed through various channels.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities did not hesitate in bringing into South Korea neutron bombs rejected worldwide as "devilish bombs". A unit in charge of the control of nuclear weapons is based in Kwangju, South Korea, and many special nuclear arsenals were built in Ulsan, Osan, Kunsan, Kongju and other areas. Nuclear weapons have been deployed densely in extensive areas from Munsan and Tongduchon, Kyonggi Province, adjacent to the Military Demarcation Line area to Seoul and Taejon and even to Mosulpo on Cheju Island to form a large network of nuclear bases and turn the whole land of South Korea into a "nuclear jungle" packed with nuclear weapons.

Citing materials showing that though many nuclear weapons have been introduced and deployed in South Korea and underground nuclear arsenals built there in secrecy, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities have tried to cover them up, the paper notes:

It is shameful of the South Korean chief executive to declare the "absence of nuclear weapons in South Korea", with U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiled in the secret arsenals. It was a trick to quiet voices of people at home and abroad for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and fool people into believing that they are interested in the denuclearization of the peninsula. It was also motivated by a sinister intention to launch an anti-DPRK campaign under the pretext of the fictitious "nuclear threat from the North".

At the North-South contact the South Korean authorities have insisted on "trial inspection" of some areas in a bid to exclude the U.S. nuclear bases and nuclear weapons

from inspection, afraid that the U.S. nuclear weapons hidden in South Korea should be unveiled.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities are now urging us to accept a "nuclear inspection" because we are "developing nuclear weapons", while keeping nuclear weapons in their secret arsenals. This is a shameless act reminding us of a thief crying "stop thief!"

The denuclearization declaration adopted and published by the North and the South with a view to removing one of the most dangerous hotbeds of nuclear war in the world must never be reduced to nil.

The South Korean authorities must no longer follow the U.S. imperialists' policy of nuclear war but take the stand of honestly implementing the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the North-South agreement.

Delegates to Joint Nuclear Control Committee Meet

Seventh Session Held

*SK1403154592 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1532 GMT 14 Mar 92*

[Text] Pyongyang March 14 (KCNA)—The seventh contact between delegates of both sides was held in camera today in the South side's portion of Panmunjom to consult the formation and operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee.

Delegate of our side Choe U-chin gave a news briefing on the contact today.

According to him, the readjustment and arrangement of the text of a draft agreement on the formation and operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee was completed at the contact.

Thus the North and the South have agreed on forming the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee through seven rounds of contacts from February 19 to March 14, 1992.

The agreement initialled today will take effect from the day when the premiers of the two sides sign and exchange its texts.

Specified in detail in the six-article agreement are matters of the formation, function and operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee and its effectuation, amendment and supplement.

The delegates of both sides agreed on and made public "joint communique on the contact between delegates of the North and the South to discuss the formation and operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee".

Delegate Reports on Contact

*SK1403132692 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1200 GMT
14 Mar 92*

[Text] The seventh contact between the two sides' delegates was held today on the South side's area of Panmunjom to discuss the formation and operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee. The contact was held behind closed doors.

After the contact, Choe U-chin, our side's delegate, gave a news conference about the contact.

He said: At today's contact the two sides completely finished drafting the agreement on the formation and operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee. In doing so, the North and South agreed to form the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee after seven rounds of delegates' contacts held between 19 February and 14 March 1992.

At today's contact, the two sides discussed a deadline for adopting clauses on nuclear inspection, an issue on which they have had differences of opinion.

Our side said: As stipulated in the articles in the joint denuclearization declaration signed and effectuated by the two sides' premiers, the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee should be formed, and its first meeting should be held by 18 March. Therefore, the joint committee should first be inaugurated, and the pending issues should be discussed there.

Taking into consideration the South side's demand, our side presented a new compromise proposal recommending that the joint committee can adopt in two months documents needed for the verification of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, including nuclear weapons and nuclear bases.

As a result, the two sides decided to handle this proposal by specifying the content of our side's new proposal in the joint communique. Thus, the contact completely finished drafting the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee, and the two sides' delegates initialed the agreement.

The agreement that was initialed today will become effective when the two sides' premiers exchange the signed copies.

The six-article Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee specifies in detail the formation and operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee and its functions, how to effectuate the agreement, and how to amend the agreement.

Also, the two sides' delegates agreed on and released a joint communique on the North-South delegates' contact which discussed the formation and operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee.

Communique Issued

SK1403144592 *Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1210 GMT 14 Mar 92*

[Joint communique on the North-South delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee released on 14 March in Panmunjom—read by announcer]

[Text] According to the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the North-South delegates' contact to discuss the formation and operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee was held on seven occasions between 19 February and 14 March 1992.

After sincerely discussing and negotiating the draft Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee, the two sides' delegates finished drafting the agreement and initialed it.

The two sides agreed on the following:

1. The North and South shall exchange on two occasions—17 and 19 March 1992—in Panmunjom the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee signed by the two sides' premiers.
2. The North and South shall inform each other of the lists of North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee members on 18 March 1992.
3. The first meeting of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee shall be held on 19 March 1992 at Tongilgak in the North side's area of Panmunjom.
4. The North and South shall jointly make efforts to adopt documents for the verification of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula within about two months after the first meeting of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee. The North and South agreed to start inspection within 20 days after the adoption of the documents.

14 March 1992, Panmunjom.

Nuclear Control Committee Agreement

SK1403135192 *Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1206 GMT 14 Mar 92*

[Report on the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee initialed at the delegates' contact in Panmunjom on 14 March—read by announcer]

[Text] The Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee to be signed by the premiers of the North and South on 18 March is:

The North and South agreed to form and operate the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as follows:

1. The Joint Nuclear Control Committee shall be formed as follows:

1) The Joint Nuclear Control Committee shall be composed of seven members, including one chairman and one vice chairman from each side, and one or two members, to include active-duty soldiers. The chairmen will be vice-minister level officials.

2) When they replace members of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee, each side shall notify the other in advance.

3) The Joint Nuclear Control Committee shall have seven suite members, and this number can be readjusted if necessary as agreed upon by the two sides.

2. The Joint Nuclear Control Committee shall discuss and handle the following:

1) The adoption and handling of auxiliary documents on how to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and other related issues.

2) The exchange of information necessary for verifying the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, including information on nuclear facilities, nuclear material, and nuclear weapons and nuclear bases that each side insists are suspicious.

3) The formation and operation of inspection teams for verifying the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

4) The selection of facilities for inspection when verifying the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, including nuclear facilities, nuclear material, and nuclear weapons and nuclear bases that each side insists are suspicious; inspection procedures; and inspection methods.

5) Issues concerning equipment to be used in nuclear inspection.

6) Issues concerning rectifications as a result of nuclear inspection.

7) Issues concerning the implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the resolution of disputes in inspection activities.

3. The Joint Nuclear Control Committee shall be operated as follows:

1) Joint Nuclear Control Committee meetings shall take place every two months in principle and can take place at any time as the two sides agree.

2) Joint Nuclear Control Committee meetings shall take place alternately in Tongilgak on the North side's area and in the House of Peace on the South side's area of Panmunjom in principle and can take place as the two sides agree.

3) Joint Nuclear Control Committee meetings shall be jointly presided over by the two sides' chairmen. They shall take place behind closed doors in principle.

4) Issues concerning the guarantee of personal safety for people who visit each other's area to attend Joint Nuclear Control Committee meetings, providing them with conveniences and writing down details of meetings, and other procedural matters shall be handled according to usage.

5) Other matters necessary for the operation of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee shall be discussed and decided by the two sides at the Joint Nuclear Control Committee.

4. The agreements on the Joint Nuclear Control Committee shall become effective from the day the two sides' premiers sign those agreements. As the case may be, important documents that the two sides shall agree on shall become effective from the day the two sides' premiers sign them and exchange their copies after completing ratification procedures.

5. This agreement can be amended and supplemented as the two sides agree.

6. This agreement will become effective from the day the two sides sign the documents and exchange their signed copies.

[Dated] 18 March 1992

[Signed] Yon Hyong-muk, premier of the DPRK Administration Council and head of the North side's delegation to the North-south high-level talks;

Chong Won-sik, prime minister of the ROK and head of the South side's delegation to the North-South high-level talks.

Texts of North-South Nuclear Committee Exchanged

*SK1703104892 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1038 GMT 17 Mar 92*

[Text] Pyongyang March 17 (KCNA)—Liaison officers of the North and the South exchanged texts of "Agreement on Formation and Operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee" with signatures of both sides' premiers at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Panmunjom today as agreed by the sides at the contact of delegates held to discuss the issue of the formation and operation of the committee.

Delegates to Talks on Nuclear Committee Listed

*SK1803053492 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0451 GMT 18 Mar 92*

[Text] Pyongyang March 18 (KCNA)—Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Yon Hyong-muk, head of the North side's delegation to the inter-Korean high-level talks, today notified his South side counterpart Chong Won-sik of the list of members of the North side in accordance with the agreement at contact between delegates of both sides to discuss the formation and operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee.

Follows the list.

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 1. Chairman Choe U-chin | roving ambassador of the Foreign Ministry |
| 2. Vice-chairman Pak Kwang-won | major general of the Korean People's Army |
| 3. Member Kim Kyong-chun | director of a department of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry |
| 4. Member Chang Chang-chon | researcher of the Foreign Ministry |
| 5. Member Kim Su-kil | researcher of the Foreign Ministry |
| 6. Member Choe Yong-kwan | senior colonel of the Korean People's Army |
| 7. Member Kim Man-kil | councillor of the Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland |

Paper Says South 'Has No Will' To Denuclearize

*SK2303063592 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0519 GMT 23 Mar 92*

["NODONG SINMUN Denounces South Korean Authorities for Putting Brake on Settlement of Nuclear Problem"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 23 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today denounces the South Korea authorities for having shown insincerity at the first meeting of the North-South nuclear control joint committee for the settlement of the nuclear problem.

Recalling that the South side came to the meeting without a draft agreement for implementing the denuclearization declaration, the analyst points out: The South side contended that there were no nuclear weapons in South

Korea as have been made clear in the "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" and "inspections of the same number should be made and brought forward" "rules of South-North mutual nuclear inspection" and insisted on reaching an agreement on them.

The nuclear control joint committee is by no means an organisation for a mere inspection, but is for correct and sincere implementation of the joint declaration of denuclearization.

Any nuclear inspection should be made not of some chosen object, but of all objects including the U.S. nuclear weapons and bases so that doubts may be

dispelled. The South side however, ignoring such practical work for firmly ensuring denuclearisation, brought forward rules of inspection in name only which excluded inspection of the U.S. nuclear weapons and bases and insisted on unrealistic "inspection of the same number". This was prompted by a petty trick to avoid the inspection of the U.S. nuclear weapons and bases at any cost.

This is a clear proof that the South side has no will to denuclearise the country and remove the root cause of nuclear danger. The South side must discard the foolish intention to do harm to us, fellow countrymen, for its own interests, in conspiracy with outside forces, and take the stand of national independence and show sincerity for the solution of the nuclear problem.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

List of 'Antichemical Agents' Submitted to CD

LD2003164992 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] At a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament [CD] in Geneva, the CSFR submitted a document about its protective antichemical agents. The CSFR wants to be the first state in the world to grant such a list to a future international organization working on a ban on chemical weapons. The list could become the basis for the organization's databank of agents. The antichemical agents in question are those at the disposal of Czechoslovak Army. Juraj Kralik, Czechoslovak representative to the United Nations, lent support to Australia's initiative to finalize a treaty on a ban on chemical weapons as early as this year.

POLAND

Russian, Polish Troop Statistics 'At Variance'

LD1003142292 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Colonel Stefan Golebiowski, press spokesman for the representative of the Polish Government for issues relating to the stay of Soviet forces, announced today that figures on the numbers of personal weapons, material and technical stores of Soviet forces withdrawn from Poland that were provided at the beginning of March by the Soviet side are at variance with information on that subject from the Polish side. The Russian figures contain figures for troops and equipment of the former Soviet Army withdrawn from Poland that are larger than the information of the Polish side.

The representative's office has also not yet received a timetable for the evacuation of these forces from Poland. Colonel Golebiowski said that everything was, however, on the right path. According to the treaty initialled in the autumn of last year, by 15 November this year all combat units of the former Soviet Army are to have left Poland. Colonel-General Viktor Dubynin will continue to be the representative of the Russian government for the stay and withdrawal of these forces from Poland.

CUBA

Ukrainian Unease on Nuclear Arms Transfer Noted

*FL1403000492 Havana Radio Reloj Network
in Spanish 2039 GMT 13 Mar 92*

[Text] The Ukrainian Government removed another stone from the already weakened structure of the CIS, and above all from Russian supremacy, when it announced that the transfer of its tactical nuclear weapons to the largest of the former Soviet republics would be temporarily suspended. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said he feared that the weapons

transfer operations would be done under unsatisfactory security conditions. With this, he expressed his lack of trust in Russian organization and his desire not to yield to Moscow's dictates.

On another topic, the European Community already has a proposal for agricultural prices for the 1992-1993 season, in which they plan to freeze all tariffs, except those in the grain sector which will be reduced by 10 percent.

PRAVDA, the former organ of the CPSU, will temporarily be out of circulation starting on 14 March due to financial difficulties.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

U.S. 'Double Standard' on Arms Reduction Scored

*LD1103230992 Algiers Voice of Palestine in Arabic
1700 GMT 11 Mar 92*

[Station commentary]

[Text] Brothers: Forty-two years ago the former USSR announced that it had discovered the secret of the atomic bomb and that it no longer feared the hydrogen bomb that the United States had developed.

Since that time bombs of mass destruction were no longer the monopoly of any single state. And for decades before the dissolution of the USSR the arsenals of the two superpowers were full of various kinds of nuclear weapons, including strategic and tactical nuclear missiles, in addition to other destructive weapons. But in spite of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war, the disappearance of the danger of East-West confrontation, and the emergence of the United States as the world's superpower, the arsenals of nuclear and traditional weapons in the United States and other great powers have remained unchanged, and the plans for developing weapons of mass destruction have continued despite huge international changes.

The news about the North Korean ship said to be carrying advanced Scud missiles to Iran and Syria, and the United States' intention to intercept it, call to mind the reality about international arms, on the one hand, and the nature of the standards which the United States adopts—which are the standards of the new world order—toward the problems of arms in general and toward the Middle East in particular.

If arsenals of nuclear weapons were an element of deterrence and balance in the cold war era, and if the massing of traditional weapons of destruction by NATO and the erstwhile Warsaw Pact was meant to prepare for the danger of war between the two former camps, then

what justification can the new world order give for keeping all these weapons of mass destruction and annihilation? After all, senior military experts and strategists admit that the dangers of such wars breaking out—and for which the superpowers have prepared themselves—no longer exist, and the new world order holds to the slogan of settling disputes by peaceful means, by giving diplomacy a greater role, and through the efforts of international organizations, particularly the United Nations, to settle these disputes on the basis of the principles of international law.

This is on the international level. With regard to the Middle East, if security and stability are required in this part of the world, and if the United States thinks that such security and stability require not only treating the symptoms of conflict in the region—primarily the arms race—but also treating the causes of these disputes on the basis of international legitimacy—if the United States is aware of all this—would the interception of the aforementioned ship really save the Middle East from the dangers of a new military confrontation and lead to the resolution of problems of security and stability? And if the aim is to prevent weapons of destruction from reaching the region in order to reduce tension, would this aim be achieved by confining efforts in this respect to traditional weapons, or confining it to one, rather than all, parties in the region, especially because nuclear weapons, which Israel is widely believed to have developed, are more dangerous and more destructive?

We believe that the criteria used in the field of disarmament in the Middle East are the same double standard criteria. And because solving the region's problems and disarming the region on the basis of international legitimacy are aims welcomed by all Arab parties, what needs to be done is to deal with the issue of disarmament with one standard, not double standards. This should also include all weapons of destruction and annihilation, including nuclear weapons, because all realize that it makes no difference whether the source of weapons was the United States or any other country, and whether the weapons were Scud missiles or advanced U.S. warplanes or new ammunition sent to the region.

RESPONSE TO BUSH, YELTSIN INITIATIVES

'New Defense Logic' Needs Consideration

PM0403164192 Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA*
in Russian No 7, Feb 92 (signed to press 11 Feb 92)
pp 30-31

[Interview with Andrey Kokoshin, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, by Marina Shakina under the rubric "Problems of Security"; place and date not given: "How To Go On Living Without A Main Probable Adversary"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] New York-Moscow—During his visit to the United States, Boris Yeltsin put forward a number of fundamentally new initiatives in the sphere of nuclear arms control. What do they mean in the changed political situation? What role will nuclear arms play?

Andrey Kokoshin, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, answers *NOVOYE VREMYA* correspondent's questions.

[Shakina] President Yeltsin recently put forward the idea of global defense of the world community, proposing to use high technology developed both in Russia and as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. How realistic is this idea?

[Kokoshin] Cooperation between the United States and Russia could be deep and active without any major production expenses. I have in mind primarily cooperation in the sphere of missile attack early warning systems, which both we and the United States possess—they are the world's largest systems with the most powerful specifications. Jointly we could virtually "cover" a sizeable part of the globe—at least the Northern Hemisphere.

An early warning system in itself is not a means of defense; it only enables a launch to be identified, and hence the question of a so-called smart [tonkaya] anti-missile defense, which could defend the United States from accidental, unsanctioned launches and from strikes carried out by a relatively small number of ballistic missiles, is being actively discussed in the United States at the present time. These questions have long been discussed in our country too—we went mainly in different directions in the development of ABM [antiballistic missile] systems, but there was also much in common.

The ABM Treaty played a major role in the difficult times of our confrontation, therefore it must be treated with caution. The Russian president expressed support for observance of the ABM Treaty.

Economically, Russia is in a most difficult position, and therefore it cannot indulge in costly projects. But to maintain what we already have and not to let it collapse, to

improve the missile attack early warning system, including through cooperation—this is a perfectly realistic task.

[Shakina] The five nuclear powers may agree on the reduction or even the destruction of nuclear weapons...Why then the costly "star wars" project with our participation?

[Kokoshin] They may agree on reduction, but as for the elimination of nuclear weapons, there are some doubts here. Suffice it to compare the recent proposals by U.S. President Bush and President Yeltsin. We perceive some quite important discrepancies. We propose to go much further and deeper. The Americans are planning a phase of deeper reductions than are proposed under the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty [START], but at a far higher level, at higher ceilings in comparison with ours. This is no accident. This position reflects their point of view not only on the role of the naval component of the strategic "triad," but also on the role of nuclear weapons as a whole. But I hope that a joint solution will be found in the very near future. The question of complete nuclear disarmament, unfortunately, is still not on yet. Though radical reductions in nuclear weapons are more realistic today than in 1985, when Gorbachev put this question on the agenda. The efforts of the second half of the eighties did not entirely go to waste.

[Shakina] You get the impression that we somehow want to "jump on the bandwagon" of the SDI project. The utilitarian goal of this initiative is clear: To somehow or other occupy nuclear physicists. All the same, why does the United States need us? We have no money, and as for brains...Surely they have enough brains?

[Kokoshin] I would reduce this idea to very specific, practical questions. I think that it is necessary to preserve that which already exists and genuinely functions. Also, it is necessary to work on systems which would make it possible to destroy missiles in the event of an unsanctioned launch. Formerly each side feared to introduce such systems, because the main concern was something different—for the missile to get off the ground, and not for the missile to be reliably guaranteed against launch. Specialists who worked on tactical control systems were always faced with a cruel dilemma: either a reliable security system against malefactors, or a quick-launch mechanism.

[Shakina] What are the prospects for relations between the four nuclear republics of the Commonwealth, in your view?

[Kokoshin] I fear that problems will indeed arise here. I hope that they will not exacerbate to the point where we look at one another across computer display screens. But the republics have nuclear weapons—that is a reality. Unfortunately, this problem was not resolved sufficiently quickly. It would be far better for Ukraine,

Belarus, and Kazakhstan if all nuclear weapons were withdrawn from their territory to Russia by September-December of this year.

The presence of nuclear weapons is attracting the world community's attention to the republics. I do not think that a responsible leader will be found who will claim full-scale possession of nuclear weapons. This would at once put such a leader in an exceptionally difficult position in the world community, and within his own country. But we can already observe a certain marginal exploitation of this factor—as a means of exerting “pressure” in politics.

[Shakina] Perhaps it would make sense to somehow enshrine the accords on nuclear weapons in the republics which were reached back in Minsk? Each republic could say: Stop, we have changed our minds....

[Kokoshin] I believe that the negotiating process between the four republics of the CIS with nuclear weapons on their territories should be permanent, deep, and ramified, and not impetuous, as has been the case up till now. This, I believe was a great mistake by Ukraine and Russia. Emotional statements by politicians often replace serious practical work in our country. Because of our economic difficulties, our public are more distanced from nuclear problems than a large part of the Western public. Therefore the pace in solving the problems of nuclear weapons has somewhat slackened right now.

Now that the bipolar structure of confrontation has collapsed and the USSR has disintegrated, nuclear weapons have started playing a different role. Not everyone has realized this yet. Nuclear weapons are becoming primarily an element of political bargaining, no longer even between adversaries, but actually in relations between friends and allies. We see this not only in the CIS but also in the West. Look at Europe: France's nuclear weapons are beginning to play a political role which recently was not so evident. I am in any case convinced that de Gaulle created nuclear weapons not in order to deter us, but to raise the status of France, to bring it back to the ranks of great powers. Not for nothing did he put forward the concept of omnidirectional defense. French nuclear forces have their own targeting plan, their own system of military command and control, and their own early warning system. In the eyes of France's political elite the French nuclear deterrent is to a significant extent intended to counterbalance the might of several other states, and especially Germany's economic might. And yet France has extremely friendly relations with Germany at the present time.

Why does the U.S. elite not accept the idea of radically reducing nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons are viewed as a status symbol in the United States. Clearly they want to remain the sole superpower. Nuclear weapons have lost their combat importance to a significant degree, but for them it is important to retain a colossal aloofness from all others. We should not foster any illusions; we should remember that there still exists in the world, albeit

transformed, a centralized power [tsentrosilovaya] structure. In this power structure, nuclear weapons continue to play a substantial, albeit reduced and transformed role.

It is being said increasingly often nowadays that, inasmuch as we and the United States are no longer adversaries, nuclear weapons should be retargeted against the South—this is being said both in the West and in our country. Against whom in the South? An era is approaching when the concept of a main probable adversary—an entirely traditional and almost key element—is due to disappear from military doctrine. There is no longer a main probable adversary, and the Armed Forces are only a kind of insurance policy in case of some unexpected eventuality. This decision shapes a whole new defense logic for the development of Armed Forces and industry—a mobilizational logic.

Bush, Yeltsin 'Hasty' Arms Proposals Examined

*PM0403153692 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No. 7, Feb 92 pp 22-23*

[Article Pavel Bayev: “Former Enemies Playing at Nuclear Giveaway”]

[Text] A new act in the political drama called “A Farewell to Arms” was played out in Moscow, Washington and New York last week. A perfectionist disarmament expert might regard this performance as hasty, even feverishly so, as if the “dramatis personae” were in a hurry to cram into it all the postponed and overdue initiatives before the curtain fell.

The USA: Arms Reduction Strategy

By sheer force of habit, our papers described American initiatives as “reply” ones, although they were not taken in direct response to their former enemy's actions. Washington realized, of course, that concrete and businesslike proposals would make it easier for Moscow to make disarmament decisions. On the whole, such considerations, seen as substantial during President Bush's summer visit to Moscow, have by now become “subtle nuances” only “connoisseurs” can appreciate.

Economic limitations and political struggle are now emerging in the forefront of the arms reduction strategy. It would be an exaggeration to say that the US economy is staggering under the burden of the arms race. Nevertheless, the “Reagan spurt” of the early eighties caused serious malfunctions in economic and industrial mechanisms which aggravate the current slump in production. The civilian sector of the economy and the social sphere require massive injections of capital; besides, there are commitments to maintain a new world order and the objective need to help the explosive Commonwealth.

Under the circumstances, a steady reduction in military spending is inevitable, and the Pentagon is painstakingly calculating its parameters and setting its priorities. The Gulf war has set clear-cut limits on the reduction of

expeditionary forces. The two German-based divisions, which covered themselves with glory in the sands of Iraq a year ago, furled their banners in January. The weapon systems regarded as necessary until a short while ago have now become superfluous, releasing more money for civilian use. It is true that the scrapping of the already launched long-term programmes (in particular the B-2 bomber programme) involves extra expenses; but then it permits concentrating efforts on new promising long-term projects.

Having a breathtaking scientific and technological programme is as crucial to President (and Presidential candidate) George Bush today as the "Star Wars" idea was to Ronald Reagan at the end of 1983, and as the Man on the Moon programme was to President John Kennedy slightly over two decades before. Therefore the President has firmly waived the unpopular and Congress-blocked items of military spending and come up with a new space programme which includes orbital stations, a base on the Moon and a flight to Mars.

Russia: The zigzags of atomic diplomacy

For the Commonwealth, a nuclear arms cut is an absolute must for two obvious reasons. On the one hand, the Gaydar government cannot afford to maintain strategic deterrence forces at their present level, let alone modernizing them. On the other, independent republics can be "de-nuclearized" only through the elimination of their nuclear weapons, and not by transferring them to Russia. Practical nuclear arms cuts call for a well thought-out and flexible strategy which is still to be worked out. Cardinal decisions turn out to be, on inspection, mere moves in the fierce political struggle among the leaders of the Commonwealth's quasi-states who try to "sell" whatever decisions they make to the highest bidder in the West.

Yeltsin made the first attempt of this kind during the last-autumn exchange of initiatives between Bush and Gorbachev—"we shall go further than that," he said. That sounded like bluffing from behind the back of the man then in control of the nuclear button.

The traditional comparison between the initiatives of the two sides can only be of statistical interest. In relationships between all but allies, haggling is improper. However, certain incongruities do strike the eye. Whereas George Bush relinquished what was impossible to keep, Boris Yeltsin failed to include in his "ten points" such obligatory nuclear disarmament moves as the elimination of missiles from Ukraine and Kazakhstan. At the same time, many experts wonder why most of our unilateral cuts are made at the expense of the air force (traditionally the weakest element of our strategic triad). Despite preliminary agreements and friendly talks at Camp David, it is still not clear whether Moscow is going to respond to the suggestion that MIRVed missiles be eliminated.

During his visit to America, President Yeltsin preferred on the whole to discuss not concrete statistics, but his

idea of making the SDI - which had been a thorn in Mikhail Gorbachev's flesh - into a multilateral project. Although rather tactless (after all, the other side is expected to foot the bills), this manoeuvre got the American partners somewhat interested - they do not want Russian nuclear missile makers to lose their jobs. The question of whether Russia can exercise reliable control over, and derive any political benefit from, its strategic forces in a new situation remains, however, open.

Denuclearization all the same

Writing in a variety of publications (NEW TIMES included), I have tried to prove for years the usefulness and necessity of a nuclear status for our country. From the standpoint of a "hawkish" expert, Gorbachev's programme for a non-nuclear world was open to criticism, because it: a) was unacceptable to Western realistic politicians; b) failed to take into account the political advantage of nuclear weapons to the Union and to Russia; c) blocked negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. Today I have to take these statements back and to admit that the nuclear potential is becoming a luxury Russia cannot afford.

Even in the absence of nuclear confrontation, these weapons retain their political role and give Russia a high international status and a seat in the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, an intricate nuclear-political game involves unacceptable risks for Russia.

As recently as in January, a conference on the problems of the Moslem republics of the former USSR was held at the Science and Politics Foundation, Germany's leading political research centre in Ebenhausen. Analysts from the Foreign Ministry and the intelligence services, academic experts and Radio Liberty commentators singled out "the Islamic bomb" as a key problem. Grave concern was voiced over a series of almost inevitable crises in which the atomic factor - from contraband in enriched uranium to the as yet hypothetical "Islamic terrorism" may have a most unexpected role to play.

The potential for nuclear differences between Russia and the Ukraine is higher still. Today the Ukrainian leadership having cast all the former ambiguities aside proclaims its commitment to a nuclear-free status and insists on an early evacuation of all nuclear warheads. However, politicians and MPs are ready for confrontation and may play the "nuclear trump card" at the slightest provocation. The absurdity of the idea of a limited nuclear war in Central Russia and Polesye does not stop the Rand Corporation theoreticians from simulating it, and the various turns it may take, in their computer rooms; they have been at it for about six months now.

The unthinkable can be rendered impossible, and atomic weapons withdrawn irrevocably from political games, only by means of a programme called, say, "Denuclearized Russia 2000." In my opinion, such a concrete programme for eliminating these weapons will compel

other republics to stop suspecting us of "great power ambitions" and will put paid to their own potential nuclear ambitions. It will get the army reform off the ground and make it possible to restore, partially at least, political control over the army. The absence of such control is evidenced by the strategic forces command being ignorant of the "ICBM retargeting plans."

As distinct from the Gorbachev project, the new programme should be a unilateral one. We must be prepared for other nuclear powers not following our example and even rejecting the International Agency's idea, while supporting in every way the measures taken to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we can reckon upon getting not only one-time aid, but guarantees of long-term investments in our nuclear economy.

Investments should be made not on the construction of radioactive-waste graveyards, but in the basic nuclear R&D, which would ensure physical destruction of nuclear warheads, the utilization of fissile materials and the recovery of waste matter. The shift of emphasis in nuclear research will detract from the acuteness of the "brain drain" problem now being so noisily and unceremoniously discussed in the West (as if there has been no "brain drain" from the US to Israel, and from France to Iraq).

In the long run, after Russia has emerged from crisis, regained self-confidence and might wish to restore its nuclear status (a prospect which cannot be ruled out), a high scientific and technological potential will enable it to do that. Though it would be better off without such a status. [Begin boxed material]

Yeltsin's package

Unilateral moves

- an end to the production of the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS heavy bombers (of which 15 and 84, respectively, are now operational);

- an end to the production of long-range air- and sea-based cruise missiles (of which 800 and 240, respectively, are now operational);

a 33 percent cut in sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, a 50 percent cut in anti-aircraft missile warheads, a 50 percent cut in aircraft tactical nuclear ammunition.

The following reciprocal moves are suggested:

- an end to the air-based cruise missile development programme;

- the elimination of all the sea-based cruise missiles (of which the CIS now has 240, and the US, 365);

- a stop to missile-submarine combat patrolling;

- a cut in the number of self-homing shell warheads to 2,000-2,500;

- withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from combat units and placing them in a centralized depot;

- abolition of antisatellite weapons systems. [box closes] [Begin new box]

War budget cuts

CIS: in 1990-91 - by 20 percent (including a 30 percent cut in arms purchase spending);

in 1992 - by 10 percent (including 50 percent on arms purchase spending).

USA: in 1992-96 - by 50 billion dollars;

by 1997 - by 30 percent as compared with 1990. [box closes] [Begin new box]

Bush's proposals

Unilateral moves:

- a cut in the B-2 bomber purchase programme to 20 instead of 75;

- a stop in the development of the Midgetman ICBM (200-300 missiles were to be deployed);

- an end to the production of the W-88 warheads for the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (96 missiles with eight warheads each have been deployed on board four ballistic missile-carrying nuclear-powered submarines);

- a stop after 1992 to the purchase of cruise missiles (there will be 640 of them instead of 1,000).

The following reciprocal moves are suggested (provided the CIS eliminates its MIRVed ICBMs - 744 missiles and 5,958 warheads):

- elimination of the Peacekeeper ICBMs (50 missiles and 500 warheads);

- making the Minuteman ICBMs monoblock (elimination of 1,000 warheads);

- a cut in the number of warheads of submarine-launched ballistic missiles by 33 percent (elimination of 1,700 units);

- a conversion of a substantial proportion of strategic bombers into non-nuclear ones. [end boxed material]

Blagovolin Lauds Yeltsin on Missile Retargeting

92WC0039A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No. 5, 2-9 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Sergei Blagovolin: "Russia Changes Its Military Doctrine"]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decision that strategic missiles will no longer be targeted at the U.S., in

my view, demarcates the period of military confrontation and the Cold War. All of us in Russia have developed a strong reaction to the word "historic." However, in this case its use is quite justified. The move opens new venues for Russia's military cooperation with the U.S., its NATO allies and other Western countries, and for its active involvement in the single security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

The Russian President's decision coincided with reports from Washington on drastic reductions of U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals, which go far beyond the Geneva START agreements. Wide opportunities for similar reductions are now open to Russia. Today, we are much closer to a situation where Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons stop being a means of mutual deterrence and threat, and become an element in coordinating and sharing responsibilities—the type of relations that exist between the U.S., on the one hand, and the UK and France, on the other. I believe that this type of relationship will enable us, in conditions of considerably lowered levels of strategic nuclear weapons, jointly to secure the guarantees still necessary in our unstable world.

If anyone needed proof that changes in Russia's military policy were those of principle and irrevocable, it is available now in full. It's also important that the decision was made just days before President Yeltsin's visit to the U.S. and a number of other Western countries. The debate as to whether, in supporting Russia, the West is assisting its potential enemy seems to be closed. By assisting the new Russia, the West assists a partner whose stable development is crucial for a community of civilized states which seeks to achieve common goals.

It would be erroneous not to see the importance of that move for the internal political situation in Russia. This country has made its choice. Those who want to see their country a strong and prosperous nation occupying a worthy place among other countries should support this important move by the Russian President, which finally breaks off with the past, with the psychology and practice of "a besieged camp." A condition has been fulfilled that is essential for promoting reforms in all spheres of life.

Foreign Ministry Aide on Strategic Arms Cuts, Global Defense

MK2802093592 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Feb 92 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Kozin, "Expert from the Russian Foreign Ministry Administration for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament: "Position: From Confrontation to Confidence. Global Shield in Context of New Strategic Doctrine"]

[Text] Russia's new initiatives have elicited a number of questions. The nuclear powers and many nonnuclear countries have quite justifiably shown interest in the possible quantitative correlation of warheads in all three elements of the strategic triad (intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's], submarine-launched ballistic missiles

[SLBM's], and heavy bombers) within the framework of the declared limits: 2,000-2,500 units. They are also interested in the number of strategic delivery vehicles that will carry the proposed range of warheads (Russia's proposals contain 1.8-2.25 times fewer of these than the last U.S. initiatives). Will the CIS and the United States be able to "compress" their strategic offensive arms so drastically, when the limit of 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads [boyezaryady] for each side stipulated by Boris Yeltsin would be lower by a factor of 4-5 than the current level of the sides' strategic offensive warheads and lower by a factor of 2.4-3 than the similar limit set by the first Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty [SSNV-1]?

By way of discussion and without, of course, aspiring to give the final verdict, I would suggest the following approach to seeking answers to these questions.

The CIS, with (best case scenario) or without the United States, could cut back its strategic offensive arms in terms of delivery vehicles and warheads to roughly 600 and 2,000 units respectively. As for the CIS, and consequently Russia, their interests would probably be served by a ceiling of 608 and 2084 respectively, with the following correlation between the three components in the strategic triad [In the following table figures in parentheses represent percentages]

Kind of	Number of	Number of
Strategic Offensive Arms	Delivery Vehicles	Warheads
ICBM's	242 (39.8)	242 (11.6)
SLBM's	292 (48.0)	1768 (84.9)
Heavy Bombers	74 (12.2)	74 (3.5)
Total	608 (100)	2084 (100)

The sides could give up MIRVed ground-launched ICBM's, keeping MIRVed SLBM's, and abandon the use of heavy bombers as nuclear delivery vehicles, which would be counted as one unit each.

Setting these levels and sublevels of the strategic triad for the CIS would mean deep cuts in its strategic nuclear arsenal. In particular, in comparison with the first Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty:

- total number of delivery vehicles by a factor of 2.6;
- total number of warheads by a factor of 2.9;
- ground-launched mobile ICBM warheads by a factor of 6.6;
- heavy bomber ICBM warheads (in the event of a move to single-warhead versions) by a factor of 20.

In response to the latest U.S. presidential proposals the CIS could eliminate all ground-launched MIRVed ICBM's provided that the United States eliminates all ground-launched Peacekeeper (MX) ICBM's, cuts the number of Minuteman ICBM warheads to one each and the number of SLBM warheads by roughly 40 percent (a third in Bush's proposals), and also totally withdraws tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. On a reciprocal basis the CIS and the United States could fully remove

from the arsenal air- and sea-launched nuclear-tipped cruise missiles—first long-range (over 600km), and then all nuclear missiles of this class.

If all this happened, the CIS and the United States would approach the level of British, PRC, and French strategic offensive arms. The level of nuclear risk would drop drastically.

The threat of a nuclear attack or a retaliatory nuclear attack could be removed not only by physically eliminating missile delivery vehicles and nuclear payloads but also in certain other ways: for instance, by taking missile complexes off combat alert, dismantling warheads, and also, probably, by "switching off" [otklyucheniye] electronic guidance systems.

Some specialists reacted negatively to the idea of non-targeting of strategic offensive arms, using the counterattacks [protivotsennostnyy] and counterforce doctrines of the past which made provision for inflicting a nuclear attack on cities as an act in retaliation or a first strike (the first doctrine) and on military installations (the second doctrine).

But times have changed, the political climate has improved, and the number of such targets has been steadily reduced. In particular, according to some estimates, the United States has reduced the register of strategic targets on CIS territory over the last seven years by 40-50 percent. The Soviet Union did not fail to keep up, and the CIS is also reciprocating. What kind of nuclear targeting can there be when the Paris Charter for the new Europe talks about its signatory states entering an era of "mutual respect and cooperation"? How can Russia and the United States keep one another's vitally important centers in their nuclear sights when their presidents said in the Camp David declaration that henceforth relations between the two countries will be based on a desire "not to view one another as potential adversaries" and that the distinguishing feature of these relations "will be friendship and partnership based on mutual trust"?

Progressing from a political decision on reducing the list of targets to the military-technical implementation of this decision is not a matter of a single step or a single day's work. But this form of deescalating the arms race is cheaper and simpler than destroying warheads. Needless to say, verification [kontrol] of these measures may present some difficulty. But it is possible given trust and cooperation between the interested parties.

Analysts have drawn attention to the second new element in Boris Yeltsin's proposals—the idea of creating a "global system of protection for the world community to replace SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]"—and to its consonance with the U.S. concept of "Global Protection Against Limited (Missile) Strikes [GPALS]."

The fundamental GPALS plan comprises two ground- and air-based echelons. The ground-based echelon incorporates two basic components: strategic and tactical. The

strategic component is designed to protect the country's territory against strategic ballistic missile attack, and it is intended that this component should have a certain number of long-range, stationary ABM missiles in strictly determined deployment areas. The tactical component is designed to cover regional groupings of armed forces outside the country's territory against tactical missile attack and should have short-range ABM missiles in its armory. It is planned that the space-based echelons of GPALS will have space-launched ABM missiles.

This system also has military-technical components: a) ground- and space-based sensors to identify and track targets and guide ABM missiles to target; b) a fire control system incorporating reconnaissance, communications, and control points.

U.S. experts think that this system will be capable of intercepting up to 200 missiles "launched accidentally or deliberately." According to Washington's plans 1996 is scheduled as the first date for the deployment of GPALS.

The main purpose of GPALS is to provide early warning of a missile attack that may come from a potentially dangerous region. Another function of GPALS is to destroy missiles. The mobility and flexibility of the ground- and space-based components of the barrier would make it possible to rapidly and broadly regroup counterforces and weapons in the interests of the states wanting to ensure reliable and timely protection against such limited missile strikes. The creation of GPALS will bring about a situation where it will be quite pointless to use ballistic missiles in a limited strike if they will be faced with an impenetrable shield. This system will be able to partially resolve one of the paradoxes of the nuclear age: the striking imbalance between offensive and defensive arms systems with a considerable bias in favor of the former.

In the interests of evening out this distorted "balance" the restrictive ABM Treaty regime could be somewhat eased: For instance, the limit on ABM missiles permitted by that document could be increased to some extent.

The idea of creating a the GPALS system did not immediately win support. "Developments have been accumulated gradually and in various structures," Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, said recently in an interview with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, including within the Russian foreign policy department, long before it amalgamated with the Union department.

Of course, Russian participation in setting up and commissioning GPALS should not be a burden on its ailing economy, and there is Boris Yeltsin's firm promise on this. As in the case of SDI, we would not like to see "space-earth" strike space arms deployed in space; space saturated with antisatellite systems; or a refusal encountered to conclude an international agreement on immunity (inviolability) for civil and noncombat (photographic reconnaissance, communications, etc.) military satellites and orbital stations.

Within the framework of the tactical section of GPALS Russia could offer not only its technology and certain innovations, but also specific output—right away, moreover. For instance, joint use, if needed, of the S-300 anti-aircraft missile complex known in the West as the SA-10, which has demonstrated good results in hitting tactical ballistic missiles. In the opinion of Commonwealth military-technical experts, this system is considerably superior to the Patriot system used during Operation "Desert Storm" in terms of effectiveness, including effectiveness in deployment time (five minutes), mobility (it is mounted on a self-propelled chassis), the ration of missiles to radar-locked targets, the capability to fire at targets approaching from varying angles of attack, warhead yield [moshchnost boyevogo snaryazheniya], and certain other features. The S-300 complex is a defensive weapon, and it would be unwarranted to curtail production or put a stop to further improvement work on it. This does not undermine our conversion.

The Russian president's initiatives have been maturing for a long time and were considerably honed [proshli sryeznuyu obkatku] by military and civilian specialists before reaching his desk. These documents have never been prepared—and never will be—by any president alone. Of course, a constructive debate can and even should be organized on various problems of security and disarmament. But it is hardly advisable to prepare such important statements as the statement of 29 January by means of a "nationwide referendum."

Amendments to the Russian initiatives are both possible and necessary. But only with a view to advancing rather than falling back, into the abyss of confrontation and mistrust.

Strategic Reductions Said To Favor U.S.

PM0303131992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant General (Retired) Doctor of Technical Sciences Professor Ye. Volkov: "Just Who Benefits From Destruction of MIRVed ICBM's?"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] During his recent "State of the Union" address to Congress, the U.S. President put forward a proposal to eliminate all land-based ballistic missiles with multiple warheads held in the CIS. What is the point of this proposal, which has resulted in numerous and often contradictory reactions? The military scientist Ye. Volkov stated his view on this question.

We are talking about missiles called land-based ICBM's with MIRVed warheads. These missiles are a substantive component of U.S. and CIS strategic offensive arsenals. Depending on writers' positions, they may be considered to be a highly important or the most important factor in strategic deterrence, or they may be considered to be quite the opposite—a destabilizing factor.

I will give a brief history of MIRVed ICBM's. Their development [razrabotka] was prompted by a desire to increase the number of warheads on strategic offensive weapons without increasing the number of missiles. The first MIRVed ICBM's appeared in the United States in 1970, when the triple-warhead Minuteman 3 entered service (there are currently 500 Minuteman 3 missiles in the U.S. strategic offensive arsenal). In 1986 the United States also developed [sozdana] the MX ICBM (the Americans call it the Peacekeeper) with 10 warheads, and there are now 50 of these missiles.

In the Soviet Union MIRVed ICBM's only appeared in the latter half of the seventies—that is, more than five years after the United States. In 1991 our strategic offensive arsenal had 744 MIRVed ICBM's of four types (the four-warhead RS-16, the six-warhead RS-18, and the RS-20 and RS-22 with 10 warheads each). All U.S. and Commonwealth [otechestvennyy] ICBM's with multiple re-entry vehicles are MIRVed missiles—that is, after the boost phase the nose section detaches from the airframe, and special motors propel each re-entry vehicle to direct (guide) it to its individual target. There may be a distance of hundreds of kilometers between the targets of one missile's warheads.

The role played by MIRVed ICBM's in the CIS and U.S. strategic arsenal today can be judged from the table. The figures used in it—along with all the other figures used in this article—are taken from the START Treaty and its appendixes, and are typical of mid-1991.

[In the following table the headings denote: A—total warheads in the strategic offensive arsenal; B—on ICBM's; C—on MIRVed ICBM's; D—on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's); E—on heavy bombers]

	A	B	C	D	E
CIS	10,271	6,612	5,958	2,804	855
United States	10,563	2,450	2,000	5,760	2,353

The figures given in the table show that MIRVed ICBM's are far more important for the CIS than they are for the United States. They carry up to 60 percent of all warheads in the CIS strategic offensive arsenal (the figure for the United States being less than 20 percent). It is therefore obvious that a direct trade-off of MIRVed ICBM's between the CIS and the United States is by no means of equal value.

Washington cannot fail to have grasped this. That is why G. Bush stated in his message to Congress that if the CIS eliminates all MIRVed ICBM's the United States would in turn eliminate its MX missiles (500 warheads), remove two warheads from each Minuteman 3 missile (1,000 warheads), cut SLBM warheads by a third (1,920 warheads), and remove nuclear weapons from some heavy bombers.

What would this result in? Above all, we would note that, adding up these figures and comparing the results with the number of warheads on MIRVed ICBM's in the CIS strategic offensive arsenal (around 6,000), we can see for ourselves that the cuts would be roughly identical only if all rather than just some bombers were removed from the U.S. strategic offensive arsenal. Since Washington has no plans to do this, we can conclude that on the simplest criterion understood by everyone—the reduction in the number of warheads—the proposed changes would not be identical, they would clearly benefit the United States.

It should be added to this that the proposed option is based on some CIS MIRVed ICBM's being "traded off" against some U.S. SLBM's and heavy bombers. Yet it is known that qualitatively these types of strategic arms are not equal. In most cases ICBM's are the most powerful and sophisticated type of strategic nuclear weapon. That is why the proposed solution ensures an advantage for the United States.

We would also note that implementation of the U.S. proposal would mean that only a few hundred of the more than 6,500 warheads in the CIS ICBM grouping would be left. This would essentially amount to the destruction of the grouping and a sharp reduction in the combat potential of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which constitute the main defense might of the entire CIS.

And, finally, one other point. Clearly, the United States made the proposal to destroy land-based MIRVed ICBM's on the basis that this type of missile is the most dangerous of all the missiles in the strategic offensive arsenal. But MIRVed missiles are also carried on submarines. Moreover, all U.S. SLBM's have multiple re-entry vehicles. In 1991 there were 672 of these missiles, carrying 5,760 warheads (there were 2,320 warheads on similar missiles in the CIS). The newest U.S. SLBM (the Trident 2) has eight warheads and is not inferior to land-based MIRVed ICBM's in terms of virtually any indicator. It seems that if the question of destroying MIRVed missiles arises, the totality of both sides' missiles in this class (that is, both land-based and submarine-launched) should be examined, rather than taking merely those which make up the foundation of the CIS strategic offensive arsenal.

It follows from this that the proposal to eliminate all land-based MIRVed ballistic missiles in the CIS strategic offensive arsenal would primarily benefit the United States and is not aimed at ensuring the main principle in strategic offensive weapons cuts—the maintenance of equal combat potential for both parties.

Kozyrev: Russian Missiles Not Targeted on Asian States

OW1503045992 Tokyo KYODO in English 0418 GMT 15 Mar 92

[Excerpt] Tokyo, March 15 KYODO—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said that Japan, China, and

other Asian countries are not targeted by Russian nuclear missiles, the major [newspaper] YOMIURI SHIMBUN reported Sunday.

In written answers to questions submitted by the newspaper, Kozyrev said Russian President Boris Yeltsin's pledge, that Russia would stop targeting the United States and Western Europe, also applies to Asian nations.

Kozyrev is scheduled to arrive in Japan on Thursday for a four-day visit, during which he will prepare for Yeltsin's planned visit to Japan in September.

"In the new historical situation, there is no confrontation either in ideology, military, or politics between Russia and the Western countries," he said.

The political circumstances have established the ground for friendly relations between Russia and the Western nations, and for the future establishment of an alliance through security and cooperation with Western nations, Kozyrev said.

Russia wants to occupy a suitable position among advanced Western nations, and since Russia is both a European and an Asian nation, it wants to also play a constructive and responsible political role in the Asia-Pacific region, he said. [passage omitted]

GENERAL

Shortcomings in Nuclear Arms Command, Control System Viewed

LD0203163092 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 4, Jan 92 pp 20-23

[Aleksy Arbatov article: "The Mysteries of the Nuclear Button"]

[Text] "Only I can start a nuclear war," Mikhail Gorbachev said in a French television interview shortly before his resignation. The former President's idea was not to scare but to reassure the world public: just rely on me, he implied, and I won't let you down. Can an important matter like that depend on the personal qualities of this or that leader? Obviously, more reliable safeguards are required. After all, nuclear arms control remains the key factor of global security. Information about the nuclear button in Moscow remains almost nothing. In the USA, which is no less security-minded than we are, this question is a subject of extensive press coverage and public discussion.

A skeleton key to the electronic lock

"The Button" is a journalistic image, of course, and it does not exist physically. The whole system is based on codes, ciphers, computers, various radio and telephone communication channels; the launching as such is done by a simultaneous turn of two keys.

Experts single out two nuclear arms control principles which can be referred to, conventionally, as the negative and the positive one. The negative principle means the use of technical facilities, system and procedures designed to rule out bringing nuclear weapons into action without the government's authorization.

This system was arranged in such a way - both in the USA and in the former USSR, - that neither the personnel of ground-based IBM control stations, nor missile carrying submarine and strategic bomber crews, nor the command posts of strategic units and fighting arms could physically start a nuclear attack unless they received special codes from above. If sent to missile crews via special communication lines, the codes are supposed to "unlatch" electric "locks" on nuclear arms.

The accepted launching procedures call for synchronous actions by many links in the system as a precaution against error, evil intent or mental derangement. Commands issued by any command station will be fulfilled only if acknowledged by all the others. The units which guard and maintain nuclear facilities in depots are accountable to superiors other than those of the missile forces. Unauthorized attempts to launch missiles trigger an alarm signal and can be blocked from above. Regulations demand that if ordered by his immediate superior to launch a missile, an operator should do so only upon the Presidential confirmation of the order.

As to the positive control system, it comprises the ways and means of guaranteeing authorized use of nuclear weapons despite likely obstacles or opposition. These facilities include, above all, multiplexed channels of underground, underwater, ground, atmospheric and space communication channels connecting those in command with the missilemen. At the action level, the destruction of some launch control posts does not prevent the same missiles from being launched from the surviving posts. As a last resort, certain types of missiles can be launched directly by a command from the centre, by-passing local launch control posts.

In times of crisis, launch control posts can be authorized to act on their own if the country's leadership is eliminated by a surprise strike. In that case the very communication blackout may serve as a signal to launch ballistic missiles.

This probably explains what transpired after the August putsch: Gorbachev was not the only one to possess the "attache case" - the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff also had them. If only the three of them could sanction a nuclear strike together (i.e. shared the unlocking code among themselves), this arrangement strikes me as strange. After all, the President stands higher in the hierarchy than the heads of the Defence Ministry. The latter's job is not to confirm or cancel the decisions of the head of state but rather to execute them. The existence of three "attache cases" can be explained by the desire to have other buttons besides the President's.

Communication vessels

As a matter of fact, the control system is not divided into negative and positive ones. It is a single system of control and communications which comprises elements of negative and positive control. What's more, these elements are like communicating vessels: the higher the level in one, the less full the other. This means that the higher the guarantee of striking a retaliatory blow under the least favourable circumstances, the less reliable the insurance against a non-sanctioned launching or against a nuclear strike caused by an error or overreaction to a threat.

Here is an illustration. If elevated to the absolute, positive control would mean a direct connection of early warning satellites and radars and of nuclear blast pickups with missile launching sites. The system could be made fully automatic and launch missiles even upon losing contact with early warning systems and with the central leadership. In that case, retaliation would be fully guaranteed, but the risk of a nuclear war breaking out through a technical fault would be enormous.

The other extreme is to divide negative control among dozen or so officers and to make the unlocking of weapons at the launching site level practically impossible unless all the "attache case" owners sanction it. In that case an unsanctioned nuclear strike or one carried out by mistake would be extremely unlikely. However, if at least one of the leaders gets killed or otherwise unreachable, the retaliation potential will be paralyzed.

It should be pointed out for fairness' sake that even in the past decades of the cold war, both the USA and the USSR emphasized negative control for fear of causing a global holocaust as a result of unsanctioned actions by missilemen or a technical error. There were substantial differences between the two nations' systems, however.

Is there "military-political leadership" in Washington?

Division of authority and the military command's unqualified subordination to the lawfully elected political leadership have also been the very basis of the American system of government. This finds its expression, above all, in the President appointing a civilian Defence Secretary who has an enormous staff under him and in the National Security Council and Congress having control over all military matters.

The U.S. Constitution has established the following sequence of power transfer in the event of the President's death or removal from office: the Vice-President; the Speaker of the House of Representatives; the Senate majority leader; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Defence and so on. The "button" of the strategic forces control system changes hands in the same order.

Billions have been invested in ensuring political control over the use of strategic arms even after a multiple exchange of nuclear strikes. The only function assigned

to the military—from the top level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all the way down to the missile crews—is to executive orders.

In the Soviet Union, the control system mirrored the totalitarian and highly militarized nature of the political regime. Much attention was paid to the negative control over local action stations, and any division of authority or primacy of political leadership, let alone a legalized sequence of power transfer, were out of the question. Even the standard Soviet term, "military-political leadership," having no analogues in Western vocabulary, speaks for itself.

The leadership of the Party exercised control over Army generals through the Glavpur (Military Political Administration) and by personnel manipulations. The Army was counterbalanced, to some extent, by the KGB which, in particular, was responsible for government communications and had certain links of the nuclear forces' command and security system under its control. Outside that, the military were free to decide on the ways and means of waging a war and winning a "victory" in a global nuclear conflict.

If the General Secretary oversleeps...

The USSR's strategic forces, in which stationary ground-based IBMs predominated, constituting up to 70 percent of the total in terms of warheads, were intended for a preventive strike and, in the 1970-1980s, for a so-called counter- or relative-counter strike. That is to say, they were to be launched before the war-heads of U.S. missiles hit our launching sites and launch control posts. Why so? Because the launching of the missiles at signals received from warning systems would make it possible to drop seven thousand megatons of nuclear explosives on American territory. On the other hand, if American warheads had hit their targets before that, the attack would have left us with "only" a few hundred or one or two thousand megatons with which to retaliate.

The generals have always dismissed as nonsense the argument that several thousand megatons differs little from a few hundred megatons. The point is that 150 largest U.S. cities harbour over 560 percent of the U.S. population and ⅓ of industry.

As a matter of fact, our strategy amounts to depriving the political leadership of the right to make a decision to use nuclear weapons. The time parameters of a nuclear cataclysm are such that a counter-strike can succeed only if politicians are capable of a split-second reaction, and even then only if everything works smoothly. Besides, the politicians will have to depend wholly on signals—mysterious to them—coming in from satellites and warning radars, or rather on the interpretations of these signals by the military.

If a strike is delivered with a submarine-borne ballistic missile at a relatively short distance from the target, even the most efficient control system will be of no use. In anticipation of that, politicians may be asked to sanction

a nuclear strike in advance on the grounds that there will be no time for drawing up new plans of operations if the existing ones are thwarted. The leader's role will be reduced to that of a chimpanzee used for testing: he will just have to push a button when a lamp comes on.

Now if the General Secretary has overslept, become unreachable or been removed from office, the go-ahead can be given without his authorization. All the codes are converted into action, and all the communication channels are maintained by military services for which instructions from their immediate superiors are law.

In other words, at the top level of leadership, positive control has always taken precedence over negative control. The monopoly of the military on working out the control system and operations plan (for a counter-strike, above all) has materialized in a concept which guards not against an accidental strike due to a mistake, a nervous breakdown or a technical problem, but against failure to respond to an attack promptly and on a massive scale.

This is a reflection of a typically militaristic mentality—the main goal is to crush the enemy, deterrence is just a sideline. For a politician, on the other hand, deterrence comes first. If deterrents fail to work and a nuclear attack is made, all the rest will make no difference any longer.

Many remain under the spell of military declarations like "an immediate and crushing retaliation" which "no aggressor will avoid." Even Yuriy Rostov, the anchor man of a TV news programme whom I highly respect, has said recently that a nuclear attack should be "instantly" reacted to, otherwise catastrophe will ensue.

What does he mean by "catastrophe?" The prospect of us dropping fewer megatons on the US than planned by our General Staff? If we indeed come under a nuclear attack, this will be catastrophe in and of itself, and our fate will hardly depend in this case on how many million Americans we kill in retaliation. If we react "instantly" but mistakenly, we shall really bring catastrophe upon ourselves and upon the rest of the world.

In the past decades this system did work, however, probably for the reason that it never underwent a real test. The superpowers feared each other so much that after the Cuban missile crisis they never pushed the world to the brink. Nevertheless, our system has proved to be no good at all in the dramatically changing situation inside the country.

It's against the rules, but it can be done

When we had the "military-political" leadership - the triumvirate of the CPSU, the KGB and the Military-Industrial Complex - our nuclear forces were under reliable centralized control (its reliability was not, thank God, given the acid test like the one failed by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant's control system). The deepening rift in our society and Gorbachev's prolonged vacillation between the Right and the Left led to the August putsch which, in addition to everything else,

demonstrated the utter inadequacy of the old nuclear arms control system under new circumstances. Having colluded, the top brass and the KGB debarred the President from control over nuclear weapons with amazing ease.

The vague subsequent assurances to the effect that everything was in perfect order and that details are state secrets hardly make sense. It sounds incredible that without the President's sanctions and the codes there are no means of launching the missiles. The military know, of course, that they are not supposed to do that, but then they are not supposed to stage coups, either. The important thing is that this is probably possible technically, otherwise the counter-strike strategy would be impracticable. Surely, certain arrangements have been made to deal with a situation where the leader is no longer in control. And if it is technically possible to launch a missile without the President following a nuclear attack, then this can be done following a coup also.

It is not hard to guess who was, on those days, in charge of the services which make up codes and combinations and which maintain government communications with the strategic missile launch posts. Besides, there are facilities for launching missiles right from the centre, by-passing local triggering systems.

Some political scientists are trying to reassure themselves and others by reasoning that the conspirators - all of them top executives of the Gorbachev government - would have displayed a sense of responsibility in the matter of "button control." What would have happened, however, if the putsch hadn't failed so quickly? What if the White House had been taken by storm with all the consequences - civil war, a split of the Army, the warring factions' attempts to win outside support? There are no answers to these questions, but one thing is clear - the old control system is unfit for the new reality.

The "attache case" changes hands

The breakup of the USSR after the August events, the formation of the CIS, the signing of the agreements on joint measures as regards nuclear weapons and on strategic forces - all this has lent special urgency to the "button" problem.

Matters have certainly been simplified by the agreement reached by the independent states to the effect that technical control is to be exercised by the President of Russia only. The heads of the other Republics which have strategic nuclear arms on their territories so far are to give oral consent to the use of these arms, if necessary. The sharing of the "button" among the independent states would contradict the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.

There are quite a few problems, however. The President of Russia has control over all nuclear weapons, but other Republics maintain that the missiles deployed on their territories do not belong to Russia. By forbidding the

withdrawal or elimination of these missiles without their knowledge and consent, the Republics claim certain rights to strategic weapons and do not recognize Russia as the nuclear successor to the USSR. However, they have no technical control over the use of these weapons.

Further, although the president of Russia does have control over the "button," the Commander-in-Chief and the joint command of strategic forces, obliged to take their instructions from political leadership, are subordinated not to him but to the Council of the CIS Heads of State. The other presidents are not in control of the "button," however, and their vetoes or sanctions are of a procedural character. Does that mean that strategic forces are subordinated to Russia after all? No, Russia has no army of its own, and nuclear facilities belong to the joint command within the framework of the CIS. At the same time, the Commonwealth has no central authorities, it is a union of states, not a state. It has its centre in Minsk, and its Defence Ministry and General Staff in Moscow.

It looks as if under the circumstances no political power is in control of the Army and, in particular, of strategic forces.

The "attache case", it is true, has been handed over by Gorbachev to Yeltsin. They showed on television the other day how the military teach Yeltsin to handle his new "luggage". This is probably the same "attache case" that was lost in Foros last August. This means that the control system, crowned with the "button," remains actually the same. The President of Russia has probably not yet taken precautions against landing in his federal predecessor's predicament.

The system in need of readjustment

The most logical and consistent thing to do would be to eliminate all the strategic weapons and tactical nuclear facilities on the territories outside Russia. A model for this is found in the Minsk agreement as regards Ukraine. The reduction of the nuclear potential in this way fits in with the obligations ensuing from the Soviet-American Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction signed in the summer of 1991, and from the exchange of the Bush and Gorbachev initiatives that autumn. Therefore, no "pumping over" of nuclear might from the Republics to Russia will take place: the arsenals on Russian territory will be reduced even further.

The missiles stationed outside Russia are to be deactivated in good time. In that case, everything—the deployment procedure, the right to ownership and use, the control system—will click back into place.

This is far from all. It is necessary to restructure the control system in Russia so as to get rid of the faults inherited from the totalitarian militarist structure of the USSR. Specifically, the working out of sanctioning codes and ciphers, putting them into the control post computers, installing the locking devices, maintaining special communications—all these functions should be handed

over to a service independent of the Defence Ministry and the KGB and subordinated to the President only.

It appears that in our case "negative" control ought to be divided among the President, Vice-President and the Chairman of Parliament so that the sanctioning of a nuclear strike should call for the technical alignment of all three parts of the code. It is also necessary to determine, by a special law, the continuity of transfer of the authority over nuclear weapons from the three top executives to the subordinate civilian officials.

It is time we gave up the counter-strike strategy which reduces the political leadership's control over the Army to a fiction and leaves open the ways to by-pass the President's button in peacetime.

It is necessary to eliminate the facilities for prompt missile launchings in case of the President's death in a nuclear attack. Instead, we had better provide the technical means for a prompt and efficient transfer of his powers to his lawful successors.

Finally, in order to prevent an unconstitutional takeover of power, measures should be taken for the control system to be completely "switched off" in such an event—i.e. for making it technically impossible, for a lengthy period, to launch strategic missiles.

Military experts will argue, of course, that all this is bound to impede nuclear retaliation, to reduce its impact, to weaken deterrence. This is true, I agree, but military potential is not a thing in itself—the fundamental changes now in progress within the country and in the rest of the world call for its restructuring.

The potential of deterrence at the level of reasonable sufficiency should be preserve as an inalienable element of global strategic stability. The very criteria of sufficiency are to be revised, however. The USA is now less likely than ever to mount a surprise nuclear attack, and it is hard to think up convincing reasons why the situation should change in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, the danger of nuclear arms control loosening up as a result of ethnic strife and domestic social and political unrest in the former USSR has grown. In their turn, the radical transformations of society and the state call for a substantial readjustment of the nuclear weapons control system. Otherwise, events like the August putsch, dangerous to our country and to the whole world, may recur.

It stands to reason that no organizational or technical measures will make up for the absence of economic and socio-political stability in society and in the Army. The fact remains, though, that the USSR has built up a huge nuclear arsenal, so it is our moral duty to see to it that the mistakes we make at home should not put the entire civilized world in mortal danger.

Chelyabinsk Nuclear Institute Head Interviewed

924P0102A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 10, 8 Mar 92 p 15

[Technical Physics Institute Head Yevgeniy Avrorin interviewed by Dmitriy Yakushkin: "The Bomb, Baker, and Salaries"]

[Text] In recent days, closed cities that are not marked on the maps have been attracting high-ranking politicians.

Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly visited Arzamas-16, and Secretary of State J. Baker is paying a visit to Chelyabinsk-70. Russia's two main centers for nuclear weapons development have become centers of attention.

What goes on at these strategic installations? A MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent met with Russian Academy of Sciences corresponding member Yevgeniy Avrorin, research director at the Technical Physics Institute in Chelyabinsk-70.

[Yakushkin] Has your institute been declassified?

[Avrorin] Not completely. We still do secret work.

[Yakushkin] And you?

[Avrorin] Prior to 1988 I couldn't go abroad, and there were restrictions on meetings with foreigners. I couldn't say where I worked and on what. Then greater openness gradually came.

[Yakushkin] What is the mood among your institute's employees?

[Avrorin] It's hard. We have to contend with difficult conditions like everywhere else; but in addition, we also have our own problems. Serious nuclear disarmament has gotten under way, and weapons work has undergone sharp reductions. Therefore the institute's financial support is very weak, and there are far fewer orders. There is no money to bring in young researchers, and this means that the institute is rapidly growing older. In general, the psychological state has deteriorated: It used to be felt that we were people the country needed, that its defense depended on us. That helped us. There were also material and psychological incentives—bonuses, titles, and simply attention from the leadership. But now the opposite is true. The press has in effect trampled on us, although it's true that the wave has now subsided. Our activities were depicted as harmful to both the country and humanity. So this transition from a feeling of being vitally needed people to people who are virtually useless is having a negative effect.

[Yakushkin] How many people do you employ?

[Avrorin] Nearly 16,000.

[Yakushkin] How many of your specialists are capable of producing nuclear weapons?

[Avrorin] A few hundred of our employees would be capable of providing substantial assistance in producing nuclear weapons. This does not mean that all of them would have to be taken away simultaneously. Realistically, a few dozen would be required for that purpose, but in any event one would not be sufficient.

[Yakushkin] You have fewer orders, but the institute continues to function. So what are you doing?

[Avrorin] We continue efforts to improve nuclear weapons and to study their effects. Lately we have been working to enhance weapon safety and to devise methods to destroy them. We are also working on methods to verify implementation of international agreements—for example, to limit the yield of nuclear tests. We currently have a team working at the Nevada test range.

[Yakushkin] Do you look for work on your own?

[Avrorin] We look for work that would be in keeping with our specialty, but sometimes there's not much to choose from. We're forced to take on orders that are not science-intensive but are, on the other hand, economically profitable.

[Yakushkin] For example?

[Avrorin] We made an egg-sorting machine for the Chelyabinsk Poultry Factory. It was a job that needed to be done, and they paid for it—not well, but something nonetheless.

[Yakushkin] What is your opinion of talk that our nuclear scientists could end up in countries like Libya or Iraq?

[Avrorin] Needless to say, I think it's mostly hot air. First, there have been no such proposals, to my knowledge. Second, would our specialists agree? We discussed the probability at our institute. No matter how some might rail against us, our people are nonetheless accustomed to being accountable for their work, and they would hardly be capable of simply going off somewhere in the knowledge that this would do such great harm. It's hard to imagine that this could happen through ignorance. So if we try to model such a person, he would have to be a potential criminal. At the same time, he would have to be a highly skilled specialist. He could not be too old, so that he would still be able-bodied, but nor could he be too young and relatively inexperienced. He cannot have too many close ties with family and friends in this country. When you try to find such a person among our colleagues, you discover that it's rather difficult. I could not propose a candidate.

[Yakushkin] What is the average salary in Chelyabinsk-70 today?

[Avrorin] In December it was 1,000 rubles. But the President promised a fivefold increase in salaries, and I hope that this will be done.

[Yakushkin] What about proposals to go to developed countries?

[Avrorin] We haven't received any proposals for that either as yet, but this is a more complex matter. The question of Western aid to our nuclear scientists is now under discussion. When we met with Baker, we told him that this cannot be a question of benefits or stipends. That would be psychologically unacceptable and ineffective. We need joint projects that would be advantageous for the Western partner and certainly useful to us.

[Yakushkin] Among possible projects, joint development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, with an antiterrorist orientation, has been cited. How realistic is this, in your opinion?

[Avrorin] I have my doubts about that, because SDI involves technologies that are so advanced the Americans would hardly share them with us, if only out of commercial considerations.

[Yakushkin] It may be that we are now entering a period of dealings with the Americans in which, following embraces after decades of estrangement, people will start saying that they are nonetheless "deceiving" us. For your field, this would mean that they have no intention of sharing anything and that, on the contrary, they will make every effort to see that we don't surpass them and assume a proper place.

[Avrorin] We needn't think that they are angels over there. Of course they are pursuing their own interests. If our interests coincide, that's wonderful, that means there's a field for cooperation. If our interests are different, we have to seek compromise. That they could propose types of work that would not be to our advantage is indisputable. There is also the danger of becoming a raw-materials appendage of America. That is a fully realistic possibility if we fail to proceed in an intelligent manner.

[Yakushkin] How did your meeting with Baker go?

[Avrorin] He came directly to the institute, where he met with our specialists. There were 20 people on our side, and he was accompanied by his entourage and American correspondents.

I spoke on two topics: the future of our nuclear weapons and our nuclear specialists. Then Baker spoke, proposing possible forms of assistance and cooperation. Then the journalists were asked to leave, and we held a discussion in a more narrow circle of specific issues relating to weapons: their destruction and safety and the construction of storage facilities for fissionable materials. We showed Baker an area where people work with highly radioactive materials.

[Yakushkin] What are your personal feelings as you look to the future?

[Avrorin] Lately life has given very few grounds for optimism. Perhaps the attention that is now being shown to us on the part of both the Russian leadership and the West will help. I would certainly like to hope so.

START TALKS

Tu-160, Tu-95 Strategic Bombers Taken Out of Production

*PM0203150192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 8*

[Viktor Belikov report: "Strategic Bombers Taken Out of Production"]

[Text] Production of the most powerful winged combat machines in our air force—the Tu-160 supersonic missile-armed combat jet and the multirole Tu-95 [Tu-95 MS] long-range turboprop strategic bomber—is being discontinued under an agreement reached during recent talks in Moscow between B. Yeltsin and J. Baker. Both are strategic offensive weapons, like the U.S. supersonic B-2, production of which has also been halted.

According to military experts and the world press, Russia and the United States have taken a significant new step toward reducing their arsenals of the most formidable weapons. It is easy to see that that is the case when you familiarize yourself with some of the characteristics and combat capabilities of the aircraft.

Tu-95 multirole aircraft has for many years been the basis of our strategic aviation. Created 40 years ago, the aircraft has undergone a number of modernizations and been equipped with state-of-the-art systems. The Tu-114 transcontinental airliner was constructed on the basis of this aircraft and saw lengthy service. The modern version of the aircraft, which is equipped for midair refueling, is capable of remaining in flight for over 24 hours and maintaining a speed of 850 kph. Furthermore, it can carry a combat payload of 40 tonnes.

The supersonic Tu-160 is a product of relatively recent times, as you can see from its aerodynamic configuration, its variable wing geometry, and four turbojet engines, which ensure a speed of 2,200 kph with a takeoff weight of 280 tonnes. Over 100 onboard computers help the two pilots, the navigator, and the radar operator to carry out flights from one hemisphere to the other.

What is the future for aviation industry enterprises that manufactured strategic bombers? All the indications are that, thanks to conversion, their highly skilled collectives will not be left without work, since for all these years they have also been making aircraft for civil aviation alongside their military output. Instead of the multirole Tu-95, the Kuybyshev aircraft builders can now launch proper mass production of the medium-range Tu-154M, which is much in demand in our country and abroad. The Kazan Aviation Plant will replace the Tu-160 with additional production of the long-range Il-62M, and will subsequently launch series production of the latest Tu-204.

If they are removed from our arsenal, these aircraft which have cost many millions will not have to be scrapped. There are options for using them for nonmilitary purposes. In particular, the multirole Tu-95 could

become flying laboratories, and they could also be used as effective carriers of containers of fire-extinguishing mixture in putting out forest fires in the taiga.

Small satellites or space freighters can be launched into orbit from on board the Tu-160 combat jet, using it as a flying cosmodrome. Using such a system, which has been given the name "Burlak," will be far cheaper than using ground-based launch facilities.

Journalists Visit Typhoon Nuclear Missile Sub

*PM0303151992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[Special correspondents Viktor Litovkin, Dmitriy Khrupov report: "Our Correspondents Are First To Visit World's Biggest Submarine"]

[Text] Our special correspondents Viktor Litovkin and Dmitriy Khrupov have returned from a trip to the Red Banner Northern Fleet. They were the first central press journalists to visit the world's biggest and Russia's most modern nuclear-powered submarine—the Typhoon. This ship carries 21 ICBM's each with 10 nuclear warheads and until now has been top secret.

The IZVESTIYA staffers spent 72 hours on the ship together with its crew. They met with the leadership of the Northern Fleet and the naval base where the Typhoon is lying, with the command of this underwater missile-carrying cruiser, conversed with its specialists, visited all the ship's duty stations and sections, and they also went to the compound where officers' and warrant officers' families live and visited them as guests.

Where the Typhoon's missiles are aimed, how they are launched, what the submarine's unique feature is, how sailors serve and live on it, what problems concern them and their families—read all about it in the next issues of IZVESTIYA. Because the crew's problems are our whole fleet's problems.

[Moscow PRAVDA in Russia 29 February 1992 on page 2 carries an Aleksandr Chernyak report entitled "We Saw This Submarine" which reads: "On 27 February IZVESTIYA's front page carried an apparent sensation entitled 'Our Correspondents Are First To Visit World's Biggest Submarine.'"

"Greetings, colleagues! Your desire to describe our fleet's difficult life is laudable. But you should have added: first, since PRAVDA staffers, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents, and U.S. journalists visited it. The fact is that PRAVDA and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents happened to visit a Typhoon-class nuclear-powered submarine, which was then indeed still

the first (now we have six of them), almost five years ago. A photograph of this submarine was published in PRAVDA 3 October 1987.

"Finally, we were informed today by the Navy Main Staff that U.S. journalists who were shooting a film visited the submarine before the IZVESTIYA staffers. Next time, esteemed colleagues, do not forget to take a look at the ship's log—absolutely all visits are recorded there."]

Ukraine To 'Curtail' Strategic Missile Production

Yuzhmash To Cease Military Production

*LD0203162592 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 2 Mar 92*

[Text] The Yuzhnyi machine-building plant [Yuzhmash] in Dnepropetrovsk, one of the major military-industrial enterprises of the former USSR, will completely cease military production in the near future, the KHARKOV-NOVOSTI news agency reports. It was here at Yuzhmash that the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles was developed. At present the enterprise manufactures about 60 types of products for civilian use.

Cabinet Decision Reported

*LD0403183592 Kiev Radio Kiev in English
0100 GMT 3 Mar 92*

[Text] Fundamental changes will soon involve the entire defense complex of Dnepropetrovsk region. Upon the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, it is planned to curtail the manufacture of strategic missiles there. For dozens of years orders of the military-industrial complex and scientific-technical implementation of the space program have been the main activity of the local multithousand production collective. Only as of late orders from the agro industry were realized and the output of consumer goods was expanded as a result of conversion.

Baker Senate Testimony on Further Strategic Arms Cuts

*LD0903160292 Moscow Radio Moscow World
Service in English 1210 GMT 7 Mar 92*

[Vadim Solovyev Commentary]

[Text] Addressing the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, the American Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker, has said that there is a real possibility to conclude an agreement soon on a slash in nuclear armaments of the United States and Russia,

After the Presidents of the United States and former Soviet Union signed last July the first agreement on a real reduction of strategic offensive weapons experts believed it would take years before the process reached the second stage but a little more than half a year has passed and the assessments have changed radically. Now

there are all grounds to believe that the meeting between the U.S. and Russian Presidents scheduled for this July may result in the conclusion of another treaty in this sphere.

Practically before the ratification the former Soviet Union began implementing the treaty on the strategic nuclear force reduction. At the same time it was declared about the warheads' reduction by another 1,000 units as compared to the agreed limit of 6,000 and additional restrictions have been introduced for the activities of air and naval strategic forces.

When the Commonwealth of Independent States was created among the major foreign political steps taken by the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, was the expanding of the nuclear disarmament process. U.S. reciprocal steps in this sphere have developed these steps into a sort of disarmament race. The United States suggested lowering the ceilings for nuclear arsenals down to 4.7 hundred [number as heard] nuclear warheads while Russia suggests making them twice the times lower.

The range of reciprocal proposals is very wide, among them is also the proposal to create a joint global system for the protection from long range missiles with the use of the latest achievements of the United States, the CIS states and other countries who would like to take part. Besides, Russia has announced a much lower intensity of combat duty performed by the nuclear submarines, has discontinued the production of heavy bombers and suggests measures to control fissionable materials. Russia has repeatedly raised the question on the full ban on all types of nuclear tests. There are also many other proposals aimed at curtailing the nuclear threat.

These proposals find understanding of the American side. According to reports from Washington scientists and Congressmen believe that the level of one or two thousand warheads per each side is quite enough. In short there are quite a few initiatives to develop the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Here our coordination will seem to make the basis for another treaty in this sphere. These matters will certainly be discussed and further developed at the meeting between Russian and American Foreign Ministers due to take place next week.

U.S. Role in Warhead Dismantling Viewed

*92WC0037A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No. 10, 8-15 Mar 92 p 12*

[Article by Artem Ustinov: "The Nuclear Deal: Will Yeltsin Open Up to West?"]

[Text] The first two Western initiatives to help Russia gain control of the nuclear-industrial complex—a job centre to recycle military scientists and U.S. armoured boxcars to transport warheads—point to Russian political sensitivity about direct foreign involvement in its military affairs. A big unanswered question is whether President Yeltsin will widen the scope for Western

involvement in efforts to dismantle nuclear warheads and prevent them—and the designers of the weapons—from finding their way to nations seeking to build nuclear weapons of their own. A proposed \$100-million science and technology centre, for which the European community will provide \$75 million and the United States the balance, will be mainly of symbolic value in helping the Russian authorities avert a huge outflow of nuclear experts. In practice, such a centre cannot give jobs to all the scientists and thousands of technicians who might be able to help other countries build missiles and warheads. That may also help prevent scientists from leaving Russia legally.

But the role of the Western donors, beyond trying to promote international industrial activity in the civilian sector, remains open to question. Western officials say it is unclear whether they can insist that the new institute concentrate on the urgent task of disarming and dismantling upwards of 30,000 nuclear warheads, some reportedly in a dangerous condition.

Dismantling the unsafe parts of the former Soviet arsenal will be a long and vastly expensive task—possibly costing \$10 billion through the rest of the decade. No one is sure of the timetable or the price tag. The actual number of Soviet warheads is unknown, even to authorities in Moscow, because of discrepancies between the output statistics from factories and the military's inventory. Taken together with spares and other hidden categories, this surplus, which came to light in the closing phase of the START negotiations on cutting U.S. and Soviet long-range missiles, means that Moscow may have 20 percent more warheads than the figure of 27,000.

Technicians in Russia and other former Soviet republics now expect standards of protection comparable to those they have learned about in the West. They will also be handling warheads that in most cases offer few or none of the safety features built into Western nuclear weapons. In contrast, the U.S. decision to give Moscow 25 armoured boxcars will bring immediate benefits, as the authorities try to ship thousands of warheads back to Russia from outlying republics where the weapons were deployed with Soviet military units. The railroad cars are designed to protect the warheads against terrorist attack: some can carry armed guards and, most important, their two-ton steel plating could absorb a bazooka round without detonating the warhead inside.

Other safety features include a system that, in an accident, would push cars up on top of each other to avoid a direct collision. The U.S. used these cars for shunting warheads across the country until the 1980s, when they were replaced with 18-wheel trucks. Each boxcar normally carries two warheads, so the U.S.-supplied convoy can meet only a small fraction of Moscow's needs, even if it constantly shuttles between outposts and storage depots. This technical gift underlines U.S. determination

to support Yeltsin's efforts to pull back all the Soviet warheads, even from republics that might be tempted to hang on to some of them.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Skrunda Radar Considered 'Monster'

92UN1047A Riga ATMODA in Latvian 30 Jul 91
pp 8-9

[Article by G. Barkovskis: "Skrunda's Monster"]

[Text] In the beginning, there was not a monster at all, but only a supersecret Soviet military unit whose current number is 18951. Its origins could be found in 1964, when the three-year-long construction of the *Dnieper* radar station (RS) began. At that time, the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [LaSSR] Council of Ministers evicted local residents without objections and provided 819.3 hectares for this undertaking. After that, only a few people knew what was happening on this land. The *Dnieper* was operating within the joint USSR defense system and its military purpose was and is (since the station currently continues its operations) to detect and to provide warnings of strategic ballistic missile launches. The rest of the time it tracks the Earth satellites and their debris whose numbers continue to grow. The station resembles two interconnected barns which look like a pair of hothouses. The first one became operational in 1967, the second in 1971 (we were not allowed to photograph them, or the building which houses the transmitter's antenna of the new and still unfinished *Daryal* system). Each of the four blocks simultaneously serves as both the transmitter and the receiver antenna, and they are arranged to cover the horizon at a 180 degree angle. The closest *Dnieper* to the north is located near Murmansk, and to the south in Mukachevo (Western Ukraine). In principle, they are located all around the Soviet Union, which is "surrounded by imperialists", and the RS is located in Skrunda for the military strategic purposes of the neighboring country, too.

The station is not fireproof, and large amounts of water are required to extinguish [possible] fires. This fact increases the suspicion that a nuclear reactor is present. However, all the military authorities and designers swore that this is untrue.

Two high-voltage power lines enter the military unit's site (a third line is being built). Electric power consumption of the garrison is equal to that of the whole Kuldiga rayon. At the present time, the garrison consists of more than 4000 men and several military units, including the construction battalion, or stroybat No 03535, which is building the new *Daryal-UM* RS. The USSR either already has, or still is building another four such facilities, so each of them is relatively unique.

The Skrunda monster became scandalously notorious since its construction started. The *Daryal* under construction is analogous to the world renowned Krasnoyarsk space studies center, whose conversion from a military site into a civilian one, as it is known, was not a voluntary action, but rather the result of the pressure by the West. The reason for it (based on unconfirmed information) was the fact that the international treaties prohibit placement of such facilities, which could be used for offensive purposes, deep inside the territory of a country. [as published]

The history of *Daryal* started on 13 November 84, when the deputy chairman of the LaSSR Council of Ministers, Kazimirs Spogis, signed a document allowing the placement of the new RS next to the already existing *Dnieper*. Therefore, people in Kuldiga suddenly learned that next year they are to lose another 156 hectares for the benefit of the Army. Nobody pays to the rayon for the land usage. The inflicted wrongs, lack of information, and misgivings have alarmed the residents of Kuldiga rayon even more. Misgivings grew with the growth of the new station's building, which could not be hidden anymore because it began to rise above the tops of the forest trees. Presently, it is an 18-story and 84-meter-high structure later to be filled up with computers that can be seen from a distance of tens of kilometers. (The height of the hotel *Latvija* is 87 meters.) The difference with *Dnieper* is that the transmitter and receiver antennas are separated and the individual buildings are located at a distance of a couple of hundred meters from one another. Both of them resemble perpendicular right-angled triangular trapeziums whose sloped planes are directed toward the north-west. This facility also belongs to the military unit No 18951, whose commanding officer is Col Viktor Khukhlin. He is under the direct command of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces [PVO] located near Moscow, and the obtained information reaches Gorbachev's desk on a regular basis. One military person in a private conversation said approximately the following: if Moscow ever begins to withdraw its troops from Latvia, this will be the last unit to go through Zilupe. PVO Col Gen Volter Kraskovskiy had asserted that the computer center serving the RS is the largest in the republic and that the new one will be even larger.

All told, the above is only an introduction, only the flowers. The berries ripened on the 16 October 1990, when the local people's deputies attended the session of the Kuldiga rayon ispolkom and, based on the studies carried out by Dr. Abelitis concerning the negative effects of the RS on people, adopted a historical resolution. It stated that the construction of the new station had to stop before 20 November. Otherwise, the bread supplies to the garrison would be stopped, food coupons would not be issued, and the railroad stations in Skrunda and near it would prohibit the unloading of arriving cargoes. A panic started in the Army's ranks, because in the recent past the construction of *Daryal* was temporarily stopped in Mukachevo, where the Ukrainians have

shown not only their hot tempers, but also demonstrated their knowledge of the really inexhaustible depths of Russian verbal folklore.

After all, the military are only people, and they also have families and children who are living too close to the RS and are receiving increased dosages of electromagnetic radiation (EMR). A common language has been found, and on 23 November 1990 the USSR Council of Ministers with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the republic of Latvia decided to form a 63-member commission to perform an all-round ecological study of the Skrunda facility. In his comments, the chairman of the Kuldiga rayon ispolkom, Aleksandrs Lange, said that the only way to deal with the Army is to apply a methodical and active pressure.

Ilmars Bisers was the formal head of the group representing our side in the commission and he was seen at its sessions only twice. Other representatives of the Council of Ministers assigned to the commission followed his example. Thanks to this "activity", the final document does not mention that the commission was an international one. This means that any word, or item that the USSR Prime Minister Pavlov does not like, will be easily removed and the work of a half-a-year (even of a full year) will go down the tubes. Even when it still could be corrected, Deputy Minister Valdis Zeikats, who justified his regular absence by being very busy and relying on the high professionalism of the Latvian scientists, found it appropriate to leave the room. This time no comments. The Deputy chairman of the USSR Environment Protection Committee, Yevgeniy Minayev, who left an impression of a far from intelligent person, was the head of the joint commission. It should be noted that Moscow was also interested in the work of the ecological study—to prove the RS harmless and to calm other people living in the vicinity of *Daryal*. Therefore, it is no surprise that IZVESTIYA and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 12 July hurried to publish the results desirable to them. For residents of Mukachevo it was a bad service. We should note that such a commission was formed in the Soviet union for the first time and the work it performed is unique in the world's practice. That the commission was unique is attested to by the fact that the USSR was represented by high-ranking officials of the Defense Ministry, famous medical workers and scientists, the general designer of the USSR missile attack warning system, Aleksey Kuzmin, and the chief designer of the Institute of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry, Vladimir Ordanovich. This Institute is also involved in the production of *Daryal*.

The commission's work may be conditionally divided into three subgroups: physical, biological, and medical. The first group measured magnitude and volume of the electromagnetic radiation (EMR) emitted by the station and their conformity with the norms approved by the USSR Ministry of Health. The second group studied the effects of this radiation on nature, and the third group—on people's health. Everybody worked hard, but results were difficult and long in coming, which caused the

delays in the commission's work until 5 July (instead of the scheduled 25 March). This could be explained by the large volume of work, its uniqueness and mutual frictions, and even by serious differences in opinions during the work on the final document, because each side tried to achieve the results it desired. However, unfortunately (or thank God) the observed deviations were within the approved norms. For example, the maximum radiation flux was 7.6 mW/sq. cm while the norm existing in the USSR is 10 mW/sq. cm. The chief specialist on EMR at the Latvian Environmental Protection Committee, Peteris Jansons, commented as follows: "In the Soviet system an object and its needs are always primary, but the health of the service personnel is secondary. Thus, all studies and the approved norms are subordinated to these needs."

EMR effects on people are generally little studied and according to the chief internist of the republic, Professor Anatolijs Danilans, the results of such studies would deserve a Nobel Prize. Not likely, of course, because they are connected with the work of closed institutes studying psychic and other effects. By the way, *Dnieper* and TV operate on close electromagnetic wave frequencies, and therefore, for example, in the Rudbarzhi township only, 62 homes experience interference with their radio, TV, and tape recorders. The main attention was directed toward the medical studies. Two zones (base and control) were selected in the Kuldiga rayon. Population of the first zone was 2500 people, that of the second zone—2765 people. According to a methodology developed in Latvia, 202 and 328 people, respectively, were selected by the Kuldiga rayon residents themselves for medical testing. Doctors have found that residents of the base zone have more headaches, worse sleep, get tired more easily, and have pain in the joints and spine more often. Other deviations in the work of the internal organs were also found, for example, heart arrhythmia. However, except for several cases, it was also within the limits of the physiological norms. To prove the connection between these deviations and the EMR emitted by *Dnieper* and that they are caused only by it is almost impossible. And that is exactly why the Army's representatives are satisfied with the commission's work. The growth biologists determined that since the mid-70's wood in the local forests was drastically falling. This phenomenon has not been explained yet, and it was decided to continue studies.

No substantial deviations from the physiological norm were found during inspections of the cattle farms, especially because the feeding of cattle at the farms is abnormal, not to say more. The environment is also polluted by the garrison's boiler room, by freon escaping from refrigerators and destroying the planet's ozone layer, and also by chlorine being used.

The region is seismically inactive.

After putting all this together, the commission came to the following conclusion: "Results of the medical testing of the Kuldiga rayon population have not provided data on the negative health effects of the *Dnieper* RS. To understand

clearly the differences between the base and the control zones, it is recommended to carry out analogous testing in the locations of similar facilities."

In addition, 22 proposals and conclusions were written, including the following:

- * to study and to define more precisely influence of the very high frequency (VHF) signals on human health, if pulse repetition frequency is 20-24 Hz, and frequency of irregular radio pulse emission is within the 150-200 MHz band;

- * to study the effects of the RS signals interference on the quality of radioelectronic equipment functioning and to develop measures to protect radio and TV receivers from noise generated by *Dnieper* and *Daryal* transmitters;

- * to study in 1991-1994 the epidemiology of effects on population in locations of analogous facilities. To compare the results with those which were already obtained and to prepare proposals for improving the health of residents;

- * to continue to observe the health conditions of people living in Kuldiga rayon;

- * to ask the USSR Defense Ministry and Health Ministry to find together with the Kuldiga rayon authorities the technical and material means to maximally satisfy the interests of the local population;

- * to recommend that the Latvian Academy of Sciences together with the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR Ministry of Radio Industry, and the USSR Defense Ministry develop options to use the RS for scientific purposes, for example, to study the interaction between the space, Sun, and Earth, and other similar research. The USSR Defense Ministry and the Ministry of Radio Industry together with the authorities of the Republic of Latvia shall develop and approve within two-months a plan, which would serve as the basis for the realization of the proposals and recommendations.

AFTERWORD

The commission has completed its work which costed 170,000 rubles. The RS remains. The construction of the new complex will continue for at least three years until a victorious end. Then it will be 10-fold larger. A whole generation has already grown under abnormal and psychically stressful conditions. One more similar facility in Vidzeme and such a notion as the genetic fund of the Latvian nation will not exist.

What to do? In principle, there are two options, namely, to leave, or to tear down the RS. The second option is simpler, because to tear down is always easier than to build. To blow up such a facility will definitely cost a million-fold less than its construction. The more sophisticated the equipment, the easier it is to damage. How real is the second option? The deputy chief designer of the *Daryal*, Sergey Korshunkov, answered this question: "The historical experience shows that some types of weapons die out, and new others emerge. In the nearest future, nobody will give up such stations. They are part of the Star Wars concept."

Thus, for the time being, nothing indicates that the Skrunda monster could die soon. What do the residents of the Kuldiga rayon and the chairman of the Kuldiga rayon ispolkom intend to do?

"The commission has completed its task and we are practically at the same place as in the beginning. Well... we will follow up that the measures written in the final document are actually implemented, especially those in the field of ecology. If it is determined that residents of areas around other similar facilities have health deviations, then, it seems, we will need the world's pressure to close the Skrunda RS."

What does the actual boss of the facility, Col Viktor Khukhlin, think about its future?


"Whether Skrunda will become a civilian space research center does not depend on us, but rather on Moscow, the

negotiations between the USSR and the USA, and the political situation in the world. I personally would benefit from the military base status. Then I would not have to think about food and other supplies to the military units, because the other party to the agreement would take care of them. In addition, we all would get a double salary for the work abroad, while my current salary is very small—700 rubles. However, all this can be resolved only through negotiations between Latvia and the USSR, or through a Union treaty. In addition, I want to say that we are not interested in a conflict with the local population."


Finally, the words of a man who is far from being a good-natured person, namely, PVO Col Gen Volter Kraskovskiy, come to mind: "Give my regards to the great Latvian people!". He is not, of course, guilty that these words may be perceived in very different ways. And these words hurt.



The building of the new complex *Daryal* receiver's antenna. The unique photo was taken from the military unit's territory. Photo by Ints Kalnins.



Daryal-UM transmitter's antenna. Antenna's array is formed by 648 (36 x 18) oscillators. - the power of a pulse emitted by one oscillator is 200 kW, - frequency band - 150 MHz, - duration of a pulse - 2 ms - λ (lambda) - 2 m



One of the *Dnieper* pairs existing at Skrunda. - the power of a pulse emitted by each transmitter is 1.25 MW, - frequency band - 154-164 MHz, - duration of a pulse - 0.8 ms

Nuclear-Armed Moscow ABM System Called 'Absurd'

924P0106A *Moscow INZHENER in Russian*
No 1, Jan 92 (signed to press 20 Dec 91) p 28

[Article by Grigoriy Kisunko: "Nuclear Harakiri of Moscow"]

[Text] "Some 50 ballistic antimissile interceptors along the Ring Road are in constant readiness for launching," asserts the Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Hero of Socialist Labor and Lenin Prize Winner Grigoriy Kisunko. "But instead of saving the capital they can cause it a torturous death in a nuclear fire.

...At present, Muscovites, worried about the ecological problems of the Severnaya [Northern] GRES, Losinyy [Elk] Island and Bittsevskiy Park, do not even suspect the secret and much more dangerous ecological surprise in the form of nuclear-armed antimissile interceptors in launch silos built close to the Moscow Ring Road. There is a total of 50 nuclear ABM interceptors.

These antimissile interceptors are merely a part of the multibillion ruble absurdity designed, in the idea of its authors, to intercept and destroy in the atmospheric zone above Moscow warheads as well as individual ballistic missiles which have been launched against the city accidentally or without authorization. And this means that with each such intercept, Moscow will be exposed to two nuclear explosion in the air above it—the explosion of the warhead of the interceptor "defending" it and the resulting explosion from activating the nuclear charge of the warhead attacking Moscow.

However, even in the absence of attacking warheads, our favorite city cannot sleep peacefully. For example, on a combat alert status, the possibility is not to be excluded of the spontaneous ignition of the ABM interceptor's engine. This did happen, in particular, with the powder boosters on the Soviet anti-aircraft missiles which, fortunately, are nonnuclear (see the newspaper TRUD, 20 November 1990). There was also a case of the spontaneous launching of an American Patriot missile during the hostilities in the Persian Gulf Region. And what would happen if such a thing occurred with a Moscow nuclear ABM interceptor? Would this be a "Moscow Chernobyl" or a "Moscow Hiroshima"?

This entire undertaking with the nuclear "mining" of Moscow appears a monstrous piling up of the absurd. Some thought should have been given to whether the Moscow antimissile defenses should have been built like the American Safeguard System which is clearly unsuitable for the antimissile defense of cities and is designed solely for defending the launch silos of the ICBM. Because of this they are protected by concrete against the air nuclear explosion of the warheads of the ballistic missiles and antimissile interceptors. Clearly here they disregarded the fact that even the Americans themselves

abandoned their Safeguard system and its nuclear anti-missile interceptors and have mothballed the launch silos designed for them.

They have begun to develop the scientific concepts for nonnuclear ABM systems which provide the identification and destruction of the ballistic warheads in the zone beyond the atmosphere in near space and at safe altitudes for the defended installations!

The newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 31 January 1991 announced that "An ERIS interceptor launched from the testing grounds at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific at an altitude of 100 miles had intercepted and upon impact destroyed the warhead of a Minuteman ICBM launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in the USA. During the test they employed decoys which impeded the detection of the warheads." This is what the U.S. antimissile designers have been working on since the conclusion of the antimissile defense treaty in 1972! But ours during this very same time were creating a nuclear disaster around Moscow, copying the technical ideas which had long since been discarded by the Americans! And here they clearly overlooked the fact that it was the USSR in 1961 which achieved this for the first time in domestic and world practice. In 11 successful intercepts we demonstrated the nonnuclear destruction of ballistic warheads from the kinetic energy of their impacting with the destructive elements of the interceptors. Five launches of ABM interceptors were also carried out in the aim of developing the elements of heat-seeking homing heads.

In letters sent at different times to L.I. Brezhnev, D.F. Ustinov, L.V. Smirnov, Yu.V. Andropov and L.N. Zaykov, specialists attempted to draw the attention of the prominent leaders of our state to the bad and blindalley situation which had come into being in the USSR in the area of ABM defense. However, these attempts ended with the authors of the letters being transferred in their jobs, with dismissals and expulsion from the party. They were undone by the multitiered interdepartmental cover-ups of the officials and rogues of science in the scientific-research institutes and design bureaus who were growing fat from the hopeless projects for ABM defense similar to a Soviet Safeguard. And for a "scientific" reinforcement of this cover-up, upon the initiative of the Ministries of Radio Industry and Defense, an interagency commission was set up under the "objective" chairmanship of Academician Ye.P. Velikhov. The commission—as was required of it—stated that the work being done in the USSR on ABM defense was in the right direction.

With the presence of such a conclusion by the commission, there is no need to go into the letter sent by the author of these lines to M.S. Gorbachev on 20 June 1987 and which, in particular, proposed that the nuclear ABM interceptors be withdrawn from Moscow, while an overall plan and program would be worked out for the interdisciplinary problem of ABM defense. Alas, the only response to this letter was an attempt to have the

"competent bodies" "nail" the author by bringing suit for violating security provisions.

Recently, as is known, M.S. Gorbachev agreed with the proposal of G. Bush to begin talks on the question of nonnuclear ABM defense systems. We would like to believe that this would attract the attention of the USSR President (and possibly that of both the RSFSR President and the mayor of Moscow), if not to the problems of ABM defense, at least to the question of clearing the nuclear ABM interceptors from around Moscow.

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Case for Joint Space Defenses Rebutted

PM2802160992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Feb 92 pp 2,3

[Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev article under the rubric "Military Observer's Notes": "Brilliant Pebbles' Over Russia And Vaults Under It"]

[Text] What awaits us in the near future if we continue to philosophize about a global space protection system?

For over six months now questions of creating an ABM space defense system have been actively discussed in our society. They have now become very topical in connection with the fact that B.N. Yeltsin has recently proposed that a joint global space defense system be created, based on the U.S. SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] and Russian defense complex development projects.

Where Did the Pebbles Come From

The first proposals on the "internationalization," or to be more precise, the occupation of space, came from across the ocean a few years ago. This was followed by hints from the United States along the lines of: If our side shut its eyes to the 1972 ABM Treaty, we would be admitted into SDI, whose purpose is exclusively to protect against rogue intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The scientific world has now started talking with all its might about a joint global protection system. The reason for this is the American "Brilliant Pebbles" technology. Its authors have essentially put forward a new ABM defense system. What does it comprise? A group of small missiles (weighing up to 40 kg) are permanently in space in a "suspended" state; these are self-guided toward an infra-red radiation source. Such a missile is called a "Brilliant Pebble." It is capable of attacking a missile in its boost phase from space. According to experts' claims, in conjunction with a space information system capable of registering the launch of a missile and performing the task of target allocation, "Brilliant Pebbles" will direct the necessary number of "pebbles" at the target.

That is the technology that the world community could press into service according to certain scientists at home and abroad (and as we can see, they have gotten as far as the Russian president's door). The reins of control could

be concentrated in the United Nations. According to Academician N. Moiseyev, the initiator of discussions in *ZA RUBEZHOM* newspaper, every launch of a ballistic missile which is not sanctioned by a special UN commission would automatically trigger the targeting at this missile of a number of "Brilliant Pebbles" which would shoot it down in the boost phase.

"Brilliant Pebbles" is an important component of the SDI program, whose formation was announced by U.S. President R. Reagan in March 1983. Since that time the program has undergone certain amendments. In 1988, with the emergence of the concept of "Brilliant Pebbles" space interceptors. And in 1990-1991, with the change in the military-political situation in the world, when a new ABM structure was put forward geared to repulsing only limited strikes rather than a full-scale threat. It was given the name GPALS—"Global Protection Against Limited Strikes." And it looked attractive. Because it is allegedly not targeted against Russia, a strike from whom it is not capable of deterring. A basis for discussions on joint projects emerged.

Until recently the disputes were of a purely theoretical nature. Today they have materialized into an initiative of the Russian president. And that is rather more than an abstract discussion between academics. Boris Yeltsin stated that "we are prepared to jointly elaborate a global protection system instead of SDI, and subsequently create and jointly use it." So far it has not been clarified which of the specialists prepared the proposals for the president's statement. Speaking in Geneva 12 February, Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev explained that the initiative presupposes joint research which would "help solve the problem of preventing the 'brain drain' from the defense complex of the nuclear-space states." The results of such work could be used "for peaceful purposes in the interests of the whole international community."

What Do the Americans Want?

First of all, something about the reaction on the other side of the ocean to the Russian president's initiative. So far the Americans have reacted in an excessively restrained way. So far, as U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker's recent visit to Moscow confirmed, the sides have not reached mutual understanding on Yeltsin's proposal. Admittedly there is the agreement on the creation of a joint center for early warning of the launch of ballistic missiles (it has not yet been decided either where it will be located or when construction will start).

It seems that this might have been expected. It would be naive to hope that the Americans will now give us a share in and access to state-of-the-art "star wars" technology (if only in the light of the ban on American companies participating in laying down telephone fiber optic cable to Siberia). Because originally SDI was created for other purposes—to achieve military-strategic supremacy over the former Soviet Union. Although in fact, with the adoption of the GPALS program, they stated that the

most important thing for them now is protection against limited missile strikes, that is, accidental unsanctioned missile launches.

It seems that the GPALS system is a subtle and far-sighted step for the transatlantic strategists. Why? We will deal with that aspect a bit later. But now, something about the purpose of the system.

The Americans want to develop the country's ABM defense system. It is proposed that the GPALS system will consist of two tiers—a ground-based one and a space-based one. For its part, the ground-based one will consist of two components—a strategic one, intended for the protection of U.S. territory from a limited strategic ballistic missile strike, and a tactical one, to protect the troops of the United States and their allies in a theater of military operations from strikes by operational-tactical and tactical missiles. So, it is planned that the strategic component will have up to 750 long-range ground-launched stationary interceptor missiles (which is 7.5 times greater than the corresponding restrictions established by the 1974 protocol to the ABM Treaty), as well as mobile radar facilities. The tactical component's interception system, that is, the "Patriot" surface-to-air missile system, does not come under the treaty. It is intended that the space-based tier of GPALS will have an all-purpose system: up to 1,000 space-based interceptor missiles and orbital systems tracking ballistic missile warheads and issuing target destinations, including for ground-launched interceptor missiles. It is considered that GPALS is capable of intercepting 200 warheads in the event of a missile strike on U.S. territory.

The main difficulty for the Americans is that in order to implement these plans you have to go (far) beyond the framework of the ABM Treaty. At the moment the Americans themselves do not want to violate it. How would they look in the eyes of the world community? But apparently if our initiatives continue to be ill-considered, the United States will receive Russia's blessing to get out of the ABM Treaty. After all, joint work on the defense initiative and observance of the treaty's provisions are simply incompatible. In a word, at first the Americans receive the blessing for a limited protection system. The technology that has been developed will enable them to beef up [uplotnit] ABM defense on U.S. territory in a short time and fill space with "Brilliant Pebbles." Thus, by the year 2005, kinetic energy weapons and laser complex weapons actually in space [sentence as published]. And that means introducing an extremely strong destabilizing factor into our lives.

And then, according to experts, the development of defensive weapons cannot be seen in isolation from the improvement of offensive weapons. It turns out that the Americans are more familiar with Hegelian dialectics than we are. They are not only speeding up work on the creation of full-scale ABM defense, but they have also

started implementing a program for "taking out" (completely) a potential enemy's state-of-the-art ballistic missiles. Analysis shows that if they work successfully on the two fronts, they can achieve the complete neutralization of foreign strategic nuclear forces between the years 2000 and 2005. It is assumed that the effectiveness of the nuclear missile weapons which we, for example, will have left by then, will effectively be zero.

Soviet specialists had differing attitudes to the SDI program; frequently it was one of skepticism, like, for example, the attitude of many American missile officers to our own ABM defense: they say it would not withstand a massive strike. Both of them are right. Today or tomorrow, or approximately until the end of the century, SDI will scarcely be able to provide protection against a heavy strike—it will not be possible to intercept all missiles, and that means it is pointless to make a fuss. But what will happen the day after tomorrow?

The day after tomorrow, experts in the Joint Armed Forces High Command and the Russian defense complex, who did not want their names to be published in the press, believe, the capabilities of SDI will be such that it will quite simply be no longer necessary to maintain and service our ballistic missiles. If we stop improving offensive weapons, or more precisely weapons of deterrence, while across the ocean capital will be poured more actively every year into SDI, then soon we will simply not be in a position to penetrate the "Brilliant Umbrella."

Here we need another small explanation. Missiles are all different. Ballistic missiles of the first generations, which were not intended to penetrate ABM defenses, are one thing. Missiles that are capable of penetrating an ABM system are another. So step by step the Americans are forcing us to abandon the elaboration of various new missile programs. They themselves, however, are intensifying efforts in the implementation of defense initiatives, and indeed they are not giving up new offensive weapons systems.

Why have Soviet specialists become skeptical? Let us have a look at quotations that came from across the ocean last year.

"The Pentagon has carried out successful tests of the 'ERIS' ground-based exoatmospheric interceptor within the framework of the elaboration of the SDI program. It was launched from the Kwajalein Atoll test range in the Pacific Ocean and at an altitude of 100 miles intercepted and destroyed on contact a 'Minuteman' intercontinental ballistic missile launched from the Vandenberg (California) U.S. Air Force base. During the tests, decoys were used, which made it difficult to identify warheads. The use of an improved aiming and guidance system is assessed by certain American specialists as a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty."

"The U.S. Department of Defense has carried out a successful test of antimissile technology over Florida within the framework of the 'Star Wars' program. The

experiment was carried out with the assistance of measuring instruments which were put into the sky by a small research rocket which was successfully launched from Cape Canaveral. An experiment forming part of the 'Red Tigris' project culminated in the placing of actual and diversionary targets were at an altitude of 100-400 km. The data gathered will be used by scientists in the creation of sensors for satellites being developed for a 'Star Wars' anti-missile system based in space."

That information was about the technical aspect, and now something about the financial aspect.

"The U.S. Congress Senate Armed Services Committee advocated allocating \$4.6 billion in fiscal 1992 to realize programs within the framework of SDI. The so-called 'Star Wars' package was adopted. This package provides for deploying a ground-based ABM defense system using sensors based in space by 1996."

Things are no worse across the ocean on the second front either—in the business of missile "destruction." It seems that for a long time now, since Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power and the appearance in his entourage of what many believe to be a pro-American lobby, one side, in my view, has been making all the moves in the U.S.-USSR (Russia) chess game—both for itself and for its opponent.

The Soviet-American Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction and Limitation, which official Soviet experts evaluated as balanced and well thought-out, was signed 31 July 1991. While I do not object to that evaluation on the whole, let me draw attention to the following fact—we agreed to an overall reduction of 900 units, of which 154 are ICBMs, which is 50 percent of our existing total. (The United States will reduce delivery vehicles by 622 units.) While cutting its heavy missiles, the USSR undertook not to build, test, or deploy new types of these missiles, although they are entitled to modernize them. Note that the USSR made significant concessions, which were compensated by the United States' accepting an important condition. "Our partners have agreed to the demand to observe the 1972 ABM Treaty," Marshal Dmitry Yazov noted in his defense minister days, "because deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons are impossible without a ban on building and deploying a large-scale ABM defense system." Look closely at this sentence, esteemed reader.

In October 1991 U.S. President G. Bush launched an initiative in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, prompting reciprocal measures by the USSR. A week later M. Gorbachev issued a statement. The Soviet Union agreed to nonequivalent [neadekvatniye] measures. Today, however, I would just like to highlight certain provisions from the sides' commitments. First: The USSR undertook not to increase the number of rail-mobile ICBM rocket launchers and to refrain from modernizing these missiles. Thus, we did what the Americans had been seeking in the course of work on the START Treaty. The second fact: M. Gorbachev stated

that the USSR was stopping the development of small-scale intercontinental ballistic missiles. Admittedly, G. Bush declared that he had given orders to stop development of the "Peacekeeper" intercontinental ballistic missile. But let's be more precise: The Americans have abandoned a project which was still in the initial stages, whereas we have destroyed a completed missile. It had even been taken to the proving ground for a test launch, which did not take place.

And within the framework of the Russian-U.S. January initiatives the Americans have again relinquished something they do not yet have. For example, the construction of a new small intercontinental ballistic missile. Instead, they preferred to modernize the control and guidance systems for existing "Minuteman" missiles. For our part, a reduction in the number of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBN's) which are on alert duty was declared. I am focusing attention on this point for the following reason. Specialists have long recognized that the least vulnerable types of weapon are missile-armed submarines and mobile ground-based missile launchers. Their presence on both sides helps military-political stability as their invulnerability provides a second-strike capability, forestalling the temptation to strike first. Now the Americans are insisting on the accelerated destruction of our multiple-warhead heavy missiles, in particular the RS-20 (SS-18), while preserving their superiority in submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

It would seem that other criteria for stability have been found across the ocean. They would like Russia to be left with silos containing old single-warhead missiles which would be no match for the ABM defense system being deployed. In short, it could be that eventually (and experts believe that this could happen by the year 2005) Russia will have American "pebbles" above it and vaults containing nuclear weapons below it (what else can you call silos housing target missiles for the the "pebbles?"). Our weapons' effectiveness will be equivalent to "zero," and the "Brilliant Pebbles" will be able to destroy any missile from our silos directly, in the boost phase. This means that the nuclear missile deterrence factor will disappear.

I have to say that I am by no means an advocate of harsh confrontation. But the complete neutralization of the Russian shield will result in great instability in our life (objectively), despite the fact that most countries have peace-loving governments in power. Not for nothing are the French and British preserving their strategic potential as their pride and joy. At the same time it should not be forgotten that nuclear weapons were used once before to destroy two peaceful cities, and the decision, let us note, was made in the very place from which today's moves for the expedited creation of SDI derive.

Remember the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station

That is how things stand. Now it is being proposed that we set up an international space protection system. Protection against whom? Let's listen to what one

learned gentleman, Academician N. Moiseyev, had to say: "The system will safeguard mankind from possible 'nuclear terrorism.' It will obviate the need for national nuclear arsenals while nonetheless preserving a small quantity of nuclear weapons under the strict control of a specialist international commission." But the terrorists don't have any missiles yet and are unlikely to have in the near future. Should they so wish, they will find dozens of other ways of delivering a nuclear bomb to its target. Remember how Mattheus Rust flew unhindered onto Moscow's Red Square. That very same day and in the very same type of aircraft—a Cessna—another pilot, Rafael del Pino from the Cuban Air Force, having decided to quit his homeland, crossed into U.S. air space without encountering any obstacles. As far as we know, he was not expected and he was only discovered at the point of landing. SDI is intended to combat the ballistic missiles of those countries which possess them, not terrorists. Russia's involvement in the "Brilliant Umbrella" is unlikely to make a great contribution to the fight against international terrorism: However, it will constitute Russia's blessing for the burial of the ABM Treaty, a fact which in the final analysis is of little benefit to anybody. Of course, access to state-of-the-art technology is important. And after that, joint work—this is a major step toward mutual understanding between two countries. Nevertheless, it is vital to think three times over before entering into an alliance in the sphere of SDI.

Thus, so far the United States has not made a single step which cannot be construed ambiguously. Since Reagan's time we have been made offers of cooperation, but it is a fairly strange kind of cooperation. Transatlantic specialists are moving toward the creation of a joint center to obtain early warning of ballistic missile launches while at the same time seeking to raze the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station to the ground. And there is cause to remember this today. Recently, Krasnoyarsk Kray Governor A. Veprev and Kray Presidential Representative Yu. Moskvich sent B. Yeltsin a letter asking that dismantling of the radar station building be suspended—the apparatus has already been dismantled. The building was handed over to the "Energetik" Association under the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy for use in the national economy, and there are plans to start producing furniture and joinery items. Kray leaders believe that if five stories of the building are preserved it could provide 60,000 square meters of production space and save around 200 million rubles in capital investment. But the Americans demand that it be reduced to "nothing." And the issue at hand is a radar station which was actually intended to monitor outer space, as the Americans are well aware having visited Krasnoyarsk: That is, it is intended for the very purposes which some of our own experts are now proposing that we strive to achieve together. Where is the sense in this?

Our defense complex is not experiencing the best of times but it is still capable of a great deal. It is possible that we will not acquire any new technology and that the Americans will have no qualms about using our achievements at no expense

whatsoever, which is in fact what they are doing already. In the authoritative weekly AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Alan Brown declared that for a long time now American military specialists have been actively employing inventions by Soviet scientists. Scientific advances by the Soviet physicist Petr Ufimtsev, published in 1962, meant a saving of up to 40 percent of the money allocated for the program to create the "Stealth" fighter, he noted. The Americans are showing an interest in Soviet "Topaz-2" space nuclear reactors, which are suitable for spy satellites, and the hypersonic ramjet engine which underwent testing at the end of last year. Such tests in the United States are scheduled at best for three or four years' time... Perhaps what will happen is—and again I must stress this—that our work will be used and we will never be given a key to the "Brilliant Umbrella." After all, the multinational forces which overpowered Iraq comprised contingents from many countries, but the decisions were made in Washington by the American leadership, headed by an American general.

In short, the following conclusion suggests itself. It is vital to perfect our own defense weapons and to devise state-of-the-art technology within the framework of the ABM Treaty, which has prevented the militarization of space up to now. And what needs to be discussed, it seems, is not the merits of a nonexistent global space protection system but rather how to ensure that "Brilliant Pebbles" with a transatlantic trademark do not twinkle over Russia.

Kuklev Defends ABM Treaty, Skrunda Radar Station

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[Text] Some experts believe a Soviet-American antimissile defense limitation treaty signed almost 20 years ago has no future. According to them, the treaty's foundations have been shaken by the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, ideas of a global antimissile defense system.

A Radio Moscow correspondent asked the deputy chief of the law department in the CIS Unified Armed Forces General Staff, Major General Vladimir Kuklev, to comment on this problem.

[Kuklev recording in Russian fading into English translation] We stand firmly for the preservation of the antimissile defense treaty, which continues to play an important role in the provision of strategic stability. Without it, the reduction stipulated in the START treaty as well as the latest cuts initiated by the American and Russian presidents would be impossible. [end recording]

In Vladimir Kuklev's view, the antimissile defense treaty may finally become outdated, but not before the global antimissile defense system—if a positive decision is adopted—transforms from a political idea into a reality and comes into operation. It will apparently take much time, during which stability is to be maintained by the existing antimissile defense treaty.

But to make it this way, it is necessary to resolve some pressing problems first. One such problem is the question of a former Soviet missile attack warning radar station in Latvia, now a sovereign state which did not enter the new Commonwealth set up by the former Soviet republics. General Kuklev now presents his opinion on the matter:

[Kuklev recording fading to translation] I think the conditions for this station to remain in Latvia must be negotiated with its government. It is quite obvious that no matter what legal basis is used—a lease agreement or whatever it may be—the operation of the station should be ensured since it is an element in the general antimissile warning network. Any breakdown in its operation that may occur could affect stability, one thing that the Latvian government cannot fail to understand. [end recording]

Cost, Security Problems Seen in Joint ABM Defenses

MK0403115592 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Mar 92 p 2

["Opinion" by Aleksey Arbatov, director of Center for Disarmament and Strategic Stability, Foreign Policy Association: "Joint SDI: Will It Promote Anyone's Security? There Are No Free Lunches in Politics Or in Strategy"]

[Text] The Russian leadership's initiative on jointly creating global ABM defenses with the United States has once again prompted discussion of what seemed a totally hackneyed problem over the last few years. A. Savelyev's interview headlined "SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] Is Optimum Scenario for Joint Defense System for Us" (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 18 February 1992) injects a new, extremely unexpected turn into the debates.

Before examining this specialist's idea, let us remember the crux of the issue. The position espoused by the supporters of the current limited version of SDI is that a ground- and space-based ABM system is needed to repulse individual missile attacks by Third World countries, nuclear terrorists, or unauthorized accidental launches.

It is claimed that both sides' deployment of ABM systems as agreed during the talks will not weaken their mutual ability to inflict a retaliatory strike since defensive systems will only have a limited intercept capability. In other words, defense systems will not make it possible to inflict a first strike and repulse retaliation using ABM defenses.

The opponents of expanding ABM systems retort that "limited" ABM systems costing \$50 billion each will not perform their tasks, will divert resources from more

effective ways of resolving the problem, and may moreover create considerable difficulties for strategic relations between the great powers.

Start with the fact that an intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] is the most costly and awkward delivery vehicle for nuclear munitions for a regime like Saddam Husayn's or for a terrorist group. It cannot be concealed, it is an ideal target on the launch pad for an air or missile strike, and it takes tremendous resources to maintain in a state of combat readiness.

If terrorists or new [Saddam] Husayns acquire nuclear weapons, they will put them on an aircraft, cutter, or mobile operational-tactical missile. A space-based ABM system will not provide protection from this. Moreover, if the great powers deploy ABM defenses that will tell criminals many years in advance to concentrate on other means of delivering nuclear missiles apart from ICBM's.

The irrationality of SDI is particularly obvious if you take into consideration the fact that the tens of billions of dollars allocated for it will not be used for more effective ways of combating the threat. I am referring to expanding the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspectorate; new (including space-based) systems to monitor the use of nuclear technology and materials; funding an economic "stick and carrot" regime depending on the line taken by states, including CIS members, on questions of nuclear nonproliferation; and creating kinds of AES [nuclear electric power station], etc. that are safer from this viewpoint.

Finally, money is also needed for international armed forces capable of implementing military sanctions against people who violate the nonproliferation regime. Russia and the United States may need to cooperate in creating reliable mobile ABM systems to provide protection against tactical missiles, new defense systems, aviation, and cruise missiles and in improving airspace surveillance systems.

Given the worsening budgetary problems in both Russia and the United States, there is not enough money for everything. Choosing SDI will of course support military-space firms in our country and the United States, but it will make the situation for the rest of the defense industry, not to mention the civilian economy, even more difficult. As for security, a space shield may protect us from imaginary threats in the next century. However, it will take away money needed to cope with more earthly, real dangers this decade.

It is obvious that this choice is even more acute for Russia than for the United States, not only for economic reasons, but also because of the problems within the CIS. Where are the early-warning ABM radars, the bases for ground-launched interceptor missiles, the new space communications stations, and modernized cosmodromes to be sited? With which enterprises are orders to be placed and where are transport routes and control and power supply lines going to go?

If everything happens on Russian territory alone, the other republics will immediately realize that Moscow has decided to defend itself without them and maybe even against them. It is simply hard to think up a better way of finishing off the CIS. But if the work is set in train within the present CIS, who will guarantee that the question will not arise in the near future of dividing up an ABM system that has cost many billions? Strategically and technically this is even greater madness than dividing up nuclear weapons. And is it certain that during the ABM's system's life cycle (it takes 10-15 years to deploy alone) Russia will have common enemies and allies with all its current CIS partners?

A host of problems arises in connection with the idea of joint SDI also with regard to Russian-U.S. bilateral relations. Everything indicates that Washington sees joint actions mainly as joint revision of the ABM treaty and nothing more. The United States will hardly make its own security and tremendous capital investments dependent on the development of the situation in Russia and the CIS. The instability and unpredictability of this situation are recognized everywhere as one of the incentives for continuing the U.S. SDI program.

The concept of a "dual key" for control of space-based ABM defenses is hardly feasible. Though it is simpler and safer to create a dual "lock" on strategic offensive arms, the Americans are somehow in no hurry to make this suggestion. Incidentally, cheaper, more effective devices for averting an accidental missile launch can indeed be developed—you only have to set a joint Russian-U.S. team of engineers the task.

Even with the most favorable course of relations between the two powers, the strategic dimension of these relations will consist for a long time to come in mutual deterrence—albeit with greatly reduced levels of potentials and with growing cooperation in ensuring strategic stability. That is the objective reality and it cannot be canceled out by a simple effort of political will, however much you may want to devise a rapid, simple way out of the situation that has taken shape. Dismantling gigantic arsenals of destruction that have taken decades to accumulate requires painstaking, dogged work, especially since during the seventies and eighties talks served more to legalize the arms race than to stop it. This work may be hampered by the deployment of ABM systems, which drastically complicates the balance and creates tremendous uncertainty regardless of the sides' intentions.

In view of all the above considerations and a number of others there is still considerable opposition in both Russia and the United States to the plans for a joint or parallel SDI program. Admittedly, the Russian leadership's recent initiatives will evidently help the Bush Administration to relax for a while the tough restrictions that the Capitol imposed on funding of the program. However, there are hardly grounds for considering the deployment of a space-based ABM system a foregone conclusion or for giving the ABM Treaty up for lost.

The U.S. Government's policy toward our country has of late merited the highest assessment. But strengthening relations with the United States is not equivalent to agreeing with the current administration in every respect. Especially since there are other influential forces in the United States apart from the administration that advocate friendship and cooperation with Russia, but oppose wastefulness in the form of a space-based anti-missile system.

Now, let us return to the aforementioned article by A. Savelyev. It voices support for a space-based ABM program to provide protection from third countries and unauthorized launches. It claims that defense does not destabilize mutual deterrence since it will be incapable of stopping a retaliatory strike. The ABM Treaty is written off, and it is proposed that it be replaced with an agreement on the deployment of the kind of antimissile system that the United States is planning. All these ideas are nothing new and their untenability was mentioned above. But there is also an original idea here. Rightly pointing to the fact that Russia is now having difficulty in setting about creating its own similar system, the expert recommends that we "join" the U.S. SDI. In other words, we will help the United States eliminate the ABM Treaty and legalize SDI and in return for this it will protect us free of charge with a space shield from third countries and accidental launches. Rapidly, profitably, and safely, so to speak.

But that is only at first glance. The Americans will make us pay, and a great deal at that, for this protection. Which would, incidentally, be quite fair. A. Savelyev points out, for instance, that the current SDI scenario is designed to intercept 200 missiles at most, yet we have more than 2,000. So, the writer reassures us, this system won't intercept any retaliatory attack on our part.

But something that suits our specialist will hardly suit the U.S. taxpayer. He will say: What is going on, are we going to spend tens of billions of dollars defending ourselves and the Russians from the main threat while they continue to aim thousands of nuclear warheads at the United States? Food aid is one thing, but protecting defense might is something else again.

No, Americans will demand, let Russia unilaterally eliminate its nuclear arms. Especially since, as the author admits, the need for SDI is dictated by the situation within the CIS and the emergence there of three nuclear powers and seats of instability and tension. Since that is the case, let the Russians reorganize and redeploy their army and fleet as Washington says and in general accept U.S. leadership like other countries under the U.S. umbrella.

Russian-U.S. relations will change radically, there will hardly be a question of equal partnership. Or of any reciprocity in the talks, of maintaining the stability of mutual deterrence, or of mutual cuts in potential. After all, there is no question of this between the United States and Britain, much less between the United States and

Japan or Germany. Yet the latter hold powerful economic trump cards...The new Russia will have to forget any autonomous role for a long time. To use an American expression, "there is no such thing as a free lunch" in politics or in military-strategic relations between the great powers.

Russia does not need its own or a U.S. space-based ABM system for its security. The same goes for U.S. security, which is what the overwhelming majority of prestigious U.S. independent specialists say. Strategically speaking, despite all our current economic and political troubles, we can continue to develop relations with the United States on the basis of equal cooperation in the interests of stability and mutual security. Provided, of course, that we do not take hasty, ill-considered steps.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Further on Baltic Troop Withdrawal Talks

NWGF Commander: Withdrawal 'Complex, Difficult'

*LD0103131892 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1311 GMT 23 Feb 92*

[Interview with Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, by correspondent Valentina Bochkova in Riga on 23 February; from the "Authors' Channel in the First Person" program—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Bochkova] Just like you, thousands of officers and soldiers have served. Now, the destinies of many soldiers here in the Baltic republics are being ruined. The first round of intergovernmental talks has taken place. Have relations stabilized perhaps between the Soviet Army, the former Soviet Army, which is customarily called an occupation army here, and the local authorities, so to speak customs officers, etc? How do you look at the situation which has now come about, at least in our Latvia?

[Mironov] I think that outwardly all this—the interrelations—has remained at the same level. But the analysis of the entire situation which is taking place, in this case in the Latvian Republic, is nevertheless putting me on my guard that it gradually has a tendency towards worsening. This may not be very correct on my part, but increasingly it is not the voice of reasonable politicians that is prevailing but the voice of nationalist positions, including in the press. This is also true of the debates which are taking place in the Supreme Soviet. It is not necessary to be or to have some intelligence service, there are officially printed publications. We analyze them and they put us on guard.

[Bochkova] After each program of ours which touches either upon questions of the work of the customs department or questions of social security, we receive very many calls from servicemen. What is to be done? How

do you see all these problems inasmuch as you are now the commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces [NWGF]? How do you yourself see the future of those who so far are subordinate to you and the future of those who have already completed their service?

[Mironov] You have asked a question which one could take days to answer, or at least not answer, but take issue on. It is very complicated in its structure and as regards the subquestions which lie behind it. I will say only one thing: Just like any other person, a commander is also a person and he expects responsible political solutions from both the leaders of the Russian Federation and the leaders of each of the three Baltic republics. But this does not at all mean that we are just sitting here waiting. Of course a whole set of measures is being carried out by the command of the group which is aimed at—prior to the achievement of such agreements, treaties—somehow alleviating some negative processes which are taking place now.

[Bochkova] How is this being done?

[Mironov] Both through personal contacts of the commander and his deputies and assistants with a whole range of leaders of some republic, and through precise reactions to any rumors which, from our position are assessed negatively, encroach on the rights not only of servicemen and the members of their families, but also of blue-collar and white-collar workers, pensioners of the Defense Ministry.

At the end of the day we worked out a whole package of those, well, not demands, but proposals which we, with our vision, placed in the overall complex of problems which have to be resolved during the talks. There are also rather material things. For example—although we are much abused for this, but that is their business and we regard it as our right and duty—it is not just that we are now engaged in tackling matters connected with the social protection of people including making housing available to our people, and here I have in mind that which we get from the sale of military technical properties. It is of course possible to judge in a variety of ways whether we succeeded a lot or a little in doing this, but I think that thanks to (?activity) we succeeded in fulfilling the 1991 building program.

We have already succeeded in purchasing a few things—this is no longer calculated in single units or dozens, but hundreds of apartments on the territory of the Russian Federation for officers and ensigns going into the reserve or retirement. I think this activity will spread.

[Bochkova] Valeriy Ivanovich, will this activity affect people? This is a question which was posed to me today over the telephone—before running over here I was able to reply to a number of telephone calls—do you think of the fate of servicemen who are already in the reserve and who, perhaps as a result of some moral considerations, would not want to remain here on the territory of the

Latvian Republic despite the fact that they have apartments. However, I understand there is a question mark over these apartments too.

[Mironov] This is a very sore subject in human terms, but at the same time it is necessary to understand that given all our involvement in tackling this problem one must not adopt the approach that it is only military people who should resolve it. This should be a state program. It is just that we cannot manage it. Today, for example, I cited the figures that if today we have somewhere around 10,000 troops in the group as a whole without housing—and that does not relate to the Baltic Fleet, if today the officers and administrative staff whose apartments have become official ones are deprived of this space, then this will already be somewhere of the order of 30,000-35,000. If one adds to this those who are in reserve, it is an impossible task.

The other question: Inasmuch as this is possible for us—conducting this commercial activity, as people are now calling it, although we are not commercial people—then of course we shall and are taking account of the interests of the pensioners of the Ministry of Defense, various favorable terms for the sale of military and technical property, and equipment. Thus people should be able, if only at the outset, to get on their feet to fulfill their goals. But I say again, and I am convinced of this, that this should be a quite clearly defined state program.

[Bochkova] Valeriy Ivanovich, you say a clearly defined state program. Do you think this should be a mutual program presented by the Russian side and the Latvian side or do you think that one side should work out such a program and get on with implementing it?

[Mironov] I think that the two sides should tackle this. For example, to strike a pose and say that everything is ours, I regard this as wrong. Views are being built on the wrong principles. If one speaks of evacuating—I have no fear of this word—a former military person, then this evacuation must be compensated. At whose expense? If this accommodation was built at the expense of Ministry of Defense, then let's talk in a human, civilized way. We shall hand over this accommodation, but in exchange build on the territory of the Russian Federation.

[Bochkova] Excuse me, Valeriy Ivanovich, but on precisely this topic during the first stage of these interstate talks... excuse me, I am changing subjects because we were speaking with Deputy Dobelis. He actually attended this special commission and he said that because Latvia has experience of construction in Tyumen Oblast they are able to help the builders. Was this just his personal idea?

[Mironov] Yes, the issue has been raised. It has to be properly understood that (?so far there has been no elaboration of specific agreements or decisions). As you know, the delegations did not sign any treaties or agreements but only communiques. This is just de facto the start of talks, nothing more. These issues were mentioned but here perhaps, as far as I understand the

Latvian side in this case, and the words of Mr. Dobelis, the Latvian side is now posing the question differently: that using our forces we agree to help construction on the territory of Russia for Russian money. This, in my view, is a quite different formulation of the issue.

[Bochkova] Valeriy Ivanovich, you are saying that for the time being there is nothing concrete in these talks. From the start there was the first stage of talks set for the end of February and this has now evidently been shifted slightly to the start of March, but how do you perhaps perceive, apart from the fact that you presumably have intuition and are a pretty experienced person, how do you perceive when this concrete element may appear?

[Mironov] It is very difficult to respond to this question in concrete terms, and I will say only that after the talks mentioned earlier, an expert group in Vilnius—there were experts from the Russian and Lithuanian sides—worked with us for a whole week. Our side was headed by special envoy Issakov. There were no big results from the work of experts. For this reason I think that all these talks will be very complex and difficult.

[Bochkova] Yes, I sensed that, because you are nevertheless proposing that the withdrawal, the optimum timescale for withdrawal, is about five years, right? The same Yuris Dobelis speaks of two years. Do you think that is too quick?

[Mironov] Each side has to justify in full the principles based on the realities. It is necessary. After all, I understand the arguments of Mr. Dobelis [words indistinct]. To have declared as property all military equipment, weapons, military property, moveable and immovable and so on, it is possible to ask the question—undress all these Russian muzhiks or cowards—probably one ought not to speak like that on the radio, build and let them walk off. A private will reach the border in just 24 or 48 hours and once he has crossed it, the withdrawal has been effected.

But that is not how things will be. Not like that. We have no intention, no intention of loading up people into convoys and driving them off into uncertainty. When all these questions are resolved in a civilized manner—it is true that I am bored with this word, of speaking about civilization against a background of uncivilized actions—when all these questions are resolved at the level of delegations, at the level of governments, and signed, each side will accurately fulfill these agreements which have been reached and then the true process of withdrawing the troops will get under way. [passage omitted]

Shakhray on Withdrawal Talks

*PM0203122492 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Feb 92 p 1*

[Report by unidentified "our correspondent" from Moscow under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Schedule for Troop Withdrawal From Baltics Will Be Generous, Sergey Shakhray Believes"]

[Text] In the latest edition of the Russian Television program "Bez Retushi" ["Nothing Retouched"], journalists from a number of Moscow newspapers met with Sergey Shakhray, vice premier of the Russian Government and Russian Federation state counselor on legal policy. As always, each of the participants in the program was able to conduct a brief interview and clarify the interviewee's views on particular problems.

Since Sergey Shakhray is head of the Russian delegation at talks with the Baltic states on the withdrawal of the troops of the Northwestern Group, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA representative's question dealt with that issue. Sergey Mikhailovich stressed in his replies that only the date of the start of the withdrawal of troops has been determined, and that the entire process will take place in the context of expediency and depending on the factors that influence this process. One binding factor is, of course, the provision of reliable social guarantees for servicemen and their families.

The vice premier also answered a question about the fate of S. Parfenov, former staffer of the Riga OMON [special-purpose militia detachment]. The subject was the rumors that Shakhray had held talks in Riga on Parfenov's release. "No," Sergey Mikhaylovich replied, "I held no official talks, there were private conversations of a consultative nature."

Officers Seek 'Social Guarantees'

*OW0203222192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1843 GMT 2 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Officers' Council of the Northwestern group of forces has urged Russian President Boris Yeltsin to provide social guarantees for the military leaving the Baltics. The Council submitted to the Russian parliament a request to adopt a legislation banning demobilization of officers who have no housing in the Commonwealth countries. First Vice Commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, Lieutenant General Feodor Melvichuk said this at a news conference in Riga March 2.

The Officers' Council called on Commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces Mironov and Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Unified Armed Forces Shaposhnikov to coordinate the timetable of the withdrawal with the Russian Government with the purpose of ensuring social guarantees.

In the opinion of Melvichuk, troops may be pulled out of the Baltics within 6-7 years.

Chairman of the Officers' Council, Colonel Vladimir Kondalovskiy told the news conference that some military units, such as those stationed in Parnu and Daugavpils, refuse to abandon the Baltics due to the housing problem.

Lithuanians Still Dissatisfied on CIS Troop Withdrawal

Delay in Air Defense Unit Pullout From Mickunai

PM0103134392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Feb 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 2

[Report by Igor Laskevich: "Withdrawal of Troops from Lithuania Did Not Start 25 February. New Date of 3 March Announced"]

[Text] Those expecting on Tuesday [25 February] morning a convoy of combat equipment and servicemen of the air defense division stationed in the settlement of Mickunai, on the outskirts of Vilnius, to head for the Lithuanian-Belarusian border and then to Russia were clearly disappointed: Their expectations were not realized.

First and foremost, the withdrawal of troops as such, that is to say, the complete redeployment of the combined unit of air defense troops from Lithuanian territory did not take place. And although Colonel V. Grigoryev, commander of the unit, confirmed to your correspondent that the official date for the start of withdrawal should indeed be regarded as 25 February, no specific actions for the large-scale redeployment of the unit had been taken.

Grigoryev then explained matters to me: The combined unit was completely ready to withdraw—which, incidentally, it had demonstrated at the inspection carried out in the morning—but the actual withdrawal of the subunit from the republic will now take place only on 3 March. According to him, during this week Russian and Lithuanian experts are to work out the property issues, transfer and receive the military installation, and resolve other questions; and only then will the combined unit head off to its new place of deployment—"the western borders of Russia."

Such a scenario for the withdrawal of the first military subunit from Lithuanian territory will scarcely suit the Lithuanian side. The day before the press attache of the Lithuanian parliament informed journalists of the opinion of V. Landsbergis, who queried whether the present redeployment can be regarded as the real start of troop withdrawal.

Landsbergis stressed that an accord had been reached at the January meeting with Yeltsin on the immediate withdrawal of Russian Armed Forces from the Lithuanian capital, which is not the case here.

The purely numerical factor—what is being withdrawn and how much—will scarcely satisfy Lithuania either. The division, which is armed with anti-aircraft missile launchers, together with officers, NCO's, and soldiers, numbers over 100 service personnel. Meanwhile, according to official statistics, very large military formations are stationed in Lithuania: four divisions—two airborne assault divisions, one motorized rifle division,

and one division of marines, plus units of air defense and military aviation. There is a substantial grouping of troops in Vilnius.

Lithuania is most interested of all in their withdrawal. However, back in January, at the meeting of Lithuanian and Russian state delegations on the problem of troop withdrawal, when the timetable for the start of withdrawal—February—was planned, it became clear that the timetable was unrealistic and was due more to political considerations than common sense.

The date only looked impressive on paper. The reality, however, was much more daunting. Servicemen could not and were reluctant to attempt to do more to pass muster. The choice therefore fell on a mobile, small subunit such as the Mickunai division. Moreover, as officers of the unit informed me, they have been promised more or less normal social and everyday living conditions "on the western border of Russia," which, according to available information, is Leningrad Oblast.

Incidentally, judging by the calm reaction of J. Paujolis, deputy minister of territorial protection, who heads the inspection group, the Lithuanian side was prepared for such a development of events.

"An inspection of the inventory and the environmental and epidemiological state of the installation will be carried out," he stated, "and the results will become known on 27 February."

And yet, despite the political upheavals surrounding the problem of troop withdrawal, the long process of phased redeployment of the Russian Armed Forces from Lithuania has started. It is difficult at present to say how it will proceed or when it is to be expected to finish. The individual stages of withdrawal, property issues, inspections, and the sequence—which subunits withdraw when and from where—all these problems will be the topic of discussion at subsequent meetings of experts.

...A small Russian flag was to be seen in the cab window of one of the powerful tow vehicles. When the driver noticed I was looking, he waved to indicate going home...

Landsbergis: Exit 'Dragging Out'

LD0203204692 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 2 Mar 92

[Text] The Baltic News Service agency has reported that in his regular address on television on Sunday [1 March] evening, Vytautas Landsbergis stressed that Russia has not yet started the withdrawal of troops, that they are dragging it out. What is most important, according to Landsbergis, is that one has arrived at the conclusion that Russia is not showing any intention of starting the withdrawal of units stationed in Vilnius. In his opinion, this is the most important agreement because it was signed by President Yeltsin. The negotiations are disrupted, dragged out, the agreed meetings with the experts do not take place or end with no results with the

representatives of Russia, or the armed forces unexpectedly announce that they have no authorization. There is much similarity in this with the recent times of Ryzhkov, Doguzhiyev, Lukyanov, and Gorbachev, Vytautas Landsbergis said.

He said that as in Gorbachev's time, seeking help from the West will continue so that the troops are withdrawn as soon as possible. According to Vytautas Landsbergis, sometimes one can already hear intentions voiced even by some fairly high-ranking Russian officials that the Baltic states will be reclaimed, if not this year then next year, or in a couple of years' time.

The disruptions of oil supplies to Mazeikiai oil refinery are regarded by Landsbergis as political pressure.

'Sad Sight' Left in Mickunai

LD2902225692 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Lithuanian Defense Ministry experts have inspected the ecological and sanitary conditions of the area, buildings, and engineering facilities vacated by the military.

According to Deputy Defense Minister Jonas Gecas, the military left behind a rather sad sight at Mickunai. Trees have been cut down, gasoline and grease have been spilled, and piles of trash have been left behind. The soil has been damaged very extensively throughout the entire 24-hectare area. [passage omitted]

Fate of Air Defense Unit Considered

PM0403103592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 92 p 1

[Report by Major A. Ivanov: "Troop Withdrawal From Baltic. It Would Be Good To Avoid Any Fuss or Mistakes"]

[Text] The beginning of the withdrawal of former Union troops from Baltic territory is a political event that has attracted the attention of diplomats, the military, and the press. On 25 February a number of newspapers and the television, in an attempt to keep their finger on the pulse of the times, published and aired items on how the men of a surface-to-air missile battalion in the small town of Mickunai near Vilnius were preparing for redeployment.

"Unfortunately," this correspondent was told by Major General of Aviation Ye. Makoklyuyev, first deputy chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, "the news of the first phase of the missile troops' withdrawal was not sufficiently objective in all the mass media. For instance, the television showed a column of military equipment ready to roll, commenting that the withdrawal timetable had been postponed and allegedly the military was to blame.

"Nothing of the sort actually happened," the general stressed. "Under the agreement between the Russian Federation and Lithuania it was decided to withdraw the

surface-to-air missile battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ryzhkov in three phases. The commission to evaluate buildings, installations, and the environmental situation began work 25 February—and corresponding documents have been drawn up. As planned, all the battalion's materiel was moved 28 February and withdrawn to the brigade directorate so as to be readied for moving out. And, finally, the subunit will actually withdraw 3 March. After a rally the missile troops will proceed to their new posting in OPOCHKA, Pskov Oblast."

But 14 officer and warrant officer families still remain at the former site. The battalion's fate has not yet been sealed, so the women and children will have to wait a little longer for a transfer.

Ensuring that the troops have everything they need in their new location, and providing social protection for servicemen is the most acute issue today. The Air Defense Troops Main Staff has reported that the timetable for the withdrawal of air defense units from the Baltic countries will largely depend on the specific solutions to these problems. The command has made realistic calculations of its abilities and funds so as to ensure that there is no repetition of what happened when our troops hastily left East Europe and were moved into tents and huts in their homeland. At any rate, as has already been stressed, there is no prospect of this for the more than 20,000 servicemen at air defense units in the Baltic.

Russian-Belarusan Proposal on CFE Manpower Limits Verification

LD0103124292 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1402 GMT 27 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 27 Feb (TASS)—The clauses on assessing troop strength are to be an important element in a future agreement on the armed forces of the European countries from the Atlantic to the Urals. They were at the center of attention of today's plenary session at the Vienna talks on conventional forces in Europe [CFE].

Those attending the forum discussed draft clauses proposed by the delegations of Canada, France, Germany, and Britain, as well as a document on the subject submitted today by the delegations of the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland. They are characterized by agreement on at least three fundamental approaches.

First, it is not disputed that the concept of "verification" in its traditional "hardline" sense cannot be applied to manpower. One can only speak of an approximate appraisal of the observance of national maximum troop levels that must not be exceeded. Second, it is assumed that a system of manpower assessment must be built into

the existing framework of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; specifically, its protocol on inspections. Third, it is intended that assessment should not create additional financial or organizational difficulties for any of the participating states.

At the same time, in both proposals, and primarily in the "document of the three," there are a number of elements that cause serious doubts. Such feelings, Vladimir Shustov, the head of the Russian Federation's delegation, said in a conversation with an ITAR-TASS correspondent, are generated primarily by attempts to "strengthen" the treaty's inspection regime that actually make it more complicated and ultimately undermine the vital principles that have been agreed upon.

The proposal about the access of inspectors [kontrolery] to all installations in an inspection area is hardly justified either. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe contains quite definite and carefully considered restrictions on the subject, and there is no reason to abandon them. The wish to assess manpower numbers in units that are not subject to restrictions under the future treaty is absolutely inexplicable, the diplomat pointed out.

Seeking to bring closer together the approaches of the various participants in the talks on the problem of manpower assessment, the delegations of Russia and Belarus today submitted a working document reflecting their viewpoint on the subject. Its essence boils down to the fact that it is essential to stick as closely as possible to the accords reached earlier. One cannot encompass the unencompassable and carry out a head count of all people in uniform.

So Russia and Belarus believe, proceeding from the selective verification concept contained in the Treaty on Conventional Forces, that assessment is to be applied to the personnel of those formations and units that have at their disposal weapons and equipment restricted by the treaty and that are, accordingly, subject to verification. Such an approach enables one to be sure, with a sufficient degree of reliability and without unnecessary delay, that national manpower restriction levels are being observed.

Further Reports on CIS Troop Withdrawal From Latvia

Chemical Unit To Leave Daugavpils

*OW2902191392 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1517 GMT 29 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Shortly, the former Soviet Army's property, including chemical agents, may be removed from Daugavpils (Latvia), in 300 vans. Chief of the Daugavpils chemical depots Sergey Kuznetsov told BF [BALTFAX] that an agreement on removing this property had been reached with the customs department.

He also said that the Army equipment which can be used for civilian purposes had been sold to private companies.

Withdrawal Talks Continue

*LD0403164492 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1400 GMT 4 Mar 92*

[Text] Experts from the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation who are examining questions on the withdrawal of the Army from Latvia met in Moscow yesterday and today. The Latvian side is led by Deputy Defense Minister Dainis Turlajs, and the Russian side by Mr. Zotov, first deputy head of administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Organizational and technical questions of the withdrawal; questions about property, ecology, and the legal aspects of the Army withdrawal; and questions of the social security of the military, their families, and military pensioners are being discussed.

It is envisaged that the protocol drawn up by the experts will be signed today.

The group feels the talks are very constructive and the mood of the group is optimistic.

Armed Forces Official at CSCE Seminar Cited

*LD0703024492 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1524 GMT 6 Mar 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Excerpts] Vienna, 6 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—A CSCE seminar on "Armed Forces in Democratic Societies" is being held in Vienna. [passage omitted]

Great interest was generated by today's presentation at the seminar by Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin, head of the treaty and legal administration of the General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. Having remarked that a whole complex of documents on defense matters to be studied by the leaders of the CIS countries at the Kiev summit on 20 March are now being prepared, he stressed that these documents lay the foundations for a new concept of security in conditions of democracy, which is determined by the qualitatively new character of interrelations between the state and society.

According to him, first place in the system of state priorities is given to the protection of the interests of the individual and society as a whole. As part of society, the Army recognizes the need for radical changes and supports the democratic reforms being carried out, seeing its role as the protection of citizens' interests.

The command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, continued Ladygin, considers it impermissible and criminal to use the Army against its own people or against the lawful, democratically elected political leadership. He

recalled that the Unified Armed Forces have been completely depoliticized and that the activity of any parties whatsoever in them has been banned.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Further Reports on Chetek Company Activities

Said To 'Frighten' World

924P0101A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
17 Dec 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Aleksandr Bogomolov; date and place not given: "Your Dollars, Our Nuclear Bomb. How a Moscow Company Frightened Half the World"]

[Text] "The Soviets, desperately in need of hard currency, have begun to sell their enormous military-industrial complex—missiles, nuclear components, and launch facilities for space flights—and are even offering the use of their flight control center. Some of their representatives say: There are no secrets any more, we will sell anything you want... Things may go too far in this regard, if a private company offers to sell nuclear weapon components to anyone who pleases," the American television company NBC cautioned warily not long ago.

Its leaders would hardly have supposed that this prediction is already starting to come true: ChETEK [Chelovek-Tekhnika-Kapital], a little-known Russian company until now, unexpectedly came out on the world nuclear technology market with a terrifying proposal on organizing peaceful underground nuclear explosions "somewhere in the Soviet Union"... for commercial purposes. Emissaries of ChETEK, primarily its president Vladimir Dmitriyev, dazzled potential clients with a nuclear technology developed by Soviet physicists and used by the company for destroying chemical weapons and toxic wastes.

Sensational articles have appeared in the Western press about the company's improbable wealth: an automotive pool, a property near Moscow for the former nomenklatura (it is a question of the "Sosna" health treatment complex, with which, being under the direct authority of Yeltsin and Gorbachev, ChETEK has a very close relation), and about the company's special connections with the Soviet military complex.

This last claim is not far from the truth.

It seems, long ago we stopped caring about how we look from the side. However, sometimes everyone feels sorry for foreign observers, eyes wide with fear and hair standing on end, watching the escapades of the emancipated subjects of the former Soviet totalitarianism.

"If you need a fast neutron reactor, enriched uranium, a certain quantity of heavy water, or a so-called 'peaceful nuclear explosion,' you can acquire all this in Moscow.

There, go to building No. 15 on Varvarka Street, where the office of the international ChETEK corporation is located..."

Incidentally, about the order of events: An international conference of the Pugwash Movement on problems of destroying chemical weapons was held in Moscow this spring. Among other considerations on this theme, most topical in a world undergoing disarmament, a report on a technology for eliminating chemical weapons using a nuclear explosion, developed by Soviet scientists under the direction of RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences] Academician Yu. Trutnev of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16), drew attention. V. Dmitriyev, president of the ChETEK company, was among the participants in this conference.

Our information: The international joint-stock company ChETEK (an acronym from the words "man," "technology," and "capital") was created in 1990. Its founders include a number of scientific research and industrial structures. According to American data, ChETEK has more than 200 million rubles of circulating capital at its disposal. However, this figure raises doubts, since stockholders are making their payments mainly in the form of technologies, the economic value of which the leader of ChETEK determines at his discretion.

V. Dmitriyev immediately realized that the nuclear method of destroying chemical wastes is "what is needed." At international specialized conferences in various cities of the world, he and representatives of Soviet academic and ministerial institutions actively lobbied in favor of implementing this project. In brief, its essence reduced to the following: The USSR Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry (MAPI) is conducting scientific research work through the efforts of its scientists to implement an underground nuclear explosion, aimed at destroying chemical wastes or toxic military substances. The completion of the joint activity, in which ChETEK, under the terms of a general agreement between it and MAPI, played only the role of financier, was to have been the creation and testing of an experimental facility, where it would be possible to verify the effectiveness and ecological safety of the technology.

A representative of the ministry, who agreed to talk to me on conditions of anonymity, remarked that even though a site for the experiment has not yet been determined, it can only be conducted after receiving the consent of the local bodies of power. American sources indicate the place where it is to be conducted, Novaya Zemlya, and the time, the summer of 1992.

My interlocutor told me that the nuclear method had sparked the interest of the USSR government, which had instructed them to perform all the necessary scientific research work. However, as often happens, it "forgot" to allocate funds for this. On the whole, the financing for MAPI was cut by a factor of 10 in 1991, compared to what was requested. Thus, in the words the MAPI

representative, who had a healthy sense of irony, conversion turned into convulsion for the ministry.

Precisely under these conditions, it was decided to turn for help to private capital in the person of ChETEK.

In principle, ChETEK is serious. Our surplus of all sorts of technological developments and inventions is huge, yet its use is so insignificant that anyone who has the sense to lift this layer even slightly is doomed to succeed. The founders of ChETEK had the sense.

When V. Dmitriyev and A. Chernyshev, a representative of "Arzamas-16," began to convince the audience at an international conference in Ottawa of the need for conducting such an explosion in the Soviet Union, in the words of the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, "everyone in the hall thought they had lost their minds." The article even confirms that these ideas received the support of V. Mikhaylov, USSR deputy minister of atomic power.

All this enables the authors of Western publications to conclude that under the conditions of the collapsing Soviet economy, the holders of nuclear technologies, seeking a way to survive, can scoff at existing restrictions and release their secrets at will. The marketing that V. Dmitriyev began is only the first sign, they warn.

"The ministry," says MAPI's statement, "considers the publications that are appearing... an attempt to discredit the Soviet nuclear engineering complex in the eyes of society and to eliminate possible competitors from the modern nuclear technology market." It is entirely possible that this is so. (Although, one would like to know just what kind of animal a "modern nuclear technology market" is in the understanding of the ministry, which for decades has not exactly been producing sausages?).

However, most likely, it is hard to blame the opponents for jumping at Dmitriyev's unrestrained and boastful announcement about the company's nuclear plans: This is what makes them opponents. I am not a specialist and do not know in general how good this, nuclear explosions even for the best and most peaceful goals, really is. However, it is entirely obvious that very few chances of surviving remain for it after the mighty salvo against this program in the Western "mass media." It is the business of the company itself and its stock-holders to assess the extent of the damage done to its authority by V. Dmitriyev's ill-considered actions. I was unable to learn his opinion on this problem: The president of ChETEK refused to meet with a journalist.

To Destroy CW With Nuclear Blasts

MK0503122692 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Mar 92 p 6

[Yuriy Meshkov report: "Will Nuclear Explosions Be Heard? There Are Plans To Use Them To Destroy Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] President Yeltsin's trip to the closed city of Arzamas-16 attracted particular attention from foreign observers. The concerns of recent months are associated precisely with this city and the Experimental Physics Scientific Research Institute there. "How far may the Russians go in their desire to earn hard currency?" is a question that is being asked increasingly often in connection with the nuclear conversion planned in our country.

Shortly before Yeltsin's visit to Arzamas-16, representatives of the legendary nuclear center visited Moscow. At a seminar organized by the Center for Independent Environmental Programs at the Russian Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, they disclosed plans for eliminating chemical weapons [CW] by means of... nuclear explosions.

In a lengthy report Aleksandr Chernyshov, deputy director of the Scientific Research Institute for Experimental Physics, tried to convince the audience of specialists, and also representatives of the antinuclear movement and environmentalists that the proposed technique for destroying highly poisonous toxins is absolutely harmless. However, existing experience of underground nuclear explosions makes it impossible to rule out the likelihood of radioactive and chemical contamination of the environment. A representative of Arzamas-16 who had come to Moscow, speaking outside the program of the meeting, so to speak, declared that "nuclear technologies are particularly dangerous in a country that does not think it necessary to construct public toilets and keep them clean. The country could not stand another Chernobyl..."

However, the authors of the plan are prepared to carry out an experiment as early as this spring by blowing up 20 tonnes of toxins packaged in containers. Only the nuclear moratorium for 1992 imposed by Yeltsin is keeping the military-industrial complex specialists from their planned explosions at the Novaya Zemlya test site.

Aleksandr Chernyshov reported that 40,000 tonnes of Russian [otchestvenny] chemical munitions have to be destroyed. This can be done with just three nuclear blasts. However, according to Chernyshov, in fact about 10 explosions are planned.

Another fact that is causing some concern is the creation of the "Chetek" international closed joint-stock company with capital of 302 million rubles, whose shareholders include the Experimental Physics Scientific Research Institute. "Chetek" also has a subsidiary in Hamburg. The "Chetek" joint-stock company has been given exclusive rights to commercial use of the technology for destroying and burying chemical and nuclear waste by the method of thermal breakdown and vaporization in an underground nuclear explosion.

There is no certainty that, once the noble mission of ridding us of our own chemical weapons has been completed, international nuclear and chemical waste collected by the "Chetek" joint-stock company from all

over the world will not pour into the Novaya Zemlya test site. For instance, in the West it costs \$100 to destroy 1 kilogram of highly toxic waste. As for our businessmen, they simply cannot get used to gambling on lowering prices...

In offering this way of getting rid of weapons of mass destruction, the military-industrial complex has its own interests; the same old explosions, the same old large numbers of personnel to prepare and stage them, the same old secrecy and therefore absence of controls...

In the very near future the Socio-Environmental Union Center for Independent Environmental Programs intends to hold another meeting for interested specialists and representatives of the green movement in order to discuss alternative plans.

Japan Assured Russia Not To Resume Testing

OW1303101492 Tokyo KYODO in English 1003 GMT 13 Mar 92

[Text] Tokyo, March 13 KYODO—Japan has received assurances from Russia that it is not preparing to resume nuclear testing, a senior Foreign Ministry official said Friday.

The source said the Russian presidential office told Japanese Embassy officials in Moscow there is no truth to reports that a resumption of nuclear testing is being planned.

Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe said in the Diet Thursday that Japan would call on Russia to halt such testing if the reports were true.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Chemical Agents Confined to Russian Territory

LD0403233592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 4 Mar 92

[Text] Media recently reported that there could be incidents involving chemical agents in Transcaucasus especially in the zone of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Now Gen. Igor Yevstafyev, a deputy chief of the chemical troops of the CIS Combined Armed Forces, comments on these reports, the source of which is kept secret:

Unlike nuclear weapons which are on the territory of a number of our former republics, all Soviet chemical agents are on the territory of one republic—Russia.

And here is information from the Russian Foreign Ministry. The Minister's adviser Gen. Geliy Batenin says:

Chemical agents are all on the territory of Russia now. Their reserves are estimated differently—roughly 50,000 tonnes of poison chemicals.

As our observer has found out, the primary storage facilities are in the Saratov region and in Udmurtiya. However, the production of chemical weapons was underway in several republics, but was terminated back in 1987. What could then inspire fears?

Gen. Yevstafyev provides the following considerations: Firstly, some units involved in a conflict might have some irritants which are not chemical agents by international standards. Belligerence could have obtained such weapons abroad, the General believes, since there are no irritants in regular troops [as heard]. However, chemical defense units have chloropicrin that could have been yet another possible reason for rumors about chemical weapons in the areas of tension. In the meantime, chloropicrin is safe, being discharged even by tonnes, Gen. Yevstafyev said, it could only irritate eyes. It's used by troops for so-called smoking of gas masks, to imitate an aggressive environment to check [words indistinct].

Such are purely hypothetical causes of fears about possible incidents with chemical agents in the conflict zones across the former USSR, however, experts believe there are no real grounds for anxiety.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Cam Ranh Bay Withdrawal 'Foregone Conclusion'

LD2902113192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Report by M. Osokin from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Our warships will no longer be able to use the base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. According to diplomatic sources in Hanoi, our withdrawal is already a foregone conclusion, since Vietnam requested \$400 million a year in rent for the base and Russia did not care for such conditions. Western observers say there are now only a few warships left at Cam Ranh Bay. The installations we built there are not being used. The number of servicemen at the base has already been cut to 2,000 men. This was reported by a diplomat at the Russian Embassy in Hanoi, who asked to remain anonymous.

A Russian delegation will be received in Vietnam in April. Some observers believe that a timetable for our complete withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay will be announced then.

For many years the Soviet Union's military presence in Vietnam was a source of special concern in Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Now it seems that the problem is going away on its own accord. However, the Japanese now have a new reason for disquiet. They fear an expansion of our military presence in another part of the Pacific. Tokyo says it has information that Russia intends to transfer ships from the Black Sea Fleet to the

Far East, if agreement cannot be reached with Ukraine on the retention of single strategic forces.

Chief of Staff Discusses Cooperation, Troop Cuts in PRC

Assesses Talks

LD0203152192 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1307 GMT 2 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Sorokin]

[Text] Beijing, 2 Mar (TASS)— Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, chief of General Staff of the joint Armed Forces of the CIS, has described his six-day visit to China as "useful to both sides." Talking to our country's journalists accredited in Beijing, he cited as among the most significant results of the visit the clarification of positions concerning bilateral cooperation in the military sphere. "An interest in cooperation was expressed by both sides. All the prerequisites to continue it exist," the military chief said.

The general said the purpose of the visit to China was to further develop political decisions and earlier accords on military cooperation between the USSR and the PRC. Along with the need to discuss the topic of exchanges of military delegations, there are questions of reducing Armed Forces in around 7,000 km border between the adjoining states, he said.

China is carefully observing the processes taking place in the West, and the reduction of tension in the relations of the CIS countries with the former potential enemy raises the question: "But what will happen in the East? If the opponent in the West disappears, then what role are we to assume?"

"Therefore", stated the chief of General Staff of the CIS joint Armed Forces, "I tried to show the Chinese side: We are implementing the same policy in the East as we are toward all neighboring states without exception. Over the last two years, the distribution of our troops in the Far East has been reduced by more than 200,000 men, and 12 divisions have been cut back. The withdrawal of the troop contingent from Mongolia is nearing completion, and it is planned that this year alone more than 60,000 personnel will be returned to their homelands, along with thousands of tanks and guns, and about 350 combat planes and helicopters."

"We are not at all indifferent to the fact that our Chinese comrades have not yet reacted to this reduction", said Col. Gen. Samsonov. "In any case, we must try to maintain parity. Undoubtedly our plans are directed toward the continuation of friendship and good mutual relations, but we must think of the security of our states as well."

The fact cannot be ignored that the CIS Armed Forces are presently going through a difficult period, and the Chinese side senses this. However, the chief of General

Staff is firmly convinced that "the events taking place in the Commonwealth must not influence our interstate relations." This was also stated by him at his meeting with Jiang Zemin.

No agreements on military-technical cooperation were signed during the visit, Viktor Samsonov said, but certain existing accords were made more specific; for example, one on supplying China with 24 SU-27 aircraft. This and next year, 20 combat aircraft and four combat-trainer aircraft will be delivered. Chinese specialists are already studying this military technology in our country. We are just about to embark on implementation of projects for military-technical cooperation, and I think that this is just the beginning, the chief of General Staff said.

Military cooperation in this area with all states is now organized via the military committee formed under the Russian Government, Viktor Samsonov emphasized. There is a list, coordinated at the United Nations, of countries to which the CIS states can supply military equipment and weapons. Unlike earlier years, this work has now been put on a businesslike, commercial footing. The profits from sales of weapons and equipment go into the state coffers, and partly to defense needs. A certain proportion of payment can be in the form of barter, considering the many difficulties that the joint Armed Forces have with their supplies.

There was no discussion of joint production at the talks that were held, but the Chinese side showed a clear interest in the modern equipment and weapons at the disposal of the CIS. China has been given a list of the weapons which the Commonwealth might sell. There is much that China is interested in, including weapons for land forces, air defense forces, and the Air Force. We are ready for cooperation in various spheres, the chief of General Staff said in conclusion.

Tank Withdrawal Announced

OW0303051792 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin 0200 GMT 3 Mar 92

[From the "News" program]

[Text] The CIS will withdraw 4,000 tanks and artillery pieces from its border with China and China will purchase 24 USSR-made interceptors.

After holding talks in Beijing, Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, chief of general staff of the CIS armed forces, made the above announcement. The Russian foreign trade minister is to arrive in Beijing on 3 March to sign an agreement on economic relations and trade.

Poll Shows 43.3% in Favor of Far Eastern Army

LD0403222192 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1943 GMT 4 Mar 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Khabarovsk—Polls have shown that 43.3 per cent of all those who were asked in the Far East are for setting up of the Far Eastern Army.

Of them, 30 per cent do not agree with the idea of setting up a professional Army and 26.7 per cent declared that do not have an opinion of their own.

A total 36.7 per cent of those questioned were for setting up of republican armies, whereas 23.3 per cent think that a united command of the CIS Armies should be organized, and 30 per cent do not have an opinion of their own.

Twenty five per cent of those questioned think that nuclear arms should be concentrated in the hands of the United Command of the CIS Armies, 23.3 per cent think that the former USSR republics should have their own control over the nuclear arms, whereas 21.7 per cent prefer a common control over the nuclear arms from the side of four republics, i.e. Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. According to 5 per cent of those questioned, the nuclear arms should be under the control of Russia, whereas 13.3 per cent said that they do not have an opinion of their own.

The results of the polls were published on March 3rd in Khabarovsk area mass media. The polls were carried out by the Far Eastern department of the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research. In the polls, 2,053 inhabitants of the region took part.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Journalists Tour Tactical Nuclear Arms Storage Site

924P0103A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
18 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Knysh, correspondent: "Strangers Don't Enter Here: A Trip to a Nuclear Weapon Storage Site"]

[Text] An exception is made for foreign journalists. Our correspondent was among them.

We were coming to the conclusion of the sixth hour of the journey when at the end of an enormous snow-covered field, bisected by a narrow asphalt road, there appeared a gate of the customary color. Army standard. Only all similarity ended with this. Two officers and a warrant officer entered the bus. All were armed. A major wearing the arm band of a unit duty officer demanded a passport. Mamada-san fumbled in the pocket of his down jacket, pulling out into the light of day the red leather passport of a citizen of the Land of the Rising Sun, with hieroglyphs and a seal embossed on the cover. Beyond the ugly rust-spotted gate we were "awaited" by a tactical nuclear weapon storage site. Or simply, an "IKS" [expansion unknown] base.

And now a slight digression. A filming group from the Japanese commercial television company Nippon Denpa News numbering four persons (one of them the combined producer and director, Hiroshi Mamada) and their entourage (with a *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* correspondent among them) received the OK from all of the appropriate authorities to visit and film the IKS base. You must agree that this is a rare bit of luck for a rank-and-file representative of this country's mass media.

The work of checking the documents and comparing names of passports with a list compiled earlier came to an end. Anxiety in the eyes of my foreign colleagues (will they let us in, or won't they?) was supplanted by the greatest impatience and curiosity. All literally had their noses pressed against the windows. Would everything they had fantasized during the long journey be really true?

Exactly so and in no way, using army jargon. Following the strict inspection the "familiar" gate opened and the duty sergeant gave a lazy salute. We were met in the commander's office by a stern lieutenant colonel. Among those whose work is as dangerous as it is difficult, this very important person was the type specimen.

But all jokes aside, this person (who turned out, by the way, to be a very communicative and pleasant speaker) confirmed his importance by his actions. Over the course of an hour he held our fate literally "by a thread," as he deliberated (by telephone) with one of his own whether or not we were to be admitted into the heart of the IKS base—the nuclear munitions storage site.

On the television screen we see the reception given to our seamen (the crew of a sailing vessel), who had sailed to the Japanese islands along a route "blazed" by their ancestors in distant revolutionary times aboard the frigate "Pallada". An impressive spectacle: music, dancing, flocks of Japanese girls mingling graciously with our clearly receptive lads.

A commotion in the commander's office. The cameraman—the most unperturbable of the Japanese visitors—suddenly began talking fast and gesturing toward the screen. He had recognized, it seems, his native island of Hokkaido. He was trying to communicate this in English. By the way, if you want to communicate something to the Japanese, all you need is English.

Time flew by swiftly. Nerves were strained. The Japanese were saying something about symbolism. Look at how we greet yours, but when it's your turn to greet us, look what happens! Shouldn't you reciprocate in kind?

They were right. Thawed, the lieutenant colonel finally gave his OK, long-awaited and approved several times over. Then we were literally swept out of the commander's office. Colonel Valeriy Kruglov, commander of the IKS base (it's no secret that the Japanese filmed and interviewed him—Author's note) was taken somewhat aback by such a reception. Oh well, you can understand our ways.

The first security zone. A gate, a checkpoint manned by a duty officer, and our group diminished by two (Japanese). From here on, they had to work at reduced strength. We went through this "no-man's land," in which the unit's soldiers are still permitted, and disappeared into the "winter" garden. To the right of the fence, a field. To the left, a confidence course. In front, barbed wire stretched over posts along the entire perimeter of the security zone. The square fenced by the barbed wire was impressive. This was the route of travel taken by sentries from the security subunit. But not yet the base itself. Though already in an area where, as the song goes, "birds don't sing and trees don't grow."

Finally one more iron gate tended by a sentry, a permanent gun position and the "bureau of passes," where special passes are issued to local officers working at the base (and only to them). We enter timidly, though of course under official escort.

A tree-covered "hill" occupies the center of the grounds. It looks like an ordinary grove. But this "hill" is man-made. It is in fact the visible part of the site at which menacing and terrifying weapons of deterrence—tactical nuclear warheads—are stored. If you were to look at it from above, naturally you won't see anything. This is despite the fact that the camouflage and concealment are simple and unimpressive (as would be true with the real thing). As is the security, by the way: a barbed wire fence of not unusual height, and latches and store-bought locks on the gate. But let's not pick on "details." The security here is conscientious and vigilant. Such that strangers don't enter here.

"You're absolutely right. Moreover, many of ours don't go in either," Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Nesterov satisfied my curiosity. "Only officers from the maintenance group. Others won't dare. Even out of curiosity. Which, by the way, no one lacks here."

A huge underground "bomb shelter." The first door (from the back), weighing around 9 tons, is opened by two persons with difficulty. I tried putting my shoulder to it—it didn't even budge. The next door is of exactly the same kind. Next a narrow winding maze of a corridor with doors in its walls. We walked along it in single file. And finally we wound up in the storage facility's enormous hall, almost as tall as a three-story house. An underground one. It is here that the nuclear warheads of tactical missiles are stored in side compartments (rooms with steel doors). The Japanese were given exactly 5 minutes to take their pictures.

And now about the most important thing. The storage facility was devoid of its contents. The nuclear goodies had been removed. In accordance with the spirit and letter of intergovernment agreements reached in Minsk and the status adopted by the Ukraine as a zone free of nuclear weapons. Such that our land is now one IKS base less (something that can be said with certainty). Now "toothless," on the whole the base is not at all terrifying. Such that "all cities can sleep soundly...."

The road back seemed shorter to us. And of course, more pleasant. Jokes and laughter could be heard. Tension had subsided. The representatives of a people that had experienced the nightmare of preventive nuclear strikes, which transformed Hiroshima and Nagasaki into ashes, grew more relaxed. Though they didn't conceal the fact that they were very much afraid of what would happen if these weapons ended up without a caretaker and uncontrollable. There were rumors, they said, that someone had already tried to "privatize" such ammunition somewhere in Siberia. But now they can see for themselves that they were nothing but stories told to children. If of course things are organized everywhere else as they are at this IKS base.

The commander is modest: "We are not the exception but the rule." Quite right. Only in our country people are always thought of last. Or to put it more accurately, they're not taken into account at all. Here is what Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Purygin, one of the veterans of not only the base but of the special forces in general, had to say:

"I've been with these forces since I was a lieutenant. When it comes to protective overalls, they're a joke. And what's more, it wasn't until 1987 that we received order to follow order No 284, issued in 1983 (also not a secret.—Author's note), stating that we were to keep track of the permissible exposure dose, and so on."

"Show him, Dmitriy," he turned to Senior Lieutenant Nesterov, "what we're talking about."

The latter agreeably pulled a manifold sheet out of his ID wallet. One of the types of personal radiation dose accounting forms. Blank, of course. No one has had the time to do anything with them yet. And why fill them out? Judge for yourself: The compensation is laughable—20 percent of your salary, but not more than 38 rubles. Plus up to 9 days extra leave (at the discretion of the unit commander, of course). That's all you get for exposure to the hazard. Is it worth it, then, to go through all of the paperwork to calculate the dose, and so on? Here they don't think it is. Now and in days gone by, the subject of exposure does not exist.

But the IKS base exists. And the security system is as irreproachable as ever. For much longer? The commander did not offer an affirmative reply. You can understand why. Guarding an empty place slowly dampens your ardor. Moreover qualified officer specialists are slipping away. And they require an exceptionally high security clearance. Also, every 5 years they have to confirm their class rating. Meaning that the future is foggy and unknown. No one is making any plans (even short-term). They have to be realistic about it all.

Are they really not joyful and relieved that this most dangerous phase of their service has come to an end? It varies. But several officers admitted that they feel no special delight in the departure of the "articles." Caring for their "child" was to them the purpose of their lives. A beloved purpose, I might add.

Can we really condemn them for their frankness? Each person has the right to his own point of view on the processes occurring today. Even if it is at odds with the majority opinion. It is each person's right to "try on" the present day and see how it fits. For some it fits well, while for others....

But this is still not the place for shop talk. Even at the holiday table. Even after a few snorts. The wives don't have to nag their husbands to leave it in the office. There is no reason to. The wives of officers of the IKS base are not permitted to know the nature of the kind of work their husbands do. Even now. But they do anyway. As we know, you can't deceive a woman's heart.

Such is the way they serve.

Kharkov Rocket Forces Academy Personnel Take Ukrainian Oath

92UM0659A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major A. Dolinin: "Agreements Say One Thing, but Another Is Actually Done. The Rocket Forces Are Now Taking the Blow"]

[Text]The current situation of the Strategic Rocket Forces, from the point of view of their integrated nature, appears to be more favorable than that in other services of the Armed Forces. However, despite agreements achieved with regard to the Strategic Forces, cases of claims made to these forces against the background of political battles have also surfaced. The officers and cadets of the Kharkov Rocket School were among the first to feel this...

The story of the Kharkov Higher Military Command and Engineer School of the Rocket Forces imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union N.I. Krylov is part and parcel of the history of the Strategic Rocket Forces. I used the full name of the school deliberately since it actually reflects the entire history of the school. The school, at one time a technical, and subsequently an aviation school, switched to training officer cadres for the then nascent Strategic Rocket Forces in December 1959. The "Krylovians" got the forces started, and now many of them hold key command positions.

The scientific potential of the school is the highest in the Rocket Forces. It graduates specialists in the area of mechanics, cybernetics, ballistics, and metrology. The instruction facilities are the most modern...

Recently, more than 90 percent of the officers, almost all warrant officers and personnel in extended service, and half of the cadets of the school swore allegiance to Ukraine. This gives us food for thought. An obvious conflict appeared between the status of the Strategic Forces, of which the Strategic Rocket Forces are the foundation, and the Ukrainian oath.

Politics had little to do with the motivation of those who took the oath. Colonel A. Popov, a senior combat training officer of the Strategic Rocket Forces who recently returned from temporary duty at the school, incidentally himself a "Krylovian," shared his observations:

"Mundane problems, pure and simple, and a lack of confidence in the future prompted the people from Kharkov to take the Ukrainian oath rather than political or ethnic convictions. It is instructive that servicemen of Ukrainian nationality were not the only ones to take the oath."

Major General V. Tolubko, chief of the school, was the first to take the oath. He did not make his choice hastily. As early as at a meeting of the Officer Assemblies of the Rocket Forces, he argued for his choice thus:

"The school is in an ambiguous situation. Nobody is giving any thought to the fact that we may become hostages or pariahs in the states where we serve. The cases of the Riga OMON [Special Purposes Militia Detachment] and the Riga School are in plain view. We have become attached to Kharkov in terms of our family roots, housing, job placement, and daily routine. Virtually no one will go anywhere else no matter how events turn out. Swearing allegiance to Ukraine guarantees us social and legal protection."

Did those who took the oath have another choice? What are the reasons for this occurrence, which shook many people in the Rocket Forces?

Representatives of the central staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces, who have been on site, are of the same opinion. Officers and warrant officers of the school found legislative documents adopted by the Ukrainian parliament attractive, especially those on the social and legal protection of servicemen and their families, and on retirement benefits. In no other state of the CIS have we seen a consistent legal basis for the life and work of servicemen provided so promptly.

Many of them followed the lead of the mass media. An appeal by President L. Kravchuk to servicemen serving in Ukraine and beyond its borders was a factor. The Rocket Forces personnel could not but note the following thought of the president: "All groups of troops and forces deployed in the territory of Ukraine, **except for troops which Ukraine will include in the composition of Strategic Forces**, (emphasis mine—note by A. D.) constitute the Armed Forces of Ukraine. By 20 January of this year, the servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine must take a military oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine." The Kharkov school, which was at that time in a legal vacuum, indeed faced an ambiguous situation. In addition, there was the procrastination of the Strategic Rocket Forces command in working out a solution, and there was financial hardship. At that time funds had not been transferred to the school for a single item of expenditure in the new academic year; material and technical supplies had stopped arriving; there had

not even been a plan to admit cadets. In a word, promises by the Ukrainian side were effective.

The peculiarities of staffing the school with permanent and temporary personnel should also have been taken into account. Persons born in Ukraine and graduates of the school account for 80 percent of the faculty; half of the cadets are local.

In the opinion of the forces command, the command of the school took little care to carry out the instructions of the commander in chief of the CIS United Armed Forces and the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, displaying obvious haste in taking the oath.

Is it worthwhile to analyze this fact in such detail? Perhaps it is not if we count the military oath for nothing and approach the Strategic Rocket Forces in general, flippantly. However, we do understand that haste in military policy is fraught with serious consequences. In the personnel directorate of the Strategic Rocket Forces I was shown requests from dozens of officers of various nationalities indicating their desire to serve within their republics. The division of officers along ethnic lines is obvious. What can this bring about for the Rocket Forces? How can a commander allow officers around the proverbial "nuclear button" when they have sworn allegiance to different states?

The episode involving the Kharkov school gave rise to many problems. In essence, confidence in agreements is being undermined. The uniform process of training officer cadres for the Rocket Forces is being disrupted. Separating this process out from the established system—if it comes to this—will also call for much funding. All of this painfully affects the people. Even now they are perceptibly hurt by the ambiguity of the situation which has only become more acute after the taking of the oath. Cadets, especially the graduating class, are in a difficult situation. Taking the Ukrainian oath may result in complications for them as far as both the completion of their studies and prospects in the service are concerned. So, are they to take yet another oath if they are posted to another independent state?

I believe that the euphoria among experienced officers in the Kharkov school has worn off. The future of the CIS Armed Forces, including Ukraine, remains unclear to this day, to put it mildly. There is less and less doubt as to the fact that many servicemen will have to get out of uniform prematurely and not of their own volition.

As I ascertained at the main headquarters of the Strategic Rocket Forces, no penalty sanctions against those who have taken the oath are expected. However, it is legitimate that they, having taken "someone else's" oath, will not serve in the Strategic Rocket Forces deployed in other states.

...While this article was being prepared for print the episode involving the Kharkov School continued. I was informed that the taking of the oath has spread to some other missile units in Ukraine. Despite every norm and

legislative act, including those of Ukraine, the Union of Officers of Ukraine is inciting missile personnel to take the oath. For example, on a recent Sunday dozens of cadets from a military technician school left their unit without official leave and swore allegiance to Ukraine on a city square with the blessing of Colonel Martirosyan and two members of the clergy, a Catholic and an Orthodox...

Ukrainian President Criticizes Kazakh Nuclear Stand

*LD2702225792 Berlin ADN in German 1944 GMT
27 Feb 92*

[Text] Kiev (ADN)—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has criticized Kazakhstan's intention to keep the nuclear weapons stationed there. In a conversation in Kiev today with the vice president of the Socialist International, Social Democratic Party politician Hans-Jochen Vogel, Kravchuk said that without an alliance with Russia, Kazakhstan could not be a nuclear power because it has no technology for build nuclear bombs. Only Russia and Ukraine possess this. Ukraine will destroy not only nuclear weapons, but also the technology for their manufacture. As Belarus also wants to be a nuclear weapons-free country, only Russia will remain a nuclear power in the CIS.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev recently stated that the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Army stationed in his country will not be withdrawn and destroyed as long as other nuclear powers do not do the same.

Ukrainian Group Suggests Revising Nuclear-Free Goal

*OW0403135092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1256 GMT 4 Mar 92*

[From "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) known for its radical outlooks believes that Ukraine might have to revise its striving for nuclear-free status. UNA motivated such a possibility with Russia's claims to the Black Sea Fleet. Its statement says that "Russia's aggressiveness as to which nation should control the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimea is a factor for political and military destabilization in the world, and an evidence in favor of the need to revise the Ukrainian government's attitude to nuclear arms".

Kravchuk, Morozov on Nuclear Issue, Tanker Regiment Status

*PM1603125092 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Mar 92 p 2*

[Colonel A. Polyakov report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "L. Kravchuk: Ukraine Loyal to Concept of

Nuclear-Free Power, But Changing Approaches on Tactics for Securing This Goal"]

[Text] Kiev—At a routine meeting with journalists on the eve of his 100 days in office the Ukrainian president stated that the republic's economy has been operating in a state of emergency for the last year or 18 months. Production has fallen, inflationary processes are developing, and social tension has increased. Relations between the independent states of the Commonwealth remain complex. Particularly as regards problems of dividing up the Union Army and forming their own armed forces.

In this situation of instability and confusion, L. Kravchuk stressed, Ukraine cannot be sure that the tactical nuclear weapons being withdrawn from its territory are being completely destroyed and are not falling into irresponsible hands. While remaining loyal to the concept of a nuclear-free extrabloc state, Ukraine is changing its tactical approaches to the nuclear weapons in the former Union Army's arsenal. The removal of these weapons from the republic's territory has been suspended. This is because Russia does not have the requisite capacities to destroy nuclear weapons, particularly strategic nuclear weapons. In the president's opinion, verification of the dismantling for salvage [utilizatsiya] of nuclear warheads is inadequate. All this has compelled Ukraine to suspend the removal of nuclear weapons.

Following the press conference I asked Colonel General K. Morozov, Ukrainian defense minister, who was in the hall with journalists, to confirm or deny the report that allegedly on his orders the only regiment of Il-78 aerial tankers in the CIS Joint Armed Forces, forming an integral whole with the regiment of Tu-95SM strategic bombers in the Uzin division, has been withdrawn from the strategic forces and incorporated in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Col. Gen. K. Morozov confirmed this and commented that the tanker regiment is not a strategic regiment. Incidentally, this division's commander, Major General of Aviation M. Bashkirov, who was relieved of his post on the orders of Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, has been appointed by order of the Ukrainian defense minister as his special representative in the Uzin Garrison. Colonels A. Pakhomovskiy and Yu. Skabkin, who were shortly before this discharged into the reserve on the orders of the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, have been appointed Gen. Bashkirov's deputies.

Aid Linked to 'Central Storage' of N-Arms

PM1703143592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Mar 92 First Edition p 7

[Yuriy Kashin "Viewpoint" article: "Are We Going To Cut Up Missiles for Dollars?"]

[Text] The Ukrainian president's decision to suspend the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia merely

confirms what a pressing problem it is, the destruction of these armaments. It is something that concerns not only experts at home.

U.S., British, and French experts intend to meet to study the question of how to give Russia concerted help in devising a method of destroying part of its nuclear armaments following Moscow's acceptance in principle of international technical assistance in that sphere.

These efforts are geared to the elaboration of coordinated projects which will then be agreed with the Russian leadership. However, joint work promises to be complex, primarily due to the cost and to the need to give Russia the opportunity to monitor the operations that will be conducted on its territory. We are talking, of course, about cooperation that will not be detrimental to our country's sovereignty.

At present the former Soviet Union has 27,000 nuclear warheads, 12,000 of them strategic. Add to that a certain number of more or less obsolete warheads, since we have never destroyed any nuclear weapons since they first entered our arsenal. Although Boris Yeltsin did say recently that 600 nuclear warheads have already been liquidated. The Western press believes that it was more a matter of "deactivation," that is, of removing the warheads without dismantling them.

The paramount task is that of eliminating tactical weapons, including shells and missiles, mines and bombs.

The thing is that these mobile systems are the arsenal that is regarded as the most destabilizing one in terms of international security. Unless they are concentrated in Russia, these overly dispersed (in Ukraine and Belarus) tactical weapons will remain in the category of especially dangerous nuclear armaments, since it is difficult to monitor them.

As for strategic armaments, which are easier to count and are more monitorable, Western experts would like them to be destroyed within the limits of the "ceilings" established by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Armaments signed in 1991 by Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, or, which is even better, in the context of the unilateral restrictions recently declared by Boris Yeltsin.

Another problem is the choice of technology for the destruction of nuclear weapons. Russia has already done some work in this area. So the reader may ask: Do we actually need help? Let us cite an authoritative view. According to CIS Armed Forces commander in chief Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, we do not need help to transport and protect the nuclear weapons, we are practiced at that. But in the sphere of dismantling nuclear warheads and turning weapons-grade plutonium and uranium into conventional industrial materials—here mutual consultations are possible, of course. Considering the size of the task, the West is expressing a willingness to share its own technologies with us.

In particular, the French can provide us with fully operational plants for the dismantling, safe removal, and deactivation of various fissile materials. Each enterprise can process 250 warheads per year. The most modest estimates suggest a plant will cost 1 billion francs, so international funding would be needed. The plan envisages that Russian engineers and technicians would direct the plants' activities, because they are the best people to deal with the dismantling of weapons they created in the first place. All or some of our specialists who once participated in developing the nuclear program could be involved.

The United States and Britain have announced plans to assist Russia in dismantling nuclear weapons. Addressing Congress, Secretary of State Baker said that the United States will provide Russia with 25 reliable, safe railroad flatcars and 250 large specialized containers for transporting nuclear weapons. I would emphasize that the Americans intend to devise for us a program for the safe storage of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Experts in the two countries will probably cooperate in ensuring a swift reaction to any nuclear accident or incident. Baker announced all this on his return from his lengthy tour of CIS countries recently. Russian and American scientists who met in the United States immediately after Baker's visit discussed specific ways of using the \$400 million set aside by Congress last year for technical assistance to Russia in the destruction of former Soviet nuclear and other weapons, the conversion of laboratories engaged in military research, the safe storage of nuclear materials, and the liquidation of enriched plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

Only recently the British defense secretary set out his government's position on this question. He announced the delivery of 250 special containers for warheads and 20 armored vehicles which would ensure their delivery from military bases to the appointed destinations. London has allocated a total of 10 million pounds sterling for the first year of a multiyear program. The secretary stressed that the armored vehicles, costing around 1 million pounds each, and the special containers will be manufactured in Britain and given to Russia free of charge. Representatives of British official circles stress that they rate Russia's experience highly, so British specialists themselves will not have to participate in the nuclear armaments liquidation process. But if need be, experts could provide consultations in the sphere of the observance of safety measures when eliminating nuclear weapons and the prevention of potential environmental pollution.

The task Russia has set itself of reducing nuclear warheads is a massive one, and the tight schedule for implementing the program will undoubtedly require much greater outside help. But so far only the United States has declared its readiness to provide a significant sum for these purposes. Central storage of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Russia is needed if this assistance is to expand.

Kravchuk Action on Nuclear Arms Withdrawal Criticized

924P0105A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 12, 18 Mar 92

["Comment" by Aleksey Arbatov: "Will We Be Greeting Spring Fully Armed?"]

[Text] Leonid Kravchuk's Statement Has Disturbed the World. Comment by Aleksey Arbatov, Director of the Center for Disarmament and Strategic Stability

L. Kravchuk's decision to suspend the withdrawal of weapons merely because, it is alleged, Russia is not eliminating them is quite pointless and unwarranted.

The elimination of the old weapons is undoubtedly contemplated, but for a start they must be removed to centralized storage locations, to the enterprises at which these weapons were manufactured and where they will, accordingly, be eliminated. There was never any strict linkage which indicated that each weapon withdrawn from Ukraine would go directly to the shop for dismantling and elimination. It is technically impossible either to trace or even to monitor this inasmuch as the manufacture of new ones has not been terminated.

I believe, therefore, that President L. Kravchuk's decision is primarily a political maneuver aimed at continued bargaining on questions of security and the formation of CIS Joint Armed Forces.

The main issue today is whether Kiev will sign a collective security treaty, whether there will be CIS Joint Armed Forces and what part Ukraine will play in them. The latter is endeavoring to constrict the joint forces as much as possible, while Russia is attempting to expand them so that more remain within the framework of the joint forces, and less, under the control of the individual republics. It is this which I see as the difference in positions.

Kravchuk declares: A complex for the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons will be created on the territory of Ukraine.

First, the creation of such a complex would take years. Second, it is not known what the West's assistance would be or whether the West would agree at all to invest money for such a complex. Third, the production cycle of the dismantling of the weapons could be reversed and easily converted to assembly.

Now let us look at the consequences of the Ukrainian president's steps.

The very first serious agreement, concerning the fact that all tactical weapons were to be withdrawn by this July, is being violated. Kravchuk has put this date in jeopardy. Consequently, the destruction of the tactical nuclear weapons is being postponed indefinitely. And the very formulation of the question of the creation of an international center is odd also. After all, the agreement was

a bilateral one between the former USSR and the United States, and now, between Russia and the United States. Whom to enlist in this international center and on what basis? After all, there is a precise relationship—the states which represent the high contracting parties, they will participate in realization of the treaty.

The situation is causing great concern because it could be taken as Ukraine's claim to the acquisition of its own nuclear weapons potential. This is a very double-edged political trump card, with which Ukraine could strike a blow at the entire system of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. It could without manufacturing weapons even avail itself of its opportunity, as a powerful lever of pressure.

The bases of all this are the unsolved problems bequeathed the Commonwealth by the former Union. I believe that the command of our armed forces creates

the soil and nutrient medium for such a political game and speculation on this theme. The key paradox is that it is very difficult for Russia, Ukraine, and others to reach agreement on a distribution of duties in control of the armed forces. After all, these armed forces have neither doctrines nor strategy nor any concepts of defensive sufficiency.

The second paradox is that doctrinal and strategic issues cannot be harmonized until it is clear who is a member of the CIS.

An exclusive circle results: military policy cannot be formulated until relations between the republics on military questions have been clarified. And relations between the republics on military matters in the CIS will be unclear as long as there is no notion of military policy. Will we break this vicious circle in Kiev?

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NACC Agrees To Accelerate CFE Implementation*AU1003132492 Paris AFP in English 1239 GMT
10 Mar 92*

[Text] Brussels, March 10 (AFP)—NATO countries and their former adversaries of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact agreed here Tuesday [10 March] to accelerate implementation of a treaty for massive cutbacks in conventional weapons.

The commitment was made in a declaration issued at the end of a meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council comprising foreign ministers from NATO, five countries of Eastern Europe plus the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

They agreed that the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty signed by NATO countries and the Soviet Union in November 1990 would be implemented as soon as possible, without renegotiation.

Implementation has been delayed by arguments among the CIS republics about how to share out control of the Red Army following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and how to allocate weapons cuts among them.

The CFE treaty calls for massive cuts in such conventional weapons as tanks, warplanes, artillery and helicopters.

The foreign ministers said they expected to see the treaty in force before the time of the Helsinki summit of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in July.

They announced an extraordinary conference in Oslo on June 6 in parallel with the next NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council] conference, to enshrine the official ratification of the treaty.

The declaration said the ministers were also determined to reach agreement before the Helsinki summit on associated talks to cut troop strengths.

"We are determined to work together towards a new lasting order of peace in Europe through dialogue, partnership and cooperation," it added.

The ministers also issued a detailed work programme of East-West military and political cooperation including defence planning and arms control.

It includes such topics as the conversion of defence plants in the communist bloc for the production of civilian goods, air traffic management and civilian control of armed forces.

NATO countries will also help their new Eastern European partners deal with defence-related environmental problems and how to clean up military bases.

The programme has been drawn up in general terms so that, as the declaration says, it will "permit all participants to raise political and security-related issues of concern or interest to them."

One item deals with "the formulation of foreign policy in a democratic state."

CSCE Foreign Ministers Agree on 'Open Skies'*LD2003095292 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network
in Finnish 1900 GMT 19 Mar 92*

[Text] During the CSCE countries foreign ministers' meeting in Helsinki, an agreement on military surveillance flights, to be signed next week, was completed. During the last-minute talks in Vienna, Turkey opposed admitting Cyprus into the agreement. The so-called Open Skies agreement will allow CSCE countries' intelligence flights in other countries' airspace.

The CSCE countries agreed now for the first time on arms control in the Asian part of Russia also.

GERMANY

Smaller, Restructured Armored Force Detailed*92GE0241A Herford TRUPPENPRAXIS in German
No 1, Jan/Feb 92 pp 38-46*

[Article by Col. Karl-Theo Schleicher: "Armored Forces in Army Structure 5; Hard at the Core"]

[Text] The end of the East-West confrontation, the increased risks from other zones of conflict in and outside of Europe, the tasks of a sovereign state, and the political objective of the Federal Government to have only 370,000 operational soldiers in a new Bundeswehr for all of Germany are changing the demands on the Army and thus also affecting the operational principles, structure, personnel strength, equipment, and training of the armored forces.

At the NATO summit in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, a new strategic concept was passed for the alliance, whose objectives have developed from merely keeping the peace to organizing the peace.

This concept stresses new things. With a substantial reduction of the total size of the armed forces, all the more operational and mobile forces must be capable of being used in crises in central Europe and in part elsewhere.

Constitutional clarification of an employment of the Bundeswehr even outside of the territory of the NATO pact is expected. The parameters of this new strategy are flexibility and mobility.

The missions for the Army are:

- Defensive capability on the national borders (national in the alliance and in major multinational formations),
- Capability of strengthening the countries on the flanks,
- Employment in international tasks (nationally, in the alliance, multinationally),
- Employment in environmental protection and disaster assistance.

For this purpose, the Army in the future must prepare itself for two primary tasks:

- Defensive capability in the scope of the existing NATO mission.

Such an employment does not appear to be very likely in the current political situation, however; hence a large share of the troops can be made up of forces dependent upon a mobilization that can be increased in the event of imminent danger after a rather long time of preparation/mobilization.

- Use in the scope of new risks/tasks. This is more probable; for this purpose, the Army must keep in readiness a limited number of forces with the capability of rapid action after a short time of preparation.

With smaller forces (reduction of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 soldiers), a larger territory, expanded operating area, and a broader spectrum of operations, these tasks require:

- Rapid, mobile combat troops,
- Great mobility of the formations,
- Larger share of long-term soldiers,
- Advanced state of training, and
- Equipment and armament with the most advanced technology.

Operational Conditions of the Armored Combat Forces

The political changes in Europe do not yet permit a reliable forecast on a future "security architecture," even though the potential East-West confrontation of the blocs is receding into the background.

In the future, as a result of the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, the number of armored combat troops in the East and the West will be far below the current level.

That is, although a conflict is still possible, an attack along a broad front is no longer realistic in terms of the previous threat analysis on account of the numbers. To a considerable degree, an attacker will be forced to concentrate his forces in one or a few sectors.

This favors massed concentration with own forces for the enterprising conduct of operations to achieve a decisive effect.

But fewer forces in a larger area to be protected after reunification require forces with high structural mobility

and penetrating power—armored combat troops supplemented by highly effective reconnaissance, an extensive blocking capability, and an efficient artillery.

For the armored combat troops, this means in combined arms combat:

- Engagement and defeat of penetrating offensive forces through the containment of the enemy's main offensive forces in penetration sectors and through counterattacks in their deep flank,
- Regaining of lost terrain, thus preservation or reestablishment of a cohesive defense,
- No dissipation of the armored forces but rather monitoring of less important areas with small but highly mobile forces utilizing up-to-date barriers and indirect fire,
- Early reconnaissance, and
- Concentrated use of the armored forces with high mobility, flexibility, and interoperability.

Forces with high structural mobility and penetrating power, that is, armored combat troops supplemented with highly effective reconnaissance and efficient support services, will continue—or precisely because of additional new objectives—to be needed to be able to cope with these variable objectives in combined arms combat.

- From now on it will no longer be necessary to have a counterconcentration in the General Defense Plan—nearby peacetime deployment across a broad band in central Europe and highly operational forces.
- What is becoming more important, on the other hand, is the capacity for mobile and flexible reactions in the scope of variable objectives.

Personnel and Structural Requirements

The new dimensions of the objectives require not only solid training and up-to-date equipment but also adjustments in the personnel and structure.

Hence, the following requirements are imposed above all for the armored battalions of the operational brigades:

- Greater professionalism of the tank crews, that is,

tank commander = senior NCO

gunner = junior NCO/extended term conscript (2 years)

driver = extended term conscript (2 years)/(18 months).

Note: Only the loader can be a conscript. But he should not be used until the end of his 12 weeks of training.

- Equipment of the armored battalion with additional command battle tanks, that is,

three battle tanks for the commander group,

two battle tanks for the company command group,

thus equipment like that of Army Model 3 on the basis of the wartime experience of the Germans and allied armored force in World War II and like that of most of our allies.

The British, who—just as the German armored force in Army Structure 4—were of the opinion that the advantage of being able to organize additional formations by “cutting back” on these battle tanks outweighs the disadvantage of the restricted command options in operations, revised this opinion in preparing for action in the Gulf war.

Task of the Armored Force in Operation

For the present, therefore, the mission of the armored force together with others, primarily armored combat and combat support forces, will still be to destroy an attacking enemy through a combination of holding and strikes and through the use of tactical and operational mobility as well as through their own fire and blocking capability. In this regard, it will chiefly be a matter of maintaining or regaining the initiative on where the decision should fall. The armored force can do this only in a system of combined arms, however.

For mission accomplishment, the previous scenarios for central Europe as well as possible new tasks in other regions require the combination of complementary weapon systems even in the lower command echelons. The battle can be waged successfully only if responsibilities are divided and the individual elements of combined arms combat supplement each other.

In the diverse spectrum of tasks in combined arms combat, the armored force must take on the primary tasks:

- Uninterrupted combat of all types under practically all conditions of terrain and visibility,
- Destruction of enemy armored forces in a direct firefight,
- Holding its own and execution even in direct fire,
- Development of the necessary striking power for the attack of armored combat forces to gain the initiative on the battlefield and to force decisions,
- Forming the column of mobile antitank defense in defense and delaying action.

Secondary tasks to be accomplished are:

- Engagement of antitank defense weapons,
- Antihelicopter defense primarily for self-defense,
- Firefight against light and unarmored targets.

Army Structure 5

An additional challenge is the new upper limit of 370,000 soldiers as the maximum personnel level of the Bundeswehr. It has substantial effects on the size of the Army and its structure and hence for the armored force as the core of the Army.

The planning directive for Army Structure 5 takes into account the fundamental changes in Europe, developments in the Soviet Union, the rise of new risks, and the reduction of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 soldiers and introduces the most comprehensive reorientation of the Army.

The armored force must reckon with a substantial reduction of its personnel level and the number of battle tanks will be cut by one-third.

Let us look back once again and recall the existing Army Structure 4.

In Army Structure 4 (as of September 1989), the armored force had about 1,200 officers, 7,500 noncommissioned officers, 18,000 troops, total personnel of 26,700, and the following major hardware:

- 2,050 Leopard 2 battle tanks,
- 2,437 Leopard 1 battle tanks,
- 649 M48 battle tanks,

thus it had a total of 5,136 battle tanks.

The Armored Force in Army Structure 5

The armored force will be incorporated into 23 mechanized brigades:

- Two active battalions each in three active mechanized brigades (so-called operational brigades),
- One active armored battalion and one build-up battalion [Aufwuchsbataillon] each in 18 partially active mechanized brigades,
- Two inactive armored battalions (equipment units) each in two inactive mechanized brigades.

Thus the armored force has

- 24 active armored battalions,
- 18 cadre-strength armored battalions (build-up battalions),
- four armored battalions as pure equipment units,

that is, a total of 46 battalions.

In the active mechanized brigades, armored combat forces together with the necessary combat support and logistical/medical forces form the framework for operations after a short time of preparation. The division of the forces for the operation is based on the “task-force” principle, that is, it depends on the situation and mission.

Under the principle of division, the 18 partially active mechanized brigades have about 60 percent of the peacetime strength. The structure is oriented toward the performance of peacetime tasks. The buildup in a crisis and the establishment of full operational readiness with reservists and through training after mobilization require a longer warning and preparation time.

The armored battalions in the partially active mechanized brigades will each be made up of one part “parent

battalion" and one part "build-up battalion," in which the experiences of a two-year operational test called "Staffing and Rapid Build-Up" (KURA) will be applied: the structure of the parent and build-up battalions is supposed to improve the operational readiness of personnel and hardware (viability) of the units of the parent battalion in peacetime so as to be able to adequately carry out the training mission and other service requirements. For the Army as a whole, the way to Army Structure 5 means a change from a military service that has heretofore been oriented more toward operations to one that is oriented toward training and buildup.

Importance of Reservists

Both battalions require a qualified command corps and efficient tank crews. The operational readiness of the tank crews, platoons, and units depends on the availability of reservists. They are to be kept at an appropriate level of training.

This presupposes the willingness and readiness of reservists to take part in military training exercises. The force cannot bear high rates of attrition. To the extent possible, the tank crews should train in the same group and be made into fighting teams; only then can one expect performance and endurance. It is here where there are special demands on the parent battalion in regard to the selection, composition, and training of the regulars and reservists of both battalions. Experiences with staffing and build-up battalions must be pursued further and evaluated.

What Is New in Army Structure 5?

Army Structure 5 retains the basic organizational structure with four line battalions. But the type of the mixed armored/armored infantry battalion, the so-called battalion with the end number "1," is abandoned. Instead, each of the mechanized brigades will have two armored and two armored infantry battalions.

In contrast to Army Structure 4, these armored battalions will now have four combat companies instead of three.

About three-fourths of the battalions will be equipped with the Leopard 2 battle tank and one-fourth with the Leopard 1 A5 battle tank. The armored companies, in turn, will be restructured from three platoons with four battle tanks each to four platoons with three battle tanks each.

With this reorganization, the Army chief of staff wants to achieve an improvement of the command density in the company.¹ Two platoons are to be commanded by lieutenants and two platoons by first sergeants.

Modern Training

The call of the former Army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. von Ondarza, for a smaller professional army applies in particular to the armored force. Among other things, this also requires new ways of training.

One way is simulator-supported training. This course is necessary to pursue marksmanship training in a short time and less dependent on training areas and to permit the practicing of the phases of combat under simulated war conditions. This is an essential precondition for effective training of the crews and platoons. Simulators make possible continuous training and rapid checking of the state of training.

On 12 November 1990, Lt. Gen. Klaffus, chief of the General Army Office, turned the "Training Installation Tank Platoon Fire Control Simulator" (ASPA) over to Combat Forces School 2 in Muenster for use.

The training equipment "Armored Force Firing Simulator" (ASPT) and "Armored Force Combat Simulator" (AGPT) will follow.

ASPT

The firing simulator is conceived for the "learning of shooting" and for keeping the gunner "in practice" as well as for the learning of the interaction between the gunner and the commander in the battle tank weapon system.

The firing of the standing and moving tank against standing and mobile ground and air targets under all weather and visibility conditions day and night and in all operating stages of the fire control system (except turret outward) is practiced in drill exercises in three different terrain scenarios. A "training library" offers about 500 programmed exercises that train the gunner and commander during the preparatory fire training in the fire-fight of the individual tank and that gradually lead from a low to the highest state of learning through an intelligent training evaluation with automatic selection of training. The training action takes place in the special basic and operational training as well as in field training.

AGPT

The combat simulator makes possible training in the command of the firefight and in the fire control of

- individual tanks and
- the tank platoon.

Through programmed exercises, dueling exercises, and free exercises with two parties, it is possible to train tank crews and tank platoons in combat firing, above all in all conceivable kinds of combat and general operational tasks under the most varied weather and visibility conditions day and night.

Artillery and engineer support (minefields) are controlled through the training management. Cooperation with other branches of service (combined arms combat) is possible with the appropriate equipping of the armored infantrymen (initiated) and tank destroyer units—rockets—(planned) in all configurations.

The training takes place during the operational training in the armored battalions in approximately one-week blocks several times per quarter and in field training.

With their planned introduction in the field forces beginning in mid-1992 (approximately 50 ASPT and 20 AGPT), in combination with the training device duel simulator (AGDUS) and with the training on the major item of equipment battle tank—for in the future as well live ammunition will remain indispensable for training in combat service (firing and practice)—the armored force will have the preconditions for up-to-date training.

The other way is the reorganization of the training of noncommissioned officers. Almost all parent battalions also have training companies for noncommissioned officers so that they can develop new commanders in the forces. There will be 16 of these companies in the armored force. The experiences are to be evaluated early so that the training of the noncommissioned officers can be put on a solid basis through necessary follow-up measures.

Reductions

Thus the armored force will be smaller in Army Structure 5. That means a reduction of personnel of approximately 35 percent and a substantial reduction of battle tanks.

As of December 1990, the "old" Bundeswehr had about 5,100 battle tanks in the armored and armored reconnaissance force and the former NVA [National People's Army] had 2,222. That yields a total of more than 7,000 battle tanks.

Since the upper limit for the united FRG was set at 4,166 battle tanks by the negotiations on CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe], about 40 percent of the battle tanks must be disarmed. This will primarily affect the battle tanks of the Soviet type of construction of the former NVA and the M48, a tank type of the Bundeswehr that we are very familiar with.

After that, the armored force will have the following major weapon systems in the armored formations:

- 2,125 Leopard 2 battle tanks (8 x 27 of them with armored reconnaissance battalions),
- 1,225 Leopard 1 A5 battle tanks.

Thus no longer planned for the armored force:

- about 640 M48 105 mm,
- about 820 Leopard 1 A3.

Stationing

These reductions also affect the stationing of the armored force.

Since 12 armored battalions (4 Leopard-2 battalions and 8 Leopard-1 battalions) will be stationed in the new military districts VII and VIII in the annexed part of Germany, there will be fewer armored battalions

remaining for the "old" part of the FRG. This also means a reduction of the tank garrisons. There will be a change in the stationing density.

Taking into account the proposals of the corps command and the General Army Office, the Defense Ministry has made decisions on the reorganization of stationing. A role was thereby played by such viewpoints as:

- Regional coverage,
- Favorable infrastructure,
- Nearness to training areas,
- Availability of volunteer manpower,
- Attractiveness of locations, and
- Economic situation of the locations.

The decisions mean many painful cuts in armored battalions that have proved successful over many years.

Modern Equipment

More than 70 years have passed since the appearance of the tank as a new battlefield weapon. Its end was predicted several times—after World War I, after World War II, and finally after the appearance of the antitank guided missile functioning under the shaped-charge principle.

But for the foreseeable future, that is, into the next millenium, it will remain the main weapon system of the armored combat forces.

It alone combines the elements of mobility, firepower, and cover. It is the carrier of the dynamic element of defense and also has the capability of bringing striking power to the enemy and of forcing decisions in offensive actions.

But technical developments cannot stand still. Even after evaluating the experiences in the Gulf, the following needs for further development result for the armored force, which can only be outlined here:

1. Combat effectiveness upgrading for the Leopard battle tank.

- Improved performance is necessary for a better utilization of the effect of the tank ammunition and also for longer combat ranges than in the previous scenario of central Europe. These measures are aimed both at a further development of primary tank ammunition and at an improvement of the performance of the weapon system (e.g. lengthening of the barrel of the 120-mm main gun) and of the fire control system.
- Improvement of the viability of the battle tank system, among other things through an improvement of the armor protection and development of warning sensors.
- Improvement of drivability at night and when visibility is restricted. Thought has also been given to an Integrated Command and Information System (IFIS) and to orientation and navigation system comparable to that of the Global Positioning System (GPS) tested in the gulf.

2. The studies for an Armored Combat Vehicle 2000 (KW 2000 2x2 men) will be continued. The field trials with the Test Vehicle 2000 (VT 2000) will be continued in 1992. The studies and developments of components will be continued including Interactive Simulation (INSIM).

Outlook

The new Army structure means the most radical change for the armored force since 1956. With the changes in the political situation and the mission, it is also the end of a time that was marked by East-West and GDP [General Defense Plan (NATO)] thinking. Today it is a matter of preparing the force for a new era in our history and for the completely changed basic conditions.

The expanded mission means new challenges that correspond to the multiple potential uses of the armored force on account of its high mobility, striking power, and performance capability. It must likewise be trained in the types of combat so that it can emerge victorious. These conditions and the possibility of use outside of Germany are putting high demands on commanders, educators, and instructors.

Despite the cuts through:

- Reduction of personnel,
- Reduction of major equipment,
- Disbanding and restructuring of formations,
- Abandonment of traditional tank garrisons,

the armored force, as the core of the Army, remains the decisive power of the armored combat forces even in the new structure.

Footnote

1. This justifiable demand—no other state in the world has such a low officer manning level—has been raised since 1956. The budget always approved only one platoon leader officer slot in the so-called “emergency requirement” [Notsoll].

Kohl Delays Response on GPALS Financial Aid Request

AU0903204092 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
9 Mar 92 p 16

[Unattributed report: “Billion-Mark Expense Indefensible”]

[Text] Chancellor Helmut Kohl is delaying a Federal Government response to a written request by U.S. President George Bush to participate through substantial financial means in setting up a global missile defense system. The system, called “Global Protection Against Limited Strikes”, [GPALS] sponsored by the U.S. Defense Department, is intended to ward off nuclear attacks by means of fighter satellites and land-based interceptor missiles. Scientists have estimated the costs of such a system at more than 160 billion German marks.

In the Chancellor's Office and in the Defense Ministry, considerable doubts have been voiced about the effectiveness of the planned antimissile system for Europe. Bush's idea has been clearly rejected by the Foreign Ministry, which says that based on the negative experience concerning the “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI), the billion-DM expense for such a project is not defensible. Instead, the West should concentrate on the destruction of nuclear weapons and their nonproliferation.

The Federal Government hopes for support from Paris. French President Francois Mitterrand, whom Bush has courted as he has Kohl and British Prime Minister John Major, has already reacted to the petition from the White House. He wrote that France will not participate in the limited missile defense system, because France rejects the “militarization of space.”

Genscher Urges Verifying Arms Control Process

LD1203154292 Berlin ADN in German 1437 GMT
12 Mar 92

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Free Democratic Party [FDP]) spoke in favor of continuing the process of European arms control with substantive mandates. In his view, verifying military power should remain a substantial element of the new security partnership, he said. “The most urgent task for European disarmament must be to put into force and implement the treaty on reducing conventional arms in Europe. It must be ratified and implemented by all the participating nations and by their legal successors,” Genscher writes in an article for Friday's [13 March] MITTELDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG.

According to Genscher, the process of disarmament in Europe must “draw in all states in the security area from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” In view of the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation and transferring conventional weapons, the full breadth of the issue will have to find expression in a comprehensive dialogue on security—including conversion, exports, and the new danger of proliferation, he said.

Against the background of the conflicts in the East and in view of the forthcoming CSCE main follow-up conference in Helsinki, the foreign minister also suggested that the CSCE develop new opportunities to prevent conflict and resolve crises in order to render it “capable of action in the event of a conflict.” “The foundations of the architecture of a large-scale area of stability have been laid. It is now important that we press on with its design,” Genscher stated.

CIS Forces Withdrawing ‘According to Plan’

AU1603083792 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German
13 Mar 92 p 6

[Matthias Krauss report: “CIS General Repeats Appeal To Speed Up Housing Construction”]

[Text] Potsdam—Withdrawing CIS forces from Germany is taking place according to plan, stated Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, after a visit to the Bundeswehr Territorial Headquarters East in Potsdam on 12 March.

Since the beginning of the year, some 23,000 CIS states soldiers have left Germany, Burlakov said. A total of 5,600 units of combat technology and 100,000 tonnes of ammunition and equipment have been withdrawn, bringing to more than one-third the number of former Soviet Armed Forces members who have left Germany. Burlakov said that it is a major problem for the CIS that housing construction for the arriving officers' families is not keeping pace with the rate of their withdrawal. Even now, one does not know where to put 15,000 officers and their families. Some 5,000 apartments have been built so far for those who are returning. Burlakov reiterated Russia's view that the buildings left behind in Germany are worth 10.5 billion German marks.

Burlakov and his host, Lieutenant General Werner von Scheven, agreed on mutual visits to troop sites—maybe a first step to joint training of German and Russian soldiers. Scheven said that "basically," the Bundeswehr is not planning to use the buildings of the Group of Western Forces.

Disagreement With France on 'Open Skies' Cited
AU1603115492 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
16 Mar 92 p 16

[Unattributed report: "Open Skies Blocked"]

[Text] The German Government is annoyed at France's opposition to an agreement on mutual reconnaissance flights over the CSCE countries. Paris is trying to find threadbare pretexts to block the signing of an agreement on "Open Skies" scheduled to take place in a solemn ceremony at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki early next week. Last week, negotiators from the 16 NATO members and the former Warsaw Pact nations agreed on a compromise, under which they will sign the agreement as partners of the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] disarmament treaty. By means of a "political declaration," they will allow all 48 CSCE nations "early participation" in the concept for the verification of arms

control accords, which was suggested by President George Bush in 1989. Paris has lately demanded, however, that all 48 countries sign the agreement immediately. Officials in Bonn say that France's "dogged behavior" could make unpredictably long renegotiations necessary.

UNITED KINGDOM

Labor Manifesto Favors Retention of Nuclear Arms

LD1803143392 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1148 GMT 18 Mar 92

[Report by Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION
Defence Correspondent]

[Text] The Labour manifesto commits the party to retaining nuclear weapons until there is worldwide elimination. However, the number of warheads will be limited to the present total, despite the introduction of the Trident submarine system in the mid-1990s.

The manifesto makes no mention of whether Labour will order the fourth Trident boat. Neil Kinnock said a final decision would be made when the party came to power and had access to further details of the arguments over the need for a fourth boat. "But otherwise, we will balance the cost of cancellation and cost of continuation, and see," he said.

Labour will base its defence policies on continued membership of NATO with a commitment to provide "whatever resources are needed for effective defence of our country, providing the necessary level of forces with the appropriate equipment and weapons".

The manifesto highlights the job losses in the defence industry as a result of the end of the cold war and promises to set up a Defence Diversification Agency. "The agency will ensure that resources made available by reductions in defence spending - reductions already planned by the Conservative government - are used in the first instance for rebuilding and investing in our manufacturing base," it says.

Labour plans to work to resolve long-running disputes in areas like the Middle East, Cyprus and Kashmir and would support a permanent United Nations peacekeeping force.

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