



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

Arms Control

19980113 061

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-003

CONTENTS

22 January 1992

CHINA

- U.S. Panel Recommends Reducing Nuclear Weapons [*XINHUA 6 Jan*] 1

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

- International Nuclear Disarmament Body Proposed [*KYODO 13 Jan*] 2

NORTH KOREA

- North-South Talks Agree on Nuclear Declaration [*Pyongyang Radio 1 Jan*] 2
Delegates Exchange Copies of Nuclear Declaration [*Pyongyang Radio 14 Jan*] 3

SOUTH KOREA

- Agreement With North on Denuclearization of Korea 3
Radio Report [*Seoul Radio 31 Dec*] 3
YONHAP Reports on Agreement [*YONHAP 31 Dec*] 3
Agreement Terms Summarized [*Seoul Radio 31 Dec*] 4
Agreement Fills 'Crucial Vacuum' [*Yi Tong-min; YONHAP 31 Dec*] 4
Delegate Yi Tong-pok Describes Talks [*Seoul TV 31 Dec*] 5
Text of South-North Joint Denuclearization Declaration [*THE KOREA TIMES 1 Jan*] 6
South, North Exchange Nuclear-Free Declarations [*YONHAP 14 Jan*] 6

EAST EUROPE

POLAND

- Defense Minister 'Anxious' Over Tactical Nuclear Weapons [*Warsaw Radio 12 Jan*] 7

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

- Exchange of Nuclear Data With Pakistan Welcomed [*P. Dev Kumar; Delhi International 4 Jan*] .. 8
Pakistani Claim of Incomplete Data Exchange Denied [*Delhi Radio 9 Jan*] 8

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

- General Staff Aide Interviewed on Global Stability [*A. Politsyn; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 12 Dec*] .. 9
Karpov Meets U.S. Nuclear Arms Experts [*TASS 16 Dec*] 10

START TALKS

- Strategic Nuclear Weapon Sites Identified
[*A. Pikayev, A. Savelyev; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 2 Nov*] 10

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

- World Strategic Defense System Urged 16
UN, Not National, Systems Needed [*N. Moiseyev; ZA RUBEZHOM 16-22 Aug*] 16
Role of Aircraft Control Stressed [*A. Gorelik; ZA RUBEZHOM 11-17 Oct*] 18

Criminal Negligence at Deactivated Radar Installation	20
Army Accused of 'Mismanagement' [B. Reznik; IZVESTIYA 19 Nov]	20
Investigation Detailed [V. Litovkin; IZVESTIYA 19 Nov]	22
Republics Said Interested in 'Small-Scale SDI' [M. Pogorelyy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Dec]	25

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Continuing Controversy With Lithuania Over Troop Withdrawal	25
Rumors of Plans To Disobey Order [Vilnius Radio 11 Dec]	25
Sajudis Demands Withdrawal by Year End [BALTFAX 14 Dec]	26
Shaposhnikov Cited: Pullout 'Impossible To Delay' [Vilnius Radio 14 Dec]	26
Landsbergis Meets Soviet Commanders [BALTFAX 17 Dec]	26
Joint Baltic Complaint Over Soviet Troop Presence	26
Letter to UN Secretary General [Riga Radio 15 Dec]	26
UN Help Requested [S. Guk; IZVESTIYA 18 Dec]	26
Estonia Protests on Soviet Border Guard Detachment [BALTFAX 17 Dec]	27
NATO Seminar on Baltic Security Meets in Vilnius	28
Official Cited on Soviet Withdrawal [INTERFAX 17 Dec]	28
Seminar Demands Withdrawal [BALTFAX 19 Dec]	28
Lithuanian Speaker Cited [Vilnius Radio 18 Dec]	28
Landsbergis, Others Speak [Vilnius Radio 20 Dec]	29
Officials on Withdrawal Timetable [BALTFAX 19 Dec]	30
Landsbergis Stresses Withdrawal [Vilnius International 20 Dec]	30
Withdrawal Hinges on Treaties [Vilnius Radio 19 Dec]	30
Lithuanian Deputy Addresses Assembly [Vilnius International 18 Dec]	30
European Inspectors Visit Military Districts	31
British Inspectors in Volga-Ural [TASS 18 Dec]	31
Finnish Inspectors in Leningrad [TASS 18 Dec]	31
Troop Withdrawals From Germany on Schedule [V. Katayev; TASS 18 Dec]	31
Former Soviet Republics To Respect CFE Treaty [Paris AFP 10 Jan]	31

NUCLEAR TESTING

Nevada Nuclear Tests Continue Despite Cuts [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Dec]	32
---	----

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Chemical Weapons Supply Stockpiled in Russia [POSTFACTUM 11 Dec]	32
Officer Discusses Chemical Weapons Destruction [I. Yestafyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Dec] ...	32

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Officials View Ukrainian Nuclear Arms Policies	34
Foreign Minister on Destruction Schedule [Moscow Radio 13 Dec]	34
Shaposhnikov on Ukraine's Role [Moscow TV 13 Dec]	34
Kravchuk on 'Liquidating' Arms [Kiev Radio 14 Dec]	35
Kravchuk on Joint Control [L. Kravchuk; Moscow TV 15 Dec]	35
Defense Ministry Aide on Withdrawal [TASS 19 Dec]	35
Belarusan Foreign Minister on Nuclear Arms Destruction	36
Demands 'Direct Participation' [INTERFAX 16 Dec]	36
To Control Arms 'Directly' [Radio Rossii 16 Dec]	36
NATO 'Concerned' Over Soviet Nuclear Arms, CFE Compliance	36
[G. Deynichenko; IZVESTIYA 16 Dec]	36
Shaposhnikov Reassures Baker on Nuclear Arms Control [TASS 16 Dec]	37
Russian Officials on Nuclear Arms Command, Control	37
Defense Chief Comments [K. Kobets; Paris LE MONDE 16 Dec]	37
Yeltsin, Baker Discuss Issue [INTERFAX 16 Dec]	38
Yeltsin Comments on Baker Talks [Moscow Radio 16 Dec]	38
Further on Yeltsin-baker Talks [TASS 16 Dec]	39
Kozyrev: Nuclear Arms To Remain 'Centralized' [Radio Rossii 19 Dec]	39
Defense Official Interviewed [A. Kotenkov; Moscow TV 26 Dec]	39

Communications Security Chief Comments [M. Andreyev; Moscow TV 26 Dec]	41
Ministry Confirms Yeltsin Has Nuclear Button [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 27 Dec]	41
Kazakh President, Baker Discuss Nuclear Arms	41
Calls for Collective Security [INTERFAX 18 Dec]	41
'Understanding' With Russia [TASS 18 Dec]	42

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Mitterrand Encourages European Nuclear Doctrine [J. Amalric; LE MONDE 12-13 Jan]	43
--	----

GERMANY

Foreign Minister Stresses New Disarmament Steps [ADN 4 Jan]	44
Genscher on European Role for French Nuclear Arms [DIE WELT 8 Jan]	44

UNITED KINGDOM

Cash Offered To Dismantle Soviet Nuclear Arms [C. Campbell; THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH 12 Jan]	44
---	----

U.S. Panel Recommends Reducing Nuclear Weapons

*OW0601213792 Beijing XINHUA in English
2010 GMT 6 Jan 92*

[Text] Washington, January 6 (XINHUA)—A key military advisory panel recommends that the U.S. nuclear strategic weapons be slashed by more than half from its current level and retargeted against "every reasonable adversary", THE WASHINGTON POST reported today.

But critics said the recommendations by the panel of current and former Pentagon officials, whose advice was sought by Air Force General Lee Butler, the commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Forces, still represent "vintage cold war thinking."

A report prepared for Butler by the panel proposes that the United States maintain a roughly 5,000-warhead arsenal in next few years, which is 6,000 fewer long-range nuclear warheads than the 11,000 the United States currently deploys and 4,000 fewer than allowed by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

The reports says that further cuts may eventually be warranted, but that the U.S. arsenal should remain larger

than the total number of French, British and Chinese nuclear arms. The total nuclear stockpile of the three are estimated at 1,500 warheads now and is expected to grow to 2,000 within a few years.

It also recommends that U.S. strategic weapons, now aimed mainly at the former Soviet Union, be retargeted against "every reasonable adversary" whether it is a nuclear power or non-nuclear Third World country.

Although the recommendations were supposed to help U.S. military face the realities of the post-cold war era, several independent experts who reviewed the advisory report said that it does not go far enough in urging deep nuclear weapons cuts, THE WASHINGTON POST said.

"The analysis represents only a very marginal change from cold war thinking," said former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who recently wrote in the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS that the United States should aim for a strategic arsenal of just 1,000 warheads.

John Steinbruner, director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institute, said "the tenor of the report is to preserve the (nuclear arms) business as best one can, while recognizing that a lot has changed."

JAPAN

International Nuclear Disarmament Body Proposed

OW1301063692 Tokyo KYODO in English 0613 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 13 (KYODO)—Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone proposed a new multinational organization for nuclear disarmament on Monday at the opening of a world parliamentarians' meeting on the United Nations.

Nakasone made the proposal in a keynote speech to the two-day meeting at a Tokyo hotel. He also urged election of Japan and other "appropriate member states" as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

The current permanent members are the United States, Russia, France, Britain and China—the main victor nations of World War II.

Speaking to the gathering of some 50 parliamentarians from 16 countries, Nakasone said that the job of controlling the spread of nuclear arsenals should no longer be left to nuclear powers alone.

He proposed that a new international system for inspection and verification be considered when the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) comes up for review in 1995.

Nakasone warned that serious international economic frictions could emerge because the former Soviet bloc countries are likely to regulate imports to protect their infant industries, while promoting exports.

He suggested that special protective provisions should be allowed because without doing so there will be "no prosperity and harmony in the world economy."

NORTH KOREA

North-South Talks Agree on Nuclear Declaration

SK0101060192 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0400 GMT 1 Jan 92

[Text] The third North-South contact of representatives took place yesterday at Tongilgak, an area on our side's Panmunjom, to discuss the nuclear issue. The contact took place in camera.

The fifth North-South high-level talks adopted the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange Between the North and South, a North-South document of agreement, and provided a channel of dialogue to discuss the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. This was followed by three rounds of North-South contacts of representatives. During the contact, the North and South completed the coordination of views and the drafting of the joint

declaration on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. This is another New Year's gift to all the fellow countrymen in the North and South, who have an earnest desire to prevent the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and to achieve peace in the country, as well as its peaceful reunification.

Our side made every sincere effort to discuss and resolve the nuclear issue, which is related to the nation's life and death, and showed sincerity and magnanimity all along. In the face of our side's just demands and its reasonable and realistic proposals, the South side admitted that their proposals were unreasonable and dropped clauses on the biological and chemical weapons issue, the issue of the inspection of all military and civilian facilities, the issue of our signing and ratifying the nuclear safeguards accord, and our unilateral acceptance of inspection, all of which have nothing to do with the nuclear issue. As a result, at yesterday's contact, the discussion of the draft North-South joint declaration on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula was completely concluded, and the two side's representatives initialed it.

During the contact, our side strongly asked the South side to suspend the Team Spirit joint military exercise.

Choe U-chin, our side's representative, gave a news conference and released a joint communique agreed on by the two sides. The joint communique is as follows:

North-South Joint Communique on the North-South Contact of Representatives To Discuss the Nuclear Issue.

The North-South contacts of representatives to discuss the nuclear issue took place on three occasions, between 26 and 31 December 1991.

Out of their common awareness of the mission to remove the danger of nuclear war by denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and to promote a favorable condition and environment for peace in the fatherland and its peaceful reunification, the two sides' representatives sincerely discussed the draft joint declaration on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, completed its drafting, and initialed it. In connection with this, the North and South have agreed:

1. The North and South are to see that the joint declaration on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula comes into effect at the sixth North-South high-level talks on 19 February 1992 through necessary procedures for effectuation.
2. The North and South are to exchange the texts of the joint declaration signed respectively by the two sides' premiers in Panmunjom twice, on 14 and 21 January 1992, as a prior step.
3. The North and South have agreed that the joint declaration on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula may be amended and supplemented upon agreement by both sides.

[Dated] 31 December 1991

Delegates Exchange Copies of Nuclear Declaration

SK1401093092 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0900 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Text] On the afternoon of 14 January at 1500 the North and South delegates for the North-South high-level talks met in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom to exchange copies of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

One delegate and one entourage member from each side participated in the contacts.

They exchanged copies of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula signed by the prime ministers of both sides.

The next delegates' contact is slated for 21 January.

SOUTH KOREA

Agreement With North on Denuclearization of Korea

Radio Report

SK3112033891 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 0200 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Text] It has been learned that at the contact between North and South delegates this morning at Tongil House in the North side's area of Panmunjom to discuss the nuclear issue, the North and the South reached a final agreement on the draft of a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The joint declaration's major contents are a preamble and six articles that include a ban on testing, producing, possessing, stockpiling, deploying, or using nuclear weapons; the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; a ban on the possession of nuclear reprocessing facilities and uranium concentration facilities; simultaneous nuclear inspection of the North and the South; and the formation of a North-South nuclear control joint committee within one month after the joint declaration has gone into effect.

It seems that the joint declaration will go into effect after both sides of the North and the South take respective necessary procedures and after they exchange copies of the document at the sixth round of North-South high-level talks to be held in Pyongyang, 18 February next year.

At today's contact, both sides of the North and the South reportedly agreed that in connection with the issue of North Korea's signing of the nuclear safeguards accord—which has been a controversial issue—North Korea's

acceptance of a nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency has been deleted from the draft of the joint declaration and that, instead, North Korea will announce a timetable on the signature, ratification, and actualization of the accord.

Along with this, both sides reportedly agreed on deleting from the joint declaration the North side's inclusion of a ban on simulated nuclear attack exercises that the North side had insisted on including in the joint declaration, being conscious of the Team Spirit exercise and, instead, agreed that the South side will announce the suspension of its Team Spirit-92 exercise at an early date.

As for the issue of a simultaneous inspection of nuclear-related facilities on North and South Korea, both sides reportedly agreed to withdraw the South side's proposal for conducting a pilot inspection and, instead, made an agreement to conduct a simultaneous inspection between them.

YONHAP Reports on Agreement

SK3112095291 Seoul YONHAP in English 0941 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 31 (YONHAP)—South and North Korea reached an agreement Tuesday on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula that will be signed by prime ministers and put into effect on Feb. 19.

The six-article agreement says the two Koreas will not possess or manufacture nuclear weapons and will not own nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

South Korea dropped its original demand that North Korea immediately sign, ratify and implement a safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and North Korea, in turn, backed off from its demand that South Korea not hold any military exercise simulating nuclear war.

The agreement also calls for simultaneous pilot inspection on each other's civilian and military installations designated by other side.

Details for the inspection will be settled by a joint nuclear committee which will be established within one month after the agreement goes into effect.

Seoul and Pyongyang will hold two more contacts at the truce village of Panmunjom on Jan. 14 and Jan. 21 and exchange the agreement signed by prime ministers of the two sides.

The agreement says both South and North Korea can revise and add to the agreement after bilateral consultations.

The marathon talks began from 10 A.M. and went through several recesses before the agreement was finally initialed close to 6 P.M.

Key articles say the two Koreas will not test, manufacture, produce, accept, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons, will not possess facilities for reprocessing spent fuel and enrich uranium, and will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.

The agreement was apparently compromised with Seoul deleting a clause demanding that North Korea conclude a nuclear safeguards accord with the IAEA and open its nuclear facilities to outside inspection.

The demand was aimed at getting North Korea to promise specific timetables for signing, ratifying and implementing the safeguards accord.

North Korea answered by dropping its demand that the two Koreas not hold any military exercise simulating nuclear aggression. This demand was aimed at getting Seoul to cancel its annual joint military maneuver with the United States, "Team Spirit."

South Korea had said it was willing to scrap next year's Team Spirit plan if North Korea provided "the right conditions," meaning its signing of a safeguards accord.

The compromise in these two points are creating speculations here that North Korea might have specifically indicated when it would accept the IAEA accord in exchange for South Korea's promise to abort Team Spirit.

The two sides made a last-minute breakthrough on simultaneous pilot inspection Seoul had insisted on by deciding to let the South-North Korean joint nuclear committee discuss details.

Another hitch was deciding when to put the agreement into force, negotiation sources said.

The North originally demanded that the two sides have more time to complete domestic procedures needed for its effectuation but the South countered that it be put into effect upon signing by the prime ministers of the two sides.

The two sides later compromised and took a middle course, agreeing to put it into effect in the first-day session of the sixth prime ministers' talks slated to open on Feb. 19 in Pyongyang.

The two sides agreed to exchange the agreement signed by the prime minister of either side in two rounds of contact at Panmunjom on Jan. 14 and Jan. 21.

The agreement left room for further negotiation by adding a clause allowing revisions and additions to the agreement through bilateral consultation.

Agreement Terms Summarized

SK311212491 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 1000 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Text] The North and the South finally reached agreement on a joint declaration for turning the Korean

peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. They decided to validate the declaration at the sixth round of the high-level talks to be held on 19 [as heard] February in 1992. Reporter Ko Tae-yong reports:

[Begin recording] The third round of North-South delegates' contacts on the nuclear issue lasted until 1800 this evening in Tongilgak, on North's side in Panmunjom. At the contact, they agreed to accept the draft of a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which has a preamble and six articles.

The North and the South agreed that prime ministers of both sides should sign the joint declaration on 20 January in 1992. They decided to validate the declaration at the sixth round of the North-South high-level talks to be held on 19 February 1992.

As a preparatory measure to validate the joint declaration, both sides agreed to exchange the copy of the joint declaration, signed by prime ministers of the both sides, in Panmunjom on two occasions—14 and 20 January 1992.

The preamble of the joint declaration on denuclearization, upon which the North and the South agreed, stipulates that the North and the South should apply the six articles to remove the danger of a nuclear war by turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone; to create conditions and an atmosphere favorable for achieving peaceful reunification of the country; and to contribute to peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

Article 1 stipulates that the North and the South should not test, manufacture, produce, introduce [chopsu], possess, stockpile, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; Article 2 stipulates the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; Article 3 stipulates the abrogation of nuclear reprocessing facilities and uranium enrichment facilities; Article 4 stipulates that the targets, selected and agreed by both sides, should be inspected through methods and procedures regulated by a North-South nuclear control joint committee that will verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The joint declaration also stipulates that the North and the South should form and operate a North-South nuclear control joint committee within one month after the joint declaration has gone into effect. In addition, the joint declaration stipulates that it will become effective after both sides take the necessary procedures and after they exchange copies of the document.

The North and the South decided that the joint declaration can be revised and supplemented if both sides agree. [end recording]

Agreement Fills 'Crucial Vacuum'

SK3112124391 Seoul YONHAP in English 1157 GMT 31 Dec 91

["News Analysis" by Yi Tong-min]

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 31 (OANA-YONHAP)—South and North Korea recorded another milestone in their

relations Tuesday by initialing an agreement for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.

The agreement fills the crucial vacuum in the inter-Korean accord on reconciliation, non-aggression and exchanges and cooperation signed Dec. 13 by providing a way to solve the decades-old nuclear problem.

The agreement, named a joint declaration for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, is a product of three working-level negotiations that began just last Thursday.

Seoul and Pyongyang moved swiftly to make major concessions, urged to make concrete progress before the year is out. After nearly eight hours of marathon talks Tuesday, the two sides produced a six-article agreement with a preamble and a three-point joint statement.

The agreement will be signed by prime ministers of two Koreas and exchanged at two separate contacts at Panmunjom on Jan. 14 and Jan. 21. It will go into effect on Feb. 19 after Seoul and Pyongyang each take necessary internal procedures and the prime ministers meet for the sixth round of talks in the North Korean capital.

The nuclear accord could not be timelier. It comes just before U.S. President George Bush, a major player in inter-Korean nuclear problem, visits Seoul Jan. 5-7.

Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa also comes to Seoul Jan. 16-18 as Tokyo moves to improve relations with Pyongyang when inter-Korean nuclear negotiations make significant progress.

There were criticism from Washington that the Dec. 13 agreement evaded the most urgent issue by passing the nuclear question aside.

The contents of Tuesday's agreement comes very close to pacifying the criticism.

North Korea has agreed to abandon nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, a declaration that it will not produce nuclear weapons.

Fears ran globally that North Korea was just months away from completing its nuclear reprocessing facilities, and primary emphasis was on getting Pyongyang to publicly renounce such nuclear capability.

The North agreed to simultaneous pilot inspection on civilian and military installations which will give the South the chance to verify absence of nuclear weapons and production capabilities in the North. It will now be up to a joint nuclear committee to be formed within one month after the agreement goes into effect, to settle the details and actualize the verification system.

South Korea compromised by repealing an article in its original draft declaration that the North must conclude a nuclear safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the immediate future.

In response, an article prohibiting any military exercise simulating nuclear war was withdrawn by the North Korean side.

The compromise suggests that North Korea is most likely to conclude a nuclear safeguards accord before the next prime ministers' talks and Seoul is expected to respond by announcing cancellation of Team Spirit, a joint annual military exercise with the United States, for 1992.

The nuclear accord is certain to affect Seoul-Pyongyang relations in other areas. South Korean officials have said the inter-Korean agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression and exchanges and cooperation will not be put into effect without successful resolution of the nuclear problem.

Tuesday's accord clears this stumbling block, passing the South-North relations from negotiation to implementation stage.

Delegate Yi Tong-pok Describes Talks

SK3112142091 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network
in Korean 1200 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Interview with Yi Tong-pok, ROK delegate to the North-South delegates' contact, by KBS anchorman Pak Tae-sok—live]

[Text] [Pak Tae-sok] How are you? We appreciate your efforts. I think the North-South agreement is more meaningful because it was reached the last day of the year. What is the background for both sides to reach the agreement quickly?

[Yi Tong-pok] We have made efforts to resolve the issue of a joint declaration on denclearization this year. As you know, the copies of the North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchanges, which was adopted and signed at the fifth round of the North-South high-level talks, will be exchanged at the sixth round of full dress talks to be held in Pyongyang starting 18 February 1992. The North-South agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, and cooperation and exchanges will go into effect then.

However, many people doubted that the agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, and cooperation and exchanges could really go into effect while the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula was not resolved. Therefore, our position was that this issue should be resolved without fail before the sixth round of the talks is held next year.

In the meantime, there can be much guessing about why the North side followed our side's intention. However, the one we can see is that the North side, considering the talks to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan and the council of the International Atomic Energy Agency which will be held in Vienna 25-26 February 1992, agreed to resolve the issue this year. I think that is the reason for today's events.

[Pak] What are the concrete methods for a nuclear inspection to verify denuclearization?

[Yi] All targets, which the other side selects and both sides agree upon, including military and civilian facilities, materials, places, are expected to be inspected. A nuclear inspection of such targets will be conducted according to procedures and methods of a North-South nuclear control joint committee which will be formed in the future.

[Pak] Do you think that nuclear threat or nuclear fear against our nation by our nation will be removed?

[Yi] The joint declaration on denuclearization contains very important principles in Articles 1, 2, and 3. In Article 1, eight principles on denuclearization are stipulated. In Article 2, use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is stipulated. Article 3—the most important one—stipulates that the North and the South should not possess reprocessing and enrichment facilities. If the three articles are abided by, the Korean peninsula and our 70 million people will be completely liberated from nuclear threat. Therefore, if we faithfully put into practice the contents regulated in Articles 4 and 5, our nation and our land will be liberated from nuclear threat.

[Pak] We find that the issue of the Team Spirit exercise is not in the joint declaration. What will become of this ROK-U.S. joint military exercise?

[Yi] The government has maintained the following position: If the North Korean side agrees to give up the nuclear reprocessing and enriched uranium facilities, we are prepared to consider halting the Team Spirit exercise.

The North side has agreed to this in the joint denuclearization declaration. However, we believe there is a problem of credibility in view of the North's behavior so far in implementing its obligations with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international treaty. Therefore, we connected this issue with the issue of the Team Spirit exercise, and the North and the South have engaged in much dialogue on this. As a result of such dialogue, we have reached a stage where we think considerable understanding has been achieved. Therefore, we expect that the North and South Korean authorities will say something about this issue soon.

[Pak] The North and the South have agreed on the joint denuclearization declaration by the adoption of the North-South agreement. What is your view of the prospects for North-South relations next year?

[Yi] As you are aware, North-South relations after the validation of the North-South agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, and exchange and cooperation will bring peaceful coexistence for the first time in 46 years of national division. Based on this agreement, many institutions will spring up between the North and the South next year. Many exchanges and much cooperation will be made through these institutions. There will be what we can call relations between North and South Korea. These relations are very precious. I hope the North and the South will join their wisdom to develop the relations well, and I expect the good relations will bring forth various tangible results in the latter half of next year.

Text of South-North Joint Denuclearization Declaration

SK0101053992 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
1 Jan 92 p 1

[Text of the South-North Joint Declaration for a Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula, initialed at the third round of North-South delegates' contacts in Tongilgak, Panmunjom on 31 Dec]

[Text] Pledging to remove the danger of a nuclear war, to create conditions and circumstances favorable to peaceful unification of our country and to further contribute toward peace and security in Asia and the world by denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, the South and the North declare as follows:

1. The South and the North will not test, manufacture, produce, introduce, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.
2. The South and the North will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.
3. The South and the North will not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.
4. The South and the North, in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, will conduct inspections of the facilities as chosen by the other side in accordance with procedures and means to be provided by the Joint South-North Nuclear Control Committee.
5. The South and the North, in order to implement the joint declaration, will form and operate the Joint South-North Nuclear Control Committee within one month after the joint declaration takes effect.

This joint declaration will take effect from the day when the South and the North exchange documents after going through the necessary formalities for their effectuation.

South, North Exchange Nuclear-Free Declarations

SK1401090092 Seoul YONHAP in English 0839 GMT
14 Jan 92

[Text] Panmunjom, Korea, Jan. 14 (YONHAP)—South and North Korea exchanged copies Tuesday of a nuclear-free declaration, each signed by one prime minister.

South Korean Vice National Unification Minister Yim Tong-won and North Korean [Ambassador-At-Large] Choe U-chin exchanged the documents at the truce village of Panmunjom.

They will re-exchange the documents next Tuesday, after each prime minister adds his signature to that of his counterpart on the other side, and the declaration will take effect at the sixth prime ministers' talks, which open Feb. 19 in Pyongyang, South Korean officials said.

The six-point declaration stipulates that a joint nuclear control committee be formed within a month of its taking effect, but YONHAP has learned that both sides have agreed in principle to inaugurate the committee at the moment it takes effect.

POLAND

Defense Minister 'Anxious' Over Tactical Nuclear Weapons

*LD1201192392 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 0700 GMT 12 Jan 92*

[Text] Jan Parys, the new minister of national defense, chaired the first meeting of his team a few days ago. He told Konrad Paradowski:

[Begin Parys recording] The situation our country finds itself in is quite specific. We are, all the time, a country which is active, which has to prepare for its defense on its own, and therefore, we must take measures to insure that we are not too weak a country, that our combat capability is not too small. At the moment, what I am anxious about is tactical nuclear weapons, which are located not too far from Poland. The superpowers spend little time discussing this subject, since they are not threatened by these weapons. However, these missiles are within the sphere of our interests, and we would like them to be subject to strict international controls. [end recording]

INDIA

Exchange of Nuclear Data With Pakistan Welcomed

BK0401120292 Delhi All India Radio General Overseas Service in English 1010 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Commentary by P. Dev Kumar, UNITED NEWS OF INDIA special correspondent: "Mutual Inspection of Nuclear Installations by Pakistan and India"]

[Text] The exchange of documents between India and Pakistan in connection with the 1988 agreement on nonattack on each other's nuclear facilities should go a long way in removing mutual suspicions about their nuclear designs. This agreement was conceived in December 1985 when General Zia visited India. At that time, Pakistan was seething with rumors that India was planning to attack the Kahuta nuclear plant in collaboration with Israel. The rumors had created a high-pitch, anti-India frenzy in some sections of the Pakistani population. It was amidst this that the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan's President Gen. Ziaul Haq agreed to sign the agreement. However, the agreement could not materialize during Gen. Zia's lifetime because of disagreement on some details. It was only when Ms. Benazir came to power that this agreement could be signed during Mr. Gandhi's visit to Islamabad in December 1988 during the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] meeting. But this agreement remained ineffective because Pakistan hesitated in disclosing the sites of its nuclear facilities as had been provided in the Rajiv-Benazir agreement.

It is significant that Pakistan finally agreed to provide the required list only after its Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's proposal in June last year for a five-nation consultation on making South Asia nuclear weapon free. India rejected this proposal outright as a rehash of Pakistan's earlier proposals for making South Asia a nuclear-free zone. Pakistan has since used this proposal as a propaganda against India in the United States and other countries. But its refusal to provide a list of its nuclear facilities in accordance with the 1988 agreement came in the way of the credibility of its nuclear-related propaganda against India. And that is perhaps the reason why Pakistan has finally decided to do the needful.

The agreement entered earlier provides each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging, or participating in directly or indirectly any action aimed at causing the destruction of or damage to any nuclear installation or facility in the other country, and that the term nuclear installation or facility includes nuclear power and

research reactors; fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities; as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form; and establishments storing significant quantities of radioactive materials. Each contracting party shall inform the other on January the 1st of each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and facilities whenever there is any change.

Now that this agreement has become effective on the New Year's Day, one should hope for a better level of relationship between the two countries. But again, everything depends on intentions. Secretary General in Pakistan's Foreign Ministry Akram Zaki has told the Voice of America that the agreement would help in easing tension, but Kashmir continues to be the main stumbling block in the normalization of India-Pakistan relations. There is another stumbling block in the process of normalization. Since the days of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan has declared that it must become a nuclear power. As early as 1965, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister of Pakistan, saw in the nuclear energy the source of military supremacy and world recognition. He played an important role in laying the foundation of the weapon-oriented nuclear program.

Dr. A.Q. Khan, who built the clandestine Kahuta plant with nuclear secrets from the Western countries, was the find of Mr. Bhutto. The Kahuta plant was Mr. Bhutto's brainchild, and as the world reports go, it is here that Pakistan has been quietly working on a nuclear bomb. Subsequently, Dr. Khan claimed that they have made enough success to produce a nuclear bomb. India, on the other hand, has declared a policy of not using its nuclear capabilities to produce a bomb. Thus, for effective peace between India and Pakistan, Islamabad will have to assure India that it has no nuclear weapon intentions. Also, it has to desist from activities such as supporting terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir and revert to the spirit of the the Simla agreement.

Pakistani Claim of Incomplete Data Exchange Denied

BK0901034092 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0245 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] The Indian High Commission in Islamabad has refuted reports appearing in a section of the Pakistani press that the list supplied by India of its nuclear installations and facilities in pursuance of the Indo-Pakistan agreement on nonattack on each other's nuclear installations is incomplete.

A press release issued by the high commission says the list is complete in every respect.

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

General Staff Aide Interviewed on Global Stability

PM1312113191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 12 Dec 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General A. Politsyn, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Operational-Strategic Research Center, by correspondent Captain S. Sidorov; place and date not given: "Global Stability and Global Responsibility"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Maintaining strategic stability in a period of very rapid changes in our own country and the world as a whole is the duty first and foremost of those who have embodied that stability for decades—the United States and the former Soviet Union. The first meeting of its kind between specialists of the two countries devoted to questions of strategic stability was held recently in Washington. Our correspondent converses with a participant in that conference, Lieutenant General A. Politsyn, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Operational-Strategic Research Center.

[Sidorov] The two sides plan that such meetings should become regular. The next one, in Moscow, is scheduled for this January. How useful are such contacts from the standpoint of specialists in the General Staff?

[Politsyn] The problem of strategic stability or, as people still say, global stability, has indeed assumed a high profile in recent years, seizing the minds of politicians, scientists, and the military. This is clearly an imperative of our times and is a product of the new political thinking. The start of consultations on this problem is therefore inevitable rather than fortuitous. And I think the range of participants will expand in future.

The participation of a representative of the General Staff in them is determined by the military factor's crucial influence on stability. Throughout preceding history, right up to the present day, two antitheses were manifest in the Armed Forces' purpose. For their own country and people they discharged the essential function of ensuring independence, security, and territorial integrity. At the same time, for other countries and peoples, the armies posed a threat which often did really destabilize the situation.

In the new conditions, where the ideologized image of the enemy is receding into the past, the possibility of resolving the aforementioned contradiction is emerging. A long and difficult road lies ahead before we can attain that goal. But the first step has already been taken!

Such meetings make it possible to ascertain and discuss the basic concerns, to ascertain positions better, and get to understand each other. It is then possible to start

drawing up specific proposals to resolve the existing problems. I consider the mutual usefulness of such meetings to be obvious.

[Sidorov] Are the concepts of strategic stability identical on our side and the American side?

[Politsyn] The concept of strategic stability from the terminological standpoint has not been discussed as a separate issue. The crux of the matter does not reside in the identical definition of this category from the philosophical standpoint. Given specific national features and scientific approaches, they may not coincide. The crux is, and both sides understand this equally, that it is necessary to pinpoint and study those factors from among the diverse ones influencing stability which most influence it today and will do so tomorrow. Once those factors are defined, it will be possible to define ways and means capable of preventing confrontation and ensuring the peaceful development of events for the benefit of all the peoples.

Our General Staff understands strategic stability as a condition of interstate relations characterized by resistance to the effect of destabilizing factors. The American military also understand strategic stability as a state of relations between states where neither side aims to initiate an attack.

[Sidorov] The former Soviet Union could turn from a factor of stability in the cold war period into a source of conflicts in the postconfrontational era. Was it appropriate in such conditions to discuss "coordinated USSR-U.S. action to prevent crises in the world," as our and American news agencies reported? What was meant here?

[Politsyn] Yes, the Soviet Union's role now is not what it was 40 years ago, six years ago, or even yesterday. A lot has changed. The former Soviet Union now seems to many people in the world to be a powder keg on top of which are smoldering pieces of coal of varying intensity. The danger is still further aggravated by the fact that what the keg contains is far more deadly than gunpowder. Therefore for the West, the Soviet Union now represents the hottest of all the world's hot spots.

Coordinating action should, in my view, be conducted in two main areas.

First, given that the process of the Union's collapse could have global consequences, mutual consultation on the peaceful development of this process is simply essential.

Second, we do not live in a vacuum. We have comprehensive ties with all states in the world. And our peoples are far from indifferent to the fate of others. That is how we have been brought up historically. I do not think that we can isolate ourselves even with such a difficult internal situation. Concern for peace is the business of all the peoples.

The meeting in Washington which we are talking about took place before the latest events in our country, the

proclamation of the creation of a commonwealth of independent states comprising Belarus, Russia, and the Ukraine. The leaders of those states have declared that single control over nuclear weapons and their proliferation will be ensured. However, there is still a lot that is unclear here. How, for example, will matters stand with strategic nuclear systems on the territory of Kazakhstan? Other serious questions also arise which are still in want of answer. That is why it is important, in my view, to stress that global stability demands global responsibility. This particularly applies to states which possess nuclear weapons or on whose territory such weapons are sited.

[Sidorov] My next question concerns the problem of maintaining the ABM system. Our partners in the United States, as you stressed earlier, appreciate that a sense of vulnerability felt by one side is a destabilizing factor. Nevertheless, the Americans are continuing to push their own line, seeking to create an ABM system that falls outside the framework of the 1972 treaty.

[Politsyn] Any ABM system has a dual character. On the one hand, it is impossible to deny its stabilizing significance as a defensive system. On the other hand, even a limited ABM system like the American GPALS [Global Protection Against Limited Strikes] system, which can destroy 180-200 warheads [boyevyye bloki], is capable in certain conditions of carrying out strategic tasks. Substantially reducing, say, the potential for a counterstrike on the United States. If the possibility of a counterstrike does not perform the role of a deterrent factor, then there can be no strategic stability either.

The more cooperation and trust there is, the less room for mutual misgivings there will be. We therefore consider the prospect of joint research on questions concerning the creation of ABM systems against individual, nonsanctioned, and provocative ballistic missile launches and limited strikes from third countries to be useful and justified.

Such conceptual research could, in my view, be conducted within the existing ABM Treaty.

We are also ready to discuss with the Americans the question of exchanging information between national missile early warning and space monitoring systems to exclude the possibility of the sides' wrongly evaluating the space-missile situation and making an inappropriate response to it. We are also ready to grant international status to national missile early warning systems facilities as systems ensuring strategic stability and security in the world.

[Sidorov] You are obviously duty-bound not to divulge in your answers the details of your conversations in Washington. But please say something about the main thing: What was the atmosphere of the meeting like?

[Politsyn] The atmosphere was frank and amicable. Neither side refused to give its viewpoint on the most complex problems. That no ready answers exist to many of these problems at present is another matter. However,

there is time before the next meeting to discuss everything and work out our positions on the basis of the prevailing situation.

The constructive stance adopted by participants in the meeting made it possible not only to correctly identify the problems, but also to plan ways of examining them in future. This has made it possible to regard as successful the results of the first consultations on problems of strategic stability.

Karpov Meets U.S. Nuclear Arms Experts

LD1612191291 Moscow TASS in English
1836 GMT 16 Dec 91

[Text] Moscow December 16 TASS—Viktor Karpov, USSR deputy minister of external relations, received a group of American experts—participants in the International Seminar on Safe Storing and Technical Aspects of Utilizing Discarded Nuclear Weapons. In the course of the talks, the sides discussed practical issues dealing with ecologically safe methods of transporting, dismantling and liquidating nuclear warheads in line with the recent initiatives of U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

START TALKS

Strategic Nuclear Weapon Sites Identified

924P0047A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Nov 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Aleksandr Pikayev and Aleksandr Savelyev of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations: "The Nuclear Might of the USSR, on Land, at Sea, and in the Air: Three-Fourths in Russia, More Nuclear Warheads in Ukraine than in England and France Together, Fewer Missiles in Kazakhstan But They Are More Up-to-Date"—a note at the end of the text states that this article is part of a brochure by these authors that is being prepared for publication]

[Text]

Top Secret

According to the official figures submitted to the American side in 1991 at the negotiations in Geneva and incorporated in the Memorandum of Agreement to the START Treaty signed by the USSR and the United States, at this time the Soviet Union has the following numbers of strategic offensive weapons at its disposal: 1,398 intercontinental ballistic missiles—ICBM's—(of which 321 are mobile), 62 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines—SSBN's—(940 submarine-launched ballistic missiles—SLBM's), and 162 heavy bombers (including 99 equipped to carry long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missiles—ALCM's). In all the USSR has 2,500 strategic nuclear weapon delivery

platforms. A total of 10,271 nuclear weapons are deployed on these systems, including 6,612 warheads on ICBM's (including 618 on mobile ICBM's), 2,804 warheads on SLBM's (the figures for long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles—SLCM's—are not given in the memorandum since these systems are by mutual agreement limited on a voluntary basis to the limit of

880 for each of the sides), and 855 on heavy bombers according to the agreed counting rules.

At this time the USSR's Strategic Rocket Forces have seven types of ICBM (see Table 1). All these systems have different characteristics, including the basing mode, type of fuel, number and yield of warheads, range, and so forth.

Table 1. Quantitative and Qualitative Makeup of USSR's Strategic Rocket Forces (as at mid-1991)

Type of ICBM	Initial year of deployment	Number of warheads	Yield of warhead (kilotons)	Number of ICBM's	Total warheads	Range (thousands of kilometers)	Throw-weight (metric tons)
RS-10 (SS-11*)	1973	1	1,100	326	326	13.0	1.20
RS-12 (SS-13)	1969	1	750	40	40	9.4	0.60
RS-16 (SS-17)	1979	4	750	47	188	10.0	2.55
RS-20 (SS-18)	1979	10	550	308	3,080	11.0	8.80
RS-18 (SS-19)	1979	6	550	300	1,800	10.0	4.35
RS-22 (silo-based)	1987	10	550	56	560	10.0	4.05
RS-22 (mobile) (SS-24)	1987	10	550	33	330	10.0	4.05
RS-12M (SS-25)	1985	1	550	288	288	10.5	1.00
Totals				1,398	6,612		

*American classification is given in parentheses

One of the priority directions in the further development of the ICBM was adoption of the mobile basing mode despite the considerably greater expense compared to deployment in hardened launch silos. The USSR now has two of these systems in service—the single-weapon RS-12M ground-mobile launcher, and the mobile railroad-based RS-22 (with 10 warheads).

If, however, consideration is given to the high rate of accidents on the country's railroads, the railroad-based

mode for ballistic missiles carries high risk of accident or sabotage. Moreover, these missiles are "registered" to railroad stations in major oblast centers that have populations of many thousands or even millions (Krasnoyarsk, Kostroma, and Bershet near Perm).

The strategic component of the USSR's Navy in mid-1991 was, as already indicated, represented by 62 SSBN's of seven classes built in different years, on which six types of SLBM's are deployed (see table 2).

Table 2. Quantitative and Qualitative Makeup of the Fleet of Soviet Strategic SSBN's (as at mid-1991)

Class of SSBN	Type of SLBM	Number of SSBN's	Number of launchers	Number of warheads	Total SLBM's	Total warheads	Yield of warhead (kilotons)	Range (thousands of kilometers)
Navaga (Yankee I*)	RSM-25	12	16	1	192	192	1,000	3.0
Navaga M (Yankee II)	RSM-45	1	12	1	12	12	1,000	3.9
Murena (Delta I)	RSM-40	18	12	1	216	216	1,500	9.1
Murena M (Delta II)	RSM-40	4	16	1	64	64	1,500	9.1
Kalmar (Delta III)	RSM-50	14	16	3	224	672	500	6.5
Delfin (Delta IV)	RSM-54	7	16	4	112	448	100	8.3
Tayfun (Typhoon**)	RSM-52	6	20	10	120	1,200	200	8.3
Totals		62			940	2,804		
including		27			456	2,320		

* American classification is given in parentheses

** Under the START Treaty the USSR expressed its intention of reducing the number of warheads on the RSM-52 from 10 to 6.

In this category of the USSR's strategic weapons, a considerable proportion of them is the system built during the 1970's (the Navaga during the first half of the 1970's and the Navaga-M in 1977, the Murena and

Murena-M in the mid-1970's, and the Kalmar from 1977 to 1982). For this and a number of other reasons (including organizational-technical reasons), about 20-25 percent of the total number of the USSR's SSBN's are on

alert status. According to the Western press, the remainder are undergoing capital or current repair at bases, that is, are vulnerable to a first strike.

Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has significantly greater numbers of SSBN's compared to the United States (62 against 36 for the United States), the latter has a much greater number of warheads at alert status on invulnerable maritime (submarine) platforms. This is achieved both through the greater average number of

warheads on each SSBN and by the higher "coefficient of presence"—the proportion of SSBN's permanently on combat patrol.

The air component of the USSR's strategic "triad" is made up of 162 heavy bombers, of which 99 are equipped to carry nuclear ALCM's, while the other 63 are equipped to carry nuclear weapons but not long-range ALCM's (see Table 3)

Table 3. Quantitative and Qualitative Makeup of the USSR's Heavy Bomber Fleet (as at mid-1991)

Type of heavy bomber	Number of heavy bombers	Type of weapon	Number	Total number of nuclear warheads**	Range (thousands of kilometers)
Tu-95MS	84	ALCM	8	672	8.3
Tu-95M, K, K22 (Bear)*	63	bombs	4-8	252-504	8.3
Tu-160 (Blackjack)	15	ALCM	12	180	7.3
Totals	162			1,104-1,356	

* American classification is given in parentheses

** These values are approximate because in practice each heavy bomber may be armed with various numbers of nuclear weapons, and this is limited only by the technical capabilities of these weapons systems

The fleet of Soviet heavy bombers is of a quite "respectable" age. The Tu-95, for example, was first put into service in April 1956. Even externally it has much in common with the TU-114 civilian aircraft on which N.S. Khrushchev flew to America in the early 1960's. Notwithstanding, according to Western information, at this time the heavy bombers put into service during the 1980's make up the basis of the Soviet strategic air force.

Deployment of Strategic Offensive Weapons by Republic.

The Union's strategic offensive weapons are deployed on the territory of four republics—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia (see table 4). Most (about three-fourths of the weapons) are located in the largest of them—Russia—least in Belorussia. The remaining one-fourth of the Soviet weapons on strategic delivery platforms are spread approximately evenly between Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Table 4. Deployment of Warheads for Soviet Strategic Offensive Weapons by Republic

Republic	Type of strategic offensive weapon	Number	
		platform	warheads
RSFSR	ICBM	1,064	4,278
	SSBN/SLBM	62/940	2,804
	heavy bomber	101	367
Ukraine	ICBM	176	1,240
	heavy bomber	21	168
Kazakhstan	ICBM	104	1,040
	heavy bomber	40	320
Belorussia	ICBM	54	54

As far as the various components of the strategic triad are concerned, it does have certain special features. While submarine-launched ballistic missiles are attached ("registered") only to the territory of Russia, ICBM's are deployed in all four republics. There are heavy bomber bases on the territories of three republics (all except Belorussia). Here, only about two-fifths of the warheads of the air component of the triad are located in Russia, a little more than in Kazakhstan.

ICBM's

In contrast to the United States, where the ICBM bases are concentrated in a relatively compact way in the states with smaller populations between Mississippi and the Rockies, the bases for the Soviet ballistic missiles are located throughout the country, from West Ukraine to Amur Oblast.

The Russian Federation. At this time almost three-fourths of Soviet ICBM's and more than two-thirds of the warheads for them are located on the territory of Russia. Within the Federation there are something on the order of two dozen ICBM bases, and the greatest concentration is observed in Central Russia, the Urals, and further east along the route of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

All types of ICBM's possessed by the Strategic Rocket Forces are deployed in Russia. In contrast to the other republics, the greatest proportion of older systems is found here: the single-warhead RS-10 and RS-12 missiles and the multiple-warhead RS-16. They are all based only on Russian soil. At the same time, it is also only in this republic that the new railroad-mode mobile ICBM's, the RS-22's, are deployed.

Starting from the late 1980's there has been intensive deployment of ground-mobile single-warhead RS-12M ICBM's in the Russian Federation. This system weighs more than 45 tons, which makes it considerably heavier and bulkier than its analogue, the American Midgetman ICBM, which has still not gone into service.

About three-fourths of RS-12M launchers are concentrated in Russia, located in seven deployment areas. These areas are often set up at the sites of dismantled RSD-10 [SS-20] intermediate-range missiles (for example, near Novosibirsk) or near bases with obsolete and withdrawn silo-based ICBM's (Bershet). This makes it possible to use the available infrastructure and offer employment for specially trained personnel. In each area the ICBM's are deployed in multiples of nine (from 27 to 45). The largest number of launchers deployed in a deployment area for ground-mobile ICBM's on the territory of Russia are found in Yurya (Kirov Oblast) and in the vicinity of Nizhniy Tagil.

Two-thirds of the RS-20 missiles—the only heavy ICBM in the world—are in the Russian Federation. These missiles have such a large throw-weight that each of them is capable of delivering up to 10 warheads in the megaton class to targets. It is not fortuitous that the American side gave such great attention at the Geneva talks to reducing these "items." The RS-20 bases are all located in the zone between the Urals range and the Yenisey River, with the largest of them in Orenburg Oblast and Krasnoyarsk Kray.

About 60 percent of the only Soviet silo-based ICBM's—the RS-18—are deployed in Central Russia and the Volga region. This missile cannot deliver to a target warheads as powerful as the RS-20. The largest RS-18 base is located in Tatishchevo (Saratov Oblast). This base is also the largest ICBM base in the country in terms of the number of ballistic missile launchers deployed.

All ICBM bases except for one are located in krais and oblasts with predominantly Russian populations. The only exception is the base near Yoshkar-Ola, the administrative center of the Republic of Mari El. There, in addition to the obsolete RS-12's there is an area in which ground-mobile RS-12M ICBM's are deployed.

Not only are most ICBM launchers located on the territory of Russia, but so are most of the facilities for their production, testing, and repair, and also the training complexes. The Federation is a monopolist in terms of nuclear weapons production. The most well-known production facility is located in the previously closed city of Arzamas-16 (Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast).

Russian plants support the production and repair of the RS-18 and RS-12M ICBM's. The RS-18 ICBM is produced in Moscow, at the Machine Building Plant imeni Khrunichyev. The RS-12M missile is made at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant. Previously this plant used to specialize in the production of the medium-range RSD-10 missile. Launchers for the RS-12M are produced at the Barrikady Plant in Volgograd. At Bataysk (Rostov Oblast) there is a facility for the repair of RS-12M ICBM launchers. In Yurga (Kemerovo Oblast) they also produce launchers for the RS-22 railroad-mode ground-mobile system.

All ICBM training centers are located in the Russian Federation. These centers are usually located either close to the production plants (Serpukhov) or repair plants (Rostov), or near the missile bases (Perm). With regard to ICBM testing, missiles are launched from the Plesetsk cosmodrome. A certain number of nondeployed or training missiles are always located at all ICBM production and repair facilities and at the training centers.

Ukraine. Ukraine is second to Russia in terms of the number of warheads on ICBM's. Almost one-fifth of warheads in the land component of the Soviet strategic triad are located there, which is more than the number of nuclear weapons in England and France together.

Two ICBM bases are located on the republic's territory. One of them is at Pervomaysk in Nikolayev Oblast. In addition to the RS-18, the main part of the Strategic Rocket Forces' RS-22 missiles in service are located there, not mobile but silo-based; this is about five-sixths of the total in the USSR. Only the RS-18 ICBM is located at the other base, in the vicinity of Khmelnytskyi. The two bases are among the largest in the country.

Two very important industrial facilities that produce ballistic missiles are located in Ukraine. At Pavlograd in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast a mechanical plant produces the RS-22 missiles. The Yuzhnyi Machine Building Plant, which produces the RS-20 ICBM, is located in Dnepropetrovsk itself.

Although along with Russia, the United States, France, and China the republic is among the five countries that produce strategic ballistic missiles, it has virtually no capability of producing them independently. As has already been mentioned, all nuclear warhead production facilities are located in Russia. Moreover, all the heavy RS-20 missile produced there in Dnepropetrovsk are transported to and deployed in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. The ballistic missile silos located in Ukraine cannot be adapted to house the RS-20 ICBM. In order to deploy them on republic territory it would be

necessary to start the very costly construction of new silos. Nor are any test ranges or ICBM training centers located in Ukraine.

At the same time, the elimination of nuclear missiles located in the republic would not require that they be moved outside the republic: an ICBM reequipment and elimination facility is located on the territory of Ukraine (at Sarny in Rovno Oblast).

Kazakhstan. About one-third of the warheads on RS-20 heavy ICBM's are located on Kazakhstan. Two bases for them are located on republic territory, at Derzhavinsk (in Tselinograd Oblast) and Zhangiztobe (Semipalatinsk Oblast). They are both in the northern part of the republic where the population is mostly Slav. Missiles with the latest modifications are deployed in Kazakhstan, and subsequently they are among the newest Soviet systems.

In contrast to Ukraine, Kazakhstan does not have its own potential for the production, reequipment, or elimination of ICBM's. One very important facility for testing ballistic missiles, however, is located in the republic, as part of the gigantic complex known as the Baykonur cosmodrome. This complex has nothing in common with the populated point of Baykonur in Dzhezkazkan Oblast shown on the maps. In fact the cosmodrome is located several hundred kilometers to the southwest, close to the water resources and transport facilities. The center of the range is the city of Leninsk, located in Kzyl-Orda Oblast near the Syrdarya River and the Orenburg-Tashkent railroad line.

Belorussia. Compared to the other three republics, Belorussia has the smallest number of the ICBM weapons, less than 1 percent. But one-fourth of the latest systems—the ground-mobile RS-12M missiles—are deployed in Belorussia (at Lida and Mozyr). Like many of these systems on the territory of Russia, the Belorussian ICBM's are deployed in the old areas where the intermediate-range RSD-10 missiles used to be deployed.

As in Ukraine, the republic has its "own" ICBM reequipment and elimination facility (in Brest Oblast).

SLBM's

As already mentioned above, all facilities for the production, testing, loading, repair, warehouse storage, and elimination of SLBM's are located within the borders of the Russian Federation.

Despite the extraordinary length of its coastline, Russia does not have very many convenient bays that meet the main requirements for the deployment of strategic nuclear submarines, namely, direct access to the open sea and ice-free in winter. All these bays are concentrated on the Kola Peninsula (the Northern Fleet), and in Kamchatka and in Maritime Kray (the Pacific Ocean Fleet).

Most missile-carrying submarines are deployed at bases on the Kola Peninsula. All the classes of submarines and missiles in service are represented there. However, the greatest importance is attached to the latest systems—the Tayfun-class and Delfin-class submarines armed with the RSM-52 and RSM-54 missiles respectively. At the same time, the Tayfun-class is today the largest submarine in service with the Soviet Navy (and the world's largest), with 20 SLBM launch tubes, while the Delfin-class submarines have only 16, and it makes less noise and consequently has less chance of being detected by enemy antisubmarine systems.

At this time there are six Tayfun-class submarines (all are attached to the base at Nerpichya) and seven Delfin-class SSBN's (attached to the base at Olenye). To judge from everything, in the future it is also planned to locate Delfin-class boats at the base at Yagelnaya. All these bases are on the Kola Peninsula.

The Pacific Ocean bases have considerably fewer submarines, and all of them are older classes (Navaga, Murena, and Kalmar). This is probably explained by the relatively great vulnerability of the bodies of water remote from the country's central regions to enemy antisubmarine and other naval systems.

SLBM's are produced in Ural at the Zlatoust Machine Building Plant, and in Siberia at the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant. An SLBM reequipment and elimination facility is located about half way between them, at Pashino (Novosibirsk Oblast). Ballistic missile launchers for the submarines of the Northern Fleet are reequipped and eliminated at the Sever Production Association located in the city of Severodvinsk in Arkhangelsk Oblast. Reequipment and elimination of Pacific Ocean Fleet missiles are done at the Far East Zvezda Plant located at the populated point of Bolshoy Kamen in Maritime Kray.

Each of the bases has several (sometimes more than 100) undeployed SLBM's. On the Kola Peninsula there are also several facilities for storing these missiles. SLBM's are loaded at Severodvinsk and Okolnyy (the Northern Fleet), and missile tests are conducted from Nenoksa (in the White Sea basin). Missiles are launched in an easterly direction.

Heavy Bombers.

The Russian Federation. Heavy bombers are the only component of the strategic triad, most of whose weapons are located outside Russia. Four heavy bombers bases are located on Federation territory, and three of them are in the European part. All types of heavy bombers are deployed in Russian, and also the so-called "former" heavy bombers (the ZMS-2 and the M-4), which have been withdrawn from service but not eliminated. The latest Tu-160 aircraft, which is the analogue of the American B1 strategic bomber, is deployed in Russia. As in the case of the SLBM's, the latest types of heavy bombers (ALCM-armed Tu-160's and Tu-95's) are

deployed in the European part, whereas the only Far East base is equipped with Tu-95's armed only with nuclear air-dropped bombs.

At the same time, Russia holds "control over the action package" to produce and test heavy bombers, and also for crew training. The plants that produce heavy bombers are located in the Volga area: the Kazan Aviation Production Association, producing the Tu-160, and the Kuybyshev Aviation Production Association at Samara, which makes the Tu-95. Flight testing of heavy bombers is done at Zhukovskiy near Moscow, and crew training takes place at Ryazan. The repair of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers is done at the same place. A facility for reequipment and elimination of bombers is located at Engels, the former center of the Republic of Volga Germans.

According to some information, in Russia, particularly in areas of the far North, there is a whole series of dispersal airfields. These airfields are to be used by Soviet heavy bombers in the event of the threat of nuclear war, so as to complicate the enemy's mission of destroying them.

In contrast to the other components of the triad, a number of facilities associated with heavy bombers are located on the territories of a number of Russian autonomous formations. This applies first and foremost to the above-mentioned plant at Kazan, and also to the Tu-95 air base at Mozdok (in North Ossetiya).

Ukraine. Ukraine comes after Russia and Kazakhstan in terms of total numbers of weapons carried on heavy bombers located on its territory. The only base for both ALCM-capable and non-ALCM-capable Tu-95 heavy bombers is located at Uzin (in Kiev Oblast). However, in contrast to Kazakhstan, within the republic there are a number of important facilities for the repair, storage, reequipment, and elimination of heavy bombers. Repairs to heavy bombers are made at the Uzin air base. Storage, reequipment, and elimination of bombers are done right there in Uzin.

Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is second in terms of total numbers of heavy bombers deployed on its territory, just slightly behind Russia. ALCM-armed Tu-95 heavy bombers are deployed at Semipalatinsk. In terms of numbers of weapons on heavy bombers, this is the country's largest air base. As far as auxiliary facilities are concerned, the Semipalatinsk base is completely serviced by facilities in Russia.

* * *

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has caused many misgivings, and not only about the integrity of the country's strategic potential. A legitimate question has arisen as to whether the combat readiness of this potential will be maintained, at least on the territory of Russia, in the event that all the facilities in the other republics are withdrawn from the strategic offensive weapons system. In this regard, the available information makes it

possible to conclude that although the loss of components of the nuclear infrastructure in the republics may initially lower the reliability of strategic forces and significantly complicate their function, notwithstanding, in general they will remain significant as a means of deterrence.

[Text is accompanied by two maps, as follows:

Map 1 shows strategic weapons bases:

In RSFSR:

ICBM bases at [Kovolsk?—original illegible], Vypolzovo, Kostroma, Teykovo, Tatishchevo, Yoshkar-Ola, Yurya, Bershet, Nizhniy Tagil, Kartaly, Dombarovskiy, Novosibirsk, Aleysk, Uzhur, Krasnoyarsk, Kansk, Irkutsk, Drovyanaya, and Svobodniy;

SSBN bases at Severomorsk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy;

Heavy bomber bases at Priluki, Engels, and Mozdok;

In Ukraine:

ICBM bases at Khmel'nitskiy and Pervomaysk;

Heavy bomber base at Uzin;

In Belorussia:

ICBM bases at Mozyr and Lida;

In Kazakhstan:

ICBM bases at Derzhavinsk and Zharghiztobe;

Heavy bomber base Semipalatinsk;

Map 2 shows strategic weapons production, testing, repair, and reequipment and elimination facilities:

In RSFSR:

Missile production facilities at Moscow, Volgograd, Votkinsk and Yurga;

SLBM production facilities at Zlatoust and Krasnoyarsk;

Heavy bomber production facilities at Kazan and Samara;

Missile repair facility at Bataysk;

Heavy bomber repair facility at Ryazan;

Missile test facility at Plesetsk;

SLBM test facility at Nenoksa;

Heavy bomber test facility at Zhukovskiy;

SLBM reequipment and elimination facilities at Severodvinsk, Pashino, and Bolshoy Kamen;

Heavy bomber reequipment and elimination facility at Engels;

In Ukraine:

Missile production facilities at Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd;

Heavy bomber repair facility at Belaya Tserkov;

Missile reequiment and elimination facility at Sarny;

Heavy bomber reequiment and elimination facility at Uzin;

In Belorussia:

Missile reequiment and elimination facility at Lesnaya;

In Kazakhstan:

Missile test facility at Leninsk.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

World Strategic Defense System Urged

UN, Not National, Systems Needed

924P0049A Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 34, 16-22 Aug 91 (signed to press 15 Aug 91) p 2

[Letter to the editor by N.N. Moiseyev, full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and of the International Academy of Astronautics, under "Ideas and Opinions" rubric: "Let's Not Lose a Unique Opportunity!: How to Free Humanity from the Danger of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] A well-known Soviet scientist has written a letter to the editor's office of ZA RUBEZHOM in which, on the basis of the international agreements and treaties that have been achieved, he sets forth a plan for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war on our planet and proposes that it be widely discussed publicly. In publishing this letter, we appeal to scientists, politicians, and public figures of the Soviet Union and other countries to state their opinion on such a vitally important question for all of us.

The political events of recent months have created an extremely favorable climate for the resolution of the most acute problems of our planetary reality and the time has come to take the next step and remove, perhaps forever, the danger of a nuclear conflict. This is the first time in our history that such a possibility has presently itself and it would be an enormous crime against humanity to let it slip by.

In the last 10 years, I have been very much involved with the problems having to do with the assessment of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and with the study of reasonable compromises in the dilemma of nuclear disarmament—that of whether to maintain or categorically prohibit nuclear weapons forever.

Despite the fact that the possibility of nuclear war, as we now know very well, threatens the very existence of humanity and all peoples of the world are objectively

interested in reducing the probability of a nuclear catastrophe, the conclusions of our analysis are not as unequivocal as the formulation of the dilemma requires. The situation is considerably more complex than it appears to be to the traditional "champions of nuclear disarmament."

The rapid development of science and the incredible leap in the area of precision technology are making (or will in the coming years) nuclear weapons accessible not only to practically all states but also to individual groups of people with sufficient means. And no methods of monitoring or bans will be able to give an absolute guarantee that the prohibition of their production will not be violated some day. For this reason, humanity must have means capable of preventing any nuclear improvisations, but this is practically impossible to do without nuclear weapons!

Hence the unconditional prohibition of national nuclear arsenals, the dream of people in all countries, must be accompanied by the preservation of some quantity of nuclear weapons in the interests of the planetary community—such is the reality! Whatever the danger of such a decision may be, it will give people a better guarantee than any other.

The second conclusion was reached on the basis of an analysis of possible compromises in the nuclear arms race. It consists of two affirmations. The first is that under the present conditions there is a mutually advantageous compromise that defines the level of the nuclear arsenals and that in principle can be defined numerically. The second affirmation is that for this level of be zero it is necessary that there exist a sufficiently complete collective (for the entire planet) system to counteract (reduce the effectiveness) of attacking nuclear weapons. Such a system must include an information subsystem in space capable of registering the launch and movement of intercontinental missiles and also adequately efficient weapons to destroy them. If such a system is not collective, it will be only a means of destabilization, that is, it will increase the probability of a nuclear catastrophe. The stated conclusion was reached on the basis of the analysis of a mathematical model of the nuclear arms race and had the nature of a theorem.

Despite the fact that these affirmations were formulated at the international seminar of the Institut de la Vie in Helsinki as early as the fall of 1983 and were published repeatedly, there was no noticeable public reaction to them. As I see it, one of the reasons (besides reasons of a political nature) for the lack of a public response was the fact that until quite recently the establishment of an effective system to destroy intercontinental missiles seemed to be rather utopian.

Today the situation has changed qualitatively and we must return to these questions. Indeed, new technical means have appeared in recent years that may serve to greatly destabilize the military and technical situation and to give impetus to the review of the basic model of

the nuclear balance, which boils down to the notion that the primary nuclear powers the United States and USSR must have nuclear strike weapons of approximately equal strength (and possibilities of delivering them).

A few years ago, the so-called "Brilliant Pebbles" technology was invented in the United States. This was a new technology for ABM defense. It was supposed to be based on a large number of small (weighing up to 40 kg) missiles self-targeted to a source of infrared radiation. Such a missile was called a "Brilliant Pebble." It is capable of attacking from space an ascending intercontinental missile in its boost phase. In combination with a space information system capable of registering the launch of a missile and of resolving the task of target allocation, that is, of sending the necessary number of "Brilliant Pebbles" to their target, such a technology for an antimissile complex seemed rather promising even at first glance.

Prof. Yu. N. Pavlovskiy and his colleagues made a thorough computer analysis of diverse technical possibilities for the use of the "Brilliant Pebbles" technology. They came to the unequivocal conclusion that through the rational choice of the technical parameters of such a technology it can serve as the basis for a very effective system to combat existing types of intercontinental missiles. And they made a quantitative assessment of its possible characteristics.

As Prof. K.V. Cherevskov justifiably noted, the invention of such a technology may serve as the cause of a drastic destabilization of the military and political situation on the planet and as a means that will make it possible under today's favorable political conditions to free mankind of the threat of total nuclear destruction.

Indeed, according to our estimates, as early as the end of the present decade the United States can deploy a quite effective ABM system on the basis of the "Brilliant Pebbles" technology and in some sense it will be "absolute" in nature. As calculations show, it will be capable not only of blocking individual launches of the "terrorist type" but also massed attacks of intercontinental nuclear missiles of the contemporary type. In this event, the United States will be a monopolist capable under the conditions of practical invulnerability of dictating any demands to other countries and above all of exercising complete control over their space systems. If such a thing happens, then there will be a dramatic destabilization of the entire world situation.

Under these conditions, the reaction of the remaining nuclear powers is obvious. This will be a striving to build new nuclear systems capable of overcoming the ABM system. And one should scarcely doubt that such systems will be built: it is always easier to create offensive systems than defensive ones. And equilibrium will be restored after a time but this time at a new and substantially more dangerous level.

But these same "Brilliant Pebbles" may also become a source of stabilization and the complete restructuring of

all principles of security. To see this, it is necessary to recall our studies at the beginning of the 1980's. The main qualitative conclusion from those studies was that with the existence of a sufficiently effective collective system to counteract nuclear missile strikes the absolute renunciation of national nuclear weapons may be a mutually advantageous compromise in the nuclear arms race. The "Brilliant Pebbles" technology may give to such an ABM defense system precisely the missing link ensuring the necessary level of effectiveness.

The stated considerations make it possible to outline a new system of collective security. Its basis is a space information system capable of registering every launch of a missile at any point on the globe. Every launch of a rocket booster for a space vehicle not sanctioned by a special UN commission automatically focuses a certain number of "Brilliant Pebbles" on this rocket, which knock it down while still in the boost phase.

Such a space security system cannot belong to one particular country. For it to perform its role and divert the nuclear danger from humanity, this space system must belong to all, that is, to the United Nations.

Established for the purpose of guaranteeing nuclear security, such a space system must be multipurpose and meet other needs of the states of the entire planetary community. It has to carry out at least three different functions. I will enumerate them in the order of importance that I perceive.

—**Police function.** The system protects mankind against possible "nuclear terrorism." It removes the need for the existence of national nuclear arsenals, preserving, however, a small number of nuclear weapons under the strict control of a special international commission. Such a system will take away from humanity the threat of the unleashing of nuclear war once and for all.

—**Reconnaissance function.** Today many countries have reconnaissance (spy) satellites and they consume considerable sums in the national budgets. The need for reconnaissance will continue to exist, for trust cannot be established without information. But as soon as a unified space system is established, then any information that can be obtained through space systems becomes public and a relatively inexpensive commercial product accessible to all members of the United Nations.

—**Ecological function.** If an international space system is established, it is natural also to use it for the purpose of monitoring the environment through the means of remote measurement utilizing special recognition and identification systems. On its basis, one can organize a special information service for ecological monitoring that provides the necessary information to research centers and, as a commercial organization, to any commercial or other structures.

Soviet space systems capable of accomplishing the massive and relatively inexpensive launch into space of the necessary space stations and American ABM defense systems of the "Brilliant Pebbles" type as well as observation instruments could become the initial technical foundation for such an international multipurpose space system. I think that it is already quite realistic to establish a Soviet-American "creative team" that in a relatively short time could develop a preliminary plan of such a collective system of antinuclear security. This plan could become the point of departure that would allow politicians to demonstrate what they are capable of.

Let us summarize.

At the present time, it has become quite realistic, both technically and politically, for mankind to do away with the nightmare of nuclear arms and to shift to a completely new phase of its development in which there will be a rational conversion of nuclear missile capacities and an affirmation of the model of mutually advantageous compromises.

If these unfolding opportunities are missed, then a new round in the arms race is unavoidable. If mankind withstands it and does not fall into the abyss of a nuclear conflict, then after a certain time we inevitably will again come to the same problem, the solution of which seems realistic today. But we will thereby lose time and enormous resources, not to mention the concomitant calamities and dangers that a new "cold war" will evoke.

Many difficulties must be overcome on the way to the establishment of an international multipurpose space system. It is a considerably simpler matter to resolve technical questions than to deal with set patterns of thinking, a traditional view of the world, and a decadent idea of reality. It will be necessary to resolve many legal problems, modify the structure of the United Nations and its place in the planetary community, and change the notion of national sovereignties and many many other things.

Here I am not talking about the ambitions and priorities of the powers that be, which must be taken into consideration. This is why the participation of the broad international public in the resolution of the questions discussed here will be absolutely essential. Besides the scientific and technical seminars and the appearance of international working groups, extensive public discussions will also be necessary.

PERHAPS YOUR ESTEEMED NEWSPAPER WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE OF BEGINNING SUCH AN INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION?

Role of Aircraft Control Stressed

924P0049B Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 42, Oct 91 (signed to press 10 Oct 91) p 4

[Responses to the plan of Academician N.N. Moiseyev "How to Free Humanity from the Danger of Nuclear Weapons": "Other Control Systems Are Also Needed"]

[Text] In No 34 for this year, our newspaper published a letter of the renowned Soviet scientist, Academician N.N. Moiseyev, in which he presented a program for the complete elimination of the danger of a nuclear conflict. The editor's office proposed to specialists that they state their attitude toward this plan on the pages of ZA RUBEZHOM. Today we are beginning the publication of responses to the letter of Academician N.N. Moiseyev.

Prof. A.L. Gorelik, doctor of technical sciences and winner of the USSR State Prize

To begin, a couple of words about the very fact of the publication of the article "Let's Not Lose a Unique Opportunity!" by Academician N.N. Moiseyev in the newspaper ZA RUBEZHOM and about the newspaper's initiative to begin a discussion on the problem at hand. Having been a subscriber and extremely attentive reader of ZA RUBEZHOM for many years, I can say that this kind of publication on a subject of particular importance is a unique phenomenon and therefore the decision of the editorial board can be welcomed in every way.

Now about the essence of the published material.

Fighter, Bomber, or Reconnaissance Aircraft?

As far as I can judge, the basic idea of N.N. Moiseyev, is the following: on the basis of international cooperation, establish and turn over to the United Nations a multipurpose space system for nuclear security and give it police, reconnaissance, and ecological functions. I am not going to touch on the last two. Here I have no comments. As for the first, it should be noted that N.N. Moiseyev sees the space system for nuclear security as the way to solve the problem of nuclear security. That is, in his opinion, the appropriate organization of this system will make it possible to reliably monitor—including by the United Nations—all unsanctioned launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles potentially carrying nuclear warheads previously unknown to the system and hence to the United Nations. As a result, their interception on the basis of the so-called "Brilliant Pebbles" technology (this was discussed in detail in the article of N.N. Moiseyev) guarantees the reliable destruction of all existing types of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

But the article did not examine other forms and means of delivering nuclear warheads to the target other than ballistic missiles.

The author justifiably notes that technological progress in the creation of nuclear fuel is making or within a few years will make nuclear weapons accessible not only to

many states but also to individual groups of people and individuals with adequate resources. But he does not talk (apparently purposefully so as to open the way to international discussion of the problem) about the necessity of establishing other control systems in addition to the space system for the monitoring of the launch of ballistic missiles. Namely, a system for the monitoring of outer space and a system for the monitoring of air space. For the means of delivering nuclear warheads are aerodynamic objects, that is, aircraft, helicopters, and cruise and other kinds of missiles. Also included are objects in space—satellites, orbiting stations, and spaceships for repeated use. It is precisely for this reason that it is not enough to establish an international space system for the purpose of monitoring only the launch of ballistic missiles. **Also needed is a global aerospace control system that would be subdivided into a system for monitoring the air space and a system for monitoring outer space.**

As early as the appearance of the first combat aircraft in the years of World War I, there was a need for the means to detect and identify them—first with the objective of distinguishing “own or foreign” and then of determining the purpose of the aircraft: fighter, bomber, reconnaissance aircraft and so on. Searchlights and sound locators appeared and later radar systems working at different frequencies. This gave rise to national systems to monitor aerodynamic targets. People of the older generation well remember the searchlights and sound locators that were set up on the streets of our cities during the years of the Great Patriotic War. And military specialists quickly learned not only to detect the aircraft of the enemy but also to identify their type. In the war years, our country had no radar technology. And this is despite the fact that the first radar sets in the world were developed by domestic scientists and engineers under the leadership of Prof. P.K. Oshchepkov as early as the mid-1930's. One of the immediate reasons was Stalin's extermination of Marshal M.N. Tukhachevskiy, deputy people's defense commissar for arms, who handled the work to develop domestic radar. And also the arrest of P.K. Oshchepkov, who spent 18 years in Stalin's camps.

Today everywhere there is a process of improving the methods and systems for the identification of aerodynamic objects. True, it is grievous to say this, for the intensity of this process here is far from what we would like. There are many reasons for this. One of the main reasons is that the leadership of our defense ministry, at least in the recent past, to put it mildly, underestimated the importance of identification. Let us recall what Marshal N.V. Ogarkov said in a television program when he stood before a map of the Soviet Union during the days of the tragedy with the South Korean aircraft: with no embarrassment at all, he declared to the entire world that the task of identifying the airliner was not resolved, for they were not able to determine whether it was a civilian or military aircraft or what country it belonged to.

“Radar Portraits”

The appearance of “invisible aircraft,” in particular of the type of the American “Stealth,” is greatly exacerbating the problem of identification. The United States has already used them in the course of the recent war with Iraq. Only the establishment of an international system for the monitoring of aerodynamic targets will make it possible to avoid huge expenditures in the process of improving national control systems. And there is certainly no doubt that such systems are presently being developed (possibly by all or almost all countries). What will yield savings in the combining of forces in the work to establish a system to monitor aerodynamic objects of different countries that develop and build such objects? This is not the place to discuss all the diverse technical aspects of the problem. But it can be shown that the main source of savings is the publication of the “radar portraits” of the aerodynamic objects being produced.

A few words about how the process of identifying objects and phenomena is realized. In the stage of the formation of an identification system, whether it is a system for medical or technical diagnostics or a system for the identification of aircraft, they create apriori descriptions of each class of the given objects or phenomena—their “portraits.” Say, one class is that of fighters, another of bombers, and so on. Or one class is myocarditis, another is stenocardia, and the like. The descriptions are made in the language of the features (symptoms) of the objects or phenomena, which can be defined with the help of technical measuring means such as radar or electrocardiographs, for example. When an unknown object (or patient) appears at the system access, the features (symptoms) inherent in it are determined, the so-called aposteriori portrait of this object, which is compared with the apriori portraits. As a result of the comparison, the question is resolved of what the object being identified represents and its purpose, whereas a diagnosis is made in systems for medical diagnosis.

In general outline, the organization of an international system for the monitoring of aerodynamic objects appears as follows. Under the United Nations, through the efforts of all countries that are developing aerodynamic objects (remember that is a matter of aircraft, helicopters, cruise and other kinds of missiles, whereby there are no more than 10 to 15 such countries), a bank of “radar portraits” is established in the various frequency ranges of these objects. The bank is open and is refined and modified with the appearance of new objects and the disappearance of old ones from the scene. Any state interested in establishing a national control system asks the United Nations for the appropriate information—radar and other kinds accessible to surface means of observation. On this basis, it develops its own national system for monitoring aerodynamic objects.

“Selection” in Space

The appearance of the first Soviet artificial satellites had an inevitable result: at the end of the 1950's, the United

States began to develop a national system for the monitoring of outer space. We are talking about the SPADATS system, which began to function to its full extent in 1961 (the author of the present article described it in substantial detail in Vol No 1 of the journal *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE* for 1968 and also in the 1970 annual of the "Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya" [Large Soviet Encyclopedia]). This system was intended for the detection and tracking of space vehicles, the last stages of rocket boosters, and other space objects appearing as a result of the launch of earth satellites, interplanetary vehicles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The system headquarters is located in Colorado Springs in the state of Colorado and radar as well as optical and radio engineering means of observation were used as sources of information on space vehicles.

Besides resolving ballistic tasks—the detection and tracking of space vehicles and the issue of target designations on them to stations for observation and forecasting their movement—the SPADATS system also helps to select functioning space vehicles from other space objects, determine what country they belong to, identify the purpose, and register the moment when active functioning ceases. Let us note that from the first days of the existence of the system its personnel included a large group of researchers and analysts. They study radar, optic, radio engineering, and other kinds of "portraits" of all types of space objects (above all, of course, space vehicles) used as apriori information in the identification of their types, country to which they belong, purpose, and so on.

It must be assumed that several other developed states have also established or are establishing their own national systems for monitoring outer space. It is not difficult to imagine that the creation, functioning, and development of systems of this kind is linked with enormous expenditures of the most diverse kind of resources, whereby their effectiveness from the point of view of the criteria of efficiency and reliability in the identification of unknown space vehicles newly appearing in space is sometimes quite far from ideal. Which, in turn, does not preclude extremely undesirable and perhaps tragic consequences.

In the context of what has been said, it appears important for there to be international cooperation above all between such states as the United States, USSR, and PRC under the aegis of the United Nations and with its direct participation in the establishment of a system for the monitoring of outer space.

Let us summarize.

The noble initiative of Academician N.N. Moiseyev, the idea of the establishment of global systems for the control of nuclear weapons, is worthy of the most serious attention. Apparently even now an initiative committee could be established under his leadership. This is necessary for the organization of a detailed study at least initially of a list of questions arising in connection with

the organization of systems of this kind. Subsequently the committee (or a group of specialists) could specify executors—organizations dealing with the interpretation, formalization, and resolution of the mentioned problems.

It is important to recognize as a conceptual theme that a system for the control of nuclear weapons must not be limited merely to the monitoring of launches of ballistic missiles. It must be made universal by including the monitoring of aerodynamic and space objects. **Thus, a global monitoring system must be organically linked with subsystems for the monitoring of launches of ballistic missiles, outer space, and aerodynamic objects.**

And in conclusion, here in our country as well as abroad, there has recently been a greater and greater realization of the necessity of a substantial improvement of the effectiveness of nuclear arms control. And different ideas are being stated with respect to the fundamentally new situation in our country, including in the republics where nuclear weapons are deployed. The agreement between the USSR and United States on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms that was signed this year by M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush and the magnitude of the latest American and Soviet proposals contributing to progress toward a nuclear-free world do not in any way remove from the agenda the question of effective control of the production and possibly unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. This question is also becoming especially important because the club of nuclear states may expand in the next few years whether we want this or not. And in this connection, the problem of the establishment of a global system for the control of **all possible** means of delivering nuclear warheads appears to be extremely urgent.

The dramatic events of August and the subsequent changes in our country are apparently making practical the prospects and the possibility for the establishment of an international control system under the aegis of the United Nations.

Criminal Negligence at Deactivated Radar Installation

Army Accused of 'Mismanagement'

92UM0165A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
19 Oct 91 Union Edition p 8

[Article by *IZVESTIYA* Correspondent B. Reznik, Khabarovsk Kray: "Secrets of the 'Dead' Facility: The People and the Army Are United in Their Mismanagement"]

[Text] The village of Bolshoy Kartel is in fact small, quiet, and in the taiga. It would have vegetated in obscurity, justifying its existence through the manufacture of lumber, if in the middle 1970's the Ministry of Defense had not begun to build something in its background that raised both the village and its inhabitants to the level of zodiac constellations. When they were

drinking, the boys suddenly began to talk about not only the usual things—chopped down cutting areas, whirring gasoline-powered saws, and good for nothing loggers—but to delve into the problems of SDI and became very interested: listen, do not quote me mister, star wars, what role will the Bolshoy Kartel super secret facility play in it?

By the way, they knew how to keep a secret. They talked "about this" only with their own and at a whisper. It turned out that the women lost their vigilance when the military exchange motorized store arrived at the "point."

"Nyura-a-a," rushed about the village, they have thrown away the chickens at "Kosmos." Will you get involved with it, pop?....

Meanwhile, facilities of non-earth configuration were erected on the plot of ground behind the double barrier of thick barbed wire under the indefatigably strict gaze of the sentries. The main facility was an item with the code name "Krug" [Circle] which was part of the complex of the mysterious "Yantar" [Amber] Program.

"Krug" actually was a circle—a metal structure, one kilometer in diameter, in the center of which was a three-story building packed from basement to roof with electronics.

Just the construction portion of the new military garrison, in the words of the people, including those involved, cost 50 million rubles and, which it is extremely important to point out today, in the prices of those years. The cost of just the electronic filling is generally a very closely held secret. However, a small flight of fantasy permits me to imagine the astronomical cost of the space complex for detecting targets, tracking them, and transmitting data into the air defense system.

They allegedly erected the "facility," according to our standards, at strike rates—two years altogether—they handed over a turnkey facility and then it turned out that it could not track any space sectors at all: it was obsolete. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Radio Industry adopted a joint decision on the withdrawal of "Krug" from the functioning space complex and transferred it to a defense enterprise located in... Ukraine for use in scientific research purposes. Indeed, experts flew in several times from there. Later they visited here periodically.

As they report it, the residents of Bolshoy Kartel "could not pick themselves up" from astonishment for a long time when their neighbor Yuriy Chubenko, a great enthusiast of fishing and drinking sprees, replaced the super-vigilant and numerous sentries armed with assault rifles. He, leaning on a Berdan rifle, "performed his duty" well alongside the "facility" until the caviar season began in the river. His soul could not bear this temptation. Chubenko did not give a damn about the space facility from the height of his poaching interest, went fishing, and was arrested for an illegal catch.

The village boys were the first to penetrate the secret and unguarded facility. I do not have the grounds to assert that they were the first to begin to hack up everybody and everything there: to crawl into the enormous halls of endless series of metal cabinets filled with electronic boards, removing the diodes, triodes, and transistors from them... To pull out, as they would later write in the act, "the low-voltage (switchboard) apparatus of the special technical equipment and the components of the technological apparatus that are composed of assemblies and parts manufactured using precious metals."

I certainly have nothing against the boys because (I am quoting that same act) "the equipment bore graphic signs of directed disassembly for the purpose of stealing the precious metals: the cut off contacts of the relays, the cut up and broken off contact holders of the starters, automated assemblies, and contacts...."

Just how much of the precious metal was stolen from "Krug" items? This is a great secret but we, for example, know that 35 kilometers of cable containing silver had been strung in the building inside "Krug" alone. We can once again resort to analogies. A shipment of dismantled, obsolete equipment was shipped from precisely this very same "Krug" that is located several dozen kilometers from Bolshoy Kartel to stamped [grifovanny] item industry enterprises. There is a letter with the complaint: "The commander did not note the fact that they did not confirm the presence of 1.3 kg of gold, 219.8 kg of silver, and 102.3 kg of platinum worth more than 10 million rubles when they received the indicated items at the plants."

The military have their own arithmetic and naturally they do not nearly calculate the losses in the prices for precious metals that currently exist on the black market. How much do we have to multiply their figures to provide albeit the approximate amount of money the thieves made?

This monstrous looting of the military garrison had already been going on for several years when workers from the Far East Military District military procuracy and representatives of USSR Gokhran [State Repository for Precious Metals] arrived there to inspect the accounting, preservation, and use of the precious metals. They were not permitted into the "facility." Colonel Mukhamedzhanov, commander of the neighboring PVO [Air Defense] garrison, who was tasked to "watch over" the "stellar" garrison thought that the passes they presented for access to secrets were inadequate to visit this super-secret facility.

"I will not permit this without authorization from Moscow!", he snapped back with a soldier's steadfastness.

For a week (!) the unwanted guests lived in the village alongside the garrison, not daring to cross the gates of its KPP [Control and Check Point] through which everyone freely passed. Enciphered messages flew and telephone calls were made on the military line to Moscow and to

the Main Headquarters of the PVO Troops. Finally, an order arrived from there: "Permit them into the facility for an external inspection. Do not show them the documentation."

"We were stunned and shocked by what we saw on the territory of the 'facility,' especially in structure 253 (this is that same three-story house in the center of 'Krug'—B.R.)," recalled Military Procuracy Agent Captain Yevgeniy Loskutov. "Packages marked 'Top Secret' were scattered on the floor and in the dirt. We found and seized a 'Technological Equipment and Specifications Installation Plan.' Everything was torn down, uprooted, and dirty...."

The paradox consists of the fact that the military district procuracy workers ended up at the "facility"... by chance. Because of its special importance and significance for the country's defense, the procuracy located at Solnechnogorsk, near Moscow, serves the Bolshoy Kartel "stellar" garrison. Indeed, there is a militia special department on site that is directly subordinate to Moscow and a KGB Special Department special subunit that is also tied only to the capital. Just how could they permit such a thing? Well, they were feeding on this "facility"! In short, it turns out that the militia "...had recorded cases of the detention of individuals who were involved in the theft of material resources that were located in the 'Krug' equipment building. And special department personnel transmitted the information 'into thin air' because no reaction to it whatsoever followed. To simply place the 'facility' under guard and to prevent its looting was not part of the 'assigned task' of either the one or the other.

We need to give the Far East Military District Military Procuracy agents their due. Despite the fact that they "were not understood" at the Main Military Procuracy, where they arrived with a demand to pay attention to the looted facility, they continued to send letters and directions to the Ministry of Defense and PVO Troops leadership. Last year, then PVO Commander-in-Chief General of the Army Tretyak along with First Deputy Minister of the USSR Radio Industry V. Kurochkin designated a commission in order to investigate just what remained after so many years of looting at "Krug"?

They found—it is funny to say—property, subject to being written off, worth R3.6 million according to the Ministry of Defense and worth R2.5 million according to the Ministry of the Radio Industry. The high commanders ordered: Dismantle the remains of the equipment and distribute them among military units, suddenly something is suitable somewhere.

No one even thought about carrying out their order. During the Spring of 1991, Tretyak visited the "facility" and soon "Krug"... burned down.

That is the sad history. For how many decades have the homegrown hawks of the military-industrial complex demanded billions to "strengthen the defense of the Homeland"! For the most part, they used it wastefully

and ineptly, they drove the people into poverty, while robbing the sick, children, and the elderly. They artificially and keenly incited secrecy because "stellar" garrisons like Bolshoy Kartel would be impossible under glasnost and people's control. And it is far from the only one. I know of another such "Krug" that was built near Chernobyl and it has ceased its existence and was also looted a long time before the explosion at the AES [Nuclear Power Plant].

The army and the people. We are united in our mismanagement.

Investigation Detailed

92UM0165B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Nov 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent V. Litovkin: "Secrets of the 'Dead' Facility"]

[Text] Our own Khabarovsk Kray Correspondent Boris Reznik's article "Secrets of the 'Dead' Facility" (No 249) which describes the flagrant cases of mismanagement permitted by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry which cast to the whims of fate in the Far Eastern taiga and resulted in the looting of a costly military facility—the "Krug" complex—has caused a great reaction

USSR President M. Gorbachev tasked USSR Procurator General N. Trubik, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, and Interstate Security Service Chairman V. Bakatin to painstakingly investigate what occurred and to bring the guilty to justice, while considering that this, as we now know, is neither the first nor the last case of unprecedented mismanagement.

A joint commission which included representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the Radio Industry, USSR Gokhran, and KGB flew to Bolshoy Kartel of Komsomolsk Rayon, Khabarovsk Kray. Our military correspondent also flew to the Far East with the commission.

Soon after publication of "Secrets of the 'Dead' Facility," a letter arrived at the editorial office from... the USSR KGB Special Department military unit from Solnechnogorsk of Moscow Oblast which services the country's antimissile defense units. "Department agents," Colonel V. Slavyanskiy told IZVESTIYA, "unambiguously positively assesses the content of B. Reznik's article and the editorial office's principled position... Actually since the beginning of 1989, the special department has been continuously placing before the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Military Procuracy, and also other high state officials the issue of the responsibility of Ministry of the Radio Industry officials (the developer) and the PVO troops commander (the customer) for cases of anti-state practice during the construction of this and other of the country's strategic defense facilities. We are ready if necessary to present the documents that we have at our disposal...."

So, what was "Krug" that was looted and burned down in the Far Eastern taiga? "It was a system of equipment," said Colonel V. Slavyanskiy, "designed to support the operation of the main facility—an over-the-horizon radar target detection site."

"Krug," like the main facility "Duga" [arc], was to have been part of the country's antimissile defense system. It was tasked with the mission of constantly probing the atmosphere, to study its condition, and to make corrections in the operations of the missile attack warning radar site. But when its reception site—a kilometer in diameter ring of more than 300 steel antennas along the external perimeter and 270 along the internal perimeter with the most complex, special and technological equipment within it, in the single-story building—was constructed, its adjustment and testing began and it turned out that it was not capable of attaining its assigned goals.

The act of the state commission, signed by its Chairman Major-General G. Vylegzhanin and approved on April 27, 1982 by PVO Troops Deputy Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Ye. Yurasov, stated:

"According to the results of state tests and experimental operation, the complex has reliability indicators that are below the requirements of technical conditions...."

And they cite this data: during 1981, 173 instances with a total duration of 120 hours occurred when the radar was out of the "Combat operations" mode due to malfunctions and equipment failure of the equipment system and external power supply. During the first quarter of 1982, there had already been 106 instances with a duration of 249 hours.

Among other conclusions, the commission arrived at the following: "remove from the military unit (commander of the over-the-horizon target detection facility—V.L.) the mission to service the special technological equipment and guard the non-organic "Krug" system. None of the officials paid attention to Commission Member Colonel-Engineer B. Boron's note that this paragraph provided the opportunity to steal the equipment.

In fact, experts testify that the military unit that operates the "Duga" system never accepted "Krug" into its inventory. All the more so since it could carry out the tasked mission on its equipment. The site remained under the management of its developer—NIIDAR (USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry Scientific-Research Institute of Long Range Radio Communications).

Experiments were conducted at it until 1983 but then they were terminated due to their total failure. The "Krug" equipment was turned off but it was not placed into storage. The leadership of the PVO Troops Main Directorate of Weaponry (GUV PVO) and the Ministry of the Radio Industry made a joint decision on the dismantling and transfer of the site's technological equipment to NIIDAR in Moscow only in 1985, its affiliate in Nikolayev, to the Khabarovsk Polytechnical

Institute and the Kiev Higher Military School of Electronics, and to other organizations. But they did not carry out this task to the end. They did not organize the guards.

The commander of the unit located about 10 kilometers from "Krug" also could not do this.

Why? Because of the drastic reduction of personnel.

"Only five officers now work at that 'Krug' complex," Colonel A. Mukhamedzhanov explained to me, "which 200 officers previously served. There is a catastrophic shortage of people. Besides, no one asked us to guard 'Krug' and they did not conclude such an agreement with us...."

We will again return to this argument but for now let us listen to Colonel V. Slavyanskiy:

"We repeatedly reported on the situation with 'Krug,' and not only to him, but to the Main Military Procuracy, and to former PVO Commander-in-Chief General of the Army Tretyak, and to my own leadership at Lubyanka, but there were no results," said Viktor Alekseyevich. "The GVP generally did not consider it necessary to answer us and Tretyak wrinkled his nose:

"Well, they have once again upset a trash heap."

The KGB leadership sent him this answer from Lubyanka: "Analysis of the materials received attests to the fact the USSR KGB Special Department has touched upon serious problems of the creation of a missile-space defense system and its combat readiness. However, the experts direct attention to the fact that the facts set forth in the documents do not reflect the actual state of affairs as a whole but assessments and conclusions on individual issues are superficial in nature and are not based on reliable, verified data...."

"I understood the reason for this attitude toward our reports only on August 19," said Viktor Alekseyevich, "when I saw my former Chief V. Kryuchkov and Central Committee Secretary O. Baklanov, who was looking after the defense industry, together on the television screen."

In 1989, according to information of the KGB organs, the PVO Commander-in-Chief and the Ministry of the Radio Industry sent a commission to "Krug" which arrived at the conclusion that 50-60 percent of all existing equipment of the reception center had been disassembled and at the need to write it off for a sum of nearly R6 million. But they did not take effective steps on this act.

At the end of March 1990, in accordance with a special department proposal, a USSR Gokhran and Far East Military District Procuracy commission visited the facility. Our Far East correspondent wrote about the results of its work in IZVESTIYA's 249th issue. And although representatives of the new commission who visited "Krug" in November 1991 dispute the figures

cited by our correspondent, the fact remains a fact—the losses of precious metals, specifically gold and silver, at the site are quite significant.

“Just a selective investigation of one of the sectors of technological and special equipment,” Gokhran Representative Vitaliy Kovalev told me, “discovered the sale of nearly a half kilogram of silver. And how much of it has generally disappeared, God only knows. Until 1989, Gokhran did not have the right to control defense industry enterprises or Ministry of Defense units.”

Even one of “Krug’s” developers, NIIDAR Chief Engineer Anatoliy Kalinin, cannot name the precise quantity of silver, gold, platinum, and other precious metals that were expended on “Krug” equipment.

“Such information is contained in the 1979 documentation,” he said. “It is very difficult to find today.”

But nevertheless. Even though it is an approximate representation of the losses of precious metals at “Krug,” we can obtain one. If you consider that when the ashes remained after the May 9, 1990 fire at the ownerless site, they shipped the scrap to be reprocessed at “Severonikel” Combine in Monchegorsk and there they discovered the remainder of 1.7 kilograms of silver, nearly 200 grams of gold, and 370 grams of platinum....

Just what kind of loss did the State and its collapsing economy bear during construction, operation, and from the looting of the “Krug” complex?

Unfortunately, today no one can say this with any kind of accuracy. Therefore the experts also consider these losses in different ways. Some name a figure of R15-20 million, others—R6 million, and still others—R1.5 million.

It is not a matter for the newspaper and its correspondent to take the place of the experts. I think that those law enforcement and investigative organs who are tasked by the President to put an end to this history can name the most precise data and also the specific guilty parties for the flagrant mismanagement. But it is impossible to end the discussion about it without having answered the question, why did such an irresponsible attitude toward the people’s property become possible.

In my opinion, one of the answers lies on the surface. The situation with “Krug” is the result of that forced super secrecy, lack of control, and monopolism that permeated our VPK [Military-Industrial Complex] for many long years and which has not yet been overcome.

The secret memorandum of Central Committee Secretary and Deputy Chairman of the country’s Defense Council L. Zaykov, who was looking after our military-industrial complex until recently, which had been sent to the Politburo in 1987, states:

“The most effective way to accelerate equipping the troops with modern equipment is the simultaneous

development of new systems and their entry into production according to the technical documentation of the main designers prior to their acceptance into the inventory....

“But this procedure was not carried out appropriately which has a negative impact on the material position of workers collectives, impedes the development of new equipment, and creates a certain reduction of the level of developments.

“It is advisable to task GK SM for VPV [Council of Ministers State Commission on Military-Industrial Issues] jointly with MO USSR [USSR Ministry of Defense] with the preparation of conclusions on interim parameters of TTKh [Tactical-Technical Specifications] (with the support of the Council of Ministers State Commission on Military-Industrial Issues and the USSR Ministry of Defense) and with a report to the Central Committee, including with the indication of the time period for achieving the assigned parameters....”

This operating procedure gave a “green light” to a state of unfinished business and under construction for a long time in the development of military equipment for very many years and “family” control from the Central Committee where experts worked—who had formerly been with the military-industrial complex or the Ministry of Defense and who plan to return there but to higher and more promising positions—resulted in the fact that some types of weapons and military equipment, like “Krug,” never attained the assigned parameters and the very idea of their construction turned out to be utopian and the money that was spent, millions and billions, was cast to the wind.

“Science, like a designer’s idea, has the right to be wrong,” First Deputy Chief of Missile-Space Defense Lieutenant-General B. Alisov convinced me. “They cannot develop without this.”

It is difficult to argue with this postulate. But these errors would have been reduced to a minimum if independent expert control, free from monopolism, existed in military science and in industry and if the right to an error was reinforced with the responsibility for its size.

“If we manage to establish strict personal responsibility, we will finally eliminate voluntarism, working in fits and starts, and nepotism,” said G. Kisunko, designer of the USSR’s first antimissile defense systems. “We will place expenditures for defense under strict, including expert, control of the Supreme Soviet, and we will make the sphere of secret work the battlefield of scientific ideas and not personalities who are competing for a place under the sun, only then will we avoid billions of rubles in losses.”

And I need to say one more thing today.

After the fire at the "Krug" reception site and the dressing-down received from the former PVO Commander-in-Chief, Colonel A. Mukhamedzhanov nevertheless found the capability to organized his own guards at the "foreign" facility. Right now a soldier is on duty there during the day near the electric stove and the intercom.

Indeed, he has practically nothing to guard there, other than the walls covered with soot, the bent steel supports that have been twisted by flame and the black tarred roofing paper which they have nailed onto the burned out window frames for the winter. Repair, reconstruction, and new filling for the building, if anyone decides to do it, will require millions and millions.

"In general, it is our good luck that 'Krug' does not sail, does not fly and that no missiles and no projectiles are stored in it," said Colonel V. Slavyanskiy. "Then the size of the losses would be incomparably higher, yes and we would not get by without human tragedies."

Yes, "Krug" is only a grain of sand, a drop in the sea of current military and state problems that have been permeated by our common mismanagement. There actually never was any weapon or ammunition in it. But today so much military equipment, weaponry, missiles and projectiles have been produced by our military-industrial complex and accumulated by our army that their proper guarding and later also utilization, reprocessing and resmelting requires enormous material, human, and financial resources and the main thing—skillful, without negligence or confusion, special posing of the matter. We do not yet have this and therefore the possibility of new fires and explosions in the taiga with irreparable damage has not been excluded.

And the last thing. The joint commission that flew to the site of the accident at the village of Bolshoy Kartel of Komsomolsk Rayon in Khabarovsk Krai is completing its work. But its conclusions are still unknown.

I foresee that it will also not name anyone as personally responsible for the flagrant mismanagement with the "Krug" complex. At this point, we do not know who specifically is guilty for the tragedy with the nuclear submarine Komsomolets, who made the decision on the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar site that violates the ABM Treaty and who cast hundreds of millions of rubles to the wind with it....

Monopolies do not betray their adherents.

FROM THE EDITOR: As it has now become known, a new fire occurred, this time at the "Duga" reception site not far from "Krug," after the commission's departure from Bolshoy Kartel. Our correspondent was with the commission. The technological equipment on two floors burned.

Republics Said Interested in 'Small-Scale SDI'

*PM2012133991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Dec 91 First Edition p 3*

[Major M. Pogorelyy report: "Former Soviet Republics Have Become Interested in 'Small-Scale SDI'"]

[Text] Representatives of a number of former Soviet republics are showing more interest than the USSR's central leadership did in the promising American antimissile defense system Global Protection Against Limited Strikes [GPALS], including at the level of collaborating in its creation. H. Cooper, director of the organization for implementing the SDI [strategic defense initiative], stated this. According to him this interest is based on an assessment by Soviet experts of the effectiveness of the use of Patriot missiles for antimissile defense during the war in the Persian Gulf. He noted that on the other hand difficulties of an economic nature may prevent the "Soviets" from carrying out the modernization of their own ABM [anti-ballistic missile] system in the Moscow region, although only a month ago such plans did exist at the Soviet General Staff.

The director of the SDI Organization also reported on several details of the program to develop the defense system against limited missile strikes GPALS, which is also called the "small-scale SDI." So, as soon as 1996 a command post should be created at the Grand Forks Air Force Base in the state of North Dakota. A radar tracking system and up to 100 launchers for land-based antimissile missiles will also be brought into commission within the framework of GPALS at its first stage. It is estimated that the project will cost a minimum of \$46 billion.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Continuing Controversy With Lithuania Over Troop Withdrawal

Rumors of Plans To Disobey Order

*LD1412065891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0600 GMT 11 Dec 91*

[Excerpt] There is a report by Virginijus Gaivenis in the newspaper RESPUBLIKA from the northern townlet military garrison deployed in Vilnius. The report includes an interview with the commander of the military unit, and it states that the servicemen have decided to disobey both the demands of the Lithuanian authorities and the orders of the military leadership and that they are not going to leave the territory they are currently occupying.

Meanwhile, the Soviet press predicts that in the near future the military will be instructed to withdraw from the capital cities of the three Baltic states. Such are international norms.

Information is available that indicates that the North-western Group of Forces has already received instructions from the USSR Defense Ministry to disband the Vilnius, Tallinn, and some other divisions. [passage omitted]

Sajudis Demands Withdrawal by Year End

*OW1412072791 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1715 GMT 14 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In its statement "Sajudis" has urged Soviet officers and soldiers stationed on Lithuanian territory to leave the republic before the end of the year. "If you do not do that, on January 13th, 1992, the day of the first anniversary of the tragic events in Vilnius, "Sajudis" will incite all Lithuanian people.

"We understand that you do not want to leave since for 50 years you have been playing the master with impunity on our land. This way or that, gentlemen, you will have to do that. We would like to remain on good terms with you, since it is our fate to be neighbours. God bless you! Good luck!" the statement points out.

The Soviet Army servicemen stationed in Lithuania have sent a letter to Chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis in connection with the "Sajudis" statement. The letter says that the "Sajudis" ultimatum is intolerably insulting and contains clear threats to the military servicemen which may cause unpredictable consequences. "Mr. Landsbergis, the statement's menacing tone and your speeches have triggered a strong negative reaction of the officers and soldiers".

Shaposhnikov Cited: Pullout 'Impossible To Delay'

*LD1512093791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius
International Service in Lithuanian 0200 GMT
14 Dec 91*

[Text] Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov today admitted that it is impossible to delay solutions to issues concerning the Army's withdrawal any longer and promised to send his authorized representative to Vilnius on 16 December. This was reported by the Lithuanian Government press bureau, reporting on a telephone conversation between Deputy Prime Minister Zigmantas Vaisvila and the Soviet defense minister. Apart from the Soviet Army's withdrawal, issues concerning the arming of the Lithuanian border protection service were discussed. Kleymentov, deputy chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, who arrives in Vilnius on 16 December, will be authorized to negotiate with the Lithuanian Government on forming a working group on the withdrawal of the Soviet Army and its work. The deputy chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces will also participate in a North Atlantic assembly seminar, which opens in Vilnius on 16 December. It was agreed that seminar

participants will be able to visit the so-called northern townlet—the Soviet military base in Vilnius. Representatives of approximately 30 countries will attend the seminar.

Landsbergis Meets Soviet Commanders

*OW1812024991 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1430 GMT 17 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the Lithuanian news agency "ELTA", chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis met with commander of the Northwestern force of the Soviet Army, Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov on December 16th. Mr. Landsbergis says the two sides discussed political and economic questions related to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania. The Lithuanian side stressed that the military stationed in the republic should not maintain contacts with political forces opposing Lithuania (especially, with underground organizations which can buy or simply receive arms from the military). "ELTA" says General Mironov has agreed with that opinion.

Joint Baltic Complaint Over Soviet Troop Presence

Letter to UN Secretary General

*LD1512214791 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1830 GMT 15 Dec 91*

[Text] The permanent representatives of the Baltic states at the United Nations have sent a letter to the secretary general, drawing his attention to the presence of Soviet troops in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This document stresses that this is disturbing peace and security in the Baltic region. The letter has been distributed at UN Headquarters as an official Security Council document.

UN Help Requested

*PM1912142191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Dec 91 Union Edition p 5*

[S. Guk report: "Troop Withdrawals From Baltic States Could Begin Before 1994"]

[Text] A letter signed by the three Baltic States has been distributed in the United Nations. In their opinion, the world community should use its authority to induce Moscow to withdraw Soviet troops from Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian territory immediately. The letter claims: "There is no justification for the continued presence of Soviet Armed Forces on the territory of the Baltic states."

Where do the Baltic state leaders see the threat to their independence? "At the moment, given that the Soviet state is disintegrating, there is a real possibility that the former Union will be unable to go on managing its

Armed Forces stationed in the Baltic states... Furthermore, over the last few weeks, representatives of extremist groups in the former USSR have publicly challenged the legality of Baltic independence and threatened the governments of the Baltic states." (Excerpt from the same letter).

It is blatantly obvious that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have recently shown increasing preference for appealing to the West without waiting for the start of official talks with Moscow on troop withdrawals—that is, without exhausting the possibilities for finding an acceptable compromise. V. Landsbergis issued a statement on "the threat of a Soviet Army-KGB plot," urging West Europe to act as a guarantee of Lithuanian security. Estonian Foreign Minister L. Meri is calling upon the United Nations to send "Blue Berets" to the Baltic region for the very same reason—to stave off the threat from the USSR.

Every state has the right to safeguard itself by means of UN contingents. If the world community deems that the situation in the Baltic region does in fact warrant international intervention, this means that troops will be sent. However, things are less straightforward with regard to the immediate withdrawal of the Northwestern Group of Forces. Konstantin Ivanovich Kobets, chairman of the USSR State Council Committee for Preparing and Implementing Military Reform, spoke to IZVESTIYA's correspondent on this subject:

[Kobets] At the moment I see no grounds for claiming that local garrisons in the Baltic region might suddenly become unmanageable. As for the threat posed, it has to be said that the troops stationed on the territory of the three Baltic Republics are mainly for strategic purposes. It is quite clear that there can be no talk of their having any influence on the development of events in the Baltic region. There are some land assault forces there. However, in line with USSR Defense Ministry leadership directives, they have no right to intervene in the actions of local authorities under any circumstances. Moreover, both the Defense Ministry and the Russian leadership are prepared to conclude an agreement with the three Baltic states that our troops will not carry out maneuvers without their consent. Incidentally, we have even suspended a number of scheduled training measures.

The Russian leadership is also ready to examine at the meeting the question of withdrawing the section of troops which cannot be categorized as strategic from the Baltic region before 1994, when our troops will return to the motherland from Germany. We are prepared to plan for this kind of schedule, proceeding all the while from the reality of the situation: Our people have to be billeted somewhere.

[IZVESTIYA] Are you not afraid that the authorities in the Baltic region may begin to create intolerable conditions for our troops, which could provoke retaliatory action?

[Kobets] Although there have been isolated instances of this (for example, individual garrisons have been deprived of the basic living necessities), I will continue to hope for common sense on the part of the leadership of the three republics. And we have issued strict orders not to yield to any provocation... [Kobets ends]

...Finally, it is still possible to find a peaceful way out of this situation: It must be realized that it is impossible to throw an army out of a republic insofar as this army is made up of living people and families. These are the words of Latvian Foreign Minister J. Jurkans. Are the other political activists in the Baltic region aware of this simple truth? After all, it would seem that it is not in their interests to push the situation to a critical juncture either.

Estonia Protests on Soviet Border Guard Detachment

*OW1712235191 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2015 GMT 17 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonia's Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to protest against the arrival in the republic of an additional detachment of Soviet border guards.

In its previous bulletins, BALTFAX has already reported that on December 17 a special train with 600 Soviet border guards arrived in Tallinn, where it was held up for almost six hours by Estonian police and units from the Department of State and Border Security.

The note says the republic's government has learned that as far as a month ago the USSR's General Staff and Committee for Border Security had drawn up plans to increase the number of border guards stationed in Estonia by sending there the recruits called up in the autumn. However, neither the government of Estonia, nor its parliament were notified.

Such actions, the note runs on, may be qualified as disrespect for generally accepted norms of international law and interference in the internal affairs of an independent country.

A BALTFAX correspondent reports from Tallinn that the train carrying border guard reinforcements left the city at 8 P.M. and is now 20 km away from it, where Soviet border guards already stationed there have provided food for the recruits. The train is being accompanied by Estonian border guards. It is expected that during the night the train will be routed towards Pskov.

Mr. Toomas Puura, an official from the Department of State and Border Defense, told BALTFAX that Estonia intends to bring up the question during a meeting of Soviet and Estonian work groups on military matters, which is to take place in St. Petersburg on December 19.

NATO Seminar on Baltic Security Meets in Vilnius**Official Cited on Soviet Withdrawal***OW1812035591 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1655 GMT 17 Dec 91*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] NATO fully supports Lithuania's position on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the republic, said NATO Deputy Secretary General Simon Lun in an interview with the Lithuanian radio. The NATO official is participating in the NATO Vilnius seminar on the security of the Baltic countries.

The NATO executive expressed the hope that the seminar members would be able to work out principles for a secure Baltic region "that will be acceptable to the NATO, the Baltic nations and the USSR." According to him, "the Soviet Union must take into account that the republic is an associate NATO member before planning the military activity of its troops in Lithuania."

Seminar Demands Withdrawal*OW1912164791 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1215 GMT 19 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At the ongoing seminar "Baltic Security Requirements" in Vilnius, Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Ceslovas Stankevicius made a report on Lithuanian security. The North-Atlantic Assembly was one of the seminar's sponsors.

Mr. Stankevicius noted that although Soviet troops stationed in Lithuania have stated clearly their respect for the Baltics' sovereignty and laws, the threat of using military force appears to be real.

Participants in the seminar were shown documents with threats against the Lithuanian government sent from the Soviet military units in Lithuania.

"The minimal conditions for Lithuania's security will appear only after full withdrawal of Soviet troops which should be started immediately and completed in 1992," Mr. Stankevicius told the seminar.

He also urged NATO countries and some other states to give financial aid to Soviet troops being withdrawn from the republic. In his opinion, it could serve as "an investment into the cause of the Baltics' security and stability." The proposal that the NATO countries' observation and information bureau be set up in Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipeda were made at the seminar.

Estonian and Latvian Representatives Also Demand Withdrawal of Soviet Troops

E. Priks, member of the Estonian parliamentary commission on defense, has spoken before the seminar in Vilnius. He noted, in particular, that the main threat to Estonia comes from Soviet troops located on its territory. Mr. Priks cited several facts of their violating Estonian laws and stirring up tension. Therefore, the republican authorities demand that Soviet forces completely pull out of Estonia during next year.

Mr. Priks said the Soviet military occupy 85,000 hectares or 2% of the republican territory, while 45,000 troops make up only 3% of the Estonian population.

Speaking at the seminar, Latvian Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis also demanded the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Latvia. He said it should begin immediately and be completed in 1994.

Lithuanian Speaker Cited*LD1912101491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 18 Dec 91*

[Text] The North Atlantic Assembly session on the security needs of the Baltic states is continuing in the conference hall of the Lietuva Hotel in Vilnius.

At the morning session, Ceslovas Stankevicius, the head of the Lithuanian delegation, read a report prepared by the leadership of the Supreme Council about the necessary prerequisites for the security of the Lithuanian state. The speaker stated that although the leadership of the Northwestern Group of the Soviet Army has asserted that it supports the sovereignty of the Baltic states and has promised strictly to observe their laws, the threats of force and armed coercion are also real. Threatening documents that the republican leadership received recently by the Soviet military units deployed on the republic's territory were shown to the participants in the seminar. The minimum prerequisite for Lithuania's security will exist only after the complete withdrawal of the Soviet Army. Its withdrawal should begin without delay and be completed in 1992, Stankevicius stressed.

The report prepared by the leadership of the Supreme Council asks NATO and other countries to provide financial aid in connection with the Soviet withdrawal, which would be an investment in the security and stability of the Baltic states, and to set up NATO observation and information offices in Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipeda. The report also notes that in 1940 the Soviet Union confiscated all the weapons and military equipment of the Lithuanian Army. These losses must be compensated for. The NATO countries are asked to supply all other arms needed by the Lithuanian Army.

Political and military aspects of the security of the Estonian state were described by [name indistinct], member of the Defense Commission of the Estonian Supreme Council.

In his report, Latvian defense minister demanded the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from that country.

The representatives of the Baltic states also expressed their views on the national armies, their formation, future arms, and [passage indistinct]. On 19 December the session will continue its work. Reports will be made by members of the delegations of the former Soviet republics. A visit to the Soviet military bases [words indistinct] is planned.

Landsbergis, Others Speak

*LD2312122791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
0000 GMT 20 Dec 91*

[Text] An international seminar on Baltic security requirements ended in Vilnius today. For the first time, a seminar of this kind was held outside Western countries. Organized by the North Atlantic Assembly and the Lithuanian parliament, the event was attended by representatives of six NATO states, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, as well as specialists from Hungary, Poland, Sweden, and Finland. A group of Soviet military officials observed the work of the seminar as well.

In his opening speech the chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, said that the presence of the Soviet Army in Lithuania created a situation of instability in the republic. The participants of the seminar devoted the greatest share of time to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states.

Four Soviet divisions and anti-aircraft defense units are still unlawfully stationed in Lithuania, occupying 1.2 percent of the sovereign country's total territory, said member of the Lithuanian parliament, Mecys Laurinkus. According to him, Lithuania was still in the encirclement of Soviet defensive units, while the Soviet Northwestern Army Grouping was still directed against the states of Northwestern Baltic region. That's indicative not only in the name of the army group but also obvious from the offensive weaponry of the army units. By President Gorbachev's decree the former Baltic Military District was renamed as the Northwestern Army Grouping.

The Lithuanian delegation declared at the seminar that actually the former Soviet Baltic Military District had undergone no changes. The Baltic states suggested that the pullout of Soviet troops should be treated as an international European problem, and it looks like the demand of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia has not only been heard but also understood. But so far few can say how the Soviet troops are to be pulled out. The Lithuanian and Estonian delegations demanded that the withdrawal be completed by the end of the next year, while Latvia maintained the plan could be one year longer.

The participants of the Vilnius seminar admitted that due to the uncertain situation in the former Soviet Union the Baltic states did not have a negotiating partner on the pullout of Soviet troops. Soviet military

commanders heard much bitter criticism with regard to the Soviet Army. They gave an assurance that the Army respected the independence of the Baltic states, but would not take any action itself before political decisions were made. Meanwhile, (Boris Bolshakov), a member of the Russian parliament, said that an immediate pullout of Soviet troops would cause big dissatisfaction of the military, primarily owing to social problems. He observed that Russia had to begin negotiations with the Baltic states on the withdrawal of troops. In the opinion of the Russian representative, such talks could begin already next month.

The chairman of parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, pointed out that Lithuania was still involved in a conflict against its will, and therefore would now like to be in the zone of NATO's political protection.

The Lithuanian delegation asked NATO member states and other Western countries to render the Russian Government financial aid, so that it could complete the withdrawal of Army troops from Lithuania in 1992. Lithuania also appealed to NATO countries to help acquire Western weapons for the Lithuanian army. The head of the Lithuanian delegation, Ceslovas Stankevicius, told to Radio Vilnius the reaction on the part of the participants of the seminar was prompt.

[Begin Stankevicius recording in Lithuanian with superimposed English translation] We immediately felt their reaction. It was both interest and benevolence. They are going to proceed in that direction as securitations [as heard] are of vital importance to Lithuania. At the seminar we had an opportunity to make sure that the West felt what our problems are, and that after the seminar they will be heard and understood. [end recording]

Dr. (John Barrett), from NATO's Disarmament and Arms Control Section, told Radio Vilnius that the Baltic states, fearing that the Soviet Army may be treated as legitimately present, were reluctant to let in the Western representatives, who under the CFE treaty signed last year could monitor Soviet troops in the Baltic states.

[Begin (Barrett) recording] From a NATO perspective we would very much like the Baltic states to become part of that treaty, because through, that as I'm repeating myself, through that we will have access to see that equipment. And that's where we stand, for the message that I've been bringing is that I think that if people use their imagination and are not totally ideologically driven, there is a possible solution and that would be that the Baltic states would join the treaty regime on a political basis. They would offer their good offices to facilitate the implementation of the regime, without becoming necessarily legal partners to it. All that means, in normal everyday language, is that if some inspectors come to Vilnius, and then into Lithuanian territory to look at the Soviet military bases, the Lithuanian authorities would say sure, come on, we'd be delighted to have you here, and maybe you could share with us some of

your information that you've been able to obtain. And I think that that would be an arrangement that could be worked out. What that means in this situation is that we would be more encouraged to see some recognition by the Baltic states that if they could play a role in the CFE and its implementation that would help us in looking at the stability—military stability—across all of Europe, and in doing that, this would not prejudice the case for Soviet withdrawal. So you could have, say, two goods instead of just one. [end recording]

Officials on Withdrawal Timetable

OW2012015891 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1905 GMT 19 Dec 91

[Transmitted by KYODO]

[Text] An international seminar on Baltic security closed in Lithuania, and one of its key subjects was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area. BF [BALTFAX] asked the participants about how much it would take to withdraw Soviet troops from Lithuania.

It is realistic to expect the pullout to be completed in two years, said Dietrich Gehschel, Major-General of the German army and deputy director of the NATO headquarters planning division.

The troops can be pulled out within a year, said Audrjus Butkjavicius. He also expressed confidence that the former Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces soon and the first reductions must be in Lithuania. The Soviet troops in Lithuania may be abolished. He also said that a total of 6000 Soviet commissioned officers were in Lithuania who did not have homes in the republic.

Soviet Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Northwestern Army Group, emphasized that the Soviet military pullout was natural. He said 5 years was a realistic period.

Landsbergis Stresses Withdrawal

LD2212122191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius
International Service in Lithuanian 0200 GMT
20 Dec 91

[Excerpts] The North Atlantic assembly ended its work in Vilnius today. Speaking at the North Atlantic assembly seminar today, Boris Bolshakov, deputy chairman of the defense committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet, stressed that there should be no haste in pulling out the troops from the Baltic states since that might cause great dissatisfaction of the officers. [passage omitted]

Vytautas Landsbergis reaffirmed today at the Lithuanian parliament Lithuania's stand that all the Soviet troops must leave Lithuania in 1992. He was commenting on the statement by Konstantin Kobets, chairman of the military reform committee of the Soviet Union's State Council, that the pullout of troops from the Baltic states could not be started before 1994. This Soviet official said this in an interview with the IZVESTIYA daily in

Moscow. Vytautas Landsbergis drew attention to the fact that the Soviet troops were already to have been withdrawn from Vilnius and expressed the hope that this would take place very soon.

Withdrawal Hinges on Treaties

LD2212120191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 19 Dec 91

[Text] Today, on the last day of the North Atlantic assembly session, its participants visited the Soviet Army's military base in Vilnius, in the northern townlet. Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Northwestern Army Group, and Colonel Valeriy Frolov, commander of the division deployed here, acquainted the guests with the living conditions of the soldiers and officers. The guests were shown the division's weapons and hardware. Mironov said that the Soviet Army in the Baltic states would not build any objects. Funds are allocated to complete the construction of houses. Col. Gen. Mironov told ELTA that the Soviet Army will withdraw from the Baltic states only after political solutions and the signing of interstate treaties. These documents must contain the withdrawal dates. Mironov also assured that, according to his order, no larger military exercises would be held in the Baltic states.

Lithuanian Deputy Addresses Assembly

LD2212023291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius
International Service in Lithuanian 0200 GMT
18 Dec 91

[Text] Mecys Laurinkus, Lithuanian parliament deputy, told the North Atlantic assembly seminar participants that available information indicates that four Soviet military divisions are stationed in Lithuania: two airborne divisions, one a combat division stationed at Kazlu Ruda, the other a training division stationed in (Ruchla); a motor rifle division, deployed in Vilnius; and a marine infantry division, deployed in Klaipeda. Laurinkus' report notes that military air force and air defense units are deployed in another five Lithuanian rayons, as well as a great number of support units deployed on Lithuania's whole territory. The area illegally occupied by the Soviet troops illegally deployed on Lithuanian territory totals 68,000 hectares, 1.2 percent of the sovereign state's entire territory. The headquarters of Soviet military formations and assault military units are deployed at eight main Lithuanian cities. There are even 32 large military installations in Vilnius, among them explosive storehouses situated in densely populated residential areas of the city. There is great concern over the concentration of Soviet troops at the Lithuanian border. Vilnius is practically surrounded by concentrations of troops, not counting the troops in Vilnius itself. Lithuania is surrounded by Soviet assault troops. The strategic assault character of the Soviet northwest military formation against the Baltic countries is being preserved, as proved by the presence of assault weapons and the fact that the Armed Forces units deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast are left in the joint combat structure

of the northwest military formation. A need for new security guarantees after the Baltic countries won back their independence was stressed in Mecys Laurinkus' report. These guarantees could be created if the Baltic states became the states of the region of trust and European security. Mecys Laurinkus stressed Lithuanian leaders' demands for Soviet units illegally deployed on the Republic of Lithuania's territory, the main factor of destabilization, to withdraw.

European Inspectors Visit Military Districts

British Inspectors in Volga-Ural

LD1812174791 Moscow TASS in English
1509 GMT 18 Dec 91

[Text] Moscow, December 18 (TASS)—British inspectors verified on Tuesday [17 December] information supplied by the former Soviet Union about the armed forces deployed in the Volga-Ural Military District.

The inspection tour was organised in response to British requests under provisions of the Vienna document adopted in 1990 as a result of negotiations on confidence building and security in Europe.

Finnish Inspectors in Leningrad

LD1812202991 Moscow TASS in English
1935 GMT 18 Dec 91

[Text] Moscow December 18 TASS—Finnish inspectors today verified information about Soviet Armed Forces, supplied by the former Soviet Union, in the Leningrad Military District, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate reported.

The inspectors visited the 134 motorized infantry regiment in the district.

The inspection was arranged in accordance with Finnish requests under the 1990 Vienna document on confidence-building measures and security in Europe.

Troop Withdrawals From Germany on Schedule

LD1912025691 Moscow TASS in English
1329 GMT 18 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Katayev]

[Text] Berlin December 18 TASS—Before the end of the current year, 164,000 soldiers, officers and civilian employees of the Western Group of Soviet troops and members of their families will be withdrawn from Germany, or 9,000 people more than originally planned, Helmut Dumke, the Brandenburg government commissioner for defence industry conversion, said in Potsdam on Tuesday [17 December].

He cautioned against concluding, on the strength of the current pace of troop withdrawal, particularly that of

military hardware and materiel, about the possibility of the group's withdrawal from Germany earlier than scheduled before 1994.

This is impossible because, as a result of political changes that have taken place in the former Soviet Union, there has arisen the need to resolve additional organisational matters and find new places on Soviet territory to accommodate Soviet units arriving from Germany, Dumke said.

A half of the military and civilian personnel of the Western Group of Soviet troops, which was originally numbered 542,000 people, will be withdrawn to Soviet republics from Germany before the middle of 1992, Dumke said.

Former Soviet Republics To Respect CFE Treaty

AU1001203592 Paris AFP in English 1956 GMT
10 Jan 92

[Text] Brussels, Jan 10 (AFP) — The new states that have emerged from the former Soviet Union promised here 10 January to ratify and apply the conventional forces disarmament treaty between NATO and the now-dissolved Warsaw Pact.

A NATO communique said the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty should "enter into force without renegotiation and be fully implemented as soon as possible." The treaty was signed in November 1990.

The communique was issued after a meeting of the states which signed the CFE treaty—16 from NATO and the former members of the Warsaw Pact. All the former Soviet republics participated except Kazakhstan. Russia and the Ukraine sent high-level delegations.

Commitments made by the former Soviet Union "should be wholly accounted for by all the newly independent States in the area of application and apportioned among them in a manner acceptable to all parties to the treaty," the communique said. It added that some updating of the treaty might be necessary after it took effect but that changes should be kept to the minimum "necessary to adapt the text to new political realities."

Western diplomats said it was not clear how the successors to the Soviet Union would divide up the task of conventional disarmament. They said the treaty had set force reductions based on the geography of the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union no longer exists, the states that have resulted from it may have different ideas about how to deploy armed forces on their territories, the diplomats said.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Nevada Nuclear Tests Continue Despite Cuts

*PM1912132191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Dec 91 First Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "Nevada: Nuclear Tests Are Not Being Discontinued"]

[Text] San Francisco, 17 Dec—The U.S. Department of Energy plans to reduce the production of nuclear weapons will not have an immediate impact on underground nuclear explosions at the test range in Nevada. James Watkins, U.S. secretary of energy, announced this at a news conference with journalists in Las Vegas (Nevada) Monday [16 December].

In his words, plans for cutbacks in production programs and reduction of nuclear weapons stocks became possible thanks to the significant changes taking place in the Soviet Union. As a result, the numerical strength of workers and employees in industrial installations in 12 states where nuclear weapons are manufactured in the country will be halved by the year 2005.

At the same time, as Chris West, another representative of the department, pointed out, the importance of the test range is being preserved even in the face of the reduction of nuclear stocks. He said that it will still be necessary to carry out tests of the remaining weapons to ensure their safety and improve their features. "The weapons that remain will become more important than ever before," he noted. "The administration's policy proceeds on the basis of the fact that tests of nuclear weapons will be necessary as long as there are stocks of these weapons."

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Chemical Weapons Supply Stockpiled in Russia

*LD1612133691 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
2213 GMT 11 Dec 91*

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] The entire chemical weapons supply—around 40,000 tons of combat poisoning agents—is stockpiled in Russia's territory. The spokesman of the chemical troops' command does not rule out a possibility that under the present political conditions Russia will have to shoulder all the expenses of doing away with chemical weapons. In late-November at a working conference the chairpersons of committees and commissions of the Russian parliament were introduced to the program of destroying chemical weapons that the USSR had failed to implement. To date there is no information whether any specific decisions on the destiny of chemical weapons have been taken. The deputy chief of chemical troops of the USSR Defense Ministry Major-General Igor Yevstafiev maintains: Destruction of the Soviet chemical weapons' supply is a purely political action

unconnected with any technical reasons. The Soviet Union discontinued their manufacture in 1987 and annually expended rbs [rubles] 12-16m [million] to store them. In such a way, the technical necessity of destroying the Soviet chemical potential could arise in 30-40 years' time only. Experts estimate that rbs 5.4bn [billion] and US [dollars] 146m were needed early this year to implement the program of chemical weapons' destruction. In 1992 rbs 28bn might be needed to meet those goals because of inflation. Hard currency expenditure shall remain constant.

Officer Discusses Chemical Weapons Destruction

*PM1612104791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Dec 91 First Edition p 3*

[Unattributed report on interview with Major General I. Yevstafiev, professor, doctor of technical sciences, and deputy chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Chemical Troops; place and date not given: "Will We Destroy the Chemical Weapons?"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Exactly one year remains until the date when we should start destroying our chemical arsenal under the appropriate Soviet-U.S. treaty. That treaty has not yet been ratified. But the problem of destroying chemical weapons will nevertheless face us in all its magnitude in the very near future. Are we ready to tackle this problem? Major General I. Yevstafiev, professor, doctor of technical sciences, and deputy chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Chemical Troops, discusses this with our correspondent.

No Matter How Costly, It Will Be Necessary To Destroy....

[Yevstafiev] Two Soviet-U.S. documents have been signed in the sphere of chemical weapons. The first is the Wyoming memorandum, which envisages a whole series of steps in the sphere of reciprocal information about the sides' chemical weapons, particularly weapons stocks. Such an exchange was carried out in 1990. We declared the quantity of toxic chemical agents in our possession and gave full details about where they are stored and produced and the makeup of our chemical weapons in terms of types. The United States naturally did the same. Under the memorandum, reciprocal visits have been made to chemical weapons storage and production facilities. Moreover, Soviet and U.S. experts have visited chemical weapons destruction facilities.

On 1 June 1990 the USSR and U.S. Presidents signed an agreement envisaging resolute steps in the sphere of reducing the sides' chemical warfare potential. The USSR has 40,000 tonnes of toxic chemical agents, the United States 30,000 tonnes. Under the agreement both sides are committed to having no more than 5,000 tonnes of chemical agents each by the year 2002. This agreement has not yet been ratified.

But there is another factor which should not be forgotten. The multilateral disarmament conference in Geneva, as part of which talks on chemical disarmament are being held, is continuing its work. And whereas three-four years ago the possibility of elaborating an all-embracing convention not only banning the combat use, development, production, and stockpiling of toxic chemical agents, but also envisaging their mandatory destruction, would have seemed unrealistic, today its elaboration is making resolute progress.

According to expert assessments, the text of the convention could be elaborated in 1992. For it to come into force, the convention has to be ratified by 60 states. This could take two years. So its entry into force toward the end of 1994 is altogether probable. And this means that, one year on, the countries party to the convention should start the process of destroying chemical weapons.

But the question as to whether technical reasons are prompting us to destroy chemical weapons is a perfectly natural one. I would like to make things utterly clear here. The United States stopped producing them in 1967 and resumed doing so only in 1987, making a small quantity of binary chemical weapons. But they are not the significant thing here. That is to say, U.S. chemical weapons have been stored for at least 24 years. There is a second factor too. They differ from ours in design terms. The Americans have made more extensive use of light alloys in their types. They have somewhat different requirements regarding the soundness of the casing. This is fine from the standpoint of their effectiveness. However, U.S. chemical weapons are now in a such a state that the problem of destroying them is a pressing one. And 30-year-old weapons are hardly weapons any more. There are no more delivery vehicles. A bomb, after all, is developed for a specific type of aircraft, and a shell for a specific artillery system.

The Soviet Union wound up chemical weapons production in 1987. We have virtually no problems regarding storage safety. Some 12-16 million rubles [R] are required each year for the storage of toxic agents. This outlay does not bear comparison with outlay on destruction. And we can store chemical weapons at least 30-40 years.

What, Then, Has Really Been Done?

In the second half of 1990 the USSR Defense Ministry began showing serious concern over the actual state of affairs and the technical basis for the fulfillment of this agreement. Chemical weapons are kept at ministry depots and bases and the ministry bears, if not legal, then at least moral responsibility for fulfillment of the agreement. No one in our country bears legal responsibility for the destruction of chemical weapons....

At the start of last year the USSR Council of Ministers made the decision to convert the installation in Chapayevsk, the only one in our country designed to develop chemical weapons destruction techniques. We have thus been deprived of a facility and therefore been unable to

verify chemical weapons destruction techniques on an industrial scale. Given this, in March 1991 the USSR president ordered the Defense Ministry to finalize within two months the chemicals weapons destruction program, which had earlier been examined in USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions, and submit it to the Cabinet of Ministers. It was to examine it, draw up draft laws ensuring the implementation of the program, and appoint a state commission to determine the location of destruction facilities.

On 10 May the redrafted program was submitted to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, where virtually no one has taken it up. It has to be bluntly said that the president's instruction has not been executed, nor have laws regulating chemical weapons destruction been drafted. Such laws do exist in the United States. They define who is responsible for the destruction of military toxic agents, who finances the program, how it relates to the country's security, and so forth.

A new spiral in the development of this problem has been observable as this year approaches its end. But no longer at the disintegrating Union level, but at the Russian level. Even earlier, deputies representing Russia and individual Russian officials were present during various discussions of programs and attended international conferences. We saw their interest, but saw no solutions. Then in November the first substantive briefing of Russian Supreme Soviet deputies on the chemical weapons destruction program took place. A report on the program was delivered on 27 November to a working conference in which deputies and chairmen of committees and commissions took part. This discussion could, it seems to me, lead to some practical steps.

We have for a long time now stated pretty clearly that the problem of chemical weapons, as distinct from the problems of other types of weapons of mass destruction, is a Russian problem. There are nuclear weapons on the territory of a few republics. Chemical weapons have been produced in Russia and they are also stored on its territory. It is difficult for me to say whether only Russia will destroy these weapons or whether the republics of the former Union will take part in this work. At best it can be said that the destruction will be paid for out of the Union budget, if it exists. But you can scarcely count on any other participation. And given this, it follows that the commission choosing the destruction locations must be Russian. The laws must be Russian. The institutions and enterprises receiving contracts to carry out the work must also be Russian.

Where, Then, Are the Facilities To Be Constructed?

The program envisages three possible options. The first is to convert existing chemical weapons production plants into destruction plants. What is the advantage? These are state-of-the-art plants in terms of equipment. They certainly need to be reorganized and modified. But

the basis is there: sources of power, purification facilities, personnel, and the right mental attitude on the part of the workforce there.

The second option is to destroy the chemical weapons at their storage sites. But there are implications here: Virtually all the chemical weapons storage sites are close to major population centers. They were created at a time when no attention was paid to these aspects. Moreover, cities are constantly growing and getting closer to the storage sites. And in our estimation, the risk of creating facilities at the storage locations is considerable. It substantially exceeds the risk involved in transportation. In our estimation, transporting chemical weapons is less dangerous than transporting chlorine, 30,000-40,000 tonnes of which "chug" along our country's railroads each year.

The third option is to select regions in the country which are remote from cities, populated areas, and rivers, but close to railroads and power installations. We have carried out such work, and a whole series of such regions can be identified in the country. But here too we will come up against a psychological barrier.

How is this problem to be resolved? I think the only way is to pass laws which lay down compensation for people for psychological damage. We are talking about a system of insurance. Risk has to be paid for. And if someone knows that he will receive compensation on agreeing to the siting of a facility, his reaction could be different. For example, we have been following very carefully how this is done in the world. In France nuclear electric power stations are sited in regions which are considered unacceptable for such construction in our country because of their population density. But the people there do not protest against nuclear electric power stations. Or take Nevada, for example: Its inhabitants are proud of the test range there, because, on the one hand, they know that everything is done to ensure their safety, while, on the other hand, the test site provides employment in Nevada.

According to prices at the start of 1991, the destruction of chemical weapons required R5.397 billion and \$146 million. Next year costs could rise to R28 billion. The sum will increase as time goes on as a result of the devaluation of the ruble.

But will we get anything out of the destruction of chemical weapons apart from cleansing our country of this lethal arsenal? Yes, the facilities set up to destroy chemical weapons can clearly be used to destroy toxic waste in 8-10 years' time after they have performed their tasks. We have more pesticides past their storage life in our country than we have chemical weapons.

Moreover we favor techniques which envisage destroying toxic agents by converting them into useful output for the national economy rather than incinerating them. For example, lewisite contains 20 percent arsenic. While the arsenic content at the deposit in Georgia, the sole deposit in our country, incidentally, is only 13

percent. By our estimates, R2.5 billion of the 5.4 billion earmarked for the destruction of chemical weapons could be recouped.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Officials View Ukrainian Nuclear Arms Policies

Foreign Minister on Destruction Schedule

*LD1412000391 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2300 GMT 13 Dec 91*

[Text] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko has told his Bulgarian counterpart, Stoyan Ganev, in Sofia that Ukraine is going to destroy all the nuclear weapons on its territory within the coming seven years, and if other nations offer it material aid it will take it three to five years to destroy the nuclear hardware.

Shaposhnikov on Ukraine's Role

*LD1312221691 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1936 GMT 13 Dec 91*

[News conference with USSR Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov and unidentified journalists on 13 December; place not given; from the "Topical Interview" program—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Journalist] Let me ask you, if I may, about the Commonwealth of Independent States and nuclear forces.

[Shaposhnikov] Indeed this is a very serious issue and is of concern to the world community. However, I also wish to state that at the present time the nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, are under unified control in accordance with the system that was announced previously. None of the presidents of the sovereign states have an opportunity in any way to implement their use.

[Journalist] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, there was a report that the president of the Ukraine has appointed himself commander in chief of Ukraine's armed forces. Could you comment on this?

[Shaposhnikov] I wish to say that the president of any republic is entitled to do so. Another question that is of greater concern to me is the transfer of the Armed Forces located in their territory to the jurisdiction of the various republics. I have had a very lengthy and detailed conversation with Leonid Kravchuk on this subject. In addition, I have spoken with the USSR president and with Russian President Comrade Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. Afterwards we agreed with Comrade Kravchuk that no precipitate and hasty steps would be taken. If Ukraine needs this process, it needs to be made a humane and civilized process.

Some sort of sequence, timetable, and mechanism will be worked out. And to this end Colonel-General Pyankov, deputy defense minister, flew out to Kiev today on behalf of the Defense Ministry. He is accompanied by a group of officers and generals of the General Staff, and they are with Comrade Kravchuk at this moment.

[Journalist] Does that mean that nuclear forces will also be subordinated to him?

[Shaposhnikov] No, it does not mean that at all. We spent a long time discussing this topic with him, and we reached full agreement that not only strategic nuclear forces, but also tactical nuclear weapons, and also all the facilities providing back-up for both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons will be under central command. [passage omitted]

Kravchuk on 'Liquidating' Arms

*LD1712223191 Kiev Radio Kiev Network
in Ukrainian 0600 14 Dec 91*

[Text] A conversation has taken place between Leonid Kravchuk and Kroner, leader of the EC delegation and Netherlands ambassador for special tasks. The EC representative showed interest in the position of the Ukraine and the Commonwealth of Independent States on issues of strategic nuclear weapons.

The president noted that the Ukraine is ready to join the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and is interested in liquidating them on its territory as soon as possible. Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk declared himself in favor of establishing broad cooperation between the Ukraine and the EC countries in the economic sphere. He also asked the guest to pass on the message that the Ukraine desires to be accepted to European structures as soon as possible.

Kravchuk on Joint Control

*LD1512173191 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1310 GMT 15 Dec 91*

[Telephone interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in Kiev by correspondents Yuliy Semenov, Tuleubay Kaymuldinov, and Igor Rudometov in Moscow; and correspondent Viktor Pasak in Kiev—live]

[Excerpts] [Semenov] And now, I want to explain to the listeners how our program will be conducted. As you already have realized, today we have a direct Kiev-Moscow television bridge. In the studio in Kiev along with Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, is our colleague Viktor Vladimirovich Pasak. And here, in our studio, along with me are my colleagues Tuleubay Kaymuldinov from Kazakhstan, and Igor Rudometov, my colleague from Belarus. As you can see, we are all heading toward a commonwealth of independent states, and accordingly, the character and structure of our broadcast should take account of the realities of

the times. But now, I ask our colleague from Kiev to briefly introduce his president to our television viewers. Go ahead, please.

[Pasak] Good afternoon. And so, in the Kiev studio is Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, president of independent Ukraine. [passage omitted]

[Kravchuk] We will create such a world and such states which will directly participate in creating a new world structure, peace and security. We have all spoken in favor of, and we are all striving to see the elimination of all nuclear weapons. We will aim for total disarmament; that is our great, common goal. We will establish a mechanism that can provide a guarantee that the nuclear forces that will be under single control will not be used. [passage omitted]

[Pasak] Leonid Makarovich, here, in Kiev, we have very many questions. This is understandable—they are being raised by people to their own president. Ukrainian television viewers have very many questions. Here is a question from Aleksey Velikorodov from Kiev. One of the main questions worrying the world community is the question of Soviet nuclear weapons. The press is interpreting the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement in different ways. Some are talking of joint control and others of centralized control. But, these are not one and the same thing, are they?

[Kravchuk] I agree. Therefore, we decided that, we decided—we agreed in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha—that until the complete destruction of nuclear weapons, including both strategic and tactical ones, all the states would assist one other in tackling these questions, so that eventually they become nuclear-free states and scrap these weapons completely. In the stage up to their complete destruction, there will be a mechanism for control over the nonuse of nuclear weapons, over their destruction. This control will be political. In other words, all the states on whose territory there are nuclear weapons—temporarily, I stress—will cooperate in this control.

The possibility of using nuclear weapons also will be determined by a political agreement among the presidents of the states having nuclear weapons on their territory. In other words, the control in this instance will be exercised from a single center, but it will also be collective, for a political solution of this question. However, for us, I stress that the most important thing is control over nonuse rather than use. We are for destruction rather than production, although there may appropriate nuances in both cases. [passage omitted]

Defense Ministry Aide on Withdrawal

*LD1912214791 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2007 GMT 19 Dec 91*

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Sergey Balykov]

[Text] Kiev, 19 Dec (TASS)—During 1992 nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from Ukrainian territory.

This belief was expressed by Major General B. Grechaninov, spokesman for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, at a news conference for Ukrainian and foreign journalists today. This process is already under way, he said. The work is implemented according to a plan under mutual monitoring by the Ukraine and Russia.

Experts from the United States, Russia, the Ukraine, and the USSR Defense Ministry participating in a seminar on nuclear disarmament issues, which is being held in Kiev now, answered journalists' questions. The organizers of the seminar, the Ukrainian "Znaniye" [Knowledge] society and the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, invited leading specialists on liquidating nuclear weapons. Scholars and practical workers told about their work to ensure a nuclear-free future for the Ukraine, methods for which are elaborated at the seminar by the united efforts of involved parties. A program for the most effective and safe elimination of the nuclear arsenal is being created, as well as an exchange of opinions with regard to ways and methods for liquidating nuclear means, their transportation outside the Ukraine, storage, stock-taking, and proper control.

Belarusan Foreign Minister on Nuclear Arms Destruction

Demands 'Direct Participation'

*OW1612175391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1400 GMT 16 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "The people of Belarus are tired of being pawns to somebody else's military decisions", Belorussia's foreign minister Petr Kravchenko told IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent before the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Minsk. The destiny of nuclear arms deployed in Belorussia and issues connected with their use, redeployment and control over them should be resolved only with Belorussia's direct participation, the minister pointed out.

As for the monitoring of nuclear weapons it should be in the hands of a unified center in accordance with the Minsk accords on forming the Commonwealth of Independent States, said P. Kravchenko. "Our ambitions do not spread to possessing nuclear weaponry", he added. "We want it to be destroyed right here in Belarus, not redeployed elsewhere.

Back last year, the minister said, Belarus called for setting up a denuclearized belt from the Baltic to the Black Sea with the inclusion of Belarus, the Ukraine and the Baltic states.

To Control Arms 'Directly'

*LD1612183391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 16 Dec 91*

[Text] Belarus Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko says Belarus intends to control the nuclear weapons on its territory directly, INTERFAX reports. Kravchenko pointed out that no decision on the use and redeployment of and on the control [kontrol] over nuclear weapons in Belarus will be made without the participation of that republic's government.

NATO 'Concerned' Over Soviet Nuclear Arms, CFE Compliance

*PM1612151791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Dec 91 Union Edition p 3*

[G. Deynichenko report: "NATO Bloc Concerned With Soviet Nuclear Potential"]

[Text] The NATO defense ministers' regular meeting last week in Brussels was overshadowed, almost as in the old days, by the "Soviet question." This time the development of events in the former Soviet Union, which almost every serious newspaper describes as "potentially dangerous," is arousing growing concern in NATO circles.

Analysis of the statements and press commentaries made in Brussels allows us to single out three groups of problems that are arousing the greatest misgivings among NATO military leaders. First, there is above all the question of who is exercising control over the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Evidently the reassuring statements being heard these days in Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk have been considered inadequate in the West, especially since the new Commonwealth's assurances that the nuclear arms are under unified control are accompanied by contradictory facts. Some of the Western press is agitated by the statement issued by Belarus Defense Minister P. Chaus to the effect that the nuclear weapons sited in the republic "must not be hurriedly handed over to someone else." Another section of the press has hurriedly set about calculating the nuclear missile potential of the Black Sea Fleet, which is now part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and regarding whose nuclear arms Kiev has made no intelligible provisions.

However, the very nature of nuclear weapons is such that any omissions, inaccuracies, or slips of the tongue are inadmissible in the political formulas concerning the future of these weapons. As long as there is uncertainty, albeit only apparent uncertainty, NATO prefers to retain the kind of order that would ensure "strict central control and reliable political control" over nuclear missile weapons in our country.

The second group of problems that aroused Western military circles' concern, once again despite the Commonwealth's assurances, was the future of the CFE Treaty. As you know, the Soviet Union signed this treaty as an integral state. The restrictions on armed forces for

which the treaty makes provision as well as the geographical borders for siting military hardware apply to the Union as a whole. But will the individual republics comply with these terms? Our Western partners are not confident about that. U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker is even warning of the danger of an "internal arms race among the former Soviet republics, which poses a potential serious threat to European security."

Last, NATO feels some concern for the future of its own plans for cuts in military spending. These plans are pretty significant, both in themselves and owing to the economic and financial difficulties experienced by leading Western countries. The United States has already announced a 25-percent cut in its armed forces and is contemplating further, more radical steps in this field. If that program is approved, the U.S. Army will be reduced by a third—700,000 soldiers. NATO as a whole plans to almost halve its forces in Central Europe by 1995.

The defense ministers gathered in Brussels took the view that the changes in our country as yet do not impede their plans for drawing in their military structures in Europe. However, a final decision on reorganizing NATO armed forces has been postponed until early next year.

As for the problems of control over Soviet nuclear weapons and the implementation of disarmament treaties, the NATO bloc cannot resolve them alone. That is why the defense ministers agreed to the U.S. proposal to hold a meeting with the former Warsaw Pact defense ministers. A joint session, as it were, on the lines of the meeting scheduled for the NATO and former Warsaw Pact foreign ministers is in conformity with the decisions adopted by the North Atlantic bloc meeting in Rome. At the same time the NATO defense ministers recommend establishing closer contacts with the republics of the former Union.

The date of the defense ministers' joint meeting has not yet been clarified. It is being said only that it should be held as soon as possible. The joint session involving the NATO foreign ministers and their East European counterparts is scheduled for 20 December in Brussels. E. Shevardnadze and the ministers of other former Warsaw Pact states as well as the three Baltic countries are to take part in it.

Shaposhnikov Reassures Baker on Nuclear Arms Control

LD1612213891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1925 GMT 16 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 16 Dec (TASS)—Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, USSR minister of defense, met today with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The conversation, which lasted for over an hour, was held

behind closed doors. Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, who also took part in the conversation, told the TASS correspondent that the sides discussed issues linked to the prospects for the life and activities of the Armed Forces in the context of the new political situation, in connection with the setting up of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The USSR minister of defense assured his guest that all nuclear weapons—strategic and tactical—are under a single command and centralized control. The process of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the sovereign states to places of centralized storage and elimination is proceeding in accordance with plans and without any complications. [passage omitted]

Also discussed at the meeting were prospects for further mutual reductions of strategic offensive weapons, the development of bilateral cooperation in the exchange of technologies and experience of eliminating nuclear weapons, guarding strategic installations, and actions in emergency situations. A mutual willingness was expressed to embark on consultations on this range of issues.

According to General Manilov, the meeting was of a trustful and friendly nature.

[Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1900 GMT on 16 December, during its regularly scheduled "TV Inform" newscast, reports on the meeting between Shaposhnikov and Baker, saying Baker "was given assurances to the effect that the Soviet nuclear arms are under reliable control and that there is full concord on this problem between the republics having these kinds of weapons."]

Russian Officials on Nuclear Arms Command, Control

Defense Chief Comments

PM1612165491 Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Dec 91 pp 1,3

[Jan Krauze report: "General Kobets' Surprising Serenity"]

[Excerpt] Moscow—General Konstantin Kobets is not Russian defense minister for the very good reason that Russia does not yet officially have a defense ministry, but he suggested that that would not be long in coming. Meanwhile, this stocky 52-year old man is at the center of the decisions that have been made and still are being made regarding the future of the USSR armed forces.

In the past few days he has had a series of meetings with Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin. In the atmosphere of general confusion and amid the present turmoil, he seemed astonishingly calm, spoke clearly, and in his huge office in the Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters, he replied with surprising frankness to the questions

everyone is asking: Who now controls the nuclear forces and who will control them in the future? How will the armed forces of the future "community of independent states" be organized? And is there the risk of a military putsch?

Of course, he also spoke about the future of Mr. Gorbachev, who might maintain his post as commander in chief "for two months." In his view, if not in reality, things seem well ordered, even if everything is far from settled and if problems arise unexpectedly, like the Ukrainian president's recent decision to take control of all the conventional forces situated on Ukrainian territory.

On the subject that strikes many people in the West as the essential issue—control of nuclear fire—Gen. Kobets clarified things: At present, he explained, this control is exercised by three people.

These three people are Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Yeltsin, and Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Shaposhnikov. Were the observations of the British intelligence service, that the Russian president is now accompanied by "a man with a black bag," true? "Yes," Gen. Kobets said without hesitation, and this has been the case "since the August putsch attempt."

During the transitional period that is about to start, each of the presidents of republics where nuclear arms are deployed (in addition to Russia, these are Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) will have the right to monitor the use of those weapons, but this will be a temporary responsibility because the desire of those countries to become nuclear-free states will be respected, as stated in the Minsk agreements.

Initially, "all the tactical nuclear weapons" located on these territories will be brought back to Russia. (It is these tactical weapons, presumed to be less closely monitored, that are arousing the most anxiety in Western general staffs, particularly if there are serious ethnic disturbances.) With regard to the strategic weapons deployed in these three republics, the launch installations will be destroyed "and the nuclear warheads brought to Russia."

The objective also is to destroy them, but Gen. Kobets stressed that no one yet has adequate technology to eliminate these warheads. "What we are able to do is reuse them" (for other weapons). That is why he stressed the need for international cooperation—and mentioned the idea of a four-party conference proposed by Mr. Mitterrand—and technical cooperation. The liquidation of these warheads "could take seven years" or perhaps less "according to the resources devoted to it."

Eventually, however, there is no possible doubt: All the nuclear weapons "will be exclusively in Russia's hands." "Russia will not give anyone the nuclear button" and therefore its president, as commander in chief, will have

control over it, with Russia becoming the guarantor of the community's collective security; there is no other way." [passage omitted]

Yeltsin, Baker Discuss Issue

OW1612172291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1400 GMT 16 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] At their talks in the Kremlin on Monday [16 December] Russia's President Boris Yeltsin and the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker discussed some 20 issues. They concentrated on problems connected with nuclear arms and control over them, B. Yeltsin told reporters.

It was decided that Russia will temporarily remain a nuclear power, B. Yeltsin said. The remaining Soviet republics will sign an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and nuclear arms deployed on their soil will be eliminated in accordance with the Soviet-American agreements already signed. This relates primarily to the Ukraine and Belarus which have already declared that they will seek the nuclear-free status. As for Kazakhstan, the problem connected with nuclear arms on its soil will be resolved in the near future, said B. Yeltsin. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Comments on Baker Talks

LD1612184891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 1730 GMT 16 Dec 91

[Remarks by Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin at news conference following talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow on 16 December—recorded]

[Text] We had four hours of talks with Baker, Mr. Secretary of State of the United States of America. Here are the main principles we agreed upon, and we regard this as a common view shared by the representatives of the United States of America and Russia.

First: Russia is developing the Commonwealth. The agreement signed by the three independent states will be signed on the 21st by six more—that is to say a minimum of 10 states will have signed the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] agreement in December. We will develop our cooperation as equals.

We are also signing a Treaty on Defensive Alliance, which will have a unified command of the strategic armed forces, comprising the Air Force, the Navy, the Air Defense Forces, strategic nuclear missiles, tactical nuclear weapons and intelligence-gathering. We have agreed that, within the framework of the agreements and treaties that have already been signed, we will strive to ensure that all the four states should sign the treaty or join the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is the first thing, and that we should

continue further to strive so that three of them are nuclear-free states for the time being, apart from Russia. [as heard]

We have agreed that with help, including that of the United States, we will implement the agreement already adopted, concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that we shall sign an appropriate treaty. We have agreed on strict control so that nuclear technology and nuclear arms technology should not, under any circumstances, find themselves in other countries and that it should not be exported. We have also agreed that we will jointly exercise control over the safety of the nuclear facilities of any type that exist today.

In all, some 20 issues were examined, including food aid, especially during the winter period. This would involve the setting up of special sub-units and committees and organizing transport to transport food to the territory of Russia.

Further on Yeltsin-baker Talks

*LD1612183291 Moscow TASS in English 1738 GMT
16 Dec 91*

[Report by TASS diplomatic correspondents Andrey Pershin and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow December 16 TASS—The nuclear push-button will be reliably protected in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russian President Boris Yeltsin told U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who had come on a working visit to the Soviet Union to see if he could allay the U.S. Administration's fears for the fate of nuclear arsenals on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Yeltsin and Baker met journalists after nearly four hours of talks which spanned a range of about 20 major issues. The joint news conference was held in the grand Kremlin palaces, St. Vladimir's Hall.

The Russian president said another six republics of the former Soviet Union would sign the agreement on membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States on December 21. By the end of December, the new Commonwealth is expected to have at least 10 members. They will sign a treaty on the defence union to be headed by the Joint Command of Strategic Forces, which is due to replace the present Defence Ministry of the USSR.

The strategic arm will comprise the Airforce, the Navy, the Anti-Aircraft Defence Group, Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Forces and the intelligence service.

"We shall work to get all four nuclear republics of the former union to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with three of them, except Russia for the time being, becoming nuclear-free states. Yeltsin said that Ukraine and Belarus have already announced their desire to become non-nuclear states. Their nuclear arms will not be transferred to Russia but eliminated within the framework of the agreements and treaties with the

United States, signed by the former Soviet Union. The issue has yet to be discussed with Kazakhstan.

Should a state of emergency arise, the decision to use strategic forces will be made by the leaders of the four nuclear republics together with the supreme commander. The order to push the button and launch nuclear missiles can only come from the single centre.

Yeltsin denied news media reports that he and Defence Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov had discussed Mikhail Gorbachev's candidature for the post of the supreme commander. According to Yeltsin, this post should be filled by a military man who will obey the orders of the council of the heads of state of the Commonwealth's member-countries.

Yeltsin said he respected Mikhail Gorbachev. "As regards his further destiny, it is for him personally to determine," he stressed.

The Russian president told journalists that he and Baker had discussed recognition of Russia as an independent state and its possible membership in the United States [as received], including the replacement of the former Soviet Union in the U.N. Security Council.

James Baker added that he had discussed with the Russian president problems of security, nuclear control and management, and aid to Russia during this winter.

He noted that one of the aims of his forthcoming trip to Kiev was to discuss prospects for the U.S. recognition of Ukraine as an independent state. The similar question was raised with regard to Russia on Sunday, Baker said, and talks were already underway.

Baker said that he would report on the matter to President George Bush as soon as he returns to Washington. He said there existed a number of considerations to be kept in mind when making decisions of this kind.

Kozyrev: Nuclear Arms To Remain 'Centralized'

*LD1912091291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0700 GMT 19 Dec 91*

[Text] Andrey Kozyrev, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, in an interview with American journalists, has stated that the Russian Government hopes that the transition from the Union to the Commonwealth will flow peacefully. He has also noted that all the Union structures will be abolished and transformed. Some officials of these departments will automatically come under RSFSR subordination, and some under subordination of other republics. Control over strategic nuclear weapons will be centralized, said Andrey Kozyrev.

Defense Official Interviewed

*LD2612231491 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Dec 91*

[Interview with Aleksandr Alekseyevich Kotenkov, deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's

Defense and Security Committee, by correspondent Rasul Mikailov; place and date not given—live or recorded; from the "Russian Parliamentary Herald" program]

[Excerpt] [Mikailov] I have in my hand the text of the agreement on joint measures for nuclear weapons signed by the presidents of four republics—Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Yesterday, 25 December, this document was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Undoubtedly, there is no need to persuade anyone of the fact that documents of this sort are of enormous significance not just for the Commonwealth of Independent States, but also for the entire world community. Aleksandr Alekseyevich, you will recall no doubt, the immediate repercussions throughout the world to all of the reports concerning the issue of who would now have his finger on the nuclear button and who would control nuclear weapons in general, and the reports that the country was disintegrating and the republics could lose control of nuclear weapons.

[Kotenzov] Yes, this problem has been a matter of concern to all the world's politicians—and, of course, not just politicians, but, undoubtedly, all sober-minded citizens in all countries of the world. We know this from the recent visit to our country by U.S. Secretary of State Baker. This was one of the central issues he raised in all the republics. Incidentally, it is no coincidence that he first visited all of the republics on whose territory nuclear weapons are deployed. This problem was the focus of attention of the latest session of the Western European Union assembly, which was attended by our delegation. The whole world was worried about who would control and command nuclear weapons following the USSR's disintegration.

[Mikailov] There was, in fact, a danger here?

[Kotenzov] Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed. There was such a danger, and all these worries were being expressed for good reason, of course. At last we can say that the agreement signed in Alma-Ata and ratified by the Russian parliament yesterday dots all of the i's. We confirmed a document guaranteeing the preservation of unified control over all nuclear weapons. Moreover, I have to say that this agreement is the primary document. Many other documents are to be drafted and signed to elaborate on it. But the most important thing is that the ideology of the actual process has been enshrined in the agreement.

[Mikailov] And its basic principles?

[Kotenzov] Yes, its basic principles—above all the maintenance of nuclear weapons—all of them, both strategic and tactical—under unified control—and, I wish to stress, under single command. The issue of command is a very controversial one, and during the discussion on this treaty, that is to say agreement, and during its ratification, the question also was raised about who would command nuclear weapons. Command will be

carried out from a single center. For now, this center is concentrated in the former Ministry of Defense, but from December 25th, the so-called nuclear button passed into the hands of Russian Federation President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. But this does not mean that he will control this button on his own. What I mean is that he personally will make the decision on whether or not to use nuclear weapons. He will make that decision in coordination with the heads of all the republics that signed the agreement: Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus.

[Mikailov] He even has stressed the detail that they are now linked by a special conference line....

[Kotenzov interrupting] They are; that's right!

[Mikailov](?I have heard), which enables them to contact each other.

[Kotenzov] There exists the concept of a conference line, which will link all four presidents, and if it is necessary to hold consultations or to obtain agreement on the use of nuclear weapons, Boris Nikolayevich can indeed, so to speak, contact the presidents of all four republics virtually instantaneously. Generally, this line will be, in a manner of speaking, in the same black briefcase which contains the nuclear button, meaning that the line is with the president at all times. Therefore, the suggestion that this coordination might take a very long time is wrong. Besides, I want to say that we shall develop this agreement by drawing up a whole series of additional agreements, including some which will provide for the possibility of using nuclear weapons in the event of a response to a nuclear strike on our Commonwealth.

[Mikailov] But this principle of no first use of nuclear weapons is enshrined.

[Kotenzov] That is what I am saying: We shall never use nuclear weapons first. But, in the event of a missile attack, a nuclear missile attack on the territory of the Commonwealth we can inflict a retaliatory strike, but this retaliatory strike must be inflicted before the nuclear missiles explode on our territory.

[Mikailov] But, of course.

[Kotenzov] Here we are counting literally in seconds, and it must be regulated by a separate agreement, of course. But, in principle, for now, it is guaranteed that decisions on the use of nuclear weapons will be made by the four presidents with unified command and control [yedinyy kontrol i yedinoe upravleniye].

I also especially would like to talk about tactical nuclear weapons. The point is, in fulfilling the agreement—the initiative of President Bush and President Gorbachev on unilateral....[corrects himself] the mutual initiative on the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons—the parties which signed that agreement reached an understanding that by July 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons would be concentrated on Russian territory, where they would be dismantled, disarmed, and destroyed.

[Mikhailov] Aleksandr Alekseyevich, nevertheless, this problem is bound up with great—I would even say immense—material and technical costs. What will Russia's share be, and what will the other republics' share be?

[Kotenkov] I believe that all of the states participating in the Commonwealth will bear the expenditure jointly, for both the maintenance of the combined armed forces and the destruction of nuclear weapons. Of course, it is a very expensive pleasure. Because of our economic potential, based on gross national product, it is natural that the main share, the lion's share, of the expenditure will fall on Russia, but all of the other states must participate in this process as far as they are able. Moreover, I do not believe that we will manage without help from Western countries, because if we want to destroy these weapons as quickly as possible, we will need not only our own technology, but we will have to attract foreign technology. We have offers from the United States and France to provide their most modern technology for destroying nuclear weapons. This will require hard currency, of course. I believe that we will need material assistance here from Western countries.

[Mikhailov] And nobody has refused yet?

[Kotenkov] Correct. Nobody has refused yet, but I want to warn now—and this is generally known—that this process will be rather protracted, by virtue of both economic and technological indices. It will take more than just one year. When studying the issue of the destruction of nuclear weapons at the Ministry of Defense, we are talking about a period of seven or eight years. It simply will be physically impossible for us to do it any earlier.

I would like to mention one more very important feature of this agreement: the republics, principally Belarus and Ukraine, have undertaken a commitment to join the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty as nonnuclear states. In other words, they are confirming unconditionally their commitment that there will be no nuclear weapons on their territory, and that when the time limit of the treaty reducing strategic weapons expires, there will be no nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus and Ukraine.

[Mikhailov] [words indistinct]

[Kotenkov] This matter has not been settled with Kazakhstan yet. In general, it is believed that such weapons will be kept on the territory of Kazakhstan for the time being, but I believe that this issue will be settled later in a separate agreement. [passage omitted]

Communications Security Chief Comments

LD2612125691 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Report on nuclear weapons control safeguards, by correspondent V. Martynov, including remarks by M.

Andreyev, "chief of the Main Administration for the Security of Communications", from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Martynov] Wherever the president of the country happens to go, there is always a man behind him holding a briefcase in his hand, a briefcase that many people talk about and know about.

From the beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet Union into independent states, the question was raised in the world's media: Who in that country keeps his finger on the nuclear button? We asked one other question: Who will ensure the technical irreproachability and reliability of this button? Who is responsible for missiles not being launched without a command?

[Andreyev] We check literally every possible point from which any unsanctioned launch might be carried out. We guarantee that this cannot happen.

[Martynov] This evening, in accordance with the understandings reached, following the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, the president of the former Soviet Union, this briefcase will be passed over to the hands of Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president. [video shows correspondent and Andreyev, close-up of Martynov's hand on a black briefcase]

Ministry Confirms Yeltsin Has Nuclear Button

PM2712114991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 27 Dec 91 p 1

[A. Khokhlov report: "On the Button Again"]

[Text] INTERFAX reported yesterday that the "briefcase" containing the nuclear button is still in the possession of the Defense Minister.

At the Defense Ministry it was reported that the information is not authentic. On the evening of 25 December, immediately after the USSR president's resignation statement, the button itself and all the necessary paraphernalia were transferred first by M. Gorbachev to Ye. Shaposhnikov and then by Shaposhnikov to B. Yeltsin.

In a telephone conversation a high-ranking general of the General Staff said that it could not be any other way.

Kazakh President, Baker Discuss Nuclear Arms

Calls for Collective Security

OW1812133491 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1209 GMT 18 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpts] The US Secretary of State James Baker is staying in the Belarussian capital Minsk for talks on the package of issues related to the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Earlier he visited

Moscow, where he met with the Presidents of Russia and the USSR, and then went to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

After his meeting with Mr. Baker in Alma-Ata on Tuesday [17 December], the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev said that he had confirmed to the guest that Kazakhstan would not threaten anyone with nuclear weapons under any circumstances. It would observe the principle of collective security and would urge the republics where nuclear arms are stationed to conclude a treaty on the non-use of nuclear force.

Mr. Nazarbayev's summary statement, made public in Alma-Ata, says that Kazakhstan, a newly sovereign republic, has always supported the idea of forming an alliance of sovereign republics—primarily in the economic sphere. However, it will never agree to be anyone's "junior brother" or anyone's raw materials depot. [passage omitted]

Commenting on the Russian Federation's readiness to move all the Soviet nuclear systems into its own territory, Mr. Nazarbayev said that, regardless of the other republics' behavior, Kazakhstan would not agree to part with its nuclear weapons.

'Understanding' With Russia

*LD1812155991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1509 GMT 18 Dec 91*

[By KAZTAG correspondents Amangeldiy Akhmetaliyev and Gennadiy Kulagin]

[Excerpts] Alma-Ata, 18 Dec (TASS)— There is an understanding between Russia and Kazakhstan about the retention upon their territory of the nuclear arsenals that they have. This was stated by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev at a joint news conference with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on completion of their two-hour private conversation last night. At the same time Kazakhstan intends to raise the issue of concluding an agreement between four states upon whose territory Soviet nuclear weapons are deployed, with the purpose of ensuring unified direction and control and also the nonproliferation of that arsenal, the republic's leader announced. [passage omitted]

James Baker confirmed that the nuclear problem, especially those aspects of it which are linked to the transformations of this process, were discussed widely and in detail during the conversation which took place in Alma-Ata. According to Baker, Kazakhstan and its president undoubtedly play a key role in this process. [passage omitted]

FRANCE

Mitterrand Encourages European Nuclear Doctrine

PM1301143692 Paris LE MONDE in French
12-13 Jan 92 pp 1,3

[Jacques Amalric article: "A Taboo Broken"]

[Text] The French strike force presents a problem in Europe—the Community and Eastern Europe which is disintegrating—which is seeking a new order. Mr. Mitterrand finally admitted that on 10 January, breaking for the first time a taboo which he had striven to keep intact since 1981. It is true that time is running out; you just have to look at the military "posturing" in which the former republics of the former USSR are indulging. Moreover, the president of the Republic admitted that when he said: "Is it possible to draw up a European (nuclear—LE MONDE editor's note) doctrine? That question will quickly become one of the major questions raised by the building of a common European defense."

Mr. Mitterrand refrained from answering his own question with a yes or a no. However, he accepted the principle of a broad debate, regarded just recently as sacrilegious. It is true that Jacques Delors, followed by Jean Francois-Poncet, had taken the bull by the horns a few minutes earlier. The chairman of the European Commission had just said: "I cannot help thinking that if, one day, the EC has a very strong political union, nuclear arms could be transferred to that political authority." Giscard d'Estaing's former foreign minister said: "It is clear that nuclear solidarity lies at the end of the European solidarity road."

We are still a long way from that, but the president of the Republic urgently needed to acknowledge this issue if he wanted to avoid being in a precarious position in two spheres:

- First, the drafting of a common European defense which, whatever was said even recently, is incompatible with the maintenance of the existing French deterrent force which is completely independent. Several European officials recently emphasized this inconsistency, primarily German Foreign Minister Genscher; doing nothing in this sphere, and obstinately going it alone would mean France being seen as the only European state refusing to go along with the reduction in armaments and would leave the main role to a NATO nuclear guarantee in which Britain still wants to participate but over which the United States—especially Congress—really has sole control;
- Second, the very nature of the French force and the strategy it is intended to serve: Deterrence, which was designed to make the Soviet leadership "stop and think" before resorting to nuclear weapons, no longer works. The risk of a full-scale Soviet offensive against Western Europe disappeared with the disintegration of the empire. The nuclear threat in the short and

medium term has every chance of being highly irrational. The deterrent will not be a panacea to safeguard against the insane actions of somebody like Saddam Husayn who had managed to equip himself with a nuclear capability or some extreme nationalist leader of the former USSR who had managed to lay his hands on a few nuclear weapons.

Vital Consideration

In addition, this kind of threat can be aimed just as easily at one of the two European nuclear states as at nonnuclear states. In this hypothesis, Germany or Italy would not be any safer than France or Britain. Do not common dangers presuppose common if not joint responsibilities? Moreover, this is why Germany frowned on the French proposal to hold a conference of the four powers which have nuclear arms in Europe (United States, France, Britain, and the former USSR) to try to control Soviet arms and guarantee the planned dismantling. The United States did not welcome it either and it is acting as if it wished to be the former USSR's sole "nuclear" interlocutor, while begging for money when it comes to funding the long and costly process of Soviet arms reduction.

The French Communists can rest easy. Contrary to L'HUMANITE's frontpage headline today, Mr. Mitterrand is not "dropping" the "bomb," is not entrusting "a daunting arsenal to German power." He is simply at last encouraging a consideration which is vital if we do not want the French strike force in the future to be no more than a unanimously condemned anachronism, the vestige of an order which emerged from World War II.

The "very strong" European political power to which Mr. Delors referred will not see the light of day in the near future and is not about to have the nuclear button, but it is time to consider the new security challenges facing France and Europe. They clearly require not only conventional defense initiatives but also going back to the drawing board as regards French strategy and the French nuclear panoply which, although frozen, includes the Pluton and Hades tactical missiles which can only threaten allies and the Albion Plateau missiles which, unfortunately, have the same role as those on the nuclear submarines. Instead we should probably be thinking about the design and deployment of an ABM defense which could one day benefit all the European countries. Is this not precisely the right material for a European defense program based on complementary if not common strategies? This would be the start of a very long process which will certainly encounter many obstacles, many preconditions, and many interests. In this sphere too, a considerable educational effort is necessary.

GERMANY

Foreign Minister Stresses New Disarmament Steps

*LD0401104492 Berlin ADN in German 0951 GMT
4 Jan 92*

[Text] Hamburg (ADN)—In the view of Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the problems of arms control and disarmament are even more pressing with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Owing to the former USSR's great military potential the concerns of many people about a crisis development following the revolutionary changes are understandable, Genscher writes in an article for the paper WELT AM SONNTAG. It is the task of a "responsible foreign and security policy" to utilize these changes for new, comprehensive disarmament steps.

In the foreign minister's view, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it must be ensured that the successor states ratify and implement the CSCE treaty obligations on conventional disarmament. The CSCE agreements are of "central importance" for security and stability in Europe, Genscher said. Considerations on the building of new defense structures must on no account undermine the CSCE treaty. A working group, set up by German initiative, of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council with the participation of the Commonwealth states will address the topic for the first time in Brussels on 10 January, Genscher said.

To prevent a "proliferation" of armed forces in the Commonwealth, said Genscher, increased importance is attached to an agreement on the reduction of troop strengths in time for the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki in July. The Federal Republic assumes that the states on the former USSR's territory will take part in such negotiations after being admitted to the CSCE.

In his article for WELT AM SONNTAG, Genscher calls for world-wide destruction of nuclear artillery ammunition and the conclusion of a convention on banning chemical weapons by the middle of the year. Arms export control and a curb on the transfer of know-how and technology are also needed.

Genscher on European Role for French Nuclear Arms

*AU0801122592 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
8 Jan 92 p 8*

[Report by "rmc": "Genscher Supports Delors' Statements"]

[Text] Bonn—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher supports the position of the president of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, on the future of French nuclear forces. Genscher stated that with the development of a

European foreign and security policy, "certain consequences will result" for this kind of weapon. Delors made a similar statement on French television, pointing out that French nuclear weapons will have to serve European policies as a result of the political unification process in Europe. Genscher said that he wants to refrain from "giving advice from outside" to France that sees its "Force de Frappe" as the supreme expression of its sovereignty.

UNITED KINGDOM

Cash Offered To Dismantle Soviet Nuclear Arms

*LD1201105492 London THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
in English 12 Jan 92 p 1*

[Report by defense correspondent Christy Campbell]

[Excerpt] The Prime Minister has instructed Whitehall officials to prepare an urgent programme to defuse the crisis in the disintegrating armed forces and nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union.

The Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence [MoD] and Treasury have been told that Britain would offer cash for dismantling nuclear weapons, in line with American offers of disarmament aid to the republics. The Treasury is involved because of the costs, according to a diplomatic source.

A Foreign Office spokesman said that each ministry had been asked to make detailed proposals to be developed in conjunction with Britain's allies and partners for the UN Security Council's special meeting at the end of this month. Britain holds the chairmanship of the council.

On Friday, [10 January] Mr Major invited Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President, to visit London to discuss the proposals before both leaders fly to the New York summit. Presidents Bush and Mitterrand and a senior Chinese delegation will also attend.

At the weekend, Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, is to follow an official visit to India by travelling to Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Moscow to seek assurances on nuclear weapons safety, the Foreign Office said.

A senior MoD source said last night that British nuclear experts were ready to assist in the huge bomb disposal exercise. But he admitted that, with a shrinking defence budget, "there could still be a tussle with the Treasury over who would pay".

In Washington, Congress has approved an immediate \$400 million, about 225 million pounds sterling, from the Pentagon's budget for republics that want to scrap the estimated 27,000 nuclear warheads. But the cost of a complete cleanup of the nuclear establishment has been estimated at about 170 billion pounds sterling.

NATO defence ministers agreed last month to offer help to maintain control over nuclear weapons and distribute humanitarian aid.

"We have nuclear expertise as good as the Americans at all levels, from strategic missiles to atomic artillery shells," said the MoD source. "We have direct experience of working on Soviet soil from treaty inspection trips. We know who is in charge in the republics and we have opened a dialogue with them."

He said that new urgency had emerged from talks between Richard Cheney, the US Defence Secretary, and his British counterpart, Tom King; last week, when intelligence reports of unguarded chemical and biological weapons dumps were raised.

One MoD adviser has suggested paying cash directly to military units guarding nuclear sites, in return for a complete inventory of weapons and names of the scientists who built them. [passage omitted]

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.