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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

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PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-019

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19 June 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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SOUTH AFRICA

Armcor Offshoot's Operations Questioned

MB3005103092 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 29 May-4 Jun 92 p 17

[Article by Mondli Makhanya: "Swords Drawn Over Armcor's Offshoot"]

[Text] Armcor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] offshoot Denel has barely settled into its new Pretoria head offices and already its raison d'être is being questioned.

While Armcor, which last year chopped its staff from about 27,000 to 16,000, remains the South African Defence Force's arms-procurement agency, commercialised Denel aims to concentrate on research and manufacturing. Armcor will buy whatever it needs from Denel and overseas companies.

By 1997, says Denel managing director Johan Alberts, the company hopes to produce 70 percent of its products for the civilian market rather than the military, as opposed to the present 15 percent.

However, Denel has attracted the ire of industrialists and peace groups. At the centre of the anti-Denel disenchantment is the fact that the company—still wholly owned by the state—is entering the marketplace on the state's back. It will use taxpayers' money to compete in a small electronics market, where the survival of many of its units will be difficult.

The need for some of Denel's 23 operations is also being questioned. These range from plants producing cricket bats and gold sticks to developing missiles and aircraft.

It is the missile production plants that are generating the most heated emotions. In the western Cape, for instance, there has been vigorous resistance from Rooi Els residents to Denel's missiles testing ground nearby.

The company's argument for its existence is that technological innovation is a prerequisite for economic growth and that, as it has been involved in this for the past 15 years while part of Armcor, it is natural for it to continue doing so. Were it to pack up and sell its R[and]2-billion worth of assets, these would have to be sold at scrap value in the marketplace because no other industry would have any use for them.

Dumping its qualified artisans into the small job market may also lead to an exodus of skills from the country, Denel maintains.

Econometric director Tony Twine argues in favour of Denel's existence, saying that provided its resources are utilised efficiently, the company has the capacity to compensate for the immense drain of the arms-manufacturing industry on the country's economy over the years.

Denel is not alone in trying to formulate a new role for itself: arms manufacturers around the world are being forced by the end of the cold war to convert their arms-manufacturing capabilities to commercial use. A classic example is provided by a missile factory in the Commonwealth of Independent States which is now producing washing machines.

It is understood that the United States has offered to assist Denel in its endeavours. But while there may be economic reason for Denel's continued existence, it does not necessarily have business justification. The local electronics industry is already overtraded and private companies in the sector view with trepidation the competition of a government-backed enterprise.

Altron managing director Bill Venter expressed the reigning sentiment in the industry by saying that "the playing fields should be levelled. We hope that Denel will pay normal interest on foreign loans, will be subjected to normal taxes and that it will not be allowed to write off assets".

Another industry source said the entry of a state-backed enterprise would disrupt the industry, resulting in the loss of jobs. "I foresee the smaller companies not being able to compete and thus falling by the wayside. Jobs will definitely be lost in the process," he said.

But Denel chairman Johan Maree, a widely respected businessman, says he is determined to run the company in an efficient manner and points out that it now has to report to the state as a shareholder and also service loans. "We will be ruthless," he says, adding that the company will not hesitate to chop unprofitable units and that jobs will not be spared for their own sake. Alberts is aware of the glut of electronics companies in the local market, but says that "because of the high level of Denel's technology its products are of a more sophisticated nature and are therefore mainly aimed at foreign markets, with the local market a secondary market".

These forays into international markets are also a source of contention. Denel is particularly interested in seeing its aerospace arm enter into joint ventures with foreign companies in space research. It envisages using its "high-level technological abilities" in space projects, which would see it placing and operating satellites in low earth orbits.

"Developing that technology was folly in the first place," says a private-sector economist. "There is just no reason for us to be wasting resources trying to get involved in the space race when other countries are already so advanced in it. Besides, unless you are a super power or have ambitions of being a super power, do you really need a space programme?"

Whatever the pros and cons of Denel, the fact is that years of defending apartheid at any cost necessitated the development of hi-tech enterprises. The object now is to determine how best to neutralise them without forfeiting the investment altogether.

JAPAN

Government To Develop Nuclear Fusion Reactor*OW0906064492 Tokyo KYODO in English
0527 GMT 09 Jun 92*

[Text] Tokyo, June 9 KYODO—The government's atomic energy commission announced Tuesday a new basic plan to develop an experimental nuclear fusion reactor as an international project involving Europe, the United States, Japan, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The new plan calls for Japan to join in the international nuclear fusion study, as the commission said Japan has already almost achieved its own study of nuclear fusion development.

The commission revised its 1975 basic plan, under which fundamental technology studies have been carried through the Tokamak-type JT-60 test reactor in Ibaraki Prefecture constructed by the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute.

Under the international study project, the four partners in the project will construct a new experimental nuclear fusion reactor, called the "international thermonuclear experimental reactor (INTER)."

The four expect the INTER to start operating around 2005 and the first prototype reactor in the 2020s, before putting it to practical use in the mid-21st century.

A nuclear fusion reactor, if materialized, is expected to produce the ultimate form of energy for humanity, since its energy-generating system is based on nuclear fusion reaction as seen inside the sun.

In a typical fusion reaction, the nuclei of tritium and deuterium are combined at a superhigh temperature to form a nucleus of helium and a free neutron.

Japan, Western Europe, and the United States have competed to successfully create the critical plasma condition needed for nuclear fusion, through experiments with test reactors that confine tritium and deuterium in doughnut-shaped vacuum containers.

Following the U.S.-Soviet summit talks in 1985, the four sides agreed at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1988 to cooperate in developing INTER, however, considering the huge construction cost involved.

The total construction cost will be about 4.9 billion dollars but it has not yet been decided where the experimental reactor will be located.

CIS, East European Nuclear Trainees Accepted*OW1606121792 Tokyo KYODO in English
1138 GMT 16 Jun 92*

[Text] Tokyo, June 16 KYODO—Japan will accept and train 50 nuclear technicians from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern Europe this fiscal year, an official of an electric power company said Tuesday.

The training program is part of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's plan to accept and train about 1,000 CIS and East European nuclear technicians within a period of 10 years, he said.

The program is part of the government's efforts to improve the management of operations at the nuclear power plants in the CIS and Eastern Europe, he said.

For the first year, the government will train the highest-ranking officials from plants in Russia, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, he said.

Each group will have a maximum of 10 trainees, who will train for about 10 days at nuclear power plants, the operation training centers of Japan's electric power companies, maintenance centers, and heavy electrical machinery makers that manufacture nuclear power plants, he said.

In the future, the training program will probably be extended to maintenance personnel from the CIS and Eastern Europe, he said. more on inspection/ but note radiochem lab

NORTH KOREA

Defector to Russia on Radioactive Contamination*SK1306103992 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean
13 Jun 92 p 1*

[Article by Moscow-based correspondent Kim Kuk-hu: "Testimony by North Korean Sergeant Major Who Defected to Russia"]

[Text] International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities pointed out the great possibility of leakage of radioactive materials due to a lack of safety facilities. It is noteworthy that simultaneously a witness stated that employees and soldiers in North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facilities, who operate and guard these facilities, their families, and residents, are suffering from symptoms of radioactive contamination.

Kim Chol-ho (anonymous name; details of his personal data are being withheld for safety reasons), who served in the North Korean People's Army as sergeant major for more than 10 years, revealed this. He worked earlier in a North Korean logging work site in Siberia of the former Soviet Union. Kim Chol-ho recently deserted to a CIS republic and is seeking asylum.

In the past, there were assertions by some people on the possibility of radioactive leakage and contamination at North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facilities. This is the first time for a North Korean who personally witnessed it to verify concrete contamination, however.

Kim stated that "researchers and soldiers and their families, who work in Yongbyon area, including the Yongbyon Nuclear Power Research Institute, as well as residents, are suffering from unidentified diseases. Most of them discharge yellow urine, are vomiting, and have symptoms of loose bowels." He added he heard that some people died of such symptoms.

Kim said that he heard from those who work on the spot that they already manufactured a nuclear detonation device but did not complete production of nuclear warheads that are needed for actual war. They said that they dug deep tunnels in mountains near Yongbyon and concealed important nuclear raw materials and equipment in these tunnels.

Kim said that North Korea describes this nuclear facility site in Yongbyon as the "Pungang district" when talking to those not involved in the project. Nuclear power research and management of nuclear facilities are under the jurisdiction of the 43rd Brigade (official name of the Korean People's Army) which consists of members of the State Defense Commission, the People's Security Forces and Ministry of Public Security. This brigade is also called "Kim Chong-il's detached force." When this unit was organized, it was composed of those who were discharged from the People's Army and whose socioeconomic class background were carefully investigated. They were forced to take an oath of secrecy and loyalty as they maintained a military status.

When he served in the People's Army, Kim himself was a sergeant major who was in charge of planning military training and simulated war between two units. Therefore, he visited the units which were in charge of research, experiments, management and protection of Yongbyon nuclear facilities many times, and personally witnessed the patients. He stressed that before he left for Siberia, he heard detailed accounts about the real status of radioactive contamination from his friend (master sergeant) who was working in Yongbyon's nuclear facilities.

Dr. Sin Song-taek (42), a nuclear expert of the Defense Research Institute [of the ROK], said, "as a result of careful analysis of the IAEA inspection team videotapes on Yongbyon area nuclear facilities, I noted that the safety facilities are extremely poor and there is the possibility of radioactive leakage. Thus, Kim's testimony is reliable and I am extremely surprised."

In particular, Dr. Sin said: North Korea's nuclear facilities are like Chernobyl's which uses natural uranium as well as a graphite deceleration cooling reactor. These facilities lack safety factors. Advanced nations in the

West call for dismantlement of this type of nuclear reactor to prevent damage both to human life and the environment.

He added that if proper safety facilities are not installed when storing underground nuclear processing facilities and fuel, including hot cells, instruments and equipment, then radioactivity cannot be detected even if it leaks.

SOUTH KOREA

IAEA Inspects DPRK Nuclear Reprocessing Plants

Video Depicts Facilities

*SK1006000792 Seoul YONHAP in English
2352 GMT 9 Jun 92*

[Text] Vienna, June 8 [date as received] (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will show its video recording of North Korea's nuclear facilities at a general meeting of its members here Wednesday afternoon (Wednesday Korean time).

The video was taken during a visit by Secretary General Hans Blix and his IAEA team that toured North Korea last month.

The 12-minute video tape, edited by IAEA, is said to show nuclear reprocessing plants reported by North Korea as "a radiochemical laboratory." It also shows both inside and outside of a large-scale nuclear power station under construction and operational machinery and equipment, according to IAEA sources.

In his report, Blix is expected to confirm that the plant that North Korea insists on calling as "a radiochemical laboratory," will become large nuclear reprocessing facilities when their construction is completed, the sources said.

But the results of the inspection conducted by a team led by Wily Theis, a section chief of the IAEA's Safeguard Department, will not be reported at Wednesday's general meeting, the sources said.

The IAEA very rarely shows video tapes of its inspection of nuclear facilities to its member countries, the sources added.

Plutonium Production Eyed

*SK1306000792 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
2200 GMT 12 Jun 92*

[YONHAP report from Vienna]

[Text] An International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] official revealed on 12 June that North Korea is observed to have completed at least an experimental

foundation for the mass production of plutonium, a raw material for nuclear weapons, in connection with its nuclear development plan.

This official explained that this is the first analysis of the recent IAEA visit to and ad hoc inspection of the nuclear facilities in North Korea. He noted that because North Korea has built a nuclear reprocessing plant, the possibility of its producing a considerable amount of plutonium is suspected. He then added that one can assume that North Korea is capable of producing as many as two small atomic bombs a year.

Commenting on all the North Korean nuclear facilities made public to the outside world for the first time, the official emphasized that international safety standards are far from being met in the North Korean facilities that have been inspected. He further stressed that even if North Korea's nuclear development is limited to non-military purposes, its safety will remain a serious problem.

Regional Stability Threatened

*SK1106073692 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
11 Jun 92 p 1*

[By correspondent Choe Maeng-ho in Vienna]

[Text] It has been revealed anew that North Korea has already started research on a fast-breeding reactor and composite nuclear fuel, advanced technology for nuclear development, and has made clear its intention to keep in place its present nuclear policy, including the completion of the nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon.

The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] officials view North Korea's intention to adhere to such a policy as a clear violation of the declaration on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula adopted between the South and the North and as the cause of grave threats to stability and peace on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

In an informal briefing given on the afternoon of 10 June at IAEA headquarters in Vienna about his May visit to North Korea and on the results of the IAEA inspection group's nuclear inspection in North Korea, IAEA Director General Hans Blix said that the nuclear fuel reprocessing facility under construction in North Korea is not an experimental laboratory but a factory and quoted the North Korean side as saying that "without a guarantee for the introduction of advanced technology from abroad and stable supplies of nuclear fuel, we cannot give up our present nuclear policy."

Director General Blix also said that "the North Korean side had explained that the radiochemical laboratory, which is at issue, is aimed at the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle for the purpose of supplying their own nuclear fuel and that it had already started research on a fast-breeding reactor and composite nuclear fuel."

Commenting on this, an IAEA official said: The highly stable and efficient light-water nuclear reactor needs the enriched uranium and the heavy-water nuclear reactor needs heavy water, which North Korea imports. Given North Korea's present financial situation, it is difficult for North Korea to pay for the imported materials. Therefore, North Korea intends to push ahead with its original plan.

Another official at the IAEA said that if North Korea can import the nuclear fuel from abroad, it hopes to get it from the United States, Japan, and China. He added: North Korea has made it clear that the supplying countries should not attach any political strings to the export of nuclear materials.

Dr. Yi Chang-kon, researcher at the Korean [South] Atomic Energy Research Institute, said on 11 June: According to data gathered by the IAEA in the course of inspecting nuclear facilities in North Korea, North Korea appears to be in possession of a high degree of nuclear technology in view of the fact that it relies on its own nuclear technology in building nuclear reactors and in researching composite nuclear fuel and building a fast-breeding reactor.

North Urged To 'Clear Suspicions'

*SK1206004392 Seoul YONHAP in English 0030 GMT
12 Jun 92*

[Text] Vienna, June 12 (YONHAP)—South Korea, Japan, Canada, the United States and other major members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have agreed to add pressure on North Korea to clear suspicions about its nuclear development.

Ambassadors of the countries met Thursday and shared the view that concern about North Korea's nuclear development had not eased but was mounting in some sectors despite the IAEA's inspection of its facilities, according to diplomatic sources.

In the IAEA Board of Governors' meeting June 15, the countries would call for a more thorough IAEA inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities and demand the North accept outside inspections more sincerely, the sources said.

They would also point out that mutual inspection between South and North Korea is vital on top of the IAEA inspections to dissipate suspicions and concern about Pyongyang's nuclear program.

The United States and Japan would reaffirm their position that they would not improve relations with North Korea unless mutual inspection was carried out.

North Korea is to send O Chang-yim, an ambassador at the Foreign Ministry, to the Board meeting.

IAEA's Blix on Nuclear Reprocessing Facility

Confirms Existence

SK1106053892 Seoul YONHAP in English 0506 GMT
11 Jun 92

[Text] Seoul, June 11 (YONHAP)—South Korea will officially demand that North Korea scrap nuclear reprocessing facilities it is building in Yongbyon, 90 km north of Pyongyang, now that Hans Blix, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has confirmed their existence, a highly-placed government official said Thursday.

Blix made the confirmation in his report Wednesday on the results of the IAEA's ad hoc inspection of North Korea's nuclear capabilities.

The government made much of the fact that the reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon were not a "laboratory" as North Korea had claimed but a large factory, and would issue a statement asking the North for an explanation, the official said.

He said the government would finalize its position for the IAEA Board of Governors' meeting June 15-19 and the sixth meeting of the inter-Korean Joint Nuclear Control Commission [JNCC] in an inter-ministerial conference after Pan Ki-mun, special aide to the foreign minister and South Korean side vice chairman of the JNCC, returned home from the Korea-U.S. policy review subcommittee meeting in Honolulu.

The JNCC is likely to meet around June 15.

The government would seek the cooperation of member countries of the IAEA Board of Governors to press for early mutual inspection of nuclear facilities in South and North Korea, he said.

Yi Si-yong, South Korean ambassador to Austria, will give a key-note speech to the board meeting in which he will emphasize that North Korea's construction of reprocessing facilities is a violation of the inter-Korean agreement and it poses a grave threat to making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

The government was considering asking the IAEA to dispatch a special inspection team to North Korea to obtain a clearer picture of the reprocessing facilities before the JNCC meeting, he said.

Meanwhile, South Korea and the United States have decided to positively take into account North Korea's recent call for technical assistance for construction of a light-water reactor if the North accepts mutual inspection and gives up its reprocessing facilities.

North Korea made the request in a contact with the United States June 1.

Recommends Conversion

SK1106124692 Seoul YONHAP in English 1235 GMT
11 Jun 92

[Text] Tokyo, June 11 (OANA-YONHAP)—North Korea will stop developing nuclear reprocessing capability if Japan and the United States provide needed technology for building light water reactors, Yi Chol, North Korean ambassador to Geneva, said Thursday.

"North Korea has already told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Director-General Hans Blix during his visit early May that Pyongyang's nuclear facilities are not for military use," Yi said in an interview with KYODO news agency.

"If we can receive uranium enrichment and light water reactor technology from Japan or the United States, we are willing to abandon developing reprocessing capability," the ambassador said.

Blix in his report to the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna Wednesday [10 June] said he recommended North Korea convert its existing graphite moderated reactor to light water reactor for higher safety and economic efficiency.

Pyongyang explained its nuclear capability status and its plans for future use of nuclear power to the United States at the counselor-level contact in Beijing on June 1, said Yi.

Commenting on the safety of North Korea's nuclear reactors, Yi said, "there has not yet been any serious accidents so far, but if any accident were to occur, Japan and other neighboring countries will be affected."

"We would welcome safety technology cooperation from Japan as well as the IAEA," Yi said.

Questions North's Policy

SK1606002192 Seoul YONHAP in English 0005 GMT
16 Jun 92

[Text] Vienna, Austria, June 15 (YONHAP)—Hans Blix, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Monday North Korea does not need nuclear reprocessing facilities like the ones it is building in Yongbyon.

Blix said there are many other aspects in North Korea's possession of nuclear materials and nuclear policy that could not be explained.

Blix made these remarks at a meeting with South Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Chong Kun-mo.

The IAEA director-general said South and North Korea should carry out simultaneous inspections in each other's territories in parallel with IAEA inspection of North Korean facilities.

At a regular board of governors' meeting which opened on Monday, Blix said he plans to express his views on the

need for North Korea to halt the construction of its nuclear reprocessing facilities and accept mutual inspections with South Korea, Chong said.

The five-day meeting is expected to discuss problems related to nuclear safeguards and financial matters. The meeting will focus on North Korean issue Tuesday and Wednesday.

Urges Mutual Inspections

*SK1606144192 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
1400 GMT 16 Jun 92*

[Report by Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] While giving a report on North Korea's nuclear situation at the second day of the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA] Board of Governors meeting, Hans Blix, IAEA director general, emphasized that in order to raise the level of openness of North Korea's nuclear development plan, it is important for South and North Korea to realize mutual inspection, as both sides had agreed.

Director General Blix said that because the purpose of the inspection system is to enhance the clarity of nuclear activities, not only is it necessary for the IAEA to carry out inspection but it is also necessary for South and North Korea to fulfill what they had agreed to, as well.

Regarding North Korea's nuclear material and nuclear facilities, Director General Blix said that the IAEA recently carried out a tentative inspection [imsisachal] in North Korea, but that it is still difficult to verify the completeness of the initial report submitted by North Korea. He also revealed that a new inspection team will go to North Korea in a few weeks.

Plans Future IAEA Inspections

*SK1206052492 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network
in Korean 1200 GMT 11 Jun 92*

[Excerpt] In an exclusive interview with a KBS reporter today, Hans Blix, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] who led an inspection team that has recently visited Pyongyang, said that he will lead another nuclear inspection team to North Korea.

Director-General Blix, who has repeatedly warned against the danger of the nuclear facilities in North Korea, hinted that the radiochemical laboratory in Yongbyon is clearly a plutonium-extracting plant.

Correspondent Cha Man-sun reports from Vienna:

[Begin Cha Man-sun recording] As its director-general's visit to North Korea and a tentative inspection have failed to dissipate international doubt about North Korea's nuclear development, the IAEA shows signs of reinforcing the nuclear inspection of North Korea by employing all the agency's inspection techniques.

The IAEA plans to make a report to the agency's regular meeting of the Board of Governors slated for 15 June on whether North Korea is sincere in implementing the nuclear safeguards accord and on the future inspection schedule based on a comprehensive analysis of the results of the tentative inspection.

The IAEA also plans to conclude with North Korea a supplementary accord specifying detailed inspection procedures and methods around 10 July.

The IAEA has decided to start regular nuclear inspection of North Korea at an early date after concluding the supplementary accord. [passage omitted]

Blix Interviewed

*SK1706022392 Seoul MBC Television Network
in Korean 2200 GMT 16 Jun 92*

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], which is in its third day session of its Board of Governors meeting, will have very important discussions on North Korea's nuclear issue today. Correspondent Kim Yong-il reports:

[Begin Kim Yong-il recording] Most of the member states of the IAEA's Board of Governors, which will intensively deal with North Korea's nuclear development issue today, share the same opinion that North Korea should open all its nuclear facilities and sincerely receive nuclear inspections. This is a short cut to enhance its confidence.

In an interview with Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation on 16 June, Hans Blix, director general of the IAEA, said that of equal importance to IAEA inspection is North Korea's faithful implementation of the North-South declaration of denuclearization, including mutual inspection between North and South Korea, which is conducive to recovering its confidence. The following is an interview with Director General Hans Blix:

[Kim Yong-il, in English] As you know, the mutual inspection between South Korea and North Korea is very essential for us, and what do you think about that in connection with the IAEA's inspection?

[Hans Blix, in English] Well, I think it is very important for their confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear energy that there be openness about their nuclear programs and the agency's safeguards system which is now entering into the DPRK and have visited all the facilities reported. This is one aspect of one method of achieving transparency and openness and this I think is very welcome. However, this is not the only possible way of showing transparency in the nuclear program, and for that reason, I have said that I hope very much that the transparency will also increase between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea and also vis-a-vis others who are interested—China, Japan, and the United States. All transparencies, openness, and transparencies [as heard] desirable to create confidence.

[Yim Yong-il] Even member states of the IAEA Board of Governors, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia—which support Director-general Hans Blix's opinion—will urge North Korea to dispel suspicion by voluntary opening all of its nuclear facilities and materials, stressing that although it received the tentative inspection [imsisachal], which is nothing but an initial procedural step, this has not completely eliminated the concerns and suspicions on North Korea's nuclear facilities.

In this regard, these countries will intensively call for information on whether North Korea will continue to produce plutonium, where plutonium will be used, and on an accurate inventory of plutonium. [end Kim Yong-il recording]

IAEA Urges Reporting of All Nuclear Transfers

SK1406035992 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
14 Jun 92 p 1

[By staff reporter Sin Hak-nim]

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is seeking to introduce a "universal reporting" system on the production and transactions of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes in order to reinforce its nuclear safeguards regime, informed government sources said yesterday.

Under the plan, all state parties of the IAEA would be required to report to the agency the export and import of nuclear materials, "sensitive" equipment and nonnuclear materials.

To that end, the IAEA secretariat will propose two draft protocols at a meeting of its Board of Governors to be held in Vienna June 15-19. The two are a "Protocol on Universal Reporting of the Export, Import, Production and Inventories of Nuclear Material for Peaceful Purposes" and a "Protocol on Universal Reporting of the Export and Import of Certain Equipment and Nonnuclear Material for Peaceful Purposes."

A heated pro and con debate is expected to take place over the projected protocols between advanced and developing countries, during the forthcoming IAEA Board of Governors' meeting. The United States and several European countries support the new system while developing countries, including India and Brazil, are opposed to the plan, according to the sources.

In particular, developing countries with uranium ore deposits strongly oppose stricter controls on the production and transactions of nuclear materials.

According to the projected protocols and relevant IAEA stipulations, special fissionable material subject to reporting include plutonium-239, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233 and any material containing one or more of these elements.

South Korea, a country with the potential for exporting nuclear power technology, has yet to decide its position

on how to deal with the protocols, a Foreign Ministry official said. "At present, our government is neither in a position to support nor oppose the plan," he said.

Critics assert that the new protocols designed to reinforce control on nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes will deal a serious blow to developing countries' nuclear power industries.

They criticize the United States and some other advanced countries for attempting to monopolize nuclear technology, according to Foreign Ministry officials.

State parties to the envisioned protocols will be required to provide data on the description, quantity, enrichment and composition of nuclear material imported and exported; the state from and for which the material was imported and is destined; the date of arrival; and the location or facility from which the material was dispatched or is stored. The report should be provided within 30 days of the end of the month in which the import or export took place.

With respect to production of nuclear materials, the information to be provided include the description, quantity, enrichment and composition of the nuclear material produced; and the date, location or facilities at which the nuclear material was produced and is currently stored, processed, or used.

Small quantities of natural or depleted uranium or thorium already being used in a peaceful nonnuclear manner would be excluded from reporting if less than 100 kilograms are transferred in any one shipment and the total amount imported by or exported to a particular state does not exceed 1,000 kilograms in any 12-month period, however.

The IAEA secretariat planned to initiate the plan on the universal reporting system during the Board of Governors meeting in February but postponed it because of strong objections from developing countries, Foreign Ministry officials said.

Such a move may have something to do with the campaign to renew the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] which expires in 1995. An NPT review conference is expected to be held before then.

North Urged To Scrap Reprocessing Facilities

Precondition for Sharing Technology

SK1506012492 Seoul YONHAP in English 0108 GMT
15 Jun 92

[Text] Vienna, June 14 (YONHAP)—South Korea's first ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Chong Kun-mo, says that there is no doubt about North Korean nuclear policy or that the North's facilities are for the production of nuclear weapons.

There were a number of "unavoidable" processes to take for the development of nuclear weapons, Chong said Sunday [14 June]. North Korea was taking those steps, including construction of facilities for nuclear material reprocessing and the extraction of plutonium.

Moreover, there was a strong possibility North Korea possessed enough plutonium to produce several nuclear bombs, he said.

Chong, a leading nuclear scientist, said that North Korea's nuclear facilities were unsafe and inadequate for electric generating. If North Korea really wanted to use its facilities for peaceful purposes, it should abandon the existing facilities and bring in new technology and start its nuclear program anew, he said.

Meanwhile, Yi Si-yong, South Korean ambassador to Austria who represents his government in the IAEA board of governors' meeting June 15-19, said that South Korea was prepared to provide Pyongyang with nuclear technology if it gave up its current nuclear policy.

There was a possibility that North Korea could announce its intention to scrap its nuclear reprocessing facilities at the board of governors' meeting, he said.

Demands Detailed

SK1206105192 Seoul YONHAP in English 1030 GMT 12 Jun 92

[Text] Seoul, June 12 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea's immediate top priority is getting North Korea to scrap its nuclear reprocessing facilities through inter-Korean negotiations, officials here said Friday.

Hans Blix, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), confirmed in his report to the Agency Wednesday [10 June] that what he and the ad hoc inspection team saw in North Korea's Yongbyon complex would serve as reprocessing plant once completed, officials said.

This places South Korea's key emphasis on disabling such capability, they said.

The comments suggest a shift from South Korea's former emphasis on speedy agreement on inter-Korean inspection regime for a cross-border check of each other's nuclear facilities.

"If the radiochemical laboratory in Yongbyon is indeed for research purposes as North Korea claims, our chief interest is in the reprocessing work of the laboratory," one official said.

"Our immediate goal would be met if North Korea converts this section of the lab work to other purpose than reprocessing," he said.

"Another alternative would be getting North Korea to reduce this facility to a truly research-oriented scale, similar to the ones in South Korea," said the official.

North Korea is due to conclude a subsidiary arrangement to the safeguards accord with the IAEA around July 10. The IAEA then can conduct routine and special inspection on North Korea.

"When North Korea accepts these IAEA inspections, there is nothing more we can do through the IAEA," the official said.

"We will have to solve Pyongyang's nuclear problem through inter-Korean negotiations," he said.

Will Not Press IAEA

SK1306001692 Seoul YONHAP in English 2345 GMT 12 Jun 92

[Text] Vienna, June 13 (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convenes a regular Board of Governors meeting Monday to discuss problems related to inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities.

The five-day meeting will hear a report on progress for the conclusion of supplementary agreements with North Korea that will enable the IAEA to undertake full-scale inspections of each plant and facility.

The board meeting will also discuss the results of the first inspection.

Unlike in the past, South Korea will not press the IAEA to discuss measures for special or forced inspections of North Korean facilities or adopt a resolution warning North Korea against development of nuclear weapons.

Instead, it will emphasize the need for simultaneous inspection by South and North Korea of facilities and installations in each other's territory by pointing out mounting suspicion in the world community about North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

South Korea's position is expected to be backed up by major member nations of the board like Japan and the United States.

In addition to the North Korean nuclear issue, the board members will discuss ways to strengthen restrictions on imports and exports of nuclear materials and plants and facilities throughout the world, nuclear safety problems in former East European countries and the IAEA membership for Croatia.

EC Preconditions DPRK Ties on Inspections

SK1006030592 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 0200 GMT 10 Jun 92

[Text] The 12 member states of the European Community have decided to demand that International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection as well as mutual inspection between the South and North are preconditions for improving relations with North Korea and have informed North Korea of this decision, according to the Foreign Ministry.

The Foreign Ministry said that the 12 EC member states held a meeting of the Foreign Ministry directors in charge of Asian Affairs last 4 June in Brussels and agreed on making South-North mutual nuclear inspection a precondition for improving their relations with North Korea.

The Foreign Ministry added that the EC member states served notice on this decision to Kim Hong-nim, director of North Korea's Foreign Ministry in charge of European Affairs who was traveling to seven EC countries, including Portugal, from the end of last month through the beginning of June, and called on North Korea to accept South-North mutual inspection.

The Foreign Ministry explained that the EC member states made clear that improved human rights and a ban on exports of terrorism and weapons, along with South-North mutual inspection, are preconditions for improving their relations with North Korea.

North Korea has been investigating improved relations with the EC since it signed the nuclear safeguards accord last January, arguing that the nuclear issues would be settled when the IAEA starts its provisional inspection [imsi sachal].

It appears that improved EC-North Korea relations will be hard to realize with the EC making South-North mutual inspection a precondition for improving its relations with North Korea, however.

North Korea has maintained diplomatic relations with only two countries among the 12 EC member states—Denmark and Portugal—and has opened a general mission in France.

Russia To Withhold Nuclear Aid to DPRK

SK1606151292 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network in Korean 1200 GMT 16 Jun 92

[Text] North Korea and Cuba have been entirely dependent on the former Soviet Union in terms of both nuclear materials and nuclear technology. Now, however, Russia, the successor to the former Soviet Union, has declared that it will not assist any country with nuclear materials and nuclear technology if it does not use them for peaceful purposes.

Correspondent Kim Son-ki reports from Moscow:

[Begin Kim Son-ki recording] The Moscow daily KOMMERSANT said in its 15 June edition that North Korea will survive the infliction of nuclear scrutiny, thereby hinting that North Korea will complete the nuclear development despite the international denunciation.

The former Soviet Union, however, was the one and only country assisting North Korea in the area of nuclear physics. Recently, Russia has made clear its basic stance that it will provide North Korea with technical assistance only in case the nuclear power is used for peaceful purposes.

In particular, Russia is reported to have emphasized to the North Korean authorities that it would not offer technical assistance that can be incorporated into military purposes. [end recording]

[Begin Saltykov, Russian minister of science] North Korea and Cuba have been receiving special assistance. North Korea is a foreign country to Russia and, therefore, cannot be an exception, however.

When it comes to the nuclear power field, any country can get assistance. [end recording]

[Begin Kim recording] (Kruchapov) and (Duvana) are the two most important nuclear research institutes in Russia.

The Soviet Union had trained about 200 North Korean nuclear researchers after helping North Korea build research nuclear reactors in the 1960's. It has been learned that about 10 North Korean nuclear scientists are permanently staying in Russia as nuclear researchers.

Nuclear research institutes in Russia are being converted into ones for industrial purposes. As they are being made accessible to all countries due to extreme financial difficulties, the close cooperative ties between Russia and North Korea in the area of nuclear physics have so changed that they no longer can be hoped for.

This has been Kim Son-ki from Moscow. [end recording]

DPRK Reacts to Demands for Plant Closures

Favorable to Conversion

SK1106091592 Seoul YONHAP in English 0857 GMT 11 Jun 92

[Text] Seoul, June 11 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea will pursue nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea if Pyongyang abandons its reprocessing facility and accepts inter-Korean nuclear inspection, a government official said Thursday.

"The government policy is that Seoul will promote exchanges and cooperation with Pyongyang depending on the progress of inter-Korean relations and nuclear negotiations," Kim Chae-sop, director-general of international organizations at the Foreign Ministry, told a press briefing.

"There is no reason we cannot pursue exchanges and cooperation in nuclear technology," he said.

The comments came after International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Hans Blix's report to the Board of Governors Wednesday [10 June] on his trip to Pyongyang and results of an ad hoc inspection on North Korean nuclear facilities.

Blix reported that North Korean officials responded favorably to his recommendation that they convert their graphite-moderated reactor to light-water reactor.

Seoul was willing to give Pyongyang its light-water reactor technology if North Korea agreed to convert, Kim said. Almost all of South Korea's nine nuclear reactors are light water.

"The IAEA evaluated Blix's and inspection team's North Korean visit as highly cooperative and positive," Kim told reporters.

"The significance of the ad hoc inspection was that the inspectors actually saw the much-suspected nuclear facilities and gained information about Pyongyang's capability," he said.

A second IAEA team will go to North Korea for a further ad hoc inspection in a few weeks, composed of same members that went for the first inspection.

There is no way of judging, however, whether North Korea had hidden reprocessing installations, and the IAEA would need to further analyze the results of the ad hoc inspections.

But construction of the "radiochemical laboratory," which the IAEA sees as a nuclear reprocessing plant, was halted when the team was in Pyongyang, and the facility was barely equipped, Kim said.

North Korea's breeder reactor was outdated and primitive, and the amount of separated plutonium reported to the IAEA was relatively small, he said.

Agrees to Special Inspections

SK1706005092 Seoul YONHAP in English 0029 GMT
17 Jun 92

[Text] Vienna, June 16 (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicated Tuesday there is a possibility that it will undertake special inspections on North Korean nuclear facilities that Pyongyang has not reported to the IAEA.

An IAEA official gave the indication after IAEA Director General Hans Blix reported to the Board of Governors' meeting Tuesday that he had succeeded in obtaining North Korea's agreement to send IAEA officials to visit unreported nuclear facilities in North Korea.

The official, who declined to be identified by name, explained that Blix's report implied that the visit means "special inspections."

For a special inspection, he went on, the IAEA needs information from advanced countries prior to the visit.

In his report, however, Blix said it was impossible to conduct complete inspections of every nuclear facility and materials that were not reported by North Korea. Such problems get more difficult in a country where research for extracting plutonium is considerably advanced, he added.

Blix said problems remained after the IAEA's first ad hoc inspection. The second inspection of North Korean facilities could come as early as in July, he said.

Blix also said it is important to implement mutual and simultaneous inspections by South and North Korea as agreed by the two countries in order to raise the degree of openness for North Korea's nuclear program.

Policy Advisers 'Optimistic' on Nuclear Issue

SK0906062492 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 9 Jun 92 p 2

[By staff reporter Kang Song-chol]

[Text] Despite lingering suspicion on North Korea's nuclear efforts, policy advisers at the presidential office of Chongwadae appear optimistic about resolving the nuclear question.

They say they are convinced that the nuclear issue will be settled "within a reasonable period of time" in the vortex of inter-Korea and international relations.

Their attitude contrasts with hawkish views voiced by some other government officials following a stalemate in inter-Korean negotiations on the agreed-upon reciprocal nuclear inspections.

"We should look at the nuclear question in the broad picture of progress in inter-Korean relations," said Kim Chong-hwi, national security adviser to President No Tae-u, yesterday.

He accused the news media of fretting and being sensational in reporting on inter-Korean relations, particularly the nuclear issue.

"The two sides (South and North Korea) may sometimes argue with each other. But I believe that the talks will ultimately produce good results," Kim said on the inter-Korean nuclear negotiations.

The two Koreas failed to work out a regime for mutual nuclear inspections by last month, the originally set deadline. It has thus become impossible for the inspection to take place this month as originally sought.

Seoul and Pyongyang in February activated a joint declaration calling for the ban of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, and agreed to pursue inspections of suspected weapons sites in each other's territory.

The inter-Korean inspection is independent from nuclear surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Kim appears to think that a reconciliation process has started in earnest on the peninsula and that accordingly, the nuclear question will be settled in the not too distant future.

"Let us compare the situation now and that of a year ago," he said while emphasizing improvements made in inter-Korean relations so far.

Both Koreas held four rounds of prime ministers' talks and numerous committee and subcommittee-level negotiations during the past year.

They signed a milestone accord calling for nonaggression, reconciliation and exchanges as well as the joint denuclearization declaration.

As part of the efforts for reconciliation, the two sides are to exchange visits of separated family members around Aug. 15, Liberation Day, for the second time since the territorial division after World War II.

Another ranking national security official at Chongwadae said he believes that the North will have no choice but to implement the mutual nuclear inspection.

"As for the mutual inspection, they (North Korea) may feel a more urgent need to do it," said the official, who asked not to be named. "They have opened their Yongbyon facilities to international inspection, and now they must want to see something in the South."

The North, he said, must also be well aware that without the resolution of the nuclear issue, it could not seek improvement of ties with Japan and the United States.

The official also voiced regrets that some domestic media had called the failure to work out the hinter-Korean nuclear inspection regime a "breakdown."

"It is not a breakdown. It is just a temporary suspension," he contended.

He said the negotiations could resume sometime after mid-June, when an IAEA team reports the results of its initial inspection of the North's facilities in Yongbyon to the agency's board of governors meeting.

"Pyongyang may think that it can avoid international criticism so long as the IAEA inspection is going on," the official said.

He hoped that each side would make some concessions to strike an accord. His remark suggests that the South is considering showing flexibility in such calls for "challenge inspections," surveillance conducted on demand at short notice.

He stressed that Seoul will stick to the principle of reciprocity, however, indicating that it would never accept Pyongyang's suggestion of opening Yongbyon in return for seeing all American military bases here.

The official also brushed aside as "sheer speculation" the allegation that the United States was putting pressure on Seoul regarding the nuclear inspection issue.

"We have consultations with the United States. But we make the final decisions," he said.

National security officials at Chongwadae in general caution against remarks provoking the North, while asserting that it is now time to see the greater picture of national reunification.

"It is now time for us to make full-fledged preparations for unification," one official said, while calling for moderation in dealing with the nuclear issue.

He admitted that there are differing views within the government on how to deal with North Korea in regard to the nuclear question. "It is natural that there is a diversity of views on the matter."

Some hard-liners in the government are said to be calling for harsher steps against the North, particularly following the failure last month to prepare the inspection rules.

The hard-liners include those in the Agency for National Security Planning.

IAEA Finds DPRK Nuclear Safety 'Defective'

*SK1506083392 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
15 Jun 92 p 1*

[By reporter Choe Maeng-ho from Vienna]

[Text] It has been found that the design, radiation shielding systems, cranes, protective devices, waste disposal sites, and safety control systems of North Korean nuclear facilities are seriously defective.

Officials concerned at the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] pointed out on 15 June [date as published] that the activities in North Korea by a delegation led by Hans Blix, IAEA director general, and the IAEA's first inspection team and the examination of the video tapes which the North Korean authorities had shot for the IAEA reveal that the North Korean nuclear facilities are 40- to 50-year-old models, that their design is shoddy, that radiation shielding standards are not uniform, and that North Korea's safety standards, which are below the general international standards, are not reliable.

In connection with this, the ROK delegation to the IAEA Board of Governors and the IAEA have decided to present the North Korean nuclear facilities safety issue at a meeting that opened that day.

A correct analysis of the North Korean nuclear facilities is not available. An IAEA official concerned said: "The design of the North Korean nuclear facilities based on what is called *chuche* [self-reliance] is clearly substandard."

In connection with, another IAEA official said: "North Korea's nuclear facilities and equipment were all designed and manufactured at plants near Pyongyang." He also said: "There is no independent supervisory

organization nor control committee in North Korea that monitors and supervises the safety of the nuclear facilities. This is worrisome."

North Korea built a five-megawatt experimental nuclear reactor patterned after the graphite reactor built by Great Britain and France in the 1950's. North Korea is now building one 50-megawatt reactor and one 200-megawatt nuclear reactor patterned after the 5-megawatt reactor.

An IAEA official concerned said: "It was found that many of the fuel rods in the 5-megawatt experimental nuclear reactor had been damaged and that the design of this reactor was partially changed after the Chernobyl incident in the former Soviet Union."

This official also stated: "It has been revealed that North Korea's radiation shielding systems in its nuclear reactors is inferior to those of the advanced countries; that the thickness of the nuclear disposal facility is not uniform; and that there are no protective devices when moving large cranes carrying nuclear waste."

At an unofficial briefing on 10 June, Director General Hans Blix revealed: "We notified North Korea of the willingness to cooperate with it in planning effective and commercially viable nuclear reactors and to secure the safety of the nuclear reactors." This indirectly hinted that the IAEA is not satisfied with the safety of North Korea's nuclear reactors.

The ROK delegation participating in the IAEA Board of Governors meeting that will continue through 18 June is planning to urge the IAEA for thorough inspection and is also planning to urge North Korea to sincerely abide by the international agreement and to accept mutual inspection between South and North Korea. This is because regardless of the first on-the-spot inspection by Director General Hans Blix and his party, the misgivings about North Korea's nuclear development have not been eliminated but rather increased.

Regarding the strengthening of safety measures, the IAEA is proposing that reporting on the production and import and export of nuclear weapons and nonnuclear materials must be imposed as a duty. In this connection the IAEA is also proposing that an international agreement on nuclear safety be established to enhance safety.

Firm Recovers Systems With Radioactive Isotopes
SK1606012692 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
16 Jun 92 p 3

[Text] Two units of testing systems containing radioactive isotopes, previously stolen in Ulsan, Kyongsangnamto, were discovered at 10:20 p.m. yesterday at the Pyongsan resting place on the Seoul-Pusan expressway, about 80 km north of Ulsan.

An unidentified man called the Korea Industrial Testing Co. around 9:30 p.m. to notify the location of the missing equipment. They were retrieved under the watch tower of the resting place, the company source said.

The isotopes, known as iridium, could be fatal if exposed to the human body.

The Science-Technology Ministry was told by the company earlier in the day that the systems were missing from a van parked in Ulsan, the ministry later made it known to the press.

Ministry officials said the isotopes were covered with lead and have radioactivity levels of 36 and 37 curie.

The systems, used for non-destructive materials testing, each measure 40cmx15cmx35cm, weighs 20 kilograms and carry pink triangle warnings for radioactivity, they said.

According to a report from Korea Industrial Testing, the equipment and the isotopes were left in a van overnight Sunday on a street in Nam-ku and the driver found them missing the following morning.

BULGARIA

Russian Staff Dismissed From Nuclear Plant

AU1306154992 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
5 Jun 92 p 2

[Text] According to a report, four drunken Russians were stopped at 0010 on 21 May as they tried to enter the high security zone of the No. 6 Reactor Unit at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. One of them was the leader of a team of Russian specialists that is replacing racks in the waste fuel tanks.

Yulian Lazarov, the shift chief in the Radiation Safety and Measurement Section, and Sergeant Naumov, the police officer on duty, prevented the four from starting work.

"This is a gross breach of internal discipline," states the report that Nikolay Todorov, chief of the department, submitted to Ivan Ivanov, manager of the Nos. 5 and 6 Reactor Units.

Zhak Karakash, deputy chief of the Administrative Council of the National Electricity Company, said that the Russians had been recalled from the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant and that the incident was inadmissible. Some of the rack fittings for the No. 6 Unit, of Russian manufacture, had proved to be defective, because of which the racks will not be replaced this year as scheduled. Only the racks of the No. 5 Unit will be repaired, for which purpose the unit will be shut down from July to September.

Mr. Karakash believes that the No. 2 Reactor Unit will start operating again in November.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Uranium Industry Head Claims Production Reduced

AU2905094992 Prague HOSPODARSKE
NOVINY in Czech 22 May 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Czechoslovak Uranium Industry, Diamo, Director Jan Jansky by Richard Stregl; place and date not given: "The Uranium Industry's Ups and Downs"]

[Excerpt] The former state enterprise called the Czechoslovak Uranium Industry has carried the name Diamo since 1 April 1992. Not only the name has changed: The production scale-down in the uranium industry began one year ago. Prospects for this industrial branch changed considerably.

We asked Diamo Director Eng. Jan Jansky, about the situation in the uranium industry and what prospects it has.

[Stregl] How far has the scale-down progressed in uranium extraction?

[Jansky] Until 1989, the Czechoslovak Uranium Industry [CSUP] was a giant that was losing money and swallowing state-provided subsidies. An excessive quantity of uranium concentrate was exported to the Soviet Union. Since then, we reduced the production of uranium concentrate from 2,400 to 1,760 tonnes. The program of production scale-down adopted by the government anticipates that we will only extract as much uranium as needed to satisfy the needs of our nuclear power stations. The number of Diamo employees decreased from 23,000 to 13,000 today. For the state it is the most important thing that uranium mining ceased to lose money, and we only need subsidies to cover social programs and liquidation costs ensuing from the previous activity of the enterprise.

[Stregl] How has the previous structure of the enterprise changed?

[Jansky] Previously, the CSUP was a closed industry within an industry, separated from other economic developments as much as possible. It has its own engineering, electronic, civil-engineering, and other production capacities, which were not very profitable. This is why the enterprise was divided into a smaller number of subsidiary plants, which are not directly related to uranium ore mining, processing, or research. They were segregated and included in the first wave of privatization. This internal restructuring allowed us to significantly reduce the administration and the redundant technical staff. Because of scaling down the production, miners, too, had to leave. However, a significant number of them had to leave because the maximum time limit for their exposure to radiation had expired.

[Stregl] What will happen to the core of the enterprise?

[Jansky] The core of the enterprise, representing ore extraction and processing, should not be privatized in the years to come. In the first phase, we are trying to transform the enterprise into a state-owned shareholders' company. The company would stay state-owned, but in the second phase it would become a holding [company] with subsidiaries that could receive private and foreign capital.

[Stregl] What would these subsidiaries do?

[Jansky] One, the core of which already exists, would deal with ore extraction and processing. The remaining ones are only on paper and are the expression of our endeavor to free ourselves from the unilateral dependence on the production and sales of uranium concentrate, the price and marketability of which are unstable. We also want to diversify our activity—what else besides nuclear energy generation? With the exception of ecologically unacceptable and expensive process of enriching uranium, we would like to secure a substantial part of the fuel cycle.

This means to manufacture fuel rods for nuclear power stations with the VVER-type reactors [water-moderated

water-cooled power reactor] and to participate in radioactive waste disposal. A third new subsidiary would be focused on solving ecological problems. Our knowledge in this line of business originates from the experience of our experts who have been in the chemical extraction of uranium business for many years.

It is also our intention to export uranium concentrate. There is a demand for it, and we are trying to achieve more advantageous marketing conditions.

[Stregl] What are other reasons for your intention to produce nuclear fuel?

[Jansky] Above all, we would like to use Czechoslovak intellectual and production capacities. We have the know-how that is recognized all over the world. We are going to sell it in cooperation with our foreign partner. The production itself is nothing more than quality engineering. This production has tradition and production facilities in the CSFR. Moreover, there are strategic, technological, and economic reasons. All the fuel rods delivered to our country come from Russia, which is a not-too-stable country, as far as prices and deliveries are concerned. Technological and economic properties of Russian fuel rods are much worse than properties of fuel rods offered by Western firms. For example, the utilization of the fission material in Russian fuel rods is much lower, which means that specific costs for fuel are higher and there is more radioactive waste.

[Stregl] With which firm would you like to establish the shareholders' company for the production of fuel?

[Jansky] For over a year, we have been negotiating with the American company Westinghouse, French Framatome, German Siemens, and Swedish ABB Atom. All these firms presented their recent binding offers. They are extremely interested in establishing a new shareholders' company, since there is a giant market for fuel for the VVER-40 and VVER-1000 type reactors. Apart from the CSFR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, Ukraine, and Russia can be considered.

[Stregl] On what does the realization of your intentions depend?

[Jansky] It would be simpler to say what jeopardizes it. The lack of coordination of individual entities in nuclear energy production causes unpleasant complications for us. For example, we are discussing the establishment of the said joint company for fuel for the VVER reactors and, at the same time, the Czech Electric Power Plants are looking for a supplier of nuclear fuel for the Temelin nuclear power station. Of course, companies with which we are dealing can also be considered. The negotiations

are held simultaneously, despite the fact that the decision made by one entity significantly influences the negotiation results of the other. The Slovak Electric Power Plants will invite another tender for fuel for VVER reactors. In my opinion, nuclear energy production is a sphere that the state must constantly coordinate. This is what did not happen over the last two years.

The realization of our plans is also dependent on the existence of Diamo itself. Its existence is jeopardized, above all, by demands raised by ecological associations and representatives of the regional administration who demand an immediate stop to the chemical extraction of uranium in Straz pod Ralskem. Chemical production is cheaper than classical extraction, and if it were stopped, it would have a substantial impact on the overall economy of extraction. Besides, chemical extraction and mining in Straz pod Ralskem, where the greatest part of Czechoslovak uranium is mined, are technologically interconnected. [passage omitted]

Reports on Construction of Temelin Nuclear Plant

Completion in Doubt

LD2705104292 Prague CSTK in English 1723 GMT
27 May 92

[Excerpt] Ostrava, North Moravia, May 26 (CSTK)—The Czech Republic's environment minister, Ivan Dejmál, today said whether or not to stop construction on the Temelin nuclear power plant is an issue of economics, not ecology.

According to the original plans under which it was begun in the mid-1980s, the Temelin plant, with four Soviet-designed VVER [water-cooled, water-moderated reactor] 1000-MW [megawatt] blocks, was to have been completed by this year. [passage omitted]

No Recommendation Made

AU1706135192 Prague CSTK in English
0941 GMT 16 Jun 92

[Text] Prague—At its extraordinary session on Monday [15 June], the outgoing Czech Government recommended to its successor, which is only to be appointed, neither to stop nor continue the construction of the nuclear power plant at Temelin, South Bohemia.

Launched in the mid-1980's, the four-bloc plant was to have been completed by this year, but in early 1990, the post-communist government decided to go through with only two in Czechoslovakia of the four Soviet-designed VVER [water-moderated water-cooled power reactor] 1000-MW blocs, on the condition that they be outfitted with Western-made safety devices.

INDIA

Agni Missile Launch Defended Despite U.S. Ban

Development Program 'Intact'

BK1006142292 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
in English 30 May 92 p 13

[Editorial: "Agni-II"]

[Text] The second successful launching of the Agni intermediate range ballistic missile on Friday indicates more than anything else that India's missile development programme is still intact despite Washington's putting hurdles ostensibly under the missile technology control regime [MTCR]. The progress achieved by our space scientists in both civilian and defence rocket technology, specially in the wake of the US sanctions, first Prithvi then the ASLV [Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle] and now Agni, also shows that the Indian space programme is in safe hands and that the civilian and defence space personnel working under the leadership of Prof. U. R. Rao and Dr Abdul Kalam are capable of driving themselves hard to prove their mettle under adverse conditions. Even if our space progress has come in for a lot of flak from the US, India has shown to the world what it means to be self-reliant. When the US Government imposed a ban on ISRO [Indian Space Research Organization] for negotiating with its Russian counterpart the sale of cryogenic rocket engines, Washington's ire was in fact directed at the Indian breakthrough in Agni and its fear of the Indian Army acquiring the Agni missile fleet eventually. Far from remaining a mere "technology demonstrator", the second Agni success comes at a time when both China and Pakistan have been flexing their nuclear muscles. It could not have come at a more propitious time when both our neighbours seem to understand only the language of matching deterrence.

Washington and its allies have been swearing by non-proliferation and their strict adherence to the MTCR ever since India successfully test-fired the first Agni missile with a range of 2,500 kms in May 1989. They did their best to deny the Indian space establishment the vital guidance components and on-board-computers for Agni. These two act as the brain of the missile. This rather unfriendly attitude did not deter our scientists and engineers from developing their own indigenous substitutes which have now paid them rich dividends. The US policy-makers must now realise that the harder they drive our space scientists to the point of desperation, the more futile will be the former's efforts and the more successful will the latter prove in achieving their set goals. The breakthrough in Agni is not just a matter of developing our own guidance and computer systems on board the last stage of the missile, but developing other launch vehicle technologies as well. These pertain to re-entry dynamics and rocket engines needed for civilian and defence missiles. There is a considerable difference in launching a satellite carrying rocket and a missile like

Agni. In the civilian rocket vehicles ascent temperature during re-entry stage is of the order of 3000 to 5000 degree centigrade. That means the metallurgy needed in fabricating the last stage of the Agni missile should be such as to withstand these high temperatures. All this has been achieved indigenously by our scientists.

Weapons Development Urged

BK1206101692 Delhi PATRIOT
in English 1 Jun 92 p 4

[Editorial: "After Agni, what?"]

[Text] After the successful blast-off on May 20 of the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), has come another "technology demonstrator", this time in the field of defence technology, the launching of the 2500 km-range one-tonne payload surface-to-surface missile, Agni II. After the success in the blast-off, the Agni II seems to have developed a snag in the second, or the re-entry, phase. But this does not matter much. A number of technologies are involved in launching missiles: in Agni II, only one of them has had some problems. It should not be difficult for our scientists and engineers to correct this defect. In the field of space research for peaceful and civilian uses, there were as many failures as successes in ASLV launches—between the blast-off of Aryabhata from Russia in 1975 and the May 20 take-off from Sriharikota. It is from their failures that our space scientists have drawn lessons which have brought them successes. But the question is: What after the "demonstrator effect"? The three years' delay in launching Agni II has had an adverse effect on the morale of our defence scientists and created an impression in the public that in the political uncertainties which came soon after the launching of Agni I in July 1989, our political leadership could not withstand the pressures from Western powers to refrain from further development of indigenous missile technology. While taking a decision on what to do with our technological capability in the field of missiles, our political leadership cannot forget that in our neighbourhood China, Kazakhstan, Iran and Saudi Arabia possess missiles and missile technologies of varied range and that Pakistan has a missile programme under way, aside from the fact that it can get missiles from the Saudis and China. The latter has been a source of missile technology for Pakistan. India has to develop its strategic weapon for the kind of threat-potential posed by proliferation of nuclear arms and delivery systems in our neighbourhood. It is a modest consolation that, despite tremendous odds, we have kept our options open. But that is not enough. Now is the time to make up for the mistake we made 18 years ago when Pokharan was not followed up with the logical next step. Now we have reached a situation in which we have to be prepared for an immediate response to any threat to our country. Ultimately, of course, there is no solution to the problem of proliferation, except a total ban, as we have been advocating all along. But we can negotiate for a ban not from a position of weakness entailed by our "have not" status. We have to acquire a

position of parity to be able to negotiate as an equal. But this would mean facing unimaginable pressures and armtwisting. We can put up with all this and undergo all consequential hardships, if our political leadership shows determination and strives for a national consensus. The ruling party has to take the initiative and the others have to rise above partisan interests if the threats to the nation are to be thwarted.

Procurement of Nuclear Parts From UK Denied

*BK1506162592 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 1530 GMT 15 Jun 92*

[Text] India today categorically denied any clandestine procurement of key components for nuclear and missile programs from Britain. A spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry described the report in this regard appearing in a London newspaper as mischievous and politically motivated. Speaking to newsmen in New Delhi, he said some components required for short-range missiles were negotiated for purchase as far back as 1986 only with the prior permission of the British Government. He also said the wild allegations made against the Bhabha Atomic Research Center are clearly intended to malign India's nuclear program for peaceful purposes.

ISRAEL

Actions Against Iran Conditioned on U.S. Consent

*TA1606111892 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 16 Jun 92 p A1*

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Extensive Action Against Arab Nuclear Installations Possible Only With U.S. Consent"]

[Text] It is highly doubtful, in the military sense, that the 1981 operation in which the Iraqi reactor was blown up can be repeated with equal effortlessness against an Arab country or against Iran, should one of them begin nuclear activity.

Not only will distances be greater—from Algeria to Iran—and routes more hazardous, the Arabs, too, have learned their lessons from the 1981 event, and they will be able to conceal their nuclear activities if they so wish.

It is likewise doubtful whether Israel should pledge to stop Arab nuclear activities by force, as implied by the remarks of Major General Herzl Bodinger, the Air Force commander. It should be remembered that, contrary to 1981, many Arab countries now have an instant retaliation capability made up of surface-to-surface missiles which could be directed at the Israeli home front.

In fact, an extensive operation against Arab nuclear installations will be possible only if the United States buckles down to the task and rounds up a few of its partners.

Yet, even in the case of Iraq, the United States and its allies were unable to eliminate its nuclear infrastructure by war. They resorted to the United Nations, whose teams took many months to carry out wide-ranging inspection tasks and blow up installations. Even now, it is not certain that the teams have managed to dispose of everything that had to be disposed of and that Iraq will not revert to its evil ways when the UN inspection is concluded.

Recent reports may have created the false impression that a turnabout has taken place in the balance of power in the region. The actual situation is different, particularly with respect to Syria. Damascus has lost its strategic partner, the Soviet Union; unlike in the past, it cannot look to Iraq for help, and it is doubtful whether Damascus will be able to recruit another Arab partner for a military confrontation with Israel.

It should be further remembered that despite the recent bout of arms procurement, Syria encounters difficulties in buying very sophisticated equipment: Many markets are close to it, and it has difficulties in paying off debts for the already purchased weapons. It is true that its surface-to-surface missiles pose a danger to the Israeli home front, but their primary purpose is to deter Israel from launching a war.

Thus, all the signs show that Israel's qualitative edge will grow in the coming years and that Syria will be hard put to attain strategic parity with Israel. It is likewise highly doubtful that Damascus will be capable of attaining a military nuclear option in this decade.

Iran, on the other hand, will probably reach such capability by the end of the decade and, in the wake of the lessons of the Gulf war, it is indeed striving to acquire the capability to manufacture means of mass destruction.

Tehran allocates about \$2 billion a year for the reorganization of its Army, although the process of building up its military will be lengthy, particularly in view of its ambition to end its political isolation and to maintain better relations with numerous countries in the West.

For some reason, the generals who reviewed military developments in recent days avoided noting that parallel to the extensive military buildup in the region—primarily in Persian Gulf countries—a peace process in which Damascus is a party is also under way and that the American presence in the region constitutes a clear stabilizing factor.

Iranian Nuclear Capability Termed 'Worrisome'

*TA0806150892 Tel Aviv IDF Radio
in Hebrew 1400 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] Iran is conducting a very worrisome nuclear project and will be capable of reaching independent nuclear capability by the end of the decade, Major

General Uri Sagi, head of the Intelligence Branch, estimates. Our military correspondent 'Ido Baum heard Gen. Sagi.

Gen. Sagi said today that Iran is investing a great deal of effort in developing the infrastructure for a nuclear project. Sagi estimated that within eight to 10 years, Iran will have a nuclear capability if action is not taken to destroy the project.

[Begin Sagi recording] Iran is conducting a nuclear fusion project which might cause us to be concerned about our existence and basic security if and when that process become irreversible. I do not want to frighten you because that is not the situation now, but if with time the Iranian effort is not foiled, and it can be foiled—if it is not slowed down or stopped—and it can be slowed down and stopped—then with time that potential will become real and by the end of the decade, which is also the end of the century, it will be possible for Iran to achieve an independent nuclear capability. [end recording]

Gen. Sagi also talked about Israeli Air Force activity in south Lebanon. In his view, Hizballah has understood the message. That can be learned from the announcements by the Lebanese Government and what is happening in the field, Gen. Sagi said.

The Intelligence Branch's investigation indicates that the terrorist squad which landed in Elat last week belonged to a three-member Fatah squad. All three trained in bases in Libya before leaving on their mission.

Gen. Sagi also said that he does not know about any Israeli involvement in the murder of the PLO official in Paris today but noted that 'Atif Bsisu had a rich terrorist past, which began with the murder of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics and other attacks for the Black September and Fatah organizations.

[Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew at 1400 GMT on 8 June carries a report on Gen. Sagi's comments on Bsisu's assassination and adds: "The intelligence chief refused to comment on 'Arafat's charge that the Mosad murdered Bsisu and said he read about it this morning."]

Western Firms' Links With Iran, Libya Cited

TA1106152592 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
11 Jun 92 p 5

[Report by Eytan Rabin]

[Excerpts] Israel is working with the United States and other countries to halt cooperation between Western companies and Iran and Libya. These companies assisted Iraq in developing its nonconventional weapons and are now helping Iran and Libya develop such arms.

A senior government source in Jerusalem told HA'ARETZ that information has accumulated in Israel

linking Western firms, some of which had previously assisted Iraq, with aid to Iran and Libya in return for astronomic sums of money.

The senior source said that Israel is deeply concerned about the activities of the firms, which provide Libya and Iran with experts and assist them in setting up infrastructures and in developing nonconventional weapons, which will be aimed at Israel in the future.

Major General Uri Sagi, head of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Intelligence Branch, said earlier this week that Iran is expected to reach nuclear capability within nine to 10 years, and if it is not stopped, Israel's very existence could be endangered.

Gen. Sagi also said that Libya is developing a missile called al-Fatah. It is a long-range missile capable of reaching 1,000 km. He said that the missile is in the early stages of development, and its technological level is low. Libya is getting assistance from Western companies for the project.

An investigation by HA'ARETZ has revealed that at least nine Western firms and dozens of atomic scientists are currently helping Iran develop an atomic program, which began in the mid-1970's under the shah. From the outset, the program was meant to match Iran's capability with that of Iraq and Pakistan. [passage omitted]

Defense sources said that there is close cooperation between Israel, the United States, and other countries in an attempt to halt these Western companies from assisting Libya and Iran.

A senior government source said that Israel will not sit idly in the face of Iran's accelerated nuclear development program. Although Iran will not have an atomic bomb for another 10 years, Israel will not wait but will use all possible means to prevent it.

'Tacit' Accord With Syria on Lebanese Airspace

TA1406155492 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew
1400 GMT 14 Jun 92

[Text] Israel Air Force is making great efforts to avoid showdowns with the Syrians during its raids in Lebanon, according to Major General Herzl Bodinger, the Air Force commander. He added that there is an unwritten agreement that Lebanese airspace is under the control of Israel Air Force and that the Syrians are not to operate there. Our army affairs correspondent 'Ido Baum filed this report a short while ago:

[Begin recording] [Baum] Maj. Gen. Herzl Bodinger, Air Force commander, judges that the Air Force incursions into south Lebanon have had an impact on Hizballah. Gen. Bodinger says the Air Force is making efforts to avoid confrontations with the Syrians in Lebanese skies and to demonstrate that we are not interested in such confrontations.

[Bodinger] There is a tacit understanding that Lebanese airspace is a space where our Air Force flies unhindered, while theirs does not. So far, this balance has not been upset. There are no signed documents to that effect; it is just a tacit understanding, simply because we fly there. We have taken possession; that is a fact. Anyway, they do not get menacingly close on their side of the border.

[Baum] Gen. Herzl Bodinger goes on to say that nuclear weapons should be prevented from reaching Iran and other countries in our region. Asked whether the Air Force can attack nuclear targets in Iran, he replies that distant places can be reached.

[Bodinger] You have to create the greatest possible interference in every available way—military, political, or through the international mediation—in a bid to prevent, as far as possible, the entry of such weapons into the region. From an international viewpoint, the entire world needs this. That spot can no doubt spark a world war that would start with a nuclear move. As for the capability to reach that spot: The capability to reach many places is available.

[Baum] In a meeting with military correspondents on Air Force Day, Gen. Bodinger says that by next spring the Air Force will have tested both the theoretical and operational aspects of the F-16's and F-18's, and will advise the chief of staff which will best benefit Israel's future Air Force. [end recording]

Arens on Terrorism, Nonconventional Arms Race

TA1606085792 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 16 Jun 92 p 12

[Report by Tzvi Singer]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Defense Minister Moshe Arens represented the government at a memorial ceremony for the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] fallen of the Lebanon war held on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem yesterday.

In his address, Arens said: "When the IDF went into the Lebanon war, Lebanon was controlled by terror organizations, and Israel's residents suffered daily terror attacks and casualties."

"In the Peace for Galilee war," Arens added, "we paid a heavy price to make sure that the children of Qiryat Shmona, Misgav 'Am, and Nahariyya live in peace and security. Since the Lebanon war, almost no Israeli citizen was hurt as a result of a terror act coming from Lebanon.

"The campaign against terrorism in Lebanon is not over. Terror organizations still operate against Israel from southern Lebanon. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments are responsible for these acts of terror. Israel expects these governments to use their influence to curb terrorism."

Answering reporters' questions after the ceremony, Minister Arens said that the whole world should be concerned by the Iranian attempts to obtain nuclear arms and the Syrian attempts to obtain chemical weapons.

Arens called for international pressure on these two countries to stop their nonconventional arsenal buildup.

PRC Envoy Denies Sale of N-Weapons to Mideast

TA1606112592 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew
1005 GMT 16 Jun 92

[Text] The newly arrived Chinese ambassador categorically denies reports that the PRC supplies Middle East countries with nuclear weapons. As for other weapons, he says, the PRC does not intend to upset the balance of power in the Middle East. The PRC ambassador was hosted by the Haifa Municipality today. Our correspondent Shula Schmerling reports:

[Begin recording] [Schmerling] The new PRC ambassador, Lin Zhen, who is apparently unaccustomed to Western-type attacks by journalists who strike directly at the underbelly of relations between the two countries, gives terse replies to questions he does not like, clearly demonstrating his displeasure.

Is there truth in the recent reports that China supplies Middle East countries—Iran and perhaps Syria—with weapons? Does China plan to take Russia's place in this sphere?

[Lin, in English] We are not doing many things in this field, and I do not think this will upset the balance of the weaponry in this region.

[Schmerling translates and continues] He adds: We strive to peace and stability in this region.

The next question really angers the ambassador. Does China supply Arab countries with nuclear weapons?

[Lin, in English] It is nonsense. China never supplies any nuclear weapons to any country.

[Schmerling translates and continues] At this point, the ambassador turns angrily to his host, Haifa Mayor Arye Gur'el, remarking: I thought I was invited to a reception. I did not know it was a news conference.

The other subjects, however—future economic ties and possibly cultural ties between China and Israel—were definitely more to his liking. He says: Endless possibilities for business and economic ties have arisen. I have not finalized any ideas in this field, but the start is very encouraging.

The actual reason for Lin Zhen's visit to Haifa was the decision to establish a twin cities pact—the first of its kind—between Haifa and the great Chinese port, Shanghai. [end recording]

PAKISTAN

French Supply of Nuclear Plant Ruled Out

*BK1006160992 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in Urdu 1500 GMT 10 Jun 92*

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Briefing newsmen in Islamabad today, a Foreign Office spokesman said that Pakistan, as current chairman of the Group of 77 of developing countries, will make efforts to help facilitate consensus between the developed and developing countries on a number of issues which still remain unresolved. [passage omitted]

On the nuclear issue, the spokesman reaffirmed Pakistan's stand that it will accept complete nuclear safeguards on all its nuclear programs provided India also does so. He said France, in accordance with its amended policy on export of nuclear materials, is supplying nuclear power plants to countries which accept safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. Therefore, there is no possibility of its supplying the proposed nuclear

power plant to Pakistan. France had hinted during the prime minister's visit to France [as heard] in January this year that it was ready to provide a nuclear plant to Pakistan under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Although no agreements have been signed, talks are expected to be held in this regard.

Nuclear Reactor Upgrade Achievement Claimed

92AS0999D Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 29 Apr 92 p 1

[News report: "Pakistan Reactivated a Nuclear Reactor and Upgraded Its Power; the President Will Inaugurate 10 Megawatt Reactor on 28 May"]

[Text] Islamabad, (JASARAT Correspondent): President Ghulam Ishaq Khan will perform the opening ceremony of a 10-megawatt [MW] reactor in Nellore. The work on the reactor was done in Pakistan. The 5-MW reactor that Pakistan had received in 1972 had ceased to function; however, Pakistani experts not only reactivated it but also augmented its power to 10 MW. This is a notable achievement for Pakistani nuclear specialists.

Gorbachev Urges Nuclear Powers to Stop Testing*LD1106224992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2132 GMT 11 Jun 92*

[Text] Moscow June 11 TASS—ITAR-TASS today received an appeal by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to the leaders of countries possessing nuclear weapons, urging them to stop nuclear testing. Following is the full text of the appeal:

“Mikhail Gorbachev’s appeal to the leaders of countries possessing nuclear weapons—George Bush, Boris Yeltsin, Francois Mitterrand, John Major, and Yang Shangkun.

As a person whose efforts helped to launch the process of nuclear disarmament, I regard it as my right to appeal to you, my former partners, urging a complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

The profound changes that have occurred in the world over the past several years have significantly undermined the role of nuclear weapons as a factor in contemporary world politics. The global nuclear threat, which was a product of the cold war, has for all practical purposes disappeared.

In the past, the principal argument for continuing nuclear testing was that nuclear weapons had to be kept operational and improved qualitatively—as a “deterrent” and in order to keep up with the ‘adversary’. An additional argument used for some time was that controlling low-yield underground explosions was impossible. Both of these arguments are no longer valid.

What is more, it is becoming increasingly clear that qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons would make meaningless their quantitative reductions—reductions that everyone now agrees are necessary and that the United States and Russia are already undertaking.

Continued testing by nuclear powers weakens the non-proliferation regime, since near-nuclear states can point out that everyone has a right to act in accordance with the principle of sovereignty. But, the renunciation of testing by nuclear powers, made legally binding under international law, would create a barrier that those who would like to acquire nuclear weapons would find it hard to penetrate.

Finally, it is clear that underground tests, despite all precautions, cause grave damage to the environment. I am referring not only to accidental discharges of radioactive substances but also to the remote consequences of nuclear tests, about which little is known so far.

All of this prompts me to put before you the following question: Is this not the time for a complete prohibition of nuclear testing? I believe that the international situation now makes it possible to do so. Such step would

speed up the transition to a new world order, which would also facilitate the resolution of issues involved in regional conflicts.

[Signed] Mikhail Gorbachev.

[Dated] June 10, 1992.

Russia Expects Nuclear Agreement in U.S.*LD1406215992 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 14 Jun 92*

[Text] The United States will render assistance to Russia in ensuring security in the transportation, storage, and elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons. According to the Russian Information Agency, it is expected that interstate agreements will be signed on these issues by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush on 17 June in Washington. The U.S. Congress earlier decided to allocate \$400 million to this end. In addition to this, three agreements have been prepared between the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Atomic Energy and the U.S. Department of Defense. There is a possibility that an agreement on cooperation in the elimination of chemical weapons could be prepared during the visit. During Boris Yeltsin’s visit to Washington, Russia and the United States intend to remove a number of impediments to the work of representatives of both countries which were created during the cold war period. We remind you that Boris Yeltsin’s first visit across the ocean as head of state begins on Monday.

Russia Adopts Resolution on Nuclear Security**Toughens Control***OW0906193292 Moscow INTERFAX
in English 1749 GMT 9 Jun 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian President has adopted a resolution on the State Committee on control over nuclear and radiation security under the Russian president. The committee was ordered to submit to the government within the next three months in coordination with the Russian Economy Ministry and Finance Ministry the procedures for issuing licenses on construction, exploitation, reconstruction and modernization of radioactively hazardous facilities, and terms of payment for them. Permission is also required for production, transportation, storage, use and burial of nuclear materials, as well as for storage, re-processing, transportation and burial of radioactive disposal. The resolution envisages the licensing of creation, production, testing, storage and liquidation of nuclear arms.

Export Controls Tightened

PM0906093592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Jun 92 First Edition p 6

[Russian Federation Government Resolution No. 366 "On Approving Documents Regulating the Export of Dual-Use Equipment and Materials and Technology That Can Be Used for Nuclear Purposes," in Moscow]

[Text] In order to tighten control of exports from the Russian Federation of dual-use equipment and materials and technology that can be used for nuclear purposes, the Russian Federation Government rules that:

1. The guiding principles of the transfer of dual-use equipment and materials and technology that can be used for nuclear purposes, the list of dual-use equipment and materials and technology that can be used for nuclear purposes, and the memorandum of understanding, which were adopted by the nuclear supplier countries in accordance with the accords reached in Warsaw in March-April, are to be approved.
2. The Russian Federation Foreign Ministry is to follow the established procedure and send in May 1992 to the states that reached the accords in Warsaw in March-April 1992 notes on the Russian Federation's adherence to the documents mentioned in point 1 of this resolution and inform the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency about this.
3. The Russian Federation Commission on Export Control under the Russian Federation Government and the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy, in conjunction with other interested ministries and departments of the Russian Federation, are to present to the Russian Federation Government in 1992 proposals on measures to implement in the Russian Federation the documents provided for in point 1 of this resolution.

[Signed] Ye. Gaydar, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government.

[Dated] 29 May 1992

Russia Announces Private Satellite Launching

PM0406120192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jun 92 First Edition p 3

[Report by Dmitriy Slobodyanyuk under the "Conversion" rubric: "SS-20's 'Refitted' for Outer Space"]

[Text] The last restrictions on private entrepreneurial activity in the sphere of high technology production processes were lifted with the beginning of economic reform. By now it has become clear that the state conversion program, if it has not failed altogether, has been delayed for many years to come. But the initial results of private initiatives are finally appearing against the background of this muted failure. The implementation of simple decisions is beginning to bear solid fruit. It

turns out that big money can be earned for the fatherland's benefit from written-off military "scrap metal." The I.V.K. Joint-Stock Company and the "Kompleks" Science and Technology Center held a promotion for "Start," the first Russian multipurpose mobile space rocket complex, at the International Trade Center on Krasnaya Presnya.

The most intriguing detail in this project is that the new space rocket launcher, designed for lifting small satellites into near-earth orbit, is designed on the basis of SS-20 and SS-25 missiles, which once instilled terror into the "fiercest" of Western "hawks." Thanks to this, the complex was developed in record time (less than nine months) and required minimal investments. The "Start" project is our country's first aerospace initiative on which not a single ruble has been spent from the budget.

According to Sergey Zinchenko, vice president of the I.V.K. Joint-Stock Company, the "Start-1" rocket is designed for commercial launches for civilian purposes. Not for any money will the so-called "black boxes" be lifted into orbit. Although, naturally, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense can buy "launches" to meet its own requirements, but on equal terms with all other customers. Large-scale reductions of the armed forces and the unsuccessfully launched conversion program have hit defense enterprises, and the economy as a whole, too heavily. The vice president stressed that the implementation of "Start" has already preserved thousands of jobs and saved unique scientific collectives from oblivion. Therefore there is nothing strange in the fact the president's economic advisers have approved the program as a whole, and Vice Premier Ye. Gaydar has blessed the initiative with his signature. S. Zinchenko promised that the Army would not be left without employment either.

Market analysis carried out jointly with U.S. experts has shown that by the end of the century the potential market will comprise approximately 300 launches. Although "Start" is a "newcomer" on the international market, in the opinion of Yu. Solomonov, director of the "Kompleks" Science and Technology Center, the new rocket is more than competitive, even in comparison with such mighty projects as "Arianne," "Delta," and "Iridium." Especially thanks to the incredibly low cost and the unique technical solutions utilized in the SS-20 and SS-25 rockets. The "Start" complex is absolutely autonomous; in other words a launch can be carried out not only from the space vehicle launch site, but even from an unprepared launch pad. In addition to everything else, the solid fuel used in the motors of rockets of this class contain a low level of compounds that are harmful to the environment, which guarantees sufficient ecological safety for the launches.

I.V.K. specialists claim that the use of such rockets for civilian launches is especially discussed in the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons, and the "Start" complex does not come within any of the bans or

limitations stipulated in the treaty. The rocket is totally devoid of a "military filling" and meets all the necessary criteria.

Russia's Defense Microbiology Institute Visited

*PM1506095392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "'We Have No Bacteriological Weapons,' Military Bacteriologists Maintain"]

[Text] The Russian Ministry of Defense Microbiology Research Institute is in very center of the city of Kirov. Although there is still no sign outside it, the fence surrounding it is covered with barbed wire, entry into and exit from the installation is by permit only, and this was the first time that journalists from Moscow had been allowed in here, everyone in the area knows that the institute is directly connected with bacteriological weapons.

"We have not produced any bacteriological weapons in the past and we are not doing so now," Colonel Yevgeniy Pimenov, head of the institute, stated categorically. "Our main purpose is [to provide] means of protection against dangerous bacteriological pathogens. This means protection both for the military and for civilians."

Colonel Pimenov is young—he is only 40. But he is already a doctor of medical sciences, an honored Armed Forces specialist, and winner of the State Prize, and he occupies a general's post. He started off here in Kirov as a lieutenant after graduating from the Second Medical Institute, where he specialized in biophysics. The institute has 36 State Prize winners, five doctors of science, 82 candidates, and a total of 114 officers who are scientists.

What do they do? Their range of interests includes microbiology, epidemiology, immunology, genetics, aerobiology, biochemistry, biophysics, physical and colloidal chemistry, and biotechnology.... It was here in Kirov that, back in the Great Patriotic War, military bacteriologists created the first industrial batch of penicillin, which saved the lives of thousands of servicemen, the first streptomycin and other antibiotics against the plague, tularemia, glanders, and anthrax....

The combined vaccine against anthrax developed in the institute is without equal in the world as regards effectiveness, the scientists claim. We were told how, during the preparations for the general attack on Iraqi positions, the American command recalled that Saddam Husayn possesses bacteriological weapons, including anthrax, and the coalition forces had only 40,000 doses of antidote for 400,000 officers and men (and even that was intended for animals).

The Americans appealed to us to sell them the vaccine, and offered us a very advantageous contract, but by the time the Central Committee and the military-industrial

complex leadership had decided whether or not they should sell the antidote, time had passed and the war had ended.

The institute does not hide the fact that it works with particularly dangerous bacteria. After all, you can verify the action of a protective vaccine only by means of experiments. We were allowed to enter the building where they are carried out. But we were warned that first of all we would have to be inoculated, and following our visit to the building we would have to go into quarantine for two weeks, as the institute's employees do. Alas, we did not have the time.

But, as the scientists maintain, the following fact testifies to the level of epidemiological protection and security in the institute: A total of 1,600 people live on the territory of the scientific research institute, including women and children—the families of the most senior specialists. We saw children playing freely by the fences surrounded by barbed wire and by the bunkers.

The microbiological institute has many problems today. The main one is the lack of resources. One-third of employees have already left as a result of this. There is only enough money in the budget for earnings, there is no question of paying for the experiments, or food for the guinea pigs, mice, and monkeys. The solution lies in conversion. There is a program aimed at this—with offers worth 8 million rubles. But the servicemen's hands are tied by the ban on their commercial activity. Admittedly, that is suitable material for another article.

Russian CHETEC Firm Denies Proliferation Role

*92WP0241A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 19, 10-17 May 92 p 8*

[Unattributed article: "Russia's Nuclear Business: Is The Threat Real?"]

[Text] The West is still apprehensive of the state of Russia's nuclear power industry and the eventuality of uncontrolled exports of nuclear components, primarily of plutonium, enriched uranium and heavy water.

Foreign experts say that the real threat emanates from fledgling private "entrepreneurs" rather than "uranium mafia" whose very existence is doubted by many, for criminals prefer rare-earth elements. The biggest headache is the appearance of pseudo-private companies blessed by state outfits closely linked with the military-industrial complex and its mighty lobby.

These new Russian "entrepreneurs" are well versed in methods of quietly circumventing legal limitations and know which ropes to pull in the corridors of power, for which reason a semilegal uranium business may well whet their appetites. Over a dozen developing states in today's world are salivating at the prospect of getting quality raw materials for their ambitious military programmes.

There have been reports of a private Polish-Russian company which sells heavy water via Finland, etc. In the majority of cases such information is found to be untrue, but there is always a grain of truth somewhere. One name, CHETEC, has been in focus of late.

CHETEC, the Russian abbreviation for Man-Technology-Capital, is the name of an international company founded in December 1990 as a private holding corporation, although in reality it has been and is an affiliate of the Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering and the Research Institute of Experimental Physics, also known as Arzamas-16. A year ago the then President of CHETEC Vladimir Dmitriyev spoke at the Moscow conference for the annihilation of chemical weapons stating that the company was capable of "exporting its services." Soon after he informed an international conference on the ecological aftermath of underground nuclear blasts in Ottawa of an experiment to be staged in Novaya Zemlya in the summer of 1992 to test nuclear waste annihilation technologies.

The company then got the backing of Viktor Mikhailov, then chief of the country's nuclear power engineering, who became Russia's Minister of Nuclear Power Engineering in March 1992. He wrote a letter to the U.N. stating that he expected the first tangible results of annihilating chemical and nuclear weapons very soon and named CHETEC as a corporation capable of financing these activities to the tune of 130 million rubles. CHETEC was said to hold all rights to the relevant technology, being free to seek partners and suppliers of the materials to be annihilated—for a price, of course. The technology was claimed to be ecologically clean and based on underground thermonuclear blasts. According to the Ministry, the technology had been considered and approved by three international conferences. The problem is that the Ottawa conference was not one of them.

Prof. William Potter, who is a leading Western investigator of CHETEC's activities, confided in THE NEW YORK TIMES that this company which offers obscure nuclear and chemical services and technologies runs a fleet of limos and has representations in eight cities and a luxurious holiday home near Moscow which used to belong to the party elite. There were unconfirmed reports that the company pays the airfare of government officials on trips abroad.

The reported millions in CHETEC's purse do not tally with its run-down headquarters. Nevertheless, the building is situated two minutes away from Staraya Ploshchad, the seat of the now defunct Central Committee, and five minutes from the Kremlin, i.e. in a very privileged location.

Nor do today's statements by the top people in the company substantiate the high-brow image. Not long ago the Board of Directors released Mr. Dmitriyev "for reasons of health." In a private conversation an officer of

the company told me: "Dmitriyev's promises and statements are full of hot air. We don't want our reputation in Russia and elsewhere smeared by groundless statements."

This MN correspondent never saw the new president of the company, who was said to be "excessively busy" before his planned visit to Germany, where he wanted to deal with the issue of CHETEC's bank accounts. Vice-President Alexander Fokin told me on the phone that his company has never been involved in the nuclear business. "We undertake ecological projects only, apart from building apartments for Arzamas-16 physicists. We possess no technologies and know nothing about any Novaya Zemlya experiments," he said.

Indeed, the company is on no lists of licensed exporters of nuclear or chemical raw materials or technologies. Officials in charge of export control see CHETEC as a product of power play, "They are bluffing" remarked Vladimir Fartakov, a Ministry official.

Yet many people in the West and in Russia are sceptical. Such pacifying statements are too good to be true, believe some. Others fear that CHETEC is lying low in expectation of better times, or is about to change nameplates.

To be objective, there is no proof of CHETEC's illegal activities. And one must remember the harsh international competition, plus widespread public phobia with regard to all things nuclear. Any rumour of uranium leaking out of this country or doubtful technologies can be used, if not provoked, by America, French and Australian suppliers of enriched uranium, who would lose no opportunity to kick their Russian competitors. After all, the export of nuclear power technologies and enriched uranium still holds pride of place with Russian export companies. In 1991 alone they earned half a billion dollars, although Russia's niche in global uranium exports is small—a mere 5 to 7 percent. Yet Russia now sets its sights on a 25-percent mark...

Russian Center Trained DPRK Nuclear Scientists

*SK1106021992 Seoul YONHAP in English 0137 GMT
11 Jun 92*

[Text] Moscow, June 11 (YONHAP)—North Korea has let hundreds of scientists study and work at an atomic research center in Dubna, Russia, since 1956 in order to obtain advanced nuclear technologies, a knowledgeable source said Thursday.

The source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the institute accommodated 10 to 20 North Korean fellows on a routine basis under an agreement between Pyongyang and Moscow. The exact number and their research subjects were still secret, he said.

Hundreds of North Koreans have completed the course in the institute and are now playing important roles in North Korea's nuclear development, according to the source.

The Dubna research center was a major supplier of personnel training and key technologies on machine operation and others when North Korea set up its first test nuclear reactor in Yongbyon in 1963 with the support of the Kremlin.

The center, 200 kilometers north of Moscow, has a world reputation in basic and applied science. It has 2,000 fellows and 6,000 employees.

Dubna had rejected fellows from non-communist countries until it started to accept Western countries as regular member nations apparently due to a serious financial pinch in 1990. German scientists are currently stationed in the institute, the source said.

Krasnoyarsk Delays Shutdown of Nuclear Reactors

*OW1206120992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1136 GMT 12 Jun 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The stoppage of two nuclear reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium in the closed city of Krasnoyarsk-26 has been put off. The first reactor is expected to be stopped in July instead of June and the second one—not later than September, although it was to be stopped at the end of August.

The administration of the local chemical and mining mill believes that the schedule proposed by the Russian Atomic Inspection Committee does not correspond to nuclear production's technological characteristics. To avoid accidents, experts prefer not to hurry.

Irkutsk Angara Factory To Produce Refractories

*LD1006161992 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1147 GMT 10 Jun 92*

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Irkutsk—The Angara uranium-enrichment factory and the Irkutsk private joint-stock company Magir plan to organize the joint production of super-hard refractories. Magir staff told PF [POSTFACTUM] magnesites from the Larchinsk field in the Chita region are planned to be used as raw material. The projected capacity of the joint enterprise's first stage is from 20,000 to 50,000 tonnes per year.

Khabarovsk Denies Loss of Nuclear Warheads

*PM1106095492 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Jun 92 p 1*

[Report by correspondent Colonel V. Usoltsev: "Nobody Lost Any Nuclear Warheads, and Vladimir Desyatov, Representative of the Russian Federation President in Khabarovsk Kray, Made No Statements to That Effect"]

[Text] Khabarovsk—A number of newspapers published a report from the POSTFACTUM agency that 23 nuclear warheads were missing in the Far Eastern Military District. The Far Eastern Military District command apparently knew nothing about it. Later POSTFACTUM, citing Vladimir Desyatov, representative of the Russian Federation president in Khabarovsk Kray, offered the clarification that the "homeless" warheads may belong to the Navy and come from the unfinished nuclear submarines at Komsomolsk-na-Amure's Lenin Komsomol Plant.

I personally was surprised by this report because Desyatov himself, not so long ago, used to work at that plant as a design engineer. He could not help knowing that there are hardly likely to be nuclear missiles on "unfinished submarines."

Desyatov was in Komsomolsk-na-Amure. My first telephone conversation was with his assistant Mikhail Che.

"It is true that the Russian president's representative Desyatov and a special commission found these warheads," Mikhail Aleksandrovich confirmed, to my surprise. "Whom they belong to has not yet been established"

"Where exactly in Khabarovsk Kray was this?"

"Not far from Komsomolsk. Where precisely? I cannot tell you that yet."

So the enigmatic story "unfurled." But on Tuesday morning I at last succeeded in talking with Vladimir Desyatov himself by telephone.

"I gave no interviews about this to any news agency or newspaper," he stated immediately, when I told him the purpose of the conversation. "My 'statement' about 23 nuclear warheads lost by the military is the fabrication of idle journalists. Only someone who was either permanently drunk or not in his right mind could make such a statement."

"Vladimir Mikhaylovich, how are we to assess the statement by your assistant Mikhail Che that you did find the warheads?"

"Obviously Mikhail Aleksandrovich expressed himself inaccurately. He knows that I did indeed say previously that there were nuclear warheads in the armory of a certain unit, and that they are not there now. They have been moved to another storage facility, which I have no doubt is safe. I have seen with my own eyes, as they saying goes, that they are not now in the vicinity of

Komsomolsk. They have not been mislaid, as certain publications are trying to tell their readers, but, I repeat, they have been removed for storage in a different special facility."

At the end of our conversation the Russian president's representative repeated that he had made no irresponsible statements about nuclear warheads and had no intention of making any such statements.

That is the whole story.

Byelarus Requires 7 Years To Remove N-Weapons

PM1706153592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jun 92 p 3

[Report by BEITA-TASS correspondent T. Khryapina: "Republic of Byelarus Will Need Seven Years To Rid Itself of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Is Deputy L. Privalov's Opinion"]

[Text] "To rid itself completely of strategic nuclear weapons the Republic of Byelarus will need seven years." This was stated in a talk with your BEITA correspondent by Leonid Privalov, people's deputy of Byelarus and deputy chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet commission for questions of national security, defense, and the struggle against crime.

"To conduct this operation more rapidly," he said, "we need enormous funds which, taking into account the economic troubles and the difficulties in forming the budget and creating our own Armed Forces, we cannot allow ourselves. But points are already being specified for unloading and delivery to the territory of the Russian Federation and a system of control is being developed by Byelarusian representatives for the destruction of the nuclear charges withdrawn from Byelarus' territory. We do not intend to retain strategic offensive nuclear weapons. The republic's position on that issue is a principled one."

"The last train with tactical nuclear weapons left Byelarusian territory back on 27 April," the people's deputy recalled. "It was the first step taken to come closer to the projected goal—nuclear-free status and a neutral state."

Ukraine Plans Removal of Nuclear Weapons

Kravchuk on Arms Destruction

LD1106220792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2128 GMT 11 Jun 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Ivan Sayko]

[Excerpt] Kiev June 11 TASS—The Ukrainian president's first visit to France will be held on June 16 and 17, Leonid Kravchuk told reporters today.

During the visit Kravchuk will meet President Francois Mitterrand and sign several bilateral agreements.

Asked about cutting nuclear weapons Kravchuk stressed that Ukraine prioritizes destroying all nuclear weapons. In the future Ukraine shall become a non-nuclear, non-aligned state, he said.

There are no tactical nuclear weapons on its territory and strategic weapons are being destroyed, he said. [passage omitted]

Reiterated in Treaty With France

LD1606155292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1529 GMT 16 Jun 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondents Sergey Batyrev and Viktor Demidenko—TASS]

[Excerpt] Paris June 16 TASS—Ukraine reiterated its pledge to become nuclear-free in a treaty on mutual understanding and cooperation signed with France by presidents of the two countries on Tuesday.

The treaty also envisages further development of bilateral ties, as well as interaction between the two states in international organisations. The two countries will hold immediate consultations in case a threat to peace emerges. The main direction of cooperation between Ukraine and France is "to build a peaceful Europe based on principles of solidarity". [passage omitted]

Ukraine To Continue Producing Nuclear Power

LD1206225292 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 11 Jun 92

[Text] Participants of yesterday's meeting between Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and representatives of the Nuclear Power Complex of the Republic reached the conclusion that there is no alternative to nuclear energy, so Ukraine will continue to develop it but on the basis of new technology, better reliability, and safety.

AUSTRIA

CSFR Citizens Arrested for Smuggling Uranium

Fissile Material Found

*AU1006152092 Vienna ORF Teletext in German
1455 GMT 10 Jun 92*

[Text] Attempts to smuggle uranium were foiled for the second time in a week in Vienna. Three CSFR citizens were arrested at a parking lot in Vienna's 11th district today. A total of 3 kg of fissile material, which they wanted to sell to Arabs, as they claimed, were seized.

Initial examinations at the Seibersdorf research center revealed that it would have been possible to extract 55 grams of pure uranium from the material. The material, however, did not pose a danger for the population.

Members of the Austrian antiterrorist task force (EBT) uncovered the smuggling attempt.

Investigation Detailed

*AU1106065992 Vienna KURIER in German
11 Jun 92 p 17*

[Report by Peter Grolig and W. Theuretsbacher: "Three Nuclear Smugglers Arrested at Supermarket"]

[Text] The activities of an international nuclear mafia are escalating. After the arrest of seven persons with 1.2 kg of radioactive material last week—KURIER carried a worldwide exclusive report—the police have managed to land another blow. This time three Czechs were arrested with the record amount of 3 kg of material containing uranium.

On Tuesday [9 June] around 1330 the "Antiterrorist Task Force" [EBT] in the Interior Ministry received the decisive piece of information. Three Czechs in a gold-colored Mercedes were waiting for Arab business partners with unknown goods in the parking lot of the "Huma" supermarket on Landwehrstrasse. Indeed, the suspects were discovered in a lightning action. The EBT investigators could not wait for the alleged business partners, since they rightly assumed that radioactive material was in the vehicle. In this case, the danger to the public in the busy parking lot could not have been justified.

Therefore, a Geiger counter was used. The instrument started ticking when it was aimed at some plastic bags in a traveling bag. The Czechs were arrested, and the material was analyzed quickly at the Seibersdorf research center. It consisted of 850 grams of pellets containing 2.4 percent uranium 235. These pellets are uranium disks, which are usually strung together to form a fuel rod for nuclear reactors. Then there were 1,118 grams of uranium-oxide pellets in the form of natural uranium.

Particularly interesting are another 1024.4 grams of test fuel of the "Skoda A1" reactor type.

This does not mean that the radioactive material necessarily comes from the CSFR. This CSFR reactor material is used all over the former East Bloc and also in India and Pakistan.

The incident shows some parallels to the police success last week—for instance, the unsuitable manner in which the traveling bags and the plastic bags containing the uranium were transported. The smugglers endanger their own health in this way.

Michael Sika, director general for public security, thinks that the two operations were carried out by different organizations, however. In fact, the material is not identical. The material that was seized in Praterstern Square last week was part of a reactor of the Soviet WWR-1000 type. The fuel rods seized in front of the Huma supermarket cannot yet be exactly identified, but they certainly do not belong to a WWR-1000 reactor.

Seibersdorf engineers say that there was no danger for the customers at the Huma supermarket. The fuel rods are harmless at a short distance.

Smugglers Seen as Amateurs

*AU1206083892 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
12 Jun 92 p 16*

[Report by Michael Lohmeyer: "Uranium Smugglers Only Amateurs? Experts Give Reassurance: 'Harmless'"]

[Text] Vienna—Nuclear experts say reassuringly: The excitement about the recently discovered smuggling of nuclear material is unnecessary. According to current information, the smuggling was not the work of an organized gang, but only of individual and amateurish criminals. In addition, this uranium could not be used for the production of a nuclear bomb in any way.

"We live in a world of absurdities," Yuliy Andreyev says, smiling. The Russian nuclear expert, formerly a top-level official in the Soviet Nuclear Energy Ministry, says reassuringly that no one needs to be afraid of the 850 grams of uranium dioxide and the 1.1 kg of natural uranium. Theoretically, not even 14 grams of fissionable uranium 235 could be gained from them. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, which is based in Vienna, one needs 25 kg of highly enriched uranium 235 to build a nuclear bomb.

It appears certain that both the 3 kg of uranium-containing material impounded in Vienna on Tuesday [9 June] and the amounts impounded in Austria, Hungary, and Switzerland over the previous weeks and months come from nuclear power plants or from uranium production centers in eastern Central Europe. Meyer [not further identified in item]: "The half kilogram that turned up in Hungary last year came from Romania and could have been stolen by someone who works in one of

the facilities for the production of fuel rods." According to the experts, the persons arrested are most likely adventurers who wanted to make big money as quickly as possible.

Natural Uranium Cheaper on the Open Market

In any case, natural uranium can be bought at a price of 300 schillings per kg, on the spot markets at even half that price. Natural uranium consists of 99.3 percent uranium 238 and only 0.7 percent fissionable uranium 235. While uranium 235 is used exclusively in reactors and—in a highly enriched form—in nuclear bombs, uranium 238 is needed in aircraft construction and for sailing boats because of its extremely high specific weight. It is relatively easy to shield the alpha radiation of uranium 238.

Experts have no idea what a potential buyer could do with the uranium from the black market: It would be impossible to use it in nuclear power plants because it is not clear how the material on offer was treated; in addition, uranium is considerably cheaper on the regular market than on the black market. "Accumulating uranium in order to be able to build a bomb later on is not realistic, either," Meyer says. "Because for that one needs processing facilities to separate uranium 235 from uranium 238." Yuliy Andreyev adds that "a facility for the processing of this kind of uranium does not exist anywhere." In addition, Meyer thinks that such facilities could be built only with the technical help of the highly industrialized countries.

FRANCE

Presidency Announces Reduced Nuclear Alert

AU0906161492 Paris AFP in English 1548 GMT
9 Jun 92

[Text] Paris, June 9 (AFP)—France said Tuesday [9 June] it was reducing the level of alert of its strategic nuclear forces. President Francois Mitterrand, who is also head of France's armed forces, had decided "to reduce the level of alert of strategic nuclear forces," the presidency announced in a statement. "From now on the permanent sea-going strategic force will consist of two or three submarines equipped with launchers", the statement said, adding that "the reaction time was unchanged."

Several Western countries have reduced their level of military preparedness since the elimination of the threat of attack by eastern bloc forces.

UNITED KINGDOM

Reaction to U.S.-Russian Arms Reductions

Accord Termed 'Unrealistic'

LD1706090192 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 0844 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Text] Huge arms cuts announced in the Bush-Yeltsin US summit were welcomed today by Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. "It is enormously heartening that we are seeing throughout the world a genuine process of disarmament done on a basis that actually helps and protects security because it is being done multilaterally and not unilaterally," he said.

The United States and Russia agreed yesterday to slash long-range nuclear weapons by two-thirds. President Bush said the pact he and President Yeltsin will sign today would further reduce the chance of a "nuclear nightmare." But Mr Rifkind said on BBC Radio 4's Today programme that suggestions of worldwide nuclear disarmament were unrealistic and the world would remain nuclear over the next 10 years. "If other countries, including some countries with very unstable governments, might be surreptitiously acquiring some crude nuclear weapons, obviously that is a problem the developed world, the western world, also has to be conscious of," he said.

Russia Remains Major 'Threat'

LD1806193192 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1637 GMT 18 Jun 92

[By Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION defence correspondent]

[Text] Russia remains the greatest military threat to Britain, according to senior defence sources. Despite this week's superpower agreement to slash strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds, there is deep concern about instability in the former Soviet Union.

"Can we be confident that rapprochement between East and West is guaranteed for all time?" said one of the sources. "Not one of us can be confident about that."

Britain has warmly welcomed Russia's agreement to cut strategic warheads to 3,500 but the programme will not be complete until the year 2003. Officials point to the inherent dangers of a large nuclear arsenal if anarchy breaks out. "We have to see our nuclear weapons as a hedge against a very different world from the one we are in at the moment," said one.

The government is carrying out a fundamental review of key sections of nuclear policy in the light of the rapidly-changing world situation. Although there is an official requirement for a new air-launched nuclear missile, there are serious doubts about whether it will go ahead. Officials are looking at whether Britain should build a small-scale Star Wars system to protect against missile

strikes. If approved, the system would consist of improved sensors in space to detect attacks and ground-based missile defences, more sophisticated than the Patriots used against Iraq's Scud attacks during the Gulf war. The four-submarine fleet of Trident nuclear-armed submarines will remain central to the government's nuclear policy

Trident Program To Continue

*LD1806193792 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1543 GMT 18 Jun 92*

[By Sarah Womack, PRESS ASSOCIATION parliamentary staff]

[Text] The prime minister today welcomed the planned US-Russian nuclear arms cuts but insisted Britain would press ahead with deploying its own Trident submarine missile system.

His remarks come after this week's agreement between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin to scrap two-thirds of their long-range nuclear warheads. Mr. Major said at question

time that he "warmly welcomed" the announcements which emerged from the US-Russian summit in Washington on Tuesday.

But he added: "We will certainly continue to maintain our own independent nuclear deterrent. "We will maintain it, we will build it, we will arm it and we will deploy Trident."

He was responding to Tory Sir Anthony Durant (Reading W) who urged him to "maintain strong UK defences within NATO and continue with the Trident programme".

The presidents agreed on Tuesday that Russian and US strategic warheads arsenals would be cut from 21,000 to a 7,000 maximum combined. They also agreed that heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles and all multiple ICBMs be eliminated.

US Trident submarine-launched missiles would be cut to 1,750 and all reductions would be completed by the year 2003, or by 2000 if the US helps Russia to destroy its stocks.

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