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Allegations in U.S. of SDI Abuses Noted

OW0203195492 Beijing XINHUA in English
1707 GMT 2 Mar 92

[Text] Washington, March 2 (XINHUA)—Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney has been ordered to investigate a Pentagon scientist's charges that officials of the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] Organization engaged in "gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds" and "abuse of authority", THE WASHINGTON POST reported today.

The directive was issued by the Office of Special Counsel, which found that a "substantial likelihood" that charges concerning the space-based anti-missile program were well-founded, the POST said.

According to the newspaper, Aldric Saucier, a senior scientist with the Strategic Defense Command, the army's component of the SDI program, wrote to the Office of Special Counsel last November and he charged the SDI officials for:

- false or misleading statements to Congress about the potential effectiveness and necessary development

time and costs for Brilliant Pebbles, a proposed constellation of space-based interceptors that would circle Earth waiting to swoop in on and destroy enemy missiles;

- off-the-books expenditures and diversions of appropriated funds, including false statements to Congress to conceal these expenditures;
- excessive reliance on defense contractors to prepare duplicative research and studies that were not used;
- wasteful research and development spending on SDI lasers instead of subjecting them to timely tests against actual ballistic missile targets.

Saucier, a civilian scientist with more than 25 years of government service, was later fired by the Army for what his military superiors termed "unacceptable performance", but his dismissal was temporarily set aside last week after protests to Cheney by some members of the Congress.

The Office of Special Counsel, which was established by the Congress to watch over misconduct by the administrative branch, also conferred official "whistle-blower" status on Saucier, THE WASHINGTON POST said.

NORTH KOREA

Implementing Denuclearization Declaration Urged

SK0603144092 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1150 GMT
5 Mar 92

[Commentary by station commentator Chong Pong-kil:
"Are They Intending To Avoid Denuclearizing the
Korean Peninsula?"]

[Text] As was reported, the fourth round of delegates' contact between both sides held on 4 March at Tongil House of our area in Panmunjom to discuss the formation and operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee ended without success. In this connection, we cannot but take issue with the South side's insinuations.

At the contact that day, in the discussion of paragraphs 2b and 2h of the draft agreement, the South side obstinately opposed our side's proposal that foreign nuclear weapons and nuclear bases be specifically referred to in the draft agreement and that clauses on measures for jointly checking external nuclear threats and receiving a pertinent international guarantee for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula be specified. South Korea's wrong insinuations cannot be interpreted otherwise than to reveal its real intention of attempting not to denuclearize the Korean peninsula but to continuously receive the protection of a foreign country.

As everyone well knows, the Korean peninsula nuclear issue was raised partly because the U.S. imperialists introduced nuclear weapons into South Korea, made it an advance nuclear base—the largest in the Far East—and, since then, have run amok with maneuvers for a nuclear war for northward invasion. It was also raised because the South Korean rulers have been viciously scheming to permanently nail down U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea while begging for the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Moreover, we do not know whether or not there are still U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in South Korea and whether or not all of them have been withdrawn and abolished. Because of a refusal to specify this issue in the draft agreement on the formation and operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee, we cannot construe it as other than an attempt to turn away the basic problem itself in realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, in the contact, the South side insisted on including in the draft agreement a mere clause regarding exchange of intelligence on the presence of nuclear weapons, and it insisted on deleting the clause regarding nuclear bases from the draft agreement.

It is useless to merely exchange intelligence while leaving the U.S. nuclear bases in South Korea as they are. To really denuclearize the Korean peninsula, it is imperative to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons and to abolish

nuclear bases. This is primary common sense, and, therefore, the South side's insistence is indeed preposterous.

In the discussion of paragraph 2h, the South side also obstinately refused to include in the draft agreement a clause on the measure for receiving an international guarantee for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This means that the South side intends not to eliminate the external nuclear threat against the Korean peninsula.

No matter how thoroughly a denuclearization policy may be enforced, if the external nuclear threat is strengthened, denuclearization cannot be implemented. This is clear to everyone.

In reality, the U.S. imperialists are clamoring about the protection of South Korea with their nuclear umbrella and is seeing to it that Japan, a neighboring country of the Korean peninsula, steps up its nuclear armament. According to reports, in a bid to possess more materials needed in nuclear weapon production, Japan, which has accelerated the development of nuclear weapon by all means, is attempting to purchase anew from foreign countries more than 100 tons of plutonium, with which it can manufacture a large amount of nuclear weapons, an amount almost equivalent to what the nuclear superpowers possess today. In addition to its existing enriching and reprocessing facilities presently under operation, Japan is also accelerating the construction of a large-scale reprocessing plant capable of manufacturing as many as 100 nuclear weapons annually in addition to the present enriching and reprocessing facilities.

Such being the situation, it is only too natural and just from the standpoint of the independence of the North and the South as the same nation to jointly cope with the external nuclear threat. At the same time, to deepen the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it is also imperative to obtain an international guarantee for this from nuclear weapon-possessing countries.

While disregarding the external nuclear threat that actually exists on the Korean peninsula today, talking about denuclearization cannot be regarded as a sincere attitude to remove the nuclear threat lingering before the nation.

The result of the fourth round of delegates' contact of both sides proves that the South Korean authorities are not sincere about the contacts themselves and that they are creating artificial obstacles to fulfilling the joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The South Korean authorities should realize that if they continue to create obstacles to fulfilling the joint declaration, they will not be able to escape the stern justice of the entire nation, which is seething with the ardent desire for the country's peace and reunification. If the South Korean authorities want the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, they should accept our fair and

aboveboard proposals and embark on the road of implementing the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Nuclear Committee Delegates Hold News Conference

*SK0603162592 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1500 GMT 6 Mar 92*

[Text] The fifth inter-Korean contact of delegates was held in the South side's portion of Panmunjom today to discuss the formation and operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee.

The contact was held behind closed doors.

At the end of the contact, the delegates of the North side gave a news briefing on the course of the contact.

Choe U-chin, our side's delegate, held a press conference and talked about the status of the contact.

According to it, the sides arranged the text of a draft agreement on the formation and operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee.

Mentioning the working-level discussion, the South side proposed that different opinions on Article Four be readjusted before anything else, thus they did not discuss the draft agreement from the beginning.

Our side suggested that the delegates of the two sides should make sincere efforts and initial the text at today's contact, saying that in the past, the two sides solved more complex problems than the issue of the formation and operation of the North-South Nuclear Control Joint Committee.

Our side put forward again some compromising proposals for progress in the discussion.

Our side agreed to the South side's proposal for defining the number of the members of the joint committee as seven in Paragraph 1, Article One.

Our side said that as the South side was reluctant to accept Paragraph 8, Article Two on the international guarantee of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, our side was ready to consider it, respecting the South side's argument that if this paragraph is considered, it would be easy to clinch other paragraphs.

But, the South side began to lay hurdles, asking our side to put forward only compromising proposals.

Charging that the South side's act is an act unprecedented in the history of inter-Korean talks and out of common sense, our side said it was ready to accept the South side's proposal for discussing Article Four before anything else and asked it to put forward its compromising proposals. But, the South side failed to put forward its own proposals.

With a view to completing the coordination of views and the arrangement of the text and initialing it at today's contact at any cost, our side broad-mindedly proposed to call the document agreed document or document of agreement in Paragraph 1, Article Two because the South side declined to accept the term—adoption of agreement. To this compromising proposal, the South side proposed to call it supplementary document, not agreed document or document of agreement.

Our side accepted the South side's opinion and agreed to the wording the matter of adopting and dealing with a supplementary document according to the debate on the implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and other allied issues.

In the discussion of Paragraphs 2 and 4, Article Two, the South side doggedly opposed mentioning foreign nuclear weapons and nuclear bases.

The South side, unable to persist in their argument against our side's logical demand and persuasion, agreed to specifically stipulate the words nuclear facilities and nuclear materials and to write clearly nuclear weapons and nuclear bases within parentheses, which they claimed to be suspect.

The sides went over to discuss Article Four.

The South side insisted on stipulating in the text the time limit of the adoption of the rules of the procedures and methods of nuclear inspection, although the right to discuss it is in the hands of the joint committee.

Refuting the argument of the South side that the time limit should be made a precondition for the adoption of the rules of the procedures and methods of nuclear inspection, our side asked the South side if it would agree to our side's proposal for stipulating that the U.S. troops should be withdrawn from South Korea within one month and the armed forces of the North and the South be reduced below the level of 100,000 men within one year at the Military Subcommittee which would discuss a phased disarmament.

Saying that it could never agree to that, the South side arrogantly ascribed its proposal to urgency and uttered words slandering and provoking the North.

In connection with this, our side, referring to the word—urgency—which the Americans use, added that the South side should make efforts to resolve the issue with its own strength.

Our side asked the South side if it planned to work out the rules of nuclear inspection in cooperation with the Americans, and charged that the South side was dancing to the tune of the United States which is trying to justify the U.S. troops' occupation of South Korea under a new pretext of nuclear threat from the North because the old pretext of threat from the North for the U.S. troops'

occupation was removed after the North and the South adopted an agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, cooperation and exchange.

Our side pointed out that since the time limit which the South side seeks is as unnecessary as a wen, it should be removed.

Our side proposed to shelve the discussion of Article 4 for the time being and enter into the discussion of Article 5, since the sides are widely divided over the former article.

Thus the discussion of Article 5 began.

The South side, however, strongly objected to our side's opinions—it is stipulated that Article Five of the important document should be signed by both side's premiers and a procedure is needed to validate it. The South side claimed that Article 4 be discussed again.

Our side asked the South side if it was willing to form the Nuclear Control Joint Committee by March 18, or not. Recalling that the joint declaration on denuclearisation was ratified by the top persons in authority of both sides, our side stated that, accordingly, the agreement on the composition and operation of the Nuclear Control Joint Committee cannot be finally ratified by the premiers.

Our side strongly urged the South side to try to finalize the draft agreement within today.

The South side, however, avoided an agreement, though it said it wanted to form and operate the joint committee quickly.

Our side proposed to refer Articles Four and Five to the Nuclear Control Joint Committee to be composed soon for its deliberation, as no agreement could be reached on them between the sides now.

The South side even talked the jargon that time would be wasted if it were referred to the joint committee which is like a marionette.

Our side sternly took the South side to task for its irresponsible utterances ignoring the functions and capacity of the joint committee to be formed, lacking confidence in one's own strength. It asked the South side did it not approach the Americans with the request to jointly work out the rules of inspection, because it did not trust fellow countrymen.

Avoiding answer to this, the South side uttered words off the point that the nuclear problem was an international problem, a problem concerning peace of Northeast Asia.

Our side asked the South side how could it ignore our proposal for denuclearisation for over thirty years, if it wanted peace of Northeast Asia, the peace of the Korean peninsula. The South side openly claimed that the nuclear weapons brought into South Korea by the

United States were a war deterrent, thus justifying the deployment of more than 1,000 pieces of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea.

This meant to admit at the official meeting that the South side did not hesitate to destroy the 70 million fellow countrymen in league with the United States, if it was for anti-communist unification, unification by prevailing over communism and to formally admit the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Our side took the South side to account, hitting hard at its treacherous and provocative remarks.

Our side put forward the reasonable proposal again to form the Nuclear Control Joint Committee before March 18 and let it discuss the pending issues, since an agreement has been reached on the fundamental problems for the formation and operation of the joint committee or to initial the points of agreement reached so far between the sides at the contacts and exchange its texts after having it signed by premiers and getting it through necessary procedures of effectuation and thus from the joint committee and let it discuss the unsettled issues.

The South side, however, proposed that a delegates' contact be again held on Monday or Tuesday next week, and rejected our side's proposal. Our side again urged the South side to form a Joint Nuclear Control Committee before 18 March stating that if the South side delays the issue which can be certainly resolved amid the entire nation's attention, it will be denounced. The South side, however, was unreasonable, stating that this is as good as a handicap and will waste time.

Our side made it clear once again that since both sides agreed upon the possibility of forming the joint committee, in other words, upon the basic matters of its formation, functions and operation, it was now possible to adopt and initial an agreement, and asked the South side whether it is ready to fix the date of the first meeting of the joint committee or not and whether it is good to announce that the South side avoided the formation of the joint committee.

But, the South side did not give any answer to the questions and ridiculously proposed to make trial inspection at least.

Our side refuted this, proposing to make an overall inspection, not trial inspection on one or two objects.

Our side said that even though the South side puts forward the so-called mutual principle and the principle of equity, this does not stand to reason. Our side said that in order for our people to eliminate their doubts concerning the South side, an overall inspection should be conducted.

The adjustment of views and arrangement of the text could not be completed at the contact today due to the unreasonable assertions of the South side.

The South side said that it will only need one hour to settle everything in the next meeting. Our side assumed this as an intention to rearrange its position, our side agreed to hold the next contact on 10 March.

It was agreed to hold the next contact on March 10.

NODONG SINMUN Urges Disarmament To Insure Peace

SK0803085692 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0837 GMT 8 Mar 92

["Disarmament Is Important Demand of Peace"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 8 (KCNA)—The South Korean authorities must show all their sincerity in realising disarmament to guarantee nonaggression and ensure peace, NODONG SINMUN says in a by-lined article today, and continues:

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song in his talk to the members of the delegations of both sides to the inter-Korean high-level talks "Let the North and the South Open the Way for the Peace and Reunification of the Country in a United Effort" defined disarmament as a reliable way for nonaggression and a crucial matter in taking practical steps to ensure peace. This is, indeed, a highly important guideline for defusing the acute military tension and opening a decisive phase for peace and peaceful reunification.

It is an outstanding matter in taking practical steps for peace of the country that the North and the South put an end to arms race and realise disarmament.

In calling for disarmament, we mean that huge armed forces of both sides, the main factor of endangering and disturbing peace, should be reduced to the level incapable of attacking the other side. This is the most reliable way of guaranteeing nonaggression.

Disarmament will make it possible to totally remove the apprehensions for the threat from the South and the "threat from the North", honestly implement all provisions of the agreement such as reconciliation, cooperation and exchange and facilitate national reunification.

Once the North and the South promised nonaggression, they should not hesitate in realising disarmament.

But the South Korean authorities are actually objecting to steps for disarmament, crying for "confidence first, disarmament next". This cannot be interpreted as a sincere attitude for providing a practical guarantee of nonaggression. Lurking behind this is a sinister intention to persistently pursue the policy of confrontation and war.

The fellow countrymen of the North and the South find no reason to stand in confrontation with each other militarily.

If the North and the South continue arms race and confrontation, remaining divided, it is also contrary to the universal trend toward independence and peace.

Reactions to Alleged Secret Arsenals in ROK

Inspection Demanded

SK0903065592 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0537 GMT 9 Mar 92

["U.S. and South Korean Authorities Must Open To Public Positions of Secret Nuclear Arsenals and Respond to Overall Inspection of Them"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 9 (KCNA) - The United States and the South Korean authorities must open to public the positions of secret nuclear arsenals in South Korea without delay and respond to an overall inspection of them including the U.S. Forces' nuclear weapons and bases as demanded by us, not resorting to an ostrich policy of "trial inspection", says a NODONG SINMUN analyst today.

Recalling that Chong Chu-yong, former honorary president of the Hyundai business group in South Korea and now executive chairman of the national party, exposed on March 5 that the group built a nuclear arsenal of U.S. troops present in South Korea, the news analyst says:

The existence of a U.S. secret nuclear arsenal in South Korea was confirmed personally by the very one who was in charge of its construction. Thus, the U.S. imperialists who have turned South Korea into a nuclear forward base and the South Korean authorities who leave the country's territory to be used as nuclear arsenal of the former can no longer conceal their anti-national and anti-peace criminal deed. The point is not confined to it.

Its graveness lies in the fact that there are secret nuclear arsenals in South Korea.

It is outrageous of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities to take issue with us and make quite a scene about "nuclear threat" while hiding their nuclear weapons in secret nuclear arsenals. It is a brigandish act like a thief crying "stop thief!".

The nuclear threat existing on the Korean peninsula comes not from the North which has no nuclear arms but from South Korea where the U.S. Forces are stationed and many U.S. secret nuclear arsenals have been built.

Dangerous gambles aimed at a nuclear war against the North are being staged ceaselessly in South Korea even at the moment.

Since the North-South Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression and Joint declaration on Denuclearisation were adopted and put into effect, there is no ground for the United States to keep its troops, nuclear weapons and nuclear base in South Korea and the United States must take steps to immediately withdraw and dismantle them

from South Korea and pull its troops out of there. If the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities persistently seek a nuclear war going against the desire of the nation and the trend of the times, they will bump into condemnations and rejection by our nation and the world's peace-loving people.

Reunification Committee Statement

SK0703124392 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1124 GMT 7 Mar 92

["CPRF Urges U.S. To Open to Public Positions of Secret Nuclear Arsenals in South Korea and Accept Overall Inspection of Them"—KCNA headline]

[Text] *Pyongyang March 7 (KCNA)*—We strongly hold that if the United States and the South Korean authorities have the willingness to dispel at home and abroad the suspicion that there may be U.S. nuclear weapons hidden in South Korea and to realize denuclearization in South Korea, they must open to the public the positions of the already built secret nuclear arsenals without delay and accept an overall inspection of them.

This is stressed in a statement issued today by the spokesman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF) as it has been brought to light that a secret nuclear arsenal of the U.S. Forces was built in South Korea.

The statement says:

It has been brought to light that a secret nuclear arsenal of the U.S. Forces was built in South Korea. This is arousing a serious public apprehension at home and abroad.

As was reported, Chong Chu-yong, honorary chairman of the Hyundai Business Group, in his lecture in Seoul on March 5 disclosed the fact that the Hyundai Business Group undertook a top secret project of digging a tunnel in a mountain to stockpile atomic bombs of the U.S. Forces and he oversaw the project on the spot.

As the truth was proved by the person who undertook the project of building a secret nuclear arsenal of the United States in South Korea, the grave fact that there is a U.S. nuclear arsenal in South Korea has been known to the world.

It is universally known fact that the United States stepped up the conversion of South Korea into a nuclear base in real earnest from the 1970s.

It is recorded in the 1985 minutes of the South Korean "National Assembly" that 1,720 pieces of U.S. nuclear weapons of various types are deployed in South Korea.

Experts said the density of nuclear weapon deployment in South Korea is four times that in the NATO area.

Despite this stark fact, the United States and the South Korean rulers have concealed the truth under the so-called NCND (neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons) policy.

When voices demanding the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea were lifted and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was debated in real earnest, the chief executive of South Korea abruptly published a "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" at the end of last year. However, this has not yet dispelled the suspicion of the world people.

His "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" has become all the more incredible as the top secret information about the building of a secret underground nuclear arsenal and its existence in South Korea were opened to the public this time.

No matter how loud the South Korean authorities advertise the absence of nuclear weapons, they can no longer deny the fact that there may still be U.S. nuclear weapons hidden in South Korea.

Accordingly, the "trial inspection" on a few objects brought forward by the South Korean authorities has become meaningless.

Now it is clear why the South Korean authorities took issue with the North over the fiction of "nuclear development" by the North, openly argued on this pretext that the agreement cannot be implemented, and moreover, cried for "sanctions" against us even after the effectuation of the inter-Korean agreement and the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was announced.

It was because they keep U.S. nuclear weapons hidden in South Korea that they raised a hue and cry over "nuclear problem" of the North like a thief crying "stop thief." And for that very reason, they insisted on "trial inspection" of a few objects and doggedly opposed an overall inspection of the nuclear weapons and nuclear bases of the U.S. Forces in South Korea at the North-South contact to discuss the formation and operation of the North-South nuclear control joint committee.

Since it has been made clear that there is a nuclear arsenal of the United States in South Korea, the nuclear inspection between the North and the South must not be confined to "trial inspection" on a few objects, but there should be an overall inspection on all objects including the U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases, as demanded by our side.

It reminds us of a thief crying "stop thief" that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities groundlessly slander the North and cry for "nuclear inspection" on the North while they are keeping U.S. nuclear weapons hidden in secret nuclear arsenals.

The chief executive of South Korea allowed the United States to build its secret nuclear arsenals in South Korea and stockpile there U.S. nuclear weapons designed to

exterminate the fellow countrymen. This is a never-to-be-condoned most towering anti-national crime.

If the South Korean authorities keep the U.S. nuclear weapons hidden and pursue confrontation and war under their patronage while paying lip service to "absence of nuclear weapons" and "denuclearization," they will be unable to escape strong denunciation and punishment by the nation.

POLAND**Spokesman: No Withdrawal Date for Soviet Troops**

*LD0303225692 Warsaw PAP in English 1607 GMT
3 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 3—The only information on pullout dates of the units of former Soviet Army stationed in Poland are given by garrison commanders to local Polish authorities, a spokesman for

the Polish commissioner in charge of stationing Soviet troops said Tuesday [3 March]. He added that such information cannot be regarded as official and binding. "The Polish side has not received from the Russian side any withdrawal schedule," Col. Stefan Golebiowski went on. "The Russians have made this conditional on the signing of an agreement on financial aspects of the withdrawal." According to a treaty initialled last autumn, all combat units of the former Soviet Army are to pull out from Poland by 15 November 1992,

RESPONSE TO BUSH, YELTSIN INITIATIVES

Reports, Comments on Kozyrev-Baker Moscow Talks

Joint News Conference

LD1802163492 Moscow TASS in English
1521 GMT 18 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and
Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Excerpt] Moscow February 18 TASS—Russian Foreign
Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State
James Baker described the Russian-U.S. two-day talks in
Moscow as “interesting” and “very useful.”

Addressing the joint news conference upon the comple-
tion of the talks today, the two said meetings in Moscow
concentrated on coordinating moves to implement the
accords to reduce strategic offensive armaments, which
were reached by the sides.

According to Kozyrev, the sides agreed to conduct mat-
ters in this issue so as to avoid protracted talks as was the
case in the past. “We will move at the maximum possible
pace using to this end meetings at the level of foreign
ministers so that the presidents could sign final docu-
ments on slashing nuclear armaments already by this
summer when the next Russian-American summit is
planned to be held,” Kozyrev said. He noted his next
meeting with Baker would take place in the first half of
March.

In Kozyrev's view, the possibility of rapid decision-
making on a drastic reduction in armaments has
emerged thanks to “the new atmosphere in relations
between the two countries,” which was fostered in Camp
David. At this stage, the political issues of trimming
nuclear armaments have been solved and purely tech-
nical problems remain to be tackled, Kozyrev noted. He
pointed to the fact that the gap in figures of weapons
subject to reduction proposed by the sides is very
narrow.

Baker agreed that the sides' positions on the numerical
reduction in armaments were being brought increasingly
closer. What is all-important is that the levels of the
remaining nuclear weapons will be significantly lower
than was envisaged by the treaty on strategic offensive
armaments, he said.

On Yeltsin's statement regarding retargeting Russian
nuclear missiles, Baker said he understands the political
importance of this statement and supports its spirit. In
practical terms, however, this issue has several technical
hitches, specifically regarding exercising control. [pas-
sage omitted]

'Efficiency' of Ministerial Talks Praised

LD1802220192 Moscow Programma Radio Odin
Network in Russian 1600 GMT 18 Feb 92

[Report by observer Andrey Ptashnikov]

[Excerpt] The final Moscow leg of U.S. Secretary of State
James Baker's tour of the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States [CIS] came to an end today in Moscow. Our
observer Andrey Ptashnikov reports.

[Ptashnikov] The whole of the first half of the day was
spent at the negotiating table with Russian Foreign
Minister Kozyrev. First, I should point out that these
talks lasted much longer than previously planned. What
might this suggest? Well, first and foremost, that the
range of questions was broad; but second, certainly, that
these questions are complicated enough.

After the talks ended, Baker and Kozyrev went out to
meet journalists, and answered their questions for 50
minutes. From this improvised news conference, it
became clear that the sides mainly discussed questions
regarding reciprocal reduction of their nuclear arsenals;
that is, they continued the discussions on this theme
which began two and a half weeks ago at Camp David
between Russian President Yeltsin and U.S. President
Bush. In addition, they continued discussions which
were begun yesterday in Moscow between Yeltsin and
U.S. Secretary of State Baker.

Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev described today's
conversation as very good and rich in content. Baker
went even further—he said that the conversation that
took place had been very, very good.

Well what was so good? The main thing is that the sides
agreed to proceed in the sphere of reducing nuclear
weapons without drawn-out full-scale talks as had been
the case before, but efficiently, through contacts at
ministerial level. And so, it became clear that the next
contact of this kind—I mean talks between Baker and
Kozyrev—is planned for March this year.

Much time during today's talks was devoted to the
problem of numerical or quantitative indicators in the
field of strategic weapons. To put it more simply, how
many nuclear warheads we should keep and how many
they should keep. Also discussed was the proposal put
forward by Russian President Yeltsin on retargeting our
own and their strategic missiles—that is, those missiles
that are aimed at our and their cities. The talks also
covered the creation of an international early warning
center for nuclear attack, whatever country decides to
take this senseless step. Baker again emphasized the U.S.
readiness to offer help in destroying already existing
reserves of nuclear and chemical weapons and in their
transportation and storage. [passage omitted]

'Specific' Arms Cuts Proposals Viewed

924P0090A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Feb 92 p 2

[Report by Lena Bereznitskaya: "Arms Reductions Are Not a Numbers Game, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker Believes"]

[Excerpt] James Baker's tour of the Commonwealth of Independent States concluded yesterday. In the morning the U.S. secretary of state had talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. Questions of reducing nuclear arsenals were discussed in development of the Russian president's far-reaching proposals. At a joint news conference upon the conclusion of the negotiations Andrey Kozyrev said that a principal achievement of their dealings with Baker had been the agreement to conduct business such as to avoid protracted perennial negotiations, which had previously frequently been reduced to a prolongation of solutions. Contacts at foreign minister level will be used to this end in order that the presidents of Russia and the United States might by the end of this July even have made decisive progress on disarmament issues and have signed definitive documents. Problems of elimination and shipment and the possibility of the use of the material remaining after elimination were discussed at the negotiations. The American side made several specific proposals on this subject. There will be further study with the participation of the international technology center for supporting nuclear scientists of the former USSR, a decision on its creation was adopted on 17 February, in a trilateral statement by the United States, Germany, and Russia. Andrey Kozyrev observed that he was struck by the proximity of the quantitative indicators which the parties intended to reach in a reduction in nuclear arms. It is at the present time a question of 2,500.

"The question of an arms reduction cannot be a numbers game," James Baker said. "We are looking at a sharp reduction in nuclear arms, and the level of those remaining will be considerably lower than envisaged by the START Treaty."

As far as Boris Yeltsin's statement on a retargeting of Russian nuclear missiles, which caused a stir, is concerned, James Baker "understands the importance of this political statement and supports the spirit behind it." But on a practical level this presents big problems such as, for example, monitoring of the retargeting.

Both Baker and Kozyrev gave a reminder on several occasions that at the latest negotiations it was questions more of a technical nature, not political, which were discussed. Both realize that agreement will not be reached immediately and that friendly relations do not mean oversimplification, but, in any event, deep cuts in nuclear arms will be made. They will have a further opportunity to work on this at a meeting in the first half of March. [passage omitted]

Missile Development Projects Canceled Due to Initiatives

OW1902221692 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1848 GMT 19 Feb 92

[From the 20 February "Business Report"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In accordance with a new program for reducing strategic nuclear forces, Russia's military-industrial complex will cancel most projects for developing new strategic nuclear weapon systems and modernizing old ones. Russia will continue to develop only two missile systems in 1992-93: the SS-18 Satan heavy strategic carrier and the new SS-25 Sickle long-range mobile missile. Businesses and scientific research centers in the Russian military-industrial complex will have to stop work on the new SS-X-26 missile and the modernized AS-17 air-based cruise missile.

The SS-18 strategic intercontinental missile, which was first added to the Soviet military arsenal in the late 1960's, is still the cornerstone of the former USSR's nuclear military forces. The SS-18 is capable of carrying up to 10 separately-targeted military warheads (based on the MIRV [multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle] system), each having 100-300 kiloton potential. Information provided by specialists from the military-industrial complex reveals that this missile system must undergo thorough modernization, including the development of new launch mounts, engine modifications to reduce delivery time, and modernized electronic components for the targeting system. A new ABM [anti-ballistic missile] hardened warhead will also be developed. Experts feel that the project could take ten years and 18-25 billion rubles (at 1992 value) to complete.

The SS-25 missile system, analagous to the U.S. Midetman, was developed in the mid-1970's. The Soviet system is noted for the fact that it is completely ready for mass production, while in 1990 the American system was still in the testing stages. The SS-25 system has hardened monoblock warheads based on trucks and railroad cars. Project developers project production of 200-300 SS-25's at the "Energy" military factories and perhaps at the Votkinsk factory, which used to produce SS-20's. Total cost for development and production of the navigation components was not disclosed.

Proximity of U.S., Russian Arms Cuts Assessed

PM1902124192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Feb 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 5

[Report by Vladimir Mikheyev and Kim Smirnov: "Russia-United States: Agreement Being Reached More Quickly, Disagreements Being Formulated More Clearly. Search Is On for Acceptable 'Low Levels' With Regard to Nuclear Warheads. International Scientific Research Center Being Set Up To Support Scientists of Former USSR"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker's two-day talks in Moscow were a gratifying manifestation of a new level of mutual understanding between the partners. At a joint news conference on 17 February Boris Yeltsin noted the proximity of the U.S. and Russian positions on the question of reducing strategic offensive arms. But "insignificant disagreements" remained. Which ones precisely?

At the recent Camp David meeting between the Russian and U.S. Presidents, George Bush did not rule out the possibility of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, further to his proposed level of 4,700 warheads. Russia advanced a counterproposal at that time—to lower the ceiling to 2,500 warheads. I will remind you that, according to data published by AP, the former Soviet Union has between 10,000 and 12,000 strategic warheads and 17,000 warheads on tactical delivery systems. The United States has 12,000 and 9,000 respectively. However, the Americans are prevented from cutting their arsenal to the Russian ceilings by the fact that "in this case the nuclear systems on submarines, with regard to which the United States has a clear advantage, will be affected" (AP).

Nevertheless, each side has already taken several steps toward the other. Russia has announced the ending of the production of its Tu-160 and Tu-95MS strategic bombers. The U.S. has promised to halt the assembly line for the B-2 strategic bomber.

The stumbling block today, according to REUTERS, is the formula for reducing strategic arms, according to which Russia will have to destroy its ground-launched heavy missiles with MIRV's—SS-18 missiles, in particular—while the U.S. will retain its superiority in terms of SLBM's.

There is not yet any evidence that the sides have managed to reach a mutual understanding on President B. Yeltsin's proposal to involve Russia in the creation of a global security system presupposing active participation in what has been called "global protection against limited (missile) strikes." In fact, Washington's acceptance of the idea of a partnership with Moscow in implementing the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program would signify the weightiest and most specific contribution to implementing the Camp David declaration, which speaks of the two countries' desire "not to regard each other as potential partners" [as published] and to build relations on a basis of friendship, partnership, and trust.

One of the undoubted successes of the Moscow talks was the decision to set up an international scientific and technical center to support scientists and specialists of the former USSR. Its founding fathers are simultaneously the U.S., Russia, and Germany.

The international center is still at the planning and design stage. It will require major capital investment. A final estimate of the costs has not been determined. Nevertheless, it is known that the United States is

allocating \$25 million. It will also be possible to take advantage of a subsidy of \$400 million approved by the U.S. Congress last year—these funds are earmarked to assist the former Soviet Union to destroy its nuclear arsenals. Germany, according to a statement by its embassy in Moscow, intends to enlist broad support for this project in the EC. According to preliminary data, the so-called technical aid fund totaling 50 million ECUs (\$65 million) will be at the disposal of the center's creators.

Yevgeniy Velikhov, adviser to the Russian president, has reported that the international center will be located in the city of Troitsk, 32 km southwest of Moscow. Branches will be opened in Arzamas and Chelyabinsk.

How will the work of the new international scientific and technical center be organized?

Reply from Vyacheslav Pismennyy, director of Troitsk Institute of Innovative and Thermonuclear Research and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences:

"Our institute is being proposed as the center's base, for it has accumulated considerable scientific potential, has created a modern infrastructure, and has experience in organizing large-scale scientific and technical developments in the sphere of high technologies such as controlled thermonuclear fusion, laser physics and technology, magnetohydrodynamic power generators, and others. We have close links with the I.V. Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute and other scientific centers of the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Power—the VNIIEF [expansion unknown] (Arzamas-16) and the VNIITF [expansion unknown] (Chelyabinsk-70)—and we also have good contacts at all levels with U.S. and German national laboratories.

"According to our ideas, the center, whose founders are the governments of the Russian Federation, the United States, and the FRG, will be headed by a council which will draw up scientific research programs on the basis of proposals from participating institutes on the Russian, U.S., and German sides. These programs could include nuclear sources of energy and nuclear safety; promising technologies and new materials; interaction between energy flows and matter; controlled thermonuclear fusion, and others. Current management of the center's activity will be implemented by a board through the directors of the corresponding programs."

General on Combat Readiness of Strategic Forces

*LD2502221592 Moscow Programma Radio Odin
Network in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Feb 92*

[Report on interview with Major General Aleksandr Gribov by "Novaya Volna" commentator Kim Kukholev; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] Some of the most burning questions today that require immediate resolution are those of war and peace, or more plainly, of the fate of our Armed Forces, their reform, and everything that is connected with the life of the Army and Navy. After all, millions of people are behind them. Behind them are also mighty weapons and immense material expenditures which fall on the shoulders of the people.

Not only politicians but everyone who is not indifferent to what will happen to us tomorrow, has understood: One should no longer experiment with the Army, just as one should not fail to introduce a certain clarity in its legal status, role and destiny, the more so if one speaks of the main force of the Army, its strategic missile forces. I have just returned from a military camp where missile men live and serve, who are called upon in the line of duty to tackle these very strategic tasks. Listen to what I discussed with their commander, Major General Aleksandr Viktorovich Gribov.

[Begin recording] [Kukholev] Aleksandr Viktorovich, can it be said that the drawing up and implementation of a single, agreed military doctrine and nuclear strategy of the states of the Commonwealth on the basis of the well-known concept of collective security, is what military people want or desire?

[Gribov] You have asked the question in a somewhat unusual way. Indeed, military people want some stability in military affairs. It is my view, that, after all everyone should do his own job, work as a professional, with understanding, be able to analyse things. In my view our present day politicians do not fully possess this ability of getting to the bottom of military affairs, something which the Army suffers from in the first place.

That is why it is my view that it would be desirable to make it possible for the military people to work out their own concept, to subsequently analyze it in depth, so as to be able to prove it to our politicians and to have it adopted. So far a process that is diametrically different has been under way.

[Kukholev] Do you think that this opportunity of working out one's own concept should come from politicians?

[Gribov] Of course, this should be the case to a certain extent; that is to say, they should provide some sort of an outline of a framework within which the argument should be conducted. But they should not dictate their will, irrespective of their knowledge of the situation. So far, it is precisely this process that has been under way: They tell us that such and such ought to be the case. But when this begins to be implemented, it then turns out that things are far from what one wants them to be.

[Kukholev] I think I am right if I say that you calmed down when you learned the fact that strategic deterrence forces or strategic missile forces remained unified. Were you relieved?

[Gribov] I must say that I believed in our politicians having common sense and fortunately, I was not mistaken. I did not believe they could be divided because that was impossible—both organizationally and technically—impossible in every respect. Therefore, this news was not some kind of surprise which brought great relief. Yes, it is good that it has come to that, but now this should be backed by concrete deeds. True, we now have single strategic deterrence forces on paper. That is, each soldier, regardless of what independent state he has been drafted from, must serve with us honestly and conscientiously. But [word indistinct] this is not the case and I cannot even guess when this will become a reality.

[Kukholev] Still one can, perhaps, say that strategic deterrence forces or strategic missile forces are the cementing base which unites all our Armed Forces.

[Gribov] Naturally, this is precisely the case, you have given a correct description of our type of armed forces. It is, indeed, the cornerstone on which I think our states' security is founded. In my view it is absolutely impermissible to denigrate this concept.

[Kukholev] This is clear. There is yet another issue I would like to discuss with you. Recently some of our politicians put forward such Russian initiatives as, for instance, to attain zero combat readiness. I have in mind the following: Andrey Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs, said in Geneva that Russia proposes to completely remove from alert duty the missiles of Russia, the United States and other nuclear powers targeted at each other and to attain the so-called zero readiness. It was stressed at the same time that the strategic missiles of CIS member states are still targeted at the United States.

Simultaneously a proposal was made to the effect that the missiles and the nuclear warheads should be stored separately, that is, that the charges and their carriers should be kept at a fairly large distance from each other. In our foreign affairs minister's view, this would give guarantees against unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons. I have the following question to ask you as a military man: Your forces, the strategic missile forces are a weapon of retaliation, so to speak, which should be triggered immediately after a possible attack on our country. If these missiles and nuclear warheads are situated far from each other, what kind of a retaliatory weapon is this?

[Gribov] Well, I believe that this talk about zero readiness is not professional, in my view. This could be in a way acceptable for tactical weapons: Here is a gun and a shell, they could be separated and then quickly brought together. But to disconnect heads from our missiles, say, and to store them separately in present day conditions, in the conditions that have taken shape in our independent countries, I believe, will lead to complete loss of combat readiness. One should not make a secret of the fact that the attitude of officers and other servicemen to performing their duty has deteriorated. This is quite a natural reaction to the situation that has taken shape.

In addition, if troops are put in such conditions we will lose the guarantee of being able to deliver any retaliatory strike at all. This is my opinion and, I believe, it is not something said off the cuff. I have thought about this subject more than once and, in my view, in no way should we agree to that.

[Kukholev] I even get the feeling that in certain circumstances your formation could turn into toy soldiers [potesnyy polk].

[Gribov] Perhaps that is so, because if the troops do not have any combat training, if there is no precise combat duty of that kind, what commander can guarantee that if the need arise they will carry out the task? One has to train constantly in order to carry out a particular task. Under the conditions of the missile troops this applies more than in any other area. We hold exercises, we do not hold launches. We carry out training; again we have no combat usage. If on top of this you remove this permanent duty, if you remove this permanent readiness, then it is totally unclear. I simply cannot predict what it might lead to. But one thing I can say firmly: It will not lead to anything good. [passage omitted]

China 'In Effect' Rejects Yeltsin Proposals

LD2102123192 Moscow TASS in English 1201 GMT
21 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Andrey Kirillov and Sergey Sorokin]

[Text] Beijing February 21 TASS—China has in effect rejected Russia's recent proposal on nuclear disarmament. Asked to comment on Russia's initiative that five nuclear powers remove strategic missiles from combat duty and store warheads and boosters separately, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that China unflinchingly supports the banning and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. At the same time, he said, "two nuclear powers, which have the largest and the most advanced nuclear arsenals" bear a special responsibility and have special duties.

In effect, the remark reflects China's old position on nuclear disarmament. Previously Chinese diplomats said that China will begin reducing its nuclear weapons only after the United States and Russia (as the successor of the USSR in nuclear weapons) bring their arsenals down to China's level.

China, the Foreign Ministry spokesman reminded, has "unilaterally" pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

"We have also vowed not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states and nuclear-free regions," he said.

China has had nuclear weapons since 1964, when Chinese specialists exploded the first nuclear device. The exact number of Chinese nuclear weapons remains a closely-guarded secret.

U.S.-Russian 'New Relationship' in Disarmament Viewed

LD2702101692 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 25 Feb 92

[Text] American Secretary of State Mr. James Baker, speaking to Congress in the wake of his recent talk in Moscow, has said the United States and Russia embarked on a new partnership in the security area—a view which is also shared by Moscow. Commentator Yuriy Solton writes the following:

Although bogged down in deep crisis, Russia is really keen to see there is international stability with civilized values gaining ground everywhere. It has now flung the door open to all countries, but is greatly preoccupied with building up relations with Washington because of the impact these tend to make on international security as a whole.

The two countries have already laid down the groundwork for normal contacts which are improving by the day particularly in the disarmament area. Moscow and Washington are both busy coordinating moves aimed at implementing nuclear initiatives by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin.

The two sides, who narrowed differences during Mr. Baker's visit to Moscow, are due to meet again next month to define their final positions.

The disarmament process itself is meanwhile in progress with Russia and the United States announcing an end to the production of strategic bombers. Hundreds of strategic missiles were taken off combat duty with the remainder put on zero alert, which means they will no longer be targeted on each other's vital centers. The two countries' decision to create a worldwide ABM system must be seen as a high degree of confidence now established between Moscow and Washington.

Away from trying to portray things in brighter colours, there are quite a few people on both sides who continue to stick to the policy of muscle flexing and confrontation. The American Defense Department has come up with a number of scenarios of possible conflict with Russia—nothing short of a nuclear war—although the two countries do no longer see each other as potential adversaries. In Russia itself there is a strong mood for a reversal to imperial thinking. The former Communist daily PRAVDA now expressing the views of the hardliners, who once dreamt of seeing the world in red alone peddles out the bogey of a breakup of the country's defenses and the prospect of being conquered by the Yankees, who continue to preach a strength policy.

Such views cannot be brushed aside easily. But then the process of a new partnership which is expected to turn into a full-blown friendly relations as stated by Camp David declaration by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin is gathering pace. This in itself is having a good effect on the international environment as a whole.

GENERAL

Plutonium Plant Begins Conversion Process

*LD2502054292 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2034 GMT 22 Feb 92*

[Report by correspondent Mikhail Sorokin; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The production of television parts has begun at one of our largest plants for producing plutonium for nuclear bombs. The K-26 underground factory, near Krasnoyarsk, is so secret that that small town—with a population of 100,000—cannot be found on any map. The main structure comprises three reactors which manufacture plutonium for 1,000 bombs; however, now, under the conditions of arms cuts, the factory has been obliged to turn its attention to transferring its industry along peaceful lines.

Commentary on Strategic Goal of Nonnuclear World

*LD2502034492 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1510 GMT 24 Feb 92*

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] The territory of what used to be the USSR will not become the source of nuclear destabilization in the world. This is the underlying idea of President Boris Yeltsin's interview for the daily IZVESTIYA in which he spelled out the principles of Russia's nuclear policy. The following commentary was contributed by Yuriy Solton:

A great evil is how Boris Yeltsin described the birth of the first nuclear bomb. Of course, it played a certain stabilizing role, but in the following decades mankind had to spend plenty of energy and means to protect itself from the weapons of mass destruction it had created. Boris Yeltsin would have been happy to see such weapons completely liquidated during his lifetime, but, as he himself acknowledged, it still remains a dream nowadays. Nevertheless, Russia's strategic goal is a non-nuclear world. Does that mean that the Russian leadership is going to destroy completely all nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union? Regrettably, the end of the East-West confrontation and the abandoning of the doctrines dividing the world into two systems has failed, so far, to provide universal security. A nuclear conflict either by ill will or accident is not excluded, given the unwillingness of nuclear powers to fully give up this kind of weapons. About two dozen of other countries are still cherishing nuclear ambitions. Under such circumstances, Russia is for nuclear disarmament but only on a parity basis. Reality does not require to have such a huge amount of nuclear arsenals accumulated by now. Aware of the fact, the American and Russian presidents launched reciprocal initiatives on nuclear disarmament last month. Despite the existing differences about when, how, and how many nuclear warheads are to be

destroyed, their positions become much closer following the United States Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Moscow. A greater coordination of efforts is expected during the forthcoming talks in March. Meanwhile, the process of denuclearization has actually got underway. In his interview, Boris Yeltsin again stressed that Russia would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is now retargeting its nuclear missiles formerly aimed at the cities and important facilities in the countries that used to be regarded as potential enemies. Under a mutual agreement with the United States, they will have a zero flight mission. Boris Yeltsin dismissed speculations carried by some of the media that Russia could pull the nuclear lever in its relations with other former Soviet Republics. He described such statements as blasphemous and insulting, saying that it was simply impossible to use nuclear weapons without the knowledge of any single nuclear republic. Strategic nuclear forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States are an independent formation, loyal to the supreme commander, who in turn obeys the council of the heads of independent states. Having the rank of colonel himself, Boris Yeltsin is not a commander in chief, since Russia has no independent army of its own. It is true that the new nuclear policy is not unanimously supported in Russia and in other member countries of the Commonwealth. It will apparently take much time before it is generally understood that a policy of goodwill suits the Commonwealth's interests much better than the policy from the position of strength.

Yeltsin Criticized on Missile Targeting, Combat Readiness

*MK2802070092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Feb 92 p 4*

[Article by Vladimir Belous: "Security: Political Rhetoric and Common Sense. How Andrey Kozyrev 'Corrected' President's Statement"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] As promised, we are continuing our examination of Russia's disarmament initiatives. This time our author analyzes the problem of retargeting missiles.

As you know, stationary (in silos), and mobile (rail-mobile and off-road) ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of launching roughly 65 percent of the nuclear warheads in the arsenal at one time form the basis of CIS strategic nuclear might. Roughly 25 percent of the nuclear warheads are sited on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the rest of the warheads [boyezaryady] are sited on strategic bombers. This structure for the strategic nuclear forces, along with the high standard of the former USSR's missile technology, were traditionally a "headache" for the West's top military-political leadership.

It is no coincidence that B.N. Yeltsin's unexpected announcement that the missiles were being retargeted brought the greatest response and the most conflicting

assessments from Western specialists. The chronology of events behind this initiative is extremely indicative not only from the military viewpoint, but also from the viewpoint of the decisionmaking process in Russia's upper echelons of power.

Shortly before leaving for the United States, the president gave an interview to ABC TV in which he said that Soviet nuclear missiles would shortly cease to be aimed at U.S. cities. This was an extremely peace-loving proposal at first glance. However, let us turn to history. In the sixties the United States formulated various scenarios for nuclear war. The main question to which Pentagon strategists sought an answer was: What should be the target of a nuclear attack—military installations, or major cities and industrial centers? New concepts were introduced into the political lexicon: "counterforce" and "counterassets" [protivotsennostnyy] attack. The first term signified attacking USSR strategic nuclear forces and centers of state and military management. Naturally, these operations only made sense in the event of a sudden first strike against the potential adversary since, if the enemy himself inflicts the first strike, there is no point in aiming your missiles at empty silos. A "counterassets" attack envisaged a nuclear attack on major cities, inflicting "unacceptable damage" on the enemy. This accorded best with the "deterrence" policy, clearly barbaric though it was. It is now acknowledged that nuclear weapons cannot be a weapon of war, that their main function is to deter by threat of retribution.

So, having studied B.N. Yeltsin's statement about retargeting missiles, military specialists immediately expressed perplexity that boiled down to a direct question: Where are they to be retargeted?

It is no coincidence that the first announcement of the missile retargeting caused concern in Western Europe, Japan, certain Third World states, and...even within the CIS. A missile on combat alert must have a specific flight program in its control system's memory. Eight flight programs for various targets are recorded, for instance, in the Minuteman-3 missile's onboard computer. The missile is given a command indicating the specific program immediately prior to launch. If missiles are aimed at military installations, that means a greater probability of delivering a first strike.

The complexity of the problem lies in the fact that it is extremely difficult to verify [kontrol] retargeting.

The Russian president's 29 January statement provides a somewhat different reading [redaktsiya] of the proposals to retarget missiles. It makes provision for the two countries to stop aiming their combat systems at one another's territory. It indicates that these radical changes will take place after the planned cut in strategic offensive arms. Consequently, the question will take several years to resolve in practical terms.

The commander in chief of the CIS joint forces shed some light on this. Answering a question from a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov said that missiles taken off combat alert were no longer aimed anywhere, while the rest were aimed at their former targets. He added here that Yeltsin's statement was of a political nature and that it would take some time for it to be put into effect.

The statement made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on 12 February in Geneva marked the next phase in developing the idea of retargeting the missiles. He confirmed that the missiles remaining on combat alert are still aimed at the United States (just as U.S. missiles are aimed at us). Not limiting himself to an explanation, Kozyrev made two new proposals supplementing the Russian president's initiatives.

First: that all missiles belonging to Russia, the United States, and other nuclear powers that are targeted on one another be taken off combat alert. Second: that nuclear warheads be removed from all missiles and stored separately, thus reducing the risk of unauthorized actions or accidental launch.

The question is bound to arise: If the second proposal is put into effect, what will remain of the first? After all, removing warheads means a lower level of combat readiness than simply taking missiles off combat alert. Moreover, it is necessary to draw attention to two aspects of these proposals—the military-political, and the technical.

Top U.S. politicians and military men make no secret of their conviction that it is precisely the U.S. policy of military strength that has averted world war three, secured victory in the "cold war", and brought about the breakup of the USSR, the revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the collapse of Communism. We can predict in advance that the United States will not agree to remove and store missile warheads.

If you consider the technical aspects of this matter, it becomes clear that this proposal is simply unfeasible in the near future. Hundreds of warheads would have to be removed and stored at every missile base, particularly from multiple-warhead missiles. Special underground stores would have to be set up to store these warheads. Every store would cost tens of millions, and they would take several years to build. No provision is made for the storage of hundreds of warheads at U.S. missile bases either.

As for the proposal for missiles to be removed from submarines and for missile carriers to be permanently based in their ports of registration, the United States is unlikely to take that idea seriously. After all, roughly 50 percent of its nuclear warheads are sited on submarines, and the naval component of the "triad" is the basis of U.S. nuclear might.

As we know, "the courtier likes to play at being king," and I must say with regret that of late—and not for the

first time—the “courtiers” have been “standing in” for their president. The authors of the raw, ill-considered proposals remain in the shadows. How can one fail to remember J. Kennedy’s witty statement about these situations: “Victory always has many parents, defeat is generally an orphan. Although the president’s statement cannot be described as a defeat, I cannot remember another case of a USSR foreign policy action provoking so many false rumors and critical comments. Time will tell whether we draw the proper conclusions from this.

Paper Reports From Former Closed Nuclear City Arzamas-16

*PM0303124392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Anatoliy Yershov report under “Events and Comments” rubric: “Closed City of ‘Arzamas-16’”]

[Text] You will not find the city of “Arzamas-16” even on the most recent maps, although it is now talked about it openly, written about in the newspapers, and shown on television.

Previously known as the military installation N. and then as the city of Kremlev, “Arzamas-16” arose in 1947 on the site of the ancient Sarovskiy monastery to become one of the nuclear centers where state-of-the-art weapons have been made for decades. The choice of site was not accidental—it is around 200 km to the oblast center, and there is dense woodland all around. The city is still surrounded by barbed wire on all sides as well as a patrolled security strip—the only possible access is by special permit through a checkpoint. Because of the secrecy, for many years the city’s inhabitants could not go off on vacation and received several months’ salary by way of compensation.

But times are changing—now, instead of the former “Moscow” supply, there are the coupons for food and industrial goods that everyone else has become accustomed to. Admittedly, the city has its special features—its own airfield, from which airplanes fly to Moscow every day, and there is a railroad...

“The most brilliant scientific minds were brought together to create the first nuclear bomb,” V. Belugin, director of the Experimental Physics Science and Research Institute, said. “Later we were involved in the improvement of nuclear weapons. Academician Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov worked here for nearly 20 years, and Academician Yuliy Borisovich Khariton, three times hero of socialist labor, is still the center’s scientific head.”

Of course, the director said, because of conversion we are not now experiencing times that are any better—orders for “defense output” have fallen sharply. Therefore we are “branching out” in various scientific directions, including applied sciences connected with the needs of the national economy. The high scientific level of our cadres involved in various “civilian” orders is

being confirmed for the umpteenth time. A great deal of diagnostic and treatment equipment has been designed for the medical world, including what is known as an antiburns bed, which helps relieve the suffering of patients with extensive burns, and many other things.

As far as the radiation situation in the city is concerned, this is monitored within a radius of 70 km, and the background contamination is no higher than the normal natural level. Although during the past few years residential areas have been located practically in the middle of the leading workshops. In that respect it appears expedient to keep the city closed, its specialists believe. Admittedly, some time ago some American specialists visited the city...

Around 40,000 skilled scientists, engineers, workers, doctors, and teachers, all committed to their work, are employed in “Arzamas-16.” But particularly heavy burdens are being placed on the city’s inhabitants today. The threat of a “brain drain” really does arise when scientists who have to some degree mastered the technology of making a nuclear bomb might be invited by some other state.

V. Takoyev, chairman of the “Arzamas-16” City Soviet, said in conversation that he once sent the Russian president a special note expressing alarm at the sector’s present position, including vis-a-vis the scientists’ salaries.

START TALKS

Ukraine Urges CIS Equal Participation in Talks

Kravchuk Proposal Noted

*PM2402152192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Feb 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 7*

[Report by Vladimir Mikheyev: “Ukraine Believes That CIS Nuclear Republics Must Participate in Disarmament Talks on Equal Terms”]

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has advanced a proposal that all four republics of the former USSR on whose territory nuclear weapons are located should participate on equal terms in arms reduction talks with the United States. At the first stage, the leaders of these four republics must sit at the negotiating table with G. Bush, and at the second stage they can be joined by the leaders of other nuclear powers. The point is, according to L. Kravchuk, that Russian President Boris Yeltsin is not empowered to speak on behalf of all four—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

REUTER has reported from Kiev that the Ukrainian president declared the following: “Boris Yeltsin said at his meeting with President Bush that he is reducing the strategic nuclear forces. I would like to comment: You can only reduce the forces which you possess. If he was speaking of the strategic nuclear forces of the whole

Commonwealth, he has not received such a mandate from us." At the same time L. Kravchuk repeated that he is a champion of nuclear disarmament, and Ukraine intends to become a nuclear-free power by 1994. On Wednesday [19 February] the Ukrainian president addressed a briefing for foreign journalists, to which, in addition to them, correspondents of the Ukrainian Information Bureau, television, and radio were invited.

According to REUTER, the discontent was sparked off by the disarmament initiative announced by B. Yeltsin during his U.S. trip. Kiev deemed it incorrect that the Russian president had not consulted Ukraine beforehand. No reaction to the Ukrainian president's statement has yet been forthcoming from Washington, but "Western states might not accept the new formula if they consider that it undermines the principle of a single joint command of the Commonwealth's nuclear forces," REUTER points out.

Another option is also possible. Under certain circumstances the United States might be favorably inclined toward the "four plus one" formula, as evidenced by the course of the hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress. Serious objections were raised during the examination of the question of ratifying the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms of the USSR and the United States, signed by G. Bush and M. Gorbachev last year. First, the ceiling proposed then of 9,000 nuclear warheads for each of the sides pales in comparison with the level now being discussed of 4,700 or 2,500 warheads. Second, in the opinion of Lieutenant General W. Odom, former head of the National Security Agency, Russia will hardly be able to afford to equip its strategic forces to such a degree. More and more voices are being heard in favor of new talks on strategic offensive arms, this time with all the nuclear republics of the former USSR.

What makes it possible to view the prospect of the four republics' joint participation in disarmament talks as perfectly realistic even tomorrow? Yuriy Nazarkin, the Russian Foreign Ministry's ambassador for special assignments, who headed our delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms, answered IZVESTIYA's question by telephone:

"A procedure for fulfilling the terms of the agreement on reducing strategic offensive arms is being worked out at the meetings of experts of the four nuclear republics held in Minsk and Moscow. We believe that the final document will be signed by the presidents. It is my opinion that, by proceeding from these accords, it will be possible in the future to model the participation of all four republics in multilateral talks. At the same time it is necessary, first, to settle questions of compliance with the agreements in principle reached in Minsk with regard to strategic arms. It is important to respect the status of the strategic forces within the framework of the Commonwealth. Otherwise it will be hard to nourish hopes of the republics' effective and concerted participation in talks with the United States."

Replying to IZVESTIYA's question about the reasons behind L. Kravchuk's statement, Vladimir Shlyaposhnikov, the Ukrainian president's press secretary, drew attention to the following:

"It must not be forgotten that the Ukrainian president has welcomed and is prepared to welcome any steps aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament. This applies to Boris Yeltsin's initiative too. At the same time we were perplexed by not having been warned in advance. Leonid Kravchuk has repeatedly expressed his firm position: All actions which affect the interests of the CIS as a whole must be concerted. The Commonwealth is still young, and a natural process of accustomation is taking place. It is gratifying that the foundations are already being laid for effective cooperation within the Commonwealth. This also applies to meetings of experts in the strategic arms sphere. If the foundations of such cooperation are laid, all will be in order."

U.S. Response Called 'Evasive'

PM2602123092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Vladimir Mikheyev: "Washington Responds Evasively to Kiev's Proposal"]

[Text] Washington has given a highly glib and evasive reply to Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk's proposal that all four nuclear republics of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] take part on equal terms in disarmament talks.

A White House spokesman stated: We are in contact with all four states—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—on the question of the ratification and fulfillment of the agreement on strategic offensive arms concluded between the United States and the USSR. As we examine the question of further strategic arms reductions we will continue dialogue with those four countries.

The logical conclusion is that to be "in contact" is not a very binding concept. Although if necessary this polite diplomatic formula could also cover an accord on expanding the number of direct participants in the nuclear disarmament talks. Washington nevertheless remains true to its tactics of making haste slowly. The reason for this is the high level of uncertainty both regarding the rules of communal life developing within the Commonwealth and regarding unified command of the CIS strategic armed forces and the characteristics of the four sovereign states' nuclear policy.

However, it is not only Washington which is experiencing a shortage of information on and understanding of the processes taking place within the CIS. As Ronald Lehman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has stated, at the recent talks in Moscow with Secretary of State Baker the Russian leadership sought a detailed clarification of whether G. Bush's initiative contained any hidden snags. We would recall that the U.S. President proposed the destruction of

all land-based strategic missiles with MIRVed warheads and the reduction by one-third of the number of those missiles on board submarines on condition that Russia agrees to scrap all its land-based strategic missiles with multiple warheads [mnogozaryadnyy].

Moscow's concern stemmed from the obvious fact not concealed by the Americans that the bulk of Russia's strategic potential consists of land-based missiles whereas for the Americans it is sea-launched missiles. According to the figures of Robert Norris, an expert from the Council for the Protection of Natural Resources, the White House is not trying to avoid strategic parity and Bush's proposal would still leave Russia with 2,320 warheads on sea-launched missiles, the United States with 2,350.

You can go on indefinitely finding arguments against such a manifestation of the "cold war" spirit as nuclear parity. The old desire to be equal to the "potential enemy" across the whole range of weapons of mass destruction in the new conditions seems an absurd anachronism even though initially it inspired a sense of security. What is indisputable is the fact that parity had a deterrent effect. The notorious "balance of fear" created a kind of confidence. Where is that confidence to come from today?

Three burdens have been placed on the fragile and incipient partnership between Russia and the United States. First, there was the incident in the Barents Sea when a U.S. submarine entered Russian territorial waters. Second, there have been reports on "restructuring" in the CIA—it is increasing its agent network abroad, hiring middle-ranking commercial managers (the "HUMINT in the Nineties" program), and placing them with the tacit permission of their directors in branches of transnational corporations in various parts of the world with special interest in the CIS. Third, there is the unrelenting uproar over the Pentagon's secret scenarios which in the event of war "on the Lithuanian front" envisage the blockading of the Russian fleet "in the eastern Baltic" and regard Russia itself as a "potentially serious threat to U.S. interests" until the end of the century.

It must be stated that mutual understanding on the general issues does not preclude misunderstanding on the particulars. I would like to think that this is a relapse of "cold war" thinking which does not reflect the general tendency toward trust and partnership.

Strategic Rocket Forces Personnel on Future

*PM2502145192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 23 Feb 92*

[Report over video by presenter Yevgeniy Kiselev; from the "Itogi" newscast]

[Text] [Kiselev] Tell me, where in Russia can you find well tended roads, and what is more in winter, and what is more in the Nonchernozem Zone far from major

cities? But such roads do exist, as you can see. Near the inconspicuous small city of Teykovo in Ivanovo Oblast for example, where a division of the strategic rocket forces is stationed. The roads are tended by the rocket forces. Their weapons are mobile strategic missiles. They can be launched from anywhere—from the unit's territory, the forest, or the road. The missile's technical and combat specifications, including even its name, are top secret. In the West this missile has been dubbed the SS-25. They do not have a weapon like this over there. You may look at this marvel of technology and take pride in our scientists and military, in our whole country, the former Soviet Union, which created it.

I can tell you that this missile could at any moment, on the orders from the president alone, deal a lethal blow to anyone who might dare to attack us. I can also tell you that if trolleybus wheels were fitted to this missile, the wages of the driver of this military vehicle would have to increase severalfold to match the wages of a trolleybus drivers.

It is these officers who mount alert duty. It is they who would operate the button if the order from the president came.

[Guards Senior Lieutenant Popov] What more can I say about the disintegration of our Army? Speaking for myself, it has become so bad that one is ashamed to admit, in a casual conversation in a bus or train for example, to being an officer. There used to be such a thing as duty and honor, but now, duty to whom? I honestly do not know to whom, and what kind of duty. Or take honor. How can we talk of honor if people spit when walking past an officer?

My acquaintances and friends simply laugh at me if I describe my situation, if I tell them how much I earn and how I live. They find it simply laughable. I do not know about others; others may think differently. But I am told at every step to pack it in, to leave the Army because here.... [changes thought] People are telling me: "Your Army is finished." It is hard to disagree; I can only say that the one thing that remains sacrosanct here in the rocket forces is alert duty.

[Kiselev] But the alert duty, the only thing that remains sacrosanct, is costing officers money. It appears that a specific amount of money is deducted from their pay for food which they consume while on alert duty. And so officers who do not do alert duty are better off. The problem is not confined to money, to wages, although this is not negligible, you will agree, especially today.

The main question facing them today is: "Who needs all this? Who needs the missiles, the nuclear warheads, and so on?" Is it they, the officers, or their fatherland? The disarmament process seems to be very difficult to implement. Premier Gaydar has said that the nuclear warheads will simply be removed from the missiles. But the

rocket forces men are asking: But where are we to store them? Industry is not ready to handle their destruction. And you cannot simply dump the nuclear goods under a pine tree. The haste with which politicians are acting worries and discourages them.

[Guards Major General V. Cherenov] The first and perhaps the most important problem is against whom are we now to defend our people and our state? The latest remarks by our president, stating that the United States is our friend, have abolished a whole series of our military doctrine tenets. We have received no clarifications as to what should replace them as regards our military labor. This question needs to be addressed in the very near future.

U.S. Funds Considered in Dismantling Warheads

LD2602210892 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to Western estimates, we will very soon have to destroy some 15,000 nuclear warheads as part of the planned arms reduction. The work is already in progress. However, in order to realize the whole program, quite a few difficult problems have to be solved. Here with the details is our commentator Mikhail Osokin.

[Osokin] [Video shows uniformed men examining and handling missiles; aircraft in flight; missile silo; U.S. installation captioned "Reporting: Roger O'Neil, Grand Forks, N.D."] The removal of nuclear warheads from military units to storage depots appears to be the most vulnerable and dangerous part of the process of dismantling such weapons. But, in fact, it is at this stage that there are the fewest problems. According to our military men, the strictest security measures are provided. A crane loads no more than a single warhead on to each vehicle, and, before a second vehicle is allowed to set out, the first must have reached its destination. The crane is only switched on after the operator has keyed in a secret code. The loading place is surrounded by three lines of soldiers, with the lines, for greater security, being subordinate to different commanders.

Well, if one, nevertheless, supposes that a warhead is stolen in transit, the troops will immediately be able to determine where to look for it. They will track the signals coming from a special transmitter installed in every warhead container. In a word, the system for delivering the warheads to the storage depots is already well worked out. The main difficulties start later, at the final stage of the dismantling of the weapons, and here we should be helped by American experience of setting up special storage facilities and by American funds. The United States is allocating \$400 million, primarily to help with the building of facilities for the lengthy storage of radioactive material from dismantled warheads. During U.S. Secretary of State Baker's visit to Moscow, agreement

was reached on building a depot for the storage of plutonium. [video shows Baker leaving an aircraft; U.S. Congress scenes]

Incidentally, other ideas are being voiced in the United States about what the funds from the promised assistance should be used for. For instance, U.S. officials do not rule out the possibility of simply buying some of the nuclear missiles from us. [Video shows missile being transported on a huge vehicle.] By so doing, they reckon to speed up the process of reducing our arsenals, which have been an object of constant Western concern ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Idea of Global ABM System Critiqued

924P0098A Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 44, 25-31 Oct 91 p 9

[Article by Maj Gen (Res) V. S. Belous, Cand Tech Sci: "The 'Diamond Shield' is Unreliable: Discussion of Academician N. N. Moiseyev's Plan"]

[Text] The editor's office continues the discussion begun with publication of a letter written by Academician N. N. Moiseyev to the newspaper ZA RUBEZHOM (No 34 of this year).

We recall that the prominent Soviet scientist proposed an interesting conception containing a number of original ideas. The goal of this conception is to insure the possibility of eliminating the threat of nuclear war by creating a space-based security system with the participation of the nuclear powers and other countries under the auspices of the United Nations. The letter was published before the September initiatives of the USA and the USSR, directed at mutual reduction of nuclear arsenals, were made public. The resolve of the two countries to continue to work for elimination of the nuclear threat imparts even greater significance to the Soviet scientist's proposals.

The article "Let's Not Miss a Unique Opportunity!" by Academician N. Moiseyev raises a number of acute military and political problems associated with insuring international security. The ideas and conclusions it contains are ambiguous, and some of them are purely polemic in nature—it is precisely in this, in my opinion, that the main value of the article lies.

During the 40 years of cold war, the probability of its transformation into a hot war—a world nuclear war—was determined by the level of military confrontation between the USSR and the USA, and by the state of mutual relations between them. Today the situation is changing before our very eyes. George Bush's September proposals on further reductions of nuclear arsenals and M. S. Gorbachev's extremely positive response are within the mainstream of the positive processes of recent years that have already improved the international situation significantly. At the same time new "centers of

power" are appearing, and the role of Third World countries is increasing, which is significantly complicating the international situation and increasing its unpredictability. The risk of war is increasing under the conditions of the spread of nuclear, missile and other military technologies, and with aggravation of regional conflicts. At the same time the transition from rivalry to cooperation between the USSR and the USA creates a unique opportunity for ridding mankind of the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe.

N. N. Moiseyev focuses attention on the inseparable relationship between offensive and defensive armaments, which together form a single system of strategic weapons. The classical definition of one of the founders of systems analysis, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, is apropos: A system is a complex of interacting elements. Change in one of the components of this system—for example the defensive component—would transfer the entire system into a new state, and it may create military superiority for one side over the other. Therefore it is no accident that the American SDI program evoked serious concern in the USSR, and not only in the USSR, despite its proclaimed purely "defensive" nature. When it comes to the "defensive" purpose of SDI, a remark of F. Engels is apropos: Raising a shoe brush to the rank of a mammal won't cause it to sprout mammary glands.

The need for significant reductions of nuclear arsenals (of the offensive component) raises no doubts in either the West or the USSR. However, the following question arises: to what level? Is total nuclear disarmament possible in the foreseeable future?

Where Nuclear Mushrooms May Grow

Responding to these questions, let me note that political scientists and military specialists are presently leaning more and more to the opinion that without nuclear weapons the modern world, which is distinguished by instability and change, will be more unstable and explosive. The Persian Gulf War confirmed that weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, are being developed behind a tight veil of secrecy in some countries. And who knows, had the war started 2 or 3 years later, might nuclear mushrooms not have sprouted in the Near East? Such a possibility is confirmed by the fact that the simplest nuclear charges (for example the "gun" charge dropped on Hiroshima) may be designed without tests. The advent of a small quantity of nuclear weapons created underground in one of the "almost-nuclear" countries would not have serious military significance on the backdrop of the existence of arsenals in the nuclear powers (or in the hands of the United Nations). However, the advent of even a few nuclear devices in the hands of an adventurist regime in a nuclear-free world could create a decisive military advantage for it, one harboring serious consequences.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that mankind will ultimately attain total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons on the planet; however, this can happen

only if an effective system of collective security is created. The road to it will be long, and it will hardly be strewn with roses.

One of N. Moiseyev's main conclusions is that a zero level of nuclear armaments can be practically achieved on the condition that a "sophisticated collective (planet-wide) system by which to counteract (reduce the effectiveness of) attacking nuclear weapons" is created.

Let's try to analyze what is behind these highly promising advances. First, creation of such a planet-wide system would be possible only if a collective security system based on mutual trust and cooperation of countries within a United Nations framework exists.

But if such cooperation is in fact maintained, do we really need to create new forms of weapons, and spread the arms race into a natural sphere that has remained free of arms? Deployment of several thousand "diamond [brilliantovyye] pebbles" equipped with homing heads in space, as N. N. Moiseyev suggests in his letter to ZARUBEZHOM, would mean crossing the space "threshold," and it would become a fatal step with consequences that are hard to predict today.

We need to consider the danger of crating such a "diamond [brilliantovyy] shield" to world exploration of outer space. According to the predictions, the number of spacecrafts, orbiting stations, and reusable crafts launched into space will increase significantly by the end of the 20th Century. Can we guarantee the safety of space flight when thousands of hard to find, miniature self-contained interceptors are deployed in near-earth orbits? Who will guarantee that at some unpredictable moment an interceptor's infrared sensor will not issue a command to intercept a satellite or orbiting station? If we also consider the possibility of unauthorized interference in the work of an automated space-based ABM system with the goal of activating the "diamond pebbles," in the hands of the malicious such a system could become an ideal means of starting a war.

Second, such a global ABM system was initially intended for defense against a massed attack by Soviet missiles. The need for such a system is disappearing today, and it will, we hope, disappear completely in the future. The main threat of nuclear attack will originate from "almost-nuclear" countries and terrorists. Under these conditions countries that might be attacked have the possibility for restricting themselves to creating land-based antimissile force groupings equipped with detection and guidance resources. The Patriot missile system, which exhibited rather high effectiveness of interception—albeit of tactical missiles—and the similar Soviet ZRC-300 system could serve as analogues of such interceptors. It is no accident that in assessing the current situation, in early 1991 the U.S. administration announced a change in its plans regarding creation of an ABM system, and oriented itself on creation of a system

of defense against small-scale attacks. "I gave instructions to reorient the SDI program on providing protection against limited strikes by ballistic missiles, whosoever may launch them," declared George Bush. It is absolutely clear that the "young" nuclear countries and terrorists will be unable to make a massed attack, and that there is no need for a "dense" global ABM system.

Third, the project to create a planet-wide ABM system is evidence that solving the political problem of insuring international security by means of the latest military technology, or in other words, by means of an arms race, is once again being proposed. It seems that this path, which has already gone bankrupt several times, is fundamentally unacceptable. It will evoke a response from some states taking the form of improvement of their own offensive arms. These states will lay their hopes on attaining their political ends by means of military force. The duel between offensive and defensive weapons has always been and remains the internal driving force of arms development. Throughout the entire history of war, the advantage shifted successively from one side to the other, and as long as weapons exist, the dialectics of their development cannot be interrupted forever. And ultimately, effective means of surmounting the "diamond pebbles" will be found.

Fourth, we should turn attention to the fact that the proposed security system is to provide protection only against ballistic missiles. It would be absolutely useless in averting a nuclear attack employing other means of delivery. For example if someone were to load one or several nuclear bombs on a slightly modified civilian airplane and send it to the territory of some state, the "diamond shield" would simply not react to this threat. Another possible variant of nuclear blackmail was described more than 30 years ago by a prominent American physicist by the name of R. Lepp [transliteration]. Terrorists could secretly place a high-yield nuclear charge in a merchant vessel, sail it to a major port of some state, and make demands of a political or economic nature under the threat of an explosion.

In an Ordinary Suitcase

Miniaturization of modern nuclear devices creates the possibility for committing acts of terrorism by means of charges secretly delivered to a target in an ordinary suitcase. Naturally the "diamond" ABM system would be useless in all of these cases.

So what can we propose for defense against possible small-scale nuclear attacks or accidental launchings of single missiles, and airplanes carrying out nuclear terrorism? First of all, we would have to agree with N. Moiseyev regarding the suitability of creating a global space-based intelligence and reconnaissance system under the auspices of the United Nations. In the very near future, a combination of the national technical monitoring resources of the USSR and the USA could become its technical basis. Later on, space-based equipment for keeping other countries under observation can be "built

into" it. Ultimately it will transform into a planet-wide system for gathering and processing information that will be available to all members of the world community. Such openness will serve as a major stabilizing factor, it will reinforce trust, and it will restrain a potential aggressor from hostile actions. Nor is there any doubt that the information system could carry out ecological monitoring of the environment. This will help to pay for its creation and operation.

Such a system could supply current information to the Military Committee of the United Nations with the purpose of taking prompt steps to prevent aggressive actions on the part of certain countries.

For prompt warning of accidental or unsanctioned launchings of ICBM's, it would be suitable for scientists of the USSR, the USA and other countries to conduct joint research aimed at creating a system of sensors (acoustic, seismic, infrared) positioned in areas of missile deployment. They will replace (or supplement) the existing warning systems, which are highly unreliable. Such sensors could transmit signals indicating missile launchings through space-based relay stations. Although it would be a little more difficult, a similar system providing warning of submarine missile launchings could also be created.

We need to create a reliable system for monitoring nonproliferation of missile technology, and especially the technology of long-range missiles. In particular the first steps in this direction were taken in 1987, when the "Big Seven" issued a declaration on controlling missile technology. The USSR and a number of European states became parties to the declaration later on. The need has now come to impart a universal international nature to it under the United Nations, thus reliably blocking the slow spread of missile weapons over the planet.

Monitoring strict observance of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is even more important. We need to keep in mind in this case that control of fissionable materials, production of which is continually increasing, is a key factor of preventing their secret manufacture. According to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] data in 1985 the plutonium reserves accumulated by countries not possessing nuclear weapons totaled around 155 tons. A certain test conducted in the USA confirmed the possibility of creating a nuclear charge out of reactor plutonium without additional purification. The IAEA has significant experience in organizing control over nuclear production, and the task of the world community is to place all nuclear facilities in all countries under strict surveillance. If there is no uncontrolled production and misappropriation of fissionable materials, there is no threat of secret manufacture of nuclear charges. **It is easier to fight the root cause than its numerous effects.**

In expressing his opinion, the author of this article hardly believes that its content is the ultimate truth. He has presented his own views, which may be debatable in

nature, as a person who has dealt with the problems of disarmament and arms control.

Scientist Backs Global Early Warning System

924P0096A Moscow KURANTY in Russian
14 Feb 92 p 4

[Interview with Nikita Nikolayevich Moiseyev, mathematician and member of the International Academy of Astronautics, by Aleksandr Putko; place and date not given: "The Northern Hoop"]

[Text] B.N. Yeltsin's proposals for the creation of a global system of defense for the world community, and later his negotiations in France, are a very important stage on the path of partnership in preventing a nuclear war. But is it not too soon to rejoice? After all, for the time being the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack is by no means excluded. And in order to prevent it not only an agreement is necessary but also real actions. The "Northern Hoop" could become the first practical step.

This is the opinion of Academician Nikita Nikolayevich Moiseyev, a mathematician who has done a lot of work in the field of space programs. He was elected to the International Academy of Astronautics for trajectory calculations and a large contribution to the study of space vehicle dynamics.

Long before the current Russian initiatives at the state level, Nikita Nikolayevich proposed the idea of collective antinuclear defense based on a partnership between our country and the United States. Moreover, he discussed this idea with well-known American scientists.

"It pleased me to hear about the space initiative of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin," says Nikita Nikolayevich, "it shows that our politicians are beginning to think in the very same key in which engineers and scientists think and discuss problems on the use of space systems. But it would be even better if the experts and the consultants of the president knew about those discussions which our specialists have been conducting for a long time with our colleagues from the United States. Today, the establishment of a joint space information system is realistic. This is in our common interests, and it does not require the disclosure of top secret material. Such a system not only resolves many problems but is commercially profitable. Of course, at a certain stage—I am convinced of this—a police system of the "space umbrella" type will be required. But, nonetheless, this is a matter for the future, when there will be a need for the establishment of an international system of security against a possible nuclear strike.

[Putko] Of a theoretically possible one?

[Moiseyev] By no means. After all, it only seems that a relaxation of tensions has already arrived. Of course, very important steps have been taken. And, nevertheless—this may seem to be a paradox—the danger of a nuclear attack, in my opinion, is still growing. Judge for

yourself: Five nuclear powers officially exist now, but intensive development is going on in Pakistan, the UAR, Israel, Iran... In the opinion of specialists, a minimum of 12 countries will possess weapons of mass destruction in the near future. Where is the guarantee that they will not fall into the hands of some kind of extremist like Saddam Husayn?

[Putko] But now, when the confrontation of the nuclear superpowers—the USSR and the United States—is moving into the past, it is possible through common efforts to work out norms of international law that prohibit...

[Moiseyev] Prohibitions, of course, are necessary. But when and what kind of a maniac would it be possible to stop with prohibitions? No, we must think about effective measures. And now the most favorable conditions for this are forming. We are living in an amazing time of quick, I would even say swift, reorientation of mutual relations between nations. To prevent a possible catastrophe, we should take advantage of this situation without fail.

[Putko] What is the essence of your proposal?

[Moiseyev] For a start, this could be a Russo-American system of warning of possible nuclear strikes with the help of space systems. The Americans have devised a system that is called "Brilliant Pebbles." It makes it possible with high probability to destroy missiles in their booster phase. But we have very good systems for monitoring and observing the earth's surface from outer space. By uniting the two we would in a short period be able to create an effective antinuclear shield. In this cooperation with the Americans we would be full equal partners, because the level of our specialists and their specialists is approximately the same, and certain scientific and experimental work in our country can cost significantly less than in the United States.

I discussed this idea with my friends—scientists, designers, and managers of large defense enterprises. We even came up with a name for the security system—"Northern Hoop." The name, of course, is conditional, inasmuch as it has in mind the geographic position of the CIS and the United States in the Northern hemisphere. But in the future, any other countries can join us. The antinuclear system is open to everyone, and it is assumed that it will operate under the aegis of the United Nations.

This, in very compressed form, is the essence of my proposal. I gave an account of it in a short article in the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM. And a discussion started immediately. I was pleased by its high professional level.

[Putko] While approving and supporting the idea itself of an antinuclear shield, certain participants in the discussion are expressing their doubts. For example, what kinds of expenditures will this require? After all, we do not have enough systems to destroy our own stocks of nuclear weapons. We are asking the Americans for help.

But here is one more project, and what is more, a space project! Or are you counting entirely on new American contributions?

[Moiseyev] Imagine, I am counting on commercial profit. Moreover, in the first stage, we will not be talking about the destruction of missiles launched by some kind of madman, but only about observation of the earth's surface. Many countries launch reconnaissance satellites, spending immense amounts of money on this. Our system can gather all of the information for them. Moreover, they can install their own equipment on the "Northern Hoop" satellites. And what opportunities are opened up here for ecological monitoring!

[Putko] I recall that one of the participants of the discussion wrote that your system is incomplete. It is capable only of reflecting a missile strike. But, after all, weapons of mass destruction can be delivered by a submarine, a railroad platform, an ordinary aircraft...

[Moiseyev] It is more than that. With time, it will be possible to deliver them in a suitcase. Designer thinking, unfortunately, works in different directions: One thinks about how to increase the lethal power of a weapon and how to ensure its unimpeded employment, and another tries to do everything to prevent or repel a strike. And I am not counting on creating a universal system all at once. But it is necessary to budge the rock, to begin the common work, and to involve as many different specialists in it as possible: physicists, chemists, designers, physicians, biologists... But by and by, as the English say, it is step by step to the established objective. Certainly, new minds will join in, and new ideas will appear. A certain consistency in joint actions is important here.

[Putko] What do you intend to start with?

[Moiseyev] We, for example (I have in mind a group of like-thinkers—scientists and specialists), want for a start to invite our American colleagues and to arrange something on the order of a seminar, at which we would be able to show our studies on the "Northern Hoop" program, prepared and translated into the English language. We have already had preliminary negotiations with political figures from an association attached to the U.S. Senate. It is more difficult to arrange direct contacts with scientists, because a regime of secrecy still operates here and there. Especially in the sphere about which we are talking.

But it is necessary to start, at least with an attempt to stop the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Just think: It has not been employed for 46 years, but it was perfected and stockpiled. In our country alone, 27,000 nuclear warheads have been stockpiled in depots. This reserve is sufficient to destroy 50 planets like our Earth. And while we, as the politicians assert, are cutting the production of nuclear weapons, somewhere in foreign laboratories intensive developments are going on, new warheads are being created, and strategic missiles are being designed.

For some, this is a question of prestige, and for others it is something more: the possibility of nuclear blackmail and even expansion.

[Putko] Do you believe that the establishment of a collective nuclear shield will cool the heads of future adventurers?

[Moiseyev] Hardly. But they can be defended against. And the main thing is that joint work on the "Northern Hoop" program would create a new climate of cooperation, goodwill, and mutual trust. But this also means a lot.

Idea of Joint ABM Defenses Questioned

924P0084A Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 7, 14-20 Feb 92 [signed to press 13 Feb 92] pp 10-11

[Article by Colonel A.I. Radionov, leader of CIS Armed Forces Space Units Press Service: "We Will Have To Wait a While for Our Participation in SDI"]

[Text] The debate on the letter of Academician N.N. Moiseyev, who presented a plan for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war by way of the creation under the aegis of the United Nations of a space-based ABM system, continues. It has now, in our view, even greater topicality in connection with the fact that B.N. Yeltsin has proposed the creation of a global space-based defense system based on the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the efforts of Russia's defense complex.

Symptoms of a fundamentally new attitude on the part of our scientists and public figures toward the system of antimissile defense of the United States being created within the SDI framework have appeared in the national and foreign press.

Some people believe that an opportune time for our direct participation in the deployment of such a system under the aegis of the United Nations in the interests of the security not only of the United States but also for all mankind has come (Academician N. Moiseyev, see ZA RUBEZHOM No. 34, 1991).

Others—representatives of the independent republics of the Central Asia region of the former Soviet Union—are displaying interest therein as a possible means of antimissile defense of the southern borders of their own territories (AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, see ZA RUBEZHOM No. 3, 1992).

It was only yesterday, it seems, that we were predicting the technical and economic futility of the American "star wars" program and likening it to a sword of Damocles, which Washington intended suspending over world civilization. And today we are prepared to recognize it as the sole defensive system acceptable to mankind and even to render the utmost assistance in its deployment.

Yielding the military-political, technical-economic and international-legal positions of a once great power, we

are, apparently, meekly applying to the Americans for partnership in the business of stabilization of the strategic situation.

The idea is not new, of course, but it is undoubtedly bold and not without common sense. And for the present times, when it has become fashionable applying to authoritative international organizations—be it the World Bank, the IMF or the EC—the idea of membership of the “SDI Supporters Club” is, let us speak plainly, excellent. The question lies elsewhere—would we be accepted? I, for example, am not sure.

Can the Niagara Falls Be Transferred to Peterhof?

I do not believe that the present situation is that auspicious for a solution of planetary nuclear problems. Testimony to this is the situation in Yugoslavia, the results of the Madrid meeting and the post-August events in our country. And what is typical is that the world community is worried not by the actual split of the Soviet Union but by the fact that its disintegration into independent powers has been so sudden. Not only for our politicians but for the leading Sovietologists of the West also.

And it was by no means favorable conditions of the international situation but, rather, concern for the fate of the nuclear arsenals on the periphery of the former Soviet Union which dictated the recent disarmament initiatives of the President of the United States and the steps in response of the leadership of our country and the NATO bloc. But we should not labor under any delusion. Bush has achieved much by his actions: He has gotten rid of obsolete systems of weapons of mass destruction, which had become unnecessary, lowered the danger of “nuclear chaos” in our country, acquired political trump cards in the light of the forthcoming elections, and reserved the right to resolutely pursue a program of the modernization of strategic arms and implement the program for the creation of the B-2 bomber and SDI. What we will achieve, time will tell.

Finally, how are we to evaluate the fact that while debating this issue we see as part of the planetary defensive system technical means of the United States, not our own? The attack and software components, what is more, which are already present in the American military-space arsenals or which are moving into the development and demonstration testing stage within the framework of SDI. Is this not a belated disavowal of the scientific skepticism in respect to the “star wars” program, a timid acknowledgment of our own technological frailty and a desperate endeavor to hang on, if only at the verbal level, among the countries resolving modern geostrategic problems?

This is, perhaps, the case. But we sometimes forget, in our opinions, what is most important—these resources are national property and the elite part of the military cosmonautics of the United States. And any discussion of their possible transfer to the aegis of the United Nations is tantamount to the idea of a change in the flow

of the rivers or, say, switching the Niagara Falls into the fountain ensemble of Peterhof.

I do not think that such initiatives will find a response in the hearts of Americans. Particularly now, when they have already happily solved many problems of strategic defense. Or have determined paths of their solution. And, as is well known, without our participation.

In nine years the United States has managed not only to organize a program, of unprecedented scale and focus, of military-applied research in the sphere of the latest technology but also to embark on the development of actual models of weapons and hardware for supporting combat operations in space. Work is under way on more than 120 projects and encompasses problems of optoelectronics and the processing of complex signals, robotics and elements of artificial intelligence, high-energy lasers, prospective nuclear power engineering, distributed complex-process control panels and automated image-identification systems. Approximately 30,000 scientists from 10 countries and 4,500 industrial firms and research establishments have been enlisted and over \$20 billion have been spent.

Aside from the technical reports, approximately 50 complex experiments and laboratory and testing-unit trials have been conducted and the demonstration and flight trials of the weapons systems and combat hardware which are being created have begun. The efficiency of the facilities for the detection, identification, and tracking of complex ballistic targets and their symbolic and actual destruction in space and the upper layers of the atmosphere has been confirmed experimentally. The prototypes of ground- and space-based combat laser complexes are being tested. Several hundred mathematical models and expert systems for performing combat operations in space have been developed and have undergone experimental trials. A catalogue of optical and radar “portraits” of Soviet artificial earth satellites, decoys, and ICBM warheads has been compiled. The formation of an experimental strategic defense system command post has been practically completed.

From the very outset we discerned in SDI an American military-political dirty trick. The Americans, on the other hand, a specious argument for taking possession of the “overseas intellect” on terms advantageous to themselves. We debated the pernicious effect of the militarization of space. They interested scientists of the 10 leading Western states in the joint development of beam weapons and rail guns, prospective space-based power engineering and fifth-generation computers, space-based transmitters and compact laser installations.

We proved the impossibility of the creation of laser weapons in the current century. The Americans have shot down with experimental models of such weapons the prototypes of cruise missiles in flight, introduced laser developments of SDI in surgical and diagnostic medicine, and created tomographic devices for the “minute” inspection of the baggage of airline passengers.

We scientifically substantiated the nuclear vulnerability of a space-based ABM echelon, they have created and introduced radar-resistant space-based electronics. We began to talk about conversion, they proposed particle-accelerator defense technology for the removal of toxic waste from power station smokestacks and demonstrated the possibility of the use of high-energy pulse devices for the fracturing of rock face and the drilling of oil wells.

But who cares about lofty subjects! We did not even find the time to ask about the meaning with which the Americans invest the term "brilliant pebbles," calling the space-based interceptor a "sparkling or flashing" stone. Yet the mere fact of the presence on board thereof of elements of artificial intelligence suggests a different version of the translation—"intelligent stone." But such a version of the translation would have forced our designers and scientists to do some thinking. And, oh, how they did not want to do so at that time, and now also, perhaps.

Keeping Afloat

This is how matters stand with the Americans. And what in terms of anticipated cooperation can we offer them? Aside from the "asymmetrical option," whose essence is still not clear even to ourselves, nothing, it would seem. Whoever believes that the Americans might entrust the guidance into space of their developments to our Zenits and Protons inasmuch as they are, allegedly cheap, is a simpleton.

First, the Zenits were cheap as long as the labor of their designers and the officers of Baykonur, where these rockets are launched, was cheap. What their price will be tomorrow, the market will tell.

Second, the Americans have sufficient of their own assets for this purpose—eight types of carrier rockets to our six.

Third, each SDI development is a technological leap forward into the 21st century. And the United States does not intend familiarizing either its closest partners or, even less, yesterday's adversaries with such innovations.

And however attractive our scientists' proposals might seem, without our own technological groundwork they are nothing more than a request for a remission of the sins of the inveterate poverty of scientific foresight and conceited condescension toward the complex problems of the present day.

So, whether we like it or not, we will have to wait a while for our participation in SDI. This task, its technological aspects particularly, is manifestly beyond us. And given the present situation in the country, simply wholly inopportune.

We should be determining our position in respect to questions of defense in our own CIS. Particularly now,

when, worried by the instability of the CIS, these states are feverishly busy forming national armies and seeking their own place in the new alignment of forces in the world. The interest of some of them in SDI, on the other hand, is merely testimony to the uncertainty as to the fate of the CIS and its defensive possibilities.

It is here that a debating platform is needed for our professionals: political scientists, strategists and analysts, military theorists, and general designers. It is they who should be saying why we have found ourselves technologically thrown dozens of years back.

Why have our warning facilities been oriented toward a massive nuclear attack, whereas the Americans have picked up from space the launchings of operational-tactical missiles and during the events in the Persian Gulf even issued target designations for their destruction? Why do we consider the national air defense system a reliable "check against foreign nuclear hipshooters," whereas American experts deem it "full of holes" and penetrable by fighter bombers and cruise missiles?

We will return somewhat later to the infinite list of these "why's." But what about the textbook questions of our daily reality? Who will tell us "what is to be done" and "where to start" in order to remain, if only on the edge of world civilization, and not lose our identity entirely? How to acquire within the CIS framework trust in one another? And how will this be told us—with that same sober-mindedness, worldly wisdom and political maturity with which we achieved state independence and dissociated ourselves from the burden of the unsettled condition of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union?

A great multitude of questions, and no answers as yet. So what is to be done?

We need to determine for a start, in my view, the kind of army we need and a commonwealth of which states and against whom to defend it, or whether, after all, each republic, having become a state, intends to defend itself.

And to begin only then. And with the latest space technology, what is more. With that with which the United States formerly began. And this is not an appeal for a blind imitation of the Americans but a way toward equal partnership, in geostrategic defense matters included.

We must recognize that these issues will in time confront us just as squarely as the problem of the riddance of nuclear weapons does now. And it is better that we ourselves understand, rather than waiting for promptings from outside, that the SDI program is by no means a chance occurrence but, rather, a natural regularity.

And we will have just as naturally to repeat the path of the Americans in SDI and the Europeans in Eureka, which the latter have created as a counterweight to SDI. They are presenting annually for consideration by their

legislators a list of 20-30 technologies, mastery of which would make it possible to occupy a leading place in the world.

We, however, have in response to SDI created nothing and compiled no such lists. But it is time we did! It is time, finally, to conduct a strict stock-taking of our technological possibilities and cease exchanging the intellectual property of the former Soviet Union for the lingerie and hard-currency travel of the "leaders of the new formation" overseas.

It is time to understand that humanitarian aid will have to be paid for not with past shoes but with energy resources, timber, furs and oil. And it is only intellectual potential which will keep us afloat. But we do not as yet understand either its significance or its value.

Just as, for that matter, as distinct from the Office of Management and Budget of the United States, we cannot understand that provision with satellite navigation facilities affords an opportunity for reducing the number of fighter aircraft from 1,714 to 1,465, thereby keeping \$7 billion in the treasury.

Nor can we understand why with our areas of crisis situations or national disasters we do not have around-the-clock communications, whereas American airborne assault forces are literally 4-5 minutes after hitting the ground reporting via space to the command of the armed forces in Washington.

The times will force us to think about these problems. I would like us to be in time.

P.S. This article was written before the president of Russia presented his initiative in the field of international security. His proposals persuade me yet again that it is Russia which needs to move forward first and foremost.

Although Washington has today recognized the independence of the states of the former Union, it is hardly likely that any of them, other than Russia, could lay claim any time soon to the role of partner of America of the same scale as was the Soviet Union.

It is for this reason that Russia has become the successor of the Soviet Union in many spheres of international life. And it is not surprising that the new initiatives concerning a cardinal reduction in nuclear arms emanate from the Russian Federation and its president. That Russia's aspiration to the elimination of ASAT weapons and to cooperation in the sphere of antimissile defenses has met from the American side with a guarded, somewhat condescending evaluation even as yet is another matter.

Without wishing to share technological secrets, the United States would like to define more precisely our opportunities for detecting missile launches and tracking warheads in flight. This was stated by, inter alia, Pentagon chief R. Cheney.

But with what might we surprise them since they are close to a solution of the problem of the detection of targets in space down to 10 cm in diameter and the simultaneous tracking in real time of up to 10,000 warheads? With nothing, I believe. Consequently, we will have to work, not let the president down! It is here that we will learn the price of the dogged disregard for the latest technology and the arrogant conceit of various departments and of interdepartmental disconnection. It is a pity merely that in total the price will not make us happy.

Demolition of Krasnoyarsk Radar Buildings Deplored

924P0087A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 21 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Valentina Maystrenko and Lyudmila Vinskaya: "The Commander in Chief Did Not Help. The President Did Not Act: The Last Hope Is To Bow to the Americans and Perhaps Our Chiefs Will Listen to Them? And Will Halt the Pulverization of the People's Property?"]

[Text] *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* has twice told the story of the Krasnoyarsk radar station and a possible use for its "remains"—on 9 October 1990 and 15 January 1991. But some people cannot wait to demolish everything there, right down to the foundation, as is the custom with us.

One has the impression that they should bomb this city harshly and mercilessly. So that the shock wave rips the roofs off the barracks and smashes in the windows of the houses. And the kindergarten, still intact but subdued, convinced us that they have marked not only military targets but also civilian ones.

However, the enemy has still not retreated. Tens of millions of rubles are being spent to destroy the city even more. Hundreds of millions will then be needed to build it anew.

This is Yeniseysk-15, known to all the world as a strategic target—the Krasnoyarsk radar.

We went up on the flights of stairs that remain intact in the former 22-story modern monster of this tracking station, and our guide, Anatoliy Kirillovich Trukhanov, says: "The water, heat, and electricity are still here...."

From the top we can see the heating network and the water-supply network...

And look at that square! If only one story of the plant could be left it would be a good factory! But they will not give it to us. They promised the Americans that they would totally raze everything. And they are leveling it...

On 12 September 1990 the radar was transferred to the Sibirenergo fuel-and-energy department joint-stock company. As it states in the document, for use in the national economy. They are still asking and demanding and begging the new bosses to halt the demolition of the multi-story building, or, more accurately, to stop at the

fifth floor, which obviously no longer threatens the Americans. But as we walk around the building, silent and morose soldiers are pushing wheelbarrows about. Enormous trucks make a thunderous noise as they carry away concrete slabs and roofing, destination unknown. No force can halt this blind destruction.

Everyone remembers the fuss about the Krasnoyarsk radar, and how our state figures boasted that our people were disarming themselves, and gave assurances while entire brigades of journalists scurried hither and thither, clicking the shutters of their cameras. No one thought about what it could cost us. True, one American representative did state not so long ago on the pages of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA that if they had known about the collapse of the communist regime at that time no one would have demanded the destruction of the Krasnoyarsk radar; it turns out that it was necessary and useful for mutual cooperation.

But what is there to say now! The object has been almost totally demolished, and the demolition continues against all common sense. And the worried inhabitants of Yeniseysk-15 are left with nothing to do but write their farewells in the name of the president of Russia. Just like the old times: "We earnestly request that this outrage be halted."

Halting the demolition at the fifth floor would make it possible to save 25 million rubles [R] and about R200 million for the construction of production shells on the same foundations (incidentally, they go down 27 meters, with all mains services included). People are appealing for the common sense that the democrats talked about so much when they came to power. They are appealing to them and to the new bosses at the site. In vain. Some kind of "new thinking" is in train.

"If we preserve the installations," says the director of Sibirenergo, Anatoliy Kirillovich Trukhanov, "then we will have 50,000 square meters of production area, and we want to make a start immediately on the construction of a furniture factory, which the region has long since been lacking. The inhabitants of the settlement could obtain 2,000 work places, but during the course of the conversion much is simply being thrown into the street. We want to convert the barracks into a joint Soviet-Chinese production facility, where we shall sew a variety of clothing, but this is what we have come to: a child's jacket cost R3,000! And how much does furniture cost? Can everyone buy it?"

We have grown tired of talking about all the nonsense that dogs our Russian reality. Previously we used to blame everything on the party apparatus. But who is interfering now? When Fedor Andreyevich Vstovskiy, chairman of the Yeniseyskiy Rayon Executive Committee, was in Moscow last spring with the latest petition to stop the demolition of the radar, in the USSR Ministry of Defense they threw up their hands and said: "We would be happy to help you by stopping this outrage, but..." And they nodded in the direction of the CPSU

Central Committee building. Now, when the Communist Party and all its central committees have collapsed, the "common sense" politicians who have come to power are laconic: "The object is being dismantled and will be dismantled." Nothing can help, including appeals from the kray leaders. And who will listen to the voice of the chairman of the Yeniseyskiy Rayon Executive Committee? Vstovskiy writes and telephones and appeals first to one chief in the old capital, then to another... Last autumn he even sent a letter to Shaposhnikov, our commander in chief, asking for compensation for the rayon for what the military has done. The minister remained silent...

Not so long ago the subject on Central Television was the fact the naval forces of the United States have left their bases in Thailand. They showed the moment when the military commander handed over the keys of the relinquished base to the head of the local authorities. The grateful Thais were applauding the American aggressors. Window dressing? We could do with that kind of window dressing.

As they leave Yeniseyskiy-15 Soviet officers are throwing the keys through the windows—now try to settle there! You would think that the military people would understand: They have been waiting all their lives for an apartment, and now that we have conversion they are pulling on their greatcoats and leaving, destination unknown. But on whom are they wreaking their vengeance? At whom are they shooting? At themselves, at their own people...

We could build a modern, pleasant town on the site of Yeniseysk-15. But...

"Ten thousand people could get work there, and this means that no one would be unemployed in the entire rayon," says A. Trukhanov. "There would be housing, and a kindergarten has already been built and is ready for handover... But they are also destroying that. What kind of threat against the Americans can that kindergarten be?"

Anatoliy Kirillovich has been speaking without much hope to the new government of Russia. He has been speaking so that our fellow countrymen might be aware of what is happening "on the expanses of the great motherland."

We stand near the pillaged and torn shell of the new kindergarten; the director reckons it will take about R800,000 to restore it. Perhaps even more—prices are rising so much! Homes ready for occupation also look as if they have endured an artillery bombardment. This means that considerable sums will be needed to restore them. Ah! Russia, Russia, our hapless motherland... And here we have a Russia where it would seem that no laws have been written for the public prosecutor's office. It is good at handling sneak thieves but reluctant to take on those who harm the national interests.

Well, perhaps all the fuss about the Krasnoyarsk radar has come to an end. Yes, they have almost forgotten it... Failing to receive a comforting response from the rulers of Russia, the Yeniseysk people have written a letter to President George Bush. Perhaps common sense will suddenly prevail. And the President of that great country across the ocean will pronounce a magnanimous "OK! Stop the destruction, lads. Build your little furniture factory!"

But what if Bush is not amused?

Global Anti-Missile System Potential Cited

LD2602141192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 25 Feb 92

[Text] [Announcer] The recent proposal of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to replace the Strategic Defense Initiative with a Russian-American global defense system presents the situation in antimissile defense in a new light. At the request of Radio Moscow, Major General Vladimir Kuklev has expressed his opinion of the initiative.

[Kuklev] In our opinion a global antimissile defense system should promote stability, that is eliminate incentives for continuing the arms race, for a competition in armaments both defense and offensive. As we understand it the system should not be American in the sense that it would protect only American or Russian-American, that is, protecting only the territories of Russia and the United States. This should be a system protecting the territory of any member country of (?the) system from a missile attack wherever it might come from.

[Announcer] The idea of a global system is in the political declaration, but experts from the General Staff can offer general practical versions of it without any technical solutions, of course.

[Kuklev] The implementation of the idea would most likely be divided into a certain number of stages. As I see it, at one of the initial stages some warning system, compatible or joint one, could be set up partly based on land, partly in space, that is systems of (?warning and control) in space. At the next stage a force could be formed for actual defense functions.

[Announcer] The question inevitably arises what is going to happen to the Soviet-American antimissile defense treaty.

[Kuklev] Evidently such a system would make the treaty outdated, however, it must not be forgotten that at present we consider it a key element of preserving strategic stability, and it will remain such an element for a long time, until the decision on a global system and until the first steps of carrying out such a decision. Being truly global in scale, the idea of (?joint) defense should be widely discussed by different states at different levels.

[Announcer] The opinion of Maj. Gen. Kuklev of the legal department of the General Staff about prospects of a global antimissile defense system proposed by President Yeltsin.

U.S. Interest in ABM Cooperation Questioned

924P0093B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 92 p 1

[Commentary by A. Golts: "Pentagon Still Intends To Pursue SDI. Without Our Help"]

[Text] The initial stage of the Strategic Defense Initiative system deployment should provide limited protection of the United States from a missile attack launched by CIS states, China, North Korea, Libya, and Iraq. As a whole, this system will provide a "highly effective defense against accidental and unapproved attacks against the United States deploying up to 200 warheads coming from any direction." This is, in brief, the gist of the report that is currently being prepared by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization and will be presented to Congress this spring. Excerpts from it have been published in the current issue of AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY magazine.

According to this information, the first hundred interceptor missiles will be deployed on U.S. territory as early as the end of 1996. Which will serve the purpose of establishing a "global defense from limited nuclear strikes"—the idea that has replaced the concept, now discarded as no longer needed (and not very feasible in practical terms), of deflecting a massive nuclear strike launched by the former USSR.

Actually, part of this initial concept—Project Brilliant Pebbles, which envisages deployment of ABM interceptors in space—still remains.

As for the deployment of ABM interceptors on the ground, in this respect, according to the magazine, the Pentagon is facing some difficulties. As is known, Soviet-American agreements provide for the deployment of ABM interceptors in only one location—the Grand Forks base. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, however, envisions using other bases as well. Specifically, Loring Air Force Base. This, however, may lead to scrapping the ABM Treaty.

Unfortunately, this is not the only circumstance indicating that the Americans are still envisioning SDI as something strictly for their own use and have no intentions of transforming this program into some global system of planetary defense, as Russia proposes.

Moreover, if the report in AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY is accurate, this makes it necessary to look from a somewhat different angle at the recently announced intentions of the heads of the foreign affairs departments of the United States and Russia to prepare an agreement on the creation of a joint tracking and early warning center. After all, it now appears that

the Americans will at the same time be building systems that will include ground- and space-based ABM interceptors designed to deflect strikes, including those launched from CIS territory. In this case, it is doubtful that they will let their Russian colleagues come close to their own state-of-the-art technologies. Then what role will the proposed international early warning center play in relation to American missiles? Does it make any sense to even set it up, or is it a stillborn diplomatic initiative?

Right now it is hard to answer these questions. One thing is clear at this point—the Americans have no intention of giving up their own “individual version of global defense.” And they plan to develop it without our participation.

Yeltsin's Joint Defense Proposal Faulted

924P0092A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 9, 26 Feb 92 p 10

[Article by Professor Konstantin Feoktistov, pilot-cosmonaut of the USSR: “If Not SDI, Then What?”]

[Text] The development of an international space system to provide protection against the political rascals and gangsters who from time to time contrive to steal power in particular states and through their activities create danger for the peoples (including their own) is an urgent matter. Therefore, Yeltsin's proposal on joint participation in a strategic defense initiative appears enticing. But let us consider the problem realistically.

This kind of system could consist of monitoring and surveillance facilities and space-based counterstrike forces. Surveillance is all very well. But with respect to space-based counterstrike forces against missile and air and even ground attack, the issue is quite controversial.

To develop and deploy these kinds of strike forces in orbit means to lard the sky with weapons and “explosives” ready to be fired not only at an aggressor but also onto our own heads—because of errors, malfunctions, or sabotage by terrorists in the control complex of this “umbrella.” Is it worth developing a system that can then threaten to fall on us?

The part of the space system that is to monitor dangerous activity is another matter. Naturally it would be open to all, even including the mass media, so that everyone would be able to see and observe suspicious military developments (missile launch sites, airfields, strategic roads, and so forth), concentrations of troops and military equipment, and preparations for military invasion. Then, dangerous preparations would not go unnoticed, and questions pertaining to suspicious activity in any particular country could be raised not only by official international bodies but also the press, and even individuals or public organizations.

A system could be developed on the basis of international cooperation to which everyone would contribute according to his means. The up-to-date but relatively

inexpensive Zenit rockets, and also the Gamma and Progress automatic space vehicles, could be used in the development and creation of surveillance apparatuses. Here, our contribution would be effective and natural. Onboard computers, surveillance apparatus in the optical spectrum, radio communications equipment, electrical-radio elements in adequate quantities, and—the main thing—adequate service life and satellite relay stations are all another matter. Here we lag far behind, and it is logical to place this “load” on the Western countries and Japan.

But there is another side to the problem. It goes without saying that whoever does specific work in the international enterprise and does not derive direct profit will have to pay for that work. Spending to develop a strategic defense initiative runs into the billions and we do not have the money. It is possible to hire ourselves out to do this work for pay, but today we cannot afford to play the Eastern potentate and assume enormous amounts of work gratis.

For us now the main thing is to develop a free economy that really functions, and to become a society not of slaves dependent on the state but of free producers of goods and services.

What is preventing this? Almost all our enterprises are still monopolies; their leaders do not have to look for work, they spend all their lives working on instructions from above. Most of our leaders, and indeed all of us, have the necessary reserve of probity and sense of obligation essential for free economic activity. The irresponsible, crazy prices being set by the leaders of enterprises and “associations” and “concerns” demonstrate quite graphically their intellectual and business acumen. Serious work, including education and grooming truly responsible personnel at all levels, confronts us, so that it is better not to be distracted from the business that will save our lives. Even though in principle it is not a bad idea, even necessary, to develop an “Anti-Saddam Husayn System,” it is hardly a priority issue for us. Today all the enterprises of the military-industrial complex should halt production of things that are useless for consumption and switch completely to the production of goods that people need.

Finally, apart from the strategic defense initiative there are more urgent and topical tasks for international space cooperation. Why not become involved in space biotechnology on global scales? Or the industrial production of very pure materials for electronics? At least here there is some prospect for material returns. For this what is needed is joint orbital stations and automatic factories, and really inexpensive reusable rockets to loft apparatus and cargo. It is possible to engage more actively in research in the field of developing an environmentally clean energy supply system for Earth with the aid of orbiting solar electric power stations. Here we certainly have experience, and new ideas.

Up at space altitudes, however, just as in the economy here on the ground, for a successful and effective docking with world civilization what is required is a thawing of the monolithic "iceberg" of the military-industrial complex and the emergence of independent, forward-looking companies and enterprises, and a competitive system of orders and sources of funding and credit, in short, all the attributes of emancipation. Otherwise space will again be hung like a millstone around society's neck.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Factors Affecting Timeframe for Troop Pullout From Baltics

Withdrawal Into Belarus To Be Gradual

LD2102230392 Moscow TASS in English 2005 GMT
21 Feb 92

[By BELTA correspondent Leonid Tratsevskiy]

[Text] Minsk, February 21 TASS—Plans to withdraw west and north contingents to the territory of Belarus require corrections, as there are too many soldiers in Belarus, Belarus Military District commander-in-chief Anatoliy Kostenko told his officers at a rally on Friday [21 February]. The district will be reorganised gradually, he said. The district Armed Forces headquarters may be reorganised into Belarussian Defence Ministry headquarters, Kostenko said.

According to Kostenko's judgment, the CIS member-states summit of February 14 brought tangible results for the servicemen and they can now be optimistic about their future.

Continuing Russian Security Demands Viewed

PM2502123092 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 23 Feb 92 p A9

[Report by Mert Kubu: "Russian Bases Stay"]

[Text] Tallinn—Bases to stay in the Baltic region. That is expected to be one of the Russian military's demands in future negotiations with the Estonian government, DAGENS NYHETER has been told. The Russians are primarily expected to want to keep the radar warning system along the Estonian coast and on Estonia's islands.

And probably also the large military air base near Tartu which is used by heavy long-range bombers.

Two other bases that the Russians would only give up reluctantly are Paldiski—hermetically sealed to Estonians—and the missile launchers and attack aircraft in Haapsalu.

However, the Estonians' demand is very simple. The former Soviet troops must leave the country, and as quickly as possible. Ideally this year.

New Prime Minister Tiit Vahi declared this publicly most recently during U.S. Vice President Quayle's visit to the Baltic region.

Economic pressure is expected to be the weapon which the Russians will use in the negotiations. Contrary to what would appear to be the case from communiques, no agreements or even protocols of any significance have so far been reached. Nor have any precise Russian demands been made known.

Terms like "Russia's military security must remain unchanged" are being used.

The Estonian government's military policy advisers, who are taking part in the negotiations with the Russian delegation, told DAGENS NYHETER:

"Two weeks ago, in our latest count, there were 24,500 Russian soldiers in Estonia. These include 10,040 officers, most of them with families."

Throughout the Baltic region there are an estimated 125,000 former Soviet soldiers and officers, stationed at 804 units.

What makes checking on numbers difficult is the fact that at the same time as some troops are going home, soldiers are being secretly flown into Estonia on large transport planes.

However, the Estonian intelligence service has an excellent knowledge of where the Russian units are located. DAGENS NYHETER has been shown topographical maps showing the location of all Russian troops—air bases, missile bases, and practically every large-size bunker.

The following are the most important units:

Attack aircraft stand in readiness in Parnu, Haapsalu, and Tapa. There is also a missile base in Haapsalu, and two on Hiiumaa with their launchers targeted on Sweden and Norway. In the middle of Saaremaa an underground command center has been built.

The heavy bombers (including around 20 TU 22M Backfire bombers, among the world's largest, and AN-78 Antonov transport aircraft) are in Tartu. Around 10 km from Tartu, in Loonia, there is a depot where, in the past at least, nuclear warheads were stored.

The combat command center for the whole of the north of the Baltic region is a gigantic underground bunker city under Paaskula, a suburb of Tallinn. Around the capital three garrisons can be found in Klooga, Tondi, and Keila.

There is an advance warning system along the northern coast facing Finland, along the coast facing Sweden, and on the islands. Here the Russian border troops formerly under the control of the KGB are still in charge.

On the islands of Vaike Tutarsaar and Suur Tutarsaar there are missile bases. The missiles are targeted on Finland.

"The commanders on Suur Tutarsaar generally boast that in five minutes they could destroy half of Finland," one of the Estonians engaged in locating and identifying the troops said.

In Viljandi Spetsnaz troops, about whom much has been written, are trained and currently these troops number 340 men. Many of them speak excellent German. They have been trained for deployment in the former West Germany.

Paldiski is an exclusively Russian town of 10,000 inhabitants. No Estonians are admitted. The town has been the base for the repair of submarines. There are two practice reactors for submarine crews.

"This has become a major problem. The earth around the reactors is radioactive. No one knows how to rid the installation of the radioactivity. When we ask about it, the Russians simply shrug their shoulders and say that they do not know. We need international help," an Estonian colonel told DAGENS NYHETER.

[Kubu] What is discipline among the Russian troops like?

"Terrible," said the military expert. "At the Tartu Air Base officers have to stand guard at night. The soldiers are entirely without discipline. Many desert and go home. Others sell what can be sold. Gasoline, clothes, complete radio stations. However, so far no arms have been sold.

"Kaitseliit (the home guard) generally goes and buys from them."

[Kubu] How are Estonia's own defenses?

"We have our border guards (Piirivalve), the home guard, and we are also organizing a regular army based on conscription. At present 100 Estonian officers are on a further training course.

"Our problem is arms," the colonel said. "We hope to be able to buy them for rubles. Here Lithuania is ahead of us. They have already equipped several battalions.

[Kubu] What is happening to the former KGB officers?

"Few have gone home to Russia. The majority of them, who originally numbered over 1,000, are still here and have been given civilian jobs. The risk is of course that some of them could form a fifth column. But we are keeping an eye on them.

"We are more worried about the agents from GRU, the military intelligence service. They are here. But we do not know where they are, or who they are, or how many there are," the colonel said.

Withdrawal May Take 5 Years

OW2802181792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1350 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Head of the Bundestag delegation comprising deputies-experts on defense Bern Vils said in Riga February 27 that up to 180,000 troops of the former Soviet Union are still stationed in the Baltics. At the same time, he noted that Commander of the Northwestern group of forces Colonel-General Mironov had told him that only 120,000 troops are currently present in the region.

Vils also said that during his meeting with Mironov they discussed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltics to Russia. According to Vils, General Mironov has stated that due to technical and financial problems the withdrawal could take about five years.

Moldovan Plans, Difficulties in Forming Own Army

Defense Minister Cited

LD2102190892 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1633 GMT 21 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau, 21 Feb (TASS)— Moldovan Defense Minister Ion Costas has stated that the republican national army will be formed on the basis of the 14th Army stationed on the right bank of the Dnestr River. The military units which are stationed in the Dnestr region and which have been drawn into the conflict by the politicians will be given the special status of an army stationed on the territory of an independent state. They will be withdrawn to Russian territory in one and one-half to two years time.

This agreement, which according to Ion Costas is a preliminary one, was reached at talks in Chisinau with Colonel General Boris Pyankov, deputy defense minister of the Commonwealth of Independent States. According to this scheme, weapons will be shared, with 90 percent kept on the right bank of the river, and only a third of what is on the left bank will remain under the jurisdiction of the republic. Weapons that have already been withdrawn from Moldovan territory are not included in this amount.

Alternative Service Widespread

OW2702040492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1635 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Practically every second Moldovan conscript will enroll in alternative service after the law is passed in the Republic. Already 4700 conscripts have signed up for alternative service in six months time.

According to the law only those unable to serve in the army due to health reasons and religious or pacifist convictions are eligible for alternative service.

The head of the alternative service of the Moldovan government Anton Skurilenko told "INTERFAX" that there is a significant rise in the number of conscripts who prefer alternative service. In view of this the Moldovan Ministry of Defence has every reason to be concerned that its army may be left without soldiers.

Skurilenko said that the number of conscripts for alternative service will be less than 10% in the Spring draft. Each applicant for alternative service will have to firmly state his position.

Army Units To Pass to Republic

LD2602135892 Moscow *POSTFACTUM* in English
1024 GMT 26 Feb 92

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] Army units deployed in Moldova territory, Pridnestroviye included, are likely to pass under the republic's jurisdiction. A high-ranking officer of Moldova Defense Ministry further stated to PF [POSTFACTUM] that the Republic was planning to sign a treaty with Russia under which certain formations and units of the 14th Army, mainly the Army's command, [words indistinct] and the units of 59th Motorized Infantry Division would report to the Supreme Command of the United Armed Forces of the CIS for a certain period of time only. According to him, a part of the vehicles and equipment of the former Soviet Army shall be privatized and the national Army shall be formed on that basis.

Touching upon the relations with Pridnestroviye and Gagauzia, the MOD [Ministry of Defense] officer expressed the hope that it would be possible to preserve the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova without resorting to force, but he did not rule out the possibility of using the would-be national Army to resolve conflicts.

CFE Implementation Agreement Finalized

LD2202153492 Moscow *TASS* in English 1417 GMT
22 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shashkov]

[Text] Brussels February 22—Countries participants to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] reached an agreement regarding procedure of putting it into effect. This accord was arrived at on Friday [21 February] in NATO's Brussels headquarter during a meeting of the high ranking working groups formed for considering problems that emerged as a result of the changes in the eastern part of the continent since signing of the treaty in 1990. Among those who took part in the meeting were representatives of countries of NATO, Eastern Europe, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and also

eight states formed on the territory of the former Soviet Union, which come into the zone covered by the treaty.

The plan of action adopted in the meeting envisages two stages. In the first stage the countries of the former Soviet Union must decide among themselves about the distribution of commitments ensuing from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in such a way that their combined strength will not exceed the commitments made by the former Soviet Union at the time of signing the treaty. The commitments will be fixed at the extraordinary conference, which, according to sources close to NATO, is scheduled to be held by the end of May 1992. It will form a basis for putting the treaty into effect.

In the second stage the member states, which will automatically include former Republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union being situated in the zone covered by the treaty, will ratify it, and it will come into force ten days after the submission of the instruments of ratification. This process is expected to be completed by the scheduled for July meeting of the heads of state and government of member countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Further on Lithuanian Demands for Prompt Troop Withdrawal

Defense Minister Outlines Principles

OW2402160592 Moscow *BALTFAX* in English
1303 GMT 24 Feb 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lithuanian Home Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius has spelled out the main principles of the Lithuanian Government concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the republic. Butkevicius spoke at an international security conference in Vilnius. The principles are as follows:

First, Lithuania does not recognize any defense interests of the former Soviet Union on Lithuanian territory. Second, Lithuania takes control over all military facilities, land and property on its territory. Third, Lithuania will seek full and rapid withdrawal of troops from its territory.

The Lithuanian Home Defense Ministry has information that currently about 35,000 Russian military servicemen, including 8,000 officers, are stationed in the republic.

Butkevicius said that the defense system of Lithuania is being built according to the "total defense" model. He indicated that Lithuania is carrying out four programs to ensure its security: border control, territorial defense, formation of a regular army and civil defense.

The border control program envisages protection of land, sea and air borders. The program will involve 5,000 people.

The second program concerns preparation of a mobilization reserve, defense of important state facilities and maintenance of the national guard.

Lithuania started to form its regular army with setting up rapid deployment units. In 1993 it plans to increase the strength of existing military units up to 5,000 men.

The civil defense program envisions struggle against misinformation, as well as resistance of the civilian population by both non-violent and active guerilla combat methods.

Landsbergis Statement

*LD2502133392 Vilnius Radio Vilnius
International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT
24 Feb 92*

[Excerpts] Various Lithuanian officials have expressed concern about the announced start of withdrawal of the former Soviet Army troops from Lithuania. It is not the real start of the withdrawal of the former Soviet Army from the territory of Lithuania, notes a statement disseminated on behalf of the Lithuanian parliamentary leader Vytautas Landsbergis.

Commenting on news agency reports concerning the start of the withdrawal of the Army from Lithuanian territory, Landsbergis notes that it was agreed on 17 January with Russian President Boris Yeltsin that the Army would first withdraw from the capital, Vilnius. We would truly hail that, but there is currently no evidence of such a process having started. We would like a truly fresh view and faster decisions, notes the statement by Landsbergis.

It was officially announced last week that on 25 February the anti-aircraft defense division stationed in Mickunai, near Vilnius, would start withdrawing. Lithuanian defense officials are doubtful whether the announced withdrawal is in keeping with the agreement, taking into account the fact that withdrawal would be considered an accomplished fact even if the former deployment site of one unit or another is just transferred over for use by the Republic of Lithuania.

Certain well-informed officials think that the withdrawing anti-aircraft defense division from Mickunai will first arrive in Vilnius. Later it will be withdrawn to Belarussian territory, by the same road, creating the appearance that the Army is being withdrawn from Vilnius.

Late this evening, BALTIC NEWS SERVICE reported that Colonel Vladimir Gerasimov, Mickunai anti-aircraft defense division commander, stated that this unit will not begin withdrawal until Thursday, 27 February. As if that were not enough, the unit will not go to Belarus, but to Vilnius. The unit's withdrawal from Lithuania will only commence on the night of 3-4 March. The reasons prompting such decisions are not known. According to the division commander, only the official farewell festivities will take place tomorrow.

If things take the course described by Col Gerasimov, it would amount to a crude violation by Russia of the interstate agreement on the start of the Army's withdrawal. [passage omitted]

Addressing a seminar, Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius gave the first official disclosure of his estimate of the number of former Soviet troops deployed in Lithuania. Minister Butkevicius says he has information attesting to the deployment of 35,000 soldiers, including 8,000 officers and non-commissioned officers. [passage omitted]

Details of Negotiations

*LD2502224292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 25 Feb 92*

[Commentary by Andrey Krasnov]

[Text] [Announcer Aleksey Abakumov] The postponement of the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania, which was to have started on 25 February, was the main event of the day. A new date for the departure of the Russian Army from Mickunai—near Vilnius—has been announced. Here is how this event is viewed by Radio Rossii observer Andrey Krasnov.

[Krasnov] For a long time the dialogue between Moscow and the Baltic republics resembled the conversation between two deaf people. The Balts were constantly demanding the immediate withdrawal of the former USSR Army from their territory, while in Moscow they were playing for time. As long ago as December of last year the Baltic states appealed to the United Nations to pressure Russia, and Vytautas Landsbergis spoke of the threat of a conspiracy by the Soviet Army and the KGB.

Apparently things had at last started moving. Three weeks ago, Sergey Shakhrai, an adviser to Russia's president, made a trip to the Baltic republics and, as was reported, at the talks with the Baltic leaders he succeeded in reaching a compromise.

However, as it is becoming clear, each side understands it in its own way. At least at the present stage it has not been possible to agree on the date for the withdrawal of Armed Forces from Lithuania. It was announced today that probably the first subunit of the Armed Forces under Russia's jurisdiction will leave Lithuanian territory on 3 March. During the next week Russian and Lithuanian experts are to look into property problems. But even this date, in the view of the commander of the anti-aircraft battalion stationed in Mickunai, is not realistic. In an interview on today's evening news, he stated that all dates being fixed are explained to a greater extent by politics than common sense. Briefly, it is unlikely that the departure of the Russian Army from Lithuania will pass without a hitch. There clearly will not be any flowers and crying women. But, nevertheless, the chances of divorcing without disgrace increased considerably today.

One way or another, the lengthy process of the redeployment in stages of the Armed Forces from Lithuania has nevertheless started.

The paradox lies in the fact that the present divorce is hitting not only Moscow but also Vilnius. The withdrawal of the former Union's Armed Forces automatically presents the Lithuanian leadership with a whole range of problems that are difficult to resolve. First, the Lithuanian leaders lose an internal enemy who previously united the nation around the present leadership. There is one more obvious consequence of the forthcoming withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic republics: the West's interest in the problems of the Baltic republics will decline with the departure of our soldiers.

But all this in the future. For the time being the departure of the Army is being postponed. It would seem that on both sides the deafness is not yet finally over.

Mickunai Departure Ceremony

*OW2502154592 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1402 GMT 25 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian parliament press officer, Audrius Azubalis, said today that the Lithuanian government had been given no official notice concerning the beginning of the withdrawal of an anti-aircraft division from Mickunai.

Yesterday the division commander, Col. [Colonel] Vladimir Gerasimov, said that nothing but an official departure ceremony had been scheduled for today. The actual withdrawal would only start on the 27th. The unit would temporarily be stationed in Vilnius and would be taken out of Lithuania on the night of March 3 and in the early hours of the 4th.

Azubalis said the Lithuanian government could not understand why Russia failed to observe the agreements it had signed, according to which one of the units was to leave Lithuania in February.

Vytautas Landsbergis said yesterday: "Russian President Boris Yeltsin and I decided on January 17 that the forces stationed in our capital, Vilnius, would be the first to be withdrawn."

'Nothing More Than Propaganda'

*LD2502120992 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0950 GMT 25 Feb 92*

[Excerpts] [Correspondent Guoda Salciute] Last week Russian Television and other mass media reported that the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the territory of Lithuania would start on 25 February. The anti-aircraft defense battalion should be the first to go from Mickunai, although according to an agreement between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Lithuanian Supreme

Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, the withdrawal of the Soviet Army is supposed to start from the capital, Vilnius.

Today's action in Mickunai is probably nothing more than propaganda. This is confirmed by my colleague, Zenonas Miksys, who has just returned from Mickunai:

[Miksys] [passage omitted] This once secret anti-aircraft battalion is registered at the headquarters of the former Soviet army as No. 36839. This battalion should be the first to be withdrawn from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. Before 1000 this morning 40 journalists, crews of foreign television companies, reporters and commentators of influential newspapers, and officials of the Lithuanian press, radio, and television assembled in front of the iron gates adorned with red stars that separate the outside from the battalion.

Reporters and officials were allowed to pass through the gate only after a Volga car carrying a colonel arrived. Five powerful GAZ vehicles carrying rockets, covered with tarpaulin and camouflage nets, stood by the gate. Their engines were idling. Soldiers of various ranks stood near the vehicles. Further down one could see a radio site. Equipment has been moved from there. It is now empty. On the other side soldiers carried firewood to a store. It seems that they are preparing to continue living here.

During a conversation with journalists, officers stated that they did not know why the withdrawal has been postponed. It should take place today, but now it is scheduled to start on 27 February. First the battalion will be stationed either in Vilnius at the northern townlet or in Visoriai, where the headquarters of this battalion are situated.

Colonel Kirsanov, deputy commander of this battalion, explained very calmly to journalists that the battalion does not have any claims or anger, and that it is ready to leave Lithuania. The battalion commander, Colonel Gerasimenko, said the same. This column was drawn up, as they said, only for journalists to take photographs and to film it. In other words, the Army is withdrawing. Foreign journalists were very indignant. They were prepared to publish photographs on the front pages of their newspapers. They asked why there was movement. Somebody joked that these vehicles have been standing there for the last two weeks on the same spot just starting their engines and switching them off. Soldiers do not know whether they will go to the northern townlet or Visoriai. It is not clear when this will happen.

In spite of this, inspection commissions started their work today. Our republican commission is led by Deputy National Defense Minister Jonas Pauzuolis. Today they will inspect the territory, examine it, check its ecological state, and inspect buildings that are being taken over. Corresponding documents should be signed. Only then will this battalion move from Mickunai. It will be decided in the future whether it will proceed straight

toward the border or will be stationed in the northern townlet or Visoriai. The issue remains open.

[Salciute] It is obvious that this is a demonstrative action and a performance.

[Miksys] Yes, it is happening in order to show the world that they have already started the army withdrawal.

[Salciute] It is very doubtful whether the Russian-Lithuanian communique providing for the start of the Army withdrawal in February will be implemented.

Issues Impacting on Withdrawal

*PM2602152192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[Report by Nikolay Lashkevich: "First Military Subunit Being Withdrawn From Lithuania"]

[Text] Vilnius—The withdrawal of troops from Lithuania begins Tuesday 25 February—Colonel General V. Mironov, commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, stated this officially in a telegram to A. Butkevicius, Lithuanian Republic minister for territorial protection. The first Armed Forces subunit to be withdrawn from Lithuania will be the formation stationed in the settlement of Mickunai, several kilometers from Vilnius. According to available data, an air defense division armed with anti-aircraft rocket launchers is stationed there. Mironov invited the Lithuanian minister to a ceremony to mark the withdrawal, and he advocated that assistance be provided in carrying out the operation.

In his message of reply Butkevicius promised to provide the necessary assistance, but at the same time he stressed that the fact of the withdrawal can only be established when the deployment site is totally handed over to republic jurisdiction.

Thus the date for the withdrawal of the troops from the republic's territory—in February of this year—which had previously seemed unrealistic and which was stipulated in the communique on the working meeting of Lithuanian and Russian state delegations three weeks ago, will in all probability be observed. And although certain observers in Lithuania believe that the withdrawal of such an insignificant—in terms of size—subunit is of a somewhat symbolic nature, nevertheless no one can say that Russia is not carrying out the commitments it has assumed, or that it is not as good as its word.

The question of border protection remains unresolved inasmuch as the CIS has still not determined definitively exactly whose command the border troops will come under. Joint forces are continuing to carry out border control on the Lithuanian borders. So far only the customs house at Lazdijai border post on the border with Poland has been completely transferred to the command of the Lithuanian Customs Service.

One can assume that misunderstandings on the border, even local ones, will not be conducive to constructive dialogue between the delegations and their groups of experts on the troop withdrawal problem. V. Landsbergis's utterance on the need to withdraw the Army from Kaliningrad Oblast, which he made in his speech during the Independence Day celebrations, will scarcely assist in this either. And although his words did not by any means sound like an insistent demand to withdraw the troops, as they were assessed in Moscow, nevertheless they could introduce a destructive element into the talks, particularly if everyone interprets them in their own way. In particular, they may serve as a signal for right-wing political forces to mount a major campaign against the stationing of troops in the neighboring Russian oblast, and indeed in Lithuania itself.

The idea of creating a Baltic Republic on the territory of Russia's western oblast, which Yu. Matochkin, head of the Kaliningrad Oblast Administration, supported in an interview on local television, may also serve as an obstacle to dialogue. That is another piece of news to which Lithuania is reacting with vigilance, because if this idea is put into practice, Lithuania's geopolitical contours will change sharply. On the other hand it may stir up a wave of territorial claims to Kaliningrad Oblast—the so-called little Lithuania, where many Lithuanians live—by part of the Lithuanian public. So any abrupt political movements will not be to the advantage of bilateral relations, and they will particularly not be to the advantage of the as yet undeveloped plans for withdrawal of the troops.

So the redeployment of the first military subunit from the Baltic countries has begun. What next?

Withdrawal To Begin

*LD2702104292 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 25 Feb 92*

[Text] The Commonwealth of Independent States has started withdrawing its troops from the Baltic area. First an anti-aircraft division is to be redeployed from Lithuania. More in the following item compiled by our commentator Vitaliy Gurov:

Most likely the name of the town of Mickunai, near the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, will go down in the history of this Baltic country. It is the spot chosen by the Command of the Joint CIS Armed Forces for starting the pull-out of troops from Lithuania. Although the unit having been withdrawn is very small and although the demands of the Lithuanian leadership are greater, one can assume that Mickunai will become a symbol of not only the beginning of the pull-out of troops but also the fact that Russia can keep its word. And what is possibly more important, Mickunai will become a symbol of new relations beginning to shape between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia on the one hand and the Commonwealth countries, first of Russia, on the other.

In the meantime, many observers in Lithuania believe that the pull-out of such a small unit can hardly be regarded as the real start of the troops' withdrawal. The Minister for the Protection of the Land of the Republic of Lithuania, Audrius Butkevicius, has noted in a cable to the commander of the North Western Group of the CIS troops, Gen. Mironov, that the fact of the pull-out can become real only when the site of the deployment is fully turned over to Lithuania. This is not a real beginning of the Army pull-out from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, says a statement by the Speaker of the Lithuanian Parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis. He adds that during his meeting with the Russian President Boris Yeltsin an accord was reached that the Army will be first of all withdrawn from the capital city, Vilnius. But the process will hardly begin in February, Landsbergis says.

Yet a beginning is always a beginning. Apparently each side understands it in its own way. I think, however, writes our commentator, that the troops pull-out has begun. The first anti-aircraft division will be followed by larger units. The situation is somewhat different with the border troops. The issue is still unresolved. The problem of whom these troops are subordinate to has not been settled so far in the CIS. Joint troops are controlling the Lithuanian borders. Only a customs checkpoint on the border with Poland at Lazdijai has been turned over fully under the jurisdiction of the local authorities.

After the CIS troops have been withdrawn from Lithuania, and two other Baltic countries, there will appear, obviously, the problem of the military units in the Kaliningrad region. A reminder that the region is a sort of enclave of Russia within Lithuania and Poland. Speaking a week ago in Vilnius, Vytautas Landsbergis advocated a full demilitarization of the region. In Moscow the statement was received as interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Undoubtedly these words of the Lithuanian leader can become a sort of detonator for the rather complicated talks underway now on the pull-out of the troops from Lithuania and two other Baltic countries.

Withdrawal Plans Change

LD2802110192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0200 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] It became clear today that the leadership of the former Soviet antiaircraft defense battalion deployed in Mickunai was changing its plans. It will most likely attempt to formally withdraw this small unit from Lithuania by the end of this month. At 1630 today, the last piece of military equipment—an automatic crane—left the Mickunai unit.

A Vilnius Radio correspondent has been informed by the deputy commander of the battalion, Major Vladimir Chudin, that all the equipment of the battalion—36 armament units and 15 trailer units—are situated at Visoriai, a military unit on the outskirts of Vilnius. According to Major Chudin, on the morning of 28

February, the battalion will leave in a northeastern direction and will cross the Lithuanian state border behind Zarasai.

According to unconfirmed sources, the battalion will be deployed in Pskov Oblast in Russia. Major Chudin told Vilnius Radio that the former battalion's territory would be soon handed over to Lithuania. Until this happens, the territory is guarded by several soldiers of the former Soviet Army.

As we have reported, the commander of the Mickunai battalion, Colonel Vladimir Gerasimov, announced last Monday that his unit will move from Lithuania during the night of 3-4 March. This means that the previous agreement between participants in the state delegations—that the first unit be withdrawn in February—would have been violated.

At present, it seems that the only obstacle to confirming the withdrawal of the Army in accordance with the agreement may be whether the battalion territory will be handed over to Lithuania, in accordance with the agreed order. Apart from that, the chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed in the middle of January that the army withdrawal should start from Vilnius. But the delegations of negotiators have not agreed on this.

This evening the government telegraph agency ELTA made public a report pointing out that not handing over battalion territory according to the agreed order may supply grounds for Lithuania to regard that Russia has not complied with the mutual agreement. According to this report, Russian Army representatives failed to come to the Ministry of National Defense today to finalize the bilateral inspection of the unit's territory. Yesterday, Russian Army representatives, having arrived for this purpose, stated that they had no authorization to sign any such document.

According to ELTA, military equipment left Mickunai today without advanced warning either to the Ministry of National Defense or to police. The Ministry of National Defense has not been informed about the removal of military equipment from the unit in Visoriai, or about transfer of territory in Mickunai, says ELTA.

Late in the evening Deputy Minister of National Defense Jonas Pauzuolis told Vilnius Radio that, according to the mutual agreement, the unit to be withdrawn may cross the state border only after obtaining his permission, as the person authorized by government, on the issue of the army withdrawal. As of this evening, nobody had asked for any such permission.

Landsbergis: Withdrawal 'Biggest Problem'

LD2902181892 Hamburg DPA in German 2245 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuanian Supreme Council chairman, said that the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Lithuania is his

country's biggest problem. Some 40,000 soldiers are still stationed in Lithuania, many in the capital Vilnius, he said at the traditional St. Matthew's Supper in Hamburg Town Hall this evening. Despite negotiations and agreements, the deadlines for the withdrawal of the Army are not being met. "They are trying to convince us that the Army consists of new CIS soldiers, and that it (the CIS) has no address."

Lithuania wants to take from the former Soviet Army equipment equivalent to what was taken from Lithuania in the Soviet occupation of 1940. Landsbergis said a further problem is his country's great dependency on energy from the former Soviet Union. There is a danger that the country's oil refinery will have to cease operations. Lithuania is planning the construction of an oil pipeline to the Baltic to create greater energy independence. Landsbergis said he is hoping for German interest in this project.

On his country's transition from a planned to a market economy and from dictatorship to democracy, Landsbergis said: "The ice is very thick, and it is not very easy to smash. But it is being carried away by the river, and there is nothing that can stop it. It has a clear destination: the Baltic."

Says Troop Withdrawal Slow

*OW0603092392 Tokyo KYODO in English 0911 GMT
06 Mar 92*

[Text] Tokyo, March 6 KYODO—Lithuanian Supreme Council President Vytautas Landsbergis criticized Russia on Friday for going slow on the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Lithuania.

Landsbergis, speaking at a news conference at the Japan National Press Club, said "Illegal stationing (of troops) on our soil" is a major problem after Lithuania achieved independence last September.

Landsbergis said some 60,000 former Soviet troops are still stationed in Lithuania, with military bases in the capital Vilnius and in other main cities.

The Lithuanian leader, who is visiting Japan on an unofficial five-day trip through Monday, said Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed in January to start removing the troops immediately, but Russia had not withdrawn any troops until Monday and then only 100 personnel were removed.

He said he thinks the removal of the small unit "was done in connection with the coming session of NATO conference in Brussels."

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will hold a meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on March 10 and one of the topics to be discussed is the removal of former Soviet forces from Baltic states.

Landsbergis suggested to reporters that the 100 troops were removed so that "Russian officials could say the removal began" at the conference, and compared it to "a TV removal."

He also said Lithuania is planning to hold a referendum in May to decide whether to restore the post of president in the government.

He said if the presidency is given a green light by the referendum, a presidential election could take place as early as this fall.

He noted, however, that there are some voices among the Lithuanian public expressing doubt as to whether the presidency need really be restored, or would really contribute to the economic reform under way in Lithuania.

Landsbergis, who is one of the presidential hopefuls, said he personally thinks the post is necessary in Lithuania because there are very few republics without presidents nowadays.

Draft Open Skies Agreement Positively Assessed

*MK2602140092 Moscow MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS
in Russian No 9, 26 Feb 92 p 13*

["Excerpts" from report by Yuriy Golotyuk: Spies Will Visit Us]

[Text] The fourth round of talks on "Open Skies" currently is going on in Vienna. Naturally, there is no Soviet delegation at the talks as there is no longer a USSR. The Russian Federation delegation is working in Vienna, headed by Yevgeniy Golovko, official representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Representatives of Belarus and Ukraine also are attending. The experts unanimously note the constructive nature of the current positions of the participants. According to preliminary evaluations, the draft of the "Open Skies" policy is already 70 percent complete. So there is every reason to expect that by the time of the Helsinki summit meeting being planned for the second half of March, work on the agreement will have been completed.

Then what is it that we have been unable to agree upon with our "potential enemy" over the course of these two years?

"Among the conditions unacceptable to us was, for example, the proposal by NATO countries to equip observation aircraft with dozens of different types of equipment", explains Colonel Podchernyayev. "The Soviet delegation proved that this was simply spying equipment. In the final analysis, it was agreed that during the first two years of the agreement's implementation, only aerial photo equipment and video cameras will be placed onboard reconnaissance aircraft. Subsequently, sideways-looking radar stations and infrared equipment will be added.

The desire of NATO countries to make more than 100 reconnaissance flights a year over our country did not

suit us. The Soviet delegation had aimed for 20. In the end, apparently, we reached a compromise decision: 40 flights per year. The fact that the United States and its allies did not guarantee us the opportunity to overfly their military bases located in states not participating in the talks—say, in Japan—provoked the most serious disagreements. As peculiar “compensation,” the Soviet side proposed closing a number of regions of the USSR to reconnaissance flights. Implied, of course, were air fields, ranges, and military production of the highest level of secrecy. It is on this very point that the talks almost stalled.

Finally, however, it was agreed that the Soviet Union would open all of its territory to reconnaissance flights and NATO members would give us information on their military activities at bases located in third countries.

True, with the collapse of the Union the situation has become complicated. Russia, “inheriting” the talks on “Open Skies” from the USSR, now can guarantee the openness of only its own Russian skies. The question of who will sign the document in Helsinki also remains undecided. It has not been ruled out that all the presidents of the sovereign states will sign, but as yet this is only a proposal.

So what do “Open Skies” bode for us? Not only an entrance to a completely new level of interaction with the West, but also a definite savings of the materials earmarked by the state for intelligence. “Reconnaissance from an aircraft is much more efficient and many times cheaper than information gotten by us from space satellites”, declares Colonel Podchernyayev.

At the same time, in the event the agreement on “Open Skies” is signed, Russian industry can count on very longterm cooperation with the West in the area of creating reconnaissance aircraft. Now, all the participating countries are examining the possibility of using our IL-76 transport plane for this purpose—true, having put on them French engines and some equipment from England—and the approximate price of one IL-76 is around 30-40 million dollars. So it is not ruled out that “Open Skies” will gain us political as well as financial capital.

Head of Belarusian Security Commission on Creation of Army

LD2702091192 Moscow TASS in English 0843 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—Belarus needs a small but highly effective army to ensure its security, Mechislav Grib, head of the Belarussian Parliamentary Commission for National Security and Defence, said.

In an interview with the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Grib said from 0.5 to 0.9 percent of adults should serve in the army, which is expected to employ 90,000 troops. The move also envisages considerable reduction of troops stationed in the republic.

Speaking on the future structure of the Belarussian Armed Forces, Grib stressed that “it won’t differ drastically from the structure of the existing Belarussian military district”.

He mentioned that the dire economic situation in the Republic will force the Army to refrain from large-scale war games and new purchases of military hardware.

Grib called for the preservation of the single logistics supply of the Armed Forces during the transition period, adding that “in the future, Belarus will support its army by itself”.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Nuclear Testing in Kazakhstan Outside Test Site

924P0082A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 2, Jan 92 pp 14-15

[Article by Yuriy Lushin: “A Big Secret ‘For Peaceful Purposes’”]

[Text]

This is by no means the end of the story because the secrets that I touched are too deep. And it started by chance.

It came to me about three years ago on an expedition with biologists who were counting the numbers of saiga antelopes. The work was tedious: Fly in a tiny AN-2 aircraft for eight hours a day searching from the air and counting the herds of the steppe antelope that by some miracle are still living even in our days (from the results of the count the scientists offer recommendations on the numbers of saiga that can be shot without harming its reproduction). We flew above the steppe in squares, going from Aktyubinsk Oblast first to the edge of Guryev Oblast and then to the edge of Uralsk Oblast (the saiga know no frontiers). On some days the flights were suddenly cancelled even though it was beautiful May weather, and the pilot was fit, and the aircraft was in proper order.

“Circumstances,” Eldos Ismagilov, the leader of our expedition would sigh mysteriously. The burden of some secret was weighing down on him, but he was not able to live with it for long. “This test site is shutting off our oxygen,” he would say. “They are firing again and we are banned.” Even though they stopped their experiments during the time that the saiga were migrating...

A day later the missile people would allow us to fly. Of course, the test site was empty; the saiga had left only a chain of tracks on the damp earth by the water holes. Everything living had hastened to remove itself from this accursed place, and all we saw was a occasional pair or threesome of animals that had been left behind. Were they sick? Wounded? It is hard to say. Eldos pointed out an almost unnoticed place between the sand hills and said that for some reason the film in the cameras was being exposed, and so there was no reason to delay. The

local hunters also knew about it, but no one could explain the reason for the strange phenomenon. On another occasion, now back on the ground, they showed me an enormously deep crater of unknown origin. I stood on its lip, and everyone put forward his own hypothesis.

"It was a meteorite strike."

"It is a karst sinkhole" (So why were there no other in the vicinity?).

"Perhaps a nuclear explosion?" I suggested, but no one supported that version. At the time it seemed fantastic. Nevertheless, I did designate the suspicious place with a question mark on a map of Kazakhstan. The mark was made in Bayganinskiy Rayon in Aktyubinsk Oblast. How could I foretell that this point would become the start of a map of nuclear explosions that were carried out not just at the Semipalatinsk test site? It turned out that they were conducted in various oblasts of Kazakhstan starting from 1966 (and perhaps even earlier?) right up to recent times.

When I was already in possession of documents confirming the reality of dozens of atomic explosions outside the test site I went to former Politburo member D.A. Kunayev, with a question: Did Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich know anything about this?

"No, it is the first time I have heard of it."

"And this despite the fact that you were on friendly relations with Brezhnev himself?"

"Nevertheless, I know nothing. I knew little about the Semipalatinsk test site. Everything was under the power of the military, and they did not share their secrets with us."

Perhaps, of course, we might be surprised at the extreme lack of curiosity of the erstwhile leader of the republic. Perhaps we may doubt the veracity of his admission. But I believe that he really was ignorant about this.

But let us return to my nuclear investigation. It moved slowly. The second point on the map appeared on a year later. It was at Mangyshlak at the time when they started to talk about conversion and the top secret Caspian mining-and-metallurgical combine (PGMK) in the city of Shevchenko opened its doors for the first time to journalists. I visited a quarry where they mined uranium ore. They assured me that it was quite safe to work there. But for some reason all the dump truck drivers traveled in respirators and the roads were being constantly flooded (Later the director of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Academy of Sciences Institute of High Energy Physics, I.Ya. Chasnikov, enlightened me and explained that the ingress of radioactive dust particles even as small as a micron into the lungs can lead to the formation of malignant tumors. But of course, there was no danger). It was there at Shevchenko that I heard about a certain drilling master who 20 years before had taken part in the drilling of an unusual bore hole a meter in

diameter in Yeraliyevskiy Rayon. It was not a deep hole, about half a kilometer. When they had finished, the bore hole was taken under the control of the military, enormous coils of cable and boxes containing instruments were brought in, and a guard was posted.

Infected by this time with the Semipalatinsk test site syndrome, I compared the facts. Bore holes a meter in diameter were also bored for atomic explosions at the test site, and to the same depth, and along with the bomb cables attached to instruments were lowered into the ground to record the parameters of the detonation. Similar, very similar... But to what end had they torn Mangyshlak apart? Those who had taken part in the experiment could tell, if they were willing. Where to find them? At that time I did not know that the military had selected a site for yet another nuclear test site, and that on Mangyshlak, 100 kilometers from the small town of Say-Utes, during 1969-1970 not one but three atomic explosions took place at depths of 410 to 740 meters. But something there did not suit the military. Was it perhaps that enormous subsiding craters appeared at the epicenter of the explosion, like those at the Nevada test site? At Semipalatinsk that did not happen; there the ground was simply burst asunder and fissures were formed that could be hidden by pressing them flat with bulldozers. But here the atomic secrets were too obvious.

I suggested that the Mangyshlak experimenters would most likely be in Kurchatov, on the test site. It was understood that they would hardly be found so simply, nevertheless it was worth a try. A second journey to the test site along with activists from the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement could not be put off. I was aware that it would be necessary to meet with the leadership of the test site but I understood that none of the generals would answer my question (especially after the piece I had published about the test site). How to ask it? Try circumlocution, walk round the target dropping hints? There was too little time. So I decided that come what may, given any convenient chance I would ask my question directly of any of the physicists or specialist officers. The chance presented itself and I asked a colonel (I shall not disclose his name or duties).

"I know," I said as confidently as I could, "that your people conducted tests not only at the test site but also in various oblasts in Kazakhstan, as, for example, Aktyubinsk and Mangyshlak."

"And in Guryev and Uralsk oblasts also," my interlocutor unexpectedly added, "but that was not our work, it was the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry."

"When was that?"

"In various years, I cannot say for sure."

"And the rayons, you do not know?"

"It was of no interest to me." The colonel was beginning to get annoyed. But I had been lucky so I decided to check one more unlikely rumor.

"Tell me, is it true that there was a case in which a hydrogen bomb was lost on the test site?"

"Utter nonsense. Some illiterate Kazakh shepherd found a cylinder on the steppe marked 'Hydrogen' and raised a panic."

Also interesting—illiterate but he could read. Amantay Kaliyev, the leader of the Nevada movement in Pavlodar told me about this case another way. By the way, a large part of the test site is located right there in Pavlodar Oblast, so that it might even be called the Pavlodar site.

"The affair happened in 1967," Amantay related. "A herder, one Botay Kaishbayev, was taking horses to Mayskiy Rayon in our oblast, and near the nomad camp at Beketay he stumbled across a strange object that was obviously of military origin. The herder was scared and he raised a fuss. The military arrived, surrounded the place, and combed it carefully, and the strange object was loaded onto a truck with great precautions, and then it departed. The inhabitants were questioned meticulously; had anyone tried to hide any object?... And during a recent meeting between the test site chief, Lieutenant General Ilyenko, and the inhabitants of Mayskiy Rayon," Kaliyev continued, "I asked him: 'So what happened, Arkadiy Danilovich, did your people lose a bomb?' 'They did not lose it, they dropped it.' And he would say no more on the subject."

What a diplomat?! However, we have already encountered the diplomacy of generals, so let us return to the investigation. Thus, by now there are four nuclear points on the map, true, still without exact coordinates. But the main thing has really been confirmed: Nuclear explosions took place not only on the test site. Does this not mean that the entire country could become a test site? USSR deputy minister for atomic energy and industry Professor V. Mikhaylov unexpectedly reinforced this wild thought with his long statement in PRAVDA in October 1990. I quote: "In various parts of the country (that is, outside the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya test sites—author's note) since 1963 some 115 underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes have taken place, but at great depth and having low yields, including those used to create underground cavities, extinguish fires in gas blowouts, intensify oil recovery, and make soundings of the earth's crust for large-scale surveying for minerals." The professor went on to write that in the past 10 years alone 43 such detonations had taken place. Unfortunately, there was not a word about locations. Neither was there any discussion of, for example, whether the extra oil recovered by the nuclear method had higher levels of radiation than the norms. Atomic sounding of the earth's crust is also quite cute. I would just like to know how the ground water is behaving at the sites of the soundings, and what people who do not suspect that they are drinking water contaminated with radiation are experiencing. These are not idle questions... In the second issue of PRIRODA for 1991 two nuclear physicists describe in the greatest detail how with the help of two atomic detonations in

salt domes they created underground capacities into which toxic chemicals and radioactive waste are pumped and stored in perpetuity since this is economically advantageous and ecologically safe.

God forgive me, old skeptic that I am, but I find it hard to believe in the eternal nature of anything created by human hands, particularly in our country. But I am convinced that by this method we are preparing delayed-action chemical and radiation bombs for our descendants.

"... I was on the shores of Atomkul (in translation from Kazakh this means "Atomic Lake") quite recently, last autumn, as part of a large group of foreign and domestic journalists and people's deputies. I honestly admit that I shall do everything possible to avoid having to go there again. We arrived in Kurchatov at dusk. As the stern men in uniform (no one, I believe, was below the rank of major) checked our passes at the checkpoint darkness fell. Notwithstanding the majors warned us: Cameras and video cameras must be surrendered. No photographs along the way." I almost fell out of my chair on the bus in amazement. The test site was already officially closed but this mania for secrecy persisted.

At the first news conference General Ilyenko, as always, repeated that the closure of the test site had been a mistake, that we should not be weakening the country's defenses, and that the Semipalatinsk test site is the most reliable and the cleanest in the world, and that even the Americans admit this. Probably everyone would have swallowed this lie had not an American journalist picked up the microphone and, to general laughter in the hall, stated that she had heard exactly the same words in Nevada from an American general and, of course, about the Nevada test site. To which Arkadiy Danilovich responded imperturbably:

"You can be convinced of this for yourselves. Where you will be visiting tomorrow is totally clean, with a normal radiation background."

Dozens of tape recorders, including mine, recorded these words. Later I tried unsuccessfully to understand why the general had got himself into a mess, for he was well aware of our route—the site of the first nuclear explosion, and then Atomic Lake...

Enormous melted boulders cluttered the approach to Atomic Lake, some weighing as much as a ton, thrown about in an 8-kilometer circle. You will encounter nothing similar on the steppe here. The test site people explained that in January 1965 (according to other data in December 1964—author's note) an underground nuclear explosion took place in the bed of the steppe Chagan River (which, incidentally, flows into the Irtysh) for national economic purposes—to form a reservoir. A kind of open-air physics experiment. The patter let out of the bag the fact that these boulders had been hurled out of the crater by the explosion to a height of almost a kilometer.

"So, was it an underground detonation?" I tried to get clarification from the chief of radiation safety at the test site, Colonel Samata Smagulov.

"Yes, underground," he confirmed, without batting an eyelid. This unholy lie was then repeated many times by General Ilyenko and all his subordinates. Why? For in the vicinity of the atomic lake there are thousands of witnesses to this lie. True, they remain silent—they are only stones and boulders. But anyone, even the nonspecialist, understands that in underground explosions there is none of this kind of debris, and that the boulders should remain under the ground...

We move to the lake, dosimeters in hand, chattering constantly—Japanese, American, French, Russian. No, the stones are not silent. I see a French television operator by one of the boulders, feverishly tugging on a respirator and excitedly saying something to an interpreter. She translates:

"We must leave here quickly, the radiation level is too high, about 9,000 microroentgens an hour" (hundreds of times above normal—author's note). "Is this dangerous?" she asks us.

"Not at all." The painfully familiar voice on the television debates, the cheerful voice of Colonel Petrushenko, is suddenly heard. "and to prove it I shall now take a dip in the dreaded lake."

Taking off his tunic as he goes, the colonel runs to the water shouting:

"In the summer Nevzorov and I ate fish soup here..."

The colonel splashes about in the atomic lake, calling on his 12-year-old son to jump into the icy October water, promising everyone who joins him a shot of that spirit that is in such short supply here.

The dosimeter chatters desperately but it is as if we do not hear it. It is like some kind of theater of the absurd with atomic scenery.

A real nuclear catastrophe occurred here, and as a result more than 200 people perished. Perhaps the military people really did plan an underground explosion to have the Ashes run into the Chagan, but that is not what happened; either there was a mistake in the calculations or a nuclear surprise. It is a secret that we are unlikely to learn. But you cannot hide the result; the explosion was a ground detonation and about 3.5 million cubic meters of earth, ashes, and rocks were hurled out from the epicenter.

One of the cleanup crew, Vladimir Zhironov from Ust-Kamenogorsk (he is now chief of a production dispatcher service in the Irtyshsk Construction Administration, but at that time was a junior foreman with the secret "Post Office Box No. 16") said this:

"I was 23 at the time, and I was strong, very strong. But I spent several days at the epicenter and admitted that I

was tired: I started to have nosebleeds, my throat scraped like emery paper, and I started to choke and had an excruciating headache... It was terrible then; everything for kilometers around was strewn with radioactive ash. It had to be carried away so that it would not be carried into the Irtysh River in the spring. We worked conscientiously, did not spare ourselves. One bulldozer driver went into the atomic water with a hawser to save a bulldozer. He saved the bulldozer, but he did not last for long; he died. As for me, I left the site of the fire with chronic decorations—bleeding from the nose, disease of the pancreas, bronchitis, cholecystitis, hepatitis...

According to Zhironov, of the 300-strong cleanup crew (the entire detachment was formed in Ust-Kamenogorsk) about 30 people are still alive. This has been the cost of an atomic explosion for peaceful purposes. Now, those who are still alive are fighting for their rights and privileges to be put on the same footing as those who suffered in the Chernobyl catastrophe. The atomic department is responding with indifferent formal replies...

The theater of the absurd also continued at the final news conference with General Ilyenko. At the insistent request of the journalists the general ordered a radiation safety (or danger?) map of the test site to be brought out. Territory with a radiation background of up to 50 microroentgens an hour (moderate) was colored yellow; blue signified 100 microroentgens an hour (undesirable to stay in the area for long), red up to 10,000 microroentgens an hour (very dangerous). Three minutes later the general gave another order:

"That's all, remove the map, we do not want the whole world to know about it."

He was splendid in his desire not to leak a secret. He sincerely failed to understand why anyone other than himself needs to know. And I sincerely failed to understand why this map is not published, why it is not distributed to the sovkhoses bordering the test site that on the sly drive their cattle to graze not only in the yellow zones on the map, but also the red zones. We saw the tracks of domestic animals on the shores of Atomic Lake. We saw people loading bales of hay onto a vehicle at the site of the first nuclear explosion, where 42 years later the readings are as high as 10,000 microroentgens, while cows grazed nearby.

"Those are not our animals," Ilyenko said, "we have none there. We have forbidden grazing but they do not listen to us. We check our animals and our milk regularly, and conduct analyses. Everything here is normal."

"Why did they not warn us that we would encounter high levels of radiation at Atomic Lake and in the area of the first nuclear explosion?"

"I did not want to take you there at all. This was 'Nevada's' idea, they insisted. But I am sure that what you received in two hours at the test site was quite safe, even beneficial for the body to some extent."

We have come that far. The only thing the general did not do was add that the test site was quite suitable for the construction of a resort zone.

I realized that only independent experts can tell the full truth both about the secrets of the test site and about the nuclear explosions around it. I marked Atomic Lake and the approximate boundaries of the test site on my map. On that same trip I succeeded in learning about a source from whom it might be possible to pick up information about other nuclear explosions for national economic purposes. I am not about to tell you how I obtained it, but I have in my hands a document about 25 atomic explosions in various oblasts of Kazakhstan (my source claims that there were about 40). The document is genuine, signed by the minister of atomic energy and industry, V.F. Kononov. The document lists the years and sites where explosions took place (without indicating the yields), and also the depths, designations, and nature of the radiation situation after the experiment.

This is what it states about the situation: "Recultivation work is being carried out on the technological areas." Excuse me: If we are talking about recultivation (what, it has been going on for more than 10 years?) then this means that the surface must have been destroyed, does it not? Is this possible with underground explosions? Or do we have more dark secrets here? As before, I also have grave doubts about the harmlessness of underground explosions and about the purposes for which they took place—for military purposes on the test site, for peaceful purposes outside it.

Unfortunately, these doubts are not groundless. In 1973 two atomic explosions for peaceful purposes took place in Chimkent Oblast to make seismic soundings for the purpose of finding structures that would be promising for mineral surveys. So, first "Meridian-2" was set off at a depth of 400 meters in Suzakskiy Rayon (260 kilometers to the north of the settlement of Chulak-Kurgan), and then "Meridian-3" at a depth of 610 meters in Kyzylkumskiy Rayon (40 kilometers north of the settlement of Tabak-Bulak). The situation was described as follows: "There have been no excursions of products from the explosion and the site has been closed." That is, do not worry, citizens, everything is in order, everything is as it was before, maybe better.

I do not know whether or not anyone found any minerals for the motherland but the "products" have in fact appeared, and the inhabitants of precisely these rayons have started to complain of deteriorating health. This year (17 years after the explosions; it could not be done earlier because no one knew about them) a commission independent of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry (scientists, physicians, geologists, public figures, ecologists) was set up "to study the ecological situation and the health of the population in Kyzylkumskiy and Suzakskiy rayons in Chimkent Oblast in connection with existing production facilities for uranium, scandium, and other rare-earth elements with respect to underground leaching, and also the nuclear explosions

that took place in the 1970's." The words here in quotation marks are taken from the official conclusion sent by experts to the president of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev. Their conclusions are disquieting. I quote: "In the underground water in both rayons strontium-90 was found, and in six bore holes cesium-137 was found, which testifies to radionuclide contamination of the water-bearing horizons. In Suzakskiy Rayon... anomalous concentrations of radioactive elements were found in underground water in 39 bore holes... Analysis of the statistical data on the state of health of the population has shown that... 65- 70 percent of the total number of oncologic diseases are cancers of the esophagus, stomach, and liver... The incidence of tuberculosis and diseases in organs of the gastrointestinal tract has increased by a factor of 1.5-2.5... Because of the presence in underground water in Kyzylkumskiy and Sizakskiy rayons of strontium-90 and cesium-137 we demand that the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry study water containment in the cavities formed by underground nuclear explosions across the entire territory of the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic. If leakage of radionuclides from the explosion cavities into stratal water is found, the leaks should be eliminated."

Fair demands, and naive. I do not know what President N. Nazarbayev had to say on the subject, but personally I doubt that it would be possible to stop the radiation that has already penetrated into the ground water, or eliminate the leaks. How would it be done? Could one more nuclear charge be used to seal off everything? Incidentally, this not a joke. It would be a doubtful thing to entrust the monitoring of underground cavities to those same atomic people, because their answer would be the same as always: Everything is normal.

No, it is independent experts who must monitor for the atomic people. It is essential immediately to make public all preparations for atomic explosions for so-called national economic, peaceful purposes, and even better, stop them. It is essential to make public a complete map of such explosions. And it is time to close down the theater of the absurd and remove the scenery.

[Box, p 15]

Lest I bore the reader, let me cite only a small part of the information that I gleaned from the document signed by V.F. Kononov:

Some explosions were given cutesy code names. For example, "Lira-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6." That is, six explosions took place under the code name "Lira" in 1983-1984 at depths of 840 to 990 meters in order to create underground cavities in a salt dome (in Burlinskiy Rayon, Uralsk Oblast, 17 kilometers north of the village of Ilek). Other explosions are designated simply by figures and letters. Thus, in Yerallyevskiy Rayon, Mangyshlak Oblast, three explosions, 1-T, 2-T, and 6-T, took place 110-115 kilometers east of the village of Say-Utes in 1969-1970 at depths of 410-740 meters; "there was no excursion of products, subsidence craters were formed."

The question is: What happened with 3-, 4-, and 5-T? There are many such omissions in the table... To judge from the document, the last explosion took place in 1987, the earliest—"A-1"—in 1966 in Dengizskiy Rayon, Guryev Oblast, at a depth of 160 meters. And there, in recent years, right through to 1979, another nine explosions took place (for some reason "A-6" is omitted) within a radius of 20 kilometers, true, now at depths of 600 to 1,500 meters. Essentially, it is just another test site.

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Operations, Environmental Harm at Semipalatinsk Described

924P0095A Alma-Ata EKSPRESS in Russian 9 Jan 92
pp 4-5

[Article by L. Mostovaya; date and place not given: "Test Range"]

[Text] *Only recently, there were five of them on our planet, giant polygons known as test ranges, living by their own special laws. Nevada, Lop-Nor, Mururoa, Novaya Zemlya, and Semipalatinsk. The closed space of one of them has ceased to be a place where the flesh of the land was mercilessly tormented. However, maimed, it will inflict harm, through no fault of its own, on everything alive for a century yet to come...*

The Semipalatinsk nuclear test range, one of the world's most active, was officially closed by an ukase of the President of Kazakhstan on 29 August 1991. However, it had fallen silent 2 years ago, thanks to the protests of people living both near the nuclear monster, as well as far from it. The "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" anti-nuclear movement led this difficult struggle. And the struggle continues.

A conference of those who have suffered from nuclear tests and the "5-I" International Tribune for Global Disarmament, held in Semipalatinsk, confirmed this. Before it began, free press days in Kurchatov were organized. The information obtained in these days was striking and sometimes cast us into despair. Again, it confirmed that closing the Semipalatinsk test range is only the first obstacle to have been overcome.

The City That is Not on Maps

It is most interesting that all of us, Soviet and foreign journalists and representatives of anti-nuclear movements, ended up at this only recently very secret site in the role of guests, about whom our military hosts, to put it mildly, were not very happy. The suspicion that this was so began to creep to mind at the moment when our Ikarus [bus] suddenly came to a stop on the steppe about 10 miles or so from Kurchatov. The time was most annoying for the curious, as it was not night yet but it was nearly dusk. However, all the same we did manage to discern a military Uazik [make of automobile] standing at some distance. After a minute or so people in civilian

dress arrived and checked the passenger list for a very long time. Understandably, we were traveling to a military site, but there was something in their glances and curt replies...

We arrived at Kurchatov in utter darkness. The city that is not on geographic maps. The city without a cemetery. The city without crime.

It is a city built of four-story buildings with ideally clean streets. It is a city with a large number of political display stands. A city with a diarchy. A city in which half the residents are in the military.

The next morning, the almost idyllic picture surprised us: Alongside the streets, now and then figures in military uniforms appeared on bicycles. Being carried away by the sight was hindered by the thought that the sinister test range is somewhere quite nearby, and that these people on ecologically clean transport are the "cogs" of the nuclear monster.

Yet another individual feature of this town is the abundance of hotels. They are completely devoid of any luxury whatsoever, with one or two exceptions. For instance, from the severe, drab sign of the "Dnepr" hotel, an unusual name for a Kazakh town, it would have been hard to guess how different it was inside. Only the placement of foreigners in it gave away its first-class nature. People from Moscow and Alma-Ata or other Soviets stayed in dormitory-type hotels. However, the advantages for foreigners ended with this. The next two days were the test range.

Counting Back: 1989

For the first time, the military for some reason decided to show the site of the last underground explosion: a concrete plug in the form of a cylinder rising above the land, clumps of "baby's breath," and steppe as far as the horizon itself. Since there was nothing impressive to look at, the owners of dosimeters became the center of attention. The average reading was 14-17 microroentgens per hour [mr/h]. The head of test range radiation safety, S.G. Smagulov, accompanying us, answered the journalists' questions.

"Have there been accidents during the tests?"

"There have been no serious accidents. Several times, inert gases have exploded through cracks. However, they are not harmful, because they have a short half-life, from minutes to 3 days. Moreover, recently the epicenter was mandatorily encased in concrete.

From speeches at the conference.

V.N. Li, head doctor of the oblast SES [Health and Epidemiology Center]:

"Every third underground explosion was accompanied by one accident or another."

"Since what year has the explosion epicenter been encased in concrete?"

"Since 1988."

"Were people in the rayons adjoining the test range informed about forthcoming explosions?"

"On the day before, we informed the local authorities of the date, time and place of the explosion and gave recommendations."

Having waited for the friskiest photojournalists, who had run all over the okrug in a radius of 2 kilometers, the "Ikarus" drove us to a nuclear lake. According to military information, the 1965 explosion was produced for national economic purposes at the order of the republic Ministry of Water Resources. In the tremendous crater, which cut off the river Chagan, a lake by the same name was formed.

The bus stopped by a "Danger Zone" warning sign. They suggested that we go further on foot. Some took the road, others moved straight toward the shore of the lake. Perhaps only the boulders, chaotically strewn about, betrayed its artificial origin. The lake looks like a lake, reeds grow in the shallows. Off in the distance is a small home where, in all likelihood, a hunter lives. Somehow, the thought was slow in coming: People live here, which means that they catch and eat fish from this lake. Indeed, they do eat them and they also sell these fish in Kurchatov. The dosimeters, which had begun to "chat" like crazy, forced us to realize the full tragedy: from 3,000-5,000 microroentgens per hour to 10,000 at certain places near the lake! This is a hundredfold above the maximum allowable norm. The foreigners were first to rush back to the bus, regardless of the fact that L.S. Khristenko, head of the test range's seismic safety service, had not finished his story about this lake's history. Most likely, we all would have been taken out of the danger zone more quickly, if the odious figure of Colonel Petrushenko, USSR people's deputy, had not quite unexpectedly appeared. Thumping himself on the chest, he began to prove that the lake is not radioactive. After arguing with one of the Pavlodar representatives of the anti-nuclear movement, he undressed and climbed into the water, having ordered his 12-year-old son to follow his example. There, he says, what is so dangerous! No dissuasions were made and the child, despite the fact that the weather was cold, only 5-7 degrees, obeyed his father. At that moment, I thought: Dear God, please let there be as few such Petrushenkos as possible in the military, unthinking, pushing even their own offspring into an unnecessary risk for the sake of farce. Do they think about other people's children like this too? It is not merely weapons, but nuclear weapons which are in their hands...

From a speech at the conference.

Orazgali Iskakov has lived almost his entire life in the village of Znamenka, 60 kilometers from the test range.

"I remember quite well that in 1969 we pastured our cattle near Lake Chagan. I shepherded a large herd of sheep. No one ever said that it was forbidden, nobody ever drove us away from it. In the summer, in the heat, I swam in the lake several times. By 1978, spots had begun to appear on my face. The doctors said that I was sick—red lupus... They are treating me, but nothing helps. My son was born with an eye defect, and everyone in the family has anemia and high blood pressure."

Roughly another hour passed before we managed to collect the photographers. They had scattered far in search of sensational subjects. Many of them did not suspect in what dangerous places they were walking. Later, when the journalists were asking S.G. Smagulov why he had said nothing about the radiation level and why personal means of protection had not been issued, a strange answer followed:

"They notified us of this measure 24 hours in advance... And they said that I would simply be a guide, that I should do nothing more."

It was useless to ask him a question concerning professional or even simply human honor. We were convinced of this once more literally the next morning.

1949

Without even issuing respirators and again without informing us of the radiation level, they took us to the site of the first nuclear explosion, which thundered on 29 August 1949. Four years later, on 12 August 1953, a 500-kiloton thermonuclear bomb was tested here. For the first time, a large-scale experiment was conducted on the effects of a nuclear weapon on people's entire life-support complex. The remnants of destroyed homes, the fused turrets of tanks, the gaping eye-sockets of "ganders" (measuring devices were installed on these turrets during the above-ground tests)... The ominous evidence of a creation of the human mind. Parity with America was achieved at that time. Nine to 10 days after the first explosion, the residents of Karaul and another 200 settlements were returned to their homes. The dose of external gamma radiation was terrible: 50-60 roentgens per hour. S.G. Smagulov comments on this tragic situation, which has already become history.

"As a specialist, I can say that people should have been returned to these places no earlier than after two-three months."

"You said that all the nearest settlements were evacuated. However, the Mayskiy settlement is located all of 30 kilometers from here and they never evacuated the people from it. What is this, an experiment on people?"

"..."

"During the first nuclear explosion, were people used as biological test subjects?"

"No, only animals."

From a speech at the conference.

Zhakhiya Akhmetov, 64 years old, of the Znamenka settlement.

"I served at the test range from September 1947 to October 1949. On 29 August 1949, 50 of us, soldiers from different companies, were driven out to the test range, formed up, and issued dark glasses. Then they ordered us to descend into a trench. There were a dog and six rabbits there. Sheep and cattle were tethered not far from the trench. Cigarettes and sugar were scattered around. The officers gave a command to lie down and left. The bomb fell from above. Everything burst into flame. I do not remember how many of us there were. I wanted to smoke, and we took the cigarettes that were heaped on the ground. An officer arrived and said, 'What are you doing? All this is contaminated.' Later several times they called me to see the doctors and gave me some kind of liquid to drink from a test-tube... I was discharged from the army under oath. I was afraid even to say anything to my relatives. After the test range I was all black and had terrible headaches. For many years I rubbed my head with vinegar and fatty sheep's tail. I made cuts on my feet with a razor and squeezed out black blood. I was mocked because I could not sleep on account of the pain. I had nine children, but two died. The others are all sick. My 35-year-old daughter has been an invalid since birth. My grandchildren are also sick. My relatives talked me out of it, but on television I saw that Americans had been at the test range, and possibly they could tell me everything..."

"Fresh cattle tracks can be seen everywhere here, at the very epicenter. Is grazing actually allowed?"

"No, grazing is prohibited."

"Then how do you explain the fact that a haystack appeared several kilometers from the epicenter last year? The people's deputies tested it: It was radioactive (120 mr/h). I hope you will not deny that many farms conclude agreements with the leadership and carry out the preparation of cattle fodder in the territory of the test range?"

"Yes, in fact, we permit grazing and hay-mowing in radioactively clean territories."

Many scientists claim that in order to obtain an accurate picture of radiation contamination in the territory of the Semipalatinsk test range, which is no more or less than 800,000 hectares, it is necessary to take measurements every 20 meters.

Having once again received an excellent dose of radiation, all covered with dust, we returned to Kurchatov. Exhaustive answers to many questions were not obtained in these two days. Therefore, we requested a press conference with the head of the test range, A.D. Ilyenko. That evening a map of the radiation traces was shown to the journalists. However, Ilyenko did not let us take photographs. True, he did favor those gathered with

a brief comment: Of the rayons adjoining the test range, only Abayskiy Rayon "glows" as before.

Directly within the test range territory there are only two places with high radiation, the nuclear lake and the site of the first nuclear and thermonuclear explosions. The lieutenant general provoked a question with this information: Why was the international group of journalists not equipped with personal protection devices and how come no decontamination was conducted? With the coolness inherent to the military, Ilyenko answered:

"I did not want to show you the site of the first explosion. All claims should be made against the organizers. They asked me to show it, I showed it."

What motivates these people in military uniforms? Is it really just the feeling of losing an inherited estate, where they were unlimited masters, and therefore their reaction borders on cynicism? Even when journalists stand before them? Only the fact that test range employees were together with us at the sites with high radiation prevents answering in the affirmative. They must be their own worst enemies, to take such risks.

We managed to dot all the "i's" at the conference in Semipalatinsk.

Test Range Employees Do Not Need Immunity Vitamins

It happens that quite recently Soviet scientists have developed pharmaceutical stimulants which help an organism cope with the damage done by radiation. They were used for the first time in Chernobyl, half a year after the accident. The immunity vitamins, as they are called in the West, were added to food products. Many countries are already buying these stimulants from us.

Professor G.M. Barenboym, director of the International Ecological Station for Monitoring the Surrounding Environment, spoke of this in his speech at the conference.

"Grigoriy Matveyevich, does this mean that the test range employees feel safe because they are taking immunity vitamins?"

"I cannot say for certain. There is a certain nuance here. There are people who are very susceptible to radiation, and for them even small doses of radiation is a great problem: The immune system is destroyed and abnormalities may arise even on the cellular level. Another category is moderately susceptible. However, there are also those, on whose bodies radiation has virtually no negative effect. When the archives are declassified, it may be possible to see that the test range was a gigantic mincing-machine which mercilessly rejected the susceptible ones and accumulated people whose bodies are not very susceptible to the influence of radiation. There is no cemetery in Kurchatov, because they commissioned people, to put it simply, and sent them away to live out their lives in other cities for a few years, or sometimes only months. A kind of natural selection. Incidentally, the human organism reacts individually not just to

radiation. I happened to observe the following at the Ust-Kamenogorsk Lead and Zinc Plant. A person stands in the shop where the lead is poured into the forms, literally in lead steam. He wears only a gauze bandage as a means of protection. Another person would be dead in a year under such conditions, yet this one is working.

"Nonetheless, the soldiers boast that there are third-generation families in Kurchatov, and therefore there is no harm whatsoever from the nuclear weapons tests. They present this fact as proof of the harmlessness of nuclear tests."

Cancer Victims May Double By the Year 2000

Natural selection... A secret clinic officially called the anti-brucellosis clinic has existed in the oblast for a quarter century. The reports on its data are signed with two seals of secrecy. To this day the research results are stored in secrecy. However, that which is being done with the people of the rayons adjoining the test range can no longer be hidden.

The ceaseless pain for loved ones does not let Marina Zinatovna Iskakova from Bashkol village, Beskaragay-skiy Rayon, stay silent. Her 18-year-old brother died of lung cancer. "Why has the Isakov family been wiped out in the course of 40 years? Who is responsible for this?" the woman asks through her tears.

Doctors are sounding the alarm: There is not a single healthy person in Semipalatinsk today (from a count of a thousand people, a thousand are sick) and 450,000 residents of Semipalatinsk have been subjected to direct radiation. In a year, 2,500 patients pass through the oncology clinic. Due to the absence of modern equipment for early diagnosis, the diagnosis is made successfully when the disease is already irreversible. It is painful to speak of what awaits them in the few remaining years, or sometimes even months, left to them.

The cost of one experimental nuclear device and its underground testing is about 25-30 million rubles on the average. Yet in the only 200-bed clinic in the entire oblast, the doctors are forced to work with a 1958 short-focus unit. They managed to get new gamma-therapeutic equipment, but a special canyon is needed for it. Its construction is frozen: The republic health care system has no money.

"If not for humanitarian aid," says Albert Aleksandrovich, "I do not know in general how we would work. After all, today 200 of every 1,000 people suffer from oncological diseases. The long-term forecast is even less comforting: By the year 2000 this figure will double."

"But the tests at the range have stopped. Why such a forecast?"

"Radiation is insidious, the effect does not manifest immediately and is wave-like in nature. A sharp increase in oncological diseases was observed in Semipalatinsk Oblast 4-15 years after the first tests. Then in the course

of 7 years there was a decline. At 23-27 years, a new outbreak of malignant tumors occurred. Right now, tumors of the lungs and gastrointestinal tract and blood diseases predominate. It is no longer those who fell under the cloud who are getting sick now, but their grandchildren. In order to save people, we need equipment that will enable us to detect the signs of disease in the early stages."

Yes, already the third generation living next door to the nuclear test range is suffering. R.L. Ivanov, doctor of medical sciences, directed the attention of those present to the fact that young women of child-bearing age increasingly often are falling ill with red lupus. Children with strange birth defects and even mutants are being born. To see them with one's own eyes, it suffices to visit the anatomical museum of the Semipalatinsk Medical Institute. In the jars are those damned by the creation of human hands, by the nuclear tests, by the ring of industrial enterprises that is stifling the city, by herbicides, pesticides...

Does the Test Range Have a Future?

It mandatorily should. The people have a future. There is no industry in Kurchatov which rules out conversion. However, the town's specialists represent its most valuable intellectual potential. The laboratories are equipped with unique instruments. There is everything for a scientific center, which would work not to improve weapons, but would solve, for instance, the problems of nuclear power engineering.

The depths of the test range are rich in coal and other minerals. Academician Velikhov repeated this several times, when the question came to the future of the Semipalatinsk test range. The military men heard that the hot energy of the underground explosions has ignited the coal, but modestly kept silent.

"I myself personally saw two bore-holes from which fire was shooting out," I.Kh. Isakov, a geological engineer who on his own initiative has spent many years studying the soils of the test range, reported at the conference. "The fires have been blazing for five years already and only now have come to the surface."

He also warns that burying nuclear and chemical wastes in the territory of the test range (such proposals were voiced) would be a fatal error, because a new man-made seismic zone has appeared as a result of the nuclear tests. This happened because the test range site was selected without considering the specific features of geological structure. First, the deep faults have a connection to the active zones of the earth. Second, the test range area is a mosaic of tectonic plates. The earthquakes in Zaysan were the first alarm, indicating that these plates have begun to move. There is a danger that the hearths of the nuclear explosions, which today seem reliably immured in a glassy casing, will be crushed like an eggshell. Then the radioactive poisons will get into the underground waters and, thus, also into the Irtysh. To imagine what sort of catastrophe this might lead to, it suffices to

remember doctor A. Abylova, an laboratory associate at the Scientific Research Institute of Labor Hygiene and Physiology. She discovered that the water of certain wells in Egindybulakskiy Rayon has mutagenic properties. Karinbek Kuyukov, the young artist who was born without hands, is an offspring of these places. Really, must children who from the time they are in diapers know what nuclear tests are also experience this? Explosions were conducted every 23 days on the average... Probably only children can talk about this in such a way.

Few in the conference hall could hold back the tears, when a nuclear mushroom appeared on the screen after the amazing dance and song compositions, performed by little girls and boys from the Karaul settlement... We also remembered the bright faces of the children from Kurchatov. From the way that one and the same flocks accompanied and greeted our buses, it was obvious that they are quite fed up with this isolation from the outside world. In the only city on the planet to have sprung up in the territory of a test range of death, there is the "Lukomor'ye" Studio. A fairy-tale world shines in two small rooms: various objects, little animals, masks, and dolls painted in the style of Khokhloma, Dymkovo, and Gzhel. And all this was done by the hands of children.

Perhaps it was predestined by fate for the author of the immortal saying "Beauty will save the world" to come to these lands...

Semipalatinsk Land Returned to Former Owners

*PM2602141192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Feb 92 First Edition p 6*

[Report from RIKI, ITAR-TASS roundup under "News Item" rubric: "Kazakhstan"]

[Text] The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site Command, which is to be eliminated in line with a decree by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, has set about handing back to its previous owners land that for four decades was controlled by the USSR Defense Ministry. The so-called buffer lands located between the zone where the weapons of mass destruction were tested and agricultural regions are also being returned. The total area of these lands comes to 870,000 hectares. The lands are being returned to Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar, and Karaganda Oblasts.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Report on CBW Tests in Kazakhstan

*924P0088A Alma-Ata YEGEMENDI QAZAQSTAN
in Kazakh 10 Dec 91 p 3*

[Article by YEGEMENDI QAZAQSTAN reporter Murat Syzdyq: "The White Steppe is No Garden Steppe"]

[Text] At first completely new military vehicles passed the completely open road aside the village and when they

began to flow towards the north various explanations were offered. "Hey, what do you think. They are going to establish a nice little military base in the area. Now we are going to get all kinds of snappy clothes and nice things." Thus a group of hey cutters. They did not know that shortly thereafter fertile livestock pastures were to be wrapped helter skelter in fire and become a military testing area. Now, more than 17 years have passed since that time. Blood drips from the sword of the governmental-administrative system. Everything has been revealed. It is in the palm of our hands. At a time of tight control, in accordance with Resolution No 13 of 14 Mar 74 of the oblast Executive Committee, 900 hectares of livestock pasture area of A. Sukhambayev atyndaghy Kolkhoz was sold for a period of 10 years to form a testing area for various tests of new military technology. Thus this region, as the "Aqdala-pass 16" Test Area, was attached to the reins of the military division situated in Zhambyl City.

As time went on, after thinking "this area belongs to the military, for that reason we should not use it for pasture at all," local people, and rayon chiefs who followed one after the other over the last 10 to 15 years, carelessly protected the tail of the snake from violation, and there were places which became totally overgrown. However, there was a limit to their patience.

Today, military people come to the so secret military testing area from other oblasts and regions have rolled up their sleeves and are testing new weapons. However, what kinds of weapons they are testing and how they are doing this is a now complete mystery for residents of the rayon. In any case, before testing starts, a group of persons called the "information division" appears to remind people in villages near the pastures and shepherds of the testing day. If automatic weapons or artillery have been fired, there will be round craters from what appears to be powerful surface explosions. One might say, to be sure, this causes no harm to the environment, or to animals and humans living in the area. One might hold it all in, "boiling within, but unable to do anything." However, it is not possible to fail to understand, as we delude ourselves, that there is something fishy about the testing area. In particular, why have the sheep of herdsmen living near to the area continued to have miscarriages? In fact, it may turn out that in fact chemical and biological weapons [CBW] are being tested in the "Aqdala" Testing Area. We must find out everything quickly. The reason is that at a time when we have achieved sovereignty, the time has come to put a stop to the unrestrained activities of military authorities who have come to amuse themselves in our ancestral lands. The present miserable state of Zhumat Bayzhumanov, who has lost a hand and an eye, at some uncertain time, due to the results of an explosion of a shell found in the livestock pastures, would seem also to be something which the managers of the military area are in fact unconcerned about.

The testing area, which comprised 900 hectares in the beginning, now takes up to some 7000 hectares, said O.

Tilewbayev, the chairman of the Kolkhoz Administration. 'Year after year a great deal of military technology is tested there. Tests involving shots and explosions go on during every season of the year. You have no doubt heard about the complaints of our shepherds returned from the Saryarqa pastures. Shortages of pasturage is a big problem for us.'

These days people living in villages near the testing area have become alarmed. The crux of the matter is that only the military people who do what they like, according to their own volition, with rich steppe land are happy. Thus the "white steppe" can become no "garden steppe." The name of this testing area which is located 50-60 versts more or less from the oblast center has taken over the mantle of the dragon in Semey and we would like to believe in our hearts that it will be closed forever.

Documents for Shutdown of Aral BW Test Site Ready

PM2702165792 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 92 First Edition p 6

[RIKA report under the "Environmental Problems" rubric: "Secret Vozrozhdeniye Island"]

[Text] The top secret bacteriological test site on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea will cease to exist. A RIKa correspondent was informed at the parliamentary Committee for Environmental Questions and the Rational Use of Kazakhstan's Natural Resources that a juridical document has already been formulated which envisages the complete elimination of the test site. The actual implementation of the document will begin after all aspects of this act have been coordinated with the government of neighboring Karakalpakia, under whose jurisdiction the abused island comes. According to information from the international committee "Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan," which first demanded the immediate closure of the test site, the development and testing of bacteriological weapons [BW] on Vozrozhdeniye Island began after the Great Patriotic War. Between then and now not a single Kazakh public figure or journalist was allowed onto the secret island. Therefore, the republic's state organs and population knew practically nothing about what the military biologists were doing there.

Recycling Instead of Incinerating CW Urged

924P0094A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 Feb 92 First edition

[Article by Oleg Zlobin, Saratov Oblast, under the rubric "Local Life": "We Want To Hear That The Contamination Is Being Canceled—Volsk Scientists Propose Their Own Option for Destroying Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] I will not say that the appearance of gas masks in drygoods stores in Saratov caused a hullabaloo, but the clerks certainly are not complaining about a lack of demand. City-dwellers still have fresh in memory the unfortunate accident on the water canal near the Volga

when a wornout container of chlorine burst open. A few kilograms of the toxic substance caused quite an uproar. The firemen called to tame the treacherous genie were able to surround the station with a water curtain. If they had not, as the city civil defense headquarters acknowledged later, a cloud of yellow-green chlorine, which causes emphysema instantly, could have reached the community of Novosokolovogorskiy and the neighboring dacha developments.

Fortunately they were able to avert the tragedy. And you might, as they say, sleep peacefully. However, here is what you would not dream. If you "pick up" the summaries of the "emergency" team for that day, they look like reports from the field of a desperate battle. Eleven "urgent cases" almost did not get carried out of the contamination zone, and I should note that these were firemen wearing special protective suits and using breathing apparatuses. Just think: 30 people in clothing sealed from head to toe (in other words almost the entire duty team that came) received some degree of contamination or other, including very grave levels. What does this reflect? The reliability of domestically made equipment? Or is it poor personnel training? There are other questions too. Why, in a city of 1 million people where there should be an inviolate store of medicines, was it hard to find alkaline infusion agents and hormones? In all Saratov just four jars of Leucocrodex were found, and long hours were spent searching for Trisomin.

In essence a major industrial center of the Volga region with huge defense potential, a petrochemical complex, and even its own military school of chemical defense was caught off guard by a small accident at a humble water pumping-filtering station. It is not at all irrelevant to recall this because Saratov today faces a much more difficult challenge than fighting a leak of a few liters of chlorine. For 2-3 hours drive from the oblast center are thousands of tons of the cruelest weapons on Earth—chemical weapons [CW]. Since 1943 the country's largest storage depot for combat toxic chemicals, indeed perhaps the largest in Europe, has been located here. And it is just a couple of kilometers from the densely populated settlement of Gornyy, the center of Krasnopartizanskiy Rayon. Now the question of destroying these lethal stocks is on the agenda.

We can see why having such a thing as a gas mask among your household goods is no luxury; it is, unfortunately, a cruel necessity for these citizens of the Volga region.

"The management of the chemical depot is no longer able to guarantee the full safety of the installation," I was told with alarm by M. G. Minikh, deputy chairman of the oblast deputy commission on questions of ecology and rational use of resources, after a trip to Krasnopartizanskiy Rayon. "You know, the tanks at the storage facility have become unusable. The oxidation process is going terrifyingly fast. The walls are getting thinner..."

The lethal contents of the tanks could spill onto the ground at any moment. Raw young soldiers in chemical

defense suits are trying to move the toxic substances to new containers. The squalor and lack of technical equipment is striking. Hangars, rows of barrels, tank cars on rails—that is the menacing chemical depot. Mountains of poison freight have grown there for decades. If something bad were to happen there would be no one to assign formal responsibility to: all the maximum storage times for the toxic substances have been exceeded.

It is clear that there can be no procrastination here. But haste is improper too: the cost of a mistake would be enormous. That is why the oblast authorities have to examine this question very carefully.

It is common knowledge that the former Soviet Union assumed an obligation to begin liquidating its deadly chemical stockpiles no later than 1992. But there is no considered program for this at all—nothing but declarations. Incidentally, S. Petrov, head of the chemical troops, stated this in the press recently. While the Americans, taking parallel steps toward disarmament, intend to put an end to their chemical weapons on an uninhabited Pacific atoll, our military department has “blessed” Mother Volga for the umpteenth time: a plant has been built in the city of Chapayevsk, which is in Samara Oblast, to destroy phosphorus-containing toxic substances. It was swept by a wave of public fury before it had operated a single day.

The inhabitants of Saratov Oblast have reason to be alarmed as well. It was not that long ago that the chemical troops sent a letter to N. Makarevich, chairman of the Saratov Oblast Soviet, substantiating the need to build a complex of installations “in the region of the settlement of Gornyy, to disarm stockpiles of toxic substances.” Having been beaten in Chapayevsk, it looks like the military specialists are trying one way after another to bring their obviously obsolete technology into the Volga steppes.

“This cannot be allowed,” M. Minikh says categorically.

Local scientists and economists stand with the Saratov ecology activist. In the opinion of respected experts, the plan proposed by the military is unacceptable from the standpoint of environmental protection, based on economic advantage, or according to ordinary common sense. The time has passed when enormous amounts of money can be spent without a thought. And the military specialists are proposing just that, an expensive way to destroy the combat chemicals. They intend to use hundreds of millions of rubles and thousands of tons of raw materials and the result will be more heaps of toxic waste which, moreover, will have to be buried in the oblast (it is clear that no republic would accept this kind of “gift”). According to the same calculations they will require 12,233 million cubic meters a year of gas alone. It is not hard to surmise that it will go for operating roasting ovens.

And so the question raises itself: is there really no other way to get rid of chemical weapons except the notorious incineration? It turns out that there is another way! After

reviewing dozens of proposals, the State Ecological Expert Examining Commission selected a procedure developed by scientists at the Volsk branch of GSNI-IOKhT [expansion unknown] as the one that best ensures the ecological safety of production.

The essential point of the procedure is to put every ton of toxic substances into reprocessing and then recycle and make rational use of every single component obtained. For example, from a ton of Lewisite, which has a skin-blistering effect, it is possible to obtain 350 kilograms of highly pure arsenic. Specialists know how valuable this material is. It is used to produce high-precision instruments. In the world market a kilogram of metallic arsenic is worth 5,000 dollars. Not having its own deposits, Russia is forced to spend hard currency for this raw material. According to estimates by Western specialists, our country has stockpiled tens of thousands of tons of Lewisite. It is not hard to calculate that implementation of the program proposed by the Volsk scientists promises profits running into the billions. The fractions obtained in the production of arsenic can also be used successfully, for example in rubber articles, to increase the guaranteed life of tires from 50,000 to 120,000 kilometers. There are attractive prospects for domestic solar energy, satellite television, and high-frequency electronic equipment as well; after all, everything necessary for very rapid development of these sectors will be created on the basis of raw material obtained in the reprocessing of combat chemicals. It is its relative simplicity, economy, and waste-free quality that make this unusual plan attractive. And it is important that the “Volsk option,” unlike all the others, offers a guarantee of maximum safety for the environment.

“These are not just calculations on paper,” explained candidate of technical sciences Vladislav Voynitskiy, one of the authors. “Our no-waste technology was tested successfully at an experimental industrial site some time ago, in the autumn of 1989.”

One thing is hard to understand: why was this technology, which has been tested and approved by prominent scientists and working specialists, not requested? You would expect, by the logic of things, that this is exactly what all interested departments would be fighting to get. And that means the military first of all. It is impossible to imagine a better conversion option in this case.

It is obvious that out of inertia they still think that such problems are “not a matter for local thinking,” that they all must be decided in the capital. But that is wrong! The citizens of the Volga region find themselves hostages to menacing weapons and it is in their interest to get rid of them as fast as possible, to take care of this dangerous “inheritance” openly, intelligently, and wisely. I stress the “wisely.” So that the colossal economic impact which can and should be received from the use of resource-conserving technologies benefits primarily the life of the outlying areas of the Volga, which languish in chemical

imprisonment. And benefits the Volga region as a whole. May our home gas masks remain as they are, unused.

Military Spokesman: No CW In Nagorno-Karabakh

LD2802083792 Moscow TASS in English 0821 GMT 28 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunajsky]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—Former Soviet troops deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh do not possess a single chemical weapon [CW], a spokesman for the CIS Armed Forces told TASS on Friday [28 February]. He denied "sensational" reports of several mass media that Nagorno-Karabakh might become another Chernobyl as the military possess chemical weapons there.

CBW Committee Set Up Under Russian President

PM2702155892 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Goodbye, Biological Weapons!"]

[Text] By decree of the Russian Federation president, a Committee on Convention Problems Relating to Chemical and Biological Weapons has been set up under the Russian Federation president. The committee's tasks are to resolve chemical and biological weapons [CBW] convention problems, implement international and internal monitoring [kontrol] to prevent their development [razrabotka], production, and stockpiling, and also organize the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons.

Anatoliy Kuntsevich is appointed chairman of the committee.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

CIS, Chinese Chiefs of Staff Confer

LD2602150192 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 26 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Sorokin]

[Text] Beijing, 26 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—Talks took place this afternoon between the chiefs of General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, during which various aspects of the international situation were discussed. V. N. Samsonov and Chi Haotian briefed one another on the development of the political and economic situations in their countries. Particular attention was devoted to issues of military organizational development in current conditions, especially in the Armed Forces of the CIS.

The sides examined the problem of reduction of strategic nuclear forces and tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces, and armaments in the world. An exchange of

opinions took place on measures that could be implemented within the context of the disarmament processes on the border of China and the CIS, and on the ways to further improve confidence-building measures between them.

The negotiations, as appraised by the participants, were distinguished by a warm and friendly atmosphere. The Chinese side declared the great importance it accords to the fact that Colonel General V.N. Samsonov is making China his first foreign trip in the post of chief of General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. Mutual commitment was expressed to continuing and developing exchanges and cooperation along military lines between the CIS Unified Armed Forces and the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Col.Gen. Samsonov laid a wreath at the Memorial to the People's Heroes today.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Kozyrev on Russia's Nuclear Role, CIS in Arms Talks

PM2602155092 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 3, Jan 92 pp 20-24

[Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev by Galina Sidorova: "Andrey Kozyrev: 'And Yet Russia Is Destined To Be a Great Power'"; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] "Quite fitting to be entered into the Guinness Book of Records," said the assistant to the minister looking at his watch meaningfully as I left his boss's study. I doubt that Guinness envisaged records of that kind; however, it was my longest interview I'd ever taken from a Soviet or foreign public figure. It is possible that the new head of the ministerial office was not yet annoyed by journalists or, probably, there are still more questions than answers in our life, including politics. [passage omitted]

Galina Sidorova [G.S.] As far as I know, Russia intends to join NATO, while the Ukraine stands for neutrality. At the same time we are talking about a common military strategic space and a unitary strategic forces command. How to combine the independence of the Commonwealth member states in their foreign affairs with their interdependence?

Andrey Kozyrev [A.K.] You've hit the nail on the head. Indeed, there is no exhaustive answer to the question of what the Commonwealth is and how it is going to operate. I think we will have to proceed from a combination of unity and plurality. It's not ruled out that the Commonwealth will be a transitional stage towards fully independent states. In this case I don't see any other way than gradually "transplanting" the armed forces on

Russian soil. It stands to reason, after all. However, for the present the question arises—what civil institutions will exercise control over armed forces of the Commonwealth? Which parliament or how many parliaments will make decisions concerning military expenses? For the moment, the answer may be either four or all twelve. But who will determine the amount of each share? There is a danger of the military becoming a state within a state, as happened in the Soviet Union, only now this will be easier, because of there being a number of parliaments. I would like the Russian part of the military budget—and Russia accounts for the lion's share of the armed forces—to go through a long procedure of scrutiny, as is the case in the United States and other developed countries. This is the only practical way to ensure reasonable sufficiency for which military science criteria do not exist at present. Civil society decides it for itself what is reasonable and sufficient, proceeding from the set of external threats, considerations of prestige and social situation, by means of its institutions, and primarily the parliament. The problem is essential not only from the viewpoint of guarantees of control over nuclear weapons; its solution is a prerequisite for the integration of the army into civil society.

G.S. Does this mean that the armed forces of the Commonwealth are a myth?

A.K. We are working out a variant which envisages an extremely complicated system of control over the army on the part of the member states, as well as a no less diversified contribution they are expected to make to the armed forces.

G.S. The control, it seems, could become so complicated that it could, in fact, cease to be effective?

A.K. There is such a danger. For the time being there are more questions than answers. However, guarantees of stability in the armed forces are of vital importance today. You have probably noticed that the surrounding world doesn't even discuss the problem of whether or not we need the enormous arsenal of a nuclear superpower. All are concerned about the problem of preserving the stability of and unitary control over this arsenal. The easiest thing to do here is to divide the army and declare the part deployed on the territory of a particular state its property.

G.S. This is what the Ukraine is doing...

A.K. I wouldn't like to criticize anyone. I proceed from the assumption that we are all sensible people. However, it is of principal importance that the natural right to possessing one's own armed forces be correlated with the reality in which we all exist. This reality is such that placing the army stationed on the territories of the independent states before the option—to whom to swear before allegiance and whom to obey—means running the risk of a split and destabilization. If in the same military unit there are officers and men obeying different states, any personal confrontation may acquire political implications. And political conflicts between the member

states of the Commonwealth are not, unfortunately, ruled out. I favour the concept of excluding the army from political life.

If we managed to reach an agreement about a three- or four-year transitional period, this time would be quite sufficient to settle in a civilized manner all problems with those republics who would like to have their own armed forces, as well as with those which prefer a united army. And those who will choose the path of a closer cooperation might join NATO together with Russia. By the way, a few words about NATO. We in fact compiled a report from President Yeltsin in which it was stated that Russia did not at the moment raise the question of joining NATO; the idea was that the matter was to be considered in the future. But the word "not" disappeared when the paper was copied by a typist... [passage omitted]

G.S. There are at least three new nuclear states in the mosaic we have presented to the world...

A.K. Not quite so, because here too the concept of a successor—this time to a nuclear superpower—works. Incidentally, I think that Russia will have to be a nuclear power—I hope, not a superpower. It is stated in the Minsk Agreement that the decision concerning the use or, rather, non-use of nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation. He acts in coordination with the member states of the Commonwealth on whose territory they are deployed and taking into account the interests of the other members of the Commonwealth. In other words, it is the strategic space of not only four, but of all the states.

G.S. All the more so that there are tactical nuclear arms on the territory of almost all of them...

A.K. We intend to remove and destroy tactical arms quickly, as stipulated by the agreements reached.

G.S. Nevertheless it is difficult to imagine how the question of the nuclear button can be coordinated if the situation requires a quick decision. Suppose one of the four is taking a bath, somebody is taking a rest and is nowhere to be found...

A.K. And this pertains to the responsibility of the leader of the state or country on whose territory nuclear weapons are deployed—once the responsibility is assumed, there can be no question of bathrooms or banquet halls inaccessible for immediate communication. Today President Yeltsin is followed by several large cars stuffed with electronic equipment affording him communication through the hotline at any point in his itinerary.

G.S. There is also the Kazakh component in our nuclear mosaic. The Ukraine has declared its desire to get rid of its nuclear burden, while Kazakhstan, in all evidence, is not in a hurry to abandon it...

A.K. You'd better ask President Nazarbayev about it. But as I understand it, the only difference is the timetable. The Ukraine insists on urgent liquidation, while Kazakhstan doesn't.

G.S. Are you going to resort mainly to traditional negotiations or to unilateral steps already taken first by President Bush last autumn and later by Gorbachev?

A.K. It will be more expedient probably to combine the method of negotiations with unilateral steps. Formerly the main method was that of excruciating negotiations while unilateral initiatives were resorted to either in order to expedite something or to place the partner in an unfavourable light. It's high time we acted on the basis of reasonable sufficiency—if we have found a surplus of weapons they must be reduced without any negotiations. In this case the other side may also react adequately and find something to reduce too. Negotiations could play an auxiliary role here.

G.S. How are you going to divide the Geneva and Vienna disarmament talks between the members of the Commonwealth?

A.K. The scheme is still to be worked out. We are discussing the matter with our colleagues just now. It stands to reason that a joint delegation with a coordinated position must be sent to the negotiations on nuclear weapons which remain under joint command. It is not ruled out that the members of the Commonwealth will participate independently in the talks on conventional arms in Geneva. After all, the NATO members are individually responsible for their quotas of reductions and the steps they agree upon. [passage omitted]

Kazakhstan Seen in No Hurry To Remove Nuclear Arms

Nazarbayev Stresses Time Needed

*AU2002202692 Vienna KURIER in German
20 Feb 92 p 5*

["Exclusive" interview with President Nursultan Nazarbayev by Hans Rauscher; place and date not given: "We Have Raw Materials and Need Technology"]

[Excerpts] [Rauscher] You are considered to be the most powerful man in Central Asia.

[Nazarbayev] This is an exaggeration. People probably say that because we have the second largest territory after Russia. We are very rich in raw materials, and our geopolitical situation is also important: Kazakhstan is located in the middle of Central Asia. Second, Kazakhstan, which is a multinational state, pursues a policy that recognizes the equal rights of all men. This ensures a stable political situation. The third aspect I would like to mention is that I am the first president in our 400 year history elected by all the people on the basis of a democratic law. [passage omitted]

[Rauscher] Kazakhstan has intercontinental nuclear missiles. What are you planning to do with them?

[Nazarbayev] Strategic nuclear weapons are deployed in four republics (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan). We do not want to be a nuclear state, but it takes time to remove them. We four have signed an agreement under which we will create one clear supreme command of our strategic forces. The problem of their possible use—God forbid—will, however, be decided by the four republics. No republic can decide anything on its own. Kazakhstan's position is clear. We take part in all negotiations on reducing nuclear weapons—on an equal footing.

Our neighbor, China, is a nuclear power. Pakistan and India are nuclear powers. That is why we have a very clear position. It will take at least 15 years to destroy these missiles if work progresses well. It would be desirable for China, Pakistan, and India to join us.

[Rauscher] Are the weapons not in Russian hands?

[Nazarbayev] Those who have them cannot control them. The high command can do nothing without our agreement.

Political Importance of Nuclear Arms

*AU2702085392 Mainz 3Sat Television Network
in German 2030 GMT 26 Feb 92*

[Report by Dieter Schulz with statements by President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland—passages within quotation marks recorded; Nazarbayev statements in Russian with superimposed German translation]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Kazakhstan has been independent since last September. Its first president, who was elected in free elections in December, is Nursultan Nazarbayev, 51. In the past he was a top communist functionary, who mediated between Yeltsin and Gorbachev before the Moscow putsch. Today Nazarbayev presents himself as a reformer who wants to bring about progress in his country with the help of a market economy and cooperation with the West. He seems to be popular with the people despite his communist past. [passage omitted]

At the international economic forum in Davos, Nazarbayev recently commented on the topic of strategic nuclear weapons:

"This issue has been settled in the agreements of Minsk and Alma-Ata. There is a joint supreme command in Moscow in line with these agreements. This is to ensure that the number of nuclear states does not rise. In addition, the world should not be worried by the fact that the nuclear weapons are stationed in different republics of the CIS. We have agreed that Russian President Boris Yeltsin maintains supreme command over strategic nuclear weapons. He, however, has to coordinate his

actions with the presidents of the three other states where nuclear weapons are stored." [passage omitted]

In the interview Nazarbayev supports nuclear disarmament in East and West.

"We have stressed in our agreements that we will strictly adhere to the disarmament treaty and to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The parliament in Alma-Ata will deal with this, and I am sure that it will ratify these treaties. The proposals, however, about a reduction of nuclear weapons, which were made in the talk between U.S. President Bush and Boris Yeltsin, must still be studied thoroughly by the presidents of the CIS states."

Self-confidently, Nazarbayev adds that he was briefed by Bush about the disarmament proposals before Yeltsin. Boris Yeltsin's disarmament initiative was not coordinated in the CIS presidents' council before it was presented. Did Yeltsin thus make promises over Nazarbayev's head? New conflicts are in the offing.

The formerly proud Soviet Army is no longer marching in step in political terms and has lost its unity. Three CIS states have started to establish their own armed forces. The disarmament by destroying nuclear missiles, which has been agreed on with the West, is to be continued. Nazarbayev does not want any doubt to arise. He knows all too well that otherwise he would endanger economic aid from the West.

"The disarmament treaty between the USSR and the United States is to continue. All are to participate in it. It is absolutely necessary to further reduce the weapons potential of both sides. However, destroying the weapons is not an easy matter. Sticking to this plan is not easy as long as nuclear weapons exist in the rest of the world. We will, of course, adhere to the treaty, even if it becomes difficult."

The West is still worried that the new nuclear powers in the CIS might pass nuclear weapons or the know-how for their construction to other states. There is also another fear: Regional army leaders might sell tactical nuclear weapons to foreign states or even to terrorist organizations.

Nazarbayev categorically rejects reports about military cooperation with Islamic states:

"I can speak only for Kazakhstan and stress that we will adhere to every letter of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, fuel rods, and technology. I know of Western press reports that claim that Kazakhstan has cooperated with some Arab states in developing nuclear weapons or has at least established contact with them. I would like to state officially that this is not true."

Nazarbayev is trying to establish a political counterweight to the efforts at supremacy by Russia and its president, Boris Yeltsin. Therefore, the Kazakh leader is looking for more cooperation with other CIS states in Central Asia. The influence of Islam has been rising

constantly in these countries since the demise of the USSR, just as in Kazakhstan. The number of mosques in Kazakhstan has tripled within a brief period. [passage omitted]

Contrary to other reports, one must note that the Muslims in Central Asia do not form a monolithic block; they belong to various denominations. Most Kazakh Muslims are Sunnis. They have little sympathetic feelings for the policy of the fundamentalists in Iran, for instance. There is not yet a mass movement advocating a new Islamic center in Central Asia. At the moment, questions of state sovereignty and of economic misery seem to be more important for the peoples in the south of the former Soviet Union than religion.

However, how long will this last? Might their economic misery make the people in Kazakhstan blindly follow the propagandists of an Islamic state?

Nazarbayev is considered a particularly skillful man in politics among the heads of state in Central Asia. The nuclear weapons on Kazakh territory strengthen his position in the poker game of power and influence in Central Asia and Moscow. The statements by the Kazakh leader do not leave any doubt: Contrary to earlier promises, he will not let the nuclear weapons out of his hands quickly.

Public Opinion Researcher Comments

PM2602111592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Candidate of Historical Sciences Burkutbay Gelmanovich Ayaganov, chief of the public opinion research and sociological forecasting sector of the apparatus of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, by correspondent Colonel A. Ladin; date, place not given: "Kazakhstan and Nuclear Weapons"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The newspaper KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA recently has published articles the authors of which give their own justification for the need for the continued presence of Strategic Nuclear Forces on the territory of an independent state: The Republic of Kazakhstan. One of the authors—Candidate of Historical Sciences Burkutbay Gelmanovich Ayaganov, chief of the public opinion research and sociological forecasting sector of the apparatus of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan—was asked by our correspondent to answer certain questions.

[Ladin] You believe that nuclear weapons must remain in Kazakhstan, and not only because moving high-yield nuclear devices is an extremely complex process at present...

[Ayaganov] Yes, I expressed my opinion that as a nuclear power, Kazakhstan will be able to be an equal among other sovereign states. That is the first thing. It also must be borne in mind that with its geographical position, our

independent state is, as it were, a bridge linking East and West, and is doomed to remain surrounded by three powerful forces. I mean Russia, billion-plus China, and also the Muslim East, where the nuclear weapons already created by someone or other are being talked about openly. It seems to me that Kazakhstan will always feel safer with nuclear-tipped strategic missiles on its territory than without them. At the same time it must be stressed that we must have the minimal number of nuclear warheads to guarantee defense sufficiency because we do not intend to fight anybody. The Kazakh people's ancient history, however, teaches them to look after their own security, which today means reliably protecting the republic's entire multiethnic people from any surprises.

[Ladin] The articles, yours included, propose that Kazakhstan become a member of the nuclear club. Should this be understood as meaning that the republic must insist on individual possession of part of the nuclear potential? That is, possession of its own button at some time in the future?

[Ayaganov] If this is the aim, then obviously the republic must be prepared to bear a considerable burden of military expenditure. I do not have enough information to claim that this is possible, but I believe that it is technically complex. Moreover, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed by the former Soviet Union must be taken into account as well, and as is known from statements made by our country's president, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan will fulfill the treaty.

This is what I think: Together with Russia and the other CIS members, we must without fail preserve the single defense area. Strategic nuclear weapons will be located on Kazakh territory within the framework of this area. In time they could be subject to reduction and possibly complete elimination, but only with regard to similar steps being taken by all states possessing nuclear weapons. I know, based on the study of public opinion in the republic, that a considerable proportion [nemalaya chast] of our population adheres to this viewpoint, although there are people who would like to see Kazakhstan without nuclear weapons, agreeing with the view that they should be removed to Russia.

It seems to me that it is not at all obligatory for each state to aspire to its own nuclear button.

In the agreement between the CIS members on strategic forces, everyone who signed the document in Minsk recognizes the need for the joint [obyedinennyy] command of the strategic forces and for retaining unified [yedinyy] command over the former USSR's nuclear weapons and other types of mass-destruction weapons. Moreover, the agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons which was concluded in Alma-Ata by the four independent states possessing the former USSR's nuclear weapons states that prior to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on the territories of

Belarus and Ukraine, the decision on the need to use them is made by the Russian president in conjunction with the heads of the states participating in the agreement on the basis of the procedures jointly elaborated by the participating states. Thus far all this is immutable and acceptable.

It will be another matter when nuclear weapons remain only on Russian and Kazakh territory. I believe that in that case a new, bilateral agreement must be concluded between our states which would strengthen each side's responsibility for making decisions on nuclear weapons [kotoroye usililo by otvetstvennost kazhdoy storony za prinyatiye resheniy po yadernomu oruzhiyu].

[Ladin] Probably the question also will arise of how Russia and Kazakhstan are to ensure the combat readiness of nuclear weapons, and their safekeeping in the future...

[Ayaganov] Of course, the whole range of questions will have to be solved jointly. It is understood that if other nuclear club partners do not want to proceed to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, then what can we do? Act appropriately, without forgoing our own security; that is what I believe. I would like the military alliance between Kazakhstan and Russia, and also other of the Union's former republics that are committed to the idea of a single defense area, to remain strong and reliable.

[Ladin] Do you not think that in time the question of modernizing nuclear weapons will have to be faced, which also means the question of the need to carry out at least occasional testing of them? Where, however, can this be done? If only Russia and Kazakhstan keep nuclear weapons, then evidently it will be only here, in Russia and Kazakhstan, and possibly also at those very same test sites, that are now silent

[Ayaganov] There will indeed be a problem. Although I am no military man I am well aware that any weapon has a purpose if it represents a threat to an adversary, and it is worthless when it loses this quality. Of course, the best thing would be for the world to reach agreement and rid itself of the nuclear danger forever.

However, it is entirely possible that test site testing will indeed be required. I would like to stress that in that case the holding of the tests must be accompanied by thorough expert study. The tests must not harm people or the environment.

I very much hope that the process of disarmament will achieve its main aim and that nuclear weapons will cease to exist forever.

Ukrainian Attitudes on Removal of Nuclear Arms Examined

Kravchuk Proposes Talks With U.S.

*LD1902231692 Kiev Radio Kiev in English
2200 GMT 19 Feb 92*

[Excerpts] A meeting was held in Kiev today between the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, and journalists. The quintessence of the press conference in Kiev became a proposal made by Leonid Kravchuk, which for the first time was announced at this press conference, to include Ukraine as well as other republics having nuclear weapons on their territories into the negotiating process on nuclear disarmament. The process which was started between the Soviet Union and the United States has to be completed by the four republics and the United States—four plus one. I suggest, said the President, the second stage as well so that we should advance further and involve in this process all nuclear states. [passage omitted]

Asked why Ukraine is voluntarily striving to get rid of its nuclear arsenal which adds strength and weight in foreign politics, Leonid Kravchuk replied that Ukraine wants to become a strong economic state and not carry a heavy nuclear burden. Ukraine is situated in the center of Europe, on the crossroads of the main east-west highways and wants to become a neutral state. [passage omitted]

Pro-Nuclear Sentiment in Western Ukraine

*PM2602131192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Feb 92 p 3*

[Correspondent Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy report under "Direct Line" rubric: "It Seems That Nuclear Weapons Will Still Come in Useful to Ukraine—That, At Any Rate, Is What They Think in Western Ukraine"]

[Text] Lvov, 24 February—The mass media in the western region of Ukraine are continuing to focus on questions concerned with the formation of Ukrainian armed forces. There is nothing surprising in this. Politicians at various levels regard the army as the structure which will enable an independent state to be built. What kind of army is it to be? If you refer to statements by parliamentarians and the president, their line is unambiguous. The Ukrainian armed forces are a state military structure designed for the armed defense of the republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity against external attack.

Both president and parliamentarians have repeatedly stressed that Ukraine has made the decision to remove tactical nuclear weapons by this July and strategic nuclear weapons by 1994. Everything seems absolutely clear and precise. However, as the mass media indicate,

far from everyone is in agreement with this decision. And not just in the republic, but outside it too.

In particular, Prof. L. Lucuk of the Department of Politics and Economics at Canada's Royal Military School writes unequivocally in the Lvov newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU as follows: "...I have come to the conclusion that Ukraine needs to maintain control over its tactical and strategic weapons." Why? Lucuk maintains that the West is not prepared to guarantee Ukraine's future. While its neighbors—excluding Belarus and Poland—are said to be laying claim to Ukrainian land. If you analyze the articles in ZA VILNU UKRAYINU it is not difficult to see that such opinions are also voiced by citizens of the republic itself.

Some politicians and military men are ready, as we can see, to reject the concept expressed by the parliament and president of Ukraine, while certain others openly describe it as pacifist.

In particular, Lieutenant General V. Stepanov, commander of the Carpathian Military District, insists that nuclear arms reduction be carried out simultaneously rather than unilaterally in every country in the CIS which has them. While Major General of Aviation V. Antonets, commander of Carpathian Military District Aviation, considers that the threat of nuclear war has not been dispelled in the world and that if you renounce nuclear weapons voluntarily you therefore put yourself in a difficult situation.

Calls To Retain Nuclear Arms in Belarus Reported

*MK2202140592 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Feb 92 pp 1,3*

[Report by Igor Sinyakevich: "Belarus: Will Republic Be Nuclear State. First Voices 'For' Appear"]

[Text] Of late the following question has been the subject of debate in Belarus: Should Belarus give up the nuclear weapons on its territory or take control of them and become a nuclear state?

Whereas previously the opinions held by all political forces and the public were unequivocal—Belarus has had enough with Chernobyl, the republic must be a nuclear-free zone—other voices can be heard now.

Unlike Ukraine, where the demands for a "nuclear guarantee" for independence can be heard at rallies held by radicals, in Belarus this viewpoint is being voiced in influential publications. Thus, Anatoliy Maysenya, a NARODNAYA GAZETA (the Belarus Supreme Soviet organ) commentator, wrote in an article headlined "Window on the World": "No one disputes the strategic aim of nuclear disarmament, but should events be forced?.. Belarus is entitled to ask whether the West is ready to compensate it for voluntarily giving up its status

as a nuclear state... I do not think that we should be consoled to see Belarus become like Upper Volta as a result of triumphal disarmament, only this time without nuclear missiles."

Geopolitician Aleksandr Peropechka, assistant lecturer at the Belorussian [as published] University, said in an interview: "Belarus should not hastily part with tactical nuclear weapons today. It would be better to transfer them to its jurisdiction and establish reliable control over them, including international control. Believe me, in the present situation where unpredictable processes are raging across the expanse of the former Soviet Union, we would feel far more confident and calm. To be frank, the West respects the existence of these 'toys.'"

Some factors that cannot be cited enable us to say that it was not without some movement in the top structures of power that these articles appeared. However, the idea of a nuclear shield has not as yet met with extensive support in society.

Weapons Transfer From Belarus, Ukraine to Perm Denied

*OW2502204092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1900 GMT 25 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the CIS Armed Forces, denied rumors that nuclear weapons had been moved from Belarus and Ukraine to the village of Bershet, Perm region. According to the Perm-based newspaper (ZVEZDA), the marshal had said that to Russian parliamentarian from Perm Valeriy Fedorov.

Shaposhnikov invited the Perm parliamentarian to meet with Defense Ministry officials. Upon a study of the documents provided by the Defense Ministry, Fedorov confirmed that nuclear warheads had not been moved from any CIS states to West Urals.

SWEDEN

Membership in Nonaligned Group at Geneva CD Under Review

PM0303170292 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 2 Mar 92 p 10

[Mikael Holmstrom report: "Conflict Over Nonaligned Group"]

[Text] The government and the Social Democrats disagree over how Sweden should act at the UN Conference on Disarmament [CD] in Geneva. The Foreign Ministry wants to abandon Sweden's 30-year cooperation with the non-aligned countries—something the Social Democrats oppose.

Since the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva began in 1962, Sweden has belonged to the so-called group of 21. The group includes some of the neutral and nonaligned states which have remained outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Apart from Sweden, the only European country which has been included in the group is Yugoslavia.

A report by Foreign Ministry experts proposed on 17 January that Swedish disarmament policy should be adapted to "a new age" and rooted in a "European identity." At the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Sweden should leave the group of 21 and instead work together with like-minded countries.

"In practice, Sweden is the only European country in the group. It is more natural for us to take up a more independent position," Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas (Moderate Coalition Party) said.

The nuclear nonproliferation agreement was worked out at the Geneva conference, which also has a nuclear test ban on its agenda. But the group of 21 contains countries which are developing nuclear arms—so-called threshold states—and which are consequently contributing to the spread of nuclear arms.

"Some members of the group do not share Sweden's view of nonproliferation issues," Margaretha af Ugglas said, mentioning India, Iran, and Pakistan.

Other members of the group about which there have been suspicions in the nuclear arms context are Algeria, Argentina, and Brazil. The group also includes China and Burma, notorious for their suppression of human rights.

The government wants to distance itself from this group:

"It is extremely important that we are able to pursue an effective policy, that our voice has credibility," Margaretha af Ugglas stressed.

A few weeks ago, the Foreign Ministry was already in the process of giving Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius at

the Geneva Conference on Disarmament a directive to make an official announcement of Sweden's withdrawal from the group.

But, the move was halted. The main reason, according to SVENSKA DAGBLADET's information, was a protest from Pierre Schori, the Social Democratic foreign policy spokesman.

"I thought that the matter should have been raised in the Foreign Policy Council, because it is an important issue. We have 30 years of work behind us," Schori pointed out.

Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas refuses to abandon her view, but is open to the idea of a discussion:

"It will prove to be correct for us to leave the group of 21. But there is no great hurry and I am open to the idea of discussions and consultations," the foreign minister said.

However, Pierre Schori considers that it would be stupidity to leave the group of 21.

"The spread of nuclear arms is the big worry after all. Should we then cut our links with the threshold countries and end the contacts we have with them? We need them in a dialogue," Schori pointed out.

A central figure from the Foreign Ministry claims that Schori's argument does not hold water.

"If it did, we would negotiate with Nazi Germany or Idi Amin's Uganda about human rights. It is the same logic. There would be just as much point."

According to the same figure, Sweden has more or less left the group. It is more a question of how the withdrawal is handled.

However, the Foreign Ministry leadership is concerned that the issue does not become a bone of contention. Officially, Sweden has not yet taken any action, it is said. The issue has been up for initial discussion between Foreign Ministry Under Secretary of State Lars-Ake Nilsson and Pierre Schori.

Later this month, the Foreign Ministry is also planning a seminar on the report on disarmament policy produced by the group of ministry experts. But, Schori considers that the Foreign Ministry's report must be discussed by the Riksdag Foreign Affairs Committee.

"We want the expert report discussed on a political level. A product of the work of public servants cannot be allowed to throw 30 years of disarmament work over board."

Pierre Schori also hinted that Center Party and Liberal Party Riksdag deputies were unaware of the forthcoming meeting of the group of 21.

"I raised it in the foreign affairs committee. No one knew about it, and I saw that there were many white faces on the nonsocialist side, too."

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