


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Disarmament Conference Concludes First Session

*OW2703213092 Beijing XINHUA in English
2002 GMT 27 Mar 92*

[Text] Geneva, March 27 (XINHUA)—The first session of the Conference on Disarmament in 1992 closed here today without any significant achievements.

Participants have focused on the draft Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) during the 10 weeks of negotiations.

Representatives from 40 countries discussed the institutional issues, site of the CWC organization, inspection and other technical issues.

Sources close to the conference said that participants have expressed their hope to complete the CWC as early as August this year, and have proposed a timetable for reaching the aim.

Talks on a total ban over chemical weapons have been continuing for about 20 years. The sources said that the marathon talk is entering a "final stage."

Differences still remain on the inspection article, protection of the facilities which is not relevant to chemical weapons and security interests of some countries, the sources said.

Next session of the conference, which is the only international mechanism of disarmament in the world, will open early in May.

AUSTRALIA

French Nuclear Testing Halt Welcomed

*BK0904070692 Melbourne Radio Australia in English
0500 GMT 9 Apr 92*

[Text] Australia and New Zealand, both long-time critics of French nuclear testing in the Pacific, have welcomed the suspension of the test programs. Australia's Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans, who is on a visit to Japan, said France has made its decision to halt nuclear tests in the Pacific permanent.

A spokesman for his office in Canberra said the Australian Government had been working directly with France to bring about an end to the nuclear testings.

New Zealand's Foreign Minister Don McKinnon welcomed the French move and linked it with the political gains being made in France by the so-called green parties.

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Economic Effects of Nuclear Testing Halt Noted

*BK1004050292 Hong Kong AFP in English 0306 GMT
10 Apr 92*

[By Eric Monod]

[Text] Papeete, April 9 (AFP)—France's decision to suspend underground nuclear testing might please environmentalists, but it deals a body blow to the economy of French Polynesia, politicians and observers here say.

On Thursday local newspapers dedicated several pages to Premier Pierre Bregovoy's announcement Wednesday in Paris of a one-year moratorium on nuclear tests in the South Pacific.

Greenpeace International had led the international drive against the long-running test program.

Last month it sent its flagship, Rainbow Warrior II, on a high-profile voyage to Mururoa Atoll to test for suspected radiation leakage. French warships intervened, arresting the ship, and the activists were deported.

Since July 1966, France has carried out 127 underground tests at Mururoa and nearby Fangataufa Atoll, as well as 41 atmospheric tests, as it continued to develop its own independent nuclear deterrent arsenal.

The two French Government agencies responsible for the tests—the Commission for Atomic Energy (CEA) and the Center for Propulsion Testing (CEP)—are French Polynesia's leading employers.

CEA and its associated enterprises had 400 local people on its payroll while more than 600 worked for CEP.

The agencies' share of French Polynesia's gross national product (GNP), almost 50 percent a few years ago, has come down to 15-20 percent, said legislator Alexandre Leontieff.

"It remains very important," he said, adding that an end to testing will necessitate "a new policy of partnership" between Paris and its territory half-way round the world.

Leontieff also noted that French Polynesia, home to 200,000 people, gets 54 million francs (9.8 million dollars) in customs duties from the Ministry of Defense.

If those funds stop coming in, it would aggravate the local budget deficit at a time when the territorial government is asking Paris for more than 100 million francs (18.2 million dollars).

French Polynesia, home to 200,000 people, has no income tax. Rather, its fiscal system is based on customs and excise.

Besides supporting nuclear testing, the archipelago's only other major industry is tourism.

CEA director Bernard Pichotin has sought to play down the situation, saying that he intended to "gently manage the social problems that will come with the suspension of testing."

Those problems, he said, include "the reduction in hours worked by employees, and negotiations with the unions on early retirement measures."

The same appeal for calm came from High Commissioner Michel Jau, the top French official here, who said: "Polynesia is not yet in a post-CEP period."

"There should be no brutal consequences in the short term," he added.

Jau stressed that French Polynesia's elected officials "sit down together, with state authorities, so that concrete solutions can be found through dialogue."

But observers say it is far from certain that politicians can join forces around this economic issue, after at least two elected opposition members have linked the suspension of nuclear testing to the evolution of French Polynesia's institutions.

One of them, Emile Vernaudeau, in a communique, demanded that French Polynesia be given a deal similar to that spelled out for another French South Pacific territory, New Caledonia, in the Matignon Accords.

The accords, named after the French premier's residence in Paris, promise New Caledonia a referendum on self-determination in 1998.

Vernaudeau said he would like to see a five-to-10 year period to reorganize French Polynesia's institutions, culminating with "an institutional deadline that would be the objective of the final motivation of the population."

The other oppositionist, Oscar Temaru, a Polynesian nationalist who wants independence from France, said on local television Wednesday: "If the test halt is going to bolster France's prestige in the Pacific, it is nevertheless Polynesian independence that will make great strides."

That view is contested by the president of the territorial government, Gaston Flosse, who told a press conference that French Polynesia "lacks the means, on its own, to adopt a development plan over 10 years."

Such a plan, he said, must be carried out with France's participation.

Responding directly to Tematu, Flosse added that an end to nuclear testing did not mean a step towards independence, "but rather a step towards poverty and greater dependence vis a vis the state."

Flosse has said that a delegation of locally elected leaders should visit Paris to see top political leaders in a "concerted action to remind Paris of its "responsibilities."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA**Material on BW Defense Measures Submitted to Convention Talks**

*AU0704131892 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 4 Apr 92 p 5*

[NO-VG report: "A Czechoslovak Contribution to Confidence"]

[Text] Geneva—Talks involving government experts from the 119 member countries of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons [BW] have resumed in Geneva. The experts are preparing a control

mechanism for the convention. In this connection, the Czechoslovak delegation submitted comprehensive material to the talks on Thursday [2 April]. This material contains extensive information on defensive and preventive programs implemented within our Armed Forces since 1951. Thus, Czechoslovakia is the first country in the world to publish information on its past and current military activities in this heretofore strictly classified sphere of activity. As of this year, such activities will become part of the comprehensive and voluntary exchange of information within the United Nations. The participants in the Geneva talks received the submitted material positively and appreciated its thoroughness and directness.

GENERAL

France Willing To Help CIS Dismantle Nuclear Weapons

LD2703232192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1900 GMT 27 Mar 92

[Text] France is willing to aid Russia and the other nuclear republics on formerly Soviet territory in their attempts to dismantle their nuclear weapons. President Mitterrand has appointed the one time secretary of state on defense matters, Gerard Renon, the head of the French delegation that is to arrive in Moscow on the 29th of this month to discuss during the next three days the possible use of French technologies in the transformation of plutonium for its eventual use for civilian purposes.

Prospects for Post-Soviet START, CFE Ratification Viewed

LD0104101292 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1924 GMT 31 Mar 92

[Text] And now, our specialist on military affairs Vadim Solovyev looks at the arms reductions in the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

[Solovyev] Many observers analyzing relations between the members of the Commonwealth show concern over the fate of arms reduction treaties signed by the former Soviet Union. Among these are such important and urgent agreements as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, concluded with the United States in July last year, and also the European Conventional Troops and Arms Reduction Treaty [CFE], signed in Paris in November 1990. These treaties await ratification. All the sovereign states that emerged in place of the former Soviet Union feel they must be put into effect as soon as possible. Moreover Russia, the legal successor to the Soviet Union on nuclear arms issues too, recently announced a wide range of unilateral disarmament measures.

Despite all this it is unrealistic to expect the Commonwealth members to ratify the agreements at once. Serious difficulties have emerged. One of the reasons is that this is a period when the unitary state is breaking up into several independent states and relations between these are still in the process of becoming adjusted to the new circumstances. One example is Ukraine's decision to suspend the withdrawal of tactical nuclear arms to centralized storage bases in Russia. Ukraine has demanded the right to monitor the dismantling of nuclear warheads. This dispute has now been settled however, according to the Commander-in-Chief of the unified armed forces of the Commonwealth, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. And work is now under way to spell out procedures in detail, though as the commander-in-chief points out the summit of the Commonwealth members in Alma-Ata last year took a decision on outline on joint monitoring of the withdrawal and scrapping of nuclear arms.

Another issue currently under consideration is ratification of the Conventional Arms Limitation Agreement. This agreement sets limits on the numbers of tanks, armored vehicles and artillery to be owned by the former Soviet Union. The quantity of weapons admissible under the agreement must now be divided up amongst the Commonwealth members, which are currently establishing their own armed forces. No member has yet agreed to have fewer weapons than the others, but all understand that sooner or later an agreement must be reached. General Leonid Ivashov of the Unified Armed Forces has given these details about the current agreement

[Ivashov] This concerns first of all the sharing of tanks, General Ivashov said. Ukraine claims 4,500, Moldova and the countries of Transcaucasia asked for 300 tanks each. But if all these claims are met, as the General points out, there would be no tanks left for Russia. However, as the result of talks with the republic of Belorussia, numbers have been agreed. Talks are also underway with Moldova, the republics of Transcaucasia and Kazakhstan. General Ivashov believes common sense will prevail and the parties will eventually settle their differences by compromise.

And that report was by our specialist on military affairs, Vadim Solovyev.

START TALKS

U.S. Concerned Over START Ratification by Republics

924P0107A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Andrey Kamorin, IZVESTIYA: "Disagreements in the CIS Threaten the Strategic Arms Treaty"]

[Text] The disagreements between the nuclear members of the CIS are becoming a serious obstacle in the way of the realization of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty [START] signed by the United States and the former USSR in July 1991.

As REUTERS reports, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has postponed indefinitely his appearance at hearings in the U.S. Senate on the issue of ratification of this key document for the process of nuclear disarmament.

Officials in Washington explain the secretary of state's step by serious doubts as to the capacity of our Commonwealth for implementing the provisions of the START Treaty under conditions where Ukraine has suspended the withdrawal of nuclear arms from its territory and where even the most general questions of the dividing up of the Soviet "strategic inheritance" remain a subject of bitter dispute.

The meeting of the heads of state of the Commonwealth in Kiev engendered in the United States certain optimism, but very guarded. As M. Tutwiler, spokesperson for the State Department, diplomatically put it at a news conference in Washington: "It seems to us that they have

not yet resolved all problems related to the START Treaty. As you know, the President of the United States has reported that he spoke with the president of Ukraine. We are continuing consultations on this matter in the capitals of all four republics."

M. Tutwiler assured journalists that the U.S. Administration is seeking the speediest implementation of the START Treaty. Time truly does not wait. If the process of its ratification is frozen until May—the anticipated date of the next summit within the CIS framework—the "nuclear problem" could become a trump card for bargaining within a contradiction-racked Commonwealth. In addition, there is one further factor also: the American factor. Ratification of this document at the height of a presidential election campaign seems highly problematical to very many experts. REUTERS quotes a staffer of the U.S. Senate as declaring: "The START Treaty is in trouble. Skeptics are close to thinking that it could simply die this year."

All commentators agree that a START Treaty "abandoned half-way" would mean an appreciable slowing of the nuclear disarmament process, which would have serious consequences for all world policy.

New Single-Warhead ICBM Could Be Developed

*LD2703200192 Moscow POSTFATUM in English
1758 GMT 27 Mar 92*

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] Moscow—According to some reports, the chief headquarters of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and Russian defense-related enterprises received an order from President Boris Yeltsin to develop a new single-block ballistic missile. Some military experts believe that this order is related to the fact that Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President George Bush may discuss at the coming meeting a total elimination of multi-block ballistic missiles, which may result in a strategic domination of the USA implementing advanced defense programs based on other weapon systems.

Russia Invites CIS States To START Talks

*OW3103194792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1831 GMT 31 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev invited his colleagues from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to talks on joining the Soviet-American START treaty. The minister's adviser Galina Sidorova said at a briefing Tuesday [31 March] that Kozyrev made the decision following a meeting Monday with American Ambassador Robert Strauss. The talks are tentatively set for sometime between April 6-10.

Sidorova said she feels Russia still has not developed a foreign policy in relation to the Commonwealth. The department of Commonwealth affairs in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be transformed into a "mini-ministry or a ministry within a ministry", the

adviser said, "depending on what emphasis Russia places or will place on republics of the former USSR".

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Arbatov Critique of Joint SDI Program Viewed

*MK2403123092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 2*

[Article by Aleksandr Savelyev, vice president of the Institute for National Security and Strategic Research, under the rubric "Perspective": "About SDI and 'Free Lunches' Yet Again. Mere Talks About Disarmament Will Not Be Enough"]

[Text] The article by A. Arbatov, director of the Foreign Policy Association Center for Disarmament and Strategic Stability, entitled "Joint SDI: Will It Help Anybody's Security?" (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA for 4 March 1992), which was written in connection with my interview (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA for 18 February 1992), raises extremely important questions connected with the Russian leadership's initiative on creating together with the United States a global anti-ballistic missile [ABM] system. The author expresses a largely negative attitude toward both the initiative in question and my interpretation of the idea—the idea of "moderate" participation by Russia in this program along with the simultaneous relaxation of restrictions on creating and deploying defensive systems by replacing the ABM Treaty with a new Russian-American agreement.

The importance of this topic forces me to return once again to this question, well "visited" though it is, as the author says. But it is clearly worth mentioning at this point that in our country it has been "visited" by critics of SDI, who have competed with each other in arguments against ABM defenses. Now, albeit rather late, the time has come to listen to the supporters of defensive systems.

Without going into details of the debates about this problem, I will dwell on a few fundamental points. Thus, after the U.S. Administration put forward in 1991 the idea of creating "GPALS," the global protection against limited strikes into which SDI had been transformed, the opponents of ABM defenses lost a whole series of "trump cards" that they had actively used in their struggle against the original version of the SDI program. One of these "trump cards" was the clear correctness of the critics' contention that the present standard of technology will not make it possible to create in the foreseeable future an "impenetrable astrodome" capable of intercepting a coordinated first strike using hundreds of ballistic missiles and thousands of warheads. This question has now been removed, since it is a question of a limited ABM system designed to resolve far more modest and realistic tasks.

The second argument was that global ABM defenses could probably be used to intercept a weakened retaliatory strike. This could create an incentive for the power possessing such ABM defenses to attack. This problem

too has been settled today, although it could be taken into account at sharply lowered levels of nuclear confrontation, given a considerable increase in the vulnerability of strategic offensive weapons. But it should also be considered here that the sides can lower their levels of strategic offensive weapons to a few hundred delivery vehicles only if there is an immeasurably higher level of trust between them. And in the present case they will be obliged to take every measure to increase the survivability of their strategic offensive weapons as much as possible and to decrease their "attractiveness" for use in a first strike, for instance, by switching to single-warhead [odnozaryadnyy] delivery vehicles.

The third claim—that global ABM defenses will cost trillions—is also invalid. The cost of such a system, as A. Arbatov rightly indicates, is around \$50 billion at present. If you "break it down" over the period of deployment indicated in the aforementioned article (10-15 years), the annual expenditure will be at the level of \$20-25 per year (\$1.5-2 per month) per U.S. inhabitant. And this spending will scarcely undermine the United States' efforts in other spheres, as the aforementioned author claims (expansion of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspectorate, creation of new monitoring [kontrol] systems and safer types of nuclear power station, and so forth), especially as most such spending does not come under the military budget and has never been regarded as an alternative to military programs.

Another argument of the opponents of ABM defenses—that there will be an inevitable intensification of the arms race if the ABM Treaty is abandoned—also does not hold water, since it is a question of replacing this obsolete document with a new agreement permitting the limited deployment of defensive systems contributing to increased security for the sides. Moreover, we are openly being offered cooperation in this sphere.

Now for the ABM Treaty itself. It is obvious that this document is obsolete and does not accord with the existing level of international and Russian-American relations. It is also obvious that this treaty suffers from a whole series of defects making it possible to evade its provisions without even formally violating the letter of the agreement. Thus even opponents of strategic defenses admit the importance of timely warning of a nuclear missile attack. So the creation and deployment of such systems, including in space, is regarded as a contribution to strengthening strategic stability.

At the same time the ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment in space of components of ABM defenses capable not only of "getting a fix" on the launch of a strategic missile but also of guiding interceptor systems to it. I am referring to space-based radars and devices capable of taking the place of these radars in performing this function. But the whole point is that the space-based sensors that are being developed [razrabatyvayemyy] under the GPALS program are supposed to perform both these tasks. And no means of technical verification are capable of "betraying" the characteristic differences

between them: This is an integrated system, the fruit of scientific and technical progress. The ABM Treaty itself does not give a definition of an ABM component capable of taking the place of space-based radars, so the question of whether such sensors are permitted or prohibited under the treaty remains open.

That is not the ABM Treaty's most serious flaw. What is far more important is the fact that this treaty does not prohibit and in no way restricts the creation, testing, and deployment of air defense and "tactical" ABM systems. In practice this means that this treaty permits the development of means of countering strategic aircraft and effectively submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), since "tactical" ABM defenses will almost certainly gain this potential in the course of technical improvements. And the distinction between systems to intercept warheads of nonstrategic missiles and SLBM warheads may become extremely shaky or, to be more accurate, will cease to exist altogether, since the same systems will be capable of performing this function.

Thus, whether they want to or not, those who advocate retaining the ABM treaty are effectively preaching the idea that it is possible and necessary to develop means of combating the least dangerous strategic systems (aircraft and SLBM's) but not the most dangerous (ICBM's). Or, to put it another way: It is correct and fine to combat stabilizing weapons for a retaliatory strike, but wrong and dangerous to combat destabilizing weapons designed to deliver a first strike. That is peculiar logic.

But let us return to A. Arbatov's article. As we can see, he allows the possibility of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the aforementioned spheres ("tactical" ABM defenses and air defenses) while denying the need to create a global ABM system. What danger does A. Arbatov see if the sides abandon the ABM Treaty and Russia takes a "moderate" part in SDI? (Incidentally, let us note that such participation might find expression precisely in joint work on "tactical" ABM defenses, which are now an integral part of the GPALS program.) If you set aside the emotional aspect of the expert's article, several such points can be noted.

Thus he expresses the fear that, if SDI is continued, the money appropriated for it will be used among other things to finance an economic "carrot and stick" policy on questions of nuclear nonproliferation—regarding a number of countries, among which the author includes the CIS members, not excluding Russia.

But, as is well known, we are already receiving "carrots" in the form of humanitarian aid. And as for the "stick," according to the expert's logic, without that the carrot is not a carrot.

The second claim is that if Russia meets the United States halfway in the latter's desire to ensure the defense of its own population, allies, and friends (including Russia) from accidental and unsanctioned missile launches and nuclear terror involving threats to use ballistic missiles, we will be made to pay for this. The

United States will demand the unilateral nuclear disarmament of Russia and the restructuring and redeployment of the Army and Navy on Washington's instructions...

It is hard to say what gives the expert grounds for such conclusions. Or is the United States indulging in such diktat vis-a-vis Britain, France, Germany, and other countries? Or are there examples of the United States issuing instructions to its friends and allies on where they should "redeploy their navy"? Or does A. Arbatov think that if the ABM Treaty is replaced by another agreement Russia will be transformed into an American colony, ceasing to be an independent state?

What is presented to us as the "main path" in the development of Russian-American relations? The proposals mainly boiled down to strengthening the regime of nonproliferation, whose importance nobody contests. But what it is impossible to agree with is the counterposing of those measures to the creation of global defenses. Those two programs can perfectly well exist in parallel, mutually reinforcing each other. Then in a number of cases the need to implement military sanctions against potential violators of that regime, which is something the author also calls for, might disappear since the incentive to create and utilize these dangerous weapons would be sharply reduced for the violators.

Finally, he proposes "painstaking and persistent work" to dismantle the sides' accumulated nuclear arsenals. Without denying the importance of talks on disarmament, let us note that, as the author himself admits, such work in the seventies and eighties served rather to legalize the arms race. Today, too, talks alone in this sphere will not be enough.

In the new conditions of Russian-American relations what may be no less important is a series of unilateral actions to lessen nuclear confrontation, agreed initiatives in this sphere, and joint steps to strengthen security, including participation in joint military programs. It is indeed time to find a common language with our potential ally, beginning by attempting to rid ourselves of suspicions that anyone wants to "lunch at someone else's expense."

Proposed Joint Global ABM System Queried

*924P0107B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Mar 92 p 3*

[Article by Lieutenant General (Retired) Ye. Volkov: "Joint Global ABM Systems. Is Their Creation Possible, and Is It Necessary?"]

[Text] Interest in problems of ABM defenses has increased noticeably of late. This has been connected not least with the well-known proposals concerning the commencement of work on joint global defense systems for the United States and Russia. His opinion on whether such systems are possible and whether they are necessary is expressed by Professor Ye. Volkov, military scholar.

The need for defense against ballistic missiles first arose in 1944, when the Germans fired V-2 rockets at London. It was clear even then how difficult their interception was—the British did not manage to destroy a single V-2 rocket in flight. After the war, military thought of various countries began to work urgently on problems of antimissile defense.

Thus scientific and design studies aimed at the creation of systems providing for the interception of Soviet ICBM warheads had been developed in the United States by the end of the 1950's. It was assumed initially that the ABM system would be ground-based and would be capable of destroying warheads in the final phase of their trajectory by way of the guidance of ABM interceptors onto them. Since the accuracy of guidance was at that time insufficient for guaranteeing destruction of the enemy warheads with conventional munitions, it was planned to fit the missile interceptors with nuclear front ends.

Despite all the complexity of defense against ICBM warheads (they enter the ABM area of operations at a velocity of several kilometers a second, that is, faster than a bullet and artillery shells, and are of small dimensions and high strength and may also be accompanied by decoys), by the start of the 1970's the basic components of ABM defenses had been perfected in the United States to such an extent that it was possible to embark on the creation of the system itself. But estimates of its efficiency showed that they could not, for all that, ensure reliable protection. Work on ABM systems was being performed in the Soviet Union also.

Under these conditions the Treaty Limiting ABM Systems was concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1972. This treaty and the protocol thereto provided for a limitation of the number of ABM districts and the number of missile interceptors (up to 100 for each country) and radars. The undertaking not to create, not to test, and not to deploy sea-, air-, and space-launched and ground-mobile ABM systems was adopted also.

Nonetheless, work on antimissile systems in the United States continued. The results that were achieved led to a revision of the former notions concerning the structure of ABM defenses. The main conclusion here was that concerning the possibility of the creation not only of ground- but also space-based ABM defenses. At the same time, however, more consummate systems of guiding the missile interceptors to their targets had been developed, which made it possible to abandon the use therein of nuclear front ends.

Nine years ago, on 23 March 1983, President R. Reagan announced that the United States would embark on "the implementation of a program to counter the horrifying Soviet missile threat." This was the initiation of the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]—work on the creation of a multilayered strategic ABM defense of the United States with space-based components (the "star wars program"). It was anticipated that deployment of the

system would begin in the latter half of the 1990's and be completed by the year 2010.

The demands on the SDI have changed with the passage of time. It was assumed at first that it should provide for the interception of the warheads of all Soviet ICBM's, even given a simultaneous launch. But estimates showed that the accomplishment of such an assignment would take tens of thousands of ground- and space-based missile interceptors, and the entire system would prove incredibly expensive (up to \$1 trillion).

Versions of so-called limited ABM systems or systems of protection against limited strikes are being considered at the present time. One of the latest such versions—GPALS—is geared to the interception of 200 warheads and is to incorporate 1,000 space-based missile interceptors and 750 ABM interceptors of a ground complex. The U.S. Congress has adopted a decision on the deployment of such a system in 1996. The Pentagon has been allocated for the present fiscal year for the SDI program a record amount of approximately \$4.15 billion. It is expected that in 1993 the appropriations to this end will be in excess of \$5 billion.

So work on ABM systems in the United States has approached the practical implementation stage. The purpose of the GPALS system can hardly be doubted, what is more. It could, of course, be used to destroy isolated missiles, launched accidentally, for example. But its possibilities are far more extensive. It could be used for parrying or, at least, appreciably weakening a retaliatory strike. As far, however, as the statements to the effect that ABM defenses are being created in connection with the threat of the "spread" of nuclear missiles around the world are concerned, we would observe that intercontinental missiles—and it is only these that are dangerous for the United States—could not, in view of their complexity, show up in the countries where the appearance of such weapons (third world countries) is forecast. Nor do these countries need them. If, on the other hand, missiles of relatively short range appear (they have already appeared in Iraq), space-based interceptors are not required for combating them, modern air defense batteries being, as the war in the Persian Gulf showed, sufficient for this. Like the Patriot, for example. How does the idea concerning the development and joint operation of a global defense system in place of the SDI which has been put forward by Russia look in the light of what has been said? It would first and foremost strike a devastating blow at the ABM Treaty for its practical realization could not be accomplished within its framework. It is not fortuitous, authoritative experts believe, that Washington understands joint actions in the ABM sphere chiefly in the spirit of a joint revision of the 1972 treaty, and no more.

To this it needs to be added that tens of billions of dollars have already been invested in the development of an ABM system in the United States and that preparations for its deployment are almost complete. The role of the CIS or Russia plugged into work at this stage would amount in practice to participation in an arms race,

albeit an essentially defensive arms race. And their contribution to the creation of the system would for both economic and technological reasons be incomparably less than that of the United States. And this would mean that the system would ultimately be, for all that, not joint but American. And that it would perform the tasks which the United States would entrust to it.

This is why the arguments being put forward by critics of joint global defense systems on our side also would appear quite serious. They rightly believe that "limited" ABM systems would merely divert resources from more effective ways of solving the problem and could, in addition, create many difficulties for the consolidation of strategic stability.

It could, consequently, be a question of Russia's participation only in work on the creation of systems geared to the accomplishment of some particular tasks—mainly on protection against short-range missiles outside of the scope of the treaty. But an exchange of technology really useful for both countries could hardly be expected in this case. THE NEW YORK TIMES has spoken candidly about this. The Russians, it wrote, are fascinated by the fantastic prospect of an introduction to American technology and the acquisition of money from the United States. But this is utterly unrealistic. The Pentagon needs the SDI program to be realized in an atmosphere of confrontation.

Thus the creation of any ABM systems with space-based components could lead merely to a disturbance of strategic stability, which was achieved with such difficulty. ABM systems of such a type in conjunction with the United States are hardly possible. A continuation of the reductions in strategic offensive arms on a parity basis, given a complete ban on the creation of ABM systems going beyond the limits stipulated by the 1972 treaty, is the only way.

Latvians Demand Removal of Skruna Radar

*OW3103142992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1204 GMT 31 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The fate of the Skruna radar will be decided at a meeting of Russian and Latvian experts in Riga April 2. Mikhail Stepichev, secretary of the Latvian parliamentary commission on internal affairs and defense, told BF [BALTFAX] that Latvia's position remains unchanged: the Skruna radar station as a military strategic facility should be removed from its territory. Stepichev stressed that the Latvian side is ready to consider preserving the station until its analogue is built in Russia. However, everything will depend on the terms of its construction.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Further on Troop Withdrawals From Latvia

Experts Conclude Talks

*LD2003000392 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1830 GMT 19 Mar 92*

[Text] The talks at Ligtane between groups of experts from Latvia and Russia ended today. As a result of the

talks a draft agreement will be prepared on a planned withdrawal of the former USSR troops from Latvia. Proposals will be also prepared for drawing up corresponding addenda to define more precisely the procedure for troop withdrawal.

The sides agreed that within the framework of the agreement on trade and economic cooperation between Latvia and Russia the corresponding government structures will mutually examine the question on future operations of the military factories on the territory of Latvia. The Russian side informed that in April a military establishment in Riga will be handed over to Latvia.

After two weeks the talks will continue in Moscow in order to draw up the final text of the draft agreement.

'Symbolic' Withdrawal Begins

*LD1903175392 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1600 GMT 19 Mar 92*

[Text] As we have already reported, a withdrawal of the Soviet troops under Russian jurisdiction from the territory of Latvia began today. However, this withdrawal is purely symbolic, because only an individual company in which there are only a few tens of soldiers and 29 vehicles have left Latvian territory.

Journalists, whose numbers were almost as high as the departing soldiers, were addressed after a festive ceremony by Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Northwest Group of Troops. He announced that the army withdrawal will continue after a conclusion of the corresponding agreements between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation. Specific schedules for withdrawal of the troops have not yet been drawn up; therefore, it is not known which unit will be withdrawn next from Latvian territory.

There was discussion today about these schedules, but information on this is rather sketchy. Talks between the groups of experts of the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of the former USSR troops under the jurisdiction of Russia from the territory of Latvia ended today. Dainis Turlajs, leader of the group of experts of Latvia and commander of the defense forces of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, told journalists that the talks were constructive and that both sides have decided to continue the work.

Turlajs' stand was supported by Sergey Zotov, leader of the Russian group of experts and ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. Zotov said that a general withdrawal of the troops will not take place simply as economic and political questions must be tackled. It has been decided to continue the talks.

Russia Wants 'Sphere of Interests'

*LD2003232292 Riga Radio Riga International
in Latvian 2030 GMT 20 Mar 92*

[Text] Military establishments in Latvia will continue to be in Russia's sphere of interests. Sergey Zotov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who is heading the delegation in the talks of experts on the withdrawal of troops, has said that Russia would like to maintain in its sphere of interests some objects on the territory of Latvia. As Zotov said, this would be in the interests not only of Russia but also of a more global policy. This primarily concerns the Skrunda radar station and some other objects.

In the talks at Ligatne, the Russian representatives said that approximately 50-80,000 soldiers and officers are stationed in Latvia at present. Also the aviation, the border guards, and the fleet are included in this number. Previously, when talking about the number of stationed soldiers, the number of 40,000 was mentioned.

The next meeting of experts on the withdrawal of Russian troops of Russia is envisaged at the end of March.

Further on Talks

*OW2003195592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1830 GMT 20 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Director of the group of Russian military experts Sergey Zotov said in Riga Thursday [19 March] that the withdrawal of the anti-aircraft defense forces is only a symbolic step. The wide-scale and complete withdrawal of forces from Latvia can begin only after an inter-government agreement is signed.

A group of experts from Latvia and Russia met in Riga March 17-19 to develop a draft of the inter-government agreement on the withdrawal of former Soviet forces from the republic.

Zotov said an agreement was made during the talks requiring the commander of the Northwest forces Valeriy Mironov, to reveal the number of forces stationed in the republic. Zotov said there are currently 50-80 thousand troops in the republic. He said the Russian government needs to know the exact number of troops in order to provide housing for them in Russia. "A hasty withdrawal of forces may have serious political ramifications", the head of the Russian group said.

The Russian expert also said that Russia does not plan to maintain military bases in Latvia but is very interested in certain strategic installations "which would ensure the security of Latvia and Russia".

The Commander of the North-West forces Valeriy Mironov said at a press conference that the withdrawal of forces would be completed in no less than 5 years.

The General said that for each installation constructed from funds of the USSR's Defense Ministry a deed of

transfer will be prepared stating the cost of the installation. The commander said the cost of the transferred installations will be determined at inter-government talks on the withdrawal of forces from Latvia.

Air Defense Unit Demands Social, Economic Guarantees

*LD2203210592 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 2100 GMT 20 Mar 92*

[Text] Unit No. 55725 of the Russian air defense troops stationed in the vicinity of Riga has announced that it retains the right not to submit to an order on its redeployment or disbandment if the demands adopted at a meeting yesterday of the officers and ensigns of the unit is not complied with. The officers and ensigns demand a discontinuation of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states until the conclusion of an interstate agreement between the Baltic states and Russia on granting political and economic guarantees to the citizens of Russia living in the Baltic states, and also guaranteeing that no sub-unit of the Russian Army will be withdrawn from the Baltics until the officers and ensigns serving in it are provided with places of residence and work in the territory of Russia.

There are other demands. The demands have been formulated in an open letter by the unit and have been signed by Lieutenant Colonel Slobodnik, the commander of the unit of Russian air defense troops, and Major Rozvinov, chairman of the meeting of officers.

The unit is not subordinate to the headquarters of the Northwest Group of Forces, but to the command of the Russian air defense troops in St. Petersburg.

Letters of a similar contents, however, are also being received from other units of Russian troops stationed in the Baltic states and which are subordinate to the command of the Northwest Group of Forces. Such information has been received at the press center of the Northwest Group of Forces.

Paratroopers 'Display Activity'

*LD2203172692 Riga Radio Riga International
in English 1830 GMT 21 Mar 92*

[Text] The special Russian Government envoy, Sergey Zotov, who headed the expert group for talks in Latvia, said at a news conference that this week's withdrawal from Latvia of former Soviet troops, now under Russian jurisdiction, was a purely symbolic act, and stressed that full-scale withdrawal would begin only after the two states sign a relevant agreement.

Meanwhile a senior Latvian Defense Ministry official has said that several Russian army paratroop units are displaying activity in the vicinity of Latvia's eastern border. According to the official, the paratroopers are digging trenches and several tank wagons of fuel have arrived in places stationing these units. Latvian defense forces are ready to avert any possible provocations, stressed the anonymous official.

Possibility of International Observers

*OW3103142092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1204 GMT 31 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] After visiting the NATO Headquarters in Brussels the secretary of the Latvian parliamentary commission on internal affairs and defense Mikhail Stepichev and a member of the commission Juris Dobelis told BF [BALTFAX] that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Latvia could have been monitored by U.N. Security Council observers. NATO cannot deal with this question since agreement of all 16 member-states is needed.

The two men said that NATO representatives believe Latvia should first sign treaty with Russia on the withdrawal of troops and set its deadline and timetable. Only after such a treaty is signed, international observers can be sent to Latvia for controlling the withdrawal. Dobelis said that the withdrawal should be completed by late 1993.

Probable Outcome of Army 'Division' Considered

*PM2003151192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Mar 92 p 1*

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev article: "If Arms Must Be Divided Up, Let Us Do It In a Civilized Way, Not Forgetting About International Treaties"]

[Text] With regard to the outcome of the Kiev summit of CIS leaders, Western news agencies are predicting that the former Soviet Army's conventional arms will be divided up 20 March. And our editorial office has information to the effect that in Kiev, where decisions will be made to set up separate armed forces, the Ukrainian, Belarussian, Azerbaijani, and Moldovan delegations intend to raise the question of dividing up the USSR's military legacy. The entire world is concerned about the "privatization" of CIS units, combined units, and entire armies. Just what awaits us if the process of division goes along the lines of "whatever I can grab is mine"?

First and foremost, the coming into force of the CFE Treaty, signed by 22 states in Paris 19 November 1990, will be delayed, and for a long time. What about it? The treaty should be ratified by the Commonwealth countries in the European part of the former USSR—Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. But there are considerable complications in this area. Above all, the levels of armaments and hardware limited under the treaty have not been determined for the Commonwealth states, your correspondent was told at a CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command directorate. Nor has the problem of the joint use of places where conventional arms are to be cut, including the questions of leadership, financing, rights to sell off material assets left over after the hardware cuts, and so on.

And it can be said that the domestic problem will be to the fore. It will be necessary to set quotas, in a civilized

way and taking account of international experience, on the armaments and hardware limited by the treaty for each individual Commonwealth state. Nothing, it seems, could be simpler: Just set the quotas. But that, as the saying goes, is where the problems start. "The main reason why this question has not been settled," Lieutenant General Viktor Samoylov, chief of the Russian State Counselor for Defense Service Military Organizational Development Department, notes in the February issue of VESTNIK VOYENNOY INFORMATSII published by the RIA-NOVOSTI and INTERVOYENINFORM agencies, "is that no principle for determining what constitutes adequate arms for each individual country has been worked out between these (Commonwealth—A.D.) states."

It should be noted that approaches toward defining these principles have not only been worked out but have even been verified by international experience. It is another matter that certain Commonwealth states do not want to recognize it. Just what is this experience?

In implementing the treaty it was necessary to distribute arms fairly and sensibly among the countries of the Warsaw bloc. Thus, this question was settled with the help of a "generalized indicator" calculated taking account of the states' area, population, and the length of their borders. Understandably, this "generalized indicator" could also be used in redistributing conventional arms among the CIS countries. It would break down as follows: 4.3 percent for Azerbaijan, 2.8 for Armenia, 6.6 for Belarus, 3.8 for Georgia, 4.3 for Kazakhstan, 2.3 for Moldova, 54.1 for Russia, and 21.8 for Ukraine. Conventional armaments should be distributed on the basis of these objective figures.

Azerbaijan could claim 565 tanks, 860 armored fighting vehicles, and 567 artillery pieces [yedinitsa artillerii]; Belarus would correspondingly receive 868 tanks, 1,320 armored vehicles, and 870 artillery systems [artsistema]; Moldova would receive 303 tanks, 460 armored vehicles, and 303 artillery systems; Ukraine would receive 2,867 tanks, 4,360 armored vehicles, and 2,872 artillery systems; and Russia would receive 7,114 tanks, 10,820 armored vehicles, and 7,128 artillery systems. The remaining hardware—the 13,150 tanks, 20,000 armored vehicles, and 13,175 artillery systems which the former USSR was allowed to retain in the European part of the country—should go to Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

Everything would seem to be sensible and logical. But this is not the case. The proposals from Ukraine, Belarus, and Armenia are based on entirely different principles. Thus, Ukraine wants to get 4,800 tanks, 5,000 armored vehicles, 5,000 artillery pieces, 1,100 combat aircraft, and 500 strike helicopters, thereby transforming itself into one of the best-armed countries in Europe. Belarus wants 2,000 tanks, 2,500 armored vehicles, 1,700 artillery systems, 320 combat aircraft, and 130 strike helicopters. The corresponding proposals from Armenia

would mean a distribution of armaments in the Transcaucasian republic's favor that would be totally without foundation from the standpoint of common sense.

It should be noted that for some reason a veil of silence is being drawn over the 14 June 1991 statement by the USSR Government on restricting the number of coastal defense and marine armaments, and the statement by a USSR spokesman on additional unilateral commitments regarding the armaments transferred beyond the Urals before the treaty was signed. After all, how might things turn out? First, armaments quotas would be set for each Commonwealth state, and then Russia would unilaterally have to cut its combat hardware by another several thousand units.

That is the picture. Certain states are striving not to honor international obligations but to acquire more arms. Let us hope that common sense will prevail in Kiev. And if the question is raised of dividing up conventional arms, as the Western press has been saying, then the states' leaders should turn to international experience and not just to the proposals made by groups of experts who sometimes do not want to heed the world disarmament process.

The CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command believes that things will not go as far as a division of armaments in Kiev. On 20 March 10 documents regulating questions of the life and activity of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces will be submitted to the meeting in the Ukrainian capital, Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Directorate of Affairs, stated in an interview with an ITAR-TASS observer. Three of these documents are of fundamental importance, in his opinion. The powers of the top Commonwealth organs on defense matters and the High Command's sphere of competence will be defined, and the principles behind the staffing of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and military service in them will be elaborated.

Lithuanians Still Dissatisfied on Course of Troop Withdrawal Talks

'No Tangible Results'

*LD2103202792 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
2230 GMT 20 Mar 92*

[Text] The two-day negotiations between Lithuanian and Russian experts in Moscow on the withdrawal of troops ended with no tangible results. The Lithuanian experts did not get more precise information on the number of Russian troops stationed in Lithuania, although this point had been agreed upon at a previous meeting.

Coordination of stands was reached in essence only on one of the four documents tabled by Lithuania last week. It is a protocol on the technical and organizational aspects of the troops withdrawal. As for the other three, the Russian side had remarks which the Lithuanian experts promised to take into account.

In their turn the Russian experts tabled nine draft documents dealing mainly with the social needs of the military.

According to Gediminas Serksnys, a member of the Lithuanian experts group, a new achievement of the meeting was that Russia accepted the stand that it must solve issues of compensation for the harm done by the military.

The experts agreed to propose that the state negotiation delegations hold a meeting to discuss the terms and order of the troops withdrawal.

Telegram Sent to Shakhray

*LD2403045592 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 23 Mar 92*

[Text] The Lithuanian Supreme Council Center of Information and Analysis reports that today Ceslovas Stankevicus, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, sent a telegram to Sergey Shakhray, deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation. The telegram reads, among other things, that the presence of the military units of the former Soviet Union on the borders of the Republic of Lithuania and the refusal to hand the border crossing points to the services of the Lithuanian Defense Ministry runs counter to the pledges made by the Russian Federation to respect the sovereignty and the laws of the Republic of Lithuania.

Ceslovas Stankevicus, head of the Lithuanian state delegation for the negotiations with the Russian Federation on the complete withdrawal of the former Soviet Armed Forces, pointed out in his telegram that the Lithuanian leadership gave a positive assessment to President Boris Yeltsin's decree of 18 March this year which points out that military units of the former Soviet Union [break in reception] guard the external state border of the member states of the CIS.

The telegram stresses that the signing of this document should serve the undelayed pulling back of the above military units from the state border of the Republic of Lithuania [words indistinct].

The head of the Lithuanian delegation expressed his belief that from now on the final handing over of the border protection installations would proceed [passage indistinct].

Delegation Head Complains

*OW2703180492 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1407 GMT 27 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Head of the Lithuanian delegation at talks with Russia on withdrawal of troops, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Ceslovas Stankevicus told a news briefing in Vilnius Friday [27 March] that he was unsatisfied with the course of the talks. "Russia delays the talks on withdrawal of troops", Stankevicus said. Two months ago Vytautas Landsbergis and Boris Yeltsin

met in Moscow "making the first step" to resolve this issue, but since then, Stankevicus noted, "little progress has been made".

He complained that the Russian side neither provides information about the number of its troops in Lithuania, nor confirms that it has no nuclear weapons deployed in Lithuania. The problem of former USSR's border troops also remains unsettled.

Stankevicus said that Lithuania intends to raise the issue of the withdrawal at the international level, either in the CSCE or the U.N. Lithuania believes that Russia should take into account the international public opinion because it is interested in financial aid. In this connection, "one of the main tasks of the Lithuanian diplomacy is now to link financial aid to Russia to the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania", Stankevicus said.

In an interview with the newspaper "DIENA" Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans warned that unless Russia withdraws its troops by this July, the Baltic States will not sign documents of Helsinki-2.

Lithuanian Delegates Interviewed

*LD3003211992 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1015 GMT 27 Mar 92*

[Interview with Lithuanian delegation to negotiations with Russia on army withdrawal—Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Ceslovas Stankevicus, head of the delegation; Aleksandras Abisala, head of the group of experts; and Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius—by unidentified journalists; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Stankevicus] The Lithuanian delegation is working all the time, although negotiating meetings are very rare. But the Lithuanian delegation is indeed working, meetings take place not less than twice a week, and during the time that remains we work on the drafts of future agreements. We have accomplished a great deal. [passage omitted]

Two months have elapsed since the meeting between Mr. Landsbergis and Mr. Yeltsin. It was the first step in the examination of this problem, and we must say today that during these two months not a great deal has been achieved. The progress of the negotiations is quite unsatisfactory, in our opinion.

I would like to describe some concrete aspects, and comment on the situation from the point of view of the Lithuanian delegation. As I have already mentioned, in spite of repeated requests and urgings by Lithuania, Russia has so far failed to supply us with official information on the total number of its troops, the number of units and places of deployment, arms etc. [passage omitted]

The second point is that the Republic of Lithuania has signed the international convention on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and is therefore obliged to

ensure that there are no nuclear weapons on Lithuania's territory. It is important to us to have official confirmation by Russia that the Russian army has no such weapons on Lithuania's territory. So far we have not received any such confirmation.

We may say that the Russian Federation delegation is delaying negotiations on the dates and order of complete withdrawal of its army from Lithuania. We have the impression that the Russian delegation is aiming to legalize the longest possible stay of the army, and to divert the negotiations to secondary issues.

As I said, Lithuania has submitted draft agreements, and is proposing an agreed withdrawal of the army in 1992. Meanwhile, Russia has not submitted any specific proposals, and is on the whole evading examination of this issue. We can draw conclusions from official statements by the members of the Russian delegation—and from their press, television, and radio—that they intend to keep the former Soviet Army in Lithuania for many years, and at the same time preserve their military influence on Lithuania.

It seems to us that showing journalists 100 soldiers withdrawing does not mean the beginning of army withdrawal. [passage omitted] During the last two months, not a single important unit has been withdrawn from Lithuania, and there is no information about how many new soldiers have been brought in.

In spite of demands by Lithuania and promises by the Russian state delegation, Russian border troops have so far not been withdrawn from Lithuania's state border. Thus, they are crudely violating Lithuania's sovereignty, and are even forcibly preventing Lithuanian border units from protecting the state border. [passage omitted]

You already know that Russian President Yeltsin has signed a decree proclaiming that these troops are under Russia's jurisdiction, and this decree clearly defines the purpose of these troops—to protect the border of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Thus, this army should be returning to the CIS and discharging its duties. It should not be violating Lithuania's sovereignty and hampering the protection of the border. [passage omitted]

However, new troops are deliberately being brought in, the unsanctioned redeployment of troops is taking place, and the army is moving without permission along Lithuania's roads and in inhabited localities. It carries out deliberate acts on land and in Lithuania's territorial waters, crudely violates Lithuania's air space, and demonstrates its military might in other ways. These actions have become more frequent lately. You must have observed these actions yourselves.

Even I have personally experienced it. Thus at 1450 on 20 March, while returning from Prienai, I was compelled to stop on the road about 2-3 kilometers from Prienai because a column of light tanks was moving toward Prienai, advancing at a great speed and destroying asphalt. It was endangering traffic. This movement had

not been coordinated with the Lithuanian authorities. And this happens almost every day. [passage omitted]

The Russian delegation refuses to consider any compensation for losses inflicted on the state, for damage to the property of inhabitants or to the Lithuanian countryside, and is putting off all discussion of this issue. These losses continue to be inflicted. Military units subordinated to Russia continue to inflict damage on the environment, on cultural monuments, and on roads. They are taking away and destroying Lithuanian property. A particular problem at present is that they will not return seized forests, land, and buildings which, according to the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, belong to the Republic, its citizens or juridical persons.

You understand that the illegal presence and behavior of the army hampers normal Lithuanian economic and civilian life, and we are already experiencing this. It has an especially negative influence on potential foreign investors, to say nothing of the fact that this constitutes a threat to Lithuania's independence and the security of its residents. Crimes by soldiers of the former Soviet army in Lithuania, and cases of illegally handing over of weapons to criminal elements, have become more frequent of late. [passage omitted]

A few days ago, we asked our acting charge d'affaires in Moscow to ask Mr. Isakov when the delegations could meet, and also about the notorious interview by Kotenkov—how it should be interpreted—and about a report that Mr. Isakov has been appointed head of the delegation for the negotiations with Lithuania. The reply on the prospects of the meeting of the delegations was vague, and Mr. Isakov let it be understood that such a meeting could not take place before the second half of April.

We are very concerned about a new decision to authorize the head of the group of experts to take over the functions of the negotiating delegation. We think that this is a tactical step which will complicate the negotiations, because the experts led by Mr. Isakov have stated more than once that they are not competent to decide on issues of principle. The fact that it may be more difficult to arrange meetings of the delegations does not make us more optimistic. [passage omitted]

[Butkevicius] I wish to give some examples. For the last 10 days, there has not been a single night in which Soviet soldiers were not caught on Lithuania's border carrying out of Lithuania building materials or gasoline, or attempting to remove the property of military units without written authorization. For instance, yesterday a freight car loaded with cement was stopped at the Kybartai border post. Soviet soldiers were trying to take this cement to Kaliningrad. [passage omitted]

I should also mention the unsanctioned sale of weapons and explosives both to civilians and to criminal groups. There is a possibility that criminal groups will continue to obtain arms, and this may increase instability and crime in Lithuania. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] The participants in the briefing also replied to journalists's questions.

Asked whether Russia's stand on army withdrawal could be justified by saying that the military have stated that they would not obey orders and that discipline in the units is poor, Ceslovas Stankevicius replied that when you do not wish to give orders, you state that orders are not being obeyed. Aleksandras Abisala added that high-ranking military leaders have stated more than once that if they received orders, they will withdraw their troops. As far as the construction of apartments is concerned, we have said that Lithuania is prepared to help with contract work. We have asked more than once how many apartments are needed, and where the work is to be carried out, but so far there has been no reply.

According to those giving this briefing, apartments will be needed for about 3,000 officers' families. This is not a problem either for Russia or for Lithuania.

Official Demands Total Withdrawal by Autumn

*LD3003141692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2100 GMT 29 Mar 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius March 30 (TASS)—“Despite the agreements reached, not a single large unit was withdrawn from Lithuania and not a single soldier was withdrawn from Vilnius in the two months that have passed since the meeting of Vytautas Landsbergis and Boris Yeltsin”, Ceslovas Stankiavicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, said on Lithuanian television on Sunday [29 March] evening.

Stankiavicius, who heads the Lithuanian delegation at the negotiations on withdrawal of the Army of the former Soviet Union, blamed the Russian delegation for the lack of the striving for progress at the talks. He claimed that “the army illegally staying in Lithuania flouts Lithuanian sovereignty and grossly violates Lithuanian laws”.

“We demand that the entire Army be withdrawn by autumn, and that all troops be withdrawn from Vilnius this spring”, Stankiavicius said.

Reports on Status of Former Soviet Troops in Baltics

Transferred to Russian Jurisdiction

*LD2303113692 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 21 Mar 92*

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed a decree transferring troops in the Baltic border district to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and placing them under the command of the commander in chief of Border Troops. This has been done to improve guarding the external borders of CIS member states in the period of transition and to ensure the systematic withdrawal of border troops of the former USSR from the Baltic countries, the decree states. The operations of troops of

the Baltic border district will be financed from the Russian budget. Lieutenant General Valentin (?Gafonin), commander of troops in the Baltic border district, has been appointed plenipotentiary representative of Russia for issues of the temporary presence and withdrawal of border troops from the territory of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. A Russian state delegation is empowered to start talks with delegations of the Baltic countries to define the status and procedure for the withdrawal of Russian border troops from the territory of the Baltic States and also procedure and conditions for (?jointly) guarding the borders of these countries until the withdrawal of border troops. The Russian state delegation is instructed to hold talks with interested CIS states on issues of defining procedure and conditions for guarding the external border of CIS member states with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia using forces of the Baltic military border district.

Latvia Seeks CSCE 'Commissar' To Monitor Pullout

*OW2803180792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1528 GMT 28 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Upon return from Helsinki where he attended a meeting of the CSCE member states' foreign ministers, Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans said that the Baltic representatives supported the proposal to introduce the post of the CSCE supreme commissar who would monitor observance of ethnic minorities' rights in various countries.

Jurkans said that Latvia wants the CSCE commissar to take control over the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltics. In his opinion, agreements with Russia on the withdrawal should be reached by July with the help of the CSCE.

Transfer of Former Soviet Troops in Moldova

CIS-Moldovan Talks

*LD2403000792 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1820 GMT 23 Mar 92*

[BY ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau, 23 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—Questions of the transition to Moldovan jurisdiction of troops units of the former USSR which are deployed here, were discussed here today during talks between Colonel General Boris Pyankov, deputy commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and representatives of the republican Defense Ministry. It is proposed that hardware and ammunition for the national army will be supplied to the republic in exchange for subunits which are classed as “strategic” being withdrawn from Moldova.

According to Moldovan Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ion Kostash, the hardware and weapons of the CIS units which are stationed here are quite sufficient to kit out the national troops. It was explained to the

ITAR-TASS correspondent at the republican Defense Ministry that the recent statement by Romanian President Ion Iliescu that he is prepared to support Moldova in the creation of its armed forces in no way means supplying the republic with arms but merely helping to train military specialists.

Moldovan Decree on Status

*AU2403111492 Bucharest, ROMPRES in English
1014 GMT 24 Mar 92*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 24/3/1992—Colonel General Boris Pyankov, commander-in-chief of CIS unified forces, is in Chisinau for talks with the defence minister of the Republic of Moldova, Lieutenant-General Ion Kostas on placing military units and sub-units of the former Soviet Armed Forces stationed in Moldova under its jurisdiction, MOLDOVA PRES announces.

On 20 March, Moldova's President Mircea Snegur signed a decree under which military units are put under Moldova's jurisdiction.

Russian Decree on Status

*LD0104112992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1120 GMT 1 Apr 92*

[Text] Moscow April 1 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on Wednesday [1 April] transferring under Russian jurisdiction the 14th Army and several other units of the former Soviet Armed Forces stationed in Moldova and which were not included into the Moldovan Army. They are now subordinated to the CIS Commander-in-Chief, TASS learned from sources close to the president.

Colonel General Vladimir Semenov was appointed Russian representative in charge of all Russian troops deployed in Moldova, according to the decree.

The decree aims to prevent the armed units from getting involved in the interethnic conflict in Moldova and to protect the military and their families, according to the sources.

The decree comes into force since the moment of signing.

Estonian Prime Minister Insists on Withdrawal in 1992

*LD3003112192 Moscow TASS-ITAR World Service
in Russian 0915 GMT 30 Mar 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Gorokhov]

[Excerpt] Stockholm, 30 March (TASS)—The Estonian Government will not agree to an extension of the stay of the former Soviet troops on the country's territory, Estonia's Prime Minister Tiit Vahi stated to a correspondent of DAGENS NYHETER on the eve of his visit to Sweden.

In the interview published by the Stockholm newspaper today, he reported that a proposal was received in Tallinn from the Russian Embassy according to which

the sides should entrust international observers with monitoring the withdrawal of troops until the year 2000. "From this address, we drew the conclusion that they want to remain until the year 2000. Under no circumstances will we agree to this," the prime minister said.

As the newspaper notes, the number of servicemen of the former USSR stationed in the republic has by now already been halved—from 50,000 to approximately 25,000. The Estonian Government demands that they leave the country's territory before the end of this year.

The authorities in Tallinn are especially worried by the nuclear reactor at the military base in Paldiski. "We requested NATO's assistance in removing the reactor from the country and delivering it to Russia. I discussed this problem with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner and he has promised to study the prerequisites existing for this," the prime minister pointed out.

In reply to a question as to whether there are nuclear weapons on Estonian territory, Tiit Vahi said: "I have no proof that this is the case, but a number of reports testifies to such a possibility. We know at the same time that there are chemical weapons here. All these weapons must be removed." [passage omitted]

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Russian Chief of Delegation on 1992 First Session

*LD2703092192 Moscow TASS in English 0854 GMT
27 Mar 92*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Geneva March 27 TASS—The first lap of the 1992 Disarmament Conference session is to end here today. Its completion marks the 30th anniversary of the 18-nation committee's first meeting at the Geneva Palace of Nations, from which the conference's history is known to begin. The name and composition of this important body, charged with drawing up international legal documents for practically the entire package of disarmament problems, have changed, as we all know, along with circumstances directly affecting its work.

Head of the Russian delegation to the Disarmament Conference Ambassador Sergey Batsanov told ITAR-TASS in this connection about the main results and prospects of the conference's work.

"The conference has several important disarmament treaties and agreements to its credit," he stated. "They include the 1963 Moscow Treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests in the three mediums. Particularly noteworthy is the 1968 treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons—one of the mainstays of the entire system of international security. The treaty played this role even during the Soviet-American confrontation and will doubtlessly play it in the future, too.

"We all know the present day importance of the nonproliferation problem in light of the latest cardinal changes on the international arena," Batsanov said.

"The conference's dropping 'productivity,' observed since the beginning of the 1980's, can be explained both by the international situation of that period, particularly the aggravation of Soviet-American relations, and the simultaneous inclusion in the negotiation process of a large number of new participants, all with their specific interests, which had to be taken into account and reduced to one common denominator. The number of fully fledged parties to the conference had by then increased to 40 countries. The art of finding appropriate compromises, which would not affect the essence of a discussed problem, cannot be acquired overnight. Several interesting proposals were tabled at the current session, including the Austrian draft convention, work on which will undoubtedly bring us closer to our goal," Batsanov noted. "The mechanism of multilateral negotiations," he continued, "has been set really going only during the recent few years.

"Today, there are more countries with observer's status at the conference than fully fledged members, the number of which dropped to 39 after Germany's reunification. This testifies to the conference's growing authority and policial attractiveness as a body discussing problems of global military security. Hence, the desire to contribute in this or another way to the practical discussion of important problems and to the drafting of corresponding treaties and agreements. I believe that, given the already set mechanism of multilateral negotiations, there are no reasons to check this urge: Everybody who really wants to take part in the negotiations, should be given this opportunity without any reservations."

NUCLEAR TESTING

Yeltsin Decrees Novaya Zemlya Russian Property

LD2003171892 Moscow TASS in English 1706 GMT 20 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—"Under a decree of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the central nuclear testing grounds of the Russian Federation (the Novaya Zemlya Islands) have become federal property of Russia", a representative of the naval department in charge of the Novaya Zemlya nuclear testing grounds told ITAR-TASS today.

The Russian Federation grants the CIS Allied Armed Forces' Supreme Command the right to use the federal land and property of the testing grounds, stressed the representative.

The testing grounds will keep the territory within borders established by a protocol to the treaty between the former Soviet Union and the United States. The testing grounds' territory within these borders is a restricted area, and the testing grounds are a special regime facility.

Asked about plans for operation of the testing grounds, the representative said "the Russian president has declared a moratorium on underground tests until October, 1992. Their renewal is possible after the term of

the moratorium expires and a correspondent decision of the Russian Government is adopted.

"No new galleries or wells are being made. Regular work, which began in 1990, is being done at already existing facilities."

Public Fears Over Possibility of Resumed Novaya Zemlya Tests

Arkhangelsk Residents Worried

LD2503015592 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Text] For many years our Union monster—the military-industrial complex—kept its secrets. Through its efforts the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test range was created right on the edge of the Arctic. And this archipelago is again an object of our anxiety. Listen to what Vladimir Loyter, the Arkhangelsk correspondent of Russian Radio, reports.

[Loyter] Only under pressure by the Greens, numerous protests, and statements by people's deputies of all levels, did the former secrets become available to the public and they are depressing. The residents of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk and the inhabitants of the Komi Republic heaved a sigh of relief when last year Russian Federation President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin declared a moratorium. And again, Novaya Zemlya has become an object of anxiety for the native inhabitants. The Russian president signed a decree on transferring the Novaya Zemlya test range to Federal ownership. It is commented upon by Valeriy Krimnus, the Russian president's representative in Arkhangelsk Oblast:

[Begin Krimnus recording] Particular anxiety among the inhabitants of the oblast was aroused by misunderstood information to the effect that allegedly new tests on Novaya Zemlya would start. The decree speaks not of the start of tests but of their possibility, if there is a need to put a stop to the moratorium that has been declared by the Russian Federation president. These things are on the whole different, to be blunt: either to start or to speak of the possibility of a start. I have no doubt that the program that the government has been instructed to draw up will envisage questions both for the protection of man and for the protection of ecology. While previously the tests were staged according to the Defense Ministry's plan and the views of the local authorities was not taken into account and concern for man was expressed only in declarations, now the government program will have to provide both for the protection of man, the protection of ecology and, evidently, other kinds of social protection in our country. [end recording]

Yeltsin Decree Protested

MK2403144192 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 6

[Yuriy Meshkov report under the "Environment" rubric: "Will the Nuclear Test Site Start Operating? Another Decree Has Been Signed About Tests in Novaya Zemlya"]

[Text] President Yeltsin has resolved to transform the USSR Defense Ministry's Sixth State Central Test Site into the Russian Federation's Central Test Site by bringing this test site under Russia's federal ownership.

Under Decree No. 194, the Russian Ministry for Nuclear Energy and the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command have been instructed to continue in 1992 the necessary work involved in preparing tunnels and wells for conducting underground nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya at a rate of two to four explosions per year (if the declared moratorium expires).

The deadline for the Russian moratorium on nuclear testing expires, as is well known, in October 1992.

In northern Russia members of the people's movement for environmental safety "Toward a New Earth" ["K Novoy Zemlye"] have protested the secret presidential decree No. 194.

Meanwhile, the Russian nuclear moratorium has inspired the international environmental organization Greenpeace to stage a protest action in French Polynesia near Mururoa atoll and demand that the French Government join the Russian moratorium. In mid-March the flagship of the Greenpeace fleet, Rainbow Warrior, arrived at the island of Tahiti. The international crew members include scientists, independent experts, and journalists from various countries (a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent is due to join the international crew of the Rainbow Warrior 19 March).

Norway Concerned

LD2403145192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostantkino Television First Program Network in Russian 2100 GMT 23 Mar 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Norwegian Government is worried by the possibility of resumption of nuclear tests on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. Such a possibility was printed in the Norwegian press in connection with the decree by Russian President Yeltsin giving federal status to Novaya Zemlya and on the arrangements regarding relations with the military.

The Norwegian Foreign Ministry has asked its ambassador in Moscow to try to clear up all the circumstances of the rumors regarding Novaya Zemlya. The reassurances of Russian spokesmen do not yet seem to be having much effect on the Norwegians.

PRC Nuclear Test Site Discussed in Alma-Ata

OW3003215792 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1909 GMT 30 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In Alma-Ata, an international conference held over the weekend discussed the problem of the Chinese nuclear test site Lop Nur, situated close to Kazakhstan's

borders. It was attended by delegates from foreign anti-nuclear movements, religious activists from the international committee called "Vostochny Turkestan" (Eastern Turkestan) and leading scientists from Kazakhstan and other countries.

Official invitations were sent to Kazakhstan's officials. However, none of them was present. The Ministry of External Economic Ties said that the conference could "cause harm to Kazakh-Chinese relations". Alma-Ata believes that "the discussion of the Chinese nuclear test site is tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of a neighboring state".

The conference opened after a delay only when the President of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" anti-nuclear movement Olzhas Suleymenov warned that "there will be an outdoor rally in Alma-Ata if the conference is banned."

Former Environmental Chief in Mururoa Protest

924P0114A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 92 Morning edition p 4

[Article by Yuriy Kovalenko: "Naval 'Engagement' Near Mururoa Atoll: Details Related by a Participant—Russian Deputy and Former Minister Nikolay Vorontsov"]

[Text] Nikolay Vorontsov, Russian deputy and former chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nature Protection, waited 5 hours at the Paris airport for permission from the French foreign affairs minister to enter the country. Our scientist had a visa issued by French authorities.

He flew into Paris from Tahiti (French Polynesia), from which he had been expelled together with members of the Greenpeace ecological organization, which had been protesting against nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll aboard its vessel "Rainbow Warrior 2."

Permission was finally received, and upon setting foot on Parisian soil N. Vorontsov communicated some details to our correspondent about the most recent antinuclear campaign waged by Greenpeace.

"I took part in this action," the scientist said, "because no matter how far away French Polynesia might be from Russia, nuclear weapon tests there are directly associated with our interests. Its goal was to give political support to the Russian moratorium and to encourage other powers to join it.

"The danger to all of mankind lies in the fact that besides the five nuclear states," N. Vorontsov continued, "another 10 are close to becoming possessors of such weapons—Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, South Africa, North Korea, Israel, Argentina, Brazil and others. If no one joins our moratorium, new countries will gradually embark upon nuclear testing. And it necessarily begins with atmospheric bursts. This is terrifying. According to estimates made by A. D. Sakharov, which no one has refuted, 5-6 million people have died precisely due to atmospheric bursts on Earth."

Having left Tahiti under sail power, Vorontsov continued his story, on 26 March the "Rainbow Warrior 2" entered territorial waters, charting a course toward Mururoa Atoll, where the French nuclear test center is located. Despite the bad weather we launched five inflatable motorboats from our vessel. These boats headed for the atolls of Mururoa and Fangatau, another site of nuclear bursts. The "Rainbow Warrior 2" followed them across the boundary of territorial waters. Recall that Greenpeace intended to establish a "peace camp" on the atoll and take samples from the water and land.

"We were about a nautical mile away from Mururoa when I saw from the captain's bridge the structures making up the nuclear test center. At this moment the commander of one of the five French frigates launched against our vessel demanded our immediate departure from territorial waters. Our captain refused, and soon after, 30 helmeted, club-wielding soldiers boarded the "Rainbow Warrior 2." As a result a French squadron under the command of a vice admiral enjoyed a brilliant victory over ecologists headed by a 28 year old New Zealander by the name of Stephanie Mills."

The ecologists were neutralized, their equipment was confiscated, and they were transferred first to a warship and then to Mururoa. Also located there were the arrested Greenpeace members who had unsuccessfully tried to reach shore in boats. The incident was devoid of violence or resistance by either side, and it was limited to filling out an incident report. In the meantime a Caravelle waited 7 hours on the atoll with its engines running for Nikolay Vorontsov and his colleagues.

On the night of 26-27 March the entire party and crew of the "Rainbow Warrior 2"—except the captain, who had to tow the vessel to Fangatau Atoll—were moved to Tahiti's administrative center, the city of Papeete. The Polynesians greeted them with flower wreaths, while the security service greeted them with the message that all foreign Greenpeace members were to be expelled from French Polynesia. However Vorontsov himself, whose interests were defended on Tahiti by the gray-haired British consul, was for some reason granted a 24-hour postponement.

"Discounting the fact that we had been unable to take samples on Mururoa," N. Vorontsov said, "we took our protest action to its conclusion. But if this campaign turns out to be ineffective and the testing is continued, pronuclear forces at home will receive a powerful argument for a new spiral in the arms race, which will require enormous assets. I can say that 2 years ago our military requested 4 billion in the 'old' rubles to restore the old shafts for underground tests on Novaya Zemlya."

"Yes, but the military in all countries assert that their nuclear tests are extremely clean from an ecological point of view in comparison with Chernobyl and with other possible accidents at nuclear power plants."

"Chernobyl was a case of criminal bungling. On the other hand nuclear testing is a planned act, or in other

words, a conscious criminal act. Consequently the evaluations of these acts should be different as well. I want to lay special emphasis on the existence of what I call the 'nuclear mafia' in the world, consisting of five or six countries. It has its own laws. No one country can leave it because all are tied together. Either this mafia continues to exist, in which case it will gradually grow larger, or all of its members break with the past and begin dealing in honest business. There is no other way.

IPPNW Meets in Moscow

Russian Deputy Premier Addresses Group

LD0104190692 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1535 GMT 1 Apr 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow April 1 TASS—"Russia will not conduct nuclear tests above the minimum" necessary to upkeep scientific research and nuclear armaments at a proper level, Russian State Secretary and First Vice Premier Gennadiy Burbulis today told a visiting delegation of leaders of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War [IPPNW].

He stressed Russia "excludes such forms of tests that have direct consequences for the atmosphere or other vitally important spheres."

Asked whether Russia will follow the example of the United States in case it is the first to stop nuclear tests, Burbulis noted "I think, they will have to follow our example in this area".

Burbulis made these statements in response to the call of the International Physicians' co-chairman U.S. physician Bernard Lown on the Russian leadership to stop nuclear tests. The physician substantiated this request, saying that nuclear threat leads to considerable negative consequences for human health, as well as to the poverty.

Lown passed over to Gennadiy Burbulis the movement's program of elimination of nuclear arms throughout the globe, a major item of which is the termination of nuclear tests.

On behalf of the movement, Lown offered Russia assistance in the creation of a modern health care system.

Promises 'Minimum' Nuclear Testing

OW0104191192 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*
1833 GMT 1 Apr 92

[Transmitted via *KYODO*]

[Text] At a meeting with leaders of the international movement "Medics of the World for the Prevention of a Nuclear War" first deputy chairman of the Russian Government Gennadiy Burbulis said that Russia will continue to conduct nuclear testing. The statement was made in response to the movement's nuclear disarmament program, including a proposal to stop nuclear testing. Burbulis emphasized that the government bans tests which directly affect the atmosphere and other

vitaly important spheres. He said only tests essential for scientific and other research will be conducted. Burbulis acknowledged the existence of a "certain confrontation" between specialists and the government. However, he noted, these are normal differences, and the government will never allow the preservation of "the nuclear evil" only to ensure that somebody could hold his favorite post.

Burbulis pointed out that Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Byelarus are just states on which territories nuclear weapons are stationed, while Russia is the country having the sole control over all these weapons.

Asked if Russia would follow suit if the U.S. stopped nuclear testing, Burbulis said: "I think they will have to follow suit".

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Further on Aral Sea CBW Site

*924P0110A Alma-Ata ZHAS ALASH in Kazakh
14 March 1992 p 2*

[Announcement signed by M. Shakhanov: "Announcement of the International 'Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan' Public Committee"]

[Text] On March 12, 1992, an express letter came to the International "Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan" Public Committee from B. Qayupov, administrator of Qyzylorda Oblast's Aral Rayon, and Republic of Kazakhstan people's deputy. The letter stated that on March 7 of this year 11 trucks from the Aral City 25484 Military Detachment were seized on the road as they left the "Vozrozhdeniye Island Bacteriological Weapons Test Site."

The soldiers were attempting to move 3 "Ural" trucks, 2 KamAZ, KA-700 tractors, 7 "Belarus" tractors, 3 tanker trucks, spanking new tires, spares and other equipment to Russia.

Letters containing this sort of information have come in recently in large numbers from the Baykonur space port, and from military detachments located on Republic of Kazakhstan territories. The letters express amazement at the theft of military equipment. This is a crass violation of the December 12, 1991, edict of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

In connection with this, we think it necessary to raise again the question of the Bacteriological Test Site on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea. It was suggested at Session VII of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, on behalf of the International "Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan" Public Committee, that this extremely secret military site be opened. The Supreme Council approved and issued a special resolution.

However, V.P. Sinevich, chief of the Aral Garrison, would have nothing to do with the bacteriological laboratory. Thus, the officials of the laboratory played down the matter in the paper EKSPRESS K saying: "the fundamental task of the test area is to avoid bringing any contamination from the mainland onto the island."

Thereby, in other words, they criticized certain social organs for raising an inappropriate commotion. It would seem that the 1976 destruction of Aral fisheries and the signs of epizootic had nothing whatsoever to do with them. But what about the sores on the sheep (the committee has the documents and photographs)? And who is responsible for the nearly half million wild goats which have suffered from mass destruction in the Torghay steppe? Subsequently, misinformation was spread about this, and various freely-invented explanations were offered. Everything possible was done to hide it all from the people.

After the Committee asked questions, D. Yazov, the former Minister of Defense, and V. Kononov, former USSR Minister of the Nuclear Industry, admitted that there was a field scientific-testing laboratory under the Microbiology Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense there. However, they emphasized again and again that this laboratory has not been ecologically harmful to the Aral Sea and its region. We were wearied of hearing this said about the Semey Test Site for many years. The International "Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan" Public Committee, bearing in mind these facts, has felt it necessary to register the property of all military units stationed on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan. If additional statements are made regarding cases whereby military equipment and property has been removed in an illegal manner, investigations should be carried out by the state procurator's office.

In the name of the Committee, M. Shakhanov, president of the International "Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan" Public Committee, Republic of Kazakhstan people's deputy.

Project To Convert Lewisite Into Metal Noted

Russian-American University Develops Process

*LD2503201892 Moscow TASS in English 1515 GMT
24 Mar 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Mineyev]

[Text] The Russian-U.S. University, an independent non-governmental organization, has offered a commercial project of turning the lewisite war gas into gallium arsenide—a material to be used in the 21st century's electronics.

University Executive President Andrey Zhukov today showed ITAR-TASS a test tube with pure product made of lewisite at an experimental installation manufactured on the initiative and to order of the university.

The ecologically-clean technology enables the immediate production of the metal. All other components received from the reaction are absolutely harmless, said Zhukov. Other technologies either damage the ecology or have too many stages of production.

The installation to produce gallium arsenide is portable and mobile. Production costs pay for themselves and even bring profit.

The university plans to obtain the Russian Government's permission for an access to chemical arms kept in military storages and work within the framework of a joint stock society to unite the university and its partners.

The overall amount of lewisite kept in the storages runs into about 6,700 tonnes, containing up to 30 per cent of arsenic. It is a considerable part of the Russian war gas arsenal officially estimated at 40,000 tonnes.

The elimination of chemical arms stocks of the former Soviet Union, all of which are stored on the Russian territory, will run into approximately 20 billion U.S. dollars, Western experts believe.

According to Russian military, the elimination of chemical arms may cost 28 billion roubles at current prices.

Udmurtia Considers Proposal

LD0104141492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1328 GMT 1 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Alfred Artamonov]

[Text] Izhevsk April 1 [dateline as received]—For the first time in many years, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Udmurtia, an autonomous republic in the Urals, discussed what should be done about chemical weapons stored in the city of Kambarka.

Containers with nearly 7,000 tonnes of warfare toxic agent—lewisite, have been kept there for over 40 years. This is a considerable part of the Russian arsenal of toxic agents which, according to official data, makes up 40,000 tonnes.

Scientists estimated that it would be most expedient to extract from lewisite expensive metal, arsenic. One kilogram of extra pure arsenic costs up to 4.5 thousand dollars in the world market. Up to 2,000 tonnes of arsenic can be extracted in Kambarka.

Arsenic and its compounds are used for the manufacture of microelectronic elements, special optics, dyes and transformers of the solar energy into electric.

But Udmurtian scientists object to organising this production in the locality since they believe this can lead to soil and water pollution.

Nevertheless, specialists from the Russian Independent Intergovernmental Organisation suggested transforming lewisite into gallium arsenide which they regard as ecologically pure.

Andrey Zhukov, executive president of the Russo-American University, said that other existing technologies are either ecologically unsafe or consist of many stages.

Scientists from the Russo-American University suggest getting the government's permission for the access to chemical weapons kept in military arsenals and for work within a joint stock society.

Some Western experts believe that the elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles of the former USSR which are concentrated in the Russian territory would cost approximately 20 billion dollars. Soviet military estimated that the destruction of chemical weapons may cost 28 billion rubles in prices of this year.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

More on Plans for Continuing Troop Withdrawals From Mongolia

Transbaykal Military District HQ Statement

LD2103172892 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1339 GMT 21 Mar 92

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] Chita—The last unit of ex-USSR troops will be withdrawn from Mongolia in July 1992. On March 20 representatives of the Transbaykal Military District Headquarters told PF [POSTFACTUM] correspondent that before 1st January 1992 Mongolia received 145 military settlements, including 4,158 buildings and facilities, in particular, 301 resident blocks, 106 dormitories, 477 barracks, 100 dinner halls, 59 medical facilities and 97 boiler units on a total of r [rubles] 451.6 mln, including supply networks, equipment and furniture.

According to the 1992 schedule 36 military settlements are to be abandoned with 885 buildings and facilities on a total of r117.4 mln. The military believe that there is a problem on the procedure of property transfer to Mongolia, namely whether Mongolia receives it free of charge or the property will be run by joint companies. The final decision has not been made.

According to PF information, some of the mixed ownership enterprises, in particular Taiwan-Mongolia joint ventures, are ready to pay a lot of money for military settlements. At present there are many offers of this kind, however the power of decision-making does not belong to commanders of the Transbaykal Military District's Mongolian group or headquarters of the Transbaykal Military District. The final decision is to be made by the Russian Government.

Mongolian Spokesman: Timetable Unchanged

LD2903112892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1107 GMT 29 Mar 92

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Dugar Sanzhiyev]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, March 29 TASS—The time-frame for a final withdrawal of the troops of the former Soviet Union, which passed under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, from Mongolia remains unchanged, according to a statement by a spokesman for the Mongolian Foreign Ministry.

The statement, circulated here today, was made in view of reports by a number of news organisations of the

country about alleged secret talks on extending the stay of Russia's military units on the country's territory.

According to an arrangement with the government of the former Soviet Union, which was later reaffirmed by the leaders of the Russian Federation, the final withdrawal of Russia's military units from Mongolia will be completed by September 1, 1992, the statement emphasizes.

This was again confirmed at the beginning of this month during the Mongolian prime minister's visit to Moscow. The government's position on that score remains unchanged, the Mongolian diplomat said.

A contingent of Soviet troops had been brought to Mongolia in the 1960s at the request of the then leadership of the country. A withdrawal of the contingent began in the spring of 1989.

According to the command, only logistical units have remained in Mongolia. They have been given an assignment to ensure the dismantling and transportation of equipment and to carry out the necessary ecology-oriented work.

Russia, Japan Discuss Troop Reductions, Korean NFZ

*LD2103102592 Moscow TASS in English
0857 GMT 21 Mar 92*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondents Aleksander Kopnov, Vladimir Kuchko, and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Tokyo, March 21 TASS—A comprehensive insurance of conditions for security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region were the focus of attention at the third and final round of talks between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and his Japanese counterpart, Michio Watanabe. The talks ended here on Saturday 21 March] afternoon.

The sides' approach, in which "international cooperation in defence industry conversion will combine with efforts to ensure the socio-economic wellbeing of the individual" as a result of disarmament processes, would be justified in the new system of political coordinates, the Russian minister pointed out during the talks.

Kozyrev drew attention to the fact that the earlier announced reduction in the armed forces by 700,000 men applied to the country's Asian part as well.

Michio Watanabe, for his part, pointed out that if Russia proceeds along the road of reducing its military presence in Asia, that would find a response in Japan where "Self-Defence Forces," in particular, would not be built up while the United States, in the opinion of the Japanese side, would respond by cutting down its military budget and beginning to reduce its military presence in Asia.

The two foreign ministers discussed in detail the question of making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone [NFZ]. They agreed that it was essential to ensure all conditions so that nuclear weapons would never reappear on the peninsula in the future. The two ministers

spoke out in favour of implementing as soon as possible the nuclear safeguards agreement signed between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency and carrying out appropriate inspections.

Kozyrev and Watanabe also touched upon the question of a final settlement in Cambodia. In this connection they pointed out in particular that U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia should be both effective and economical to the utmost.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Confusion Surrounding Kravchuk Stance Viewed

*MK2403090592 Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian
No. 12 16-23 Mar 92 p 22*

[Lyudmila Beletskaya and Aleksey Kucherenko report: "Putting a Brave Face on It. Ukraine Still Has the Bomb"]

[Text] On 18 March INTERFAX reported that in a telephone conversation with Boris Yeltsin Leonid Kravchuk had announced the lifting of the embargo on the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia. Kravchuk denied this report 20 March.

As KOMMERSANT's correspondent learned at INTERFAX, the information had come not first hand but from a representative of one faction of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet who had been present at a closed meeting with the president 18 March. KOMMERSANT was unable to obtain confirmation from other participants in the meeting: No one could remember any clear-cut statement having been made, although there may have been "discussions on the topic" which boiled down to saying that Ukraine's position is inconclusive [neokonchatelnyy] and that at one moment Kravchuk states one thing, then on the telephone he assures Yeltsin of something else (which is perfectly plausible—if you believe Kravchuk's remark that their last telephone conversation was 16 February). Observers note that even the transcript did not make things totally clear: Boris Nikolayevich's speech was full of grimaces [mimika] expressing the gamut of emotions evoked in the president by his Ukrainian colleague's inconsistency.

Some experts believe that, even if this conversation did not take place, it would have been worth inventing it on the eve of the Kiev summit. Kravchuk's statement of 13 March (which KOMMERSANT reported in No. 11) justifying the embargo on the grounds of the instability of the situation in Russia (in such cases there is usually a reference to Zhirinovskiy) caused a surge of anxiety in the West. The story goes that the Ukrainian president was not unduly serious and hoped merely to show that he is vigilant on questions of national and international security, but he failed to make the requisite adjustment for his Western audience, which has no sense of humor at all when it comes to anything nuclear. Thus the INTERFAX report can be regarded as a prophetic error.

There are 1,420 strategic nuclear warheads in Ukraine and 2,390 tactical warheads. There are 176 ICBM's—130 RS-18's and 46 RS-22's—in 90 silos in Khmel-nitskiy and Nikolayev Oblasts. In Uzin (Kiev Oblast) there are 30 heavy bombers each carrying six cruise missiles. If it were not for its proclaimed nuclear-free status, Ukraine would be third in the nuclear club after the United States and the Russian Federation.

In observers' opinion, Kravchuk may well soon actually abandon the embargo after first attempting to use nuclear weapons as a trump card in the bargaining over the fleet. There is also an opportunity to issue a reminder about the fair division of secondary resources: Together with the warheads, Russia is also getting a lot of valuable metals, including nonferrous metals. Viktor Antonov, minister for questions of the defense complex and conversion, told KOMMERSANT's correspondent that if the missiles are destroyed in Russia, Ukraine "will lay claim to some of the assets recovered from them."

CIS Kiev Summit Meeting Discusses Nuclear Arms

Belarusan, Kazakh Intentions

LD2003220592 Moscow TASS in English 2154 GMT
20 Mar 92

[Excerpt] Kiev March 20 TASS—By UKRINFORM-TASS: Belarus is resolute to become a nuclear-free state. There are no violations or deviations in achieving the goal, Belarussian parliamentary speaker Stanislav Shushkevich told a press conference on Friday [20 March] after the end of a CIS summit here. "We are transferring all nuclear tactical weapons (from the republic) ahead of schedule and will remove them as envisaged by international agreements, before July 1, 1992", he said.

Kazakhstan also strives to become nuclear-free and will join all agreements and treaties in future, according to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. "We want to be equal partners in future talks on strategic arms cuts... The reality is such that it was not the will of Kazakhstan to keep these armaments on its territory until all other missiles are eliminated as agreed", he stressed. [passage omitted]

Kravchuk at News Conference

LD2003204592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1830 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Report from Kiev by special correspondent Vera Shchelkunova]

[Excerpts] A news conference on the results of the meeting of CIS heads of state has been in progress for almost half an hour. [passage omitted]

The second question, also for the Ukrainian president, concerned nuclear weapons. Here is Leonid Makarovich's response:

[Begin Kravchuk recording] [passage omitted] As for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, Ukraine's position is

based on the fact that in accordance with the Alma-Ata agreement, there is supposed to be a commission on the destruction and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons. There is, as yet, no such commission. Perhaps I am partly criticizing myself here. There is no such commission. Ukraine has also advocated international supervision of the destruction of nuclear weapons. In connection with this, a question has arisen of the immense responsibility that we bear. Unforeseen actions could arise from our soil, and we have to be responsible in the resolution of all issues connected with nuclear weapons, without exception.

So we have been looking for the mechanisms of such a solution. Ukraine has thus temporarily suspended the withdrawal, while not altering the outline, and it continues to insist on this today. [end recording]

[Shchelkunova] Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk also said that in one of the newspapers, it seems it was the IZVESTIYA newspaper, it was reported that there was a telephone conversation between Yeltsin and Kravchuk regarding tactical nuclear weapons. There was no such conversation. The last telephone conversation between Kravchuk and Yeltsin was on 16 February. [passage omitted]

Views Tactical Arms Removal, Sales

LD2203130492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 0845 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in Kiev by Igor Malashenko in the Ostankino studio in Moscow; from the "After the Kiev Meeting" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Malashenko] Good morning, esteemed viewers. As you know, the latest meeting of the leaders of the countries of the Commonwealth took place in Kiev. Today we have an opportunity to ask Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk a few questions about the results of the meeting. [passage omitted]

[Malashenko] The issue of nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons in particular, emerged on the eve of the Kiev meeting. The removal of those weapons from Ukraine was suspended, as we understand it, until the establishment of an international commission supervising the process of their withdrawal and destruction. Was this decision met with understanding? How was this problem discussed in Kiev? How long might this transitional process take? In other words, do you have any real deadlines for the establishment of such a commission and for the work of this new mechanism to begin?

[Kravchuk] We agreed with Boris Nikolayevich in Kiev that this commission will be set up in the near future. I am talking about a commission which will consist of representatives of the four states—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—in accordance with the Alma-Ata agreements. The second stage—the participation of

international observers—is a more complicated one. We will have to turn to other states. This process will not be very protracted. But I will be able to reply to this only after the commission provides information on whether it is true that the tactical means which are being withdrawn from Ukraine are destroyed.

I just would like to say that, as far as this matter goes, Ukraine has not changed its fundamental concept. But we have a great responsibility before the world and the peoples for when and where the issues of the destruction of nuclear arms are tackled.

The mass media reports some fact every day. Somewhere they discovered uranium and are selling it, somewhere else something else is happening. I am afraid that it soon could be discovered somewhere that a tactical weapon was sold. And then....[Kravchuk changes thought] This tactical weapon has its own serial number, and I never would want the entire world community to learn that this tactical weapon was situated on Ukrainian soil. So, that is what led to our decision. [passage omitted]

Kazakhstan To Retain Arms as 'Bargaining' Chip

AU2003134492 Paris AFP in English 1339 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Rome, March 20 (AFP)—Kazakhstan intends to use the strategic nuclear weapons deployed on its territory as a bargaining counter in arms reduction talks, President Nursultan Nazarbayev said in an interview published here Friday [20 March]. The weapons will not be destroyed in order that Kazakhstan “will be able to take part in strategic arms reductions talks along with Russia and the United States”, Nazarbayev told the LA STAMPA daily.

“Kazakhstan did not become an atomic power by its own will”, Nazarbayev commented.

“On our territory at Semipalatinsk, from 1949 onwards, 467 nuclear tests were carried out. We want to become a denuclearised state, and we have closed Semipalatinsk. But as regards the strategic missiles, we have asked for the status quo.”

Nazarbayev argued that Kazakhstan “is entitled to belong to the nuclear club because tests on its territory were being carried out 18 months before the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty” in May 1968.

Earlier this year Kazakhstan, along with Ukraine and Belarus, agreed to transfer all tactical nuclear weapons to Russia where they would be dismantled and destroyed by Russian experts.

Nazarbayev told LA STAMPA that “the transfer to Russia would cost billions of rubles which Kazakhstan does not have”. He added that there was “no control mechanism for the elimination of nuclear weapons.”

“Common sense requires that the reduction in strategic nuclear forces should be in line with the defensive needs

of the Commonwealth (of Independent States), notions which unfortunately do not for the moment exist”, he concluded.

Ukraine Decision on Withdrawal Still Unclear

Halt Said 'Still in Force'

LD2003205992 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 20 Mar 92

[From the “Vesti” newscast]

[Text] The Ukrainian defense minister has said that despite yesterday's reports, Kravchuk's decision on halting the withdrawal of nuclear missiles from Ukraine is still in force. This is despite the fact that Boris Yeltsin has said that he will insist on the withdrawal and destruction of nuclear weapons in Russia, monitored by Ukraine.

Moscow Press on Kravchuk

LD2003203892 Kiev Radio Kiev in English 0100 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Text] As was already reported, on 4 March this year President Leonid Kravchuk announced suspension of the tactical nuclear arms shipments from Ukraine to Russia until firm guarantees are provided that these arms are destroyed there. In other words, the move by Ukraine's president was temporary and forced.

Moscow's response to this move was quite specific. This especially refers to the Moscow-based press which resorted to distortions, accusations and even theft. The newspaper IZVESTIYA, for example, published allegations to the effect that Ukraine is going to become a nuclear state. However, the newspaper ignored the fact that Leonid Kravchuk reiterated Ukraine's intention to get rid of nuclear weapons by 1994 in his speech at [words indistinct].

The statement of the president's press service issued on 17 March, reaffirmed Ukraine's readiness to become a nuclear-free state. They also accuse Ukraine of the fact that it allegedly undermined an agreement among the Commonwealth leaders on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine and Belarus by 1 July this year. At this point they forget, however, that the Russian side violated its pledge to destroy these arms under international control.

These days, Chief of the General Staff of the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Col-Gen Viktor Samsonov, told journalists that Russia strictly abides by the obligations (?it took) upon itself. At this point it would be most appropriate for him to mention the number of destroyed charges shifted from Ukraine. However, the general did not do that.

Is there a way out of the situation? Yes, there is. Such a way was mapped out in the statements by President Kravchuk and his press service. These contain a proposal to the government of Russia and the governments of

other Commonwealth countries to liberate the mechanism of joint control over the dismantling of these tactical nuclear charges as envisaged by the Minsk and Alma-Ata agreements.

It was also proposed to lay down an agreement on the procedure of transferring nuclear charges to the bases in Russia for their subsequent liquidation. There is yet another way to liquidate nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine. At present Ukraine has not enough potential to dismantle and destroy nuclear charges, especially in view of the fact that apart from tactical missiles, there are 176 strategic missiles stationed in Ukraine.

Still operating is the Chernobyl nuclear power station whose power units must be shut down and the nuclear waste recycled. This is why Leonid Kravchuk does not exclude the possibility of appealing to the world community with a request to help build a plant in the Chernobyl area for the destruction of nuclear weapons. This is yet another proof of the fact that Ukraine has no nuclear ambitions and sincerely strives to do away with the dangerous weapons.

It is noteworthy that the above explanations were passed on to the U.S. charge d'affaires in Ukraine and were acknowledged quite satisfactorily by the U.S. government. On 20 March the heads of the Commonwealth member states will hold their meeting in Kiev. Quite obviously the question of nuclear arms shift from Ukraine will be discussed there.

Financial Motives Seen

*MK2003143792 Moscow KURANTY in Russian
20 Mar 92 p 1*

[Mikhail Shchipanov "Forecast" article: "Maneuver Is Over. Will You Forget It"]

[Text] After pausing like a grandmaster, Kiev has disavowed President Kravchuk's loud promise to suspend the transfer of tactical nuclear munitions to Russia. The forceful maneuver, obviously designed to coincide with the opening of the scheduled Commonwealth summit, has ended. Moreover, the end is surprisingly well timed. Any delay in backpedaling might have seriously alarmed our Western partners, who are good at imposing sanctions. As it is, all the interested parties, in order not to inflame passions (it is rather frightening to look into the abyss), have pretended that they were satisfied by the explanations offered by the Ukrainian authorities. But Kravchuk will not succeed in completely "washing his hands" of the unpleasant episode. In the risky game of escalation, the president has only earned points in the race for the not terribly honorable title of "unpredictable politician," a title which people in nearby foreign lands and further afield try mainly to give to Boris Yeltsin. The nuclear maneuvers and the strange obfuscations over the question of the debts which were jointly entered into as members of the Union have left their mark on world consciousness.

In fact there were clearly also other incentives prompting Kravchuk to undertake this risky demarche. For, if you think about it, the rationale whereby Kiev attempted to justify the "pause" in removing the nuclear warheads demonstrated that the Ukrainian authorities had no genuine cause for dispute. The statement regarding a delay in the destruction of the weapons already removed to Russia is essentially naive. At present there is no effective means of destroying nuclear warheads other than underground detonation. Did they want to turn the Poltava region into another Semipalatinsk? In this connection the supposition that in this rather awkward fashion Kiev was making a play for at least a share of the \$400 million which the United States has promised Russia for the expensive process of nuclear disarmament must not be dismissed out of hand. Thus, Ukraine has said "yes" to the removal of weapons, but what we hear is "yes, but."

Belarus To Withdraw Weapons Before 1 Jul

*LD2103091592 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0800 GMT 21 Mar 92*

[Text] Stanislav Shushkevich, the chairman of the Belarus parliament, has stressed that the republic is consistently moving toward being a nuclear-free, neutral state. We will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons ahead of schedule, and we will withdraw them, as required by international agreements, before 1 July this year, Stanislav Shushkevich stated.

Tatar Public Center Proposes 'Nonnuclear Zone'

*LD2403142392 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1211 GMT 23 Mar 92*

[Text] Kazan —The military doctrine of the Tatar Public Center envisages immediate withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the republic's territory and setting up the national guard of Tatarstan.

The chairman of the Tatar Public Center (TPC) republican committee for military issues Rashad Safin unveiled the TPC leadership's military doctrine at his news conference on March 22. According to the doctrine, Tatarstan is proclaimed a non-nuclear zone and a neutral state. The new military doctrine states that all the conscripts in the Republic of Tatarstan must serve on the republican territory, for that purpose special construction battalions, civil defense units and alternative service departments should be formed in addition to the national guard. Conscripts from the Republic of Tatarstan are also allowed to serve in the frontier guard units of the CIS, however, they should be assigned for the areas specially designated for Tatar republican units. The servicemen who refuse to serve in other states are to return to the Republic of Tatarstan for further service in the republican units. Higher military training institutions, which fell under the jurisdiction of Tatarstan are authorized to train personnel for the armies of other countries on a contractual basis.

The Tatar Public Center military doctrine stipulates the transfer of the KGB and interior ministry's troops to the

republican jurisdiction. The military inspector under the Tatarstan's president is entrusted with the military command for the transition period. The leaders of the Tatar Public Center believe that Tatarsan as [word indistint] state should not join the military organization of the CIS, confining itself only to the Commonwealth political bodies. Rashad Safin said that the military doctrine was submitted to the president, the government and the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan for consideration.

Report on Yeltsin-Kravchuk Conversation Denied

*PM2303131992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Pavel Golub report: "Kravchuk and Yeltsin Did Not Speak Over the Telephone"]

[Text] On Thursday [19 March] our newspaper published an INTERFAX report to the effect that, during a telephone conversation with Boris Yeltsin, the Ukrainian president had apparently confirmed his intention to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory within the previously stipulated timeframe—by 1 July.

A "clarification" from UKRINFORM arrived at the editorial office Friday [20 March] morning, citing a report from the Ukrainian president's press service: "The leaders of the two states have not been in contact recently. As far as Ukraine's position is concerned, it is well known, and remains unchanged." So, did the two presidents have a conversation or not?

This question is not as insignificant as it may seem. After all, the Ukrainian president's press service deemed it necessary to immediately publish a "clarification" on the very day when both Kravchuk and Yeltsin were to sit down at the negotiating table in Kiev. And after all, if the conversation did not take place, then Ukraine's readiness to honor the commitments it has taken upon itself is put into doubt.

Let us note straight away that the Ukrainian permanent mission confirmed that the dates for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons remain unchanged. So that there is no reason to be anxious on this score. It is something else that is worrying.

As we have explained, no telephone conversation with Kravchuk was recorded in Yeltsin's office 16, 17, or 18 March. Russian State Counselor S. Stankevich informed INTERFAX of the conversation between the two presidents. INTERFAX possesses a tape recording of this report, the agency's head M. Komissar said.

In response to my direct question about the "culprit" of the refutation, unprecedented in Russian-Ukrainian relations, he noted that he considers it immaterial "which specific one of the numerous conversations between the two presidents had produced the agreement... The main point is to clarify which one of Ukraine's positions remains unchanged: To withdraw its weapons by 1 July or not to withdraw them."

Judging by the state counselor's reaction, the Kremlin is not treating the refutation from Kiev as a signal of failure. The reference to an event which, as has now become completely clear, did not in fact take place, is turning from a serious political blunder into the object of a slight misunderstanding.

However, Ukraine has probably come to the conclusion that the people in the Russian president's entourage have not quite rid themselves of their old ideas. The autonomy of the former Union republics is still not being seen as something natural. Out of inertia, they frequently imagine them to be lower-ranking bodies, ready to agree with everything they are told "from above."

It would be sufficient to transpose this Russian-Ukrainian incident onto Russian-French or Russian-Italian relations, and the conclusion is quite obvious. It is clear that a direct telephone line between the offices of the two presidents does not only mean two nice telephones. It means a high level of confidentiality in their relations.

Ukraine's Morozov on Nuclear Arms, CFE Allocations

*PM2403165992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Sergey Tsikora report: "Ukrainian Defense Minister: We Will Tackle the Problems of the Army Our Own Way"]

[Excerpts] Kiev—Ukraine is not changing its strategic aims in military organizational development, but it does intend to tackle many army problems in a new way. This was the basic idea running through the press conference held by Colonel General K. Morozov, Ukrainian defense minister.

The minister reported that since the well-known statement by republic President Leonid Kravchuk suspending the removal of tactical nuclear weapons not a single nuclear weapon had left Ukraine. Journalists were also informed that nuclear weapons have been removed from the arsenals of units and are being kept at special storage depots under reliable protection. K. Morozov confirmed that, despite the accord, the mechanism enabling the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to block a nonagreed launch of nuclear weapons from the territories of their republics had not yet been implemented.

A detailed reply was given to a question about the situation of the Strategic Forces. After confirming that Ukraine still considers that nuclear weapons should be under unified command, Morozov reported a change in the view of the republic's military department on the status of officers, NCO's, and warrant officers serving in those forces. Those who have sworn the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine will be protected by the law and are under the jurisdiction of the republic. [passage omitted]

The minister's information about how work is progressing on the agreement on the maximum level of armed forces and armaments on the European territory of the former USSR [CFE] proved interesting.

"Ukraine has now proposed six ways of 'allocating' arms on the European territory of the former USSR. They were supported by Belarus, Moldova, and by the republics of the Caucasus. Russia adopted a special position and submitted its own draft. Under it three-quarters of all armaments subject to verification [podkontrolnyy] would be withdrawn to Russia. Ukraine and the other republics did not agree with such a division. A difficult situation has taken shape, but it is not so alarming as to be described as dangerous."

'Nuclear Temptation' of Ukraine Assessed

PM3003113492 *Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*
28 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Article by Andrey Ostalskiy: "Nuclear Ukraine Not End of the World"]

[Text] It looks as if the Ukrainian leaders may not be able to resist the "nuclear temptation" and the possibility of quickly and easily bringing their country in a single move into the realm of the great nuclear powers. And all the complications resulting from this, even the West's exasperated reaction, will not be able to halt Kiev.

It is clear that the emergence of yet another powerful nuclear power right next to Russia greatly changes the geopolitical map of Europe and indeed of the whole world, makes the equation of the military-political equilibrium many times more complex, and so on. Does this not point to universal disaster? I do not think so. A scenario whereby this development of events might turn out to be a blessing is not even ruled out—history likes paradoxes.

Remember all those myths in whose grips we lived. The "nuclear-free world" upon close scrutiny turned out to be one of them, a dream which did not stand up in reality.

However, leaders of the USSR—from Stalin to Chernenko—used this myth in a fairly cynical manner, as a kind of bait for foreign liberal fools. They used it and at the same time laid plans for protracted nuclear wars with the West, plans for "preemptive nuclear strikes" against the imperialists which were devised by the General Staff. They appealed for nuclear disarmament from the podium at the United Nations, but labeled those trusting fellow citizens who in their naivete had taken the propaganda designed for export in too literal a manner as unreliable pacifists.

It seems that only Gorbachev seriously believed in this dream and even at one time almost converted the idealist Reagan to his faith.

The war in the Persian Gulf was a time of reckoning. Saddam Husayn's escapade proved that the idea of a

"nuclear-free world" is not only utopian but also dangerous, inasmuch as it creates illusions and hopes among dictators of their instantly becoming rulers of the world.

When Margaret Thatcher unleashed on unprepared Soviet television viewers the idea, which for many people in the West is entirely commonplace, of the good sense and necessity (albeit as the lesser of two evils) of nuclear deterrence, it caused a shock. At that time the majority was not yet ready to accept her argument that it was precisely the presence of nuclear weapons, the "balance of fear," which had allowed a world split into hostile camps to avoid a third world war—which is an absolute miracle if you think about it. In the meantime the adversaries had piled up so many instruments of destruction and mass murder that their use would produce an effect little less than that of an atomic bomb.

The western political scientists' experience over 45 years had led them to the idea that nuclear weapons are not weapons at all, as they are created not to be used in war but only to maintain an equilibrium between hostile states—and in the last analysis to maintain peace. But what about Hiroshima and Nagasaki? The whole point is that for an atomic bomb to stop being a weapon and become a means of deterrence, one condition must be fulfilled: that both the warring sides possess it. Otherwise the temptation of using it becomes, on the contrary, too great....

Looking today at certain demonstrators in Kiev and Moscow, whose faces are twisted with hatred as they read bellicose statements by parliamentarians and political leaders who are ready to pay "any price" for the Crimea or the Black Sea Fleet, it does not stretch the imagination that the Serbian and Croatian "experience" may very well lie in store for Russians and Ukrainians in the future. True, with the present distribution of political forces—with President Yeltsin in Moscow and President Kravchuk in Kiev, a full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war still seems impossible. But the political equilibrium is not permanent, and politicians are even less permanent. So nobody can guarantee that at some moment the dreadful hour will not arrive when it will remain for the pacifists on both sides to put their trust in nuclear deterrence.

Ukraine May 'Attempt To Remain' Nuclear Power

LD3003093792 *Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 0907 GMT 30 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS Correspondent Valentin Vasilets]

[Text] Ottawa, 30 Mar [dateline as received]—Despite its policy proclaimed earlier, and the assurances given by parliament and its president, it is possible that Ukraine will attempt to remain a nuclear power. A CANADIAN PRESS correspondent reports from Kiev, "Government and parliament leaders in Ukraine are saying that they are quietly but seriously studying the possibility of a fundamental change in policy, according to which the new independent state will preserve a certain number of nuclear weapons."

According to the correspondent, such a step "will be perceived in the West as extremely contradictory. The West has many times expressed concern regarding control over the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union since its collapse last December."

According to the author of the report, leaders in the government and parliament of Ukraine are now stating that there are two reasons for their renewed interest in maintaining a place in the closed nuclear club: "The desire to be taken seriously in the international arena, and fear of Russia."

The author quotes Viktor Antonov, the minister for defense conversion, who said: "People tell us we are acting stupidly, declaring that we are giving up nuclear weapons without demanding anything in return." Sergey Kolesnik, a member of the parliamentary committee for military affairs, agrees with him: "Suppose America began sending its nuclear weapons to Canada, and imagine what everyone would think. They are laughing at Ukraine in the Pentagon."

Noting that the Ukrainian parliament will soon begin discussing the country's military policy, the CANADIAN PRESS correspondent writes that parliament "may review its stance on the nuclear issue." Stepan Khmara, member of parliament, stated that more and more deputies "are coming round to the idea that Ukraine should remain a nuclear country. In this unstable world it would be suicide for nations possessing nuclear weapons to reject the idea of nuclear status without any guarantees. The majority of parliamentarians realize this." Antonov says, the author continues, that there is one more reason for the change in the stance, in accordance with which Ukraine was dispatching its tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. He says that the nuclear materials in the warheads are worth \$1 billion, or even more. Antonov complains that Ukraine began dispatching weapons to Russia without receiving anything in return. After all, it has to buy nuclear fuel for its power stations from Russia.

"Many Ukrainian leaders also think that they made a mistake when, under Western pressure, they agreed to let Russian President Boris Yeltsin have main control of strategic nuclear weapons, including ballistic missiles," the report says. "The West only recognizes strength, one Ukrainian legislator stated, and Ukraine intends to be strong."

Morozov on Ukraine's Nuclear 'Responsibility'

LD3103200892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1236 GMT 31 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Zhirnikhin]

[Text] Budapest, 31 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—Only the National Ukrainian Army will be stationed on the territory of Ukraine. That is why all legal norms which have been elaborated by the CIS countries regarding the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States do not apply to Ukraine, Colonel General Konstantin Morozov, the Ukrainian defense minister has

stated in an interview to the Hungarian newspaper NEPSZABADSAG. Ukraine itself will carry out a program of reducing armed forces, will define its military policy, and be responsible to other states for its actions, the head of the military department stressed.

We are seeking to ensure that between Russia and Ukraine there are as few disputable issues on military problems as possible. For this purpose we have put forward several proposals relating, in particular, to pension provisions for those officers who retire, and to deliveries of military equipment to military formations during a transitional period.

After the meeting in Alma-Ata, the military and political situation in the CIS changed somewhat. An accord is known to have been reached in Alma-Ata on the strategic armed forces coming under a unified command and unified control. Today the situation is different, as Russian President Boris Yeltsin "has taken over the functions of minister of defense." Thus some questions have arisen to which an answer has not yet been received. Russia has announced the setting up of its own national Ministry of Defense. However, no announcement has yet been made about the setting up of a national Russian army. At the latest meeting, moreover, Russia stated that "it had never defined itself as an independent state nor had it left the Soviet Union." It occurs to us that an attempt is thereby being made to set up strategic forces on the territory of Ukraine, "among which it would be possible to have other military forces as well," besides the nuclear forces.

Ukraine does not intend to discuss such a question. We are firmly convinced that military formations should be located on the territory of Ukraine that are called upon to defend the citizens of Ukraine and are subordinate solely to Ukrainian military leadership. As well as joint control over the nuclear forces, a program to reduce them needs to be implemented.

At the present time, Ukraine has suspended the withdrawal of nuclear warheads from its territory. At the bases where these weapons are located, under the control of the relevant qualified personnel, guards have been increased. The need for this step taken by Ukraine is motivated by the fact that both the president of Ukraine, like the country's military leadership, does not have guarantees that the nuclear warheads being withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine are being destroyed. In the statement on unilateral disarmament made by Ukraine, reference was made to the setting up of an international committee to monitor this process and to jointly monitor the destruction of the nuclear warheads. Neither of these things has been done. Ukraine bears responsibility for ensuring that the nuclear disarmament implemented by one state does not lead to the strengthening of the nuclear potential of another, K. Morozov stated in conclusion.

Kravchuk 'Uncertain' About Weapons Safety

*LD0204083592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0804 GMT 2 Apr 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Voskoboinikov]

[Text] London April 2 ITAR-TASS—Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk told THE TIMES newspaper that all nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, located on the territory of the republic, could be destroyed in Western countries.

Kravchuk said he was uncertain about the safety of storage and dismantling of nuclear weapons in Russia.

Quoting reports indicating that uranium from the former USSR was offered for sale in West European countries, Kravchuk said: "If uranium is sold, then I am afraid that

a bomb could be sold as easily." According to him, each weapon has its number and he did not want Ukraine to be blamed for its sale.

According to THE TIMES, the president said that nuclear warheads, located on the territory of the republic, could be either destroyed at a special plant due to be built in Ukraine or transferred for dismantling by Western countries or international organisations.

"These armaments can be destroyed on the territory of other countries, provided there is appropriate international control," he emphasised. "It is irrelevant where these weapons are located, provided they are destroyed."

According to THE TIMES, Kravchuk, who reaffirmed Ukraine's desire to become a nuclear-free state, also indicated that the republic might stop transferring tactical and strategic nuclear weapons to Russia if a "viable" alternative variant of their destruction appears.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS**NATO, Former Pact Defense Ministers Meet****Russian Assurances on Nuclear Arms**

LD3103220892 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 31 Mar 92

[Text] All the tactical nuclear weapons will be transported to Russia from other former Soviet Republics by 1 July despite the resistance of Ukraine—a top military adviser of the Russian President Colonel General Pavel Grachev told journalists that he made the promise to the American defense secretary at their Tuesday [31 March] meeting in Brussels. Their meeting preceded the unprecedented conference of defense ministers of NATO, East European countries, and the Commonwealth of Independent States in Brussels.

Nuclear Safeguards, CFE Discussed

AU0104122792 Paris AFP in English 1212 GMT 1 Apr 92

[Text] Brussels, April 1 (AFP)—NATO and its former adversaries of the Soviet-led Warsaw Bloc pledged at a historic first meeting of their defence ministers here Wednesday to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and other arms of mass destruction.

The countries, 15 from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and 17 from the republics of the former Soviet Union and its communist bloc allies, also agreed on the “safe, responsible and reliable control” of their remaining nuclear arsenals.

There was no specific reference in a final communique to a current dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the Ukrainian reluctance to send its short-range nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction by July 1.

In the communique, the ministers issued a lengthy list of topics for defence cooperation, including how to manage and dismantle the armed forces of the former communist empire, and place them under civilian control.

They expressed their determination to implement the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty signed in November 1990, before the Helsinki summit of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in July.

Implementation of the treaty, which provides for deep cuts in conventional weapons, has been blocked by quarrels between Russia and other former Soviet republics over how to divide amongst themselves both the Red Army and the weapons cuts agreed by the Soviet Union.

The ministers also agreed to finalise negotiations on cutting troop strengths by July.

The meeting scheduled a “high-level seminar” on the role of the military in democratic societies, plus workshops on defence management and the environmental clean-up of defence installations in Eastern Europe.

It said NATO countries would set up small groups of defence experts which could be sent at short notice to Eastern European countries needing help.

The statement said: “The aim is not only to increase mutual understanding and confidence among us, but also to provide practical assistance on defence-related matters at a time of profound transformation and transition.”

The ministers agreed on a list of additional cooperation possibilities ranging from military strategy, budgets and air control to the army’s role in, search and rescue operations and humanitarian aid.

All republics of the former Soviet Union plus its Warsaw Pact allies were represented at the meeting, except for Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

Tajikstan was represented by the Russian envoy, Colonel-General Pavel Grachev, first deputy defence minister.

On the NATO side, only France was absent, because it is not a member of the alliance’s military command.

Italy To Aid Russia With Nuclear Safeguards

AU0204122892 Rome ANSA in English 1003 GMT 2 Apr 92

[Text] (ANSA) Brussels, April 1—Italy will send a mission of nuclear technicians and experts to the Russian Federation some time over the first half of April to cooperate with Moscow officials in setting up safeguards during the transport and storage of atomic weapons destined to be removed from what during the cold war were considered front line emplacements.

The announcement was made here today by Italian Defense Minister Virginio Rognoni on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) meeting which for the first time has seen defense ministers from the Atlantic alliance and those from the disbanded Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet republics sitting down at the same table at the NATO general headquarters in Brussels.

Rognoni said that the Italian experts, whose mission comes at the request of Moscow officials, will all be civilians who work for the Italian National Alternative Energy Agency (ENEA) but who will operate in contact with the Defense Ministry. They are to put their experience at the service of their hosts in the delicate task of maintaining controls over the nuclear arms in the possession of the former Soviet republics now a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Italian defense minister, who during the NACC meeting took the initiative of proposing such controls, told journalists that the Western nations want to be certain that the nuclear weapons that belonged to the former Soviet Union and which are to be destroyed in line with treaties stipulated previously with the USSR,

are effectively eliminated and that safety measures are in force regarding the transport and storage of those nuclear weapons that remain.

The NACC today launched a broad program of technical assistance to the former communist states and CIS republics for the reconversion of their military structures to peaceful means and Rognoni said that, together with the control of nuclear arsenals, the other problem that remains to be solved with the West's former adversaries is that of ratification of the 1990 treaty for the reduction of conventional arms in Europe.

According to the minister, ratification of this treaty and agreement on how the former Soviet republics are to share out ceilings on conventional arms which were already agreed upon by the USSR, must be achieved in time for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe set for July in Helsinki, so that participants can get on with further arms reductions.

Nordic States To Oppose Russian Nuclear Tests in Arctic

LD1004103792 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 0900 GMT 10 Apr 92

[Text] The Nordic countries will jointly oppose nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya. According to Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, the Nordic countries in the near future will ask Russia for an explanation of its nuclear security plans. If Russia intends to continue tests on Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Ocean, the Nordic countries intend to make a strong protest to prevent the tests, Vayrynen says.

At present, there is a one-year ban, proclaimed by the Russian president, on nuclear tests in the Novaya Zemlya region.

FINLAND

Foreign Minister on CSCE Future Security Forum

LD0704154992 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 1000 GMT 6 Apr 92

[Text] According to Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, the new security forum of the CSCE should negotiate on reducing troops and weapons in the areas neighboring Finland in the northern part of Europe. In addition, the new security forum should agree on new confidence-building measures and develop a mechanism to stop conflicts from arising.

Vayrynen presented Finland's views at a seminar which opened in Helsinki. The fourth follow-up meeting of the CSCE is currently preparing the new security forum.

GERMANY

Help Urged for CIS Nuclear Weapons Destruction

AU2903145392 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 28-29 Mar 92 p 6

[Report by "cas": "Bonn Called Upon To Help Destroy Weapons"]

[Text] Because of problems the CIS is having on agreeing to a plan for destroying the former Soviet Union's tactical nuclear weapons, the FDP [Free Democratic Party] and the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] are planning to introduce in the Bundestag a joint motion on disarmament help for Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Disarmament policy spokesmen Olaf Feldmann (FDP) and Peter-Kurt Wuerzbach (CDU) said in Bonn on 27 March that Germany should focus on help regarding centrally storing weapons under international control and converting fissionable nuclear material.

Feldmann and Wuerzbach said the nuclear weapons systems not only endanger European security but that "the greatest danger of proliferation emanates from these weapons." Both experts are worried that such weapons are being given to other states, which is why the comprehensive control of the transport, storage, and future destruction of these weapons must be ensured as soon as possible, to include the detailed registration of and information on the existing weapons. Both politicians hold the view that the first necessary step is coordinating bilateral disarmament help from the West. They say the NATO "Ad Hoc Group" founded at Bonn's insistence should play a decisive role; the tasks should be reasonably divided. They believe that it would be the right task for Germany to help store the weapons and convert the fissionable material. Bonn is one of the Nonproliferation Treaty signatories that does not possess nuclear weapons.

SWEDEN

Prime Minister Warns Russia on Baltic Force Withdrawals

PM0604151292 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Apr 92 p A7

[Kaa Eneberg report: "Bildt Warns Russia"]

[Text] Prime Minister Carl Bildt yesterday warned Russia to begin real negotiations in earnest with the Baltic states on withdrawing the troops remaining in the independent states.

The presence of Russian troops in the absence of an agreement is a security risk for the whole of Europe, Carl Bildt said.

He also called on the Balts to satisfy the Russian minorities' democratic rights and not to demand a revision of their borders.

Carl Bildt made these calls from the Riksdag podium yesterday afternoon when he took the opportunity to turn Riksdag question time into a major speech on foreign policy. His half-hour speech was occasioned by the fact that the government has recently played host to the three Baltic prime ministers. The government also put the three free trade agreement signed during the visits before the Riksdag for approval.

Bildt's intention with his speech was also clear. It will be distributed to all affected governments, Carl Bildt said

when Pierre Schori, Social Democratic Riksdag deputy and former Foreign Ministry under secretary of state, demanded that the government send an "emissary" to Moscow.

Carl Bildt revealed that the government is heavily involved behind the scenes in the Baltic governments' various negotiations, chiefly in the field of restructuring their economies. He also indicated that the government has particularly good relations with Boris Yeltsin's government.

In response to a question from Schori, who demanded that the government speak out clearly to Moscow on the subject of the troops, Carl Bildt said that he was to have had consultations last Monday [30 March] with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shakhray on the withdrawal of the former Soviet troops.

The fact that the visit was canceled at the last minute is a sign of the instability which reigns in the collapsing former Soviet Union, Carl Bildt said. Shakhray has been forced to leave his post.

In Stockholm today Carl Bildt will meet the head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to discuss the bank's possible future involvement in the Nordic aid program for the Baltic states.

In his talks with the Baltic prime ministers there was detailed discussion of the concepts of security, economic development, and democracy as interdependent elements, Carl Bildt stressed. He gave the problem concrete form by asking what would happen if the Russian minority were to appeal for support to an increasingly nationalist regime in Russia.

"A question which today is to do with the reconstruction of the democratic structures in these countries could then rapidly be transformed into a question of their ultimate security," Carl Bildt declared.

He said that he had formed the impression that the Baltic governments realize how important it is that the problems of minorities are handled "wisely and with the necessary care."

He pointed out that as far as their Russian minorities are concerned, it is chiefly Estonia and Lithuania which are facing very difficult problems which need to be weighed very carefully. He described a large number of the Russians living there as "just as little responsible for and just as much the victims of an indefensible Soviet policy as the other inhabitants of the three Baltic states."

On the subject of the troops in the Baltic region, Carl Bildt said that the withdrawals that have taken place hitherto are only symbolic. He also pointed out that it is unsatisfactory that the independent republics themselves have not been given information about the size of the foreign forces on their territory.

Carl Bildt did, however, offer his "own estimate" of their size: larger units of an army division each in Estonia and Latvia and three divisions of various sorts in Lithuania, three major naval bases chiefly in Latvia and Estonia, 15 air bases of varying importance and a very large number of antiaircraft installations, and the strategic advance warning station at Skrunda in Latvia.

The overall estimate of military personnel is 25,000 men in Estonia and 35,000 each in Latvia and Lithuania.

"We are assuming that real negotiations will begin as soon as possible and lead to a timetable for troop withdrawals that is accepted by the states," Carl Bildt.

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