


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'Roundup' Views Ukrainian Controversy on Nuclear Arms

OW2703082492 Beijing XINHUA in English
0322 GMT 27 Mar 92

["Roundup: Kiev's Position Makes Nuclear Issue in CIS More Complicated"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, March 26 (XINHUA)—Ukraine's recent announcement that it would suspend the transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia has made the nuclear issue in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) more complicated.

On March 12, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk decided to halt the transfer of tactical nuclear warheads to Russia because of what he called Moscow's inability to destroy the large stockpile.

He also expressed dissatisfaction over the lack of international supervision of the destruction. He said the weapons might fall into the wrong hands.

However, given the mounting feud between Russia and Ukraine, experts say that Kiev's decision is just another move to gain a bargaining chip in its dealings with Moscow.

Despite Ukraine's repetition of its pledge to become nuclear-free and neutral, the announcement has caused an outcry the world over.

The United States, Britain and France have all voiced their concern and urged Kiev to abide by the nuclear agreement.

On March 18, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said Kravchuk had agreed to resume the transfer of tactical nuclear warheads, an announcement that somewhat eased international anxieties.

Just two days later, however, at the fourth summit meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and in Yeltsin's presence, Kravchuk denied any such agreement and said the suspension would continue.

According to the agreement among the four nuclear republics of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, the former Soviet Union's 27,000 nuclear warheads would be put under unified control and all the tactical warheads would be assembled in Russia for destruction.

In addition, Ukraine and Belarus have repeatedly promised to become neutral nations free of nuclear weapons and to transfer all strategic nuclear warheads to Russia before the end of 1994.

The other nuclear republic, Kazakhstan, has already sent all tactical nuclear warheads to Russia but has kept silent on what it will do with the remaining strategic warheads.

Tactical nuclear stockpiles inside Belarus are also being moved to Russia according to plan.

CIS military sources say that if Ukraine fails to resume the transfer before the end of March, the prospect of moving out all tactical nuclear warheads by July 1, a deadline set by the four countries, seems to be unlikely.

So far, Ukraine has moved out just 57 percent of its tactical nuclear stockpile. An extra 2,390 tactical and 1,420 strategic warheads remain on its soil.

In the face of Kiev's dwindling interest in the CIS, observers fear that the nuclear agreement would vanish into thin air if Ukraine quit the commonwealth.

The commander-in-chief of the CIS armed forces, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, says Ukraine signed only one of nine military accords reached at the fourth CIS summit in Kiev on March 20.

Although a committee was set up during that summit to supervise the destruction of the nuclear stockpile in Russia, the problem is far from settled.

The local press says it is very difficult for Russia to get rid of the tactical nuclear warheads according to schedule because of the lack of expertise and money.

The accord on nuclear weapons is one of the first, if not the only, substantive agreement reached since the birth of the CIS. However, the prospect of its implementation continues to be in doubt.

Meanwhile, the world remains anxious about the future of the nuclear stockpile in the face of the chilly relationship between Moscow and Kiev and mounting ethnic conflict in various republics of the former Soviet Union.

U.S. Underground Nuclear Test Reported

OW2703051492 Beijing XINHUA in English
0435 GMT 27 Mar 92

[Text] Washington, March 26 (XINHUA)—The United States today carried out an underground nuclear test in the Nevada desert after a 24-hour delay caused by unfavorable weather.

Local press reports say the blast, the equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT, sent a shudder through high-rise buildings in Las Vegas, 177 kilometers from the testing site.

It measured 5.5 on the Richter scale at the National Earthquake Information Center in Golden, Colorado.

Twenty-three Russian scientists were present to monitor the explosion under the terms of the United States-Soviet threshold test ban treaty, which was signed in 1974 but not ratified until 1990.

Originally scheduled for Wednesday, the test had to be postponed because the wind was blowing towards a populated area, which the authorities feared could not be properly evacuated if radioactive gas leaked from under ground.

This is the first nuclear test conducted by the United States this year. The New York-based Natural Resources Defense Council says the country has conducted 936 nuclear tests, or one every 18 days, between 1945 and 1991.

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Greenpeace Ship Heads for French Nuclear Test Site

BK2203002492 Hong Kong AFP in English 2149 GMT 21 Mar 92

[By Tim Cribb]

[Text] On board Rainbow Warrior II, March 21 (AFP)—Greenpeace's flagship left Papeete harbour Saturday bound for Mururoa Atoll and almost certain confrontation with the French military as it attempts to establish a peace base at the nuclear test facility.

The environmental group's ship cleared the harbour at 9:16 a.m. (2016 GMT) and took a heading of 115 degrees as it began the 650 nautical mile journey to Mururoa to the southeast.

Nuclear campaigner and mission coordinator Stephanie Mills, 28, of New Zealand, said the Rainbow Warrior would make a brief stop at the atoll of Here Here to take control samples of plankton and coral. Scientists Briton Valerie Smith, 38, and German Simone Troendle, 26, plan to compare the control samples with others to be taken at Mururoa.

They will be looking for signs of radioactive contamination caused by leakage of material from the coral and basalt atoll, used by France for 131 nuclear blasts since 1975 when it ended its atmospheric program in the face of international protest after 44 tests there and at Fangataufa.

Within 30 minutes of the Greenpeace ship leaving port, a French naval vessel, one of three fast attack patrol boats stationed at Papeete, began to shadow the Rainbow Warrior, named after her predecessor sunk by French secret agents in Auckland harbour in 1985.

There was no sign of the frigate Lavalee, but Mills expected it to get underway within hours of Rainbow Warrior's departure. The 56-metre 550 tonne former North Sea trawler is expected to arrive at the 12-nautical mile limit around Mururoa on Tuesday or Wednesday, depending on weather conditions.

Mills said Greenpeace would defy the 12-mile limit in an attempt to land a team on the atoll to establish a peace base, both as a protest against nuclear testing and to take marine samples.

French authorities have told Greenpeace that they would be breaking the law should they enter the restricted zone around the atoll.

But French Environment Minister Bryce Lallond was reported Friday to have called on the French military at Mururoa to exercise restraint in their dealings with Greenpeace.

In Papeete, military and civilian authorities said the situation on the Mururoa was quiet and that no particular measures were being taken in light of Greenpeace's plans to land on the atoll, where around 1,000 French troops are stationed to maintain security.

Mills defended Greenpeace's intention to enter the restricted zone, saying: "Radiation does not respect national boundaries, military exclusion zones or anything else—if there is pollution occurring, there is pollution occurring."

"In some situations you take a principled stand, which is at a higher level than some piece of paper which says you cannot enter these territorial waters," she told AFP [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE].

The 1992 test series is expected to commence in May and will comprise some four to six detonations of varying size. France maintains the tests are safe and there is no risk of radioactive leakage at the atoll.

Greenpeace Ship Intercepted at Restricted Area

BK2703004692 Hong Kong AFP in English 1918 GMT 26 Mar 92

[By Tim Cribb]

[Text] Aboard Rainbow Warrior II, March 26 (AFP)—The Greenpeace flagship was sailing about half a nautical mile off Mururoa Atoll Thursday three hours after it began its action against nuclear testing there despite repeated requests to leave the atoll's 12 mile exclusion zone.

The fast patrol boat La Tapageuse contacted captain Joan Guitart at 7:58 a.m. local (1758 GMT) and asked his intentions as the Rainbow Warrior proceeded under sail towards the pass in the coral atoll some 14 nautical miles distant.

"My intention now is to go inside the atoll," Guitart told the Lavellee.

"But if you try to stop me I will sit," he said.

Lavellee responded: "I intend to stop you."

As this exchange took place, the Lavellee was closing fast to the stern, preceded by three inflatable boats carrying French marines. The supply tender Revi stood to starboard and a helicopter circled overhead.

Three warnings were then communicated to the Rainbow Warrior to leave the zone by a northerly heading at full speed.

Guitart said he would not do so and continued sailing towards the pass, but reiterated that if La Tapageuse wished to board his vessel, he was ready to receive a boarding party and would halt his ship.

At 8:15 a.m. (1815 GMT), Rainbow Warrior was six nautical miles from the pass.

Campaigner and action coordinator Stephanie Mills deemed the mission a success, in spite of the arrest of nine campaigners who earlier attempted to reach the atoll in outboard powered inflatable boats, chased by marines in five fast inflatables after they breached the 12 mile exclusion zone.

About 20 minutes afterwards British campaigner Tim Chauvel driving one of the inflatables radioed the Rainbow Warrior that the four single engine Nova boats had been arrested, including a dive team hoping to take marine samples from the lagoon at Mururoa to check for radioactive contamination.

One boat with three campaigners on board was unaccounted for.

They were protesting against continued nuclear testing at the French facility and had been attempting to land a party on the atoll to establish a peace base.

In Paris the Defence Ministry said the arrests were made "without violence."

The ministry did not say what action would be taken to stop the Rainbow Warrior.

Reports from Mururoa said five boats had been intercepted and those on board were being questioned by police. It did not say how many had been arrested.

Greenpeace campaigners were hoping to reach the atoll to take marine and water samples. They want to verify French claims that there has been no radioactive leakage from the atoll.

This, the fifth Greenpeace action at Mururoa since 1972, began at 03:00 a.m. (1300 GMT) after days of careful planning.

At 03:35 a.m., the four single-engined Nova inflatables and a twin-engined Avon were lowered into the water as Rainbow Warrior held a position less than a mile from the exclusion zone.

Rainbow Warrior then changed its heading and began its run to the line. At 5:23 a.m. Greenpeace entered the restricted area.

Briefing the campaigners prior to the action, Greenpeace veteran Martini Gotje, 41, of the Netherlands, had said: "Our chances to get there are actually not very high. Better phrased, they are slim.

"Some say we have no chance, but I would not be doing this if that were the case," he said.

On board the diving boat were British marine biologist Valerie Smith, 38, Rainbow Warrior first mate Pelle Petterson, 31, of Sweden, and nurse Sheena Chainey, 30, of Britain.

Smith, on leave from the University of Saint Andrews at Fife on Scotland's east coast, and Petterson had collected

control samples at the weekend during a 19-hour stop at the tiny atoll of Hereheretue.

British nuclear physicist John Hassard, 35, of London's Imperial College, hopes to take those controls and samples from Mururoa back to Britain for analysis to confirm the coral and basalt atoll, subjected with nearby Fangataufa to 131 underground tests since 1975, is leaking radioactive material.

The next series of tests is due to begin in May. France maintains there is no risk of leakage, but has refused permission for independent sampling.

Remaining on board the Rainbow Warrior were campaigners Mills, 28, of New Zealand and Jean-Luc Thierry, 40, of Greenpeace France, as well as Hassard, four Soviet environment minister and scientist Nikolai Vorontsov, 58, and Polynesian nationalist leader Oscar Temaru, 53.

JAPAN

Envoy to CD Urges Agreement on Chemical Weapons

OW2603114892 Tokyo KYODO in English 1126 GMT
26 Mar 92

[Text] Geneva, March 26 KYODO—Japan called Thursday for promoting disarmament talks based on an Australian-proposed draft chemical weapons convention.

Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament [CD] Mitsuro Donowaki also announced that Japan would back The Hague as the venue for an international organization to oversee limitations on chemical weapons.

Donowaki told a plenary session of the conference at the United Nations European headquarters that adoption of the Australian draft would facilitate an end to differences between nations over inspection and verification.

Several sites have been considered for a proposed organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, including Australia, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, but this is the first time Japan has openly backed the proposal for The Hague.

In his speech, he called for early agreement on the disposal of biological weapons and said that a ban on nuclear testing should be a priority now that the cold war has ended.

Donowaki said the Japanese Government "has traditionally attached special importance" to the issue of nuclear testing.

NORTH KOREA**U.S. Urged To Help Denuclearize Peninsula**

*SK2803103492 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1007 GMT 28 Mar 92*

[“The United States Must Adopt Measures Helpful to Denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 28 (KCNA)—The United States must fully open to public at home and abroad the location and inventory of its nuclear weapons and the position of its nuclear bases in South Korea till everyone comprehends the matter, withdraw all of them from South Korea and respond to a comprehensive inspection as demanded by us. This is what the United States should do to denuclearise the Korean peninsula and remove the danger of a nuclear war.

NODONG SINMUN says this in a signed article today, which reads in part:

The United States is now raising a hue and cry over fictitious “nuclear development by the North” and “nuclear threat”, contending that “a tough step” should be taken. It seeks in this a sinister political and military aim.

Recently Chong Chu-yong, former honorary chairman of the South Korean Hyundai Business Group, stated that there is a nuclear arsenal in South Korea the secret project of which he undertook and oversaw.

Why are the United States and the South Korean authorities raising terrific outcries over the fictitious “nuclear threat” from the North while keeping nuclear arms in secret arsenals in South Korea? This is a mean false propaganda to lull the demand for the U.S. troops pullout from South Korea which is growing louder at home and abroad with the adoption and effectuation of the inter-Korean agreement and joint declaration on denuclearisation and justify the permanent presence of the U.S. forces in South Korea. It is also to invent a pretext to conceal the danger of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and continue the nuclear war manoeuvrings stepped up in Asia with the Korean peninsula as the base.

With no false propaganda, however, can the United States justify its policy of occupation of South Korea and its scheme to turn it into a nuclear base.

The United States must not kick up a row over “threat of nuclear development” by us who have nothing to do with it, but fulfill its obligation for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

RESPONSE TO BUSH, YELTSIN INITIATIVES

Kozyrev, Baker News Conference After Brussels Meeting

Discuss Disarmament Initiatives

LD1203174592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1430 GMT 12 Mar 92

[Passages in quotation marks are recorded]

[Excerpts] As we have already reported, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker held a news conference after their five-hour meeting in Brussels. Our special correspondent Viktor Levin, who accompanied the minister, has prepared an account of the news conference, which I invite you to listen to.

[Levin] The news conference was opened by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

[Kozyrev] "We covered the whole agenda of our bilateral relations. We made a first attempt to reach the level of disarmament initiatives set forth by our presidents. In essence, this involves specific fulfillment of the Camp David declaration. We worked in the spirit of this declaration, with us standing as friends and allies on the one hand, and complex problems on the other. I personally feel great satisfaction and optimism in the fact that we will be able to prepare an intensive and unusual—in terms of its productivity—summit meeting between our presidents in Washington in June." [passage omitted]

[Levin] The question was raised at the news conference of the proposals of Russian President Boris Yeltsin to eliminate all multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, both land and sea-based. Secretary of State James Baker said that the basic differences between our positions are to be found first, in the deadlines for these reductions, and second, in how fast we will move toward more sweeping reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Regarding this, James Baker pointed out, no agreement has yet been reached. Andrey Kozyrev said that President Yeltsin did make such a proposal, but President Bush for his part proposed the elimination of all land-based multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and a partial reduction of submarines with multiple warheads. He also emphasized that the difference lies in the deadlines for the reductions, and now efforts are being made to bring these approaches closer together. [passage omitted]

Further Report

PM1203202092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Maksim Yusin report: "Kozyrev and Baker Did Not Agree on Everything in Brussels"]

[Text] Brussels and Moscow—"We worked as allies and friends on the same side of the barricades; on the other

side were the problems we have to tackle. I am satisfied with the results of the conversation and I hope that the forthcoming meeting between our presidents in Washington in June will be full and fruitful." That was Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's assessment of the results of his talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker at the Russian ambassador's residence in Brussels 11 March.

The secretary of state was more restrained: "We were not able to achieve a final accord, but we were able to discuss calmly and productively many important aspects."

Instead of the planned two hours, the conversation lasted nearly five. "We ran through the entire agenda of bilateral relations," Kozyrev said at the concluding news conference. "Half the time, if not more," was devoted to disarmament issues, according to Russian diplomats who took part in the talks. And that is no accident.

Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, when they adopted the Camp David declaration, presented the heads of their diplomatic departments with a very complex task. A new strategic arms reduction treaty is supposed to be ready in time for the Washington summit meeting (16-17 June). In the old days this used to take years. Now the ministers and experts have only a few months at their disposal.

Neither Kozyrev nor Baker would enter into technical details or specify what stage the discussion has reached. Baker confined himself to a brief remark: "We were unable to reach agreement on the time scale for missile reductions and certain technical parameters."

There is nothing so terrible about that in the opinion of Russian experts. Nobody was expecting all the differences of opinion to be eliminated at only the second meeting between the ministers since Camp David (the first took place in Moscow three weeks ago). "A normal process of coordinating positions is under way. The subject is too complex. Instant results were never on the cards. In order to prepare the treaty by June, several more meetings will have to be held between the ministers. It will be a busy spring in this respect," said one member of the Russian delegation at the talks.

Russia Said To Lack Nuclear Disarmament Concept

OW1703003292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1410 GMT 16 Mar 92

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "Russia has no definite concept in the nuclear disarmament area. It seeks to step up the process of disarmament, but it's not clear from what considerations. It seems that the speed of this process has become an aim in itself for us." This viewpoint was expressed in

an interview with DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent by Aleksandr Savelyev, Vice-President of Russia's National Security and Strategic Research Institute.

With reference to the problems Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker came to face on March 11 in Brussels at disarmament talks the expert said: "Russia can advance maximalist nuclear disarmament proposals for two reasons: either we feel that because of economic difficulties we'll have to make very many cuts in any case, hence the attempts to drag the U.S. along in order to maintain parity with it, or the Russian leadership is leaning in favor of the primitive enough idea that the less arms, the better. It evidently thinks that all the evil lurks in nuclear weapons. Most likely it entertains both notions."

According to the Russian expert who is also a member of the London-based Institute for Strategic Research, Russia's disarmament concept is not quite clear. "It's only clear that we are in favor of zero, but there is no clarity as to what stage of transition should precede this," he said.

The leadership of the former USSR reached an understanding with the U.S. that the future talks should focus on the efforts to strengthen strategic stability. The Americans mean a perfectly clear thing in this connection: above all cuts in the specific weight of intercontinental ballistic missiles. One of the ways to gain this goal lies through decreasing warheads on each missile. That is why George Bush suggested to Russia that an agreement based on transition to single warhead missiles should be signed. This fully conforms to the American idea of strategic stability.

"With this we agree, while disagreeing with another thing," A. Savelyev went on to say. "There is great asymmetry between us and the U.S. within the strategic triad. The main specific weight of our nuclear warheads belongs to its land-based component, while that of the U.S. to the sea-based component. That is why the Americans pay less attention to reducing it as compared with the land-based one."

The U.S. experienced great-difficulties in the deployment of MX ICBM. So far it has deployed only 50 such missiles, having failed to resolve the problem of their vulnerability to the first strike. If transition to single warhead carriers in the land-based component is accomplished, the Americans will manage to resolve in one stroke two problems: the vulnerability of their MX ICBM and higher security as a whole.

Why does Russia want deep cuts to be spread to the naval forces then? "I think that this is connected with the interests of strategic stability to a lesser extent," said A. Savelyev. "Economic considerations prevail here. We've cut by half the number of operational service submarines and suggested to the U.S. that all submarines should be kept at their bases. However from the viewpoint of

stability this could have the opposite effect. The U.S. will never agree to make the invulnerable part of its strategic triad vulnerable."

"In this area our economic considerations gain the upper hand," A. Savelyev said. "We simply cannot afford to have a large number of operational service submarines. The Americans take into account the factor of effectiveness when submarines are referred to. They won't agree to reduce the number of warheads on missiles carried by submarines to one. In such a case the fleet of submarines would become ineffective in terms of cost. Talks on these issues might come to a deadlock. In fact this is what is happening now," said A. Savelyev, Vice-President of Russia's National Security and Strategic Research Institute in conclusion.

GENERAL

Security Issues Facing Russia Discussed

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["Opinion" article by Sergey Rogov, deputy director of the United States and Canada Institute: "Does Russia Need Its Own National Security Policy? The Legal Successor to the USSR Cannot Remain the Same Country in Everything But Name"]

[Text] Russia has again emerged into the world arena. The tricolor flag has been raised over the embassies of the former USSR in various countries of the world. Russia is taking over the Soviet Union's debts and commitments and has become a member of the UN Security Council. But it would be naive to expect to be able to confine ourselves to merely replacing the concept of the USSR with the concept of Russia in the familiar formulas of international politics.

The international system that Russia has joined as a full member differs from our familiar world in that it is multipolar. In a multipolar world Russia can become one of the great powers, but it will scarcely be a "superpower." The Russian Federation, although it is the legal successor to the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, is by no means the same country in everything but name. After all, a state like today's Russia has not previously existed either politically (the democratic structure), economically (the liberal market economy), or even geographically (within the borders inherited from the RSFSR). The new Russia has yet to determine its identity, character, national interests, and place in the modern world.

Almost before it has been revived, the Russian state has already run up against its first crisis in the foreign policy sphere. The agreements on creating the CIS may prove to be merely scraps of paper without any specific content. Russia is faced with the threat of being dragged into a

conflict with Ukraine and the other former Soviet republics. In these conditions fundamental decisions on questions of its national security can be delayed no longer.

First of all it is necessary to impose order in the machinery for making decisions on military-political questions. At present Russia has no such mechanism. But secrecy, improvisation, a failure to speak with one voice, and a gap between declarations and real policy are impermissible here.

So it is very important to create as soon as possible a Russian National Security Council which, under the president's leadership, should elaborate Russia's national security strategy; prepare alternative possible positions on specific issues; provide information support and perform the functions of operational control in crises; and coordinate the fulfillment of the president's decisions by ministries and departments.

Three Circles of Interests

You can imagine Russia's security interests, in their foreign policy dimension, in the form of three concentric circles.

Russia's relations with the former Soviet republics are of prime, priority importance. The greatest danger today is that of being dragged into territorial and national conflicts with these states. It is vitally important for Russia to avoid such a development of events and to establish friendly relations and preferably allied relations with its immediate neighbors, where tens of millions of Russian citizens live.

The second circle of Russia's security interests is connected with regions such as East Europe, the Near East, and the Far East, which were traditionally part of the USSR's sphere of interests. Although Russia is now separated from these regions (except for the Far East) by a belt of former Soviet republics, geopolitically and economically we cannot withdraw from these parts of the world. Moreover, certain former republics may find themselves under the influence of regional power centers like China or Iran. Conflicts in these regions could lead to Russian involvement.

Relations with China and Japan may to a considerable extent determine the future "contribution made by Siberia to increasing Russia's wealth." If relations with its great neighbors in Asia deteriorate Russia may miss this opportunity.

The third circle is Russia's relations with the West, primarily the United States and West Europe. Even in the event of more radical cuts (of 75-80 percent) in strategic nuclear arms Russia and the United States will retain the capacity for "mutual assured destruction," which will impart a special character to Russian-American strategic relations, which may be transformed from confrontation to quasi-alliance.

Moreover, the prospects of Russia's participation in European or North Atlantic integration will be of fundamental importance from the viewpoint of the development of democratic principles and market relations in our country. If we find ourselves outside these integration processes, we will have to reconcile ourselves to lagging hopelessly behind the developed countries, and Russia's "Eurasian" nature will inevitably take on an increasingly Asian tinge.

Will Russia's vital interests be global in scale? This is hardly likely in the immediate future. Events in Africa or South America and in a number of other regions of the world will probably not directly affect our state's security.

Today the main threat to Russia's national security is by no means linked with the danger of military aggression. An external enemy may appear in the future, but in the meantime Russia's security is threatened by explosive internal problems. Centrifugal tendencies are intensifying inside the Russian Federation as a result of the exacerbation of the socioeconomic situation and interethnic conflicts.

Of course, this does not mean that Russia can embark on unilateral disarmament. Military force remains an important factor in ensuring national security, but there is no point in our continuing the Soviet policy of an arms race with the whole of the rest of the world. In the international arena Russia needs not confrontation with power centers like the United States, West Europe, China, and Japan, but a quest for reliable partners and allies.

How To Create a Defensive Community

These natural partners for Russia could be the CIS members, with which we are united not only by common economic and political problems, but also by the huge Soviet military machine, which remains almost untouched. Since the disintegration of the USSR there have effectively been no controls on its Armed Forces. The former USSR Defense Ministry is only nominally subordinate to the CIS Council of Heads of State and in fact is defending its own departmental interests, endeavoring to preserve the structures that existed in the unified state and reducing the necessary fundamental reforms to purely cosmetic changes.

Essentially the Army has ceased to be an instrument of state policy today. It has been deprived of civilian political control and has been left to its own devices. An intolerable situation has arisen whereby the military themselves have to decide to which state they should be subordinate, if indeed to any. Demoralization and the decline in discipline have reached an explosive point in the Armed Forces, as was graphically shown by the All-Army Officers' Assembly, which reacted enthusiastically to Colonel Alksnis' calls.

It looks as though Russia made a serious mistake in refusing to define its own approach toward military

questions, giving carte-blanc to the Defense Ministry. This merely frightened the other CIS members, which suspected Russia of imperial intentions. As a result the Brest, Alma-Ata, and Minsk meetings missed the opportunity to create a military-political alliance by transforming the Army into Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces (except for those troops placed under the jurisdiction of individual states under an agreed procedure). Compromise formulas such as "unified command of a common military-strategic space" cannot solve a problem on which the security of Russia and the whole world depends.

The Commonwealth's Joint Strategic Armed Forces cannot exist in a political vacuum. They need a juridical basis in the form of a Treaty on the Collective Security of the CIS and a political structure (patterned on the NATO organs). This will be possible only if Russia agrees that the other members of the alliance should have equal rights with it, including the formation on a basis of parity of the supreme coordinating political and military organs to which the Joint Armed Forces would be subordinate.

Therefore this scenario makes it impermissible to continue to equate joint and Russian military structures. Russia must be a member of the joint organs, but it must not allow the Defense Ministry of the former USSR to supplant its own Russian structures. So the creation of a Russian Defense Ministry cannot be postponed. Clearly, it must have a civilian leadership, which would make it possible to ensure reliable political control over Russia's Armed Forces.

Besides the coalition approach, Russia's military-political relations with certain former USSR republics will have to be based on bilateral agreements. This probably applies not only to the Baltic states but also to Ukraine.

It is the inalienable right of any sovereign state to create its own army. But Ukraine is consistently seeking a totally free hand [samostiynost] in military-political questions without taking Russian interests into account at all. Moreover, you get the impression that Ukraine regards Russia with great suspicion, fearing territorial claims by it.

In order to prevent an escalation of relations with Ukraine, Russia must compromise by acknowledging Ukrainian control of the troops of the Kiev, Carpathian, and Odessa Districts and at least part of the Black Sea Fleet. However, the agreement to transfer these forces to Ukrainian jurisdiction should be made conditional on three points:

- the inclusion within the CIS Joint Strategic Armed Forces, in accordance with the Minsk agreement and in addition to the Strategic Rocket Forces grouping and missile warning systems, of the 24th Air Force Army (strategic aviation), some of the air defense systems, all the tactical nuclear arms, and also the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet;

- terms for the partial withdrawal and disbandment of the Joint Strategic Armed Forces grouping on Ukraine's territory after all the strategic nuclear arms on its territory have been destroyed by the end of 1994, in accordance with Ukraine's pledge, must be agreed in advance;

- an agreement should immediately be signed with Ukraine on its reduction of its conventional arms to a predetermined level on the basis of the quota set by the Paris treaty for the USSR with regard to tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, and helicopters. Otherwise the problem of sharing out the Soviet quota could be a source of conflict between Russia and Ukraine, since according to the General Staff's former plans 40-45 percent of all conventional arms on the European territory of the former USSR were to be stationed in Ukraine.

Does Russia Need Its Own Army?

Russia could become the only CIS nuclear state if nuclear arms are totally eliminated in Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly Kazakhstan. Russia's nuclear status would reliably guarantee its security against external aggression in the foreseeable future. In these conditions does Russia need to keep 3-4 million men under arms? There is neither the strategic need nor the economic resources for this.

Clearly, the creation of Russian Armed Forces is inevitable. In addition to the troops stationed in Russia (over 2 million men), they would include the Soviet troops currently on the territory of foreign states—in Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states (about 400,000 of them)—since no former Soviet republic is laying claim to them.

Clearly, Belarus (220,000 men) will follow Ukraine (550,000) in taking command of the troops on its territory. At present the situation with regard to the troops stationed in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus (a total of over 650,000) is unclear. If they choose to switch to Russian jurisdiction this could lead to serious complications in Russia's relations with these states, including demands for the speediest withdrawal of these troops and the advancement of claims to their arms.

At any rate, Russia will scarcely be able in the immediate future to deploy over 1 million additional troops on its territory. Clearly, large-scale reductions in the strength of the Army are inevitable as early as this year. This will require the immediate implementation of a well thought-out and expensive program for the social adaptation of the discharged servicemen in order to avoid very dangerous political consequences.

These problems can be solved only in the course of a process of transition whereby the armies of the independent states are formed on the basis of units of the former USSR Armed Forces while the rest of the troops remain under joint CIS control.

Nuclear Weapons Safety Issues Discussed

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PRAVDA
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[Interview with Gennadiy Novikov, Chief of the Sector Special Security Laboratory at Chelyabinsk-70, by V. Umnov; place, date not given: "Few Bombs Will Survive Till the Year 2000: In the Past Year the Safety of Our Nuclear Weapons Has Declined Sharply"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] I would not have dared make that statement before my conversation with Gennadiy Novikov, chief of the sector special security laboratory at the nuclear city of Chelyabinsk-70.

How Were the Warheads Brought Back From Their Old Sites?

[Novikov] It is no secret that we had to urgently ship nuclear weapons from many territories where they had been placed in specially equipped sites. For example, we had to bring them out of the Transcaucasus across a land in the grip of unrest. So even in the process of shipment there was the risk of an accident happening. You yourself know that the accident rate on the railroads is very high...

On the other hand, we were removing warheads from their prepared storage areas to other sites. The weapons were sited at bases built long ago and, furthermore, ones not designed to take additional warheads.

[Umnov] Have new storage facilities not been built?

[Novikov] Who has had the time to build them? After all, these are specially equipped storage depots protected from outside influences and sited in specific places.

Admittedly, these installations have already reached the end of their service life, which is the case throughout our industry. In some places they need to be rebuilt—that is ordinary current work. But now...

[Umnov] In that case, can it be said that in the past year the safety of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of the former Soviet Union has declined?

[Novikov] Technical safety, like the internal characteristics of the weapons, remains unchanged. But in the broad sense—taking into account the political and psychological situation—safety has undoubtedly declined sharply.

How Were Nuclear Weapons Monitored in the USSR?

[Umnov] We never had independent monitoring [kontrol] of nuclear weapons or their safety...

[Novikov] Decisions on their development, production, and introduction into the armory were made by joint resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. The number of nuclear

weapons and their location were also determined at the top party and administrative level. There was no question of any discussion at the Supreme Soviet (by analogy with the U.S. Congress). The most appropriate state organ—the USSR State Committee for Safety in Industry and Atomic Power Industry—never had anything to do with nuclear weapons.

In other words, there was complete legal anarchy but the most rigorous departmental discipline. Legal regulation of the relationship with nuclear weapons was simply not required!

[Umnov] Quite recently, in the period of glasnost, it was suddenly discovered that our country has the largest stockpile of nuclear combat supplies. How did it manage to conceal it?

[Novikov] Until recently what we had was not a nuclear combat stockpile but simply a "reliable shield of the motherland." Only a few individuals—you could count them on your fingers—knew about the real arsenal. I think that even the government could only guess at it.

The figures came from the arms reduction talks and first appeared in foreign sources. The figure most often mentioned—and this is the most reliable one, even though it has not been officially confirmed—is around 30,000 nuclear munitions.

[Umnov] They need to be constantly updated...

[Novikov] We may assume that the usual guaranteed lifetime is 10-15 years. Each year 2,000-3,000 have to be taken out of service and dismantled and replaced by an equal number of new ones.

[Umnov] What happens to the obsolete warheads?

[Novikov] They are taken to the plant where they were first built, the electronics and automatic systems are removed and destroyed.

The fissile [delyashchiysya] material, the nuclear charge itself, remains. It can be reprocessed as new munitions, or stored, or used in nuclear reactors after the appropriate reprocessing.

[Umnov] Which method is actually used?

[Novikov] The methods vary, it depends on need.

What Was the Defense Ministry Able To Hide From the Nuclear Scientists?

[Novikov] There is no good monitoring of nuclear weapons now either.

[Umnov] Independent monitoring?

[Novikov] Most often it is state monitoring. Our nuclear weapons belong to different departments. One department develops and produces the charge, another the

missiles, and another the ships and submarines. Departmental separation is such that we conceal information from one another, including information affecting safety.

[Umnov] ??? [question marks as published] What, for example, was the Defense Ministry able to hide from the Ministry of the Atomic Industry?

[Novikov] Whatever it wanted: The location of warheads, storage conditions... By no means all representatives of the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry were allowed into the storage facilities and military bases.

Read foreign literature on safety, not necessarily even nuclear safety, but in the chemical and metallurgical industries. You will see that for any activity which could harm the population or the environment a firm has to obtain a license. To do that it has to prove that measures have been taken to guarantee safety...

But in our country there was no licensing system even for nuclear power stations. The decision to build a nuclear enterprise was made at departmental level—with the agreement of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

Was the location of these enterprises based on considerations of the population's safety? Hardly... Rather the decision was based on military requirements—dispersal, ease of enemy strike. And these installations ended up near a number of large cities...

In the United States aviation is the main means of transporting weapons, road transport is an auxiliary method. Perhaps this is connected with the fact that U.S. weapons are deployed outside its borders and any route can be used for aircraft.

We use mainly rail transport and a little road transport. All the railroads run through large centers. Do you think that nuclear munitions are transported on different railroads? They use the very same track...

Are Even The Good Things Bad in Our Conditions?

[Novikov] I would say that in terms of safety we lag behind the Americans somewhat. There is a reason for this. They have learned from their own mistakes. They have had at least two accidents in which plutonium was released: at Palomares in Spain in 1966 and at Thule in Greenland in 1968. There were no nuclear explosions there but radioactive substances escaped.

After that they immediately changed their concept of safety. Aircraft were forbidden to carry nuclear munitions on alert duty. A whole series of technical measures were devised and introduced.

But in our country there have been no accidents involving nuclear weapons with radioactive contamination...

In principle an accident involving our nuclear weapons could have happened. Even before Chernobyl. The preconditions existed, for example, in submarine accidents.

How Can One Gram Contaminate a Whole Kilometer?

[Novikov] We, too, have now quite radically changed the concept of nuclear weapon safety. After all, there could be a conventional explosion or fire affecting munitions in an assembly shop, on board a train, in a storage depot, or on a delivery vehicle. The probability of such an event in present operating conditions is estimated at approximately 10 to the power of minus six or 10 to the power of minus seven a year. Given the vast nuclear arsenal we have a quite significant expected accident rate—about one every 30-300 years...

Previously, for example, it was simply not taken into account that plutonium could also escape as a result of a conventional explosion—for the population this danger is not much less than that of a nuclear explosion. According to U.S. publications, one nuclear munition contains three kg of plutonium. Approximately one gram is "enough" to contaminate one square km, requiring the population to be evacuated. Clearing up a "simple" accident of this kind will cost from half a billion to several billion dollars.

Try Not To Be Conscientious!

[Umnov] The brain drain has a direct bearing on safety... Are people fleeing?

[Novikov] First, they simply are not allowed to, they have signed an undertaking.

In addition, and this I think is the main thing, for years professional pride was instilled in nuclear scientists. They were selected when they entered prestigious, effectively specialist university departments or when they were students at the country's best institutions. Then, after being sifted again, they were sent to closed cities or military garrisons. There they worked side by side with top professionals both from a sense of fear (the careless and the miscreants could easily be expelled) and conscience. In that way a pool of nuclear scientists was formed and those people are now perceived by many to be if not the elite of Soviet applied science then at least a real national asset.

For the sake of the great aim, nuclear scientists also suffered the discomforts of life behind barbed wire where even their relatives were not allowed and from where they could not talk freely on the telephone. Not that they wanted to brag about their production achievements! For the sake of that aim they endured risks in tests and experiments and some died as a result...

Now that aim is being eroded, it is disappearing.

[Umnov] But nuclear scientists are now working abroad under contract, are they not?

[Novikov] The Kurchatov Institute, which I respect, warns of the danger of a covert exodus of their physicists. But there is no need to restrict the Kurchatov physicists, they have nothing to do with nuclear weapons.

[Umnov] Would you care to predict how the situation will develop?

[Novikov] Events, unfortunately, are hard to predict. A few years ago we did not have the concept of nuclear terrorism at all. Now we are talking of the possibility of the deliberate seizure of nuclear munitions. You could blackmail people by threatening a simple detonation. This is a new area for us, it was always believed that we had discipline and order.

If all nuclear weapons are removed from the territory of the other three nuclear states of the CIS that will be very good for them, of course. But for Russia it is an additional strain.

[Umnov] What can be done quickly?

[Novikov] A Council of Ministers resolution in 1990 stated: A single system of ensuring the safety of nuclear weapons is to be created.

At present, however, mutual relations among the nuclear states in the sphere of maintaining the level of safety depend on the goodwill of the sovereign presidents—a pretty unstable foundation.

CIS Meeting on START, CFE Ratification 'Successful'

*LD1203164692 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1603 GMT 12 Mar 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow, 12 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, Russian first deputy foreign minister, described as "successful" the meeting which ended in the Russian Foreign Ministry here today. The meeting had continued the work on agreeing on the procedure for ratifying and implementing the signed, but as yet unratified, treaty with the United States on reducing and limiting strategic offensive weapons [START] and the treaty on limiting armed forces in Europe [CFE]. He noted that "a useful exchange of opinions took place" on the drafts of the corresponding agreements. These agreements will be presented for examination by the heads of state who will meet in Kiev on 20 March.

Taking part in the meeting were deputy foreign and defense ministers from the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia.

Russian-U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety Talks

*LD1603190792 Moscow TASS in English 1831 GMT
16 Mar 92*

[Text] Moscow March 16 TASS—The implementation of the U.S. proposal to help Russia dismantle and store nuclear charges was discussed on Monday [16 March] by Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev and General William Burns, head of the U.S. delegation at Russian-American talks on safe storing, transportation and elimination of nuclear weapons, the press centre of the Russian foreign ministry reported.

The results of the previous consultations were discussed during the meeting. Shelov-Kovedyayev and Burns agreed the first round of consultations was fruitful and constructive, the press centre said.

Dartmouth Conference Opens in Moscow

*LD1703204792 Moscow TASS in English
2004 GMT 17 Mar 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow March 17 TASS—A meeting of the working group of the Dartmouth conference on problems of security and cooperation opened in Moscow today. The meeting focused on the fate of and control over the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, as well as on the future of the Commonwealth Armed Forces.

"We are particularly interested in the fate of the Commonwealth nuclear arms and control over them", Edward Warner, chief analyst of the American research organisation "Rand Corporation", told ITAR-TASS. "The most important task is to determine how to reduce the armaments inherited by Russia and other Commonwealth countries to reasonable volumes unilaterally or in the context of international relations," he pointed out. According to him, the matter also involves how to carry out the reduction in armaments and at the same time "maintain the global stability and stable relations among new independent states".

A group of scientists and experts on disarmament and international security from the U.S. and Commonwealth countries are taking part in the meeting which will last till the end of the week.

Kokoshin Outlines Future Military Needs

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in Russian 17 Mar 92 pp 1, 2*

[Interview with Andrey Kokoshin, correspondent member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the Institute of the United States and Canada, by special correspondent Yelena Agapova, with additional questions from WASHINGTON POST correspondent Fred Hiatt; place and date not given: "Before

You Form An Army You Should Know What It Is For, Expert Andrey Kokoshin Believes"—first four paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Today's issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publishes an account of the decree setting up a Russian Ministry of Defense and (temporarily) entrusting B. Yeltsin with the duties of defense minister. This decree and this appointment undoubtedly furnish some answers to numerous questions about the military policy of the Russian state.

The formation of a Russian army, so the official commentary stresses, is not yet in question. But, following the logic of events, this question is predetermined. Undoubtedly analysis of the basic concept of the Russian armed forces will occupy the minds of analysts and specialists both in the CIS countries and in the world community in the immediate future. In this context we think that readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will be interested in the views of Andrey Kokoshin, correspondent member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the Institute of the United States and Canada, a specialist in military-political questions and national security, who, as we know, is regarded as of this moment as one of the most likely candidates for the post of Russian defense minister.

I entered the office of the deputy director of the Institute of the United States and Canada almost at the same time as WASHINGTON POST correspondent Fred Hiatt. He asked twenty questions—from the one about military reform, which he must be heartily sick of, to a question about the relationship between the USA Institute and the KGB. I think there is some sense in reproducing, in addition to my own, some of Fred's questions, which are interesting in themselves and reflect the spectrum of U.S. interests in the situation surrounding our armed forces.

But first about how the 46-year-old Andrey Kokoshin himself reacts to being nominated. (Let us recall that this conversation took place some days ago, when the question of the formation of a Russian Defense Ministry had not yet been settled). Among those who have made the suggestion are representatives of the "Democratic Russia" and "Military Men for Democracy" movements; G. Yefremov, general director of the "Mashinostroyeniye" science and production association; B. Bunkin, general designer of the "Almaz" science and production association; Academicians Yu. Ryzhov and Ye. Velikhov, and others.

[Kokoshin] I confess that this was somewhat unexpected for me. It is not so important whether or not I become minister. I assess the very fact of my nomination as a good opportunity to bring my views and ideas in the military-political sphere to public attention and to participate in drawing up a military doctrine for the Russian state. I am deeply convinced that military policy and military doctrine should not be created solely within the confines of the military department. Just as they should

not be fathered only by civilian specialists. Serious joint work is needed, a synthesis of the views of both groups. But this work, unfortunately, is not being done. In fact it never has been done.

[Agapova] It would appear that the perennial opposition between Arbatov's Institute and some military authorities has played its part.

[Kokoshin] There have been attempts to establish cooperation, nevertheless. For example, experts from the General Staff Academy and the Committee of Scientists for Global Security held an 18-month seminar on "Policy and Military Strategy." Initially there was not even a common system of parameters within which to conduct the discussion. But step by step we have moved toward mutual understanding and have achieved positive results.

Today the time has come to leave aside emotional outbursts and cliches of all kinds. A sober, pragmatic approach to military policy is needed. I entirely advocate ending the war between "whites" and "reds." Right now it is extremely important to gather all the best forces of the officers' corps and specialists to resolve military-political problems. We are faced with a profound crisis in the Armed Forces which threatens to have serious consequences for the whole of society. As of today Russia has no clearly defined military policy within the CIS. The CIS Joint Armed Forces not only have no doctrine, but no military concept either. An army cannot live that way. It must have clear goals and tasks. Without this an army becomes ungovernable and dangerous. [Kokoshin ends]

From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA dossier: A. Kokoshin was born in 1945, the son of an officer. He graduated from the Moscow's Bauman Military-Technical Institute. He belongs to no political party. He is an officer of the reserve.

[WASHINGTON POST] Can you explain why Generals Volkogonov and Kobets are talking about setting up a Russian army in the near future, while Yeltsin is still claiming that Russia will be last in this question?

[Kokoshin] Right now there is one sentiment in the Armed Forces—everyone wants certainty. The state of not knowing has dragged on too long. It is having a crushing effect on the morale and psychological state of the officers. But I understand perfectly well Yeltsin's position too. It is simply dangerous to try to transform overnight a gigantic organism which has existed for 70 years. What is needed here is especially careful consideration, followed by determination.

[WASHINGTON POST] How do you think that officers will relate to a defense minister who has not served in the army?

[Kokoshin] I think that they will relate in different ways. But, to answer your question, let me say that a civilian minister should not command troops, lead exercises, and so forth.

[WASHINGTON POST] (Fred smiles). Our former Defense Secretary Weinberger always wanted to do that...

[Kokoshin] That is a mistake made by some civilians who very much want to command troops. The military should do their own job: combat training, the elaboration of operations plans, and the direct running of the day-to-day life of the troops. A civilian minister has his own duties: for instance, questions of material and technical backup for the army, which is extremely complex in our difficult economic conditions. The military budget, the optimization of arms-purchasing programs, juridical questions concerning rights to land, the transportation of arms, and so forth. World experience in this sphere is well known, including U.S. experience in dividing duties between a civilian defense secretary and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

[Agapova] What kind of armed forces does Russia need, in your view?

[Kokoshin] I do not claim to have a ready-made formula. I will repeat: Dozens of specialists, both military and civilian, should participate in the elaboration of Russia's military policy. But there are things which are obvious, in my view. Throughout the postwar period we have been preparing for either a nuclear or a large-scale conventional war. Our Armed Forces and the mobilizational plan for industry—everything was geared toward this. Today the probability of these types of armed conflict is quite minimal. But there is a probability of conflicts of the type that the Americans call low- or medium-intensity. In the West armed forces have been reorganized to take account of this. Our Armed Forces are still slaves, I would say, to the circumstances of the disintegration of the former Union and the very serious economic situation. We will not succeed in ensuring the security of Russia and its allies unless we answer the question: What kinds of conflict can we expect in the future? And unless we reorganize the Armed Forces with this in mind. The reduction of the army should take place not just because we have budget difficulties but, I repeat, taking account of the types of probable conflicts. A combined-arms army with a powerful tank component is already an anachronism, a dinosaur from World War II. Russia can be given a reliable defense by the use of restructured, high-technology branches of the Armed Forces—the Air Force, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Navy, with significantly reduced and radically restructured ground troops. Rapid deployment forces, capable of operating in any area where an external threat to Russia's security arises, should occupy an important role in the overall structure of the armed forces.

Many people believe that, in conditions whereby conventional armed forces and armaments are being sharply

cut back, nuclear weapons will play a more important role in our country in maintaining security. But I do not think that we should rely too much on the nuclear shield, sitting under the nuclear umbrella and believing that not one drop of a world conflict will fall on us. It is absolutely essential that we have small but efficient general-purpose forces, including a navy, which is needed not only for coastal defense but for the defense of the strictly regulated interests of Russia and its CIS allies.

[Agapova] I know that you are a member of a national commission for assisting conversion and head of the the Center for Conversion and Privatization. What are your views on this problem?

[Kokoshin] It is impossible to convert the defense industry without once again clear guidelines for military policy. Above all, we have to know what armed forces and what types of weapons we will have in five, 10, or 15 years. Defense industry leaders talk as follows: All our lives we have made missiles to combat U.S. aircraft-carrier groups. What are we to do now, seeing that we are almost allies with the United States? And what should we make instead of missiles anyway? It is important for defense industry workers to know what part of the industry to convert, and what should remain to ensure our state's defense capability. So far there are no answers to these questions. Meanwhile our defense complex is a sort of resource of competitiveness on the world market. In cutting back military production, Russia should not simply close plants and workshops which produce military output, as is done in such cases in the West. They should be converted to civilian production. Our research and selective analysis of the course of negotiations between 50 Soviet enterprises and partners in the West indicate that many Soviet enterprises have a chance of getting into international markets. This applies above all to space technology, rocket building, the aviation industry, ship building, the production of high-quality steel and composite materials, oil production and oil rig equipment, laser technology... Our center is now actively working on recommendations in the sphere of conversion policy. [Kokoshin ends]

To conclude the conversation we asked A. Kokoshin to briefly summarize some of the theses which, in his opinion, should be reflected in Russia's military doctrine.

[Kokoshin] Russian armed forces and the CIS Joint Armed Forces should be viewed above all as an instrument to deter aggression. If we do not manage to avert military conflict, our armed forces should be sufficient to rapidly curb the escalation of the conflict. I agree with specialists who consider it essential to create centrally based rapid deployment forces, which can be thrown in the shortest possible time into any region of the CIS to repulse external aggression, to end conflict on favorable terms acceptable to us. This requires appropriate transportation facilities and a developed infrastructure, including combat hardware dumps in appropriate regions under reliable control.

Aggression against Russia or other CIS states involving not just nuclear weapons but also the extensive use of conventional weapons is now extremely unlikely. Accordingly we need to eliminate the huge gulf which exists today between the current structure and composition of the armed forces and the real requirements of Russia and the CIS. The thesis that the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring the security of Russia and the CIS increases relative to the radical reduction of conventional armed forces, as some of our specialists suggest, needs to be studied very carefully. The war in the Persian Gulf did not give an unequivocal answer to this question. The role of nuclear forces can hardly be so important in "low-intensity conflicts."

For a long time the ability to deliver a retaliatory strike inflicting unacceptable damage on an aggressor was considered the basis of strategic stability. Today the problem of safe and reliable storage of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are coming to the fore. There is a threat of nuclear weapons' escaping from the control of Russia's state leadership and CIS military command.

Right now it is necessary to take advantage of the possibilities which are opening up for cooperation between Russia and the United States as well as other nuclear powers in improving missile-attack early warning systems and increasing the reliability of systems covering the possibility of the nonsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. This will also enable us to substantially reduce our expenditure on ensuring strategic stability.

A new concept for Russian and CIS naval forces is needed. Russia and the Commonwealth states have real interests on the world's oceans. We are committed to ensuring safe navigation in a number of ocean areas as well as reliable lines of communication between western and eastern parts of Russia, which account for 50 percent of maritime freight traffic within Russia.

As I have already said, we need not only coastal defense naval forces, collaborating with aviation and land forces, but some proportion of the strategic missile carriers deployed on combat patrol in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk regions. Submarine forces are also needed, to ensure security of navigation in waters of the world's oceans which are important for Russia's national interests.

UK Offers Aid in Dismantling Nuclear Warheads

PM2003134592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 92 p 3

[Report by Major M. Pogorelyy under general heading: "CIS Nuclear Weapons Still Worry the West"]

[Text] British Defense Secretary Tom King recently reported his country's proposals for rendering aid to Russia in reducing and destroying nuclear weapons. The secretary deemed it necessary to specify that Britain respects the Russian specialists' experience and knowledge and is in no way trying to interfere in the process of

the dismantling and destruction of the nuclear warheads or even usurp Russian experts in this sphere. But the tasks facing them are so large and unprecedented that the aid of other states will obviously be essential, Tom King said. He also stated that these questions have been discussed with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Aviation Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and later were studied in detail by leading experts and representatives of the armed forces of the two countries.

Britain, in particular, is prepared to grant Russia several special armored vehicles and 250 containers to transport the dismantled nuclear warheads. Consultation aid was also offered in implementing the conversion of weapons-grade fissile materials for use for peaceful purposes and where necessary in ensuring International Atomic Energy Agency safety standards and a number of other measures. "Our experience in the nuclear field enables us to offer assistance and we are glad to do this," Tom King stated.

NUCLEAR & SPACE ARMS TALKS

Russian, CIS, Republic Roles in Future Arms Cuts Pondered

PM0603135192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Aleksandr Savelyev: "Nuclear 'Home' Without Owner. Disarmament Talks With United States Senseless Without Agreement Within CIS"]

[Text] Russia is shaping its foreign policy course as an independent state before our very eyes. Its main principles have already been proclaimed: Desire to join the world community as an equal member and commitment to the idea of arms limitation and reduction, disarmament as a whole, and strengthening of cooperation.

The Russian leadership is trying to demonstrate its good intentions in practice, too. This is proved, in particular, by the several foreign policy initiatives made by President Boris Yeltsin in the disarmament sphere. It cannot be said that all the initiatives have been successfully or sufficiently thought-out—those are points that have already been made by our newspapers and the foreign press. But, on the whole, the generally positive thrust of these steps is quite clear. As was the case during the thaw of the sixties, the stagnation of the seventies, and the perestroika of the eighties, the calls for disarmament and "peace initiatives" remain—even in the nineties—one of the main "trump cards" held by the former Soviet and current Russian leadership in foreign policy.

Postwar history shows that such initiatives have indeed sometimes "worked" the way they were intended. In many cases success was quite modest, but more often these actions produced nothing but a "propaganda effect."

Of course, it cannot be claimed that the Russian president's latest proposals are copying the USSR's previous approaches to the problem: They are more specific and, above all, they have announced a number of unilateral Russian actions without making reciprocal demands of the U.S. side.

The "Sacred Cow" Has a Better Chance, Despite Its Infirmary

At the same time, a number of the Russian leadership's subsequent statements leave no doubt that the Russian Foreign Ministry would like to see these initiatives resulting mainly in fresh talks with the United States on more cuts in strategic offensive weapons to equal levels. B. Yeltsin's statement that Russia is prepared to join in the U.S. program for the creation [sozdaniye] of a global defense system, which clashed [natolknulos] with the ABM Treaty—a "sacred cow" for many (if not most) of our politicians, military men, and diplomats—has for some reason gradually started to "fade" away. And it seems as if the "cow"—despite its infirmity—is gaining the upper hand in this "clash."

It is hard to get away from the impression that everything is coming full circle—just like in the good old days, we are planning to work out another disarmament agreement with the United States, except at a faster pace. Just a year or two ago this course of events would only have been welcomed. But the situation has changed in the most fundamental way. First, the question of just who constitutes this "we" is not entirely clear. Is it Russia? But it does not have its own armed forces. Is it the CIS? But it is not a state and, correspondingly, not an entity [subyekt] in international law. Is it a Russia authorized by the other CIS participants to conduct such talks? But none of the nuclear republics is planning to delegate such powers to it as yet. Moreover, it is well known that Ukraine wants to have its own representatives at these talks. This may also be stated by other states which were formerly Soviet republics. In this connection the question arises of how close are the positions of the four nuclear members of the CIS not only on general approaches to future talks, but on the fulfillment of the START Treaty conditions.

There is an acute need for a full-scale discussion of all disarmament problems among the CIS states, and primarily among the four members of the former Soviet Union's "nuclear club." This is what these states' foreign ministries should focus on. After all, the START Treaty should be ratified before a new agreement with the United States is signed.

It is not yet clear whether Ukraine will eliminate the SS-19 and SS-24 ICBM's and the heavy bombers on its territory within the framework of the treaty—that is, observing all the stipulated procedures for notification, inspection, and the elimination procedure. Or whether it will view its statement on the complete destruction of nuclear weapons on its territory by 1994 as a "goodwill" gesture. If Ukraine does eliminate these ICBM's and

heavy bombers within the START Treaty framework, this would mean that it would have no practical reason for subsequent talks: It would be a nonnuclear power as a result of meeting the provisions of the START Treaty. If Ukraine chooses the second approach, the question will again arise of what proportion of the arms it is planning to eliminate and to what schedule. This should be a subject for discussion between the four CIS states, with a view to elaborating a unified schedule for fulfilling the treaty provisions.

Kazakhstan Will Disarm Only in Conjunction With Everyone—That Is, Never

And this is not even the most complex example of the possible difficulties over the ratification and fulfillment of the agreement conditions. Far more serious is the situation with Kazakhstan, whose leader, N. Nazarbayev, has expressed readiness to eliminate nuclear weapons on Kazakh territory only in conjunction with all the other nuclear powers—that is, virtually never, since this is hardly likely to happen in the foreseeable future.

It is well known that there are 104 launch vehicles for the latest-version, silo-based SS-18 heavy ICBM deployed in Kazakhstan. They each have 10 warheads and constitute the most dangerous and destabilizing strategic weapon system, in the Americans' opinion. Under the START Treaty, our side must eliminate one-half of its 308 missiles of this type (the remaining 204 SS-18 ICBM's are on Russian territory). The question is: Will the ICBM's deployed on Kazakh territory be affected by these cuts and to what extent? Is Kazakhstan prepared to fully eliminate these ICBM's within the START Treaty framework (or subsequent agreements with the United States), since a call for an all-out ban on heavy ICBM's is more than likely and will be one of the U.S. side's tough conditions at future talks?

Needless to say, the problem of nuclear weapons on the territories of the former Soviet republics is not restricted merely to the above questions, which relate to the ground-based component of the strategic triad. There are still the problems of strategic aviation, verification and monitoring, ways and means of eliminating strategic offensive weapons and financing work under the treaty, and the problem of tactical nuclear weapons. That is why the speediest introduction of complete clarity on all these matters is more than topical today.

If We Were To Ally Ourselves With the United States...

The concept of new talks with the United States also requires major elaboration. So far only one thing is clear in this regard: Russia's desire for deeper and more radical cuts in both countries' strategic offensive weapons. This is the most "visible" aspect of the problems. But how will we proceed in putting forward our own position at the talks? How does our concept reflect the provision that we do not intend to see the United States as a probable adversary any more? Moreover, on

the basis of the Russian president's statements, the United States is henceforth a friendly state, as far as we are concerned, and virtually an ally. This is a most important political statement capable of changing all ideas of security in the most radical way and will need to be actually implemented in disarmament policy.

Needless to say, at the current stage of Russian-U.S. relations it is hardly possible to move immediately to a new quality of relationship. At the same time, we can hardly consider that the existing approaches to arms limitation square with the concept of allied relations. Just take the example of the United States and Britain. If we tried to "superimpose" on those two countries' strategic forces the criteria that we use in respect of existing and planned agreements with the United States, we might conclude that under certain conditions there could be a real threat of nuclear conflict between them—there is an absence of parity, strategic stability has been undermined, and the U.S. advantage is so great that with a first strike the United States could really count on winning a nuclear war. As a consequence of this, should relations between the two countries deteriorate, Britain would have a major incentive to launch a nuclear first strike, since it would be incapable of retaliating. Realizing this, the United States too would have an incentive to launch a preemptive strike, and so forth. From this example we can unambiguously conclude that applying these criteria to normal allied relations is simply absurd.

Of course, today it may seem fantastic to many people to propose that Russia and the United States could ever reach the level of allied relationship that exists between the United States and Britain and could stop worrying about problems such as maintaining parity or strengthening strategic stability. But why not start moving in this direction right now, if only by taking the sides' main concerns fully into account in any future treaty? After all, this can be done even without "sacrificing principles"—that is, by strengthening strategic stability (concepts which, it seems, are basically similar both for us and for the Americans). We need to realize that this kind of consideration is far more important from every standpoint than strategic offensive weapons cuts for the sake of cuts.

(Aleksandr Georgiyevich Savelyev is 42, a candidate of economic sciences, a participant in the Soviet-U.S. START talks, vice president of the Russian Institute of National Security and Strategic Research, a member of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, and author of a number of studies on the problems of international security and arms control.)

START TALKS

'Three Days on the Typhoon' Submarine Described

Submarine Described

PM0503152592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 3

["Part one" of Viktor Litovkin series: "Three Days on the Typhoon"]

[Text] 1. The Missiles Are Not Targeted Anywhere

The submarine crew was not surprised by the Moscow journalists' visit. They actually took us all around it, showed us and did not prevent us photographing everything we wanted, as if there were no secrets left anymore, or as if there was no point in guarding them like the apple of the eye. And they told us about everything frankly, although with pain. Let us leave the pain till later. First something about what the Typhoon actually is.

Captain Third Rank Viktor Tkachev showed us around the compartments and corridors of the submarine.

"The displacement of our ship is 25,000 tonnes," he said. "It is the world's biggest submarine. It is 170 m long, 25 m wide, and its height, together with the conning tower but without the extendable devices—periscopes, antennas, etc.—is 26 m.

The U.S. Ohio class submarine is of the same length as the Typhoon, almost two football fields long.

"Our submarine was built in the early eighties to counterbalance that submarine," Viktor explained.

But the "American" is a single-hull submarine, whereas the Typhoon is a unique construction. It is a catamaran, or more precisely, a trimaran. Inside its steel hull are two titanium pressure hulls with a diameter of 10 m. Between them are another three identical pressure modules—one in the bow, with six torpedo tubes and several dozen torpedoes and anti-submarine rocket-propelled torpedoes, one in the stern, where the steering compartment is located, and a central one where the main command post is located.

Each of the inner hulls—where the Captain Third Rank is in charge, being responsible for the power engineering—has a water-cooled water-moderated nuclear reactor with a capacity of 190 megawatts, a steam turbine of 45,000 horse power, an 800-kilowatt diesel generator, a propeller shaft, and a six-blade propeller.

This layout enables the submarine to submerge to a depth of several hundred meters, travel beneath ice, surface in ice breaking the floes with its hull, and to remain underwater for as long as necessary, although physicians do not recommend that people stay in a closed space for over 100 days.

Unlike diesel-powered submarines, where people even sleep on the torpedoes, the submarine has truly luxurious living conditions. The officers—there are 50 of them—live in two- or four-man paneled cabins. The cabins, which resemble train compartments but are far more spacious, have a wash basin, a television set, a writing table or desk, a bookcase, a wardrobe for outer clothing, and an air conditioner. Warrant officers—of whom there are 80—live like this too, as do the conscript sailors and petty officers—of whom there are around 40.

And this five-story "house" also has showers, a sauna with a dip pool, a small greenhouse with house plants

and oxygen-releasing flowers, and bird cages—the bullfinch Gosha has already accompanied the crew on four independent cruises, and they also have some budgerigars.

The missile silos are in the space between the hulls, between the torpedo and central compartments. They contain 20 ICBM's with 10 nuclear warheads on each one. The RSM-52 missile (NATO classification SS N 20) weighs almost 100 tonnes, has a height of 16 m, a diameter of 2.5 m, and is capable of striking targets at a distance of over 9,000 km.

The "Trident-II" missile on the U.S. Ohio class submarines has approximately the same specifications. Admittedly, they carry 24 of these, with eight warheads on each. The United States has 12 such submarines, whereas we have six Typhoons.

The missiles are launched not by pressing a "red" button, which is what happens in many movies, I was told in the submarine, but by turning two special keys, one of which is held by the commander of the missile command department (Command Department 2), the other by the Typhoon's commander, Captain First Rank Sergey Yefimenko.

Viktor Tkachev joined as one of the first crew members in 1985, when the submarine was standing on the stocks at the Northern Machine-Building Plant in Severodvinsk. He was involved in lowering it into the water, the first submersion, and the first missile launches. I asked him:

"Where are your missiles targeted?"

He shrugged his shoulders in embarrassment. "I do not know. We are not told about that. Maybe the commander knows."

I asked Captain First Rank Yefimenko the same question.

"Nowhere now," he answered. "The flight program, which is recorded on punched tape, is only entered into the ship's computer complex during the performance of combat service at sea. The rest of the time it is kept sealed in my safe."

Furthermore, the submarine's commander himself cannot make the decision to launch a missile, and then launch it. This can only be done if the computer receives a coded signal from President Yeltsin's "nuclear briefcase."

The ship's computer will compare this code with the one that is in its program and will give the "go-ahead" for pre-launch operations, the commander will feed the punched tape into the system and enter several signals known only to him, the computer will assess them again, juxtapose the whereabouts of the submarine with the coordinates of the set target, and make the necessary amendments itself.

Of all the pieces of technical wisdom that were explained to me on the Typhoon, I could only understand one, but I felt that it was the most important one—any unsanctioned launch of a missile with 10 nuclear warheads from the submarine is virtually impossible.

Does Captain First Rank Yefimenko know what program is recorded in his punched tapes and where the missiles are targeted according to this program? Have amendments been made to this program following the Russian president's statement that henceforth Russian missiles will not be targeted at U.S. cities?

"My punched tapes have not been amended by anyone yet," the Captain First Rank said, "and I do not know where my missiles are targeted; this information is held only by the General Staff where the program is written, but I suspect that they are targeted at the military installations of one of the countries that are now supplying us with humanitarian aid."

The commander added:

"I think that this should not be the case. It is improper. In the same way that it is wrong to give me bread with the one hand, and go into my pockets to see what I have in there with the other."

Sergey told us about the incident involving a U.S. submarine which occurred in our country's territorial waters while we were in the Northern Fleet. The Russian submarine with its damaged conning tower was moored next to his ship, and an analysis of its commander's actions was going on in the division staff.

"If we and America have declared that we are no longer one another's adversaries," Yefimenko said, "this statement needs to be corroborated by specific deeds and greater trust. As a step toward such trust, we must put an end to the mutual patrolling by nuclear submarines in the world ocean. I always remember that you can count the boats we have at sea on the fingers of one hand, whereas they have 18 with 368 missiles, or 2928 in terms of warheads [a u nikh—18 s 368 raketami i 2928 s boyegolovkami]. I would guess that they are not targeted at a vacuum, and this does not make me any calmer."

Captain First Rank Sergey Yefimenko is young. He is only 37. He has already been commanding the submarine for five years. He was the Typhoon's youngest commander and is now classed as an excellent specialist. He has carried out 11 training missile launches and has led several torpedo attacks. They were all successful. It would seem that Sergey has brilliant prospects and reasons to be sure of his own bright future, but Yefimenko is in a gloomy frame of mind.

The country's serious economic position and the fact that the army's problems have not been resolved are filling his life as a commander with as yet insuperable alarm and concern. People are leaving the submarine where living and service conditions are so wonderful. Almost half of the warrant officers, professionals of the

highest class, are Ukrainians. They are leaving to go to their own state, since they are not convinced that they will be able to obtain a pension and an apartment at home following their military service in Russia. That is what morale is like among 40 percent of officers, too.

"I am afraid that soon I will not have anyone with whom to perform military service," the commander said.

The situation with the officers and warrant officers' labor remuneration on the submarine is also bad. The commander of the Typhoon himself, who holds in his hands the fate of whole continents, earns around 5,000 rubles [R], taking into account the bonus paid for service in the Arctic, the percentage paid for submarine service, and payments for the special conditions on nuclear submarines; Captain Third Rank Viktor Tkachev earns R3,600, while the bus driver who drives seamen the 14 km from the residential facilities to the naval base earns R5,600!

Meanwhile a packet of the cheapest cigarettes in the Arctic costs R20 and a kilogram of crackers costs R37.

However, money is not the main thing that is worrying the submariners. We will talk about their problems again.

Shore Facilities Inadequate

*PM0603125592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 3*

["Part two" of Viktor Litovkin series: "Three Days on the Typhoon"]

[Text] 2. Ships Without a Shore

"The main problem that bothers us today," Admiral Feliks Gromov, commander of the Northern Fleet, said in conversation with us, "is the lack of appropriations for the social sphere. We have been allocated money only for housing construction, but there is a dire shortage of it for equipping base areas, tackling radiation safety questions, protecting the environment, and repairing ships."

Indeed, it is an old, peculiarly Soviet tradition—the weapons and combat equipment first, all the rest some-time later. While creating a powerful, modern Typhoon fleet, spending billions in the process, the government did practically nothing to equip its base, although the plans were there and the money too had been allocated for the construction of berths, repair shops, arsenals, and depots and for the social sphere. Not very much, it is true, and, as it turned out, even that did not materialize.

"According to the master plan," Captain 1st Class Vladimir Sysoyev, division deputy commander for rear services, said, "there should have been a diesel charging unit here in Nerpichya for the submarine storage batteries, but there is none. There were plans for a nine-story training block for submariners, where every specialist from hydroacoustics expert to nuclear reactor engineer would be able to run through a particular

emergency situation and, indeed, any combat task on a simulator, thus saving engine time and equipment."

The training center was not built either. There is only one—in Paldiski, Estonia. It is too expensive to take crews there—at current prices a one-way ticket costs 150 rubles [R], moreover a submariner would be parted from his family, whom he very rarely sees anyway. Indeed, Paldiski is now abroad: You cannot go there without visas, without agreement with the republic government. The seamen are also having to "flog" the combat materiel and extend its lifetime, lest they find themselves in a critical, perilous situation on a long voyage.

The depot zone is a big problem, too. Construction began alongside the submarine berths—in the hills. They blew up cliffs, dug holes for the foundations, filled them with cement, then abandoned them—no more money. Now the torpedoes, as with rocket-torpedoes, and other ammunition are kept in unfinished depots and the spare parts for submarines and the instruments are kept in inconvenient buildings that they put together themselves, using whatever material was available, and 60 trucks, graders, and other engineering and ancillary equipment has been left in the open in all weathers. Only a flimsy awning "protects" them from the watery Arctic sun. It is no fun replacing a fanbelt or a wheel flange in 40 degrees of frost.

Yet some specialists claim that the entire shore base was handed over a long time ago, in accordance with the documentation, and is fully operational. Every kopek has been accounted for.

I do not know about that; I have not been able to check the documents. But I did see that none of the above actually exists.

Transport is a particular worry at the base. The submariners live 14km from Nerpichya—in Zapadnaya Litsa. There is practically nothing to take them to and from their work, and you cannot go on foot in blizzards and ice. In 1987 the then defense minister Dmitriy Yazov visited the garrison. He gave an order for the submariners to be allocated eight "Ural" trucks with cabs. Thereafter they were nicknamed "UAZiks."

The "UAZiks," which carry 25 people, have had their day. The vehicles have been sent for a major overhaul and the cabs have been transferred to the chassis of trucks from the Kama plant and they have been adapted to carry 40 people, but this is not much help either—more than 1,500 officers and warrant officers have to be taken to work starting at 0600. It is easy to calculate how much time it takes when a one-way trip through the hills takes half an hour.

The base command concluded a contract with the Murmansk vehicle service to lease several buses. Every officer and warrant officer pays R50-60 rubles a month for them out of his own pay, but the buses provide an irregular service. Do not expect them to show up in a

blizzard on an icy Arctic night—civilian drivers are not eager to risk their lives, but a combat post cannot be left unattended.

So the submariners get to work however they can. Some officers and warrant officers, particularly the young ones, choose the simplest option—they never go anywhere. The fact that a submarine compartment is left without a specialist is not their problem, which is essentially fair.

Fairness in social matters is a very sore spot in a submariner's life. Captain 3d Class Viktor Tkachev, who showed us around the ship, was at a loss:

"Why is the difference between the pay of an officer afloat and that of an officer on shore only R150—the price of a kilogram of sausage?"

A shore officer works from 0800 to 1800 hours, and he gets a food ration which he can use to feed his family. An officer on the ship eats on board and is on watch every third day on top of the 40-hour working week approved in Russia. That is more than 82 hours.

Captain 1st Class Leonid Zakatov, deputy commander of the ship, has estimated that in March each crew member will spend 372 hours on board. That is 198 hours more than the law prescribes, and that is assuming that the submarine stays on base and does not go to sea.

During combat service a submariner is on watch for 12-16 hours a day, if not more; that is, taking care of the reactor, dealing with the missiles, computers or steam turbines, and being in the navigation room.

What do people have to show for their labor, aside from the obviously laughable pay?

"Practically nothing," Captain Lieutenant Aleksey Atapin believes. "You would not even get a sanatorium pass for the family. They go to those whom the medical service considers the 'right people.' That is life."

Not once in 10 years' service has Tkachev been to a sanatorium, and the same goes for Atapin in six years, and for warrant officers Andrey Volkov and Petr May-sak. Practically none of the seamen we spoke with had been to one.

Volkov has a son with chronic bronchitis, and they are expecting an addition to the family in the summer, but their apartment is damp and old.

"In the morning you go into the kitchen and there is a puddle on the floor," he said. "The walls are damp. Changing apartments is a problem."

"For our garrison apartments are not a problem," according to the deputy commander for rear services. "There is no one without a roof over his head."

Captain 1st Class Sysoyev actually promised to help Volkov.

"But it will be some time before we get rid of our dilapidated stock," he said. "Reproach, criticize, and punish me as much as you like—it will not help matters. There is no money for new construction."

Captain 1st Class Sysoyev is very proud that they were able to construct a bath and laundry combine and food depot at the base despite the total lack of resources.

"Do not ask where the construction materials came from—I cannot say," he shrugged his shoulders. "It is a matter for the prosecutor."

But the combine is standing. There is no provision as regards staffing it, but Sysoyev is able to do the entire division's washing in a day—thanks to naval rear services, who helped obtain a Czech washing machine—and provide shower facilities for 50 people per hour.

There are no baths at the garrison in Zapadnaya Litsa. When the heating season ends there for the summer and the hot water is switched off, you have to wash in a tub or even in a basin.

But the situation is even worse in the city regarding schools and kindergartens: There are 6,000 children in the garrison. The kids attend school in four shifts and there are only 800 places in the three kindergartens.

One morning we heard some piping children's voices on board the ship. Apparently, Warrant Officer Kryukovskiy had come on watch. His wife was sick and in the hospital, there was no one to leave the preschool children with, so he was forced to take them with him—into the inner hull.

"You don't want them cooped up all day," he said.

Well, forget about the kindergartens! The submariners are short of the most basic things. For example, standard black navy boots. The only factory in the country that makes them, the St. Petersburg "Skorokhod" factory, has stopped supplying them, maybe because of a lack of leather or maybe because there is no advantage in cooperating with the Navy—it is not "Salamander" [Austrian fashion footwear concern]. Cooperation with it is a far better prospect. But the divisional depot in Nerpichya is lacking 2,000 pairs of footwear.

It is the same story with officers' shirts, vests, and meat.

During the three days we spent on board the crew did not eat fresh meat once—it was substituted by canned stewed meat or slices of very fatty sausage. What the ship also lacks is special heated rescue suits. It has been three years since the Komsomolets and its crew went down, but there are still no effective rescue facilities.

"The Navy has not received a single suit," Sysoyev told me. "Our country does not produce them and there is no hard currency to buy them abroad."

"They find the money for parliamentarians to travel abroad," Typhoon crew members say, "but it is never available for the most essential things, on which our lives depend."

Incidentally, some Russian people's deputies are well aware of the situation in Zapadnaya Litsa and on the submarine in particular. Two months or so ago a parliamentary delegation headed by Valeriy Shuykov, secretary of the Russian Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee, toured the submarine.

"We told him, as we have told you," Senior Lieutenant Oleg Bolshov, commander of the bilge team, said, "at great length and in great detail, about our problems without beating around the bush. He listened carefully, wrote everything down, signed the Visitors' Book, and left, but everything remained the same. Are we to go on strike to get at least some improvements?"

Unlike the miners or air traffic controllers, submariners have no right to strike or even to threaten a strike, but they do have their own way of reacting to the situation in the Navy—by resigning.

Ship Commander Captain 1st Class Sergey Yefimenko has seven letters of resignation from officers on his desk, and practically all the letters are from captain lieutenants or captains 3d class—experienced, able specialists, mature, serious people. Although they are by no means all those who want to leave the Navy.

And why are they leaving?

Russian Foreign Ministry Aide on START-2 Prospects

*OW0503174392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1657 GMT 5 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The leaders of Russia and the United States may sign a new major treaty cutting down strategic offensive weapons. "So far there is no telling whether the document will be called START-2 or not, but both sides are working hard to reach a substantive agreement", a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official dealing directly with Russian-U.S. relations told IF [INTERFAX].

Reaching a compromise solution, he stressed, will depend on whether the two sides succeed in solving specific problems related to cutting Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles and U.S. submarine-based ballistic missiles.

The Foreign Ministry official said that these and other issues would be discussed by Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker during their meeting in Brussels on March 11. The meeting is supposed to lay ground for Boris Yeltsin's visit to the United States scheduled for mid-June when the new START treaty is expected to be signed.

Joint Venture With U.S. To Dismantle Submarines

*LD1603105892 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1314 GMT 15 Mar 92*

[From the "External Economic Relations" section]

[Text] Khabarovsk—Russia's far eastern-based Zvezda (Star) plant and US company AM International sign an agreement in Primorye Maritime Territory on March 14 to jointly dismantle Russian nuclear submarines.

Work to set up Stella, a Russian-American joint venture, began in the town of Bolshoiy Kremen (in Primorye territory). The JV [joint venture] would deal with the task of dismantling, utilizing, and deep processing of Russian nuclear submarines, in line with international accords on strategic offensive weapons' cuts. Some sources say that the project will use American technologies of plasma cutting for super-durable and tough materials, and of processing and utilizing high-alloy steel, which the submarines' hulls are made of.

Plans are made to register the Russian-American Stella JV at the Russian Finance Ministry this coming April. The joint venture's founders include the Zvezda far eastern ship-repairing plant, the Red Flag Pacific Fleet, and the US Company AM International. Stella's authorized capital is 15 million US dollars. The joint venture's profits will be split between the founders on a 50:50 basis, with the US share subsequently diminishing. The American side will begin shipping US equipment 30 days after the joint venture's registration.

In his interview for PF [POSTFACTUM], Yuriy Samoilov, who is on the joint venture's founders' council, disclosed that having a general knowledge of the Russian program for withdrawing Russian ships with special equipment from duty, which provides that no less than 6 nuclear-propelled ships be liquidated each year, they decided that with the stone-age dismantling technologies of the Russian military they will not be able to keep up such a high pace of dismantling, and that's why the need to attract Americans to this program emerged. According to Samoilov, the American side can also help free large industrial capacities at the Zvezda plant, which could be used to launch different production. Besides, the Americans can also cut labour expenses 6 times.

According to PF sources, close to the Pacific Fleet Command, all special equipment, activated areas, as well as all weapons on board the submarines, being dismantled, will be carved out by the military themselves, and will then be transported for burial, presumably, in Krasnoyarsk. PF sources also say that at present some 35 to 40 submarines, of the Mayak (Lighthouse), Akula (Shark), and other types, with 6 thousand ton displacement, are now ready for dismantling.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Expert Endorses Renunciation of ABM Treaty

OW0603155892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1531 GMT 6 Mar 92

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" (DP) feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] As Russia and the US may decide to unite their efforts in creating a common "nuclear umbrella", they should fully renounce the ABM treaty and replace it with a new bilateral agreement, Vice-President of the Russian Institute of National Security and Strategic Studies and participant in the START talks, Aleksandr Savelyev, told DP.

He believes that although Russia and the US have announced their adherence to the ABM treaty, they interpret it differently. The US administration believes that the Treaty bans exclusively "exotic" defence systems. "We insisted until recently that the treaty ban the development and testing of ABM systems and components, both traditional and exotic, except the stationary land-based ones.

In Aleksandr Savelyev's opinion, if Russia decides to work on any programme going beyond the limits of research jointly with the US, it will instantly violate the ABM Treaty in its own interpretation. The US will not.

Further developments may be as follows. First, the Russian leaders may choose to adjust Boris Yeltsin's and Andrey Kozyrev's statements, reducing the whole problem to our participation in "research programmes". A radical revision of the ABM Treaty towards softening its limitations would be a more radical step, Aleksandr Savelyev believes. This would allow both sides to deploy a strictly negotiated number of land- and space-based ABN components.

And yet, complete renunciation of the ABM Treaty and its replacement with a new Russian-American treaty would be the most radical and correct measure. Such a document might contain many parameters of the modernized ABM Treaty with the only essential difference that it would reflect a new level of relations between the two countries, Aleksandr Savelyev said in conclusion.

CIS 'Cannot' Defend Against Nuclear Strike

LD1503115692 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
0950 GMT 15 Mar 92

[From the "Military News" section: "CIS Army Cannot Withstand Nuclear Missile Strike"]

[Text] Moscow—CIS Air Defense (AD) and Anti-Missile Defense systems (AMD) are considerably lax and cannot withstand a nuclear missile strike, believes CIS JAF [Joint Armed Forces] General Staff commander.

In his March 14 meeting with journalists, CIS JAF General Staff Commander, Col.-Gen. Viktor Samsonov also revealed the fact that the single Air Defense and Anti-Missile Defense was non-existent in CIS, since no progress was achieved in this respect at the Minsk negotiations in strategic defense context. Besides both AD and AMD systems had undergone a considerable toll after the Baltic countries seceded from the former Union, and the southern borders had to be laid bare after repeated assaults committed in the Trans-Caucasian republics and aimed at AD and AMD armed formation units.

Samsonov also pointed out the practical current impossibility of delivering a so-called strike of retaliation.

Velikhov, Kokoshin on Joint SDI Idea

MK1803134592 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 12, 22 Mar 92 (Signed to Press
17 Mar 92) p 12

[Interview with Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Andrey Kokoshin, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, by correspondent Nikolay Khorunzhiy; place, date not given: "Space Shield: 'Made in Russia and USA'"]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin's proposal in his UN speech that Russia and the United States jointly create a global system of space defenses came as rather a surprise and prompted a polemic. Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Andrey Kokoshin, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, discuss this plan in conversation with MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent Nikolay Khorunzhiy.

[Khorunzhiy] In the Western press you encounter talk of the Russian president's foreign policy improvisations. Did B. Yeltsin consult with anybody before putting forward this initiative?

[Kokoshin] The idea of joint strategic defenses has long been in the air. Yeltsin's statement was motivated by political considerations. It demonstrates our new attitude toward the United States and, in my view, is a declaration of intent, rather than a call to sign a treaty in the immediate future. He put forward a concept on which there is still a lot of work to be done.

[Velikhov] The president has already met three times with Russian scientists and this question was among those discussed, including with me.

[Khorunzhiy] Are there in Russia opponents to joining the American system of ABM defenses?

[Velikhov] There are practically none among either designers or the military. The critics of this proposal in both Russia and the United States are, rather, maniacs obsessed with old ideas and they have no influence.

[Kokoshin] The opponents of joint ABM defenses are those who believe that this venture is too expensive and that it is unnecessary, since there is no real threat or the threat is minimal, and also those who believe our relations with the United States have not reached a level where we can cooperate frankly and in earnest. And we must cooperate the way all developed countries do, without revealing valuable commercial secrets to others. Our Russian nature rushes from one extreme to the other. After decades of mistrust we are now in such a state of euphoria that we seem to be ready to hand over anything.

[Khorunzhiy] A U.S. submarine tracks a submarine of ours in Russia's territorial waters. We learn of a Pentagon plan, albeit a hypothetical one, for waging war against Russia. Would not joint military research projects [razrabotki] go against Russia's national interests?

[Kokoshin] On each occasion we must carefully assess those interests and seek solutions where our interests coincide with those of the United States. Today there is a danger that Russian military researchers will be dragged off by certain elements all over the world, including representatives of a number of "Third World" countries. I think it would be more advantageous to organize cooperation with the United States and the EC on a number of major strategic defense programs than to allow everything to drift. It is better for this process to proceed under the democratic control of state organs, via the budget and parliamentary checks and via a civilian Defense Ministry, than for it to proceed spontaneously—through deals between defense complex enterprises and foreign firms. If the program for cooperation in creating strategic defenses is based on realistic, moderate aims and is competently fitted into the structure of our national security and into Russia's security policy, which as yet does not exist, it will yield dividends for us.

[Velikhov] Confrontation still exists between the United States in the form of metal, military hardware, and old instructions, but there is no longer any political confrontation, any confrontation of concepts. Today we must switch from nonconfrontational concepts to joint action to strengthen security. Of course, before this we should considerably "cleanse" our military potentials, reduce them to a minimum, and then create joint defenses and a security strategy.

Before, in conditions of counterforce nuclear confrontation, SDI would merely have worsened the situation. It would have been unable to intercept all the opposing superpower's missiles, but it would have provoked it to increase the number of them in order to guarantee breaking through the defenses. Today the world community needs to be made safe not from the superpowers, which are reducing their armaments, incidentally, but from any underdeveloped adventurist aggressor. An ABM system designed for this purpose can be much more modest than that contemplated by the Americans

five or six years ago. In this case joint military research projects with the Americans would accord with Russia's national interests.

[Khorunzhiy] Some people believe that we need joint Russian-American ABM defenses in order to retain the asset of the potential of our scientists and workers in the military-industrial complex.

[Velikhov] It would be strange to use a guillotine in order to ensure that it does not rust and the executioner does not lose his skills. The aims of joint ABM defenses are different.

[Kokoshin] I repeat, Yeltsin's statement was dictated primarily by political considerations. But now all Russian leaders of the defense industry are saying: Give us a military doctrine, tell us what we should keep in military production and what we should convert and privatize. Military orders are unprofitable, but military plants are prepared to fulfill them if they can be confident that these orders will not be canceled in three months' time. If we get an ideology of national interest and our own military policy, we will be able to carry out the conversion of the military-industrial complex more painlessly within the framework of programs like SDI.

[Khorunzhiy] What can we offer the Americans to interest them in our participation?

[Velikhov] First, our S-300 system, which is analogous to the U.S. "Patriot" antimissile complex, has evoked interest in the weapons market. Second, we have considerably improved the sole ABM system permitted by the ABM Treaty, which surrounds Moscow and is disrespectfully known as the "galosh." Third, we could offer to use "Energiya," the world's most powerful rocket, which is currently standing idle, in order to place a large number of satellites in orbit.

[Kokoshin] We have a whole series of research projects where we are at least at the same level as the Americans, and in some respects even at a higher level. Moreover, our geographical situation in itself makes it possible to create a unified ring for very reliably tracking the situation in most of the Northern Hemisphere.

The war in the Persian Gulf showed that the air defense systems used there were not perfect. The Soviet S-300 system has not been tested in combat conditions. Improved air defense systems would be used to provide defenses against tactical missiles with a range of up to 500 km. But a different quality of defenses will be required to intercept intermediate- and longer-range ballistic missiles. These missiles can carry a large number of dummy warheads and other means of breaking through defenses. We can start cooperating with the United States right now in the sphere of creating a Joint Space Monitoring System and a Missile Early Warning System.

[Khorunzhiy] Won't the interests of those countries that take no part in creating ABM defenses be damaged?

[Velikhov] All countries that can bring anything valuable to the project must be involved in creating ABM defenses, for instance, West Europe and Japan. Of course, they would all be able to enjoy the "common shield."

[Kokoshin] I too believe that a strategic defense system cannot be created without Europe and Japan. Who will receive the strategic shield and who will not? That is a tricky political task, although all participants in creating the "shield" would not necessarily have to have missiles. The participation of the CIS countries in such a system is a difficult question. This is an area for the subtlest, most meticulous work by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

[Khorunzhiy] Would not the creation of limited ABM defenses cause a new round of the arms race?

[Velikhov] The ABM system must be developed in such a way as to secure political stability on the one hand, and as not to provoke an arms race on the other. For instance, we reaffirm that nuclear weapons must not be used, but we also retain them, because we can deter potential aggressors. ABM defenses too can deter countries that immediately become superpowers, as it were, by creating a limited number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

[Kokoshin] Such a danger exists, but we should begin not with the stationing of weapons but with the creation of an early warning system. Moreover, the 1972 treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile defenses (ABM-1) limits the arms race in this sphere. Although ABM-1 is a product of the "cold war," I would not say that its days are numbered. Cooperation with the United States can be developed in the sphere of ABM defenses without touching ABM-1.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

More on Lithuanian Complaints on Pace of Soviet Pullout

Spokesman: 'Nothing Comforting'

*LD0103031892 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 25 Feb 92*

[Interview with Audrius Azubalis, press attache of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, with unidentified studio correspondent on 25 February—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Correspondent] One of the most urgent problems continuing to agitate Lithuanian society is the withdrawal of the former USSR troops from its territory. This was mentioned today at a briefing conducted by the press attache of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Audrius Azubalis. What is new today?

[Azubalis] There is nothing comforting. First, the military has created such a propaganda hue and cry that, allegedly, they were withdrawing a small detachment of troops of anti-aircraft defense. Later we heard only from

the Baltic News Service, but not from the military, that it, allegedly, had decided not to withdraw for the time being and only to redeploy this small group of anti-aircraft defense nearer to Vilnius. And if they start withdrawing, then only, maybe, at the beginning of March. Thus, there is every indication that the Russian side is so far not implementing our latest agreement concluded at the last meeting of the state delegations of Russia and Lithuania in Vilnius.

[Correspondent] Does the Lithuanian side have more precise information?

[Azubalis] Today, Minister of National Defense Butkevicius is meeting the military and, probably, something will be elucidated. But I wish to stress once again that we do not see any important steps by the troops of the former Soviet Union on their withdrawal.

[Correspondent] Could you tell something about the border service and what is the news from Klaipeda?

[Azubalis] Audrius Butkevicius, minister of national defense, reported today that our border services had already taken over the Mukran international ferry, and they had been receiving the coming vessels. Former Soviet border guards are not interfering, but, in spite of this, they still occupy the control building of the post in Klaipeda and do not intend to leave. It is true, our border guards are there, too. They are not leaving either, together with the head of the border service, Mr. Stancikas, who, according to our information, announced a hunger strike. I think that all this will be solved in the nearest future. Thus, there are no important misunderstandings with the border guards. It is most important to us that the Russian side begins to implement the agreement concluded by the delegations headed by Mr. Shakhrai and Mr. Stankevicius. [passage omitted]

Military Base Not Handed Over

*LD0603063392 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1500 GMT 3 Mar 92*

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Today 103 officers and soldiers left, but at least 35,000 former Soviet and now Russian soldiers are still in Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Northwestern Army Group, met with Minister of National Defense Audrius Butkevicius. [passage omitted]

Minister Butkevicius told a BALTIC NEWS SERVICE correspondent that his talk with Gen. Valeriy Mironov concerned mostly the handing over to Lithuania of the Mickunai military base. So far the territory of this military townlet is guarded by soldiers. According to our minister, after some misunderstandings, especially on property matters, the act of handing over the military base was not signed. Therefore, Lithuania does not regard the withdrawal of the army from the territory of Lithuania to have started, said Audrius Butkevicius.

Further Reports on CIS-Latvian Troop Withdrawal Talks**NWGF Spokesman Claims Accord Adherence***OW0503192892 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1819 GMT 5 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Colonel Golin, the spokesman of the North-Western Military Group [NWGF], told BF [BALTFAX] that the Russian troops were abiding by the agreement on the troop pullout entered into on February 1 by Riga and Moscow. In accordance with the agreement, the Russian side promised not to increase the number of troops deployed in the republic.

Colonel Golin said that any reports about conscripts and soldiers being sent to Latvia were groundless. Servicemen may only be moved across the Latvian territory from one unit to another, he said.

The Latvian defense ministry said earlier that conscripts from Russia and the other CIS countries were being sent to Latvia.

Withdrawal Talks End*LD0603231292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 6 Mar 92*

[Text] Talks in Moscow between government and parliamentary groups from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Latvia concerning Russian troops in Latvia, have ended. Latvia proposes completing the process of withdrawing troops of the Baltic military district by the fall of 1993. The Russian leadership's position on this issue is not yet clear; neither is the fate of army property. Russia is claiming it all; Latvia agrees only to part with weapons and military equipment.

Additional Troops Denied*LD0703185492 Riga Radio Riga International
in Latvian 2030 GMT 6 Mar 92*

[Text] The leadership of Russia's northwestern group of Armed Forces denies reports that troops stationed in Latvia were recently supplemented with men called up for military service. We remind that the Latvian Defense Ministry reported this, reproaching the Russian side for not adhering to agreements on the Army's withdrawal from Latvia. Command representatives say that soldiers can only move from one unit to another within Latvia.

Withdrawal To Begin With Communications Unit*LD0903191292 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1517 GMT 7 Mar 92*

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Riga—According to some sources, on March 10-20 a military communication unit stationed in

Salatsgriv will be among the first units to leave Latvia. Competent sources informed PF [POSTFACTUM] that the final date of withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the Baltic territory is not yet clear, but it is not likely that it will happen before 1994, when the troops from East Germany will be withdrawn completely.

Further Report*OW1103135992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1305
GMT 11 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Soviet military unit No. 68461 stationed in the Latvian village of Salatsgriva will be the first to withdraw from Latvia March 19, 1992, as Commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces Colonel-General Valery Mironov notified Chairman of the Latvian parliament Anatolijs Gorbunovs in a letter March 10. General Mironov pointed out that the unit will be pulled out in compliance with an agreement between the Latvian and Russian governments, under which the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Latvia should start in March of 1992.

Mironov invited Gorbunovs to attend the send-off ceremony March 19.

A Latvian inspection commission on taking control of military facilities and territory is working today in the Salatsgriva military station.

Talks Reopen*LD1803000392 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1830 GMT 17 Mar 92*

[Text] A regular round of talks between Latvian and Russian military and foreign policy experts began today in Ligatne in accordance with the previously reached agreement. This meeting aims to draft an interstate agreement on the army's withdrawal from Latvia and to coordinate the troops' withdrawal dates. Deputy Defense Minister Dainis Turlajs and Eriks Tilders, the government's counsellor on defense questions, are leading the Latvian delegation, while Sergey Zotov, the first deputy head of the Russian Foreign Ministry administration and ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, is leading the Russian delegation.

Belarusan Military District To Reduce Scale of Exercises*LD1103212792 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarussian 1300 GMT 11 Mar 92*

[Text] The editorial office received the following report from the press center of the Belarussian Military District [BMD]:

Military exercises are continuing in the military units of the district. Regiments' tactical exercises are now taking

place at testing grounds and in training centers. Questions of control in the headquarters structures are being inculcated.

The headquarters of the BMD, with the purpose of amplifying the tasks, made the decision to reduce the scale of the exercises because of the need to save material and financial resources. It was recommended that the automated control system resources be used more widely and that the movement of troops on the territory of the republic be restricted during the organizing of the military exercises.

Report On Tank Dismantling, Recycling

924P0100A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 13 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Alim Lysyuk: "Conversion: You Can't Smash Your Head Through This Armor"]

[Text] Lvov—How can a tank be deprived of its combat capabilities? By dropping it into the Marianas Trench? By cutting it in two? It may be strange that Colonel Aleksandr Sharapov, chief of the Lvov Tank Repair Plant and an expert in his field, agrees with an uninitiated journalist. It would be simpler and cheaper to do that. But, he adds, there is the Vienna conventional arms treaty, signed in 1989. That treaty specifies the method to be used in eliminating armored equipment. Under that method, a tank cannot be simply "cut in two"; its armored body has to be cut in a special configuration, and only then can it be declared scrap. The longer the perimeter along which the cutting torch has to be passed, the more public money is burned up in its flame. Foreign experts were mindful of that fact, and ours consented.

Now there's no arguing with the Vienna accords. There remains only to implement the treaty. To this end, an armored equipment elimination and recycling shop has been set up at the Lvov Tank Repair Plant. The armored vehicle is first "undressed"—its engine, transmission, manifold, and radiator are removed—and then it is cut up "in the configuration." Over the 40 months set aside for elimination, the plant will have to turn into scrap some 2,000 tanks that are to arrive here from the countries of the former Warsaw Treaty and the CIS.

Three hundred tanks are already awaiting their end. The shop is ready to go to work. All the preparations have been made to receive foreign inspection groups—work places, a hotel complex, a cafeteria. Everybody is waiting for Ukraine to ratify the Vienna treaty, which is expected to take place at the March meeting of CIS chiefs of state.

Soon Ukraine will get the world's best scrap metal for its open-hearth furnaces. But it could get more. For example, the Energiya [Energy] space firm is prepared to buy from the plant today 100 GTU-1-05 tow tractors manufactured from the T-55 tank. That powerful machine is in great demand, with no end to potential buyers. The plant could produce any number of the tow tractors, but the Vienna treaty is making itself felt: It

allows only 5.7 percent of the aforementioned 2,000 tanks to be utilized for peaceful purposes. The treaty is more valuable than money.

Troops Abroad Under Russian Jurisdiction

Forces in Germany, Poland, Mongolia, Cuba

LD1603095192 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0715 GMT 16 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Osinskiy]

[Excerpt] Berlin, 16 Mar (TASS)—In accordance with a decree by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the Western Group of Forces (WGF), as well as troops temporarily stationed in Poland, Mongolia, and Cuba, have been transferred to the jurisdiction of Russia. They will continue, however, to be subordinate to the CIS Armed Forces commander in chief until the Russian Defense Ministry is established. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was told this at WGF headquarters. [passage omitted]

More on WGF Status

LD1503195592 Berlin ADN in German 1337 GMT
15 Mar 92

[Text] Angermuende (ADN)—The Western Group of Forces [WGF] of the former Soviet Union stationed in Germany is now under the command of Russia. This was confirmed on 15 March by Major General Vyacheslav Krivulin, vice president of a Russian conversion company dealing with the housing construction for returning army members. A relevant decree issued by Yeltsin on 4 March was handed over on 12 March to the Supreme Command in Wuensdorf by a representative of the Russian State Committee for Defense. At the same time the Bundeswehr liaison command with the Western Group has been informed about the step, Krivulin said at a press briefing held on the premises of Messrs. Buck, a German technology firm from Pinnow near Angermuende.

Krivulin assumed that Yeltsin has coordinated the Russian decision with the other CIS states. Up to 20 March, the date of the next meeting of CIS presidents, the Western Group troops will still be officially under the command of CIS Defense Minister Shaposhnikov. However, the leadership change has already in fact taken place since Russia has taken over the financial obligations. The Western Group has "noted positively" the Russian decision, Krivulin said. Furthermore, the German side has not raised any fundamental reservations.

Baltic Leaders Discuss Troops, USSR Debt

OW1703143592 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1351 GMT 17 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpts] The process of talks between Russia and the Baltic states on the withdrawal of troops under its

jurisdiction is unsatisfactory, said the Baltic Council in a statement adopted on Monday [16 March] in Jurmala at a session attended by the heads of the parliaments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia: Vytautas Landsbergis, Anatolijs Gorbunovs and Arnold Ruutel.

According to the statement on troops withdrawal, this poses a threat to the sovereignty of Baltic states. The Baltic countries' demand made on October 20 that Soviet troops be withdrawn from the capitals of the three republics at once remains ignored. The troops continue to behave as invaders. They fail to respect the sovereignty and legislation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Troop movements are conducted without coordination with the governments of the 3 states. The troops continue to do harm to the local environment. The Baltic Council also finds it objectionable that the border troops of the former USSR continue to be deployed on the sovereign territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, preventing their own forces from guarding their frontiers. Besides, the Baltic states insist that compensations should be paid to them for the property of their armies seized in 1940, along with compensations for other damage inflicted by the presence of the Soviet army in the Baltic region.

The document will be forwarded to the presidents of the former Soviet republics with the request to consider it at the CIS summit to be held in Kiev on Friday [20 March]. [passage omitted]

At their summit the leaders of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia also adopted a statement which calls for proclaiming the Baltic Sea area a zone free from nuclear weapons.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Disquiet at Report of Plans To Resume Novaya Zemlya Tests

PM1803132392 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 14 Mar 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from Arkhangelsk by V. Loyter and Yu. Bulinskiy, identified by caption]

[Text] [Loyter] This is Novaya Zemlya, the precious land of the Nenets coastal dwellers. For the last 30 years or more it has been closed to outside eyes. The military-industrial complex kept its secrets for many years. The people of Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, and the Komi republic heaved a sigh of relief when Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin last year announced a moratorium, yet once again Novaya Zemlya has become the subject of alarm for the indigenous inhabitants. The president signed a decree 27 February this year transferring the Novaya Zemlya testing range to federal ownership.

[A. Krimuns, identified by caption] An incorrect, incomplete report caused particular disquiet among the

oblast's residents—a report that more tests were to start on Novaya Zemlya. But the decree talks not about starting tests, but about the possibility of tests if it becomes necessary to suspend the moratorium announced by the Russian president. I am in no doubt that the program which the government has been tasked with studying will make provision for protection measures for people and for the environment.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Urals Chemical Explosion Rumors 'Exaggerated'

PM1003155192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Chemical Weapons Did Not Explode in Russia"]

[Text] On 9 March CNN-TV broadcast a report on a chemical weapons explosion in the Urals and said that 17 people were injured in the explosion.

IZVESTIYA's correspondent tried to clarify the causes of the accident and its consequences. Major General Yuriy Koryakin, deputy chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Chemical Troops, stated:

"There has been no chemical weapons explosion here and there have not been any in the past, especially in the Urals, where there are no chemical weapons stores. All chemical weapons at our disposal are stored in the most reliable conditions."

The Russian Civil Defense Staff explained the situation:

"Yes, there was an accident 6 March in the main pipeline at the Solikamsk magnesium combine. Up to 200 kg of chlorine were ejected into the air. The source was located by the combine's civil defense detachment the same day. No one was killed; three people were injured but their lives are not in danger."

So the rumors about the chemical weapons explosion turned out to be somewhat exaggerated.

CBW Committee Chariman on Elimination Problems

OW1903151692 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1417 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian president's newly-formed committee for the problems of chemical and biological weapons [CBW] plans to send to the republican Supreme Soviet a new program for the elimination of chemical weapons [CW] that will be based on ecologically-benign and economic technology and provide for a safety net for the population in the regions where these weapons are scrapped and to the personnel involved in the work, said

committee chairman Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kuntsevich in an exclusive interview with IF [INTER-FAX]. Today, said Kuntsevich, there are three major problems en route to the elimination of chemical weapons. No. 1 is the personnel problem as the threat of a brain drain among chemical weapons experts is far higher than among nuclear weapons makers. No. 2 is the inadequate funding of R&D in chemical weapons elimination. To keep the chemical weapons elimination program on track, said Kuntsevich, 1.5 to 2 billion rubles is required for R&D alone in today's prices. Problem No. 3 is the difficulty of agreeing on the chemical weapons elimination effort with local authorities and the public, said Kuntsevich.

Technology for Lewisite Elimination, Recycling

924P0108A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Mar 92
Morning Edition p 8

[Article by Aleksandr Mineyev: "A Toxic Substance May Be Useful"]

[Text] Specialists have developed a new technology for obtaining pure arsenic out of the toxic substance Lewisite, which is used as one of the components in chemical weapons. Arsenic, in addition to being what was used to poison the exiled Napoleon Bonaparte on the island of St. Helena, is widely known as the electronics material of the 21st century. Its compound, gallium arsenic, is now replacing silicon semiconductors.

Under the 1 June 1990 Soviet-American agreement on reducing the military chemical potential of the sides, the two superpowers pledged themselves to destroy this type of mass destruction weapon. The obligations were ratified and defined by the United States and Russia.

Eliminating stores of chemical weapons, which according to Boris Yeltsin are entirely concentrated on the territory of Russia, would cost, as certain Western experts believe, roughly 20 billion dollars. According to the calculations of our military experts, the destruction of chemical weapons may cost 26 billion rubles in this year's prices. There is no money to do that. But even if we had the capital and technology, it would be extremely difficult to obtain the population's consent to build installations to destroy toxic substances.

There are, however, new features in our life which allow us to view the task with optimism. The executive president of the Russian-American University (RAU), Andrey Zhukov, showed me an ampule of arsenic obtained from Lewisite from the military storage facility in Udmurtia. A specialist in the problems of disarmament and doctor of historical sciences, he himself was the initiator of the project to destroy Lewisite. And RAU, an independent nongovernmental organization, has found scientists and industrial workers who are able to devise and introduce the technology to utilize it. They partially financed this work themselves. In September gallium arsenic was obtained at an experimental unit.

According to A. Zhukov, their technology is ecologically clean and allows the metal to be extracted immediately in one step. All the other components obtained as a result of the reaction are absolutely harmless.

Other technologies known nowadays are either ecologically dangerous or take many steps: although disarmament tasks are being performed, a useful product does not result.

The unit created under the organizational efforts of the RAU is compact and mobile: the poison is reprocessed locally. And the most important thing is that this is a commercial project: the technology exists and there are people who can do it. But the state must simply make the toxic substance storage facility accessible to them, along with giving political and moral support. And then just collect the taxes.

Future use in the production of semiconductors would make it possible to sell the reserves in the sphere of electronics and enter the world market. It was proposed that the local Udmurt authorities also participate in the project; the basic reserves of Lewisite are located there in a storage facility in the settlement of Kambarka.

The United States plans, by the year 2000, to increase allocations for developing the latest technologies using gallium arsenic by a factor of 15. In our country its production is being delayed because of a lack of highly pure arsenic. The metal used to be supplied for the most part from the Rachinskiy Mining-Metallurgy Combine in Georgia. The mine was destroyed by an earthquake and deliveries to Russia have virtually ceased. On the world market a kilogram of pure semiconductor arsenic costs several thousand dollars. The total reserves of Lewisite are roughly 6,700 tonnes containing 30 percent arsenic. This is a significant part of the Russian arsenal of toxic substances, which according to official data totals 40,000 tonnes. The lost deposit in Georgia and the storage facility in Udmurtia are comparable in terms of quantity of material, and the storage facility is even richer.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Nuclear Talks on Korean Peninsula Discussed

SK1003121792 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1000 GMT 9 Mar 92

["Talk" by station commentator Viktor Valentinov on inter-Korean contacts on the nuclear issue from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The North and South delegates are expected to meet for the sixth round of contacts to be held in Panmunjom on 10 March to discuss the nuclear safeguards issue. No success has been assured in the five rounds of prior talks. The two sides have failed to reach

any agreement. Our station commentator, Viktor Valentinov, writes on this issue as follows:

The North and the South agreed on this issue in principle, but differences of opinion continue over the technical matters.

The North and the South this year signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. These documents were soon ratified and began to go into effect. Based on this, the inter-Korean dialogue was expected to proceed very smoothly. However, though the historically significant agreement was made, the distrust between the North and the South was not eliminated. This distrust, which has continued for half a century, may not be dissolved overnight.

The issue of nuclear inspection, which is to be discussed at Panmunjom, will be for the realization of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This inspection is designed to ensure that nuclear development is intended solely for peaceful purposes. Therefore, simultaneous inspection of the nuclear facilities of the North and the South has been proposed.

Pyongyang wants to verify that Seoul has completely eliminated U.S. nuclear weapons from the South, and Seoul wants to obtain accurate data of the DPRK nuclear facilities from nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

Some Western media even claim that the North has already developed nuclear weapons. Pyongyang denies this report, and Seoul demands that this denial be proven.

This mutual distrust makes the talks difficult. Each country wants to display its good intentions on its own with unimpaired honor and without being forced. However, the two sides seem to be attempting to put pressure on each other. It seems that the South is applying more pressure, which inspires confrontation, than the North is.

Seoul, following the United States, demands that the North subject its nuclear facilities to international inspection no later than 18 March. The North in response says that the nuclear safeguards agreement signed with the IAEA will not be ratified by the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly [SPA] until 10 April. Since Pyongyang has set this schedule, it will not change it. However, Seoul complains about this. The U.S. media, in the meantime, are spreading the report that the North is delaying the inspection of its facilities to develop its nuclear weapons by this summer. Seoul, as if convinced by this report, insists on the deadline of 18 March like an ultimatum. The North warns that if this pressure continues, talks will be even more difficult.

In the meantime, Seoul and Washington are raising their threatening tone even more. With this mutual distrust

and disregarding the other party's will, the talks could be disrupted completely. Who will benefit from this?

NAVAL ARMS LIMITATIONS

Navy's Arms Cuts Center Chief Interviewed

*PM1803123792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 3*

[Interview with Captain First Rank Vyacheslav Apanasenko, chief of the Navy Main Staff Center for Ensuring the Implementation of Treaties on the Reduction of the Armaments of the Navy, by Vyacheslav Kocherov; place, date not given; followed by IZVESTIYA's "For the Record" commentary: "Sailors Begin Disarming"]

[Text] The Center for Ensuring the Implementation of Treaties on the Reduction of the Armaments of the Navy has been created at the Navy Main Staff. Why is it needed and what will it do? Captain First Class Vyacheslav Apanasenko, the center's chief, now talks about this with our correspondent.

[Apanasenko] The Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in 1990, a treaty which unilaterally includes our Navy's coastal forces and marines, while work on the preparation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Forces has entered the final stage. The treaty covers large areas of naval armaments: Submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's] and launchers (in fact, missile-carrying submarines as a whole), sea-launched long-range cruise missiles, and individual aviation armaments and delivery vehicles. The relevant subunits were required to implement these tasks. That is how our center came into being.

In addition to control functions, it is also tasked with a whole range of work to implement the most important documents—the 1990 Vienna document, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons. That requires the preparation of over 80 naval installations covered by the aforementioned treaties, backup for foreign inspections at those installations, and our representatives' participation in inspection activity abroad.

Furthermore, the center performs tasks in reducing a large quantity of equipment and arms: several dozen missile-carrying submarines, over 1,500 SLBM's, around 600 Navy combat aircraft, and over 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles and antisubmarine torpedoes.

[Kocherov] How many people are involved in resolving these tasks, and will it not require a new structure of additional costs?

[Apanasenko] The center's subunits were formed within the framework of the existing staffs. It is not a large collective, just a few dozen people. The volume of work is substantial. For example, merely taking stock of the

equipment and arms covered by the treaties is measured in five- and six-digit numbers, and so is the total cost to be allocated to the elaboration of the technology for the scrapping of individual types of armaments. The implementation of the START treaty as a whole will cost several billion rubles. But if the question of finance is not resolved before ratification begins, our country will not be able to meet its international commitments.

For information's sake I shall give you the following figures: The U.S. Congressional Budget Office has noted that yearly spending connected with implementing the START Treaty is at least \$300 million, while total spending will exceed \$2 billion. This is despite the fact that the United States is in practice not destroying a single one of its existing strategic offensive arms systems. That is why the Memorandum of Accord for their part did not specify a single SLBM installation to be scrapped.

[Kocherov] Why was that?

[Apanasenkov] The Americans intend to use all obsolete SLBM's and their components as booster systems and for launching commercial facilities. For that reason they have retained their so-called launchers in undefended positions.

[Kocherov] What is preventing us from using our systems in this way?

[Apanasenkov] The COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] regulations and a number of other restrictions whose retention the United States still insists on. According to those regulations, other countries may not launch their facilities into space or the upper layers of the atmosphere with the help of our SLBM's.

[Kocherov] But that is patently unfair.

[Apanasenkov] I agree with you entirely. I think that a revision of the restrictions and COCOM regulations would also significantly ease and possibly even accelerate the process of scrapping nuclear weapons.

For the Record

Russia's submarine-launched strategic missile bases are: Northern Fleet: Nerpichya (six Typhoon class nuclear submarines, 120 RSM-52 ballistic missiles), Yagelnaya (six Navaga class nuclear submarines, 96 RSM-25 SLBM's, 4 Murena M class nuclear submarines, 64 RSM-40 SLBM's; one Navaga M class nuclear submarine, 12 RSM-45 SLBM's; three Kalmar class nuclear submarines, 48 RSM-50 SLBM's), Olenya (two Kalmar class nuclear submarines, 32 RSM-50 SLBM's; seven Delfin class nuclear submarines, and 112 RSM-54 SLBM's), Ostrovnoy (nine Murena M class nuclear submarines and 108 RSM-40 SLBM's).

Pacific Ocean Fleet: Rybachiy (three Navaga class nuclear submarines, 48 RSM-25 SLBM's; three Murena M class nuclear submarines and 36 RSM-40 SLBM's;

nine Kalmar class nuclear submarines, 144 RSM-50 SLBM's); Pavlovskoye (three Navaga class nuclear submarines, 48 RSM-25 SLBM's, six Murena class nuclear submarines, and 72 RSM-40 SLBM's).

In all there are 62 strategic nuclear submarines and 940 deployed ballistic missiles with 2,804 nuclear warheads.

The U.S. strategic missile submarine bases are: Charleston, South Carolina (12 Lafayette, James Madison, and Benjamin Franklin class nuclear submarines and 192 Poseidon class SLBM's; 12 Lafayette, James Madison, and Benjamin Franklin class nuclear submarines and 192 Trident 1 SLBM's), Kings Bay, Georgia, (four Ohio class nuclear submarines, 96 Trident 2 SLBM's), Silverdale, Washington State (eight Ohio class nuclear submarines and 192 Trident 1 SLBM's).

In all there are 36 nuclear submarines and 672 ballistic missiles with 5,760 nuclear warheads.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Ukrainian President Suspends Removal of Nuclear Weapons

*LD1203182992 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1808 GMT 12 Mar 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Aleksey Petrunya]

[Excerpt] Kiev, 12 Mar (TASS)—While not changing the overall policy that Ukraine is seeking to become a nuclear-free, nonaligned power, we are making alterations to its implementation. A decision has been made to suspend the removal of tactical nuclear weapons. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk made this statement at a news conference in Kiev today. Explaining this stance, he commented: There are powerful nuclear forces on the territory of the republic, and Ukraine bears an extremely high responsibility for their fate. Because of the political instability and confusion that have developed, Kravchuk noted, we cannot be certain that the missiles being sent away by us are being destroyed and not falling into unfriendly hands. We are in favor of the process of removal and destruction of nuclear weapons being placed under international control, the president stressed.

Leonid Kravchuk stated that Ukraine considers the capacity of the nuclear arsenal destruction works located in Russia inadequate. Therefore, in the president's opinion, Ukraine has the right to have an equivalent enterprise on its own territory. It will most probably be located in the Chernobyl zone. This enterprise could also undertake the processing of waste from Ukraine's nuclear power stations, since Russia is now refusing to make its territory available for these purposes, he said.

Ukraine has requested a number of countries to assist in setting up an international nuclear center on its territory. [passage omitted]

Plans Elimination Facility

*LD1203214192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 12 Mar 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Next week may become very important for the future of the CIS. The next meeting of the heads of the republics will take place on 20 March. But now, many of them already are indicating what their position will be. Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukrainian president, replied to journalists' questions in Kiev today.

[Correspondent V. Lyaskalo] The latest news conference by Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk was essentially a news conference to take stock. After all, he has been a president for 100 days now. What are the main tasks facing the president of Ukraine today? This was the first question. The tasks are as before, life itself has set them, Leonid Kravchuk noted: building an independent, democratic law-governed state; strengthening its economic base; ensuring the observance of all human rights in Ukraine.

Replying to a question about the progress of nuclear disarmament, President Kravchuk came out with this piece of news: In order to speed up this process, Ukraine has decided to build a works for the destruction of nuclear weapons on its own territory. In the future the problem of processing waste materials from nuclear power stations will have to be resolved. There are also plans to set up an international nuclear center in which it would be possible to use the intellectual scientific potential that is now working for the military-industrial complex.

More on Ukraine Halting Removal of Nuclear Arms

Nuclear Center Proposed

*PM1303215592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 1, 2*

[Sergey Tsikora report: "President Kravchuk Suspends Removal of Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Ukraine"]

[Text] This sensational news was announced to journalists by President of the Republic L. Kravchuk at a news conference held 12 March—on the eve of L. Kravchuk's 100 days in the post of president.

IZVESTIYA reported earlier that during a meeting with representatives of the U.S. Congress, the Ukrainian president said that he is not confident that the nuclear weapons which are being taken out of the republic are being destroyed. At the news conference he elaborated

on his statement. L. Kravchuk said that he gave the order to suspend the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Ukraine until reliable guarantees of their subsequent destruction can be obtained.

At the moment none of the CIS countries can furnish such guarantees, the president emphasized. Russia lacks the facilities for dismantling and mass destruction of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic ones. Therefore we are having to introduce corrections in our concept. Without changing its strategic goals of becoming a non-bloc, nuclear-free, and in the longer term neutral republic, Ukraine believes that the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory and their destruction should be carried out under international supervision. We have addressed this request to West European states and the United States, L. Kravchuk went on.

The absence in Commonwealth countries of a modern enterprise for the destruction of nuclear weapons gives Ukraine the moral right to have such a plant in its own republic. All classes of nuclear missiles will be destroyed here, and also waste from nuclear power stations which specialized enterprises in Russia are refusing to accept for processing. Such a plant could be built in the area of the notorious Chernobyl zone. The entire world community will help us to built it, L. Kravchuk emphasized.

The president also announced another correction to Ukraine's strategic plans. In view of the fact that hundreds of military-industrial complex enterprises are located in Ukraine, the republic leadership is putting forward the idea of opening an international nuclear center here. It will gather military technology specialists under its roof. In the president's view, the opening of such a center will forestall the exodus of physicists, chemists, and biologists who were working for the army to countries with undemocratic regimes. The new institute will also help to organize conversion.

The Ukrainian president's answers to journalists' questions led to the impression that the Commonwealth is going through hard times. Most of the interstate treaties are not operating. While signing them, the young independent states constantly have to look over their shoulder and think about backup schemes to ensure the viability of their republics.

It appears that Ukrainian specialists are also working on such a project. The republic president revealed that the aim of this scheme is to guarantee the preservation of Ukraine's independence in all kinds of emergency situations, and primarily during an economic blockade and technological catastrophes. Scientists have been set the task of identifying regions where alternative output is being produced. At the same time a list of enterprises in the Ukraine is being drawn up whose technology would make it possible to quickly organize the production of the scarce goods. According to L. Kravchuk, the project will be ready in four to five days, that is before the meeting of the CIS heads of state in Kiev.

Much time at the news conference was devoted to the Crimean problem.

We are prepared to discuss any questions with the leadership of that republic on the one condition that Crimea remains part of the Ukraine, L. Kravchuk stressed. All other options mean changing Ukraine's borders, carving up its territory... Our position remains unchanged—we are in favor of granting the Crimea the broadest possible powers—economic, cultural, language, and social powers. I have signed a decree on granting Sevastopol the status of a republic city. However, no democratic state can agree to the establishment of a power within a power.

L. Kravchuk described the forces which have raised the question of Crimea's withdrawal from the Ukraine as "hostile to the peoples of the Crimea." If Crimea's intelligentsia and its democratic forces fail to understand this, history will give them a harsh assessment.

I will talk to the Crimeans until I have managed to convince them that Crimea's separation from the Ukraine would be no good for anyone, L. Kravchuk declared. Run your own land, if you like. We will adopt a law on the division of powers and we will strictly adhere to its clauses. Virtually all the provisions of this document have already been agreed on, only four controversial points remain to be finalized...

Your correspondent asked the Ukrainian president for his opinion in respect of the attempt of a number of former deputies of the former USSR Supreme Soviet to hold an extraordinary congress. L. Kravchuk said that any actions to recreate structures of the former Union were unlawful. All the republics of the former Union have declared its demise. Therefore even if USSR deputies gather and adopt some kind of resolutions, these will have no legal or political force in respect of anyone. From the common sense viewpoint, these initiatives will merely make people laugh. I see behind the attempt to convene a congress of old structures wanting to draw attention to themselves and to return to power. Therefore I regard the decision made by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium a few days ago as correct, the Ukrainian president stressed.

At the same news conference L. Kravchuk addressed a few words to IZVESTIYA.

I would like to congratulate the newspaper on its glorious jubilee—the 75th anniversary of the publication of its first edition. Today IZVESTIYA is doing a great and important job. At the same time I would like to express the wish that the newspaper be guided by the same spelling rules for everyone. If the president of Russia is spelled with a capital letter, then it is desirable to refrain from spelling the presidents of the other independent states with a small letter...

Defense Minister Explains

LD1403194992 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Mar 92

[Remarks by Ukraine Defense Minister K.P. Morozov on suspension of withdrawal of nuclear arms to Russia; date and place not given; from the "Novosti" newscast—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Morozov] I would like to say that Ukraine has, from the very beginning of its independence, firmly taken a line toward nuclear-free status, and the state has been tackling this program consistently. The president has announced that Ukraine is not changing its nuclear-free status and is continuing to implement it consistently. It was a question of correcting the mechanism for carrying out Ukraine's program of cutting nuclear weapons.

Ukraine has stated—and this is the result of calculating the possibilities, and it has been set out formally by special agreement—that before 1 July all tactical nuclear systems will be removed from Ukrainian territory to central factory depots for dismantling under international supervision.

However, all this time we also have been assessing how another side of this obligation is being carried out. It is difficult to obtain information as to whether these weapons really are being dismantled. In proceeding to nuclear-free status, Ukraine is aiming at reducing the nuclear potential, not at redistributing it from one region to another, and at relaxing tension in nuclear confrontation in one region, and not at creating tension in another. This is a very responsible action, and Ukraine, feeling responsibility to the world community in freeing its territory of nuclear weapons, cannot take a calm attitude toward a rise in the nuclear potential in another region.

This is why the president made the decision to suspend the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine.

Arms Remain 'Temporarily'

LD1503033392 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1916 GMT 14 Mar 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Kiev—I think in positive terms while assessing the president's decision of temporarily suspend withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, says Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's commission chairman. Vladimir Pilipchuk, member of Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's presidium, chairman of Commission for the Economic Reform also said on March 14 to PF [POSTFACTUM]: Western politicians hold up even unjustified actions by Russia for the sole reason that it is a mighty power, since they are guided by a double standard—for public consumption and for factual consumption. It means that they treat the former republics proceeding not from the

point of equal rights, but from that of strength. Pilipchuk labels as erroneous the mere initiative to withhold nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory. He believes it is necessary to get rid of the reason for which Ukraine is not considered to be strong. Aleksandr Yemets, Ukrainian state legal advisor, is aware of the present situation only indirectly, that is why he is not capable of providing adequate assessment. However, he does not see that something is incompatible with the Ukrainian course where it claimed from the very beginning its readiness to export arms, but only under control. He assumes that there has been a glitch in the control. Igor Yukhnovsky, Ukrainian state advisor in issues of scientific and technical policy, physicist, academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences asserts that Ukraine is void so far of the ability to independently build a plant to process nuclear waste. In his opinion, there is even a shortage of specialists capable of servicing nuclear reactors.

Nuclear Power Intention Denied

MK1403123192 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Mar 92 p 3

[NEGA report under the "News in Brief" rubric: "Ukraine"]

[Text] Commenting on Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's statement about the republic's suspension of shipments of tactical nuclear weapons from its territory, Vladimir Kryzhanivskiy, Ukrainian plenipotentiary representative and people's deputy, made the following statement: "Our president has stated that Ukraine is suspending shipments, but not discontinuing them. That is, Ukraine needs time to definitively assure itself that nuclear weapons transported out of Ukraine are being destroyed and not moved elsewhere.

"With regard to President Kravchuk's remark that Ukraine would like to carry out the destruction of missiles on its own territory, this was made in the subjunctive mood and can be interpreted merely as a wish on the part of Ukraine.

"Ukraine has never mentioned any intention of becoming a nuclear power. The establishment of a nuclear center on Ukrainian territory in no way indicates any desire on its part to become a nuclear power, and, what is more, this will not encourage nuclear weapons to leak abroad, as Colonel General Sergey Zelentsov, deputy chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Directorate, fears."

Officials Deny Nuclear Arms Located in Caucasus

CIS Deputy Commander Pyankov

LD1403183692 Moscow Russian Television
Network in Russian 1700 GMT 14 Mar 92

[Report by television correspondents V. Kukushkin and V. Andreyev, identified by screen captions, and

including recorded interview with General Boris Pyankov, deputy commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani side are trying to accuse the CIS troops of having transferred weapons to the militants in the Transcaucasus. However, this is completely at variance with reality.

[Pyankov] Well, the depot in Agdam was seized. It was seized in a sudden attack. It was seized, let us be blunt, with the aid and as a result of treachery by one of the warrant officers of Azerbaijani nationality. Artillery ammunition, including some rocket-propelled munitions for the Grad installations, were kept there. Arms seizures are continuing even now. There is a clear hunt for officers. Sudden attacks are launched on military encampments.

[Unidentified correspondent] One more question, a very important one: Are there nuclear weapons on the territory of the republic? After all, they were there during the period of the earthquake in Spitak.

[Pyankov] I must tell you absolutely objectively that there are no nuclear weapons in the Transcaucasus. The current arms situation testifies to the fact that the conflict is taking on new qualities; large-scale military operations are underway with the use of tanks, armored equipment, and the Grad installations, something that will inevitably entail an escalation of the combat operations already in the next few months, when mountain passes become free of snow, and when roads have had a chance to dry out a bit.

Russian Vice President Rutskoy

OW1503182292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1638 GMT 15 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy of the Russian Federation clarified his pronouncements on the presence of nuclear weapons in the Caucasus. Asked by IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent, he said that "nuclear weapons were present [as received] in Transcaucasia, including air-based destruction means. That is why I was confident saying that its using by any national armies is 1,000 percent impossible. Today, as far as I know, nuclear weapons have been completely withdrawn from Transcaucasia". [passage omitted]

Reaction to Ukraine Nuclear Decision Reported

Ukraine Seeks 'Concessions'

LD1503120892 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
0950 GMT 15 Mar 92

["Ukraine Attempts to Make Russia Yield in Military Sphere"—POSTFACTUM headline; from the "Military News" section]

[Text] Moscow—Ukraine seeks certain concessions from the Russian side in exchanging for withdrawal of tactical weapons from its territory, believes CIS JAF [Joint Armed Forces] General Staff commander.

While meeting journalists on March 14, CIS JAF General Staff Commander Col.-Gen. Viktor Samsonov said, among other things, that president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk's statement concerning temporary suspension of withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory was nothing more than a political maneuver undertaken in anticipation of concessions in Russian-Ukrainian standoff in the question of Black Sea Fleet's ownership.

Samsonov made his point saying that the statement is running counter to nuclear-free principles announced by Ukraine. He labeled Ukrainian president's statement regarding Russian alleged inability to handle all nuclear charges incoming to its territory from other republics incompatible with the real state of affairs. Russia has four modern plants that are quite capable of meeting this objective, asserts Samsonov, and 50 per cent of tactical nuclear weapons originally based on the Ukrainian territory have been exported, as of now. Intents of Ukraine's to set up analogous enterprises on its territory will put off nuclear disarmament to a more distant future, thinks General Staff commander. Samsonov also confessed that he did not harbor hopes for major results to be obtained by the forthcoming Commonwealth summit in Kiev, planned to be held on March 20.

Zelentsov Comments

*LD1403185292 Moscow Radio Moscow World
Service in English 1510 GMT 14 Mar 92*

[Text] In defiance of agreement among the republics of the new Commonwealth, the Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, says his country is suspending the transfer of nuclear weapons from its territory to Russia. According to the deputy chief of the nuclear forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, General Sergey Zelentsov, the Commonwealth military command did not anticipate the Ukrainian move, even though trouble started brewing a while ago.

Without giving reasons for its move, Ukraine suspended the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons as of 23 February, yet last December at the Alma-Ata Commonwealth summit, it pledged, in line with international law, to help destroy nuclear arsenals by moving the nuclear weapons it had on its territory to special places in Russia.

What the Ukrainian president did was in fact declare that his country refused to keep its word. This could torpedo the schedule of the transfer and destruction of the weapons. Gen. Zelentsov says the Commonwealth's military are worried about another thing. Ukraine says it will build its own facility for the dismantling of nuclear weapons and hire nuclear experts. But if it does build such a facility it will be able to assemble nuclear weapons, too. It will thus violate its commitment under

international law, said Gen. Zelentsov. What in the general's view motivated the Ukrainian president's decision?

[Zelentsov, in Russian fading into English report] Many countries have pledged help in the dismantling and destruction of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The United States alone has promised to set aside \$400 million for the purpose. Ukraine might want to claim part of that money. It's only Russia, however, that has facilities for dismantling the weapons. Building more facilities in Ukraine makes no sense. Ukraine might want to benefit from the sale of plutonium and uranium that will be released in the dismantling process. In this case, the Ukrainian ambitions are contradicting international law.

There is yet another possibility Gen. Zelentsov cannot discard: Ukraine might want to challenge Russia as another nuclear power. The general said he would be only too glad if that was not so. But will Ukraine possess nuclear weapons, and if it does, what then? Gen. Zelentsov:

[Zelentsov, in Russian fading into English report] Ukraine as such possesses no nuclear weapons. There is one finger on the formerly Soviet nuclear trigger, and it's not Ukrainian. The command of the Commonwealth Strategic Armed Forces has no intention of ceding control of the nuclear stocks to Ukraine. If worst comes to worst the weapons can be destroyed where they are, most likely by explosion. And, although no one is talking about nuclear explosion as such, Ukraine will be sure to suffer damages. The nuclear devices will be destroyed without a nuclear explosion. What survives will remain where it is and will present a big problem. The parts that remain after the destruction will be potentially dangerous.

But Gen. Zelentsov feels it will be better this way because otherwise the weapons might escape control. He says the Commonwealth military command will resort to this way of action only if worst comes to worst. In any case, Ukraine will possess no nuclear weapons. But the world public, in Gen. Zelentsov's view, must intervene to check the Ukrainian move.

Kozyrev 'Concerned'

*LD1303183892 Moscow Radio Moscow World
Service in English 1600 GMT 13 Mar 92*

[Text] In Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev is meeting with his Romanian counterpart, Adrian Nastase, who arrived in the city on a working visit. The two ministers are expected to discuss bilateral relations and prospects for their expansion.

Talking to newsmen before the meeting with Mr. Nastase, Andrey Kozyrev said he was concerned about the recent statement by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to the effect that Ukraine was halting the transfer of

tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Andrey Kozyrev stressed his government will study the statement in greater detail.

Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan React

*LD1403181292 Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian 1526 GMT 14 Mar 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Boris Krivoshey]

[Text] Moscow, 14 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian Foreign Ministry today expressed concern over Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's decision to halt the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the republic. "Such a step, were it actually to occur, would be at variance with existing accords among the Commonwealth states," a Foreign Ministry statement says.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent tried to ascertain official reactions to this Ukrainian move from other CIS countries. An executive officer in the Belarussian Supreme Soviet chairman's apparatus said that the republic's leadership does not yet have an official view on Leonid Kravchuk's decision; however, it does intend to discuss it at a Supreme Soviet meeting.

A spokesman for the Kazakh president's press service said that the matter is currently being studied. He further remarked that halting the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine would run counter to the documents adopted by the Commonwealth states.

Nuclear Physicists 'Concerned'

*LD1403193192 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1300 GMT 14 Mar 92*

[Text] A group of leading nuclear physicists working in Arzamas-16, the city closed until recently, are concerned about Leonid Kravchuk's decision to halt the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, ITAR-TASS notes. The statement was signed by Academicians Yuliy Khariton and Yevgeniy Negin and other prominent scientists. They also express concern over the plan to create a factory in Ukraine for destroying nuclear weapons. The scientists draw attention to the fact that the Ukrainian president's decision contravenes its obligations not to proliferate experience, knowledge, and the technology of nuclear weapons production.

Ukraine Could Be 'Pariah'

*MK1403102992 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Mar 92 p 2*

[Pavel Felgengauer report under the "Army" rubric: "Ukraine Seeks Nuclear Independence. This Could Lead to Its International Isolation"]

[Text] President Kravchuk stated 12 March that he is discontinuing the removal of tactical nuclear warheads

from Ukrainian territory. This statement was not unexpected: This turn of events had been anticipated in the CIS High Command (formerly the Defense Ministry and General Staff). President Kravchuk could have declared at any moment that "I am, of course, in favor of nuclear-free [as published] disarmament and a nuclear-free Ukraine, but for the time being, for security purposes, Ukraine is taking control of nuclear weapons on its territory." Which is precisely what has happened. Moreover, there had been earlier instances where the removal of tactical warheads had been delayed by the Ukrainian authorities.

Until now the relevant directorate of the High Command (Military Unit 31600) has exercised full control over the storage, combat readiness, and movement of nuclear munitions. However, the implementation of the recent Bush-Gorbachev-Yeltsin disarmament initiatives did indeed require the efforts of all the available forces. Thousands of tactical nuclear warheads have been moved from outlying regions to Russia, to "the locations where they were manufactured" (Arzamas-16, mainly). Moreover, they have mainly been moved by railroad, which in itself is extremely dangerous.

Then the warheads had to be dismantled, which, in the opinion of specialists, is rather complex from a purely technical point of view. And consequently there have been some delays in the dismantling process (if in some cases the process has gotten under way at all). After all, the cardinal question has still not been resolved: What should be done with the weapons-grade plutonium? Should it be stored in a special supersecure shelter built with money allocated by the U.S. Congress (the plan put forward by newly appointed Russian "nuclear" minister Viktor Mikhaylov), or should it be processed into nuclear fuel (the plan suggested by the U.S. firm Westinghouse and an alternative plan proposed by some of our own scientific research institutes)?

So there was undoubtedly a pretext for Kravchuk's unilateral actions. However, the construction of an alternative nuclear center, even with Western help, on Chernobyl soil poisoned with radioactive isotopes will certainly not speed up the process of nuclear disarmament. After all, conditions are undoubtedly better at the nuclear research and production centers that exist in Russia: These have trained personnel and also the necessary tools and infrastructure.

Following the collapse of the USSR, four republics declared themselves to be "nuclear," but this was only really true in Russia's case. The other presidents received "correspondents" ["korrespondentskiy"] nuclear attache cases, not the main ones. They could neither use the nuclear weapons themselves nor even veto their use if the holders of the two "main" nuclear buttons (President Yeltsin and Commander in Chief Shaposhnikov) were suddenly to decide to activate the weapons of retribution. The other presidents would only be able to slightly delay the adoption of the final decision.

However, the likelihood of a foreign nuclear threat emerging in current geopolitical circumstances is rather unrealistic. The nuclear dangers that are undoubtedly lying in wait for the inhabitants of the former USSR come from within, from "our own" reactors and warheads. After all, the dismantling of nuclear weapons (even with international verification) and their subsequent reassembly from the very same components—many of which it is physically impossible to "eliminate"—are entirely compatible processes within the same complex, for which President Kravchuk has found an excellent and extremely symbolic location: Chernobyl.

Neither Russia, the United States, nor any other world power will be able in the near future to take from the Ukrainians the bombs they have "arrested": Nuclear weapons are all too dangerous and harsh actions are impossible where they are concerned, especially when the lives of millions of completely innocent people are in jeopardy. As in most cases when hostages are taken, the only way out of the situation is patient negotiation. It may be that the "arrest" of the warheads is only a tactical move and the crisis will resolve itself fairly quickly. But even in the worst-case scenario, it will be a year or two before Ukraine is able to detonate the first "separatist" nuclear device.

The principal result of Kravchuk's recent statement may be that Ukraine, albeit for a few years, will join the group of "pariah" countries (Iraq, Libya, the DPRK, etc.) which the world community suspects of trying to have their own nuclear potential.

Arms Decision Threatens CIS

*PM1603163492 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Maksim Yusin report: "Decision of Ukrainian President Threatens International Accords"]

[Text] An event occurred on 12 March which could be fatal for the CIS and have unpredictable consequences for Russian-Ukrainian relations. Speaking in Kiev, Leonid Kravchuk stated that Ukraine is suspending the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from its territory.

"Given the prevailing political instability and confusion, we cannot be sure that the missiles being removed by us are being destroyed and are not falling into unfriendly hands... Ukraine regards as inadequate the capacities of the plant for the destruction of nuclear arsenals situated in Russia. It is therefore entitled to have similar enterprises on its own territory... The enterprise could also undertake the reprocessing of waste from the republic's atomic power stations," the president said, justifying this move.

Kravchuk's decision effectively means that Ukraine intends to become a nuclear power. And this radically alters the situation and the correlation of forces in Europe and the world. The worst fears regarding the

Soviet nuclear legacy are, it seems, starting to be realized. The assurances given by the republic presidents about the reliability of centralized control over nuclear arms are nullified by Kravchuk's statement yesterday.

What might the consequences be, then?

First, the already difficult relations between Russia and Ukraine will worsen. Kravchuk's decision is an open challenge to Yeltsin and Moscow. The Ukrainian president has made use of his main trump card, which he had hitherto held in reserve—Kiev is playing the nuclear card to counterbalance Russia's "imperial ambitions."

The promises to destroy the missiles taken under the republic's control will scarcely reassure Moscow. Kravchuk could repudiate them at any time as blithely as he has disregarded Ukraine's commitment to remove all tactical nuclear missiles from the republic by 1 July 1992.

Kravchuk's step, taken a week before the Kiev meeting of CIS leaders, indicates that Ukraine will henceforth speak to Russia in a different language. It is difficult to say as yet what this will lead to or whether the Ukrainian president's calculation will pay off. How will Yeltsin react? The Russian leader is faced with a difficult choice. Either he makes concessions to Kiev in all the inevitable disputes of the future in the hope that Kravchuk will soften his position and recognize Russia's nuclear exclusivity or, following the Ukrainian president's example, he gambles on confrontation.

Each option contains serious dangers. The concessions could prove endless. By taking this shaky route, Russia will not only harm its international prestige by allowing a neighbor to talk to it from a position of strength, but will most likely achieve no results. Kravchuk won't give up the nuclear argument here, but will make skillful use of it in all the ups and downs of Russian-Ukrainian relations, first increasing and then decreasing the pressure.

If, however, Yeltsin accepts Kravchuk's challenge, the CIS will most likely break up, the two republics will find themselves on the brink of conflict (I would like to believe that it will not be armed conflict), Ukraine will start making claims on strategic weapons after the tactical ones, and the question of the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet will be raised again, while Russia for its part will recall its claims on Crimea.

As this issue goes to press, there is still no official response from the Russian Government. The Western capitals are silent too. Kravchuk's statement is as unpleasant a surprise to the West as it is to Moscow. Throughout recent months the Ukrainian president has persistently sought to persuade Baker and Genscher that the republic will honor its commitment to become a nonnuclear state and has no claims on Soviet missiles. All those promises have now been broken. The world is on the verge of seeing the emergence of a sixth nuclear power.

Such a drastic change of course, one out of keeping with European political standards, will hardly strengthen the Ukrainian leadership's position in the international arena. Kravchuk has been gradually acquiring the reputation of an unpredictable leader (of which Yeltsin, incidentally, has been divesting himself).

Ukraine's example could infect other "nuclear" republics of the former USSR. Nursultan Nazarbayev has long held a "special stance" on the question of nuclear arms control. Belarus' policy has also been ambiguous of late. Russia's priority in the nuclear sphere is again in question. And this increases still further the danger of a chaotic division of Soviet missiles.

As for the military, they have treated Kravchuk's statement extremely seriously. "The fact that Ukraine is stopping the removal of nuclear weapons and is trying to take them into its possession is a most flagrant breach of the 1970 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Colonel General Sergey Zelentsov, deputy chief of a CIS Joint Armed Forces main directorate, told our military correspondent, Viktor Litovkin. "Ukraine is also breaching the accords reached within the CIS."

"The plant for the destruction of nuclear weapons which Kravchuk mentioned would certainly have to be equipped with the appropriate technology and manned with specialists. The possibility of a brain drain abroad is thus created," according to him.

More Comments on Ukraine Stopping Arms Removal

Russian High Command

*PM1603133592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Ukraine Has No Access to Nuclear Weapons, High Command Asserts"]

[Text] A news conference for Russian journalists has been held at the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command. It was prompted by the statement of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk on halting the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the state's territory. The press conference was chaired by Lieutenant General Sergey Zelentsov, deputy chief of a CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Directorate.

He stated that Ukraine breached the schedule for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons made on 23 February without offering any explanation for its action. It has become clearer since the president's statement.

But this step undermines the accords of the leaders of the CIS countries achieved and signed in Alma-Ata and Minsk. Under those accords tactical nuclear weapons must be removed from the territory of Belarus and Ukraine before 1 July 1992 (they have already been removed from Kazakhstan). Furthermore, Kravchuk's statement casts doubt on Ukraine's readiness to fulfill

the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article Two of which plainly bans the direct or indirect transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices by anyone as well as their receipt.

There is also doubt over the plans to build a plant for the development [razrabotka—could be misprint for razborka—dismantling] of nuclear warheads. Scant justification has been given for those plans. The construction of such a plant will require investments of billions, which Ukraine scarcely has. In addition, these plans by their nature can also be plants for the assembly of nuclear munitions. They cannot be used in the future for the reprocessing of nuclear fuel from nuclear power stations. These are completely different technologies.

Those who have prepared such a decision for the president are hardly familiar with this process or the international commitments that Ukraine has signed.

Gen. Zelentsov stated that Russia does not have the right to transfer nuclear weapons, including the components from which they are made—weapons-grade plutonium and uranium—to anyone, either. Extending the range of people working with nuclear fuel may also lead to its loss [utechka] abroad and the proliferation of the technology of nuclear weapons manufacture, which is equally intolerable.

"Our nuclear weapons today," the general stated, "are under unified and reliable control. Ukraine does not nor will it have access to them. We will take care of that so that the Ukrainian people and the peoples of Russia and other states may rest assured: Nuclear weapons will not bring them disaster."

Answering an IZVESTIYA correspondent's question on how in practice the military will be able to do this, the general said: We have an action program against saboteurs and terrorists but we do not yet have one against arbitrary political decisions. But we hope that at the conference in Kiev on 20 March we will reach a decision based on common sense and the observance of international commitments.

An IZVESTIYA correspondent asked other leaders of the CIS Joint Armed Forces to comment on the statement by the Ukrainian president. Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, chief of the Joint Armed Forces General Staff, expressed full solidarity with Gen. Zelentsov's opinion.

He said that the Ukraine president's statement has no worthwhile basis. It is more a political game than a farsighted action conceived in the light of all its real consequences. The comment on Russia's lack of a production base for the dismantling of nuclear munitions does not accord with the facts. Russia is fulfilling its commitments impeccably. It has four excellently equipped plants for this purpose with well-trained and highly skilled specialists who work with nuclear munitions in precise accord with the technological and safety requirements. The only problem is the lack of sufficient

storage facilities for the weapons-grade plutonium and uranium removed from the munitions.

High-ranking military specialists believe that some of the \$400 million allocated by the United States will be used for this task. Incidentally, in a conversation with your IZVESTIYA correspondent, some leaders of the Joint Armed Forces High Command expressed the view that the Ukraine president's statement on halting the removal of tactical nuclear weapons and the construction of its own plant for their dismantling could be dictated by a desire to secure for Ukraine a substantial proportion of the credits allocated to Russia. Admittedly, this did not take into account the fact that no one in the West will give money to people who repudiate so easily commitments that they have previously adopted.

Military experts consider that Ukraine's "nuclear demarche" could also be due to a desire to pressure Russia before the summit meeting in Kiev where the fate of the Black Sea Fleet is to be decided.

The talks on the division of the fleet are proving to be very difficult. Agreement has not been reached on any parameters. The command of the Navy and the Joint Armed Forces will fight tooth and nail not to concede to Ukraine a single ship or shore unit more than the 219 previously offered. There can be no compromise and the mood in Sevastopol and the Crimea is certainly not in favor of official Kiev. A firm step was needed to break down Russia's defense—thus the idea of halting the removal of tactical nuclear weapons arose.

This version is supported by the fact that the initial reason for suspending the withdrawal was the demand to remove nuclear weapons from the Black Sea Fleet first. At the Joint Armed Forces General Staff they have been forced to agree to revise the schedule. They compiled a new plan, coordinated it with the Ukraine Defense Ministry, and prepared the first train. But it, too, was halted.

The military think that this decision by the Ukraine President cannot last long. The situation within the CIS and the reaction of the international community and the leaders of the United States, the FRG, and other states will soon make it necessary to repudiate this unpopular action, which is fraught with dangerous consequences.

In a statement released by ITAR-TASS, the Ukrainian President's press service explained the position of the head of state. Ukraine does not repudiate its principled position regarding the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its territory and would like to ensure the fulfillment of the accord in full, the statement says. The process of dismantling and destroying these weapons must take place under the joint control of the CIS states and Ukraine must have complete information on the fate of these weapons after withdrawal from Ukrainian territory, the statement stresses.

Kazakh President's Spokesman

LD1603191992 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT
16 Mar 92

[Text] Moscow March 16 (TASS)—Ukraine's decision to suspend the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia signals its abandonment of the Alma-Ata and Minsk accords between member-countries of the CIS, Kazakhstan president's spokesman Seitkazy Mataev told the Kazakh news agency.

Last week, announcing Ukraine's decision President Leonid Kravchuk justified it by saying that Kiev cannot be certain that the transferred missiles will be destroyed and will not fall into bad hands.

Article Six of the document, signed in Alma-Ata on December 21 last year stipulates the need to cooperate in eliminating missiles, the procedure and time for transferring warheads to central bases and other dismantling conditions.

References to "alarm about the uncontrollable character of the process" can hardly be accepted, the spokesman said, adding that "they harm mutual understanding and trust in relations between Commonwealth member-states and delay the resolution of the problem of nuclear weapons."

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in his Thursday [12 March] statement maintained that "Russia has insufficient capacities to destroy nuclear arsenals". Ukraine, thus, has the right to "have analogous plants on its territory", he said.

Kravchuk does not have the information about Russia's facilities used to dismantle and destroy nuclear weapons and has not asked corresponding Russian agencies about the problem, Valeriy Bogdan, an aide of the Russian atomic energy minister, said.

On the other hand, the entire weapons complex is situated in Russia and nuclear weapons should be dismantled by those who produced them, Bogdan told ITAR-TASS. Otherwise, things could go dangerously wrong, he explained.

Commenting on Kravchuk's appeal to put the process of dismantling nuclear weapons under international control, he said that only materials created as a result of dismantling should be subject to international control. Facilities used to dismantle nuclear weapons are a state secret, he said. It looks like the Ukrainian president does not know this as well, he said.

Russian Commentary

LD1603200992 Moscow Radio Moscow World
Service in English 1210 GMT 16 Mar 92

[Station Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] Kiev and Moscow have laid down their positions. The Ukrainian leaders say they have no faith in Russia's

ability to destroy the weapons and they fear that they may fall into evil hands. Moscow in turn accuses Ukraine of violating the agreement that all tactical nuclear weapons must be withdrawn from Ukraine by 1 July and doubts that Ukraine is prepared to keep its promise to move to a non-nuclear status. That Ukraine's arguments are far from convincing is an opinion shared by the United States Department of State, which has turned to Ukraine for additional clarification. Russia is fully capable of dismantling nuclear warheads. It has plenty of experience in doing so. Most of the nearly 2,000 short and medium range nuclear missiles already destroyed were destroyed in Russia.

Strictly speaking, Ukraine has no nuclear weapons of its own. It has no access to nuclear weapons and cannot use them on its own. According to the General Staff of the Commonwealth Armed Forces, tactical nuclear weapons can be destroyed right where they are deployed, if necessary, whether Ukraine wishes it or not, though this would be undesirable.

The dangerous nuclear ambitions of the former Soviet republics are most pronounced in Ukraine. But Kazakhstan has announced it will pursue a special nuclear policy, though it no longer has such weapons, and Belarus, too, is wavering. Such uncertainty only adds to the fears of the international community that several nuclear powers will emerge in place of the former Soviet Union. It undermines faith in official statements. This trend is encouraged by claims in the Western news media that control of nuclear weapons in the Commonwealth is weak and there is a danger of their proliferation. The German weekly "STERN", for example, has alleged that Iran now has two nuclear warheads and middle range launchers obtained in one of the former Soviet Central Asian republics. The allegation has been denied by the Commonwealth military responsible for nuclear weapons. As for Russia, President Yeltsin says it has no secret policy in nuclear matters. It has no intention to use its nuclear status as a trump card in relations with the other Commonwealth members. It will strictly abide by its commitment to gradually abolish nuclear weapons.

The nuclear weapons will be high on the agenda of the Commonwealth summit due to open on the 20th [March] and we may expect some agreement.

Reaction To Kravchuk Statement Continues

U.S. Said To Consider Sanctions

*PM1803094192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 4*

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "United States Asks Ukraine To Explain Itself"]

[Text] Washington—The United States has expressed concern over the fact that Ukraine has suspended the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from its territory.

President Kravchuk, as we know, gave as the motive for the Ukrainian leadership's decision the fact that Russia, to which the weapons are being withdrawn, has not provided sufficient guarantees that the weapons will be destroyed.

In the words of State Department spokesman R. Boucher, Washington has reminded top Ukrainian officials that only last December Ukraine promised to complete the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory by no later than July of this year. So far 57 percent have been withdrawn. "We have asked for additional information and explanations from the Ukrainian Government," Boucher continued. "We would like the weapons to be destroyed as soon as possible."

Washington is concerned that the intention expressed by President Kravchuk to destroy some of the warheads on Ukrainian territory will entail a significant delay in the process of the weapons' destruction, since the appropriate enterprises do not exist on Ukrainian territory, as they do in Russia.

According to reports in THE WASHINGTON POST, U.S. intelligence noted disruptions in the timetable for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine a week before President Kravchuk announced this publicly. However, the paper continues, the administration preferred not to take any measures then, because it was unsure whether they were dealing with a substantial change in Kiev's policy, rather than a chance event.

Now the administration is launching a thorough campaign to put pressure on Ukraine. The possibility has not been ruled out of declaring—or making very clear—to Kiev that a refusal to withdraw nuclear weapons, whatever the explanation, will force Washington to resort to measures of economic and financial pressure on Ukraine. Ukraine could face difficulties with receiving loans and credits, including from international financial organizations in which the United States plays a leading role.

West's Response Noted

*PM1703114392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Mar 92 p 3*

[Article by Aleksandr Golts: "Kiev's Nuclear Gambles Have Taken Aback Not Only Moscow But Also the West"]

[Text] The consensus, at official level at least, which has been displayed by the heads of the CIS countries regarding the fate of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenals was one of the few buttresses still holding up the West's trust in our contradiction-torn Commonwealth. L. Kravchuk's recent statement on the suspension of the removal of tactical nuclear munitions to Russia and on plans to create their own capacities to destroy these weapons seems to have made a crack in this buttress too.

The Ukrainian leader's unexpected move has dismayed the leading Western countries for which the question of reliable control of nuclear weapons on CIS territory has been and remains very important (I recall that this was the main problem at the talks with all the numerous foreign visitors who have been in Moscow and Kiev in recent months).

"Ukrainian President Kravchuk has frequently stated his adherence to the process of the withdrawal of all nuclear arms from Ukraine's territory as rapidly as possible," U.S. State Department spokesman R. Boucher, stated in Washington. "In this connection he agreed with the accords reached in Minsk and Alma-Ata on the transfer from Ukraine to Russia of all tactical nuclear weapons by 1 July 1992 (to prepare for their dismantling) and the withdrawal of all strategic nuclear weapons by the end of 1994. We remember these commitments and therefore now as that you give us additional information and explanations."

The British Foreign Office is also seeking such additional information now. Announcing this, the Foreign Office spokeswoman deemed it necessary to mention that "Ukraine's adherence to the provisions of the arms control agreements served as the basis for recognition of that country's independence."

Finally, Ukraine's decision, REUTER reported, has caused considerable anxiety in NATO headquarters. They have seen in Kravchuk's statement evidence that the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR could remain without proper control. In the opinion of the NATO officials, the step taken by Kiev shows that Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia may not succeed in implementing their intention to complete the transportation of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia by July, as they had previously persuaded the Western countries. The nuclear arsenals threaten to become the subject of political bartering in the CIS, the NATO diplomats are concluding.

This reaction leaves no doubts that Kiev's unexpected step was in the nature of a political improvisation. It is obvious that the plans to create, with international aid, its own center for the destruction of nuclear weapons were not coordinated with those who should render the aid itself. Consequently, it is indeed a case of an intention to conduct political bartering. After all, in the opinion of THE NEW YORK TIMES, Kravchuk has not provided any proof of the justice of his suspicions that the nuclear weapons shipped out of Ukraine will not be destroyed. And now not only Moscow but also the West is having to guess what lies behind the nuclear missile interpretation of the well known saying: "I shall not swallow it, just take a nibble."

In my view, it is a case of another relapse into the temptation of the "red button" which the CIS leaders successfully overcame in Alma-Ata and Minsk. I have in mind the false sensation that possessing nuclear weapons can enhance the republics' international status and

strengthen their position in disputes with each other. Obviously, a part was also played by the fact that the Russian Government, as its CIS partners have frequently stated, is conducting talks with the West on disarmament questions without painstaking consultations with the other nuclear republics. The suggestion of the French newspaper LE FIGARO that Kravchuk has had to address the nuclear weapons problem in order successfully to resist the opposition nationalist forces is also not without foundation.

However that may be, everyone agrees that it is no accident that L. Kravchuk issued his statement on the eve of the CIS leaders' meeting. The West has seen in it an attempt to put pressure on Russia.

For my part I shall not venture to predict whether this dispute will be a trump card for the Ukrainian representatives. But it is already obvious that it will in no way strengthen the international prestige either of Ukraine or of the Commonwealth as a whole. Indeed, we are seriously counting on cooperation with the West and on its support in implementing economic reforms. And at the same time with an unusual levity we are renouncing our own guarantees on a question which today is the main headache for our partners. After all, all the Western mass media are full of speculation regarding the uncontrolled spread of our nuclear weapons. And the sensation of the French television journalists who filmed talks which allegedly took place in Moscow with smugglers on the transfer of radioactive materials across the border had not died down before the foreign press published a report that Iran had become the possessor of nuclear weapons obtained in a Central Asian republic of the former USSR.

Under these conditions one cannot fail to understand the concern of the high-ranking NATO diplomat who stated in an interview with REUTER that "there are increasing signs that political motives in the rivalry between the republics are gaining the upper hand over international commitments, despite the repeated assurances conveyed to the West." The diplomat said that this could have very serious consequences...

Ukrainian Aides Comment

*PM1703153392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Mar 92 p 1*

[Lieutenant Colonel A. Polyakov report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Nuclear Weapons Removal Suspended as Base Controls Are Stepped Up"]

[Text] Kiev—Kiev's media are issuing detailed reports on CIS and world reaction to Leonid Kravchuk's decision to suspend the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory. Here is how the republic's politicians and military are commenting on this event.

In a television interview, Ukrainian presidential adviser Anton Buteyko described the removal of weapons from Ukraine as a goodwill gesture insofar as the agreement

concluded in Alma-Ata on their destruction is subject to ratification. But it has not been ratified, and the destruction of warheads is not being jointly monitored, so Kravchuk's decision is understandable and natural.

A conversation with Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov was shown on republic television late Sunday evening. In answer to a question from the television journalist on the possibility of the missiles' being destroyed in Ukraine, the minister said that Ukraine has been recognized by 108 states and as an independent power it has the right to do this. For the time being, in his words, controls at the bases where nuclear weapons are located have been stepped up. Admittedly, he did not explain why this is being done, but clearly it is primarily to prevent the uncontrolled removal of weapons.

Belarus' Chaus Comments

*OW1703204592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1843 GMT 17 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Belarussian Defense Minister Petr Chaus approved Ukraine's decision to stop the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. He feels that the destruction of the weapons "must be supervised". In an interview with "INTERFAX" Chaus said that Belarus "is considering the problem of shipping nuclear weapons to Russia".

Chaus said concerning the reductions of offensive weapons in the republic that "if Belarus sells weapons it will do so in strict observance of international agreements". This obviously refers to the accumulation of a large number of tanks in the Belarussian republic.

Concerning the trade of weapons by Belarussian military factories Chaus said "we are already receiving orders".

Chaus said regarding the recent comments at a press conference of the head of the Belarussian parliament criticizing the Commonwealth United Armed Forces, that "we have many complaints". Most of the complaints are connected with the ingorance of legislative acts passed by the republics.

Decision Viewed

*PM1803130192 Moscow Russian Television
Network in Russian 2000 GMT 14 Mar 92*

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Announcer-read report]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Today the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in connection with the fact that Ukraine is suspending the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from its territory. The Russian Foreign Ministry points out that this step does not fit in with the accords reached between the Commonwealth countries. A few days ago the West was ready to applaud Ukraine for its firm decision to become a nuclear-free power.

President Kravchuk said that by this July tactical installations [takticheskiye ustanovki], along with their weapons [zaryady], would have left Ukrainian territory. But on 12 March Kiev suddenly halted the withdrawal of weapons to Russia. Even though it is known that almost 60 percent of these weapons have already been removed and even though Ukraine still swears that it will acquire nuclear-free status, the matter is so serious that it cannot help but cause concern, above all in Russia.

Why has Ukraine's position changed so drastically, within a matter of days? Perhaps something happened in this short time in Russia, making it unacceptable to Ukraine for its weapons to be taken to Russia? Perhaps the position of the incumbent Russian authorities ahead of 17 March no longer inspires the Ukrainian leadership's confidence? Perhaps perspicacious Kravchuk suddenly glimpsed the sinister shadow of Zhirinovskiy looming over independent autonomous Ukraine from Moscow? It is hard to tell, but one cannot take seriously Ukraine's plans to build its own enterprises to destroy warheads. According to experts, these enterprises simply do not exist there. Warheads can only be destroyed by an explosion, and an explosion on territory that has still not gotten over Chernobyl would be terrifying.

The Ukrainian president's press service explained today that the president has only expressed doubts that the weapons being removed are actually being destroyed, and concern that this process is effectively being carried out without supervision [beskontrolno]. Kravchuk advocated temporarily suspending the removal of these weapons. Admittedly, that is little explanation. [passage omitted]

News Conference on Control Over Nuclear Weapons

*PM1803155592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Mar 92 p 3*

[Major A. Yegorov report under "Direct Line" rubric: "There Are No Incidents of the Loss of Nuclear Weapons, Trustworthy Experts Declare"]

[Text] Moscow—A news conference was held 17 March at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center on questions concerning the reliability of control over nuclear weapons kept on the territory of Commonwealth member-countries. Taking part were Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Zelentsov, deputy chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Directorate; G. Tsytkov, chief of a Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Power Main Administration; and Lieutenant Colonel A. Fagotov, expert of a department of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Directorate.

In his speech Gen. Zelentsov once more refuted reports that have appeared in the foreign and domestic press alleging incidents of the loss of nuclear weapons. The storage system completely rules out unauthorized access to munitions under centralized control, he said. In

accordance with the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, nuclear munitions are kept in a protected zone which is under the constant surveillance of security guards and electronic instruments. This zone is surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of access points under the appropriate control. Access to the zone is permitted only under security observation. In the general's words, this system of control has never broken down, either within the forces or at the storage bases.

To the journalists' reasonable question as to whether guarantees of security remain in the event of the loss of centralized control over nuclear weapons—and this tendency can already be observed, in their opinion—Zelentsov replied that in the event of weapons being transferred to people who do not know how to use them, there are no such guarantees.

Georgiy Tsytkov from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Power supported the general. In connection with [Ukrainian President] L. Kravchuk's decision to suspend the removal of tactical nuclear munitions from Ukraine, he read out a statement from scientists of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16) Russian nuclear center, which contains a resolute protest against such actions. The dismantling and destruction of nuclear munitions should be carried out under the supervision of those who developed the weapons, and only at the special plants where they were assembled, the statement says.

The statement is signed by nuclear munitions developers Academicians Yu. Khariton, Ye. Negin, and A. Pavlovskiy, and other scientists.

Reaction to Kravchuk Statement on Arms Continues

Ukraine Affirms Adherence to START

*OW1803181492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1630 GMT 18 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Strategic nuclear weapons will be completely removed from Ukrainian territory by 1994, the press service of the Ukrainian President reported in connection to a statement by US Senator Sam Nunn who is heading a Congressional delegation to the republic. The statement said that the delegation had received "serious indications" that Kiev may claim the strategic nuclear weapons located on its territory. The press service said that Ukraine plans to strictly adhere to the Soviet-American START treaty.

Foreign Minister Assures NATO

*LD1903091592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 0800 GMT 19 Mar 92*

[Excerpt] The Ukraine has confirmed it will take out tactical nuclear weapons to Russia by July as has originally been planned. The republic's Foreign Minister

Anatoliy Zlenko says this in a letter to the NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner. [passage omitted]

Kravchuk Statements Noted

*PM1903093592 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Mar 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Video report by Petr Fil]

[Text] [Fil] In a recent interview to the TRUD newspaper the Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk declared: Ukraine wants to be and will be a nuclear-free, non-aligned, and neutral state. At the same time the president stressed that Ukraine intends to eliminate its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons without setting any conditions on other states.

Let me recall that under a previous accord between the nuclear countries of the former USSR—that is, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—the latter was to transfer its missiles to Russia for subsequent destruction. Then, on the 99th day of his presidency, 12 March, Kravchuk made public his decision to suspend the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory. Leonid Kravchuk said that this decision of his government was motivated by a lack of confidence that these missiles were being destroyed rather than by the fear that they were falling into the wrong hands, as the president put it. Expressing himself in favor of international supervision of the removal and dismantling of nuclear weapons, Leonid Kravchuk declared that Ukraine deems the capacity of the Russian plant for the destruction of nuclear arsenals inadequate. Therefore Ukraine, according to Kravchuk, has the right to have its own plant of this kind. In his opinion the Chernobyl zone would be the most suitable site. There, in his view, a production facility for the processing of nuclear waste from Ukrainian nuclear power stations could be created at the same time, since Russia is now refusing to accept this waste. Major financial expenditure is required for the implementation of these plans. In this connection Ukraine has asked a number of countries for help in establishing an international nuclear center on its territory. Thus it can be assumed that with the use of foreign financial assistance Kravchuk's plan will resolve the question of the Ukrainian nuclear waste which no one wants to accept, and simultaneously establish a facility for its own destruction of nuclear arsenals.

[Announcer] For your information: There are four nuclear republics on CIS territory. In Russia there are 17,505 units of nuclear weapons, in Ukraine—4,356, in Kazakhstan—1,690, and in Belarus—1,222 units.

Warhead Dismantling Plan Viewed

*PM1803142192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 18 Mar 92 p 1*

[K. Belyaninov report: "How Much Will Its Own Arzamas-17 Cost Kiev?"]

[Text] Strange though it may seem, the Ukrainian president's statement about stopping the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the republic's territory and building an international nuclear center for the dismantling of munitions and the processing of radioactive waste inside the 30km zone of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] did not come as a surprise either to the military or to nuclear scientists.

Specialists of the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command Staff maintain that the Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly delayed the departure of trains with tactical weapons before, and the possibility of such a step by Leonid Kravchuk was discussed in the High Command as much as a month ago.

Nevertheless, specialists of very diverse ministries maintain almost with one voice that the problems which obliged the Ukrainian president to make such a risky statement are not so much political as technical.

"The fact that Ukraine would raise the question of building such an enterprise on its territory became clear when the Krasnoyarsk-26 plants refused to accept spent fuel from Ukrainian AES's," Anatoliy Zemskov, deputy chief of a main administration of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, believes. "The republic is now using the reserve capacities of nuclear stations, but they are limited: According to the roughest estimates, they will suffice for no more than three years."

A plan to build the "Vektor" plant in the Chernobyl zone had been discussed two years ago. At a news conference marking the first 100 days of his presidency Leonid Kravchuk essentially repeated the previous substantiation for the project, which had been submitted to Ryzhkov's Council of Ministers: "In ridding ourselves of the nuclear missile potential, we will also rid ourselves of the nuclear fuel of the Chernobyl sarcophagus." But at that time the money to implement it could not be found even from the Union government.

"Even if the money were there, Ukraine would be unable to resolve the problem of its nuclear waste in less than five years," Anatoliy Zemskov maintains. "According to the most cautious estimates, it will take precisely that long to build the plant."

But the waste problems constitute just a small part of the problems which Ukraine will have to encounter following Kravchuk's statement. Nuclear munitions specialists of the Russian Nuclear Center, better known as Arzamas-16, believe that nuclear weapons can be dismantled and destroyed only at those enterprises where they were assembled and only under the control of those who developed them. "An obligatory condition for

ensuring the safety of the process of destroying nuclear munitions is the presence of the experienced, highly-qualified specialists who developed these models of weapons, special equipment, corresponding methods and technologies, and the complex of specialized production facilities which took many decades to create," reads a statement signed by Academicians Khariton, Negin, and Pavlovskiy and by other acknowledged specialists.

The system for destroying nuclear weapons has still not provided the answer to one question: What is to be done with weapons-grade plutonium and uranium? They propose to store it in supersafe shelters and to process it into fuel for AES's, but not one of the projects has yet been realized. At the same time, according to Lieutenant General S. Zelentsov, chief specialist of the Joint Armed Forces High Command, it is precisely the shortage of storage facilities that is now the chief problem for Russia. There are none in Ukraine at all, although it would take at least \$500 million to eliminate the consequences of an accidental diffusion of plutonium as the result of careless handling of just one nuclear munition.

Belarus Stand Reiterated

*LD1703171892 Moscow TASS in English 1639 GMT
17 Mar 92*

[By BELTA correspondent Vladimir Glod]

[Text] Minsk March 17 TASS—"The Ukrainian decision to suspend the withdrawal of nuclear arms from its territory is an exclusively internal affair of this state," chairman of the Belarussian Supreme Soviet Stanislav Shushkevich told BELTA-TASS today.

"We do not interfere in the affairs of sovereign Ukraine," he added. "I can only say this decision had no influence on the Belarussian stand. We firmly keep to our opinion that Belarus should become a non-nuclear state. The Supreme Soviet of our republic has not changed its opinion either. That is why all disarmament arrangements in the republic are following the adopted scheme."

Russian Scientists Protest

*PM1803143792 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Mar 92 First Edition p 1*

["Statement by Scientists at the Russian Nuclear Center"]

[Text] There have been reports on radio and television, referring to Ukrainian President L.M. Kravchuk's press conference, on his decision to suspend the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine and on the establishment on its territory of an International Atomic Center for their dismantling.

In this connection, specialists on nuclear weapons at the Russian Nuclear Center (All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Arzamas-16) protest

strongly against such actions and consider it their professional duty to state the following:

Nuclear weapons, given the presence of highly toxic radioactive substances and powerful explosives in them and in the event of their being handled by nonprofessionals, are highly dangerous, so their dismantling and destruction can only be carried out under the control of those who developed them and at the special plants that assembled them.

The presence of the experienced, highly skilled specialists who developed these types of weapons, of the special equipment, the proper methods and techniques, and the complex of specialized production facilities that took many decades to create is an essential condition of a safe destruction process. Failure to observe these conditions could have disastrous consequences, affecting the interests of the peoples of Ukraine, Russia, and the entire world community.

According to estimates carried out here and in the United States, it would cost around \$500 million to clear up after the accidental dispersal of plutonium in a nonnuclear explosion of just one weapon.

The aforementioned decision by the Ukrainian president is not in line with international commitments on the nonproliferation of experience, knowledge, and technologies of nuclear weapons production.

Aware of the awesome responsibility borne by us, the developers of these weapons, in terms of making them safe, we consider it intolerable that the dismantling of nuclear weapons should be organized on the territory of Ukraine and we urge Ukrainian President L.M. Kravchuk to abandon such plans, primarily in the interests of his own people's safety.

[Signed] Academician Yu. Khariton; Academician Ye. Negin; Academician A. Pavlovskiy; Candidate of Technical Sciences V. Afanasyev; Candidate of Technical Sciences S. Voronin; Doctor of Physical-Mathematical Sciences G. Goncharov; Candidate of Technical Sciences G. Dmitriyev; Doctor of Physical-Mathematical Sciences R. Ilkayev; Doctor of Technical Sciences S. Kocharyants; Doctor of Physical-Mathematical Sciences V. Mokhov; Candidate of Physical-Mathematical Sciences L. Ognev; Doctor of Technical Sciences L. Timonin; Doctor of Technical Sciences Yu. Faykov, and Candidate of Technical Sciences Ye. Yakovlev.

Kravchuk Reverses on Nuclear Arms Withdrawal

*OW1803143392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1343 GMT 18 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk told the Russian leader Boris Yeltsin in a telephone conversation March 16 that he had changed his position regarding the timetable for the removal of tactical nuclear weapons

from Ukraine and accepted the initial agreement under which all weapons should be delivered to Russia for dismantlement by July 1, 1992. IF [INTERFAX] learned that Boris Yeltsin had said this at a meeting with the leaders of the Russian parliamentary factions in the Kremlin Wednesday [17 March]. Speaking in Kiev last week, Kravchuk announced that the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine would be suspended lest these weapons should fall "into wrong hands". [passage omitted]

Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev Supports Kravchuk

*LD1903202392 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1630 GMT 19 Mar 92*

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Shchelkunova] Good evening. I will not talk to you about anything. Right away I will put on a tape recording of a Nazarbayev interview which he gave when flying in to Kiev. Incidentally, he was the first of the meeting participants to arrive in Ukraine's capital today. [passage omitted]

[Nazarbayev] I think that the question of unified strategic troops has been resolved, but on the other question I support President Kravchuk, and we talked with President Yeltsin, saying that the mechanism on the participation of states on whose territory nuclear weapons exist should be worked through, going as far as blocking in the event that each of the states that has them uses them. We will be discussing this question, and it is probably necessary to create a commission so that the specialists do a good job. [passage omitted]

Conflicting Reports on Ukraine's Nuclear Plans

Letter to NATO Confirms Plans

*AU2003113192 Kiev Radio Kiev International
Service in Ukrainian 1430 GMT 19 Mar 92*

[Text] Ukraine has informed the leadership of NATO that the previously set terms for withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from its territory remain unchanged. This was stated yesterday [18 March] by an official representative in the Brussels headquarters of the North Atlantic Alliance. He said that Manfred Woerner, secretary general of NATO, has received a letter from Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukraine's foreign minister. It is confirmed in the letter that the withdrawal of these weapons will be completed, as planned, by July 1992.

Ukraine is only ready to talk about bringing up to strength the strategic forces within the Commonwealth and only within its own [Ukrainian] territory. This was stated in an interview for the press by General Leonid Ivashov, chief of the administration in charge of the affairs of the CIS joint forces when he commented on the prospects of discussing military issues by the CIS leaders during the meeting in Kiev. In the general's opinion, this package of problems may involve the greatest difficulties. With regard to the problem of the powers that the supreme organs of the Commonwealth will have in the

question of defense, this project, Ivashov stated, has passed all levels of authority practically without objections.

If the temporary suspension of the withdrawal of the tactical weapons from Ukraine acquires a long-term character, this circumstance cannot but give rise to a certain concern. This was stated by Daniel Bernard, official representative of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He emphasized that the question is whether president Kravchuk's decision is a tactical one adopted within the framework of diplomatic work on preparing the forthcoming meeting of CIS leaders in Kiev. Let me remind you that during a news conference the president of Ukraine confirmed Ukraine's unchanged concept with regard to withdrawing, for destruction, tactical weapons from the territory of the republic.

Promise to NATO 'Refuted'

*LD1903215292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 19 Mar 92*

[Text] [Announcer] New facets have appeared in the story regarding nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Over to my colleague Andrey Krasnov.

[Krasnov] Vladimir Shlyaposhnikov, the Ukrainian president's press officer, stated today that Leonid Kravchuk's decision regarding the temporary suspension of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons remains in force. Thus he refuted a promise given to NATO by the Ukrainian foreign minister. At the same time, the Ukraine president's press secretary denied that the nuclear issue had been discussed during a telephone conversation on 16 March between Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin. Previously it was reported that Kravchuk, in a telephone conversation with Yeltsin, had agreed to return to the previous accords regarding the schedule for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine. This report is disinformation, the Ukrainian president's press secretary stated.

At the same time, a news conference by Viktor Antonov, member of the Ukrainian Government, took place in Kiev. He dealt with problems of conversion. He confirmed that the strategic line of the Ukrainian leadership on nuclear weapons has not changed. Moreover, Viktor Antonov stressed that Kiev is interested in receiving the dismantled parts of the tactical nuclear missiles.

Briefly, a fairly paradoxical situation has arisen. One gets the impression that Kiev keeps changing its mind. The least one can say is that in the evening it denies what it said in the morning. The most unpleasant thing in this connection is that it is becoming ever more difficult to find out where the truth lies. So what is it going to be? Is Ukraine becoming a nuclear power, or not? Is it complying with the schedule for the removal of weapons, or is it breaching it?

In the final analysis, nuclear weapons are not a trifling matter. One should not make loose statements in this connection. Of course, politics is politics, but one must also have a conscience.

Ukraine To 'Demand' Uranium

*MK2003082592 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Mar 92 p 1*

[Vera Kuznetsova report: "Ukraine Wants To Get Uranium"]

[Text] At a news conference at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry on 19 March, Viktor Antonov, Ukraine's minister of machine-building, conversion, and defense industry, said that President Leonid Kravchuk's statement about control over tactical nuclear weapons does not change the republic's strategic position; Kravchuk's statement is only about control over the withdrawal of tactical weapons.

Although the minister believes that it would be more secure to dismantle nuclear weapons in the republic, he reaffirmed the desire of Ukraine's leadership to remove tactical weapons from combat standby [boyevyye dezhurstva] by 1 June 1992. Moreover, the republic's government intends to demand from Russia's Government some of the uranium recovered after the nuclear warheads are reprocessed in Russian plants. Ukraine proposes to take 70 percent of the reprocessed uranium and to leave 30 percent to Russia.

Destruction Possible in Third States

*LD1903223492 Moscow TASS in English 2139 GMT
19 Mar 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Stepovik]

[Text] Bonn March 20 TASS—The nuclear weapons located on the Ukrainian territory may be destroyed not only in Russia but in other countries as well, Aleksandr Tereshchenko, a secretary of the Ukrainian parliamentary commission on defense and security, said in an interview with the DPA agency published in Bonn today.

According to the Ukrainian parliamentarian, the agreement on the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory, reached in December 1991, was not worked out to the end. The fact that nuclear weapons are only removed from one place to another, may result in the losses both for Ukraine and the whole world, Tereshchenko pointed out. It is important for us to establish control over the destruction of weapons, but neither international nor Ukrainian representatives are taking part in the process of control.

So far, we do not know for sure whether the nuclear arms delivered from Ukraine to Russia are destroyed or not. Therefore a control mechanism should be created with the participation of parliaments and representatives of the world community. If such guarantees are given, Ukraine will remove all tactical nuclear arms from its

territory before the end of June 1992, as was stated in the agreement. I hope, Tereshchenko stressed, an agreement on this issue between Russia and Ukraine will be reached in the course of the forthcoming Commonwealth summit meeting in Kiev.

Nunn Statement Unconfirmed

*AU2003124792 Kiev Radio Kiev International
Service in Ukrainian 1430 GMT 19 Mar 92*

[Text] The Ukrainian president's service [sluzhba] has not confirmed the statement by the influential U.S. senator, Sam Nunn, that during its visit to Ukraine the delegation of the U.S. Congress which he headed received serious hints that Kiev might lay claims to the strategic nuclear weapons that remain on the territory of Ukraine. As the Ukrainian president's service responsible for international affairs has stated, during their visit to Ukraine the U.S. senators received clear assurances that Ukraine was determined to adhere strictly to the agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons. As envisaged, the strategic forces must be withdrawn from Ukraine by 1994.

U.S. Spokesman 'Cautious'

*PM2003125192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Mar 92 p 3*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent A. Fedyashin under general heading: "CIS Nuclear Weapons Still Worry the West"]

[Text] Washington, 19 Mar—In extremely balanced and cautious terms the White House has made it clear that so far it has had no information that something is out of order with regard to the tactical nuclear weapons which are being withdrawn from the former USSR republics to Russia. Thus, at a White House briefing, the U.S. President's press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, answering questions about whether the United States is worried by the Ukraine's decision to suspend the return of nuclear

weapons to Russia and shares Ukraine's concern over the lack of guarantees that these arms are being destroyed, said:

"Of course, there is anxiety over the status of the nuclear arms and we are continuing consultations with the leaders of all republics to assure ourselves of the safety of these arms. But we have received assurances of their safety from Mr. Kravchuk and Mr. Yeltsin and others and we continue to believe that is indeed the case."

Yeltsin Backs Agreed Schedule for Tactical Nuclear Withdrawal

*LD2003103592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 20 Mar 92*

[Report by special correspondent Vera Shchelkunova from Kiev]

[Excerpt] I apologize in advance for any interference, but I am transmitting this information by phone. As our listeners are already aware from our report half an hour ago, the meeting has begun. It was opened by Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk. The presidents of the Russian Federation and Moldova were welcomed at Kiev's Borispol Airport this morning. They were the last delegations to arrive, literally an hour before the opening of the meeting.

At the airport, journalists naturally asked the most trenchant questions, which received very brief replies. In particular, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was asked about his telephone conversation with Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk about Ukraine's decision to withdraw or not to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine to Russia. The Russian president said that he feels it is necessary to comply with obligations that have already been signed to the effect that tactical nuclear weapons should be withdrawn by 1 July 1992 from Ukrainian to Russian territory to be destroyed and that the destruction of the missiles should be monitored by Ukraine.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Fokin, who met Yeltsin at the airport, added to this that the Ukrainian president had not altered his position. [passage omitted]

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

'Open Skies' Treaty Signed by 24 Countries

*AU2403112092 Paris AFP in English 1052 GMT
24 Mar 92*

[Text] Helsinki, March 24 (AFP)—Foreign ministers from 24 countries on Tuesday signed the "Open Skies" treaty, opening up the airspace of Europe and North America to military inspection flights.

For the first time in the history of disarmament, countries will be allowed to make overflights of each others' territory to monitor weapons installations and other military activities. Its signatories are the 16 NATO members, the five remaining Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania), plus Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

GERMANY

Inspector General Views Bundeswehr Goals

*AU3103200092 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
27 Mar 92 pp 7-8*

[Interview with Klaus Naumann, Bundeswehr inspector general, by Christoph Bertram; place and date not given: "I Am Not Looking for Hostile Images"]

[Text] [Bertram] General Naumann, in the middle of February the Cabinet defined the Bundeswehr's assignment and tasks in the following way: Defending German territory against external dangers; participating in the alliance; and German soldiers participating in international peacekeeping missions once the constitutional criteria are satisfied.

German territory, however, is not exposed to any threat. The alliance is going through a crisis. Apart from the constitutional and political problems linked with international missions, they cannot justify the force of 370,000 soldiers that will constitute the Bundeswehr in 1995 and thereafter.

[Naumann] It is true, even from a military viewpoint, we can state today that Germany is not exposed to a threat that would endanger its existence.

[Bertram] Is there any threat at all?

[Naumann] Germany's existence is not threatened, which means I do not believe a large-scale attack—that we had to consider during the past 35 years—is likely to occur.

I do not know, however, how the situation in Europe and the CIS will develop in the future; after all, a tremendous conventional military potential still exists there. There is also a considerable nuclear potential that the former Soviet Union has pledged to reduce, but it does not possess the required technical expertise to fulfill its obligations in the next 10 years.

[Bertram] Do you think the weapons and soldiers deployed on the territory of the former Soviet Union might become a direct threat to Germany?

[Naumann] The CIS states are characterized by alarming internal instability. Against this background, numerous medium- and long-term developments are conceivable. It is necessary to retain instruments to deal with imponderables so that we remain capable to act politically.

[Bertram] Are there any signs that nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union have reached other countries?

[Naumann] I do not know of any. According to our information, transferring tactical-operational weapons to Russian territory is being conducted swiftly and responsibly.

[Bertram] The CIS republics have just declared they want to implement the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) as soon as possible.

[Naumann] Even if the treaty is ratified and implemented in 1995 at the earliest, some 60 army divisions, 5,000 aircraft, and 1,500 combat helicopters will remain on the territory of the former Soviet Union. I think that in the interest of a responsible security policy, one must keep an eye on such forces to prevent creating pressure points, particularly in view of internal instability.

[Bertram] Who might develop pressure points?

[Naumann] We must concentrate on Russia, which is the central power that seems to be evolving in the CIS and is a Euro-Asian power with global nuclear armed forces capabilities that will be retained in the future. Russia will remain a space power, a naval power of global dimensions, and a land power on our continent.

Secondly, Russia has no democratic control mechanisms now, and there is no democratic tradition that would make the early introduction of such mechanisms likely. One must take all this into consideration, despite the confidence that we place in the leaders currently governing Russia.

[Bertram] Are you saying that because Russia is not a democracy, it is not able to form alliances and thus must continue to be viewed as a danger for Germany?

[Naumann] I would not use the word "danger," because "danger" implies "threat."

[Bertram] What about risk?

[Naumann] There is a certain potential for risk and insecurity. We want to hold out our hand to Russia in friendship and cooperation. We want to do that in military matters as well. At the same time, we must ensure that we remain capable to act politically in unexpected situations.

Here I would like to revert to the second point you mentioned, the Western alliance. I do not see any crisis in the alliance.

[Bertram] It no longer has a specific military mission.

[Naumann] It is true the alliance was founded to avert a real threat that existed at the time. It was very successful in doing so.

The alliance has always been a source of stability and a transatlantic cooperation and coordination forum where numerous political decisions not directly linked with defense were prepared, a function the alliance will retain.

[Bertram] A sizable German military contribution is hardly required to ensure this.

[Naumann] Influence in international bodies depends primarily on the weight that a country throws in. Our military performance and contribution helped increase the international standing of the FRG in the 1950's, a principle which I think is still valid today.

[Bertram] In contrast to today, military power was an instrument of international politics in the 1950's. Is this not outdated thinking?

[Naumann] I agree with you in the sense that the causes of the conflicts that exist around us cannot be removed with military means. I cannot say military means will never be required.

[Bertram] Don't you risk painting crisis scenarios that are no longer convincing?

[Naumann] For God's sake, no. I am not looking for hostile images. I would certainly be one of the last to recommend the early use of military means, which is for me the last resort if political means fail.

I cannot rule out such cases forever. After all, our goal is to prevent conflicts, and one can see a tendency toward using force everywhere in the world.

[Bertram] Which applies mainly to the part of the world outside NATO. As a matter of fact, these dangers are the third official justification for the existence of the Bundeswehr.

[Naumann] There are external risks. There is no doubt about that. It will not be possible to use military force to remove the causes of conflicts, particularly in the area extending from southern Europe to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Ultimately, the United Nations will have to decide how we should proceed there to safeguard peace or restore it, if necessary.

[Bertram] The United Nations alone?

[Naumann] Now, I see no other instrument that may legitimately order compulsory measures to ensure peace. A political decision will have to be made as to whether this is to remain so, which is an issue that will have to be examined in cooperation with European institutions, because it is also important for the CSCE and the European political union.

It will take a long time in Germany to achieve a consensus on deploying our armed forces outside the country, even if they are only to participate in so-called peacekeeping operations, which cannot be accomplished overnight. Such a process takes time.

[Bertram] The ability of the Bundeswehr to intervene in far-away crises also serves as a justification for military expenditure.

[Naumann] The primary task of the Bundeswehr will continue to be the defense of our country and the ability to fulfill our obligations within the alliance, which is stipulated in Article 1 of our Basic Law. It results from the obligation to protect the state. Thus, we do not need a threat to justify the existence of our Armed Forces. Risks might be used as an argument in connection with the strength of the Bundeswehr.

[Bertram] How do you justify the strength of the Bundeswehr, since our country is not exposed to an actual threat, our contribution to the alliance is assessed in more general terms than military ones, and in view of the fact that, you once said our contribution to an international peacekeeping mission should comprise about one battalion; that is, 1,000 or 2,000 men. Why do we need 370,000, as planned for 1 January 1995?

[Naumann] First of all, it is not up to the soldiers to justify the strength of the Bundeswehr. I do not want to evade this question but simply make clear that political decisions are involved here.

A strength of 370,000 men was agreed on in the spring of 1990, on the basis of stability considerations. When discussing stability in our neighborhood, we asked ourselves what degree of military strength should the unified Germany, while remaining a member of the alliance, display in peacetime without being viewed as a threat of any kind by its neighbors in the East. We then examined the level of European stability and tried to find a formula that would make it possible for the Soviet Union to agree to an acceptable reduction of the strength of its Armed Forces. On this basis, we determined the peacetime strength of the future Bundeswehr.

[Bertram] Which was also agreed to by Kohl and Gorbachev in Moscow. No one assumed then that the Soviet Union would collapse.

[Naumann] No, no one knew that. The force of 370,000 troops corresponds to the requirements of stability and arms control policies. We are currently the only country that has stipulated a reduction of the peacetime strength of its armed forces. The government does not plan to further reduce the Bundeswehr, because other countries have not yet taken similar steps.

[Bertram] Thus, 370,000 is a political figure and not absolutely necessary from a military viewpoint.

[Naumann] It is a figure that is militarily justifiable in terms of stability and politically justifiable in terms of arms control.

[Bertram] Doubts are increasing as to whether this strength is still realistic. Over 150,000 conscientious objectors were registered last year, twice as many as the previous year. There are problems concerning recruiting officers and noncommissioned officers.

[Naumann] When making plans concerning the strength of the army, we considered the current number of

conscientious objectors. There was a dramatic increase in February and March last year.

[Bertram] Because of the Gulf war.

[Naumann] Between April and December 1991, the number of conscientious objectors dropped again to nearly the level of the previous year. Thus, our estimates are not that unrealistic.

[Bertram] What about the professional soldiers?

[Naumann] As far as volunteers are concerned, it is true we suffered a setback last year. For the first time, we were not able to cover our demand for officers and noncommissioned officers. We have to find out now whether 1991 was an unusual year. I believe constant talk about the strength of the Bundeswehr—you know that there was real competition as to who could offer the lowest figure—led to the impression among young men that this is an enterprise that will soon collapse; therefore, they did not want to join it, which caused considerable insecurity. Thus, the defense minister and I insisted on a clear political solution.

The reduction process can only be controlled in a sensible way if a light is visible at the end of the tunnel. The new model for the personnel structure adopted by the Cabinet outlines the structure of permanent positions for 1995. It proceeds from the assumption that there will be 135,000 conscripts and 4,000 reserve duty trainees. The rest are soldiers who sign up for a certain period and professional soldiers, which shows that the personnel structure that we aim for is still based on the principle of compulsory military service, but the number of volunteers is quite high, which ensures sufficient flexibility.

[Bertram] The responsible officials are probably not opening up prospects for soldiers by sticking to a figure that is becoming increasingly questionable, or do they adhere to this figure because they want to create a realistic basis for the year 2000?

[Naumann] One could argue that. On the other hand, I must stress the following: The reduction by nearly 30,000 men annually, accompanied by the removal of material and the closure of numerous barracks, must be handled carefully. For this reason, the reduction to 370,000 soldiers must be carried out in a sensible way, otherwise, chaos will prevail and make the army a worthless instrument.

[Bertram] There are many who mourn the clarity of the beautiful old threat scenarios.

[Naumann] Things were naturally easier then, but I am not sad that that era is over. I find it fascinating to live at a time that we can shape ourselves. What I do not know with 100 percent certainty is whether we have found the right solutions. We have at least tried to keep open the various options that can be used when the situation in Europe has consolidated somewhat.

[Bertram] To what extent are the military planners still prisoners of the old criteria? The Fighter-90, the controversial fighter aircraft project, is currently being compared with other possible systems. The specifications used for comparison are the same as for the Fighter-90, despite the fact the military environment has changed after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.

[Naumann] One must not apply the criteria of the past to acquisition of a fighter aircraft, but one must distinguish between quantitative and qualitative factors in this regard. Qualitatively, the demands on the fighter aircraft have not really changed, except for a few details. The planes must be able to locate and strike relatively small airborne objects after a relatively short reaction time.

[Bertram] They should also be able to intercept about 10,000 aircraft [sentence as published].

[Naumann] I think I beleaguered the Luftwaffe leadership with endless questions, because I wanted to ensure that the 1986 requirements are being adapted to a completely new situation as far as security policy and strategies are concerned. Certain features, however, including agility—the extreme mobility of the aircraft—and maneuverability are still necessary today.

What I cannot and do not want to understand are old parameters, such as a certain number of attacking planes must be repulsed by a certain number of aircraft within a certain time, which no longer makes sense. The new situation should be based on the number of planes needed, and possibly the type of planes, which are the criteria we have to consider.

[Bertram] One of your colleagues among the generals recently said: "All problems in the Bundeswehr can be solved provided the task is clear." The new missions of the soldiers, however, are still very vague. Can they become so clear again so as to motivate conscripts and professional soldiers and to convince the public that has been promised a "peace dividend" that it is necessary to continue spending 50 billion German marks on defense every year?

[Naumann] No. The crystal-clear clarity of the past 35 years, when we had a clear defense mission and when we knew nearly every bush in the territory that we had to defend, will not return.

Still, the tasks adopted by the Cabinet in February are clear. They are quite comprehensive. For one thing, the Cabinet decided that defending alliance territory has the same priority as defending Germany, which is an enormous step for an army of conscripts. For 35 years, the only Bundeswehr mission was to defend German territory and air space with land and air forces, which is a concept that must be revised. It must become a matter of course for every young man in the Bundeswehr that operations in the alliance area are equally justified from a moral and ethical viewpoint for the defense of Germany.

[Bertram] What other new tasks have been adopted?

[Naumann] The first step is a gigantic step for an army of conscripts. If we have to assume additional tasks at a later date, such as UN missions, we will have to examine the extent that we can use conscripts very carefully in every individual case. No decision has been made yet.

This adaptation will not be easy for the officers and noncommissioned officers. Thus, it was important for the new mission, which involves an amendment to the Basic Law to outline the role of the soldiers. It was also necessary to provide security for those now serving in Iraq and Cambodia within the UN framework and to

show them that this is a task that has to be assumed by the Bundeswehr should the politicians decide accordingly.

[Bertram] Are you in favor of that?

[Naumann] I do not want our soldiers to fight, because I cannot look forward to assuming responsibility for the deaths of people entrusted to me. I certainly do not want that, but I want Germany to assume its responsibilities and fulfill its obligations as a member of the United Nations, which have been ratified with the consent of all parties without reservation, on which I also want to achieve a broad consensus among the people.

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