


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


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Article on Nuclear Strength, Part Two

HK2208021492 Hong Kong PAI HSING in Chinese
No 269, 1 Aug 92 pp 26-31

[Article by Chao Yun-Shan (6392 0061 1472): "Communist China's Nuclear Might (Part Two): How Many Nuclear Bombs Does China Have?"; first paragraph is PAI HSING editor's note; Part One of article published in the Science & Technology section of the 23 July China DAILY REPORT, beginning on page 23]

[Excerpts] (Some 50 footnotes to this article have been deleted for reasons of space limitation. They will be sent to interested readers upon request.) [passage omitted]

A. Communist China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Communist China currently has about 1,000 warheads in its strategic nuclear weapons arsenal, which will be increased to about 1,200 in the next two to three years. The reasons for the increase will be explored in the chapter on "Communist China's Nuclear Strategies."

1. Ground-based strategic nuclear weapons

The Dongfeng-2 (DF-2/CSS-1 [preceding letters in Roman alphabet and throughout]) ballistic missile was fully developed by 1956 and fitted with nuclear warheads in 1966. Its range is 1,450 to 1,800 km, covering Taiwan, Japan and all U.S. military bases in Japan. But the time needed for DF-2 missiles to proceed from the preparation stage to launch was too long, and so non-mobile Dongfeng-2 missiles were all retired.

The Dongfeng-3 (DF-3/CSS-2) ballistic missile reached full development in 1966. They can each carry over 3 megatons of TNT in H-bomb warheads. Its range is between 2,800 to 7,000 km, covering Asia and U.S. bases in the Philippines. About 150 Dongfeng-3 ballistic missile are deployed at fixed launch sites.

The Dongfeng-4 (DF-4/CSS-3) ballistic missile saw full development in 1971, and can carry over 3 million tonnes of TNT in H-bomb warheads. Its range is between 5,500 and 10,000 km, covering the Soviet Union, the Middle East and U.S. bases in Guam. It is estimated that 350 to 400 Dongfeng-4 are now in service in communist China's strategic missile units.

The Dongfeng-5 (DF-5/CSS-4) ballistic missile was fully developed in 1980 and put into service in 1981. The Dongfeng-5 missile can deliver 5 megatons plus in H-bomb warheads and carry multiple warheads on independently targeted reentry vehicles [MIRV's]. [as published] The Dongfeng-5 is capable of carrying more than 10 MIRV's. Its range is between 13,000 to 15,000 km, covering all countries in the world. The Dongfeng-5, of which there are an estimated 200, is in active service. About 100 of these carry large H-bomb warhead equivalents [da dang liang 1129 3981 6852], and the remaining 100 or so carry MIRV's. Dongfeng-5 missiles are deployed in the central mountainous regions of Mainland China.

2. Underwater strategic weapons

At present communist China has about five submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles at its disposal. One is the Hai Wan-class conventionally powered submarine, which has only two launching tubes and which is usually only used as an experimental launch pad. And then there are the four Xia-class nuclear submarines. Two of them each have 12 launching tubes, and the other two have 16 each.

The submarine-launched ballistic missile Julang-1 (JL-1/CSS-N-3) carried by Xia-class submarines was developed in 1982 and can carry 2 megaton warheads, has a firing range of 2,800 km, and is an important element of communist China's nuclear-retaliatory capability, that is, second strike capability. At present, Julang-1 missiles are being replaced by the Julang-2 (JL-2/CSS-NX-4). The Julang-2 is a strategic nuclear weapon capable of carrying MIRV's.

The other two Xia-class submarines being built by the Hulu Island Ship Manufacturing Plant in Liaoning Province may be completed and put into service some time between 1992 and 1993.

3. Aerial strategic nuclear weapons

Compared with those of the United States and the Soviet Union, communist China's air power does not enjoy any advantage, and so it is not reliable for communist China to carry nuclear weapons on bombers. Therefore, at present, communist China does not have many nuclear-armed cruise missiles available for bombers to deliver. Communist China has about 100 to 150 air-launched strategic nuclear weapons.

Communist China is vigorously increasing its high-performance fighters, for example, the Jian-9 (J-9/F-9), and is actively producing a new generation of long-range supersonic bombers in order to boost its airborne delivery capacity for strategic nuclear weapons. This type of long-range supersonic bombers is expected to go into service in 1993.

At present, the airborne deliverer for communist China's strategic nuclear weapons is Hong-6 (Tu-16/B-6D). Its highest speed is 786 km/hr, its greatest combat radius is 4,300 km, and it is estimated to be capable of carrying four to six cruise missiles.

Summing up the above, we can see that communist China is striving to boost its submarine- and air-launched nuclear weapons capabilities in anticipation of changing strategic requirements in the future. The defensive capability of communist China's land-based strategic nuclear weapons is comparatively strong. One of the reasons lies in the fact that communist China's early nuclear retaliation capability relied solely on what land-based missiles survived after a nuclear attack. The second reason was the Soviet Union's plan to conduct "surgery" on communist China in the summer of 1969,

which played a great role in bringing about determination and action on the part of communist China to defend its strategic missiles well. Communist China hid its strategic missiles in caves in remote mountains and gorges and silos dug out of solid rock, or made them mobile, with a view to preserving and using them should hostile nuclear bombs fail to score a direct hit on these targets.

B. Communist China's Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Although communist China issued reports on its military exercises employing tactical nuclear weapons only as late as June 1982, it was discovered as early as the 1970's that communist China possessed tactical nuclear weapons ranging from 10 to 30 kilotons. In fact, communist China already possessed a variety of tactical nuclear weapons ranging from 2 to 20 kilotons.

Actually, when you have grasped the technology to make 20-kiloton nuclear warheads as those above, manufacturing tactical nuclear weapons is not difficult. Communist China may have gained experience in reducing the burst effect of energy (yield) by controlling the ratio of fissionable fuel with neutron reflection technology when it was conducting experiments on tactical weapons. Communist China also learnt a long time ago to use lithium and polonium to make priming devices for tactical nuclear weapons.

Therefore, communist China was familiar with the technology to make tactical nuclear weapons. Communist China's fighters, such as the Jian-7, the Jian-8, and the Jian-9; attack aircraft like the Qiang-5; and bombers like the Hong-5 and Hong-6 can all serve as tactical nuclear weapons carriers. A variety of domestically researched and produced intermediate- and short-range missiles can also carry tactical nuclear warheads, such as the M-9 and M-11 missiles. Although communist China's tactical weapons have a low accuracy rate because of backward avionics, this mainly affects missiles with conventional warheads and in no way affects accuracy requirements when nuclear warheads are mounted.

If war breaks out between the two shores in the next few years and if the United States directly intervenes in armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, with the result that communist China cannot succeed in taking out Taiwan despite sustained attacks, then communist China might threaten to attack U.S. surface forces with tactical atomic weapons, thereby bringing the United States and China into an arena of large-scale conflict. [passage omitted]

In the past, communist China aimed its strategic nuclear weapons at two imaginary enemies: the United States and the Soviet Union. Chronologically this can be divided into three periods.

For 14 years, from the Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee on 25 January 1955, personally presided over by Mao Zedong, at which a decision was

taken to commit full resources to nuclear weapons production, up to the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border war in the summer of 1969, the target of communist China's nuclear strategic forces was the United States.

In 1970, Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to Beijing and showed then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai satellite pictures and intercepted Soviet messages indicating Soviet missile deployments in preparation for "surgery" on communist China's nuclear bases. Thereafter, communist China's nuclear weapons were aimed at Moscow. This lasted for 19 years, from 1970 to 1989.

With Gorbachev's 1989 visit to Beijing and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the threat from the north against Communist China was reduced and Deng Xiaoping believed that the chief enemy against communist China from then on was the United States.

As U.S. support for Taiwan's efforts to win independent international status becomes increasingly clear, tension has again appeared in relations between communist China and the United States. Predictably, communist China's nuclear weapons will once again point at the United States. However, because of inadequate numbers, communist China may step up production of about 200 Dongfeng-5 (DF-5/CSS-4) multiple warhead missiles in the next two to three years to counteract the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) system, and the production and deployment of Xia-class nuclear submarines.

In communist China's nuclear strategy there is no concept of launching an offensive against an opponent's nuclear weapons (counterforce). The reason: Given the accuracy rate of communist China's MIRV's, an offensive against U.S. or Soviet nuclear forces would, without a doubt, be suicidal. The blueprint drawn up by communist China according to its weapons technology and capabilities is that it always has enough nuclear weapons to survive an enemy's attack and to launch destructive strikes on the enemy. Therefore, Communist China's nuclear weapons defense is better. The equivalent volume [deng liang 4583 6852] is larger and the targets they aim for are mostly industrial and population centers. In other words, communist China's nuclear strategy has remained at the value-destruction (countervalue) level and has not reached the force-destruction (counterforce) level. Precisely for this reason, it is a great threat to human survival.

While remaining at the value-destruction level, communist China's nuclear strategy has also effected three incidences of class-one [yi ji 0001 4787] nuclear dissemination strategy.

The nuclear dissemination strategy is a method which creates secondary threats and troubles for one's opponents by disseminating nuclear technology and related weapons to potential or actual enemies of one's opponent. It hurts the opponent's interests and furthers Communist China's strategic interests and status.

In 1980, communist China disseminated nuclear technology to Pakistan, with the result that Pakistan was able to make atomic bombs with which to counterbalance and contain India and offset its potential threat. Communist China not only assisted Pakistan in making atomic bombs, but also provided it with nuclear weapons vehicles, such as the M-9 missile with a range of about 600 km and M-11 missiles with a range of about 1,000 km.

In the Middle East, communist China has helped Algeria build nuclear reactors. Despite Chinese arguments that reactors cannot produce atomic bombs, it is common sense that nuclear reactors are able to produce plutonium-239. More importantly, communist China knew that Algeria, an Arab country which thus far appears to be stable, might transfer acquired nuclear technology to unstable Arab countries or that other unstable countries might take the initiative in obtaining the nuclear technology they need from Algeria.

In view of U.S. long-range strategic forces, communist China taught North Korea how to make atomic bombs and the Iraqis how to separate and enrich uranium-235.

In the era of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the West ignored the growth and threat from communist China's nuclear power, giving it the time to quietly build the world's third largest nuclear arsenal.

Do Communist China's Nuclear Weapons Pose a Nuclear Threat to the United States?

With the collapse of Soviet communism, communist Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping believes that the world will now be one of a faceoff between China and the United States, saying: "The Soviet Union is now behind us, and from now on we stand on the front line of opposing American imperialism. In a word, from now on our opponent is the United States."

On 3 and 4 September 1991, Yang Shangkun attended a Central Military Commission plenary meeting on behalf of the CPC. At the meeting he read a report on mobilization entitled "The Whole Army Must Fight Well the Two Battles Under the Leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission," in which he pointed out: "Do a good job in material preparations in anticipation of waging war, regional war, modernized three-dimensional war, or even nuclear war," and in obvious reference to the United States, "we are not the chief of staff of hegemonism and power politics, but this we can say outright: whichever country launches or starts war and imposes war on us will be answered with destructive counter-strikes on its own land." In other words, if communist China resorts to force against Taiwan and the United States directly intervenes, Communist China will go to the length of launching a nuclear attack.

Three months after Yang Shangkun's speech, former U.S. ambassador in Beijing, James Lilley, gave a speech

on the Taiwan issue on 5 December at Harvard University, before he became assistant secretary of defense, in which he pointed out that all communist China's threats to use force are "dream talk by an idiot," adding a statement in Chinese: "that is baloney!" James Lilley stated that if communist China used force against Taiwan, then when necessary, the U.S. President can, on the strength of the Taiwan Relations Act, adopt defensive military action without the consent of Congress. He pointed out: "We have the capability to fulfil our promises. The Gulf war is the best proof."

If the words from the two sides as described above reveal the latent possibility of nuclear conflict, then the next question is: Can the United States avoid being eliminated while destroying China with its nuclear might? Does it have the ability to shoot down all the atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs from a massive retaliatory strike by communist China? At present does it have the capability to free itself from communist China's nuclear threat?

An important and significant breakthrough in ballistic-missile reconnaissance and tracking technology was made in May 1990 on a space shuttle mission for the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative). When a rocket motor ignites in space, it emits a hitherto unknown electro-optical bell-ranger, which can be picked up by a Brilliant Eyes satellite at a distance of about 10 km. The Brilliant Eyes will keep track of the missile and direct ground stations to launch antiballistic-missile missiles to intercept incoming nuclear warheads or it will relate the data to a laser radar, which will lock onto the incoming nuclear warhead and let Brilliant Pebbles destroy it.

This was a breakthrough American discovery, which was based on the electro-optical bell-ranger and latest SDI concepts.

The U.S. Air Force is drawing up plans to apply for \$6 billion to make 40 to 60 brilliant eyes. For the moment, let us leave aside the question whether all the parts in this grand system will function accurately, without error, and in accordance with the present concept, because this is a matter for the future. The question so far and in the next four years until the end of 1996 is that the United States does not have a very effective defense system against massive ballistic missile attacks.

Looked at from another angle, if the United States already had a reliable ballistic-missile defense system, it would not be spending so much on building it. The SDI cost \$4.15 billion in 1992, up 30 percent from 1991, and the sum will continue to grow considerably in the next few years as it is still far from meeting the needs of developing 40 to 60 brilliant eyes.

In the next few years, the United States will mainly rely on ground-launched antiballistic-missile missiles to intercept an enemy's incoming nuclear warheads, because laser-guided interception and electromagnetic rail gun systems are still immature. This is also the reason why the United States changed President

Reagan's space-based SDI into a ground-based SDI. The United States plans to complete by the end of 1996 in (Grand Forks) [da yi zhen 1129 5030 6966], North Dakota, a ground-based antimissile system comprised of more than 100 missile interceptors before it deploys the same kind of system in other areas.

From now up to the end of 1996, if communist China launches a massive nuclear attack on the United States, for example, about 400 Dongfeng-5 ballistic missiles with multiple warheads or large equivalent H-bomb warheads, the U.S. ground-based antiballistic-missile missiles and laser-guided interceptor systems cannot possibly intercept all the nuclear warheads, many of which would then fall on the North American continent.

Possibly taking note of this latent threat, President Bush invited the Soviet Union to jointly research and develop a ground-based SDI antiballistic-missile missile system.

In the next few years, communist China's nuclear weapons will truly be a threat to the United States.

Conclusions

By the end of 1991, if we calculate that the production of a nuclear warhead takes 17 kg of uranium-235 and 5 kg of plutonium-239, then the aggregate production of uranium-235 and plutonium-239 by the plant in Lanzhou, Gansu; the No 1 plant in Helanshan, Ningxia; the plant in Baotou, Inner Mongolia; and that in Yumen, Gansu, will be enough to make at least 2,733 nuclear warheads, which might represent half of the actual number of warheads in communist China's nuclear arsenal, as those made by the No 2 plant in Helanshan, Ningxia; the plant in Hanzhong, Shaanxi; and the plants in Hongyuan and Mianyang, Sichuan, are not included.

It is an appropriate estimate that Communist China possesses 5,000 nuclear warheads. This sum is more than 10 times that estimated by experts in the West.

In June 1967, communist China detonated a 3-megaton H-bomb. That was 25 years ago. Communist China has large amounts of uranium-235 and deuterated uranium (LiD) for manufacturing H-bombs.

Since the successful modeling on the Soviet R-2 rocket in November 1960, Communist China has possessed nuclear delivery vehicles of different kinds, whose precision performance is up to the requirements of nuclear weapons delivery.

Communist China is gradually retiring low-end type [di xing hao 0144 0992 5714] Dongfeng strategic missiles. At the end of 1991, communist China had about 200 Dongfeng-5 vehicles capable of carrying MIRV's or H-bombs of 4 megatons plus. Another 200 or so Dongfeng-5 strategic nuclear weapons will be in service in the next two to three years.

Dongfeng-5 ballistic missiles cover all the countries in the world.

Communist China has an underwater ballistic missile launch capability. Julang-2 (CSS-NX-4), the missile launched on nuclear submarines and which carries MIRV's will also go into service in the near future.

Western estimates of the number of communist China's nuclear-warhead vehicles are wrong.

China tried hard to reduce its number of nuclear tests, with the result that the West's conclusions on the development of Communist China's nuclear weapons, obtained as they were through inferences drawn on the basis of the development of the West's nuclear weapons, are erroneous. Communist China now has enough nuclear weapons to pose a threat to the survival of any country in the world.

At present, the ground-based strategic missiles, which have a better defense system, are the mainstay of communist China's nuclear power. About four Xia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines are now under water, two of which have 12 launching tubes, the other two having 16. Although communist China is actively making new strategic bombers, of those in service only the Hong-6 type can act as a strategic bomber, but its combat range is only 4,300 km.

Communist China has tactical nuclear weapons of various types and models, which are mostly mounted on short-range missiles. If an outside force intervenes in what communist China calls its internal affairs, for example, armed conflicts between the two shores of the Taiwan Strait, the possibility that communist China would launch a local attack with tactical nuclear weapons cannot be excluded.

In the immediate future, communist China may increase production of the sort of nuclear weapons that are aimed against the United States. Communist China's nuclear capability enhances its bargaining power in the international community. It quietly built up its nuclear capability as the whole process was overshadowed by the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, Western experts generally ignored its nuclear power.

Existing U.S. antiballistic-missile missiles are not sufficiently powerful to intercept communist China's nuclear weapons. It is still some years before the American SDI system will be fully developed. The possibility of a nuclear confrontation between China and the United States exists.

Army Begins Further Half-Million-Man Reduction

HK2608130292 Hong Kong CHING CHI JIH PAO in Chinese 26 Aug 92 p 8

["Special dispatch" from Beijing by special correspondent Chang Hua (1728 5478): "China Decides To Further Reduce Troops by Half a Million; Central Military Commission Document Relayed to Army Units"]

[Text] Following Deng Xiaoping's reduction of 1 million troops in 1985, the CPC's plan to reduce troops by another half a million is now being carried out by various military regions.

Sources from the CPC's military top levels said that as early as the beginning of last year, the Central Military Commission [CMC] had already begun to discuss the applicability and necessity of another reduction, mainly by reviewing the international situation and analyzing the situation of reform and opening up. Especially since the Persian Gulf war, the CPC has understood very well that the troops are valued for their quality, not their quantity.

The internally-circulated political document issued by the CMC said the central authorities will take three years to complete the task of the second reduction (which is internally called streamlining). According to the CMC document, the main targets of the streamlining are three major departments—the General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department, and the General Logistics Department. In some departments, which are not key departments, about one-third of the personnel will take off their army uniforms.

Sources pointed out that a new round of reductions has already begun within the Army. All arms and services and all military regions have conveyed the spirit of the document to the grass-roots units and some departments have begun to fill in the relevant forms. Everyone is required to fill in a form, first to express his willingness to obey orders. Then it will be decided by the higher level leaders who will remain in the Army and who will leave with reference to their "voluntariness."

A major general in the General Political Department said that although the work of streamlining and reorganization will be completed in 1994, there is much discussion about this within the Army now. Some people are quite restless, especially those who have served in the Army for a long time, have a lower educational background, are comparatively advanced in age, or who are in lower positions. They have shown a greater resistance to the streamlining, but some young servicemen, especially young officers who have graduated from military academies and schools, are enthusiastic about it. One reason is that they are dissatisfied with the lower pay and remuneration the army receives. Another reason is that many of them want to take part in local reforms.

Changes in Global Nuclear Power Viewed

*OW3108165592 Beijing Central People's Radio
Network in Mandarin 0500 GMT 31 Aug 92*

[From the "International News and Current Events" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, the end of the cold war has brought about great changes in global strategic nuclear power. Large numbers of offensive nuclear weapons have been demolished or dismantled following the implementation

of the U.S.-Soviet START Treaty. The new situation has prompted major nuclear states to start revising their nuclear deterrent strategies and to actively promote the modernization of their strategic nuclear forces. In this program, we will brief you on the changes in global strategic nuclear power over the past year.

Major progress was made in global nuclear disarmament over the past year. Between September and October of last year, the United States and the former Soviet Union reached a new agreement on nuclear disarmament. According to the agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union will destroy large numbers of their tactical nuclear arms, including thousands of nuclear artillery pieces, the U.S.-made Lance missile, the Soviet-made Scarab missile, the U.S. (?B-6E) nuclear cruise missile and B-517 nuclear bomb, and the former Soviet Union's (?Eel) and (?Gladiator) cruise missiles. These weapons provided the major nuclear deterrence in the East-West confrontation during the cold war. However, we still have a long way to go in realizing our hope of world peace even if all these weapons were destroyed, since START limits the United States and the Soviet Union to no more than 6,500 nuclear warheads each. This means that the United States and the Soviet Union will have a total of 13,000 nuclear warheads. Such massive nuclear arsenals hang over our head like a sharp sword.

In his State of the Union address delivered at the end of January, President Bush put forward a new proposal on massive nuclear disarmament which includes strategic surface, sea, and air nuclear arms. The United States proposed to Russia that both sides reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to 4,700 for the United States and 4,400 for the regions of the former Soviet Union. Fully agreeing to President Bush's new proposal on nuclear disarmament, Russian President Yeltsin proposed plans for deeper cuts. He suggested that each side limit their strategic nuclear warheads to around 2,500, that the CIS completely lift its alert status for nuclear arms, and that nuclear arms be directed away from the United States. Half a year later, the United States and Russia reached an agreement of understanding on START based on this proposal. Both sides agreed to additional massive cuts in their offensive strategic arms. The United States and Russia agreed that seven years after implementing the START Treaty, each side should have no more than a total of 3,800 to 4,250 nuclear warheads. A problem ensuing from the START Treaty was how to destroy the excessive nuclear arms. This is a difficult problem for both the United States and the CIS. The destruction of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and all sorts of nuclear strategic arms poses a difficult problem, technically and economically. That was why the United States and Russia, in their agreement of understanding on START, only vaguely stated they would trim their respective nuclear warheads to not more than 3,000 to 3,500 by the end of 2000, provided the United States is willing to provide the funds needed to help Russia destroy or dismantle its strategic offensive arms. There is very little hope of achieving that goal. Reports indicate

that there are about 27,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union. Russia, the CIS, and other nuclear states do not possess the capability to destroy such massive amounts of nuclear warheads. According to reports, the U.S. Congress approved \$400 million in financial aid to help regions under the former Soviet Union destroy their nuclear arms. We have yet to know how much can be accomplished with \$400 million. Furthermore, the U.S. economy has been in a recession over the past few years; it is not easy to deliver the full \$400 million approved by the U.S. Congress. The process of reducing strategic nuclear arms has at long last begun, despite the many difficulties facing it.

It is a relief that the two biggest nuclear powers are reducing their arsenals. However, massive cuts in offensive nuclear weapons do not mean the disappearance of the nuclear threat. The United States, Russia, Britain, and France still consider nuclear deterrence the major component of their strategic plans. They are actively pushing for the modernization of their strategic nuclear forces in order to adapt to the post-cold war international situation. These countries have revised their nuclear deterrent strategies over the past few months. The United States has suggested turning its previous nuclear deterrent theories—which were mainly targeted at the USSR—into a comprehensive, multilevel nuclear deterrent strategy directed against other regions. It has proposed adjusting its strategic defense plan into a global system to counter limited nuclear attack; it has also proposed strengthening its leading position in high technology to guarantee its strategic superiority.

However, Britain insists that nuclear deterrence is the principal element of its national defense strategy. It will not limit the quantity of its nuclear arms in light of other countries. Britain feels it must possess enough nuclear weapons to strike at potential aggressors. France has revised its previous concept of limited and sufficient nuclear deterrence in light of the new situation, and has proposed the theory of fundamental sufficiency in nuclear deterrence. France believes that one should possess a minimum nuclear deterrent to cope with all types of contingencies or the possible infringement of its interests by potential enemies. Nuclear deterrence has diminished in the CIS, where the danger of nuclear proliferation has arisen following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the CIS has concentrated on coordinating the actions of its member states. To this end it has drafted a new security strategy based on a unified strategic airspace and a unified command system to effectively control and supervise nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, and to counter global nuclear threats directed against it. A common distinctive aspect of these new thoughts on nuclear strategy is that all parties, having been deprived of a clear enemy following the end of the cold war, have conjured up an imaginary enemy to prove the need for the existence of nuclear arms.

William Arkin, director of the Military Affairs Research Department of Greenpeace, believes this is a product of

rigid convictions in the need for eternally preserving the system of nuclear warfare. Because it is not clear what constitutes an imaginary enemy or a global threat, the major nuclear states regard efforts to upgrade the mobility, survivability, and sustainability of nuclear arms as the major focus in the development of nuclear power. They actively promote efforts to modernize strategic nuclear forces. To guarantee its nuclear superiority, the United States plans to modernize and retool its intercontinental missile units, strategic bomber units, and submarine-based strategic missile units by the end of the 1990's. It will continue to maintain its triad of strategic nuclear power. However, Britain and France will focus on modernizing their ballistic missile nuclear submarines and on developing their submarine-launched strategic nuclear missile systems in order to ensure the reliability of their nuclear deterrent. The CIS has also been pushing for the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces despite its economic difficulties. It plans to build and deploy its (?TIV)-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines and various types of high-performance strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The new nuclear strategies adopted by these countries show that the theory of nuclear deterrence, which is a product of the cold war, has not disappeared following the end of the cold war. Mankind still lives under the threat of nuclear arms.

U.S. on Russia Producing Biological Weapons

*OW3108225292 Beijing XINHUA in English
2206 GMT 31 Aug 92*

[Text] Washington, August 31 (XINHUA)—The U.S. State Department today confirmed a press report that the Russian Government has failed to provide evidence that it has shut down germ warfare production program.

"The current overall status of the illegal offensive weapons program remains unclear," State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said.

"To date, we do not have the kind of concrete actions that would indicate that the Russian Government has effectively terminated the illegal Soviet offensive biological weapons program," he said.

Boucher's remarks came following a WASHINGTON POST report that U.S. and British officials are worried that Russia has yet to meet repeated U.S. and British requests for evidence that the germ weapons program has been terminated and for a detailed declaration by Russia of the program's past scope.

The POST said that during his meeting with U.S. President George Bush, Russian President Boris Yeltsin acknowledged that the former Soviet Union maintained a secret germ weapon program in violation of an 1972 International Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Yeltsin issued a decree in April to halt the program involving the development of bombs and warheads capable of carrying anthrax, tularemia and Q fever biological warfare agents.

The U.S. intelligence community has determined since April that the program has at least been scaled back, but cannot verify that it has been eliminated, the POST said.

The revelation of Russia's non-compliance with the U.S. demand that it stop developing biological weapon program may affect the Western aid for the country because under a 1991 U.S. law, at least 500 million in U.S. economic aid to Russia and other former Soviet republics is contingent on Moscow's adherence to the 1972 treaty.

"Our objective is that Russia take concrete steps to demonstrate that the former Soviet offensive biological weapons program has been terminated," Boucher said.

Text of Foreign Minister's Speech to Asia-Pacific Disarmament Conference

*OW0909022692 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
No 35, 31 Aug-6 Sep 92 pp 9-12*

[Speech by State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the UN Conference on Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asian-Pacific region, delivered in Shanghai on 17 August: "On Regional Disarmament and Security"]

[Text] Today, I take great pleasure in attending the opening session of the UN Conference on Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region upon invitation. High-level government officials, well-known experts and scholars of the participating countries will take this opportunity to have an in-depth discussion of major issues such as security and disarmament in the world and the Asia-Pacific region in particular in the 1990s. This is of great significance to enhancing mutual understanding and promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. On behalf of the Chinese government, I wish to extend congratulations on the convocation of the conference, thanks to its sponsors—the UN Disarmament Office and Shanghai Institute for International Studies, and warm welcome to foreign participants. I wish the conference a success.

In recent years, the United Nations had made tremendous efforts in facilitating settlement of regional conflicts, promoting disarmament and arms control and maintaining world peace and security. The convocation of a series of conferences and seminars on disarmament and security in the Asia-Pacific region is part and parcel of these efforts. We hereby express our appreciation and support.

At present, the international situation is undergoing unprecedented changes. Such changes are very rare in peace time. The bipolar pattern and the half-a-century-long East-West military confrontation have

come to an end. These changes are conducive to the prevention of a new world war. However, they have not brought peace and tranquility to the world. The old contradictions and conflicts are yet to be eliminated. As the equilibrium of forces in the world has been seriously disrupted, contradictions which were either hidden or relatively inconspicuous in the past have rapidly deteriorated into sharp and sanguinary conflicts or even local wars. The international situation has become all the more complicated, turbulent and volatile.

We are delighted to see, however, that the situation in the Asia-Pacific region is moving towards relaxation and stability. The political settlement of the Cambodian question according to the Paris Agreements is under way. Despite many setbacks and difficulties which have happened and will continue to happen, a peaceful settlement of the issue accords with the trend of the times, and national reconciliation conforms to the popular desire. The relations between Indochina and ASEAN countries are improving. The more-than-ten-year-long Afghan war caused by foreign invasion has come to an end with the patriotic armed forces coming out of the war triumphantly. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is further easing off as a result of the North-South reconciliation and major progress in the denuclearization process on the peninsula. The relations among Asia-Pacific countries have generally developed with deepened mutual trust, strengthened friendly and neighbourly ties and more stable relationship among big powers. It should be particularly noted that the Asia-Pacific region is the most dynamic region in the world economy. Many countries in the region have initially embarked on a virtuous cycle of political stability guaranteeing economic development and promoting political stability. This is a reliable basis for stability in the region. Of course, we are also aware of the fact that there are destabilizing factors in this region. For instance, some countries are still in a state of division; the historical disputes which have triggered many wars on the South Asian Subcontinent remain unresolved; territorial and border disputes and religious strifes still exist. If these problems are properly resolved in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence governing state-to-state relations, it is possible to maintain regional peace and stability.

With the end of the East-West confrontation and cold war, certain progress has been made in the global disarmament and arms control. In Europe, a conventional disarmament process has started. The two major military powers have reached several agreements on the reduction of various categories of nuclear weapons. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council have agreed on a few norms for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the transfer of conventional weapons. And the negotiations on the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction are now at the concluding stage. The US and Russia have cut their troops stationed in the Asia-Pacific

region. Some countries have increased confidence-building and security-enhancing measures with their neighbours and some have reduced their border troops. At the same time we should note that in spite of the disarmament efforts, the major military powers still possess a large quantity of over-kill nuclear weapons and a big arsenal of sophisticated weapons and space weapons. They still have strong offensive naval and air forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, some Asia-Pacific countries are still in military confrontation with each other. All these are incompatible with the growing trend towards peace, relaxation and stability in the region. It is an important task facing Asia-Pacific countries to seize the current favourable opportunity to adopt effective measures with a view to improving the security environment in the region. These measures constitute an important guarantee for regional peace and stability and for economic development of all countries in the region and serve their fundamental interests.

The security of the Asia-Pacific region is inseparable from that of each country in the region. If not every country enjoys security in the region, there is no regional security to speak of. One of the characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region is diversities in terms of the size, wealth, strength, social system, ideology, religious belief, culture and custom of various countries. The diversity requires all countries to respect each other, treat each other as equals and live in harmony. The post-war Asia-Pacific rim was a region of frequent local wars. A review of the local wars shows that all of them were caused by aggression waged by the big or strong against the small or weak in an attempt to impose their own social system, ideology and will upon the latter and that the aggressors have all ended in failure. A host of facts have shown that none of these engaged in hegemonic practices, military expansion in preparation for war or in military aggression has ended up well, or could avoid going downhill, being defeated or even collapsing, no matter how strong they were. Historical experience tells us that to ensure security of all countries, apart from disarmament and arms control, what is more important is that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country should be respected and maintained, in particular that the big, rich and strong countries should respect the independence and sovereignty of the small, weak and poor ones, and that all acts of hegemonism, aggression and expansion in whatever form should be opposed and prevented. This is the key to and a prerequisite for ensuring regional security.

Regional security also hinges on the overall world situation and the status of international relations. During the current historical transitional period with major changes taking place in the global pattern, the future of the world and the evolution of international relations largely depend on the nature of a new international order to be established. We believe that to establish a fair, rational and stable new international political and economic order on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and

mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence is the only way to ensure the independent and equal status of all countries, their peaceful coexistence, mutually beneficial cooperation and common development, and to lay a solid foundation for lasting world and regional peace, stability and security.

Asia is the birthplace of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference. The concept and principle of peaceful coexistence initiated by Asian countries have already been universally acknowledged and accepted in the international community. It is a valuable spiritual asset for a healthy international relationship and for regional and global peace. If all the Asia-Pacific countries valued and observe these principles, regional disputes and problems left over from history will not be difficult to solve and it will be possible to establish a new just and rational political and economic order in the Asia-Pacific region first.

The Asia-Pacific region occupies an important position and has a significant influence in today's world. The forthcoming 21st century will afford it greater opportunities and pose more challenges to it. With a view to promoting regional disarmament and security in an all-round way as well as regional peace and development, I wish to share my views with you:

1. In developing relations with one another, Asia-Pacific countries should strictly abide by the United Nations Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respect each other, treat each other with sincerity, cooperate with each other on an equal footing and live in amity. They should join their efforts to turn the Asia-Pacific region into one of peace, security, good neighbourliness and prosperity.
2. None of the Asia-Pacific countries should seek regional or sub-regional hegemony or establish sphere of influence, set up or participate in a military bloc directed against another country, build military bases on foreign soil or station its troops abroad. Nor should it infringe upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity or interfere in the internal affairs of other countries under whatever pretext.
3. All of the Asia-Pacific countries should commit themselves to developing good-neighbourly and friendly relations with their neighbours. They should settle territorial and border disputes as well as other problems left over from history through peaceful consultations in accordance with the relevant international conventions and UN resolutions instead of resorting to force or threat of force. In this regard, peaceful negotiations may be conducted when conditions are ripe; otherwise, a dispute or problem may be shelved until conditions are ripe. Pending settlement of a dispute, the countries concerned should adopt security-enhancing and confidence-building measures so as to avoid possible contingencies or conflicts.

4. None of the Asia-Pacific countries should engage in any form of arms race. The defence capabilities of each country should be kept at a level commensurate with its legitimate defence needs. Those countries with the largest nuclear arsenals and arsenals of the most sophisticated conventional weapons should continue to assume a special responsibility and fulfill corresponding obligations in disarmament, support the establishment of nuclear free zones or zones of peace in various sub-regions and pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or regions.

5. To promote common prosperity and development, Asia-Pacific countries should increase economic exchanges and co-operation. They need to expand and deepen the bilateral and multilateral economic relations between and among them and strengthen and improve APEC and other regional economic co-operation organizations so as to push the regional economic co-operation to a new high.

Over the past decade or more since the introduction of the policies of reform and opening up, China has unswervingly focused on economic development, reform and opening up and scored tremendous achievements. It is enjoying political and social stability and sustained economic growth. In addition to years of economic growth, China's GNP this year is expected to grow by about 9 percent. And its aggregate national strength and people's living standards have all improved markedly. At present, people throughout the country are working hard to deepen the reform and open China wider to the outside world, in an effort to develop the economy to a new high. A stable and economically growing China with a population of 1.1 billion constitutes an important factor making for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In order to realize modernization and focus on economic development, China needs a long-term peaceful and stable international environment, particularly in the surrounding areas. China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It has made maintenance of peace in the region and the world at large the overarching goal of its foreign policy and has taken development of friendly and good-neighbourly relations with surrounding countries as its set state policy. It has made unremitting efforts and due contributions to that end.

China upholds the principled stand of opposing hegemonism and power politics and will not seek hegemony and spheres of influence. As one of the initiators of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China is committed to these principles. China has no military bases overseas, nor has it sent any soldier to station abroad. China presents no threat to any country, nor does it interfere in the internal affairs of others.

China has settled border questions left over from the past with many countries through consultations on an

equal footing and on the principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. It will also endeavor to seek a satisfactory solution to the outstanding boundary issues or territorial disputes with the countries concerned in the same spirit.

China has always attached great importance to and actively participated in the disarmament efforts of the international community. It stands for effective disarmament and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner. It has all along been in favour of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear, biological, chemical, and space weapons. The possession by China of a limited number of nuclear weapons is solely for the purpose of self-defence. Besides, China has unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and regions. It supports non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It has formally acceded to the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] treaty and agreed to observe MTCR [expansion unknown]. It has actively participated in the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention and hopes to see the convention concluded at an early date.

China's military expenditure has always been kept at a very low level, much lower than that of any other big power. A few years ago, China unilaterally cut down its armed forces by 1 million. This gives full expression to the sincere desire of the Chinese government and people for peace and their courage in maintaining peace.

It is the shared goal and mission of all countries in the Asia-Pacific region to promote regional disarmament and security and ensure regional peace and development. So long as all countries have good faith, trust one another, carry out active cooperation and make concerted efforts, there is every promise of peace, stability and sustained development in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s and even the next century.

Support Reiterated for Chemical Weapons Ban

CD Chief Delegate Speaks

*OW0509002292 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0713 GMT 3 Sep 92*

[Text] Geneva, 3 Sep (XINHUA)—Hou Zhitong, head of the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament [CD] and ambassador for disarmament, reiterated here today that China has always supported a comprehensive ban and total destruction of all chemical weapons and their production facilities.

Speaking at the final plenary session of the conference, Hou Zhitong pointed out: Major progress has been achieved this year in negotiations on drafting a convention on banning all chemical weapons, thanks to the joint efforts of all member states and vigorous support from the international community. On 26 August, the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons agreed to transmit a work report attached with to a draft of the "Convention

on Banning the Development, Production, Storage, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" to the Conference on Disarmament for deliberation. The Chinese delegation took part in the deliberations.

Hou Zhitong said that at the instruction of the Chinese Government, he had explained its position on the ad hoc committee's report and the attached draft convention.

He said: As a nonchemical weapon state and a victim of the scourge of foreign chemical weapons, China has always stood firmly for the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention so as to forever free mankind from the danger of such weapons of mass destruction and promote world peace and security effectively.

China has always attached great importance to, actively participated in, and made due contributions to convention negotiations. The Chinese Government is willing to continue to work together with other countries to realize a chemical weapon-free world as soon as possible.

He said: Although the ad hoc committee's report and the attached draft convention on chemical weapons generally reflect the outcome and major progress in negotiations achieved by the Conference on Disarmament and its ad hoc committee on chemical weapons over the past years, divergencies remain in the current complex situation. The draft convention contains some positive provisions on which years of negotiations have culminated in a consensus. The provisions conform with the fundamental objective of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons. Comprehensive and earnest implementation of the provisions will contribute to safeguarding world peace and security.

He said: The Chinese Government believes that an essential guarantee to realizing the fundamental objective of the convention is for the relevant states to fulfill without reservation or delay these obligations of international law. Meanwhile, the draft convention does not reflect adequately the just demands and reasonable propositions of many developing countries, including China; it also lacks balance in a number of important issues. For this reason, China cannot but express concern and reservations.

He said: China has once again expressed sincere hopes that constructive consultations and negotiations will be held in the future for solving pending divergencies and eliminating drawbacks of the draft convention so as to realize the fundamental objective of the convention.

Hence, China, as a major developing country and proceeding from the overall interests of world peace and security, is willing to take part in the discussion for consensus on the report and its attached draft "Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons" prepared by the Conference on Disarmament.

Further Report

OW0309183592 Beijing XINHUA in English
1819 GMT 3 Sep 92

[Text] Geneva, September 3 (XINHUA)—A Chinese delegate said here on Thursday [3 September] that China has always been in favor of a convention on complete ban and thorough destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities.

Ambassador Hou Zhitong, head of the Chinese delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), made this statement at the final plenary meeting of its third session.

"Now we are pleased to see that the negotiations have finally made important headway this year," he said.

On August 26, the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons of the CD agreed to submit its report and the appendix containing the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction to CD for its consideration. China has joined the consensus, said Hou.

China, as a non-chemical weapon state, has always stood firmly for early conclusion of a convention on a ban and destruction of all chemical weapons so as to free mankind forever from the threat by these weapons and greatly contribute to international peace and security, he said.

Referring to the present draft of the convention, he said, taken as a whole, it represents the result of years of negotiations and reflect "the current complex situation where these negotiation have made important headway but some divergencies still remain."

The draft contains some positive parts on which years of negotiations have culminated in consensus, which conform to the fundamental objective of the convention on prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, he pointed out.

For example, he said, article one of the draft convention expressly stipulates that states parties possessing chemical weapons undertake to destroy their chemical weapons and production facilities and that each state party undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain, or to use chemical weapons.

In accordance with the provisions of the convention draft, each state party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another state party.

Obviously, the important provisions are just, reasonable and balanced, noted the ambassador.

However, he emphasized that the draft has not reflected adequately the just demands and reasonable propositions of numerous developing countries including China.

These drawbacks mainly include, he noted, too broad scope of verification of the chemical industry, excessive emphasis on challenge inspection being "extremely intrusive and short-noticed."

"An extremely large number of chemical facilities not relevant to chemical weapons are subject, where there is no necessity at all to declaration and verification," added Ambassador Hou.

He pointed out that the excessive emphasis on challenge inspection ignores the danger of abuse and necessity to prevent abuse of the right to request such inspection. It threatens the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

Therefore, Hou expressed his hope that outstanding differences can be ironed out and drawbacks of the draft be removed through constructive consultations and negotiations so as to realize early and completely the objective of the convention.

However, he said, in order to maintain international peace and security, China is ready to join the consensus on the CD's report and its appendix containing the draft convention.

CD Passes Draft Convention

OW0409062092 Beijing XINHUA in English
0533 GMT 4 Sep 92

[Text] Geneva, September 3 (XINHUA)—The Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed here today to transmit its report and its appendix containing the draft convention on banning all chemical weapons to the 47th General Assembly of United Nations.

The agreement was reached at today's plenary session of the conference, which is the final session of the conference this year.

Despite the agreement, many delegates from the developing countries expressed their concerns and reservations over some provisions of the draft.

If the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons is adopted at the U.N. General Assembly this fall, it will be open for signature. A signing ceremony is scheduled to be held in Paris early next year.

According to the draft, an "organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons" will be established in The Hague, Netherlands. The organization will be headed by a director-general.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Plans for Reducing Conventional Weapons Outlined

AU0109095492 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
29 Aug 92 p 1

["(jc)"]-signed report: "European Disarmament"]

[Text] Prague—As of 17 November, the Czechoslovak Army must significantly reduce the number of its conventional weapons. According to the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, we may dispose, at maximum, of 1,435 tanks, 2,050 combat armored vehicles, 1,150 artillery systems, 345 combat aircraft, and 75 combat helicopters. In the case of tanks alone, this means cutting the existing number by 1,800.

According to a LIDOVE NOVINY interview with Colonel Rudolf Kľofac, of the Federal Defense Ministry office charged with disarmament, Army officials are facing a difficult task. So far, a preliminary plan for gradual reduction of the number of weapons has been drawn. It is assumed that on the given date, 150 tanks and 100 armored vehicles will be converted. They can be used, for example, in the building industry. The sale of

500 tanks, 710 armored vehicles, 778 artillery systems, and 88 combat planes is also contemplated. If it is impossible to sell the weapons, they will be destroyed. A total of 1,119 tanks, 1,623 armored transporters, 1,436 artillery systems, and 10 combat aircraft have been singled out for destruction, which consists of dismantling all usable components (for example, engines, optical systems, and tires—in the case of armored vehicles). Destruction of weapons dismantled in this manner is done according to technical processes strictly defined in the treaty.

For the member states, the treaty also sets the obligation of reporting the time, place, number, and type of weapons designated for destruction ahead of time. All signatory countries have the right to send an inspection commission to another country that is prepared to immediately destruct the weapons set for liquidation.

The Czechoslovak Army will begin implementing this treaty on 1 September simultaneously in Novy Jicin (75 tanks) and Moldava (116 artillery systems). This is why an FRG inspection commission will visit Novy Jicin on 31 August, and a British commission will visit Moldava on the same day. At the beginning of August, our army inspection commission visited the FRG.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Opanal Approves Amendments to Tlatelolco Treaty

PA2808013092 Mexico City XHTV Television Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 27 Aug 92

[Report by Gabriela Resendes]

[Text] The amendments presented by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico to the treaty to ban nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, namely, the Tlatelolco treaty, were approved and signed during the closing ceremony of the seventh extraordinary meeting of the general conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Opanal, the organization which supervises compliance with the Tlatelolco treaty.

At the headquarters of the Mexican Foreign Relations Secretariat, Foreign Relations Secretary Fernando Solana said the approved amendments open the way for the full incorporation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to the Tlatelolco scheme. Recalling the day the treaty was put into force in 1969, Solana said it marked the signatory countries renunciation of the squandering of resources for the construction of nuclear weapons:

[Begin Solana recording] We maintained the conviction that resources generated in our countries should be channeled to the economic and social development of our societies rather than to the industry of death and military expenditures that reached \$1 trillion. [end recording]

He said the end of prolonged confrontations in the region and bloody wars among fraternal peoples is drawing closer with the full incorporation of these nations to the treaty. Solana added Latin America today requires greater efforts to channel additional resources to economic development tasks.

Opanal Secretary General Antonio Stempel said the full integration of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba into the Tlatelolco treaty could occur before September 1993.

BRAZIL

French Ratification of Tlatelolco Treaty Praised

PY2808151292 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 1000 GMT 28 Aug 92

[Text] The Brazilian Government has conveyed its great satisfaction over France's ratification of the Additional Protocol No. 1 to the Tlatelolco Treaty, which bans nuclear weapons in Latin America.

The protocol includes provisions on the nuclear powers which, despite being outside Latin America, have territories in the region coming under their jurisdiction. For instance, France has French Guyana.

According to Itamaraty, the French ratification of the protocol will make it possible for the Tlatelolco Treaty soon to take effect in the entire Latin American region.

CUBA

Adherence to Tlatelolco Treaty Confirmed

FL2808024092 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 2300 GMT 27 Aug 92

[Text] Today, Cuba reiterated its intention to adhere to the Tlatelolco Treaty for the sake of Latin American unity once all the states of the region assume their obligations regarding the agreement. Cuba's position was stated before the plenary session of the disarmament conference by Cuban Ambassador Jose Perez Novoa [title as heard]. Perez Novoa said that Cuba maintains the same position it expressed in Guadalajara.

Perez Novoa said that during the First Ibero-American Summit, our Commander in Chief Fidel Castro expressed the commitment to join the agreement for the prohibition of nuclear arms in Latin America, known as the Tlatelolco Treaty, as soon as other countries in the area comply with the agreement. This treaty, which was signed in 1967, has not taken effect due to the unwillingness or the lack of confirmation by some states of the region.

According to Perez Novoa, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile presented at the beginning of the year a collection of amendments to update the text of the agreement in consideration of nuclear developments in Argentina and Brazil. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the reasons that determined their noncompliance to date, the Cuban Government has already informed those states involved that the amendments are acceptable and that they do not represent a change in Cuba's position with regard to the treaty.

Commentary on Willingness To Sign Tlatelolco Treaty

PA2908214492 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 0000 GMT 29 Aug 92

[Roberto Morejon commentary]

[Text] Not all the states in the region signed the agreement banning nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean—known as the Tlatelolco Treaty—signed in Mexico in 1967.

Steps have been taken this week to get more signatories. France has now signed a supplementary agreement regarding the denuclearization of territories under the jurisdiction of countries outside the continent, which will now include French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique.

The Caribbean island of St. Lucia also signed the text of the treaty, even though it must still comply with ratification requirements and other details.

The fourth meeting of countries that signed the Tlatelolco Treaty and the seventh special session of the organization for the banning of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean held in Mexico accepted the amendments made to the text presented by Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.

With the approval of the suggestions regarding the protection of nuclear information, a new outlook is opened for imminent inclusion of these three countries to the 29 that already met the formal requirements.

As you may know, the Tlatelolco Treaty commits the signatories to use their nuclear installations for peaceful means and prohibits them from possessing nuclear weapons.

The essence of the document is in keeping with Cuba's policy of peace, however, this country has not signed the treaty for good reasons. Cuba has not signed the treaty because it cannot abandon the possibility of possessing the weapons required for its defense, bearing in mind the hostile U.S. policy and the illegal occupation of the Guantanamo Base by this nuclear power.

Despite an increased U.S. aggressive stance, Cuban officials were recently in favor of signing the document in an effort to contribute to Latin American unity. In this regard, on 4 March, Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez said Cuba was willing to participate in the Tlatelolco Treaty as a way of contributing to regional unity.

EGYPT

Foreign Minister on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction

NC0809135092 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1200 GMT
8 Sep 92

[Excerpt] Cairo, 8 Sep (MENA)—Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa stated that eliminating weapons of mass destruction is the primary item on the regional and international agenda, because the issue is closely linked with other significant issues like peace, security, development, and the environment.

He remarked that today the climate is more favorable for tackling this issue now that the cold war is over and the recent tension in the world has been eliminated. He pointed out that Egypt proposed two initiatives: The first calls for declaring the Middle East a nuclear-free zone and the second for eliminating all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Musa was speaking at the opening session of the seminar that started this morning to discuss disarmament and security in Africa. The seminar is cosponsored by the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Institute and the UN Disarmament Commission.

He said Egypt is convinced that peace and stability cannot be established in the Middle East unless "all regional states agree on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction." He emphasized that this is one of the prerequisites of peace.

The foreign minister reiterated Egypt's fixed commitment to the principle of achieving disarmament in the African continent through a common understanding among all parties concerned, since disarmament is linked with peace and stability in neighboring states. [passage omitted]

INDIA

Prime Minister's Speech to Nonaligned Summit

BK0309043592 Delhi Doordarshan Television
Network in English 1627 GMT 2 Sep 92

[Speech by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao at the Nonaligned Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia on 2 September—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The Nonaligned Movement is uniquely placed to forge a global consensus on issues of global concern. The first and foremost concern is human survival which obviously cannot be assured as long as weapons of mass destruction exist on our planet. We can never ignore this stark reality. The world has to become nuclear weapons-free and then go on to complete disarmament adopting nonviolence as its creed and credo. We welcome the successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention at Geneva because it is a multilateral instrument with all state parties assuming equal obligations and responsibilities—a pattern we would like to adopt to all weapons of mass destruction. As an immediate step, India envisages a convention on the nonuse of usable weapons, a verifiable freeze on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, a suspension of nuclear weapons test, and negotiations on general and complete disarmament which should be undertaken through appropriate mechanisms between countries. Let our movement put forward an attainable agenda for a world beyond deterrence—the world we can bring into being within this century. [passage omitted]

We are particularly concerned by the growing tendency to attach noneconomic conditionalities to grants of bilateral and even multilateral assistance and the increasingly stringent restrictions being imposed on transfers of technology to developing countries. The ever growing list of items subjected to the so-called double use restrictions effectively threatens to deprive developing countries of the fruits of technological progress in many key areas. Such restrictions have come to cover everything from computers to machine tools, to specialized alloys, to chemicals and even to medical equipment. They are imposing the name of preventive proliferation, even though the major responsibility for proliferation often rests with the very countries that are imposing the restrictions. This is extremely unfair. [passage omitted]

GENERAL

Possibilities of Accidental Nuclear War

924P0170A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Aug 92 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Belous: "Accidental Nuclear War: Myth Or Real Danger? Experts Believe That It Is Not Only Real, But Also Much Greater Than Before"]

[Text] The realization that there can be no winners in a nuclear war has created a situation in which no politician is likely to give the order for a first nuclear strike. In recent decades, however, a new term—"accidental nuclear war"—has been added to the political lexicon.

According to many military experts, the danger of the accidental, inadvertent start of a nuclear disaster has increased in recent years. It could start as a result of several factors, frequently of an objectively indeterminate nature. Experts who analyze this problem point out the fact that the probability of this kind of war grows stronger on successive steps of the hierarchical ladder. In other words, the greatest threat is posed by mistaken military-political decisions on the highest level, resulting from a leader's misinterpretation of a potential adversary's actions.

The Caribbean crisis of 1962 was a vivid example of the mutual misinterpretation of the intentions of the opposing sides. Participants at a tripartite (USSR, United States, and Cuba) conference on this crisis in January 1989 in Moscow agreed that the world has never been as close to the brink of nuclear disaster in the whole postwar period as it was at the time of that conflict. Furthermore, they were unanimous in the opinion that neither side wanted a war, but the mistaken assessment of mutual intentions led to the escalation of military preparations that put the world on the verge of thermonuclear war. It is no coincidence that when R. McNamara, who was then the U.S. secretary of defense, described his state of mind in those days later, he admitted: "...when I left the White House and walked to my car to go back to the Pentagon, I thought I might never see another fine evening like this one."

The behavior of top-level politicians in stressful situations can be quite dangerous. We know that at the time of the Watergate scandal in 1973, R. Nixon was so distraught that he could not take part in discussions of important issues. This led to a situation in which military commanders put their strategic nuclear forces on alert.

The risk of the inadvertent start of a nuclear conflict is much stronger at a time of crisis. When the USSR sent its troops to Czechoslovakia in 1968, for example, its strategic missile forces were put on red alert. The United States took comparable actions at the time of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. Duty officers removed the launch keys and envelopes with the presidential launch codes from their double-locked safes.

Mistakes and malfunctions in ballistic missile early warning systems (BMEWS) could be another reason for the heightened danger of war. As we know, these systems are based on the use of complex electronic and optical systems distinguished by a high degree of automation and computerization. In response to a signal, this system makes the decision to sound the alarm and deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike. The electronic computer receiving the information from early warning stations on land, in the oceans, and in space has to assess the situation instantaneously, formulate a command, and transmit it to the headquarters of strategic forces.

The transmission and confirmation of a signal (which could be false) of a missile strike are followed by a command to put strategic systems on alert and deliver a nuclear strike.

The relatively low reliability of the existing BMEWS of the CIS and United States could lead to an accidental conflict, because the decision made by the top military and political leaders would be based on false information. As American Professor P. Bracken pointed out, "no one wants war, but everyone would rather be the first to attack."

The potential dangers of the BMEWS are attested to by an analysis of the system's work by American researchers. According to their calculations, the BMEWS of the United States transmitted 3,804 false signals just between January 1979 and June 1980. There is no reason to idealize the BMEWS of the USSR either; it is simply that general data on its performance were never published in the press. In January 1982, for example, one of the Soviet radar stations detected a flying ballistic missile in one of the southern sectors. It was not until several minutes later that station personnel learned the alarm had been triggered by Israel's test launch of a Jericho II missile. In February 1989 the intermittent signals caused by the fragments of a U.S. naval reconnaissance satellite on Soviet radar formed the trajectory of a flying ICBM. The false information was sorted out at the command center.

Another reason for the heightened danger of war is the possible exacerbation of the internal political situation and inter-ethnic conflicts within the territory of the former USSR and the efforts of some leaders of nationalist movements to get a share of the Soviet nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons should fall into the hands of nationalist elements, the consequences would be difficult to predict.

The attempted coup in the USSR in August 1991 was the cause of considerable anxiety in the West. Everyone was worried about the possibility of the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. For the sake of objectivity, we have to admit that this kind of crisis can lead to various unpredictable situations in principle, and this would heighten the risk of an accidental disaster.

One of the common themes in the many conflicting press reports following the putsch was the anxiety over the

whereabouts of the black briefcase with the "nuclear button" in the president's possession. As we know, this briefcase contains an electronic device which would transmit a coded signal to command posts. It is significant that this would not be a command to launch missiles, as some people have said, but only an authorizing signal, removing the restraining elements from the system for the command and control of strategic nuclear forces, and would also require a BMEWS signal of a missile attack. According to some reports, the leaders of the 18 August putsch took the "nuclear briefcase" away from the president in Foros. The officer on duty, however, had managed to dump the codes and disable the device, effectively blocking its access to the strategic command and control system.

It is important that the three commanders in chief of the strategic branches of the armed forces—the Air Force, the Strategic Missile Forces, and the Navy—did not violate their military oath and refused to carry out the orders of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. The report that reconnaissance satellites had recorded the withdrawal of Soviet SS-25 mobile ICBM's from combat patrol zones and their return to their permanent shelters had a calming effect on the American public. Given the atmosphere of that time, this was a brilliant move on the part of General of the Army Yu. Maksimov, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces.

The increasing complexity of modern weapons and their enhanced efficiency and readiness for immediate use in combat heightens the risk of their accidental firing. Electronic locks and various systems to prevent accidental firing have increased the safety of nuclear weapons considerably and reduced the possibility of their unauthorized use, but none of this can completely exclude unpredictable situations with unforeseeable results. In September 1990, for example, a Titan II missile exploded in its silo on the Little Rock Air Force Base (in Arkansas). The shock wave sent a megatonne warhead flying several dozen meters. In January 1985 the solid-propellant engine of a Pershing II missile suddenly exploded on an American base in the FRG near Heilbronn (Baden-Wuerttemberg). In June 1987 a bolt of lightning activated the engines of an Orion missile and two smaller missiles, causing a spontaneous launch, on the Wallops range (in Virginia).

Nuclear submarines have not escaped dangerous incidents either. In April 1963 the submarine "Thresher" sank in the Atlantic with its crew and weapons. The submarine "Scorpion" suffered the same fate after an accident in May 1968. In March 1986 there was an accident on the missile submarine "Nathanael Greene" in the Irish Sea. It was carrying 16 Poseidon nuclear missiles. There are many such examples.

Obviously, it would be wrong to assume that only the American strategic "triad" is prone to accidents. During preparations for a launch on the Baykonur range in September 1960, the fuel components exploded. Chief

Marshal of Artillery M.I. Nedelin, then commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, and several members of the combat crew were killed in this accident. The explosion of a launch vehicle on the same range in July 1983 was recorded by an American Nimbus satellite.

In October 1990 a disabled engine caused the explosion of a Zenith rocket during the launching of a spacecraft of the Kosmos series.

We also know of accidents on Soviet submarines. In October 1986 a ship of the "Navaga" category, carrying 16 ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, sank near Bermuda as a result of a fire. In April 1989 the submarine "Komsomolets" was lost in the Sea of Norway. It was carrying torpedoes with nuclear warheads and cruise missiles. In June 1989 there was an accident in the main propulsion unit of another submarine. The problem was corrected, and the ship was towed to Severomorsk. It was also carrying torpedoes with nuclear warheads and cruise missiles.

Military systems have undergone rapid computerization in recent years, causing experts to pay closer attention to the complexities of the human being's interaction with computers and to their unreliable performance in some cases. The software for military command and control systems constitutes one such area of particular complexity and, consequently, of diminished reliability. We will cite just one example to illustrate this point.

At the time of the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the British Navy lost one of its best ships, the destroyer "Sheffield," which was equipped with an automated BMD system. An investigation of the causes of the loss revealed that the English experts who compiled the program for the command and control of the BMD system had overlooked the Argentine Navy's recent adoption of the French Exocet antisubmarine missile. This is one of the missiles used by the NATO countries and it was classified as "friendly" in the destroyer's BMD control program. As a result, when the missile approached the ship, countermeasures were not activated, and the missile easily penetrated the BMD zone and sent the destroyer to the bottom with a direct hit.

There is also the danger of the outside infiltration of the military computer systems that would seem to be protected reliably by the most sophisticated devices. One example of this kind of interference in the performance of military computers was the computer virus that attacked around 6,000 computers of the Arpanet military automated system in fall 1988. An investigation revealed that the virus program had been developed by a computer expert who had entered it in the computer system after deducing the access code. When the virus reached the computer memory, it began multiplying with incredible speed, breeding hundreds of parasite programs and disabling the computers. It is easy to imagine what might happen if someone with sinister intentions

manages to figure out the access codes to, for example, the automated systems for the command and control of strategic forces.

The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is still playing a significant role in reducing the danger of nuclear war. For 25 years it has seriously impeded the ambitious plans of certain authoritarian regimes, but the development of science and the proliferation of nuclear technology have created the objective preconditions for the production of nuclear weapons in several states. Suffice it to say that more than 30 countries have nuclear power plants within their territory. According to the calculations of prominent American nuclear physicist T. Taylor, each industrial reactor can produce enough plutonium for 40 nuclear weapons a year.

Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and some other countries already have military nuclear technology, and there could be more than 20 of these "threshold" states by the beginning of the 21st century. Under these conditions, the military-political instability that is characteristic of many regions and the periodic armed clashes could provoke a nuclear conflict that probably would not remain local in nature.

The accumulation of huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the use of these weapons in virtually all branches of the armed forces have created a situation in which they are handled, guarded, and transported by tens of thousands of servicemen. In the middle of the 1970s there were around 150,000 people who could have had access to nuclear weapons in the United States. A person who works with nuclear weapons, particularly in emergencies, may be put in an extremely complex state of mind, in which his behavior might be absolutely illogical and potentially quite dangerous.

American Professor T. Sheridan directed attention to the possibility of irrational behavior by certain individuals under strong mental and emotional pressure. He warned that the human operator could be the most enigmatic of all enigmas. There was a case in which a mentally disturbed sergeant in the U.S. Air Force fired his gun at a hydrogen bomb "in an attempt to get even with life."

In recent years world public opinion has been focused on the increasing danger of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear terrorism can take many forms. It includes the theft of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials, acts of sabotage in nuclear power plants, the kidnapping of nuclear physicists, etc. The experts of a special international task force against nuclear terrorism counted around 150 such incidents in 20 years in the United States and Western Europe starting in the middle of the 1960s. Nuclear blackmail has also been attempted. In 1975 an anonymous terrorist in Boston demanded a large sum of money, threatening to set off an atomic bomb. Although it turned out to be a bluff, the United States set up a special investigative team equipped with devices for the detection of nuclear weapons.

When we consider the possible causes of a nuclear disaster, we have to realize that it is not a fatal inevitability and that the probability of this kind of disaster is relatively low. The price of this kind of accident would be extremely high, however, because human error or negligence could cause the extinction of the human race. The world community must conduct thorough investigations of the phenomenon known as "accidental nuclear war" and take a group of measures to prevent this. This, however, is a different topic.

Caution in Rethinking Doctrine, Strategy Urged

924P0171A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Aug 92 p 4

[Article by Valentin Larionov: "Mistake on the Strategic Map; It Could Be Expensive for Russia, Which Is Developing a New Military Doctrine Today"]

[Text] There have been recent indications that the agonizing process of the development of new structures of Russian armed forces, the clarification of the new outlines of military doctrine, and the choice of new priorities in military-technical policy is coming to an end. This was announced by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and his first deputy Andrey Kokoshin. This news can only be applauded. Although the decisions to be made in these areas are extremely important, and although excessive haste in making these decisions could lead to mistakes, the process cannot go on forever.

The professionals in the military, whose future will depend wholly on military reform, are not the only ones who are showing their impatience. The general public has become directly involved in the debates. Two major scientific conferences, attended by foreign specialists, were held in the Military Academy of the General Staff in June and July, and they were followed by another conference in the Russian Academy of Sciences. All of them were concerned to some extent with questions of military policy.

These issues are also being discussed widely in the news media. In particular, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA initiated a discussion of the nature of the military threats to the state, which might be useful in revealing the prevailing views in our society and in a broader context.

One vivid example is the new controversial article by Daniil Proektor, "What Is Threatening Us?" (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 21 July 1992). After stating his opinion that the "main threat" has moved inside the CIS, the author proceeds to discuss a broad range of issues: How we can climb out of the abyss of ethnic and religious conflicts, what kind of danger they pose to Russia, Europe, and the world, and how we should form new alliances in order to avoid a new phase of the cold war.

We should start by discussing this. Even though I agree with the author that internal conflicts are dangerous, I

disagree completely with his opinion that there is "absolutely no basis" for concern about external threats. After all, these are not limited to the now defunct threat of an American missile strike or the probability of a Bundeswehr attack on Russia.

Let us take a closer look at those internal conflicts. Are they not spilling over our border, and might they not pull external forces into the whirlpool of events? These conflicts are not the only reason for the hysterical demonstrations in front of the television stations, which are held for completely different purposes.

Can we be indifferent to the crescent of instability that has taken shape to the south and southwest, in near and distant foreign countries? Besides this, the Russian army will be expected to participate in peacekeeping operations and in measures to stop aggression for the maintenance of peace and stability within the CIS and beyond its borders.

Although I agree that defensive structures should be ready to perform external functions, I cannot agree with the formula of "defense in all directions," which was declared in Proektor's first article. "In all directions" means nowhere in particular. Given Russia's 60,000 kilometers of border, this is a crude and primitive approach that has nothing to do with territorial security. A. Kokoshin was right when he said in an IZVESTIYA interview that Russia rejected the principle of defense "covering the full extent of the border." External threats also have to be classified in order of importance.

Now we should discuss the strategic landscape of Europe at the end of this century. It is true that it might be distinguished by unpredictable conflicts, the massive regrouping of forces and, I would add, the disruption of the present equilibrium, but there are also obvious elements of integration and of interaction by countries and nationalities, even within the still shaky Commonwealth of Independent States.

Some examples of this are the Tashkent treaty on mutual security and several bilateral economic commitments. Tripartite agreements were concluded on the conflict in Southern Osetia and in the Dniester region. These agreements could serve as examples to follow in other hot spots in the CIS. It might be time to start picking up the pieces.

This is quite natural. The collapse of all empires in history was always accompanied by the efforts of certain ethnic strata to unite and even to integrate. Besides this, we are witnessing the convergence and unification of states within the CSCE structure. Proektor believes that the European Union and NATO will "draw" Russia into their orbit in time. According to him, this must not be resisted. On the contrary, we must make every effort to be accepted for membership in this club. In connection with this, our military organization and our military doctrine should, in his opinion, correspond completely to this possibility. In other words, they must be duplicates of foreign models.

I beg to differ: We can, after all, become part of the European and global systems of strategic stability without being "drawn into NATO" and without adapting our doctrine. First of all, Russia is Asian as well as European. Second, the inequality of our economic situation today will make us completely dependent on the Western countries. Our military organization must be highly flexible, corresponding to the current strategic situation and the capabilities of our country, so that we will not be kept waiting on the doorstep like poor relatives, as we were in the case of the International Monetary Fund. This is the first thing. The second is that we have to be firm and uphold our dignity in our interrelations with partners. We must always remember something: However strong European unity may seem today, and however unanimous the world community's wish for world peace might be, each individual state will need its own security.

Incidentally, a recent sociological survey revealed the average Russian's opinion of Russia's historical mission. Fully 69 percent of the respondents answered yes to this question: "Do you agree that Russia should remain a great power, even if this hurts its relations with the outside world?" (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No 30, 26 July 1992).

Deliberately ruining our relations with the outside world would be wrong, but the affirmation of Russia's status as a great power should be our constant concern. Otherwise, we might reconcile ourselves to the idea that we will never emerge from the present crisis and we will always feel inferior to others.

But let us return to our topic. On the level of military doctrine, it is important to find the correct definition for the "new architecture of security"—in other words, the possible nature of future unaverted wars, in accordance with which military organizational development is generally conducted. I agree that world wars, nuclear or conventional, are obsolete because they exclude the possibility of victory and are therefore absolutely unprofitable. The huge multimillion-strong armies are also a thing of the past. Although the nuclear powers retained their huge armed forces for almost half a century after World War II, this was frequently not a case of preparedness for nuclear war, but an attempt to maintain the balance of power, to satisfy imperial ambitions, and sometimes even to perform police functions in foreign countries.

The most probable of all the different varieties of local wars and military conflicts today are the so-called "non-contact wars," like the war in the Persian Gulf, and low-intensity regional conflicts. The first type of war is, in my opinion, a new technological phenomenon, in which the latest models of highly accurate, "smart" weapons are used in all spheres of military operations—on land, in the air, on the seas, and in the space between the spheres. These include the guided missiles, bombs, and artillery shells of the air Force, air defense and missile defense forces, naval cruise missiles, electronic

warfare systems, and night vision and guidance equipment. The weapons used today are most likely to be systems based on a combination of reconnaissance (or tracking), guidance, and result verification equipment. This kind of war can be fought without the classic type of front and without any contact between large forces on the ground, with limited human resources, but without excluding the possibility of civilian casualties.

The second type—the low-intensity conflicts—can take the form, as the experience of recent years has shown, of a confrontation between opposing sides with limited military potential, unless a developed power becomes involved in the conflict.

The danger of the exacerbation and escalation of this kind of conflict must be eliminated by political means for the sake of world security and stability, to the point of intervention by peaceful forces, and the Russian army must always be prepared to take part in these operations.

If this prediction of the future types of unaverted wars is correct, the structure of the Russian armed forces should include three basic military components: strategic nuclear deterrence forces, a corps of technical engineers (the forces and equipment of the air force, air defense forces, and the navy, electronic warfare systems and the equipment for their command and control), and an operational-strategic corps for rapid deployment and mobile operations, consisting of airborne assault troops and marines with their own means of transport by air and by sea.

We have to admit that this description of the nature of future unaverted wars and the organization of the Russian armed forces to meet these special demands have not always met with complete approval in hearings in parliamentary commissions and on the highest professional military levels. In some cases the reason is a lack of self-confidence, and in others it is the force of inertia and the conservative nature of military thinking. I will not try to choose the prevailing factor, but I will cite an example from a field closer to my own recent experience as an academy professor.

I think our system for the training of the highest ranks of military personnel, especially the top brass, is a definite hindrance in the comprehension of the current changes in the sphere of military science. We have to seriously wonder whether it is worthwhile to continue to teach these personnel to draw the "nests" of enemy troops and the arrows of full-scale tank assaults on maps instead of learning to wage technological warfare with efficient computerized equipment.

The second problem, which is indissolubly connected to the first, is the problem of security and strategic stability on the national and international levels. In essence, the ability to balance combat readiness with security, the ability to prevent wars, but also to fight them when necessary, constitute a skill our officers and generals must master. Finding the right combination of efforts in order to prevent a war, or to stop one in extreme cases,

is the most difficult job today, because no state has the special weapons and secrets guaranteeing the prevention of war, just as no one knows how many weapons a country needs for effective defense.

All of this proves how easy it is to make mistakes in determining the military organizational guidelines of a state and points up the serious implications of mistakes in an area in which Engels warned that a mistake of a single centimeter on a map of strategic operations turns into tens of thousands of square kilometers of lost territory and the lost lives of millions of soldiers on the battlefield.

It is a common belief that mistakes are usually the result of the limited knowledge of leaders and their inability to comprehend ongoing events and look into the future. This does happen, of course, but Professor A.A. Svechin, the well-known Russian military theorist who has devoted many pages in his works to the topic of strategic planning and forecasting, once made the paradoxical observation that "colossal damage to the military machine is sometimes caused not by insignificant or ignorant individuals, but by outstanding leaders who have regrettably taken the wrong road."

This is a paradoxical statement, but we know that genius is "no stranger to paradoxes."

Tomsk-7 'Super Secret' Nuclear Reactor Closed

OW2508142092 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1855 GMT 23 Aug 92

["Utro" video report by A. Pelt]

[Text] [Pelt] Our crew was allowed to enter the super secret installation of the Siberian Chemical Combine. A nuclear reactor for producing plutonium for military and industrial purposes was activated here 31 years ago; the people here have spearheaded the creation of the country's atomic shield. Vyacheslav Yudin, deputy chief of the reactor who first activated it in 1961, pressed the "stop" button at 6 A.M. Moscow time on 14 August.

Our group had a unique opportunity to stand in the very womb of the reactor which has just been stopped. Right now, I am standing on what is known as Reactor No. 3.

The specialists' opinion is that the manufacture of plutonium could continue for quite a few years. The site has operated with no incidents up till now, and has a triple safety and control system. It was the process of disarmament and conversion that made it necessary to push the "stop" button. [video shows interview with V.V. Yudin, deputy chief of reactor]

[Begin video recording] [V.V. Yudin] To put it bluntly, I used to swell with pride. After all, this is a reactor, and we are strengthening our defense—our shield—here. It was wonderful. We really believed this was necessary work, a sheer joy. We were just a little upset that we

could tell no one about it, since naturally it was all secret. But today I feel sad. [end video recording]

[Pelt] The reactor will remain closed for five years, after which it will be dismantled. With its closure, the ecological situation around Tomsk—which numbers half a million people—will improve greatly. But there is also a downside—the most experienced personnel at the reactor will be left jobless. Taking into account this site is the third one to be closed, the problem of unemployment in the city of Tomsk-7 will become a major one.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Openness in Arms Cuts Process Urged

924P0174A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 33, Aug 92 pp 24-25

[Article by Valeriy Yarynich, candidate of military sciences: "Sure Head and Weak Hands?: Who Will Pay for Disarmament and How Much?"]

[Text] A keen polemic is developing around the decisions adopted by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush on a steep reduction in strategic offensive arms. People want to know the answers to serious questions connected with this decision. How much will have to be paid for all this and by whom? And how will such leaps forward be reflected in the capacity of our strategic nuclear forces for accomplishing their purpose?

Playing "Blind"

The doubts and the anger even of the opposition are understandable: We are agreeing at a stroke to eliminate our most modern and powerful weapons, which the Americans had been seeking unsuccessfully for many years. And, in addition, it will inevitably be necessary to spend substantial resources here. And then the very nature of the leadership's actions—without parliamentary approval....

Now let us look at it from the other side. Intuitively, from general standpoints, each of us has to welcome the steps in this direction. It is time to free ourselves from the role of hostage of the nuclear monster. Everyone is pretty tired of the prolonged to-do over plans to cut strategic offensive arms and is awaiting truly decisive steps. They are now being taken, it would seem.

The deep-lying roots of the disagreements lie, of course, in the political confrontation of the national leadership and the opposition. And the immediate cause is the absence of an officially stated, open procedure of substantiation of the decisions which are being made. The game is being played "blind," virtually. The instrument employed by the experts and leaders at the negotiations cannot be seen. I believe that the question of the procedure of substantiation will be decisive at the time of ratification.

I believe that some official instrument of substantiation does exist. That it periodically lags behind the rapid pace of life is another matter. I know from my own experience that many of the approaches in this field which were employed just a year or two ago are today hopelessly out of date. A new spirit and new scale of values are now being introduced to military-political decisions, and this is good. But the instrument of substantiation should be calibrated in accordance with this also, if only initially on the qualitative, ideological level, and subsequently made more specific in the mathematical, model, and other respects. And become the property of the public at large. Difficulties of comprehension should not be feared here—whoever is interested will understand as much as he needs to, and there will be popularizers also. Why not ask the experts, American included, to publicly set forth the basic provisions of the procedure employed at the negotiations? There can, after all, be nothing secret in these themselves.

Friends Have To Be Deterred Also

The evolution of the "mission of the strategic forces" concept appears interesting as well. Previously the nuclear forces were designed for "assured destruction" of an aggressor. On the final lap of the period of perestroika, having sobered up, we realized that they could serve only for deterrence since realization of the nuclear threat is meaningless, in a military respect included. This is not simply more logical but also cheaper, it turned out. The concept of nuclear deterrence is commonly accepted throughout the world and is recorded in doctrines and other fundamental documents. But an erosion of this concept also has, in my opinion, been charted most recently. Since we are almost friends, it is said, whom are we deterring and for what reason?

Let us try to separate one from the other. Deterrence is an objective thing independent of the declarations and wishes of leaders, of public opinion even. It is merely a derivative of the actual fact of the existence of nuclear weapons and the hypothetical capability of punishing a hypothetical aggressor and, with him, all the earth also, unfortunately. No more, no less. Consciousness of the possibility of if only a dozen nuclear explosions above cities and villages deters. The euphoria of the dashes away from insanely large to very big potentials is no reason to forget this. No one today, incidentally, seriously believes in a total nuclear zero, everyone talks about some "reasonable" minimum. And it is this which is in fact recognition of deterrence.

So what is, in fact, the value of this minimum, considering the collapse of the Union, the comminution of its nuclear potential and its control system, and the development of ABM and conventional arms systems among our new friends? Are we not going too fast? Or, on the contrary, is this not enough, and if someone can pay, should we be going much further? It is obvious that not only money determines by how many times—three or 10—nuclear power can be reduced.

Quite serious questions, but they are not directed against the decision made in Washington. On the contrary, a thorough and convincing answer to them should strengthen popular support for the president's policy. But for full approval of the forecast design data it would be better to show how they were arrived at also.

C³ Plus I

Upon substantiation of reasonable levels of nuclear arms such a factor as the system of control deserves the closest attention. In this case the system of control is understood in the broad plane as a unified complex of authorities, facilities, and actions realizing the formula: "attack detected—decision made—response."

Included here are missile attack early warning and reconnaissance systems, control posts, and technical systems for conveying orders to the nuclear delivery systems—all that the United States calls C³I: command, control, communication, and intelligence. Consideration of the influence of this factor on an overall assessment of the dependability of deterrence would seem manifestly insufficient today. At the same time, on the other hand, a new approach which takes account of this influence exists and is already being employed in a number of private assessments. Its essence is as follows.

Comparing simply nuclear potentials is pointless. It is more correct to compare the forecast results of their realization as a response to aggression. And this is possible only via the prism of the control system. The point being that its appearance (structure, composition, and specifications of the componentry) determines not only the power of the retaliatory strike of the strategic forces but also its probability. In simplified form the system of control has a "head" (the missile attack warning system, the leadership's central control posts) and "hands," that is, individual subsystems linked with various groupings of nuclear weapons (sea-based, air-launched, ground-based, stationary, mobile). If such a structure is subjected in a statistical model to multiple tests under the conditions of a hypothetical conflict, a set of various values of the level of nuclear retribution for the aggressor is outputted. There will be powerful strikes, weaker strikes, and zeros even. Depending on the kind of control system we study.

If the "head" is highly dependable (much in the way of resources has been invested in it, consequently), the probability of the actual fact of a retaliatory strike will be high. But this does not in itself signify the great power of the strike since the second component of the deterrence indicator is determined by the dependability of the "hands." If, for example, of the limited resources allocated for a control system we spend the bulk on the "head," we will obtain the following description of a forecast of retribution: "very probable, but weak" (we would note, of course, the relative nature of the concept "weak," for even one or two nuclear explosions over Chicago or Washington could be considered a catastrophe for the United States).

If, on the other hand, we pump the main resources into the "hands," we get the formula: "unlikely, but powerful." These issues are highly interesting, particularly from the standpoints of reasonable sufficiency. We would note that on the basis of this approach resources may be reallocated not only within the control system but also between it and the nuclear weapons grouping itself. Expenditure on these two components of the strategic forces is commensurable and constitutes tens of billions of rubles.

Capacity for Retribution Is Preserved

If we are to speak of practical matters, the need for appreciably increased attention to questions of the control of strategic nuclear forces is now becoming perfectly obvious. Control matters are in the most propitious state in the strategic rocket forces, which have far outdistanced the other branches of the armed forces in this respect. At the same time, however, the problem of the control of deeply submerged submarines remains the most complex. But in the latest agreement on strategic offensive arms it is the sea-based component which becomes the main one, and the rocket forces are considerably reduced! So should we not be examining practical measures for the use in the interests of the navy not only of the existing work-in-progress inventory in the rocket forces but also of the actually functioning components of their control systems?

In connection with all this I would like to stress the need for considerably more openness than has been the case with us thus far. We have, after all, accomplished a revolution in people's minds and have shown, essentially, our nuclear potentials in full. The United States and other countries are not afraid of openly discussing questions of control of the strategic forces.

The uniqueness of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons is such that there should be an entirely particular attitude toward the problem of openness in this sphere. The truth about conventional weapons may be concealed, in the hope of winning thereby a conventional war (which, unfortunately, still cannot be ruled out). The truth about nuclear weapons and their control should necessarily, on the other hand, be made public in order to prevent a catastrophe.

It is very important to show the world that, despite the deep cuts in arms and Russia's economic, political, and social difficulties and also the fact that the buildup of other countries' military might continues, our capacity for retribution is preserved.

Japanese TV Crew Inspects Russian Typhoon Submarines

Visit to Severomorsk Area Base

OW2108153292 Tokyo Broadcasting System
Television Network in Japanese 1400 GMT 20 Aug 92

[Report by correspondent Seiichi Kanise on visit to a Russian Typhoon-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine; from "News 23" program—moderated by newscaster Tetsuya Chikushi; date of visit not given]

[Text] [Chikushi] This evening we would like to begin the news program by showing exclusive pictures. One year has passed since the Soviet Union collapsed. Meanwhile, despite its economic woes, the Russian Republic remains a military superpower. What can be called the trump card of this power is the Typhoon-class submarines which are the largest such nuclear ballistic missile submarines in the world. We of JNN [Japan News Network] are the first from a Western nation to see these submarines.

[Unidentified announcer] The Typhoons were docked at a secret base northwest of Severomorsk, the home port for the Russian North Sea Fleet. Each of these Typhoons is said to carry enough nuclear missiles to destroy all the United States. Kanise, a reporter on the Special Reports Desk, visited one of them.

[Kanise] [video shows aerial photos of the Severomorsk base area] Severomorsk is the headquarters for Russia's North Sea Fleet. This large port on the North Sea may lie within the region of the North Pole, but within its area is deployed the most up-to-date vessels of the Russian Navy—such as the Kiev class aircraft carrier as well as missile cruisers.

The home base for the Typhoons is located at the corner of a fjord called Guba Zapadnaya Litsa, about 150 kilometers northwest of Severomorsk.

Code-named Zapadnaya Litsa by the U.S. Defense Department, up till now this base could have been seen only through data supplied by satellites. This satellite photo—taken from 800 km—confirms the existence of three submarine docks in an area 5 km in diameter. At the southern end of the base, one can see a 260-meter long floating dock. Next to it is a large submarine which appears to be a Typhoon, and then large piers for Typhoon-class submarines. According to reports, the area is alleged to have large tunnels to protect the submarines from enemy attack. Truly the base is a secret area for the Russian submarine fleet.

When we entered the base, we saw three of the Typhoons anchored, but there were supposed to be six of them altogether. They were preparing to sail on their next mission. [video shows close-up of a Typhoon, and Kanise climbing the ladder to go onboard]

Wow, this is big. It's as big as a three or four-story building.

[Announcer] At 170 meters in length and 23 meters in width, the Typhoons are the world's largest ballistic missile nuclear submarines. With a crew of 150, they can operate deep under the Arctic Ocean for long periods of time—from three to six months. [video shows a room described by the subtitle as "Combat Command Post"]

[Unidentified Russian officer] Captain, preparations for combat are completed.

[Second unidentified Russian officer] I am reporting from the periscope. The strength of the waves is degree 3.

[video shows interior of the Typhoon, including shots of a passageway, dining facilities, gym, sauna, and small swimming pool]

[Announcer] Sleeping quarters were arranged in three stories and partitioned from each other by ladders and water-tight hatches. In the dining room, people ate meals cooked by kitchen personnel. They were using china dishes and glasses, which is impossible to imagine in Western submarines. A specialist from a Western nation said he could not understand why they were using such noise-producing ware in submarines where one cannot but be sensitive about noise lest they should be discovered by an enemy vessel. Inside the submarine, one did not feel the crewmen were living in confined and hot spaces as is normally the case in other submarines. There were recreational facilities to help the crewmen endure such long operational missions as those lasting six months.

The biggest feature of the Typhoons is that in front of the bridge it contains two lines of 10 nuclear missile launchers—a total of 20 launchers. One ship like this can attack 180 different targets simultaneously. The total destructive power is equivalent to 4,800 times that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. [video shows Kanise and unidentified Russian officer standing on the bow of the submarine, directly above the missile silos]

[Kanise] You mean there are nuclear missiles right underneath here.

[Unidentified officer] Yes.

[Kanise] Eh? It is so scary. Under each of these sections there are several sets of them with so many warheads.

[Officer] Yes. [video cuts to an interview with military commentator Kazuhisa Ogawa]

[Kanise] We now live in the post-cold war era. Is there a rationale for having such vessels?

[Ogawa] There probably is no one who is seriously thinking about using them in war, but this one vessel can launch 200 warheads. Theoretically, one Typhoon can destroy the entire United States. Because Russia has this kind of weaponry, it can do as it pleases as regards negotiations with the United States. It is a very effective trump card in Russia's negotiations.

Visits to Pacific, Northern Fleet Bases

*OW0309071792 Tokyo TBS Television Network
in Japanese 0900 GMT 30 Aug 92*

[Editorial Report] Tokyo TBS Television Network in Japanese at 0900 GMT on 30 August begins its "Special Report" program on the visit by TBS "special reports desk" newscaster Seiichi Kanise to a Typhoon-class submarine. The program begins with a video of U.S. President George Bush announcing the U.S.-Russia agreement on reducing strategic nuclear weapons, and brief shots of Russian troops training, as well as the

narrator describing the role of Russia's nuclear-powered submarines in the post-cold war period.

TBS newscaster Kanise, pointing to a Kilo-class nuclear-powered submarine anchored at the port of the Russian Pacific Fleet, says reporters can approach a submarine but without cameras. Video then cuts to show a distant view of Typhoon-class submarines docked at an unidentified naval port, and newscaster Kanise walking around a Typhoon-class sub.

Video shows newscasters Naoya Ryoji and Kunio Ogawa in the TBS studio. Ryoji makes opening remarks, and Ogawa introduces newscaster Seiichi Kanise, who led the TBS film crew. Speaking at the studio, Kanise stresses that Russia still maintains the combat capability of its nuclear-powered submarines despite the end of the cold war, saying it took about six months to complete filming.

Video cuts to show people celebrating the first naval day in St. Petersburg and scenes of a ceremony on the warship Aurora. At the ceremony, the flag of the former Soviet Union was replaced with the naval flag of Imperial Russia.

Video then shows a distant view of the Russian Pacific Fleet shot from a helicopter, with the narrator stating the documentary begins with a report on the Russian Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok. Video cuts to show Kanise meeting with Lieutenant General Andrey Nikolayevich of the Russian Pacific Fleet Submarine Brigade, exchanging greetings in front of the gate through an unidentified interpreter. Video shows three submarines at anchor (defined by video caption as Foxtrot-class), as well as Kanise touching torpedoes placed on the pier. Kanise points to Russia's newest diesel-powered submarine (defined by video caption as Kilo-class) at anchor, and asks Lieutenant-General Nikolayevich for permission to get closer. Although Kanise's request was rejected at first, the film crew was eventually allowed to go aboard the Kilo with their camera. Video then shows Kanise, an interpreter, and Lieutenant-General Nikolayevich standing on the deck of the Kilo. Kanise points out sound-absorbing rubber which covers the entire deck. Video then shows inside the submarine, including the control room and torpedo tubes.

Video cuts to show a distant view of two Kilo-class submarines at anchor.

Video then shows the film crew heading toward Komsomolsk on the near reaches of the Amur River. An unidentified narrator says that "the largest shipyard in the Russian Far East is located in this town, and nuclear-powered submarines used to be built here." At the shipyard office the manager confirms to Kanise that nuclear-powered submarines used to be and still are built there.

Then the narrator adds: "The Komsomolsk shipyard is the second oldest former Soviet shipyard designed to build nuclear-powered submarines. Since the first of these submarines was put into commission in 1960,

more than 20 have been built. However, due to drastic disarmament and cutbacks in military spending over the past few years, the one being built now will be the last."

Video cuts to show Kanise looking around the shipyard. He finds a hatch used on submarines and a large propeller screw which is corrugated to lessen the submarine's noise; he asks if the screw is to be used on a submarine. The shipyard manager denies it, saying the screw is owned by the Far East Public Vessel Corporation and is temporarily being kept at the shipyard.

Video then cuts to show the crew moving to another area. On the way they come across another building, which is closed. Pointing to the building, Kanise asks whether it, too, is a shipyard where nuclear-powered submarines are built. This time, the manager appears reluctant to answer, merely saying that radiation levels here are normal. The narrator says: "According to the manager, matters relating to nuclear-powered submarines are classified as top military secrets and he cannot comment on them."

Video cuts to show large portions of a submarine laid out in front of the building, then shows file photos of a Typhoon-class nuclear-powered sub, with the narrator describing the shock of Western nations when the pictures of the Typhoon were released for the first time, saying attention was focused on the sail of the Typhoon.

Video cuts to show freelance military analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa, who talks about the significance of the Typhoons. Ogawa says the Typhoons were made large not because of antiquated Soviet technology, but because it is well designed for operations in the Arctic Ocean. He adds that the submarine is a "monster."

Video then shows a simulation of a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine launching ballistic missiles, with the narrator describing the function of strategic nuclear subs in modern warfare.

Next the video shows a general view of Petropavlovsk, the home port of the Russian Pacific Fleet, then shows Delta-class, Victor-class, and Oscar-class nuclear-powered submarines, with the narrator noting that 24 out of Russia's 62 nuclear-powered submarines reportedly are stationed with the Pacific Fleet.

Video then shows Kanise visiting Russian Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Vladivostok to interview Vice Admiral Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Khvatov, commander of the fleet, on the current situation and role of nuclear-powered submarines.

Khvatov, speaking in Russian with simultaneous Japanese translation, states: "Since we no longer have any specific enemies, at present the primary task of the nuclear submarine brigade is national defense. Under such circumstances, we do not have to assign offensive operations to our nuclear subs." Asked if his fleet really needs such a large strategic sub as the Typhoon, Commander Khvatov says: "As a commander, it is quite

natural to desire the most advanced weapons. I believe commanders in your country would give you the same answer."

Video cuts to show Kanise in the studio explaining the location of Russian Pacific Fleet naval bases and the nuclear-powered submarines which are said to be deployed in the Arctic region, pointing to several places on a map of the northern hemisphere.

After showing a segment on the Bush-Yeltsin agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, video carries an interview with former Norwegian Deputy Defense Minister (?John Scorgan) by an unidentified reporter. Scorgan says the role of ballistic missile submarines will become more important since the U.S.-Russian nuclear reduction agreement does not include submarine-launched strategic missiles; Russia's submarine-launched missiles are concentrated in the waters off Kamchatka and the Kola Peninsula.

Video then shows the film crew visiting the Norwegian-Russian border area in the Barents Sea in company with Norwegian border guards. It shows the guards patrolling the Kola Peninsula border, then briefly shows a Norwegian Air Force P-3C airplane flying over the area to monitor the movement of Russian submarines in the Arctic.

Video shows Elena MaSchbetz, a Norwegian pilot, who says: "I was really surprised when I saw the Typhoon for the first time. I have never been afraid when flying but, all of a sudden, I felt fear. Compared to the Typhoon we look very tiny. It took us a long time to catch up with it and pass over it. I have never seen such a huge thing in my life."

The camera crew then go back to the Kola Peninsula. As they are filming from a speed boat, a Kilo-class submarine is seen moving toward an inlet. Masahiro Ketatani of Tokai University Information Technology Center uses computer analysis to predict that the submarine was heading toward Zapadnaya Litsa base—as it is code named by the Department of Defense. The video shows satellite photos of the base, saying this must be used for Typhoon-class nuclear submarines.

Video pans to show distant view of the Russian Northern Fleet Headquarters at Severomorsk, where many warships—including the Kiev-class aircraft carrier Baku and the Kirov-class nuclear-powered missile cruiser Kalinin—are at anchor. Video then shows an entrance way to a base called Nerpichaya Guba, where three Typhoon-class submarines are seen at anchor.

Video cuts to the TBS studio where newscasters Kanise, Ryoji, and Ogawa are standing in front of a large map of the Scandinavian Peninsula. Using the map and a satellite photo, they describe the location of the Russian submarine base, stressing how fjords on the Kola Peninsula are the ideal location for secret submarine bases.

Video shows Kanise and the film crew being introduced to the base commander, making arrangements regarding filming restrictions on base, and Kanise walking along the submarine mooring points where a Typhoon is at anchor. The TBS crew is led to one of three Typhoons at anchor. The narrator says Russia currently has six Typhoons, and the crew got to go aboard the third-oldest one.

Officers on deck welcome the TBS crew, but refuse to show the front portion where the nuclear missile launchers are located. Kanise points at two protrusions on the rear deck, which have been thought to be special propulsion devices. However, the screen caption says they are just stabilizers.

The TBS crew enter the submarine and climb into the sail. The video shows the front deck as seen from the sail, highlighting the missile hatches. The narrator explains the power of nuclear missiles mounted on the submarine. The next scene shows Kanise and his translator walking along the hatches on the front deck, both men in the company of Captain Petrov.

Captain Petrov, speaking in Russian with simultaneous Japanese translation, says: "This is a strategic nuclear submarine, and as a matter of course, nuclear missiles are mounted under the deck." Asked about his biggest concern as captain of such a large submarine, Captain Petrov states: "I pay primary attention to the safety of the nuclear reactor. I think my heaviest responsibility is to prevent accidental launching of nuclear missiles without due process."

Video cuts to Kanise in the TBS studio, displaying a miniature model of a Typhoon and describing how large the submarine is.

Video shows publicity film of a Typhoon surfacing in icy waters, that describes how the submarine is well designed for operations in the Arctic Ocean. Introducing various features of the Typhoon, the video caption notes it is 170 meters long and 23 meters wide. The narrator says the full crew complement is 150 and that all the staff officers in the control room are elite officers of the Russian Navy.

An officer walking down a walkway describes the living quarters. He walks into a dining room on the bottom of a three-story living area. Video briefly shows a recreation room, sauna, training gym, and swimming pool within the submarine. Birds and fish are kept in the recreation room. Sub-Lieutenant Valentin, a 32-year-old sailor from Russia, says he is happy to be part of the crew of the ultramodern submarine.

Video shows crew during a fire-fighting exercise. Freelance military analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa notes the submarine contains many wooden parts, and describes how the wooden interior is dangerous for a fire-prone warship. He indicates the interior of the submarine does not at all look like that of a warship. Ogawa adds the

crew may well be aware that no one can survive if the submarine engages in combat. Video shows the Typhoon leaving port.

Video cuts to Kanise, Ogawa, and Ryoji in the studio discussing the significance of the large ballistic submarine. Kanise says the Typhoon is most useful to Russia as a political trump card, noting that Russia has succeeded in taking over the former Soviet Union's position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

'Expert' Interviewed on Nuclear Arms Cutbacks

*PM2508123792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Aug 92 p 3*

[Interview with Gennadiy Khromov, Russian Federation Ministry of Industry expert on arms control questions, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Strategic Offensive Weapons Cuts. Will Russia's Interests Be Infringed?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The problem of strategic offensive weapons cuts is not just a central issue in mutual relations between Russia and the United States. In essence it also determines world stability as a whole. The editorial office asked Gennadiy Khromov, an arms control expert with the Russian Federation Ministry of Industry and formerly a delegation member at the nuclear and space arms talks with the United States, to comment on the current state of affairs in this sphere.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] First of all, Gennadiy Konstantinovich, we would like to hear from you when we can expect the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons [START] to come into force. After all, it is already over a year since it was signed, and it still has not been ratified.

[Khromov] Indeed, this extremely important treaty has not yet come into force. The changes that took place in the former USSR after it was signed were the main reason for the delay in its ratification.

A bilateral Soviet-U.S. treaty has essentially turned into a five-sided one. The commitments that the USSR took on have now been assumed by Russia, and also by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, on whose territory the strategic offensive weapons are currently deployed.

A number of issues connected with mutual understanding between the states that used to constitute the USSR had to be reviewed. The most complex was the problem of guaranteeing the nuclear-free status of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. But this has finally been resolved as of today. These three states expressed their readiness to accede to the 1962 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as nuclear-free parties in Lisbon 23 May 1992. The way was opened to complete the legal formalization of the START Treaty—the ratification of this document by all participating states.

The U.S. Senate states that we can expect the treaty to be ratified in the United States as early as September. There are grounds to believe that here in the CIS countries the ratification process will be over by this fall. Then we can proceed to its full-scale implementation.

At this point it should be noted that many of the treaty's provisions are already operating. Ballistic missile launches are taking place, as the treaty requires, without encryption of telemetric information, both sides inform each other of the technical specification of their weapons, and comply with the prescribed quantitative limitations.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How does the treaty signed 31 July 1991 square with the new agreements reached at the June summit meeting in Washington?

[Khromov] At the moment these documents are in different "weight categories," figuratively speaking. The START Treaty has already been completely formalized and could come into force in a month or two. However, the framework agreement signed in Washington—regarding further cuts in strategic offensive weapons—is basically and for the time being just a "protocol of intention" which will be converted to the format of an international legal treaty document in the course of upcoming talks. Moreover, an understanding exists between the parties that no new treaties on further cuts in strategic offensive weapons will be brought into force until the 1991 START Treaty is ratified.

However, as the parties have agreed, this new treaty (or agreement) will envisage deeper cuts in strategic offensive weapons. But this is already the next stage. And as far as "superimposing" one treaty on another is concerned, this is entirely permissible from a legal point of view.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Following the signing of the framework agreement in June, mass media reports both in our country and in the West spoke about the unequal terms it dictated for us and for the United States. Is this the case, are there grounds for making these claims?

[Khromov] It is well known that the June agreements, unlike the treaty signed earlier, envisage deeper arms cuts: Down to 3,800-4,250 weapons (instead of 6,000) over a seven-year period, and down to 3,000-3,500 weapons by 2003.

All this has basically been presented correctly: Arms levels are coming down toward the limits of reasonable sufficiency. At the same time the types of weapons that threaten the other side most of all—the ones termed destabilizing weapons—are being cut back in particular, in our case the heavy RS-20 missiles, often denoted by the designation SS-18, and on the U.S. side the Trident-2 SLBM's and so on.

As has been noted in the West, the level of mutual understanding that already exists in the political sphere has finally been reached in the security sphere. At the

same time it seems that, for the time being, elements of inequality have indeed been enshrined in one way or another in the framework agreement. Elements that infringe our country's security interests somewhat.

But this is admitted even by representatives of the Pentagon, who state that, despite the agreement, all U.S. plans are inviolable (including the potential to conduct nuclear tests and to develop SDI), and by their very nature the cuts are more favorable to the United States.

Unless amended in the course of turning the framework agreement into a full-scale treaty document, and while naturally preserving the basic provisions of the agreement, this state of affairs will lead not just to a serious upsetting of the balance of power, but could also force us to bear substantial additional costs. And this is no gift for our already dumbfounded people.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Could you cite just one example of this unequal approach?

[Khromov] In Russia's case, it is planned to carry out the bulk of the additional cuts in the total number of weapons as specified in the framework agreement by completely doing away with the 154 RS-20 (SS-18) heavy missiles that will remain after the implementation of the main START Treaty (under this agreement alone the number of weapons is being reduced by 1,540). Moreover, we are not just talking about a reduction in the number of missile-borne weapons, as is the case in respect of the U.S. Trident-2's, but about directly raising the issue of eliminating absolutely all our missiles. Not just the missiles, but also their launchers. Thus the entire infrastructure connected with these weapons is being eliminated.

There is one other issue that crops up in connection with the proposed option for resolving the RS-20 missile problem. The question arises as to why the launchers need to be destroyed if it is easier and cheaper with slight modification to mount single warhead missiles on them—the very weapons we are supposed to have after all the cuts have been made under the terms of the framework agreement. This would save billions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How do these problems look in the United States, Gennadiy Konstantinovich? What solutions are envisaged there?

[Khromov] As far as the United States is concerned, it is planned to achieve the total levels set by the framework agreement mainly by reducing the number of warheads for Trident-2 missiles. This missile currently carries eight Mk-4 warheads (although the missile has also undergone flight tests with 12 warheads of this type). The Americans are planning to have a total of 432 such missiles on 18 submarines, in other words 3,456 warheads.

So it is planned to remove four warheads from each of these missiles (in other words a total of 1,728 will be removed). There are no plans to scrap these warheads.

They might be stored next to a pier where a submarine is moored. In which case the original set could be brought back into service within a matter of hours, owing to the fact that there is a special rider to the framework agreement preserving untouched the mounting [platform] on which the warheads are fitted in the missile.

Some may reproach me for adhering to the old way of thinking, and for being overly suspicious: Nobody, they say, can return to the past and the arms race. But the fact of the matter is that a concept like stability—and nuclear weapons cutbacks are made primarily in order to increase stability—is associated not just with a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads, but also with the elimination of the potential to accumulate weapons. But in its present form the framework agreement is a long way from achieving this goal in its entirety.

And finally, when will we start to count the cost? The rich Americans have made a special stipulation that the mountings on missiles that enable warheads to be fitted should be kept. They have stipulated this because in a normal partnership, when the interests of both sides are taken into account, logic dictates that these mountings should be destroyed and new ones should be manufactured that are designed purely for the reduced number of warheads. But all this costs money! They are counting literally every cent!

I would like to hope that in the preparation of the treaty document based on the framework agreement, the two sides' economic interests will also be analyzed in depth and taken into account. For us at least this is very important.

Four Republics Coordinate on START Compliance

OW0109144992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1418 GMT 01 Sep 92

[Report by diplomatic correspondent A. Borodin and others—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The special commission on compliance with the treaty on cuts in strategic offensive weapons [START] signed between the USSR and the USA in July, 1991, held a session in Kiev. According to the local press, its members managed to settle most of their differences.

The session involved representatives of the USA and of the 4 CIS states which inherited nuclear weapons from the former USSR: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

According to observers, the main problem that remains to be solved is the sources of financing the process of dismantling nuclear weaponry and its subsequent scrapping.

Kazakh Defense Minister Reassures U.S. on START*LD0109172492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1517 GMT 1 Sep 92*

[By correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS—The Republic of Kazakhstan is committed to the spirit and letter of the agreements on strategic armaments concluded at the level of the CIS heads of state and advocates scrupulous compliance with the provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Kazakh Defence Minister Sagadat Nurmagambetov told Steven Steiner, the U.S. representative in the special commission to monitor compliance with the START treaty, today.

The top-ranking U.S. diplomat arrived in Alma-Ata for a protocol meeting to acquaint himself with the Kazakh leaders' position on issues related to the reduction and elimination of strategic nuclear armaments that are deployed on the republic's territory.

A spokesman in the Kazakh Defence Ministry's press service told ITAR-TASS by telephone that the sides achieved mutual understanding on all aspects of the problems discussed.

U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Kazakhstan William Courtney attended the meeting.

Deputy Commander on State of Rocket Forces*PM0409103192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Sep 92 pp 1, 2*

[Interview with Colonel General Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Ryazhskikh, deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces for armaments, by Major Aleksandr Dolinin under the rubric "Interlocutor of the Day"; place and date not given: "Russia Needs Nuclear Missile Weapons and Can Perfectly Well Afford Them"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] He was born in 1931. He is deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces for armaments and a member of the Strategic Rocket Forces Military Council. He is a doctor of military sciences and candidate of technical sciences. He took part in the development of the first Soviet rockets. He is an experimental engineer. He took part in the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite and of the lunar probes. He worked for many years with S.P. Korolev, V.N. Chelomey, N.A. Pilyugin, M.K. Yangel, and V.P. Barmin.

[Dolinin] It has now been proved that it is impossible in the modern world to resolve the problems of a state's national security without an army with powerful weapons. Therefore priority attention is being paid to strategic forces groupings and to their foundation—the Strategic Rocket Forces—in forming the Russian Army. But what is the technical condition of the forces today? Given the country's present economic position, have

they not lost their former might, and will their continued maintenance and development not be a heavy burden on the people?

[Ryazhskikh] I should stress right away that, compared with other branches of the Armed Forces, the Rocket Forces are not only the smallest in terms of number of personnel but also, surprising though it may seem, the cheapest. Few people know that only 7-9 percent of the funds appropriated for defense are earmarked for them.

The initial expenditure on setting up missile complexes is considerable, of course. But the missile men are very careful with their equipment and arms. Largely thanks to this, the operational life of complexes is considerably extended. Moreover, the maintenance of missiles in a combat-ready state is an automatic process. All this to a great extent recoups the expenditure.

[Dolinin] In that case, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, it is reasonable to ask whether the Strategic Rocket Forces can have a high level of technical equipment when the funds allocated to them are so modest?

[Ryazhskikh] I can say without exaggeration: There were practically no tasks beyond the capability of our missile industry. The most complex models of equipment were developed and placed in series production on time, as a rule.

In terms of basic combat and operational performance characteristics, our arms are not inferior to the corresponding foreign models. Some indicators are higher abroad, and some are higher here. In general, there is in practice balance. Incidentally, that was also the conclusion drawn by Russian President B.N. Yeltsin after his recent visit to a missile test range in Mirnyy.

I will also cite some illustrations of the quality and reliability of our missile equipment. Take the RS-10 (SS-11) missile complex, which is to be replaced in the very near future. It has been on combat alert duty for around two and a half times its originally prescribed lifetime, but it still retains its combat and operational performance characteristics.

As is well known, 72 RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles were destroyed by the launch method during implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. They all were launched precisely on time and their nose sections hit the calculated target points.

That is not all. In several dozen planned launches of the latest-generation RS-12M (SS-25) missiles there have been no deviations at all in prelaunch preparations or in flight. I think this is a convincing testimonial to the quality and reliability of our missiles and in general to the standard of the missile industry.

[Dolinin] But, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, doubts are arising whether the missile industry will stop in its development given today's "indiscriminate" conversion?

[Ryazhskikh] That danger does exist. Processes that may get out of control have already begun at a number of plants and design bureaus. The exodus of skilled personnel has increased sevenfold. And it is the most highly skilled professionals who are leaving.

The growth rate in the level of technical equipment at enterprises has fallen by 20-30 percent. Given this dangerous trend, our plants will be unable to take on board new technological processes in arms and equipment production.

Coproduction arrangements are being wrecked. Taking Ukrainian plants into account, the loss of suppliers is reaching 40 percent or even more. Design bureaus and research institutes do not have the funds to develop experimental facilities.

[Dolinin] So unless appropriate measures are taken, the missile industry's potential may fall below the permissible "danger mark"? What will be the quality of weaponry in 10 or 15 years' time, say?

[Ryazhskikh] Each new generation of weapons must have approximately a 50-100 percent improvement in combat and operational performance characteristics. It is impossible to achieve this without scientific and technical groundwork, a high level of technical equipment at enterprises, and modern experimental and research facilities. We are already beginning to lag behind in solving many problems.

[Dolinin] What is the solution?

[Ryazhskikh] Within the limits of my competence, I can express my personal opinion on how to alleviate the negative trends in military industry. Clearly, we in the Armed Forces must first of all ensure that the defense industry has stable, guaranteed orders. Plant directors and chief designers must be confident of military customers as reliable partners capable of financing the development and creation of the armaments the state needs.

It is important to preserve the backbone of state defense enterprises, to give them economic incentives, and to lessen the pressure of high taxation. At all costs we must preserve our intellectual potential, even if it means state subsidies.

Conversion, which was planned on the scale of a state that no longer exists, must be geared to Russia and must have a clear, scientifically-substantiated character.

The forward planning of experimental design work and series production must be improved. It takes between five and seven years to create a modern missile complex, or even longer if you count the groundwork, so well thought-out long-term planning is essential. U.S. experience shows that over there, after they have drawn up a list of the most important long-term developments, they bolster them with dozens of projects, set up long-term cooperation, and systematically resolve the set tasks.

[Dolinin] In the hope that one day at long last everything will take shape, how do you see the purpose of Russia's nuclear missile shield?

[Ryazhskikh] Nuclear missile weapons, and we should not close our eyes to this, are a really reliable means of ensuring global stability in the foreseeable future. Not only political and military stability, but also economic stability. Irrespective of whether the states that possess them are in opposition in any sphere.

Though the army is commonly seen as guns and tanks, the basis of this army called upon to safeguard the right of Russia's peoples always to control their present and future themselves is in fact a military-political means of ensuring global stability. It is those means that the Strategic Rocket Forces have. The whole point of the Rocket Forces' existence lies in not using them, but in preventing global conflict under any circumstances.

Aside from their exceptional, unique importance for Russia's guaranteed sovereignty and defense structure, nuclear missile weapons are also necessary because they are weapons that we can perfectly well afford. If you make an integrated assessment on the basis of the "defense effect-cost" criterion taking the costs of creating them into account, they are the most economical and cheapest weapons. And it is important that they be of a level that is not inferior to foreign models.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Controversy Over Fate Of Military Space Units

Space Units Press Officer Dissents

924P0167A Moscow DEN in Russian No 30, 1 Aug 92
p 3

[Article by Lt Col Igor G. Makhalov, officer in the CIS Joint Armed Forces Space Units Press Service: "Out of Orbit..."]

[Text] The incipient process of organizing a Russian Army presupposes first of all the formulating of the state's military doctrine and the elaboration on the basis of this of an overall concept of the Armed Forces. In the words of the Minister of Defense G. Grachev, the former should be submitted to the Russian Federation by 1 July, and the latter by September of the current year. As a whole, the reform of the Russian Army is to be concluded in 6-8 years. For comparison, let us point out that the Special Commission set up at the end of the 1960s by the U.S. President took only 5 years to work out a general plan of military reform and in accord with this, for example, a service, such as the ground forces, was improved qualitatively for a period of another 13 years. And this was all on the basis of a highly developed economy, with American efficiency and organization. Certainly in establishing the Russian Armed Forces, in the words of the same G. Grachev, "changes are required in literally all spheres, beginning with military doctrine

and ending with the required qualities of a soldier." And this is under the conditions of an impoverished Russia.

The implementation of the Russian military reform presupposes the solution to a triune task: a quantitative cutback in the Armed Forces, their structural transformation and their qualitative improvement. How does all of this appear in terms of space facilities?

The space units of the former USSR were assigned to launch and support the functioning in orbit of spacecraft for scientific, national economic and military purposes, the interplanetary automatic stations, the manned spacecraft and orbital stations. They possessed cosmodromes in Baykonur and Plesetsk with the corresponding subunits for testing and preparing the space equipment for launch, the Main Command and Control Center as well as the auxiliary subunits. From the specific purpose of the space units—the simultaneous carrying out of military and national economic tasks—one can see their special role in the structure of the Armed Forces in contrast to the other combat arms which are organizations that are purely military. Another particular feature of this combat arm is that the space units in peacetime live according to the laws and standards of a combat situation. This specific feature of theirs requires a special approach in examining the prospects for the development of the space units.

Here the question arises first of all: where are they needed? The problem is that the space facilities, in being an element of the unified space complex of the former USSR, were located over all its territory. With the collapse of the Union, certain republics, in taking an unique approach to the desire to confirm their sovereignty, hurried to declare their right to the facilities of the space units located there following the principle "whether we need it or not, take it."

In actuality, one cannot help but understand the leadership of Kazakhstan in "privatizing" Baykonur, which was on its land, as the republic simply did not have enough either economic or intellectual potential even for maintaining this unique cosmodrome, let alone to operate it.

The Ukrainian authorities should realize that the inclusion in the system of its air defense of the Command and Control Centers in Crimea, in being subunits of the space units, will not substantially increase its combat readiness, but the efficient use of the space facilities here will be sharply restricted. If Ukraine intends to carry out an "independent" space policy, it would scarcely be beneficial for it to have absolute separation from the space capabilities of Russia. But even worse here they follow the adage "I can't use it but I won't give it to anyone else." In either instance, one feels like using the political saw of modern times: "Political ambitions are getting the uppermost over common sense."

Since an agreement between the former USSR republics on joint activities in the sphere of space more and more often are suspended in mid-air, one can speak of the

established trend for the collapse of all our cosmonautics, which still continues to hold leading positions among the space powers. It is not even a matter of national prestige, for at present, as they say, "these are lean times...." But in order to survive, we cannot allow ourselves to be deprived of the system developed over the decades for the participation of the space units in the country's national security.

Experts have established and practice has confirmed that "military space" increases the effective operations of the Armed Forces by 1.5-2-fold. The successful Desert Storm operation was largely the result of highly effective support for the combat operations of American troops from space. For this reason the U.S. continues to increase allocations for the military space programs. In the strategy of U.S. national security it is pointed out that "both sea and space routes can be concealed and can be employed chiefly as a springboard for attack."

The First Deputy Minister of Defense A. Kokoshin, in speaking about the nation's military doctrine, in contrast to the Americans, emphasizes in every possible way that this will not be based upon the existence of a potential enemy or opponent. Having noted here that, contrary to formal logic, an incorrect premise would lead to a correct conclusion, we will not halt for critically examining from the military-political viewpoint the obvious inconsistency of the initial thesis, but rather let us agree with the correctness of the final assertion by the vice minister that the Russian Armed Forces should be the "guarantor for security in the instance of any unforeseen events and deter any aggression."

Hence, the necessity of a sharp rise in the role of space facilities in the military organization of the Russian state. Under the new conditions of "a defense for all azimuths"—and this is precisely how one might define the meaning of the new military doctrine—in the forefront, in the words of the Chief of the Space Union Col Gen V. Ivanov, emerges a highly operational detection of the early indications for preparing to commence military operations, the prompt warning of a missile attack and providing the troops with dependable global communications and combat control and command.

In the first place, one of the crucial aspects of the military reform is the organizing of the rapid deployment and response forces. Secondly, as a result of the Russo-American Agreement on Reducing Strategic Offensive Weapons, a large portion of the U.S. nuclear potential remains on aircraft and submarines, where the Americans have an advantage over us in quantity and mobility. Thirdly, the "Charter of Russo-American Partnership and Friendship" proposes to the CSCE member states in the aims of strengthening the mechanisms for the prevention, surveillance and settling of conflicts and the opportunities for supporting peace in Europe, that the Armed Forces and the resources for their joint employment be allocated. The question is also being examined of creating UN Joint Armed Forces under the aegis of the Security Council.

One could mention a number of other factors which have brought about new approaches to assessing "military space," however the listed ones are enough to realize that the interests of Russia's national defense, European security and universal peace urgently demand not only the maintaining of our space facilities, but even their strengthening and development. Life urgently poses the question of creating the unified military-space forces of Russia on the basis of the Directorate of the Chief of Space Facilities and the space formations, field forces and units subordinate to him.

In accord with the new defense strategy, the Russian Army to an ever-greater degree will consist of professionals and in quantitative terms will be reduced by 50 percent. In professional terms, the officers operating the complex space equipment are on a level of the strictest modern requirements. The picture is less happy in terms of the manning of the space units with personnel.

Even now, the establishments of the subunits have been drawn up without considering the details, leaves and sickness. As a result at certain command and control centers, for example, the composition of the duty shifts operating costly spacecraft in flight is just one-half of what it should be. Only the greatest professionalism and responsibility by the personnel of the command and control centers, their correct understanding of the difficulties which the entire nation is experiencing, can explain the virtual absence of unsuccessful sessions for controlling the spacecraft. What reduction at all can be considered here? Certainly the patience of the personnel is not infinite. Such a state of affairs as well as the absence of clear legal status for the Russian servicemen carrying out their duties outside its territory have already led to the expression of dissatisfaction by the Baykonur officers. There must be a strict legal basis for using both jointly and unilaterally the space facilities located in neighboring states of Russia.

If one understands professionalism as the high skills of a specialist and his conscientious attitude to his job, then it must be admitted that the personnel in regular service with each new draft less and less conforms to these demands. Things have reached such a point that the pilots at Baykonur are afraid of carrying out missions on aircraft which are serviced by mechanics in regular service. The aviators at the cosmodrome several years ago concluded that the high-quality execution of the given missions could be carried out only by a fully manned establishment of warrant officers ["praporshchik"]. Incidentally, the freed soldiers could strengthen the personnel at the security facilities of space equipment. However, this initiative to work in a new manner did not gain its proper response from the superior levels.

One other thing. If we speak about the organizing of a Russian Army on a qualitatively new level, then we must not, having reduced the army in quantitative terms, hope on some magical rise in its combat readiness and a transition to a new qualitative state without any additional allocations. This is elementary common sense

which on the given question was demonstrated by the Speaker of the Russian Supreme Soviet R. Khasbulatov, who has repeatedly declared that "a cheap army is a bad army."

From this viewpoint, the space units which define qualitatively a new level of national defense clearly cannot be reorganized without any cost any more than can the other components of the new Russian Army. Almost one-half of the facilities for the command and control of military-purpose spacecraft are located on the territory of CIS countries adjacent to Russia. In converting to command and control of these spacecraft solely from Russian territory, the efficient execution of the missions of communications, intelligence and navigation is reduced by 1.5-2-fold. For recovering the status quo within the Russian Federation it would be essential to set up another several command and control centers. Let us add to what has been said that, as any sea power cannot not have ports for the basing of its fleet, so Russia should have its own cosmodrome. With the transition of Baykonur to the jurisdiction of Kazakhstan, the Plesetsk Range will become such a space harbor. Thus, the reorganizing of the Plesetsk Cosmodrome as the State Cosmodrome of Russia, along with the further development and improving of the infrastructure for the space facilities, requires definite expenditures.

Someone, in speaking about the national economic importance of cosmonautics, compared this with a chicken which lays golden eggs, having noted, in this case correctly, that we have still not learned to use this with advantage for ourselves. We, of course, can save in feeding it, but will we gain from this in any other more substantial way?

We greatly want to believe that the planners of the military reform and the legislators approving it know the correct answer to this question.

Makhalov, Radionov to be Fired

924P0167B Moscow DEN in Russian No 32, 15 Aug 92
p 1

[Unattributed article: "Fit for Service but Unsuitable..."]

[Text] Our newspaper (DEN, No 30) published an article by Lt Col I. G. Makhalov, an officer in the Space Units Press Service, "Out of Orbit," where the author proves the necessity of strengthening the space facilities in the course of the pending military reform, as an important element in the system of Russia's defense capability. Subsequent events were to show that the Russian Ministry of Defense not only closely reads our newspaper but responds quickly to its articles.

As we were to learn from reliable sources, the office of the chief of space systems received a telephone call from the top military leadership expressing dissatisfaction over the "tone of the given article and its publication in the newspaper DEN" and also demanding "a talk with the

author." Just how such analyses end is well known not only to the men in epaulets but also civilians. However, reality surpassed even the gloomiest forecasts characteristic for the recent era of stagnation.

In carrying out instructions from superior levels, the chief of space systems, Col Gen V.L. Ivanov, ordered the dismissal from the Armed Forces of not only the author of the mentioned article but also the head of the Press Service, Col A.I. Radionov, for "not preventing the publication of the material" and also announced its decision to completely eliminate the press group, having said that it "does not see a place for this subunit in the new structures of the military space forces."

In a telephone conversation with our correspondent, both disgraced officers confirmed the fact of their forthcoming dismissal, but here, remaining loyal to the officer's honor, refused to comment on the actions of their command. Bravo, Mr. Generals! I congratulate you on your next victory of "democracy" over free speech.

Economic Use for Krasnoyarsk Radar Facilities

*PM2108115792 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Aug 92 p 1*

[ITAR-TASS report: "Krasnoyarsk Radar Station Installations Left to National Economy"]

[Text] By an ordinance of the Russian Federation Government, it has been decided that installations left behind following the dismantling of the former Krasnoyarsk Radar Station will be used in the national economy. It has taken note of the fact that the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command stopped the dismantling of the receiving and transmission installation buildings at the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station and will resolve the question of transferring them to the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy. The Ministry of Fuel and Energy, together with the Krasnoyarsk Kray administration, has been instructed to prepare draft documentation, on the re-equipping of the remaining installations at the former radar station into a furniture combine and other production installations for the manufacture of consumer goods, for the American side.

Decision To Expedite SDI Deployment Noted

*PM2708150992 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Aug 92 p 3*

[Unattributed report under the "Foreign Military Hardware: In Laboratories and on Test Sites" rubric: "United States Intends To Speed Up"]

[Text] The United States intends to speed up the deployment of the ABM system being deployed within the SDI framework. This has been reported by H. Cooper, director of the SDI Organization. The first group of launch complexes, which are to constitute the basis of U.S. strategic defense, will be commissioned in North

Dakota no later than 1995-1996 if the research work now being carried out makes sufficient progress.

The development of the ABM system is aimed at defending the United States against a "limited attack" by third countries or against an accidental missile launch from the territory of the former USSR. According to H. Cooper's forecasts, over the next decade between 20 and 24 countries will become the possessors of ICBM's, some of which are capable of carrying nuclear or chemical warheads.

The new structure of the ABM system will also make it possible to protect U.S. Armed Forces stationed abroad, allies of the United States, and states friendly to them, since it will be possible to launch the new missiles, which are designed to replace the Patriot guided surface-to-air complexes, from mobile ground launchers or from ships.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Baltics Seek UN Discussion of Russian Troop Withdrawal

*PM2408153592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Aug 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Konstantin Eggert article: "Baltic States Take Dispute With Russia To United Nations"]

[Text] Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have asked for an additional point entitled "The complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of the Baltic states" to be included on the agenda of the 47th UN General Assembly session.

ITAR-TASS reports that the request was formulated in a letter from these states' representatives to the UN secretary general. The inclusion of this question on the forthcoming General Assembly session agenda, the document notes, would be a "timely use of preventive diplomacy in a region where a threat could emerge to the maintenance of international peace and security." A year has passed since the restoration of the Baltic states' independence, the letter notes, but foreign armed forces are still present on their territories. Bilateral talks on this issue have "so far been mainly unsuccessful," the document points out.

Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn are thus continuing the diplomatic offensive launched long ago, which achieved its main success at the July CSCE "summit" in Helsinki. That was when they managed to get a reference to the need for the speediest withdrawal of the former USSR's Army from Baltic territory included in the summit communique. Continually reminding the world community about this is probably the only thing that the Baltic capitals can do to counter the Russian arsenal, which includes powerful levers of economic pressure. The Baltic states will probably meet with understanding at the General Assembly too—an understanding which

may be reflected in its resolutions. But this will have no impact on the crux of the matter.

In terms of the inflexibility shown by both sides, the Russo-Baltic conflict is starting to resemble the confrontation between the Arabs and Israel. We would recall that, at the last meeting of the foreign ministers of the Russian Federation, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in Moscow 6 August, Andrey Kozyrev stated a readiness to withdraw the troops in 1994, while making a number of reservations, including the withdrawal by the Baltic countries of their demands for compensation for the damage done to them in 1940-1991, the abandonment of territorial claims (with reference to Estonia), and the safeguarding of the nonnative population's rights.

Kozyrev's colleagues—Ministers J. Jurkans, A. Saudargas, and J. Manitski—considered both the schedule and the accompanying conditions to be unacceptable. The planned cycle of summits between President B. Yeltsin and the heads of the Baltic states is hardly likely to fundamentally alter anything.

The only realistic way out the deadlock seems to be to divorce the question of the former Soviet Army's presence from all other problems on one condition—the Baltic states should pledge to enter into talks with Moscow on questions of interest to it, when a troop withdrawal agreement is signed. Ultimately the calls for the evacuation of the Russian servicemen are entirely legitimate. There is little point waiting until there is not a single influential international organization left which does not express support for the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians.

The continuous connection that is made between the problem of the Russian-speaking inhabitants of the Baltic and the presence of our officers and men could sooner or later cast Russia in the unseemly role of blackmailer. Nor is Moscow really planning to resolve these contradictions with the help of armed force.

Concessions on the troop withdrawal issue will undermine the positions of the national radicals in the Baltic states and create favorable preconditions for a tough dialogue both on the problems of minorities and in the Russo-Estonian dispute over Pechory. Moreover, real progress at the talks on the Army would split the Baltic states' united front and allow Russia to take different approaches to the conclusion of agreements with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Russian Foreign Ministry Statement on Baltic Talks

*LD2408140292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1330 GMT 24 Aug 92*

[Punctuation as received]

[Text] Moscow August 24 TASS—Foreign ministers of Russia and Baltic states met on August 6, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry said. Information

about reaction abroad to Russia's "package" initiative on the Baltics is contradictory, diverse assessments are offered, he said.

"In Washington, London and Paris Russia's readiness to complete the withdrawal of troops from Baltic states in 1994, provided an agreement is reached on a number of related issues, was received with satisfaction.

As for other Russian proposals, Russia's general position is viewed as constructive, although necessarily 'tough'.

Scandinavian countries regard the four-partite talks in Moscow as a positive sign testifying to a desire to reach compromise decisions. Awareness of the complex situation and the need to take account of the interests of all sides was recently displayed at a meeting of heads of Nordic countries on Bornholm Island.

Interestingly, a positive assessment of the Moscow meeting was given by a number of East European countries which discern the desire of the Russian leadership to seek a settlement on the basis of full equality and respect for mutual interests, on the basis of generally recognised international legal norms. It is interesting that against the background of discriminatory steps by Tallinn and Riga with regard to Russian-speaking population, as well as territorial claims made by them, a more critical assessment of the policy of Baltic capitals is evident.

A presidential stage can give a new quality to the process of unblocking complex interstate problems between Russian and Baltic states, which, hopefully, will lead to fundamental decisions on acute problems: ensuring international standards in the field of human rights in Baltic states, legal provisions for troops during the pull-out period, observance of the principle of inviolability of borders. However, such a turn must be carefully prepared, for which realism and common sense must prevail in the attitudes of our partners. In the meantime, the first reaction received by us—a note of the Latvian foreign minister—is, obviously, not directed towards a positive turn, for which the Russian side calls and which constitutes the essence and importance of the Moscow meeting on August 6.

In connection with numerous commentaries in the press and addresses by representatives of news media, it seems necessary to explain in more detail the issue of 'linkages' and 'interdependence'. The official position of the Russian side is that direct 'linkage' exists inside the third block of the Russian proposals dealing with military matters, namely: The withdrawal of Russian troops from the territories of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1994 will be completed only if agreements on several related issues are reached and implemented. The point at issue is nine articles included in the relevant military 'package'.

As for the three other blocks, there is no rigid 'linkage' between them and the military block. There is objective interdependence because they involve measures that, put

together, make it possible to achieve a breakthrough in relations of the sides towards their normalisation and improvement. The essence and importance of the Russian proposals lie precisely in this breakthrough.

Finally, we cannot keep silence on attempts to ascribe to Russia power diplomacy. Now that the anniversary celebrations marking the August triumph of democracy in our country are held, it will be appropriate to recall that it was precisely the position of democratic Russia that paved the way to independence of Baltic states and that, inherently and on principle, it provides for renouncing the threat of use of force and any forms of pressure," the statement runs.

Shaposhnikov on Withdrawal of CIS Troops

*LD2708122192 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 27 Aug 92*

[Text] Touching on issues relating to the withdrawal of armed forces of the former USSR from the territory of independent republics, Aviation Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, said among other things in his exclusive interview to the news service of Russia's radio:

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording] Here we have several approaches depending on regions and the situation which has taken shape there. Let's take the Baltics, for example. We support the opinion of the Baltic states regarding the need to withdraw Russian troops from their territory. We also support the opinion of the Russian leadership, which does not disclaim this. But any hastiness in this matter may lead to heaps of unwanted consequences.

We have withdrawn troops in a very hasty manner from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and this year we are almost concluding the withdrawal from Poland. The withdrawal of the mightiest grouping of armed forces from Germany continues. And on top of it, there are problems regarding a withdrawal from the Baltic states, the Transcaucasus, the Dniester region, and so forth.

I think, if we are civilized people and call upon each other to solve these issues in a civilized way, in my opinion there is no need to conduct referenda regarding the withdrawal of troops. This is not a constructive position. A dialogue is needed, talks are needed, and timetables are needed. Yes, there is need to withdraw troops from the Baltic states. But when and how? It is necessary to do it stage-by-stage and calmly. We cannot withdraw them into an empty field or a forest.

That's why the Baltic leaders are somewhat hasty in using public opinion. Our servicemen, including Russian ones, are not guilty of anything before the present leaders of these states—not guilty of happening to be there. I beg your pardon, but it is not like dust on the table which can be dusted off or cleaned, and the problem will be solved thus. The problem will not be solved in this way.

No, no other state in the world except Russia is experiencing such difficulties with the withdrawal of troops, the market economy, conversion, the curtailment of the military-industrial production and so forth. There should be Russo-Baltic talks, Russo-Moldovan talks, Russo-Caucasian talks, etc.—my position lies in such an approach. [end recording]

Russia, Lithuania Agree on 1993 Troop Withdrawal

Withdrawal Begins

*LD2808222392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Aug 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Russian Army has started the withdrawal of its units from Lithuania. The first military installation has been handed over to the Service for the Protection of the Kray of Lithuania in Klaipeda. On leaving the Russians left the whole military cantonment, equipped in accordance with the requirements, to the Lithuanian Army.

Landsbergis: Russia Modifying Terms

*LD0109121192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius
in English 2300 GMT 31 Aug 92*

[Text] Speaking on the national TV yesterday, Chairman of parliament Vytautas Landsbergis said the Russian side was making changes in the parts of the text already agreed upon and proposals unacceptable to Lithuania. These proposals twist the real legal state of Lithuania and are an attempt at making Lithuania take on certain commitments so that later the troop withdrawal might depend on those commitments. We can help Russia pull out its troops or build something, but namely help, said Mr. Landsbergis. He expressed a big wish that an agreement on the troop withdrawal would be signed on 8 September, the day when he was meeting with President Boris Yeltsin.

Lithuanian Delegation on 'Constructive' Talks

*OW0109172092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1638 GMT 1 Sep 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "Our discussions in Moscow are very constructive. It seems, we had not observed such constructiveness on behalf of the Russian side until yesterday and today," Lithuania's charge d'affaires in Russia, Egidijus Bickauskas, admitted in his interview for the Lithuanian radio Tuesday. In the meantime, he said that very little progress was being made in the delegations' work on the agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the territory of Lithuania.

In the words of the Lithuanian diplomat, half of the delegations are working in the Lithuanian embassy in Moscow, while the other half work in the General Staff of the Russian Army. Mr Bickauskas expressed hope that the work of the delegations will be completed Tuesday night.

The Lithuanian officials, including the head of the Lithuanian parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, are still refraining from commenting on the unofficial statement that Russia proposes to shift the date of the final troops withdrawal from the territory of Lithuania to 1993.

Yeltsin, Landsbergis Agree on 1993 Withdrawal

*LD0809162192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1547 GMT 8 Sep 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Lyudmila Aleksandrova and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow September 8 TASS—A one-to-one meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Lithuanian Parliament Leader Vytautas Landsbergis was held in the Kremlin today. The two then signed Russian-Lithuanian documents. However, the expected signing of an inter-state agreement between Russia and Lithuania did not take place.

In this regard, the press secretary of the Russian president Vyacheslav Kostikov said Yeltsin asked to tell journalists that the agreement has not yet been finalised and some details need to be specified. Work on the agreement continues and about a month will be needed to sign it. No political problems arise in this connection, Kostikov noted. Simply there are some technical elements that need additional study.

At a press conference upon the results of the Kremlin meeting, Kostikov told journalists today that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania will be completed by August 31, 1993.

At this meeting, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Lithuanian Minister for the Protection of the Territory Audrijus Budkjavicus signed three documents—the timetable for the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from Lithuania's territory, a protocol on the procedure for solving technical and organisational issues related to the pull-out of Russia's Armed Forces from the territory of the Lithuanian republic and also an agreement on the rules of the conduct and functioning of large and small units that are being moved out.

Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas signed an agreement on the issues of jurisdiction as regards persons who serve with the Russian Armed Forces that are moved out of Lithuania and members of their families, an agreement on the rules of settling property and housing issues of servicemen and other persons in the forces that are being pulled out of the Lithuanian

republic, and also an agreement to settle social issues concerning persons in the Armed Forces that are being withdrawn.

Landsbergis Comments

*LD0809181892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1644 GMT 8 Sep 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Krasulin]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Sep (ITAR-TASS)—The accords reached today in the course of the conversation with Boris Yeltsin, and the documents signed by the defense ministers of the two countries are a mutual achievement, Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, stated today at a news conference at the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow.

Both Lithuania and Russia, he noted, are striving to strengthen trust and expand cooperation. The main obstacle to this—the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Lithuania—will be eliminated as a result of today's signing of the documents on their withdrawal, which should be concluded by the end of August next year. The political agreement related to the withdrawal of Russian troops will be improved, and the next meeting on this issue is planned for the beginning of October, Vytautas Landsbergis said.

Answering journalists' questions as to why the interstate agreement between the two countries had not been signed, the head of the Lithuanian parliament said that in Boris Yeltsin's opinion this document needs more work. "Yeltsin showed me the draft text of this document. A fair number of amendments were made by the Russian president", he noted.

Touching on the issues of economic cooperation between the two countries, Vytautas Landsbergis reported that the work on relevant agreements is already proceeding, and it is quite possible that they will be initialled or even signed this month.

Landsbergis News Conference

LD0909101192

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 0705 GMT on 9 September carries a 45-minute live news conference at which Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis gives an account of the results of the 8 September Moscow talks on troop withdrawals. The news conference is moderated by Supreme Council press spokesman Audrius Azubalis, who announces that Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council and head of the Lithuanian delegation which conducted the negotiations with Russia, will answer journalists' questions.

Landsbergis begins by saying that the issue of the troops' withdrawal from Lithuania was raised back in the

summer of 1989 when 1.5 million signatures were collected demanding the withdrawal. He adds that the issue became very pressing after the coup in Russia, and especially after the world community's recognition of the independence of Lithuania and of the other Baltic states. Landsbergis goes on to say that "on the other hand our relations with Russia have always been good and must remain such in the future and this obstacle, the hotbed of tension, the hotbed of instability and after all the source of the economic and ecological damage, should be eliminated. There are no doubts about that. This has not been argued against anywhere in the world or in the Russian leadership." He continues by saying that, in spite of all these evident and incontestable arguments for the troops' withdrawal, it was not easy to reach an agreement on this. He notes all the efforts made by Lithuanian diplomats at home and abroad to exert pressure on Russia to withdraw its troops from Lithuania.

Landsbergis says that yesterday it became clear that some aspects in the draft documents to be signed raised questions and had to be subjected to coordination and discussions again. He adds: "It was President Yeltsin's idea—which he had suggested earlier during our telephone conversation which I have already mentioned—that the agreed timetable should be signed by both ministers and that this should be done before our signing of the political agreement. Concerning the texts of the documents, not everything was entirely clear yesterday. Thanks to certain efforts made and with ministers and the members of the delegations working—I also had to take certain steps—it was ensured that the timetable is coordinated and ready for signing, and in fact it was signed during the meeting in the Kremlin."

Next, Landsbergis says that the signing of these documents was a proof that "both the states are indeed interested in the normalization and development of good-neighborly relations." He goes on to explain what documents were signed, saying that the first document dealt with the order and procedure of the withdrawal:

"The document specifically regulates where the withdrawing units should be deployed before their pullout, what these units can do inside the territories, the barracks they temporarily occupied, and what they cannot do outside the territories, the barracks they occupied."

Describing a conversation that he had with Boris Yeltsin, in which they exchanged opinions on the withdrawal agreement, Landsbergis says "President Yeltsin saw, and indicated to me, various aspects that were unacceptable to him or which had not been sufficiently well prepared. We attempted to discuss one or two of those instances right there. I thought that perhaps this was possible, or perhaps if we had more time then it would have been possible to discuss them there and then. However, he indicated that the remarks were rather numerous and that there was indeed not enough time. Therefore, we agreed that the text of the draft would be subject to further review before we meet on 1 or 2

October in Moscow." Landsbergis adds that the documents signed indicated that the Russian troops should be completely pulled out not later than by the end of August 1993. At this point questions are invited from journalists.

A Lithuanian Radio journalist asks: "Esteemed chairman, what is your opinion on the fact that Lithuania will construct houses for the Russian servicemen right next to the Lithuanian border in Kalininograd?"

Landsbergis replies: "I can only interpret this as an order received by our construction company and as an agreement to carry out this order. The construction of houses is a commercial matter, and I do not think that any construction company in the world would consider who will live in the houses they build: civilians or servicemen." The next question is by an unidentified journalist who requests more specific information on the remarks made by Boris Yeltsin on the political agreement and why the next summit is to be held in Moscow again and not in Vilnius.

Landsbergis says: "Perhaps I could reveal this to you as a secret, strictly confidentially, after you have sworn that you will not tell anybody anything that must remain undisclosed while the negotiations are still under way. However, perhaps this is not worth doing. Why in Moscow? We did not discuss this as an issue."

A BBC journalist asks whether the other Baltic states would not accuse Lithuania of having left them in an uncertain position.

Landsbergis replies: "The withdrawal of the troops from the Baltic countries will be a very specific process. The withdrawal from Lithuania will not be a withdrawal from the whole of Lithuania at the same time. The troops will be pulling out from some bases, from some cities, airports or training grounds. It seems that the withdrawal will be carried out in this way from all the Baltic countries. It would be rather unrealistic to imagine some improvised simultaneous withdrawal from all the places of deployment.

"We maintain contacts with our Baltic neighbors and companions-in-arms in the fight for liberation; we hold consultations. These issues will be discussed probably not only when the prime ministers meet this week but also at the meeting of the leaders of the Baltic states which will be probably be held next week."

A LIETUVOS AIDAI correspondent asks Landsbergis to comment on talks yesterday between the Lithuanian defense minister and the Russian Defense Ministry. He says: "As I understand it, Russia wanted to have some installations excluded from the timetable. Are these combat or intelligence installations?"

Landsbergis replies: "The curiosity of journalists has no limits. However, this question should be asked of Mr. Butkevicius, who is still in Moscow. He phoned me

several times yesterday from the Russian Defense Ministry. He was concerned and surprised at the situation which had developed several hours before the signing of the agreement. He was confronted with attempts to change issues which had already been agreed upon earlier, these attempts being made by officials who were of considerably lower rank than the leaders of the ministry with whom he had coordinated these issues earlier. He could not find his counterpart, the Russian defense minister. Then I had to intervene to some extent to make sure that the defense minister was found. This issue was resolved when Mr. Burbulis and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin, who was accompanying him, arrived at the Lithuanian Embassy.

A BALTIC INDEPENDENT correspondent asks whether the issue of transit through the territory of Lithuania to Kaliningrad was raised at the Moscow talks. Landsbergis says that this issue was discussed and recorded in the state treaty between Lithuania and Russia signed 29 July last year. He says that there were no discussions on this issue yesterday in Moscow.

An unidentified journalist asks: "Esteemed chairman, are you sure that the troops will start to pull out? A month ago, I think it was on 12 August, a similar timetable presented by the Lithuanian side was described by Isakov as a 'railway timetable,' as Mr. Stankevicius will remember. On 1 February Mr. Shelov-Kovedyayev also said here that the troops were starting to pull out from Lithuania at that time. So far there have not been any orders in writing. However, General Lebed, in the Dniester region, commenting on written orders, said that if he received Yeltsin's orders to pull out from there he would consult first Smirnov, who is something like a president over there. Do you believe that the troops will start pulling out this month?"

Landsbergis says: "I think if the commanders of Russian troop units asked us whether they should pull out of Lithuania we would tell them we have no objections. The fact that a very specific timetable has been signed which indicates specifically when units should be pulled out from the territory of Lithuania is a very important point in the breakthrough toward a solution to the whole issue. Indeed, it is very topical now, as you have rightly pointed out, whether this withdrawal will occur. We have no reason to doubt that this agreement will be carried out. Moreover, the problem of the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania and from the Baltic states has been watched attentively at an international level. One could say that a permanent political international monitoring system exists. This will affect the withdrawal process."

Next, Ceslovas Stankevicius says that he wants to add that "the timetable for troop withdrawal has not been signed on behalf of the Defense Ministry but on behalf of the Russian Federation. This is a kind of international agreement." INTERFAX journalist Kasperius asks about the objective of the document which had not been signed, to which Landsbergis says that this would be a

political document which would "also confirm the agreement on the troop withdrawal, while embracing certain circumstances which are related to it and ways of resolving the questions related to it."

An unidentified journalist asks how the question of the damage inflicted by the occupying troops is being tackled and about Russia's demands to guarantee military transit to Kaliningrad Oblast. Landsbergis says that the issue of transit was not discussed because this was not such a pressing issue. He says that "the issue of compensation for the inflicted damage has always been very sensitive."

Next, Stankevicius reads a namelist of the entire Lithuanian delegation, noting that the press knows only some of the names. He also speaks about the delegation's work and says that other treaties, including the treaty on Russian transit through the Republic of Lithuania, are being prepared: "During the negotiations the Russian position changed. Some demands presented by Russia that were unacceptable to the Republic of Lithuania were later not mentioned, especially at the end of negotiations, so that we managed to coordinate many articles in the package of documents that corresponded to the aims of both sides." Stankevicius adds that compensation for damage was also discussed within this context; therefore this issue was not discussed specifically at this stage of negotiations.

An unidentified journalist asks about the arrangements for damage compensation and about the handing over of some military equipment to Lithuania as compensation.

Landsbergis says that the issue of compensation will be discussed in due course: "Concerning the payment of compensation in weapons, well, this issue is under discussion. This question was touched upon during the meeting with President Yeltsin in January, if not earlier, and it has been an open issue ever since."

A journalist from the OPOZICIJA newspaper asks how the discrepancies found by Yeltsin in the draft agreement that was not signed in Moscow yesterday could be explained. She notes that the draft had been coordinated for such a long time by both sides. She also wants to know why an agreement was signed on withdrawing the troops in 1993, when the Lithuanian referendum demanded that the troop withdrawal occur this year.

Landsbergis states that it became clear from the way that matters proceeded in Moscow that there was inadequate coordination in the Russian leadership and the Russian state delegation. He adds:

"Indeed, the draft documents had been prepared by state delegations. The contradictions were eliminated either through compromise or by creating additional draft documents. Therefore, we thought that the work had been carried out well enough and that all the documents could be signed and, moreover, that the Russian side did not leave any specific time for possible additional summit negotiations. It looked as though there were no

controversial points. However, it came out later that the Russian president did not like everything in the agreement. But these are problems for the Russian side which I expect will be solved." He adds that the demand to withdraw the troops in 1992 was a unilateral demand and not part of a bilateral treaty on the issue.

Stankevicius says that the people of Lithuania voting in the referendum in June addressed their demand to Russia and that "Russia was confronted with a problem: to ignore this demand by the Lithuanian nation expressed by way of a referendum or to take it into consideration." He notes that not all the Lithuanian Government demands on the issue were responded to properly. He says that the Lithuanian referendum was a decisive factor in the adoption of Article 15 of the Helsinki political declaration with which Russia also agreed. Stankevicius continues: "The Russian troops must be pulled out regardless of the above agreements. Therefore, at last Russia has adopted a political decision to take the just demands of the Lithuanian people into consideration. What remained to be resolved was to what degree this consideration was to take effect; namely, whether Russia was withdrawing these troops by 1992, as Lithuania demanded, or Russia would be late in complying with this demand. The timetable reflects this difference. However, this does not mean that somebody has changed the Lithuanian demand."

He says that although the demand by Lithuania to pull the troops out in 1992 remains, Russia has declared that it would be done on a delayed basis. The next question is about the case of deputy Cepaitis, who was accused of cooperation with the KGB.

A journalist from the URM Press Center asks whether Vytautas Landsbergis did not expect that new remarks made on the margins of the treaty prepared for signing would appear on 1 October.

Landsbergis says that life is full of surprises and everything is possible, adding: "I do not doubt that now the work will be continued via negotiating delegations, or through diplomatic channels, thus clarifying the president's remarks or doubts."

Asked about whether there was any connection felt with the statement made by Ordzhonikidze, a Russian United Nations diplomat, Landsbergis says that this outburst was not mentioned directly during the negotiations. However, in the lobbies it was explained that this person was not an outstanding diplomat whose statements of this nature would represent the Russian stance.

Estonian Officials on Prospects for Early CIS Pullout

Foreign Minister Awaits Action

LD3108213292 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network in Swedish 1600 GMT 31 Aug 92

[Interview with Estonian Foreign Minister Jaan Manitski by Krister Larsson on 31 August; place not given; from "The Echo" program]

[Text] The Baltic governments are still taking a wait and see attitude toward reports that came out of Moscow earlier today that Russia is prepared to withdraw all its troops from the Baltic states as early as next year. Moscow had previously discussed 1994 as the earliest date. This is what Estonia's Swedish-speaking Foreign Minister Jaan Manitski told "The Echo" program a short while ago:

[Begin recording] [Manitski] Every signal in that direction that they are taking specific steps to withdraw their troops. Each step in time in the right direction is, of course, something that we welcome, but there is usually a certain distance between word and specific deed, and it remains to be seen. We cannot trust anything else until there is a signed timetable and international supervision; that is precisely what the Helsinki document requires. It states clearly that action must be swift, good order must be maintained, and withdrawal must be total. I want to stress that there is no room for any basic agreements or any so-called strategic installations. On that the three Baltic states are in complete agreement.

[Larsson] Nothing should remain of any former Soviet armed forces, now the Russian Armed Forces, in the Baltic states?

[Manitski] No. There is no reason for any of the Soviet armed forces to remain in the Baltic states, any more than anywhere else in Europe.

[Larsson] It sounds as though you had heard similar reports in the past about Russian withdrawals but that you are still doubtful about today's reports.

[Manitski] Withdrawal is always under way, but what is of interest is not when the first 10,000, 15,000, or 20,000 will actually depart but when the last 3,000 or 5,000 finally leave. [end recording]

Deputy Shows 'Restrained Optimism'

OW0109172892 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1637 GMT 1 Sep 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's position on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic States is becoming more acceptable for Estonia, according to Estonian Deputy Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste.

Commenting at BALTFAX's request on unofficial information from the Russian Foreign Ministry about Russia's readiness to withdraw its troops from the Baltic States by 1993, Mr. Velliste said that he feels "restrained optimism" regarding the question and hopes the meeting planned for September 8 between Boris Yeltsin and Estonian Parliament Head Vytautas Landsbergis "will become an indicator of the seriousness of the Russian government's intentions".

Mr. Velliste said that Estonia demands the withdrawal of the greater part of the troops by the end of this year. As a compromise, he said, certain units could be pulled out in 1993.

So far about 60% of the former Soviet troops once stationed in Estonia have been withdrawn. According to experts, from 12-13 thousand Russian servicemen remain in the republic.

Questions regarding the troop pull-out from Estonia will be discussed at the next round of Russian-Estonian negotiations, which will take place September 9-10 in Moscow.

Russian Aide: Baltic Withdrawal Possible in 1993

*PM0209131692 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET
in Swedish 1 Sep 92 p 9*

[FINSKA NOTISBYRAN report: "Russian Troops Out of the Baltic Region in 1993"]

[Excerpt] Moscow—Russia is prepared to withdraw its troops from the Baltic region as early as next year, one of the key figures in the Russian Government's negotiations with the three Baltic countries has said.

In the past Moscow had demanded that the former Soviet Armed Forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be allowed to stay until the end of 1994. Oleg Muradyan, head of the Foreign Ministry's department for Baltic questions, told the BALTFAX news agency yesterday that next week President Boris Yeltsin will propose to Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis that Russian troops should leave Lithuania during 1993.

He described his remarks as "informal information," but added that an agreement between Russia and Lithuania could be signed as early as the meeting between Yeltsin and Landsbergis in Moscow on 8 September.

"Such an agreement would set a precedent in the negotiations with Estonia and Latvia, too," he said. [passage omitted]

Vorontsov, Baltic Envoys on Russian Withdrawal

Envoys Ask UN Help

*WS0209130192 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1425 GMT 1 Sep 92*

["The Reluctance of Russia To Pull Out Its Troops"—ELTA NEWS BULLETIN headline; from ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 69]

[Text] 1 September 1992—The ambassadors of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to the United Nations handed in to the U.N. Secretary General a petition to the effect that the problem of the complete withdrawal of the foreign armed forces from the territory of the Baltic States should be included in the agenda of the 47th session of the General Assembly of the U.N.

The three ambassadors met with the Russian ambassador to the U.N. Yuliy Vorontsov and assured him that by raising the issue of the troops' withdrawal they are not seeking for a confrontation with Russia. Ambassador Vorontsov maintained that this problem ought to be solved at a summit of the leaders of Russia and the Baltic States. He said he was surprised the Baltic States perceived a threat to peace and security in the Russian troops' reluctance to leave their territory. The Lithuanian ambassador to the U.N. Anicetas Simutis pointed out that the protracted and persistent presence of the Russian Armed Forces in Lithuania obstructs the process of restoration of its economy and frightens away potential investors. Present also at the meeting, the Russian extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador and Minister Sergey Ordzhonikidze warned the Baltic ambassadors that the Russian delegation at the U.N. had been authorized by the Russian parliament to raise the issue of the violation of human rights with regard to the Russian minority in the Baltic States.

Vorontsov: Only Practical Problems Left

*OW0109112092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
0945 GMT 1 Sep 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the Lithuanian mission to the United Nations, the ambassadors of the three Baltic states met the Russian representative at the organization to assure him that though their countries demand the complete withdrawal of the Russian army they do not want any confrontation with Russia.

The Russian ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov was surprised that such an issue as the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Russian Army is raised at the United Nations. He said Russia has agreed to pull out and thus there are no political differences, only practical problems related to the withdrawal. He believes that practical questions should be settled by the leaders of Russia and the Baltic states.

According to the Lithuanian mission, Mr. Vorontsov conducted the discussion in a polite and correct form and the hour and a half meeting took place in a normal atmosphere.

As BF [BALTFAX] has reported, the ambassadors of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia handed a request to the UN leader to discuss the withdrawal at the 47th session of the General Assembly.

Latvian Officials Deem 1993 Troop Withdrawal Acceptable

*OW0109172392 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1636 GMT 1 Sep 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Latvian officials view as "acceptable" the proposed withdrawal of the Russian troops from the

Baltic region in 1993. In commenting, on the BALTFAX request, on the "unofficial" information provided by a high-standing Russian MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] official who averred that Russia is prepared to complete the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic states in 1993, Latvian parliamentarians and government officials note positive changes in Russia's stance, as regards its relations with the Baltic republics, which transpired recently.

The chairman of the Latvian parliamentary commission for international affairs, Indulis Berzins, reminded the BALTFAX correspondent that at the talks with Russia, the Latvian delegation has always been concurred with the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the republic by the fall of 1993. Now, should Russia officially confirm its preparedness to pull out its troops from the republic in 1993, it will be meeting halfway the Latvian proposals, he said.

In the opinion of Mr Berzins, there are no technical or social obstacles impeding the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the territory of the Baltic republic in 1993, and all the problems encumbering the implementation of this decision are mainly of a political nature.

An employee of the political department of the Latvian MFA, Aivars Vovers, remarked that the Latvian diplomats who are maintaining close contact with their Russian counterparts have noticed a softening of the Russian position in this regard. In particular, he noted, the Russian side no longer regards as imperative for the troops withdrawal the provisions proposed by Russia at meeting of the Russian and Baltic foreign ministers in Moscow on August 6. But the Russian side indicates that it has envisaged a number of issues "to be addressed in the course of our future discussions".

In the meantime, the head of the Latvian government delegations at the talks with Russia, Janis Dinevics, has pointed to the unofficial nature of the Russian statements, and expressed a reservation that they wouldn't turn up in the future.

In an interview to the BALTFAX correspondent, Mr Dinevics expressed a conjecture that these terms of withdrawal of the Russian troops could only apply to Lithuania where the strength of the Russian troops is smaller than in Latvia. He also pointed out that the situation in Lithuania is much more intricate, considering that most of the citizens in the republic voted for the unconditional withdrawal of the Russian troops already in 1992. Most of the Latvian politicians argue, Mr Dinevics said, that the referendum results are likely to "tie the hands" of the chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis.

Smolensk Air Division Begins Return to Russia From Belarus

LD0309105592 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1416 GMT 2 Sep 92

[By BELINFORM correspondent Sergey Nikonorov for TASS]

[Text] Vitebsk, 2 Sep—The pilots and mechanics of the Smolensk guards division of the military transport aviation, which was stationed in the town on the Dvina River, gathered for a farewell meeting. By decision of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry leadership, a withdrawal of hardware and personnel from Belarus to Russia has started. The guards formation has been stationed in Vitebsk for almost half a century. In June 1944, soldiers and officers of the division took part in liberating this town from the fascists.

Foreign Ministry Deputy on Baltic Withdrawal

PM0809151692 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 6 Sep 92 p 4

[Report on interview with First Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev by Torgny Hinnemo in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] Moscow—Russia needs a little over two years to bring home its troops from the Baltic region. But it is possible that one of the Baltic states could be emptied of Russian soldiers before the end of next year. Russia is not demanding that it be allowed to keep any bases after the withdrawal.

So said Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev in a SVENSKA DAGBLADET interview. Shelov-Kovedyayev is the man at ministerial level who is responsible for Russia's relations with the 14 former Soviet republics.

He also sharply criticized the Baltic states because a large section of their Russian-speaking inhabitants are being refused citizenship. As a result the Baltic states themselves are creating an explosive situation, the minister said. The actions of the Baltic states also represent a breach of the agreements they have entered into.

On Tuesday [8 September] Russian President Yeltsin and Lithuanian President Landsbergis meet to reach agreement on the timetable for the Russian forces' withdrawal from Lithuania. Before this meeting an official at the Russian Foreign Ministry recently said in an interview that Russia is prepared to bring home its troops over the course of the next year.

"So far I have no information about this," Shelov-Kovedyayev said, after thinking a long time about his reply.

"And another consideration is that depending on how many troops there are in one or other of the countries the

timetables could be different. It is well known that the largest number of soldiers are stationed in Latvia."

However, after the general withdrawal Russia has a great interest in being allowed to keep for a transitional period the installations—chiefly radar stations—whose function it is to give advance warning of nuclear attack. Russia needs if not decades at least several years to build new installations on its own territory, Shelov-Kovedyayev said.

According to the minister, there are around 12 sites in Latvia which Russia wants access to in a transitional period. None are in Lithuania, while the Russian Defense Ministry is still engaged in internal discussions about whether any of the Estonian installations should be added to the want list. None of these installations need a large staff and therefore do not represent a threat to the states in which they are located, he said.

Even though in principle the warning systems were part of the defenses of either NATO or the Soviet Union, they were in close contact with each other, Shelov-Kovedyayev said. When unreliable observations were made, the two superpowers' surveillance centers simply contacted each other to avoid disastrous mistakes. Now that the world is no longer divided in NATO and Warsaw Pact spheres of influence, there is even less reason to take any part of the system out of operation, he said.

"Existence will simply become more dangerous without a wall-to-wall surveillance network. Without the Baltic units a situation will arise sooner or later, in a month's time or a year's time, in which Russia will discover a flying object without being able to determine with any certainty where it is coming from."

One of the questions which remain open is what fate is facing the Paldiski naval base in Estonia. Paldiski is of interest to Sweden in part because the two minisubmarines, which SVENSKA DAGBLADET discovered last year and the existence of which was confirmed this year by the Russian Naval Staff, have operated from Paldiski.

"I do not intend to reveal any details. But especially when I had talks with Estonian President Ruutel this May he spoke in positive terms of jointly using Paldiski. This would not necessarily involve military use but be some form of jointly owned company," Shelov-Kovedyayev said.

The question of military withdrawal and the rights of the Russian-speaking groups are being discussed within the framework of the same negotiations. But this does not mean that the military issues are being used as some form of threat, the minister said.

"It is true that we are interested in clearing up a whole complex of questions. But when we talk about a package solution this does not mean that one problem will be allowed to delay the solution of the others."

It is in the interests of both sides that an agreement on the status of and support for the Russian troops before withdrawal is reached quickly. This will prevent possible provocations, in Shelov-Kovedyayev's view. At the same time, the period leading up to withdrawal can be used for negotiations on the social conditions of former employees of the defense forces. There are many former officers and technicians who have their roots in the Baltic states and who therefore want to stay there, in Shelov-Kovedyayev's view.

"If you ignore the rhetorical statements made by representatives of public organizations both in Russia and the Baltic states, very businesslike and very detailed talks about these social problems are actually taking place."

Shelov-Kovedyayev said that the position of the Russian-speaking groups is exposed in various ways in all the former Soviet republics. However, it is only in the Baltic states that their right to citizenship is being questioned. The bilateral agreements which Russia reached with all three states state that Russians living in the Baltic states when they proclaimed their independence last year have the right to choose between citizenship of the country in which they live or citizenship of Russia.

"What is contained in an international agreement has the same validity as law," the minister said. "Estonia's citizenship law, which provides for a qualifying period of two years, meets international norms. But it cannot invalidate the agreement on those Russians who lived in Estonia during the Soviet era," he stressed. Everyone living in Estonia was not only a Soviet citizen but automatically an Estonian citizen too.

"The Russians who worked for Estonian independence have been put in a very difficult position. Many Russians were involved in the People's Front in Estonia. Today they are being treated like outsiders. And 40 percent of the population does not have the right to vote. This could lead to a dangerous explosion," Shelov-Kovedyayev said.

Shelov-Kovedyayev himself thinks that many Russians in the Baltic states will choose to become Russian citizens.

"The important thing is that people should have a free choice. This provides the guarantee that they will feel solidarity with the state whose citizenship they hold," he said.

The citizenship issue is one of the most difficult in the negotiations. Nothing is expected to happen in this respect before the 20 September Estonian presidential election. Only after that date will it be clear whether Estonia will relax its position, the minister said. He also stressed that the citizenship law under discussion in Latvia violates the Russian-speaking group's rights even more.

"Their position is reminiscent of the old Soviet Union, which signed an agreement on human rights in Helsinki and implemented different legislation here at home," Shelov-Kovedyayev said.

The Russian parliament has been very critical of a number of agreements with the former Soviet republics. It has also raised the question of the situation of the Russian-speaking groups in the Baltic states. What are the Russian Government's chances of having an agreement on troop withdrawals and other questions ratified by its parliament?

"That is a problem which ministries come up against in all countries. But I am an optimist because despite everything it is wise to follow common sense. Perhaps the agreements will not be approved immediately. But sooner or later they will receive the approval of parliament," Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev said.

Logistics Hamper Paratroop Pullout From Estonia
PM1009103592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Sep 92 p 3

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Zadubrovskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Fewer Russian Troops in Estonia"]

[Text] Tallinn, 7 Sep—Under a directive from the chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, the paratroop brigade stationed in the city of Viljandi is being disbanded. Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Posokhov, acting commander, explained that the movement of hardware to a new base is the most complex item on the agenda. There are still 41 items of hardware to be moved, but the Estonian authorities have specified that a convoy must include no more than 10 vehicles. Withdrawal of hardware is being delayed as a result.

Russian Inspection of UK Forces
92P50134A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Sep 92 p 4

["NG" item: "Russia Inspects British Army"]

[Text] The British Ministry of Defense has already reported that the Government of Russia last Thursday [3 September] put in a claim for an inspection of the Armed Forces of Great Britain. The claim was approved, and yesterday a group of Russian military inspectors, who will perform their mission in accord with the November 1990 Treaty on limitation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, arrived in England.

Belarusian Leader, CIS Commander Discuss Forces Withdrawal
LD0909185392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1650 GMT 9 Sep 92

[By BELINFORM correspondent Larisa Lazar for TASS]

[Text] Minsk September 9 TASS—Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of Joint CIS Armed Forces, paid a visit to the Belarusian parliament on Wednesday [9 September] at the invitation of the Belarusian Parliamentary Speaker Stanislav Shushkevich.

Shaposhnikov and Shushkevich discussed problems of mutual interest and discussed in detail issues of the reduction of armed forces and the withdrawal of strategic troops from Belarus.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Kemerovo Official Seeks Data on Alleged 1984 Nuclear Explosion

92WN0728A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Aug 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Yermakov: "Kemerovo: Is Chernobyl Moving to the Kuznetsk Basin?"]

[Text] The Kemerovo Oblast Soviet's press center has released a report to the effect that Aman Tuleyev, who heads the Soviet, sent a telegram to the Russian president, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and the State Committee on Chernobyl.

Aman Gumirovich has information to the effect that a nuclear explosion was conducted in the northern part of Kemerovo Oblast in September 1984. In addition, for almost 30 years hydrogen fallout carried from the Semipalatinsk proving ground contaminated the southern parts of the Kuznetsk Basin. On the basis of this information, the Kemerovo leader asks the Federation's top official levels to either refute this information or to name a duly empowered commission to conduct an investigation. In the event of a "positive" outcome, A. Tuleyev considers it necessary to appropriate a certain amount of funding for treatment and preventive care for the afflicted population.

Since the government never responded to a previous inquiry, the chairman of the oblast Soviet has drawn up documents to be submitted to a court of arbitration. For its part, the oblast Soviet is forming commissions of deputies that are to go to the State Committee on Chernobyl and to Semipalatinsk.

As a resident of the Kuznetsk Basin, I really want to hope that Aman Gumirovich is mistaken or that he has been deceived for some reason.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

'Mixed Feelings' Over Proposed CW Convention

PM0109113592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Aug 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 4

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Moscow Votes for Chemical Weapons Convention Despite Not Agreeing With Everything in It"]

[Text] The final meeting of experts discussing the final version of a global convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and utilization of chemical weapons [CW] and their destruction has begun in Geneva under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament. Representatives of 45 of the world's states, including Russia, are participating.

What attitude do Russian experts take toward the document submitted for discussion? Judging by their reactions, they have mixed feelings.

Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Committee on Statutory Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian president, said in an interview with IZVESTIYA's military correspondent:

"Russian will undoubtedly sign the convention; it cannot do otherwise. At every stage of its elaboration and coordination—and it has been a long and detailed process—we have stated, and continue to state, that we are prepared to be an original and definite party to it. And, moreover, since Russia possesses the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, a powerful chemical industry, and enormous scientific, technological, and technical potential in this field, it is claiming permanent membership of the Convention Executive Committee headquartered in the Hague."

At the same time, in the Statutory Committee chairman's words, Russian experts in no way idealize the work done on the text of the convention. What are the problems here?

In the academician's view, the problem is that that version of the convention that has been worked out does not encompass a whole number of fundamental questions. These include defects in detailing the provisions on the nondevelopment of chemical weapons. This term is absent from the convention's title, and there is not a hint in the text, either, of how this process is to be monitored.

The requirements relating to the limitation of the utilization of herbicides and toxins when suppressing mass unrest and other issues are phrased in incomprehensible terms, too. But the main thing is that Russia also has concerns of its own.

First and foremost there is the financial burden linked with international inspections at chemical weapons production, storage, and destruction facilities. The final version of the convention prescribes that all expenditure related to inspections be borne by the state destroying the weapons in question. And the total of future payments for Russian runs to \$50 million a year, which is virtually equal to half of all its expenditure on the program for the destruction of toxins and is essentially more than it can afford.

The original versions incorporated the idea that all 60 countries signing the convention would pay a proportion of the cost of inspections in line with the UN scale of

membership contributions, under which the total would have been \$5 million—still a considerable sum for the Russian budget but nevertheless one that appeared acceptable. The present figures, unfortunately, are simply unaffordable.

The problem is not that we are reluctant to pay, Academician Kuntsevich says. We have to be realists—the crisis makes it impossible. And the convention cannot become a piece of paper which we sign but don't fulfill.

What is the way out of the situation? Russia is working on several options: a return to the formula of proportional participation by all the countries, the creation of external [vnekonventsionalnyy] systems to provide the country with financial support for providing the where-withal for monitoring activity, the creation of international funds, which could have an international governing body...

Anatoliy Kuntsevich said that Western countries understand Russia's financial concerns, and possibly inspections will be partially funded from the funds the United States makes available to it for the destruction of chemical weapons.

But there is one other question worrying our specialists. In the text of the Convention as currently worded Russia does not like the formula demanding the complete elimination of chemical weapon production facilities.

At various times chemical weapons in Russia were produced at Berezniki, Chapayevsk, Dzerzhinsk in Gorkiy Oblast, Novocheboksarsk, and Volgograd. There are major combines there with shops that used to produce toxins and load them into artillery shells and aircraft bombs.

The weapons were manufactured by highly skilled experts operating efficient and reliable systems. In Kuntsevich's words, throughout the period up to 1987, when we ceased production of toxins, there was not the tiniest accident or incident at any of these places.

Now that there is an insistent need for the destruction of chemical weapons, the Convention authorizes the utilization for this purpose of the facilities that produced them, together with their personnel and safety systems. This will cut costs and increase the reliability of the work, which will be carried out by highly experienced professionals—in itself an additional guarantee of reliability.

After the weapons have been destroyed, the specialist equipment has to be eliminated, of course. But the workshops could be switched to the production of civilian output and goods for the national economy—they could be converted. The convention's requirements that the plants be eliminated, right down to demolishing the walls, are irrational and simply ruinous economically.

"We believe," Academician Kuntsevich said, "that all these questions can be resolved within the framework of

the preparatory committees' work. We have no political alternative to the convention, and there are financial difficulties that we hope to resolve. The convention must be signed, and we will do this without fail."

According to experts, the entry into force of the global convention on the destruction of chemical weapons can be expected in 1995.

Officials on Bacteriological Weapons Charges

*PM3108213192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Sep 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 5*

[Article by Viktor Litovkin and Konstantin Eggert: "Biological Research Is of Course a Secret, But Not a Military One"]

[Text] "The fact that the Russian Government is probably not keeping the commitment it made six months ago to halt the Soviet program creating banned bacteriological weapons is causing anxiety in the United States and Britain" writes Jeffrey Smith in a front-page article published in the 31 August issue of THE WASHINGTON POST, citing high-ranking official American sources.

The article, excerpts of which have been carried by ITAR-TASS, says that acting U.S. Secretary of State Eagleburger communicated American concern during last week's London meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. According to information from American representatives, the inability to present a detailed account of the Soviet Union's long-term use of the "Biopreparat" civilian pharmaceutical complex as a cover for a secret military bacteriological program constitutes the most serious breach of Russia's commitments.

According to Smith, the United States and Britain base their suspicions on the testimony of an unnamed "high-ranking Soviet defector."

Commenting on this situation for IZVESTIYA, a Foreign Ministry representative who wished to remain incognito said: "It is unimaginable that the president should not keep a check on such an important sphere, one connected with Russia's strategic security. However, we do have to take very seriously any statements by the Americans, as we are aware that this is a problem that creates great anxiety in the Congress. We would not wish any Congressmen to suspect a lack of sincerity on the part of Moscow when they vote to give substantial aid to Russia," the Russian diplomat stated. At the same time he did express doubt about the objectivity of Smith, who, in his words, gives a one-sided interpretation of the facts, ignoring the Russian side's explanations.

The current WASHINGTON POST article devoted to Russian bacteriological weapons is far from being the first. Two months ago, after the Russian president's visit to the American capital, correspondents Rowland Evans and Robert Novak published an article in which they

also accused the Russian Federation military command of deceiving the head of state and continuing work on the creation of techniques for waging bacteriological warfare.

"It is all utter lies," we were told at the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for Radiation, Chemical, and Bacteriological Protection, which we approached for clarification.

All work on creating bacteriological weapons, we were told, was legally banned in Russia by President Yeltsin's April Decree "On Ensuring the Implementation of International Commitments in the Sphere of Biological Weapons," and it was effectively stopped by the military back in 1975, when our country ratified the international convention banning these dreadful weapons.

As distinct from other countries, we actually have no such weapons, the military said. We are not even faced with the problem of destroying stocks of them.

"Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Russian presidential Committee on Convention-Related Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, told IZVESTIYA that "the fact that our country has presented a detailed report to the United Nations on the defense programs that have been carried out on these questions is evidence of the sincerity of our position."

The document cites the specific formulas that we have in Russia and lists all the tests carried out with artillery shells, aerial bombs, and missiles. The test site on the island of Vozrozhdeniye in the Aral Sea, which has been closed for several years now, and the Defense Ministry's scientific research institutes in the cities of Kirov (microbiology), Sergiyev Posad (virology), and Yekaterinburg (military technical problems of antibacteriological protection) are cited.

Information about the "Biopreparat" concern, which was part of the now-closed Administration of the Microbiological Industry, whose scientific research institutes did indeed work on problems of military-related biology, was communicated in documents that were presented to the United Nations and also to the U.S. Administration on a confidential basis. The information presented there is exhaustive, Russian experts maintain.

It has been proposed at the highest level to the U.S. leadership and to its appropriate organizations that mutual verification be carried out at all facilities that the sides deem necessary. There has been no response to this to date. Why?

According to specialists, there are several reasons here. The basic reason is that it requires working with bacteria—and that could involve not just dangerous pathogens and vaccines against them, but also compounds making it possible to create new science-intensive and highly efficient techniques in bioengineering, genetics, biophysics, and other neighboring scientific disciplines. They represent state and commercial secrets.

The deadly rivalry between scientific schools and the desire on the part of competitors—by one means or another—to explain a particular problem, to prevent others from implementing their ideas, and to send them down a blind alley give rise to “leaks” of confidential information and exposures that in no way serve the cause of cooperation and the search for the truth.

And the cooperation between the microbiologists of Russia, America, and other developed countries could really be of great benefit, notably in the fight against such a dreadful twentieth century disease as AIDS. But, as experience shows, it is sometimes more difficult for scientists to agree than for the military.

Russian Foreign Ministry Statement Denies BW Charges

*LD0209210592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2026 GMT 2 Sep 92*

[By diplomatic correspondent Igor Shubin]

[Text] Moscow September 3 TASS—Russia is abiding by a constructive position on the problems of monitoring the implementation of the 1972 agreement banning bacteriological weapons [BW], a Russian Foreign Ministry official told TASS on Wednesday, commenting on reports published by the American press alleging that the Russian Government was encountering opposition by the military in winding up bacteriological weapons programmes.

The Russian Foreign Ministry proceeds from the fact that after the Russian president signed a decree in April 1992 banning all activities connected with bacteriological weapons, no such activities are taking place in Russia, which was confirmed by the corresponding authorities, the official said.

In July, 1992, the Russian side officially informed the United Nations Organisation about the work in this field carried out by the former Soviet Union.

The document, in particular, mentioned the incidents of violation of some provisions of above-mentioned agreements in the former Soviet Union.

However, some officials from the United States of America and other Western countries keep on saying that Russia is not observing its commitments to stop developing bacteriological weapons. Their allegations are based on the evidence of one of the defectors, and they refuse to verify the information.

To dispel these doubts, Russia has twice proposed to the United States to set up a joint commission of experts which could check the information available at both sides on bacteriological weapons research. Nevertheless, Washington has not responded to the initiative, the Russian diplomat said.

In this case the silence of the American side can be regarded as a manifestation of insincerity in the solution

of such problems, important for the whole mankind, as control over the termination of work on bacteriological weapons.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Kazakhstan Proposes Asian Version of CSCE

*MK0709120192 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Sep 92 p 3*

[Report under the “NEGA Reports” rubric: “Kazakhstan”]

[Text] Kazakhstan has proposed that participants in the May meeting in Ashgabat assemble once again, in Alma-Ata in October or November.

The heads of seven Asian states (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Kyrgyzstan) are being invited to discuss an idea for creating a new collective security system in Asia.

As a NEGA correspondent learned from sources in the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, it was decided to base the idea of forming a Conference on Cooperation and Confidence Building Measures in Asia on the principles of the work of the CSCE and to make use of this organization's structure when creating their own mechanism.

The new meeting's initiators hold the view that the Asian collective security system must not be exclusive in character in order to make it possible for other states in the region—in particular, Russia, China, India, and Mongolia—to join it.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Question of Nuclear Defense for Kazakhstan Raised

*924P0161A Alma-Ata YEGEMENDI QAZAQSTAN
in Kazakh 17 Jun 92 p 3*

[Article by Qaynar Olzhay: “Will We Defend Ourselves or Be Defended?”]

[Excerpts] Policy in the area of the military, and of defense, was difficult at first, but the situation has gradually improved. We regard the 40th Army stationed in Kazakhstan as ours. Good. A Ministry of Defense has been formed. The missiles have begun to be our security. Good.

If we have nuclear weapons, no one will attack us with nuclear weapons. This is the security of the U.S. We have put into force such great policies. The president fulfills a duty in the defense area. But what about the duties of the rest of us? What kinds of things is the Ministry of Defense doing? Whom are the military schools preparing? From the platoon, to the division, and the army, who is in control? When will Kazakh soldiers and others

from Kazakhstan in foreign states return, and what condition will they return in? What is being done to defend them in the military courts? Thus we need to look for answers to these and similar questions from the government, starting with the Ministry of Defense, and look into things. But things are, in the strictest sense of the word, bad. Starting with the small questions before us, we will move to the more complex. [passage omitted]

Russian President Boris Yeltsin has announced that he will strengthen his country's border forces by force. This means that all Russian border forces will be concentrated. If you look at the map, Russia's longest frontier is with Kazakhstan. Moreover, it would seem that keeping the most troops facing Kazakhstan is what is intended.

Good, the Russian president and the Kazakhstan president are friends, and they are extremely cultured. You will say that a military attack is out of the question. That is now. Who can guarantee that some other day Yeltsin will not send the troops he has collected together and directed towards Kazakhstan to attack us? Who knows what the future will bring. We must bear in mind the possibility that Zhirinovskiy might become Russian president, and Makashov, or Alksnis Russian Minister of Defense. We remember in this case what our ancestors have taught us. However, belief is good, but we must not be surprised. We have made sacrifices, spilled blood and struggled for the sake of an independent Kazakh state lasting many generations, for national freedom, and for the equality of the peoples of the world. If we are deprived of this freedom just at its birth, not only our bones, but the bones of heroes of the past will lie on the ground.

Our ancestor Kazakhs have said: "One of my daughters is clumsier than the other." It is like that. Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev himself and his words are more powerful than the president. This minister had made known publicly his intention to send in the army wherever Russian honor has been crushed under foot. Be strong, stand up straight. What is this? Is this the glittering of the fangs of the old imperialism as bright as the moon?

However, Russian interests have not been crushed under foot in Kazakhstan. It is, on the other hand, Kazakh interests which have suffered this many times. We console ourselves with the fact that it is the interest and honor of other peoples, above all Russians, which have been seen to. Under such circumstances, this Grachev, we find no reason to send troops into Kazakhstan. No, this is no consolation. [passage omitted]

This being the case, what must we do? Will the 40th Army, which has been transferred to Kazakhstan jurisdiction, defend Kazakhstan under such circumstances, or will it support Russia? Can anyone answer? You might say that "You are turning things on their heads." There is the idea that the possible theater of war is in the USA. If there is war in some region or the other, possible actions have been sketched out and planned. It is also

possible that there will be no war there, however, we cannot be careless since everything has been "stood on its head for us." [passage omitted]

The soldiers are ashamed not to bear weapons, but shovels. We rejoice that our young people have honor, and heart. That honor is not found in many citizens who are concerned about our defense and who are in control. In fact the uselessness of the military construction units was proven in a number of articles published last year. [passage omitted]

Thus Kazakh young men are to go only to combat units. This is to make it possible for them to become familiar not with shovels and picks, but with powerful weapons and advanced technology. [passage omitted]

It is well known that a great many officers do not like the fact that Kazakhstan has begun to be a nation. Former Colonel Petrushenko could not hide this at all. It is in fact good that he does not hide it. How many things are under the table, being carried on secretly with us now? The fact that soldiers have taken up, or have stolen, their various baggage and have run away to Russia proves that they have no desire to defend Kazakhstan. In fact, no one is stopping them. We are not concerned about their personal belongings. They can take away everything they own. However, are the soldiers the owners of their weapons, their equipment and military property?

We will discuss weapons in particular shortly. Until that time, the question arises of why, when we have changed our policy, we are amused by officers going elsewhere, migrating to other nations. Whereas YEGEMENDI QAZAQSTAN has discussed several times the question of preparing defence specialists in the future, it has not been to the slightest effect. If it had some effect, it would again dry up the flow of tears which have begun to appear in the eyes of the ancestors. [passage omitted]

However, it is suitable, in this connection, that our government be generous and swiftly find the funds needed for Kazakh young men to learn military specialties. The time has even come for us to think about sending our military specialists to study in Turkey, Germany and the U.S.

Unfortunately, leaving aside the question of the government finding financing and means, it is clear that they are being deprived of what is in hand. We have raised the alarm about this several times. We have reported in various places about the capture of military aircraft and vehicles loaded to the full with weapons. If this is not stopped, how much wealth is being removed from the Kazakh steppe? Someone should add it up.

There is a secret military base on the side of a lake, on the west side of Balqash City. Its official name is Balqash-9, the old Kazakh name is Ushtubek. It is about 50 versts from us.

There are residential houses there, various military installations, a ten-story-tall radar and many other things there.

"MIGs" used to fly from there day and night and leave crisscrossed trails in the sky above the city.

The base is presently empty. A small guard has been left behind, the others have gone somewhere else. What worries me is where the military aircraft have gone. Has someone, to be sure, investigated and checked the weapons and technical equipment of other closed bases in the vicinity of Balqash?

B. Qadybekov

Zhezqazghan Oblast Balqash City

We expect an answer to this question from the Ministry of Defense. All in all, there are a lot of questions lying before the ministry. They are the questions of readers. [passage omitted]

There are some unpublished telegrams which were sent to the editorial office in the past. An unpublished letter supported the statement of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which asked that we be recognized as a nuclear power. Later Nursultan Abishuly changed his position and the letter remained in his pocket. But read this:

We, a group of Kazakhs, are very interested in your statement on our nuclear weapons sent to the President of the United States. It is clear that others of our people support your bold initiative. Our ancestors have said: "If you esteem what has been esteemed, you will not be the common slave of your father and, when it comes time to depart, neither the son of the prophet." We have esteemed what is not esteemed, and now it is our time to depart. We believe that the nuclear weapons in our hands have the capacity to make us depart.

The Kazakh people have gotten down on all fours before their neighbors, before brilliant empires for centuries. Stand up straight, raise the head.

Thirty one specialists of the Scientific-Production Union for the "Improvement of Kazakh Villages," headed by Seyilbek Qyshqashuly, Toqtar Abilzhauly.

However, not long after that our president gave up nuclear weapons and in place of them accepted the guarantee that the U.S. would protect Kazakhstan from attacks with nuclear weapons and made a deal.

As a policy-maker, it was very difficult for Nazarbayev to do anything else. First of all, countries with nuclear weapons are considered enemies in the world by the U.S. The reason that efforts are being made to come to agreements with so many countries and there is hostility toward China is because of this. However, it is clear that if the United States regards us as an enemy, our affairs will probably not prosper.

In addition, the U.S. and its allies have suddenly bombed countries wishing to make nuclear weapons. The attack once made on the Syrian nuclear center, and the attack against Iraq were for this reason. They have to

give most of it up to save themselves. The nuclear weapons mounted on ballistic missiles at Derzhavin and Zhegystobe in Kazakhstan are in any case only intended to fly across continents. However, whichever direction they face, what course they fly, they will fall on the U.S. We must understand the alarm of the U.S. under such conditions. We must "look out for the striking out of the frightened man."

However, Nursultan Abishuly is thinking cautiously and is forging a careful policy. Repressing all the hostilities in our breasts, we must support this policy.

Thus, the hopes and joys of Kazakhs united with Seyilbek Qyshqashuly, of the Turkic world of basic common origin with Kazakhs, and of the Muslim world which has religion in common with us, that "there be a nuclear power among us," will not get far. There are many unanswered questions, however.

Good. The U.S. has given us a guarantee that we will not be attacked with nuclear weapons. However, if General Grachev marches in non-nuclear troops to "protect Russian interests," who will guarantee our defense? The policy of China is changing, and if former disputes are raised, who will help us, who will protect us if they march a nuclear-weaponless army of millions in our direction?

More specifically, can we defend ourselves or not? Under such circumstances, we cannot but think suddenly of our dear children, which we worry so much about...

Russian Control of CIS Nuclear Arms Urged

924P0172A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Petr Korotkevich, academician and deputy chairman of Russian government chairman's board of experts: "We Need a New Global Strategy, But Few Members of the Governing 'Team' Realize This"]

[Text]

Geopolitics

Russia still has no comprehensive theory of national security and no defense policy doctrine, just as it has no programs and plans for arms production with a view to the new geopolitical situation. There has been no further work on the plans to secure the necessary conditions for the reasonable sufficiency of defense efforts, maintain the combat training of troops on the necessary level, and administer all branches of the armed forces with consideration for the need to reduce and modernize them.

The situation in the world, however, has changed radically in recent years. East-West confrontation has become part of history, and the words themselves have lost their earlier meaning. There is no longer a Soviet Union, a "socialist community," and a Warsaw Pact. Russia's relations with the United States of America and other NATO countries are acquiring the features of a partnership. Some of the former union republics of the

former USSR, on the other hand, are effectively at war with each other (the former SFRY has suffered the same fate).

When we try to predict the international situation at the turn of the millennium, we can assume that third-world countries will be increasingly persistent in their efforts to acquire nuclear missiles and that this prospect is looking more and more realistic. According to my calculations, from 20 to 24 of the countries now categorized as developing states could have these weapons by the year 2000. This means that the danger of a large-scale nuclear conflict, provoked by some irresponsible regime south of our borders and of NATO's present sphere of interests, will increase dramatically.

In view of this, it seems advisable to begin analyzing the prospects for the creation of an integrated and unified system of strategic defense, which would be based on the strategic deterrence forces of Russia, the United States, and all of the United States' NATO allies. Only this kind of united effort can deter aggression and prevent the start of a third world war. I am personally willing to serve this cause, devoting all of my knowledge and experience to it, and I will cooperate with anyone interested in saving world peace.

The issues of geopolitics and nuclear safety are among the most complex problems facing the leadership of our country today. Military and political officials in Russia and the other countries that combined to make up the Commonwealth of Independent States after the collapse of the USSR are debating problems connected with the command and control of all branches of the armed forces. A special place among these topics is occupied by the command and control of the strategic missile forces, which, in my opinion, cannot and should not be turned over to the control of the CIS, which is not a state, but a commonwealth of several states.

We must proceed from the fact that the whole battle-management structure of our strategic defense, or the strategic deterrence forces, on the vertical and horizontal planes is located in Russia and is based on a single set of principles and mechanisms. Any deviation from these principles and these mechanisms would be counterproductive. For this reason, we are disturbed by the maneuvers over the nuclear missiles located within the former Soviet territory outside Russia and by the fact that our CIS partners are in no hurry to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Yes, strategic objects may be launched without outside assistance, there are secondary and tertiary backup procedures, and there is the possibility of multiple launches, but there is a special controlling sequence of algorithms. No one can ever disconnect a warhead, change the data in an aircraft computer, or enter "his own" target designations. As long as the whole command and control complex is located in Russia and does not go anywhere else, the yearnings of those who crave Russian nuclear weapons are absolutely futile.

The command and control of missile complexes is not, however, the main issue in the guarantee of nuclear safety within the territory of the former USSR. The main thing is the organization of guaranteed oversight of the operation of battle systems and high-risk installations. This applies, of course, to all types of systems: land- (ground or rail), sea-, air-, and space-based.

In addition, 85 percent of the defense industry potential of the CIS is concentrated in Russia. It supplied—and is supplying—all of the defense industry enterprises in the former union republics with all of the necessary components. Virtually all of the science, the whole materials technology base, and the whole testing and experimental base are concentrated in Russia. It was our country, and not some other CIS state, that developed and distributed new models and new generations of military hardware.

In view of this, we must admit that only Russia can—as long as the necessary conditions are established—guarantee the kind of manufacturer's services that are carried out not by the armed forces units operating the equipment, but by enterprises in the defense branches of industry or the military-industrial complex.

Meanwhile, we are witnessing the collapse of the administrative and production structures of the managerial staff that arranged for manufacturer's services in the past and should continue to do this in the future, providing for guaranteed oversight of the use of strategic nuclear arms. A normative and technical base was established and perfected, the appropriate documentation was prepared, teams of experts were formed to take charge of these services, and practical experience was accumulated in the USSR for decades. Today, however, we have to admit that we are rapidly losing our experts and that standard servicing procedures are being ignored. If this process is not stopped as soon as possible, by tomorrow we may not have anyone to guarantee the proper oversight.

In this connection, I want to stress that Russia's chief asset today is not its rich supply of natural resources, and it is not even the defense industry potential that put us on an equal footing with the United States of America. Our greatest asset is the country's scientific potential—a result of the work and effort of many generations. Today we are disastrously close to losing it.

I believe strongly that the reforms following the revision of laws should begin in culture, education, the arts, and public health. This work should be done on truly nationwide scales, and the completion of this work, as well as the comprehensive national security system, should be guaranteed by the president. Unfortunately, virtually no funds are being allocated for reform in education and the other spheres listed above. The reason is the notorious remainder principle of financing. People here somehow managed to tarnish the reputation of the professor, who was once put on a pedestal. The state always protected teachers and scientists, who gave us knowledge, set the

trends in social development, and served as the generators of progress. Now a driver is paid four, five, or even ten times as much as the educator of future engineers, physicians, economists, and politicians. The result is the increasing number of undereducated individuals with degrees from our universities and institutes who make their way into all of the links of industrial, economic, administrative, civil, and military management. Might this not be the source of a threat to our security?

It is fascinating to watch discussions of strategic issues. The discussions are led by individuals who are frequently absolutely incompetent and have no professional knowledge, practical experience, or personal authority. Their statements, the terminology they use, and their general view of problems testify that the solutions they propose are based on misinformation and misconceptions.

In general, the situation in our country is incomprehensible and paradoxical. The people elected a man of integrity and honor to serve as our president. I have the deepest respect for him, and I believe that the chief executive of the state should be able to rely on the qualified assistance of all of his closest advisers. The present situation, however, is quite different. The voters who supported Boris Yeltsin and the president himself are "burdened" by an administration which is unable (or unwilling) to enlist the services of genuine professionals and to make use of their expert opinions in the elaboration of a clear and precise development strategy. This administration is not expressing the interests of our country and its inhabitants, and is making no attempt to control ongoing processes (when it does try to take control of them, it is easily thrown off course). People are beginning to believe that some members of the governing "team" are pursuing their own personal goals, and that these have no relationship to what the Russians really need.

We can only hope that the situation will be corrected in the not too distant future. Then a new global strategy will finally be elaborated in accordance with the interests of the Russian State, and will allow us to become an integral part of the civilized world.

From the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Files

Academician Petr Korotkevich is one of Russia's leading experts on the strategy of military security and defense. He was the first to propose and substantiate the idea of developing a new generation of nuclear strategic arms with countermeasures against the casualty-producing elements of the probable adversary's ballistic missile defense system, and to set forth the fundamental precepts of a new unified strategic defense system.

He was referring to a new defense-policy doctrine, allowing for qualitative changes in the appearance and structure of the army and its new equipment.

Army reform based on the proposed doctrine would reduce the numerical strength and funding requirements of the

army, but the most important result would be the avoidance of the irrational expenditure of material-technical and intellectual resources, which would guarantee the stability of the country's whole financial and economic system for many decades at a time of continuous economic and political reform.

Academician Korotkevich is now the deputy chairman of the Board of Experts of the chairman of the Government of Russia.

No Nuclear Warheads in North Caucasus Military District

LD2408191292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 24 Aug 92

[Text] According to a report from NEGA, the Command of the North Caucasus Military District has stated that there are no nuclear warheads on the district territory. They were withdrawn in the fall of 1991 because of the aggravation of the regional situation.

Ukrainian Deputy Opposes Warhead Transfer to Russia

AU3108120392 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 31 Aug 92

[Text] In the opinion of Ukraine's People's Deputy Yuriy Kostenko, which he expressed for the Ukrainian press, it is impossible to fully agree with the conclusions reached by some departments on the need for Ukraine to simply transfer warheads to Russia. These warheads contain uranium and plutonium. The cost of these materials on the international market is estimated at up to \$100 million per one tonne uranium and between \$500 million and \$1 billion per one tonne plutonium. Besides, points out the deputy, rich uranium and plutonium are extremely important energy resources and their secondary utilization for the needs of Ukraine's power engineering is worthwhile. This will help us resolve the problem of nuclear fuel for our nuclear electric power plants within a certain period of time.

CIS Ministers Discuss Nuclear Strategy

Structure, Control of Strategic Forces

LD0309164892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1524 GMT 3 Sep 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow September 3 TASS—Nuclear strategy of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was discussed at a meeting of the Council of Defence Ministers of the CIS member-countries on Thursday [3 September]. "I believe we shall find mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of the Alma-Ata agreements", Aleksandr Kotenkov, chief of the state-legal agency of the Russian president, told ITAR-TASS. He favoured

the preservation of unified control and unified management of nuclear forces within the framework of the Supreme Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS.

Non-nuclear status of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan does not permit them to have strategic nuclear forces, Kotenkov said. These should be Russian forces, since Russia bears the responsibility to the world community for their safety. While these forces are kept in territories of other states, functions for their management and operation should be discharged with the participation of the Supreme Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, Kotenkov said.

Under the Alma-Ata agreement, the president of the Russian Federation has the right to make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons in coordination with heads of other countries of the CIS in whose territories nuclear forces are stationed, and for which commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, Marshal of the Airforce Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, is directly responsible. Kotenkov believes that an intermediate variant should now be found. This approach will not require substantial modification of the existing agreements, although some adjustment will be needed, he said.

Lieutenant-General Valeriy Manilov, press secretary of the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, told ITAR-TASS that the Council of Defence Ministers will try to find a compromise on strategic nuclear forces that would suit all countries of the Commonwealth, both signatories to the treaty on collective security and those who do not participate in it. "We have learnt to listen to each other and look for mutually acceptable solutions", Manilov said.

No Agreement Reached

*OW0409104592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1002 GMT 4 Sep 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A session of the CIS Defence Ministers Council has failed to solve the issue on the makeup of a strategic forces command and operational procedure. On Friday [4 September], the 2d day of debates, Marshal Shaposhnikov, the CIS Strategic Forces Supreme Commander invited representatives from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to try to settle the differences in such a composition.

As usual, the stumbling block was the position of Ukraine, claiming the right of administrative control over strategic forces on its territory.

GERMANY

Foreign Minister Lauds Chemical Weapons Convention

*LD0409133692 Hamburg DPA in German 0817 GMT
4 Sep 92*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel today in Bonn welcomed the chemical weapons convention concluded in Geneva after nine years of negotiations. The minister expressly praised the success of the German diplomat and leader of the negotiations, Adolf Ritter von Wagner, who achieved the breakthrough. Kinkel announced that during his visit to the United Nations at the end of September he will appeal to all states to join this worldwide ban on chemical weapons as original signatories at the signing conference in Paris in 1993. This is "one of the core objectives of German foreign policy," Kinkel stressed.

FRG Firm To Destroy Russian Chemical Weapons

*LD0609145392 Hamburg DPA in German
1413 GMT 6 Sep 92*

[Text] Frankfurt/Main (DPA)—The chemical installations company Lurgi AG of Frankfurt/Main has signed a cooperation agreement with a delegation from Russia on the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia. The company announced today that a German-Soviet joint venture with the partners Metalchim Progress AG and Entsorgungs-und Sanierungstechnik GMBH [EST] will be set up as soon as possible. EST is owned 50 percent each by Deutsche Aerospace AG [Dasa] and Lurgi-Umweltbeteiligungsgesellschaft MBH.

The plans envisage the construction and operation of a large processing plant in the Russian republic of Udmurtia, where 7,000 tonnes of the chemical weapon levasit are being stored. Later, six to seven similar installations are to be built at other locations in Russia, the only CIS republic where chemical weapons are being stored. It is necessary to decentralize the destruction because Russia does not want to carry out transfers for security reasons.

Lurgi's parent company, Metallgesellschaft AG; Metalchim, and Dasa are already cooperating in disposing of conventional ammunition in Russia.

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