


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Ilinden OMO Chairman on Macedonian Minority
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[Interview with Jordan Kostadinov, chairman of the Ilinden OMO, by Mirche Tomovski in Skopje; date not given: "It Is Not Easy To Be Human"]

[Text] *Jordan Kostadinov is chairman of the Ilinden OMO [United Macedonian Organization], the organization of Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia. He was born in 1932 in the village of Vrapcha in Sandanski Okoliya. He is a teacher by profession, and, in a way, his biography is typical of the situation in Pirin Macedonia and of Bulgarian policy toward it. "No parent or ancestor of mine has ever claimed to be Bulgarian," Kostadinov says. It is perhaps this family tradition that determined his firm Macedonian awareness that "ensured" two Bulgarian court trials and prison—first three years and the second time two—and the loss of his right to teach. Kostadinov was cruelly persecuted and mistreated by Bulgarian police and security organs: He was kept in solitary confinement for 11 months, and an attempt was made to commit him to a hospital for the insane. He has been kicked out of work 13 times. His latest job was in a metallurgical plant, where he worked as a designer, but which he lost by order of the Bulgarian state security. During a leave of absence permitted by the factory authorities, Kostadinov visited Macedonia and attended the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] congress. The present interview was held in Skopje, in the course of which Kostadinov discussed the situation in Bulgaria, Bulgarian policy toward Macedonia, the political climate in Pirin Macedonia, political demands for Pirin Macedonian autonomy and the withdrawal of the Bulgarian Army, and the broadcasting of radio and television programs in the Macedonian language. He then openly discussed the attitude of the Macedonian State, the state leadership, and the political parties toward the situation of Macedonians; the Ilinden OMO and its activeness and cooperation with political parties; the VMRO-DPMNE; and the Balkans. Kostadinov is a very open interlocutor. His opinions and speech, political assessments, and viewpoints are based on the environment and the condition in which he lives, and the feelings with which he accepts them and survives in these decisive historical times.*

[PULS] We are witnessing major social changes. How do you survive them? How are democratic processes in Bulgaria developing?

[Kostadinov] I have spent time in prison, behind bars, and in Bulgarian jails because of my free thinking, which refuses to observe Draconian standards. I was jailed because of my free thoughts and my views on the Macedonian question in Pirin Macedonia. I said openly that we are Macedonians and not Bulgarians, and that we must preserve our national awareness and know our history. That is why I was persecuted. It is not easy to be human, and even less so to remain a Macedonian in

Greece, Bulgaria, or Albania. As to changes in Bulgaria, there have been no such changes in Zhelev's Bulgaria. Nothing has changed. That was the case with the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]. We are now about to try to establish contacts with the political parties and the state. We shall also request a meeting with Zhelyu Zhelev. Let us see whether he will answer our request for a meeting and a discussion of our national demands, and see what the actual thoughts and intentions of the authorities are.

[PULS] How are Macedonians currently being treated in Pirin Macedonia and Bulgaria?

[Kostadinov] The situation of the Macedonians remains unchanged. We Macedonians legally founded a united Macedonian organization. All of us believed that, in Bulgaria, democracy would affect us as well. There have been changes in democratic relations in Bulgaria. However, that has occurred under pressure applied by Western Europe. In our case, the case of the Macedonians, there have been no changes. There were changes only during the Dimitrov period, from 1945 to 1948. Regarding Macedonian rights, treatment under Zhivkov and Zhelev remained the same. We were told that, after meeting with Kiro Gligorov, Zhelev stated that he would soften his view on denying the existence of the Macedonian nation. If such is the case, there will indeed be changes, and it will be proved to us that Bulgarian policy favors the stabilizing of Balkan issues, which, should they worsen, might lead once again to the outbreak of conflicts and result in bloodshed.

[PULS] How many Macedonians are there in Pirin Macedonia and Bulgaria?

[Kostadinov] I cannot give you a precise figure, but I believe there are approximately 350,000-400,000 within the ethnic boundaries of Pirin Macedonia. There are 1.5 million Macedonians in Bulgaria. We know, however, that assimilation is doing its work, which is why it is difficult to determine how many Macedonians have a feeling of national awareness. However, we still believe that at present in Bulgaria, even Macedonians who are over age 80 are aware of being Macedonians. God willing, the young will also have a national awareness.

[PULS] Where is the highest concentration of Macedonians outside Pirin Macedonia?

[Kostadinov] There is no concentration in Pirin Macedonia. It is true that there have been many immigrants from Aegean Macedonia. Macedonian refugees from the Aegean part of Macedonia replaced the Turks who fled in 1912. These migrations occurred before 1912-13 and 1918. Other major Macedonian groups in Bulgaria are in Plovdiv, Burgas, Varna, Ruse, Sofia, Stanke Dimitrov (Dupnitsa), Kyustendil, and other areas where the Macedonian population is concentrated.

[PULS] Is the Ilinden OMO officially banned?

[Kostadinov] The Ilinden OMO went through the three levels of the Bulgarian court system. However, the Ilinden OMO was not registered because the Bulgarian Constitution has an article according to which organizing a party or any other association on a national or ethnic basis is not permitted. Last year, in Moscow, the Bulgarian delegation was sharply criticized for that article and asked to amend it because it was in violation of international law and international standards. Even the new Bulgarian Constitution does not include the article [as published]. Amendments to the Constitution will be possible when the Bulgarian National Assembly adopts the international conventions on human rights. At that point, the Ilinden OMO will be registered. Currently, we are a forbidden organization. Todor Zank, an American from New York, visited us, and we held discussions. He then drafted a report that he submitted to the Bulgarian National Assembly, telling the Bulgarians that the Ilinden OMO is a legitimate organization, although it was not registered with the court.

[PULS] Is the issue of ethnic minorities, the rights of minorities or ethnic groups related only to the problem of the Macedonians? How are Turks and other minorities treated? How are you getting along with the Turks?

[Kostadinov] Bulgaria fears Macedonia and Turkey because of the people within its ethnic borders. The other groups or minorities are small, such as the Gypsies. Therefore, it is the Turks and the Macedonians that are the largest groups. In Pirin Macedonia, we have not cooperated with the Turks. Naturally, we would like to establish relations with all parties. I believe that we shall have good relations with the Turks. It will be difficult to find a common language with the Bulgarians, however.

[PULS] Macedonia has proclaimed itself an independent and sovereign state. However, Macedonia's international recognition is encountering difficulties. What is your view of that situation?

[Kostadinov] Many citizens in Pirin Macedonia have raised this question with a feeling of concern. Personally, I am not worried because this does not depend on us. We have neither the power nor the magic wand to accomplish this. To me, Macedonia exists and will be recognized. I do not waste time thinking about recognition. I think about what we will be doing after it. Unity must be achieved among the Macedonian parties and among all Macedonians, so that the world will see that Macedonia will not abandon either its name or its national affiliation but will struggle peacefully for its rights and independence.

[PULS] In your view, what are the reasons for the lack of unity?

[Kostadinov] The lack of unity among Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia, Aegean Macedonia, and Albania is the result of foreign propaganda. The Bulgarians are trying to find a way to prove the Bulgarian origins of Macedonia. Perhaps some psychopaths will show up who will claim that all Macedonians are Bulgarians. Bulgaria

hopes to find grounds to be able to implement its old program. They are counting on the VMRO-DPMNE here, saying that "the VMRO-DPMNE is a Bulgarian and not a Macedonian party." This is being said by senior security officials. We have never said that the Bulgarians are Macedonians, nor do we have the right to say that. However, the Bulgarians also do not have the right to say that we are Bulgarians. Nevertheless, we hope we shall eventually mature.

[PULS] How united are the Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia? Are you united within the Ilinden OMO?

[Kostadinov] Controversies are the result of the formulation of the Ilinden OMO program, related to the bylaws and issues of autonomy, the church, the schools, and radio and television in the Macedonian language. Some informants who penetrated the organization opposed some of our national rights. Everyone signed the declaration that was adopted last year in the Rozhen Monastery and subsequently by the Coordinating Council. Stojan Georgiev and Jordan Berbatov mounted a propaganda campaign against that document. That made some people hesitant and fearful that if they signed it they would be beaten up and lose their jobs. However, it became clear that those were pro-Bulgarian elements. Over there they are Bulgarians, while here they are the friends of the Macedonians. Here they are welcomed as Macedonians, but over there they consider themselves Bulgarians. They are unfortunate people who were dropped from our ranks: Berbatov and Georgiev were dismissed from the Coordinating Council. For the past year and a half, they have not responded to invitations and have not participated in any activities.

[PULS] How do you explain the Bulgarian political act of recognizing the Macedonian state but not the Macedonian nation?

[Kostadinov] I truly regret that in Macedonia there are many Macedonians—politicians, newsmen, historians, and others—whom I consider intelligent but who are unfamiliar with the Bulgarian mentality. Bulgaria was the first to recognize the Republic of Macedonia. Zhelyu Zhelev had two reasons: He recognized Macedonia before the elections so that we would vote for him. Regardless of that, even before the elections, the first and the second, on behalf of the Ilinden OMO, we came out with the appeal "Let us not vote for Bulgarian democratic rule that will not grant Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia their national rights." That appeal was accepted. However, some of our members relented on the second round and voted. Those were members who truly believed that changes would take place. Recognition of the Macedonian State while not recognizing the Macedonian nation is the trickiest and basest policy pursued by the Bulgarian statesmen. Such people have always pursued a policy of conquest. That is why we cannot trust them today. They are saying that they will have a rapprochement with Macedonia, that they will extend a hand to it and will cooperate with it. However, they always have ulterior motives. If you come near a

bridge, they push you into the river. They would not help you because they are pursuing their own interests. The supremacist VMRO-SMD [VMRO-Union of Macedonian Societies] is financed by the Bulgarian State. It is being armed and is preparing another bloodshed in Pirin Macedonia and a division within the Macedonian parties in Vardar Macedonia. That intention has not been abandoned. The state will not make its participation apparent. It is those who have sold out, who are supremacists, or who have been bribed who will emerge.

[PULS] What then is the solution? The circumstances have changed. Macedonia has become an independent and sovereign state. It is now raising the issue of Macedonians on the basis of the CSCE and respect for human rights and freedoms.

[Kostadinov] The Ilinden OMO has its own program. It calls for gaining the status of an autonomous oblast in Pirin Macedonia and having all Bulgarian institutions that were introduced following the occupation of Pirin Macedonia replaced by Macedonian ones. That right is granted to us by international documents. We have the right to autonomy because we are not Bulgarians, and the land is not Bulgarian. We are not a minority in Pirin Macedonia. It is inhabited exclusively by Macedonians, a few Muslim Macedonians who are under the influence of Turkish propaganda, and a few Bulgarophiles. However, their percentage is small. We demand an autonomous status; an autonomous oblast, with the Macedonian language taught in the schools and spoken by the administration; a Macedonian Orthodox Church, independent of the Bulgarian Church; and radio and television in Blagoevgrad in the Macedonian language and in all other institutions. We shall demand the withdrawal of the Bulgarian occupation forces from Pirin Macedonia and keep only a militia to fight crime. Within this framework, we demand that we be supported by the Republic of Macedonia, the CSCE, the United Nations, and all other international institutions. Only in that way can we put a halt to the assimilation of the Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia. Today our Macedonians are being assimilated through hunger. That is state policy. They are being pressured into keeping silent and not thinking of their nation, instead thinking about bread and their children.

[PULS] Does the Ilinden OMO include in its program a stipulation that autonomy be treated as an act of secession, with changes in the borders, which is in violation of international documents? Are you saying that you will accept those documents?

[Kostadinov] The Ilinden OMO is a Macedonian national organization that is fighting for the national rights of the Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia and of Macedonians in Bulgaria. We are not a military organization. We are not engaged in a fight. We do not favor territorial secession by force of arms. We are demanding our rights within the framework of Bulgaria. The separation of Pirin Macedonia and Aegean Macedonia and the unification of Macedonia is the concern of the

Macedonian State, the United Nations, and the CSCE. However, that is a separate phase. That is our right. Unless that is understood by our Macedonian politicians, the Macedonian parties in the Republic of Macedonia, and the Macedonian Government, the government will find it much more difficult to support our demands. We have the right to such demands.

[PULS] Macedonian policy includes a firm commitment to promote individual and collective human rights and freedoms of Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia and Bulgaria. How do you assess that commitment?

[Kostadinov] The Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia have seen that the people of Vardar Macedonia are creating a state for themselves and not for us. State policy changes, and I justify it because we are living in truly touchy times. However, on this matter I do not want to interfere with the affairs of the statesmen. We shall not be accusing them of this. Let me say that, in the discussions held by the VMRO-DPMNE and those of Mr. Kljusev and now in Burgas, the following question was not asked: "Why is the Ilinden OMO being physically mistreated, why are its members being beaten up on roads, in meetings, and at gatherings?" It is such a silence that I cannot understand. It is not interference in the work of Bulgaria, but Bulgaria should be told not to engage in state terrorism toward its citizens, regardless of whether they are Macedonians, Gypsies, Turks, or anything else. I know what diplomacy and ethics mean. One can display ethical behavior toward one's opponent when that opponent displays the same ethical behavior toward you. If a Bulgarian opposes you and you engage in talks and he rejects you, and he does not recognize either you or all of the Macedonian people, how is one to talk to him? He must be spoken to in such a way that he would be ashamed to look at you.

[PULS] Are you in touch with representatives of Macedonia who have visited Bulgaria?

[Kostadinov] Last year, representatives of the Ilinden OMO asked to meet with Mr. Kljusev. They tried to organize such a meeting. However, independently of this fact, when last year Mr. Kljusev was having discussions with Dimitur Popov, the former Bulgarian prime minister, the latter openly said in front of Mr. Kljusev and his associates that "we shall not tolerate either individuals or groups such as the Ilinden OMO because they commit acts of violence." Our Macedonians in our own land did not answer that they were fighting for human rights and that they are not against the state or against the people. They kept silent. Such silence has brought about fear and mistrust on the part of our people in Pirin Macedonia. This also led to the acts of physical violence committed in 1991 on 4 May, 25 May, and 27 July; on 19 December and 26 December 1990; and this year on 19 April at the Rozhen Monastery, and, of course, on 2 August. Terrible things were done to us. We are surprised that, aside from NOVA MAKEDONIJA, no other newspaper has been supporting us. I have become disappointed already in the VMRO-DPMNE, which claims

to be a Macedonian national organization. I met with Ljupcho Georgievski and Dosta Dimovska, but we did not go more deeply into this matter in order to avoid a conflict. What we would like is to establish contacts and gradually come closer and to find a common language. They are familiar with our problems. Despite this, however, we have not heard even a single word said in our defense. We did not meet with Ljupcho Georgievski when he visited Sofia. However, we also did not seek to establish contacts. He himself did not say a single word to the Bulgarians about the Ilinden OMO or about what the Ilinden OMO wants or the fact that its members are being victimized with physical violence.

[PULS] Are you collaborating with the various parties in the Republic of Macedonia?

[Kostadinov] According to a stipulation of the Ilinden OMO Coordinating Council, we must resume contacts with the Macedonian parties, regardless of their ideology. However, those parties themselves have not tried to establish contacts. On our side, it is more difficult to establish them. If some of our views are wrong, we would like them to help us. We are human and someone may make a mistake. Someone may misunderstand something. However, we have not had such support. We were invited to attend the VMRO-DPMNE Congress and the congress of the socialists, and we sent our representatives. We oppose the ideological struggles of the various parties in Macedonia. That is the weakest side of the political parties. Today there are clashes between communists and anticommunists. My view is the following: The VMRO-DPMNE is an anticommunist party, and the destruction of communism is important to it. To me, communism was destroyed as early as 15 or 20 years ago. However, the VMRO-DPMNE has not mentioned even a single word about the fact that, although there was no communist party in Greece and there was no communist dictatorship, the Macedonians were nonetheless deprived of all national rights! It has not said even two words about the fact that, in Yugoslavia, in the Republic of Macedonia, after World War II, the Macedonians were granted their own national rights and had their Republic and Macedonian institutions, an academy, and radio and television. They have not mentioned that. Meanwhile, in Bulgaria, the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] has concentrated its propaganda on the fact that it was the Comintern that created the Macedonian nation. Therefore, the VMRO-DPMNE supports Bulgarian ideology in that "the Macedonians were created by the communists!" In this area, the VMRO-DPMNE is fighting against the national interests of the Macedonian nation.

[PULS] You have repeatedly stressed the complex Balkan international situation. What are your views on the future of the Balkans?

[Kostadinov] Two or three years ago, some tricky diplomat mounted the "Europe without borders" slogan. Some of our members and many other people said, "Why should we talk about Macedonia? There will no

longer be borders. We shall be able to travel freely because there will be no frontiers." Some of our people, as well, who have laid claims to leadership, said: "We shall no longer be talking about borders or the unification of Macedonia because there will no longer be any borders." All of this is wrong. Countries have borders. The people, however, must be free to communicate and to cooperate economically and help each other. As to ethnic groups that are being restrained, they should be moved from one nation to another—Albanians to Macedonia, Greeks to Macedonia, Macedonians to Bulgaria, and Turks to Bulgaria. These are complex problems. One should not exclude the possibility that what is happening between Serbs and Croats, and what is happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, or between Hungarians and Romanians, may also take place between Bulgarians and Macedonians and between Albanians and Macedonians. We cannot view with optimism our Balkan territory because the Balkan peoples have not attained the necessary level of development. Look at Greece, which claims to have an old culture and which is displaying incredible discrimination toward a nation within its own land. Albanians who have come into foreign territory want to set up their own republic and take for themselves a part of the Republic. Bulgarians who entered foreign territory and occupied the territory of a foreign people would like to eliminate that people and assimilate it and make it Bulgarian. That is impossible. If they do not abandon their aspirations and their assimilation efforts and genocide, matters will naturally come to conflicts and fighting. Let us hope, nonetheless, that we shall become mature in the Balkans.

Yordanov on SDS Successes, Myths About State

92BA1457A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
17 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by Aleksandur Yordanov, Union of Democratic Forces, SDS, parliamentary group chairman: "Bulgaria—Our Common European Home"]

[Text] What happened in Bulgaria after 13 October 1991 had not happened for nearly half a century before that:

1. The Bulgarian Republic became a member of the Council of Europe.
2. For the first time a president was democratically elected.
3. Talks were initiated on EC associate membership.
4. The process of the restoration of private property of the land was initiated; a free land market was established; private ownership by the previous owners of stores, workshops, studios, and small industrial enterprises was restored;

The banking system was reformed;

The process of privatization was initiated and is developing on a legal basis, under full social and parliamentary control;

The country's financial system was stabilized and Bulgaria began to settle its foreign debt;

Democratic changes were made in the judiciary;

Problems of pensions, housing policy, unemployment, education, health care, and others, were partially resolved.

5. Bulgaria's foreign policy is rated highly by the international community and is contributing to the country's national security.

6. The democratic institutions are actively functioning and relations among them are within the constitutional framework.

7. Efforts at engaging in criminal economic activities are being blocked with increasing success. The internal stability of the state is strengthening its new democratic image even further.

Against that really democratic background, the catastrophic view of our country, emphasized by some gutter newspapers, can trigger nothing but an ironic smile. Let us recall that, allegedly, this past summer the government was to fall, new elections were to be held, we would have become exhausted by hunger, and there would have been no wheat harvest. Not one of those malicious prophecies was realized, but neither did the yellow press or the politicians become serious. There was a harvest, without waving red flags, without socialist competition, without a Central Committee Plenum, and without a brigade movement.

A great many things occurred during Bulgaria's first truly democratic year: God gave us strikes and soccer victories; the "suppressed" private business kept changing their Mercedes-like handkerchiefs; former communist grandees changed their "residences"; Todor Zhivkov took the path to his penultimate residence; some people lost their ministerial seats and, topping everything else, the Bulgarian president turned liberal.

On Mythological and Collective Awareness

The collective individual needs myths. It is only within the cocoon of a myth that he feels safe and secure. The myth guarantees his adaptability. The search for and creation of collective utopia has always been the essence of Marxism. One of the absurdities which continues to entrap some of our statesmen is that of achieving democratic changes through collective myths. The myth dealing with "national conciliation," the participation of the "entire people," and the "united front" of all democratic forces are merely part of the neo-mythological nature of the socialist collectivistic awareness. The myth-makers forget a simple democratic truth: in a democracy everyone defines his own self, for which reason everyone participates in the democratic process through his own

difference. Democracy gives birth to citizens, to individuals, and to individual views on society, and it is only the mechanisms through which that sum is "regulated" that could be the object of laws, as a special collective act. Party conferences and congresses, press conferences on green meadows or roundtables cannot "replace" real democracy. They can only be part of it. It was no accident that Professor Ralph Dahrendorf, the contemporary guru of democratic liberalism, emphasized the link between the basic liberal idea of an open society and the need for a new civil religion, which would fill the existential vacuum of the free man. That applies to a society that has already attained (or is striving to attain) freedom from any kind of ideological system.

This is an area on which all political parties could concentrate their efforts: freeing our society from ideological schemes and collective utopias. Seek, on the basis of the attained democratic values, the common religion which welds society together.

That value (or religion) may not consist of the attitude of some parties toward other parties or of some interests toward other (regardless of how good they may be!), or of a given ideology toward another. Such a value may not make people quarrel or lead to confrontation. It cannot set one person against the Person; it cannot and will not divide people into poor and rich, townspeople and country people, intellectuals and the nation, Bulgarians and Turks, workers and intellectuals; such value cannot wave any party flag. Several mythologies still oppose this value orientation, which could save Bulgarian society from the tireless effort of proving its collectivistic atavism; mythologies aiming precisely at destructiveness and confrontation and, as their final objective, a return to the warm diapers of a collective utopia.

Myth No. 1: On the 'Good' and 'Bad' SDS

What makes a myth is the fact that it replaces and substitutes. The "good" SDS was the first to be established. It was then taken over by the "bad" SDS. The "good" SDS held a roundtable meeting with the communists, while the "bad" SDS is today unwilling to do so. The "good" SDS lost the elections while the "bad" SDS won them, for some unknown reason. The "good" SDS tried to abolish the SDS, while the "bad" SDS, again who knows why, rescued it as a "movement." The "good" SDS left the SDS and the "bad" SDS stayed on. The "good" SDS formed a coalition with the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], while the "bad" SDS is unwilling to do so. It is on that ground that the myth developed, and no one has asked the makers of the myth about their thoughts and understanding.

There is no "good" or "bad" SDS. As a political reality, there is a Union of Democratic Forces. One may freely either join or withdraw from such a union. The Union of Democratic Forces is the people, the citizens of Bulgaria who voted for a democratic change and who are its voice and conscience. There also were "leaders," some of whom understood the voice of the people while others

who listened only to their own voices. Some of those who listened to their own voices are today within the SDS and they continue to listen to themselves only. Unfortunately, the people do not need such politicians.

That is how one could structure and unstructure the myth of "that" and "this" SDS. But who needs to play the "game" of collective myths?

Myth No. 2: The SDS Has Declared War on Everyone

This is the most stupid myth, for some myths could also be intelligent. Neither the government nor the SDS parliamentary group have declared war on anyone. We are simply doing our jobs. It is only the infantile collective awareness that could interpret a change in the system as war. But why not: a "war" on the collectivistic social way of life itself; a "war" on restructuring! Confrontation, chaos, and catastrophic policy are only part of the mythological neo-communist baggage. The objective is the same: to change reality. It is of interest to ask why is it that those "fighting" people did not drown last summer in the Black Sea? Who prevented them? It may be regrettable but it is a fact that after a great deal of reading the gutter press one either gets a sunstroke or gives a press conference on the green. Dear friends, what kind of a war is it to rule in accordance with the laws and not with "theses and considerations," to pass laws rather than issue military commands, and have a policy evolve rather than revolutionize the people. The SDS is being steadily joined by ever new political organizations and an increasing number of nonparliamentary parties. We shall continue to broaden our political and social base.

Myth No. 3: Change of Government

The president is one of its creators. It is true that Dr. Zh. Zhelev has repeatedly promoted the concept that in the period of the "peaceful transition" many governments could and should change. They "burn out." I have repeatedly discussed that matter. The experience of other "former" socialist countries indicates that this is not the best way. To demand a frequent change of government in Bulgaria means to exploit the collectivist feeling of insecurity and instability, which is deeply rooted in the national mentality. Practical political experience existed before socialism confirmed that fact. That feeling enhances a mentality which tends to circumvent the law. The more frequent the transformations in the executive authorities, the more the authority of the president grows. In a situation marked by constant governmental changes both errors and wrong executive decisions are bound to increase.

The attitude toward the SDS government also includes something described by the people as civic morality. Let some statesmen and politicians be remembered in our new political history by their efforts to bring down the first democratic and educated government after almost half a century of communist mediocrity. And let me be among the others, who would like to be remembered by having helped the first government to broaden the range

of democracy. I can hear the following objection: Everyone must participate in the reforms. Here again we have the collectivistic myth. Why *everyone*? Let those who wish participate, those who understand change and support it. If someone wishes to obstruct it, let him, but within the limits of the law. Democracy is born in the course of arguments and dialogue and not of stale accord. I respect my interlocutor, not when he agrees with me on everything, but when he differs, when he has another view. However, do not force me to accept his view as my own.

More than at any other time, today Bulgaria needs the trust of the democratic countries. Such trust is not attained easily. It requires specific political qualities and a period of proof. However, we have the unique opportunity of jointly building trust in Bulgaria through our internal national dialogue, the parliament, the president, and a stable and efficient legitimate government. The myth of war among institutions does not promote Bulgaria's good name. It serves personal objectives and we hear within it some of the old voices.

Myth No. 4: The Nation Is Divided

This myth thundered from the pages of the communist press immediately after the first free parliamentary elections. It is natural that when elections are being held the people become divided according to their preferences. It is even more natural for the various political preferences and trends within society to have an impact on human behavior. However, such a simplistic presentation of national life, in the sense that political preferences are tearing apart and setting off a confrontation among people, is indeed paradoxical.

A handful of former communist grandees started yelling when it became necessary to change their cool bedsheets imported from Vienna for the warm domestic coarse sheets; then, some "serious" people appeared, who began to burden just about the entire nation with their aches and pains. A nation could indeed become divided and involved in civil war only when communists or neo-nationalistic forces gain the upper hand. That is confirmed both by old and recent history as well as the present in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union.

The theory that during the "transitional period" (let us not forget that under socialism we always lived in a state of "transition"), should everyone undertake to participate in the administration of the state such an administration would be more successful, is naive. Under democracy it is the laws that govern while the government is only the modest executor of the laws. Today in Bulgaria, by virtue of free and democratic elections, there are both "blue" and "red" obshtinas. There are obshtinas in which the local power is in the hands of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. I do not know how the supporters of the theory of the "division" of the nation intend to "unite" the nation. Perhaps by prohibiting elections! Or if illegality were to replace legality?

Actually, this is the first time in nearly half a century that the people in Bulgaria have common interests and individual successes in life. That is not a wish, but a legitimate reality. The state supports and steadily expands that reality. The people also have a common value—democracy. Democracy provides opportunities without giving any gifts. Here is a very clear example: Only one year ago the nation was divided on whether or not the people would take back their land. Under this parliament and government, under this president the people united around the idea that they wanted their land back! Actually, democracy offers the opportunity, if the people so wish, to put themselves in whatever situation they want: If they so desire, they could feel immature, divided, and split. They could also feel... united. If people so wish, they could fall into the arms of most basic communist propaganda. Furthermore, here is something else worth remembering: With the end of totalitarianism, the nation no longer has a Father. In a parliamentary republic it is impossible to have a Father of the Nation. As to who will live in a parliamentary republic and who will use the old mechanisms and ways of thinking aimed at "personal use" that is a different matter, a moral matter above all. Paternalism is not the philosophy of freedom.

Myth No. 5: G-39

In the spring of 1991, the SDS supporters demanded that their representatives in the Grand National Assembly withdraw from the parliament and that new elections be held. National conferences were held and the SDS National Coordination Council passed resolutions. After extensive and lengthy urging, only 39 national representatives honored the will of their electorate. It was precisely because they did not betray their voters that later those same voters re-elected them to parliament. Today they are doing the same thing: They are listening to the voices of their electorate and mind their business in parliament and in the government. Within a single year the number of such people reached 110.

I perfectly understand what precisely irritates and exasperates some of today's nonparliamentary opposition. However, I cannot help such people. Nor can I help the gutter press, for I lack the necessary strength to satisfy the ambitions of all gifted and talented people who work there. Their case is simply beyond salvation.

The great wish of those who could not be saved was for the SDS to fail, for its government to fall and be unable to stay in power for at least one year. However, the SDS has an intelligent and clear-thinking Coordination Council, with an exceptionally competent parliamentary group and politicians who can find a good solution to any situation, using internal democratic principles and procedures that work perfectly. It is particularly stupid to believe that if the gutter press and communist agitation sound the attack against their ghost, known as G-39, someone in the SDS will swallow the bait and that the SDS supporters will immediately follow the ideas of a nobody. The more the pro-communist press starts

yelling the better the SDS parliamentary group feels, for it means that we are doing our jobs well and shall complete our jobs well.

Myth No. 6: Change of Policy

Those who do not wish for a change in the system now call for a change in policy. Their transformation is truly touching. However, no one specifically describes what is meant by that. For example, someone may determine that a change in policy is needed only after he has lost his ministerial position. In order to restore it, naturally, the policy must be changed. Someone else would be jumping around and like an old gramophone record, keep repeating: trade unions, trade unions. Yes, the trade unions as well should participate. However, so should the government, for the trade unions cannot govern alone. In Bulgaria there must be a government as well. Someone else again is thinking of finance. He may be an expert in petrochemistry and the arms business. Regardless of his origins and training, we find him amazing.

What is needed is not change, but a decisive acceleration in the activities of the government and a firm and categorical application of the laws in order to pursue the only policy that could rescue Bulgaria, and that is being implemented by the SDS. The government may be criticized for being somewhat inefficient in its activities and for insufficient firmness and decisiveness in implementing the reforms. However, its policies are implementing the SDS program. Those policies are based on the following:

The establishment and development of a strong private sector through restitution and privatization;

Stability of state institutions;

Stabilizing the country's financial system;

Care for the socially weak;

Civil peace and democratic dialogue with all democratic organizations—trade unions, parties, and associations.

There will be no change in such a policy, for it is a policy of peace, governed by the law and democratic. The results of such a policy are visible today as well. The time for its total implementation is four years. Such a policy may be expanded, enriched, burdened with ever new tasks, updated, improved, and made more active, but not changed. Any attempt at changing policy means, in practice, holding new elections. It also means postponing the policy of changing the system for an unspecified amount of time, until another cabinet is set up, new commissions are organized, relations of international trust are established, and the mechanism of majorities and minorities is enacted once again.

I am convinced that once again reason will prevail and that the latest propaganda myth will burst as a result of self-inflation. Both within the SDS as well as in terms of our partners and the parliament, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, we shall attain the type of free

dialogue-based coalition policy which would most accurately express the essence of the SDS and its program.

Bulgaria Is Our Common European Home

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe deprived millions of people of guidelines. Somehow of all a sudden, without any advance general programs and profound policies, the comfort of slavery was replaced by the discomfort of freedom. All of a sudden the people felt both free and insecure. The political whirlpools cannot compensate, as though with a magic wand, the many long years of negative accretions on the organization of society. The collective awareness remains strong and still burdened with socialist habits and reactions, finding a niche in the various forms of compensatory socializing. The mentality of the "labor collective," for example, provides a temporary shelter—for eight hours you are among your own. Collective action—strikes, demonstrations, and meetings—strengthen the growing feeling of cohesion within a steadily atomizing new world.

Today the absence of a common civil religion, which would balance extremes in national life and give a meaning to the internal psychological life of the Bulgarian person, is being felt ever more sharply. But let us admit to this: We, Bulgarians, are a strange nation. Within our own home, we worship comfort, tranquillity, and safety. Within that home a tender and caring hand has arranged and put in order everything with love and patience. To us Bulgarians, the family is sacred. Our family home is sacred. But why would our life in society be different from our life at home? Why is it that so frequently and irreconcilably the social home is not in harmony with "my home?" Why is it that social lack of coziness, and not only in relations but also in material aspects—buildings, streets, and squares—has become, in accordance with a socialist routine, the essence of our civil life.

We Bulgarians can find our new civil religion through the values that have been ours forever and that are shared by all of us. Bulgaria can become our common European home with ethnic and religious tolerance, individual perfection, and cultivation of family values. Is it not possible for the model of the Bulgarian family, with its tolerance, goodness, and warmth, to become, actually, the social home we are building together? Bulgarian society has the spiritual strength to seek and find itself once again through the values of family, home, and freedom. Let us not dream of distant countries and a different world. That other world is within us. It is not Bulgaria that will be joining Europe, but Europe will rediscover itself through Bulgaria. What is demanded is both a great deal and not so much: simply for us in society to be the same as we are at home, and to begin to live free from the mythological collectivistic way of thinking and thus make Bulgaria our common home.

Zhelev Speaks at Liberal International Congress

92BA1421A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 5 Sep 92 p 8

["Text" of speech given by President Zhelyu Zhelev at the Liberal International Congress in Mainz; date not given: "National Reconciliation a New Social Agreement"]

[Text] Unlike our naive initial ideas, the collapse of communism, no matter how grandiose it was, did not automatically lead to liberal democracy. Life has shown that the transition from communism to liberal democracy cannot be accomplished directly; it cannot be accomplished directly and all at once.

Many years ago, on the basis of structural analysis of classical totalitarian states, I came to the conclusion that between the totalitarian system and liberal democracy there is a transitional link of an authoritarian type. It most often could be military dictatorship or a complex mixture alternating between military dictatorship and civil war until gradually social and political pressures decrease and society enters the calm waters of liberal democracy.

That pattern, totalitarian system—military dictatorship—liberal democracy, in one way or another, was confirmed in a number of cases. But as always, life turned out to be much richer and more varied than patterns, and that is why it cannot always be so easily included in them.

The postcommunist ideological vacuum that resulted after the collapse of the world communist system was filled by nationalism, racism, neofascism, revanchism, and in some republics of the former Soviet Union, of religious fanaticism. The end of communism gave rise to postcommunist mutants like the national communism of Slobodan Miloshevic or national socialism in a milder form.

The words uttered by Zbigniew Brzezinski quite some time ago, that nationalism will be the last refuge of communism, have all come true. Retreating communism, which in its youth always spoke of internationalism, is reaching for nationalism everywhere like a drowning man.

Placing nationalism and liberalism on opposite sides is fundamentally important for the political development of Eastern Europe and especially the Balkans. In that respect the chances of liberalism in the region are directly related to the way the crisis in Yugoslavia is resolved. If the crisis in Yugoslavia continues to increase, it will lead to greater and greater increase of nationalist and extremist political forces.

Thus nationalist regimes, which are a real danger, can have their ideological basis in neocommunism (the Serbian case), as well as extremely right-wing revanchist ideas. Given that background, I would like to describe two basic problems that I will discuss for you.

The first one is on the transformation of dissident liberalism into liberal government strategy, and the second is how I see the future development of Bulgaria.

The processes taking place in Eastern Europe during the last two to three years define, according to many, a sad trend: the dropping out of many former dissidents from the political scene, and what is more, their isolation.

There are many explanations that can be given. But there is one that I feel is especially important: Eastern European dissidence, which for the most part was based on the principles of liberalism, could not transform those values into pragmatic policy and convince postcommunist societies that the liberal choice was the correct one. That created conditions for extremist political organizations to gain great popularity in some of our countries, something that I would call unenlightened anticommunism. I will try to give an example from the political development in Bulgaria.

The fragile Bulgarian opposition, which in 1987 became a political factor, was substantively a liberal formation. It was not by chance that the platform and values of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] (a union of all noncommunist forces of the country), of which I had the honor to be the first chairman, and which was created on 7 December 1989, were liberal.

But for more than two years now, the SDS has actually turned more into a coalition that includes almost all ideological currents. That makes me think that political space in Bulgaria is still in the process of taking shape.

Looking precisely at such a future formation, I would like to show my principle ideas for the tasks and the way we must carry out the transition of Bulgarian society from totalitarianism to democracy.

An economic reform is being implemented in the country which is as radical as the Polish one. In the country, a consensus has been reached by society as a whole regarding the reform's goals. What is yet to be done, is to reach consensus regarding the means.

One alternative we are up against is administrative economic reform carried out mainly by the state apparatus, or economic reform that seeks support from the larger part of society and depends on the structures of the newly emerging civil society, trade unions and other amateur organizations.

I strongly support the second version, because the economic reform we are implementing goes beyond purely economic dimensions. The market economy that we are trying to establish, is the only guarantee of democracy for

the country. That is why limiting the government, and its slow removal from the economy, seems to me especially important.

But how is it possible to ensure broad public support for an economic reform that is necessarily accompanied by enormous unemployment, misery of large parts of the population, and is implemented at a time of radical political polarization, in a situation where opposition to the communists and anticommunists continue to have decided significance. The idea of national reconciliation, which I proposed recently, seems to me a necessary condition to ensure such broad public support for reform. National reconciliation is not simply "forgetting the past." It is a new social agreement, a condition for the establishment of a democratic consensus in our politics.

In that respect, national reconciliation and the success of economic reform are for me the true decommunization, and that is why I was against the special decommunizing legislation, which is in vogue among some of the politicians in our country and in other Eastern European countries.

If I can permit myself an ironic note, what we need now is "anticommunism with a human face."

Remembering Darendorf's pendulum, I think that my principal task as president and liberal politician is to do everything possible to limit the range of that pendulum, to overcome its extreme points.

According to many, the victory of liberalism is the victory of a liberal party in the parliamentary elections. My understanding is somewhat different. The fundamental task of the transition taking place in the former communist countries is the creation of a liberal consensus in society, the creation of a political space that would exclude extremes, and in which the political struggle would be between right- and left-wing liberals, no matter what they call themselves.

In the name of the creation of such political space, I am here with you in the belief that we will travel along this difficult road together. The success of liberal reform and liberal democracy in the countries of the former communist bloc depends to great degree on the support of the developed West: economic, financial, and political.

At the end I would like to finish with the words: liberal democracy at the end of the 20th century, which has seen fascism, bolshevism, national socialism, and communism in its different variations, does not have the right to be naive.

Its organism must have a strong immune system against all the viruses of totalitarianism, regardless whether right- or left-wing, so it can nip them in the bud.

Douglas Hurd on CSFR's Relations With EC
 92CH0967A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
 14 Sep 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Douglas Hurd, British foreign secretary, by Petr Janyska, datelined London; place and date of interview not given: "You Will Have To Wait for a More Precise Statement"]

[Text] [Janyska] Mr. Secretary, Czechoslovakia will most likely split up and, as of 1 January, two states will come into being. The EC signed association agreements with the Czechoslovak Federation; each of the two new countries will most likely press for the most rapidly possible acceptance into the European Community. Do you, as a representative of a nation which will chair the Community for another three months, feel that the agreement will have to be renegotiated or will it automatically transfer to both countries in its present form?

[Hurd] It will definitely not be possible to transfer it automatically. However, it is still too early for a more precise response: First, the Czechs and the Slovaks will have to negotiate with each other and come to some agreement or not come to any agreement. However, I am hoping that they will come to an agreement. Only then will we in the EC be able to decide on the kind of relationship we should have with both of the new countries. Given the current state of affairs, we cannot yet do so. But no matter how the specific response will sound, we will definitely wish for our relationship with all portions of Czechoslovakia to be gradually more friendly and more intensive.

[Janyska] Association agreements with the EC were signed simultaneously by three countries: Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Might membership by two new countries in the EC be delayed, in comparison with Hungary and Poland?

[Hurd] This year, Czechoslovakia still exists and the EC is showing an interest (which is a British initiative) in intensifying talks involving all of the above countries regarding political matters. That is why your three foreign ministers will meet with our 12 foreign ministers on 5 October and will, together, be discussing questions which are important for all of Europe. Subsequently, there will be a meeting at the prime minister level. We are negotiating with all three of your countries at the same level as countries which are closest to full membership in the EC among all the countries of central and eastern Europe. This is true for 1992. As far as next year is concerned, everything will depend on how you will come to agreement within Czechoslovakia. When that happens (and it will happen fairly rapidly), then we shall be deciding on the method for organizing or reorganizing our mutual relationships. As I have said, you are still going to have to wait for a clearer formulation.

[Janyska] As a country which is currently chairing the EC do you consider it to be sensible for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to become somehow mutually integrated?

[Hurd] It is not up to us to take a position on this matter. However, I would consider it to be a matter of course if collaboration were to grow among the above-mentioned nations.

[Janyska] Do you understand such collaboration to involve, say, a free trade zone?

[Hurd] It would seem natural to me if those three countries, which find themselves in similar positions, were to draw logical conclusions from this fact and were to collaborate closely.

[Janyska] The Danish rejection of the Maastricht accords in the referendum caused a great deal of agitation; the French vote is now being anticipated with tension. Why is there so much fear as to which way the French will vote?

[Hurd] When the Danes said no with their votes, the Danish Government turned to us and said that it still has all possibilities open and that it needs a certain amount of time to consider how to proceed further. And as the Danish minister of foreign affairs said today, they are continuing to think about it. I am hoping that, in the fall, they will come out with an idea for further progress. However, in the event other countries were to express their disagreement in a referendum, we would be compelled to make the judgment that the Maastricht process is at its end. And the Community would have to work somehow differently.

[Janyska] Why do you believe that a portion of the Europeans, who are not negligible in numbers, are opposed to the Maastricht accords?

[Hurd] I believe that there is a lot of misunderstanding surrounding the Maastricht accords and that a whole lot of matters will yet need to be explained. They did so in Denmark, but unsuccessfully; they did it in Ireland and were successful; they are doing it in France. The results always show up in a referendum. In our country, there is a very intensive ongoing debate, particularly in Parliament. During the past year, we have had three or four large discussions on this topic. And in each one, the government was subjected to a harsh test, because a united Europe is a topic which runs counter to political parties. Each country is subject to the democratic process and this means polemics and it is not always possible to win a victory in every discussion.

[Janyska] In a united Europe, Germany, which is Czechoslovakia's neighbor, will be a very strong country. Does that country have any kind of special responsibility or mission within the framework of the continent with respect to central Europe?

[Hurd] Within the framework of the EC, Germany is the strongest economic power, a fact which gives it a special

position in all economic negotiations. However, I have the strong impression that neither the Germans, nor the Czechoslovaks, nor the Poles, nor the Hungarians have an interest in seeing Germany stand out at the expense of other European friends. That is why we British, French, Italians, and others are energetically seeking our own contacts, investments, cooperation partners. And we are doing so not only in Czechoslovakia, but in other countries as well.

[Janyska] Several days ago, German President Weiszacker stated that the question of refugees should become a question for the entire European Community and not only for his country. What is your opinion?

[Hurd] We do not wish to stimulate an influx of refugees from Yugoslavia because people who have been chased out of their homes are more sensibly cared for as close to their homes as possible, so they might return as soon as this is possible. That is why we are attempting—and here I speak for the entire EC—to provide aid to refugees where they are located: be it in Croatia or still in Bosnia. We shall substantially increase this assistance—and we would do so rather than setting some kind of quotas, which could have the opposite impact. They would still further stimulate the flow of refugees leaving Yugoslavia.

[Janyska] The Yugoslav conflict is playing out directly in Europe. Thus far, the European Community has not done a whole lot to solve this conflict and, according to many, it has even failed in this regard.

[Hurd] It would fail if we were to approach Yugoslavia like a colony. If we were to adopt a colonial approach, we would be saying to the Yugoslavs: This is unacceptable, we shall impose a governor on you, a system which you will adhere to, an agreement which you will sign. But we are not in such a position. We are not a conquering community which would march into central and eastern Europe and reorganize your affairs for you. We can only participate from the outside in an attempt to achieve peace between the various nations of Yugoslavia. We are striving to accomplish something like that and I believe that, in the end, we shall succeed. The new process, initiated by the European Community and by the United Nations and supported by the sanctions, will certainly have an impact and the sooner the better.

[Janyska] But are you not afraid that it is dangerous for the European continent to have a second Lebanon permanently on its territory?

[Hurd] This is very dangerous and no one wants it. And it would be very dangerous if the entire disunited southern portion of the former Soviet Union were to become a second group of Balkan states. That is why we must forge not only the European Community, but also the CSCE process, of which Czechoslovakia is a part and which it chairs today. The sooner we succeed in creating preventive diplomacy, based on the CSCE process, in which the EC will also play a role, the smaller will be the danger that Europe would be "Lebanonized," as you say.

[Janyska] In other words, you are betting on preventive diplomacy?

[Hurd] Yes, precisely on preventive diplomacy.

Czech Foreign Minister Interviewed in Warsaw

92CH0931A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
2 Sep 92 p 8

[Interview with Josef Zieleniec, foreign minister of the Czech Republic, by Andrzej Jagodzinski in Warsaw; date not given: "How To Remove Barriers"]

[Text] [Jagodzinski] Can you begin with a few words about yourself, for you are a relatively new figure on the Czech political scene? Reportedly, until recently you had Polish citizenship. How did it happen that you became a Czech politician?

[Zieleniec] I am of Polish origin and I spent my childhood in Poland, in Warsaw, where some of my family still lives. Later I moved to Czechoslovakia, where I have now lived for 30 years. I finished my secondary and higher education here in Czechoslovakia and then began to work as an economist at a research institute. I had Polish citizenship in order to avoid difficulties in traveling to Poland, but immediately after the velvet revolution in 1989 I applied to have it changed.

I am not a completely new person in Czech politics. From the very beginning, I participated actively in the preparation of our economic reforms. While still working at the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, I conducted a seminar which produced the materials which are the starting point for our thinking about reform. Although I worked the last two years as an academic, I have lived politics and participated in it actively. Along with the current prime minister, Vaclav Klaus, I was a cofounder of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which is the group currently governing the Czech Republic; throughout the entire period, I have been in its leadership (now I am its deputy chairman). Since I have worked on the construction of the party, the creation of its structures, and ideological foundations, I was not so visible on the outside. I can, however, say that I was the author of the election program of the ODS. I also directed the election campaign. Thus, I am not so green.

My dealings in foreign policy are connected with the preparations of the election program of the ODS. The chairman of the Citizens' Movement, a competition group which also derives from the Citizens' Forum—was the previous minister of foreign affairs of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, Jiri Dienstbier. Our election campaign required that someone in the leadership of the ODS conduct a polemic with him during the campaign. That person could not be Vaclav Klaus, who as an economist applied himself chiefly to economic problems. Thus, I took on the task.

[Jagodzinski] Let us move on then to foreign policy. Prime Minister Klaus and you have repeatedly said that

you are not so interested in such intensive cooperation in the Visegrad Three and in the group until recently called the hexagonal. Why?

[Zieleniec] We value specific projects with more measurable results more highly—for example, work on free trade zones—than high-sounding formulas that have no actual results in cooperation. Recently, I was in Hungary with Prime Minister Klaus and we discussed this with our Hungarian partners and I got the impression that we found a common language. We agreed it is necessary to develop specific cooperation in the most varied areas, both in the Visegrad Three and bilaterally. And we should forget the problem of constructing institutional frameworks for this cooperation, for example, on the model of the EC. We are convinced that there is a large field for trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation, but that does not mean that we should build some alternative to the European integration structures. We have gotten the impression that prior to the elections Czechoslovak foreign policy did not understand this.

In Budapest, we proposed shortening the period for creating free trade zones from the planned eight years to four or five. Since we hope for integration with Europe in eight years, the same horizon for building zones is laughable. If we genuinely want to have benefits from them, and we hope the free trade zones will provide us with benefits, then let us set them up as quickly as possible. I think that this example illustrates our approach to these issues.

[Jagodzinski] It seems to me that the only structure created by the Three is the Council of Ambassadors, a purely consultative body, it has no authority and practically serves only to help in organizing the successive summits.

[Zieleniec] To be sure, for now that appears to be the case, but one must take into account the projects and declarations which say that if the EC will not establish sufficiently open relations with us, we will create a second EC. Such formulas also appeared and one should take a position on them. The point is precisely not to create such a thing.

[Jagodzinski] But it was primarily the West that pressed for the closest possible cooperation and coordination of actions within the Three; I think primarily for their own interest, but that is another subject. Perhaps the best proof of the interest of the West was the proposal for a simultaneous ratification of our agreements on association with the EC.

[Zieleniec] Yes, but as you surely know, the agreements on association have little to do with actual acceptance for genuine membership for these states in the European structures. And that the West is interested in some form of integration in our region is obvious. Speaking in great simplification, the point is some form of spatial organization which in the past was so uncertain. But it is not always the case that certain things are in the interest of

everyone. Personally I think that a far-reaching institutional integration of the states of the Three is not in the interests of any of them. If it conflicts with the interests of the West, that is simply too bad, for we must take care of our own national interests.

[Jagodzinski] But why has Prime Minister Klaus only now spoken of accelerating the free trade zones? And why is he constantly speaking of four or five years? I remember Poland proposed an immediate liberalization of trade during the Mazowiecki and Balcerowicz administrations, but the Czechoslovak and Hungarian sides presented significant resistance. Prague—through its economic ministers—to such a degree feared opening that it did not even decide on a symbolic gesture in border movement and preferred to pursue an absurd maintenance of a "little iron curtain."

[Zieleniec] Obstacles in the border movement were not absurd. They were associated primarily with the fact that our economic reform began more than a year later than Poland's, thus market mechanisms were created appropriately later. Simply, there were justified fears that opening the borders when there was a strongly market-driven Polish economy and reforms had barely begun in Czechoslovakia would cause market disturbances and, along with them, political disturbances. We all lived under socialism, and we know what a state of shortages means. Fortunately, the borders are now open; Poland and we have privatized trade, supply exceeds demand, and when someone buys something from someone—everyone is satisfied.

[Jagodzinski] I cannot easily accept your explanation. It suffices to look at the statistics from that period to realize that more Germans and Austrians came to Czechoslovakia then. And those were states which had a market economy much earlier than Poland. For the western and southern neighbors of Czechoslovakia purchases in Czechoslovakia were more beneficial but somehow the "emptying" of stores by them bothered no one.

[Zieleniec] You constantly return to the past. Be my guest. But you are not right. The structure of the demand of a citizen of Austria on the Czech market was completely different from the preferences of Poles. People from the West sought goods with a standard acceptable to them. You want to move the problem from a purely pragmatic, economic sphere to some other. And there simply was no other. Perhaps someone made a mistake in calculations, but I was around and I do not think so.

[Jagodzinski] And the free trade zones? Why not now?

[Zieleniec] That is a similar problem. It was difficult to accept the offer of free trade zones when we were half way through the reforms, and half way through privatization, when our prices and other things were not of a market character. It seems to me that the resistances are distributed equally among our countries. The free trade zones also mean an agreement on what is excepted from that trade. Each of us has his long list of exceptions. One

country wants to protect its agricultural production; another, its textiles, etc. Thus, construction of free trade zones is not easy. But from what I know, it appears that Czechoslovakia is not creating the greatest obstacles.

[Jagodzinski] Then who is?

[Zieleniec] The question cannot be put that way. We will discuss that during my visit to Warsaw. I hope that a new movement will appear in this process, which obviously requires goodwill from everybody and a willingness to give something for something. One thing is certain: Everyone is aware that free trade zones in the long term benefit everyone. They open a broader market, ensure greater sales, and are a motor for economic growth.

[Jagodzinski] What specific proposals for bilateral, tri-lateral, or quadrilateral cooperation will you bring to Warsaw?

[Zieleniec] I get the impression that it would be good to reconsider what has been done and what caused problems, and to draw conclusions. I am, for example, convinced that proposals for our coordination of actions in relation to the European structures make sense and can be profitable for everyone. The situation with existing mechanisms for political consultation in various areas is similar and they should be expanded. I think that if we define the approach to various questions, then cooperation will be much more effective.

[Jagodzinski] There is still one very concrete problem. In the last two years like mushrooms after rain, literally at distances of a few kilometers, new border crossings between Czechoslovakia and Germany or Austria have been established. The number of such crossings on our border has remained unchanged for many years. It is natural: Those who live along the border live from the border. Moreover, on both sides, the regions are particularly affected by unemployment and the vision of more jobs through opening the border is the point. The local authorities are even inclined to provide money for the construction of the necessary facilities, but the decision can be made only at the central level; it is a political decision.

[Zieleniec] I realize that these issues are important for us and for Poland, although the accents on both sides are distributed somewhat differently. When one looks at a map, it is obvious that the southern direction is important for Poland not just because Czechoslovakia is on the other side. It is simply another route to the world, one not through Germany. For Czechoslovakia, the northern direction does not have such significance. Thus, there is a certain objective difference in the evaluation of the importance of that boundary. The construction of border crossings is very expensive: One has to build infrastructure, solve environmental problems, get the approval of the concerned officials on both sides of the border. One makes a global calculation of the profitability of the undertaking; Czechoslovakia has a long border and many unmet needs. The number of crossings to Poland is

actually too small. Frequently for purely economic reasons, crossings are built earlier on other borders. I get the impression, however, that the stage of "filling" the southern border is reaching an end, and the time has come to take up the northern one. I know that if this is not done, the problem will cast a shadow over our mutual relations.

[Jagodzinski] Can one count on the support of Prague for a Polish-Czech Euroregion which is already beginning to develop: Slask, the Klodzko-Nachod region, the Opava-Raciborz region?

[Zieleniec] Absolutely, for we think that such regional cooperation will make possible the gradual and systematic blurring of the boundary. For now, we have, however, a problem, constituting a certain administrative barrier: the poor system of local self-government. In Czechoslovakia there are self-governments at the local or regional level, then parliament. Thus the Polish voivod can find no partner; he is not the Czech wojt or the mayor of a small town. We are making reforms; we are changing the local self-government to a three-level system. For now, however, the problem of border cooperation is in the hands of the state bureaucracy, which always and everywhere is poorly prepared for such tasks.

[Jagodzinski] The picture of Poland in the Czechoslovak media is grotesque. Even now the stereotype appears that Poland is a country of empty shelves, lines, rampant inflation, even simply of poverty and hunger. Does that not pain you, as a Pole.

[Zieleniec] It pains me.

[Jagodzinski] Obviously, that is directed at the media, but politicians can also do something in this area. Unfortunately, I must say that I have heard neither from you nor from Prime Minister Klaus a good word on the subject of the Polish economic reforms. As experienced economists, the two of you have never submitted the huge, civilizational changes that have occurred in Poland during the last three years to an objective analysis. On the contrary, you have repeatedly spoken of the "Polish syndrome" or the "Polish portent." These statements, clearly, were a fragment within a political game, but you admit that in the general feeling they did not present Poland in a favorable light.

[Zieleniec] The problem of the mutual perceptions of our two countries is much older than our revolutions or democracy. I agree with you that at least a part of our media present a one-sided picture of Poland. It is caused by the continuing stereotype from communist times—carefully nursed on both sides of the border. There are still too few contacts to break that stereotype. I see it even in myself. You are right there is an obligation for politicians to break such stereotypes.

I can, however, make the same accusation against the Polish mass media, including GAZETA WYBORCZA, that it presents a certain stereotype with which I basically do not agree and which feeds the tensions about which

you spoke. It is naturally not such a simple stereotype as the picture of a Pole constructed by some of our media, but it is a simplification of the problems with which we are dealing. It appears even in the way in which you are conducting this interview with me. I see in this a lack of understanding of the depth of our problems and the responsibility weighing upon us all—on politicians and ordinary citizens.

If I had somehow explicitly to define this stereotype which functions in your articles it would be the stereotype of a few politicians who decided to divide the state, or leaders who divided Czechoslovakia to satisfy their own desires. That is not an approach building a true picture of what is happening in Czechoslovakia, and as a result, it hinders the efforts of which we have spoken today. Efforts for sincere relations, for taking up what is best between our nations, and erasing what causes tensions. Politicians must open the doors, but journalists, artists, and other citizens should go through the doors.

[Jagodzinski] You know, I have heard about opening doors since the time of the velvet revolution many times. Many symbolic gestures have been made. But you declare yourself a pragmatist and a supporter of specifics. As yet, I have heard little of them, but I hope that is only the beginning of a new stage.

[Zieleniec] Obviously. I have dedicated myself to opening these doors wherever it is possible. That is my duty. But in relation to Poland, I feel it especially strongly. Not just for private reasons, but also due to our thousand-year tradition as neighbors. I am convinced that I will be able to eliminate all the unnecessary and artificial barriers in Polish-Czech relations.

Czech Role in CSFR's Failure Assessed

92CH0947A Bratislava KULTURNY ZIVOT in Slovak
3 Sep 92 pp 1, 6

[Article by Vaclav Zak, political secretary of Civic Movement: "Good-bye, Slovakia...?"]

[Text] In all of East Europe a revision of the results of World War II, and to a certain extent also of World War I, is taking place. The process of creating new national states is being brought to its conclusion. We did not escape this process either, even though it seemed that we had a chance—as the only one—to maintain a multinational state. Wilson's idea of the self-determination of nations is being fulfilled in its special East European form. Some Western experts write contemptuously about its influence on the birth of "balalaika republics," and would prefer to damn Wilson to hell. However, they forget to suggest what they themselves would do to solve this problem. Political nations, as European history shows, do not come into being very easily.

The controversy about the mode of coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks is not new, its history is as old as the common state itself. But for the first time in history we had the ideal conditions for arranging our relations

without worrying about external pressures. An enlightened president in the Castle guaranteed that some kind of Milosevic would not come to power in the Czech lands. Why then here, too, did Murphy's law go into effect: Whatever can go wrong, will? How much blame does OH [Civic Movement] bear in all this?

The Game Before the Checkmate

We took over the Czech-Slovak chess game, which was started by the first republic, and which the communists continued, almost just before the checkmate. We are paying the bill for the political mistakes which were made during the entire 70 years of coexistence. Thanks to its cohabitation with the Czechs, Slovakia, we can say without hesitation, extricated itself from the backwardness into which it was plunged by the harsh policy of Magyarization, and it soon began to aspire to autonomy within the framework of Czechoslovakia. Thanks to the idea of Czechoslovakism and the shortsightedness of most of the Czech politicians, the first republic did not manage to deal with this problem; nothing was done to solve it—with the exception of a halfhearted attempt for an asymmetrical solution between 1945 and 1948, and the attempt to create a symmetrical federal state in 1968—even after World War II. The normalization after 1968 led to a considerably curtailed federation. Today, the Slovaks are a self-confident nation which also wants to confirm its status institutionally. But their self-confidence has its limits—most of them do not consider Czechoslovakia to be their homeland, only Slovakia.

The difference in the current developments in Slovakia is also given by some factors of the times: The party purges after 1969 were less severe here than in the Czech lands, and the aversion to the past regime was not as strong. In addition, the industrialization of Slovakia was completed, and that brought at enormous costs an increase in the standard of living. However, in spite of that, the efficiency of the Slovak economy does not reach the level of the Czech economy, particularly in the ability to export to Western markets. The neoliberal economic reform, the proposed conversion of the arms industry, together with some mistakes in the social policy of the Slovak government under these start-up conditions resulted in a much more severe impact of the reform in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. Slovak politicians began to demand the so-called Slovak specifics, that is, a different approach in Slovakia. In some cases their demands were justified (for example, the plan for an immediate conversion of the arms industry was not realistic).

However, the effort to change the status quo did not come only from Slovakia. The Czech minister of finances demanded a change in the management of the budget money immediately in January 1990, even prior to the "hyphen war." The Presidium of the Czech National Council [CNR] at that time voted in favor of separating the budgets. The idea was to prevent "paying for the Slovaks," to which the Slovak political scene

reacted with annoyance. Our marvelous politicians sent Slovakia a clear signal how they see the future federation.

Development of the Controversy

The emigres who appeared in the Czech lands after 1989 were democrats who left because of communism. A different kind of emigres returned to Slovakia, emigres from the Slovak state. The unveiling alone of the commemorative plaque to Tiso by an important representative of the Slovak church reminded everyone that Slovakia has not only the tradition of the Slovak national uprising, but also of the Slovak state.

The sensitivity of the Slovak question became immediately obvious when the name of the state was being changed, which gave rise to the well-known "hyphen war." Negotiations between the Czech and Slovak politicians about changing the federation, which were taking place already before the 1990 elections, were negated, without anyone even noticing, by the abolishment of the federal economic ministries. Responsibility for the specific economic policy was transferred almost totally to the national governments. However, the federal government (especially the federal prime minister) underrated the vitality of the state setup issue and thought that there was no more reason to be concerned about the new setup. That left the field open for the Slovak initiative, with the federal and the Czech governments only reacting to constant Slovak pressure.

The victorious Public Against Violence [VPN] wanted—as did all the other Slovak political parties—to resolve Slovakia's status in a new way. Supporters of Masaryk's Czechoslovakism had no representation at all, change of the federation was being demanded by all parties which differed only in how radical and quick a change they demanded. The spectrum ranged from seceding immediately (Slovak National Party), seceding after a certain time (Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]), to a "looser" (not specified more fully) federal setup of equal with equal (Party of Democratic Left [SDL] and VPN). At this time a crack already appeared in the constitutional system, which only grew wider: In the Federal Assembly sat deputies of the Slovak National Party who promised on their honor and conscience to defend the interests of the federation. At the same time they represented in the parliament a party which had the federation's abolishment in its program! This obvious contradiction was not being addressed at all, the abolishment of the state, treason in fact, became the daily theme of the press. Even at that time it was clear to many that the foundations of the common state were standing on quicksand. But what was the alternative? Put deputies in prison for treason?

Immediately after the elections, Slovak Prime Minister Meciar presented President Havel with demands, which were based on a not very clearly defined concept of an "authentic federation," for transferring powers to the republics. The Slovak deputies understood by "authentic federation" merely a transfer of powers to Slovakia

under the slogan "strong republics mean a strong federation" (the Czech prime minister often repeated it with a straight face). The politics of Prime Minister Meciar could have been interpreted in a good sense as an effort to exploit the upsurge of nationalism in Slovakia to call for the overcoming of the problems which the transformation process will bring. In the background there were, of course, also other motives, Meciar wanted to be the lord and master in Slovakia, but it was also obvious that the painful process of transformation would be difficult to direct from Prague. The Slovak Government drafted a new law on powers, which put the law on the Czechoslovak federation back into its 1968 form. This act caused considerable tension among the political representations as well as the public. From that time on, some Czech periodicals, especially LIDOVE NOVINY, took a harder line in their commentaries on Slovakia.

The split of VPN into a national and a federal wing led to the recall of Prime Minister Meciar, and considerably radicalized the Slovak political scene. Very likely the Castle played some role in Meciar's recall. It does not need to be emphasized that this greatly complicated the way President Havel was viewed in Slovakia. In the meantime, the Slovak political representation became quite caught up in the game "I will show you who is a better Slovak." The attitude toward the national emancipation process in Slovakia became the dominant theme in politics. Prime Minister Carnogursky began to talk openly about a future Slovak star in the European integrated groupings. With that he stepped over the boundary previously defined by Meciar—i.e., equal rights within the federation. Meciar—now in opposition—went further. Now the star will not be there in the future, but immediately after the elections.

Almost all Czech politicians reacted to Carnogursky's star with much resentment, seeing in it an effort to pay for Slovak independence with Czech money. At the same time, it was one of the few opportunities to carry Czechoslovakia over the hurdles of transformation. Today even many VPN politicians admit that it was a program they should have supported. It would have made it possible to postpone the resolution of this complicated controversy until the time when we could have been better prepared to resolve it. How? In the Czech lands, for example, with the pipeline from Ingolstadt, in Slovakia with a new status within the federation.

The Constitutions

Thanks to the total impotency of the mixed constitutional commission composed of deputies from the national councils and the Federal Assembly, the groups of experts in this commission never received political acceptance in order to be able to draft the constitution. President Havel therefore submitted to the commission his own draft of the new federal constitution, which contained a version of a federal republic, i.e., a federal council composed of deputies of the national councils.

Havel even then understood that an "authentic federation" cannot mean a permanent dissolution of the federation's powers. The federal council was to ensure that the republics were involved in the decision making process of the federation. For the federal deputies, many of whom felt superior to the deputies of the national councils, that was an unacceptable idea.

Following his lack of success in this respect, President Havel—as an emergency measure—began to travel here and there in an effort to contribute to an agreement between political representations on the state setup. In the end, these negotiations led to an acceptance of the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] model, inspired by the treaty among the successor states of the disintegrating Soviet Union, according to which part of the future federal constitution would be adopted on the basis of a treaty between the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council. The model of the treaty was accepted in Slovakia by the entire ruling coalition, therefore also by VPN, as well as by part of the opposition (SDL). The positive sector of the Slovak politicians began to understand the treaty as an expression of a new beginning, expression of the desire to live in a common democratic state as partners with equal rights.

In the meantime, a radical shift took place on the Czech political stage. Prime Minister Pithart's understanding for the Slovak demands began to be seen, after the endless calls for changes in power sharing, as a weakness, only leading to an escalation of other political demands. The demands for a symbolic expression of a new relationship between Czechs and Slovaks, which was key for the Slovak politicians, were understood by the Czech right as a portent of the breakup of the state. The slogan of the day became "take a hard line," enough of appeasement (Kalvoda). Fortunately, at the head of the state was not a Czech Milosevic, so that attempts to resolve the controversy by force did not come into consideration. However, the change of attitude on the Czech side only played into the hands of the Slovak separatists.

Our "conservative" neo-ideologues began to place the national and the civic principle into a false antithesis. My goodness, another scholarly misunderstanding—conservatism is very closely connected with the national concept. It is worth noting how this problem is viewed by historian Josef Pekar, to my mind the most conservative thinker we had in the 20th century: "Only the realization that we are but two branches of the same tree, of the same national family that has been bound together from time immemorial not only by language but also by land, the physical homeland, as well as the homeland of historical traditions, by the bond of a common fate, the realization that each generation has to resolve, under conditions that are changed and nevertheless in their core similar, the same problems which our forebears had to solve in order to preserve their past, is the immutable foundation that pervades and in fact carries our history. Can it be said, therefore, that the national concept is the meaning of our history? I answer, yes, and indeed it is more than that. It is its prerequisite, its blood, its beating

living heart. We certainly could not talk about the meaning of Czech history if it were not Czech history."

Rather, the true conservatives would be alarmed by the absence of Czech national feeling, they would be very concerned about our national identity in these days of *zimmerfrei* [rooms to rent] and prostitutes by the side of the expressways, and would not see the aspirations of the Slovaks as something that is in contradiction to the civic principle. (The opposition of the idol of our conservatives—Margaret Thatcher—to a federated Europe was to a considerable extent motivated by her defense of British national interests and concern about a possible future British identity crisis in a united Europe.)

After all, the civic principle succeeded in taking root in Europe only after national ambitions were fulfilled and definite boundaries between neighbors established. A political nation in the U.S. sense does not exist in Europe, and most likely never will—in spite of European integration. Everywhere where the industrial revolution did not lead to the creation of an ethnically homogeneous state it is a source of constant tensions, such as, for example, in Belgium.

The treaty and its interpretation became the subject of the controversy. Under the influence of ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance], deputies refused to include in the treaty the article that would define the Czech and Slovak republics as the participants. Their arguments were based on the final interpretation of the treaty. In reality they wanted to prevent the possibility of an agreement being struck, and they assumed that the Slovak politicians will retreat when faced with the breakup of the state. It was a cynical, for the state's fate destructive, but for political success on the Czech political stage a safe policy: A more hard-line policy toward Slovakia was received gratefully in the Czech lands; the Czech public saw the Slovaks' conditions as ingratitude. At the same time it created in Slovakia a reaction, which in turn confirmed the correctness of such an attitude. And so began a spiral which proved fatal for the common state.

What Is the OH Position?

The position of OH was complicated by the vacillating policy of Prime Minister Pithart—the prime minister kept changing his stance on Slovak demands, especially during the budget negotiations. The policy of understanding took turns with "giving priority to Czech interests" and the willingness to "take a more hard-line approach" (the budget that took into consideration the different conditions in Slovakia was not pushed through by Pithart but by V. Klaus). And so it happened that his speech with the well-known concept of a "semidetached house" was not understood as an expression of an effort to end the discussions about the federation and begin to discuss a separation, but as an expression of an effort to give in to Slovak demands even beyond the acceptable limit. And at the same time today—to the applause of a considerable part of the population—ODS and HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] are building

Pithart's semidetached house with great speed. Of course, modesty prevents them from giving it a name.

The OH club in the Czech National Council formulated several strategic principles, which its representatives used as their guidelines during the negotiations with their Slovak partners. We were the only ones to support the idea of establishing the federation on the treaty principle. True, we did not allow the possibility of the so-called looser federation, the definition of which has always been very vague. We were the only ones to support the creation of a federal council, which would be able to guarantee the republics a share in decisionmaking.

We asserted at the same time that the road to a confederation leads through a separation, most likely also including separation of the currency. To our way of thinking, this step is made necessary by the difference in productivity in the two republics, which was something the Slovak deputies did not want to admit.

We started with the following assumptions:

1. The Slovak nation has a full right to self-determination until the secession, guaranteed by the constitution.
2. The federation inherited from the former regime is dysfunctional, it is not possible to insist on maintaining the status quo.
3. The republics must have an equal rights status in the federation, and must share not only in the legislative activity of the federation but also in the execution of power.
4. The common state must have its own sovereignty including a single international legal subjectivity, which, however, may allow independent activity by the republics in the international arena under conditions defined by law.
5. The republics must have a constitutionally guaranteed share in the decisions of the federation.

Above all, however, there must exist a clear political will on both sides for its preservation and further development.

Thanks to these principles and particularly the agreement to build the federation from below, the Milov agreement was negotiated. The Milov model was in many respects better than the present situation—and at the same time met the demands of the Slovak parties for an equal rights status in the federation.

But in the end the negotiations did not end well. Why? The mistake was already in the fact that they were conducted by the presidiums of the national councils—such negotiations should be conducted primarily by the government, the parliaments should only approve the results. During the negotiations different positions were often put forward: separation (SNS), a weakened federation (KDH and SDL), which KDH would want to separate in the future, an authentic federation (VPN).

The effort of President Havel to influence the negotiations already taking place (Karlovy Vary, Hradecek) did not make the situation any less complicated.

Political Suicide of VPN

VPN chose as its partner on the Czech political scene ODA, although as far as the questions of the state setup were concerned, OH was much closer to it. But at that time OH already was tarred with the leftist brush, with which our press began to regale it. Some differences were unimportant—for example, VPN did not like the criticism of the coupon privatization by some OH deputies (they saw in it support for the attacks on minister Miklos). But our fundamental differences were on the issue of the vetting law, from which VPN expected a solution to the situation in Slovakia! OH became isolated as a result, and without the backing by VPN it was difficult for us to support the treaty between the republics.

The political party, the only Slovak party that enjoyed good reputation in the Czech lands, thus paradoxically joined up with a party which based its preelection strategy on the breakup of the state. During the time of the brief marriage VPN tried in vain to persuade ODA that the policy pushed by Dr. Kalvoda is harming Czech-Slovak relations. In the end, ODU-VPN [Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence] parted company with ODA, but only after the Milov negotiations, when it was too late. The vacillation of VPN in its stance on the process of national self-awareness (there were dissensions even among VPN deputies in the Federal Assembly and the Slovak National Council) was a political suicide.

ODA and ODS followed a strategy based on the assumption that an unyielding attitude will undermine the Slovak determination to realize the changes (this sage strategy was called "reining in a runaway horse"), but they achieved exactly the opposite. Their unyielding stance only strengthened Slovak centrifugal tendencies; the Slovak political representatives took it as an unwillingness to admit that a common state is made by a union of two republics. (By the way, today it is quite clear how the scrupulous adherence to that strategy at that time was aimed at the Constitution. All of a sudden, the unconstitutional division of the state without a referendum does not bother ODA at all.) The collapse of the negotiations on the state setup only benefited Meciar, who could blame the failure on the incompetence of the ruling coalition.

We can only state with bitterness that the proposals for the reduction of federal agencies, which ODA submitted to HZDS at the beginning of their negotiations after the elections, would have been almost certainly sufficient for us to reach an agreement with the Slovak representatives during the previous electoral term. The treaty could have

been made, a new federal constitution could have been adopted. That could have obviously influenced the election results in Slovakia. ODS naturally did not have interest in the treaty before the elections, because the treaty would have improved the chances in the elections not only for OH, but also KDH and VPN. On that point it was in full agreement with HZDS. That is how party politics look in practice.

The chances for success of the negotiations on a functional federation were negligible from the beginning. Ludvik Vaculik presented them with a gift which they never got rid of. Yes, if the Slovaks want to move the bed, better let them have their own house. Some politicians went by Nietzsche's words: What is breaking down should be given a push. In order to preserve a common state, there would have to sit on both sides of the negotiating table politicians able to anticipate, have a better understanding of the requirements of the partners, and value the common state more than their own power ambitions. That, of course, was hard to achieve. More demands were placed on the Czech side, the bigger and richer of the two. The Czech side could not handle them.

Maybe the excesses of the Slovak "nationalists," the insults which some Slovak politicians hurled at the Czechs, and the tilt of the Slovaks toward politicians of the Vladimir Meciar, Markus, or J. Slota type were more than the Czech public was willing to put up with. True, the inability to see the problems of coexistence through Slovak eyes (for example, the paeans to Masaryk were taken by Slovaks as an indirect desire to restore Czechoslovakism—and in the case of Pavel Tigrid, advisor to President Havel, they were, unfortunately, right), the higher social costs of the transformation in Slovakia, interpretation of the attempts at a correction as "breaking up the state," the mistrust of even the profederation Slovak politicians, the cynical policies of part of the Czech right together with the stupid demagoguery of some journalists—all that was a corrosive agent that drop by drop ate away the foundations of the common state.

One of the most important tasks of a politician is to forestall danger. From that point of view the breakup of the state spells political danger—in the short term, but above all in the long-term time horizon. It is sad that OH, which for the entire two years had a decisive political influence and drew together politicians who, I believe, best understood the Slovak issue, in the end managed to do so little for the preservation of the state.

Dubcek Rejected as Presidential Candidate

92CH0944B Bratislava SLOVENSKY NAROD in Slovak
1 Sep 92 p 3

[Commentary by (tk): "Dubcek, Definitely Not!"]

[Text] Unfortunately, Mr. Dubcek has wasted this precious opportunity and, to say it out loud, he wasted it because of personal vanity and in the attempt by some

kind of inertia to preserve his personal merits from years ago, by which he has assigned himself to political and ideological immobility.

It is not at all necessary to cheapen or demean Mr. Dubcek's deserving accomplishments in connection with 1968. It would not be correct to demean Mr. Dubcek's situation in the long period of Husak's normalization program. It is not at all desirable to accuse Mr. Dubcek for what he did not do when things did not depend on him or even for what he had to do under the brutal "international" oppression when he was aware that his refusal would mean a tragedy for our nations.

It is enough, however, to state the unhappy fact that Mr. Dubcek was for many years a party functionary, and his loyalty to the Communist Party and the ideas which it supported, even worse, also implemented and opened the path for him all the way to the seat of the highest party official in that state. It is simply unimaginable and would be against all logic to have a man at the head of an independent Slovakia who devoted the most active years of his professional life, willingly and from personal conviction, to the propagation of the communist ideology and the practical application of the ideological flip-flops of the Communist Party which, during Dubcek's participation in party positions, with his consent and support, committed so many evil acts, particularly in the 1950's, that there is enough blame to go around for every person who was a party official at that time.

Moreover, Mr. Dubcek has been committed in no small way to preserving the Czechoslovak federation and is thus demonstrably against making Slovakia independent. It would be not only a mistake, but also an error with unforeseeable consequences to entrust such a person with the job of the highest state representative of an independent, self-governing, and democratic Slovak Republic.

Response to Meciar's Alleged Slovak Press Curbs

Association's Appeal

92CH0950A Bratislava SLOVENSKÉ NARODNE
NOVINY in Slovak 8 Sep 92 p 2

["Text" of statement signed by Association of Slovak Journalists for a Truthful Image of Slovakia: "Declaration of the Association of Slovak Journalists for a Truthful Image of Slovakia"]

[Text] Declaration of the Association of Slovak Journalists for a Truthful Image of Slovakia:

Slovakia, our motherland, finds itself at a time of historic decisions. The Slovak nation can, with final validity, compete its struggle of a thousand years for a free national development in our own state, in the family of the free nations of Europe and of the world. It is a struggle in which our nation seeks understanding in the surrounding world, but it is also a time for breaking down prejudices and fear for our own existence, a chance

to culminate our unity in this basic matter, in our consciousness and will to have our own homeland encompassed by our own independent, democratic state cooperating with all its peoples.

We, the journalists of today's generation, have a dual responsibility on the scene of this historic struggle. The complexity of this struggle by our nation is also reflected in us on the pages of our press and in the radio and television broadcasts.

We must decide whether we will go with the nation and we will strengthen its will, bolster its spirit and certainty in the right to our own existence, and give it strength to overcome lies and disinformation which unfriendly people are spreading about our nation not only throughout the world, but also at home. This struggle is also taking place in our ranks and in our professional organizations. In the name of this struggle For a Truthful Image of Slovakia, we wanted to join an association with the present Slovak Union of Journalists in the club For a Truthful Image of Slovakia. We were rejected. We therefore have established the Association of Slovak Journalists with the goal of giving our work to the service of the nation and its historic struggle for its own statehood. With the idea For a Truthful Image of Slovakia we take a stand with professional courage and ethics against the distortions which are flooding our nation from the domestic and foreign mass media and to contribute all our personnel and resources to spread the truth about our motherland. We call on you to join our ranks. In the name of the highest principle of our national interest—the right to form our lives according to our own ideas and needs.

[Signed]—Your colleagues in the Association of Slovak Journalists For a Truthful Image of Slovakia

KDH Commentator's Warning

92CH0950B Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak
7 Sep 92 p 1

[Commentary by Zuzana Zemlova: "Will There Be Censorship?"]

[Text] There are more and more warning signals by which one can judge the rapid increase in the danger that there will again be some form of censorship imposed in Slovakia. The first signs were noticeable even right after the elections and with the passage of time they became still stronger. Even the least attentive reader, listener, or viewer must have noted the warning fingers being shaken by some politicians from among those in the party currently governing the state.

Already, not all journalists are being invited by the fellow travellers of the politicians who, before the elections, still were creating the necessary image. Today only a few people—Bohuslav Geci, Ivan Mjartan, Dusan Slobodnik, and above all the chairman of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] and Slovak

prime minister, Vladimir Meciar—decide on their qualities and their opportunities for access to information. The latter has already gone further. It is not just a matter of his dispute with the initiation of a regular 10-minute segment on Slovak television, but also of the declaration which he made recently during his visit to the Press Office of the Slovak Republic in Bratislava. According to him, Slovakia's new position demands another journalism and, in the common interest, journalists should disseminate only objective information. This would be alright, since to date the majority of the journalists (at least the more serious ones) have tried for objectivity and have made it possible through their media to orient their own readers, viewers, or listeners just by this acquisition of information from various sources. But suddenly V. Meciar in his interview for the TK SR [Press Office of the Slovak Republic] emphasized some kind of ethical self-regulation of the journalists.

When we think about this, it is a very dangerous announcement which bears the seeds of some kind of self-censorship in it, which has already begun to show up visibly among some journalists. If they want to stay "nice" and further receive access to the sources of information, not all of them will have the courage to report also on what might not please the current set of Slovak politicians.

The other side of the coin is the fact that if the press agency is to select information in Slovakia according to the model presented (and we do not have any reason not to think this since the new director is a supporter of the HZDS), then actually all the media will receive the official news already sufficiently checked over and with the spin added. This a priori means a grayness and uniformity. The not quite three years which have passed since November 1989 have still not erased from our memories what this kind of news looks like. The further announcement of the Slovak prime minister that the TK SR will be financed by state moneys also does not awaken any great feelings of trust; this has to appear as moderate pressure to people.

Fortunately, the question of what kind of image of Slovakia is being created in the world today is not decided just by the members of the Association of Journalists for a Truthful Image of Slovakia. More and more of our fellow journalists are also coming to Slovakia from foreign press agencies, radio stations, and television networks. It is not possible to give them orders. If they also do not get access to information, they will write and speak in a way which will not help Slovakia, but will cause further harm to its present image.

ODU Chairman Speaks

92CH0950C Bratislava TELEGRAF in Slovak 4 Sep 92
p 3

[Statement by Ivan Miklos, First Deputy Chairman of Civic Democratic Union: "The ODU Passes On a Warning"]

[Text] The Civic Democratic Union is expressing its serious dissatisfaction with and fears of the developments in Slovakia since the elections. The division of Czecho-Slovakia is becoming a reality as a consequence of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] policies, as assisted by the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] and the SNS [Slovak Nationalist Party].

The approval of the SR [Slovak Republic] Constitution, which is the Constitution of an independent state, creates a status of dual legalities with the danger of legal chaos and conflicts. Attacks on journalists are increasing and already the HZDS is totally systematically and almost openly taking steps to take control of the most important media. The characteristic feature is that it is coming to the criminalization of employees with whom they are not comfortable and of people with differing opinions.

Yesterday, 2 September, Slovak television broadcast a discussion in which the representatives of the state power, Deputy Prime Minister M. Knazko and State Secretary I. Mjartan, clearly demanded what and how television should broadcast and prepared the ground for a change in the television's management. Their method and the way in which it was done must deeply shake all those who have a feeling for freedom and democracy.

We protest against such actions by the governmental officials and warn the public that the change prepared in the law on Slovak television and Slovak radio makes it possible for the HZDS to take full control of the management of both these media and will mean the end to a period of free dissemination of information through them. The HZDS is proceeding in a similar manner in the case of the daily newspaper SMENA.

The HZDS, the SDL, and the SNS are appealing to the interests of the Slovak people and to the need for a good image of Slovakia in the world. This is the same procedure and has the same goal as the communists' appeal to the interests of the workers and socialism a few years ago.

The HZDS actions since the elections create the fear in us of the development of a new authoritarian regime and a dictatorship.

Miklosko: Independence KDH's Original Goal

92CH0946A Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak
10 Sep 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Jozef Miklosko, SNR deputy for Christian Democratic Movement: "Quo Vadis, Slovakia?"]

[Text] Is there a Slovak who does not dream about the most far-reaching independence for Slovakia, which we would then turn into another Switzerland in the shortest possible time? However, the path we are now following involves too many risks and conflicts. Quite a few of the individuals whom I happen to have met think that we are

aboard a speeding train which ignores all railroad signals, does not slow down for turns ahead, and has even shut off its emergency brakes; now it is approaching a tunnel where no one can see a light at the end. Have the conductor and his crew planned everything so thoroughly that they can be trusted?

The program of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] included a confederation with the foreknowledge that the Czechs would not accept it. That was changed much too hastily in an independent state, which only the SNS [Slovak National Party] had so radically proclaimed in its failed program. After its premature agreement with the ODS [Civic Democratic Party], the HZDS began to see the trap for which it had not been prepared. Some people put on the brakes while others continued to speed up the development. The HZDS deputies completely failed to comprehend the efforts in the Federal Assembly to slow down the process in a sensible way. They are preaching international legal subjectivity but are doing precious little for it, particularly abroad. They disregard warnings from other countries about observation of democratic procedures and human rights. There are verbal pronouncements that an independent Slovakia will need conciliation, unity, and many experts, but searches for enemies and guilty parties are conducted everywhere. While skilled experts are getting fired, their positions are assigned even to former communists; negotiations with the radical left in the Czech lands are underway, but no one knows why. Attempts are made to block free flow of information in Slovakia and to expand the state monopoly over the media. Some of the ministers made unauthorized interventions. There are efforts to give the state more influence on the economy, although the visit of experts to the United States pointed out its undesirability; the program of small privatization is being stalled. The impacts of the sudden breakup of the state are not made public; our citizens are not being told what awaits them. The assertion that things will be better "later on" is not supported by any evidence. The adoption of the Constitution in this particular form is a one-sided step in contravention to our current legal situation. The efforts give the prime minister and the government more power and to exempt them from accountability to the parliament are undemocratic. We would be delighted to also mention here some positive achievements of the current government and parliament, but alas, they are very few.

This situation suits the ODS just fine for other reasons, although the members of the government and of the parliament have also pledged their allegiance to the CSFR. They calculated—without having to apply advanced mathematics—that the economic reform was being held back because of the Slovak Republic, and that the unity with the Slovak Republic made another "February 1948" kind of a takeover a real possibility. The International Monetary Fund would welcome an example of a successful transition to market economy. The ODS hopes that with its effective help the Czech Republic can qualify. It does not want to associate the

adjective "social" with market economy, especially because in the Slovak Republic it is often confused with the adjective "socialist." The case of the former GDR, into which the former FRG has invested about DM200 billion annually without achieving any substantial improvement of the situation, confirms that money is not the only problem. The politicians of the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance] as well as of the ODS and the OH [Civic Movement] used to have unrealistic attitudes toward Slovakia: "Either the federation, or a divorce," "A state pact makes no sense"; they failed to realize that the old model of federation was outdated; that a transfer of most of the powers was inevitable; that the reform has hit Slovakia harder; that it was imperative to appoint more Slovaks to federal agencies, and so on. Thus, they have gained their current partner for the "coalition." As a former member of the government, I confirm that their positions, particularly on economy, were often controversial. Solutions to problems of conversion, power engineering, agriculture, the Gabčíkovo and Mochovce projects, Transpetrol, Transgaz, the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] project, division of foreign aid, and so forth, often set off legitimate protests in Slovakia. Slovakia has the kind of government it chose. Even the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] should consider how it has contributed to this situation. Yes, we were the first to bring up certain issues but we were unable explain them well enough, and we failed to think them through; we did not adequately publicize our achievements nor did we react to attacks; we lacked a sense for details, and we failed to involve in our programs experts who offered their cooperation; the headquarters could not operate professionally. Nevertheless, in two difficult years the KDH, representing one-fifth of the government and of the parliaments, contributed a good deal of honest accomplishments, which was one of the reasons we could live a peaceful life. The KDH's objective always was Slovakia's independence, however, by means that would guarantee its prosperity, stability, and security.

Under the new conditions, in an independent Slovak Republic, we shall promote the welfare of our citizens; we shall help deal with problems that await us, mitigate adverse consequences, and influence Slovakia's position in Europe in the positive sense.

ASV Chairman on Future Changes in Army

92CH0944A Bratislava NOVY SLOVAK RANO in Slovak
10 Sep 92 p 10

[Interview with Eng. J. Repasky, chairman of the Association of Slovak Soldiers, by M. Palusova; place and date not given: "Slovakia and the Army"]

[Text] The Association of Slovak Soldiers started its activities in 1991 when some of the professional military realized that the defense of Slovakia was being neglected and the redeployment of the troops was being delayed. Their activities got a negative response in military circles, but great sympathy among the civilian population.

Three members of the ASV [Association of Slovak Soldiers] received the support of the voters in the elections and today are serving in the Slovak and the federal parliaments. We spoke with the chairman of the ASV and deputy to the FZ [Federal Assembly], Eng. J. Repasky, about their activities after the elections.

[Palusova] Mr. Repasky, have the tasks and goals of the ASV changed after the elections?

[Repasky] In particular now, in a period of the division of the state and the constituting of an independent Slovakia, the ASV will have to pay a great deal of attention to make sure that the proponents of a unitary Czechoslovak state do not create the power prerequisites and conditions for its de facto continuation under such concepts as a defense union, a joint army, and a joint or unified command. To date, none of the responsible governmental or legislative officials has either defined or clearly explained these concepts. The long-term and differing time frames for dividing up the army are very suspicious. The occasional statements in the mass media on the continuing validity of the current military doctrine even after the division of the CSFR testifies to the fact that some of the responsible officials do not take ensuring the defense of the SR [Slovak Republic] as an independent state seriously.

It is obvious and very irresponsible. Even a lay person is aware that in central Europe the division of Yugoslavia, and now that of the CSFR as well, has brought about a new geopolitical and geostrategic situation. Slovakia's interests demand its own realistic security policy and a military doctrine and defense strategy along with it. One does not need to emphasize the fact that enormous interest is necessary in the dividing up of the army from the standpoint of the arms, property, and equipment.

[Palusova] What relationship do the political, governmental, and military officials and institutions have toward the ASV?

[Repasky] Despite the fact that the ASV was properly registered on 17 January 1991 with the MV SR [Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic] and that its program and organizational regulations fully respect the Bill of Human Rights, the Constitution, and the laws, from the beginning it has become a target attacked by governmental representatives, including the former president and the prime minister of the government.

The former deputy prime minister of the federal government, Mr. Hoffman, in discussions at Sliac even equated the ASV with the Slovak Liberation Army. It is not necessary particularly to talk about what kind of relationship the former minister of defense Dobrovsky himself had with the ASV. It is enough just to recall his answer to the journalists' questions as expressed at various political and military discussions in Prague, on trips around Slovakia, and in foreign countries as well.

It was his initiatives that resulted in the procurator's investigations of Major Svec; Lieutenant Colonel Socha

was relieved from army duty, and I was relieved at age 55 in a situation where I would certainly have been making a contribution to my profession. Particularly treacherous was the retaliation against the members of the Third Air Regiment, named for M.R. Stefanik, in Piestany for their open expression of their position on the disestablishment of the regiment as part of the reorganization. The characteristic and common theme for these persecutions is that they were carried out under the law in the reorganization or disestablishment of units or branches. Those affected had nowhere to turn.

In an interview in OBRANA LIDU on 25 July 1992, the minister of defense responded to the question by the editor, "How do you want to deal with the ASV, members of which are now in the parliament?" by saying, "When grandma is afraid of the spider, she should touch it... We have already met with the chairman of the BBV [Defense and Security Committee] and..." The representatives of course know this saying more precisely as a Russian proverb... They got to know the Russian-Soviet cordiality in a practical way in 1968. They would be naive if they limited themselves to admiring the minister's quip.

[Palusova] Are audit inspections currently being made by the participant states in the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (of 19 November 1990) and the Vienna document of measures to increase trust and security in Europe (of 17 November 1992)?

[Repasky] On the basis of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, the Czechoslovak Army is supposed to reduce the number of its conventional weapons significantly by 17 November 1995. Tanks are to be reduced from 4,585 to 1,435; infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers from 4,900 to 2,050; cannons over 75 mm and mortars over 50 mm from 3,445 to 1,260; combat aircraft from 407 to 345; combat helicopters from 101 to 75. The initial base data are from the time that the treaty was signed and actually represented the share that the CSA [Czechoslovak Army] could have of the overall number of weapons of the Warsaw Pact at that time. And so it is necessary to destroy an enormous number of weapons systems. The reader can very easily calculate the difference.

In fact, the plan is to sell off part, about 500 tanks, 710 armored personnel carriers, 778 artillery systems, and 88 combat aircraft. The Czecho-Slovak Army has started to implement the agreement, that is, getting rid of the weapons, by 1 September of this year and their destruction should take about 40 months. In Novy Jicin 75 tanks will be destroyed and in Moldava there will be 116 artillery systems destroyed.

[Palusova] Now even the Ministry of the Interior of the SR is coming up with a proposal for a Home Guard. We well know that the ASV has had this form of defense for Slovakia worked out for a long time now. Why does it become such a pressing issue at this time in particular?

[Repasky] The submission of this proposal in the SNR [Slovak National Council] by Mr. Klepac just on the

possibility, or the necessity, of discussions about it caused literally such an earthquake in the mass media and political circles at home and this was even echoed abroad. Roughly a year ago the Home Guard became an illustrative example of how a good thing can be literally misused for the political battle, for abuse and degradation. Who at that time set himself up against the idea of establishing a Home Guard? Besides the Prague profederation circles, they were all profederation parties and movements in Slovakia. However, it is truthful to say that they did not help correct the idea and the substance of the Home Guard, but rather harmed the various lay adventurist opinions of the so-called fellow experts.

If Slovakia wants to be an independent sovereign state with an international legal identity, it must be prepared and capable of defending itself.

Klaus Decision Favoring Westinghouse Announced

92CH0982A Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech
18 Sep 92 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Klaus in Pittsburgh"]

[Text] Washington—Last Thursday, the prime minister of the Czech Government, V. Klaus, flew to the American city of Pittsburgh, located in the state of Pennsylvania, in the eastern United States. In this steel town he will meet with representatives of the Westinghouse Company, the town mayor, S. Masloffov, the president of the University of Pittsburgh, D. O'Connor, and with B. Holvner, who is the director of the Center for International Relations. From Pittsburgh Klaus will fly to Washington where, on Friday, he will speak at the International Conference on Economic Development, organized by the TV station CNN. At a news conference on Thursday, the U.S. company, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, announced that it has received an order from Skoda Prague to deliver machines and equipment for the nuclear power station Temelin.

Koruna To Become Fully Convertible by 1995-97

92CH0989A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY (FIN NOVINY supplement) in Czech 16 Sep 92 pp 1, 5

[Article by Vladimir Zdrasky, SBCS: "Koruna 'Hard' by 1995-97?"]

[Text] Within the framework of the adopted measures that create conditions for incorporating Czechoslovakia into the European Community, a schedule was worked out by the SBCS [Czechoslovak State Bank] and approved by the SBCS board, leading to a full external convertibility of Czechoslovak currency. With regard to the present developments in the state setup situation, it should be pointed out that the proposal was designed for the entire CSFR, but can be used even if the state is divided into two republics and a common currency

retained, or can be used by only one of the republics if two independent currencies are introduced. The goal of these measures is to create conditions for incorporating the koruna into the European monetary system about the year 2000, and achieving full convertibility of the koruna.

During 1995-97 such conditions should already have been achieved that will make it possible to consider the koruna as a fully convertible currency (as characterized by the IMF). At the present time, following the liberalization measures enacted after 1 January 1991, the Czechoslovak koruna can be evaluated as internally convertible in respect to current accounts in the balance of payments, with certain limitations.

The focal point of the work aimed at achieving the stated goal can be divided roughly into four groups:

1. Completion of the transition to full internal convertibility of the currency, especially:

—Liberalization of the access of individuals to freely convertible currencies.

—Cancellation of the import surcharge on consumer goods.

2. Use of the koruna in the system of payments abroad (external convertibility).

3. Creation of technical conditions for this step:

—Free quotation of rates by commercial banks, i.e., integration of computer networks, training of personnel, etc.

—Agreements with selected foreign banks on koruna quotations, possibly on help by intervention during the initial stages.

4. Liberalization of key items in the capital account:

—Direct investments abroad, purchase of foreign securities and immovable assets abroad.

—Acceptance of financial credit from exchange foreigners.

—Direct investments by exchange foreigners in existing state enterprises.

—Export of Czechoslovak securities and purchase of immovable assets.

—Granting of financial credit to exchange foreigners.

The deadlines for the realization of individual steps are proposed with consideration for certain linkages and chronology among them, depending, as a rule, on the fulfillment of certain conditions, particularly economic, but also technical ones.

In the schedule, therefore, a certain time span was considered which determines the earliest and the latest possible deadline for implementation. This provides the

prerequisite for individual steps to be taken at the time when the necessary preconditions are met, and economic or currency stability thus not endangered.

Implementation of some individual steps will begin very soon. At present, drafts of procedural regulations are being prepared.

At issue are the following steps:

—Liberalization of direct investments abroad (substitution of permits by prior or subsequent registration). The overwhelming part of direct investments consists of creating affiliations to support sales of Czechoslovak products abroad, and the risk of speculation with transfer of capital is not as great as with other kinds of investments.

—Liberalization in accepting credit of a developmental character from exchange foreigners (substituting registration for permits).

Certain risks connected with possible speculation by some investment funds with property, transferred within the framework of the coupon privatization to the public, that would benefit foreign entities, are the reason why not all financial credits are allowed to be accepted at present.

—The possibility of free transfer of koruna accounts remainders of exchange foreigners to free currencies (registration). This step is, of course, the most risky of all three planned measures (speculative conversion of koruna assets into foreign exchange), and therefore the implementation of this step may be postponed until after the resolution of the state setup issue, or, until the time when the decision is made about keeping a common currency.

In the very near future we can also expect the removal of the last supplementary regulatory instrument adopted in connection with the transition to internal convertibility of the koruna, i.e., the cancellation of the import surcharge of 10 percent on imported consumer goods. At present it is applied especially for fiscal reasons, partially also as an instrument of protection against foreign competition. In connection with the transition to a new tax system on 1 January 1993, its cancellation can be expected on that date.

The remaining, rather important restriction within the framework of internal convertibility is the regulation of access to free currency by the public. The present favorable developments characterized by the growth of foreign currency reserves as well as foreign currency earnings and the confidence of the public in the Czechoslovak currency made possible increases of the limits on exchange, and if this trend continues, the exchange limits are expected to be removed in 1994 or 1995 (again, subject to economic stability, i.e., resolution of the state setup before the limits are removed). On the other hand, however, some limits on exporting money

(korunas and foreign exchange) are expected to remain with respect to regulations on the export of capital.

The key step of the entire process of transition to full convertibility of the koruna will be to free the koruna for use in the foreign payment system.

This relatively risky step from the standpoint of maintaining stability of the currency can be realized only if some economic and technical conditions are met, particularly:

- Approximate equilibrium in the current balance of payments account.
- Sufficient amount of foreign exchange reserves.
- Stabilization of the economic situation (restoration of economic growth).
- Development of the capital market (stabilization of stock prices).
- Success of the privatization process.

Among the technical conditions, especially:

- Creation of an information and distribution banking network of commercial banks and its integration with the SBCS.
- Making agreements with selected foreign banks on koruna quotations.
- Legislative provisions for this regime.

According to information currently available, the possibility of implementing this step is expected by 1 January 1995 at the earliest, and by 1 January 1997 at the latest.

The liberalization of items in the capital account will be implemented gradually, particularly with respect to the development of the capital market, stabilization of market valuation of individual investments, immovable assets, and securities, and with respect to the amount of domestic capital.

We should reach the European standard by the year 2000. At the same time, even developed countries apply a number of restrictions precisely in this sphere, despite full convertibility of their currencies. Therefore, keeping some restrictions even after the year 2000 is not ruled out (linked to the course of the liberalization process in the EC).

Trade Union Leader Skeptical About Referendum

92CH0969A Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 14 Sep 92 p 1

[Interview with Richard Falbr, president of Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions, by Stanislav Knenicky on 13 September; place not given: "It Is Far Too Late for a Referendum"]

[Text] Yesterday morning, the delegation of Czechoslovak trade unionists, headed by Richard Falbr, president of the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions,

returned from a visit to Belgium. Immediately after they landed, we asked the president of the confederation a few questions.

[Knenicky] What was the program of your visit; did you speak with the representatives of international trade union centers even regarding the continued functioning of the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions after a possible breakup of the CSFR?

[Falbr] We made this visit as an official delegation at the invitation of the Belgian trade unions. In addition, while we were in Brussels, we visited the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions of which we are members, as well as the European Trade Union Confederation, in which we are observers. We familiarized both of these institutions with the views of Czechoslovak trade unionists regarding the current situation in Czechoslovakia; we familiarized even Mrs. Papandreou, the European commissioner for social affairs, with this matter. All of the parties with whom we dealt found out with satisfaction that the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions is not thinking of terminating its activities because it already has a confederative arrangement. Our national centers are independent to the point where existence in this unit does not present any difficulties for us.

[Knenicky] What are the views of the Belgians who have certain similar problems with federation regarding the process of partitioning our country?

[Falbr] As far as the process which precedes the partition of the state is concerned, I would say that we encountered cool understanding. Belgium is a functioning federation, which its citizens have been forging for more than 20 years and in which nationality groupings quite different from each other are living side by side. The Flemish people, who actually speak Dutch, and the Walloons, who speak French. Nevertheless, it was successfully possible to find mechanisms to make this federation functional. Of course, Belgium is a very rich country and had sufficient time to handle the necessary negotiations. It is possible to state that virtually with the first signals of dissatisfaction steps were taken to prevent either of the two nationalities from feeling badly in a common state. Compared to our situation, they have a head start here—something which we unfortunately can no longer have. In conjunction with the process of partitioning Czechoslovakia, however, the Belgians did admit that voices have been heard—mainly from the Flemish side because Flanders is richer than are the Walloons—indicating that if there is a velvet divorce in the CSFR, one could contemplate something similar even in Belgium. But we even encountered opinions among the Flemish, indicating that a partition would be an error and would be highly unpleasant with respect to Belgium's position within the EC.

[Knenicky] What is the level of work performed by the Belgian trade unions?

[Falbr] From the standpoint of trade union work and from the standpoint of the work done by the trade unions in general, it is highly noteworthy to see the type of level of social partnership which they have achieved. All trade union institutions are functioning so that cooperation exists not only on paper, but in actual fact. As a result, it is possible to maintain social peace in Belgium and a high standard of living.

[Knenicky] Let us return to the domestic "federal" ground. Currently, the left is increasingly demanding the arrangement of a referendum which would decide the future of Czechoslovakia. Do you agree with these demands?

[Falbr] A public opinion poll which we organized indicated that 80 percent of the trade unionists favor a referendum. However, it is not possible to conclude from

this that they would favor preservation of a common state. The majority of citizens were unable to have input into anything for 40 years and they now have the feeling that they should take a stand on such an important matter. As far as my personal attitude is concerned, I believe that it is far too late for a referendum. The proclamation of a referendum and the campaign which would precede the referendum would contribute to bringing about chauvinism, would result in manifestations of animosity on both sides and other manifestations which we would like to avoid. On 30 June, the council general of the trade unions said that it favors the constitutional method for terminating the federation, so that we expressed ourselves unequivocally in favor of a referendum. It is possible that we shall deal with this question on 22 September, but I personally cannot identify with the type of argumentation which is being used in the parliamentary discussions, now that I have read about them.

New KLD Leader Analyzes Political Scene*PM0610143092 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish
23 Sep 92 pp 3-4*

[Interview with Grzegorz Schetyna, general secretary of the Liberal Democratic Congress, by Elzbieta Graczyk; place and date not given]

[Text] [Graczyk] How have you, a young man from Wroclaw or, as they say in Warsaw, from the provinces, progressed to become general secretary of a party that took part in forming the government and commands a considerable presence in parliament? Who were your rivals and why did they lose to you?

[Schetyna] It would be best to address these questions to Donald Tusk. It was he who suggested that I take on this post, and who later promoted my candidacy in the election. My main rival, Adam Samborski of Opole, decided to withdraw from the contest. Subsequently, in a majority vote the Presidium decided to approve my candidacy, even though I was certainly a surprise choice. I came neither from Warsaw nor from Gdansk. Why was I selected in preference to others? Well, after I had been appointed head of the KLD [Liberal Democratic Congress] Wroclaw division, the party began to develop a vigorous, dynamic profile in Wroclaw, and it certainly grew in numbers. In addition, I believe that my work experience in the state administration sector—where I served as deputy voivode, among other things—also counted in my favor.

The KLD is not exclusively a parliamentary party. It is also firmly represented in the field: in cities, towns, and villages throughout individual regions. This means that our people are not only found residing in parliamentary halls in Wiejska Street, but also holding surgeries in the KLD offices in Szpitalna Street in Warsaw. I envisage our party's further development through continued expansion of KLD structures, through sound preparation for local elections, and so on. This is one of the principal goals that I will have to face as general secretary.

[Graczyk] What benefits will Wroclaw and the whole region of Lower Silesia reap from your promotion? Or, maybe you see your Wroclaw career as a closed chapter in your progress?

[Schetyna] I will spend more time in Warsaw from now on, but I am definitely not breaking contact with Wroclaw. On the contrary, I would like to see Wroclaw even more fully represented in the KLD. I want to see ideas developed by local activists promoted and realized within the party, and I hope that people from Wroclaw will encourage our parliamentary caucus, the KLD chairman, and government ministers representing our party to act more quickly and make more specific decisions.

[Graczyk] Will you enter the KLD offices in Szpitalna Street as a man prepared to promote your own ideas and projects, or as Donald Tusks's man?

[Schetyna] But the one does not preclude the other! Seriously, though, I will enter it with a solemn awareness of the magnitude of the work awaiting me there. Our immediate plans include the KLD program conference scheduled to take place 24-25 September. The conference will open a new political season in our party's life. We are reorganizing our structures and entering a completely new development stage in the KLD's history. Previously, the KLD was rather at a loss when it came to forging its identity. As an opposition party during the previous government's time in office, we were the target of vigorous attacks (both personal and against the party as a whole), directed against us through the press and television by former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski. We also had problems of a more organizational nature: For example, we could not find a suitable abode for our party headquarters. Admittedly, the situation is diametrically different today. We have ministers representing our party in the government, and it seems as if a favorable weather for the KLD prevails in the political climate at the moment. However, our party structures still remain underdeveloped. I want to change this, and I have several ideas of how to do it. I intend to revive our Information Bulletin service, to oblige local party leaders to raise the KLD's profile in the field, and to make their presence known within local communities. I also nurture specific plans that will raise our profile in a positive way in the media. I want to promote a program that maps out the only way that is possible for our country, instead of one that leads into a blind alley. I will promote the sort of attitudes that Poland needs: Attitudes demonstrated by people who are bold, hardworking, resourceful, ready to embrace new ideas, and open to contacts with Europe.

[Graczyk] But for the time being Polish people believe that contacts with Western capital spell very bad news for Poland. Some believe that foreigners will buy us out cheaply; others, that no sane businessman will bring his money to Poland. From the very first day in office, Hanna Suchocka's government has had a very difficult job.... Does the present government, which was formed with your participation, stand any chance at all, or is it the last government before Lech Walesa takes over, brings in a new team, and appoints himself prime minister?

[Schetyna] I am convinced that there will be no government run by "Prime Minister Walesa," even if Miss Suchocka's government fails. In any case, that is not where the problem lies. Polish people are now facing a fundamental question: What kind of country will it be, and to whom will it belong? Will it be a country whose people are open to new developments and understand that there is no other way apart from that which embraces democracy, private property, the rule-of-law principle, a free market, and so on? Or will it be a country ruled by the likes of Moric, Lepper, Jurczyk, and others like them?

[Graczyk] Let us assume you are appointed prime minister. Would you decide to use force to put a stop to strikes?

[Schetyna] These decisions are in the competence of the voivodes, not the prime minister. As a Liberal, I believe that strikes ruin enterprises, are pointless, irresponsible, and contrary to the public interest that is so often invoked by demagogues in their defense. But they occur in a specific social situation and rationally-thinking politicians cannot afford not to take that into account.

To go back to your previous question about Miss Suchocka's government, the latter is composed of seven very different parties that are only united, after a fashion, by the shared platform of problems faced by the government. And you were absolutely correct to state that, apart from difficult, long-term problems connected with the economic crisis, we also face tough questions to do with current questions requiring immediate attention. The present government very badly needs a manifestation of success—no matter how small. The KLD's determination—matched by the determination shown by the other six parties—leads us to the conclusion that only the present government—and only if it follows its present course—can last long enough to see the breakthrough leading to an improvement of our situation.

[Graczyk] You are talking about the situation in the national economy, whereas—since its return from the summer recess—the Sejm has been spending all its time debating the proposed anticommunist scrutiny acts instead of matters affecting the economy.

[Schetyna] That, as subject number one, and the anti-abortion act as subject number two. But, my dear lady, such is the price we pay for democracy.

[Graczyk] These two subjects on the agenda, which have now acquired the range of symbols, are joined by a third, related topic: religion.

[Schetyna] I am a Liberal in this, too. Questions of world view or, strictly speaking, the Catholic religion, have played an enormous role in building up Polish national identity and reinforcing the foundations of our independence movements. However, as far as I am concerned, separation of church and state is an obvious prerequisite, in the best interests of both the church and the state.

[Graczyk] Let us go back to the subject of politics. What role do you envisage for the KLD in the immediate future? Do you intend to use your presence on the political stage as, so to speak, the needle that tips the balance of the scale—that is, an influential, albeit numerically small, parliamentary group whose role is akin to that played by other liberal parties worldwide? Or, maybe, you have other ambitions?

[Schetyna] The Polish political stage has been suffering considerable "seismic tremors" recently. Cracks are appearing in erstwhile solid edifices; old parties are falling apart, and new ones are forming. We view all

evidence of these tremors, such as the recent division within the Democratic Union, with considerable regret because we believe that Polish parties should rather strive to consolidate, build up their strength, and form a political coalition. In addition, we are arguably one of the few parties that has no tendency to split up, where there are no opposing groups pursuing incompatible interests. After the election we were listed as the seventh most influential party; now, as a result of current talks on the possibility of a confederation with the Polish Economic Program party, we may yet rise to the third place in the Sejm. This will change our role quite considerably!

[Graczyk] Was it your pragmatic approach that made the KLD approve the "Pact for Enterprises," which clearly flirts with socialism?

[Schetyna] The "Pact" is not an attempt at flirting with socialism. After all, one of the coauthors of the pact was Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. It may be that the terminology used by Minister Kuron in the document could suggest that it contains such elements. The pact is an attempt at a global look at the national economy, an attempt to arrive at an overview of the condition of Polish enterprises, and to find a suitable platform on which we could hold talks with the trade unions; talks that will be calm and reasoned rather than emotional, and that can be conducted with the sides sitting comfortably on chairs rather than squatting on sheets of polystyrene [reference to 1980 strike at Gdansk shipyard]. We will try to hold talks about the possible methods of saving enterprises that have not yet been privatized, how to prevent their ruin and devastation until they are taken over within the privatization scheme. The pact proposes certain solutions, but the actual decisions could still take entirely different directions.

[Graczyk] You are talking about saving enterprises from ruin, but it often turns out that the costs of privatization exceed the total value of the enterprise. There can be no conceivable accusation that has not been leveled against the Ministry of Privatization and, specifically, Minister Lewandowski, a Liberal, who stands at the ministry's helm. Let us, for example, consider all the comments occasioned by RZECZPOSPOLITA's publication of the lists of consultancy firms which, according to the ministry, must be used in the privatization operations....

[Schetyna] Well, if you contrast a consultancy firm established 120 years ago that commands a well-rounded experience of the subject combined with an international reputation, with a little, obscure Polish firm set up three weeks previously, is there really a conflict about which of them should be used? Nevertheless, a variety of charges are immediately leveled against the ministry, the relatively mildest ones claiming that Western firms are being preferred "for obvious reasons." In addition, there is always the insinuation that the recommended firms are owned by friends or relatives.... The Privatization Ministry can be criticized for having made certain mistakes, but we must realize that it is doing strictly pioneering work. On the other hand, Minister Lewandowski, a

Liberal, can never be charged with any sins of omission in his appointed task. During the period when he was absent from the ministry, no decisions whatever were made, with the result that some 300 privatization projects have now been started and are awaiting his personal attention. And decisions on these projects must be made immediately, or at least as soon as possible. Let me give you one example: A particular enterprise has been valued at about \$10 billion, but there is only one potential buyer, and he is unwilling to pay more than \$2 billion. We could delay the sale and keep waiting for a higher bidder. Unfortunately, in the meantime the value of the enterprise will decline; a year from now, either its situation will be a hundred times worse, or it will no longer be there at all. However, it is really not any real, substantive problems that endanger the privatization scheme: It is public reaction to it. Its image is being constantly tarnished in the eyes of the public. Nevertheless, despite all the accusations, of which you mentioned only a couple, and despite repeated audits and monitoring operations, the public prosecutor's office has not received even a single official complaint or charge against the ministry. The accusations leveled against it are definitely generated by political rather than economic concerns! Even the slightest difficulty encountered by the ministry is immediately and unscrupulously exploited in the political campaign against it, with the adversaries hoping for an early election. The latter lure people with promises of streets paved with gold and manna falling down from heaven—without the slightest chances that such miracles could ever be accomplished. We are not interested in such impromptu goals and short-term successes. The KLD does not promise people fat pensions, instant wealth, and a rapid emergence from the recession, because no such promises would be realistic. We are facing a long period of slow, laborious effort—and also of learning how to implement the principles of democracy and bring about a rule-of-law state. We aim to enable the 8,000 people who wait outside their factory gates to go in and get on with their work, which they cannot do now because another 2,000 people are occupying the premises. We intend to teach people to observe legislative norms and rules, pay taxes, and respect customs and excise regulations. None of the KLD parliamentarians could be charged with resorting to invectives or slanderous accusations. Our politicians do not use such weapons in their fight, because we do not believe that there is a place for them in the rules of fair play. This is why, despite all attempts at an open and fair dialogue, we will never find a common ground that we could share with Mr. Lepper. Nor do we intend to follow closely television, press, or radio campaigns to find out who has just deigned to spit on the Liberals. There are institutions that have been designed to deal with such tactics. No one should try to do their work for them.

[Graczyk] Thank you for talking to us.

Sejm Authority After Regulations Analyzed

92EP0661A Warsaw *TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC*
in Polish No 37, 11 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by Jan Kulus, deputy from the parliamentary club Solidarnosc: "Is the Sejm Reformable?"]

[Text] Let us recall that only a minority of our society—approximately 42 percent—participated in the 1991 parliamentary elections. In addition, a deficient electoral law contributed to political fragmentation of the new parliament, in which representatives of 29 political parties took seats.

Thus, the new parliament began its work in very difficult conditions, albeit in a lofty atmosphere and with high societal expectations.

The new parliament's capabilities have turned out to be considerable. It has been possible to combine the experience of 125 deputies from the previous terms with the zeal of newly elected deputies (73 percent of the whole assembly). Three fourths of them are in their prime of life (20-49 years of age). Approximately 77 percent of them have a college education. They represent all basic professions and social strata. All of the significant social and political forces are represented in parliament. However, the Sejm's activities have so far been incomprehensible to and negatively evaluated by society. For example, a CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center] poll conducted in mid-June 1992 indicated that the Sejm was the most criticized high government institution (an opinion expressed by 71 percent of the respondents). The same respondents bitterly complained that the deputies represented above all the interests and needs of their political parties (40 percent) or their own interests (27 percent). Only 12 percent of respondents thought that deputies represented the interests of all of society in general and their electorate in particular. When asked a question what qualities and skills a deputy should have, respondents would point out most often honesty (72 percent), knowledge of the country's social and economic problems (60 percent), knowledge of the needs of the deputy's own electoral district (48 percent), sensitivity to human suffering (43 percent), knowledge of the law (37 percent), industriousness (31 percent), patriotism and intelligence (28 percent each), and negotiating skills (23 percent). According to 22 percent of the respondents, a deputy ought to be tolerant of opposing views, while 19 percent are of the opinion that a deputy should be characterized by moral courage and personal comportment.

The Sejm, similarly to the governments of the last three years, does not have a coherent and convincing public relations system. The society is not aware of the fact that the current elected parliament has been more productive than the make-believe Sejm before. Thus, 22 plenary sessions of the Sejm have taken place before August 1, 1992, lasting 59 days altogether. This means that the Sejm convened two or three times each month. Simultaneously, the Sejm's permanent and extraordinary commissions have held between a score and almost 90 sessions each. This resulted in the Sejm's enacting more than 30 bills and 67 resolutions. However, the Sejm's legislative accomplishments have been overshadowed by the much more important and urgent needs of society as a whole, as well as the lack of a quorum during the Sejm's sessions, which were well-publicized by the media. (To

be sure, one must state that more than 100 deputies, including this author, have never missed even one day of the Esteemed Chamber's sessions.) Similarly, the way the media have portrayed the issue of the deputies' salaries has not improved their prestige. Public opinion does not know that the deputies' salary (a lump-sum and an allowance)—while not small—is nevertheless much smaller than the salaries of ministerial directors, of deputy heads of the central government offices, or of deputy voivodas.

The Sejm made several crucial decisions affecting the state during the period discussed, and adopted a number of bills which have influenced the political system of the Third Republic. By maintaining democratic procedures and meeting deadlines, the Sejm has managed to twice appoint a Council of Ministers, chairmen of NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control] and NBP [Polish National Bank], as well as the Ombudsman. Among the bills and resolutions passed by the Sejm, the most significant are the budget bill, the so-called anticorruption law, the ratification of the European Accord, the constitutional law (known as the "small constitution"), the amendment to the "popiwiek" [excess wage tax] law ("On the taxation of the increase of salaries"), and the Sejm's procedural regulation. One cannot deny that the current generation of deputies has been involved and industrious.

Still, public opinion would first of all place blame on the deputies for the conflicts between the Sejm, the government, and the president. For this reason, the Sejm's enacting the Constitutional Law on August 1, 1992, has to be considered its greatest success. As a result of that legislation, a classic, democratic model of the separation of powers and a balance between the highest offices of the state was established. To the advantage of its legislative and supervisory functions, the Sejm ceased to be the center of power in Poland. The parliamentary-presidential system thus introduced contains mechanisms to facilitate a harmonious cooperation between the president and the government on the one hand, and the parliament on the other. In this way, the "small constitution" makes it more feasible to overcome the weakness of the state agencies.

What is equally important, that constitution has strengthened the local self-governments and sanctioned decentralization of power in the outlying regions.

In July of this year, the Sejm underwent an internal reorganization, having adopted a new procedural regulation in legal form. This regulation should eliminate the Sejm's shortcomings and weaknesses, while making its sessions more efficient, improving the quality of legislation, enhancing its supervisory functions, and disciplining the deputies. Let us list the most important provisions out of the regulation's 132 articles. A 15-person minimum is now required to establish a parliamentary club, and this should make the Sejm more cohesive, as well as shorten parliamentary debates. Simultaneously, the setting of time limits during plenary

sessions and discussions on specific topics ought to cut down the annoying talkativeness during debates. In addition, the regulation that a bill may be adopted after three readings on the floor, while a resolution may be passed after two readings, is supposed to improve the quality of legislation. Furthermore, a provision that limits a deputy's membership in the Sejm's permanent commissions to only two is supposed to increase the effectiveness of deputies' work. Another provision, according to which the Sejm would automatically accept all senate amendments to bills that have not been rejected by at least two thirds of the votes, is designed to prevent legislative stalemate. A provision that categorizes so-called formal motions would make it difficult to abuse this mechanism. In addition, a stipulation that makes it obligatory to put in writing all proposals to change the Sejm's agenda at least 12 hours in advance would contribute to a rational fulfillment of the planned timetable. Moreover, the fact that the quorum requirement for the Sejm's commissions has been lowered to one-third of the members of a commission will stimulate the decisionmaking process. In turn, the Sejm's standing should be improved by the introduction of a so-called "questions and answers hour," during which deputies could question the government officials who will be obligated to give direct answers. Furthermore, the Sejm weekly sessions will be scheduled three months in advance from now on, which should facilitate a better planning of those sessions and give deputies time to prepare more thoroughly for debates. It is also worth mentioning that the procedural prerogatives of the House [Sejm Marshal] have been strengthened. He now has a right to tell a deputy to "stick to the point," to reprimand a deputy, and even to expel a deputy from a Sejm session in extreme cases.

The regulation envisions penalties for deputies, the provisions of which have been introduced in order to make the deputies' work more disciplined. They include a reprimand, a censure, and a fine. In the latter case, a deputy would have to pay one-third of his/her allowance if he/she misses unexcusably one-third of the sessions of his/her parliamentary commission. Information about deputies' unexcusable absences will be available to the public.

The Sejm is becoming more professional in its work—60 percent of its members are now career deputies [intending to make politics their career]. Intensive work has been planned for the remaining four months of 1992 during the Sejm's tenth term. This is necessary because there are more than 100 bills and almost 30 resolutions waiting to be reviewed. Bills labelled as urgent will have a priority. The deputies will insist that the government present a concrete economic program that would have to include deadlines to finish particular projects.

Several of the Sejm's accomplishments—such as its overcoming the government crisis in July, enacting the Sejm Regulation and the Constitutional Law, as well as making deputies personally and politically responsible for their actions—augur well for the future. Still, in order

to refine the Sejm's work, it is necessary to constantly improve parliamentary customs, respect the basic principles of tolerance, and raise the level of political culture.

Government Decentralization Reforms Discussed

92EP0677B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
18 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Lech Mazewski, Liberal Democratic Congress member: "A Program for Yesterday or Tomorrow"]

[Text] The reform of the state structure is the main challenge to the postcommunist governments in Poland, apart from creating a free market economy. An indication of success in this area would be Poland's relinquishing the model of a centralized state. However, after three years of noncommunist governments we have only begun this journey. What role in the process of Poland's decentralization can Hanna Suchocka's government play?

The territorial self-government at the level of gmina [township] was restored in 1990. While more legislation is needed to prop gminas' activities, there is no doubt that they have become an important element of the state's new structure.

The 1991 experience resulted in a common conviction that what is needed to finish the self-government reform is the creation of counties, both in the countryside and in the cities. It has also become a common understanding that the process of regionalization of the country should begin as well, which would be accomplished through a functional cooperation of the voivodships. The theoretical output for 1992 was the concept of metropolis (a metropolitan association) as a method of managing large cities. Another accomplishment is the fact that the National Assembly for Regional Self-Government [KSST, Krajowy Sejmik Samorządu Terytorialnego] has drafted the basic county legislation.

Thus, without prejudging the final results, we know more or less what has to be done to reform the local state agencies. What we need is the political will to limit the central administration and accomplish that goal. Suchocka's government has announced more than once that it has that will. The prime minister declared in her government expose: "My government will strive to make Poland strong with the strength of the local communities. Therefore, we will take the second step in the reform of territorial self-government, which began in 1990 and which is dramatically far behind the schedule today."

The Second Step of the Self-Government Reform

During a 11 September 1992 session of the KSST in Poznan, Minister Jan M. Rokita, chief of the URM [Office of the Council of Ministers], presented the government's program that is supposed to implement the second stage of the self-government reform. This program is composed of two parts, "the program for yesterday" and "the program for tomorrow."

"The program for yesterday" includes all those measures which should have been taken in the process of restoring the gmina self-government. They include a bill on the regional accounting chambers, a new bill on local financial matters, and legislation that would change relations between the gmina council on the one hand, and the gmina board, the village head (mayor), and/or the town president on the other hand. That change would strengthen gminas' executive bodies. "The program for tomorrow" has only one item on its agenda—that of establishing the county self-government, which may happen by spring 1994, according to the URM chief.

Proposals made by URM chief Jan M. Rokita are totally inadequate. Of course, it is high time to enact the bills on regional accounting chambers and on municipal finances, as well as to amend the bill on regional self-government. Similarly, there is no question but that a new level of the territorial self-government, that is county, has to be introduced. But all that put together is nothing more than a program for yesterday indeed. After all, it was exactly one year ago that the idea of the county self-government was developed, without, however, being put into practice.

If the government is unable to present in September 1992 any concrete plans to implement the county reform, having limited itself to rendering its verbal support to this idea, then the chances of having counties restored by spring 1994 are slim. All that despite the fact that the basic county legislation has been already drafted. It is impossible even to begin the county reform without having a government point man who would be in charge of establishing counties in the provinces. The point of departure for his work must be a resolution of the Council of Ministers that would define the attributes of a city and of a county seat, and that would list those cities that would be excluded from a county. Without such a resolution, county reform cannot even be started.

Without a clear statement of the government's will, there will be no counties for another reason as well. As far as its jurisdiction is concerned, the county cannot simply succeed the regional organ of the state administration. This means that the government has to limit the powers of the ministerial administration in the outlying areas. This will be the litmus test of the government's determination to cede particular matters to the jurisdiction of the local authorities. I have not noticed any such determination in the statements of the government officials during the KSST session in September.

City Self-Government

The fact that the government's pro-county declarations do not seem to be serious is illustrated by still another issue. The big cities are the best place to begin the county reform. One does not even have to wait for the enacting of the county self-government bill. It would be enough to

amend the bill on the territorial self-government in such a way as to exclude the big city gmina from it, and grant the jurisdiction of the city county to such gminas, beginning 1 January 1993, for example.

It is almost certain that this operation would be successful because big cities have already both the proper infrastructure and office personnel. By granting full local jurisdiction to those municipalities we would transform them into the engines of reform. The government could also gain politically on this operation by showing that it has finally accomplished something. Why then are no initiatives to rebuild the city self-government forthcoming?

The Voivodships' Functional Cooperation

Grzegorz Grzelak, KSST's deputy chairman, told Minister Rokita that it would be impossible to draft a program of state reform without the functional cooperation of the voivodships. It is impossible because a nascent functional regionalism (the current government hates this term) is already taking place in some parts of Poland, for example in Greater Poland, Lower Silesia and the Vistula Pomerania.

The program that would lead to a regionally defined Poland was formulated as early as last year. Only the political will is needed to implement it. The crux of the functional regionalism is the cooperation of the existing voivodships, while preserving the system of power employed to date. However, in order to accomplish this, legislation has to be changed in two ways. Firstly, a minister has to be able to cede some of his powers and funds to voivodes who agreed to cooperate with each other. Secondly, the transfer of powers and resources should not take place only vertically, but also laterally, among cooperative voivodes.

In the beginning, that cooperation ought to take place within the improvised structures. With time, more permanent structures could be introduced to facilitate the voivodship cooperation. In particular, they would be needed to facilitate the transfer of funds from the central budget to particular voivodships involved in this cooperation. At the same time, these structures would decentralize the functioning of the Polish state.

Decentralization

Poland has to cease to be the largest gmina of Europe, with Warsaw as its capital. This is not only in the interest of the state, but also of those in government. Decentralization would bring numerous benefits.

First of all, strong centralization does not allow the government to disperse the negative results of necessary reforms to the local communities. It has been very clear in the case of all noncommunist governments (including the current one), which, by sticking to the centralist model, automatically became a part of all the conflicts throughout the country.

Secondly, decentralization would help to mobilize local resources, some of which could be used to assist projects on the national scale.

Thirdly, if the local governments run social policies and economy, then the national, unified norms and regulations could be disposed of. As a result, the citizens would become responsible for themselves, while the central authorities would cease to be a target of social tensions.

Furthermore, centralization of power goes against rational governing. Centralized power is unable to guarantee an efficient functioning of the social system. Life is so unpredictable that even the best organized central power cannot possibly control the situation at all places at all times. The centralized system can be effective in undertaking one-time, short-term efforts that require a maximum concentration of resources. However, this could take place only in an exceptional situation, called a constitutional dictatorship.

The Program for Yesterday

As it turns out, the government's pronouncements about the second stage of the self-government reform amount to nothing more than a program for yesterday. Hanna Suchocka's government has been unable to move away from the dual administrative arrangement (gmina and the central administration), while its support for the idea of the county self-government has been purely declarative. This is highly disturbing because by now we know what we have to do. We only need the political will to proceed.

What is the source of the government's purely defensive position? I think it results from the fact that the current administration equates a strong government (which Poland indeed needs) with a centralized government. In fact, the strength of the government does not stem from its omnipotence, but from the principle of assistance, according to which the state performs only those functions that cannot be performed by gminas, cities, regions, associations, families and/or citizens themselves. If Prime Minister Suchocka's government does not understand this, it will go down in history as yet another administration that was unable to alter its preconceived notion of self-government.

Scale of Fraud, Abuse of Economy Examined

92EP0634C Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (Economy and Law supplement)* in Polish 4 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Katarzyna Jedrzejewska: "Tracing Billions"]

[Text] "I do not want to brag, but the results of our work have exceeded our wildest expectations," says Zygmunt Sachnowski, director of the Fiscal Control Department of the Ministry of Finance, of the department's first six months.

Twenty thousand audits have revealed 5,500 billion zlotys [Z] worth of fraud and abuse in economy. Of those

control operations, 8,500 were reviews of the yearly fiscal reports, while approximately 12,000 were direct investigations.

The cost of an average audit was Z6.4 million, while it would uncover Z172.725 million worth of fraud.

There is also the other side of the coin. Auditors are being threatened more and more often. "It is not a joke," says Director Z. Sachnowski, providing examples from Bielsko-Biala, Lublin, and Bydgoszcz. One auditor was threatened with a hand grenade.

Cheating on taxes has been the most widespread abuse, costing the Treasury Z3,930 trillion. The most common types of tax fraud were failing to report all taxable income, conducting economic activity which was only partially reported (if at all), and avoiding payments of customs fees and turnover tax. The vast majority of tax fraud that has been detected has taken place in the private sector. Abuses in the state enterprises have usually taken place in the process of ownership transformations.

Fraud in the realm of the foreign currency law has amounted to Z505 billion. Furthermore, Z120 billion worth of budgetary allocations have been spent improperly, the worst abuser being the voivodship administration. In addition, Z94 billion worth of ineligible subsidies (mostly for lime fertilizers), as well as Z45 billion worth of undue surcharges on so-called official prices, have been snatched as well.

The so-called ruble and potato affairs were responsible for a large share of the total amount of fraud last year.

The auditors have hit the jackpot in 74 percent of the cases, that is, their inspection turned out to be successful. This has brought Z2,322 trillion into the Treasury.

The law guarantees the taxpayer a right to appeal the auditor's report, provided that there is a legal and/or factual basis for that. Even so, 57 percent of persons and/or companies audited accepted the audit results without reservation.

According to Director Z. Sachnowski, the results of the auditors' work are even more satisfactory, given their concern about the new audit law. People in the business were concerned that the new law, more liberal and one that gives the sides a right to contest their cases, would delay the auditing process and lead to a situation in which the taxpayer would be in a better position than the auditor.

It appears that Poland's audit law is much more liberal than in many other countries, even in one presumably as liberal as the United States. Polish inspectors have a very limited field of maneuver. First and foremost, before beginning the audit they have to present their identifications and warrants. To be sure, they could begin the control without authorization (and even in the absence of the taxpayer), but they have to present it the next day at the latest. They cannot use many methods which their American colleagues apply in accordance with their law.

In the United States, the initial investigation (in the case of a criminal act, or when there is suspicion of a financial crime) could go on for months without the taxpayer's being informed. In the process, the authorities gather information about the taxpayer by various means, including spying and eavesdropping on him/her, or even by provoking him/her to undertake actions that would constitute a crime. Sometimes, the tax inspectors pretend to be businessmen in order to establish a direct contact with the suspect. Polish law directly prohibits all such methods. The inspectors may not establish any contact with the taxpayer without first identifying themselves and presenting the warrants authorizing them to conduct the audit.

In practice, our Polish law—other than the formal applications—allows only for the use of informants. That provision was controversial at one time, especially the problem of paying off the informants. It is not a new issue. In the United States one can provide anonymous information on tax evasion by phone 24 hours a day, just as with information about accidents or fires. Yes, the Polish inspectors have utilized anonymous information too, but so far none has turned out significant enough to reward the informant. "We certainly do not intend to treat informants as the exclusive basis of our operations," assures Z. Sachnowski.

There is a provision in the audit law without any precedent in the world that permits the authorities to undertake proceedings based on the Treasury penal code only as a result of the audit. The inspector may not undertake any such proceedings on his own. The audit, conducted in the manner prescribed by the law, has to precede the opening of the case.

The Ministry of Finance has drafted an amendment to the audit law. "If our inspectors receive the necessary tools, the results of their work will be even better," argues Director Z. Sachnowski. In his opinion, Poland is still far behind Austria, which—having trust in its taxpayers—is reducing the audit apparatus. "We have not yet reached that stage of economic transformation," he says.

[Box, p I]

Who Is an Inspector?

The fiscal inspection currently employs 4,926 people. Of them, only 1,520 are empowered to conduct audits. The rest can participate in the proceedings under the supervision of inspectors.

One inspector has conducted 13.5 audits on the average in the first half of this year.

The director of a fiscal inspection office in a large inspection office makes Z10.8 million, a deputy director—Z9 million, a department head—Z].6 million. In smaller offices the director makes Z10 million, while his deputy earns Z8.4 million. A good inspector makes Z6.4

million, while a beginner earns Z5.6 million. (All these are gross monthly salaries). In addition, inspectors are rewarded for being intuitive and inventive in their work. For example, the Lublin inspectors came up with a method of bank inspection, for which they were awarded Z20 million. The first stage of inspection in the Lublin banks has brought Z59 billion worth of additional revenue into the Treasury, while the second phase resulted in more than Z100 billion. This program is currently being implemented throughout the country.

Statistical Profile of Unemployment Noted

92EP0634A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 1-2 Aug 92 p III

[Article by Ada Kostrz-Kostecka: "It Is Worse in the Cities"]

[Text] There will probably be 2.9 million registered unemployed in Poland by the end of this year, according to CUP's [Central Planning Administration] estimates. In addition, there is hidden unemployment as well, the size of which is difficult to establish. What is worrisome is not only the scale of unemployment, but also the fact that it is spread unevenly throughout the country and is dramatically high in some voivodships. These are predictions for the end of this year. What follows are details of the present situation.

The regional employment offices had registered 2,297,000 unemployed at the end of June, that is 68,000 more than at the end of May. During the first six months of this year, 710,400 people filed for unemployment benefits for the first time, with the smallest numbers in March (96,400) and April (101,300), and the largest number in June—171,300. The record figure in June resulted, among other things, from the fact that this year's graduates have joined the ranks of the unemployed. Most of them were graduates of trade and vocational schools.

Considering the number of people who found work and the number of newly registered as unemployed in the first half of the year, one comes to the conclusion that the number of unemployed increased the least in April, while in March it even decreased temporarily.

In sum, the growth of unemployment was slower in the period under discussion than in the previous six-month periods, but it apparently resulted, among other reasons, from the implementation of regulations which set new criteria for the unemployment registration and restricted eligibility for the unemployment benefits.

Every Fifth Person Unemployed in Six Voivodships

The number of people working in the national economy stabilized in comparison with the situation at the end of December 1991. According to GUS [Main Office of Statistics], 8,987,400 people were employed in enterprises with more than five employees each in the period


January-June 1992. That was 9.2 percent fewer than one year ago and 4.4 percent fewer than in the second half of last year.

Of the professionally active members of society, 12.6 percent were registered as unemployed at the end of June. This percentage has been growing systematically—from 8.4 percent a year ago to 11.4 percent half a year ago.

At the same time, the disparity between various regions affected by unemployment has been deepening. Since January, the number of unemployed has been unceasingly growing in eight voivodships—Elblag, Krakow, Plock, Sieradz, Siedlce, Suwalki, Opole, and Poznan. The highest percentage of the registered unemployed, as compared with those who had work, was recorded in the following voivodships—Suwalki (22.1 percent), Koszalin (21.9 percent), Olsztyn and Slupsk (21.9 percent each), Elblag (20.3 percent), and Walbrzych (19.7 percent). This means that practically every fifth professionally active person has remained unemployed in these six voivodships.

The smallest number of unemployed (as a percentage of those professionally active) was in the Warsaw voivodship—only every twentieth person was unemployed (more exactly 5.1 percent). The situation was a little worse in the Poznan (6.6 percent), Bielsko (6.9 percent), Katowice (7.9 percent), Wroclaw (8.5 percent), and Krakow (8.9 percent) voivodships.

Rate of Unemployment in Voivodships (as Percentage of People Professionally Active) at the end of June 1992



At the end of June, 78.9 percent of people registered as unemployed had a previous employment history. In turn, 15.9 percent of those registered for the first time have been laid off by their employers. In the whole period under discussion, 27.2 percent of the newly

registered unemployed have been laid off by their companies. Furthermore, 36,000 firms have announced plans to lay off 170,000 employees soon (including 130,000 in the public sector).

72 Unemployed for Every Job Vacancy

The unemployed who have been registered by the employment offices are usually graduates of vocational schools. In June, every fourth unemployed person had a trade or vocational education, whereas every fourteenth was a high school graduate. At the same time, the number of unemployed college graduates has been decreasing.

Young people have had the most problems with finding work. At the end of June, every third unemployed person was in the 25-34 age group, while every fourth was in the 35-44 bracket. The smallest number of unemployed was in the age group of 45 and older. The growth of unemployment in the young age groups has been faster than in other age groups in recent months (see Table 1).

**Table 1. Rate of Unemployment in Poland
According to Age (May 1992)**

Age Bracket	Percent
16-17 years	7.5
18-19 years	34
20-24 years	25
25-29 years	15
30-34 years	12.5
35-44 years	8
45 years and older	6.5

The majority of the unemployed are skilled workers. They have also received most of the job offers—86.6 percent out of 42,800 job vacancy announcements sent to unemployment agencies in June. More job vacancy announcements appeared in June than in any other month of the discussed period, which has resulted from the improvement of the economy. At the end of the half-year period, the employment agencies listed 31,700 job vacancies, registering 72 unemployed people per position.

In total, 308,600 unemployed started work in the first half of this year. Tallied by month, the best result was achieved in April (59,900 people found jobs), while the worst was in January (41,900).

In addition to regional differences, unemployment manifests itself differently based on the level of urbanization. On the basis of research surveys of the population's professional activity at the end of May, GUS concluded that the unemployment rate was much worse in the cities than in the countryside (15 percent, as opposed to 9.6 percent). In addition, GUS's research showed that the number of unemployed was higher than that indicated by the regional employment offices. According to data

provided by the latter, the unemployment rate in Poland at the end of May was estimated at 12.3 percent, whereas GUS estimated it at 13 percent.

Government Pact for State Enterprises Analyzed

*92EP0661B Krakow TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA
in Polish No 32, 30 Aug 92 p 2*

[Article by Bogdan Sowa: "The Pact for State Enterprise—An Analysis"]

[Text] Krakow, 21 Aug—Jacek Kuron, minister of labor and social policy, has presented "The Pact for the State Enterprises in Transition" to the trade union Solidarity. (We have already published its full text in our weekly). Subsequently, the government asked Solidarity to review drafts of bills that would transform state enterprises.

By today, that is 21 August, 1992, the Board of the Malopolska Region of Solidarity has received drafts of three bills: (1) on the financial restructuring of enterprises and banks; (2) on the principles of representing the Treasury and managing its property; (3) on the Treasury share funds.

1. The draft of the bill on the financial restructuring of enterprises and banks is a legislation that our economy needs. The state enterprises owe money to each other and to the Treasury. The new bill will enable them to restructure these debts.

According to the draft, the banks would play the main role in that process. One of the concrete solutions to this problem is the so-called settlement procedure applied to the indebted enterprises. The question arises whether the banks will be able to meet this challenge. Do they have the necessary expertise and personnel? Furthermore, the banks, as the main creditor, may not be the most objective party. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to include a new organization—the Board of Property of the State Treasury—into this process, as a party that would play a role equal to that of the banks. Another problem is that the draft fails to categorize debts. In some cases, the Treasury itself has been responsible for the indebtedness of the state enterprises, for example by:

- Making some international agreements binding for the enterprises (as in the case of shipyards, which—following such agreements—took credits and built ships for the republics of the former USSR that now do not have money to pay for the job, etc.);
- Delaying its payments to enterprises;
- Forcing enterprises to undertake certain investments (especially after 1989).

Despite that, the draft sees all debts in the same light. As a result, neither the above mentioned enterprises nor enterprises that would come up with sensible plans of escaping the debt trap have strong enough guarantees that their debts will be restructured in the settlement process. A provision of the draft that says that "it could be done" does not provide such guarantees because it is

the banks that will make the final decision. The bank, as the enterprise's main creditor, may not be interested in the settlement process envisioned by the bill. Instead, it may decide to take the enterprise to the bankruptcy court.

2. The draft of the bill on the principles of representing the Treasury and managing its property has been long expected, just as the draft of the law discussed above. The purpose of this bill is to straighten up the legislation on this matter and to establish an organization that would duly protect the state's interests.

According to this draft, a new organization—the Board of Property of the State Treasury—would be established. This organization would operate in accordance with the provisions of the bill and its own statute, written by the Council of Ministers. The Board would be composed of a director and four deputies. In addition, provincial branches could be established as well. The chairman of the Council of Ministers would supervise the work of the Board. A board of trustees, established by the president of the Republic of Poland and the chairman of the Council of Ministers, will have supervisory functions as well. This double supervision system may result in conflicts and incoherence. The board of trustees should rather be an advisory board. Furthermore, there is a danger that the Board of Property of the State Treasury may become yet another agency of the state administration, which will only complicate and delay the decision-making process in economy. It could also be perceived by the public as yet another bureaucratic invention.

The final provisions of the draft envision amendments to the state enterprises law and the law on the privatization of state enterprises, among others.

As far as the first of those bills is concerned, it is not clear why the Board of Property of the State Treasury would substitute for a founding agency in some provisions of the draft. Following the changes in the chapter titled "The agreement on Enterprise Management," the workers' council will have to ask the founding agency to appoint a person or a company as the enterprise manager. At the same time, according to the second part of that clause, it is the would-be manager and the Board of Property of the State Treasury who would sign the agreement about managing the enterprise. This is an error. When an enterprise is in a difficult economic situation, it must act quickly. These provisions of the draft would only delay decisionmaking and cause conflicts of authority. There are similar problems with the amendments to the law on the privatization of the state enterprises. Why is it that in some clauses of the draft the authority of the minister of ownership transformation has been substituted with that of the Board of Property of the State Treasury? In this way, a third agency is being introduced into the decisionmaking process regarding privatization (apart from the founding agency and the minister of ownership transformation). It could lead to conflicts of authority between them. For example, it is the minister of ownership transformation who makes a

decision that would transform a state enterprise into a single Treasury company. In contrast, it is the founding agency that makes a decision to liquidate a state enterprise through privatization, with the approval of the minister of ownership transformation and the Board of Property of the State Treasury. Another problem is the economic-financial analysis of the enterprise's performance. As it is known, the enterprise itself has to pay for it. This analysis has to be undertaken before the minister of ownership transformation makes his decision about the transformation of the enterprise into a single Treasury company. However, the draft envisions that in the second stage of this privatization procedure, just before the stocks are made available to other parties, a second analysis could be made if ordered by the Board of Property of the State Treasury. In this case, the enterprise would pay the costs of analysis twice. Until now, all decisions were supposed to be made by one agency, that is the minister of ownership transformation. It appears that the authors of the draft have stopped half way through—one decisionmaking agency (the Board of Property of the State Treasury) could substitute the hitherto existing two agencies [the founding agency and the minister] in both discussed bills. As of now, however, the procedure envisioned by the draft could lead to delays in determining the fate of a given enterprise, especially as far as its privatization is concerned.

3. The draft of the bill on the Treasury share funds has resulted from the treasury law. The draft brings order into activities conducted by several agencies, which fact has not always been conducive to having a coherent policy. The funds would be created by the Board of Property of the State Treasury and would act as single, joint-stock companies of the Treasury, in accordance with the trade law.

The director of the Board of Property of the State Treasury would appoint the management and the board of trustees of a given fund. Thanks to this bill, the Treasury's shares will be managed by specialists, instead of bureaucrats, which will be beneficial to the state and to society. The management would provide the funds with the capital stock, guaranteed entirely in cash. In addition, the companies into which the state enterprises will be transformed would contribute their stocks and shares to these funds as well. Stocks and shares that could be bought by employees at discount prices will not be contributed to the funds. Only after 15 months, when the employees' right to purchase those stocks expires, the latter could be brought into the funds.

The main task of the funds is to manage their capital in order to make a profit. The funds will have to account to the state for their profit, in accordance with the budget bill that will determine the dividend rate for each particular fund.

The drafts of the bills were supposed to be supplemented with the drafts of their executive acts. Unfortunately, this has not been accomplished. While the provisions of the bills mention them, none of the three drafts actually

has them. Therefore, all drafts received by our Union in the future will have to be analyzed again to determine their coherence.

(The author has drawn from reports prepared by Marian Molo, Henryk Bulara, and Zbigniew Dresler.)

Rise in Incidence of Violent Crime Reported

92EP0681 Warsaw WPROST in Polish No 37, 13 Sep 92 pp 55-56

[Article by Maciej Luczak: "Ravage and Plunder"]

[Text] "The remains of the little girl looked like raw hamburger. Only twice in my life have I seen a body slashed like that," Dr. Krzysztof Kordel, of the Department of Forensic Medicine in Poznan, recalls. "The father who tortured his daughter that way was fond of knitting colored mufflers and reading the Bible. The court sentenced him to 13 years in prison."

In Pila, a son poured gasoline on his mother and turned her into a living torch. Another man tormented his wife by sticking her head into the spinner-washing machine.

The next time he drove a knife into her shoulder and back. When the woman fell, he strangled her, then used a saw to cut the body up into pieces. When Stanislaw S. went up to one of the residents of Zakopane and said: "Blessed be Jesus Christ," there was nothing to suggest the tragedy that was to follow. A moment later the man asked: "How long do we have to live?" and shot the man and his son.

"In previous years we issued about 400 decisions in cases involving bodily harm. Last year the number climbed to 700. We are seeing more and more displays of inhumanity. In many cases the perpetrators go far beyond subduing the person they pick to rob. They also mistreat the person, often with unspeakable cruelty," says Prof. Zygmunt Przybylski, head of the Department of Forensic Medicine in Poznan.

Policemen confirm this fact. Recently a woman had two fingers cut off merely because she was unmarried and had no wedding ring to steal, and the body of a homosexual was branded with information about his most private preferences. In Swarzedz two burglars tortured a homeowner, placing an electric heater on his abdomen.

In most cases, assailants outnumber their victims. They begin the attack with mace. Next they knock the victims down, hit them in the face, and wind up by kicking them.

One beating out of every five involved kicking.

In the past the success of picking pockets was determined largely by manual dexterity, reflexes, and cunning. More and more often today the act consists of a crude and brutal attack. One rarely sees an imaginatively contrived modus operandi, such as the case of the poisoner who prowled the trains, offering his victims deadly refreshment, lemonade containing mind-altering drugs.

The number of crimes in Poland has remained constant for some time now in Poland, but there is a difference. There are more crimes involving bodily injury, especially murder, which increased by 83 percent between 1988 and 1991. Assault and battery increased by 82 percent, bodily injury by 42 percent, and robbery by as much as 138 percent. The situation this year is similar. We are, therefore, dealing with a constant increase in the number of the most dangerous criminal acts.

Prof. Marian Filar, a criminologist at Nicholas Copernicus University in Torun, thinks this is a worldwide trend. Until recently, South American crime featured a high degree of cruelty directed against people, while Europe exhibited a predominance of economic crimes and crimes against property. We have been dealing for several years now with a convergence of the two forms of crime. The differences are becoming blurred. European crime is tending more towards crime in the Western Hemisphere, while theft, fraud, and embezzlement are starting to play an ever greater role in Latin American criminal behavior. In terms of the statistics for the most serious crimes, the figures clearly place Poland behind the advanced Western countries, although Poland is showing a steady rise, and the trends occurring in our country are bringing us closer and closer to the West. According to experts, the pace of "integration" and "the eradication of differences" in this respect is way ahead of other areas of life in our society.

Murders are committed where there is a great deal of money, where people find themselves in the throes of great emotions, and where there is easy access to the instruments of crime, especially firearms. What is more, social discipline has become lax, and the authority of moral standards has deteriorated, owing to the relaxation of the mechanisms of public control that repressive forces exercised in Poland until recently and the shift from a totalitarian system to a democratic one.

A "lynching law" may come to pass, especially since people have less and less confidence in the justice system, according to Prof. Filar.

At the beginning of this past August, a man streaming with blood was found in downtown Szczecin, a large kitchen knife next to him. The police were immediately called. According to witnesses, the perpetrator, a young man dressed in an orange tee-shirt, was hiding at a nearby gateway. After several apartments had been searched, a man fitting the description was found. When the police brought the man out into the street, the crowd began to yell, and a moment later somebody rushed the man and injured him in the head. The police barely managed to fend off the crowd's vengeance against the man they had in custody.

Research was done in the United States, at the beginning of this century, on the relationship between the cotton crop and the number of lynchings of blacks. The number of incidents of aggressive behavior increased in those years when the harvests were good, when there were

problems selling the crop, and when the harvests were very bad. For blacks, the safest years were those when cotton yields were average.

"We are dealing with a social condition of anonymity. Moral and legal standards change or even cease to apply. In such a situation there is always a sense of threat," says Prof. Wojciech Poznaniak, of the Institute of Psychology at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan.

Aggression is a reaction to frustration. The possible assimilation of model behaviors where hatred and cruelty predominate is an aggression-provoking stimulus.

"All the barriers that might impede freedom in social communication have disappeared. The hidden elements in the brutal struggle for power are coming out into the open. Crime and coercion have become standard fare in the mass media," Prof. Poznaniak claims.

A dispute has been waged for a long time over whether observation of aggressive behavior evokes the same reactions or whether it has a purgative influence and relieves tensions that are potentially dangerous. Researchers have recently tended more towards the first notion. Two American groups of experts, the National Commission on Violence and Crime Prevention and the United States Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior, stated that viewing television violence brings about aggressive behavior.

The experts did not, however, confirm such a connection in relation to girls, who are most often presented as victims. Scenes where there is a struggle, violence, or rape leave traces most often in the minds of people with emotional disturbances, in sociopaths and psychopaths, and in people who are normally very peaceful and balanced. It is they who usually are unable to discharge their emotions, and when these emotions start to build, an explosion comes easily. In Germany, the federal censorship office makes a list of publications and films that may upset the psychological balance of children and young people.

An experiment was run a few years ago in the United States in which two groups of students were assigned to determine their fellow students' penalties for errors in reciting texts they had memorized. The students who had been in an environment heavily saturated with objects associated with aggression (pistols, knives, and rifles) were far more likely to push the button to administer punishment than those who had been in an environment with "neutral" objects.

Nearly 95 percent of the members of industrialized Western societies obtain information about brutal crimes through the mass media, which, according to criminologists, focuses entirely on the sensational element without trying to explain the underlying cause or foundation of the conflicts. The perpetrators in these accounts are usually devoid of any human characteristics. Civil cases, in turn, cause people to lose their identity, make them anonymous, and bring about a weakening of interpersonal bonds. More than 75 percent of all murders in Poland are committed in towns and cities.

The deep-rooted conviction that stiffer penalties should be imposed to combat criminal behavior is society's reaction to the frightening atmosphere at each stage. There has been a 2 percent increase during the past year in the number of young people in Poland who favor the death penalty.

"Aggression may also become a source of pleasure. Through violence, a person can become famous and make the newspaper headlines. Violence also has psychological value. It allows a person to have control over other people. Through violence a person may go from being a subject in the life of society to being an acting component of it. Finally, aggression makes it possible to supply the ever greater stimuli that some people need. For certain people, aggression is a unique solution to boredom," Prof. Poznaniak says.

Seventeen bombs exploded in Poland during 1991, and five others were found and disarmed.

During the first half of this year, there were 801 bomb scares. Of these, 29 proved to be real.

In the summer of 1966, Charles Whitman killed his wife and mother and then climbed to the top of a tower at the University of Texas. He shot 58 people with a rifle fitted with a long-range sight, killing 14 of them. No similar cases have been noted yet in Poland, but what disturbs us is not only the escalation in aggressive behavior, but also the fact that the voivodship police headquarters are receiving several dozen applications for firearm permits each day.

Rat poison was used to kill all the ducks in the pond in the very center of Opole just recently. The police are conducting an investigation into the matter, because a note promising that the perpetrator would "now go after people" was found at the scene of the crime.

Number of Crimes in Poland Against Persons

	1988	1989	1990	1991
Murder	530	556	730	971
Bodily harm	9,111	8,586	10,415	12,956
Assault and battery	3,050	2,988	3,935	5,553
Rape	1,564	1,660	1,840	1,921
Robbery	7,182	9,067	16,217	17,094

Number of Murders per 100,000 people in 1990

Ireland	19.5
Netherlands	14.1
Scotland	9.5
United States	9.4
Italy	6.4
France	4.5
Germany	3.9
Poland	2.9 ¹

¹ 2.5 in 1991

Discontentment With Vance Plan in Sector North

92BA1471B Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
22 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by Trajko Grkovski: "Vance Plan Come to Naught?"]

[Text] The assertions reaching people in Karlovac these days, in particular the 10,000 people driven out of villages along the Kupa and occupied Slunj, to the effect that there nevertheless has been progress in carrying out the Vance Plan in the Sectors East and West, but most of all in Sector South, are a bit irritating, because there have been almost no positive developments in Sector North. It is obviously important by whom (and how) the peace plan is being carried out, because members of the peace-keeping forces in Sector North—Poles, Nigerians, Czechs, and Slovaks are causing concern with their conciliatory and indifferent attitudes toward the activity of Serb formations and Chetniks along the Korana and Kupa, and particularly in the area of Slunj.

High-level officers and commanders of Sector North, General Musa Bamaya and the coordinator for civil affairs, Charles Carrugia, have not held a single press conference, nor do they like newsmen (from Karlovac). The meetings held occasionally in Karlovac with representatives of the zone of operations of the HV [Croatian Army] and civil authorities and with the top officials of the Karlovac Municipal Assembly are closed as a rule, and everything the public is learning about the activity of the peacekeeping forces along the Kupa and Korana and in the area from Karlovac via Vojnic, Vrginmost, and Topusko to Slunj and Plitvice they get in a "slow drip." And in Karlovac these days one is apt to hear, say, that the French in Sector South are doing better. After the French battalion went to Sector South, the provocations, for example, ceased entirely. Musa Bamaya, UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force] officer in Sector North, is not making public statements, nor does he speak openly about the situation in Sector North and the efforts of the peacekeeping forces or difficulties carrying out the Vance Plan. Charles Carrugia, coordinator for civil affairs in Sector North, has failed to answer certain specific questions put by the government commissioner for Vojnic, Vrginmost, and Slunj municipalities. Are the peacekeepers in that sector themselves satisfied with what they have done, above all with carrying out the first phase of the Vance Plan?

Vladimir Cvitanovic, deputy from Karlovac, declared the other day that the peacekeepers are obviously satisfied that they have not come into conflict with the Chetnik units and police of "Krajina" in the area of the so-called pink zone along the Korana and Kupa, that up to now they have not had a single man killed or wounded, nor has any incident been recorded when they thwarted the Chetniks in their dirty work. But this kind of conciliatory attitude also causes concern, because the peacekeepers in that "pink zone" are showing themselves to be helpless against the Chetniks. The Chetniks,

that is, are refuting the assertions of the UNPROFOR that heavy weapons are under control, that the Serb formations are being disarmed, and so on. The incidents almost nightly along the Kupa and Korana are no longer merely provocations. With the announcement that those driven out are returning to the suburban settlements along the Korana and Kupa—and this applies to Turanj, Mekusje, Logoriste, and Husje—they have renewed their attacks and armed incidents. Every night they are using in the attacks not only heavy infantry weapons, but also rifle grenades, missiles fired from the "Wasp" and "Hornet," and 80-mm mortars are being used more and more frequently. Turanj and Logoriste, along the Korana have been experiencing new destruction, and every night the people in Karlovac are returning again to shelters because of fierce new explosions.

There was nothing left for those driven out of 24 villages along the Kupa and Korana to do but to protest and ask when they can return to their homes that were set on fire and devastated. After all, there has been no progress in this sector if we omit the direct attacks on Karlovac and Sisak. Shells from mortars are threatening the city itself. From the beginning of the occupation of a portion of Karlovac Municipality (this pertains to 55 percent of the territory occupied) not a single Croat driven out and wanting to return before winter has set foot in any of the 24 villages along the Kupa and Korana. There is no certainty even for the inhabitants of Turanj, Logoriste, Mekusje, Husje, suburban settlements and villages which are on the first line of the front, even under the supervision of the Croatian Army. Helplessness is being felt both by those driven out and by the municipal authorities.

A great deal is being done, we were told by one municipal leader, but the effort is not being seen or felt. Stipe Poljak and Mirko Putric, government commissioners for Vrginmost-Vojnic and Slunj Municipalities, are bitter about the slowness of the peacekeepers in Sector North. And so today when those driven out announced they are returning on their own initiative, in human terms this is a justified desire, but it is risky. Overnight, between Sunday and Monday, it was again stormy along the Korana and Kupa. There was firing from all weapons and guns, and only cannon and tank projectiles were absent. Villages burned, there were new murders and arrests of Croats. Reports indicate that in this area under UN protection, in Bugari and Trzacke Rastele on the border between Slunj and Velika Kladusa Municipalities, strong Chetnik forces are concentrated and are attacking Bosanska Krajina from there. And that is an area under supervision of the peacekeepers, who are "closing their eyes" to all of this. None of the UN officers have had anything to say about the new pressures in Karlovac from those driven out for return to the Korana and Kupa. It would be interesting to hear from General Musa Bamaya or Satish Nambiar.

Herceg-Bosnia President Boban Interviewed

92BA1470A Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian
24 Sep 92 p 7

[Article including interview with Mate Boban, president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia, by Branko Tudjen in Zagreb on 22 September: "Will Meet Karadzic Only in the Presence of Witnesses"]

[Text] Mate Boban, president of the Croatian Community [HZ] of Herceg-Bosnia, was just back from another round of (un)successful negotiations in Geneva concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H]. That was Tuesday morning. He had spent the entire night traveling by car from Geneva to Zagreb. His impressions and conclusions were fresh. Boban is a rewarding subject to interview, emotional, wrapped up in politics. As he speaks, he lights one cigarette after another. He has quite a bit of political experience behind him. In wartime, that is, one matures considerably faster than in peacetime. Although he would say that in a political sense he was formed at age 17, it is obvious that the recent (wartime) months have impressed a permanent stamp on his personality. One gets the impression that this is a man conscious of his own responsibility and a politician who has risen up out of the regional context. His contribution is large, so are the possible consequences.

Boban has been or is negotiating with two lords (Carrington and Owen) and one Vance. The details are not already to be made public. Boban nevertheless says some things. He does not like terms such as "the Hercegovinian lobby around the Croatian president." He prefers "Croatian integralism." That is, all Croats, not Hercegovinian Croats, nor Bosnian Croats, nor Dalmatian Croats, and so on. He believes in the individual's role in history, except that he adds "the constructive role of the individual," because that would exclude Tito. Although he has committed himself to the policy and party of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], he says:

"If Tudjman had not won the election in Croatia, on 2 August Herzegovina would have disappeared in 24 hours."

We talked for a long time, sometimes alone, sometimes in the company of Boban's Zagreb friends and acquaintances. There were many topics, and they were ticklish. The reactions will probably vary. It is logical to start with Geneva.

The Game With the Government Delegation

[Tudjen] It is my impression, Mr. Boban, that the last round in Geneva somehow evaporated.

[Boban] The main problem of that meeting was that the Muslim people, as a partner in resolving the political crisis and war in B-H, did not have its delegation there.

[Tudjen] Well, so Izetbegovic was not there, but Silajdzic was there?

[Boban] He was, but here is the point. That was an attempt to play with some kind of government delegation that included Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. The upshot was that they ended up uninvited guests. Had there been a Bosnia-Herzegovina, there would have been a government and negotiations of this kind would not have been necessary. But the facts are different. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been destroyed and plundered by the war, and we know exactly who did that. We also know exactly who defended it, how they did it, and who wants a unified B-H. And that means a future state, not one from yesterday or today. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state that has been given international recognition, but it has yet to be created. Only the Croatian people today have access to creation of the state of B-H in compliance with international standards and those of civilization, and it is doing that unstintingly.

The Serbs are the aggressor, and what they have made of B-H will never be forgotten or forgiven. They will have to pay for it in one way or another. But at the same time the Serbs are a fact in B-H, and the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be created together with them.

The Muslim people have no real political leadership. That leadership lives in illusions. One proof of that illusion is the attempt with the government delegation at the Geneva negotiations. The real and only representatives are the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats as separate ethnic communities, and they are the only ones able to resolve the crisis and stop the war. Any other combination postpones the solutions and prolongs the conflicts.

[Tudjen] If I have understood you correctly, Izetbegovic believes that he is the state, and the rest of you are secessionists of some kind. Why does he not go to those negotiations? Is it really because he does not want to sit down with Karadzic the war criminal?

[Boban] Yes. Izetbegovic is saying that he is the one who represents the state, and the rest of us are somehow to the left and right. I do not think it is a question of his refusing to sit down with a war criminal. No one can determine who will represent another nationality. Alija is thinking in the old way, when the Croats were included in the former government and the old system without being designated and chosen by Croats, but were rather designated by the someone whom they were supposed to serve. That way of going about things can no longer be allowed.

Give 33 Percent of the Government to the Croats

[Tudjen] Did you also have similar problems in terms of objections that you are not the legitimate representative or that you do not represent all Croats in B-H?

[Boban] I did. I was told by one of the high-level international officials: Mr. Boban, you represent only such-and-such a percentage of Croats. I do not know how many, but mainly a minority. I answered him: Then please invite the person who represents the majority. The gentleman fell silent and never raised the subject again.

[Tudjen] In view of the office you hold and the situation in B-H, you have been in a whirlwind of domestic and international events, you have been meeting prestigious diplomats (Vance and Owen). Are you convinced that they are disinterested?

[Boban] It is well-known that these are experienced world politicians. They have taken part in numerous previous missions similar to this one in B-H. The chairman of the Conference on B-H is Mr. Ahtisaari, who recently completed a job very successfully in Namibia. We might conjecture this or that, but I am convinced that these are honest men, professionals who will look only at the facts in evaluating the sincerity of the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. And make decisions on that basis. I am convinced that after Yugoslavia's disappearance, they personally have no interests or intentions whatsoever to favor any of the three sides.

[Tudjen] It would be good if you would explain the participation of Miljenko Brkic and Mariofil Ljubic in Silajdzic's delegation. They are members of your political party, but they were with him.

[Boban] They came, as I said, in the delegation established by the Government of B-H. They first presented themselves as a government delegation, and then as a state delegation. When they saw that Croatian interests and Croatian political options were threatened by that delegation and that it actually was uninvited, Brkic and Ljubic joined the Croatian delegation on my invitation.

[Tudjen] What kind of political solution—in compliance, as you say, with international standards and those of civilization—did you advocate in Geneva?

[Boban] I repeat, the only steady and consistent view is our Croatian view. We favor an independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in compliance with the standards of the advanced world. But that state must be such that in it the Croatian people have rights in the same proportion as the other two nationalities. That means that the Croats must be a sovereign and constituent nationality and creator of that state, and it should be entitled to 33 percent of the central authority. That principle of ours is understood and supported by the world and understood and accepted by the Croats in B-H. I would go so far as to say that at this moment we are the only ones who want to create B-H. The Serbs and Muslims, given their extreme positions, are destroying its integrity.

We Want the War To Be Stopped

[Tudjen] What do the Serbs want?

[Boban] The extremist Serbs would annex all of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the remainder of Yugoslavia. Because of the firm position of the international community that there is to be no forcible change of borders and because B-H has been recognized as a state, the objective of the Serbs is to create a Serbian state within B-H and win recognition for it.

[Tudjen] But the Muslims?

[Boban] They want a unitary state, supposedly a state of citizens. They would use their majority to impose their will on the others.

[Tudjen] You, Mr. Boban, have frequently been accused of secret negotiations with the Serbs. Radio Belgrade reported from Geneva that Karadzic offered you one-on-one negotiations, but that you rejected that.

[Boban] First, I think it is worthwhile to talk with any man of goodwill in the world who wants to stop the war and make of B-H a modern state with equal ethnic and civil rights. And second, the talks should be mutual, which means even one-on-one. If you look at the battlefields in B-H and the areas that have been defended and liberated, you will see how much the Croatian people have done. There is hardly any battlefield where the Croats and Serbs have not come into direct conflict. But aware of the kind of sincerity there is on the other side, we do not want to talk to them without an intermediary and without the United Nations and EC as witnesses. We have said that to Messrs. Vance and Owen. The Serbs in Geneva did not directly offer bilateral negotiations to us, but to the Conference on B-H, and the cochairman passed that on to us, and we agreed, in accordance with their instructions, to work in that direction.

[Tudjen] Viewed from the prospective of the citizens of Slavonski Brod or Zupanja, who are being destroyed and killed every day because of the war in B-H, is it not true that they rightly can have no appreciation for those nuances?

[Boban] The two sides to the war need not talk about stopping the war only in global terms, it could also be done segmentally. When it is stopped on any battlefield, a prerequisite is created for its ultimate conclusion. We favor negotiations to stop the war in the Bosnian Sava Valley and for a truce, if there is no other way, over a 200-km-long battlefield from Livno to Jajce, and from the border near Dubrovnik to Konjic, where the Croats are maintaining a battlefront 80 km long. That is, we are also in favor of halting combat on battlefields if it cannot be immediately stopped everywhere. The essential thing is to persuade the other side of that.

B-H Has Yet To Be Created

[Tudjen] Why have Karadzic's units been attacking Jajce so persistently and fiercely?

[Boban] They would like to take control of hydropower plants, or perhaps they would stop if we gave them power.

[Tudjen] LE MONDE, according to our Paris correspondent, does not spare the Croatian side, you, that is, either. He writes that Karadzic's speech in Geneva could please the Croats, who speak about the division of B-H with several nuances. How do you personally reconcile

the fact that you are at one and the same time both a "Croatian integralist" and an advocate of an integral B-H?

[Boban] We are the only ones who are not dividing B-H. My desire and that of many Croats in B-H is quite natural to live in our parent homeland. But the circumstances are different. We are making a sacrifice both because of B-H and because of historical and geographic reasons. Just because we have decided to remain within B-H, the state of three constituent nationalities, that does not mean we are renouncing our ties with the Republic of Croatia.

[Tudjen] From certain quarters there was a strong hue and cry against establishing the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia. It was said: What do we need with a state within a state?

[Boban] The old system has ceased to operate in our region, but the government must function. We cannot fight and make sacrifices and after everything say: Alija, please come and we will reestablish the state we had yesterday. Bosnia-Herzegovina is an internationally recognized state, but it has to be created.

We Will Correct Injustices

[Tudjen] The Serbian side is being fiercely accused of concentration camps, but to a lesser extent this is also being addressed to the Muslims and Croats. Are there concentration camps on the territory of the HZ Herceg-Bosnia?

[Boban] There are no camps on the territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia, that is, on the defended territory from Bosanski Brod and Orasje to Livno and Neum. We have prisons containing captured enemy soldiers and criminals of every faith and every nationality, who have committed crimes in one way or another. Just recently we have organized the operation of the courts. Judicial proceedings are under way. We will release everyone who by the rules of the court ought not to be detained. Civilians are in those prisons solely because of crime. An international commission of the Red Cross has seen that for itself by an inspection. It is true that we were criticized because of a school near Bosanski Brod, but because the prison for that area was in Doboj, which was occupied, a temporary prison was set up in Bosanski Brod, and it is to be broken up in a matter of days.

[Tudjen] Explain how it happened that Mostar, which 10 years ago had a Croatian majority, now has a Muslim majority.

[Boban] The 1991 Population Census of which you speak has not been verified, that is a provisional census. However, in the eighties Mostar ceased to be a predominantly Croatian city when the powers that be, as in many other areas in B-H, separated 6,000 Croats in the village Ljuti Do, which is 5 km from Mostar, and attached those Croats to Siroki Brijeg Municipality,

which is 15 km away. All of that in order to alter the ethnic composition. We, of course, are going to correct such injustices and monstrous decisions. In spite of that, Mostar continues to be a city with a Croatian majority, because, as we know, the population of Mostar includes about 5,000 Croats who are employed temporarily all over the world, but they were not taken into account in the last census.

[Tudjen] As far as we know, Mostar is not the only such case.

[Boban] Take Ravno Municipality, which was attached to Trebinje. A municipality with a 60-percent Croatian population became a part of a municipality in which Croats represent 10 percent. You have the example of Jajce, where the proportion of Croats was 73 percent, and in 1966 they took away Dobretici and other places and attached them to the almost completely Serbian municipality Skender Vakuf, in which the Croats then represented some negligible percentage, and in Jajce they became a relative majority instead of an absolute majority. We have the example of the compact Croatian area in central Bosnia, where 50,000 Croats in an entirely homogeneous area were divided among five municipalities: Zavidovici, Maglaj, Teslic, Tesanj, and Zepce. They were bothered by anything Croatian. Today, many policies are based on that, because again Croatism bothers people, but we will not allow that.

[Tudjen] Let us go back to Mostar. The Muslim Council of Herzegovina was established there the other day.

[Boban] You are referring to an unreasonable expression of political intention concealed up to now. This should have been created, and we would have been happy if it had been created at a time when Herzegovina needed to be defended. But that was the time when there was also a need to make sacrifices for that defense. The council is being created now in Herzegovina that has been defended with the political intention of ruling it. I think that at this point the Muslims can spend their time more intelligently than wasting energy separating the Croats and Muslims.

[Tudjen] The other day, Dobroslav Paraga made a statement to the German magazine DER SPIEGEL to the effect that in the end the Croats would be grateful to the Islamic countries for their freedom, not to the West, and that units of the HOS [Croatian Defense Forces] are armed with new U.S. rifles for which a high price was paid. What is your comment on that?

[Boban] Even in this very serious situation in B-H the world needs comedy. The world always finds comedy to lift its spirits. I think that Mr. Paraga, as a marginal person of Croatian political reality, has made a very good contribution to the world's amusement. But as for his weapons, no one has so far seen them in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not a single Croat, nor have the Chetniks captured them. If that is the case, then those weapons do not exist.

Patience of Exiles From Banija Exhausted*92BA1471C Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
22 Sep 92 p 6*

[Article by Antun Petracic: "UNPROFOR Is Silent and Inactive"]

[Text] For those driven out of Banija, a full year has already passed, or soon will, since the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and Chetnik terrorists drove them from their homes in Petrinja, Glina, Hrvatska Kostajnica, and Dvor na Uni by force of arms. The Croatian exiles have incessantly, since the summer and fall of last year, been dreaming about returning and renewing their badly damaged villages and settlements, and when the fiercest armed conflicts ceased and in the expectation of specific political talks, all eyes and hopes were turned to the UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force]. Even after half a year of their presence and responsibility, Croats from Banija have not felt or had any benefit whatsoever from the Nigerians and Danes in the UNPA [UN Protected Area] North. The dark-skinned and light-haired gentlemen are to be seen every day in Sisak, where they exchange money, where in markets and stores they buy who knows what and for whom (for the rebels and terrorists from neighboring villages, it is believed).

Commissioners of the Government of the Republic of Croatia from all four occupied Banija municipalities, whose headquarters are in Sisak, are unceasingly demanding of the UNPROFOR more effective and visible effort, that is, complete realization of the Vance Plan. In the Sector North, final realization of even a small part of the international obligations is very far off and uncertain, because it still is not clear to anyone how the UN forces will disarm and confiscate all the weapons from the occupiers, who have replaced the olive drab uniforms they wore until recently and replaced them with blue police uniforms and proclaimed themselves some kind of defenders of a so-called Serbian Krajina.

Banija is overflowing with JNA officers of limited intelligence and blinded by Serbian expansionism—like former Colonel Stanko Letic, whose tanks last summer destroyed Glina, Kraljevcani, Dragotinci, and other

Croatian villages in Banija, who is now some kind of police commander, and who on Monday delivered a speech in Petrinja for the "anniversary of liberation from the Ustashi"—who have already been proclaimed war criminals, whom commissioners of the Government of the Republic of Croatia are constantly pointing out to the chief officials of the UNPROFOR and of Sector North. It seems that those driven out of Glina are the loudest and most severe in demanding their international rights and establishing the status of UN forces. Through their lobby in Zagreb and the government commissioner's office, the people from Glina have sent an open letter to Charles Carrugia, UN representative for civil affairs in Sector North, from whom they are demanding an urgent independent and separate meeting with the top officials of the commissioner's office, which, says the Glina commissioner, Marko Sremic, should be held in the coming week at a place and time fixed personally by Charles Carrugia.

The approximately 20,000 people driven out of the Petrinja area, who for an entire year have lived from hand to mouth, scattered over Croatia and the world, are already pretty well exhausted, and this Monday it was exactly a year since the complete occupation of their city and the entire municipality. The rebel Serbs have proclaimed the "historic events" in bloody September 1991 a "triumphant day of liberation," with intensive glorification of their power, might, and some kind of inherited rights to century-old Croatian soil in the center of Banija, where they were newcomers in the Turkish times, and where, in the past year of wartime, because of their Serbian expansionist ideas and appetites, they have been destroying all Croatian traces. No one knows the number of Croats, civilians, mainly people who are old and helpless, who have been killed.

The people of Petrinja, like all the others driven out of Banija, have complete plans and entire programs for rebuilding life, the economy, and all other segments in their municipalities, among which the fewest are from the area of Dvor na Uni. Nevertheless, more than 1,000 people driven out of that part of the Una Valley, although they are the fewest, but were the longest in Banija, are not giving up on returning and starting life again beside their own Una River.

State Council Electoral Districts Defined

93P20006A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 2 Oct 92 p 2


[Article by Jana Taskar: "State Council: Electoral Districts Should Be Cohesive Units"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 1 Oct—The new Slovene Parliament will have a 40-member State Council. Eighteen of its members will represent employers, employees, farmers, craftsmen, independent professions, and noncommercial activities. They will be elected indirectly by electoral bodies: in chambers, associations, and unions of specific activities. The other 22 members will represent local interests and will be elected directly by electoral districts. Elections for the State Council will be held simultaneously with elections for the State Assembly and the president.

The Parliament had to adopt the Law on Establishment of Electoral Districts for the election of representatives of local interests. They will have an imperative mandate, and thus the electoral districts should adhere, to the greatest possible degree, to the rule of being cohesive units in historical, geographical, and other respects. Originally, 19 electoral districts were planned; however,

due to numerous comments by deputies and communities, in the adopted law their number corresponds with the number of elected council members.

For the election of representatives of local interests, Slovenia will be divided into 22 electoral districts. The first electoral district is comprised of all Ljubljana wards: Bežigrad, Center, Moste-Polje, Siska, and Vic-Rudnik; the second includes Domžale, Kamnik, and Litija; the third—Maribor and Pesnica; the fourth—Slovenska Bistrica and Ruse; the fifth—Celje, Lasko, Slovenske Konjice, Sentjur Pri Celju, Smarje Pri Jelsah, and Zalec; the sixth—Mozirje and Velenje; the seventh—Ptuj; the eighth—Ormoz, Ljutomer, Gornja Radgona, and Lenart; the ninth—Kranj, Trzic, and Skofja Loka; the 10th—Jesenice and Radovljica; the 11th—Murska Sobota and Lendava; the 12th—Nova Gorica and Ajdovscina; the 13th—Tolmin and Idrija; the 14th—Novo Mesto and Trebnje; the 15th—Crnomelj and Metlika; the 16th—Postojna and Ilirska Bistrica; the 17th—Vrhnika, Logatec, and Cerknica; the 18th—Koper, Izola, and Piran; the 19th—Slovenj Gradec, Dravograd, Ravne Na Koroskem, and Radlje Ob Dravi; the 20th—Krsko, Brezice, and Sevnica; the 21st—Trbovlje, Hrastnik, and Zagorje; and the 22d—Kocevje, Ribnica, and Grosuplje.



Intensive Preparations for Upcoming Elections

92BA1434A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 17 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Veso Stojanov: "The Parties' Attention Is Focused on Possible Alliances"]

[Text] *The parties have already formed electoral lists, and a strategy for the election campaign; the SKD [Slovene Christian Democrats] think that the electoral legislation does not permit any close alliances.*

Ljubljana, 16 Sep—After the passage of the fundamental electoral laws, especially the laws on elections to the State Assembly and the State Council, the political parties have begun intensive preparations for the December elections. In addition to the fact that almost all the parties have already formed their electoral lists, prepared a strategy for the election campaign, and hired marketing agencies that will conduct their election campaigns, announcements and hints can already be heard among the political public about possible preelection and also postelection coalitions and alliances.

For now, the problem of preelection and postelection alliances is being dealt with most by the smaller parliamentary parties, which (many of them) are not very convinced that they will even be able to get into the lower, house of representatives of the Slovene parliament, since in order to enter the State Assembly, in the elections a party has to receive more than 3.4 percent of the votes in the entire state. It is interesting, however, that they are dealing with this in spite of the fact that the law on electing deputies to the State Assembly is not written in such a way as to encourage possible preelection alliances. It is from this standpoint as well that one should judge yesterday's demand by the Liberal Party that the parliamentary opposition parties clearly state as soon as possible what they think about preelection cooperation and possible postelection government coalitions. The Liberal Party representatives, in fact, are not satisfied with the rather "lukewarm" attitude of the Christian Democrats toward several initiatives and actions launched by their party and other opposition parties. As Liberal Party secretary Danijel Malensek stated yesterday, that sort of behavior by the Christian Democrats encourages them to conclude that the Christian Democrats are already thinking about a possible postelection coalition with the Liberal Democrats and also some other party in the current ruling coalition, which they themselves do not want to have anything to do with.

This demand by the Liberal Party may jeopardize the present relatively coordinated approach by the opposition parties, since it is demanding a clear and final statement from all these parties on their postelection intentions. That position, however, not only in the opinion of the Liberals, but also of representatives of the People's Party and the National Democrats, is one of the fundamental conditions for any possible closer cooperation by the current opposition parties in the elections. Of course, the big question is whether the largest opposition

parties, the SKD [Christian Democratic Party] and the SLS [Slovene People's Party], will agree to closer preelection cooperation or even alliance. Both parties, in fact, would not particularly benefit from such an alliance, which, however, does not apply to the National Democrats and the Liberals.

The Liberal Party's demand was actually elicited by statements by Christian Democratic leaders, including also Lojze Peterle, that the SKD was prepared to enter a government coalition after the elections with all the parliamentary parties except the Reformers. These statements, and simulations of the possible election results prepared by several parties, have now given rise to still very cautious rumors that it would not be surprising if Drnovsek's Liberal Democrats and Peterle's Christian Democrats formed a government coalition after the elections, especially since everyone expects that these parties will be the ones to receive the most votes in the December elections. Some people even predict that both of them together may even get more than 50 percent of the votes. Because of the bad experiences with the present and former government coalitions with five or six parties, that outcome of the December elections would not be any sort of surprise, and the ideological differences between the two parties are not big enough that with a precisely defined government program they could not be elected. At the same time, this would guarantee a relatively stable parliamentary majority, and allow the new government to pass most laws.

This not completely impossible outcome of the approaching elections is being considered not only on the right, but also by the smaller parties in the center and on the left. The predictions of a possible joint, or rather, coordinated approach by the Socialists, the Social Democrats, and the Democrats in the elections have been a bit premature, since it is already almost certain that the Democrats will participate in the elections by themselves, since they are aware that they have several individuals who are extremely popular with the public, and who can bring them some electoral votes. At the same time, however, these influential individuals are precisely the ones who could be a serious obstacle to the subsequent formation of a government coalition. The antagonisms between the Liberal Democrats and the Democrats are well known, not to mention relations between the Democrats and the Christian Democrats. It is precisely for this reason that the speculations and predictions about a postelection coalition among the Christian and Liberal Democrats and also one of the center parties (it is hard to believe that the LDS and the SKD would really get more than 50 percent of the votes) are causing the most concern to the Democrats, who may easily find themselves on the opposition benches in the future parliament.

[Box, p 2]

Particularly numerous speculations about possible preelection and postelection coalitions were caused by statements that the Democrats are already supposed to have

offered Drnovsek's Liberal Democrats a "nonaggression pact" last week. This pact would be in effect for the period of the election campaign, and would also be the basis for a coalition after the elections. As we have heard, however, Drnovsek's party did not agree to this. Moreover, we have heard that such a pact has been quietly agreed upon by Dr. Janez Drnovsek and Lojze Peterle.

[Box, p 2]

Edvard Stanic, the chief secretary of the Slovene Christian Democrats, repeated for us once again their already well-known position that the electoral legislation, especially the legislation for elections to the Slovene parliament's house of representatives, does not permit any closer alliances. They themselves are determined to act independently in the elections to the State Assembly, but they are prepared to enter into possible alliances in the elections to the State Council and the possible second round of the presidential elections. He also emphasized that coalitions are usually formed after elections, and regarding the Liberals' demand, he stated that at this time whoever states now what he will do from now on is not acting wisely politically. Furthermore, he also told us that there were significant differences between the [word illegible] coordination of the parliamentary parties, and the preelection coordination of political parties.

Composition of Slovene Air Force

93P20005A Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 3 Oct 92 p 24

[Unattributed article: "Gazelle in Air Again"]

[Text] Brnik, 3 Oct—The Slovene Air Force consists of two types of helicopters: AB-109 Hirundo and AB-412 (a larger helicopter for 12 passengers). Recently a Gazelle was added as a result of the defection of its pilot, Joze Kalan, and flight engineer, Bogomir Sustar, on 28 June last year. The aforementioned Gazelle has remained in the hangar in Brnik for almost a year due to malfunction and a missing spare part. Therefore, it did not fly on the anniversary of the defection, as had been previously announced. Pilot Kalan flew Milan Kucan, president of the Slovene Presidency, to the military exercise "Triglav 92" on the slopes of Begunjsca last Wednesday. The Gazelle SL-HAA is the first of its type in the Slovene Air Force, which will consist mainly of light helicopters.

Director on Condition of Ljubljanska Banka

92BA1434B Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 17 Sep 92 p 4

[Unattributed interview with Marko Voljc, acting general director of Ljubljanska Banka; place and date not given: "Afterward the Weaknesses of Our Banking System Will No Longer Be Hidden"]

[Text] *The Ljubljanska Banka [LB] stock company has been in prerehabilitation proceedings since 1 July. Acting general director Marko Voljc explained especially for DNEVNIK what this means.*

[Voljc] Ever since April, the bank has no longer been able to allocate appropriate funds for the mandatory reserve at the Bank of Slovenia [BS]. The latter therefore appointed two authorized representatives, who are examining the bank's liquidity situation on a daily basis, together with two LB representatives. There are several reasons for the bank's liquidity difficulties. Along with its restrictive monetary policy, the BS has prevented the previous concealment of our banking system's weaknesses, and as we know, in the past most of these difficulties have been concentrated in the LB system.

The requirements for a daily liquidity flow showed that the bank could not meet its obligations to its customers without borrowing in the interbank market and liquidity loans from the BS. This is partly a result of the situation after the collapse of the Yugoslav market, and even more a result of the liquidity and solvency difficulties that the bank's larger debtors have. They cannot service their obligations to the bank. The bank, however, must settle its obligations to depositors, and in the past it always has. In other words, on the assets side, the inflow of funds declined, and on the liabilities side, the bank has to settle its obligations.

Now, the bank can only loan money to the most reliable clients, with an A credit rating, and in exceptional cases, with permission from the BS, to clients with a B credit rating as well. This part of the assets is consequently no longer threatened; it is earning income and profits; but it is a relatively small percentage in LB's total liquidity flow. Consequently, the bank will now have to cooperate exclusively with sound clients, and this will also permit it a complete new method of operation. When it is known in the rehabilitation process for the Slovene banking system how large the liquidity gap is, and when the government says how much new funds it has, the financial rehabilitation will also be able to get started. The bank is now trying to do what it can on its own so that things will be easier later on.

[DNEVNIK] Some Slovene banks are being rescued by additional capitalization from abroad. Is LB also thinking about this?

[Voljc] We will only be able to think about this when things are under control. It would not be sensible now, strategically, politically, and economically. In this case it is easier for smaller banks. Of course, we are not renouncing partnership or any kind of foreign cooperation, since a bank can only gain by this. Not least of all, enough is said about LB's reputation abroad by the fact that we were invited to the regular annual assembly of the IMF and the World Bank, which will be at the end of this week in Washington.

U.S. Policy Toward Macedonia, Balkans Analyzed
93BA0004A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 22 Sep 92 p 7

[Article by Anton Purvanov: "Macedonia Is the American Domino With a Balkan Address"]

[Text] In November 1990, CIA analysts prepared a report about the Yugoslav situation for the White House. The basic conclusions in it are summarized as follows:

1. "Tito's" Yugoslavia is entering the twilight of its existence, which will begin no later than 18 months from now.
2. It is "more than probable" that the finale will assume the apocalyptic dimensions of a cruel, bloody civil war.

In spite of those analyses and predictions, the Washington administration supported the integrity and international government status of Yugoslavia. In a State Department declaration it was emphasized: "We support the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and its establishment as a commonwealth of democratic political partners enjoying equal rights."

From the beginning of 1992 the events in Yugoslavia definitely buried the hopes for a "civilized breakup." After vacillations and application of "double standards," the countries of the European Community (EC) recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Hercegovina. In spite of the fact that, in the first place, Macedonia was found to meet the conditions and criteria of the so-called Badenter Commission, it remained "outside the scope" of official EC recognition because of the implacable opposition on the part of Greece.

In the situation that had been created, the leadership of the Republic of Macedonia undertook energetic actions to overcome the isolation, to ensure the support of the leading international factors, among which special hopes are held for the United States. At the beginning of the year President Gligorov visited Washington, where he was received by President Bush and his national security advisor, General Skowcroft. The latter assured that "the United States attaches particular significance to Macedonia among the former Yugoslav republics."

The exchange of messages between Bush and Gligorov in April of this year was a unique "warm to hot" type communication for possible rapid recognition of Macedonia. The intentions of the United States to cooperate wholly in the efforts of the EC to find a "modus vivendi" in the positions of Greece and Macedonia, which will open the way for the international recognition of the latter, were confirmed upon the delivery of a Bush message by the American ambassador in Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann.

That U.S. benevolence provoked the acute dissatisfaction of Greece, whose embassy made diplomatic demarches to Washington and organized mass public protests. The "cool-cold" dichotomy for the recognition of the republic of Macedonia prevailed in U.S. policy. In

a special message to the Greek Prime Minister, G. Bush adopted the Greek arguments and explained the position of the United States—to recognize the three republics that requested independence and sovereignty. Macedonia dropped out of "the package." There is a change in U.S. policy, with which the events in Macedonia are left to develop according to the Yugo-crisis scenario—"the more evil, the better."

After the obvious collapse of the "Macedonian hopes" for collective recognition by the EC at the EC Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels in May of this year, the Macedonian leadership took special measures to explain the positions and further intentions and actions of Washington. K. Gligorov and Foreign Minister of Macedonia D. Maleski held an unexpected "working meeting" in the United States in May of this year devoted to the constructive nature of Macedonian policy.

The American side remained restrained and markedly cool.

In the complex tangle of courses and interests Washington clearly has its plans for the Balkans after the removal of Sl. Milosevic into the last "Tito-Bolshevik bastion" and with the creation of a "third Yugoslavia." A privileged place in those plans is assigned to Turkey, which has to assume the role of "outpost of Western democracy" and a "regional minisuperpower." Backed by the unconditional support of the United States, it is to be converted into a restraining and balancing factor at the intersection of three continents with the most sensitive regions for peace in the world: the Balkans, the Caucasus and former Soviet Central Asia, and the Near East.

In these plans Macedonia is looked upon as a third-stage component of the domino, which may be used as a "reserve version" and will be "set in motion" under certain circumstances of limited scope and goals at a given moment.

The analysis of U.S. policy towards the Yugo-crisis and the recognition of Macedonia reveal some tendencies that have taken shape:

1. The strategic line confirmed after the success of Operation "Desert Storm" against Iraq and after the tremendous changes in Central and southeastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union after 1989 is being followed; the United States will prove to be the only superpower in the world and is entrusted with the mission of building a "new world order."
2. Within the framework of that U.S. strategy, the role of Europe increases, but up to certain limits. The circumstance that the situation is fundamentally different from that which existed at the time of "Yalta 45," or even of "Malta 89," is taken into account. The democratic, but drama-filled, changes in the Eastern European countries,

the disintegration of a number of multinational federations: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, and the appearance of a number of new countries, has increased the risk factors for peace on the continent and in the world.

3. The United States does not have a specially developed strategy for the Balkans; they do not occupy a front burner in the arrangement of their interests. After the EC efforts proved fruitless and compromised it as an independent and sufficiently authoritative factor for solving the crisis, Washington then came to the forefront, demonstrating its superiority in capabilities for action, pressure, force, and influence. Undoubtedly, the Balkans are turning into one of the basic intersections of the struggle for power and influence between united Europe and the United States in their competition to acquire followers from among the Balkan countries. In this struggle the United States is definitely oriented toward, and betting on, Turkey, and to a lesser degree on Bulgaria and Albania. Greece remains for them an allied country that creates certain inconveniences and whose loyalty has to be assured with temporary concessions and reassurances.

4. The tactic of "things in Macedonia will be left to come to a head" is evident in the policy concerning the so-called "Macedonian case," as care is being taken not to change the following parameters.

Not to let internal unrest reach a large scale, which would call for opening a "southern front" in the Yugo-crisis and to lead to intervention of other countries—Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria.

Not to let it come to open armed aggression by the Serbian Army in Macedonia, which would activate the desire for mass resistance.

Not to allow any of the leading European countries (especially Germany with its traditional interests and allies in the Balkans) to establish its dominance in the region and to replace the American influence and interests.

Evidently, pragmatic goals, limited by the forthcoming presidential elections, prevail in the line and activities of the administration in Washington toward the desire of Macedonia for independence and sovereignty. Even the reverse is not excluded in the situation—there is a preference for the situation in which, after the changes made in the "reduced Yugoslavia" and the naming of the American citizen M. Panic as prime minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there will be a "return of the prodigal child," Macedonia, into the bosom of the third Yugoslavian national formation.

Exodus of Serbian Republic Krajina Serbs

92BA1470B Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
19 Sep 92 p 16

[Article by Ivkica Bacic: "Knin Emptied Overnight!"]

[Text] For several months now stories have been circulating in Belgrade, first quietly, then more and more loudly, about the "postwar exodus" of Serbs from the "Serbian Republic Krajina [RSK]," which formerly was Babic's and is now Hadzic's and Paspalj's. Even the most hard-bitten in Belgrade use the expression "exodus" only out of habit—that is, any occasion to remind the public of the "Ustasha" government in Zagreb is welcome, although even the most hard-bitten openly admit that the most recent flight should be blamed on the leadership of Serbia, "which has betrayed us," to the command of the Yugoarmy, "which withdrew in cowardly fashion," to the leadership of the "republic krajina," which "wanted us to wage war while they lounged around in luxury apartments in Belgrade."

From Knin and certain opstinas with a majority Serb population, from which before and even during the war—into which the "threatened" Serbs were led by the late Jovan Raskovic, who afterward, suddenly realizing that war meant killing, soon fled to Belgrade—there were the fewest refugees, from opstinas that had hardly even caught the smell of the war, in which there was no major wartime destruction, from which pictures and news were sent out into the world for a long time to prove that, here, "we now have our own state, schools, health service, and everything we need," from those opstinas and from that "state" people are now fleeing in droves. Teachers, general practitioners, pediatricians, anesthesiologists are leaving, and, above all, young people are leaving. When a private manager from the South African Republic announced recently that he was hiring, more than 2,000 people from Knin, most of them young, applied to go to work in that country.

As he was leaving, one of them said to a BORBA newsman, asking to remain anonymous: "If I stay, there is no future at all—only to wait to be called up for another mobilization and to see others avoid the war by using connections. I want to flee from that as soon as possible, and I am sure that I will never come back." According to certain reports, the Knin SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs] has been simply overwhelmed in the last two months with notifications of termination of residence. Of course, only "ordinary" Serbs are officially terminating their residence. Those with a political "address" simply disappear overnight, and it is precisely that flight of those Serbs from Knin and the Krajina who are well-known in politics that was an unmistakable sign to the others to pack up and forget the "just struggle for unification of all Serbs." After all, reasons the "ordinary" Serb, if the "more visible" Serbs are abandoning ship, it is certain to sink! One of those more visible Serbs is now strolling the streets of Belgrade in a civilian suit, and he has removed his uniform, the cockaded cap, and machine gun, although he has not forgotten them, because from the deep shade of the International Press Center, along with the tavernkeeper Vinko Stupar, he is announcing the establishment of "guerrilla detachments if the Ustashi attack us again." Lazar Macura, a man who was a close confidant of the former Krajina leader

Milan Babic, is also fighting for the "Krajina Serbs" in the Serbian capital. It is an open secret that Mile Paspalj, after he signed the Vance Plan, which he was induced to do by Kostic, Jovic, and Adzic, thereby signing a political death warrant to his previous intimacy with Babic—has acquired a four-room apartment in an elite part of Belgrade. According to what BORBA has written, Milan Martic, top Krajina policeman, recently revealed that the former Kostic-Jovic federal treasury had financed construction of no fewer than six apartments in Belgrade to meet the "personnel needs of the Krajina." Slavko Prijic, former head of the Krajina office on Terazije in Belgrade, was removed not only because he had made a statement to foreign "anti-Serb" media that the "republic krajina" was nothing more than a fata morgana, because "they all betrayed us." He was removed above all because he "rounded out" the list of "more visible" Krajina Serbs who had settled down quietly in Belgrade. So, yet another "Pan-Serb" dream has evaporated. Only now the deceived population sees the fate intended for it by those Serbs who were the first to fight and brought them to their feet, armed them with weapons and with lies about the "new Ustasha campaign," telling them fairy stories along the way about their own state. And they actually did wage a struggle, which was for luxury apartments far from Knin, leaving the people behind to choose either to stay in the darkness of their own "state" (recently the Krajina has ceased to have electricity except for hospitals) or to buy a ticket to the South African Republic.

Panic on War Crimes, Economic Crisis

AU1310084592 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
12 Oct 92 p 5

[Interview with FRY Prime Minister Milan Panic by Oliver Vujovic in Belgrade; date not given: "The World Is Not Against the Serbs"]

[Text] [Vujovic] Mr. Prime Minister, you are the head of the government of the internationally not recognized "FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]." How do you feel as prime minister of such a country?

[Panic] First of all, it is not true that the FRY is not recognized, because 48 states have recognized us. However, it is a fact that the EC, the United States, and some other countries have not done so as yet.

[Vujovic] But the position of your country in the United Nations is vacant.

[Panic] No, since Yugoslavia has not been excluded from the United Nations. However, I wanted to change the flag of Tito's Yugoslavia in the United Nations, but it has remained.

But let us talk about the situation in the country. It is really hard for me here because some people want to continue Tito's Yugoslavia by all means possible. I am against this.

I want finally to put an end to the past, to Tito's Yugoslavia, and to start with Panic's new Yugoslavia. Well, I think that Panic's Yugoslavia sounds very good.

In this context, I want to burn the old Yugoslav flag in front of the UN building. That would really be the end of Tito's Yugoslavia.

[Vujovic] During your visit to Washington last week, war crimes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia were discussed. There are already documents on war criminals. What action is to be taken against them?

[Panic] I do not think that all that is new. If the world had engaged in lawsuits against war criminals as early as during World War II, we would have had thousands more war criminals after the war. Many Germans and Americans who were said to be "innocent" after the war would have certainly been among them. One must learn from this, and I have also said this to all the world politicians to whom I have talked.

[Vujovic] What are people supposed to learn from it?

[Panic] This is simply being discussed too much while the war is still going on. Only when an end has been put to the war can war crimes be discussed and can one assess who is really a war criminal. Then one can engage in lawsuits in court and punish all the culprits, but, of course, only if they really are guilty.

[Vujovic] Many Serbs, Muslims, and Croats might be convicted as war criminals.

[Panic] In a civil war it is difficult to say who is and who is not a criminal. It is hard to give a definition of a war crime. Many people who have been completely normal until then do very foolish things in a civil war. However, some of these people are in reality innocent, because they were often forced by their circumstances to shoot in the civil war.

[Vujovic] What are the priorities of your policy?

[Panic] Peace, peace, and once again peace. Free elections, free elections, free elections. Also a democratization process and the improvement of my country's position in the world.

Of course, I also want to remove the UN sanctions and develop the economy afterward. My final objective is to form an economic union of the Balkans.

[Vujovic] What have you done so far to remove the UN sanctions?

[Panic] Very much. Not only in words, but also in deeds. Cyrus Vance and the UN observers can confirm this for you. I have opened up the airports and streets to the UN forces.

As I have repeatedly stated, I am against "ethnic cleansing." And that is not all. Meanwhile, many people from the FRY have also been imprisoned for "ethnic cleansing." For example, I had the mayor arrested in the village

of Hrtkovci, where he clearly carried out "ethnic cleansing" of Croats. Also in Montenegro, in the town of Pljevlje, several people have been imprisoned.

I have dismissed former Deputy Interior Minister Mihalj Kertes.

[Vujovic] Do you believe that Serbian President Milosevic is finished because he is only attacking you because of your economic policy?

[Panic] Milosevic is not attacking me.

[Vujovic] Not Milosevic personally, but his people.

[Panic] As I said before, these people no longer live with reality. They are living in Disneyland. In the final analysis, everyone knows that it was not I who led the country to the UN sanctions, because they already existed when I took office.

I travel a lot, I have visited almost the whole world during my short term. Now I should also meet with Austrian politicians. I once met Mr. Mock at the United Nations and I must say that I agree with the Austrian Government on the solution to the problems.

This is simply great, because one of the greatest mistakes of the former policy here was the belief that the whole world hates us. This is not true, the world is not against the Serbs, as I have found out for myself.

[Vujovic] You just mentioned Foreign Minister Mock. But today Mock is not exactly popular with the Serbs.

[Panic] No, this is not true. It was only Austria's policy that was criticized by the Serbs, because Austria was exerting pressure on the United Nations regarding Yugoslavia. This should be done by other countries, not by Austria. There have been and there are no reasons for Yugoslavia to have bad relations with Austria. Good relations with Austria are very important to us.

When I was still a cyclist, I cycled several times from Zagreb to Vienna and back again. I can still remember cycling around Vienna town hall. I also lived for some time in Austria, near Gloggnitz.

We must have good relations with Austria and I will work on them.

[Vujovic] Let us go back to the problems of the remainder of Yugoslavia: There is a major economic crisis in the country. What do you intend to do about it?

[Panic] At present, we have the greatest economic crisis that has ever occurred on this territory. My government is now trying to get the monetary system under control. This has resulted in a conflict with the Serbs and the Serbian Government, but this is also normal. Always when a federal government carries something out, there are protests from local government.

But I am sure that I will manage all of this and I will control the economy, because I am a businessman. Take,

for example, the debts of the country: This can be solved very simply by the sale of buildings. Then one gets cash.

[Vujovic] Elections have been announced for November. Can you make a forecast?

[Panic] The winner will be somebody who advocates peace. I think that it is only a question of who will do most for peace in the next few days.

The winner will also be somebody who offers a good economic policy in addition to peace. And what I am implementing is precisely peace and economic changes.

[Vujovic] You are very sure of your ground. But who controls the Army, which is certainly an important political factor?

[Panic] I am also the defense minister and the Army must simply do everything that I say.

Once, when I met with General Zivota Panic, the chief of staff, and a journalist asked me whether I had Zivota Panic under control, I proved it. I asked the journalists whether I should order Zivota Panic to get up three times for me. The journalist was speechless, but I believe that everyone realized that I am the one who gives the orders in the FRY Army.

[Vujovic] Your first 100 days as prime minister will soon be over. Are you satisfied with the results of the work that has been achieved so far?

[Panic] I am never satisfied, but I hope that we will soon be able to eliminate the UN sanctions and that democracy will win in the country in the November elections. Then everything else will continue to go well.

[Vujovic] Are you an optimist?

[Panic] Yes, of course I am an optimist.

SPS Leader Jovic on Panic, War, Sanctions

92BA1471A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 11 Sep 92 pp 18-20

[Interview with Dr. Borisav Jovic, president of the Socialist Party of Serbia, by NIN editors; place and date not given: "War Was Forced on the Serbs"]

[Text] Dr. Borisav Jovic, a man who in the most dramatic period of recent Serbian history was in key positions in Yugoslavia (the second, which has been dismembered, and the third, newly created), now head of the incumbent party, responded to NIN's request that he speak about the most recent political happenings in the country. Mr. Jovic, then, answers questions of NIN editors in the presence of the reader.

[NIN] We know the result of the initiative to vote no confidence in Prime Minister Panic. With respect to the behavior of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] in the course of last week, was this a tactical retreat following the reactions of the domestic and world public, or was

this an indirect admission that factions exist within the party that are becoming increasingly difficult to control?

[Jovic] It is not a question of factions. The party is unified in looking at the shortcomings of the government's performance. The only dilemma we had was whether to bring down the government or criticize it, and the party decided on criticism of the government, on giving it a chance to straighten up.

In this matter there is obviously no difference between the position of the party and the position of the group that made the motion for a vote of confidence, but it was very clear that that was only the initiative of a certain number of people whom we did not want to challenge at that point, but we did state clearly that the party had yet to take a position.

If the party felt that the criticism was not justified, then there would have been differences between us. At issue is the assessment of whether it is expedient to bring down the government or not. I must say that the entire deputy caucus and the entire leadership of the party were unified in the judgment that the government should not be brought down.

[NIN] What in general is the relationship, at both the republic and federal levels, between the SPS deputies and the party's Main Committee? We have heard that differences are not all that rare.

[Jovic] Cooperation is very good in the federal deputy caucus. As far as the republic caucus is concerned, there are several differences. Simply because the election was specific for the deputies of Serbia. A very large number of people became deputies there because they are suitable in their own community, and frequently they are not even members of the Socialist Party. But the main reason is that we have a relatively large number of deputies—193, while 126 is quite enough for a majority. Accordingly, the very fact that it is possible, say, for 50 deputies to vote against us makes us relaxed, which is not good.

[NIN] What is your assessment of the performance of the federal government and federal prime minister up to this point?

[Jovic] We share the opinion of the public that the prime minister has made an immense effort to break through the news blockade and has tried to get people abroad to understand what Yugoslavia is, what Serbia is, and what Montenegro is; however, we also have very serious objections to the way this is being done. We very much fear that he is pursuing a line we do not agree with—that he is in favor of peace, and that we are in favor of war, that we have been in favor of war, and that he is in favor of peace.

However, when he came to take up office, to accept his powers, we talked for a long time, and he told me that he was deeply convinced that we had been treated in the world the way we had because we had misrepresented

ourselves abroad. That is, the world does not have the truth, but lies are dominant, and his main task is to change that. But he would not be able to make that change unless it was true that we are in favor of peace. He would not be able to change that if it were not true that we are not waging war in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Our understanding, then, was that the course of events would be to make public that Serbia and Yugoslavia are not in favor of war and are not involved in war. But I am afraid that the course of events is such that the fight for peace begins with him and before him there was the fight for war. We absolutely do not agree with that, and it is an out-and-out lie.

Whether there is a need behind that to operate that way in order to succeed in the world or some need of a political nature so that the people here in the country will think that we really have been for war—that is the big question, but we categorically reject that. After all, what benefit can come to our country if a lie—that we are in favor of war—is replaced by another lie—that only he is in favor of peace?!

[NIN] Those are more reproaches at the verbal level....

[Jovic] This is a very big thing. And some of his specific moves have also been very dangerous. We in the Assembly have boiled this down to two or three points. What Europe and the United States demanded of us in The Hague and Brussels and now in London, and this is apparently largely the reason why they instituted the sanctions, which they are pressing us with, this is for us to give up the position of equality of the Serbian people as compared to other nationalities in the unraveling of the Yugoslav crisis. If we are supposed to accept everything they have required of us and to consent to everything, then we had no need for Panic at all. We could have done that ourselves.

We are very afraid that he is either acting naively or superficially, or he is pursuing some tactic which we do not see the way out of or when it promises anything.

He ought to familiarize himself very fully with what is what and then make statements, and not say that the foreign critics are right. A few days ago he said that the Albanians cannot be banned from speaking Albanian on television—as though someone here is prohibiting them from doing so; that they cannot be prohibited from having school instruction in their own language—as though someone is keeping that from them.... Then he talked about the notorious emergency powers, which do not exist. He talked about those laws which discriminate against Albanians, but which do not exist. If someone is issuing statements which are absolutely unfounded, regardless of whether he is doing so deliberately or unawares, he, first, is encouraging separatism, and second, he is increasing the pressure on our country from abroad. This is, of course, harmful to our country and must be criticized.

[NIN] The economic situation in the country is getting more and more critical. The encirclement in the form of

the sanctions around Yugoslavia is slowly being tightened just before winter begins. You know what the conditions are for removing them. Would you be ready to consent to them without qualification?

[Jovic] I must say that I do not know what the conditions are for removal of the sanctions. If I did know, it would be much easier. If the conditions are to sacrifice the interests of the Serbian people in the krajinas and in B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina], to sacrifice Kosovo, and possibly Vojvodina and Sandzak, then they will have to keep that up until they force the Serbian people to elect another leadership, and then that leadership can consent to that, because we will not consent. If it is a question of something else, then we might talk. If it is a question of the war in Bosnia, we are for peace in Bosnia, but peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina depends more on those who instituted the sanctions toward Yugoslavia than it does on us.

[NIN] The resolutions of the Security Council do not mention a sacrifice of the Serbian people, Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak....

[Jovic] Look at the document on Serbia and Montenegro from the conference in London, where all that is mentioned. Look at the documents of the European Community so far from the conferences in The Hague and Brussels, where all of this is mentioned. If that is in question, then I personally do not believe that the Socialist Party can consent to such sacrifices. Perhaps someone else will be able to do that in the name of the Serbian people, but we cannot go down in history as traitors to our people.

[NIN] It is said that an unwritten condition is changing the current government in Serbia. How do you interpret that, and would you be ready to withdraw in the general interest?

[Jovic] If a condition were for any of us to withdraw to get the sanctions removed, I personally make an offer that we will immediately sign an agreement and withdraw. I believe that any of us holding office would accept to do that in the interest of the people. However, that is not what they are demanding. In actuality, that is not enough for them. In my opinion, they are demanding a government that will sacrifice the interests of the Serbs and the Serbian people and a portion of Serbian territory. I do not know whether they will find such a government. Only the voters can decide that.

[NIN] What kind of cooperation have you had with Prime Minister Panic? You had meetings with him even before he was elected prime minister....

[Jovic] I talked to him in detail about everything when he came and accepted the nomination, and I saw that he was not that familiar with our situation. He came with certain conceptions which do not correspond to the situation at all. I tried to convince him that those conceptions cannot be imposed on a situation which is not that way either concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina or

concerning Croatia, or indeed concerning Kosovo and Metohija. I believe that he would talk to a great number of people and would adjust. However, I must say that so far he has not been adjusting much, that by and large he has obstinately continued to push what he came with, and that is a serious problem.

[NIN] What are your mutual contacts and cooperation at present?

[Jovic] He has gathered around him a team which probably advises him to do as he is doing. Even in the period when the government was being formed, he hardly included in it anyone from Serbia we nominated. He took from Montenegro all that they nominated, almost no one from Serbia. He did take some from Serbia, but he did not take those whom we nominated, except for a few people, and that is another serious problem. As the strongest party in the Assembly, we do not have channels through which we can affect the federal government, either with information or influence.

[NIN] It is said that on the day Mr. Milan Panic was elected prime minister, you personally intervened for certain names not to be included in the federal government.

[Jovic] It might be put the other way about: We proposed the members of the government as the incumbent party, of a government we would support, from the ranks of our party, from the ranks of specialists from Serbia. He did not accept the bulk of that.

[NIN] What were his reasons?

[Jovic] He proposed different people, I do not know who proposed them to him, some of them we were unable to accept, and we had serious objections to some. In some cases, he postponed the choice of ministers, and some he named in spite of our objections. It is obvious that someone else is influencing the membership of the government, that is, not the incumbent party, or he came with some membership of the government which could not be influenced.

[NIN] And has he accepted any of your suggestions?

[Jovic] Well, yes, some of them. The foreign minister is our nominee, the minister of the economy is our nominee. We did not make a nomination for deputy prime minister to run the economy, who does come from our republic, but we supported him as though he were ours. Accordingly, those are three figures whom we have supported. We did not support the rest. We felt there was no reason to create ministries and appoint ministers for areas in which the federal government or federation does not have jurisdiction, but he did not accept that.

[NIN] Prime Minister Panic is a man with a capitalist spirit, style, and thinking. He does not recognize social ownership. But it has a distinct place in what the SPS advocates. How do you resolve that discrepancy in logic?

[Jovic] Someone can recognize or not recognize many things, but still they exist. Someone may not recognize social ownership, but it exists. And it is dominant. It is the result of a period of 50 years. Accordingly, we should see what we are going to do with it, not refuse to recognize it. As for our views, I think there are many things that are overemphasized here. We have a completely equal attitude toward all forms of ownership.

[NIN] Mr. Radoman Bozovic and his government, nevertheless, it seems, like state ownership the best, and so it seems within the SPS itself they have caused great damage with that love of theirs (for instance, with the initiative to nationalize POLITIKA). What do you think about that?

[Jovic] I do not like that kind of commentary. We might speak about certain specific moves of the government, whether they have been to the point or not, but as to whether someone likes this kind of ownership or does not like it—that is not a proper description. After all, Bozovic is a member of our party, and he respects our program, and the program says that all forms of ownership are equal.

[NIN] The congress of the Socialist Party is approaching. It seems that in many respects, by the very choice of the party's future course, and also because of the shifts in personnel, it will be important both for itself and for Serbia and Yugoslavia. What are your expectations, and what outcome do you personally hope for?

[Jovic] I think that there is a public expectation from that congress that goes far beyond what is realistically possible. Any congress, including this one, is a summation of what has happened, with certain minor changes and reinforcements of policy. Between the first and second congress we shaped the organization in the entire republic, we have a membership of nearly 450,000 people, we have a youth organization with about 100,000 people, we have won elections in the republic, in the Federation, and in opstinas. So, this is an impressive result....

Also, in many matters essential to the life of our citizens, our country, and our party, very great progress has been made in the treatment of certain political issues and adoption of positions, in building an orientation, and so on, so that we have arrived at the point where we can round out our program, which up to now has for all practical purposes been a sketch of a program, and so now we can improve our bylaws.... But not only that, but we can elect a new leadership from that immense number of members.

Our perspective is a very clear programmatic orientation of a socialist party of the democratic type corresponding to similar parties in the West.

[NIN] In public, there is quite a bit of speculation about the proximity of views between your party and those of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], a party with a clear right-wing stamp. The most recent example is this one

last week in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Assembly, where you acted in concert, at least at the outset....

[Jovic] Our party has an authentic policy and authentic views on all issues, and one can only talk about whether someone is close to us. I do not intend to go into that.

[NIN] It seems to me you did not take a position on the Hrtkovci case.

[Jovic] I do not even know what happened in Hrtkovci, I do not have precise information on that. I learned about it from the newspaper. If there had been any specific cases of persecution, I am not aware of them, and if it is proven that that has been the case, it is very clear that this is not a matter of our policy, and we will fiercely condemn it and we do not support that. If something did happen, those are isolated cases which must be prosecuted under the law and in the courts. There has absolutely been no widespread practice of persecution in our republic, nor is there now, nor can there be so long as we are in power.

It is interesting that the same ones who are fiercely attacking Serbia because of several citizens in Hrtkovci (if it is true) do not see fit to point up the numerous drastic cases of ethnic cleansing of Serbs, such as the one in western Slavonia, where people were driven out of 90 villages, over 70,000 people, where almost all the households were destroyed, where villages were completely destroyed and people prevented from returning. Unfortunately, most of those settlements are not even under protection of the United Nations, they remained outside, and there is a question of whether they can return there at all.

[NIN] Even the SPS is being shaken by internal party conflicts. You said on one occasion that there is "no room for any factions" in the SPS. They do nevertheless exist. How would you define them?

[Jovic] I made that statement concerning the discussion of the future bylaws. You see, up to now we have not had factions and we ought not to have them in the future either. Our position is that the party should nurture democracy in its operation, that every member of the party or group has the right of initiative, they have the right to a contest of opinions, to make proposals, to defend their views, but they should and must respect the decisions of the party, but they can continue to defend their own positions and what they advocate within the bodies of the party, until the congress, if they think that they are right. This should be retained.

[NIN] That is in general. But do there objectively exist differing tendencies in the party?

[Jovic] Tendencies always exist, but factions do not exist. The group which set itself apart to form the Social Democratic Party was not a faction in our party. They did not have any programmatic orientation that would differ from ours. At one point, they came forth with a

written pamphlet, if I might call it that, to the effect that the party had made a mistake in carrying out its program. We told them: We cannot accept that, because it is not the truth. The natural thing would be for them to go to the congress and to say: "This leadership has not performed well...", and then to wait for the outcome.

[NIN] They probably had reasons for not doing so....

[Jovic] In my opinion, their reasons are something other than that we did not carry out our program. They have ambitions which cannot be realized in the regular process within our party. No one is standing in their way. In the final analysis, our party is so large—that it is no great harm if a dozen people or even 1,000 people leave it if they like.

[NIN] By all appearances you will also be changing the party symbol?

[Jovic] As far as the symbol is concerned, at present it seems that the strongest predilection is that it be a red rose. We will see how the congress decides.

However, the problem does not lie just in the symbol. Our entire program contains all the elements of the programmatic orientation of the European socialist and social democratic parties. I must say in this connection that there is no great difference between them. These European parties are all socialist in the south and social democratic in the north. It is the same thing. Those people here in Yugoslavia who want to make a difference between socialist and social democratic must realize that this is an artificial difference that does not exist. I believe that they are unable, those who are now creating the Social Democratic Party, to draw up a program which differs from ours.

[NIN] You personally are associated sometimes with a softer line and sometimes with a harder one. While there are stories that the hard-line pro-communist nucleus wanted to remove you in a meeting of the party's leadership just before 9 March of this year, at the same time certain distinguished party members such as Mr. Pavic Obradovic, for example, made charges against you after your debate with President Milosevic "that you had gone beyond all measure in your impudence, arrogance, and undemocratic spirit" and that you "had lost your bearings and should give up the place of leadership in Serbia's incumbent party." You have not reacted to those charges.

[Jovic] There is an assessment to the effect that the taking of power by the other parties depends very greatly on the possible breakup of our party and of its leadership, on its breakup into several parties, and this is the tactics that has been used persistently.

Many things that you have mentioned here revolve around attempts to cause a split in the party and its breakup. Stories about their wanting to remove me are manipulations. This is the first time I have heard of it. There is no split in our party.

There was one wing which was more inclined to the experience of the former Communist Party, that is, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

It is very clear that our party as a whole has committed itself to the socialist orientation of the European type and there is no dispute whatsoever that I belong to that nucleus and that orientation. And if there is any hard core in our party, then it is those minor remnants of certain of our members who are more inclined to hold on still to that communist experience, but in my opinion that is completely marginal.

As for Pavic Obradovic, that deserves no comment at all. There are such people who fish in muddy waters, and as soon as there is any disturbance anywhere, or any vacillation, they rush to be the first in case some great turnover takes place so that they can seize upon certain favorable political positions.

[NIN] Much calculating is being done in public concerning the relationship between you and President Milosevic. Is that the relation between the president of the party and an ordinary member or between the president of the state and an ordinary citizen?

[Jovic] This is once again an attempt to give the public the impression that there is some split, that there is going to be a break, and so on. That is for those who wish our party ill. Our cooperation is altogether normal. And if there is any difference between us, that is natural, there is nothing there to give joy to those who wish us ill.

[NIN] President Milosevic's speech in Leskovac, where, in speaking about the SPS, he said that "certain members of the leadership often show toward the membership and the public a conceited attitude and haughtiness that repels people," is interpreted by many people as a direct allusion to you....

[Jovic] That is the same kind of thing I have already mentioned. His explanation is that he wanted to help me, that in the pre-congress debate he is stating clearly that he thinks that all those who represent ballast for the party should leave their positions and that he had no other intention than to help me and the party, to strengthen it.

[NIN] You responded to those accusations of President Milosevic at the time by saying that "assessments of this kind expressed in public without prior democratic discussion within the bodies of the party can only do harm to the SPS and also to Comrade Milosevic." Has there been damage, to whom, and when?

[Jovic] There has been damage, in my opinion, because it confused people. After all, it would have been more useful if it was clear to whom or to which group it applied. This way, everyone can think that it does not apply to him, or, conversely, he could think that it does apply to him and take offense.

[NIN] It is also being mentioned that the SPS could even boycott the next election.

[Jovic] Why would we boycott it?

[NIN] For instance, if an election law were adopted which does not suit the SPS.

[Jovic] It simply cannot be adopted without us. We have a majority in the Assembly.

[NIN] The opposition feels that the "roundtable" possesses a kind of binding authority.

[Jovic] Provided we go along....

[NIN] How would you define the national interest of Serbs today?

[Jovic] Peace and equality with other nationalities are the national interest of Serbs. Everything follows from that. Both freedom and prosperity follow from that. If there is no peace and if there is no equality with the other nationalities, then their interests are threatened.

[NIN] Could our people have gotten by with fewer blows (from the thousands of dead and resettled to actual expulsion from the world community) than it has in the denouement of the Yugoslav drama?

[Jovic] It could, absolutely, if the other side, that is, those who broke up Yugoslavia, had respected the vital interests of the Serbian people. If Croatia had not excluded them from the Constitution as a nationality, if it had not prohibited them from writing in Cyrillic, if it had not sent the police to take away their arms, if it had not armed itself for the purpose of forcible secession, and so on. Simply put, if some had not separated from Yugoslavia by violent means and had not disputed by violent means the right of others to remain in Yugoslavia. Then it could have worked out without war, by agreement, and Serbia and the Serbian people were willing to do that. But that did not depend on us alone.

[NIN] Many foreign factors and even certain domestic ones think that Serbia is to blame for the war in Bosnia....

[Jovic] That is propaganda which has multiple purposes. First, we have to go back to the genesis of who seceded and caused the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Serbia was always against the disintegration of Yugoslavia, for the simple reason that the Serbian people fought for that Yugoslavia in order to unite the entire Serbian people in one state. For Serbia and the Serbian people, the fundamental issue was that Yugoslavia not disintegrate, that they remain to live in one state.

It was the disintegration of Yugoslavia that caused the war in Yugoslavia, and disintegration was the objective of Slovenia and Croatia, which were the first to bring about forcible secession, and, of course, also of the European powers which wanted to dismember Yugoslavia.

As to who began the war in Bosnia—it is well-known that first the Serbs were attacked at the wedding in the middle

of Bascarsija and that the Serbs were for all practical purposes driven out of the parliament, because the Muslims and Croats decided to make decisions on secession of B-H from Yugoslavia without consent of the Serbs.

Accordingly, all the unconstitutional and forcible moves did not originate with the Serbs, but with others and third parties who recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina prematurely.

I must say that Europe knew and the United States knew that a bloody war would take place in B-H because of what they were doing.

[NIN] Many things are still unclear concerning the Vance Plan, in which you were actively involved. It is thought that in actuality it for all practical purposes leaves to Croatia the territories where the Serbs are the majority of the population.... And we are therefore required now to grant special status to Kosovo as well?

[Jovic] I think that everything possible was done to liberate the Serbian people and the territories, although not all, where the Serbs live, and in the most critical moment to bring in the United Nations to protect them from complete destruction, and also to halt the conflicts which could have had disastrous dimensions for all of Europe. This is the best that could have been done for the Serbian people. This was done to put them in a position relatively independent of Croatia until a final political solution is arrived at.

It now depends on the balance of power as to how the Serbian question will finally be resolved. It is an achievement that they will be equal partners in the discussion. We think that is very important.

Linking Kosovo and Metohija with the fate of the Serbian people in the krajinas is tendentious and nonsensical.

Panic, Cosic Lead in Poll on Confidence

92BA1470C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 11 Sep 92 pp 24-26

[Article by Ljuba Stojic: "Milosevic's Decline"]

[Text] The question "Who instills confidence in you?" certainly does not exhaust all the important dimensions of what makes a politician attractive to voters. Nor did the 200 participants in the "NIN Forum," whom we bring together early every month by telephone, completely reflect the structure of the electorate of about five and a half million citizens of Serbia (not including Kosovo). Nevertheless, the place a politician has on the "confidence list" rather sensitively reflects the fluctuations in activity of various figures and the impression which their actions leave on the "telephone public."

For the first time since we have been asking that question (since last October), Slobodan Milosevic is not in first place. Three months ago he was first with the same

percentage of the vote, because no one received more than he did. Now there are two ahead of him: Milan Panic and Dobrica Cosic.

It is not necessary to search very far for the explanation. It is clear that the citizens blame Milosevic, although he was not directly involved, for the fiasco of the attempt to bring down federal Prime Minister Panic because of his posture at the London conference. We began the survey on Saturday, 5 September, in the morning, immediately after the Assembly debate on the vote of confidence in the federal government, which lasted until late Friday evening.

The person directly "doing the dirty work" got the short end of it: Vojislav Seselj has fallen from a very stable position at the top to the bottom of the rankings.

We will come back to a more detailed analysis of the ranking of politicians on the basis of voter confidence after we survey the answers to the questions about Prime Minister Panic.

Widespread Support, Some Perplexity

A day or two after the Assembly debate the "NIN Forum" gave Panic support more or less similar to what he received in polls when the question of confidence was put ("Partner" on Tuesday, 1 September, and "STATLAB" on Wednesday, 2 September).

In response to the question "At the London conference did Panic act in the interest of the country or was he neglectful of that interest?" nearly three-fourths (73 percent) replied "In the interest of the country," and only one-seventh (14 percent) that "He neglected it." Slightly less than one-seventh were unable to decide. In the "STATLAB" poll, there were 10.2 percent negative assessments of "Prime Minister Panic's accomplishment at the London conference" (out of the 313 telephone customers in Belgrade who were polled). They did not encounter respondents who were uninformed and undecided, so that the support given to Panic resembled the results of the Albanian elections in the time of Enver Hoxha (89.8 percent favorable marks).

In the "Partner" survey (like that of the "NIN Forum," it polled 200 telephone customers from Serbia, not including Kosovo), two-thirds felt that "Prime Minister Panic should not be removed," and slightly more than one-seventh "thought that necessary." In the "NIN Forum," support following the debate was understandably a bit stronger, but condemnation was at the same level. There is probably nothing that Prime Minister Panic can do to influence those opponents, representing one-seventh, to change their position.

The president of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] unambiguously took the side of his prime minister and immediately before the Assembly debate was opened, he did this in a speech at the beginning of the debate. "Did he do a good thing?" we asked participants in the September "NIN Forum." Hardly anyone

reproached President Cosic for his decisiveness (only 4.5 percent), which means that even a sizable portion of Panic's opponents supported this move by Cosic. Slightly more than one-eighth (12 percent) were undecided, and support climbed to 83.5 percent of those agreeing! It is possible that Cosic's posture in this situation had something to do with the rise in his confidence score.

Over the several days from the initiative of the group of deputies of the SRS [Serbian Radical Party] and SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] to put a vote of confidence in the government of Milan Panic, up to the beginning of the debate, a large segment of the world and domestic public opinion opposed that initiative, as did many influential political figures in the world and in the country. The chairman of the SPS deputy caucus explained before the debate began that they did not even intend to go to the end and vote for a lack of confidence in the government which they themselves had elected only 50 days before.

What was the decisive influence on the SPS to soften its position?

In the assessment of the "NIN Forum," pressures from outside and inside the country were equally significant (28 percent and 27 percent). In the group of reasons mentioned with moderate frequency were "They did not even have serious intentions" (13.5 percent), and then "They saw their mistake" (9 percent), "Panic's resoluteness" (7.5 percent), "They became afraid" (7 percent), and "They only wanted to give him a warning" (6.5 percent), and at the end were the reasons mentioned more rarely ("The situation as a whole," "Hastiness," "Their arrogance backfired on them," "Internal divisions in the SPS," "They cut a deal," and so on). Undecided was at its usual level (13.5 percent).

"His Time Has Passed..."

It was clear to everyone who followed the London conference even in the most superficial way that initiating the vote of confidence in Panic in the parliament originated in the personal confrontations between Panic and Milosevic in London. During the intensive media offensive on the domestic scene in the days before the debate was opened, Panic did not conceal his determination to stand by the constitutional powers which as federal prime minister he possesses in the domain of the country's foreign policy. Because their intercourse in the Assembly during the debate (while Milosevic was present) showed no signs of melting the ice either, we asked the participants in the "NIN Forum" which of those two should go if one should have to?

A majority managed to decide, but the percentage of undecided was extremely high (43 percent), which is, of course, understandable in view of the fact that the question involved a choice between the nation's untouchable leader for many years, whose charisma has begun to crumble only in the recent past, and an American businessman who suddenly became Yugoslav prime

minister only 50 days ago. Three-fifths of those who did decide nevertheless found it easier to give up Milosevic (35 percent of all participants in the "NIN Forum"), and two-thirds Panic (22 percent).

A young farmer from Pricevici near Valjevo could not decide: "Milosevic has not done anything so far, but I don't know whether we should trust Panic...." An electric welder from Bor (age 36) thinks that "the one who is less able should go," but, he wonders: "But which one is that?" An elderly farmer from Gornji Milanovac near Nis (age 67) says briefly: "Both are true Serbs."

Those who would give up Milosevic frequently express their disappointment. "His time has passed, and he should withdraw, although I supported him," says a retired woman (age 65) from Belgrade. A housewife from Gornji Milanovac (age 66) spells it out: "He led the people to this point.... War! And we voted for him so there would not be war." A student from Nis (age 23) approaches this dilemma quite pragmatically: "Panic is a rich man, and that is the kind that should be in power. But all these others, including even Milosevic, are interested in privileges."

"Milosevic is like a rock!" a retired policeman from Novi Knezevac explained his renunciation of Panic. And the retired woman from Velika Plana (age 69) laments: "There it is, we somehow became accustomed to Slobodan Milosevic...." An economic technician from Senta (age 39) is perplexed about Panic: "I do not know, but that is how I feel—he is, after all, a foreigner!" (it is of interest that she is a Yugoslav of Hungarian origin).

In any case, most of the participants in the "NIN Forum" rather like Panic for not speaking Serbian well and for not concealing that he is an American (69 percent), one-sixth did not care (16 percent), and only one-eighth were bothered (12 percent). A negligible number of those surveyed could not decide (3 percent).

Did Panic's militance, displayed in that Assembly debate, gain him some new supporters from the ranks of the skeptics and opponents? Judging by the answers in this survey, no. The percentage of those who now believe in Panic's ability "to rid us of the sanctions and return us to the international community" is almost exactly the same as the percentage last month of those who thought that he would "keep his promises" (73 percent). To be sure, a higher share has now strengthened their belief in Panic (50.5 percent now trust him more than earlier), and the number of those who do not trust him has dropped (from 20.5 to 15.5 percent). But they did not pass over to supporters, but to the undecided (their numbers have now increased from 6.5 to 11.5 percent).

An Agile Businessman

Those in whom he instills confidence attribute a multitude of attributes to Panic: He is agile, expeditious, sensible, enterprising, intelligent, a man of the world, a fighter for peace, decisive, and likable. Much less frequently do they say he is a Democrat, that he is helping

the Serbs outside Serbia, that he is not a Communist, that he is communicative, and so on.

In any case, one gets the sense that in August the opposition leaders who earlier enjoyed confidence of participants in the "NIN Forum" were too busy quarreling with one another to do anything spectacular. The abstinence was therefore high (only in June was it higher than now: 37.5 as against 31 percent; and now it is twice as high as last month). Panic and Cosic have thus captured the attention of the telephone subscriber segment of the public, while others—except for Milosevic, who has held on to his most loyal adherents—are hardly noticeable or have altogether disappeared from view. Seselj fell 18 points, Kostunica and Micunovic are on the verge of dropping out of the ranking, and Paroski is not even in the "anteroom" (two figures in the debate on confidence in Panic's government, coming from opposite sides: M. Bulatovic and B. Crncevic, did arrive there).

Age-specific differences, as usual, are striking. Young people give the most support to Panic (53.5 percent), the middle-aged also put him in first place (45 percent), the elderly single out Cosic (43.5 percent), and they give Panic the same number of votes as Milosevic (36 percent). Among the middle-aged, Milosevic finished ahead of Cosic by sticking out his chest (37.5 and 36.5 percent, respectively). The elderly mention no one other than the first three, while the ranking near the bottom is the same for both the young and middle-aged.

Many economists, sociologists, and political scientists foresee serious social unrest this fall and winter. The economy has died under the sanctions, and inflation is galloping unstoppably. However, Radoman Bozovic has promised that "there will be no hunger or freezing." Is his government capable of fulfilling that promise, or should we expect serious unrest to break out in the fall?

Since 100 days of the Serbian Government passed, a majority of participants in the "NIN Forum" have not been giving it a passing mark, but now they are stricter than ever: More than half of those surveyed anticipate unrest, and another one-eighth judge the government to be inept, although they do not foresee unrest (54 percent and 12 percent give a total of 66 percent failing grades). One-fifth of the respondents believe in the competence of this government, and one-seventh cannot decide.

If we relate these responses to responses to the question about which shortages are hardest for people to bear, then they take on even more weight. Only one in every 12 (8.5 percent) answered that he was not short of anything essential, but on the other hand one in every four (26.5 percent) were short of "everything"! Among the specific shortages, first place went to food (25 percent), and then fuel (22.5 percent), while shortages of medicine, articles for personal hygiene, and so on, are mentioned less frequently.

Quarrels Without End

However optimistic expectations were last month concerning the federal "round table" between the government and opposition, now they are pessimistic to the same degree—following the first sessions of this institution, whose powers are ambiguous ("a compromise will be found" thought 61.5 percent, but now 37 percent; earlier, 34.5 percent judged that they would remain "unyielding," but now 56.5 percent judge that they will "quarrel as they have up to now"). There were not many undecideds here, nor are there now (4 percent as against 6.5 percent).

Just as before, the pessimists come from both sides of the barricades. "That is the opposition's style of communication," believes a machine technician from Radinci (age 38), and a plant engineer from Pirot (age 25) says on the contrary that this is occurring because "no opposition exists in Serbia, the government does not recognize it," and he concludes: "It is operating, then, underground, just like the communists before the war."

Those who hope for an agreement base that hope on desperation. "They have to!" says an officer in the Army of Yugoslavia from Zemun (age 55)—"Otherwise they are all fools!" A retired electrician from Sremska Mitrovica is somewhat milder, but still gloomier: "I hope they come to their senses, because otherwise we are threatened by civil war."

In the public opinion surveys throughout the world one question is used to pinpoint the attitude toward democracy by opposing democracy to dictatorship and posing the choice. A two-thirds majority of participants in the telephone survey "NIN Forum" took the view that "democracy is better than any other system" (66.5 percent), one-eighth favored the position that "dictatorship is better in some cases" (13 percent), and the same number opted for the position "it is completely the same for people like me." Very few of those surveyed were unable to decide (7.5 percent).

Age-specific differences in this respect are such that they must be a concern to those who are nurturing the myth of the biological progressiveness of the young generations. That is, those under age 35 also put democracy in first place, but not so strongly as those over age 55 (50 percent as against 79 percent!?). At the same time, even in this group supporters of dictatorship represent the smallest segment, but that segment is more pronounced than among their elders (18.5 as against 5.5 percent!?). Finally, and perhaps most seriously, the young include the largest number of those who are indifferent, to whom it is "utterly the same" (27.5 as against 5.5 percent among the elderly!?).

It is of interest that supporters of democracy qualify their position with the same conviction that there is an undemocratic trait in our mentality that is used by the supporters of dictatorship. Thus, a democratically disposed unskilled worker from Trstenik (age 50) says: "Our people think democracy is the same as anarchy.... We are still not capable of that!" And a retired worker from Kanjiza (age 68) believes in democracy, "except that democracy should be adapted to everyone!"

On the other side, the supporters of dictatorship start out with the same belief, it is just that they intensify it a bit. "Our people are uncivilized and there is no democracy for them," says a retired teacher from Aleksandrovac (age 65). "Dictatorship is in the interest of the people themselves!"

After these responses it is no surprise that the participants in the "NIN Forum" take a rather mild attitude toward Seselj's behavior during the parliamentary debate on the question of confidence in the government. One out of every 10 gave him direct support ("That is how it should be" and "It did not bother me"), and another one-fifth were very mild in their condemnation ("He behaved a bit freely"). Together this makes almost one-third of those surveyed and almost one-half of those who watched the TV coverage.

Confidence Rating of Politicians

Can you give the names of three politicians either in the government or in the opposition who instill confidence in you personally?

None	31.0%
Milan Panic	45.5%
Dobrica Cosic	35.0%
Slobodan Milosevic	32.5%
Vojislav Seselj	8.0%
Vojislav Kostunica	5.5%
Dragoljub Micunovic	5.5%

Note: M. Bulatovic and B. Crncevic were also mentioned by between 3 and 5 percent of the respondents.

Belief in Panic

At this point do you have more confidence or less confidence in Milan Panic's ability to free us of the sanctions and return us to the international community?

More than before	50.5%
Same as before	22.5%
Less than before	9.0%
I had no confidence in him even before	6.5%
I do not know	11.5%

Seselj's Behavior

If you watched the TV coverage from the Federal Assembly during the debate on Friday, 4 September, what do you think about Vojislav Seselj's behavior?

Scandalous	21.0%
He was unfair	12.5%
A bit free	18.5%
Did not bother me	1.5%
That is how it should be	9.0%
Do not know	1.5%
I did not watch the TV coverage	36.0%

[Box, p 25]

Profile of the Respondents

Although beginning last month we corrected the sample of participants in the "NIN Forum" with respect to the degree of urbanization, there was no essential change in their composition with respect to other important features. In this survey, 46.5 percent of the respondents were from rural areas, 33 percent from towns, and 20.5 percent from large cities (above 100,000 inhabitants), which corresponds to the structure of the electorate. However, this did not increase the share of farmers nor of less-educated citizens in general (to the level of elementary school graduates).

Two-thirds of the respondents were in the labor force, and among them the most numerous were this time workers (32 percent), followed by specialists (22 percent), and there are considerably fewer offeworkers and technicians than previously (13 percent). There are now fewer pensioners, and more housewives, and they have come equal to one another (13 and 13.5 percent, respectively). There are fewer secondary and university students than earlier (only 5 percent).

Simplifying the questions and making the answers easier (usually a choice between one of two possibilities offered, without asking for the reasons of the choice) made it possible for a larger number of uneducated citizens to take part in the survey (24.5 percent who had not completed elementary school). But this is still only 40 percent of their actual percentage of the adult population. The percentage of women is now closer to the actual percentage (46 percent).

The percentage of those under age 35 is slightly less (27 instead of 33.5 percent), while there are more middle-aged people than in the electorate (46.5 instead of 37.5 percent), but the number of elderly over age 55 is in the right proportion (26.5 percent). This time there were fewer refusals to talk than last month (61 of the 200 conversations conducted), while taking part anonymously and agreement to take part were at the usual level (30 percent and 94 percent).

DEPOS Leaders Agree on Single Electoral List

92BA1471D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Sep 92 p 9

[Article by Slobodan Kostic: "All on a Single Slate"]

[Text] Although the government is still "putting the finishing touches" on the election campaign schedule, that part of the opposition which at the moment is binding its destiny with DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] is warming up seriously for the start of the race. And that means clearing up all internal perplexities in the expectation that the election will be scheduled early. Or in translation—to terminate discussions over the election slate, which for a month now has been a stumbling block and subject of discussions that have not

been pleasant at all. But this is not going easily, because the parties want their part of the pie.

At the same time, this does not mean that the matter has become so bogged down that two or more election slates would be drawn up, as it perhaps seemed at the end of last month. The people in DEPOS are aware that in practice this would undercut their joint efforts over the last six months even though they prepared themselves for this alternative. DEPOS would remain DEPOS regardless of whether it takes part in the election with one or several slates—we were told in the movement at that time. Nevertheless, the belief prevailed that they are strongest together, so that even the staunchest gave up the tug-of-war. But the meeting of representatives of the four founding parties—Vuk Draskovic, Vojislav Kostunica, Nikola Milosevic, and Dusan Mihailovic—ended in an agreement, so DEPOS will probably campaign with a joint election slate.

The Main Criterion Is the Quality of the Candidate

The party leaders agreed in the end that they should take into account quotas and proportions of the various parties, but that the primary criterion which must be respected is the quality of the individual candidates. That means that the parties, regardless of their strength and estimates of the number of their members, agreed to choose those candidates who have the best chance in the upcoming election. Although this criterion has still remained indefinite, the people in DEPOS hope that there will not be a problem carrying it out. Thus, there has been a certain relaxation by the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], who wanted members of their party in more than half of the slots on the general list, for example, among the first 30 who could get by, which evoked strong resistance from the rest of DEPOS. At this point, Draskovic demonstrated that he has a desire for DEPOS to really win—so a certain relaxation is interpreted—while the previous tug-of-war is explained in terms of pressure from the establishment of the SPO. So now the SPO is no longer insisting that half be actually members of that party, but they might also be those candidates which this party merely supports.

The situation concerning the drawing up of the election slate has been additionally eased by the announcement of the republic election. Thus, now there are to be more candidates, so that this "gift from heaven" will help in resolving the problem over the "surplus." This helped in satisfying everyone's appetites.

It is through this development of the circumstances that the atmosphere in DEPOS suddenly improved. So now people are waiting with a certain impatience today's agreement of the nonparty leaders of DEPOS concerning who might be on the election slate. Today's discussion is,

of course, only preliminary and probably will not produce any specific decisions, but people will know at least approximately the mood of the prestigious nonparty individuals. It is assumed that some of the nonparty opposition, which the effort of DEPOS has "made articulate" over the last six months, has been afraid that the parties could not agree on an election slate. This, so it is interpreted in one segment of the movement, was in fact the reason why they refused to go before the voters. Now that conflicts between the parties are reduced, the anxiousness within the nonparty segment has also disappeared. Thus, this important segment of DEPOS no longer has the impression that the parties are quarreling over candidates.

Members of the Academy Do Not Want To Be on the Slate

Nevertheless, so we have learned from DEPOS, the most influential nonparty figures are categorical in their refusal to run in the election. This position has already been taken by Predrag Palavestra, Ljubomir Simovic, Mica Popovic, Borislav Mihailovic-Mihiz, and Matija Beckovic.... Palavestra, so we have learned, has proposed a compromise solution. Thus, people with a reputation, for example, who do not want to take an active part in politics would be put at the end of the election slate, where there are no chances of possibly being elected. This would pay respect to the form, the nonparty people would run in the election, but they would not be elected. However, this solution aroused doubt in the other members of the council, because that, it was said, would confuse the voters. They would rightly wonder, it is estimated, why a prestigious figure, say, like Palavestra or Simovic is at the end of the list?

Nevertheless, at DEPOS they are expressing a certain hope that the story will be "somewhat" different with Matija Beckovic and that the well-known writer might perhaps run on the slate. As a matter of fact, they have openly asked Beckovic whether he wants to run, and he likewise answered in the negative and said he would not. Nevertheless, the hope that he will perhaps change his mind is being awakened by the new development of the situation concerning the election slate, because at that time it seemed that the parties were quarreling too much over the places on it. In any case, the parties would enthusiastically accept Beckovic's candidacy and will be trying, so we have learned, to bring it about.

Before today's agreement among the nonparty leaders, it was difficult to say precisely who will consent to run, but unofficially the figure of some 50 people has been juggled with. In any case, the "stars of DEPOS" who will not consent to run will be supporting the joint slate and will take part in caucuses, promotion events, television programs, and public meetings.

Optimism among the members of DEPOS is being aroused by the report of pressures being brought to bear from outside on the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] and Milosevic. Thus, an official report is circulating about a letter which Eagleburger sent to President Milosevic on behalf of the State Department in which he explicitly demands his withdrawal and noncandidacy in the upcoming election. The assessment in DEPOS is that Cosic could perhaps support the entire opposition together in the upcoming election. The forecast is that the version with support only for a possible coalition of the Social Democratic Party and Micunovic's Democrats would be too small a stake for Cosic to play for.

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