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Criticism of Greek Election 'Propaganda' in South

AU297102992 Tirana KOMBI in Albanian 15 Jul 92
p 1

[Article by A.K.: "'Vorioepiriots' Have Started Election Campaign"]

[Text] The Greek reactionary clan has started the election campaign with the notorious slogan: "We want Vorioepir." They are afraid of war because they know the mind and strength of the Albanians. They have chosen the way of Greek cunning by way of the "peaceful road." With election propaganda in favor of the notorious "Omonia," which was later christened the Union for Human (Wrongs) Rights, they are seeking to completely take over all local government seats and are shouting "Long live Vorioepir" in the name of "self-determination." These are castles in the air; but not for them. Here is what they are specifically doing to achieve "victory in the elections":

On 5 July 1992 Radio Athens calls on Albanian refugees to return to Albania on 26 July and vote for "Omonia." The reward is profitable. Surprisingly, this is an official radio. While Mr. Mitsotakis states that he has no territorial pretensions, the fight for territories continues to be fierce!

The "Greek humanists" finally reminded everyone of the Cam people of Konispol, a minority group living in southern areas also inhabited by the Greek minority. Now on the eve of the election campaign, they went there and distributed parcels to all of them. Do they really believe the Cam people are so gullible?!

They have placed various resources and a lot of money at the disposal of "Omonia Union for Human Rights" to contest this election campaign. They are unsparing in sending blue enamel paint to paint the white walls of Albanian houses.

In this context, is it right for the Albanian political parties not to find a common language and put up an honest and capable Albanian as a candidate in the districts of Vlore, Sarande, Gjirokaster, and Korce? And much worse, is it right for these parties themselves to put up pure or half-Greeks as candidates for the local government? They forget that these candidates will vote against their candidacy and say: "Long Live Omonia!"

REPUBLIKA Criticizes Greek Extremists

AU0708140092 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian
16 Jul 92 p 2

[Statement by the Laberia Association: "Provocative and Insulting Acts by Greek Chauvinists"]

[Text] The so-called program of the self-styled "Free Himara of Vorio-Epirot and Greek Minority," which is a branch of a dark chauvinistic organization based in Corfu, has been published in our press. This scrap of

paper signed by self-named President Rafalidhis Andrekos, Secretary Eftallos Papadhimitris, and General Secretary Antonis Sallaro, which was cooked up in the Sebastiano bakery, angers not only the residents of Laberia, but every citizen of the Albanian nation and state with its extreme chauvinism.

This is not the first example of such an insulting, provocative, and anti-Albanian act from the Vorioepirot chauvinists and their lackeys, who have been living for ages in the Albanian territories. We have been hearing such statements for decades. In most cases they were accompanied by promises of a collective Easter celebration in Gjirokaster and Korce, with warnings and threats to annex the so-called Vorio-Epir. A telegram sent by Archbishop Sebastiano of Konica to Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis and the former minister of Samara on 3 March 1992 said: "The time has come." This is an example of the typical wickedness that puts a blemish on "history" and the lackeys that follow these chauvinists like mad enemies of not only the Albanian people, but also of the good traditional friendship between the two neighboring peoples.

This program is a new example of the chauvinist policy of the organization's headquarters. It expresses the aims of the Vorio-Epirot chauvinists openly in a persistent and intensified manner.

Each one of the 10 points of the so-called program is more ominous than the other. Therefore, we consider it necessary to explain, at least briefly, the content of some of them.

These people operate openly. After a series of visits to Corfu, Ioannina, Arte, Konispol, Sarande, Vuno, and Qaparo, according to their program (why not visit Tirana?—our note), they will hold a huge meeting in Spile, where the Sebastianos and Janulatos of this world will hold masses. As we can see, the mission of the Greek Church in this dangerous adventure is very great. The people engaged in this mission will sign an agreement with the Albanian Orthodox Church which, as the program states, "has always been and will remain united with the Greek Church against the Muslims and Catholics."

It could not have been said more clearly. The stand of the Albanian Orthodox Church is suspicious. We consider it necessary to emphasize that the leaders of our Autocephalous Church know that in our orthodox churches, masses are held—and should be held—in the Albanian language, and that the Albanian religion is part of Albanian nationalism. Being God's people, let them say these things to Sebastiano and some other Vorio-Epirot supporters—the so-called Himariots!

No religion or sect can assume upon itself a worse and more misanthropic mission than that of Sebastiano and his lackeys, who are urging Albanians to launch a fratricidal war. The times when religious divisions caused Albanian blood to be shed because of the chauvinistic interests of neighboring countries will not return again.

There will never be a return to 1914, when the cruel Greek bandits led by the traitor Spiro Milo martyred the people of Kurvelesh and other villages of Laberia, killing children, women, and elderly people, burning them out and making them seek shelter in the olive groves of Vlore.

The deliberate aims to direct the administration of Himara and tell the autonomous province of Himara when it should to join the homeland—Mother Greece—are very provocative and revolting. Everyone knows that chauvinistic greediness goes beyond the bounds of logic, but we could not believe that it could go so far. Poor and foolish gentlemen of the black program, you are day-dreaming because Himara and the Albanian territories are not the districts of Corfu, nor of Athens. We remind you that the Albanian people are the masters of these territories, together with all the honorable patriotic Himariots who will not sell out their sacred Albanian origin. The Albanian State alone, with its constitution and its laws, administers every inch of Albania. As for the joining of Himara with Greece, we say that chauvinism has made you blind and is driving you into a dangerous, blind alley.

Other claims in this program that a "minority Vorio-Epirot radio station will be installed in Himara which in cooperation with 'Omonia' will broadcast interesting programs, that Greek schools will be opened in Himara, etc.," prompt us to remind the people behind this black program that it is pointless to chase the wind, and that they have been reckoning on acting with impunity. Albania is in the European family and is as sovereign as any other nation. Albania does not owe a thing to anyone; it is the others who owe Albania.

The Laberia Association thinks that the Greek Government, bearing in mind its statements on good neighborly relations with Albania, repudiates such chauvinistic programs that seriously violate the friendly relations between the two peoples. We do not want the noble people of "Omonia" to become involved in such a filthy affair. We consider it the duty of "Omonia" to refrain from this, because the first tragic consequences will fall on the Greek minority, in the same way as they will on the Albanians, Himariots, Laberians, and Camerians.

The Laberia Association reminds the Greek chauvinists and their lackeys once again that the old plans of Megalidhe will never see the light of day. This is an advance warning to the Vorio-Epirots from Corfu to stop their hostile activities toward our country.

At this difficult stage that Albania is going through, there are some people who think that with the parcels and aid arriving, and our sons being employed in Greece, the time has come to defeat us. Those who think this are making a terrible mistake. "Little" Albania has always been great against invaders.

Our association appreciates the friendship with the Greek people as a necessity of life for both sides. We consider the Greek minority as a bridge of friendship

between the two peoples. We will do our part to strengthen this friendship and solve the Camerian problem democratic ally.

The Laberia Association is convinced that the people of Himara stand aside from acts that may blot their glorious history and their true love toward the country. We urge all our members and friends, all the people of Laberia, and the entire Albanian population in such situations to be more vigilant than ever before. The interests of the homeland must be above all. At the same time, we are surprised because the Albanian Foreign Ministry and other relevant bodies remain silent about this more hostile than provocative act of the Vorio-Epirots chauvinists, who, after a long period of setting the scenes, are openly calling for the partition of southern Albania.

It is time, on behalf of the nation, to act decisively, prudently, and vigilantly. Otherwise, the coming generations and history will seriously condemn us.

[Signed] Laberia Association

'Greek Chauvinist' Slogans Attacked in South

*AU297130292 Tirana KOMBI in Albanian 15 Jul 92
p 1*

[Article by Arber Kastrioti: "Why Is the State Just a Spectator When Albania Is Being Sold Every Day?"]

[Text] We were in Gjirokaster and Sarande recently. We stopped near Jorgucat. Several Greek slogans were daubed with blue paint on the shops' walls. Observing our surprise at these slogans, an old man approached us and said: "Are you Albanians?" "Yes," we answered. "Do you want to know what is written in them?" he asked. "Yes," we said. "I will tell you..." "We want Greek schools everywhere," "We want independence," and "Long live Greece,"—that is what they say."

We went to Alikaj in Sarande. There the Greek flag has been fluttering more than two months. Everyone was just a spectator.

Despite the election campaign, you see no Albanian slogans in Himare. Every slogan is written in Greek: "We want independence," "Omonia will win." We stopped at Dhermi. It was the same tragic situation with revolting slogans.

There exists a law on the Main Constitutional Provisions in Albania. There exists the Penal Code of the Republic of Albania. It states that fascist, war-mongering propaganda, etc., is punishable as a serious crime. This hostile propaganda against the Albanian nation and state, this incitement to war, and the disintegration of this nation and territory is being done in broad daylight by a Greek chauvinist hand (that is well paid), by Greek paint on Albanian territory. The National Intelligence Service, forces of order, and justice bodies are just spectators. The president, parliament, and democratic government

have fallen into a deep sleep in the face of this situation. Instead of standing up to prevent and punish this serious activity against our national sovereignty, they think of how to outlaw the Albanian political forces. You should outlaw the chauvinist-devourers who are bringing Albania to a disaster! Gentlemen, whether you want to accept it or not, the people are openly voicing their own opinion: "Albania is being sold everyday. May the bread be damned for you Albanians. May the blood of our patriotic ancestors be spilled on you."

First Arab-Albanian Islamic Bank Established

92AE0481A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
30 Jun 92 p 9

[Article by Ahmad Makhtum]

[Text] Jeddah—In the first Arab-Islamic investment of its kind in Albania since that country's recent liberation from the communist nightmare, the Arab Islamic Bank of Bahrain has joined the Albanian Government in establishing an investment bank in the capital, Tirana. The bank's authorized capital will be \$100 million; it will operate in all available investment sectors and provide many modern banking services.

The memorandum of understanding for the establishment of the bank, to be named The Arab-Albanian Islamic Bank, was signed yesterday (Monday) in Jeddah. Signing for the Arab-Islamic Bank was its chairman of the board, Mr. Hisham 'Ali Hafiz, and its chief executive officer, Mr. Haydar Bin-Ladin; and signing for the Albanian Government was the governor of the Central Bank, Mr. Eileer Burhan Hootty. Mr. Hootty, in an exclusive interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, expected the new bank to begin operations soon in Tirana. He stated that the partners will later establish another commercial bank. Mr. Hootty is currently on a visit to Saudi Arabia as part of a Gulf trip that included Bahrain and will be concluded with a visit to Kuwait.

The Albanian official said that the Albanian Government will have 60-percent ownership of the bank and the Arab-Islamic Bank will have 40 percent. The initial capital investment of the Arab-Albanian Islamic Bank will be \$20 million, to be paid according to the above percentages. The new bank will be advertised and introduced to investors by the Arab Islamic Bank of Bahrain. He added that the new bank, which is the first Arab-Islamic investment on this scale, will operate in the available investment sectors that include mining, oil, electricity, water, agriculture, tourism, and other sectors. The Arab Islamic Bank of Bahrain will also provide technical and administrative expertise to the new investment bank.

Mr. Hootty expected the bank to establish branches in many Albanian cities in the near future. He expressed confidence in the success of the bank, which will provide customer banking services in addition to its principal activity in the field of investments. The Albanian official, appealing to investors in other countries, mentioned

that Albania is the world's second largest exporter of grapes and is also rich in iron ore, copper, bauxite, oil, and other minerals. This, in addition to Albania's other natural resources, such as water, agriculture, and tourism.

Hootty explained that Albania had recently passed a new investment law offering special privileges to foreign investors, such as freedom of movement of capital, the right to own land and real estate for 99 years (extendible), tax and tariff exemptions, investment guarantees, and other incentives to encourage an influx of foreign capital.

He said that the existence of a banking base would also encourage foreign investors and he also mentioned his country's great potential for food, apparel, electronic, and electrical appliance industries. Mr. Hootty added that due to transportation difficulties and the lack of modern technology, Albania had so far been unable to make use of its potential agricultural wealth, especially in fruits, vegetables, and other products. He emphasized the importance of Arab-Islamic investment in Albania, in light of his country's spiritual and historical ties with Arabs and Muslims. Hootty said that although Albania is geographically a part of Europe, almost 80 percent of its 3.2 million population is Muslim.

Hootty said that the Vatican and other European countries, such as Italy and Germany, offer aid to his country with the aim of attracting it to the Western camp. He appealed to Arab and Islamic countries to quickly extend all possible forms of aid and assistance to his country, which was totally ruined by the tyrannic communist rule that isolated it completely causing its backwardness in many areas. He added that his country is in urgent need of aid from Muslims so that it would not lose its present freedom that was gained after a long, sacrificial struggle. That aid is also needed to allow Albania to confront the explosive political situation in its northern borders with Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Hootty mentioned that his country had inherited heavy debts from the communist rule in excess of \$500 million. It needed aid to consolidate its new economic direction toward a free economy. He pointed out that the per capita annual income in Albania held the line at \$80 during the tyrannic communist rule, and that \$50 million are needed to support families of the martyrs and prisoners who struggled against that terrible rule.

During his visit to the Kingdom, Hootty met with senior officials of the Islamic Bank for Development. In Bahrain he met with officials of the Baraka Bank and the Faisal Bank of Bahrain to brief them on the new situation in Albania and to try to obtain more aid for his country.

Price Liberalization Weakens Economic Situation

AU277080892 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
18 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Shyqyri Meka: "The Town Has No Power To 'Feed' the Reforms in the Countryside"]

[Text] Producers and clients confront each other in the peasant market as if on a stage. The peasants are the sellers and the owners of their goods; the city dwellers are the buyers waiting for the price as if in a courtroom before the judge. They are innocent and powerless in their troubles, but need makes them watch each other's hands.

Is the government guilty? Not at all, as long as it is in an inherited situation. Doubt arises when it wants to get involved as a "friend" of the countryside with statements such as:

At whose "expense" are prices liberalized? The government's budget is empty, declared its minister, and cannot finance any projects at all. Twenty-thousand tons of fertilizer granted free were sold at auction. The government maintains policy, and thus, its reputation; the towns pay expenses. Enthusiasm collapses at the simplest glance at the market. Thousands of families cannot afford to buy one kilogram of peaches to maintain "good health." Meat will be first to reach European prices, and according to the president, it will be a luxury for urban salary earners.

Here is the problem. The cities with 35 percent of the population are expected to financially "feed" the 65 percent of the population who live in the countryside. The cities, with their collapsed economy and with the political "help" of the "zero variant," are called on to help in the countryside's revival. The cities, with their blocked reform, are required to lead the reform in the countryside.

The countryside is taking land and initiative into its own hands, which is a great investment. In the meantime, the government regrets to say that agricultural investments and expenditure have been restricted. How much less machinery, fuel, fertilizers, and funds has the countryside received this year? These things have been neither calculated nor published but they go further: Tariffs for mechanical services have risen three, four, five times, prices of fertilizers have risen, and a decision is being prepared for interest rates of 30-40 percent on agricultural credit.

The trumpets blow for the liberalization of prices, as if for great good news, but remain silent for the burdens placed on the countryside. What can the peasants do to cope with them? The prices of their products will increase as much as the town's "wallets" can cope, even though the government and the president intend to make them equal to those of our neighbors. The only thing the peasant can do is to reduce the production costs until the state subsidy disappears.

What products for the market, what income from export can an agricultural plot with 20 dynym [0.1 hectares] per person provide? Let us balance good exports with good agricultural results and an agrarian policy according to the concepts of the market economy. However, this is not an easy thing without additional investments. Can these sources revive the countryside economy when thousands of peasant families, at least in 13 districts of the country, can hardly assure production for their family needs? What can a closed economy give when there is scarcely a single kilogram left for the market?

Any government would face such a collapse, created by a failed policy. The question is how to come out of this, and what realistic alternatives they propose. The variant of price liberalization, unaccompanied by other effective agrarian measures, is nothing but a forced operation with small and slow effects—not to mention a blind alley. Our economy is like an old ship on which someone has fixed a fan to the stern in order to blow its torn sail. Can our economy be moved by an internal force that does not budge from its own point of leverage? What help can the town give to the countryside when it can hardly stand on its own feet?

On the demographic map of Europe that we use as a model, the highest percentage of the population living in the countryside does not exceed 25 percent. There is two to three times more land per person. Here, the towns are really in the lead. A powerful industry "feeds" output in the countryside. Finally, while we boast of not burdening the countryside with taxes, the EEC subsidizes agriculture with billions of dollars every year.

Can the government gain aid from abroad? This is the way the Albanian economic knot can be untied. This would be to its undisputable credit. Surely, we will know how to pay back the debts of the world. Otherwise, the price liberalization that the government is carrying out is nothing but a "renewed" variant of the principle of relying on your own resources, but in the opposite direction: The towns must now provide for the countryside. If Allah is willing!

Trade Union Declaration on 'State of Nation'

AU21070835 Tirana SINDIKALISTI in Albanian
5 Jul 92 pp 1-2

[Unattributed article: "Declaration by the Union of Independent Albanian Trade Unions on the Current State of the Nation, approved by the Independent Trade Unions National Council in Tirana on 1 July"]

[Text] The downfall of the communist dictatorship in Albania was accompanied by a general economic—and not only economic—collapse. The democratic reconstruction of the state and society and the revival of the economy are a gigantic and extremely difficult task for the new government that emerged after the 22 March elections. The people have placed great faith and hopes in it and are looking for results. They will not be disappointed.

Hundreds of thousands of people were downtrodden under the totalitarian communist regime and lost their rights; they are not finding legal support in reestablishing them. Hundreds of thousands could be added to their number because of the implementation of the reform for the country's social and economic transformation. These people feel weak, defenseless, and bewildered when faced by the grave economic situation, the chaos and paralysis of the state administrative apparatus, and the huge legislative void. Of course, the government cannot construct a legislative and institutional pyramid by waving a magic wand. However, when people see that the government, through some of the laws that it has drafted, is either intentionally or unintentionally excluding from its activities the trade unions, this great organized force of working people that will fight to defend the interests of working people for social justice and for social order and security. They lose faith and hope for their own future and for the democratic future of the country.

The BSPSh [Union of Independent Albanian Trade Unions] dislikes the obstinacy and opacity of some members of the government who seem to have difficulty in shedding communist and totalitarian habits. It is they who do not wish to recognize the role of the trade unions as an important force in the country's democratic government.

If today's economic and financial resources do not permit the government to meet the utterly fair demands of the working people who have been hardest hit by the reform, no one prevents them using the most advanced European and world models of economic democracy and labor relations in the field of legislation. The BSPSh is aware of the role it has played and will play in the future in establishing a genuinely democratic order in Albania. It holds fast to the idea that without a democratic order there can be no democratization of economic, production, or employment relations; no fulfillment of working people's economic and social rights; and no dialogue and agreement among interested parties. If this active, constructive, and progressive role of the trade unions in society is not embodied in law, and if bureaucratic obstacles and restrictions are placed in the path of their activities, harmful social tensions and confrontations will be unavoidable.

Assessing the present sensitive period of transition, fraught with perils for people's destinies and the fate of the country, the BSPSh has attempted to take a constructive attitude, with the aim of establishing a constructive dialogue with the government, overcoming the present anarchic crisis, and making the country governable. It has not asked the government for power and privileges for itself or for impossible things. The BSPSh has asked the government:

—To establish the authority of the state and the law in order to stabilize the country, to establish public order, and to restore calm and people's faith in the exercise of justice;

—To combat the bureaucracy and corruption of the old administrative and judicial apparatus and to carry out fast the institutional renovation without which the reform cannot succeed;

—To move determinedly toward carrying out the reform by democratic means, and not by edicts and political directives, to expropriate the state through privatization as a premise for moving toward a market economy, while consulting working people (the trade unions) about the fate of their enterprises;

—To restart work in the enterprises and to carry out a reform in social areas without shock therapy and without drastic measures that could worsen people's already wretched situation, while recommending strict financial control on the speculative rise of prices and, alongside this, a general regulation of the system of wages, pensions, and welfare, within existing resources;

—To approve the most democratic legislation possible on labor relations and trade union rights, giving the trade unions their rightful place, so that the saying: "No democratic government without trade unions," will not remain an empty slogan, but will become an everyday reality.

The BSPSh's dialogue and cooperation with the government on these matters has not yielded the desired result, and has even often been difficult and tiring—especially in the drafting of the law on state enterprises, wages, and social support. The BSPSh has not confined itself to comments and suggestions, but has submitted its own draft dispositions, especially regarding the status of trade unions in the management of enterprises and criteria on the enforcement of the law on social support.

As for the implementation of the law on laying off workers and placing them on social assistance, it has asked for the amount of this assistance to be sufficient to guarantee minimum living standards for unemployed working people. This is vital in an economy that is not functioning, when prices have been totally freed and are continuing to rise in a speculative fashion, and while wages have been frozen between minimum and average levels and placed under central government control. The BSPSh thinks that excluding the enterprises from discussions on wage increases is not in accordance with the economic reform. It considers that the government's measure of introducing 50-percent pay levels for workers, calling this payment social assistance, is a trick. The BSPSh considers this level of payment to be unacceptable and antisocial because it cannot guarantee minimum living standards for people without other sources of income. It therefore demands the cancellation of this measure, and the determination of a minimum wage and the level of social assistance by 15 July. The trade union will otherwise initiate action as provided by the law.

The BSPSh has deplored the fact that the bills in question have as a whole been pervaded by a centralist and

communist spirit. They have been unclear, contradictory, and equivocal. This has left room for the issue of government edicts that often themselves misinterpret the law. The BSPSh has insisted that edicts should never be issued about a law, not only because this is an illegitimate and arbitrary method of communist totalitarianism, but because it contravenes the rule of law. The BSPSh sees a great danger to the reform and the country's future in any reflection of the communist-socialist mentality and world view in laws and social-economic measures. The people will never forgive the government for this mistake. People fought to overthrow the communist regime that oppressed, impoverished, and massacred them and they do not ever want to see its restoration, a danger posed by the Socialists and the neocommunists of other parties.

The BSPSh has stressed and stresses again that the success of the reform depends, among other things, on the government drafting a clear program and policy on employment today and for the future. It is this program which will open doors for constructive social work by the trade unions. However, the government's sluggishness has concealed and dimmed these prospects. This has meant that people felt as if they had been sentenced to death by the loss of their jobs. They felt helpless and hopeless.

Seriously distressed at this grave socioeconomic situation through which the country is passing, and at the fate of democracy and of Albania itself, the BSPSh considers

that it has a major moral responsibility to publicly state that, if the government fails to struggle for all-embracing and general solutions for all people's problems, but resorts to partial solutions only for those groups and categories of people that go on strike, and if the government fails to maintain a constructive and open dialogue with the BSPSh, the latter will be forced to adopt a clear stand of opposition toward the government, for which the government will be responsible. The BSPSh is convinced that, if the urgent need arises to place the interests and destiny of the country above people's socioeconomic interests, the government will publicly announce this, and people will be ready to sacrifice these interests. However, with the laws that it will make, the government must first demand sacrifices from those who grew rich in this confused period of instability, and only later from the poor. The overwhelming majority of the people in the towns and villages (especially the peasantry) who made sacrifices for 47 years for the sake of building a society that is aborted, have nothing left to sacrifice except the breath of life that keeps body and soul together. The time of patience and sacrifices for political ends is over. We demand dynamic and vigorous measures from the government to bring the country out of its crisis, its chaos, and socioeconomic anarchy. The government obtained an absolute vote of confidence from the people, and thus, has a great debt to them. The time has come to keep promises. Let whoever is not ready to keep them leave the stage. This is the lesson that democracy teaches.

Various Causes of CSFR Breakup Discussed

92CH0773A Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech
23 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Ferdinand Peroutka: "Why Are We Breaking Up?"]

[Text] It is certainly not because Vaclav Klaus is willing to accept conditions set by Vladimir Meciar or vice versa. It is also not because the breakup of the CSFR is a random capricious act by one of the victorious parties. The trend toward a breakup cannot even be considered to be the lack of recognition of the opinions of political entities, which would, admittedly, like to preserve the federation but do not know how, nor to be the expression of the Czechs' desire to play in their own economic sand pit. And it certainly cannot be considered to be a warning gesture, which is meant to make the Slovaks think straight because the time for warnings has run out and it is time to come to a decision.

The main cause threatening the common union is political and is rooted, on the one hand, in the not too distant and not always idyllic past and, on the other hand, in the expectations and course of the November revolution and the subsequent development. The coolness and the hesitancy with which a large part of Slovakia joined the revolution should have served as a warning. The obstructive attitudes of the powers that were intrinsically linked with socialism and were toppled in November, regardless of how hard they tried to distance themselves publicly from communism, were also indicative. It is impossible to overlook the fact that these elements were metamorphosed into a nationalistic movement, especially into the strongly oppositional HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia]. Yet the HZDS is not a purely separatist organization as is, for example, the SNS [Slovak National Party].

The true essence of the HZDS's policy is to exploit the nationalist elements in order to implement socialist objectives—not just in Slovakia. Since V. Meciar needs the nationalists' support, he has to simultaneously insist on the status of Slovakia according to international law. In his eyes, the link between the two opposites is the trap of the confederation. Therefore, in addition to the separatists, he is trying to involve the entire federal left wing, starting with Weiss's and Svoboda's "reformed" comrades, via both social democracies, through to Trnka's socialists in the game, though he purposefully does not do this openly. These are the people who, by calling for the preservation of the federation, are now pursuing a different goal. They are trying to maintain the interconnection between the left wing and the paralysis of the post-November changes. Meciar's shuffling of the cards is an ever clearer preparation for a fundamental political reversal, which is to be achieved following the institution of a leftist parliament, a weak federal government, and a puppet president. Thus, the last hesitation between a new socialist hopelessness and a civilized breakup is coming to an end. There was no lack of altruism on the

part of the Czechs, and even the Christians in the CR [Czech Republic] do not need to have a bad conscience. Those Slovak believers who were taken in by V. Meciar should have been warned by his statement that the church should not have a say in Christian politics. Adolf Hitler said the same in the 1930's; however, one should add that the German Catholics were not guided by his attitude.

The breakup of a state, even if it is for reasons of self-preservation, is surely a risky and depressing process, but it is certainly not apocalyptic. At a given moment it may also have a cleansing effect on two formerly brotherly nations. It is quite possible that several years of independent living will cure the Slovaks of their social-nationalist adventure, and that they will then wish to return to a natural union with the Czechs and Moravians. But in that case, they will have a lot to make up.

Adam Michnik Evaluates CSFR Predicament

92CH0738A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
2 Jul 92 p 5

[Article by Adam Michnik, editor in chief of GAZETA WYBORCZA: "A Black Wind Over Europe"]

[Text] In January 1990 I was in Prague at a meeting of the Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity. We spoke of the future and at that time—I do not know by what intuition I was influenced—I said that our best chance is to build up some kind of alliance between Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava, and Budapest. I said this because only if we form an area of common interests do we have a chance to be an actor on the European scene and not just an object with which the powerful interests of that world can toy. I recalled Munich and Yalta. I remember that I said that today, after the fall of communism, our territories and the peoples of our region are threatened by an explosion of ethnic conflicts and hatred.

For many of us, the republic of Czechs and Slovaks represented hope. The democratic tradition of the Masaryk era. Peace, a balance, a healthy judgment. Care about one's own interests joined with the brave tradition of Jan Hus. All this seemed to us to be the fertile soil from which grew the miracle of that time, the velvet revolution. We looked with respect on the openness and political discretion of the Havel team and at its decisiveness as they embarked on building a democratic state to be some kind of motherland of Czechs and Slovaks.

Even later I observed with hope how a Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian triad was born in pain and inconsequence. This tripartite alliance was a great political success for our countries in their efforts toward stability in the center of Europe.

Today a question mark hangs over the future of the republic of Czechs and Slovaks, just as it does over that triangle. What has happened? We are probably witness to the rapid rise of a populist and nationalist tendency in

each of the countries of postcommunist Europe. Unfortunately, not even the motherland of the Czechs and Slovaks has escaped this tendency. It appears that it is just these populist and nationalist forces which have gained a victory in Slovakia. And the defeat has been suffered not only by the adherents of a federal state, but likewise by the Christian Democratic parties, which is very surprising in traditionally Catholic Slovakia. In the Czech lands it came out differently, even though I cannot hide my fears about the fact that Sladek achieved greater for his party among the Czechs than did the Civic Movement headed up by Jiri Dienstbier and Petr Pithart.

What then awaits the Czechs and the Slovaks? The breakup of the republic? Compromise? What will the Czech lands be after the breakup of the republic? Another state in the Federal Republic of Germany, as some writers predict? And what will Slovakia be? How will the Slovak-Hungarian and Slovak-Ukraine relationships develop? What will come from all this for Poland and for all of Europe? I fear that nothing good will result from all this. For some time I have been following the developments in the Czech lands and in Slovakia with uneasiness as I saw them as another variation of the dangerous developments which are today taking place in Poland. It is a sharp paradox that the splendid speech by Vaclav Havel in the newly elected parliament, a profession of faith in democracy for the population of Central and East Europe, may turn out to be a eulogy over the grave of the republic.

A black wind is blowing over our Europe. For me, with my many friends in Prague and in Bratislava and after travelling through the Czech lands and Slovakia with great pleasure so many times, it is very hard to part with the hope that there is some chance for a joint state of the Czechs and Slovaks. I still believe that reason can win in the struggle with limited particularism and dark ethnic emotions. Even though this faith of mine is growing steadily weaker.

Former Privatization Minister Views Situation

92CH0759A Bratislava TELEGRAF in Slovak
26 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview with Ivan Miklos, vice chairman of the Civic Democratic Union, by Gejza Pinter; place and date not given: "How Far Will We Go?"]

[Text] *It seems as if the current domestic political developments have forced a pause. The SNR [Slovak National Council] and the SR [Slovak Republic] government have constituted themselves. Further steps will follow at a rapid pace. Therefore, we turned to the first vice chairman of ODU [Civic Democratic Union], Ivan Miklos, and asked how he perceives the prospective steps in the area of CSFR state powers arrangement that the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] proposes to initiate in the parliament.*

[Miklos] Without question such a grave matter ought to be decided by a referendum, assuming that prior to that the SNR will not adopt measures predetermining the further direction of events, thus actually preventing the preservation of a common start. Already prior to the elections we characterized the HZDS position on state powers issues as misleading and irresponsible, and we insist that the referendum be called as soon as possible. Should the referendum result in favor of a common state, it is necessary for the political parties to apply the conclusion in economic policy because there cannot be a common state in which two economic reforms are being carried out.

[Pinter] The political parties and movements of the former coalition are far from favorable. Are you reconciled to this state of affairs?

[Miklos] On the political map of Slovakia there isn't room for more than two groupings of the right. One is the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] and the other could be formed by the ODS [Civic Democratic Party], ODU, and DS [Democratic Party], which would differ from KDH by the civic orientation of a modern party of the right. The room is there for such a constellation. Hence, we direct all negotiations toward the creation of such subjects because only then they could build up sufficient strength and influence. In our original conception, if some kind of a bloc of right-wing parties were to be formed, it can exist only on condition that they are willing to merge because if their policies differ in some way it would make the political situation even more opaque.

[Pinter] Talks between the two parties that won the most votes in the elections have caused tension. What is it based on?

[Miklos] Every political force, if it is responsible, ought to do everything to safeguard economic stability and continuation of economic reform. It is in this sense that I understand the ODS's impatience and also a large section of the Slovak public believes that the problem of the common state's breakup is caused by the unyielding stance of ODS. The HZDS has shrewdly set two sharply defined positions against each other and then conceded some compromises. It thus created the impression that if ODS also yields in some matters they would meet in the middle and a consensus would become possible. But the middle is no longer a common state. If it is to function effectively and continue economic reform, there are no longer many opportunities to shift powers, subjectivity under international law, and the like.

[Pinter] So the negotiation was justifiable?

[Miklos] It was right to negotiate. When it turned out that the positions are diametrically opposed, the proceedings took the course they did.

[Pinter] Can you offer a characterization of the HZDS economic program and what do you expect from carrying it out?

[Miklos] The program has several contradictory aspects. Take for example the HZDS policy of development by deficit financing while at the same creating the best possible conditions for an influx of foreign capital; the two are mutually exclusive because deficit financing of development while ownership remains largely in state hands means very rapid inflation, which causes an unstable economic situation, hardly attractive to foreign capital. This is only one example. What is important is what the actual economic policy will be. If we listen to R. Filkus who says that the reform is good in principle, and similarly, that the concept of privatization should be continued, and then hear the contrary from economists M. A. Huska and H. Kocuch, I am not sure what the concrete economic policy will be and therefore, I let myself be surprised. Personally, I do not see importance in the program but in the concrete economic policy.

Rules on Presidential Election Rounds Explained

92CH0782B Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech
9 Jul 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Unfinished Elections"]

[Text] The number of rounds in the presidential elections is not in any way connected to the fact that the term of office of the current president, Vaclav Havel, will definitely terminate on 5 October (if a new president has not been elected by that time), a member of the presidium of the Federal Assembly, J. Mecl (Leftist Bloc), said yesterday. Theoretically, that means that if the deputies do not agree on the proposed candidates, the elections can be repeated at 14-day intervals for several years. According to J. Mecl, if no candidate is officially nominated for the second round of elections for CSFR president, which begins 16 July, the parliament will have to declare that a president was not elected, as there was no one to elect. Parliament would then be obliged to prepare a third double-round of elections which must take place, according to the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak federation, within 14 days after the second double-round, that is, no later than 30 July. At the same time, the names of the persons proposed for the third round must be submitted, as in all the rounds, no later than 72 hours before the election day. The third round could thus take place no earlier than 20 July.

HZDS Prevarications Perceived During Meeting

92CH0760C Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Slovak
30 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Stefan Hrib: "Windows Unfortunately Open"]

[Text] Saturday's HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] meeting on the premises of the future exhibition site at Petralka was held behind closed doors, yet the windows somehow unfortunately remained open. Thus, the journalists got an unexpected opportunity to compare the actual words of HZDS representatives

coming through the open windows, with the words of HZDS press secretary J. Sucha, who occasionally stepped out from the half-open door.

Thus the unambiguous nature of the "Merciarites" policies was revealed in all its glory on Saturday. As clear words about a plan to put off the referendum were "escaping" through the windows, equally clear assertions to the contrary came from the mouth of an unruffled HZDS spokesman. While the windows reported HZDS readiness to gain control of Slovak TV by adopting a "control" law in the Slovak National Council (which given the numerical strength of this movement's deputies will not even be an issue for political negotiation), at the door one heard the spokesman's emphatic words asserting the exact opposite.

By now it may well be futile to worry about the possible consequences of postponing the referendum, or the effect of a single movement's gaining control of the television regarding the outcome of that very referendum. Saturday's remarkable information imbroglio at Petralka permits a more useful conclusion for the future: Negotiations between the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] and HZDS are futile, because if the ODS representatives want to learn the true views of HZDS representatives, relying on their own ears and eyes during the negotiations is not enough. For ODS, the best way of finding out what HZDS evidently really wants would be if during the next closed-door HZDS deliberation Vaclav Klaus finds one of those open windows of the meeting room and disciplines himself to sit by it quietly for the duration of the meeting.

Views on Impact of HZDS Splinter Discussed

92CH0759C Bratislava TELEGRAF in Slovak 1 Jul 92
p 2

[Unattributed article: "'It's Their Business': Officials of Slovak Opposition Parties on a Possible Breakup of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia"]

[Text] Prior to the June legislative elections speculations began to crop up, especially in the Czech media, on a possible breakup of Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. According to our information, there are five wings within the HZDS: the "radicals" (V. Meciar), "realists" or "pragmatists" (R. Filkus), "nationalists" or "separatists" (M. Knazko, A. M. Huska), "renewalists" (supporters of reform-communist ideas, I. Luluha), and a certain "religion-tinted" trend.

We asked representatives of Slovak opposition parties for their views of the possible impact of an eventual breakup of HZDS on the Slovak Republic's political scene or the negotiation on powersharing with the Czech Republic representation.

"Look, an HZDS breakup, that is their business," we were told by KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] Vice Chairman Jan Petrik, who added that he would not comment on it. "To put it simply, it's their worry and

that is how I see it. When they break up, then we will comment," elaborated J. Petrik.

According to ODU [Civic Democratic Union] Chairman Martin Porubjak, a split in HZDS is "unfortunately not imminent" in the present situation. He explained that when HZDS becomes established in positions of power it will have the effect of uniting its individual representatives on the basis of shared interests. "But if a split really occurs, it will depend on who will emerge in the top position, whether it will be the separatists who hold it very strongly for now or the pragmatic forces centered around R. Filkus," M. Porubjak continued. In the latter case, according to the ODU chairman's view, an agreement with the Czech side would be possible. "That's because the pragmatists in HZDS recognize what economic separatism would entail: a deficitary budget, subsidizing bankrupt enterprises and so on," explained M. Porubjak.

In another comment he noted that a HZDS breakup would surely lead to polarization of the Slovak political scene and influence the conduct of all political subjects with the exception of SNS [Slovak National Party]. "I can well imagine that the KDH would enter into cooperation with the pragmatic wing and thus possibly move away from the 'hard' opposition into which it is being driven by Meciar's current policies," concluded M. Porubjak.

"Let it run its course," was the opinion expressed by Jan Holcik, chairman of DS [Democratic Party] and former Slovak Republic industry minister. He said that currently there are "some other problems. A leader of Meciar's type should also display generosity, which he, however, lacks. For instance, yesterday he decided that former ministers would draw salary not for four months, but only two," J. Holcik explained. "We will see what happens," he continued, "because people to whom V. Meciar promised the same jobs, and there are five for each of them, will come forward. They will surely watch for the failings of the ones to whom the HZDS chairman had given preference."

Slovakia's Two Political Options Discussed

92CH0759D Bratislava TELEGRAF in Slovak
30 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview with Fedor Gal, former chairman Public Against Violence, by Gejza Pinter; place and date not given: "How Power Is Tempered: From Olympus They Not Only Ruled But Also Prophesied"]

[Text] *The contradictory nature of current developments and the fickleness of political fates are portrayed vividly in the person of Fedor Gal. After 17 November 1989 he was among the leaders and originators of fundamental change in the then existing power structure. Today, he is not safe from anger and hatred. Is it because he had helped society to loosen the constraints, without which ambitions suppressed and curbed for over 40 years have also come forth? Has he seen and heard much? It is premature to pass*

judgment, but it surely is of interest how the forecaster perceives present-day reality.

[Pinter] The issue of making Slovakia more visible gained urgency prior to the elections. Have we achieved this goal?

[Gal] We succeeded in making Slovakia visible very forcefully and very quickly, first of all by questioning the authority of the most charismatic figure of the post-November political scene in Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel, and by questioning the meaning and future prospects of our integrated state. These two acts have made Slovakia visible. There are two ways to make Slovakia visible: One is negative—look at the Slovaks, the mischief they cause; the other is positive—look at them, what they have accomplished, what experts, what bright people they have, what they can show to Europe and the world. This way is long-term and it requires a permanent effort and people of quality. I am afraid of prolonging the first way of gaining visibility and overshadowing the second. Personally, I think it will happen.

[Pinter] Already the first steps of the new governing assemblage forebode radical changes. What kind?

[Gal] We will have to learn very quickly how to read the real content between the lines. In my opinion, what the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] is doing at this moment, and I regard it as an organic part of doing politics in established democracies (we are not yet one of them), is nothing but a forceful push for power. I expect that in time, this will become reflected also on the local level, and that the HZDS will seek to get itself entrenched in positions that they gained by legitimate means in this parliamentary election.

[Pinter] In connection with the HZDS election victory there has been speculation about a foreign share, in particular Bavaria's, in this success. Do you attach any relevance to such a possibility?

[Gal] I do not like to argue on the basis of second- or third-hand information. If we are talking about Vladimir Meciar's contacts with representatives of other governments and countries, as the Slovak Republic prime minister he is fully entitled to them. I want to add something else. For the foreign affairs officials of European governments the situation in the CSFR and Slovakia is political reality and they base themselves on it. If we want to understand how they perceive this new political reality let us look at how entrepreneurs and Western capital are acting.

[Pinter] You are a forecaster. How would you characterize Slovakia's road into the third millennium?

[Gal] There are two kinds of forecasts. One is self-destructive and the other self-fulfilling. When a forecaster puts forward this vision of the future, it is up to the listeners whether they will act to make it a forecast of the first or the second kind. When I say that in the event of a CSFR breakup Slovakia will be faced with a difficult

period, much more difficult than it would have to face in an integrated Czecho-Slovakia, it is a forecast I would not want to see fulfilled in my lifetime. I hear and understand the talk of emancipation, national identity, Slovak self-confidence. At this moment it is important to distinguish what leads to emancipation, identity, and Slovak self-confidence. If this road is to be paved with ethnic and nationality conflicts, aversions, new enemy images, as well as economic, social, and cultural decline, then this road leads to somewhere else altogether. The most national program for Slovakia at this time is a program of economic prosperity, in association with the democratic and civilized countries of Europe. And it is precisely this road which seems to me rather questionable at this moment.

Slovaks Have 'No Use' for Western Criticism

92CH0759B Bratislava SLOVENSKY NAROD
in Slovak 30 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Samuel Brecko: "Major as if General"]

[Text] We Slovaks never cease wondering about how much the U.S. Government cares for us. First, we witness how "someone" prepares a report for the U.S. Government on the state of democracy in Slovakia, which talks of anti-Semitism, nationalism, and our other ailments, then follows regular telephone conversations in which President Havel assures President Bush that everything is okay thus far and the Slovaks rebel only here and there. And ultimately, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency issues a document on Central and Eastern Europe in which we read more absurd fantasies about ourselves. It is surely not the love of Slovaks emanating from the seven pages devoted to the CSFR.

But the height of concern for Slovakia at the highest level were the utterances of John Major at the White House on the occasion of his recent visit to the United States, in which he tried to frighten Slovaks that only a united Czechoslovakia is acceptable to him, on which President Bush, standing at his side, was in warm agreement. So I suppose I should begin reevaluating my opinion of the claims of Czech politicians that "the world is looking at us," "what would the world say to this," "we will not be accepted abroad," and other blatherings. But before I begin to believe it, I must remind the two gentlemen: Yes, you are the top leaders of two great powers of the world, but that does not mean that you can "counsel" Slovakia on whether or not to continue its emancipation process and thereby save this nation from impending doom. We have no use for that!

It defies comprehension that such a British politician is unable to learn from the errors of others. I have in mind politicians such as Gorbachev or Thatcher. Both, even though enjoying recognition abroad, had to step down from the highest office because they lacked support at home. Mr. Havel, too, is ending in a similar way. While holding the presidential office he was most concerned with the resettlement of Russian Jews to Israel, war in

the Persian Gulf, a variety of prizes and doctorates, but for Slovaks, he somehow did not find time.

Mr. Major apparently overlooks all of this. Still, he has yet another worry: an impending lecture to Slovaks about living together in Europe. Too bad that on the White House grounds no one whispered to him that the U.S. President too, due to a policy of neglect toward his own country, now has a fire burning under his behind. Why is it that Mr. Major failed to notice the recent race disturbances in Los Angeles, or the gradual division of the largest state in the United States, California, into a northern and a southern part? He ought to take heed because he too is not immune to such influences. For instance, a referendum on Maastricht may, following Denmark's example, lead to completely opposite and unexpected results in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I find it hard to imagine that the Scots, Ulstermen, or Welshmen would want to represent mere ordinary regions within Europe's integration.

So, Mr. Major, when in the future you look at the European continent from beyond the ocean, your kingdom is not a neighbor of Austria, but of Ireland!

Slovak Cabinet Makes Media-Related Decisions

AU2907143792 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Jul 92
pp 1-2

[Frantisek Melis report: "Do You Have Two Billion To Spare for Gabcikovo? The Slovak Government Canceled the Decision on Privatizing Danubiaprint"]

[Text] At its fourth meeting, which was resumed yesterday [21 July], the Slovak Government took note of a report on preparations for the construction of the multipurpose Zilina hydroproject and its use for power generation. It recommended to the relevant ministers to organize an international tender for the project within two months and to discuss the terms of the tender in the Slovak Government's Economic Council.

The Slovak cabinet yesterday also dealt with the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric power project. It instructed the Slovak minister of agriculture and food, who is also charged with managing the Slovak Ministry of Forestry and Water Economy, and the government commissioner for this project to submit by 15 August 1992, in cooperation with the CSFR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, updated background material for further decisions of the Slovak and CSFR Governments. Speaking at a news conference after the government session, Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac said, among other things, that this year it is necessary to raise 3.5 billion korunas and next year 5 billion korunas to finance work related to the completion of the alternative variant of the project. At present, the government has a guaranteed sum of less than 1.5 billion korunas, which means that it must seriously think about ways of obtaining the remaining sum. The options include foreign capital involvement in the form of ownership, but also privatization of the

infrastructure parts of the project. Given the fact that the prime minister of the previous government, Jan Carnogursky, was the CSFR Government's plenipotentiary for talks with the Hungarian Government, following yesterday's meeting Vladimir Meciar took over this function. Together with the newly established commission of the CSFR and Slovak Government, he will devote himself to the economic, ecological, legal, and political consequences of the unilateral cancellation by the Hungarian Republic of the 1977 interstate treaty on the construction of this project.

The interest of the journalistic community will be aroused by the cancellation of government resolution No. 477 of 26 May 1992, in which the previous Slovak Government approved the privatization project for the Danubiaprint Bratislava state enterprise and the direct sale of a part of its assets to the ISTER company for 394,337,000 korunas. Lubomir Dolgos, minister for the administration and privatization of national property, told the news conference that the government had arrived at this decision because there existed the possibility of misusing the dominant position of this enterprise on the Slovak market for the production and distribution of the daily press (the annual volume of deliveries of newspapers printed by Danubiaprint exceeds 242 million korunas, which is 73.7 percent of the total volume of newspaper deliveries in Slovakia), as well as because the buyer had not been selected in a public tender, despite a recommendation to this effect by the appropriate commissions. Moreover, the ISTER company has not been registered with the court to this day, which raises doubts that are subject of investigations by the relevant authorities. At the same time, the government assigned to Ludovit Cernak, Slovak minister of economy, who is also charged with managing the Slovak Ministry of Industry and the Slovak Ministry of Trade and Tourism, the task of ensuring that the Danubiaprint's Zilina plant is split up, for reasons of demonopolization.

One of the key points of yesterday's government session was the assessment of the draft constitution of the Slovak Republic. The government took note of the draft and established a commission of experts to incorporate into the draft written and oral comments. The commission is to submit the final draft to the Slovak Government for approval next week, so that the Slovak Government can then submit it to Slovak National Council bodies. The constitution's text states, among other things, that "the Slovak Republic is a sovereign, democratic, law-governed, and socially equitable state that can, on the basis of its free decision, enter into a state alliance with other states."

In the light of commitments arising from the CSFR's Association Agreement with the EC, the government agreed with projects that have been proposed to improve the Czechoslovak transportation infrastructure, on the understanding that these projects will be supplemented and harmonized with conceptual plans concerning the development of transportation in the Slovak Republic. It

discussed, furthermore, the proposal to change the structure and personnel composition of Slovak Government auxiliary and advisory bodies, changed the composition of the Slovak Television Council and the Slovak Radio Council, and took note of a report on provisions for the resettlement to Slovakia of citizens of Slovak nationality from the areas of Ukraine affected by the Chernobyl nuclear accident. The government approved the renaming and setting apart of some towns and communities and discussed also other issues.

[Note: Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech on 22 July on page 2 carries a 600-word unattributed report on the Slovak Government session, which specifies one of the changes in the structure of Slovak Government auxiliary and advisory bodies. According to the report, "the Slovak Government abolished the Government Council for Information Policy and Mass Media and fully transferred its powers to the Slovak Ministry of Culture, which is headed by Dusan Slobodnik."]

Defense Minister Interviewed on Possible Split

AU2707102992 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 21 Jul 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with CSFR Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcek by Branislav Janik; place and date not given: "No One Has Tasked Us With the Division of the Army as Yet"]

[Text] Imrich Andrejcek, nominated by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], has become the CSFR Defense Minister. We asked him for a short interview.

[Janik] There has been some speculation in the Czech press about your having been appointed the defense minister. In brief—how did it happen?

[Andrejcek] Two days prior to my appointment, Mr. Meciar suggested that I assume this office—but the president's and the Czech prime minister's approvals were still needed. I told Mr. Meciar I did not have any reason to refuse. One day later, we spoke on the phone again and he told me that Havel's approval depends on my leaving the Army and becoming an active reservist. I agreed with that, and I waited for the president at the airport when he was returning from Bratislava. I told him that I agreed and submitted to him my request to be released from the Army.

[Janik] If this country ceases to exist, a situation may arise in which you will no longer be the defense minister. What will happen then, are you going to rejoin the Army?

[Andrejcek] I asked the president for an opportunity to rejoin the Army should this happen. He agreed, but he said that it could happen that he himself may be out of office. Which is what eventually happened....

[Janik] What did you mean by saying that you had no relationship with the HZDS. This movement nominated you as a member of the Federal Government....

[Andrejcak] I was answering the question whether I was a HZDS member. I am not, and no one proposed membership to me.

[Janik] You have undoubtedly spoken with the Slovak prime minister about what the HZDS expects of you in your post as defense minister.

[Andrejcak] Of course, in our first personal conversation, I asked Mr. Meciar what he expected of me politically. His answer was that, in the event of the division of the state and the Army, he expects an organized division, in accordance with the political will in Czechoslovakia.

[Janik] Will you be able, as a former lieutenant general and as Defense Minister Dobrovsky's deputy, to fulfill this task, if this happens? Are you going to fulfill political decisions precisely?

[Andrejcak] Someone else should say whether I will be able to fulfill such task or not. However, yes, I am convinced that I will be able to fulfill it. I am determined to do it, if necessary. Of course, I am not going to do anything unconstitutional. If we get beyond legal limits, I will notify the relevant authorities. My role in this government can be partially understood in the way you have described.

[Janik] The former minister rejected the so-called catastrophic scenarios, yet I have information that the division of the Army has been prepared. For example, the number of professional soldiers in the Czech Republic was fixed at 20,000 men, etc. Can you confirm or disprove this?

[Andrejcak] People have imaginations. The Army is organizationally divided into independent operational units. They are military commands able to work independently. The rest the units have in common: We have the same regulations, standards, and—which is the most important thing—joint defense. If there is division to a certain degree and the defense remains joint, then it is not necessary—if no unforeseen events take place in Europe—to change the operational plan. Only if the republic becomes completely independent, will we have a new situation here.

[Janik] The number of soldiers is being reduced. Next year the Czechoslovak Army should have 140,000 men. How would this reduction proceed in the event of division?

[Andrejcak] The long-term plan of the Czechoslovak Army is to have 60,000 to 80,000 men by 2005. You are correct when you say that in 1993 the army should have 140,000 men. However, the thing is whether the reduction of armed forces will continue in Europe. When the politicians are working out the possible division of the state, they also will be working out the division of the Army. We are going to suggest such a division as will

respect all international obligations—with respect to the Army—concluded by the CSFR. I realize that a possible failure to respect these obligations would cause an unpleasant situation in the world. As far as the planned gradual reduction in the number of soldiers is concerned, I see no problems.

[Janik] What would be your first steps in the event of the division of the state and the Army?

[Andrejcak] I hate answering such a question. As long as the politicians are willing to accept advice, there are real opportunities of how to avoid danger. I believe that they will listen to us and take their course of action accordingly. If they ignore the situation when they make their decisions, there would be a certain threat of danger.

[Janik] During your talks with the HZDS chairman did you discuss the military and security aspects of the division?

[Andrejcak] Not in the sense you mean. I spoke with Mr. Meciar and Mr. Klaus, as the prime ministers, as well as with Mr. Havel, as the president, about this. If I am given such a task, we will take gradual steps as permitted by the law and approved beforehand. We would prepare the expert part of them. The condition is, however, that politicians reach consensus in their opinions and adopt a solution acceptable to both sides. In such case no danger can arise.

[Janik] You do not have an order to divide the Army in your desk?

[Andrejcak] Not at all, despite the fact that we are discussing ways of approaching this problem. It would be premature to be more specific. No one has given us this task, as yet. I repeat, we are considering ways of approaching this problem.

[Janik] I understand that, based on some interview you have granted, you personally are a supporter of the common state. Is that true?

[Andrejcak] I am not a member of any party or movement. I am an Army official. My opinion is that the larger the Army is—and the better it is equipped—the better it is prepared to fulfill a unified plan—the stronger the army is. Let us have a look at the map and compare the possibilities of a unified common state with the possibilities of independent Czech and Slovak Republics.

[Janik] I would like to hear your opinion....

[Andrejcak] I am convinced that if we have a unified army after the country is divided—based on a treaty or in some other form—this army will be stronger than two independent armies. This is logical. However, my expert opinion as a member of the military is one thing, and the political will of the republics is another. I must respect the political will.

Slovak Arms Industry at 70-Percent Capacity*AU3007111392 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 23 Jul 92 p 2*

[Interview with Slovak Minister of Economy Ludovit Cernak by Stanislav Tomanek; place and date not given: "Let Us Demystify the Language of Figures"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Tomanek] How will you come to terms with the problems of conversion and insolvency?

[Cernak] Indeed, the conversion of Slovak arms manufacturing enterprises came like a bolt from the blue. It was more a political than a rational gesture. The previous government was stuck between two stones: It was limited by the proclaimed decision of federal bodies to phase out the production of heavy weaponry and, on the other hand, by the social and economic pressure against the conversion of the armaments industry. I have to note here that in the United States, for example, companies undergoing conversion reduce their original output by 10 percent a year. Foreign journalists are asking me whether we are going to renew the production of weapons. I reply to them truthfully: It was renewed by the previous government, the companies are running at 70-percent capacity. We are not going to increase the production, but to gradually obtain funds to change the production program. As to corporate insolvency, one has to distinguish between primary and secondary insolvency. Operations such as the one undertaken by FIZAKO [expansion not given] to mutually offset companies' debts have only a partial effect. Assistance from the outside is necessary, by our or foreign capital. A detailed plan has been drawn up by the Slovak Ministry of Finance. We want to separate the wheat from the chaff and, once this is done, we want to introduce strict financial discipline for enterprises. The bankruptcy law, too, will contribute to this as of October [when the law comes into effect]. [passage omitted]

Federal Tripartite Meetings Will Continue*AU2907184092 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 22 Jul 92 p 3*

["(hor)"-signed report: "The Federal Tripartite Meeting Continues"]

[Text] Vaclav Vanek and Pavel Hajek, vice presidents of the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions, met with Deputy Prime Minister Miroslav Macek and representatives of employers at a meeting of the Presidium of the Federal Tripartite Council yesterday.

It was agreed that the trade unions and employers will have seven representatives each in the CSFR Council of Economic and Social Accord, while the government only four, which is in conformity with the tripartite's rules of procedure. It is likely that M. Macek will become chairman. At the federal level, the tripartite body should

continue playing an important role, above all, in communication with republican tripartite organs, and it should make political decisions based on drafts by the already existing expert groups and the secretariat. After the session of republican tripartite bodies, all three presidiums should meet before the end of August to discuss their jurisdiction and further course of action.

Moreover, social reform was discussed regarding the tax system, which is to become effective on 1 January. It is necessary to reach an agreement as soon as possible about creating resources for health and retirement insurance and for employment funds. When asked by a HOSPODARSKE NOVINY reporter, Vice President Vanek said that Deputy Prime Minister M. Macek said that this will be a subject of discussion at today's meeting of Czech and Slovak representatives in Bratislava.

The issue of the Social Charter of Europe was also discussed. Trade unionists demand its fast ratification in the Federal Assembly. Regarding better control over the management of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] fund financial means, consensus was reached. The implementation of the PHARE project at the ministries, particularly as far as support to small and medium-sized businesses is concerned, still remains a problem, however.

Attempts To Control Slovak Culture Perceived*92CH0783B Bratislava TELEGRAF in Slovak
10 Jul 92 p 3*

[Article by Jan Strasser: "What Is Not Political?"]

[Text] Mr. Igor Gazdik, chairman of the Slovak Graphic Arts Union (SVU) felt obliged in TELEGRAF of 8 July 1992 to set straight the information about a meeting of representatives of artists associations he convened on 6 July in Bratislava's *Umelecka beseda* [Artists Encounter]. In his rejoinder he took strong exception to suspicions that the meeting constituted an attempt to form something like a united cultural front under HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] leadership.

In TELEGRAF Mr. Gazdik says: "...Nor was the meeting in any way motivated politically. I convened it as chairman of the Slovak Graphic Arts Union in order to inform representatives of individual artists associations about the position the Culture and Arts Club affiliated with HZDS has adopted on the present and future of Slovak culture."

Let us not make light of analyzing the significance of that remarkable statement, and in that context, raise a few questions:

1. Does the statement quoted above suggest that a nonpolitical or nonpartisan artists association, which the Slovak Graphic Arts Union undoubtedly is, has identified itself with the political positions of the Culture and Arts Club affiliated with HZDS?

2. If not, what led SVU to decide it should familiarize other artists associations with the opinions of that club?

3. Is such conduct in compliance with SVU bylaws? Is the SVU chairman authorized to act in such a manner?

4. And especially: Is this in accordance with the independence and freedom of culture and the arts in a democratic state?

5. Moreover, if the top official of SVU convenes representatives of artists associations with the purpose documented in the statement quoted above, is it not a political motivation?

I would welcome replies to my questions. I should also be interested in hearing what graphic and other artists and those active in the cultural field have to say to such initiative on the part of the SVU chairman. For it seems to me that in the new political situation in Slovakia, it is

vitally important to clarify matters in the triangle power—state administration—culture, and the arts, as soon as possible, when any discussion of it is still possible. The SVU chairman put it rather clearly in concluding his statement: "The Culture and Arts Club affiliated with HZDS is prepared to oversee the present and future of Slovak culture! I don't know who in the Slovak cultural field gave HZDS a mandate for doing so, but one thing I do know, there was already a party that had such a 'mandate' and held it for a long time."

On the same day, and in another Slovak daily, the Slovak Republic culture minister commented as follows on the future of literary journals: "I do not rule out the possibility of legal changes involving publishers of some periodicals. I find sufficient reason to believe that the leading role of one movement will soon become fixed in legal statute of the utmost effectiveness." In the interest of the Slovak nation, naturally.

Istvan Benedek Evaluates U.S., Emigres*92CH0780B Budapest MAGYAR FORUM
in Hungarian 25 Jun 92 p 14*

[Article by author Istvan Benedek, honorary chairman of the recently founded Union of Hungarian Journalists: "Istvan Benedek: One Last Time About America and the Emigres"]

[Excerpts] After a three-day drive I arrived depressed from the South to the North, from North Carolina to New York. America saddened me. From movies and books I know of course about the existence of another America—rich, magnificent, beautiful, and intelligent—but what I saw with my own eyes was depressingly dreary.

Those who travel with limited means see only this America, with its 5 million unemployed, cheap stores, hamburger- and pizza-like junk food, and infantile citizens who swallow not only hot dogs but also the notion that their country is the greatest and they live in a democracy. Only them.

New York is different. It has so many faces and colors that it is not possible to make such a simple judgment about it. Note carefully—I know that the above statement is one-sided, but it is good to know that this side also exists, although what I like about it is precisely what I had expected to hate: the heart of the city with its skyscrapers. At home I can't stand the high-rises, but here they fascinate me with their variety, ingenuity, and functionality. Not their size but their aesthetic value is what appeals to me. The shops are full of merchandise, and the restaurants may even offer edible food, for unaffordable (for us) prices. But when I bought something here and there they always tried to cheat me out of a couple of dollars, and they thoroughly tricked me in a travel agency. Their perception of business ethics is certainly different from ours. It doesn't hurt to be aware this, since we are trying to develop business relations with America. We have to be on our guard.

Washington appealed to me in every way. A huge suburb, open and spacious. The people are nice and helpful—the black taxi drivers know that Hungary is not a communist country any longer and say with a hopeful expression, "now everything is O.K., isn't it?" We nod.

The museums are wonderful in both cities. I saw some paintings of Courbet and Manet that I had written books about, although I knew them only from reproductions. It was great to see my earlier opinion justified.

I cannot say the same about my encounters with emigres and other Hungarians living abroad.

In New York and in Washington the consulate and the embassy gave me a warm welcome, not only providing lodging but also organizing lectures for the local Hungarians. To be more precise, for a tiny fragment of the local Hungarians, because compared to their large number the

attendance was very moderate. This confirmed my earlier experience elsewhere that only a small number of Hungarians living abroad have maintained an interest in what is happening here at home. Most of them are like my colleague, who invited me to America and drove me from the South to the North in his car and buried himself in the newspapers every spare minute he had, concerned only about the U.S. election campaign. He couldn't understand why we bothered him day after day with questions about the war in Yugoslavia—which the papers perhaps ignored completely. [passage omitted]

The emigres are mad at us—no doubt about it—because we managed to survive that which they had escaped from. That explains why they try at all costs to label everybody a collaborator both at home and abroad, if it is at all possible. Their fundamental philosophy is that whoever survived communism must have collaborated; otherwise he would have been eliminated. [passage omitted]

One more remark about the emigres' arrogance. In addition to the overcompensation of their inferiority complex, its obvious reason is their higher standard of living. They got used to the idea that only money counts, and since we cannot hide our poverty, they think it is a concession simply to talk to us. They never stop pointing out how much they sacrificed for us in terms of dollars, marks, and francs. They bought with that—they assume—the right of knowing everything better. They want to teach us about democracy, government, and Hungarianness, and they fail to understand why their wise advice is not accepted immediately. They are convinced that through their information service they are better informed about Hungary's domestic affairs, and they get insulted again because we live as it is possible, and not as they expect us to.

Summarizing the lessons of my brief American trip—and now I am talking about the New World in general and not only about the emigres—I was not impressed either with its wealth, its poverty, its democracy, its liberalism and its controlled press freedom, or with its materialism and spiritualism, and least of all with its fundamentalism, its superpower arrogance, and its morality that clings to an illegitimate status quo. Let us not try to imitate infantile America, or try to catch up with mercenary Europe; instead, let us just remain gentlemen and Hungarians.

Media Battle: Arguments Against Antall's Stance*92CH0791B Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian
4 Jul 92 pp 4-5*

[Article by Akos Radvanyi: "Loves Me, Loves Me Not, From the Heart, But Not Truly"]

[Text] Jozsef Antall will wait until 1 July for Arpad Goncz's reply in connection with the release of the media presidents. The prime minister's letter addressed to the president of the Republic, published in the press (MAGYAR HIRLAP 24 June) presents a long list of

arguments for the president why he must sign the release document. But the prime minister's legal argument is not the only possible argumentation. The BESZELO's legal expert will look at all possible counterarguments. If Arpad Goncz will make his reply public by 1 July, i.e., by Wednesday, our readers can check whether the tips of our expert were on mark. If not, they can continue guessing how the president will decide and argue.

Jozsef Antall wrote another letter to Arpad Goncz recently.

In this writing, which is an "open letter," he presented extensive quotations from the Constitution Court and, on the basis of the recommendations of Parliament's cultural, educational, scientific, sports, television, and press committees, initiated the release of the presidents of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television. He made reference to the fact that "the committee's unanimous opinion is that Csaba Gombar is unqualified to continue filling the Hungarian Radio's executive post" and that "the attitude displayed by Csaba Gombar" makes it impossible for Jozsef Antall as "the responsible head of government" to abort this initiative for his release. According to the letter, in the case of Elemer Hankiss the committee made a recommendation for his succession and, thus, the prime minister pledges to take such measures.

In view of this, the prime minister proposed two different dates for the release of the two media presidents, namely, 1 July and 15 September, respectively.

It is not worth guessing what action this letter will elicit from the president. But it is perhaps worth expressing certain concerns that the reader of this letter may have.

Loves Me...

According the Paragraph 1.(1) of statute 1990/LVII, the presidents of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television shall be appointed on the basis of the prime minister's recommendation, following a committee hearing.

Here the role of the committee hearing is different from the case in which the committee hearing is for having a cabinet member render account of his work or for another purpose (Article 21, Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the House Rule).

According to the Constitution Court Resolution 48/1992 (IX.26) AB, the hearing of the candidate and the decision are part of the process which the president must review as two of the legal (formal) prerequisites for appointment or release.

However, it is unclear what the actual role of the committee hearing is in this context. There is a view that the reason why the Constitution Court included the appropriate parliamentary committee in the process of appointment (or release) was to include in the regulations on the appointment and release process itself the constitutional requirement regarding the regulations of

appointment and release, namely, a minimum of two-thirds consensus among the parties, beyond the ruling majority.

This view is contradicted by the clause of the Constitution Court that "a consensus among the parties is inadequate for offering constitutional assurance for the complete exercise of a basic right." (But, then, the question is, why does the Constitution require a two-thirds majority for legal regulations in most cases of basic constitutional rights?)

There is another view that the committee decides on the qualifications or lack of qualifications of the person to be appointed (released).

This view is contradicted by the clause of the Constitution Court that the president has the obligation to include the standpoint of the office that is part of the process only when this is specifically stated in the statute. Statute 1990/LVII does not include such an obligation; indeed, in the case of release, the review of the recommendation from the aspect of the person to be released is specifically excluded from deliberation by the Constitution Court. And, if the president does not (cannot) deliberate on whether the person to be appointed (released) is—in the committee's opinion—qualified or unqualified to fill his post, then it makes no sense to assume that the process has such a purpose.

Loves Me Not...

If the committee—as the submitting, evaluating and counseling body, for instance—in fact decides on the qualifications or lack of qualifications, then it is cause for concern that there is no statute or parliamentary resolution that regulates the hearing process. Such regulations would be absolutely necessary to prevent the committee from changing its role (so that it will not act as a disciplinary council or as a court or as a body of inquisition). Such regulations would also be needed to assure a fair process.

If the committee in fact decides on the qualifications or lack of qualifications, then it is cause for concern that there is no statute or parliamentary resolution that sets the requirements for decision making. It is unclear what the process of the voting and the ratio of the votes have to be for accepting a decision as a committee decision. Is a decision "unanimous" where representatives of three of the six parliamentary parties leave the scene of the decision making as a sign of their protest against the decision?

If the committee in fact decides on the qualifications or lack of qualifications, then it is cause for concern that there is no statute or parliamentary resolution that sets the requirements for justifying its decision. For the legislative regulations of the release, which is one of the methods of terminating employment that was established through the appointment, require an indication of the cause of the release in a way that its cogency and veracity can be reviewed. The Constitution Court

extended the requirement of justification to cases of refusal to resign (i.e., when the act of resigning did not take place). However, in view of the contradiction that, according to the Constitution Court's Resolution 36/1992 (VI.10) AB, the recommendation for a person's release (i.e., the person's qualifications or lack thereof) cannot be reviewed, any kind of requirement for justification can only be interpreted in the light of the requirement of mutual cooperation between the parties that take part in the process.

In its Resolution 8/1992(I.30) AB, the Constitution Court states that the presidential authority of appointment and release is embedded in the decisionmaking mechanism of the highest state organizations and, in view of this, it specifically emphasizes in Resolution 36(1992 (VI.10) AB that these organizations shall exercise their authority in good faith and shall carry out their tasks through mutual help and cooperation. If the recommending party makes his appointment recommendation on the basis of the committee's view, then, obviously, he must be familiar with the justifications of the committee's decision. And, since the president's authority of appointment and release is an authority that is limited by the Constitution Court's resolution, i.e., the president decides only on the basis of the recommendation submitted by the authorized party, the mutuality of the cooperation between the prime minister and the president is implemented only if both justify their decision.

Of course, all this is difficult to interpret when none of the parties that take part in the process of appointment and release act as authorities and, thus, their decisions do not take the form of a resolution. It is especially difficult to interpret the requirement that the president justify his decision when the issue is a refusal of release, for these cases are not even documented (by signatures attesting to the appointment or release). The difficulty in interpreting the situation is exacerbated by the fact that our laws generally require justification only in connection with legal decisions against which legal redress can be used. On the other hand, the refusal of appointment or release is the president's final and incontestable decision.

The regulations on the parliamentary committee's procedure and on the decisions of the parties that take part in the appointment (release) process are inadequate for observing constitutional requirements.

From the Heart...

If the committee in fact decides on the qualifications or lack of qualifications—and if its standpoint can be considered by the party that makes the recommendation—then it is cause for concern that there is no statute or parliamentary resolution that specifies when a person is qualified or unqualified for filling the post of public media president.

No legal prerequisite for appointment (other than the requirement of committee hearing) exists and, thus, a

media president does not have to meet any requirements of age, citizenship or professional qualifications, does not have to have a clean police record, and the regulations on incompatibility do not apply to him.

The issue is even more complex in the case of release. In this case, a lack of qualifications may arise because of health reasons. Beyond this, no statute regulates the qualification requirements for the continued filling of the post. Thus, we can only make guesses as to who is qualified and who is unqualified.

It is certain, however, that the attitude demonstrated during the process of determining a lack of qualifications cannot, in itself, be the basis for a decision of lack of qualification. If someone is indicted because of a committed crime, his conviction—in a constitutional state—will not be based on the fact that he challenged the court's authority during his questioning or that he left the courtroom without permission.

In the absence of specified requirements, the appointed person's lack of qualifications can supposedly be determined if, during his activity, he fails to live up to the confidence invested in him at the time of the appointment. In the case of media presidents, this can—constitutionally—happen if the radio or television under their leadership is unable to provide complete, well-balanced and unbiased information, i.e., when they cannot implement the freedom of the press.

However, in this connection the Constitution Court determined as a fundamental truth that "there are legal guarantees in a constitutional state for both the operation of the state administration and the assurance of fundamental rights that operate without personal considerations." Of course, this statement, in itself, is "inoperative," just as the world would be without people.

Even the most perfect law is worthless if the person of the judge or the official administrator do not guarantee the effort to completely uncover the facts of a case, a humane process, or a just decision. Even the most perfect curriculum is worthless if the person of the educator does not guarantee the transmission of his knowledge to youth or the effect of his personal example on his students. Even the most perfect work of music is worthless if the person of the performer does not guarantee the ability to present the beauty of the work to the audience. And even the most perfect theory (the creation of which is, incidentally, guaranteed by people) is worthless if its practical implementation (which also depends on people and affects people's lives) is impossible.

Truly...

Does a letter, in which—"despite his regard and esteem"—the initiator of a release process lectures the president of the Republic on the correct interpretation of Constitution Court resolutions, meet constitutional requirements?

Can the initiator of the release process use any pretext to restrict the time frame allotted for the president of the Republic to make a decision—a time frame which, in consideration of the various presidential tasks, is merely circumscribed even by the Constitution Court, without specifying it in terms of days, weeks or months?

Can an attention-calling letter (e.g., on party views represented at the time of the appointment of media presidents) by the one making a recommendation contain data that are not supported by available documents?

Can an official recommendation for a release oppose the interpretation of the Constitution Court, namely, that bringing the release in harmony with the supervision of the state organization's democratic functioning is not the recommending prime minister's task but the task of the president of the Republic who has the authority to release? Can anyone forget the fact—which is defined in all of the Constitution Court resolutions that deal with the interpretation of the president's sphere of authority—that the refusal of release is the president's definitive, final, and incontestable decision?

Prime Minister Interviewed on Role in 1956

92CH0795A Budapest *MAGYAR NEMZET*
in Hungarian 4 Jul 92 p 4

[Unattributed interview with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall; place and date not given: "Our History's Continuity"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [*MAGYAR NEMZET*] Before that, to follow the story line, could we hear a synopsis of the revolutionary days?

[Antall] In 1956 I was a teacher at the Eotvos High School in downtown Budapest. In my absence I was unanimously elected president of the revolutionary committee. I was absent because on 31 October I left Budapest in one of the first cars to bring my father from Veszprem County to Budapest at the request of the executive committee of the Independent Smallholders Party, which by then had been formed once again. He arrived at the same time as Bela Kovacs, who came from Pecs to the party headquarters on Semmelweis Street.

[*MAGYAR NEMZET*] This is already act two of the revolution.... How did you experience 23 October?

[Antall] Where shall I begin? On 6 October we planned a demonstration with my students at the eternal flame at the Batthyany Monument, together with my friend, the historian Jozsef Molnar, who was bringing the humanities students. We were surrounded by police, and an inquiry was begun. I have preserved up to this day my speech of 6 October, one sentence of which read: "For every Hungarian prime minister it is a historical lesson that will last forever that the first legitimate Hungarian prime minister died a martyr...." Before that, in September 1956, I was in Poland. I was able to meet people who told me the details of the defeated Poznan uprising.

I met many Polish refugees. I was able to experience the particular atmosphere that foretold the events in Poland in October.

[*MAGYAR NEMZET*] And the Hungarian October, the 23d?

[Antall] I took part in the demonstration, together with several hundred of my students from the Eotvos High School. We marched together with the university students along the Pest side of the Danube, over to Buda, to Bem Square.... We saw the first flags with the coat of arms of the People's Republic cut out of the middle. The soldiers leaned out of the barracks' windows, waving this flag. This is one reason why in 1990, when headquarters locations were distributed among the parties, I as party president chose these barracks for the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] headquarters—precisely because of the *genius loci*, the spirit of the location. The headquarters has a connection not only to the person of General Bem in the square and its monument, but also to the barracks where the soldiers' first demonstration of sympathy towards the idea of the revolution took form.

[*MAGYAR NEMZET*] Well-known episodes recall that wonderful day. In the experience of old people, something like this happens only once in a century.... The young Jozsef Antall marched with his students from Bem Square to Kossuth Square. Imre Nagy arrived, prime minister of the 1953 government program, accompanied on his way to parliament by political prisoners who had been freed from prison, among them a childhood friend of Jozsef Antall, Gyorgy O'svath, today the prime minister's personal adviser. Then on to the radio. Smoke bombs filled the air in the evening, and then the armed battle began.

[Antall] I was there when the first shots were fired, when we were crowded out and the gun-battle began. Under the command of Janos Solymosi (who has been promoted and awarded a medal by the new regime), the soldiers from Piliscsaba were the first to change sides and take part in the battles. It was a crucial moment of the revolution when the Piliscsaba unit changed sides, on the night from 23 to 24 October. (They stopped in Kossuth Lajos Street.)

[*MAGYAR NEMZET*] In our imagination we are now at Hotel Astoria during that night. This was the temporary "headquarters" of the rebels. At dawn it was occupied by a Soviet armored unit. The hotel's cellar master was Kalman Keri, former colonel of the general staff, currently the oldest member of the democratic parliament elected in 1990.

[Antall] One of my activities during the days of the revolution was what everyone in the streets experienced: I was present at almost every episode of the armed uprising. Our students went from school to fight, and finally, just like the armed youth of 1849, they joined the national guard. This was a factor later in my arrest, removal from school, and suspension from teaching. The Alliance of Christian Youth was founded in the physics

lab of the Piarist High School; it could be called more exactly the Alliance of Christian Democratic Youth. Gyorgy O'svath was elected as the first secretary. I was a founding member. Later we never admitted that this is where it happened; as far as I know, the Piarist Order never had any difficulties because of this. We started out from the Astoria at the same time as the Russian soldiers before the volley in front of the parliament. In the meantime, I was called to Buda; one of my classmates, several acquaintances, and some friends were staying there—this is the way luck works.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] During the second, quieter period of the revolution we talked about earlier, you were with your father at the Semmelweis Street headquarters of the Independent Smallholders Party....

[Antall] Our armed group reoccupied the old headquarters on 30 October, and this well-organized Smallholders guard (later National Guard) garrisoned the building, which was badly needed. The board of directors of the Smallholders Party moved in there. Janos Csorba, former mayor of Budapest and former president of the municipal court, was the party president.... Many among the old members took part, from Tivadar Partay to Jozsef Kovago, who became the mayor of Budapest again. Everyone who was at home, who was freed from prison, was there. Bela Kovacs came up from Baranya County, and others, too, of course, my father as well.

In order to be able to negotiate, one had to keep order. Newer and newer masses arrived. Old Smallholders from the country, and others. As far as I know, none of the members of this armed group was convicted, because those whom they arrested did not testify against anyone. They were secondary school students, university students, policemen on active duty.... As a matter of interest, I can tell you that one of the policemen who joined us was there when I was arrested in the spring of 1957; he only gave me a sign with his eye that he would not say anything. One of the leaders of the armed group was Pal Tar, the present Hungarian ambassador to Washington. Of course, I was interrogated a lot because of this, too.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] This parliament building is familiar to the current prime minister from 1956.... Or even if I look further back into the past, your father was a member of the government that was formed in November 1945 after the first free elections under Prime Minister Tildy, and later Ferenc Nagy....

[Antall] Yes, I was here in February 1946, at the proclamation of the Hungarian Republic.... On 1 November 1956 my father and I came here to the parliament to Zoltan Tildy, who at the time was already a cabinet minister of the newly formed coalition government led by Imre Nagy. Tildy immediately offered my father a position in the government. During the following week the coalition government was supposed to add ministers with portfolios to the coalition cabinet ministers.

Among other things, he offered my father the portfolio of the interior minister, or a mandate as the minister to lead the delegation to Warsaw, which would have had the task of negotiating with the Russians. Because I was in Poland at the beginning of the fall, Zoltan Tildy thought it expedient that I accompany him as the delegation's secretary. Had this happened, I hardly believe we would be sitting here now.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] What sort of negotiations would have taken place in Warsaw?

[Antall] On 2 November I was commissioned by Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs to prepare a short draft of the Smallholders Party's platform, including not only the demand for a withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the schedule for this, but also a proposal for the country's internal constitutional transformation. A "compromised" version of the original was found among Bela Kovacs's inheritance. The story of this version is that Janos Kadar gave a speech on 15 November 1956 about how they want to work on the basis of a multiparty system. On the next day, Janos Kadar called Bela Kovacs to come to his office for negotiations. During that one night, based on the draft of the proposal for negotiations in Warsaw, I wrote the proposal for negotiations which Bela Kovacs had in his hand. (The original version of 2 November was never found, but that plan is known exactly on the basis of this one.) This is what Bela Kovacs, who was then staying with us, took with him to Kadar.

I consider drawing up the proposal important, an event of great magnitude in my life, when at the age of 24 on 2 November on the request of ministers delegated by the Smallholders Party, Zoltan Tildy, and Bela Kovacs, I was allowed to draw up a proposal which could serve as the basis for negotiations. And I was granted the miracle that in 1989, during the national round-table negotiations, I was allowed to submit the principles which were included in the constitution—not only as a member of the committee on constitutional rights, but as one of the leading delegates of the MDF.... This form of state and government, based on Article I of 1946 and Article III of 1849, became the basis of the political transformation of 1989. Thus, according to constitutional law, this was the form of state and government which was accepted.

Another of my lifeshaping experiences was that in the draft of 1956 I was allowed to write, if only briefly, about the schedule of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In 1990-91, more than three decades later, I was allowed to conduct negotiations for months on the same topic.... Finally, I was the one, as prime minister, who signed our withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which would already have been part of the negotiations in Warsaw in 1956.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] A no-less-interesting part of this document published in the periodical HISTORIA, or rather part of the study preceding it, which illuminates its background, is the summary of the events following 4 November....

[Antall] After 4 November, that is to say, after the defeat, our apartment above the restaurant Karpattia was not only the "center" of the Smallholders Party; next to Bela Kovacs, who was staying there, Jozsef Kovago, Zoltan Tildy, Istvan Bibo, Ferenc Farkas, Jozsef Fischer from the Social Democrats, the ministers of the Imre Nagy government, and many others were in and out of the house—almost everyone who took part in Hungarian politics at the time. I don't have to give separate mention to Istvan Bibo's well-known and courageous role. The events that amounted to an attempt at negotiations happened here. The issue was that on the one hand the basis for negotiations was the system of demands presented in the document published in HISTORIA, and this phase lasted until the beginning of January. On the other hand, we no longer believed that these were real negotiations on the part of Kadar and his group.

We have always thought that they were obviously negotiating, but a part of the negotiations was aimed at pacifying the country. It would have been good for them to win people over from the individual parties.... On the surface they were negotiating with parties, and this would have been followed by the same salami politics that they conducted after 1945.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] In the meantime, arrests began, and Kadar's retaliation started....

[Antall] I had several students who were arrested and who returned from Ukraine.... I was also interrogated by the Soviet military authorities. These personal matters are no longer interesting. I only mention them because they are relatively unknown parts of the revolution. I prepared several analyses for Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs, partly on the basis of the history of the Bolshevik Party, which was an excellent political "cook-book," as a condensation of communist methods. This is the way they were thinking. It is a well-known fact that Malenkov stayed here as governor. While political negotiations were under way between 4 November and 1 January, it was clear to us that nothing would come of these in the long run.... So far this was only a part of the Kadar government's attempt at legitimation. By the fall of 1956, the international constellation had become unfavorable for us. England and France were busy with the Suez crisis, and the United States was occupied with the presidential elections. Imre Nagy trusted the Chinese in vain. China realized that the program of "let all flowers bloom" must be ended, because it could start a chain reaction in the countries of the Communist Bloc. Actually, the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party were the most determined to defeat the anticommunist revolutions of the area and reestablish the regime. [passage omitted]

[MAGYAR NEMZET] As far as a historical analysis is concerned, what is the viewpoint of the contemporary approach to history?

[Antall] At the dedication of the monument, I said that we could not pretend that there was a national consensus

in connection with 1956. And we cannot contrast it with today. The year 1956 meant a national unity in the withdrawal of the Russians, in the establishment of a democratic order where opinions could be voiced freely, from freedom of speech to freedom of the press. But in the question of what kind of an economic, social system there would be in the country, there was by far no unity. In those days it was not worth discussing what should happen for many questions. But it is clear even from the draft quoted earlier that the possibilities of compromise were there. It contained the idea of democratic socialism, but also of a market economy, and the social and economic image of private property. Furthermore, the idea of compensation was also contained in these discussions.

The year 1956 was also "multifaceted." Democratic socialism had not yet been compromised then, socialism still had elements that people could believe in. I myself have never believed in it.... When I was young, I even wrote a pamphlet on Karl Marx called "Marx, the Savior of Capitalism, the Averter of Socialism." The economics of capitalism have developed, but after 70 years it is still impossible to write a political economy of socialism.... Every year, new brochures were published at the universities, which then immediately became obsolete. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 4]

The Draft of 2 November 1956

(Excerpts from the modified draft of the law of 16 November.)

This document was first published in the summer of 1988 by the periodical HISTORIA (Issue No. 6). The three editors were Jozsef Antall, Arpad Goncz, and Vince Voros. This draft of a platform included along with the political prerequisites the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the chapter on constitutional law is interesting.

I. Political Prerequisites

1. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.
2. Full amnesty for the participants of the revolution and the fight for independence.
3. Immediate cessation of deportations to the Soviet Union, and the immediate return and liberation of those who have been deported so far.
4. Guarantee of the equal rights and free operation of the permitted parties.
5. Acknowledgment and practical guarantee for free, general, and secret elections.
6. Because of the dire financial situation of Hungary and the Hungarian people, acceptance of foreign aid and preferential loans.
7. Complete liquidation of the AVH [State Security Authorities]; cessation of its infiltration into the unified state police; exclusion of its former members from the new law enforcement agencies.

II. Military Withdrawal

The Independent Smallholders Party demands the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Hungary, while it leaves Soviet-Hungarian friendship, based on complete equality, untouched. In order to ensure this, a treaty must be entered into with the Soviet Union as soon as possible.

1. Within two months of the treaty, the last Soviet unit will leave Hungary. The Soviet troops will immediately vacate Budapest and return to their bases before the revolution. Afterwards, in 10-14 day intervals, they will withdraw their troops from Transdanubia and the counties on the Great Hungarian Plain bordering Yugoslavia; in the second phase, from the rest of the area with the exception of Szabolcs-Szatmar county, and finally from the area of Szabolcs-Szatmar county on the border of the Soviet Union.

During this time the Soviet troops and authorities will abstain from military, police, or any other (economic, social) interference in the country's matters. A Hungarian-Soviet joint commission must be formed to organize the withdrawal and to dismantle the bases.

2. During the withdrawal of Soviet troops, while new Soviet troops are not allowed to cross the Hungarian border, it will be necessary to secure the internal state, social, and economic order of Hungary....

III. The Government of Hungary

The legal source of Hungarian political development is the 1946 constitutional status quo and the revolution on 23 October 1956. Hungary's form of state is the republic formed on the basis of Article I of 1956; its form of government is an independent, responsible, parliamentary government based on popular representation as stipulated in Article III of 1848....

Presidential Adviser Pick on Military's Role

*AU3007111092 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
23 Jul 92 p 8*

["(il)"]-signed report: "Neighbors Without Evil Intentions"]

[Text] Prague/Budapest—"Hungary has already fulfilled its commitments arising from the Vienna negotiations on reducing armed forces in Europe. The Hungarian army currently has fewer than 100,000 personnel. We have made it clear that we have no aggressive intentions against anyone; we want good-neighborly relations," said Colonel Robert Pick to a LIDOVE NOVINY correspondent.

According to him, Hungary is the only country in Eastern Europe that has taken such a step, both in equipment and in personnel, in harmony with the Vienna negotiations. "We have reduced the duration of compulsory service from 18 to 12 months, which is in harmony with the signed agreements. The Hungarian parliament made that decision two years ago. Moreover, the size of the air force does not even correspond to the minimum. I am unable to give you the exact figures, but you will find them in the documents of the Vienna negotiations. The Hungarian army—despite such reductions in its forces—is capable of fulfilling defense tasks," said Col. Pick.

Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said recently that troops are amassing around Budapest and that the Hungarian army's exercises are much more intense than NATO's exercises. The CSTK report on the formation of Hungarian Home Guard units 50 kilometers from the Slovak border confirms that. However, the report does not mention that the Hungarian army reservists in those units will only receive call-up orders in the event of a general mobilization. However, the planned exercises in September involving 1,200 reservists is nothing unusual.

"I would like to quote the figures, because Mr. Meciar has not done so," said Col. Pick. "A NATO pilot flies approximately 2,000 hours per annum, while a Hungarian pilot spends much less time in the air. The Czechoslovak supreme command has very precise information on Hungarian army and air force exercises. That information in no way backs up what the Slovak prime minister said. In my opinion, he is giving an inaccurate account of the facts."

The Hungarian Home Guard should assist the army in stemming the wave of refugees fleeing from unstable countries in the East Bloc. Moreover, according to Col. Pick, those units do not yet exist, they are merely at the planning stage. "With such a small army as ours, we have to seek the optimum defense system. The method for resolving the situation may vary. However, the Hungarian state's new defense principles—where such possibilities have to be enshrined—have not yet been drafted. The Hungarian parliament will discuss the issue in the fall. If a specific form of Home Guard were established, its task would be to defend a specific territory. No acts of aggression will be involved. There is a similar Home Guard system in Austria, and no one is bothered by it."

So far, Hungary has taken in up to 100,000 refugees. "However, our country has received only a little financial assistance from international institutions. Nevertheless, the Hungarian Government recognizes humanitarian principles and has assumed this task despite the fact that it places a considerable burden on the state budget," said Col. Robert Pick, who is an adviser to the Hungarian president.

Fears of Russian Soldiers Becoming Businessmen

92EP0567A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
2 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Roman Przeciszewski: "Finishing up Business"]

[Text] The soldiers have no special affection for the area, but Legnica officials know what is going on. The commanding officers of the Russian garrison, which operates within the structure of the Polish city, does not try to be diplomatic but is very direct: If there are any complications in the operation of the management school, this certainly will have a decisive and concrete impact on Russo-Polish relations....

"An economic issue has become a political issue," says Antoni Golab, plenipotentiary for the Legnica voivodship governor for cooperation with foreign countries.

And Legnica council members dot the "i." They are afraid that the Russian soldiers who are temporarily stationed in Poland will take off their uniforms, put on business suits and...stay on.

"The transformation of the military base infrastructure into economic ventures would constitute a serious danger to maintaining law and order and to the sovereignty of our country," says Golab, and there is a sense of alarm at the Belveder, the URM [Council of Ministers Office], and in the Sejm and the Senate.

Plenipotentiary for Disclosing the Real Story

Mr. Golab points out that no one in Legnica plans to get mixed up in large-scale politics. The RP president signed a Polish-Russian agreement in Moscow, an important part of which is the matter of the withdrawal of the Northern Armies Group [PGW] of the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Legnica case shows the dangers which may arise during the implementation of these agreements. "Once bitten twice shy," explains the plenipotentiary.

According to official statements, all AR [Soviet Army] PGW combat units are to leave by 15 November. However, several thousand Russian soldiers will remain in Poland, including 1,300-1,500 in Legnica alone. Thus, the city is asking what the purpose of this is. Are the Russians staying to liquidate ecological damages? How, for what reason, and by what methods? Perhaps they will help to do inventories. But the so-called zero option is supposed to be adopted, which will eliminate the claims of both sides regarding possible damages. And so the man on the street understands that "they want to finish up business."

The average person perceives the Russians differently today. While just yesterday the Red Army man seemed imperious as he lived off the renown of the massive army, now he is looking for money. People in Legnica make business deals with him—big and small ones that are more or less legal. It is no problem to purchase a

place to live there. As a Russian officer was already sitting on his suitcases awaiting the date for his departure to Russia, he was told that for several hundred dollars he could receive information about which apartment he could go into without any hassles, and when he could do it. Today the council members are tearing their hair out. Several hundred apartments have been occupied illegally. Even people who were not hard up have moved into them. They have satellite antennas on the balcony and a Mercedes in front of the building. And what can be done with them? "Self-government is the executive organ. This organ has ordered the public prosecutor to intervene," says A. Golab.

The plenipotentiary is aware that many irregularities could have been avoided if he had been able to enter the area of Russian military installations and inspect them. Unfortunately, at every turn he had to ask for approval and at the gate he heard, in Russian: "Excuse me, the commanding officer has not given permission." Thus, he did not have free access, while others did. In January, when the Legnica school of management was opened with a gala, the plenipotentiary and the voivodship governor were both extremely surprised when the PGW AR commander presented to them "the truest, most devoted friend of the Russians"—Piotr Krzywiecki from Lubin.

Billions Each Day

Businessman Krzywiecki knows his own. If a reporter knocks on his door, then certainly he must have been sent by some official who does not like his cooperation with the Russians.

"I work honestly, in accordance with the law," he emphasizes over and over.

His credo is complicated: In Poland the Russians are exposed to settling accounts for history and he, Krzywiecki, is sure that nothing constructive is produced in this way. And so he looks only toward the future. He thinks practically and invests in that future. He is not afraid to spend money on this. Today a billion zlotys must be invested—that is very clear—and tomorrow a second billion will have to be invested. It simply must be done. But in a month or two we will have a return on our investment and then some.

Krzywiecki sympathizes with the officers and the Russian generals who are supposed to return to Russia. Many of them have no homes and no prospects for the future. With them in mind, he has proposed that the PGWAR command create a management school. The Russians will simply lease a portion of the Museum of Glory and Arms, and a branch of the Wroclaw Economics Academy [AE] will be opened there to offer training in information science, marketing, and business in general. The Russian generals agree that that is a good idea. Initially Krzywiecki laid out 3.2 billion zlotys [Z] from his own pocket. That was the cost for remodeling the building, computer equipment and furniture. Now he must give the AE Z250 million each quarter to pay the

teachers who are preparing the generals and colonels for a new life. The school opened in January and it already has its first graduates, including, of course, six Russian generals....

"The AE would like to open its own representative bodies in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The representatives would be the best graduates of the management school," says Krzywiecki.

The problem is that one cannot live only in the future, and as time goes on there may not be enough money. The Russians understand this and for that reason they suit the purposes of the Lubin businessman. Does Krzywiecki want to sell Russian fuel and scrap metal from the military units? If so, then let us get down to business. In the PGW AR staff, 25,000 tons of fuel and construction materials have already been set aside to be sold for approximately Z25 billion, but... "I ran up against a wall of Polish envy and indifference," says Krzywiecki. He went to Brig. Gen. Zdzislaw Ostrowski, RP government plenipotentiary for affairs of the residence and withdrawal of the PGW AR, to obtain a business license, but he was sent away empty-handed. Nor did he get any results from Mr. Golab and he made a complaint to the voivodship governor—to no avail. A few weeks ago he had to suspend the activity of his Rembud company....

"I owe banks approximately Z6 billion, but is that really the problem?" Despite everything he remains optimistic.

The Authorities Pull the Wool

Antoni Golab knows these arguments by heart and considers the accusation of envy and indifference to be an insinuation. In his opinion, Krzywiecki just has a lot of nerve and wants to make big money at any price. Having won the confidence of the Russians, he has the first, hardest step behind him.

"No one in Legnica is hindering Krzywiecki from doing honest business with the Russians, but the law cannot be circumvented," stresses the plenipotentiary.

In Legnica it is an open secret that the local authorities pull the wool time and again. For example, at the beginning of May, the voivodship governor of Legnica signed an agreement with the PGW AR on the possibility of using Russian television, but several days later the Cargo company was the first to use the Russian frequency band and equipment to transmit a private advertisement program. Now A. Golab admits that the PGW AR command signed an agreement with the voivodship governor and then did business with someone else. Meanwhile, the people on the street say more graphically that the Russian generals have led the authorities by the nose.

But is the matter of the creation of the management school completely above-board, and does it not arouse controversies? The authorities found out about the creation of the school as a *fait accompli*—and it was too late for the intervention of lawyers. However, it is obvious

that the Russians, in accordance with the 1957 agreement on stationing the Soviet Army in Poland, did not have the right to lease a building which was being used by the army at the time. Thus, the legal status of this lease is unclear, at the very least. The agreements concluded with Mr. Krzywiecki by the PGW AR command are also unclear. For example, the plenipotentiary found out that the military promised to make possible for Krzywiecki the sale of approximately 100,000 metric tons of fuel, which had been brought in for the needs of Russian units and was, consequently, tariff-free. It is certain that the Lubin businessman has already purchased a large quantity of "military" gasoline from the Russians, and that he has begun to trade in scrap metal from the PGW AR units....

"He does not have any license for such activity. Once, in the case of a PGW AR general, he appealed in Warsaw, but to no avail. Then, at every opportunity, he issued complaints that the seeds of Polish-Russian cooperation had been destroyed and that the authorities were tendentious. When the voivodship governor requested a substantive conversation with him, he did not appear at the office. However, the Treasury Chamber has been occupied with his 'economic activity,'" the plenipotentiary stated.

The unofficial word is that perhaps a scandal is brewing. Krzywiecki did not keep tax records and has no documentation of turnovers. He is in arrears in paying his taxes and in repaying bank credit. Despite the "warnings" of the Russians, the sheriff's officer has already gone to the management school and has confiscated a portion of the recently purchased furniture there.

"Krzywiecki is not giving up. In April he suspended the activity of Rembud, but recently he created another limited liability company, this time in Wroclaw," informs Andrzej Z. (the editorial staff knows his surname).

What's next? The Legnica council members do not conceal their fears that many Russian military personnel will want to be businessmen and that the Krzywiecki case will not be an isolated one by far.

Agency To Work on Attracting Foreign Investment

92EP0585A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 16 Jul p IV

[Article by Bogdan Chojna: "Countries for Sale: How To Promote Investments?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] In April 1992, the State Agency for Foreign Investments was registered in Warsaw, Poland. It is to operate according to Western models and to promote Poland in the international arena. Its main task, like that of all agencies of this type around the world, is to attract foreign capital. [passage omitted]

Proposals of the State Agency for Foreign Investments

What then should be done in order to encourage foreign capital to invest in Poland? Consultation with foreign businessmen and politicians indicates that the best and also the simplest thing to do now is to give the world an unambiguous and strong signal that foreign investments are in the Polish national interest and have the determined support of the Polish authorities. The signal could take the form of a parliamentary resolution. A proposal for such a resolution prepared by the Sejm Commission for the Economic System and Industry, and consulted with the State Agency for Foreign Investments, has already reached the Sejm presidium.

However, a declaration of goodwill alone is not enough. It is necessary to promote Poland by showing its greatest advantages and possibilities. Until now, the main emphasis has been placed on the attractiveness of a market of 40 million people and the possible base for expansion to the east. Perhaps these arguments are losing some of their value, perhaps they have been used too much; certainly, they have not brought the expected results. There is then an immediate need to show the world other advantages of Poland. In my opinion, it is necessary to show them above all the people, the young people learning, partners for business ventures.

An Unused Advantage

International institutions have earmarked \$1 million for training Polish personnel. As part of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program of the EC, Poland has received nearly \$1 billion. There are also other aid programs as well as bilateral agreements between Poland and individual countries giving us educational support. However, what we have done with these funds, how many people we have trained, and in what areas is difficult to say. So far no report has been developed to show the dimensions and effects of this educational offensive. Such a report could be an important promotional argument to show Poland as a country of intensive "European education" on a large scale, the largest in this part of the continent. The argument would be all the more effective because, in the opinion of foreign investors, we are a nation that learns willingly and quickly, distinguishing ourselves with our "technological courage."

In promoting Poland as a country of "intensive European education" we would not be the first to pursue such a path. A similar program was tried and found successful in Ireland in the 1960's (the memorable slogan was "We Are Young Europeans") and in part in Spain in the 1980's. In both cases, it was implemented by a national agency for foreign investment.

Until recently, Bogdan Chojna, president of the State Agency for Foreign Investments, was president of the Business Foundation. The only stockholder of the State Agency for Foreign Investments is the State Treasury, which is represented by the Ministry of Privatization.

The supervisory council of the agency includes representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, the Ministry of Privatization, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Finance, and also the Office of the Council of Ministers.

The agency as a partnership is governed by slightly different laws than the bodies of the state administration. Based on the Commercial Code, it has greater freedom in choosing employees than is available to the ministries due to their rigid personnel and financial policies.

Trade With Former CEMA Countries Increases

92EP0563B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 4-5 Jul 92 p II

[Article by A.W.: "Trade With Former CEMA Countries: Eastern Pillar Remains"]

[Text] The value of goods exported by Polish producers to former CEMA countries reached \$550 million during the first five months of this year. In comparison to a similar period last year, this is a 20-percent increase in sales.

The data presented here come from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation [MWGzZ] and include commercial trade with postsocialist European countries¹ and China. As noted at MWGzZ, this is not a complete picture of this cooperation because it comes only from payment data (calculated by the Economic Development Bank). There is a lack of objective data, which is developed by the Central Office of Statistics, and which reflect the scale of barter trade—a rather item in trade with countries of the former USSR, for example. Not yet taken into consideration are data dealing with seasonal trade (in the fields of agriculture and fuel and energy).

The growth of export revenues applies to all countries except for former Yugoslavia and China. The highest growth was noted in cooperation with the "triangle," the highest rate of increase in exports applies to Hungary—a jump of 50.6 percent, and Czechoslovakia—36.2 percent. Trade with Czechoslovakia experienced the highest growth, because along with improvement in export results, there was also an increase in imports of 21.2 percent. Generally, on the other hand, a state of balance was achieved between exports and imports, with a slight lead in the value of imports, \$550 to \$570 million.

Countries of the former USSR hold first place among consumers of our products in the analysis conducted. On the list of all our economic partners, it is in second—behind the Federal Republic of Germany. After Czechoslovakia and Hungary, next on the list are countries of former Yugoslavia, then Romania and China. Bulgaria has the smallest portion of commercial trade with Poland.

An analysis of the structure of the share of individual commodities groups shows that the greatest increase in

exports occurred in agricultural goods, where countries of the former Soviet Union played the biggest role. Agricultural and food-industry products remain at a constant level in commercial trade. The chemical industry noted a significant increase in sales and, as with agricultural goods, it is an export mainly to our eastern neighbors.

The share of agricultural and chemical goods among all exports to countries of the former USSR amounts to about 45 percent. Pharmaceutical products had a substantial impact on increasing these exports; in the case of trade with other countries, sales of Polish sulphur increased. The part of the economy that felt most intensely the change in the accounting system is the electrical machine industry, where the drop in exports came to 6.4 percent.

According to MGWzZ's data, the share of the private sector in our exports is growing—currently about 20 percent of all sales (3 percent more than in 1991). Preliminary estimates are that sales of goods to the countries mentioned will reach a value close of that of last year, about \$4.5 to \$5 billion. Of this amount, export with constitute \$2 to \$2.2 billion, imports \$2.5 to \$2.8 billion. A break in the downward trend of trade with China is also expected.

Footnote

1. This includes countries of the former USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Albania, and former Yugoslavia.

Reaction to U.S. Enterprise Fund's Operations

92EP0488B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 19 May 92 p IV

[Article by Zbigniew Zwierchowski: "A Thousand Loans: Polish-American Enterprise Fund"]

[Excerpt] "I heard that it was difficult to obtain such a loan, but my experience does not confirm popular opinion. I received credit from the Polish-American Enterprise Fund [PAFP] a month after I filed my application," said Wojciech Kasprzycki, owner of Linex, a firm that produces automotive items. The statement was made during a meeting on 18 May at the foundation's Warsaw office, on the occasion of its issuing its 1,000th loan to Polish small and moderate-sized enterprises.

Fund Vice President Barbara Lundberg, who directs the institution's operations in Warsaw, stated that by mid-May, the institution had awarded 1,006 loans totalling more than \$20 million. That figure exceeded the \$18 million amount originally provided to support private firms, when the fund was created. President Bush and the U.S. Congress established the fund in 1990. Ms. Lundberg listed the creation of 3,300 new jobs in Poland as one of the greatest results achieved through the credit.

The program called "Credit Windows" now has a larger amount available, \$28 million, for loans to small and moderate-sized businesses, because the fund's administration increased it a month ago. Marek Kulczycki, program director of "Credit Windows," anticipates, or at least hopes, that the amount can be increased, perhaps doubled. The rate of issuing credit is also to be accelerated up to 100 per month, but without changing the criteria.

Small and moderate-sized firms can even receive a half million dollars at one time, but they usually receive a maximum of about \$70,000, and the average loan is \$20,000. The credit is usually given for setting up production and services or for development. In principle, the fund does not use its money to support commercial activity, and it is rather reluctant to increase companies' working capital. [passage omitted]

Military Reports on Ecological Cleanup Efforts


92P20349A

[Editorial Report] Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish on 17-19 July on page 3 carries a 1,100-word article on the military's efforts to combat the environmental contamination caused by its own forces. The article is written in light of accusations that the military pollutes the air and water, causes noise pollution with its loud planes, and emits radiation from its radar dishes. Despite tighter legal restrictions and an ever-dwindling budget, the military claims that it has done much to clean up the environment. It cites that its weakness lies in having the know-how but lacking the funds and equipment needed to carry out the job. The military claims a steady decrease in both water and air pollution emissions over the years. This is due to preventive measures taken such as using fuel with a lower sulfur content and adjusting boilers to higher standards. This applies to the heating of barracks. Efforts are being made to use unconventional sources of fuel and install the most modern equipment for processing pollutants. A problem area is in the use of fuel to propel tanks and other heavy vehicles, whose engines use excessive amounts of fuel and the cost to control the pollution emitted by them is high.

The sewage system in use is seen as one of its major accomplishments. Each unit is responsible for maintaining its own sewage system. The units sought out local government officials in order to form cooperative action in combatting sewage waste. The local government would connect its sewage disposal systems with the military ones and successfully clean up the waste.

The military does not deny that the seepage of petroleum into the ocean and the ground occurs, but they blame it more on human error rather than on intentional actions.

The military is also combatting noise pollution from aircraft. They have plans for drawing up an acoustic map of regions close to military airports where noise pollution is at its worst. They are considering moving air force



Key:

1. PAFP loans for small and medium-sized businesses during the first year of operation
2. Food production and processing
3. Production of wood products
4. Medical services
5. Construction firms
6. Farms
7. Forwarding firms
8. Clothing production
9. Printing and photography
10. Automotive services
11. Warehouses
12. Business services
13. Production and services
14. Miscellaneous
15. PAFP = Polish American Enterprise Fund

units further away from populated regions. Air flights over populated areas will be regulated, construction will be prevented in the vicinity of airports, and buildings already finding themselves too close to the air bases will be reinforced for sound purposes.

Radiation from microwaves is another area of concern. The article points out that Poland has very high standards regarding radiation control. Although the standards are more rigorous than in other countries, the army acknowledges that improvements can be made. Radars can be reduced in size and they can be turned in such a way so that they do not direct their rays at homes. Sectors for radar use would be demarcated and designated.

The military budget is limited, and this is a major problem in further developing pollution control. Yet, the military never negated the importance of this area; it has developed proper training and methods for sewage treatment and has done much more for society than other institutions.

Review of 1991 Financial Situation Published

92EP0585B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 16 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by P.J.: "There Was Too Much Optimism: The Financial Condition of the State in 1991"]

[Text] Due to the efforts of the Institute of Finances, the "Report on the Financial Condition of the State in 1991" has been published. It is another in the series of this type of publications. Unlike reports for previous years, however, it has been enriched by a chapter devoted to private enterprises.

The report presents all the basic data on prices, the state budget, enterprise finances, loans, and currency policy. The report's authors attempted in describing the various phenomena also to give a brief commentary. The performance of the state budget on the income side was criticized most sharply. The budget was modified three times during the course of the year. The last time was in

December 1991. Nevertheless, even in the last modification, some incomes were not estimated correctly; for example, privatization provided only 48 percent of the planned income. The report's authors think that the basic cause of the worsening of the financial condition of the state was the constantly deepening recession. Although it began at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, the government did not take any step to halt the decline in production and to break the recession. Moreover, the restrictive monetary, fiscal, and currency-exchange policies contributed to its worsening.

On the other hand, the Polish recession was a significantly more complex phenomenon than a recession occurring in a normal market economy. That does not mean, however, that it was impossible to take action against the recession. Meanwhile, according to the report's authors, actions deepening the unfavorable economic changes were taken. In particular, the tax policy for state enterprises had this effect.

That was a result, however, of tax instruments being established on the premise that economic stimulation would occur. When it was realized that the recession was deepening, it was too late, and the issue of a balanced budget came to the fore. In order to maintain control over the growth of the budget deficit, state enterprises were "sacrificed." Nevertheless, at the end of 1991, macroeconomic control was lost. In the opinion of Andrzej Wernik, who edited the report and is the author of its summary, the basic mistake of the macroeconomic policy in 1991 was the false judgment of economic developments. If they had been judged realistically, the decline in GNP would not have been so serious.

Causes of Railroads' Economic Decline Noted

92EP0585C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
(ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish
13 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Wieslawa Mazur: "At the Polish State Railways, Poverty and Wage Increases"]

[Text] A shortage of cash is keeping the Polish State Railways on the brink of disaster. It has been calculated that maintaining the infrastructure of the enterprise at current levels (tracks, buildings) requires a subsidy of 17 trillion zlotys [Z]. No one has dared to ask for such a horrendous sum from the budget yet; the minister of transport and maritime economy has asked the minister of finance for Z10 trillion to subsidize the railways. In the budget law, together with the subsidy for infrastructure investments, the Polish State Railways received barely Z5.35 trillion, of which Z2.6 trillion was for subsidies for passenger tickets. That is less than little, but there simply is no more money and there will be no more. At the General Directorate of the Polish State Railways, they know about this and have shown understanding. In any case, what else was there left for the General Directorate to do?

Before the wave of protests rolled through the firm and prevented 25,000 individuals from being laid off and led to

raises of Z250,000 a head, the enterprise's performance for the five months of 1992 were as follows: the railway had moved 81.6 million metric tons of freight (16.7 percent less than in the same period in 1991) and 237 million passengers (18.5 percent less than in 1991). For all of 1991, the Polish State Railways carried 226 million tons of freight and 650 million passengers. It is worth adding that in the period of rail prosperity in 1977, the rails carried 471 million tons of freight and carried 1.143 billion passengers. However we do the calculations, the Economic and Financial Office of the Polish State Railways says that the last 15 years have shown a decline in traffic of 43 percent and in transportation work of 10 percent. This means that if we take the train, we choose longer routes. A similar trend has occurred in the French and German rail systems. German railways are to receive a shot of DM80 billion (Z68 trillion) to absorb the former railway of the GDR, and only then are to begin a fundamental reform. The Polish State Railways moves less and less, and the firm's costs are growing. Price increases are reducing shipments and are raising costs sky high.

In this situation, talk has begun about the need for reforms, including a reduction of costs and "a diet" for the enterprise. The railways have begun to close (unprofitable) tracks, and improve traveling conditions on profitable domestic and international express lines. The Polish State Railways are attempting to push the local and municipal train transportation onto the backs of the voivods, presidents and mayors (so far without success). There are also unsolvable problems within the firm: Railway workers demanded a wage increase and got it. It is estimated that at present, the average basic wage in the six sectors of the economy is Z2.65 million, but the Polish State Railways pay Z2.7 million after the increases, although no one is earning a lot. Moreover, the railway workers' trade union has opposed reductions and promised no one will be laid off.

Aleksander Janiszewski, the director general of the Polish State Railways, was greatly embarrassed when asked in this situation whether one can even speak of reform, but he said yes. In recent months, 10,000 individuals have left the firm, which employs 275,000 at present. There will be no reductions, but soon transfer of personnel from transportation services to units maintaining the right of way, where there is a shortage of 6,000 to 7,000 employees, will begin. Whoever does not agree to change positions will have to leave the firm. That has been agreed to by the trade unions. The reform at the Polish State Railway is to consist of "balancing the budget or minimizing the deficit." He added that in such an important and large organism, one must hurry slowly with reforms and that it is worth making use of the experiences of others. For example, in Japan, it took 10 years to reform the railways, and in Germany they are also not hurrying. Our Western neighbors are considering forming a stock company, because in that way it would be possible to liquidate various railway privileges that have unfavorable effects on the till.

Nastase Reviews Central Asia Trip, Priorities

92P20365A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 28 Jul 92 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase, on the airplane returning from his visit to Central Asia, by Ileana Coman; date not given: "To the Countries With the Suffix 'Stan'"]

[Text] [Coman] The diplomatic initiative of Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase, in opening up roads to collaboration and cooperation on many levels, in zones that have not yet been "cleared for cultivation," with countries which, until recently, were subject solely to the order of the brain of the Kremlin, has proven, ultimately, to be an indisputable success. The visit, from 14 to 22 July, to Alma Ata (Kazakstan), Bishkek (Kirghizstan), Tashkent and Samarkand (Uzbekistan), Dushanbe (Tadjikistan), and Ashkhabad (Turkmenistan), demonstrated, in addition to the boldness of the move, how effective and necessary it is to have a dynamic and flexible foreign policy, adapted to a reality that in a constant state of flux. It also showed the extent of the desire for communication, and the expanse of the area on which common aspirations are found and in which an equal partnership, beneficial to all parties, can be formed.

Representing an important moment—both by its intentions and by its results—this unique move by the Foreign Affairs Ministry constitutes a significant and profound invitation to a dialogue, to the acceptance, with full awareness, of the truth of a world in which today is no longer the same as yesterday and tomorrow is linked with the near future. In addition, this is the view of Minister Nastase, which he stated on the airplane when he was returning from his trip, at a time when the fruitfulness of his thought already had solid support in the more than positive results of his Asian "adventure."

[Coman] There are many new and interesting, and some unusual, elements in the visit that you made to the states of the former Soviet Union—currently members of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]—in Central Asia: a trip into the unknown, the ambitious nature of a complex move, illustrated by the composition of the delegation, the diversification of the area of diplomatic intervention by the inclusion of less traditional components. And, last but not least, the providing of a lively image of the ministerial institution, which is usually thought to be conservative and rather rigid. Tell me, Mr. Minister, will this trip remain unique or is it part of a program? If the latter is true, what other "virgin" areas do you have in mind?

[Nastase] In the framework of our foreign affairs activity, we are trying to evaluate the principal areas of political and economic interest. On the whole, things are already "underway" with Western Europe, the United States, and our neighbors; in regard to these regions, we know what the problems are and what we have to do. However, it is important that we have a clear picture of the range that we can allow ourselves in foreign policy.

Obviously, we will never engage in the globalistic politics of the old regime, concerning ourselves with all areas and all countries. At the same time, we do not have the right to promote that type of foreign policy that could be called provincial. Therefore, we developed the idea of a strategy of bridgeheads in the most remote areas; we are calling it a "bridge-star" in the sense that—proposing to identify territories of maximum importance in distant geographic areas, in order to establish special relations with them—we are aiming to provide a covering around them in the form of a star, which is necessary but not very expensive. The implications and also the effects are—or will be—evident both at the level of diplomatic representation and on the level of economic relations.

I needed this introduction to explain why it is necessary to have a correct evaluation of the situation in Central Asia, where there is an immense potential, mainly because of natural resources. I believe that this trip permitted us to draw conclusions both in regard to matters of diplomatic interest and in regard to priority actions in the economic sphere. The team of "explorers," as you know, was composed of diplomats, representatives of the economic ministries, businessmen, members of parliament, representatives of the media, so that the contacts made could provide a complete picture of the paths to be followed.

[Coman] What are the positive elements that you believe to be significant from this diplomatic, and also cultural, marathon for economic cooperation and cooperation in other areas?

[Nastase] From the political point of view, I would emphasize the number and the level of the contacts—more than 20 meetings with decisionmakers in the five countries, the signing or initialling of numerous documents in the political and economic spheres, the establishment of projects of governmental importance for the near future. In the economic sphere, the direct contacts necessary for the completion of these projects were made, contracts amounting to more than 35 million dollars were signed, and the legislative framework for cooperation projects amounting to several hundred million dollars was set up. Cultural representatives initiated contact with ministries and with professional associations of artists and plans for cultural agreements were submitted. Also, contacts in the parliamentary area were established.

[Coman] What actions will the Foreign Affairs Ministry be taking in the near future, in the current political situation?

[Nastase] The situation in the Republic of Moldova continues to be a priority for us. In this republic, the political situation has been developing very rapidly and these developments must be evaluated with great care so that they will not lead to a regression, to another type of involvement in a new Soviet Union reconstructed under the name of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The situation in Yugoslavia is also of great importance.

We are trying to participate in the efforts to resolve the Yugoslav crisis because, as I have said, we cannot remain spectators at a fire in our neighborhood. We must help to get the fire will be extinguished as soon as possible. At the same time, we are concerned with making overtures to the new Yugoslav republics, in order to influence, more properly, the divergent points of view in this geographic area, as well as to Albania (the new foreign minister of this country will soon be in Bucharest). Negotiations with the Common Market and, in general, efforts to make connections with institutions in Western Europe, continue to be a special priority for us. We are aiming for a constructive dialogue and a privileged relationship with the United States, and we must also develop a pragmatic approach to relations with Eastern Europe, Russia, and Ukraine.

We cannot lose sight of the need to pursue relations with the countries of South America and Africa—setting certain priorities in these zones—or of the problems of the Middle East that will become more obvious in the coming months. Romania has had an important role in the area, and I believe that we could also participate, in the future, more dynamically, to the extent to which it is requested, in finding solutions to the crisis in this part of the world.

Soon, President Ion Iliescu will visit Kuwait; the basis of the meetings that will take place on this occasion is the need to find energy and raw material resources for carrying out industrial activity and ensuring the comfort of the people.

[Coman] Thus, the dynamization of Romanian foreign policy is absolutely evident. Minister Adrian Nastase and his team are walking with confidence on the mined territory of the agitated contemporary political scene, showing understanding and elegance, and also courage and professionalism, moderation and balance. The image of Romania has only to gain from this.

Nastase Discusses Moldova's Ties With CIS

92P20369A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
29 Jul 92 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase by Sergiu Andon; place and date not given: "An Opportunity That Is Moving Away"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Andon] At this moment, what element in the international situation gives you the most anxiety?

[Nastase] Perhaps "anxiety" is not the most appropriate term. I am concerned with the somewhat contradictory development of the conditions on which the independence of the Republic of Moldova depends.

[Andon] I would guess that you are thinking about the recent agreement on the peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Republic of Moldova, concluded between "the two parties" after a process of peaceful

settlement had begun among "the four parties." Are you afraid that Snegur was forced to promise the full integration of Moldova into the empire which Russia is trying to rebuild in a disguised form?

[Nastase] A distinction should be made between two questions: one of principle and one of practice. In principle, any settlement that leads to an end to the bloodshed and a just solution, in accordance with principles that are generally accepted in Europe, already enunciated in the statements at the meetings of "the four parties," can only be welcome. To the extent that the agreement signed by presidents Snegur and Yel'tsin responds to this criterion, it is to be welcomed. In practice, it remains to be seen whether this agreement will be followed by the much-desired peace in the eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova. The few days since the signing of the agreement, which went into effect, according to its provisions, as soon as it was signed, do not make us too optimistic. The cease-fire, which was supposed to be observed as soon as the agreement came into force, is still not certain. The separatist forces have continued to fire on the legal forces of order and on the civilian population.

[Andon] Do you believe that the end has come for the political mechanism of peaceful settlement created by the ministerial meetings of "the four parties"? Do you think that Romania has been eliminated from the settlement process?

[Nastase] Theoretically, no. The joint commission of "the four parties" has continued to function even after the signing of the agreement. The agreement even expressly provided for the use of groups of military observers created in the framework of "the four parties." The two action plans supplement each other, in theory, at least. It remains to be seen how things will evolve and how the efforts on the two planes will be coordinated effectively. In any case, our government will continue to be involved in the efforts for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, both in the framework of the mechanism of "the four parties" and, if necessary, in the mechanisms of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council.

[Andon] Then, what are the reasons for concern? What are the contradictory aspects of development?

[Nastase] The signing of the agreement by Russia is an indication of open acknowledgement of what we have been saying for a long time, including what we said at the meetings of the foreign ministers of "the four parties"—namely, that certain political forces in Russia bear the primary responsibility for the situation created in the Dneister region, and that they support the separatists. Without political and financial support from Russia, and without the military support of the 14th Army, which supplied them with tanks, weapons, ammunition, and even military personnel, the separatists would not have refused such a systematic dialogue, and would not have

adopted this policy as a *fait accompli*, aiming at the separation from the Republic of Moldova of a part of its territory.

[Andon] Could this be a trade-off on the part of Russia—to openly admit that it is really behind the separatists, and to promise peace and quiet in the eastern regions in exchange for uniting the Republic of Moldova with the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]?

[Nastase] Perhaps. But we do not have enough information to make a firm evaluation.

[Andon] What larger significance would this trade-off have, if it were to be real?

[Nastase] It is obvious that any decision to ratify the membership of the Republic of Moldova in the CIS is an historic responsibility, with long-term consequences, which can involve a number of generations. Up to now, and not without justification, the Republic of Moldova has shown much prudence in its relations with the CIS. At the Alma Ata meeting, when the objectives of the CIS were still unclear, the Republic of Moldova justified its presence by citing the economic interests that linked it, and that continue to link it, with the former Soviet republics. In the meantime, things have started to take shape and the direction of the development of the CIS is much clearer than it was at that time. Initially, it was said that the model for the CIS was the Common Market, that is, a political-economic body. In reality, so far, the CIS has been more concerned with security and political-military problems. The "peace-keeping" forces that will operate within the CIS have been created. It is obvious that the political and military components are dominant. The document on "The Juridical and Organizational Bases of the CIS," which was presented for discussion at the 6 July Moscow meeting of heads of state and government, and that will be discussed at subsequent sessions, reveals the intentions behind the creation of the CIS. It seems that the CIS aims to become a sort of "Warsaw Pact," on a reduced scale, for the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Under these conditions, the ratification of membership in the CIS would mean that the Republic of Moldova would willingly cede to the CIS some of its powers of sovereignty and national independence. For Moldova, as one of the small member countries of the Commonwealth, this ceding of powers would not be accompanied by corresponding advantages. Also, from the viewpoint of defense and national security, this will mean exclusive dependence on arrangements within the framework of the CIS.

[Andon] How could such a complicated situation be prevented?

[Nastase] I believe that the model of the Baltic countries, which became part of the USSR as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, remains, as it has been up to now, the most appropriate one for the Republic of Moldova, for the consolidation of independence, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the country, and integration into European structures. At present, the

Republic of Moldova can be compared to a piece of metal between two magnets. On the one side—Russia and the CIS and on the other side—Europe and the European structures. Certainly, the pressure for CIS membership is especially strong, just as in the case of the other former Soviet republics. The resistance to these pressures, which has been remarkable so far, can be increased by diversifying economic relations and by attracting foreign investments to the Republic of Moldova. The political role of the conflict in Eastern Moldova comes into the picture at this point. If this source of tension is maintained, the international relations of the Republic of Moldova will be "frozen," and the attention of the management organs of the state will be diverted from a concern for creating an international identity for the new state to a problem of an internal nature, which is hard to resolve as long as there is a possibility of continuing intervention from abroad. In addition, an internal conflict, which can degenerate, at any time, into armed confrontations, is always a discouraging factor for foreign investors.

[Andon] Is it possible that economic interests of the moment might prevail and might make the option of CIS membership attractive?

[Nastase] This is hard to believe. The opposite might occur. The normalization of the economy and the conversion to the market economy will be hindered by the differences in economic development, and by the lags in economic development in the other member countries, especially in Russia. It is expected that the attention of the Western countries will be concentrated on the CIS as such and on its principal members, which will have negative consequences in granting credits, assistance funds, and other benefits to the Republic of Moldova.

[Andon] Would Romania be able to provide what is necessary for the economy of the Republic of Moldova in the hypothetical case that the Republic of Moldova were to give up certain ties with the other republics in the CIS?

[Nastase] The problem would have to be examined in order to give a response; I, personally, believe that this is not impossible. In any case, I do not believe that our government would not do everything possible to confront such an exigency, if such a situation were to present itself. It is a fact that the Republic of Moldova is, by history and function, European territory. Its democratic and prosperous future and that of Romania cannot be characterized by anything other than association with and, in the future, integration in the European Community and in other European structures.

[Andon] What would be the effect of full CIS membership of the Republic of Moldova on its relations with Romania?

[Nastase] Certainly, it would have a number of effects on relations with Romania. As a first result, we should expect a considerable decrease in the chances of achieving a common spiritual space. Probably, direct economic ties will become noticeably more difficult,

since it is expected that relations with the "internal Common Market" of the CIS will have priority; with its predominantly agricultural economy, the Republic of Moldova will be much more vulnerable to domestic market demands.

[Andon] Can we expect to see "CIS border guards" at our borders with the Republic of Moldova?

[Nastase] In all likelihood, yes. Basically, Moldova's membership in the CIS would not only considerably reduce its chances for achieving its national ideal, but could also directly affect its newly won independence.

Report on Socialist Labor Party Conference

92P20371A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
27 Jul 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Corina Dragotescu: "In the Socialist Labor Party: Iliescu Called Upon to Pardon the 'Comrades'"]

[Text] "We are proud of our predecessors who worked with their hands and minds to create a dignified existence." This was the basic idea stated in the open discussions during the National Conference of the Socialist Labor Party [PSM] on Saturday. Earlier, Ilie Verdet presented a report on socioeconomic development. We listened to an incursion into history, with stories about the workers' movement and about the communists' ability to distinguish good from bad during WWII. "Despite the mistakes they made, the communists correctly calculated the danger of fascism." In a familiar note from old history books, he spoke about Ion Antonescu and the ex-king "whose first dethronement was the work not of the communists but of his own father." He passed over the period from 1944 to 1960 more hurriedly and with more confusion. After every two sentences, he pointed out that, "although the Romanian Communist Party made mistakes," Romania's development in the 1965-89 period was unprecedented.

On the other hand, everything, absolutely everything that has happened in the economic domain since December 1989 is catastrophic; it is the beating that the West has given us. The measures of the Roman and Stolojan governments, "by means of which beatings were given to companies with state capital," were vehemently criticized. These companies received a variety of names; some were sold and the fate of others was unknown. The conclusion has been easy to forecast: "The economic reform promoted by the government has failed."

The PSM supports the conversion to the market economy and to a mixed market economy, but envisages another mode of implementation, carried out over a period of 10 years and in two stages: 1. The creation of specific mechanisms; 2. The retooling of industry. The result envisaged for the end of the transition period would be the achievement of a gross domestic product of \$6,000-7,000 per capita, corresponding to that of the developed countries. In the economy, the state would keep control of the key branches (they did not say which

ones these would be), and industrialization would continue by means of the typical market mechanisms.

After the report was presented, there were speeches. All the speakers supported the idea of the struggle against capitalism, which is considered to be the main enemy. The campaign was launched by the first speaker, Borta Miluta, from Bacau, who, screaming into the microphone, criticized the report presented by the party chief because it mentioned the December revolution. "We should not talk about the December revolution. It was not any kind of revolution. It was a coup d'etat, a counter-revolution carried out by occult forces from abroad, with the support of traitors of the country and of the people."

After hosannas were sung to the working class, which has worked and has created all the national wealth, an exalted speaker from Arges, Sorin Popescu, said: "On 22 December, where were the people who are making fun of us today and are saying that what we have done in 50 years is not good?! Let us protect ourselves from the judgement of our working class. Today's governing officials should be subject to as scrupulous an examination as was required of Ceausescu."

Janos Fazekas said, among other things: "If we voted for Iliescu in 1990, if he does not pardon all our comrades now, then he should not expect our vote." Treating the issue of the prefects in Harghita and Covasna, he said: "I ask the conference to condemn the dismissal of the prefects as an anti-Romanian, antisocialist, and anti-communist measure." The participants in the hall began to shout "No, no!" Seeing the reaction, Janos Fazekas said: "If this is your attitude, I am resigning from the PSM," leaving the room. It was thought that this was a good time for a break. The traditional cigarette calmed spirits, and when he returned to the room, Ilie Verdet asked the permission of the conference for the members of the steering committee to organize discussions with Janos Fazekas to find out if he still wants to leave the party.

During the final part of the conference, held in the absence of the press, the attitude of the party during the election campaign was discussed. Later, from a press conference held by Tudor Mohora, PSM secretary for propaganda, we learned the following: the PSM will participate alone and with full slates in all electoral constituencies; although the candidacy of Ilie Verdet for president of Romania has been proposed, he thought that such a decision was not opportune; the party hopes that it will reach the figure of 3 percent of the vote needed to be represented in Parliament; if the party is represented in Parliament and a rightist coalition government is formed, the PSM will not participate in the government.

Fazekas' Comments at PSM Congress Criticized

92P20372A Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*
in Romanian 31 Jul 92 pp 1, 5

[Article by Dan Stanca: "Janos I, the Socialist"]

[Text] Looking like a bulldog fed on goulash, Janos Fazekas stated at the Socialist Labor Party [PSM] Congress that he wants to establish a socialist party for Hungarians in Romania. This information appeared almost unimportant in the chorus of inanities that were recited at this forum of professional activists. But, under the magnifying glass of analysis, it attracts our attention. Mr. Fazekas knows quite well that in a country like Romania, which barely had a thousand communists in 1944, the national minorities were the first to lay the foundation for the new regime. Hungarians, Ukrainians, and Bulgarians, not to mention Jews and Gypsies, acted under the aegis of the so-called democratic left and paved the way for the dictatorship that followed. The propaganda campaign orchestrated by the communists proceeded in the following direction: Romania is a rightist, national state that does not look kindly upon other ethnics. Therefore, it is necessary to proceed with the destruction of the Romanian element and maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat. The slogan that had made the rounds during the last century, when the Communist Party Manifesto was being drawn up, was circulated: Workers do not have a country, they do not have any national sentiments, they form an ethnic entity of exploited labor. They must join in solidarity against this exploitation and bury this class enemy. All the Internationals operated on this type of fuel.

In other words, in their struggle for power, the communists used the forces of the national minorities, which they knew that they could indoctrinate quite rapidly. Mr. Fazekas probably thinks that it is 40 years ago. Imagining that his position will be well-received in Covasna and Harghita counties, he called the governmental measure to appoint two Romanian prefects in these counties, political stupidity. He claims that he is defending Hungarian ethnic interests. In reality, this is completely false. In reality, Mr. Fazekas is defending the cause of demagogic socialism. His political maneuver is so rudimentary that the liberal faction of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] probably thought it was a bad joke. But it shows us how tangled the ways of politics are when the goal of achieving power continues to sicken the minds of people who, long ago, should have been stuffed and taken to the Antipa Museum. We will not discuss the step approved by Prime Minister Stolojan along with Mr. Ursu and Mr. Vaida from the Department of Local Public Administration. In theory, it is perfectly justified. But, in light of the sensitivity in this geographic area, it should probably be postponed for the moment. Especially since, in the UDMR, trends have sometimes been impetuous and sometimes slow—in any case, they have been unpredictable. Therefore, Mr. Fazekas threw out the bait, convinced that it would light the spark of nostalgia in the souls of many older Hungarians who have not forgotten

that there was an autonomous Hungarian region during the time of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.

Much has been written in our press to the effect that, in contrast to us, the Hungarians are a disciplined electorate, and do not vote on the basis of political doctrines but on the basis of their own ethnic interests. It is also said that the Hungarians have not cursed their communists as much as we have cursed ours. Along the same lines, it was insinuated that a number of atrocities committed in Harghita County were not carried out against persons because they were members of the Securitate or the militia, but because they were Romanians. These assertions came from the crypto-communist press, which was obsessed with the advancement of the reform process in Romania. In any case, at the end of the nationalist-communist decades in our country, the interests of the Hungarian ethnics, like the interests of any other minority, are moving in the direction of democracy and transparency. We find it very hard to believe that, to obtain privileges, the Hungarians would espouse the socialism preached by Janos I. This would be impossible since there is no demarcation line between national rights and human rights. In time, they will merge.

Babiuc on Ministry Functions, Presidential Race

92BA1263A Bucharest *BARICADA* in Romanian
21-27 Jun 92 p 5

[Interview with Interior Minister Victor Babiuc by Stefan Stoian; place and date not given: "The Head of State Must Be Replaced"]

[Text] [Stoian] Minister, almost all the press has recently published comments that the Democratic National Salvation Front [DNSF] intends to carry out a major realignment. The main ministry being considered is of course your ministry. What would you like to say in this regard?

[Babiuc] I have some difficulty saying anything because the causes for this intention to realign are not stated in so many words. The first question to answer is why this realignment is being sought, and here, if you want an answer, I am not convinced that I have all the information. Let us attempt to clarify matters, starting with the activities of the Interior Ministry during the past 10 months, ever since I became minister, activities that have resulted in achievements and failures; some of them were explicitly mentioned by various reporters, others I myself mentioned at press conferences because, whether I liked it or not, I made no secret of them. In any case, a campaign for local elections took place during that period without significant incidents, the elections were carried out under normal conditions, and the assessments that followed the elections were that the latter were correct and that the Interior Ministry, the police, and the rural police did not get involved beyond the requirements of the law, that is, in order to assure that the electoral campaign was conducted under normal, civilized conditions, without violence or other

illegalities, and that the elections themselves were carried out correctly. Under these conditions, as we near the second election campaign, it is at least suspect to find this wish to replace an interior minister who has successfully passed a first test in this respect, as determined from the expressed public opinion.

[Stoian] It appears that this is exactly what they are afraid of, because everyone, the Romanian press as well as foreign observers, have concluded that the elections were very correct, and it would seem that they fear correct elections....

[Babiuc] While we are speculating, it seems to me that your assumption is of course well-founded. Otherwise how else can we explain this animosity against the Interior Ministry, or even more so, against its minister.

[Stoian] You are being attacked for having held the position of university professor without having passed through the lecturer stage; your answer to that attack carries an explanation. Could you elaborate on it?

[Babiuc] All university professor positions are accessed after a competition. And in order to access it, I entered such a competition, announced in MONITORUL OFICIAL, and met all the criteria required to participate. Here are some of the criteria in question, criteria required by law: I have a doctorate in law, I have more than 15 years of seniority in scientific activities, more than 30 years of seniority in law, I have more than 100 published scientific papers, I have been principal scientific researcher, level II, in international commercial law for about 13 years, and since 1990 I have been principal scientific researcher, level I. I should point out that according to legal regulations, my scientific levels are equivalent to those of lecturer and university professor, respectively. During the time I was principal scientific researcher, I have on several occasions taught both undergraduate and postgraduate courses in international commercial law at the Academy for Economic Studies. During the same period, I have advised diploma projects and sat on about 20-25 doctorate commissions at the School of Law. I have thus been conducting scientific activities in this domain, I have both practical activities and scientific titles to my credit, so I confess that I do not know where these challenges come from, other than the fact that they result from misinformation or bad faith.

[Stoian] You are one of the three candidates proposed by the National Salvation Front [NSF] for Romania's presidency. As such, I would ask you to respond to several rather uncomfortable questions, since the position of president of Romania must be filled by a man who offers many guarantees to the Romanian people. My first question then is what has been your connection with Securitate during the past 10 years?

[Babiuc] The simplest and most precise answer is, no connection at all.

[Stoian] What would you do if the NSF were to nominate you as candidate? How would you conduct your electoral campaign? Did you prepare for this possibility?

[Babiuc] I could of course give you an ambiguous answer, and one which may even be the most correct one, in the sense that I am prepared only in principle. And that is because my position is clearly ambiguous; since the NSF convention has not yet been held, I cannot state with certainty that I am a candidate, and therefore my preparation is somewhat circumstantial. But I do have enough issues in mind for this campaign, what I should say to show the voters that I can be a good president, to show them that others among those who are candidates cannot or should not become president of Romania.

[Stoian] Since you mentioned that some should not be president of Romania, how do you see Iliescu's candidacy and his wish to run again—though almost unanimously, all the Romanian newspapermen, except naturally those from DIMINEATA and the Presidency papers, have asked him not to become a candidate again. How do you interpret this?

[Babiuc] The wish to be president of Romania is certainly understandable. From that standpoint I can understand Iliescu's wish. At the same time, I feel that some criteria should also be considered, kept in mind, when you decide to take this step. Criteria concerning yourself in the first place, and the correspondence of your qualities or faults with that which the country expects from a president or from his image. From this standpoint, it seems to me that after the two and a half years since the December revolution, after the changes that have taken place in Romania during that time, after the image that Romania and its president have acquired in this country and abroad, there is need for a change. If we want to present Romania to the world in another image, one of the first things that needs to be replaced is the chief of state.

[Stoian] Under your leadership, little by little, and especially on the occasion of the visit of the king, the police regained its essential attribute of not becoming involved in the political life of a country. How do you view the future role of the police?

[Babiuc] As long as I have been in this ministry, I have tried to have both the ministry and the police—which is one the ministry's basic branches—retain total political neutrality; this has been one of my policy objectives in this ministry. On every occasion, I tried to say that the ministry, the police, the rural police, all police branches, must remain politically neutral if they want to project a correct image for the country, if they want to meet the responsibilities which the law establishes for them. Moreover, I have stressed one idea which I considered important for the interest that the people in the ministry, in the police, have for their own future, namely, that they can assure the continuity of their work as policemen only by remaining politically neutral, by not supporting any

party, by not oppressing any party, by not supporting any person, and by not oppressing any person, because the moment they abandon this neutrality they become vulnerable to any change in government party, to any change of minister, because the newcomer will attempt to punish those who did not behave correctly during the previous period. It is therefore not only a matter of the fact that they have a legal duty to be neutral, but also that this neutrality is indispensable in terms of their own interests.

[Stoian] What are the relations of the ministry which you lead with the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], and in this respect, what is your opinion of the files of the former Securitate?

[Babiuc] As I have said on other occasions, relations with SRI are those of cooperation. After all, both institutions complement each other for activities relating to the assurance of public order and national security. As to the files of the former Securitate, I am afraid that I cannot express a very original opinion: I believe that those files should not become public. The only files which should become public are those of people who are part of the Government, Parliament, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the file of the country's president; at the same time, each one of us should be able to see his own file, independently of the position he has within society. I believe that with the exceptions indicated, those files must not become public, because Romanian society is already embittered and divided, and I don't think it needs another reason to deepen the division and antagonism. By the same token, all those who want to lead the country have a duty to show that they have nothing to hide from public opinion, that they have not transgressed during the communist dictatorship.

[Stoian] Should you become president of Romania, what solutions do you see for the agricultural problem, and afterwards, the other problem, the problem of tourism in Romania, the only branches that appear to be able to rapidly straighten out the budget and all the calamity of the country?

[Babiuc] You know, I would like to not answer this question, for the following reason: A great deal of confusion exists between the purpose of the president and that of the government or Parliament. We have a presidential position with functions stipulated by the Constitution, aimed at foreign policy, national defense, national security, and several other things, but not referring to economic activities. That is the sphere of the executive and the legislative. Many people usually misunderstand this, I think probably due the communist tradition, in which the head of state could do anything and no one could prevent him from doing what he should and what he should not do. For this reason alone, I would like not to answer, because otherwise, while my activity since the revolution was conducted in law, it was in the field of economic relations, and I have quite a few ideas in the economic field that I think could prove useful. But because I want to establish this difference

between what a president must and can do, and what the executive and Parliament must do and can do, I don't want to answer your question.

[Stoian] EUROPA magazine, in its characteristic style, considers you Jewish. What can you say about that?

[Babiuc] I also found out from EUROPA that I am Jewish, just as according to another magazine, absolutely independently, I found out that I am Ruthenian. What can I tell you? My parents were country teachers all their life, and their religion was Christian-Orthodox. They were Romanians, just like their parents were Christian-Orthodox Romanians.

[Stoian] You are a steadfast presence at sports arenas. For our readers' information, what are your favorite teams in the national division and what sports do you prefer?

[Babiuc] My favorite team is the 1955 Rapid, and with minor intensity fluctuations, I have not changed my allegiance. Which does not mean that I am not also conscientiously involved at present in the affairs of the Dinamo Club, given that it belongs to the ministry. As to my favorite sports, the first is soccer of course, where you sometimes see me at the stadium, but I also like rugby and other sports.

[Stoian] Thank you very much for your courtesy, minister.

[Babiuc] It has been my pleasure.

Rabbi Rosen Discusses Country's Past, Future

*92BA1263B Bucharest BARICADA in Romanian
21-27 Jun 92 pp 8-9*

[Interview with Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen by Elena Gugu; place and date not given: "We've Been Accused of Killing God, But Can God Be Killed?"]

[Text] Moses Rosen was born in Moinesti in 1912, into a family of rabbis. "My family tree reaches, generation after generation, to the famous Gaons," he says about his forebears. His father came from Galicia and was a rabbi in Falticeni. Moses Rosen was chosen chief rabbi of the Jewish community in Romania in 1948, and since then, his fate has been the same as that of his coreligionists.

It can be said that within the community he leads, there reigns an organic, free-will discipline. It is as if an invisible wire exists between him and his subjects, carrying the news, events, and even moods that pervade this increasingly smaller, but still morally and spiritually representative social cell. The authority of the chief rabbi is accepted and recognized by all, so that everything that moves, is said, is consumed, or is done, has his direct sanction. That is why we spoke to him, hoping that from his answers we might learn some truths about an unusual existence and about the singular and unfortunate history in which he participated, influencing the fate of many people, Jewish and non-Jewish.

[Gugu] How did you begin your activity as chief rabbi of the Jewish community?

[Rosen] In 1948 I was chosen chief rabbi of the Jewish faith. At that time, the Federation was led by communists, with whom I started the battle that lasted until 1964, when I was elected president of the Federation of Jewish Communities. I then dismissed all the communist Jews from the Federation. Even under the communist regime, a regulation was issued, requiring that those who wanted to be part of a community's leadership could not be party members.

[Gugu] You are speaking of the dispute you had with the former chief rabbi, Alexandru Safran, who left the country in 1947?

[Rosen] It is true that the Romanian Senate did me the honor of insulting me several times, until one fine day Mr. Motiu surfaced to announce with great pleasure that the Romanian Senate was inviting the former chief rabbi, the great rabbi of Geneva, who has 500 Jews, to come here and tell how things were during the Holocaust. He responded that he was glad to come, that he was honored by the homage he was being paid, and all I did was to publicize the words published in his book about "his fabricated banishment from Romania." The result is that Mr. Safran is no longer coming here.

We reprint here an excerpt from the letter addressed by Alexandru Safran to his teacher, Josue Jehuda, president of the Geneva Jewish community. "I remember, dear master, that during our conversation in Basel you asked me to think about and suggest a rabbi for Geneva's Jewish community. Wishing to be in a position to enjoy a quiet life, dedicated exclusively to study and reflection, I think that I might do well to propose myself for this service. I will confess that this need for spiritual peace is sustained by the prospect of finding myself near you, dear master." Bucharest, 21 April 1947.

The conclusion of Mr. Moses Rosen is that "instead of leaving for Palestine (as he had announced), Mr. Safran went to Geneva, where he took the position for which he applied eight months before."

[Gugu] Let me ask you what function does a rabbi serve?

[Rosen] In our connotation, a rabbi is not a priest, just like Judaism is not merely a cult, or a religion, or a nation; it is all of these things. It resembles Islam more than Christianity. The rabbi is not a priest, he is a teacher. A priest is a sort of agent between the faithful and God. I, instead, bring God's message to men. The rabbi is not a holy man; he is a man of teaching. That is what a rabbi is, just like the synagogue is not a church. The synagogue is a house of teaching, not of prayer. The rabbi is the one who teaches his fellow men, and in the older meaning, is a judge. You cannot divorce or marry without his permission, not as a holy man, but as a lay person, as a tribunal. Being in this situation, as a result of circumstances, I have been not only chief rabbi, but also president of the Jewish Federation in Romania, and

even though these are not rabbinical concerns, I have had to fight for the rights of Jews, and first of all for the right to Alya ("exaltation to Israel"), the right to make a new life in their country of origin. But as I have said, circumstances create situations.

[Gugu] What can you tell us about the massive emigration to Israel during this time?

[Rosen] Such is our duty and our ideal ever since we were banished from Israel, to pray at each meal for this return to the Holy Land. That is why the highest percentage of Jews who have returned to Israel come from Romania: 97 percent of Romania's Jews are now there, and 3 percent are still here. The largest tribe in Israel, in terms of numbers, not quality, comes from Romania.

[Gugu] Are you still continuing your efforts in that direction?

[Rosen] Pretty much in the same direction. I want to say that the recently published statistic is totally false; it puts the number of Jews in Romania at 9,000; in fact, the figure is between 17,000 and 18,000. There is actually a joke about this: one lie is the positive, more lies is the comparative, and statistics is the superlative. In 1956, 140,000 Jews were registered, when in fact there were more than 300,000. At that time there were two reasons for it: on one hand the Jews' cowardice, actually fear, and on the other hand, the communists' interests. They were reporting a smaller figure because they didn't want to release any Jews from the country; they needed them because they were in the medical sector, but when the number of doctors became too high they began to release Jews. There was another amusing situation: At one point, they wanted to eliminate the JEWISH FAITH JOURNAL, and so whoever wanted to leave would take a job there and leave. They were stupid. Now, it's only a matter of cowardice; they register in statistics as Romanians but continue to come for help.

[Gugu] Please explain the purpose of the outside announcement which draws attention to the fact that you don't receive requests for conversion to Judaism.

[Rosen] I will repeat my earlier statement. Judaism is not a religion and it does not proselytize. The way things have been, many have turned religion into a tool: They did not want to become Jews, they just wanted to leave. They would get on a plane for Israel and would end up in Germany. That has been our emphatic response to such accidents, which have not been rare.

[Gugu] What is the typical difference between a Jew and the people among whom he lives?

[Rosen] A Jew is a man who embraces a Jewish concept of life. For Jews, the blend of religion and nation is much more powerful than for any other people, and that is what leads to the difference you mention. King David's parents were not both Jewish; his mother was a Moabite, but he has been one of the greatest of Jews. The Jews are not a race. They represent a concept; in their life they satisfy

the Torah, in which case they are Jews, or they do not, in which case they are not Jews. The one who assumes the yoke of the Torah does not merely adopt its theoretical aspects, but its laws for life: how he sleeps, how he eats, how he dresses, his sexual life, his behavior toward his fellow men, it is all written in it.

[Gugu] I would like to know your opinion about the roots of antisemitism and about the reasons it has persisted over time.

[Rosen] Ah! You don't know the story about the bicycle riders? Let me tell it to you. In Hitler's time, a German is riding the trolley and he says: "Oh boy! These kikes! If we don't have bread, it's because of them." And someone answers him: "And because of the bicycle riders." The man continues: "And this war, who made it? Also the kikes!" And the other man says: "And the bicycle riders." So the first man says: "Wait a minute! Why the bicycle riders?" And the other man answers: "So why the kikes?" That's how it is with antisemitism. Antisemitism does not have any logic. We have been accused of killing God, but can God be killed? Moreover, the first Christians were Jews and were killed in the Colosseum by the Romans. The Christians later judged the former Jews, and that's where all the confusion and hatred started. We have been considered as an inferior race by Hitler and decimated; after that we were told we were Judeo-Capitalists and that we want to rule the world, and that we take advantage of this classification. Later, we were told we were Judeo-Communists. Does this have any logic? People forget that Stalin killed all the Jews around him or sent them away, just like Ceausescu did afterwards.

[Gugu] Nevertheless, what have been your relations with the communist power here during the past 45 years?

[Rosen] I opposed the government from the first, and that is why the Americans put all their trust in me. Because I did not hesitate to risk any consequence to do my duty toward my people.

[Gugu] What was your contribution to obtaining Most Favored Nation [MFN] status for Romania? Was it tied in with the Jews' right to emigrate?

[Rosen] No. The Jews started to leave Romania in 1946. When Ceausescu came to power, in 1975 as a matter of fact, when MFN was granted to Romania, there were still about 120,000 Jews here. But my contribution to obtaining MFN was direct. On my arrival in America in 1961, I achieved a certain prestige. All the American administrations, from Kennedy to Bush, took into account the opinions I expressed, and demonstrated their friendship. It happened at that time that the offer of the MFN was conditional on the number of passports given by the Romanian government to Jews who wanted to leave for Israel. In 1979, the American government asked me to report every two months on the emigration situation. This was evidence of great trust on the part of the Americans. After that, I was asked to intervene in the MFN problem in order to obtain it, and at the same time

in order for the Jews to be able to leave Romania. When Ceausescu requested MFN for three years, I told them: "Do not give it, do not give it! Only for one year, that is enough. Keep him in check." That was the truth. But at that time, it was not just a matter of Jews. Using the same considerations, we released Baptists and neo-Protestants from prison, we brought the Christian Bible in the country.

[Gugu] In other words, your relationship with Ceausescu was one of mutual dependence?

[Rosen] No. It was one of hate; his hatred of me. I now regard Ceausescu's policy differently. I do not want to say better, because I do not want to be taken for a Ceausescu supporter. That is all I need! These were the facts. He respected me because I took heavy risks, until I gained a sort of immunity. Under Ceausescu there was a single man, a single enemy, who was not stupid and on whom I could count, whereas now there are hundreds of irresponsible hooligans. During Ceausescu's time I continued to educate the children and could bring people in the church. Also during his time, no Jews moved from any other country, while now they are almost all gone, legally. And I was also the one who brought the Joint Distribution Committee into this country, under the communists. When it arrived, Ceausescu tried to obtain concessions based on the Jews' emigration requests, and I exploited the situation and stopped the concessions. I told the Americans: "Gentlemen, give them to him, but gradually, in small doses." It is said that I had friendly relations with Ceausescu; it was the other way around, and he tried to snub me every time, just so that I would not think he was playing my game. Who says that I behaved like a chameleon? Those who all their lives applauded like puppets. Let me give you some examples: Parhon, Calinescu, Sadoveanu.

[Gugu] Since you knew the Americans very well, did you ever tell them during the Ceausescu period what was happening in the country with the Romanian people?

[Rosen] No, I did not tell them anything. I said to them: Do not think that I am your agent. I am concerned only with my fate and that of my people. We are allied only in this respect, for our defense—mine and that of the other Jews. But they knew the situation....

[Gugu] It is said that there currently exists a certain animosity between you and the Israeli ambassador. How real is it?

[Rosen] He said that there was no antisemitism in Romania, but now he no longer says it....

[Gugu] And he is leaving... Do you believe there is antisemitism among the Romanian people?

[Rosen] No, just a little. It is an artificial thing; it is the hand of the Securitate; all their methods can be perceived in this matter.

[Gugu] What do you think is the future of the Jewish community in Romania? Will it disappear or will it persist, even in reduced numbers?

[Rosen] Anything is possible. There are countries with only 6,000 Jews. It is true that the young people in particular, want to leave. It is possible that it will disappear during this reform period, but an answer is not possible.... Right now, I am looking for someone to succeed me, but I have found no one who wants to come here.

[Gugu] Have you thought of retiring from this activity?

[Rosen] For twenty years I have thought about it, but no one wants to come because the income is also very low. Ever since I have been a rabbi here, I have only given. I take nothing. We are now in a crisis about that.

[Gugu] Do rabbis refuse to succeed you because of the political situation?

[Rosen] Political, economic situation... there are many reasons.

[Gugu] What do you think is the short term future of Romania, which you know maybe better than us?

[Rosen] I am not a prophet, but the picture of Romanian life is too much like Caragiale....

[Gugu] Do you think that the weak spot is demagoguery?

[Rosen] No, not only that. Actually, democracy never existed in this country, but now more than ever it is as if the dam has broken, there are no morals, no faith, life is like a flash flood. The Romanian people, as I have known them, are some of the best people around, but now, we all seem like an unleashed mob.

[Gugu] Do you think that the Romanian people do not have a democratic vocation?

[Rosen] You have not experienced the past and do not know what elections meant in Romania in the past, nor the hunger of the successive parties that came to power. First of all we need time, and continuity. Everything does not happen overnight. Even now, because those who are in power, who like it very well where they are, do not want to hold elections in time, the Clause has been lost for one year.

[Gugu] What do you think Romania needs immediately following the elections of September?

[Rosen] Real democratization, of course.

[Gugu] But how can that happen?

[Rosen] I will answer you with another anecdote. A Jew was riding the train, and after the first station he looked out the window and got excited. At the second station he began to wail, and at the third he started to pull out his hair. So the people asked him: "What ever is the matter?" Well, as it turns out, he was going in the wrong

direction. So they told him: "You have no choice; you have to get off and take the train that is going back." So this is my answer.

[Gugu] Thank you.

Military Doctrine Based on National Interest

92BA1267A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 25 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview With Lieutenant Colonel Eugen Campan, chief of the Military Doctrine and Theory Section in the Institute of Military History and Theory, by Gabriel Barca; place and date not given: "Let Us Respond to National Interests"]

[Text] [Barca] No matter what one says, the view that military doctrine does not change from one day to another does enjoy a support that is difficult to refute. The leadership of the National Defense Ministry shares this view. Could we examine "point by point" the elements that compose a military doctrine?

[Campan] I could say—and you are perfectly correct—that a country's military doctrine is not a set of precepts. There are those who think that we had a certain doctrine until 1989, and now, in 1991-92, having gone through the revolution, we have another. Doctrine is not carved in stone (and therefore is not fixed, immovable); nor is it a system of concepts and principles that can be changed from one day to another. A lot has been said about the fact that we should totally change our national military doctrine. It is very well-known that among the former member nations of the Warsaw Treaty, the only one that had its own military doctrine was Romania, who did not join the block doctrine established by Moscow. These principles and elements of military doctrine took into consideration Romania's concrete situation, its economic and demographic potential, and its national traditions. After the Revolution, the military doctrine elements that had to be changed concerned primarily some of the fundamental principles in the structure of the doctrinary framework. This means those principles that referred to leadership, risk assessment, threats, and dangers against our state, matters of national defense system structure—in fact, principles aimed at organization, equipment, and preparation. These change as a function of evolution in the world's military art. That is why I consider that military doctrine, as opposed to other doctrines (economic, philosophic, and even political), is relatively stable in time because it must respond to perennial national interests (independence, integrity, unity, sovereignty). These do not change from one stage to another, from one year to the next. But it is true that the fundamental elements of a doctrine, such as its essential objectives, can change as a function of political options.

[Barca] This is one of the points I also wanted to examine. What exactly are you referring to?

[Campan] I was referring to the alliance system, aspects that concern the structure of the system; aspects

regarding international cooperation, linkage with or independence from multinational military structures, and aspects associated with the size, level, and value of the armed forces. But the mode of action, the specifically military mode of action of forces does not change: They are elements that belong to the military art, to strategy. That is why I was surprised that the many programs of political parties said little about the fundamental problems of defense policy (not of the doctrine!), thus making it somewhat difficult for us to formulate some of the basic objectives of national defense. And that is because the current form of the doctrine approved by the Supreme Council for the Country's Defense includes several elements as structure, as a "template" that refers to the primordial principles/objectives of national defense (principles of a defense policy). The second "sequence" refers to general foundations, principles, and orientations regarding the armed defense of the country, which brings us down to the level of the military agent. After that comes the structure of forces in the national defense system, principles regarding the organization, training, and endowment of the forces, and several basic orientations in foreign collaboration relations that concern exclusively the army and other European armies or armies on other continents.

[Barca] A "pendulum" motion exists between the offensive and the defensive, between "the best attack is defense" and "the best defense is attack." We have a defensive doctrine. Many people wonder why it is defensive?

[Campan] It is a confusion in terminology. Romania's defense policy is defensive. This is a political orientation. It formulates several principles. In the first place, it is a matter of the nonaggressivity principle: Romania considers that no country is a potential enemy, and thus excludes from the start the definition or denomination of a possible enemy. Second: Romania will never initiate the first offensive military action against other states. Third: In case of aggression, Romania will act only to defend its national territory. Movement beyond the national territory will be strictly governed by law, under

clear conditions stipulated by regulatory acts, and in accordance with prevailing international agreements. This is the sense in which the defensive nature of military doctrine must be viewed. When we say defensive or offensive, we speak of the forms in which military actions are conducted. Consequently, Romania will call upon strategic defense as its fundamental form, but nowhere in the world and under no military experience is an army constantly on the defensive. This is not possible, because the main form in which an enemy is defeated is through offensive. In conclusion, we can say that in terms of defense policy, as strategic position, Romania is defensive, but that in operative-tactical terms, the main forms in which an enemy penetrating the national territory is defeated, are offensive.

[Barca] A very interesting and revealing evolution concerning the laws and principles of armed conflict is taking place throughout the world—and this did not start just a couple of years ago. The quality-quantity ratio, with its many ramifications, is visibly growing toward qualitative values. Where does Romania stand in this respect?

[Campan] With respect to armed conflict and its corollaries, I want to say that we intend to achieve a professionalized army of optimum dimensions (some say small, others say medium), whose endowment, organization, training, and strategic design, will bring it up to the qualitative evolution level of modern armies. This results partly from an application of agreements to reduce conventional forces in Europe, and partly from the principle of defensive self-sufficiency, adopted as essential principle of military doctrine. This self-sufficiency requires that we determine, as exactly as possible, the military capability needed by our state to discourage any aggression; in other words, so that any aggressor will know that the losses that the Romanian army is capable of inflicting will be much greater than the successes that it might achieve at a given moment. This also implies a suitable, optimum retaliation capability, to destroy, neutralize, and repel any aggression.

Illegal Aspect of Krajina Ruling Party*92BA1274D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
25 Jul 92 p 16*

[Article by Milan Cetnik: "The Incumbent Party Has Gone Underground!"]

[Text] Knin, 24 Jul—It is a news item for Ripley, but reality is so inventive! The Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of Knin, which is legally the incumbent party in Krajina, has gone deep underground. What is more, five officials who in the 1991 elections were deputy candidates and members of Racan's Croatian Communist Party [HKP] are sitting in the Krajina government, which has expelled the incumbent party from political life (only in Knin). These are the deputy prime minister, the minister for fuel and power, the deputy ministers for trade and education, and director of the republic Fund for Health Care. When we add to that that the government has also taken over the administrative personnel of the Knin Communists, then the observation must be made that the former opstina committee of the LC [League of Communists] has begun to shine with the old personnel gleam.

Before the government decision was made on the moratorium on political parties, Raskovic's wing of the SDS was almost completely disenfranchised in a showdown with the Babicites, but Babic's attempt to continue party activities after the moratorium was proclaimed culminated in the well-known beating in a private apartment in Benkovac. Lukewarm resistance to the government decision was also offered by the Raskovicites, without success, but also without any very serious political intention to alter the situation. Alert and well-informed chroniclers of the fortunes/misfortunes of Knin have also recorded a detail that also provides picturesque indication of the downfall of the Serbian Democratic Party, which by strange pathways of destiny grew from a political party into a national movement, and in the end ended up underground.

That is, the other day a Krajina minister whose face was on the election posters of Racan's party two years ago departed on an official trip in the official automobile of Jovan Raskovic, the official representative of the SDS. It may be some consolation to members of the SDS that he was in the company of the Serbian Chetnik Movement, which, according to its leaders, "is respecting the decision on the moratorium."

Perhaps the explanation of Knin politics at the moment, which is marked by indisputable elements of the theater of the absurd, can be found in the words of Prime Minister Zdravko Zecevic, which he uttered in a recent address to the people over Knin Radio: "I expect all Krajina citizens to help to affirm and consolidate our young state. Neither the people nor the new government will show any understanding whatsoever to those who do not think that way. Such individuals, to put it simply, will not exist for us," Zecevic said.

Dr. Milan Babic, who at the moment is recuperating at home, is not engaged in politics, that is, he is not exercising the powers of the mayor of Knin and the head of the Krajina SDS. The most famous dentist in Krajina, say informed sources, intends to go back to his tooth-pullers. By all appearances, Babic has not suffered as much from the bruises as from the fact that no political institution, establishment, organization, or association of citizens in Krajina expressed even the slightest protest because of the blows he received. Thus, Babic is another among the "throwaway" Krajina political leaders who have come to know of the old pagan custom of erecting idols that usually end up rolling in the mud.

Serbian Army of B-H Protests Intervention Plans*92BA1274B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
25 Jul 92 p 14*

[Press release by the command of the Serbian Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina: "Military Intervention Is Being Prepared"]

[Text] Sarajevo, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—The main headquarters of the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] today accused the authorities in Sarajevo, the Republic of Croatia, and the international community of having planned military intervention against the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina in late July and early August. In a press release that its Information Department issued today, the command refers to secret documents allegedly examined during the Tudjman-Izetbegovic meeting in Zagreb on 21 July. The press release does not say how the command obtained those documents.

According to the Information Department's press release, the intervention will begin by "German air-planes included in the forces of the countries of the West European Union in the Adriatic staging an air incident."

According to the allegations contained in the press release, no intervention was envisaged on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], which precludes the possibility of the conflict spreading throughout the Balkans.

The plan, which the press release asserts was taken up in the Tudjman-Izetbegovic meeting, calls for offering the Serbian people in Bosanska Krajina a specific status within B-H following destruction of Serbian forces in central and southeastern Bosnia.

The press release also asserts that the military intervention of the West was planned for 5 July, but postponed because the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia and the Territorial Defense of B-H were not ready to "exploit what the intervention achieved."

Refugees From Bosnia-Herzegovina in Macedonia
92BA1200A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 28 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by S. Kaziovska: "Fear Surrounds the Border Ramp"]

[Text] *Despite the decision made by the Macedonian Government to accept mothers with children and sick people who are refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, every day new groups of refugees are coming to Macedonia from Serbia. In 10 days, the newly opened reception center at the youth settlement in Katlanovo became overcrowded.*

The civil war that is raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the killing and the suffering of the civilian population, and the destruction of material and cultural values that were created over the course of decades by generations of people have also brought with them the tragedy of the refugees. Facing the horror of the military madness, ordinary people, protecting their lives and those of their children, are leaving their homes. To save their lives, the people are leaving behind everything they have spent years creating and investing in, and, with their homes far behind, are going elsewhere to wait for the end of the madness, which must eventually come about. Trembling over the lives of relatives they have left behind, they are waiting for the end of the war in order to have someone and somewhere to go to.

The Most Terrible Is the Unknown

Since 14 April, when the first group of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina arrived in Macedonia, so far, in 73 days, 28,000 citizens from Bosnia-Herzegovina, mainly from areas near the eastern border, Visegrad, Foca, Gorazhd, and Srebrenica have arrived. These are areas from which, for more than one month, virtually all communications with the rest of the world have been stopped. The refugees who came to Macedonia earlier and the new groups that are now arriving from Serbia say that the most terrible of all the hardships they have experienced is the fact that they do not know what is happening in their home areas. Fatima Kurspakhic, who arrived in Skopje with her three children on 22 May and is staying with the Cocalic family, says that, despite the good welcome they received, the children are simply stunned by the events. Every day they go to the Red Cross to await the arrival of new refugees to ask them whether anyone has heard anything about her family, which was left behind in Visegrad. I wish I knew whether my husband is still alive, after his imprisonment, Fatima says, because alone, with three children, I do not feel safe anywhere. For the sake of the children, I had to flee from Visegrad, but now, separated and not knowing what is happening, without any news, it is worse. What I am certain about is that our house was vandalized; they took away our car even before we left, and people who have come to Skopje after us tell us that both people we know and strangers go into our house, and no one has come out

of it empty-handed, Fatima goes on to say. Her children—17-year-old Mubera, 13-year-old Adnan, and the small Muamer—say nothing. Their hostess, Jasmina, tells them to be patient because even bad things come to an end, and until they do, the Kurspakhic family should feel at home here. The fact that 10 people live in a two-room house is no problem. We shall adapt, but we need assistance in procuring food because the packages issued by the Red Cross are insufficient for an entire month, Jasmina says.

Across the Border—Around It and on Foot

Ever new groups of refugees are coming to the Skopje Red Cross organization, which is the main center for the reception of refugees. This time, they have not come directly from Bosnia but are refugees that, so far, have been staying in Serbia. As most of them say, they initially stayed in Priboj and other Serbian border areas, unwilling to put too great a distance between them and their homes, in the belief that the war would end soon. However, several days ago, they heard on the radio that refugees from Bosnia would either have to leave Serbian territory or move to one of the reception centers in Uzice, Bajna Basta, or Ruma. Mekho Abdurovic told us that most Bosnian Muslims, after all that has been happening in the past two and a half months, do not dare remain in Serbia any longer. Thus, the deadline being 15 June, by bus and by car the refugees made their way to Macedonia, which, for the time being, is their only way out. When we asked them how they crossed the border, in light of the decision made by the Macedonian Government that the Republic will accept only mothers with small children, the elderly, and the disabled from Bosnia-Herzegovina, we were told that some of them were allowed to cross the border without any problem, while others made their way through circuitous ways and walked into Macedonia! This was confirmed by the Red Cross, where we were told that, at the border crossing, they take mothers and children and find places for them to stay, but that, three to four hours later, the other adult members of the accepted families join them. Bearing in mind the lack of money and the fact that refugee families are frequently large and unwilling to split up but insist on staying together, taking care of them is quite difficult. According to Stojce Atanasov, secretary of the Skopje Red Cross Committee, the reception centers in Skopje and throughout the Republic are filled to capacity, and few Macedonian citizens, bearing in mind the present situation, can make the commitment of taking into their homes such large families of 10-15 members.

Hope Begins With Sarajevo

Two weeks ago, the youth camp in Katlanovo was opened to the refugees. Within a short time, 510 individuals were placed in it. More refugees arrived subsequently, and more beds were needed. According to the latest refugees, most of them cannot go back to their native areas because their houses have been either destroyed or set on fire, while in Serbia and now here, after exchanging dinars for denars at an unfavorable

rate, they have become moneyless, and, furthermore, everything here is expensive. Therefore, all that is left is for them to stay here and try to survive until it becomes possible for them to go home. Until then, according to Muarem Khadzhik, they are totally helpless, and the only hope they have is that Sarajevo will soon be liberated soon and they will be able to return to their families. According to Sava Ivic, from Visegrad, who came to Katlanovo several days ago with her child, the most difficult part of her life is to go to Skopje every day and ask the new refugees for news from Visegrad about her entire family, which was left behind. It would be of some help, she says, to establish some kind of radio contact with Visegrad because, given the current situation, nothing is known. The most recent refugees to arrive left that city one month ago and are bringing conflicting news, and the people are exhausted from lack of news and concern for their families. Here we are treated decently, her neighbor Safeta says. It is only that the children are short of milk and vegetables. We hope to be able to get soap and detergent. With such moving from place to place, everyone, the children most of all, are exposed to the danger of contagious diseases. As to the rest, we shall survive somewhat, the good thing being that here everything is peaceful and our demands are modest, the middle-aged woman added.

It is only the youngest children who have no worry in that reception center. They waste away the time running barefoot. The adults are burdened with the concerns and problems of refugees, but, as they say, they are sustained by the hope that their Sarajevo and the other cities will be free and that things will slowly return to normal.

Meanwhile, the number of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina seeking shelter in Macedonia is growing. The sanctions against Yugoslavia, worsened by threats and the fears of the Bosnian population, are bringing new refugees into our country, and, for most of them, there is nowhere else to go. It is fear for their very lives that make them illegally cross state borders, and little remains of the decision by the Republic's government to selectively accept only mothers with children, the elderly, and the sick. Following the decision of the health inspectorate to close down the main Dare Dzhambaz reception center, where, for several days on end, groups of 200-300 adults slept on the floor, which created a serious threat of outbreak of contagious diseases, in the past few days there has been no place for the refugees to turn to and seek aid. The Red Cross people are only helplessly shrugging their shoulders, saying that, until the government, through its Commission on Refugees, opens a new reception center, nothing can be done to place the new refugee groups.

Declaration of Macedonian Assembly on EC Decision
92BA1208A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 4 Jul 92 p 2

[Declaration of the Republic of Macedonia Assembly by President of the Assembly Stoyan Andov in Skopje on 1 July 1992]

[Text] On the basis of Article 68, Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia discussing the Declaration of the European Council of the European Community concerning the former Yugoslavia, adopted in Lisbon on 27 June 1992, in the part that relates to the Republic of Macedonia, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, at the meeting held on 1 July 1992, passed the following

DECLARATION

1. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia considers to be unacceptable and rejects the part of the declaration of the European Council of the European Community concerning former Yugoslavia, adopted in Lisbon on 27 June 1992, that relates to the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia "with a name that will not include the term 'Macedonia.'"

With the adoption of this position, at least temporarily, a precedent with exceptionally serious international consequences was set.

2. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia welcomes the part of the declaration that guarantees the borders of the Republic of Macedonia and its inviolability in agreement with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Paris Charter.

3. With the transfer of its share of the sovereignty in the Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the right of self-determination, the Republic of Macedonia becomes an international subject with a clearly expressed and recognized name, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and, as such a subject, it is an equal legal heir of the SFRY, accepted at the Conference for Yugoslavia of the EC and in its documents.

4. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, with the declaration of 17 September 1991, confirmed the will of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, expressed by the referendum of 8 September of the same year, in which they defined themselves as an independent and sovereign state under the name of Macedonia, which also is expressed in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, adopted on 17 November 1991. In these documents, it is emphasized that the Republic of Macedonia will endeavor to see to it that the principles of international relations contained in the documents of the United Nations, the final document from Helsinki, and the Paris Charter of the CSCE are respected consistently.

5. For the legitimacy and justification of its request based on the Declaration for International Recognition, the Republic of Macedonia received and officially confirmed the report of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia and the EC, in which the position is stated that "the Republic of Macedonia implements the conditions of the directions for recognizing the new countries in East Europe and in the Soviet Union and, from the declaration concerning Yugoslavia,

adopted by the Council of the EC on 16 December 1991," as well as the statement that "the use of the name Macedonia does not contain any territorial pretensions toward another country."

6. The name Macedonia is a basis for the name of a people, the Macedonian people, who represent a majority in this state, and its denial discriminates against this people and the nationalities that live with them. This denial does not help in providing a peaceful and stable comprehensive development of the Republic of Macedonia and maintaining its sovereignty and independence, ensured in a peaceful and democratic way.

7. The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia insists and seeks from the EC as well as from the wider international community, the CSCE, and the UN and its members, that the Republic of Macedonia be recognized internationally, with its name and in the existing borders.

8. This Declaration is to be published in SLUZHBN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA.

Serbia's Laws on Health Protection Inefficient

92BA1274A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
25 Jul 92 p 15

[Article by Olivera Popovic: "The Operation Was Successful, But the Health Service Died"]

[Text] The Serbian health service, with less than \$25 per capita for annual health care, has seen itself compared ingloriously with some of the poorest African countries. It is not easy to find a word of justification for a government that has not managed to prevent the collapse of the health service with energetic moves and to slow down its descent to the last rung on the ladder, although, to be fair, the Serbian health service was not prospering even before this government took office.

Nevertheless, during the 250 days of the Radoman Bozovic government, the health service has experienced the most difficult days in its history. Everything seems to have higher priority than the nation's health, although in all the hospitals and health institutions the alarm bells have been ringing for a long time and dramatic warnings have been coming in to the effect that the physicians no longer have what they need for treatment.

The Story About Copayment

Health-care workers have been called upon to economize, but they have tightened their belt to the last hole. No more can be done in that direction. Inventories are exhausted. The list of patients in jeopardy is getting longer and longer.

More than 400 patients with transplanted kidneys have been waiting day by day for the drug that means life to them. There are no drugs, no anesthetics, no oxygenates for heart operations, solutions for dialysis, bandages, hypodermic syringes, and other medical supplies....

Patients are dying waiting for a pacemaker. There have been cases when for an entire month patients have not had a meat ration on their hospital plate, bread delivery has been stopped to the largest hospital complex, telephone service has been cut off to hospitals.... Top-flight medicine is a forgotten concept.

What has Radoman Bozovic's government done for the health service? The Law on Health Care and the Law on Health Insurance and certain pieces of legislation to implement them have been enacted. A systematic reform has been announced in the health service. Finally, there have been promises of long-term solutions to the problems in the health service. It is true that an effort has been made here, but the health service's situation has been getting worse with every passing day. As they say, "the operation was successful, but the patient died."

Literally overnight, as if cut by a sharp knife, a decision of Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic did away with copayment. It is true that in some cases copayment was a heavy tax for impoverished people, but copayment is more than a necessary part of the system of health care, properly measured and adjusted, of course. The copayments were eliminated, but health institutions were not compensated for the loss of those funds. Over the last three months, there has been a tug-of-war several times over restoring copayments in meetings of the government. Last week, they were in fact restored, declaratively to be sure, because they do not go into effect until the sanctions are removed.

The long-awaited Law on Health Care and Health Insurance also failed to fulfill many expectations of medical personnel. The criticism is that the law (and in particular the Network for Optimalization of Serbia's Health Institutions) has turned the health service into a public department, and reduced health-care personnel to the rank of civil servants. In those same health-care institutions, every pill that is taken and every bandage used is paid for at market prices. On a market that has less and less understanding for the troubles of the health service. The law that prevails here is—first pay, then treatment.

The Long-Awaited Rescue

The diverse forms of insurance envisaged by the law are simply not taking on life. Instead of 1 May, the Health Insurance Bureau of Serbia will, they say, be established next week. Adoption of measures for financial rescue in the health service was also long awaited. Had those measures been taken in April, as was agreed, perhaps the bottom would not have been reached in May. The government boasted that it had adopted the program of financial rescue measures, but the top people in the large medical centers in Serbia say that even yesterday they had not seen that financial rescue program.

Nevertheless, the present government is receiving the greatest amount of criticism because it has been unjustifiably impeding adoption of the Law on the Chamber of Physicians. Instead of a well-prepared law on the chamber being adopted in a package with the other laws,

it still does not exist, although it is urgently needed. Physicians, whether they belong to the incumbent party or the opposition or are uncommitted as to party, are, of course, the most embittered by this. It seems incredible that the government is refusing to transfer some of its rights and powers to the Chamber of Physicians, without which it is not possible to organize the health service in an up-to-date way. Is the state so afraid of losing power to a better systematized and organized health service such as we undoubtedly could expect from the chamber?

More and more frequently the government is leaving many "hot potatoes" in the health-care system to inertia, and nothing, it is clear, can be worked out that way. The physicians are losing patience. The first in a series of roundtable discussions of physicians representing the government and the opposition has been organized on the initiative of the Serbian Medical Society. Serbia also now has the Independent Trade Union of Physicians. We hear more and more frequently that the government and its Health Ministry do not enjoy the support of a majority of physicians. The situation in the health service, incidentally, has been specifically highlighted by the resignation offered several times by the minister of health. Some of the ideas with which he has been attempting in these difficult times to at least put out the fires will more and more obviously be overwhelmed by collapse.

New FRY Veterans Association Established

92BA1274C Belgrade *POLITIKA* in Serbo-Croatian
25 Jul 92 p 5

[Article by M. Nikic: "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Federation of Associations of Fighters in the National Liberation War Established"]

[Text] The Federation of Associations of Fighters in the National Liberation War [SUBNOR] of Yugoslavia will hereafter operate on the territory of the FRY [Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia] as a federation of independent SUBNOR organizations of Serbia and Montenegro. Yesterday, the Federal Committee of the FRY SUBNOR was established in the headquarters of the Serbian SUBNOR in Belgrade. The new federal veterans' committee consists of 12 members elected from the veterans' associations of each of the two republics. General Velizar Skerovic was elected chairman of the Federal Committee, and Gen. Slavoljub Petrovic its secretary.

The transformation of the old veterans' organization occurred, members of the SUBNOR presidencies of Serbia and Montenegro explained, because it was no longer possible to work in the former structure. With the establishment of the new states on the territory of what until yesterday was Yugoslavia, the republic committees from Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] withdrew from SUBNOR. They have since that time operated independently.

"Members of the veterans' associations of Serbia and Montenegro want to continue to nurture the achievements of SUBNOR on the territory of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Especially because the new state on whose territory they are operating has been exposed to pressures and now even sanctions to subordinate it to the interests of Germany, the United States, and their obedient followers. We want to offer support to the federal Assembly, to the government, and to the president of the FRY," said Dusan Lazic, president of the previous Presidency of the Federal Committee of SUBNOR of Yugoslavia.

In the founding meeting, it was said that the veterans' organization of the FRY would be collaborating with organizations of veterans of the National Liberation War from the previous republics of the SFRY, veterans of the war in 1990-91 and the wars between 1912 and 1918.

An assembly of the new SUBNOR will be held before the end of the year to adopt a programmatic declaration and bylaws and to elect new bodies.

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