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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Russian Parliament Report on CFE Impact on Forces

924P0154A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Jul 92 pp 1, 2

["Report by the Center for National Security and International Relations of the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (Abbreviated Account)": "Conventional Arms Treaty: Consequences for Russia"]

[Text] The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was prepared during the course of negotiations which began in Vienna in March 1989 among delegations of 23 countries (16 NATO countries and seven Warsaw Pact countries) and was signed by the heads of 22 states (the number of participants decreased because of the unification of Germany) in Paris at a meeting of the heads of states participating in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] in November 1990.

The mandate of the negotiations and the structure of the treaty were initially set up on the basis of the task of achieving strict quantitative parity in the basic categories of conventional nonnuclear weapons by the two military-political alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

...Now the goal is no longer the achievement of parity between the opposing military-political groupings but a safe and stable balance of conventional weapons with a significant reduction of their numbers in Europe. Additionally, the agreement set the task of eliminating the dangerous imbalances and asymmetry in those categories of conventional arms which determine the possibility of a sudden attack and large-scale offensive operations.

According to the CFE Treaty, five categories of conventional arms are subject to limitation: tanks, BBM's [armored combat vehicles], large-caliber (100 millimeters and more) cannon artillery and salvo fire systems, combat aircraft, and strike helicopters for fire support.

The most important feature of the CFE Treaty is the division of the territory of Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) into zones with their own sublevels of maximum quantities of arms. The construction of these zones proceeded according to the nested-doll principle, whereby each succeeding expansion includes the preceding part as a constituent element...

Since the conditions for the agreement were formulated in such a way as to make it possible to move arms from the "center to the periphery" without violating the total quantitative restrictions and to prohibit such moves in the reverse direction, this plays a certain stabilizing role in the Central European strategic area. But this approach could also become unproductive in the flanking areas,

and therefore the treaty specifies separate quantitative restrictions on the flanking zone. Without being subdivided into northern and southern parts, it includes the territories of Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, Norway, Romania, part of Turkey, and the Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and the Odessa and Leningrad military districts.

As can be seen from Table 1, before the signing of the treaty about 70,000 units of arms or an average of about 100 units each day were transferred beyond the Urals. According to information from the Ministry of Defense, 4,000 tanks were written off for scrap metal, remade into auxiliary vehicles, or sent for export. About 8,000 tanks, mainly modern models, were sent to re-arm units beyond the Urals. Approximately the same number are to be either destroyed or re-equipped for the national economy.

The political disintegration of the USSR, that is, the appearance of a number of new independent states in the zone in which the treaty is in effect, also makes the implementation of the CFE Treaty problematic. There has arisen a need to transform the quotas formulated for the military districts in the European part of the USSR into quantitative restrictions for states whose borders practically nowhere coincide with the borders of the military districts. This work culminated with the signing in Tashkent of a document on the division of Soviet quotas of the CFE Treaty among the European states of the CIS.

As can be seen from Table 2, the division of the Soviet quota of the CFE Treaty among European states of the CIS does not encroach upon the interests of the security of Russia. In terms of armored equipment and artillery, it receives 1.5-2 times higher ceilings than its closest partner, Ukraine, and in terms of combat aircraft and strike helicopters, this ratio is approximately 3:1 in favor of the Russian Federation. Of the overall quotas for the European part of the USSR, Russia receives 48 percent of the tanks, 57 percent of the BBM's, 48 percent of the artillery systems, 67 percent of the combat aircraft, and 59 percent of the strike helicopters. Taking into account the considerable potential of combat equipment in the Asiatic part of Russia, one can say with confidence that the Tashkent agreement creates no imbalances that endanger Russian interests.

At the same time it should be noted that the question of distribution of the financial and technical participation of the CIS states in the implementation of the CFE Treaty is still open. One can assume that Russia will have to take on all the financial and technical burden of this process, which can hardly be called fair.

Conclusions

1. ...The elimination of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union have led to a situation where our share, that is, Russia's share, will be approximately 15 percent of all the arms in Europe (as compared to the 50-60 percent the Soviet Union had).

3. ...In reality the USSR and its allies had a two- to three-fold superiority over NATO in terms of the main kinds of arms (with the exception of helicopters). Therefore 90 percent of all cuts are for the former USSR and other members of the former Warsaw Pact.

... 5. The CFE Treaty is the only basis for any further steps for the creation of a Europe-wide security system... In essence, today the treaty is the only legal document and the only real instrument making it possible to prevent an arms race among the states of the CIS.

6. The implementation of the Treaty for Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Tashkent agreement concerning the division of the Soviet quota according to the treaty among the former Soviet republics means a repeated reduction of the main grouping of former Soviet troops stationed in Europe (for example, for tanks—eightfold). That is, with respect to ground forces Russia can have several times fewer forces (20-25 divisions) than the USSR. The time period for the implementation of the treaty (40 months) does not leave us time for a prolonged reduction and a radical reorganization of the armed forces Russia has today.

The time periods and levels established by the treaty preclude leaving the present grouping of Russian forces for a long time on the territory of the Baltic States and a number of other former Soviet republics. The withdrawal and stationing of a large part of these troops on the territory of Russia will not only require colossal means but also could lead to a situation where we violate the international commitments we have made under the CFE Treaty and the Tashkent agreement. Consequently, these troops basically will have to be reformed either in the places where they are currently stationed outside Russia or as they return to Russia.

7. The scale of the armed forces cutbacks envisioned by the treaty requires the immediate adoption of a state-wide program for social provisions for military servicemen. Since it would be pointless to retain in the armed forces personnel without arms or even barracks, in the next few months it will be necessary to carry out a reduction of the armed forces and take measures to provide housing, occupational retraining, and labor placement for up to 500,000 officers and warrant officers.

One should also take into account that Russia is not in a position to provide a contingent of recruits for the current armed forces. In order to avoid a situation in which we would have hundreds of thousands of "superfluous" military servicemen and at the same time have military units that are not staffed, it is necessary to give priority to the most rapid organization of the military service on a contractual basis.

8. Deprived of a quantitative advantage in conventional arms, Russia can successfully carry out further military construction only under the condition that there is a real reorientation to qualitative parameters of military equipment and arms...

9. The geopolitical situation and balance of military forces Russia will encounter as a result of the implementation of the Paris Treaty and the Tashkent agreement require intensification of the efforts of Russian diplomacy in its search for reliable and strong partners and allies. Both in the former Soviet republics (above all Ukraine and Byelarus, which account for about 45 percent of the former Soviet conventional arms quota) and in the United States and other NATO countries.

Thus the ratification of the CFE Treaty and its implementation are fully in keeping with the interests of Russia and will contribute to strengthening its security.

Quantity of USSR Conventional Arms in Europe

Category of Arms	Declared by the Committee of Ministries of Defense of the Warsaw Pact as of 1 Jul 88	Indicated at signing of treaty as of 18 Nov 90	Levels under treaty
Tanks	41,580	20,725	13,300
BBM's	57,800*	29,890	20,000
Artillery systems	42,400	13,938	13,700
Combat aircraft	3,682	6,611	5,150
Strike helicopters**	2,200	1,481	1,500

*The Warsaw Pact declaration indicated 45,000 BBM's.

**The Warsaw Pact declaration gave data on "combat helicopters."

Soviet Quota Section of the CFE Treaty among European CIS States

	Russia	Ukraine	Byelarus	Moldova	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Flanks	
								Russia	Ukraine
Tanks	6,400	4,080	1,800	210	220	220	220	1,300	280
(including for storage)	1,425	950	275					600	400
BBM's	11,480	5,050	2,600	210	220	220	220	1,380	350
(including for storage)	995	700	425	130	135	135	135	800	
Artillery systems	6,415	4,040	1,615	250	285	285	285	1,680	—
(including for storage)	1,310	800	240						
Combat Aircraft	3,450	1,090	260	50	100	100	100	—	—
Strike helicopters	890	330	80	50	50	50	50	—	—
Naval aircraft	300	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

CIS: POLICY

Russian Government's Problems in Forming Defense Budget

92UM1268A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by Yefim Lyuboshits, International Conversion Fund; and Vitaliy Tsymbal, Center for International and Military-Political Research, Russian-American University, in the "Analysis" column: "Forming Russia's Defense Budget: Foreign Experience Not Our Own"]

[Text] Russia, in finally abandoning its fruitless attempt to retain the USSR Armed Forces under the banner of the CIS Unified Forces, became one of the last of the former "brotherly" republics to undertake the creation of its own Army and Navy.

A subsequent and highly important aspect of the situation involves dealing with financial and logistical planning for Russia's Armed Forces. The reality here of course is that an attempt to maintain that kind of forces at a level suitable to the status of a great power is an "extra" that carries a high price.

It cannot be said that the defense budget of the country (the former USSR, now, its legal successor—Russia) is of no concern to anyone. There were quite a few attempts made to analyze military expenditures and write about this subject during the perestroyka years. Everyone is well aware of what is going on. For example, about the fact that the information on the USSR's military expenditures published up to 1989 constituted an outright and foolish lie. It was impossible to maintain military parity with the USA by spending 17 to 20 billion rubles a year against the 250 to 300 billion dollars expended by the USA. However, further discussions and estimates presented by our publicists have been characterized by a glaring lack of agreement.

Even with the USSR government's 1990 submission, for the first time, to the U.N. of something that was obligatory for members of that organization, the "Document on Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures," there was little that came to light.

In spite of explanations supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, the amount of expenditures for 1989—amounting to 78.1 billion rubles—was a cause of distrust of the report. Comparison of expenditures for the purchase of weapons in the two great powers—the USSR and the USA—rendered it difficult to understand why the cost of comparable weapons systems in the USSR (in rubles) was lower by a factor of from 6 to 14 compared to that in the USA (in dollars). There was also lack of agreement between many other figures, such as that pertaining to military expenditures as part of the country's total budget and the gross national product (GNP). Coming later were "more accurate" military budget estimates. This in absolute amounts was up to 200 billion rubles and more; as a part of the GNP, up to 15% (in the foreign country), even as much as 25% (in the lobbies of the Supreme Soviet, a topic written about by G. Trofimenko). What other country can have this level of expenditures (which usually do not exceed 7%) and such manifest differences in estimates?

A noteworthy feature of the discussion that developed was the kind of persons involved. Participants included military professionals (S. Akhromeyev, D. Yazov, and M. Moiseyev); an engineer and naturalist (Yu. Ryzhov); a group specializing in foreign studies (the Arbatovs - father and son; G. Trofimenko, S. Rogov, and others); and American economist I. Birman. And the writers of this article, who work in technical sciences, until recently involved in military research. Take special note of the following: There was not a single piece of writing in which the author could truthfully claim to be, or be known to others, as a specialist (theoretical or practical) on the defense budget of the USSR. Even now, there is neither hide nor hair of anyone claiming to specialize in the defense budget of Russia. Why is this so?

The answer to the above question is quite simple. We need do nothing more than pick up the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary published in 1983. Here we can see how the concept of "military budget" was defined. We read that this is "part of the state budget of capitalist countries, used for direct military expenditures. The size and structure of the military budget reflect the policy of bourgeois countries and the processes associated with military preparations." That is the end of the quote, in the expression employed by television commentators. Since the USSR was neither capitalist nor bourgeois, then, in the thinking of our ideologists, it could not have had a military budget. The slogan "Everything for the struggle against Denikin!" prevalent during the Civil War became the "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" of the Great Patriotic War, and it continued to enjoy an artificial existence in the postwar years. Nothing was to be spared to "protect the gains of socialism" and the "victory of socialism throughout the world"! That is what happened. If someone is naive enough to believe that there was such a thing as a clearly defined USSR military budget, but that it was kept hidden, then it is time to drop this illusion. Expenditures for military needs were hidden among figures relating to the national economy, with many defense industry enterprises "writing off" the construction of kindergartens and boarding houses as part of work performed in the interests of the country's defense. The dachas and hunting lodges erected also "in the interests of the country's defense" served only to exacerbate the profound chaos reigning in the USSR's defense economy. And how much voluntarism there was when it came to setting prices for defense and nondefense production! And so, it is useless to search for the truth about the defense budget in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee, the Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR, and in other departments. Some figures can and undoubtedly should be brought out for purposes of history. However, in general, it is not possible to reconstruct that which constituted the defense budget of the USSR.

Since there "never was" a USSR defense budget, there likewise were no specialists in this area. But speaking of the military budget of the USA, well, that is a different matter! In our country there are quite a few specialists in this area, and this includes A. Kokoshin, the new first deputy defense minister of Russia. This being the case, no problems are foreseen relative to possessing a knowledge of the military expenditures of the USA in the domain of Russia's Ministry of Defense. When the matter becomes one of defense budget and expenditures of Russia, the going is still much more difficult.

It seems to the writers of this article that the experience of the last few years bears witness to the fact that it is not permissible to place Russia's defense budget under the purview of any particular departments, regardless of how democratic the heads of these departments may be. What is required is external supervision, exercised from the outside, the kind that is independent.

It so happens that in this civilized - as now referred to - world, there has come about a division of areas of responsibility relative to the state's defense budget. An executive authority prepares a draft bill, while a legislative authority performs a review, then approves and supervises the implementation.

There can be no doubt that Russia's Ministry of Defense and other structures of the country's executive authority can gather together the particular kinds of specialists required to prepare a draft defense budget. The trouble is, no one has any desire for any supervisors to keep watch over it.

However, is the Supreme Soviet of Russia in a position to bring sufficient qualifications to bear on the draft of a military (defense) budget if such is submitted? Is it in a position to introduce necessary changes and perform an approval with confidence? The most obvious rule to follow, so to speak, that of the recommendation "do it the same way as the USA," can result in a fatal error. And the cause of the error will be embarrassingly simple.

Yes, the American system of "planning, programming, and development of the budget" is reasonable and effective, the same as virtually everything else that is American. That system, in combination with other factors, was the very one that helped the Americans win the Cold War. But that war is over. However, the finely-tuned machinery that was possibly optimum for waging a cold war continues to operate as before, but it is no longer suitable for the new conditions.

The principal conclusion one must arrive at here is that the machinery for formulating military expenditures must be changed in both the superpowers: In Russia, where the old machinery is falling apart of its own accord, and in the United States of America, where the euphoria associated with winning the Cold War is in no way conducive to dismantling the war machine, which has become so beloved by the military-industrial complex.

It will be necessary for Russia to cut its own budgetary path in the postconfrontational world! Of course, everything that has been useful in our own experience (which did have something to offer, after all) and in the foreign planning experience must be retained. In particular, we can borrow the following: First, the sliding annual planning; the programming and development of the budget, in place of our fixed five-year plans, the execution of which was mandatory, even if no need existed, with the reason for this being the changed military and political situation; second, the intensive method of weapons and military equipment development, with its emphasis on the timely creation of a scientific and technical base.

There undoubtedly will be other borrowings. There however will be unavoidable and substantial differences. Principal among the differences will be the following. The major portion of the estimates entering into forming the defense budget should not be based on models of wars (operations), but rather on models of mutual

restraint for peacetime. And the criteria (the principal ones!) should not be associated with victory over a "probable adversary," but with prevention of every kind of war and the assurance of international (and, concurrently, national) security.

The above must not be employed as an argument for denial of estimates based on war models with various scenarios. However, these estimates should be of an auxiliary nature, one which provides a justification of essential military expenditures as required by the principal criterion.

In addition, the change to the abovementioned new kind of approach to justifying a defense budget should proceed directly from the Supreme Soviet, from the chosen representatives of the people—those who carry the messages of the hopes and interests of the peoples in the Russian Federation.

The first step in this direction is special passage by the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Decree on Military Policy Priorities of the Russian Federation. In world practice—the USA, for example—it is not Congress that sets the priorities, but rather the President, who acts on the basis of information prepared by executive branch bodies. However, what can be done if these bodies in our country have dragged out for a very long time the matter of creating our own Armed Forces of Russia, of devising a concept of the country's national security? The decree passed may possess certain shortcomings, as pointed out by specialists, but the fact that it was published is of paramount military and political significance. Why is it not possible to take the announced priorities, and—to use a phrase from the recent past—have them assume a basis, one which is also applicable to forming of the defense budget?

The time lost due to slow action on the part of government agencies has also had an adverse effect in another area. The military budget may be compiled quarterly, and done so in a truncated form, but it is compiled. In addition, a temporary procedure to be followed by executive bodies in the formation process has been established. But what procedure is to apply relative to budgetary review and approval?

The position of the executive authority is clear: The narrower the authority wielded by the Supreme Soviet, the simpler the action of defending any draft budget during the review process.

The above being the case, the initiative of developing proposals for tasking and for a procedure applicable to scrutiny of the defense budget by the Supreme Soviet could be made a reality only by nongovernmental agencies, by independent specialists. That is how it came about.

The above problems prompted the International Conversion Fund (ICF) to propose an initiative. The fund's specialists were guided by the abovementioned considerations pertaining to the country's defense budget, and

also by the fact that the volume and time frames of conversion are closely associated with that budget. The ICF organized its Council on Conversion of the Armed Forces and the Defense Industry, and it provided the Supreme Soviet with an offer to participate in the development of a procedure for forming and furnishing other expertise relative to the defense budget. The offer was accepted by the committee and the commission of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet headed by, respectively, Russian people's deputies S. N. Krasavchenko and A. P. Pochinok. Thus, the Supreme Soviet's requirements and the capabilities of independent experts intersected.

The reader should not gain the impression that government specialists harbor an ulterior motive in their avoidance of involvement in defining the position to be occupied by the Supreme Soviet. This is simply a matter of their bearing a great number of other burdens. The Interdepartmental Analysis Center, recently organized by the government and engaged in seeking a solution to the problem of compiling the defense budget, welcomed the opportunity of working with the ICF. Also joining the effort were specialists of another nondepartmental organization—the Center for International and Military-Political Research of the Russian-American University (RAU).

Progress is being made in overcoming a highly significant administrative and psychological barrier—secrecy. The people should know where the defense money is going. The major items in the defense budget should be unclassified, with the exception of a limited portion of expenditures for the research, development, production, and employment of fundamentally new military technology or of tasks of paramount importance, such as intelligence. These expenditures should also be subjected to supervision, only in this case of course by a small group of Russian people's deputies and experts.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

[ERRATUM: In JPRS-UMA-92-029 of 5 August 1992 in the article: "Communicators: In Order to Withstand Enemy Electronic Surveillance" on page 8, column 2, paragraph five, the formula should read $\Delta Z=7(1+V)$, where $0 < V \leq 2$ $12.95+20\lg V$, with $V > 2$, (4). On page 9 in Program 2 under the Address 17 Command column, the data should read $Fx < 0$ instead of $Fx0$.]

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Chernavin Clarifies Ownership of Navy's Ships
92UM1350A Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 23 (1664), 5-11 Jun 92 p 4

[Interview with Admiral Chernavin, commander of the CIS navy, under the rubric "Events and Assessments";

reverse translation from *CORRIERE DELLA SERA*, Milan: "Admiral Chernavin: 'We Have Not Stopped Building Ships'"

[Text]

[Question] Mr. Admiral, you command the CIS navy and the Russian naval banner stands in your office, but your ships continue to fly the Soviet flag. Ukraine and Russia are presently engaged in talks on the division of the Black Sea Fleet. To whom does the fleet actually belong?

[Chernavin] I command the Black Sea Fleet. The ships belong to Russia, though. According to the praxis and doctrine of international law, you see, a warship has to belong to one certain state. Furthermore, it is considered to be part of that state's territory, and any encroachment, hostile act or attack upon that warship is regarded as a violation of the territorial integrity of the state to which the ship belongs. When we speak of the Black Sea Fleet, we have in mind the CIS navy. The CIS is not a state, however, but a Commonwealth of Independent States. This is why the ships belong to Russia today, but they could also become Ukrainian when there is a Ukrainian navy.

[Question] Nonetheless, Ukraine maintains that some of the ships belong to it.

[Chernavin] All of the ships presently belong to Russia. Some of them could be transferred to Ukraine as a result of bilateral talks. For now we have agreed only that a decision must be found within the framework of bilateral talks and that while the talks are underway both sides should refrain from unilateral initiatives.

[Question] Is it true that you have removed all nuclear weapons from the Black Sea Fleet? What is the point in having submarines and missile cruisers without nuclear warheads?

[Chernavin] Yes, by 6 May all of the nuclear weapons in the Black Sea Fleet had been removed to Russian territory. Delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons are multipurpose, however. They can also carry conventional charges. We still maintain that the Black Sea Fleet is part of the strategic forces, however—not because it is armed with nuclear weapons but because it is assigned certain military missions.

[Question] This is an important problem. From the beginning the Soviet navy performed global missions and was prepared for action on any part of the planet. How have the Russian navy's strategic missions changed now that the USSR no longer exists and Russia is not striving to be a world superpower?

[Chernavin] With respect to our strategic interests, I would remind you that Russia has always been a naval power, even before the USSR existed. The length of our maritime borders greatly exceeds that of our land borders, and the nation's economy has always involved maritime shipping. Therefore we must have a navy

capable of guarding our naval lines of communication and protecting our interests wherever this is necessary. Such a navy exists. It would be incorrect to speak of a constriction of its strategic objectives.

Nonetheless, our activities have been altered considerably recently. But only as a consequence of geopolitical changes in our country and our internal problems. The changes were influenced primarily by changes in the world situation, particularly the disarmament agreements signed jointly with the USA or in the stage of development. The number of missile-carrying submarines patrolling the world oceans was drastically reduced, for example. Naval exercises have begun to be conducted far more rarely, particularly in remote waters.

[Question] What about the Mediterranean? You still have bases there.

[Chernavin] We never had on-shore bases in the Mediterranean. We have still maintained a constant and fairly considerable presence with our ships in the area, however. We now have a rotation system. We do not have a constant presence there today. Sometimes we concentrate ships there; at times there is not a single ship of ours there. This does not mean, however, that we are departing the Mediterranean and halting our operations in the area.

[Question] How do you deal with the enormous cost of maintaining a powerful navy? Newspapers have reported that you have halted the construction of new ships and begun selling off existing ones. You sold Iran an order of submarines, for example.

[Chernavin] The navy does not engage in commercial dealings or the sale of its own ships. The submarines sold to Iran were built at our shipyards specifically for that country under an order from Teheran. With respect to the cost of maintaining the navy, it is indeed great, especially today, when the economic situation in the CIS is extremely unstable. I am confident, however, that these are temporary difficulties and the situation will improve. Russia has been and remains a great nation with a powerful industry and considerable material and technical resources. Right now we are experiencing a drop in production, which is reflected also in the launching of new warships. We must convert our economy. This certainly does not mean that we have halted shipbuilding, however.

Today an Officer—Tomorrow a Manager

92UM1310B Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 p 20

[Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Grishantsov and Captain 1st Rank A. Shapochkin: "Today an Officer—Tomorrow a Manager"]

[Text] A considerable number of officers will be discharged from the ranks of the army and navy in connection with the cutbacks in the armed forces, and questions

will arise for each of them: how to live now, what to do, how to find oneself under the conditions of civilian life today? Uncertainty, lack of confidence in tomorrow and anxiety concerning the future of the family—these and other disturbing feelings could destroy the spiritual equilibrium of even the most steadfast person.

The officer taking off his shoulder boards, however, need not despair. Organizations ready to come to his aid have already been created. One of them is the All-Russian Center for the Retraining of Officers Being Discharged into the Reserves (ACRO). The center appeared as the result of efforts by the Coordinating Council on Problems of Retraining Officers of the government of the Russian Federation. A considerable portion of the officers, having received the appropriate training, will find application for their abilities in the sphere of business and in commercial and state structures thanks to the ACRO.

The leadership of the Russian Federation considers officers to be a significant reserve in solving many of the problems of Russia. High professional training, responsibility, discipline and ability to work with people are indispensable features of the Russian officer. They will be evaluated according to their merits under the new conditions, and will provide an impetus for the development of state and commercial enterprises. It is no accident that businessmen and managers from among former officers enjoy a quite high reputation in foreign countries.

The mass media have already been reporting on the actual results of the activity of ACRO. It has experience in the retraining of officers. That experience has been analyzed, and recommendations for organizational practices and methodology have been devised. A group of 40 officers who had been discharged into the reserves completed training in the field of "manager" at the beginning of March of this year based on the Russian Economic Academy imeni G.V. Plekhanov. Having received diplomas of an international type, they all found jobs, and moreover occupy prestigious positions in commercial structures that include joint ventures in Moscow and Moscow Oblast. The graduation of another group (97 former officers) took place on April 9 at the Moscow Institute of Radio and Electronic Gear.

The ACRO acceptance commission made the selection for the next training group, larger in composition, on a competitive basis. The range of fields offered was also expanded. ACRO began the retraining of officers in such fields as "social work," "tax inspection" and "market economics" in April of this year based on the Economic Management Institute. The ACRO is taking steps to organize evening training based on one of the higher educational institutions of Moscow, taking into account the large number of those wishing to complete the course of training.

The activity of ACRO is not limited to the region of Moscow and Moscow Oblast alone. The issue of creating

a widespread network of branches of the center across the entire territory of Russia (Murmansk, Ufa, Ulyanovsk, Novosibirsk, Tver...) is being decided.

The leadership of the navy was the first to respond to the ACRO proposal to create a Northwestern Branch at Kronstadt and a Southern Branch at Rostov-na-Donu. More than 70 naval officers planned for discharge into the reserves in 1992 will complete the training course in the field of "manager" starting April 1 of this year. A great deal of work has been done to prepare the branches for the training process, and programs have been developed whose content meets international standards. The attendees at the courses obtain knowledge of finance and credit, marketing, management and foreign economic activity.

The training will be conducted by the professional-instruction staff of leading higher educational institutions in St. Petersburg and Rostov-na-Donu.

The ACRO will remain true to its principles as before—free training, the issue of a prestigious diploma, and job placement for attendees who complete the course of training successfully.

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Disputes Surrounding Aircraft-Carrying Ships

92UM1310D Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 pp 49-52

[Article by Rear-Admiral (Reserve) V. Kharko under the rubric "Questions of Theory": "Is the Question of Aircraft-Carrying Ships the Topic of Disputes Today?"]

[Text] A series of articles about aircraft-carrying ships¹ published in the journal MORSKOY SBORNIK in reply to features by "specialists" newly brought to light in the naval realm leaves a dual impression.

Familiarity with the various opinions of specialists taking part in preparing materials for decision-making on the fate of aircraft-carrying ships in our fleet, on the one hand, is undoubtedly of interest to the military reader, who has not been spoiled with such information even in our times.

On the other hand, returning the reader to the period of official debates on this issue, the authors for some reason do not specify that by the middle of the 1980s it was namely those structures in the former Ministry of Defense and General Staff that had earlier opposed the construction of aircraft-carrying ships that had changed their minds and, along with the specialists of the navy, substantiated and supported the adoption of long-term plans figured for the period to the year 2000 for their construction—which, by the way, did not quite signify the victory of the "proponents," and the defeat of the "opponents," of aircraft-carrying ships. No, this was the consequence of an evolution of views on a number of issues constituting the military doctrine of the state,

caused by the appearance of tasks of an operational-strategic level and conditions for their fulfillment in the theaters of military operations for which the use of aircraft-carrying ships was becoming not only well-founded, but even essential. We will try to fill in that gap and, insofar as we are talking about aircraft-carrying ships with full-fledged carrier-based fighters, we will call them aircraft carriers for the sake of brevity.

As a start we will analyze the arguments put forth by the authors of the features, and they can be reduced to two principal conclusions.

The first conclusion is that the missions given to the fleet are performed with the essential effectiveness only with the presence of aircraft carriers in the composition of various groups of forces, which should increase the ability of those groups of forces to withstand the effects of enemy means of surface attack to a significant extent, as well as to perform the functions of the forward edge of the country's air defenses from maritime sectors.

The second conclusion is that no other arms systems are able to perform these functions with the effectiveness of aircraft carriers.

These conclusions are substantiated via a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of fulfillment of operational-tactical missions by various groups of fleet forces with an aircraft carrier and without one—the destruction of enemy aircraft carriers in a naval battle and the waging of antisubmarine [ASW] operations. It is obvious even without the performance of calculations, however, that the presence of air cover increases a group's effectiveness in the performance of missions and ability to resist in combat.

The second conclusion is drawn without using a computational model of an alternative version for providing air cover for diverse groupings of naval forces. The authors limit themselves, in this variation, just to the assertion that land-based aviation becomes ineffective due to the unacceptable cost of its performance of the mission when the depth of the coverage zone of fleet forces is greater than 250 km [kilometers].

The results of these calculations, however, are not as pessimistic if we discard the requirements of "operations continuous in time," "unrestricted flight time" and "independence from the weather." We moreover read that "...the areas of fighter cover for fleet forces should moreover be designated chiefly outside the reach of land-based fighters for the aircraft-carrying ships. The ships themselves should be located, as a rule, in the area where our forces have supremacy..." The authors presumably understand that zone to include air supremacy as well. The assertion is completely justified, and we must give credit to F. Matveychuk, V. Babiy and V. Potvorov, who could not fail to point out this detail of no small importance in the principles of the employment of aircraft carriers and the whole group of various naval forces, even though it contradicts the arguments of our authors and their own.

According to contemporary views, in order to defeat an enemy aircraft carrier naval forces employ operational-tactical antiship missiles whose operating range makes it possible for the launch platforms not to enter the immediate defensive zone of the aircraft carrier and to operate from the same area that is covered by their aircraft carrier, *i.e.* namely from the area of supremacy of our forces.

The authors themselves, whether they wanted to or not, thereby acknowledged that a group of various naval forces, either with an aircraft carrier or without one, should operate in an area where our forces have supremacy, including in the area that can be reached by our shore-based aviation.

This circumstance has always been a weak spot in substantiating the necessity for aircraft carriers for our navy, and no commands and directives from above could help the specialists investigate this until the evolution of military-political and military-technical factors and views of the aims, tasks and methods of waging combat operations at sea had led to the appearance of conditions for our use of such a weapons system as the aircraft carrier.

Over the time that has passed since the conclusion of the official debates, unfortunately, the arguments of the "defenders" of aircraft-carrying ships have not undergone any great changes, and they employ them as before not as the foundation for effective substantiation but rather as a tool of argument. Let's take the first conclusion on the purpose of the aircraft carrier.

The constant attempts to impart an unfounded universality to the aircraft carrier in the performance of a broad range of missions has served the aim of easing the substantiation of the need to construct ships in that class. It is, however, namely they that explain the many years of vacillation in defining the purpose, composition of armaments, features and methods of employing our aircraft carriers that were so colorfully related by V. Kuzin.

Arms systems of considerable cost and duration of life cycle inevitably become the topic of disputes among military specialists and the planning bodies of the state when determining requirements for appropriations for their creation and upkeep. The contribution of the given system to the achievement of the ultimate aims of armed struggle is considered to be the principal criterion when selecting priorities. Exceedingly large appropriations were made at times for the creation of a submarine fleet, naval strategic nuclear forces and naval missile-carrying aviation without any vacillation, since their role and place in the overall system of armaments met the views accepted at the time of the methods of achieving the aims of military operations. It was more complicated with the large surface vessels, the expenditures for the creation and upkeep of which, it was considered up to the beginning of the 1980s, did not correspond to their contribution to the achievement of those aims. One

could, of course, accuse the high command and political leadership of adhering to the development of certain areas, but that adherence was determined by the system of views of the aims and methods of using armed forces by which they were guided.

Starting with the postwar period and virtually until the beginning of the 1980s, it was felt that the principal military threat to our state came from the United States and its NATO allies. The European theater was considered to be the chief theater of military operations. It was assumed that with the start of a war we would be able to knock the NATO countries out of the war in the course of sweeping offensive operations, relying on groups of troops advancing on the West, and force the United States to shift to political resolution of the military confrontation. Individual details of this scenario underwent changes with the passage of time, but its essence remained unchanged.

The deciding role in the achievement of success was thus relegated to the ground troops, frontal aviation, long-range aviation and the air-defense troops. The fleet remained in the role customary for military leaders of the time—support for the combat operations of the maritime flanks in joint operations. It was entrusted, independently and in interaction with long-range aviation, with destroying enemy air-strike groups and missile submarines carrying ballistic missiles.

The military-political leadership of the state, directing the principal appropriations to equipping the ground forces, air forces and air-defense troops with the essential armaments, assumed that the groups of frontal, long-range and air-defense aviation that were being created would not only be able to perform missions in the ground theater, but would also provide air cover for the naval forces in the area of combat operations. That mission was given to land-based aviation, and the leadership of the air forces and air-defense troops affirmed their readiness to perform it.

Soviet military doctrine never envisaged waging combat operations in maritime theaters. It was namely for that reason that the creation of strike aircraft carriers was not supported by the General Staff. The leadership of the air forces and the air-defense troops moreover blocked it at certain stages.

The naval command was able to bring the purpose of the large gun ships, and later missile ships—true, at a certain cost—into conformity with the military doctrine. There were also individual successes at the same time. At the end of the 1960s, thanks to the insistence of the naval command and the support of Marshal A.A. Grechko, they were able to achieve the decision to start construction of the first aircraft-carrying ships of the Moskva class, and later the Kiev class, which were classified as antisubmarine cruisers at the time. This was substantiated by the importance of fighting the enemy missile submarines carrying ballistic missiles in the nearby ocean zone. They then agreed to start work on design

engineering for aircraft-carrying ships with carrier-based fighters, but the necessity of their construction had yet to be substantiated. The program to "missilize" the fleet forces that was being implemented in those years, the successes in the creation of antiship missiles and the noisy advertising of them were moreover a counterbalance to the idea of constructing aircraft-carrying ships.

The situation had begun to change by the end of the 1970s. The opinion began to predominate in military circles, with a regard for the growth in the military potential of NATO and the achievement of parity in strategic nuclear forces between the sides, that a war in Europe and, as a consequence, in other theaters could be of a protracted nature and that its course would depend to an ever greater extent in the delivery of human and material resources to Europe from the United States, which would require the performance of the mission of disrupting or restricting military shipments across the Atlantic, that mission gaining strategic significance. An analysis of the means and methods for performing that mission showed that the creation of temporary zones of air supremacy outside the reach of our land-based aviation would be required with any composition of forces operating against convoys at certain stages of the operation. Concrete substantiation thus appeared, for the first time, of the necessity of including aircraft-carrying ships with a fleet of ship-borne fighters in the force composition of the fleet.

Despite the fact that the resolution of this task could not at first be embodied in the operational documents due to a shortage of manpower and equipment to create the necessary groups, and later due to the new changes in the military-political situation that will be mentioned below, it became possible—before the construction of the fifth vessel of the Kiev class—to coordinate the necessity of improving the characteristics of ships in that series during the period of study of the operational substantiation for this mission. It was namely at that time that the design engineering of aircraft carriers of the next generation was resurrected, and the creation of ship-based fighters was begun.

Well-known events occurred in the second half of the 1980s, and the military-political situation in the world was fundamentally altered. The prospects for the elimination of forward-based groups of Soviet troops in Europe and the new correlation of the forces of the sides and the boundaries of the state, as well as political and military factors, forced a reconsideration of the system of views on the nature of the military threat, the aims of combat operations and the conditions for waging them. Prior calculations receded into the past. The approach of the possible areas of combat operations right up to the borders of the country, the creation of effective and high-precision conventional weapons and the rejection of the concepts of nuclear warfare posed the question of armed forces of such composition as to ensure an operative reaction to the actions of a likely adversary and the repulsion of unexpected aggression, and then a transition to a sound defense.

Military specialists, in formulating the concepts of military organizational development for the period after 1990, concluded that a change in priorities was necessary in favor of the development of the air forces, air-defense troops and the navy, as determined by the ability of those forces to perform missions in areas located in international spaces, which are today becoming the sphere of interest and application of the efforts of all nations to ensure their own security. The actions of fleet forces to ensure the defensive capability of the state under the new conditions are gaining particular significance therein. The conditions for their actions are become more complicated at the same time, due to the significant cutback in the quantitative composition of land-based aviation in accordance with the conventional arms treaty with the simultaneous narrowing of the areas for their basing in connection with the return of our troops to Russia. And this has preordained to no small extent the fact that ensuring air supremacy in areas of combat operations by fleet forces is becoming its intrinsic task, and the presence of aircraft carriers with a full-fledged fighter inventory is becoming not only expedient, but essential.

The arms programs for the period after 1990, based on the concepts for the organizational development of our armed forces, envisaged the building and entry into naval service of a sixth aircraft-carrying ship with a fighter inventory and a new-generation aircraft carrier that was to become the first in a series of ships in that class. The realization of this program, as is well known, has begun successfully.

The many years of efforts by naval specialists and commanders have thus been concluded with full-fledged decisions to build aircraft carriers. This did not occur, however, as the result of the victory of someone's passions or the defeat of some "group," and not before the objective factors conditioning the necessity of such a decision had appeared.

The aim of this article was to show the interconnection of questions of military theory and the practice of military organization development using a concrete example, which confirms once again that the subjective role of individual leaders and even collectives could play a definite role in a short time interval, while the ultimate result is the product of a quite prolonged, objective process.

The disputes about aircraft carriers in our navy should be considered closed today—the more so as they ceased in military circles in the middle of the 1980s—while the process of stopping the development programs of arms and military hardware that touched on more than aircraft carriers alone has its own causes, lying outside the bounds of military-technical problems.

It seems that certain circles are creating for themselves the possibility of evading responsibility for short-sighted and poorly thought-out decisions and actions they are making today by urging the military to renew the debate

surrounding aircraft carriers. There is no need to help them with that. We must work on clarifying the purpose of aircraft carriers, substantiating the required quantity of them and their characteristics and methods of combat application. We will hope that the reinforcement of the political and economic independence of Russia will lead to an understanding of the necessity of having an effective instrument for ensuring that independence in the form of high-technology armed forces. Encouraging prospects could be revealed for the navy in that case, including for aircraft-carrying ships.

Footnote

1. L. Khudyakov. "Concepts of the Issue of Creating Domestic Aircraft-Carrying Cruisers" (1991, No. 2); F. Matveychuk, V. Babiy, V. Povtorov. "Aircraft-Carrying Ships—An Element of a Balanced Fleet" (1992, No. 1); V. Kuzin. "Aircraft-Carrying Cruisers: We Knew What They Were Doing" (1992, No. 2).

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Adm Chernavin on Naval Incidents Agreement

92UM1310E Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 5-6, May-Jun 92 pp 67-69

[Interview with Navy Commander Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin by MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent under the rubric "Flights and Marches": "Confidence-Building Measures and Navigational Safety"]

[Text] *The package of bilateral agreements in the military realm that was concluded by the Soviet Union and the United States at the beginning of the 1970s included an Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas.*

The 25th of May 1992 marks 20 years since the entry into force of that Agreement. A correspondent of MORSKOY SBORNIK met with Navy commander Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin and asked him to answer a series of questions in this regard.

[Correspondent] The Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas between the governments of the USSR and the United States was signed twenty years ago, on 25 May 72. What can you say about that time?

[V. Chernavin] A little history. In the middle of the 1960s the Navy of the USSR entered the world's oceans, which had been under the complete sway of the United States. This step by the Soviet Union was regarded in the West as a kind of challenge. One could frequently encounter, in the foreign press at that time, biased discussions of the activity of our ships, as well as calls to display firmness in meetings with them on the open seas. The facts testify eloquently to what this firmness led. New types of maritime incidents began to be widespread—the simulation of attacks (weapons delivery) by ships and aircraft against ships and aircraft; the hazardous maneuvering of ships relative to one another; overflights of our ships and vessels by aircraft, and the dropping of various items close to them that posed a hazard and interference to navigation.

This maneuvering of U.S. Navy vessels in relation to Soviet vessels led to collisions with them in a number of cases in 1966-71. It should be acknowledged for the sake of fairness that the commanders of the Soviet ships, at the time not having sufficient experience in mutual relations with foreign ships and prolonged sailing close to them, also performed some hazardous maneuvers.

A situation took shape overall in which incidents between ships and aircraft of the USSR and the United States not only reflected the state of relations between the nations in that period, but also had a negative effect on those relations in and of themselves, making them worse. It had become clear at the same time that unilateral measures by either the USSR or the United States were unable to resolve the problem of safe activity for their naval fleets. The idea of having a discussion on this problem thus appeared. It was expressed by the Americans in January of 1968. The consideration of this proposal and the preliminary work took almost four years. Official negotiations between delegations from the USSR and the United States were held at the beginning of the 1970s with the aim of devising an agreement on this issue, and the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas was signed in the Kremlin on 25 May 72. It was signed on our side by Navy Commander-in-Chief Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov, and on the American side by Navy Secretary J.W. Warner. This was an event whose significance could be realized only now, 20 years later.

[Correspondent] What are the aims and basic substance of the Agreement?

[V. Chernavin] The chief aim of the Agreement consists of ensuring the safety of navigation of our and American ships and vessels in the waters of the open seas, as well as the flights of military aircraft in the airspace over them. The Agreement contains the mutual obligations of the two nations, supplementing the prevailing norms of international law, that are aimed at reducing the possibility of unfavorable situations arising in the actions of ships and aircraft of both parties in immediate proximity to each other. It is ultimately called upon to eliminate the factor of chance in the relations of the navies and the countries in general.

The immediate executors of the obligations under the Agreement taken together, and those responsible for its fulfillment, are the commanders of the ships and aircraft of the parties. They are required, in enjoying the freedom of the open seas, to follow the letter and spirit of the MPPSS [International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea] and avoid such maneuvers that could be hazardous for ships and task forces of the other side, especially in surveillance, when ships remain in the immediate proximity of each other for a prolonged period. Special signals stipulated by the Agreement serve to ease mutual understanding and to inform each other of one's intentions. They can be transmitted by any means available to the sailors (flags, search lights, radio).

For the first time in military navigation and flights of military aircraft, an international treaty such as the Agreement posed strict but reasonable requirements toward military ships and aircraft. It was forbidden for ship commanders in particular, in accordance with it, to undertake a simulated attack with the training of weapons, launchers, torpedo tubes and other types of weaponry in the direction of the ships and aircraft of the other side. The commanders of aircraft crews were not to simulate attacks via the simulation of weapons delivery against aircraft, ships and non-military vessels in the interests of mutual safety. They were also not to perform aerobatic maneuvers over ships and vessels or drop any objects posing a hazard or interference near them.

The military sailors and pilots of the two countries have worked out additional requirements to be guided by over the 20 years. It has been deemed essential that the ships of the parties not make use of search lights or other illumination to illuminate the cockpits of aircraft in flight, and that signal rockets not be launched that would pose a hazard to the ships and aircraft of the other side. These and other additions have entered into the draft Protocol to the Agreement that is envisaged to be signed in the future.

The link between the navies of the two countries has been established and is operating effectively within the framework of the Agreement. It is implemented through naval attachés in Moscow and Washington. The fleet headquarters of both sides have the opportunity, thanks to this, to report to each other in operative fashion on any incidents that have occurred at sea, and to take steps to eliminate possible negative consequences.

[Correspondent] The Agreement, in the opinion of specialists, remains one of the few in a series of such bilateral agreements that remained in force during the most tense periods of relations between the USSR and the United States. What is your opinion of this phenomenon of such vitality?

[V. Chernavin] The entry into force of the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea provided an impetus to reducing the overall number of incidents, and decreasing to a minimum the most dangerous of those. It is enough to say that the overall number of incidents between the ship and aircraft of the USSR and the United States was cut by almost two thirds over the first five years the Agreement was in effect, and cases of collisions between the ships of the parties were moreover able to be eliminated almost entirely. This makes it possible to say that the Agreement had the expected impact, and was a good means of ensuring safety at sea.

The peaks of violations of the Agreement came in those years that were marked by a worsening of the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. This was especially typical of the 1978-80 period. They were just as unfavorable in 1983-85. Events developed especially dramatically in connection with the incident with the South Korean aircraft on 1 Sep 83 in

the Kamchatka region. During the operations to search for the downed South Korean aircraft, in which up to 40 ships and vessels of the USSR, the United States and Japan took part simultaneously, a large number of violations of the Agreement was recorded on both sides. One can say without exaggeration that the Agreement was subjected to a serious test during that period. Its very existence was threatened. The negative effects of the policy of confrontation being pursued by both sides caused legitimate alarm among sensibly thinking representatives of the navies, both in the USSR and in the United States, for the effectiveness and fate of the Agreement. It is namely they who deserve the credit for preserving the Agreement.

One may say in summing up that the Agreement, as with any other international treaty of this level and substance, operates successfully only when a favorable military-political climate exists, and when the relations between its equal partners are structured in the spirit of mutual understanding and high responsibility for the fulfillment of the obligations they have taken on.

There is also, in my opinion, another reason for the vitality of the Agreement and its lack of susceptibility to unexpected changes in the political situation, thanks to which it has remained among those few bilateral treaties between the USSR and the United States that did not disintegrate in the period of confrontation. The point is that the Agreement does not pertain to the basic substance and thrust of the activity of the navies of both countries and in no way restricts their quantitative and qualitative composition, but rather makes it possible to resolve the task, limited to a certain extent, of ensuring the safety of navigation and flights outside territorial waters. There are no grounds to treat the Agreement expansively in this regard, to review or equate it to documents in the realm of arms control. Taking into account the aims of the Agreement, it would be more correct to consider it an agreement on confidence-building and predictability measures.

[Correspondent] An impetus was also provided as a consequence of the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea for the same kind of agreements with the majority of the NATO countries. What are your comments on that?

[V. Chernavin] The active inclusion of the other NATO countries in the process of preventing incidents at sea was started in 1986, when Great Britain became the second country after the United States with which the USSR concluded such an agreement. Agreements were then concluded with the FRG, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Italy and Greece.

Each new agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea, taking into account the experience of its predecessors, naturally included new elements, as well as differences in the approaches of the parties to the resolution of this problem.

The necessity of imparting a universal nature to all the agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea—especially in what pertains to the use of special signals, radio frequencies and the like—was invariably emphasized at the same time. It was justly taken into account herein that sailors at sea would ultimately have to employ the provisions of the agreements. And mutual understanding exists among them as nowhere else by virtue of the unity of the profession and its specific aspects, as well as the existence of universal principles and norms, both legal and technical, that have been worked out over centuries. And that natural order should not be disrupted.

[Correspondent] Serious positive changes have occurred in the relations between our countries, and the question of the integration of Russia into Western European military security structures is coming onto the agenda. How could this turn of events affect the fate of the Soviet-American agreement, and others like it, on the prevention of incidents at sea?

[V. Chernavin] Quite a few statements have actually been made recently by the leaders of Russia and the United States that testify to the radical changes in the policies and new political points of reference. Our countries, as has been declared, do not consider each other to be enemies. A tendency toward partnership in many areas has moreover been noted, including in the naval sphere, although the operational activity of the U.S. Navy—as opposed to us—is not decreasing in various regions of the world's oceans.

The aforementioned predetermines my answer to the question of the fate of the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of 1972. This and similar agreements constituted, and continue to constitute, a good treaty basis with the aim of ensuring the safety of the activity of military ships and aircraft. They are called upon to play their important role in the future as well.

I would like to take advantage of the opportunity to transmit my congratulations through your journal, on the 20th anniversary of the Agreement, to all those who took part in creating it, who supported its operation for such a prolonged period and who strove with such hope into the future.

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Baltic Fleet Denies Attack on Vessel by Estonians
92UM1356G Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Jul 92 p 6

[Unattributed article: "No Attack on a Warship Occurred"]

[Text] The press center of the Baltic Fleet refuted a report of central mass media that Estonian border troops attacked the military hydrological ship "GS-108."

The incident, which occurred on 22 July in Parnu Bay, actually boiled down to the simple conduct of a number of formalities. The ship's crew was not subjected to any outrage, or all the more so, physical violence.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Missions, Functions of GRU Examined

92UM1375A Tashkent VREMYA "CH" in Russian
No 146-147, 1 Jul 92 p 5

[Article by Lt Col N. Poroskov: "Released for the First Time: Military Intelligence Reveals Secrets"]

[Text] The activities of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) until recently was a secret under seven seals for a majority of our citizens. The State Security Committee [KGB] has already revealed many secrets, including on foreign intelligence, but nothing has been released on the work of the military intelligence officers.

At present the KGB does not exist as a single whole. It has been broken up into independent organizations. The GRU continues to exist, but this shows that for the CIS, military intelligence is essential as a unified coordinated organization, although one being reformed in the spirit of the times.

A little history. Military intelligence is a component part of the armed forces, one of the types of combat support for their military activities. In 1918, the central apparatus of military intelligence was comprised of the Registration Bureau of the Military Strategic Department of the Main Staff and the Intelligence Unit of the Operations Department of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. In November 1918, the Registration Directorate of the Field Staff was established and this became the ancestor of the current GRU.

As of April 1943, there were two central bodies in military intelligence: the GRU and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. There were also changes in the organizational structure during the postwar period, when new types of intelligence appeared and the administrative system was being improved. From 1953, military intelligence was concentrated in the single GRU of the General Staff.

The bright names of the military intelligence officers from the prewar and war years are well known: Richard Sorge, Lev Manevich, Max Klausen, Branko Vukelich. More than 138,000 intelligence officers were awarded orders and medals and 121 persons became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Among them were V. Karpov, V. Leonov, Kh. Mamsurov, V. Shcherbina and others.

Both in our country and in others, the main goal of military intelligence is the collecting, analysis and generalizing of the most diverse information and on the basis of this a conclusion is drawn on the degree of the

potential military danger or the possible threat to the state, in our case, the CIS. The objects of attention for military intelligence include the armed forces, equipment, weapons, the equipping of the assumed theater of operations, the systems of communications including roads, airfields, rivers, canals and the capacity of the transport mainlines. And, of course, the economy operating for the armed forces.

The work methods of military intelligence are the most diverse. Information is provided both by professional intelligence officers working overseas as well as by foreigners who have been recruited or who have volunteered their services. Much can be gained from attending exhibits, air salons as well as acquaintance with publications in the periodical press.

Conditionally military intelligence can be divided into three parts. The first is strategic or agent and special. The second is technical such as radio, electronic and space. Also included here is the constant monitoring of the entire world's airwaves on the military frequencies. And the third is the analysis or decoding service.

There is also operational intelligence. These are units in the districts and fleets and are subordinate to the appropriate commanders. Under these are also the special purpose formations designed to carry out a number of intelligence tasks. In wartime the special purpose formations are entrusted also with conducting special measures deep in the enemy rear, and in particular, subversion at facilities and on lines of communications, capturing essential persons and so forth.

The intelligence of each military district has its own "sphere of interests" determined by the neighboring countries. As a rule, a special purpose group consists of 3-7 persons who have a good knowledge of the country where they can be dropped by any method, including a hang glider. The special purpose subunits are manned by specialists with high intellect and good physical training. They know how to parachute, they have mastered the techniques of hand-to-hand combat and they know languages, demolition work, radio communications and much else. The program for the training of such groups includes also survival in desert or swampy terrain, in the cold and heat, and "living off the land."

In the military intelligence structure there are also scientific research facilities engaged in improving intelligence equipment and the special purpose ammunition as well as making various documents such as passports, diplomas, identification and so forth.

The military intelligence personnel is trained at a number of the military academies and schools where there are faculties or groups for the training of military intelligence officers for the corresponding branches of troops and the services of the Armed Services: the Kiev Combined Arms School, the Cherepovets Radioelectronic School, the Ryazan Airborne School, the Artillery Academy imeni M.V. Frunze as well as other academies. In the troops there are training subunits which prepare

specialists for engineer and chemical intelligence as well as artillery reconnaissance and observation.

The personnel for strategic military intelligence is trained on the corresponding faculties of a number of the military academies and in specialized institutions of learning. Officers are sent here who have completed a military school or academy. The special training program includes a thorough study of the equipment and weaponry of foreign armies as well as languages. The skills of becoming acquainted with unknown persons are instilled, and the ability is developed to establish contact with them and, when necessary, to impose one's will. Here also they study how to behave under the conditions of close scrutiny of counterintelligence, and much else.

Persons go into operational intelligence only at their own request. Strategic is something else. The servicemen are carefully selected by the command for this. A request to be sent to strategic intelligence is considered to be unethical.

The intelligence officers carry out tasks of exceptional state importance. For this reason there is a system for testing them for reliability. This involves an extensive range of measures involving the selection, training and retraining, the study of a person, his behavior, way of life, views and the system of recommendations for officials... Testing also provides good results. An element of insurance comes from the fact that they send overseas only married officers who have children.

Nevertheless, traitors are encountered among the military intelligence officers. Many recall the Penkovskiy story. Great harm was caused by Col Krapiva and the operations technician Chernov (they worked in the U.S.) and Gen Polyakov in India. The latter collaborated with the foreign special services for about 20 years, he caused a great deal of harm and was sentenced to an exceptional level of punishment. There was extensive publicity for the book published abroad by Viktor Suvorov, "The Aquarium," and which describes the work of our military intelligence. In 1991, this was published in the magazine NEVA. Under the pseudonym of Suvorov is concealed the formed major and GRU employee Vladimir Rezun who in 1978 betrayed the motherland.

What impels these persons to betrayal? As was explained by the current GRU Chief, Col Gen Ye. Timokhin, chiefly this is a mercenary spirit and acquisitiveness. Some, like Filatov, "were hooked" by the special services. But there has not been a single case of defecting for political reasons. Many of the traitors were punished in accord with the law. However, those who remained abroad continue to live and thrive and after Stalin's death in 1953, there has not even been an attempt to "bring back" such a person.

At present the GRU, like any type of intelligence, uses all the ways, channels and means available to it in order to provide the leadership with information for taking political and military strategic decisions. A mass of information flows into the directorate from all ends of the nation

and the world. People work around-the-clock, be this technical intelligence, strategic or the central staff of co-workers. The information is decoded and undergoes analysis. Right at 0800 hours, a file of preliminarily processed information lies on the desk of Col Gen Ye. Timokhin. He forwards the most important to the commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and to the chief of the General Staff, or he sometimes delivers information to them personally. Moreover, the information in the established manner is issued to the staffs of the military districts and fleets and to other interested departments. The nature of the information, due to the mission of the GRU, is basically on military problems.

Can one speak about an economic effect from the work of the directorate? Certainly it would be complicated to calculate this accurately. However let us examine a particular case. In seeking an original solution in the manufacture of new models of weapons and means of control, command and communications, the scientific research and experimental design work is carried out, as a rule, in 3-5 areas by different firms and scientific research institutes, and these require a good deal of money. But the intelligence officers work for a finished model and end result. Then there is no need for financing.

Recently the GRU itself has been financed in the minimum necessary amounts and these do not cover the existing demands sufficiently. The shortage leads to a drop in the volume of information received by the military department and by the CIS governments.

The future of the GRU at present is not completely clear. Until recently, its tasks, main areas of activity, the organizational structure and the size of the staff were set by the nation's Ministry of Defense and the government. At present this is done by the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. With the establishing of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the enforceable enactments on the functioning of the GRU will clearly be reworked.

If a part of the well-organized structure of military intelligence goes to the former republics, it will be destroyed. Everyone will lose. But in surviving as a single whole, the GRU will be able to provide information to the sovereign states and train specialists for them.

Recently in the foreign mass information media and in statements by individual officials, the demand has been made to curtail the activities of our military intelligence abroad. Need one explain that this will not only weaken the nation's defense capability, but will also deprive the politicians and the military command of the possibility of responding effectively to the changes occurring in a world which at present is very troubled and unpredictable?

Yeltsin Decree on Recalculation of Pensions

*92UM1370A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 30 Jul 92 p 4*

[Decree of the Russian Federation President on Recalculating Pensions for Pensioners from Among the Officer Personnel, Warrant Officers and Reenlisted Servicemen, Leadership and Rank and File Personnel from the Internal Affairs Bodies and Members of Their Families]

[Text] In the aims of strengthening the social protection for pensioners from among the officer personnel, warrant officers [praporshchik, michman] and reenlisted servicemen, for the leadership and rank and file personnel of the internal affairs bodies and the members of their families, I decree:

1. To recalculate as of 1 August 1992, the pensions assigned in accord with the USSR Law On Pension Coverage for Servicemen for the number of years served and in terms of disability for persons of the officer personnel, warrant officer and reenlisted servicemen, for persons of the leadership and rank and file personnel of

the internal affairs bodies and for pensions in the event of the loss of the bread winner of their families, proceeding from the average pay level for the corresponding categories of servicemen, for persons of the leadership and rank and file personnel as of the designated date.

2. To establish that the pensions paid out to the pensioners from among the persons of the officer personnel, the warrant officers and the reenlisted personnel, the persons of the leadership and the rank and file personnel of the internal affairs bodies, as well as the pensions in the event of the loss of the bread winner of their families, are to be periodically revised, proceeding from the increase in the pay for servicemen, persons of the leadership and rank and file personnel of the internal affairs bodies on active service.

3. The current Decree comes into force as of 1 August 1992.

[Signed] The President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin

Moscow, the Kremlin, 16 July 1992, No 781.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russian-Turkmen Agreement on Military Cooperation

Communique

92UM1374A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 9 Jun 92 p 1

[Communique On the Results of Talks with a Russian Federation Delegation Headed by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense, Army Gen P.S. Grachev]

[Text] Upon the mutual agreement of the President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov and the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin, from 7 through 8 July 1992, a visit was held by a Russian Federation Military Delegation headed by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense, Army Gen P.S. Grachev, in Ashgabat.

The Russian Federation Minister of Defense P.S. Grachev was received by the President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov.

In the course of the visit, talks were held and during these they discussed the questions of military collaboration between the two states and the status of the troop formations of the Armed Forces of the former USSR stationed in Turkmenistan.

The parties confirmed the intention to achieve close collaboration and interaction on the questions of defense policy and military organizational development and for providing the normal activity of the troop formations stationed in Turkmenistan.

The parties set out their position on the status of these formations, the principles for the manning, financial support and logistic support. The participants of the talks gave great attention to the legal and social protection of the servicemen and the members of their families.

The Russian Federation Delegation was informed in detail of the domestic and foreign policy of Turkmenistan and its desire in the future to strengthen relations of friendship and collaboration with the Russian Federation, to follow a position of nonintervention into the domestic affairs of other states and in international relations, to support a policy of positive neutrality.

A Protocol was signed on the results of the talks.

Protocol

92UM1374B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 9 Jun 92 p 1

[Protocol of a Working Session of the Government of Turkmenistan and the Military Delegation of the Russian Federation Headed by the Minister of Defense P.S. Grachev]

[Text] In Ashgabat on 8 June 1992, a working meeting was held of the Government of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation Military Delegation and in the course of this they discussed the questions of military collaboration between Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation.

Proceeding from the interests of ensuring the security and defending the sovereignty of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation under the conditions which have come about with the end of the existence of the USSR and referring to the reciprocal determination to conduct a coordinated policy on defense questions, the Parties have reached an agreement that:

1. Turkmenistan, in accord with its Constitution, on the basis of the two formations as well as the units (the list of these is to be approved) of the Armed Forces of the former USSR stationed on the territory of Turkmenistan, will establish national Armed Forces under the joint command of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation.
2. The Air Defense formation and the individual Air Forces units of the Armed Forces of the former USSR, in being stationed on the territory of Turkmenistan, will in organizational terms be part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The status and conditions for the stay of this formation and the units on the territory of Turkmenistan will be agreed upon by the Government of Turkmenistan.
3. The manning of the troop formations on the territory of Turkmenistan and the training of personnel for them will be carried out jointly by Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation.
4. Support for daily routine (housing, utility services, medical support and so forth) for all the troop formations stationed on the territory of Turkmenistan will be provided by the Turkmen side, while the financing and logistic support during the transitional period will be from the Russian side.
5. The parties proceed from an understanding that in the process of reorganizing the Armed Forces of the former USSR on the territory of Turkmenistan, the civil and social rights of the servicemen and the members of their families will be fully observed.

Upon Authorization of the Government of Turkmenistan, The Minister for Defense Affairs of Turkmenistan, Lt Gen D. Kopekov.

Upon Authorization of the President of the Russian Federation, The Russian Federation Minister of Defense, Army Gen P. Grachev.

Turkmen Press Commentary

*92UM1374C Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 9 Jun 92 p 1*

[Article by B. Perengliyev of Turkmen Press: "Turkmenistan and Russia Have Signed a Protocol on Military Collaboration"]

[Text] Ashgabat, 8 June. With the signing of the Protocol on the Questions of Military Collaboration, today talks were concluded between the Government of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation Military Delegation headed by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense, Army Gen P.S. Grachev. The talks were held during his official visit to Ashgabat with this being done under the mutual agreement of the President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov and the Russian President B.N. Yeltsin.

Proceeding from the interests of ensuring the security and defending the sovereignty of the two states and referring to the reciprocal determination to conduct a coordinated policy on defense questions, the Protocol states, Turkmenistan, in accord with its Constitution, will establish on the basis of two formations as well as the units located on its territory, national Armed Forces under the joint command of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation. The Air Defense formation and the individual Air Forces units located in the republic in organizational terms will be part of the Russian Armed Forces. Their status and the conditions of the stay will be approved by the Turkmenistan Government.

The document states that the manning of the troop formations on the territory of Turkmenistan and the training of the personnel for them will be carried out jointly. Support for their daily routine will be provided by the Turkmen side, while financing and logistic support during the transitional period will be by the Russian side.

According to the contents of the Protocol, in the process of the reorganization of the Armed Forces of the former USSR on the territory of Turkmenistan, the servicemen and the members of their families will be guaranteed the full observance of civil and social rights.

After the concluding of the talks, the President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov and the Russian Minister of Defense, Army Gen P.S. Grachev, participated in a joint press conference.

As P.S. Grachev explained to the journalists, the idea of establishing the national Armed Forces of Turkmenistan under a joint command arose in the course of his 45-minute talk with President Niyazov. He emphasized that the given approach to resolving the "military question" exists in international practice and most fully reflects the interests of both sides.

Our Army will have primarily a defensive nature, in protecting the interests of both Turkmenistan and Russia, pointed out S. Niyazov in his comments at the press conference. The document signed today stands out

in the clarity of its phrases without leaving any room for ambiguities. Its content conforms to the aspirations of the entire Turkmen people, the President said.

A joint Communique was adopted on the results of the talks. This confirmed the intention to provide close cooperation on the questions of defense policy and military organizational development and the desire to strengthen the relations of friendship and cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan.

In the photos [not reproduced here]: During the meeting of the President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov with the Russian Federation Minister of Defense P. Grachev; the ceremony of signing the documents by the Turkmenistan Minister for Defense Affairs D. Kopekov and the Russian Federation Minister of Defense P. Grachev.

Photos by A. Saparov (Turkmen Press) and Yu. Shkurin.

Events in Battle for Bendery Chronicled

*92UM1299A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Jul 92 pp 1,2*

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer under the rubric "Armed Conflicts": "Battle for Bendery Is Main Military Event of Month"]

[Text]

Review of Military Events During the First Half of June

On the night of 19 June several newly formed motorized-rifle battalions of the Moldovan army burst into Bendery and rapidly occupied the city. Detachments of the Dniester region were unable to offer organized resistance. The Moldovan forces were unable to take several centers of resistance (first and foremost, the city soviet building), but they did capture the main strategic point in the city, the railway and motor-vehicle bridges across the Dniester (they are side by side). It was only slightly more than 3 kilometers by paved highway to the capital of the rebelling Dniester region, Tiraspol.

The Moldovan troops did not attempt to destroy or even to mine the captured bridges. It was apparently planned to continue the offensive. And the motor-vehicle bridge was covered against a possible counterattack from the people's militia by an adequately powerful antitank screen of the Moldovan army.

Moldova's President Mircea Snegur went on radio to explain the storming of Bendery as an exchange of fire near the city police department. The fact that the storming of the city began only two hours after the incident, however, permits one to assume that everything was readied in advance. The strike groupings had already been concentrated, a fact promptly detected by Russian intelligence. A radio intercept also indicated some sort of "operation." The scale of the Moldovan offensive was unexpected, however.

In the meantime, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy formed a small situation staff at the Kremlin in Moscow, which maintained contact with all the parties involved (presidents Snegur and Iliescu, authorities in the Dniester region and even the basement of the city soviet in Bendery. Consideration was given to the possibility of rapidly moving in airborne troops to assist the Dniester region.

Airborne divisions at Tula and Pskov were quartered a fairly long distance from the Dniester region, the handling capacity of the 14th Army's airfield on the left bank was small and, most important, there was absolutely no certainty that Ukraine would permit the aircraft carrying the airborne troops to cross its territory. The 98th Airborne Division was quartered nearby, at Bolgrad in South Bessarabia. The division did not have its own air transport equipment, but it could reach the area of the conflict in its own vehicles (135 km by highway to Bendery). South Bessarabia is Ukrainian territory, however. The 98th has not taken the Ukrainian oath, nor has it been taken under Russian jurisdiction. It is not clear whose orders the division now follows. The other day the ministers of defense of Ukraine and Russia, generals Morozov and Grachev, met in Bolgrad and agreed that the officers and enlisted men of the 98th Division would themselves decide whom to serve. There had been no such voting in our military since 1917-1918.

By the second half of the day on 20 June the Dniester people had mobilized enough forces made up of Cossacks and guardsmen for a counterattack (up to a battalion of infantry and several tanks, prime movers and BTR [armored personnel carriers]). The motor-vehicle road was stormed and taken.

There are several versions of the capture of the bridge. According to one, Cossacks and guardsmen broke through despite the loss of several tanks. Another has it (this was told to a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent on the evening of 22 June by one of the state advisers, who was at the Kremlin with Rutskoy at the time). The first onslaught by the Dniester forces was beaten back. Several tank crews performed incompetently and their tanks were knocked out of action. Volunteer officers from the 14th Army took over the controls, and the Moldovan antitank battery was wiped out.

Cossacks and guardsmen burst through to the center of Bendery but did not have the forces to take the entire city. The Moldovan units withdrew to the outskirts.

During the evening of 22 June the Moldovan army used aircraft for the first time. Two MiG-29s dropped bombs near the Bendery bridge. Official Chisinau still denies that its fighters took part in the combat operations, although they were seen in the act by members of the delegation from the Russian government and parliament.

The fighter regiment of MiG-29 frontline fighters at Marculesti was turned over to the Black Sea Fleet in

1989, even though it is based a fairly long way from the sea. But then, many completely land-operating formations were transferred to the fleet at that time, on the threshold of the signing of the Paris Agreement on the Limitation of Weapons in Europe. The regiment had [number illegible] MiG-29 fighters, and they were all turned over to Moldova in good condition. Unofficial army sources report that no more than 10 aircraft are battleworthy right now. But there are apparently even fewer pilots trained to fly the MiG-29 in the Moldovan military.

The MiG-29 is easy to pilot and maneuverable. It can therefore be used successfully as an attack aircraft. To fly them, however, the pilots require a certain amount of retraining and, most important, there cannot be a large supply of assault ammunition in the fighter regiment. Mainly air-to-air missiles, ammunition for airborne automatic guns and a certain number of bombs (certainly not high-precision weapons) are stockpiled there. Conventional gravitational, high-explosive fragmentation bombs were used in an attack near Parkany (on the left bank, near the end of the bridge over the Dniester), and these were clearly brought in by someone. It is impossible to determine today whether the Moldovans actually wanted to blow up the bridge in Bendery or simply to frighten the enemy.

The Russian 14th Army presently has no aviation. It was stationed in Ukraine and was "privatized" by the latter. There are only a few reconnaissance helicopters.

The 14th Army does have an adequate number of antiaircraft weapons, however: Osa ZRKs [antiaircraft missile systems] (comparable to the American Hawk system, with a reach of 30 km and an altitude of up to 15 km), Strela and Igla ZRKs (comparable to the famous American Stinger), and Shilka self-propelled, armored quad artillery units. The 14th Army's PVO reports that as many as four Osa launchings were carried out in recent days against Moldovan air targets, including MiG-29s. It reports that the "targets were destroyed," although the only hit which can be verified was against a helicopter which fell inside Ukraine. If a certain part of the PVO weapons are also "privatized" by the Dnieper region forces, Moldova's air superiority will be eliminated. If, of course, Romania does not intervene in the conflict.

After 22 June the fighting in the Dniester region was once again reduced to artillery, mortar, missile and other kinds of duels. The exchanges of fire had fallen off by the time the UN mission arrived. The civilian population was fleeing the battle zone. Bendery was clearly becoming a "free-for-all fire zone," another Vukovar on the Dniester. If the Moldovans finally do capture this single left-bank enclave on the right bank, they will get only piles of rock and ruins with those pitiful remains of the former industrious population who lived out the fighting in homemade "bunkers."

The incompetent use of powerful modern weapons by both sides in Moldova (the most heavily populated republic of the former USSR) was the main cause of extensive losses among the civilian population. The precise number of casualties in Bendery has still not been determined, but the figure will in any case run into the hundreds of people killed or wounded.

Forecast

A political compromise appears more achievable today than ever before. After both Russia and Ukraine supported the right of the left-bank residents to self-determination, the leaders of the PMR [Moldovan Dniester Republic] will hardly agree to less than a multinational confederation.

Moldova has overwhelming military superiority on its side, however, particularly in heavy weapons. The Dniester region detachments will certainly not hold out, should there be a new offensive. But the 14th Army has a new and extremely decisive commander. He is Maj Gen Aleksandr Lebed (general of airborne troops and former deputy for airborne troops under Gen Grachev). He has promised to "protect the population of the Dniester region from genocide." The Moldovan leadership apparently continues to believe that escalation of the conflict is in their interest, however, since massive involvement of the Russian 14th Army could shift the sympathy of the world community to the side of Moldova, and Russia would be forced to withdraw from the Dniester region under the threat of sanctions. Furthermore, protraction of the conflict would bring Moldova to total economic ruin, and any form of political autonomy within the framework of a federation or confederation with the left-bank region remains political unacceptable to Chisinau.

And so, when the UN mission goes home, active combat operations will most likely be renewed on the former scale.

Gamsakhurdia Supporters Saved Tskhinval

The siege of Tskhinval continued unabated in June, and the city—more precisely, what remained of it—seemed doomed. The absolute superiority of the Georgian National Guard under Tengiz Kitovani in fire power left the Ossets no chance of rescue. The constant shelling took new lives every day, and the threatening announcement by Aleksandr Rutskoy changed nothing. Gamsakhurdia's supporters attempted a coup in Tbilisi on the night of 23 June.

More than 100 of Gamsakhurdia's supporters commanded by Valter Shurgay and supported by several pieces of armored equipment captured the television center and tower in Tbilisi. A recorded television statement was broadcast from the former president (which gave rise to rumors that the president himself had arrived). Up to 2 battalions of National Guardsmen drove Zviad's people from the television tower on Mount Mtetsmida and then took over the television

center. In general, it was all over by 13:00, although shelling continued in the city long afterward.

The Georgian procuracy announced that Gamsakhurdia's supporters had taken the weapons and armored equipment from a military unit of Russian Internal Troops.

The pressure on Tskhinval dropped considerably following the attempted coup. Apparently National Guard personnel began to be moved to the Tbilisi area immediately. In addition, the confrontation between Georgians and Abkhazians in Sukhumi intensified sharply. That same evening of 24 June Eduard Shevardnadze signed an agreement on a cease-fire and on the deployment of troops in Ossetia. And this agreement actually began to be implemented, unlike the previous one concluded in Kazbegi. The truce gradually began to take effect on 28 June, and on 29 June Kitovani issued an order for the National Guard's heavy equipment to be withdrawn from Tskhinval.

Forecast

Another storming of Tskhinval in the immediate future would probably be impossible, but this has not made the long-term prospects for a final peace any more encouraging. The complete withdrawal of Russian troops from South Ossetia will soon be completed, and then nothing can prevent a new storming of the city, should any one of the Georgian leaders decide once again to settle the Ossetian problem once and for all by the "most direct means," that is, by military means. Until a stable, legally elected, democratic government is established in Tbilisi, a solution to the Ossetian problem is hardly possible. Power is increasingly falling into the hands of "field commanders" (military leaders) in the Caucasus, however, for whom war is a normal way of life. And only peace carries the threat of loss of their accustomed power.

Uncertain Outcome of Battle in Karabakh

Throughout the second half of June the Azerbaijani army attempted to develop the initial success of its offensive but was unable to achieve a breakthrough—neither on the Mardakert nor on the Askeran sector.

The Azerbaijani army has more than a hundred tanks and several hundred pieces of other armored equipment "privatized" from 4th Army units. According to specialists with the Russian General Staff, however, less than 50% of this equipment is battleworthy at any given point in time. So only dozens of pieces of armored equipment at best operate in any individual operation (not hundreds, as is sometimes reported). The Armenian side has only individual pieces of armored equipment in the area of the conflict, however, and this is actually what predetermined the course of combat operations in June.

The foundation for the offensive capability of Azerbaijan's army consists of professionally fairly well-trained armored groups with crews made up of servicemen from

the former Soviet army, most of them of the Slavic nationalities. The Azerbaijani army continues to suffer a shortage of organized and trained infantry, however. This is apparently what prevented it from developing and reinforcing its initial success into a final victory. The Armenian forces continued successfully to stage ambushes, to infiltrate the rear area of the attacking groupings and envelop their flanks. An unstable balance was established in the fairly mobile battle in Nagorny Karabakh, in which tactically important positions are constantly changing sides.

Forecast

The pendulum of military success can essentially swing to either side, but it is most likely that military triumph will now increasingly smile upon the Armenians. Armored equipment has limited capabilities in the mountainous conditions and, as the Armenians accumulate antitank weapons, a few successful ambushes can alter the balance of power drastically. At the same time any attempt by the Azerbaijani army to move assault groupings from near Mardakert to strategically important sectors will inevitably result in the loss of most of what it has recently gained.

Even if the Armenian forces are able to force the Azerbaijani formations from most of Mardakertskiy and Shaumyanskiy rayons, the previously liberated villages will never return. The thriving agricultural region, previously almost untouched by the war, has become a desert suitable only for war. The villages have been destroyed, ruined, and the residents have fled. The fickle course of the combat operations, determined at first by a powerful flow of weapons into the conflict area, could still see Armenian formations on the streets of Agdam, but even they will bring only death and destruction.

Purge of Loyalty Oath Takers in Black Sea Fleet Termed 'Kasatonovshina'

92UM1356C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian 17 Jul 92 p 1

[Press release from the Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "Kasatonovshina Continues"]

[Text] According to a report from the press center of the Ukrainian Navy, on 15 July of this year the personnel of the military commandant's office of the Kacha Air Garrison took the oath of faithfulness to the Ukrainian people. However, these servicemen were immediately removed from their positions simply for vowing allegiance to their people. No documents or written orders regarding this action followed from the command of the Black Sea Fleet—the undesirable servicemen were simply turned out, having been issued temporary duty orders placing them at the disposal of the commander of the Ukrainian Navy.

Baykal Cossack Force to Be Formed

92UM1356F Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* in Russian 28 Jul 92 p 3

[Text] The Ataman government of the Transbaykal Cossack Forces has voiced support for the establishment of a Cossack regiment in the Transbaykal Military District. It will be manned by Russians, Buryats and representatives of other nationalities.

The leadership of the First Department of the Transbaykal Cossack Forces invites all persons of Cossack extraction from 16 to 27 years old who had not undergone compulsory military service to register in military commissariats at their places of residence. They will be the ones to man the Cossack regiment.

Estonian Group Says 'War' Not Over While Occupiers Remain

92UM1300A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* in Russian 2 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Ilya Nikiforov under the rubric "Estonia": "World War II Is Not Over, Says the Estonian Kaitseliit With Its Inherent Directness"]

[Text] The Harju district (western Estonia) people's militia group Kaitseliit, has circulated an appeal in which it vows to fight the Russian army, the former SA [Soviet Army], which still occupies Estonia. The kaitseliit (Defense League), which came into being 70 years ago, is a paramilitary, armed formation, something like a people's home guard or the U.S. National Guard. An independent and legal organization, the kaitseliit is a structural component of Estonia's defense forces and is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and the Main Staff of the Defense Forces of the ER [Estonian Republic].

The 302 members of the Harju district's KL [kaitseliit] people's militia group, feel that World War II will not be over until the last soldier of the "occupation army" and its "colonial stooges" have withdrawn from Estonian soil and have therefore promised to continue the armed resistance left unfinished in the '50s. The KL people's militia group considers the marshal law declared by the Estonian government in exile in 1952 to be still in effect.

One of the first acts of this people's militia group was to forcibly requisition 27 Kalashnikov assault rifles from the site of the former Tallin Higher Military Political Construction School. The Ministry of Defense of the ER took responsibility for this and announced it to a commission sent from Moscow to investigate the ChP [extraordinary occurrence].

Manivald Kasepyld [transliteration], head of the republic KL, described the announcement by those in the Harju district being made at their own personal initiative and complained of inadequate subordination and discipline.

We know that a decree of the armed forces of the ER declared all property of the Russian army within Estonia to be the republic's property. Any raid or theft of property or weapons is therefore regarded as restoration of the right of ownership. It should be noted that the ER clearly has a shortage of regular army border and police units, and the authorities are forced to use KL volunteers to make up for these. The latter have not yet lost their partisan spirit or their desire to prove themselves no matter what it takes.

Toomas Puura, deputy defense minister, as a state official not supporting the KL, agreed in principle with the desire of the KL to make the presence of foreign troops in Estonia "uncomfortable" (read "intolerable"). The analysts point out that the increased activeness of the KL does not rule out the possible of incidents with subunits of the former Soviet army on the eve of the CSCE [Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe] conference in Helsinki on 15 July.

Attacks on Russian Personnel in Tallinn Viewed as 'Provocations'

92UM1356H Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Yelena Visens: "Battle in Central Tallinn: Two Wounded, None Killed. Provocations, or the Beginning of Combat Activities?"]

[Text] Another incident on Monday involving Russian and Estonian servicemen shook the credibility of statements made by Estonian government press secretary Neem Brus that Russian servicemen were the instigators and culprits of the collisions.

On 27 July, at 1040 in the morning, 26 (30 according to other information) servicemen of the Estonian regular army armed with assault rifles and headed by Estonian Defense Forces Main Staff chief of rear services Eelmaa seized the territory of Russian military unit No 33074 in Tallinn (the construction directorate of the Baltic Fleet). All entrances and exits of the facility were placed under guard. By this time there was only one Russian serviceman in the military unit, Colonel Temnikov, whom the Estonian servicemen took hostage.

The fact is that for practical purposes this military unit has been disbanded, and transferred to Pskov. All that remained was a liquidation commission headed by the unit commander and civilians, chiefly laborers and hired female workers. The acting Russian charge d'affaires in Estonia Oleg Popovich immediately went to the place of the incident, and he was able to retrieve the hostage without any special difficulties.

The command of the Tallinn Naval Base sent 40 armed marines in bullet-proof vests to the facility in order to liberate the unit. The Estonians met them with fire, which was returned. A skirmish ensued, accompanied by frequent automatic fire, from which the Russian soldiers emerged victorious. The 24 Estonian servicemen that

were captured and the weapons confiscated from them were soon transferred to the Estonian side. On the "battlefield," there remained two wounded on the Russian side: deputy chief of staff of the Tallinn Naval Base Captain 1st Rank Vyacheslav Gay (wounded in the leg) and a worker of the military unit by the name of Melnikov.

The version given by the Estonian side is somewhat different. In the words of representatives of the Main Staff of Estonian Defense Forces, the Estonian soldiers were sent to the facility with the purpose of "preventing the sale of military property." "Everything was quite normal at first, but then armed soldiers appeared in three vehicles and forced us out of there," the staff duty officer reported to "Baltfaks." Estonian Minister of Defense Yulo Uluots said in his statement: "Our military personnel did not fire a single shot, because cartridges had not been issued to them. Assertions of fire from the Estonian side are a groundless provocation." This is also insisted by a direct participant of the incident and an associate of the Chief of Staff of Estonian Defense Forces, Mikkkel Salla, who believes that the Russian soldiers wounded their own in the confusion. According to a "Baltfaks" report the Estonian police who arrived at the scene of the incident did not take a single assault rifle as evidence, and therefore it was impossible to establish which weapon wounded the officer and the worker. The officer in charge of the Tallinn prefecture also had interesting information: He asserted that after quickly gathering together and consulting with his subordinates, the operation's leader, Mr. Eelmaa, announced that they had not been issued cartridges.

The Russian embassy in Estonia asked the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia to provide official explanations for the actions of the Estonian Defense Forces (incidentally, Estonian officials with whom Oleg Popovich talked in the first hours after the incident knew nothing of the exchange of gunfire in the center of the capital of their state).

Former Kiev MD Commander Indicted on Corruption Charge

92UM1356A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 92
p 2

[Article by Boris Reznik and Viktor Litovkin: "Kiev-Style Toyotas"]

[Text] It was reported over the Russian airwaves and in a number of newspapers that the board of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry decided to submit a petition indicting Colonel General Viktor Chechevatov, former troop commander of the Kiev Military District.

I telephoned Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov. He declared that such an issue was not even discussed by the ministry board.

Nonetheless the rumor did not come out of thin air. The attack on this general, who refused to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine and who was removed from his position in this connection, has been continuing for over seven months. The essence of the case, which some people would very much like to turn into a criminal case, was presented in the Ukrainian newspaper NEZAVISIMOST, in an article by Colonel of Militia Grigoriy Omelchenko titled "Chechevatov in the Transbaykal, the Toyota Behind Bars."

Even the title itself contains what can be termed an error in the least case. Chechevatov was never in the Transbaykal. In May of this year he was appointed troop commander of the Far Eastern Military District. And here's another detail: The newspaper NEZAVISIMOST, which had been unknown hitherto in the Far East, suddenly appeared in that same month in the Khabarovsk Kray Soviet, the kray administration, the editor's offices of local newspapers and the IZVESTIYA press center.

Omelchenko's article describes how Colonel E. Korchmarchik, chief of the construction directorate of the Kiev Military District, exchanged two Ural vehicles for as many Japanese Toyota Land Cruisers in May-June of last year. But what relationship does the former commander of the Kiev Military District have to this story involving Japanese vehicles? Could it be that the Toyotas were acquired on his orders, or for him personally? Although G. Omelchenko mentions Chechevatov's name several times, the article does not offer an answer to these questions.

I went to Major General of Justice V. Gurinovich, procurator of the Far Eastern Military District, for an explanation.

"Back in February of this year the Ukrainian Procuracy conducted a meticulous investigation of the legality of the acquisition of the Toyotas on the basis of the conclusions of independent economic, technical and legal expert commissions. The request to institute criminal proceedings regarding the fact itself of the purchase and sale of the Toyotas was denied on the basis of these materials. Moreover the investigation revealed that upon learning of the acquisition of the Japanese vehicles, General Chechevatov himself recognized this to be a violation, and ordered the sale of the motor vehicles in accordance with established procedure, and punishment of the culprits under military law.

IZVESTIYA military reviewer Viktor Litovkin comments on the situation:

General Chechevatov's story is only one link in a long chain of problems associated with division of the Black Sea Fleet, removal of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory, civilized methods of transferring combat equipment and adoption of a "second" oath by officers. But the false information on

alleged criminal cases can be interpreted as nothing other than an attempt to cast doubt upon the general's honor and dignity.

I met with Viktor Chechevatov in Kiev in December of last year. He was still commander of the Kiev Military District, but he absolutely refused to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

"There is more to it than the fact that in my deep conviction, an officer takes an oath only once in his life," he told me. "The problem is more complex. Could I accept a compromise? Could I remain in Kiev, where I have a good apartment and a secure position, and could I serve here another five years, all the more so because Moscow had no claims upon me and I wasn't about to take just any position? In principle, yes. But on thinking that my son, a platoon commander on Sakhalin, will be serving in one army and I in another, and, God forbid, we may find ourselves on different sides of a border, I found the choice to be impossible."

Forty-seven year old General Viktor Chechevatov remained true to his principles. He chose Khabarovsk over Kiev. We need only add that he was born in Ulyanovsk Oblast, and he has been with the army since 1963. He graduated from a military school, an armored academy and the Academy of the General Staff. He progressed through all positions from platoon commander to district commander.

Karabakh Defense Chief on Recent Reverses

92US0707A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 32, 5 Aug 92 p 2

[Interview with Major General Arkadiy Ivanovich Ter-Tatevosyan by Iosif Verdiyan in Yerevan; date not given: "The Karabakh Rambo: 'We Are Destined for Victory': Interview with the Grandson of a Priest, Whose Nickname Is the 'Mountain Fox'"]

[Text] Many people have heard a lot about the commander of the self-defense forces of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Major General Arkadiy Ivanovich Ter-Tatevosyan. The folklore elevated him to new heights after the taking of Shusha and the opening of the Lachin corridor.

Ter-Tatevosyan is 53 years old. He was born in Tbilisi and graduated from the Leningrad Military Engineering Academy.

[Verdiyan] Arkadiy Ivanovich, have you really retired or have you been dismissed?

[Ter-Tatevosyan] That's nonsense. I still hold the same post and I have no intentions of abandoning Karabakh.

[Verdiyan] I just have to ask you: How could we have given up Shaumyan and Mardakert?

[Ter-Tatevosyan] The Armenian detachments retreated in the face of the superior forces of the enemy—in the

face of tanks. It was not Azerbaijanis who forced them to retreat, but Russian mercenaries. They are getting rich off of the military trade. They are lining their pockets, they go on wild drinking binges—what kind of officers are those? It's a total disgrace! These mercenary soldiers are a discredit to the honor and dignity of the Russian officer.

[Verdiyan] All right, so they retreated in the face of the tanks. Then what?

[Ter-Tatevosyan] The main reason for our retreat from Shaumyan lies with us ourselves. We should fully realize that Armenia, whether it likes it or not, is in a state of war, although it is an undeclared war. Do bombs have to explode in downtown Yerevan for the people to realize this? Recently I spent several days relaxing in Tsakhkadsor in the company of writers. My God, they talked about everything—about women, drinking, the weather.... But not about the war. That sort of mood is astonishing. Meanwhile, it is not just the fate of Karabakh that is being decided in Karabakh.

The press is doing the same thing. Newspapers are looking for something sensational in the Karabakh war. But what they need to see here is the human tragedy, and emphasize the point that war itself is an unnatural phenomenon. What's normal is when a person builds a house, plants a tree, writes poetry.

[Verdiyan] So, the war in Karabakh is hopeless?

[Ter-Tatevosyan] Who told you that? Nothing of the sort. Granted, we left Mardakert, but we are going to get it back without fail. The same goes for Shaumyan. People are going to live there, plow the fields, and do their planting. The victories of the Azerbaijani national army, or rather, of the mercenaries from the Russian army, are temporary.

I got a phone call from Stepanakert: Several more locations have been liberated there, some tanks were knocked out, two combat helicopters were shot down, and about 50 Azerbaijani soldiers were captured. They are fighting badly: The mercenaries only care about the money.

Still, we are destined for victory.

[Verdiyan] Are the army self-defense detachments in Karabakh heavily politicized?

[Ter-Tatevosyan] No. I do not belong to any party myself, and I have equal respect for the representatives of the various political orientations. For me there are only soldiers who are defending the freedom of Karabakh.

[Verdiyan] One last question: Why did they give you the nickname the "mountain fox" in Afghanistan?

[Ter-Tatevosyan] I fought in Afghanistan, in Egypt, and in some other places. But I am a pacifist, believe me.

UKRAINE

Resolution on Social Protection of Servicemen

92UM1238 Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
26 Jun 92 p 4

[Text of resolution of Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers: "Statute on the Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine"]

[Text] *Approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 18 Jun 92*

Statute on the Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

1. The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen is a central body of state executive authority subordinate to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The committee, within the limits of its authority, pursues a unified state policy in the sphere of social protection for servicemen of the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the Security Service, the Border Troops, the civil defense troops, the troops for internal and convoy protection of the MVS [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Ukraine and other troops formations that are created by the Supreme Council of Ukraine, the Strategic Restraint Forces that are stationed on the territory of Ukraine during the completion of their service, those who have been discharged into the reserves or retirement, the members of their families, draftees and the members of the families of servicemen who have been killed or have died, are missing or have become invalids during the completion of their military service (hereinafter servicemen and the members of their families).

2. The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen is guided in its activity by the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, the decrees of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, the decrees and directives of the President of Ukraine and the decrees and directives of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, as well as this Statute. The committee organizes the fulfillment of the legislation of Ukraine and implements the systematic monitoring of its fulfillment within the limits of its jurisdiction.

The committee summarizes the practice of the application of legislation on issues that fall under its jurisdiction, develops proposals on improving it and submits them for the consideration of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

3. The chief tasks of the Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen are:

—participation in the formulation and realization of state policy pertaining to the social protection of servicemen and the members of their families in conjunction with the corresponding ministries and agencies of Ukraine;

- the implementation of monitoring of the fulfillment of laws, acts of the President and Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine pertaining to the social protection of servicemen and the members of their families;
 - participation in ensuring a socially just cadre policy in regard to the selection, placement, movements and discharge of servicemen of the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the Security Service, the Border Troops, the civil defense troops, the troops for internal and convoy protection of the MVS of Ukraine and other troops formations that are created by the Supreme Council of Ukraine;
 - the creation of conditions for the satisfaction of the socio-economic and spiritual requirements of servicemen and the members of their families in conjunction with the corresponding ministries and agencies, local state administrations and bodies of local and regional self-government; and
 - the performance of organizational and methodological work for the realization of state policy pertaining to the social protection of servicemen and the members of their family in keeping with legislation on those issues.
4. Authorized representatives of the committee operate in the Republic of the Crimea and the oblasts and cities of Kiev and Sevastopol in order to accomplish the tasks given to the Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen.
5. The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen, in accordance with the tasks entrusted to it:
- a) implements measures pertaining to ensuring the rights and freedoms of servicemen and the members of their families as defined by the laws of Ukraine;
 - b) considers proposals from interested ministries and agencies, as well as the requests and complaints of servicemen and the members of their families, on issues that fall under the jurisdiction of the committee; where necessary it takes part in resolving conflict situations that arise between servicemen and commanders;
 - c) verifies, where necessary, the observance of the requirements of legislation on the social protection of servicemen and the members of their families, particularly pertaining to the duration of the work week of servicemen;
 - d) takes measures to improve the ecological and health-safety climate at locations where military units are stationed and promotes the medical rehabilitation of individuals who were stricken from the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe, as well as other ecological emergencies and catastrophes;
 - e) furthers the creation of the necessary health-safety and domestic conditions for servicemen and the members of their families, taking into account the specific nature of service and the ecological situation, providing qualified medical care for them at military medical institutions and at the preventive-treatment institutions of the MOZ [Ministry of Health] of Ukraine, as well as health-resort treatments and rest at sanatoria, rest homes, pensions and tourist bases of the Ministry of Defense, the MVS, the National Guard, the Security Service, the State Border Committee and other military formations of Ukraine;
 - f) takes part in the creation of proper conditions for the activity of health-treatment and health-resort institutions with the aim of ensuring the treatment and relaxation of invalids among the servicemen;
 - g) facilitates the examination of issues connected with pension support, state obligations for personal insurance for servicemen and compensation for damages in the case of their death or crippling for the members of their families;
 - h) facilitates the social adaptation of servicemen discharged into the reserves or retired and their job placement and necessary retraining;
 - i) takes measures to ensure the social rights of draftees, their skilled medical examination and the granting of deferments from the draft on grounds envisaged by legislation in force; raises the issue under stipulated procedure for the institution of proceedings against individuals who do not uphold legislation on the social protection of servicemen;
 - j) lends methodological assistance to the workers of the corresponding ministries and agencies and the authorized representatives of the committee in resolving issues of the social protection of servicemen;
 - k) conducts explanatory work pertaining to legislation in force on issues of the social protection of servicemen and the members of their families.
6. The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen, in fulfilling the functions entrusted to it, interacts with the Ministry of Defense, MVS, National Guard, Security Service, the State Border Committee and other central bodies of state executive power of Ukraine, bodies of the Republic of Crimea, local state administrations, bodies of local and regional self-government and civil associations, as well as the executive bodies of other states.
7. The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen has the right:
- a) to create, in essential cases, working groups (commissions) to check on cases of the violation of the rights of servicemen and obtain the necessary documents on issues that arise; and
 - b) to obtain information from ministries, agencies and other bodies and organizations on issues that fall under the jurisdiction of the committee.

8. The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen promulgates orders within the limits of its jurisdiction on the basis of, and for the fulfillment of, legislation in force and organizes and monitors their fulfillment.

The committee also promulgates joint statements in conjunction with other central and local bodies of state executive power, bodies of local and regional self-government and civil associations.

9. The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen is headed by a chairman designated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The chairman of the committee has a deputy who is designated at his request by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The chairman of the Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine bears personal responsibility for the fulfillment of the tasks entrusted to the committee and the implementation of its functions, and stipulates the extent of responsibility of the deputy chairman and the supervisors of subdivisions of the committee.

10. The committee creates a collegium made up of the chairman of the committee (the chairman of the collegium), his deputy and other supervisory workers of the committee for the coordinated resolution of issues that lie under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen.

The composition of the collegium may include supervisors from other central bodies of state executive power and representatives of the corresponding public organizations.

The members of the collegium of the committee are approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The decisions of the collegium are brought to life, as a rule, by orders of the committee.

Supervisors of interested ministries and other central bodies of state executive power, enterprises and organizations that have a direct relation to the issues that are being considered take part in sessions of the collegium when necessary.

11. The maximum size and wage fund for the workers of the central apparatus of the Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen is approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The structure of the central apparatus of the committee is approved by the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine.

The standard composition of the central apparatus of the committee and the statute on its structural subdivisions are approved by the chairman of the committee.

12. The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen is a legal person, has an independent balance

sheet, accounts at banking institutions and a seal with the impression of the State Emblem of Ukraine and its own name.

Decree on Amnesty for Ukrainians Who Committed 'Crimes' During the Afghan War

92UM1356B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
9 Jul 92 p 1

[Decree of the Ukrainian President "On Confirmation of the Fact of Amnesty for Ukrainian Citizens Who Had Committed Crimes and Who Are Former Servicemen of the Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Considering the numerous appeals from state organs, public organizations and individual citizens regarding amnesty for former servicemen in the contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan who had committed crimes, and in order to eliminate obstacles on the path of the return of imprisoned Ukrainian citizens to the motherland, I RESOLVE:

to confirm the fact of amnesty for former servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens, implemented in accordance with the 28 November 1989 decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Amnesty for Former Servicemen of the Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan Who Had Committed Crimes."

[Signed] President of the Ukraine L. Kravchuk
Kiev
1 July 1992

Statute on Publication of NARODNAYA ARMIYA

92UM1287C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Jul 92 p 1

[Text of Statute]

[Text]

Statute on the Publishing House of the Central Organ of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine NARODNAYA ARMIYA

Approved by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine on 8 Jul 91

The publishing house provides for the high-quality and timely output of the newspaper and its efficient delivery to subscribers. The subscription to the newspaper NARODNAYA ARMIYA and other mass publications in the Armed Forces and among the population of Ukraine is organized and performed through the subscription department. The overall supervision is exercised by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The publishing house is maintained through:

—income from the dissemination of newspaper circulation;

- income from the publication of advertisements and announcements, as well as other types of commercial activity;
- deductions for subscriptions and the dissemination of newspapers and other periodicals on a commission basis;
- appropriations according to estimates of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine as subsidies to cover the difference between income and expenses for the publication of the newspaper.

The business and financial activity of the publishing house is accomplished according to estimates of income and expenses approved by the first deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

The Ministry of Defense carries out the material and technical support for the activity of the publishing house through the Center for Technical Means and Printing of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

The publishing house makes monthly transfers to the business account of the editorial office the necessary amount for authors' honoraria, as well as the amount stipulated for the fund of the editor-in-chief, from the income received from the sale of newspapers and the publication of advertisements and announcements.

The publishing house may create its own typography and small or joint enterprises with the right of publishing activity.

The publishing house accomplishes material and technical support for the everyday activity of the editorial office. Production, material and financial relations between the publishing house and the editorial office are structured on the basis of a contract between both parties.

The publishing house enjoys the rights of a legal person and has its own seal and business—and where necessary foreign-currency—account at a bank.

The chief of the publishing house is designated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine by submission of the editor-in-chief of the newspaper NARODNAYA ARMIYA.

Statute on Central Military Press

92UM1287B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Jul 92 p 1

[Text of statute]

[Text]

Statute on the Central Press Organ of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine NARODNAYA ARMIYA

Approved by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine on 8 Jul 92

In accordance with the decree of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine of 11 Oct 91, the newspaper NARODNAYA ARMIYA is the central press organ of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The newspaper is guided in its activity by the Press Law of Ukraine, the orders and directives of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, this Statute and the Editorial Charter. The overall supervision of the editorial office is exercised by the Minister of Defense and the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The newspaper is called upon to cover in objective and operative fashion the political, economic and spiritual life of Ukraine; profoundly and comprehensively show the course of organizational development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, reflect the problems of combat and humanitarian training of the troops, social and legal protection of the interests of the servicemen, their families, participants in the liberation struggle of Ukraine and veterans of the Armed Forces and wars; actively elucidate the substance of the military policy of the Ukrainian state, the requirements of the oath and regulations and the legislation of Ukraine; broadly show the advanced practices of commanders in training and indoctrinating personnel, reinforcing military discipline and maintaining strict regulation order in the units and subunits; cultivate in the servicemen a feeling of duty and responsibility for conscientious service to the people of Ukraine on the basis of introducing them to national history, heroic deeds and culture.

The newspaper is published in the Ukrainian and Russian languages, except for Sundays and Mondays, in four pages using format A-2.

The editor-in-chief of the newspaper will complete a certification commission of the Ministry of Defense, is designated by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and is the direct superior of all editorial personnel. Designations for all other officer positions are made after the completion of an editorial certification commission by submission of the editor-in-chief by order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine with the signature of his first deputy. The selection of journalistic personnel is made on a competitive basis according to the results of internships at the editorial board. Office staff are designated by the editor-in-chief of the newspaper.

The publication of each issue is possible only with the permission of the editor-in-chief, or in his absence the first deputy editor-in-chief.

The duties of editorial officials are defined by the "Regulations for the Daily Routine and Functional Duties of Editorial Workers," approved by order of the editors. The workers of the newspaper are prohibited from being diverted from the execution of their immediate duties.

The editorial office enjoys the rights of a legal individual, has its own seal and, where necessary, a foreign-currency bank account.

The monetary upkeep of the editorial workers is accomplished through budgetary financing from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The amount of authors' honoraria for one issue of the newspaper and the procedure for paying them are defined in a supplement to this Statute and are approved separately by the First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine in coordination with the Finance Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in cases of changes in the economic situation in the state. The amount of authors' honoraria are transferred monthly to the editorial business account of the publishing house from the income received from the sale of newspaper circulations.

Material and technical support for the everyday activity of the editorial office is accomplished by the publishing house of the newspaper. Production, material and financial relations between the editorial and publishing offices are structured on the basis of a contract between both parties.

Long-Range Aviation Officers Relieved for Malfeasance

92UM1287A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Jul 92 p 1

[Order by Ukraine Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov under the rubric "At the Ukraine Ministry of Defense": "The Offenses Have Been Curtailed"]

[Text] *Ukraine Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov has issued his latest order on abuses by officials and the punishment of the guilty.*

Major-General V. Yakunov, commander of a division in an aviation group of long-range aviation of the Ukraine armed forces, and Chief of Staff and Deputy Division Commander Colonel Ye. Pachin, as well as Lieutenant Colonels G. Shkiryia and A. Kustenkov and Major A. Lyubchenko, are relieved of their duties by order of the Minister of Defense. The documents on them have been submitted for discharge into the reserves, and materials have been transmitted to the General Procuracy of Ukraine.

The aforementioned officers have been abusing their official positions for a long period of time, grossly violating prevailing legislation and the orders of the Minister of Defense. They repeatedly organized and dispatched sugar, building materials and other goods whose export is prohibited over the borders of Ukraine using military air transport. They squandered military matériel and hardware, and made illegal use of personnel subordinate to them and special machinery and apparatus for operations at various cooperatives and enterprises.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted according to the facts of the abuse by the military procuracy, and preliminary investigation is being conducted.

Ukraine Ministry of Defense Press Service

From the editors: *A host of letters replying to features which discussed the abuses by Colonel Korchmarik and Colonel-General Chechevatov have been coming in to the editors. Our readers already know the fate of the former. As for Chechevatov, who is today serving in the Far East, the General Procuracy of Ukraine has instituted criminal proceedings against him for "affairs" conducted during the period of his command of the troops in the KVO [Kiev Military District]. We will provide additional reports on the details.*

Draft Evasion in Zaporozhye Oblast

92UM1286 Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
14 Jul 92 p 1

[Interview with oblast military commissar Colonel Nikolay Ivanovich Moroz by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Vasilii Goshko under the rubric "Topical Interview": "How Did the Spring Call-Up Go?"]

[Text] *My trip to Ivano-Frankovsk coincided with the last days of the call-up of the youth of the oblast into the ranks of the Ukrainian armed forces. Speaking by telephone with the oblast military commissar, Colonel Nikolay Ivanovich Moroz, I asked him to give an interview to our newspaper.*

[V. Goshko] Nikolay Ivanovich, you have quite a modest office, and the building that accommodates the oblast military commissariat has cracks. I have in mind the splitting that has appeared, especially in the ceiling. Who should be repairing the facilities? But that is by the way. The chief question—how did the call-up go?

[N.I. Moroz] Believe it or not, there were no real problems. The draft plan was overfulfilled. Don't be surprised, a plan exists. So then, we called up 100 more people than we were supposed to. And there is still a reserve. We were short just 68 drivers, but we will find out who has a driver's license and send them to the units.

Here I would like to emphasize one detail. Whereas in other call-ups some draftees were sent notice after notice and the future soldier was virtually delivered to the assembly point with the aid of a police detail, the picture is different today. There are no few examples where a youth who has received a deferment on a legal basis comes to the rayon military commissariat and asks that he be sent to the army. Many come with their parents, who have asked with the most honest of motives that we "take in," as they express it, their son. I cannot name them all. They are Yuriy Ivanyuk, Stepan Knignitskiy, Mikhail Nazaruk, Mikhail Pavlyuk and dozens and dozens of others. True patriots of their Motherland live in Ivano-Frankovsk and Bogorodchanskiy, Kosovski, Rozhnyatovski and many other rayons of the oblast.

[V. Goshko] The officers and the rayon military commissars were probably working well on that plane?

[N.I. Moroz] Of course. It was explained to the draftees that from now on they will serve in the Ukraine, that essentially a new army is being created and each of them should consider it a matter of honor to perform their soldierly duty. I will give a small example. Not all used to agree to serve in the navy. Even today serving as a sailor is half a year longer in duration than serving as, say, an artilleryman, motorized rifleman, in short, those serving on land. We proceeded according to the principle of volunteer enlistment. That is, we asked in front of the formation who wanted to serve in the Black Sea Fleet. Many of the youth took three steps forward without hesitation or vacillation. We then chose from among them those who were best suited by health and other requirements. In short, some 290 people have already been dressed in sailor's caps. That is simply delightful.

Colonel Valeriy Fedorovich Shapovalov, Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Dyuzhin, Major Mikhail Alekseyevich Slyvotskiy and the other military commissars deserve credit for this. I would like to talk about Slyvotskiy in particular. He was recently assigned to that post, and is handling all of his duties successfully despite all of the existing difficulties.

[V. Goshko] In general, everything went along smoothly?

[N.I. Moroz] Not at all. There were evaders who cleared out for home from the assembly points and hid in their parents' yards. But they were few and far between. Those who ran away in particular were Vladimir Gibel, living in the village of Goshiv in Dolinskiy Rayon, Vasiliy Babinyuk from the settlement of Lesnaya Slobodka, and Miron Yakubyak, called up from Nadvornaya. It is sad, but criminal proceedings have to be instituted against some of them. The motives for their actions are unknown, but most likely they have become addicted to business, and service in the army thus simply scares them. It is easier to pile up money.

[V. Goshko] Pardon me, Nikolay Ivanovich, but perhaps they did it for religious reasons? It is no secret, after all, that many are members of various sects that are forbidden to bear arms.

[N.I. Moroz] That cannot be ruled out. But we have on the order of 30 statements from draftees with a request to send them to alternative service. All of this is substantiated in the statements, by the way.

[V. Goshko] And you called them up?

[N.I. Moroz] No, we gave them a deferment to the fall. Just for the reason that the mechanism for alternative service has not been worked out. No one can say where to send the young men. They thus decided to wait a little.

[V. Goshko] Were there any other misunderstandings in the draft? Perhaps you have your own considerations on this score as the military commissar?

[N.I. Moroz] I am inclined toward doing one call-up a year, and that only in the fall. I will substantiate that point of view. By the fall everyone who will have to serve

in the army can precisely determine his fate. A person in the tenth grade, in other words, will not be guessing and trembling whether he will be called or not, and he will be calm if he decided to prepare for the institute. If he gets in, fine. If he does not, he can prepare for service in the army and change his plans for a time.

Next. Who today is unaware of the complexities of the hardware? We cannot put the motorized rifleman and the missile soldier on the same scales. In sports terms, they are in different weight categories. A youth who has landed in a motorized-rifle unit could—and a year would be plenty enough with a conscientious attitude toward improvement—master his combat specialty. What about the missile soldier? Eighteen months are scarcely enough. I myself was an artilleryman and know how complex the science is there. One thus has to think about how to make service for the soldiers more flexible and useful for the Motherland.

[V. Goshko] Where are the people from the Carpathians serving now?

[N.I. Moroz] In various oblasts of Ukraine. Some, you could say, are almost at home. If not in their own settlement, then next to it.

[V. Goshko] The guys do not run home to their mothers for dinner in such cases?

[N.I. Moroz] It all depends on the parents. If they gave their son instructions to serve without a hitch, he fulfills them. Those who pat their little boy on the head and stick an extra hundred in his pocket are doing a disservice. I will refer to one case. A soldier was serving in the oblast military commissariat. The father lived in the city of Kosovo, repairing motor vehicles at a cooperative. He used to come and leave his son heaps of money. The son would throw it all away. He considered himself a rich man, with his colleagues in the department working and he with his hands in his pockets. The officers make a remark and he starts an argument with them. I told the father this and that, your son is headed the wrong way. The father implores forgiveness and says that everything that happened was for the last time. But he only had to leave and his descendant was the old way again. We had to part ways with such a soldier, of course. If you are fed up with serving at home, go further away.

[V. Goshko] And now, Nikolay Ivanovich, we return to the cracks in the corridor all the same...

[N.I. Moroz] We have to make major repairs, but no one is allocating any money. You look warily at the ceiling. Although we are essentially a department of the oblast ispolkom, the local authorities, candidly speaking, are not all that worried about us. A number of officers of the rayon military commissariats have been waiting for apartments for many years. I myself have not had a roof over my head for a long time now. Even though everyone understands perfectly well that we are performing a task

of great state importance. All right, we will bear the difficulties staunchly in the future as well, here we are not alone.

[V. Goshko] The boys from Ivano-Frankovsk are serving well in principle. Isn't that so?

[N.I. Moroz] Certainly. A feeling of patriotism is characteristic of an overwhelming number of the youth. Now all the more so as they are serving under the blue and yellow flag for which their ancestors died.

[V. Goshko] Thank you, Nikolay Ivanovich, for this discussion. I think that this is not our last meeting, and our newspaper will be writing occasionally about the fellows from the Carpathian region and how they are serving.

[N.I. Moroz] Thank you, that would be the best incentive for those who are preparing to be called up in the fall.

BYELARUS

Byelarus Deputy Commander on Loyalty Oath, 'Anti-Crisis' Committee

92UM1304A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 10 Jun 92 p 2

[Interview with Colonel Vladimir Vasilyevich Savenok, deputy chairman of the Byelarusian Servicemen's Association, by journalist Vladimir Rudenko under the rubric "The Matter Hinges Upon Debtors": "Col Savenok: 'Do Not Look for Enemies but Serve With Devotion and Honor'"]

[Text]

[Rudenko] Vladimir Vasilyevich, The Byelarusian Servicemen's Association (BZV) is the first robin in the spring of a national rebirth in the military. What are your concerns today?

[Savenok] Six months ago few people believed in the establishment of a Byelarusian army. It is now a reality. Mar Avn Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov openly states: "An army without a state is no army. A state without an army is no state." I would point out that quite recently he had a different opinion. There was active promotion of a unified army. What happened? Was it belated insight or consideration of the new circumstances?

Unfortunately, not everyone understands the need to establish a Byelarusian army. People advance the argument, used until it sets the teeth on edge: Can we afford to maintain an army? What does one say to that. The reality has provided the answer. Including the answer to the question of what kind of army we should build. One which we can maintain in a fitting manner, of course. It goes without saying that military development is a painful matter today, but sooner or later that line has to be crossed. The main thing is not to create artificial barriers. It is time to grasp the fact that we are a nation,

Byelarus. And believe me, we have grounds for respecting ourselves. The purpose of the Byelarusian Officers' Association is to defend our sovereignty. The Anti-Crisis Committee has been set up at our initiative, and a corresponding agreement has been signed.

[Rudenko] Incidentally, some newspapers have not missed the opportunity to state sarcastically that it is not far from the AKK [Anti-Crisis Committee] to a GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]....

[Savenok] The BZV has succeeded in assembling at a round table all political parties, public organizations and the nation's leaders. It has one goal—to ensure reliable protection for Byelarus' new statehood.

This is unprecedented in history, but it is a fact. People are beginning to think from the perspective of a state. They are capable of assessing objectively the changes occurring.

[Rudenko] You personally nominated Kebich to head the Anti-Crisis Committee.

[Savenok] I did. And I do not feel that I was mistaken. Vyacheslav Frantsevich is a patriot. He is a firm and decisive person, capable of making independent decisions.

[Rudenko] I admit that I was somewhat surprised when I saw Col Savenok at the headquarters of the former Belorussian Military District. When you were transferred to the new job, was anyone in the BZV assigned that enormous job of combatting corruption in the forces?

[Savenok] A new structure was being created in the district to work with the personnel. I was offered a place in it.

I have to say that some people tried to paint the BZV in various nationalistic colors. The things that were attributed to us: a Baltic syndrome, national egotism and so forth. Rumors were spread that we were forcing out officers of other nationalities. That was too much! We look at other qualities when considering people for the Byelarusian army—professionalism and devotion to the homeland.

The question of the oath comes up. Some people say that an oath is given only once. Is that so? Let us examine that. In the first place, the old Union no longer exists. A new statehood has been formed, which has to be filled in with the appropriate institutions. This includes an army. Maintained by its people, it must serve those people.

In the second place, every time there was a new czar, the military took an oath to him and to the homeland. It would not be a disgrace—in fact, it is essential—to take an oath of loyalty to the Byelarusian people and government.

With respect to fighting corruption, I am not abandoning that obligation.

[Rudenko] What are your impressions on the new job?

[Savenok] I am performing a military-sociological study. Information on those problems which are troubling the officers and warrant officers was submitted to the Supreme Soviet of Byelarus. This was done before the laws on servicemen were passed. Incidentally, only 4% of the servicemen intend to leave Byelarus following their discharge. This figure reveals how the Byelarusians treat members of different nationalities.

[Rudenko] What things are upsetting?

[Savenok] A spirit of uncertainty hangs over the officers and warrant officers. They do not know what the future holds. And they receive no feedback. Administrative officers have no direct contact with the personnel. There is no money for temporary duty assignments. Some officers do not know what to do. A new agency has been set up to work with the personnel, but the work style of the old political directorate remains. The capabilities of this or that officer are determined by how much paperwork he writes up. Even the typists, who are accustomed to filling out rubber-stamp documents are protesting—still timidly, to be sure. Many officers seem to be living in the past. It is time to wake up, to take a look around. We should not be dividing people up according to nationality and looking for enemies. It is time to roll up our sleeves and work for the good of the Republic of Byelarus.

[Rudenko] All the more, since there are things deserving the application of hearts and minds in the development of patriotic feelings in the army.

[Savenok] Without patriotism there is no army. We have things with which to indoctrinate the armed defenders of the homeland. Our homeland has a truly great military history. Not to exaggerate, but Europe knows that.

Those who will be the motive force behind the big job are already to be seen. It is interesting that the new growth of a Byelarusian renaissance is sometimes stronger outside the republic. Is this paradoxical? It is true, though. Judge for yourself. Lt Col Stanislav Sudnik serves at a garrison in far-off Kazakhstan, in a small remote town. He publishes a newspaper in the Byelarusian language and has helped to open two Byelarusian Sunday schools. The officers received every kind of support from the command element and local leaders. And from this have come tangible advances in the rebirth of the Byelarusian language and culture. Our organizations are active in Moscow and Tver. They have access to the mass media and participate in the public life of the cities.

[Rudenko] Patriotism is not born. It is developed....

[Savenok] I agree. Commanders, officers and educators, play first fiddle in this. They have an obligation to work in the new way, with state interests in mind. There is no such thing as haphazard, CIS patriotism. And so, it is a matter of who performs the education. Right now, these

are people with a poor grasp of the new tasks. Social-humanitarian training as an adjunct of militancy cannot produce perceptible results in the development of patriotism. It is fairly abstract and removed from the actual history of Byelarus today. The situation has to be fundamentally changed.

Clearly, erudite, literate and experienced people must perform the indoctrinational work in the army. I believe that these agencies were put together in haste, however. The structures put forth by Moscow are efficient. Judging from everything, their establishment was dictated by a desire to retain official functions. Officers-and-educators responsible for everything cannot completely direct their abilities. They function as errand boys.

[Rudenko] Vladimir Vasilyevich, are we, then, to have an army which is Byelarusian in purpose, spirit and devotion to the homeland?

[Savenok] I believe so. As part of my public work I frequently travel with the people's deputies to garrisons near and far and meet with the fightingmen. They all have an enormous interest in military reforms. We tell people the truth. And it is not always pleasant to all of them. I am disturbed, for example, by the dragging out of many matters pertaining to the army. If they say "A," for example, it has to be taken as a realistic proposal. If we are forming a Belarussian army, then let us do it openly and systematically. Let us respect the laws, the elected government and the sovereignty proclaimed by the parliament.

BALTIC STATES

Republic's Coastal Security Measures Detailed

92UN1805B Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian
3 Jul 92 p 13

[Article by Ricardas Jarmalavicius: "How the Coast is Guarded"]

[Text] Lithuania possesses 99 kilometers of Baltic sea-coast. In February of this year, the coastal defense force of the border defense service of the KAM [Ministry of National Defense] took control of the coast from the Russians. It also guards the border along the Niemen River in the Kaliningrad area. The Russians have not yet evacuated their posts at Nida, Joudkrante, Giruliai, Palanga, and Karklinikai. Negotiations concerning their transfer are continuing. The Lithuanian border defense service has already received three technical observation posts, but two of them, at Karklinikai and Svetoji, need repairs. There is an operational radar only at Melnrage. From here, traffic through the sea gates is watched. The radar is effective for about 22 kilometers, i.e., to the limit of Lithuania's territorial waters, and scans a narrow area. There are more powerful Russian radars some tens of meters away, but, like those at the Palanga and Nida radar posts, Lithuania does not yet

own them. So far as Lithuania's territorial waters elsewhere are concerned, not to mention the 200 kilometer economic zone, Lithuania exercises no control. There are observation towers at Sventoji, Karklenai, Melnrage, and Koppalis. From these towers, Lithuanian soldiers can only see as far as their 5 kilometer beam goes, and only in the daytime. Mornings, patrols walk the seacoast, looking for signs of any nocturnal landings.

Coastal defense does not just mean coastal fortifications. The role of the resurrected navy is perhaps more important. Thus far, only one cutter, the "Vytyis-1", has since last February guarded the sea gate, and checked incoming and outgoing ships. Several river cutters constantly patrol the Niemen at Panemune and Rusne, and once in a while, when information is received about smugglers, one sails into the Kursiu Lagoon. The last has yet to catch any evildoers-the technology has proved disappointing. Soon repairs will be completed on the "Vytyis-2", which will patrol the ocean at Sventoji.

The Russian coast guard ships left their base in Klaipeda right after the August putsch. The KAM then set up its coastal defense force ship division there-the nucleus of the future naval fleet. Soon, on July 4th, ceremonies will take place, at which three substantial ships will be christened-the rescue ship "Vetra," and guard cutters "21" and "22." On that day they will still be unarmed; it is planned to equip them with light or medium caliber machine guns. The names of the ships will be unveiled by their godmothers; candidates to perform that function are currently being intensively sought among famous Lithuanian women who have served their country. With pomp and ceremony, the flag of the naval forces of the Republic of Lithuania will be consecrated. It consists of a blue cross against a white background, and sports the tricolor in one quadrant. It will be presented to the coastal defense force, and raised on their ships. By the way, the Latvian navy has been flying its flag since early May.

Later, the plan is to obtain 5-6 more patrol boats from Russia, and to set up apartments in Kaliningrad for Lithuanian coastal patrolmen. That is in the process of being negotiated. It might be possible to get a ship or two from the West, initially perhaps for free. Reliable sources indicate that besides five or six patrol boats, it is deemed desirable to have 2-3 mine-laying trawlers, and several ships capable of launching rockets. Powerful coastal artillery or perhaps small rockets are also on the wish list.

It will be difficult to obtain the needed manpower, for experienced naval specialists in Lithuania still qualified for service can be counted on one's fingers. Both mercenaries and draftees will serve in the Lithuanian navy. The latter will serve for a year and a half, i.e., for half a year longer than those in other branches of the military. Specialists will be trained at the University of Klaipeda, the naval school, and the Kaunas Technical University. Promising youths will be sent to the West to study.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijan to Take Control of Military Supply Warehouses

92UM1300C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Jul 92 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Azerbaijan"]

[Text] An announcement from the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Azerbaijan published in the local press states that the republic defense department has adopted a decision to assume control of military depots of the CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces] within Azerbaijan. The Ministry of Defense protested an incident which occurred on 11 July in Geranboyskiy Rayon adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Azeri sources a group of officers of the CIS OVS took off in a helicopter belonging to the Transcaucasus Military District and shelled an ammunition depot at 15:00 on 11 July. A fire broke out and burned for six hours. It is asserted that had the ammunition at the depot exploded, flames would have engulfed an area within a radius of 150 kilometers.

In addition, the military procuracy of Azerbaijan's MO instigated legal action under Paragraph 3 of Article 191 of the Criminal Code ("intentional destruction of state property") concerning the destruction of property of the military post at Kürdamir. It is reported that at the command element's order a military unit of the Russian army stationed there burned or blew up military facilities and put the communication system and transport equipment out of operation prior to the regiment's evacuation to a new station.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Decree on Ministry of Defense

92US0721A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 17 Jul 92 p 1

[Decree Issued by the President of Turkmenistan: "On Changing the Name of the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense Matters to the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] In accordance with Article 12 of the Turkmenistan Constitution and in connection with the creation of Turkmenistan's Armed Forces, I hereby decree the following:

The name of the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense Matters shall be changed to the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense.

[Signed] S. Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan
City of Ashkhabad
14 July 1992

Decree on Alternative Service

92US0721B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 17 Jul 92 p 1

[Decree Issued by the President of Turkmenistan: "On Introducing Alternative (Labor) Service on the Territory of Turkmenistan"]

[Text] In order to further improve the performance of effective military service, as well as to broaden civil rights and liberties, I hereby decree the following:

1. Alternative (labor) service shall be introduced on the territory of Turkmenistan.
 2. It shall be established that those draftees or selectees whose health is suitable for military service, who have reached the age of 18 years or older, and who can possibly be freed from the necessity of performing military service, shall—by a decision of the draft or selective-service commissions—be sent during peacetime to perform alternative (labor) service. For this purpose, the above-indicated citizens shall submit a statement setting forth their motives and reasons, together with a request to be sent to perform alternative (labor) service to an etrap (shakher) military commissariat for the place of permanent military registration during the period from 1 January through 1 March and from 1 July through 1 September of the six-month period during which they become 18 years of age.
 3. The calling up of citizens for alternative (labor) service shall be conducted annually on the territory of Turkmenistan twice a year (in May-June and in November-December). The specific time periods during which citizens must appear at the call-up sections shall be determined by an order of the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense.
 4. The places where alternative (labor) service is to be performed shall be established by the Turkmenistan Cabinet of Ministers.
 5. The procedure for sending selectees and their performance of alternative (labor) service shall be determined by the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense, based on the conclusion of agreements with interested ministries, departments, institutions, and organizations.
 6. The time period within which alternative (labor) service is to be performed shall be established as two years.
- Periods of absence from work without important reasons and periods of administrative arrests shall not be counted toward the time period of alternative (labor) service.
7. Citizens of Turkmenistan who are performing alternative (labor) service and members of their families shall be extended all the privileges which are provided for military-service personnel performing actual military service in the Armed Forces.

Those persons serving on a call-up basis cannot be released (dismissed) from their work upon their own volition; nor shall they be granted leave without pay or additional leave.

8. Citizens of Turkmenistan who have been called up to perform alternative (labor) service and who violate labor discipline or public order shall bear responsibility or liability according to the procedure provided for by Turkmenistan's legislature.

[Signed] S. Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan
City of Ashkhabad
14 July 1992

Decree on Strengthening Military Discipline

92US0721C Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 18 Jul 92 p 1

[Decree Issued by the President of Turkmenistan "On Strengthening Military Discipline and Law and Order Among Troops Stationed on the Territory of Turkmenistan"]

[Text] In order to strengthen military discipline and law and order in military units stationed on the territory of Turkmenistan, I hereby decree the following:

1. All military-service personnel who have been called up and have been serving on the territory of Turkmenistan, but who have been absent without leave (AWOL) from their place of service, shall report to their place of service within a period of a month from the time the present Decree is published in order to perform their service duties and obligations, or to the nearest organs of military administration (military commissariats, commandant's office, or military headquarters).
2. Criminal cases with regard to persons indicated in Paragraph 1 of the present Decree, in accordance with Articles 276 (Absence Without Leave from a Unit or Place of Service) and 277 (Desertion) of the Turkmenistan Criminal Code not tried by the courts prior to this Decree entering into force shall be subject to suspension.
3. The leading officials of the military administrative organs which have been turned to during the period of this Decree's effect by military-service personnel who have been called up to perform service on the territory of Turkmenistan shall immediately send them to their former places of service.

Those military-service personnel who were called up on the territory of Turkmenistan and who arrived at military units stationed on the territories of other CIS states shall—in a mandatory procedure—appeal to their military commissariats, commandant's offices, or military headquarters units, and, with the consent of the garrison commander, be redeployed within Turkmenistan's military units.

4. Military-service personnel who continue to refuse—after the expiration of the time period indicated in

Paragraph 1 of the present Decree—from reporting to their places of service or to the nearest military administrative organs, as well as military-service personnel who are AWOL from their places of service after the present Decree has entered into force shall be held responsible in accordance with the presently operative legislation of Turkmenistan.

5. It shall be established that the period of AWOL from the military unit involved shall not count towards the term of service.

6. Violation of the official rules and regulations concerning the interrelations between military-service personnel, regardless of the relations of subordination between them, as expressed in violence which does not endanger the life or health of the person who suffered, shall entail—upon the decision of the commanding officer of the stationed military unit, the arrest and detention of the guilty person for a period of up to 10 days in the guardhouse or stockade.

Persons who have committed these same acts repeatedly or with more significant consequences shall be held criminally responsible or liable in accordance with Turkmenistan's legislation now in effect.

7. Being AWOL from a unit or place of service for a draftee or enlisted man, as well as his failure to report for duty within the specified time period without important reasons—such as being released or dismissed from the unit, upon a designated mission, transfer, under command, on leave, furlough, or undergoing medical treatment—for more than three days shall entail a disciplinary penalty—arrest with detention in the guardhouse or stockade for a period of up to ten days, to be imposed by the commanding officer of the military unit in question.

Persons who have committed these same actions after disciplinary actions have been applied or which continue for more than three days shall be held criminally responsible in accordance with the legislation presently in effect in Turkmenistan.

Time spent by military-service personnel in a guardhouse or stockade shall not be counted toward his time period of active military service.

8. The Turkmenistan Ministry of Justice shall be assigned the task of preparing within a month's time proposals concerning the introduction of changes and additions to the existing Turkmenistan legislation on matters stemming from the present Decree.

9. The Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense shall organize a disciplinary battalion on the territory of Turkmenistan within a three-month period of time.

The chiefs of the garrisons and the commanding officers of the military units shall bring the garrison and military guardhouses into line with the proper requirements.

10. The present Decree shall enter into force from the moment of its signing.

[Signed] S. Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan

Tajik Fighters Reportedly Trained in Afghanistan

92UM1356D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Jul 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Fighters Penetrate to Tajik Territory"]

[Text] According to a report from the headquarters of the Central Asian Border District, camps training fighters referred to here as "brotherly mujahedin from Tajikistan" were established in the Afghan province of Kunduz. In the last three months, 110 Afghan border violators were detained. As a rule the goal of the crossings is to move sizable consignments of firearms across the border. One of the groups of violators possessed plans for terrorist attacks on Tajik territory.

It is noted that the border violators are often given covering fire from Afghanistan.

Tajikistan to Open Military College for Officer Training

92UM1356E Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 92
Morning Edition p 8

[Article by Aleksandr Karpov: "The First Military College in Tajikistan"]

[Text] Tajikistan will be training its own officers. This is the job of the republic's first military college, which will open in the immediate future.

Military educational institutions of CIS countries are presently accepting Tajik youngsters only on a contract basis. This requires considerable material outlays. Moreover under the present circumstances difficulties of a legal nature are also arising. In particular there is the problem of taking the military oath. When it opens, the republic's military college will help to alleviate these problems. The college offers a four-year training program. Its graduates will be awarded the rank of lieutenant.

Uzbek Defense Chief on Size of Army, Oath

92UM1300B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Semen Novoprudskiy under the rubric "Uzbekistan": "'Alternative' Servicemen Will Become Conductors"]

[Text] A decree passed by the parliament on the military oath was another step toward the establishment of Uzbekistan's national army. Two of its provisions deserve attention. The first is that the fightingmen will swear allegiance to the people and the president and not

to the state. The second states that the authorities have prudently decided not to create additional problems for personnel of the disbanded Turkestan Military District who are located in Uzbekistan. Anyone who took the oath of loyalty to the USSR will not be required to take the oath to Uzbekistan.

According to President Islam Karimov and Military Minister Rustam Akhmedov, Uzbekistan intends to have an army of 25,000-30,000 men and a small

National Guard of less than 1,000. There are provisions for alternative service—including important jobs. Specifically, some recruits will now serve as conductors in the city transport system to make up for a severe shortage in the Uzbek capital.

Cadets at the Tashkent Combined-Arms Command School and new recruits in one of the special units of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Uzbekistan were the first to take the new oath.

ARMS TRADE

Military Trade With Finland

92UM1294B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Jun 92 p 1

[RIA report under the rubric "In Brief": "We Are Trading Tanks for Cosmetics"]

[Text] Finland will purchase military equipment worth 290 million Finnish marks from Russia this year. Minister of Defense Elisabeth Rehn announced that armored equipment and ammunition will be shipped to that nation's armed forces. The purchases will not include T-72 tanks, since Finland has acquired dozens of these combat vehicles from Germany.

Russia will receive Finnish products in exchange for these shipments: industrial equipment, maritime vessels, personal computers, children's foods and cosmetics, among other things.

MAPO Foreign Sales of MiG-29 Licensed

92UM1371A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 6 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Kuzmin, general director of the Moscow Aviation Production Association: "Don't Give Up the MiG"]

[Text] In the world there are just four nations which produce equipment like the MiG-29. It would be an unpardonable error to surrender the positions we have won. Just what can happen here can be seen from the example of the head enterprise producing tactical fighters, the Moscow Aviation Production Association (MAPO).

If one takes MAPO, its inevitable conversion, which has been the frequent subject of important politicians, has already been completed. For instead of the planned 40 percent, the military orders have been reduced by 100 percent!

But in fact things are somewhat different. The association at its own risk and peril is continuing to assemble the MiG-29. Of course, in a significantly smaller number in order not to halt the well established production or put skilled personnel out on the street.

Moreover in the West the stir over the MiGs has not declined and this was again confirmed by the recent Berlin Aerospace Salon IPA-92. There were many offers to purchase it, the analogous U.S. aircraft are no better but much more expensive. In the opinion of specialists, our fighter in terms of performance and combat qualities surpasses the Eurofighter Jagger-90 which is still being designed.

The replacing of the economic levers of conversion by arbitrary directives and haste in carrying this out creates an absurd situation.

We lived through conversion more or less calmly. But at the end of 1991, the Government unexpectedly deprived the association of 34 million dollars for the delivery of equipment to one of the countries and then "froze," but in essence confiscated 28 million from the account at Vneshekonombank [Foreign Economics Bank] and blocked all the foreign currency receipts for the enterprise...

After this the workers, due to the cutback in the main order and the uncertainty as to the further work load and the low wages, began to submit requests for release, and since the start of conversion, that is, over the last 18 months, some 3,000 persons have left and these were first-rate specialists.

Instead of airplanes, we were forced "from above" to produce a cumbersome 10-tonne automatic machine for the batching of sugar. There was no end of trouble in developing its production, we manufactured five units and these stand unsold, as no one will take them because they cost 10 million rubles.

In my view, each person should participate in his own job: the cobbler should make boots and the baker should make pies. With one MiG sold abroad it would be possible to purchase scores of these automatic units.

According to a recent Government decree, at present MAPO together with the MBES [International Bank for Economic Cooperation] have finally been granted the right as equals to seek out purchasers, to conduct talks, to discuss the delivery and payment conditions and to sign contracts. Due to the intense search for an entry into the international market, things are already moving toward the signing of a contract with one of the countries. With a favorable conclusion, a number of countries neighboring the first are ready to submit their offers for the purchase of the MiGs.

At present at the association there is not a single person who does not view hopefully the success of the direct talks. For the financing of the civilian programs depends upon this. In anticipating the severe consequences of conversion, the MAPO leadership some 18 months ago, in cooperation with the Tashkent Aviation Production Association imeni V.L. Chkalov, assumed the development of the IL-114 aircraft, and this in the next few years can become the main civilian aviation export. Not so long ago, with the aid of Rosaeroprogress [Russian Aeroprogress], MAPO began producing on the basis of the An-2, a private 10-12-seat aircraft, the T-101 (this year with the help of the commercial structures, we plan to produce our first aircraft and in the coming year production will be on the level of 40 units). An effort has also been made to manufacture the very popular equipment for the heat treating of meat products, smoking sheds with a productivity of one tonne per day. In the brief period of 18 months, the enterprise has developed the production of superlight aircraft, the Junior. These mini biplanes, which can be used both for sports purposes as well as for agricultural needs, are exported

abroad. But the main thing at present, of course, is not to give up the MiG. Over the next 3-5 years, this aircraft will have no competitors.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Current Situation, Future of Tula Weapons Plant

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8 Aug 92 First Edition p 4

[Interview with weapon plant chief engineer Valentin Nikolayevich Babakhin by Mikhail Lukanin; place and date not given: "Our First Experience With Conversion Was as Far Back as After the Crimean War"]

[Text] There was a time when the Tula Weapons Plant was a classical example of a defense enterprise. Although this was never publicized, its main product was the Kalashnikov assault rifle, so well known to all the world. Naturally, the no less famous TOZ's—high-class hunting and sports weapons—also brought glory to the plant. But this is in a sense secondary, since priority has always been given here to military orders.

There are barely any signs of life today in the shop in which Kalashnikov rifles are assembled. Most of the workers have been put on leave. Almost all of the hangers on the conveyer belt, which crawls along at a snail's pace, have nothing on them. You could smoke half a pack waiting for just a single part to arrive. The less you do during a shift, the better. As it is, for a long time the warehouse has been stuffed full with finished products that have nowhere to go. Since the beginning of this year the Russian Ministry of Defense has not taken delivery of a single assault rifle from the Tula weapon manufacturers.

And so, is this farewell to arms?

The subject of my interview is the chief engineer of the weapons plant, Valentin Nikolayevich Babakhin

[Lukanin] What do you intend to do with the assault rifles you have already produced, as well as those which continue to be manufactured at the plant, albeit in a minimum quantity?

[Babakhin] We will offer them in the foreign market. The Russian government gave us the right to do so. More precisely, all we have so far is the basic decision, which has yet to be scrutinized at many levels of authority: including the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and so on.

[Lukanin] To be honest, I, and many others as well, believed that you are already quite active in the foreign market, including in countries at our borders. Is it true that the belief that you can now simply come to Tula for Kalashnikov assault rifles is nothing more than a totally unconfirmed rumor?

[Babakhin] Our plant is not a private stall in a market square. Assault rifles may be delivered only on the basis of a license, and this itself precludes all possibility of uncontrolled sales. But as far as selling hunting weapons, there are no problems at the present time. People do in fact come to us for them from all directions. We participate in the most prestigious international auctions, and we have had advantageous offers from within the CIS.

The demand for hunting weapons is exceptionally high today. It is owing to this, by the way, that we are able to maintain relatively stable economic ties with associated enterprises, which, you must agree, is a real stroke of luck for a defense plant today. In particular, we have been able to retain normal relations as partners with Ukrainian manufacturers of special grades of steel. We keep each other happy.

[Lukanin] I must say that I myself witnessed the coming together of many nationalities at your plant's permit office. There were many vehicles with foreign license plates. From what you say, the influx of customers is explained by an interest in hunting, and not in war. Valentin Nikolayevich, doesn't it seem a little too strange to you that the number of hunters increased so abruptly in recent years?

[Babakhin] The answer is obvious: It is not at all excessive today to have a double-barreled weapon around "just in case." In fact, how is a farmer, for example, to ensure his personal safety otherwise? Life is somehow more tranquil with a hunting weapon around, especially if you live alone in a sparsely populated region.

[Lukanin] If I understand you correctly, production of hunting and sports weapons is doing a lot to keep you afloat in times when orders for assault rifles have stopped coming in.

[Babakhin] Yes, but my hope is that this is a temporary phenomenon. We still associate our future with production of combat weapons. We produce 60,000-70,000 units of hunting and sports weapons annually. This is not enough to ensure the plant's viability. Especially if we consider that the proportion of our hard currency expenditures in support of production of hunting and sports weapons is high. For example we go abroad to buy high quality wood for rifle stocks, varnishes and ornamental and finishing materials. As you would surmise, modern assault rifle systems don't need such things. Moreover we have a significantly higher capacity for manufacturing them.

It is also very important to keep our hands on the unique production procedures and specialists. What they told us is true: The Russian army can get by quite well with the existing reserves of automatic weapons. But time doesn't stand still. The weapons business is developing dynamically. And we must be ready for the time when military orders appear once again, we must not fall behind technical progress. I can say without false modesty that the weapons produced in our plant are distinguished primarily by their quality and reliability.

As we know, Kalashnikov assault rifles of different modifications are manufactured not just in Russia alone. There are plants in China, Romania, Bulgaria and elsewhere. The models may resemble each other outwardly, but while the survivability of our assault rifle is 15,000 rounds, the Romanian or Chinese "Kalashnikovs" can't rise beyond 5,000-7,000.

We test each barrel to see if it conforms to the basic specifications (grouping, accuracy, maximum range of aimed fire). The reliability tests also necessarily include proof firing at 1.5-2 times the normal pressure.

[Lukanin] Can we assume that with such advantages, you will be without competitors in the world weapon market?

[Babakhin] Things are much more complex than that. When it comes to competition, much also depends on price. It can be said that the price of Kalashnikov assault rifles has been brought down by the large quantities supplied by our former Warsaw Pact allies. In order to attract the attention of solid partners we need to offer improved developments and new modifications. We already have specific ideas, but unfortunately I am unable to describe them at the moment—they're a commercial secret. All I can say is that realistic conditions exist for entering the foreign market with a starting price of \$120 per weapon unit. For comparison, a 7.62-mm AKM presently costs within \$60-70 abroad. A 5.45-mm AK74 costs up to \$90-100.

[Lukanin] Valentin Nikolayevich, let's now talk about conversion. How is it manifesting itself at your plant, considering that you have decided to keep producing assault rifles?

[Babakhin] Conversion has primarily affected sections that were producing antitank guided rockets until recently. We will use these capacities to initiate production of engines for minicultivators on the basis of a license from a certain Italian company. In addition we are setting up production of motor vehicle spare parts, for example for Icarus buses. For a long time we have also been suppliers of compressors and relays for refrigerators, and other peacetime equipment.

Another manifestation of conversion is our improvement of self-loading Simonov carbines. We are making them into superior hunting carbines—the dream of every hunter.

By the way, this is not the first time that the Tula Weapons Plant has found itself undergoing conversion in its 280 year history: The first occurred after the Crimean War. Meaning that we have experience in this. And it tells us that no matter how we retool production, never forget about weapons!

Here is one case. Relatively recently we were approached by a delegation from a certain Baltic state. They wanted to know what would be more advantageous: to purchase infantry weapons elsewhere, or to manufacture them

themselves at a volume of 25,000-30,000 units per year. They acquainted themselves with our production processes, and they made some calculations. And they found that in order to set up even such a relatively small line, they would have to invest R3-5 billion.

[Lukanin] What do you make of the numerous press reports that weapon manufacturers in Grozny managed to start up production of some automatic weapons very closely resembling Israeli Uzi's?

[Babakhin] I haven't seen these models. Personally, I have many doubts in this regard. If you're talking only about assembling weapons, that's one thing. Any machine building enterprise can be tooled for assembly. Even a primitive shop. But it can only produce primitive weapons.

Good weapons can be manufactured only by experts. Do you know what we call our plant's basic educational institution, the one in which we train workers with high qualifications cleared to work in the most critical operations? It's not a vocational-technical school. The plant does have a vocational-technical school, but it provides training in general occupations with universal applications—fitters, turners, milling machine operators, adjusters and so on. In this case, however, we are dealing precisely with weapon manufacturers, with narrow specialists. Our School for Expert Weapon Manufacturers trains the most gifted youngsters. This is not just an eloquent title. An experienced expert gathers together several students, in the way that musicians commonly do, and transmits his secrets to them gradually, on a one-to-one basis.

Believe me, arms experts put an extremely great amount of emphasis on who it is that is offering goods to them: a company with traditions, or Johnny-come-lately manufacturers. It is a question of quality. Without traditions, there can simply be no quality in the weapons business. Advertising won't do a bit of good here.

Hypersonic Missiles

92UM1353C Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE
in Russian No 5-6, 92 p 40

[Article by Lt Col A. Pokatov, candidate of technical sciences, and Maj Yu. Beldzeyko, candidate of technical sciences: "Hypersonic Missiles"]

[Text] As a rule, missiles of this type are designed to hit air, land, and surface targets. In the United States, for example, the HVM ground- and air-launched missiles designed for destroying armored equipment are considered this type. It is also possible to use them against other targets, including helicopters. Multiple launchers in canisters are used to launch the HVM missiles: up to 20 missiles in each canister for ground-based platforms; 6-12 in each for aircraft. It is planned to use the Bradley IFV and other armored vehicles as platforms for this

weapon, as well as F-16, A-8B Harrier, F-15E, and other aircraft. Each aircraft can carry from two to four canisters on underwing mounts.

The ground-to-ground HVM missiles are part of a self-propelled system. Target detection and identification time is 1 second. The distance to the target is determined by a laser rangefinder. The missile weighs 45 kg (77 kg according to other sources), is 162.6 mm in diameter, and has about a 5-kg warhead.

On the air-launched version, guidance is accomplished over a laser beam using a MICOS multifunctional infrared coherent scanner housed in a separate pod, around which the launch canisters are mounted. The information contained in the beam is fed into the missile's receiver for processing and formation of control commands.

The beam of the laser target detection and identification system scans a 68-degree field of view in front of the aircraft. The missiles are automatically assigned to targets, launched, and controlled in flight with the aid of a computer that is part of the guidance equipment. The guidance device ensures independent control of 6-10 missiles against various targets bypassing obstacles on the terrain, engagement of targets at low altitudes, and undetected approach. A beam with a large angle of divergence is used to ensure control of the missiles immediately after launch, and a beam with a small angle of divergence is used in the terminal phase. According to the conclusion of foreign experts, tests conducted have shown that guidance commands are received stably by the missile when the laser beam passes through the gas stream of the propulsion system, dust, fog, and smoke, both day and night.

The missile has a solid-propellant engine which provides a speed of Mach 4.5-5.0. Flight control is accomplished by means of low-thrust reaction motors whose thrust vectors are aimed at an angle to the missile's longitudinal axis. Missile stabilization in flight is accomplished through the rotation which is imparted to the missile in the launcher. The missile weighs 32 kg (23 or 29.5 kg according to other sources), is 930 mm long, and is 96 mm (101 mm) in diameter. It can hit targets at a distance of up to 6 km.

Effective destruction of armored assets is achieved through the high kinetic energy of the missile with a direct hit.

The warhead is a non-separating, high-density, solid-metal device weighing 2.27-2.7 kg. A pointed rod made of tungsten or depleted uranium is used as the contact element. It is reported that such a rod can pierce thick sheets of armor at an angle of impact of up to 60 degrees from perpendicular. In doing so, a large number of fragments and particles of molten metal form within the armored space.

To increase the effectiveness of destroying bunkers or buildings, the warhead is equipped with a ring made of

metal heavier than the rest of the body. The warhead also contains submunitions in the form of cylinders very small in size and weight (40 mm long, 2.54 mm in diameter) that are able to pierce bulletproof glass 3 inches (76.2 mm) thick and homogeneous armor plate up to 1 inch (25.4 mm) thick.

Spike unguided rockets are also being created in the United States for destroying armored targets. Their warhead consists of a large number of solid metal (tungsten) projectiles that have hypersonic velocity (1,524 m/s) at the moment of dispersion and create the effect of a shotgun. The target kill probability for such a rocket is low compared to the HVM; therefore, they are used to create screens. Virtually any helicopter in the U.S. Army and many types of motor vehicles can be used as platforms for them.

Foreign press has reported on the creation of surface-to-air missile [SAM] systems equipped with hypersonic missiles. The British Setter is one. It is planned to be used against aircraft and light armored vehicles at distances up to 1.5 km. The system includes six missile canisters. The speed of each is Mach 5. It has a casing diameter of 48 mm and weighs 2 kg. The warhead is made in the form of a tungsten alloy core or is filled with 18 arrow-shaped projectiles 150 mm long and 3 mm in diameter.

The hypersonic missile of the Starstreak portable SAM system, developed based on the Javelin SAM system, is equipped with a new booster and a modified sustainer, which gives the missile a speed of Mach 4.

The warhead consists of three arrow-shaped submunitions which are ejected forward after the engine propellant stops burning. Each is directed at the same target on its own heading (laser beam-rider guidance is assumed). According to foreign press data, this ensures the possibility of effective engagement of a ground-attack aircraft at a range of 5-7 km with a 0.96 probability on the first shot. The burster charge and core, designed to destroy the target through high kinetic energy at a direct hit, take up more than half of the length of the body of the submunitions.

Launchers are also being developed for three and four SAM's. It is planned to carry two launchers on each armored personnel carrier.

There are reports on the creation of a shipborne version of this system. It is designated Seastreak. The submunitions in it are positioned in straight lines (in tandem) and not in a "cluster." It is believed that this will increase the effectiveness of fire against antiship missiles flying at very low altitudes.

The Thunderbolt SAM system implements the command principle of laser beam-rider guidance with two-way communications. The missile is calculated for a direct hit and destruction of the target by means of

kinetic energy of the entire projectile. For example, it is capable of piercing a helicopter's main rotor hub made of a very hard alloy.

The missile is 1,500 mm long, and its body is 60 mm in diameter. The booster is located in a ring around the tail section. The missile's speed is Mach 4. Its effective firing range is about 5 km, and its minimum range is less than 300 meters. On the front portion, the missile has small delta-shaped wings, but lift is created mainly by the body. Orientation in flight is provided by control jets located in the nose section.

Presently, work is continuing in the United States to create advanced hypersonic combat missiles. For example, the design of a hypersonic cruise missile with a body made of a carbon-carbon composite material was demonstrated. In the opinion of foreign experts, weapons capable of delivering nonnuclear strikes against especially important targets may be created based on such systems.

Footnotes

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Strategic Missile Control Systems

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[Article by Col A. Borisyyuk: "Strategic Missile Control Systems"]

[Text] Factors such as an improvement in antiballistic-missile [ABM] systems and an increase in the degree of protection of strategic installations, as foreign experts note, are making new, higher demands on missile systems and intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's].

The level of basic characteristics of missile systems depends to a considerable extent on improving control systems, which are becoming more complex with each year. They are being equipped with new highly sensitive sensors, more improved special-purpose onboard and ground computers are being introduced, and the algorithms of their operation are becoming more complex. Their effectiveness in the stages of a missile system's life cycle is determined, it is believed, by the following indicators: readiness, probability of preparation and launch, reliability, survivability, and accuracy. In addition, the weight of the control system must not be more than permissible, and the cost must be minimal.

To increase missile system readiness, as is noted, it is necessary to accomplish such tasks as ensuring full automation of control system monitoring; increasing its information content, depth, and volume of self-tests, the ability to effectively eliminate detected malfunctions,

and operation of the system in a continuous mode; and also reducing the time of the mission shift. The main efforts of foreign experts today are concentrated on accomplishing the latter. The problem is made more complicated by the fact that in the dynamics of war it is necessary to relay new target designations, which requires preliminary assessment of their feasibility at top levels of command and control.

In the United States, a considerable reduction in the time for preparation of missiles for launch against new targets is achieved by using powerful computer centers located at the missile system position areas. These centers allocate targets by launch positions; calculate the optimum order of bypassing targets according to fuel consumption and allocate them among individual warheads of the multiple reentry vehicles [MRV's]; calculate the mission for each missile of the position area; and make the flight mission platform, deliver it to the launcher, or ensure direct relay of information over communication lines to the working memory of the onboard computer. Other variants of speeding up the mission shift are also being studied. They are based on using the results of a priori computations for an expanded catalog of targets and storing them at the launcher or using special-purpose ground computers at each position that are capable of efficiently calculating the mission prior to missile launch.

In the opinion of foreign experts, the most feasible solution to this problem is guidance of missiles over so-called free trajectories. In this case, launch and target coordinates and combat employment conditions are fed into the onboard computer, and program calculations are made during flight ("terminal guidance"). Full-scale implementation of this guidance principle is being held back by the high demands on performance of the onboard computer. However, foreign experts are successfully introducing individual elements, constantly making the onboard algorithms more complicated and activating the ground computer only for conducting part of the preliminary calculations.

Increasing the probability of successful preparation and launch of missiles is ensured by a higher degree of automation of the process of monitoring their systems, reducing the time for acceleration of the gyro units, creating constantly functioning control systems, and also by a high level of organization of maintenance of the missile system.

Complicated algorithms of high-speed acceleration of the gyro motors are used to reduce the time for the gyro units to reach a stable operating condition, by program changing of the amplitude and frequency of the power supply voltage. Foreign instrument building has amassed experience in creating continuously operating systems on gyro units with gas-dynamic suspension, which function during the entire operational period of the missile system (10-12 years). Some types, the control system of the MX missile for example, are presently on alert and have acceptable reliability and accuracy characteristics.

A shortcoming of this method is the increase in the overall electrical power consumption by the missile system, since it is necessary to cool the gas-dynamic suspension constantly. The time periods of autonomous operation of the missile system decrease accordingly.

A high degree of organization of maintenance of the missile system requires knowledge and consideration of the individual peculiarities of each launcher and the impermissibility of using mean reliability parameters of single-type missiles. When designing advanced ICBM's, designers widely use methods of ensuring stable desired indicators. The level of the new Midgetman small missile is the result of its single-channel nature and strict limits on weight and size characteristics. In the process of operation, the control system is subjected to the effects of numerous unfavorable factors. As a result, interruptions occur (brief disruptions in the normal operation of elements, instruments, and devices), the frequency of which exceeds the intensity of stability failures by an order of magnitude. Normal functioning is restored following them. However, this leads to an accumulation of errors when performing navigation and guidance tasks and thereby reduces the effectiveness of the missile system.

The methods being used abroad for reducing the likelihood of interruptions and recovering information are divided into equipment and program methods. The first method includes increasing the reliability of the component base by improving parts production technology; constant redundancy, including using logic devices; proper selection of secondary power sources; ensuring light-duty operating modes of components; and using jamming-resistant coding equipment. However, such methods and also the combination of them are being used on a limited basis today. Program methods, which include test checking, double or repeat checking, and also using a simplified algorithm, multiple storage, extrapolation checking, the method of reference-time marks, testing based on using identities and jam-resistant algorithms are sufficiently effective. They do not involve increasing the weight of the equipment and can be successfully introduced into single-channel systems.

However, the most promising is the method of extrapolation checking; it is relatively simple and fairly accurate. Its essence lies in the fact that parallel with solving the basic algorithm, an extrapolation is done at each step of the computed value according to several previous calculation points. The results are compared. If their difference, taken in absolute value, does not exceed a certain threshold number, in the process of future calculations an indicator obtained according to the basic algorithm is used, otherwise (which indicates the presence of an interruption) they are replaced by the extrapolated values.

A shortcoming of this method is the monotonous changing of the function being extrapolated throughout the flight, which cannot be carried out at intervals

(relatively short) of separation of components of the missile and execution of a number of other one-time commands, where it changes spasmodically. The problem of identifying interruptions and recovering information can also be solved by other methods.

To ensure survivability of the control system (giving it characteristics to preserve and restore the capability to perform basic functions in extreme conditions), it is necessary, first of all, to protect the equipment against the casualty-producing effects of a nuclear blast and weapons operating on new physical principles. Foreign experts single out three directions of solving this problem.

The first includes using design and technological methods of protection, assuming the selection of a stable component base, development of new methods of shielding equipment and components, improving configuration, searching for effective technologies for producing large integrated circuits, and using new materials, special adhesive compounds, and protective caps.

Promising components (from the standpoint of durability) include logic devices on complementary MOI-structures with a sapphire base, in which protection from penetrating radiation is provided by dielectric insulation. U.S. and Japanese experts are devoting special attention to gallium arsenide based integrated circuits in which the speed of displacement of electrons is five times faster than in silicon elements, with less energy consumption and high resistance to the effects of radiation.

The second proposes the introduction of arrangement and topological methods, including the development of fundamental circuit arrangements that localize the effects of the interaction of radiation with equipment components and assemblies (based on integrated circuits), protection of instrument leads by using special arresters or filters on each conductor, use of nonconducting information mediums, for example, optical fibers (light guides) and others.

The third direction is implemented by using structural and algorithmic methods represented by two groups. The first group includes program means of protection, which are algorithms of control signal forecasting for a possible interval of interruption in the operation of the control system and programs of deviation maneuvers by the missiles and warheads, including lengthwise rotation of their bodies to protect against laser radiation. The second group include equipment means, including development of special durable memory devices, using jam-resistant coding, data recovery, and missile control devices during an interruption in the operation of the system, and creating high-speed and sensitive onboard sensors for primary damage-producing elements of a nuclear blast.

An advanced information recovery system being developed in the United States works in the following manner. One of the memory units [MU], the role of which is

performed by the main memory of the onboard computer, is constantly in the on position, and access is only to it in the normal operating mode. MU2 and MU3, which are part of the super-protected memory device, serve to protect information during special effects and operate in the "flickering" mode, and the time intervals when they are in the operating mode do not cross. The processor performs an alternate, sequential recording (from MU1 to MU2 and MU3). If a sensor detects primary damage-producing effects of a nuclear blast (penetrating radiation), information in the unprotected main memory and in the MU2 (MU2) that is on is lost due to induction, being preserved in the units with the input circuits turned off. When the effects end, the structure of the control system is automatically reorganized upon the recovery signal: memory unit 3 is connected to the main memory, and the preserved information is re-recorded to it to continue the computing process.

In addition to these methods of protection against special effects, in advanced U.S. missile systems it is planned to create autonomous aiming systems not connected to the launcher experiencing the seismic effects of the shock wave of a nuclear blast.

U.S. experts plan to achieve an increase in missile system survivability by reducing the boost phase and, accordingly, decrease the time for intercept. In addition, it is considerably more difficult for the ABM weapons of a potential adversary to hit the platform in the dense layers of the atmosphere.

To reduce the likelihood of a simultaneous malfunction of all warheads of a missile with a multi-element nose section, foreign experts propose switching to a new guidance system, the essence of which involves the simultaneous separation of all elements of combat equipment from the platform and their simultaneous guidance to the target ("taxi" system). The existing principle consists of the fact that the separation stage delivers the warheads in turn to the required points in space ("bus" system). It is assumed that survivability and the area of separation increase considerably if each nuclear weapon has its own missile platform, for example, a missile system with small missiles like the Midgetman.

In the opinion of foreign experts, to increase the accuracy of future ICBM's, it is necessary, above all, to decrease the instrumental errors of the control system instruments through calibration of the meter and taking into account systematic errors, improving organization of monitoring, and introducing command instruments based on new physical principles. In addition, it is necessary to reduce methodical inaccuracies of guidance algorithms, taking into account the larger number of parameters, and also to make algorithms more complicated, and to use more accurate models of the earth and the atmosphere. Overseas, they are also examining other ways of accomplishing this task: introducing new

methods of control; making algorithms of warhead separation of multi-element nose sections more complicated; making adjustments to make more precise the initial conditions during separation of the warheads from the separation stage.

Instrumental errors depend primarily on the degree of perfection of the command instrument system. In addition to traditional models of attitude and acceleration sensors, foreign designers are proposing advanced designs: electrostatic, magnetic-resonance nuclear, dynamically adjustable dry and modified laser gyroscopes, and also modified accelerometer on a magnetic suspension. The use of circular laser gyroscopes, which are presently used in aircraft, in missile control systems seem to be the most probable. They do not have complex gimbal mounts and demonstrate a very long mean time between failures. Their operating principle is based on the fact that they generate two oppositely directed light waves that have an identical optical frequency if the gyroscope is stationary. If it is rotating around an axis perpendicular to their plane, the frequency of the beam running in the direction of the rotation increases, the frequency of the one running in the opposite direction decreases. Their difference is directly proportional to the speed of rotation of the base.

In the opinion of foreign designers, laser gyroscopes are highly stable, are reliable at high g-loads (up to 300 g), and quickly reach operating conditions. However, they are not sufficiently accurate and, in addition, not resistant to the damage-producing effects of a nuclear blast (electromagnetic pulse, temperature changes).

To determine (after double integration) the path covered in advanced control systems, it is proposed to use well-proven pendulous positions and also recently developed jet accelerometers. The use of integrating gyros for this purpose is quite problematic, since they do not have a gas-dynamic suspension and cannot be in the "on" state for an extended time (about 10 years) and retain the required characteristics.

Jet accelerometers are set up in the following manner. An inertial mass is positioned at the center of a string secured from two sides; under the effect of acceleration, the mass changes the tension of the string. The frequency of oscillations of both of its parts under the effect of the generators in the absence of acceleration is identical; in the presence of acceleration, the frequency differs. This difference is proportional to the missile's acceleration and is the output parameter measuring acceleration.

Accurate modeling of the gravitational forces affecting the missile is especially important during operation of the first stage, when the effect of its error on the extent of the miss is the greatest. The paramount task of foreign designers of algorithms for operation of control systems is reducing the complete model of the earth's gravitational field to a level making it possible to use it in a special-purpose, relatively low-power computer of the

missile platform when making the onboard model of the earth as close as possible to the reference model.

As western experts believe, one promising direction in increasing the effectiveness of missile systems is the widespread introduction of terminal guidance (over a free trajectory), which through updated calculation of the flight mission after launch makes it possible not only to increase combat readiness but also to improve substantially the firing accuracy of ICBM's equipped with MRV's. The method of determining the required velocity is at the basis of one of the terminal guidance algorithms. During the flight, at set intervals the missile control system makes a comparison of two velocity vectors (current and required) determined from the condition of the warheads reaching the assigned target. The difference between these vectors is the current corrective velocity vector, in the direction of which the thrust vector of the propulsion plant is established.

Algorithms making it possible to guide the warheads with an accuracy of up to tens of meters were developed by foreign specialists back in the late 1970's. However, their practical introduction was made difficult by the complexity of the hardware implementation, caused by the specifics of the conditions of the warhead's flight: high velocity, high g-loads, intense combustion loss of the surface, difficulty in creating control elements, and rigid weight and size limitations. Nevertheless, in the United States they are considering a variant of equipping the advanced Midgetman missile with a maneuvering warhead and a terminal-phase terrain-following guidance system using radar.

Before entering the dense layers of the atmosphere, the control system uses a radio altimeter (or other similar devices) to determine its attitude and velocity, then adjusting the inertial guidance system which is also constantly operating when passing through the dense layers. The warhead can then execute protective maneuvering. At an altitude of 10-12 km, after the decrease in velocity and the end of plasma formation around the warhead, it is possible to turn on the radio systems again to update the coordinates according to the terrain map and compensate for inertial system errors that accumulated after the previous correction.

In the opinion of foreign experts, for future land-based mobile systems it is also possible to use astro-inertial systems that make it possible to reduce errors of hitting the target to the initial error of determining the phase coordinates after the astrocorrection session. The astro-tracker determines the position error of the warhead in the at the end of the boost phase or during the period between termination of operation of the main engine and separation of the warheads and takes a fix on a star. In doing so, the onboard computer determines the trajectory error and calculates corrections, which are fed into the flight program before final shutoff of the propulsion plant.

Astrotrackers, the first generation of which are already being used in American sea-launched missiles, are special television cameras with a narrow field of view. The image of a star is focused on a sensitive receiver, for which vidicons and semiconductor devices may be used. Having focused its position, special algorithms may be used, holding a repeat session for detecting another star if necessary, to determine the location and velocity of the missile and then compute the required corrections.

Calculations conducted by U.S. specialists show that as a result of using astrocorrection of intercontinental missiles, the standard probable error deviation is decreased by 14 percent, and decreasing the error requirements in determining initial data at the launch point increases the effectiveness of the inertial control system. In turn, this makes it possible, with a decrease in the cost of the system, to improve its readiness indicators, which result from decreasing the accuracy requirements on the inertial system itself and also from the possibility of disconnecting the equipment during alert. However, it is believed that the astrotracker will not be installed on the Midgetman missiles, since this will require serious modification of the part of the control system borrowed from the MX missile.

It is also possible to solve the problem of decreasing the cost and increasing the reliability of control systems for various types of missiles by introducing modular configuration of instrumentation section equipment. This makes it possible, first, to reduce the likelihood of design errors; second, to standardize mechanical components and circuit-functional assemblies; third, to ease maintenance and lower the qualification requirements on servicing personnel; and, in addition, make test equipment less expensive.

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Use of Old Munitions To Produce Graphite Powder, Oil Additive

92UM1353A Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE* in Russian No 5-6, 92 p 5

[Unattributed article: "We Are Not Licked Yet"]

[Text] One of the timely issues of the conversion of military production is the use of arsenals of small-arms weapons, tanks, and aircraft in the interests of the national economy. Equally important is the problem of effective use of the stocks of explosives that exist in military depots, including in the form of various munitions (shells, torpedoes, and aviation bombs).

Specialists at one of the polytechnical institutes have proposed a technology of using military explosives for obtaining a unique material—an ultra-dispersing diamond-graphite powder. The preparation is the product of detonation conversion of organic nitrocompounds and consists of cubic modification diamond and graphite. Its hardness properties can change. Therefore, it is possible to use the powder as friction modifiers and

components and additives for oil and process liquids used in machining and plastic metal working. In addition, it has proven to be successful as a component of super-fine grinding pastes and suspensions, catalysts, activating agents, and inhibitors.

The diamond-graphite powder will find broad application in machine building and powder metallurgy (read about the new technology in more detail in following issues).

The SUFIPOL 1-1 VZh diamond-graphite polishing paste is an abrasive compound based on ultra-dispersion diamond-graphite powder with an abrasive grade of 4-12 NM. It can be used to work glass and metal surfaces, precious and semiprecious stones, and also paintwork with a quality that cannot be achieved using other compounds.

The SUFIPOL 1-1 VZh polishing paste contains no toxic substances.

"UDAV-SIBMA" is an antifriction motor oil additive containing ultra-dispersion diamond-graphite powder.

It guarantees smooth engine operation; makes it possible to break in a new or overhauled engine quickly and effectively; reduces friction by a factor of 1.5-2.5; decreases wear of the cylinder and piston group parts; reduces gas and oil consumption by 5-7 percent in operating conditions; helps to increase engine power and service life; and has no toxic components.

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MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Military Bars Finnish Research Ship From Lake Ladoga

92WN0712A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 92
Morning edition p 6

[Report by Marat Zubko, IZVESTIYA, Helsinki: "The Stalinist Instruction Remains in Effect; The Reason for Which a Finnish Scientific Vessel Was Barred From Ladoga"]

[Text] New Russia remains governed by the laws of Stalinist times. This was recently proved by the Russian military authorities with their decision on allowing the sailing of the Finnish scientific ship Munkku in Lake Ladoga. Referring to a 1952 instruction which prohibited the navigation of foreign vessels in internal USSR waters, their verdict was: "Refused!"

This decision puzzled the Finnish authorities and public. It was actively criticized by the local press. It is a question of a joint Russian-Finnish scientific expedition to study the possibility of treating the waters of the Ladoga Lake. The interest of the Finns in this case is that

the water from this lake falls through the Neva into the Gulf of Finland, which borders Suomi.

Timo Myakelya, chief of the Eastern European program in the Finnish Ministry of Environmental Protection, told me that the official appeal to the Russian authorities with a request to allow the Munkku to sail into Ladoga had been sent some four months ago. In Moscow, the Russian minister of foreign affairs told the Finnish ambassador, according to one of the local newspapers, that everything was in order. Nonetheless, no answer was received. At that point, the Finns investigated and determined that permission was refused. The reason for the refusal was that same 1952 instruction. To the Finns this prohibition looked rather strange also because a number of Russian vessels are sailing internal Finnish waterways.

Is the military indeed fearing the revelation of its secrets? In any case, the Munkku is a strictly scientific ship. The Finns are even prepared to offer Russian experts the possibility of seeing this for themselves. As to whether military secrets may exist in the Ladoga area, given present tracking facilities, my interlocutor reminded me, such secrets have long become known.

Incidentally, Russian vessels have already undertaken the implementation of the program. However, it is precisely the Finnish vessel that carries the equipment which so far the Russians lack. Such equipment makes it possible to determine the existence of various organic matter in the water, the presence of heavy metals, and to identify even the slightest current.

"Now," said my interlocutor in conclusion, "a number of rumors are making the rounds about Ladoga and the extent of the pollution of its waters. Russian and Karelian scientists have done a great deal of work to study the environment of the lake. However, this also needs new joint studies. We hope that our expedition, which should include 15 Finnish scientists, will eventually be granted permission to work in Lake Ladoga...."

What can we add to this? Naturally, under the Soviet system so many laws, decrees, and instructions have been passed that it is difficult to revise all of them immediately. Nonetheless, since we have a request filed by a neighboring country to assist in a project which is useful to Russia as well, should the authorities not think about how to act: on the basis of 40-year old instruction or despite it?

France's Defense Reform Program Examined

92UM1360A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Aug 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimir Beketov: "Certain Sacrifices Are Needed. And France Is Ready for Them"]

[Text] Radical changes in the world in recent years compelled France to begin serious transformations in its

defense system. Its adaptation to new conditions in Europe is to be completed by the end of the century.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, military programs became the principal official documents determining and guiding development of French armed forces. In addition to the problems of financing specific armament systems, they address the principles of the conception of national security, and determine the priority directions of the country's technical military policy.

Development of French armed forces will be determined in the next few years by a law on military programs for the period from 1992 to 1994, the draft of which was approved by the French Council of Ministers on the first of July of this year. What are its principal features?

In the opinion of Defense Minister Pierre Joxe, the main goal of this draft is "to support transition from defense oriented on a probable military conflict between the East and West, to defense not oriented on a defined adversary and corresponding to today's requirements." There are plans to allocate 308 [first digit illegible] billion francs to implement military programs in the areas of both nuclear and conventional arms.

As before, the principle of nuclear deterrence, developed earlier by Charles de Gaulle, remains the cornerstone of national defense. It is supported today chiefly by nuclear missile submarines. However, even the principle of nuclear deterrence is being adapted to the new geostrategic situation. Thus, France has practically completely rejected plans to replace five "substrategic nuclear weapon" divisions equipped with Pluto missiles by three divisions equipped with Hades missiles with a range of up to 480 km. A decision was made to put the latter in storage.

Of the principal strategic nuclear force programs financed in the preceding period, only one has been confirmed—development of M-5 ship-to-surface missiles, which are to be supplied to a new generation of nuclear submarines. A plan to develop a land version of this missile to replace S-3D missiles housed in silos on the Albion Plateau is in the research stage.

While in former times priority attention was devoted to nuclear forces, to which up to a third of all assets earmarked for arms development were allocated, priority is given in documents pertaining to the next three years to development of sectors associated with space and reconnaissance. In 1991 for example, the proportion of allocations to military space research increased to 2.8 percent of total expenditures on technical military developments, at the same time that in 1986 the figure was only 0.6 percent. The main attention is being devoted to programs for launching Syracuse and Helios communication and observation satellites. The Helios satellite, which is the fruit of joint efforts by France, Italy and Spain, is to be launched in 1994. There are also plans for orbital insertion of the Osiris observation satellite and the Zekon [transliteration] electronic eavesdropping satellite.

Significant changes are also planned in the ground forces. Their numerical strength, which is currently 261,000, will be reduced to 225,000 by 1997. Moreover the number of divisions is to be reduced from 15 to 8. Instead of the previously planned 1,200 new Leclerc tanks, the ground forces will receive only 800.

As before, the French air forces continue to be oriented on equipment manufactured in France. However, Mirage-2000 airplanes will be rearmed at a slower rate than foreseen by the initial plans. This year the air forces will receive 16 airplanes of this kind. And work on Rafal [transliteration] warplanes and their delivery to the air forces are postponed to a later time. Efforts to design the Transal [transliteration] transport airplane of a new generation are being postponed to 1994. This means that for effective application and transfer of "quick reaction forces" in an emergency, France will be forced to seek assistance from the USA. In addition the number of warplanes in the air forces is to be reduced from 450 to 375.

Quantitative changes will also occur in the navy. While its present strength is 110 warships, by the end of 1994 it will be 105. According to the plans, the French navy will contain six nuclear attack submarines instead of eight. Construction of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier "Charles de Gaulle," which was to be launched in 1998, is postponed to a later date. Programs to design the new Atlantic-2 airplane and MU-90 torpedoes for the French navy, which were the recipients of considerable assets in the past five-year plan, are to be reviewed in the direction of their reduction. And overall, implementation of around 30 military programs is to be reduced in the next few years or postponed to a later time.

Specialists explain the trend of decreasing budget expenditures at the expense of the armed forces in recent years not only by geostrategic changes in the world but also by noticeable reduction of arms sales. Last year the volume of deliveries of French arms to Third World countries decreased by 87 percent—to \$400 million, as compared to \$3.1 billion in 1990. In the opinion of military specialists all of this will have the most serious consequences not only to military industry but also in the social aspect. According to a report in the newspaper LE MONDE, from 80,000 to 100,000 persons may be laid off in military industry in connection with production cuts; consider this in light of the fact that this sphere employs around 300,000 in France.

However, as Pierre Joxe declared, "In order to effect a transition from an army constrained by the conception of global confrontation of a strong adversary to a more-mobile army oriented on quick response, on a decisive repulse and on a fast, precise and powerful blow capable of discouraging an adversary, sacrifices will be needed." And judging from everything, France is prepared to make them.

SECURITY SERVICES

Protocol on Border Guards Reported

92US0721D Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 25 Jul 92 p 1

[Turkmen Press Report: "On Border Troops in Turkmenistan"]

[Text] Stemming from the mutual interests of securing the state borders and defending sovereignty, as well as the need to create the legal foundation for the border troops stationed on the territory of Turkmenistan, the governments of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation have signed a Protocol on border troops.

Taking into consideration the fact that the formation of Turkmenistan's border-guard troops will require a certain amount of time (a transition period), such border troops are being set up based on the combined forces and

units of the Central Asia Border District, stationed on this republic's territory. They will be under the joint command of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation.

Recruiting the combined forces and units of the border troops, as well as training the staff personnel for them will be carried out jointly on the basis of bilateral agreements.

During the course of intergovernmental negotiations, agreement was reached that providing for the vital activities of the border troops in the territory of this republic will be carried out by Turkmenistan, whereas the financing and material-technical services will be handled by the Russian Federation. The civil and social rights of the military-service personnel and the members of their families will be fully observed.

The Protocol Document which was signed will be in effect during the period until the creation of Turkmenistan's border troops.

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