


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Cocom Lifts Ban on Hi-Tech Exports to CIS
OW0306021792 Beijing XINHUA in English
0153 GMT 3 Jun 92

[Text] Paris, June 2 (XINHUA)—Seventeen Western countries have agreed to conditionally lift controls off high-tech exports to CIS countries, a well-informed source said today.

The conference of the 17-member Co-ordinating Committee Controlling East-West Trade (COCOM) decided Monday to terminate the controls on telecommunications exports, particularly optical-fiber technology, as the technology has been widely used in the West.

However, the closed-door conference agreed that the CIS countries should establish effective organs to supervise exports to the "southern countries" of some sensitive civil exports with military potential.

The conference also discussed the applications of former Warsaw Pact countries for membership of the committee.

The committee, also called the Consultative Group Cooperation Committee, was established in 1950 to supervise the West's export of strategic materials to the socialist-bloc countries. The committee includes most of the industrialized countries.

XINHUA Reports on US-Russian Summit

Nations Agree on Arms Reduction

OW1606230292 Beijing XINHUA in English
2209 GMT 16 Jun 92

[Text] Washington, June 16 (XINHUA)—The United States and Russia today agreed to reduce their strategic weapons to no more than 3,500 warheads each by the year 2003.

This was announced by U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin at a joint press conference following the first round of their summit talks here.

Bush said that the two sides have agreed to eliminate all land-based multiple warhead missiles, including Russia's SS-18's. Yeltsin added that warheads of submarine-launched ballistic missiles will go down to 1,750 each.

"Those dramatic reductions will take place in two phases. They will be completed no later than the year 2003, and may be completed as early as the year 2000, if the United States can assist Russia in the required destruction of ballistic missile systems," Bush said.

He said that "both sides will go down to 3,000 to 3,500 warheads, with each nation determining its own force structure within that range."

Currently, the United States and Russia possess about 10,000 and 10,200 warheads respectively and under the

1991 Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty, warheads for the United States will be reduced to 8,500 and that of Russia, to 7,000.

The agreement on reduction of strategic weapons beyond the START level came after five months of negotiations between the senior officials of the two countries. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev met for several hours yesterday evening and this morning for the last-minute negotiations.

The new arms accord contains compromises from both sides, with Russia no longer resisting elimination of all land-based ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, while the United States agrees to deeper cuts in submarine-launched missile warheads than it originally proposed.

Bush said that he and Yeltsin also agreed to set up a joint group to explore the establishment of an early warning system against nuclear attack and cooperation in the development of anti-missile defense system.

"This group will also explore the development of a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements and possible changes to existing treaties and agreements necessary to implement the global protection system," Bush said.

Bush and Yeltsin also instructed the heads of a joint commission investigation the fate of missing U.S. servicemen to meet immediately to discuss the possibility that some American prisoners of war are alive in the former Soviet Union.

Before sitting for the first day of talks, Yeltsin revealed that "it is possible" that some American servicemen captured in the Vietnam war are still alive in Russia or other Soviet republics.

'Roundup' Views New 'Partnership'

OW1906122192 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0911 GMT 18 Jun 92

["Roundup" by reporter Ying Qian (2019 6197): "The Meeting Between the U.S. and Russian Heads of State; 'Partnership Relations'"]

[Text] Washington, 17 June (XINHUA)—After a two-day heads of state meeting in Washington, U.S. President Bush and visiting Russian President Yeltsin signed a series of statements and agreements on "total cooperation" between the two countries in various fields at the White House on the afternoon of 17 June.

This meeting was different from many past meetings between U.S. presidents and leaders of the former Soviet Union. In welcoming Yeltsin's visit, Bush said clearly: Past meetings were between two powers vying for global superiority. However, this meeting is between "two

partners." Yeltsin also said: The United States and Russia are no longer rivals but mean to establish a relationship of "total cooperation."

The principal topics of the meeting were nuclear disarmament and U.S. aid to Russia.

Prior to this, the United States and the former Soviet Union had signed a treaty cutting strategic nuclear weapons. But the treaty has not been approved by the U.S. Congress and has yet to take effect. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, confrontation between the two powers no longer exists. In view of respective political and economic reasons, the United States and Russia have no choice but to earnestly consider slashing further the alarming numbers of their nuclear arsenals. It was exactly under these circumstances and after five months of negotiations that Bush and Yeltsin finally reached a new nuclear disarmament agreement on the first day of their meeting.

According to the new agreement, the United States and Russia will slash the number of warheads on their respective strategic nuclear weapons to below 3,500 by the year 2003, a cut of about two-thirds. Of course, they will still possess large stocks of nuclear weapons once the reduction plan is fulfilled. Yeltsin called the disarmament agreement "unprecedented" and "historical." He said that it symbolized a "fundamental change" in political and economic relations between the United States and Russia.

The media here feels that the agreement to further cut strategic nuclear weapons was indeed an important achievement of this U.S.- Russian heads of state meeting. However, the main purpose of Yeltsin's visit was to seek U.S. economic aid for Russia. It can even be said that Russia did not hesitate to make concessions in order to reach the new nuclear disarmament agreement. It was also the leaders' intention to create a conciliatory atmosphere for the meeting, thus prompting the U.S. Congress to smoothly pass the motion on aid for Russia proposed by the Bush administration.

Yeltsin addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress on the morning of 17 June. He assured U.S. congressmen that he "would not go back on reforms" and called on them to speed up approval of the \$24 billion aid package the West pledged to Russia and other CIS nations. He said: The success or failure of Russia's reforms does not concern only Russia's future; aiding reforms also suits U.S. interests. He announced that Russia had already downgraded the combat readiness of the SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile aimed at the United States.

Apart from persuading the U.S. Congress directly, Yeltsin also attended a gathering of U.S. and Russian business executives in the company of Bush on 17 June. Speaking at the gathering, he called on U.S. entrepreneurs not to miss the opportunity but to hurry to invest in Russia.

Meanwhile, President Bush repeatedly urged Congress to approve the aid plan for Russia. He said: Although the United States is in a "politically difficult period," it should still assist Russia. He repeatedly stressed that aiding Russia "suits U.S. interests."

In the past two months, the U.S. Congress has been stalling its action on a motion on aiding Russia. Apart from the sensitive political factor of the election year, the United States has just lifted its economy out of a prolonged recession. The recovery is still slow-moving, and numerous economic difficulties and social problems that have accumulated over a long period demand urgent solutions. It is still unknown whether Congress will respond positively to the calls by Yeltsin and Bush.

One of the many documents signed by the two Presidents at the close of their meeting is the "Charter of U.S.-Russian Partnership and Friendship," also called the "Washington Charter." The charter clearly states that the "solid and lasting foundation" of the U.S.-Russian relationship is not to treat the other party as an enemy but to develop mutual trust and respect. The two sides will cooperate in various fields such as economics, science and technology, trade, and military affairs. There is also the potential for establishing a "strategic relationship." President Bush billed the achievement of the meeting as "the establishment of truly new...partnership."

The change from hostility to a partnership between the United States and Russia is a major event in today's world. How will relations develop in the future? How will this affect relations between the two nations and the world's situation? This question is attracting attention.

Beijing Reiterates Calls for Outer Space Arms Prevention

*OW1606205792 Beijing XINHUA in English
2050 GMT 16 Jun 92*

[Text] United Nations, June 16 (XINHUA)—China has reiterated that in order to further promote and strengthen the peaceful use of outer space, effective measures must be taken to prevent the expansion of arms race into outer space.

The reduction of military confrontation currently taking place among major powers offers a good opportunity to protect the peaceful environment in outer space, Chinese Delegate Yin Yubiao said today at the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space which opened its 35th session yesterday.

Yin said that China "is ready to join with others in a common endeavor to explore feasible ways and means through intensive consultations" for the protection of outer space.

For more than thirty years, Yin pointed out, the development of space technology has brought enormous benefits to the mankind as a whole and those countries with major space capability in particular.

"To further the exploration and utilization of outer space and the development of space technology necessitates the strengthening of international cooperation including that between the developed countries and developing countries, between space faring states and non-space faring countries and among space faring states with special emphasis on technical exchange and technological transfer."

China, as a developing space faring country with limited space application capability, Yin said, has always given importance to applied satellite and the utilization of satellite and is ready to strengthen exchange and cooperation with other countries.

According to the Chinese delegate, his country has made a voluntary contribution of 30,000 U.S. dollars, as a sincere support to the U.N. program on space applications and the U.N. efforts for the international space year.

IAEA Head on DPRK Nuclear Capability

*OW1606022292 Beijing XINHUA in English
0106 GMT 16 Jun 92*

[Text] Vienna, June 15 (XINHUA)—Hans Blix, director-general of the International Nuclear Energy Agency (IAEA), said here today that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not yet acquired the capability of producing nuclear weapons.

Addressing an IAEA meeting on the result of his trip to the DPRK early this month, Blix said that after inspecting a nuclear reactor in the Yongbyon area during the trip, experts of the IAEA believed that the nuclear technologies there are 30 years behind that of the West.

Earlier, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency speculated that the DPRK could produce a nuclear weapon within a year.

XINHUA Reports on U.S. Nuclear Test

*OW2306033192 Beijing XINHUA in English
0314 GMT 23 Jun 92*

[Text] Washington, June 22 (XINHUA)—The United States conducted an underground nuclear test last Friday, the third such test it has carried out this year.

The blast, equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT, was conducted at Yucca Flats test site, 75 miles northwest of Las Vegas, the energy department said.

Washington has carried out more nuclear tests than any other nation. The New York-based Natural Resources Defense Council said the U.S. had detonated more than 900 nuclear devices since 1945.

Kazakhstan To Tackle Nuclear Test Consequences

*OW2406021392 Beijing XINHUA in English
0144 GMT 24 Jun 92*

[Text] Alma Ata, June 23 (XINHUA)—Kazakhstan's government adopted a decision today to take emergency measures to tackle the negative consequences of previous nuclear tests conducted on its territory.

The government said a draft law would be in place later this year protecting the victims of nuclear testing, local media reports said.

Kazakhstan will also introduce foreign investment and advanced technology to help avoid further problems.

The former Soviet nuclear test site of Semipalatinsk is located in Kazakhstan and Alma Ata recently announced that 10 regions including Semipalatinsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Eastern Kazakh, Karaganda and Pavlodar had been designated ecological disaster areas.

JAPAN

UN Disarmament Conference Opens in Hiroshima*OW1506151292 Tokyo KYODO in English 1450 GMT 15 Jun 92*

[Text] Hiroshima, June 15 (KYODO)—The United Nations should explore ways of outmaneuvering efforts by some countries to conceal their nuclear programs, a senior Australian diplomat told a U.N. disarmament conference that began in Hiroshima Monday.

Noting the on-site verification system has many shortcomings, John Gee of Australia's Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade said, "The answer has to be the correct application of the appropriate mix of verification technologies."

"Even then, there are still limitations and they cannot always be relied upon to relieve all," Gee said.

At the first plenary session called Monday to discuss nonproliferation of mass-destruction weapons, Stephen Hanmer, deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, voiced hope for an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Hanmer said, "The United States strongly believes that the NPT should be extended indefinitely and unconditionally in 1995," at a conference of the signatory nations.

The nonproliferation pact, signed in July 1968 and put into effect in March 1970, calls for a conference in 1995 to decide the whether to keep the treaty in force indefinitely or extend it for a limited period.

With the NPT coming under constant fire for maintaining the disparity of nuclear "haves and have-nots," its fate is still unclear, observers said.

Ryukichi Imai, former Japanese ambassador to Mexico, said the NPT has great significance in the post-cold war era.

Rolf Ekeus, executive chairman of the U.N. special commission on the abolition of Iraq's mass-destruction weapons, pointed to the importance of beefing up the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency for stricter implementation of the NPT.

However, he advocated prudence when the agency conducts nuclear safeguard checks, just as it did in Iraq, so as not to encroach on the sovereignty of countries.

He said the U.N. special commission intends to have demolished Iraq's chemical and biological weapons totaling 50,000 tons by the end of the year.

At the opening of the conference, Prvoslav Davinic, director of the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs,

said significant disarmament and arms control could be achieved by first establishing transparency in possession and movement of weapons.

Hiroshima Gov. Toranosuke Takeshita urged the participants to take action for a global consensus-building on the entire elimination of nuclear arms.

Takashi Hiraoka, mayor of Hiroshima, asked the U.N. to choose the city as the venue for the fourth U.N. special session on disarmament in 1995, the 50th anniversary of its atom bombing.

The mayor said he hopes the current conference will engender sincere exchanges of views to effect eternal global peace and stability.

Speaking for the Japanese Government at the opening ceremony, Mitsuro Donowaki, former Japanese ambassador to the conference on disarmament in Geneva, touched on the need to strengthen "political dialogue for mutual reassurance" to boost regional cooperation.

The U.N. talks will not adopt any resolutions or make any formal appeals, so as to facilitate free debate among the participants.

At the second and third plenary sessions Tuesday, the conference is scheduled to focus on confidence-building in the Asia-Pacific region.

Security Cooperation Highlighted*OW1606133692 Tokyo KYODO in English 1238 GMT 16 Jun 92*

[By Takehiko Kajita]

[Text] Hiroshima, June 16 KYODO—Confidence-building and cooperation on new security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region grabbed the spotlight at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues here Tuesday.

James Cotton, professor at Australian National University, told the gathering that the policy of constructive engagement between the two Koreas is probably the safest and surest way to security on the Korean peninsula.

The application of pressure by outside states might be counterproductive, he said.

Carolina G. Hernandez, professor of political science at the University of the Philippines, focused on the need for strengthening security dialogue among Asian nations in connection with the Indochina peace process.

Many speakers at the conference agreed on the areas in which confidence-building measures should be applied, according to a U.N. official who briefed reporters.

Among these were areas where political, ethnic and economic differences are especially vast, the official said.

For example, Mohamed Amir Jaafar, high commissioner of Malaysia to India, called for the development of people-to-people contacts to reduce social and ethnic tensions among states, particularly in south Asia.

Meanwhile, Roland Timerbaev, professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, voiced concerns over the presence of industrial infrastructure capable of producing weapons of mass destruction in newly independent central Asian states.

But the professor said the international community can encourage such states to join in security dialogues with other regions.

Mark Hong, deputy permanent representative of Singapore to the U.N., raised the question of whether a continued U.S. presence in Asia will lead to regional stability.

Some participants echoed him in expressing skepticism on the U.S. role as a moderating force in Asia in the post-Cold War era.

Hong also called on European and Asian countries to develop cooperative security approaches to stability in Asia.

Participants in Tuesday's session also dealt with the remaining hostilities between North and South Korea, as well as the role of the U.N. in the region.

U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Accord Hailed as 'Epoch Making'

OW1706040492 Tokyo KYODO in English 0347 GMT 17 Jun 92

[Text] Tokyo, June 17 KYODO—Japan hailed as "epoch making" Wednesday an agreement by the United States and Russia to slash strategic nuclear arms by two-thirds.

The agreement by the two powers to reduce strategic nuclear warheads to an unexpected 3,000 to 3,500 each, achieved in such a short time, "is epoch making," Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato told a news conference.

"Japan is highly appreciative," he said.

U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin said in Washington Tuesday they would complete the cutbacks between 2000 and 2003.

Last year the U.S. and the then-Soviet Union agreed in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to cut the combined total of 21,000 warheads to roughly 8,500 each by 2000.

Kato said that the government has not yet confirmed whether the two leaders also discussed Japan's dispute with Russia over four Russian-held islands off of Hokkaido.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said prior to Yeltsin's arrival Tuesday that the Japan-Russia territorial issue would be brought up during the two-day summit.

However, a Russian Foreign Ministry official said it was not mentioned during the three sessions of talks held Tuesday.

NEW ZEALAND

New Zealand Minister Wants ANZUS Treaty Restored

BK0806031892 Hong Kong AFP in English 0238 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Wellington, June 8 (AFP)—New Zealand was working towards restoring its military ties with Australia and the U.S. cut by a previous government's anti-nuclear policies, Defence Minister Warren Cooper said Monday.

He said the government intended to work towards the "fullest possible participation" in the ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand, United States.)

New Zealand's role in the treaty ended in 1985 when the government of Prime Minister David Lange introduced anti-nuclear laws which the U.S. claimed compromised its policy to "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. warships.

The current National Party government promised in the 1990 elections that it would abide by the anti-nuclear laws, but has since signalled its intention to seek a resumed ANZUS role, especially as the U.S. has announced it will remove nuclear weapons for its surface fleet.

Cooper said in a speech that this U.S. initiative had removed the primary reason for resisting ship visits.

"The issue is no longer of nuclear weapons, but of nuclear propulsion," Cooper said.

He said the world had changed considerably since the withdrawal from ANZUS.

"A return to the fold of ANZUS will have a significant impact on the general security and influence of this country as a whole.

"Once again, this country will have access to high-level intelligence, will train with the technology and doctrine that won the Gulf War and, most importantly, be accepted back into the military fraternity with our natural allies," Cooper said.

HUNGARY

Defense Official Holds Talks With Russia's Kokoshin*LD1706205192 Budapest MTI in English 1905 GMT
17 Jun 92*

[Text] Budapest, June 17 (MTI)—Lieutenant General Antal Annus, administrative secretary of state of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, held talks with Andrey Kokoshin, first deputy of the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, who was passing through Hungary.

Themes discussed at the meeting, held in the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, included relations between the two ministries and armies, the acquisition possibilities of items required by the Hungarian Army, and the pending questions of the Soviet troops withdrawal.

Kokoshin briefed Annus on the organization and tasks of the recently set up Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation.

POLAND

General Dudybnyin Provides Withdrawal Timetable to Poland*LD1206204992 Warsaw TVP Television First
Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 12 Jun 92*

[Text] Before leaving for Moscow, General Victor Dubynin, the former chief of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army in Poland who was recently appointed Russia's first deputy defense minister, informed Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the head of the Ministry of National Defense, about the time-table for the withdrawal from Poland of the troops of the former Soviet Army.

By the end of the year, more than 15,500 soldiers will be withdrawn. Almost 6,000 will still remain in Poland. As of 1 January, there will not be any heavy Russian military equipment in our country. Victor Dubynin handed Janusz Onyszkiewicz a map that shows the location and numbers of former Soviet Union troops.

Onyszkiewicz Discusses Pullout*AU1806073692 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA
in Polish 15 Jun 92 pp 1, 2*

[Unattributed report: "Janusz Onyszkiewicz tells POLSKA ZBROJNA"]

[Text] The date of the pullout of combat units of the former Soviet Army given in the communique—1 January 1993—is rather loose. I am sure the Russian side wants to evacuate these forces as soon as possible for various reasons, including financial ones. They cannot afford to keep their forces in Poland because all

accounting is being performed in convertible currency, and it is becoming increasingly expensive for them to keep their forces here. From what General Dubynin has said, it looks as if the evacuation process will proceed rapidly, and the remaining 6,000 troops who will remain here to maintain communications and guarantee conditions for an efficient evacuation will themselves be evacuated quickly.

I hope General Dubynin, as chief of the Russian General Staff, will take with him a positive impression of Poland.

As for the map given to us by the Russian side, it does not seem to contain any confidential information. Whether this information will be revealed depends on a decision by the Polish General Staff, after consulting the Russian side.

In Poland, Mr. Dubynin was a soldier and a general first, and a politician second. For many years the post of chief of the northern group of Soviet forces was purely a military one. But recently it also became a political one. The general is well-known for several statements that have understandably caused a great deal of confusion and controversy. But I remember General Moyseyev, who visited us once as chief of the Soviet General Staff, saying that General Dubynin is a military man more than anything else, and anything political he might say should be viewed solely in a military context.

I think our future cooperation with the Russian forces under General Kovalov will be good because the main political decisions and the other decisions, in the form of various protocols, including the agreement on the pullout of the forces from Poland, have already been reached. We are already standing on solid ground. The field of conflict, which existed far too long, has been eliminated. It is good that the agreement has been concluded in such a form, in accordance with our starting position. I remember my conversation with Minister Kozyrev (literally a few days before the putsch), at a time when the Soviet Union still existed in a formal sense and it was clear that a breakthrough had been made. We met in Budapest, and already then I renewed my suggestion of a zero option. He displayed a great amount of understanding. I am pleased things ended the way they did.

Right now the pullout of the Soviet forces from Poland is a technical and supply operation. The facilities left vacant have to be taken over, and that is a huge burden for our Army. It could cost our Army a lot of effort and money because all the local government bodies expect the Polish Army to look after these facilities. But we do not have enough manpower and resources for this task. The Army must keep in training. It cannot be given an increasing amount of guard duties. This is something that the government will have to decide. After all, the chief task of our Army should not be the guarding of facilities it does not need.

INDIA

PRC Nuclear Test Said Factor in Deciding Indian Policy

*BK0506032692 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0245 GMT 5 Jun 92*

[Text] The chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. P.K. Iyengar, has urged the political leadership in the country to take into account the recent Chinese nuclear test before framing India's response to nonproliferation. He told newsmen in Puna as a country we are not against nuclear nonproliferation, but some countries continue to demonstrate their nuclear weapons capability. He said the recent Chinese nuclear explosion has shown that they are still sharpening their arsenal.

In reply to a question, Dr. Iyengar said no decision has been taken on the sale of a nuclear reactor to Iran.

IRAN

Commentary Views U.S.-Israeli Arms Issues

*LD2405170492 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic
of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1300 GMT
24 May 92*

[Unattributed station commentary]

[Text] The issue of the sale of U.S. arms technology to other countries as well as the sale of some proscribed arms to countries like China, South Africa, and Chile are among topics that every now and then the Western press ascribes to the Zionist regime. Of course, despite the tension that was whipped up between the United States and the Zionist regime over the \$10 billion loan, in recent months White House officials displayed their lack of animosity toward the Zionist regime many times. Nevertheless, some of those officials stated that the denials of the Israeli authorities regarding the nonsale of U.S. weapons represent only one side of the story and that the other side must become clear through more research and investigation.

But it is obvious that the Israeli Zionist regime is an important facet of U.S. global strategy, and the U.S. position regarding the Zionist government—considering the general and regional conditions—enjoys a wider viewpoint, since that regime plays an important role in safeguarding U.S. interests in various areas of the world, including Latin America, South Africa, and so on. Thus, it does not come under regional disarmament policies. In fact, this is because the secondary propaganda did ostensibly downgrade the issue of the likely nuclear potential of the Zionist regime and the need for its restriction or destruction. This is when there exist many reports—some of which are exaggerated—regarding the extent of the regime's nuclear capabilities.

For example, a Jewish American journalist wrote in his book entitled *Israel, America, and the Bomb: On Israeli*

nuclear capabilities there are reliable reports. In 1973, Kissinger officially announced that Israel had three nuclear warheads. In 1976 the Americans gave the number as 10, but in 1981 one of the scientists from the Israeli nuclear center revealed that Israel made around 100 nuclear bombs since then. Thus, the number of Israel's current nuclear warheads is much more than that and includes more than 10 nuclear [word indistinct] and mines used in ground warfare.

Notwithstanding the motives behind the revelation of such information—which may include instilling fear in Arab regimes to gain more concessions for the Zionist regime—the issue of nuclear arms in the Middle East is a matter that must be considered within a global framework; these are arms that have, from a technological viewpoint, mainly originated from the West, especially America, and proliferated in molding U.S. policies. Nevertheless, it is said that differences, albeit limited, have occurred between that country's and the Zionist regimes's regional policies. According to U.S. viewpoints, strategic cooperation with that regime should not contradict U.S. ability to expand the level of relations and increase cooperation with friendly Arab states. Thus, while many of the joint maneuvers with the Zionists are kept away from the attention of the mass media, reports relating to some maneuvers jointly carried out with Arab forces are, on the contrary, widely publicized. This shows that by revealing the aspects of cooperation and agreement with friendly Arab forces and suppressing its cooperation with the Zionist regime or portraying it as unimportant, America is paying more attention to regional considerations.

Of course in the real world, the United States allocated 20 percent of its foreign aid to the Zionist regime and concluded many secret military operation agreements with that regime on the basis of the 1981 agreement. This is a position that cannot be denied or concealed under any circumstances, and further persistence in this unveils other behind-the-scenes issues.

Syrians Said Killed in Scud Project Accident

*LD3105092592 London THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
in English 31 May 92, p 20*

[Report by John Bulloch]

[Text] Four Syrian Army officers have been killed while working to extend the range of Scud missiles in Iran.

The families of the four were told they had died in "a military accident". Syria and Iran signed a treaty on technical co-operation this year and a number of Syrian officers have been sent to Tehran though Syria has never acknowledged it is helping Iran's missile programme.

Iran has contracted to buy 150 Scud-D missiles from North Korea which have a range of 1,300 kilometres and can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads. Two months ago, a North Korean cargo ship delivered the first to the Iranian naval base at Bandar-e 'Abbas.

The missiles will cost Iran \$320 million but part of the agreement with North Korea is that Iran should also acquire technology to manufacture its own rockets. Coupled with new Iranian efforts to acquire a nuclear capability Iran is believed to be intent on taking over Iraq's role as the dominant Gulf power.

President Hashemi-Rafsanjani of Iran is seen as a moderate, said an intelligence analyst, but added: "When it comes to real power he is as hardline as anyone else."

Reports that Iran has two tactical nuclear shells from Kazakhstan are being taken seriously in Israel. The shells would not be used but could be copied. Israeli commentators said the head of Iran's nuclear programme, Dr 'Ali Reza Mo'ayeri, is now a deputy prime minister reporting directly to Mr Rafsanjani.

Analysts do not believe Iran would attack Israel but there could be a conflict if there was a war between Israel and Syria. Relations are strained after Israeli air raids in south Lebanon, which is supposed to be under Syrian protection.

Without Moscow to hold him back, President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria could invoke his alliance with Iran if there was a conflict with Israel. Iran's only practical means of helping would be to threaten Israel with missile attacks.

ISRAEL

U.S. Efforts to Halt Proliferation Called Insufficient

TA1506185792 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in English
1700 GMT 15 Jun 92

[Text] The commander of Israel's Air Force [IAF] says the United States is not doing enough to stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The statement, which followed Major General Herzl Bodinger's remarks yesterday about the danger of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, was made at a news conference for foreign correspondents to mark Air Force Day. But first he elaborated on his remarks about Iran and Syria getting nuclear weapons:

[Begin recording] [Bodinger] If countries in the region—like Iran, Libya, and other countries—will have nuclear weapons, this can endanger the whole area. And a kind of war that can take part in this area and use nuclear weapons can later deteriorate into a world war position.

If we will have any kind of report that any country in the region is getting close to get a nuclear ability, it should be looked after and we should first try to work against that by political means. With that I mean the United Nations, all kind of international negotiations. And, if this doesn't work, we may consider an attack. The intelligence information that we have is that these countries, especially Iran, strive very hard to get this ability. We think,

according to the information that we have, that if nothing is done within a decade or so Iran will have an ability of nuclear weapons.

If the United States, I think, can do something. I think, yes, they should do.

[Unidentified correspondent] Are they doing enough?

[Bodinger] Right now I don't think they are doing enough. [end recording]

U.S. Consent Needed for Attacks on Nuclear Targets

TA1606111892 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Jun 92 p A1

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Extensive Action Against Arab Nuclear Installations Possible Only With U.S. Consent"]

[Text] It is highly doubtful, in the military sense, that the 1981 operation in which the Iraqi reactor was blown up can be repeated with equal effortlessness against an Arab country or against Iran, should one of them begin nuclear activity.

Not only will distances be greater—from Algeria to Iran—and routes more hazardous, the Arabs, too, have learned their lessons from the 1981 event, and they will be able to conceal their nuclear activities if they so wish.

It is likewise doubtful whether Israel should pledge to stop Arab nuclear activities by force, as implied by the remarks of Major General Herzl Bodinger, the Air Force commander. It should be remembered that, contrary to 1981, many Arab countries now have an instant retaliation capability made up of surface-to-surface missiles which could be directed at the Israeli home front.

In fact, an extensive operation against Arab nuclear installations will be possible only if the United States buckles down to the task and rounds up a few of its partners.

And yet, even in the case of Iraq, the United States and its allies were unable to eliminate its nuclear infrastructure by war. They resorted to the United Nations, whose teams took many months to carry out wide-ranging inspection tasks and blow up installations. Even now, it is not certain that the teams have managed to dispose of everything that had to be disposed of and that Iraq will not revert to its evil ways when the UN inspection is concluded.

Recent reports may have created the false impression that a turnabout has taken place in the balance of power in the region. The actual situation is different, particularly with respect to Syria. Damascus has lost its strategic partner, the Soviet Union; unlike in the past, it cannot look to Iraq for help, and it is doubtful whether Damascus will be able to recruit another Arab partner for a military confrontation with Israel.

It should be further remembered that despite the recent bout of arms procurement, Syria encounters difficulties in buying very sophisticated equipment: Many markets are closed to it, and it has difficulties in paying off debts for its already purchased weapons. It is true that its surface-to-surface missiles pose a danger to the Israeli home front, but their primary purpose is to deter Israel from launching a war.

Thus, all the signs show that Israel's qualitative edge will grow in the coming years and that Syria will be hard put to attain strategic parity with Israel. It is likewise highly doubtful that Damascus will be capable of attaining a military nuclear option in this decade.

Iran, on the other hand, will probably reach such capability by the end of the decade and, in the wake of the lessons of the Gulf war, it is indeed striving to acquire the capability to manufacture means of mass destruction.

Tehran allocates about \$2 billion a year for the reorganization of its Army, although the process of building up its military will be lengthy, particularly in view of its ambition to end its political isolation and to maintain better relations with numerous countries in the West.

For some reason, the generals who reviewed military developments in recent days avoided noting that parallel to the extensive military buildup in the region—primarily in the Gulf countries—a peace process in which Damascus is a party is also under way and that the American presence in the region constitutes a clear stabilizing factor.

PAKISTAN

Pakistani Nuclear Program Said Only for 'Peaceful Purposes'

BK3105161692 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 1500 GMT 31 May 92

[Excerpts] Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif has said that the indigenous uprising of the Kashmiri people is a struggle for their right to self-determination and it is incorrect to give it a religious coloring. In an interview with the EGYPTIAN MAIL, the prime minister made it clear that the Kashmir problem is not a

dispute between Muslims and Hindus, but a movement for attaining the right to self-determination. [passage omitted]

Asked whether he will raise the Kashmir issue during a meeting with the Egyptian president at the forthcoming Earth Summit, the prime minister said that he definitely will draw his attention to the serious violations of human rights by Indian forces in Kashmir. He will request that the Egyptian leader use his influence on India in favor of the Kashmiri people.

About Pakistan's nuclear program, Nawaz Sharif reiterated that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear bomb nor does it intend to manufacture one. The country's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. Pakistan is fully determined to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and Islamabad is willing to accept any fair and nondiscriminatory regional solution to this problem.

Pakistan has achieved a peaceful technical capability in the nuclear field to develop its nuclear program, and in view of its determination to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Islamabad will not supply sensitive technology to any third country. Nawaz Sharif said that Pakistan has been working consistently toward checking nuclear proliferation and promoting the process to reduce conventional arms in South Asia ever since India exploded its nuclear device in 1974. He regretted that India has adopted a negative attitude to all these proposals. He said that his 6 June 1991 proposal for convening a five-member conference to check nuclear proliferation in the region was the latest proposal forwarded by Pakistan, but India also did not respond positively to that proposal.

Referring to the Afghanistan problem, the prime minister expressed the hope that mutual differences will be resolved within the current Islamic system under the leadership of Professor Sebghatollah Mojaddedi. He said that the time has come now for the United Nations to play its role in the repatriation of refugees and the reconstruction of war-ravaged Afghanistan.

About the economic reforms initiated by his government, the prime minister said that special attention has been paid to privatization, ending unnecessary control of the government and encouraging the private sector to promote investment and economic progress. The objective of Pakistan's economic reforms is to further open up the economy and increase the role and activity of the private sector.

GENERAL**Construction of Warhead Storage in Tomsk Discussed With U.S.***LD0306132792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1301 GMT 3 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Yakushev]

[Text] U.S. and Russian experts discussed on Wednesday [3 June] a possibility of constructing a depot in the Siberian town of Tomsk for storing charges from nuclear warheads liable to elimination.

The U.S. delegation, consisting of representatives of the Departments of Defence and Energy, Los Alamos laboratory and an adviser of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, met the leaders of the Tomsk-7 chemical plant, which had for long been a closed city.

The participants studied the project and sent it for expertise to the local ecology committee.

However, the purpose of the visit of the U.S. delegation caused great concern among local population.

Security Council Accord Blocks Export of CBR Materials'*PM0806144792 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jun 92 First Edition p 7*

["Commentary" by observer Sergey Demidov: "Insuring Against a Weapons Drain"]

[Text] The numerous warnings, sometimes panic warnings, in recent months by experts and the media of a possible "drain" of technologies for the creation of various types of mass destruction weapons from countries possessing them to states dying to acquire them, for example, Iraq or Libya, are a constant preoccupation for politicians and for the political scientists who evaluate the future of the world. So the question of how to insure against the spread of nuclear or chemical and biological bombs is no idle one.

It was discussed, in fact, at a meeting that ended at the end of last week at the U.S. State Department by representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—Britain, China, Russia, the United States, and France. One unnamed U.S. diplomat reported that they had reached a preliminary accord on blocking exports of equipment, services, and materials that could be used to produce not only nuclear but also chemical and biological armaments.

It is hard to overestimate its significance, since hitherto none of the members of the "nuclear club" had promised not to sell and not to transfer for any reason to a third party "goods" that come under the last two categories of weapons. According to an official spokesman for the U.S. foreign policy department, this agreement is the clearest public assurance by all five nuclear nations to

date that they are fully determined to get down to tackling the problem of the probable spread of mass destruction weapons worldwide.

This is evidenced by the 10 provisions included in the document prepared at the Washington meeting, which make it incumbent on the nuclear "five" not to assist "any nonnuclear state to develop, acquire, produce, test, stockpile, or site nuclear armaments." There is a separate point on their commitments regarding chemical and biological weapons.

The meeting participants did not neglect conventional weapons. But they did not succeed in reaching agreement on the exchange of data on the delivery of tanks, military aircraft, guns, and so on to various countries and on notifying one another (if need be) of planned deals of that kind. They merely concluded that there is a need to hold separate consultations in order to discuss "worrying trends" toward an increased flow of weapons to the Near East. Which is significant in itself: Indeed, there are a number of countries in this turbulent region which are governed by regimes with thwarted leadership ambitions.

So if the Washington accords are fleshed out by political actions, then, presumably, the world community will have taken at least one step toward a secure future.

Mikhailov: 'Complete Cessation of Nuclear Tests Possible'*PM0506135992 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 5 Jun 92 p 2*

[Article by Sergey Ovsienko: "'Cold War' Has Ended but There Are More and More 'Trouble Spots'"]

[Text] It is the paradox of our times. The collapse of the USSR and the formation of independent states on its territory, although they have shaken stability in Europe have nonetheless put an end to the "cold war" which lasted nearly 50 years. Having avoided a third world war during that time, the world has been plunged into a raging sea of local conflicts.

In this complex geopolitical situation Russia has embarked on the building of its own armed forces. If there is no need to convince anyone of the need to do so, the future military doctrine is generating a large number of disputes. Evidence of this is the international conference on "The Democratization of Society and Military Security" held at the General Staff military academy, which is about to become a Russian academy.

The end of the "cold war" has substantially reduced the threat of a nuclear missile clash. In addition, Army General P. Grachev stressed, Russia does not regard a single state or coalition of states as its enemy. War is possible, but it is important for Russia to know where its sources are. The defense minister diplomatically indicated regional, religious, and ethnic contradictions...Russia will view the buildup of armed forces near

its borders and the introduction of troops onto the territory of adjacent countries as a threat.

P. Grachev confirmed that the Russian Army is free from political influence and a guarantee of that is the effective control exercised by the President, the Supreme Soviet, and the government.

Touching on the place of nuclear weapons in the new military doctrine, the defense minister stated that Russia advocates the complete prevention of nuclear tests and of the improvement of nuclear weapons of all types.

But V. Mikhaylov, leader of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, has a different opinion on this score: The complete cessation of nuclear tests is possible when Russia declares itself a nonnuclear state and abolishes nuclear weapons. From the viewpoint of the nuclear specialists, it would be sensible to agree with the United States on a strict limitation of the number of explosions, for instance two to three charges a year and no more.

The scientific conference was in my view also useful because its participants did not restrict themselves to the framework of the problems of Russia's military security. V. Chernega, deputy chief of the Russian Foreign Ministry's First Administration, expressed the view that Russia's foreign policy needs powerful armed forces. Only in that case will it achieve its aim—and be integrated into the world community and take its place there. The defense of national interests also presupposes Russia's entry into the system of collective security and alliance with the United States, not at the price of concessions, but as equals.

According to specialists' assessments, by the early 21st century 24 countries will have a nuclear missile capability. And that means that the threat of nuclear war will increase immeasurably compared with the nineties. That is why strict control by the world community over the proliferation of nuclear weapons is already essential right now.

An interesting thought about the interconnection between Russian foreign and domestic security was voiced by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V. Vorozhtsov (Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs). The growth of crime is exerting substantial influence on the democratization of society, the security of economic reforms, and Russia's state integrity.

Touching on relations within the framework of the CIS, S. Blagovolin, president of the institute of strategic studies and national security, noted that the situation on Russia's borders has become complicated: In the south there is a lack of stability and since the collapse of the USSR new sources of contradictions have arisen in the West. Russia's stance in this complex situation should be as follows: As much tolerance as possible without waiving national interests.

Yeltsin Discusses Reform Policies, U.S. Trip

LD1106190792 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1630 GMT 11 Jun 92

[Interview with President Boris Yeltsin by Oleg Poptsov, chairman of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, and Igor Golembiovskiy, chief editor of IZVESTIYA, with Vyacheslav Kostikov, the president's press secretary, in the Grand Kremlin Palace on 10 June—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Kostikov] Esteemed television viewers of Russia, we are here in the Kremlin, in one of the rooms of the Grand Kremlin Palace meeting with Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. A year has passed since the election of the first President in the history of our country. As you know, a president has for the first time been elected by the people and he is answerable to his people. We have gathered here today to talk about our problems, difficulties, and hopes with the President and with you.

Participating in the meeting is Igor Golembiovskiy, editor in chief of the IZVESTIYA newspaper; Oleg Poptsov, the president of Russian Television; and Vyacheslav Kostikov, the president's press secretary. Over to you, Oleg Maksimovich Poptsov.

[Poptsov] Boris Nikolayevich, first I would like to thank you for finding the time for this interview which, generally speaking—and I make no secret of this—the television viewers are eagerly awaiting. I would like to take up the baton proffered by Vyacheslav Vasilyevich about the President's year. This topic is on everyone's lips, it is a topic in the newspapers. I would like to put it like this: If you had been elected 10 days or a week ago and were just beginning that presidential year, what would you regard as necessary, what would you repeat, and what would you discard as an error or mistake?

[Passage omitted]

[Yeltsin] At the Russian Security Council today we discussed the question of a global reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, but it should be equal reductions with the United States. I believe Mr. Bush and I will succeed in signing the basic framework agreements on this question. It is a reduction amounting to billions in expenditure which is being made just to increase or maintain our nuclear forces.

We have a clear idea of the future stages of a program for reforms and I do not believe one can say that Gaydar's team is being destroyed. Indeed not! As a result of the criticism at the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies we brought four people on additional posts, experienced industrialists, into the government. That is justified and not destroying Gaydar's team. It will continue to operate as a reformist team, as a young, decisive, strong, and intelligent team. And it will face no obstacles. All the talk about my alleged deviation from the reforms, about my

becoming more conservative than I was a month or two ago or on 2 January, is untrue.

[Golembiovskiy] That is very important.

[Yeltsin] Again and again I say in no circumstances will I allow any deviation from the reforms. Just as I will not let myself be ousted from the post of Russian President. Some people naively believe that you can impeach a president if you collect a few signatures. There are only three possible options under the Constitution: I resign—but I am not going to do that; I commit a crime; or I am so sick that I am in no fit state to govern the state.

[Poptsov] You won't do that either, hopefully.

[Yeltsin] My last medical examination showed that I am healthy. So you need have no doubts on that score.

[passage omitted]

[Golembiovskiy] Boris Nikolayevich, could we change the subject? You have already touched on it. You are about to visit the United States. This is a very important visit for Russia, and a very important visit for the United States, judging by the information we are receiving from there. I have encountered the opinion, in my own editorial offices, which expresses a certain regret that it used to be representatives of a huge power that frightened the whole world who traveled abroad. Nevertheless, it was a large, powerful country. But now the President of Russia represents a country in a rather shrunken form. In my view, values are completely different. You are perhaps the first President in our history who can travel abroad with head held high, honestly and proudly, because there are much higher values than tanks and missiles... freedom, independence, and the desire to organize a normal life for people. In my view, this outweighs all the rest. I would like to ask about your feeling. How do you feel when you represent our huge country?

[Yeltsin] Formerly, say, the United States and the former Soviet Union were regarded as superpowers. Their opposition, confrontation, or departure from cold war determined the climate throughout the world. But in essence this superpower status was determined by the quantity of nuclear weapons: 36,000 nuclear warheads on one side, and about a few more, 40,000 on the other side. We knew no other criteria. Even living standards were not taken into account. This was secondary. We want to change the situation in such a way that people's lives are the primary consideration. This is more important than everything we are all—and the president above all—working for.

At the moment we should not compare ourselves with the Americans in this respect. It is necessary to make deep cuts in nuclear weapons, not unilaterally but on a basis of parity. We cannot allow people to live in poverty solely because of nuclear weapons, over 50 percent of the people to exist below the poverty line because we have so

many nuclear warheads—12,500 strategic ones alone. Why so many, if 1,000 can destroy the entire planet?

So, the first thing is: The destruction of tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons have been completely withdrawn from the territory of all three states—Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus—and are now being destroyed, in Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. About strategic weapons: In Lisbon, at the CSCE, these states signed a protocol saying that they will be nuclear-free states and are signing the nonproliferation treaty, that is, Russia will remain a nuclear state. Naturally, this gives greater certainty from the viewpoint of control [upravleniye], safety in operation, accidental launches, and so forth. Therefore Russia remains a great power in terms of many components.

And if you take history, whose is richer? Russia's? Not the Soviet Union's, but Russia's. The United States, which is a little over 200 years old? Or Russia, with its history stretching back over thousands of years, with its spirituality, culture, traditions, art, scientific and creative potential, and the skill, professionalism, and endurance of its people? With their character and patriotism. Not jingoism but genuine, full, real patriotism.

People's living standards and so forth still have to be taken into account, because a true superpower incorporates a whole range of such considerations and not only the quantity of nuclear weapons.

Why is the whole world, or most of it at least, watching Russia today? Watching with such sympathy? The world is worried about how our reform will go, and people are sincerely concerned. And if they offer support for our reforms, we should not regard that as a mere sop. I am not going to the United States holding my hand out. No, I want to hold my hand out to the U.S. President. In my speech at the joint session of the chambers of Congress I want to hold my hand out to the whole American people: Let us cooperate, let us be partners, let us end the era of confrontation. Let us not regard each other as potential enemies, but allies. Let us set up a universal nuclear missile early warning system, so as to take the whole world under our protection. This would be a joint technological project under joint operation. There are some very interesting proposals for this visit.

[Golembiovskiy] You have already expressed this idea, have you not?

[Yeltsin] Yes, when I was at the UN Security Council session and was invited to Camp David by President Bush, I put it forward as an idea. At first they received it in silence. Now, having analyzed it, the Americans have come round to the view that this is a rational idea, to set up a joint system of surveillance over the whole world. We launch 24 rockets into space, they launch 24—48 rockets in joint operation and surveillance over the whole world. And that's it. They send something up from Iraq or somewhere else, and we know about it immediately.

[Golembiovskiy] I nearly named another possible place.

[Yeltsin] Well, yes, we will not go into that right now. But there are another two or three countries that have to be kept under watch. That is what this system is for. Also, it is considerably cheaper than ABM, although we will not abandon that just yet. It is even cheaper compared with SDI. But if we compete—if the Americans embark on creating SDI and we start creating something similar, then we will become complete paupers. Because this is not going to require hundreds of billions, trillions will have to be invested in space in order to set up such a system.

[Poptsov] Boris Nikolayevich, I would like to bring us back to our fatherland again. It is natural that all kinds of forces attempt to exert pressure on the President. That is inevitable. You have already expressed your position very precisely—that the policy will not change. Nevertheless, the reorganization of the government that has been carried out is put together with some other phenomena—Shakhray's resignation, Popov's resignation. Is the government reshuffle a compromise, or is it a consequence of pressure from [other] forces—especially since you were just talking about disarmament, and we have seen quite a lot of political galvanization of the military-industrial complex within the country?

[Yeltsin] First, it is useless to pressure me. For your information, I do not yield to pressure. Cooperation or negotiation with me is possible. Go ahead! By anyone you like. But I cannot be pressured! It is a different matter that we are currently in a so-called transition period. In other words, we have jettisoned the administrative edict system but have not created a new system, and therefore we have enterprises which have rapidly gone in for flotation and privatization, while there are also enterprises committed to the conservative methods of leadership that used to exist—and there are considerable numbers of them, particularly in the military-industrial complex. That is quite true. But the government team which has been put together is going boldly for reform. But at the same time, when these sectors started to suffer we felt that during the transition period there have to be some figures who, while believing in and supporting reform, would nevertheless be able to work with those enterprises which are still in such a state and which are still loyal to administrative edict methods.

There was therefore—and I said this at the Congress—a need for three or four people whom we would take on with definite production experience. But not the kind of people who would lead us away from the strategic course of reform.

[Poptsov] Let us put it this way: A concession to life rather than to the Congress?

[Yeltsin] You know, it is a concession to the logic of life, of today's situation. And not even a concession. I would say, perhaps, several tactical... [pauses]

[Poptsov] The filling of tactics with other content?

[Yeltsin] Yes. A small tactical change. And that was welcomed—apart from those who criticize any step. If something is not done properly, you are criticized. If you promise, you did not carry any industrialists with you. If you do something, another side criticizes. You see how Gaydar's team has been disturbed. The Gaydar team is and remains in place. On 5 June I got together with all the deputy prime ministers—plus Burbulis and myself. We agreed to talk not about global problems but about Russia—about our relations and, as it were, what would happen in our country. We all came to the conclusion that, first, we are all devoted to reform; second, a unified team remains in place; third, Gaydar's authority must be enhanced; fourth, yes, I will hold on to the post of chairman of the government a bit longer—maybe a few months. But when I see that the team has become strong enough that a new premier can be nominated I will immediately agree to that because it's hard for me in purely physical terms, not to mention other factors of a political nature.

I am asked: On what principle do you choose people? Where do they come from? The first thing, of course, is professionalism. Second, he must be no older than I am—I have already spoken about this, and there is no one [older than I am]. Third, support for reforms and the relevant work. Fourth, to a certain extent, of course, support for the president personally, because I do not want to end up in the role of Gorbachev when he was betrayed by his own entourage. And if you recall the time of the putsch, on 19 and 20 August, none of the comrades in arms selected by me defected. Give me just one name.

[Poptsov] Why do you say that? Of course...

[Yeltsin interrupts] Precisely! There aren't any!

[Poptsov] I believe that.

[Yeltsin] Exactly! There aren't any!

[Passage omitted]

[Poptsov] One more question, Boris Nikolayevich, perhaps not the most straightforward one. Is the army with you?

[Yeltsin] I have just this morning been at a meeting with the military, at 0900—some 700 people, or maybe more. They were chiefs of all the categories of troops, all the territories, and military districts, and Defense Ministry employees. The Joint Command was there, too—only the leadership, that is, only the Russian section.

I addressed them. Then I answered some questions connected with the army for the press after my speech. Incidentally, I have signed a decree on another 80 percent increase in pay for all servicemen.

[Golembiovskiy] That is already the second one, one was signed on 9 May.

[Yeltsin] Yes, yes, as from 1 June. Moreover, there will be new additional payments for ranks. Whereas a lieutenant used to receive 50 rubles [R] for his rank, he will now receive R500 and so on, colonels, generals and marshals, admirals and so on. Of course, this is not the thing. There are two viewpoints on a more fundamental question: The first is that we are behind with creating the Russian Army, and the second is that we have been in somewhat too much of a hurry.

I believe the time is right. We held out as far as possible for there to be a single unified army. This was our concept. It was impossible to cut the army up into pieces. It is the sort of organism that really needs to be unified. Generally speaking, the whole sphere and this organism's support system alone are so complex that everything would at once fall apart at the very first cut. Therefore, we have waited and waited.

But when the states began announcing the creation of their own national armies, when the Ukraine just recently announced its national currency, we realized that we must defend Russia should there suddenly be any collisions. The resolution was therefore adopted and it was well-received.

We do not require officers to take the oath a second time. An officer of the Russian Army has always sworn once. Even after 1917, in 1918, when the army was being created, officers did not swear a second oath. True, they did sign a piece of paper. But I have told them today that I do not demand a signature, because you have already sworn an oath to the people of Russia. The people remain, and the oath is to the people. This is chief thing. Therefore, officers will not swear a second oath, even though they are in the Russian Army. Then they broke into applause. There was far less applause in connection with pay than in connection with the oath. I would like to say that. The army now is closer to us than ever.

Therefore, when people speak of a possible putsch and so on they are simply frightening the people, and the army leadership today cannot imagine their president finding himself in a position like the one which existed on 19-20 August last year. No, no. Our army must be trusted completely.

[Passage omitted]

Explanations Cited for 'Homeless' Warheads

PM1106095492 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Jun 92 p 1

[Report by correspondent Colonel V. Usoltsev: "Nobody Lost Any Nuclear Warheads, and Vladimir Desyatov, Representative of the Russian Federation President in Khabarovsk Kray, Made No Statements to That Effect"]

[Text] Khabarovsk—A number of newspapers published a report from the POSTFACTUM agency that 23 nuclear warheads had disappeared in the Far Eastern

Military District. The Far Eastern Military District command apparently knew nothing about it. Later POSTFACTUM, citing Vladimir Desyatov, representative of the Russian Federation president in Khabarovsk Kray, offered the clarification that the "homeless" warheads may belong to the Navy and come from the unfinished nuclear submarines at Komsomolsk-na-Amure's Lenin Komsomol Plant.

I personally was surprised by this report because Desyatov himself, not so long ago, used to work at that plant as a design engineer. And he could not help knowing that there are hardly likely to be nuclear missiles on "unfinished submarines."

Desyatov was in Komsomolsk-na-Amure. My first telephone conversation was with his assistant Mikhail Che.

"It is true that the Russian president's representative Desyatov and a special commission found these warheads," Mikhail Aleksandrovich confirmed, to my surprise. "Whom they belong to has not yet been established"

"Where exactly in Khabarovsk Kray was this?"

"Not far from Komsomolsk. Where precisely? I cannot tell you that yet."

So the enigmatic story "unfurled." But on Tuesday morning I at last succeeded in talking with Vladimir Desyatov himself by telephone.

"I gave no interviews about this to any news agency or newspaper," he stated immediately, when I told him the purpose of the conversation. "My 'statement' about 23 nuclear warheads lost by the military is the fabrication of idle journalists. Only someone who was either permanently drunk or not in his right mind could make such a statement."

"Vladimir Mikhaylovich, how are we to assess the statement by your assistant Mikhail Che that you did find the warheads?"

"Obviously Mikhail Aleksandrovich expressed himself inaccurately. He knows that I did indeed say previously that there were nuclear warheads in the armory of a certain unit, and that they are not there now. They have been moved to another storage facility, which I have no doubt is safe. I have seen with my own eyes, as they saying goes, that they are not now in the vicinity of Komsomolsk. They have not been mislaid, as certain publications are trying to tell their readers, but, I repeat, they have been removed for storage in a different special facility."

At the end of our conversation the Russian president's representative repeated that he had made no irresponsible statements about nuclear warheads and had no intention of making any such statements.

That is the whole story.

START TALKS

Moscow Hosts Conference on Weapons Dismantling

PM0406101592 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jun 92 p 3

[S. Ivanov report under the "From Missile Life" rubric:
"We Do Not Need Advice, Build Us a Dump"]

[Text] The hopes that every Soviet family would acquire a separate apartment by the year 2000 have crashed, as has another slogan by the same author calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the millennium. At any rate, our closest partners in distant foreign parts are not striving to become nuclear-free by then.

At the same time everyone is perfectly well aware that it is necessary to reduce nuclear potentials. At the international conference "Democratization of Society and Military Security," which is being held in Moscow at this time, everyone—ranging from top military officers to politicians and the actual developers of weapons at Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16—has arrived at a consensus on this question. According to V. Mikhaylov, Minister for Atomic Energy, approximately \$2 billion will be required in order to implement B. Yeltsin's strategic nuclear initiatives in the space of five to 10 years.

Western countries are prepared to give us real assistance here too. It was here that a certain misunderstanding arose at the conference: What specific assistance do our nuclear scientists need today? Siegbert Fischer of the Transatlantic Nuclear Research Center, for example, spoke of the readiness of a number of German firms to finance a program for the dismantling of Russia's nuclear weapons and to send their specialists to us. He said that businessmen, however, would like to know how many nuclear weapons have been produced and where they are....

I asked S. Voronin, chief designer at "Arzamas-16," one of Russia's federal nuclear centers, to comment.

"Foreign representatives who are seeking to assist in the disarmament of Russia believe that they must participate in the dismantling, and they are doing all they can to obtain information of this kind. You understand, we do not need this kind of assistance. We have the necessary production capacities and top-class specialists. The problem is a different one. The scale of the dismantling and disassembly is such that the problem of storage arises. There is a shortage of storage premises and packing containers for materials."

Russian Deputies Discuss Problems in Strategic Arms Treaty

LD0906111992 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
0935 GMT 9 Jun 92

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] Moscow—According to members of the Russian parliament, reduction of Russia's defense capacity makes it refrain from pursuing the military policy of ex-USSR based on arms balance.

Discussing the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty at the June 8 second round of the parliament's special session, several deputies of the Supreme Soviet pointed out that considering the amount of stockpiled weapons Russia will be able to follow the undertaken obligations only for a while after which a serious unilateral reduction will be needed to observe the treaty. Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense and Security Aleksandr Piskunov told PF [POSTFACTUM] correspondent:

Strategic weapons remain the principal base of global strategic stability. Regarding this issue Russia is willing to retain its strategic ground forces and currently cannot back away from MIRVS [multiple independent re-entry vehicle] and switch to mono-blocks, as proposed by the American party. At present Russia cannot economically stand such transition. According to Mr. Piskunov, ratification of the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty both by Russia and the USA will first of all depend on the pace and completion of realization of nuclear-free principles proclaimed by Kazakhstan, Byelarus and the Ukraine.

Agenda For Yeltsin's North American Trip

Disarmament, Economy To Dominate

MK1006145892 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Jun 92 p 1

[Yuriy Leonov article: "Russian-U.S. Disarmament Is Becoming Reality. Economic Cooperation Remains Future Prospect"]

[Text] Next week a Russian-U.S. summit meeting will be held in Washington. In the U.S. capital yesterday, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker completed their talks in preparation for the summit.

The main subject of summit meetings between our two countries' presidents is traditionally disarmament. Kozyrev and Baker told journalists during the talks that they are, in addition, discussing the question of defining the parameters of a framework strategic arms limitation agreement which is to be approved during the meeting of the two presidents. However, the well-informed WASHINGTON POST, citing sources close to the U.S. Administration, announced 9 June that Russia and the United States are near to a far more wide-ranging agreement to reduce the levels of their strategic offensive arms far

below those stipulated in the START Treaty signed by the Soviet and U.S. presidents last year. THE WASHINGTON POST claims that the aim is to reach a "ceiling" of 4,700 nuclear warheads for each side by the end of the decade (this means that the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals will be halved rather than reduced by 30 percent, as the treaty envisaged).

During their discussion of the trickiest questions on the agenda of the coming summit, Baker and Kozyrev had to be extremely cautious. Kozyrev said the following in Washington: "We have to observe Russia's interests and find the kind of solution that, even hypothetically, would not jeopardize the two sides' security." I believe the Russian minister was referring to more than the realization of the well-known principle: "Trust but verify." The problem of how the public in the two countries views the results of past ministerial talks and the coming presidential talks is inevitably of importance to the Russian side. The point is that the implementation of existing disarmament agreements involves palpable financial (not to mention domestic) difficulties for Russia. It is not only Russia's conservative politicians who are seriously worried by the question: Who will pay for disarmament.

The extremely attractive idea that, after disarmament, military confrontation between the superpowers will give way to cooperation and, in the future, alliance partnership has noticeably begun to lose its luster and is not bolstered by substantive arguments from the United States and the West. It has emerged that we are not going to receive the promised \$24 billion for the time being; private investors have not rushed to invest money in postcommunist Russia; and it seems increasingly often in world politics that the "panhuman values" that our former president "invented" are strangely similar to U.S. national interests—with which Russia's interests increasingly and unconditionally coincide, judging by the decisions that are being adopted.

The CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency report on the economy of Russia and the CIS which has just been submitted to the U.S. Congress does not inspire optimism in potential investors: It foresees further instability and uncertainty, that is, it clearly indicates the lack of clarity here. A Georgetown University report published this week states quite bluntly about U.S. support for Russian democracy: "There is still a discrepancy between the avowed aims and the means that they (the United States—Yu.L.) are using to achieve these aims." Thus on the eve of Yeltsin's U.S. visit the reality (first and foremost, the economic reality) of Russian-U.S. relations, leaves a lot to be desired. The presidents have a good deal of work to do. In order to boost his prestige ahead of the elections, Bush, for instance, needs to do more than announce another "historic reduction" in weaponry (things are easier for Yeltsin in this respect—he has said that he has no intention of running again). It cannot be denied that the summit will pose tricky conundrums. However let us remember that the harder the problem, the greater the honor in finding a wise solution.

Yeltsin on Disarmament

*LD1006191592 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 10 Jun 92*

[Text] The question of reducing nuclear armaments was discussed at the latest session of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on 10 June. Journalists were told this by president of the Russian Federation Yeltsin after the signing of the Russian-Kyrgyz Treaty.

Yeltsin said that despite the intensive contacts, including meetings between the foreign ministers of Russia and the United States, the positions of the two sides on this matter have not yet been clarified. The president expressed the desire that during his forthcoming visit to the United States, apart from a charter on the principles of relations between the United States and Russia, a document should also be signed on the framework principles for reducing nuclear armaments. This document should determine the principles of the approach toward this matter; and if it is signed, it will give us the opportunity to achieve a deeper reduction of nuclear armaments than the START Treaty, Yeltsin believes.

He said that on 3 June he had sent a letter to President George Bush on this issue.

Boris Yeltsin also said that during his visit to the United States, some 20 documents will be signed at various levels, including the level of governments and ministers.

Replying to a question, the president said that the Russian-Ukrainian summit meeting will take place after his return from the United States.

More on Kozyrev's U.S. Visit, Baker Talks

*PM1106112792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jun 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 5*

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "Baker-Kozyrev: Main Part of Journey Still To Come"]

[Text] Washington—Essentially the only thing that James Baker could say after his and Andrey Kozyrev's joint audience with President George Bush in the White House was that "we will be continuing the discussions, perhaps in the next few days." According to the available information, Baker and Kozyrev should be meeting again—either in Moscow or on neutral territory—to work out a strategic arms agreement for initialing by Bush and Yeltsin at the Washington summit.

There is some hope, of course, but we have to admit that it is not very great. I have been told by sources in the Russian delegation that "there has been no meeting of minds [sostykovka] with the Americans. Admittedly, things are now clearer regarding each other's positions and how far each side can go to achieve an agreement."

The essence of the problem, I would recall, is simple: Moscow is prepared to embark on really radical cuts in strategic arsenals and go right down to the level of 2,000

warheads for each side, but it is not prepared to completely withdraw from service our most powerful weapon—ground-based SS-18 missiles. The Americans would like to completely deprive us of the “18’s,” but not to radically reduce other types of strategic arms, and to set a “ceiling” of approximately 5,000 warheads—for both Russia and themselves.

Quite frankly, there is a purely practical reason for setting the ceiling twice as high—we simply do not have the capacity to “grind up” all the missiles and warheads to be taken out of service. As Baker noted in his talk with journalists 9 June, the United States “in no way agreed to shoulder the full cost of dismantling the strategic nuclear weapons” of the former USSR.

Of course, it is not so much a question of the dismantling capacity and its cost—although I would emphasize that this is a very substantial factor. Far more important, the U.S. press believes, is another point—the Bush administration’s readiness to substantially reassess its values and reject ideas, concepts, and theories which were fine during the cold war but have now lost their topicality and justification.

The most important of these concepts is based on the fact that even in the post-cold-war period it has been impossible to totally rule out the possibility of nuclear aggression, and that, during an attack, first-strike weapons—that is, superheavy SS-18 missiles—would naturally be used. Hence the aim of reaching an agreement with Russia under which the SS-18’s would be scrapped.

As THE NEW YORK TIMES noted the other day, the Bush administration is coming in for increasingly fierce criticism alleging that the elimination of this missile has become a kind of *idee fixe*, and, as Democratic Senator Joseph Biden put it,

In the unstable situation which exists in the former Union, THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, summing up the opinion of critics of the White House’s disarmament position, “it is far more important for the United States to win Moscow’s agreement to destroy as many warheads as possible as quickly as possible, rather than worrying about the extremely unlikely prospect of a nuclear attack on the United States.”

By all accounts, even within the administration itself, there is no complete unanimity about which line to follow. If this were not the case, the achievements at the three current rounds of talks between Baker and Kozyrev would probably have been substantive—which has not been the case. The Americans were very insistent in their demands for an end to the “18’s” and even at a certain stage directly put the following proposal to our diplomats: “Name your price. What do you want in return?”

As I understand it, we answered with a counterproposal offering to reduce but not eliminate the SS-18’s, with a parallel reduction in the category of strategic arms which is most important for the Americans—sea-launched missiles.

Now to what has been achieved. It has proved possible, I was told, to almost completely agree on a charter for Russo-U.S. relations—something which IZVESTIYA has already reported on. It has proved possible to get the agreement on the peaceful use of space, on questions of military conversion, and on certain other bilateral issues and problems as close as possible to the final version which is due to be signed. It has been hinted that one agreement will result in a definite improvement in living and working conditions for Russian and U.S. journalists.

However, far more still remains to be done than has been done already. There is hardly any time left before Boris Yeltsin’s visit to the United States, during which all these agreements are to be signed.

There is a precedent in the history of our relations—the text of the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear missiles was flown from Geneva to Washington, arriving at virtually the very moment when Gorbachev and Reagan were sitting down in the White House to sign it.

‘Americans Demanded Too Much’

OW1106130792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1230 GMT 11 Jun 92

[From the “Diplomatic Panorama” feature based on reports by “diplomatic correspondents Igor Porshnev et al”; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At the talks between Russia’s Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the American Secretary of State Baker in Washington, the sides were unable to agree details [as received] of the framework of a nuclear arms reduction treaty above all because Americans demanded too much. This has been reported for “DP” [Diplomatic Panorama] by a senior Russian diplomat.

In his words, Americans insist on such a cut in Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles which Russian military experts regard as “excessive.” Russian specialists view as “unequal” an “exchange” offered by Americans for Russia to reduce far more of its IBMs than the number of sea-based nuclear missiles to be cut by the U.S. In short, this means that at this stage, the sides are unable to come to terms on mutually acceptable strategic nuclear forces reduction ceilings. “Nor is it certain yet that the framework treaty will be signed in Washington” an RF [Russian Federation] Foreign Ministry official said. In his words, Russian diplomats and military experts have been working “very intensively” on proposals for the American side.

The diplomat also disclosed that a letter sent by President Yeltsin to President Bush on Wednesday [10 June] contained “proposals on the results of the meeting between the heads of the foreign policy departments of Russia and U.S. in Washington.” This is yet another attempt to push Americans to the need to search for mutually acceptable solutions” - he stressed.

Reduction Figures Discussed

*PM1006154192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 10 Jun 92 p 3*

[S. Ivanov report: "Kozyrev-Baker: "Dismantling Ahead"]

[Text] The culmination of the Russian president's visit to the United States, which starts 15 June, is scheduled for the Tuesday [23 June] of the following week. Yesterday Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev and Secretary of State J. Baker decided that on this day they would make public the Russian-U.S. agreement on the reduction of both countries' arsenals to the level of 4,700 warheads for each country.

The figures for the weapons subject to destruction that Kozyrev and Baker laid down in the treaty [zalozhili v dogovor; as published] presuppose an even greater reduction than the figures that were agreed to by G. Bush and M. Gorbachev in Moscow last summer. However, the agreement, as we know, remained a paper agreement only, since the process of the ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons [START] was inherited by the remaining nuclear powers of the former USSR. The Russian successor to the ex-president of the Soviet Union in the sphere of disarmament is now prepared to put his signature to a reduction of approximately 50 percent of the former Soviet SS-18 type missiles which have always generated the greatest alarm among our transatlantic partners in the arms race. While the problems of the ratification of the future Russian-U.S. agreement by Ukraine and Kazakhstan have possibly been resolved following the recent visit of these countries' leaders to the United States, the technical and financial difficulties involved in the dismantling of such a quantity of missiles in such record time (10 years) by Russia alone is generating a feeling of pessimism. The process of dismantling a missile is not much cheaper than that of assembling it.

'Significant Progress' Made

*LD1306064192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0448 GMT 13 Jun 92*

[By TASS correspondents Yuriy Sidorov and Gennadiy Shmelev]

[Text] London June 13 TASS—Significant progress has been achieved at the Russian-American talks on a further reduction of strategic offensive armaments. This was announced by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker at a press conference, held in London on Friday [12 June].

At the same time, they refused to make public the details of the talks held in the premises of the Russian Embassy in Britain, explaining it by the need to inform of them Presidents Yeltsin and Bush, in the first place. Baker stressed they were looking forward to the visit of the Russian president and foreign minister to Washington,

which starts next Monday [15 June]. According to the U.S. secretary of state, there is a good opportunity to sign a concrete agreement on strategic offensive armaments, but there will be no agreement, until the presidents discuss the problem in a comprehensive way.

"We have made a major step forward, but it is the forthcoming meeting of the two presidents which will be of decisive importance," Kozyrev pointed out.

Aside from disarmament problems, Kozyrev and Baker discussed the situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Russia and the United States decided to develop cooperation in rendering humanitarian assistance to this former Yugoslav Republic. Both countries supported the growing role of the United Nations organisation in settling the situation in the region.

Further on Yeltsin Speech to Army, Navy Chiefs

*PM1106223592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Jun 92 First Edition p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Speech by Boris Yeltsin to Conference of Senior Command Personnel of the Army and Navy"]

[Text] "Difficult, but not hopeless" was how Russian President Boris Yeltsin described the situation in the republic. He was speaking yesterday at his first meeting with the senior command personnel of the Russian Army and Navy.

"I am convinced," Boris Nikolayevich observed, "that we must keep going now. Any stopping will simply spell ruin for Russia."

The creation of national armies should not turn into the dismemberment of the unified military organism, Boris Yeltsin stressed. He advocated the development of military cooperation among the republics of the former Union. The legal basis for such cooperation is now being built, meaning principally thereby the treaty on collective security, which is open in nature.

The president stressed that "Russia does not question the necessity of Joint Armed Forces subordinate to the Council of Heads of Commonwealth States and is implementing the agreements which have been signed in this regard by the heads of state." At the same time he did express regret that CIS members have not yet reached consensus on the question of the specific composition and function of these forces.

Dwelling on the position of the 14th Army in Moldova, the president said: "We cannot allow the Yugoslav scenario to be repeated in the region, particularly with the involvement of Russian troops. At the same time we do not forget that tens of thousands of our compatriots who live in the Dniester region. I am certain that the Moldovan problem cannot be resolved without consideration of their interests."

The problem of the Black Sea Fleet is also acute. The talks with Ukraine "are tough going," in Boris Yeltsin's estimation. "But the main thing, on which we have agreed," he said, "is to reject unilateral action until a compromise form of solution of the contentious issues has been worked out."

"We are working toward ratifying the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms [START] at the Federation Supreme Soviet, said Boris Yeltsin, touching on problems of arms reduction. At the same time the possibility of more flexible reduction and destruction of strategic nuclear weapons is being examined in Russia and the United States. Here, he noted, we have not yet reached a total figure, since Russia is pursuing the idea of strategic parity, while the American side is following a somewhat different route. It proposes the destruction of all our ground-launched MIRVed strategic nuclear missiles while simultaneously reducing to a lesser extent the numbers of naval strategic nuclear forces. If such a decision were accepted, the United States would be in a more advantageous position. All these questions, Yeltsin observed, will have to be tackled by negotiation during the official visit to Washington. We would want strategic offensive arms to be reduced to 2,200-2,500 units per side by, at least, the year 2000.

The creation of a basis for the social protection of servicemen, people discharged from military service, and the members of their families is a very important task in the period of forming the Russian Armed Forces, the president remarked. To solve this problem completely more than 20 normative acts have to be passed, and that will take time.

Regarding the timetable for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries, Boris Yeltsin noted that "these problems can be solved only on the basis of realism. And the appeal by certain of these countries to the CSCE and the United Nations over these issues is particularly perplexing."

Kozyrev, Baker Meet in London for More Talks

'Significant Progress' Made

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0448 GMT 13 Jun 92*

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SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Global Security System in 'National Interests'

*MK1006134592 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Jun 92 pp 1-2*

[Article by Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Grigoriy Chernyavskiy, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, under "Disarmament" rubric: "From 'Star Wars' to a Global System for the Protection of the World Community: Boris Yeltsin Will Discuss That Topic With George Bush"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] At present the threat of global war is virtually nonexistent.

The draft fundamentals of Russia's military doctrine published recently in the press state that, in present-day conditions, military conflict may have catastrophic consequences not only for the countries involved but for life on earth itself. Russia regards the preservation of peace as a priority goal of the protection of its national security. Russia does not regard any one state or coalition of states as its enemy. Russia is prepared to view all peace-loving states in the world community as its allies in averting war as well as in possible actions to maintain peace and ensure security.

The most important aspect of the contemporary military-political situation is the gradual transition from confrontation to partnership relations between Russia and the West. [passage omitted]

At the same time, the danger of the use of nuclear weapons remains on the agenda.

Russia and the United States are taking major new steps to achieve a radical reduction of their strategic offensive arms. It is obvious, however, that strategic nuclear weapons will long be viewed by the nuclear states as a

real factor in deterring a potential aggressor. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons is an illusion for political and social reasons. The only realistic aim is to try to maintain the balance around the "nuclear zero" mark. [passage omitted]

There are still interstate contradictions which threaten to develop into localized and regional conflicts and wars. The arms race has not come to a halt. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, missiles, and missile technologies continues. [passage omitted]

In a multipolar world, in conditions of the emergence of partnership relations between nuclear states and the reduction of nuclear arms, the strategy of deterrence acquires new content and presumes not only the existence of strategic offensive weapons but also the means to provide protection against nuclear threats.

Clearly it is in this context that the Russian president's statement during his speech to the UN Security Council in January should be examined: In that speech B.N. Yeltsin proposed examining the question of creating a global system for the protection of the world community based on the reorientation of the U.S. SDI using high-technology systems developed within the Russian defense complex.

This arrangement is designed to substantially augment the existing set of measures to reduce the nuclear danger which are being implemented via international agreements, UN-sponsored cooperation, and national military-technical programs.

The idea of the global protection system was supported in principle by the U.S. administration.

The creation of a global protection system meets the national interests of Russia, which as a leading nuclear power bears a special responsibility together with the United States for averting the threat of nuclear war. It is envisaged that the global protection system be geared to the preparation of practical measures to create an international system for monitoring the proliferation, testing, deployment, and combat use of nuclear missiles, including a set of measures providing protection against the use of such weapons.

Problems related to the global protection system are presently being discussed in state circles and by the public, and there have been various reactions to proposals on the creation of this system from the press. The Russian Government sponsored a large group of experts comprising members of the Russian Academy and leading Russian industrial specialists, these authors among them, to work on this question: That work finished recently. Representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry also took part.

As a result of the discussions that took place the majority of experts supported the idea of the global protection system and recommendations for its implementation were drafted.

The complexity of the political, scientific-technical, and economic problems connected with creating the global protection system make it impossible to present the finished version of the system today. Russian and U.S. experts first have to accomplish a considerable amount of research in many spheres together.

According to the Russian experts, the global protection system should tackle the following tasks:

- helping to monitor observance of the weapons non-proliferation regime;
- detecting ballistic missile launches, including the monitoring of missile and delivery vehicle test launches;
- notifying world community countries of missile attack;
- protecting the member states against ballistic missiles.

The global protection system's main principle must be that it is open to all peace-loving states. The system must be based on joint creation and operation.

With regard to protection against ballistic missiles, it is deemed expedient to include in the global protection system "supranational" ABM systems geared for the defense not of individual states but of many states together. ABM systems of this kind will be an effective deterrent and will be able to perform a stabilizing role.

Thus it would be correct to think of the future global protection system as an international system for protection against the nuclear threat including all aspects of the nuclear problem.

Work should begin in the very future on the phased creation of the global protection system. The first practical steps in that direction could be to resolve such questions as harnessing the Russian and U.S. national early warning systems and the exchange of defense technologies between them.

The exchange of information on ICBM launches and flight trajectories will make it possible to expand the surveillance zone of regions containing a missile threat, increase the reliability of information, reduce the likelihood of the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, strengthen confidence between Russia and the United States, and deter a potential aggressor.

An integrating link could be provided by a Russian-U.S. missile early warning center, whose functions include the receipt of data from various sources, national early warning systems among them, and the dissemination of the relevant information among countries involved in operating the center.

The CIS states must be enlisted first and foremost in creating the Russian-U.S. early warning center, given that they have unified strategic forces and that a number of the early warning system's information centers are

located on the territory of republics of the former USSR which are now independent states.

The emphasis in the Russian president's proposals on the possibility of using in the global protection system high-technology facilities developed in Russia's defense complex emphasizes that Russia is ready not just in words but in deeds to help mankind rid itself of the threat of nuclear catastrophe and that Russia's entire accumulated scientific and technical potential in the defense technologies sphere can be used to achieve this aim.

Cooperation in defense technologies with the United States is in Russia's national interests and, on the one hand, will help to maintain the country's scientific and technical potential through investments and stem the "brain drain" and, on the other hand, will help the country's high-technology output gain access to the world market and aid industrial conversion.

Defense technologies in the power industry, passive and active surveillance systems, materials, information technology, and so forth may be of mutual interest to the United States and Russia.

Clearly, the exchange of technologies must be carried out on an equitable basis, and to that end the legislative and other restrictions on the transfer of defense technologies which exist in the United States must be changed or eased, including the revision or relaxation of COCOM [Coordinating Commission for Multilateral Export Controls] requirements.

To a certain extent defense technologies have potential for use in the solution of a broad range of questions, including offensive weapons and civilian output. In this connection a blanket approach is impermissible in resolving questions of exchanging technologies, especially since some of these technologies may constitute a state or commercial secret. Collaboration in the production of these technologies should be regulated by a Russian-U.S. cooperation program and the creation of a joint agency ensuring interaction between the sides.

Hence it follows that we have set ourselves the task of illuminating in a single article the links and differences between the "Star Wars" program and the program for the "Global System for the Protection of the World Community" and prospects for the latter's implementation. It goes without saying that the global nature and multidimensionality of the problems under discussion require a very thorough and comprehensive analysis.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Arms Expert Denies INF Treaty Violation Charges

PM0206142992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Jun 92 p 3

[Commentary by G. Khromov, "Russian Federation Ministry of Industry expert on arms control questions

and member of the delegation in talks with the United States on nuclear and space weapons": "Washington Rushes To Make Accusations. Is This Proper?"]

[Text] THE WASHINGTON POST reports that six U.S. senators have sent a letter to the U.S. President accusing our country of violations of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles (INF), which came into force back in the middle of 1988. The letter in particular indicates that "secret armed forces" equipped with SS-20 and SS-23 missiles are deployed on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The same missiles whose destruction under the surveillance of U.S. inspectors was completed in the first half of 1991.

Now, however, citing unspecified "numerous intelligence reports," the senators claim that far from all the missiles were destroyed. Not one or two museum models, but hundreds of combat units were supposedly preserved. That is to say that it turns out that Russia supposedly managed to conceal some missile divisions. Is it necessary to say that in modern conditions this is absolutely impossible?

This is why, even compared with the statements of some of our new-fledged politicians and political analysts, whom we often accuse of incompetence and a lack of professionalism, these claims by the U.S. senators sound manifestly unconvincing. Nevertheless, some people do heed the senators, and some even share their "concern" and profoundly agree that they should directly link their exposures to proposals for Russian aid.

However, this is only one link in a whole chain of farfetched accusations. Recently, for example, the administration's latest report to the U.S. Congress appeared, "On the Nonobservance by the Former Soviet Union of Arms Control Agreements".

These reports have been presented since 1984. Today's report is an anachronism, testifying that its compilers have not yet been fully cured of the illness known as Cold War.

What accusations are being advanced?

You name it! However many bilateral and multilateral agreements there are in the sphere of arms control, that is how many, they say, our country is not fulfilling.

And even where the authors of the report cannot say anything specific, a "guilty" verdict is returned all the same, even if—evidently to deflect charges of prejudice—it is pointed out that "analysis of the data on the violations which have taken place is not yet complete."

Individual accusations contained in the report to Congress—about alleged violations of the ABM Treaty, for example—are so paradoxical that even P. Nitze, one of the leading representatives of the U.S. Administration at the original talks on limiting ABM systems, has noted that, first, these charges are farfetched and, second, "we have done the same ourselves; how come we could do it, but now they cannot?"

But what is surprising about that! Many people across the ocean continue to live according to double standards: They think that what the United States can do, others are not supposed to do.

Are there any deviations by our side from treaties and agreements? Unfortunately, there are. In particular, there was a deviation from the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons [START], signed 31 July 1991 (true, it has not yet come into force). Under that treaty the encoding of telemetry during missile launches should not be allowed. But this was done during the launch of a reequipped ICBM 20 December 1991. We acknowledged our mistake and took measures to ensure that such incidents do not occur in future. As for the Americans, they cannot indefinitely fail to see the beam in their own eye. They have committed a fair number of deviations from existing treaties. But Congress' attention is not drawn to these incidents.

This is not the custom with us. Suffice it to recall that during the discussion of the results from fulfillment of the IMF Treaty in the middle of last year a report was presented to the Supreme Soviet without any vehemence or loud words, containing a sizeable list of U.S. deviations from the treaty, together with an analysis of American comments and claims against our country. This report was published in full in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin, and anyone wishing to do so can study it.

The fact that the claims advanced in the United States coincide with preparation for the visit of Russian President B. Yeltsin to Washington cannot escape attention. Obviously it is no accident either that this time has been selected to accuse Russia also of violating the regulations on the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technologies in connection with Russian-Indian cooperation in the sphere of peaceful space exploration—regulations which neither the former USSR nor, so far, Russia has officially endorsed, although they did announce their support for them in principle. Our refusal to agree to juridically endorse the regulations on the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technologies is connected right up to the present time with the discriminatory measures directed against our country (the existence of the notorious Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls rules, and a ban on the launch of foreign satellites by Russian missile carriers).

The Americans have decided to "punish" us—they have announced sanctions against the Russian Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research; this they have done according to the might is right principle. The point being that the very regulations for the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technologies themselves provide for a control mechanism—international consultations among technical experts. Only such consultations can determine who is guilty of what. In the case of the Russian-Indian project there have been no such consultations of experts whatsoever.

Moreover, it is thought that if such consultations had actually taken place, they would not have confirmed any "violation." The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has risen to the occasion on this issue, and has not balked at drawing the Americans' attention to the fact that, before the official presentation of charges, international consultations of technical experts should have been held.

As for all these accusations of "violations," the standard question arises: Who stands to gain from this?

It is the U.S. circles which will not accept equal partnership between the two countries which obviously stand to gain from this. And these circles still possess great, if not decisive, power in the formation of state foreign policy.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Latvian-Russian Talks End, Communique Signed

*LD3105100392 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 30 May 92*

[Text] The latest round of talks between Latvia and Russia has been held in Moscow, which has been hosting a Latvian delegation led by Minister of State Janis Dinevics. The Latvians plan to accelerate the withdrawal of Russian forces, with completion by September 1993. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev estimates that 40 percent of army units can pull out from the Baltic by 1994, with the remainder following later. However, the final deadline, General Grachev said, will be determined during future talks. In addition to military matters, there are also financial, legal, economic and other issues still to be discussed. The Latvian delegation has drafted a number of agreements, including one on restoring borders. The talks, which lasted for three days, ended with the signing of a communique.

Yastrzhembskiy on Baltic Troop Withdrawal

*PM0806142992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Gennadiy Charodeyev report: "Deadlines for Troop Withdrawals From Latvia and Lithuania Still Not Agreed"]

[Text] "Russia's refusal to fix specific dates for the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic states could prove to be more dangerously explosive than everything that can be observed in Yugoslavia"—this is British Foreign Secretary D. Hurd's opinion, which he expressed the other day in a conversation with British journalists.

However, according to Russian diplomats such statements by politicians in various states are probably being made on the basis of distorted or incomplete information.

An IZVESTIYA correspondent put a question to S. Yastrzhembskiy, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, on the results of the official talks with the Lithuanian and Latvian delegations that have just ended in Moscow. The Lithuanians, he said, claim that the troop withdrawal question is an absolute priority question for them and that other questions "can wait, however important they may be." However, despite the preliminary accords, the Lithuanian delegation did not include the necessary experts and the talks were not attended by C. Stenhiavicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, and a number of other senior officials.

Nevertheless, sessions of three expert groups for troop withdrawal questions took place on the first day, at which progress was made on draft agreements. It is proposed to send a group of military experts to Lithuania after 10 June for a prolonged period to complete the draft troop withdrawal agreement.

At the talks with Latvia, Yastrzhembskiy went on to say, the Russian side agreed that attention must be focused on the troop withdrawal question. The Latvians were given a general timetable for the phased withdrawal from Latvian territory of the armed forces that are under Russian jurisdiction. In accordance with this document, the troop withdrawal, which, incidentally, started in March 1992, must be implemented in phases and completed no later than 1999. Our timetable shows that the withdrawal of the main grouping will start in 1995, but after the troop withdrawal from Germany has been completed and the necessary infrastructure has been created in the new deployment locations. In the first phase, in 1992, 78 military units and facilities are to be withdrawn. In the second phase (1993-1994) 76 military units and facilities are to be withdrawn and weapons stocks, ammunition, and materiel are to be removed. In the third stage 255 units will be withdrawn.

Lithuanian Minister on Negotiations With Russia

*LD0606083692 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0500 GMT 5 Jun 92*

[Text] A Negotiation Card From the Sleeve is the title of an interview with Minister Aleksandras Abisala published today in LIETUVOS AIDAS. Two negotiations are involved: the negotiations in Moscow with Russia on the troop withdrawal from Lithuania and the negotiations between both parts of the deputies of our Supreme Council.

Speaking about the negotiations in Moscow, Alesandras Abisala says that a lot of time was devoted to discussions on the procedure for these negotiations. The order of negotiations was not coordinated with Lithuania in advance. Russia is attempting to convert the withdrawal of the army into one of the many issues which are not the most important. The main aim of our delegation is the same—the troop withdrawal. During discussions on procedural issues, little time was left for the most important issue. Furthermore, during the remaining time we had to

talk about the unsuitable behavior of the Russian Army in Lithuania. In our opinion, says Aleksandras Abisala, our criticism did not receive due attention. On the contrary, when we said that we will not allow the bringing of new soldiers to Lithuania, Russia stated that it would do this anyway.

Why does Russia behave like this? Journalist Lina Peceliuniene thinks that the situation in Lithuania still harbors ideas of an empire policy and that maybe Russia is glad at the formation of a leftist majority in our parliament.

Aleksandras Abisala replies that there is no doubt they are watching the situation in Lithuania. The classical theory of negotiations requires that a watch be kept not only on what is being said at the table and put on the table but also that the rear be watched. I am sure that Moscow is watching the events in Lithuania with great attention. It may be that Russia is pinning hope on another, more compliant Lithuanian Government with which a more simple agreement can be reached on the stationing of military bases. What would be the result? Aleksandras Abisala forecasts that it is sufficient to consciously turn toward Russia. It suffices to somewhat reduce resistance to Russia's efforts to include us into the sphere of its influence, where we will be very soon. It is difficult to tell what kind of a new government will be formed and how the situation will change in Lithuania. It seems that the latest events provide some hope. It will be possible to reach an agreement among the factions and maintain the strength of foreign policy at least. If this does not happen, the danger will increase.

What possibilities does Aleksandras Abisala see for reaching an agreement by the left and right? One can call them right and left only conditionally, says Abisala. Since we have to call them something, let us call them this. It is possible to agree when there is a common aim. Discussion is also possible when the ways to the common aim are different. The negotiations between Lithuania and Russia and among the factions in parliament are different. The aims of Lithuania and Russia are manifestly different, but in Lithuania a single aim is declared: the consolidation of the state and the creation of better living conditions. If both sides are really striving for this aim, then there cannot be doubt about the possibility of an agreement.

CIS States Sign CFE Treaty

*LD0506184992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1830 GMT 5 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Loskutov]

[Text] Oslo, 5 Jun—A final document on conventional armed forces in Europe was adopted today at the extraordinary conference which took place here. On behalf of their governments, the document was signed by eight republics of the former USSR—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Byelarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, which thereby took

upon themselves the obligations under the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, which earlier had been taken by the Soviet Union.

Instead of the initial 22 signatories, the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe now extends to 29 states. These countries also have pledged to ensure that the treaty will come into force in time for the CSCE summit conference in Helsinki from 9 to 10 July.

Baltic States Seek To Internationalize Withdrawal Issue

*OW0506135092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1322 GMT 5 Jun 92*

[From "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Baltic states will seek to internationalize the issue of the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union's forces, now under Russian jurisdiction, from their territory at a CSCE-2 conference due to open in Helsinki on July 9, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algis Saudargas told BF [BALTFAX] news agency.

He said Lithuania's referendum on the issue on June 14 in support of demands for troop withdrawals by the end of this year could trigger off the process. While predicting a positive result, the minister pointed out there could be difficulties in including the issue in CSCE documents.

Saudargas believes there can be less Western support for their demand if Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania fail to reach their goal.

Russian-Estonian Talks End in Counterclaims

*PM0806145792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[Leonid Levitskiy report: "Difficult Dialogue Between Estonia and Russia"]

[Text] Tallinn—The third meeting of Russian and Estonian delegations has ended. The first documents have at last been signed: a consular agreement, an agreement on legal aid, and a transport agreement.

All three documents are, of course, important for normal relations between states and for their citizens. Nevertheless, the delegations parted—and this could be felt at the news conference—with relief. Diplomatic equanimity was blown apart by the military problem. The delegations' approaches to it are too different. The Estonian delegation insists on completion of the troop withdrawal this year. The Russian delegation proposes starting it in 1994 and completing it in 1997. Or, in order to bring the deadlines forward, Estonia must reimburse the costs of a fast redeployment. Furthermore, each side considers that its country owns military property. This is also holding up units in Estonia. For instance, for several days now the Chemical Troops brigade, ready for the

march to Russia, has not received the Estonian Government's consent. It is being requested to leave hardware and equipment behind.

In its statement, the Estonian delegation accused Russian diplomats of having fallen under the diktat of generals.

The Russian side naturally responded with a counter-statement. It refuted the claim about the diktat of generals. In a short space of time, the statement notes, 12 units and subunits have been withdrawn. However, the Estonian delegation's unilateral act "severely complicates the prospect of holding talks on military questions."

Doubts on Intention To Withdraw

*LD1006102492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1053 GMT 10 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn June 10 TASS—Tiit Made, deputy chairman of the Estonian parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission, is of the opinion that Russia, in talks with Estonia, has chosen a procrastination tactic and, it seems, is prepared to drag out negotiations for decades.

Speaking at the commission's meeting recently, he voiced doubt that a dialogue on the problem of Russia's military presence in Estonia would be continued during the next round of the talks.

The fourth round is scheduled to be held in Moscow on June 30 while talks on a time-frame and a procedure for the withdrawal of troops that are under Russian jurisdiction were suspended on the Estonian delegation's initiative at the Tallinn round of the talks on June 2-4.

In a statement made in this connection, the Estonian side accused Russia of seeking to perpetuate the stay of its troops in Estonia by "imitating the conduct of negotiations".

In the belief that Russia's military presence in Estonia poses a serious threat to European security, the authors of the statement urged the political leadership of Russia, other states, international organisations and the world public to use all their influence to ensure that foreign troops are withdrawn from Estonia.

Meanwhile, Russia, accused of tactics of procrastination and delays, has already withdrawn 12 military units from Estonia, without waiting for the conclusion of any agreement on military matters. The withdrawal is being hindered by the Estonian side, Russian delegation leader Vasilii Svirin told journalists.

A large unit of ecologically unsafe chemical troops [as received] stationed in the health resort city of Parnu, has been for a long time waiting for a permission to leave. The authorities are hindering its withdrawal owing to

property disputes: the Estonian side declared all hardware, equipment and facilities that are at the disposal of "occupation troops" to be state property.

Svirin's opinion is that it is difficult to speak about a withdrawal of the Army, having in mind only personnel, and not everything that is part of the notion of the Armed Forces—hardware, weapons, ammunition and other army equipment.

Some local analysts believe that the suspension of the talks is primarily of benefit to the Estonian side. Having interrupted the talks by a demand to withdraw troops by the end of 1992, the present authorities find themselves clean before their potential voters during the forthcoming elections to the new parliament this autumn.

Official on Not Excluding Yugoslavia From CSCE

*LD0806115692 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0859 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Surikov]

[Text] Helsinki, 8 Jun—The present evolution of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina convinces us that it would not be right to place all the responsibility for the tragedy continuing there solely on the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. The UN Security Council's report which, in our opinion, gives an impartial analysis of the development of the events, proves that the realities existing now in Bosnia-Herzegovina are of a complex and multifaceted nature. Under these conditions we still think that it would not be expedient to raise the issue of suspending the powers of the FRY delegation to the CSCE and, even more, to exclude Yugoslavia from the European process. Russia has come with this position to the meeting of the CSCE committee of senior officials that opened in Helsinki today and which has resumed examining the crisis in the Balkans.

Speaking at the meeting, Yevgeniy Gusarov, head of the Russian delegation, stressed that the expulsion of Yugoslavia would create a dangerous precedent of depriving a CSCE member of access to the work of the conference and depriving the other members of an important channel for dialogue with the latter, and for exercising influence on it at a time when this is especially necessary. I would like to remind you that the Security Council has been exercising the most balanced and considered approach to the question of the expulsion of Yugoslavia. Is it really worth insisting on adopting decisions which could prove to be unacceptable for the international community as a whole?

The Russian chairman continued: One must also take into account the fact that Belgrade's latest initiatives, somewhat belated perhaps and not always consistent, show the intention of the FRY leadership to heed the criticism expressed in its direction and to cooperate with the CSCE.

We believe, Gusarov said, that the efforts to unblock the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be made in the framework of a specially created committee for settlement in Yugoslavia. We think that the United States, the European Community, and Russia could be members of such a committee. Part of the committee's task would be to monitor the implementation of all previous decisions made by the CSCE on Yugoslavia and to submit appropriate considerations to the committee of senior officials on 29 June. The committee could act in close contact with the United Nations. Of course, the committee's work would be based on an objective assessment of the measure of responsibility of all the sides involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and urging them to take constructive steps to overcome the crisis.

Today's meeting of the committee of senior officials was preceded by a serious elaboration of the participants' positions during unofficial contacts and the search for a mutually acceptable compromise, bearing in mind their different approaches to the problem. If, at the previous meeting, the Russian position, which blocked the idea of excluding Yugoslavia from the CSCE, was a surprise to many, now the element of surprise has been reduced to a minimum. The search for a consensus is continuing at the meeting.

A dramatic discussion is also expected on the second issue on the agenda—the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding area. The meeting in Rome which examined the situation in this hotspot lead to an impasse. The issue has been returned to the committee of senior officials.

West's Support for Army Withdrawal Noted

*LD1006034392 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1730 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] Beautiful words and loud words, even for justified demands, will not give us anything if we ourselves don't work for our own needs. This was said by Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans speaking today at a news conference on the problems associated with the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Latvia.

The Minister, who has just returned from Oslo where he attended a session of the Council of NATO and a meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, reported that in the West there is full support for the Baltic states' striving for the soonest possible solution to the question of the withdrawal of the former USSR Army. In documents adopted in the Norwegian capital, it was stressed that Russia must observe the basic norms of international justice. These stipulate that a foreign military force may not be present in a sovereign state without that state's permission.

In the words of Janis Jurkans, in the documents to be signed at the summit of participant states in the Helsinki process due to be held in July, these formulations, so important to the Baltic countries, will be worked in. The minister expressed the prediction that Russia could not

have any essential objection to these. The West understands us; therefore at present our most important work must be done in Moscow, said the Latvian foreign minister.

Janis Jurkans believes that in the talks with Russia on the questions of the withdrawal of the army, Latvia must work out a flexible and refined tactic. In addition, in the minister's view, at the moment it is necessary to coordinate the two countries' positions at the highest level because it is necessary to direct relations between Latvia and Russia into a new phase of development.

I also think we ought to support the democratic forces in Russia because in the event that they are lost, people could come to power whose action could destabilize the situation not only in the Baltics but all over Europe, Jurkans said. He also believes that only and solely at the negotiation table can a speedier timetable for the withdrawal of the Russian Army be achieved.

Grachev Discusses 14th Army Withdrawal From Moldova

LD1006103392 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0253 GMT 10 Jun 92

[Interview with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev by correspondent Tatyana Chemodanova; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Chemodanova] During his recent tour of Altay, Russian President Boris Yeltsin promised the public that the 14th Army would be withdrawn from Moldova to Russia. Pavel Sergeyevich, how justified is this step, in your view?

[Grachev] The withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of all foreign states is a legitimate and predecided matter. The president's statement on the withdrawal of the 14th Army, in particular, does not mean that orders will go out immediately and that the troops will leave for Russia. Things do not happen that way. An army is not something that you can just install or remove. An army is, first and foremost, made up of people. It is from the standpoint of the human factor that we will view the issue of withdrawal of the 14th Army.

How do I see the process? Well, first, it is necessary to set up an expert group at an intergovernmental level, by mutual agreement between Russia and Moldova, to draft the documents that should define the status of the temporary stationing of the 14th Army on the territory of Moldova, and the obligations and guarantees for servicemen and their families in all spheres of life and work, the obligations of servicemen and their families to strictly observe the laws of the Republic of Moldova, and other issues. Once the documents have been worked out and they have been discussed and endorsed at sessions of the governments and Supreme Soviets, there must be a top-level meeting to sign these documents.

Once the presidents have signed the relevant documents, evidently these issues ought to be discussed in detail. What are they? I would think they are the stages for the withdrawal, where to withdraw to, the creation of conditions to ensure there is full housing provision, first and foremost, for officers and warrant officers, barracks for the soldiers and sergeants, a procedure for financing the troops subject to withdrawal, conditions for sale of part of the arms and equipment to the Moldovan side, the conditions for handover, and many other issues.

We do not have the right to forget the Russian who will remain in Moldova to live. We are simply obliged to ensure a civilized life for them, with guarantees. That is, there must be reliable political stability, and firm guarantees from the Government of Moldova to this part of the population.

Talks with Ukraine will be needed concerning the transit of troops being withdrawn via its territory.

[Chemodanova] As I understand it, this is a long process. It is not a question of a year, for example. How do you imagine it, as the minister?

[Grachev] Yes, you are right, it is a long process, since this process will take up not just the period of the talks, but also the practical actions. In my view, if it is not rushed, this process may take something like five or six years.

[Chemodanova] Pavel Sergeyevich, couldn't the situation arise where you will be forced to adopt a decision, and the government will be forced to adopt a decision to withdraw the Army in a shorter period of time?

[Grachev] I cannot exclude the possibility that we will be artificially pushed to withdraw the 14th Army to Russia's territory immediately. However, I would like to caution that pushing for immediate withdrawal is simply—well, it is not possible. Simply driving us from the territory of the Dniester region by force is an uncontrolled process, armed confrontation, something we must not allow under any circumstances, for the sake of our people.

Status of Troops Returning from Germany Noted

LD1406174492 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1902 GMT 11 Jun 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] This year 30 percent of the personnel and equipment of the Western Group of troops are to return to Russia. Almost 34,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers, motor vehicles, and 750,000 tonnes of so called logistic and technical support will be transported back by sea.

The main problem is housing. Last year 15,000 officers and warrant officers left Germany without housing to go to. To this number we should add another 20,000 for their families. The 7,800 million marks allocated by the German Government to build housing for them is still

not being used. The leaders of the military departments of Russia, Ukraine, and Byelarus are still not able to agree on sharing this money fairly.

CFE Manpower Limitations Discussed

*LD1206060992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1307 GMT 11 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 11 Jun—Issues involving an agreement limiting the manpower of the conventional armed forces of states participating in the Vienna talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] were under intense discussion at a plenary sitting of the forum held here today.

The agreement, on which work has been going on for over a year already, is intended to be a substantial adjunct to the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, signed at the CSCE Paris summit in November 1990, and to form an "integral composition" with it. The main point of the manpower agreement is that, as a result of its being achieved, all the participating states, without exception, will assume a political commitment to limit the manpower of their conventional armed forces to a national level that each of them will announce. It is for the sake of such a limitation that the document, which will undoubtedly promote the strengthening of security and stability in Europe, is being concluded.

As the discussion at the Vienna forum shows though, some of its participants are now trying to solve, through the manpower agreement, a number of side issues that are often not only out of keeping with its aims but also go beyond the framework of the mandate for the current talks. This is manifested with particular clarity in such areas as the involvement of personnel in the exchange of information and limitations and questions of control [kontrol]. A strange situation has arisen: On the one hand, everyone agrees that the monitoring [kontrol] of manpower numbers by means of a head count is an unrealistic task. Incidentally, the problem has been discussed in detail but without success in all possible ways during the many years of talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. On the other hand, some delegations are seeking to fit into this unrealistic task a scheme for exchanging data in the manpower agreement, a scheme that many experts regard as being excessively detailed and complex, sharply out of keeping with the content of an agreement that is clear in its objectives.

Russian delegation leader Vladimir Shustov told ITAR-TASS that the delegation objects to the manpower agreement's covering more and more elements that have no connection with conventional armed forces, which are considered within the framework of the CAFE treaty. This concerns the Navy's land-based elements apart from those that are connected with the CAFE treaty, as well as internal troops and a number of other elements.

The subject of a future agreement, he continued, is an accord on the nonexceeding of national levels for the numbers of conventional armed forces of the states in the area of application, which will be achieved in 40 months after the coming into force of the CFE treaty and will have to be observed henceforth. It follows logically from this that in the manpower limitation agreement there should be no consideration of any kind of assessment either of existing personnel numbers or of the process for achieving the final levels. All that should be assessed is observance of the national level of limitations, the diplomat indicated.

At today's plenary sitting, the Russian delegation circulated a document setting out its position on various aspects of the exchange of information. Moreover, it was stressed that the proposed scheme for the exchange of information was a fair compromise that took account of an absolute majority of the ideas and wishes voiced during the talks. The hope was expressed that the proposal, if adopted, would make it possible to render the work of the talks more intensive, and to complete the preparation of the text of the agreement by the appointed time, namely before the CSCE Helsinki summit.

Results of Lithuanian Referendum on Troop Withdrawal

Voting Figures Released

*LD1406192292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1800 GMT 14 Jun 92*

[Figures as heard]

[Excerpts] ELTA reports that information has been received by the republican Election Commission about the progress of the referendum on troop withdrawal being held in 47 cities and rayons of the Republic of Lithuania. By 1600, 52.36 percent of the citizens with the right to vote had voted. [Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 1600 GMT lists this percentage as 58 percent]

Information is coming in from Vilnius, where 15 percent of all the voters of the republic are, as well as Panevezys, Alytus, and other cities. Unofficial reports say that about 70 percent of the citizens have already voted. [passage omitted] The lowest turnout is reported in Vilnius Rayon with only one-third of voters participating, and in Salcininkai and Ignalina rayons where only 39 percent in each have participated. [passage omitted]

'Over 90 Percent' Say 'Yes'

*LD1506052292 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 0500 GMT 15 Jun 92*

[Text] Over 75 percent of the electorate participated in the Lithuanian referendum on the unconditional, immediate withdrawal of the former Soviet Army from the Republic of Lithuania before the end of the year and compensation for harm done to Lithuania. Over 90

percent of the electors who participated said yes to the Army's withdrawal this year.

A detailed account of the preliminary results will be given at a news conference in the Lithuanian parliament at 1000 today.

Lithuanian Referendum May 'Complicate' Ties with Russia

*LD1506110392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1022 GMT 15 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow June 15 TASS—"I think that the referendum held in Lithuania will complicate significantly the relationships between Russia and this state and certainly cannot help complicating the stay of our troops in the neighbouring country," Russian Parliamentary Defence and Security Committee Chairman Sergey Stepashin told ITAR-TASS.

He recalled the examples of "the civilised solution of such issues", specifically the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Such agreements on moving out Russian troops from Poland and Germany are now being studied. "It is in this vein that we ought to have acted today," he noted.

Stepashin added: "I do not think the stay of our troops in Lithuania can jeopardise in any way democratic and other transformations in this state. It is exactly our troops and citizens of the Russian Federation that found themselves in the more complex situation."

Stepashin recalled that the right to hold referenda naturally belongs to the leaders of any state and the expression of the people's will is very important. "Generally speaking, the Lithuanian leadership's concern is understandable as all keep fresh the memory of the event that occurred 18 months ago. At the same time, I think the issue of moving out Russian troops should be solved not through a referendum. Especially since the armed forces

themselves appeared to be ignored. Their stance, especially the position of the command of the armed forces was not taken into account. Therefore, I think issues of this kind should be solved at the level of inter-state relations and relevant agreements."

Stepashin confirmed that the problem of withdrawing troops from Lithuania does exist. He said the all-important thing today is to define their status as troops of another state stationed, in this case, on the territory of Lithuania.

Another issue is the terms for the withdrawal of these troops. "Naturally, the terms for moving out the Russian Army should be clearly defined. They should proceed from the potentialities of the Russian armed forces and the economic and political situation shaping in Russia today."

Stepashin emphasised that today Russia "cannot physically pull out its troops before the end of this year as the issue in the referendum was formulated. The withdrawal of our troops means not only their movement anywhere—we are also interested in the defence of our western frontiers."

"Lastly, I would not want to link this issue with the stay of Russian troops but, nevertheless, I would like to draw the Lithuanian leaders' attention to the fact that the observance of human rights concerns all states that share the ideas of the declaration of human rights and the Helsinki agreements. Regrettably, the Lithuanian side does not fulfil these agreements in the part that concerns the non-indigenous population, especially Russians residing in Lithuania, including servicemen.

"This is evident especially since it was exactly Russia, Boris Yeltsin who actually saved democracy in Lithuania in the tragic days of January. Russia was the first to raise the issue of independence for Lithuania after the August events. In this regard, one would like both the leaders and the public of Lithuania to be mindful of this circumstance in the specific present-day situation," Stepashin emphasised.

Radiation Detected at Former Testing Grounds

*LD2905113492 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 2308 GMT 28 May 92*

[By KAZTAG correspondent Karibek Yermukhanov for ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Atyrau, 28 May—Research carried out by St. Petersburg scientists at the sites of the Oblast's former military testing ranges alarmed the region's population in earnest. Carried out at the behest of local authorities, results indicate that weapons testing and missile launches in the Azgir and Taysoygan sands have left their ecological mark. High rates of child mortality and allergic illnesses are found among the local population. A third of the wells used by animals contain water unsuitable for drinking. This explains why nearly all antelopes that have been trapped have turned out to be blind. Moreover, radiation leaks can be observed from a number of underground voids which were formed during the course of military testing. Although scientists continue to gather data and intend to analyze their conclusions carefully, there are already reasons to suspect that the testing ranges which have been returned to the republic are not very viable.

Commentaries on US Nuclear Testing Policy

Support for Nuclear Test Limits Viewed

*PM0206133592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Jun 92 p 3*

[Article by Major M. Pogorelyy: "To Explode or Not To Explode?"]

[Text] The old problem—whether to continue or to halt nuclear tests—is again being discussed in Washington. The underground explosion recently carried out by China was evidently the "impetus" to this discussion. Its yield, according to Russian experts' estimate, was one to two megatons. The United States, like the Soviet Union in the past, restricts itself to detonating charges of less than 150 kilotons, but there are an average of six a year of these.

Unnamed "high-ranking officials" in the U.S. Administration, according to the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST, have prepared a draft document on the prospects of America's nuclear tests. It suggests either halving the number of underground explosions or virtually completely renouncing them by 1995. That this is possible in principle is confirmed by the examples of the USSR and its successor—Russia—and also by France, which are observing a moratorium on such tests.

The U.S. press has begun a lively discussion of the suggestions that President George Bush may make public his stance on this problem before or during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to the United States. So far Congress, the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Department

of Energy have come out in support of restricting nuclear tests. So far only the Pentagon has opposed a restriction. Its leader, Richard Cheney, believes that "it would be a serious mistake." He has said that the explosions which are carried out serve to ensure the reliability and safety of nuclear arms.

But nonetheless the Department of Energy is responsible for nuclear arms. And its experts are convinced that the reliability of weapons can be ensured even with a smaller number of tests. On the other hand it is obvious that the Pentagon needs these explosions for other purposes. In particular, to modernize existing nuclear munitions systems and to develop new ones. Therefore, if the jointly assumed course toward the reduction of nuclear potentials is firmly followed and if not only the letter but also the spirit of the agreements already concluded in this sphere (including the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty) are observed, then the answer to the question "to explode or not to explode?" will become perfectly obvious.

Vote on Nuclear Moratorium Examined

*LD0706211192 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1240 GMT 5 Jun 92*

[Commentary by Viktor Nikolayevich Levin; from the "Panorama" program]

[Text] Here is the commentary which Mayak listeners were promised. I repeat the news that gave rise to it. The U.S. Congress' House of Representatives has voted for the introduction of a moratorium on staging underground nuclear tests. Today this telegram is commented upon By Viktor Levin. He is at my side. Over to you Viktor Nikolayevich.

[Levin] Yes, the decision by the House of Representatives is not final inasmuch as President Bush, through his representatives, has already made it clear that he will veto the bill on military expenditures if the amendment providing for the introduction of a moratorium is retained. It must be said that the Administration as a whole, and the U.S. military in particular, is rejecting the idea itself of a moratorium on tests. The most the Pentagon will agree to is to restrict their numbers, motivating this by the fact that the continuation of tests is necessary to maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S.' nuclear arsenals.

Yet the President will not find it at all easy to impose a veto. It is one thing when calls for introducing a moratorium come from abroad; it is another matter when they are supported by the Congress House of Representatives. In my view this is a decision of paramount importance.

At the present time, two nuclear powers have unequivocally announced their readiness not to carry out nuclear tests. They are Russia and France. Inasmuch as Britain has long refrained from staging independent tests and is guided by the results of U.S. tests, the global pressure on the United States has of late increased markedly. The

congressmen have proposed that a moratorium be introduced as long as a similar ban is observed by all nuclear republics of the former USSR. I think that there is no need to have doubts about this. I have told you of Russia's stance, while Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as far as I am know, do not intend to stage tests. The technical possibilities for this simply do not exist. True, Semipalatinsk does exist, but Nazarbayev banned using it even earlier.

By its vote the House of Representatives has demonstrated new political thinking. This is a fact which it is impossible to ignore.

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan React to PRC Test

PM0206150492 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jun 92 p 1

[K. Bayalinov report: "Chinese Firecracker Will Surprise Plenty More People"]

[Text] China, now Kyrgyzstan's friend (following the signing of a treaty), has exploded a nuclear device. The one-megaton explosion thundered out at the Lobnor range in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which borders on Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

According to some reports, the explosion, with a huge yield, was carried out very close to the land surface.

The Kazakhs hurried to protest. The Kyrgyz kept silent. Whether still under the influence of President Akayev's triumphal visit to China (it is rather embarrassing to start your friendly relations with protests), or whether because they felt that the torrential rain, torrents, floods, and powerful earthquake in the south of the republic have absolutely no connection with this unfortunate explosion. And the scientists are still silent on this point. Maybe they too find it embarrassing? Only President Akayev has thus far expressed concern over this serious incident, but mildly and diplomatically.

Environmental Impact of Perm Blasts Probed

PM0906082392 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 4 Jun 92

[Video report by V. Fefilov from Perm, from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Fefilov to camera] It has now become officially known that 10 underground nuclear explosions were carried out in Perm Oblast.

A Russian Supreme Soviet Committee group of experts is currently studying the consequences of these explosions for the ecology of the Kama River basin. It has already established that at some of the sites there are leaks of radionuclides. At least the background radiation there...

[B. Golubov, chief of the expert group] ...in individual boreholes up to 300 microroentgens have been measured. In any case, there is no need to panic...

[Fefilov] The experts also optimistically assured the press that they will do everything possible and impossible to save the flora and fauna of the Kama river basin. [video shows street scene, map of the area, interview]

Gorbachev Urges Nuclear Powers To Stop Testing

LD1106224992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2132 GMT 11 Jun 92

[Text] Moscow June 11 TASS—ITAR-TASS today received an appeal by former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev to the leaders of countries possessing nuclear weapons, urging them to stop nuclear testing. Following is the full text of the appeal:

"Mikhail Gorbachev's appeal to the leaders of countries possessing nuclear weapons—George Bush, Boris Yeltsin, Francois Mitterrand, John Major, and Yang Shangkun.

As a person whose efforts helped to launch the process of nuclear disarmament, I regard it as my right to appeal to you, my former partners, urging a complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

The profound changes that have occurred in the world over the past several years have significantly undermined the role of nuclear weapons as a factor in contemporary world politics. The global nuclear threat, which was a product of the cold war, has for all practical purposes disappeared.

In the past, the principal argument for continuing nuclear testing was that nuclear weapons had to be kept operational and improved qualitatively—as a "deterrent" and in order to keep up with the 'adversary'. An additional argument used for some time was that controlling low-yield underground explosions was impossible. Both of these arguments are no longer valid.

What is more, it is becoming increasingly clear that qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons would make meaningless their quantitative reductions—reductions that everyone now agrees are necessary and that the United States and Russia are already undertaking.

Continued testing by nuclear powers weakens the non-proliferation regime, since near-nuclear states can point out that everyone has a right to act in accordance with the principle of sovereignty. But the renunciation of testing by nuclear powers, made legally binding under international law, would create a barrier that those who would like to acquire nuclear weapons would find it hard to penetrate.

Finally, it is clear that underground tests, despite all precautions, cause grave damage to the environment. I

am referring not only to accidental discharges of radioactive substances but also to the remote consequences of nuclear tests, about which little is known so far.

All of this prompts me to put before you the following question: Is this not the time for a complete prohibition of nuclear testing? I believe that the international situation now makes it possible to do so. Such step would speed up the transition to a new world order, which would also facilitate the resolution of issues involved in regional conflicts.

[Signed] Mikhail Gorbachev
[Dated] June 10, 1992

Russian Supsov To Examine Nuclear Testing

92WN0613A Moscow TRUD in Russian 16 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Yu. Rogozhin: "End the Explosions. Let Us Go Home?"]

[Text] Today in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation a joint session of the Committee for Questions of Ecology and the Committee for Questions of Defense, devoted to problems connected with the testing of nuclear weapons, will be held.

The basic question is: Are such tests necessary at all in the present-day geopolitical situation and in the conditions of the accumulated experience? And if it is impossible to avoid them, should one not be satisfied with experiments in simulation installations?

The participants of the meeting will have to develop recommendations for the Russian parliament in regard to these problems.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Arzamas' CHETEK Proposes N-Blasts To Destroy Toxic Waste

92WN0613C Moscow MEGAPOLIS CONTINENT in Russian No 21, 22 May 92 p 10

[Article by Tatyana Kovalenko, MEGAPOLIS CONTINENT columnist: "Chetek: Explosions for Sale. But at What Price?"]

[Text] A sensation has been spread by many foreign publications: The former Soviet power intends to put up for world auction "energy emitted during underground nuclear explosions. This sounds exceedingly intriguing. But what precisely is being offered for sale?

The international joint stock company "CHETEK," connected with the former Soviet military-industrial complex and the possessor of a unique technology, asserts that this is the best means of destroying toxic waste, as well as chemical and nuclear weapons.

Founded in December 1990, "CHETEK" (which is deciphered as "CHElovek—TEkhnologiya—Kapital")

[Man—Technology—Capital], is a sort of "child of a regiment" of many founders.

However, the secret parents that reared "CHETEK", as has been suggested, are mainly two: The Tel Institute of Experimental Physics (better known in our country as the center for the production of atomic weapons "Arzamas-16"), where Andrey Sakharov worked in his time, and the former union Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry (now the Ministry of Nuclear Power of Russia).

The Ministry of Nuclear Power has granted "CHETEK" the exclusive rights for the commercial use of nuclear explosions, and "Arzamas-16" assigned the majority of its staff members to this undertaking. As the former president of "CHETEK", Vladimir Dmitriyev, reported, the company in actual fact obtains from the "atomic scientists" of "Arzamas" the fruits of intellectual labor, exchanging them for its shareholders, and thus receives the right of the commercial use of technology.

Now "CHETEK" has opened its branches in eight cities of former republics of the Union. Until recently, the company even had its branch abroad as well—"CHETEK-Hamburg", which was happily closed after the activity of Soviet "businessmen and specialists in nuclear technology" was publicized in the newspaper BILD. However, the closing of the foreign branch did not ruin the holders of "CHETEK" shares: Now it has approximately R1 billion in annual turnover and operates a number of jet-propelled aircraft (the contribution of a Kharkov enterprise shareholder), a fleet of imposing automobiles, and country residences in suburban Moscow, which at one time belonged to the highest party elite.

They had planned to carry out the first experimental nuclear explosions in the summer of 1992 on Novaya Zemlya. However, the representatives of the company resolutely refuted this, having declared that in the conditions of the unilateral year-long moratorium on nuclear tests proclaimed by the President of Russia, it is impossible to do this. They obviously were cunning, for, connected with the Ministry of Atomic Power, they could not but know that recently Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 194 "On the Testing Area on Novaya Zemlya" with the stamp "Not for the Press", and in this region the accelerated laying of new galleries and the drilling of holes for the next series of nuclear explosions will begin again.

"With a single stroke," the Ministry of Economics and Finance of the Russian Federation were allotted funds for "nuclear needs." By this decree, the testing range on Novaya Zemlya was removed from the jurisdiction of the administration of Arkhangelsk Oblast and temporarily turned over for use by the Chief Command of the OVS [Combined Armed Forces] of the CIS. The explanation for this decree is given by the following: The majority of Novaya Zemlya containers, in which for 20

years nuclear waste was stored, producing allegedly constant leakage, compel us to start thinking about their destruction.

The cheapest and safest method of eliminating highly-toxic radioactive waste, in the opinion of Vladimir Dmitriyev, who was directly engaged in "CHETEK" in a corresponding project, are underground nuclear explosions.

First of all, as Dmitriyev asserts, the physics of an underground explosion are such that it is capable of "sealing" itself (if, of course, in the geoshiny [not further identified] there are no fissures through which the emission of radioactive gases can take place). The influence of the shock wave and high temperatures underground will at once destroy many harmful chemical elements, and the repeated equal reflection will so thoroughly mix up the melt and disperse the radionuclides that the re-creation of harmful substances will become practically impossible and their content in the atmosphere will approach the natural radiation background.

Secondly, even if the emission of gases through the microfissures will indeed occur, there will be no special danger, since the explosions will be produced at great depths and in special testing ranges.

And, finally, very likely, the most important argument in the opinion of "CHETEK". There are a number of technologies of destruction, but all of them are too expensive. One of them envisages the construction of plants (such as in Chapayevsk). But for the elimination of all wastes there need to be at least 68 of them. And for their work, as the specialists assert, it is necessary to create another nuclear power station, the harm from which will be immeasurably greater than from underground nuclear explosions.

The prospects of "CHETEK" are tempting. "Our nuclear scientists, who have proposed the realization of the technology of the simultaneous destruction of chemical weapons and highly toxic nuclear waste are ready even for joint projects with other countries—naturally, on the condition of the conclusion of corresponding intergovernmental agreements," Dmitriyev declared.

It is well known that the United States, having renounced the expansion of the program of nuclear research in the 1970's when the danger of environmental pollution arose, is now already conducting negotiations about the possible conduct of explosions. . . but on the territory of other countries.

In part this is caused by very strong opposition among American defenders of the environment and arms control experts.

William Potter, a spokesman for the Institute of International Research in Monterey, California, after visiting the headquarters of "CHETEK", wrote: "CHETEK is a characteristic example of global danger. Soviet scientists have encountered economic difficulties, and they are

being subjected to the temptation to sell their knowledge to anyone who can pay foreign currency."

The study of this problem has also been taken up by Tarik Rauf, a leading staff member of the Canadian Center for Arms Control and Disarmament in Ottawa. He made public the activity of "CHETEK" and other analogous companies. As Rauf says, "every person in Moscow wants to get involved in business. These people, as a matter of fact, are not concerned with the consequences of their deals. They only want dollars."

Ray Kidder, an arms expert of the Livermore National Laboratory in California, declared that the idea of the use of nuclear explosions for the burning of toxic waste and even nuclear warheads is technically extremely attractive, but it is necessary to make certain that the explosions will not be secretly used for the further research and development of nuclear weapons designs.

There exists still another problem which our Russian government cannot pass over in silence. The newspaper *TRIBUNE* cited the statement of one of the partners of "CHETEK", Danny Wolfson. It turns out, that people living abroad do not have to worry about anything, for radioactive chemical waste will be exported to the territory of the former USSR. The company of Mister Wolfson has already prepared special containers, trucks, and ships. According to his words, the cost of the work on utilization ranges from \$300 to \$1,200—the cheapest method of the destruction of toxic substances, it goes without saying, if one does not take into account the health of our compatriots.

The representatives of "CHETEK" reported that the project for the destruction of toxic and radioactive waste was submitted for review to the government of Russia, which this [as published]

But the point, obviously, is not even that the leakage of nuclear secrets is possible, about which Gennadiy Burbulis in his time was so worried: The firm "CHETEK" sufficiently jealously protects the unique technology belonging to it—in so doing, true, leaving the solution of the problem of public health care to others.

The director of the branch "CHETEK-Atom MAK" "CHETEK", Sergey Tokmachev, asserts that the scientists will assume all responsibility if the experiment is not successful, and one of the elaborators of the technology, Aleksandr Chernyshev, guaranteeing the complete safety of the experiment, says that during the underground explosion he is ready to stand next to the surface, and after 2 years, having undressed to his trousers, go into the underground shaft.

A truly heroic intention. History already knows such cases, where, for example, doctors inoculated themselves with mortal smallpox vaccine. But it would be a good thing to also ask others whether they are in agreement with such experiments on themselves and on their descendants. It has been proved by scientists that the ecological consequences of nuclear explosions, including

underground ones. have an effect even after dozens of years, and the experiments over the gene pool of the people, which underwent catastrophic degradation after Chernobyl, and the tests in Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya, will lead to the degeneration of tens of thousands of people.

This is something to think about in the first place.

Lewisite in Udmurtia Will Remain in Storage 4-5 Years

LD0406105392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1000 GMT 4 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Alfred Artamonov]

[Text] Izhevsk June 4 TASS—"Huge amounts of Lewisite are apparently destined to remain in storehouses for another four or five years in the port of Kambarka," a press conference, held at the Udmurtian Council of Ministers here, was told today.

A delegation from the Republic has recently been to Moscow. It discussed the problem of this deadly depot with representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry, the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, as well as with scientists from several institutes and specialists in reprocessing toxic substances.

A protocol of intentions to utilise the Lewisite was drawn up. It envisages a meeting of representatives of various ranks in the capital of Udmurtia this June. They are to decide the question of building corresponding facilities.

It was decided to ask the Russian President to accelerate the adoption of legislative acts, making someone responsible for the building of facilities to destroy or reprocess chemical weapons, as well as acts on special allowances to people employed on such jobs.

A contest must be held to select the safest and most economically profitable technology. Udmurtia has recommended Vyacheslav Gurov, chairman of the Republic's State Nature Protection Committee, doctors of chemical sciences Vladimir Kodolov and Sergey Reshetnikov, as well as several other experts to be included in the expert commission to select the needed technology.

The draft programme of practical actions envisages measures to enhance Lewisite storage safety, to build storehouses for it 3-4 kilometres away from dwelling areas. Repumping the toxic substances from huge reservoirs into containers of one cubic metres each is also envisaged. Then it will be easier and safer to transport the deadly cargo.

Investigative Reporting on Sverdlovsk Anthrax Incident

927C0441 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by K. Belyaninov, V. Nedogonov, V. Umnov, V. Chelikov, Sverdlovsk Oblast, under the rubric "KP (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA) Investigation": "If You Find Me Unconscious, Please Report It to the City of Sverdlovsk...": Our Expedition Tracked the Clues of a Secret Biological War"]

[Text] On 1 May, as prescribed, the table was set. Klimov hadn't gotten through the first cup when two orderlies arrived.

"Have you drunk it all?"

"No," Klimov answered honestly.

And they took him away in the ambulance.

He had been expecting their arrival for almost a month—when his acquaintances began dying. Prokhorov died, and then Lozhkin, and then Romanov. People were dying on the trolleys and in doorways.

After comparing the facts, Klimov understood that he himself was the next candidate for the grave. It was taking those who lived or worked in Chkalovsk Rayon, near Military Base No. 19. In early April, Klimov went through military courses in a neighboring unit.

On 1 May 1979, he was vaccinated for anthrax. The physicians warned him that there could be complications: convulsions, cardiovascular disturbances, and even anaphylactic shock. In his passport, Vladimir Mikhaylovich wrote a note that he thought up right then and there: "If you find me unconscious, please report it to the city of Sverdlovsk, at this address..."

In the spring of 1979, in the CPSU Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee, an unhealthy situation developed. Alarming rumors about an epidemic were going through the corridors and smoking areas. When the alarm reached its apogee, the staff put together an address for First Secretary B. N. Yeltsin, so that he could inform the public.

Yeltsin agreed, and he set a date for a staff meeting.

On the appointed day, at the large oblast committee concourse, Boris Nikolayevich, trying not to stray from the paper, read a report from the rostrum about how in Syserts Rayon, a cow and a sheep infected with anthrax had been butchered and sold on the market, and that's how the epidemic had begun.

After he finished reading, he looked around the hall and said, "Any questions?"

The first secretary always proposed that questions be raised after his speeches, but he always remembered, long after, who it was who had raised the questions. So

there weren't any questions. Everyone dispersed, grown quiet and even more frightened.

He went to Base No. 19, but they wouldn't even let him into the supersecret area. Boris Nikolayevich, by his own words, didn't know what was going on there. "It didn't have anything to do with me," he later said, "but I knew there was something there. And that's all. But when the epidemic broke out, I saw to it that it was taken care of right away."

The illness developed too quickly for the official "isolated cases." And it was strange that the anthrax appeared in the spring, when the snow was on the ground, instead of the usual time—in the summer heat. According to the official data, 64 people died (now, by the way, related deaths are being announced, and the names of those people are not on the list that came out of the depths of the UKGB in December of just last year after inquiries by people's deputies.) Since then, only a few cases of anthrax have been recorded in Sverdlovsk Oblast.

"There are no documents whatsoever in the archives of our directorate, and never have been," said Dmitriy Kondratyev, deputy director of the oblast directorate of the Ministry of Security, who with that wiped away half of our questions. "The Chekas were in fact brought in to investigate the causes of the epidemic, but we didn't find anything substantial."

A number of detailed versions about the epidemic have sprung up. The first was that it was a terrorist act. No saboteurs, of course, were found; but at any rate they sent some American student—how he got there no one knows—out of Sverdlovsk. The student later wrote a "whole book" about the anthrax.

A second version was that the illness was "sent in" with imported equipment. Such things happened, in the words of Kondratyev, rather frequently. They would check the lathes that came into a plant, and they would find antisoviet literature or bags of gum. And once, in a railcar with Canadian wheat, they found a box, and in the box were strange ampules. It wasn't until about two weeks later that they figured out that they were rat poison...

When the official Moscow commissions confirmed that the source of the epidemic was infected meat, the people in the UKGB calmed down.

"According to the data of intelligence agencies and the testimony of individuals who emigrated from the Soviet Union, the outbreak occurred early on the morning of 3 April 1979 in the military Base No. 19 (?—Ed.). A cloud of spores went up into the air... The wind took the aerosol cloud to the south, which was lucky—otherwise, 1000 residents could have perished." (New Scientist, 1980)

Stanislav Alekseyev, head of the Center for Documentation of Public Organizations (formerly the oblast party

archives), could barely find a hint of the anthrax in the documents of the oblast committee. Back in those days, the bureau met twice a month. In April 1979, the priority issues were things like statistical reports, the preparations for the plenum of the oblast committee of the All-Union Young Communist League, and the presentation of awards for "Active Propaganda of Marxism-Leninism."

In May, there was a seminar of first secretaries of rayon committees about people's control...

Not a word anywhere about the anthrax.

"Any record had to go through the head of the protocol department on its way to the archives," Alekseyev explained now. "Part of his job was to screen out the most secret matters, and only he could carefully pull out a page or two from the folder. If, indeed, such a record existed at all."

Yeltsin, as his former colleagues recall, didn't like paperwork.

Nevertheless, in 1979, there was an individual living in Sverdlovsk who wasn't very afraid of what was going on. His name was Aleksandr Karenin. Seeing everyone rushing around the city, he recalled the summer of 1969, the sunburnt steppe, an island lost in the Aral Sea.

Karenin served on the island of Vozrozhdeniye—the only biological testing ground in the homeland. The job of the sergeant of the CW defense troops was very simple: deliver a vehicle carrying horses to the testing ground, and then don a gas mask and wait in the vehicle's cabin for the "article" [vehicle] to be "attacked." When the cloud had passed, he would take the horses to a unit to die, and then scientists—including some from Sverdlovsk—would take over.

Sheep were brought to the testing ground in boxes: a special opening kept them from hiding their heads, and the calculations of the specialists were based on the notion that the sheep would inhale as much of the material as possible. There were also monkeys on the island, although Karenin, quite honestly, didn't see them. They weren't brought to the testing ground—they were sprayed with something right in the laboratories. The monkeys lived in style on the island: It cost 4 rubles 80 kopecks a day to keep them there. It cost only 1 ruble 24 kopecks to keep Karenin. But he and the other soldiers didn't complain about serving there. They would occasionally have shashlik from a sheep who hadn't been "gassed," and some soldiers weren't even squeamish about contaminated animals.

It wasn't until 10 years later that Karenin spoke about his service—in 1979. With the only difference that now people are playing the role of the horses.

The frontline physician Nikolay Babich reached Prague in 1945. He greeted the spring of 1979 holding the rank

of a medical general—the head of an oblast health department. But that April, he, like Karenin, felt like a private.

The anthrax outbreak was a sneak attack. The first corpses came in quickly, but the doctors were very slow—it took three days for an accurate diagnosis, and then they waited for enough vaccine to come from Georgia...

In his pocket, Nikolay Stepanovich [Babich] carried a piece of paper folded like an accordion, on which he wrote the new addresses of the anthrax. He traced the flows of sick people.

The dead, for lack of a crematorium, were buried in the clay soil of the Vostochnaya Cemetery, sprinkled on all sides with calcium hypochlorite. On paper, thousands of people were said to have been vaccinated with anthrax vaccine; word of mouth, however, put the figure at hundreds of thousands.

The USSR Chief State Health Physician, P. Burgasov, came tearing into Sverdlovsk. He didn't rush to Base No. 19—people were surprised, not knowing that in the summer he was to fly to a congress in India, and all he would have to do would be to take one step into the secret area, and he would immediately be confined to the place.

Burgasov headed a commission of civilian medical people.

A second commission consisted of military medical people. It was directed by Ye. Smirnov, the chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

A third commission—headed by the first deputy Andropov—also didn't leave any visible clues.

A fourth commission was an oblast epidemic-control commission.

Every morning, a cavalcade of black Volgas would roll up to the oblast health department building (so many that the chiefs were eventually asked to ride several to a car, so as not to create a traffic jam in the narrow lane). But Base No. 19 kept silent. Were there sick people there? One night, Babich and Burgasov stole up to the fence around the post and took samples of the run-off water. They didn't find any anthrax, but then they themselves were "exposed"—the next day, a "well-wisher" showed Babich photographs of the nighttime sortie.

While the commissions of Burgasov and Smirnov were writing their secret reports, urgent telegrams were coming from Moscow. At first, they ordered the roofs washed—so they were washed. If the agent was there, it would run off onto the asphalt with the water.

After a few days, a telegram came saying change the soap, put down new asphalt, and remove the upper layer of soil. After that, they gave up on it.

Many of those who arrived rushed into the wards to the patients—they were collecting material for their dissertations. That's when the order came down from the center: no one is to be admitted.

As Nikolay Babich learned many years later, a unique brochure appeared on saving people from mass infection with the anthrax. It appeared alright, but only in manuscript, because the author didn't live to see it come out—the brochure was banned.

Only the epidemic-control commission of the oblast executive committee worked in the open—it was looking for contaminated meat in the Syserts Rayon, which is 40 kilometers south of Sverdlovsk. Everyday, the physicians of the oblast health-epidemiological station went out to the neighboring livestock burial grounds in search of the anthrax agent.

But the chief of the oblast UKGB showed up with a pistol and two strong guys with handcuffs in the office of the head of the oblast health department. They hauled out every single history of the disease, diaries, maps, and reports on the anthrax from the safe and put them into bags. For a finale, they even stuck the "accordion fold" from Nikolay Stepanovich's pocket into a bag.

Two month's of work and the unique training associated with saving hopeless patients (they had managed, after all, to pull several people out of it!) were forever buried in the entrails of the KGB.

Now the retired Nikolay Stepanovich Babich recalls with a smile how on the third day of the epidemic, at some meeting, a military commander suggested putting Babich in jail—"He overlooked the signs of the epidemic!"—and the second secretary of the oblast committee stamped his feet and threatened a trial.

Babich knew that that was no real threat to him at all.

It's instructive that although there was an epidemic of anthrax, not a single physician or epidemiologist (all of whom worked truly courageously, under the most difficult of conditions) was dismissed, and no reprimands or penalties were made. It was obvious that the epidemic was not their fault.

In July, a secret order came down: Forget the anthrax. They say that the anthrax story came to light at the SALT-1 talks with the United States, and the Americans expressed their displeasure to Gromyko.

And when Nikolay Stepanovich Babich flew to the Black Sea to rest, people were curious and would ask, "What happened there?" And he would reply, "Nothing."

To the state advisor of the Russian Federation on Ecology and Health Care, A. Yablokov:

In reference to the inquiries by the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR...The materials of the investigation of the epidemic outbreak of the illness were of a "Top Secret" nature. For that reason, no official information has come concerning the causes of its occurrence, the number of individuals infected, or the number of people who died. All the records of the laboratory tests of the environmental samples and of the materials from the infected individuals and those who died that were kept by the laboratories of the Sverdlovsk Oblast health-epidemiological service were confiscated by the KGB and the military procurator's office, as were the epidemiological analyses that were done afterward.

The RSFSR State Committee for Health and Epidemiological Inspection does not at present have any official documents on the causes or the extent of the tragedy.

*Ye. N. Belyayev, Chairman
November 1991*

"We didn't destroy any documents," Dmitriy Kondratyev, the deputy chief of the Yekaterinburg Directorate of the Ministry of Security, assured me in May 1992. "We don't even have furnaces for that kind of thing in the directorate. We never had those documents at all."

Six months ago, presidential advisor Aleksey Yablokov telephoned the chairman of the KGB, V. Bakatin.

"The president is getting ready to investigate the causes of the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk. He needs the archive documents."

"We'll find them by this evening," Bakatin promised.

But two days went by, and no news came out of the committee. On the third day, Yablokov himself telephoned.

"I can't do anything with my subordinates," Bakatin complained. "They can't find anything."

Several days later, the chief of the center for social relations of the KGB went to Yablokov. He brought a thick folder of documents stamped "Secret." It contained the reports of the Burgasov commission, with a detailed elaboration of the official meat version.

"Look them over carefully," the visitor advised. "There's something in those documents that will shed light on the truth. Our staff members back then let something slip by. Here, for example: in smears taken from a rug and a wall mailbox, the anthrax agent was found. If the source were meat, the agent wouldn't ever have been found on household items."

Recalling that strange visit, the head of the organization department of Yablokov's office, S. Revina is certain of this:

"He clearly read the real documents just before coming to us. For no reason at all, he suddenly conjectured that the source of the illness was cracks in the ventilation

filters of some "classified enterprise." He said that in the spring of 1979, after hard freezes, there were rapid warm spells, and the filters could easily have cracked."

The visitor admitted that secret documents from Sverdlovsk were kept in the archives of the KGB all the way until 4 December 1990. It was then that the USSR Council of Ministers issued a supersecret decree "On the Work on Special Projects" (most of those documents were signed at that time by N. Ryzhkov). That decree ordered that all secret papers be destroyed. It was to no avail that the state advisor on ecology and health care went to the then head of government I. Silayev.

Former military Base No. 19 has been renamed about 10 times. First it was the Scientific Research Institute of Vaccine Preparations, and later, a sector of the Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense. In December 1991, when even the veterans began to get confused about its name, the post received the name of Center for Military-Technical Problems of Biological Defense of the Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense.

At one time, everything was all so very simple. The Americans didn't even consider hiding the fact that in the early 1970s, they had about 10 kinds of biological weapons. So the specialists from Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Zagorsk, and other of our secret centers had to do "nothing more than" things like find a vaccine for known diseases, figure out the probable losses that would come from the use of those weapons, and develop plans for decontamination. The international convention that banned the development, production, storage, and acquisition of biological weapons ruined all that. In 1972, the convention was signed by the Soviet Union, too.

"Work like that has been done and is being done throughout the world," said Col. Gleb Arkhangelskiy, deputy chief of the Center for Science, brushing aside the digression. "After the signing of the convention, there were three international conferences, but a unified system for monitoring was never created. How do you determine, for example, whether strains of, say, brucellosis are being studied in a university laboratory, whether the work is being done for peaceful purposes or for military purposes, under orders from the Pentagon?"

People on the post don't like talking about the anthrax epidemic of 13 years ago. They explain that the center's specialists were not involved in the work of the commissions, that they were not approached for help, and that they didn't even see the results of the examinations of the sick individuals. Even though, perhaps, a better place for conducting any such research couldn't have been found.

The vaccination of the Sverdlovsk residents began about a month after the onset of the epidemic, when the number of dead had already reached into the dozens. The residents of Base No. 19 were vaccinated with an

anthrax vaccine that was produced in the post's own laboratories not long before the tragedy.

"It had a great many advantages," explains Colonel Arkhangelskiy. "It was purer, less reactogenic. We asked for permission back then to 'treat' Sverdlovsk at least, but we never got a reply. Instead, they used a Tbilisi vaccine and vaccinated with a triple dose, well aware that there could be serious complications."

According to our information, nobody from Base No. 19 died from the anthrax.

In the years gone by, the center's specialists have been approached only once about that very vaccine. In January 1991, just before the start of the war in the Persian Gulf, when Saddam Hussein declared to the entire world that, in the event of military action, the Iraqi army would use strains of that same anthrax. In Pentagon laboratories, either they didn't have the proper vaccine, or they simply didn't have it in proper quantities, but they approached the Soviet leadership with a request for it, explaining that the American army couldn't vaccinate all its soldiers.

"If they had approached us before 1985, we could have helped them," Arkhangelskiy says. "Back then, we had what was estimated as some 10 million man-doses of the vaccine on the post. But after 1985, we began receiving orders to shut down one research area after another, and we stopped producing our own vaccine. By 1985, we were already working on improved vaccines for that same anthrax and brucellosis, and we were doing research on glanders and melidiosis, for which there are no vaccines at all."

The center ended its active work a year ago. That's when all testing on the island of Vozrozhdeniye ceased ("Look, they shut down the testing ground, so how are you supposed to determine a lethal dose for a human if you don't test it on animal models?!"). They switched to working with simulators, among which certainly not the last is that same anthrax vaccine.

The projects the specialists of the center are proposing today sound like a collection of science-fiction stories. They are preparing to do the following:

- cleanse maternity hospitals of staphylococcus
- disinfect poultry farms and railroad cars, removing every kind of fungus or mold
- destroy chemical weapons and highly toxic waste with their own bacteria
- clean up spills of oil and kerosene with microorganisms that will reprocess the oil into protein that will go in food for fish
- set up production of the very antibiotics that hospitals are so catastrophically short of

Back then, in 1979, the families and relatives of those who died were given compensation—50 rubles. Exactly 13 years later, on 4 April 1992, the president of Russia, as if covering up someone's guilt, signed the law "On

Improving the Pensions of Families of Citizens Who Died As a Result of Anthrax in the City of Sverdlovsk in 1979."

Almost at the same time, Yeltsin finally admitted openly that, yes, our country had violated the Convention of 1972.

Had not the son of the chief physician of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Hospital gone to the university, the riddle of the Krasnoufimsk fields would probably never have come up.

In August 1989, the senior Sibertsev went to the Krasnoufimskiy Sovkhoz to visit his son. While waiting for the students to arrive from the onion fields, he noticed four girls with a strange gait: their feet were "slapping" against the ground. They were immediately sent to a medical examination, in which disturbances in the nervous system activity were found—paresis (numbness) of the extremities.

It turned out that the strange illness had stricken more than 200 students that same year. And again, as had happened 10 years before, the medical luminaries went to Sverdlovsk. A commission of the USSR Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Institute of Biophysics arrived, as did state security specialists. In vain.

Initially, as usual, the students were blamed for everything: They probably drank beer with dichlorophos. Then it was said that the ill-starred fields contained toxic chemicals that exceeded the maximum permissible levels by 240-fold. But not a trace of pesticides was found in the blood of those who took sick.

Even though the health-epidemiological station banned the use of toxic chemicals throughout the entire oblast, new outbreaks of the illness occurred on the Krasnoufimsk fields last year. Similar symptoms were found in individuals working in fields in Beloyarsk and Kamensk rayons. Questioning of the students revealed that they had felt similar symptoms even earlier, before 1989, but they were afraid to say so, for fear they would be considered malingerers.

The strange illness forced scientists to comb the vicinity of Krasnoufimsk. Now a new version of the cause was born. It turns out that near the fields is a secret facility—a "state reserve" warehouse of radioactive monocyte sand of the Pobeda combine. In the 1950s, it was laid in store under the personal order of Beriya, to be used for the production of nuclear weapons. The sand was of no use, and the warehouses were abandoned.

The oblast health-epidemiological station brought an action against the Ministry of Defense. Guards once again appeared at the warehouses. The radioactive version of the cause of the illness, however, remained just another version. In its place, a careful examination of urban and rural residents showed that the residents of

Sverdlovsk Oblast—mainly, the children and teenagers—suffer from severe avitaminosis.

To date, the number of individuals who have come down with the strange illness is at 284. And although the mystery of the Krasnoufinsk fields is still unsolved, local kolkhoz workers and sovkhoz workers are sending the oblast government dispatches requesting that new students be sent to harvest the onions.

"We don't have a moral right to send students there," says V. Tretyakov, prorector of the Ural State University. "There won't be any orders given or any mandatory student detachments. After all, pesticides have been used there for several decades, and maybe toxic chemical agents have formed there..."

The most dangerous places will, perhaps, have to be left unharvested. The oblast health-epidemiological station isn't too upset about that: The peak of unemployment is expected in Yekaterinburg by the fall. The fields not harvested by students will make for pretty good feeding for the poor in a cold winter.

How many other unknown diseases are roaming about the former USSR?

"Unbeknownst to the rest of the world, a disease broke out 11 years ago in our city of Krasnoyarsk and then quietly disappeared, leaving in its wake nearly 500 sick children. Until now, only a handful of medical people and parents knew about it.

"My son was born in October 1980, and by November he was already being treated for pneumonia and came down with some mysterious disease that was later called uveitis. His temperature rose to 40° [centigrade], and conjunctivitis and a closing of the pupil began. The virus affected newborns only. Children in whom both eyes were affected were blinded even before they had learned to see. The disease was especially noted in blue-eyed children—the color of the affected eye would turn dark blue.

"They told us openly that there wouldn't be any improvement. At that time, in the thick of the battle for vision, they didn't look any farther. The official version that came down to the parents was something like, The ecological conditions in Krasnoyarsk have revived a virus that was 'asleep.' In January 1981, a delegation of medical people came to Krasnoyarsk from the Gelmgolts Moscow Institute, where there were probably also some clues to the disease. A special uveal center was opened.

"And now this year, in the boarding school where our children are gathered, cases of hepatitis started to appear. Later, they were linked to the disease itself. It turns out that almost all the internal organs of the children have been affected, and they suspect that the brain is affected, too.

"We parents have our own version of what happened: secret tests of biological weapons, or waste from the 'numbered' enterprises..."

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Kurils' Return Said to be Impossible for Yeltsin

OW1006120292 Tokyo KYODO in English 1153 GMT 10 Jun 92

[Text] Moscow, June 10 KYODO—The Russian Information Minister Tuesday said President Boris Yeltsin would be swept from power if he announced the return of disputed islands to Japan during a scheduled Tokyo visit in September.

Mikhail Poltoranin said in an interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE that at present "it is simply impossible" for Yeltsin to announce the return of the islands, which Japan claims as its northern territories.

"He can't right now go to a rostrum and say, 'tomorrow I am returning the Kuril islands to Japan' because he will be simply swept away," Poltoranin said.

The four islands off Hokkaido have been a thorny issue between the two countries since the end of World War II when they were captured by the Soviet Union's army.

The Russian minister called upon Japan to understand the situation in Russia, the fact that public opinion in Russia must "ripen."

Poltoranin made it clear that Yeltsin is not going to postpone his visit to Japan because of a Russian referendum later this year. "This is a normal situation. Japanese people realize pretty well what Yeltsin can and what he cannot say," he said.

Poltoranin also said that a referendum on private ownership of land will be held in Russia most likely "some-time in October."

"If we fail to solve this question our reform will collapse," he said.

Poltoranin also said the Russian people will vote on a new Constitution to decide whether Yeltsin should be given strong executive powers to carry out reforms.

Yeltsin first suggested a referendum on the draft Constitution in early April at the congress of Russian People's Deputies.

Referring to the future of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Poltoranin, recently appointed vice-premier of Russia, said the Commonwealth is not viable and can not survive.

He said he is pessimistic about the future of the Commonwealth because "it is trying to restore, recreate that former Union built by Communists who made different civilizations live under one roof."

The Union was replaced in December 1991 with the Commonwealth, made up of 11 of the 12 former Soviet Republics.

Poltoranin said the CIS countries "have fallen ill with independence," but said that after they have had this "national measles we will again begin to unite."

Poltoranin expressed certainty that the CIS will undergo changes and Russia's interests will concur with the Ukraine's.

He criticized Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk as "bathing in nationalism," saying that in 3-4 years "this dust will sink" and Russia, the Ukraine, Byelarus and a number of other republics...will be something single."

"We will be in the European Community. This is the future of our union," he said.

Experts Begin Installing Tokamak Reactor in Eastern China

LD0406134892 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 3 Jun 92

[Text] Russian and Chinese experts in the field of nuclear physics have begun installing a Tokamak thermonuclear reactor in the eastern Chinese province of Anhui. Chinese physicists are hoping to considerably advance their nuclear fusion research with the help of the Tokamak. The Russian Tokamak remains unsurpassed in the world, but we are still not managing to reproduce many of its units, stated (Ban Qun Za), deputy director of the Anhui Institute of Plasma Physics, in an interview with the Chinese newspaper CHINA DAILY.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Byelarus 'Ready to Join NPT, CFE Treaties

LD0206183192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1740 GMT 2 Jun 92

[By BELTA correspondent Tatyana Khryapina for TASS]

[Text] Minsk June 2 TASS—"The Republic of Byelarus is ready to join the treaties on non-proliferation of nuclear arms and limitation of conventional armaments in Europe," Chairman of the Byelarusian Parliamentary Commission on National Security, Defence and Anti-Crime Activities Mechislav Grib told Professor William Potter from the U.S. Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center of Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Potter, who heads the center, is currently on a working visit to Byelarus.

Grib expressed the assurance the Byelarusian parliament will ratify the international treaties at its regular session in fall.

"The final aim of Byelarus is to become a non-nuclear and neutral state. Our principled stand on this issue will

not be changed, it reflects the point of view of the government, the parliament and the republican public," said Grib.

"Tactical nuclear arms have been completely withdrawn from Byelarus. Strategic arms wait for their turn, the time of which depends on Russia, whose territory accommodates the only enterprise eliminating nuclear charges.

"The approximate term of strategic arms withdrawal is seven years. It could be less if not for the difficulties created by holding of the economic reform and creation of the national armed forces. In addition, Byelarus lives under special conditions caused by the Chernobyl accident.

"Nevertheless, the Supreme Soviet keeps to the opinion one cannot gain political dividends from keeping strategic nuclear arms," said Grib.

Professor Anatoliy Volkov, director of the Byelarusian Scientific and Technical Center—The Institute of Radiation Safety Belrad, called attention to the fact peaceful nuclear uses are as dangerous for people as military ones.

"The Chernobyl accident is a vivid example of it. A total of 122,000 square meters of land fell out from economic circulation for a long time due to the radiation impact. Seventeen million people, including every fifth Byelarusian, children are no exception, still live on affected territories in Byelarus, Ukraine and Russia," said Volkov.

He is convinced only efforts of the entire international community can combat the aftermath of the major 20th century nuclear catastrophe.

In his turn, Potter stressed the United States will welcome any steps of Byelarus, if it is the first among the CIS states to ratify the above-mentioned international treaties on nuclear arms and conventional armaments in Europe. He assured Byelarus will receive the most favoured nation status on the part of the United States in the development of the economy, science, conversion and the solution of Chernobyl problems.

Unfortunately, they in the United States know little about Byelarusian problems, said Potter. He believes he will help Americans see the problems and troubles of Byelarusians.

Isinaliyev: 'Kazakhstan Must Remain A Nuclear State'

LD0306110292 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 0957 GMT 3 Jun 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Alma-Ata—The chairman of Azat Civil Movement of Kazakhstan Mikhail Isinaliyev is critical about the understandings made by the president of Kazakhstan in the course of his visit to the U.S. in May.

According to Marat Isinaliyev, Kazakhstan must remain a member of the nuclear club. On June 2, Mikhail Isinaliyev circulated the text of his article "No Security Guarantee" which was not published by any of the independent press organs of Kazakhstan, in the press center of parliament. The article says, in particular, that Nursultan Nazarbayev should not have given in to U.S. President George Bush and should not have given up the nuclear missiles, whereas the U.S. did not assume any obligations to protect Kazakhstan's security. Isinaliyev argues that the visits of Margaret Thatcher, James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, made last year, was not accounted for by the fact that they were concerned about the future of Kazakhstan, rich in natural resources but flaccid as a state, and the necessity of making contacts with it, that they had to consult the president of Kazakhstan, a prominent CIS figure, but by the fact that nuclear weapons were deployed in the republic's territory.

According to the republican mass media, the leaders of Azat Movement, whose chairman is Mikhail Isinaliyev, requested the president of Kazakhstan to refrain from ratifying the agreement with the U.S. on nuclear weapons.

Krasnoyarsk Reactor to Be Shut Down

*LD0506112192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0729 GMT 5 Jun 92*

[Text] Krasnoyarsk June 5 TASS—The oldest Soviet nuclear reactor, which has been producing plutonium for military purposes since 1958, will be shut down on July 1 in the Krasnoyarsk-26 "Nuclear City", according to a decision of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry.

However, it will take half a year to completely mothball the Chernobyl-type reactor situated 250 metres underground. Scientists will study for five years its structures which have been subject to neutron radiation for over 30 years.

The enterprise in Krasnoyarsk-26 will switch to producing polycrystal silicon.

Russia To Provide CIS With 'Nuclear Umbrella'

*LD0506154892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0402 GMT 5 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo, 5 Jun—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has indicated that only Russia of all the former Soviet republics will possess nuclear weapons by the year 2000, and it will shelter the other CIS countries that have signed the treaty on collective security with a "nuclear umbrella." Russia's nuclear forces will be sufficient for effectively conducting a policy of deterrence and ensuring the security of the countries that are a party to this treaty, he stressed in written replies to questions

submitted by the Japanese KYODO news agency, the account of which has been circulated today.

Setting forth the main directions of Russia's defense doctrine, the minister noted that its Armed Forces are regarded as a means of stopping aggression and preventing war. He reported that by the year 2000, Russia's expenditure on defense will be cut to 5-6 percent of its gross national product, and the number of Armed Forces personnel will decrease to 1.5 million.

Answering a question about relations with Ukraine, Grachev drew attention to the fact that the sides are presently working on a number of problems, including military ones. However, "it is still too early to talk about results."

The minister pointed out Russia's striving to improve the international climate and to strengthen stability in the Far East. It is precisely in this context, according to him, that the approach to the solution of the military aspects of the territorial problem in Russian-Japanese relations should be determined. Grachev supported the plan of Russian President Boris Yeltsin that envisages the withdrawal of all servicemen, except border guards, from the islands of Uturup, Kunashir, Habomai, and Shikotan, which are disputed by the Japanese. The demilitarization of the islands will be carried out, he stressed, after noting that the question of the procedure and conditions of withdrawal of the troops should be resolved not by the military but by politicians.

Kravchuk: Ukraine To Become Nonnuclear State in Future

*LD1106220792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2128 GMT 11 Jun 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Ivan Sayko]

[Text] Kiev June 11 TASS—The Ukrainian president's first visit to France will be held on June 16 and 17, Leonid Kravchuk told reporters today.

During the visit Kravchuk will meet President Francois Mitterrand and sign several bilateral agreements.

Asked about cutting nuclear weapons Kravchuk stressed that Ukraine prioritizes destroying all nuclear weapons. In the future Ukraine shall become a non-nuclear, non-aligned state, he said.

There are no tactical nuclear weapons on its territory and strategic weapons are being destroyed, he said.

"I know that Russian President Boris Yeltsin will be discussing with U.S. President George Bush during his visit to the United States further cuts in offensive nuclear weapons," Kravchuk said.

"Ukraine supports such moves. However, the Russian side will be discussing reducing weapons stationed on its territory. Ukraine did not authorize Boris Yeltsin to discuss weapons stationed on its territory," he said.

Commenting on Western concerns about relations between Russia and Ukraine, Kravchuk said the two countries should have friendly, equal relations.

These are possible under two conditions. First, "not to tear out from our broad relations individual sharp issues, such as the Crimea or the Black Sea Fleet, but base these relations on a political basis, as relations between the two states. Second, Russia should unconditionally recognize Ukraine as an independent state, treat Ukraine like, say, France, Germany or Britain," he said.

"Exclude from Russia's political actions any pressure, including territorial claims," he said.

At the meeting with Boris Yeltsin, this month, it is planned to discuss a wide range of issues connected with relations between the two states. Ukraine wants democratic processes in Russia to expand. On its side, Ukraine has not made a single step which can be regarded as interference in Russia's internal affairs.

From July 1 Ukraine will begin a planned withdrawal from the "rouble space", Kravchuk said.

Ukraine Establishes C2 Structures for Nuclear Forces

*PM1006180092 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Commander of the Strategic Forces Accuses Ukrainian Leadership of Attempts To Wreck International Accords"]

[Text] The servicemen of a number of units of strategic designation stationed in Ukraine have recently taken the oath of allegiance to that Republic. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry is creating structures designed for the command and control of strategic forces, including those equipped with nuclear weapons. In this regard General of the Army Yuriy Maksimov, commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Strategic Forces, asked IZVESTIYA's military observer to call on him and made the following statement for publication.

Under the Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements among the CIS states and the international commitments assumed by the heads of Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan, the strategic forces and strategic nuclear armaments deployed on the territory of the four CIS countries are subject to centralized command and control and are to come under the single direction and control of the strategic forces command. The procedure governing the chain of command, decision making, the necessity of using strategic nuclear forces, and their status, is determined by these agreements.

On the whole these provisions are being met. And the Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms signed by Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan in Lisbon should help settle all questions connected with these weapons.

Russia will remain the legal successor to the USSR with the status of a nuclear state. Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan have stated their readiness to comply with the provisions of previously signed international treaties and to lay no claim to the possession of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, however, Ukraine, in spite of these and other commitments, has actually started taking practical steps aimed essentially at assuming effective command and possession of the nuclear weapons located on its territory. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk issued a decree whereby all groupings of strategic nuclear forces deployed on the territory of the state are included within the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This was then confirmed by an order by Defense Minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov. Moreover, a special control body—the Center for the Administrative Command and Control of the Troops of the Strategic Nuclear Forces—is being set up in the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

These acts effectively establish dual command and dual leadership of the strategic nuclear forces, drastically restrict the functions of the strategic forces command, and lead directly to violation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ukraine, in General Maksimov's opinion, is becoming in practice a country which possesses nuclear weapons.

The Ukrainian leadership has in practice removed the Moscow command from manpower acquisition and the selection and appointment of commanders for missile units, the training of servicemen, and the performance of other important tasks concerning combat readiness. Only operational management has been left to the strategic forces command.

But how is this to be done, the strategic forces' leadership wonders, if Kiev demands that missile troop officers swear an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine, as this means that people on duty on the nuclear button will carry out orders not from Moscow, but from the capital of Ukraine.

There are 276 strategic missile launchers, with more than 1,200 nuclear-tipped warhead assemblies [boyevykh blokov yadernykh boyegolovok], plus several hundred nuclear warheads for long-range bomber aircraft deployed in Ukraine.

The training center at Kotovsk, in the environs of Odessa; two technical maintenance facilities for strategic aviation; and two regiments of strategic bombers at Uzin and Priluki, whose officers have taken the Ukrainian oath of allegiance; a combat equipment maintenance facility at Sarny; and a school for junior-grade specialists at Vinnitsa figure among the strategic units that have effectively switched to Kiev's command.

If this process continues, as the Ukrainian leadership is insisting, the missile men consider that the dispute over the division of the Black Sea Fleet, about which so much

has been heard, will look like child's play compared with the struggle for possession of the strategic nuclear missiles in Ukraine.

Where, then, is the solution to the present crisis? Army General Maksimov considers that the leaders of the Ukraine should announce, in line with the state's international commitments, that they will not interfere in the direct leadership of the strategic nuclear forces, bypassing the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command

and the Strategic Forces Command. As has already been done, incidentally, in Byelarus and Kazakhstan.

Until the talks with the Ukrainian leadership produce results, the fate of the strategic missiles is in doubt. In this case, according to Maksimov, Ukraine's leadership should officially declare its state a nuclear power possessing strategic nuclear systems. Moscow will cut itself off from the command and control of them and switch it to Kiev. Then all responsibility for violation of international commitments, the state of the strategic forces, and nuclear security will rest solely with Ukraine.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NATO, CIS States Reaffirm Intent to Ratify CFE Treaty

AU0506143092 Paris AFP in English 1406 GMT
5 Jun 92

[Text] Oslo, June 5 (AFP)—NATO and its former Cold War adversaries of the Warsaw Bloc Friday sealed a deal for the destruction of thousands of tanks and other conventional weaponry from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains.

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which provides for the withdrawal or destruction of thousands of tanks, warplanes and artillery pieces, was signed in November 1990 by NATO countries and the defunct Warsaw Pact, but ratification was then held up following the collapse of the Soviet Union and quarrels among its former republics over how to share the cuts among themselves.

They finally reached agreement at a meeting of eight republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at Tashkent on May 15—Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan.

Foreign ministers signed a declaration "reaffirming their determination" to ratify the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty within a month.

They want the treaty in force by the start of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Helsinki on July 9 and 10.

But Byelorussia told a meeting of foreign ministers from the two sides here it might not be able to ratify the agreement by the target date of July 8 next month.

But Byelorussia Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko said his country might have "technical problems" with ratification, which must be done by all signatories if the treaty is to be effective.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel quoted the Kravchenko as saying that conservative elements in the republic might block ratification.

The declaration of intent to ratify the treaty was the main item debated at a meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)—a security forum linking NATO's 16 members with 21 countries of the former Soviet Union, its eastern European allies, plus Albania.

Under the accord, the republics of the former Soviet Union must, for example, cut their numbers of tanks from 19,000 to 13,150.

The treaty aims to restore an east-west balance in conventional arms. Under its terms, the countries of the

former Warsaw Pact will have to eliminate nine times as much weaponry as NATO countries.

FRANCE

Government Reduces Nuclear Forces' Alert Level

PM0806081092 Paris LE MONDE in French
5 Jun 92 p 24

[Unattributed report: "France Reduces Level of Alert of Its Nuclear Forces"]

[Text] In view of the reduction in East-West military tension following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in Europe, France has just reduced the operational constraints of all kinds on those manning its nuclear forces. This decision relates to the so-called level of "alert" of the forces which help to ensure nuclear deterrence.

Defense Minister Pierre Joxe said that explicitly in reply to Michel Sainte-Marie, Socialist Party deputy for la Gironde, who questioned him on the new military programming law in the Assembly on the afternoon of Wednesday 3 June.

"We have started to reduce and restructure our forces," Mr. Joxe said in particular. "We are easing the operational constraints on staff. Thus, for instance, in the army we are introducing differentiated operational readiness," which is distinguished from the previous system—immediate readiness—by the fact that it allows longer periods in the possible escalation in readiness of most of the units. "We are reducing the nuclear constraints," the minister added, "in other words, we are reducing the levels of alertness of the deterrence forces."

The number of Pluton surface-to-surface nuclear missile regiments will be reduced from five to one in 1993. The Hades missiles, which are to replace them, are stockpiled in smaller numbers without being deployed. The Mirage-IV bombers will be withdrawn from service in 1996. The number of Mirage 2000-N squadrons will be reduced from five to three. The intercontinental missiles buried on the Albion Plateau will no longer be operational at the beginning of the next century and, at that time, the fleet of strategic submarines will comprise four units (instead of six).

At the same time as the nuclear forces are being reduced in this way, France—as Mr. Joxe has just revealed—has started to reduce the state of alertness and readiness of the various staff operating those missiles. These measures directly affect the reaction times of the weapon systems which will be increased, the mobilization of the teams used which will be less permanent, the number of weapon systems on a state of alertness will be reduced, and thus the wear and tear on equipment will be less.

It seems that this initiative was taken by a defense council which met at the Elysee on Wednesday 27 May.

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