


JPRS-UPA-91-045
29 OCTOBER 1991



JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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19980120 055

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Poll Rates Popularity of National Figures

924B0009A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Sep 91 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Verification of the Victory"]

[Text] (A survey of the results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Rossika Center for Representative Sampling in Russia—15-19 September; 1,500 questioned.)

With respect to personal assessments (ratings), one can observe a rapid growth of the popularity of the main heroes of August, some of whom have been raised to an unprecedented level in the public consciousness. Muscovites who observed the dramatic events from close up single out the behavior of Yeltsin, Rutskoy, Shevardnadze, Khasbulatov, Romyantsev, and Yushenkov.

Rating on a Five-Point Scale

Name	Moscow	Large cities	Small cities and villages	Ratio between supporters and nonsupporters
1. B.N. Yeltsin	4.36	4.44	3.95	86.5:4.3
2. A.A. Sobchak	4.31	4.07	3.49	83.8:4.0
3. E.A. Shevardnadze	4.06	4.05	3.44	74.8:7.1
4. A.V. Rutskoy	4.02	3.82	3.26	68.0:4.1
5. I.S. Silayev	3.99	3.89	3.26	73.3:6.1
6. G.A. Yavlinskiy	3.87	3.88	3.26	63.8:6.8
7. R.I. Khasbulatov	3.85	4.24	3.32	69.7:5.0
8. S.B. Stankevich	3.83	3.35	3.14	66.1:6.0
9. G.Kh. Popov	3.77	3.46	3.28	65.6:11.0
10. S.S. Shatalin	3.71	3.58	3.18	57.1:5.0
11. A.N. Yakovlev	3.70	3.64	3.21	58.3:8.3
12. V.V. Bakatin	3.51	3.72	3.37	52.8:10.6
13. I.I. Zaslavskiy	3.46	3.22	3.15	42.3:9.0
14. G.V. Starovoytova	3.42	3.32	3.04	43.1:12.0
15. N. Nazarbayev	3.32	3.47	3.16	38.8:14.1
16. S.M. Shakhrai	3.28	3.45	3.02	28.3:5.3
17. M.S. Gorbachev	3.26	2.93	3.11	41.3:22.2
18. O.G. Romyantsev	3.23	3.07	3.06	18.7:5.6
19. T.Kh. Gdlyan	3.20	3.88	3.35	46.0:14.3
20. G.E. Burbulis	3.13	3.10	3.08	15.3:5.8
21. Yu.N. Afanasyev	3.03	3.17	2.91	28.5:11.7
22. V. Landsbergis	3.01	2.99	2.94	26.5:21.6
23. L.M. Kravchuk	2.80	2.83	2.92	11.8:22.7
24. N.I. Travkin	2.76	3.24	2.93	16.0:28.0
25. A. Mutalibov	2.49	2.60	2.92	3.5:34.5
26. V.I. Alksnis	2.14	2.61	2.82	7.5:54.1
27. Z.K. Gamsakhurdia	2.09	2.45	2.77	4.0:55.5
28. V.V. Zhirinovskiy	1.58	2.01	2.80	3.7:78.5

Rural areas and small cities remain unpoliticized and politicians are practically unknown there except for Yeltsin and Gorbachev. It is still difficult to explain the significant decline in the ratings of such once-popular people as Afanasyev and Travkin. Zhirinovskiy has become a completely odious figure.

The majority of figures on the list have a markedly democratic character and approximately the same image. They are idols primarily of the radical intelligentsia in the large cities and of youth. The exceptions are Khasbulatov, Bakatin, and Nazarbayev, whom public

opinion regards more as democratic-centrists; the populist Gdlyan, whom the intelligentsia hold in considerably less esteem, has a special image; Zhirinovskiy, Alksnis, Mutalibov, and Gamsakhurdia have a markedly reactionary image.

So far there is no opposition in public opinion to the autocratic leanings of the winners. And it would have been easy to predict this earlier. Sometime in the spring there was a merging in the mass consciousness of the democrat and rebel Yeltsin with the strong hand that

some desire so much. And, possibly, the future is not the brightest for democrats in Russia in the next few years. This, of course, is by no means a matter of the personality of Yeltsin or Popov, but of the considerable anti-

democratic potential which still exists in the society, in which democracy (in the image of "pluralism") was more a result of the two centers of political power than of a perceived need.

	Moscow	Large cities	Small cities, villages
"One must always observe the spirit and letter of the laws and regulations, even if they are imperfect."	44.8	30.4	27.1
"A strong and authoritarian leader to whom the people have entrusted their destiny is more important than laws"	32.1	42.9	39.4

Scholar Argues for Preservation of Union for Transition Period

PM0310110691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Sep 91 Union Edition p 3

[Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Kiva article: "Either the Authorities Are Strong or They Will Collapse"]

[Text] We are not insured either against new attempted conspiracies, or against new eruptions of hostility and clashes on ethnic grounds, or against conflicts over the division of land, water, and other resources, and so forth. But under certain conditions all these problems can be resolved promptly without allowing control of the situation to be lost. What are those conditions?

Number one. One way or another the Union must be preserved. At least for the transitional period. Until the formation of new sovereign states, which is often very painful. Until relations between the components of the old Union are regulated. Until we pass through the most critical phase of overcoming the economic crisis. In the acute crisis period of national state building in the former union and autonomous republics, the regulating role of the center and the union is simply irreplaceable. Not to mention the importance of preserving the Union for the creation of a single economic space—ultimately, many of our present troubles and potential future upheavals are linked to the state of the economy.

One cause of the war in Yugoslavia is the acute weakening, if not paralysis, of the central authority and its loss of control of the Army, which has effectively taken the side of one people—the Serbs.

As I understand it, what justification is there for the hopes of those who still dream of taking revenge? The disruption of the normal rhythm of life as a consequence of the severing of the visible and invisible ties and the malfunction in the work of the mechanisms of production sharing and cooperation between the constituents of the former USSR will sharply aggravate the economic difficulties, heighten social and interethnic problems, and have a particularly adverse effect on the position of the nonindigenous populations, especially the Russian-speaking population. Yet there are 25-30 million Russians alone living outside their historic homeland. In this situation it is natural to expect an intensification of powerful separatist tendencies among them.

The unwillingness of people of another civilization and culture to live in conditions of dictatorship on a national, clan, or religious basis and to be subjected to discrimination will also play into the hands of those tendencies. Not to mention possible bloody interethnic conflicts and their aftermath when it affects representatives of large nations. Who is going to undertake to protect the Russians, for example? Either the center or Russia.

It does not end there. The small states that leave the USSR may find themselves in a certain vacuum in the international arena, especially given that the new world order has not taken shape yet, and nature, as is well known, abhors a vacuum. There will doubtless be a great temptation among neighboring states to try to establish wardship of the newly formed states and to impose on them their own, unfortunately far from always democratic procedures, for instance, in exchange for economic (financial) assistance. I have in mind primarily the countries of the east. It is not hard to guess what the reaction will be here not only of the nonindigenous population but also of a considerable part of the indigenous population.

As the experience of many young countries shows, the euphoria connected with the acquisition of sovereignty soon passes. People's completely unsubstantiated expectations soon give way to profound disappointment, especially if living conditions are constantly deteriorating. But that is precisely what is happening in the majority of cases. Incidentally, the most terrible dictatorial regimes appeared soon after the acquisition of independence.

Time will pass and the supporters of the imperial Union, the great-power advocates among the Communist fundamentalists, the utopianist supporters of "back to the soil" ideals, and even national communists and national anticommunists (if we are talking about Russia), motivated by hatred of democracy, may organize and create an alliance. For what purpose? In an attempt to revive the empire. "An insane idea!" the reader may say. True. But have we not lived under insane ideas for over 70 years?! World revolution and the building of communism—were they not madness? The problem is that the popular consciousness, which bears the powerful imprint of irrationalism and utopianism, is inseparable from social myths. But here the decisive role will undoubtedly

be played by Russia. Without Russia and against Russia, no Alksnises, Prokhanovs, Zhirinovskiys, or the rest will be able to do anything.

It is precisely in Russia that it is graphically obvious how incomplete the mechanisms of power are, how little they are adapted to the extreme conditions in which we actually find ourselves now. The conflicts gathering momentum between the democratic executive and the democratic legislative powers are worrying. The fact that this reflects the immaturity of our young democracy, the birthmarks of totalitarianism, on the one hand, and the populist-lumpen aspirations toward leveling down on the other, is beyond doubt. Just as the dilettantism of many politicians and the lack of professional suitability of many legislators are beyond doubt. But the essence of the problem does not end there. When the most important and most influential of our democratic figures, such as B. Yeltsin, G. Popov, and A. Sobchak, begin to encounter growing opposition from the representative powers at a time when the cohesion of all democratic forces is needed, that is already a bad omen. I see in this the manifestation of certain objective trends and certainly not of some individual's authoritarian or evil character.

At least two things are obvious. First, the enhancement of the role of the executive is an objective need, a categorical imperative, if you will, in a situation close to chaos. Which is also reflected in the activity of the most prominent representatives of our democracy. And second, the danger of a split in the ranks of the democratic forces is looming, which is certainly not a new phenomenon in our history. Opposition to power, whatever its nature, is an inherent feature of our radical intelligentsia, which virtually all the country's major philosophers have noted.

Yes, democracy is of intrinsic value. It is the oxygen for a full life—economic, social, and spiritual. Furthermore, it is surely the only tangible achievement of perestroika. Yes, the separation of powers and rational counterweights to the executive (which yearns for self-sufficiency) in the form of the legislative and the judiciary is the greatest gain of human civilization. Yes, the press and the mass media in conditions of freedom are effectively a fourth estate. But as V. Bukovskiy asserts, they must act as an opposition to the official authorities. But I would ask: Do you mean always? All the mass media? Against any authority? Under any conditions? Even when there is a fight to the death going on in society and a mortal threat to democratic power from the right? Even when society, having chosen the path of transition from one formation to another, has lost stability and is literally tearing itself to pieces by social, national, and other conflicts?

Let us clarify certain things. The role of the executive and the legislative, like that of the democratic mass media, is not invariable. In particular, the role of the executive increases sharply in periods following wars,

revolutions, and major social cataclysms and in conditions of profound crises. Here the objective law is this: Either the authority is powerful and able to resolve the tasks facing society or it collapses. There is no other way.

The executive was exceptionally strong under Roosevelt during the Great Depression, under Adenauer in the conditions of postwar havoc in Germany, under De Gaulle during the protracted crisis of the political system in France, and under Thatcher when overdue structural transformations were being carried out. You can also point to the example of such countries as Turkey or South Korea, which—may this not wound our national pride!—are not so far removed from us in their level of development and the degree to which democratic traditions are rooted in society. Authoritarianism there began to give way to democracy only when a powerful middle class was formed in society.

As for the democratic mass media, if memory serves me well, in countries where common sense prevails they have always sought to help to inculcate democrat power and have certainly not stood in opposition to it. Did they criticize it for mistakes, weaknesses, or abuses? Undoubtedly, yes. But that is another approach entirely.

Thus for me the abstract posing of the question of the role of the executive and legislative, as of the mass media, means only that many are still bearing the heavy burden of Russian idealism and utopianism and that we may again suffer a crushing defeat. To think that the degree of democratism and the correlation between the executive and the legislative that they have in politically and socially stable and "contented" countries (such as the United States, Britain, or Japan) can be achieved in our present impoverished and embittered society, which is experiencing the deepest historical cataclysms that could possibly occur in the life of a nation, is as illusory as the idea of many of our forebears of Russia as the Third Rome and of its universal mission of saving other peoples (though what it was to save them from is, admittedly, unknown), and as the Bolsheviks' idea of world revolution. I stress: Either we abandon the world of illusions or we are a doomed nation.

If the democratic authority, succumbing to the pressure of the "eternal oppositionists" and the "patent democrats," cannot ensure the conditions for the transition to the market and the normalization of the situation and people's lives, then others will do it. But society must be aware: Those "others," that is, the right, will not balk at the extensive and merciless use of force to implement unpopular measures and suppress opposition and will interrupt the present democratic process for many years to come.

For some democrats it is almost a tradition to indulge in euphoria after each victory and to overestimate their own strengths and underestimate the strengths of their political opponents. I recall almost on the very eve of the

putsch, one left-wing newspaper wrote about the far-fetched nature of the talk of the possibility of a right-wing coup and praised those who had set about separating the "pure" from the "impure" democrats. The cause of this good humor then was the democrats' victory in the June elections.

Society had hardly had time to recover from everything to do with the putsch when the "Democratic Russia" supporters were already declaring that their support for President Yeltsin was conditional. Again an attack is being mounted against the Yeltsin-Gorbachev alliance and against Gorbachev personally as though his departure from the presidency would not complicate but improve the situation in the country. Again contradictions are being fueled among the ranks of the democrats themselves.

In my view, a section of the democrats, in particular the radical democrats, do not properly understand the situation in the country today. It clearly seemed to them that with the disappearance of the CPSU as the ruling structure it is necessary to urgently change the direction of their struggle and criticism: to direct their fire at the newly formed non-Communist establishment, the new organs of power, or, as the left-wing press puts it, the new nomenklatura.

But this is an aberration, gentlemen! Democracy has still not grown strong and its opponents are powerful. Yuriy Orlov, once a prominent dissident of ours who now lives in the West and represents the interests of the "Democratic Russia" movement abroad, assesses the situation far more accurately, I think. He believes that the gravest danger to society comes from neo-Stalinism. I would even say from neobolshevism, meaning here not just those communist fundamentalists, orthodox communists, and others who have been temporarily eclipsed. The desire for the "strong hand" capable of "instilling order" is a widespread phenomenon in our society. But that is bolshevism—our national curse. Berdyayev has shown its roots well.

Bolshevism, in Yu. Orlov's opinion, must be opposed primarily by "Democratic Russia" and the "Movement for Democratic Reforms." They are natural allies in the struggle against the right-wing danger. But once again some people are impatiently waiting for these two movements to clash and to prove that one is the true grassroots movement while the other comes from the top, the nomenklatura. What is all this for? The first elections will sort everything out.

Society today is being subjected to a stern test of maturity. After the August revolution fate gave us an opportunity, a most rare historical opportunity for civilized development without new revolutions, bloodshed, and destruction. Let us take advantage of it!

As for the democratic forces, they, it seems to me, face several major problems. In the first place, to unite their ranks and leave the trial of strength until later. Second, they must try to find a difficult solution to a dual task: On the one

hand, they must do everything to strengthen democratic power so that it is not crushed and, on the other, not allow that power to take the path of antidemocratism, abuses, and so forth. Third, democracy, as is well known, means not just the right to express and do whatever is not forbidden by law but also high responsibility. In this acute crisis period that the country is experiencing, we must think three times about the consequences of what we say and do before using this right. In other words, I urge democrats to show a certain self-restraint.

One final point. We still often discuss the situation in the country as though it were the old USSR. But it no longer exists. The situation in our former republics varies. Here, too, there is often a substitution taking place. We speak about democrats where it is not they but the nationalists who set the pace. We describe them all en bloc as democrats. Let us differentiate. Because under the cloak of those whom we continue through inertia to call democrats we can already see the hog's snout of fascism, narrow-minded nationalism, and so forth.

The word "democrats" in our country has become almost sacred. Do not dare say anything against it. But I still believe that understanding will soon dawn: For real democracy it is still necessary to create the preconditions in the socioeconomic and spiritual spheres. I do not rule out the objective fact that the postcommunist stage of development in the majority of republics will not yet be democratic. And for objective reasons. Neocommunist still does not mean democratism. Otherwise, the whole world would be democratic today. In fact, democracies are still small islands in a sea of authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

Transcripts of Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov Interrogations Published

924B0036A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Oct 91
Union edition p 7

[Report: "State of Emergency in the Committee for State Emergency;" this is an IZVESTIYA translation of materials published in the 7 October issue of DER SPIEGEL]

[Text] In its 7 October issue, DER SPIEGEL, the influential German weekly, published the minutes of the interrogation of the members of the GKChP [Committee for State Emergency], obtained, according to the weekly's editors, "through their own private channels." IZVESTIYA is reprinting the text of these minutes retranslated from the German. This, naturally, will not exclude some differences with the original text. We hope that the readers will show some tolerance, for our editors have had no access to the originals of the minutes.

Interrogation of Dmitriy Yazov, 22 August

[Interrogator] This interrogation is conducted by Leganov and Sychev. We are recording the testimony of Marshal Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, former USSR minister of defense.

Yazov sighs.

[Interrogator] I must inform you that you are being interrogated in connection with your participation in a crime which we qualify as treason to the homeland, conspiracy with a view to the seizure of power, and abuse of official position. Now I would like to hear what you have to say about these charges.

[Yazov] I do not conceal that my concept of what means treason to the homeland is somewhat different. Betrayal of the president perhaps, but I did not betray my homeland, my country. I have known Gorbachev for many years. We worked together and we jointly resolved many problems.

[Interrogator] This interrogation is being recorded on a Panasonic camcorder. We are interrogating the marshal at the Senezh Sanatorium, Solnechnogorskiy Rayon, near Moscow. The interrogation began on 22 August 1991, at 11:20 am.

[Yazov] I personally feel a great deal of sympathy for Gorbachev. The reasons for which I acted against the supreme commander in chief of our Armed Forces had to be quite serious. Negative feelings developed in many people, including myself. I explain this with the fact that the living standard of our people declined, the economy collapsed, ethnic conflicts became increasingly aggravated, along with conflicts among republics.... Debates broke out in some circles of our party leadership. Gradually, the idea ripened that Gorbachev had, strictly speaking, exhausted his possibilities as an active state leader. It was felt in some circles that he was either very tired or else it seemed as though he had lost his guidelines. His economic policy was expressed in the fact that he kept cadging off loans, incurring debts, while doing very little for the economy inside the country. We discussed this matter with Mikhail Sergeyevich at the Central Committee, and at Supreme Soviet sessions. However, the line of solving economic problems through foreign policy continued. Both he and his cabinet virtually ignored internal problems. Our economic mechanism had become totally worn out. The country, meanwhile, was on the brink of collapse. The Union treaty was scheduled to be signed on 20 August.... Personally I, and many other comrades with whom I had talked, suddenly clearly realized that we were unavoidably facing the breakdown of the Union. Everyone was in favor of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; all of a sudden, there was the draft Union treaty which was speaking of sovereign states!

We were convinced that this was not a matter of some simple error but a purposeful action, the result of which would be that there would be no Union whatsoever but only a confederation of republics with their own presidents.

[Interrogator] Let us once again go back to the problem. You were appointed minister of defense not without Gorbachev's support. Yet you suddenly made the decision to overthrow him. You had sworn an oath to the president, the parliament, and the people. You have now

briefly described your reasons. What led you to the belief that the president should be deprived of his power? And in violation of the constitution at that.

[Yazov] I never reached the conclusion that the president should be deprived of his powers. I see my guilt in this crime in the fact that all of this became possible thanks to my participation. I could have prevented this, and I should have probably informed the president about all of this. On Sunday 18 August we decided that five people would fly out to him to discuss with him his voluntary resignation and that his functions should be assumed by Vice President Yanayev. Unfortunately, I did not know Yanayev and simply supported all of this without entering into the details. I now greatly regret all this. This was a rather gross error.

[Interrogator] This sounds quite naive for a statesman such as the minister of defense.

[Yazov] In the past as well we had been meeting in various places, and frequently discussed such matters. This was most frequently done in the presence of Comrades Kryuchkov, Baklanov, and Boldin. We discussed the situation in the country, the breakdown of the party and the economy, the debts we were incurring, the gradual impoverishment of the people, and the fact that someone should be held responsible for all this and assume the leadership of the people and the country. Unwittingly, we came to the conclusion that the president was to be blamed for this, for he had distanced himself from the party and, according to some, had betrayed the Armed Forces....

[Interrogator] Could you tell us who specifically said this?

[Yazov] No, these were simply discussions. Everyone agreed that in recent years Gorbachev had taken frequent trips abroad and we often lacked information as to what important matters he discussed there. For example, what was the content of the speech which Gorbachev delivered in London, at the meeting of the "seven?" We had no precise knowledge about what he had said there. In the past, at least such matters were always discussed within the Politburo, the Presidential Council or the Security Council.

[Interrogator] Was it any better than in the past, when everything was openly discussed?

[Yazov] Yes, perhaps this may not have been constructive, but nonetheless everything was resolved within the collective. But when only one person makes decisions, then.... Naturally, we were not prepared to become even more dependent on the United States politically, economically, and militarily.

[Interrogator] What decision did you reach?

[Yazov] There was neither conspiracy nor a plan. We gathered on Saturday....

[Interrogator] Who organized the gathering?

[Yazov] Kryuchkov.

[Interrogator] Where did you meet?

[Yazov] At one of the military locations in Moscow, at the far end of Lenin Prospekt, to the left of the GAI [State Automotive Inspectorate] post. There is a street there.... It was simply that by the end of the working day Kryuchkov rang up and said: "There is something we must discuss." So I went. Then came Shenin, and then Baklanov.... It was there that this thing began: should we go see Gorbachev and talk with him?

[Interrogator] Why the hurry? Was it not because of the forthcoming signing of the Union treaty?

[Yazov] Naturally, because we were dissatisfied with this plan and we knew that the state would break down. I said that I would provide an airplane with which five people would fly out of Chkalovskaya. Shenin, Varennikov, Boldin, Plekhanov, and Baklanov. Plekhanov was the person familiar with the entire security system down there. I already knew that Kryuchkov had instructed him to replace the entire guard.

[Interrogator] For what purpose?

[Yazov] To try to persuade him and, should he not agree, decisive measures would have to be taken.

[Interrogator] Who thought of all this: to fly there, to persuade, then to interrupt the communications system, and to replace the bodyguards?

[Yazov] I believe that this was a collective decision. In general, I was always somewhat skeptical as to whether something should be done at all. I had my doubts. When they returned, we were in the Kremlin, in Prime Minister Pavlov's office.

[Interrogator] And so you, Pavlov, and who else? Was Yanayev present?

[Yazov] Yes, he arrived at about 7:00 or 8:00, i.e., after they had returned. They came at about 2100 hours.... A committee was set up after the envoys had returned from Gorbachev with a rather dour expression on their faces. He had virtually kicked them out. In his discussion with them, he said: Well, you must decide for yourselves what it is that you want. When they announced that they were practically played out and that the idea could not be carried out, it became clear that Yanayev had to sign the document. Since Gorbachev was not sick, we had to start by announcing that he was. At that point we realized that our previous plan had failed.

[Interrogator] How did the Committee for State Emergency appear?

[Yazov] We were in Pavlov's premises. At around 9:00 Yanayev showed up, followed by Lukyanov, who had flown in. He had been summoned but had been on leave. Lukyanov said that he cannot become a member of any

committee. I, he said, am chairman of the Supreme Soviet. This is a legislative body which must be obeyed by one and all. The only thing that I can do is issue a declaration that the Constitution has been violated, and which, in any case, would challenge the signing of a Union treaty.... By then Yanayev was quite drunk, i.e., he was cheered up somewhat.

[Interrogator] Was Kryuchkov also drunk?

[Yazov] Pugo, I, and Kryuchkov. We told Pugo: We sent people but Gorbachev made them wait for a full hour before receiving them. He has with him now a doctor with a vaccine or something of that nature. And if Gorbachev would now agree, for a while Yanayev would assume the presidential functions.

[Interrogator] And if not?

[Yazov] That which you are referring to now—removal, liquidation, or something of that kind, that was never mentioned. At around 2300 hours we were joined by Bessmertnykh, the minister of foreign affairs. He said: "If you include me, that would mean the end of all foreign affairs." At about midnight, or 12:30 am, I was already home, in Bakovka. I got up at 5:30 and went to work.

[Interrogator] Had you already been able to give some orders?

[Yazov] No, in the evening I gave no order at all before the documents had been signed. As of 6:00 am the telecenter was no longer operational. We sent our sub-units there. This was at about 6:00 am.

[Interrogator] Why?

[Yazov] It was necessary to announce that a Committee for State Emergency had been established and there may have been people who would not agree with this.

[Interrogator] Did you not want to determine what the reaction of the population would be? Would the population be scared? This might have solved the problem.

[Yazov] No. To have two divisions in a city of 10 million and to rely on the fact that everyone would be immediately scared would have been naive.

[Interrogator] From the purely psychological viewpoint, it was precisely the act of bringing in troops that would make the people doubt that Gorbachev was truly ill and that the document is genuine.

[Yazov] Our president is invincible and bringing troops in was also probably a mistake. False rumors broke out: that someone was exaggerating the condition of the president, someone was manipulating him. Perhaps this was the reason for which we undertook this entire action, this adventure.

[Interrogator] You probably relied on the fact that all of this will be accepted and that you will be supported without anyone asking whether this was constitutional.

[Yazov] Yes, subconsciously we thought so.

[Interrogator] Did you at that point realize that you had become entangled in an affair from which you should pull out?

[Yazov] Yes, naturally. At that point I began to make some preparations. Strictly speaking, all of this was getting out of hand. It was announced that we would meet twice daily yet we met only once. On the next morning I did not attend at all.

[Interrogator] You mean on 21 August?

[Yazov] Yes, yesterday. I started pulling my troops out.

[Interrogator] If you had already realized after the press conference that you had gone too far and had committed a crime, why did you continue? I am referring to the bringing in of tanks on the night of the 20th, declaring a curfew, and appointing a city commandant.

[Yazov] It just happened. Let us speak frankly, and I always speak frankly: When a state of emergency was proclaimed, the rumor that this will be followed by curfew became widespread. It was only on the following day that that vice president, that same Yanayev, declared a state of emergency. However, when a state of emergency was declared I appointed General Kalinin city commandant. He needed entirely different forces and facilities, for a state of emergency and a curfew are two different things. It so happened that it was only on the evening of the 20th that he was able to order the curfew. This requires additional forces and all of this had to be accomplished in a pouring rain and with the politization of the people.

[Interrogator] Who could have recommended to Yanayev to proclaim a curfew? Yanayev is not in the military. Be honest about it.

[Yazov] I am speaking honestly. You are insisting on this after each one of your questions, whereas I am always answering you honestly. He proclaimed a state of emergency in Moscow, while Kalinin, as the commandant, proclaimed the curfew.

[Interrogator] On whose recommendation?

[Yazov] On my recommendation.

[Interrogator] Was it your recommendation to disperse the forces which were defending the White House? The official reason given was the following: by 2300 hours everyone should disperse and go home.

[Yazov] There were 70,000 people there.

[Interrogator] Yet tanks were rolling in the city.

[Yazov] They were moving but I forbid the use of firearms. All they were supposed to do was block the streets.

[Interrogator] This is like lighting a match standing by a powder keg. An unforeseen accident could have happened.

[Yazov] Who could have imagined that bottles with inflammatory liquids could be thrown from this underground passage? They had erected barricades made of buses.... There were five or six BTR [armored troop carriers] trapped in the underground passage.

[Interrogator] Were troops being replaced, such as, for example, those which were facing the White House? Was this not because the military servicemen were in touch with the people and had already become politically unreliable?

[Yazov] A battalion from the Tula Division was there and its commander was a former commander of that division and a personal friend of Yeltsin. He withdrew the battalion, in order to ease the situation and to restore calm.

[Interrogator] Who replaced him?

[Yazov] Another subunit from the same division. However, they could not stay there all the time, they needed food and sleep. Therefore, replacements had been planned. At the beginning of the second day, I saw that large quantities of vodka, entire buses of it, were being supplied to them. It was thus that efforts were being made to make them fail to do their duty. Just imagine: drunks in a BTR, this becomes an entirely different threat.

[Interrogator] When did you realize that the putsch or the coup....

[Yazov] How could this be described as a coup d'etat? We told Yanayev: This must be a joke, was it not? At the end of the press conference this would be presented as some kind of a joke. In order to calm the people down he said that Mikhail Sergeyevich was his friend and that when he gets well he would resume his functions.

[Interrogator] And at that point you decided to withdraw the forces and, as of yesterday, for all practical purposes you started to repent?

[Yazov] Yes, my God, early in the morning I ordered the withdrawal of the troops and also to provide help in dismantling the barricades, to put finally an end to this disgrace. On my own free will and by my own decision I initiated the withdrawal of the troops, knowing that one does not play such jokes on the people.

[Interrogator] And now tell us please, honestly: Was everything planned in such a way that the people would accept all of this in silence?

[Yazov] I believe that this would have never happened. I am telling this to you honestly.

[Interrogator] Again the same question: Had the people swallowed this, what would you have done with Gorbachev later?

[Yazov] I believe that at that point once again we would have established communications and restored him to his functions. For those who had assumed such functions would have been unable to implement them.

[Interrogator] But how could a person whose honor had been so gravely insulted, who had been detained with his entire family, have been able to carry on?

[Yazov] This is a legitimate question. To me now this is pure torture.

[Interrogator] You should have thought about this situation before it happened.

[Yazov] We did not think of this either in terms of the immediate or the distant future.

[Interrogator] Had all of this happened, was it not necessary to consider what to do with Gorbachev next?

[Yazov] No one thought about it. My view was that Gorbachev should be brought back.

[Interrogator] So that you could convince him?

[Yazov] I was not anticipating this but hoped that it would happen.

[Interrogator] In that case how could you have then won the sympathy of the people?

[Yazov] We were hoping that some goods would be found, that there would be some reserves, stocks, for which reason we especially summoned Shcherbakov. He said the following: "That which you want does not exist. All of it may be found in the Union republics, but here it is totally lacking. For one thing, we do not have such goods, and for another, we could not obtain credit. In five days we would start howling like wolves."

[Interrogator] What was the reason for Pavlov's illness?

[Yazov] I think that it was alcohol abuse. He may have done this deliberately in order to pull out of the game. I saw him on two or three occasions. He was drunk as a lord. When he rang me up I sensed this from the tone of his voice. He said: "Arrest everyone." This was after the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, i.e., on the evening of the 19th.

[Interrogator] Generally speaking, why did you concoct all this?

[Yazov] This is always the case with adventures: there is no plan, there are no preparations, and it was a good thing that we had no plan and that everything collapsed. Whatever happens to us now we shall go through with it, whether they put us in front of a firing squad, hang us, or torture us. This is better than the shame which could

have followed. Not one of those involved in this coup d'etat was on the job: one was sick, the other was drunk....

[Interrogator] Let us now draw the curtains. We must do this, as a possible safety measure.

[Yazov] Does anyone think that an attack may be launched?

[Interrogator] We do not know. However, provocations must not be excluded. Perhaps the object of a provocation may be to free you?

[Yazov] They should have thought of it earlier.

[Interrogator] How do you see your role now?

[Yazov] I wish I could vanish beneath the earth. I feel infinitely unhappy. I would like to ask both Gorbacheva and Mikhail Sergeyevich for their forgiveness. I realize my guilt to the people. The only thing which could be done now is to do everything possible so that no one in the Armed Forces would repeat this stupidity. Let me say that this should be a lesson to us all.

[Interrogator] I would like to believe that all of you have realized the dramatic situation into which you led the country.

[Yazov] I cannot deny the fact that during that period the defense of our country was not at its best, when the president and supreme commander in chief was deprived of communications and information and was unable to transmit such information himself.

[Interrogator] Are the missile troops and everything else now once again in order?

[Yazov] Yes, all the codes are with the General Staff and with the supreme commander in chief of the missile forces; all equipment and systems, since 10:00 am, are in the hands of Gorbachev. The missile forces and the strategic and civil anti-aircraft and the Navy, not one of them had in any way anything to do with this adventure. They were unaware of the circumstances and were not even in touch with us.

[Interrogator] You now have the opportunity to send a message to President Gorbachev.

[Yazov] In November I will have been in the Armed Forces for 50 years. And I, an old fool, participated in this adventure. I now regret and realize what nightmare I have caused you. I regret it now. Probably it is too late, considering that I put troops on the streets of Moscow. I

know that you are a good-hearted person and you will show as much understanding as possible. I have fought and been wounded twice. I would like to beg of you not to be court martialed but simply to let me go. I condemn this adventure. I shall condemn to the end of my life what I caused you, our country, and our people.

Interrogation of Vladimir Kryuchkov, 22 August

[Interrogator] Please describe in detail when and under what circumstances was the decision made to fly to the Crimea to see the president?

[Kryuchkov] We intended to tell Gorbachev frankly that after he had gone on leave, we had reached the conclusion that the country was paralyzed. For example, the crops were not being harvested. This applied to the sugar beets as well. There was total irresponsibility and no procurements and unless instant measures would be taken to stabilize our state, we could expect that the state would soon collapse. We wanted to inform him. Furthermore, we wanted to hear Gorbachev's views, and after which we thought that stabilization steps should be taken. These were harsh measures which we intended to suggest. However, we saw no other way. We wanted to do everything possible for the workers to have work and for fewer enterprises to be closed down. We believed that the situation was so critical that to wait until September-October was impossible. We intended to tell Gorbachev to resign for a while and inform him when subsequently he could come back....

[Interrogator] You wanted to ask him to announce his resignation.

[Kryuchkov] So that, for a while, he would delegate his powers to Vice President Yanayev. However, we knew that Gorbachev would rather....

According to Article 127, point 7, he could delegate his authority to someone else.

[Interrogator] Therefore, it was not a question of some kind of illness. Was it that Gorbachev refused to delegate his powers to anyone else?

[Kryuchkov] He said that we could try but that nothing would come of it. He also said that he was not feeling too well. At this point, naturally, no one could claim to be feeling well.

We cut off communications in order to establish order, as we saw it, and strengthen security on the shore.

[Interrogator] To hear you talk, all this sounds somewhat naive: as though a few adolescents had gathered and decided to play a game.

[Kryuchkov] Cutting off communications and removing him from his position are in themselves criminal acts as per the Criminal Code.

[Interrogator] And assuming that Gorbachev would not agree....

[Kryuchkov] In that case we were prepared to discuss this once again in Moscow.

[Interrogator] Who informed Gorbachev that communications were cut off and that the guards had been changed?

[Kryuchkov] They were not. We had agreed only on strengthening security.... The area is small.

[Interrogator] Was isolating Gorbachev specifically discussed?

[Kryuchkov] I am repeating this once again, the area is small and it was easy to isolate him.

[Interrogator] Could he have gone to Moscow or Kiev, had he so wished?

[Kryuchkov] No, if he wanted to do so he could not have, either on the 19th or the 20th.

[Interrogator] To put it bluntly, he was isolated.

[Kryuchkov] Of course, yes.

[Interrogator] Why are we beating about the bush?

[Kryuchkov] Yes, by then we had blocked communications and isolated him quite well; we restricted his freedom of movement to that territory.

[Interrogator] Who made this decision?

[Kryuchkov] All of us.

[Interrogator] What about your own establishment in particular? Did you instruct Plekhanov?

[Kryuchkov] Yes, I personally did.

[Interrogator] How were communications interrupted?

[Kryuchkov] I issued an order to the chief of administration.

[Interrogator] When did you give this order?

[Kryuchkov] On the evening of the 18th.

[Interrogator] That was Anatoliy Georgiyevich Lyabeda. Did this inform him of what was happening?

[Kryuchkov] No, it did not. We told him to interrupt communications, and nothing else.

[Interrogator] Was he obliged to obey this order?

[Kryuchkov] Naturally, he was. That was his duty.

[Interrogator] But in this case this was about the president, the supreme commander in chief.

[Kryuchkov] He had my order and he had to obey it.

[Interrogator] Was that according to his instructions? He should have probably turned to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet or to someone else.

[Kryuchkov] No, in such cases my order is sufficient....

[Interrogator] You said that you spoke with Gorbachev, described the situation to him, and that initially the discussion was quite sharp.

[Kryuchkov] We suggested to him to proclaim a state of emergency, to surrender his powers to Yanayev, and eventually resume his position. His reaction to this was rather violent. He then calmed down but held on to his views, saying that he will never agree to this. It was not a question of depriving him entirely of his presidential powers. This is quite important: in not even a single discussion was this mentioned....

[Interrogator] Are you referring to physical elimination?

[Kryuchkov] What are you talking about? We never even conceived of what you have in mind, nor did we discuss it. There was not even a question of this. Gorbachev was to live. When we started discussing Yanayev, all of us could quite well imagine that he would stay in power for a very short time. We knew in advance that if matters reached the point of confrontation or something of the sort, we would immediately have to resign or adopt an entirely different approach.

[Interrogator] Were there any oral or written orders to storm the White House? Did you initiate any talks with Yeltsin's people at all?

[Kryuchkov] Our GKChP took no steps whatsoever, no actions of any sort against the Russian leadership and Russia. We realized that no force of any kind would be useful there.

[Interrogator] Were any efforts made to prevent Yeltsin from returning to Moscow from his dacha?

[Kryuchkov] Not at all. We knew that he had left and although we were not watching him, we knew what was happening.

[Interrogator] Were your Armed Forces activated?

[Kryuchkov] In Moscow we strengthened security at the Kremlin. We had already done this on the 19th.... We were not prepared. On the morning of the 19th we did not issue any orders. All of this was postponed for later. And to the best of our knowledge nothing was issued on the 19th. We did this later. You are now saying that the people were against, and so on. The people reacted in two ways. The first reaction was like a feeling of trust, of awakening hope: the call for strike was not followed by the people. Somewhere there were four mines striking, in the Komi Republic, and near Sverdlovsk. The country reacted much more calmly than one could imagine. The next day, however, the situation worsened. Again, in industry, matters did not go so far as to strike and it was only a matter of holding meetings. The biggest meeting occurred in Leningrad, and this makes sense, whereas Moscow's reaction was weaker. In Moscow there were no more than about 160,000 demonstrators.

[Interrogator] At any point was there a secret or oral order issued to put the Russian leadership under detention?

[Kryuchkov] No, there was nothing of the sort.

[Interrogator] You were called on the phone by the Russian leadership.

[Kryuchkov] And I can now repeat my answer. First: We knew that there were some armed people in the White House. I cannot tell you the number now, you will find this out. These people had come motivated by their own good will and I believe that their actions were proper. However, there also were people who simply wanted to make use of the situation for their own purposes.

[Interrogator] Did the Russian government or the parliament ask you to strengthen security?

[Kryuchkov] No, the militia should have been asked and we had no people there. However, we were receiving constant telephone calls that the storming was about to begin. I kept answering: sleep calmly and let other people sleep....

[Interrogator] People were surrounding the White House defending the building. Why would they show such concern?

[Kryuchkov] Yes, shots were fired at the BTR. Had no such shots been fired, the tanks would not have fired back.

[Interrogator] This is not my question. You are anticipating.

[Kryuchkov] It is you who are anticipating. I believe that it would be better if we continue this in the form of questions and answers. On the 21st all military ordnance was withdrawn from Moscow.

[Interrogator] Why?

[Kryuchkov] Because we saw that this could lead to a major confrontation. On the 21st, in any case, we wanted to avoid any aggravation of the situation.

[Interrogator] But could this not be interpreted as follows: you saw that your intentions had failed entirely?

[Kryuchkov] There was no total failure. It became clear once again that order is order, and that order can be established. All enterprises were functioning. The proclamation of a state of emergency proved to all of us that no state of emergency could be instituted anywhere, either in Central Asia or in the republics. We were telephoned from the republics and asked: Do we have a state of emergency? To which I answered: If the situation is calm there is no need for it.

Interrogation of Valentin Pavlov, 30 August

[Interrogator] Valentin Sergeyevich, do you consider yourself guilty of the charges filed against you?

[Pavlov] No.

[Interrogator] Why?

[Pavlov] Above all because there was no conspiracy whatsoever. Therefore one cannot argue as to whether it was criminal or not. If something of that nature had happened, I knew nothing about it.

I did not need any more power than the power I already had. The president probably knows that it was my very strong wish to give up this power.

After the prices rose in April, on 22 April, on the day marking Lenin's birth and death, Gorbachev told me: I too will probably soon be standing on Red Square carrying a placard saying "Down with Pavlov!"

To this I answered: "And I will be standing next to you with a placard: 'Thank you very much my president.'" It was in such a jocular manner that I expressed on several occasions my wish to resign, and the president frequently told me: "I know that you want to leave."

On the other hand, after the meeting of that committee, I was not given any power in addition to the one I already had....

When the president is absent, his functions are assumed by the vice president. When we saw the president off on leave, in the presence of many people he told Vice President Yanayev: "You stay here and you are in charge of everything."

Since, in any case, prior to the meeting of the Supreme Soviet Yanayev was interim president, as prime minister, as had been the case in the past, I had to obey the instructions of the interim president. Therefore, in this case there was no violation of the Constitution whatsoever.

Yanayev also said that he is assuming the functions of the president only until the meeting of the Supreme Soviet or else the president's return. Sunday evening we discussed the fact that it was necessary to convene the Supreme Soviet on Tuesday. We, Yanayev and others, made this suggestion to Lukyanov. His answer was that for purely technical reasons this was impossible, and that in all likelihood the meeting would be held on the 16th (of September). At that point everything would be resolved. We nonetheless said: "If it is impossible on Tuesday, this must be done at the latest on Wednesday." This means that, having created the committee, we thought that we needed two or three days to convene the Supreme Soviet. At that point that would have automatically constituted a legitimate step. Either the committee will be in power or else the Supreme Soviet would determine what other steps were necessary.

During the meeting at which this committee was formed, I developed a very violent headache, my blood pressure went up and I took some medicine. The pills were "Valimiton" or something like this, it is a medicine which I regularly take and always carry with me.

In the course of those rather sharp debates, they brought us more coffee and some alcohol. After a while I must have lost unconsciousness. My bodyguards told me that I was taken out of the room where I was resting on a sofa. Therefore, to say the least, I could not move without help. I was carried out to the car. I was simply not able to participate in the debates or the decisions. My only action was that on Monday evening, with the help of my physicians, I was able to attend the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers. At that meeting the people were to tell us what they wanted. However, in any case my state of health was not the best. This is the truth. I would also like to draw attention to the fact that I had heard nothing about any bringing in of troops, storming the White House or anything of that kind, or else of stripping the Russian leadership of its power. If any kind of discussion had been held on this subject, in general I would have been unable to understand it.

[Interrogator] To listen to you, the conclusion is that you absolutely deny any guilt on your part.

[Pavlov] Possibly, but I am being blamed.

[Interrogator] How do you explain this?

[Pavlov] At the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers I said: "No confrontation, no closing down of enterprises, no bloodshed, no looting on the streets and stores should be allowed." I could have and I should have assumed a more active stance. I could have also joined the other side, the one which was defending the White House.

[Interrogator] At that point you would have been one of the defenders of the White House.

[Pavlov] Probably. In the afternoon, as my physician told me, he tried to make me functional, and if you are aware of this then you can imagine that, strictly speaking, this means a blood pressure of 200 over 100.

I repeat: My only justification is my state of health.

[Interrogator] What follows from your previous testimony is that you were aware of the fact that the president had refused to yield to the pressure applied on him.

[Pavlov] The group which returned from the Crimea reported the following: "Today the president is unable to do anything whatsoever. And he has refused to sign anything. He is legally incapacitated and one cannot even talk with him." That is what they said.

Among others, they told us that they had to wait for more than one hour before he would see them, which gave them the opportunity to see his family which seemed in a state of severe shock, as is most frequently the case when someone in the family is gravely ill. There were physicians with him. It was only after the doctors left that he was.... He was not in good shape. He told Plekhanov (the commander of his bodyguards) to go away. He did not want to talk to him at all. He was raving, and Plekhanov was simply forced to leave the premises. It was simply impossible to talk to him. He was

not in good shape, he did not behave like a normal person. For that reason he signed nothing.

[Interrogator] How should I interpret what you said last Friday: "It was reported to me that the president had categorically refused to sign any kind of document relative to the state of emergency?"

[Pavlov] The members of that group said that, in general, it was impossible to talk to him. In other words, he was not in a condition to talk. For that reason we said that he was now ill.... They reported that it was impossible to have a calm discussion with him at present. Therefore, it was necessary for us to make our own decisions for a while. After his return, on the 20th or the 21st, everything would fall in place again. That is the way we saw the situation.

[Interrogator] Who among the participants said: "With this trip we have naturally revealed everything. Anyone who is present here now, is involved in it. We must now make a decision. It was then decided that since we had gone that far, we had to go farther and give all power to Yanayev, and so on." Am I rightly interpreting this?

[Pavlov] In such a situation I had to trust Boldin, who was the head of the presidential office. This was not the first time that the president had not reacted immediately. He always needed for things to be repeated two or three times before he was ready to make a decision. In the final account, we learned of his decisions from Boldin. Naturally, I had to trust Boldin, who claimed that it was impossible to explain anything to the president.

[Interrogator] Did this mean that the president had to be stripped of his powers?

[Pavlov] No, we did not make a decision to this effect.

[Interrogator] Why not? If a State of Emergency Committee was being set up and the power was being turned over to Yanayev?

[Pavlov] If the doctors were saying that he was in poor health and incapacitated, what was I supposed to do? People had come, who had always worked with the president, saying that he was now incapacitated. He made us wait a full hour while the physicians were with him, and so on. Eventually he would be cured, and at that point we shall report to him all of this, once again. For the time being, we must make decisions ourselves and take over. At his return, then....

[Interrogator] What kind of decision was this, to deprive him of his powers?

[Pavlov] We are fulfilling our functions when there is no president, when he is sick, or when he is absent....

[Interrogator] Did you try to call the president?

[Pavlov] Personally, I was not in a condition to do so, for in the middle of that session I was already on laying on

my back and did not participate in it. In other words, I could not call him for purely physical reasons.

[Interrogator] Did you drink any alcohol or coffee in the afternoon?

[Pavlov] No, no.

[Interrogator] Although your bodyguards tell us something quite different.

[Pavlov] What I mean is that we had some coffee and some alcohol. I now know that this was whiskey, for there was a bottle of whiskey on the table. I probably drank some.

[Interrogator] Had you had the opportunity to speak with Gorbachev, would you be able to look him straight in the eye?

[Pavlov] I would have probably asked his forgiveness for what was done....

[Interrogator] Nevertheless, was there an attempt to seize the power?

[Pavlov] I am firmly convinced that no one intended to deprive the president of his powers. This is an entirely different matter. We tried to convince the president that decisive steps should be taken. The fact that Yanayev intended to assume the powers of the president was believed by no one.

Coup Leaders' Attorneys on DER SPIEGEL Interrogation Transcripts

*PM1810153191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 16 Oct 91 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with putschists' defense attorneys A. Galogonov, N. Pechenkin, A. Gofshteyn, G. Padva, and Yu. Ivanov by N. Belan; date and place of interview not stated; first two paragraphs are introduction: "Attorneys Read the Interrogation Records. Material Published in DER SPIEGEL Gives Them the Right To Express Dissent"]

[Text] There have been widely differing assessments of the scandal over the mysterious handover of a video film showing the interrogations of three members of the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] to the German magazine DER SPIEGEL. But what do the arrestees' defense attorneys think about it? Unfortunately, I was unable to see all of them, I only met with V. Pavlov's attorney A. Galogonov, D. Yazov's attorney N. Pechenkin, and A. Lukyanov's defense attorneys A. Gofshteyn and G. Padva. I also got through on the telephone to V. Kryuchkov's attorney Yu. Ivanov, but for various reasons at present I am not entitled to report this conversation in its entirety.

And so let us listen to the attorneys' opinions. This is especially important since, as Russian Justice Minister N. Fedorov stated, in any country where legal procedure

and criminal proceedings are respected, this affair would be a most decisive trump card in the hands of defense attorneys battling to ensure there is no conviction.

[Belan] Thanks to DER SPIEGEL, the records of three interrogations—of D. Yazov, V. Kryuchkov, and V. Pavlov—have been widely publicized. But are you familiar with the investigation documents in their entirety?

[Galoganov] I was present at the interrogation of Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov, the stenographic record of which we read in the newspapers. By that time I had already taken part in interrogations. And it seems strange that the published stenographic record is incomplete. In particular, I can see none of the questions I put to Pavlov. What can this mean—either the videotape given to DER SPIEGEL was somehow doctored appropriately, or DER SPIEGEL did not give the full story, or else IZVESTIYA carried an abridged version when it reprinted from the German magazine. I cannot say whom this would benefit, but a fact is a fact.

To me personally there is a lot that seems strange in the published interrogation records. Like the fact that the defense attorneys are seeing them thanks to German journalists. After all, none of us defense attorneys possesses the investigation documents in their entirety. How many times have we spoken about this: We need to know the documents in order to ensure a normal defense, but...

[Pechenkin] What I noticed is this. Since D. Yazov appears in the video first in uniform, and then in a light blue tracksuit, presumably another video recording of Dmitriy Timofeyevich's interrogation exists, and therefore I think we should wait until it is published.

I have heard that Yazov was supposed to have had another attorney before me, but admittedly this is news to Dmitriy Timofeyevich. But right from the start when we set out on the case we raised the question of being given, in accordance with republic legislation, the opportunity to familiarize ourselves with all the material relating to the case, and not just the investigation materials relating to Yazov. But the Russian Prosecutor's Office takes a different stance, and this question has still not been resolved. What do we know at the present time and what have we seen? Only a minimum of material relating to Dmitriy Timofeyevich.

[Padva] I will explain the overall situation in order to clarify it. In world practice there are two basic models or systems for the way defense attorneys work. The first grants the defense attorney the right to collect material for the trial at the same time as the prosecution. That is, two independent investigations go on, as it were. In the other procedure only the prosecution conducts an investigation, and the defense attorney sees the material that has been gathered. Of course, in this case the defense has fewer rights, but these exist all the same.

[Gofshteyn] Our procedural system has absorbed only the restrictions from these two models. Therefore the material published in DER SPIEGEL was a revelation to some of us.

[Belan] And how do you view the fact that this material appeared in the Western press?

[Padva] What has happened verges upon a crime. After all, as far as I understood it, the investigation considered all this material to be secret. Even the defense attorneys were warned that they would incur criminal liability if they divulged information about the investigation.

[Galoganov] To be frank, I was prepared for the appearance of any sort of information in the press that would cast aspersions on and discredit both my client and the others. And at a press conference back in September I drew attention to this possibility, because certain representatives of the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office were giving a rather one-sided account of the progress of the investigation in speeches they were making at the time. But all the same, my amazement has exceeded all expectation. You will note that it was the defense attorneys who gave written undertakings not to divulge anything, not the investigators.

[Gofshteyn] And how well the building where they work is guarded! To get in, I have to call up investigator from the entrance, and he comes down specially and escorts me to his office. And I cannot get out of the building until the investigator escorts me out. This shows how strict the security system is.

[Padva] Therefore the whole thing is incomprehensible: If everything is so restricted, how is the leak of material to be explained? It must be one of two things: Either all this is a sham, there is in fact no secrecy at all, and all this is merely being done to deny the defense the opportunity to see the investigation documents; or a crime has occurred: Secret information has been allowed to slip through or has been sold.

[Pechenkin] Of course, the leaking of this material to some extent undermines the prestige of the prosecutor's office because people are very right to be puzzled by it: What sort of secret investigation is this, what sort of people are they in this investigation team, and what sort of procedure do they have there? But I think it unlikely that prosecutor's office personnel did this. I am not at all sure that the filmed material was not shown to another group of people, and this may be how the information leak took place.

[Belan] I do not want to speculate, but an interview given to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA by J. Mettke, chief of DER SPIEGEL's Moscow bureau, does much to explain the situation. The "Russian friend" who brought the video recording of the interrogations gave the following answer when Mettke asked how he had gained access to this material: "Well, it isn't at all difficult, hundreds of

people can access it... Many people have access to the place where the material is kept... You can simply drop by and watch it."

[Padva] That's right. But in any case this is a quite unprecedented incident. And the fact that the official inquiry that is meant to determine the reasons for and the sources of this leak has been entrusted to RSFSR Deputy General Prosecutor Ye. Lisov, among others, is utterly incomprehensible. After all, he is the leader of this investigation team...

[Galoganov] We think that the USSR prosecutor should tackle this inquiry. And another thing: We will certainly be submitting a petition for the possible removal both of specific investigators and, maybe, of the current investigation team. Because it is impossible to trust work done by investigators who have allowed such a major leak of information to occur. There is no guarantee that other material, and, I stress, material of a one-sided nature detrimental to our clients, will not appear in the press. Yet according to the law an investigation must be conducted fully, thoroughly, and objectively.

[Belan] In that case, how valuable is the information that was published, could it damage the defense and your clients?

[Galoganov] I hope this information will not damage my client or the defense at a later stage. But it is also impossible to take a calm view of it. What is noticeable is that somehow an attempt has certainly been made to shape public opinion (however, I do not know who is doing this; I am certainly not implying that it is the investigation) and to show the former prime minister, the former USSR KGB chairman, and the country's former defense minister in a biased light. For example, there is much talk of liquor consumption, but very little about other important aspects of their behavior.

[Pechenkin] A story is already being put about, including by the mass media, that Yazov is the only one among them who has admitted his guilt. But if we make a careful reading of the published stenographic record of the interrogation, nothing of the sort can be detected in it. Betraying the president—certainly, but Dmitriy Timofeyevich does not admit betraying the motherland. I do not know how far my client will suffer because of this publication. I do not think it will damage him particularly, his position is open and honest.

[Padva] This published material affects our client in practically the same way as it affects my colleagues' clients. It is perfectly clear even from these interrogations that the man must be released. You must understand that what is at issue here is not the position that Lukyanov took—a human and ideological one—but whether or not he took part in any criminal actions, whether he did anything unlawful. The published material confirms that he refused to join the SCSE. I am chairman, he said, of the Supreme Soviet, which is the legislative organ to which absolutely everything is subordinate. Lukyanov's behavior and his answer contradict

the SCSE statement. So why was he arrested at the time? I put the question in the following terms: Show me, just show me a single solid, convincing piece of evidence of Lukyanov's guilt. Surely it is disgraceful that the chairman of our parliament was taken into custody merely because he was under suspicion. I can understand the need for this measure if the suspect is a bandit who killed someone today and might kill someone else tomorrow. But put him under house arrest at long last in view of his state of health...

[Belan] Following the publication of these documents, do you now have more grounds for insisting that the trial should be open?

[Galoganov] If the investigation documents are published, what sense is there in hiding anything? We and our clients favor an open trial.

[Pechenkin] I do not think there are grounds at all for having a closed trial. When we discuss certain technical points relating, for example, to the president's communications system and its disconnection, then yes, there is no point in throwing open our secrets, but how long will this take at the trial? A day or two.

[Padva] Only the court can decide what sort of trial it will be. And I am amazed that certain ranking figures are discussing this issue. As soon as people talk about a closed trial, it means that there is a desire to hide something from the public. Those times are past now. People should know and draw their own conclusions about what happened in August. After all, it is no accident that Lukyanov is staying silent at the present time. First, it is his protest against what is happening at the moment. Second, he is remaining silent because whenever proceedings are held in camera, there can be no guarantee of true justice. If there is a public trial, everyone will be able to hear Lukyanov.

[Gofshteyn] Incidentally, what has happened confirms the truth of this position. Lukyanov immediately said to the investigators: You are people I cannot trust because you are breaking the law. DER SPIEGEL's article has already shown everyone that violations are indeed occurring.

[Belan] Are your clients aware that there has been a leak of information?

[Galoganov] Of course they are, they read the newspapers and listen to the radio. Pavlov reacted calmly to this publication, although he was surprised: After all, he knows that the investigation is supposed to be secret and its documents cannot be relayed elsewhere.

[Belan] And how did you react to the investigation team's statement that the material published by the magazine had not been officially passed on to it...

[Galoganov] A leak could only have occurred from the place where this material is located.

[Belan] In his NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA interview Mettke said that the cassette was an original, not a copy...

[Ivanov] Generally speaking, this interview is strange. We get the impression that everything possible was done to reveal the source of the information. The time of the first contacts is given, as is the mechanism for handing over the the material, even the fact that someone flew to Hamburg with the video recording. So it is easy to single out a group of people among the passengers who could be suspects—after all, the tickets were not booked beforehand. Can Mettke really be that naive? There is a lot that is strange about all this.

[Padva] In my view, when we speak about possible motives for handing over the videocassette, why is there only one motive that we consider seriously, namely material gain and the chance to earn a tidy sum? After all, in a certain sense all the published evidence is not worth a penny. Yazov was interrogated without an attorney—this is a an extremely gross violation. Besides which, it has to be said that the content of these records does not stand up to criticism either. In fact they contain no information. For example, there is mention of the sharp debates that the SCSE members had. But where is the content of these sharp debates, why did the investigator not ask about it? And this is the central point. If there were debates, and sharp ones moreover, it means that some people were opposed, and some people had their own views. Why does the prosecutor's office not clarify this?..

You know, the impression that I, for example, get from this feeble interrogation is either that I am looking at incompetent investigators who do not know the normal procedure for conducting an interrogation, or else nothing is being clarified on purpose, they are giving out general information in order to kick up a fuss later. And could it be that they are giving out disinformation of some kind?

[Pechenkin] Generally speaking, leading questions which contain information in themselves are inadmissible. But this rule was hardly ever observed in full by any of the investigators. Herzen once said that it is impossible to live in Russia and not break the law. Unfortunately this continues up to the present.

[Galoganov] I think that the motive of somehow causing conflict between our clients cannot be excluded from the fact that the interrogations have been published. After all, everybody knows very well that Yazov, Kryuchkov, and Pavlov will read the newspapers. And when my client, for example, reads what Yazov says about him in the documents, then it is natural to expect a negative reaction.

This is one side of the matter. The other is that the initial interrogations were conducted without the participation of attorneys; as we know from the press, Yazov was even charged without an attorney. And he was charged under an article that carries the death penalty. There is also the

question of compliance with legality and, naturally, the question of confidence in the published stenographic records. I would adopt a critical attitude to these and would beware of assessing them.

[Belan] In which case the conclusion is as follows: It is wrong to make all this public, and especially to publish extracts even from material that has itself been published.

[Galoganov] That goes without saying. Therefore you must understand our feelings as defense attorneys. Because some people still do not understand us: What are you doing defending the members of the SCSE! We have been labeled SCSE sympathizers. But this is our profession—to come to people's aid regardless of their political convictions. Like doctors. To those who condemn us I would say: Are you sure that you will not require our help one day? After all, the popular saying that nobody is insured against beggary or jail is true. Yes, today our assessment of the fact that information has been leaked is particularly tough. More than anybody else, perhaps, we have full justification for thinking this.

Supreme Soviet Chairman Laptev Comments on CPSU, Gorbachev, Coup

924B0037A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 40, Oct 91 pp 4-5

[Supreme Soviet Chairman Laptev interviewed by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Correspondent N. Zhelnorova: "From the 'Kremlin Secrets' Series: President, Parliament, Power"]

[Text] Our correspondent N. Zhelnorova spoke with USSR People's Deputy I. Laptev.

[Zhelnorova] Ivan Dmitriyevich, please tell about how Gorbachev, at the final Congress, managed to stage a Kremlin coup—to free himself from the fetters of the Deputies.

[Laptev] On the eve of the congress, on Sunday evening, we chairmen of the chambers met with Gorbachev. There we saw for the first time the statement that had been drafted by the republics' leaders.

[Zhelnorova] Whose idea was it?

[Laptev] As I understand it, the idea was conceived by the republic Presidents and was dictated by two circumstances: the situation in the country, and the negative reaction to the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet. The republic leaders brought that reaction here, to Moscow. It essentially amounted to this: If the congress also takes a path of nothing but talk, mutual recrimination, and statements that have nothing to do with the matter at hand, society could simply explode.

[Zhelnorova] The CPSU has departed this life. This joyous phenomenon is clouded by the fact that in some areas, rank and file communists are starting to be persecuted.

[Laptev] This is a disease in which we feel compelled to combat someone, a disease we have had for a long time and from which we have only just begun to recover. God forbid that we should come down with it again. As for the collapse of the CPSU, I would put it this way: In my opinion, the CPSU collapsed long ago.

There were always three lines in the CPSU, even in the days when it was completely monolithic. The first line was the rank and file communists, who made up the majority of the party but never determined its true face or its policies. Another line was the small group of leaders who personified the party before the entire world and who, in the eyes of the people and the world, appeared to be its leaders. But the third and most important line was the apparatus, which represented communists to the leaders, the leaders to the communists, and the party to the masses. This is where the slogans were conceived and then sent downward: "We are following the sole correct path." "We are loyal Leninists." "The leader of our party is the greatest figure of modern time." And other nonsense. People became accustomed to this division and didn't notice it. But before our very eyes, another division occurred—a horizontal fragmentation of the party. When the movement to create the Russian Communist Party began, it became clear that the CPSU was approaching its end.

[Zhelnorova] Why were you so afraid of the Russian Communist Party?

[Laptev] It wasn't us who were afraid, we were simply aware of all the implications of that party's creation. For it was no accident that the apparatus pushed it through so strongly, despite Gorbachev's resistance. The party's creation pursued two objectives: to acquire a powerful means of putting pressure on Gorbachev "on behalf of Russia," and to take the republic under control "on behalf of the party." But it was already too late. The gaining of sovereignty by the union republics was followed by the gaining of sovereignty by the former autonomous entities. Republic legislation increasingly split the party. There were 40 to 50 de facto communist parties before the putsch. And while the putschists wanted to save the Communist Party, the old structures, and a single union, they achieved the opposite: The putsch dealt the final blow to those structures. But the collapse began precisely when the apparatus, in an attempt to gain control of the Russian mass of communists, tore it away from the CPSU, thereby destroying the only link that brought all the communist parties together. Apparently, the party leaders simply didn't know what kind of reality they were dealing with, and they acted according to the old patterns.

[Zhelnorova] Some say that Gorbachev changed after the putsch. But I think that at the age of 60, a person doesn't change, he simply changes his course of action.

[Laptev] It's not a matter of changing his views. His views remain the same. For if we look at all Gorbachev's

behavior over the past six years, we see a rather meandering path—but a path that still leads in one direction. As a politician, he must calculate and compare everything and rely on real strength. Up to a certain point, he saw that strength as the structures that cruelly and mercilessly let him down.

Therefore, the most important change in him, in my opinion, is an understanding that he should have moved earlier to rely on other forces. Those forces had matured to this.

[Zhelnorova] But for him, such a course of action would be humiliating, for he would have to side with those whom he had been wary of and whom he had harassed.

[Laptev] All sorts of things have happened during these past six years. He harassed them, they harassed him. He feared them, they feared him. He trusted them, they trusted him. He beguiled them, they beguiled him. He can be criticized for many things, like any real politician. But it is precisely as a real politician that he made his choice.

[Zhelnorova] And if the situation with the democrats changes and they lose their strength, will he go over to their opponents?

[Laptev] You know, only one man, if I remember correctly, has succeeded in doing that. That was Winston Churchill, who left the Conservatives for the Labor Party, and then went back to the Conservatives. That, I'm sure, is the only such example in history. And it can't happen again. Why? Because today's situation can proceed in only one direction. The democratic forces may very often argue and act in different ways, but they are headed in the same direction. And this direction must be supported. If, however, they change course and betray their nature, they will cease to be democrats, and that will be that.

[Zhelnorova] A lot of people are saying this: What kind of President is it who can't judge people, who has no personnel "instinct."

[Laptev] Surely he's not the only person who lacks that instinct. One of our unfortunate Russian habits is to think that if he's the leader, then he's smarter than everyone else, shrewder than everyone else.

[Zhelnorova] But he was told him that these were not the right people.

[Laptev] It seems to me that a systematic personnel purge had been carried out around Gorbachev for the past two years. One figure after another who linked Gorbachev with the democratic movements was dislodged. You remember the kind of fire that was trained on Shevardnadze—he was simply forced to explode. Or at Yakovlev. And how Bakatin was made to look like a culprit! The President should have both seen and known what was going on and why. But he himself has spoken about this many times now. For me, however, what happened is an example of the tenaciousness of certain

habits on the part of our leaders. When a group of people is formed to manage things, the main concern of many leaders is that the candidate understand him and not pursue his own agenda. Our notorious nomenklatura is fundamentally flawed precisely because of this kind of personnel selection, because of the principle of selecting people for political qualities and "tastes." We name to the post of USSR Minister a person with whom we are going to entrust 20 billion to 30 billion rubles a year, but a CPSU Central Committee instructor might block a shrewd manager from reaching such a post. Why? Because he, the instructor, is the starting point for everything, and the first reference came from him: "Yes, he is good, but there's something wrong politically." From there it goes to the department deputy chief, and then to the department chief. When things reach the corresponding level and it is said about a candidate that "something's wrong politically," I assure you, not a single Central Committee Secretary would dare sign the appointment.

At the same time, others were able to pass through all the "walls." The late Pugo was first secretary of a republic Communist Party Central Committee, chairman of the Party Control Committee, and a candidate member of the Politburo. Baklanov was a CPSU Central Committee Secretary and a minister. How many years did Yanayev head the Youth Organizations Committee and the trade unions? He was a Central Committee Secretary and a Politburo member. In short, these people made it through all levels, their references were impeccable. I think that the President should continue to pay primary attention above all to the system used to select personnel in our country.

[Zhelnorova] What's going on with the USSR Supreme Soviet right now, what will the new Deputies be dealing with?

[Laptev] The new Supreme Soviet is being formed with great difficulty. Some republics haven't succeeded in solving this problem even after several attempts. A Preparations Committee has now been formed on an interrepublic level, and matters concerning the next session are now being studied. The committees and commissions of the "old" Supreme Soviet are holding out the draft laws with which they had been entrusted and preparing to turn them over to new commissions and committees. As for what they will deal with and what the members of this Supreme Soviet will decide, I can say that the briefcase they will be given contains nearly 70 draft laws. The most important ones are those that set forth the basic approaches to the new forms of management and new property relations—in short, to the formation of a market. I would emphasize that we are talking precisely about basic principles, for each republic will obviously adopt its own laws on these matters; but the basic principles will become a kind of common foundation for such acts. It will also be necessary to revise previously adopted laws that deal with this sphere.

A great many social problems that have no "legal support" await consideration, and so on. As we say in Siberia, the Supreme Soviet will have more than enough work to do.

Tank General Recounts Role in Coup Failure

*LD1810165491 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT
18 Oct 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—"The armed forces did not obey orders by the 'State Emergency Committee' and sided with the people," Major-General Vladimir Chuzhikov, commander of the Kantemirovskiy Tank Division, told TASS, explaining reasons for the failure of the August coup in the Soviet Union.

On August 20, the second day of the putsch, the division was sent to Moscow together with other army units "to ensure order in connection with the introduction of a curfew".

According to the general, on that very morning, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's representatives visited him at the division temporary command post at Vorobyevy Hills in Moscow and explained the situation resulting from the putschists activities.

"This information was extremely important for me, as on August 19 I was on vacation with my family in Yalta and returned to Moscow only in the morning of August 20," Chuzhikov said.

Chuzhikov then told officers that the division will not take part in illegal actions and its command will not send tanks against its own people.

At the night of August 20, Chuzhikov ordered the pullout of tanks from Moscow. "By the morning of August 21, only a few units still remained in the capital. They left the city before noon," Chuzhikov said.

Coup Investigators Pressure Journalist To Reveal Sources

*924B0022A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Oct 91
Union Edition p 8*

[Article by V. Rudnev: "The GKChP Affair: Journalists Are Also Being Interrogated...." First paragraph, in bold font, serves as introduction. Expansion and translation of the abbreviation "GKChP" is: "State of Emergency Committee."]

[Excerpt] Usually it is we journalists who telephone an investigative team, looking for new information. This time, an investigator called IZVESTIYA and invited me to come over. When I tried to find out the nature of the proposed conversation, it turned out that I was being called in as a witness and would be interrogated on the GKChP affair.

"You do not have the right to turn down our request," I was told curtly.

And the correspondent went off to his interrogation. [passage omitted]

First came the formalities: Family name, given name, patronymic, date of birth, education, party membership, employment and position held, home address, and telephone number. Then, a warning: Answer all questions relating to this investigation and speak only the truth. Otherwise, there is a criminal liability. "Sign here."

"What do you know about the GKChP affair?"

I answered: "I know for certain only what was published by IZVESTIYA." The next question: "But you know more than what you write, don't you?" An awkward pause ensued. I had to explain to the investigator the difference between a reporter's work and an investigator's job. But the investigator did not give up:

"All professions are equal under the law. Tell us everything you know! Who said what? Where did you get the information?"

I shall, however, interrupt our tense dialogue and try to explain the essence of the problem.

We began our journalistic investigation on the GKChP affair back on August 19th, the first day of the coup, even before the investigative team started its work. By the time the criminal case was begun on August 21st, our files were already bulging with information. People are writing us even now, they come to see us, bring documents, and share their impressions and thoughts with us....

But not everything ends up in a newspaper column, of course. If we are certain of something, we print it. We continue checking some of the information. In other words, with regard to the GKChP affair, only what has been printed in the newspaper is reliable as far as we are concerned.

But now the investigator shifted from general to specific questions: "Who specifically told you this?" He was speaking about one certain piece of information published in IZVESTIYA. "What information?" "Oh, I cannot tell you that." According to the investigator this question is an investigative secret (again—a secret!), the revealing of which (my God, here, too!) is a criminal offense.

In any case, with every new question, a new problem.

Usually we newspapermen reference the source of information on publication. But sometimes we cannot do this: The information may be of a confidential nature, or else the person giving it has asked that his name not be revealed. Our relationships of trust with people are built on this. This is why journalists are told things that cannot be told to others. And sometimes we cannot reveal the source. This is not merely a moral and ethical

principle. When all is said, an editorial secret is guaranteed today by the Law on the Press. Only a court can require a journalist to reveal the name of a person who has given information under the condition that his name not be revealed.

But the investigator was persistent: "All the same, who told you this?" I can understand him: If I named that person, the investigation would reach its goal more quickly. But how about journalistic ethics? After all, I gave that person my word that I would not say anything. I proposed a compromise: I shall ask my informer to give his name himself to the investigator.

"If you do not answer," stubbornly continued the investigator, "it means that you are refusing to give evidence! This is a criminal offense."

At this point we parted. I went away to try to resolve the problem of law and conscience for myself. The investigator went off to learn about the correlation between the Law on the Press and the criminal process, so that he could renew the interrogation of the journalist at a later time.

...The investigators' work is protected by people with submachine guns. It would be interesting to know who will protect us journalists, and how?....

Workers' Alienation From CPSU Examined

924B0038A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 9 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Igor Zaramenskiy: "Workers Have Turned Away From the CPSU—But Will They Turn to Trade Unions? Or Become a Fundamental Force in the Democratic Reform Movement?"]

[Text] The working class as a social basis is the object of many political forces' desires. It represents tens of millions of people organized in collectives who are capable of determining the fate of any political leader, government, party, doctrine, course, or even social system. However, the working class is multifaceted, not just in terms of its production activities and skills levels, in vocational terms, or in terms of its awareness of its economic interests, but also in terms of the forms its uses in the struggle in which it has become engaged during the perestroika of society.

The new workers' movement, a social phenomenon of our times, has broken free of the bounds of its former uniformity and hyper-organization, and is now developing in extremely contradictory ways, from destructive strike-based protests and maximalist political demands to a conservative braking effect. From protection of narrow vocational or regional interests to powerful support for fundamental democratic, political, and economic reforms in society at large.

Before we project the social and political consequences of interaction between the workers' movement and various political schools of thought in society, let us recall the lessons of our country's most recent history: how the CPSU, the "vanguard of the working class," was rejected by the workers' movement.

How the Vanguard Position Was Lost

Today many of us in this country and abroad are surprised by the paralysis of the until recently all-powerful, millions-strong communist party. "Should it not at least make itself heard in some way, even if its leadership is paralyzed in the wake of the coup?" people ask, including those who are far removed from the communists' policy or any sympathy for them.

Actually there is nothing surprising about this. This confirms the tragic truth that a party of that nature is not viable under democratic conditions, outside of the power structures. Its structures in labor collectives and among the public have long been mired in a state of anabiosis, teary-eyed affront, or outbursts of rhetorical aggressivity. Only to bureaucrats did it seem (or they wanted it to seem) that they were "in control of the situation" and exerting an influence on it. The people, particularly the working class, had long since gone their own way.

The CPSU, which originated as the party of the working class and which declared itself the vanguard of that class, became alienated from it and lost its political influence on the workers' movement.

In order to renew itself in the course of perestroika, the CPSU had to resolve a very difficult contradiction: to overcome the gap between the working class's profound interest in reform of society and its de facto lack of confidence in the party which began the reforms. Now it is clear that the party did not succeed in resolving this contradiction.

Before August the party had a chance to preserve its position as the political vanguard of the working class. That position could only have been realized through radical changes within the party itself and through the party's once again proving able to initiate social processes, come up with a new systematic approach to the strategy and tactics of interaction with the working class, propose to the working class comprehensible and dearly held political goals, and find effective ideological methods of influence. The party did not succeed in doing so.

The scene had been set historically, in proportion to the party's degeneration from a political organization of the working class into the key component in the state administrative mechanism, into an administrative structure. In this hypostasis it met the wave of the new workers' movement which emerged during perestroika as a logical development and which regarded the party as the bureaucratic apparatus superstructure and rejected its political and intellectual patronage.

Since the CPSU in its own documents self-critically acknowledged workers' alienation from authority, then it comes as no surprise that they also became alienated from an essential attribute of authority—the party. Not to mention the totalitarian nature of an authority which blocked social and political initiatives, including the workers' movement. The spontaneous nature of the workers' movement was eliminated in the 1920's. In organizational terms the workers' movement was forcibly restricted to the framework of official trade unions, which were built with a state system of administration and became the "reins" of the party and the state.

The CPSU claimed a monopoly right to express the interests of the working class. Therefore as it asserted its independence the revitalized workers' movement from the very start assumed an identity opposed to the party, the trade unions, and the state.

Most important, of course, was the problem of economic interests. The policy of the party and the state did not serve the genuine economic interests of the working class, attempting instead to soothe it with a system of planned meager and equalizing distribution which taught parasitic attitudes, tolerated laziness and poor work, and insulted the dignity of good workers.

Thus long before perestroika a crisis was brewing in relations between the working class and the communist party. Yet party functionaries continued to console themselves with illusions.

By this time the CPSU had to a significant extent also lost its organizational ties with the working class. According to statistics workers comprised up to 45 percent of the party membership, but that figure was self-deception. The party had long been failing to recruit members from among industrial and agricultural workers who were connected with advanced technology and scientific-technical progress or who had high skills levels. These factors were not even taken into consideration in the omniscient party statistics.

The CPSU's internal crisis, the decline in its authority, the unpopularity of the government's measures, and its indecisiveness in making the transition to the market drove a significant portion of blue collar workers away from the party. In 1990 approximately one million of them terminated their CPSU membership. Subsequently this process has been proceeding even more intensively. That is why the people's voice was not raised in support of the CPSU when its activities were suspended.

Without the 'Reins'

The workers' movement loudly announced itself with a series of massive miners' strikes in the summer of 1989. As of that moment one could say that the working class had declared its independent and active entry into the processes of perestroika. The fact that that entry was so abrupt, accompanied as it was by consequences which were destructive to an ailing economy, can be explained

by spontaneity and by the acuteness of the socioeconomic situation in the coal-mining regions, as well as by the special social composition of mining collectives. Yet on the whole it was objectively justified and essential.

The inconsistency of the country's state and political leadership with regard to the conducting of reforms and mistakes made in the implementation thereof worsened the situation in industrial regions. To this one could add the inability of local organs of authority to affect the situation and the passivity of trade union organizations. All this prompted workers to undertake independent actions in the struggle for their economic, political, and social interests and rights.

The massive strikes and the decisiveness of the workers' committees served to stimulate radical perestroika of the trade unions' operations and changes in their goals and in their forms of organization and operation. The task of providing social protection for working people took top priority. It seemed that the trade unions could do this most effectively through the process of incipient destatization of property and through public monitoring of workers' pay indexing. It is through these measures that workers' principal vital interests will be realized.

The process of trade union renewal cannot be considered complete, even though a congress has been held and the General Confederation of Independent Sector and Regional Trade Unions has been established. This organization has already assumed the role of partner to the government by signing a joint agreement.

Trade unions must overcome workers' disillusionment with many years of complicity and their role as the "reins." It is also difficult for many state and commercial organs to accept the new purpose of trade unions, i.e. as a constructive opponent to the administrative structures. Constant attempts are made to give orders to them, or simply to ignore them. It seems that with the loss of the CPSU's former influence in society the trade unions will soon teach everyone to respect them as a political force. Their yearning for independence in this regard is clearly evident in their struggle in the USSR Supreme Soviet for passage of a Trade Union Law and their efforts regarding the content of that law.

An independent and well-reasoned position can be seen in the actions of the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions, which has unequivocally risen to the defense of working people's social interests.

One special characteristic of the development of our country's workers' movement is its diversity. This is due to the objective processes connected with increasing diversity in forms of property and production relationships, political pluralism, and the multiparty system. In my opinion there are good prospects for the labor collective council movement and independent trade unions which are not part of the General Confederation, on the model of the independent miners' union or "Sotsprof" and "Birlesu," as well as for detachment of

regional and sector-based trade unions. During the transition period it is only natural that there will be a process of fragmentation, shifts in various directions, and emergence of long-lived and short-term new sociopolitical formations, and within the workers' movement as well. Their ideological and political orientations will be equally changeable, and we must get used to the fact that they might not be socialist.

The other special characteristic of the workers' movement is its high degree of politicization. Virtually every branch of it—sector-based and regional trade unions and workers' committees—have made themselves felt not only as organizations dedicated to the social protection of working people, but as organizations which express their political interests. (Perestroika of economic relations is currently a major political issue.) The working class tends to trust its own organizations more than the various parties, including the communist party. Hundreds of thousands of working-class communists left the CPSU but did not join other parties, even though the selection is great. Their political activism is being realized through labor collectives and trade unions.

This phenomenon is definitely characteristic of the present transitional stage in social development. As market relationships and various forms of property ownership take hold and as social differentiation in society increases the specific interests of various segments and groups of the population will emerge more clearly. Political parties will be defined according to those interests. Yet even in that event no single party will be able to subordinate the working class in its entirety to its ideological influence.

The workers' movement is essentially already prepared to accept and actively promote economic and political reforms. In my opinion this is an area for joint action by the various parties, movements, trade unions, workers' committees, and labor collective councils. It could become the basis for their interaction, expressing the essence of the centrist policy of those democratic forces which are interested in leading society out of its crisis as soon as possible.

Prescription for Happiness

You will agree that in our society, where intolerance has long been the guiding principle in relations between people, one is instilled with a negative attitude toward centrist policy from the time one is a child. Any steps in that direction evoke mistrust. Even now our "experience" with the recent break with and confrontation with the CPSU continues to dominate the minds of a number of leaders of new parties and democratic forces and a substantial portion of the press. Yet the logic of political development at the stage where this crisis is to be resolved presumes consolidation of the majority around the policy of the center, the position of reason. The sooner intolerance is overcome, the easier it will be to undergo a process of genuine democratization and to overcome the crisis in our country.

The President of the USSR could be the symbol of that consolidation, and on a social level the Democratic Reform Movement could play the same role. Its program coincides with the interests of the working class in terms of its general democratic aspirations. The Democratic Reform Movement does not claim to be the political leader of the workers' movement, nor does it usurp representation of workers' social interests; it does not set ideologically oriented, confrontational goals. Yet it does leave a great deal of room for independent action by all branches of the workers' movement. What is the purpose of such an alliance? Together they represent a force which is capable of making democratic and economic reforms irreversible, leading society to harmony and preserving our unity, therein lies their common interest.

Deputies, Officials Comment on Human Rights Declaration

924B0016A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 38, 25 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by various authors: "A Declaration of Rights or Appeals for November 7th?"]

[Text] The 5th Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies has crowned its work with the "Declaration of Citizens' Rights and Freedoms." Was this important historical document born before the attempt at a military coup, or did the congress start to adopt the "declaration" in short order so as to fortify the the victory of democracy in this manner?

It makes no sense today to explain how it came about; the document has been made public. We will attempt to discuss it. We took this proposal to people's deputies, specialists, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA journalists, requesting that they comment on certain of the declaration's points.

The Congress Has Swallowed a Sweet Pill

Konstantin Lubchenko, USSR People's Deputy

In principle, this declaration includes everything that is necessary from international pacts. Unlike the 1977 Constitution, which included practically all positions of the Helsinki concluding pact, an obvious deception of the people on the part of the party hierarchy, in this case it was the congress itself which swallowed the wonderful sweet pill. And despite that proclamation of natural and inalienable human rights and freedoms in the first article, the issue of to what extent this can be realized is the most important one.

At the present moment there does not exist an effective method to implement the declaration, because the central union structure has been practically destroyed. It is impossible to monitor the realization of an act effective within the territory of the formally existing Union. This may be done only within the framework of each republic. Yet we see various contradictions here as well, confrontations and conflicts in the republics. It is in fact difficult

to cite a republic in which there exists a rule-of-law system capable of implementing this declaration into life by direct means.

Today's reality is linked with the difficulties of the formation of union structures, in the given case, the signing of an economic agreement. The process of discussing these most important issues indicates that the republics are more likely in a state of escape in various directions than in a state to aspire to soberly and calmly sit down at the negotiating table. That is why I view this declaration as a pleasant narcotic pill that everyone has swallowed, but cannot implement in reality, particularly because of the absence of a Union rule-of-law system.

The most important element in a rule-of-law system is a single process associated with the adoption of laws in parliament and the implementation of these laws by the executive power, with the control of parliament with the action of judicial, investigative, and other law enforcement organs. In the given situation, the rule-of-law system has been destroyed, and moreover, it is now subjected each day and every minute to powerful destruction, and in this situation, when we need only agreement with the activity of the union structures, to which the republics could transfer certain authority. There is no third-party judge, whom all could trust, and in light of this, there is no real guarantee, inasmuch as in rights, as in regulation of human behavior in general, in addition to conscience and moral motivations (and the declaration now has just such significance), coercion must be in effect as well. The state must display its power in the given case. And who, let's say, will use this power with regard to the republics?... No, I do not have in mind direct violence with the use of troops. The action of the law is important; it would be ensured simply by the action of investigative and some other sorts of union organs, for example, or the application of various types of sanctions, as exist in international practice, that is, the imposition of sanctions or the refusal to conduct foreign policy toward this or that state on a normal basis. All this is lacking in the given case. As far as the destiny of the republics themselves is concerned, I do not know of a single republic in which human rights and this declaration would not be violated from the very moment of its adoption.

Naturally this declaration has significance, but mostly ideological significance, and I am afraid that overall it cannot get to people's hearts and understanding. After all, the 1977 Constitution containing all these Helsinki positions did not act at all regarding human rights and freedoms. And now all the more so this declaration cannot be effective.

Well, what can the unfortunates who have taken up this declaration do? Well, they can go out to the square, stand near the reception area of the Supreme Soviet, an area that simply does not exist (today many do not even understand that there is no Supreme Soviet, that the once and possibly future buffer for the self-absorbed,

egotistical claims being leveled at one another by republics, thus inflaming certain passions among peoples, has been destroyed). To stand in the reception area of the USSR Supreme Soviet is as senseless as standing in reception at the office of the General Procurator, or the USSR Supreme Court, or the USSR KGB. But people continue to send complaints about all sorts of violations to the Committee for State Security. Now this is irrepressibly being destroyed, and who is leading us into this decline, who is pushing, who is forcing this to be done, what inhuman forces—it is difficult to say, but it is, unfortunately, happening.

Yes, the declaration addresses the direct effect of these norms. Yet they cannot be effective directly. Our courts are not even accustomed to the direct effect of the 1977 Constitution. Everything has always been measured through a prism, but was this expressed in the Criminal Code, or the Foundations of, say, criminal, civil legislation, in the corresponding civil codes; was it expressed in an appropriate decree of the the Council of Ministers or not?

Thus, the declaration may have purely moral significance, but not political, or judicial, since international pacts on human rights do not have judicial meaning within our territory. Even though we recognize them as being prevailing or having more judicial meaning than the norms which are being established by national legal systems. And the declaration has no other meaning. To put it more precisely, it is simply a pretty wreath on the lid of this congress, the lid that closed a certain period in our country's history. And however we view it, the declaration will not have any other meaning until the republics immediately express their will for building a common structure, which could serve as at least some sort of basis.

Therefore the declaration is good, but without force. And a state is always a force; an ideological, organizational, technical force. It is amusing to say that it can only be viewed as a sort of paradise for all citizens. This is first and foremost an organizational force that includes a mechanism for coercion at the moment a violation of the law occurs. But these are all just pretty words.

Article 7. Freedom of conscience and religion are guaranteed. Each person has the right, in accordance with his convictions, to freely confess any faith or none at all, to disseminate religious or atheistic views, to raise children with a religious or atheistic upbringing and education. The freedom to exercise religious rituals is guaranteed.

There Are No Major or Minor Religions

Sergey Averintsev, Corresponding Member, USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR People's Deputy

I don't have the chance to follow television all the time. But, say, when they had the Easter program, I remember that the basis of it was the Easter service (this was Orthodox Easter), and this was interrupted by showing the Jewish service in the Moscow synagogue, and the

Catholic service at Saint Peter's was shown, etc. Further on, everything depended on the frame of mind of each individual television staffer, as they say.

I may say that as an unworthy member of the Orthodox Church, I would in no way want any unfair advantages for my church, no false status as a quasi-official state church, something that was bad before the revolution and would now strike a false note of comic opera. Yet to come out and make a special announcement about removing and placing few high priests, and more persons of other confessions, and the such would just be tactics, I think, and false tactics, which would not lead to anything. Because on the one hand, this is simply an action causing a reaction, and on the other hand, this is a matter hard to solve through some sort of mathematical calculations. It is probably impossible to achieve absolutely equal television coverage, satisfactory to all, of all religious tendencies, sects, confessions, etc., and there are extraordinarily many of them. The situation that there are in Russia nevertheless more Orthodox transmissions than any others is in an of itself natural and inevitable to some extent. Of course, it is simply necessary that all the others not be suffocated.

Two years ago, while speaking on a BBC religious program, I said that I wished my church only an equal place among equals, not the position of a predominant church among trampled churches, that being the most fallacious situation a church could have, and the one most destructive to the church itself.

What should be done here? What is to be done by some declarations, broad critical speeches; it is better to prepare programs on the Armenian-Gregorian church, on the Germans, and Catholics, and Protestants in Kazakhstan and elsewhere, and so on. That would be a natural equilibration.

Article 18. The inviolability of housing is guaranteed. No one has the right to enter a dwelling and conduct a search or examination against the will of the persons residing there except through the procedures stipulated by the law.

The Militia: First They Knock, Then They Enter

Aleksandr Yakovlev, Doctor of Jurisprudence, USSR People's Deputy

The norms stipulated by the Law on the KGB and the Law on the Militia are not only a violation of this convention, but also a violation of our Criminal Process Legislation, according to which a dwelling may be entered only upon the determination of the court or the procurator's sanction. And both a court decree and a procurator's search warrant are associated with a motion for a criminal case. Until the motion is made for a criminal case—and grounds for this must exist—and until the search warrant is issued either by the court, or by the procurator, searching premises is prohibited.

Secondly, throughout the world, a search warrant may be issued only by a court. But here it has been a tradition

since the 30's, when the USSR Procuracy was created, that the procurator may also give permission for a search, which in and of itself is a violation of internationally recognized norms. The Procuracy is an organ which implements criminal prosecution, and thus, only they themselves either permit or prohibit a search. Nowhere else in the world is that the case. But this is associated with the fact that we live according to the norms established back in the 30's by the Stalinist Constitution and the corresponding legislation.

Each person has the right to protect his honor and reputation, to defend against any arbitrary interference in the area of personal life.

The KGB: First They Enter, Then They 'Knock'

This is a very important norm. There is a broad concept in English, the word privacy, the area of private life. The world over, this general declaration is developed in a number of concrete norms, for example, the impermissibility of listening in on telephone conversations, incursion into private life, opening correspondence, disclosing medical secrets, that is, everything relegated to the area of your private life—this is a very important field poorly developed here. This is the sphere of professional privileges. What do I have in mind? Say, a doctor, if called to give evidence in the criminal case of his client, has the right to refuse to answer questions which may lead to him violating medical secrecy. The same way, a lawyer has the right not to disclose secrets entrusted to him by his client. These are two cases where the issue of protecting private life are connected with another issue, the institution of professional privilege. The privileges are that people of certain professions associated with the private life of citizens have the right not to convey information which other citizens are obligated to relate, if this can lead to a violation of the citizen's right to the inviolability of his private life.

This circumstance is often ignored here, or is simply lacking. Our swift investigators attempt to interrogate lawyers. Well, this is the stone age in the sphere of rule-of-law construction. And even in the courts, I have not heard a doctor say, "I will not answer that question, since doing so will lead to a violation of professional privacy."

Like the entire declaration, these norms, in general, are words that sound nice, but without a mechanism capable of making them reality. The declaration will be a real document if the courts, in defending, for example, personal inviolability, satisfy the suit of someone whose personal inviolability was violated, and "get" a hefty chunk of money out of the violator, as is done throughout the world. Now we have some suits for libel, disclosing defamatory information; there is such a foundation. All these norms need to be embodied in concrete legislation. For example, the right to observance of professional secrecy and privilege is that the professional has the right not to reveal corresponding information. This requires special legislation. And second is that the

citizen may realize his concrete right not just anywhere, but in court. If there are violations and there is nowhere to turn, then all these rights of ours aren't worth a red cent. Without codes, without court practice, all this will remain pretty words. There must be accountability for the violation of human rights.

Article 29. A person has the right to a favorable environment and compensation of damage done to his health or property by ecological violations.

Take the Factory Smokestack to Court

Nikolay Vorontsov, USSR Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection

First of all, I would like to note that according to Article 2, the declaration takes direct effect and its implementation is mandatory for all organs and officials, that is, while not having an all-union environmental protection law (it must be submitted at a regular session), we have the right to a favorable environment, in addition to compensation for damage caused to our health or property by ecological violations. That means that a human right is placed at the apex: It is not a social organization making a court case, but an individual. If you are convinced that your child is suffering from allergic illnesses because of some combine's activities, and you have borne the corresponding moral and material damage, you have the right to take it to court.

It is another matter than our courts are perhaps not ready for this, despite the fact that environmental protection procuracies have been created in many rayons, yet relying upon this norm, you may defend your rights as an individual. And also, on the basis of the articles of the future law, which will nonetheless be adopted, it will also be possible to defend the rights of a collective, for not just an individual resident to make a court case, but for all residents of a building to go against an enterprise polluting the environment, filing a strong joint suit, assisting in a radical improvement of the ecological situation.

Every person has the right to labor and to its results, including the opportunity to allocate his capabilities toward production and creative labor; the right to freely choose work and to refuse work, to favorable working conditions, to a state-guaranteed minimum wage for labor, and to protection from unemployment. Forced labor is prohibited by law.

The Free Labor of Forcibly Gathered People

Vladimir Gulyayev, Chief, Main Administration for Corrections Affairs, USSR MVD.

Let us be realistic. The state and the individual, whether they want to be or not, are in constant judicial relations. The declaration of rights and freedoms is a sort of public statement of contractual relations of the state regarding individuals. This does not at all exclude similar contractual obligations of the individual toward the state,

society. Elementary logic would show that it cannot be otherwise; no sort of state could then exist, let alone proclaim something. And since it is the case that throughout time, and in every nation the criminal has always been considered as one of the parties having violated the contractual relations. The other party, the state, quite naturally goes back on a number of its proclaimed principles with regard to the violator. Just do not be too hasty in ascribing to me the logic of totalitarian thinking. International documents regulating contact with persons incarcerated for criminally punishable crimes sentenced by a court state that their labor in places of incarceration cannot be considered forced. Our policy regarding healthy and able-bodied convicts who refuse to earn even their daily bread is also natural. They will be punished for that in the future.

Article 21. Each person has the right to free movement within the country, the choice of residence and visitation. Restrictions of this right may be established only by law. Citizens have the right to leave the country and return to it, and cannot be deported from the country.

Permission for Nondeparture, or Who Rules the Roost

Igor Glinka, Chairman, Mossovet Commission on Housing Issues and Citizen Housing Permits

The freedom to choose a place of residence does not so much violate the permission system as it does our housing legislation, of which the permission system is an inalienable component. Thus, the abolition of the permission system simply balances the situation. If only permission is abolished, then, for example, nothing will connect you with your apartment, since the existing rent contract has not always been drawn up in written form, and if one day you find other people who live there in your apartment upon returning from vacation, then the only thing that proves the apartment is yours is the permission form. The permission is not quite what is limiting people.

As far as a system of restricting permission is concerned—and this is already something different from the permission system—it arose first of all as a result of the program of the totalitarian system for restricting residence permission for different-thinkers and the like, and secondly, as a result of the housing legislation, according to which people in our country receive housing free, in turn, with consideration for need. And since all this is in effect, it is necessary to somehow have a fix on where people are living.

The abolition of the restriction of residence permission is impossible without a substantial review of housing legislation.

As far as the declaration is concerned, life itself contradicts it. We are all accustomed to having free housing, that a person is firmly fixed in some apartment, and holds it his whole life. If we rescind that now and announce free choice of place of residence, then we must reject the principle of guaranteed housing for a person. If

we guarantee him housing in one location, a second, then a third—well how many housing units can be guaranteed? Not only the poor socialist society, but also capitalism cannot manage this. Either we guarantee housing or we guarantee freedom of choice of place of residence.

Even though this system is odious and has outlived its usefulness, its abolition is nevertheless a phased process which will undoubtedly be linked to the transition to a market. As there is advancement toward a market, in all other spheres, all three components of the administrative system will become weakened: the passport system, the housing permission system, and the system for restricting housing permission.

More on Moves To Rehabilitate Rights Activist Grigorenko

*PM2110154191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2*

[V. Litovkin report: "Rehabilitation of Petr Grigorenko in Prospect"]

[Text] The Main Military Prosecutor's Office is carrying out a further investigation into the case of the well known champion of human rights General Petr Grigorenko, chief of a department of the M. Frunze Military Academy who was discharged from the Army and twice subjected to forcible treatment in psychiatric hospitals for criticizing the CPSU, for defending the Crimean Tatars, and for other matters...

Major General Justice A. Boriskin, chief of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office Directorate for Oversight Over the Use of Laws by USSR KGB Preliminary Investigation Organs and Questions of Rehabilitation, told your correspondent:

We have opened a further investigation into newly discovered circumstances of the case. We recently received documents from the United States, including a video recording. Eminent U.S. psychiatrists concluded that Gen. P. Grigorenko was a mentally healthy person.

We have passed a resolution appointing a team of forensic psychiatric experts to assess the documents of the criminal case and other documents relating to the late champion of human rights. The group of experts includes representatives of various scientific schools in our country. From Moscow, Kharkov, and St. Petersburg, and also specialists from the Baltic. The group is headed by Professor Modest Kabanov, director of the Bekhterev Psychoneurology Research Institute and doctor of medical sciences. We should receive the results of the researches in the next few days.

If they corroborate the conclusion of our American colleagues, we will send a protest to the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium about its decision on the forcible treatment of P. Grigorenko.

So the numerous cases of the lifetime or posthumous rehabilitation of many Soviet champions of human rights will soon be joined by yet another case, probably the most notorious one—the total vindication of rebel General Petr Grigorenko.

Radical Party Appeals for Abolition of Death Penalty

914B0423A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Sep 91 p 3

[Radical Party appeal: "Against Death Penalty—for the Right to Life!"]

[Text] *The Radical Party and Amnesty International warn that the infamy known as the death penalty is spreading more and more. They warn against legalized violence.*

This outrage is spreading all over the world. Even children may be sentenced to capital punishment in the United States. Hundreds of people fall victim to this barbaric custom. Sometimes these are innocent people and then it becomes impossible to correct the error!

Members of our transnational, transparty, nonviolent Radical Party, which supports the right to life and provides life-support for the law, think that it is here, in Moscow, in Russia that the initiative may start to unite the efforts of the European parliaments, the United Nations, churches of every denomination, and all democratic forces in their fight to abolish capital punishment.

In Europe and in the USSR this fight has been already supported by dozens of deputies, by people of art and science, by civil rights fighters, and by thousands of citizens.

We are publishing here the list of the people who were the first to put down their signatures. This is an appeal to everybody asking support for the initiative and help in attracting people's attention to it.

To the USSR President

To the USSR Republic Presidents

To the Republic Parliaments

Today, at this difficult time when legality and democracy are being established we, deputies and citizens—signatories to this appeal—would like to address the republic presidents and President Gorbachev with an appeal to display an act of enormous force and courage, an act that can set an example for the entire world. We call on you to suspend immediately all death sentences that have been pronounced up to this day.

We call on all legislative bodies, on their chairmen and deputies asking them to undertake the initiative and demand that capital punishment be removed from Soviet legislation.

We think that the organizers of the coup d'etat should go on trial, and that is fair. But the possibility of a death sentence should be excluded for them also.

This will prove to be a courageous and revolutionary act which is expected by the democrats of the entire world from the country that could make the right civil and moral choice in its most dramatic hours.

THE APPEAL WAS SIGNED BY:

Sergio Stanzani, Italian parliament deputy, first secretary of the Radical Party; Flaminio Pikkoli, deputy of the Christian Democratic Party; Marco Pannella, deputy of the European Parliament, chairman of the Radical Party Federal Council; Abdus Salam, Nobel prize winner in physics (1979) from Pakistan; Achille Occhetto, secretary of the Left Democratic Party, Italy; Gore Vidal, writer, the United States; Emma Bonino, deputy of the Italian parliament, Radical Party president; Landing Savane, secretary of the And-Jef Party, Senegal; Renato Altissimo, secretary of the Italian Liberal Party; Adelaide Alietta, deputy of the European Parliament; Marek A. Nowicki, chairman of the Helsinki Human Rights Group, Poland; Virdzhinio Bettini, deputy of the European Parliament; Maykl Prokop, musician, Czechoslovakia; Marko Taradash, deputy of the European Parliament; Antonio Serres, writer, Spain; Alfred Biondi, vice president of the Chamber of Deputies, Italy; Mari-Andre Bertran, a university docent, Canada; Gianni Mattioli, deputy of the Italian parliament; Arnold Trebakh, president of the Drug Policy Foundation, the United States; Paolo and Vittorio Taviani, film directors, Italy; Antonio Cariglia, secretary of the Italian Social Democratic Party; Severino Gadzelloni, musician, Italy; Franchesko Rutelli, deputy of the Italian parliament; Father Ernesto Balduchchi, Italy; Viller Bordon, member of the Radical Party; Jean Maria Volonte, actor; Mikele Plachido, actor; Mauro Bolonyini, film director; Franko Piro, chairman of the Chamber of Deputies Finance Commission, Italy; Eros Bichich, journalist, Yugoslavia; Mino D'Amato, TV journalist, Italy; Marko Boato, senator, Italy.

Yuriy Afanasyev, USSR people's deputy; Oktay Akhmedov, USSR Supreme Soviet member; Viktor Alksnis, USSR people's deputy; Urukan Akhmataliyeva, USSR Supreme Soviet member; Sergey Belozertsev, member of USSR Supreme Soviet committee for legislation; Vladimir Bolbasov, USSR Supreme Soviet member; Eduard Gams, member of USSR Supreme Soviet committee for ecology; Nikolay Demakov, USSR Supreme Soviet member; Raisa Ibraimova, USSR Supreme Soviet member; Oleg Kalugin, USSR people's deputy; Yuriy Koltsov, USSR Supreme Soviet member; David Kugultinov, USSR Supreme Soviet member; Vladimir Larionov, member of USSR Supreme Soviet committee for science; Dmitriy Likhachev, USSR people's deputy, academician; Etibar Mamedov, USSR Supreme Soviet member; Mirsaid Mirrakhimov, USSR Supreme Soviet member, academician; Arkadiy Murashev, USSR people's deputy; Kaken Smailova, USSR Supreme Soviet

member; Igor Sorokin, member of USSR Supreme Soviet committee for legislation and law and order; Valeriy Trofimov, USSR people's deputy; Sergey Tsypliyev, USSR Supreme Soviet member; Viktor Aksyuchits, RSFSR people's deputy; Viktor Dmitriyev, RSFSR people's deputy; Tatyana Koryagina, RSFSR people's deputy; Vladimir Lysenko, RSFSR people's deputy; Yuriy Nesterov, RSFSR people's deputy; Vitaliy Urazhtsev, RSFSR people's deputy; Vladimir Moskovka, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet member; Vladimir Bokser, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Viktor Bulgakov, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Anatoliy Zheludkov, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Aleksandr Kalinin, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Oleg Kazakov, Moscow City Soviet deputy; S. Kornev, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Aleksandr Koshevarov, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Aleksandr Osovtsov, Moscow City Soviet presidium member; Oleg Romanovskiy, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Aleksandr Solovyev, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Olga Suprunenko, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Yuriy Khramov, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Yu. Sharykin, Moscow City Soviet deputy; Boris Gubanov, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Dmitriy Zapolskiy, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Aleksandr Yegorov, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Mikhail Kruchnov, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; P. Lanskov, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Vladimir Mironov, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Lyudmila Ponidelko, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Roald Pyaskovskiy, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; A. Ritari, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Aleksandr Rodin, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Viktor Smirnov, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; O. Smirnov, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Aleksandr Sungurov, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; G. Khizha, Leningrad City Soviet deputy; Yevgeniy Proshechkin, Moscow Tushinskiy Rayon Soviet deputy; Aleksandr Privalenkov, Moscow Leninskiy Rayon Soviet deputy; Sultan Batyrov, City of Malgobeka Soviet member, Checheno-Ingush SSR.

Stella Alenikova-Volkenshteyn, MOSKOVSKAYA TRIBUNA executive secretary; Leonid Batkin, Democratic Russia coordinating council member; Vyacheslav Bakhmin, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs department head; Leonid Bogdanov, Democratic Russia coordinating council member; Larisa Bogoraz, Moscow member of the Helsinki Group; Vladimir Bukovskiy, writer; Viktor Voronkov, director of independent research institute, Leningrad; Mikhail Volkenshteyn, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member; G. Gavrichenkov, assistant director of the children's foundation imeni Dostoyevskiy, Leningrad; Yakov Gilyanskiy, Leningrad University professor; Prince Andrey Kirillovich Golitsyn, leader of the alliance of descendants of Russian nobility; Sergey Grabovskiy, Green Party political council member, Kiev; Vladimir Zolotarev, cochairman of the Ukrainian Constitutional-Democratic Party; Mariya Ivanyan, Green Party secretary, Moscow; Aleksandr Kabakov, writer; Tssetsiliya

Kin, writer; Vladimir Klimchuk, cochairman of the Ukrainian Liberal Democratic Party; Vera Kriger, Democratic Russia coordinating council member; Mikhail Mazo, cochairman of the Moscow Scientists Union; Susanna Pechuro, Memorial society board member; Aleksey Pochinok, Ukrainian radio journalist; Arseniy Roginskiy, Memorial society board member; Irina Rodnyanskaya, member of the NOVYY MIR magazine editorial board; Vitaliy Savitskiy, leader of the Christian Democratic Union, Leningrad; Boris Strugatskiy, writer; Lev Timofeyev, Moscow member of the Helsinki Group; A. Feldman, Memorial society commission executive secretary; Yevgeniy Khramov, poet; Aleksey Eksler, Democratic Russia coordinating council member.

MOSCOW

RADICAL PARTY

Nagatinskaya Emb. 58-2-119

115407 Moscow

tel/fax No. 70/95/1176895

English, French, and Russian spoken

ROME

Partito Radicale

Via di Torre Argentina

76-00186 Roma

tel. 39/6/689791, fax 39/6/6545396, telex 610495 prlife 1

Italian, English, Spanish, and French spoken.

BRUSSELS

Parti Radical

Rue Belliard, 97

113 Rem 508 1040 Brussels

tel 32/22304121, 2843173, fax 32/2/2303670

English, French, and Portuguese spoken

First Secretary Zyukin Addresses Final Komsomol Congress

924B0035A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Sep 91 p 2

[Report by V. Zyukin, Komsomol Central Committee first secretary, to the 22nd Komsomol Congress: "As It Withdraws From the Political Arena, the Komsomol Must Fulfill Its Duty to the Young"]

[Text] This is perhaps only the second time in our history that such precipitous changes are taking place, paralleled by a radical dismantling of the entire sociopolitical structure of the society.

Yes, history decreed that it is precisely we, the delegates to the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress, that it chose to pass resolutions pertaining not to some individual although profound reforms in the Komsomol, but to the beginning of the new countdown in the development of the youth movement. I realize how difficult it is to psychologically accept and understand the need to pass a resolution on terminating the political role of our organization.

However, the objective prerequisite for precisely such a resolution was predetermined by the logical development of the Komsomol after the 21st congress. Gradually, step by step, proceeding on the basis of the realities of the political situation in the republics and the individual areas, we set out to create a new, a democratic youth organization. Essentially, in the initial months following the last congress, the Komsomol had already advanced past its statutory and programmatic rules. From a federation we were becoming a confederation and were no longer an association of communist youth unions. Gradually, a reality of a different type of youth movement was developing within the Komsomol, which included independently functioning youth unions. The pace of political changes in the individual republics and areas also determined the pace of change in the content, structure, name, and forms of activities of the youth organizations within the Komsomol. All of this was bound to result in the creation of a pluralistic youth movement, in terms of ideological concepts and structure, which would replace the Komsomol. Let me emphasize that this was the right way in terms of *realpolitik* and in order to form the outlines of the future organization. However, the pace of restructuring of the Komsomol today can no longer be all that smooth and unhurried. Why?

First. Our youth union which, in recent years, had been rejecting bit by bit the old ideological legacy, was unwilling to remain part of the totalitarian-absurd system and had to become logical and consistent to the end. The old system was destroyed and, together with it, so was the organization which for many long years was its element, and which must withdraw from political life. The existence of the Komsomol, in its old aspect, although in new clothing, was objectively impossible.

Second, the radical changes being made in the foundations of the economic and political structure of society are a factor which determines the end of the gradual evolutionary reforming of the Komsomol.

Third, today an essentially different system of governmental and intergovernmental relations is taking shape, essentially based on respect and recognition of the manifestation of the will of the peoples of sovereign republics and states. The new Union of sovereign states and the common economic space will require a new youth movement, different in terms of its essence and structure.

Thus, today the independence of the Baltic republics has already been granted *de jure* recognition. A number

of legislative acts have been passed by the parliaments of the other republics. In this connection, the resolutions of the associations for youth progress of Latvia and Moldavia, on the need to convert to a different, intergovernmental, type of reciprocal relations among youth organizations, appear entirely logical.

Fourth. The activities of three subjects of the federations of the present Komsomol—the Armed Forces, and the border and internal troops—have been essentially terminated through legislative acts.

Finally, **fifth.** This is by no means a secondary factor: Even recently we continued to view the Komsomol as the main bearing structure of the youth movement, proceeding from its formal size. But let us be frank: Political reality cannot be assessed on the basis of statistical reports. Our future entirely depends on the ability to surmount the profound fear of facing the real future: how many are the real members of the organization, how many are “dead souls,” and how many are those who have not officially announced their actual break with the Komsomol. We must abandon the illusions of the multimillion strong Komsomol membership, for any false political self-deception is simply unrealistic and could make us lose everything positive that has been accomplished so far.

Finally, without waiting for the resolutions of the 22nd congress, an intensive process of profound reforming has already been undertaken in the republic and regional organizations.

Therefore, it is the opinion of the Central Committee Bureau that today's Komsomol with its institutes, center, and traditions, has already exhausted its possibilities.

That is why it is suggested to the congress to adopt a resolution on terminating the political role of the Komsomol as a federation of communist youth unions, and divest itself of the authority of the central Komsomol organs. This also means the liquidation of the Komsomol Central Committee and Central Control Commission apparatus. Republic youth unions, which are members of federations and organizations included in the Komsomol, could take over as its successors. This should be the political will of the congress, marking the definitive end of the uniform model of the youth union. However, we must also show a will to live. It would be very simplistic and illogical if, having separated, the successors of the Komsomol would not already sense in themselves the development of radical changes.

The refashioning, the change of names, and cosmetic repairs involving the statutes and the program are no more than half a step. I believe that if there are some who are trying to “rescue” the organization through such means, they are in error.

It is entirely likely that several youth organizations will appear in the process of determining who will be the successor of the Komsomol. The Central Committee

Bureau is far from the idea of dictating any sort of shared political outlines and development trends for everyone. Nonetheless, taking into consideration priorities in the sympathies of today's Komsomol, its successors could be given substantial help in developing movements for democratic reform and democratic movements in republics and regions.

Whatever path may be taken by the self-determination processes, and whatever types of organizations may be established, there is one basic stance about which the congress must speak out. At the 21st congress, the Komsomol formulated as its main function the social protection of the youth. A great deal has been accomplished in that area, for it is precisely thanks to the persistence of the Komsomol that the term youth policy has appeared in the political glossary of our state leadership. For the first time in history a law to this effect was passed. Yes, today it is difficult to expect this law to operate efficiently and in full. However, the fact that the Law on Youth gave an impetus to republic and regional law-making and the formulation of youth social programs alone indicates its significance. The Komsomol initiated, shaped, and invested substantial funds in the development of a social service for the youth which, in many areas of the country, is becoming reality. Powerful structures—youth labor exchanges, associations, and foundations originated with the Komsomol. Their activities are aimed at resolving various youth problems. It would be logical, regardless of the resolutions which will be passed in the future by the successor of the Komsomol relative to its destiny, not to lose but to preserve the social trend of the organization, for objectively the state and society will be unable to deal soon and properly with youth problems.

I would like to mention something else as well. Of late, particularly after the appeal of the Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat, we have been accused of deliberately burying not only the Communist Youth Union but also the communist idea of the youth movement. We are being asked by veterans and members of the Communist Initiative Movement whether any Komsomol would exist at all. The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau believes that in a truly law-governed and democratic society the rights of individuals to freedom of political views and convictions must be guaranteed. What is buried, in the Komsomol case, is not the idea of communism but the practice of artificially uniting on its basis the majority of young people. We must not exclude or obstruct the process of the founding of communist associations of young people within the limits of self-determination of the republic and regional youth organizations, any more than there should be limits about others, such as socialists, social democratic, and so on.

At the same time, it is the opinion of the Central Committee Bureau that neither the congress nor the leading authorities of the Komsomol's successors should strictly define the various options concerning their future development.

The method of apparat changes from above has already exhausted its possibilities. The new youth movement must be organized from below.

I wish especially to address myself to the Komsomol veterans, the people who are painfully reacting to everything taking place in our union. The best years of your lives were linked to the Komsomol. Your strength, capabilities, and health were dedicated to the fatherland when you were members of this youth union. No one has the right to desecrate this memory. This was your organization. However, new times are coming and you must understand that the young must have the right to set up their own organization, the kind of organization they need today.

Never before in the course of its history has the Komsomol addressed itself to the members of the organization as follows: think of the type of union you need, define it yourselves, build your own organization. To try today automatically to move files from the safe entitled "Komsomol" to a safe bearing another name would be a political error. The will of the congress in defining the successors of the Komsomol should be simple: personal choice by every member of the union and respect for his position and views.

Someone may ask: Is it worth following such a difficult path? Would it not be simpler to rename the Komsomol into a confederation of democratic youth, amend the bylaws and programmatic objectives, set up new central agencies with a different type of authority, and only then initiate the process of self-determination of the republic unions. It is the opinion of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau that such an approach would be essentially wrong, for this would impose certain limitations and dictate an algorithm of the internal development of independent organizations. It is impossible today to formulate at this congress a single prescription, system, or projection for the development of the successors of the Komsomol, for the center of the new political reality is in the sovereign republics and states. Therefore, all the processes within the youth movement must be defined precisely by this factor. Any other approach would mean a return to a unitarian approach. Let us remember that until very recently all the plans for the renovation of the state were being provided by the center, prescribing the development of sovereignty on the basis of a single stereotype and command. Efforts were made to renovate the unitarian state by unitarian methods. The results of this are familiar and sad. It is precisely by virtue of political logic that the essence of the suggested resolutions is one of granting to the successors of the Komsomol the right to self-determination, to be followed by a process leading to a treaty.

The creation of any kind of all-Union structure at this congress would mean a standardization of the models of organizations which will succeed the Komsomol. In our view, it is only the autonomous and self-determined

republic and regional organizations that could determine whether they need a treaty center and the type of functions it would have.

However, putting an end to Komsomol activities should not mean the termination and break-up of all relations. We must develop an essentially different model of inter-republic and regional cooperation. We are confident that the need for unity and accord among independent youth unions, on a new basis, is defined both by the internal processes within the youth movement as well as the logic of development of relations among states. The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau believes that the rejection of the totalitarian-bureaucratic imperial system should be achieved in a law-governed and civilized manner. We emphasize the support of the organization for the establishment of a Union of sovereign states and the integration of all republics on an equal footing and in a variety of ways. The initial aspects of the new community began to develop after the extraordinary congress of people's deputies: interrepublic accords on economic cooperation, protection of the rights and freedoms of the citizens, and the principles of collective security. We must realize that the outcome of a total break in economic and cultural relations would affect above all the young. That is precisely why the youth organizations must be profoundly interested in having the same type of democratic choice made by the republics and in the development of a new sociocultural model.

I would like to inform the delegates of the congress that the leaders of the republic youth unions have drafted a declaration which is being submitted by the Central Committee Bureau as a draft congress resolution.

We proceed from the fact that in the new Union of sovereign states and economic community, a common youth area must be developed and used in the interest of the young people in all republics and regions. How to establish it? In our view, it can be established only via a treaty process among the successors of the Komsomol and the other youth organizations. We deem it expedient, for that period of time, to establish a provisional coordination council (VKS) organized on the principles of parity representation by the Komsomol successors. The VKS must be open to other youth organizations as well.

The purpose of the VKS will be to inform the Komsomol successors about the development of their self-determination and the development of contractual processes among them; to provide practical and methodical aid and support to them and to other youth organizations in defining the forms of cooperation. The following circumstance as well must be taken into consideration: the Komsomol has accumulated unique experience and mechanisms for cooperation with foreign youth partners. Intensive nontraditional relations have been developing with influential youth forces, particularly of late; social programs have been formulated and developed jointly. The VKS could pursue the development of international relations established by the present Komsomol with a

view to their decentralization and transfer to its successors. The establishment of a VKS executive committee, managed by a small staff, is contemplated for ensuring the activities of said committee and handling day-to-day work.

The task of the VKS can be fulfilled if as a result of the contractual process an all-national youth movement is created.

Unquestionably, such kinds of contemplated political approaches require the solution of the problem of Komsomol property by the Komsomol Central Committee. Let me immediately emphasize that the approaches suggested by the Central Committee Bureau proceed from three basis aspects:

First. The need to preserve the youth trend in the property of the present Komsomol.

Second. The use of such property exclusively in the interest of the young people of all republics.

Third. Ensuring the right of labor collectives in enterprises, publications, and organizations of the Komsomol and providing them with facilities required for their normal functioning under market conditions.

Hence the proposed solutions.

First. It would be the greatest possible error to disperse among various areas and sites the material facilities of the Komsomol, which were created and are working for the benefit of young people. Conversely, by preserving its integrity, and with a share participation, we must make it accessible to the other youth organizations.

We should not divide the joint-stock companies of MOLODAYA GWARDIYA and SPUTNIK, and the Komsomol newspapers and journals. Therefore, the members of the federation and the organizations which are a full part of the Komsomol have agreed on the establishment of the "Cooperation" enterprise, the purpose of which will be to ensure the efficient and effective management of the property. This would make it possible to maintain the youth trend of the enterprises and to take into consideration the interests of the successors.

Second. It is suggested that the insurance reserve of the Komsomol be used as follows:

Two hundred and seventy million rubles will be transferred through proportional shares to the successors of the Komsomol; the problems of the support of the youth movement in the individual republics and regions will be determined subsequently;

One hundred and three million rubles will be transferred to enterprises established with the participation of the Komsomol Central Committee, for the development of their material base and for resolving the social problems of labor collectives;

Seventeen million rubles will have to be appropriated for meeting the obligations of the Komsomol to the youth and children's organizations, the youth institute, and the archives of the youth movement.

Third. We must see to it that both the Komsomol successors and the other youth and children's organizations and Komsomol publications have their headquarters in Moscow. To this effect the: "Home of Youth and Children's Organizations" Association is being established.

Fourth. Because of the need to implement an entire array of measures and the complex operations related to liquidating the Central Committee apparatus and establishing new models of economic cooperation among youth organizations and the implementation of Komsomol obligations, it is suggested to set up a working commission of the congress for a term of 10 months. It is planned that the commission will regularly inform of its activities the Komsomol successors who will initial its final documents.

Our congress must display political wisdom and judgment. There have been bright and dark periods in the history of our organization. We have things to be ashamed of but also we have positive developments. We were what society was. The new system of social relations and the system of democracy, civil consensus, respect for the sovereignty and independence of republics, and the rights and freedoms of the individual need new type of youth organizations. As it leaves the political arena, the Komsomol must fulfill its final duty: initiate a civilized, law-governed, and truly democratic conversion to a qualitatively different youth movement, a movement which will make society address itself to youth problems, a movement which will be a reliable guarantor of the irreversibility of democratic reforms.

Documents Issued by Final Komsomol Congress

924B0029A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Oct 91 pp 1,3

[Resolutions of the 22nd Komsomol Congress: "The Last Congress Is the Most Difficult One...."]

[Text] *The 22nd Komsomol Congress took place over two September days in the "Orlenok" hotel. It was really an extraordinary congress, for we were speaking about the fate of an organization with a 72-year history. In fact, it was a difficult congress, because the Komsomol had to leave the political arena with dignity. And it was really the last congress for the Komsomol. But the Komsomol has what to remember, has what to regret, and has what to leave as a legacy to the youth movement...*

Resolutions of the 22nd Extraordinary Congress of the Komsomol

A totally new political situation has developed in our country. A new system of state relationships is developing, based on the will of the peoples of the republics.

Komsomol reforms, begun by the 21st Congress, were directed at a gradual transformation of the Komsomol into a de-ideologized organization for the social protection of youth, at turning society toward problems of the young generation, and at establishing a strong policy regarding youth.

The new political reality and radical changes in the principles of national-state organization are requiring changes that are just as radical in all public and political institutions, and are causing the evolutionary period of Komsomol reform to come to an end. In the new Union of sovereign states there should also be a youth movement that is totally new in essence and in structure.

The extraordinary Komsomol congress hereby resolves:

1. To conduct the reorganization of the Komsomol by breaking it up in accordance with the USSR Law: "On Public Associations" and the Charter of the Komsomol, having taken into consideration that the political role of the Komsomol as a federation of communist youth leagues has come to an end.

2. To designate as the legitimate successors of the Komsomol, republic youth leagues, which are present members of the Komsomol federation: Youth League of Azerbaijan, Youth League of Armenia, Lenin Komsomol of Belorussia, Lenin Komsomol of Kazakhstan, Lenin Komsomol of Kyrgyzstan, League for Progress of Youth of Latvia, Lenin Komsomol of Lithuania, Youth League of Moldova, Lenin Komsomol of the RSFSR, Lenin Komsomol of Tajikistan, Lenin Komsomol of Turkmenistan, Lenin Komsomol of Uzbekistan, Lenin Komsomol of Ukraine (MDS) [expansion unknown], Youth League of Estonia, as well as Komsomol organizations which are direct members of the All-Union Komsomol: Abkhaz republic, League of Democratic Youth of Bashkortostan, Dagestan republic, Kabardino-Balkar republic, St. Petersburg Federation of Youth Associations (organizations), Moscow city, All-Union Komsomol of the Republic of Tatarstan, Youth League of Chechen-Ingush Republic, and Yugo-Osetin oblast.

To realize that the activities of the central electoral organs of the Komsomol have been concluded.

3. That the Congress, in consideration of the rights of people to freedom of thought and conviction, propose that each member of the Komsomol independently and freely exercise his free will with regard to participation in various youth organizations.

That the democratic self-determination of the legitimate successors of the Komsomol is necessary; the Congress calls upon every member of the league to participate in deciding the future of its organization.

4. That the Congress propose to the legitimate successors of the Komsomol to resolve issues tied to the necessity of developing and supporting a youth movement.

5. That due to necessity:

- to form a Union of sovereign states and an economic union;
- to preserve and develop a single economic, cultural, and social territory for youth;
- to cooperate with the development of political, economic, and humanitarian ties among youth;
- to create conditions for the participation of youth and its organizations in forming a new system of interstate relations, the Komsomol Congress hereby declares the necessity of developing a common youth movement.

The Congress believes that when the process of the establishment of the legal heirs of the Komsomol has been completed, there should be a process for reaching an agreement between them and other youth organizations with the goal of determining forms of cooperation and the formation of an interrepublic and interregional youth movement.

The Congress proposes the formation of a Coordinating Council on a parity basis with representatives of the legitimate successors of the Komsomol, for a period of up to ten months, as a special organ of the Congress to resolve issues connected with carrying out the resolutions of the Congress. The Congress proposes that an agreement on creating a Coordinating Council and its functions be approved.

Declaration of the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress

The attainment of state sovereignty by republics that comprised the former Union of SSR is an objective and inevitable process. The delegates to the 22nd Komsomol Congress are convinced, however, that the fragments of old economic and political organizational structures should neither come crashing down upon people nor break the ties among peoples who have lived next to each other and together for centuries. Youth should be protected against international hatred and bloodshed.

Our organization is ceasing its activities as an All-Union organizational structure. Throughout its entire history the Komsomol never allowed even a hint of disrespect toward any nation or any people. We are in favor of true state sovereignty for the republics, but we consider that a mandatory condition of that sovereignty be a guarantee of human rights for every person, regardless of his nationality, and a solution to all problems, including territorial, through exclusively peaceful and political means.

And today, in approving the resolution on the cessation of our organization as an All-Union organizational structure and stepping into the period of self-determination by republic and regional youth leagues, the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress hereby declares it

necessary to preserve the humanitarian, cultural, and social relations among youth of all republics and states.

The delegates to the Congress, representatives of all the republics and regions of our country, hereby declare their intention to conduct a process leading to an agreement among youth leagues, with the goal of forming an all-national and interregional youth movement.

We appeal to all youth organizations and associations: Notwithstanding the differences in political views and convictions, let us unite in the name of one goal—the development of human contacts among youth and the exclusion of bloodshed to further political ambitions.

Youths, who are the first to reap the bitter fruits of international strife, can come out as the initiators of a totally different community of peoples of the former USSR.

We believe that a new, no longer unitary, agreement is vital. To live in independent states does not mean to live separately, does not mean to wage war, and does not mean to isolate oneself from others by the insurmountable barriers of national differences.

No matter what the legal successors of the Komsomol become after their establishment and after their elections, the delegates to this congress, in approving this declaration, hereby proclaim the necessity of a speedy determination of forms of cooperation among the sovereign republics in all spheres of life.

Resolutions of the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress 'On Property'

1. The following organizations, established on a level with the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, are hereby declared legitimate successors to the property belonging to the Komsomol: Central Committee of the Youth League of Azerbaijan, Central Council of the Youth League of Armenia, Central Committee of the Komsomol of Belorussia, Central Committee of the Komsomol of Kazakhstan, Central Committee of the Komsomol of Kyrgyzstan, Central Committee of the Youth League of Latvia, District Center of the Komsomol of Lithuania, Central Council of the Youth League of Moldova, Central Committee of the Komsomol of the RSFSR, Central Committee of the Komsomol of Tajikistan, Central Committee of the Komsomol of Turkmenistan, Central Committee of the Komsomol of Uzbekistan, Presidium of the Union of Youth Organizations of Ukraine, Central Committee of the Youth League of Estonia, Abkhaz Republic Committee of the Komsomol, republic committee of the Union of Democratic Youth of Bashkortostan, Dagestan republic Komsomol committee, Kabardino-Balkar republic Komsomol committee, Moscow city council of the Komsomol, oblast committee of the St. Petersburg federation of youth associations (organizations) - Leningrad Oblast Committee of the Komsomol, republic committee of the Komsomol organization of the Republic of Tatarstan, Checheno-Ingush republic committee of the Komsomol, and the Yugo-Osetin oblast committee of the Komsomol.

2. Komsomol property subject to transfer to legitimate successors of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, includes all fixed capital included on the balance sheet of the Komsomol Central Committee and in the Administration of Affairs of the Komsomol Central Committee; monetary resources included in the accounts of the Komsomol Central Committee and in bank vaults; and shares in enterprises established with the participation of the Komsomol Central Committee and joint stock companies.

All property belonging to the Komsomol will be distributed to each legitimate successor by shares, as approved by the Congress.

3. All measures to liquidate the Komsomol Administration of Affairs will be taken prior to August 1, 1992. In order to implement measures with regard to liquidating the Administration of Affairs, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Komsomol, as well as establishing the "Sotrudnichestvo" enterprise, and the "House of Youth and Children's Organizations" joint stock company, and to fulfill other responsibilities, the Komsomol Central Committee will create a special organ - the Working Commission - for a period of 10 months and with a staff of 13 persons. Expenditures relating to the above measures will be financed by the remaining monetary resources in the accounts of the Komsomol Central Committee.

The provision on the Working Commission, the commission staffing, and the estimate of expenditures for the operations of the Working Commission was approved.

Approved were comrade Ya. K. Chudrov for position of Chairman of the Working Commission, and comrades S.V. Artakhov and S.M. Potapenko as deputy chairmen of the Working Commission.

During the period that the Commission will be working, it will exercise its full rights to use seals, stamps, bank account, and any other property of the Komsomol Central Committee Administration of Affairs.

Comrades Ya.K. Chudrov, S.V. Artakhov, and S.M. Potapenko have been approved to manage Komsomol Central Committee accounts during the period of the Commission's work, and are authorized as primary signatories.

Comrades Ye.N. Molodtsov and A.Yu. Serikov have been approved to manage Komsomol Central Committee accounts and are authorized as secondary signatories.

4. Having the goal of safeguarding the interests of the legitimate successors of the Komsomol Central Committee, labor collectives of enterprises, editorial staffs of the mass media, and Komsomol organizations with regard to utilization of property owned at the Komsomol Central Committee level, the Congress resolves that:

—property owned at the Komsomol Central Committee level be transferred to the accounting books of the "Sotrudnichestvo" enterprise for

joint share ownership, utilization, and management for the benefit of all legitimate successors;

—the Komsomol insurance reserve be used, as follows:

—A sum of 270 million rubles, in proportional shares, will be transferred to the legitimate successors of the Komsomol, to be used for creating conditions of self-determination and resolving issues about the future of the youth movement for the benefit of youth in the republics;

—A sum of 103 million rubles will be loaned to the legitimate successors of the Komsomol from deposited funds, with a payback in June 1992, for developing material resources that had been established with Komsomol Central Committee participation, supporting labor collectives during the transitional period, and guaranteeing a stable income from their operations by youth leagues. The Working Commission will prepare a detailed statement justifying each specific amount and will present this statement to the legitimate successors of the Komsomol Central Committee. The joint stock companies will treat any disbursement of funds as an increase in their general stock capital;

—A sum of 17 million rubles be given for fulfilling the responsibilities of the Komsomol with regard to supporting the activities of youth and children's organizations, as well as the youth institute, and preserving the archives of the youth movement.

Appeal of the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress to the President of the USSR, State Council of the USSR, and Presidents and Chairmen of The Supreme Soviets of Republics

The 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress has approved the decision on the cessation of the political role of the Komsomol as a federation of communist youth leagues.

Republic youth leagues and regional organizations, which are direct members of the All-Union Komsomol, have been designated as the legitimate successors of the Komsomol. This decision was based on the objective process of democratic changes in our country and by the new realities of a national-state system.

By decision of the Congress, a significant portion of Komsomol property has been transferred directly to republic youth leagues and provisions have also been made for procedures relating to collective utilization of this property for the benefit of youth in all the sovereign republics.

We believe that this move will facilitate the preservation of a unified arena for youth and the creation of opportunities for the formation and development of a democratic and pluralistic youth movement, first and foremost in the republics.

Unfortunately, authorities in a number of territories have recently made decisions to expropriate the property of youth organizations. This goes against the generally accepted standards of international law and is not conducive to the civilized development of a youth movement.

We ask you to render your assistance in preventing possible attempts at a unilateral approval of decisions by state organs to expropriate property belonging to youth leagues—the legitimate successors to the Komsomol.

We express the hope for your understanding and your support.

[Signed] Delegates to the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress

'On the Abolishment of the Komsomol Central Committee and the Central Control Committee Staff Organizations'

In connection with the cessation of activities by the central electoral organs, the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress hereby decrees that:

1. The staff organizations of the Komsomol Central Committee and the Central Control Committee be abolished. The staff of the Komsomol Central Committee Administration of Affairs will remain for a period of not over ten months to fulfill the functions given it by the Working Commission on Distribution of Property Rights and Obligations of the Komsomol Central Committee to the legitimate successors of the Komsomol.

2. The Working Commission, established by the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress, is hereby charged with implementing measures for the release from duties and job placement of employees of the Komsomol Central Committee and Central Control Committee staffs in accordance with labor legislation.

'On Komsomol Organizations in the USSR Armed Forces, Border and Internal Troops, and Other Military Organizations'

Approval of legislative acts regarding the cessation of activities of political parties and movements in the USSR Armed Forces and law enforcement organs have the effect of causing the cessation of activities by the applicable Komsomol organizations. At the same time, these organizations recently began to establish procedures for the social protection of young servicemen and to implement a state policy for youth.

The cessation of their activities, in the absence of successor organizations, requires a decision on the state level on questions of implementing a policy on youth in the Armed Forces.

The Congress hereby decrees that:

1. An appeal be made to the President of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and the Committee for State Security of the USSR to examine the following proposals that have the goal of guaranteeing social protection to young servicemen:

to establish an institute of officers in the forces, within the framework of authorized organizations, that will work among youth and be directly responsible for the implementation of the civil, social, and cultural rights of young servicemen;

to support the activities of public associations that do not have a political orientation (funds for the social protection of young servicemen and members of their families, youth associations, and others) in the USSR Armed Forces, and border and internal troops;

to give organizational, material, and personnel support to public youth associations that work with the Armed Forces, and border and internal troops in preparing young men for military service.

2. Support be given to decisions made earlier by leading electoral organs of Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces, and border and internal troops, regarding the transfer of the remaining funds established by them for the social protection of young servicemen.

Appeal by the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress to the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet

The 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress has passed a resolution regarding the cessation of the political role of the Komsomol as a federation of the communist league of youth. We were led to this decision by the realization of the impossibility to continue activities as an All-Union organization that does not correspond to the new realities of a national-state system of the former Union of SSR. Pursuant to a decision of the Congress, activities of central electoral organs have ceased and the staff organization of the Komsomol Central Committee has been abolished. Based on the will of the peoples of the republics to attain true sovereignty, the Congress has designated republic and regional leagues as legitimate successors to the Komsomol. From their very inception, these organizations—jointly with organs of authority in the republics—will rule on questions relevant to a future youth movement.

The Congress believes that the possibility of forming any interrepublic organization can be determined only during a negotiation process among the independent republic and regional youth leagues.

These decisions open up the opportunity to use Komsomol property for the benefit of youth organizations in all republics.

In connection with the approval by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of the resolution: "On Property of All-Union and Interpublic Public Organizations in the RSFSR," the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress appeals to the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet with a request to determine the precedence in applying point No. 2 of the aforementioned resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet with regard to the decisions of the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress.

When this issue of the newspaper had already been made up, the following document was received by the editorial office:

Appeal of the Russian Delegates to the 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress to Members of the RSFSR Komsomol

Dear Friends and League Comrades:

The 22nd Extraordinary Komsomol Congress has approved the decision to cease activities of the All-Union Komsomol as a federated association of youth organizations in our country. Its legitimate successor in the RSFSR is the Lenin Komsomol of the RSFSR. This step was prompted by the political situation that developed in our country, by the establishment of sovereign

states on the territory of the USSR, and by the necessity to implement a policy for youth at the sovereign republic level, since this matter lies within their competence.

The end of the political role of the All-Union Komsomol as a federation of youth leagues, however, does not mean either a cessation or a temporary halting in the activities of republic youth leagues, including the RSFSR Komsomol. The importance of an organization existing in Russia, which is capable of protecting the interests of young people and helping them find their way in life, has remained unchanged. This role can be played by the Russian Komsomol, but only if a radical reorganization takes place: A public status must be approved for the organization, its name must be changed, it cannot be oriented toward any single ideology, and conditions must be created for the self-determination of its members who are proponents of various political forces. These issues should be resolved by the conference of the Lenin Komsomol of the RSFSR, which takes place on October 19-20, 1991.

We call upon you to define your attitude toward this organization and to find a way in which you can participate in its work under the new conditions.

'Wiedergeburt' Society Urges Volga German Autonomy

92US0057A Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Oct 91 p 2

[Interview with Genrikh Grout, chairman of the Provisional Council for Restoration of the ASSR of Volga Germans and a leader of the Wiedergeburt (Revival) Society, by M. Pereplesnin; place and date not given: "The Germans Need Autonomy"]

[Text] A congress of Germans of the USSR will be held in Moscow 18-20 October. More precisely, part two of the congress which began 12-15 March of this year. Our correspondent met with Genrikh Grout, chairman of the Provisional Council for Restoration of the ASSR of Volga Germans and a leader of the Wiedergeburt (Revival) Society, and asked him to initiate TRUD readers into the problems which currently trouble Soviet Germans.

[Pereplesnin] Genrikh Genrikhovich, let us begin with what is most important: Why autonomy for the Germans in the Volga region at this time?

[Grout] I have heard this question many times. It comes from a lack of information primarily. Today there are few people who know the history of the settlement and life of the Volga Germans. Even textbooks and aids pertaining to the history of state and law skirt around this aspect of Russian history or mention it only in passing. Recreation of the autonomous republic of Germans in the Volga region would mean the restoration of historical justice and the rehabilitation of a people who for 50 years now have been deprived of the opportunity of compact residence and study of their native language and deprived of the roots of their spiritual culture.

Information: The settlement of foreigners in Russia on vacant land goes back to the time of the promulgation of Peter I's edict of 23 November 1719. This policy was continued by Catherine II. Following the publication of her manifesto of 22 July 1763, a large stream of German farmers and craftsmen moved to Russia. By 1772 some 104 German colonies had formed in the Volga region. By the mid-19th century approximately 100,000 Germans had moved to Russia.

[Pereplesnin] It is well known that the autonomous Republic of Volga Germans formed under Soviet power scored considerable successes in economic and cultural building.

[Grout] This is true. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan even the autonomous republic had become a foremost agricultural region of Russia with a rapidly developing industry. The German autonomy was one of the first to achieve total literacy.

It was all brought to an end by the inhuman edict of 1941 on the resettlement of the Germans in areas of Novosibirsk and Omsk oblasts, Altay Kray and Kazakhstan. Huge masses of people were torn away from what had become for them their native parts and dispatched to special settlements without the right to return to their

former dwelling places. Hundreds of thousands died from starvation and cold, succumbing to the strain of work which was beyond their powers. Fifty years have now elapsed since this monstrous inhumane act, but the Germans, like other repressed peoples also, come to that, have not been fully rehabilitated. It is the achievement of this goal which the Wiedergeburt public organization formed in March 1988 sets itself.

Calendar of events: The autonomy of the German colonies in the Volga region was recognized on 19 October 1918 by a decree of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars signed by V.I. Lenin.

The Volga German ASSR was formed on 19 December 1924 by a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict: "Resettlement of Germans Living in Areas of the Volga Region" was adopted on 28 August 1941. Fifteen districts of the Volga German ASSR were incorporated in Saratov and six districts in Stalingrad oblasts.

The declaration of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "Recognition as Illegal and Criminal the Acts of Repression Against the Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and Assurance of Their Rights" was adopted on 14 November 1989.

The RSFSR law: "Rehabilitation of Peoples Subjected to Repression," which provided for the restoration of the national-state formations which had evolved prior to their abolition, was enacted on 26 April 1991. The law prohibits agitation or propaganda for the purpose of preventing the rehabilitation of peoples subjected to repression.

[Pereplesnin] There is together with the Wiedergeburt Society the Union of Germans of the USSR—its presentation occurred quite recently. Why was a second public organization needed?

[Grout] The appearance of the Union of Germans is the continuation of the long-standing opposition to the recreation of the Volga autonomy, which Wiedergeburt has supported from the start. This opposition was manifested in the activity of the State Commission for Problems of the Soviet Germans headed by V. Gusev, former member of the Union cabinet. And the Union of Germans is Gusev's creation attempting to advance alternatives to the idea of autonomy.

The "Union" cannot be considered a public organization since it was created on government money and unites essentially no one. Gusev himself has already quit the political scene, but the party-bureaucratic formation which he created as yet lives on. So political opposition persists also.

Information: V. Gusev—former chairman of the USSR State Committee for Chemistry and Biotechnologies and

former chairman of the State Commission for the Problems of Soviet Germans. At the meeting of the cabinet on 19 August he actively supported the coup d'etat.

[Pereplesnin] Not without foundation either, most likely, are the misgivings in connection with the recreation of a German autonomy on the Volga. Will not the rights of the Russians today settled on the territory of the former Volga German Republic be infringed here?

[Grout] We have already negotiated the stage of the furious defamation of the plans for a revival of the German autonomy. There were attempts to incite interethnic discord and to intimidate the population of Saratov and Volgograd oblasts with possible reprisals against Russians "if the Germans return to the Volga region." The source of these attempts was the former party apparatus. But life itself is showing the absurdity of such apprehensions.

People have been intimidated with a possible deterioration in their life if they come under the "power of the Germans." But, please, is it possible to live worse than the population on the territory of the former Volga German Republic lives today: the irrational use and salination of the land, the chronic housing shortage, obsolete production and equipment and the broken-down state of health care, education, culture and municipal services. All this needs to be put in order, and we are ready for serious work. In the event of the restoration of the German autonomy, substantial foreign investments in the economy of the autonomous republic would follow, and this would mean that not only the Germans but also the entire population on its territory would have a better life. After all, earlier also the Germans and the representatives of other nationalities lived side by side in the Volga region and did not trouble one another.

Fortunately, we in the Volga today are encountering an ever increasing understanding of our position. We are actively supported by the Russian United Evangelical-Lutheran Church, which has both German and Russian parishes. Both the ordinary people and the official authorities are now supporting our plans.

The more so in that we ourselves adhere to the viewpoint that the problems of restoration of the autonomy are not just a matter for the Germans alone. All questions must be discussed with the participation of representatives of the nationalities concerned.

Information: The first congress of the Confederation of Peoples Subjected to Repression, which took place 1-3 July of this year in Moscow, also prepared, among other documents, a draft edict on restoration of the Volga German ASSR. It provides, inter alia, in the process of restoration of the Volga German ASSR for strict compliance with current legislation and the legitimate rights and interests of the citizens of all nationalities residing on this territory. The official languages here should be both German and Russian.

[Pereplesnin] Do you believe that the creation of the autonomy could influence the intensity of the German emigration flow?

[Grout] Undoubtedly. Meanwhile this flow is growing continuously. According to the figures of our sociological polls, three-fourths of Soviet Germans and members of their families or approximately 3 million persons have a possible departure in mind.

[Pereplesnin] This is understandable. People's endeavor to avail themselves of an opportunity to break away from our disarray and live in the prosperous West is natural....

[Grout] The material aspect and an aspiration to amenity provision play a part, of course. But are not predominant. Those same sociological polls have shown that people are driven more often than not, not by the material but the spiritual factor. Lost language, severed roots of spiritual culture—these are far more important than a slice of bread thickly spread with butter.

Add to this the difficulties of acclimatization in the new locality and the not inconsiderable factor that Germany today is simply not in a position to accept such enormous numbers of departees and provide them with housing and jobs. For this reason also a positive solution of the question concerning restoration of the Germans' Volga autonomy could dispense with a large part of the problems. Incidentally, half of the Germans who are today intending to leave are prepared to stay, given our people's complete rehabilitation. And just think—what is better: being in a position of family dependent or acquiring an opportunity to improve one's life oneself by one's own labor?

It is not without interest that Bonn's official position fully coincides with our viewpoint on the urgent problems. I met in August in Bonn and in September in Moscow with German Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher and in the course of these meetings obtained confirmation that our further efforts pertaining to the revival of the German autonomy would be supported in every possible way by the German Government.

[Pereplesnin] What do you expect of the coming congress?

[Grout] It should be an important stage in the process of consolidation of the aspirations of the Russian Germans. As I have already said, a certain political opposition persists among us, and it is important to find a common language with our opponents, the more so in that there are no differences of principle in our positions. We also expect the participation in the congress of Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin—we have repeatedly received such a promise from him. We hope with his assistance for the swift realization of the RSFSR law "Rehabilitation of Peoples Subjected to Repression" and, consequently, achievement of the cherished goal—restoration of the autonomy of the Germans in the Volga region.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Tats

924B0039A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 34,
21 Aug 91 p 19

[Ethnographic dictionary entry edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences U.B. Simchenko: Tats]

[Text] Self-designation **Tats**, which is probably of Turkic origin, meaning settled non-Turkic-speaking population.

There are approximately 331,000 Tats in the world. Most of them, 300,000, live in separate and dispersed villages in the northwestern part of the Iranian Plateau, between Tehran and Kazvin, and in the flat Zohreh area. For a number of reasons it is very difficult to determine the total number of Tats living in the USSR. To begin with, the long and intensive assimilation processes, in the course of which some Tats merged with the Azerbaijanis. Second, because of their no less than triple religious affiliations. Third, because of their dispersed settlement (small islands) among other ethnic groups, particularly the Azerbaijanis.

According to the 1926 census, there were 28,443 Tats living in the Soviet Union. The 1989 census shows 30,669, including 10,239 in Azerbaijan and 12,939 in Dagestan. Almost all Tats live in cities.

Anthropologically, the Tats are members of the minor Balkan-Caucasic race of the Big Europeid race.

The Tat language belongs to the Iranian group of the Indo-European linguistic family. Ordinary speech is divided into two reciprocally understandable dialects, the southern and the northern.

The literary Tat language is based on the northern dialect, spoken in Dagestan. Although retaining the language of their ethnic group, the Tats have also extensively adopted the use of other languages. Many of them are bilingual or trilingual.

The origin of the Tats is not entirely clear. According to one theory they are the descendants of the Iranianized but not Turkicized ancient indigenous population of the Transcaucasus. According to another, after the fall of the Khazar Kingdom and the spreading of Islam in the northeastern part of the Caucasus, the living conditions of the Jews which were the old settlers of the region, became unbearable. The population of many Jewish settlements converted to Islam. It is believed that it is precisely this population that constituted the ethnic nucleus of the Tats, whose features, language, and way of life are little different from those of the mountain Jews.

In the past farming, truck gardening, viticulture, and artisan industries were the Tats' traditional occupations. Tat rugs enjoyed great popularity. At the present time most of the able-bodied Tats living in the cities are employed in industry. A significant stratum practices a variety of intellectual professions.

In the mountainous areas, Tat settlements are located in the vicinity of rivers and springs. Their housing (most frequently made of stone) with an earthen roof is made more spacious by the building of second stories and the use of slopes. On the flat areas, in the Apsheron woodless tracts their homes were made of shell-rock limestone.

Many aspects of the traditional social, spiritual, and family life of the Tats were based on custom law: hospitality, respect for elders, particularly parents, and mutual help among neighbors and relatives. Blood tribute was demanded for murder, bodily harm, and rape (khun-bakhasy).

Their spiritual culture was similar to that of the Azerbaijanis. Some folklore works, such as those of the visits of the Mullah Nasreddin, have long existed in two languages: Tat and Azeri. There are published texts in the Tat language dating from the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century.

Some Tats are Shiites, while others profess Judaism and are known as mountain Jews; others again Tats speak Armenian and are known as Gregorian Christians.

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**SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary:
Turks-Meskhethians**

924B0039B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 38,
18 Sep 91 p 19

[Ethnographic dictionary entry edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences U.B. Simchenko: Turks-Meskhethians]

[Text] Self-designation **Turk**.

According to the 1989 census, more than 207,000 Turks live in the Soviet Union.

The 1989 census, as published, does not make it possible to trace the dynamics of the size and forms of settlements of Meskhethian Turks, for a variety of reasons. To begin with, once again the USSR population census "forgot" one of the ethnic names, classifying the Turks-Meskhethians as either "Turks" or "other nationalities." Second, for a long time the Meskhethian Turks were not asked what they preferred, arbitrarily classifying them as Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, or Tatars, or else even as "Muslims" or "Caucasians," without any ethnic affiliation. Third, some of the Meskhethians deliberately concealed their ethnicity so that this item No. 5 in the census would not obstruct their professional or social careers. Fourth, the assumption has been expressed that today about one-third of the Meskhethian Turks are simply classified as Turks.

Anthropologically, the Meskhethian Turks are heterogeneous. They are part of the Europeid race, with features such as Balkan-Caucasic and minor pre-Asiatic.

Most believing Turks-Meskhetians are Sunni Muslims. The Turkic spoken language is part of the Oguz subgroup of the Turkic group of the Altay language family.

Prior to their 1944 deportation, as a rule, the Meskhetians had all settled in multinational ethnically mixed groups and had adopted other languages. Particularly widespread among them was Georgian.

Today Turks-Meskhetians have neither a literary language nor an alphabet. Their native tongue, spoken in small family circles, is gradually losing its thin stratum of original Turkic vocabulary, and the mechanisms for intergenerational transmission of the values of national culture are increasingly breaking down.

To this day, the ethnic origin of the Turks-Meskhetians remains an unraveled secret, although a number of hypotheses have been voiced. According to one viewpoint, their ancestors were Azerbaijanians. According to another, they were Meskhi—Turkified Georgians; yet another claims that they are Turks who assumed a toponymic name.

In the 11th century, the Meskhet territory was known as the Akhaltsik Pashalyk.

It would be more suitable to replace the terminology used in tracing the stages of the ethnic history of many nations with the word "tragedy," particularly if we consider the catastrophic role of the 14 November 1944 order of the USSR State Defense Committee, according to which more than 100,000 people were deported from 209 Meskhet settlements to the republics of Central Asia, under the pretext of "reinforcing border security."

No less tragic was the latest stage in their unfortunate destiny, which took place in 1989, literally in full view of everyone. This refers to the secondary (and, essentially coerced) resettlement of this ethnic group in Uzbekistan, caused by the Fergana events.

This social depression created a state of shock in the development of the national culture of the Turks-Meskhetians. Their national culture, language, and customs are melting away like an iceberg under the hot rays of the sun in springtime. Unless the time continuity can be restored, this will be one more ethnic group that will disappear from the ethnic map of our homeland, as was the case with the last of the Ubykh.

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SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Turkmen

924B0039C Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 39,
25 Sep 91 p 19

[Ethnographic dictionary entry edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences U.B. Simchenko: Turkmen]

[Text] Self-designation **Turkmen**. In ancient literature they were known as **Trukhmen**, **Trukhmentsy**, or **Trukhmyan**.

According to the 1989 census, about 2.8 million Turkmen live in the USSR.

The Turkmen language belongs to the Oguz group of Turkic languages. It is subdivided into several dialects.

The Turkmen developed a long time ago. Their origin is related to the ancient peoples of the Aral-Caspian Steppe. The ancestors of the Turkmen include the Dacians and the Massaget of the Aral area, as well as the settled population of southern Turkmeniya and Khorasan. Their ancestors included Parthians as well.

The Turkization of this population occurred long before the Oguz invasion. As early as the fourth-fifth centuries, Khronites and Ephthalites penetrated the area and, in the sixth century, Turkic groups accounted for large masses of people, particularly in the area of the Atrek and Dekhistan Rivers. They are mentioned in written sources of the seventh and eighth centuries.

The Oguz as well began partially to resettle in these lands before the 11th century. In the 11th century, after clashes with the Pechenegs, the Oguz seized the areas from the Usturt on toward the Embe, from where they moved south.

The most important stage in the establishment of the Turkmen people was the movement of the Seldzhuks in the 11th century, who advanced west from the Syrdarya. The local population was subjected to the particularly strong influence of the Mongols when they arrived in Central Asia in the 13th century. Northern Khorasan was crushed. At that time, the Turkic-speaking population acquired the name Turkmen, and its territory, Turkmenistan.

A further merger of the tribes inhabiting the steppes—the Yazyr and Oguz—with the settled Khorasan occurred in the 14th-15th centuries. At that time some of the Oguz—the Alan, Kypchak, and others, merged with the Khorezm. The Turkic language prevailed in the new groups and became the foundation of the Turkmen language, which included a number of tribal dialects and idioms.

In the 15th-16th centuries, Central Asian Turkmen established settlements throughout the entire eastern shore of the Caspian, the Mangyshlak Peninsula, the banks of the huge Sarykamysh Lake, the Karakums, the edges of the Khorezm Oasis, and southern Turkmeniya.

In the 16th century war broke out on Turkmen territory between the rulers of Iran and Bukhara. After both sides had become weakened, the Uzbek khans of Khorezm conquered most of the Turkmen tribes. The war continued throughout the 17th century, when Turkmenistan was divided among Iran, Bukhara, and Khiva.

Throughout the 18th century the Turkmen were subject to violence and plunder by Iran.

Ties between Russians and Turkmen can be traced from the 16th century. In the 17th century Khodzha-Nepes

asked Peter the Great to grant Russian citizenship to the Turkmen, fearing the violence of aggressors and feudal quarrels. The Russian government sent numerous scouting expeditions to Turkmenistan.

In 1869 a Russian detachment settled on the eastern bank of the Caspian and founded the city of Krasnovodsk. In 1874 the Transcaspian Department of the Governorship-General was established, consisting of the

annexed Turkmen territories. In 1881 the troops commanded by Skobelev stormed Geok-Tepe, and Akhal was annexed by Russia. In 1884 Russian citizenship was granted to the Merv Tekin and, in 1885, the Salor and Saryk of Serakhs, Molotan, and Pende. In 1899 the Transcaspian Oblast became part of Turkestan Kray.

The official religion of the Turkmen is Islam in its various denominations.

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Smolentsev Ponders Supreme Court's Future*PM1810161191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
17 Oct 91 p 2*

[Interview with Ye. Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, by G. Ovcharenko; date, place not given: "What Will Happen Above, or the Proposed Staircase for Our Justice"]

[Text] It is no secret that, now that to all intents and purposes the USSR no longer exists, central power structures are not enjoying their best days. The USSR Supreme Court is no exception in this respect. Its plenum, where there was a collegial discussion of whether the country's Supreme Court should continue to exist and, if so, what its functions and powers should be, ended the other day. Our correspondent met with Ye. Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Ovcharenko] Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, the current plenum can largely be called a watershed in the activity of the country's Supreme Court and for our justice in general. What is the current situation?

[Smolentsev] Above all we need to decide where we stand: The court should not and does not deal with the fight against crime. So those people who link in the deteriorating crime situation—and the number of crimes this year will clearly exceed the 3-million mark—with judicial organs' activity are mistaken. There are different reasons for this, and these are to be found first and foremost in the society's critical socioeconomic state. The main thing is that the principle of the inevitability of responsibility for a crime is not being observed—every year around half of all crimes registered remain unsolved.

[Ovcharenko] Nonetheless, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, you will agree that the general policy in judicial practice cannot fail to affect the crime situation.

[Smolentsev] I do not deny it. And I believe that the courts have generally taken the correct policy as their foundation. Its essence is to strictly differentiate between punishments: People who commit major crimes, repeat offenders, or members of the burgeoning organized groups which feed off the new social relations should be and are subject to the strictest measures allowed by law.

At the same time, there has been and should continue to be an abiding rule that if people have committed for the first time a less dangerous or, in particular, a negligent crime there is no need to punish them severely.

[Ovcharenko] Let us return, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, to the main question of the last plenum: How do you view the concept of the country's Supreme Court in the current transitional period?

[Smolentsev] We proceed on the basis of the conviction that real preconditions exist for forming a new Union of Sovereign States. And whatever form a future Union

takes it will undoubtedly come with the main signs of statehood—a legislative, an executive, a judiciary, and the corresponding institutions of power. A unified state will naturally have functions such as the protection of human rights and freedoms, the interests of the republics themselves, defense, and foreign policy and economic activity. Federal legislation and organs to back it up—specifically, a Union Supreme Court—will be needed to implement these functions.

[Ovcharenko] But it is also obvious that in the new conditions the status of the Supreme Court and its powers should undergo substantial changes. Exactly what kind?

[Smolentsev] I think that for the overwhelming majority of civil and criminal cases justice should be handled by the courts of the sovereign states which are members of the Union. The only exceptions should be:

cases of state crimes, crimes against peace and humanity, military crimes, and a small selection of other crimes, responsibility for which is stipulated under federal legislation;

cases of crimes for which conviction carries the death penalty. Given the supreme value of human life, citizens sentenced to death should have the right of appeal to the Union Supreme Court;

cases of crimes which may be committed by senior officials of Union organs or Union court judges. It will be more expedient for these to be placed directly under Supreme Court jurisdiction. Upon petition from the supreme organs of power in various republics the Union Supreme Court could also examine cases in respect of other citizens.

[Ovcharenko] At a time when the Union is being set up as a new political, economic, and legal formation, disputes and even conflicts will inevitably arise between sovereign republics themselves, between the sovereign republics and the Union, and between individual citizens and the state. Who will resolve these matters?

[Smolentsev] Protection of the rights and freedoms of Union citizens and subjects [subyekty] in the aforesaid situations cannot be wholly ensured solely by republic-level courts and should, I think—if necessary and in the necessary cases in conjunction with the spirit and letter of the Declaration on Human Rights and Freedoms—also be placed within the competence of the Union Supreme Court. Needless to say, the list of such cases should be coordinated with the sovereign republics and enshrined in legislation.

I think that it would also be expedient to preserve the provisions of newly adopted USSR legislation under which a considerable number of civil cases have been placed under the jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Court—cases of the banning of parties, trade unions, and other Union- and interrepublic-level organizations which contravene the Constitution; cases of appeals

against the refusal to register the statutes of all-Union or interrepublic associations; appeals against a refusal to register a question proposed for submission for a USSR referendum; complaints from citizens about illegal actions by Union organs and officials...

The Union Supreme Court should continue to settle matters stemming from the Union's international treaties on the provision of mutual legal aid—connected in particular with the execution of sentences or rulings by other countries' courts or the possible use by our country's courts of another state's procedural law during the implementation of certain instructions.

[Ovcharenko] Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, how do you view participation by the sovereign republics or states in the new Supreme Court's activity?

[Smolentsev] For a long time the republics' representation in implementing justice at Union level has been ensured by the active participation of republic supreme court chairmen, who are ex officio members of the Union Supreme Court. However, under the new conditions participation by sovereign republic representatives in the work of the country's Supreme Court should be considerably expanded. This is dictated in particular by the need to increase the role of the Supreme Court plenum as a coordinating and consultative organ. Bearing in mind the fact that the future Union's competence will be limited, it is worth examining the question of instituting a unified Supreme Court which, within the limits outlined by the Union Treaty, could also implement constitutional supervision as well as carrying out some of the work currently done by the Supreme Court of Arbitration (a large proportion of that court's powers will devolve to the Economic Community's Court of Arbitration).

[Ovcharenko] What should be the makeup of the country's Supreme Court in such an event?

[Smolentsev] It could operate as a plenum, a constitutional collegium, a judicial collegium for civil and economic affairs, a judicial collegium for criminal cases, or a military collegium.

The Supreme Court's status and the procedure for its formation should take account as fully as possible of the interests of the states making up the Union. This could be promoted by the following possible solution: The chairmen, his deputies (they would also be collegium chairmen), and a certain number of Supreme Court members (including members of the military collegium) would be elected by the Union Supreme Soviet at the submission of the Union president. Two members of the Union Supreme Court would be elected from each republic or Union component by the corresponding Supreme Soviets at the submission of the republics' presidents. All the aforesaid judges would be elected for periods of unlimited duration—until they reach age 70—and would work on the Supreme Court on a permanent basis.

Moreover, the position whereby republic Supreme Court chairmen are members of the Supreme Court plenum should be maintained.

The process of hearing cases and handing down rulings on points of principle will be elaborated by the participants in the Union of Sovereign States.

[Ovcharenko] Let us hope that the plenum's proposals will be supported by the supreme legislative organ and by the country's president. But will the USSR Supreme Court really have to be inactive until this happens?

[Smolentsev] Of course not. It is planned that in the period of transition to the new Union institutions and structures the Union Supreme Court should implement the powers entrusted to it under existing legislation.

MVD Legal Expert on New Criminal Law

OW1910192391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0728 GMT 18 Oct 91

[From "Nation and Society"; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The leading legal expert of the USSR Interior Ministry Vladimir Barchukov has talked with INTERFAX about the new basic criminal law of the USSR and its constituent republics. He described the legislation passed last summer as more humane compared to former policies in this field, providing guarantees and protection of civil rights.

[Correspondent] In our turbulent and fast-changing time the mass media—and society as a whole—tend to concentrate on certain problems and events at the expense of others, no less important, which are undeservedly neglected. That was the case of the new Basic Criminal Law of the USSR and its republics passed last July. There was no great stir in the press, though the act belongs to the most essential recent legislation reflecting the current processes of humanization, democratization, and priority given to individual rights.

[Barchukov] You are quite right. To begin with, the country had lived to that day with the criminal law of 1958. Compared to that more than 30 years' old act, the new one certainly follows more humane policy with more guarantees and protection for the citizens.

Clause 1 setting the goals of criminal legislation gives priority to personal safety, rights and freedoms.

For the first time Soviet law includes the premise that no one can answer twice for one and the same crime.

Death penalty has been limited to fewer crimes and types of criminals. The capital punishment is admissible only for high treason, premeditated murder, rape of minors with aggravated circumstances, abduction of children resulting in grave damage, also aggravated crimes against peace and humanity. It is not applicable to women or minors (up to the age of 18).

[Correspondent] There's a rising outcry for abolishing the death penalty altogether, isn't there?

[Barchukov] This is a debatable issue, there are still enough people for keeping the capital punishment. But the new legislation takes a substantial step towards a more humane practice.

That concerns more than only the death penalty. The maximum prison term is to be normally up to ten years, and not more than 15 in case of particularly grave crimes. Completely ruled out are now exile or deportation.

[Correspondent] That's unprecedented not only in the 70 years of Soviet administration, but actually in hundreds of years. But as far as I know, the new law has introduced some new penalties, while excluding others.

[Barchukov] Yes, such as partial constraint of freedom, or certain restraints for army servicemen, or measures applied to juvenile delinquents.

[Correspondent] Can you speak of the latter point in more detail?

[Barchukov] There's a special section "Responsibility of the Minors" with milder treatment in assigning places and conditions of imprisonment, and in granting release.

Minors can be punished with an obligation to set right the damage caused, or some public works, or control over their free time.

As to the age of criminal responsibility, it is to be set by the criminal codes in the republics, but not under 14.

[Correspondent] Now that you mention the republics, isn't there a danger that with the current disintegration of the Soviet Union the new basic criminal law may be already outdated?

[Barchukov] The Basic Law formulates the key principal clauses leaving it to the republics to supplement and develop them in their codes. In that sense the new law is in keeping with the current processes in the country. The republics which have seceded from the Union are free, of course, to set their own criminal laws, but they may find useful our experience in shaping this legislation on the basis of the present crime rate and trends, also taking into account practice in other countries.

Our basic law has 71 clauses grouped in 8 sections, each incorporating substantial changes. I can't mention all of them, you'd better read them, but the important feature I'd like to point out is deideologization. This is a good example of divorcing law from ideology. For the first time under Soviet administration the goals and principles of criminal law, also the aims of the punitive system, contain no reference to social order or ideology.

In the Basic Law of 1958 a crime was defined as a publicly menacing act against the social order of the USSR, against its political and economic system, against socialist property, or against persons, or property, labour

and other rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as against the socialist law and order, as per the criminal code. The new law simply defines a crime as a publicly menacing act banned by law on pain of penalty. For the first time in this country the criminal law encompasses protection of the environment, also protection of peace and humanity. The legislation sets the principles of equality before law, of no evading responsibility, of Justice and legality. On the other hand, the list of grounds for release from criminal responsibility has been broadened, particularly in case of reasonable professional or economic risk, which is essential in the present conditions of transition to market economy.

[Correspondent] When does the new law come into force?

[Barchukov] The new Basic Criminal Law will come into force from July 1, 1992, but some of its provisions—the death penalty limitations, for instance,—are already acting today.

MVD Work in Combating Crimes by Foreigners Detailed

924B0002A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 2 Oct 91 p 4

[Report by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondent Sergey Shevtsov: "Crimes by Foreigners in Russia"]

[Text] *Mssr. Jean-Paul K. is convinced: Despite the current economic chaos, the Soviet Union still offers enormous opportunities for foreign business. Until recently a director of a Paris transportation firm, Jean-Paul has already managed to complete several small but successful projects in Moscow. The French businessman's personal plans include twenty more specific proposals of economic cooperation with Russia. According to Jean-Paul, he has already mentally calculated it to the smallest detail during the 15 months he had spent in the KGB investigative detention facility cell in Lefortovo.*

"I would like very much to do some work in your country," says Jean-Paul hopefully, "if the authorities permit me after I am released..."

For more than a month, this French businessman is engaged in simple carpenter work in a small wood-working shop in the Soviet colony where foreigners, who had violated the law on the USSR territory, are serving the time. He is making extensive plans for the future and wishes the least to talk about reasons that had brought him here, behind the barbed wire in a strange country; this is also the reason he asks not to mention his name in print.

The substance of the case is, however, that on 11 April 1990, during the customs inspection at the Butovo

transit point, the customs have confiscated from Jean-Paul contraband items—valuable icons, sacral accessories, and other valuables worth about half a million rubles.

Jakob Schtobbe, a young businessman from Germany, currently temporarily resides in the same barrack with the former director of a French firm. He had tried to smuggle into our country, in addition to a large sum of Soviet money, powerful explosives used by Bundeswehre, disguised as a piece of soap.

Jakob sits on a small stool in the camp shop and periodically dips into a can of laquer carved chess figures attached to the end of a thin metal rod.

"The most important thing that is valued by prisoners," he confides, "is to remain human in any conditions."

By the way, Jakob has no complaints about the conditions in the "Russian colony": the food is normal, the work not taxing, and representatives of the administration and internal troops supervisors treat the prisoners "as human beings." Jakob apparently has a very personal understanding of what it means to "remain human." It is clear that the bomb he was trying to smuggle in was not meant for holiday fireworks. The guest from Germany has never disclosed, however—either to the KGB investigators or, of course, us, the journalists—what was the destination of the bomb.

A person that commands special respect in a colony is a cook. In the foreign zone (this is the way they call the colony of foreigners here) this respected position of responsibility is held by Marcillo Rossa—former professional circus clown from Argentina. Dressed in a white work coat, Marcillo smilingly nods in the direction of his kitchen domain and says in a broken Russian: "You are invited to the National restaurant..." His joke brings out laughter from his coprisoners. It occurred to me, though, that this attractive dark-complected Latin American probably hardly felt like laughing when Soviet customs officers discovered three kilograms of most powerful narcotic—heroin—in his luggage.

Of course, smugglers are not the only people serving various times in the foreign zone. The range of crimes is most extensive: hooliganism, robbery, plunder, hard currency machinations, murders, illegal border crossing...

During the day, "ambassadors" from the entire world—from Europe and Asia, Latin America and Africa—saw Russian birches into lumber, sew paper bags for food products, and carve chess figures; in the evening, they play ball in the small prison yard or watch television program TV Inform on the color television set in their barrack.

It so happened that Lady Luck had withdrawn her protection (not without some help from the guardians of the law) from these soldiers of fortune—in a country currently struck down by a malaise and torn apart by political and inter-ethnic strife, a country that right now

could really use concrete tangible help from abroad. But the support that comes from there is miserly, in small dosages, and surrounded by a multitude of demeaning preliminary conditions. It has been clear for a long time that we have to get out of the crisis on our own and stop comforting ourselves with high hopes. We also have to count on ourselves in combating crime, including international one. It is at least naive to ask esteemed foreign gentlemen and ladies not to send us their thieves, con men, and bandits—at least during this especially difficult for Russia time—since we are up to our ears in these goodies ourselves. Especially considering that our own mafiosi, just stretching their wings now, increasingly louder declare their presence over there, too.

International criminals have already created a long time ago a single criminal space. Civilized Europe is uniting not only economically—it is expected that in the near future the police and the investigative organs of the EC states will act in accord on the territory of each other.

Unlike Europe, however, we are scattering. Even the more or less established interrepublic links between law enforcement organs are disintegrating.

In the offices of the all-union and Russian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], a degree of uncertainty still hangs in the air in regard to reforms that are piling up on them; nobody knows what will happen to his department or his job tomorrow. The work does not stop, though, because crime, including international one, does not take vacations; on the contrary, operational summaries are full of alarm.

Along the lines of criminal investigation alone, during the first six months of this year 17.4 percent more crimes have been committed by foreigners in Russia than during the respective period of last year; on the all-union scale, the increase is 24.3 percent. Neither are the figures reassuring for other MVD and KGB services. Especially dangerous is an increasing cooperation between many of our less-than-honest businessmen and their Western "colleagues" in the business of continuing to pump out of the country everything that may be of slightest value "over there."

For those who feel in a rush to accuse the author of prejudice and of an attempt to harm Soviet-foreign business relations, I will make a special qualification: We are not talking about honest and mutually profitable trade.

The talk about a market economy, privatization, convertibility of the ruble, and so on, has been around for a long time; meanwhile, our money keeps swiftly devaluing, and homegrown millionaires try in any way possible and at any price to "ensure safe retreat" for themselves and their relatives—to get more hard currency and to put it into safe Western banks. And since money here, as Ostap Bender put it, simply lie around, with the current frightening lack of control over foreign economic activities of hundreds of freshly-baked SP

[joint ventures] come uncountable ways of reaping freely convertible rewards. Just place an order.

For instance, our SP has entered a "mutual interest" fictitious contract with a Western firm to buy a large shipment of computers for Russia. The money has been transferred to the firm's account. Months go by, all terms are expiring, but no computers arrive. The SP director goes over there to "sort things out," and time goes by again. The spectacle continues, while the currency—priceless for our economy—is in reality put to work in the Western market: It is working for a foreign country, bringing high profits, which settle—again—over there, in personal accounts of "venture participants."

At the first serious signal of alarm the original amount is returned to our country. The joint venture is charged—"for violation of contract"—a fine that is laughable in comparison with the true profit they receive. And the "rewards," of course, stay "over there."

It would probably never occur to you and me, dear reader, to collect empty glass bottles, crash them to smithereens, and then load all this broken glass into boxcars and send it abroad. Some homegrown "enterprising" cooperators, however, collected bottles from the populace or accepted them for the refund value, then crushed them and sold what was left abroad—cheaply, but for hard currency. Because there was an order from "over there." "Playing on the price differential" and elementary calculations: The profit for the cooperators and the "Westerners" is obvious.

The "order" system also works successfully in the relations between deal-makers in the area of culture and arts. Judging by reverberations coming from famous Christie and Sotheby auctions, and many others, the Western market is literally flooded by valuable works of art from Russia. Except that now rich collectors in the West more and more frequently turn to specialists—thieves—with a request to bring from Russia not just some "old Russian exotic items," but a specific icon, painting, or a precious ring from a specific museum or an apartment... And so these goods flow to the West.

All-union and Russian MVD officers told me of so many ways and tricks used by crooks to pump the valuables abroad that it is impossible to mention them all in one report.

International drug trade is a special topic. So far, it is unprofitable for foreign dealers to bring the weed here, to sell it here for "wooden" rubles. There is not much demand for our low-quality drugs on the Western market, either. Therefore, the drug businessmen strive to set up underground labs to manufacture high-quality drugs from cheap local raw materials, and then to send the "goods" to the Western markets.

The territory of Russia is also used as a transit in transporting drugs to other countries.

It is known that "laundering" dirty drug money in the West is a very, very troublesome and dangerous business. So, hundreds of thousands dollars get transferred to an account of our SP—to purchase, for instance, Siberian deer antlers. Then this sum is pumped back in the same official way—the deal on the antlers "feel through."

Somebody was left "with the antlers" again, but not the international dodgers, who have received another addition to their personal accounts and became an accessory to crime.

Operatives of USSR and Russia MVD departments and services for combating international crime, officers Viktor Kulikov, Vladimir Malyshev, Oleg Burov, and Valeriy Osipov, and many others, whom I had an opportunity to meet and talk to, are people loyal to their duty, ready at any moment on the first available information to "brainstorm" the issue, or, armed with a "Makarov," detain the criminals.

They talked with obvious sadness and pain about the legal chaos reigning in the country, which permits thousands of international businessmen to deceive our people and stuff their own pockets with hard currency. Tens of specific proposals and letters in regard to increasing "negative tendencies in the area of joint business ventures" have been sent by militia personnel to various levels, all the way to the president of the country. In a fit of temper, one of my interlocutors said: "Nothing changes! One somehow feels that somebody is deliberately destroying the country..." This opinion and a lengthy personal story that followed are "off-the-record" contemplations of a professional who had given many years of his life to combating organized crime, and who has a firsthand knowledge of secret, hidden springs in the movement of money—and their influence on politics and vice versa—evoke sad thoughts.

Soon our new "babies" will be born: CEZ—free economic zones. The world practice shows that wherever they are set up properly, they create wonderful conditions for foreign investment. With our organization, however, where we first do something, and then think how to fix it, there should be no doubt that CEZs will bring quite a few surprises—most likely, the riches will be flowing out of Russia, not into it.

Meanwhile, all we can do is turn to the West and the East and say: "Esteemed ladies and gentlemen. Come to Russia to trade honestly. We need you. You need us. So let us help each other, including combating international crime."

As to the Russian "foreign zone," let it be a harsh reminder and warning to those who is coming to us will ill intentions.

Central Committee Jurisdiction Over KGB Activities Examined

*91UF1177A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Sep 91 p 1*

[Article by Andrey Zhdankin, press secretary of the working group of the State Commission for the Investigation of the Activities of State Security Organs: "The KGB Is a Central Committee Organ"]

[Text] Each day brings new "discoveries." Recently, for example, the commission read the document serving as the basis for the activities of the USSR KGB. The document is quite intriguing.

The "Statute on State Security Organs" was ratified by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers in 1959. Although a law on the USSR Committee for State Security was passed this year, everything has remained the same because all revisions of administrative ordinances and instructions were purely cosmetic. The document deserves to be known outside KGB official circles.

Section One: The Committee for State Security of the USSR Council of Ministers and its local organs are political organs carrying out the measures of the party Central Committee and Government.

Section Three: The Committee for State Security of the USSR Council of Ministers will work under the direct control and supervision of the CPSU Central Committee.

Section Four lists all of the functions of the Committee for State Security. The committee's functions in relation to the administration and other government agencies are spelled out concretely. The section ends with Subsection K, which says that the committee will **also carry out other CPSU Central Committee instructions.**

There were virtually no restrictions on CPSU Central Committee measures to be carried out by the KGB, within the territory of the union and abroad.

Even the documents the commission examined contained many examples of surveillance instructions issued by extremely high-level CPSU Central Committee officials without any kind of authorization from the procurator. They did not bother with the "formalities."

All of the officials of the KGB upper echelon, including the chairman, his deputies, administration chiefs, and several others, had to be approved by the CPSU Central Committee before they could be appointed by the Council of Ministers. Virtually all of the administrative ordinances and instructions serving as the basis of KGB activities were ratified by order of the committee chairman after they had been approved by the CPSU Central Committee. All of this suggests that **the CPSU Central Committee did play the leading role in the events of 19, 20, and 21 August.**

The statute also answers the question of whether or not the party spent government funds.

Section 20 of the statute says that **KGB organs and troops will be maintained by state budget funds.** In my opinion, there is no need to prove that if an organization maintained at government expense carries out the orders and instructions of another nongovernmental organization, the "boss" has the complete and unrestricted ability to pick the government's pocket. In essence, this is an ordinary mafia connection.

A few days ago we watched a tape of KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov's recent meeting with people's deputies of the USSR. It was taped for broadcast on "In Service to the Fatherland." When Kryuchkov was asked about the document serving as the KGB's operational guide, he frankly admitted that it was the 1959 statute. And this was the absolute truth: The committee operated without the minimum adequate legal base for virtually decades.

To put it frankly, an armed detachment of the party was operating in the guise of a state agency and at state expense until recently.

KGB Officer Joins Review of ANT Case

LD1910140891

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian AT 1837 GMT 15 October carries a 15-minute recorded 'Vesti' production by Aleksandr Gurnov entitled: "ANT - Life After Death".

The program consists of two intercut interviews by Gurnov, with additional video material. Gurov conducts one interview with B. Pogorelov, caption-identified as an investigator for important cases under the USSR Procurator General, and V. Rats, caption-identified as the deputy chief of the investigation management department of the USSR KGB. Gurov conducts the second interview with Vladimir Ryashentsev, caption-identified as the "former leader of the ANT concern", in Ryashentsev's Budapest office.

Gurnov begins the program with a Pogorelov comment on the current state of the ANT cooperative concern:

"The investigation is at the stage of—let me put it like this—at the stage where fundamental decisions are being made. The investigation of the basic element is still going on. That is, the delivery of tanks to the ANT concern with the subsequent consignment overseas of these twelve tanks. Several other elements are at the completion stage, ones involving some large branches of ANT. It was a ramified system. But as far as the majority of the small branches of ANT are concerned, the decisions have already been made. The investigation group has concluded that there have been certain violations in the activities of these branches but that they are not criminal in character."

Gurnov later asks Pogorelov if anything is preventing reaching fundamental decisions. Pogorelov responds:

"Yes, I think something is hindering this. First and foremost, it is the stance of the former leaders of ANT that is getting in the way. The ANT concern, as such, was closed down by a decision of the government in January, 1990."

Video next shows Gurnov in Budapest, where he has gone to interview Vladimir Ryashentsev at the headquarters of the Russian Home [Rossiyskiy Dom] organization, the commercial structure organized by Ryashentsev following the effective closure of ANT. As Ryashentsev describes the scale of his enterprise, video shows warehouses stocked with canned meat, hosiery and technical equipment.

Later, Gurnov asks Rats:

"Do you now have the enough documents proving that ANT did indeed try to sell tanks?"

Rats responds: "I don't think any question of that arose at the initial stage of the investigation. It certainly doesn't arise now. It has been proved convincingly that ANT acquired and sold tanks."

Gurnov interjects: "That it tried to do so or that it did sell them?"

Rats: "It conducted talks. It took those talks to the point of implementation. The complicated part of the investigation of this case was the fact that it had to establish, and establish very exactly, if these were the actions of Ryashentsev or if they were sanctioned by superior organizations."

Gurnov: "And what conclusion did you reach?"

Rats: "As things stand today, we have gathered exhaustive proof that there was no decision by the government for the sale of such weapons via ANT, nor was there any decision by any other bodies, which incidentally would not be competent to make one."

Cutting to the interview with Ryashentsev in Budapest, Gurnov asks:

"Did you sell tanks or did you not sell tanks?"

Ryashentsev answers: "That's the biggest paradox in the entire affair, because from the very beginning we did not sell any tanks. We have all the documents confirming that there were no tanks. This is a very interesting, large-scale provocation."

Gurnov: "But, there were tanks. What you mean is that there were none of the things that were blown up around this."

Ryashentsev: "Let me put it like this. You have the documents in front of you. [video shows typewritten documents] They say it all in precise terms. There was an agreement concluded with the Vzlet scientific production association for the tanks to be reequipped and converted to tractors. We had nothing at all to do with the Nizhniy Tagil works. I knew neither its boss nor the

people from there. We transferred at least 4 million rubles to them. Then, without any notice, and doing absolutely nothing, they quite simply dispatched the tanks to the port, without naming a consignee. They dispatched them to the Port of Novorossiysk. They spent several days sorting out who owned the tanks. We were simply faced with a fait accompli, that the tanks had arrived."

Gurnov: "In what form had they arrived? With or without their guns?"

Ryashentsev: "To be quite honest, I never saw them, only what was shown on television, because we couldn't travel anywhere. As far as what we were told and what I have seen, they arrived without their guns, but following them there were trains with trucks carrying these armaments. The equipment on top had been removed, the machine guns and the gun barrels were removed, but these were carried by a separate train. Effectively, therefore, we were sent not what we had ordered and paid for."

The feature then returns to the interview with Pogorelov and Rats.

Gurnov asks: "These papers don't convince you in any way?"

Pogorelov responds: "We are familiar with these papers. We discussed them a long time ago. Take this approach to Ryashentsev: [video shows Pogorelov reading from a handwritten document] Urgent. We request... various specifications, and so on. On Monday we also intend to hand over a letter: On the strength of that letter please prepare a contract for twelve of the 72-M1-M's within a week. Please confirm. There are also appeals to firms. We have testimony, testimony from witnesses, about this document. [video shows Pogorelov turning to Rats] I think we can show another document, Vitaliy Aleksandrovich? Here's the signature of Vladimir Igorevich. Here's an approach to a company. Here's his signature. On the T-72's I'm having a meeting on 23 October and I think this issue will be perfectly clear."

Rats explains that the type of tank in question was widely exported and no military secrets were involved. He says the point is that export deals can only be carried out following a government decision.

Gurnov asks: "But didn't ANT enjoy very considerable support from above, including support directly from Ryzhkov. In other words, could we say that Ryzhkov used the concern as a kind of testbed for checking out certain new economic structures?"

Pogorelov answers: "I think that perhaps we could say this: as a testbed, as an experiment."

The program then returns to the Ryashentsev interview:

Ryashentsev: "We got into a situation of political intrigue. You have to pick out two situations here. I'm not frightened of saying so. The blow against us was

simultaneously intended to be a blow against Ryzhkov and against Gorbachev, too. It was just after February, if you remember, the Central Committee plenum, that very gloomy February, 1990 plenum, when anything at all could have happened. Those respected forces which were to conduct the August putsch had to find an organization, no matter what the cost, against the background of which they could act. But there were people, when this tank scandal broke, who ran to Ryzhkov saying: we told you, there's something dirty there, suddenly it'll be bribes, don't protect them. Ryzhkov took fright. By the end of February we were due to market goods worth 6 billion rubles and you know prices were quite different then. That would naturally have stabilized the situation. It was to someone's very great advantage that that stabilization should not take place under any circumstances and that this should go on."

Gurnov: "You mean that as long ago as the end of 1989 you were prepared to rescue the Soviet economy?"

Ryashentsev: "Effectively, that is the case. But I can tell you one thing today. I am very glad that this happened, that we did not save that old structure."

In the final part of the program, Gurnov speaks to Ryashentsev about his personal circumstances and then to Ryashentsev, Rats and Pogorelov about the extent of their personal emotional involvement in the contest between them.

'Myth' of Gdlyan Disputed

92US0044A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by Leonid Nikitinskiy: "The Mafia and Power. The Last Victim of Telman Gdlyan"]

[Text] During the days and nights of the August putsch Bakhtiyar Abdurakhimov could be seen at the barricades in front of the White House in Moscow, again shoulder to shoulder with Nikolay Ivanov, whom, unlike Telman Gdlyan, for some reason they did not manage to arrest. Bakhtiyar arrived in Moscow a couple of days before these events in order to meet with his lawyer Yelena Lvova and the author of these remarks; he arrived illegally, violating the signed statement not to leave which had been taken from him in Tashkent.

The failure of the putsch was marked by the fact that his commander Telman Gdlyan was not only released from illegal arrest, but on 30 August the USSR Procurator General N. Trubin, who as early as July had spoken to the president about the existence of sufficient grounds for an accusation, dropped his charges against Gdlyan and Ivanov because of the lack of formal elements of a crime. Apparently the case against Abdurakhimov will also be dropped. But that was in Moscow. But Bakhtiyar, after returning home to the rayon center of Pskent in Tashkent Oblast, has not left: After the breakup of the USSR, Uzbekistan became a different state, which, incidentally, it has always been vis-a-vis Russia.

Therefore—who said the case was closed? In one place it was closed and in another—not really. The more so since one highly placed worker of the USSR Procuracy, who was personally in charge of the investigation group for the case of Gdlyan and others, did not agree with Trubin and spoke out categorically against closing it, exclaiming: Was all this work gathering evidence done for nothing?

What is interesting is that this persistence in the persecution first of Gdlyan and Ivanov and then, when their invulnerability under the protection of deputy immunity became apparent, in the persecution of rank-and-file workers in the group, particularly Abdurakhimov, is exhibited by that same worker of the USSR Procuracy with the open and sympathetic face, who at one time liked so much to show off on television against the background of the treasures dug up by the Gdlyan group.

How can one respond to him today? Perhaps it is not in vain that the investigation gathered evidence; perhaps it will still be of use, if not in Moscow then in Tashkent; and perhaps from this "evidence" they will still tie a noose if not around the neck of Gdlyan himself then at least around the neck of Abdurakhimov. You cannot get your hands on the former, but the latter is right there: He locks himself in at home during the day and at night he sometimes goes out, like a thief...

There are many contradictory articles regarding the Gdlyan case and even more legends and conjectures. In our absurdly mythologized social awareness, the figures of Telman Gdlyan and his faithful henchman Nikolay Ivanov have assumed religious-mythical features—the only difference being that for some Gdlyan is like St. George, slaying with his trusty lance the hydra of Soviet corruption, while for others, on the contrary, he himself is the hydra, on whose spine even the all-mighty USSR Procuracy has chipped and broken its lance.

The mythologized, hysterically inclined consciousness does not see the living people beyond the mantle of good and evil; moreover, it does not see the middle ground, classifying everything and everybody in terms of the extreme poles of good and evil. But in fact a middle ground exists, just as living people exist, wavering between the two poles as they change their polarity. Let us try to look at events through the eyes of one of them.

Either hunter's luck accompanied Bakhtiyar Abdurakhimov or the reason lay in his detective abilities, but it turned out that he was always among the front ranks during the most exciting and theretofore unprecedented areas of the criminal life of the republic. Thus one of the first cases of the then neophyte investigator who had recently graduated from Tashkent State University was in 1978 concerning a bribe taken by the chairman of a rayon ispolkom [executive committee].

In 1982 Investigator Abdurakhimov, who had managed to travel the path from the rayon to the republic procuracy, ended up in the brigade that worked at the Karshi

Cotton Plant in Kashkadarya Oblast. Like the aforementioned bribe, this case occurred at an unprecedented time, although all of Uzbekistan was aware of the deeply entrenched system of padding cotton prices.

In between these two investigations Bakhtiyar Abdurakhimov had time to work with Telman Gdlyan in Surkhandarya, where the latter, as an emissary from Moscow, not yet having any inkling of his future Uzbek epic, was in charge of investigating a series of murders and bandit attacks in which workers of the local law enforcement organs were mixed up.

Gdlyan again demanded that Abdurakhimov be at his side in August 1983, which did not make the latter happy at all. He managed to quarrel with Telman right at the beginning of their previous acquaintanceship, when he was late to join a group because he had to take care of other matters. But Gdlyan never accepted any excuses: He acted as though his investigation were all there was, and his subordinates could have no other concerns, either business or personal.

This is perhaps the place to discuss one local peculiarity which surprised the newly arrived brigade during the investigation: In hundreds of episodes only one suspect tried to hide, and he was taken quickly and easily when he made his way home. Uzbeks do not flee, an Uzbek without a family is like a fish out of water: There is a limit beyond which he cannot take any more and he will suffocate. And was Bakhtiyar not made of this Uzbek dough? Yet when he was in the group he did not take any more than two or three days off a month just like all the rest, and this was year after year.

One time near morning on one of these infrequent days off Bakhtiyar was bitten by a scorpion—he sucked out the poison and traveled dozens of kilometers to get back to work. It was not that he feared Gdlyan's anger more than the scorpion's poison; it was simply that this was the way things were in the group: Do or die. And they did, frequently subjecting themselves to physical risk because—one must give him his due—the first to provide an example of self-sacrifice was Gdlyan himself.

At first they discussed having Bakhtiyar work in the group for a year and then return to his usual duties and his family. Three years later, in 1986, when the group was at its strongest, he made a desperate attempt to get away and even worked for a month and a half as the procurator of a remote rayon in Tashkent Oblast. But Gdlyan, the transfer having been made against his will, put the procuracy's command mechanisms to work and returned him to his group again.

He latched on to Bakhtiyar with the same deadly grip with which he grasped the throat of the accused. For Gdlyan he was perhaps the only person who knew the language and local customs in whom, on the other hand, he could place his complete trust. He was not only an interpreter but also an intermediary in the group's complicated relations with the local population. Although a common principle applied to Bakhtiyar as well as other

investigators in the group: Everyone knew his own narrow area of the work, but only the leader could put together the entire mosaic of facts and testimony.

The secret of Gdlyan's success lay in that he even kept the leadership of the USSR Procuracy in the dark, constantly confounding his known and unknown enemies with the unpredictability of his moves. He also demanded that his workers observe the law of absolute silence: Leakage of information could destroy an investigation. But if this was not so difficult for other investigators who came there, the local resident Bakhtiyar was forced gradually to build a glass wall between himself and his compatriots who, of course, came to him to discuss matters as both friends and relatives. The majority of them gradually turned away from him, even those who had been sympathetic, while others treated him like a leper.

For his part, even today Bakhtiyar is convinced of the correctness and ultimate justice of their work, whose goal was to free his native Uzbekistan from the yoke of corruption and exploitation by rich landowners, even though this was attempted by inappropriate means. He followed Gdlyan like a soldier on the attack, but not out of fear that a border unit would open fire on his rear but because of his conscience, which in some circumstances required that he renounce his own well-being and deny his friends and himself.

In a certain sense he was also a "victim" of Gdlyan, although, unlike many others, he really was innocent. Having worked in the group from the first day to the last, he perished along with it, sharing the fate both of the work itself and of the group. It was a bitter experience for all of them when in 1989 the USSR Procuracy, constantly changing its position, began to destroy the work that had been accomplished with such difficulty. But if for the others this ultimately meant a return to their homeland—even if they lost their job, since they had hopes of finding another one and getting on their feet again—Bakhtiyar was not given this chance: Uzbeks do not flee.

Today, cut off from his neighbors at home, Bakhtiyar's thoughts run through the various episodes of his work in the group again and again, as though he were watching a boring film for the hundredth time. He is forced to do this by the inquiries and the threat of a trial that hangs over his head like the sword of Damocles, but that is not all: Alone with his conscience, again and again he decides whether he was right or wrong regarding his homeland and his compatriots. These episodes sometimes merge together, slip away, and become confused, for hundreds and hundreds of them occurred over six years of work; but some of them are recalled especially clearly, others are disturbing, and still others are so painful that his heart begins to ache unbearably.

It was early in the morning when they approached the home of Gaipov, former secretary of the Kashkadarya Obkom who ruled the oblast alone for almost 20 years.

Gdlyan had revealed his name to them 15 minutes prior as they were driving in the car. Before that many in the group, which had spent two days touring the Khiva region, had guessed where he had brought them this time.

The task was, as usual, complicated by the demand of the party higher-ups who gave a sanction for an arrest in spite of all laws: The order was to be given to Gaipov not at home but only in an official institution, where he was to be "invited." This time what seemed to be the major role was assigned to Bakhtiyar, who was to "play" the invitation scene precisely, as they say, "hush-hush."

The three of them went into the house: Gdlyan, Abdurakhimov, and an operative; the master was having lunch in the dining room under an immense portrait of himself. He politely invited them to sit down, and they did because, according to the instructions Bakhtiyar was following in the group, to refuse would have been impolite and therefore impossible. You ought not to impose your own rules in someone else's house, even if you have an arrest order in your pocket.

Gaipov's lunch, which was apparently nothing out of the ordinary for him, gave the impression of being a festive banquet, but they asked only for a little bowl of tea without sugar: just exactly as much as was required to be polite. With reserve Gdlyan explained that the master was invited to the procuracy for an important discussion. "And we cannot talk here?" Gaipov raised his eyebrows. Telman explained that no, that was not possible. Without hurrying, without showing any external signs of nervousness, the master went into the next room to change clothes. The door was left open and the tulle curtains barely moved in the breeze. His wife brought in trousers and a fresh white shirt. Then the master stuck his head out and asked for a handkerchief. There was no way, in keeping with the local custom, that one could watch him change his pants, and therefore Bakhtiyar looked at the gold star of the Hero of Socialist Labor on Gaipov's jacket which his wife had brought in.

From behind the door, which was open as before, the wrenching sobs of the housewife rang out. When they rushed into the room, the person whose monumental portrait hung in the dining room had already cut the vein in his throat, the hot blood was gushing from it onto the snow-white shirt, and now it was streaming across his belly. The three of them tried to bandage up the 60-year-old secretary, who was strong for his age, but they certainly did not succeed at once. Growing weaker, he collapsed on the couch and tried to rip open with his hand the incision from a recent appendectomy. He screamed, but not from pain but from fury, using terrible oaths to revile the three men, especially Bakhtiyar—"traitor to the Uzbek people."

Oh, what a terrible death: not with farewell but with curses on his lips. In Bakhtiyar's intonation as he discusses the unsuccessful arrest of Gaipov one can hear respect for this last suicidal act. Would it really have

been easier for Gaipov if a complete stranger had come to arrest him, someone who did not know how to go in and greet him, someone who concealed or perhaps even did not really conceal his colonizer's attitude toward this "clod" with the exalted rank?

They say that words roll away like water off a duck's back. But the dozens of curses addressed to Bakhtiyar in his native language clung tightly to him, they weighed on his heart, and he could not pry them loose or cast them off.

It was even more difficult for him during investigations when he had to look into the eyes of people who had been drawn into crime against their will. The preservers of landowner values frequently themselves turned out to be hopelessly poor people leading an impoverished existence along with their children and other members of their households. Few of them were attracted to the money that was buried somewhere in the garden or sometimes simply tossed carelessly in a suitcase under an old bed: Deceit and betrayal, according to the way the local people understood it, were far graver crimes than bribery.

The confiscations were carried out according to a strict schedule, under conditions of the strictest security and efficiency, so that the people keeping the valuables would not have time to split them up and hide them somewhere else. The brigade, which usually consisted of many groups of investigators and operatives, received the addresses in envelopes which were not opened until they were in the car. Suddenly showing up in a village, they would go to dozens of homes at the same time and ask the inhabitants to voluntarily turn over the money and gold they were storing. If letters from the owners of the valuables, brought from them in the solitary interrogation cells in Moscow, did not help, the people storing the valuables would be taken to the rayon center, to the group's staff, where they saw a videotape with a direct appeal from the "owner." If that did not work either, they were detained as concealers of stolen goods: not so much to "make them talk" as to prevent leakage of information.

One time in Karakalpakia the very experienced Bakhtiyar made a blunder anyway. One of the concealers who was directly fingered by Kamalov played the innocent lamb so convincingly that Bakhtiyar assumed there had been a mistake. He was not arrested until the next day when he was again fingered by Kamalov's wife, who the night before had ordered that 200,000 be thrown into the Amudarya, and he even went down to the river but he could not raise his arm: So much money! All right—he could not raise his arm, but what if he had thrown it in? There was neither proof nor money.

Yes, somebody had to experience the steamy stench of the Central Asian rooms, but those who turned the valuables over voluntarily were never called to account while those who refused to cooperate, if they were arrested, were, as a rule, released as soon as the operation

was over. Nobody had the goal of persecuting them, but the isolation was necessary in order to discover the truth.

That is the truth. It will be more difficult to find it than to find a pot of gold with a mine detector in the garden. Moreover, gold has a standard while the truth is always changing, and even after you have found it you never have can tell whether it is really the truth or not. Is it the same for everyone or does everyone have his own?

In any case Bakhtiyar, who understood and loved his people, sincerely tried to respect even those who became caught up in the webs of corruption that encompassed anything and everything. There were witnesses who testified with an obvious sense of relief and liberation, especially after a series of arrests of highly placed party and militia bureaucrats. But many, conversely, spoke to Bakhtiyar without ceremony: Gdlyan came—Gdlyan would leave, but we have to live here. And you have to live here, Bakhtiyar. Oh, Bakhtiyar, what did you get mixed up in!... These people, who preferred to endure and remain silent, turned out to be the really wise ones, who understood history in the Eastern sense, history completing its eternal cycle.

No, it was not Gdlyan who brought Uzbekistan to its knees. Long before he arrived the republic had been crushed, tormented, transformed into an agrarian colony without rights or prospects, growing only cotton, as ordered by the imperial center. The attitude of the Moscow partocracy toward this country was criminal, and in response the country itself became criminal and countered the exorbitant plans for cotton by falsifying reports and throwing dust in their eyes. The corruption was only the consequence.

The practically overt falsifications soon led to a situation where both the theft and the bribes here acquired a status close to being legal. It was not at all difficult to come up with the diagnosis that the country was suffering from corruption, and all the activity of Gdlyan and his group amounted not to discovering some secret mechanism but only to registering examples that were obvious, almost on the surface.

But then why did the results turn out to be so ephemeral, why did this immense business collapse so easily as soon as its creators could no longer hold it up on their own shoulders? The weakness consisted in the very nature and source of this power, to which Gdlyan and his group applied their just but short-lived work. This power had no firm foundation within Uzbekistan; its source and force lay completely outside. Gdlyan (and this does not diminish the objective credit due him) remained an emissary of the same imperial metropolis which initially infected its agrarian colony with crime and then sent him to fight by no means against the causes but the consequences of this disease which it had induced itself.

Trying to do a noble thing for Uzbekistan, Gdlyan and his group remained outsiders to this country, missionaries of a different religion, one which might be more true but which will not be assimilated here without

difficulty. On the other hand, the empire both put this power into Gdlyan's hands and took it away as soon as he began to get out of control. And the social and economic roots still remained untouched: The process of self-purification from within the republic did not manage to gather steam, and therefore the cancerous cells of corruption returned to their places as soon as the surgeon's knife was put away.

As one of his last assignments in the group in 1989, Bakhtiyar Abdurakhimov interrogated Elnora Usmankhodzhayeva, wife of the former secretary of the republic Central Committee. Although she herself was under guard after being accused of concealment, in the interrogations she conducted herself confidently and tried to draw the investigator off his course: "You are an Uzbek, Bakhtiyar, you would be better off doing what I tell you to. But if you are not with us, then look out!..."

But neither when the pressure on the group had increased and the first secret turncoats had appeared nor later, when the group had already been crushed, did Bakhtiyar agree to betray Gdlyan, from whom quite recently he was trying to figure out how to distance himself. Along with the other investigators he signed a letter of protest to the Procurator General when on 3 May 1989 Gdlyan was fired from the position of leader of the group, and it was actually replaced by a completely new group with directly opposing goals which was headed by the director for especially important cases of the USSR Procuracy, Galkin.

Soon Abdurakhimov was fired from the procurator organs and he went back, unemployed, to his native village of Pskent. But even here he found no peace. They started hauling him in to be interrogated in Tashkent and Moscow, trying to get him to testify against Gdlyan and Ivanov. He would not give this testimony since he knew of no crimes of his superiors except perhaps for the fact that they unwillingly, for the sake of the work, had damaged his own destiny.

Moscow was the turning point for Gdlyan. He overestimated his strength, trying, on the basis of evidence he had, to approach not the republic but the Union Central Committee. The attack was repulsed by the partocracy, and they were not slow in taking advantage of the situation in Uzbekistan, where they began to hurriedly destroy the results of six years of the group's work.

Beginning in April 1989 the newspapers started shouting from the rooftops about "1937" and about "mass repressions" in the republic. And they deliberately mixed up various cases: The Gdlyan case, in which several dozen highly placed apparatchiks were convicted exclusively of taking bribes, and the so-called cotton affairs, which were investigated in Uzbekistan at the time but at were being investigated in parallel by other groups based largely in the republic procuracy in which they brought charges against more than 20,000 people, mainly "small fry": warehousemen, brigade leaders, team leaders—all

those whom the system of report falsification simply forced to be participants, sometimes receiving nothing in return.

Yet one must recall that Gdlyan and Ivanov, beginning in 1986, repeatedly wrote reports, including to Gorbachev, in which they protested against the repression of the "small fry": This was not only unfair and immoral (although from a formal-legal standpoint it may have been legitimate), but it also hampered and derailed the investigation of much more serious crimes in the higher echelons of power. They protested in the same way against carrying out sentences to death by firing squad.

Regardless of what motivated the far from compassionate Gdlyan, to accuse namely him of "mass repressions" in Uzbekistan would mean to deviate from the truth, to say the least.

But who recalls those letters and protests today? On the contrary, in Uzbekistan today they heap on Gdlyan, as on some supernatural force, everything bad, right down to the economic collapse, while all some other ordinary thief, who has never looked an investigator of this group in the eye, has to do is mention Gdlyan's name in order to gain an early release. In the republic Gdlyan is equated with Satan himself, and his investigators, correspondingly, are the same as little devils and petty demons. And not the least of them is Bakhtiyar Abdurakhimov, who remains here.

In April 1990, when the USSR Procuracy was unable to reach an agreement to bring criminal charges against the leaders of the investigatory group, Bakhtiyar was transformed from an investigator into the accused. Someone from this group had to occupy the place in the jail that was left vacant by those who a couple of years earlier had been sent there by Gdlyan and who had been released before any of their terms were up. Today the majority of those who were convicted in the case are free: Some have been pardoned and some have been rehabilitated.

By August 1991 the investigator from the USSR Procuracy, E. Yakubovskiy, had completed the case accusing Abdurakhimov and prepared it for submission to the court. We must briefly discuss three episodes of this case.

In July 1985 in Bukhara, Bakhtiyar interrogated Rakhmatov, one of the people storing valuables of the secretary of the Bukhara Obkom, Karimov, who had been fingered both by Karimov himself and by the manager of his storehouses, Abdullayev. At this time Abdurakhimov had allegedly "threatened Rakhmatov with spending a long time under guard"—that was all there was to the crime. Does the investigator have the right to remind the accessory to the crime that the criminal code threatens him with prison? This is more of a question for a theoretical discussion, but in practice this device is used all the time.

In December 1988 Abdurakhimov conducted an interrogation of Obbazov, the keeper of the valuables of Usmanikhodzhayev, who had been arrested in Fergana.

Considerably later Obbazov recalled in response to questions from another investigatory group that Abdurakhimov "threatened him with the electric chair." This terrible thing is not repeated in any other testimony.

Finally, in April 1988 Abdurakhimov was interrogating Bekimbetov, who was keeping Primov's valuables in Karakalpakia, and then he went to see his sister in the village where Bekimbetov had voluntarily turned in 50,000 rubles [R] (during the interrogation he had promised 500,000—the investigator assumes that Bekimbetov's relatives managed to hide the rest in a different place). Later Bekimbetov submitted a complaint to the effect that he had given in to the pressure of the investigation and turned in as Primov's money 50,000 which he had borrowed from the other residents in his village.

This version would seem more convincing if the third of the seven "lenders" indicated by Bekimbetov had not stated during an interrogation that he had not given Bekimbetov any money but that Bekimbetov had tried to talk him into deceiving the investigators. Later similar testimony was given by all seven and even by Bekimbetov himself.

Of course, we have given only a general outline of the three episodes used to accuse Abdurakhimov, but the fine points and details would interest only specialists. One such specialist, namely the lawyer Yelena Lvova, finds a number of cases of direct juggling of facts and internal contradictions here, and she asserts that after she and her client became familiar with the case, a page in one of the volumes was switched. The demand that this be investigated was refused.

But these, I repeat, are questions for jurists, and for us to see the barely concealed nakedness of the accusation it is sufficient to state that all of it is completely and exclusively based on the testimony of the three individuals involved.

Even if some court were to muster the courage to assign a sentence on such shaky grounds—what would such a sentence say to public opinion? Only one thing, namely: Since this was all the USSR Procurator was able to dig up using all of its skilled forces, what mass violations of the law could there be in the work of Gdlyan's investigators? The absurd result of the investigation undertaken by the USSR Procuracy not only do not cast a shadow on the group but rather remove the guilt from it in the eyes of anyone who knows even a little bit about matters of investigation and criminal proceedings.

Of course, we will not assert that not one of the 700 investigators who passed through Gdlyan's group used incorrect or even criminal methods in his work with witnesses and accused persons, ones that are widely known in the practical activity of our law enforcement organs. But Abdurakhimov is hardly the most appropriate candidate for the illustration of these methods. Another thing that is not especially convincing are the

"career considerations" that allegedly motivated him to abuse his position. We already know what kind of a career that was.

For his work in the USSR Procurator's group Bakhtiyar was awarded 10 certificates of merit from the Procurator General—but today because of this work he has been driven out from everywhere, he is despised, impoverished, and persecuted. He has been betrayed and turned over to be torn apart at the whim of the political marketplace, his fate has ended up as small change in the hands of the USSR Procuracy. And, after all, he was ultimately only a subordinate in the Gdlyan group—an honest, skilled worker who understood the essence and need for the orders he followed, but only as a soldier.

If, as is quite probable, the case against Bakhtiyar Abdurakhimov, which has quietly died down in Moscow, is resumed in Tashkent, one can assume that they will throw the book at him. And in this case he will be sent to do his time not to Churbanov in Nizhniy Tagil but to one of the local colonies—and it is terrible to imagine what will happen to him then.

In essence, today we must raise the question of granting Bakhtiyar and his family political asylum in Russia, for he cannot live in Uzbekistan. But will he agree to leave his homeland even if one can find an organization that will extend a helping hand to him? Uzbeks do not flee. Most likely he will decide to take what comes to him in Uzbekistan. That is his right. But it is the duty of the USSR Procuracy, if it still exists and is prepared to expiate its crime, at least in this individual case to do everything possible to protect and save him.

Details of 'Istok' Scandal Revealed

924B0028A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 5 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Larisa Kislinskaya, TASS special correspondent, written especially for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Moscow: "The Tarasov Millions"]

[Text] How the Noted Entrepreneur "Shod" Russia

If an ordinary brief TASS news item was to be written on this topic, it would have read as follows: Yet another actor was identified who participated in the preparations for the failed August coup. We have learned from official sources that it is... the journal STERN.

"Readers, do not faint. The source of this item is indeed official: It is VASKHNIL academician Vladimir Tikhonov, USSR people's deputy, president of the Union of Associated USSR Cooperatives, and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Economic Reform Committee. The explosive result of this information, which spread throughout the reading public following its publication in STERN, in its 5 September 1991 issue, mentioning machinations of the "failed" Artem Tarasov, who, as was made perfectly clear from the German journal, became an "insider" in our organized crime.

The reaction was immediate. On 19 September, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium received a letter from our (or, more accurately, no longer our) merchant, who wanted to be relieved of his duties as Russian people's deputy. Photocopies of the letter were addressed to virtually all Soviet publications. The document was dated 23 August. Yet, knowledgeable sources assert that the message was written precisely after the STERN exposure.

The subsequent development of events was as follows: Deputy V. Tikhonov addressed a query to the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], in which he listed new 'participants' in the putsch. As we pointed out, these were the journal STERN and Aleksandr Biryukov, senior official in charge of the administration for the struggle against organized crime and corruption. A telephone call was made to the office of one of the deputy ministers of the Union MVD, by the present leadership of Istok, Tarasov's association, with a request to pacify this all too-knowledgeable operative....

Let me remind you that the scandal, which has now assumed international dimensions, began with an ordinary crime. Last December, a group of racketeers, who had extorted from a locally kidnaped victim one million rubles, was detained in Vilnyus. The detainees (incidentally, the criminal cases of most of them, as was reported in the Lithuanian capital, are already in the hands of the court) worked at the Arisa cooperative in Moscow, which is in Sheremetyevo-II. The investigation led the agents from of the international airport to Zdorovye, another cooperative. From there, the tracks led to the Istok company. It was established that both Arisa and Zdorovye were under the control of a noted Moscow gang, the so-called "Chechen community." One Musa Ozdoyev, a minor Mafia boss, the chief of the transportation shop of Arisa, was the leader of the Vilnyus attack.

But let us go on: The Istok company is a branch of the association by the same name headed by Artem Tarasov. (Incidentally, both Arisa and Zdorovye are its offsprings). An incredible scandal broke out when an attempt was made to conduct a search in Istok. The noted merchant accused the law-enforcement authorities of violating his rights as a deputy. He also accused the president of the USSR of seeking "revenge." And although there is no law which prohibits an investigation if a people's deputy may be involved (such was precisely the case of Istok, Tarasov's company), there was a great deal of hullabaloo. This gave birth to the assumption that if such a tremendous brouhaha was made because of a petty event, such as searching the premises of one of the companies branches, and Istok has nearly 150 of those, it meant that Tarasov, who was not being accused by anyone of having hired suspicious personnel to run his numerous cooperatives, including criminals, considered creating such a scandal necessary. Was this in order to block an investigation? Most likely, the reason was a large sum of money, as was assumed by the investigators for the USSR MVD and the MUR [Moscow Criminal Investigations] who were investigating the criminal case of the "Vilnyus"

extortionists. However, the fact that the amount was almost \$50 million, became known to A. Biryukov, the operative in charge, much later.

Meanwhile, despite the difficulties, Istok (the company and not the association) was searched. One of the interesting papers among those which were seized allowed the company to terminate its existence at will (which is the usual trap set by most of our "merchants"). Slightly rushing ahead of the story, let me inform the readers that Vladimir Ponomarenko, the company's manager, took off for France with his family the moment there was even a whiff of a possible investigation. In France, according to informed sources, he divorced his wife. The divorced spouses each married a French citizen. Therefore, now Ponomarenko is a French citizen and cannot be touched by our system of justice.

Meanwhile, Artem Mikhaylovich continued to publish in KOMMERSANT heart-breaking stories. "Now they can simply shoot me dead," he began by telling the startled readers. Later he wrote: "They no longer searched me. They began to rob me." I am mentioning this event, which occurred six months ago, in connection with some titillating and until now unknown facts of the "robbing" of Tarasov's former wife. The list of items stolen from her included valuables, money, hard currency, and fur coats. In off-the-record talks the special investigators insisted that Artem himself had assisted in the robbery. Indeed, investigation data, the same type of data used throughout the civilized world to submit proof in a court of justice, confirmed that Tarasov had told Dmitruk (his former wife) that it was he who had taken the money and wanted her to file a claim for the loss of the fur coats....

Is it not true that such obviously criminal actions do not befit the status of a Russian people's deputy, that of our most notorious businessman, who is stealing millions? As to the millions: for Tarasov, they began at the Tekhnika cooperative not without engaging in various criminal activities, as became known later. Money was contributed by trusting simpletons, who dreamed of the computers in which the cooperative had specialized. The millions vanished but no one ever heard anything about the computers.

A. Biryukov, a person who has spent decades as an investigator, began by studying the life of his client, starting virtually with his birth. The information he gathered was extremely curious. However, the reaction to all the unseemly actions by this Russian people's deputy, who was a member of the Republic's government, was that he was "slandered."

What did the disgraced investigator establish? It turned out that the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office had still not completed its investigation of Tekhnika. Claiming press of business, Tarasov stopped going to the investigator's office. Meanwhile, it was reported to the Zhilsotsbank, in Moscow's Sverdlovskiy Rayon, that claims filed against Tekhnika had already reached the sum of 11

million rubles. But who needed such information, when the view had taken firm hold that Tarasov would feed and clothe the people. Alas, to use the street slang, Artem Mikhaylovich had indeed "shod" the people: according to very rough estimates, \$48 million'.

Last August, Tarasov obtained from the RSFSR Council of Ministers an export permit for 500,000 tons of fuel oil. Materials taken from Biryukov proved that instead of low-grade fuel oil, he had exported high-grade oils (Tarasov was also granted incredible customs and tax facilities).

The millions which were earned with such a dirty deal, to put it mildly, did not go to meet the needs of the people. Incidentally, it was precisely Biryukov and his colleagues who estimated that this "operation" earned Tarasov not \$10 but some \$70 million.

The next action which Istok undertook is little-known to our people. It is a question of the "Harvest-90" program. Do you remember what a noisy campaign was mounted in the press on this subject? So far, however, no farmer has cashed a check for the delivered crops, although here as well the "bread-earner" Tarasov offered his services. The RSFSR Council of Ministers allowed Artem Mikhaylovich to transfer the money earned from the fuel oil to the account of the Istok association. Curious, is it not? The fuel oil belonged to the state and was not Tarasov's. But there is more. Allegedly, in the interest of "Russia's economic sovereignty" the hard currency was deposited in an account in the Paribas French bank.

The moment he smelled the stink, Artem Mikhaylovich took off for "treatment" (that was the specific purpose of this trip as reported to the Russian Congress of People's Deputies) to the banks of the Seine. This was followed by the disappearance of the \$48 million from the Paribas account, after which rumors spread about the disappearance of our noted merchant. According to their data, officials of the USSR MVD Sixth Administration claim that Artem Mikhaylovich is alive and well, that no attempt was made on his life, and that he still controls the situation in Moscow, the reason for which appeared in the "letter from afar," which was clearly predated.

The author of this article spoke with agent A. Biryukov soon after he met with the correspondent of STERN. This was on 31 August. Aleksandr Mikhaylovich said: "If our newspapers do not wish to print the information, eventually someone is bound to find the truth."

Yes, it was difficult for Commissioner Cattani to live in his own country. The courageous Italian, however, was almost always accompanied by bodyguards who would occasionally engage in a shoot-out. Operative Biryukov has been "shooting" for more than half a year mainly with a fountain pen. Ever since his name appeared in the press in connection with the "Tarasov scandal," the USSR MVD leadership received 11 deputy queries demanding explanations. The explanation was provided and no violations were found. The same answer was

received from the Union, Republic, and City Prosecutors' Offices, which were also instructed "to find out what Biryukov was doing." In this stack of documents, the question asked by academician Tikhonov stands really out. "I no longer mention aspects such as being accused of undermining the power of our state and accusations that I played a role in the 'Kryuchkov scenario,'" A. Biryukov said. "But why is it that a people's deputy of the USSR and president of the Union of United Cooperatives is reporting about the criminal inclinations of V. Ponomarenko, director of the Istok company, who escaped to France? Is it because he is certain that that individual stole \$48 million? If Tikhonov knew this already, as an official, what personal role did he play in this scenario?"

Yes and, incidentally, where have all these dollars gone? According to the agents, after Tarasov left for France, two vans loaded with inexpensive shoes (allegedly part of the "Harvest-90" program) were shipped from France to Moscow. Because of their substandard quality, the shoes were returned. This, however, was not the only item. Baggage wagons carrying foreign identification labels were stuffed with personal items owned by Ponomarenko and Tarasov. Standing out among the numerous belongings were two luxury-model Mercedes, about which Artem Mikhaylovich loved to boast in Moscow.

The "Moscow" money was sufficient to pay for such purchases made by Tarasov. Nonetheless, where did the millions which disappeared from the Paribas account go? Data acquired by the investigators proved that it was precisely this money that could earn interest and be used to obtain more bank credits and thus live in France entirely carefree. However, such money would also suffice to purchase a small plant, or a private airline. Other assumptions have been made as well. Thus, according to A. Biryukov, it was precisely with Tarasov's hard currency millions that the familiar Alisa company was able to open branches in the United States. And although this may be just a hypothesis, we have always been amazed at the skillful manner in which German Sterligov, the young millionaire, was able to avoid to answer the question of how he made his millions? According to Biryukov, he made them precisely the way our other noted businessmen had: by being given the right to make use of scarce government materials, our merchants have essentially replaced state structures with their own. According to the businessmen, this precisely applies to materials about which stupid officials cannot even find customers. Why should they seek customers if they are part of the new market structures, such as stock exchanges, Soviet law, and small enterprises, all of which which leads to substantial earnings? Generally speaking, is it possible to "play the market" in our country, exhausted by shortages as it is? Here no one plays the market. One simply dictates one's conditions and charges a given price which is a hundred times higher than the official state price.

Incidentally, you may not have noticed that in those distant Western democracies the public is usually

familiar with celebrities, whereas in our country no one is. And if bad rumors are circulating about you, be good enough to answer. Such is not the case in our country. The only fact that was made clear after numerous conversations with Mr Sterligov was that this 23-year old millionaire does not have higher training. A colleague of mine established an extremely interesting detail: it turned out that Sterligov was not expelled from the school of law at Moscow State University for making anticommunist statements. He left voluntarily, the moment he became a defendant in setting fire to a cooperative stand on the Arbat (the scenario of habitual racketeer "account settling: some cooperative members steal from other, and some which refuse to pay the "tax"). Sterligov's friend, who testified about him, was sentenced (the sentence included the charge of carrying firearms which, in 1989, was still sensational), while the "case" of G. Sterligov was thrown out of court for lack of proof. Investigators at the Kiev Rayon Internal Affairs Administration remember this noted millionaire from copies they keep of answers to complaints filed by Sterligov, who claimed that they took from him 20 kopeks and a ballpoint pen. A sample of this epistolary genre of Mr Sterligov's has been kept by a colleague of mine as well. He uses refined expressions such as "sailing against the wind," "worrying about deadlines,"...

Incidentally, as to deadlines. Would he be bothered if we were to suggest that the "Tarasov millions" found their way into the hands of the Alisa management? "And how did you manage to earn this hard currency?" is the question with which Biryukov answered Tarasov's question. Generally speaking, as the former people's deputy A. Tarasov said, having prophesied that the president of the USSR would surrender the Kuril Islands to Japan, "everyone has the right to make assumptions."

Therefore, what is the specific result of this sensational "Tarasov" story?

The moment the disappearance of \$48 million from the hard currency account of Istok became known, the current management of the association purchased goods for the same amount as part of the "Harvest-90" program. All information on A. Tarasov's activities and his association was submitted to the USSR Prosecutor's Office, which is trying to determine whether theft is involved in the disappearance of \$48 million from the Paribas account, or not.

The only unresolved question is that of Tarasov's whereabouts, for no official data whatsoever may be found as to how he flew abroad. Interpol refuses to look for him. The very thought of going to France or to the United States, in pursuit of the "banished" former people's deputy, becomes academic in the case of our investigators, exhausted by complaints and various stipulations, for where would they find the necessary hard currency? Therefore, what they can do is to wait for the next puzzling bit of news from Tarasov. It is interesting to see how he will manage this: He did not use the mails or a

messenger yet the letter announcing his resignation as deputy nonetheless reached the "White House."

What conclusion could be drawn from all this? We are not yet ready to live according to the laws of civilized countries. Justice is helpless in the struggle against real organized crime. Criminologists claim that today a left-wing branch of organized crime has emerged, which is clearly superior in terms of number and strength to the old, conservative one. As a result, we have the picture described in STERN: "They swindle the state for billions of rubles and they are connected with the old communists and the new capitalists. They blackmail and kill people. Gangster syndicates are ruling the collapsing huge empire."

Stiffer Sentences Urged To Combat Rise in Crime

924B0044A RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian
16 Oct 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Valentin Demin, first deputy director of the All-Union Institute for the Study of Problems of Strengthening Law and Order: "We Have Surpassed the United States in the Number of Murders as Well as in the Number of Presidents: We Need Only Measure Up to Them in Terms of Authority"]

[Text] There is a wise Vietnamese saying: "Two may sleep in the same bed, but their dreams will be different." So it is with respect to the law. It is utterly different to "radicals" and "conservatives"; to representatives of the Union and republic state structures; to those who strive to live better by their own labors and those who reap profits by dishonest deals.

Musing over the fact that our people lack respect for the law, A. Herzen noted: "The crying injustice of half the laws have taught them to hate the other half; so they submit as to some blind force."

Over the years of Soviet power, the decline in prestige of the law became simply catastrophic, I think for this very reason. There was, however, a distinctive aura about it, as if to say: If those in authority can break the law, then why can't we?

The bureaucratized CPSU, running the country as a monopoly without any supervision, not only did not consider itself bound by law. It openly set itself above the law. The indiscipline and corruption of party officials locally became increasingly illegal and widespread. Judicial and law enforcement bodies were reduced to the role of obedient executors of political directives.

But is it really tolerable that such a person as Yevgenyevich Nikonov, the former procurator of Krasnogorsk, for example, who selflessly engaged in battle with the local mafia and successfully prosecuted its ringleaders for taking bribes and other misdeeds, should be held responsible for the evils of the entire system? When the workers at the largest plant in Krasnogorsk nominated Nikonov as a candidate for USSR people's deputy,

everything was done to prevent his election and to drive him out of the procuracy as well as out of Krasnogorsk. Coming to the defense of Nikonov during these difficult days for him was SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, the predecessor publication of what was to become RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.

Instructive, too, is the position taken by the collective of the public prosecutor's office of Ryazansk Oblast on 19 August. It not only promptly dissociated itself from its superiors, who had taken the side of the putschists, but announced its readiness to come to the defense of legally constituted authority with weapons in hand.

The overthrow of the unjust system that existed offers us a historic opportunity to affirm—not in terms of demagoguery but in fact—lawfulness as one of the foundations of the new state system and emergent society. To achieve this, however, it is necessary to profit fully from the bitter lessons of our past. Any power, even one that serves the noblest of aims it would appear, inevitably will grow into a state of totalitarianism if it dares to rise above the law—if it does not feel itself bound by it—and if society does not work out effective ways of controlling this power.

It is therefore particularly important that any changes and reforms carried out by the new regime from the outset have a firm legal basis and be strictly in accordance with the law, so that arbitrary acts in violation of rights may be promptly and rigidly suppressed.

Widespread condemnation of the activities of the leadership in Russia in this respect during the putsch cannot be called justified. The Russian government bodies, for example, were forced to take upon themselves the functions of the Union ministry departments in their territory since the USSR Supreme Soviet was inoperative and the Union government backed the coup.

A tendency to revert to this habit of not respecting the law, however, is manifesting itself even now.

Why are certain of the ukases issued by the president of the RSFSR so lacking in substance from the legal standpoint and therefore stirring justified criticism?

Why as a result of the actions of six members of the Presidium of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labor, who had supported the putschists, was it necessary to disband the Moscow and rayon councils of this organization, close their bank accounts, and seal off the premises? More than two million veterans in Moscow were thus deprived of the opportunity to requisition food supplies through their councils, to get material assistance from charitable organizations, or to obtain legal counsel.

A campaign that has been widely unleashed to expose persons who did not take a stand against the State Committee of the Emergency [GKChP] during the 19-21 August period is stirring profound public apprehension. Among them, of course, are many who were simply

confused, disoriented, or poorly informed with regard to the law, persons in the habit of carrying out everything coming from such highly placed personages as the president of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the acting President of the USSR and chairman of the Council of Ministers, and their department heads. Indeed, how can we speak of compliance on a mass scale with fiats of the Emergency State Committee when the putshists failed to hold out for even three days?

Many people were sincerely convinced of the need to declare a state of emergency in the country; they demanded it from Gorbachev, and they detected weakness of power in his "indecisiveness." Can all of this really be ignored? Can the conniving role of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as its other organs perhaps if their complicity is established, really be the determining factor in the persecution of communists who have supported democratic changes by their actions wholeheartedly, and who have participated and continue to participate actively in this process?

The point is not simply that democracy stands to lose thousands and thousands of people who might have remained to uphold it. In a country where until recently without respect for the law such a campaign may assume extremely dangerous and destructive forms. As one so-called revolutionary, A. Platonov, put it in a similar situation: "This means that all the bad people must be killed or there will be very few good ones left."

It is true that the underlying causes of the putsch, its driving force and mechanism, must be explored in depth and exposed, and that everything must be done to apply the lessons that have been learned from what happened.

After the establishment of personal blame by competent bodies, however, those alone who committed unlawful acts must answer for their misdeeds in accordance with the law. That is the way it must be in a lawful state. It is for us to ponder this fact long and hard.

The crime situation is particularly alarming. Last year there were almost 120,000 cases of criminal hooliganism, of which more than 30,000 were dropped. The remainder went to court. What was the disposition of these cases? Roughly two-thirds of the hooligans who were guilty of acting with "malice aforethought" and 90 percent of those who committed acts of hooliganism without aggravating circumstances remained free.

Of course, these findings must not be oversimplified. To call for the incarceration of all hooligans would be unjust and irresponsible. But facts are facts. Whereas previously a hooligan knew in advance that he would be jailed, and that only the very lucky ones could manage to get off with a slight scare, now he is convinced of his impunity.

We need not be surprised by the fact that street crime has tripled since 1986, that in many places criminal gangs literally terrorize people, and that we now surpass the United States in the number of murders committed. Nor can liberal admonitions alter such a situation. People judge authority by how reliably the property, the health, and the lives of citizens are protected. A democratic revolution requires stable order. It is time to get rid of a host of illusions about "humanizing" punishment, the humanity of which lies largely in protecting citizens from people who commit crimes and in forcing criminals to feel the unyielding force of the law.

**Burlatskiy on Actions During Coup, Dismissal
From LITERATURNAYA GAZETA**

924B0013A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Sep 91 p 6

[Article by Fedor Burlatskiy: "Chronicle of One Mini-Coup." Subheading: "The chief editor of LG will leave the newspaper after observing the legal procedures." Article is introduced as boxed material by Vitaliy Tretyakov.]

[Text] I am familiar with all the arguments that can be made against publishing the following material. But there is at least one "for," which in my estimation tips the scales in favor of publication, even if all the "against's" are fully justified. This "for" consists of the fact that Fedor Burlatskiy has been denied the right to state his position in the newspaper that he headed.

It goes without saying that NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA [NG] will make its pages available also to those who hold an opposing opinion regarding the "mini-coup" at LITERATURNAYA GAZETA [LG]. In any case, I believe it would be wiser if the LG's internal problems were resolved on its pages. It is precisely from its pages that the readers of this respected newspaper, among whom I also include myself, would find out about both points of view. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA remains true to its rule: He, who cannot obtain a forum anywhere, may obtain it in NG.

-Vitaliy TRETYAKOV

Position

Readers of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, many television viewers, and also foreign correspondents and partners have asked me: "What happened at LG? Why did the newspaper collective express its distrust of its chief editor? The number of questions has been increasing, since the flow of publications and speeches by some colleagues at LG has been growing like a snowball. Not limiting themselves to the four pieces in LG (No. 35, August 4, 1991) [Translator's Note: The date, August 4, 1991, is incorrect. The correct date is September 4, 1991, as evidenced from Mr. Orekhov's letter, cited below. The coup began on August 19, 1991.], they organized close to hourly appearances on Russian television, then sent deliberately false information to IZVESTIYA and other newspapers, organized an appearance on Radio Liberty, and gave interviews to THE WASHINGTON POST and other foreign newspapers. While all this was going on, I was not given an opportunity to meet with the collective or publish anything in the pages of LG, where I had published since 1956 and where I had been chief editor for one and a half years. They refused to publish a letter to the editor written by A.P. Orekhov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and other materials which shed light on the events.

In the information given to MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and published by them, there is literally not one word of truth: Despite what was written, I did not submit a resignation; no one called me in the Crimea to

demand that I return immediately; I was not removed from work, but distrust was expressed behind my back without observing elementary procedures that are provided for in the LG charter and by the laws of the country.

At the same time, notwithstanding my statements on television and in various print media, I was refused the elementary right to come out with the true facts.

All this has motivated me to compile this chronicle, without commentary, of what actually transpired at LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

1. On the morning of August 19th, having heard the State of Emergency Committee (GKChP) announcement on the radio, I called First Deputy Yu. D. Poroykov in the editorial office to obtain more complete information and to work out a plan of action. That same day we spoke again several times. When it became clear that our newspaper was not among the publications permitted, that the Committee on Publication (Gorkovlyuk) is demanding an announcement with a request to allow publication on condition that GKChP materials be published, and that a number of publications—MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, and others are preparing OSHCHAYA GAZETA through illegal means, I gave clear instructions: Do not write an announcement for Gorkovlyuk in any case; prepare the newspaper and gather comments with protests against the coup until we are forbidden to publish; join forces with OSHCHAYA GAZETA or publish our own underground newspaper by computer or even by the rotoprint method and severely censure the illegal coup; and make a presentation at the impending general meeting of the collective in the name of the chief editor in this spirit.

I cite a letter from A.P. Orekhov, which confirms my words:

September 6, 1991

To the Editorial Office of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA from the People's Deputy of the USSR, 343-rd Territorial Electoral Okrug, Orekhov, Anatoliy Pavlovich.

Dear LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staffers!

I read in your newspaper of September 4, 1991, No. 35, the material you published under the rubric, "What Transpired at LG," and was surprised by the gist of the accusation against Burlatskiy, Fedor Mikhaylovich, regarding his conduct during the days of the coup.

On August 18th I arrived in Crimea for my vacation at the "Nizhnyaya Oreanda" health resort, and on August 19th, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning I heard about the GKChP over the radio and television. I immediately telephoned Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov's office and asked: "What should we do?" The answer I received was: "Watch television, listen to the radio, and keep your self-control and patience!"

I felt uneasy and began meeting with Deputies who were vacationing there, with the goal of agreeing on what more we should do. I also happened to see Fedor Mikhaylovich Burlatskiy there and decided to consult with him. I had already worked out my own conviction: I firmly believed that this was illegal and that we must vote against the GKChP at the session of the Supreme Soviet. F.M. Burlatskiy agreed fully with my reasoning and invited me to his room later on August 19th. When I arrived there around 1850 hours, Fedor Mikhaylovich was on the telephone with someone from the editorial office and was giving instructions to publish the newspaper in any way possible, even as an underground edition, and condemn the coup. While I was there, this telephone conversation lasted some 15 minutes. After he was through, he told me straight out that this was a coup and it must collapse with our help.

I proposed that Fedor Mikhaylovich try to break through to Foros and meet with M.S. Gorbachev, so that later, on August 26th at the Supreme Soviet session we could tell the truth about Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's state of health. Fedor Mikhaylovich reacted very coldly to this proposal, saying we would not be allowed to go there and, even worse, they could detain us and not allow us to be present at the session of the Supreme Soviet. He said that our task was to make a decision right now about flying to Moscow as soon as possible and prepare all members of the Supreme Soviet to vote against the GKChP. On August 20th the Deputies began to look into flights to Moscow, and it turned out that the earliest flight out was on August 22nd.

On the 19th and 20th of August we did not think that the coup would be over in three days, and we believed that we were facing a very responsible decision-making mission at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on August 26th. I am happy that the coup was stopped prior to that. I would just like to caution all employees of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA not to make rash judgements about your comrades.

I am a person from the Transbaykal area, and I am used to honesty and truth. I consider the reproaches against Burlatskiy, F.M., unjust.

Respectfully,
People's Deputy of the USSR
A.P. OREKHOV

I ask you to publish this letter in a forthcoming issue of the newspaper.

The letter was not published. I should also note that we received incomplete information, since the All-Union television program in the Crimea was replaced by an American program on satellite communications.

During the day of the 19th we met with S.A. Ambartsumyan, L.A. Arutyunyan, and other members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and came to the mutual conclusion that we should speak out and decisively condemn the GKChP at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We began attempts to fly to Moscow. Representatives of the

"Nizhnyaya Oreanda" health resort administration explained, however, that tickets for all Deputies had been ordered for August 25th, by instructions from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and that possibly this would be a special flight. And it is true that our tickets actually were changed to August 25th (My wife and I were originally scheduled to fly out on September 1st). We asked about our tickets a number of times and only on the 21st were we able to get tickets for August 22nd. S. Ambartsumyan and L. Arutyunyan, as far as I know, were able to fly out only on the 24th, and other Deputies, as late as the August 25th.

2. On August 20th I spoke with Yu.D. Poroykov four or five times. I confirmed my earlier instructions about preparing an underground issue. He told me that colonels were sitting in the editorial offices and in the printing plant (which is in a building on another street), and an armored personnel carrier (BTR) was in front of the entrance. I told him that our staff should type their material where there were no military people and where they had the necessary computer or Xerox equipment. He assured me that he would do everything possible. I asked him to include my statement and gave him my assessment of the events and what action must be taken.

3. On August 21st Yu.D. Poroykov called me in a high state of agitation and said that Yu. Shchekochikhin had not asked his permission, had gone over the head of the administration, and invited representatives of the democratic press to LG, that a meeting was scheduled in one hour, and he did not know what to do. I gave him firm instructions to chair that meeting and make a statement in my name, condemning the coup. It took about 15 minutes to dictate my statement to him. At the end, feeling his vacillation, I asked him to put a stenographer on the line, but he answered in an irritated tone that he had written down everything himself. But I had doubts and I called the editorial office again, reached a driver, and asked him to put Yu.B. Solomonov, another one of my deputy's, on the line, to whom I dictated my statement for publication in the newspaper (open or underground). The telephone connection was interrupted several times, but I still was able to complete my message. I cite this statement in full (the headline "We Protest!" was inserted by the editor, replacing my word, "Statement.")

We Protest!

I am expressing my resolute protest against the USSR GKChP Resolution No. 2 regarding the de facto ban and reregistration of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, as well as many other publications in our country, which is contrary to the Law on the Press and Other Means of Mass Information. We shall do everything we can to have our newspaper, which has been published since 1929, including the Stalin era, remain viable.

As a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I consider it necessary to state the following:

First: USSR President M.S. Gorbachev should have been invited to the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet

planned for August 26th. Even during the coup in October 1964, Khrushchev was invited to the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and was given the opportunity to respond to accusations against him and defend his position.

Second: A meeting of the USSR Council of Federation should be scheduled without delay, so that this constitutional organ can clarify the status of the republics, and this status conveyed to the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Third: The views of A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, should be heard, because his position remains unclear.

Fourth: As chairman of the Public Commission on Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights (SKEBS), I appeal to all participants in these political events to prevent bloodshed and loss of life at all costs. I hope this appeal will evoke a response from all defenders of the law in our country and abroad.

I call on all People's Deputies of the USSR to cast aside their differences in this hour, crucial to the destiny of our country, and take a courageous position in the struggle for the triumph of constitutional order, lawfulness, democracy, and political reform.

F. BURLATSKIY
Chief Editor,
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA,
Member of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

August 21, 1991

1000 hours. By telephone from the Crimea.

At the end of the conversation I asked Yu. Solomonov to meet us at Vnukovo on August 22nd, since it was possible that I might be met by some others, and he would be a witness if that happened.

After the meeting I spoke again with Yu. Poroykov. He informed me that he had read my statement at the meeting of the democratic press, but then it turned out that he spoke for himself and mentioned only in passing that his opinion was supported by the chief editor.

That same morning I had a talk with A.V. Golovchanskiy, general director of the publishing house, and asked him why an illegal edition was not being prepared, to which he answered that colonels are sitting in his office, but there are none in the LITGAZ building and furthermore, all the necessary equipment is available, but Poroykov is afraid to do anything. I called Poroykov, and he told me that the computers and Xeroxes had been sealed (this was not true).

Altogether, during the three days of the coup I spoke with my editorial office over 20 times (this can be seen from the payment receipts for the telephone calls made).

After my return I found out that a column had been prepared on August 20th which had GKChP documents and no (not even international) negative commentaries. Under these documents was a satirical article, "With My [Male] Wife, Vitya" [sic].... I also found out that editorial employees tried to withdraw all copies of this column, but the newspaper LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA—LG's opponent—managed to obtain a copy and published it in No. 36, dated September 11, 1991.

4. On August 22nd I was met at Vnukovo not by Yu. Solomonov, but by Yu. Poroykov. I wanted to go to the editorial office immediately, but he said that no one was there any longer. We sat at the train station for an hour, listening to M.S. Gorbachev on the television and then went to our respective homes.

5. On the morning of August 23rd I participated in a meeting of the initiative group of USSR Deputies (Kalinina, 27). There were about 50 people there out of more than 600 Deputies. After that I went to the editorial office. There I was told that I. Mamaladze, chairman of the bureau of the journalists' organization (she had worked at one time with Yu. Poroykov at MOLODOY KOMMUNIST, where he was chief editor), is collecting signatures from employees regarding my retirement. Three reasons were given: (1) He did not come to Moscow during the coup; (2) he made a weak statement; and (3) he did not watch over the work of the editorial office, because he had so many meetings at the USSR Supreme Soviet. The letter was allegedly signed at the time by 61 persons out of a total of 230 editorial workers. They promised to show me this letter, but notwithstanding my numerous requests, they never did.

We had a meeting of the editorial collective with members of the bureau of the journalists' organization, where Mamaladze repeated the contents of the letter. The participants, in turn, made critical remarks about me, and made a real trial out of it. I said that I would take the substantive criticism under consideration, that I consider the reprimands about my insufficient attention to every editorial employee justified, but that this occurred because of a lack of time (meetings in the Supreme Soviet last from 10:00 o'clock in the morning until 7:00 in the evening). I reminded them that I had managed to resolve such key problems as establishing the labor collective as the owner of LG, for which I was "attacked" by some 30 hate-filled, critical articles in PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, and other publications; that I was able to supply newsprint for a year ahead; that I increased salaries by nearly double for all employees (except the chief editor); that I stood up for our foreign correspondent stations; and that I prepared the reunification with the publishing house. The main thing I was able to do was to keep the newspaper on a clear liberal-democratic line against the right-wing reaction and the "left" extremists, who were pushing the country to a dictatorship. I expressed surprise that no one had ever reprimanded me a single time in all the time I had worked there.

With regard to political accusations, I announced that this was dirty slander and that I shall fight to my last bullet for my honor as a person who has led the fight for democracy in our country already for several decades. I reminded them that only a half year ago, the Central Control Commission of the CPSU Central Committee had proposed to expel me from the party for my article, "Alternative," in which I put forth the idea of creating a broad front of democratic forces, and that at the 4th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR I presented a resolution, "Dictatorship Will Not be Accepted," for which I also had to take a number of sharply worded articles written against me in the right-wing press.

I asked that a meeting of the LG labor collective be scheduled after the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

6. On August 27th, Daniil Granin sent a letter to the editorial office. I cite it in its entirety:

To the Members of the Editorial Board of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA

Dear Comrades!

I have learned that in the near future you are to have a meeting of the newspaper collective devoted to the state of affairs in the editorial office. At one time, a group of writers and I worked quite a bit on resolving the issue of the new status for the newspaper. Finally, we were able to achieve the newspaper's independence and some restructuring of its leadership. Since that time we have considered the newspaper as our own writers' newspaper, and it actually did change for the better in many respects. We deeply feel all the events and difficulties that the newspaper is going through. This is why I think it would be desirable that this sort of important meeting be attended by members of the newspaper's public council, writers, and even I would like to attend. Many of us writers will be participating in the Congress of People's Deputies which opens on September 2nd, and if there is a chance on the evening of the 2nd or the 3rd, my comrades and I could be at that meeting. In the event that this is not possible, I still consider the participation of the members of the public council mandatory, but in order to achieve this, everyone has to be notified in advance.

August 27, 1991

Daniil GRANIN

The public council is comprised of major writers and public officials, for example, Bykov, Yevtushenko, Voznesenskiy, Okudzhava, Petrovskiy, Averintsev, Shmelev, and many others.

But exactly on August 27th at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a meeting of the labor collective took place without participation of the members of the public council and without me. I telephoned, having left the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet at 1:00 PM, and was told that the meeting will take up only the question of interrelationships with the publishing house. It was,

however, devoted exclusively to the issue of the chief editor and passed a resolution, "On Distrust." At the same time they made a press announcement to the effect that the resolution was passed unanimously. In actuality, many major journalists did not participate in the meeting and one of the editors, I. Rishina, not only voted against, but even (I apologize) threw a shoe at Yu. Poroykov's face. A.V. Golovchanskiy, a member of the editorial board, submitted a resignation from the board as a sign of protest against the persecution of F.M. Burlatskiy.

The same day the LG editorial board decided to relieve me of my position as chief editor, although according to the LG charter the chief editor can be elected only by all members of the collective and only after receiving approval from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, since we are speaking about a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet. I still have not been shown the minutes of the meeting.

When I arrived at the editorial office, my office was locked, the secretary fired, and the nameplate on the doors was torn off.

The next day, the labor collective of the Publishing-Production Association [IPO], which belongs to the USSR SP [expansion unknown], and which includes journalists, employees, and workers from the place where LG and more than ten other publications are printed, made a decision on organizational establishment and invited F.M. Burlatskiy to take the position of IPO chairman.

I cannot help but ask several questions of my first deputy and other members of the leadership at LG, because answers to these questions are still unclear in my mind.

Why weren't my instructions carried out about publishing an illegal newspaper and why did LG not participate in the publication of OBSHCAYA GAZETA of the democratic press? Who is personally responsible for preparing two versions of the political column, one in the event of victory and the other in the event the coup was crushed? Why didn't a single person in the newspaper's leadership make a **personal** statement in the press (illegal or foreign), condemning the GKChP? Why was it necessary to conduct a meeting of the labor collective in such a hurry and make a decision on distrust that was clearly contrary to the LG charter, and then a decision of the editorial board to fire me, contrary to law? Why was D. Granin's and Ye. Yevtushenko's proposal ignored about the participation of the public council at the meeting? Who directed that the names of members of the public council be removed from the 16th column of the newspaper following all these events? Why didn't members of the editorial staff tell me that a group of employees at LG had already been preparing this overthrow for many months, and were just waiting for an opportune moment? And finally, was it moral to take advantage of this political event, this anticonstitutional coup, in order

to strike a blow at their colleague at work, stir up the entire collective, and place it on the edge of collapse?

In conclusion I shall permit myself to make a short sociological commentary as a lesson to other editorial offices. Of course, I understand how different the psychological state of people can be, standing on the square next to the White House, or people finding themselves far from Moscow and not even knowing the contents of orders given out by RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin. And still, this is no excuse to condemn those who held to the firm position of fighting against the coup under these circumstances.

In the LG mini-coup, however, various interests, views, and even tastes

crisscrossed. With regard to interests: Not long before my vacation I was careless enough to offer the position of first deputy to one of the members of the editorial staff; I refused to hire the chairman of the bureau of the journalists' organization and the chairman of the trade union for the editorial staff, and it was they who became the "instigators"; I fired four members of the editorial staff, one of whom was particularly zealous on television, and so on.

The main point is something else. It is the problem of generational change. At the last meeting of the editorial board, jointly with the sections, just before I left for the Crimea, I said that the main problem of our collective is gerontocracy, in other words, the power of the old men; we sixty-year-olds have sat around for too long. We have 50 people who are of retirement age. We must give our places to the young people. In the West, executives of various ranks retire at age 60, and no revolutions or coups are necessary.

With regard to ideological differences with some members of the collective—they said on television that they do not want to work with me because I am a "liberal democrat" and what is needed now is revolutionaries—I already briefly responded to this at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR: If extreme revolutionaries begin to deal with liberal reformers, it will lead to a repetition of October 1917 with all its well-known consequences.

And a more general conclusion: The model of electing the leadership of any enterprise by the collective itself, with all the democratic trappings, is defective. Everything in this case is decided by the activity of small groups or even by the furies of private interests. It would appear that a competitive system is preferable.

Of course, I shall leave the newspaper, but only after observing the legal procedures, and being convinced that the newspaper will be in the hands of a worthy successor and will continue the liberal-democratic traditions inherent in our literature and culture from the time of the great Pushkin, whose profile, as I had proposed, was the only one left on the first page of the newspaper.

OGONEK's Korotich Explains Reasons for Resignation

914B0403B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 35, Sep 91 p 3

[Article, under rubric: "In Response to the Question, 'Who's Who?': "V. Korotich: 'My Conscience Is Clean'"]

[Text] In a number of published items, V. Korotich, the former editor in chief of OGONEK magazine, was accused of having decided, during those three terrible August days, to sit things out in the "American trench" and had thrown the collective at the editorial office "to the mercy of fate." He had been in America and had in his hands a ticket for the 19th, but he handed it in on the day of departure and sent the editorial office a facsimile message with his resignation from the position of editor in chief.

[Interviewer] Vitaliy Alekseyevich, what was that? Momentary weakness, or fear of the junta or the "intrigues" of enemies?

[V. Korotich] I shall reveal the "terrible" secret to you. On 19 August I was supposed to fly from New York not to Moscow, but to Taiwan, where an interview with the president of that country had been planned for me. The night before I received a telephone call and was told that a coup d'etat had been carried out in the Soviet Union. That night I handed in the ticket, and at 0600 hours appeared on American television.

Then I got in touch by telephone with the editorial office. My deputy, L. Gushchin, told me that, in order to avoid arrest, our employees were planning not to spend the night at home, and he recommended to me that I do not return, or I would be arrested on the spot at the airport.

Of course, if I had been in Moscow, I would have been among the defenders of the White House. But I was in New York and I remained there for a few more days. I realized that the time had come to make room for younger people. Talking over the telephone with the chairman of the labor collective council, I recommended to the editorial office that they elect L. Gushchin as editor in chief, and to make me chairman of the magazine council. I told them, "Maybe I can be your wise Deng Hsiaoping." Incidentally, all the employees there are 10-12 years younger than me. The journalists accepted this recommendation with understanding and gratitude. Therefore this entire story is completely ridiculous and a bunch of lies.

Moreover, on the very first day of the coup I spoke on Radio Freedom and stated the following, "I ask the collective to do one thing—not to debase themselves and not to establish any contacts with the junta." Therefore my conscience is clean.

Unfortunately, in our country it is impossible to do anything normally. So I probably decided to change my status at the wrong time.

You realize that, within our memory, not a single one of our country's leaders voluntarily left his position. None of them subsequently was remembered with a good word. Practically speaking, not a single editor in chief had ever resigned properly either. This has always been accompanied by terrible mud-slinging. I wanted very much not to remain that kind of editor.

After six-eight years a person, even a very talented one, begins to think in stereotypes. Therefore I always took an attitude of horror toward those editors who remained in their seats for 30 years. A publication like that will inevitably be covered by moss.

If I was wrong about anything, berate me and "beat" me, but don't invent stories about me.

Personnel Changes, Plans for Reform Reported at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA

924B0026A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Sep 91 p 2

[Information by Natalya Dvoynishnikova: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Continues To Fight for Its Independence"]

[Text] Reliable sources report that two colonels from the disbanded Army and Navy Main Political Directorate have been put at the disposal of the editor in chief of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. One of them is Colonel Lukashenya; the other is Colonel Baranets, former consultant to General Shlyaga, former chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council. After the fate of the Main Political Directorate had been determined, Baranets was initially made editor in chief of the journal ARMIYA. However, the journal's collective succeeded in pleading with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense to retain its former editor in chief.

A meeting was held at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA at which the new statutes of the newspaper and a draft for a reform were approved. However, apparently the implementation of the planned reforms will not be easy. Rumor has it that the Ministry of Defense has its own views on the future of the newspaper. It is apparent that a similar situation is developing in the case of the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN.

Election of New LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Editor Considered

924B0026B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Sep 91 p 1

[Report by Boris Kuzminskiy: "LITERATURNAYA GAZETA May No Longer Be Literary; Arkadiy Udaltsov Appointed Editor in Chief"]

[Text] By no means were there 15 serious applicants for this job, which was what the press reported. A real struggle developed between Arkadiy Udaltsov, who was Fedor Burlatskiy's former deputy (in charge of the

"World of Man" section) and Yevgeniy Sidorov, presently rector of the Literary Institute. The former was persistently supported by a number of leading commentators of LG's [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] general policy section. The latter was supported equally firmly by the new SP [Writers' Union] leadership, headed by Yevgeniy Yevtushenko and Timur Pulatov. Last Thursday, however, several members of the newspaper reacted so sharply to this support of the writers that Ye. Sidorov was forced to withdraw his nomination. The "warm reception" given to him confirms that the confrontation between LG and the USSR SP had completed a new round.

Therefore, the meeting of the labor collective on Friday was faced with the task of choosing an editor in chief, having only one candidate. The problem was resolved successfully, and A. Udaltsov was given a vote of confidence with 11 "nay" votes.

Udaltsov enjoys the reputation of an experienced newsman and as a person with a profound neglect of literature. It should be expected that under his guidance LG will cover political problems more sharply and freely and will become modern and professional. However, there will be virtually no space left on its pages for the discussion of strictly literary problems. In any case, according to some information, it was essentially the personnel of the Russian literature section that voted against A. Udaltsov.

Journalists Fear for Future of IAN

924B0026C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Sep 91 p 6

[Unattributed letters to NG: "Once More About APN-IAN"]

[Text] This is not the first time that NG is publishing materials about the Novosti Press Agency, which was renamed IAN one year ago. Once again, we take up this topic.

This can be partially explained by the "benevolent attention which NG pays to the APN," as the author of one of the letters notes. Some of the NG personnel, including the editor in chief, had worked in the past for APN. At this point, however, this is not what is most important.

The agency personnel (despite past reductions, the collective remains quite numerous) are once again faced with the fact of the appointment of a new chairman of the board and the team he brought with him. Once again the APN-IAN personnel who, within a short period of time, have gone through several reorganizations, are concerned with what will happen to them tomorrow.

God, Give Us an Idea!

There were spontaneous appointments after the coup.... Would they bring about, once again, the presence of

incompetent people, dilettantes, in the higher power echelons? The threat exists. Thus, despite the great respect I feel for Yegor Yakovlev, I am totally unable to understand why he agreed to become chairman of Gos-teleradio. He is a newsman to the marrow of his bones. He is a high-class journalist, and television and radio are quite specific types of activities and factories for the production of entertainment! Does he have a bent for music and motion pictures? Hardly. It is rather a matter of prestige and ideological reasons... to become a state official.

Let us consider the new appointment to the IAN of Andrey Vinogradov. Naturally, he had worked for IAN, has had foreign assignments, and managed the RIA [Russian Information Agency], with a personnel of about 50 people. IAN, however, is a worldwide news agency, with correspondents in 120 countries and about 20 correspondent bureaus in the country. And what about the television directorate and the equipment system which handles all engineering facilities of the IAN, the press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the USSR Union of Journalists? Is Vinogradov prepared to assume the management of this entire machinery? Has he weighed everything before saying "yes" to someone up there?

In his address to the IAN council of directors, Andrey Vinogradov said that he still has no ideas about the further activities of the agency. Therefore, once again management has been assumed by someone who may not be an amateur but is a person without concepts. The large IAN collective knows quite well what this means. For four years we were waiting for such a concept to come from the former IAN chairman A.I. Vlasov, who spent that entire time in all sorts of activities, ranging from buying consumer goods abroad to an attempt to exchange Soviet rubles for dollars. How did all of this end? Instead of having an editor in chief a director was appointed and the personnel was reduced by a full third. And now, once again, we have a manager without a concept. The idea, however, seems to be the following: to reduce everything down to the maximal limits, for the RIA does not need such a monster and, furthermore, Russia has other things to worry about than the IAN. The problem, however, is that the supporters of perestroika are still relying on an imminent Russian revival. And since there will be, once again, a great Russia, it will need the IAN, with all of its expensive equipment, photographic archives, and experienced cadres. Who can say, perhaps it will be possible to recreate something like the IAN. However, the efforts to break up the agency in 1976 proved that such recreation would require a minimum of 15 years and hundreds of millions of dollars. Would it not be thriftier to retain as much as possible that which now exists, the more so since the printing of a few tens of millions of rubles for the time being would cost nothing? As to the concept, let us seek the advice of the USIA, they have a great deal of experience in such matters.

By an APN-IAN veteran.

For a variety of reasons, for the time being the author would like to remain anonymous.

The Slaves Are Trembling

Thanks to the benevolent attention which NG pays to the IAN, I would like to wish it well and to thank M.S. Gorbachev for his fatherly concern for its personnel. All that happened to the IAN last year affected no more than a few thousand people, a mere trifle!

Last August, by ukase of the USSR president, the IAN was placed under Russian jurisdiction.

Last year, if I am not mistaken, once again in August, to spite Russia, a ukase was signed on closing down APN and creating a new agency, but with the former chairman. This ukase saved Albert Vlasov from retirement and forced Russia to set up its own news agency—the RIA.

As far as the APN personnel were concerned, for a period of several months they expected yet another restructuring and dismissals. Eventually, the structure was approved. Its newness was essentially that some periodicals for foreign consumption were closed down and a council of directors was created. Last April, after initialing our dismissal slips, we parted with APN. Many of those dismissed were not rehired by the IAN.

Contracts were signed at the beginning of June. The "contracted" members of the IAN were leisurely called to report to work (understandably, the mood of the people who were in a pre-dismissal state of mind for quite some time, given minimal information, mostly based on rumors rather than on reliable data concerning forthcoming changes, did not predispose to fruitful work).

Then there was the coup, followed by happiness: the coup failed! There was more joy: the two presidents found a common language and now they will be jointly building a democratic state.

There was happiness for everyone, but in the case of the IAN personnel, it was spoiled by further layoffs. We had not even become accustomed to the new name and kept referring to the APN. We were given to Russia. The previous structure was naturally eliminated. The reason was the position assumed by the IAN during those three days in August. I am not trying to excuse the agency personnel. The lion's share, however, in my view, falls on chairman A.I. Vlasov, who was appointed, I repeat this, by the USSR president himself.

Once again we are being informed of our dismissal. This is the second time in one year! The situation is worsened by the fact that Russia already has its news agency—the RIA—which is performing adequately, which means that no one needs us and, if anyone does, needs very few among us.

Had Russia been given all of this last year, there would have been fewer unemployed journalists and more money would have been saved as well as better results would have been achieved.

Last year, however, this was impossible. Last year Mikhail Sergeyevich was quarreling with Boris Nikolayevich and kept the agency for himself, making it "presidential" (true, without any particular need to do so).

This year the APN-IAN personnel lived according to the saying according to which "when the bosses quarrel the slaves tremble." Actually, heads begin to break when they make peace. However, I have yet another question which triggers a great deal of apprehension. What if Mikhail Sergeyevich would (God forbid!) once again quarrel with Boris Nikolayevich? What would happen then with what is left of the APN-IAN?

The name of the author of this letter is known to the editors.

BBC Signs Broadcasting Agreement With Radio Rossiya

924B0046A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Oct 91
Union Edition p 2

[Article by Tim [Hewell], BBC Moscow correspondent, special to IZVESTIYA: "BBC on Radio Rossiya's Airwaves"]

[Text] For the first time in history, Soviet radio listeners will gain the opportunity to listen to BBC broadcasts on medium wave lengths.

In accordance with an agreement signed in Moscow on Wednesday by Oleg Poptsov, chairman of the All-Russian Television and Radio Company, and John [Tews], director of BBC's World Service, Radio Rossiya will grant its British partners part of its air time. Starting next year, at the end of each week BBC will broadcast directly in Moscow twice—with news and commentary programs. Once a week a BBC essay-style program will also be heard over Radio Rossiya. The agreement provides, in addition, the possibility for Radio Rossiya's journalists to serve as internships in London.

"If someone had told me five years ago that such a thing could happen, I would have considered him crazy," said John [Tews] after signing the agreement. Just in 1987 Soviet authorities were jamming BBC's broadcasts. Now the radio station broadcasts in Russian on the shortwave band more than eight hours a day and has about 13 million regular listeners. However, the size of BBC's audience in the USSR grows at times of crisis. During the August coup attempt that audience was joined by President Mikhail Gorbachev, who stated later that the foreign radio voices, and especially BBC, had served as his main source of information during his confinement.

Commenting on the concluding of the agreement, Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev said: "I

hope that BBC will continue its 'subversive programs' aimed at smashing the totalitarian system that once waged war against BBC."

Competition Between TV News Teams Examined

924B0046B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 12 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Zaynetdinov: "And the Passions Are Higher Than the Ostankino Television Tower"]

[Text] And so, the competition for the best television news program on Central Television is over and the results have been summed up. The TNS [Television News Service] brigade won. But the conflict between the new management of the All-Union State Television and Radio Company (AUSTRC) and the staff of the news studio continues. Our newspaper has already written about that this 21 September. Let me briefly recall the essence of the fuss. The journalists with Central Television's news service believe that there never really was any competition as such. And that it was cooked up merely in order to remove people, particularly Olvar Kakuchay, editor in chief of the "Vremya" program, who were not to the liking of the new AUSTRC management. In short, "Vremya" was supposed to cease existing.

When the competition results had been summed up, on 4 October a recording was made of a program in which the following took part: the TNS team; "Vremya" journalists led by editor in chief O. Kakuchay; Yegor Yakovlev, chairman of the Television and Radio Company, and his deputy Eduard Sagalayev; Boris Nepomnyashchiy, director of the news studio; sociologists who had conducted the survey of television viewers; and newspaper reporters. The program lasted for two hours, but a half hour of the tape, at the most, was shown on the air on 7 October. Trenchant presentations by "Vremya's" editor in chief, the "Utro" program's moderator Aleksandr Goryanov, and many journalists who criticized the reforms being carried out by the new management ended up being cut off. The broadcast did not follow the chronological order, and some episodes were presented in such a way that the meaning of what had been said was frequently distorted. Before the start of the broadcast, "Vremya" journalists had warned the moderator Dmitriy Krylov that they would not be able to participate in the program to the end; nonetheless, it was stressed that "Vremya's" representatives had left the studio without waiting for the broadcast to finish. In general, things worked out the way that Yegor Yakovlev had said at a meeting of the news studio on 18 September: " 'Vremya' has lost to everyone that it could, and it will no longer exist." And what will there be in its place? That is not yet clear.

On the other hand, it is already reliably known that Yegor Vladimirovich Yakovlev signed an order 23 September on the establishment of a television news agency in place of the news studio. The agency's founders will be

TASS, the NOVOSTI INFORMATION SERVICE and the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, which, incidentally, conducted the survey of television viewers during the competition.

What will the upshot of this "alliance" be for the country? Merging with television, these news monsters will become supermonopolists in the news field. As we know, the mass news media are the fourth estate. The power that this supermonopolist will possess is such that has not even been dreamed of by Gorbachev, or Yeltsin, or all the Supreme Soviets taken together. Let us note in this connection that not a single person from the Central Television news service will take part in the work on establishing the agency.

But what do the news studio's journalists want? Just one thing—to work independently. That, as the competition showed, is something that they know how to and can do. Now they would like not to be interfered with in some things but to be helped in others. So that things do not work out as they previously did, when the party and various state structures weighed heavily on them.

Totalitarianism, we believe, is now a thing of the past (God willing, forever), but phone calls from the top echelons of power continue. And people are tired of constantly being a kind of news servant.

The Television and Radio Company's new management blames the "Vremya" program for having become the embodiment of conservatism. People often recall this January when "Vremya" tendentiously covered the events in Vilnius. However, for some reason they do not recall that Central Television's news service was headed at that time by its present general director Eduard Sagalaye. Yegor Yakovlev, the new chairman of the Television and Radio Company, either does not recall or does not want to recall how on that same television he shot 22 films of the leader of the world proletariat. But he, after all, has reformed! So why not grant that possibility to others?

As strange as it may seem, the staff of the news studio and the management of AUSTRC are united in the opinion that "Vremya" should not exist in its previous form. Both want to change not only television's main news program, but the whole news service as well. Only the means by which they want to do that are extremely different. The management of the State Television and Radio Company has embraced the tried-and-true Bolshevik method: "Tear down everything to the foundation, and then—." Then there will be a news superempire.

The journalists, on the other hand, want to create their own, independent television studio. Therefore, at the general meeting of the studio staff that was held on 9 October, a decision was taken to found and register an Inform-TV [TV News] independent studio. But an attempt is being made to persuade the journalists that that is impossible. Television is an expensive pleasure. You need professional television equipment, service personnel, and most importantly—air time. And under

present conditions all that can be provided only by AUSTRC. Therefore, it is impossible to be fully independent of it. Although such an example already exists—the ViD television company.

The staff of the Inform-TV studio is proposing to earn their livelihood from advertising. But the management of the Television and Radio Company is doing everything possible to keep the news service in its power. It is resorting to economic sanctions against journalists. Thus, in August all the studio's creative personnel were deprived of bonuses for—"participation in the coup"! The journalists believe that that is an ominous warning. It may be followed by harsh repressions.

SELSKAYA ZHIZN on Current Subscription Campaign

924B0012A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
28 Sep 91 p 5

[Unattributed report: "We Are Counting on You, Our Dear Readers"]

[Text] It is bitter to read these letters; people are asking not for a piece of bread, but for their newspaper. But they are asking for it as if for bread, but even more awkwardly—well, how can they refuse us? And they make stipulations, and they laugh at it... Yet for many, for thousands, the newspaper is the final thread linking them with the world, and the last interlocutor they speak with, arguing or agreeing. And overcome, they sadly write, how can I live, I can't subscribe, but I can't be without a newspaper!?

Today we speak above all of the veterans, who have been counting every kopek of their meager pensions for a long time now, and who now face an almost unsolvable problem, whether they want it or not. And indeed, what can we advise them? Subscribe not for a year, but let's say, for just three months, sacrifice the 7 rubles, and then in late February, extend it for three more months, to a half-year, but then there will be others; how will many people do this? It is possible to go to the kolkhoz chairman or sovkhos director and ask them for help, although it would be better, of course, if they were to do that themselves, without waiting to be asked.

There is a proposal in the newspaper's mail that a collective social fund be created, which would be used for SELSKAYA ZHIZN subscriptions for the very needy. Yet this is a matter of time, and most likely, in the long term.

And therefore, we are addressing our talk about subscription today above all to farm managers and rural trade unions. And we request that they understand us, and we request help, since nowadays there are not many newspapers that know the life and concerns of the peasant so well, and that fight for him and his village. You can read other papers, and that is good too, if there is something funny and serious, but in addition there is the open

threat to the intractable village, the desire to crush the stubborn peasant. He won't sell grain—take it! Help with the harvest? Let him manage on his own! There isn't anything in the village stores? They'll get by; it's not like going to the theater... They are threatened with the courts, fines, ever more openly—highway robbery.

That is why we, to the displeasure of many who are unaccustomed to fighting to defend goodness and promote kindness, come resolutely to the defense of the peasant when there are attempts to wound him.

Alas, we have few opportunities. At the "Soyuzpechat" kiosks, they prefer to sell the somewhat more expensive publications; naturally, the profits from these are higher. We have no strong defenders other than you, reader. Nor are there rich patrons ready to donate 2-3 million as needed. Again, our faithful readers are our wealth, and our hopes and strengths are vested in you.

The current subscribership is essentially an issue of the paper's life. And as usual, it is needed in the countryside at a complicated time, a time of urgent matters and the autumn lack of cash. Some people haven't been given their pay, others used it up on schoolchildren... As they say, it all comes down to the same thing. And this is where farm managers could support us and help their workers and kolkhoz workers by paying for the newspaper subscription with an advance, and over a year, about 7 rubles each, quarterly, taking the advance out of salary. Of course, this is an extra bother for the book-keepers, and these days no one likes that. Yet we would request that they take on this work in the name of our common cause!

And that is not even to mention that a segment of our subscribers on farms could simply be paid for, as has been done by the general director of the Vishnevskiy poultry association of Tselinograd Oblast, Hero of Socialist Labor Ibragim Dautovich Zhangurazov, who signed an unusual order however you look at it: The enterprise's 12 best toilers are commended for their high production achievements with a year's subscription to the newspaper SELSKAYA ZHIZN. Among them are field cultivators, hero of socialist labor Ivan Alekseyevich Trenenkov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Skvortsov, Pavel Pavlovich Baksheyev, Valeriy Ferber, high-volume milkmaid Galina Mikhailovna Grinevich, poultry plant metal worker Aleksandr Pavlovich Vasilyev, incubator department head Liliya Ivanovna Tokareva, agronomist Petr Romanovich Filatov, and toilers of other departments.

True, this 250 rubles will not ruin the economy. And this unusual gift, this quarterly payment, which would seem ludicrous; give it as a premium, and it will remind you of itself within families for an entire year.

We are working for you, our dear readers. We promise you that all that is the best in the newspaper will remain there in the new year. And we are preparing a great deal that is new, interesting, and useful. We are counting on you, on your attention and your assistance.

SELSKAYA ZHIZN Announces New Prices

924B0012B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
1 Oct 91 p 4

[Unattributed report: "More Expensive, but Only in Retail Price"]

[Text] Yes, dear reader, starting today, the four-page issue of SELSKAYA ZHIZN will retail for 20 kopeks and the six-page issue will cost 30 kopeks.

We speak of this with regrets, but under the harsh market conditions generated by the rising cost of paper, services, the very cost of producing the paper, this measure was forced, even though even it does not solve all our financial difficulties. Incidentally, we assume that you have already noticed that our journalistic colleagues raised the price of their newspapers, IZVESTIYA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, TRUD, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and a number of other publications?

Naturally, we would not want to lose those who have been reading SELSKAYA ZHIZN for a long time, so we would like to direct your attention once again to the fact that the newspaper will cost you over 50 rubles less than last year, for subscribers, and you will not have to go to a kiosk for each issue. The newspaper has only gotten more costly in its retail price, we would note. The subscription price of SELSKAYA ZHIZN remains as previously announced, 27 rubles 60 kopeks annually, 13 rubles 80 kopeks per half-year, and 6 rubles 90 kopeks quarterly.

And a reminder: this is the last month for processing a subscription for the new year.

Moscow Soyuzpechat Official on Press Distribution Problems

924B0012C Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 36,
4 Sep 91 p 6

[Interview with chief of Moscow city Soyuzpechat Vyacheslav Antonov by Aleksey Chernyshev: "A Professional's Opinion: There Is a Chance That Muscovites Will Be Without Papers Next Year"; date, place not specified]

[Text] However sad it is for journalists and publishers to realize, perhaps the basic link in the entire complicated system of newspaper journalism is nonetheless the service for the distribution of the printed product. You can put out the most interesting, clever, pointed, and topical newspaper with unparalleled graphics, but if it doesn't get to the reader, all your efforts aren't worth a cent. In brief, to paraphrase the well-known slogan, today it can be boldly stated that "Soyuzpechat' determines everything"

Incidentally, to be fair, it should be noted that Soyuzpechat is not only the fundamental, but the extreme link of the system, and thus, in accordance with "the law of extremes," in general, it is at Soyuzpechat where the

majority of claims against magazines and their distribution come crashing down. Readers may understand how well-founded are these claims, and what is the actual state of affairs in the agency from our correspondent's conversation with the chief of Moscow city Soyuzpechat Vyacheslav Antonov.

[Correspondent] Vyacheslav Vasilyevich, how can you explain the fact that in spite of the explosion in freedom of information, it is increasingly difficult for the reader to purchase the publication he needs or likes in the Soyuzpechat kiosks?

[Antonov] In part that very newspaper freedom is to blame. No one was ready for the sudden enormous quantity of periodical publications. Newspaper kiosks have literally turned into print warehouses.

In Moscow now we sell in approximately 2,000 commercial outlets. That is obviously inadequate. For example, there are over 2,000 commercial outlets in Cologne, with one-fifth our population.

[Correspondent] What is keeping us from increasing the number of commercial outlets, starting departments in stores?

[Antonov] What is keeping us from doing that? In all of Moscow, we have only one expediting center, where the newspapers and magazines coming in from the publishing houses are sorted and distributed. It is located in the city center, and the newspapers have to be trucked all over Moscow. Some 160 expeditors come there every night to manually sort the newspapers among the kiosks, and then distribute them. Each has an average of 10-15, and it is already morning when he speeds along to them.

In addition, one of our most important problems is transportation. As a rule, periodicals are delivered to kiosks by taxi. Last year, the management of Moslegtrans [Moscow Passenger Vehicle Transportation] refused until December to draw up a transportation contract with us.

[Correspondent] Could such a situation be repeated this year as well?

[Antonov] It's already repeating itself. Right now I have a document stating that in 1992, the transportation people do not intend to work with us. That is, we face a new round of negotiations and talks. To be frank, we do not now have the moral right to conduct subscription campaigns, inasmuch as we have no transportation contract and we cannot guarantee that these newspapers and magazines will be delivered.

[Correspondent] You speak of a terrifying shortage of transportation and space, yet you can go out on any street and your eyes will convince you that a large number of kiosks are not working simply because there is no kiosk seller. Why is that?

[Antonov] The thing is that the personnel problem is also one of the worst problems. More than half our workers

are pensioners. The summer comes, and they can shut down their kiosk practically at any moment, citing poor health, or simply retire. In September, the situation changes radically, the pensioners try to come back to work. Frankly the workload for kiosk sellers and postal workers has multiplied, by comparison to recent years. Last year alone, Muscovites subscribed to 17.5 million copies of newspapers and magazines.

[Correspondent] Perhaps the problem lies in low wages?

[Antonov] That's not the likely cause. Someone who wants to earn money will always be able to do that, the desire is all. A person must have a sense of entrepreneurship. After all, we have both young people and family collectives working for us. They rent entire Soyuzpechat stores, draw up their own contracts, get subscriptions, and earn good money.

[Correspondent] Does that mean that selling newspapers is a fairly profitable business?

[Antonov] The problem is that it isn't! In practice, we have nothing from our newspaper sales; we only cover our losses. Incidentally, that is what goes on the world over. Stores selling the press "make money" through sales of companion goods: cigarettes, chewing gum, calendars, posters, and the like. It's the same way here.

[Correspondent] In that case, where is the guarantee that one fine day Soyuzpechat will altogether refuse to do such unprofitable work as distributing newspapers?

[Antonov] The temptation is great, but there exist for that purposes mayorships, to exercise control over city life. Again, in Germany, let's say, if you want to buy a newspaper kiosk at a train station, a mandatory condition will be imposed—it must operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. By the way, we are also concluding a contract with our lessees that stipulates that the newspaper and magazine sales volumes must not fall. The mayorships should operate on the same principle, granting space at stores planning to deal in print sales.

[Correspondent] Then what is the most important solution to the problem?

[Antonov] We propose a way out: for everyone, publishers, distributors, editors to unite. To create with pooled resources their own expediting center and transportation subunit, involved only in the transportation of newspapers and magazines—this could be used quite effectively.

And of course, the most important thing is taxes. After all, we are selling an unprofitable commodity, not gold or diamonds. If the state is concerned with our work, the taxation policy must be much kinder to us.

[Correspondent] The editors of SOYUZ take this opportunity to convey their special gratitude to Moscow Soyuzpechat for its expedient distribution of the special issue of our newspaper during the days of the coup.

New Head of Central Television Interviewed*924B0047A Moscow TRUD in Russian 16 Oct 91 p 4*

[Interview with Yegor Vladimirovich Yakovlev, head of central television, former editor-in-chief of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, by L. Pavlyuchik: "I Came to Ostankino as a Viewer"]

[Text] [Pavlyuchik] Yegor Vladimirovich, with your permission, I will not start asking convenient, streamlined questions...

[Yakovlev] For heaven's sake, that will be more interesting for both of us.

[Pavlyuchik] Then right away I have a question about "filling up." You were recently appointed a member of the Political Advisory Council under the president. Moreover, you are a USSR people's deputy, and you are probably a member of the leading bodies of various funds, associations, societies... Does it not happen as it did, for instance, for the former editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, whose involvement in his public career did not enable him to work properly at his direct job?

[Yakovlev] First, I have not managed to "fill up" my time. I am not joining various funds and associations. Moreover, I am one of those people (most likely, this is an enormous shortcoming today) who, for better or worse, know how to work at just one job. For me, this job is journalism.

As far as the council under the president is concerned, this appointment was unexpected for me. I found out about it in Italy, although before this there were two meetings with Mikhail Sergeyevich in which we discussed the forms of our future interaction.

Today, many people are asking what the authorities, responsibilities, etc. of the political council members will be. I view my own role only as participating, along with the president, in "brainstorms" on one or another problem of our fickle reality. True, Sobchak and I both stated that if we merely took and nothing changes afterwards, as it was under the old Presidential Council, then this form of work is hardly to our liking. However, so far only a few meetings with Mikhail Sergeyevich have been held and it is too early to generalize. In any case, for now this activity does not occupy much of my time. Really, my basic problem is not an abundance of permanent responsibilities, but something quite different... The little MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI was under my leadership before, but now there is the big Gosteleradio. This is a different scale, different responsibilities, and finally, a different specific nature...

[Pavlyuchik] In this regard, I have another "provocative" question. Your predecessors, rumor has it, considered cadres a paragraph, and the topic—a chapter... The creative life of publicist and editor Yegor Yakovlev has also basically been linked to newspaper journalism. In this regard, do you have any fears that a lack of purely

television professionalism will not enable you properly to manage the very complex creative organism that is Central Television?

[Yakovlev] I came to television as a viewer. This is my big "minus." However, at the same time it is also a big "plus." After all, the perceptions of television by the viewers and by those who work "inside the box" are, as they say in Odessa, two big differences. I was utterly astounded when one of the "Vremya" commentators announced in one of the creative discussions that she works in art and the viewers' opinions are of entirely no interest to her. For me, I repeat, as for a viewer, the very idea that television can exist in parallel with the audience, that it does not take the audience into account even in political programs, not to mention artistic ones, seems unacceptable and absurd.

Only direct contact with the viewers. Only the unconditional consideration of their opinions. Only the creation of real feedback. That is my "creed," which I learned when I was on the "other" side of the screen. I do not intend to part with it now.

Now, on the subject of professionalism... You know. I feel fairly confident behind a clipping table: The experience of thirty films, most of which I made together with Vitya Lisakovich, is telling. I cannot consider myself a professional in communications systems or other technical matters. On the other hand, however, must an administrator who manages a huge number of people enter into all the subtleties of production? It is debatable. In any case, I feel particular trepidation before television professionals. When I had just arrived at Ostankino, all my deputies (and there are 12 of them!) set declarations on my desk, most likely experiencing discomfort from the very fact of working with the previous leadership. However, I did not accept their resignations, because in my work I want to rely on professionals, on specialists. And I want to judge them by their present, not their past work.

[Pavlyuchik] As a rule, a new person, on coming to power, brings his own team with himself. Do you have such intentions and will there be cadre "shake-ups" in connection with this?

[Yakovlev] In creating ZHURNALIST and in restructuring MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, I always relied on like-minded friends. I must say that the course of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI did not presume mandatory pluralism: We took our own strictly defined path and did not turn from it. However, on nationwide television one team cannot and should not monopolize the airwaves. Indeed, to put together a collective of like-minded people out of 26,000 people is, of course, quite humorous.

[Pavlyuchik] In the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET interview, you said that you do not belong to any one political party. However, the policy of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, which you most likely will also implement

on television, and the invitation of Popov and Shevardnadze to Ostankino as political reviewers indicate your "party" sympathies quite distinctly. In this regard, can people of a different political orientation, for instance, the writers Rasputin, Bondarev, and Prokhanov, the Liberal Democratic Party chairman Zhirinovskiy, and the journalist Nevzorov count on air time?

[Yakovlev] You may disagree with me, but let me state one thing firmly: I will not promote allowing the screen to call to Stalinism, to stagnation. I believe that society has taken this path and has rejected it. The documents of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which are fairly distinctly taking a course toward the democratic development of our country, attest to this. So, I repeat, I do not intend to go against the policy of social progress just in order to be considered democratic. This is in my principal plan.

As far as Rasputin, Belov, or Prokhanov are concerned, they recently expounded their views on Central Television, which happened, let me say immediately, through no fault of mine. I do not sympathize with this. However, I must stipulate one circumstance here. This may be rudimentary, but an informational broadcast should be informational, and an analytical—analytical. I consider it fundamentally improper that Nevzorov should engage in politics on the particularly informational "600 Seconds." Yet on a problem-oriented broadcast, views similar to those preached by the leader of the Russian Union of Writers are possible, but they should certainly be aired with a counter-argument. No matter what our attitude toward Popov and Shevardnadze, their positions do not contradict the democratic trends of society's development. The positions of the above-named writers do contradict it. After all, we are letting them have their say on the television of a democratic state.

[Pavlyuchik] You have been head of the television and radio company for a little over a month. Of course, this is a very short period of time, but nonetheless... When I open LITERATURNAYA GAZETA to the opinions of television experts, there is one motif: There is nothing on the television screen, just all-round despondency, tedium... When do you expect a qualitative change on the air?

[Yakovlev] I would not undertake to name the time when television will change for the better. The organization is too big and cumbersome, the inertia of the past is too great... At first, it seemed to me: Here I am going to Ostankino, where everything has suffered so during the political corvée: I will open the hatch and the locomotive will go. But there is no locomotive. The collective is bloodless. Judge for yourself: The independent talented people, like Molchanov, Pozner, and the "visionaries," have taken off on their own, a huge number of young people are now working under the "roof" of Russian Television, and many of those who remain, accustomed to pleasing the leadership, are broken.

Take an unbiased look at the screen... I think that today we do not have a single show that is not obsolete in both

form and content. I have great respect for my friends who make "International Panorama," but how much is possible? They have grown old with it, they have grown fat and have lost their former youthful curls, and nothing on the show has changed since anyone can remember. Characteristically, on "Viewpoint" or "Before and After Midnight," like living, creative, fruitful organisms, they think about the creation of new broadcasts, yet the basic mass of television people are living in the past.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union is dying in convulsions, even though it is a natural death. However, the screen, as before, symbolizes its decrepitude. There are few young people at Ostankino. A huge number of new names have appeared in film, but there are none in television. I am interested in the youth theatrical studios, yet I am offered the performances of the Little Theater... Television ought to grow younger, or else it will be the television of a dying country.

Finally, look at our publications on television. The newspaper SEM DNEY has a circulation of a little over a million, while in Western countries with a much smaller population the circulations of such publications are significantly higher. There is one journal, EFIR, which is very nice and professional, but who, except for television associates, knows about it? Meanwhile, the cinematographic publications, EKRAK and ISKUSSTVO KINO, have a solid reputation and decent circulations. They influence both public opinion, as well as the condition and development of their own "muse."

In short, we have a mass of problems. However, even under these conditions some progress has already been made. The work of the Commission on Structural Reorganization of Television is coming to an end. I want to create a public council at Ostankino that will include authoritative, respectable people: politicians, scientists, people active in the arts. The principles for converting television to self-support are being drafted. Finally, for better or worse, we held a contest between two brigades for the right to occupy the air time of the old "Vremya" [Time]. It showed: We are so far behind in informational television that not one brigade was able to present a program that would entirely satisfy the viewers. If not for this contest, we would have patched up good old "Vremya" and would have been content with that. Now it is obvious that we must seek a new model, a new concept of televised information. Work in this direction is already starting.

[Pavlyuchik] In this regard, I cannot help but ask a question "straight off." Your activity in the post of chairman of the television and radio company began with a scandal, spread by many newspapers. I am referring to the conflict precisely surrounding the contest for the "Vremya" program and its director, Olvar Kakuchay. I happened to be at the press conference arranged by the "Vremya" collective, the leitmotif of which was: A neo-Bolshevik has come to the leadership of television, a Yegor Kravchenko has replaced Leonid Kravchenko...

[Yakovlev] It is more pleasant to be seen as good, than bad. A democrat is more prestigious than a conservative. However, the work is more important than the names that they call you. The fact is, for a long time the "Vremya" program symbolized the totalitarian state, which has passed on: To me this is obvious. Therefore, the program must be reformed. How? By way of a contest. However, the "Vremya" collective viewed the idea of a contest with incomprehensible bitterness. "We will not put them on the screen," was the reaction of the "Vremya" on-duty service when I decided to return Mitkova, Kiselev, Molchanov, and Tikhomirov to the first television channel.

I asked Olvar Kakuchay not to create antagonism between the two competing brigades, not to ignite passions. The point of the contest was to combine the best of everything that the two groups developed. Instead, the director of "Vremya" took a course toward confrontation, the final chord of which was A. Denisov's topic, in which he likened the contest to an odious socialist competition. It is funny to think that such material could insult me personally: I have more self-respect than that. The attempt itself to divide the collective into "ours" and "not ours," to turn a professional contest into a political intrigue, was insulting. That is why I called Olvar Kakuchay the next day and suggested that he find a new place of work. He has not done this. The confrontation continues, the collective is split, and work suffers.

[Pavlyuchik] At one of your first press conferences in your new capacity, you announced (I am quoting the newspaper SEM DNEY) that the "new leadership of the television company is striving to contrast the flow of critical opposition information with official opinion." Now, when you yourself have joined the Political Advisory Council under the head of the state, will television be able to retain its independence, will it not once again execute the "will of the President," only now as you understand it, and not Kravchenko?

[Yakovlev] I could not have said the words that the weekly SEM DNEY attributed to me, for the simple reason that, given the current arrangement of political forces, there is no longer either a center, or a right or left flank. Today I cannot, for instance, consider Yeltsin's opinion to be opposition, and Gorbachev's opinion—ruling. In this, if you wish, lies the additional complexity of my position compared to that of my predecessors. It is always easier to attach oneself to a particular shore. Today the three white telephones in my office, through which only recently the leadership of television occurred, are silent. Even if they were not silent, I would still rely on common sense in my actions.

[Pavlyuchik] One last question about the future of the television company and, accordingly, your future. As everyone knows, today the Union budget does not have funds for Central Television. The republics are agreeing only to maintain the local channels. How will nationwide television, which, in addition, is eking out a miserable existence due to the lack of equipment, of skilled cadres,

and of tolerable working conditions, survive under these conditions? Might it not soon turn out that you were appointed "general" of a nonexistent army?

[Yakovlev] First, about myself. I am 61 years old, and my entire life I have steered clear of careers, so that whatever future is there...

If we speak of television, things are more complex. Its future is really in a haze. However, at the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies I talked to Kravchuk, Nazarbayev, and other republic leaders, and they confirmed their interest in the affairs of the television company. There are two reasons. When we burst the hoops of Stalinism and militarism, which held together the body of the country, along with them we also burst the empire, like a cracked barrel. There are not many genuine ties left which might spiritually unite us. One of these is a unified information space, the Union-wide airwaves. The republics understand this quite well, and that is why they want to ease our problems.

Second, Russian Television has suddenly appeared, and a broadcast of "Play the Accordion" is showing on Central Television, as before. Yet, after all, the accordion is played in Russia. On the other hand, the appearance of leaders from Kazakhstan, Armenia, or the Baltics on Channel 1 is perceived as a sensation today. What am I trying to say by this? Only that Central Television has remained predominantly Russian, and we must tell about the lives of peoples living in our country more boldly and with greater diversity. In this regard, of course, I am counting on help and support on the part of the republics and I am hoping that we will definitely receive a budget for next year. Judging by everything, we will have to rely on our own strengths alone by 1993. Of course, we will put an emphasis on commercial broadcasts and we hope to attract strong sponsors, but the general path is to return to subscriber payment, which was long ago established throughout the world. This is laborious and expensive work, but if we create broadcasts that interest the viewers, they will meet us halfway and become our friends and helpers.

Radio Liberty Interviews SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on Alleged Violations of Press Law

924B0027A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 8 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Yakovenko: "How I Gave an Interview to Mr. [Daich]"]

[Text] Last Friday Radio Liberty correspondent Mr. M. [Daich] telephoned me and asked for an interview—for the "Vremya" television program! That is something to wonder over. But is there any reason to? The new thinking, evidently, includes the possibility of foreign journalists' serving as moderators on our most popular television program and interpreting events that are happening in our country in their own way. Glory to pluralism!

Mr. [Daich] was interested in the newspaper staff's attitude toward the torrent of reports in newspapers and on radio and television about the imminent closing of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. I explained to him that we were carrying a statement on that subject in the next day's, that is, Saturday's, issue: I hoped that it would contain all the information he needed. No, Mr. [Daich] insisted, it would be good to get a live conversation for television, a living picture for the television viewer.

Well, if you please, we are ready for a conscientious discussion in any forum. We have nothing to hide. We met in the newspaper's offices and talked for the previously agreed-upon minutes. The interview was partially shown to television viewers and our newspaper's readers on the Sunday "Vremya" program. More precisely, not the interview but what remained of it according to Mr. [Daich's] wishes. By "living picture" what he primarily meant, of course, was himself. It is necessary to make additions to what was shown on the screen. I do not know what the custom is on Radio Liberty, or now on the "Vremya" program, but I have a clear idea of professional ethics and honor.

And so, Mr. [Daich] started the discussion by reading the complaint filed by the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Information with the Sverdlovskiy Court in Moscow, the gist of which lies in the assertion that articles published on 20 and 21 August in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA constituted an "informational and ideological cover for the attempted coup d'etat." Well, these absurd conclusions have been refuted not just by us but by the Sverdlovskiy Rayon procurator in Moscow.

What is curious is something else. Mr. [Daich] had a copy of the complaint in his hands, yet none had yet been received by the newspaper, although it was supposedly SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA against whom the complaint had been filed. How did that happen? Mr. [Daich] declined to answer, but asked: "Can it be that you failed to receive warnings from the ministry?" And he was not very surprised to hear a negative reply.

That moment was not reflected in the broadcast "interview." Mr. [Daich] informed me that he had already visited M. Fedotov, the RSFSR deputy minister of the press and mass information, and had received the necessary explanations.

Mr. [Daich] asked yet another extremely important question, which also did not end up in the television broadcast:

"If the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Information exercises its authority to annul the registration of

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and thereby closes your newspaper, what will you do?"

In response to which the following was said:

"The ministry must first of all obtain a revocation of an ukase of the RSFSR president, the second ukase with regard to the newspapers PRAVDA, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, which speaks of rescinding the point about suspending their publication. That ukase has been published, in our newspaper among others. So will the ministry act against the president? I do not know how the ministry will solve that problem."

Mr. [Daich] objected:

"There is no contradiction there. The ministry has the right to register you and the right to revoke its decision."

After which the following reply followed:

"To do that, the ministry must send SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA a warning about a violation of law and, upon a second warning, make a decision. We have not received any such warnings."

Now a few words about Mr. [Daich's] reflections following the end of the interview. In his opinion, the makeup of the editorial board has not changed—and that is true; such was the will of the staff—and therefore he, [Daich], does not understand when SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's journalists were lying—then or now. And just what grounds does he have for accusing them of lying then and now? None whatsoever! Pluralism of the agile tongue, which is nowadays being encouraged in every way possible not just in smoking rooms and kitchens, but even before audiences of millions. Mr. [Daich] did not like the new member of the editorial board, A. Ryabov, either, who he took, out of fearfulness or something, as the "body guard" of the first deputy editor in chief. He did not like him because he had supposedly started speaking energetically about Zionism and Russophobia. Excuse me, Mr. [Daich], we will not be so bold as to adopt your initiative in the discussion of that topic. It was your initiative, of which there is proof. And my comrade Aleksandr Ryabov merely rejected your claims to the effect that certain articles in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA "are anti-Semitic in spirit."

In bidding us farewell, Mr. [Daich] noted that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and other party publications were totally ignoring the law. And only he had always followed it. It would be good to compare his word of praise for himself with his Sunday presentation on the "Vremya" television program.

Zalygin Highlights 'Environmental Catastrophes'

92WN0041A Moscow *ZEMLYA I VSELENNAYA*
in Russian No 3, May-Jun 91 [signed to press
30 Apr 91] pp 30-34

[Report by E. K. Solomatina on a press conference conducted by S. P. Zalygin, chairman of the Ecology and Peace Association, in February 1991 in Moscow: "Environmental Disasters in the USSR: Facts, Causes and Consequences"]

[Text] Environmental disasters are considered no less dangerous today for the earth's future than the nuclear threat. Chernobyl, the Aral, the crisis state of the Black Sea, which is being poisoned by pollutants, the turning of the great Russian Volga River into a chain of artificial, stagnant seas—these are just a few from a sorrowful list of environmental disasters, and only a list of those within our country. In recent years a good many environmental-protection organizations have been established in our country, including the Soviet Ecology and Peace Association. This nongovernmental organization of scientists and public-affairs writers, which is headed by its well-known writer S. P. Zalygin, editor in chief of the magazine NOVYY MIR, has been conducting independent public expert evaluations of the most dangerous projects entailing the alteration of nature, and has been working out new ecological concepts for the development of the country and individual regions of it. The association also views its objective as the development of public environmental consciousness and international cooperation in addressing environmental-protection problems.

The board of the Ecology and Peace Association, which was organized in 1987 under the Soviet Peace Committee, includes full members of the USSR Academy of Sciences and All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and USSR people's deputies. These include academicians A. L. Yanshin, B. S. Sokolov, N. A. Shilo, G. S. Golitsyn and V. A. Tikhonov; A. S. Monin and A. V. Yablokov, corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Doctor of Economic Sciences M. Ya. Lemeshev, Doctor of Geographical Sciences B. V. Vinogradov, and other scientists and scholars who are prominent in our country and in the public environmental movement. The association was established by scientists and specialists, who in 1983-1986 conducted a comprehensive independent expert evaluation of projects for diverting part of the flow of northern rivers to the south and part of the flow of Siberian rivers to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and the materials of the expert review provided scientific substantiation for the adoption in August 1986 of the CPSU Central Committee's and USSR Council of Ministers' Decree: "On the Termination of Work on Diverting Northern and Siberian Rivers." With the active efforts of the Ecology and Peace Association, it has also been possible to turn aside other, similar projects, such as the "Volga—Chogray," "Volga—Don-2" and "Danube—Dnieper" projects.

"Environmental Disasters in the USSR: Facts, Causes and Consequences" was the title of a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists that was held this February in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Press Center. It was conducted by S. P. Zalygin, the association's chairman, and a group of scientists, along with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. F. Petrovskiy. They drew the attention of the press conference's participants to three major environmental disasters in our country—the Aral basin, the Lower Volga and Caspian region, and the Neva inlet and Gulf of Finland. The crisis in these regions continues to intensify and is creating a threat to the future not only of our country but of its bordering territories. "The imposition of the problems of Chernobyl and the Aral on the problem of the Persian Gulf," S. P. Zalygin said in opening the press conference, "may create an absolutely new, very serious, even ruinous situation throughout the entire world, and the two centers, the Aral Sea and the Persian Gulf, may merge into a single region of unprecedented and totally unforeseen disaster."

The Aral crisis, as a rule, is associated with the drying up of the Aral Sea. The sea is perishing, it must be rescued and filled with water! But the problem, in reality, is much more complicated. The Aral is nothing more than a symbol and the end result of a distorted and one-sided means of conducting the economy throughout all of Central Asia over the past 30 years. To one degree or another, a vast region of the Aral basin, including both its plains and mountainous parts, where about 35 million people live, has been affected by environmental disturbances. This was discussed at the press conference by Doctor of Agricultural Sciences N. G. Minashina, a professor at the Soil Institute imeni V. V. Dokuchayev of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and member of the board of the Ecology and Peace Association. Along with the drying out of the Aral and the desertification of the Aral region because of the numerous dams, reservoirs and large canals that have been built there, water is building up in other places, where swamps and new man-made lakes are being formed, irrigated land and pastureland are being flooded, and soil is becoming salinized. (*ZEMLYA I VSELENNAYA*, No 3, 1990, p 33.—Eds.).

The government has been allocating large amounts of money to eliminate the environmental disaster, but it has been going to those who brought the region into crisis and continue to carry out hydraulic engineering construction contrary to environmental requirements. First the former Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, which was later renamed as the Ministry of Water Resources Construction, and now the newly established Vodstroy [Water Construction] state concern, have been represented by the very same people, who besides their work in the Aral basin drew up the infamous water-diversion projects. They are precisely the ones who invested billions of rubles in building the Danube—Dnieper and Volga—Chogray canals, not to mention the Volga—Don-2 Canal, the construction of which has gone too far.

A solution to the Aral crisis—many scientists spoke about this—is possible only by overcoming departmental monopoly. Water resources and the future development of their use in the region must be removed entirely from the jurisdiction of Vodstroy and turned over to a special committee. And top-priority measures must be the restructuring of the economy in the Aral basin, the prompt and drastic reduction of cotton-growing plans, elimination of the massive use of toxic chemical agents, and the changeover to water-conserving irrigation technologies, with the development of a scientifically substantiated and economical plan for the use of water from the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers.

Doctor of Physical Mathematics A. S. Mishchenko, professor at Moscow State University and deputy chairman of the board of the Soviet Ecology and Peace Association, devoted his presentation to the problem of the Leningrad dike. Designed to protect the city against flooding, this system of dams and spillways cuts off the Neva inlet from the water of the Gulf of Finland. Since Leningrad surrounds the shores of the Neva inlet like a horseshoe, practically in the center of the gigantic megalopolis an artificial, closed body of water has been formed, on the environmental condition of which the way the city "feels" is completely dependent.

During the time that the dike was being designed and built, repeated expert reviews were conducted, all of which without exception gave negative assessments of the potential environmental consequences. But the construction went on. Despite the resistance of the executives of interested departments, at the request of a general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences, as of mid-1989 an independent expert commission was finally set up under the leadership of A. V. Yablokov, a member of the board of the Ecology and Peace Association and a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The commission reached the unequivocal conclusion: the main reason for the drastically deteriorating environmental condition in Leningrad was the dam that was being built, and it was the dam that had drastically altered the equilibrium in the Neva inlet. By upsetting the natural self-cleansing mechanism, it had turned the Neva inlet into an accumulator of pollutants. The "blooming" of the water and the growth of bacteriological pollution had formed a kind of biological reactor there. The presence in it of toxins and carcinogenic and other harmful chemical substances was creating the danger of epidemics for the major city's population.

The commission established that the project plan for the Leningrad dike lacked any comprehensive environmental feasibility study and assessment of the consequences of building the protective installations, while the hydraulic modeling was based on a false concept, and furthermore, mistakes had been made in the actual execution of the modeling. This was demonstrated by the association's scientists with the participation of leading specialists in the field of hydraulics.

However, the system of ploys that the technocratic lobby uses to push environmentally destructive projects through the government still exists. They include the deliberate concealment or distortion of information, errors in scientific analysis, and the selection of suitable and obedient experts.

"According to the information of the USSR State Environmental Protection Committee," Doctor of Geographical Sciences B. V. Vinogradov, a professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Evolutionary Morphology and Animal Ecology, and a member of the association's board, noted in his presentation, "about 12 percent of our country's territory is located in environmental-disaster zones. One of the largest such zones is the **Lower Volga and the Caspian region**, including Kalmykia. The most intensive desertification in the world is happening there, and the area of shifting sands is growing, as a result of which the productivity of pastures has now declined in some places by more than 90 percent. This territory's environmental situation has been aggravated by the fact that it is located on the outskirts of technologically developed regions and serves as a receptacle for polluted effluent from the basin of the Volga and other rivers.

"Following the tilling of sandy soil, hundreds of thousands of hectares of shifting sands formed. And as the result of unjustified irrigation of land, tens of thousands of hectares of land have become salinized and swampy. The attempt to carry out the construction of the Volga—Chogray Canal in Kalmykia has removed tens of thousands of hectares more of agricultural lands from production" (ZEMLYA I VSELENNAYA, No 2, 1990, p 33.—Eds.).

As an alternative to the costly, economically ruinous and environmentally dangerous projects of the Ministry of Water Resources Construction, a group of scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences and the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences has drawn up its own concept of the agricultural and ecological development of these territories. The concept is based on the broad reclamation of sands for agricultural use and forestation, the improvement of pastures, the restoration of meadows, the development of local water supplies, and the restoration of the conditions in which the Kalmyks' traditional way of life developed. This alternative is economically effective, environmentally useful, and socially propitious. Its cost is estimated at approximately 1.5 billion rubles (as against R4.5 billion for development through hydraulic engineering construction, not counting the extensive environmental damage caused by the latter). The environmental and economic crisis of the Chernyye Zemli is highly instructive. In past years an additional output of approximately R400 million was obtained as the result of the predatory exploitation of those lands. But now R1.5 billion needs to be invested in order to restore the territory's natural potential. Therein lies the difficulty of our situation today.

Among the numerous questions asked the scientists at the press conference, two were especially trenchant. The first: is it a good idea to set up international commissions to address environmental problems in our country? After all, we have enough of our own highly qualified experts among our scientists. "International commissions must be established," USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. F. Petrovskiy answered this question, "because in certain cases it is impossible to reach agreement among our scientists, who have various views of a given problem." However, there was also another answer: international commissions are established (and hundreds of thousands of dollars are found for this in a situation of economic crisis!) in order, by paying for the services of foreign experts, to obtain findings that are convenient to interested departments. The second question: is the USSR Supreme Soviet discussing the question of the huge sums (in both rubles and hard currency) that are being spent by the government for the purposes of environmental protection? A. V. Yablokov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on the Environment and a member of the board of the Ecology and Peace Association, answered that the USSR Supreme Soviet had still not interested itself in how those sums are being spent.

The many years of study by members of the Soviet Ecology and Peace Association of the three biggest environmental disasters in our country will be discussed at the UN scientific conference "The Environment and Development," which will be held in Brazil in 1992.

Nuclear Experts Discuss Future of Atomic Power Station Safety

92WN0003A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 35, Aug 91 p 3

[Interview with Ye. Adamov, director of Energy Technology Scientific Research and Design Institute (NIKIET), V. Orlov, president of the USSR Nuclear Society, V. Malyshev, USSR State Committee for Atomic Energy Oversight chairman, A. Yeperin, director of Leningrad AES, L. Hegberg, general director of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, and J. Olikkala, chief inspector of the Finnish Center for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, conducted by G. Lomanov: "The Baltic's Atomic Necklace—a String of Pearls or a Stone Around the Neck of Countries Developing Nuclear Energy?"]

[Text] *Nuclear power plant safety, a problem which concerns everyone today, is gradually being driven from the pages of our press by topics which are no less important, but more pressing. Yet the state of the power industry will to a large extent determine the level of our none-too-prosperous or well-supplied lives. That is why our newspaper deems it essential to provide regular reports on the opinions of experts in this field and to publish facts and figures from which our readers can draw their own conclusions.*

Participating in today's discussion are Ye. Adamov, director of NIKIET, V. Orlov, president of the USSR Nuclear Society, V. Malyshev, USSR State Committee for Atomic Energy Oversight chairman, A. Yeperin, Leningrad AES [nuclear electric power station] director, L. Hegberg, general director of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, and J. Olikkala, chief inspector of the Finnish Center for Radiation and Nuclear Safety.

[Lomanov] As you are aware, as a result of a referendum conducted in Sweden in 1980 the decision was made to shut down all nuclear power plants there by the year 2010. However, judging by sociological surveys the categorical nature of this decision has recently been called into question, has it not?

[Hegberg] I recall that the referendum took place shortly after the accident at the American plant at Three Mile Island. After Chernobyl the parliament set even stricter time limits: the first two reactors are supposed to be shut down in 1995-97. Three weeks ago that decision was reconsidered; now the specific date will depend on realization of the energy supply program, on how successful we are in replacing nuclear power with other energy sources, and naturally on our nuclear power plants' level of safety. The original goal still remains, though I believe that even it could be adjusted depending on these three factors. People in Sweden are beginning to realize more and more clearly that nuclear power plants cannot be shut down without causing damage to our country's economy and to the welfare of its citizens.

[Orlov] I would like to make what is, in my opinion, a substantial addendum to that: in addition to common problems in the various countries which are developing nuclear power, there also exist substantial differences. For example, in Sweden nuclear power plants provide one-half of all electric power, while here that figure is only 12 percent. That means that the reasons for developing it in Sweden might prove unconvincing in the USSR. It is also very important to consider the size of a country: a small state may for a time give up a certain technology and then go back to it at a higher stage of its development. There they are certain that one of the great powers will perfect it. Think about it: is it a coincidence that not a single major country is even discussing a moratorium on nuclear energy? Countries like that are forced to look far ahead so as not to find themselves left behind. And that is precisely what would happen if, say, the USSR were to follow Sweden's example and declare a moratorium. We would voluntarily be giving up scientific and technical potential accumulated over the course of several decades at the cost of millions of people's selfless labor. In order to reconstruct that it would take heroic efforts and an equally long time.

[Lomanov] The subject of today's discussion is not the reliability of nuclear power plants in general, but rather the safety of the plants along the shores of the Baltic Sea. Are regulatory agencies satisfied with their level of safety?

[Malyshev] We have three plants in the Baltic region. First-generation reactors are in operation at the Kola AES and Leningrad AES. The Ignalina AES has two more modern reactors of the channel type from the subsequent generation.

Thus the safety level at the Kola and Leningrad plants does not fully satisfy us. Our contacts with our colleagues in the regulatory agencies of Finland and Sweden are aimed primarily at arriving at an ideology for the use of those plants and for the fate of that type of reactors. There are two scenarios. The first involves rebuilding of the plants and their continued use until the expiration of their planned life span. The second is to find an optimum life span, which would probably be less than the planned period of use, at the end of which the reactors would be shut down. The feasibility of rebuilding the VVER-440 reactors in use at the Kola AES has been studied repeatedly, including at the international level, and was not rejected out of hand. The State Committee for Atomic Energy Oversight has given its permission for the rebuilding, though it feels that the premature shutdown option is preferable.

[Lomanov] It would be reasonable to add the six reactors in the first RBMK-1000 generation as well. What is the oversight committee's position with regard to them?

[Malyshev] There exists a concept for rebuilding them, but we do not regard it as fully finalized. We are prepared to consider proposals from operational personnel, if they are sufficiently well-founded.

[Yeperin] A strange situation: all one needs to say is that a nuclear power plant is using a first-generation reactor, and suddenly everyone arrives at the same conclusion—the plant should be closed. I cannot agree with that approach. In recent years the Leningrad plant has been modernized to such an extent that it would be unfair to equate its power plant with the early reactors built in the first generation.

[Lomanov] Let us get away from the technical issues and talk about people. Are you not concerned about the extremely low rate of competition for admission to technical VUZs [higher educational institutions]? Are you not afraid that within a few years' time it may not be the best specialists, to put it mildly, who will be entering jobs at nuclear power plants?

[Yeperin] I am afraid of something else: that our sector will receive neither good nor bad specialists. In view of the present situation in the field of atomic energy VUZs are closing the departments which train operational personnel for nuclear power plants. Yet experienced personnel are leaving, some of them retiring. A very alarming situation. I am convinced that it can be changed only by a law on atomic energy and a program for the further development of energy production in our country approved by the republics.

[Lomanov] In Finland there is currently a move afoot in favor of a fifth unit: at this time the two plants there have

four reactors, two of them Soviet. If parliament agrees to a fifth unit, then what type of reactor would be picked: Soviet, Swedish, American, German?

[Ollikkala] That project is being promoted mainly by representatives of our business circles. The reactor would be their property, and that means that they would be the ones to choose. It is difficult for me to make a prediction; I can merely tell you what I have observed, and that is that the chances of a Soviet reactor winning out in any competition are quite serious.

[Adamov] We are using the words "plant" and "reactor" as if they were one in the same, but we should not forget that they are different things. The problems of safety within the reactor itself are one thing, the problem of safety throughout the entire plant complex quite another. As a rule it is easier to solve the problem of the former than the latter; the reactor is more accessible for changes. But how, for instance, to rebuild a building in order to take more stringent seismic standards into account? When V. Malyshev talks about the lack of an encasement. I must clarify that he is referring to a shortcoming in the buildings, not in the power-producing reactor. I would remind you that around the world such an encasement is not always regarded as an essential—the Super Phoenix reactor functions without one, and it is felt that its [kompaymenda] is quite sufficient.

[Lomanov] Please explain to our readers what that arcane term means.

[Adamov] That means conditions in which protection of the reactor is not guaranteed in the event of accidents such as, for instance, the explosion of a train car filled with explosives next to the reactor or an airplane crash on the roof of the reactor, but which do fully compensate for the internal malfunctions associated with release of radioactive substances.

[Lomanov] Let us hope that no airplane crashes on a plant: all in all, the probability of that happening is virtually nil...

Environmental Impact of Chevron Tengiz Oil Field Exploration Viewed

92WN0005A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Aug 91 p 2

[Interview with L. V. Popov, socioeconomic union coordinator, conducted by Viktor Romanchin: "Russia and the World: 'Industrial Racism' in the Tengiz Oil Field"]

[Text] *The Tengizneftegaz Association and the U.S. firm Chevron are preparing to sign a contract to develop the Tengiz Oil Field. How will development of this rich and promising field affect the region's environment, and what will be the effects of development on the health of the people who work at the refineries which process Tengiz oil? We asked L. V. Popov, coordinate of a socioeconomic union, to analyze the situation.*

[Popov] The region in which the Tengiz Oil Field is located is semiarid and is notable for its high degree of vulnerability to anthropogenic influences. Even now, before large-scale development has begun, the anthropogenic burden has put the region's entire ecosystem in a "depressed and degraded state." Even test wells in the vicinity of Tengiz and in nearby areas have released hydrogen sulfide into the atmosphere.

The majority of the pollution sources have not been documented. Soils in the vicinity of test wells are being polluted. Yet virtually no provision has been made for a system of comprehensive environmental monitoring in connection with the project; without such a system industrial development of the oil field is impossible.

Development of the Tengiz Oil Field could cause settling of its surface due to the intensive removal of fossil fuels. The result could be numerous accidents, formation of lakes and swamps, flooding of wide areas, and intensive dust storms.

[Romanchin] Does the project make provision for the socioeconomic effects of developing the Tengiz Oil Field?

[Popov] The project does not make any provision for the public health and ecological safety of the population, which will increase sharply. Even now the region has low drinking water quality, and there has been a significant increase in the number of persons contracting typhoid fever and viral hepatitis, and the number of persons suffering from tuberculosis, various types of dermatitis and eczema has increased.

The project also lacks a solution to the problem of how to create special areas for the neutralization, burial and utilization of industrial, construction-related and household wastes. No provision has been made for drinking water treatment. No plans have been made for a system of biological purification at treatment facilities.

Now a word about the quality of Tengiz oil. Despite its uniqueness, this oil also contains aggressive components (hydrogen sulfide, carbonic acid and mercaptans). Therefore during refining of Tengiz oil by refineries which are not presently handling toxic raw material the workers will be exposed to a hazardous ecological situation. There is a possibility of nausea and headaches, and in the presence of higher concentrations of toxic substances there could be disability, loss of mental functions and damage to eyesight.

[Romanchin] At the present time preparations are being made to turn over development rights to the entire Tengiz region to the Chevron Company. Will that company be concerned about preserving the environment of the country of which it about to take control?

[Popov] Here is what we have managed to find out about the activities of Chevron in its home territory, the United States. At our request the organization Multinationals and Development Clearinghouse prepared a packet of newspaper clippings (from U.S. sources) which report that in the 1984-88

period Chevron held the "record" for the greatest amount of oil spilled. In September 1989 the U.S. Department of Labor fined Chevron \$877,000 after three workers were severely burned during an explosion and fire at an oil refinery. Between 1986 and 1988 the State of California filed a number of criminal charges against Chevron for storing hazardous wastes in leaking or open containers. In 1988 the U.S. Department of Justice sued Chevron for \$8.8 million in connection with the company's frequent violations of government environmental pollution standards. Chevron has also been accused of violating the Clean Air Act and permitting unmonitored emissions of sulfur dioxide.

Chevron has been repeatedly criticized in connection with numerous other ecological and social problems, including its operations in South Africa and an attempt to drill for oil in the Montana Wilderness Preserve. This company was also accused of "industrial racism" when it allowed by-product gases to burn unchecked for four days at a refinery located in the poor town of Richmond, California, which has a primarily black population.

The United States has fairly strong environmental protection legislation, yet even that has proved insufficient to prevent Chevron from polluting the environment. One can hardly expect this scandal-plagued company to take a different approach to its operations in Russia.

USSR State Structure Seen as Obstacle To Solving Ecological Problems

92WN0005B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Aug 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Socialism and the Environment"]

[Text] Could the Soviet Union even now apply world experience with the handling of ecological policy in democratic countries with a federal system in its own system? A majority of those who attended an international meeting on "Federalism, the Economy and the Environment" in Moscow said "no."

Mikhail Galyatin, RSFSR Council of Ministers assistant deputy chairman, agreed that the system which presently exists in the USSR has thus far prevented effective solutions to ecological problems. However, in his opinion "the West is poorly informed about the fact that we have fairly good ecological laws." He noted that even industrially developed countries have spent decades changing people's consumption-oriented attitude toward nature.

Existence of 'Dead Zone' in Kola Peninsula Reported

92WN0005C Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 13 Sep 91 p 2

[INFO-NOVA report: "Stop the Presses!": "Dead Zone in the Kola Peninsula"]

[Text] International observers have determined that everything that lives—trees, fish, grass, mushrooms,

berries and insects—has died within a radius of 700 square km in the Kola Peninsula.

The people who live within this zone in the city of Nikel are also essentially doomed. Even though official statistics are deliberately not kept, local doctors claim that nine-tenths of the population, including children, have suffered serious damage to their lungs, brain and air passageways. These are the horrible effects of environmental pollution stemming from a combine located in the city, concluded Norwegian experts visiting Nikel.

Numerous Radioactivity Sources Found in Cities of Ulyanovsk, Dimitrovgrad

92WN0005D Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Sep 91
Single Edition p 2

[Article by N. Senchev, PRAVDA correspondent: "The Walls Radiate Death"]

[Text] Approximately 60 radiation sources which are hazardous to human health and life have been discovered in Ulyanovsk and Dimitrovgrad. The residents of one apartment building on the outskirts of the oblast center had to be moved at once—the building's cinder block walls were radiating 20,000 microroentgens per hour!

"The tragic case in the city of Yenakiyevo, Donetsk Oblast, reported by PRAVDA last year started us thinking about doing a comprehensive radiological survey of Ulyanovsk and Dimitrovgrad," commented V. Arefyev, oblast environmental protection committee chairman. "What we found was very alarming. On the grounds of an instrument making plant, for instance, we discovered 15 anomalies. There are roofing tiles and structures which are 'glowing'."

RSFSR Decree on State Counselor for Environment, Health

Order on Approval of Decree

92SD0009A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Oct 91 p 2

[Order on Approval of Decree, signed by Boris Yeltsin, president of the RSFSR: "Order of the President of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on the Approval of the Decree on the State Counselor of the RSFSR for Ecology and Public Health and Its Service." The order is published under the rubric, "Official Section."]

[Text] 1. The attached decree on the state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health and its service, and the general organizational structure of the service with 25 employees and a monthly salary funds of 32,780 rubles per month, is hereby approved.

A.V. Yablokov, the state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health, will establish the service in accordance with this decree.

2. Providing the service of the state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health with technical resources, as well as everyday needs and medical services for employees, will be the responsibility of the Administrative Department and relevant offices of the administration of the president of the RSFSR.

3. A fund will be established to pay for work carried out through agreements between the service and scientific and research organizations, as well as individual specialists, for providing expert opinions, examinations, and reports in accordance with the decree on the state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health and its service, at 25,000 rubles per month.

[Signed] President of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin

October 7, 1991

No.51-rp

*APPROVED by order of the President of the RSFSR
October 7, 1991, No. 51-rp*

Decree on State Counselor

92SD0009B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Oct 91 p 2

[Unsigned decree: "Decree on the State Counselor of the RSFSR for Ecology and Public Health and Its Service"]

[Text]

I. General Provisions

The state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health is appointed by a decree of the president of the RSFSR, is subordinate to him, and is a member of the State Council of the president of the RSFSR.

Within his area of responsibility, the state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health and his service executes the assignments given him by the president of the RSFSR, the vice-president of the RSFSR, and the state secretary of the RSFSR.

The state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health:

develops proposals along conceptual lines of the policy of the RSFSR in the area of environmental protection, public health, and the ecological safety of the Russian federation, and secures agreement on the ecological policy of the RSFSR with other republics of the USSR, and other states;

prepares proposals on improving ecological legislation and increasing the effectiveness of state management in the area of ecology, utilization of nature, and public health;

organizes the development of state programs and of resolutions from the president of the RSFSR in the area of ecology and public health;

secures the cooperation of the president of the RSFSR with leaders of international organizations, foreign states, union republics, and the union of SSR on issues dealing with ecological safety, environmental protection, efficient utilization of nature, and the health of the population.

II. Authority Vested in the State Counselor of the RSFSR for Ecology and Public Health

The state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health, in the fulfillment of his functions, is empowered to:

present to the president of the RSFSR proposals along conceptual lines on the policy of the RSFSR in the area of environmental protection and the health of the population, as well as the ecological safety of the Russian federation;

organize the preparation of, and presentation to the president of the RSFSR, draft laws, decrees, and other standard documents on issues of ecology and public health;

control the implementation of decisions made by the president of the RSFSR on issues of ecology and public health, to be carried out by the executive organs of administration, and inform the State Council of the president of the RSFSR about work progress in these fields;

analyze and summarize work done by executive organs of administration on the territory of the RSFSR on their immediate implementation of legislation in the areas of environmental protection and public health;

organize the compilation of an annual state report on the status of the environment and the health of the population of Russia;

implement the consultative advice of the president of the RSFSR on issues of ecology and health protection;

receive and validate draft decrees and orders of the president of the RSFSR which are relevant to ecological and public health issues;

request and receive from state and other organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, including foreign entities operating on the territory of the RSFSR, all necessary information on issues of the efficient use of natural resources, preservation of nature, and the health of the population;

attract employees of relevant state and other organizations and their subordinate offices, to establish councils of experts and groups of specialists, including foreign personnel;

make recommendations to state administrative organs, republic executive authorities within the RSFSR, krais, oblasts, autonomous entities, the cities of Moscow

and St. Petersburg, as well as to organizations subordinate to the union, on having their activities coincide with the state policy in the areas of ecology and public health;

listen to reports from heads of ministries and departments, local executive organs of authority, institutions, and organizations on issues of ecology and public health;

on instruction of the president of the RSFSR, provide official interpretations of decisions made by the president of the RSFSR in the areas of ecology and public health;

coordinate activities on issues of environmental protection, health of the population, and efficient use of natural resources with state organizations of the Union of SSR and union republics;

participate, with right of a deliberative vote, in meetings of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, Council for Federation and Territorial Affairs, Security Council of the RSFSR, and other organs established by the president of the RSFSR, as well as attend sessions of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, its committees and commissions;

analyze and summarize foreign management experience and trends in international cooperation in the areas of ecology and public health;

exercise additional authority on orders from the president of the RSFSR.

III. Establishment and Duties of the Service of the State Counselor of the RSFSR for Ecology and Public Health


The service of the state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health is charged with assuring that the charter given the state counselor of the RSFSR is complied with. The Service operates in accordance with this decree and with decrees on organizationally subordinate offices of the service approved by the state counselor of the RSFSR in agreement with the director of administration of the president of the RSFSR. Employees of the service perform their functions in accordance with duty instructions approved by the state counselor of the RSFSR.

The service, in its operations, is directly subordinate to the state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health.

The organizational structure and staff of the service are approved by the state counselor of the RSFSR within the framework established by the president of the RSFSR with regard to the number of employees and the salary fund of the service.

The state counselor of the RSFSR for ecology and public health has the authority to establish the service on a contractual basis, to determine the salaries of each specialist within the limits of the salary fund as approved by the president of the RSFSR, and to issue directives to the service.

OVERALL ORGANIZATION of the Service of the State Counselor of the RSFSR for Ecology and Public Health



Key: 1. State Counselor of the RSFSR for Ecology and Public Health, 2. Organizational Department, 3. Policy Department on Ecology and Use of Nature, 4. Policy Department for Health Protection

Surplus money in the salary fund, as a result of economizing, may be used by the state counselor of the RSFSR as incentive pay to department directors and specialists of the service.

Information services for the state counselor of the RSFSR and his service will be provided by the Information Analysis Center of the administration of the president of the RSFSR.

Financial activities of the service, including currency transactions, are provided for by a separate line item in the estimate of expenditures of the administration of the president of the RSFSR and approved by the president of the RSFSR. The state counselor of the RSFSR will manage credit payments within the total sum approved by the president of the RSFSR and he has the authority to sign financial documents.

The state counselor of the RSFSR is authorized to use financial resources for concluding agreements with scientific and research organizations, as well as with specialists, in order to pay for their expertise in executing draft programs, special scientific research projects, and compilation of analytical observations and other documentation necessary for implementing the functions of the state counselor of the RSFSR and his service.

State of Pollution in Ukraine Outlined

91WN0688A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
2 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by Igor Zabilyk under the "Ecocatastrophe" rubric: "After Us - the Deluge"]

[Text] According to UkSSR Derzhkomstat [State Committee for Statistics], the following facilities were commissioned in

the Ukraine during the 12th Five-Year Plan: sewage treatment plants with the daily capacity of 3.8 million cubic meters of water, a circulating water supply system with the daily capacity of 28.5 million cubic meters of recirculated water, and facilities for collection and neutralization of noxious substances in effluent gases with the hourly capacity of 22.4 million cubic meters...

It is nice to read the above data. The hope that in time the Ukraine will be less bothered by ecology problems starts glowing. But it is too early to console oneself. Statistical indices of environmental protection construction only state the facts. But Dneprodzerzhinsk residents still have to breath ammonia vapors, as they did two years ago, and residents of Svetlovodsk (Kirovograd oblast) must hide from rain, because the Pure Metals Plant discharges into the sky elements of Mendeleyev's chemical table in an almost pure form. The ecological situation in the Kharkov, Cherkassy, Donetsk, Zaporozhye and Lugansk oblasts is not much better.

According to the Ukrainian ecological association "Zelenyy svit" [Green World], the Ukraine's is the most polluted air in the [Soviet] Union. The Donetsk-sub-Dniester industrial region has the USSR and Europe's highest share of antropogenic discharge (in t/sq. km) of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides into the atmosphere. Of 64 USSR cities with the highest air pollution, 15 (Mariupol, Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Pavlodar, Kerch, Makeyevka, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Kiev, Donetsk and Odessa) are in the Ukraine. Results of decoding of satellite TV images indicate that large pollution spots appear on snow in winter in the Republic's territory - in the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog region (126.9 sq. km), around Kiev (6,180 sq. km), Odessa (6,000 sq. km),

Kharkov (6,320 sq. km), Sumy (2,500 sq. km), Kherson (1,500 sq. km) and Pavlodar (10,840 sq. km).

In recent decades Republic's rivers have been polluted with phenol, ammonia nitrogen and copper compounds. Large Ukrainian water arteries - water reservoirs (rotten man-made seas) - are completely befouled. Average annual contents of copper and manganese in Kremenchug and Dneprodzerzhinsk reservoirs exceeds 10 GDK [expansion not given]. In the Kiev reservoir the contents of chlorine-organic pesticides increases tens- and hundreds-fold; manganese, which was not detected there before, has been now. Bacterial and chemical pollution of the Black and Azov seas has reached extremely high levels.

Add to this the Chernobyl disaster...

UkSSR Derzhkomstat states that during the 12th Five-Year Plan R2.3 billion was invested by the State for measures aimed at protection and efficient utilization of natural resources - R1.4 billion (62 percent of all expenditures) for protection and efficient utilization of water resources, R135 million (6 percent) for protection of atmospheric air, and R387 million (17 percent) for protection and efficient utilization of land.

Compared to the 11th Five-Year Plan, expenditures for environmental protection increased by 11 percent, while commissioning of environmental protection facilities declined - for sewage treatment by 0.2 million cubic meters per day (five percent), for circulating water supply systems by 5.3 million cubic meters per day (16 percent), and for facilities for collection and neutralization of noxious substances in effluent gases by 3.2 million of cubic meters of gas per hour (13 percent).

During the 12th Five-Year Plan annual state investment allocations for environmental protection was underutilized by seven to 13 percent.

Last year R67.2 million (13 percent) were not used. Only in three oblasts (Rovno, Kherson and Lugansk) the allocations were used 100 percent, while in the Lugansk, Kharkov, Cherkassy, Zaporozhye, Kiev and Poltava oblasts environmental protection funds remained mostly unused. Apparently, this is the reason these very oblasts have the most critical ecological situation. Take sewage treatment plants. The annual plan of commissioning them was underfulfilled by 674,000 cubic meters per day (71 to 100 percent) in the Lugansk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov and Donetsk oblasts. The result - the Mokra Moskovka (Zaporozhye), Bakhmut and Kalmius (Donetsk oblast) and Lopan (Kharkov) rivers are polluted with phenol (about 32 GDK), ammonia nitrogen (about 26-56 GDK) and copper compounds (65-85 GDK).

Managers of enterprises that pollute the environment blame all this on the disbalanced character of the national economy, which cannot provide construction projects with material and technical resources, equipment and construction machinery.

Apparently, it is easier to pay penalties - they are not coming out from one's pocket. It is bitter, but it appears that after us - the deluge.

Increasing Lung Cancer Deaths Attributed to Fossil Fuel Use

92WN0004A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 25 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by Mikhail Dmitruk: "Doctor, Could You Listen to My Country's Lungs Sometime...": "What Is the Cause of the Massive Incidence of Cancer? The Air Is Polluted With Radiation, Scientists Think—and Recommend Their Medicine"]

[Text] This story began over 30 years ago. It was then that at the initiative of academicians S. P. Korolev and I. V. Kurchatov a CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree was prepared concerning development of new principles for obtaining energy and new principles of obtaining propulsion without discarding mass and new principles for protection against nuclear radiation. The significance of this research to our country was so great that Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov petitioned for the program: "Concerned as I am about the fate of Russia, I request that you sign this decree." And it was signed by N. S. Khrushchev, A. N. Kosygin and other leaders on 23 June 1960.

Work on all aspects of this program was done by I. S. Filimonenko, chief designer of the Krasnaya Zvezda Scientific Design Association. Yet following S. P. Korolev's death he was removed from the position he held. Is it possible that the researcher had poorly performed the assignment given him by the party and the government?

"We succeeded in building and testing a fundamentally new power plant," related Ivan Stepanovich. It operated continuously for four days, until it was shut down. Many specialists became convinced of the reality of a process based on new physical principles. Even now I do not have the right to reveal all its particulars. I can merely tell you that the plant split water into oxygen and hydrogen and created steam with a temperature of 300 degrees celsius and a pressure of 300 atmospheres, as required to drive turbines. But in contrast to thermal and nuclear power plants it did not produce harmful wastes. Moreover, it could be used to clean the hazardous wastes of thermal and nuclear electric power stations out of the environment. The plant emitted radiation which accelerated the half-life of radioactive substances, even to the point of fully neutralizing them within a short period of time."

Does that mean that there is a means of removing radiation pollution from the environment? Perhaps I had heard wrong. But the scientist repeated what he had said and explained what it meant.

It is a well-known fact that the Sun is periodically racked by tremendous cataclysms equivalent to the detonation

of millions of atomic bombs. But what happens on Earth at those times? Is it affected by the nuclear echo?

It is affected, Filimonenko determined. And in part in a very unexpected fashion, producing acceleration... of the rate of radioactive decay.

"Oh, well," I said, disappointed, "we cannot very well make the Sun shine the way we want it to."

"That is true," responded Filimonenko, "but we are quite capable of creating sources of nuclear radiation similar to that produced by the Sun."

During testing of his power plant in 1957 he discovered odd changes in its electrolyte. Isotopes were appearing in it which had not been there before: tritium, helium-3, oxygen-17 and oxygen-18. That means that synthesis of light nuclei was occurring in the electrolyte—something similar to what, in the opinion of some scientists, happens in the Sun.

At first the scientist was frightened. Was this a joke? He had obtained a nuclear reaction at a temperature of only 1,150 degrees celsius (today this would be called a cold thermonuclear reaction). This reaction was fairly simple to control and use to accelerate the decay of radioactive substances.

At that time, three decades before the Chernobyl disaster, the scientist had already predicted similar cataclysms and, more importantly, had proposed ecologically sound technologies for suppressing radiation and rendering the waste products of the atomic industry harmless. Today it would be difficult to overstate the significance of those proposals. It is no secret that experts have acknowledged the ineffectiveness of the present decontamination measures used in the polluted zones. Now there is hope of saving the millions of people who suffered from the disaster. And not just them. Because nuclear power plants are not the only source of radioactive contamination.

...In 1896 Becquerel discovered radioactivity, and was also the first to be injured by it. He carried a piece of radium-226 around in his pocket, and a wound that would not heal formed in that spot. But were you aware that there is radium in coal—and, incidentally, uranium and thorium as well? Of course, those radioactive impurities are only present in microscopic quantities. But we process coal in huge quantities. What is the danger in that? Judge for yourself.

In 1948 Moscow's Thermal Electric Power Station #12 pulverized coal from Moscow Oblast. This coal was burned in a special furnace and the amount of uranium contained in the dust-like fuel measured. As soon as an elevated amount was observed, that particular shipment of coal was rerouted to a military plant, where the valuable impurity was removed.

Yet hundreds of other thermal electric power stations burned anything—fuel oil, oil shale and other types of fuel, all of which contain radioactive impurities.

Now let us calculate along with Ivan Stepanovich, at least in approximate terms. Since the beginning of human civilization 100 billion metric tons of hydrocarbon fuels have been burned, releasing 50 million curies of radium-226 plus as much as 300,000 metric tons of uranium-235 into the atmosphere. Today the world burns 10 million metric tons of hydrocarbon fuels each year, and those fuels contain 5 million curies of radioactive substances. This is equivalent to blowing up the Chernobyl reactor in addition to the 10 which have in effect already blown up. In the opinion of experts the population should be evacuated if pollution of an area exceeds one curie per square km.

In view of calculations such as these it should come as no surprise to find cases of catastrophic declines in health which scientists supposedly cannot explain. When homes in England were heated with coal, teenagers who worked as chimney sweeps often contracted cancer. Many miners in Schneeberg died in middle age of so-called "miners' disease." Later doctors discovered that the majority of them were suffering from lung cancer. Eventually researchers modeled a similar situation: they injected monkeys with a small quantity of radium-226 taken from coal. The animals contracted oncological illnesses.

That was many years ago, but now the experimental animals are... millions of people. Here are the statistical data. In the United States in 1900 the cancer death rate was 3.7 percent, but by 1959 this figure had risen to 15.7 percent. In the USSR in 1989 almost one-third of all deaths were cancer patients.

To Filimonenko it is clear that the principal reason for this rapid increase in oncological illnesses is hydrocarbon-based energy production. According to his calculations, even without an increase in the amount of fuel burned by the year 2010 humanity will release another 100 million curies of radium-226 into the atmosphere—and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the planet's entire population will be threatened with death from cancer.

Up until now scientists have attempted to prove that nuclear power is the solution. Yet for some reason they have failed to mention that nuclear power plants also release a huge quantity of radioactive substances into the air, even when no accidents occur. The technologies to intercept all of these wastes simply do not exist. And substitution of nuclear energy production for hydrocarbon-based energy would in any event be fatal to life on Earth.

Filimonenko's work a quarter of a century ago would have made it possible to "avoid" the kind of nuclear energy which now threatens life on Earth. It would have been possible to restructure hydrocarbon-based energy production, which upon closer inspection proves to be just as harmful as nuclear energy. Ecologically sound plants would have been built instead of the infamous boilers and reactor units.

Here is the economic justification for such replacement made by the researcher: the active zone of an atomic reactor costs R380 million [rubles]. Filimonenko's power plant of the same capacity would have cost R100 million in serial production. But unfortunately...

"Humanity has a real chance of survival," the scientist said in conclusion, "but it could squander that chance. It was Mendeleev who said that burning fossil fuels 'is like stoking a furnace with banknotes.' Because coal, oil and natural gas are highly valuable raw materials for the chemical industry; spewing them out of a smokestack is at the very least stupid. We could have put a stop to this faulty practice in our country by implementing the resolution of 23 June 1960. My research indicated that that was completely realistic. To whose benefit was it to terminate that research, and why? Is it not time for the presidents of the USSR, the RSFSR and the Union's other sovereign republics to finally realize that radiation kills everybody—capitalists and communists, Christians and Muslims, masters and servants... Until now information regarding the radiation threat was a state secret. Ordinary people had no idea what a monstrous threat thermal and atomic energy production represented, and therefore they did not object to murderous projects. But now all the most secret information is being made public, and the ranks of the 'greens' are growing with each day that passes. Thanks to their efforts the construction of many thermal electric power stations and atomic electric power stations has been halted or forbidden. But that is not the solution; we need alternative energy sources, ones which are ecologically clean. I have my own option to propose. Recently there appeared hope that it might become a reality. In 1988 I was permitted to resume my research. Thanks to the selfless labor of many designers, engineers and workers, experimental models of ecologically sound power plants have been created at a certain scientific PO. But, just as a quarter of a century ago, the financing for this work was suddenly cut off. Who once again benefits from this fiendish game, and why? Could the death of all of humanity be to someone's advantage? I can find no reasonable answers to these questions. I only know that it would take R12 million to complete our research, and someone was not willing to spend that money..."

One last thing. In contrast to the Tokamaks and Ogras, Filimonenko's power plant has already worked, and in

contrast to the RBMK [uranium-graphite channel-type reactor] it has never blown up. If we do not help this scientist complete his research now, in a few years it will be too late. We will be done in by radiation, and we will deserve our fate.

The following chart shows mortality rates in the republics of the USSR. The columns indicate how many persons died per thousand in each year indicated. For example, in the RSFSR in 1960 a total of 814,000 people died, yet by 1985 this figure had doubled.

A majority of republics steadily climbed this cruel ladder. Latvia and Estonia were ahead of all the rest. Why? The citizens of those republics take pride in their high standard of living. Ivan Filimonenko posed this question to Arnold Ruutel when they met in 1990. In search of an answer Ruutel talked for a long time with his advisors, but they could not come up with a solution to this paradox, either. Then the Russian scientist provided the explanation: thermal electric power stations in Estonia and Latvia burn local oil shales, which have a very high concentration of uranium and radium.

Republic	Year			
	1960	1970	1981	1985
Latvia	10.0	11.2	12.6	13.1
Estonia	10.5	11.1	12.3	12.6
Ukraine	6.9	8.8	11.3	12.1
Russia	7.4	8.7	10.9	11.3
Moldova	6.4	7.4	10.3	11.2
Lithuania	7.8	8.9	10.3	10.9
Belarus	6.6	7.6	9.6	10.6
Georgia	6.5	7.3	8.6	8.8
Turkmenia	6.5	6.6	8.5	8.1
Kirghizstan	6.1	7.4	8.0	8.1
Kazakhstan	6.6	6.0	8.0	8.0
Uzbekistan	6.0	5.5	7.2	7.2
Tajikistan	5.1	6.4	7.8	7.0
Azerbaijan	6.7	6.7	6.9	6.8
Armenia	6.8	5.1	5.3	5.9

Law on Liability for Damage to Historical, Cultural Monuments

914B0245A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 91
Union Edition p 3

[Text of Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics "On Criminal and Administrative Accountability for Violation of Legislation on the Preservation and Use of Historical and Cultural Monuments"]

[Text] Historical and cultural monuments are the property of the people and testimony to their contribution to the development of world civilization; they help develop science, public education, and culture, shape patriotism, and promote moral and esthetic indoctrination. They cannot be replaced. At the same time, however, existing legislation on the preservation and use of historical and cultural monuments is not sufficiently effective. The destruction of monuments continues everywhere and cases of unconcealed vandalism occur. In order to increase accountability for violations of legislation on the preservation and use of historical and cultural monuments, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees the following:

Article 1. Deliberate destruction, ruin, or damage of a historical or cultural monument—is punishable by a fine of up to 5,000 rubles [R], or corrective labor for a period of up to 2 years, or incarceration for a period of up to 3 years.

Deliberate destruction or ruin of a historical or cultural monument which is a repeated offense or entails serious consequences—is punishable by incarceration for a period of up to 8 years.

Article 2. Careless damage to or destruction of a historical or cultural monument which entails serious consequences—is punishable by a fine of up to R3,000, or corrective labor for a period of up to 2 years, or incarceration for a period of up to 2 years.

Article 3. Outrage upon a historical or cultural monument marked by exceptional cynicism—is punishable by a fine of up to R3,000 or corrective labor for a period of up to 2 years.

Article 4. Preliminary investigation in criminal cases envisioned by articles 1 and 2 of this Law is carried out by the investigators of the procurator's office organs, and for criminal cases envisioned by Article 3—by the investigators of the internal affairs organs.

Article 5. Outrage upon a historical or cultural monument without the elements envisioned by Article 3 of this Law—entails an administrative penalty in the form of a fine from R100 to R500.

Article 6. Doing construction, development, road, or other types of work which may create a threat to the existence of historical or cultural monuments without the consent of the appropriate state organs for protection of monuments and without taking preliminary measures

at the instructions of these organs to identify, classify, and protect the monuments; doing earth, construction, and other work in the protected zones of these monuments as well as carrying out economic activity in these zones without the permission of the appropriate state organs for protection of monuments; or failure to fulfill the orders of the appropriate organs which carry out state monitoring of the protection and use of historical and cultural monuments to eliminate violations of the regulations on protection of monuments—entails an administrative penalty for officials in the form of a warning or fine in an amount from R100 to R500.

Those same actions which are a repeated offense after an administrative penalty has been exacted—entail an administrative penalty for officials in the form of a fine in an amount from R500 to R1,000.

Article 7. Administrative accountability for citizens or officials violating the regulations for protection of historical and cultural monuments other than those listed in articles 5 and 6 of this Law is established by the legislation of the republics.

Article 8. Officials of the organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations whose official duties involve ensuring fulfillment of the regulations on the protection and use of historical and cultural monuments bear responsibility for violations envisioned by Article 6 of this Law.

Article 9. Records of violations envisioned by articles 5 and 6 of this Law are compiled by the officials of state organs for protection of historical and cultural monuments who are empowered to do so, as well as by workers of the militia and public inspectors of societies for the protection of historical and cultural monuments.

Article 10. Cases of citizens violating the regulations on the protection and use of historical and cultural monuments are heard by administrative commissions under the executive committees of rayon, city, urban rayon, settlement, or rural soviets of people's deputies and by the executive committees of settlement and rural soviets, while cases of officials violating the regulations on the protection and use of historical and cultural monuments are heard by single people's judges alone.

Article 11. Application of an administrative penalty or criminal punishment against an official or citizen does not release the wrongdoer from the duty of making restitution for the damages done to the historical or cultural monument.

The amount of damages done to the historical or cultural monument is determined with consideration of its historical, scientific, artistic, and cultural value as well as the cost of restoration and renovation work.

The methodology for determining the value and amount of the damages done to the monument is ratified in the manner established by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 12. In the sense of this Law, historical or cultural monuments are objects of material culture which have a particular historical, artistic, scientific, or other cultural value and are registered in the state lists of historical and cultural monuments.

Newly identified objects of material culture which represent historical, artistic, scientific, or other cultural value and are registered in the lists of newly identified objects are also to be protected in accordance with this Law before the issue of accepting them on the state registry as historical or cultural monuments is resolved.

Article 13. Add the words "deliberate destruction or ruin of a historical or cultural monument which is a repeated offense or which entails serious consequences" to Part 2 of Article 7¹ of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Union republics ratified by the USSR Law of 25 December 1958 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1959, No 1, p 6; 1972, No 22, p 176; 1973, No 11, p 157; 1974, No 18, p 275; 1983, No 51, p 784; 1987, No 28, p 437; 1988, No 10, p 152; and 1989, No 15, p 106) after the words "theft of narcotics under aggravating circumstances and also sale or theft, manufacture, acquisition, storage, transportation, or forwarding of such substances for the purpose of sale."

Article 14. Add the words "and for violation of legislation on the protection and use of historical and cultural monuments" to Part 2 of Article 14 of the Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Administrative Offenses of 23 October 1980 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1980, No 44, p 909; 1987, No 22, p 312; and 1988, No 31, p 506; and VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR, 1990, No 15, p 247; and No 45, p 953) after the words "for violations related to an offense against public order."

[Signed] President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, M. Gorbachev

Moscow, the Kremlin, 2 July 1991.

Decree Enacting Liability Law on Historical, Cultural Monuments

914B0245B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 91
Union Edition p 3

[Text of USSR Supreme Soviet Decree "On Enacting the USSR Law 'On Criminal and Administrative Accountability for Violation of Legislation on the Protection and Use of Historical and Cultural Monuments'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees the following:

1. To enact the USSR Law "On Criminal and Administrative Accountability for Violation of Legislation on the Protection and Use of Historical and Cultural Monuments" from the moment it is published.

2. To charge the USSR Cabinet of Ministers with ensuring completion of work to register all monuments of monumental art by 1 July 1992.

3. To recognize the following as no longer in force:

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 17 February 1977 "On Administrative Accountability for Violation of the Regulations on the Protection and Use of Historical and Cultural Monuments" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1977, No 8, p 141) and the USSR Law of 17 June 1977 "On Ratification of USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukases Which Introduce Certain Changes and Amendments to Existing USSR Legislation" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1977, No 25, p 389) in the part which ratifies this Ukase;

Article 16 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 8 September 1982 "On Amending and Recognizing as No Longer in Force Certain USSR Legislative Enactments on Administrative Offenses" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1982, No 37, p 698).

4. We recommend that the Supreme Soviets of the republics bring the legislation of the republics into line with this Law.

[Signed] Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A. Lukyanov

Moscow, the Kremlin, 2 July 1991.

Law on Procedure for Changing Forenames, Patronymics, Surnames

914B0245C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 91
Union Edition p 3

[Text of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Law "On Procedure for Citizens To Change Surnames, Forenames, and Patronymics"]

[Text] In order to expand citizens' rights and establish guarantees of their effective implementation, and taking into account the numerous appeals of citizens on the issue of changing surnames, forenames, and patronymics, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees the following:

1. Citizens are allowed to change their surnames, forenames, or patronymics upon reaching the age of 16.

2. Surnames, forenames, or patronymics are changed by the department (or office) of civil registration of the executive organ of the rayon, city, or urban rayon soviet of people's deputies at the place of residence of the petitioner.

Denial of the change in the surname, forename, or patronymic can be appealed in the appropriate oblast, kray, district, or city (of cities of republic subordination) organs of civil registration, and in republics without an

oblast division, in the republic organ of civil registration, within 3 months of the day the notice of the denial was received, and if the complaint remains unsatisfied, in people's court.

3. Petitions to change surnames, forenames, or patronymics are heard in the manner established by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

[Signed] President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, M. Gorbachev

Moscow, the Kremlin, 3 July 1991.

Decree Enacting Law on Name Changes

914B0245D Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 91
Union Edition p 3

[Text of USSR Supreme Soviet Decree "On Enacting the USSR Law 'On the Procedure for USSR Citizens To Change Their Surnames, Forenames, or Patronymics'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees the following:

1. The USSR Law "On the Procedure for USSR Citizens To Change Their Surnames, Forenames, or Patronymics" is enacted as of 1 September 1991.

2. The following are no longer in force:

the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 26 March 1971 "On the Procedure for USSR Citizens To Change Their Surnames, Forenames, or Patronymics" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1971, No 13, p 146) and the USSR Law of 26 November 1971 "On Ratification of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukases Which Introduce Certain Changes and Amendments into Existing USSR Legislation" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1971, No 48, p 471) in the part which ratifies this Ukase;

Article 10 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 26 January 1983 "On Introducing Changes in Certain USSR Legislative Enactments on Issues of Civil Legal Relations, Marriage and Family, Labor, and Social Security" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1983, No 5, p 74).

3. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers must bring the decisions of the USSR Government into line with the USSR Law "On the Procedure for USSR Citizens To Change Their Surnames, Forenames, or Patronymics" before 1 September 1991.

[Signed] Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A. Lukyanov

Moscow, the Kremlin, 3 July 1991.

Decree on Citizens' Rights to Education

914B0245E Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 91
Union Edition p 3

[Text of USSR Supreme Soviet Decree "On Violations of Article 45 of the USSR Constitution on Citizens' Right to Education"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet observes that recently the administrations of a number of higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, in violation of the USSR Constitution and the rights of Soviet people established therein, when accepting matriculants into VUZes and secondary specialized educational institutions in one form or another demand from citizens guarantees of payment for instruction from personal means or submission of a concluded contract on advance payment from an enterprise or institution. Payment to take an exam or for a laboratory course during instruction has been introduced in certain educational institutions.

This destroys the social achievements of the people attained in the course of historical development.

The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees the following:

1. To recognize the practice of exacting payment for instruction in higher and secondary specialized educational institutions or demanding from citizens guarantees of payment for instruction from personal means or submission of a concluded contract on advance payment from an enterprise or institution as not in keeping with the USSR Constitution and USSR laws. In connection with this, the enactments of the organs of state power and management adopted on this issue are rescinded.

2. The USSR Procurator General along with the procurator of the republic are to review cases where educational institutions have exacted payment for enrolling or studying in them and take the appropriate measures against persons guilty of violating the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of the republics.

3. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers is to take concrete measures and make its own suggestions to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of cases of violation of Article 45 of the USSR Constitution presented by the USSR General Procurator.

4. To recommend to the supreme soviets of the republics to be strictly guided by the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of the republics in ensuring the rights of citizens to obtain free education in state higher and secondary specialized educational institutions.

5. The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Public Education and Indoctrination and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Policy are charged with monitoring the fulfillment of this Decree.

[Signed] Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A. Lukyanov

Moscow, the Kremlin, 11 July 1991.

Women Faced With New Social, Economic Hardships

92US0004A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
15 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by S. Maksimova: "Matters of Concern: The Market Is Not a Knight"]

[Text]

Statistical Mirror:

- 51,411,000 women live in rural areas, one-third of all women in the country.
- 43 percent of all women employed in agriculture work on sovkhozes and kolkhozes.
- Women account for 35 percent of all agronomists, 45 percent of all livestock technicians, 31 percent of all veterinarians, and 37 percent of all economists and accountants.
- The life expectancy of rural women is 72 years, one and one-half years below that of urban women.

The question of questions today is how to effect the least painful transition to the market. The first steps—clumsy, timid ones, like those of a toddler—toward the market have already been taken. How have they affected people's standard of living and moods, what have they brought most—joys, or disappointments?

In studying the editors' mail of the past few months, it is not hard to notice that the ratio (in percent) of positive to problematical situations is 1:99. The process of entering the market is most dramatic in areas where open wounds have already festered for many years—the sphere of social life, which has been warped from the outset and developed in a destructive direction for many years.

The multifunctional roles that women play in our country and with which our women, exhausted, are forced to cope (and which are enshrouded in their mythical "liberation" from the fetters of a workaday existence) have now become intertwined into such a knot of problems the time has come not to talk about them but to shout about them!

The lot of the rural woman is especially hard. Rural women have always been virtually enslaved, forced to work day and night. And what has society given them in return? To this day, virtually all rural areas lack elementary conveniences, the simplest services, and quality medical care. There are acute problems to contend with in enrolling one's children in preschool facilities and even schools.

Given these conditions, the effect of our supposed market on women has been like the gaze of a snake. It is as though they are frozen and do not know where to turn, how and what to do to survive and to remain professionally competitive, to maintain their homes and families, and to protect their children from being reduced to begging. The local authorities to whom she turns first are also no doubt in a hypnotic state, stunned by economic and social chaos and the stream of newly promulgated and well-intentioned

but ineffective decrees and laws. How else is one to explain their basest indifference and helplessness in the simplest situations: to restore legality when a single mother raising her children on her own is laid off work; to sell a cow to a family with several children; to repair the dilapidated home of an old widow; to lease an additional plot of land to young hands eager to work.

How are women to live when they are continually faced with such questions as how to feed their children, how to find clothes and shoes for them, where to get the money to keep from collapsing under runaway price increases? One hardly need say that the universal shortages today have struck a ruthless blow to women first and foremost; after all, it is not men but women who have to deal with all the headaches of providing for the family.

According to the most conservative estimates, one of our readers, T. Oborina of Krasnoyarsk Kray, who is raising five children ranging in age from 14 years to two months, in order to buy winter clothes for her children and, in addition, to provide three of them with all the things they need for school, needs 3,500 rubles (at a minimum).

It is mothers with several children like these, for whom things were never easy before, who now find themselves in especially dire straits. Also languishing are those who have started their families recently and whose living conditions are still unsettled, who are exposed from all sides, whose incomes are small, and whose bills are large. And in both cases, it is the children who suffer most, children whose "privileges" in our country can be discussed today only in a bitterly ironic sense.

All these things are causing new abscesses and exacerbating old ones. The number of children given up in maternity wards has been on the rise in recent months. Such long-forgotten diseases of the 1920's as pediculosis (lice infestation), cholera, bubonic plague, and typhoid fever are cropping up here and there—diseases of poverty, filthy living conditions, and malnutrition.

Juvenile crime is on the increase, there are more frequent cases of theft (including the theft of food products), vagrancy, begging, and suicide.

What awaits us tomorrow?

Against the backdrop of the today's social and economic turmoil, such visible features of the market as paid child-care, education, and health care already appear somewhat innocuous. A network of lycees, colleges, and art schools is starting to evolve into a system—a network of elitist education that only very well-to-do parents (from among the nascent "Soviet bourgeoisie") are able as yet to give to their offspring. But what about rural children, whose parents' means are well known? How are they to compete in higher-school entrance examinations with their peers from the privileged lycees? Are they to apply exclusively to vocational-technical schools? Especially considering that higher schools too are now starting to charge for their services. In other words, hard cash is also becoming the ticket to getting an education. If you have the money, you

can become a doctor, a journalist, a lawyer, a manager. If you do not, kindly move on. How many talented people will never benefit our already ailing and impoverished society as a result? How many writers, artists, musicians, politicians? Take a look at how many of those we have today came from rural areas. Can it really be that in a fit of universal commercialization we will deny rural boys and girls access to the summits of art, science, and technological progress?

In short, the fog has lifted, and the stratification of society into rich and poor, sated and wanting, has become clear and irreversible. As it turns out, we have finally reached what we have been struggling for throughout these years of perestroika. We wanted Western amenities without preparing the necessary legal foundation, without implementing economic reforms, without overcoming inertia and a dependence mentality, without ensuring the necessary state assistance to low-income and vulnerable strata of the population—the old, the disabled, single mothers, and mothers with several children.

All have now clearly felt the mercilessness of the market knocking at our door. But is it not true that we are in such difficulties today because we have gotten out of the habit of relying on ourselves and our own resources to patch our own holes? Today we must feel with our hearts and appreciate in our minds, as they say, the fact that the main rule, the main law of the market is this: Help yourself. It is hard and impossible to expect that the market is going to come to our women in knight's armor on a mission of virtue and protection. If you want a good life, you have to make the effort and work long and hard.

But we also need social guarantees from the market's arbitrary conduct. For it is a fact that women above all are becoming the victims of the "Western" life: They are the first to be put out of work and to be deprived of the opportunity to buy land, the first to be transferred to low-paying jobs. What are they to do when kindergartens, consumer-service centers, schools, stores, and maternity centers are being closed all around?

Woman, and the market. These are not simple words, but two profound concepts. Two powerful roots—one social, one economic—that nourish and from which grow the vast crown of the tree of social organization, a tightly interwoven, interdependent crown. Today these concepts are in a state of confrontation. And we cannot allow the first, most important, aspect to be defeated. For only a society in which women are healthy and happy is viable and resilient.

USSR People's Deputy Semenova on Women's Rights

924B0025A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Galina Semenova, USSR people's deputy: "Once Again in the Waiting Room?—Our Steam Engine Is Rushing Forward, but Women Are Not on It"]

[Text] Politicians today are noting a high degree of radicalism in the social atmosphere. Economists are

joining ranks with their market programs as though they were bayonets, preparing the last and decisive battle. And only journalists are tactfully cautioning that all is not yet well with our democracy in the "human dimension." Let us take a look at this dimension through the prism of women's problems. After all, "democracy" means rule by the people. And the people is 53 percent women.

The bitter days of the putsch are past, when the hearts of mothers trembled with fear and pain. Of all mothers. Because those were their children who were defending the new life on the barricades, and it was their children who were sitting in the tanks. And this time, too, as always, women found themselves in the role of hostages of male rivalry and embitterment. And again they suffered most of all.

To the country's existing woes—the collapse of the consumer market, the worsening of the housing and employment situation, rising prices, the imperfection of compensatory measures, and so forth—one more has been added: destructive mistrust. In speaking of women, I do not just have psychological traumas in mind. Their mistrust today has a sociopolitical character and is directed toward society and toward power.

Indeed, how many attempts can there be to "turn toward women," "relieve the dual burden," and "bring them into politics"? The fine words proved to be merely patches on the old dress made for women back in the 1920s by legislation that was advanced for that time. But that dress has become rather worn out in communal apartments and at machine tools, and has already gone out of party and sports fashion. A new one was about to start being cut, but the effort "collapsed" after August along with the central structures and the "Basic Principles of State Policy for Improving the Situation of Women," which had been created on order of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

It is hard to accept the thought that this fundamental work, in which our best women—deputies, scholars, politicians, and representatives of the most diverse social associations—invested not just promising ideas and extremely rich experience, but their hearts, may turn out to be unneeded.

Of course, today every independent republic will outline its own strategies for resolving the so-called "women's questions" with a view to its own specific socioeconomic and demographic circumstances. But can it be that the idea that has already been worked out for combining the social protection of women in the context of the transition to a market with the organization of their self-protection and the enhancement of their political status will not be of use? Or take, for example, the need to preserve minimal social guarantees in all republics at a fixed level. An extremely important problem.

At the beginning of the year the question of the influence of economic and political reforms on women's situation

in Eastern Europe was discussed at the UN's Vienna center. Here are the conclusions that the experts reached at that time: there have been a rise in women's unemployment, a loss of traditional social guarantees and even fundamental human rights, a return of the old thinking about women's role as housewives, and a lowering of their living standard.

A picture that is already familiar to us, as well! How can this be resisted, if the efforts of republic state structures and public organizations cannot be coordinated?

For example, a colossal gap has developed in the system of measures facilitating the transition to a market—a lack of sufficient social and legal services, and of employment and vocational retraining centers. There is no need even to say how essential they are. People are confused and degraded by firings, incomprehension of what is going on, a lack of knowledge of their rights, and chaos in the distribution of allowances, compensatory payments, and coupons. And to whom does one complain about the injustice and the slow-wittedness and irresponsibility of the people who are supposed to carry things out? The social and legal services and the employment centers are supposed to help people free themselves of that degradation and find their places in the new economic structures. And there should be tens of thousands of such services, safeguarding people's rights regardless of what republic they live in. Models of new social services, programs for the vocational retraining of women, special measures for solving the problem of women's employment, a course of instruction for women in business—I know that all this was being prepared in the former union Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry for Labor and Social Problems, and in public organizations and at research institutions, that is, in the so-called center, which no longer exists.

Now the republics are independent and free in the allocation of money for specific measures of social protection. But their capabilities are far from equal. And won't it turn out, for example, that the women of one republic will be less protected and in some cases completely discriminated against in comparison to those living in another? How can a uniform minimum level of social guarantees be retained throughout the union?

Among the new political and economic councils being established under the presidents, what is most likely missing is a single common interrepublic agency that could coordinate and subject legal acts and economic measures to expert review as to whether human rights were being observed and discrimination was not being practiced.

I would like to be mistaken, but neither in the past nor at present have I met a single male politician who had even an intelligently formulated attitude toward women's problems. One constantly runs into the traditional emphasis on the social weakness of the fair sex: "Give attention to women, children and old people!" Yet they cannot be placed on an equal footing, even with all our

present problems! It is in disasters and emergency situations that women and children are saved. So can it be that an emergency situation is permanent for women? For what, then, have we been fighting? And when, finally, will we understand that a woman is not a social invalid and not the object of condescending good deeds (although good deeds would be extremely in order nowadays), but an active actor in all processes taking part in society? Understand that without her participation, common sense, and practical ability to make ends meet, we will not take a single step toward that market? That even in politics we will not get by without her, since she is always the one responsible for life, for its preservation and continuation? And she will always strive to change and improve that life, and to change it within specific time periods, because she understands not just with her mind but with her mother's heart that delay in political actions or mistaken political actions and the substitution of aggression or embitterment are paid for in human need, despair and misfortune. In the final analysis, paid for in life.

We know from "competent sources," as it is customary to say, that it is not being proposed to establish commissions or committees common to both chambers in the new union parliament that are concerned with human and family rights. Only separate, functional committees are being proposed, to assist in economic reform, privatization, etc. How one would like for this news not to be confirmed, and for us not to confuse the means and the ends! The end, our golden premise, is the human being. In short, there is every reason to fear that the new bodies of executive power and the future parliament will be purely male. And if women are allocated a share of the power pie, it will be a tiny share, albeit a difficult one, as before.

At the special, fifth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, Marina Rakhmanova, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Women's and Family Affairs and Demographic Policy, spoke persuasively about the exclusion of women from the addressing of political, economic and moral problems. She spoke about the fact that it is intolerable for state budgets to be drawn up and approved solely by men. Indeed, would women start buying toothpaste or plastic bags instead of baby food and children's medicine, or start to pay for those things with oil and gas? And in order that more accurate decisions that hit the "bull's eye" of life might be made, she even proposed the establishment of a separate women's chamber, a women's co-parliament.

However, that is not what has happened. What is happening is just the opposite: the few women who worked in parliament are quitting it. At all levels of the executive branch, it is precisely the women's structural formations that are being cut back.

"What are your bureaucratic problems compared to our life of servitude in barracks and waiting lines?" a woman from the Moscow area wrote me in reply to an article about women in politics. And she was a thousand times

right! Yet in order for us to get rid of the barracks and waiting lines, we need to have more women where these issues are being decided. Both in bodies of authority at all levels, and in parliaments, and in the leaderships of various parties and movements.

Where is the way out of today's labyrinths for women? Once again, to wait? To wait until the necessary conditions are created for liberation from the burdens of everyday life, for the easing of work, for the raising of standards, and for promotion to the leadership? Stop! After all, we have already been through all of that.

Saddling iron horses, in the workaday routine of great construction projects we have already waited for the radiant future and the necessary conditions for real equality and equal opportunity in the choice of our own destinies.

Now, it seems, the only change that is imminent is in the "waiting room." We will await the appropriate conditions at home in the family. After all, it will be professionals, and not those who are rendered powerless by concern over everyday life and exhausted from waiting lines who will be chosen for the future prosperous enterprises. Are we to let the men work, while we run around from store to store, feed them dinner and wait?

So is the old myth, turned inside out, being reborn? Today's waiting—forgive me for the bluntness—means being converted to slavery once again, but slavery not to the "communist doctrine," but to foreign videos. Do any women want that? Help yourselves.

The point is not to provide the opportunity to choose between an agricultural combine in one case and a kitchen combine in another. The point is to acquire the freedom to choose one's own path in life and to realize one's individual identity, the freedom and the opportunity to decide for oneself!

And women are thinking and deciding, in creating new public movements in the struggle for their rights, and in organizing social-protection unions, business women's clubs, and associations based on occupations and interests. With respect to public political life, I dare say the options of not thrusting oneself forward, on the one hand, or of acting, on the other, no longer exist. Act!

And therein, perhaps, lies women's new interpretation of their rights and the protection of them. Not to wait for appropriate conditions, but to be autonomous, in order to create those conditions themselves.

For all the great diversity of the interaction among republics in the new union or commonwealth, there cannot and must not be great diversity with regard to the human right to life and a woman's right to her own role in it, and to the perpetuation of that life and to social protection. Throughout the world, questions of human rights are not the internal affair of an individual state or republic. And the world community has assigned the women's question to the list of common global human

problems. Let us add to this the fact that the UN Long-Range Strategies in the area of improving women's situation that were adopted at the world conference in Nairobi in 1985 are in effect until the year 2000. They oblige the countries that signed them to have national programs and mechanisms for the implementation of those strategies. And if we adhere to the principles of civilized society, we have no right to reject them. In November an international UNESCO conference on women's problems will be held through the Academy of Social sciences. Will we once again stand humiliated and insulted before the world community?

Today the future of the new union is being actively debated in our country and abroad. Debated by men. So there is every reason to fear that in the new democratic house a familiar corner is being prepared for us somewhere in the kitchen.

Report Finds Normal Children Housed in St. Petersburg Psychiatric Institutions

924B0025B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 91
Union Edition, p 4

[Article by Staff Correspondent Ye. Solomenko:
"Normal Children in Psychiatric Institutions"]

[Text] Normal children often wind up in St. Petersburg children's institutions for the mentally ill and mentally retarded.

That is the main preliminary conclusion reached by the Warsaw Bureau of the international organization [Physicians of the World]. Over the course of 10 months, a mission of [Physicians of the World] studied the "question of abuses of psychiatry" on the Neva's shores. In 17 institutions for mentally ill or mentally retarded children, 48 persons underwent examination. It turned out that 41 of them were normal. (And the disturbances noted were merely the consequence of living conditions in orphanages, boarding houses or the family). Specialists considered the remaining seven to be only mildly mentally retarded, that is, at the lower limit of the norm.

Just why did normal children turn up in conditions that are abnormal for them? In the opinion of [Physicians of the World], there are several reasons for this. First of all, the lack of properly trained psychologists (which means a lack of proper psychological examination, as well). Diagnosis is made by pediatricians and even by simple kindergarten aides. Secondly, even children here are held up to unreasonable standards based on plainly exaggerated norms that do not accord with international norms. And the "internal," even more rigid instructions for orphanages raise those standards to such a height that most children unjustifiably fall into the category of feeble-minded or mentally retarded.

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