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Political Affairs

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Extensive Turnover in Zhitomir Gorkom Follows Special Conference

90UN0685A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 16 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with N. Zhurbu, first secretary of the Zhitomir gorkom, by G. Dolzhenko, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent, in Zhitomir: "The End of Apparatus Games"]

[Text] On the insistent demand of the rayon committees of the party and primary party organizations in Zhitomir, a special city party conference was held which replaced 70 percent of the staff of the gorkom [city party committee]. Only three persons from the former membership of the bureau are left. Our special correspondent, G. Dolzhenko, asked N. Zhurvu, the newly elected first secretary of the gorkom, to comment on this "coup."

[Dolzhenko] Nikolay Grigoryevich, why was the special conference convened?

[Zhurvu] If I am to be frank, then the former city committee of the party was not able to head the reconstruction processes that unfolded in society.

Everything started with the elections of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Instead of searching for ways to reach a mutual understanding, gorkom members entered into a confrontation with entire collectives that nominated candidates that did not suit them. An unjust distribution of apartments in a prestigious house did serious damage to their authority. And this was against a background of an unbalanced economy, numerous shortages, and critical problems. An authoritarian style of management, servility, and the lack of a desire to listen to the opinions of people predominated in the activity of the apparatus. It was no accident that the idea could be heard in some of the speeches that it was not the elected organ that was managing its apparatus, but the opposite.

[Dolzhenko] How did the conference itself go, and what kinds of feelings prevailed in it?

[Zhurvu] I would call the atmosphere very tense. Almost all of the speeches were of a critical nature. In the end, the communists were able to express themselves frankly and fearlessly on all of the problems that troubled them. They talked, in particular, about the inability of the old gorkom staff to lead the city organization, about the necessity of dividing the functions between the party and the soviet, and between the obkom [oblast party committee] and the gorkom of the CPSU, and about the importance of consolidating forces for overcoming the current crisis.

Also, unnecessary sensationalism was not avoided. All of a sudden, leaflets were distributed in the hall calling for an independent Communist Party of the Ukraine. Communists resolutely censured this provocation. The question again was raised about Article 6 of the Constitution. But this subject did not receive support from the delegates. A feeling of responsibility for what is occurring in

the city and in the country prevailed over emotions. Adopted documents that are quite constructive and well-thought-out attest to this.

[Dolzhenko] Which of the proposals that you heard at the conference were most to your liking?

[Zhurvu] For example, to create a soviet of public organizations and informal associations in the city to coordinate actions and to work up decision compromises. It is correct, I believe, to select officials of the apparatus, beginning with departmental heads, on a competitive basis, with a preliminary consideration of candidates from enterprises and in the organizations.

[Dolzhenko] For a start, I would like to hear briefly about you and your plans.

[Zhurvu] For more than 12 years, I was the director of a laboratory glass plant, and last year, I was the first secretary of the Korolevskiy rayon [rayon party committee]. Thus, I know the life of the people and its concerns firsthand. I think that it is very important not to dampen the high political ardor that we have today in the masses, and this energy must be directed to the resolution of all of the political, economic, and social tasks that have accumulated.

Estonian SSR Ukase on Administrative Reform

90UN0594A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 14 Dec 89 p 3

["Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Ukase on the Creation of an Administrative System of Self Government"]

[Text] For purposes of realization of the Estonian SSR Law on the Principles of Local Self Government and the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution dated 8 August 1989, "On Implementing Administrative Reform in the Estonian SSR" at the first stage of administrative reform, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves that:

1. The elected rural, village, rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies bear the task of providing for of a transition to local self government based on the Estonian SSR Law on the Principles of Local Self Government and other Estonian SSR legislative statutes.

2. The basic goal of the activity of the rural, village and city (city under rayon jurisdiction) Soviet of People's Deputies is to create a self-governing administrative primary level unit on their territory.

3. In order for the self-governing status of a volost [rural district], village or city to be recognized, the appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies must develop a program defining the socio-economic development and status of the appropriate self-governing volost, village or city. A commission of experts formed by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will implement control to see that this program corresponds to the requirements set by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Based on

the opinion of the expert commission, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ratifies the self-governing status of the volost, village or city. Beginning with the date specified in the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution, the volost, village or city assumes the rights of a self-governing administrative unit.

4. Districts and republic cities are formed as of 1 January 1990 within the administrative boundaries of existing rayons and cities under republic jurisdiction. Their status, organs, sphere of competency and order of functioning are established by the Estonian SSR Law on the Principles of Local Self Government and other Estonian SSR legislative statutes. Moreover, the formulation and activity of the appropriate organs becomes effective 10 December 1989 in the order specified by the above-mentioned law.

5. Prior to recognition in the order established in Article 3 of the present Ukase, the functions of self-governing status of the volost, village or city are fulfilled and the funds managed by the appropriate organs of self government at the secondary level. Prior to recognition of the above-mentioned status, at the petition of the Soviets of People's Deputies of the first level, they transmit to them those powers provided by the Estonian SSR Law on Principles of Local Self Government and other Estonian SSR laws whose realization is possible in the appropriate administrative unit at the primary level, provided the Estonian SSR legislation makes no other provision.

6. The transfer of property belonging to enterprises, institutions and organizations to municipal ownership of the appropriate units of local self government, in accordance with Articles 13 and 14 of the Estonian SSR Law on the Principles of Local Self Government, is performed in the order and volumes established by the Estonian SSR government. Prior to recognition of the self-governing status of the corresponding administrative unit at the primary level, as specified by Article 3 of the current Ukase, the property transferred to municipal ownership is managed by the executive organ of the appropriate unit of local self government at the secondary level. All the enterprises, institutions and organizations transferred to the organs of local self government are handed over together with the fixed and turnover capital belonging to them.

7. In Tallinn, the city rayons continue their activity up until the time of additional regulation of the question through Estonian SSR legislation. The definition of the rights of organs of city rayons and other self governing units of Tallinn is performed by the Tallinn City Soviet. Part 8 of Article 6 and Article 12 of the Estonian SSR Law on Principles of Local Self Government are applied in forming the executive organs of city rayons. Moreover, the leaders of these executive organs cannot be members of the Tallinn city soviet, and they are ratified by the Tallinn city soviet no later than 1 month after their appointment by the Soviet of the appropriate city rayon.

8. The rights of the committees for people's control as provided by the laws are extended at the local sites until the reorganization in the Estonian SSR state system of control organs.

9. If, at the decision of the appropriate Soviet, a staff position of chairman or deputy chairman of a district Soviet and Soviet of a republic city is created, or the office of Soviet presidium, the Soviet may provide for their wage fund in the ratified budget of the district or republic city through economy of the wage fund, free budget surpluses, or other means. The wages of the Soviet chairman or his deputy, as well as the wages of workers in the Soviet presidium office, cannot exceed the marginal limits established by Estonian SSR Council of Ministers Resolution No 335 dated 11 October 1989.

10. The first session of the elected Soviet is called to order by the chairman of the appropriate territorial electoral commission, who chairs the session until the Soviet chairman is elected, and then signs the resolution of the Soviet on the election of its chairman. Prior to ratification of the new ispolkom membership, the ispolkom functions are carried out by the previous membership.

11. The resolutions of the Soviet and its presidium are signed by the chairman of the Soviet, while the decisions of the corresponding ispolkom are signed by the volost, village, or district elder or city rayon (ispolkom chairman) and the volost, village, district or city secretary (ispolkom secretary).

12. From the moment of ratification of self government status of the volost, village or city, the Soviet of People's Deputies begins to execute in full volume its functions as Soviet. At the initiative of the Soviet itself or upon demand of no less than one-half of the voters, or upon change in the administrative boundaries in part of the territory adjoining the territory of the corresponding administrative unit, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium calls for early elections to the appropriate Soviet.

13. For purposes of ensuring the preparation and implementation of administrative reform, the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers must provide for the formation of a permanently acting working organ, as well as the necessary funds in the state budget.

14. It is recommended that the organs of units of local self government at the secondary level, for purposes of ensuring the realization of administrative reform, provide for the necessary funds in the local budgets.

15. The present Ukase will no longer be effective after recognition of the self-governing status of all the administrative units of the Estonian SSR.

A. Ryuytel,
Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman,
A. Almann,
Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary

Tallinn, 6 December 1989.

Kaunas Executive Committee 'Retired'

90UN0675A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
6 Jan 90 p 3

[Report by V. Butkus: "New City Executive Committee Elected"]

[Text] For slightly more than a week Kaunas was without a local executive authority, which, as we reported earlier, (SOVETSKAYA LITVA 14 and 27 December 1989) was compelled to resign as a whole because of a lack of confidence by the city's populace. In spite of warnings by the former mayor upon his resignation, such a premature "changing of the guard" did not cause any interruptions in the daily life of the city, and, it seems, is no longer a threat to inhabitants of Kaunas. The soviet of peoples' deputies has already elected new members for the city executive committee, and the period of supposed anarchy has come to an end. According to the recommendation of A. Gaputis, who at the previous session, in addition to his duties as chairman of the Leninskiy rayon executive committee, received the powers of mayor, the new "cabinet" of local powers was fully renewed and also reduced in numbers. Until the next elections to local soviets it was decided to have only one deputy chairman of the executive committee instead of the former five. Authoritative and active deputies in the city soviet, for example O. Radviliene, director of Middle School No 40, P. Stavinskas, chief engineer of the machine factory "Apvija," poet A. Mikuta, P. Docius, master of production training at the Professional- Technical School-2, and others, were elected to the new city executive committee. Following the oral single-list elections of the city executive committee the session heard reports on basic indicators of economic and social development of the local economy and the city budget for 1990. Without tiring the readers with a string of figures I shall only note that this year will be rather strained for the city. It should suffice to say that in the annual budget the first figure noted is the deficit of in excess of R5 million. The program of building living quarters creaks at all seams, there is a lack of consumer goods, city transport works poorly... In a word, a full collection of our common problems. Recommended solutions to these problems and distribution of the budget prepared by the old city executive committee, belong to a group, in the opinion of the deputies, of substantive additions. It is notable that during the session representatives of the recently created groupings for social self-government were involved. They recommended the creation of a city fund for health, the assets of which would go to the procurement of the latest medical equipment and other undelayable purposes in the field of health in the city. Representatives of the Kaunas union of workmen also addressed the city deputies. Appropriate decisions were made on all matters under discussion.

Thus, the crisis of local executive authority in Kaunas was overcome. Time will show how the new staff of the city executive committee will manage their heavy burden.

Ukrainian SSR Election Commission Chief on Impending Elections

90UN0627A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 3
Dec 89 p 4

[Interview with V.F. Boyko, chairman of the Central Election Commission for elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies, by unidentified RATAU correspondent: "A Most Responsible Stage of the Election Campaign"]

[Text] A little more than a month has passed since the republic's Supreme Soviet adopted the new electoral legislation designating the elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies and local soviet deputies. The preparations for them pick up speed with each passing day; the population's sociopolitical activity and public self-awareness are growing, as is the concern of its broadest strata with good results for this important political campaign. A RATAU correspondent met with V.F. Boyko, chairman of the Central Election Commission for elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies, and asked him to answer a number of questions which are coming to the editorial boards of newspapers, television, and radio.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Fedorovich, a few words concerning, first and foremost, how the preparations for the elections of people's deputies to the republic's highest organ of state power are proceeding; what now are the tasks of the election commission?

[Boyko] More than a few measures for election preparation have taken place over the last month. In accordance with the Law on the Elections of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, 450 election okrugs have been formed; okrug election commissions have been formed. They have already begun to exercise their authority. The Central Election Commission is providing them the necessary assistance. An instructional letter with concrete recommendations for organizing the work of the okrug commissions was approved at its second meeting, and was sent to them. In the near future, we plan to conduct seminar-meetings of the leaders of these commissions, at which issues of the practical application of the new electoral legislation will be considered. The Central Election Commission has prepared and sent to the provinces sample forms of election documentation. Other matters of the initial stage of the preparations for the elections have been resolved.

In such an important political campaign as the preparations for the elections, it is difficult to determine what is of primary importance, and what is secondary. But nevertheless, such a stage of the preparations for the elections as the nomination of candidates for people's deputy should be distinguished specially. In accordance

with the law, nomination begins 3 December and will continue for exactly one month, until 3 January 1990.

It is understandable that in many ways, this stage will determine who will be elected to the republic's highest organ of state power. All voters are concerned that their interests be represented in the Supreme Soviet by competent people, capable of solving in a new way the problems which the current stage of perestroika poses for society.

[Correspondent] How does the procedure for nomination of candidates for Ukrainian SSR people's deputies differ from the practice in existence until this time?

[Boyko] The law democratizes the system and order for nomination of candidates for Ukrainian SSR people's deputies. Above all, the circle of subjects granted the right to nominate their candidates has been expanded. The collectives of professional-technical, specialized secondary, and higher educational institutions, as well as residence-based voters' meetings have received such an opportunity for the first time. The republic law, unlike the union law, establishes a type of quantitative voter qualification over the collective, which may nominate its own candidate if it numbers no fewer than 200 people. Yet a norm has also been defined by which the rights of collectives of lesser numbers may not be infringed. They conduct united meetings for the nomination their representatives as candidates for people's deputy. The conduct of meetings must be agreed to upon a preliminary basis by the appropriate election commission.

I would like to underscore one more significant feature: Only one candidate may be nominated from a single labor collective, or, for example, a single voters' meeting. Yet this norm should not be confused with the right of the meeting or public organization session participants to discuss an unlimited number of candidacies. At the meetings and sessions, an atmosphere should be created in which each participant would have the opportunity to introduce proposals on the candidates for deputy, to participate in their discussion, to support the proposed candidacies, or to introduce proposals that they be withdrawn, and to propose his own candidacy for discussion.

[Correspondent] Please tell us in more detail about the particulars of nominating candidates for people's deputies from labor collectives.

[Boyko] In addition to the aforementioned, the following refinements may have practical meaning: The collectives of branches of industrial enterprises, associations, and organizations enjoy the rights of labor collectives, and may nominate candidates in the election okrug where they are located. I want to emphasize one such detail: The competence of the meeting (conference) of a labor collective is regulated by the Law on Labor Collectives. The meeting is considered to be competent if more than one-half of the total number of collective members participates in it, and the conference, no fewer than two-thirds of the delegates.

[Correspondent] In holding meetings for nominating candidates for deputy, is the quantitative complement of workers at the enterprise or organization taken into consideration, or the numbers of the personnel roster?

[Boyko] It should be based upon the number of those working, also counting those on long-term leave, official travel, etc.

[Correspondent] May a meeting (conference) of an enterprise's labor collective nominate its worker as a candidate for deputy in his residence okrug, rather than in the okrug where the enterprise is located?

[Boyko] No, it may not. The law (Article 10) grants labor collectives, and public organizations, educational institution collectives, residence-based and military servicemen's voters' meetings the right to nominate candidates only in the election okrug where they are located. In the given case, his residence-based voters' meeting may nominate the enterprise's worker as a candidate for Ukrainian SSR people's deputies.

[Correspondent] There is a significant number of enterprises in the republic where many thousands of labor collectives work. Does, for example, the shop or other subdivision collective numbering over 200 workers have the right to nominate a candidate for Ukrainian SSR people's deputies?

[Boyko] No, the collectives of structural subdivisions of enterprises and organizations do not have such a right. The law clearly and simply determines that only labor collectives in their general meetings or conferences may nominate candidates for republic people's deputies.

[Correspondent] As you have already noted, for the first time, a large youth group—professional and technical college and technical school trainees, and VUZ students—has been granted the right to nominate its own representatives to the republic's highest organ of state power. What is special about the nomination of people's deputies specifically from this layer of the population?

[Boyko] There are no significant differences in the procedure for nominating candidates by the collective of an academic institution from that of the labor collective of an enterprise. In particular, the technical school or professional technical college collective must also number no fewer than 200 voters, that is, people who have reached age 18.

[Correspondent] Unlike the union law, there exists in the republic law a statute on direct elections of people's deputies from public organizations. What are the opportunities for these organizations to have their own representatives in the republic's Supreme Soviet?

[Boyko] The same as other subjects with this right have. Public organizations are equal in rights with labor collectives, academic institution collectives, residence-based voters' meetings and military unit servicemen's voters' meetings. That is, they are granted the equal opportunities for the nomination of candidates for

Ukrainian SSR people's deputies, as well as for participation in all other phases of the election campaign. Incidentally, this norm has operated in the past as well. It is regulated in detail that oblast, rayon, city, and city rayon organizations carry out the nomination of candidates at congresses, conferences, plenums, and general meetings. At the same time, primary organizations of public organizations do not have the right to nominate candidates for people's deputies.

In considering the issue of the right to nominate candidates for people's deputies from public organizations, it is necessary to begin with the premise that the public organizations are voluntary associations of citizens, created in a procedure established by law, and that their charters are registered in republic state organs. The characteristics of public organizations are: the presence of membership, a clear-cut structure, including republic and local organs, primary organizations; as a rule, public organizations build their activity on the basis of a charter, statutes, and a program.

[Correspondent] Where do the public organizations have the right to nominate their own candidates for people's deputies?

[Boyko] The law (Article 10) grants them such a right for the okrug within whose territory they are located.

[Correspondent] And as far as nominating candidates from residence-based voters' meetings is concerned...

[Boyko] The procedure for organizing this process is quite clearly defined in Article 34. Nevertheless, questions about this come in to the Central Election Commission. I think it reasonable to pause on several of these. Voters' meetings are convened by the soviets of people's deputies or their presidiums jointly with the okrug election commission. Both the soviets and commissions themselves may act as initiators for holding such meetings, or the territorial organs of public amateur activity (settlement, village, street, block, district, or building committees). But if the meetings are held at the

voters' initiative without the consent of the okrug election commissions, the soviets of people's deputies, or their executive committees, they are then considered invalid.

It is appropriate to emphasize that the 4 November 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution establishes that until the formation of the local soviet presidiums, the creation of which is stipulated after the 4 March 1990 elections are held, the authority defined by the law on elections is exercised by the local soviet committees.

The law determines that the residence-based voters' meeting is competent if there are in attendance no fewer than 200 voters residing in the corresponding territory of the electoral okrug, that is, those who live in the settlement, the village, on the street where the meeting is conducted. Hence stems the need to conduct registration of meeting participants, to inventory their residence and age.

And one other thing. The law stipulated the opportunity to appeal to the Central Election Commission the decision of the soviet, ispolkom, and okrug commission regarding the rejection of a proposal of organs of public amateur activity to hold voters' meetings. Therefore the appropriate soviet of people's deputies or its ispolkom must make a decision to accept or reject the proposal. Their spoken consent to hold the voters' meeting is insufficient.

[Correspondent] There are attempts in individual oblasts to create various formations to prepare for and conduct the elections. Vitaliy Fedorovich, what is your opinion on this?

[Boyko] In accordance with the law's statutes on elections, all organizational measures associated with the electoral campaign are implemented solely by the election commissions. Therefore, attempts to create in the provinces any public committees, coordinating councils, or centers to prepare for and conduct the elections to the republic's soviets of people's deputies are impermissible.

But the main thing is that the electoral campaign in the republic proceed on a broad democratic basis, with strict observance of the law on elections.

Workers' Front Orthodox Extremists Assailed*90UN0683A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 52, Dec 89 p 4*

[Letter from repairman Yu. Birov of Leningrad]

[Text] I wish to share my disquiet over the growth of activity of the orthodox "Marxist" wing of the Leningrad United Workers Front (OFT), particularly in light of recent events in the past month.

The determining ideological postulate of this front, as I understand it, is the proposition concerning the working class as the most progressive and revolutionary in society, which role, moreover, is predetermined by Marx's theory and is thus independent of social and historical specifics and of today's level of the consciousness and readiness of the people's masses for revolutionary transformations.

Thus it is proposed that we make a 180-degree turn from perestroika and go back half a century: from the state of all the people to the dictatorship of the proletariat, from values common to all mankind to purely class values, from a pluralism of opinions to ideological monopolism and from the unification of the healthy forces of society to its division into those who are superior and "fellow travelers". The appearance in our city, among the main figures of the OFT, of personalities of the Nina Andreyevna and Mikhail Popov type—the chief ideologue and vigilant guard of "our socialism" against "petty bourgeois erosion"—is natural, therefore.

There remains for the apparatchiks from the ranks of yesterday's inspiration behind Brezhnevite "socialism", who are feeling the ground slipping away from beneath their feet, one last chance to remain afloat. They have suddenly remembered that with all their special distributors and freedom from all laws and lines they are flesh of the flesh of the working class. They have always, incidentally, needed not only special stores but also special workers who would read out the speeches composed in offices: "We workers are accustomed to speaking plainly...."

And so, speculating on the workers' healthy aspiration to adopt a more assertive position in perestroika, the conservative part of the apparatus has taken refuge behind the broad backs of the workers and begun to whoop out from there: "The workers' party is being beaten on and abused!!!" A really paradoxical situation is arising. The leader of the party is acknowledging and speaking about responsibility for the negative past and its present lag behind the restructuring processes in society, but at the same time certain delegates "from the workers" are threatening simply, in Stalinist fashion: "We will not allow attacks on our party." And that is that!

We can, of course, make a cut, separating the working people on a nationality basis (like "Pamyat") or on social grounds (like the OFT)—this is not the point. The point is that the hidden opposition to perestroika, which has,

it is true, finally given notice of itself openly, is prepared to go to any lengths to preserve its power and privileges. This has been shown by the events in the Transcaucasus and Fergana, "Pamyat's" sinister rallies in Leningrad's Rumyantsevskiy Garden last year sanctioned by the obkom [oblast party committee] and, finally, the recent events in our city.

It remains to be hoped that the OFT will be able to isolate the extremist section of workers of the political clubs and that the aware workers will have enough common sense to entrust the country's concerns to honest, competent and creative people. And let us leave the poll data to Nina Andreyevna, for example, to amuse herself with.

Is Russia capable only of dividing, destroying, looking for enemies and marching in formation?!

Informals' Heads on Role, Place in Society*90UN0579A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 30 Dec 89 p 4*

[Set of articles by members of informal groups: "Citizen Informals"]

[Text] "I believe it is necessary to state today at the plenum of the Central Committee: The CPSU is open to an extensive dialogue with all social forces advocating a renewal of our society; it is interested in cooperating with them and consolidation." Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said this on 9 December.

Our party newspaper also subscribed to this point of view in the process of putting together a page devoted to informal social movements. Quite a few people do not like the division of organizations into formal and informal ones. However, the latter notion has become an integral part of the perestroika processes and, perhaps, will become an entry in the most up-to-date dictionaries.

We know that informal organizations are marked by an extremely broad and varied spectrum of positions, views, and actions. There are also organizations among them which are clearly extremist, whose manifestations, declarations, and deeds are at odds with our legislation and the Constitution. SOVETSKAYA KULTURA has always criticized such activities. We will do this in the future as well. However, at the same time we are going to promote contacts with those who are in favor of perestroika, democratization, and the renewal of socialism.

On this page, you will read responses by the leaders of some informal organizations that are well known in our country to the questions asked by our editorial office.

What did we ask the informals?

Try to evaluate the role and place of your association in the life of society, in its political structure.

What kind of a relationship do you have with official organs of power locally?

Do you believe that in our state an association with any program has a right to exist, or should there be some restrictions?

Is it true that it is easy to criticize the authorities being an opposition group of sorts and not being personally responsible for anything...?

The informals answered these and other questions. No matter how controversial the points of view outlined by them are we should remember that we are looking at citizens of our country, people wishing to take part in public life and change it for the better. The most dangerous tactic is to pretend that this or that social movement does not exist. We have already paid on many occasions for "hiding our head in the sand" in this manner.

Let us hear out the informals. Let anybody who so wishes take issue with them.

A. Manokhin, candidate of technical sciences, member of the coordinating council of the Novosibirsk organization "Democratic Movement":

We Exist and... We Do Not Exist

Our association began its activities by discussing publicly acute issues that arose as far back as the period of preparations for the 19th Party Conference. We started more specific work after the draft Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies was published. We organized a mass protest campaign against nondemocratic procedures of district meetings, against elections from public organizations.

When our organization emerged, elections to the city soviet to replace a departed deputy were held in our city. I was nominated candidate by the collective of the Institute of Mathematics and was given the support of the voters. This is how the first and thus far only representative of the informals appeared in the Novosibirsk Soviet of People's Deputies.

Members of the "Democratic Movement" played a great role in the election of people's deputies in the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences. We belonged to an action group which coordinated the efforts of the collective of the division, ensured repeat elections, and freed up 12 out of 20 mandates for popular candidates.

This shows that informals also have a role to play in the political system of society at present.

Initially, oblast leaders came up with derogatory names such as "loudmouths," "drug addicts," and "who are they working for?!" However, in this matter labor collectives gave us their clear support. Despite leading comrades not having completely adjusted to the new conditions, our current relations with the party and soviet organs are on the whole constructive. For example, we have had two meetings on an equal footing with the top people at the party obkom [oblast committee]. Members of the party gorkom [city committee]

talk to us and debate us as equals; a gorispolkom [city executive committee] chairman and his deputies take part in our meetings. We are given the floor in the local press, radio, and television, albeit not as extensively as we would like.

Here is one of our problems: For four months now, we have been trying to get registered unsuccessfully. The wording of the rejection is as follows: "We have no law on informal associations, and this is why we cannot register you."

Of course, our "Democratic Movement" is in favor of radical changes. Meanwhile, as I see it, organizations such as Pamyat and the United Front of Toilers represent conservative opposition. For example, they are against our transition to a market economy, they are in favor of reinforcing the planned, centralized element, and against direct universal elections.

I am not an advocate of such forms of activities by informals that destabilize the social environment and "rock" critical situations. If informal associations want to ensure genuine support, constructive opposition should be their hallmark.

M. Auezov, writer, vice president of the "Nevada- Semipalatinsk" Anti-Nuclear Movement:

The Bombs Which Explode Underneath

The "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement originated as a protest against many years of nuclear tests at the testing grounds. Admittedly, even the organizers of this movement did not expect that it would gain such extensive, effective support from the public in our republic, our country, and abroad so quickly, altogether instantaneously. Is the movement capable of playing a role in the political structure of society? I will put it this way: It can use political instruments in order to accomplish its tasks. However, the main objectives of the movement are associated with eternal values. This calls for nonpolitical, rather viewpoint-oriented actions. For example, our movement will not nominate candidates in the forthcoming elections. We are going to fight for the conscience of voters rather than for their votes, for people capable of free and deliberate choice, prepared to defend their convictions. On the initiative of the president of "Nevada," USSR Supreme Soviet member O. Suleymenov, it is planned to convene a congress of the voters of the world against nuclear weapons in May of this year in Alma-Ata. It is proposed that at the congress a pilot international treaty on a complete ban on the production, testing, and proliferation of nuclear weapons be adopted as a uniform instruction of voters to deputies and leaders of all countries.

Through someone's inopportune efforts, a quite stable opinion has emerged to the effect that any informal association is necessarily created in opposition to official power structures. Why not in order to help them? As I see it, the burning topicality and maturity of the program

of informals definitely presupposes a tactical opportunity for united actions with official power structures, provided, of course, that their specific representatives are not burdened by obscurantism. The proven weapon of nonviolent methods of struggle and cooperation is the main means in the arsenal of the "Nevada" movement, in its current relations with the state and the government. This does produce good real results: Instead of 18 explosions planned for this year, only seven were set off. Recently, the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan adopted unanimously an appeal to the USSR Government and USSR people's deputies asking them to discontinue tests at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test facility.

"The advantage" of an informal movement, ours in particular, is in the fact that we have a well defined program and a sacred goal.

A. Tokarev, member of the standing collegium of the board of the All-Union Society "Memorial": We Are the Ones Responsible for Everything

As a historical-education society, the "Memorial" does not set for itself the task of changing political structures. The study of history and the nature of totalitarianism, immortalizing the memory of victims of repression, charitable activities—aid to former victims of repressive measures in their ultimate political, civic, and social rehabilitation—are the most significant tasks of our society. However, our statute also provides for, so to speak, preventive activities with a view to avoiding a recurrence of the past.

The "Memorial" has 185 chapters and groups at the city, rural, and republic levels. However, to this day we have not been recognized by the state. More than a year has passed since the founding conference. The statute of the society has been endorsed by the founding creative-arts unions. However, despite numerous appeals by the board of the society to the Supreme Soviet, to the USSR people's deputies, to the public, despite numerous publications in the press, this issue still has not been resolved.

We do not have office space for the operation of the board of the Moscow chapter of the "Memorial," the Association of Persons Subjected to Unjustified Repressions, medical and legal consultative services, and the archive which increases with every passing day and already numbers tens of thousands of storage units.

What can provide a better indication of our relations with official structures? Mind you, this is happening in Moscow. It is worse yet in local chapters. With few exceptions, the militant attitude toward "informal" public organizations strengthens as you get further away from the capital.

We criticize official structures, for example, for failing to open access to the archives holding evidence of the heinous crimes of Stalinism. They do not want to get

involved in the social advocacy of former victims of repression; meanwhile, we accomplish this task only to the extent we can.

We understand that the responsibility for the fate of a country devolves primarily on the citizens of that country rather than on the official structures no matter how perfect they have been made.

M. Malyutin, candidate of philosophy, member of the Coordinating Council of the People's Front of Moscow (MNF):

Let Us Get Involved in Politics

When I read in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (with a reference to the Information Exchange Bureau) that the MNF is a quite sizable organization by the standards of the capital city, this represents a certain result of one and a half years of work. As of now, the main results of the MNF include about 1,000 members united in approximately 50 rayon, enterprise, and club groups, self-government committees, and so on.

The MNF was involved in extensive work long before the rallies at Luzhniki which attract 100,000 people and before the Moscow Association of Voters emerged (to which, along with the MNF, large organizations belong, such as Memorial, the Deputy Club of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and teams of a number of other popular deputies). It is exactly within this bloc that the MNF is embarking on the new election campaign. I would like to stress that a majority of members of our coordinating council do not plan to become candidates to the Supreme Soviet of Russia, unlike the leaders of some microparties which number several dozen people.

As far as mutual relations with the authorities are concerned, they largely run into the problem of registration. Incidentally, the tactics are changing now. In some rayons, they engage in talks with us, and hurry to state in the press that the MNF is prepared to cooperate. They even offer us a single bloc in the election campaign. However, currently one gets the impression that this is a propaganda move in the course of political struggle rather than a serious policy.

At any rate, at the talks held at the Moscow Soviet in late October they told us bluntly that there are no major reservations concerning our statute. Instead, questions came up: "Why do DS [Democratic Union] representatives speak regularly at your meetings and say all kinds of nonsense?" We had to explain that party functionaries of various ranks also get to speak at our meetings (though not regularly). We are responsible only for our own words and deeds.

Well, taking into account the attitude of Muscovites toward "their" soviet, the refusal to register the MNF will be a priceless advertisement for the elections. We will get involved in the elections under the slogan: "The current Moscow soviet has failed to register both us and Memorial, having registered Otechestvo alone."

This is in response to the question on a more advantageous situation of organizations responsible for nothing and on who has the right to exist and who does not. Usually, representatives of new public movements are asked: What have you done specifically?

Now about politics. Economic functionaries should manage the economy, trade unions should defend the interests of specific strata of the population, scientists should develop theories, and journalists should write the truth. Socio-political associations should engage in political activities. In our state, this primarily means nominating candidate deputies, drafting and implementing a program. Of course, for now this is an ideal.

I. Drach, writer, chairman of the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroyka (Rukh):

Rukh Cannot be Ignored

Our movement appeared in September 1988. Prior to this, there was a blockade by the apparatus blessed by Shcherbitskiy.

Rukh is essentially an internationalist political structure of the contemporary Ukraine. It is hard to ignore it now. Now that the vernal floods are sweeping other republics and the ice of stagnation is melting, the highly experienced and unyielding, mistrustful, and multilayered monolith of the Ukraine is merely showing its first cracks.

Members of the CPSU, academicians, dissidents who have just returned "from places [more desolate than] they are remote," priests of the nonlegalized Ukrainian Catholic Church, and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Youth Communist League] members at the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, many workers in Lvov and a few miners in the Donbass, and representatives of strike committees belong to Rukh... the renaissance of the Ukrainian people and all peoples for whom the Ukraine is their motherland. Concerning the accusation of nationalism leveled at us, it is necessary to say the following: The use of the word "nationalist" in the Ukraine should be forbidden for 10 years or so as the most offensive word infringing on human dignity. Only a chauvinist masquerading as an internationalist can go sniffing for nationalism in the Ukraine when the native language can hardly be heard in Kiev; when you have to fight for every Ukrainian day-care center; and when a war is on in Donetsk, which has hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, for just one Ukrainian school.

Rukh is essentially internationalist. The Council of Nationalities within it is headed by an Armenian, USSR People's Deputy Colonel Martirosyan.

For now, Rukh has not been registered, but I believe that processing will end before the end of the pre-election campaign in our country, "on time" as far as we are concerned, so that we will not have an opportunity to nominate our candidates. Here is the attitude of the Kiev city party organization toward the Rukh set forth in the

election platform: "We are in favor of a close dialogue with constructive, healthy forces in the People's Rukh of the Ukraine for Perestroyka, but at the same time against extremist forces and actions in this movement..." Nobody wants to be an extremist or a sick person in any structure, and this is why we count on dialogue. The road toward genuine consolidation leads through a dialogue. Only leveling and averaging may be attained through monologues which were used for decades.

Rukh is too extensive and diverse, too heterogeneous and multifaceted to be a prototype for a new political party.

When the charge is made that we, i.e., Rukh, which includes hundreds upon hundreds of communists, is trying to force out the Communist Party of the Ukraine, I say that this can only be accomplished by... the Communist Party of the Ukraine itself.

Naturally, the people will vote against the apparatus, most of which was formed during the years of stagnation, rather than against the party. This is why democratization in the Ukraine will proceed from the principle of opposition—the people are going to vote "against" in order to say "yes" to Perestroyka.

Yu. Khodko, deputy chairman of the Council of the Belorussian People's Front, professor, doctor of physical-mathematical sciences:

We Act in Keeping With the Constitution...

Our organization does not overestimate its influence, being aware that we still have to undergo many trials. Social actions and presentations by the BNF [Belorussian People's Front] on Chernobyl became a major test of its authority and vitality. The first one was held in April of last year, and as early as October the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, yielding to the pressure by public opinion, adopted a resolution based on the concept of Belorussian scientists rather than the previously proposed 35-rem concept which condemned the population of contaminated areas to dying off slowly.

Appeals to cooperate are issued by the authorities from time to time. The point is that they are not confirmed by deeds. We have encountered nothing but ill will. Meanwhile, such a policy hardly ever brings dividends. They refuse to register us. The responses are not on the merits of the case, and they do not come from the people to whom the questions are addressed. Our lawyers have compiled substantiated objections to these perfunctory responses; however, we have invariably received this answer: "The opinion of the Presidium still stands." In general, relations between the authorities and the informals testify to the level of political culture. Our position does not differ from the official policy of the state, from the concept that the party has set forth in the process of perestroyka.

Certainly, in principle there can be restrictions in cases when informal associations are involved. There is no

state system that does not restrict some kind of unlawful actions by its citizens. It is set forth in the front's program documents that we operate within the framework of the Constitution, and this says it all. This is not a hollow declaration; it has been confirmed in numerous instances by the BNF statute and all of our actions.

Many people say that it is easy for us to criticize those who work in official organs. This is merely a ploy. Criticism should be reasonable. Meanwhile, the above statement proceeds from the concept of people as an unwise mob. Of course, there are currents that engage only in criticism, or in whose programs criticism dominates. However, our program is constructive and creative.

I am more concerned about the issue of social protection for the person offering criticism. As far as complaints about the difficulties that the official structures experience are concerned, this situation is frequently their own doing...

I view our front as an association of democratic forces rather than a party. We should use this cultural and political tradition more extensively. We should look for our own path.

A. Yuozaytis, member of the Council of the Sejm of the Lithuanian Movement for Perestrojka Sajudis:

Democracy Does Not Mean Just Sajudis

Something new happened after the founding congress of Sajudis. Certainly, we did not even see how the slogan of democracy gradually began to be eclipsed by the slogan of independence. Initially, it was even difficult to sort out what was more important "as of now." Claiming independence as one's goal was more courageous and attractive. Besides, many of us came to understand that we lost our hope for democracy together with independence.

The elections are drawing closer. Even now we may hear some people rub their hands and hope for a redistribution of power, and possibly for taking it. The buzz of voices of those striving and thirsting for power is getting louder. Agitation begins in the course of which all potential candidates talk about independence and predict it. Supposedly, everything is all right... Or is it?

We have lived to see democratic elections. It is impossible, but it is a fact. However, it is difficult for us to grasp not only this fact but also its essence. Democratic elections are merely an ingredient of the democratic way of life. After such elections, the defeated opponent is not annihilated; you go on living together with him, and at the next election the tables can be turned.

Radical "proponents of independence" (may the reader pardon me for the quotation marks in this case) proclaim the slogan: "Send to the Supreme Soviet only those who have decided to vote for independence rather than others." These others include scientists, instructors, and people who have tasted power. Let us not elect them? Fine. "The proponents of independence" will proclaim

what they have promised, but what will they do the next day? They will withdraw, having created a power vacuum in Lithuania, a wide-open field for chaos and peril. Could it be that they will just ban everyone else, and will not at all disperse?

The issue of proclaiming independence actually is not an issue anymore. As February draws closer, proclaiming it is going to become more easier, and implementing it is going to become more difficult. This is going to require greater wisdom, diplomacy, and experience.

The slogans are not the only problem of "the proponents of independence." The image of an enemy is their greatest shortcoming, and not just an enemy, but a very strong and eternal one. Are there communists and representatives of the authorities among us? Fine—all of them are enemies, all of them have sold out, all of them are collaborators. Should we despise and control them? Do not trust them because they really do not want a free Lithuania!

Therefore, a model of totalitarianism is in full view. Several "functionaries" exist who are in the know and promise that, once they take power, they will make Lithuania into "what it ought to be." This is why even now we have to be united (rallying around them!), disciplined, and obedient. There should not be any talk about democracy either. "We will talk about democracy later..."

This will not work.

Democracy does not postpone its birth. Having come to Lithuania one and a half centuries ago, it is already spreading spontaneously. It demands loyalty, and is not lenient to either the members of Sajudis or all others. Molding human spirit and wisdom is the greatest advantage granted by democracy. Democracy is not anyone's property, and this is why it cannot be stopped by way of an ignoramus usurping the editorial office of a newspaper or seizing control of television programs. Democracy bursts in through other windows (not necessarily Sajudis) and leaves its adversaries in the shadows. It does not accomplish anything else for them.

However, has Sajudis been striving for all of this? Let us consider in all honesty: Did we really create it as a force that should definitely confront evil? We created it so that there would be no evil left, and so that we would not have to look for it artificially. If evil is on the run let us rejoice, and let us not chase it. May our restraint be wise, and then the time will indeed come soon when Sajudis fades away in a democratic Lithuania.

V. Ponomarev, member of the Committee of New Socialists, graduate student, Moscow State University:

We Are Socialists

Of course, a general democratic stage in informal movements is unavoidable in a country liberating itself from totalitarianism. However, it is so... only until the first successful election. The people still have to be convinced that a multiparty system and a market **taken alone** will

not solve our problems. What next? After all, criticizing political decisions, even justifiably, in the environment of an economic crisis is not enough in order to overcome negative tendencies.

We, the Moscow Committee of New Socialists (MKNS), believe that it is necessary to seriously study in theory a model of social development. The key planks of our program include self-government, preservation of social guarantees and rights, and the municipalization of property. Our meetings with striking miners and employees of other branches show that at some later point a socialist program may come to enjoy considerable support in our society.

Along with many informal entities, the MKNS believes that at present the CPSU unites in its ranks people with diametrically opposed political views. We cooperate with progressive-minded communists; in the process, CPSU (as well as VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], trade union, DOSAAF [Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy], and so on) membership and rank of the person do not directly affect our attitude toward him.

Our mutual relations with city and rayon authorities are mainly normal. I believe that an appearance of stability in the rayon is often much more important for the functionaries of executive committees than particular political sympathies of the population.

Indeed, it is "easier to live" in the opposition. In civilized countries, a solution to the problem of responsible criticism comes easy: The criticizing party may at any moment take power itself. This is not the case in our country; hence, a high proportion of irresponsible statements from both sides.

As of now, talking about a law-governed state is premature. One scenario includes evolving gradually toward a multiparty system. (In this case, the answer to the question is clear.) The other scenario is more probable—a stormy epoch of transition with crises, leaps, and so on. If we were to say that the current crisis will culminate in one and a half to two years forecasting for a longer period of time would be a utopia.

In any event, the delineation of proponents of various ideological views should begin in the amorphous consciousness of mass people's movements. However, this will not happen until the elections are held and the minority is given political rights. Until that moment, the party interests of various groups will remain mainly subordinated to the United Front tactics.

[Unattributed commentary]:

Pamyat Is Posing

This is a picture from a Western magazine. However, there are our Soviet people in it. They are informals as well. They also say that they are in favor of perestroika.

We are looking at Pamyat, one of its groups. They say that it is the most extreme. Of course, its leader D. Vasilyev who sits in the center, would not agree with this statement. The fine fellows wearing boots and somewhat different uniforms who not so long ago rallied in Red Square also would not acknowledge that they sow enmity and interethnic discord by way of their appeals and speeches.

The perfidy of all reactionary ideas lies in the fact that their proponents never proclaim them in their pure form. They definitely adorn their design with beautiful and attractive clothes. Who among us is against patriotism? Who believes that Russia, the Russian Federation, should not develop at the same rate as all other republics, and should be infringed upon in some manner? Who objects to restoring historical and cultural monuments and the entire spiritual heritage of Russia?

Certainly, all normal Soviet people are "in favor."

However, at this point Pamyat says: No, not all of them. There are thoroughly camouflaged enemies in the midst of our society. They are the ones who brought about the decay of the country—"Yid-masons," "Zionists," and the rest of "the other kind" with incorrectly sounding names.

So, here is the image of an enemy. Here is an explanation of why Pamyat needs our common sore points—in order to find fault with others rather than itself.

People who do not want to look for those who are guilty with Pamyat are either "Zionists" themselves, or "masons" and "antipatriots."

Incidentally, Pamyat is not the only one to exploit the slogans of perestroika and our current troubles. Extremists of every color are the one thing that is not in short supply now. Whether you look to the right or to the left, they yell, appeal, and threaten...

Therefore, let us stay calm. Let us learn to separate the good from the evil and wise thoughts from demagoguery in the case of informals.

Also, let us be mindful. Let us look at this picture through the eyes of history.

Does this conjure up something for you?

Election Platform of RSFSR Informals Bloc

90UN0636A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 52, 29 Dec 89 pp 2-3

[Statement issued by RSFSR informals associations: "For a Policy of National Accord and Russian Rebirth—Election Platform of the Public-Patriotic Movements of Russia"; date and place not given]

[Text] Citizens of Soviet Russia! Russians! Fellow countrymen!

The elections of people's deputies for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and the local soviets will largely determine the fate of Russia and its peoples. The deepening political crisis has already cast doubt on the existence of a power that has lasted a millennium as a socioeconomic and cultural-and-moral integrated formation.

The economic crisis is gathering speed. National economic management structures are being mindlessly destroyed, including those that could be modernized, and the sole purpose of this is to replace them with a spontaneous market mechanism. The state does not have a realistic, carefully tested strategy to improve the economy and the well-being of the people and strengthen its social gains and preventing the chaos that threatens.

While remaining the guarantor of political and social stability in the country the CPSU has in fact assumed a defensive and compromising stance. It is not expending sufficient effort to consolidate society and its ranks, and step by step is retreating before the bloc of separatists and "leftist radicals" who are already prepared to dismember the Soviet Union and sell our nationality wealth to Western "partners."

It is difficult to name any period in our motherland's past when our national dignity and our national pride were subjected with such sadism to such abuse.

Transforming the "blank spots" in our history into "black holes" is aimed at instilling in the Russian people and all Soviet people a solid inferiority complex. The false concept of our "lapse" from world civilization, which not only contradicts reality but also is at variance with the evaluations of serious foreign scholars, serves the same purpose. The systematic outrages by the mass media and cynical politicians against the defenders of the motherland and the law enforcement agencies is demoralizing the public's awareness and preparing it for acceptance of antidemocratic ideas about the supposed natural condition of the country in which the people are isolated from the army, and it is playing into the hands of criminal elements.

The life of the peoples of Russia continues to deteriorate. The decay of human relations and the decline in morals are being encouraged by increasing alcoholism among the population and the soulless indoctrination of young people, the breakdown of the family, and the transformation of mothers into some adjunct of production.

The bureaucrats at the center and at the local level, and corrupt elements are increasing the social tension. Crime has spread to the streets and is permeating the sphere of production and distribution. It now threatens the safety of everyone and is engendering an atmosphere of fear in society.

For whom is this favorable? There can be but one answer to this—the "shadow" economy and its bigwigs, the mafia groups, and politicians who are prepared to turn the country into an adjunct of raw materials for the

West. They have unleashed a campaign for the legalization of private property, falsely calling it "handing over" the means of production "to the people," so that they can be masters in their own country. Hand in glove with venal bureaucrats, the people involved in the "shadow economy" lust for the levers of political power so that they can have a free hand in deciding our fate. They are pushing society into a confrontation fraught with the danger of a repetition of the tragedy of the civil war.

THE MOTHERLAND IS IN DANGER! This is the sober and honest conclusion drawn from an analysis of what is happening. Can Russia preserve its political and economic independence and its own cultural distinctiveness? This is what every Russian must realize before he casts his vote at the 4 March 1990 elections.

The bloc of Russian public-patriotic movements is proposing a solution to the crisis, the rebirth of national life for the Russian and other peoples of the republic, and retrieval of their dignity and the dignity of every citizen of the Great Russian Federation.

Soviet Russia is an independent socialist republic that is part of the USSR and has every justification for exercising the rights afforded by the concept of state sovereignty. Our deputies will strive persistently to guarantee these rights fully.

Soviet Russia will restore or create anew its own system of administrative-economic management, which will put an end to the interference of all-union organs in the republic's affairs not provided for in the treaty that created the USSR. The priority task in developing a political system for the RSFSR is the reconstitution of the Russian Communist Party [RKP] as part of the CPSU. The deputies from our bloc will act to achieve the rebirth of a renewed Leninist RKP.

The territorial limits of Soviet Russia were arbitrarily established in the twenties and were arbitrarily altered in subsequent decades. In the event of the secession of any all-union republic from the USSR, Russia will try to achieve a situation in which the sovereignty of the republic will extend to all the numerically large peoples that have belonged to it from time immemorial. Our deputies will act for a fair and objective review of and solution to this issue.

Soviet Russia should have complete disposal of its own economic potential, lands, water, and raw materials and put a stop to the sway held on its own territory by the all-union departments, which are not controlled and not sanctioned by their Supreme Soviet.

In order to guarantee the scientific potential and a modern level of economic and social development a full-blooded Russian Academy of Sciences should be established, capable of eliminating the dominance of patriotically bankrupt programs that ignore the republic's own interests. As a first step an Institute of Ecology of Russia, an Institute of the Economy of Russia, a coordinating center for basic research in the field of

science and technology, and an Institute of Russian History and Culture, should be opened, relying here both on structures of the USSR Academy of Sciences that already exist, and on the opportunities available to a scientific community united in the Russian National Academy of Sciences.

Soviet Russia will act on the basis of equal relations with the other all-union republics, which assumes equal and proportional political, legal, and economic representation in the all-union organs of power, management, and planning.

From 1991 onward, Soviet Russia will end the shameful practice of passing tens of billions of rubles to the all-union budget to provide subsidies and artificially raising the living standard of other all-union republics that do not work for it. Within the framework of the USSR it is essential to observe proportional taxes for the republics. Budget policy and price policy should not create conditions for the emergence of disproportions in providing for the welfare of the workers of the various nationalities. This is a real way to improve living standards in the republic, and our deputies will strive to have it used for the good of the people's of Russia.

A transfer to cost accounting for the all-union republics can offer the expected result if it is equal. Any cost-accounting output should be in line with the cost-accounting prices for articles, raw materials, and energy going to the all-union republics from Russia. If this output is unsatisfactory in terms of quality, then like any other all-union republic, the RSFSR has the right to move out into the world market.

All all-union organizations and departments, including governmental and legislative bodies, will make payments to the budget of Soviet Russia for their sojourn on its territory. This will apply equally to the representations, institutions, and organizations of the all-union republics on RSFSR territory. Trade, economic, and other deals will be done by the center with the all-union republics and shall not be legally binding if they are made at the expense of a third party—the RSFSR. The RSFSR is capable of deciding for itself what to do on its own territory in its relations with other all-union republics, and how to do it. This is yet another source for the economic and state development of Russia.

The economy and industry of Soviet Russia should be focused on the needs of the republic and the needs of the individual. This is a long-term strategic task, and our deputies will strive to resolve it. It is essential to draw up immediately a general plan for the scientific-technical and industrial and economic development of Russia that excludes any continuation of the wasteful attitude toward its land and resources. Industrial reorientation and steering the activity of ministries and departments to the needs of the individual will change the structure of the budget and free manpower to resolve social problems. Reorienting the activity of the Ministry of Land

Reclamation and Water Resources on highway construction and the regeneration of land is capable of significantly helping the development of villages and the countryside in Russia without extra spending.

The country must make an end to extensive development, which is dragging it into an economic chasm and condemning it to chronic backwardness in relation to many of the world's countries. Modernization is the main direction in industrial development that will resolve ecological problems and create human conditions for production. Modernization on the basis of advanced technologies and clean production processes will enable savings of 50 percent in energy use and make it possible to abandon totally the construction of nuclear power stations and the irrational use of electric power and raw materials. Thus shall we insure the future for our children and grandchildren and their descendants. Modernization is today's path to improving production standards and freeing manpower for human needs. It is the path of ridding a woman of her involuntary emancipation and returning her to the family, where she fulfills the role of mother, guardian of the hearth, and bedrock of the nation. Modern production frees the individual from physical and moral stress and gives the worker an opportunity to have a vacation guarded by law.

The peasant is the fully empowered master of the land that he works. He is the fully empowered master of the fruits of his labor. Only the peasants themselves can decide what forms they need for the organization of labor and production. The land can be given to the peasant and his family and his descendants on an open-ended lease but it cannot be bought or leased to other persons for the exploitation of the peasant and his family. It is essential to consider seriously the traditional love of freedom of the Russian peasant, and his devotion to his artel origins. There have been more than enough experiments with the land of Russia and with the peasant—the sower and custodian.

The republic is choking on the environmental pollution. Our bloc has drawn up a program for a solution to the ecological crisis that includes change in the system of water use and energy supply, restoration of forests and arable land, comprehensive measures to purify sewage, and the development of closed technological cycles, and rejection or reducing to minimum levels the use of chemical products in agriculture. We are against the creation of mixed enterprises that are turning Russia into a factory for harmful production facilities and a site for the burial of toxic chemical and nuclear waste. The health of the citizens of Russia is a national achievement, a condition for the burgeoning of future generations. The siting of atomic power stations on the territory of Soviet Russia, and often in the best areas and nature reserves and densely populated regions, is the result of a short-sighted and harmful energy policy. Our bloc supports the appeals of other public organizations to denuclearize Soviet power engineering. It favors concentration of the best scientific and engineering forces on opening up free and safe energy sources—solar, wind,

tidal, and thermal sources—as the foundations of the power engineering of the future.

The national economy of Soviet Russia is based on public ownership. This choice was made in 1917 by the people themselves, and no parliament has the power to change it. Our deputies will strive to achieve a situation in which the problem of ownership will be resolved by national referendum. Only one's own labor confers the right to ownership. The working man should become the fully empowered master of the land and of production. We shall not allow the political fixers of the "shadow" economy to decide and change the destiny of the motherland and of the peoples of Russia.

The people are right to demand from the government a legal way to remove from the "shadow" economy the billions of rubles and other material values stolen from the state and the workers over the decades. To this end it is necessary to implement a monetary reform immediately, or more accurately, the exchange of ruble bank notes for up to R10,000 or R15,000 per person. All other money should be issued only on the strict condition of a declaration stating that it was honestly obtained through labor. Let the fire of the people's anger and justice burn the smart dealers of the corrupt "shadow" economy, and the speculators, second-hand dealers, machinating cooperative people, racketeers, sharp dealers, bureaucrat bribe-takers, and all who have enriched themselves and are enriching themselves by dishonest and thieving means. Let social justice triumph.

It is essential to introduce a progressive inheritance tax. These steps will make it possible to remove the threatening influence of the "shadow" economy and the mafia on society and approach perestroika in the national economy in a more well-considered manner. Corruption is largely predetermined by the crisis. We are demanding a purge of the management apparatus and the bringing to justice of all who take advantage of their official positions in order to profit from and flout the rights of working people. We demand that all those who have ravaged the country by entering into international deals in the interests of foreign "partners" be made accountable. Foreign policy and foreign trade should be under the control of the people.

Our country has been created through the labor and sweat and blood of many generations and no one has a right to trade its territory by yielding to foreign occupiers. Our bloc is against the creation of "free trade zones," concessions, and joint-venture enterprises of the neocolonial type acting on the principle of "they have the income we have the expenses." Our deputies to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet will insist on the cancellation of antipopular deals and reject any kind of compensation for such deals because of their illegality.

Soviet Russia is a multinational state. None of the nations living here enjoys any privileges, and the principle of the equality of citizens operates throughout the

territory of the Russian republic. Separatism is unnatural from the standpoint of its state integrity. This does not hamper the development and consolidation of the autonomous formations, maintenance of development, and the preservation and deepening of national uniqueness among the peoples making up unified and indivisible Soviet Russia. The Russians are equal throughout the territory of the RSFSR, and the nations and nationalities within it enjoy proportional representation in the legislative and executive organs of power.

Ethnic persons from Soviet Russia live in all the all-union republics, often in compact areas. Our deputies will demand the creation of RSFSR representation in those republics for links with their fellow ethnic communities. In cases of discrimination, Russia will take all necessary steps in accordance with international practice to safeguard human rights. Proud of the "universal responsiveness" of the Russian people, it will not permit abuse of its national and human dignity on the territories of other all-union republics. There is no room in Soviet Russia for any form of chauvinism or nationalism.

Within the country there has long been a need to set up a committee for refugee affairs, and determination of their status. The legal definition and proven status of a refugee should entail the legal and political and economic and moral responsibility of the republic that they have been forced to flee. A person of any nationality should be assured of a future and safeguarded against encroachment on his tranquillity and well-being and his rights and honor.

In order to extricate ourselves from crisis, deal with crime, and preserve the independence and might of Soviet Russia what is needed is a modern people's army, a valiant officer corps, and strong and authoritative law enforcement agencies. Against a backdrop in which the United States is implementing all kinds of military programs the arguments of politicians and political commentators about reasonable sufficiency in defense appear naive. Our deputies will not permit the Army, the militia, and the state security organs to be made a scapegoat for the failures in foreign policy and the economy, or for corruption and mismanagement. Defense-patriotic indoctrination of youth should be an organic part of the healthy national indoctrination of the future masters of Russia.

The resolution of political, economic, and ecological problems is not an end in itself. It is only the means to enrich national life and the morality, spirituality and culture of the people. Schools should instill a sense of civic responsibility and patriotism and educate the full-blooded, conscientious worker, not someone who has only a superficial knowledge of things. Humanization of the schools is a crucial national task, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet must resolve it in order to guarantee a future for our people. Our deputies will act for the people to have real access to the national cultural legacy, and for teaching of the history of our people and homeland in schools, and for work on legislative measures to restore

and preserve historical and cultural monuments and the historical lineament of Moscow as the capital of the RSFSR.

The mass media are now actively working on the awareness of people today, first and foremost young people. There is popularization of the "mass cult," and unrestrained propaganda for amorality and individualism, pornography and violence. The all-union television channels are not national, and it is high time that we stop making fools of the peoples of Russia. To this end it is necessary to restrict all-union broadcasting on Russian territory so as to leave more time for information programs, and to set up an RSFSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. A pro-Western propaganda complex is not indicated for Russia with its great culture. The peoples of the RSFSR have their own mass media! They should disseminate better models of the national cultures and world classics. Only along this path is it possible to assert truly human values and mutual understanding between peoples. Under conditions in which impunity is to the advantage of some, our deputies will demand that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet pass a law on morality that provides safeguards against choking of the spiritual milieu and the criminal preaching of the cult of shamelessness and arbitrary conduct. We are against the so-called "personal" mass media whose real bosses will be those who deal in the corrupt "shadow" economy, and comprador capital.

The traditional religions of the country's peoples have largely determined our national and cultural-historical uniqueness and our moral and spiritual experience. We believe that the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations can be actively involved in developing spiritual life among the peoples of Soviet Russia. And for this we need legislation on freedom of conscience for both believers and atheists so as to bring historical tradition and the sociocultural realities of our time into line. We need neither a theistic nor atheistic state. The church should enjoy the right of a legal entity along with other legal associations of citizens. Only if this is done will it be able to make a positive contribution in line with its possibilities to the shaping of patriotic and civic self-awareness in society.

For full state self-determination for Soviet Russia a political and administrative center is needed. Historically that center is Moscow—the focus of political and spiritual life for Russians. In order to liberate it from its all-union administrative structures our deputies will demand the creation of an administration center for the USSR outside Moscow.

Dear fellow countrymen! It is still possible to extricate ourselves from the crisis. Russian revival depends on each of us, on our selfless labor and high sense of self-discipline and responsibility. We are reviving the glorious name of the Russian man and woman, the human dignity of all the peoples of our multinational

motherland! The bloc of Russian public-patriotic movements appeals in the spirit of National Accord for support for its candidates for the post of deputy so that this rebirth may take place.

EVERYONE TO THE ELECTIONS!

WE DO NOT NEED GREAT EVENTS, WE NEED A GREAT SOVIET RUSSIA!

RUSSIA HAS ALWAYS BEEN AND STILL IS A WORLD POWER!

SHE WILL DO EVERYTHING NEEDED TO KEEP THE SOVIET UNION AS IT HAS BEEN!

NO TO SEPARATISM, CHAOS, NATIONAL ENMITY, AND INTERNECINE DISSENT!

FOR NATIONAL ACCORD, FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING PEOPLE!

The "United Soviet Russia" Association (National Accord);

The "Yedinstvo" Association Lovers of Russian Literature and Art;

The "Rossiya" USSR People's Deputies and Voters Club;

The All-Russian Cultural Foundation;
The All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments;

The Public Committee To Save the Volga;
Society of Russian Artists;

The Russian Branch of the International Foundation for the Slavic Language and Slavic Cultures;

The Union for the Spiritual Rebirth of the Motherland;
The RSFSR Voluntary Society for Book Lovers;

The Foundation for the Restoration of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.

Estonian Democratic Party Program

90UN0616A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in
Russian 15 Dec 89 p 4

[Democratic Party Program Committee: "Theses for the Democratic Party Program"]

[Text] The Democratic Party believes that in 1940 Estonia was effectively annexed. After the USSR Armed Forces entered the territory of Estonia, the government of the Estonian Republic was removed and a state parliament was elected. The state parliament passed a resolution incorporating Estonia into the USSR without being empowered to do so by the people of Estonia. The Democratic Party (DP) does not accept such methods of political struggle and states that any decision changing the status of a state must be made by the citizens of that state in a referendum. The DP condemns attempts by certain political forces to go back to methods of the past, giving supreme authorities of the republic and various congresses and forums the right to decide the political status of Estonia without the participation of the people. These tactics hold out the danger of a totalitarian regime

being established in Estonia under a different political status. The DP believes that the issue of Estonia's political status can be decided only by the entire population of Estonia in a referendum. Moreover, this issue may be put on vote only by the decision of the Supreme Soviet. A necessary condition for the referendum is the acceptance by the Supreme Soviet of a multiparty system and freedom of speech, religion, the press, gathering and association.

In the referendum, every citizen should make the decision individually, of his own free will. In a one-party system and in the absence of democratic freedoms, the apparatus of power will be able to shape public opinion in whatever direction it finds useful, using newspapers, radio, television, party committees, union committees, etc. In these circumstances there will be no free expression of the will of citizens.

The DP believes that citizens must have the right to form parties and organizations freely, not by registering them but simply informing government authorities. We think that this issue must be raised at the first session of the new Supreme Soviet of Estonia. The next step must be to pass a new law on elections to the Supreme Soviet based on a party list system. The current multi-mandate system offers elections based on personality. Given political and ethnic divisions in the population, the multi-mandate, or personal, election principle allows for the possibility of personal ambitions in the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet will become an effective organ reflecting the interests of the people only when it consists of representatives of political organizations for whose political platforms voters cast their votes, with self-nomination not excluded. This will allow a politically organized minority to be represented in parliament. The multiple mandate system does not guarantee this since at the polling station the voter votes for a person and not for a platform.

Given the above-mentioned ideas, the new Supreme Soviet will in effect be a transitional legislative body whose main purpose will be to establish democratic principles of government in Estonia.

The DP believes that according to the existing Constitution Estonia is a sovereign state, even though the republic's sovereign rights, as well as many rights of citizens, were not safeguarded. Based on this, the DP believes that all residents of Estonia who arrived here after 1940 have the same civic responsibilities to the Estonian SSR as former citizens of the Estonian Republic do, just as the Estonian SSR has the responsibility to its residents to uphold their civil rights. For this reason, the DP believes that it would be illegal to deprive residents of Estonia who came here after 1940 of their civil rights based on a residency requirement. The law can not be retroactive. There must be a law on Estonian citizenship. When the law on Estonian citizenship is passed, all residents of Estonia must have the right to obtain its citizenship unless they choose otherwise.

The 10-year residency requirement for candidates to the Supreme Soviet passed by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet is in effect a precedent for depriving those who have lived in Estonia for less than 10 years of their Estonian citizenship. In our opinion, the residency requirement was adopted because the present Supreme Soviet is not a true parliament representing the will of the people but a typical organ of the period of stagnation comprised of individuals appointed by the administrative system to perform the role of deputies. This is why they are guided not by considerations of their civic responsibility to the electorate but by emotions (under pressure from the apparatus or various political groupings). Supreme Soviet deputies represent no one but themselves. For instance, the Supreme Soviet, under pressure from the Estonian Popular Front, first passed an active two-year residency requirement and then the same deputies rescinded it two months later. The ability of this Supreme Soviet to fulfill legislative functions in current conditions is very much in doubt. In this situation, the most rational step would be to withdraw the mandate of the Supreme Soviet until the new Supreme Soviet is elected and to temporarily transfer power to the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet Presidium. However, the DP understands that it is not feasible under current political conditions.

The DP declares that its goal is to nominate candidates for the Supreme Soviet based on a party list with a uniform political platform to foster democratic processes in Estonia, taking into account the interests of the Russian-speaking population, and announces the establishment of a Democratic Election Committee charged with drafting the platform and conducting the election campaign for the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. The DP invites all interested organizations, individuals and future candidates to take part in the work of the committee on an equal basis.

The mailing address of the Democratic Party is Tallinn 200029, a/ya 5125. The Democratic Party Program Committee meets every Friday at 6:00 p.m. at the former House of Political Education (Sakala Street, 3), room No.2.

Ukrainian CP's Gurenko on Elections, Rukh 'Manifesto'

90UN0664A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
9 Dec 89 pp 1,3

[Interview with Ukrainian CP Central Committee Second Secretary Stanislav Ivanovich Gurenko: "The Party is Tempered in Struggle"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Reporter] Stanislav Ivanovich, what is so special about the forthcoming elections of People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR and local Soviets?

[Gurenko] Primarily, the continuing, active democratization of all social life, which is reflected in the adoption of the new Election Law, established as the result of

extensive nationwide discussion. I would like to place special emphasis on the fact that the Law embodies all the constructive desires for improving elections of People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR and local Soviets. All social organizations, associations and formations representing specific variants took part in the discussion of drafts of the Law, and were provided explanations and expert opinions on each of their proposals. Another matter of considerable importance is the fact that alternative drafts of the Law were published in the republic press. And that is how the document prepared by Candidate of Juridical Sciences I.A. Timchenko, senior scientific associate at the State and Law Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, came to light. Proposals on new principles for formation of election okrugs published in Kiev's city newspapers and supported by the Supreme Soviet and the ispolkom of the Kiev City Soviet of People's Deputies grant the right to hold elections according to an experimental system [skhema].

Thus, practical steps have been taken to improve the democratic processes in the social life of the republic.

However, one must not forget the background against which the pre-election campaign is being waged. The politicization of our lives is still going on and is becoming more profound, as diversity of opinion flourishes and new social forms and structures appear. It goes without saying, that this is leaving its imprint on the pre-election campaign which, frankly speaking, is also complicated by the fact that the government has not yet managed to completely overcome the negative trends in our economy, or to consolidate the positive features which appeared last year. Here, of course, the disruptions in the operation of the coal industry, brought about by well-known events, played their role as well. Right now the situation in the mines and in the related industries is being normalized, but it will clearly be impossible to correct the situation before year's end. Compared to last year, coal extraction has declined by 10 million tons, and the losses will increase. Naturally, this will affect, and already has affected contiguous industries—metallurgy and coking-by-products, and so on, throughout practically all links of the national economy; for all its branches are interdependent.

And yet, there was a positive aspect to the strikes. Primarily because it became a genuine crucible, through which both the workers and the party organizations passed. We have profited from the lesson. The work-level of many party committees has increased; and, most important, positive trends can be seen in the working collectives. Extremist demands are becoming more rare, and the people are beginning to ponder the political realities. True, the processes in the working world are not identical today; however, it is clear that many working collectives are rejecting temporizing positions, are more and more boldly taking part in perestroyka, and are taking up the solution of concrete social and economic problems.

On this plane, I would like to especially invite the readers' attention to the appeal of the working collectives of the Kievtraktordetal Production Association, the kolkhozes Iskra in Cherkassy Oblast and Pravda in Chernigov Oblast, the Gogolevskiy Sovkhoz in Kievshchina, the Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Potato Culture, and the workers, peasants and working intelligentsiya, to join in with the Union of Workers for Perestroyka. The appeal was published in the republic press on 2 December this year. Such initiatives, in which the workers plan concrete matters for resolving social problems both in the city and in the countryside, and then carry them out, can only be welcomed. And we have quite a few collectives who approach this from positions of social and not group interests. Just take the Novomoskovskiy Metallurgy Plant in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast. Its workers are not spending their wages for the needs of the moment, but are investing them in housing construction and in developing the city's infrastructure. I would like such experience to be disseminated as broadly as possible (and here the party committees have the decisive vote).

And finally, we must not forget to mention the recently-convened Central Committee Plenum, which adopted the platform of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee for the forthcoming elections. In our view, in the present situation we are dealing with a well-considered document which considers both the complexity of the situation and the difficult prospects of the way out of it. It is a fine basis for consolidation of all the positive forces which are striving for the success of perestroyka.

[Reporter] How should the republic party organizations operate in the conditions of the pre-election struggle?

[Gurenko] We have already answered this question partially in the first part of our conversation. But the main thing, and I want to dwell on this in particular—is making it clear that the elections will be a very serious test for the republic party organization as a whole, for our "primary cells" and for all party committees. We have already declared repeatedly that today the active participation of every communist is required. This means that all party members must take a most active position, and display it as distinctly as possible in the coming pre-election struggle. And I stress the word, "struggle," because the political campaign which is about the begin will be noted for its severity—such as we have never encountered during the previous election of People's Deputies of the USSR. The politicization of social life, complication of the economic situation, and perhaps the most noteworthy—the empty shelves in the stores—all will make our task extremely difficult and will force us to take serious thought on where we are heading and how we will realize the goals of perestroyka. And the "prescription" here is as follows: We must overcome the passivity and lack of faith in success, which has spread in our society—and, let's face it, in certain party organizations as well. Therefore, the truth must be grasped that not only conscientious labor, but also active party-political activity (Here I have in mind agitation and

explanatory work) will permit us to hope for a favorable outcome in the pre-election campaign. It is a question of ordinary work, but forms of work which many people are not familiar with. Somehow the order was given that only certain party committee representatives should deal with these matters. We recall that just ten years ago it was believed that for an ordinary communist to live up to his high calling, it was enough just to work well. Of course, working for one's conscience is already doing a lot. But after all, the party is a political organization. And if a communist does not strive to increase his political influence on his organization by means of his personal contribution—both the prestige and the influence of the entire organization plunges. Look: let us speak frankly—the criticism to which the Communist Party is subjected today has come about precisely because of the inactive (I would not say—passive, but precisely, inactive) position of many party members. They at times expect some kind of protection “from above,” from the higher party organ. But you see, every communist is obliged to stand up for his own convictions and for his party, himself! The CPSU is millions and millions of people: there are 3,200,000 party members in the Ukraine alone. To energize every communist, to show every party member and every sympathizer (It's a shame we rejected this term) the necessity of participation in the political struggle in his own organization, in his city or village—this today is the paramount task. And all the conditions are present for this, a fine opportunity to gain experience in the political struggle, to gain strong political tempering, and to derive practical lessons from the pre-election campaign. The Communist Party of the Ukraine should come out of the campaign stronger.

As far as tactics are concerned, here it is very important that every primary party organization have a socially-significant cause. For years now the working collectives have been successfully promoting perestroyka at the Konveyer Association in Lvov, at Rotor in Cherkassy, at the Kharkov Tractor Parts Plant, at the Precision Electronics Instrument Plant in Kiev, and many others. And when communists, relying on the working collectives and utilizing all the reserves, take up a cause, then significant results are at hand, even in today's complex conditions.

And finally, we've had enough of repentance. We must show that the Communist Party is capable of resolving the problems which are of concern to the people today. On this basis we must rally the best forces, and nominate the most worthy—communists, non-party members, believers, Komsomol members, representatives of all categories of our society—honest, upright people as candidates for People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR and local Soviets, and ensure their democratic election. Such is the mission of the republic party organization today.

[Reporter] Various informal organizations are also preparing for the elections, “Rukh” in particular, which has adopted a pre-election manifesto containing attacks on the CPSU. What is your attitude toward this document?

[Gurenko] I note that a number of leaders of NDU have announced that they they were not privy to the manifesto. But we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that pre-election meetings are already being held under the slogans of this appeal; in Kiev, for example, where those very same Rukh leaders are speaking out. To what does this manifesto appeal? With even a cursory reading one cannot find specific proposals on how to improve our lives. But on the other hand, there are enough references to black and white places in our history and attacks on the CPSU to set one's teeth on edge.

[Reporter] Our society is in a situation of crisis. Are there hopes for a way out of it?

[Gurenko] That is the question of questions. There is a way out; what's more the prospects are not all that gloomy. But one must reject the thinking, to which many people are captive, that the situation can be improved only by means of changing the distribution of social wealth. One can, of course, achieve some kind of local success by that method. But that would be temporary, a brief phenomenon. After all, if the economy is not strengthened, in time there will be nothing to divide. Let's say that increasing pensions “flushes” new billions into the market. This in the final analysis might cause an even greater imbalance in the economy. There is only one way to ensure that this does not take place: by increasing the production of goods. And we have such a program. According to the totals for the 11 months of this year the republic has over-fulfilled its plan for production of consumer goods. It is especially gratifying that the plan for production of foodstuffs has been exceeded. The greatest grain harvest in all the years [sic] has been gathered in the republic, more than a ton per capita (and this is—world-class!). There are real possibilities for over-fulfilling the plans for production of sugar and vegetable oil. There will be an increase if only a small one, nevertheless an increase in production of animal products. This will establish the prerequisites for improving the supply of foodstuffs to the populace as early as next year.

The reorientation of industry to production of consumer goods continues, although this is a very painful process. Temporary difficulties here are inevitable. One must only evaluate them properly. One must not hope for “extrasenses [ekstrasensov] from the economy,” but set concrete tasks for oneself and solve them. It is necessary to work! In my opinion the 13th Five Year Plan will become a period of serious crisis for the socio-economic development of our republic, and for the whole country.

In conclusion I will dwell on one very important question. One must not strike out with one stroke the 72-year history of one's country and the undoubted achievements made along the way. Carrying out the historic will of the Ukrainian people, 67 years ago the republic entered the USSR as one of the initiators. And out of the ruins which the Second World War inflicted on the Ukraine, we have achieved a rebirth, thanks to the fraternal assistance of all all the nations of the Soviet

Union. The Ukrainian CP Central Committee sees the fruitful social and economic development of our republic only within the context of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Today political stability is vitally necessary, in combination with further democratization—and intensive work on renewing the economy.

Of course the time has also come for perfecting production relationships, and above all the form of property. But it would be politically naive to suppose that one can change the a person's attitude toward his work just by adopting a Law on Property. One of the most important tasks in getting out of the crisis, in my view—is to restore to the people the sense of being the master. I place here first of all not a mercantile meaning, but the need for a respectful attitude toward skilled, quality labor. And this is connected with strengthening morality and the general culture of the people. Here there is an awful lot to do.

Today our society is at the stage at which the creative activeness of the masses is to a significant degree aroused. And this is the pledge on which our real hopes for a way out the crisis rest. The Central Committee and all the party committees of the republic see their task today as restoring the vanguard position of the party, not by declarations but by specific deeds, and to support the success of perestroika.

Ukraine Party Official Meets With Rukh

90UN0673A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 9
Dec 89 p 3

[RATAU report: "Searching for Paths to Constructive Work"]

[Text] On 6 December in the premises of the Ukrainian Union of Writers a meeting was held between L.M. Kravchuk, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, and representatives of the leadership of the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika [Rukh].

During the course of the conversation they touched on a wide range of problems that are crucial for our republic today. L.M. Kravchuk discussed the approaches of the Communist Party of the Ukraine to the preparation of the program of actions in connection with the forthcoming 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and the work related to interpreting and reinterpreting the dramatic pages of the history of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and the republic; he explained the fundamental position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine regarding such issues as economic independence and state sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], overcoming the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, improving the ecological situation in the republic, enforcing the law on languages in the Ukrainian SSR, and dealing with Greek-Catholic communities and national symbols; and he answered numerous questions from those present.

Also speaking at the meeting were I.F. Drach, secretary of the board of the Kiev writers' organization and chairman of the NDU; D.V. Pavlychko, chairman of the Society of the Ukrainian Language imeni T.G. Shevchenko, USSR people's deputy; Yu.M. Mushketik, first secretary of the board of the Union of Writers of the Ukraine, deputy of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet; and other participants in the discussion.

During the course of the meeting it was established that the leadership of the NDU would prepare concrete proposals concerning problems which in this stage can be solved in conjunction with party and Soviet organs and social organizations.

Rukh, Ukraine Party Official Express Views

90UN0673B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 1, 1-7 Jan
90 pp 10-11

[Dialogue with Ivan Drach, secretary of the board of the Union of Writers of the Ukraine, chairman of the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika, and poet, and Leonid Kravchuk, candidate member of the Politburo, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, by Nikolay Baklanov: "Two Viewpoints on Rukh"; place and date not given]

[Text] Our weekly suggests having a regular column entitled "Two Points of View." Its material will be controversial. The column begins with an interview by Nikolay Baklanov, SOYUZ correspondent for the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], with Ivan Drach, secretary of the board of the Union of Writers of the Ukraine, chairman of the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika [Rukh], and poet, and Leonid Kravchuk, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

1. The significance of the Ukraine in the family of nations of the Union hardly needs any extensive evaluation or commentary. Therefore, there is nothing especially surprising in the fact that the sociopolitical processes taking place here, particularly the creation of the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika—Rukh—is receiving particularly constant attention in the society. What, in your view, has brought about the appearance of this organization?

2. What meaning do you see in the concept "perestroika"? To what extent do the strategic goals and tactical tasks of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and Rukh coincide and where do they contradict one another?

3. What do you think, is Rukh not a prototype of a new political party? What tendencies prevail in it: internationalist or nationalist?

4. Will Rukh always operate within the framework of existing legislation?

5. The example of Solidarity in Poland shows that it is not at all necessary for a group to be officially called a political party in order for it to come into power. Is Rukh capable of accomplishing something similar during the course of the forthcoming elections in the Ukraine, pushing the republic Communist Party into a secondary role?

Ivan Drach: Democratization Will Proceed From Opposition: Not So Much "For" as "Against."

1. Rukh is a movement. The People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika exists among other movements and people's fronts as a social organization which is unregistered so far. The ice of stagnation stays longer in places where both the earth and the soul have been frozen harder, where there has been a model ice farm of emperors of all the Russias, the generalissimo, Leonid Ilich, and his followers. But now the ice has begun to chip. While spring waters have already begun to run in other republics only the first cracks are beginning to appear in the deeply frozen block of the Ukraine. And when you hear Rukh, this chips the ice. The desire to live differently—this is Rukh. When people no longer believe in anything, the last thread of hope is called Rukh. And the more the Ukraine thaws, the greater the benefit to perestroika—and to other peoples, above all its neighbors.

2. The Communist Party of the Ukraine must be reborn rather than renewed in order for both to keep in line with the spirit of the times and to respond to the demands of the Ukrainian people and their deepest tendencies. For until recently, even the very combination of the words "Ukrainian people" was not used. In the history of the Communist Party of the Ukraine there have been such Ukrainophobes as Kaganovich, Postyshev, and Sherbitskiy, but there have also been Ukrainophiles like Skrypnyk, Khrushchev, and Shelest. I understand how problematical this division is, but still...

In the concept of "perestroika" I include above all the problem of rebirth of the Ukrainian people, and unless this problem is solved, "perestroika" for me is an empty sound.

Rukh includes communists, members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UKhS), academicians, dissidents returned from places "not so distant," clergymen of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] members from the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, many Lvov workers, and a few Donetsk miners. Naturally, for such human diversity, for this kind of all-national (by design) group, it is both very complicated and very simple to formulate goals and tasks. These include the rebirth of the Ukrainian people and all peoples living in the Ukraine. Russians must live better in Kiev than they do in Moscow, Leningrad, and New York. Jews in the Ukraine should live better than they do in Moscow, New York, and Tel Aviv, and Ukrainians should live better in the Ukraine than they do in Canada and the United States. Such is the "nationalism" of Rukh.

At the Rukh congress there were more than 200 communists out of the 1,109 delegates; Rukh's sociopolitical spectrum is, naturally, broader and more diverse than any constituent part of it. But it can be no stronger than its weakest link.

3. In my opinion, Rukh is too broad and varied, to heterogeneous and open to interpretations to be the prototype of a new political party. Although a multiparty system is not far away in the Ukraine: Yuriy Shcherbak suggested that the ecologists organize a "green" party and Sergey Plachinda—a peasant party. In time the UKhS will also be a party association.

As for the internationalist and nationalist tendencies in Rukh, these are the same as they are among other people and other nations. The specifics might be these: For about 10 years it should be forbidden to use the word "nationalist" in the Ukraine since it is a most insulting word which defames human dignity. When the native language is almost never heard in the republic's capital, when you have to fight for every Ukrainian kindergarten, when in Donetsk, where there are hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, there is a war for one single Ukrainian school, only an overgrown chauvinist posing as an internationalist could find nationalism in the Ukraine.

4. Here is the latest event that has gotten Kiev worked up: The reburials of poets who fell victim to repressions—Vasil Stus and Yuriy Litvin and the philologist Oleksa Tikhii. For there are nothing but violations here within the framework of existing legislation. None of them has been rehabilitated. Two of the three are not from Kiev. But the Union of Writers of the Ukraine, Rukh, and other informal organizations have taken on this burden which would seem to be beyond them and the ispolkom [executive committee] of the Kiev gorsovet [city council] has acted humanely and met them halfway—and the impossible has happened. It would seem that this would be an opportunity for the Supreme Court of the Ukraine, the procuracy, and the KGB against this backdrop to cancel all the rigged court proceedings of the stagnant seventies, shake them off, and say: That is the end of it... But no! Either they are waiting for instructions from above or pressure from below, from Rukh... Everything is changing before our eyes, and much in existing legislation is also changing—because it should work for man and not against him.

5. The Communist Party of the Ukraine can be pushed into a secondary role only by the republic Communist Party itself. Rukh does not have the real power to take on such a task; it seems to me that perhaps this is possible only in the western Ukraine. In the elections, naturally, the people will vote not so much for Rukh, which is largely slandered and defamed, as against the apparatus. And the semiofficial organs have the most to fear from this "against." We have lived for almost 20 years in the age of Shcherbitskiy, and the majority of the apparatus was formed both under this name and under this banner. Some of the apparatchiks who are more intelligent, mobile, and enterprising are trying to shake off this

influence and rise up under the banner of perestroika, but very many of them are merely mastering the new terminology while remaining ardent new-Stalinists in their hearts. But it is difficult to deceive the people, although it is possible, as is demonstrated by the experience of our sad decades. Therefore, sad as it may sound, democratization in our republic will proceed from opposition—not so much “for” as “against.” Such is the actual situation.

Leonid Kravchuk: Doing Everything Possible So That Nobody Will Be Able To Deceive the Voters With Loud Phrases.[subhead]

1. The sociopolitical situation in the Ukraine, as in the country as a whole, is quite complicated now. There are contradictory, complex processes which have brought to the surface very many problems of an economic, social, spiritual, and other nature. Moreover, the expectation of rapid changes under the influence of perestroika—let us be frank—has not been justified. In a number of respects the crises have even worsened...

All this plus the deepening process of democratization have brought about—and it could be no other way—the appearance in the society of new organizations, frequently alternatives to the party, that propose their own variants of solutions to the problems that have accumulated. I do not see anything unusual in this. In my view this is quite a natural process. An awareness of the stage we are in and a search for the path for further development are impossible without comparing various viewpoints. It is from these positions, in my opinion, that we should look at the creation of Rukh in the Ukraine.

2. Our views on perestroika and our understanding of its essence change along with life. We now understand much better than we did five years ago the serious changes that are needed in the entire structure of our society—from the base to the superstructure. The Communist Party of the Ukraine supports these changes but at the same time we are firm in our belief that they should be carried out on the basis of socialism and as a part of the union of Soviet republics, a unified state. Based on these principles one can also speak about common goals and also divergences with Rukh in strategy and tactics. I must note that this movement is quite heterogeneous and is undergoing significant changes during the course of its development. Today there is every justification for saying that with certain Rukh leaders—including Ivan Fedorovich Drach—we are finding mutual understanding with respect to a number of fundamental issues and from these positions we are conducting constructive discussions and developing joint actions for solving various kinds of problems. This was the case, for example, when we participated in the preparation of laws on elections in the republic and languages in the Ukrainian SSR. We are now working together on preparing a program for the development of the Ukrainian national culture.

Still I must declare with all certainty that there are many extremists under the roof of Rukh and they are calling

for withdrawal from the union and a return to capitalism. Understandably, we shall never be able to find a common language with activists of this kind for from the very beginning we have not had a common platform from which we could begin a dialogue. We shall wage a resolute ideological battle against this extremist wing and show the futility of their adventuresome aspirations. But here it is necessary to distinguish clearly and not indiscriminately criticize the positive forces in Rukh who enjoy a good deal of authority among the people.

3. The future of Rukh depends largely on the forces that win out in it. If the extremist wing takes the upper hand the movement will end up in an impasse for from the historical standpoint it will have no future in our society. But if the Rukh leadership begins to adhere to a realistic, constructive, and moderate policy, which rules out the possibility of destabilization of social development, the reign of chaos and anarchy, and the application of force, in the future this movement could take form as an alternative force to the party, one based on the fundamentals of socialism, but with its own program and regulations. But it is a question of the future whether or not Rukh will be able to win over the masses: With what and how, with words or deeds? Now, during this period which is difficult for the country and the people, the main thing is the unity of all healthy forces and responsibility to perestroika.

Here a most important role, of course, will be played by Rukh's position in the sphere of interethnic relations. We know how fervently the leaders of the movement and the majority of its participants are speaking out in favor of restoring Ukrainian culture, language, and traditions, further advancement of the republic's economy, and greater social protection for the people. We also know and fully support these aspirations for our common goal. For out of a respectful, solicitous attitude toward the national grows the same kind of attitude toward the international. But at the same time we cannot but hear the provocative slogans like “The Ukraine only for Ukrainians” which put off people who count themselves among the proponents of Rukh and act on its behalf. It would seem that not only communists but also all sober-minded and healthy forces of Rukh should be against this kind of national-careerists who play on the difficulties that are being experienced by our union.

4. Unfortunately, not always. I shall give just one recent example. The Rukh leadership came out with an initiative to rebury V. Stus, O. Tikhiy, and Yu. Litvin. The fate of these people was complicated and dramatic but I, for example, support this idea since I think of Stus as a talented person who has made an appreciable contribution to Ukrainian culture. We must not disregard talent simply because a person has made some mistakes. Who does not make them? We must learn to be civilized people and protect our national wealth. The Kiev authorities were also understanding about the suggestion and in conjunction with the Rukh leaders determined a procedure for conducting this measure.

When the matter reached the point of practical implementation of what had been earmarked, all the agreements that had been reached were broken, which led to a disturbance of the normal rhythm of the life of the large city. I am not even speaking about various kinds of provocations—right down to an unfurled Bandera flag in front of the republic KGB building—with which some people wanted to begin open conflict with representatives of the authorities. In a word, I got the impression that the Rukh leadership is not always capable of controlling the situation and the extremist wing of the movement has skillfully taken advantage of this, operating according to the principle of “the worse, the better.”

5. Rukh is now doing a large amount of work in preparation for the forthcoming elections in the republic. Looking forward, I can say that I do not see a big problem in the fact that some representative of Rukh can give serious competition to a candidate from the gorkom, obkom, or even the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. It seems to me that it is important for the voters to concentrate attention on making sure that the winner is a truly worthy person who is capable of advancing the cause of perestroika.

If we assess Rukh's chances as a whole during the forthcoming elections, against the backdrop of the difficulties being experienced by the society and the wave of criticism against the authorities, its situation is favorable. The republic Communist Party, of course, is also unwilling to give up its leading position and drop to a secondary role without a struggle. It will wage a battle for its carefully tested pre-election platform which, after it is realized, can significantly improve the life of the people in the republic. Incidentally, I am convinced that our people during the time since the elections of USSR people's deputies have acquired a good deal of experience in sober evaluation of pre-election promises and subsequent deeds and have learned to find their way around in the complicated sociopolitical, economic, and interethnic processes, and they are able to make a worthy choice.

And we are trying to do everything possible so that nobody will be able to deceive the voters with loud phrases, taking advantage of “fashionable” appeals and slogans.

Ivashko Nominated for People's Deputy

90UN0699A Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian 15
Dec 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: “The Voters' Trust”]

[Text] A conference of representatives of the work force for nominating candidates for Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies for Kiev's Industrialnyy Electoral Okrug in the “Bolshevik” Production Association was held in an atmosphere of democratic spirit and a wide-ranging exchange of opinions.

First at the podium was mechanic-assembly worker P.P. Fedorov.

“We in the assembly shop discussed possible nominations stringently,” he said. “A basic criterion was formulated in the course of this polemic: In the present situation the people's deputy must be a decisive, bold and at the same time democratic person who takes the fate of perestroika to heart. We were of the common opinion that V.A. Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, is such a person. He visited our plant and made a good impression. You can speak with him on any topic. He does not avoid giving answers but tries to explain and defend his position.”

The opinion of the workers of the assembly shop was supported by N.Ya. Gupal, lawyer of the housing-municipal department, who observed that he considered V.A. Ivashko a high-minded and skilled leader and practical individual.

Other suggestions were received also. The candidacies of V.A. Karpenko, editor of the newspaper *VECHERNYY KIIYEV*; Ye.V. Kiyanitsa, director of the “Bolshevik” Production Association Test Machinery Plant; the writer V.A. Yavorivskiy; and V.A. Pastushenko, deputy secretary of the association's Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] committee, were put forward.

A number of speakers advocated the nomination exclusively of their own, plant people. Such a position was adopted by, specifically, representatives of the “Rukh” plant group. It was the party's fault, they declared, that the country had found itself in so difficult a situation. And for this reason the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee cannot lay claim to a deputy's mandate.

Plane operator A.I. Kulik asked to speak:

“I am non-party,” he said. “But I wholeheartedly support the party and believe in its healthy forces. After all, it was the party which initiated perestroika. It was the party which declared with all candor that the country was in a crisis and began to look for a way out of it. We therefore need to have in the corps of deputies not mass-meeting bawlers but competent, decisive, practical chosen people.”

The worker was supported by S.N. Lisovskiy, chairman of a workforce council, N.V. Podmogilnyy, chief of the mechanization and automation shop, and others.

“But we do not know V.A. Ivashko's program,” his opponents insisted.

“His platform is the election platform of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee,” P.S. Kalita, secretary of the association's party committee, explained. “It sets out clearly the party's position at the current stage. It is set forth also in the CPSU Central Committee appeal to the Soviet people. We may, in addition, cite concrete facts. During his visit to our plant Vladimir Antonovich, in conversation with workers and specialists on republic cost accounting, supported the need for

a very careful preparation for the transition thereto. He gave in illustration striking examples: Before introducing it, it is necessary to create a flexible mechanism and to regulate prices, including purchase prices for agricultural products. Otherwise cost accounting would lead to an even more difficult situation.

"I share the opinion of those who believe that people who really think, who are authoritative, and who have a clear-cut position should be working in parliament. The first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee is just such a person."

When the candidates for nomination as people's deputy of the republic who were present were given leave to speak, V. Kiyanitsa stood down. V.A. Pastushenko resolved to fight and offered his election program. The platform of the rest of the candidates was known from the election campaign which had been conducted.

In the course of a show of hands the vote was distributed as follows: for V.A. Ivashko 91, for V.A. Karpenko 30, for V.A. Pastushenko 12, for V.A. Yavorivskiy 8. Thus Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, was by an overwhelming majority nominated candidate for people's deputy of the Ukrainian SSR for Kiev's Industrialnyy Electoral Okrug.

Implementation of Ukrainian Language Law

90UN0699B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 15
Dec 89 p 3

[Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Information Department release: "Language Law: Time for Concrete Action"]

[Text] The UkSSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers has issued a decree on priority measures pertaining to organization of the implementation of the UkSSR law "Languages in the UkSSR".

Republic ministries and departments and ispolkoms [executive committees] of soviets of people's deputies are instructed, together with the artistic unions and public organizations and the mass media, to initiate work on introducing the said law as of 1 January 1990.

A republic commission headed by M.A. Orlik, deputy chairman of the UkSSR Council of Ministers, which includes executives of a number of ministries and departments of the republic, leading figures of science and culture and authoritative representatives of the workforce, artistic unions, and public organizations, has been formed for the elaboration of a state program for the development of Ukrainian and other national languages in the UkSSR for the period up to the year 2000.

Oblast and city commissions for the elaboration of specific plans for the introduction of articles of the law in the corresponding regions will operate locally.

The republic commission should collate these plans and proposals of the public and submit a draft state program for examination by the government in May 1990.

"A particular feature of the initial stage," V.F. Kazmiruk, executive secretary of this commission, comments, "is the fact that it is proposed that the ministries and departments, ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies and enterprises, establishments, and organizations begin work on realizing the law without waiting for the adoption of the state program.

First it is necessary to provide for the comprehensive and cogent explanation and in-depth study of the law in the workforce and in teaching and educational institutions and among all strata of the republic's population, making extensive use here of the provisions of the Leninist nationality policy and material of the CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum and the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee October (1989) Plenum and of the 11th UkSSR Supreme Soviet 10th Session.

The task is to create for trainees, students, and working people the necessary conditions for the study of Ukrainian and other national languages or for extended mastery thereof by organizing individual classes and groups in teaching and educational institutions and courses, study groups, and workshops at enterprises and in establishments and organizations.

When replacing nameplates which are no longer of any use and preparing new ones for state and public authorities, enterprises, establishments, and organizations and the names of localities, administrative-territorial units, streets, squares, rivers and so forth and also seals, letterheads and stamps, and official forms, the inscriptions thereon will be made in accordance with the demands of the law.

The State Agro-Industrial Committee and the ministries of light and timber industry and consumer service of the republic and other UkSSR ministries and departments must demand that when enterprises place orders for the manufacture of trademarks, commodity markers, labels, and sets of instructions for the use of these commodities that the inscriptions on them be in Ukrainian.

The republic State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and Book Trade is instructed to ensure compliance with the requirements of this law when printing the texts of official notices, reports, posters, placards, advertisements, and so forth. And the UkSSR Ministry of Communications will place orders for the manufacture of envelopes, postcards, forms, and so forth whose inscriptions will be in Ukrainian and Russian so that their supply will be in a sufficient quantity as of 1 January 1990 to post offices and other communications enterprises.

The State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and Book Trade, the Academy of Sciences, and

the ministries of public education and secondary specialized education of the UkSSR must ensure the preparation for publication by the 1990/91 academic year of the

necessary editions of curricula and textbooks, visual-methods aids, dictionaries and phrasebooks, and also literature on clerical work and business language.

Press Law Amendments Proposed

90US0364A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in
Russian 30 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Baturin, Mikhail Fedotov, and Vladimir Entin: "For Several Lines in the Law"]

[Text] On 27 October 1917, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin) signed the Decree on the Press in which he projected the appearance of the most extensive and progressive law on the press for the time when the new system asserts itself and normal conditions for public life come about.

On 27 November 1989, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev signed a resolution on publishing the draft Law of the USSR "On the Press and Other Mass Media" in order to be discussed.

Will this law indeed become the most extensive and democratic? Will it be in line with the normal conditions of public life? Are we certain that the democratic standard established by the deputies who have adopted the law in the first reading will not be reduced in the future? Could the future of the freedom of the press hinge on several lines, or, worse yet, on a comma?

Period, Period, Comma...

Indeed, what can simple punctuation do in this case? This is the question the former staff inspector of Chukhloma schools, a titular councilor, asked himself in Shchedrin's time when he contemplated how reforms should be carried out.

The significance of commas was not lost in the course of drafting the Law on the Press. Members of the working group of the Supreme Soviet committees happened to encounter the potential of punctuation in the very first sentence of the draft. This is how it reads now: "The press and other mass media are free. Censorship of mass information is not allowed."

The period which separates these two sentences and which was there from the very beginning was intensely disliked by someone. It was interpreted as a hint at the press being completely and ultimately free. The period was replaced by a colon. The sense changed immediately: The freedom of the press was reduced to a ban on censorship, and nothing more! A semicolon became an interim, compromise version—completely in line with the recommendation of Shchedrin's character who believed that first of all the force of passions needs to be weakened, and the placement of periods should begin after that, the periods being real, valid, rather than that which may be scraped off.

Since punctuation is that important, what is the significance of entire lines, paragraphs, and articles? It is by far not the same. An analysis of the text of the draft indicates that some fragments could be removed harmlessly. Other fragments definitely need to be omitted so

that in the future our society will not experience excruciating pain. The third group of segments which have disappeared at various stages of preparation definitely needs to be restored; otherwise, deficiencies in the law will cause failures in practice.

Since the draft has finally been published for discussion, let us read its every letter, line, and comma attentively—the future of glasnost depends on them.

Frankly, there are no grounds for attaching great hopes to the draft changing perceptibly due to the public discussion because there are no provisions for registering, generalizing, and analyzing proposals. Our own experience of participation in various working groups makes it possible for us to maintain this: If an amendment is clearly keyed to a specific article in the draft law and contains a clear wording of proposed changes and additions, the probability of it being taken into account definitely increases. However... this increase is only discernible compared to the remarks of the kind "it is necessary to enhance (expand, raise, reinforce)" which are not taken into account at all. This is exactly why in these notes all proposals are set forth in legal terms (they are boldfaced in the text) and are fully adapted for being "built into" the draft immediately.

Minus the Citizen

The main variant of the draft proceeds from both an organization created in keeping with the law and an individual citizen who belongs to nothing enjoying the right to set up mass media.

Unfortunately, our country cannot boast being the first in this regard: The French did it long ago, 200 years ago in the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights. The novelty of the situation is in the fact that we are beginning to treat more seriously the political rights and freedoms codified in the Constitution. This means that they have to be implemented genuinely and immediately, and some people became scared.

The emergence of a legal mechanism whereby the freedoms of speech and the press proclaimed in the law can be materialized means an end to the legal codification of the monopoly on ideological activities. In other words, the ideology prevailing in a society loses its status of a secular religion, and the label of heretics will have to be removed from those who disagree with it or doubt it.

The experience of revolutionary struggle in Russia showed that a circle of adherents is formed around press publications (this is even more so in the case of the electronic media). Therefore, a free press acts as a catalyst of political life.

Should this be feared? Providing necessary and sufficient information for a society in order to make decisions means making democracy constructive and efficient. Without this condition being met, self-government turns into a sham, and if information is administered in

minuscule doses it turns into an illusion. The "independence" of democratic structures deprived of the free access to information is akin to the independence of puppets.

They are scaring us with the prospect that, by allowing anyone rather than only loyalist organizations to set up mass media, we will create yet another source of profiteering. The press, for its part, may end up being controlled by politically crooked wheeler-dealers. In this reference, an alternative wording of Article 6 proposes to omit citizens in their capacity of individuals from among the eventual founding parties of a newspaper or another mass medium. However, it is no big deal for wheeler-dealers, especially in view of their skills, to unite in a cooperative, labor collective, or, at the very least, "the association of children of Lieutenant Schmidt."

Please note that in substantiating the alternative wording of Article 6 its authors unintentionally or deliberately equated the right to set up a mass medium with the private ownership of newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations. The point is that, according to the draft, the mass media are owned by the publisher rather than the founding entity.

This emphasis on the word **private** is hardly accidental. Thus, Article 32 refers to the private rather than personal life of a citizen. The apparent calculation is that by now a stable rejection of everything private as the opposite of collective has been inculcated upon our society.

Of course, we could engage in a strict legal analysis of other absurdities in the alternative wording. However, there is no need to do this because all of it as a whole contradicts Article 1 of the draft the first paragraph of which proclaims the right of a citizen to freely disseminate socially significant information through the press and other mass media. It is desirable to remove from the text the somewhat hazy and hard-to-interpret attribute of "social significance." However, even at this point this does not change the essence of the matter.

There is every reason to fear that even leaving the citizen in Article 6 won't make things any easier for the citizen himself. In our alternative draft, we proposed a mechanism of founding [a mass medium] different from the one described in Article 7. We remain the advocates of it even after one year of discussion.

The concept is as follows. If you want to, say, start a newspaper in order to freely express your opinion in keeping with Article 1 it is sufficient for you to notify an organ of power of this. This is a political action. If you decide to take up, say, commerce you should settle some issues, e.g., those of taxes, with the state, and to this end register your publication at specialized organs of administration. This is merely a technicality.

Thinking that this two-stage design is a bureaucratic ploy, the deputies resolved to roll both procedures into one. As a result, powers of a political nature came to be concentrated in the hands of departments (the State

Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade and the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting). This calls into question the reality of the ban on monopolizing the mass media (Article 6). Indeed, why on earth would the above departments multiply the number of their competitors out of the goodness of their hearts?

Backdoor Censorship

"Censorship of mass information is not allowed"—this is how the draft begins. This is beautiful because hardly anyone has the time and mental stamina to read lengthy draft laws to the end. Everything is said in the beginning, and the rest is details. However, it is exactly the details strewn in the text of the draft law that make it possible to restore what has been solemnly destroyed in the beginning.

A modest addition to Article 42 was proposed by "a group of USSR people's deputies." It contains a qualification, innocuous at first sight, to the effect that the provision codified in this article does not apply to relations between the founding entity, the publisher, and the editorial office. What kind of a rule is it from which an exemption was needed? It bans interfering with the operation of the mass media, demanding that editorial offices submit materials for prior endorsement, and banning their publication in full or in part. What did the authors of the alternative variant strive for? It looks like they tried to provide a legal foundation for the principles long established in relations with the press: "the master gives the orders," "he who pays the piper chooses the music," "I will run the show." So, what will happen? For example, the management, the party committee, the trade union committee, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Youth Communist League] committee, the council of the labor collective, as well as the publishing house at which the newspaper has had the misfortune to be published will be able to give instructions to a plant newspaper, this time legally. Under this arrangement, preliminary censorship increases several-fold, in keeping with the number of coordinating and instructing entities. Also, there is nothing to prevent all of them together or each entity separately from appointing a special official who would see to it that the newspaper does not get out of hand. So, here is for you the very censorship that "is not allowed."

Incidentally, in the main draft as well censorship has retained its second line of defense. The organ which has registered a mass medium has a right to receive mandatory free copies immediately after the press run is completed (Article 19). This organ may also forbid the publication of say, a newspaper for one month by its decision (Article 10). Here you have new offices for the old Glavlit [Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press].

Besides, Article 19 gives the "registrar" the right to impose contributions of sorts on the publication in the form of mandatory free copies which should be sent on

his instructions to various organizations. What options are left for a small publication if its entire press run is taken up by mandatory copies the mailing of which will, on top of this, require postage? The "registrar" may be deprived of the opportunity to strangle an undesirable publication economically by the following additions to Article 19:

- Firstly, it should be set forth that only mandatory copies which are paid for are sent out on the instructions of the organ which has performed registration;
- Secondly, it should be set forth that **"the number of mandatory copies which are paid for cannot exceed 1 percent of the press run, and for publications with small circulation—five copies."**

The issue of consequences of abusing the freedom of the press turned out to be virtually the most confused in the draft. For a violation of Article 5 (this is exactly where an exhaustive list of such abuses is given) an organ empowered by the law may either suspend or discontinue the operation of a mass medium. In addition, pursuant to Article 40, such an abuse entails the confiscation or destruction of the copies printed, as well as "administrative, criminal, or other penalties."

However, how is it to be determined when operations should be suspended and when they should be discontinued? When should the printed copies be confiscated, and when should they be destroyed? The draft provides no answer. It does not at all contain criteria that would make it possible to determine the degree of gravity of a particular abuse.

Meanwhile, it is not difficult to find such a criterion. The essence of it lies in the presence or absence of socially dangerous consequences: mass disturbances, arson, outbreaks of violence and vandalism, and so on.

Article 10 will become logically streamlined if it is going to allow for the suspension of a press organ **"following the dissemination of information in contravention of Article 5 of the present law which has not entailed socially dangerous consequences."** In turn, Article 11 should associate the discontinuation of operations **"with a violation of Article 5 of the present law which has entailed socially dangerous consequences."** Therefore, the discretion of the supervisors and the courts will be restricted by the rigid framework of the law.

Not a Romantic Triangle

The editorial office frequently turns out to be a fifth wheel in a tightly knit couple consisting of the founding entity and the publisher. A couple and any unnecessary third persons form a classical romantic triangle. According to the draft, there is no redundancy in the triangle consisting of the founding entity, the publisher, and the editorial office. Their relationship is determined by contracts and an editorial statute. The fact that the draft leaves the resolution of most questions to the discretion of the contracting parties is undoubtedly its

great advantage. It is exactly within this triangle that real economically accountable relations can evolve, provided that none of the participants tries to interfere with the affairs and finances of others.

The aspiration of the founding entity to make a mass medium not only a source of revenue but also its mouthpiece is understandable. To this end, the draft provides certain opportunities for it. The founding agency has a right to adopt a program of operations of the mass medium which must be submitted at the time of registration and is a permanent document setting forth goals and tasks.

However, this program is carried out by the editorial office on the basis of complete professional independence. This is why the addition to Article 42 proposed by a group of people's deputies contradicts Article 13 of the draft and cannot be adopted without corresponding changes in the latter article and, consequently, without altering the balance of forces in the triangle of economic accountability.

In this instance, just as in the case of Article 6, the "law of resistance of legislative matter" becomes clearly apparent. The alternatives indicated may be built into the draft only by destroying its concept, toppling it, and turning it inside out. In the process, the poles in the conceptual design of the law will be switched, the negative pole will become the positive pole, and vice versa. To be sure, the bulbs will still produce light, but everything that rotates in the mechanism of press freedom will rotate in the opposite direction.

The triangle is not immune to changes. When the founding entity and the publisher are one and the same this means that the creator of a mass medium assumes the burden of all difficulties associated with financing it and providing material and technical support. Situations are possible when the editorial office acts as the founder. Let us assume that a newspaper no longer meets the requirements of its founder, and the latter resolves to close it down. In this case, the editorial office may act as a founder and buy out its own publication. It may be worthwhile to add the following paragraph to Article 13 of the draft: **"In the event the founder resolves to discontinue the operation of a mass medium, the editorial collective of journalists enjoys a preferential right to acquire the legal powers of the founder."**

Finally, a situation is possible when the founder, publisher, and editorial office are one and the same. In this case, no problems arise in their mutual relations.

It may also happen that the editorial office of one publication becomes the founder of another. A publisher may also appear in the role of a founder.

A flexible design of the unromantic triangle proposed in the draft makes it possible to resolve all conflicts, even the sharpest, including cadre conflicts.

Everything for Sale

There are quite a few norms in the draft which may give the mass media an opportunity to generate profits. However, there is just one norm which may ruin them financially. Fifty thousand rubles is the price a court can put on the moral damage inflicted by the press on a citizen. However, are the journalists the only ones to inflict such damage? Why then is this sword of Damocles in the form of ruin hung over us alone?

This is a good norm. It must be in the law, however, not in this one but rather in the civil law or in a special law on the protection of the personal rights of citizens. The idea of financial indemnities for moral damages is not at all new. Legal scientists have been discussing it for a long time but thus far have not been able to arrive at any definite conclusions. It is just that too many problems arise in this matter. Here is an example.

It is easy to conceive of a situation whereby a citizen sort of sells his honor and dignity by organizing the publication of false and compromising information about himself. An opportunity for drawing an employee of the editorial office into such a scheme for a share of the compensation amount cannot be ruled out. Therefore, should we provide yet another "relatively honest way to appropriate money?"

Having ended up in the text of the draft, this norm sort of remained on its own. Also, it sits apart from the rest, it comes last in the text. The logic of the legislative matter should have either rejected it or created companion norms for it. This is how the last paragraph of Article 32 came about: "Release of information on the private life of a citizen without his consent is not allowed if this information is not socially significant. In the event a court does not acknowledge particular information to be socially significant, moral (but not financial) damages are paid pursuant to the present law."

As a result, a paradoxical logical and legal combination has emerged: Divulging information on the private life of a citizen without his consent in itself inflicts moral damage on the citizen the monetary price for which is up to R50,000, provided, of course, that the court does not recognize the information in question to be socially significant. Tell me, however, how can it be determined whether an item on the relatives of cab driver N. is socially significant? Or an item on the relatives of party functionary N.? The principle of equality of citizens before the law requires that both items be considered either equally significant or equally insignificant. Indeed, the situation of the court is unenviable. And what is a newspaper to do when faced with a choice between being silent and going bankrupt? This is how an outwardly humane norm may become an instrument of destruction of undesirable publications and psychological pressure on journalists.

When We Save on Words

They say that Mozart received an august rebuke once for having too many notes in his music.

They also say that someone came to believe that there are too many norms in the Law on the Press.

Mozart did not omit a single note. In the working group, their were no Mozarts.

Which articles were omitted from the text? The republics, both union and autonomous, were the first to go. These subjects of the federation will lose their right to regulate the activities of the press unless the following norm is returned to the chapter "General Provisions":

Article 5 prime. Legislation on the Mass Media

Organization and activities of the mass media are regulated by the USSR Constitution and constitutions of union and autonomous republics, as well as other legislative acts of the USSR, union and autonomous republics.

In the course of discussing the draft at the 24 November meeting of the Supreme Soviet, a number of deputies expressed their absolutely justified bewilderment at the tasks of the press in our society not even being mentioned in the draft. Indeed, one would do well to be definitive on this issue. Let us say that some people prefer the press to express public opinion while others prefer the press to shape it. It is preferable to have these tasks set forth in the law, for example, in this manner:

Article 2 prime. Main Tasks of the Mass Media

The main tasks of the mass media are:

- 1) Implementing the constitutional principle of glasnost;
- 2) Informing the citizens of events in domestic and international life;
- 3) Expressing public opinion;
- 4) Providing an opportunity for citizens and their associations to fully express their views.

The draft law turned out to be wary of words when codifying the right to a refutation. There is nothing in it about procedures, deadlines, and conditions for the publication of a refutation. It turns out that you can cast slurs upon a person on the front page, and tuck the refutation away so that it could not be found without a detective. Would it not be better to set this forth as follows:

Article 30. Refutation.

Citizens, their associations, and organizations have a right to demand that a mass medium publish or otherwise disseminate a refutation of untruthful information communicated about them. Legal representatives of the citizen and interested organizations also have such a right if a citizen himself has no opportunity to demand a refutation.

The mass medium must publish or otherwise disseminate a refutation if it has no proof of truthfulness of the information in question.

The refutation should indicate precisely which exact data turned out not to be truthful, when and where they were published or otherwise disseminated. If the text of the refutation is received from the petitioner no abridgments or other changes are made in the text without the consent of the petitioner.

Article 30 prime. Deadlines and Procedures for a Refutation

A refutation must be published before the following deadlines:

- 1) In a newspaper—within seven days of the receipt of the text of a refutation or within 15 days of the day a demand to publish a refutation is received;
- 2) In other periodicals—in the next issue or one of the two following issues being prepared to go to press;
- 3) On radio and television—on the next similar program, but no later than within 15 days of the receipt of the text of a refutation or a demand to make a refutation.

A refutation in a newspaper or another periodical should be set in the same print and published under the headline "Refutation," as a rule, at the same location on the page where the item being refuted was published. On radio and television, a refutation should be broadcast approximately at the same time of day and in the same program as the item being refuted.

The text of a refutation cannot exceed the volume of the refuted fragment of printed matter by more than a factor of two.

However, frequently it happens this way. The facts are skillfully selected, added to one another, and the emphasis placed and evaluations altogether change the picture. In other words, the facts are correct whereas truth and justice have got nothing to do with this. In these cases, the right to a response including a statement on their positions should be given to the citizens, their associations and organizations. Such responses should be disseminated in keeping with the same rules as in the case of refutations. We will not receive the balanced information we seek without this additional safety device for the right to a refutation.

It Is Not Mentioned in the Text

The draft ends in a chapter which is, at first sight, strange. Everyone who reads it would agree that the title "Responsibility Without Responsibility" would be quite appropriate. Indeed, there is not a word in the chapter about fines, length of prison terms, or other penalties. Does the legislator intend to ensure the execution of his intent solely due to the citizens and officials being highly conscientious? Certainly not: It is just that the establishment of criminal and administrative penalties falls mainly within the jurisdiction of union republics.

Of course, forcing a specific wording on the republics does not become the Supreme Soviet. For our part, we can reflect.

For example, this is how an article on penalties for violating the right to information could read:

"Provided the signs of a crime are absent, an official who has illegally turned down the request for information by a mass medium or has violated the procedures established by the law for providing such information, as well as furnished deliberately false information, is subject to..."

Let us not guess which penalties the republics might provide. As far as a protocol on such an administrative violation is concerned, it should, perhaps, be drawn up by the management of an editorial office interested in securing the information necessary, and sent to a court.

Journalists might object that the article quoted clearly does not cover all the actually occurring cases of infringements on the freedom of their professional activities. We agree, and this is why we propose one more article:

"Interference by the officials of state organs and public organizations with the lawful professional activities of journalists in the form of establishing restrictions on contacts with them and the transfer of information to them, except for information constituting a state secret or another secret specifically protected by the law entails the penalty of..."

Specific penalties should also be provided for violating the rules on responses and refutations.

Possibly, the republics will see fit to amend the criminal codes by adding to them articles on, say, coercing a journalist, on the illegal commercial dissemination of mass information, and so on. Apparently, we will not be able to do without changes in the civil and labor legislation.

Perhaps, critical notes have dominated our discussion. However, even in its present form the draft has a good chance to become the "most extensive and progressive law" which was promised 72 years ago. Taking advantage of this opportunity depends on us.

CPSU Official Outlines Reform in Party-Press Working Relationship

*90US0346 Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian
No 23, Dec 89 pp 20-25*

[Article by V. Motyashov, sector chief, CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department: "The Party Committee and the Press"]

[Text] The establishment of qualitatively new relations between the elected party aktiv and the party apparatus on the one hand, and the mass information media on the other is an important link which today is predetermining the success of the party's mass political work.

The adoption of the USSR Law on the Press will create a new situation for party committees. It will, however, concern only the legal aspects of the interrelations of the mass information media and the party organs. The party's political influence on the press's activity is not regulated by legislative means. This is above all a matter of the style of the party committees themselves, their workers' understanding of all the innovation of the situations and the necessity of change, the rejection of former stereotypes. Unfortunately, the situation which has come into being here is not a simple one.

Incidents of direct confrontation between the party committees and the editorial boards have become typical and taken on a desperate nature. In many union republics and regions of the country, on the wave of democratization and glasnost there has begun to form and operate the so-called alternative press, a significant portion of which is demanding for itself absolute freedom, not accepting the principle of party guidance of the press. To one degree or another, many journalists attempt to view themselves as a their own sort of "party of the opposition." Even those who orient themselves by economic accountability of cooperative publications and on the development of the commercial press regard the party leadership with skepticism.

All of these are tendencies which require of the party organizations a precise position and an active policy. And until now there has been a deficiency of constructive elements in both the one and the other. Certain party committees lay on the press the responsibility for falling party worker prestige in the eyes of various public groups, movements, and individuals, as well as blame for intensified pressure upon the party apparatus, and even upon the party as a whole. An accusatory bent with regard to the press resounded acutely in a number of speeches at the April (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies, and at the meeting of party committee first secretaries in July of this year.

Indeed, there are more than a few errors, over-exposures, and wishes to attract people's attention with sensational material in the newspapers and magazines, and on television and radio programs today. Certain publicists and editorial workers are not against making a name for themselves on dubious prognostication, scoring points by criticizing the "party bureaucrats" and the "party apparatchiks." And in the latter case, the criticism is frequently of not only a sweeping, but even indiscriminate nature.

However, in spite of all the problems noted, an attitude toward the press as a source of evil not only distorts the real state of affairs, but does damage to the CPSU. Those party workers who see in publications, in television and radio programs almost the main source of their personal failures, spiritual discomfort, and their persons being turned into the object of criticism are laboring under a delusion with regard to cause and effect. And this will inevitably lead not to a search for paths of cooperation

with the press, but toward greater confrontation with it. Such a position is, in essence, a dead end; it blocks any constructive resolutions or measures designed to assist the CPSU in guiding the work of the mass information media with maximal aid for perestroika.

After all, the press is an integral part of the mechanism of one of the most important guarantees of perestroika of both society and of its political core, the Communist Party. Of course, we speak here of the press which reflects public opinion without distortion and genuinely works for perestroika, for public progress.

How should the party committee behave toward the press in the climate of developing democratization, the burgeoning pluralism of opinions? Is the principle of self-management being disseminated in the press, television, and radio, and if so, how is this being reflected? How do political methods of guiding the mass information media distinguish themselves from the usual practice in relations between the party committees and the press? What paths leading to fruitful cooperation of party workers and journalists to a common party platform, to consolidation of their efforts to resolve the tasks of the revolutionary perestroika of our society have the best prospects?

These and many other questions demand profound conceptual grounding, perhaps discussion in party publications. In light of this, I would like to share certain ideas.

Take the problem of the relations of subordination in party guidance of the press. Today, life is showing that they are losing badly by comparison to relations of partnership and cooperation. Let us say, disagreement with the utterances of authors or the opinions of editorial associates which are expressed in the form of the notorious "calling in on the carpet" [nakachka] are the least effective, and frequently harmful methods, leading to the opposite result. A different result is obtained when party workers express their opinion either through the organ which, in their opinion, is in error, or have oriented other publications for appropriate resistance to the distortions of facts and prejudices.

Today, the task of the party committee is seen not in giving its blessing for the publication of almost each significant piece being prepared by the editors, but in planning with the editorial collective a strategy of searching, of developing a true political course, with consideration for local features and conditions.

A paradoxical situation has come into being. Due to the fact that the majority of the press is in one way or another under the supervision of the CPSU Central Committee, either the journalist's personal opinion or the position of a definite group is not infrequently taken to be the party viewpoint by many readers. Apparently, therefore the new mechanism of party guidance of the press requires a certain distancing between the party

committee and its press organ, and all the more so between the party committee and non-party publications.

The committee's influence on the mass information media becomes more effective when it gives no grounds for the journalists to be accused of blind execution of the authorities' will. A much greater proportion than previously must be granted to the administration of the press's work through public opinion, through various types of public control in the form of editorial councils, commissions, etc., executing consultative functions. Their composition may be completely such as would be capable of having authoritative and unobtrusive effect over the editorial policy in the direction agreeing with the party lines.

Guidance of the press with the assistance and by means of the press itself has great possibilities. The party accrued its first experience at this back in the twenties (the ROSTA [Russian Telegraph Agency] magazine, "Krasnaya Nov"). It could be reborn in a new capacity—as an institute not only for offering professional assistance, but political influence. Let us say, it would be useful to expand, having freed it from formalism, the practice of holding seminars and internships in the central newspapers, and the same for oblast journalists. In turn, the republic and oblast press could substantially increase their control over the editorial boards of the rayon newspapers.

Effective influence on the press in modern conditions requires a serious change in the existing attitude toward social-psychological and psychological aspects of managing ideological processes in general and the mass information media in particular. While previously the psychological "fine points" in the interrelations of party organs and journalists were practically not part of the equation, today it is impossible to make a move in guided political influence on the line of a given publication over the matter of from what viewpoint information will be presented, what topics and problems will be dominant, without taking these into consideration.

Any press organ, despite all striving to be objective, inevitably experiences the influence of certain social groups, and somehow or another serves as a conduit for their interests, sympathizing with public movements and forces "dear" to their heart, themselves enjoying the support of same. Hence the conclusion: In the name of one and the same goal, the party committee must approach various editorial boards in various ways. Under modern conditions, the editorial collectives are becoming for the party organs just as differentiated, as demanding of the art and science of communication as the readers, radio listeners, and television viewers are becoming for the journalists.

The efficacy of the party directives in many ways depends upon an accurate calculation of the predisposition to accept the viewpoint of the party committee, upon its representatives' ability to find topics, accents,

and turns at which there is proximity and coincidence of viewpoints. In this case, even the criticism leveled at journalists will be heard and understood, and constructive proposals will not elicit the editors' rejection.

As experience indicates, it is no less important today to know the informal leaders, the more authoritative figures in the editorial boards. To make them allies of the party committee, to enlist their support in many ways means solving the problem of the normal working interaction of the party with the corps of journalists.

Far from all party workers possess the understanding that it is one thing to guide the party press, and another to influence the contents of the state and public press, and yet something else to find paths for influencing the press of informal associations. That which is completely natural within the framework of the party, its charter relations, cannot be transferred to non-party publications. If the party committees were to dictate their demands to, for example, the trade unions or youth publications, mass information media, then they would obviously exceed their authority.

Many informal associations now have their own press publications. And it is already obvious that trying to prohibit them or control them strictly means chasing a portion of these publications "underground," and also means giving them grounds for speculative conversations about undermining glasnost and public self-management. Yet it is no better to look at it from the side, giving this press over to the control of destructive elements.

Apparently, the party committees cannot get along without actively searching and finding paths to enter into contact (not necessarily direct contact) with the journalistic collectives of new publications, correctly, but with the position of principle to influence them through the party press, through the press of state and public organizations.

Under conditions of perestroika, the role of the high-volume press of enterprises and institutions, as well as the possibilities of factory radio programming, are cast in a new light. Supporting the party's candidates for local organs of power, neutralizing calls for strikes, blocking undesired developments of events—all of this, and the resolution of a multitude of other highly important political tasks may be successfully set on course with the help of the press. Its role is sharply heightened in extreme circumstances. The forces opposing the CPSU strive to bring under their own control such a convenient, effective instrument of ideological influence with a "grounding" effect on a concrete collective and on concrete people. And here the party committees must not delay; they must act, first and foremost through well-planned cadre policy.

One of the most important elements of the new mechanism of CPSU and mass information media interrelations is the participation of elected party organs in determining the lines of their publications. Until now,

many party committee newspapers have in actuality been subordinate to their apparatus. In the absolute majority of cases, the fundamental issues of the activity of the rayon, oblast (kray), and republic press—political evaluations, the problematic-thematic trend, cadres—are being viewed by only a narrow circle of personnel party workers, without broad discussion with all committee members. This not infrequently leads to administration by injunction, conflicts, hastily drawn conclusions, and unjustified cadre moves.

A significant elevation of the role of conferences and plenums in the guidance of the press organs could help correct the situation. It is here alone, on the principles of broad collegiality, that the strategic line of a publication can be confirmed. Here is the very place to listen to the editors' reports, to evaluate the activity of the editorial collectives. Guided by the decisions made, the committee apparatus is called upon to help fine-tune the effective operations of the editorial board during the period between plenums.

The selection, rather than the confirmation of editors seems advisable at the conference or plenum, this being on an alternative basis. Candidates for editor may be nominated by the party committee buro, a superior party organ, the editorial board itself, or by any plenum member. The deserving one is determined by secret ballot. In such a case, releasing an editor from a position held must also take place only at a conference or plenum.

Overcoming the corporate-professional reserve of the editorial collegia directly controlling the newspapers, radio, and television is also extraordinarily important in the party influence on the press. Journalists frequently, and in many cases, justifiably criticize ministries, departments, party organs, etc. for a lack of glasnost, for alienation, for failure to take public control, and especially for a "closed-door policy" toward representatives of the press, radio, and television. However, the very activity of the majority of the editorial collegia is carefully guarded from "outside eyes." This hampers society's genuine democratic control over the press.

There is, of course, another side to this policy of "stone-walling." At a meeting with PRAVDA journalists, M.S. Gorbachev cited the words he had said to the newspaper and magazine editors at the last meeting in the CPSU Central Committee: "Name me any newspaper or magazine, and I'll tell you the position in any speech, in any issue. Both for internal policy issues, and for cultural issues. Instead of many voices, instead of glasnost, we get one voice without glasnost."

The public editorial councils, which are granted consultative and deliberative powers, could help in overcoming such reserve and corporate atmosphere. For them, the main things are the implementation of representative public influence on the general line of the mass information organ, constructive criticism of its work, bringing the opinion "from below" to the press, radio, and television workers, and participation in the discussion of

candidacies for occupying positions with political functions, yet non-interference in operations activity, the obligations of the editors-in-chief, and the editorial collegia. In turn, the activity of these public organs and their interrelations with the corresponding editorial boards must constantly be kept in the area of glasnost for the readers and the television viewers.

The formation of public editorial councils could proceed along a number of channels: the delegation of representatives from public organizations, amateur associations, soviet deputies, from the masses of the population (from initiative groups, or by public opinion polls), etc.

It seems timely to create a regulation mechanism for interrelations between party committees and editorial collectives, in which non-party journalists and editors would predominate, as well as the editorial boards of the so-called alternative publications.

Such public organizations as the USSR Journalists Union All-Union Council on Professional Ethics and the Law, and analogous councils on the boards of journalistic organizations of republic, kray, and oblast echelons could become the most appropriate instrument for this purpose. The public organs could be supplemented by the corresponding committees or by journalistic honor courts under primary organizations, which would allow the rayon, city, and high-volume press, including the network of special correspondents, to be encompassed. Such a mechanism would allow the support of the press's ethical level in accordance with the moral norms of socialist society, and would subject to public condemnation the actions of those journalists who transgress morality, and who will not be regulated by the Law on the Press, as well as other mass information media.

The councils and commissions on professional ethics and the law, which include authoritative journalists, with veterans of party publishing among them, are capable of becoming a notable moral force, able to block the path of group interests, and attempts to discredit the representatives of party and soviet organs in the provinces. They would play the role of arbiters between the organizations and the editorial boards. Reports on analyses of conflict situations with which the councils and commissions would concern themselves must be published in the rayon, oblast, kray, and republic newspapers, and in particularly important cases, in the central press as well.

Such a mechanism is a serious hindrance to those authors who disregard journalistic ethics, settle personal scores, heap abuse on honest workers, and unceremoniously intrude upon citizens' private lives.

It seems extremely important to change significantly the nature and raise the level of day-to-day business contacts of party committees and mass information media.

Today, it is becoming an all-the-more-unacceptable practice for first secretaries of rayon, city, and kray party committees, republic Communist Party Central Committees to recognize the only means of communication, even with their own party newspaper, to be the editor's summons for a conversation. And as a rule, the reason for such a talk is some sort of accident, the publication of material which caused dissatisfaction. Many top people in rayons and regions are in their positions for not yet one year, and so have not found time to spend with the editorial board, to meet with its collective.

Under the conditions of perestroika, the party committee first secretary cannot afford not to be at the same time the chief ideologist in his party organization—and not by position, but for real. Otherwise, he simply does not have the right to be first secretary. To an enormous extent, the authority and combat readiness of the entire party organization, his person and chances in the political fight, depend upon his authority both as a political and an ideological leader, and upon his personal agitation and propaganda work. The party committee first secretary is obligated to be constantly and directly concerned with the press—this is an imperative demand of the time, of the entire political situation falling into place in the country.

The quality of the first secretary's interrelations with representatives of the mass information media are acquiring particular significance. The effectiveness of the meetings organized on a regular basis in many ways depends upon such a frequently lacking aspect nowadays as the trustworthiness of the conversations, their unconstrained nature. During the course of the meetings, the journalist must feel that he is being asked not for directives, but for assistance. That is exactly how the matter was put in the Orlov CPSU obkom, and the Shchekino city party committee, Tula Oblast.

It also seems very important that not only the editor and his deputy receive invitations to the meetings, but the best authors who enjoy the more authority among the readers—staff authors, and those not on the staff of the given publication. Domestic (so far rather modest) and foreign experience indicates that a small, carefully selected group of influential journalists which receives the most trustworthy first-hand information in an informal setting, a group which itself acts as a steady collective adviser of the leadership, simplifies, to a great extent, the task of having a constant channel of reporting to the broad public information on various policy matters.

Obviously, for the purposes of ensuring the party organs' constant communication with the mass information media, it would be worthwhile to think about instituting under the party committee first secretary the position of press secretary.

I will risk offering the following model. The press secretary, whose status may be established on the level of department head, is directly subordinate to the first

secretary—from the rayon to the republic echelon—and he speaks to press representatives in the name of the first secretary. By nature, his function is political, not technical. His function consists not only of preparing materials for the press conferences, briefings, and confidential meetings with journalists that the party committee first secretary conducts, but of independent maintenance of the day-to-day contacts with press workers.

Within the range of the press secretary's responsibilities is work with the representatives of the mass information media of the given region, as well as with the central publications' own correspondents. He is entrusted to explain the point of view of the party committee on various issues, help form the journalists' opinion to support the party and soviet organs' decisions of principle, both those taken and those under preparation, and promote people's broad familiarity with the business and human qualities of the representatives of the local leadership. This is especially important in the climate of glasnost and democratization.

In his work, the press secretary may rely upon the small apparatus of a press service (its numbers are determined by the scale of the region, the quantity of publications under its "guardianship," and the population's national composition, etc.). The press service functions in two directions: It organizes and carries out various measures for journalists, and strives to help with counter-requests and the desires of the mass information media representatives.

It is extremely important to select for the position of press secretary CPSU members who have much work experience within the mass information media, highly erudite, benevolent people who are quickly able to establish contacts with the representatives of various public forces.

It seems that the proposed ideas could help in the party committees' search for effects paths of political influence on the press under perestroika.

Radical renewal of the mechanism of party guidance of the mass information media is not only one of life's demands, but life itself. The experience being born in the party organizations must be disseminated. Among the new forms are an exchange of analytical materials, prognoses, plans, and orientations among the party committees and editorial boards. Mutual reports of the party apparatus and editorial staffers have had a lot to recommend for themselves, as does joint study for party and journalistic cadres; courses, seminars, business games directed at studying the most pressing problems advanced by perestroika. Such practice needs all possible deepening and assistance, even within the party press, and including the publications of the informal associations. And it is very good that the journalism chairs of the CPSU Central Committee AON [Academy of Social Sciences], and the Moscow and a number of other higher party schools are conducting a great deal of work here.

Nor is it scarcely worth rejecting such traditional methods as would give the press a more businesslike manner, humanize it, make it more precise in adjusting feedback when they are utilized in an informal, thoughtful manner. This also includes readers' conferences, selections of letters not only to the editors, but to all other departments in the region, and sociological research of the press and television audience, with an analogous survey of their materials.

The times demand that we learn to guide the press not by the force of order, but by the force of being authoritative.

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Writers' Union Plenum Resolutions on Journal 'Aprel'

90UN0580A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* in Russian No 49, 8 Dec 89 p 5

["Decree of the Sixth Plenum of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union of 13 November 1989"]

[Text] The report from the Sixth Plenum of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, published in issue 48 of *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*, evoked great interest among our readers in problems related to publishing and the internal life of the Writers' Union. At the same time, readers requested orally and in writing that the editors publish the major documents adopted by the plenum, documents which our report either paraphrased or abbreviated. We are fulfilling this request.

Having heard and discussed the report of L.N. Shapkin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Goskomizdat [State Publishing Committee], and M.P. Shevchenko, secretary of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union on the organization of book and journal publication in the Russian Federation, the plenum notes that, thanks to the efforts of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, writers' organizations, and party and state organs, certain positive changes have occurred in the solution of one of our most urgent problems—the publication of our writers' books. The Moscow writers' organization is establishing the Stolitsa publishing house with its own monthly journal *MOSKOVSKIY VESTNIK*. The publishing house, Sovetskiy Pisatel, has been taking a more realistic position in recent months and has finally begun giving manuscripts of Russian writers some attention. As always, the lion's share of the work is being done by the *SOVREMENNİK* publishing house.

Changes are also taking place in journals, changes which, in part, are the results of replacement of the editors of Russian journals. The process of renewal of editorial boards and editors-in-chief has occurred in all regions during the last 5 years. Thus, on the eve of the sixth congress of the RSFSR writers, two journal replaced their editors-in-chief: Boris Nikolskiy came to *NEVA* in early 1985, while slightly earlier Sergey Borovikov assumed the editorship of *VOLGA*. In 1986 Vasilii

Voronov was made editor-in-chief of *DON*. In 1987 Gennadiy Karpunin became editor of *SIBIRSKIYE OGNI*, and slightly later Valentin Fedorov was put in charge of *DALNIY VOSTOK* and Evgenii Novichikhin of *PODYEM*. Recently Ernst Safonov was appointed to head up the weekly *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*, and Stanislav Kunyayev the journal *NASH SOVREMENNİK*. The long vacant post of editor-in-chief of *TEATRALNAYA ZHIZN* has been filled. It now can be said that during recent years more than half of the editors-in-chief of the journals of the Russian federation have been newly appointed. This picture is augmented by changes in the editors of journals published in the other languages spoken by the people of the Russian Federation. Pavel Nikitin was appointed chief editor of *KHOTUGU SULUS - POLARNAYA ZVEZDA* in Yakutsk. Bulat Rafikov was made editor-in-chief of the Bashkir journal *AGIDELI* and Aziz Fatullayev of *LITERATURNAYA DAGESTAN*. In 1988, Vladimir Popov took over the editorship of *VOYVYV KODZUV* published in the Komi language, Anatoliy Timirkayev became editor of *ONCHYKO*, which is published in Mari, and Fedor Konovalov of *TAVAN ATAL* published in Chuvash. Galina Pronina was appointed editor-in-chief of the Finnish *PUNAL-IPPU*. Considering that in recent years childrens' journals were established in a number of autonomous republics and oblasts, and that these naturally attracted fresh literary forces, headed by energetic, enterprising editors, such as Tsyden-Zhap Zhimbiyev in Ulan-Uda and Said Chakhkiyev in Groznyy, it is fair to say that appreciable changes have taken place in the extensive literary and journalistic industry of the Russian Federation.

Without a doubt, there is more work along these lines that must be done and the Plenum finds it desirable to adopt for unconditional implementation the recommendations of the plenum of the board of the USSR Writers' Union concerning limiting tenure in the position of editor-in-chief to 10 years for all literary/artistic journals and almanacs, including those published in the languages of ethnic minorities.

In our time the role played by those in charge of periodicals has grown, as has their responsibility for what is published in the mass media. However, as those who spoke at the plenum rightly noted, some editors are attempting to use glasnost and democracy to further their own group and purely selfish interests, ignoring moral standards and artistic criteria. We can only pity and condemn the unprecedented behavior of A.A. Ananyev, secretary of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union and editor-in-chief of the journal *OKTYABR*, who allowed the journal to adopt an insultingly disdainful attitude toward Russia and toward what we hold sacred, evoking universal indignation among the populace.

After all, our first concern as Russian writers should be the preservation and revival of the historical, cultural, and spiritual values of the peoples of Russia, which for so

long have been subjected to unceasing deformation and sometimes even annihilation and destruction.

The plenum believes that the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union must increase the energy of its support of the process of spiritual renaissance, its work to introduce new and progressive ways of organizing the publishing of books and journals, to facilitate the unification of writers' editions within the framework of the RSFSR Writers' Union, and to guide and facilitate the expansion of glasnost and democracy and the consolidation of all healthy intellectual and creative forces regardless of ethnic affiliation.

The Sixth Plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union resolves:

1. To concentrate the attention and creative energy of writers' organizations, publishers, and journal editors on portraying the men and women of today—the key figures in the political, economic and social renewal of our nation. To take all measures necessary in order to increase the professional level of the work of publishers and journals, focussing attention on publishing the writings of contemporary writers, especially young writers.

The board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, jointly with the Goskomizdat of the RSFSR and other organizations, will participate in the development of the concept of Russian book publishing.

2. During the period of 1990-1995, the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR will assiduously attempt to found new publishing houses and periodicals in all oblasts and krais of the Russian Federation, actively utilizing for this purpose business arrangements based on cooperative contracts. We will go to the government of the RSFSR with a proposal to establish a unified independent journal-publishing and production center for the USSR Writers' Union.

The Secretariat will submit a request to the higher authorities that local Soviets (of oblasts, krais, autonomous republics, and national okrugs) be granted the right to engage in publishing and that the number of journals existing in 1977 be reinstated. The Secretariat supports an initiative to institute cost-accounting in the production-creative associations for publishing the journal STERKH, the organ of the organizational committee of the Association of Finno-Ugric writers and the Association to Save "Yugra."

3. The plenum condemns the practice of many regional publishing houses of expending the lion's share of their paper supplies on reprinting profitable (and only profitable) books, to the detriment of the creative interests of local writers. This generally places poets in particular in a bad position by printing insultingly small editions of their books.

4. The plenum supports the RSFSR Goskomizdat in its stance concerning the need to increase the republic's material resources and facilities in the area of publishing,

and to take real measures to radically restructure printing combines, replacing obsolete and worn-out equipment, and also to transfer control of a number of printing enterprises, as well as one of the paper combines located in the RSFSR but under control of Soviet Union agencies, to the Russian Federation. The plenum supports the creation of a Russian book shop with branches in all the autonomous republics.

5. The secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union will continue to work on renewing the membership of editorial committees, editorial councils and the directorship of publishing houses and literary journals, devoting special attention to length of tenure in management positions and to retirement age.

The secretariat will have until the end of 1989 to decide the issue of replacing the editors-in-chief of the journals MOSKVA (M.N. Alekseyev) and OKTYABR (A.A. Ananyev). It will be taken into consideration that D.Ya. Gusev, who successfully and productively headed the journal SEVER for more than 35 years, submitted his resignation from the post of editor in March of this year.

6. In light of the complex situation that has developed in the Leningrad writers' organization, as an experiment, the Plenum will comply with the request of the Sodruzhestvo Association to become an independent oblast writers' association consisting only of members of the USSR Writers' Union. The plenum will submit to higher authorities a proposal to change the status of the newly organized journal LENINGRAD and to make it an organ of the Leningrad oblast Writers' Organization and of the writers' organizations of the Novgorod, Pskov, and Kalinin oblasts.

By the end of 1989, the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union will, within the limits of the By-laws of the USSR Writers' Union, develop a statute concerning alternative organizations, their rights and obligations, their print organs, and their interactions with their kindred writers' organizations within an oblast or city and will submit this statute to the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union for consideration at their next Plenum. Until that time, no decisions will be made concerning establishment of new organizations of this type.

7. The Secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union will develop a specific plan for implementing critical suggestions and proposals put forward at the Sixth Plenum of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union and will define measures for implementing them. The implementation of decisions of the Plenum of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union and the plan to implement critical suggestions will be discussed at the joint meeting of the expanded secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union and the RSFSR Goskomizdat no later than February of 1990.

8. The literary miscellany KUBAN will be considered an organ of the RSFSR Writers' Union and of the Krasnodar Krai and Adygeysk Oblast writers' organizations.

Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the RSFSR Writers' Union of 14 November 1989 Concerning the Declaration of 'Aprel'

The coarsely and insolently expressed dictates of the members of Aprel can evoke only pity, annoyance, and

protest. This declaration, full of suppressed hostility against Russia and the RSFSR Writers' Union, sows discord between peoples and ethnic groups.

We do not accept such a position, we condemn and renounce it absolutely.

**Vorontsov Comments on Personal S&T Career,
Environmental Issues**

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89 pp 3-7*

[Interview with N. N. Vorontsov by N. V. Uspenskaya:
"Complete Glasnost in Ecology is Needed"]

[Text] Nikolay Nikolayevich Vorontsov, a doctor of biological sciences and the new chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature, has been connected with the USSR Academy of Sciences for 34 years and does not intend to neglect his work in science. He has been an associate at the Zoology Institute in Leningrad, a scientific secretary at the Presidium of the Siberian Department, a director of the Biology-Soil Institute and a member of the Presidium of the Far Eastern Science Center. He remains the chief scientific associate at the Biology Institute imeni N. K. Koltsov. His scientific research is dedicated to the systematics and morphology of animals, evolution and cytogenetics. He has been an organizer of and participant in 41 expeditions to Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, the European north, southern Siberia and the Far East. He is the author of many science and popular science publications, some of which may be found in older and quite recent issues of *PRIRODA*.

Nikolay Nikolayevich is a frequent guest of the editors of this journal. On the eve of his appointment to this high state post we invited him to visit us and talk about the work of his deputies. Nothing presaged the new development in his life. Ten days later our associate interviewed him at USSR Goskompriroda.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Nikolayevich, in view of your long association with *PRIRODA* and your familiarity with the editorial board, it must be noted that your appointment as "the core scientist" to a ministerial level post was a great surprise to many people.

[N. N. Vorontsov] It was a surprise to me also. I have already had to explain that I recommended six candidates for the post of Goskompriroda chairman, but forgot that initiative is punished.

I have been linked with *PRIRODA* for a very long time. I wrote my first article when I was 24 years old. It was titled "On the Biological Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing." It went into the January 1959 issue. Naturally, it contained genetics terminology. There was a special article in *PRAVDA* with a criticism of the *BOTANICHESKIY ZHURNAL*. It was a regular relapse into Lysenkoism. D. I. Shcherbakov, then the chief editor of *PRIRODA*, asked me to visit him. His deputy, D. M. Troshin, was present at the meeting. They told me, "Your article is excellent. You have only to take out words such as 'mutation' and 'chromosome' and other such terms." I very much wanted to be published and to obtain an honorarium. I was then a junior scientific associate. However, I thought it over. If I give in now, what will become of me in the future? The article was

removed from the issue, which had already been prepared for publication. I was not able to obtain a reprint. Perhaps there is one in your archives?

[Correspondent] Unfortunately not. It would be an interesting addition to your list of "nature" publications which I have compiled in preparation for this interview: "Biological Prerequisites for Human Evolution," "The Role of Viruses in the Formation of Animal Species," "Genetic Consequences of the Intensive Use of Pesticides," "Chromosomal Divergence of Sevan Trout," and many others, including an excellent scientific-biographical sketch of A. A. Lyapunov.

We reviewed your basic monographs "Short Essay on the History of Evolution" (written together with N. V. Timoveyev-Resovskiy and A. B. Yablokov) "Lower Hamster-like Animals Throughout the World." So, our readers have some idea of the breadth of your scientific interests and the rich geography of your research. However, in our journal you have not written specifically about the problems of ecology and have not been an organizer of any environmental protection activities. Has this taken place outside of *PRIRODA*?

[N. N. Vorontsov] I am primarily a specialist in the study of mammals. All my mammalogy teachers—S. I. Ognev, A. N. Formozov, B. S. Vinogradov and V. G. Geptner, were enthusiastic about setting up game reserves and protecting endangered species. This is an old tradition. People who study large animals faced environmental protection problems far sooner than do those who study entomology or botany, for example. Beginning with my student days I have had long and close contacts with ecology.

During my work in Siberia and the Far East, that is, in the 1960s and 1970s, I had to become totally involved in the struggle to protect nature on a country-wide level. The Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences was only beginning to be influential. I had the good fortune to study at an excellent school and to be associated with outstanding scientists and science organizers. I have in mind M. A. Lavrentev, A. M. Budker, A. A. Trofimuk, A. P. Okladnikov, N. N. Vorozhtsov and G. K. Boreskov. G. I. Marchuk should also be included here. I participated in the most decisive stage in the opposition to the now almost forgotten "project of the century"—we "buried" the Lower Ob State Hydroelectric Station. This was a proposal to build a gigantic dam near Salekhard and flood a large part of the West Siberian lowland. It got so far along that when the railway line to Tobolsk was built it was forbidden to lay tracks in those areas which were to be flooded.

Scientists were up against the wall. There were many reasons for opposing the project. These involved salt water intrusion into the Ob Estuary, the creation of a monstrous swamp and the destruction of migrating sturgeon and salmon. Also, A. A. Trofimuk, A. L. Yanshin, B. S. Sokolov and their accompanying circle of Siberian geologists had spoken of the very high prospects for oil

and gas in the region. Nobody believed this. If it had not been for the first gushers, the scientists would hardly have been able to prevail.

I also participated in the fight against the Baykal pulp and paper plant, which was built in spite of opposition from the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The first heroes here are Trofimuk and, of course, G. I. Galaziy, who for many years was the head of the USSR Academy of Sciences Limnology Institute, and M. M. Kozhov, a veteran in the study of Baykal. Sergey Gerasimov took Kozhov as sort of a prototype for the character in his, to put it softly, untruthful film, "U Oзера" ["At the Lake"]. I think that this caused the outrage against him. These people are all uncompromising fighters, knights above fear or reproach.

For an entire month in the summer of 1970 I was the Siberian Department's representative at the Commission of the USSR Committee for People's Control. It was established that there were many deliberate falsehoods in the previously approved CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree on measures to protect Lake Baykal. For example the transportation of timber in cigar shaped rafts was to be halted for 2-3 years. The straps would break and the timber would sink, causing pollution in the lake. This was covered by the decree. However, there were no log transport ships nor plans to produce them. Also, representatives of five ministries and the local leadership were inclined to hide the most important problems and to simply deceive the government. I remember months of work in a state of nervous exhaustion. In general, the results were positive.

In my official position in Siberia and the Far East I often encountered such problems. However, perhaps that is enough reminiscing.

Regarding my competence in the work that I will have to do, I think that when Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov asked me to become chairman of USSR Goskompriroda he realized that he was not obtaining a trained minister. I even asked him whether it would not be better to have a good scientist as a consultant rather than an inexperienced minister. However, it was clear that if I were entrusted with this position I could obviously attract scientists. I see one advantage in that I know the Moscow, Leningrad, Siberian and Far Eastern institutes and can count upon the closest contacts.

[Correspondent] Could you explain the tasks of your committee and how they will be posed to you when you assume the position?

[N. N. Vorontsov] The committee was set up terribly late, only 18 months to 2 years ago. My teachers V. G. Geptner, G. P. Dementev and other scientists of that generation, for example, A. G. Bannikov, asked whether there should be an all-union organ for monitoring the environment—this is now our main function. Republic committees arose one after another at the end of the 1950s. We began to set up USSR Goskompriroda only when the ecological situation in the country had become

critical and was turning into a source of social tension. The urgent task of changing environmental protection legislation now exists. Perhaps it will be necessary to have ecological law in addition to civil and criminal law. Effective economic mechanisms must be developed so that a wasteful attitude towards nature will not be economically profitable. The rapid construction of good treatment facilities and measures to conserve resources should yield substantial benefits to enterprises. Perhaps progressive taxation should be introduced.

F. T. Morgun did a great deal to set up the agency apparatus. However, the process of creating Goskompriroda organs is still far from complete. I cannot now seriously talk about any formulated program. I can only say that I will attempt to attract skilled people to Goskompriroda so that we can collectively make recommendations and, naturally, honest ecological impact statements. Every manager, at the center or at local levels, should have a map of the ecological situation in the country. This requires organizing a special type of cartographic service based upon comprehensive research. All this will take resources that our agency still does not have.

In many cases a high quality environmental impact statement will require more than just a group of experts visiting a project. We will have to organize our own expeditions. These should include soil scientists, geographers, botanists, geobotanists, foresters, specialists in treatment facilities and water recycling and in the study of resources and hydrometeorology. In other words, such cases require extensive study. Goskompriroda should enlist specialists from various scientific research institutes. They will eagerly come; nobody is indifferent to the fate of nature. However, now that science has been converted to the notorious self-financing, Goskompriroda should have its own money to pay, for example, the Soil Science Institute at VASKhNIL [All Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin] to participate in an expedition. When the discussion is about building or not building a billion ruble project, we should have at least a tenth of a percent to do the appropriate scientific research.

In addition to several scientific research institutes, our agency includes 30 reserves, mainly biospheric reserves. These are quite indigent organizations and the people who work there are pure and simple devotees. This applies not only to the scientific associates, but also to the hunters, who obtain 100-120 rubles, do not have the right to keep livestock and are in the gun sights of poachers. Reserve workers need material support.

[Correspondent] One hears this about almost all areas of our shattered economy. How can this happen when there is a budget deficit?

[N. N. Vorontsov] What if I say that I do not know. This would at least be honest. I am counting upon our economists. I will study foreign experience. So far it tells me the following. In all the developed countries 5

percent of gross national income is spent upon environmental protection measures. We, however, spent only 1.23 percent in 1981-1985, and 1.32 percent in 1988. When we talk about this 5 percent, it must be recalled that regions that are considered zones of ecological calamity obtain huge additional sums. Americans succeeded in cleaning up the Great Lakes only by allocating a lot of additional resources. It must be kept in mind that it will be very expensive to restore nature. Therefore, we must not be stingy in regard to its protection.

[Correspondent] So, you are now a representative of the higher echelon of the command-administrative apparatus that is now being harshly judged. Your advisor for the interregional deputy group, A. A. Sobchak, recently stated that this stratum, 18 million strong, is somewhat larger than the bourgeois-landowner stratum on the eve of the October Revolution. Excuse me for the joke. In fact, hopes are being placed upon the increased number of important scientists in the country's government. However, do you think that environmental protection problems could be more effectively solved at the soviet level?

[N. N. Vorontsov] The organizational structure of environmental protection differs by country. In Sweden, Finland and the GDR these matters are handled by ministries. The United States has the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality. We have set up a USSR Supreme Soviet legislative committee on problems of ecology. USSR Goskompriroda has the status of an executive organ; however, it has control-management functions. By their very nature, control functions should belong to the soviets. I was told that all members of the ecology committee insisted that in contrast to other ministers I remain a people's deputy. By doing so they stressed that the union-republic agency Goskompriroda has special rights. I think that our committee should have dual subordination—to the USSR Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet.

We still have 15 republic committees under us. However, in the republics a movement is beginning to transfer these to republic Supreme Soviets. Possibly, we will be transformed into a Committee for Ecological Control, similar to the Committee of People's Control.

[Correspondent] Have you already had working contacts with the Council of Ministers?

[N. N. Vorontsov] To a minor extent. Enough to be convinced that the council has some understanding of the importance of ecological problems. At the beginning of the 12th Five-year Plan there were 23 indicators by which Gosplan kept track of the rational use of natural resources and environmental protection. By 1989 they were reduced to seven. Fortunately, we have succeeded in increasing them to 17 in the 1990 plan.

There is great concern about the nonfulfillment of plans for the introduction of environmental protection facilities and about the underutilization of state capital

investments, in particular during 1986-1988. For the country as a whole the plan for the introduction of waste water treatment plants was 63.1 percent fulfilled, the plan for building water recycling systems—66 percent, and for air pollution control systems 73.8 percent fulfilled.

The prospects for 1990 are still not bright. Because of the difficult economic situation the financing of capital investments is being generally reduced. There is talk of a sharp reduction in the construction of environmental protection facilities. The situation differs for various agencies, republics and regions. Surprisingly, in its proposals for reducing pollution from stationary sources, the Kazakh Council of Ministers foresees that the 1990 indicators will be lower than those in 1988, including for such ecologically unfortunate cities as Aktyubinsk, Dzhambul, Pavlodar, Semipalatinsk, Temirtau, Tselinograd and Chimbkent.

Of course, one must be aware of the situation in the country. However, there are areas where one cannot economize.

We will also be struggling to see that the 14 major themes for state scientific-technical programs implemented by the State Committee for Science and Technology include problems of ecological research.

[Correspondent] Do you fear more ecological strikes?

[N. N. Vorontsov] It is quite clear that they are unavoidable if there is no glasnost in ecology. Only full glasnost will help move this matter, equip an army of informal ecology organizations and direct them in the right channels. People should have precise data and materials for comparison. They want to understand where processes are going and what they can expect. There is a mass of figures which people need to know as well as they know weather forecasts. Here is some information on air pollution from stationary sources. Compared to the first half of 1988, during the same period in 1989 emissions declined in most cities. Emissions of particulate matter declined by 6 percent for the country as a whole, by 18 percent in Moscow and in frightfully smoky Novokuznetsk by 8 percent. These and other figures would be comforting if they were realistic. But what do they actually mean? In Moscow 140,000 tons of particulate matter were emitted, while in Novokuznetsk the figure was 399,000 tons—2.7 fold more. Also, Novokuznetsk is a smaller city than Moscow.

Or take Mariupol for example. During the first half of the year 385,000 tons of particulate matter were emitted into the air over it. This is almost as much as for Novokuznetsk. Also, the rate of decline over the past year was only 2 percent. If this continues it will take Mariupol 50 years to reduce emissions by a factor of 2, thereby reaching a level which is much worse than we have in Moscow today.

[Correspondent] We have extremely unfavorable ecological situations in hundreds of cities. However, neither a

list of these cities nor expert evaluations of air, soil and water quality have been published. True, every year there are many books with tables and graphs showing the extent to which maximum permissible concentrations are being exceeded for practically all chemical elements. However, this type of literature is for service use. Even PRIRODA cannot print all this information. When will this cease to be a "state secret?"

[N. N. Vorontsov] I have stated my position and intend to adhere to it. I cannot cite dates, but I think that this is urgent. People are prepared to suffer if they are confident that they can expect something better. They will stimulate efforts in this direction and find an optimal pace. If people are told that the situation in their city will improve in 5 to 7 years they will wait, but if this period is stretched out over 15 years, the wait will become unbearable.

[Correspondent] What hopes do you place upon cost accounting in enterprises, regions and republics?

[N. N. Vorontsov] Without an understanding of general ecological standards this will not work. If, for example, we talk about full cost accounting within the framework of enterprises in the forest industry together with forestry, this can lead to positive results. Here there are advantages in conserving resources. But the transition to cost accounting in the construction of power engineering enterprises will not provide advantages in this sense. How are we planning the series of power plants in the Nurek and Rogun GESes? Well, in the mountains there are sites for high dams. However, why one after another in Tajikistan? This is because it was very advantageous for engineers to move construction facilities short distances, from one "great project" to another. This gave no consideration at all to the interests of the Tajik people. At one time there were discussions about reducing the height of the monstrous Rogun GES—300 meters, so that it would not flood the fertile land in the valleys of rivers flowing into the Vakhsh, Surkhob and Obikhingou rivers. There was no thought that this would remove many cubic meters of water from tributaries to the Amu Darya, which even now does not provide enough water to the Aral Sea. Neither water nor land costs us anything. This results in inundated gardens and farmland.

[Correspondent] However, fines will have a stronger effect in the new economic system. Assume that an enterprise is on self-financing and that you fine it for exceeding the maximum permissible concentration.

[N. N. Vorontsov] There is a danger that this will cause a strike, which will require the removal of the fine. We are encountering such things. For example, one of the demands of miners in Sakhalin was to remove fines for environmental pollution.

Now something about regional cost accounting. I was among those who were very sympathetic to the idea of cost accounting in the Baltic republics. I understood it when they claimed sovereignty over the land, but when they claimed sovereignty over fresh water I did not

understand it. This is because water flows into the Baltic republics from Belorussia and the Upper Volga highland. This is simply an example. I want to say that regional cost accounting can cause regional egoism, something we encounter in the location of new enterprises.

It is necessary to consider the ecological capacity of areas and how much anthropogenic stress they can withstand. Tundra, taiga and broad leaved forests all have differing ecological capacity. How many enterprises can be built in a given region? What will be the effect of maximum permissible or even lower concentrations of toxic compounds on a given environment? These are very serious questions for theoretical and applied ecology. Unfortunately, we have not worked on them enough.

In order for cost accounting to help solve ecological problems, it is necessary that all social groups, beginning with management, have a high moral understanding of it. This requires not only full ecological glasnost but also serious educational work. For several decades our schools have not been teaching general biology, but have been cultivating slogans about the conquest of nature. During this time the profession of naturalist has lost its prestige for us.

[Correspondent] In IZVESTIYA you said that with regard to such "non-prestigious" sciences as botany, zoology, soil science, hydrobiology and others we have a leading role throughout the world. Isn't there a contradiction here?

[N. N. Vorontsov] I should mention that very high standards were set by our predecessors. Also, it is important that we are studying one-sixth of the world. Yes, we have many excellent scientists. However, we do not give classical biology the respect it needs.

Every Englishman knows that he can be proud of the British Museum of Natural History and the Herbarium at the Kew Botanical Garden, one of the three largest herbariums in the world (no distinction is made between them). Does every Leningrader know that on Aptkarskiy Island is located the herbarium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, also one of the three largest in the world? No. This herbarium should also be part of our national pride and self-consciousness. Our biology is based upon one of the largest collections. A minor thing such as herbarium leaves makes possible a retrospective analysis and forecast of the development of the biosphere.

We have come to a point where the USSR Academy of Sciences has only one member and one corresponding member who are botanists. This is even though there are brilliant botanists enjoying world wide authority such as A. K. Skvortsov, an expert on domestic flora and systematics and V. N. Yurtsev, a specialist on arctic flora, and others. In this area too, we are, as a whole, starting to lag.

[Correspondent] I remember your speech at a meeting of associates of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the presidium building which was held to protest the failure

to nominate A. D. Sakharov, D. S. Likhachev, R. Z. Sagdeyev and other very worthy individuals at a conference of active members. Your words made a strong impression.

[N. N. Vorontsov] I think that is because I told it the way it was. The Academy of Sciences is in a deep crisis that did not arise today. Pressure on the academy, its politicization and the introduction of people far removed from science began with the elections in 1929. Undoubtedly, outstanding scientists have also been elected to it over the past 60 years. However, if the trend continues, then the Academy of Sciences will really be transformed into an "Academy of Directors."

Of course, this does not mean that an institute director is a priori not worthy of being an academy member. Not at all. However, take, for example, the Far Eastern Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Beginning in 1972 only one person, archaeologist N. N. Dikov, was elected to the academy from his position as head of a laboratory. All the remaining members were directors. It is agreed that this is an abnormal process. There are world class biologists working here—the marine biologist O. G. Kusakin and the paleobotanist V. A. Krasilov.

[Correspondent] Perhaps writers are justified in attacking academy science, accusing it of all the ecological misfortunes?

[N. N. Vorontsov] In spite of everything I have said, the answer is no in the overwhelming majority of cases. One must keep in mind that the Academy of Sciences has always had a healthy core.

[Correspondent] The next question. What is your opinion about the planned construction of the Katun GES?

[N. N. Vorontsov] Many authoritative geochemists, in particular from the Geology and Geophysics Institute of the Siberian Department, USSR Academy of Sciences and from the Geochemistry Institute imeni A. P. Vinogradov as well as prominent medical specialists are speaking out against it. They say that there are huge amounts of mercury in this area and that fluctuations in reservoir water levels may promote the methylation of mercury. This will poison the water and land. I am surprised at the position taken on this question by my colleague from the Siberian Department, O. F. Vasilev, a specialist on hydrodynamics. There are many doubts about the conclusions his institute made regarding the Katun GES project. An environmental impact statement by the RSFSR came to a negative conclusion on this project.

[Correspondent] But the government's decision prevailed?

[N. N. Vorontsov] I would not rush events. We still do not have the money for constructing it. I think that in the immediate future we will understand that the clean

environment of the Altay is more precious than the energy resources promised by the Katun GES.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Nikolayevich, on behalf of PRIRODA I want to wish you success in your multifaceted work to assure our common welfare. And thank you for this frank, honest, open interview.

Yablokov Cites Local Governments' Weakness in Solving Ecological Problems

90US0353A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 23 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by Ye. Smirnov: "Soviets and Nature"]

[Text] How serious is the country's ecological situation, and can the Supreme Soviet change it for the better?

In answering this question from a NOVOSTI correspondent, Aleksey Yablokov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Joint Committee on Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources, said that 20 percent of the country's population lives in zones of ecological calamity and another 35 to 40 percent live in ecologically unfavorable conditions. Throughout the country there is a steady increase in air pollution and a decline in the amount of suitable drinking water; fertile land area is being reduced through erosion, salination and chemical degradation and forests are being cut down.

Is society feeling the effects of ecological calamities? Of course. For example, in recent years there has been a considerable increase in the illness rate due to environmental deterioration. There is an increase in the cancer rate and in some regions infant mortality is increasing and life expectancy is declining. People sometimes are in situations where the air is dangerous to breathe. Food product quality is declining.

In A. Yablokov's opinion, if effective measures are not soon taken the ecological crisis in the country will grow and deepen, increasing social tensions. Last year alone, ecological reasons caused 2 million people to stop work, participate in meetings and sign petitions.

A. Yablokov is a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He has long studied zoology, problems of chemical use in agriculture and the effects of pesticides upon animals and humans. He has worked on several state environmental impact statements: for the South Ukrainian AES, the Astrakhan gas condensate complex and the Volga-Chogray Canal. He is now leading the USSR Academy of Sciences Commission in work on an environmental impact statement on the Leningrad flood control system presently under construction. The scientific world listens to his opinion.

A. Yablokov distinguishes two main reasons for ecological misfortunes—the improper use of nature and the weakness, or more accurately, the powerlessness of local soviets.

On the improper use of nature: Natural resources in the USSR are general public property. In practice this has lead to there being nobody specifically responsible for water, forests, air and land. Industrial enterprises, ministries and agencies use natural wealth as they want and do not pay for it. This leads to curiosities. For example, in Nizhniy Tagil, to assure the normal operation of converters a pipeline was laid to a city park and clean air pumped out of it.

Guided only by their own interests, industrial enterprises often inflict harm upon nature without any serious consequences for themselves. After all, fines for damaging the environment are so small that they can be ignored. Even when in addition to the fine there is also compensation for damage to nature, the money goes into the budget and not into repairing the damage to nature. In 1988 Gosarbitrazh [State Board of Arbitration] levied only 500 million rubles in fines for damage to nature. This is only about one-tenth the amount the fines actually should have totalled.

Incidentally, something about resources. According to A. Yablokov, on a country wide scale 1 percent of the gross national product is spent for the protection of nature. This is about as much as is spent for packaging. Experience in developed countries shows that correcting the situation requires spending 5 to 6 percent of GNP.

Industrial enterprises' wasteful attitude towards nature is everywhere intensified by the economic weakness and powerlessness of local soviets. Rural, rayon and even city soviets sometimes cannot forbid a ministry to build a production facility on their territory. Nor can they require that an enterprise completely restore a river channel, forest or meadow.

A. Yablokov thinks that the situation will change radically after the USSR Supreme Soviet passes several important laws providing legal guarantees of the irreversibility of the perestroika process. These include the law on property in the USSR, on land and land use, on local self-management and local economies in the USSR. With their introduction enterprises will start to pay for using all natural resources. It will become unprofitable for them to damage the environment because this will hurt them economically. Under the new conditions local soviets will have effective means of protecting nature in their territories from industrial giants; if necessary they will use enterprise resources, equipment and specialists to restore the environment.

A. Yablokov noted that in our country in the 1970s and 1980s several fairly good (from a scientific perspective) environmental protection laws were passed. These covered forests, minerals, the atmosphere, land, water and the animal world. Unfortunately, these laws did not work because the country did not have an effective system for managing environmental protection. The laws were essentially blocked by masses of agency instructions. Perestroika changed the situation. USSR Goskompriroda, a special state institution for managing

environmental protection, was established for these purposes. It is now time to pass a single USSR law on protecting (better yet, defending) the environment. This law could bring together all previous legislation.

In conclusion A. Yablokov noted that there has long been a need to create a single international organ, something on the order of an ecological security council that would coordinate the activities of all countries in this area of human activity. The Soviet Union has already proposed such an idea. Unfortunately, the UN General Assembly did not support it in 1988.

A. Yablokov stressed that this spring the USSR Supreme Soviet will have an excellent opportunity to show the world that the Soviet Union has serious intentions regarding the defense of the environment. Possibly we will be believed.

Scientist Scores Effectiveness of Uzbekistan's Goskompriroda

*90US0353B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
21 Nov 89 p 3*

[Article by R. Kulmatov, senior scientific associate, Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Nuclear Physics Institute, doctor of chemical sciences: "Paying Debts to Nature"]

[Text] The ecological situation in Uzbekistan is one of the most unfavorable in the country. The republic has a leading place in the use of pesticides, herbicides and mineral fertilizers in agriculture, especially in cotton production.

The water resources situation is of special concern. Reserves of water, particularly fresh water, in the republic are practically exhausted. Waters in the middle and lower stretches of the Amu Darya, the Syr Darya, the Chirchik, Zaravshan and other rivers contain high concentrations of pesticides, petroleum products, phenols, nitrates, sulfates, heavy metals and their compounds. Chemical fertilizers and toxic chemicals are the main sources of pollution in rivers, canals and other bodies of water.

The lower stretches of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya are mineralized several times higher than the norm. The chemical and biological indicators of large and small rivers in the republic do not meet GOST requirements.

The construction of reservoirs and large irrigation systems in the republic has considerably speeded up the salination process. The reconstruction of irrigation and drainage networks, major land leveling and other measures are required on more than half of the 4.2 million hectares of irrigated land. According to data from Goskompriroda, during the past 15 years the area of salinated irrigated land has increased by 770,000 hectares and has reached 2 million hectares. When talking about land resources one must mention the irrational use of mineral fertilizers and toxic chemicals. Farms in the

republic have accumulated more than 6,000 tons of forbidden toxic chemicals, including highly toxic DDT, thiodanbutophos and others in more than 250,000 containers.

I would call the environmental situation in large cities critical. Due to several physical-geographic and climatic reasons there are difficulties in air circulation over cities in the Fergana and Zarafshan valleys and in Tashkent Oblast. Therefore, the atmosphere is saturated with various industrial and motor vehicle emissions. The air over Tashkent, Almalyk, Chirchik, Angren, Fergana, Andizhan, Zarafshan, Samarkand and other cities repeatedly and systematically exceeds maximum permissible concentrations for many gases (oxides of sulfur and carbon) and for dust. This leads to serious health problems for people and to the death of urban greenery.

According to statistical reports, last year more than 4 million tons of pollutants entered the atmosphere; 1.5 million tons of this was from industrial enterprises and about 2.5 million tons was from motor vehicles. These are only the emissions that have been identified. What about the overlooked boiler smokestacks, garbage dumps and sites where construction asphalt is burned openly? In short, there is not a single industrial center or large settlement in the republic in which air quality meets sanitation norms.

The cities with the highest pollution levels include Almalyk, Akhangaran, Angren, Chirchik, Tashkent, Bekabad, Andizhan, Fergana, Navoi and Samarkand. In Fergana, Angren, Almalyk and Chirchik air pollution levels are 1.5 to 2 fold higher than norms and for some compounds 4 to 6 fold higher than maximum permissible concentrations.

We have extensive mineral extraction and processing, machine building and chemical sectors, the enterprises of which are massive sources of environmental pollution. However, central agencies actively continue attempts to expand the existing and introduce new "ecologically aggressive" industries. For Uzbekistan as a whole the pace of industrial growth continues to substantially exceed development rates for environmental protection measures.

We are experiencing the bitter fruits of this policy. The republic has the highest infant mortality rates and growth in infectious diseases, cancers and other diseases. The true scale of ecological calamities has still not been evaluated; however, the facts and tendencies already revealed are cause for serious public concern.

Is there a way out of the catastrophic ecological situation? How can the effectiveness of ecological work be improved?

There is a Committee for the Protection of Nature in the republic. Its task is to protect the environment. Its other tasks are to implement a unified scientific and technical policy for the protection of nature and the rational use of

natural resources, to coordinate the environmental protection activities of ministries and agencies and to take decisive measures to prevent the degradation of nature and deterioration of the ecological situation. However, the work of the committee is not very effective. It is necessary to improve the status of the committee and its chairman, who should be a the first deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers.

The committee still does not have its own scientific unit or laboratories for monitoring, evaluating and predicting environmental conditions. The existing ones—used for monitoring—have remained at the disposal of Gosagroprom, Goskomvodka [State Committee for Land Reclamation and Water Resources], Uzgidromet [UzSSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology], the UzSSR Minzdrava [Ministry of Health], etc. In most cases data from agencies' chemical and biological studies remain inaccessible to the public. There is an acute need to set up an independent public center for monitoring the quality of the environment and food products. Such a laboratory or center would be created at Goskompriroda or the UzSSR Academy of Sciences.

The environmental protection problem is complex and interdisciplinary. Therefore it can be solved only through coordinated activity by many science collectives. Environmental protection work in the republic is now conducted in the UzSSR Academy of sciences, higher educational institutions and sector institutes. The academy has a scientific council for problems of ecology and environmental protection. As a result resources and efforts are fragmented; small, low priority projects are undertaken and there is practically no close coordination of work on ecology in the republic. Almost no work is conducted upon important problems such as forecasting environmental conditions in Uzbekistan and creating low and no waste technologies. Competitive ecological programs have not yet been announced.

In view of the difficult ecological situation in the republic, I think that it is necessary to take immediate measures to protect the environment and use nature rationally. First, the agro-industrial complex should minimize the use of pesticides and mineral fertilizers at least to the level for the country as a whole. It should also eliminate the storage of forbidden chemicals: DDT, butyphos and others, more widely use biological control of crop pests, compile soil maps of the republic, implement specific measures to improve soil fertility, quickly reduce the discharge of untreated industrial waste waters into any body of water, set up water protection zones (belts) along rivers and other bodies of water and set up a network of protected areas in the upper stretches of small rivers.

I have a nature protection program for industrial centers in the republic. I will mention only one point that I think is important. This is the refusal to expand existing or introduce new "ecologically aggressive" industries in the republic until the parameters for environmental quality

have been stabilized. Primarily this applies to these industrial centers: Almalyk, Angren, Chirchik, Fergana, Navoi and Tashkent.

I think that one of the main reasons for the negative ecological phenomena is the continued existence of the principle of nonpayment for natural resources (land, water, mineral and raw material resources, etc). Many ministries and agencies are based only upon narrowly departmental interests, ruthlessly and rapaciously use natural resources in the republic. Consequently it is necessary to promptly establish the scientific and economic prerequisites for organizing payments for the use of natural resources and to introduce payments for harmful emissions and any environmental pollution.

Finally, I am hopeful that republic party economic management officials will have a meeting on protecting the environment and using nature rationally, at which there will be an open and fundamental discussion and solution to urgent contemporary ecological problems.

Koptyug Answers Critics of Katun GES Project Reasoning

90US0353C Moscow *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA* in Russian No 49, Dec 89 p 16

[V. A. Koptyug, chairman of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, answers the Open Letter from member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences V. P. Kaznachev and a Group of Scientists (*EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA*, No 46); a translation of the open letter to which Koptyug is responding may be found on pages 110-111 of the JPRS series SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, JPRS-UPA-89-070, dated 29 December 1989."]

[Text] *Deeply Esteemed V. A. Koptyug! Deeply Esteemed Comrades!*

The position of the SO AN SSSR [Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences] on the questions touched upon in the "Open Letter" is known to most of you. Because of this I will examine the questions you put to me more as an appeal to public opinion than as a desire to once again hear an answer. The answer must thus examine a more general problem underlying the "Open Letter"—the responsibility of science and scientists to the public.

The study of the natural resources of Siberia and problems in its economic and social development have been and remain one of the basic tasks of the SO AN SSSR. The department has acquired sufficient expertise in this work. Representatives from medical science in Siberia actively participate in the preparation of many conclusions by experts. This was true in examining questions on the diversion of some of the waters from Siberian rivers to the south, in solving problems at Lake Baykal, etc. We consider such fruitful cooperation with medical scientists not only useful, but also necessary.

Therefore, in forming an expert commission for the Katun GES project both scientists from the SO AN SSSR and VASKhNIL [All Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin] and representatives from the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences were included. In the first half of 1987, having examined materials presented by Hidroproyekt [State Institute for the Planning of Hydroelectric Projects] and conclusions by specialized institutes, the commission agreed with the economic feasibility of this GES as a power engineering facility. At the same time, the commission's conclusion noted that many questions, above all those involving the social and economic aspects, had not been sufficiently elaborated in the draft plan.

Because the questions in the "Open Letter" concern mainly the medical-ecological aspects of the problem, I will restrict myself to them.

As you know, in order to analyze the possible behavior of mercury and other heavy metals in the Katun River Basin if the Katun GES were to be built, in July 1988 the Presidium of the SO AN SSSR set up a temporary inter-institute science collective (VMNK). To implement the first stage of the program more than 700,000 rubles were collected in the form of a "tax" on institutes in the SO AN SSSR. This made it possible to quickly enlist the efforts of scientists from organizations other than the SO AN SSSR. There were researchers from organizations in USSR Goskompriroda, USSR Goskondigromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology], USSR Ministry of Geology, USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy, RSFSR Ministry of Health, RSFSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, USSR Gosagroprom and the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.

The Coordinating Commission was established to guide work on the program. It included two authors of the "Open Letter": Ye. M. Trofimovich, department head at the RSFSR Ministry of Health and a candidate of medical sciences, and V. P. Kaznachev, member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, who, with the approval of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, headed the biomedical section of the program. As with other section leaders, he was given the right to enlist any organization into the work. In view of this, the question of the Novosibirsk Hygiene Institute's lack of participation in preparing conclusions on the biomedical aspects of the behavior of mercury and heavy metals in the intended construction zone of the Katun GES should be redirected to V. A. Koptyug himself.

Concerning the essentials of the matter, I want to note the dissatisfaction of the SO AN SSSR with the work of medical scientists on this problem. I will explain why.

The report on the survey of health conditions among inhabitants of the Gorniy Altay that V. P. Kaznachev presented to us in May 1989 concluded that the "totality of symptoms and syndromes in the clinical picture of

public health can be interpreted as resulting from the chronic presence of mercury compounds in the food chain and other chains... These phenomena are the greatest in the settlement of Chermal, where the mercury content of the hair and urine of individuals tested is the maximum: 0.25 ppm (parts per million) and 4.5 micrograms per liter respectively."

There are naturally doubts about this conclusion because it is generally known that the background (for ecologically clean regions of the world) for mercury content in people's hair is 1.5 to 2 ppm, while for zones where mercury has an influence one could expect 10 to 20 ppm, that is, 50 to 100 times higher than the figure in the report.

Given such data, what kind of mercury danger can there be? In this case it would seem to be more logical to show an interest in the reliability of the study and to simultaneously look for other possible reasons for the anomalies in the health of the population. I did not receive an answer to this question. However, V. I. Petrovich apparently was doubtful, as his speech to a meeting of Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers in a scheduled examination of the Katun GES had a somewhat different conclusion:

"We examined hundreds of people in the Gorniy Altay... A comparison of all indicators reveals immunological shifts, changes in metabolism and liver and cardiovascular functioning. We still do not know the reasons for these anomalies. Among children we definitely found evidence of illness and psychoneurotic disorders; among women there were threatening conditions during pregnancy. This is not simple poisoning. We studied people who have been living here for at least 5 to 7 years. This means that during this time the organism is accumulating trace elements, not only mercury, but also others, especially compounds of cadmium and arsenic." (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIA, 16 September 1989)

I will not now undertake to judge how reliable are the medical data used as the basis for conclusions about such serious anomalies in public health in this part of the Gorniy Altay. The Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers entrusted the RSFSR Ministry of Health and the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences to jointly carry out a comprehensive study of public health in the Gorno-Altay Autonomous Oblast. One can hope that this will clarify the question.

In the meantime, it follows from V. P. Kaznacheyev's speech that a prolonged stay even in the health resort areas of the Gorniy Altay such as Chermal is extremely hazardous to one's health. Is it permissible to make such a frightening conclusion on the basis of contradictory data prior to their thorough verification? However, if prior to reviewing the results of the studies one accepts the viewpoint that the Gorniy Altay already has a serious problem with the biological accumulation of heavy metals, then how can one understand the suggestion

made in the "Open Letter" to orient the Gorniy Altay towards the production of ecologically pure and medicinal food products?

Naturally, the SO AN SSSR cannot make any conclusions about medical problems—this is a matter for medical scientists. However, in making inferences from all data we would like to have a thoroughly based conclusion about these problems, one which would answer our questions.

Completeness and reliability of data, the obligatory application of world experience and well founded conclusions were demanded of all working groups in the temporary collective. Not all data met these demands. In each specific case materials were examined at working meetings and decisions were made about using them. Therefore, I do not accept blame for ignoring any conclusions or opinions. We are ready to examine additional data and materials on any specific question.

As far as questions of financing expert reviews are concerned, it will undoubtedly be agreed that in principle they should be paid for from non-agency sources.

At the initial stages of expert reviews, when general evaluations are being made, the SO AN SSSR usually uses its own resources. This is what was done in this case. However, the total cost of such a review is measured in millions of rubles, beyond the department's budget. Therefore, until Goskompriroda and the RSFSR Council of Ministers find enough money we have to use agency sources. Incidentally, to a considerable extent these same sources were used to finance biomedical research on Katun related problems performed by the Clinical and Experimental Medicine Institute of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and the Altay Medical Institute.

Now the main point—the position of the SO AN SSSR on the Katun GES. The quotations from SO AN SSSR Presidium documents cited in the "Open Letter" show that we did not try in any way to conceal but, on the contrary emphasized attention to the "water reservoir being planned for a zone with increased ecological risk due to the presence of toxic elements (primarily mercury) in various components of the natural environment...". This is why there was so much field and laboratory research and repeated review of the data. Thousands of samples of bedrock, soil, alluvial deposits, water, plants and animals were analyzed. Most of the work should be completed in the spring of 1990. On the basis of data available today, if the Katun GES is built there is little reason to expect that the mercury and heavy metals transported in water and suspended solids will differ sharply from other reservoirs throughout the world. The question of mercury accumulation in biota is more complicated. Preliminary estimates show that there is only a small possibility of mercury content in fish increasing to a really hazardous level. However, it cannot be excluded that there may be additional factors to be

considered. Even if the hazard for fish becomes real it can be overcome by preventative measures common to worldwide practice.

Naturally, this requires constant observation of the bio-accumulation of mercury, something scientists at the SO AN SSSR have already begun and propose continuing regardless of whether the Katun GES is built. This is very important in its own right, as the country has many rivers and bodies of water polluted by mercury from industrial waste waters.

The complicated problem of mercury and other heavy metals is important and requires further research. However, on the basis of preliminary data we do not think that it is a determining factor in deciding to build the

Katun GES. The dramatization of the mercury problem in several newspapers is a diversion from a discussion of the fundamental problem: Can a compromise be found between meeting the region's energy demand and keeping untouched the unique environment of the Gorniy Altay? A serious energy shortage has a negative effect upon the economy, working conditions and the social situation. Small energy sources alone will not solve this problem.

The range of questions in planning the construction of the Katun GES is broad and complicated. It is the task of scientists to make an objective decision on each of them. The population in the Altay and its soviets of people's deputies should have the final word in the question about the construction of the Katun GES.

Treatment Facilities Criticized, Changes Recommended

90US0358A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 23 Dec 89 p 11

[Article by Nina Rusakova: "The Referral to the LTP: Those Who Get It Are No Angels, But Do They Deserve Such Treatment?"]

[Text] I always thought a labor camp was a huge area enclosed by barbed wire. This is why I was so surprised by how small and crowded it was. You could never lose sight of the tall concrete wall. Everywhere were groups of people with identical pale faces, dressed in quilted cloth jackets and boots. Living quarters were dim even in daytime, even with the electric light on. Rows of double-decker bunk beds—40 per room—blocked the light. The place smelled of mildew and sweat. After personal clothing had been permitted to inmates and the list of food items that could be brought in by visitors widened, lice and roaches appeared. This was because there was no storage space: regulations allow only two square meters per inmate. It was dinnertime: some slept covering their heads with their jackets, others drank tea that was black as oil from yellowed liter jars, still others petted the cat. The cat walked on the bed arching its back. The reader might conclude that this is going to be yet another article on the horrors of life in the penitentiary. He would be wrong. These people committed no crime. I was cautioned never to call them convicts. They were patients, or at least inmates. The institution was not a penitentiary. It was called a labor treatment prevention center (LTP). The Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary defines it as follows: "in the USSR, denotes an institution for treatment and work rehabilitation of persons abusing alcohol." The first words in the definition are very significant: the LTP is indeed ours, a domestic invention without precedent elsewhere in the world. What is it really, a jail or a hospital? Are people treated here or rehabilitated?

The Lock Clicked and the Gate Opened

There once was a stable where the Kazan LTP-1 now stands. Then a veterinary clinic. Twenty years ago an LTP was opened here, at first for 300 inmates. Now, 1,210 patients are being treated and reeducated here.

The first LTPs was set up in 1964 in Kazakhstan. "Drunks should be jailed, undergo compulsory treatment and made to work," was the call at the time. Three years later, the country had a network of LTPs. Now, there are 314 of them holding 171,660 inmates. The LTP was formed under the aegis of the MVD and therefore had much in common with its older sibling, the labor camp.

Before we entered the camp, three different locks had to click and three iron gates to open—although the gates were not of a classic variety but had instead a pattern depicting the rising sun.

Inmates are put behind these bars for two years. The hospitalization period lasts for just one month, and for the remainder of the term rehabilitation is by labor. Shops, mostly metal working ones, are located right here, in the camp. The patients get no vacations. Violations are punished by solitary confinement. No paid sick leave is provided. Until recently, they could not vote. Thirty percent of their salary is docked by the state (which is only 20 percentage points lower than what real convicts pay.) In addition, child support payments and court-related expenses are withheld from their pay. Plus, additional sums are collected for food, medical treatment, clothing, shoes, etc. In short, the state pays nothing to keep inmates at the LTP.

But the LTPs are profitable, and very highly so. These institutions produce R900 million worth of output. They also provide construction and installation services worth over R1 billion. As is well-known, our MVD is an industrial ministry. Its responsibility is to fulfill its plan, not worry about reeducating criminals or treating alcoholics. In recent times, the number of LTP inmates has been reduced ("thanks to our glasnost"), and the MVD immediately began receiving complaints for not carrying out its contractual responsibilities. What was the ministry's reply? They wrote back: "In this case, intensify the struggle against drinking in your region."

How difficult is it to put an alcoholic into compulsory treatment? Prior to 1985 it was not so easy. Proof was needed that he not only drinks but that his behavior endangers others: that he perpetrates domestic violence, disturbs peace, refuses to work, etc. In addition, other means had to be tried first, such as fines and the peer court. Only after all of this proved futile could he be committed to the LTP.

After the well-known ukase passed, procedures were much simplified. Now, chronic alcoholics who refuse to be treated at Ministry of Health Care facilities or continue to drink after treatment are sent to the LTP. In other words, one no longer has to be a public nuisance: it is enough to be ill and refuse treatment to be put behind bars. As it was explained to us in 1986, "relatives, neighbors and other people who live with the drunk have been freed of the need to gather all kinds of legal proof of his antisocial behavior. They can now simply request that he be confined to the LTP." (It augurs well for the law-based state: one no longer needs legal proof to put a man away for two years.)

The decision whether or not to put a person into compulsory treatment is up to the court. I looked through the files of Kazan LTP patients. "The decision can not be appealed," wrote one rayon judge. "Ordered to be brought to court under guard," said another file. The proceedings do not require that a defender be present, that evidence be presented by the sides, etc. Sessions often last only 10-15 minutes during which documents are read aloud and referrals issued. (Yes, they are called

referrals, as though it were a sanatorium or a real disease prevention center, one which creates conditions for work and leisure.)

Let us ask ourselves a question: could something like this happen to one of us? Could someone tie our hands behind our back and drag us to court, where without formal charges being brought up we would be put away for two years? However imperfect our legal system, this is improbable. The difference is that they, alcoholics, are not us. It is as though our laws did not apply to them.

Everything Is Possible

True, LTP inmates are no angels. I asked employees of the Kazan prevention center to describe the typical patient. The following picture emerged: it is a male 28-to-35 years old (take a note of the age), a manual laborer, a driver or a construction worker, previously convicted (this LTP is for people with a police record), usually under Article 206, which covers petty crimes; he changes jobs frequently, staying on usually until the first pay day, and has a variety of ailments: gastritis, heart disease, cholecystitis and lack of teeth.

Mikhail Ignatov and Leonid Sachkov are Muscovites. Life is harder for them at the LTP than for local residents, for they have nowhere to go on their eight-hour furloughs in the strange city. Whenever they get a package from home, half of all food in it spoils on the way. Until he gets a referral to the LTP, the person does not know what city he will go to. He goes where there is a vacancy and where labor resources are needed. But even when he gets to an LTP, the inmate does not know whether he will finish his term there. Recently, a group of inmates from the Kazan LTP went to Elista, whence a group of local patients was sent to Kazan.

"It is, of course, a myth that one can be cured here," said Ignatov. "Here, one can lose whatever brain one still has. Before, when I did crossword puzzles I could get all but a few words. Now I don't know half of them. There is nothing to do here after work or on leave. For two years I have seen the same faces and heard the same conversations: where to get a drink or how to make alcohol substitute. One forgets how to live a normal life."

Most inmates tell the same tale when asked how they got there: "I was like everybody else. I drank no more than others. But the local cop likes it better that I am here and off his hands." I do not venture to judge how much truth there is in it. One thing is clear, however: as long as commitment without legal proof endures, everything is possible.

Useless Work

One could say that those who are committed to the LTP do not serve time but are being treated and get back their standing in society. Isolation is for the good of the alcoholic himself: it keeps him away from temptation. But let us see whether or not this is true.

As I have mentioned, hospitalization lasts just 30 days. "There is no need for more," said A. Babiyenko, the chief physician at the LTP. "We use drugs to put an end to the drinking binge and eliminate the craving for alcohol." I could add to this that the world over the treatment of alcoholism with drugs does not exceed 3 or 4 weeks.

The Kazan LTP has alcoholics at the third stage of alcoholism. At this stage, the patient is practically incurable. However, most patients here are in the second stage of alcoholism. In theory, they could still be cured. What kind of results does the LTP achieve?

I heard different numbers in connection with the success rate of the alcoholism cure. Optimists mention 30 percent, pessimists zero. A patient is considered cured if he abstains for three months.

"Most often, however, they resume drinking right here, in the camp," said Evgeniy Ivanovich Kuptsov, an addiction specialist who looks like a tired, disillusioned doctor out of Chekhov. "What keeps me here? Money. Otherwise, our work is useless. Everything is useless."

Alcohol is being tossed over the wall, smuggled or manufactured in the camp. This year alone, 43 liters of alcohol and 28 liters of substitute have been seized. How much more got through undetected?

It is thought that the LTPs are useful if only because they give a two-year respite to the alcoholic's family and neighbors. But is their life really so peaceful? Employees of the prevention center say that recently inmates have begun fleeing in record numbers. They walk away from outside sites, fail to return from leave and even climb over the wall. (The barbed wire has recently been removed.) Another method is equally popular: the person punctures his stomach with a nail or a sharpened object, is taken to the hospital by ambulance and escapes from there. In the first nine months of the year, 136 inmates of the Kazan LTP have been sent to the hospital with penetrating wounds to the stomach.

"They will do anything to get out of the LTP, if only for an hour," said D. Savchenkov, the director of the center.

But escapes could in the end be stemmed: an article is now being used under which even reporting late from leave could lead to a term at a penitentiary. The most horrible thing is that two years later these people are back. Not back to Mars or to the Moon, but back here, in society. Will they return sober, rehabilitated and thankful to us for showing them the way—or not?

"My heart bleeds for the young guys. They have not even tried good wine yet, and here they drink aftershave, static removers and deodorants," said an LTP veteran A. Zuyev. "A fellow gets to the prevention center who has never drunk anything but vodka, but leaves it as an accomplished substance abuser who knows by experience which brand of acetone gives a better buzz, can

make a brew from sawdust and knows exactly how much bi-chlorophosphate to inject to get a high and to stay alive."

Incarceration is a stiff punishment in and of itself. When I noted sentimentally that there were many cats at the LTP, employees lowered their eyes: "You are a woman and we can't explain to you how they use the cats. We catch them but they appear again and again." The inmates are allowed only four visits from their wives in two years. Is it any wonder that after being released from the LTP inmates commit monstrous rapes and murders?

I felt at times that the very air in the LTP shook with anger. A spark could start a chain reaction. One time, someone would burst out from the back of the room, from the darkness, and shout tearing open the shirt on his chest: "Why do we have so few books?" Another time, a crowd would surround us and start to shout: "Why don't they show us 'Intergirl'? I will be out in two years, where will I see it then?" There was so much passion in those words that it seemed that the person would die if at that very moment he would not get to see the film about the adventures of the night creature. It was both scary and ridiculous.

But laughter was far from the minds of LTP employees. Prevention centers have been hit by a wave of disturbances. The slang word for prison strike has a different meaning at the LTPs. Here it means a senseless riot without any demands being put forward. It is a way to let out impotent rage, which makes people destroy, burn and break everything indiscriminately. Last winter, the inmates of the Kazan LTP already had the gates open, and it is awful to think what that half-drunk, hysterical mob would have perpetrated in that city, which already has a bad reputation.

For a long time we claimed that we had no social roots for drunkenness, drug addiction or prostitution. If isolated instances occurred, it was enough to isolate its carriers and the vice would be defeated. The opinion now seems to be changing, but we still see alcoholism as a crime. Note that even drug addicts are treated more kindly: we understand that they inject the drug not only for pleasure but because they can not live without it. But to alcoholics we say: "Get your act together and stop drinking." Yet, it is tantamount to saying to a consumptive: "Make an effort and stop coughing."

Useless People

Recently, proposals have appeared in the press to transfer the LTPs to the Ministry of Health Care.

"What for?" asked V.Yegorov, deputy director of the special care department of the USSR Ministry of Health Care. "Treatment at the LTPs uses our methods. As to the upkeep, we would have to ask the MVD for guards and industry for work managers. Does it make sense?"

Doctors are not the only ones who do not want to bother with alcoholics. No one does. It is very difficult for them

to get a job at a factory: their labor record books have an entry indicating that they had been to the LTP.

"I once got a job and the manager wanted to hire me even though he knew about my past," said Ignatov. "I only needed a referral slip from the employment agency. A commission met at the agency and decided that I was not worthy of that position. I first had to work at the foundry shop for a few years and prove that I had changed and then perhaps they would let me work where I wanted."

It is a paradox. We are so sure that labor helps rehabilitate a person, but when he really needs a healthy collective, normal conditions and a job that gives him a modicum of satisfaction we hit him over the head to make sure that he goes down for good. In many countries, there is a special quota at plants for socially unstable individuals, mainly former alcoholics, drug addicts and convicts. If management refuses to hire such a person within the set quota, it faces stiff penalties.

Nor does the family need our alcoholics. I saw letters from family members to the Kazan LTP administration. "I urge you to put my husband away for another two years. Let him stay there." "I beg you not to let my son out of the LTP anymore since he causes us inconvenience." The father of one patient came to the supervising physician. "Dmitriy Andreyevich," he asked, "please give him some poison, we don't want him back with us."

But should we blame these people? I can imagine their condition if they wish their husbands and sons in prison or dead. And yet... A paraplegic causes his family no less suffering. But he is not thrown out or put behind bars. People learn to cope somehow, they learn how to give him the chamber pot, to turn him over and to give him shots. But who will explain to the family of an alcoholic that he is pathologically jealous or aggressive or demanding not because he is bad but because it is the drug that affects him so? How to behave themselves, how to tell that a binge is coming, what to do if there is a relapse—there is no one to teach them all this.

"I do not know what will become of me when the treatment is over," said a woman, an alcoholic, at a Moscow dependency treatment center. "My husband left me, I lost my job and my family is ashamed of me. I very much want to get out, but most likely I will be back with my girlfriends, the black-eyed ones. You have seen such women, have you not, the ones with perpetual black eyes?"

Many alcoholics get into the LTP 5 or even 7 times precisely because they no longer have strength to struggle for their place under the sun. Their will power is weak, they have lost their self-respect and they have zero desire for live. If we do not help them, sooner or later it will come to haunt us.

The newspaper gets many letters now about perverse kindness. Kindness and compassion, claim their authors,

should be directed at normal people. We should not be kind to drunks and addicts. But can humanism be perverse? If it applies only to some people, i.e., normal ones, is it really humanism? We are a single organism. It is impossible to treat one part while letting the other rot and decompose. We sympathize with abandoned children and with old people left without care, demanding assistance for them. Where do such people come from in our society? Some 88 percent of the families who are unable to care for their children are families destroyed by drink. No matter how many funds we set up to help orphanages and nursing homes, alcoholics will continue to provide new orphans and miserable old people.

Sociologists have recently conducted a selected poll. It turned out that 90-to-92 percent of our population consume alcoholic beverages and 45 percent drink regularly. At the turn of the last decade drunkenness pervaded all layers of our society. Consumption of alcohol rose 2.5 times. There are entire villages populated by alcoholics and their retarded offspring. Apparently we do not fully understand how sick our society is. We must take effective, workable measures. Locking up all drunks at the LTPs is the same as chasing disease underground. We need a comprehensive medical and social program to assist those who suffer from alcoholism and not a declaration of war on drunkenness whose manifestation is the closing of liquor stores. We need new methods in solving this problem, ones that are not typical for our country.

All those to whom I spoke at the MVD and the Ministry of Health Care were skeptical about the Dovzhenko treatment method: "He takes on only those who have not been drinking for at least three weeks. In other words, his patients already understand the need for getting help. It is easy to be successful in this case. Let him work instead with our charges, ones who must be brought to the doctor in handcuffs."

But then maybe we should focus our efforts not on forcing people to get help but on working to **make them want** to get help? In the case of a tuberculosis patient, regardless of whether or not he wants to be treated, antibiotics will kill the disease. In the case of an alcoholic, he can not be treated without wanting to be cured. This desire will hardly arise if he is treated by force.

In the U.S., there are 7,500 assistance programs for alcoholics and drug addicts. All of them try to foster the desire to be cured. Enterprises employ specialists trained to gauge whether the person drinks occasionally or has already become dependent on alcohol. In the latter case, a group is formed around him consisting of family members, the supervisor, the clergyman and friends. They gently encourage him to seek help under the guidance of a psychologist. Are capitalists so concerned with the well-being of their employees only because they love their neighbors? Not at all. When losses from absenteeism and hangovers are factored in, it turns out that it is cheaper to pay for treatment rather than keep suffering those losses. The alcoholic can be dismissed, of course, but it may also be more expensive to train a

skilled replacement. But in our country, nobody knows how much is lost thanks to drunks and high personnel turnover rates. Maybe now, with the introduction of economic accountability, we will finally learn to count our money and to spend it smartly.

The world over, it is not so much addiction specialists (not to mention the police) who treat alcoholics as psychologists. Without them, even the most sophisticated equipment is like a microscope used to drive in nails. The Kazan LTP used to have a psychologist (one for the 1,000 inmates), but his job was cut.

Transition

The most difficult time for an alcoholic is transition after treatment. Many countries have so-called halfway houses. Former alcoholics voluntarily join a commune, live and work together and support each other. In our country, this role could be performed by a cooperative, or a plot of land could be leased for this purpose. Once the person feels that he could resist his disease on his own, he would leave this monastery and enter the real world. In the real world, special social assistance centers would welcome him in the rayon. It would be neither a medical nor a police organization. Instead, it would be a dependency specialist, an educator, a psychologist and a lawyer with office hours in the rayon. Anyone could drop by anonymously. It would organize group and family therapy sessions and set up a special telephone hotline. It would provide information on job opportunities in the region and could defend the rights of its charges.

This is neither a utopia nor a rosy picture. The Voluntary Society for the Promotion of Sobriety is doing something: it sets up groups using the Shichko and Dovzhenko treatment methods. This society is probably the least popular of the recently created public organizations. Probably everyone has honed his wit at its expense.

"We took this criticism into account and ended the practice of collecting membership fees," said Yu. Mikhin, deputy president of the Russian Republic Society for the Promotion of Sobriety. "If local chapters want to collect money, let them themselves decide how to use it. Let them pick mushrooms and buy their own trips to sanatoriums."

How does the society survive? It has put the campaign against drunkenness on a self-financing basis. All those groups charge fees. They are not cheap, either, costing R80 to R120 per program. I wonder whether the average hobo has ever held so much money in his hand at once and if he has, what his thoughts were. Probably not about treatment.

Everything is upside down in our country: A charity organization does not help the poor but the rich, and does not treat the sick but the healthy and the sober.

It would be naive, however, to make a public organization do all the work. At least 1 percent of profits from the

sale of alcoholic beverages should go to combat alcoholism. Currently, the state budgets R500-to-R800 million a year for addiction services. This seems like a lot. However, if we think of the U.S., where \$4 billion is spent on such services, it turns out that the cheap always wind up paying twice.

I have read the following statement in a newspaper: it is useless to treat alcoholics kindly because sociologists estimate that 10 percent of them do not respond to it and are ready to use it for evil purposes. But let us think it over. It is only 10 percent. What about the remaining 90 percent?

In the spring, there was a fire at the Kazan LTP. The shops burned down. Dmitriy Andreyevich Savchenkov, the LTP director, appealed to the inmates: "Help us, guys! We have no money to pay you." Everyone came out for unpaid Saturday work. "Do not mention it, boss," they said. After the Armenian disaster, they decided voluntarily to give a share of their earnings. No one forces them to buy the Children's Fund's charity lottery tickets, but they do. "Yes, they are responsive," said Dmitriy Alekseyevich. "They are just rudderless. And nobody needs them."

There used to be a hobo at the LTP who seemed to be abandoned by everyone. When he arrived, the administration sent the form notice to his family: "Your husband (son) is held, etc." All of a sudden, that man got a reply: "We are so happy you have surfaced and are being treated. You will come back and everything will be back to normal." He was in a trance all day and hung himself that night. He did not have the strength to deal with simple human emotions, that someone should love him, remember him, and wait for him.

Kindness is a terrible force.

Belorussian SSR Chernobyl-Related Health Problems Increasing

90UN0668A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELOROSSIYA in Russian 9 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by BELTA correspondents Yu. Bekhterev, L. Peresyphkina: "The Alarming Voice of the Zone"]

[Text] The directors of the four rayons of the Mogilevsk oblast, which suffered the most from the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, have sent the leadership of the republic a letter demanding that urgent measures be taken to implement a number of points in the state program for eliminating the consequences of the accident. The oblast representatives were received by Ye. Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee. On 7 December, Yu. M. Khusainov, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Gosagroprom (State Agricultural Industrial Agency), A.T. Kichkaylo, and N.A. Makayed, deputy chairmen of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, and directors of republic ministries and departments met with the authors of the letter and

also a large group of heads of party, Soviet, and economic organs of Kostyukovichskiy, Krasnopol'skiy, Slavgorodskiy, and Chervikovskiy rayons in the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

What made the officials of Mogilev write these disturbing lines: "The State program for eliminating the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station are not fully meeting the needs of the inhabitants of the contaminated areas. The elevated levels of radiation are having serious effects on the health of the populace, especially the children. Their parents are no longer willing to believe the advice and recommendations of the experts and demand that the government take urgent measures to resettle the population"

This is how, A.I. Knyaziv, the first secretary of the Chervikovskiy rayon committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, responded to this request in his speech at the meeting.

"We were brought here by our concern over the health of the inhabitants of the zone and especially the children. While the agencies assigned to put the program into effect are clarifying the situation, engaging in discussions, and making numerous decisions, our people continue to live under a constant threat to their health and even their lives."

There are more than enough facts to confirm that this is not merely a case of panic, but the sad reality of the zone. These facts were cited by V.K. Penkovskiy, the chief physician of the Krasnopol'skiy rayon, Z.N. Tkacheva people's deputy of the USSR and chief sanitary physician of the Slavgorodskiy rayon, Ye.N. Demyankov, chairman of the Revolyutsiya kolkhoz of this same rayon, and many other participants in the meeting. Here they are this alarming evidence of misfortune. There has been a significant increase in blood disorders and a decrease in immunity in children. Number of cancer patients has grown. Problems with the respiratory organs and the thyroid continue to increase. And there was no lack of specific examples. We have decided to cite only a few of them, fully understanding that any alarming news will serve to even further exacerbate the already dangerously explosive atmosphere in the contaminated regions, the inhabitants of which have grown tired of waiting.

The incidence of neonatal disease in the Kostyukovichskiy rayon is more than twice what it was in 1986. The number of children with delayed mental development has increased by a factor of 1.5. In the village of Vetukhno, 110 out of 130 children were found to have enlarged thyroids. The statistics for the other three rayons of the oblast are approximately the same.

Commenting on this, the director of the Scientific Research Institute on Radiation Medicine, V.A. Matyukhin, said that a curator has been appointed for each affected rayon, that groups of specialists are conducting examinations of the population, that a branch of the Scientific Research Institute has been opened in

Gomel and is being established in Mogilev. He emphasized that data from the examination can be made available to any of those present who would like to see them.

He was answered: examinations performed today and repeated after a year are all right, but what else besides examinations will there be? After all people need to be treated. And frequently there isn't anyone to do it. It is no secret that the Mogilevsk and Gomelsk oblasts do not have enough physicians, drugs, or equipment. The facilities of many hospitals and polyclinics are in a pitiful state. And the words of V.S. Adashkevich, first secretary of the Kostyukovichskiy Raykom of the Belorussian Communist Party simply shocked those present: the hospital in the rayon center was built at the beginning of the century. A polyclinic is planned for this year, but the end of the (construction) work is not in sight.

V.S. Ulashchik, Minister of Public Health of the Belorussian SSR was present at the meeting. Many complaints were lodged about his agency. These included one expressed by Peoples' Deputy Zoye Nikolayevna Tkacheva. "Why is it us, and not you sounding the alarm? You are doctors you know our situation very well, but say nothing."

This commentary was, as they say, excessive. Could this be the reason, that the minister was virtually silent?

The discussion came around to the reason the representatives of the affected rayons came to Minsk: resettling of the population must begin immediately, without waiting for construction of housing facilities to be completed. Especially since construction itself has barely begun. What are the reasons for this? Elementary interagency "games." At this point, the design documentation has still not been prepared, contractors are very reluctant to sign contracts. It should be said that in Kostyukovichy they are still "not acquainted" with the future builders of 650 houses. There are a huge number of complaints against workers of the Brestselstroyproyekt [Brest rural building project] Institute. No, the builders of the Vitebsk and Brest Glavpolesyevodstroy organization are in no hurry to help their unfortunate neighbors.

Can it be that the words of the proverb, "another's grief does not hurt," are true? And, in these times of hardship for the republic, is not the disease of indifference that has broken out in some departments even more terrible than radiation phobia? Can't the exodus from the Mogilevsk oblast of 576 teachers, including 132 young specialists, in the current year alone be considered a complication of this disease? After coming up against indifference to their fates, physicians and agricultural specialists are leaving the contaminated zone. I.I. Titenkov, first secretary of the rayon committee of the Belorussian Communist Party brought with him a packet of diplomas for the work groups in the trade and food service industries which had not been claimed by their owners.

But the representatives of the localities and centers had not come together in order to complain or blame one

another. Together they sought a way out of this situation, which has justifiably been termed critical. Yes, building of new settlements must start as quickly as possible. And not simply rural streets, but modern temporary agricultural towns, in which it will be no less convenient to live than in a big city. These people, who have been tormented by anxiety and even disease, deserve no less. The officials, who have had more than a little experience with party and economic work are confident that as soon as active building begins, the flood of complaints to the rayon, oblast, and republic authorities will diminish significantly.

The new settlements will take more than a single year to build. And this is why it was repeated over and over that families with preschool and school-aged children and others who for medical reasons should not live in the contaminated zone must be resettled immediately. For this reason it has been proposed that all the living quarters built in the uncontaminated cities and rayons of Belorussia in 1989-1990 be made available to the people of the affected rayons, especially those who live where the density of contamination exceeds 15 curie per square kilometer. Another idea, which we consider reasonable, was expressed: it is time to stop dividing the zone into more and less contaminated sections. Radionuclides, even in small quantities, do not improve people's health. Sooner or later all the sick land must be abandoned.

The idea of immediate resettlement was supported by all participants in the meeting. One hopes that the population of the republic will also approve it, even those who have been waiting in line for living quarters for more than a single year. After all charity and compassion have always been the main trait of the Belorussian people.

Reasonable solutions were found not merely to the major underlying problems, which only yesterday seemed impossibly complicated, but also to smaller specific problems. Specific solutions were found for dozens of different problems, for example, supplying the affected rayons with equipment, consumer goods, food products, and special instruments. As A.T. Kichkaylo, deputy Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, who conducted the meeting, emphasized, all the problems associated with Chernobyl will be resolved if we stop seeking people to blame and finally start work on concrete issues. And as for meetings like this, it would not be a bad idea to make them a tradition. And to hold them not only in Minsk, but in Khoinki, Chernikov, Vetka... Attention and good words also mean a great deal.

Belorussian SSR Official Interviewed on Contaminated Areas Resettlement

90UN0687A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA in Russian 13 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with A. T. Kichkaylo, deputy chairman, Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, by BELTA [Belorussian Telegraph Agency] correspondent; date and place not specified: "A Cure for Anxiety"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers approved the decree "On Urgent Measures to Accelerate the Realization of the State Program to Eliminate the Consequences, in the Belorussian SSR, of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES and to Relocate and Find Employment for the Population." This document provides for transferring part of the housing fund to various cities and villages in the republic suffering from the accident so that in the first quarter of 1990 first priority evacuation can begin. A BELTA correspondent asked A.T. Kichkaylo, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, to comment upon the decree.

[Correspondent] About 2 months ago the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR approved a state program to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. Aleksandr Trofimovich, you were one of its authors and spoke from the podium during those October days, assuring the deputies that there was enough time to carry out the evacuation. Why then today do the government and the Central Committee have to take what are essentially emergency measures to evacuate people? Isn't this once again an underestimation of the danger? Or perhaps the radiation situation in the zone has changed?

[Kichkaylo] If we made mistakes in working out the Chernobyl program, it was not only in estimating radiation. Our specialists learned to do a fairly good job in calculating rems and curies even when there was an instrument shortage. But what dosimeter can measure human concern and the anxieties of thousands and thousand of fathers, mothers and children? I have worked in Mogilev almost the entire time since the Chernobyl accident and have visited the zone hundreds of times. I saw tears and pain first hand and thoroughly studied medical statistics. Obviously, other members of the government and the Central Committee have equally complete information. To a great extent people's moods and desires were dictated by the short deadlines for the evacuation that we included in the program.

I will not try to hide that just a few months ago there was hope that the very fact that a program had been approved and that the planning and construction of new settlements had begun would calm people down and reduce radiation worries. There was a lot of concern about avoiding extreme measures. After all, everybody understands what it means to take away, even for a noble cause, an apartment from a person who has waited for it for perhaps 10 years, hoping to become a new settler.

However, it turned out that we had to take emergency measures. A few days ago the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the republic government received a letter from the first secretaries of Kostukovichskiy, Krasnopol'skiy, Slavgorodskiy and Cherkovskiy rayons. It expressed extreme anxiety about the worsening psychological situation in settlements and about the high levels of radioactive contamination. The letter made an urgent request to begin resettlement, not at the end of

1990, but without delay. As has already been reported, representatives from the oblast were received at the republic government and the of the Belorussian CP Central Committee. The approval of this decree was a result of these meetings.

[Correspondent] We are not accustomed to criticizing party and government documents. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the decree contains points that are difficult for a nonspecialist to understand. For example, it is unclear who will be resettled: all the inhabitants of the zone or only those living in the rayons who have suffered the most?

[Kichkaylo] So far the only ones who will have to get ready to move are those living in settlements where there is a risk of receiving more than 35 rem during a lifetime, or where the contamination of the land exceeds 40 curies per square meter. In Gomel, Mogilev and Brest oblasts there are 112 such villages; more than 7,500 people live in them.

The ispolkoms of local soviets are now looking for available housing for these people. Obviously, this means new, unoccupied apartments and houses. In the next few days we will learn how much the republic has. Then we will be able to offer the evacuees new housing. Practically all rayon centers and many farms in the republic are ready to accept the newcomers. Aged parents desiring to live with their children are authorized to live in any city, including the oblast centers and Minsk.

An apartment shortage has also been foreseen. Some of the evacuees, primarily pensioners and nonworking women with children, will be temporarily housed in sanatoria and vacation houses. In about 6 to 7 months they will obtain housing in new agrogorodoks.

Here is something that I would like to stress. We are ready to receive and locate in clean areas all those wanting to immediately leave the danger zone. Certainly families with young children and pregnant women should not stay in this zone one extra day. At the same time, many people, especially the elderly, have no need to rush from the homes. It will be much more convenient to wait and then move, together with neighbors and relatives, to one of the agrogorodoks that are now under construction as part of the Chernobyl program. I can guarantee that the conditions there will be better than in the majority of even the modern Belorussian settlements. As you know, architects, engineers and builders in the republic have been exerting their best efforts to build these agrogorodoks. We are confident that the main construction projects in the republic will be completed on time. It thus makes sense for inhabitants of the zone to once again think it over and weigh their decision so that their choice will be the best one.

[Correspondent] Many Belorussian scientists and cultural figures are saying that it is necessary to evacuate all inhabitants of the zone, regardless of the degree of contamination. This was also proposed at the meeting with the Mogilev delegation.

[Kichkaylo] I have also heard the assertion that 5 or 40 curies are equally hazardous to health. Apparently then even 1 curie is dangerous. However, if we take the lower limit to be 1 curie, then we will have to evacuate more than 2 million people in the republic, including the cities of Gomel and Mogilev. But where do we evacuate them? Why stop at 1 curie, why not 0.5 or 0.1? It is a difficult question. It cannot be answered by scientists alone. Many of them say that the concept "35 rems in a lifetime" is correct. Research is continuing. In the meantime, any conjectures or attempts to inflame the situation can only cause harm.

With specific reference to people living in settlements where contamination ranges from 15 to 40 curies the government's approach to this problem is as follows: Anybody who wants to leave has that right. All those who leave are paid compensation for the houses and property they leave behind. With these resources they can build a house or acquire a cooperative apartment. There are also provisions for state assistance.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Trofimovich, one last question: What fate awaits the deserted villages and fields?

[Kichkaylo] We are moving equipment and livestock to clean zones. Studies show that what was indoors is, for the most part, not radioactive. It has been decided to put a freeze on major construction projects; they will serve our descendants. Wooden structures will have to be buried. Forests will take over most abandoned fields. At the request of Gosagroprom, small areas will be left for scientific research. There will be studies about how to grow clean grain, feed and produce on them. All this land has been taken out of the crop rotation; no products from it will show up on the dinner table.

In conclusion, on behalf of the republic government I want to thank all those who have responded to a stranger's misfortune and opened their houses and apartments to evacuees. Obviously, everything will be done to see that delays in completing the new settlements are minimized—as a rule to not more than a year.

Pocket-Sized Dosimeters Being Produced

18004003A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 16 Dec 89 p 2

[BELTA REPORT: "Pocket-Sized Dosimeters"]

[Text] The first manufactured batch of individual radiation dose indicators have come off the assembly line of the young self-financing enterprise Poisk, which was created under the Minsk Gorizont association. More than 500 dosimeters will be manufactured by the end of December, and in the coming year no less than 10,000 of these instruments will be manufactured.

The director of the enterprise, Georgiy Grits, said "Dosimeters, we named our new item 'Master 1', will be manufactured until the need for them in the republic is fully met". The item will turn up in the pockets of many

consumers both literally and figuratively because it only weighs 100 grams and is relatively inexpensive. This unique thermometer, which indicates deviation from natural background radiation in 36 seconds, is guaranteed to work for 750 hours continuously.

Scriptures to be Taught in Lithuanian Schools

18004004A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "The Holy Scriptures in School"]

[Text] *I heard that the Holy Scriptures will be studied as a subject in Lithuanian schools. Is this true? V. Panfilov, Murmansk.*

We asked TRUD's Lithuanian SSR correspondent G. Konchyus to answer this question.

According to the agreement reached between G. Zabulis, chairman of the Lithuanian Committee for Public Education, and Cardinal V. Sladkevicius, chairman of the Lithuanian Bishops' Conference, the procedure for teaching the Holy Scriptures in the republic has been established. However, whether a student will attend the lessons or not should be decided by the parents or guardians of the child. Public educational organizations are setting aside a place for instruction in general education and other schools, and the Bishops' Conference is designating the instructors.

New Church Publications

18004005A Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Jan 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "The Church Gazette"]

[Text] *I heard that new church periodicals will soon be issued in Moscow.*

V. Logunova, Moscow

A.G. Parmenov, head of the production department of the Moscow Patriarchate's Publishing House, responds to the question.

Up to 1917 more than 100 various church publications were being issued in Russia. Then there was a long interruption. The first periodical publication was not permitted in the USSR until 1943. This publication was VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOY PATRIARKHII.

MOSKOVSKIYE EPARKHIALNYYE VEDOMOSTI, will soon be published in Moscow, and we hope that the Novosti press agency will help us with the publication.

The newspaper MOSKOVSKIY TSERKOVNYY VESTNIK, with a circulation of 50,000 copies, as well as the yearbook BOGOSLOVSKIYE NAUKI (Theological Studies) have been published since last Easter.

Believers to Make Pilgrimages to Holy Land

18004006A Moscow TRUD in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by S. Pankratov: "Pilgrims Prepare for the Journey"]

[Text] Israel's Minister for Religious Affairs Zevulun Hammer was in Moscow on an unofficial visit at the invitation of the joint venture SPROS (whose founders are soviet trade unions and the Swedish-Canadian firm SEABEKO). Before departing for his homeland he met with journalists.

"The Soviet Union today is undergoing an important period of development", said Z. Hammer, "and we hope that Gorbachev's reforms will bring not only economic prosperity to your country, but will harmonize national relations.

"Meetings with Jews in Moscow and Leningrad convinced me that at present their spiritual and religious life is being restored in the USSR. "The process of revival is also characteristic of the Orthodox Church. Archbishop Kirill and I discussed this in a conversation. The archbishop noted that among the Russian people today there is a noticeable reawakening of Christian outlook. In the course of the meeting possibilities for our collaboration with the spiritual mission of the Orthodox Church located in Jerusalem were discussed. An agreement on the pilgrimage of Russian Christians to the Holy Land had already been reached last year. The joint venture SPROS is doing what it can to solve organizational questions."

Church Donates Disposable Syringes

18004002A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian, 16 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by N. Borisenko: "An Act of Charity"]

[Text] G.V. Grushevoy, responsible secretary for the coordinating council of the republic organization "Children of Chernobyl" recently carried out an unusual request. In the presence of raykom and rayispolkom workers and members of the organization, he turned over 800 disposable syringes to Aleksey Pavlovich Tarasevich, chief doctor of Khoynikskiy Rayon.

The unusual nature of the action was that the history of the acquisition of the medical instrument is connected with Metropolitan of Minsk and Grodno and Patriarchal Exarch Filaret's visit to Japan on business for the Russian Orthodox Church. He bought a batch of disposable syringes there to contribute to the improvement of medical service to children who live in rayons suffering from the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

In the near future, medical instruments will be handed over to hospitals in a number of other rayons in the Gomel and Mogilev areas.

Belorussians Demonstrate for Return of Church

90UN0680A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by A. Leonovets: "To the Church That Which Belongs to the Church, or How Believers Blocked the Entrance to the Brest Oblispolkom"]

[Text] The phone rang in the SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA newsroom: "Your newspaper printed a paragraph headed 'Return of the Church' which said that in Vitebsk the fate of the Pokrovskaya Church, a monument of 19th century architecture, had been decided in favor of the believers. But we, the Orthodox who live in Brest and its environs, simply have not been able to achieve the return of our church, which was taken from us by force a long time ago. In defense of our rights we intend to hold a rally at the entrance to the oblispolkom. We ask your newspaper not to remain aloof from our pain..."

There was no need to guess which architectural monument the person had in mind: in Brest the number of churches can be counted on one hand, and the appearance of the Saint Nicholas (Bratsk) Church, which has deteriorated into an indecent state, has aroused the feelings of many people for many years.

Here is the history of this church. Built (with the people's money, let us note) at the beginning of the century in the pseudo-Russian style, it witnessed a number of military battles. But it is in relatively recent times that the monument has suffered.

However, the officials were not so zealous as, for example, their colleagues in the city of Pinsk, where a unique place of worship, the Catholic church of the Jesuit order, well known throughout civilized Europe, was "simply" blown up; it was described shamefully on page 283 of the first volume of the "Svod Pamyatnikov istorii i kultury Belorussii" [Guide to the Historical and Cultural Monuments of Belorussia], which was published by the Belorussian Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House in 1984, as "not having survived." Ah, if only one could add to our Soviet encyclopedias the names of those who directed architectural policy with a safety fuse in their hands!

In the 60's they hit Saint Nicholas Church in Brest in their own way. In the presence of a surprised crowd numbering in the hundreds, contract steeplejacks carried out a very strange maneuver: they removed the crosses from the cupolas. It was difficult work, but they made the effort.

Subsequently they made the former house of worship into an archive storage facility. But this decision left many people in the city dissatisfied. After all, in one way or another the nation's unused religious buildings found better applications: some became picture galleries (as in Yaroslavl), others became concert halls (as in Kiev), and a third group became museums of the history of religion

and atheism (as in Volynya). The last alternative, let us recall, had a substantial number of supporters in Brest as well; the author of these lines also thought it preferable to using the architectural monument as a storage facility.

However, they attempted to restore the former church building. What a sad spectacle that was! The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Culture, as often happened, did not have enough funds, and the workers at the Grodno restoration workshops kept delaying matters time and time again.

In short, a richer owner was needed. The Orthodox congregation proved to be one. Without requesting funds from a single state agency, the believers quickly transformed the external appearance of the religious monument. A Brest enterprise produced crosses; now they grace every one of the cupolas, and from Voronezh they obtained bells, specially cast for this church.

All this was possible thanks to the perestroika processes in the country, as a result of which the Second Orthodox Association of Brest Citizens (the first was comprised of those who attended the Simeonovskaya Church) was registered with the Council on Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers. It seemed that everything was developing according to the law of logic. But no. I quote a document of the Brest Oblispolkom: "Use of the building for religious services will be granted after a new building is constructed for the oblast archives and after the documents stored in the former sectarian building are moved into it." Aware of the rate of cultural construction, the members of the Second Brest Orthodox Association were not pleased with the prospect facing them. And the most exalted believers organized a protest rally directly at the entrance to the oblispolkom. Their banners stated categorically: "We demand that the church be liberated from the archives! Immediately!"

The parties held fruitless negotiations for two hours. The representatives of the authorities accused them of being impatient and intolerant, citing the fact that building programs in the oblast center are overburdened and that a state archive cannot be located in just any building. The believers, however, stubbornly emphasized the fact that the question of granting them the church was raised not today or yesterday and that if the authorities had so desired, they could long, long ago have found an alternative place for the archive materials, even if was not necessarily in a facility specially built for the purpose.

An "amicable parting," as they say, was not reached that day. And the believers blocked the entrance to the oblispolkom another time. Now the representatives of the authorities were prepared to propose an acceptable alternative to the protesters: the gorispolkom and the appropriate oblast agencies were instructed to make an effective search for temporary quarters for the archives. The believers heard firm assurances that Saint Nicholas Church would be granted to them for complete restoration in January 1990.

That is how the matter was settled.

But look at what kind of conclusions suggest themselves. New church parishes have been opening for some time now, and it would hardly be sensible for the Brest authorities to close their eyes to this quite massive phenomenon, and all the more so because the collective requests by the Orthodox believers that Saint Nicholas Church be returned to them have been registered at several levels and more than once. It should be kept in mind that other protests which are breaking out here and there are the direct result of the short-sightedness and sluggishness or the bureaucratic stubbornness of certain functionaries.

On the other hand, attempts by individual Brest believers to take an extremist position toward the state archive should also be condemned. At the rally there were cries of "No one needs this archive! Set it on fire!" It turns out that in defending one sacred thing, a number of the protesters were threatening another.

Everything should be saved for posterity—architectural monuments as well as archive documents.

New Culture Minister Gubenko Details Plans

90UN0482A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 50, 13 Dec 89 p 2

[Interview with Nikolay Gubenko by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondents Yelena Yakovich, Yevgeniy Kuzmin: "Putting On White Clothes"]

[Text] It is only very rarely that one can see our parliament in high spirits. It might have been so obvious, therefore, when Nikolay Gubenko was up for nomination as the USSR Minister of Culture. Another thing that stayed in mind from that day was how the Minister tried to elbow his way through a large circle of journalists after the session, saying: "I'm going to be late for my show..." The next morning, when we started our conversations with him, which resulted in this article, his telephone was ringing practically nonstop, with people calling to congratulate him. But he was not in a festive mood...

"There is practically no phone call or a telegram that would not express sympathy. The situation regarding the state of culture in the country is such that sympathy is no less relevant than congratulations. Galina Volchek called me a suicide. Unsigned letters started to pour in, which is a customary thing since our Taganka Theater has a whole file of them.

[Correspondent] Nikilay Nikolayevich, will you tell us the secret - this is not what one expected to query about before - what were the circumstances and who offered you the job of minister?

[Gubenko] I do not know who initiated this. I know only that there were several candidates. They settled on K. Yu. Lavrov, who turned it down himself, since he is already in charge of the USSR Student Theater of Drama and the Bolshoi Drama Theater, which had been bequeathed to him by Tovstonogov as it were.

I received a surprise summons from Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev. I usually asked to be received myself in the high echelons in the past two years. It was mostly to try to bring Yu. Lyubimov back to the theater and let him work in normal conditions. I used this opportunity again to try to get for Lyubimov an apartment and a multiple visa, since he has many contracts and a foreign-born wife... When I felt I could not abuse the time of a Politbureau member any longer, I could not but ask at the end who they at the center thought was going to be a minister of culture. And all of a sudden, I heard: "Well, I'd like to know your opinion about who could it be." Such a simple chess move. "Kirill Yuriyevich is rumored to be up for it," I replied. "No, unfortunately Kirill Yuriyevich has turned it down." We talked about the prestige enjoyed by D.S. Likhachev, and then out of the blue: "Many people have recommended you."

[Correspondent] So, what did you do?

[Gubenko] I stood tongue-tied. They had already planned for me to meet N. I. Ryzhkov the next day. I asked for some time to think it over. I had mulled it over for three weeks before I decided to go and see Nikolay Ivanovich.

[Correspondent] Did you seek anyone's advice?

[Gubenko] I talked with my family and my wife first of all, and also with my friends of whom I have very few. I realized, of course, in what situation I was putting the theater, but we had been doing everything for two years to have Taganka returned to Lyubimov. I was planning to quit anyway, since I scheduled to start a new Mosfilm picture in April. Everything was turning out well - Yuriy Petrovich takes full charge of the theater, I leave to work in the movies and, as before, continue to work in the theater occasionally. But everything has changed.

[Correspondent] What was the reaction of your wife, Zhanna Bolotova, to your appointment?

[Gubenko] She took it very badly. Zhanna believes that my job is to make movies and to act. Besides, she and I are homebodies.

[Correspondent] What made you make up your mind eventually?

[Gubenko] I do not feel like using any high-flying words. Let's put it this way: a desire to try to penetrate the membrane called state mechanism and to find out whether nothing can really be done, or do it, if it can.

[Correspondent] What has been your own relationship with that mechanism?

[Gubenko] Chekhov said that an artist should be engaged in politics since he has to defend himself from it. This is probably so. But one's relations with the state and the authorities last during one's life time, becoming so customary that one even does not single them out. In these cases everyone usually talks about the negative things - how they were restricted, humiliated, accusing

ex-ministers. But let us make it clear for ourselves that the state policies were as such that many books, paintings, works of music and movies were kept under wraps from the public. And a person occupying a particular position was a conduit of those policies. If he did not want to do this, he was forced to quit. The policy has changed now. You understand that I would not have been offered this position before.

[Correspondent] The Supreme Soviet heard a lot of debates in the summer whether we need the Ministry of Culture in principle. The U.S. does not have one, and culture seems to be all right there.

[Gubenko] But it has private companies, the State Department and the agencies also populated with officials and managers. What difference does it make what you call them? They have a streamlined system of accounting and a data bank..

I would like to abolish the idea of "management" as far as arts are concerned. But one has to manage culture, especially today when 1.2 percent of the state budget is allocated for it for 1990. How are you supposed to manage such poverty? Deputies have already submitted to me their proposals. One has asked for a railroad for children, another has requested camcorders to tape the ruin of the architectural monuments, a third one demanded something else. All these are very important. But I think that we should chart the main directions, set the priorities and channel the money in them, without scattering it.

[Correspondent] Large-scale programs again, Nikolay Nikolayevich? But we always turn them into noisy propaganda campaigns which end in nothing. Shouldn't culture - the entire culture - develop on a steady basis?

[Gubenko] Undoubtedly it should. But we should understand the way it should be. What is to be done? I do not know. Right now I'm just an actor and a director. What we need most is the knowledge of what is happening with culture. What kind of relationship does modern man have with it? We need a diagnosis before we can make recommendations. It is not enough to say that culture is dying. We need to give answers to thousands of specific questions. So far I clearly realize the need for a long-term (we would not be able to do it fast) program of cultural revival, saving what still remains. I am confident that we have people prepared to devote their lives to that, the fact that keeps hopes alive. Most of these people are in the shadow, they run into obstacles and often face harassment even today. The main thing is to find them and to create such a system that would not turn off oxygen for them. We should give way to those who can walk along. I need such people around me - the makers, sociologists and students of culture. How can one find them? I address them through the paper: "Come, my doors are open for you."

[Question] You have just said that people are the most important thing. We are losing them in the most shameless and inhuman manner. How do you think it is possible to stop a depletion of the human fund in culture and arts?

[Gubenko] We should institute genuine and not make-believe competitions for vacancies. As to the teachers in art institutions - and their role is tremendous today - all challengers should be given an opportunity to show their mettle to the public, maybe through a series of open lessons, lectures and so on. I think we should change the system of vocational education. A freshman at the State Institute of Theatrical Art or the State Institute of Cinematography will not necessarily become an actor or a director. By guaranteeing him the right to receive a diploma, the state makes a commitment to place him according to his training and often ruins his life. But who can be sure that a freshman will by all means become an Artist? What can be done for a student - who has pinned his hopes on making it in the arts - in terms of reguidance all in good time (and when?), without lowering his self-esteem? We should be watchful, on the other hand, for a conservatory post-graduate student to have it guaranteed that upon graduation he is offered a job in a music school, like an ordinary music school graduate.

We should establish a system under which the talented people are in demand in society. We should scout for the nation's talented leaders in a steady way. Nothing will work until all of us - actors, artists, library and museum workers - get together, each in his own field, and have elaborated normal laws, on a par with international practice, that would protect a creative person from the diktat of a mediocrity and invest him with the rights tantamount to his gift. Why is it that the genius of Svyatoslav Rikhter, whose performance costs \$30,000, is left with only \$800 by the state? The same applies to the magnificent piano player Nikolay Petrov, whose foreign concert is not cheap either. Had they received compensation at the level of the world's practice of taxation, had they had the right to dispose of their money themselves, had they been able to influence the environment themselves, they might have donated 40 percent, for example, to the Children's Fund, or to help the conservatory which is now in bad shape. Otherwise their money is faceless. Who knows how it is used?

[Question] When a family has no money, one begins to borrow, sell things and cut down on something. In general, one makes ends meet. But you should not be dictated to at that moment as to how you should spend your money. Culture cannot be self-financed, it is not anywhere in the world, but it can find untapped reserves if left unhindered. For example, the country's main libraries are in terrible shape, but all of them - both the Foreign Languages Library and the Lenin Library - could make money if they were granted publishing rights.

[Gubenko] They should be given such a right! We should understand today what each can do with its own authority. This is obvious and crystal clear: if a library

can make money this way, go ahead. Thank God! The cultural workers should be relieved from senseless duties of the past and from idiotic instructions. Why should musicians write useless dissertations? Let them spend their time with their students and on their own pursuits.

[Question] Nikolay Nikolayevich, you came to the Ministry of Culture, and from the very first day you have been surrounded by officials of the department that has discredited itself. It is clear that they begin to present to you the problems pertinent to their world outlook, their experience and their priorities, backing them all up with figures, charts, schedules and diagrams since they are privy to the information. More often than not, they themselves have created the problems, frequently turned them upside down and confounded them. And... Everybody is guessing what you are going to do.

[Gubenko] I have one advantage. I am a person completely ignorant of all those instructions, norms, dogmas and the like. I daresay that my thinking is not bound by them. If I am told that this or that cannot be done and shown respective documents, orders and clauses signed by particular officials, I am going to reply: "I'm sorry, I don't understand why it cannot be done. I take responsibility." And then we shall straighten this out.

Right after the voting in the Supreme Soviet, one delegate instructed me to come up in a few months with a platform for upgrading people's morals. He is probably an idealist. But it is plain as day that the church - be it the Christians, Moslems, Judaists or the people of other denominations - could do a great deal in this area. We should make every effort to return our rather decayed and disunited society to spirituality. Why can't we telecast a morning sermon from the Yelokhov cathedral if our country has millions of believers? What can't we give 15-20 minutes on channel 1 to the liturgy so that bed-ridden believers could hear a prayer at least? The need to cooperate with the church is apparent. A confrontation is possible, however, with the ideology preached by the apparatus. But we have talked about alternatives for a good reason. It means that we shall have to convince them.

I hope that the delegates could hear my words when they passed the decision. I spoke about the church, the students, the informal groups and emigration, the things that I want very much to see done. The post-revolutionary emigration - a handful of people of over 80 and whose soul belongs here - should be reassured that our state not only guarantees the protection for their archives and collections, which they are prepared to donate to us, but would stay away from sorting them out along ideological lines. An undeniable condition for the people's cultural revival, memory should embrace all and everything. Both fortune and misfortune. Culture should be shielded from departmental abuse.

Citizenship should be restored to those cultural figures who were expelled to the West, who left the country in the past decades because they were unable to realize their

plans and who were stripped of their citizenship by willful decision of the previous leaders. It should be reinstituted across the board. I have in mind Solzhenitsyn, Rostropovich, Vladimov and others. It is up to them to decide whether they want to accept it or not.

I see no denigration of the state's dignity here. Isn't it a normal human act? This is another step in the difficult science of correcting the past mistakes.

[Question] Did anyone help you to draft the program?

[Gubenko] Nobody did. But people aware of the situation, the press, and my professional experience helped me to find my bearings. I did virtually no preparatory work. I'll explain why. This important position should not be filled by a person who has done hectic homework over the past two-three weeks. He should be what he is, with all his shortcomings as far as his culture, education, intellect, impulses and like are concerned. Yes, impulses, because only a dead person has none. He should be someone shaped by nature and profession by the time he is nominated to this position. Therefore, I did not want to make any special preparations as a matter of principle. I just sat down and wrote my speech.

I could have punctuated it with quotations of course, polished it, learned it by heart and passed it off as my own. It would have been a deception. What is not a deception is that you have such a person, Gubenko, aged 48, who has something behind him, certain actions and certain things in his profession. Here he is in front of you, take him for what he is, or leave him and think who should replace him. It is only honest to do it this way because the moment is too important.

[Question] Nikolay Nikolayevich, you mentioned that until now your habit and your experience made you do everything on your own. But now you will have to do things with "other people's hands," since you cannot do everything yourself.

[Gubenko] This is the most difficult thing to do at the first stage. I saw how the commission and the committee in charge of culture in our parliament fought over higher budget allocations. And those bodies include the people that have brought fame to our literature, art and science... And they could do practically nothing. We should hire into the ministry the people who would be able to do it together with them.

[Question] Here is a question posed by Boris Vasilyev during the discussion of your nomination at the committee and the commission of the Supreme Soviet. You are coming to power in a rather complicated time when cultural figures are faced with a split. There are two ways - either to dissociate ourselves or to consolidate. Everybody is concerned as to what line you are to choose.

[Gubenko] I do not think there is a single serious person or an artist who would fail to understand that culture is of concern to all of humanity and that it is not a separate

issue by any means. But each time the country experiences hardships, a temptation arises to put the blame on somebody else - for example, we see the revival of the idea of the "Kike-Masonic plot", which cannot but take us to a dead end and destroy us both in politics and in creative work. As a human being, I strongly detest it. I intend to explain to the advocates of this idea in very simple and human terms where they erred and how much they are losing by narrowing their human and artistic interests. There is no other way. One should approach the problem of self-development of the national dignity in a calm manner, without tolling the bells. National culture would not be able to exist without neighbors and without kindred cultures.

[Question] You emphasized that you saw the goal of a union ministry today in granting cultural autonomy to the republics. But when your name was up for discussion and nomination in the Supreme Soviet, Boris Oleynik twice appealed to you in your capacity as head of the union ministry to pay attention to the repertoire policies of the Ukrainian theaters, where few Ukrainian plays turned out to be performed.

[Gubenko] Herein lies a paradox. Should the center initiate the revival of national dignity? Do I have the right to tell the Ukrainians which plays they should write and stage?

Whether a repertoire policy can be influenced is another matter. What did Malraux do in France, for example, to preserve national culture when the expansion of American culture began? He established a system of encouragement in the form of stipends and special funds to cultivate native talents. The French productions were subsidized by the state to be able to compete on TV and in the theaters. New forces were drawn into writing film scripts and plays; people who had failed to prove their mettle in their former occupations as actors, directors were retrained as educators. Theaters on the outskirts of workers' areas were born. This is a useful experience for us.

Although we live in the same house, I think I know less about what is taking place in the apartment next door than the people who live there. The only way to revive culture is to decentralize management and to grant full freedom to everyone, since only in this way can its diversity be actually preserved. The center's role lies only in encouraging intra-national cultural ties, in providing help if their own forces are not sufficient. We see a groundswell of popular support, for example, to have the Survivor's Cathedral built again. So many things have to be restored everywhere! But let us ask ourselves why the ruins of the Coliseum have been preserved. Why isn't it being restored? Because this is a monument of the times. The Moskva swimming pool is also "a monument" of the times, a sign of vandalism. Do we want to forget about this? We should develop approaches that are more important in terms of the history of culture rather than of the present time. Can't we fathom that our noble aspirations of today are permeated with the desire to

glorify ourselves at the same time? Maybe it would be better to build something new?

[Question] For example, a new, rich and modern complex for the V.I. Lenin Library, our national library. This could become a real monument to the epoch of perestroika!

[Gubenko] Leningrad is dying. Its palaces, museums, parks and even houses are in a catastrophic condition. As soon as the Law on property is passed, the hope will arise that all this can be passed over in ownership to the artists, sculptors, to those who have the money and who could restore all this. The dwellings associated with the names of great people should by all means have memorials and some expositions. The rest of the building, with the exception of the living quarters, can be turned into a studio, a library, or a gallery where the building owners can display their works. Part of the gallery proceeds will be used for house preservation and maintenance. We should give up our false pride and not feel ashamed to plead to the world for aid. We should ask the Italians, the French whose masters - Rossi, Rastrelli and Montferant - invested their labor in this great city. I am confident that the entire world would be interested in having it preserved for the world culture. Here is my first utopia as a minister for you. But I want to repeat that nothing will work as long as culture remains like a beggar with a cap in his hand. Maybe we should establish a bank for anonymous contributions to culture?

[Question] A utopia once again?

[Gubenko] Why not? If someone has stolen a million and wants to have a clean conscience, why shouldn't he be given such a chance?

The old principle of divide and rule will rein supreme again if we fail to understand that this is really our last chance, if we, pardon me, do not devote the fine aspirations of our souls to the Motherland, if we fail to realize that most of our time should be devoted to actions and not words. It is not that difficult to divide and rule in art. Just award one person a state prize and grant a foreign trip to another one...It is time to put on the white clothes, to fast, like icon painters did before starting work, to sacrifice ourselves for some time and just work.

[Question] The last question is: how do you do acting in the theater, being a minister now?

[Gubenko] The stage helps me to divorce myself from my job. Besides, this is just a normal and living bond with the people whom you respect, appreciate, and without whom you cannot imagine your life.

Opinion Polls' Effect on Political Process

90UN0630A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by V. Rukavishnikov, Doctor of Philosophy, department head of the USSR Academy of Sciences

Institute of Sociology, and project supervisor for the USSR Academy of Sciences: "The Average Temperature in the Hospital"]

[Text] Every time the results of public opinion polls are published in the press they attract considerable interest. Our society is not accustomed yet to such polls and public opinion itself is just becoming a factor in our sociopolitical life. However, it is also beginning to affect, more and more, the process of decisionmaking in the matters of politics and management.

Practically every reader who familiarizes himself with the poll results asks himself: What would I have answered to this question, what is my personal opinion? As you well know, very many people whose own point of view initially differs from the position of the majority feel inclined to change or amend their opinion due to the emerging variety of views. One should not rashly accuse such people of being conformists or lacking principles. Every normal person considers opinions of others, otherwise living with society becomes impossible.

In that respect we should consider as especially important the problems of interpreting the acquired results. Of no less importance are the details they entail which are highly specific and very often incomprehensible or uninteresting for the public; such as the propriety of the questions asked, the way they are phrased, similarity of their understanding by people of various levels of education, or how correctly were the people chosen—speaking the sociology language: How representative was that choice. The latter is of vital importance because in one way or another it defines the generalization range of the results: Opinions of which category or what part of the population are reflected in the collected data? These could be, for instance, the opinions of students, or young people of ages from 18 to 25, workers of all the industries or only of heavy industry enterprises, the population of one or several regions or of the entire country. Our understanding of the realistic positions of various social categories, groups, and forces can be objectively distorted, regardless of their causes, by an improperly posed question or by an incorrect generalization like presenting a specific position of one category or group of people as the public opinion. When published, such data serve only to mislead the public.

Unfortunately, I have to mention this fact again and again as we lack a sufficient number of qualified sociologists and the polling mania keeps spreading. Questionnaires are made up by whoever feels like it and for whatever reason. In one of Leningrad's NII's [Scientific Research Institute], for instance, the administration used such unsophisticated questionnaires to learn the employees' opinion: "Why do you personally respect the director?" (I want to note that the director is in fine health and is not going to leave his post); "In what respect, do you think, the director needs help from the employees, from his immediate subordinates, from the party bureau, from the trade-union committee?"; and "If you could vote, would you have voted for him, or who,

do you think, is more appropriate for this position?" The kind of answers the survey's authors hoped to solicit is not hard to guess.

Sociologists from a very serious academy were polling future voters without wondering whether their questions could be easily understood by the people or whether the voters were competent enough to pronounce their judgment on the essence of each question: What do you think (approve, do not care, disapprove, do not know) about the development of the cooperative movement in the country; about creating a professional army; about the introduction of a multiparty system; about separating the party from the government; about introducing regional financial autonomy; about the right of a republic to secede from the Union; about the new Law on Progressive Taxing; about allowing individuals to own land and separate enterprises; about stricter law enforcement through tougher and more decisive measures of the internal forces and militia; about the present system of planning; about electing the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet by direct and secret ballot of the entire population. All of this was put together, in one heap, but "please answer each question". And the people who were polled were well-mannered, they tried to comply with the request and give positive or negative grades and they based them on their own notions of the most complex problems over which the outstanding scientists and leaders of the country rack their brains. Then all the answers are summed up and presented in percentages by a computer and we have another impressive figure displaying the "public opinion".

However, it becomes quite obvious for any unbiased person, not even an expert, who would look into the above-mentioned methods, that the data thus collected could not be really trusted even if the participants were chosen correctly. The premise of the designers of these methods is incorrect: They treat a respondent (sociologists' term to denote someone answering the poll's questions) as a competent source of previously digested information on various subjects, as a know-all "answering machine" that can immediately satisfy any request. But in reality we often see that people just do not understand what they are being asked about as they had never before thought about such matters. In order to hide this fact they choose either an answer meant to present them more favorably to the pollster or an answer along the same lines as the ideas promoted in the media.

Unfortunately, both the reader and the newspaper publishing some "sensational" results of the public opinion poll usually remain in blissful ignorance of the sociological technique for achieving those results. And if the polling organization carries a respectable name and the researchers possess academic degrees then nobody can doubt the validity of the conclusions; but if some doubts arise they will be immediately dispelled, especially if the interpretation of the figures coincides with the opinion of the editor. The sensational figures and conclusions begin their "Brownian movement" from one article and

newspaper into another and still another; they seep into the leaders' report and the speeches of the "Znanie" society lecturers.

For instance, the All-Union center for the study of public opinion under the USSR VTsSPS [All-Union Central Trade Union Council] and the Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor], headed by the Academician T. Zaslavskaya, published on 12 December 1989 in the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA the results of a poll on people's attitude to new economic types of enterprises and the possibility of private property in the USSR. The creators of this poll are far from being amateurs but the newspaper material does not make it clear who was polled and where it was done; whether they meant the adult population of the entire country or just of a part of it; what the regional differences were; what the positions of separate social groups were; and how justifiable it was to average the results for the whole number of those polled. As the sociologists' joke goes: "The average temperature in the hospital" may be normal which does not mean we can make far-reaching conclusions about the health of every patient. We need some brief information on the polling techniques including the data on the representation selection. Without these the commentary of the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA remains just a phrase when it claims that the sociologists' conclusions are not for everyone "because only he hears who wants to hear and only he sees who wants to see". This claim, with its heated defensive pathos, can sooner lead to doubting the validity of the quoted figures than to a contrary reaction. Especially because the statements are really sensational; for instance, according to the poll 56 percent of the participants allow the possibility of private property in the USSR, and 61 percent believe that introducing private property will improve the economic position of the country and of the people.

If these are the results of a country-wide poll, we know how great the differences are among the population of the republics, big cities, and villages in their sociocultural, economic, national, linguistic, and many other characteristics all of which should be taken into account. One can, of course, ask both a Muscovite and a villager from a far-away kishlak about their opinions on joint-stock companies operating on shareholders' investments and then come up with the average of their answers. But it might be worth while to clarify at first whether the respondents know what they are being asked about as well as whether they have similar understanding of what is meant by private property. To us these aspects of the poll seem to go beyond the limits of specific subjects and acquire a different angle. And it is unfortunate that some annoying omissions lower the objective level of scientific validity of the poll results for the readers.

The results of the public opinion polls are being used more and more often by various sides as proof of their positions. This definitely symbolizes the recognition of the sociologists' important work and they can repay the public trust only by the high professionalism of their work. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to publish

the poll results correctly, without obvious contradictions that cast a shadow on the pollsters. For instance, one popular publication described the results of a poll conducted by a sociologist named L. Keselman. (We must note that again no data on the selection and methods of the poll were provided.) The poll dealt with the opinion of Leningrad citizens on the meeting that took place on 22 November. Thirty percent of those polled considered the meeting a positive phenomenon, 40 percent displayed a negative attitude to it; primarily, only those older than 60 supported the meeting, it was also supported as a rule by the military and police, leaders and managers, skilled and unskilled workers (!?). A reader can go crazy with figures and phrases of the nature: Who was polled by the sociologists? How appropriate was it to include the entire population of Leningrad in the results of the poll? Can one trust such conclusions anyway? Such an "interpretation" does not make one trust the polls more. But a journalist cannot be bothered as for him the poll results serve not as a means of searching for the truth but only as an illustration to the previously made point: "The Romanov times are not over yet in Leningrad". Let it be so but what do the polls have to do with it?

It is bad enough, definitely, if mistakes are made due to insufficient professionalism or negligence. But it is totally unacceptable to present desultory pieces of information as the opinion of the entire people, of a republic, of a city, of a rayon, or of the employees of an enterprise; when the questions are posed with the intention to solicit preprogrammed answers. Such are, for instance, questions of the type: "Should land be transferred to individual owners? If so, in what order?"; "What do you think about construction of atomic power stations? If you are against it, why?" In cases like these we are entitled to think, not without reason, that the public opinion polls are being used as a means of forming certain popular ideas. Then, instead of helping to find the truth, they serve to manipulate the social consciousness.

Youth Views on Socialism Polled

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[Article by sociologist A. Arefyev: "Socialism Through the Eyes of the Young"]

[Text] How do young people now view the prospects of socialism? In order to answer these questions the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Higher Komsomol [Communist Leninist Youth League] School Research Center Department for the Study of Public Opinion carried out sociological studies in the countries' three biggest republics—the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and the Belorussian SSR. Some 2,000 representatives of working youth (workers, engineering-technical personnel, artistic intelligentsia, office workers, and so forth) and more than 1,000 students from 30 different VUZ's [higher educational institutions] in

Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, and other cities and oblasts were polled altogether.

The distortions of socialism, the stagnation phenomena in the economy of the socialist countries, their lag in the new technology fields, and so forth could not have failed to have been reflected in the youth's political consciousness.

It also needs to be considered that, according to the data of the studies, the youth's interest in socialism is to an increasingly large extent becoming pragmatic.

But perestroika is, unfortunately, being accompanied by a noticeable improvement in the life of the younger generation, and many people are, on the contrary, experiencing somewhat of a deterioration therein. None of this is adding to the attraction of socialism in the eyes of the young people but is leading to a growth of critical sentiments.

As the studies showed, both the working and student youth see the manifest advantages of socialism in two spheres—the opportunity to obtain free education and the lack of unemployment. And whereas among students, furthermore, these advantages of socialism were commended by approximately two-thirds of those polled, among the young working people, by no more than half. On average one out of every 10 of those polled fails to see any particular difference between socialism and capitalism in the efficiency of the solution of everyday economic and social problems. But the rest of those polled (two to five percent of young working people, up to 25 percent of students) believe that these problems are, nonetheless, solved better by socialism or found it difficult to give preference to either social system.

The opinions of the student and working youth here differ in respect to practically all indicators, sometimes appreciably. Thus students of the higher school put a higher value on the advantages of socialism in environmental protection, health care, the citizens' participation in the solution of social problems, the fair distribution of material benefits, and the development of culture and democracy in society, whereas the bulk of working youth believes that capitalist society has relative advantages in the solution of these problems, albeit sometimes minimal.

Most critical in their evaluation of the achievements of socialism are engineering-technical personnel, people working in the liberal arts, and artistic and scientific personnel. Young workers, employees, and executives have a relatively positive perception of socialism.

The opinions of the working and student youth on the prospects of our further social development are distributed more evenly. On average, one out of every six persons polled (16-18 percent) supports "the former path of socialist development based on the specific conditions of our country and ultimately leading to the victory of communism". The impermissibility of the distortion of this, in their opinion, sole correct and genuinely socialist path of development is indicated here.

The second group of those polled (one out of every four on average or 27-28 percent) also advocated the socialist development path, but one such as is "based on the experience of other socialist countries".

The most populous was the third group of those polled (41-44 percent)—supporters of a "mixed development path combining elements of both socialism and capitalism". The participants in this group propose "taking all that is best from capitalism, the socialist countries, and our country and attempting to combine all this".

Relatively few of those polled wholly reject socialism and advocate "the capitalist path of development"—approximately four percent. In amplifying their choice in favor of capitalism almost one-half of this group emphasized that the most desirable thing for our country would be to follow the Swedish development model.

Finally, the smallest group of those polled (one to two percent) advocated our country following any path as long as it led to the quickest rise in the well-being of the whole people. Approximately 10 percent of those polled refrained from answering this question.

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