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Yazov Interview Summarizes Trip to UK
18010867 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Aug 89 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with Army Gen D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense and candidate member to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by TASS correspondent: "From Positions of New Thinking"]

[Text] **General of the Army D.T. Yazov, candidate member to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, answers questions from TASS correspondent.**

[TASS] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, the other day you concluded your visit to Great Britain. As we know, and as the foreign mass media also emphasized, you became the first Soviet minister of defense in the history of relations between the two countries to set foot on British soil. What is your assessment of this visit?

[Yazov] The fact that I happened to be the first USSR minister of defense to visit Great Britain added a special responsibility. My comrades in the military delegation and I were well aware of this. We were also aware that to a certain extent we had to open a new page in Soviet-British military relations. But in the context of the current international situation, our visit was one of many steps dictated by the logic of new political thinking. It is perfectly obvious that it became possible thanks to the significant improvement in the political climate in Europe and in the world as a whole. And if one has in mind Soviet-British relations, the inclusion of military contacts in them is the result of summit meetings and talks between the leaders of the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Perhaps the dialogue was the most noteworthy thing in our visit. It turned out to be candid, mutually interesting, and dynamic. We listened attentively to them and, as it appeared to us, they also listened very attentively to us. We made it clear to them that the Soviet Union is striving for a decisive reduction in the level of confrontation, for disarmament, for creating a comprehensive and reliable system of security, and for a nuclear-free, non-violent world.

The Soviet delegation held meetings and talks with Prime Minister M. Thatcher, the secretary of foreign affairs, the secretary of defense, and other military leaders of Great Britain. Along with the obvious interest, good will, and openness, one still sometimes got the feeling that the burden of old ideas is still great. I hope that our talks will to some degree help the British leaders better understand the words and deeds of the Soviet Union.

We see the main result of our trip to be the fact that, judging from the numerous meetings and talks and from the statements by the British mass media, it helped to move forward in this direction.

[TASS] You, as they say, discovered Great Britain for yourself. Undoubtedly, you gained various impressions.

Naturally, you cannot talk about everything in such a brief interview. Nevertheless, we would like to hear about what was most memorable for you and about the most significant impressions you got during the visit.

[Yazov] If we talk about "discovering" Great Britain, I began familiarizing myself with it back in my youth. I was helped in this by W. Shakespeare, G. Byron, C. Dickens, H. Wells, S. Maugham... I gleaned quite a bit from history, including from the history of the art of war. The years of the Great Patriotic War left an indelible mark on me, when the Soviet Union and Great Britain were allies, when our armies were fighting a common enemy—fascism. This is of special value for us frontline soldiers.

So, before I arrived in the British Isles, I had a sufficiently clear and, I would say, thorough notion about the people who live and work there, about their nature and traditions. But you are generally right—familiarization without seeing, no matter how extensive and substantive, cannot take the place of direct association and personal contacts.

The schedule was quite full. We became familiar with how they train soldiers and how they train officers of the British Army. We visited the paratrooper training center in Aldershot and talked with the commander of ground forces on the territory of Great Britain, Gen C. Huxtable, the commander of the training center, Lt Col D. Campbell, and other officers. At the Sandhurst Military Academy, its chief Maj Gen P. Graham demonstrated to us the psychological aspect of training cadets. We also looked at new combat equipment. The air base commander, Air Col A. Begnoll, acquainted us with the capabilities of the Tornado and Harrier aircraft. On board the aircraft carrier Invincible, the ship's commander Capt 1st Rank M. Gretton conducted a small demonstration exercise.

Of course, our impressions were not limited solely to the military. Everywhere the Soviet military delegation went there were meetings and talks with people—planned and spontaneous. The range of issues which were touched upon in one way or another during these talks was extremely broad and diverse. The British show an interest in perestroika in our country, the processes of democratization and glasnost, the activities of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, reforms in the Soviet Armed Forces, the peace initiatives and steps by the USSR in the international arena, and many other issues.

A conclusion suggests itself: there must be more contact, contact at all levels. Incidentally, there was a separate conversation about this. We exchanged with the leadership of the British armed forces proposals on development of military contacts in the next few years. These proposals will be studied by the sides, after which a general, coordinated program for expanding bilateral military relations may be determined.

[TASS] In connection with your visit to Great Britain, public attention in the West was drawn to the problems

associated with the Soviet Union's position in the area of disarmament. Your address at the London Royal Institute of International Relations, Dmitriy Timofeyevich, evoke a particularly large response. Could you briefly outline the content of this address?

[Yazov] A wide range of problems were touched upon during the meeting at the Royal Institute of International Relations. But in the final analysis, they all focused on disarmament. And this is natural. After all, for centuries how have states carried out the task of ensuring their security? According to this seemingly permanent pattern: Any action in the area of arms was immediately followed by a counteraction. Thus, a vicious, closed circle emerged. To continue to follow this circle in the nuclear age means to move inevitably closer to a catastrophe. In order to break this circle, we must change the direction of movement, turn sharply away from the principle of overarmament to the principle of defense sufficiency. In other words, we must embark on the path of disarmament. But, you would agree, it is not enough just to embark on this path. We must move along it. It is clear that such movement makes sense if everyone participates in it. But to begin this movement, it is important to overcome inertia, move off dead center, take the first step. Realizing this, the Soviet Union decided to take major steps in the area of disarmament, including unilaterally.

The unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops is a materialization of our radically revised military doctrine, which now, as is known, has been given a particularly defensive nature. Its nucleus, expressing the highest goal of the Soviet state and its armed forces, is the prevention of war. In accordance with this, qualitative changes are taking place along with the quantitative reductions.

This deep restructuring of the armed forces is closely tied to our other peace initiatives.

We are deeply convinced that reliance on force, on deterrence, on nuclear weapons is irrational by its very essence, since it objectively leads to a catastrophe. Unfortunately, up to now the West, recognizing that nuclear war will lead to catastrophe, has still not abandoned attempts to adapt nuclear weapons for carrying out missions on the battlefield and in a theater of war on a global scale. Declaring that there can be no winner in a nuclear war, they still do not wish to outlaw nuclear weapons or at least pledge not to use them first, as we have pledged.

We consider a mutual reduction in naval forces to be one of the most important problems of disarmament. We see expanding confidence building measures to naval activities as an integral part of the all-European process. I suggested to the participants in the meeting at the Royal Institute to picture themselves in the position of a man who finds himself in someone's sights, no matter which way he turns. The Soviet Union has been in roughly the same position for many years, encircled by hundreds of U.S. and NATO military bases with more than a

500,000-strong grouping of armed forces, large air and naval forces, and nuclear weapons stationed on them. Wouldn't it really be logical to include this constantly active factor of destabilization of the international situation in the disarmament process?

Success of the negotiations in Geneva and Vienna are of key importance for further development of the disarmament process. A good beginning has been created in Geneva. A search is now under way for a mutually acceptable solution to the question of the interrelationship of strategic offensive arms and antiballistic-missile defense. Any deep reductions in strategic offensive arms are possible only if the sides reject creating and deploying wide-scale antiballistic-missile defense systems—this is an essential condition for maintaining stability in the process of reducing nuclear potential. We expect from our negotiating partners constructive approaches to resolving issues associated with air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles.

We consider the goals of the negotiations in Vienna to be quite attainable. The initiatives advanced by M.S. Gorbachev and the quick response to them by U.S. President G. Bush have given these negotiations a new political impetus. Our position is clear: Any attempts to gain military superiority—and this is precisely the essence of the NATO proposals on aviation and the number of troops of the USSR and the US located on the territory of allies, and also the desire to create new imbalances and asymmetries—are unacceptable and impermissible. We need to search for compromises on a mutual basis.

We attach fundamental importance to opening independent talks on tactical nuclear weapons for the purpose of reducing and totally eliminating them. Keeping this type of weapon, which has an enormous destructive potential and are capable of being used in a first strike, will have a destabilizing effect on the situation in Europe. Moreover, this effect will intensify as a result of the planned modernization and buildup of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO.

As far as other disarmament problems are concerned, the USSR's constructive approaches to resolving them are known. We favor the complete elimination of chemical weapons as soon as possible and the destruction for good of the production base for building these weapons. We are ready at any time to halt nuclear testing, if the United States will do the same. We are against building any types of space weapons whatsoever and are in favor of the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of other countries and the simultaneous disbanding of both alliances in Europe and, as a first step, the elimination of their military organizations.

Without question, the problems of disarmament are difficult, complex, and voluminous. Their resolution requires much intense, responsible work. The joint search for a solution, step by step, is strengthening universal security and peace. You will agree, it is worth working for this.

In answering your question on the eve of the visit to Great Britain, I emphasized the need to build up the potential of trust. The visit has strengthened this thought in me even more. I would only add this: In building up the potential of trust, it is important to do everything possible to realize it.

**Latvian People's Deputy Discusses Proposals,
Peacekeeping Units**
*18080066 Riga PADOMJU JAUNATNE in Latvian
10 Jun 89 p 7*

[Interview with Lt Col V. Alksnis, USSR people's deputy, by ZA RODINU correspondent; reprinted from the 4 June issue of ZA RODINU: "Let's Talk About the Army"]

[Text] With each working day of the congress the paper receives even more questions. After a few deputies' speeches the telephone rings almost without a break. Some of the readers ask us to explain how one or another proposal voiced at the congress should be understood. Others, confirming what was said at the congress, mention concrete examples. We asked V. Alksnis to answer the received questions.

[ZA RODINU] Is it true that the deputies from the Baltic republics do not carry the badge "USSR People's Deputy"?

[Alksnis] There are also those. They give precedence to signs of historical symbolism. A part of the deputies have fastened both badges next to each other.

[ZA RODINU] Readers ask—what is meant by the word "center" in our Union's formulation. Will this concept not become an abstraction, if the RSFSR, as well as the other republics, switches to economic calculation and payment?

[Alksnis] Everything depends on who proposes this formulation. If it is M. Gorbachev, then a strong center must be understood as a united, centralized union of sovereign republics.

The People's Fronts of the Baltic republics propose another formulation: "Strong republics—a strong center." In this case, the concept "a strong center," for which remain only two functions—defense and foreign relations—, becomes very blurred and essentially turns into a fiction. In my opinion, it is only a castle of the air, which lacks an elementary, economic base. Thus, for example, because of the lack of raw materials and energy resources Latvia will not be able to be economically independent from Russia. But without this there is no point in talking about political independence.

[ZA RODINU] Now let us discuss our military issues. How was the proposal developed, which you expressed to M. Gorbachev, on ranking the office of USSR Minister of Defense in the civil position category?

[Alksnis] We, the deputy soldiers, have discussed this question in the meeting recesses not only once. We arrived at the conclusion that our minister must first be a politician. A military person can also take this job. But then the uniform will have to be exchanged for civilian clothing and he will have to occupy himself with politics. Others can also command the army. His main task will be to work out the armed forces' development perspective in regard to the constantly changing situation. Obviously the minister must speak the decisive word, when accepting resolutions that involve the army. Otherwise, in my opinion, many mistakes are tolerated, which seriously influences the soldiers' socioeconomic condition.

[ZA RODINU] Many of our readers consider that in his speech, J. Peters concretized the essence of Latvian President A. Gorbunovs' proposed Union treaty. Is this so?

[Alksnis] Truthfully speaking, it really is so. Moreover, he came into the open with a proposal in yet another sphere—the military one.

[ZA RODINU] But the treaty between the Union republic and the Ministry of Defense, which determines in which places, in what numbers, and for what length of time what kind of army will be stationed on the republic's territory, means the introduction of a paid army. The same as existed already before the new era and in the Middle Ages. Will the republic be able to maintain it?

[Alksnis] This is not the issue. Here everything is at once both simpler and more complicated. According to the intentions of our People's Front, the military department, guaranteeing Soviet defenses, will have to submit to the republics' Supreme Soviets proposals on the stationing of the army. And after their agreement it will have to pay itself for the location of army units and subunits on the territory of sovereign republics. About the same as when the United States pays the Philippines because they have provided the opportunity for American military bases to be located on their territory.

[ZA RODINU] Oh, really?! But in the Philippines the United States is defending its interests. Whose interests will our Ministry of Defense then defend, more correctly speaking, our army, for example, in Latvia, if not the republic's own interests?

[Alksnis] I don't know. But the question is being raised in precisely this fashion.

[ZA RODINU] Many have noticed J. Peters' words to the effect that all servicemen must be included in the republic's history, in which they are located. But in this field much work is already being done. Is ignorance of the situation not at the basis of this request?

[Alksnis] Yes, evidently. In the army unit all new arrivals are obligatorily introduced to the station republic, its people's history. In the political education system, time and topics are especially provided for this. It has become

traditional in the army units and subunits to organize disputes, quizzes, and Union republic nights. The soldiers meet with the local creative intelligentsia. But, according to the thoughts of many commanders, this occurs too rarely. Now here writers, poets, actors and artists could come forth with their initiative. The army units' control and transit points are wide open for them, especially now. But the intelligentsia is not hurrying hither. Evidently it prefers to be an examiner than a disseminator of its nation's spiritual, cultural, and historical values.

[ZA RODINU] Our telephones began to ring more often also after the speech of the Liepaja 304th election district's deputy. His surname, as I recall, is Medvedevs. He had poorly taken Comrade Chervonopisk's announcement that in the Baltic assault units have been created, and denied their existence. As if in one voice, our readers assert that such units truly exist and ask you to make this fact known to the congress.

A part of the callers respond to the repeated request of the Latvian People's Front (LPF) representatives that during demonstrations and meetings the legal order be defended not by the militia but by their units. Others bring to attention to the 29 May 1989 issue of the LPF information bulletin ATMODA [AWAKENING]. In it on page 7 it says: "For the first time at the Duma level the question on the formation of LPF units for the defense of social order was discussed." They ask us to give this bulletin to you.

[Alksnis] Let the readers not worry. It is known to me that such units are being formed. There are irrefutable proofs in this regard. Moreover, they are constantly being supplemented with new data. You also do not need to give me the bulletin. It is being freely distributed here. I will find it and do everything that depends on me.

[ZA RODINU] Thank you for the information.

Continuing Problems of Afghan Vets in Latvia
18010591 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
2 Apr 89 p 2

[Materials of newspaper-sponsored roundtable prepared by V. Varlamov, I. Starodub and L. Shaldayev: "Now Where Can a Soldier Go, Who Can Bear His Grief..."]

[Text] [Introduction] For 9 plus long years, our fellows had a difficult time there, beyond the passes of Hindukush. This was the longest war for our motherland in this century. Almost 15,000 were killed. Almost 37,000 maimed. Some 313 men are still missing in action. These are the lamentable results of this war.

We are all tired from the heavy military burden. At present, it has become easier for all of us to breathe. Virtually everything is behind us. But only virtually. Afghanistan has and does worry our parents' hearts. Even yesterday the soldiers killed there were buried secretly. And only now has this war hardened in the obelisks and monuments at cemeteries scattered

throughout the nation. It has begun to be heard in songs, verses, stories, novels, plays and films. But in some places even now people still encounter the closed offices of various bureaucrats when the issue arises of the "Afghaners" [Afghan vets].

The war-seared generation has returned home. And a great deal is imprinted in the faces of the men who went through Afghanistan. In some the wounds sustained in fighting the Mujahedeen have still not healed. And in our people the pain of irreplaceable losses will not die out soon.

At present, the nation has over a half-million Afghaners as well as the families of thousands of killed. In this enormous list are also hundreds of men from our republic. How have their rights been defended? What benefits have been granted to yesterday's soldiers as well as for those who still are in the army? Unfortunately, they are not always able to receive what is due from the state and at times difficulties arise out of legal ignorance.

Participating in a discussion of these questions at a roundtable of SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA were the Latvian Minister of Social Security Guna Luss, the Chief of the Political Section of the Republic Military Commissariat, Col Valdis Teymer, the Chief of the Administration of the Latvian Ministry of Health Igor Veselov, the Section Head of the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee Andris Dzenis, the Deputy Chief of the Administration for the Registration and Allocation of Housing at the Riga Gorispolkom Raymond Ozolin, the Section Chief of this administration Andrey Platonov, the Chairman of the Riga Municipal Fund for Assisting the Elderly and Disabled Nina Nikitina, Senior Inspector from the Social Security Section of the Riga Gorispolkom Anita Ergle, the Secretary-in-Charge of the Salang Club Boris Isakov, as well as the former Afghaners and activists of the Republic Salang Club: its Chairman and Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the Riga Industrial Polytechnical School Yanis Kivkulis and the club members, the vehicle driver at the Riga Ambulance Station Ivan Kuzmin, the construction worker Uldis Veselis, and the white collar employee Guntis Vabole.

The meeting at the editorial offices was held on the eve of the second conference for the members of the Republic Salang Club which was held yesterday in Riga. Its main task was to bring together similar clubs existing in the rayons "under a single roof," in the aim of better coordinating efforts in providing aid to the families of the deceased, to the disabled and all former Afghaners in resolving the vitally important questions confronting them in the area of providing full social benefits. [End of Introduction]

[S.L. (SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA)]: The military commissariat is certainly that institution at which the fellows would not only begin their army life but also their civilian life.

[V. Teymer]: As is known, the basis for the activities of all military commissariats is good accounting. This includes the accounting of reserve military personnel who have served in Afghanistan. We keep them separate. And not only because they have special benefits. They already have combat experience and hence they are our main reserve.

[S.L.]: How many "Afghaners" are there in your file?

[V. Teymer]: At present registered are over 2 ½ thousand such reserve personnel. I cannot give a precise figure because a portion of the fellows after the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan is continuing active service in troops stationed on our territory. I will be able to give a precise number only at the end of the year.

[S.L.]: How many among them received wounds and are disabled? And how many families cannot expect the return of their sons?

[V. Teymer]: There are 186 persons. These include 44 of the appropriate disability group and they receive pensions.

The republic has 63 families who have lost their close ones in this war. Some 51 persons have been buried in Latvia. The remaining families arrived in the republic after the loss of their close ones. Of the number of persons killed, only 43 young men were inducted directly from our republic. If one were to speak about the nationality of the personnel killed, 45 percent are Russians, 39 percent are Latvians and the remainder are other nationalities. I give the figures with reason. Recently, we have been asked this information very frequently and by the most diverse, basically social organizations.

I would like to point out that, unfortunately, at times I would say an unhealthy situation arises around the Afghaners. Let me explain from the following example. On 23 February, at the Kuldigskiy Komsomol Raykom a meeting was arranged with the internationalist soldiers. At it all of a sudden a comrade stood up and asked the fellows to give up...their benefits. Supposedly it is not worth having the Afghaners disgrace themselves for the sake of a piece of sausage and it is essential to give up this pittance from a state which involved them in the "dirty war." I was pleased that the fellows were indignant over such an attitude.

[S.L.]: In this context a question for Yanis Kivkulis. In Salang are there groups of the NF [People's Front] and IF [Interfront]? And how generally are interethnic relations among you?

[Ya. Kivkulis]: Our relations are the same as they were in the war and there we did not pay any attention to who was from what nationality. In our club there is no awareness at all of a dividing of the fellows by nationality. Although no one would prohibit or condemn those who join one of the fronts. But certainly there are no extremists among us.

[I. Veselov]: At present, certain organizations, both state and social, the People's Front and Interfront are literally competing to see who can help the Afghaners more. What happens is some sort of self-promotion. And if we pooled our efforts, there would be greater benefit.

[B. Isakov]: We are doing everything that we are capable of. Let me give an example. Successfully operating in Moskovskiy Rayon of Riga is an offshoot of the Desantnik [Airborne Troop] Club. The very name speaks for itself. Here school children in following an interestingly organized program can master military knowledge, they participate in sports and, in particular, learn how to parachute jump. As I was recently told by one of the sponsors of this club, Vladimir Kovtun, the club welcomes kids from Russian and Latvian schools. There should be more such clubs. And they should be helped more with supplies and teaching aids and they would be flooded with fellows.

[U. Veselis]: Let me add something here. Our meetings with inductees during their send-offs into the Army have already become a tradition. But I realize that this is not enough. I am hoping that the work of our conference will help intensify activities in this area.

[S.L.]: Let us return to the benefits. What departments are in charge of them?

[V. Teymer]: To some degree all of those represented at today's roundtable. As for us, we have constantly monitored the material and everyday conditions of life as well as the completeness and promptness of providing the Afghaners with the stipulated benefits. Naturally, the families of deceased servicemen as well as the disabled have been under our particular attention. The Republic Military Commissariat, together with the Republic Trade Union Council, have worked out instructions to systematize the benefits paid to the Afghaners and have sent these out to all the republic rayons.

The military commissariats distributes the free trips to medical rehabilitation centers where the fellows spend time not only among their combat comrades but also undergo, if need be, a course of treatment or receive medical consultation. Quite recently a new paragraph was added. Now the Afghaners should be provided with cars on a preferential basis. This was established by the Decree of the Republic Council of Ministers No. 420 of 21 December 1988.

[Ya. Kivkulis]: A comment on the cars. At present, the disabled men are given Zaporozhets. Can you imagine how difficult it is to drive in the winter even for a strong person? Why not give Zhigulis to the fellows who had their health impaired in the war? This could even be for a longer time than for a Zaporozhets, the service life of which is planned for 7 years. The Zhigulis could be given for 10 years.

[S.L.]: Still, probably the most painful question is how to provide housing for those who require it?

[V. Teymer]: According to the data of the executive committees, there are 210 internationalist soldiers registered on the waiting list to improve their housing conditions and this includes 52 in Riga. And here we have encountered a bureaucratic hitch. According to the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, the internationalist soldiers have a primary right to upgrade their housing conditions while in the republic legislation there are restrictions which prevent being placed on the list. For example, it is essential to live 3 years in a rural locality and 10 years in a city. Only after this can one be put on a list. Clearly, our responsible bodies must analyze this discrepancy.

[S.L.]: We are not lawyers but probably if a public decree contradicts a national one the latter would take precedence?

[V. Teymer]: Yes, you are correct. That should be the case. But in fact the situation is otherwise.

[A. Platonov]: The problem obviously is that in the national decree, unfortunately, they have not stipulated the times for being placed on the housing waiting list. And for this reason the republic legislation does not contradict the law.

[R. Ozolin]: All the internationalist soldiers who prior to induction lived in Latvia or decided to move here in order to live and work have benefits in obtaining housing. In terms of these benefits, the Afghaners are the equal of the participants of the Great Patriotic War. In Riga we have set a standard of preferential space per family member of 5 m² with a permanent residence permit. For the disabled the standard is somewhat higher of 6 m² per family member. The disabled Afghaners as well as the family members of deceased servicemen are considered the equal of the disabled of the Great Patriotic War and have the right to upgrade their housing conditions.

This right remains in force regardless of the size of housing area if the apartments lack the necessary types of amenities. However, according to the new decree on the measures to halt migration, a time has been set according to which a person can be put on the waiting list for obtaining housing only 10 years after his arrival in Riga. This decree has also been extended to the Afghaners. However, those who had the right to go on the list even before the adoption of the decree, their period before going on the list can be set at 5 years. At present, in Riga 52 Afghan families expect to obtain housing in the state sector and 31 families are waiting for cooperative apartments. I would like to add that the time for being placed on the list for obtaining a cooperative apartment is at present 5 years of residence in Riga with a standard of 9 m² per family member. This is a very standard. Of course, even now we have provided a few internationalist soldiers with housing. Over the last 3 years, just 18 families. The reason for this is largely the general problem of the nonfulfillment of the plan in Riga for

providing housing to the public. In the city, apartments are in chronic short supply and this is a secret for no one.

[A. Platonov]: I also feel that the Afghaners have too long a time waiting for housing. Regardless of the fact that even now there still are veterans of the Great Patriotic War waiting. But I have a particular attitude for the fellows who have returned from Afghanistan. They went to war when we were at peace and the state of many is depressed and even in shock. And if here, back home, their life is still unsettled, it becomes even worse. It is well and good that the war has ended in Afghanistan. There will be no more young people returning here with traumatized lives. And hence it will be easier for us to help those whose roots are here in Latvia, those who have returned home.

I feel that the question of each Afghan who needs housing should be settled individually, considering all aspects of the conditions of his life.

[U. Veselis]: There are other problems. These include the medical standards. Often just a few surplus meters keep you off the list. What should we do?

[A. Platonov]: The gorispolkom has a commission. I feel that the question should be settled here individually.

[B. Isakov]: We have tried to ease the housing problem with the participation of the Afghaners in the work of the MZhK [Youth Housing Construction Combine] detachments. We appealed to the Republic Council of Ministers to permit the fellows to work regardless of the length of residence in the given locality. Let themselves build housing for others and for themselves. This question was brought up also before the Commission on Youth Affairs of the Republic Supreme Soviet. But the problem has still not been resolved.

[A. Platonov]: For the Afghaners who are registered there is also an opportunity not to wait for 10 years. Those employed in building treatment facilities and in a housing construction combine have benefits in obtaining housing faster. This also includes the MZhK. But I repeat, this applies only for the fellows already registered. I would like to point to one other decree of the Republic Council of Ministers No. 307 (1988). This states that the Latvian ministries and departments, the rayispolkoms and gorispolkoms should provide housing area during 1988-1989 for the families of servicemen, for workers and employees who were killed or died as a consequence of wounds, contusion, maiming or illness sustained in carrying out their international duty in Afghanistan and who do not have housing and need an improvement in housing conditions.

Why have I drawn attention to this decree? It states that not only the gorispolkoms and rayispolkoms but also the ministries, departments and the labor collectives of industrial enterprises have their own housing. So a plant is building apartments. So come to me and I will suggest the addresses of apartments under construction. And you can find out whether or not Afghaners are employed

at the enterprise. You must turn to the council of the labor collective. It is simply obliged to help.

[B. Isakov]: But again with this we can only help those who are already on the waiting list.

[N. Nikitina]: The fellows are in pain. They are concerned for those who returned recently from Afghanistan. As of today, for example, in Riga there are several fellows who were brought for treatment to our district hospital. After treatment they have remained here. But now they are forced to wait 10 years.

[R. Ozolin]: Under the conditions of the existing situation in Riga and in line with the decree limiting migration, I can only advise that one turns to the place where you were called up. There rights have been stipulated for an apartment. And there they will receive them earlier.

[N. Nikitina]: The identity card of an Afghaners states that their rights extend to the entire territory of the nation. On 22 July 1988, for all the executive committees of the nation, including in our republic, the state of affairs was checked by the USSR Procurator's Office. Violations were discovered in providing apartments for the Afghaners. After this, a letter appeared from the USSR General Procurator which stated that the internationalist soldiers should not have to wait from 4 to 10 years before they are put on a list. But this letter is not an enforceable enactment and hence, the question must be precisely formulated.

But for now no one can violate the existing legislation and the fellows must wait. I advise the Salang Club to appeal to the USSR Procurator's Office for precise explanations. There are, unfortunately, cases of violations at the work place of the Afghaners. They refuse to put them on the list, in voicing their own demands. Thus, I personally had a long "fight" with the VEF [Riga Electrical Engineer Plant imeni V.I. Lenin] for the Afghaners Viktor Kalinin.

They refused to resolve the housing question for him stating that he had violated labor discipline. Yes, that was the case. But the fellows who have returned from the war actually often behave in a way that seems challenging to us. But it is precisely here that we should be particularly sensitive for them.

[A. Platonov]: The question of Kalinin's housing has already been resolved affirmatively.

[N. Nikitina]: Yes, it has been settled, but what a struggle it was! We often have to fight a long time for what is stipulated by the law. How many people could do so?

[R. Ozolin]: I would like to comment on an appeal to the USSR Procurator's Office. It seems to me that the request should be sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Only this body has the right to resolve the question.

[S.L.]: We will not be able to discuss all the questions involving housing today. But we have made a start. Let

us move on to the question of pension security and other problems which concern the Afghaners and the members of their families.

[G. Luss]: We are concerned with the disabled persons and the families of deceased personnel who have the right to pension coverage. We make certain that the persons receiving merit pensions are paid promptly. But this does not mean that we are not concerned with how they live. For this reason our rayon and city social security departments annually visit the disabled persons and families of deceased personnel. We settle the arising questions. We also have a good tradition: on the eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day, on 23 February, we together with the city social security department and the Republic Military Commissariat set up meetings with personnel who have been maimed. We invite them to visit us at the ministry. And we endeavor by friendly conversation to discover how they are living. Thus, the last time at such a meeting the Chairman of the Afghan Veterans Club of Rizhskiy Rayon G. Vabole turned to us for help in settling the question of specialized stores. The choice is too restricted in them and these stores are being unsatisfactorily supplied.

[G. Vabole]: The problem is that we in Rizhskiy Rayon do not have a special food store. The special hardware store also does not satisfy normal needs. We cannot be served in Riga since we do not have a Riga residence permit. And so it turns out that the fellows in Riga can purchase something for a holiday but we cannot.

[G. Luss]: At present we are studying this question. Recently, a former Afghaners, Igor Marachkovskiy, came to us. He had been seriously wounded and he required a complicated individual artificial limb. We had heard that a group of Afghaners were being sent from Moscow to Czechoslovakia to be fitted with artificial limbs. Marachkovskiy requested help in joining this group. However, we do not have such contacts with Moscow. We are solving the question of artificial limbs differently and have established contact with one of the world's leading firms in manufacturing artificial limbs, Otto Bock. This is a West German firm. We have already met with its representatives. It was proposed to us that we purchase equipment and organize the delivery of semi-finished products and send specialists so we could organize our own production. But we need foreign exchange. The Republic Gosplan has shown understanding for us. However, in order for this question to be affirmatively resolved, we need the support of the newspaper and the Salang Veterans Club. We are counting on you. As of now, we have already drawn up a letter of appeal to the Republic Council of Ministers. During preliminary talks they promised to help us.

[S.L.]: In our republic there are 13 men from among the internationalist soldiers who are forced to wear prostheses. Is it not possible to send abroad those who need a new prosthesis?

[G. Luss]: You see, of course, we want very much to help these fellows, but one must not forget the many other needy persons. There is no possibility of sending everyone abroad. For this reason, I feel, we must have our own high-quality production.

[N. Nikitina]: Recently I attended the plenum of the Soviet Charity and Health Fund. During a speech at it I stated that in our republic there are 13 fellows who need individual high-quality prostheses. And since this fund receives foreign exchange as donations, I proposed that attention be paid first to the Afghaners. They are young. They must study, work, establish their own families and their prostheses are primitive and prevent them leading a normal life.

[I. Veselov]: The problems of the Afghaners have also been examined by a Commission on Youth Affairs in the Republic Supreme Soviet. They analyzed aspects of work of the various ministries and departments. There were comments on the poor physical plant of certain medical facilities and the Ministry of Social Security.

[G. Luss]: If the Charity and Health Fund has its own foreign exchange and can provide the Afghaners with prostheses, this is a very good thing. We are still more concerned with equipping our own facilities for making prostheses. Unfortunately, we do not have foreign exchange. Of course, we will endeavor to bring the level of our prosthesis manufacturing close to the best world models. But at present we have nothing to boast about the quality of the prostheses.

[I. Veselov]: A whole series of decrees has already been adopted aimed at concern for the Afghaners. But I feel that even more could have been done if the international aid of our fellows to Afghanistan had for a long time not been kept under "seven seals." I recall that as soon as I read the first announcements about our men in Afghanistan in the newspapers, I immediately set off to the Republic Military Commissariat. I was able to obtain the first figures. Now we are keeping our own records. In the Administration for Therapeutic and Preventive Aid under our ministry, at present there is a special inspector physician who is concerned with the registering and the questions of providing medical aid for the disabled persons of the Great Patriotic War and for the internationalist soldiers. At present, the Afghaners according to the territorial principle have been assigned to physicians who also treat the war veterans.

The families of deceased servicemen are also registered. They all are provided with preferential medical examinations and treatment in the local and republic medical facilities. And when necessary they can also consult with the republic specialized centers. A supply of scarce medicines has been established in the drug stores for them as well as for the disabled persons of the Great Patriotic War.

In taking advantage of our roundtable, I would like to appeal to all republic physicians to be more charitable when we turn to them.

The Republic Ministry of Health has a number of decrees and documents concerning what aid we are obliged to provide to the Afghaners and to the families of deceased personnel. Quite recently I was informed that in the near future we will receive the right independently to send fellows for treatment to the recovery and rehabilitation centers of the nation. We have already been sent the AUCCTU travel vouchers and we will soon begin distributing them.

[B. Isakov]: Please tell us how these travel documents will be distributed?

[I. Veselov]: Through the republic rayon therapeutic and preventive facilities.

[S.L.]: Would it be possible for us to set up our own rehabilitation center on the basis, for instance, of a certain sanatorium in the republic?

[I. Veselov]: This question is within the competence of the Latvian Republic Trade Union Council and the Latvian Republic Resort Council.

[S.L.]: We will get in touch with them....

[N. Nikitina]: The Afghaners need quarters for their club. And not only for meetings but also for sports. Certainly those who were wounded require therapeutic physical culture. I have appealed to the Republic Komsomol Central Committee for this.

[A. Dzenis]: We have always been quick on the questions related to the Afghaners. As a whole these have involved the Salang Club as well as individual fellows. We have not always been able to do something here. For example, former soldiers living in other republics have appealed to us several times with a request to register them in Riga or somewhere in the republic. But because the corresponding decree has been adopted on this question, we have not been able to help them. At one time, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA criticized the Republic Komsomol Central Committee for an insufficiently attentive attitude toward the problems of the Salang Club. This was the period of its founding. The fellows had vast plans. Some things were dubious. Now it can be said that we have been able to do a great deal. Under the Central Committee, a club chairman has been approved and the question of quarters for the club has been settled on 2 Blvd. Raynis. In truth, a little more time is needed to obtain it. But then the Afghaners have refused a basement which was additionally offered the club....

[B. Isakov]: We have plans to set up our own museum and gymnasium. But the quarters of an old apartment building which we have been promised and which will soon be turned over to us are too small for the entire club to meet, for example, for the Riga section. We turned down the basement due to the absence of financial support at that time. Then we were not able to carry out the repairs with our own forces. At present, we are already capable of commencing such work.

[A. Dzenis]: Unfortunately, we have turned over the basement to one of our self-supporting enterprises. It will be hard to get it back. But we will search for some way out of this situation.

[S.L.]: Now something of a delicate question. The mother of one of the deceased soldiers has turned to us. While she was working she received her son's pension but when she herself retired, this payment was halted. It seems to us that this is incorrect. Would the Ministry of Social Security raise this question?

[G. Luss]: According to the current legislation, a person can receive only one pension. We have switched the mothers of deceased soldiers to merit pensions. It is higher than the usual pension.

[I. Kuzmin]: I have a different question. I am frequently with the families of deceased fellows. I myself work on an ambulance and often see human suffering. But the pain which the mothers of our fallen fellows feel is simply incomparable. Many of them, having learned of the death of their son, fell seriously ill.

[A. Ergle]: I am one such mother. I had four sons and now three remain. My health has been shattered. Is it impossible to supervise the health of those such as I without waiting until we ourselves come to a polyclinic? Why, for example, can't the district physician or nurse from a polyclinic look in, for instance, once a week or even more rarely on such a family? Certainly there are not so many of us, the unfortunate mothers of the Afghaners.

[I. Veselov]: By a special decree of the Council of Ministers last year we were permitted to use a hospital from the Fourth Administration of the Republic Ministry of Health for inpatient treatment of disabled persons of the Great Patriotic War and the internationalist soldiers. The question arose of what about the families of deceased personnel. I spoke about this in the Council of Ministers. And it was decided that upon the request of the Ministry of Health in the near future the government would adopt our proposal for assigning the members of families of deceased military personnel to the Fourth Administration.

Now about the free trips. We also can offer the Afghaners free trips and this does not mean to rehabilitation centers. At their request we can send them also to other sanatoriums.

[G. Vabole]: I was recently at the Rus Therapeutic Rehabilitation Center in the Greater Moscow Area. The Afghan veterans from other republics came here together with their families. And now we are saying that an Afghan from our republic can receive a free trip only for himself.

[I. Veselov]: Trips to centers of rehabilitation therapy for further treatment of wounds or suffered illnesses are given when necessary to members of families including wives and children. These are given out by the health

institutions gratis on the basis of the rulings of the selection commissions for 24 calendar days. But there is one other problem. The allocating of the free trips is carried out through different institutions. These include the Ministries of Social Security and Health and the Republic Military Commissariat. This is a complex system. It must somehow be systematized.

[G. Luss]: We receive free trips for the disabled persons of the Great Patriotic War. We have, in addition to other sanatoriums, the vacation home Yaundubuly. Please come visit us, it is not far away. Here we can send not only disabled Afghaners but also the family members of deceased personnel who require further treatment.

[S.L.]: What other questions will be raised at the Salang Conference?

[B. Isakov]: At the facilities of the Optimist Sports Club for Disabled Persons, the Salang member G. Agadzhanian has begun training disabled persons and those Afghaners who were wounded. He has made the initiative of establishing a sports federation for the disabled in the republic. The council of the Salang Club has supported this initiative. So we have decided jointly with Optimist to help all disabled persons. We are hoping that the Republic State Committee for Sports will aid us.

[G. Vabole]: I myself have trained at Optimist. I have traveled to sports meets for the disabled in Tallinn. It must be said that Estonia has already organized a sports federation for the disabled. In addition to direct physical culture training, the federation has organized the production of special supplies which are in very short supply in our country. And this is being done on a high level, considering the individual needs of the disabled persons. The local authorities actively help the federation.

[B. Isakov]: For the fruitful work of Salang, and I have in mind primarily work with induction youth and the providing of aid to needy Afghaners and the families of deceased personnel, the establishing of a monument to the fallen and our own museum, we are still greatly limited in our financial capabilities. In truth, Salang has already been able to open up its own bank account. We have received money from the Republic Trade Union Council, the Republic Charity Society and the Ministry of Social Security. The Torgservis [Trade and Service] and Orto Cooperatives have given us active help. We are also hoping for other sponsors. So for those who would like to help us, let me give our account number: No. 100700668, Operations Administration, Housing and Social Bank, Riga.

[Ya. Kivkulis]: A couple of words on the building of a monument in Riga to those who have fallen in Afghanistan. In our opinion, we should announce a competition. At the gorispolkom we were asked where we would want to see such a monument put up. It was proposed that it be put up at the garrison cemetery. We would like to see it in one of the corners of our Latvian capital. Incidentally, the architects should decide.

Structure, Primary Functions of Main Political Directorate Set Out

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[Unattributed interview with Maj Gen Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Trushin: "Abbreviated—GlavPUR"]

[Text] GlavPUR is a familiar abbreviation but also almost unknown. Men know it better, particularly those who have served or are serving in the army. GlavPUR is the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. At present, GlavPUR is celebrating its 70th anniversary. Our correspondent turned to Maj Gen Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Trushin, an official at the GlavPUR with a request to describe the history of the founding of the senior political body in the Army and Navy and which operates as a Section of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as describe its present, perestroyka and the prospects for improving the style and methods of work.

[Correspondent] Vyacheslav Vasilyevich, please tell us when and under what circumstances the Main Political Directorate was established.

[Trushin] The decision to found the Political Section of the Republic Revolutionary-Military Council [RVSR] was taken by the Eighth Party Congress. On 18 April 1919, the RVSR established the Political Section of the RVSR, and already on 15 May 1919, it was renamed the Political Directorate of the RVSR [PUR]. Thus, 15 May 1919 is considered the official date of the founding of the GlavPUR.

It should be said that by the establishing of the GlavPUR, as it were, the final period was put in a series of major undertakings to shape the Red Army political bodies. Everything began upon the initiative of the soldier and sailor masses, the local party bodies and the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] party cells as they were the first to find an organizational structure which harmoniously combined the functions of party and administrative leadership and which ensured flexibility and efficiency in party political work in the Army and Navy and its continuity and effectiveness. It also embodied such principles of military organizational development as one-man command and the extraterritorial organizational principle. This was the political sections. The first of them appeared in 1918. Initially they were bodies of the administrative and political apparatus of the military commissars. But gradually their role in the troops was significantly raised and the range of duties clarified and broadened.

By the spring of 1918, the Red Army and Navy had 6 fronts, 19 armies, 1 fleet, 8 flotillas, 125 rifle brigades and 9 cavalry brigades. In them already were around 80 political bodies. In January 1919, a meeting was held of the heads of the front political sections at which the Secretary of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and Chairman of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee],

Ya.M. Sverdlov, spoke. At this meeting a unified structure and a table of organization were worked out and the specific functions of the front, army and divisional political sections were clarified.

With the establishing of the PUR in May 1919, the activities of the party bodies assumed a more dynamic and all-encompassing nature and their main purpose was more precisely and clearly formulated. They had become the leading party bodies of the RKP(b) in the Red Army and Navy. The political bodies organized their activities in accord with the principles of general party construction and the standards of party life, carrying out the duties of the corresponding party committees as set out by the RKP(b) Bylaws.

A characteristic detail. The Eighth Party Congress, in abolishing the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars and taking a decision to establish the RVSR Political Section, pointed out that at its head there should be a member of the Central Committee with the rights of a member of the RVSR. At the end of March 1919, the RKP(b) Central Committee member I.T. Smilga was recalled from the front and appointed to the position of head of the RVSR Political Section. Later, he became the chief of the PUR.

[Correspondent] What functions were assigned to the PUR RVSR?

[Trushin] Initially, the PUR was in charge of inspector-instructor functions, agitation and propaganda work, the reporting and assigning of political workers in the Red Army and Navy. But the tasks were being adjusted....

[Correspondent] Can they be formulated in a most concise form?

[Trushin] I feel that this was done best at one time by Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, the faithful associate of V.I. Lenin and outstanding Soviet military leader. He said: "Who has introduced the elements of order and discipline into the ranks of our young Red regiments which have been constituted under the roar of cannon rounds? Who during the hours of setbacks and defeats has maintained the courage and cheerfulness of the men and invested new energy in their shaken ranks? Who has organized the army rear services, implanted Soviet power there and established Soviet order, thereby providing the rapid and successful advance of our armies forward? Who by his tenacious and stubborn work has shattered the ranks of the enemy, upset its rear and thereby prepared for the coming successes?

"This has been done by the army political bodies and they have done it, it must be said, brilliantly."

[Correspondent] What can you say about the activities of GlavPUR after the end of the Civil War and up to the start of the Great Patriotic War?

[Trushin] These were years of restructuring in the activities of the political bodies under peacetime conditions.

The GlavPUR played a major role in military organizational development. It ensured the unswerving execution of the Communist Party line in the Armed Forces and the solidarity of the personnel with the party and its Central Committee. The most characteristic feature in the work of the GlavPUR during that period was a party concern for increasing the level of troop combat skills, establishing conditions for the ubiquitous introduction of one-man command and its strengthening and working out the questions of the content and forms of activity for the political bodies in wartime as the GlavPUR never forgot the looming threat to our country and proceeded from the higher interests of the Soviet state and our people.

For example, there are few who know that in the prewar years GlavPUR worked out a document entitled "Field Service of Political Bodies." The document did not obtain official confirmation. But it was discussed with interest in the political bodies and fostered creative thought. And this armed the political workers with a knowledge of the most important provisions related to party political work in combat.

The PUR and the RKKA political bodies played a major role during the period of the technical rearming of the Armed Forces (1929-1941). At present, some have endeavored to assert that mechanization in the Red Army was being introduced slowly and our troops were far inferior to the probable enemy's troops. This is not at all the case. While in 1929, the technical equipment level calculated per soldier was 2.6 hp, in 1930 it was 3.07, in 1933, it had reached 7.74 hp. This was higher than in the then strongest armies of the capitalist countries. The GlavPUR Chief, Army Commissar 1st Rank Ya. Gamarnik was a great friend and shared the same views as MSU M. Tukhachevskiy. They both realized perfectly well that the future lay with motors, tracks and wings. During that period, the GlavPUR set up sectors for work in aviation, in the tank and mechanized troops and in 1933, these were converted into sections.

Unfortunately, the repressions at the end of the 1930s did not miss the PUR. Army Commissar 1st Rank Ya. Gamarnik was forced to end his life in suicide. His deputies, virtually all the leading nucleus of the PUR and many regular workers were arrested and repressed. Army Commissar 1st Rank P. Smirnov was executed, all 15 Army Commissars 2d rank were destroyed, 25 out of the 28 Corps Commissars were repressed, and 79 out of the 97 divisional commissars. Enormous harm was done to the political personnel in the brigades and regiments. The Military Political Academy, 4 higher military political schools under central subordination, 9 army and 17 district military political schools and 16 district junior political instructor courses could not make up for the chronic shortage of political personnel in the troops. For precisely this reason, the VKP(b) Central Committee in 1940 sent 1,500 communists into the RKKA and this included 1,250 for positions of middle and senior political personnel while just before the start of the war another 3,700 communists were sent also as political workers.

I will put it this way: in the history of the Armed Forces nothing missed the GlavPUR. Its workers shared fully the plight of the Armed Forces. On this path there were both victories, doubts, the bitterness of irreplenishable losses and again victories. Let me mention here all the GlavPUR chiefs from the moment of its formation up to the present and the reader certainly just from these names will be able to imagine all the glorious and difficult history of the Soviet Army and Navy: I. Smilga, S. Gusev, L. Serebryakov, V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, A. Bubnov, Ya. Gamarnik, P. Smirnov, L. Mekhlis, A. Zaporozhets, A. Shcherbakov, I. Shikin, F. Kuznetsov, K. Kraynyukov, A. Zheltov, F. Golikov, A. Yepishev and A. Lizichev.

[Correspondent] The Great Patriotic War and the political bodies are an enormous subject. What was the most essential during this period for the activities of the political bodies?

[Trushin] By the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army and Navy had 2 central political bodies, 21 district and fleet political bodies, 25 political bodies in armies and flotillas and over 800 in the corps, divisions, brigades and military schools.

The Main Directorate of Political Propaganda in the Red Army which existed for less than a year was turned into the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army (GlavPU RKKA). The restoring of full-power party bodies in the Armed Forces—the GlavPU and the political directorates and sections—intensified their activities, increased their role in carrying out the combat tasks confronting the troops and improved leadership over the party and Komsomol organizations. The structure of the senior political body as well as the political directorates of the fronts, and the party sections of the armies, corps and divisions was improved. All the political bodies were strengthened with experienced political workers, including secretaries of the Central Committee from the republic communist parties, the party obkoms and kraykoms. The GlavPUR was also filled out by workers from the staff of the VKP(b) Central Committee. In 1942, the GlavPUR was headed by the candidate member of the Politburo and Secretary of the VKP(b) Central Committee A. Shcherbakov.

Day by day, step by step, from the first to the last battles of the Great Patriotic War, the GlavPUR and the Army and Navy political bodies under the leadership of the party Central Committee improved the effectiveness of their work in mobilizing the communists, the soldiers and commanders to defeat the Nazi invaders and they acted as active proponents of all that was new, and widely propagandized advanced combat experience of the units and ships, the courage and military skill of the personnel. The forms and methods of work were flexibly adjusted. For example, on 24 January 1943 the GlavPUR in a directive demanded that in agitation-propaganda work the accent be shifted in accord with the new strategic situation, focusing it on indoctrinating a powerful offensive drive. The political bodies carried out

enormous work to strengthen one-man command, particularly after the institution of military commissars was abolished in October 1942. Incidentally, at that time many professional political workers were promoted to command positions. The scope of this work can be seen in a report from the personnel directorate to the chief of the GlavPUR RKKA: "In execution of the Decree of the USSR Main Defense Committee of 24 May 1943, according to the plan approved by you, some 119,000 political workers had to be shifted to command work. Actually 130,297 were transferred...." An impressive figure, is it not?

In the spring of 1944, GlavPUR again made adjustments in its work and in the activities of subordinate political bodies as the Red Army was entering the territory of foreign states and for this reason new urgent tasks arose in the area of political leadership of the troops, in strengthening international education of the men, and ensuring their correct conduct as representatives of a victorious army of a socialist state.

In a word, the political bodies and party organizations in the Army and Navy proved themselves to be during the war years militant, strongly united party bodies. Along with the commanders they closely carried out party policy in the troops and fleets and played a major role in defeating the hated enemy. Active and effective party political work was one of the decisive conditions for the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

[Correspondent] What changes has GlavPUR undergone in the postwar period?

[Trushin] To be brief, there were both major gains and major losses. For example, during the first postwar years certain trends appeared of underestimating party political work in the Army and Navy. In particular, the training of political personnel in the military schools was cut back. In August 1955, they eliminated the institution of deputy company commanders for political affairs. But already in October 1957, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee examined the question "On Improving Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" and rectified the situation.

[Correspondent] This involved removing Marshal Zhukov from his position?

[Trushin] That is not exactly how I would put the question now. The October (1957) Central Committee Plenum emphasized the decisive importance of party leadership in the organizational development of the Armed Forces and the observance of Leninist standards and principles of leadership in the Army and Navy. As the plenum decree pointed out, a task confronted the party and the people: to keep our defenses on a level of modern military equipment and science and ensure the security of our country. Along with the solely responsible commanders, in carrying out this task an important role was to be played by the military councils, the political bodies and the party organizations in the Army and Navy.

The plenum defined the paths for improving party political work and emphasized that it must strengthen the combat might of the Armed Forces, rally the personnel around the Communist Party and Soviet government and educate the servicemen in a spirit of total dedication to the Soviet motherland and in a spirit of friendship of the Soviet peoples and proletarian internationalism. The carrying out of the plenum decisions helped to improve party political work and the activities of the GlavPUR and political bodies and to increase party influence on all aspects of Army and Navy life. In 1957-1958, the Army and Navy restored 84 and established over 150 new political bodies. In 1967, in accord with the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 21 January, the Army and Navy reinstituted the deputy company, battery and squadron commanders for political affairs and organized a network of higher military political schools. In that same year, they established the political directorates of the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Troops, Air Forces and Navy as well as the Political Section of the VDV [Airborne Troops]. The structure of both the GlavPUR and the other political bodies assumed a clearer and more concrete nature as applied to each Armed Service. In a word, the character of today.

The organizational structure of the GlavPUR is determined by the CPSU Central Committee. It consists of directorates and sections concerned with the specific areas of party political work. In the GlavPUR are the following: the Directorate of Party Organizational Work, the Directorate for Propaganda and Agitation, the Personnel Directorate as well as a number of independent sections: Komsomol work, technical propaganda facilities, finances, a letter bureau and others.

[Correspondent] As is known, there is a Buro in the GlavPUR. What are its functions? Who are members of the Buro? How are its decisions approved and carried out?

[Trushin] In the aims of ensuring collectivism in settling the most important questions of party and political work and educating the personnel of party political workers in the Army and Navy in a spirit of observing the Leninist standards of party life and principles of party leadership, the CPSU Central Committee on 4 August 1960 adopted a decision to establish the Buro of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

It was established that the membership of the Buro would include the chief of the Main Political Directorate (chairman), the deputy chiefs of the Main Political Directorate, the chief of the Directorate of Party Organizational Work, the chief of the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation, the chief of the Personnel Directorate and the assistant of the chief of the Main Political Directorate for Komsomol Work, the chief secretary of the Party Commission under the Main Political Directorate and the military council members including the chiefs of the Political Directorates of the Armed Services and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Let me give the current membership of the GlavPUR Buro: Army Gen A. Lizichev, Flt Adm A. Sorokin, Col Gen V. Nechayev, Lt Gen G. Stefanovskiy, Lt Gens V. Lukinykh and A. Maslov, Col Gens A. Shirinkin, V. Rodin, M. Popkov and V. Silakov, Adm V. Panin, Lt Gen I. Panov, Lt Col I. Yefimov and others.

The Buro decisions are passed by a majority of votes and are obligatory for each member and are carried out by directives and instructions of the chief of the Main Political Directorate. In the event of disagreement on an adopted decision, the Buro member has the right to report his opinion to the CPSU Central Committee.

[Correspondent] For example, what questions were reviewed by the GlavPUR Buro in the first months of this year?

[Trushin] In 1989, the GlavPUR Buro examined the conclusions from the results of the reporting-electoral party meetings and party conferences in the Army and Navy, the state of training and educational work and the activities of the leading cadres of the Donets Higher Military-Political School, the question of restructuring in the training and educational process in the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin. A military council member, the Chief of the Political Directorate of the Belorussian Military District, Lieutenant General N. Boyko, reported on the work of the district political directorate in carrying out the ideas of the 19th CPSU All-Union Conference on having the political bodies and party organizations master the methods of political leadership, while the military council member and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Volga Military District, Lieutenant General V. Filippov, reported on the work of the political directorate, the political bodies and party organizations in the district in carrying out the demands of the CPSU Central Committee on preventing drunkenness and alcoholism. The question was also reviewed of the course of certifying political officers in the troops of the Transbaykal Military District. The results of the elections of the USSR people's deputies in the units and ships of the Army and Navy were summed up and a number of other questions examined.

[Correspondent] The GlavPUR today is also keeping step with perestroika. But what is the most important here? Please tell about this.

[Trushin] Perestroika has demanded from GlavPUR new approaches in the political, military, social and spiritual spheres and in combating shortcomings in combat readiness and troop training.

GlavPUR has constantly come up with proposals concerning defense development in our nation. These proposals are reported to the CPSU Central Committee and to the USSR Minister of Defense.

The Soviet Armed Forces under present-day conditions are one of the most significant, actively working factors for preventing a war, for maintaining peace and for ensuring international security. They are the bulwark of

the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. The party and people have put the main responsibility on them for maintaining the country's defense capability, as was emphasized by M.S. Gorbachev in his speech before the United Nations, "on the level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency so that no one would try to encroach on the security of the USSR and its allies." This also determines the place and role of GlavPUR in perestroika. As the senior political body of the Army and Navy, it takes an active part in all the perestroika processes and in the nation-wide work of the revolutionary renewal of the nation and at the same time is undergoing perestroika itself and restructuring party political work in the Army and Navy. Here the basic efforts are focused on increasing party influence on all aspects of the training and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Its quality indicators at present are determined by the strictly defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine. The combat readiness of the Army and Navy should be such to ensure the guaranteed prevention of a war and the dependable rebuff of possible aggression under any conditions of its unleashing.

[Correspondent] Obviously, in order to improve the qualitative indicators in the training of the troops and staffs not just in words but in actual deeds, it is essential to strengthen the service and party demands on those who organize the training and educational process, who direct it, who determine its efficiency. What does the GlavPUR think about this?

[Trushin] Undoubtedly, an improvement in the qualitative indicators will remain a good intention if we do not carry out the task of instituting everywhere strict prescribed order and strong military discipline.

It must be said that as a whole the process of improving the situation is continuing to gather strength. Starting from 1986, there has been a decline in the crime rate and accidents as well as the death of personnel. And this decline has been going on in all the Armed Services and combat arms, in all the districts, groups of forces and fleets. In comparison with 1985, the total number of crimes for the Army and Navy has declined by more than one-third. The number of persons condemned by judges of military tribunals has been reduced by 55 percent.

But we have still been unable to achieve fundamental shifts and a major improvement in military discipline.

Instances of so-called nonregulation relations have assumed exceptional acuteness. They have become, in essence, one of the main indicators by which the people judge the state of the Armed Forces. At present, there has been a noticeable decline in these instances but we must eliminate them completely. Not everything has been done to put an end to such a shameful phenomenon as refusing military service. In the troops and on the fleets there still are frequent instances of apathy, an ignorance of people, and the inability to promptly come to their aid

in a difficult vital situation for them. The equipment accident rate is declining slowly. Drunkenness has not been eliminated.

The ongoing tense situation with military discipline presupposes a further rise in all the organizational and ideological-upbringing efforts of the GlavPUR, the commanders, the political bodies and party organizations, as is required by the CPSU Central Committee. It is essential to change decisively the approaches to the problem of maintaining discipline and shift the center of gravity to individual work with a man, to strengthening its creative sources, at achieving not a feigned but rather a strong spiritual closeness between superiors and subordinates and at establishing proper conditions for the service, routine and recreation of all personnel.

The GlavPUR sees its social position in having the Army and Navy be disciplined and organized, in having the combat skill and political-moral state of the personnel rise and the inseparable link of the Army with the people grow stronger. Here it is clearly understood now how much was lost in the past, we have still not completely assimilated—neither in theory and particularly in practice—the entire fruitfulness of Lenin's ideas and plans as well as the practical recommendations concerning creative discipline. All of this at present is being reestablished and brought within the context of the main and pressing practical undertakings of the GlavPUR.

For these purposes the GlavPUR has set up a monthly analysis of the state of military discipline and disciplinary practices and there is a regular review of these questions with the members of the military councils who are the chiefs of the political directorates of the Armed Services, districts, groups of forces and fleets. Each month, large groups of GlavPUR officers and generals work in the troops and on the fleets, helping on the spot to strengthen discipline, prescribed order and to shape up negligent workers. All the subdivisions of GlavPUR have begun to be more actively concerned with disciplinary questions. In 1989, we are to set up a sociopsychological service in the Army and Navy and leadership over it has been entrusted to the GlavPUR. The responsibility of the GlavPUR Buro members has been increased for organizing the execution of the decisions taken to combat bureaucracy as well as hold responsible the officials guilty of red tape and chicanery. A commission is being established on interethnic relations. We plan to set up a body as a scientific information center. It will include the leading social scientists and practical workers in party political work from the troops. Not a single appeal to the GlavPUR will go unnoticed and each is to be thoroughly scrutinized and the guilty parties strictly punished. But this is only in the briefest form. Here clearly we must also speak about perestroika in all the main lines of party political work as the GlavPUR stands at the center of all the perestroika processes in the Army and Navy.

[Correspondent] I would like to speak a bit about these main lines. What new, for example, has appeared in the

GlavPUR activities in directing the political organizations and party organizations of the Army and Navy?

[Trushin] First of all, the GlavPUR is seeing to it that each Army and Navy political body firmly embodies in its practical activities the fundamental notion that party leadership is political leadership. And incompatible with political leadership are: pulling rank, dictating of terms, command-pressure approaches, a command-giving style, the practice of duplicating and taking over for the commanders and chiefs of the rear or technical bodies. For this reason GlavPUR has set the task that the political bodies themselves live by the same laws which rest at the basis of perestroika. An example has been set of the democratic organization for its inner life and activity. They must be, if you wish, an example, a model of political organization. They must constantly be concerned that the style and methods of work and the forms of organization correspond to the requirements of the times and that none of the political elements fall behind the perestroika processes. They must act decisively against conservatism, inertia, dogmatism, administration by mere injunction, they have given themselves a more modern organizational structure and have made them strictly reportable to the party masses and more democratic. The communists receive with satisfaction the GlavPUR decision that all political bodies at the previous party conferences give accountability reports and their activities be judged from the same system as in the local party bodies. This has straightened up many party bodies and their leaders.

The role of the primary party organizations has been substantially increased. At present, all the communists, regardless of the positions they hold, bear responsibility to the primary organization. The commander in his activities relies on the party organization but he no longer directs it. The notion of "directing" in the new working of the Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Army and Navy has been omitted, as it is identical with the concept of "leading" and this right has been given solely to the political body.

The potential of a party organization in the Army and Navy represents almost 40,000 primary party organizations, including almost 20,000 which have party committees or buros. The party organizations and groups function in 85 percent of the companies, batteries and equivalent subunits. The party stratum among the personnel is around 20 percent. Communists make up $\frac{3}{4}$ of the officers and 1 out of every 4 warrant officer.

But the question arises quite reasonably: with such party forces can we be satisfied with what has been achieved in training of the troops, in discipline and in the educating of the personnel? The answer is only one and that is we cannot. First of all, we must completely overcome the organizational looseness, the flabbiness and impotence of a whole series of Army and Navy primary party organizations and also certain political bodies.

[Correspondent] How does the Army and Navy Komsomol organization appear?

[Trushin] The size of the Komsomol organization has somewhat declined. Over the last 6 years, there has been a decline in the admissions to the Komsomol. In 1987, the admission of new Komsomol members declined by 32.3 percent and in 1988, by 15.3 percent.

All commanders, the system of political bodies and the party organizations must be better concerned with the problems of the army Komsomol. We must not interfere or take over but rather trust and create conditions for meaningful work of the Komsomol organizations, work which truly interests and attracts the youth. We must develop democracy in the internal Komsomol life as well as the responsibility of the cadres and aktiv. The question for GlavPUR is as follows: a political body cannot be affirmatively assessed if stagnation and formalism reign in the Komsomol and other social organizations.

[Correspondent] One other question. How is perestroika going on within the political study system?

[Trushin] Democratic principles are being developed in the organization of political studies: there is a situation of creativity, dialogue, a frank discussion of pertinent problems and the conducting of experiments in the search for new approaches. Annual certification of the political study leaders has been made a practice. The political bodies have been given the right to change up to 20 percent of the subjects. They also have the right independently to set the sequence of their study in accord with the specific tasks of the units and formations. The organization and thematic focus of the plans support a thorough study of the materials and decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the questions of CPSU defense policy. In the range of subjects, the accent has been put on increasing the level of educational work considering the multinational composition of the troop collectives.

We are continuing to search for optimum ways for studying Russian by those servicemen who have a poor mastery of it. At present, an experiment in this area is being conducted in all the districts. There is a fundamental agreement with the USSR Academy of Sciences to prepare and publish a new accessible Russian language textbook in 1991.

Work is also being done to improve the quality of the physical plant and procedural support for political studies. The textbook "Svyashchenny dolg" [Sacred Duty] (1988) was published on a competitive basis. As a whole, over the last 5 years five textbooks have been published. In addition, the Military History Institute has prepared five teaching aids on the problems of military, moral and legal education and an aid "V pomoshch izuchayushchim proizvedeniya V.I. Lenina" [Help for Those Studying the Works of V.I. Lenin]. A new version of the textbook has been published for the political studies of warrant officers. The visual aids for political exercises have been redesigned. To help the group

leaders each year nine or ten film strips are put out with a total run of up to 100,000 copies.

But, we still have many complaints against the content of political studies. A monologue has been replaced by a dialogue far from everywhere. There have been instances of empty words, the rehashing of rote truths, mere twaddle, a divorcing of political studies from the urgent needs of troop training and the strengthening of military discipline. We are rectifying all of this by turning things upside down. Perestroika itself in the military sphere requires from the political bodies a greater reliance on ideological work and its energetic ideological support.

[Correspondent] Does this also apply to the teaching of social disciplines in the military schools?

[Trushin] Yes. Here as well there have been failures. But much has also been done. In particular, new subject plans and curricula have been worked out for all the social disciplines and these are aimed at a fundamental improvement in the Marxist-Leninist education of the students and officer candidates and a thorough elucidation of the revolutionary transforming activities of the CPSU at the present stage. They presuppose a higher level of study of the works by K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin and the documents of the CPSU. New organizational and procedural instructions and the Directive "On the Teaching of Social Sciences in the Military Schools of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Measures to Restructure This" have been worked out and introduced. In the military academies they have organized work on preparing to teach the interdisciplinary course: "Urgent Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory and Policy of the CPSU." A unified comprehensive state examination has been introduced and it is recommended that this be taken by the colloquium method. The social science chairs have been unified into the single chair of Marxism-Leninism. In the military schools, instead of the graduating state exam on CPSU history, an exam has been introduced on Marxism-Leninism.

In the military academies and schools they have introduced such new active forms of instruction as individual quiz colloquiums, independent work under the leadership of an instructor, practice exercises, press conferences, professional games, "roundtables," seminar discussions, practical sessions and so forth. Great attention has begun to be given to coordinating and working out priorities in scientific research. In the military schools they have commenced interdisciplinary research on the following: "The Dialogue," "Habits," "Education," "The Complex" and others.

[Correspondent] Is the military press which is led by the GlavPUR also undergoing perestroika?

[Trushin] At present, the Army and Navy publish 268 military newspapers and journals with a total single run of 6.5 million copies. Voenizdat publishes over 2,500 titles with a total run of 70 million copies.

At present the printing capacities of the central military press do not make it possible to fully satisfy the spiritual needs of the Army and Navy personnel. A majority of the printing equipment at the military printing plants is worn out, it is obsolete and physically aged. Of the 25 printing plants for the district, group and fleet newspapers, two-thirds require reconstruction or capital construction.

To a larger degree, perestroika has involved the content of military newspapers and journals. The district, group, fleet and central newspapers have been given a Komsomol-youth character and many of them have been turned into a rostrum of advanced experience in perestroika and an organizer of work to mobilize the personnel for involved participation in the struggle for high end results in training and discipline. Noticeably better on this level are the newspapers of the Northern Caucasus, Far Eastern, Odessa and Turkestan Military Districts, the Southern Group of Forces and the Black Sea Fleet as well as the soldier large-run papers in the Leningrad, Far Eastern and Moscow Military Districts and certain others.

Since January 1989, as the readers have noticed, the number of pages in the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN has increased and this has made it possible to more frequently publish on its pages artistic works of a military patriotic nature and more completely treat the heroic past of our motherland, military history and the present-day life of the Army and Navy.

In addition, it will be interesting for the readers to learn that we have set up and have at work a Section of Literary Consultant Editors under the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio and a Military Artistic Writers' Studio. We are completing a study of the question of publishing a weekly sociopolitical supplement SYN OTECHSTVA for the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (similar to the supplement to the newspaper IZVESTIYA, NEDEL'YA). This will be designed for the broad reader. The district and fleet newspapers at present distribute a portion of their run (from 3,000 to 13,000 copies) through the local bodies of Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for the Distribution of Publications] for retail sales. There have been other changes in the military press and in the work of our mass information media.

[Correspondent] In the mass information media, announcements have sometimes appeared on the low level of organizing cultural educational work in the Army and Navy and that its physical plant can be widely criticized. Is this the case?

[Trushin] The system of cultural educational institutions in the Armed Forces includes over 6,800 officer clubs, around 8,000 libraries with holdings of 125 million copies, 750 military history and troop museums with holdings including more than 5 million storage units and which comprises 1/10 of the nation's museum holdings as well as over 2,500 combat history rooms. During the 11th Five-Year Plan, 260 buildings were put up for

cultural education institutions. During the 12th Five-Year Plan, we intend to build 32 officer clubs and 326 other clubs, 6 museums and some 237 million rubles will be employed for these purposes. Unfortunately, construction is being carried out at a slow pace with the exceeding of the set times.

Among the questions of improving the physical plant of the cultural educational institutions, one would also put an increased volume and quality of supplying technical propaganda facilities. Additional standards have been introduced for supplying the troops with motion picture projection equipment, radio phonographs, television sets, video tape recorders, electronic games and other equipment. At present, in the Army and Navy per 1,000 servicemen, there are 23 television sets, 9 tape recorders, 40 radio receivers and 8 motion picture projection units. In comparison with 1985, the Army's film holdings have increased by 21,000 copies of feature films. Television has reached our most remote garrisons in the North and East as well as ships in the Indian and Pacific Oceans....

Cultural ties have noticeably increased between the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. This includes joint film festivals of military films, exhibits and festivals of army amateur artistic activities, exchange concerts of song and dance ensembles and the exchange of literature, photographic exhibits and fine art exhibits, museum displays and exhibits.

Starting with 1965, we have held once every 2 years movie and photographic festivals for the armies of the socialist commonwealth countries. At the last 17th Festival held in the Bulgarian city of Burgas in 1988, 73 films and 149 photographic works were represented with delegations participating from Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, North Korea, Cuba, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The Central Museum of the USSR Armed Forces annually organizes exhibits devoted to the fraternal armies in its rooms. In 1988, the museum was visited by 125 foreign delegations.

The GlavPUR and the political bodies are working to further improve the financial support for party-political and mass cultural work in the troops.

In addition to allocations from the state budget under the USSR Ministry of Defense, funds are also being used from the income of Army and Navy cultural institutions as well as money from the self-supporting and publishing activities of the enterprises subordinate to the political bodies. In 1988, the internal income of the cultural educational institutions reached 46.2 million rubles and covered 84 percent of all the expenditures on their upkeep. The value of the products produced by the self-supporting enterprises and printing plants of the military newspapers in 1988 was 21.9 million rubles.

[Correspondent] Within the GlavPUR, as in each political body, a party commission is at work. In contrast to the other party commissions, its members are not elected, but are appointed by the CPSU Central Committee. Please describe its functions.

[Trushin] The party commission under GlavPUR carries out important work in ensuring the purity of party ranks, supervising the fulfillment of the CPSU Bylaws by the communists, their observance of party and military discipline, the standards of communist morality. With the forms and methods inherent to it, it focuses its main attention on checking the actual fulfillment by the communists of party decisions related to defense questions. Over the last 2 years, it has participated in more than 30 inspections on the spot on questions related to party and military discipline and with reference to the activities of specific communists of the leadership level. Such work has been carried out in the Transbaykal, Transcaucasus, Kiev, Odessa and other military districts as well as in the Black Sea Fleet.

In the work of the party commission a major place is taken up by review of cases concerning infractions by the communists and requests for expulsion from the CPSU as well as the strictness of the party reprimands. In 1988, around 300 such cases and requests were reviewed, including over 100 of these sent to the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The results of this work are analyzed and the conclusions are taken into account in practical activities in educating communists on the spot.

At present, the party commission, in accord with instructions from the CPSU Central Committee, is examining the questions of the party rehabilitation of army communists who were repressed in the 1930s and 1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s. Just during the first 5 months of 1989, the party commission has received over 60 letters from the relatives of victims with a request for their party rehabilitation.

[Correspondent] In the press one can often see the most contradictory views of the problems of military organizational development. Some attack one-man command from the standpoint of democratization while others argue in favor of abolishing the political bodies....

[Trushin] The question does exist. And although both sides usually are being guided by personal considerations and by unsatisfied ambitions, clearly one must take a closer look at the existing mechanism for allocating functions and the interaction of commanders and political bodies.

One-man command is the fundamental principle in the organizational development and leadership of the new type army. V.I. Lenin viewed one-man command as a system of command whereby it is possible to achieve a unity of actions of hundreds, thousands and scores of thousands of men. He insisted on introducing one-man command in 1919-1920. However, the lack of cadres and the psychological mood of the people who had just escaped from the tyranny of the bourgeoisie did not make it possible to implement his ideas. Complete one-man command was introduced in the Army only on 2 March 1925. As is known, the temporary introduction of the institution of military commissars in 1937-1940

and then in 1941-1942 was dictated by specific conditions and did not contradict the general party line in military organizational development.

In our times the importance of one-man command has risen further both from the viewpoint of the ability of the Armed Forces to carry out the functions assigned to them as well as normal activity of the troop collectives in peacetime. A further strengthening of one-man command and the increased authority of a commander are a constantly present task for the GlavPUR, the military councils, the political bodies and the party political apparatus as is the necessity of more actively developing in the commanders a political maturity, a state responsibility for the assigned job and the ability to rely on the party organization in one's activities and work under conditions of broadening democracy. Certainly there is no need to say that the criticism of one-man command which is presently found in a number of oral and written statements is aimed not at its basis but rather its distortion. This is more and more often the response to abuses, administration by mere injunction, an isolating from people, a negligent attitude toward laws and moral standards, to the rights and needs of others and a reticence to consider the opinion of subordinates. We feel that the new general troop regulations, the Regulation Governing the Political Bodies and the Instructions to the Party Organizations will fully consider as inseparable tasks the strengthening of one-man command on a party basis and the democratization of sociopolitical life and relations in the troop collectives.

Now let us take up the question of why political bodies and not party committees? First let us ask the question: Why is an army needed? The answer is clear: to defend the nation. Hence, the entire organizational structure of party work should be subordinate to this main task. Hence, any organizational change in the conditions of the Armed Forces should be aimed at increasing troop mobility and their readiness to shift to combat status. It should be brought closer and not made more distant from those forms of organization which we would employ in the course of a war. All the experience of party construction in the Army and Navy and the experience of the last war teaches that where the political bodies simultaneously combine political-administrative and party functions, the results were significantly more effective. In a combat situation, the party committees cannot provide leadership over the party organizations. Thus, we need precisely an organization such as the political sections which, in the first place, would be sufficiently flexible to lead the party organizations on a daily basis and, secondly, sufficiently centralized to carry out the arising tasks efficiently and in accord with the rapidly changing situation. If we follow the path of establishing party committees instead of political bodies, then inevitably in the event of danger, instead of responding immediately, we would have to be concerned with a reorganization and the creation of political sections instead of party committees. But as you can understand, we would not have time for this.

Furthermore, the presence of party committees does not provide the necessary efficiency under army conditions in carrying out the arising tasks. The chief of a political section and the deputy for political affairs can and should resolve a whole series of questions efficiently, while a party committee secretary does not have such a right and in order to avoid the criticism of administration by injunction, would in a majority of instances be forced to bring up such questions for discussion by the buro and committees.

So that is it. But we have a good view of the flaws in the work of the GlavPUR and the political bodies, the imperfection of their structure in a number of instances and a certain gravitation toward command-administrative methods. For this reason we are posing the task of further developing democratization and glasnost in the work of the political bodies. This is the most important condition for their perestroyka.

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YUNOST, OGONEK Criticized for Printing Voynovich's 'Chonkin'

18001260c Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
5 May 89 p 3

[Open letter by members of Odessa Military District's Gold Star Club to YUNOST editor A. Dementyev and OGONEK editor V. Korotich: "Sacrilege"; reprinted from VETERAN No.18, 1989]

[Text] Former Soviet writer V. Voynovich, who currently lives in the FRG, has written a defamatory and sacrilegious work titled "Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin"; YUNOST and OGONEK printed it, with the kind permission of the West German Ardis Publishing House.

What was it in this work that attracted our editors?

What does Mr. Voynovich laugh at? What is the subject of his ridicule?

First of all, it is the first day of the Great Patriotic War. It is the officer corps, political officers and soldiers of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, as well as men and women on collective farms.

We are war veterans, Heroes of the Soviet Union and full bearers of the Order of Glory, belonging to the Gold Star Club at the Odessa Military District's Officers' Club; we began our careers in the Red Army before the war. We are deeply outraged by the publication of this work.

In our memory, and in the memory of the entire Soviet people, the first day of the Great Patriotic War will always remain the most tragic day of our 70-year history. On that day our cities were bombed; on that day our front-line units engaged the enemy; on that day the first thousands of our soldiers fell under fascist fire. We, the witnesses of those times, remember the tears of the

mothers, the wives, the sisters, the brides and the children sending off to war their sons, husbands, brothers, fathers and fiancées. We can still see the long lines of volunteers stretching in front of military commissariats.

It is this day of national mourning that Voynovich chose to mock.

Could any of us, soldiers on the front lines, imagine during the war that this tragedy would become the butt of a series of jokes? Truly, cynicism and ridicule know no bounds.

Could it be that our editors failed to understand this? Could they fail to see what they, along with the author, were mocking?

They are mocking the dead and those who engaged the fascists in the first days of the war, of whom only three percent were still alive in May 1945. Those were the officers and political commissars who would lead the charge and would be the first to die; they took their last stand at the walls of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Odessa and Sevastopol. They stopped the brown flood of fascist plague. They freed the peoples of Europe.

Can we allow the fallen heroes to be ridiculed? The Motherland's defenders to be ridiculed? To be made the subject of angry satire?

Comrades Dementyev and Korotich, do you not understand that this is a sacrilege?

According to a Turkmen proverb, if a friend cries a foe laughs.

And what about Voynovich's portrayal of country women and other residents of the village of Krasnoye? He endowed them with primitive minds and actions, bestial feelings, profanity and mental retardation. All is imbued with hatred for everything Soviet and Russian. The taunting and the contempt on the part of a supercilious gentleman for the darker masses show the author's lack of common decency.

But what about you, comrade editors?

Where is your civic conscience? Your pride?

You have given your editorial blessing to the insult to the memory of the people and the heroes.

We, the survivors, protest in the name of those who fell the profanation of the most sacred memory of the people.

In the name of the members of the Gold Star Club, which includes 72 Heroes of the Soviet Union and 16 full bearers of the Order of Glory, this letter was signed by club chairman Colonel (Retired) V.Zavertyayev, Hero of the Soviet Union; Lieutenant General (Retired), Air Force, V.Aleksenko, twice Hero of the Soviet Union; Major General (Retired), Air Force, P.Gnido, Hero of the Soviet Union; Major General (Retired), Air Force, G.Shadrin,

Hero of the Soviet Union; L.Buzhak, full bearer of the Order of Glory; and club secretary Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) G.Kargopol'tsev)

Military Leadership Accused of Misuse of Air Transport

18010847b Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by Ye. Domnysheva: "A Million [Rubles] Flew Away"]

[Text] At one of the last sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Deputy Aleksandr Tsalko listed cases which looked like they are a flagrant disparity with conversations going on at the session in the Kremlin about our economic troubles and needs.

"This is precisely how I regard it," the deputy and colonel confirmed in a conversation with me when I asked him to reveal the essence of his stated charges in more detail. "On 23 June, approximately 50 passenger aircraft, including such large ones as TU-154's, TU-134's, AN-12's, and AN-26's, took off from military airfields near Moscow. There were five to ten passengers... on each of them! There is a good passenger network literally with all cities from which military leaders flew to the capital and they could have gotten by on scheduled Aeroflot flights. Alas, the personal ambitions of our high ranking military know no limits... But

this is not yet all. The majority of the aircraft, having left their 'registered' passengers in Moscow, flew to airfields in Kiev, Leningrad, and other cities and, after completion of the conference with the minister, the aircraft were forced to return to the capital and take these same five to ten passengers on board.

"These petty whims and 'tricks' for only one day in July cost the Ministry of Defense and consequently the whole country approximately one million rubles. And let us point out: It was not at all spent on strengthening our defense capabilities, but was simply burned up in the air.

"I do not know what was decided at the conference with the minister. But if they were problems of the same importance as changing the distance between the stars on officers' shoulder boards (an innovation which also cost the state a pretty kopeck), then a million [should be spent] on something so 'urgent and needed' and more worthy of the use of the people's money than what we are talking about. General Arkhipov also [flew] from Moscow to Kalinin during the pre-election campaign on this same series of flights. The general obviously did not know that the whole journey is two hours travel by car.

"I have listed several cases all told and have not talked about many others that are no less wasteful. Have the highest ranking military personnel really not noticed that the situation in the country has changed?"

Influence of Stagnation Still Retarding Development of Tactics

18010848 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Jul 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Ranevskiy, Baltic Military District:
"How Tactics Is Being Revived"]

[Text] Issues associated with the revival of tactics as the art of organization and conduct of battle are frequently raised in our publications under the heading of "Combat Readiness: Parameters of Quality" which started at the beginning of the current training year. There is no doubt that fixed attention will be devoted to resolving them while carrying out the resolutions of the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies on further qualitative development of the Armed Forces. The following paragraphs discuss how things are turning out in practice today.

This occurred at one of the exercises where issues were being worked out associated with combat operations during offense and defense.

Some vehicles had driven through the defending motorized rifle battalion's combat formation at night. Sedately with headlights on. The soldiers from the security outpost had only paid attention to that: They said that the vehicles were giving their location away. As for the vehicles' unit affiliation, there is little of such equipment dashing about on the roads—a training exercise is a training exercise...

But they "scurried about" and, as it turned out afterwards, they were scouts for the opposing side. Having used the lack of concern of the defenders who are subordinates of Guards Lieutenant O. Gaydar, they practically "took" the battalion observation point without a single shot.

In the morning, a commotion was literally raised in the training exercise area. Rebukes were hurled mainly at the scouts: The defenders said that the scouts violated safety regulations and began operating before the exercise leader's plan came into force... Generally, they did not act in accordance with regulations.

It is true that the conflict caused by the scouts' daring raid was also exhausted on an emotional level because the further course of the exercise was precisely staged with the aggressors' traditional attack and the defenders' counter-attack along the length and breadth of the initial point—both sides were totally satisfied.

Oh, what an ostentatious tactic! How many daring and unusual decisions it filtered out. Who has not lost a taste for initiative while instilling ordinary linear thinking. Lt Gen V. Khazikov was indeed correct when he noted in the first article dedicated to the problems of reviving tactics that we ourselves have become hostages of a false idol—the live fire exercise.

But is the priority only assigned to fire [exercises] to force commanders "to not become wise" and to "hold the line" with all their strength so that, God forbid, no

one lags behind and no one rushes ahead? Here, it seems to me, we need to look at the big picture.

Now many talk about those problems of society which we associate with the period of stagnation and which were also reflected in Army affairs. Moreover, we know quite a few examples when organization and regimentation took on an openly hypertrophied character in Army structures. And this had to affect the organization for training troops, including in such an important "branch" of military art as tactics. Really a training leader cannot take a step without approval. Where can we now count on bold decisions and a creative search for tactical innovations? The content and nature of exercise limits have imparted an entirely concrete specificity and oversimplification to the actions of commanders and personnel. Placed within the strict confines of the plan sent down by higher headquarters, people have turned out to be prisoners of a somewhat more refined idol—bureaucratism and they do not have the practical opportunities to oppose it.

But what is happening today when perestroika presents such an opportunity?

Since the beginning of the current training year, subunit and unit access to training centers envisioned by the combat training program has begun to be actively practiced among the forces of our military district. This form of training gives commanders a good opportunity, as it is called, to become immersed in tactics in earnest. At the same time, naturally, emphasis is placed on working out missions associated with defensive combat operations.

While visiting these exercises, you can see how officers are all the more frequently returning to pretty well forgotten issues. For example, in Major A. Diyakonenko's battalion I managed to be present at exercises where operations were worked out for defense of a building. Specific missions of war were carried out against real facilities with the use of simulation. As many officers stated afterward, they received an object lesson.

For a long time, we had almost forgotten such concepts as disengagement from an enemy force and withdrawal. And during the final training sessions at the end of the winter training period, I had the opportunity to be present during development of these issues, too. In particular, battalion tank crews which Lt Col V. Fedorov commands showed how important it is, even during the current defensive trend in tactical training, to improve mastery of the theories and practice of operations in various types of combat. For example, Lt Col Fedorov succeeded in carrying out the disengagement of his battalion from an enemy force on terrain which impeded maneuver and coordination among subunits and preserved his forces for a subsequent offensive. And he succeeded in many ways thanks to the fact that elements of military cunning and camouflage were skillfully used by the subunits and they continuously conducted reconnaissance. A group of tanks commanded by Lt O. Markobrunov boldly operated from an ambush. Artillery men

commanded by Captain Yu. Melnik intelligently placed their barrage fire and smoke screens.

Major General P. Koryagin, deputy military district commander who was present at this exercise, did not like all of the tank crews' operations. But instead of the patterned thinking which we see at concluding training sessions where people usually attempt to not risk anything, we saw creativity, initiative, and a search—a gratifying phenomenon.

It is true that even here I have to say: There are still not so many such exercises as we would like. What is the reason for this?

In my view, there are two important circumstances which immediately become evident. First of all, new maneuvers of combat field (in the literal sense of the word) bureaucratism when the schedule for conducting tactical exercises is compacted in the guise of intensifying the training process to the detriment of quality. Under such conditions, it is difficult for the commander to introduce, let us say, elements of surprise into the training process which would force people to think keenly and act in a military manner. It is also no accident that the concluding training sessions demonstrated that many soldiers, sergeants, and even officers experience difficulty arriving at conclusions about the tactical situation and poorly orient themselves to it.

I must particularly discuss the shortcomings in officer training. As we know, in order to competently organize a battle and control it, it is not enough to teach the appropriate provisions of the combat regulation and unflinching sustain the prescribed sequence of actions. If we talk about the big picture, the development of commanders' tactical mastery and tactical art in the Army as a whole is not progressing via uniformity, but let us put it this way, is progressing via tactical heterodoxy. This must be natural, as natural as an alternative, for example, in the selection of the optimal decision or method of carrying out a combat mission. But where does this heterodoxy come from if frequently tactical echelon commanders themselves, and not only their chiefs, do not want (and this is the second circumstance) to take risks?

Here is an example. A year ago, Lt Col D. Kashin's subordinates demonstrated weak skills in tactical training. And recently I had the opportunity to see them once again at an exercise, incidentally, at that very same location. And what of it? The tank crews acted in a straightforward manner as before, counting on an unsophisticated and awkward enemy. Decisions were made by the officers without taking the tactical situation or the correlation of forces into account.

Of course, it is difficult to restructure thinking and to repudiate postulates which imposed so-called show tactics on commanders for many years. Not only a subordinate but even the commander himself cannot be forced to think in a new way in a very short period of time. Moreover, unfortunately we do not always have real

conditions which stimulate bold steps beyond the limits of the ordinary. What interferes with the creation of these conditions?

There is no simple answer. But this is what experience, including combat experience, shows. The nature of contemporary battle completely rejects calculations on enemy frontal attacks and on the accustomed disposition of forces when line deployment of weaponry prevails and standard intervals and distances are strictly observed. The problem of ensuring steadfast defense, in particular, acquires a particular sharpness in connection with this when the enemy uses highly accurate weapons.

This mission, as we know, is complicated in and of itself. We know, for example, that the reconnaissance-strike systems (RUK), let us say, that the U.S. Army has in its inventory are capable of very rapidly determining the location and destroying dozens of group targets. Second echelon defenders in particular present heightened interest for RUK. In connection with this, you can often hear the opinion among tactical echelon officers about the advisability of another deployment of forces and weapons in defense. And the search is of course ongoing for such a disposition in which the capabilities of modern weaponry would be taken into consideration to a greater degree and would ensure necessary conditions for carrying out the mission with which the troops are tasked. But this is being done, so to speak, at the level of enthusiasts.

One of the causes of this situation, and also the difficulties with the revival of the tactical art as a whole, is also, in my view, imperfection of our field training facilities. I must confess that it remains at the 60's level in certain parameters. Of course, everything is not as simple here as it appears at first glance.

Yes, we are saying that tactical training of all branches and combat arms of the Armed Forces must rid itself of patterned thinking and primitivism in the most energetic fashion. For example, it will not do at all that many Ground Forces subunits carry out combat training missions on one and the same sections of terrain.

But what is the way out of this? What can we do if the equipment on our ranges is static and frequently tied to base power sources?

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written about new innovations which allow us to "increase" the limits of our ranges. The newspaper also reported that the forces are impatiently waiting for remote controlled pneumatic target lifting devices, for example. The matter is, according to experts, very promising. At the same time, for example, they are extremely concerned about protracted delays caused by perfecting new equipment while conducting military district combat training.

"The compressor station portion is poor," Major S. Petrov, a special electrical equipment engineer, pointed out in a conversation with me. "It is still unclear if it will

be mobile or stationary. And who will service this equipment—once again homebred skilled craftsmen?"

In fact, the more intently you delve into the production, so to speak, aspect of tactical training, the more questions arise. For example, it turns out that equipment is first of all delivered to training centers and only afterward, about two or three years later, is an organic description of its "servicing" determined. It is the same thing with component parts: First of all the facility brings them up to the mark and their delivery is begun only after expiration of the warranty periods.

But even this type of bureaucratic barrier cannot stop people who are really creative and have the initiative to make their main goal ensuring qualitative parameters of combat readiness, comprehensive improvement of the level of organization of combat training, and consolidation of its equipment base.

Knowing all of the "peculiarities" of its management, for example, officers of the section headed by Col T. Stolyar are not sitting idle. Lt Col A. Prymachev developed a new target sensor. The innovation quickly justified itself in practice and reduced the time for equipping fields and renewing targets after firing. Eight modifications to target destruction sensor subassemblies with the use of cannon and machine-gun fire light simulators have been developed and are being used in the district. Equipping them with laser simulation devices will make an even greater contribution to the improvement of troop field training.

One thing concerns me: While the inventors work, the hacks propagate. And are we not risking that we will turn out to be "hacks" in the big picture while shutting our eyes to the close interrelationship of all aspects of the development of tactics, military-scientific, social, economic while attempting to resolve each of these problems individually and not comprehensively?

Obituary of General of the Army A.T. Altunin
18010849 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Jul 89 First Edition p 4

[Obituary: "General of the Army Aleksandr Terentevich Altunin"]

[Text] General of the Army Aleksandr Terentevich Altunin, prominent Soviet military leader and Hero of the Soviet Union, died on 15 July 1989 after a serious illness.

A true son of the Soviet people and active participant in the Great Patriotic War has died who devoted all of his conscious life to selfless service to the people, to the Socialist Fatherland, and to the cause of the Communist Party whose ranks he joined in 1948.

A.T. Altunin was born to a peasant family on 14 August 1921 in the village of Steklyanok in Kalachinskiy Rayon in Omsk Oblast. He began work as secretary of a rural soviet. In 1939, he voluntarily entered the Red Army. He served in its ranks for approximately 50 years covering the long journey from infantry school cadet to general of the army.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, A.T. Altunin's courage and organizational capabilities were clearly manifested. He commanded a rifle platoon, company, and battalion, was deputy commander of a rifle regiment, participated in battles for defeating enemy forces in the area of the city of Yartsevo, in amphibious assault operations in the Crimea, and in the Lvov-Sandomir, Vistula-Oder, and other operations. His firmness of will, individual valor, and fearlessness distinguished him during the most difficult combat situations.

During the post war period, A.T. Altunin graduated from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy. He commanded large units, formations, and the North Caucasus Military District. He worked in a responsible position in the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, was chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, head of USSR Civil Defense, deputy USSR Minister of Defense, and of late was a military inspector and advisor to the USSR Ministry of Defense group of general inspectors.

Everywhere the party sent him, he regarded his entrusted mission with high responsibility, imparting his knowledge and experience to strengthen the Armed Forces and increase their combat readiness. A.T. Altunin was a demanding and concerned military leader and enjoyed the respect of both his subordinates and comrades in the service.

A.T. Altunin actively participated in social work. He was a member of the CPSU Central Committee, a delegate to a number of Party congresses, and a deputy of the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The Communist Party and Soviet government highly valued the services of A.T. Altunin. He was awarded the

rank of Hero of the Soviet Union, decorated four times with the Order of Lenin, twice with the Order of the Red Banner and the Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy, Patriotic War First Degree, Red Star, "For Service to the Fatherland in the USSR Armed Forces" Third Degree, and with many medals and also orders and medals of a number of socialist countries.

The blessed memory of Aleksandr Terentevich Altunin, true son of the Communist Party and patriot of the Socialist Fatherland, will be forever preserved in our hearts.

M.S. Gorbachev, V.I. Vorotnikov, L.N. Zaykov, Ye.K. Ligachev, V.A. Medvedev, V.P. Nikonov, N.I. Ryzhkov, N.N. Slyunkov, V.M. Chebrikov, E.A. Shevardnadze, V.V. Shcherbitskiy, A.N. Yakovlev, D.T. Yazov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, A.D. Lizichev, A.S. Pavlov, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Efimov, V.N. Chernavik, A.N. Soshnikov, M.I. Sorokin, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, D.S. Sukhorukov, Yu. A. Yashin, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, S.K. Kurkotkin, N.V. Ogarkov, V.I. Petrov, S.L. Sokolov, I.G. Pavlovskiy, and I.N. Shkadov.

Maj Gen Ivashov on Functions of Administrative Directorate

18010843 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Jul 89 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Maj Gen L. Ivashov, chief, Administrative Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, by Maj I. Ivanyuk: "In the Epicenter of Military News"; date and place not given]

[Text] [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Leonid Grigoryevich, for a long time office work has been considered monotonous and boring. I believe that most of our readers associate the Administrative Directorate with that kind of work.

[Ivashov] Well, I cannot let it go at that, for that would be wrong. The truth is that the functions assigned to us generally entail much more than clerical work. As a matter of fact, the Administrative Directorate handles an enormous number of documents addressed to the USSR Ministry of Defense, the minister of defense, and his deputies; they all require proper processing. However, this is only part of the functions. The Administrative Directorate is charged with legal supervision over documents intended for higher party and state organs, and also over drafts of orders and directives issued by the minister of defense and other officials. We also publish and distribute the orders and directives to field units and military control organs, and we monitor compliance. Another example of the kind of activities in which the Administrative Directorate is involved is furnishing guidance for legal services performed by the USSR Ministry of Defense, the role, significance, and amount of which are undergoing substantial growth.

Another important and considerable aspect of our work is modification and systematization of military laws.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Have you been affected by the Armed Forces reductions?

[Ivashov] Yes, the same as the entire central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defense. However, this does not mean a reduction in work. For example, we are now required to perform more intensive study and monitoring of international treaties and agreements in the area pertaining to the Ministry of Defense. We are in the process of organizing a small group of experienced and qualified jurists who will be involved with this work in the Armed Forces.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] There is a reason why I asked you about the reductions. We are all aware that the Armed Forces are establishing the system of universal legal information instruction and that legal reform is on the way. Your statements indicate that a number of these concerns will come under the purview of the Administrative Directorate. In this connection, when military reform was being carried out in the 1920s, there was the independent Military Legislation Directorate with its small staff of 90. What is the present situation?

[Ivashov] We have several officers that are involved with military legislation. They participate directly in preparing draft bills and perform a coordinating role. To rewrite existing and develop new normative acts, we enlist the services of experienced specialists from the ranks of generals and officers assigned to the General Staff and the various military services, and scientists from research institutions and military schools. For example, the draft Law on USSR Defense has drawn interesting suggestions from the General Staff Military Academy and the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze.

A law can remain in force for a long time only if it is written well and thoroughly thought out. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, such as the laws on state enterprise and cooperatives. In a simple example, a cooperative worker is sent on a three-month temporary assignment to the Armed Forces. Who is to pay him for this time? No normative act has ever had anything to say about this kind of situation. Some cooperatives have refused to compensate individuals and have even gone so far as to fire them. To prevent such situations, our jurists must become actively involved in preparing all-union acts and documents.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What are you presently doing in the area of military legislation?

[Ivashov] We are preparing the outlines of a bevy of laws. Specifically, we are reworking some articles of the USSR Constitution that regulate military construction. The mandates and speeches of peoples' deputies deal with the need for developing a code of servicemen's rights and framing a determination of the status of military service.

Intensive work is currently under way on preparing a draft of the Law on USSR Defense, which is to be reviewed by a Ministry of Defense collegium in the first quarter of the coming year, modified as much as necessary, and then submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Other draft laws are being drawn up. This is a fairly problematic matter, since it is necessary to reach a clear understanding as to which norms are to be included. In general, at the present time the primary effort involves reform of military legislation. As a result, this work must be put on a more solid footing.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The outcome most likely will be decided by proper inclusion of public opinion in the new legislation. How democratic is this process?

[Ivashov] I believe that we are speaking mainly of glasnost in writing the legislative acts. It is making progress. For example, after KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a discussion of the temporary Statute on Assembly of Officers, the comments and suggestions made were incorporated and the statute published. It has been decided to subject to wide discussion drafts of the new general military regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Many suggestions submitted by the Army community have been taken into account in the draft Law on USSR Defense. For example, there are the possibility of voluntary discharge of officers after 10 years of commissioned service and mandatory leave for enlisted personnel based on length of service, and many others. It is still too early to say whether or not they will be written into law, but here we have indications of democratization of military law.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The actions of the Army and Navy are regulated by a great number of normative documents. Is it possible to reduce this torrent of paper that threatens to literally inundate the Armed Forces?

[Ivashov] Within the framework of legal reform, we are required to review within a period of two years about 500 documents of both a legal and intradepartmental nature. Some of them are simply obsolete, while others regulate the same matters from various aspects. We must systematize and rework them to accommodate the new conditions. In this connection, the number of normative documents should decrease by more than two-thirds.

We have recently been successful in reducing the number of documents feeding into reports submitted to USSR Ministry of Defense authorities. As a rule, matters requiring preliminary study are forwarded to the particular organs of authority that can prepare the necessary recommendations or effect immediate resolution.

In general, I am convinced that the principal consideration in overcoming the great amount of paper work is the granting of greater independence to commanders and chiefs of all ranks. In those instances where they are authorized to make decisions, more can be asked of them. The point is that many unnecessarily "go to the

top", merely to report on their actions or simply to be on the safe side. In the USSR Ministry of Defense Administrative Department, one can readily see the large amount of papers received from each service. Incidentally, the input is markedly lower from the Strategic Missile Forces.

Relative to complaints and requests, there is little likelihood that fewer will be received in the near future. The visitors' room of the USSR minister of defense takes in about 600 letters a day and receives up to 100 visitors. Add to that the mail addressed to the peoples' deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is it possible to see the minister of defense or his deputies?

[Ivashov] It is. Every Saturday morning, starting at 10 am, a USSR deputy minister of defense receives servicemen, members of their families, and other citizens. The USSR minister of defense personally attends to the more important requests. Ministry of Defense officials are naturally not in a position to meet with all persons desiring such contact, but this most likely is not even necessary. A number of questions comes within the purview of other departments. Some of the matters are handled by the chief of the visitors' room, his deputy, or legal services officers in charge of visitors. Other reports, suggestions, and requests are channeled to officials into whose area they fall. As a rule, highest priority is assigned to pressing problems related to violation of regulations, discharge of military duties, and social justice. The fact that people come to the visitors' room is an indication of their faith in protection of their rights. On the other hand, examination of a matter often indicates something else: Some people use this approach in an attempt to facilitate their military duty or escape responsibility for committing an offense. As shown by analysis, the usual reason for a visit is to obtain clarification of a particular legislative act or regulation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nevertheless, much depends upon the Administrative Directorate rather than commanders and superiors. Distribution of most orders and directives to troops is delayed.

[Ivashov] That is unfortunately true. Although the time required to publish orders and directives issued by the USSR minister of defense has been cut almost in half, this does continue to be a problem. It is thought that the problem will be completely solved when construction of the new printing facility is completed. We hope that it will commence operating as early as 1991; this will help resolve many problems. We are also looking for ways to effect more expeditious delivery of orders and directives to districts and fleets.

To improve legal literacy on the part of servicemen and members of their families, we are placing high hopes on universal legal information instruction and the introduction of a new corps of jurists who will function as deputy commanders for legal affairs. This entails a number of personnel problems, since no particular attempt has

been made to provide specialists who could perform legal services for the USSR Ministry of Defense. Starting with 1 September of this year we will be offering a special three-year course of study via the department of military law. Another source of personnel has recently come to our attention. Since KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published the articles, we have been contacted by officers serving in field units who either possess a higher legal education obtained by correspondence study or are presently engaged in such study. Their first-hand knowledge of the way subunits function renders them valuable specialists.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade general, I have the impression that the Ministry of Defense Administrative Directorate is a kind of epicenter of military news. Could you possibly share some information on a recent development with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers?

[Ivashov] By all means. A recent decision will serve to simplify evening and correspondence study for officers, Army and Navy warrant officers, and conscripts in civilian VUZ's. Whereas this matter was previously restricted to resolution by army commanders and high-ranking authorities, now a unit commander is authorized to approve such a request.

Incidentally, the USSR Ministry of Defense order on organization of the universal legal information instruction requires us to employ the press to provide servicemen with information on new legal developments on a regular basis. This means that our contact with the press, including KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, should become permanent.

Col Gen Gromov Reflects on Problems of Kiev Military District

*18010853a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jul 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col A. Polyakov: "An Invited Guest: General Gromov"]

[Text] What military people have not witnessed such an occurrence? A senior commander arrives at a post on a visit, but the barracks area shows no signs of life.

That was the greeting extended to Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, the new commander of the Kiev Military District, by a post, while a second post... I am an eyewitness to the fact that Gromov is doing all he can to dispel the "fear of generals" existing since the time of stagnation, but the stereotype remains. Nevertheless, Col Gen Gromov is persistent in knocking down the invisible but completely real wall that often separates the general and soldier, the senior and the junior.

I have heard it said that there was not much of this wall in combat situations in Afghanistan. Is that true?

Boris Vsevolodovich looked tired as he settled back in his chair (we were holding this conversation after a hard day: riding in vehicles, quick trips by helicopter).

"You must pardon me, but I cannot supply a short and simple answer to that question. All I can say is that war is war, and anything can happen. However, there is a rule which has virtually no exceptions. Every military leader who made an honorable mark in history was close to his soldiers, understood their souls, and valued their lives. In Afghanistan this—concern for peoples' lives, for the least combat losses—constituted the very basis of this closeness. He who did not understand that could miss quite a bit!

"On one occasion, before I had assumed command of the 40th Army, a major military commander arrived and immediately suggested that part of the military forces be put on the pass and the remaining forces be committed to action on the other side of the pass. This was exactly what is taught at the training center. We protested, telling him that he had not taken into account the peculiarities of combat in Afghanistan, solicited the opinions of subordinate commanders, or thought about troop losses. He insisted. I tell you frankly that it was very difficult for us to put our point across, but the then chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev, supported us."

Colonel T. Povarchuk is presently serving in the Kiev Military District. At one time he was engineer service chief of 40th Army. He was known to "stomp" kilometers of rocky terrain with combat engineers that were later to be traversed by columns. On one occasion he accompanied Lieutenant General Gromov on a visit. Before getting down to business, he handed a package of candy to one soldier, a bottle of mineral water to another, and joked with a third.

"You had to be there to appreciate the effect this had on the troops," recalled the commander. "The attention and humanity displayed by the superior were of great significance under those most difficult of conditions."

In the Kiev Military District the commander encountered new problems that were just as difficult. There were about 20,000 families of servicemen that were without housing. A wide gap existed between personnel and training: There were Chernobyl, Armenia, and personal construction. Nevertheless, combat training could not be neglected.

A study of the problem indicated that artillerymen were not doing their part. What had to be done? Issue another directive? No, resolved the military council and commander. The artillery battalion commanders were invited to a discussion.

The officers expressed everything that was on their minds. There is too wide a disparity in wage leveling. Salary, apartment, and leave benefits were the same for good and bad subunit commanders. Superiors do not seem to appreciate higher proficiency ratings held by subordinates! Perhaps we could try setting up base pay and allowances with an upper and a lower limit and granting greater independence.

The participants left the discussion inspired and with a desire to work. Much credit was due to acceptance of the baton of their concerns by the commander and military council. The officers acquired the feeling that their opinions do receive attention and that they are not to be blamed for all troubles. They however did realize that quick solutions to all problems would not be forthcoming, since the matters had not been handled at the district level.

What was the first thing General Gromov noticed in his new capacity? What does he find unacceptable?

"Something done for show," quickly answered the commander. "That is quite ruinous."

On arriving on one occasion at a commander's observation post, he noticed that the walls of the trenches were lined with glossy wooden panels, with the walkways covered with sand.

"In Afghanistan we used boulders in our KNP's [commander's observation posts]," said the commander. "Even there, where boulders were available, you fill in holes and smooth the surface of the rocky ground to remove all traces of work. But here..."

On another occasion, a commander arrived at a post. All was cleanliness and order! He soon became aware of the odor of whitewash which had only recently been applied to decorate trim.

"I should think that it is difficult to maintain everything in such shape," he said to the troops.

"Yes sir!" answered the men. "Three days and two nights we worked without sleep."

"That tells you something about keeping such order," said the lieutenant general. "The commanders do think about how to put up a false front, but about people they do not think."

There is no doubt that Afghanistan has affected the life, person, and habits of Colonel General Gromov. He avoids excesses of any sort; he even took a smaller apartment than the one offered him. He does not like to raise his voice, and he makes no snap decisions for the purpose of rapid reporting. The point is that quick decisions always have a way of affecting people!

Documents, letters, and telegrams are always awaiting the commander at headquarters.

He is helping "Afghans" and his constituents of the Prilukskiy Rayon of Chernigov Oblast that nominated him for USSR people's deputy and the military patriotic clubs.

I remember well the question submitted to Gromov via the presidium at the pre-election meeting: "How can you, General, who knows nothing about how the civilian populace lives, carry out the mandate of your electors?" Although a mere four months have passed since the

elections (incidentally, the vast majority voted for Gromov), residents of the Chernigov area are saying that he is enjoying unprecedented luck.

"Boris Vsevolodovich is holding fast to the promise he made to the voters," A. Shved, secretary of the Prilukskiy Rayon of the KPU [Communist Party of the Ukraine] said to me. "The problem of assigning an excavator, which is invaluable to our installing gas facilities in villages, has been resolved; we are to receive six diesel powered generating units; and neighbors are slated to be provided with 15 trucks."

All the above equipment, which has been released by the military, will be put to good use in agriculture.

What does he do for himself? For his working day starts in the early morning and ends... But does it really end for the commander? Boris Vsevolodovich and I were flying in a helicopter when he answered my question by saying that he had still seen Kiev only through the windows of vehicles. Nonetheless...

"All of a sudden I discovered the music of Dmitriy Shostakovich," said the commander. His facial features took on a softer tone.

As we were parting, I made the remark that nowadays readers are interested in the private lives of the country's famous people, not only about their service and work.

"That is true," said Boris Vsevolodovich. "Times are changing, but I am not in the habit of sharing such information. It has been several years since my wife died in the airplane crash. Life without the comfort of a family is difficult even for a commander. My personal life will settle down soon. Older son Maksim is about to enter the Suvorov School, and younger son Andrey is still a schoolboy."

Association of Veterans of Foreign Military Assistance Groups

18010853b Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jul 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Dokuchayev: "Association of 'Unknown' Internationalists"; first two paragraphs are KRSNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] This is the first year that articles have been published on the subject of Soviet servicemen that rendered assistance in repelling outside aggression committed against the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Egypt, and Syria. KRSNAYA ZVEZDA readers were made familiar with this by "That Egyptian Year," "We Also Defended Vietnam," "It Happened in Korea," and others. The articles raised the questions of recognizing those who participated in combat activities in foreign countries as internationalist soldiers and of uniting them into social organizations. The 17th of May saw the passage of the Ukase on awarding those who carried out combat tasks in foreign countries Certificates of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and designating a

distinctive device. On June 30 the USSR Council of Ministers passed a decree granting benefits. Then came the announcement that veterans of combat in Vietnam and Egypt had organized their associations.

Our correspondent met with Colonel General of Aviation (Retired) V. Abramov and Lieutenant General (Reserve) V. Belousov, who are representatives of select lead organizations.

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Nikitovich! Vladimir Alekseyevich! You are to be congratulated on the creation of the organizations. Along what guidelines will they function?

[V. Abramov] We are a voluntary social organization and a part of the All-Union Organization of War Veterans, whose regulations will govern us. This forms the basis of our tasks and guidelines along which we will function, which are military patriotic and international education of youth; strengthening of friendship between servicemen and armed forces veterans of the Soviet Union and Vietnam; rendering of assistance in the resolution of social problems relating to former fellow servicemen; and preparation for printing of memoirs of those who participated in combat activities. Our association is invested with responsibility as a primary organization by virtue of our acceptance as a collective member by the Society of Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship.

[V. Belousov] The organization meeting of the "Egyptian" combat veterans was the first time they met since the hot summer of '70. Action to unite the veterans into an organization started after publication of the articles on participation of our troops in protecting Egypt from aggression. This action was supported by the Political Directorate of the Air Defense Forces. Incidentally, Lieutenant General of Aviation Vyacheslav Grigoryevich Mikhaylov, first deputy chief of the Political Directorate, was the chief of the political section in a unit rendering international assistance to the Egyptian people. Relative to general guidelines, we set the aims of our forthcoming work to be about the same as those of the "Vietnam" group.

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] Are there differences?

[V. Belousov] It is not a matter of differences. In addition to determining the guidelines, we decided to take certain actions in the near future. Thus, the meeting's participants tasked the elected presidium with contacting the appropriate organs to request them to once more take up the question of recommendations for awarding decorations, a matter which was dropped after our troops were withdrawn from Egypt.

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] How can someone reach the presidiums of the new associations if he wishes to do so?

[V. Abramov] Vietnam combat activity participants can use the address: 119885, Moscow, Gogolevskiy bulvar, 4, SKVV, International Commission, "Vietnam"

Group. Incidentally, we will hold our next meeting on 5 August in front of the Bolshoy Theater, in the square, at 1800.

[V. Belousov] The address for former "Egyptian" fighting men is: Moscow, K-160, Political Directorate, Air Defense Forces, Council of Veterans.

Early Release for Night School Students?

18010871 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Aug 89 Second Edition p 6

[Unattributed: "On Retirement from the Army".]

[Text] PRAVDA is receiving questions from the parents of soldier-students, who studied in evening departments of higher educational institutions [VUZy] prior to being drafted. Are they subject to the retirement into the

reserves? Does the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet extend to them? Many questions also concern certifications for soldier-students.

In the USSR Armed Forces' General Staff the following was reported to PRAVDA's correspondent: the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet does not extend to students of correspondence and evening departments. It turns out that the certification in the military records, which they would need, contains no note to the effect that prior to being drafted a serviceman studied in a higher educational institution. In this event commanders of military units must make an inquiry to the respective VUZ on providing the certification on form No. 26, confirming the studies of the serviceman in the VUZ. The certification must be signed by the Rector or his deputy.

Aviation Medicine: Problem of Retaining Experienced Pilots

18010845 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jul 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major General of Medical Service V. Ponomarenko, doctor of medical sciences, professor: "The Price of Longer Flying Careers: A Flight Surgeon's Comments"]

[Text] It is a fact that medicine places special demands on military pilots. The health of aviators is one of the elements that characterize combat readiness of units. This is an area in which we must take on the problem of length of a pilot's career. However, in considering the question from the standpoint of today's requirements, I must say that the process, organization, and even the theory of the problem of pilot retention require definite restructuring, even though the health of military aviation personnel is guarded by a health care system, a qualified medical fitness examination procedure, a network of treatment facilities, and formal schedules for nutrition, labor, and rest.

Statistics tell us that negative phenomena are being felt with increasing frequency. For example, we have a "lowering of the limit" of certain serious illnesses which are associated with a higher rate of disqualification of young pilots. A cause of alarm is the short active period of pilots possessing higher proficiency ratings—merely 10 to 12 years. This is also a moral problem: From the social point of view, the loss of the profession a person has selected as his life's work in the prime of his life is a vitally dramatic situation.

There is also an economic aspect to the problem. Estimates show that a five-year extension of the flying career of military pilots possessing the first-class rating can save the government more than half a billion rubles. However, other than the economic aspect, there is also the purely military consideration. Thus, the loss of a 35- or 40-year old specialist represents a virtual weakness in the mechanism of passing on professional experience.

What are the causes of the breakdown in the medical and organizational measures currently being used to extend flying careers? One of them is insufficient involvement of physicians and engineers relative to optimizing the physiological and hygienic factors associated with flying in the initial stages of flight testing. We must face the fact that scientific and technical progress, from the medical point of view, does have its negative side. A characteristic of an aviator's labor is his exposure to physical and chemical stressors under high levels of tension. Thus, a high cockpit temperature reduces the body's resistance to positive g forces by a factor of 1 to 1.5; in combination with the effect of vibration, the reduction attains 2 to 3. Unfortunately, flight testing at times involves violation of recommended health norms amounting to several orders of magnitude. I am convinced that aircraft design and testing should proceed in close collaboration with

physicians, which is not always the case. This kind of collaboration will promote flight safety and longer professional flying careers.

Officers A. Marasanov, Yu. Kukushkin, and A. Sharanov, working in the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Forces, have developed special programs for onboard computers. This makes it possible to control the hygienic factors in the cockpit as a function of the crew's condition. The institute's collective has designed computer systems which make it possible to plan flight loads on a scientific basis. However, the Ministry of the Aviation Industry is in no hurry to implement scientific attainments.

The present day strategy employed to assure flight safety is limited to grounding a pilot, timely diagnosis of initial stages of illness, and timely and accurate statement of expert opinion. It is distressing that we hear the terms "grounded," "not recommended," and "denied" more often than we do the term "prevention." In other words, one gains the impression that in aviation medicine restoration of aviators' health and extension of flying careers are relegated to a position of secondary importance. This trend should be countered by a scientific procedure which allows viewing the gradation of professional health as a component of the combat fitness and readiness of the "man-armament-technology" system. As far as restructuring the medical approach to evaluating professional health is concerned, the requirement for determination of ailing pilots should be replaced by management of a person's health reserves.

We must proceed objectively to control the pilot's psychophysiological condition and his ability to withstand loads, and utilize a biological basis to replenish his strengths. This is the methodological aspect. With this as a starting point, we define the term "professional health" as the body's ability to conserve its compensatory and protective forces associated with capacity for work. The principal characteristic of health is the body's ability to restore itself to a functional condition. This particular approach to the problem focuses the minds of physicians on the factors that lower a person's psychophysiological reserves, on the creation of an apparatus that can effect their control, and on something which is new in aviation medicine: a system of rehabilitation, that is, restoration medicine.

A pilot associates the word "hospital" with medical fitness determination and therapy. It is time that we raise above our hospitals the flag of rehabilitation not only of an ill pilot, but also of one who is suffering a temporary loss of requisite health reserve or wish to perform labor in the air! The creation of a system of restoration medicine is dictated by the need for improving the ethical, moral, and professional interrelationship between the flight surgeon and pilot.

I tell you frankly that every year physicians ground several thousand aviators due to conditions that do not permit continuing their type of activity. A survey shows

that about a third of flight personnel conceals from the physician experiences they have in the air related to hallucinations, blurred vision caused by overloads, a feeling of alienation in the stratosphere, or a sense of alarm without apparent cause. Paradoxically, pilots attempt to conceal these unpleasant conditions because of a strong desire to continue flying! What we need are a restructuring of trust, of high ethical standards and culture of personal relations, for a pilot who experiences a difficult psychological situation has less need for medical fitness certification than for emotional support and bolstering of his self-confidence. I venture to say that most of the above "illnesses" should be treated in the sky, not in a hospital.

I recall a case I experienced as a flight surgeon. Officer I. Zharkov would suffer extremely high blood pressure after every precision formation flying event. I held a confidential discussion with flight commander S. Ivanov in which I explained that the pilot fears low speeds. We put together a special training program tailored to the pilot's personality. A month later the pilot was completely free of fear of low speeds, and the threat of permanent grounding was eliminated.

The time has come to organize specialized rehabilitation departments in air-force hospitals where pilots can undergo rehabilitation rather than medical certification. There are many ways to do this: physical exercises; physiotherapeutic and balneological procedures; psychotherapeutic mood control; and cultural programming. There would be a single purpose—extension of professional careers. A pilot who is exhausted or undergoing psychological stress, one who has lost interest in his work and is in conflict with his personal shortcomings is in need of respect for his person, especially for his work. Scientists and practicing physicians have already acquired some experience in rehabilitation work based on the application of psychotherapeutic techniques in combination with flight drills. Many pilots who lost confidence in their future as pilots have returned to duty. So as not to be misunderstood, let me state that an inability to apply essential piloting skills cannot be cured by means of lights and music. The point is that complete restoration of psychophysiological qualities adversely affected to some degree by life's difficulties is something we are in a position to deal with today.

In the Central Military Scientific Research Aviation Hospital, the efforts of its chief, Colonel of Medical Service A. Ivanchikov, Professor L. Grimak, and Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service V. Zvonikov have resulted in the organization of a rehabilitation department that applies restoration medicine techniques. Nevertheless, the new thinking will not enjoy success until it becomes a part of command personnel in units. Commanders must realize that application of the new technique is associated with a number of physiological peculiarities. These include extended periods of flying at reduced levels of motor activity with a requirement for instantaneous action and high loads on the cervical portion of the spinal cord imposed by heavy helmet

systems during arrested landings. This means that although a higher level of pilot health would be in order, a lack of concern is not conducive to achieving this end.

One of the more difficult aspects related to length of professional flying careers is that of social and psychological support of a strong motivation for flying as a hazardous profession. From the physiological standpoint, the term "hazardous profession" has the connotation that the body, or more accurately the nervous system, functions under a condition of (word illegible) sensory thresholds. From the psychological point of view, extreme sensitivity is not so much a case of "exposed nerves" reacting in their way to a danger signal as it is of "exposed nerves of the soul."

Study of human behavior in critical flight situations indicates that people who enjoy the most favorable position are those whose life is full of love for the profession and a striving to be useful to others. One can work in the sky only if he can do this honestly and selflessly, in an atmosphere of enjoyment, optimism, and humor.

The desire for quality flying originates in the depths of a person's self-consciousness: He must not deceive, bring disgrace, or cause trouble. For this reason, loss of interest in flying is a symptom of a social breakdown in the aviation collective. Psychoneurological research has shown that some illnesses are traceable to negative emotional judgments a pilot may make relative to his professional competence for handling special flying situations. The person may start to doubt his choice of profession. A nervous breakdown may ensue after some delay, a consequence of the pilot's concluding that his training is insufficient for the task, even though it officially does satisfy the requirements. The resulting "moral scissors" aggravate the pilot's conscience. These self-doubts give rise to loss of love for flying.

Extension of the flying career presupposes a complete solution to the problem of the aviator's social protectiveness and the creation of living and labor conditions that further and strengthen the purport of the pilot's life - joyful, happy, aesthetic, and confident flying. I would say that flying is the pilot's mission in life.

A pilot's failure to acknowledge the uplifting moral basis of his profession and his disregard for his reasons for flying lead to diminution of the profession's prestige. All he has to do is "knock it down" a bit and he is beset by primitivism and conformity, which are precursors of proneness to accidents. The latter lies in wait for us in the "bushes" of a superficial attitude toward flying. If flying is a mere element—not the purpose—in the pilot's rich life, you can expect trouble.

In conclusion, I would like to say that extension of the professional flying career is a state task, while the duration of a pilot's active period depends upon the elevation of our civic position. This is a measure of the spirituality of the aviation fraternity.

Characteristics, Design History of 'Tu-160'

18010854 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jul 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by S. Levitskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Our Defense Arsenal": "The Tu-160: Strategic, Supersonic"]

[Text] I make myself comfortable in the Tu-160 copilot's seat, flip a switch to the side, and the seat is lifted for several seconds toward the cockpit windows. From the height of a two-story building, one can see the runway blazing with heat.

The Tu-160's long nose resembles the outstretched neck of a swan. But I make note of all this, as they say, out of the corner of my eye. There is no time for emotions; there is a stream of information coming in; the four engines are operating normally, all systems are normal. Check, check... It is convenient to check the information: almost all of it is on the display panel screen; the eyes do not flash over the numerous instruments.

Despite the Tu-160's 275-ton takeoff weight, its takeoff roll is short and smooth. The wings are now positioned at right angles to the fuselage. Then they change their sweep (indicated by an instrument). The aircraft commander, Gds Lt Col Valeriy Ivanovich Gorgol, moves the engine controls forward, as if they were toys. (The air intakes of each engine are open.) Only the instruments will "notice" when the sound barrier is broken...

In the mid-1960's, the U.S. military and political leadership decided to develop the B-1A strategic, supersonic bomber. Rockwell International won the large contract in 1970. Four prototypes of the aircraft were built between 1972 and 1979. In 1977, however, President Carter announced that the B-1A development program was suspended.

But in 1981, the Reagan Administration resumed work on the new strategic bomber program suspended by Carter. The improved B-1B, capable of delivering strikes deep into enemy territory, was developed based on the B-1A. Construction of the planned 100 B1-B aircraft was completed in 1988. This bomber is equipped with wings with a varying-sweep angle of 15 to 67.5 degrees and four engines. It has a 4-man crew and can carry 22 cruise missiles or 20 nuclear bombs.

"The Tu-160 is not a record-holder aircraft. It is a forced step by our country in response to NATO's military preparations," says P. Deynikin, commander of Long-Range Aviation. "Of course, those who built the aircraft and gambled on 'the wing' accomplished a special feat. Anything was possible at the test airfield. The crew commanded by Boris Ivanovich Veremey, for example, managed to land the multi-ton monster without...the nosewheel landing gear. And they did this so skillfully that the aircraft was again ready for testing after minor repairs. Veremey also managed to take the aircraft up to a speed of 2200 km per hour. This is a tremendous speed! It is possible to achieve thanks to the Tu-160's four

powerful, under-wing mounted engines. The wing planes can either be pressed tightly to the fuselage, like on a quick-moving fighter, or spread wide open, like on a slow-moving aircraft. Therefore, the crew has a wide choice in combat maneuvering—in speed and altitude. On board the aircraft are missiles equipped with modern guidance equipment.

The general designer, Valentin Ivanovich Bliznyuk, and a large collective of Tupolev workers, of course, managed to make a qualitatively new aircraft, one that is capable of carrying out the mission in small numbers.

The Long-Range Aviation guards air regiment undertook to master the very complex equipment at an accelerated pace. The Ministry of the Aviation Industry, the design bureau, and aviation enterprises are setting up round-the-clock teletype and telephone communications with the airfield. This is something new in joint work.

Yes, reducing the time for putting aviation equipment into service after its design development is an increasingly complex problem throughout the world. Operational testing in the regiment is one way of solving it. However, specialists in the Ministry of the Aviation Industry maintain that the Air Force is sometimes timid in getting used to the new aircraft. Here is one example. The aviation engineering service is guided by documents from 1978, and the aircraft is grounded when any of its systems malfunction. But, you see, each of the aircraft's systems has triple or even greater redundancy. Operation of this type of equipment throughout the world has shown that as the number of redundant systems increases, naturally, the number of malfunctions increases, without detriment to flight safety. Here it is necessary to know in which malfunctions are combat readiness and flight safety of the missile-carrier guaranteed. There is no such listing.

I will never forget the first temporary duty trips to the guards air regiment when operational testing of the Tu-160 began. Those were busy days. The crews went from a cautious flight around the pattern to long-distance routes and weapons delivery. And the Tu-160 did not disappoint its pioneers—Maj Gen Avn L. Kozlov (then deputy commander of Long-Range Aviation), Gds Lt Col V. Grebennikov (now a colonel, promoted to a higher position and awarded the Order of the Red Star for mastering the new aircraft), Gds Lt Col V. Gorgol, Gds Maj A. Medved, Gds Maj N. Studitskiy, and others.

Many crews of the guards regiment have successfully mastered the new aircraft. But it was difficult. Of course, they had to smooth over some rough spots; the new aircraft had some urgent problems.

"We were delighted with the aircraft; it simply won us over with its abundant capabilities. All the same, it is felt that the Tupolev Design Bureau has no one 'breathing down its back.' It has a monopoly!" is what Gds Lt Col Ye. Ignatov, deputy regimental commander for aviation and engineering service, had to say on this account.

"They 'abolished' the Myasishchev Design Bureau for no reason. Competition is needed!"

Aviators make other, purely technical complaints, too. Thus, the economic savings from operational testing of the Tu-160 in the regiment have not been reflected at all in the regiment itself. Have not the aviators earned this? Funds are critically needed here; there are hundreds of families in the garrison without apartments.

Another problem. The building for housing the simulator is still in a sad state—military builders, subordinates of Lt Col A. Suyatnikov, are at fault here. The crews have to "beat" an expensive aircraft instead of practicing basic exercises on a simulator. To the uninitiated, the question will seem petty. But let us consider this fact: the simulator for the expensive aircraft costs more than the aircraft itself! And both must be treated with the utmost responsibility.

The regiment's ground services have their own problems. There are constantly 15-20 special motor vehicles buzzing around the Tu-160—the noise level exceeds standards by one and a half times. Toxic refueling fluids have appeared, and there are other harmful effects. It is as if they do not notice this. All the allowances and authorized categories are almost the same for the ground specialists.

When the aircraft flies in the automatic mode, when the navigator's computer draws the actual flight route on the topographic map, and when missile firing data lights up on the display screen (for monitoring), you somehow better understand a statement heard often at the airfield: "The Tu-160 is good for the pilots, but hard for the aircraft specialists." The problem of scientific organization of labor is considered a painful one in the regiment.

The aircraft glides lightly during landing. The aircraft commander pushes the control stick full forward. The flight ends smoothly.

But at the parking space, the crew will have to wait until the high ramp is put up to the fuselage. I thought: If the aircraft landed at another airfield and there was no "special ramp," the only way out would be to eject. Or live in the aircraft, since it has folding bunks and (finally) other conveniences. Of course, self-contained devices are also needed; you cannot rely just on the airfield ramp.

Trivialities again?

After the flight, Gds Lt Col Gorgol communicates his new plans...

Designers on MiG-29, Canadian Airshow
18010862 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jul 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview with MiG-29 Chief Designers M.R. Valdenberg and A.A. Belosvet by Col A. Andryushkov: "MiG-29's Will Fly in Canada"]

[Text] In August, an international aerospace show will take place in the small Canadian City of Abbotsford

which is located approximately 40 miles from Vancouver. Combat aircraft will also take part in the airshow for the first time in the history of Canadian Aviation. This honor has been bestowed upon MiG-29 front-line fighter aircraft designed by the Experimental Design Bureau imeni A.I. Mikoyan.

We are publishing a conversation between our Correspondent Colonel A. Andryushkov and MiG-29 Chief Designers M.R. Valdenberg and A.A. Belosvet.

[Andryushkov] The Abbotsford Aerospace Show being conducted on the North American Continent is considered to be one of the most prestigious in the world. It is difficult to become a part of it. What allowed the MiG-29 to obtain authorization to participate in it?

[Valdenberg/Belosvet] Last Autumn when we first demonstrated the MiG-29 front-line fighter at an airshow in England, experts immediately assessed its advanced aerobatic maneuvering and tactical qualities. Against the background of foreign aircraft of this class, such as the F-14, the F-15, and the "Mirage-2000," our MiG-29 had a number of indisputable advantages. It is more maneuverable, G load limits have been removed, it is simple to fly, and it ensures highly effective weapons delivery on air and ground targets. While we were still in England, Mister Ron Price, president of the Abbotsford International Exhibition, requested our participation in the North American Air Show.

[Andryushkov] In June, the MiG-29's prestige grew even more during its demonstration at the Aerospace Show in France. We all know that foreign experts not only admired our pilot's flying skills, they even conducted negotiations for acquiring the MiG-29 for their nation's VVS [Air Forces]. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers are interested: How does our fighter aircraft look in a commercial context?

[Valdenberg/Belosvet] First of all, we need to emphasize this detail: The MiG-29 is a defensive and not an offensive fighter aircraft. In spite of the fact that the political climate in the world has noticeably warmed up a bit, things are still unsettled in many regions. And each nation wants to keep its skies peaceful and have something for its reliable defense. What causes interest in our fighter aircraft? Besides its good tactical-technical data, it has one other advantage: It is cheaper to operate than similar aircraft from the U.S., France, or England and has high operational reliability. There is a demand for it.

[Andryushkov] It is more than 10,000 kilometers from Moscow to Vancouver. How will our fighters arrive overseas?

[Valdenberg/Belosvet] The Airshow in Canada is an aviation holiday. But the MiG-29 aircraft was not created for parades—it is a functional combat aircraft. Its element is the sky. A lengthy flight along the northern borders of our Fatherland, a flight across the ocean and further over Alaska, then along the Pacific Coast to Vancouver awaits the MiG-29. All aircraft systems will

undergo a check under complex conditions and the MiG-29's capability to rapidly cover enormous distances will be demonstrated.

[Andryushkov] The MiG-29 is a tactical aircraft. Does that mean it needs to land at intermediate airfields?

[Valdenberg/Belosvet] Yes. Three landings are envisioned on the territory of the USSR. The pilots will make their last time adaptation [for jet lag] at Chukotka before flying to the air base at Anchorage, Alaska. We have discussed all of the issues with the American side. F-15's will meet us over the ocean and escort us to Anchorage and afterward they will fly alongside the MiG's to the Canadian Border. I will emphasize one feature of our participation at the Abbotsford Airshow. We are not flying there because we ourselves wish to demonstrate our fighter aircraft, no, the Canadian side's invitation is the basis [for the visit]. They wanted our MiG-29 to participate in their exhibition.

[Andryushkov] In many letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, readers ask about the expenditures which we are incurring during participation in such activities. We know we need to pay for kerosene and airport landing fees overseas...

[Valdenberg/Belosvet] The question has essentially been posed and it must be cleared up. Having received an invitation from Mr. Ron Price, we also acquainted ourselves with the conditions under which we will participate at the airshow. First of all, the Canadian side intends to refuel aircraft with kerosene at its expense; secondly, it will also assume half of aircraft servicing costs. We are very appreciative to the exhibition's organizers for this. Thus, our expenditures in this case will be minimal.

[Andryushkov] Preparing the fighter aircraft for the return flight will require considerable time and a large number of ground specialists. How has this issue been resolved?

[Valdenberg/Belosvet] We direct your attention to this feature of the flight. An advanced team will arrive on an AN-225 "Mriya" aircraft before the MiG's land in Alaska. The AN-225 will also have the SU-26 sport aircraft and the K-36 helicopter on board, but the Canadians will not see the word "Buran" painted on the fuselage since the multi-use space craft has returned to the Cosmodrome where other flight paths await it.

The MiG-29 is easy to operate and a minimal number of specialists is required to prepare it for flight: A mechanic and an aviation equipment/electrical systems engineer. The pilot will conduct the system readiness inspection.

[Andryushkov] I have wanted to ask you this for a long time: Who will pilot the MiG's?

[Valdenberg/Belosvet] Test pilot Roman Taskayev will fly the [two-seat] combat trainer fighter aircraft to

Canada but he will have a new lead-navigator—Yuriy Yermakov is carrying out another mission. And world-renowned Anatoliy Kvochur will demonstrate the combat MiG in the skies over Canada.

[Andryushkov] People are constantly asking about his health and for some reason many do not want to believe that the pilot was uninjured after ejecting at Le Bourget.

[Valdenberg/Belosvet] You yourself reported that Kvochur returned home from Paris in a MiG. During the last month, he has undergone a comprehensive medical examination and he has no health problems. Anatoliy has flown five flights in a test program and is in outstanding professional form.

[Andryushkov] As I understand it from our conversation, the aerospace show in Canada is primarily a commercial venture. A great number of international aviation and space equipment sales are conducted there. We cannot be outside observers. We have a commodity for which there is a demand. But this is what I have already noticed at Le Bourget: It is very little to deliver a commodity to market, you need to know how to display it. The systems and capabilities for advertising our aircraft could be better to put it mildly. How strange it is that the Americans have advertised the MiG-29 better than anyone else by launching sales of T-shirts, souvenirs, and stickers with the MiG-29's likeness on them. They made a lot of money at our expense. Have we been studying these lessons before Canada?

[Valdenberg/Belosvet] Unfortunately, little has changed. You understand how the situation is developing. Aircraft are born in a design bureau and plants manufacture production model aircraft, but propagandizing the merits of aircraft are assigned to entirely different institutions which, as a rule, are far from the interests of the aircraft builders. Our foreign trade organizations need to study marketing so they can make money and not put it into foreign hands....

[Andryushkov] We hope that the best advertisement for the MiG-29 fighter aircraft in Canada will be its demonstration flights. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will attempt to describe them to its readers.

MI-8 Crash Near Sochi

*18010866 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jul 89 First Edition p 4*

[TASS: "Helicopter Catastrophe".]

[Text] On the 26th of July in the mountains within forty kilometers of the Sochi airport an MI-8 helicopter of the Sochinsk aviation enterprise crashed. Three crew members and five passengers were on board. Five people were killed as a result of the catastrophe. An investigation into the incident is being conducted by a commission of USSR GOSAVIANADZOR [State Aviation Oversight]. (TASS).

U.S., Soviet Submarine Fleets, Roles Discussed

18120112 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 28, 11-17 Jul 89 pp 22-24

[Article by Alexander Polyukhov]

[Text] When the world learned on April 7 about the Soviet atomic submarine disaster in the Norwegian Sea, it did not come as much of a surprise to the West. That was neither the first, nor supposedly the last mishap of this kind. According to Western experts, we have lost five atomic submarines (the Golf in 1968, the November in 1970, the Charlie I in 1983, the Yankee in 1986 and, finally, the Mike, alias the Komsomolets) as against the United States' two—the Thresher in 1963 and the Scorpion in 1968). The wreckage of the Golf was recovered, on the sly, by U.S. Navy intelligence, and that of the Charlie—by the Soviet Navy. Besides, several Soviet atomic submarines were scrapped after being reduced to wreckage by accidents.

The citizens of our mighty naval power know next to nothing about the composition and objectives of the Soviet Navy. In the U.S.S.R., there are no reference books available to the general public like the American "The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Navy". Our bookstores do not offer Jane's Fighting Ships, one of the world's best publications of its kind brought out in Britain, or the monographs of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), let alone more specialized works. Therefore we will have to resort to the approximate unclassified statistics of Western origin for want of other reference (the names and classes of our submarines are also classified information, which explains why we use NATO's names for them).

Stalin's Dreams

After Port Arthur and Tsushima, World War I and the Entente's intervention, the Russian Navy ceased to exist as a real force, but by 1941 its squadrons in the Baltic and Black seas and to a lesser degree in the North and in the East, were replenished with new vessels. Stalin's misjudgment of Nazi intentions, massive repressions of naval officers and other factors which hit the navy and the ground forces equally hard, prevented us from using the formidable weapon forged by the people's titanic effort. Our naval might was quite impressive: we had 218 submarines alone, and in the Baltic Sea, we had 75 subs versus Nazis' five. Unfortunately, they were unable to take offensive action in the early months of the war: our submarine fleet was prevented from taking offensive action in the early months of the war by a barrage of fire from German warships and aircraft and by minefields which locked Soviet U-boats in the Gulf of Finland. In the Black Sea and in the North, they did better, but paid a heavy price for their successes... As a result, the situation in 1945 differed but little from that in 1919.

As East-West relations deteriorated sharply after World War II, the mighty naval forces of the United States and its allies dwarfed ours. Stalin knew, of course, that a handful of German submarines had all but forced Britain

down to its knees by sinking nearly 2,700 vessels, that the then up-to-date battleships Bismark, Prince of Wales, Repulse and other giants had lost to German submarines, tiny by comparison. This gave Stalin the idea of submarines having a special role to play in neutralizing naval threat to the Soviet Union. According to American sources, he planned building 1,200 submarines. Although Khrushchev slashed that ambitious programme, 240 Whiskey subs had been launched. One of them (No 137) contrived to run aground off the Swedish shores in October 1981, causing quite a row. Another basic submarine model was the Romeo of which 20 ships were built as against 560 planned. In 1956-57, our Navy was replenished with 157 submarines, an all-time high.

As far back as in 1954, however, scientific and technological revolution passed a "death verdict" on diesel submarines—the first atomic powered submarine, the Nautilus, was built in the United States. The Soviet answer to it, the November, was given four years later. Owing to strict secrecy and to the submarines' continuous movements from shipyards to bases and from their combat unit to reserve, it is only the General Staff officers who have all the relevant statistics. The only declassified information to date is that the U.S.S.R. has 186 atomic-powered submarines, and the United States, 135. Besides, the Soviet Union has a large number of diesel-powered submarines which the U.S. has long stopped making.

This information, found in Jane's, pertains to 1986 when the Soviet Union had a total of 364 submarines. If sorted out on the basis of the weapons they carry, 76 subs (including 62 atomic-powered ones) are armed with ballistic missiles, 67 (50 of them atomic-powered) with anti-ship missiles, and 218 (73 of which atomic-powered) are torpedo-armed attack submarines. As far as other Warsaw Treaty member states are concerned, only Poland and Bulgaria have submarines (three each), which brings the East's total to 370.

The U.S. has 139 submarines, of which 38 are atomic-powered missile-carriers, 97 atomic-powered attack submarines (armed with torpedoes, anti-sub and antiship missiles and cruise missiles), a number of nuclear-powered submarines intended for subversive action, and four diesel-powered submarines never used in combat patrolling. Other NATO countries have a total of 153 submarines, of which 18 British and 10 French ones are atomic-powered. Japan has 14 subs, and Australia 6, so the West's total runs into 312.

Weapon of Retaliation

The Soviet Navy was the first to replot seaborne ballistic missiles by converting, in the second half of the 1950s, six Zulu-class submarines into launching platforms for such missiles with a range of 500 km. In 1960, the U.S. Navy adopted the George Washington submarine armed with Polaris ballistic missiles; the Soviet submarine in this class, the Hotel, appeared in 1962.

Further on, escalation went non-stop because the stealthiness and partial invulnerability of submarine missile carriers made them a superb strategic weapon, although the inadequate accuracy of their homing and targeting systems restricted their use to retaliation. Even if they might miss targets like missile silos and command posts, they could certainly hit large population centers.

According to SIPRI estimates, Soviet atomic submarines attained the American first-generation ones' level only in 1967 but, as distinct from Polarizes, their missiles were not solid-propellant, but filled with liquid fuels and oxidizers. The submarines in this class (Yankee) are still in use, although, as evidenced by the loss of one of them in October 1986 near the Bermudas caused by the explosion of the missile tanks, such a "stuffing" is extremely dangerous. Their ballistic missiles have a killing range of about 3,000 km, which compels us to send our submarines close to the U.S. shores to break through the main anti-submarine defence line larded with the ships, planes and tracking facilities of NATO stretching from Greenland to Iceland and Britain. The latter problem has been eased off in five years, when the deployment began of the Delta submarines each of which is armed with 12 intercontinental missiles capable, if launched from Soviet waters, of hitting targets deep inside the United States. Even, though, they are liquid-propellant ones, which retains the threat of accidents. The subsequent submarine types, such as Delta I-IV, also suffer from the same flaw. Naturally, this comes not from the misunderstanding of the advantages offered by solid-propellant missiles (reliability, compactness, ease of maintenance), but from the intricate technical problems involved in changing over to such weapons.

Just as in the case of the ground-based missiles, success came rather recently. The SIPRI is of the opinion that the Typhoons, used since 1981, possess reliable and accurate solid-propellant missiles, cluster ones included. Each of such submarines has a displacement of 25,000 tons and carries two reactors totalling 80,000 hp. However, it carries only 20 missiles as against American analog Trident's 24, although the latter's displacement is only 18,700 tons and its rated power, 60,000 hp. Although such a mechanical comparison is unacceptable in the art of war, larger dimensions combined with a low level of armament can hardly be considered an advantage. Today Tridents and Typhoons are in a position to mount missile attacks even on protected small-sized targets, and therefore experts have good reason to doubt the expediency of restricting the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines' function to deterrence.

An important difference between the atomic-powered missile-carrying submarine fleets is that the U.S. has been mass-producing only three types, of which only two are now operational. The U.S.S.R. has developed nine types of such submarines most of which—varying in the degree of their combat readiness and armament—still exist. According to the SIPRI statistics, the U.S. is now building Tridents only (nine boats) and the U.S.S.R.

Typhoons (5) and Delta IV (5). The spread in the number of missile types is larger still.

A Quiet War

Seeking supremacy—or, to use a word currently in military usage, control—over the oceans, the U.S. puts a great deal of emphasis on combating Soviet submarines, missile-carrying ones in the first place. These are to be destroyed before the breakout of a nuclear war, "just in case." The attack nuclear-powered submarines, which keep tabs on enemy movements in peacetime, are assignee the decisive role to play in the interaction with the anti-submarine defence ships and planes. Besides that, they carry out intelligence operations off Soviet shores, protect USN attack surface forces and serve as practice targets for friendly anti-submarine defence services. In wartime they are to sink enemy U-boats and surface vessels, mount cruise-missile attacks on ground targets, and mine Soviet harbors. The Americans make their NATO allies chiefly responsible for patrolling the Greenland-Iceland-Britain line.

Western experts maintain that Soviet attack submarines, apart from serving analogous purposes, have been detailed to fight 14 American aircraft carriers and transatlantic cargo convoys which could decide an armed conflict in Europe. True, before the loss of the Komsomolets it hadn't occurred to anyone that a combat submarine could be constantly used in numerous research experiments which inevitably imperil the discharge of its main function—reliable combat action. Experiments were made on an object fitted with an atomic reactor, just as in the case of the Chernobyl atomic power plant. Only this time the Komsomolets also carried nuclear torpedoes.

Be that as it may, the diversity of the tasks set to Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines leads to their functional variety: according to the SIPRI estimates, the Soviet Union has seven classes of submarines to date and three types of diesel-powered submarines. Under construction now are the Sierra, Akula and Oscar atomic-powered submarines and the Kilo diesel-powered one. In the United States, atomic-powered subs of three classes are going operational, with only one, the Los Angeles, an all-purpose one, now under construction. The list of the weapon systems Soviet subs are fitted with is several times longer than the American one.

Western experts believe that American attack submarines are better armed than their Soviet rivals. Their chief advantage is, however, that they are better equipped to spot the enemy from afar, while remaining out of his sight (or, more accurately, out of his earshot). The U.S. submarines emphasize passive listening to depth noises and avoid active sonar methods which betray the location of a hunter-killer. This is combined with a low noise level of their own power plants and other mechanisms, which hinders enemy search action.

Relevant information is classified, of course, but, at the estimate of the American researcher T. Stefanik, the Los

Angeles and the Soviet submarine Victor III—then under construction—may be under similar circumstances detected at the ranges of, respectively, 1-25 miles and 20-500 miles in deep-water areas, and 1-15 miles and 10-70 miles in shallow waters. The latest Soviet submarines—of the Akula type, for instance—have been noted for their greater stealthiness. However, their number in the Soviet Navy can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Experts are at one in saying that diesel-powered submarines are outdated. Although modern types of non-nuclear submarines are produced in a number of Western countries, they are suitable for limited functions only and are not ocean-going in the full sense of the word. It is only in restricted water spaces, like the Baltic Sea, for instance, that they may have an advantage over large atomic-powered attack submarines.

More or Less?

So, the West is behind us quantitatively, but ahead of us qualitatively. A familiar situation isn't it? A closer inspection will reveal that we haven't got quantitative advantage either. As a British expert remarked rather cynically, most Soviet submarines are out of date and are a threat to their own crews rather than to NATO. A large number of the submarine types already operational and under construction creates a semblance of flexibility while actually, in expert opinion, involve problems in spare parts supply, weapon and system interchangeability and quick personnel replacement capability. The maintenance of old submarines is costly: they need more frequent repairs and consume more materials and fuel. It is elementary logic that the more submarines a nation has, the more officers and men they need; they have to be paid, accommodated and their children are to be looked after in day care nurseries and sent to schools.

Certain sacrifices could have been made if justified by higher submarine fighting efficiency. Unfortunately, Western analysts point out that Soviet missile-carrying submarines are armed with less warheads, and Soviet attack submarines with less long-range and accurate cruise missiles than U.S. boats. The SIPRI says that a mere 11-15 per cent of Soviet missile-carrying submarines are deployed in the ocean a day as against America's 50 per cent. In terms of nuclear warheads, the figures are 500 and 3,800, respectively. Needless to say, this tells on the standard of seamen's training, on their combat readiness and on operational planning.

In its studies the SIPRI implies that the U.S.S.R. does not share the U.S. principle of "aggressive deployment" of submarines in peacetime and will bring them into play in the period of crisis. Over the past few years, however, no submarine exercises of this kind have been conducted by the U.S.S.R., which may have negative consequences if the need for massive combat action arises. Even provided the situation is tense enough to warrant such a deployment, the opposite side is certain to regard this move as a step towards the escalation of a conflict. The U.S. Navy's offensive strategy doctrine provides for American submarines countering the outgoing Soviet U-boats right at their bases. It is

certainly a more tempting prospect for American strategists to destroy submarines right at the pier with their cruise missiles.

Does It Pay To Compete?

The West expects about 240 Soviet submarines to sign off as having expired their service life before the year 2000 (they have long gone out of date anyway). They are going to be replaced by 100 new ones, at the most (considering the present construction rates). In the period of 1983-86, the U.S.S.R. built an average of 6.25 submarines a year (of six types, ming you!). Another thing worth remembering is that the Soviet Union is in no position to compete with the U.S. in surface vessels. So what's to be done about that?

The record of other countries goes to show that we'd better give up, as soon as possible, outdated submarine models which only cost us human lives and exorbitant expenses, renounce the variety of submarine types and weapons which only gives us all sorts of problems, stop diverting warships to "research jobs" and seamen to minor tasks. It is more expedient to build quality boats of two or three classes capable of being put to a broad spectrum of combat uses. Even if fewer in number, they will work for defence more efficiently. A hundred new submarines will contribute enormously to the future strength of the U.S.S.R. And strength requires reasonable attitude and a thorough analysis of the naval ship-building programmes on the part of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.

The money required for the construction of high-quality submarines can be saved on account of the "tired" pension-aged submarines. And what about the full-sized aircraft carrier being built at a Black Sea yard for 16 years now (which, according to the SIPRI, has changed three names—the Kremlin, the Leonid Brezhnev, and the Tbilisi) and its analog under construction for 14 years. Western experts are unanimous in that they will hardly ever be fitted out with weapons and base systems effective enough to compete with 14 American ones. Doesn't it make more sense to sell or scrap them? The Soviet Navy will be none the worse for giving them up. On the other hand, by depriving itself of a mighty submarine fleet the Soviet Union will find itself in a difficult position. And we must, of course, use whatever opportunities are offered for reducing naval confrontation by negotiations and agreements with the U.S., regardless of the problems involved.

Sub Casualty Underscores Need for Improved Safety Equipment

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jul 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank A. Pilipchuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Baltic Fleet: "They Returned to Base Without the Commander: A Look at the Problem Through the Prism of a Serious Accident"]

[Text] Last summer Anatoliy Borisovich Nekrasov, a submarine commander, was vacationing in his native

Ryazan. Slightly less than a year later the officer's colleagues learned from his relatives that while on leave he had saved a drowning person's life. By that time Capt 1st Rank Nekrasov himself was no longer among the living. He had been swept off the boat by a wave and drowned. Could the crew have saved their commander?

The submarine departed territorial waters on the surface and set out for the exercise area. Sea turbulence was up to 3-4 (balls), and wind velocity measured 12-13 meters per second. For safety reasons the personnel were forbidden to go topside, and only the regular underway watch remained on the bridge: the commander, watch officer and signalman.

The commander of the submarine unit and the commander of the superior formation with staff officers were on board. Capt 1st Rank A. Nekrasov, who described himself as level-headed and unafraid, was, judging from the external signs, nonetheless experiencing considerable stress. This was understandable. The conclusions drawn from the latest certification procedure had opened up broad prospects for the officer, who had completed the Naval Academy not so long ago: appointment to the position of deputy commander of a submarine unit. Naturally, Anatoliy Borisovich did not want even the slightest shadow to fall onto his reputation. Always calm and collected in any case, on this cruise Capt 1st Rank Nekrasov was performing at his peak as a commander. Everything went to pieces unexpectedly and tragically.

Deciding visually to verify reports from the signalman of the watch and the watch officer on a target intersecting the submarine's course, the commander climbed onto the footboard of the bridge. After that Capt-Lt Yu. Zharov and PO 2nd Rank S. Novikov could see only the commander's feet. Standing almost straight up, he towered above the turret. A wave 6-8 meters high (estimated by those present) swept over the turret unexpectedly. The watch officer instinctively stooped down behind the guardrail, and the signalman of the watch was knocked to one side. When the water had rolled off, PO 2nd Class Novikov saw that the commander was no longer inside the guardrail....

The elements are said to be blind. A blind force does indeed inflict its blows at random. They are perceived as aimed blows, however, when they fall upon an unprotected spot. The killer wave (the name used by sailors for a wave emerging suddenly from a buildup of several relatively low waves) selected the submarine commander only because he was the only one not attached to the guardrail by a safety line. Incidentally, 6 years ago this device, borrowed by the submariners from installation workers, saved Capt-Lt Yuriy Zharov from going overboard in a similar situation.

The watch officer and signalman, the only witnesses to the event, were also the first crew members to try to save the commander. According to Navy Regulations, Capt-Lt Zharov had the right to run the submarine on his own for a certain period of time. (A Navy commission

subsequently determined that the watch officer acted properly). PO 2nd Class Novikov rushed to untie a life ring attached to the bridge. Literally seconds later, after the watch officer had issued the command "Practice alert! Man overboard!" the unit commander rushed up to the control room. He knew better than anyone that no exercise involving the rescue of a man overboard had been planned for that cruise. This meant that everything occurring was the terrible reality.

Valeriy Aleksandrovich took over control of the submarine. It could not have been in better hands, as they say. The officer has served more than 2 decades on submarines with diesel-electric power units. He has been seasoned by both northern and southern seas. The unit commander maneuvered deliberately and vigorously. The emergency party designated for the "Man overboard!" alert had already assembled on the submarine superstructure. Several times Capt 1st Rank Nekrasov appeared for an instant in the waves before disappearing into the water once and for all. However, this was sufficient to determine that Anatoliy Borisovich showed no signs of life. An excellent swimmer and physically strong, he should have been able to keep himself on the surface until the ship approached. What was the matter?

Many things become clearer when one ascends to the bridge on a submarine of this design. Its powerful hull opens up from the height. Upon falling from the turret, the capt 1st rank most likely first struck the deck, was seriously injured and rendered unconscious. For the helpless individual the question of life or death was decided within a matter of several minutes. He remained on the surface as long as his clothing held him there, until it became soaked.

Could the outcome of it all have been less fatal? (Let us set aside the commander's violation of safety rules; the living must draw the conclusions here.) The commander of the submarine unit opened a clothes locker, and I saw all kinds of clothing: warm underwear, cotton trousers, boots, a fur coat.... This is the attire in which the submariners go on watch at sea. They frequently also don an insulated protective suit (chemical service issue). Piercing wind, spray, even waves flooding the bridge—the "100 layers" of various clothing barely protect one against this. God forbid that one should find himself overboard in this clothing, however. The "knight's armor" will pin the arms and legs of any giant. Furthermore, as we know, not all strong men are good swimmers.

I brought this up with Vice Adm I. Ryabinin.

"More than 30 years of my life is linked with submarine sailing," Igor Ivanovich said. "But I have yet to see any significant improvements in the clothing worn for standing watch topside. If the submariners themselves had not realized that they could adapt the chemical service outfit for this purpose, commanders, executive officers, watch officers and signalmen would still be

constantly getting soaked to the bone in stormy weather. The protective suit becomes a dangerous burden in the water, however. If the personnel on watch at sea were required also to don life jackets, they would not be able to pass through the conning tower hatches. Clearly what we need is comfortable clothing which combines protection against cold and moisture with life-saving features for extreme situations...."

Not long before the death of Capt 1st Rank A. Nekrasov, by some incomprehensible coincidence, Valeriy Lvovich Nekrasov, an officer in the same unit, spoke in a speech at a fleet party conference about the fact that the submariners had waited in vain for modern gear which would protect the sailors on the bridge from ice cold showers and simultaneously serve as a life-saving means in the water. Representatives of the Main Naval Staff attended the conference. Although he no doubt possessed the information, Valeriy Lvovich did not say that a large number of submariners suffer from radiculitis and joint diseases, and this year alone several experienced and still fairly young officers from the rank of ship commander to division commander are apparently going to have to part with seagoing service for reasons of health. This is a perceptible, premature loss for the navy. It cannot be compared with the loss of human lives, however.

The submariners need well designed, special-purpose combination clothing as no one else. A submarine is a special vessel. There are no boats or launches on it. To let crew members go on deck in a storm, even to rescue a person, is to risk new losses. Only he who bears responsibility for the lives of many dozens of people knows the price at which such decisions are made. Today it can be said with great certitude that had Capt 1st Rank A. Nekrasov worn life-saving clothing, particularly of a bright color, it would not have been necessary to look for him until one's eyes stung—and most importantly, hopelessly—in the leaden waves.

One listens with envy to submariners who have seen for themselves our combat friends—boat crews of the GDR, for example—wearing orange-colored, impermeable, insulated coveralls, which immediately inflate when a sailor enters the water. Why not buy such suits from there if we do not have our own?

"You have to rummage around in various departments," an acquaintance, a submariner and officer, told me. "More than one scientific research institute in the nation is no doubt working to develop artificially heated underwear, personal life-saving gear and the like, for example.

Indeed, we need this. We should not begin designing our own, however, without studying foreign ones, should not "reinvent the wheel," which is always a costly and lengthy process.

The sea has not yet surrendered the commander's body, as though preventing us from closing out this tragic incident....

From the editors: this article was readied for publication after the tragedy occurred with the nuclear-powered submarine *Komsomolets*. Many submariners perished there, in the Norwegian Sea, precisely because they were inappropriately outfitted. And it was not a desire "to pour salt on the wound" which dictated our decision to publish the account of yet another dramatic event. We cannot remain silent about shortcomings which cost the sailors their lives.

Navy Criticized for Neglect During Typhoon Emergency

18010904 Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by V. Konoplitskiy, TASS correspondent, and Yu. Yudin, TRUD correspondent: "Parade During a Typhoon"]

[Text] On 29 July, the newspaper was already reporting about the unprecedented flooding in Maritime Kray. Today our special correspondents continue the story from on location.

"The situation is critical," these alarming words were heard at the meeting of the kray headquarters for combating natural disasters. Although the menacing tropical typhoon "Judy," which residents feared would come close, had noticeably lost strength along the way, it still brought heavy downpours to the kray. Here is the latest information from the localities.

Fifteen rayons are completely flooded. For a week now, more than 70,000 head of hungry livestock have been bawling on farms cut off by the waters... The city of Nakhodka with its 200,000 residents has been left without drinking water; tankers from the kray center are bringing water here... There is almost no contact with 150 populated points; the swift currents have washed away more than 600 km of telephone lines... There are also human casualties: seven people have died as of Monday...

...We fly in a helicopter, loaded with canned stew meat, dried bread, and canned goods, along a highway route to the north, toward Nakhodka. No matter where you look, it is a solid lake of murky water to the horizon... It is easy to see the cows, surrounded by high water on all sides, rush about on the small spit of land near a farm after hearing the helicopter. We later find out at the rayon center: Attempts to bring in at least some feed to these unfortunate animals have come to nothing. Amphibious vehicles sent by the military did not reach their goal; they broke down half-way there... And there is no other equipment in the rayon that is capable of operating in such extreme conditions.

However, there is now a critical need not only for all-terrain transport. There is also an urgent need for rescue watercraft, diving suits for rescuers, radios for communicating with people cut off from the rest of the country... The military—the seamen of the Pacific Fleet and the Border Guards—has all these things. But...

"Despite all our requests," says B. Bespalov, first deputy chairman of the Maritime Kray Ispolkom, "it is very difficult to get the fleet leadership to assign equipment for rescue operations, especially helicopters... And what good is the equipment if it breaks down right away? One gets the impression that the fleet is not very concerned about the natural disaster that has befallen the kray. That is why our emergency commission and kray staff were forced to send an urgent telegram to Moscow on Sunday addressed to the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the USSR minister of defense about the strange attitude of the leaders of the Pacific Fleet and the Far East District toward the troubles that have befallen the Maritime Kray..."

Maybe the military seamen were busy during these days with a more important and crucial matter concerning ensuring the security of our Far Eastern borders? Alas... A military-sports celebration dedicated to Navy Day was held in Vladivostok last Sunday with much pomp by tradition... Dozens of warships led by the cruiser Frunze were drawn into Amur Bay a week before the celebration... Even the heavy rain did not stop the rehearsed celebrations. Warships skillfully hit the "enemy" with bombs and torpedoes. A formidable assault force of amphibious tanks and amphibious watercraft captured the necessary "bridgehead" in no time under the thunder

of naval guns... Apparently, the tanks and combat vehicles at the celebrations were somewhat more reliable and new than those sent for rescue operations and which broke down along the way.

At this same time, in the flooded countryside and villages, people were sitting without bread, light or communications, waiting for help from the military. You see, the day before at a meeting of the headquarters, fleet representative Vice Adm A. Kurik stated that several dozen watercraft and ships for transporting equipment and foodstuffs had been assigned for this purpose. All remaining forces, one must assume, were sent to hold the celebrations...

In this regard, we would like to express a "rebellious" thought: Is it advisable to arrange such a grandiose show every year on Navy Day? Why bring dozens of warships and submarines into Vladivostok and ply Amur Bay for a week, practicing parade maneuvers? Are there really no other opportunities to improve combat skills? Certainly it is enough to hold such celebrations of such a scope every 10 years, but not annually. Today is not the time to organize a show for all honest people. Especially when the help of the Army and Navy is of decisive importance in such a difficult situation.

...An emergency situation has been declared in the kray effective 31 July.

Call For New Disaster Relief Agency

18010836 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Jul 89 Second Edition p 2

[Article by S. Karkhanin: "In The USSR Supreme Soviet: Predicting Catastrophes—A Political Commentator's Notes"]

[Text] Chernobyl, Arzamas, Bologoye, Leninakan, Ufa... These points on the map are connected by a red line of alarm. Each catastrophe could have been prevented, and after the calamity struck, rescue and reconstruction work was often substandard. There was not enough organization and coordination, no clear program of standard actions to be taken in the emergency.

This is why it was so important to create in the new government's structure a special agency that would be charged with supervising all operations in a disaster zone and that could establish operational communications among ministries at the highest level. The Commission on Emergencies will do precisely that. It will be headed by V. Kh. Doguzhiyev, whom the Supreme Soviet session has confirmed as Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

A more detailed discussion was held in the two chambers' commissions. There's doubtless reason to return to that discussion if only to answer the numerous questions readers have asked in letters to the editors. For all their differences, the questions exhibit a common concern. Why isn't the number of tragedies getting any smaller? What are their causes? How can the avalanche of catastrophes be stopped?

V. Doguzhiyev: We intend to create a system to ensure public safety in natural disasters and industrial accidents that is based on prevention. The system must be comprehensive and supported by appropriate legislative acts.

The session of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Ecology emphasized that the State Committee for Hydrometeorology has the capability to monitor the elements in such a way as to predict hurricanes, squalls, and typhoons based on the dynamics of natural phenomena. Now the seismological service will become part of the state committee, and so there will be greater vigilance with respect to possible earthquakes.

Prevention. Yes, until now it has been underestimated. It turns out that the ship Maksim Gorkiy, which recently had an accident, could have avoided the mishap. But it didn't receive meteorologists' forecasts in time because it didn't have the necessary equipment. As is always the case, economizing on safety features led to enormous damage. The elements cruelly punish those who are fond of taking their chances. Unfortunately, there has been ample evidence of this, especially recently.

V. Doguzhiyev: I don't want to become the country's "chief fireman." I intend to focus primary attention on ways in which we can use all the possibilities of science to learn in advance of imminent natural disasters and have

time to prepare for them. In addition, the idea has been proposed of insuring cities and rayons located in "high risk zones" in order that, if nature does serve them some surprise, they would be reimbursed for the damages. Japan has experience in this, and it has demonstrated its value.

At the deputy committee's session, Vitaliy Khussey-novich also had to answer a question—one that is now all but inevitable in any forum—about the notorious "Swedish forecast," which predicts unprecedented natural cataclysms all over the planet this year. According to the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, the Swedish Academy of Sciences has told it that nobody in Sweden knows who the author of the forecast is. Nevertheless, Soviet specialists are carefully analyzing the materials cited in the book. Even "supervigilance" doesn't hurt here: The price of carelessness too high.

But nature can be blamed for by no means all the disasters that have struck of late. There are figures that attest to a highly dangerous tendency: Some people all but purposely bring disaster upon themselves. The cause of roughly half of all catastrophes is negligence and irresponsibility. This is the case even in instances in which the very nature of a production activity entails such powerful forces that, if they were ever to get out of control, could cause a second Chernobyl.

Last year, the number of equipment shutdowns at the country's nuclear electric power plants in which service personnel were at fault was 10% higher than the figure for the year before. The number of equipment shutdowns in which the plants that produced the equipment were at fault was also up 10% over the previous year. True, none of these shutdowns involved the release of radiation, fortunately, which is to say they posed no hazard to people's health. Even so, isn't the curve for breaches alarming all the same—a curve that has been creeping upward along with the number of nuclear reactors? Nor does a comparison of Soviet indices for all types of accidents with foreign data give us anything to be proud of. In the mining industry, for instance, we have 600% more accidents than other countries do.

Finally, one more figure. Each year, 14,000 people die from fatal injuries sustained on the job. Needless to say, such losses cannot be measured in any amount of money. How much grief lies behind that impassive statistic!

It remains to be said that the statistic was obtained from V. Kh. Doguzhiyev's Commission on Emergencies. He does not intend, then, to throw up his hands in the face of frightening figures. His experience at organizational work in an extremely complex branch—until recently Vitaliy Khussey-novich headed a major ministry—will doubtless come in handy. And judging from his answers to the people's deputies' questions, he intends to take his new responsibilities seriously.

The USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources has proposed that the USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature and

the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology be made subordinate to V. Kh. Doguzhiyev. N. I. Ryzhkov observed at the session that this idea merits study. This is all very good: Nature too finds itself in an emergency today

and requires emergency assistance. The people's deputies promised the new commission their utmost support in finally breaking the vicious cycle of irresponsibility and carelessness that demarcates the "high risk zone."

Sverdlovsk Accident Recovery Operations Detailed

Railroad Troops Complete Cleanup

18290219 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jun 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major A. Bugay, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "At the Site of Last Year's Accident"]

[Text] At the station, the Sverdlovsk shunting yards, the exercises of railroad troop subdivisions, to eliminate the consequences of potential transport accidents, have been completed.

At the beginning of June, work ceased for the entire shunting system of the Sverdlovsk transport junction, which was set against the tactical background of the exercises being carried out. The staff of the track railroad battalion, under the command of Major S. Mukhayev, set about performing the task in an organized manner.

Military-railroad workers, in the first few days, instead of seven, laid 21 switch assemblies.

The military men had to work under complicated technical conditions. A special feature of this major railroad junction is the fact that at the shunting yard, the track slope reaches two meters per kilometer. It was to be "eased." With negligence, it could have become the cause of an accident, for example, like the one that occurred on 4 October of last year at this same station. It was then that the soldiers of the railroad unit, headed by Colonel V. Boropolskiy, appeared.

The subordinates of Senior Lieutenant A. Kalinin and other officers performed their tasks in a professional manner. Here is the opinion of Major General V. Khimchenko, deputy chief of Railroad Troops, on the course of the exercises:

"In the course of the training-practice, the troops worked out problems of eliminating the consequences of potential accidents, and moreover did this at a junction as complicated as the Sverdlovsk shunting station. In addition to the training problems, we also achieved economic results. Tens, or even hundreds of thousands of rubles (this is the calculation of specialists) worth of work was done to reorganize the station, and moreover, in a short time. The reliability of the track facilities has been substantially increased, and this means, the safety of the train traffic as well."

Lines, Equipment Installed

18290219 Moscow GUDOK in Russian 30 Jun 89 p 1

[Article by V. Korshik, GUDOK correspondent: "A Large 'Blocking Interval' in the Shunting Yard"]

[Text] Twenty-eight days, instead of forty-five, were required for renovation, with complete traffic stoppage, on the down shunting system of the Sverdlovsk shunting station. During these June days, 6 million rubles worth of

construction-installation work was performed. Such rates are virtually unknown in the practical work of operating the country's railroads.

It was 28 June, 0800 hours. The first train, No 3601, entered the receiving yard. The car workers of N. Kolegov, shift foreman, immediately started processing it. There were many people in the spacious combined electric centralization dispatcher post. Gathered here were the directors of the Sverdlovsk Railroad and division, and representatives of the press. The largest "blocking interval", lasting 28 days, was coming to an end. T. Ivanova, the duty attendant for the station, gave the order to begin the cut. Dotted lines flashed on the huge chart of the control desk. The first coupling of five gondolas rolls into the marshaling yard. The down system, fitted out with new equipment, with reserve strength which was not there before, has set to work again.

The size of this major shunting system is best indicated by the following figures: there are 135 loudspeakers installed here, and its yard, with numerous tracks, extends for over 4 kilometers.

"About 11 kilometers of tracks were removed and laid in the receiving yard alone," says V. Skubak, chief of track service, deputy chief. "The work periods here were almost cut in half. How? The entire railroad renovation of the track facilities was done under 'blocking interval' conditions for the capital repair of the track."

The characteristics are very precise. Anyone who has even once been present at a "block interval" in the time for capital repair knows how pressed and stepped-up the rhythm is. In order to withstand it, the track workers prepare for the "block intervals" in advance, collecting the rodding, adjusting the equipment and mechanisms. The work preceding the renovation was even more scrupulous. It made it possible, accurately and smoothly, to carry out in four weeks an operation estimated for six months of work. The experience of the Sverdlovsk track workers must still be correlated and studied.

Incidentally, the excellent work organization of the power engineers, communications workers, and workers of other services requires careful review. Hundreds of collectives from other roads were employed here. Each one deserves acknowledgement. I should like especially to mention one person, A. Yergozov, track fitter of the Alma-Ata Mainline: for outstanding work on the renovation, V. Skvortsov, chief of the Sverdlovsk Railroad, awarded him the title of "Honored Railroad Worker."

The work of the collectives of the Sverdlovsktransstroy General Contracting Trust and of the Uralstroymekhanizatsiya Trust deserves high praise. The latter, at the end of the work "got stuck" because of the errors of their planners, and found themselves in a difficult situation, but got out of the hold-ups properly, because they were guided by a feeling of responsibility for the matter entrusted to them.

A great deal has been placed on the shoulders of the communications workers. In just the last few days they had to install 170 switch-operating machines, set 190 traffic control signals and lay 350 kilometers of signal-blocking cable. The chief executor of this work is the SMP-805 collective, and A. Perov is the train director. They finished all the work on time. The last—was on the morning of 28 June.

In recalling the days of the renovation, one must not forget the rear guard. I have in mind the transport workers of the Sverdlovsk road. Things were not easy for them. Although the Ministry of Railways, because of the redistribution of the plans, diverted the grouping of almost 50 percent of the car flow from the Sverdlovsk mainline, there was, nevertheless, still stress. It increased particularly on the day of the accident near Ufa. Some of the flow had to be taken on by the Sverdlovsk workers.

"This did not last long, however," says G. Androsov, deputy chief of the road for transport. "The next day we were working according to plan. Today, when the main part of the renovation is completed, we can say that the idea of stipulating the redistribution of functions of the Sverdlovsk shunting yard among the stations close by—Peresortirovochnaya, Voynovka, Kamensk-Ural, Druzhinino and others—fully proved itself. Through their work efforts, as well as through the increase in the transit flow along the northern and southern bypass of the Sverdlovsk junction, it was possible to maintain the normal train situation on the mainline. I should like to note the collective of the up hump system of the station, the Perm shunting yard, where the car detaching almost doubled during these days. The shift of A. Tikhonova, duty attendant for the Sverdlovsk division, did outstanding work."

The big "blocking interval" has been completed.

Conversion: Vans from Bryansk Auto Factory *18010867*

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA published in Russian on 14 July 1989 a page one article in the first edition, entitled "English Model Soviet Motor Vehicles". The article states that the production association of the Bryansk Motor Vehicle Factory has concluded a contract with the British Firm IAD for the development of an urban, one and one half ton delivery van.

The factory must within two years produce forty thousand freight vehicles for small deliveries as part of the process of converting from military to civilian production. As a transitional product the Bryansk plant will "assimilate" 12 modifications with diesel and gas engines of their own KiAZ-3727.

T-10 Scrap Being Used at Yenakievskiy *18010870 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 16 Jul 89 p 2*

[Unattributed: "Dreams—Into Plows!"]

[Text] (TASS). Donetsk Oblast. Tanks, exclusively for peaceful purposes, have "been introduced" at the

Yenakievskiy Metallurgical Plant. Yesterday in the enterprise's conversion shop the first smelting of steel from scrap which had once served as yesterday's powerful combat vehicles took place.

Fifty heavy "T-10" tanks, which until recently were in operation in one of the military formations, were transferred to the metallurgists by the command of the Kiev Military District. After re-smelting the combat metal will be used in steel-reinforced concrete castings for the construction of residences, kindergardens, hospitals and stores.

In all the military plan to transfer 300 such vehicles to the enterprise for re-smelting.

Votkinsk Producing Automated Lines for Agro-Industry *18010851 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jul 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent Yu. Shatalov: "The 'Feya' Conquered the Missiles"]

[Text] A defense plant has switched to producing goods for the people.

Not long ago, few people knew about the existence of the Votkinsk Plant Production Association. In a situation of deep secrecy, formidable SS-20 missiles went into "service" from here. Now, the whole world has heard about the enterprise, and a group of American specialists located at Votkinsk is observing how our country is implementing the treaty on ending the production of medium- and shorter-range missiles.

In the shops there are more and more often conversations about conversion. In January of last year, the collective of the Votkinsk Plant Association began converting part of the production capacities to production of peaceful products.

"We didn't forget about them before either, but now there is an opportunity to produce more of them," says the association's chief engineer Yu. Chertkov. "To do this, we had to bolster our design and engineering services working on the national economy, using the specialists who were freed; open a new design bureau, which is now developing automatic lines for processing sectors; and change the nature of some of the shops."

Quite a number of problems have come up, and not all of them have been resolved yet. For instance, the designers who came to the new divisions from basic production encountered a shortage of materials for completing the civilian products. Before, everything needed was readily available.

"My job today has turned out to be just as interesting as it was before," says V. Vinikurov, a former missile assemblies engineer.

Now he heads the new division for developing various machinery for processing sectors of the agro-industrial

complex. The designers began from scratch, so to speak, since the previous technical documentation was hopelessly outdated. But despite this, they have already managed to develop a powerful pasteurization and refrigerating plant for the dairy industry, unlike any in our country. It was put into series production just recently, but it has already been exhibited at the USSR VDNKh [Exhibition of USSR National Economic Achievements] and has received high marks from specialists.

The shops for producing consumer goods are also gaining momentum. Now the Votkinsk workers will send 420,000 "Feya" washing machines to the trade network, many more than in 1987. Next year, they will bring the number produced to 600,000. The popularity of the small-size household machines indicates their high quality.

As far as baby carriages are concerned, there is a great demand for them. This year trade has requested at least 300,000 carriages, 50,000 more than last year. In order to fill this order, the association management has decided to convert another machine shop to producing a new model of baby carriage.

Defense Plants Lack Proper Materials To Make Food Industry Equipment

18230071 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 5 Aug 89 p 1

[Article by engineer A. Yegorov: "Both Time and Money"]

[Text] Defense industry workers who have been charged with creating equipment for the food industry have been faced with an unexpected problem. It turns out that only those materials whose use has been permitted by the USSR Ministry of Health are suitable for such equipment. The designers consulted the document of guidance given to the "late" Ministry of Machine Building for the Light and Food Industry and became discouraged. The defense industries had little to do with the materials that

were among those permitted. To get permission, according to the workers of the sanitary-epidemiological station, was a long and costly procedure: two years and almost R10,000 for each type of material. And there was no guarantee that it would be allowed in production.

What is to be done? Are the "permitted" materials to be assimilated? But money, time, and additional capacity are also needed. Perhaps there is enough of these, for example, to adjust, along with the products produced, the manufacture of a wide assortment of new fasteners? Of course not. In a word, all the work for output of equipment for the food industry is threatened with disruption.

But there is a way out. Using an immediate directive from Gosstandart, the technical specifications of each material must carry corresponding instructions as to whether or not it can be used in contact with food products. A code would be better. For example: 1—can be used with all products; 2—can be used only with dry products; and so on. Over the course of a year the Ministry of Health should coordinate the technical specifications for all materials, domestic and imported. It would also be possible to enlist the services of oblast and city sanitary-epidemiological services and Ministry of Health scientific research institutes.

There is also another faster and more convenient choice. Issue a handbook which would specify for all materials the permissible contact with food products.

It should also be taken into account that the existing system, in which the Ministry of Health gives permission for the use of materials in manufacturing specific components—choppers, covers, knives, handles, and so forth—is basically faulty. After all, the variety of components, especially now when we are moving toward broad reproduction—and the billions to produce such multi-faceted solutions—holds back the creation of equipment. The Ministry of Health does not have enough personnel or material resources to carry out the work of assimilating equipment in the planned period of time, all the more since these time periods are extremely tight.

**Gen Shkadov Proposes Reorganization Of
Management Of Military Education**

*18010837 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jul 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Army Gen I. Shkadov: "Problems Of Military Education: Paradoxes Of Administration"]

[Text] For a number of years, many of my colleagues in the USSR Ministry of Defense General Inspectors Group and I have had to deal directly with the problems involved in training officers and in organizing the training and educational process in academies and schools. For the past three years, more than 20 of our group's army generals and branch marshals have chaired academies' and schools' state examination commissions. Naturally, on the basis of higher educational institutions' performance results, we thoroughly analyze and compare results, exchange views, and formulate and submit proposals. And here is the remarkable thing: Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the higher educational institutions in which we work belong to different branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms and that their students and cadets are trained for a variety of military specialties, the characteristic shortcomings in their training as revealed in the course of examinations usually prove so typical that one gets the impression that they were all trained at the same military educational institution and under the direction of the same professors and instructors.

For all practical purposes, we have yet to achieve a decisive shift from mass, "gross output" training and education to individual training and education, to the most active methods of holding training sessions and intensifying training, in the interests of molding the military specialist as a creatively thinking individual. Very often, the chief subject of military education—tactics and operational arts—are mastered in an oversimplified setting that is devoid of critical, nonstandard situations. This remains a chronic illness, so to speak, of our educational institutions, as does the fact, incidentally, that a sizable portion of all graduates conceptualize the basic principles of martial art in an insufficiently full and in-depth fashion during their training.

Excessive tutelage of students and cadets remains a universal phenomenon. Too persistently and doggedly, they are deprived of the opportunity to acquire knowledge on their own. Though everyone seems to acknowledge the need to give them more time for self-training, specific and substantiated proposals for setting aside one day—and, in their final year, two days—a week for self-training remain under protracted study.

Nor are there any grounds to speak of meaningful progress in reorienting the training process toward active forms and methods of training and toward widespread use of computers.

The causes of all this vary widely, but one cause is the most common and affects all aspects of higher educational institutions' life and activity in one way or

another. I refer to the system of administering military educational institutions, which in its present form, in my opinion, is completely obsolete and, in view of its extremely low effectiveness, incapable of ensuring implementation of the restructuring process in higher educational institutions.

As is common knowledge, administration can be effective only if, first, it is built on a scientific foundation, and second, that it is effected by competent agencies and specialists. Qualitatively analyzing and evaluating the course and effectiveness of training sessions, generalizing advanced experience, and drawing up scientifically substantiated recommendations for adjusting the training and educational process are things that can be done only by people whose level of training and competency is at a minimum no lower than that of the higher educational institutions' professors, instructors, and command-and-political staffs. This is elementary logic. But what is the case in practice? What is the nature of this system?

Military educational institutions in the Armed Forces, as a component part of the branches and combat arms, are subordinate to their commanders in chief and commanders. Administration of the training and educational process is the responsibility of the staffs of deputy commanders in chief for higher educational institutions, and of departments and groups of combat arms and main and central administrations. In addition, there also exists the Ministry of Defense Main Administration of Higher Educational Institutions, to which not a single higher educational institution is subordinate.

Contrary to elementary logic, however, all these agencies are staffed with officers who are less competent in the field of organization and implementation of the training process than the professors and instructors of the academies—as well as of many service schools. These agencies' staff categories do not envision their replacement with officers who hold academic degrees and titles. If such officers are appointed, they are deprived of monetary compensation for their academic titles and ranks. Finally, such officers are, in relative terms, below the staff categories of higher educational institutions. Herein lie the paradoxes of administration: The flower of our military scholars and educators is concentrated in the higher educational institutions, while their work is administered by people the absolute majority of whom are far removed from scholarship and teaching. Essentially, the administrations and departments of branch and combat arm higher educational institutions are typical bureaucracies capable of little more than compiling statistics, writing directives and instructions of dubious validity and need, and conducting second-rate inspections.

Take the Main Administration of Higher Educational Institutions. According to its organizational and staff structure, it consists of administrations and departments. Though some departments are charged with organizing training at academies and schools, in fact they

perform no training organizational work at higher educational institutions—nor could they, because their employees lack sufficient skills. Furthermore, if we take an in-depth look at the problem, nor should they perform such work, because it relates to the functions assigned to the commanders in chief of Armed Forces branches, to commanders and chiefs of combat arms, and to chiefs of academies and service schools. Commanders in chief and commanders confirm training plans and programs, and they also provide all initial data for their formulation. What, then, remains for the Main Administration of Higher Educational Institutions? Purely perfunctory tasks—coordinating training plans and programs, compiling general statistical data, and holding inspections. However, is this really what this agency should be doing?

Today, at a time when we are called upon to deepen the processes of restructuring military education, it is extremely important to have the findings of a serious, scientific analysis of the entire existing system of military personnel training, on the basis of which it would be possible to devise options for its development, to set basic guidelines for continuous military education and for the comprehensive operational-tactical training of students and cadets, and so on. But who can do such an analysis and draw up recommendations? Neither the Ministry of Defense nor the Armed Forces branches have a research agency staffed with military scholars and educators who are capable of dealing with these questions on a scientific basis. And this is the main reason why all sorts of decisions are often taken on the basis of superiors' arbitrary "directives." I don't mean to say that they are all mistaken; sometimes intuition and experience suggest a decision's expediency. But by no means everything that is put into practice is thoroughly documented and scientifically validated.

What is proposed?

In place of the Main Administration of Higher Educational Institutions, we should set up a research center for the system of continuous military education and the training and educational process. Naturally, it should be staffed with the most authoritative and prominent scholars and educators, charged with research functions,

and granted authority to draw up scientifically substantiated recommendations and proposals. It would seem worthwhile to have in the Main Inspectorate a group charged with monitoring the training process and likewise staffed with experienced military educators.

We should follow the same principle in staffing the administrations and departments of branch and combat arm higher educational institutions, in order to shift them from statistical functions to living, creative and, most importantly, scientifically substantiated activity that exerts a rather active influence on the development of the training and educational process in academies and schools.

I am convinced that we need today a clearly defined and comprehensive concept of the administration of higher educational institutions that is formulated on a new basis. In devising such a concept, we will have to rethink a good deal and resolutely abandon all that fails to promote the deepening of restructuring processes in military education. And quite a few such things have piled up. Here is but one example, concerning the practice of holding so-called comprehensive inspections of academies and schools. These inspections only divert many staff members from their work and throw the training process in higher educational institutions out of rhythm.

To treat higher educational institutions the way we treat troop units and formations is simply wrong. A frontline subunit or unit should be in a state of constant combat readiness, and it is logical to inspect it at any time. But subunits of cadets or students have a completely different function. Consequently, the time and frequency with which they are inspected and the criteria for evaluating them must be different. The chief parameter here is the end result—graduation, and it should be evaluated with due regard, naturally, for the performance of previous years' graduates.

Revising and fundamentally restructuring the system of higher educational institution administration is undoubtedly a complicated affair. But we have to do it. Without skilled and effective administration, the restructuring of military education is scarcely feasible.

Israelis Seek To Develop Longer Range Missile
18010838 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jul 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Golubyev: "Shagreen Leather' Of Security"]

[Text] People in Israel have traditionally tried to justify its feverish arms race and brutal occupation of Palestinian territories primarily by citing security interests. They love to point out the vulnerability of the small state, in whose narrow littoral zone two-thirds of its population and 80% of its industrial capacity are concentrated. In a matter of minutes or hours, they say, these areas could be reached by Arab missiles, aircraft, or armor. "We wouldn't even have time to mobilize our reservists," says one Rafi of the Israeli press service, in an effort to reinforce such claims. "Returning the Golan Heights to Syria would be like amputating a man's arm, and giving up the West Bank would mean almost certain death." Because of this "dramatic" situation, it is said, the Israelis have to make sure the country is militarily superior to each Arab country and to any combination of Arab states that allegedly dream of throwing them into the sea.

Essentially standing the cause on its head, the Swiss newspaper NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG asserts: "The supplying of intermediate-range missiles to neighboring Arab countries, which has become public knowledge, encourages Israel to build up its forces even more." Yet it would be more correct to say that this "buildup," which has proceeded without interruption from the moment of Israel's formation in May 1948, is in fact the very thing that has compelled the Arab countries to build up and modernize their own defense potential, to the detriment of their civilian development.

Speaking of missiles, it is Tel Aviv that has sought to break out of the pack and to be the first to expand its capability to launch "preventive" and punitive missile and bombing strikes against its neighbors, and over increasingly greater distances. According to the American press, the Shavit rocket, for example, which lofted into orbit the first Israeli spy satellite, the Ofeq-1, could be put in the class of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are capable of delivering nuclear warheads a distance of 3,300 to 4,500 miles. Incidentally, according to the West German KOLNER STADT-ANZEIGER, Israel now has more than 200 nuclear warheads. It's not surprising that the Arab countries have termed the launching of the Ofeq-1 a "threat to their security," especially in view of the fact that, at the same time, the Israelis conducted yet another secret test of the intermediate-range Jericho missile, which is also capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Now its designers have been given the task of increasing its range from 850 to 1,500 kilometers.

The danger confronting the Arabs is all the greater considering the fact that Israel has become the largest foreign participant in the American Strategic Defense Initiative. Its centers and industrial companies were

allocated \$165 million to fulfill contracts under the program in 1988; the bulk of the money is to be spent on developing the Arrow system for intercepting intermediate-range missiles aimed at Israeli cities. In March of this year, the SDI Organization and the Israeli Ministry of Defense signed an agreement to set up a computer center for the purpose of modeling a tactical antimissile defense system designed for the Middle Eastern theater of military operations. We should add that the Ofeq-1, in addition to identifying Arab strategic installations, is capable of guiding Khetz and Barak-1 missiles to them.

Israel is also involved in a race for other weapons under the principle of "specialization and advanced technology." The intention is to always keep one step ahead of the enemy. However, since there are no precise data on the level of weapons design the enemy has attained, the "worst case scenario" invariably serves as the point of departure for Israel's own efforts. And so everything is taken to the absurd: Every "step ahead" on Israel's part compels its neighbors to build up their weapons, in order to be able to deal Israel a devastating counterblow.

According to Shif, military commentator for the Israeli newspaper HAARETZ, Israel, though the first to initiate the spiral of the space weapons race, will not keep its "monopoly on superiority" for long. Several Arab countries, led by Egypt, have already set about devising joint measures to counter that superiority in space. An Egyptian project to launch an Arab satellite will be financed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Nor is the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt ambiguous with respect to Israel's threats to stage strikes against other Arab countries' missile positions. U. al-Baza, the chief of the Egyptian President's political office, has declared: "Egypt will not remain a neutral observer if Israel is to undertake hostile action against any Arab country. The ARE will come to that Arab state's assistance, using all the means at its disposal without exception." And those means, in the opinion of the Paris-based journal ARABE, are quite effective. "The Egyptian Army," the journal writes in part, "is the only army in the Arab world that has an excellent mastery of weapons that are produced in the most varied countries and that sometimes serve highly contradictory military doctrines... Egypt's chief success has been to integrate these diverse and seemingly dissimilar types of weapons within the framework of a single strategy."

For his part, the Kuwaiti Defense Minister has announced that his country "will soon receive from Egypt the first shipment of air-to-surface missiles." Commenting on this announcement, the newspaper KUWAIT TIMES notes that the ARE last year concluded two major contracts for supplying weapons to Arab countries—including Iraq, which has emerged from the Iran-Iraq conflict "with a seasoned and battle-hardened army that has an impressive array of hardware and could again pose a threat to Israel's eastern front." According to Gen D. Shomron, Chief of the Israeli General Staff, Iraq presently has 55 land divisions, and

"this is more" than the number of American and Israeli divisions in the region combined.

Washington, without whose help, in the words of the London MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, "Israel would not survive," could also become a source of the Arabs' forced—albeit dangerous from the Israeli standpoint—arms buildup. For Tel Aviv's unreasonable policy is causing mounting discontent among American arms merchants, who are losing a great deal owing to the opposition of the Israeli lobby in the US to arms supplying to Arab countries. According to ARABE, the American Congress' "negative position" has already forced Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan to buy weapons from other Western countries. "By virtue of this single factor," the journal emphasizes, "the American military industry lost \$70 billion in 1988 alone." Great Britain, meanwhile, having intercepted Saudi Arabia's order, will supply it with weapons valued at several billion dollars—a serious blow to American industry.

American business has no intention of accepting this situation. The American press is already predicting that Saudi Arabia will ultimately succeed in buying F-15E aircraft, which the Americans consider to be the best fighter-interceptors in the world. For its part, the Reuters agency reports that if a new deal is approved by Congress, it will be the "largest purchase of American military hardware by Riyadh since Saudi Arabia bought AWAKS aircraft from the US in 1981 for a total sum of \$8.5 billion." We should add that Kuwait already has American F-18 aircraft. Washington is considering supplying certain Arab countries with M-1 Abrams tanks, multiple-tube rocket launchers, F-16 and F-18 fighters, and Maverick and Sidewinder air-launched missiles.

Incidentally, non-Arab Moslem countries, in particular Turkey and Pakistan, have also expressed a readiness to supply arms to the Arabs. Turkey will supply Egypt with 40 Turkish-made F-16s this year, and Pakistan proposes to supply Arab countries with light aircraft, aerial cluster bombs, mortars, machineguns, and various types of ammunition. Figuratively speaking, then, there are enough weapons to fan the flames of the Middle Eastern fire.

This weapons buildup has been stimulated by the aggressive policies of Tel Aviv, which now needs to think about how to stop the catastrophic shrinking of the "shagreen leather" of Israel's security. Wouldn't it be better, instead of pursuing an arms race, to "pile arms," to convert military industry, and to look for political means of resolving the Middle Eastern conflict, in the interests of a world without arms and of genuine security for peoples?

Development of Stealth Bomber Described

18010908 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Jul 89 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Baberdin: "Two Hours Over the Mojave Desert"]

[Text] To begin with let us go back to events of half a year ago. The United States, November 1988. Aviation

shops of plant No 42 of the Northrop Corporation were working intensively for days at a stretch. Soon thereafter a magnificent ceremony was held at the airfield in Palmdale. To the sound of a brass band and stormy applause by the audience assembled, a prototype of the newest strategic bomber created with "Stealth" technology was towed out of the hangar and onto an open pad. From this moment on the last stage of preparations for its maiden flight began.

Western military commentators noted in their writings at this time that all work on the B-2 project is shrouded in unprecedented secrecy. Even the production of tools and mounting hardware intended for assembling the aircraft was kept strictly secret. However publicity in the Western press did not at all pass over the B-2. This is understandable: Rank-and-file taxpayers are entitled to know what their money is spent for.

Initially it was planned to conduct test flights during the month and a half following the demonstration of the bomber. However, a number of problems developed. Troubles with the onboard computer, disruptions in the control system in some regimes of its operation...

Final preflight testing of the superaircraft began officially on 10 July. In the course of a week the B-2 performed several taxi runs with the front landing gear leaving the concrete runway at a speed of 210 kilometers per hour. As Western news agencies reported, everything proceeded according to plan and caused no alarm. The takeoff of the aircraft was scheduled for Saturday, 15 July. However, 15 minutes after the engines were started the sortie was postponed due to dropping pressure in the fuel system.

Work resumed early on Monday morning. At 0636 hours the B-2 aircraft was in the air. Having flown a circular route for 2 hours, the aircraft landed at Edwards Air Force Base 60 kilometers from the takeoff point. According to data in the Western press, the aircraft was piloted in flight by a crew consisting of Northrop Corporation test pilot Bruce Hinds and U.S. Air Force pilot Richard Couch. The altitude of flight in the course of testing reached 3 kilometers.

Let us recall that the B-2 strategic bomber is built on the basis of a "flying wing" pattern without a well-defined fuselage and tail surfaces. This is a subsonic jet aircraft with a wing span of 52 meters and overall length of 21 meters. The pilots' cockpit is located in the center of the wing on the fuselage at whose edges two narrow engine nacelles are located (the maximum thickness of the wing is 5.2 meters). There are four engines with a thrust of 8,500 kilograms each.

The carbon-filled plastics used in the design of the aircraft are capable of absorbing radar waves, but they also have reflecting properties. As noted in the Western press, other materials, such as kevlar by the DuPont Company, are dielectric, nonconducting substances and are thus transparent for radar rays.

The plane has virtually no sharp edges, welds, or gaps in the skin which reflect radar energy. It has no vertical stabilizers. The air intake of the engines is positioned at the top. It has a V-shaped empennage which deflects radar waves. The exhaust gases from the engine pass through carbon grates in the back of the fuselage in order to reduce the heat signature. Compressor blades are also screened by a special coating protecting them against the access of radar rays.

The entire battle complex is contained in the internal bay of the aircraft and includes short-range guided missiles, improved cruise missiles, and aircraft bombs. Altogether there are 25 tons of nuclear or conventional weapons. The range of flight (without air refueling) is 16,000 kilometers.

The aircraft's targets will be designated basically by the KN-12 and Lacrosse intelligence satellites. This is done in order not to entail the danger of being detected by means of air defense when the onboard radar is turned on.

According to official information, the Pentagon is trying to secure the purchase of 132 bombers of the new generation (at present the cost of each is estimated to be \$532 million). In addition to the first experimental

prototype, five more are currently at various stages of assembly. Overall more than \$23 billion has been spent for the bomber.

Foreign commentators stress that the B-2 is merely a part of the "Stealth" program. If it is carried out completely, it will become the most expensive in the history of American armaments.

Concern Over Possible U.S. Military Facilities in Singapore

18010875

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA of 11 August 1989 published in the Second Edition on page 8 a 700-word article entitled "Point of View: Singapore Invites" by Dmitriy Kosyrev, PRAVDA's "Own Correspondent" in Singapore. The author notes that the government of Singapore has declared its readiness to locate U.S. military facilities on its territory. These facilities may include both port and air facilities.

Kosyrev terms Singapore's act an "unexpected jest", that may have resulted from "U.S. pressure". In any case the significance of such facilities is related to Singapore's location in relation to the key Straits of Malacca.

State of Talks in Pakistan on Soviet POW's
18010831a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jul 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview with A. Prokhanov by M. Kozhukhov: "We Are Not Losing Hope"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] As was reported in IZVESTIYA earlier, a delegation of the people's "Hope" committee for the rescue of Soviet servicemen captured in Afghanistan visited Pakistan. Were they able to find out anything about their fate? What were the results of talks in Pakistan? Writer A. Prokhanov, the leader of the delegation, talks on these matters with an IZVESTIYA special correspondent.

[Prokhanov] Our trip was essentially a real step of "people's diplomacy" for the rescue of Soviet prisoners of war. Of course, we departed from Moscow with the hope of not only learning something about MIAs, but also perhaps even bringing some of our boys back home. We were sent off by dozens of women, and we carried to Pakistan their letters to sons who had not yet returned—essentially, letters to nowhere....

Many of our illusions were dispelled in the very first days, but nonetheless the work of our delegation in Pakistan promoted creation of a certain emotional background, owing to which diplomats have been able to move forward significantly in talks with the mujahadin. An agreement was reached to exchange POWs on an "all for all" basis—in other words, all Soviet POWs for all mujahadin held by the Afghan government. Second, agreement was reached with the opposition to permit access of representatives of the International Red Cross Committee to Soviet prisoners, and to allow them the possibility to write home and communicate that they are still alive—in exchange for the same measure on the part of the government of Afghanistan.

[Kozhukhov] The mujahadin previously said that they would not conduct any kind of talks on releasing our POWs until "Najibullah's regime collapses"....

[Prokhanov] Judging from everything, this requirement has been dropped: The talks are proceeding on a humanitarian basis—without any conditions having to do with the military and political situation in Afghanistan.

[Kozhukhov] How did the talks go, and with whom were you able to meet?

[Prokhanov] In Peshawar, where the headquarters of the Afghan opposition is located, we met with Modzhaddedi [transliteration], the head of the opposition "government" created on Pakistani territory, with Syed Ahmad Gilani, and twice with Gulbeddin Khekmattar [transliteration], the leader of Islamic fundamentalists. The names of these people are well known to all who have been following the events in Afghanistan: These are the key figures of the opposition....

Although the talks proceeded within the bounds of diplomatic propriety, they were rather complex. Different variants were discussed in the initial stage—for example in exchange for some of our soldiers we offered the mujahadin to come to Moscow in order to meet with the Soviet public and freely present their positions. Their counterproposal was to send to Moscow a delegation of Afghan mothers whose sons were missing in action. Their claims upon our army and the Afghan army are considerable: Their lists of MIAs contain 40,000 names, including 109 persons just from the Modzhaddedi clan.

[Kozhukhov] Judging from reports from information agencies, the appearance of our delegation in Peshawar elicited persistent interest from the press.

[Prokhanov] The leaders of the armed opposition tried to "squeeze" the maximum propaganda impact out of our trip. Khekmattar, for example, obviously attempted to present us in the role of repentant sinners who had come to atone for their guilt. Receiving the delegation in the headquarters of the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan," he covered the lawn with around 200 of his soldiers who had been disabled by the war.... An openly propagandistic trip to an Afghan refugee camp was also planned, but the Pakistani security service insistently recommended that we cancel this trip: Public opinion in the camps had been correspondingly prepared. Incidentally, an explosion that brought on casualties occurred on one of the streets of Peshawar our vehicle was to travel. I do not think that the bomb was intended for us—more likely it was a means of psychological pressure.

[Kozhukhov] Were you able to clarify the number of our soldiers believed to be missing in action, or at least the number of those who have remained alive?

[Prokhanov] The mujahadin refused to confirm or deny any data. Perhaps to gain a political advantage, or perhaps out of ignorance, which is fully probable considering the serious differences that exist among their different parties. For example Ahmad Shah Masuda, a Panjshir field commander, also has some of our POWs, but he refuses to submit to the Peshawar government. It is believed, by the way, that there is a computer containing a full databank on all Soviet POWs in Khekmattar's headquarters, the very same place where we had our meeting. Nonetheless I think that only a few of them are still alive, though Khekmattar assured us that they were "being treated as guests." But I have been to Afghanistan on several occasions, and I know how the dushman dealt with our prisoners, especially in the first years of the war—they were brutally and barbarically killed.

[Kozhukhov] Were you able to learn anything concrete about any of them?

[Prokhanov] We were able to learn a few things. For example we now know what happened to pilot Morozov, whose airplane was knocked down by antiaircraft artillery near Bagrame. American reporters were with one of

the opposition detachments at this time, and they confirmed that Morozov ejected practically at ground level, breaking his leg in the fall. As the mujahadin approached, he finished himself off in order not to be taken prisoner.

Private Ilshat Garaykhanov is possibly alive—or at least he was alive in 1983. Wounded in combat, he fell into a river, and later on his body was never found. One Pakistani who spoke with us recognized Ilshat from a photograph—he had met him in Afghanistan. Of course, almost 5 years have passed since then. Ilshat Garaykhanov might also have been among those who perished during the rebellion of our POWs at Badaber [transliteration], Pakistan in 1985, about which, incidentally, we were unable to gain any new information.

Finally, we met with one of our POWs. This was Andrey Lopukh from the village of Grechikha, Brest Oblast. The meeting was not an easy one, and it was staged from the beginning to the end. Andrey entered wearing an Afghan national costume, he announced to us from the threshold that he had voluntarily gone over to the side of the mujahadin, that he had accepted Islam and that he had no intention of returning. We were informed that Andrey was participating in combat activities on the side of the mujahadin. It was evident however that the lad had been prepared for the meeting with us—everything had been rehearsed, including the moment he pulled recent photographs from his wallet showing him posing in an embrace with his commander. Andrey shuddered at this moment, he began acting nervously, vacillating, and we felt that if we were to insist, he might have even consented to return. But we refrained from doing so, fearing for his life—we did not know what his consent might have cost the lad. We brought back a letter he wrote to his mother containing what was most important to her—information that Andrey was alive.

[Kozhukhov] Did the Pakistani authorities provide any assistance to your delegation?

[Prokhanov] Their relationship to the delegation was benevolent: We were received by the minister of foreign affairs and by the top officers of the Pakistani internal affairs ministry, and our safety was looked after by the Pakistani security service, though of course ours was an unofficial delegation: parents of MIAs—A. Gorbunova, A. Semenova and A. Omelin, and “Hope” committee members I. Andronov, V. Akimov and Ye. Poplavskaya. I believe that the delegation left a certain “humanitarian imprint” upon the development of relations between the USSR and Pakistan, in which, it seemed to us, the Pakistani side was interested.

[Kozhukhov] How successful are the efforts to free Soviet POWs by official channels? In what other ways can “Hope” help our diplomats?

[Prokhanov] The Soviet Embassy in Pakistan is applying all possible effort to free our boys. I think that our actions supplement each other. As far as the “Hope” committee is concerned, a trip by its representatives to

Kabul is planned: All of the positions discussed in the talks with the mujahadin must be coordinated with the Afghan side, and all procedures associated with possible exchange of prisoners must be discussed. We are not losing the hope of seeing all of them back home.

Flight Inspectors Denied Benefits From Afghan Service

18010831b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jul 89 First Edition p 2

[Letter to the editor by Col F. Kotik: “Is This Just?”]

[Text] Dear editor! I have served as a senior pilot-inspector and in other positions in the air force. As is true with my comrades and colleagues, I was ordered to carry out combat missions in Afghanistan on several occasions. I personally flew 131 sorties there, and 31 times I participated in especially heavy fighting, for which I was awarded the Order of the Red Star. But neither I nor my inspector colleagues receive any benefits as combat veterans. When I wrote the chief of the district's air force personnel division concerning this matter, his answer was this: “You had not served within the composition of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.” So it turns out that those who flew in combat together with pilots of line units are not combat veterans. While those who served peacefully in rear services in the same place, in Afghanistan (we saw that kind), enjoy all of the benefits.

Belorussian Action Support Afghan Vets, Families

18010846 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jul 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Col R. Makushin: “Personal Pensions—Belorussian Government Authorizes Payments to Disabled ‘Afghans’ and Surviving Family Members”]

[Text] “He wrote to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in desperation, pleading for help, and the newspaper forwarded the letter to us. I immediately telephoned the lads in the Komsomol gorkom in Mogilev to tell them that they had an “Afghan,”—Oleg Grinkevich. How was he getting along? Their reply was: he had died the previous day.

We then set out for Mogilev. There were three of us: Lena Lukashevich from the youth newspaper; Pasha Shetko—you remember him—the one who spoke at the Congress of Deputies; and I. We looked into the matter. We discovered that Oleg was disabled by a head injury, underwent a number of serious operations, pulled through, and enrolled in a pedagogical institute. He lived with his parents. Both were handicapped; the father preceded the son in death. Oleg could not perform heavy work: no carrying of water or firewood. The father was in the same situation. Only the mother was able to do things. Oleg moved into an apartment of his own. He felt sorry for his mother, but he did have to study, and the apartment could afford some conveniences. Nevertheless, his life was still difficult. He was gravely ill. He requested

that he be given an apartment so that he could live with his parents, in exchange for the house.

It turned out that the city knew about this, but no one seemed to get around to doing something about it: certain documents were still required; his address was lost. Later Lena was to write about this in detail in the CHERVONAYA ZMENA.

A fact came to light: Oleg had a brother, also an "Afghan." He was not disabled, fortunately. He returned unhurt. We went to visit him. I thought I had seen it all, especially after the episode with Oleg. When we arrived at Sasha's place, it was another matter. He had two small children, who were coughing all the time. The walls were covered by something green—a mold, most likely. It was not a sight for the very sensitive. So we asked him, "Sasha, how are you?" He answered us politely: look around. He kept addressing us with the honorific "you." I said to him, "That is not necessary. We all were there in Afghanistan. Why are you speaking to us like that?" He answered, "I do not believe you. I do not believe anyone."

At that point I promised myself that I would help these people if it's the last thing I do. And we did help, of course. Not I alone, but all of us—the "Afghans" and all normal people possessing a conscience. However, someone must have become frightened, because of Oleg. Now Sasha lives in an apartment consisting of four rooms. He took in his mother. Conditions seem to be better. Nonetheless, I sometimes think, and Lena Lukashovich agrees, that no one would have moved a finger if Oleg had not died. Sasha would not have been helped."

The above and other quotes are those provided me by Valeriy Kurdyukov, instructor in military patriotic education in the Ideological Work Department at the Belorussian LKSM [Lenin Young Communist League] Central Committee.

At one time KRASNAYA ZVEZDA made the statement that veterans of the Great Patriotic War residing in Belorussia are entitled to free public transportation. The editorial office later received information on authorization of personal pensions to be paid disabled veterans of the Afghan War and family members of servicemen killed in action. Also authorized was a number of benefits, including that of exchanging a Zaporozhets car (which is provided to virtually all persons entitled to such a benefit) for a Tavriya, and so forth. The point here is that this apparently is a matter of social policy, not of individual acts of charity.

I was amazed at the ease with which I was able to reach the Belorussian minister of social security. The 09 number provided me with the telephone numbers of the information desk and the visitors' office. A soft feminine voice suggested that I write down the minister's number she was about to provide.

One of the main questions I intended to put to the republic social security minister was : Why was

Belorussia doing so much in comparison with other areas of the country for Great Patriotic War veterans and the "Afghans?" I expected to receive a reply to the effect that, first, Belorussia lost one out of every four persons in the war, so that who but we are to exercise charity, and, second, Belorussia is stronger economically than other republics.

Tamara Fedorovna Krutovtseva listened attentively to my questions and my preconceptions relative to this subject. After a pause, she said, "Those reasons most likely apply." She then stated her opinion succinctly: "Even if the republic had no money, we would still feel obligated to do what we did. There has been enough talk of charity; we must follow up and take action. There are some things that cannot be put off until tomorrow. Finally, debts must be paid."

During our conversation in the ministry, a department chief made the remark that personal pensions for disabled "Afghans" are only one of their acts of charity. For example, there are cooperatives that pay "Afghans" benefits out of their own funds. That was not news to me: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA had reported on a Moscow cooperative of this kind. The point here is that charity is necessary and commendable, regardless of the source.

So, we have charity in practice. In Belorussia, as of 1 February of this year, there were 16,346 persons that had seen combat duty in Afghanistan. Of that total, 436 were disabled, and there were 764 families of men killed in action. On the day of my visit to the Minsobes [Ministry of Social Security], personal pensions granted by the republic were being paid to 349 disabled veterans and 393 members of families of the deceased. Papers are presently being processed for the remaining claimants.

On 3 February of this year the KPB [Belorussian Communist Party] Central Committee held a meeting for young reservists that had discharged their international duty in Afghanistan. The meeting was led by Central Committee First Secretary Ye. Sokolov. It would take too long to list all the questions that were discussed and decided, in areas naturally including more than material benefits for the former "Afghans." As far as this particular question was concerned, it was resolved with speed that was surprising even for our time: As early as the 27th of February the republic Sovmin passed a decree authorizing payments of personal pensions to disabled "Afghans" and surviving family members of the deceased. The amounts for disabled veterans were set as follows: group III—110 rubles; group II—150 rubles; group I—160. In addition, the difference between the old and the new pensions would be paid as of 1 July of last year, regardless of the effective date of payment of the pension.

The settlement of Pleshchenitsy is located several kilometers from Khatyn, in Logoyskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast. This is the home of "Afghan" (he is not alone) Vladimir Dedyulya, a group II disabled veteran. He first wound was a light one, to the hand. He later was struck by a

burst of fire, suffering four bullet wounds. A third wound he suffered prevents him from bending his knee; his kneecap is fragmented. He lives in a modern four-room apartment, together with his wife and baby. He has a Zaporozhets and a telephone. He works as a watchman earning 90 rubles. The pension paid him by the republic is 150 rubles, which is 46 rubles more than before.

We made another visit. The son of Nina Pavlovna and Yevgeniy Petrovich Mironchik died in 1985. The mother is receiving a survivor's pension of 100 rubles, which is 45 rubles more than her own pension. The younger son had entered the Army two months previously. Nina Pavlovna said thank you, but they have everything. She works. They have a house. A kitchen garden. A pension. They were invited to visit Minsk in April. They were received so warmly that she was moved to tears. She showed me a radio they had been gifted. In addition to 100 rubles. Everything was arranged well. With flowers. They were grateful.

"I was assigned to duty in Afghanistan upon graduating from officers's school. My story is quite average. I was the last man in a troop. The man in front of me stepped on a rock and started to fall. Falling there was bad, since the area was mined. I tried to hold him up and then pushed him so that he would straighten up, at which point I lost my balance and stepped to the side. A mine exploded and I fell. I tried to support myself with my hand, a reflexive action. A second mine exploded. I was sent to a hospital in Podolsk, where I was classified as group II disabled. In the hospital I met Tatyana, a nurse. We now have two small children.

"After recovering from my injuries, I set out for Lida, a small town located in Western Belorussia. I followed the established procedure by visiting the military commissariat the first day; I was invited to visit the party raykom on the second day. The first secretary at that time was Nadezhda Ivanovna Popova. She told me to take a job with the Komsomol gorkom. I did not even think about—let alone know how to do—that kind of work. I asked her why she was suggesting the gorkom. After all, she did not know me. Nadezhda Ivanovna replied that she did not want me to start drinking and perish; she felt I must work.

"Now I cannot imagine what would have happened if I had not met her. No, I would not have become an alcoholic. I am an officer, after all. So I took a job with the gorkom, then I enrolled in law school. I had occasion to be in Minsk, and I decided to stop in at the Komsomol central committee for a chat with the boys. They invited

me to join them. I thought about it a bit and did so. Later they nominated me as a candidate for peoples' deputy. However, I was not accepted to be one of the 75 Komsomol deputies at the Central Committee Plenum in Moscow—only the cream of the crop were elected."

Listening to Valeriy Kurdyukov, I thought to myself: If every "Afghan" returning from the war had his own Nina Ivanovna, we could resolve many problems.

I will never forget the tragic story of Oleg Grinkevich of one year ago. Granted that Oleg could have died had he been living in an adequate apartment, but maybe he would not! The conclusion here is that help was late in coming. Judging from what I learned about "Afghans" in Belorussia, that sort of thing could not happen today. At least let us say that it should not happen. We must hurry, however, for tomorrow may be too late. I am speaking of "Afghans" and veterans of the Great Patriotic War living beyond the poverty threshold, and of all those who more than others have need of our charity.

In the house where the young man lived (I am back at Pleshchenitsy), the center of a large room is occupied by a small table. On the table there are two photographs: one of a youth wearing the uniform, the other of a young man dressed in suit coat. Igor and Oleg—brothers. And flowers. And the radio received as a gift in Minsk. Nina Pavlovna told me in a soft tone of voice that the younger one was assigned to the Baltic area, that he would later be reassigned to another area. Could he not be assigned closer? Nevertheless...

Yevgeniy Petrovich explained what the "nevertheless" meant: "We gave the Motherland one son, then the second one left. I myself will travel wherever necessary to visit him, even to the Far East, but as far as Mother is concerned... She is troubled by her legs... Why cannot the boy remain to serve in Belorussia? I know that we have that kind of servicemen... But what about him?"

In the republic military commissariat I was cited a statistic: Approximately every fifteenth inductee remains in Belorussia. Nina Pavlovna's son was not such a statistic.

Now one hears it said in Logoyskiy Rayon that sure, it would have been better to let the boy stay here. However, we did not know, we did not think.

Today our country faces a multitude of problems, one of which—the "Afghan question"—is only one of the most difficult. Examples of how it is being resolved do exist. We must follow them.

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