




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JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Complaint To Yazov Of Dedovshchina Proven False

18010608 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 89 First Edition p 2

[Letter signed by Petrov, Kaygorodov, Korovinskiy and a total of 28 signatures, entitled: "The Sons Were Indignant In Response To A 'Letter On Behalf of Their Mothers' To The Minister of Defense", followed by an Editorial response by the "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" Komsomol Life Department.]

[Text] We will quote it in full, without any changes in the author's style. Especially since subsequent events demanded of us the utmost objectivity and accuracy.

"When things are bad for a mother, it can be gotten over. But when things are bad for her child, it's doubly hard on the mother. And the mother's pain is multiplied tens of times if she is unable to help her son.

"I am writing on behalf of the mothers of the soldiers in troop unit..., who were called up from Moscow. My son is a soldier of the 1988 autumn call-up. His letters have deprived me of sleep and peace of mind. My son is no sissy, and god didn't short him on strength. He wanted to serve in the Army. But before he had seen it only on television.

"As we were seeing him off at the train station, some of the people there talked about dedovshchina in the unit. One of the fellows from the group that had been called up tried to commit suicide right then and there. Some people were able to stop him.

"We mothers feared Afghanistan, but why should mothers have to fear for their children in their own country? We turn over our children so that they serve in the Army, learn something good there, and become strong both morally and physically. But can it really be that they have to learn those good things through 'tortures' at the hands of conscripts who have already served most of their term, and through hunger and cold? Why do we have officers in the Army, just to collect their pay? If officers can't keep order in the Army, they have no place in it. Today our children are being mistreated, and tomorrow, embittered, they will mistreat others.

"We watched the program 'I Serve the Soviet Union!' It showed the Belorussian Military District, where there is no dedovshchina, because the officers are conscientious. We know that dedovshchina is strong, especially in the Far East. Until changes come there, more than one fate will be maimed. Please help us mothers. When will restructuring reach the Far East? Our hearts ache for our children. In the Army they are soldiers, but they are also people's children, people's sons, often the only ones.

"The unit's address is:...

"We are withholding our names because we fear for our children. For they still have two years to serve there, and there's no telling when changes will occur in the conditions in which they serve."

That is the letter, an anonymous one. As we know, such letters are no longer acted upon. But this letter seemed to warrant a different response. An authoritative commission traveled to the unit, and the editors contacted Lieutenant Colonel V. Usoltsev, permanent correspondent for the Far Eastern Military District. His assignment was a specifically journalistic one: to investigate the alarming claims. His report follows:

Everything Turned Out Differently.—The small garrison is located deep in the taiga. It is surrounded by a rich and untouched wilderness. The area is renowned for its mushrooms and berries. And the opportunity to supplement the soldiers' diet with nature's gifts is not missed here.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Sazonov, commander of the unit, spoke about this as we toured the military compound.

We stopped in the first barracks. I won't hide the fact that I was somewhat taken aback when I saw openwork decorative partitions dividing the sleeping area into "berths," the luxuriant greenery of flowers, and easy chairs. There were also a color television, a tape player, and a record player. The commander, noticing my expression, explained:

"We try to create a comfortable atmosphere. The soldiers need mental relaxation."

The linens on the beds were clean and starched. The consumer-service room was orderly and had every necessity. (Let me say from the outset that my arrival, like the commission's, was unexpected and that there had been no time to "prepare" for the encounter.)

The soldiers were attending training sessions at the time, but I didn't pass up the chance to speak with a company charge quarters, Private M. Yaroshenko:

"What kind of microclimate do you have in the barracks?"

"We have no complaints. But we did have some trouble one time." Pointing suddenly to a thermometer in the barracks, he continued: "The reading on those days was below 18°C. That was a foul-up. The deep-well water pump had broken."

The cadet had taken my question literally, and when I explained what sort of microclimate I was referring to, Yaroshenko smiled:

"Are you talking about dedovshchina? We get along well, ask anybody."

I did ask, and more than once. The answers were similar: "The situation is normal," or "I've made friends here." Though I didn't suspect everyone of having collectively agreed to cover for one another, I watched closely how the soldiers interacted during the training sessions and while going about their everyday activities.

I paid close attention during the morning exercises, thinking that perhaps I would see a bruise or cut on someone. But there was no such thing. I dropped by the medical unit and asked what sort of complaints the soldiers come in with. There too, however, I didn't find a "trace" of any beatings in a single registration book. On learning of the purpose of my visit, the doctor, Medical Service Captain A. Ternovoy, said:

"There haven't been any such injuries. But I can tell you about a different statistic. In six months of training, the soldiers have put on an average of 3 to 8 kg. They have significantly increased their endurance and physical strength."

Again, there was no reason to doubt the doctor. Prior to that I had visited the soldiers mess and become personally convinced that the soldiers are well fed here. On holidays and nonworkdays, the menu is supplemented with produce from the kitchen garden. The unit raises its own pigs and has its own hotbeds. And the athletic facilities would be the envy of many units: a large gymnasium and a swimming pool. Several athletic groups are continually active.

Nor has the unit neglected leisure activities. It has its own singing and musical ensemble and its own brass band. Despite the unit's remote location, it is frequently visited by professional artists. The ensembles "Flow-ering May" and "Amur Daybreaks" gave concerts recently. Artists from the oblast drama theater are frequent guests.

And the more I learned about the unit's life and came to know its people, I more I pondered a difficult question: How could such a letter have appeared?

I had a special discussion with the soldiers who had been called up from Moscow. None of them had been mistreated by anyone, and judging from our conversation, they had sent only good letters home. So it could not have been their parents who "sounded the alarm." Private Pavel Kulvinov shared the following experience:

"After graduating from secondary school, I went to work at the Moscow All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League Automotive Plant, and there I heard about dedovshchina from the older fellows who had already served in the Army. But I myself have not encountered it, though I naturally expected all kinds of unpleasantness."

Private Boris Yurochkin told of having had similar concerns. The fellows also called attention to the following detail: they had flown by airplane from Moscow to the Far East, and so there had naturally been no seeing-off at a train station.

They spent a long time discussing how such a letter could have appeared. Perhaps someone had written some "tearful" letters home in an effort to cadge money or something else, and now that person was ashamed to admit it. Perhaps the letter wasn't written by any of the Muscovites at all but by someone who was trying to use it to settle scores with the commanding officers. They were indignant: "No, our mothers could not have written such things."

As I was working in the taiga garrison, I met Leonid Valentinovich Medvedev, who had traveled there to visit his son.

"My son wrote that they got along well and that living conditions were good, but I still had doubts, thinking that maybe he didn't want to worry me. Some newspapers write other things—about such "horrors." And so I came. With the commander's permission, I spent the night in the barracks, tried the food in the soldiers mess, and spoke with many of my son's fellow soldiers. Now I'm no longer worried—my son wrote the truth."

I don't want to give the impression that there aren't any problems or shortcomings in the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Sazonov. Some soldiers are having difficulty mastering the specialty of communications operator, and others are having a hard time giving up bad habits that they've brought with them from civilian life. For example, one soldier recently received a package containing two hotwater bottles of vodka.

Incidentally, after that incident a meeting was held in the unit in which the soldier's fellow servicemen spoke their minds in a blunt and principled fashion. I want to think the lesson will benefit the soldier, and so I'm not going to give his name.

As for the commission's conclusions, I can give them in one line: "The claims set forth in the letter were not confirmed."

But it was too early to consider the matter closed. The Moscow soldiers themselves were unwilling to do so. When the commission was still working in the unit, they gathered together. Their opinion was unanimous: "Our honor was been impugned. We're going to write our own letter."

And soon a letter of the following content lay on the desk of the Minister of Defense:

"Writing you are representatives of the city of Moscow who are serving in company three, N training unit.

"We have learned of the contents of a letter that has been sent to you, and we immediately decided to write you.

"Since our arrival at the unit, we have not experienced what we had prepared ourselves for in "civilian life" on the basis of stories and rumors. From the very outset, we have been the object of attentive concern on the part of the officer corps and have enjoyed great support on the part of the company's sergeants, without whose help we would have much more difficulty mastering the finer points of army life.

"For the first few days, of course, it was very difficult to get used to the demands of the army regimen and to the physical training, but we experienced no mistreatment on the part of the soldiers who have served longer than us and are not experiencing any mistreatment now.

"We have learned a lot in our first two months' of army service, and the difficulties that once seemed insurmountable to us have become for us normal army routine. We have been helped in this by the great attention and support of the company's officers and by the example of the sergeants, especially as the company first sergeant and a number of junior commanders were called up from our city.

"We are worried about the nerves and health of our mothers, who on the basis of some sort of incomprehensible rumors think that we are being mistreated here and that people are taking our money and parcels. We concisely of the 1988 autumn call-up and servicemen of N unit want to assure our mothers that all these things are absurd tales and rumors. Our mothers should not worry and should not think that we are victims of 'rampant dedovshchina,' which does not exist here, and they should know that we are being turned into dependable defenders of the Motherland here. Let those who are spreading these filthy rumors come to our unit and see for themselves that we are speaking the truth.

"Please don't think that someone compelled us to write this letter. It's just that it's sometimes shameful to hear the verbal mud that is being flung on our Army, our commanders, and our senior comrades. And that is why we wrote this letter. Petrov, Kaygorodov, Korovinsky..." (Twenty-eight signatures in all).

From the Editors. So, then, are we dealing with a forged letter? A letter whose "facts" took both considerable time and considerable resources to clarify? How to make up for the anxiety and nervous strain, for the distrust between people that the letter sowed in the soldiers collective?

Perhaps someone's mother did indeed write the letter "just in case," a mother who was frightened by the bloodcurdling "stories" about army life with which she has been bombarded of late. Dedovshchina does exist. To deny this would be to go against the facts. But it is important to say something else. Today dedovshchina is often becoming an object of speculation, and some people

see an opportunity for personal gain in this situation. A remiss but calculating soldier stirs fear and sympathy in his parents in an effort to get transferred to some place closer to home. An opportunistic journalist thinks he will "make a name for himself" using the now "fashionable" army theme.

But the time has come to take a constructive, thoughtful approach to this serious problem. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA'S department for Komsomol life.

Mar Avn Kozhedub Is Candidate for Deputy

18010417b Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
22 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT unofficial correspondent A. Kovalenko under the "Candidates for USSR Deputy" rubric: "I.N. Kozhedub: Youth Are Our Future and Our Hope"]

[Text] Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub. A human legend. A Marshal of Aviation. A celebrated combat pilot. Thrice-decorated Hero of the Soviet Union. Kindly, modest, demanding, and always willing to lend a hand. This is the way Soviet people know him.

The son of a Sumsk kolkhoz worker was hungry for knowledge. That was what led him to enroll in the chemical engineering tekhnikum. But Ivan had another dream—to conquer the skies, which was why he became a member of the Shostka Flying Club of the Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to the Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction of the USSR].

His love for the sky prevailed. Inducted into the Army, Kozhedub was accepted into the Chuguyev Military Aviation School for Pilots. He became an instructor there upon graduating.

The war broke out. An ardent patriot, Kozhedub tried to be where he felt most needed in the Motherland's most difficult time. He wrote messages to headquarters requesting transfer to the front. It was in March of 1943 when his request was finally granted. He was assigned to the 240th Fighter Regiment.

Kozhedub entered the fighting by engaging the Hitlerites in dogfights over the Kursk Salient. In no time at all he made himself known. The Fascists would warn their pilots: "Achtung! Achtung! Ace Kozhedub is in the air! Ace Kozhedub is in the air!"

The invader had good reason to panic. With his deep theoretical knowledge, superior fighter pilot technique, tactical skills, and excellent mastery of the craft's weapons, Kozhedub racked up 20 victories by October. Entered in his personal file are the following notations: "shot down ME-109 at 0900 hours on 2 October 1943;

shot down Ju-87 at 11:15; at 13:10 shot down FW-190; at 15:00 shot down Yu-88". In many aerial encounters the fighter pilot would destroy three, four, even five enemy aircraft.

The frontline pilot was always studying as a squadron commander. Later, as deputy commander of an aviation regiment—the 176th Guards Regiment—he would teach subordinates both on the ground and in the air. His victories mounted, and the Motherland was watching. On 4 February 1944 Kozhedub was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On 19 August he was honored with the Gold Star for the second time.

By the end of the war Guards Major Kozhedub had flown a total of 326 combat missions, having shot down 60 enemy aircraft, including the newest Fascist fighter—a jet plane. All this in a little more than two years of service at the front. He destroyed the last two aircraft on 5 May 1945 over the capital of the vanquished Hitlerite Reich—Berlin. For high military skills, personal courage, and valor, on 18 August 1945 officer Kozhedub was awarded the Gold Star for the third time.

The Great Patriotic War was over. Kozhedub remained in the ranks of winged protectors of the Soviet aerial borders. He flew and studied: He graduated from the Air Force Command Academy and the General Staff Academy to assume high positions of command.

A veteran whose chest is decorated with many orders and medals awarded by the USSR and foreign countries, he is still on active duty, working in the Inspector-Generals Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Marshal of Aviation Kozhedub has been performing great social work all these years.

As a member of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, Ivan Nikitovich often meets with defense society members to instill in youth love for the Fatherland and readiness to protect the achievements of October. Collectives of students and school children, laborers, white collar workers and kolkhoz workers, creative intelligentsia; military units and combat ships; it is difficult to say where his thoughts on heroic deeds have not been heard. His talks have taken him to virtually every part of the country.

The Lipetsk Flying Club collective was one of the first to nominate Kozhedub for USSR deputy. There is sound reason for this: The marshal of aviation on a recent visit to the club not only met with student pilots and their instructors - he was instrumental in strengthening the facility. It was also noted that Ivan Nikitovich represented the Lipetsk Oblast party organization at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

The DOSAAF's nomination of Kozhedub as a candidate for USSR deputy is an acknowledgement of the outstanding services he has rendered to the country and the defense society. He does not live in the past, however.

His thoughts are of the future; he would like to see the DOSAAF, primarily the aviation organizations, operate at even higher levels of quality.

"This is not my first election to the USSR Supreme Soviet," said Ivan Nikitovich in his conversation with A. Kovalenko, our unofficial correspondent. "I always tried to be conscientious in discharging my duties as deputy and carrying out the mandate of the voters. If I am so entrusted again, I will work as much as I did previously. My platform consists of devoting my energy and knowledge to raising the prestige of aviation specialties, primarily flying. At the present time youth is less interested in attending air force schools. There are two applicants—at times only one—for each opening. This should not be so. I believe there are several reasons for this.

"Many young persons do not apply to flight schools on account of poor health. This being the case, the government must play a more active role in strengthening health in the early years. Lack of achievement is also due to insufficiency of knowledge. School workers should seriously ponder ways to fill this void. I am sure that the situation is not helped by the weak social standing of the officer corps. I will strive to make improvement there.

"A second task—one at least as important—is organizing DOSAAF flying clubs which will be provided with modern equipment, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters in all oblast and republic centers and in cities where there are more than 100,000 inhabitants. Although we are cutting the Armed Forces, we should not forget the military threat posed by imperialism. We must offer training that will enable every defense society sports pilot to rapidly master military aircraft and helicopters with minimum expenditure of effort and means.

"It should be understood that problems of new flying clubs are very complex and cannot be resolved off-hand; this will require years and years. A good deal of interest in this matter should be developed on the part of local organs - party, soviet, Komsomol, and others. There must be real interest, not mere words.

"A USSR people's deputy is a servant of all the people, of course. Therefore, if I am elected I will devote myself to purely down-to-earth matters in addition to the ones I have mentioned. Also calling out for attention in today's circumstances is military patriotic and international education of our youth. Widely divergent opinions are expressed in this regard. Many 'hotheads' have made their appearance in the atmosphere of democratization and glasnost, with some of them even 'shouting from the housetops' that 'there is no longer a need for military patriotic education, since we are so strong that we can smash any aggressor or invader.'

"I would like to caution these public criers: We have paid dearly more than once for this foolish attitude and carelessness. I believe that we are still paying. High ideological conditioning, Soviet patriotism, internationalism - these are our most powerful weapons. We must not forget this.

"The events that have occurred in the Baltic area, Armenia, and Kazakhstan are an indication of the weak work that has been performed among youth in the DOSAAF and the Komsomol, especially at the secondary school and university level. We all know that this is an environment which under certain conditions is easily influenced by charlatans of every stripe.

"Thus, I have decided to devote all my energy to educating youth. I will always be with them. I am sure that I will find something in common with boys and girls and adolescents. They are our future and our hope; the fate of perestroika depends on how we train and educate them."

Personal Data

Surname, First Name, Patronymic: Kozhedub, Ivan Nikitovich
Year of Birth: 1920
Nationality: Ukrainian
Education: Higher
Party Affiliation: Member, CPSU
Position Occupied: Military inspector-adviser, Inspector-General Group, USSR Ministry of Defense
DOSAAF Affiliation: Presidium member, Central Committee, USSR DOSAAF
Place of Residence: Moscow

Col Gen Nechayev Notes Pacifism, Low Opinion of Military Among Youth

18010417a Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
22 Feb 89 p 1

[Article by Colonel General V.S. Nechayev, Deputy Chief, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "By Way of Feats of Valor and Glory"]

[Text] In the history of the Land of the Soviets and in the annals of its Armed Forces, many pages tell of the time of severity, when the fate of the Soviet Republic was being decided. It is as if these pages were singed by fire, creating a most vivid picture of the heroic struggle our people waged for freedom and independence.

The Soviet Army is only a few months younger than the world's first state of workers and peasants. It was born in the February days of 1918 and became tempered in the bitter battles fought for the cause of October. The more the heroic events of that distant time recede into the past, the more deeply and clearly do we comprehend V.I. Lenin's stating that "a revolution is worthwhile only if it can defend itself." This thesis was essentially adopted by the Communist Party in its practical approach to organizing armed protection for the socialist Fatherland.

At the very beginning the Republic of Soviets came out in favor of peaceful coexistence of countries having different social systems. Its first legislative act was the Decree on Peace. However, international imperialism

rejected our peace-loving offers, preferring force. In addition, the internal counterrevolution mounted a concentrated effort to destroy the Soviet system.

The Red Army and Navy fought a difficult struggle against the White Guards and interventionists for more than three years. Strikes delivered the enemy increased determinedly in scale and force. The Red Army in the battles and skirmishes for the Soviet system smashed the combined counterrevolutionary forces.

Many foreign scholars still do not understand how the people of the young Soviet state were able to achieve victory over the White Guard hordes and interventionist, expeditionary forces. The Red Army fighters and commanders displayed unparalleled courage, determination, and mass heroism in the Civil War. There had not been anything like this in the past. However, such an army had not previously existed. The party of Lenin created a new type of socialist regular army, one united by conscientious discipline, called upon to provide reliable protection for the achievements gained by the Great October Socialist Revolution and the people's system.

The great power of proletarian internationalism rallied the wide masses of workers to the defense of the socialist Fatherland. Included in the ranks of the new type of army were representatives of all the ethnic groups residing in our Motherland, with representatives from other peoples. This was the key to the victories won by the Red Army.

The strength of the Soviet state and the power of its Armed Forces were derived from the indestructible friendship between peoples of the USSR. This became manifest in full force in the Great Patriotic War. The extremely difficult trials brought to the forefront the indissoluble social, political, and spiritual unity of the Soviet people. Fascism brought fire and death to our land. Hitlerite Germany strove to destroy socialism, annihilate millions of people, and enslave the survivors. Everyone—the young and the old—rose in the sacred struggle against the Fascist invaders. The party's fiery appeal "All for the front, all for victory!" set the goal for the country.

The war went on for 1,418 days and nights. Soviet soldiers demonstrated unbending strength of mind and valor on an extremely wide scale in battles fought for the Motherland's freedom and independence. Fighting battles near Moscow in the winter of 1941, our Army buried the Hitlerite "blitzkrieg." After that came the unparalleled engagements at Stalingrad and Kursk. The result was that Hitlerite Germany was pushed to the edge of military catastrophe.

The Soviet Army subsequently delivered the enemy crushing blows at Leningrad, in the Baltic area, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Kishinev. The largest offensive operations of 1945 culminated in the historic battle of Berlin. The Soviet people and their Armed Forces

achieved a victory that resounded around the world, destroying Hitlerite Germany and militarist Japan. Our soldiers freed many peoples of Europe and Asia from the yoke of the aggressors.

Hundreds of thousands of sons and daughters of the Land of the Soviets were awarded high decorations for the steadfastness and courage they displayed at the front in the Great Patriotic War. Included in those who earned the title of Hero of the Soviet Union are representatives of more than one hundred nations and nationalities of our country. The severe military tribulations were more proof of the applicability of Lenin's ethnic policy in governmental and military construction. The brotherly union of Soviet peoples, based on indissoluble community of class purposes and interests, offered convincing evidence of its viability. The Soviet Army took its place in front of all mankind as an army of liberation that wholeheartedly serves the cause of protecting socialism and strengthening peace and international security.

The history of the Land of the Soviets is a record of unprecedented events, great victories, extremely severe trials, and tragic errors. Our people remember well their past and are justifiably proud of the Soviet soldier. He is the one that defended the achievements of the revolution in the heat of the Civil War, fought at Khalkhin-Gol and Lake Khasan, took on the Fascists in Spain, and then defended the freedom, honor, and independence of the Motherland from the Hitlerite aggressors. Not a single page of the heroic chronicles of the Soviet Armed Forces has been erased in the people's memory. This history has known the so-called "blank spaces," however. Now they are becoming fewer.

The Soviet people are drawing the necessary conclusions from the lessons of history. As long as imperialism exists, there will be a threat to peace and socialism. This means that it is necessary to strengthen the defensive capability of the country and assure a strong collective defense for the socialist countries.

An historic achievement for socialism was the establishment of strategic military parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. Strategic military parity was the result of intensive labor on the part of all the Soviet people. Thanks to this, we now possess a reliable bastion for deterring aggression and preventing nuclear war.

The Soviet government has as its constant concern the maintenance of the defense potential of our Armed Forces at the proper level. The Armed Forces must set an example of discipline, organization, and order. Reality requires that we improve our work with military cadres and with those who are preparing to take their place under the Motherland's banners.

It is unfortunate that there are those in our society who forget this. For some reason, it has become fashionable to have a less than favorable opinion of the Army. There

is a reason why the allure and interest in military service have suffered a decline. Serious concern is aroused by the fact that some young people have experienced a deterioration in patriotic feelings, with pacifist views given preference. This is occurring at a time when weapons and military technology are improving at a rapid pace and problems of maintaining strategic military parity are taking on greater complexity.

The USSR Armed Forces have a need for trained, disciplined, and morally stable soldiers and seamen. Every six months army ranks are swelled by thousands of youths who assume the honored duty of protecting the Motherland. Those who have had the opportunity of experiencing army service have learned for themselves that military service requires thorough preparation. Much is being done in this regard by the primary and training organizations of the DOSAAF. The overwhelming majority of those who have been trained by the defense society are fulfilling their military obligation honorably and conscientiously.

However, we should not oversimplify the problem by thinking that all a youth has to do is to don a uniform to become a real soldier, as if by magic. The recruit has to be made into a soldier—one that has a deep understanding of the requirements imposed by the military oath and regulations, the need for extremely strict discipline, and the ability to steadfastly withstand the burdens and deprivations of campaign and field life.

The modern army's routine is most accurately characterized by the broad term "combat readiness." It determines the very nature of the daily activities of army and navy personnel, from soldier and seaman to general and admiral. Military service is a special kind of activity—one associated with the highest responsibility for the Fatherland's security.

Service in the Army means difficult instruction, extended sea duty and flights. It could be the BAM, Chernobyl, or Afghanistan.

For more than nine years our glorious soldiers fulfilled their international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan, rendering assistance to the friendly people. Participation in combat operations against the counterrevolutionaries constituted a severe test of the moral qualities and strength of mind of army youth. The unsurpassed feats of Yuriy Islamov, Oleg Onishchuk, Aleksandr Stovba, Nikolay Chepik, Aleksandr Rutskiy, and many others were brilliant examples of the devotion the new generation of Soviet soldiers feels to our Army's glorious combat traditions.

Service in the Army means constant readiness on the part of personnel to perform tasks that may not always be foreseen. This was evidenced by our soldiers in their

clean-up operations following the earthquakes in Armenia and Tajikistan. Soviet soldiers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and officers working under extraordinary conditions demonstrated courage, organization, and discipline.

Service in the Army means attending a school of internationalism. Almost every one of our subunits constitutes a collective made up of many ethnic groups. All service personnel feel a deep responsibility for the fate of the Motherland. It is no accident that most soldiers are people possessing a keen world outlook, solid convictions, and real patriotism. They hold the banner of internationalism high.

Today perestroyka is proceeding in the Army, as it is everywhere. As noted by the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the active renewal process is primarily aimed at quality factors. It has been shown that a higher level of military art and combat proficiency in combination with the spiritual potential of personnel constitute an inexhaustible source of further improvement in the country's defensive capability.

The purpose of including quality factors into defense construction is to maintain the fighting strength of the Armed Forces at a level that would preclude anyone's acquiring military superiority over us—a level that would assure reliable protection of peaceful labor of the Soviet people. Successful resolution of this task is completely responsive to the strategy of perestroyka, the road to democracy, and a stronger role for the human element.

This constitutes the main thrust at the present time. All the more since we are carrying out highly involved operations having to do with structural changes in the Armed Forces. You should know that the decision has been made to reduce army strength by a half million men. We will make cuts of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft. However, the country's defensive capability should remain at the same level.

It is a most complex task. It demands maximum discipline and great effort on the part of every soldier. For this reason, the training process is being restructured such that all service personnel fully realize their personal responsibility for: strengthening military discipline; improving the quality factors in the area of combat training in the subunit, unit, and ship; devoting their full resources and knowledge to this cause.

There are wonderful people serving in the Army and Navy. They demonstrate their patriotic feelings in definite acts, in their principled attitude toward their shortcomings, and in their useful undertakings. Our soldiers possess something in addition to modern equipment: remarkable combat traditions constituting a weapon that does not corrode. They are passed on the same as a baton

from generation to generation of defenders of the Motherland. The people and the Army are united. The soldiers of the eighties are augmenting the glorious traditions. They hold the defensive shield in their hands. The Soviet Armed Forces are diligently safeguarding socialism and peace.

Background, Electoral Program of Gen Army Arkhipov

*18010443a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Mar 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Colonel L. Nechayuk in the column: "Candidates for Deputy—A Profile": "From a Labor Dynasty"]

[Text] Strong fingers, a firm palm—the same as that of a laborer. His brown eyes look at you openly and peacefully, with a hint of irony. His speech is simple but lively, with no trace of pompousness or vanity. This describes Vladimir Mikhaylovich Arkhipov—Deputy Minister of Defense; Chief of the Armed Forces Rear Services; General of the Army; and candidate for USSR People's Deputy from Kalinin National Territorial Electoral District No 12 of the RSFSR.

Vladimir Mikhaylovich was the oldest son of a railroad worker's large family consisting of four brothers and two sisters. His father worked all his life at the Chelkar Station depot, which is located in Aktyubinsk Oblast. That is where Volodya Arkhipov worked before his induction into the Army, first as an apprentice lathe operator, later as a lathe operator. Perhaps he would have completed his term of service and returned to his home collective to become a laborer the same as his brothers, were it not for an uncle who had served at the front. On one occasion his uncle said to him: "I look at you and think: 'What a good tanker you would make.'"

And so, that is how Arkhipov became a cadet at the Tashkent Tank School. His uncle had not made a mistake—his nephew graduated at the top of his class, after which he set out to climb the steps of his officer career ladder in various areas of our immense country. He did not skip any of the steps: He progressed from platoon leader to commander of the capital district.

Today General of the Army V. Arkhipov counts among his assets graduation from two academies, a great deal of professional and life experience, and the authority of a mature statesman and political leader. I believe that serious voters will take particular note of these qualities, since a deputy carries a heavy responsibility. We all know that he is instrumental in one way or another in deciding the fate of people and the entire nation. All this on the condition that he be forthright in dealing with legislative issues, push forward his proposals, and demand action on the part of executive authorities, not simply raise his hand to go along with all decisions. This is the kind of performance voters expect of their deputies.

In his talks with voters, workers of the Tver area, Vladimir Mikhaylovich said: "If I am elected, I will spare no effort to render perestroika irreversible and assure that it gains momentum. I note with dismay that there are people who are diluting the effort with empty talk; valuable time and energy are also wasted on empty discussions and excessive emotionality. More important is the realization of concepts announced by the party in the pre-election appeal made by the CPSU Central Committee. I am in complete agreement with them, and include them in my platform. This does not mean that I have no ideas of my own relative to translating words into deeds. The main thing I want to say in this regard is that there is no need to panic. We were faced with difficulties in the past. How did we win out? By exhibiting persistence, firmness, patience - that is how we will achieve victory again."

Vladimir Mikhaylovich in his service, party obligations, and his conscience is daily concerned with the practical realization of the course of renewal supported by our people. In the language of the Central Committee's appeal to the party and people, he serves the cause of "renewing the very concept of socialism by freeing it from the captivity of stagnant dogma."

Release from this captivity is difficult; there are many obstacles and ambushes on this route. However, the goal is clear - the establishment of true government by the people. As stressed by the USSR people's candidate, if he is handed a mandate by the voters, he will devote his efforts, energy, and experience to make reform of the political system a reality, bring about a socialist law-abiding state, and create conditions conducive to developing creativity and initiative on the part of workers and to their participation in deciding the fate of their country.

Vladimir Mikhaylovich knows from his own experience—not speculation—that a strong social policy is the basis of the present reorientation toward the individual, toward his needs and interests. Relative to the Army, this means that timely and quality satisfaction of material essentials and medical care is basic to combat readiness, high political satisfaction and morale. The chief of Armed Forces Rear Services demands that each commander, political worker, and communist ask himself every day: Have I done everything possible for the soldiers, for my subordinates?

He refuses to accept any manifestation of formalism, indifference, willfulness, or lack of respect for the dignity of the individual. For this reason, in his pre-election program he stated specifically that he will employ his deputy's mandate to decisively and insistently protect the social interests of women and children, the handicapped, veterans of war and labor, internationalist soldiers, and pensioners.

Vladimir Mikhaylovich has visited voters in a number of Nechernozemye areas. "I will tell you plainly," he said sharing his impressions, "it was difficult to observe the

poor conditions under which rural toilers work. In some cases the bare essentials are lacking in villages; we should not be surprised that young people are leaving. Cities also have their problems, of course: waiting lists for housing; a neglected service sector. Nonetheless, I believe that villages should have first priority. We must first feed the country, then make progress elsewhere."

The candidate proposes taking definite urgent measures to help Nechernozemye villages rebuild in the next few years—accelerating the construction of roads and housing, and solving the supply problem. The reductions in the Armed Forces make it possible to transfer some decommissioned motor vehicles, engineer equipment and other materiel to enterprises located in Kalinin, Novgorod, and Pskov oblasts.

There is no doubt that General of the Army V. Arkhipov, working with the deputy's mandate—or even without one—will implement the perestroika line in the Army and Navy to comply with the directives issued by the 19th All-Union Party Conference relative to realignment of defense construction for exclusively quality factors. This problem is far from being as simple as it appears to other candidates for people's deputy who offer proposals that at first glance appear to have merit but in reality are unrealistic and ill-considered. Attempts to plan for "great leaps forward" on a local scale promised to obtain pre-election advantages are of no help. It is clear that what we need is fewer promises and more personal preparation for the difficult and responsible work ahead.

I asked Vladimir Mikhaylovich about that upon his return from his latest trip through the Nechernozemye. "People have had more than enough promises," he said. "We need action."

This in my opinion is the kind of understanding of current problems that future deputies must possess. On top of that, they should be equipped with the knowledge and resolve to assure that matters that pertain to all the people are not confined to local boundaries. We may say without exaggeration that we entrust the fate of our country to those whom we elect.

Vet-Candidate Calls for History of Afghan War
18010522 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Roundtable discussion moderated by Maj B. Zyubin and Maj V. Kazakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "We Have Not Left the Front Line: A Roundtable Discussion Arranged by the Editors With Former Soldier/Internationalists Who Are Komsomol Candidates for People's Deputies of the USSR"]

[Text] The following people took part in the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA roundtable discussion: Pavel Shetko, lecturer with the Minsk Obkom [Oblast Committee] of

the Belorussian Komsomol in the city of Minsk; Rizoali Odzhnev, deputy chairman of the Internationalist Cooperative Association under the Frunzenskiy Rayon Committee of the Tajik Komsomol, Dushanbe; Capt Aleksandr Kolodeznikov, assistant chief of a section of the Yakutsk City Military Commissariat, Yakutsk (top row [photos not reproduced]); Vladimir Bulatov, instructor in initial military training at Secondary School No. 4 in the village of Igra in Igrinskiy Rayon, Udmurt ASSR; Vladimir Finogenov, foreman of a section at the Elektroavtomat plant in the city of Alatyr, Chuvash ASSR; Igor Novikov, stope worker at the Mine imeni Ye.P. Abakumov of the Donetskugol Coal Extraction Production Association in the city of Donetsk, Ukrainian SSR; Yuriy Romanov, second secretary of the Gubkin City Komsomol Committee in Belgorod Oblast (bottom row).

From the sideline it appeared that some very close friends had come together. But prior to this their paths in life had not crossed. They are linked not just by ties of kinship, however. They are linked by fate. And their fate was the same. It was Afghanistan for all of them.... And this itself no doubt determined the subject of the discussion....

[Moderator] Although I have been assigned a certain role today, that of moderating the discussion, I want least of all for my role to be conspicuous. What you have to say is the main thing. About what lives within each of you, what is trying to surface, what occupies your thoughts and feelings. And about what cause you are serving today, what you are defending....

[P. Shetko] The first thing I want to say during the meeting with electors is this: Let us think! Let us think seriously about the place of the soldier/internationalists in our life. This is far from a secondary matter for the society, for the restructuring (you may consider this presumptuous of me).

I am not a Solomon and not a politician, and I am aware that I lack an in-depth knowledge of economics. There is much to learn, but the problems encountered by the invalids, the families of those who died in Afghanistan and simply the soldier/internationalists are near and understandable to me.

[Yu. Romanov] I agree with Pavel... but we can also not focus our activities on the resolution of these problems alone. The society and the people are counting on us. Or am I wrong? What about the youth? They are scrutinizing us. They want to find in us something important for them. Will they follow us? Just what are we worth if they do not? I therefore consider the education of patriots and future defenders of the homeland also to be our cause. There are a lot of problems. We have had too many meetings and too much fanfare, have been "buried" beneath an avalanche of reports and accounts. I am in my second year as secretary of the Komsomol gorkom [city committee], so I have seen these things with my own eyes.

I can even say that our lines in the battle against "the old ways" lie in this area, in the military-patriotic work. We have to help the army, have to develop in the young people a sense of dignity and respect for those who will enter the military ranks alongside us, intolerance of evil, cruelty and denigration of the individual....

[A. Kolodeznikov] Forgive, me Yuriy, but just who is going to tell about our denigration? The soldier/internationalists were denigrated when we were ignored. Then, when the disabled and dead appeared, it was no longer possible to remain silent, and we immediately became heroes. People have now gone to the other extreme, attempting to depict us as victims, as a lost generation. Denigration again. Because they have not and are not telling the truth about us. Who, if not we, is to tell it? So let us talk. Let us do what each of us knows how to do. If we can educate the youth, let us educate them. If we have a bent for something else, let us do it. I therefore disagree with Yuriy that we should play the main role in the military-patriotic movement. People sometimes feel that since we are soldier/internationalists, even have a medal or an order, we need to work with the youth. That is not enough, though. Our Yakutsk City Council of Reserve soldier includes 115 soldier/internationalists, of which only 10-15 are truly able to work with the youth. I therefore feel that to impose the military-patriotic education of the youth upon the soldier/internationalists is to depart from the resolution of their urgent problems. People essentially want to brush us aside by telling us to work with the youth, and the rest.... Are we not capable of anything else?

[Moderator] To the contrary, no doubt. They see a force in you which is capable of many things. Not just the military-patriotic education of the youth....

[A. Bulatov] Besides, who is imposing this?

[A. Kolodeznikov] I am talking about what bothers me. Another thing: We need to look the truth in the eyes. There was a Vietnam syndrome; there will be an Afghan syndrome. Not all of the soldier/internationalists are such good people. Many of the young people are already beginning to let themselves go. And these are worthy fellows with orders and medals. We therefore need not just the All-Union Association of Military-Patriotic Unions, but also a separate committee of soldier/internationalists.

We cannot abandon the military-patriotic education, of course, but that is a temporary thing. Perhaps the need for it will disappear entirely in a few years.

[Yu. Romanov] Excuse me, Aleksandr, but just whom are you acceding to? Unfortunately, such views on the military-patriotic education of the youth have become fairly widespread lately. There is a plank in the Komsomol platform in the elections for people's deputies whose wording I simply cannot accept: "The Komsomol will

promote the realization of initiatives aimed at improving the preparation of the youth to protect the socialist homeland." It seems that the Komsomol itself is surrendering the initiative to someone else in this important matter and will itself only "promote realization...." In my opinion, we need a precisely defined concept of defense policy for the Komsomol as a whole.

Now, about the Afghan syndrome.... Oh, how some people would like to place the actions of American soldiers in Vietnam on the same level with ours in Afghanistan! And it would not be so bad if these voices were coming only "from there." But we even have these babblers here. I would like to look those people in the eyes and talk to them. Like a man. We did not go to kill; we went to help. I did not shoot at children and old people. I shot at the enemy. We were soldiers who had taken an oath. They need to ask us only those questions which we can answer. There are questions, however, which only the government can answer....

[A. Kolodeznikov] Please understand me. Yuriy, you said it very well just now. My comrades-in-arms are also very dear to me. But not all of us are above reproach, are we?

[Moderator] But there is certainly no room for argument here.

[I. Novikov] I agree. These are obvious things. But this is what I want to talk about. There is no need for us to complain and turn our pain inside out. That is not expected of us, and rightly so. People look to us for support. And we have to justify their hopes. We have to help the homeland at a difficult time.

I have heard a statement from my comrades which has become imprinted in my mind: "We have not left the front line." Yes, we must not surrender, must not give in to all sorts of rumors and gossip. Some people are already calling us a "trump card" to be played for their own benefit.

[R. Odzhnev] That will hardly happen. We will not permit ourselves "to be played." We do need to develop patriots. But this is all just words. When it comes to action, though.... There are no funds, for example. Once again, however, who can give us an adequate amount right off? We have therefore taken another route in Dushanbe. We established the Internationalist Cooperative. We provide domestic services for the population and are planning to begin producing prostheses. We invest the proceeds in the development of the materials and equipment base for the city military-patriotic club. That might sound unusual, but we feel that it is a promising route. We should not be afraid to establish such cooperatives. Particularly since the Armed Forces are now being reduced, and many officers will be looking for a place to apply their efforts. Let them come to us. This is a matter dear to our hearts, after all. But

enterprises of the Ministry of Defense need to help these cooperatives with raw materials and equipment. That is, they need to establish economic collaboration.

[I. Novikov] That is very interesting, Rizoali. But.... Something is not right. The noble work of educating the youth and preparing them to defend the homeland, on the one hand, and a cooperative, so to speak, on the other....

[R. Odzhnev] Igor, you hurt my feelings. Why would you think so badly of me as a cooperative member...?

[V. Finogenov] (smiling) Comrades, no hurt feelings. In my opinion, Rizoali is to be admired. A man of action. I took part in the 20th Komsomol Congress and attended a discussion on military-patriotic work. Think of it: for 2 hours I sat there and listened to the Komsomol members squabble. Private citizens, military personnel, DOSAAF members.... The argument was about who should take care of the matter. A war veteran, a woman, could take it no longer. She stood up and said: "Young people, you are not talking about what needs to be discussed. We need to talk about doing something." So let us focus on the specific work.

[Moderator] Then how would you begin your work as a deputy, should you be elected?

[P. Shetko] If I am elected a deputy, this is how I will begin. We presently have a statute on the payment of pensions to families of soldiers who died in Afghanistan. But look at how absurd it is. If a mother has worked throughout her life and earned a pension of 120 rubles, she is granted a pension of 121 rubles and 51 kopecks for her son who was killed. She actually receives only an extra ruble and 51 kopecks. It is understandable why people refuse to accept such "benefits." As we say in Belorussia: "They jest."

[R. Odzhnev] Let us be realists. Do the soldier/internationalists always receive the benefits they are entitled to? Please understand me correctly. If I am a deputy and a disabled person comes to me for help, I will help him, of course. But there are many of these disabled.

[A. Kolodeznikov] I would like to return to the problems again. There are things which have simply not been thought out. The only legal document the mother of a son who died in Afghanistan has for obtaining her benefits and any sort of compensation is... notification of the son's death. She is forced to make the rounds of various authorities and show the notification, each time explaining who she is. Does that make sense? We resolved this matter without any bureaucratic red tape. We began issuing special certificates through the military commissariat to the mothers of soldiers who died. The city authorities backed us in this.

[Yu. Romanov] No kind of material means can make up for the death of a son, of course.... In this context it is difficult even to pronounce the word "compensation." It sounds official and cold.... Since we must discuss the matter, however, we need to think about moral compensation. We must not permit the shadow of an unkind word to fall upon their names, the names of our comrades. We can prevent it only under one condition: that people know the whole truth about the war.

Today, 44 years later, we have begun learning many previously unknown facts about the Great Patriotic War. One cannot help thinking about how many opportunities have been missed, how many eye-witnesses to those events are no longer with us. Is the same thing actually going to happen with the Afghan war? I consider it essential right now to publish a book with a detailed description of all the events. This would be the best memorial to those who died. I believe that my proposal will be supported by all the candidates for people's deputies who traveled the fiery roads of Afghanistan.

[V. Bulatov] Fellows! We have talked a great deal. Are people not going to have the impression, however, that we are slipping into a discussion of narrow issues understandable only to us? We might be reproached with the fact that the youth problems are not just problems of patriotism or of the reserve soldier....

[Yu. Romanov] I needed this discussion, though. It enabled me to precisely define my feelings. I am confident that is true for all of us. Isn't that so, fellows? Another thing: All of our concerns and problems are just as urgent as other aspects of the life of our youth. And I agree with Pavel Shetko too: Who, if not we, is to talk about them and stand up for them in the future parliament?

Roundtable on Democratization of Military
18010188 Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 pp 6-8

[Roundtable discussion: "The Thorns of Dogmatism"]

[Text] At the first meeting of our club, the notion was voiced that perestroika is in the development stage in the army. The editors mail to a certain degree confirmed this view. Lieutenant A. Suchkov, Major G. Vazhnov, Sergeant T. Kolomayko and others have written about the contradictions of perestroika in the army. "Do military personnel need democratization? An order, as is known, is not debated," writes Major Vazhnov.

We proposed that military scientists voice their opinion on this problem. Participating in the debate were: the Delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference and Chief of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, Colonel General Nikolay Fadeyevich Kizyun, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences; Major General

Vladimir Mikhaylovich Dudnik, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences; Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Savinkin, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences; Major General Nikita Andreyevich Chaldymov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Professor; Major Mikhail Alekseyevich Smagin, advanced student on the Chair of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy.

[N. Kizyun] At present, there is no more important task than embodying the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference in life. This is the guarantee for the irreversibility of the process of revolutionary renewal in Soviet society. Our Armed Forces have every opportunity for carrying out the programmatic ideas of the conference. The main thing at present is to improve the qualitative state of the Army and ensure the dependable security of the USSR and the socialist commonwealth nations. What is needed for this? Above all, a substantial improvement in our military potential, and the bringing of its organizational structure into conformity with our defense doctrine. Definite quantitative reductions are also possible. But this process, it seems to me, will be determined by the real forward progress in the course of mutual disarmament. In the future, it is essential for us to maintain and strengthen the leading role of the Communist Party in military organizational development. For defending the victories of socialism, as before we must have a permanent professional, disciplined army characterized by high professional training. It is also important to strengthen the unity between the Army and the people. This is an essential condition for the existence of an army in a socialist society. The process of perestroika in Army and Navy life, democratization and glasnost in society make it possible to bring about a qualitative improvement in the historically formed military organization of the socialist state. The possibilities in the given instance have not been exhausted.

[N. Chaldymov] When the issue comes up of the need to democratize the army and democratize the life of the troop collectives, the reply can be heard: "Does this mean that you are against sole command [edinonachaliye]?" This is a typical example of the absence of dialectical thinking. It is not necessary to put sole command in opposition to democratization, but on the contrary, to attempt to see to it that the processes of democratization operate to strengthen sole command. For this reason for me personally there is a simple answer to the question of "does the army require democratization?" And that is yes, it does? Since we can scarcely convert to a new quality of the Soviet Armed Forces without fundamental changes in this area. And here we need not merely cosmetic repairs but rather a radical perestroika which would provide the necessary changes in the army in accord with the new domestic political conditions. The democratization of defense development as a whole also requires new political thinking. Just what this process will be, there are no ready-made formulas. And in the same manner, unfortunately, there are no overall concepts for the democratization of our military policy. And now we no longer

need an overall concept but, if you will, a broadly elaborated, precise program for democratizing the Soviet Armed Forces.

[A. Savinkin] The essence of perestroika consists in switching to a new qualitative state in both society and the army. In my view, it is possible to achieve this goal only in the instance that perestroika "from above" will be supported and broadened by a movement "from below." It is essential to provide first of all an opportunity for the participation of the broad army community in elaborating and adopting managerial decisions of the most diverse sort. Certainly there still are frequent instances when a subordinate offers his own version for solving a problem while his superior destroys or ignores it. The staffs, headquarters and editors receive letters with proposals on improving various aspects of army life. Are they studied, will they be carried out? Many merely disappear without a trace. Certainly it is possible, for example, to involve scientists in working out constructively critical information and on this basis clarify the concept of perestroika in the Army and Navy and its real strategy. And simultaneously to employ any opportunities to improve the state of affairs on the spot.

Democratization of army life presupposes a further consideration and shaping of public opinion. I feel that within the military department there should be its own service for contacts with the public. Its information and organizational activities could ensure an interaction between the military leadership and the civilian and army community. In my view, it would not hurt to have the corresponding print organ (for example, VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA OBOROY SSSR). Due to this it would be possible to resolve many problems concerning the relations between the army and society.

Finally, I feel that it is impossible to work out a modern concept of democratizing the army, if we do not hark back to the experience of the military theoretical debates in 1917-1925. At that time, there was a very active discussion of the questions of the democratic ways and methods of military organizational development. Under the altered conditions, many ideas could find their practical application. We must also take into account progressive foreign experience.

[N. Kizyun] I prefer to evaluate a real situation. In talking about the future, one can and must give some thought to a greater role for the army in the area of the ideological, moral tempering of the young people serving in the Armed Forces. I do not share the pessimistic views concerning the course of perestroika in the Army and Navy. Yes, difficulties do exist. The mechanism of inhibition has still not been completely shattered. But many problems have been resolved both in combat training and in troop discipline. The so-called "improper relationships" are being eradicated although there still

are difficulties here. In the army there are favorable conditions for realizing the goals of perestroika and upbrining work. It is essential to make maximum use of them.

Perestroika in the army is sound and is assuming an irreversible nature. All servicemen have taken up its ideas: from the private to the minister of defense. The tasks of perestroika have been largely defined. But they must be carried out, in clearly determining one's role and participation in perestroika. Each person should start with himself, carry out his duties effectively and be responsible for the state of affairs in his section. I would draw particular attention to raising the authority of the Armed Forces in society, explaining the importance and necessity of military service for the defense of the fatherland and raise the role and calling of the officer as an educator and leader responsible for what is occurring in the Army and Navy.

[V. Dudnik] For a long time we have denied the idea of self-development in military organizational development. Often we have been guided by the ideals of the old times. But certainly the army is also influenced by the new situation in society, by detente and peaceful coexistence. As of now I cannot say precisely what organizational form we will require for the army in the immediate future, but it, in my view, should take into account the multinational nature of our state. At present, this is an acute problem for us. Of course, it must be resolved on a new basis. I would like to voice two other ideas on the course of the debate. I am concerned by the fact that the thesis "start with yourself" and "restructure yourself first" has become widespread. I agree that the thesis does have a positive content in the idea of changing yourself, finding the civil courage to enter with initiative into the struggle for perestroika, to openly take the floor, to make constructive criticism of superior levels if their activities fetter and impede the process of renewal in the specific work area. But not everything depends upon the specific person. "Begin with yourself" often means don't interfere. Under the conditions of democratization and glasnost, each serviceman has the right to submit proposals and to make judgments. But a position of "don't make waves" can reduce perestroika to mere administrative procedures, to bureaucratic experimentation and so forth. In this regard, I feel that the main driving force of perestroika in army life is its democratization inseparably linked with glasnost. The 19th All-Union Party Conference again pointed to the necessity of developing this process, including in terms of the Army.

[N. Kizyun] The purpose of democratization in the Army and Navy consists in making maximum use of the opportunities of the democratic institutions of the Army, in establishing an organic link with the masses of servicemen on the part of the headquarters bodies and the individual leaders and in their ability to work relying on the party and Komsomol organizations, the various councils and troop collectives. An unique democratic credo is being worked out: to get closer to the people, to

put a specific person, a soldier at the center of Army and Navy life, and to be able to mobilize the soldier, sailor, warrant officers and officers to actively carry out the tasks of combat readiness, combat training and the strengthening of troop discipline. Such an understanding of democratization does not contradict the principle of sole leadership but rather complements it with a new content....

[V. Dudnik] But at the same time one can scarcely deny the fact that the existing system of sole leadership has frequently been turned into a form of sole rule, and centralism has been turned into absolutism and a dictatorship of the commander. This must be limited and transformed by adding a democratic content, by strengthening it in the general structure of command, by eliminating dogmatism and conservatism and unquestioning execution. sole command objectively should not be able to defend itself against criticism. If the criticism is to the point, it does not undermine authority but rather helps strengthen it.

In this same vein we should discuss the army problems with maximum openness. Generally speaking, I prefer to view democratization in a broader context: as the democratization of interpersonal relations, as a certain style of leadership which makes it possible to maximally increase the activeness of the army community and rely on it. In this context the role of the officer and the relations in the officer corps increase substantially. Of great importance is the democratic procedure of conducting officer meetings, personnel meetings and courts of honor. Their status, incidentally, could be changed making them more active and less dependent upon the commander. The commander has an opportunity in taking decisions to rely on the views of the democratic bodies. And not only the existing ones. For example, it would be possible to restore such a body as the regiment officer council elected at an officer assembly. Analogous bodies could be set up also for the remaining categories of servicemen. The specific features of their work could be outlined generally in the combined-arms regulations or special provisions. They would take it upon themselves to solve very many social problems and thereby provide substantial aid to the commander.

[N. Chaldymov] Disputes about the fact that democratization contradicts sole command are partially valid but not in principle. A real contradiction exists between the demands of democratization and the existing system of sole command in which there are many shortcomings. When the commander considers himself to be god, tsar and holy ghost, here you can expect illegality, arbitrariness and incompetent decisions. This must be combated. But something else should also be pointed out. All military affairs must be put on a solid legal basis. The rights and duties of the personnel should be clearly stipulated and the guarantees of their realization fixed. A serviceman is a member of our society with complete rights. We serve and do not work, but all the same in peacetime the workday of an officer cannot help but

have a systematic, organized appearance. And what about active military service? A soldier has minimum free time, and a leave is granted only as a commendation. It would be possible to mention other unjustified limitations of his rights. This situation must be changed, in my view....

[M. Smagin] I agree with the stated ideas on the democratization of army life. However, democracy in the army, as in society as a whole, cannot be boundless. In terms of army life such limits are centralization and sole command. These are effective principles of its organizational development. For this reason the strategy of search should, in my view, consist not in broadening but rather deepening democracy in the army. That is, not so much in inventing additional forms of democracy as in altering the nature of relations between servicemen. You can create as many different councils in the subunits and units as you like, but does this actually produce greater democracy? Scarcely. Certainly, certain councils are essential, certain assemblies are necessary, but the number of meetings and councils is not the most important indicator of democracy in the army. In my understanding the degree of army democratization is determined by that social distance which exists between the officer and the soldier. Yes, certainly there are other criteria but this is the main one. In our army there are no socioclass differences between the officer and the soldier. However, there remain legal, sociocultural and domestic ones. How to surmount this distance? I feel that this is not achieved by bringing the officer closer to the soldier (even if the former comes to live in the barracks, the problem will not be resolved). It is essential to bring the soldier closer to the officer. The observance of social justice raises the civil dignity of a person and without this democracy in interpersonal relations is impossible. This is aided by eliminating excessive regulation of relations between servicemen when not carrying out official duties. For example, the procedure for saluting emphasizes the subordinate position of some in relation to others even in those situations when this is not required at all. Would it be possible, for instance, to introduce such a provision in the regulation that a salute would be given first by the one who is more courteous? Democratization also should not overlook such a "detail" as the uniform. It differs for the officers and the soldiers. The peaked service caps also differ in their badge and other accessories. One can count rather many such details in the military uniform. Why these differences? Certainly when our army was young the commanders in terms of uniform differed from the rank-and-file only in terms of their rank insignias and military rank....

[A. Savinkin] In my view, it is basic that the army itself be included within the democratic policy of security and defense. Here there are many problems which must be resolved: the process of taking military-political decisions should be more open and society needs military political information. All these questions can be resolved in the interests of democratizing army life. Finally,

neither perestroika nor the democratizing of the army can be consistently carried out if we do not achieve a new quality of military science, primarily social science. It must be raised to a new level and made constructive. What, for example, happens? Previously the military scientific society encompassed all of those who wanted to examine the existing problems. Now it is merely a concern of retirees, students and officer candidates, that is, people who are divorced from troop practice. We have few analytical groups which would investigate the general questions of military organizational development, security policy....

[N. Chaldymov] To improve the quality of military science means also to raise the level of military sociology. Without this we cannot carry out the tasks of perestroika and democratization in the army. It is essential to investigate society, the army and public opinion on the questions of army service. It is a very good thing that many persons are presently endeavoring to study the complex problems of military theory and practice. However, it would be a good thing if they would rise from the emotional level to the scientific, political level. How would it be possible, for example, to carry out the recommendations of Ales Adamovich stated in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI on 8 March 1987, where literally the following was written: "From the military man (it is essential.—N.Ch.) the boldness to recognize the senselessness, absurdity and inhumanity of the very 'undertaking' of a war. For me personally, at present, there are no braver nor more dignified military than those who, like the retired generals, dedicate their military knowledge to the antiwar movement." One wants to end this quotation with the words from the song: "Take your coat and go home." I see no necessity for long commentaries on this quotation. One thing is clear and that is this is a debunking of the social importance of military service. We cannot agree with such statements. But we will welcome constructive proposals by specialists, both military and civilian, in the area of the policy of security, perestroika and democratization of the army.

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Khabarovsk Kray Commissariat Creates Pension Department to Handle Reduction

18010443b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Vorobyev, chief, district finance service: "Information on Pensions—Pension Departments in Far East Military District Krays and Oblasts Ready to Offer Assistance"]

[Text] The Khabarovsk Kray Military Commissariat has set up a model pension department in connection with the forthcoming Armed Forces reduction and discharge into the reserve of generals, officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel who are completing their tour of extended duty.

An office has been specially equipped so that future pensioners can quickly and easily help themselves to acquire all necessary information dealing with obtaining pensions and assistance, submission of claims for benefits and entitlements, admission to sanatoria and rest resorts, and filing various forms. This purpose is served by floor displays, charts, posters, and brochures.

Users have access to a self-service facility which provides essential information on eligibility and payment of pensions and on benefits available to disabled war veterans, internationalist soldiers, and families of servicemen who lost their lives in line of duty.

In the event a user still needs help with a particular problem, a department staff member is available to answer questions.

The Khabarovsk Kray Military Commissariat is being used as a model to instruct all district kray and oblast military commissars and chiefs of pension departments.

Living Conditions, Costs of Maintaining Professional Army in U.S. Examined

18010443c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Mar 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain M. Zhiglov in the column: "Answering Readers' Questions": "How the American Professional Soldier Lives"]

[Text] In newspapers and on television there are discussions to the effect that it may be less expensive to have a professional volunteer army. However, I have heard that it costs more to maintain such an army than it does armed forces that are made up of inductees. In this connection, I am interested in how professional American soldiers live. How much does it cost the government to maintain this army? S. Kozlov, Moscow

Background

The American Armed Forces converted to the volunteer basis back in the early 1970s. There were a number of reasons for this change. They included the failure of the shameful military venture in Vietnam, a confluence of economic and political considerations, the public's mood of the time, and the new views held by the military and political leadership of the USA. It should be noted, however, that the decision to make the complete change to the all-volunteer force was made only after long and heated discussions and was less than unanimous. In past times there were long lines of applicants to be seen at recruiting stations on the one hand, and a lack of interest in taking up the military banners on the other. Extensive and difficult efforts have produced a system that satisfies the high command, whereby professionals choose to serve. At the same time, the Army has become more attractive as a way of life for certain young, healthy, and well-educated American men and women—those constituting "high-quality" recruits. The cost of this general

satisfaction rose every year in dollar amount. Today it amounts to the hard to imagine sum of 80 billion dollars. This is the amount required every year to pay for the personnel of the American Armed Forces.

Measured in Dollars

The pay received by American Armed Forces personnel depends on rank and length of service. The dollar amount varies, being about 700 dollars a month for a fresh recruit, to more than 6,000 dollars for a general with 26 and more years of service. These amounts are subject to change, since they are increased periodically to allow for inflation.

The base pay can be augmented by additional amounts that are not taxed. For example, as explained in the publication "Handbook for Families of Servicemen," they include payments for : housing (for those who must rent an apartment); moving to a new duty station; compensation for a family in the event an enlisted man or officer is assigned outside the continental limits and cannot take his wife and children with him.

Also measured in dollars is "hardship duty", especially that associated with toxic chemical agents, explosives, underwater operations, and serving in an area that is officially declared to be "subject to enemy fire" (recent examples of such areas include Grenada, Lebanon, the waters near the Libyan shores and the Persian Gulf. Each serviceman on duty at those locations was paid an additional 110 dollars a month.) In general, adding together all extra allowances, the average pay for officers can theoretically be as much as 40,000 dollars a year, while for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers it may attain 20,000 dollars. This is a rather large amount, of course. However, in considering this sum it must be kept in mind that, first, it is only theoretical, applicable only if for a one-year period nothing is withheld from the serviceman's pay and he continues to receive his additional amounts and other compensation. This is impossible in reality. Second, we cannot neglect the actual standard and cost of living in the United States. Third, the monetary compensation, which is more than a way to attract qualified cadres, also constitutes a method to force the servicemen to "give all of themselves."

The requirements are extremely exacting: Servicemen must periodically pass qualification tests in their specialty, physical fitness, etc. Officers undergo regular evaluations by review boards. Failure to pass the first time can disqualify the officer for promotion and eligibility for pay raise. Repeated failures may form the basis for discharge from the Armed Forces.

Money is also used as a means of discipline. Fines, deductions, and delay in disbursement of pay for a considerable period of time are used widely and effectively as punishment. There is also a procedure whereby amounts are deducted from the serviceman's pay for

damage to military equipment for which he is responsible and for equipment which is lost or unserviceable as a result of his wrongdoing. Loss of pay, allowances, and privileges is also used as an additional punishment measure in case the serviceman violates military or criminal law.

It often happens that housing expenses eat up the personal budget of American enlisted personnel and officers. For example, the monthly rental for a two-room apartment in the United States amounts to 200 to 300 dollars. However, this is not the amount generally charged everywhere - it applies to small towns and rural areas. In large cities a single room of a house located in a less than prestigious area can cost as much as 400 dollars a month. For this reason, housing allowances cannot compensate for the actual expenses.

Considerable amounts of money are also spent on higher education for children. The family budget must often cover college expenses of 6,000 to 10,000 dollars a year. Many servicemen, largely senior officers, send their sons and daughters to colleges and universities for the privileged, where tuition costs can be as much as 20,000 dollars a year.

To make it possible for servicemen to effect economy, military personnel and their families have access to free medical care which is provided on military posts, although 36 percent of Army personnel surveyed expressed dissatisfaction with the long lines of people waiting to see a doctor, the low quality of care, and lack of attention on the part of medical personnel. Retail stores that exist for military personnel offer prices that are lower than those of stores located off the bases, with merchandise selections and quality being the same.

Housing—Not Without Problems

In most cases servicemen that are not married live in "classical" barracks or dormitory type buildings, where there are several men to a room. Judging from letters servicemen write to military publications, they do not like their barracks and their dormitory buildings, many of which were erected decades ago. Upon the arrival of a serviceman having a family at his new duty station (in the last three years every fifth Army soldier has been transferred at least three times), attempts are made, working from a waiting list, to provide him with military housing or a small single house located on the post. However, in most cases there is a shortage of such housing, and many servicemen in this situation rent housing situated off the post. This solution is not popular, due primarily to high costs. An enlisted man or officer transferred to a post where housing conditions are especially poor may be requested or simply ordered not to bring his family along.

It is known that a serious problem was encountered in the recent formation of Army light infantry divisions with respect to adequate housing at the proposed locations. According to American military newspapers, the lack of housing for service personnel and their families was one of the causes of putting off final formation of those units.

The Family

It can be readily seen that the change to the volunteer principle was associated with a new problem: a large increase in number of servicemen with families. Attempts are made to find jobs for the wives (or husbands) of service personnel so that the family can enjoy a second income. This is not always possible, especially overseas. In the case of the Army, for example, in 19 percent of families the spouse does not work.

A solution to this unemployment is the organization of child care facilities on military posts. Here a child can be cared for for several hours or the day, or, if that is not what is required, he can be taken to a kindergarten on a regular basis. Thus, a military post located in West Berlin carries daily morning radio announcements of child care centers having vacancies.

Also worthy of note is a relatively new phenomenon: families that are "all military", whereby both spouses are serving in the Army. In 1987 they numbered about 80,000. The U.S. Army is of the opinion that this kind of family offers advantages to both parties. The family earns a good and reliable income, while the Armed Forces benefits from the high state of morale produced by this arrangement.

What other inducements are offered to enlist recruits? A major one is the opportunity of cost-free acquisition of a trade or profession that is often of a high-technology nature. In addition, the serviceman can continue his education while still in service or after completing his term of enlistment. This need is filled by state-supported university extensions where he can study evenings or by correspondence. In one program in effect, regular deductions made from the serviceman's pay are entered into a special bank account so that he can pay for his education at the college or university of his choice upon completion of his contract-stipulated service.

Also of no small importance is the rise in prestige of military service that has occurred in the last few years. In addition to ideological reasons, this to a great extent is due to improved service conditions and living standard, a guaranteed income, and certain privileges. The number of recruits possessing a secondary education and scoring in the highest three intelligence quotient categories has risen above 90 percent and continues to hover near the maximum.

It should be perfectly clear that, let us say, Master Sergeant John Smith, who earns a nice dollar income, lives with his family in a separate small house, drives to work in his own car, and studies evenings at the university, exists only on a glossy wall poster. There is no place on this poster for the Master Sergeant John Smith that who can hardly crawl to bed at night after giving all that he has to his duty assignment, and who looks forward anxiously to payday since money is in short supply and to the forthcoming proficiency test that he cannot be sure of passing.

In a word, by making the change to the volunteer principle to fill the ranks of the Armed Forces, the U.S. placed the load of heavy responsibilities onto the shoulders of both its servicemen and that of all the American people. The fact is that for all these years the major reason for the growing burden of expenses for the U.S. military was the ever-increasing allocation for expenses relating to personnel. Although the U.S. military budget is not "gaining weight" as rapidly at the present time, it is approaching 300 billion dollars (to gain some idea of this sum, compare it to the expenditures portion of the USSR state budget, which is approximately 495 billion rubles).

The volunteer arrangement presently in effect in the U.S. Armed Forces is a business contract which is not always fair. Under its terms, the Pentagon - the hirer—creates for its workers—enlisted personnel and officers—conditions that are on a par with the general standard of living. The Pentagon in this connection is acting in its interests, not in theirs. With its interests related to extracting maximum effort, it pays for and promotes the latter, with first priority going to watching over the interests of the Army, which is the executor of the ruling classes in the USA.

Dispute Over Restrictions on Press Coverage of Submarine Accident

18010575 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 89 p 3

[Open Letter to Captain First Rank D.A. Makrushin, chief of the Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Red Banner Northern Fleet Political Directorate, from Reserve Senior Lieutenant Sergey Kuznetsov, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent: "With Whom Are We Fighting, Comrade Captain? Open Letter to Captain First Rank D.A. Makrushin, Chief of the Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Red Banner Northern Fleet Political Directorate"]

[Text] Permit me to address you, Comrade Captain First Rank, I am Senior Reserve Lieutenant Sergey Kuznetsov. How do you do, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich.

It is a pity that such tragic events, the deaths of Soviet sailors, preceded our acquaintance. But, as they say, such is life. Of course, it is a pity that, since our acquaintance in KOMSOMOLKA [KOMSO-MOLSKAYA PRAVDA], an article has appeared ("Tragedy in the High Latitudes," 11 April) in which we were compelled to discuss why our readers were left without photographic information about the events in the Norwegian Sea. You and I had already personally discussed this material which had caused your displeasure. But subsequent events are forcing me to carry our dispute to the pages of the newspaper.

Since the article [appeared], I have had the opportunity to hear accusations that KOMSO-MOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondents pursue "hot" stories and, despite the complexity and tragic nature of the situation, are succumbing to ambition and are squaring accounts with the Red Banner Northern Fleet.

Moreover, they have accused the editorial staff of disseminating disinformation, obviously, in their haste they did not understand that a portion of the great amount of material is a survey of the foreign press.

It is true that for some reason your supporters are mainly headquarters staff workers. But then line officers and their wives shook our hands and expressed their gratitude for the article.

Believe me, I do not want to belittle your merits or your prestige in any way for behind them are many years' service in the fleet and, finally, your zealous regard toward military duty. But really, I also have such a professional duty. Why, in your eyes, was the attempt to describe the sailors' heroism to my readers and provide details of events which engrossed the attention of millions of people—pursuit of a "cheap sensation." But that is the specific nature of my profession. I am a photo correspondent. If an event has already occurred and I was not present during it, then I can never catch it on film and reproduce it for my readers.

I understand that the government commission's decision not to allow civilians into the port was caused by the extraordinary circumstances. Apparently, none of its members contemplated that the central press would react so quickly to the event. But my colleague and I rushed to Severomorsk—and arrived prior to the cruiser Kirov's arrival. And I am certain that it is within your power, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, to help us meet with the commission's leaders for only a few minutes. I hope that they would understand us. But you had an order. In addition, your fleet newspaper has two highly professional photo correspondents at its disposal. KOMSO-MOLKA would have taken advantage of their assistance with thanks. But they were not even told of the Kirov's departure to sea to aid the submarine's heroic crew. That

is why I was the only photo correspondent at the port's entry-control point. It is true, [I was] without an access badge from the Main Naval Staff. And this, I suggest, is your trump card.

But late Saturday evening, when the editor sent us on the temporary duty trip, he could not provide us with the Main [Naval] Staff's written assignment. Referring to that, you did not include me on the list sent to the garrison's command post, where a farewell to the deceased sailors was taking place. It is difficult for me to verify that every person on this enormous list had such an access badge. And this is not necessary now since the duty officer resolved this problem with one phone call to higher headquarters, not waiting for a telex from Moscow. With one phone call, he obtained approval for me to carry out my assignment in the "closed" city. I do not think that I revealed any military secrets in my photographs.

Incidentally, about secrets. Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, look at these copies. I took one of them. The photo accompanying article "On the Zaporozhe's Watch" was taken by the editorial staff of your fleet newspaper. The photographer is a Northern Fleet sailor. He took this photo from the deck of our combat vessel with our Soviet-made Zenit camera. The two reporters pictured in the photo are foreigners. They are completing a flyover of our ships on a helicopter over neutral waters and with the aid of a very modern camera are "unraveling" military secrets.

They are flying so close that a camera far beyond the Zenit's professional level allowed them to take a quality photograph. We can also judge their information quality from Stern [magazine] excerpts which we are providing alongside.

Do not think only that I am asking for removal of all bans and limitations on military articles in our press. God forbid! Obviously, we simply need to review regulations that are not in accord with the times and in such situations, we should be guided not only by them, but also by common sense. And the fact is also that both you and I are interested to an equal degree in millions of our readers being kindly disposed toward the Army and Navy.

I am certain that you, as head of a section of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, worry about the attitudes which have formed in recent years between the military and the mass media. Yes, there is something to ponder here—to ponder together. And we also have an obligation to the Army and Navy. But believe me, journalists are not chasing after "hot" [stories]. They are learning to speak the truth. Take a [photo] album about the Army and Navy from the library. Look at those pretty, and I would even say, lacquered photographs. Is this what Army life is really like? Do you really

not have any problems which are like those in the "civilian sector" and which also need to be resolved as soon as possible? Resolve them—jointly with the press, radio, and television.

I am always ready to come to your assistance.

Incentives For Ex-Servicemen To Resettle In Rural Area

18010648a Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Apr 89 p 6

[Article by Yu. Burov: "A Farm for a Soldier"]

[Text] Managers of sovkhoz' and kolkhoz' of the oblast are visiting the soldiers of the Kalinin garrison: they invited those preparing for discharge to the reserves to resettle in the villages.

Increasingly in recent years, military units have opened their gates to civilians. This happens on the "open door days" and in meetings with parents, and quite recently mothers' "calls" have come into fashion... A meeting that took place in the Kalinin garrison might be called the first of its kind: representatives of kolkhoz', directors of sovkhoz', and oblast officials visited one of the subunits.

There was a story behind this meeting, albeit a short one. A few days ago, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published a letter from three managers of sovkhoz' and kolkhoz' of the Kalinin oblast. "Take off your greatcoat, let's go home..."—with these words from a popular song, addressed to those facing demobilization or a reduction, they asked them to set up permanent residence in the Tver countryside. And now they themselves have come to the unit in order to talk directly with the soldiers and officers, without intermediaries, to tell of the terms that will be offered to those who wish to live in the country.

The first to speak to those gathered was the director of the state judicial section of the Kalinin party obkom, Yu. I. Rusin.

He said, "We realize that not everyone will choose a rural cottage with a private plot, a work place on a farm or in the field. Those who have served a quarter century or even more, often under extreme conditions, need their rest. But even for them, the climate and the nature of the Kalinin oblast will do them good. There is room for all, both for active types and summer residents."

Indeed, the oblast is one of the largest in the non-chernozem zone. It covers 84.1 thousand square kilometers. Much ploughland, many meadows and pastures, but poorly utilized; there are not enough working hands. Cowberries, cloudberries, cranberries, mushrooms, fish in the streams and lakes, medicinal herbs, and forest game often go unhunted in these parts. Just one figure. In the last decade 14 thousand peasant's huts have been abandoned in these villages.

The guests did not wait for them to ask what was the natural question, under the circumstances: "If everything in the oblast is as great as you describe, why do the huts remain untenanted?" The deputy chairman of the Kalinin oblast agro-industrial committee, V. V. Sergeyev, answered this before it came. It was all the fault of neglect of the interior, the extremely deficient rates of construction of roads, schools, and clubs, the shortage of comfortable living quarters, and much else that man requires. The administrative-hortatory style of management also did nothing to keep a person on the land of his grandfathers and great-grandfathers.

Now the situation is changing. G. P. Borisov, the deputy manager of the section for labor and social questions in the Kalinin oblast executive committee, detailed the benefits now offered to those who decide to resettle in a village. To a head of a family, the state will allocate 2000 rubles gratis, plus another 500 rubles for each child, parent, or relative. A cow, pig, and sheep will be provided free of charge, and in the first year the feed for them as well. Travel, shipment of baggage, and per-diem expenses will be paid. For some time the family will not have to pay for their housing, fuel, electricity, and municipal services in their new home. If desired, a loan of 50 thousand rubles with a payback over fifty years will be granted.

The generous assistance of the state draw many to Tver land. In just three years, more than five thousand families have moved there from other regions of the country. Among them are many who were born and raised there. The people are not coming to visit, but for a long time, to stay: they are settling down thoroughly. The Smirnovs recently had a housewarming in the Krasnopoletskiy sovkhoz (in the western part of the oblast). Yuriy Vasilyevich and Zinaida Fedorovna are comparatively young people, and they have two daughters. With regard to housing, the matter was settled without complications—a suitable house was found at once. They bought tractors, a tracked and a wheeled one, a van, a cow, heifer, young bull, several pigs, and twenty ewes with offspring (around forty lambs). They are planting a garden and starting an apiary. The lease includes around fifty hectares of land. This is the farmer's variant, an individual peasant's farm. There are others. One can join a kolkhoz or sovkhoz, become a tenant, or simply buy a home.

This year hundreds and hundreds of families from the Perm oblast, the Mariyskaya and Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan are celebrating housewarmings in Tver villages. Basically these are Russians who are used to the local climate and nature. The director of the sovkhoz Kudrino, G.S. Pukhayev, the chairman of the kolkhoz Zavet Lenina of the Oleninskiy rayon V. I. Vasilyev, the deputy chairman of the Staritskiy RAPO [rayon agro-industrial association] V.V. Krutikov, the chairman of the Iskra kolkhoz of the Krasnokholmskiy rayon V.H. Nazarenko, and other managers at the meeting described preparations for their reception. The chairman of the kolkhoz imeni Lenin of

the Molokovskiy rayon, Ye. A. Kupriyanov for example, reported that the farm ended last year with a pure profit of almost eight hundred thousand rubles. This money is used to build houses with amenities, production buildings, and in particular a shop for subsidiary small industries, and that the farm has organized the production of an oil whose taste even local residents had forgotten, linseed oil. The need for workers is down, but not by much, and even today the kolkhoz is ready to grant houses to fifteen families.

To say that those gathered at once began writing down kolkhoz and sovkhov addresses would be to stretch the truth. The hosts were very careful in their statements, but all agreed on one thing: under certain conditions not only the soldiers and sergeants, but even some of the officers would settle in the countryside with pleasure. Here the opinion of Captain V. V. Ogurtsov:

"For 23 years I have served in aviation. I have an apartment in Kalinin. Now tell me, why should I change my residence, what will I win, what will I gain? Generally reserve officers have a very hard time getting housing. You have to wait, not for three months, as legislated, but several years for an apartment. Perhaps these officers will take the risk of moving to the country?"

A question arose at once: why is it that the Defense Ministry only builds housing for reserve officers in the cities? Why is not at least a part of the funds earmarked for these goals spent in the country? Those gathered frankly suggested asking the Defense Ministry this question. For many, a cottage with a garden in a picturesque area is much more attractive than the standard city apartment.

Other complexities rise in the way of the possible resettling of an officer to the country, including psychological ones. Major R. U. Usmanov had this to say about one of them:

"Often our colleagues go into the reserve in the prime of their physical strength. Many were born in the country and have not forgotten the laws of the land; they could work well both in the field and on the farm. But good work also means high wages, which today no one is limiting. But in this case they stop paying us our pension, which did not come easy. In short, the government should abandon the artificial limitations, as was done in Moscow. The state would only gain from this."

Colonel M. M. Neskladniy served some thirty-three years in the army, beginning as a private. He was born in the Ukraine, and has served in ten military districts, and wandered throughout the country. In the Kalinin garrison for two years, he works in the rear service. His pension comes in a year. He does not intend to leave, but would like to acquire a cottage in the country...

"I will mow hay for a sovkhov or kolkhoz, as much as I can," he mused, "I will also help others when needed. It's painful to see what the land in the center of Russia has become. Last year we harvested potatoes not far from a little village. In it there had been eleven households. Only one had a living soul, a tractor driver. Where else to go?"

Unfortunately, even now the oblast usually gives marshy and other unproductive land in its grants. But is this logical if thousands and thousands of rural homes are going empty? Meanwhile they are not easy to buy, and often there are fabricated obstacles, although kitchen gardens have also been abandoned along with the homes, and they could supply more than one family with vegetables, potatoes...

In the heat of the discussion, a woman came to the podium and introduced herself. It turned out that the head of the cadre section of the Likhoslavl radiator plant, V.A. Ivanova, had come to visit the soldiers without an invitation. She explained that it was just a forty minute trip from the oblast center to the plant, which produces radiators for motor vehicles. The most diverse kinds of specialists were required. Managers also; from deputy director to shop and shift bosses.

Concluded Vera Alekseyevna, "We in turn would like to take fewer people from the local villages."

The official part of the meeting was over. After it there were talks, as we will call them, about interests. The economist A.A. Rummyantsev of the Oleninskiy RAPO, V. I. Vasilyev, the chairman of the Zavet Lenina kolkhoz from the same region, with Ye. Ya. Ibragimov, a private from Azerbaijan. His fiancee waits at home, but he decided to pick her up and then try his luck on Tver land. He would like to work, as he puts it, at "man's work", raising cattle or as a machine operator. Also, Pvt. N. A. Abdullayev. He too bargained in a business-like manner with the managers about housing, conditions, work. The same with Jr. Sgt. A. M. Gasanov, whose civilian specialty was salesman. He took down an address. He asked if he could bring his relatives and friends. The reply was in the affirmative.

I asked the Oleninskiy members if they were satisfied with the meeting.

"Not entirely," V.I. Vasilyev answered frankly. "It should have been a little different. And a little earlier. We should have come to the unit for a whole day, bring the boys refreshments, talk candidly, unhurriedly... Bring them to visit us, so that we're not promising a pig in a poke. That's what I'll do next time, too bad we didn't think of it before."

Guests and hosts of the garrison parted as acquaintances, intending to consider and weigh everything, and then meet again.

1st Deputy Defense Minister Kochetov Victory Day Interview

18010577 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 May 89 first edition pp 1-2

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview of General of the Army K. Kochetov: "The People—Creator of Victory"]

[Text] **First Deputy Defense Minister of the USSR, General of the Army K. Kochetov, answers questions from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA**

[KZ] Comrade General of the Army, perhaps this time we can depart from prevailing traditions, and on the threshold of Victory Day talk about those questions that particularly trouble KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers today. Many letter-writers are concerned by the fact that many attempts have been made abroad to belittle the importance of our Victory and the role of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in the defeat of Hitler's Germany and militarist Japan. Recently something similar has been happening even among us. Certain historians and columnists claim that we paid such a high price for victory that, they say, this victory is not even worth mentioning.

[Kochetov] I believe that such claims are groundless. You see, at issue in that war was not simply military victory, but the life and death of the Soviet State, the Russian and many other nations. Fascist plans to destroy more than a hundred million Slavs and enslave the rest, to eliminate all elements of our state and destroy and burn Moscow and Leningrad, are documented. Many other peoples awaited a similar fate. Our army and the Soviet people won the victory, and foiled those evil plans.

But speaking purely from the military aspect of the matter, one should objectively compare the contribution of the states belonging to the anti-Hitler coalition in the defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan. Let us look at everything that happened in 1941-1945 through today's eyes, and try to see it all as it was in reality.

First of all, one should keep in mind that this war began with a show of particular imperialist brutality against the only socialist state in the world. The enemy delivered a powerful blow on our Motherland (we will not exhaust the reader with facts and recall the makeup of the military force of the fascist bloc). Here combat operations were conducted over an enormous territory, with a frontage of 3,000 to 6,200 kilometers, and depth of up to 3,000 km. Secondly, if we compare the contribution of the states making up the anti-Hitler coalition to the defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan, we can graphically see the historical truth. From the start of the Great Patriotic War to mid-1944, 190 to 270 enemy divisions were fighting simultaneously on the Soviet-German front, while against the English and American troops there were: in North Africa, from 9 to 20 divisions, in Italy, from 7 to 26 divisions. Even after the

opening of the second front in Europe, the number of fascist forces on the Soviet-German front exceeded the German force operating on the West European and Italian fronts by a factor of 2 to 2.5. Consequently, in terms of the scope of armed conflict, the Soviet-German front occupied the chief place in the course of the war. And third and last, in the period of the war 507 German fascist divisions were defeated and destroyed on the Soviet-German front. In addition, German satellites lost no less than 100 divisions. The losses of German armed forces in dead, wounded, and missing on the Soviet-German front amounted to 10 million men. Here also fascist Germany lost three fourths of its aviation, a large percentage of its artillery and tanks, and more than 1.6 thousand combat aircraft and transport ships. The Red Army crushed the Kwantung army, the main ground military force of Japan, which significantly speeded up the end of the Second World War.

Thus every honest person cannot doubt that it was precisely the Soviet Armed Forces that broke the back of the fascist army and forced Japan to capitulate, defeated their main forces, and rid the peoples of the world of the brown plague.

Now let us consider something else. Were there blunders on the part of the Soviet leadership and the military command, about which there is a great deal of talk today? Unfortunately, there were, and they were significant. For instance, as a result of unjustified mass repressions in the 30s, including against the army, and errors committed through the fault of Stalin and his circle, we found ourselves unready to repel the first and subsequent powerful blows by the enemy. However, after recovering from these blows and forming reserves and restructuring the economy to a wartime footing, we were able to change the course of the war in our favor, and achieve our military-political goals.

The war forced upon us was a ruthless test of the vitality of the socialist system, the fortitude of the multi-ethnic Soviet state, the strength of the patriotic spirit of the Soviet people. And we passed this test of fire and sword. Passed it because for our people this war became the Great Patriotic War. Everyone rose up to defend the Fatherland: old and young, men and women, all nations and nationalities of the country. The generation born of October and raised in the socialist system joined in its first battle. Unprecedented staunchness and heroism in battles on the field, courageous fighting of partisans and underground members behind the front lines, tireless labor in the rear, this is what the war was to us.

And when Victory came, on the 1,418th day of the battles, all the rescued world breathed freely and gave the Soviet people its due—to the victor, the hero and worker and his valorous army that had covered thousands of kilometers in battles, each of which had cost many lives, much blood and sweat. The enormous political will, purposefulness, persistence, and organizational and ideological work of the CPSU played its role in achieving

victory. But the main weight of the war was borne by the simple Soviet soldiers, the workers of villages and cities, the great Soviet people. It was the true creator of Victory!

[KZ] The defeat of Hitlerite Germany was an important point in the history of mankind, and was to bring about enormous changes in the fates of countries and peoples, including the life of our country and our people. How were these changes reflected in the military policy of the Soviet state, in its military doctrine, its Armed Forces?

[Kochetov] Our Victory was an event of enormous importance, a true turning point in the fate of mankind. The prospect of social progress and lasting peace opened up to all peoples. However, soon the militarist circles of the West, seeking social revenge, began the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist "cold war". Its icy winds changed the international political climate for the worse, and made the world situation unstable. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty bloc (NATO) in 1949 meant the virtual split of Europe into two opposing groups of states, and the strengthening of confrontation between them. Imperialism, guilty of unleashing two world wars, was pushing mankind toward a third, this time a nuclear war.

The Soviet Union, together with all the forces of socialism, of peace and progress, fought constantly for the strengthening of international security. However it did not succeed in improving the political situation. The intensification of the military threat confronted our country with the necessity of taking retaliatory measures to safeguard its own security. With its wartime wounds still unhealed, the Soviet Union was compelled to strengthen its defense, to seek ways for a reliable rebuff of the aggressor. Therefore from the mid-50s our Armed Forces began to be equipped with nuclear missile and other types of modern weapons. Military science was raised to a new level. The face of all branches of the Armed Forces and service arms was transformed. The Strategic Rocket Forces were created, a mighty defensive shield of our state and all the socialist community. In May 1955, the defensive Warsaw Pact Organization was formed to counter the aggressive NATO bloc, and this was an important step in the cause of safeguarding the reliable defense of the attainments of socialism and peace in the postwar period.

The achievement of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the U.S., the Warsaw Pact and NATO, was of truly historic importance. This reinforced the position of socialism and all progressive forces, and overturned the plans of imperialist reaction for victory in a world war. And it is largely to the credit of our Armed Forces that it did not succeed in toppling mankind into the nuclear abyss.

But as was noted in the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, in concentrating enormous resources on the military aspect of countering imperialism to safeguard

the security of the state, we did not always take advantage of political opportunities that opened up in connection with the fundamental changes in the world, in order to reduce tension and achieve mutual understanding between peoples. As a result, we allowed ourselves to be drawn into the arms race, which could not help but affect the socioeconomic development of the country and its international position. At the same time, today we have every justification to say that the main direction of Soviet military development elaborated by the party corresponded to the needs of the time. Its consistent implementation assured the readiness of the army and navy to repel aggression and reliably to defend the peaceful labor and peaceful life of our Motherland. And this is precisely the historic mission and calling of the Soviet Armed Forces.

[KZ] The advent of the nuclear-space age has forced us to revise many old ideas about war, about the means of safeguarding security of the state, about military superiority, etc. In your view, how is the new political thinking, which has become a characteristic feature of reality of our party at the modern stage of development of Soviet society, implemented in our military construction?

[Kochetov] Recognition of the realities of the nuclear-missile age and the interests of mankind's survival brought about the need for new political thinking and its corresponding approach to matters of defensive development. Therefore, in implementing perestroika in the army and navy, we clearly distinguish two aspects of it.

The first aspect is directly related to the practical implementation of the new political thinking in familiar Soviet initiatives in the international arena, including in defensive Soviet military doctrine, i.e. in the transition from the principle of a super-high arms level to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense. Thus our new initiatives in the area of reducing troop strength and arms of the army and navy constitute a graphic example of perestroika of the USSR Armed Forces on the basis of the new political thinking, the defensive nature of military doctrine, and demonstrate to all mankind that the Soviet Union is genuinely and persistently seeking a world without wars, conflicts, or confrontations, and a significant reduction and destruction of all types of arms.

The second aspect of perestroika in our Armed Forces is related to the principled, innovative political precept of the 19th All-Union Party Conference regarding the shifting of military construction primarily toward qualitative parameters of equipment, military science, and the composition and development of the army and navy, and proceeding from principles of reasonable sufficiency for defense and the demands of Soviet defensive military doctrine. It is this precept that today determines all the content and direction of work to assure a level of training and combat readiness of the Armed Forces that meets the demands of the times. As was noted by candidate member of the Politburo, CC, CPSU, USSR Defense Minister General of the Army D. Yazov, "The precept of

qualitative indices of defense development has as its goal not the build-up of the combat might of the Armed Forces, and this should be stressed most strongly, but the maintenance of this might at a level that rules out military superiority over us, and guarantees reliable protection of the peaceful labor, the peaceful lives of Soviet people." The performance of this task on the basis of a qualitative approach corresponds not only to the specific historical conditions of the present stage of international development, but also to the strategy of perestroika and the demands of economic reform.

Implementation of the decision of the 19th Party Conference regarding development of the Armed Forces primarily through qualitative parameters in the future will allow us to achieve their even greater mobility, and to provide them with highly effective weapons and combat equipment, and personnel trained at an up-to-date level.

[KZ] "It was been 44 years since Victory Day", I. Kuzmenko of Dnepropetrovsk and other readers write to the editors, "but to this day we do not know the precise numbers of our losses. Mention was made of 20 millions, but now one encounters significantly larger figures in the press. Isn't it time to shed light on this question?"

[Kochetov] Since the mid-50s, on the basis of preliminary studies made at the time, the figure of 20 million people has been cited in all sources. As further studies showed, finding the actual number of losses is a complex, time-consuming task, based on tested, scientifically sound methods and extensive documentary material. However the problem of losses became a forbidden topic during the years of stagnation. At present we have returned to it. Work is being done by a special commission to calculate the human losses in combat actions, and to clarify losses of equipment and arms. These data will be published in the near future.

[KZ] Many letter-writers write of the need for a reverent attitude toward the memory of those who fell during the Great Patriotic War. They recall Suvorov, who said that a war cannot be deemed finished until the last soldier has been buried with military honors. In many of our sites of previous battles, the remains of soldiers lie unburied to this day. Would it perhaps be more reasonable for the search for the dead to be undertaken by state institutions, rather than on a public basis, by students?

[Kochetov] Unfortunately, your facts are correct. A reverent popular memory of those who died for the freedom and independence of our Motherland should not fade away. From it we draw our strength, our future. In this regard, in January of this year the CPSU Central Committee decided to publish an All-Union Memorial Book, in which will be entered the names of all those who died in battles for the Motherland, and brief information about them.

Military commissariats, military units, komsomol, veteran, and other public organizations are now being called upon to participate actively in finding unaccounted-for fallen soldiers, learning their names, searching for unburied remains of the dead in places where combat actions occurred, clarification of the lists of those buried in fraternal graves, and tidying up military cemeteries, memorials, and obelisks. For these purposes, large sums are being allocated at the expense of the Soviet Peace Fund and local budgets, as well from the donations of workers. This is not only a tribute to the bright memory of the fallen, but also an important human, humanitarian act, of great moral and educational importance for the young generation.

[KZ] Konstantin Alekseyevich, the Victory celebration is an all-union holiday. You cannot find a family among us in which traces of the last war do not remain. What are your personal feelings on this day, how do you mark it?

[Kochetov] This is a bright and joyous holiday not only for the Soviet people, but for all progressive mankind. However to this day, along with a sense of joy, we also feel sorrow at our irretrievable losses. Indeed, the war did touch us all. My father, in military counterintelligence, died in it in 1945. On this day, as always, I honor his memory, and the memory of all those who never returned to their mothers, wives, and children.

Military Features of New Criminal Legislation
18010496 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Apr 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel of Justice V. Shchuplenkov, Doctor of Juridical Sciences, under the rubric "The Legal Reform: at the Crossroads of Opinions": "In the Channel of New Approaches"]

[Text] We have begun organizing the socialist legal state in a situation necessitating the rectification of major deformations which have developed over a period of many years not just in the economy but in the state-legal system, and even in the society's spiritual area. It is no longer any secret that crime has become an increasingly acute social problem in the country, while efforts to combat it have become less effective. All of this could not help affecting law and order and discipline in our Armed Forces.

The legal reform undertaken at the initiative of the CPSU has begun with criminal law. A broad aktiv of legal experts, both scholars and practical workers, was enlisted to develop the draft Principles. Military legal experts have made a contribution, and foreign experience has not been ignored. Extensive discussion of the draft and summarization of its results will make it possible legally to eliminate certain flaws so that it can be fully "accepted" by the society.

Many things have been changed in the draft Principles of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics. The current system of criminal punishments has undergone only slight changes, however, and in the direction of making them more humane. They include a drastic reduction in the grounds for imposing capital punishment, expansion of the range covered by punishments not involving incarceration, and the rejection of punishments which have outlived their usefulness in the contemporary situation (exile and banishment).

The military reader will undoubtedly be particularly interested in changes affecting the liability of servicemen for the commission of crimes and the special penalties applying to them. Generally speaking, the same punishments apply to servicemen who commit crimes as to any other lawbreaker. This tenet is based on the constitutional principles of a single legality for all and the equality of citizens before the law and the court. At the same time, the specific circumstances of the organizational development, the life and functioning of the Armed Forces have produced certain differences in the application of certain types of punishment for servicemen. What are they?

The fact is that when a soldier commits a crime, which does not pose any great danger, it is far from always expedient to punish him by discharging him from the Armed Forces. After all, the purpose of the punishment is primarily to rehabilitate and reeducate the convicted person. And this can be achieved also in a situation in which the serviceman continues to perform his duties.

This is why the criminal law allows for exceptions in the application of certain punishments to servicemen, on the one hand, and provides for special punishments applicable only to them, on the other. I refer to the assignment of first-term servicemen to a disciplinary battalion. This has been retained in the draft Principles, but it has been included for the first time among those punishments to which the serviceman can be given a suspended sentence with probation. Until now the court was authorized to impose probation only in the case of incarceration. While eliminating this incongruity, the authors of the draft, in my opinion, still made some mistakes. I refer to the provision in Article 60 pertaining to the commutation of punishment for an individual who has begun to correct his ways at a place of incarceration to assignment to a disciplinary battalion for the rest of his term.

The maximum term of punishment in the form of assignment to a disciplinary battalion also obviously needs to be more specifically defined. Currently the term is 3 years. This is longer than the active duty term for most categories of servicemen. This is hardly sensible. Should we not restore the former maximum term of 2 years?

The addition of yet another, special punishment, which applies to officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and reenlisted men, should be regarded as one of the major changes in criminal legislation. I refer to the service restriction. This will probably evoke objections from many people, as it did from Col V. Bakharev ("KRASNAYA ZVEZDA", 17 Jan). I believe that they are groundless, however.

The question of the need for the law to provide for a special type of punishment applicable to first-term servicemen while they continue to serve in the military service did not come up just recently. Proposals to this effect, based on the study of judicial experience of military tribunals, have been made for a long time, and there are convincing grounds. Briefly, they are the following. Under current law, out of the extremely vast system of punishments applicable to regular servicemen, the main one could be regarded as incarceration or a conditional sentence with mandatory labor for the convicted person. In either case the serviceman is discharged from the Armed Forces.

And if we try whenever possible to retain a first-term servicemen for the military by sending him to a disciplinary battalion, then it is all the more expedient with respect to an officer. And correcting the negative qualities which resulted in an infraction of the law can be achieved at minimum cost both to the state and to the officer himself. This is where the service restriction is useful. Particularly since both existing laws and the draft Principles allow for the loss of military rank as an additional measure (but not a mandatory one) only in the case of a conviction for a heinous or particularly heinous crime.

Nor can I agree with certain other opinions and statements by Colonel Bakharev. He proposes extending to the military unit commander the authority, based on the specific circumstances surrounding the commission of certain military crimes, to decide whether to turn the case over to the judge advocate or to impose a disciplinary penalty upon the guilty party. I believe that this is wrong.

In the first place, the findings of authority and of the officials rendering a decision related to the commission of a crime, as well as procedural questions, come under criminal-procedural and not criminal law. In the second place—and this is the main thing—the implementation of such a proposal would go against Article 28 of the Principles of Legal Procedure of the USSR and the Union Republics. The latter specifies that it is mandatory to perform a preliminary investigation into all military crimes. And only the judge advocate's agencies have that authority.

Furthermore, in the situation of the organization of a legal state, the existence in the current Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR of a standard (Article 45) vesting in the commander the authority to determine

the measure of a serviceman's liability for the commission of a military crime, in my opinion, does not completely conform to the principle of equality of citizens before the law and the court. Certain commanders actually use this standard to conceal crimes and give the appearance that all is well.

I am convinced that the prestige of military commanders is enhanced not by turning juridical functions over to them, but by the strict and precise fulfillment of their regulation duties with respect to maintaining a high level of military discipline and order, and with effective organizational and indoctrinational work with subordinates. Let us leave the authority to apply criminal law to individuals committing crimes to the juridical agencies.

Something else: the proposal that the Principles be supplemented with a standard which, along with other grounds for suspending criminal liability and punishment, would provide for replacing criminal liability with disciplinary steps for a serviceman who has committed a crime which does not pose a great danger to society. I think that this proposal deserves support.

In general, the attempt by the authors of the draft Principles to resolve the problem of criminal liability on the basis of new approaches and taking current circumstances of the society's development into account is extremely productive.

Possible Discrimination Against Female Medical Service Personnel

18010611 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Major V. Mikhalev: "Abuses of Female Service Personnel Occur More Frequently"]

[Text] In the outer darkness, the vehicle made its way through a pounding storm. Its headlights reflected off a streaming wall. Its only passenger was a woman in the uniform of a Warrant Officer who rode in the cargo bed. The car drove up to the gates of the training center, and halted.

Dressed in an overcoat, the woman made her way across a field to the Command and Control Point. No light was on in the booth. All gates were tightly shut. The night firing drills had been cancelled, but no one had remembered to inform the medical specialist. Having stood in the freezing weather a bit longer, she sighed, and headed back across the field. She had to get back somehow, but didn't dare be late for the next day's duties.

The very same story was told to me by Warrant Officers N. Buchelnikova, L. Dombrovskaya, E. Saitseva, and G. Yudina. It was not surprising, therefore, that no matter how hard fellow service members tried to convince medical Warrant Officer Farnda Satdinova to put off her request for discharge from the Armed Forces, she remained adamant.

Some of the unit's officers also acted surprised. What did the warrant officer need? She served in a medical unit. As a specialist, she had authority. Perform your service, but serve yourself as well.

Yet soon thereafter, another medical technician prepared to leave the Army - Warrant Officer Tatyana Kostenko. And then other female medics began to doubt the sense of extending their contracts further.

It should be noted that not one female warrant officer complained about the burdens or misfortunes of service life. They complained only of the unfairness and heartlessness of their superiors who steadfastly refused to hear them out or to become involved in their problems and requests. And of problems there were enough.

Judge for yourself. The work week of medical technicians is almost twice as long as for their civilian counterparts. After duties at the medical unit, including night duties, they have no opportunity for time off. Exceptions, of course, are holidays and Sundays. And many of the female warrant officers, after all, have families and children. It's not easy for them to also stand a watch at home after duty hours. Or one could take another unit practice which has developed. It seems that there are frequent instances where female medical personnel are "requalified" as waitresses and machinists. This takes place with female service personnel serving at headquarters. Why? Perhaps its because commanders who deal with them on a day-to-day basis are uncomfortable with passing instructions concerned with the their execution of service duties. And even moreso on off-duty days.

Or, perhaps its because women who serve at headquarters are usually the wives of the unit's own officers and warrant officers, but in the medical units—they are the former graduates of medical institutes.

As a matter of fact, official personalities in a troop unit openly told me that medical institute students knew what they were getting into when called up for military service. Service means serving!

And who, at any rate, would be able to explain to them that condescension and indulgence are not expected, but something else—genuine attention and care for people who voluntarily fulfill military duties under trying circumstances. Then neither biting wind nor frost would be cause for complaint...

Summary Results of Moscow MD Exercise

18010635 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 April 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel General N. Kalinin by Correspondents Colonel G. Miranovich, Lieutenant Colonel O. Vladykin, Lieutenant Colonel A. Oliynik: "Affirming New Approaches"]

[Text] On 20 April a military exercise on the territory of the USSR was concluded. Questions of command and control and the coordination of various combat arms were practiced.

The goals set for the exercise were achieved, and the forces that participated in it are returning to their permanent garrisons.

Observers from a number of member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were present.

Immediately after the conclusion of the exercise, our special correspondents asked its director, the Commander of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General N. Kalinin, to answer a few questions related to its conduct.

[Correspondent] Comrade Colonel General, an exercise of this kind was held in the Moscow military district for the first time. Did any problems arise in this regard?

[Kalinin] Indeed, two-sided exercises with the participation of more than seventeen thousand men and the confrontation of two armored divisions have not been held for many years in the district. But I must say, no special problems related to this arose here. First of all, our Armed Forces have already accumulated sufficiently extensive experience in such measures, and there are qualified specialists whose help we can always count on in resolving questions related to, for instance, the stay of inspection groups and foreign military observers in the exercise region. Speaking of which, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to these comrades. Secondly, we had sufficient time to thoroughly consider everything—after all, this is a scheduled exercise.

Of course the presence of the inspection group from Italy, and foreign observers from 22 countries left some mark on our work - we wanted everything to look its best, as they say. But these concerns affected only the exercise director and those who helped us support the work of the representatives of the member countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The troops worked strictly according to plan.

[Correspondent] The goal of the exercise was to improve the field proficiency of the troops. What in your view were the most characteristic features of their actions?

[Kalinin] Most typical was the fact that even in an exercise like this, where to some degree compromises with reality cannot be avoided, elements of creativity and the desire to find unusual solutions were graphically displayed in the actions of the staffs and political organs. I admit that at times, in the dynamics of the exercise, some of the especially "hot" commanders even had to be held back to some extent, so they wouldn't go overboard, as we say. This is a cause for rejoicing: it means that new approaches are also being affirmed in combat training. In particular, I would especially like to note the actions of the regiments commanded by Colonel Yu. Pakhomov, and Lieutenant Colonels L. Bratukhin and V. Soshnikov. The personnel of these units displayed high field proficiency in carrying out their missions in the main axes.

Among the lessons that we should extract for the future, I would name the following. Experience showed that commanders and staffs without personnel in peacetime have gotten used to paper shuffling and cliché, and in a number of cases have simply lost their skills in practical work with real subunits. And unfortunately we do not always take this into account in work with a given category of cadres. So even now, in one of the regiments, literally on the eve of the battle, they did not organize training for it, but a demonstration class not directly related to the upcoming actions. In short, after the exercise, along with resolution of other questions, we must more thoroughly work on commander's training of officers, with allowance for the specifics of their service.

[Correspondent] There was a group of inspectors from Italy in the exercise area, along with the invited observers from the member countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We know that you met with them and talked. What briefly were the results of the inspection?

[Kalinin] As is known, a document of the Stockholm Conference called for the possibility of inspection of this type of military activity. As the senior official of the inspection group stressed in an interview with your newspaper, this opportunity was used. The inspection of the indicated region was done by two methods, from the air and from the ground, for which the inspectors and those accompanying them were allocated off-road vehicles and the necessary communications equipment, and two helicopters. For forty-eight hours the inspectors were given an opportunity to examine the designated region without hindrance.

At a meeting with the Italian inspectors, which was held at the request of the senior member of the group, Colonel Alfio Maggiore, they expressed satisfaction at their reception and working conditions, and no complaints were lodged against us. As for the results of the inspection, they will be known only when the government of Italy sends a note to the USSR government with the results of the inspection, in accordance with the Stockholm Conference document.

[Correspondent] Among the troops performing in the exercise there were many soldiers who had been called up from the reserve. We know that the upcoming reduction in the Armed Forces will exacerbate the problem of training a reliable reserve. In your view, what lessons should be learned from the results of the exercise?

[Kalinin] Indeed, today the army has a special responsibility to the party and people to ensure that the announced reduction of the Armed Forces does not negatively affect the level of combat readiness of the troops. This will largely depend on the quality of training of the reserve, on its reliability, so to speak. Soldiers called up from the reserve participated in the exercise. For example the Gorkiy oblast military commissariat alone called up a significant contingent to scheduled

musters of unit-assigned reservists, who performed in our exercise at the concluding stage of the musters. I must say that the reserve soldiers made quite a good showing. At the time I had a chance to visit many regiments, battalions, and fire positions, and everywhere the commanders and political workers noted their special zeal and effort at all stages of the exercise. In my view, the following fact is also not without interest. Some Gorkiy enterprises, from which a portion of the reservists was called up, allotted monetary funds to reward the outstanding troops of the exercise. At the same time, the exercise showed that we still have much to think about in order to achieve qualitative improvement of the training of the reserves, in addition to resolving other problems.

Command System for Military Crime Ineffective
18010640 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Apr 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel of Justice (reserve) V. Luneyev, lead scientific associate at the State and Law Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the rubric "Polemical Comments": "The Costs of Double Statistics"]

[Text] The article "Dignity" published in last year's 3 December issue discussed contradictions in the existing procedure for recording incidents and crimes and their direct linkage to the concealment of infringements of the law. The issues raised in it evoked the interest of military legal experts. Workers with the Main Judge Advocate's Office expressed their opinion on the matter in the newspaper on 6 April. The following commentary by a legal scholar expresses a different—although, perhaps also debatable—point of view on the problem raised in the article.

It hurt me when I read the article "Dignity." And not just because our army has still not eliminated cases of derision of some servicemen by others, diplomatically called nonregulation relations during the years of stagnation. My heart was heavy from yet another statement about the many years of Sisyphean efforts by commanders at various levels to combat the concealment of crimes.

One hears calls for an end to crime cover-ups year after year. If the order is repeated, however, does this not mean that each previous one was not carried out? Why? A pat answer is ordinarily given: We still have individual unconscientious commanders.... Then they should be severely punished and educated. It is all very simple: just keep lambasting them.

It is possible that some people will not agree with me, but it seems to me that the causes of these many years of "lambasting" are the following. It is not an easy matter to determine with great objectivity the combat readiness of the units and subunits. I feel that there are too many theoretical criteria for peacetime. We do not have a [Mathias] Rust flying in everyday, after all. The indicators of military discipline which have long been used in the forces are ordinarily surface signs, however. It is easy

to calculate and compare the number of infringements of the law revealed. Some OICs, therefore, regard this information as extremely "convenient" for evaluating the performance of subordinate commanders. And it frequently becomes the main and crucial indicator.

A detrimental system has actually developed, which, according to my observations, makes it possible to decide hastily on a response to infringements of the law and to create the appearance of focused administrative work without thorough investigation or in-depth analysis of the actual situation in the units and subunits. And although orders flow from the center not to subject the commanders to indiscriminate punishment for the infractions of subordinates, penalties are imposed fairly frequently simply for the fact of incidents or crimes, for their quantitative indicators, known as "clubs (palka)" in the forces.

For many years now the existence of "clubs" in the reports, as I have repeatedly seen, are grounds for punishing the officers at the most diverse levels. They are bawled out, general reprimands are issued, some officers are demoted or relieved. Some with justification. Frequently, however, a generally conscientious and honorable commander will be removed and hastily replaced with clearly a worse one in order to report through the chain of command that: "The guilty parties have been punished." Since "there are clubs and there are clubs," what concerns the author of the article "Dignity" is the fact that their interpretations give an additional degree of freedom for demonstrating subjectivism in the evaluation of this or that officer's performance. As a result, the report figures become a fetish, and, along with other negative effects, this creates fertile soil for the development of far from the best qualities in subordinate personnel. Honor, decency, principle and independence become far less "advantageous" than time-serving, cunning and deceit.

The existing system for evaluating discipline in the units and subunits, I would say, produces deceivers. First it forces the commander to be evasive for the sake of a decent report and then, if he has not been clever enough, it severely punishes him for getting caught. Incidentally, his superior also has a dilemma: to report "upstairs" on an incident by a subordinate—in which case he himself may receive a penalty or at best, a dressing-down—or cover up the matter. In the latter case he may also be punished—but only if they find out. So which is better? It turns out that every superior, who would seem to need objective information "from below" on the state of discipline, is actually not interested in an honest report on incidents. This relieves him of the need to penalize someone and also to resolve a dilemma for himself. It is a sort of chain reaction.

The ability to manipulate statistics on crimes and incidents has become a sort of art. An art, let us frankly say, which is incompatible with the officer's professional duty and his honor. The commander or political worker

has an obligation to report through the chain of command immediately and with maximum objectivity on any serious incident. And any manifestation of dishonesty or manipulation of the truth—and they are hard to eliminate, as we have already stated—has to cause concern. We do not have the right to reconcile ourselves to them.

Then just what is the way out of the situation which has developed? First of all, of course, everyone must be convinced with indoctrinational and other measures that the army cannot function normally in the absence of a precise system of extremely objective reports on all infractions of the existing order. In my opinion, attention must be given to one other significant pattern. If the curve representing the crime dynamic in the nation since the war is superimposed upon the curve showing the dynamic of criminally punishable acts by servicemen, these two lines will coincide almost totally. This coincidence is only possible with deeply rooted interdependencies between crime in the nation and infringements of the law by servicemen. And since the conditionality of crime in our society today is acknowledged as internal conflicts and not just relics in the thinking of individual people or a pernicious influence from somewhere outside, the same must be applied to infringements of the law in the army. This includes the notorious "old ways." In the campaign against unlawful acts in the military the will of the commanders and OICs, which is ostensibly capable, when necessary, of reliably preventing all attempts by subordinates to violate laws and regulations, is not enough. We cannot get by without a thorough study of the general and internal military causes of infringements of the law, without developing on the basis of such a study realistic departmental, regional, specific group, and facility programs for preventing them.

In the army, organization, regulation order, demandingness on the part of the commanders, individual indoctrinational work performed by them with subordinates, constant monitoring and the nature of the military work itself develop in the youth a heightened sense of responsibility, of course. Only in the ideal situation, however, does this process proceed without a hitch. Real life is more complicated. It is naive to believe that all of the draftees will leave everything they have learned in their previous, civilian life at the unit traffic control post, like their old clothing. It is men who serve in the army, it should be mentioned, and among men the ratio of illegal activity is 6- to 8-fold greater than among women. In addition, those men range in age from 18 to 25 years, the age group responsible for most of the crimes, which doubles the figure again. What is more, the area of application of criminal law in the army is expanding considerably with respect to liability for military crimes. And what about the constraints of barracks life and the separation of the youth from family and friends, from their accustomed way of life?

When all of this is taken into account, the holding of commanders and OICs responsible for the crimes of

subordinates in absolutely all cases becomes questionable. They frequently bear responsibility only because of their position, while actually bearing no guilt. Yes, the officers organize the life, the everyday routine, the professional work, the leisure time activities, the training and indoctrination of subordinates. It is simply impossible to "feel out" the character of dozens of basically already developed people and remake them hastily on the go. Is it right to expect a commander to unerringly prevent likely deviations in the behavior of a draftee practically the second day after the latter arrives in the unit? Is it right always to hold him accountable for any unlawful actions by subordinates? Basic logic tells us that the responsibility of commanders and OICs should be limited to the framework of their actually capabilities. How should this framework be defined. I believe that several basic factors need to be taken into account.

In the first place, the guilty party himself should be held primarily responsible for his crime. At the present time there is clearly a distortion in this matter. When some soldiers violate the law they know very well that the commander will try to prevent them from being punished, since it is not to the latter's advantage to fan flames in which he himself could burn up. Such "expectations" can be dispelled only by 100-percent application of the principle of inevitability of criminal punishment for a crime. And this is possible in a situation in which commanders are not afraid to expose rotten spots. I can foresee the question: So the officers bear absolutely no responsibility for the crimes of subordinates? No, they are accountable to the full extent of the law, but only when they have directly or indirectly contributed to the commission of the crimes with their actions. And the findings of inquests and the courts are particularly important. After all, the law already requires that the investigator, the procurator's office and the court study the causes and the conditions contributing to the commission of crimes and submit recommendations (or partial recommendations) for their subsequent rectification. Unfortunately, however, these documents are not always adequately well substantiated and are written with the same old approach: if a crime has occurred in the unit, this means that the commander has indoctrinated the guilty party poorly and is himself to blame.... And so, in order to alter the approach, the investigative and judicial agencies will also have to study the causes of infringements of the law thoroughly and from a standpoint of principle.

In the second place, do we really need centralized, departmental record-keeping on crimes in the forces? It duplicates the state records kept by military justice agencies and requires the use of a large number of additional people. It is subjective and unprofessional. It is not surprising that at the end of the report periods officers from various headquarters verify their data against information in the procurator's offices and tribunals. Divergences are significant. Can data from these kinds of reports form the basis for objective analysis and summarization? Military justice agencies already inform

the command element on a regular basis. And when necessary the required data can be requested from them and received without hindrance at any time. Just do not allow these data to be used as the only criterion for evaluating the state of military discipline. A comprehensive approach is needed.

In the third place, it is time to rid ourselves of a postwar legacy: that procedure for bringing servicemen to criminal account which the military legal experts call "indulgence from above for criminals." After all, to this very day the consent of the superior chief is required to bring law-breakers to criminal account. Depending upon the category of the serviceman who has committed the crime, the consent of the regimental, division or district commander; for an officer, that of the minister of defense. And a case is halted under any pretext if such consent has not been obtained. This procedure is in conflict with the present Constitution of the USSR, Article 34 of which proclaims equality of citizens of the USSR before the law. A principled judge advocate can obtain the necessary consent, to be sure, if it is a soldier or sergeant being brought before the court. It is more difficult in the case of officers and generals.

Whatever the circumstances of each individual case, however, this feature in general makes possible the selective application of the law to lawbreakers. Moreover, it is extended precisely to those individuals who are answerable for the number of "clubs." For 12 elements of military crimes committed under mitigating circumstances the unit commander can limit the matter to disciplinary punishment of the lawbreaker. Particularly since there is no rigid list of such circumstances in the law. And many OICs with a direct interest in having the report in complete order try to take full advantage of their authority. Sometimes even in cases in which they would not be authorized to limit the matter to disciplinary measures under any circumstances.

Precisely such a situation was discussed in the article "Dignity." Having ascertained that Pvt N. Babadzhanyov had ridiculed the young soldiers, the unit commander had an obligation to instigate an inquiry and inform the procurator's office about what had happened. Both he and his senior chief considered it acceptable to classify what had happened as an infraction and attempted to conceal the crime from military justice agencies—and thereby also from the records. Their aims were clear: to evade responsibility for a subordinate's crime. And it needs to be said most definitely that this kind of actions on the part of commanders only contribute to the survivability of the "old ways."

It is my firm conviction that the infamous institution of consent must be eliminated as rapidly as possible. I believe that the new criminal law should not contain elements with alternate liabilities (criminal and disciplinary). If certain of the acts do not constitute a great public danger, then the law should not be cluttered up with them. Accountability for them should be only

disciplinary. Other acts in this group which constitute a real danger to the combat readiness of the units and subunits and to the honor and dignity of the servicemen should obviously be regarded as crimes and settled on the basis of criminal procedure. In other words, we need to eliminate all possibilities for the double interpretation of infringements of the law in the military, which will make it possible in fact and not just in words to observe the principles of commensurability and inevitability of punishment for a crime.

I have expressed my thoughts about only a few possible reforms which, in my view, would play a significant role in the campaign against cover-ups of crimes in the army and navy. Life insistently demands that we abandon many, many established stereotypes, however, scientifically study problems of unlawful behavior on the part of servicemen, develop basic measures for preventing it, and thoroughly restructure the entire system for evaluating the performance of commanders in the strengthening of military discipline. It should give them a vital incentive to observe Soviet laws and—this is very important—to resolutely and consistently reveal infringements of the law.

Therefore, I consider it necessary to stress the fact that the chronic disease will not be cured with instructions "from above" to continue evaluating the officers from the numbers of "clubs" and not punish them indiscriminately for infractions by subordinates. Another order will not be executed either, since the conditions which exist in the forces and the present praxis will keep falling into the old patterns. We must have a corresponding legal mechanism and legislative acts, and now is the very time to begin developing them. Right now, after all, the nation is vigorously discussing and improving the draft Fundamentals of Criminal Law, which contain a section also on liability for military crimes.

Moscow Area Given Low Marks for Pre-Draft Training

*18010651 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Apr 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Col Res F. Semyanovskiy: "Conscript from Moscow. How He Is Prepared For Military Service"]

[Text] On its pages KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has repeatedly posed problems related to pre-draft training of youth. In just the last two years, we have analyzed the training of youth for service in the Army and Navy in the Tomsk oblast ("Without Due Attention...", 7/15/87), in Leningrad ("Too Many Cooks...", 8/1/87), in the Murmansk oblast ("Found Unsuitable For Service", 6/15/88), in Latvia ("Not Only To Establish Facts", 9/15/88), in the Gorno-Altay Autonomous Oblast ("In the Interior, by the Old Methods", 1/26/89), and in other regions of the country, a total of around twelve articles. Three times in this period we have written of how things stand with preparation of youth for military service in Tadzhikistan ("Words Cannot Replace Deeds", 6/18/87), "Break the Barrier of the

Customary", 3/2/88, and "On the Way to the Military Formation", 10/4/88). We have also analyzed deficiencies that exist in the military patriotic work and organization of pre-draft training of the capital's youth ("How Are You Doing, Conscript?" on 22 and 23 October 1987). Today we again return to this problem.

Increasingly we hear this opinion from various officials, civilian and military: in recent years Moscow has markedly lost ground with regard to the work of military-patriotic education of youth, and the preparation of young people to perform their military duty in the ranks of the Armed Forces. The conscript now coming to military units from the capital is not the same. He lacks the knowledge and skills of basic military training, physical tempering, his previous zeal for service, and clearly defined moral orientation... Some time ago one also heard this fact officially acknowledged: based on the results of pre-draft training of youth, Moscow had lost its leadership position and last year held only fifth place among the oblasts on whose territory the troops of the Moscow Military District are stationed. This was announced at a meeting of the first secretaries of the rayon executive committees, officials of military commissariats, leaders of organs of public education and health, and other organs and organizations of the capital whose sphere of activity includes education of youth and their preparation for military service.

Many alarming facts and statistical data testifying to serious shortcomings in the work to organize pre-draft training of Moscow youth and the low effectiveness of this work were cited in a report by the secretary of the CPSU gorkom, V. Kuznetsov, and in speeches by military council member and chief of the political directorate of the Moscow Military District, Lt Gen A. Makunin, municipal military commissariat member Maj Gen V. Vespalov, first secretary of the Tushinskiy party raykom S. Abramov, and other participants. Of course examples were also cited of thoughtful, purposeful, effective work with youth, but they seemed to dissolve and fade against the background of the general accumulated problems, perhaps for that reason perceived with special intensity.

I will not enumerate all the eloquent figures and facts cited at the conference; I will just mention certain of them, which I believe most graphically characterize the current level of work. In a sample poll taken of young Muscovites, every third one said that he did not see the need for military service. And this was not only the sentiment of a certain sector of youth. Last year the number of those avoiding military service passed 400 persons. If we add to this the fact that several hundred conscripts were on the rolls of narcotics dispensaries, and almost 8 percent were found unsuited for service, then I believe one can gain some idea of the state of the conscript contingent in the capital.

An official estimate of this situation was not made at the conference, but I would hardly be wrong to say that it can certainly not be counted among the best. Indeed, more

than enough problems have accumulated, perhaps even more than a year-and-a-half ago, when KRASNAYA ZVEZDA analyzed the state of affairs in the preparation of youth for military service in an article entitled "How Are You Doing, Conscript?" However, registering this fact and publicizing and stressing the problems, even at such a representative conference, is only a part of the job. The main thing is to study the causes, to determine specific ways of correcting them, to achieve unconditional execution of plans. This, at least to some degree, was what the conference was supposed to promote.

Yes, many reasons were given for the reduced effectiveness of work with youth: the influence of pacifist sentiments, heated up by certain mass media; the formalism reigning in military-patriotic education; the alienation of pedagogic collectives of academic institutions from the problems of basic military training; the low level of health and sanitation measures... All these things exist, all influence the ultimate results. But the main reason, I am convinced, is something else. It lies in a kind of "alienation" of individual party committees and executive committees from important work, from truly active work to implement the decrees of the CC, CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers aimed at further improvement in the preparation of youth for military service.

In light of this decree, for example, the Tagan, Kiev, and Proletarskiy rayon executive committees of Moscow resolved to have no less than three full NVP [basic military training] facilities in their rayons in two to three years, and at other academic institutions, no less than 30 percent of NVP elements. So what happened? Not a single complete complex was built, and the equipment level of the schools and SPTU [intermediate professional-technical schools] with the other elements does not exceed 15 percent. Nor are things much better in certain other rayons. Overall in Moscow 43 percent of academic institutions do not have gymnastic facilities, and around 60 percent do not have obstacle courses. Or forget about gymnastic facilities—more than three percent of academic institutions do not even have military offices. Seemingly not a large figure, but on a city-wide scale it means more than 40 schools, SPTUs, and technical schools. Consequently many hundreds of tomorrow's soldiers are forced to assimilate elements of military affairs solely from textbooks.

Last year there were operating defense sports and health camps in just four rayons, developed on the basis of military units. In the other rayons there are none, and no one knows when they will get them. What is the result? In the Krasnogvardeyskiy rayon alone, around 4 thousand pre-draftees did not go through the required musters. This year many of them will become soldiers, and the commanders of units and subunits will again have to "clean up" the faults committed in their preparation for service.

Last year no "Orlenok" or "Zarnitsa" military sports games were held in the schools of 11 of the capital's rayons. Why? There is no answer to this question.

Of course these games need to be improved. But as past experience testifies, they pack a powerful educational charge, and develop important qualities in the school children, such as a sense of collectivism, the will to victory, the ability to overcome difficulties. Clearly they should not be curtailed; rather, they should be more varied, and new, more substantive and entertaining forms of competition should be sought. Who will do this? Well perhaps the boys from the military-patriotic associations and clubs, of which there are already more than 300 in Moscow. It is another matter that this work must be coordinated and directed in the necessary channel. But for that, apparently, no one has time.

As we see, the statistically average pre-draftee from Moscow is deprived of much that his contemporary in a more fortunate region has. And most importantly, he is deprived of the opportunity to receive that charge of knowledge, abilities, and sentiment that is necessary to the future soldier. I believe another strong influence on the pre-draftee's attitude toward service is the fact that his military training officer is a man of very venerable age (30 percent of military leaders of the capital are over sixty). The upshot of all this apparently is that for a hundred young men graduating from academic institutions, only one will express the desire to take up the officer's profession.

How are we to solve these problems? By the logic of things this question should have been the central one at the conference. But it was not. Not one of the present

executive committee representatives at the conference even spoke. And this is more than strange. You see, a great deal depends on precisely these people, on their attitudes toward pre-draft training, their persistence in its implementation. And such unanimous indifference...

Here I believe it is apropos to cite one other piece of information. In the article "How Are You Doing, Conscript", the following figures were mentioned. In 1984-1986, 74 intermediate schools were built in the city, and 11 SPTUs, but they "forgot" to build NVP training facilities in them. After that article, 43 new academic institutions have appeared in Moscow, again without NVP facilities. But funds were allocated for the construction of these facilities. Where did they go, who used them, and for what? And most importantly, why? Why does this happen, why do local organs of authority look upon this so calmly, why do the leaders of public education accept installations built according to plans that have been truncated by departmental pencils? There are no answers to these and many other questions.

I do not know how others present at the meeting felt, but my hopes for a rapid change for the better have plummeted. This thought came unbidden to my mind: would this conference prove to be another one of those events to be "ticked off", obligating no one to do anything?

One thing is clear, that it is time now to switch to a concrete posing of the question: how are decisions executed, what is done and what not? And why not done?

120-mm Vehicle-Transported Mortar

81440520 USSR VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian
No 2, Feb 89 pp 15, back cover

[Article by Col (Res) V. Knyazkov: "120-mm Vehicle-Transported Mortar"]

[Text] *Several tarp-covered motor vehicles darted out from the woods and, one after another, descended into the deep ravine. The casual observer would not have noticed anything unusual in this: apparently, on someone's command, the equipment safely took cover in the natural terrain folds. However, the characteristic claps of mortar fire were heard from there several minutes later....*

We will remind the reader that all mortars are classified according to their mode of transport—self-propelled, towed, man-portable, and vehicle-transported. The mortar discussed in this article falls in the latter category.

It is delivered to the battlefield by a GAZ-66, which carries in its bed everything necessary for operation of the equipment. The vehicle carries 5,968 kg on its flatbed—the mortar with road wheels, ammunition (48 rounds), the 5-man crew (commander, gunner, loader, setter, and ammunition handler), and an individual spare parts and tool kit. If it is necessary to transport the mortar over short distances, the vehicle tows it; the length of the move is not to exceed 30 km at a maximum speed of 60 km/h on highways, and off-road and on dirt or cobblestone roads the maximum distance is 5-10 km at no more than 20 km/h.

The road wheels of the 120-mm mortar are wheels with a suspension mechanism and a dolly. The design, as we see, is extremely simple, but performs important functions. First, the road wheels allow the crew to load the mortar (over two ramps) onto the flatbed of the transport vehicle or to unload it in similar fashion. Secondly, the crew can wheel the mortar over short distances to change the firing position, for example. Thirdly, as was indicated above, the mortar can be towed thanks to the road wheels.

Now—about the missions that are carried out when firing the mortar. It is possible to provide motorized rifle subunits effective and timely fire support, in particular, to accompany them in the attack, to repel enemy counterattacks, to destroy his emplacements, fighting and communication trenches, and light earth-and-timber structures, and to destroy or suppress enemy personnel and weapons situated in the open, in field shelters, on reverse slopes of hills, in deep crevices and ravines, and in forests. The mortar itself is capable of "hiding" in deep shelters that are hard for enemy fire to reach.

The 120-mm mortar is fired at high angles of elevation in the range of 45-80 degrees. The firing range is very important. The maximum range is 7100 meters, and the

minimum is 480 meters. Anything within these distances is susceptible to destruction by the mortar, in other words, any point or given area can be covered by accurate fire.

The 120-mm mortar shell (weighing 16 kg) is a powerful projectile to which no spin has been imparted. A stabilizing fin keeps it straight in flight. A rough analogy can be found in ordinary life, for example, in the game of badminton: Regardless of what position the shuttlecock is in when it hits the racquet, it straightens out and always flies "head first" after being struck. Inside the mortar shell is a 4-kg explosive charge.

It is necessary to make a very important addition to what has already been said—the frequency with which the mortar hits the area of the target. You see, the weapon's effectiveness and reliability in hitting the target depend on this. Let us turn to the mortar's rate of fire: its aimed rate is up to 10 rounds per minute; without adjustment it is up to 15 rounds per minute. A round every 4 seconds!

Maneuverability is a significant criterion for the vehicle-transported mortar, just as it is for any other artillery system. To assess it, let us use a brief combat training scenario. A crew is tasked to switch from the primary to the alternate firing position. How much time will be required to switch the mortar from the deployed to the traveling configuration?

Of course, the move is accomplished at the top permissible speeds. If the mortar itself is not being towed but is "tossed" into the truck, the transport vehicle can develop a speed of 90 km/h on a good highway. Of course, the battlefield is not a freeway, and sections of level roadway will, as a rule, be the exception. Therefore, the commander must base his calculations for the real time of a "wheeled" maneuver on the terrain and road conditions, the weather, the season, and the time of day.

Once the crew and equipment have arrived at their new position, the command "Action!" is given. The crew unloads the mortar and wheels it into a revetment, removes the cover, and sets it up in the deployed position. The transport vehicle heads for cover. Meanwhile, the crew completes the final preparatory operations. Special care is given to placement of the base plate; its entire surface must rest on the ground. It will take up the full force of the recoil—a powerful, dynamic blow.


The commander raises a signal flag—"Ready!" The stopwatch is stopped—the entire operation must take no more than 3 minutes. In addition, the mortar is designed with the capability to fire with the road wheels attached or removed.

Let us turn now to the design of the mortar. It consists of four basic parts: the barrel, a standard with a sight shank, a base plate, and a double-loading prevention safety device. The idea behind the design is extremely simple:

120-mm Vehicle-Transported Mortar

40 коп.


120-ММ ВОЗИМЫЙ МИНОМЕТ




(Статью читайте на с. 15)

МИНОМЕТ В БОЕВОМ ПОЛОЖЕНИИ:

1 — сошки; 2 — двунога;
3 — механизм горизонти-
рования; 4 — подъемный
механизм; 5 — предохра-
нитель от двойного заря-
жания; 6 — прицел; 7 —
ствол; 8 — амортизатор;
9 — фиксатор; 10 — те-
лежка; 11 — колесо; 12 —
тяга; 13 — обойма тяги;
14 — опорная плита; 15 —
казенник.



ПЕРЕВОЗКА МИНОМЕ- ТА В КУЗОВЕ АВТОМО- БИЛЯ ГАЗ-66.



БУКСИРОВКА МИНО- МЕТА.

Towing of Mortar (bottom); Transporting Mortar in Bed of GAZ-66 Truck (middle); Mortar in Deployed Position (top)

Key:

1. Spike foot
2. Bipod
3. Cross-leveling mechanism
4. Elevating mechanism
5. Double-loading prevention safety device
6. Sight
7. Barrel

8. Shock absorber
9. Lock
10. Dolly
11. Wheel
12. Towbar
13. Towbar ring
14. Base plate
15. Base cap

the barrel, which fires and directs the mortar shell, is connected to the base plate by a ball joint and maintained in the deployed position by the standard.

The standard is an additional support for the barrel. It is connected to the barrel by a yoke and provides for vertical and horizontal laying.

The purpose of the base plate has already been addressed. This rigid, welded structure includes the base (upper plate) and the base plate dish, with ribs, arcs, and other parts welded to them to provide the necessary rigidity.

A few words about the double-loading prevention safety device. It consists of two safety mechanisms; at the base of each is a turning vane. The name itself hints at the purpose of this device: to completely preclude the possibility of loading the mortar with the next round if the previous round is still in the barrel. The loader takes a prepared mortar round and inserts it with the stabilizing fin into the muzzle down to the bourrelet and lowers it into the barrel smoothly, without jolting. The rear ogival section of the mortar presses against the safety mechanisms, which click into the "Closed" position. If the loader makes a mistake, the safety will not allow a second round into the barrel.

The question automatically arises: How is it fired if the bore is covered by the safety mechanisms? It turns out that, when the mortar is fired, a small portion of the powder gases exit ahead of the mortar round and force the safety mechanisms open, clearing the bore for the mortar round.

On the whole, the 120-mm mortar has high performance characteristics, allowing it to be used successfully in various types of modern battle.

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Tank Battalion Commander: Training Problems Persist Despite Perestroika

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian,
29 Apr 89 Second Edition p 1*

[Maj. V. Sitnikov, Tank Battalion Commander: "Counterattacking on ZILs"]

[Text] Noticeable changes are occurring in the routine of the troops in connection with perestroika. Even in a field so little susceptible to change as combat training, the new growth of democratization has begun to force its way up. The men seem to have become emancipated, and have actively joined in the quest for ways to resolve urgent problems. Of course we found at once that we still do not know how to do many things. However, this "discovery" only mobilizes us to even more serious work.

It seems to me that we have also begun to depart somewhat from cliché in exercises. Nevertheless I must admit that I personally am not completely certain that we will succeed in getting rid of it entirely in the short term.

Judge for yourself. Granted, earlier in the organization of the attack—and it is precisely to this that I pay special attention—operations generally took place on registered lines and axes, according to a standard scheme (attacking, repelling, counterattacking, pursuing, etc.) Now you might say the same thing is done in defensive training. The commanders have begun to dispose their subunits in familiar, to some degree even homelike positions. Sometimes the trainees need only slightly renovate their foxholes, touch up their trenches and camouflage. And the scenario of operations is also known ahead of time: march, shift to the defense, engineer "preparation" of positions, repelling of attack of enemy tanks and infantry, counterattack.

But let us consider: in a real battle can we lay out everything so neatly, when it is a question of surprise, drastic changes in the situation, the dynamics of action of the sides? You might say to me that it is precisely the expansion of independence of commanders in the organization of the training process that is envisaged by the new training program, that it gives scope to creativity and initiative. I will not argue. But at the same time there are all sorts of guardians who continue to stand over the commander and do not allow him to take one step independently. For example, in preparation for an exercise he is often forced to report several times how he will negotiate obstacles, in what axis he will counterattack, in which direction he will fire. Let there be no improvisation. Otherwise you will be accused of incompetence and neglect of safety precautions.

More than once I have had occasion to observe our foremost commanders, Majors V. Karayev and P. Makarenko, apply a progressive method of integrating drills in practice. I am convinced that their work is worthy of attention. However even these officers ultimately cannot rid themselves of the burden of cliché, since they are limited to working solely with subordinate subunits: the involvement of other subunits in the drills is up to higher staffs. Everyone understands that integration may bring maximal benefit only with involvement of personnel from different arms in the drills, for example, engineers, signal troops, chemical specialists, and so forth. Nevertheless commanders can organize combat training in this way only after receiving the corresponding permission "from above", and that is precisely what is very hard to get.

And another "however" which negatively affects the quality of combat training of tank troops. The program of combat training demands that the battalion conduct tactical exercises on their organic equipment. But what do we have? We have begun to introduce into practice not only company, but even battalion exercises using

training tanks assembled from the entire regiment. And such equipment, as is known, breaks down more frequently, and at times in an exercise we have to spend more time on repairs than on tactics.

The ban on using combat equipment in our units has resulted in platoons practicing tactical problems only by the method of "walking through tank movements", contrary to the combat training program. Indeed, such questions as camouflage of combat equipment, combating the air enemy, electronic jamming equipment, and preparation of night firing data are completely omitted. Very often, in order to practice subjects provided for by the plan, the commanders must resort to various dodges, and even relaxations of demands. To the point of oddities. On one of the exercises in our battalion, for example, the company operating in the second echelon moved to the counterattack line on ZILs. Circumstances related to the shortage of training vehicles forced us to undertake this "innovation". Simply amazing: on the one hand, we are reducing forces, we plan to convert tanks into tractors for the domestic economy, and on the other we suffer from a shortage of training equipment...

I have only touched on some of the problems associated with restructuring in combat training. But in fact there are very many. And if we seriously want to maintain course toward qualitative parameters of combat readiness, then first of all we should think about how to more quickly eliminate "bottlenecks", give the men an opportunity truly to show their independence, and provide them with everything necessary to resolve their assigned tasks.

Combat Training Officer on Forthcoming Drill Regulations

18010649a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel P. Poloz, Senior Officer of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Grounds Forces by a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "How We Will Be in Drill"]

[Text] The draft of the new Drill Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces has been prepared. In the near future it will be sent to the troops for discussion. Our correspondent met with a senior officer of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the USSR Ground Forces, Colonel P. Poloz.

[Correspondent] Pavel Pavlovich! What is wrong with the present Drill Regulations, why the need to prepare a new one?

[Poloz] It has already been 14 years since the ratification of the present Drill Regulations. The troops have accumulated some experience in drill training in this period, and there have been changes in their organizational-staff structure, equipment level, uniform, and personal gear.

Demands on the maintenance of combat readiness and the state of military discipline have been raised. Finally, we must also allow for the fact that drafts of the other combined-arms regulations have been developed... All this has made it necessary to bring the Drill Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces in accord with reality and practical demands.

Some time ago a request was sent to the staffs of formations and units and the relevant institutions and organizations for suggestions on the nature of the changes in the structure and the content of the future regulations. This draft was prepared on the basis of the data received.

It eliminates those provisions, techniques, and commands that are used rarely or not at all in troop practice. The changes also affected some terminology, while the section on military rituals has been supplemented and new illustrations have appeared. We believe that elements of drill proficiency have been brought closer to the requirements of tactical training. For example, techniques that no longer play a substantive role in it have been eliminated. On the other hand, the draft of the new regulations has been supplemented, for instance by provisions aimed at raising the prestige of the NCO staff, and the duties of the command before and during formation have been clarified...

[Correspondent] Are there any provisions in the regulations now that are controversial, or that you yourself perceive as ambiguous. Or is this a tribute to fashion—discussing and ensuring glasnost?

[Poloz] We would like an interested discussion of the draft regulations. Today I personally have no unequivocal opinion, for example, on whether or not it is advisable to regulate the methods of movement on the battlefield, or personnel actions in a sudden enemy attack, by the Drill Regulations. Perhaps they should be reflected in the Field Manual. And each side has its own arguments in this regard. We would like to learn the opinion of those who are directly involved in drill training of personnel, including in the system of basic military training.

[Correspondent] How do you plan to conduct the discussion?

[Poloz] The draft of the regulations has been published in a comparatively small printing. But we will send several copies to each formation and military educational institution. In May through August we propose testing its provisions in the course of classes on combat training subjects and in the daily routine of the subunits and units. After collection, synthesis, and analysis of the remarks, additions, and changes that we receive, the draft will be revised by the relevant commission and submitted for approval to the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Mar Avn Yefimov Victory Day Article
18010661a Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 9 May 89 p 1

[Interview with Mar Avn A. Yefimov, deputy USSR minister of defense, commander in chief of the Air Forces, and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, by V. Kiselev, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA correspondent: "Remember the War"]

[Text] *We had already bid farewell. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yefimov moved from behind the table and shook my hand. Suddenly, the corners of his lips curled up sorrowfully: "Now the only thing left is to reminisce. I have finished my flying...."*

Endowed with power over many thousands of people armed with the most modern equipment, he very much missed the absolute subordination of one aircraft which he takes into the air. He himself, personally.

"You see, I am a pilot; I dream of being at the controls of an aircraft until now, it turns out."

"What about the war?" I asked.

"The war, too," he answered after a brief pause.

"From Moscow to the Elbe in a ground attack aircraft feared by the enemy" is the inscription Captain Yefimov left on the wall of the still-smoking Reichstag. He had 222 combat sorties—an incredible figure. According to the horrible front-line statistics, the 22-year-old squadron commander stepped over three deaths and part of a fourth. You see, a ground attack pilot managed to take off no more than 16 times on the average...

[Kiselev] We are celebrating Victory Day again... Aleksandr Nikolayevich, what are you, a front-line soldier, thinking about on this day?

[Yefimov] Every person who has lived through war has an indelible scar. And these are not only scars on the body, but, more horrible perhaps, wounds in the soul. Decades have passed by, but they all do not heal; they bleed and hurt. You recall past experiences, comrades, you bow your head in memory of the fallen. Imagine, only one other person besides myself, out of all the flying personnel of the regiment in which I began fighting, made to Victory Day.

The victory was paid for by incalculable suffering of the people; it was washed by a sea of blood. The USSR's casualties comprised about 38 percent of the total for World War II. We lost twice as many killed than Fascist Germany. Were such a price and so much blood really unavoidable? This is what torments me.

And, of course, in recalling the war, you ask: But did you do everything you could to see that such a thing is never repeated, are you doing everything?

[Kiselev] Columnists and historians are opening and evaluating facts of the Great Patriotic War that were hidden up to now. Often, their opinions are not indisputable. The attitude of people like you, who have personally experienced a great deal, toward the process taking place now is much more interesting.

[Yefimov] There is no such thing as a partial truth, just as there is no such thing as a big or little lie. Either there is truth, or there is not. In taking a close look at the past, we are trying to understand the sources of the victories and the mistakes made and to imagine how events would have developed if certain opportunities had not been missed and incorrect steps had not been taken. We have to hear an opinion—but why stir up the past: What was was, and all of us together cannot turn history back... I am confident that we must know the past in all its unvarnished completeness in order to avoid possibly repeating the mistakes, including those associated with defense.

The events before and during the war can be judged in two ways. Take a position serving to expose something—they say, they overlooked, did not understand, were not oriented. But it is much easier to be smart after the fact. An unbiased analysis based on facts is much more useful.

As a military man, I can say the country was thoroughly preparing for the impending storm. Here are but a few examples from aviation. By the summer of 1941, the number of aircraft had nearly doubled compared to 1939; the number of aviation schools had increased fivefold during the last prewar years; scientific fundamentals of operational-tactical art and combat employment of the Air Forces were developed.

However, we simply did not have time to do more. The same restructuring and technical re-equipping of the Army had only begun to gain momentum. In 1941, we were planning to create 50 new aviation regiments with the most modern aircraft. We managed to create 19.

[Kiselev] Could the Soviet Union meet the enemy in a fitting manner and, if we could not throw him back from the borders and defeat him on his territory, how did they drum it into everyone's head at that time that we could win with few losses?

[Yefimov] That is a very difficult question. In one of his letters, Konstantin Simonov, a writer I respect, places the entire responsibility for the tragic beginning of the war on Stalin. It cost us so many millions of lives and millions of square kilometers of ravaged territory. I would not be so categorical. In talking about the army not being prepared for the war, one must keep in mind a series of miscalculations by not one man but by the top military leadership.

The ominous role of Stalin is absolute in the unprecedented scale of the destruction of military cadres—between 1 May 1937 and 1 September 1938, almost

40,000 top- and mid-level officers of the Red Army were destroyed. It is also known that, on the eve of the war, the general secretary rejected the national defense plan, not agreeing with the arguments of the General Staff that Hitler would make the main strike on the western axis. In the end, he imposed his opinion—we were to wait for the enemy on the southern axis and, consequently, concentrate our forces there. Having come to believe in his own infallibility, Stalin was convinced up to the last that he would be able to delay the war. It was even dangerous to mention that it was approaching. But this, I believe, cannot justify the passiveness of those representatives of the Supreme Command who, possessing information in its entirety about the inevitable attack by Germany—in our age this is difficult to hide—still did nothing to at least mobilize the Army and deploy troops. If this would have been done in a timely manner, it is still not known how the border battles would have ended, but I am confident that Hitler's troops would not have reached Moscow.

There also were serious mistakes in organizational development of the armed forces. The role of aviation was underestimated. It reached the point that, shortly before the war, Mar Timoshenko issued the order that pilots were to be graduated from military schools not as officers, but as sergeants. Those who had managed to receive "peg tops" on their patch, but had not served 3 years yet, were to be sent to the barracks. Such things do not go by without a trace. The organizational structure of the Air Forces was simply anachronistic—flying units were attached to the ground forces and were deliberately assigned a secondary role. We had to reorganize and make up for the mistakes when we were already fighting, at the cost of incredible overstraining of forces and large losses.

From the tactical standpoint, aviation, like the entire army, was caught unawares; some units on the western axis had a high percentage of unserviceable aircraft; and some of the flying personnel were undergoing conversion training. Our airfields were well-known to the fascists. Back before the war, their aerial reconnaissance aircraft had insolently crossed the borders and photographed our defense plan, but Soviet pilots had orders not to shoot them down and not to give cause for provocation. The first strike also hit the airfields. The aircraft with the red star did not have time to take off and burned on the ground. Aviation of the southwestern axis suffered less noticeable losses; without waiting for orders from Moscow, at their own risk they gave the order to depart and disperse.

The remaining aviation forces were not used in the best manner in the first stage. Guderian's tank spear heads broke our defenses and moved on, sweeping away everything in their path, toward the capital. But instead of breaking off the armored spear heads from the air, we flew bombing strikes to somewhere in the vicinity of Warsaw.

Again, we did not have time to upgrade our aircraft. Therefore, the most experienced pilots perished in uneven battles, flying aircraft that were obviously inferior in performance to the German aircraft and with the enemy having a great numerical superiority. But when we began receiving excellent aircraft, we ended up not having anyone to fight in them; young people like myself, who had hardly learned to take off and land properly, arrived at the front. No matter how they protected the green youths, no matter how they tried to pass on their experience before sending them out on the job, the lads perished. It wasn't until 1943 that our aviation finally recovered from the first striking strikes, and we no longer yielded superiority in the air.

[Kiselev] I realize that back then Stalin's authority was unquestionable. But weren't there still some doubts about his infallibility during all the years at the front, wasn't there ground for that?

[Yefimov] When I wrote the book "Nad polem boya" [Over the Battlefield], one military leader reproached me: He said the scale of the events described was painfully modest and that I did not bring up in my memoirs the field airstrip. I objected to him, saying that I was only a captain, essentially a child, and therefore I described what I saw and knew personally. I would begin later on arguing for fronts, but they would not believe me and rightly so.

The same goes for Stalin. Now everyone can name more than enough reasons. But at that time.... What did we know, ordinary people who had endured a lot of grief? We piously believed the leader and linked all successes with his name, but he was miraculously always uninvolved with the failures. Even when we were retreating, we blamed anyone we liked, just not him. Only much later did we understand what an appalling substitution of ideas was taking place. We made one man a symbol of socialism and attributed to him everything that the people were accomplishing at a cost of great suffering and casualties.

Sometimes, some disturbing concern still stirred in the most secret depths of my soul. But I was terrified of my own doubt. In any case, during his life, Stalin never heard any criticism directed toward him. On the contrary, they glorified him too obsequiously. And I was among them. I bitterly recall this. But that was the way it was.

We all were probably under secret control. But, to be honest, we did not notice this. In any case, we did not experience any fear. We were filled with a single desire—to win. This feeling stifled everything else.

[Kiselev] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, in recent years, many have been arguing about a victory monument in Moscow. What is your opinion? Do we need one, and if so, what kind?

[Yefimov] Absolutely, we need it. But a very simple one. The well-known memorials in Kiev and other places do not evoke reverence, but rather different feelings altogether. The monument should depict the harsh existence of wartime. It should tell about the front, about the rear, and about the unity of the entire nation, but should be modest so one wants to bow to the heroes.

It is not just we front-line soldiers who need a victory monument. Above all, the young people need it. The more distant the war becomes, the more the monument will be needed. It is needed as a harsh reminder, a warning, a precept: when thinking about the future, remember the past; when strengthening peace, remember the war.

[Kiselev] Don't you see a contradiction here? Shouldn't we perhaps think first of all about peace when strengthening peace?

[Yefimov] They will not be amused by your good will. But every country must be ready to protect itself from the unexpected, including aggression. Our state needs an army only for defense; the Soviet military doctrine is strictly defensive in nature. But the armed forces are obligated to be at the peak of combat readiness at any moment—this is also one of the lessons of the past war.

Large-scale reductions have begun in the Army and Navy. In the armed forces, for example, the aviation grouping in Mongolia is being virtually completely eliminated, the management apparatus is being reduced considerably, 800 combat aircraft are being removed from the inventory, and there will be fewer military aviation schools. The Soviet unilateral initiative is not simply economy of resources or a redistribution of them, although economic considerations certainly are important, too. Above all, this is implementation of our country's long-term foreign-policy course. The armed forces are given a distinct, non-offensive structure.

The army does not live outside of society, but its deeds and hopes. Perestroyka, which has stirred up the entire country, cannot help but affect aviation, and we also have quite a few problems. Excessive paperwork has swallowed us up, quality often suffers for the sake of quantity, and discipline has gotten out of hand in some places. We talk about this honestly and openly, since we are confident that we will work everything out and have enough strength.

Service as a pilot is not easy, and it requires a full effort to skillfully fly an aircraft packed with electronic and computer equipment; desire alone is not enough. We are introducing a new personnel training system. Schools will open in eight cities for training youths for entrance into aviation schools. The young lads have to master fourth-generation equipment, models of which, the MiG-29 and AN-124, were rated very highly at the International Air Show in Great Britain.

To protect peace and serve under the banners infused with the glory of their fathers and grandfathers, honorably and responsibly. This imposes a high responsibility.

Aviation Mechanics Not Compensated for Health Hazard

*18010495b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Mar 89 First Edition p 1*

[Letter by Senior Lieutenant O. Shirokov: "No Benefits, No Compensations"]

[Text] Dear editors! The specialists in our unit are performing aviation equipment maintenance work while being subjected to ultra-high frequency electromagnetic radiation. The harmful effect of this has an influence on a person's health.

I have learned that benefits are given to employees of the Ministry of Civil Aviation who work with UHF sources: an abbreviated work day, longer leave, a hazardous occupation pension after 8-12 years of work, and free milk.

Then I asked Lieutenant Colonel V. Boykov how work under such conditions is compensated in the Armed Forces. He could not give me any sort of definitive answer. I asked Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Services A. Preobrazhenskiy. He answered that he did not know of any documents that granted military personnel working with UHF sources any benefits.

So I found out nothing, and our specialists are still working, having neither benefits, nor compensation for work on equipment that is much more dangerous than that of the Ministry of Civil Aviation.

Qualitative Parameters: Moscow PVO Training Centers Faulted

*18010495a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Apr 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Major A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Born in Torments"]

[Text] The district placed great hopes on this training center (UTTs). It was believed that it would make it possible to train large unit command post teams with a minimum expenditure of resources, in the most difficult air situation. The centers were seen as the future of combat training in the Air Defense Forces. Today the center has been created, but it is assessed in various ways. Lieutenant Colonel Aleyev, an air defense missile battalion commander, states:

"In five days of exercising at the training center the skill of the battalion officers improved approximately to the level that we reached in the unit in two months. The effectiveness of a training hour is very high. Here we are prepared for everything. We have operable equipment at our disposal, and experienced methodologists work with

us. Moreover, there are no economic works, which at times eat up a whole day, and no details. So I vote strongly in favor of the training center. I always wait impatiently to be called to come here."

And here is the opinion of Colonel T. Gorchakov, Deputy Chief, Combat Training Directorate, Moscow Air Defense District:

"It is too bad that the training center to this day is not equipped with modern training equipment and simulators. It has a lot to give to subunit specialists, but the combat crews of units and large units cannot yet train here. The place is not so equipped."

Colonel V. Kononov, an officer from the Air Defense Forces Main Commissariat, states:

"Not all the problems of the district training center are solvable. It is located in a place where it is virtually impossible to use real flights to create an air situation."

Why such varying assessments of the training center? In order to answer this question, let us familiarize ourselves with the history of its creation. The Air Defense Missile and Radiotechnical Troops came into being on the basis of new equipment at the end of the 1950s. The methods of mastering this equipment also appeared at that time. It was difficult to create an acceptable training material base at the "points," all the more so if it is taken into account that training aids, simulators and electrified stands were supplied in small numbers. Two ways were left. The first was to train right on the combat equipment. The second was to create non-organic training points in the large units and units, where subunits would go from time to time for exercises. Both variants received a green light. In the early 1960s training points appeared. Each year the opinion was more and more affirmed that such "points" were needed as organic entities. In 1976 a corresponding order was promulgated. Several dozen training points were created in the Air Defense Forces. Now officer instructors began to conduct training. The capabilities of the training points increased. However, they were not able to rise to the level of modern training objectives; only subunit crews acquired combat work skills here. Therefore, at the start of the 1980s the Moscow Air Defense District began to create a training center, which would substantially expand the capabilities for training specialists.

"Life itself pushed us to this," stated Lieutenant General of Aviation P. Khatylev, Deputy District Commander for Combat Training. "We posed the task of training not only subunits at the training center, but, parallel to that, training the crews of unit and large unit command posts, and conducting effective comprehensive training drills." What is the training center today? It is a small military installation. On its territory are a barracks, guest house, dining hall, and, naturally a classroom building, the facility for the sake of which all the rest exist. Lieutenant

Colonel S. Krasilnikov, chief of the training center, showed us beautifully equipped classes, with electrified stands, and operating miniature ranges. Training equipment is also located here.

All of this was born, so to speak, in torments. You see, the center was not created from organic resources. Much equipment was purchased with money allotted to the corresponding items for combat training, and a lot had to be "dislodged" in various organizations. But, most strictly speaking, they were not able to bring the idea completely to fruition.

"Look here. A command post complex has been set up in the classroom," Lieutenant Colonel Krasilnikov showed us. "There are no longer such complexes in the forces." Is it possible for us to train the arriving combat crews productively on such a complex? And here radar equipment is set up. The effect from it is the same. It is museum piece; it is not in the inventory."

Later Lieutenant Colonel Krasilnikov showed us a current generation computer, an article of pride at the training center. Unfortunately, so far it is not in operation; its installation is going on. Without it, it is not possible to create a truly complex air situation. The matter is aggravated by the fact that in selecting the site for the training center it was not taken into account that here air flights are virtually prohibited.

In short, the training center, which produces an outward impression, does not work as effectively as its creators would wish. There are numerous difficulties with the manning levels. When the training center was being created, officers from the District Combat Training Directorate put forth proposals about giving the center more complex functions than those of the training points. Based on this they proposed that a corresponding manning level be established. This was so that it would be possible to train the crews, both of subunits, and of unit and large unit command posts. However, in a higher directorate it was decided otherwise. A manning level was determined that was capable merely of maintaining the training equipment in working condition. The argument was that a similar Navy training center had precisely the same number of specialists.

Today, in talking with officers, one hears more and more often the term "the ideology of combat training;" i.e., a definition of what is most important, most essential in the training process. They did not even think about ideology then, and ended up with a kind of half-solution to the problem. This was the reason for all the difficulties. It was why the training center was located in a place where there are few real flights, why the facility lacks modern equipment, and why it does not have the appropriate manning level. The training center is, as we say, neither fish nor fowl.

Today the attitude toward the training center is beginning to change. In a talk with me, Lieutenant General N. Chukarin, Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Combat Training, Air Defense Forces, said that training centers are viewed in the main commissariat [Glavkomat] as a promising element in the training process, and that they will be created in each formation. Last summer the Air Defense Forces Military Soviet approved a special resolution on this question.

The turnabout of the officials toward the training centers is understandable. The need for them is most urgent. Here it will be possible not only to conduct high quality exercises and training of crews, but also to effectively test the combat readiness of crews, from subunit to large unit. "And what is the range for? Combat firing?" The knowledgeable reader will ask. Yes, the range is not to replace the training center. But the missilemen go there infrequently. And here effective control can be exerted without great cost. However, despite the turn toward the training centers that has been noted, their fate is not yet clear. Eight months have passed since the moment the military soviet approved the resolution, and the proposals from the field have just arrived at the main commissariat, and not even all of them. Apparently some considered creation of the training centers a not especially important matter. Thus, in the formations where officers N. Skorokhod and O. Yeysin serve, it was decided that the problem could be successfully resolved without their participation.

That is the attitude. But without a broad spectrum of opinions the optimal decision can hardly be made. For example, the Moscow Air Defense District Combat Training Directorate proposed that the training centers include a training department with a section for programming, monitoring and analysis of the results of the work of the crews; large unit and unit training command posts; support subunits; and a classroom building for conducting exercises. And the manning level would be up to 150 military personnel, including no less than 50 officers. The headquarters of the formation where Officer V. Kolomeyets serves proposed an even larger manning level. And, well grounded arguments were made.

"But I fear," stated Colonel V. Kononov, "that these proposals will seem excessive to some. Won't the officials on whom deciding the matter depends refer for an example to some training facility where the structure is simpler, and the manning level lower? Won't incomplete decisions be made? If this is so, tomorrow combat training in the Air Defense Forces will start to slip."

The situation is not clear with respect to delivery of training equipment. Life requires that the training centers be equipped with air defense missile and radar complexes, produced in a classroom variant. However, up to now this is considered a costly matter. But is it really cheaper to train right on the weapon, especially if they are in operation on alert duty?

The question of the delivery of simulators is even more acute. Colonel S. Kurbatov, a department chief in the District Combat Training Directorate, had this to say:

"If so far no measures have been taken to speed up the production of simulators, then reckon when we will receive them. After all, time is still required for development, and then for series production. And without simulators we simply cannot get by. Talk to people."

Colonel P. Gorchakov was also categorical:

"Here are a few figures for you to think about. One hour of flight on a modern fighter-interceptor costs many thousands of rubles. Several hundred hours of flying time are needed to train a pilot. Multiply it out. Then consider that there are many aviators in a regiment. An impressive figure is obtained. And now let us make this change: We use modern simulators in the course of training. The skill of the pilot will grow more quickly, by approximately a third, with fewer hours of flying time. Moreover, the use of simulators reduces the accident rate."

Why then has the lag in the creation of simulators that has existed for years not been eliminated? I asked this question of Colonel S. Kolganov, who is involved in improving simulator equipment, and spoke to other specialists. The essence of their answers amounts to the following. It is simply not advantageous for industrial enterprises to manufacture simulators. They are not combat equipment, they say. Big money, orders and bonuses will not be obtained. Thus, in particular, the USSR State Prize for simulators was awarded one time, in the mid-1970s. In short, there are no incentives for industry, and from this comes also the notorious residual principle, and stagnation.

It seems to me that the time has come to encourage industry to carry out the state resolutions, and to deliver training models and simulators from the start of production of a weapon. Worldwide practice also bears witness to the benefit of such an approach: Combat equipment is purchased simultaneously with training equipment, and with simulators.

So far the only training center does not meet the requirements placed upon it. Will the training centers being created in the formations meet tomorrow's requirements? This is not an idle question, and requires a serious and thorough answer.

Investigation Into Misassignment of Aviation Mechanics

*18010609 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Colonel N. Mulyar and Lieutenant Colonel S. Levitskiy: "Recounted With Distortions? How People Sometimes React to Criticism"]

[Text] "'Sham' Mechanics" was the title of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel V. Zverev that was published on June 11 of last year. Specialists who are in acute short

supply—aircraft mechanics—were hardly ever at the airfield, the author reported, but were instead working as clerks, mail carriers, and so forth, though they were getting paid for their supposedly highly skilled labor.

Unfortunately, we are unable to report on any specific measures taken since the article appeared, though letters to the editor have included dozens of responses from readers and official documents.

Let us begin with a response to the editors from Air Force Lieutenant General P. Belonozhko, former acting Chief of the Main Staff of the Air Force. He reports that the author, Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Zverev, former chief of the Air Force Finance Service in the Transcaucasian Military District, recounted alleged instances of violations of personnel discipline with distortions. This has been established by an investigation conducted by the Main Staff of the Air Force. It turns out that, as a result of chronic undermanning, the units' commanders have been forced to reassign people from some jobs to others. For example, in the interests of maintaining elementary living conditions, soldiers in the units are assigned to such jobs as stoking furnaces, loading, outfitting training classrooms and Lenin rooms, and so forth. The Army has not and will not have special people to perform these jobs. "Comrade V. A. Zverev failed to illuminate this in his article, something that attests to his poor knowledge of the life and living conditions of the units' personnel and shows that he used the press for purposes of self-promotion, to 'gain' authority. It is desirable and expedient that the editors consult us before publishing articles. We are always in favor of justified criticism in the interests of our job and support the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA..."

Four explanatory documents are attached to the reply.

The first one is signed by Private M. Boldareva: "I began serving in the air regiment's equipment maintenance unit in July 1984... After I passed the tests, I was given a first class proficiency rating... I can provide proof of my proficiency rating as a mechanic..."

The remaining explanatory documents refute Lieutenant Colonel Zverev's article in the same spirit.

So did he distort the state of affairs in an effort to "gain authority"? There were explanatory documents attached to the letter from him that was published. The following one, for example, is from that same Boldareva: "From March 5, 1986, to September 30, 1987, I have been working as a tool maker. I have declined a proficiency rating test because I am not prepared and have not worked in my specialty as a mechanic in an aircraft equipment group. September 30, 1987." Such a comparison of those explanatory documents with the newly arrived ones could be continued.

The editors have also received a letter from the author of "Sham Mechanics" himself (Lieutenant Colonel Zverev is now chief of the inspectorate and Deputy Chief of the Finance Service in the Turkestan Military District): "After I was assigned to a new post, I turned over my duties to Major P. Grabarchuk (he is now a lieutenant colonel), and here's what happened next. Representatives of the Main Staff of the Air Force visited us and, after warning the local commanders, set off to investigate. On their return, the members of the commission announced that the charges were had not been confirmed. Grabarchuk replied that the comrades had come on a 'face-saving' mission, not to investigate the matter objectively..."

In short, the situation demanded that the charges be investigated on site. This is what we have done. A bulky package of documents that confirm numerous violations of financial and personnel discipline in the air units proves that the commission had indeed been on a "face-saving" mission. The following is just one excerpt from a report on an audit of the district Air Force's financial and economic activities that was conducted by Major General V. Kikhtenko, Lieutenant Colonel S. Nezhenets, and others. One is struck by the scale of the monetary losses. Servicewoman M. Soskova was illegally paid 1,384 rubles; O. Derevenskaya, 1,122 rubles; warrant officer S. Klyuyeva, 694 rubles. Again, the list could be continued.

Let us conclude with a "fresher" audit report: "The command of N air unit has failed to comply with the USSR Minister of Defense's ban on the use of servicemen, workers, and office employees for other than their assigned duties. As a result, illegally dispersed wages amounted to 1,363 rubles and 40 kopeks."

No, Lieutenant Colonel V. Zverev did not distort the facts. On the other hand, that he opened the door on the problem—there's no disagreeing with that. Readers write the same.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Pozdeyev and Lieutenant Colonel A. Antonovich, also of the Transcaucasian Military District, report: "Violations of personnel discipline occur constantly in the air units. Many soldiers, though officially registered as aircraft mechanics, are in reality doing completely different jobs, such as equipping training classrooms, printing documents, and building and repairing various facilities."

The letter's authors explain why commanders are sometimes forced to assign a soldier registered as an aircraft mechanic to help a staff typist, thereby diverting the mechanic from maintaining equipment. Last year, the regiment in which Lieutenant Colonel Pozdeyev and Lieutenant Colonel Antonovich serve received almost 12,000 documents, requiring that some 3,000 (!) separate documents be drawn up in response. Numerous volumes have accumulated in the flight group, the party committee, and the line unit.

Guards Lieutenant Colonel S. Yurko of the Kiev Military District believes that the actual state of affairs often forces commanders to assign aircraft mechanics to other than their assigned jobs. Sometimes one-third of a regiment's soldiers are assigned to administrative and support duties. And of all warrant officers and servicemen doing extended service, 15.5% are used as athletes, artists, builders, carpenters, typists, and clerks.

Lieutenant Colonel Yurko proposes that subunits be created for daily duty and administrative and support services and that positions be created in regiments' table of organization for artists, librarians, aviation engineering service dispatchers, and so on, but that we not expose combat subunits or pretend there's no problem.

Colonel V. Grinenko of the Far Eastern Military District offers similar proposals.

Letters from readers also show convincingly that specialists' work time is being relentlessly destroyed by paper-shuffling and by economically unsubstantiated requirements for training facilities, subsidiary farming operations, and "exemplary" garrison upkeep. Or take the organization of internal service again. Within an air regiment—in each squadron or equipment maintenance unit—there are comparatively few personnel, while both duty officers and dutymen are sometimes serving in every subunit.

No, no "kind uncle" is going to look after personnel. If necessary, soldiers will tend the furnace as well as keep the compound in good order. The army teaches any number of useful skills. But when almost all aircraft mechanics are working in the boiler room—can we possibly tolerate that?

Why "hide our heads in the sand"? Let's call specialties by their names, so that the table of organization isn't used to mask deception and a lack of order. For it is clear that the work of an aircraft mechanic and the work of a typist are far from equal. Why, then, is a "typist" paid like a mechanic, and a mechanic with a high proficiency rating at that? Meanwhile, ground service officers are doing the work of the absent mechanics (and without any monetary compensation for performing highly skilled labor). This undoubtedly damages flight safety.

The Main Staff of the Air Force advised us to consult it beforehand about problems that are raised in articles prior to the articles' publication. But that is exactly what we do. With respect to the problem of a negligent attitude toward aircraft mechanics, we obtained not only oral but also written consultations from various Air Force staffs and from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. We reported this to readers on December 11, 1987, in an article entitled "Wanted: Aircraft Mechanics," in the official responses to that article (June 9), and in an article entitled "Accustomed to Stagnation" that appeared last year (July 24).

Responding to the latter article, Colonel General of Aviation V. Shishkin, Chief Engineer of the Air Force, assured readers (September 27 of last year) that soldiers' proposals would be submitted to the commander in chief for consideration. However, we have received no information on the results of that consideration. Meanwhile, there's been no decrease in the number of letters on the subject. And they come from not just the Air Force. Here's a letter that just arrived. Sergeant R. Mustafin, a mechanic from naval aviation, reports that many aircraft specialists play virtually no role in preparing machines for flight.

And so the question remains: How will a way out of this situation be found? For some way out of it is essential if we intend to really accomplish the task of activating qualitative parameters in combat training.

Fuel Economy in Aviation Operations

18010610 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by K. Suponko, entitled: "Such Simple Calculations: Conserving Fuel and the Service Life of Aviation Equipment—An Important Indicator of Flight Proficiency".]

[Text] I read the article "When to Engage Afterburner" by Colonel V. Kopylov published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 8 January with great interest. In all seriousness, the question of fuel conservation in the course of aviation equipment utilization is most topical. I would like to submit my own opinion And suggestions on the subject.

A factor which can be characterized as determining effective aviation fuel utilization during aircraft or helicopters operation is the average flight fuel consumption. This indicator is defined as a quotient of the amount of fuel expended on the ground and in flight over a corresponding calendar period. Moreover, the longer the evaluated period, the more reliable the indicator.

We evaluated a selective number of air regiments over an operational year. As it turns out, the overall results significantly differed among themselves. The average flight fuel consumption was greatest precisely in those locations where fuel shortages occurred as described in Colonel V. Kopylov's article.

In addition, we uncovered other factors as well which contributed to inefficient fuel consumption. First, there was a launching of aircraft with unfilled fuel tanks attached which created surplus aerodynamic drag. Second, there was a deliberate acceleration of fuel consumption through the engagement of higher aircraft engine performance regimes with the afterburner, and prolonged flight in a varied aircraft configuration (through extending flaps or landing gear) in order to permit a faster landing approach.

In those units where the average flight fuel consumption was high, a drop in the level of reliable aircraft engine performance was also apparent. They were removed more often from operational use ahead of schedule, before reaching an established service life due to failures or damage. Two causes explain this. In the first place, the fuel amount used by the aircraft engine is an actual equivalent of its performance output, and it determines the effect that thermal and dynamic loads have on subsystems and components. The longer and heavier the loads are on parts and equipment, the faster they go down. Second, one of the basic factors leading to an increased average flight fuel consumption due to organizational deficiencies. This leads to a greater probability of damage to the engines from foreign objects on the airfield which are ingested into the intake elements. In this way, added fuel consumption in the process of aviation equipment utilization leads to a directly increased consumption not only of fuel, but also in aircraft engine replacements.

I would like to point out that a comprehensive review of flight missions is a factor that, in addition to saving fuel, also promotes the conservation of aviation equipment service life. As a matter of fact, a comprehensive review of flight missions is accompanied by a reduction in the number of aircraft landings, aircraft engine startings, and in decreased ground running of the engine.

Saving fuel and the service life of aviation equipment is an important state mission. All aviators are responsible for it: pilots, navigators, political workers, mechanics, and rear service technicians. For an objective evaluation of results achieved in this area, we recommend the use of those criteria we have cited—the average flight fuel consumption, computed along with the unit and subunit evaluation factors for activity during training periods.

In our opinion, the ability of air crews to carry out flight missions with a reasonable expenditure of fuel and of equipment service life also reflects their proficiency levels.

We support the opinion of Colonel V. Kopylov on the need to grant commanders of aviation regiments the right to use some of the fuel saved to encourage those aviators who excel most in this area. This would create a genuine material basis for reinforcing activities to conserve fuel and equipment service life.

Another author has also written on this subject. He is Colonel V. Filipov.

Design, Performance, Maintenance Costs of Su-27
18010634 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 89 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel V. Moroz: "Su-27: The Aircraft and the People"]

[Text] I climbed up to the cockpit of the two-seater aircraft together with Colonel Sulambek Oskanov. The steps were steep: the Su-27 is taller than other fighters.

With all its harmonious compactness, it is appreciably larger in size than the MiG-29 standing next to it. The new fighter also differs in its paint: it is not camouflaged in green earth colors, but is white and blue like the July sky. A bright company emblem on one of the tail fins gives the Sukhoy a special smartness.

"A first-class machine always turns out to be beautiful and convenient to operate," says Sulambek Susarkulovich. "With its high combat qualities, the Su-27 is simple to fly. Many of our pilots mastered it without waiting for the two-seater. They studied up on the theory and then it was into the sky."

Colonel Oskanov's assessments are authoritative. He has qualified at the rating of military sniper-pilot for over ten years. He is a master of sport in expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers in jet aircraft. He has mastered practically all types of fighters to perfection, including those of the fourth generation—the MIG-29 and Su-27.

Sulambek Susarkulovich tells about the Sukhoy's merits with obvious satisfaction: a fly-by-wire control system with quadruple redundancy; a thrust-to-weight ratio permitting loops and Immelmans to be executed both at low and high altitudes; ten external stations for suspending weapons; a superb view from the cockpit; and a surprisingly soft landing because of a good wing, which creates an air cushion.

"Both experienced and young pilots have fallen in love with the little crane," says Oskanov with a smile.

I already knew this.

"Flying in the Su-27 is a joy," said Major Yuriy Vinyar, the deputy air squadron commander for political affairs, the day before. "I even take g-loads in this aircraft easier than in others."

"In air-to-air combat a person can devote more attention to tactics," says Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Mashkin, sharing his impressions. "If you unintentionally cross the threshold of what is permissible in maneuvering, the Su-27 will help you out and correct the error. It has a mode threshold limiter, the pilot's friend and ally."

Yevgeniy Viktorovich also related that one of the most remote, border Air Force garrisons always had experienced a pilot shortage. The flying strength filled out immediately when it became known that the Sukhoy interceptor was going there.

Major Albin Ziziko, who has a propensity for theory, convincingly described the Su-27 in his own way. With pencil in hand he showed that a pilot was capable of getting the maximum from this fighter that designers had put into it and that the interceptor's potential was still far from exhausted.

Each of my companions invariably mentioned a quality of the Sukhoi to which it is especially difficult to get accustomed—the long flight range and endurance. No other fighter, neither one of our own nor a foreign one, will compete with the Su-27 in this respect. Is it necessary to explain what gives the interceptor the capability of lengthy patrolling in the air?

The Su-27's high characteristics are achieved through the application of the most advanced technologies. New aluminum and titanium alloys, steel, composite materials, and the use of welded load-bearing units permitted making the airframe light and strong. There are many fundamental innovations in this aircraft's aerodynamics.

Foreign sources, particularly the Anglo-American "Jane's" weapons yearbook, call the Su-27 the equivalent of the F-15 fighter. Does the word "equivalent" wound our self-esteem in this case? I believe not. The F-15 Eagle is the pride not only of the firm of McDonnell Douglas, but also of all American aircraft construction. This fighter, very costly even under western standards, was especially designed to achieve air superiority and really has been given high combat performance characteristics. Only our P-42 aircraft, which is close to the Su-27 in specifications, succeeded in taking five world records for rate of climb away from the F-15: for 3, 6, 9, 12 and 15 km.

"The bad news for NATO," wrote the journal INTERAVIA the year our interceptor appeared at military airfields, "is that the Su-27 aircraft codenamed Flanker' is potentially the world's most capable fighter. This is not surprising, since the Flanker' is becoming operational only now, ten years after the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, the most closely comparable western aircraft. This new aircraft of the Sukhoi firm is a remarkable aircraft."

Just one thing can be added to this: news of the appearance of the F-15 also was disturbing for us at one time, the more so as this aircraft is excellently adapted for delivering bombing strikes.

We called the F-15 a costly aircraft, but how does the Su-27 appear in this sense? It too is not much less expensive. It is impossible to make an aircraft which has tens of very sophisticated electronic systems inexpensive.

"But at times fewer funds go into creating an aircraft than are required for its subsequent maintenance," said Mikhail Petrovich Simonov, general designer of the Experimental Design Bureau imeni P. O. Sukhoi in a conversation. "Experience confirms that many of the people's rubles can be saved in the maintenance process."

Mikhail Petrovich is a fervent adherent of aircraft servicing. Time periods and costs of repairs will be reduced significantly if industry will establish regional servicing centers (and such experience is being accumulated),

assume responsibility for restoring damaged aircraft and engines that have been disabled, and establish the closest working contacts with unit engineers and technicians. It will be possible to relieve unit depots of excessive supplies which often no one needs and to restore aircraft combat readiness faster.

Later Colonel General Aviation Viktor Mikhaylovich Shishkin, the Chief Engineer of the Air Force, spoke about the same thing. He emphasized that aircraft maintenance ideology is changing along with the appearance of fourth-generation aircraft. A principle to which aviators are so accustomed is fading into the past: when an assembly has used up the service life in hours established for it, immediately remove it, replace it with a new one and send the old one to a repair enterprise regardless of cost. Today such an approach is unacceptable.

Reflecting on the subject of cost economics, Viktor Mikhaylovich cited with bitterness the fact that several hundred unclaimed AL-7 engines, used in second-generation aircraft, are being stored at one of the plants. Such aircraft are becoming fewer and fewer and it is not always possible to use the spare engines for them in the national economy. The new approach to aircraft maintenance consists of henceforth not allowing miscalculations in establishing circulating holdings. Here too specialists of the aviation engineering service find full mutual understanding with the Su-27's creators. Never before has cooperation in this sphere been so close and productive.

Just why did the costly Su-27 prove to be very economical to maintain? What design characteristics of the aircraft dictated this? Specialists of the Saturn Scientific Production Association [NPO], which supplied the fighter with two superb AL-31 F engines, helped me understand this. By the way, this is a prototype of the turbojet bypass engine created by the engine building firm whose fame is indivisible from the name of designer and academician A. M. Lyulka.

"Our engine has a modular design," said Viktor Mikhaylovich Chepkin, NPO general designer. "To put it more simply, it consists of separate, interchangeable units. It is unnecessary to replace the engine if damage, which is impossible to remedy by local repairs, occurs. It is sufficient to change the unserviceable module. This is done right here at the airfield under field conditions. Last year around 85 percent of engines which were damaged because foreign objects got into them and over a third which malfunctioned for other reasons were repaired directly in the units. Much has become a commonplace, everyday matter among the troops, such as, for example, the replacement of compressor blades. Experience in replacing modules also is being gradually accumulated."

As confirmation, Viktor Mikhaylovich shows a telephone message received a quarter-hour ago. Major General Aviation A. Dvornikov, Chief Engineer of Air

Defense Aviation, reported that a low-pressure compressor module had been replaced on an Su-27 in one of the regiments. The aircraft had been given a post-maintenance check flight and there had been no adverse comments. Previously specialists of the firm's warranty teams and regimental engineers and technicians could not assume responsibility for such a serious repair operation. The engine would be sent off on a long journey, and if it returned, it would be many months later. Transportation expenses alone amounted to tens of thousands of rubles.

"It is true," continued the general designer, "that we also do not relieve ourselves of responsibility for any repair among the troops. Our concern is to teach people in the units, certify them for performing complex operations during field repair, inspire confidence in abilities and knowledge, and supply them with necessary equipment."

Representatives of the firm travel to Air Force garrisons not at all as designers supervising the quality of maintenance on their creation, but for joint work. I was convinced. Aleksandr Petrovich Smirnov, Deputy Chief Designer of the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni P. O. Sukhoy; Pavel Semenovitch Taraban, Chief of the Saturn NPO flight test and maintenance department; and his colleagues Yevgeniy Sergeyevich Vorobyev and Vladimir Alekseyevich Nikolayev are well known at military airfields: known and respected. These people spend a large part of their lives on TDY trips and are infinitely dedicated to aviation. And Reserve Colonel Nikolay Vladimirovich Kaplyushnyy, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Mikhaylovich Voynalovich, and Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Lev Stepanovich Savostyanov removed their shoulderboards quite recently and for them the airfield is their native element.

Someone with whom I was talking called the modern aircraft engine a work of art. I believe he is not far from the truth. I held in my palm a 90 gram turbine blade that in a roaring engine withstands a centrifugal force of 10 tons and is as white-hot as the filament in a powerful electric bulb. The heat-resistant alloy would not withstand the tortures of temperature if the monolithic piece of metal did not have an internal "radiator," unique capillaries for removing heat. The thought flashed through my mind that one does not need the entire engine; this blade alone is sufficient to judge fairly the level of modern technology and the achievements of scientific-technical progress.

And if we sometimes have difficulty competing with the West in the sphere of production know-how, especially in a series flow, we have the right to be proud of a great deal in the sphere of technical ideas and engineering developments. This includes being proud of the Su-27 fighter-interceptor and its AL-31 F engines.

For the first time—and this is something new for our aviation—engine service life is coming up to that of the aircraft. In contrast to its older brothers, the AL-31 F is

maintained according to technical condition. The time indicators which previously played the deciding role now have only a secondary control significance. The engine will live and take the aircraft up as long as it is serviceable. A modern level of diagnosis will ensure flight safety.

The Saturn NPO has done much to facilitate and simplify engine servicing. Many operations simply were eliminated as being useless. Here is an eloquent detail: the maintenance requirement cards prescribed by the GOST [State Standard] for engine servicing ordinarily make up several weighty volumes. Just try to get set up with them on a windy airfield. The cards for servicing engines of the Su-27 fighter were placed in a booklet which can be carried in a coverall pocket. It does not contain directions such as "Take such-and-such a wrench," rather there is a symbol such as D-9. This means that the necessary tool is stored specifically in that pocket of the flight bag. I am telling about details in the knowledge that such an approach is acceptable not just for aviation.

An endoscope approximately the very same as physicians have is actively used in diagnosing the aircraft engine. The firm equipped it with a measuring device. Now it is possible not only to locate a tiny dent or jag on that same blade, but also to quickly determine its metric dimensions. Mothballing and demothballing are done in a new way on the AL-31 F: it has been greatly simplified. The so-called group set has been reduced: it now includes only what is really required, and required frequently. Much of this originated not at the firm itself, but was suggested by aviation unit engineers and technicians. It is an interesting fact that NPO General Designer V. Chepkin paid officers monetary compensation for the most valuable innovative suggestions from the troops. I think he will be able to explain things with the financial inspectors.

Major General Aviation Anatoliy Vasilyevich Ivanov, Chief of the Maintenance and Troop Repair Directorate, told me in the Air Force Staff: "Close cooperation with the designers of the Su-27 provides not only a substantial gain for combat readiness and a serious economic effect; the people themselves are being transformed. Specialists in the regiment cease to be timid with the equipment and receive greater satisfaction from their very complicated and difficult work. At the side of the Su-27 they really feel themselves to be engineers, technicians and mechanics."

"Almost all our specialists have visited units possessing the Su-27," said Saturn NPO Deputy General Designer Nikolay Mikhaylovich Menn, sharing his observations in turn. "Even the material-strength engineers and, one can say, the pure mathematicians. They returned with some kind of gleam in their eyes. They saw pilots and aircraft specialists capable even today of mastering that which

we have for now in the mock-up sections and which is trying its voice on the test beds. They saw that it is possible to rely on the first link in the pilot-aircraft system."

The first link... With what warmth the aircraft builders mentioned the names of military aviators, officers P. Shereshev, A. Krendelev, A. Krutilin, V. Mamashvili, V. Kaminskiy, A. Pokrova and many, many others. Rapid mastery of the Su-27, a very sophisticated aircraft, would be problematic without their selfless labor.

An article on an aviation topic in one of the relatively old issues of a foreign journal is prefaced by the title: "NATO—Quality, Warsaw Pact—Quantity." That is arrogant and unobjective: the West always had more combat aircraft and helicopters, especially attack helicopters, than we did. But in a more recent issue of the same journal the title above an article about our aviation had been transformed: "Both Quantity and Quality?" The question mark at the end is like an eyebrow raised in surprise. It makes sense if, concerned for reasonable sufficiency of our defense and the improvement of its technical base, we place stress on qualitative parameters. And we hide this from no one.

Pilot Training: Key to Air Combat Success

18010661b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 May 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by V. Menitskiy, Hero of the Soviet Union and distinguished test pilot of the USSR: "Flying Skills: The Key to Victory. Notes of a Test Pilot"]

[Text] It is possible that my assertion will seem somewhat strange to some people. Especially since KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has more than once called tactics the key to victory in the air. Is this a paradox or not? I do not think so. I will cite interviews with marshals of aviation I. Kozhedub, Ye. Savitskiy, A. Silantyev, and other famous front-line pilots. The all contended that flying skills were the core of their training and the basis of their success in air battles. But how do things stand with flying skills today? And what is our role as test pilots in teaching this art of air combat to the personnel of fighter aviation?

Modern aircraft systems, particularly MiG-type fighters, which proved their competitiveness at the International Air Show in Great Britain last fall, have made a good showing in aviation units of the Air Forces. But the following must be said here. Fourth-generation aircraft systems are equipped with efficient armaments and electronic equipment, and are capable of carrying out a wide range of missions day and night, and in instrument weather conditions. The growing capabilities and complexity of the aircraft, in turn, place increasingly higher demands on the people flying them. In the units we have encountered this problem: many aviators do not perceive the demands the new equipment is placing on them!

In my view, the high professionalism of every worker is the most important element of the ongoing perestroika. The closer one is in contact with the unique expensive equipment, the immeasurably higher the demands on his professional skills must be. Our people must be confident that the equipment, which they have built with their labor and which has cost the state millions of rubles, is in safe hands.

An aircraft forgives no one for superficiality and conceit. Having mastered more than 50 types of aircraft, I can state that the basis of training today, just as during the Great Patriotic War, is aircraft handling and performance training. And it must be instilled from beginning instruction, that is, from cadet flights. The initial perception of aerobatic maneuvers by the young organism is the strongest and most profound, and skills are developed more rapidly and learned more firmly.

Modern close-in air-to-air combat assumes maneuvers at maximum positive G forces and angles of attack, in the full range of flight speeds and altitudes. This is not mastered on the spur of the moment.

I have heard this question many times: Were many aircraft shot down from expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers? To be persuasive, opponents emphasize that the sighting system of the modern fighter makes it possible to execute a rear-hemisphere attack, let's say, at long ranges; therefore, it is sufficient to master the aircraft's electronic equipment for victory in air combat.

Let us talk about this in more detail. First of all, veterans can confirm that in shooting down enemy aircraft more often from simple maneuvers, they themselves managed to avoid the return fire only by using advanced aerobatic maneuvers. As a rule, they did this by using "feints," which were not written down in any instructions. Secondly, in a detailed approach to modern air combat, you can be sure that it will certainly involve many elements of expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers and use of the maximum capabilities of the aircraft, that is, of course, if the mission is to win without leniency. I will explain more specifically.

The attack begins with detection of the target. But in order to get a "lock-on" of the enemy in the sight and remain unnoticed or break up acquisition on his part (air-to-air combat is not a game of giveaway!), the fighter must be able to execute a flight at low altitudes at maximum and minimum speeds, and abruptly change direction and speed. Such maneuvering involves flying at near-maximum conditions and requires great skill.

But now the enemy is detected and "locked-on" in the sight, you can launch the missile. At this time the warning station onboard your fighter informs you that the enemy is already opening fire. An energetic maneuver is necessary to win in a duel situation after simultaneous launching of missiles. And in this situation, the

maximum positive G forces may be sustained. A maneuver such as rotating the aircraft around a longitudinal axis with maximum positive G forces, for example, may help you avoid getting hit by the missile.

Now imagine that all this is taking place over water or a desert, in the clouds or at night, and it will become clear that only the pilot with sound skills aircraft handling training can maintain spatial orientation and efficiently control his actions in executing such maneuvers.

I remember several instances when pilots, involved in working with the sight in an air battle, ended up in a difficult situation when they were unable to assess it competently. The consequences were grave in some of the situations. What are the causes? It turned out that in the flight practice of military pilots 1st class Maj Kh. Muratov and Maj S. Yuzvishin, for example, aircraft handling training was weak back upon graduation from the military school. In addition, the ban that existed at that time on advanced aerobatic maneuvers obliterated what was left of their skills. They are efficient at finding the "fall guy." It's always the same. He is usually the pilot or his current commander. But I do not believe that we can blame them alone for what happened. The system itself for training combat pilots already assumed the appearance of this dangerous situation. You do not have to be an astute psychologist to understand that even sounds and stable skills break down without training. The trouble was that none of the big chiefs wanted to admit this during those "stagnant" times. Now, too, at times we fight for flight safety using the principle of that grandmother who said: "Fly, my little son, carefully—lower and quieter." You will not fly far with such an approach to combat training before you kiss the ground.

Without a doubt, emphasis on winning also assumes a pilot's high level of tactical training. More precisely—it poses the problem of integrating tactics and flying skills. Test pilots at the Experimental Design Bureau imeni A.I. Mikoyan regularly visit line units and study how aviators are mastering the equipment and how they are improving tactics taking into account the capabilities of the aircraft system. We see that in the units where they underestimate the role of flying skills and approach tactics like a reader and in a trite manner, the results of combat training are low. Unfortunately, these shortcomings are not always the result of commanders' being afraid of departing from the usual patterns. From my own experience I have been convinced many times: A new maneuver and tactical techniques originate directly in combat, being the fruit of improvisation. But improvisation is the result of a creative approach to the problem, and indepth knowledge of the subject and aircraft handling skills are always the basis of creativity.

In demonstrating at units the behavior of the aircraft at extreme conditions, I saw how interested the pilots were. And in the places where they are constantly improving aircraft handling training, mastery of the new aircraft is proceeding effectively. Knowing the capabilities of the

combat aircraft strengthens their confidence in themselves and gives impetus to creativity. Many pilots themselves have suggested tactical maneuvers, using something new in the behavior of the fighter. They are even no longer frightened by its negative aspects, such as stalling, which incidentally was also employed by front-line pilots in air battles. Such experience is being successfully employed in combat training in the units where officers V. Longvinenko, V. Basov, and A. Gunko are stationed. During exercises, they have more than once used their non-standard actions to put the simulated enemy on the spot.

I would like to dwell on moral and psychological training. This is a factor that has a significant effect on aircraft handling skills and the safe outcome of any flight.

High moral and psychological qualities do not just come by themselves. They are instilled. But this work bears positive fruit only for an aviator who thoroughly knows and has fully mastered the equipment. Expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers in their full range, including extreme conditions and air-to-air combat, forces a pilot to constantly monitor the dynamics of the rapidly changing flight parameters and the mutual positions of the opposing aircraft. The situation requires instantaneous reaction both in assessing what is taking place and in response actions. Without a doubt, this increases a pilot's readiness for actions in special instances and other difficult situations.

A complicated maneuver always inspires a pilot and raises his psychological tone. You must see the emotional state of a combat pilot after he has been successful. He develops a confidence that, when he gets into a critical situation, he knows how to act. For example, in familiarizing pilots with the behavior of the MiG-29 at high angles of attack, we directed their attention to use of the pitch control channel in a critical situation in full range. Two pilots, having used this technique, were able to save their lives and the aircraft after they found themselves in what seemed to be a hopeless situation when flying at low level.

In a combat, such situations will be encountered much more often. A sense of confidence will help a pilot improvise more boldly and in a timely manner in air-to-air combat, maintaining self-control and a clear head.

True, safety can be achieved by using bans, but this safety is illusory, resulting in sad consequences in the end. The bitter experience of bans has more than once placed military pilots in a difficult situation. It is a pity that even now they sometimes have to reprove obvious truths. There is no doubt that mastering flying skills is a difficult and thorny path. However, it is the only path to perfection of equipment mastery, the key to flight safety, and the basis of victory in air-to-air combat. Almost all pilots understand this, but, unfortunately, not all commanders share their point of view. They command

subunits and units, being prisoner to old concepts. Such commanders oversimplify tasks in all kinds of ways, teach subordinates to fly over the usual routes and made strikes from simple types of maneuvers, trying in this way to reduce the number of near-accident situations in the air. By doing this, they train pilots not to be creative and do not develop their ability to act in extreme conditions.

In working closely with the Combat Training Directorate of the Air Forces, I must admit that Col Gen Avn A. Borsuk, his subordinate officers V. Kashirov, O. Derzhavin, P. Chernyy, and others are working hard to introduce flying skills into the summer training of line units. Moreover, I cannot understand the shortsighted position of individual commanders in outlying areas

who, covering up their actions with lofty statements about increasing combat readiness and the proficiency ratings of flying personnel, relegate flying skills to the background. Outwardly, everything appears fine—report documents are filled with high proficiency ratings of pilots, but for some reason no one gives a thought to the fact that among them there are pilots who are potential causes of near-accident situations in the air, since only flying skills can help them truly master the aircraft.

My works may appear to be slogans, but again and again I will not get tired of repeating: If commanders, on whom the combat training of aviators depends, will think not about their positions and ranks, but about bringing up combat pilots oriented on winning, they will do an exceptionally beneficial deed.

Design Flaws, Rescue Effort, Media Coverage of Submarine Sinking

*18010636 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko: "Check the Compartments. Epilogue to the Loss of a Soviet Nuclear Submarine."]

[Text]It is two weeks since that day, April 7, when a torpedo-armed nuclear submarine caught fire and sank in the Norwegian Sea. A large part of the crew died, and the boat itself was lost. The pain of loss is sharp and heavy; the entire country felt the deaths of the submariners as a personal bereavement. But the time has come, speaking the language of the submariners, to check the compartments, to try to answer the questions that inevitably arise.

Enough has already been said of the main and basic thing: the crew of the sunken submarine, both the survivors and the dead, showed courage and heroism in the course of the struggle for the boat's survival, genuine military comradeship and mutual assistance.

The command post and the staff of the Northern Fleet took all possible measures to rescue the personnel of the sunken submarine Komsomolets.

Those rescued expressed special thanks to the navy pilots. And first of all to the crews of the aircraft commanded by Majors G. Petrogradskikh and V. Votintsev. The surviving submariners asked that a meeting be arranged with the pilots at the hospital last Saturday. Participants included the commanding general of the Northern Fleet Air Forces, Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Deyneka, and Military Council Member and Chief of the Air Forces Political Department MajGeneral of Aviation V. Pupynin.

Said Lieutenant General of Aviation Deyneka at the hospital, "We applied all resources, all forces at our disposal. Rescue planes and helicopters were in readiness to take off. But since the accident occurred in a remote region of the sea, for greater effectiveness we decided to use IL-88 antisubmarine aircraft, which can stay aloft a long time. I have often been asked why seaplanes were not used. They simply could not have landed there. With level 2-3 seas, as there were at the time, the crew of the seaplane would have died too, and the mission would not have been accomplished."

We will return again to the specifications and performance characteristics of the M-12 seaplane. But now let us recall at least briefly how the fleet naval aviators performed in the air.

The crew of Major Petrogradskikh's aircraft, which was the first to take off, had been ordered to find the submarine in distress, to establish communications with it, to guide the nearest ships to it, and then subsequently play the role of relay between fleet headquarters and the

submarine. Only by virtue of the experience and art of Major Petrogradskikh was it possible, after descending below the clouds, to reach the drifting submarine.

"There were around eight men on the bridge", recalled Major Petrogradskikh in a conversation with me. "A wisp of smoke rose from the hull at one place. Reports were reassuring: we are extinguishing the fire, we do not need assistance. When, quite unexpectedly, the boat began to sink, we were some distance away from it, guiding surface ships toward it. Rushing back to drop rescue containers, we drove the aircraft as hard as possible—any faster and its wings would have come off."

I am still amazed that the surviving submariners spent almost one and a half hours in water at a temperature of just plus 4 or 5 degrees. In the medical service of the Northern Fleet, they showed me a document that clarifies which of the sailors was where when the rescuers approached. Twenty-two men were taken from the raft, four were pulled from the water, and one, Warrant Officer V. Slyusarenko, was found after he was thrown from the rescue chamber (VSK). And here is a peculiarity that the doctors noted: there were fewer negative consequences to the survivors who were in the water than to those on the raft. This is because the air temperature was lower than the water temperature, just plus 2-3 degrees, and there was also a wind.

Along with the survivors, the bodies of nineteen dead submariners were also taken to the main fleet hospital. The youngest of them were Petty Officer 2nd Class S. Golovchenko, seamen A. Grundulyo, V. Kulapin, and R. Filiplov, who were little more than twenty. The eldest was Senior Warrant Officer Mikhail Anatolyevich Yelenik, who was 47... However fast the help arrived, for many it came too late.

"We have insufficient experience in overcoming and in studying the consequences of serious hypothermia of the human organism", said the acting deputy chief of the fleet medical service, Col of Medical Service V. Telpov, who did much to organize comprehensive medical assistance to the rescued submariners. "And now the doctors are faced with the difficult task not only of returning as many surviving crew members of the submarine to service, but also of doing some scientific work in the interests of medicine."

The incident in the Norwegian Sea became, in addition to all else, another serious test of the readiness of our society to pursue the proclaimed policy of glasnost. Indeed it hard to imagine that the particulars of the loss of a modern combat ship would have been covered so widely and openly just a few years ago. This was not entirely habitual, even for us journalists.

Incidentally, the first meeting of journalists with representatives of the State Commission for Press Contacts was more than a little disappointing. A pre-prepared

half-page text was read, and it was strongly recommended that we not go beyond the framework of the text. "So much for glasnost", was the impression we later shared with one another. But in just a day or two the restrictions were lifted, and quite an impressive stream of information appeared on the pages of the newspapers.

Regarding this stream. In reports of various mass media one sometimes encountered contradictions and different readings. Indisputably, journalists should operate only with checked and established facts and information. But errors and imprecisions in operational materials occurred not least of all because there was no official, documented information of even the main factors of the struggle of the submariners for survival of the ship, the rescue operation, etc. But you know, the State Commission already had the relevant data at the time.

We recall that the TASS report of the emergency and the loss of the submarine and of the human victims did not name the specific ship in any way. But how many nuclear submarines do we have, and how many sailors, petty officers, warrants, and officers serve on them? And how many family members and friends do they have? So many thousands of relatives and simply acquaintances of the nuclear submariners read the few lines of the official report in terror: is this boat "ours"? Why not at once give at least the name of the commander?

Naturally the tragedy in the Norwegian Sea aroused concern and sympathy in other countries, especially Scandinavian. This could be seen in the attention of the western mass media to the loss of the submarine. Concern was dictated by the fact that a nuclear-powered ship had sunk, and one that had two torpedoes with nuclear warheads. The opinion of competent specialists and a test analysis of the environment convinces us that there are no grounds for worry in this regard. The sympathy was dictated by the deaths of a large number of sailors. Even here doubts were raised; had we done the right thing, relying solely on our own forces? The facts are most convincing. Neither the boat's commander nor the fleet command could predict that the boat would sink. The crew could not believe it to the last minute. Nor were there foreign ships nearby that could have come to help quickly. Therefore it was natural that the fleet relied on its own forces.

At a funeral gathering, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin said: "We should take all steps to ensure that this is never repeated." Apparently he also had in mind measures to improve the reliability of ship's equipment. And the relevant instructions have already been issued by the State Commission. "We must double, triple efforts to raise equipment reliability", noted the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, I. S. Belousov.

The rapid spread of the fire in the submarine with compartments sealed perhaps indicates that not all ways for fire to spread had been considered in the design and

building of the ship. One of the working assumptions is that the electrical panel in the seventh compartment caught fire.

"All fires on submarines come from electrical panels", I was told by Captain-Lieutenant S. Vochkarev, the commander of a command department on a submarine of the same formation to which the Komsomolets belonged. But if this is so, shouldn't we put automatic fire extinguishers in each panel?

I will not undertake to judge whether electrical panels are the cause of all fires and prerequisites for them on submarines. But the fact that these panels and various electrical packages are an object of concern to submariners is well known. And since at this stage it is impossible to improve their design for some reason, this means it is necessary to take more effective fire safety measures.

I believe that neither the fleet as the customer, the representatives of science employed in the Navy, nor industry can say that these reproaches are unfounded and are not aimed at them. The facts here speak for themselves.

For example, take the question of the equipment of the submariners belonging to the emergency parties. Many had to reconnoiter burning compartments and fight the fire in respirators that had rubber masks, while wearing their regular cotton uniforms. Is it any surprise then that the high temperature caused the rubber mask to melt on the face of Captain-Lieutenant Nikolay Volkov, who subsequently died, and that many received burns, including some that were life-threatening? No special heat-resistant suits, not even asbestos masks, nothing like this, unfortunately, for our submariners. One would have to be superhuman to fight fires with such puny individual protective gear. It is hard to grasp: so many resources are invested in developing a submarine, yet the money could not be found for effective means of protecting the men from fire, the most terrible enemy on a submarine.

The rescued submariners say: there would have been fewer dead if they had individual inflatable boats, like those that the navy pilots have. How handy they would have been for those going overboard into the icy sea.

What about collective rescue gear? The sunken submarine was well equipped with it: a rescue chamber, and life rafts designed for the entire crew. Both were put into action. But the result is known. The VSK did not separate from the submarine for some time, and only an explosion in the pressure hull of the boat "shook" the chamber loose from it. And scarcely had it floated up when it immediately sank again. Two life rafts thrown onto the water immediately capsized. In addition, it was necessary to apply a lot of force to pull the rafts from their wells on the upper deck. The rescued seamen say that in a training drill conducted with the crew in the winter, four men could managed this task, not without

difficulty. It was just a good thing that the rafts are well arranged on this boat, on the top deck. On some other submarines they are inside the pressure hull, and must be brought up through a conning tower hatch. In extreme conditions, and indeed those that arise suddenly, it would be quite difficult to use these rafts. In short, the design concept needs some work.

The navy aviators got to the submariners earlier than anyone else. But what could they actually do to help the sailors?

"We do not have rescue devices in our arsenal that are specially designed to aid sailors in distress", said the Chief of the Search-and-rescue and Paratroop Service of the Northern Fleet Air Forces, Colonel V. Kuts, with chagrin. "The aviation rescue containers (KAS) that we used on 7 April were all we had available. But they are intended for rescue of pilots in the water, who are also trained to use them."

Now one can understand the nature of the bewilderment of the rescued crew members. They failed to comprehend why the KAS' did not open up when they hit the water. It appears that one must apply physical force, up to 20 kg, to activate them. But first of all you have to know this, and secondly, a human being is unable to do such work in icy water. In addition, you have to swim over to the container. This may perhaps be easy for a pilot in an individual boat, but the closest KAS to the submariners was 50 meters away. As a result not a single man was able to use them.

Now in the Northern Fleet they are organizing and conducting joint drills of pilots and ship crews everywhere in the use of aviation rescue containers. Well, this is acceptable as a temporary solution to the problem until special rescue equipment (for example, the so-called raft garlands) arrive from industry. But on the condition that the KAS' themselves will be improved.

Colonel Kuts is conducting studies in this area with the support of the Naval Air Forces command.

"Rafts and inflatable boats work in the Arctic only for the first moment after entering the water", said the submariners. "But in the future we need self-propelled rescue apparatus."

"In the future"... If they only knew that this future has already passed. In the Northern Fleet Museum of Aviation, one of the displays in the exhibition of aviation equipment is the Fregat aviation rescue launch, which is air droppable. It had fair performance characteristics, and was radio controlled. But four years ago it was removed from the arsenal. The Northern Fleet aircraft detachment that carried these launches was disbanded. At that time the replacement was the An-12 aircraft in the search-and-rescue variant. They are supposed to transport the new Yersh aviation rescue launches to the necessary region of the sea. But the state in which these

launches arrived from industry! The producing plant was very late in delivering the parachute systems. There was no auto-disconnect, the mounting attachments did not join, and there were a number of other problems. Last year the launches were tested in the Black Sea Fleet, but according to Colonel Kuts they did not risk dropping the launch from an aircraft with crew—due to level one-and-a-half seas. They did this only in almost dead calm weather. So what sort of rescue equipment is this? In addition, the use of search-and-rescue aircraft is now banned—imperfections are being corrected.

"Of course, two of our aircraft will soon return from repairs", notes Colonel Kuts. "But essentially no one has started on the launches; they are still not ready for use due to production flaws."

Nor could the fleet use seaplanes in the course of the rescue operation. For this it was taken to task by one of the central newspapers, which did not understand the crux of the matter.

M-12 seaplanes and their crews were ready to take off, but they can be used with a wave height of just 0.6-0.8 meters. Such a provision absolutely does not suit the pilots themselves. Not for nothing did the aircraft commanders of the aviation regiment commanded by Colonel A. Dedukhov send a report to one of the sections of the State Commission, saying: "...We earnestly request you to assign to the general designer, Comrade Konstantinov, the task of developing a genuine rescue seaplane to provide assistance in the open ocean with no less than level 5 seas... Why is it that during the Great Patriotic War, pilots of our regiment rescued people in the open sea in their "Catalinas" with seas higher than level 4 (from their accounts), while our M-12 is unable to do this."

It is quite apparent that the need has arisen for our country to develop a special rescue aircraft with high flight and seakeeping characteristics. This task has been assigned by the State Commission, and the deadlines for its execution have been set.

The sad experience of the wreck of the steamer Admiral Nakhimov and the loss of the submarine Komsomolets convince us that the country should have a uniform system of search and rescue for persons at sea. Not belonging to a particular entity, but extra-, inter-, or best, supra-departmental. After all, this work must be structured on the most serious foundation—scientific, material, and organizational.

I long ago noticed that the brave, selfless deeds of contemporary service members often enter a kind of dead zone in our attention and interest. For instance, in the military museums the heroics of the war are exhibited extensively and vividly, while postwar heroics are often flat and insignificant. I would like for the courage of the crew of the lost submarine Komsomolets to find a worthy reflection in museum exhibits. Offhand I can

name two objects that made a strong impression on me personally: a piece of the emergency buoy from the sunken submarine, saved by Captain 2nd Rank G. Barskhov, a friend and colleague of the commander of the sunken submarine, Captain 1st Rank Ye. Banin, and the Polet wrist watch belonging to Warrant Officer Yu. Podgornov. He showed me this wrist watch. It stopped at 17:07, when Podgornov jumped from the submarine into the sea.

And why not put under museum glass at least a few of the letters sent to the State Commission from relatives of the dead submariners? Here is one of them, signed by a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, retired Colonel G. Avanesov, the father of the senior deputy commander of the sunken submarine: "I request that my grandson Philip, the son of Avanesov, Oleg Grigoryevich, be accepted at the Leningrad Nakhimov School". Or another one: "I, Burkulakov, Artur, a student in grade 10, want to be a cadet at the Submarine Navigation School imeni Leninist Komsomol, and to continue the work of my father, the chief of the political section, who died at sea." And this is what was written by the sons of Senior Warrant Officer M. Yelenik. Valeriy: "I request your assistance in my assignment as warrant officer to the military unit... (indicates the number of the unit in the formation where his father served)". Anatoliy: "Compulsory-service member. I would like to enter the Higher Naval School of Submarine Navigation imeni Lenin Komsomol..."

The places of the fallen are taken by their sons. Glorious the fleet, glorious the country that has such sailors, and such children of their sailors.

'Alarming' Trends in Health Problems Tied to Naval Service

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[Interview with Colonel of Medical Services V. Dovgusha, Doctor of Medical Sciences, by Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Interview With a Competent Person": "Seagoing Personnel Turn Gray Early: Why?"]

[Text] The number of officers removed from sea duty for reasons of health each year in the Navy today equals approximately two graduating classes of the naval school. Medical statistics show that the age of the group removed is growing progressively younger.... These and other alarming facts will be at the focus of attention of a representative conference on the problem of health protection for seagoing personnel soon to be held in the city of Amursk.

Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, our correspondent, interviewed Colonel of Medical Services V. Dovgusha, Doctor of Medical Sciences, who is participating directly in the preparations for the conference. In the Northern Fleet Dovgusha went from medical officer of a nuclear-powered

submarine to deputy chief of the fleet's medical service. He was discharged into the reserve several weeks ago, but naval medicine is still his main interest today.

[Ishchenko] When I have been on ships, Viktor Vasilyevich, I have noticed that commanders with some length of service ordinarily look older than their years. Is this an illusion or does it reflect some sort of pattern?

[Dovgusha] Your observation is fairly accurate. Our studies have shown that individuals who have commanded combat ships for 5 or more years appear 5 or more years older than their "identification" indicates with respect to the state of their systems and the functioning of their organism. The biological age of seagoing officers and warrant officers who have spent many years on ships also sometimes significantly exceeds the average statistical age factor. Statistically speaking, seagoing personnel turn gray earlier.

[Ishchenko] What causes this?

[Dovgusha] There are many factors. I shall not even attempt to list them all. For our discussion it is enough to mention only a few.

The very occupation of the regular serviceman has one ineradicable feature. Nowhere else does the need to carry out a mission or an order from the commander over and over again come into such real conflict with the organism's capabilities, with the orientation of its biological protective responses. The serviceman is required to carry out an order, "sparing neither his blood nor his very life," disregarding how this will affect the state of the organism's systems and functions and ignoring the excessive stress.

Other specific factors are superimposed upon this background. First of all, there is what is known in the civilian situation as a nonstandardized workday. Despite steps taken in the Navy to regulate the service schedule, the seagoing officers still work an extremely large number of hours: including the amount of time spent on the road, 14-18 hours a day when the ship is in base. More than half of the officers we studied, particularly the ship commanders, have an average of 10-20 days off annually. I would add to this the fact that a third of the ship commanders spend around 5 months a year at sea, when their work load can be considered to continue round-the-clock. In specific cases, however, the figure can be far greater.

[Ishchenko] Excuse me, Vitaliy Vasilyevich, but we should not forget that category of seagoing officers which includes the commanders of units and formations, their deputies and chiefs of staff...

[Dovgusha] Yes, these officers work constantly under pressure. Furthermore, various kinds of organizational factors very frequently produce extra cruise stress for officers at the highest level in the units and formations,

which causes the organism to wear out more rapidly. I would point out two of them: the appointment of ship commanders of officers not yet fully prepared professionally to take on the duties, and excessive tutelage of veteran commanders who know their job well.

[Ishchenko] Is that it?

[Dovgusha] What do you mean? We are just beginning the serious part of the discussion. Having studied the intensity of their work—around 20 factors in all—we have determined that the service duty of seagoing officers is constantly within the “moderately intensive to intensive” boundaries, while that of the ship and formation commanders ranges from “intensive to very intensive.”

The harmful effects of excessive stress on the organism are known: they “eat away” at the organism from within. And so, with respect to the number of stressful situations the service of seagoing officers and warrant officers correlates to the work performed by skilled workers and engineers at a ratio of approximately 10:1. There are typically 9-13 risk factors generating stress for seagoing personnel. After a long cruise officers and warrant officers have increased levels of cholesterol, bilirubin and triglyceride in the blood. This is a sure sign of stress.

Because it is so obvious there is no need to talk a lot about the therapeutic effect of physical labor and muscular activity on the human organism. The specific nature of seagoing service is such, however, that the motor activity of officers and warrant officers drops by a factor of 2-3 while on shore and by 5-10 on a cruise, compared with the usual urban resident. Ocean cruises can last several months.

Add to this the fact that most of the seagoing officers change their place of residence 3-10 times during 10-15 years of service. A result of this are chronic housing difficulties, frequent changes of schools for the children, family conflicts, divorces....

[Ishchenko] On the aircraft-carrying ASW cruiser Kiev I lived in a cabin with a vent opening up onto the flight deck. When flights were underway the rumble in the cabins made it impossible either to sleep or to relax. The ship designers clearly did not give enough thought to the people when they designed the living area of this class of cruisers and certain other ships....

[Dovgusha] Life has now forced us to take a more careful look at the habitability of ships.

The latest designs of nuclear-powered missile submarines are a sort of standard in this respect. Fine living conditions have been created on them for the crew, particularly in comparison with other submarines: a spacious wardroom, a lounge area with a “living corner,” a sauna and swimming pool, a gymnasium.

Not all of the possibilities have been exhausted, however. People sometimes have to take a back seat to the equipment and weapons. The officers and warrant officers frequently live in crowded, four-person cabins, and no sports areas have been provided on many ships.

[Ishchenko] In addition, most of the seagoing officers and warrant officers serve on far from the latest submarines. To the best of my knowledge, the “drop out” rate is even greater for submariners than for pilots. What is the reason for this?

[Dovgusha] Up to a month is required to restore the cardiovascular system after spending 60 days in a sealed space even in a normal gaseous environment. And at the systemic, regulatory and molecular levels the adverse effects on the organism of the submariners last 3-6 months after the cruise ends. It sometimes happens that officers and warrant officers, particularly those over 30 years of age, leave on another long cruise before their physiological functions have been completely restored. The accumulated adverse effects lead to illnesses.

[Ishchenko] But it is commonly believed that most of the seagoing personnel are strong and basically healthful people.... Or is it time to reject that stereotype?

[Dovgusha] I am not a promoter of absolute axioms. The assessments must be based on the facts, on statistics and studies. I would say that there is a certain age threshold beyond which illnesses are in store for the statistically average member of the seagoing personnel.

An in-patient study of a group of officers with an average age of 38.7 years showed that the [average] age of individuals without illnesses was 35.7 years, those with illnesses 39.4. Illnesses therefore emerge precisely during those 4 years between the two ages. Military medicine should therefore devote the most careful of attention to the area of the border conditions between health and disease and to preventive treatment for pre-illness conditions. If medicine succeeds in resolving the “border issue” to benefit the health of seagoing personnel, their active functional life can probably be extended by 5-10 years.

[Ishchenko] Certain articles on the army and navy appearing in the “civilian” press time and again let slip a bewilderment at what the authors consider to be the excessively high level of social and material support for career servicemen: officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers. How do you view this?

[Dovgusha] The complaints are ordinarily made about two things: the relatively early retirement with pension of officers at ages 45-50 years and the fairly large amounts of the pensions themselves. Uninformed people far removed from the military service can and do develop the incorrect idea that this is a violation of the principle of social justice. In fact, however, it is not a violation; on the contrary, it is a manifestation of this

principle. Such advantages are ordinary compensation for the hardships and deprivations with which the regular servicemen have lived for 25, 30 or more years in the army and navy, after all. And primarily for loss of health, irremediable, which no kind of material or other benefits can replace. For some reason no one doubts the correctness of the relatively early retirement with pension of miners, ballet dancers and a number of other specialists. They somehow forget, however, that the circumstances of military service are not only comparable to the work of members of these professions with respect to their burden and their working conditions, but frequently far surpass them. I am not even talking about situations such as the recent loss of the nuclear-powered submarine....

[Ishchenko] And one last thing, Vitaliy Vasilyevich. In your opinion, what must be done to resolve the problems we have discussed?

[Dovgusha] A great deal is already being done for this purpose. In the Northern Fleet, for example, constant, dynamic observation is maintained over all the chronically ill seagoing personnel. They are all provided upon request with treatment at sanatoria and health resorts. Ship commanders are provided with passes to sanatoria along with their families. The physical capacity of the fleet's medical service is being expanded. Medical instruments using electronic computers are being adopted in the diagnostic process at the fleet's main hospital.

There are still reserves, however. I consider it absolutely essential to identify the seagoing officers and warrant officers as a special profession group with its characteristic illnesses. This is done in the navies of many nations. Measures to prevent illnesses in seagoing personnel are poorly taught to the future seagoing doctors, however; their training program needs to be revised.

Until proper facilities have been built for rehabilitating the health of the submariners following cruises, in my opinion, we need to consider the possibility of multiple leaves for officers and warrant officers throughout the year. Inter- and pre-cruise preparation of the crews would be reduced, but it would be improved by using modern simulators. A sports complex must be built in each formation of ships, with a mandatory gymnasium and pool.

And naturally—although this is a subject for other specialists, so to speak—we need to vigorously improve living conditions, resolve the problems of housing and duty hours, and so forth.

I have certainly only outlined those changes which should be made in the interest of better protecting the health of the seagoing officers and warrant officers. We should assume that the forthcoming conference will do this far more thoroughly.

Construction Troops Work Almost Solely on Civilian Projects

18010641 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
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[Article by Yevgeniy Sorokin under the rubric "Commentary of a Publicist": "Neither in the Formation Nor in Battle".]

[Text] Just the evening before the railcar had stood there safe and sound in the frozen taiga. Smoke had billowed from the flue and rose in a column to the sky. Located dozens of kilometers from the nearest settlement, it was the only oasis of life around. That was in the evening. The next morning, when Captain of the Railroad Troops V. Yastreba and I returned from the "head" of the line, there was only a heap of smoldering wood where the car had stood. It had burned to the ground. What had become of the soldiers? Where had they gone in the frigid night?

Everything turned out fairly well, I was told at unit headquarters. Unfortunately, however, the outcome is not always so lucky. Many of these railcars are scattered along the BAM route. The railway troops live in them. They sometimes catch fire and burn like kindling. Right now there is no other housing....

I once traveled the Eastern Section of BAM from one end to the other. The rails of the "mainline of the century" are abundantly washed with the sweat of soldiers. I cannot forget the tent life of the BAM soldiers, their endless workday, their hands calloused from the heavy labor and their great, seemingly inhuman patience.

They were honorably performing their job. During those years we journalists sang the praises of their feat. There was even a whole series of songs about the BAM workers. Few gave much thought to why and how the puzzling substitution of the soldier for the construction worker had occurred.

When I was at the headquarters of the railway troops I heard the specialists complain about the fact that the combat training is deteriorating. And one was in fact immediately struck by this when attending so-called special tactical exercises. That is not surprising. People who are expected to defend the homeland had not had their hand on an assault rifle for months. And timid attempts by the command element to set things right encountered an angry "You are entrusted with such an important job, and you engage in demagoguery!"

Whom do the Railroad Troops work for? The USSR Ministry of Transport Construction. It is the one which deals with this mobile and undemanding army as it pleases. Where there is no way to entice civilian specialists, there you will see the soldiers at work with crow-bars and sledge-hammers. And without pay. This is considered to be "practical training" for them.

The Ministry of Transport Construction "entrusts" the most nonprestigious, low-paid work to the military. They perform only a small percentage of the ministry's total construction and installation work. They perform exactly one quarter of its low-paid but difficult jobs, however: excavation and ballasting and the buildup of the track bed.

The railway units are a part of the Ground Forces, of course, but are not actually that. Why were the young men drafted into the army? To master a military trade. So that they will know how to lay tracks and build bridges, set up communications and beat off enemy attacks in case of combat operations. This is an obvious fact. Unfortunately, I saw few of them in the combat formation. They are occupied from morning to night with one thing: fulfilling the plan. Just where is the time for improving their military skills? The main thing is to squeeze as much as possible out of yesterday's poor students so that the ministry can report on plan fulfillment in good time.

Life is complicated, of course. We cannot keep up with the work of patching over rents in the economy. Obviously, the temptation to use the work of soldiers is therefore great.

There are situations in which the assistance is absolutely essential, of course. Take Chernobyl and Arzamas, the Far East typhoons and Armenia.... I have seen our military personnel more than once in these extreme situations. People regarded the soldiers as saviors. All of the conventionalities were tossed aside, even military secrecy was forgotten, and "How many battalions should be sent to assist?" was broadcast in plain language. The young men in the uniform performed true miracles, not just because military regulations required it, but in answer to the call of their hearts. This is natural for an army which is rightly referred to as part and parcel of the people.

A restructuring, difficult and sometimes "creaking," is underway in it and throughout the nation. Many problems are moving from the theoretical to the practical realm. These are frequently problems which people were afraid to mention just a few years ago. Democratization and sole-command, glasnost and secrecy, economic accountability, self-financing and "budgeting".... How can they be reconciled and forced to serve the restructuring? These questions are being openly raised by both the army Communists and the military press.

It is a different situation with respect to the use of military construction workers in the national economy. Until recently this was a sort of "sacred cow." "Untouchable"!

But is it justified and essential to use the labor of soldiers where economic methods do not "work"?

Many of our departments "pervert" the use of soldiers to meet the planned targets. They cease to compare their desires and their capabilities: a department has no difficulty getting workers.

Last fall, on one of the motor vehicle routes in Udmurtia, I had a long talk with Lieutenant Colonel V. Prokhorov, chief of the political section of a road construction unit, and Lieutenant Colonel V. Goncharuk, rear service chief for the unit. The discussion took place next to canvas tents, the wind blowing right through them and their tops sagging from the endless rain. Disheveled soldiers bundled up in sleeveless jackets passed by without even considering it necessary to salute.

I listened to the officers, and the worst of the BAM "pictures" flashed before my eyes. The same old problems: not enough tents (not to speak of Minneftegazstroy [Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises] "barrels"), uniforms and even dishes. Not even the basic needs had been met. First provide the plan and then (or simultaneously, at best) normal living conditions for the soldiers. And just what kind of soldiers were they? They were not even military construction workers; people had simply been collected from all the branches and troop arms, most of them violators of discipline, and ordered to lay the track with almost no training. There is not enough equipment, nor experience. But the RSFSR Ministry of Highways reported that the plan was considerably exceeded last year.

I was once present during some filming for television at the Ignalinskaya GES. Military construction workers were also present. The television reporters knew their business and had asked the soldiers ahead of time to wear civilian clothing and stand in front of the platform to provide "background." I must admit I was surprised. The officers only laughed; they were accustomed to the masquerade.

This kind of "disguise" was successfully used also at the Gorkovskaya AES and on the irrigation canals of the Volga and Maritime regions. And not just there; one can see military construction workers digging on just about every Moscow street. But the fact that military construction workers are working on civilian projects is rarely mentioned. Is that not embarrassing? Just as during the years of stagnation, however, it is not embarrassing today for any minister or any party functionary to send desperate telegrams to the government: "If you do not send soldiers, the plan will fail." (Read: the nation will be ruined.)

Two Volga area obkoms recently engaged in such a squabble. The object of the struggle were two military construction detachments of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. Instead of establishing elementary order in the construction and providing normal conditions for civilian specialists, the local authorities count on the "labor army."

The Moscow Soviet won a real victory in this area. When its source of extra workers was closed off, the Moscow organizations found themselves on the brink of failure. They asked the USSR Council of Ministers to assign them several military construction detachments. I happened to visit the party gorkom. My goodness, was I at general headquarters? Nothing but uniforms! The former construction section was holding a military council with the command element of its "labor army." The Moscow Soviet does not advertise this very much. It complains, however, that there are not enough soldiers to meet the city's needs; more are needed. But if the Moscow Construction Committee does not begin showing real concern for the civilian construction workers, the last of them will also depart. Just what should be done? Ask for soldiers again?

Each year there is moaning in the military commissariats: the higher-ups demand that every last draftee be put into the army. It does not matter that one is in poor health or has a criminal record, or is simply "not quite right"; even they are acceptable as military construction workers. Thousands of them are returned from the military units, while others spend months in hospitals. I have spoken with them more than once.

"Why did you not tell them about your illness?" I asked.

"What do you mean, didn't tell them?" many of them replied. "We did, but they would not believe us. They said that we would shuffle papers at headquarters. But here we have bricks and not papers."

The military construction workers "present" our army with most of the cases of nonregulation relations, desertions and crimes. It has reached the point in my own Ministry of Defense that the military construction units have been turned from "schools of life and schools of indoctrination" into schools of reeducation. Even on the Baykonur 6

of the military construction workers had records.

I do not know whether any other army has the branch of military construction workers. Since we do have them, though, they should work where they are supposed to work. Particularly since the Ministry of Defense has no end of work. Suffice it to say that more than 7,000 officers are in need of housing in Moscow alone. I was told at the Main Billeting Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense that around 20,000 reserve officers lack housing in the country. Families of officers will flood into cities and settlements as a result of the impending reduction of the Armed Forces. An anticipated 40,000-45,000. They face the prospect of settling on the doorsteps of the ispolkoms to beg for nooks and rooms. The most "interesting" thing about it is that they are required by decree of the USSR Council of Ministers to be provided with housing within a few months.

Everywhere they are told that there are no apartments, however. And this is frequently where those same officers built canals, AESs and plants.

But why talk about the reserve personnel, when even active officers and warrant officers have been waiting years for an apartment? How many "grass widowers" the army has—that is, officers whose wives live far from where they are stationed! How many family dramas are played out and how many divorces occur because of it! I have seen more than enough of this. And not just at remote garrisons, but also in fairly "civilized" cities and settlements.

The country maintains an army for its security and not for bailing out the plans of the departments. The ministries do not know how to work with the military personnel, regarding them as a source of unskilled labor. "Our military construction detachment," write rate-setters Kubykina, Rashidova, Shchelkova, Bessarab and Voshchenina, "is attached to the Karataukhimstroy Trust of Kazakhstan's Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises. The command element makes a big effort to see that the soldiers work regularly. Some things do not depend upon it, however. The trust converted to economic accountability, and we found ourselves without jobs.

"The wages of military construction workers are extremely small, and many have found themselves in debt: those who spend more on food than they earn. The fightingmen receive poor occupational training. They mainly perform auxiliary jobs, where the crow-bar and the shovel are the main tools. Rates and wages are lowered without any basis. Is this what the military construction workers were sent to national economic projects for?"

This detachment is one of those sent with fanfare to help Kazakhstan at the beginning of the '80s. So this is how the republic needed that assistance. It actually begged for and justified the need. And this is unfortunately not an isolated example. ?? A letter sent to the editors by military constructor workers of a detachment under the USSR Ministry of Construction in the Urals and West Siberia Regions was signed by more than 170 people.

"We have no complaints about the military chiefs," they wrote. "We are concerned about something else: finding work. The Zhilstroy Trust 'keeps' us as seasonal workers, to which all of the low-paid, unskilled work is assigned. We are already around 30,000 rubles in debt. The main cause—hard to believe!—lack of work. And this is in a trust which builds housing. Or are we already in the year 2000, and every family is provided with an apartment?"

"Unfortunately, we are not. We ourselves live in abominable conditions. The barracks is at a plant shop, where the sewage system and waterline have long outlived their usefulness and constantly leak. All of us—300 people—live on the grounds of a combine where we are constantly poisoned from a potassium plant. There are clouds of harmful haze day and night. There are two faucets for washing and only two lavatory pans for 100 people. There is neither a sports facility nor a real club.

"We have appealed to both the Ministry of Construction in the Urals and West Siberia Regions and the People's Control Committee, but our problems apparently concern few people...."

"I appeal to you only out of desperation," V. Gargalo, assistant chief for material and technical supply at a military hospital, writes, as though continuing the previous letter. "Our hospital was established in 1981 by authority of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR to provide medical support for the military construction detachments located in the Kuzbass and attached to the USSR Ministry of Light Industry...." He goes on to report that back in 1982 the Soyuzshakhtostroy Association ordered the Kuzbassshakhtostroy Combine to construct the necessary buildings for the hospital. They still do not exist, however. "One has the impression that the officials in the Ministry of Light Industry have simply forgotten that their sons serve somewhere in the same kind of units, for whose health and lives they bear direct responsibility."

How many of these written confessions are received by PRAVDA and other central newspapers! People write that it is unnatural to have construction battalions in civilian departments, that this is a rejection of the economic principles we have proclaimed.

Explaining Shortage of Gas masks, Dosimeters
18010490a Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in
Russian No 3, Mar 89 pp 36-37

[Article by A. Zaytsev: "A Gas Mask and Dosimeter For Each?"]

[Text] In the weekly bulletin ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (No 44, 1988), in the article "Questions Without Answers" prepared by N. Soldatenkov, the question is asked: "Why are dosimeters, gas masks, and other individual protective equipment not sold freely?" The readers of VOYENNYE ZNANIYA ask similar questions.

Indeed, why not? Why, for instance, can we not arrange the production of individual protective equipment so as to release it for free sale?

It has been done elsewhere in the world. For example, several years ago they began to sell gas masks to the public in the FRG and Sweden, but people were not interested and the effect proved to be rather slight.

There is also another reason. As we know, gas masks are stored in warehouses at a specific temperature and humidity, so that they will retain their protective and operating properties for the guaranteed period. During this time specialists inspect them periodically, in particular examining the intake and outlet valves, which are made of very fine and elastic rubber, and repairing them if necessary.

The respirator boxes are kept sealed at the neck with a rubber gasket and a screw-on coupling nut, and at the bottom with a rubber plug. Under these conditions the adsorbing and filtering elements do not come into contact with the outside environment, and do not absorb moisture, impurities, or gases from the ambient air. When the guarantee expires, the gas masks are written off and used as training masks at enterprises, academic institutions, kolkhoz, housing bodies, and Civil Defense classes, and new ones are shipped to the warehouse. Thus the individual protective equipments stored in warehouses are always ready for use.

But this is one aspect of the matter. We must also take into account the following fact. The average family consists of four persons—a husband, wife, and two children. They require two adult gas masks, one children's, and one infant's protective chamber. All this will cost on the order of 100 rubles or more. Will each family be able to buy the whole protective kit? In all probability young families with lots of children, and probably with a low income, will not be able to. So we can only be talking of a free issue.

Should we issue gas masks in all populated areas? Of course not! There are cities with complex ecological situations, where there are many enterprises producing or using aggressive toxic substances. For instance, water works use chlorine for water decontamination, textile

enterprises use it to bleach fabrics. Ammonia is widely used in refrigeration combines and meat processing plants. Under such conditions, storing gas masks at home is fully justified. But, store them correctly.

One should not allow the masks to be damaged or the respirator boxes to be unsealed. It is also forbidden to use them for other than their designated purpose. For instance, some people try to obtain gas masks to more conveniently coat their floors with lacquer, spray orchard shrubs and trees with toxic chemicals, paint their cars, etc. Others try to use the boxes as filters for various liquids. With such treatment the gas mask very quickly loses its protective properties, and then cannot be used when it is needed.

Now about dosimeters. The most common today is the DKP-50-A (dosimetric chamber, direct-indicating), in outward appearance reminiscent of a fountain pen. It is part of the DP-22V and DP-24 instrument sets. It may be used to measure exposure doses of gamma radiation in a range from 2 to 50 roentgens (R) at radiation levels (powers of radiation dose) in the terrain from 0.5 to 200 R/hr. As we can see, this dosimeter operates in contaminated areas and zones of contamination with high levels, which practically do not occur in peacetime. In addition, the dosimeters self-discharge (up to 4 R per day) under normal conditions, so they must be charged up daily, and an annual inspection at Gosstandart organs is mandatory.

The ID-1 dosage measuring kit is more up-to-date. Its individual dosimeters are designed for measuring absorbed doses of gamma neutron radiation at ranges from 20 to 500 rads (1 rad is equal to 1.05 roentgens), with a radiation dosage from 10 to 366,000 rads/hr.

But all these dosimeters are not used in peacetime, since the norms of irradiation in war and peacetime differ sharply.

Of course one can use the DK-0.2 dosimeter kit. However it measures a gamma radiation dose from 10 to 200 mR at a power exceeding 6 R/hr. Such radiation levels are created in peacetime only in accidents at nuclear power plants.

And one other thing. Man is constantly subjected to ionizing background radiation; it differs at different points on the planet, and indeed is impossible to measure with individual dosimeters. In other one-time irradiations that one may encounter in daily life—fluorography, x-rays, etc.—the patient also does not need to measure the dosage. So is it necessary to equip everyone with individual dosimeters?

I think the subject should not be the sale to the populace of individual dosimeters or gas masks, but the effective organization of the service of radiological and dosimetric monitoring, and a reliable system of warning the population. Each person should be well trained, have a sound

knowledge of protective methods and the rules of behavior under conditions of increased radiation, know how to seal off his premises, perform radiological decontamination of his clothing, shoes, and work places, if necessary to take an active part in evacuation measures—in short, should be ready for capable and deliberate actions in extreme conditions.

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New Training Program in Schools

18010490b Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian Mar 89 p 36

[Article attributed to the "Civil Defense Department", entitled: "New Programs"]

[Text] According to a directive of the USSR State Committee of People's Education, the USSR Chief of Civil Defense, the USSR Health Ministry, and the Union of Red Cross and the Red Crescent Associations dated 26 September 1988, in the coming academic year civil defense classes in intermediate schools will be held in accordance with new programs.

Are the changes substantial? Judge for yourself.

The training of students in incomplete intermediate school is to consist of 22 hours. Older students will continue to study civil defense for 35 hours in the basic military training course.

Civil defense lessons will now appear in the curriculum of sixth-graders. As in the fifth grade, 8 hours will be allocated for its study. Classes with students in the second grade will be conducted in the second semester, a total of 6 lessons of 40 minutes each.

One of the features of the new programs is the practical trend of the material studied. The main tasks of the school are to teach the children to protect themselves and their comrades in any extreme situation, to adapt their everyday clothing and shoes to protect their skin from radioactive dust and toxic substances, and correctly to use the most simple equipment for protecting respiratory organs. They should know how to quickly make a wadded gauze bandage and to provide those in need with basic medical aid, and know where the nearest shelter is located, and what to do in an evacuation.

New for all levels is peacetime civil defense. The program of practical classes especially includes the subject "Actions of students in accidents, catastrophes, and natural calamities typical of the given region."

These same goals are pursued by the classes on medical subjects. The sixth graders will study methods of self and mutual help for accidents, burns, fractures, exposure to radioactive or toxic substances, bacterial agents, and aggressive poisonous materials.

Another feature of the new programs is the continuity of the practical study. As early as the second grade, in order to reinforce skills, 5-6 drills of 15-20 minutes each will be conducted during non-class time. For example, in the third drill the children study what to do when there are accidents at nearby radiological or chemical installations or in transport, what to do if a calamity overtakes you at home, at school, or outside. In the fourth drill they learn about the rules of behavior during a natural calamity. The skills obtained are used in practical classes in the third and fourth grade.

Seventh-graders practice preparatory procedures and methods of evacuation during accidents, catastrophes, and natural calamities typical of a given area. Training sessions are also mandatory for eighth graders. Here special attention is paid to improving the skills of providing self and mutual assistance for burns, fractures, wounds, and bleeding in various situations when there is exposure to aggressive poisonous materials.

Who conducts these classes and training sessions? Both in academic and non-class time, medical workers from the schools or assigned by health bodies, as well as teachers of biology and other disciplines having nurse's training. The directors of the schools organize and monitor the conduct of the training sessions, and military leaders provide methodological assistance to the teachers.

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Protecting Livestock From Radioactive Contamination

18010490c Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian Mar 89 pp 42-43

[Article by V. Senchikhin: "Method of Maintaining Livestock in Zones of Radioactive Contamination"]

[Text] Radioactive contamination of the ground may occur both in peacetime, as a result of industrial accidents at installations using, producing, or storing sources of ionizing radiation, and in wartime, after the burst of nuclear weapons.

In order to reduce damage, to maintain the health of the livestock, ensure their reproduction, obtain quality, uncontaminated (or with maximum acceptable concentrations of radioactive materials) products in contaminated terrain, it is necessary correctly to organize the livestock maintenance regime.

The most important thing is the feed. First of all because the basic quantity of radioactive materials enter an animal's organism from feeds. And secondly, the production of pure feeds on contaminated territory is a primary task, which if not resolved prevents organization of intelligent feeding.

In resolving the problem of the livestock maintenance regime on ground contaminated by radioactive materials, each farm manager should set three goals: to create safe conditions for the work of the servicing personnel; to ensure safe health of the livestock; to obtain livestock products with acceptable concentrations of radioactive materials.

If animals were in pasturage at the time when the radioactive fallout began to fall, they must be immediately driven to uncontaminated territory. The shortest path in this case is a route at an angle of 90 degrees from the direction of motion of the radioactive cloud.

On uncontaminated territory or where the radiation levels are acceptable, the livestock undergo a veterinary examination and dosimetric check. Depending on the readings of the veterinary specialists they are sorted and either sent for veterinary treatment or to a farm for stall maintenance.

After veterinary treatment and determination of the state of health, the livestock may be sent for slaughter at the nearest meatpacking plant, for treatment at a veterinary treatment center, or to a farm, where they should be kept separately from the others, under continuous observation by veterinarians.

If they are close to farms when the radioactive cloud approaches, the livestock should be immediately sheltered, regardless of whether or not buildings have been prepared for their protection. After this, spare servicing personnel leave the building, closing doors tightly, and proceed to a shelter. Two or three persons remain on duty. When there are dairy cows, four or five persons for 150-200 head remain. As soon as the livestock are in place, they are given a little coarse feed from reserves created within the farm.

The length of stay in the buildings adapted to shelter cattle depends on the temperature of the outside air, the wind speed, and the number of animals. As experience has shown, in a brick type building (with a norm of 16 m³ per cow, 12-13 m³ for young cattle up to 2 years old, and 6 m³ per pig) the animals may be kept without harm to their health: in the winter, with daily fluctuations of temperature of outside air of -20 to -25° C and wind speed of 2-4 m/s, up to 72 hours; at a wind speed of 5-6 m/s, up to 90 hours; in the warm season at a temperature of outside air of 10 to 20° C and wind speed of 3 m/s, up to 24 hours, and at an air temperature of 8 to 16° C, up to 34 hours.

If it is noted that respirations of the livestock have increased and they have begun to salivate and sweat, and their body temperature has increased by 1-1.5° C (measured on 2-3 animals located in the center area), this means that the content of carbon dioxide has increased (a struck match will go out at once when the CO₂ content is 5 percent), and they do not have sufficient oxygen. In this case it is necessary to immediately ventilate the

building by opening the windows and doors on the leeward side, and opening the dampers on ventilation pipes. They may be opened even after the passage of the radioactive cloud if there is no wind.

The livestock is kept in the buildings until the danger of exposure is eliminated, i.e. the level of radiation on the grounds has decreased to the established norms. Not only the buildings and structures should undergo radiological decontamination, but also the grounds of the farms and complexes, and in extreme necessity, also the feed.

The first feeding and milking of the livestock should be done 4-6 hours after sheltering. Cows nursing calves should be kept together with the sucklings so as to reduce the possibility of inflammation of their udders (mastitis). Subsequently the milking and feeding should be done once a day. Feed and water are given simultaneously. If there is a shortage of water, succulent feeds should be given—potatoes, beets, turnips, cabbage, carrots, and other root crops. Salt should be excluded from their rations during this period.

Minimal daily norm for feeds for the animals, per head: cattle, 5-6 kg of hay or 4-5 kg of hay and 1-2 kg of concentrates, 20-30 l of water; sheep and goats, 0.5-1 kg of hay, 4-5 l of water; pigs, 2-3 kg of concentrates, 6-8 liters of water.

It is recommended that livestock be fed pure feeds that were protected in the initial period after the fall of radioactive fallout. The basic threat to man and animal in this period is the radioisotope iodine-131. After two months, when the danger of exposure to iodine-131 decreases, strontium-90 and cesium-134 and -137 remain the chief and most dangerous radionuclides. The livestock are shifted to stall-pasture maintenance. Ration feeding is organized according to the type of green conveyer or from sheltered reserves. The basis of the feed rations should be hay grasses or other feed obtained from field crop rotations. Such feeds, all other conditions being equal, will be less contaminated by radioactive materials than those obtained from natural meadows and pastures, on which radioactive materials are concentrated in the top 5-centimeter layer (sod) after deposition. Hay from natural meadows should not exceed one half of the daily ration.

Less contaminated feeds can also be obtained from natural agricultural lands, if they are cultivated, i.e. if they are fertilized, plowed, and sown with feed grasses. The best ones are those that assimilate less radioactive materials, for example herbaceous grasses.

Chernobyl confirmed that when making up rations for various groups of livestock, it is necessary to allow for the following: dairy cows and pregnant livestock should be fed primarily grain, coarse feeds of herbaceous crops, corn, and potatoes. Rations should not include the tops of root-bearing plants, since they contain an increased

amount of strontium-90. It is necessary to increase the amount of mineral additives containing potassium and calcium. They may be added in the form of bone meal or tricalcium phosphate. Thus with an increase of calcium from 50-70 g to 220-240 g per day in dairy cows, the concentration of strontium-90 in the milk decreases by 30%.

Dairy cows whose milk is fed to infants should be given pure feeds. For cattle and pigs being fattened, as well as draft animals, feeds with a content of cesium-137 and strontium-90 may be given, but only when concentrations are no higher than those set for a daily ration, and for 2-4 weeks before slaughter for meat they may receive only pure feeds. In this period, the amount of strontium-90 and cesium-137 in the muscle tissue decreases significantly.

Feeds and the livestock products at kolkhoz, sovkhoz, and other farms located in zones of radioactive contamination are constantly monitored by medical and veterinary services. After laboratory analysis their specialists give permission for their further use (to be used for its purpose, reprocessed, utilized, or destroyed).

Chernobyl also showed that cattle can graze without restrictions with a level of contamination up to 0.05 mR/hr. At 0.15-0.40 mR/hr, only draft and fattening cattle, as well as dairy cows if their milk will be processed into butter.

Wartime norms are considerably higher. Meat and draft animals may graze at a level of 0.5 R/hr, and dairy cows whose milk is intended only for adults, at 0.1 R/hr (a schematic diagram of the use of pastures in wartime is given on the third cover page).

If the need to evacuate cattle arises, then this is done first of all from the region directly adjacent to the site of the incident. As we know, at Chernobyl this was limited to a 30-km zone. From other areas cattle are evacuated simultaneously with the population by the safest routes.

Cattle coming from the zone of contamination are inspected and subjected to dosimetric testing. As the Chernobyl experience showed, if the level of contamination of the body surface of livestock is above 1 mR/hr, they undergo veterinary treatment. On farms these cattle should be kept separate from the local ones.

What should one do in a situation with house cats, dogs, or ornamental birds? On the condition that they are kept inside, they may be evacuated with their owners (with the consent of the Civil Defense organs for protection of animals and plants) but only after inspection and dosimetric testing. Animals kept outside are culled out. Depending on the received dose of radiation and state of health, they may subsequently be returned to the owner or sent for treatment at the nearest veterinary treatment center.

Experience in handling the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant showed that the kolkhoz and sovkhoz that promptly began measures for intelligent conduct of agricultural work on territory contaminated by radioactive materials even now are producing pure animal products suitable for human consumption and all types of processing.

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Radioactive Contaminants Found At Kirovogradstroy

*18010490d Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA
in Russian Mar 89 pp 34-35*

[Article by N. Sukhomlin, entitled: "Retribution"]

[Text] On 5 Sep 1988, an alarm signal arrived from the oblast office of the public prosecutor: burns that were similar in nature to radiation burns had been found on two workers of the division of the Chief Mechanic SU No 2 of the Kirovogradstroy trust. The next day specialists of the division of radiation protection of the SES [Medical-Epidemiological Service] went to the site where the incident had occurred.


The suspicions were fully confirmed: there were radiation levels many times greater than the norms acceptable for human beings in the section where the sick men had been working...

So what had happened?

Workers N. Prashchur and A. Krivokhizha found unfamiliar instruments on a pile of metal scrap. They decided that they could be used as counterweights for the "Pioneer" crane. At the same time they dismantled a pair of them, purely out of curiosity. A layer of lead was concealed behind the iron case, and they used it as sinkers for their fishing rods. How can we not recall Chekhov's "Malefactor" here? These too knew not what they did.

In the opened capsules of the gamma relay GR-6V (as these instruments were called) was a radioactive element in the form of a white powder. One of them carried a capsule in his pocket for several days, then opened it and poured the powder into a ditch. The other followed his example. Thus radioactive material turned up on the grounds of the enterprise.

Plan for Use of Pasture in the Track of Radioactive Cloud



Some time later, ulcers that refused to heal appeared on the skin of the "researchers". They had been treated since 1985, but without success. No one guessed the origin of the illness. And only on 6 Sep 1988 was it possible to make an accurate diagnosis.

The next day there was an emergency session of the Permanent Extraordinary Commission to Eliminate the Consequences of Accidents, Catastrophes, and Natural Calamities. It heard information from the SES representative on the situation that had developed on the grounds of the installation and at nearby residences, and discussed necessary measures.

Starting on the morning of 8 September they began eliminating the consequences of the radioactive contamination of the area. At this time the Civil Defense staff of the oblast and the city of Kirovograd assumed the role of organizers and provided practical assistance to the staff of the trust. The chief engineer of the Kirovogradstroy trust, Civil Defense Chief of Staff S. Zhadanov was appointed leader of the work. Subsequently the trust staff independently performed the tasks of radiological decontamination of the contaminated grounds, and arranged coordination with the assigned forces from the city Civil Defense services, as well as with the enterprises that helped to prepare containers and allocated transportation. With the help of specialists of the oblast SES, systematic and strict dosimetric monitoring of persons and equipment located directly on the contaminated grounds was organized.

The party commission and the trade union organization of the trust helped to mobilize the collective to execute the unexpected task. In coordination with them, the trust manager issued an order providing for remuneration for the labor of persons participating in eliminating the consequences of the emergency, and ordering comprehensive support of the radiological decontamination work. But then they seemed to disappear. Representatives of the party committee did not always participate in summarizing the results of the work for the day. The company newspaper and wall press did not respond to this event in any way. Nor did one sense that the party committee supported the chief of staff in questions of coordination of all services of the trust. The result was disruption of rhythm and reduction in work speed. Only after intervention by the party obkom did his position change, and this immediately affected worker attitudes toward this important work.

In order to squelch false rumors, the party gorkom and gorispolkom, with the participation of workers of the oblast Civil Defense staff, prepared and on the morning of 8 September broadcast information on the incident over local radio. That same day the oblast newspaper KIROVOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA ran an interview with the Civil Defense oblast Chief of Staff, Colonel I. Melnik. But as subsequent events showed, the measures taken were not sufficient. It was necessary to prepare a new briefing, which was delivered over television by the

head physician of the oblast SES, Yu. Lysenko, and over the radio by the manager of the department of radiological protection of this station, V. Chaplygin.

Later an article appeared in KIROVOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA on the progress of elimination of the radiological contamination and on the actual situation. Specialists of the staff and Civil Defense courses of the oblast, medical epidemiological stations and the oblast hospital, and assigned personnel of the gorispolkom held talks with the people living close to the region of temporary storage of the contaminated waste containers. All this brought positive results.

The formations and equipment of Kirovogradstroy and other municipal organizations and institutions designated by the peacetime Civil Defense plan for elimination of the consequences of accidents, natural calamities, and catastrophes, worked at the very focus and at the temporary storage area of the containers. Two radiation observation posts, a mechanized work unit, two grounds decontamination groups, a group for maintenance of public order, and radiological specialists and a medical therapist from the medical service were put into action. A fixed washing point and equipment decontamination station were set up. Engineer machines and vehicles were recruited depending on the situation, so their number fluctuated in the range of 6-10 units, not counting the special equipment of the various services, of course.

What specifically did these non-militarized formations do? They rid the region of buildings and metal structures, took down and removed contaminated equipment and soil and materials to a temporary storage site. Around 300 metal containers were prepared for transporting radioactive wastes, and permission for their movement was given only after a check and entry of their numbers in a log, along with their background radiation.

Specialists from Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, and the Moscow NPO [Scientific Production Association] "Radon", who had already worked in similar situations in the region of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, and drivers, equipment operators, dosimetrists of the oblast SES, and employees of the rayon department of internal affairs provided great help in eliminating the consequences of the accident. And it should be said that during the entire period, from 8 September to 20 October when the work was concluded, the people worked conscientiously, selflessly, and practically without days off.

At the end of each day a map was set up on which the reduction in the level of contamination of the grounds was noted. An account was kept of the property and materials removed. In an adjacent region, at the request of the residents, specialists of the municipal SES examined all sectors and structures for contamination.

The work regime of the plant was not disrupted during radiological decontamination. The employees of the contaminated section and members of their families

underwent medical monitoring. The results were reported to each subject. No deviations were found in almost all, with the exception of the two victims and members of their families. Specialists concluded that there was no need to issue medical radiological protective medications, since there was practically no dust, everyone was working in respirators and special clothing, and the section was periodically washed down with water.

Dosimetric monitoring was organized both at the exit from the contamination zone, and in medical processing of persons and decontamination of equipment. At the exit from the zone, a bath was set up with water and wash basins with a closed drainage tank. Clothing was beaten in a special area. All were checked by SRP68-01, DP-5V instruments. Each participant in the decontamination was equipped with an individual dosimeter. At the end of the day, specialists ascertained that the established norms had not been exceeded.

Some difficulties arose in the organization of equipment decontamination. There are good stationary points in Kirovograd, but of course they are located away from the zone. In order not to contaminate the streets of the city in taking the equipment to the decontamination station, this work was organized at a nearby motor pool, especially since almost all the vehicles belonged to this automotive base. SES specialists showed how to prepare a closed water supply cycle.

Unfortunately, neither the manager of automotive base No 11, I. Gordiyenko, nor the chief of the municipal services A. Sych could handle their tasks. Only under the pressure of the permanent extraordinary commission did things still move forward. Testing of the water for contamination by the oblast SES showed that it was practically safe, and could be discarded into the purification facilities.

The service for protection of public order made a fine showing. It was under the supervision of the chief of the Kirov ROVD [Rayon Department of Internal Affairs] of the city of Kirovograd, militia Lieutenant Colonel A. Zaporozhchenko, and blocked all attempts to enter the contaminated zone, and ensured the safety of container shipments.

During elimination of the consequences of the radioactive contamination, we also encountered a manifestation of a purely parochial attitude toward the job by individual leaders of enterprises and organizations, and party and Soviet organs. Thus the misunderstanding of the situation on the part of the chief engineer of the Ingulets mining administration I. Onikiyenko and the chairman

of the Pervozvanovsk rural Soviet L. Mozhayeva led to significant delays and unjustified expenditure of material resources. The chief engineer of a construction materials production association, V. Romaniv, tried to shirk implementation of commission decisions using fabricated pretexts. These actions received a thoroughgoing party evaluation in the obkom secretariat of the Ukrainian CP, and at a session of the oblispolkom.

Who were the guilty parties in what occurred? First of all, those assigned personnel by whose fault the gamma relays were written off and thrown on the dump in 1981. For it was they who violated the rules of operation and storage of instruments containing the sources of ionizing radiation.

Secondly of course, those employees who dismantled the instruments and used them as counterweights on the crane. Although if the gamma relay GR-6V instruments produced by our industry in large numbers were marked with a clear warning of the danger, even persons without a good knowledge of what they were would be prevented from picking them up.

But facts remain facts. Radioactive contamination of the terrain occurred, lasted for three years, and was detected by accident. People paid with their health for the mismanagement and carelessness. And the elimination of the consequences of the emergency cost the trust hundreds of thousands of rubles.

It must be admitted honestly that Civil Defense classes held in the trust brought a very low return. And the cause here lay not so much with the employees as with the production managers. I believe that will serve as a good lesson.

The Civil Defense directors of the oblast and city also drew the relevant conclusions from what occurred. Now specific measures have been marked out to prevent such incidents. A check was made of all installations that use instruments containing sources of ionizing radiation. It found that in addition to those registered at enterprises, there were several hundred that were not duly accounted for. The composition of the permanent extraordinary commissions and the functional duties of their members were clarified. Additions were also made to civil defense training programs.

The unpleasant story at Kirovograd ended happily. But all should remember that its cause lay in the irresponsibility of some managers, in their misunderstanding and ignorance of elementary facts.

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Defense Plants Criticized for Not Meeting Agricultural Machinery Needs

18010620 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 11 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by N. Kutorgin, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA special correspondent: "A Tractor for
Show"]

[Text] When will the horticulturists and leaseholders be
provided equipment?

Literally everyone lingered by these two small machines. Participants of the area conference-seminar who had gathered in Omsk to share their experience in cooperation between industry and agriculture assessed straight off, as they say, the merits of the small orchard-and-garden machine and "Ruslan" mini-tractor. The first was small, but enterprising. Thanks to a set of attachments on it, you can plow the land as well as cultivate young seedlings, as needed. The second—what a Herculean machine. It can pull up a load of up to 2 tons on a trailer. This wonder was built by V. Dorozhkin, an electrician from the local Pobeditel Sovkhoz, using an engine from a Ural motorcycle and components from a junked motor vehicle. On his farm he has a cow, a pair of bull calves, a heifer calf, and 15 sheep. It would be pretty difficult without equipment. The homemade "Ruslan" has become a good helper for him.

But the conference participants circled around the remarkable display models in vain, trying to find out where and how they could acquire them. Disappointment was in store for them. Concerning the general-purpose machine, its owners—Kursk machine builders—stated right away:

"It is being distributed only by multiple purchase order in Moscow and Kursk oblasts. We ask that you not contact the plant; we will not be able to help with anything."

As for the "Ruslan," it is not available at all, since it is the only existing copy. And that one copy was assembled by the lone inventor with his own hands.

"In the 8 years it has been in use, not a single enterprise has taken an interest in the mini-tractor, V. Dorozhkin shrugs his shoulders. "Even though nothing like it is produced in Omsk."

In my view, these examples best illustrate the problem discussed at the conference. The whole point is that, if we do not go farther with small-scale mechanization and equipment for processing agricultural products, we cannot expect any radical changes in agriculture or development of lease.

So, what is the problem? After all, a rural-aid program has been adopted. Besides the enterprises of the civilian ministries, its orders are being fulfilled by 340 plants and

2 research institutes and design bureaus of the defense complex, but there are still problems getting equipment. Last year, for example, only 27,000 motor blocks entered the market for the 16 million private subsidiary farms in the Russian Federation. There are about 50 million of these farms throughout the country, but the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery manufactured 150 million rubles worth of equipment for them, including forks and shovels—only 3 rubles per family. The defense provided even fewer of these products. And individual means of mechanization are being produced in miserly batches—from 10,000 to 40,000 pieces. As far as fundamentally new items are concerned, one of the conference participants joked that there are hardly enough to support exhibits similar to the one that opened on the occasion of the seminar in Omsk.

Of course, the machine builders, and especially the defense complex machine builders, deserve a most serious rebuke for their lack of output. Of course, they must fulfill the quota. But we apparently must also wonder: What is the reason for their low output? Perhaps it is because everything, like in the past, is structured on coercion, regardless of material interest? As they say, here and now, but you will count your wages later.

We spoke about this with two directors of large enterprises in Omsk. At one, an enterprise of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, they produce cardboard boxes as consumer goods. At the other, also a defense sector enterprise, they make bottle-washing machines. Of course, both are needed, but we first have to have something to put into the cardboard box and to pour into the bottles. So, why aren't the directors in a hurry to change their production specialty? Why don't they begin making those motor blocks that are in such critically short supply? The answer is simple: because it is not to their advantage.

You must admit, regardless of how all-powerful the "defense complex" may be, you will not set up production of tractors as a side-line on special machine tools design for producing military products. You can, of course, break it down and manufacture a small and therefore unprofitable batch of mechanisms. But for a new product to take hold and so the stable economy of defense plants does not tear it away, mass flow-line production is needed, which is inconceivable without automatic lines. However, domestic machine-tool building is so far unable to provide these. What is to be done? In the opinion of A. Systsov, minister of the aviation industry, it makes sense to purchase automated lines abroad, redistributing to the "defense complex" part of the currency intended for acquiring equipment for the agroindustrial complex and light industry. Let us say frankly, the proposal is not indisputable. But something must be done. It is clear as day that we will achieve much today by setting our hopes only on the "whip."

Incidentally, something can be done here, and without imposing expenditures. Low- and medium-power equipment for the countryside, noted V. Doguzhiyev, minister

of general machine building, should be categorized as consumer goods. Then enterprises would have greater incentives for increasing production of them. Many participants in the conference proposed increasing deductions to plant funds, making them directly dependent on the increase in the volume of nonspecialized production.

Here is an idea expressed to me by V. Varnavskiy, first secretary of the Omsk Party Gorkom:

"We have several defense plants. Some of them manufacture already one-fourth peacetime products. Why couldn't at least one of them specialize completely on producing equipment for the countryside? We raised this issue before the central organs, but there is still no "yes" or "no" from Moscow. They are thinking it all over."

It goes without saying, industry owes its partner. But, in turn, industry also has quite a few claims against the client: He does not know how to clearly state requirements. Exactly what means of mechanization does he need to be developed right now?

The system of centralized planning and distribution of equipment also gives rise to a mass of discrepancies. Alas, up to now it has not been the future owner who requests it, but some anonymous person from the center. Often, the figures are frankly made up out of thin air. For example, the agroindustrial complex ordered for one of the ministries 700 sets of equipment for packaging fruits and vegetables, but in the end, it backed down, cutting the request to 119 units. It doesn't matter, it's as if that's the way it has to be. It seems that only direct ties between industry and the countryside will rid us of similar incidents. But as long as the apparatus, and not the producer and consumer directly, decides everything, as long as there is no mutual responsibility and mutual interest in the relations of the partners, the miracle motor blocks and mini-tractors, it seems, will roam from exhibit to exhibit.

Use of Defense Systems For Peaceful Purposes

18010648b Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Apr 89 Second Edition p 4

[Article by B. Surikov: "Not for Scrap, for Good. How to Use the Reduced Arms for Peaceful Purposes"]

[Text] Now, when the arms reduction and the elimination of certain of their types have become a reality, the question of the possibility of their peaceful use has shifted to a practical plane.

Earlier one heard the slogan: weapons for scrap or the dump. But do we need to take this literally? Hundreds of billions of dollars and rubles have been spent to develop modern weapons, and the latest scientific-technical achievements have been utilized. Therefore they should be handled efficiently. For example, with the halt in production of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles,

we did not destroy the corresponding plants, but converted them to production of peaceful goods. Perhaps the arms subject to cuts in the future may also be used in various spheres of peaceful life? Let us consider this in the example of one of the most topical problems today, protection and improvement of the environment.

The main thing in the struggle to preserve the habitat has been and remains the prevention of nuclear war, which threatens us with total ecological catastrophe. I must say that the arms race also runs counter to efforts aimed at protecting nature, and hinders the noble task of preserving a harmonious balance of society, technology, and nature on Earth. The wasteful demand for unrenovable resources for military purposes is a heavy burden on nature. Attempts to affect the habitat for military or other hostile purposes, in ways hard to predict, would have serious costs.

Our defense enterprises have always produced civilian goods (passenger planes, ships, communications equipment, radioelectronics, and others) In connection with the ongoing conversion it is helpful to consider how scientific-technical potential may be used to resolve problems of the ecology on the basis of a systems approach.

The availability of space-, air-, sea-, and ground-based technical systems that allow us quickly to detect a worsening of the habitat in a specific region, and the causes, makes it possible for the relevant government organs to take timely measures to correct the situation. In addition, the use of modern technical assets for monitoring the habitat will stimulate the development and adoption of ecologically clean technologies in all sectors of the domestic economy.

Considering the financial deficit in Moscow and Washington, it is evidently necessary, in a very short period, to do studies to assess the possibility of the controlled use of powerful missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines for resolving ecological problems.

In accordance with the joint Soviet-American summit statement signed by the leaders of the USSR and the U.S. in December 1987, after the treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms takes effect, there will be 154 heavy SS-18 missiles at our disposal. What are we to do with the rest, considering that they are equipped with powerful rocket motors and are capable of carrying a load of several tons into space? Would not their simple destruction be too wasteful?

For twenty years now we have successfully exploited the Meteor meteorological space system. In past years dozens of weather satellites have been launched into space. With their help we regularly receive global images of cloud cover and the earth's surface in the visible and infrared regions of the spectrum.

The accumulated experience of space meteorology is quite helpful. It should also be used in the event that a decision is made to create a system for monitoring the condition of the habitat from space. For these purposes, clearly we should assess the possibility of refitting SS-18 missiles into ecological delivery missiles, designed to orbit artificial Earth satellites (ISZ) equipped with sensing apparatus. The information on the state of the habitat received from space will make it possible to regularly compile ecological monitoring maps of the country and individual regions.

These ISZ' also may be used for space geography, including monitoring of the dynamics of cloud and snow covers; observation of the thermal irregularities of the earth and ocean surface, volcanic activity, forest fires, and surveys to monitor the development of young crops and plant diseases.

At the start of February of this year, a bright orange helicopter equipped with various instruments to perform express analysis of water flew over the city line. Using a thermal viewfinder, geophysicists detected areas of heavy contamination of the Moscow river from the effluent from industrial enterprises.

However helicopters have a limited cargo capacity and short flight time. Therefore the possibility of creating multi-function ecological laboratories, set up on heavy aircraft, deserves careful consideration. Present-day strategic bombers have a radius of action of several thousand kilometers and are capable of transporting megaton loads. So it makes sense to study the possibility of modernizing a certain number of strategic bombers, subject to destruction in the future, with the goal of using them as platforms for apparatus to monitor the habitat.

It is apropos to note that modern military reconnaissance aviation is equipped with sophisticated optoelectronic apparatus possessing high specifications and performance characteristics. The use of such equipment on flying laboratories would make it possible periodically to inspect the activity of our industrial and lumber enterprises in remote regions of the country.

Candidate member of the Politburo of the CC, CPSU, USSR Minister of Defense, General of the Army D. T. Yazov in a recent interview talked about the second profession of military aviation. In particular he recalled the broad use of military transport aviation in the tragic aftermath of the earthquake in Armenia. Clearly, if it is considered advisable to refit some of the strategic bombers removed from the armament for peaceful purposes, then one cannot doubt that the experience and knowledge of pilots, navigators, and ground specialists of the VVS could prove quite beneficial in resolving domestic economic and ecological problems. A similar approach in refitting naval and missile equipment is also possible.

The role of the World Ocean in the life of mankind is constantly growing. The influence of pollution on the ocean ecosystems and biological productivity is studied continuously by scientists. The USSR is interested in the rational use of biological and mineral resources of the World Ocean and the coastal zones by all states, as well as in prevention of their pollution. However the nature conservancy work of the international community in the seas and oceans is being held up by a shortage of scientific expeditionary vessels equipped with ecological laboratories.

The American columnist Fred Reed called the Ohio-class missile-armed nuclear submarine a machine capable of causing the end of the world. A billion dollars was spent to build each of them. Such missile carriers have an underwater displacement of more than 18 thousand tons. Soviet submarines also are very expensive and have impressive specifications and performance characteristics. In accordance with the treaty being developed for a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, some of the submarine missile platforms will be destroyed in accordance with agreed procedures.

Considering the worsening ecological situation in the World Ocean, it seems expedient to study the technical possibility of converting submarine missile platforms into expeditionary ships for ecological and economic purposes.

Probably there is no need to use such nuclear vessels in their underwater navigation mode. To take samples of water and soil from any depth, they may be equipped with bathyscaphes. Large illuminators built into the hulls of submarines not only will create more favorable conditions for the work of the crew and scientists, but also will rule out the possibility of their covert modernization into strategic missile platforms.

I believe the need has arisen for a rapid expert assessment of the question of modernization of the Soviet and American elements of the strategic nuclear triad subject to destruction into civilian equipment, including for the purpose of creating an ecological monitoring system. The performance of such studies by traditional means is inefficient and protracted, which is unacceptable under the conditions of the current Soviet-American negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons.

Why not create a temporary research collective in one of the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences to make a quick expert assessment of possible ways of creating a state system for monitoring the habitat, making broad use of the strategic nuclear weapons elements subject to destruction in the development of space- and ground-based ecological laboratories? Such a temporary collective of researchers could be formed, for example, in the multi-profile Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In addition to justifying the principle concept of a state system of monitoring the habitat, specialists could prepare proposals for the development and serial production of apparatus necessary for equipping the ecological laboratories.

As part of the temporary collective, in addition to scientists, it would be good to include specialists from defense sectors of industry and military specialists. The work could be paid for from funds obtained through the reduction of orders for military equipment. According to a preliminary assessment, the total cost of this collective work would be roughly 200-250 thousand rubles.

During proposed express studies by scientists and specialists, the foundation should be laid for a complex of technical and organizational measures, subject to agreement with the American side, ensuring mutual confidence of the signatories of the treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons that the strategic triads allocated for civilian modernization would be used by the USSR and the U.S. only for peaceful purposes, including for the creation of national systems for monitoring the habitat.

The specifics of such monitoring, with observance of the draft of the Soviet-American treaty being developed, evidently would be that all types of civilian work to refit an agreed number of strategic missiles, heavy aircraft, and nuclear missile-armed submarines should be done only in the presence of inspectors of the other side. In addition we should consider the expediency of monitoring the non-military use of modernized elements of the strategic triad of the sides on a quota basis.

If a decision is made for a stage-by-stage establishment of a state system of monitoring the habitat with the use of space-, sea-, and air-based ecological laboratories, the

need will arise for the formation of powerful technical services to operate and maintain these assets in working condition. Due to their novelty and complexity, the resolution of these multi-faceted problems solely through the efforts of Goskompriroda [State Committee for the Protection of Nature] and Goskomgidromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology], will not be easy under our conditions.

At present the USSR possesses powerful scientific-technical potential which, under conditions of partial conversion of the defense industry and the forthcoming reduction in strategic nuclear arms, will make it possible quickly to carry out integrated studies and present the government with agreed proposals for subsequent development and stage-by-stage establishment of a state system for monitoring the environment.

Speaking in New York in December of last year, M.S. Gorbachev proposed creating a U.N. emergency ecological assistance center, whose functions would include rapid dispatch of international groups of specialists to provide assistance in regions where there is drastic worsening of the ecological situation.

The work of such an international U.N. center could be successful only if a monitoring system were developed that could observe the global pollution of the atmosphere and the World Ocean.

The expected reductions in nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons will open up a real opportunity to raise the effectiveness of preventive actions in the world aimed at protection and improvement of the environment. The international community should do everything possible to halt the creeping ecological catastrophe.

Selection Process for Suvorov Academies Discussed

18010552 Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
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[Article by Major V. Sosnitskiy, special correspondent of the journal: "Trouser Stripes for the Son"]

[Text] Have you ever been by the gates of a Suvorov military school (SVU) during a regular selection of the young men? There you can hear all sorts of things: "All these lists are just window dressing. They accept who they want....," "I heard that this year they are taking only orphans....," "What do you mean, orphans, they only admit generals' sons here....," "Right, if someone needs the grades they get them....," "Don't be stupid. My son without any string-pulling got two fives and a four...." Generally speaking, you can hear the most contradictory things. But what do the facts show on this score?

How Are Selections Made for the SVU?

"The Suvorov military schools can admit students (young men) at the age of 15-16 years (during the year of admission to the school) with an 8-year education, fit in health or study at the schools and desiring to become an officer in the future."

(From the Admission Rules to the Suvorov Military Schools)

How many are seeking admission? We started the calculations with this question. Sociology here has not been much help. Ordinary arithmetic was better. It turned out that judging from the applications which come into the desks of the military commissariats from 1 through 25 June each year, there are 13-14 applicants for each place at the SVU.

Then begin testing with harsh conditions. "Fit in health." Behind this rather general phrase lies the ability to endure the physical and mental stresses under conditions of the Arctic, the desert, high mountains, swampy and other terrain in the most diverse climatic zones. And endure not only under conditions of an experiment, but in real daily, often completely exhausting officer work. For this reason the physicians are so strict with the young men. On one-half of the applications lies the categorical judgment: "Not fit for state of health." An analysis indicates that a majority of these fellows are "hothouse flowers." They are not acquainted with elementary physical exercises, let alone sports. They know the address of a polyclinic better than they do the location of a nearby sports field. And this is the first weeding out.

Then the allocating goes to work. For example, an oblast military commissariat is instructed to choose 30 persons. There are double the number of applications. Hence it is essential to select the most worthy. The outstanding students are no problem. There are another 12 with

"firm good grades." There are 3 "preferred students," that is, those without parents. For the remainder it must be explained that they should have studied harder and prepared more seriously for the Suvorov schools but that their dream has not collapsed as after school they can go right into a higher military school. Of course, it is also possible that several of the most tenacious mothers and fathers will begin to pester, persuade, convince and assure. Then the scheduling takes longer.

Later the general flow is corrected by the selection commission of the military district. The schools will be sent the name lists of the candidates and the documents for each. There will be 3 or 4 applicants for each place. Thus, on the way to the entrance exams, two-thirds of those desiring to take them are weeded out. Ordinarily 20 percent of this number does not agree to the commission ruling. It is difficult to estimate how many are right among these, but recently it has not been rare to find such replies to complaints: "As a result of a check, the facts set out by you have been confirmed...." Hence, there are loopholes for injustice. Where are they? The first is the lists of "callers." Yes, in addition to the three main lists of applicants which we have mentioned, there is a fourth which consists of those recommended by phone from the obkom, the ispolkom or simply from "good persons." The second is why are there 30 candidates per oblast? If this is determined by the capability of the SVU to admit candidates, then probably one should assume that there should be more such schools. As for the "callers," times themselves dictate a means against them for us: glasnost. In the work of the selection commissions, public opinion need not play the last role. We feel that involving in this question the Komsomol organizations, the parent committees and the military instructors of the schools and PTU [Vocational-Technical School] would help in closing these loopholes for the dodgers.

How Are Applicants Admitted to the SVU?

"The results of the exams are determined by the grades: 5 (excellent), 4 (good), 3 (average), 2 (bad), 1 (very bad)...."

(From instructions on admission procedures for the SVU)

But the grades, in turn, are determined by people. By the teachers. Again the same instructions remind: "In assigning grades to the applicants, the members of the examination commission should be guided by the example standards and recommendations in assessing knowledge as set out in the curricula for the subjects." Having left the floweriness of style as a problem for the compilers of the instructions, let us conclude that criteria are provided in assessing knowledge. Everything is clear in terms of the written (and incidentally, nameless) works as the number of errors speaks for itself. The oral exam is at the whim of the instructor. We happened to be present at a physics exam at the Moscow SVU. The

instructor Mikhail Gennadyevich Korenev was more than fair. From all appearances, the examinee was about to receive a two but still the examiner by leading questions was "prodding" the fellow.

"Do you know the formula for Newton's first law?"

"I have forgotten."

"The second?"

"I can't remember...."

Later, after the examinations, we spoke with the instructors.

"The transitional programs for the reform of the secondary school have dealt a strong blow to the knowledge of the fellows," said an instructor, A. Tolokonnikov. "I have been working many years now in the Suvorov school and I have noticed how recently the level of training for the young men has declined."

In this same conversation I happened to hear about the "point for social justice" which can be given to a young fellow from a rural 8-year school where mathematics, biology and physical culture are given by yesterday's 10-year school.

Well, possibly the pedagogical experience and the intuition developed by them are useful qualities. But how reliably can they maintain a principle of social justice? Where are the guarantees that this "point" will always be given by clean hands and with an honest heart? These are indispensable. Also meriting support is the system of vocational and psychological selection which is to be introduced in the place of an oral exam in mathematics. All the more as the higher military schools have already gained experience in vocational selection and this would allow the schools to select precisely the best candidates while the young people themselves would not have to rely solely on emotion in choosing a military profession. It is completely within the power of the staff psychologists of the Suvorov schools to adapt this experience for the conditions of the SVU, if they, as is still often the case, were not used as the assistant chief of the training section "for general questions." There still is one other "but": For now the SVU psychologists in terms of their capabilities are very reminiscent of a tractor driver without a tractor or a tank driver without a tank. The psychologist has still not received his "implement of production"—the computer—in the Suvorov schools.

But what about those discussions with the KPP [selection committee] on the objectivity of the grades? Certainly after the grading of the written works, there were instances of their rewriting, as happened last year at the Leningrad SVU. Again, does this mean that there are loopholes for injustice? It turns out that this "delicate point" requires a change in the existing methods. The previous entrance exams showed that the lists of the

results of the exams put up for general viewing reduced the false rumors about the KPP. And if the grades on these lists would appear on the day of grading the written works, this would also benefit justness. As would the final information on admission stated on the same list along with the examination grades of the candidates.

Why Do They Go to the SVU?

"...It is no one else's business why our boy is going to the Suvorov school. This is our family affair!"

(From a conversation with a statuesque blonde named Viktoriya Mikhaylovna)

We spoke with Viktoriya Mikhaylovna about 15 minutes. Over this time I learned that Serezha was the only child in the family. The husband had been against sending the son to the school. But the son judging from everything was used to believing the mother. And then I asked the question directly:

"Why are you dictating your son's fate?"

After a glance that measured me from head to foot, there came a florid expletive and the words quoted above.

I remembered meeting first-year Suvorov students who in a schoolboy hand had written on graph paper: "I request that I be released from the school due to the fact that I have erred in choosing a profession." But was the choice yours, fellow? Possibly, a pushy mother had determined everything.

A woman was in tears in the office of the chief of the Kalinin SVU. It was a familiar picture for the time of entrance exams. On the desk was an examination sheet. And on it were the grades: 4, 5, 5, 2.

"He went to the Physics Olympiad for the school," said the mother, listing the accomplishments of her son and wiping away a tear.

Opposite her was the guilty party in the investigation. He was silent.

The mother: "From 4th grade he has dreamed of becoming a military man!"

The son, lowering his glance: "It was not I, but you! I will be a biologist!"

The general and the woman were left alone. She, without raising her eyes, said:

"But how can I get him to 10th grade? He has completely stopped listening to me. He is the only thing I have," concluded the mother, no longer with tears but rather annoyance in her voice.

The general was silent. There was nothing for him to say. He felt sorry for the fellow.... Incidentally, he had some character as he did not allow himself to be intimidated. But how many others are more willing to follow the orders of others and thereby pushing aside those for whom the army is their choice in life.

Two tides of parental emotion break on the Suvorov schools each year. These are on the days of the newly selected class and on the days of assignment to the higher military schools. In both instances there are requests, threats, petitions and telephone calls from all sorts of people.

In the assignments there are often unhappy voices:

"Why to the combined-arms command school?! Why to Omsk and not to Moscow?! Such an assignment is not to our liking and we demand that the educational diploma be issued to us!"

Yes, the path to the Suvorov schools is possibly a family matter. But the path of the Suvorov graduate is now a state interest. It serves nothing to involve the family. All the more as each such "state person" costs the country much more than a school child.

The process of allocation is rather complex and is often covered with a layer of fog.

But the Moscow SVU considers differently.

"Previously that was the case. Now the situation has been rectified," said the company commander, Lieutenant Colonel A. Gusev. "In the collectives of the Suvorov schools there is a so-called 'scale of justice.' There are penalty points for twos, threes, disciplinary 'failings' and other mistakes. And this is done fairly for all: from the first in the class to the very bottom. In giving the assignments, the list of schools by order hangs next to this 'scale.' The best is chosen first. Then down the list depending upon endeavor and the other Suvorov qualities."

I could not refrain from asking the question:

"What is the most complete justice guaranteed? What happens if the son of a 'big shot father' ends up last?"

"It happens," they answered me, "in different ways. This same big shot can organize an additional place in a prestige school for his son. But not at the expense of others. For instance, above the schedule...."

How can the "scale of justice" be made obligatory for all? Possibly, turn it over to supervision of the community? The council of Suvorov students, the parent committee and the Komsomol organization—all of them together can, and certainly, should become an obstacle against abuses. What would happen if the assignments lists were made available to junior comrades continuing

their studies in the SVU so that they could see how the very "scale" worked in fact? But what should be done with the fellows who are convinced of the effectiveness of a "telephone call from above"? Advise them not to entertain "such details"? No, today there must be a different solution. Glasnost is capable of indoctrinating honesty. Honesty and honor have the same root, not only as words but also as social concepts.

Who Is Trained in the SVU?

"A future officer should possess the ability to process a large amount of diverse information and for intense mental work under the conditions of a shortage of time...."

(From the procedures on psychological selection of SVU Candidates)

The Suvorov schools were established in 1943 in order to help war orphans get back on their feet. At present, we are shocked by the statistics on orphanhood with living parents. More and more frequently, the opinion is heard that the Suvorov schools should now assume the care of the fellows from the children's homes. How realistic is this? A modern Suvorov school with a 2-year period of instruction trains fellows for admission to the military VUZes. It provides training on the basis of a certain level of education and most importantly knowledge. We can honestly state quite frankly that it would be difficult to find students possessing the required level of knowledge among the graduates of the 8-year boarding schools. In 1988, officers from the Minsk and Moscow Suvorov schools conducted an individual selection of candidates in the boarding schools and children's homes. They frequently encountered pedagogues who were working there with unconcealed amazement:

"You want to find future Suvorov students?! A vain undertaking, this is not the group...."

All the same, 42 candidates were selected for Belorussia. Only 7 made it to the schools. Five were admitted with twos.

In violation of the existing rules, last year 158 persons became Suvorov students. Each of them had received a two on the exam. They were all either students of the children's homes or boarding schools or children whose parents had perished or had become disabled in carrying out official duties.

What should one do when circumstances become stronger than the rules? Probably change the rules. In the given instance, make them more just.

But let us return to the "violation" itself. After the first quarter, 75 percent of the "preferred students" received all the twos. According to the existing rules, they should be expelled. Where?

Let us recall those first Suvorov schools. There were 7 years of instruction and preparatory classes. Both the fellows and their teachers had time to make up for what had been missed. And they did.

Today the army means complex equipment and electronics. You can't go far without engineer knowledge. The quality parameters of the equipment and the human factor are now becoming the main things. In 2 years of study, it is impossible to make up for the numerous gaps in the knowledge of a majority of the "preferred students." It turns out that for this category of boys it is essential to establish a school with at least a 5-year period of instruction. These should be filled on the basis of psychological selection and not exams. This notion will clearly become a matter of friction between the financial interests of several departments. That is one thing if it were just an idea, but behind it is the fate of a boy who must be helped immediately, today, now. The officer educators and the instructors at the Suvorov schools are ready to assume a concern with the boys with difficult histories. There has long been the idea of Kutuzov (or possibly Zhukov) schools where education would be provided for orphaned boys after 4th grade. This is a possible solution to the existing situation.

One other thing about the periods of instruction. As an average, 3 years are spent in a PTU. At a SVU, it is 2 years. The difference is not to the benefit of the future officer candidates in military schools. A third year of instruction is essential. One could hear the argument that supposedly the graduates of secondary schools

would be in a better position in being admitted to the military schools. But certainly they must take entrance exams. Possibly the question could be resolved differently: admit the fellows to the SVU after 7th grade. Whatever the case, the additional year for the Suvorov students would mean improved quality training for the future officers.

In the 1950s, the country had 19 Suvorov schools and 3 Nakhimov schools. In addition, there were special naval, air forces and artillery schools. Now the Suvorov students are studying in eight cities and the Nakhimovs only in Leningrad. The Air Forces Command made a good start in reorganizing special air force schools. It is quite possible that in time these will become Chkalov schools which would train an excellent reserve for manning the aviation military schools.

One other thing which we must say. We are moving toward a cutback in the Armed Forces. Quantity should be compensated for by quality. Hence the question of training an officer requires long-range views, similar thinking and working for an end result.

...In a single article it is difficult to claim complete coverage of all the problems of the Suvorov schools. This was not our goal. Certainly the Suvorov students themselves, their mentors and parents could take best of all about the "sore points."

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