


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Soviet Union

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 9, September 1988

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USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 9, September 1988

Role of Business in U.S. Elections

18030002a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 (signed to press 15 Aug 88) pp 3-12

[Article by Nikolay Anatolyevich Sakharov, candidate of historical sciences and senior research associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Business and the Parties"]

[Text] Each election campaign in the United States is accompanied by tense confrontations between various sociopolitical forces. Prominent businessmen are among the most influential of these. Many American business leaders interact closely with the leaders of the two main bourgeois parties, are prominent members of the campaign "teams" of presidential candidates, and are directly involved in the drafting of the Republican and Democratic party platforms. Besides this, businessmen, especially small businessmen, represent a sizable segment of the voting public. American political statistics indicate that middle- and high-income voters are more likely to vote in elections than members of the poorest strata. Finally, business groups are still the source of the largest financial contributions to candidates and parties.

As we know, American businessmen have been conducting their political activities on a bipartisan basis for a long time. Many of them support both parties' candidates in elections, but the degree of support can vary widely. There are coalitions of businessmen who lean toward either the Republican or Democratic party. Therefore, business does not represent a unified or monolithic force in elections, and its distribution of support between parties usually reflects the overall alignment of forces in U.S. ruling circles. This was once analyzed in depth by V.S. Zorin and I.I. Beglov.¹ How do the Republican and Democratic party bases in the business community look today?

Most American businessmen have taken the side of the Republican Party since the days of the Civil War in the United States. This historical trend has continued up to the present day, and this is attested to by the greater financial support Republican campaigns receive from the business community and by the data of numerous polls of businessmen. A poll of the top executives of the 500 largest industrial companies in 1986 confirmed that the overwhelming majority of members of this substratum of the American monopolistic elite (around 80 percent) supported the Republican Party. Only a few (under 5 percent) of the "Fortune 500" executives were registered Democrats.²

This does not mean that the Democrats are less zealous than the Republicans in securing the interests of the dominant class. Nevertheless, in comparison with the

Republican Party, the Democrats have a narrower base in the American business community. The Republican Party, which is still the "minority party" as far as the general voting public is concerned, retains its influence in the two-party system largely as a result of its position as the "majority party" in the business community. The Republicans have traditionally had obvious financial advantages over the Democrats. In the last congressional elections in 1986, for example, Republican committees collected 185 million dollars in contributions, while Democratic committees collected only 35 million.³

What is the reason for the American businessmen's invariable preference for the Republican Party? The main factor here is the similarity of the views of most businessmen to Republican platform objectives. Although businessmen display flexibility and innovation in commercial operations, their sociopolitical views as a whole are conservative. It is true that most businessmen, especially the executives of the largest monopolies, departed long ago from the doctrine of non-interference by government in the private sector, a doctrine which was so popular in the era of free monopolist capitalism. Today big business interacts closely with the government in the resolution of domestic and foreign problems, but influential financial and industrial groups in the United States are much less likely than businessmen in Western Europe and Japan to support the idea of extensive government regulation, not to mention the planning of economic processes. American business and its leading organizations still insist that government intervention in these processes should be limited and that the market mechanism should operate in a free atmosphere. This idea is one of the main postulates of the Republican party line.

The Republican approach to social problems is close to the views of American businessmen. The Republican anti-union platform essentially reflects the class antagonism between employers and the army of hired labor. The Republicans agree completely with business' opposition to higher government expenditures on social needs and they like to reiterate that each person should rely primarily on himself rather than on the support of government agencies. The business community opposes all attempts to increase budget allocations for the underprivileged and the needy by raising taxes on business. The Republicans also insist that they are against the collection of higher taxes from the wealthier strata of the American society. The owners of capital and the captains of industry constantly demand the reinforcement of the government's police functions in defense of law and order, and this accords completely with the ideological aims of the Republican Party.

Both groups believe that U.S. foreign policy should be pursued primarily from a position of strength and support the continuous buildup of American military strength and the maintenance of a high level of spending on armaments. At the same time, members of influential business groups are now more likely to support the

efforts to limit nuclear weapons and conclude the appropriate agreements between the United States and the USSR. This is now an important element of the Republican Party's foreign policy activity as well.

Businessmen are more likely to trust Republicans than Democrats because of important distinctions in the electoral base of the parties. The Democrats are more closely associated with workers, ethnic minorities, low-income strata, and the liberal segment of the American intelligentsia; many members of these social strata vigorously oppose the excessive influence of monopolies in the economy and in U.S. politics and exert pressure on the party leadership. Republicans, on the other hand, have a more homogeneous and limited social base, consisting primarily of wealthy strata. It is understandable that businessmen would be much more likely to affiliate themselves with the party of property owners than with the party of the lower strata of American society.

The Republican Party's backers include businessmen representing all parts of the United States. The party base is particularly strong in the leading business groups of the northeast. Influential Republicans in the 1980's have included banker D. Rockefeller, Citibank Chairman of the Board W. Wriston, the Houghton family of industrialists, the owners of the Corning Glass monopoly, PepsiCo Chairman of the Board D. Kendall, and many other prominent monopolists from New York, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Boston.

Influential business groups in the midwest have supported the Republicans for a long time. The Crown family of Chicago, who control the General Dynamics military-industrial monopoly, Detroit industrialist M. Fisher, J. Louis from the Johnson family, the owners of the Johnson Wax company—these are just a few of the Republican Party's influential patrons. In the beginning of the 1980's the treasurer of the party national committee was a prominent industrialist from the midwest, R. DeVos, co-owner of the Amway firm.

Leading businessmen in California and other western states have considerable influence in the Republican Party. They include D. Packard, the founder of the Hewlett-Packard electronics company, H. Tuttle, owner of a car dealership in Los Angeles, prominent Los Angeles attorney and businessman W. Smith, and the Weyerhaeuser family, lumber industrialists from the state of Washington.

For a long time the Republican Party base was comparatively narrow in the business community of the southern states, which traditionally supported the Democratic Party. In recent decades, however, the number of Republicans among southern businessmen has risen dramatically. The most active have been prominent businessmen from Dallas—real estate magnate T. Crow, the Hunt family of oil industrialists, and the Thompson family, who control the Southland chain of convenience stores.

Others who warrant special mention are R. Milliken, the head of the Milliken family's textile monopoly in South Carolina, and construction magnate W. Blunt from Alabama.

The businessmen who belong to the Republican Party are most likely to support its centrist (actually conservative-centrist) group, and it is this group that has the broadest base in the U.S. business community. The extreme right wing, however, also has considerable influence in the business community.

The Republican right wing is usually associated primarily with conservative businessmen in the southern and western states who amassed their fortunes a relatively short time ago and are not part of the monopolist elite of the American bourgeoisie. Many members of the nouveau riche in Texas and California support rightwing extremists in the party. These include the previously mentioned Hunts, R. Milliken, and the owners of the Coors brewery in Colorado. Prominent monopolists from other regions also fit into this category: R. Galvin from Chicago, co-owner of the Motorola electronics company, some members of the Du Pont family, the Pew family of oil industrialists from Philadelphia, Wall Street financier W. Simon, I. Galbraith and L. Lehrman, partners in the Morgan Stanley & Co. banking and investment firm, publisher R. Scaife from the Mellon family, and the hotel magnates in the Marriott family.

Sometimes the Republican Party has a discernible liberal wing. The liberalism of its representatives is extremely relative, but some of their views are definitely left of center. Nelson Rockefeller was once regarded as the main spokesman for this group. In the 1960's and 1970's this group was represented by the head of the large Cummins Engine company, I. Miller, and by M. Pillsbury-Lord from the family controlling the Pillsbury food monopoly (Minnesota). In the 1980 presidential campaign independent candidate J. Anderson, who had won the reputation of a progressive Republican in the Congress, received the fairly vigorous backing of influential business groups. It would be difficult to define any of the leading American monopolists today as liberal Republicans, however. The overwhelming majority of Republican businessmen support the conservative-centrist group or the right wing of the party.

As for the segment of the U.S. business community which has consistently supported the Democratic Party, it is distinguished by more pronounced reformist views. The businessmen who support the Democrats share this party's fundamental belief in active economic regulation by the government and large social expenditures for the alleviation of various social problems. Most of the Democratic businessmen agree with the party's preference for social partnership rather than confrontation between employers and workers. The foreign policy views of the business groups supporting the Democratic Party are close to the views of Republican businessmen, and this reflects the bipartisan nature of many areas of the foreign

and military policy of U.S. ruling circles. On the whole, however, the Democratic businessmen are more moderate (and sometimes even more liberal) in their ideological and political views than Republican businessmen. Some of the most conservative of these still regard Democrats as socialists, and the businessmen who support the Democrats as traitors to their own class. It is true that the Democratic segment of the U.S. business community also has some conservative members, and they will be discussed later.

The financial backers of the Democrats include several of the largest banking and investment firms on Wall Street. The Democratic businessmen include F. Rohatyn, partner in Lazard Freres & Co., R. Roos, partner in Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., H. Allen, Jr., co-owner of Allen & Co., and others. For a long time the patriarch of the Democratic Party was financial and industrial magnate, politician, and diplomat A. Harriman. Now his widow, P. Harriman, is an active fundraiser for the Democrats in the ruling elite.

The Democrats' base among the main northeastern industrialists is narrower. The prominent supporters of the party include T. Watson from the Watson family, who owned the IBM company for a long time, E. Bronfman, co-owner of the Seagram company, and A. Wang, the head of Wang Laboratories. The Democrats have many backers among the New York and Washington attorneys closely connected with big business (C. Clifford, L. Cutler, C. Vance, P. Warnke, S. Linowitz, T. Sorenson, and J. Califano).

The Democrats have a few backers in influential business groups in the midwest. They include, in particular, D. Andreas, chairman of the board of Archer-Daniels-Midland, one of the largest agribusiness companies. In recent years the boss of the Chrysler automobile monopoly, L. Iacocca, has formed close ties with Democratic leaders.

The Democrats' earlier monopoly in the south has been seriously undermined, and many local businessmen now support the Republicans. Nevertheless, many influential southern businessmen have maintained their traditional loyalty to the Democratic Party. They include the Reynolds family from Virginia, who control the Reynolds Metals monopoly, and in Texas they include oil industrialists S. Bass, G. Mitchell, and J. Elkins from the Elkins family and lumber magnate A. Temple. Dallas attorney R. Strauss has considerable influence in the party and was once the treasurer and then the chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Houston oil industrialist J. Calloway now heads the committee's fund-raising operations.

Prominent California businessmen also give Democrats campaign support. Until recently the local Democratic organization here was headed by multimillionaire landowner L. Lawrence. The Democrats' main financial backers here include San Francisco real estate magnate

W. Shorenstein and the head of the Music Corporation of America, a Hollywood show business firm, L. Wasserman. In the first half of the 1980's the Democratic National Committee was headed by California attorney and banker C. Manatt.

Most of the Democratic businessmen support the centrist group; some multimillionaires back the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, including several Jewish investment bankers from New York, California computer entrepreneur M. Palevsky, and S. Mott, who inherited the capital of the huge General Motors automobile monopoly. Besides this, several businessmen who support the escalation of the arms race and higher military spending are affiliated with the conservative wing of the Democratic Party. In particular, they include G. Fowler, partner in the Goldman Sachs & Co. banking and investment firm on Wall Street, and P. Nitze, former partner in the Dillon Read & Co. banking firm. Both of them were active in the establishment of the militarist Committee on the Present Danger in the 1970's. Many of the Democrats' supporters in the southern business community have conservative views and assign priority to cuts in social spending. Incidentally, in contrast to other conservatives who insist on the limitation of government regulation, Texas businessmen want more federal government assistance in the economic development of their state. These views are also characteristic of the man who won the Democratic vice-presidential nomination, Senator L. Bentsen from Texas, who is closely associated with these businessmen.

Political scientists who study the party affiliations of businessmen have found that they depend largely on their sectorial, religious, and ethnic affiliations. For example, T. Ferguson and J. Rogers concluded that the Democrats are supported primarily by investment bankers, real estate and construction magnates, and the executives of insurance companies, several leading transnational corporations, and some military-industrial companies.⁴

Another researcher of the Democratic Party, R. Kuttner, has noted that most of the businessmen who support this party are outside the nucleus of the monopolist elite. These are mainly Catholics or Jews rather than Protestants, they are usually representatives of "new money" rather than the owners of inherited fortunes, and they are more likely to be investment bankers than executives in commercial banks, individual oil industrialists than executives of leading oil companies, and real estate speculators than industrialists.⁵

These features of the party affiliations of businessmen are not hard and fast rules. A detailed analysis indicates that there are supporters of the Republicans and the Democrats in each industry or sector of the American economy. There are many Republicans, for example, among the investment bankers on Wall Street. The secretary of the treasury in the Nixon and Ford administrations was W. Simon, a former

partner in Salomon Brothers, and some of the key positions in the Reagan Administration were also offered to investment bankers. The head of Merrill Lynch, D. Regan, was first the secretary of the treasury and then the White House chief of staff; the co-chairman of Goldman Sachs & Co., J. Whitehead, is now the deputy secretary of state; the vice chairman of the Hutton Group, J. Shad, headed the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission. By the same token, the head of the Aetna Life Insurance Company, J. Feiler, leaned more toward the Democratic Party, but top executives R. Beck and R. Shinn from the Prudential and Metropolitan life insurance companies actively supported Republican Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election. Most of the executives of TNC's and military-industrial monopolies are more likely to support Republican candidates. The latter also have many backers among individual oil industrialists. An important feature of the party affiliations of nouveau riche businessmen is that the initial base of Reagan's political career in the Republican Party consisted almost exclusively of representatives of "new money" in California.

The statement that Catholics or Jews are prevalent among the Democratic businessmen also requires some clarification. Wall Street financier W. Simon, for example, is an influential Republican and a prominent Catholic. Although the Jewish bourgeoisie is still likely to support the Democrats, the Republicans also have a base in this community, and it has expanded perceptibly in the 1980's. The same is true of the negro bourgeoisie: The Republicans are trying to consolidate their influence here by encouraging "black capitalism."

The party affiliations of small business, which is called "Main Street" in America (after the main street in small towns), are not uniform either. The Republicans regard Main Street as their natural ally because of the widespread conservatism among small businessmen. There are many liberal capitalists, however, in big and small business. One indication of this is the organization known as Businessmen for National Security, made up primarily of small and middle businessmen who advocate nuclear arms control and limits on military spending.

The mass media play an exceptionally important role in American politics. During campaigns they mold voter opinions of candidates and have a significant effect on the outcome of elections. Most of the owners of newspapers, magazines, and radio and television companies are Republicans, just as most of the owners of other businesses in the United States. In the 1984 presidential campaign, for example, 386 newspapers supported Republican Ronald Reagan and only 63 supported Democrat W. Mondale.⁶ It is true that Democratic candidates are consistently supported by such leading newspapers as THE WASHINGTON POST and THE NEW YORK TIMES, controlled by the Graham and Sulzberger families. Real estate magnate M. Zuckerman, who became the owner of the ATLANTIC and U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT magazines in the 1980's, supports

the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party is also supported by A. Cox Chambers, the co-owner of a large southern newspaper, the ATLANTA CONSTITUTION.

The division of businessmen into Democrats and Republicans is extremely hypothetical and relative. In spite of some important distinctions in approaches to foreign and domestic policy issues, the Democrats and Republicans agree on the need to secure the common interests of American capitalism, and this allows businessmen to interact with both parties. It is indicative that in congressional elections businessmen are more likely to make campaign contributions to politicians who are already members of the upper echelons of the supreme legislative body in the United States; party affiliations are secondary here. And although some businessmen are more likely to support Republicans in the elections while others are more likely to contribute to Democratic campaigns, they are united by a common class ideology and mentality, their common social milieu, and their common commercial interests.

Businessmen frequently make campaign contributions not on the basis of the party affiliations of candidates but on the basis of their own feelings about the candidates. The regrouping of forces in the business community is a frequent occurrence in the final stage of a campaign, when businessmen foresee to the probable victory of certain candidates and "jump onto the winners' bandwagon." Nevertheless, in presidential elections the overwhelming majority of American businessmen consistently vote for Republican candidates. Only once, in the 1964 election, did the Democratic Party win majority support in the business community, when centrist L. Johnson ran against rightwing Republican B. Goldwater, whose extremism was unacceptable to the businessmen. In all other cases, Democratic candidates have won the minority vote in the business community whether they have won or lost the election.

The 1988 presidential campaign is no exception to this rule. At the beginning of the year a FORTUNE poll of the top executives of the leading industrial corporations indicated that most of them supported Republican G. Bush.⁷ Influential groups were pleased with this candidate for several reasons. It was important to them that he represented the Republican Party and that he was loyal to its leadership. During the Watergate crisis, for example, when he was chairman of the Republican National Committee, he did not dissociate himself from the discredited President Nixon, and during the Irangate scandal he also remained on the side of President Reagan. It is also important that his views lean toward the conservative-centrist line in the party, which has the greatest support among influential business groups. Just as most businessmen, Bush favors limited government intervention in the affairs of the private sector and opposes high taxes on corporate profits. In unison with the majority of businessmen, he asserts that the problem

of the huge U.S. budget deficit should be solved primarily by cutting government expenditures on social programs, and he has appealed for energetic concerted action by business and government to enhance the effectiveness of the educational system for the provision of the American economy with more highly qualified personnel. He is in favor of better conditions for blacks and other minorities and has promised to "span the black community with the bridge of capitalism and enterprise," and this is also consistent with the common view in the business community.

The foreign policy aspects of Bush's platform also impress many in the business world. He believes in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy from a position of strength, but he also favors the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. This kind of duality is characteristic of the political thinking of many prominent American businessmen, who acknowledge the realities of the nuclear age but still cannot give up the hopeless and dangerous illusion that the United States can achieve military-strategic supremacy over the rest of the world.

Bush's social origins and his own career in business are important factors contributing to his support in the business community.⁸ Bush, the son of a Wall Street banker, made a large fortune for himself in the oil business and became a member of the elite Trilateral Commission, created on the initiative of D. Rockefeller, at the end of the 1970's. Incidentally, many American publications, especially those expressing rightwing extremist views, portray G. Bush as a member of the eastern establishment and a protege of the Rockefellers. His base in the business community, however, is much broader, and this was clearly apparent even in Bush's first presidential campaign in 1980. He was supported then not only by members of the Rockefeller family but also by some of his long-time backers in the Houston business community and by prominent California financier W. Draper.

The forces backing Bush in the current presidential campaign look even more impressive. The fund-raising for his campaign is headed by Texas oil industrialist and millionaire R. Mosbacher. One of the Bush's closest advisers is his Yale classmate N. Brady, the head of an influential Wall Street banking firm, Dillon Read & Co. The head of the gigantic Westinghouse Electric monopoly, D. Danforth, held a fund-raising dinner for Bush in his own home. One of Reagan's prominent sponsors and supporters, H. Tuttle, the Los Angeles car dealer, has also come out in support of Bush. As a result of this, Bush was ahead of all other contenders for the presidency in terms of campaign contributions from the very beginning.

Another factor contributing to Bush's strong alliance with influential business groups is his reputation as an experienced leader (he occupied important positions in

three administrations) and a responsible official. Members of these groups believe that Bush will always maintain his ties with business leaders if he is elected and that he will coordinate his policies with them. In the opinion of American business leaders, as far as the two main candidates for the presidency in 1988 are concerned, Bush is a known quantity, an experienced official whose actions will be predictable and who will certainly secure the continuity of the Reagan Administration's pro-monopoly policies while abandoning some its extremes.

In contrast to Bush, his rival M. Dukakis entered the arena of big politics only recently. As the governor of Massachusetts he proved to be an extremely effective administrator and a man willing to work closely with the private sector. This brought the new Democratic leader the support of a certain segment of the U.S. business community, especially the businessmen who have traditionally supported this party.

One of Dukakis' prominent backers is multimillionaire A. Wang, the co-owner of Wang Laboratories in Massachusetts. When Wang announced his support for Dukakis, he stressed that his actions as governor of Massachusetts had stimulated the growth of commercial activity in the state. The multimillionaire Kennedys, who still have political influence, also support their local politician. Many members of the wealthy Greek community in the United States have also taken Dukakis' side because of his Greek origins. The members of this community include prominent businessmen from Boston, Chicago, and New York and many owners of small trade enterprises. Besides this, Dukakis is backed by many members of the influential Jewish community in America, to which his wife belongs.

The Democratic candidate's foreign policy program appeals to the businessmen who support more sizable steps toward the reduction of U.S. and USSR nuclear arms than the steps the Republicans are prepared to take. At the same time, military industrialists are intrigued by Dukakis' appeal for a conventional arms buildup.

During the primaries Dukakis collected more money for his campaign fund than any previous Democratic candidate for the presidency. The previously mentioned poll of the top executives of the leading industrial corporations, however, indicated that only a few members of this influential substratum of American business supported his candidacy. It is probable that most American businessmen will vote for the Republican candidate in this election as well. Some indication of their mood can be found in a lengthy article the leading organ of monopolist groups, *FORTUNE*, published under a title which struck fear into its readers: "Democrats: Raise Taxes or Win?"⁹ The article asserted that the election of Democrats in general and of M. Dukakis in particular would certainly mean a rise in taxes for business and broader government economic regulation. The article stressed that once again, just as in the 1984 campaign, the Democrats were proposing a so-called industrial policy,

envisaging united effort by business, the federal government, and the labor unions for the assistance of regions and industries in a state of crisis and for the promotion of the most dynamic forces in the economy. Many businessmen see the industrial policy primarily as an augmentation of government's role in the economic sphere and are therefore inclined to have negative feelings about the kind of partnership the Democrats have suggested. FORTUNE warned that the Democrats were planning to use anti-trust legislation more actively for the prevention of speculative mergers and takeovers in the private sector.

The business community also opposes Dukakis' support of union demands for a higher minimum wage and larger employer contributions to employee health insurance plans and his statements about the impermissibility of American corporate investments in the economy of the racist regime in South Africa.

In order to weaken the campaign position of Bush's rival as much as possible, conservative groups in the American business community are trying to convince the voters that Dukakis played a negative role, and certainly not a positive one, in the office of governor. To this end, a book compiled with the active participation of the largest bank in Massachusetts, the Bank of Boston, was published at the height of the campaign. It portrays Dukakis as a typical liberal Democrat—in other words, as an opponent of business and economic growth and an advocate of a heavier tax burden on the private sector. The authors assert that Dukakis professed more moderate views after he lost his bid for re-election in the state and that this repaired his relationship with local business groups and allowed him to return to the office of governor later.¹⁰

The campaign attacks on the Democratic candidate by some business groups certainly do not mean that he would be completely unacceptable to the business community as the next president of the United States. Dukakis' liberalism in the spheres of social and economic policy is extremely moderate and he certainly has not aroused the kind of impassioned criticism and antagonism with which business groups have responded to other Democratic candidates.

In spite of the significant differences in their views, both candidates lean toward the center, toward the position shared by many leaders of the American bourgeoisie. As the American press has pointed out, Dukakis' economic program is geared primarily to business interests in the most advanced high-technology industries in the U.S. economy. Republican candidate Bush has also underscored his belief in encouraging primarily the businessmen who are actively incorporating the latest technology. We could never say that the different segments of the American business community have no preferences as to which candidate will become the 41st president of the United States and which party will make up the next

administration, but it is clear that the new administration, just as all previous ones, will interact closely with the monopolist elite of the dominant class.

Footnotes

1. V.S. Zorin, "Dollary i politika Vashingtona" [Dollars and Washington Policy], Moscow, 1964, pp 129-151; I.I. Beglov, "SShA: sobstvennost i vlast'" [United States: Property and Power], Moscow, 1971, pp 376-502.
2. FORTUNE, 28 April 1986, p 27.
3. R. Kuttner, "The Life of the Party. Democratic Prospects in 1988 and Beyond," New York, 1987, p 42.
4. T. Ferguson and J. Rogers, "Right Turn," New York, 1986, pp 145-146, 224.
5. R. Kuttner, Op. cit., p 44.
6. M. Parenti, "Inventing Reality. The Politics of the Mass Media," New York, 1986, p 13.
7. FORTUNE, 15 February 1988, p 33.
8. For biographical notes on the leading candidates, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1988, No 7—Ed.
9. FORTUNE, 11 April 1988, pp 63-66.
10. THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 22 March 1988.

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Discussion of Democratic Platform, Strengths
18030002b Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 (signed to press 15 Aug 88) pp 13-21

[Article by Vladislav Martinovich Zubok and Aleksandr Nikitich Darchiyev, candidates of historical sciences and researchers at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "The Democrats on Election Eve"]

[Text] The results of the Reagan Administration's 8 years in power are being summed up in the United States. The present situation is distinguished by a state of transition, change, and inquiry.... The old and the new, a desire to preserve continuity and a demand for change, are curiously intermingled in the public mood and in the views of ruling circles and the leaders of both parties. After swinging to the right at the beginning of the 1980's, the political pendulum has returned to the center, registering the disappearance of the impulses giving rise to the "conservative wave." The outlines of the post-Reagan era, however, are still indistinct.

After Reagan makes his exit from the political stage, the legacy he leaves behind will affect the new administration's approach to domestic and foreign policy issues. Public opinion polls indicate, however, that the American mood as a whole is turning away from Reaganism, with its apologies for the free market, toward an acknowledgement of government's positive role in the resolution of socioeconomic problems. This is giving the Democrats new opportunities as the opposition party which has traditionally upheld the idea of using government levers to regulate the effects of the market economy and alleviate social tension. The tendencies prevailing in the new political cycle will depend largely on the nature of the alternative the Democrats propose for the 1990's.

Party Groups and Their Programs

In the first half of the 1980's the Democrats' position in American politics became much weaker, their social base became much narrower, and their share of the electorate decreased perceptibly. The abandonment of this party by large groups of voters, a process accelerated by socio-structural and demographic changes in the American society (they will be discussed later), forced its leaders to consider the renovation of the party's political ideology and a change in campaign strategy and tactics.

Even before the current campaign began, the Democratic Party was divided into discernible groups with different attitudes toward the policy line which had failed at the end of the 1970's. The previous intensity of intra-party rivalry declined perceptibly, and a new generation of politicians occupied the leading positions. The balance of power between the main groups became distinct. Liberals of the old school lost the initiative in policymaking to the younger party officials advocating the reassessment of the traditions, principles, and methods of postwar policy.

The leading role is now being played by the moderate-liberal wing. Its leaders are the influential politicians of the new generation who made a name for themselves in the early 1980's—Senators B. Bradley and J. Biden, Congressmen T. Wirth and R. Gephardt, and others. In the 1984 campaign the neoliberals were represented by Senator G. Hart; in the current campaign the Democratic candidate for the presidency—Governor M. Dukakis of the State of Massachusetts—came from the moderate-liberal wing.

The group of conservative politicians from the southern states, including Speaker of the House J. Wright, Senators S. Nunn and A. Gore, Jr., and others, is quite influential.

The left wing still occupies a prominent place, although not as prominent as in the 1970's. Its nucleus consists of progressive labor unions, the civil rights movements of

blacks and other minorities, leftwing liberal organizations, J. Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, and the Democratic Socialists of America, headed by American socialist leader M. Harrington. As we know, Jackson was Dukakis' runner-up among the Democratic contenders for the presidential nomination in primary elections and caucuses.

The position of the group of liberals of the old school was weakened by the defeat of W. Mondale in 1984, and in this campaign their influence has been declining ever since M. Cuomo, the popular governor of New York, refused to join the race and Senator P. Simon from Illinois did run but then dropped out of the race after suffering a defeat at the very start of the primaries.

All of the different Democratic groups are now striving for unity in November. There are still important distinctions between them, however, in their views on key items on the agenda, in their approaches, and in their regional and financial base.

We will start with the neoliberals. After setting forth their widely publicized "new ideas" in the beginning of the 1980's, they tried to strengthen and expand the party's social base by appealing to the moderate segment of the monopolist elite and to the middle strata comprised of the majority of voters in the United States. As the advocates of a moderate reformist policy, the neoliberals assign priority to the stimulation of economic growth through the adjustment of social programs and the reduction of direct government social expenditures. As for government activity in the economy, they are prepared to give up ineffective forms of business regulation. They criticize Reaganism for its irresponsibility and incompetence and prefer a de-ideologized, technocratic approach.

The moderate-liberal wing has taken the initiative in defining the party's position on the main economic issues. The neoliberals advocate the structural reorganization of the economy, with emphasis on the new industries based on the latest technology and meeting the demands of competition in the world market. Although they acknowledge the negative effects of restructuring, which would change, in Hart's words, the image of the American labor market,¹ they hope to alleviate them through the purposeful retraining of workers and the offer of social assistance to those in genuine need by putting it in the hands of state governments and charitable organizations.

The socioeconomic platform of the neoliberals is a contradictory combination of reliance on market regulation of the economy and the hope of developing new forms of social partnership between business and the labor unions under government auspices. Whereas the Republicans want to transfer the entire matter of structural reorganization over to private capital, a plan with which southern Democrats agree, the neoliberals are inclined to consider the interests of labor unions, ethnic

minorities, and low-income strata. They have to do this if they want to keep their reputation as "friends of labor" in the eyes of their traditional supporters in the industrial northeastern and midwestern states. There is no question, however, that the real policy of the neoliberals, which is consistent with the attitudes of well-to-do and highly educated middle strata, cannot take all of the genuine needs of the lower social strata into account.

Seeing a healthier economy as the solution to the main problems of the country and the party, the neoliberals are cautious in their approach to social issues. They favor limits on government spending, including military spending, and effective government, which, in M. Dukakis' words, "should be active where necessary and not interfere where it is not necessary."²

In an attempt to expand their social base, members of the moderate-liberal wing publicize the successful policies of several governors—Dukakis himself, R. Lamm from Colorado, and others. They were able to win more voters over to the party's side in their states while retaining the old segments of the party coalition. In particular, Dukakis' activities as governor received extensive coverage; the skillful advertising of these activities played an important role in this politician's success in the primaries. This was something known as the "Massachusetts miracle"—the rapid and stable development of the state economy as a result of an efficient policy of regulation which allowed the inhabitants of the state to retain earlier social gains without any painful effects on the middle class—such as a budget deficit, inflation, or higher taxes.³

Many of the ideas and proposals of the moderate-liberal wing have been taken up by the southern Democrats. They have a strong position in the party leadership and in the Democratic faction in the Senate.

The group of southern Democrats of the new generation put forth their own platform in February 1985 by establishing the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC).

The council, headed by former Governor of Virginia C. Robb, was quickly joined by 130 influential politicians, including 19 senators, 69 members of the House of Representatives, and 13 state governors. Announcing their goal of a new party line, differing from the line of old-school liberals like W. Mondale, the council activists proceeded to strengthen their position in the party. The leaders in the council are Georgia Senator S. Nunn, the head of the Committee on the Armed Services, and other southerners who are the chairmen of key Senate committees—Budget (L. Chiles) and Finance (L. Bentsen). After Texan J. Wright was elected speaker of the House of Representatives, the southerners had more influence in the planning of the party agenda and personnel policy. Recent campaigns have demonstrated that a Democratic victory in 1988 will be impossible without the support of southern voters (who backed Republicans in the last two elections), and this gives this group considerable influence.

The southerners' political ideology includes some of the ideas and slogans of the Reaganists and some of the proposals of the neoliberals; it stipulates more conservative party aims. This applies above all to economic problems, because the southerners reject Ronald Reagan's social-Darwinist philosophy in the social and ideological spheres. The new generation of southern Democrats acknowledges the need for social reform, but only on an extremely limited scale; in comparison with the supporters of racial segregation from the 1930's through the 1960's, the new southern politicians are more willing to work with other groups in the party.

The southerners believe in the mobilization of resources in the private sector to stimulate economic growth and oppose broader government intervention for the sake of the modernization of American industry and the enhancement of its ability to compete with the flood of cheap goods from Japan and other countries. They reject efforts to control the activities of corporations and advocate reasonable deregulation and the granting of tax advantages and other privileges to big capital. The southerners support the reform of the entire social security system in the United States, viewing the reduction of social spending as a means of reducing the federal budget deficit. They believe that abolishing free government assistance, decentralizing it, and turning it over to state governments will enhance the effectiveness of the remaining welfare programs. In the opinion of these southerners, these programs should obligate the recipients of assistance to seek employment more actively or to acquire new skills. In contrast to the neoliberals, they support restrictions on the activities of labor unions and defend the principles of the anti-labor laws in several southern states. The southerners are not afraid of the possibility of increased social friction and are willing to sacrifice some programs for the sake of the restructuring and growth of the economy.

Early in the campaign the southern group of Democrats already had the support of large corporations, Pentagon contractors, and financial groups. They receive large contributions from Texas oil capital and from the group of Virginia businessmen making up IMPAC-88, with major dealers in real estate among its members.

Even with this solid political-organizational base, however, the southern Democrats were unable to produce a strong candidate in this campaign. Their leaders, C. Robb and S. Nunn, who support the tough line in foreign policy and take a conservative, pro-Reagan position in domestic policy, did not choose to run. This decision was dictated by the fear of coming up against the vigorous opposition of the party's liberal backers.⁴ The only representative of the southern group in the campaign, Senator A. Gore, Jr., had to concede to leftwing leader J. Jackson.

The leftwing Democrats have a completely different view of the party's future than the members of the moderate-liberal wing and the southerners. Declaring their intention to continue the reformist tradition of the 1930's through

the 1960's, they blame the failures of many liberal moves in the 1960's and 1970's not on the excessive escalation of government regulation, but on the subordination of government policy to corporate interests. In their opinion, these failures were a result of the structural crisis of the entire system of postwar capitalism in the 1970's, a result of the intensification of global interdependence and contradictions in the world which had spread beyond national boundaries and could not be controlled by the earlier Keynesian methods of economic regulation.⁵ In addition to these fundamental causes, the leftwing Democrats list other reasons for the failure of the party's earlier policy line: The goals of social programs were vague and were not balanced sufficiently, many programs duplicated one another and were ineffective and, finally, huge sums were spent on the maintenance of the swollen and excessive bureaucracy.⁶

The consideration of past experience served as the basis of the proposals of the left wing's "think tanks"—the Institute for Policy Studies, the Economic Policy Institute, and others. These proposals are based on a variety of ideas, from the social reformist plans of the American socialists to the "economic populism" proposed by economists J. Foe, R. Kuttner, L. Thurow, B. Bluestone, and others.⁷ All of these authors agree that the Democratic Party must formulate a precise and vigorous program of action before the election and plan an economic strategy combining economic growth and higher labor productivity with the resolution of social problems and the institution of a new "social contract."⁸ A key aspect of this new strategy, in the opinion of leftwing Democrats, should be the democratic reconstruction of the economy, presupposing some socialization of corporate property, the public control of investments, the institution of some elements of national planning, and widespread participation by workers and employees in management.

Questions of social justice are central in the campaign slogans of the Democratic left wing. Jackson has put special emphasis on them. His populist criticism of big business and corporate America guaranteed him the support of not only the overwhelming majority of black Americans, but also 15-20 percent of the white voters from the working class, the middle strata, and the liberal intelligentsia. Jackson believes that reformist activism must be given a more radical nature and has advised the party to express unequivocal support for social reform. His demands include the payment of higher taxes by corporations and the rich, full employment, a higher minimum wage, a national system of public health care, the doubling of federal expenditures on education and, finally, dramatic cuts in military spending, the consent to disarmament, and the renunciation of interventionism.

The Democratic left wing has increased its influence in the party and strengthened its position, which had been weakened in the late 1970's and early 1980's. In general, however, the party agenda is formulated under the influence of centrist tendencies; its present ideological-political features are dictated by the succession of one generation by another in the party leadership and by regional changes.

After witnessing the failures of postwar Democratic policy in the 1970's and its resounding defeat in the 1980's, the new party leaders were inclined to avoid any direct confrontations with Reaganism. Now that the Democrats of the new generation, both southerners and members of the moderate-liberal wing, have assumed leadership of the party, they are speaking out against the extremes of socio-economic policy in the 1960's and in the 1980's and are advocating a more moderate position.

The New Democrats and the Voters

The average age of the Democrats of the new generation is under 50. They differ perceptibly from the leaders of the old school in their social origins and their ideological and psychological image. Most of them are highly educated professionals—attorneys, journalists, experts in advertising and the mass media, and members of the academic community. The leaders of the older generation were the children of workers, small shopkeepers, and farmers. They were supported by the party machine in big cities and worked hand in hand with labor unions. The new Democrats are the personification of the new middle strata and they come from white suburban America. Their electoral districts are also located in the suburbs as a rule, and the backing of labor unions and urbanites is of secondary importance to them.

The view of contemporary political reality through the prism of the old "conservatism-liberalism" dichotomy is alien to the new Democrats. They prefer to take a pragmatic and de-ideologized approach to problems. They have negative feelings about the bureaucratic model of public administration of the 1930's through the 1960's, measures of administrative regulation, the concentration of authority at the federal level, centralization, the reinforcement of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative branch, etc.

The new Democrats witnessed, and frequently participated in, the "counterculture revolution" of the 1960's. They are even more distant than their predecessors from the black-and-white, one-dimensional view of the world and from the slogans of American exclusivity and chauvinism. They are more receptive to the idea of global interdependence, assuming the coexistence of different cultures, races, and nationalities, and to the principles of planetary thinking. The new Democrats are not inclined to blame communism for all of the social unrest and upheavals in the developing countries, they know the real reasons for these events, they understand the limited value of the use of military strength in international affairs, and they prefer more flexible forms and methods of participation in world events. The new Democrats want to put the emphasis on non-nuclear weapons and a "more rational" U.S. military machine.

Some of the new Democrats want to restore the party's earlier firm position in matters of military and foreign policy and not only support some Republican bills on new military programs but also introduce their own—

specifically, the Midgetman missile program. Intra-party differences are not as pronounced in this sphere as the old differences between the "doves" and the "hawks," but they do exist. Whereas southerners S. Nunn, A. Gore, E. Hollings, L. Aspin, and some others place new military programs above arms reduction talks, regard these programs as the future basis of strategic stability, and do not believe in a nuclear-free world, Governor M. Dukakis, Senators G. Hart and C. Dodd, Congressman S. Solarz, and most of the Democrats in the Congress are willing to give up the idea of "reduction through buildup" and cancel new programs for the modernization of strategic arms. They feel it will be senseless to deploy large antimissile systems with space- and land-based elements. These politicians are most likely to believe that the perestroika in the USSR could relieve the United States of the burden of "cold war" and of some military expenditures and could demilitarize foreign policy. In general, the new Democrats support the INF Treaty and oppose the "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Opposition to the continuation of military aid to the Nicaraguan contras is strong in this group.

The events connected with the ratification of the INF Treaty proved that spokesmen for a tougher line, especially S. Nunn, have strengthened their position. Relying on the combined strength of the members of the party's conservative wing, they will probably be able to continue influencing military policy and disarmament talks.

The succession of one generation by another and the arrival of the young politicians coincided with changes in the balance of power in the party leadership. The northeastern and midwestern leaders are being ousted by representatives of the southern and southwestern states.

The demographic changes resulting from migration to the "sun belt" states, from Florida to California, have turned the south into the leading region in terms of population: In 1984 more than 81 million people lived in the south, whereas 50 million lived in the northeast and 59 million lived in the midwest. As a result, the north lost 15 seats in Congress to the south; this process is expected to continue at the same rate. After the 1986 elections the majority of new senators and members of the House of Representatives were southerners. In the congressional campaign this year, two of the three novices with a good chance of winning a Senate seat are southerners. These are the previously mentioned C. Robb and former Governor of Florida R. Askew. The influence of the south and its role as a supplier of the party elite have been increasing throughout the 1970's and 1980's, but this does not mean the decline of the northeast and the midwest, the source of many earlier Democratic initiatives.

The importance of southern votes in presidential elections, however, is indisputable. When the Democrats lost the presidential elections of 1980 and 1984 with such a wide margin, they suffered their most perceptible losses in the south, where the Republicans had doubled their support. It is true that the Democrats regained

control of the Senate in the midterm elections in 1986 after losing it in 1980; their strong position on the state and local levels secures them a solid majority in the House of Representatives.⁹ Furthermore, forecasts do not predict any serious changes in the situation in Congress. Opinions vary, however, with regard to the outcome of presidential elections. Some researchers of demographic and sociopolitical processes, for example, say that the nomination of M. Dukakis, whose political career is firmly associated with the northeast, will doom the Democrats to defeat in the south.

According to common opinion, the outcome of the elections will depend largely on which of the two candidates will win the affection of "independents": They represent 36 percent of all voters on the national level and they also represent around a third of the voters in the south. Party specialists and consultants who have assessed all of the possible versions of the "southern strategy" believe that the unification of a large segment of the white middle strata and the overwhelming majority of black voters under its banners is an attainable goal. In the belief that the "sun belt" states are "traditionally populist and anti-elitist regions in the political geography of the United States" (in any case, this is the belief of the well-known journalist K. Phillips), the Democrats are planning their moves accordingly. They are proceeding on the assumption that the conservatism of most white southerners, blue- and white-collar workers, can be neutralized with appeals to their vital economic interests, which usually conflict with the free market philosophy and are closer to the activist principles of the Democrats.

In the final analysis, however, the primary consideration for Democrats in the upcoming election will not be regional problems, but the attraction of the young and middle-aged voters from the "baby boom" generation, representing around half of the entire potential voting public.¹⁰ American sociologists categorize around one-third of the members of this generation as "new-collar workers," members of the "lower-middle class" who experienced increasing difficulties finding jobs, supporting their families, buying their own homes, and so forth in the 1980's. Many of these voters trusted Reagan in the last presidential election, but now they are facing problems which cannot be solved by Reagan's conservative policies and are returning to the once discredited idea of active government social policy.

Polls indicate that the measures Dukakis proposes for the stimulation of economic growth (and the populist rhetoric of J. Jackson, who criticizes corporations for "taking jobs out of the country"), appeal to the "new-collar workers." The fact that Dukakis belongs to the new generation of politicians is an argument in his favor, and another is the economic recovery in Massachusetts. In a direct confrontation with the Republicans, however, the negative reputation the Democratic Party gained in the last decade when it was unable to solve difficult economic problems will work against him. This reputation was repaired somewhat in 1986 and 1987, but only

30 percent of the Americans associate the Democrats with the hope of economic prosperity, whereas 40 percent do expect this of the Republicans. Dukakis will have to make a great effort to emerge from the unfavorable shadow his party casts over him.

Finances and Elections

In public opinion polls the Democrats are far ahead of the Republicans in the number of voters expressing support for them (42 percent against 29 percent).¹¹ The problem, however, consists in mobilizing these voters to take part in the elections. The Democrats are seriously inferior to their rivals in organizing techniques, in fund-raising methods, and in the size of contributions.

In recent months the Democrats have narrowed the gap between them and the Republicans in campaign funds and technical equipment. An expensive computerized communications center, paid for with a contribution from A. Harriman's widow, began operating in party national headquarters. With this center, the Democrats can organize efficient direct-mail fund-raising campaigns; communication satellites facilitate appearances on local television networks and individual TV antennae. The Democrats have been paying more attention to this kind of work in recent years. Dukakis conducted a successful experiment: He entered the addresses of 40,000 of his most reliable backers, representing 2 percent of the voting public of the state, into a computer databank. As a result, the governor collected 2.5 million dollars in contributions in this way in 1986 and, what is most important, activated the nucleus of his political coalition. It is interesting that after the primary elections were over, Dukakis had a personal campaign fund twice as large as that of Republican G. Bush.

All of these new circumstances have reduced the financial and technical gap which threatened the Democrats with negative consequences in the presidential campaign. Nevertheless, the financial strength of the Democrats as a whole relies less on contributions from the general public than on labor unions, the political action committees (PAC's) of corporations, and the Jewish community. Furthermore, the role of labor unions and especially of the Jewish community is growing weaker, while the percentage of contributions from the business community is increasing.¹² In contrast to this, the Republican Party is financed primarily by members of the general public from more or less wealthy strata.

This gap can keep the Democrats from winning the support of the "new-collar workers," "independents," and undecided voters. The Republicans have taken every opportunity to cite the Democrats' dependence on funds from major contributors ("fat cats") and various "special interest groups." In an effort to defuse these accusations, which could be fatal to the party, some

Democrats have refused to accept campaign contributions from the PAC's of unions and corporations. In 1984 this was announced by G. Hart, and M. Dukakis followed his example when he was still governor.

The leaders of the Democratic Party are trying to employ Republican methods of business management and are reviewing the party's financial and technical base. In contrast to the last presidential campaign, this time much less attention is being paid to the publication of documents clarifying the party's ideological position. The Democrats have virtually no theorists in central headquarters, and the reason cited by party leaders for this lack is that no one reads these documents and that the party has to concentrate on bringing simple and concise slogans to the attention of the average voter.

There is a deeper reason, however, for the emphasis on the financial and technical side of the matter. The Democratic leaders believe that the forces rallying round Republican candidate G. Bush have no impressive stock of new ideas and approaches. Everything they do and say is unavoidably covered by the shadow of the Reagan presidency. For this reason, the Democratic leaders assume that the ideological and political initiative is automatically in their hands.

In the last 3 or 4 years the Democratic Party as a whole has made perceptible advances in the elaboration and clarification of its agenda. A sizable contribution has been made by "think tanks," the Democratic Leadership Council, and the commissions of the National Committee, especially the platform commission, which did so much work in 1985 and 1986. Its members represented all of the main groups in the party, and their proposals became part of the party platform and defined general objectives for the end of the 1980's and the first half of the 1990's.

The discussion of the party platform at the party convention in Atlanta (Georgia) on 19 July took place in an atmosphere of party unity.

Dukakis, who won the votes of the majority of delegates, was not only nominated as the official candidate but also secured the support of J. Jackson. The latter proved at the convention that he was a force to be reckoned with by the party leadership. He proved he was a responsible politician by avoiding confrontation during the discussion of the party platform, compiled under the influence of Dukakis' supporters from the moderate-liberal wing.

The nomination of the vice-presidential candidate was an equally important event at the convention. The choice of Senator L. Bentsen from Texas could, in the opinion of many analysts, become an important factor guaranteeing Dukakis the support of the party electorate in the southwestern and southern states and of influential conservative leaders in the south.

The Democrats have now completed the stage of intra-party consolidation and have left behind the period of pronounced differences of opinion. In the near future we will learn whether the opposition Democratic Party will be given a chance this year to start a new chapter in U.S. political history.

Footnotes

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 March 1984.
2. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 21 December 1987.
3. The governor's program for the partial conversion of military industry in the state to civilian production has also aroused interest. This aspect of the "Massachusetts experiment" will be the subject of an article in the next issue of the magazine—Ed.
4. TIME, 31 August 1987, p 21.
5. DISSENT, Winter 1988, p 65.
6. MOTHER JONES, June 1986, pp 13-21.
7. DISSENT, Winter 1988, pp 44-56; R. Kuttner, "The Life of the Party. Democratic Prospects in 1988 and Beyond," New York, 1987, p 197.
8. "Post-Reagan America," New York, 1987, pp 18, 25, 35.
9. We should recall that the relative strength of the factions in the two houses of Congress is now the following: 54 Democrats and 46 Republicans in the Senate, and 258 Democrats and 177 Republicans in the House of Representatives.
10. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1987, No 9, pp 63-68.
11. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1 December 1987.
12. T. Edsall, "The Political Impasse," THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 26 March 1987, p 8; R. Kuttner, Op. cit., pp 43-46, 50-55.

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Influence of Propaganda in U.S.-USSR Relations 18030002c Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 (signed to press 15 Aug 88) pp 22-31

[Article by Tatyana Yuryevna Znamenskaya, candidate of philological sciences, and Aleksandr Viktorovich Smagin, candidate of philosophical sciences, both researchers at Sociology Institute of USSR Academy of Sciences: "Foreign Policy Propaganda: War of Words or Interested Dialogue?"]

[Text] Soviet-American dialogue.... People had to wait so long for it, and the road to it was so hard. The summit meeting in Moscow is the result of the new political thinking. The heads of both states, representatives of different sociopolitical systems, are able, in spite of their differences, to find a common language for the discussion of the most vital issues of the present day, especially the problem of preserving life on earth. "The two leaders," the joint statement of the Moscow summit says, "do not underestimate the real differences in history, tradition, and ideology which will continue to affect Soviet-American relations, but they believe that the dialogue will also continue because it is based on realism and focused on concrete results."

We have to admit with regret that the political leaders of the USSR and the United States have made greater advances in Soviet-American dialogue than their national mass media, which should serve as a channel of international communication. What is keeping the Soviet and American mass media from conducting a dialogue of partners rather than a "war of words"?

The word "propaganda" comes from the Latin "propagare," which originally meant "to transplant seedlings." The word eventually took on metaphorical connotations in the minds of the ancient Romans: to transplant the seedlings of new ideas.... The ancient mind thought of propaganda primarily as instructive activity, as the logical and precise expression of one's own views—combined with proper consideration for the views of the other side. In this context, the philosopher Socrates was one of the most brilliant propagandists of his time. He structured his famous conversations according to the principle of dialogue, with pronounced respect for the opinions of his real or imaginary opponent.

There is mention of propaganda as a specific and purposeful activity in 1627. It was then that Pope Urban VIII founded the "Congregation for Propaganda"—a committee of cardinals in charge of the missionary activity of the Catholic Church. Even then, the term retained its original meaning and primarily signified instructive activity—obviously, within the framework of Catholicism.

The meaning of the term changed in time, and in the 20th century it acquired obvious negative connotations in the West.¹ A tenacious stereotype took shape: The

"enemy" conducts propaganda, but the "free world" resists it by countering it with true and objective information. "We should be proud," one guide to "public diplomacy" says, "that the United States as a whole adheres to a completely different standard of behavior than the communist countries. America delivers the message of freedom, human rights, cultural and economic development...."² In this way, everything coming out of the USSR is portrayed as disinformation for obviously hostile purposes; the United States, on the other hand, disseminates the truth, delivers the "message of freedom," etc.

We have our own equivalent of this stereotype: We conduct "ideological struggle," but they conduct "psychological warfare"; "bourgeois propaganda" is nothing but lies and disinformation. The people in the United States who accuse Soviet propaganda of all the mortal sins also compare it to "Goebbels' propaganda." We are not stingy with epithets either: "Is it true that contemporary bourgeois propaganda is employing Hitler's 'big lie' technique?" ask the authors of "Ideologicheskaya borba. Voprosy i otvety" [Ideological Struggle. Questions and Answers]. Then they answer: "There is no doubt about this.... The shameless methods and slander of contemporary bourgeois propaganda indisputably date back to Hitler's fascist 'school' of propaganda."³

These stereotypes reflect the realities of the "ideological warfare" which has been conducted for many decades and in which propaganda has played a far from instructive role. In the information age, as our era is frequently called, what is predominant, regrettably, is not the exchange of information assisting in "transplanting the seedlings of new ideas," but a fierce "war of words."

The practice of international relations, especially Soviet-American relations, has demonstrated that one of the reasons for the "deadlocks" impeding the conclusion of compromise agreements on the most important world problems is the fact that opponents do not understand one another and tend to view one another through the prism of their own propaganda cliches. Now that the world is facing the threat of nuclear war and has to deal with global political, economic, ecological, and other problems, general human values are the top priority, and this should be reflected in some changes in our behavior in the sphere of ideological confrontation with the United States and in our foreign policy information activity.

Here, for example, is one of our axioms: In contrast to political, economic, cultural, and other relations between states with different social structures, which can and should be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence, in the sphere of ideology there is not and cannot be any kind of peaceful coexistence. The alternative to peaceful

coexistence, however, has always been a state of war, or of "cold war" at the very least. For decades this dominated Soviet-American relations, including the ideological sphere.

Apparently, one important negative factor which doomed the "era of detente" to failure was the lack of correspondence between political and economic relations, which had entered a new phase of peaceful coexistence, and ideological relations, which were based on the earlier approaches and stereotypes of "cold war."

The CPSU Program stresses, however, that peaceful coexistence is the kind of international order in which "friendship and cooperation" prevail and in which there is "the broad exchange...of cultural values."⁴ We believe that the exclusion of ideological relations from the zone of action governed by the principle of peaceful coexistence cannot contribute to the establishment and reinforcement of trust and is more likely to prevent this. "Ideological warfare" can only stop the process of the normalization of international relations and undermine efforts in political and other forms of cooperation.

We feel that ideological relations between states and peoples should also be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. The interdependence and integrity of today's world demand the renunciation of "military actions" in all spheres of international relations. This does not mean the renunciation of ideological struggle. The clash of ideas and ideologies is an objective reality because there are two opposing social systems in the world. But what forms should this confrontation take? After all, even the principle of peaceful coexistence does not mean the cessation of competition or struggle between socialism and capitalism in the political, economic, or other spheres. This principle does mean, however, that competition between the systems must take strictly peaceful, civilized forms.

Why should ideological relations remain a battlefield instead of becoming an arena of natural competition and rivalry? Is the militant assumption of the irreconcilability of ideologies not obsolete? Would it not be better to speak of their contraposition, putting the emphasis on coexistence in ideological relations rather than on the "war of ideas"? In the historical context, capitalism and socialism cannot be reconciled because they are, we repeat, opposing social structures and will always compete with one another. The historical situation, however, is such that their historical debate can only take place in an atmosphere of peace. Otherwise, it will end in total annihilation, not even leaving any witnesses to judge the result. The terms "ideological enemy" and "ideological front"—i.e., strictly military terms⁵—should be replaced with new concepts: "ideological opponent," "ideological contest," and "competition of ideas"—the terminology of competitors rather than enemies.

This presupposes the modification of another seemingly immutable thesis—the exacerbation of the ideological struggle. This cliché can be found at the beginning of any article, monograph, or dissertation on ideological issues. All of them, whether they were published 5 or 20 years ago or just yesterday, speak of the exacerbation of the ideological struggle, and the only difference is in the modifier—dramatic, unparalleled, unprecedented, etc. Of course, if this is a matter of an “ideological front,” then the position of the warring sides could undergo unparalleled exacerbation. Let us ask ourselves, however, whether this thesis is consistent with the new political thinking. Today the paramount goal, the top priority in our relations with the outside world, is the preservation of human civilization and the elimination of the danger of war. This means that we should not be talking about exacerbation, but about a search for peaceful forms, about reasonable dialogue, and about debate. The authors acknowledge the controversial nature of their opinions, but it seems to them that a search for new concepts and approaches to this matter is necessary.

The move from the “war of words” to dialogue will require concerted effort. For many years people in the United States made genuinely tremendous efforts to accomplish the opposite: to convince Americans and the rest of the world that the USSR is an aggressive power, that “the Russians cannot be trusted,” and that they are “the bad guys”.... As soon as World War II was over, President Truman’s foreign policy advisers, a dissertation by American researcher Leslie Adler says, began cultivating a “new image” of the Soviet Union in the American mind, an image quite different from the prevailing image of the war years. This “new image” portrayed the USSR as “an aggressive, totalitarian, Nazi-like state governed by inhuman fanatics who were obsessed with the idea of converting all mankind to their own false beliefs.”⁶ This was the beginning of the stereotypes to which President Reagan added a few new features with his notorious references to our country as the “evil empire.” How can the public, the legislators, and the average voter now be assured that the Russians can be trusted after all?

The “enemy image” is still being created by the American mass media today. Here is what the influential CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR had to say, for example, about the Soviet side just before the historic treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles was signed: “The West must not forget that negotiating with Moscow is an extremely arduous business and that the partner across the table is sly, and sometimes even insidious.” Then it remarked: “In the final analysis, the USSR is a country which has made an earnest effort to steal American military secrets and technology.”⁷ Many examples of this kind could be cited. If a newspaper as respectable as the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR is still portraying the “enemy image,” then what can we expect from the WASHINGTON TIMES and many others?

Is there any point in dragging the world back into “cold war”? Should we allow the “war of words” to poison our

relations? “The anti-Soviet biases and prejudices instilled in the public mind,” Soviet researchers Yu. Zamoshkin and T. Kuznetsova correctly point out, “will eventually impede common efforts to achieve detente and to turn detente into a truly intense and irreversible process.”⁸

“Ideological warfare” is being waged by both sides. We have to admit that the Soviet mass media are partly to blame for the creation of “enemy” stereotypes. Has it been a long time since we read about “imperialism’s savage sneer”? Or about the absolute omnipotence of the military-industrial complex, all of the interests of which are always defended by the White House and the Capitol against the interests of citizens? Is it not true that strictly negative information represents the lion’s share of what we say about the United States? “One item about electronic dairy herd management in Holland for every 100 articles about the wretched life of the unemployed and the homeless in America. This interpretation of balance is too narrow and is also counterproductive,”⁹ writes IZVESTIYA political correspondent Stanislav Kondrashov in reference to the obviously tendentious methods our mass media use in the selection of reports on capitalist countries.

The danger of dogmatic thinking is greater today than ever before, and this danger has been pointed out by many researchers.¹⁰ The continuation (although in another form) of the same kind of “verbal warfare” is also fueled by the routine propaganda insistence on the embellishment of one’s own image; both sides employ these stereotypes.

It is not our intention to analyze U.S. foreign policy propaganda. The main purpose of this article is a critique of our own shortcomings in this area.¹¹ This kind of self-analysis seems particularly important and necessary today.

Until recently the main purpose of our foreign propaganda activity was the assertion of the unconditional superiority of socialist values and their fundamental difference from the ideals and moral standards of other political cultures. This interpretation of the function of Soviet propaganda was also promoted by its main procedural principle—it compared and contrasted “our” sociopolitical and ideological precepts to those of “others.” As a rule, “other” became a synonym for “enemy.”

Today, however, priority is being assigned to the communicative and informative function of propaganda: the dissemination of information about the humanistic essence of socialism and the features it has in common with all mankind. If we want to reach a mutual understanding with the outside world and we want to be trusted, we must also make substantial changes in the

methods of our propaganda work—the didactic monologue of the communicator must be replaced by conversation and proper dialogue. This, in turn, presupposes the renunciation of some obsolete premises of our theory of propaganda which are inconsistent with today's political thinking.

One of the basic principles of our propaganda in general and our foreign policy propaganda in particular is the principle of offensive action. This principle was worded in the following terms: "The offensive nature of propaganda should be reflected in vivid and convincing demonstrations of the advantages of the socialist way of life and in the uncompromising exposure of the defects and contradictions of the capitalist order and all of the artificial cosmetic devices bourgeois propaganda uses in an effort to conceal these organic flaws."¹² There is no question that we have always had more than enough uncompromising exposures of "artificial cosmetic devices." But what about the convincing demonstrations?

This wording essentially excludes the possibility of the objective disclosure and analysis of our own shortcomings, problems, and contradictions.

This interpretation of offensive action was derived from the definition of the goals and objectives of propaganda as a means of converting the population of other countries "to our beliefs." The definition sounded like this: "Fully armed with progressive revolutionary theory, we must wage a tireless struggle against all class enemies in the ideological sphere and conquer the hearts and minds of millions and millions of people on all continents with the force of the inspiring example of the new social order and the passion of the propaganda of the advantages of our order and the magnitude of Leninist ideals and goals."¹³

But what if the person we are dealing with is not an enemy we want to destroy, but a partner in peaceful coexistence, even though he might have views differing from ours? And what if the people in other countries are not lost sheep looking for a spiritual shepherd, but people of a "different faith," completely committed to their own ideals, who should not be "conquered," but should simply be given accurate information and a complete and objective description of our world? Let them make their own choice of the most appealing values and ideas. The principle of objectivity seems more in line with present conditions and the present objectives of our foreign policy activity than the principle of "offensive action."

After all, the practice of discussing only advantages and of trying to pass wishes off as realities while concealing any features not contributing to a positive portrayal (to avoid "adding grist to the mill") only turned propaganda into a set of incantations. Its scientific basis disappeared and was replaced by the creation and perpetuation of myths. What is the point of trying to influence the "hearts and minds of millions and millions of people" with the aid of myths on the threshold of the 21st century?

Let us take a look at SOVIET LIFE, a magazine published by APN and intended for American readers. It is easy to find an abundance of self-praise here. For example: "Ninety-nine percent of all Soviet patients receive high-quality specialized medical care in the area where they live."¹⁴ A short time later, Americans learned from their own sources, citing reports in our press, that the Soviet minister of health had been "relieved of his duties...and retired," and they also learned that the rate of infant mortality in our country is higher than in Barbados and that the very system offering 99 percent of all Soviet patients "medical care in the area where they live" had been criticized severely in the Soviet Union....

"Soviet people are the true masters of their country and the makers of their destiny. All of our endeavors are geared to improving their well-being. In this, socialism has no peer."¹⁵ "Only under socialism," "socialism has no peer," and "decisive advantage"—these phrases can be found in almost every article, and more than once.

There was a long article on the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the February 1986 issue, 3 months before the accident. It describes the operation of the power plant in the most rosy hues. The dogma of "passionate propaganda of the advantages of our order" did not allow for even a hint of the existence of problems connected with the safety of nuclear power plants, problems common to all and known to all (especially the Americans, who had experienced the Three Mile Island accident). "Petr Bondarenko says that working at the plant is safer than driving a car."¹⁶ We have "absolute safety"! Can information of this kind be trusted after what happened?

Here is another example. The March 1987 issue of SOVIET LIFE was devoted to Soviet women. The cover of the magazine showed the enchanting Anastasiya Vertinskaya smiling at the reader. So that there would be no doubt that the typical Soviet woman looks exactly like the famous movie star, our author asserted: "Today's affluence (this is how she describes our standard of living!) has given her (the Soviet woman) precious furs, exquisite clothes, fragile high heels, and French cosmetics."¹⁷ Do tell! Is this how she is dressed, in "furs and silks," when she produces more than half of the social product, as the same issue of the magazine reports? Although our women have more than enough problems in their life, the reader is "informed" that "we have no reason for pessimism because the Soviet woman is completely aware of the guarantee of the constant improvement of her life." The "only thing she needs is lasting peace. Peace is our main concern." Does she really have no other problems?

The authors of this article have calculated that from 80 to 90 percent of our publications intended for distribution abroad contain one-sided, only positive accounts (if not advertisements, and in the worst sense of the word) of Soviet reality. But the communicator's understandable desire to convey the impression of a society perfect in all respects is contrary to the customary Western tendency to seek balanced and objective information. We should also be disturbed by the contrast between the conflict-free "image of the USSR," created by the Soviet foreign policy media, and reports in our own domestic press, which are now widely quoted abroad. It is obvious that this discrepancy undermines trust in Soviet foreign policy information.

Propaganda should be based on the results of research in sociology, psychology, and other social sciences. It should have a scientifically sound theory, defining its main goals and priorities, media, methods, and techniques commensurate with these goals, etc. Propaganda, however, has been isolated from its basis, from the social sciences, and has slipped into the mythological sphere. By the same token, deformities in the social sciences have undermined its theoretical basis. Our social sciences have ceased to perform their function of objective scientific analysis and prediction. "This created a vicious circle: Unhealthy developments in practice engendered unhealthy tendencies in social thinking and in science. In turn, these complicated the redirection of theory and practice into the channel of realism, of real life with its contradictions.... Instead of studying real living socialism, we chose to build speculative models."¹⁸

It is important to understand the distinctive features of the audience. Let us return to SOVIET LIFE and take a look at how the specific features of the American reader are taken into account in this magazine.

In this context, the overabundance of Marxist terms, familiar to us but unfamiliar to Americans, is particularly striking. It sometimes appears that the articles were written for our party educational system. There are references to the "objective law of socialism," "productive forces," "production relations," and many other terms whose meaning escapes the reader. For example: "The growth of productive forces and their qualitative modification should be accompanied by corresponding changes in production relations, which will be needed for the resolution of the non-antagonistic contradictions arising between them in time."¹⁹ What can this kind of sentence tell an American? There are also too many quotations from the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and statements by party and government leaders. In one of the popular analytical articles, which only took up a single page in the magazine, we counted eight of these quotations.²⁰

Soviet foreign policy publications sometimes suffer from a shortage of debate and controversy. Arguments are frequently confined to harsh criticism of the opponent.

The viewpoint of the USSR is proclaimed to be the only infallible method of solving all difficult international problems, while the policies of the United States are sternly and indignantly condemned. The absence of convincing arguments and, what is most important, the harsh and offensive tone of these publications are less likely to suggest adherence to principle than intransigence in Soviet foreign policy views.

One of the reasons for the isolation of the communicator from his audience is the very structure of the foreign policy media, the prevalence of central editorial boards simultaneously preparing publications for all regions, without delving into the distinctive features of each, and the relatively weak influence and secondary role of regional editors. Compulsory reports, compiled centrally and "issued from above," represent 70 percent of all radio programs for the foreign public, while only 30 percent are prepared by the personnel of regional offices who are directly concerned with a given country and know its distinctive features. Whereas the personnel of regional offices have some contact, however weak it might be, with their audience,²¹ central editorial offices have absolutely none.

The situation is similar in APN. According to the data of an expert analysis of the agency's work, centralized materials constitute around 80 percent of the contents of magazines published for distribution abroad (the ratio is more balanced in SOVIET LIFE); the same report is frequently sent, for example, to the United States and to Egypt or Japan.

One radio program prepared in the United States Department of Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] was a commentary on "Irangate." The program was informative and revealed the negative aspects of American administration policy, but the tone of the broadcast was reserved and proper. "A major political crisis in another country is not necessarily a plus for us," the reporter said. A few days later, however, the Main Propaganda Editorial Staff of Gosteleradio prepared its own program specifically for the United States Department—"Mistake or Inevitability?" It gave the same event a different interpretation: "Interference in the affairs of other countries and people, clandestine operations, and contempt for international law—this is Washington's political creed and permanent policy. This means that 'Irangate' and all of the other 'gates' are links of the same chain." This point of view will obviously leave no doubt in the American mind that "those Russians" are always overjoyed when they hear about a political scandal in Washington. After this, how can we convince the American public of our desire for cooperation and mutual understanding?

Reports disclosing the image of the Soviet individual (they represent only 10-15 percent of the total) still offer a one-dimensional portrayal, concentrating almost exclusively on his job. When the positive features of our people are listed, at the top of the list they are described

as highly professional, persistent, and industrious, while their kindness, sensitivity, sense of humor, and independence are always at the bottom of the list. The individual is mainly portrayed as a laborer, with no signs of vitality, originality, or spontaneity. The data of polls in the United States indicate, however, that intelligence and independence are the human qualities valued most by Americans....

The process of the democratization of Soviet society, as we know, is a matter of great interest to the foreign public, both in socialist and in capitalist countries. Unfortunately, our information is not keeping up with life in this area either. There are only timid and partial references to the profound changes in our society. For example, there is virtually no mention of glasnost, an exceptionally important development. It is precisely glasnost, however, that has become the main indicator of perestroika as far as the foreign public is concerned.

Soviet foreign policy publications are still ignoring the issue of human rights—a matter of exceptional importance to this audience. Americans are extremely interested in the personal freedoms of Soviet citizens, but instead of this, publications usually discuss the socioeconomic gains of socialism, the right to work, to vacations, to free medical care, etc. The substitution of references to these social guarantees for the discussion of individual freedom is so obvious that the foreign audience might assume that the Soviet mass media are deliberately avoiding any discussion of the issue.

One of the essential conditions of effective communication is that the communicator must know the exact destination of his message. The results of his work can be nullified if there is no consideration for the social addressee and no analysis of the informational atmosphere and political climate in the particular country (not to mention knowledge of the country as a whole) or region and of the main stereotypes and distinctive features of public opinion there. The authors and editors of our articles, reports, and reviews, however, know little about the mentality of these Americans and seem to be living in an imaginary world. The overwhelming majority of the personnel of Gosteleradio editorial offices and departments who were surveyed by sociologists, for example, were dissatisfied with the quality of their own reports and believed that their work could be much more precise and professional.

The communicator needs feedback from his audience to verify the effectiveness of his work and to plan long-range strategy. The strategy and theory of the work of the mass media depend on two factors which are not always the same and do not necessarily agree with one another. The first of these is the purpose and desire of the communicator who must report a particular thesis to the audience at that particular time. The second is the willingness of the audience to hear and accept the message, which depends on the degree to which its

contents agree with the inner beliefs, mental stereotypes, cultural and historical traditions, set of images, and linguistic peculiarities of the reader or listener.

The audience is something like a tuning fork, keenly registering the false notes of unconvincing arguments and fraudulent declarations. The absence of feedback or audience control, however, forces the journalist and the editor to rely primarily on the half-baked instructions and "opinions" of superiors.

The centralized bureaucratic structure created a paradoxical situation in Soviet news agencies, in which professional competence and brilliant individuality were not necessarily rewarded and were more likely to be regarded as "disruptive influences" because they upset the routine. This led to huge losses—in the form of vulgar and oversimplified renditions of directive theses and precepts, lost points of reference, and irrelevant information.

Today our mass media are successfully learning how to address the "domestic" audience frankly and seriously, without condescension or didacticism, and this has dramatically increased the public's trust in the press, radio, and television. As for "foreign" information, it is still suffering from a strong fear of any criticism of our shortcomings. Too many sweets, however, cause toothaches. After hearing all of the praise of the Soviet way of life, the foreign consumer of this information might wonder why perestroika is needed in an atmosphere of absolute prosperity.

The spacebridges were one of the first joint attempts to surmount the "enemy image" by the mass media of the USSR and the United States, and they became extremely popular precisely because of their positive implications. Besides this, the spacebridges allow for instantaneous audience feedback to check reactions. Unfortunately, far from all of the television programs have been successful. Earlier approaches and old stereotypes have forced their way onto the TV screen more than once or twice, showing millions of viewers how accustomed we and the Americans are to employing the terms of the old political thinking and respecting yesterday's cliches.

We can see this just from the highly indignant reaction of the Soviet participants to the very first "accusatory" statements by Senator D. Moynihan (during the spacebridge between the U.S. Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet on human rights), which did nothing to build a bridge of trust between the two populations. But we must also acknowledge the flaws of "our people" in several spacebridges. The constraint of the audience was evident—its conscious or unconscious perception of the debate as another "battle on the ideological front".... this was often partially due to the behavior of our new leader, his tendency to take the offensive, to the point of aggressiveness, his attempt to interpret each pointed

question from the American side as a political provocation, and his peremptory tone; all of this is obviously inconsistent with the idea of dialogue and the creation of an atmosphere of trust.

Let us summarize our conclusions. Foreign policy information and propaganda work should play a new, constructive role in today's interdependent and integral world. "We must communicate, we must solve problems in an atmosphere of cooperation instead of hostility"²²—these words should be the motto of all participants in this constructive work, which is so important today. Not a "war of words," but the creation of an atmosphere of trust—this should be the paramount objective of the mass media in both of our countries today. It is not mutual insults and accusations or unrestrained self-praise and vulgar self-advertisement that will help us learn to live in peace, but interested, serious, and meaningful dialogue.

Footnotes

1. English political scientist J. Brown, for example, calls propaganda a "technique of coercion" and "brainwashing." L. Dove defines it as "the systematic attempts of the individual or group of individuals concerned to control the attitudes of groups through suggestion (or persuasion), with the aim of the subsequent control of their actions" (J. Brown, "Technique of Persuasion. From Propaganda to Brainwashing," London, 1965, p 19).

2. "United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy," Washington, 1985 Report, p 13.

3. N.M. Keyzerov and Ye.A. Nozhin, "Ideologicheskaya borba. Voprosy i otvety," Moscow, 1987, pp 230-231.

4. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [CPSU Program], Moscow, 1986, p 21. "In line with the new thinking," M.S. Gorbachev says, "changes were made in the new edition of the CPSU Program approved by the 27th party congress. In particular, we felt it was no longer possible to retain the definition of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures as 'a specific form of class struggle'" (M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Perestroyka and the New Thinking for Our Country and the World], Moscow, 1987, p 150).

5. In general, metaphors taken from military terminology are used too extensively in our journalism: "the battle for a good harvest," "the front of struggle," "the soldiers of the five-year-plan," and so on and so forth.

6. Quoted in: P. Steinberg, "The Great 'Red Menace' (United States Prosecution of American Communists, 1947-1952)," Westport (Conn.), 1984, p X.

7. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 30 October 1987.

8. "Obshchestvennoye soznaniye i vneshnyaya politika SShA" [Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy], edited by Yu.A. Zamoshkin, Moscow, 1987, p 247.

9. KOMMUNIST, 1987, No 14, p 57.

10. See, for example, A. Bovin, "The New Thinking Is a Requisite of the Nuclear Age," KOMMUNIST, 1986, No 10, pp 113-124; Ye. Aleksandrov, "The New Political Thinking: Genesis, Factors, Prospects," MEZH-DU-NARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1987, No 11, pp 114-123; A.V. Nikiforov, "Peaceful Coexistence and the New Thinking," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1987, No 12.

11. The conclusions in this article are based on the results of sociological surveys of the employees of the two leading foreign policy propaganda agencies—APN and USSR Gosteleradio—by a group of researchers from the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1986 and 1987.

12. S.I. Beglov, "Vneshnepoliticheskaya propaganda. Ocherk teorii i praktiki" [Foreign Policy Propaganda. Notes on Theory and Practice], Moscow, 1984, pp 209-210.

13. M.A. Suslov, "Marksizm-leninizm i sovremennaya epokha" [Marxism-Leninism and the Present Era], Moscow, 1979, p 68.

14. SOVIET LIFE, May 1986, p 31.

15. Ibid., March 1986, p 50.

16. Ibid., February 1986, pp 12-13.

17. Ibid., March 1987, p 12.

18. A. Yakovlev, "The Achievement of a Qualitatively New Situation in the Soviet Society and the Social Sciences," KOMMUNIST, 1987, No 8, p 8.

19. SOVIET LIFE, January 1987, p 4.

20. Ibid., May 1986, pp 6-7.

21. Contact is maintained with listeners only by letter; common editors, radio journalists, and authors are not sent on assignments to the country they are studying, the United States.

22. M.S. Gorbachev, Op. cit., p 3.

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Changing U.S. Attitudes Toward Europe

18030002d Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 (signed to press 15 Aug 88) pp 32-42

[Article by Anatoliy Ivanovich Utkin, doctor of historical sciences and chief research associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Fate of 'Atlanticism'"]

[Text] When the Americans learned that the West Europeans would not help them in the "dirty" war in Vietnam and would not give them any serious assistance in the performance of their police functions in the developing world, and when they realized that the nuclear weapons of Western Europe could not be put under American control, the agonizing reassessment of the alliance with Western Europe began in the United States.

The author defined the problem back in 1974 (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4): "Atlanticism" vs. "Europeanism." What has changed since that time in U.S. foreign policy guidelines? This article will answer this question.

The United States recognized the vital importance of the West European region in June 1940, after Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and two-thirds of France had been occupied by German troops. In the opinion of President Roosevelt, this situation had shifted the balance of power in the world to a point dangerous to America.¹ The United States' active interest in the West European region and its increasing influence there date back to that time.

Throughout the postwar period the alliance with the countries of Western Europe—the largest zone of developed capitalism—was the basis of U.S. foreign policy. One American administration after another assisted in the reinforcement of this region (the "Marshall Plan," etc.). Furthermore, specific forms of supra-national "Atlantic" unification were proposed in the first 20 years after the war.

The value of Western Europe's alliance with the United States was first reassessed between 1965 and 1975 when De Gaullism offered West European integration as an alternative to "Atlanticism." This is why the American advocates of convergence with Western Europe stopped announcing great plans for a supra-governmental union in the second half of the 1970's. In light of the stronger West European separatism, the improbability of unconditional control over the development of the West European region became apparent to American experts. This was accompanied by doubts about the possibility of, and even the need for, the interdependence of the United States and Western Europe.

Arguments for Atlantic Priority

The arguments of the advocates of reliance on Western Europe are quite simple. The "Atlanticists" believe that intra-European processes have to be under American control because Europe is still the only region in the world where the composition of economic forces creates potential superior to that of the United States. In this situation "there is no viable alternative to the coalition with Western Europe, which is the cornerstone of American strategy."² In the opinion of the traditional establishment, "the importance of Europe to the United States cannot be overestimated. If the resources of Western Europe were to somehow come under the control of the Warsaw Pact, this would change the world balance. From the standpoint of priorities, no other part of the world outside the American borders is of such obvious importance to the United States."³

Other arguments, arranged in order of importance, are the following: This is the location of countries with the most highly developed economies; the political system in Western Europe is close to the American system; many Americans have an abiding interest in the birthplace of their ancestors; Western Europe is an important economic partner of the United States; there are large American investments here. England and France have nuclear potential, and other countries here are also capable of developing these weapons. The developed industrial center's domination of the "periphery"—the developing countries—seems to "Atlanticists" to be attainable only through the stronger unity of the two main Western political centers. Proceeding from the imperative of historical development, the significance of the United States' Atlantic ties will increase by the end of the 20th century. "It is inconceivable that something might happen in this decade or the next to reduce the importance of Western Europe in the security and prosperity of the United States," writes former Secretary of State C. Vance.⁴ "Europe is still the location of the highest concentration of industrial strength outside the United States. The classic considerations of the balance of power stipulate that the loss of U.S. control in this region would be just as vital a matter today as in the first and second world wars. It is only right that the United States should pay attention to conflicts outside Europe, but America should not fall victim to the absurd notion of using its strength in regions where crisis is more probable without comparing the strategic importance of the new crisis regions to the European region," R. Komer, former U.S. deputy secretary of defense, agrees.⁵

What is the point, the now less influential "Atlanticists" ask, of defending West European interests in, for instance, the Persian Gulf if the West Europeans themselves withdraw from the American sphere of influence? The creed of contemporary "Atlanticism" is that the United States should retain all of its earlier belief in the priority of Western Europe and strive to extend general NATO functions beyond the current geographic boundaries of the NATO zone of operations.

Atlantic strategists believe that the collapse of NATO would have unpredictable effects on the United States' position in the world. In the United States this would revive the chauvinist forces willing to aggravate relations with yesterday's allies. The supporters of the idea of "Fortress America" and the supporters of the priority of the Pacific zone in foreign policy would take the lead. The threat of a split in the vanguard of developed capitalism would become a reality, and this would immediately lower the level of U.S. foreign policy capabilities. If nationalism, party politics, or a conflict between the executive and legislative branches were to impede the creation of a bloc of developed capitalist countries in the North Atlantic zone, the eventual result would be the contraction of the American sphere of influence. This general assumption is shared by all advocates of the priority of Western Europe in U.S. policy in world affairs. In more specific areas, however, the range of Atlantic theories is quite broad.

The "Atlanticists" caution that among the 12 most highly populated countries in the world by the end of the 20th century, the United States will be the only member of the "Atlantic world," and that only one-seventh of the world's population now lives in developed capitalist countries. If the current trend continues, B. Wattenberg from the American Enterprise Institute predicts, the capitalist world's share of this population will quickly fall to 10 percent in the 21st century. The "Atlanticists" are advising U.S. ruling circles to give some thought to the future of American-European civilization.

Changes in the economic balance of power are just as possible as demographic changes. It will be difficult (if not impossible) for the Western countries to restore the rapid pace of economic development of the period between 1950 and 1973, which began with the implementation of the "Marshall Plan" and ended with the dramatic rise in oil prices in 1973. The main concern of today's "Atlanticists" is the preservation of the world positions of the North Atlantic zone and the developed West. This, in their opinion, can be accomplished only through concerted effort by all of the main forces in the developed capitalist countries, united by their common social features and the interest in retaining their dominant position and strengthening their close alliance.

On the basis of this ideological platform, the "Atlanticists" are pointing out the danger of the "self-isolation" of the United States from the European continent. "It is precisely the relative weakening of American strength that will make America's close cooperation with key friendly countries all the more necessary, in spite of the politically appealing internal pressure in favor of protectionism and unilateral action," Z. Brzezinski writes.⁶ Only Western Europe can assist in enhancing the significance of the organizations headed by the West, such as the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This is the opinion of the apologists for the alliance with Western Europe.

The "Atlanticists" are counting on a lengthy period of substantial U.S. military presence in the region. They are certain that the contingent of American troops stationed here will serve as a lever of American influence. The ideas making the rounds in the United States with regard to the withdrawal of this contingent are, in C. Vance's opinion, "a sign of extreme stupidity."⁷ Former Secretary of State H. Kissinger agrees.⁸ The "Atlanticists" believe that the withdrawal of American troops from Europe would be an unforgivable mistake because, in the first place, the United States would lose leverage and, in the second place, Western Europe would be demoralized. "This could cause the irreversible erosion of the political will and military commitments of the West Europeans," renowned American political scientists J. Dougherty and R. Pfaltzgraff warn.⁹

Therefore, the "Atlanticists" are warning against diminished emphasis on Western Europe and regard this as the most important area of future U.S. foreign policy.

Material Preconditions of Ideological Crisis

This advice, however, is gradually losing its appeal. The influence of "Atlanticism" grew perceptibly weaker in the United States by the end of the 1980's. The main causes are objective ones connected with the relatively weaker position of Western Europe in the last decade. Three factors warrant special consideration.

The first is the technological gap. The European Economic Community's share of the high-technology market was reduced by 17 percent between 1970 and 1986. In 1970 the EEC accounted for more than 50 percent of all high-technology products, but the present figure is 35 percent. On the other hand, Japan's share increased from 13 to 25 percent and the U.S. share increased from 32 to 37 percent during the same period. In general, the output of high-technology products increased by less than 5 percent in Western Europe in the 1980's, as compared to 7 percent in the United States and 14 percent in Japan.¹⁰ "In the middle of the 1970's the American and Japanese societies," LE POINT, a French magazine, remarked, "began to take a special interest in new technology in the sphere of information and biology. This early fascination and subsequent maximum mobilization of forces were the deciding factors in Japan's tremendous development and the United States' renewal. Western Europe, on the other hand, fell into a deep sleep."¹¹ As a result, the largest producer of microchips in Western Europe, the Phillips firm, now ranks no higher than 11th among world producers. The first West European computer firm, SII-Honeywell-Bull, ranks 10th. Western Europe no longer ranks third in the world production of machine tools with numerical programmed control. The leading West European concern for the production of robots,

ASEA (Sweden), is 10th on the list of the world's main producers of these items. The dramatic erosion of Western Europe's position in the production of high-technology goods is evident.

A second objective factor is the change in inter-Atlantic investment patterns. We should recall that the United States was a field of mass West European investment before World War I, but the tendency then changed and America was the largest investor for the next 70 years or so, while Western Europe turned into a debtor. There was a new reversal in the middle of the 1980's. The Reagan Administration encouraged higher interest rates and made the transfer of European capital to American banks exceptionally appealing: Capital from Western Europe, which had been stricken by economic stagnation, streamed across the Atlantic and promoted the growth of the American economy instead of its own. "In the middle of the 1980's the American federal budget absorbed almost one-tenth of all world accumulations," ex-Chancellor of the FRG H. Schmidt remarked.¹² There was an exceptionally important change in the investment situation: The United States, which had been the main investor in the world, turned into the biggest debtor. In 1985 the United States was more in debt to foreigners than they were to it for the first time since 1914. This was due largely to the change in Western Europe's role, when it ceased to be a powerful magnet for American TNC's and sent the capital of its own TNC's to the American market. This is clear evidence of a weaker West European economy, which lost more development stimuli than the Japanese and American economies during the difficult period for the West after 1973.

The third factor contributing to the weakness of Western Europe is the present rate of unemployment, unprecedented in the postwar period, rising as high as 11 percent of the able-bodied population in the EEC countries in 1987, a figure much higher than in Japan (2.5 percent) and the United States (5.7 percent).¹³ According to OECD forecasts, the rate of unemployment will be higher in 1989 in the main Common Market countries, especially the FRG and France. The growth of unemployment has been accompanied by overall changes in the relative size of the labor force in the United States' favor. In the United States 15 million jobs were created between 1977 and 1987, while 3 million jobs were lost in Europe. According to OECD estimates, the real indicator of the growth of economic activity in Western Europe was 2.5 percent in 1985 and 1986 and the figure will fall to 1.5 percent in 1989.¹⁴ These estimates served as the basis for quite pessimistic forecasts: "At best, Western Europe can hope for the cessation of the present decline in its growth rate and international competitive potential; at worst, it will gradually move to a secondary position in the economic and technological spheres." In the report cited here, the OECD warned that if present trends should continue, Western Europe "will gradually turn into a supplier of food, raw materials, and products of the traditional branches of the processing industry to other regions in the world."¹⁵

The West European region's loss of strength undermined the arguments of those in the United States who had been saying for 40 years that Western Europe had the highest concentration of economic resources; if the United States did not want to lose the key to world power, it should gain control of this colossal force. The relative loss of Europe's strength (against the background of the considerable success of the Asian-Pacific countries) struck a blow at the "Atlantic" ideology.

The second blow was struck by the changing view of this region as a "vulnerable" spot, incapable of forceful self-assertion and requiring American protection. This was the result of a paradox, the point in Western Europe's contemporary development when it fell behind in the economic sphere but built up its strength in the military-strategic respect. The current modernization of strategic forces will cost France 30 billion dollars and England around 20 billion. By the middle of the 1990's England and France could move from their present level of around 300 weapons launched by land- and sea-based missiles to at least 1,200 strategic nuclear weapons. By the beginning of the 1990's the English fleet of nuclear submarines, which now have 64 missiles with 3 warheads each, will be replaced by four English Chevaline ships equipped with the American Trident-2 missile system. The number of warheads will be four or five times as high (each Trident-2 missile can have up to 14 warheads), their range will double, they will be more accurate, and the ships will have a broader patrol zone.

In the next few years France intends to replace its 18 stationary single-warhead strategic missiles with the new mobile MIRV'ed SM missiles. Seven atomic submarines will be equipped with M-4 missiles with six warheads each, allowing France to deploy 592 strategic warheads in the sea. The French Air Force will be armed with the new Mirage- 2000N strategic bomber. As a result of this augmentation of strategic potential, "Western Europe will soon have a nuclear triad capable of being escalated to the level of a devastating nuclear exchange with Soviet armed forces," specialists note.¹⁶

In view of Western Europe's increased military strength, the opponents of today's "Atlanticists" question their references to the fatal "defenselessness" of this region, which could allegedly become the prize of a nearby superpower. Furthermore, "the independent English and French nuclear forces will work against the very basis of the NATO alliance, an organization of collective security where there should not be any independent forces.... The declaration of independence by some forces in the alliance will release them from general agreements."¹⁷

Therefore, even some of the earlier supporters of West European priority in U.S. foreign policy believe that Europe has ceased to be a unique center. Others feel that Western Europe's military growth will make the United States' "overexertion" in Western Europe unnecessary and are saying that the U.S. military "contribution" to NATO is unjustifiably generous.

We should recall that four American divisions are now stationed in Western Europe, and this is also the location of huge weapon depots for six more U.S. divisions ready to be sent to Europe. As a result, two-thirds of the U.S. Army is essentially earmarked for West Germany (the official Pentagon apportionment is 11 and $\frac{2}{3}$ divisions for NATO/Europe, 3 and $\frac{2}{3}$ for East Asia, and 5 and $\frac{2}{3}$ for other regions and the strategic reserve). Some of these troops are stationed in the FRG and some are in the United States but are ready for transfer to the FRG in the event of a crisis. Thirty squadrons of U.S. tactical fighter planes are located in Western Europe, and another sixty are ready to be sent across the ocean within 3 weeks after the start of a conflict. This means that 42 percent of the United States' tactical aviation is intended for Europe.¹⁸ Half of the combat and landing vessels of the American Navy are intended for Europe.

The United States spends 133 billion dollars a year on the maintenance of the armed forces and arms intended for Europe,¹⁹ and this represents almost half of all Pentagon expenditures. The arguments that the United States could reduce its military budget by around 150 billion dollars a year if it were to withdraw from NATO have aroused understandable interest.²⁰ These estimates have been made at a time of urgent need to reduce the federal budget deficit and the colossal U.S. federal debt (almost 3 trillion dollars) and in an atmosphere in which 86 percent of the American voters are in favor of cuts in military spending.²¹

In the belief that Western Europe is rich enough to satisfy its own defense needs, the more egotistical and Americanocentric Reagan Administration subjected the objective basis of "Atlanticism" to two strong shocks in the 1980's. The first was the proposal of the SDI program and the second was the signing of the INF Treaty.

The announcement of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" in March 1983 was one of Reagan's most deliberate moves away from "Atlantic" priority. It was virtually the first time in postwar history that Washington had separated the defense of North America from the defense of Western Europe. Whatever the arguments cited, this important reversal in American policy essentially meant that the United States was willing to make exceptional efforts for the sake of only its own invulnerability.

"We did not think about the Europeans at all when we made the decision on the SDI," admits H. DiSantis from the State Department Policy Planning Staff.²² The reaction to this was quick: The West Europeans saw the SDI as another road to "Fortress America," to a strictly autonomous strategy, with no consideration for the interests of allies. The Republican administration ignored the opposition of the West Europeans when it proposed the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which would allow SDI-related testing.

The conclusion of the INF Treaty in December 1987 also attests to the reduction of U.S. interest in Europe. However the Americans might try to justify their action, in the eyes of their European partners it looks like the severance of another of the bonds connecting the two regions. One English magazine remarked that "the attempt to put Western Europe on a leash with the presence of American weapons on European land has failed."²³ After commenting on the Washington treaty, the West European press is now reporting the shared conviction of the main countries of the region that "a combination of geopolitical and budgetary considerations could motivate the United States to limit the scales of its current commitment to participation in the defense of Western Europe."²⁴ With a view to the new situation in Europe, a special bipartisan commission submitted a report on "selective deterrence" to President Reagan at the beginning of 1988. In Europe it was described as the ideological validation of the "separation of U.S. strategic potential from European defense."²⁵

Therefore, the SDI and the INF Treaty demonstrated the United States' determination to make unilateral decisions and to regard "Atlanticism" as an unsuccessful experiment in American global strategy. Along with the reduced economic significance of the West European region, this emphasis on national strategic needs accelerated the disintegration of the Atlantic ideology and struck a blow at the once prevailing argument in the minds of the U.S. ruling elite about the vital importance of ties with Western Europe.

"Atlanticism" Under Siege

In spite of the great effort the supporters of "Atlanticism" have made to broaden inter-Atlantic ties, they have gradually had to take a defensive position. As State University of New York Professor W. Goldstein describes the situation, "the Atlantic system was seriously challenged in the 1980's and there is now some doubt that the system will survive."²⁶

The United States has colossal forces earmarked for Europe. According to one influential American magazine, "Europe costs us 400 million dollars a year.... The American nuclear shield and the presence of American troops in NATO have apparently motivated the West Europeans to economize on conventional forces and to use the money for their own benefit. The time has come to halt this process."²⁷

In the United States the question of whether the deployment of more than 300,000 American soldiers in Europe is in the American interest is sounding more and more relevant. Is the control of Western Europe worth this price? The old assertions that the American combat divisions are a "solid" argument capable of "dissuading" the Soviet Union if it should decide to seize the region, or that the West Europeans need these troops to feel safe, are losing their strength. Are nuclear guarantees not enough for these countries, and do military contingents

have to be deployed here as well? With a view to the federal debt and the negative balance of payments, many American political scientists are concluding that America has "overextended itself." Where should the reduction of excessive regional commitments begin? Of course, it should begin in the areas and regions with their own material basis for the reinforcement of Western power. Western Europe fits this description....

This became the topic of an exchange of opinions between the administration and legislators. At the beginning of 1988 Congresswoman P. Schroeder sent Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci a letter which was later published: "More and more Americans believe that the allies are abusing our relationship with them. They say that we spend too much of our wealth on joint defense, that too many of our soldiers are stationed on their territory, and that the allies are using the money they save on defense to subsidize their own trade, engendering a huge negative balance in American trade."²⁸

The problem became one of the key issues in the foreign policy debates of the 1988 presidential campaign. It was discussed by Democrats and Republicans. Republican R. Dole asserted that "we cannot pay for everyone, but we have been doing this for 40 years." Democrat J. Jackson expressed his feelings even more specifically: "It is senseless to spend from 100 to 150 billion dollars a year on the defense of Europe 42 years after the war, when Europe can carry much more of this burden itself."²⁹

The American leadership has to make a decision on the optimal distribution of its increasingly costly armed forces. Congressional pressure stopped the growth of the military budget, and the more efficient use of existing forces has become a primary consideration. An idea popular in the beginning of the 1970's, Senator M. Mansfield's proposal to reduce American troops in Europe, appears to have been reborn. Senator S. Nunn has proposed the reduction of American troops in Europe by 30,000 soldiers a year until the West Europeans begin fulfilling their obligation to increase their military budgets. The withdrawal of some American troops from Europe, according to the critics of "Atlanticism," would force the West Europeans to consider their replacement. Americans have noticed, however, that the process of integration in Western Europe is slowing down. Assessing the prospects for the military unity of Western Europe, specialist S. Sloan from the Congressional Research Service arrived at a conclusion contrary to the forecasts of "Atlanticists": "There is little reason to believe that France and England will be able to surmount the obstacles which impeded their nuclear cooperation in the past."³⁰ The lack of unity in Western Europe makes various unexpected reversals possible, and each of these (by virtue of the United States' involvement) could pose a threat to the United States. Even former "Atlanticist" Z. Brzezinski now believes that "there is no reason for the United States to be involved in the explosive situation in Europe."³¹ There

are stronger feelings in favor of offering West Europeans more important positions in the NATO bloc. Military integration within the framework of a West European alliance, according to these critics, would make the buildup of conventional armed forces possible. They also feel that a West European could be appointed supreme allied commander of NATO troops in Europe (a position traditionally occupied by an American).

In U.S. relations with Western Europe in general, the following factors will probably acquire increasing importance.

The first factor is the difference in the geostrategic positions of the continental United States, protected by oceans, and Western Europe, located on the Eurasian cape. This is a question of strategic vulnerability and of secured resources.

The second factor is Western Europe's increasing independence in international affairs. This is not simply a matter of the separatism of the EEC. Changes in the foreign policy views of the Labour Party leaders in England and the Social Democrats in West Germany are reinforcing the growing tendency in the United States not to rely on the West European region.

The third factor is the mounting contradiction between the economic interests of the EEC and the military NATO commitments of most members of the Common Market.

Arguments against joint NATO programs are cited by Carnegie Endowment researcher R. Steele: Close ties with Europe can only diminish American resources, they do not strengthen the overall position of the United States in the world, and they weaken the United States as a power center. The NATO bloc, in his opinion, is essentially only an obstacle preventing the more rational and efficient use of American strength in the world. "The time has come to put an end to the previously necessary but now obsolete and undesirable military ties with Europe. The United States can no longer afford to protect Europe and extinguish social unrest in the entire non-communist world.... The United States no longer has the economic surplus to do things for others that they have long been able to do for themselves."³²

For several years American Enterprise Institute researcher I. Kristol, another man who advocates relieving the United States of its European commitments, has questioned even the need to "be polite" to the NATO allies. "What is the sense of insisting on consultations with our partners? They only hold us back. To move ahead, we have to get rid of the alliance."³³ The critics of "Atlanticism" have even gone to the extreme of saying that the two regions are getting in each other's way. Western Europe is keeping the United States from pursuing its global policy.

Americans are afraid that some West European countries (especially Greece, Spain, and Turkey) will want to prohibit the use of their military bases by the United States. In fact, Spain and Greece have already decided to do this. The possibility of substantial cuts in the military spending of some large West European countries cannot be excluded.

Americans are aware of the West Europeans' plans to strengthen their economic position. There have been impressive efforts to establish an independent aerospace industry and develop the computer industry, military industry, and other advanced technology sectors.

More and more Americans believe that one of the negative aspects of the assignment of priority to Western Europe is that this promotes the growth of competitors (economic and, in the future, political). In the opinion of H. Bretton from the State University of New York (in Albany), "spheres of conflict are unlimited in relations between such powerful industrial centers as the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. As the bonds of military alliances grow weaker, the increasing dependence of all of their members on the most critical resources needed for self-defense and economic survival will give rise to conflicts that will be much more acute than the earlier 'wars' over exports of food or steel."³⁴

A fourth factor is the more pronounced difference than before in attitudes toward developing countries. We should recall that Western Europe sells the developing countries 60 percent more goods than the United States and buys 73 percent more from them. Western Europe's investments in the Third World have matched and surpassed American investments. There is a growing conviction among experts that nationalism will become an increasingly strong force in American affairs and could impede closer Atlantic unity.

The large West European countries which do not want to be mere consumers of American weapons and will build their own powerful military-industrial base could cause the division of the North Atlantic region.

All of these assumptions lead to the hypothesis that the present military-political guardianship is less in the geopolitical interest of the United States than the termination of European commitments and freedom from the vagaries of European evolution.

In light of this conclusion, which has won considerable support in the United States, the "Atlanticists" and their emulators are gradually losing the exceptional influence they once had in American politics and in American political science. It would be an exaggeration to portray this process as a full-scale abandonment of Europe and an unequivocal renunciation of the strong political, economic, and military ties with the West European region. It is unlikely that anyone has to be convinced of the importance of the North Atlantic alliance, the OECD, the GATT, and the annual forum of the seven

most highly developed countries to the United States. It is just as important, however, to note the significant reversal in the U.S. ruling elite's view of America's place in the world of the future. Pro-Atlantic strategists once saw it in a "North Atlantic Community" which would represent the first level of a variety of associations. Now the very question of the institutionalization of ties with Western Europe has been virtually shelved, and among the proposed development patterns for the year 2000 and beyond, there is a conspicuous lack of any proposal of a North Atlantic state. The planners of U.S. foreign policy see many different roads ahead, but this is not one of them. It has lost its appeal.

The much more modest trilateral projects and scenarios for the choice of preferential partners and favorites among the West European countries are also being subjected to skeptical analysis. In the 1980's the Americans seemed to have rediscovered other areas of emphasis in world politics and other systems of regional priorities.

This is an extremely important fact. If the majority of experts analyzing possible future world developments now refuse to consider the option of convergence with Western Europe (because it is unrealistic), this means, in the first place, that America is thinking about its own future in isolation from the largest reserve of potential economic and other strength—the West European region; in the second place, this reversal means the revival of earlier competing ideas (a continental alliance in North America, the unity of the Western Hemisphere, etc.) and the appearance of new options of economic and political development—in an alliance with the rapidly growing Pacific region.

The American administration is fully aware that the North Atlantic alliance is held together by "fear of the East." This is why the summit meeting in Moscow in May-June 1988 was followed by efforts to preserve the convenient and useful atavism. Addressing the annual session of the Atlantic Council in Washington on 13 June this year, the President's National Security Adviser C. Powell said: "We do not know what all of the new events in Moscow will mean to us." He advised "trust, but combined with caution and prudence." That same day, at the third special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz suggested higher demands on socialist countries, "demands for asymmetrical reductions from the East." He added the reminder that "history did not spare the lives of states which disregarded their fundamental obligation to safeguard security."

The many years of unconditional U.S. emphasis on alliance with Western Europe have come to an end. The future of postwar "Atlanticism" is in question. It is important for us to take note of this tendency: America

is not satisfied with the results of its earlier excessive emphasis on Western Europe and is seeking a new optimal method of using its strength in a rapidly changing world.

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Report of 27th Congress of CP of Canada
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[Report by V.P. Ulasevich on 27th Congress of Communist Party of Canada in Toronto on 20-23 May 1988]

[Text] The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of Canada was held in Toronto on 20-23 May. It was attended by around 200 delegates from all parts of the country and by representatives of 20 communist and revolutionary-democratic parties and national-liberation movements from various countries. The parties of the socialist countries were widely represented: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Romanian Communist Party, the Polish United Workers' Party, and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

The forum in Toronto was preceded by 3 months of partywide debates and a thorough and frequently intense discussion of the basic political resolution. Provincial and regional organizations held congresses to discuss party documents and elect delegates.

The 27th congress was a regular party congress, but the party had special hopes for it and expected it to lead to important, long-overdue changes in its activities. Canadian communists have recently been increasingly dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the party—the slow growth of its influence and the erosion of its positions in some parts of the country. The party leadership has frequently concentrated on the drafting of various resolutions, appeals, and statements. They have often contained interesting and extraordinary ideas (for example, the communists were the first to come up with the popular, now nationwide slogans of an independent foreign policy for Canada, the transformation of the country into a nuclear-free zone, autonomy for the Canadian labor movement, etc.). Without the necessary political and organizational reinforcement, however, these have not been taken up by other political forces.

Canada's communists work in a complex political and ideological atmosphere. Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism have been cultivated for decades by ruling circles and by many bourgeois-nationalist emigre organizations. In addition, they have had to deal with the subtle discrimination against communists and have had to compete for influence with the well-organized and authoritative Social Democrats. In spite of this, the Communist Party has influence in the labor and peace movements, in solidarity organizations, and in several municipal governments. Communist D. Verlin is the president of the Federation of Labor in Alberta Province, with more than 100,000 members. A convention of the Canadian Labour Congress—the country's largest labor association (more than 2 million members)—in April 1988 approved a program of action which included many Communist Party proposals. The Canadian Alliance for Peace, which has been joined by more than 300 peace organizations and movements, was established with the active participation of communists (its national coordinator, Bob Penner, addressed the congress).

The debates at the congress and the election of new leaders attested to "a new mood in the party and to long-overdue changes," the CANADIAN TRIBUNE reported on 6 June.

The delegates were representative of the party's social image today. Of the 146 delegates with a deciding vote, 40 percent were women. The majority were from 30 to 39 years old (the oldest was 85 and the youngest was 19). The average length of party membership was 15 years. Around 46 percent of the delegates were members of labor unions. One out of every three was an elected official of a lower-level party organization or union. Almost a third were activists in the peace movement.

As speakers noted at the congress, now that the country is witnessing a turning point in its relations with the United States (this was a reference to the signed but still unratified free trade agreement with the United States), now that the Canadian public is displaying a greater interest in what is going on in the Soviet Union, and now that participation in the peace movement is putting communists in touch with various political forces in the country, the potential for the growth of the party and its influence is increasing dramatically. Finally, the desire for changes in the party has been stimulated considerably by the processes of perestroika, democratization, and glasnost in the USSR.

The report presented by W. Kashtan and the political resolution of the congress contained a thorough analysis of the international situation, domestic political affairs, and the main areas of struggle by democratic and progressive forces and defined the party's main current political objectives. Priority was assigned to the struggle for the survival of mankind and the opposition of the conservative government's efforts to intensify economic and military integration with the United States, which would jeopardize the sovereignty and independence of Canada. There was also special emphasis on the need for broad-scale unity: the unity of peaceful forces for the elimination of the nuclear threat, the unity of national and patriotic forces for the defense of Canada's sovereignty, and the unity of workers and other population strata for the repulsion of the neoconservative onslaught of the monopolies and the government.

The main current objective, as the Canadian communists see it, will consist in the establishment of a nationwide coalition of broad sociopolitical forces opposing integration with the United States in order to defeat the government's neoconservative policy line.

The congress decided that the Communist Party would nominate at least 50 of its candidates in the upcoming federal elections in order to move the slogan "Survival and Sovereignty" into the central political arena. After thorough discussion, the congress agreed with the thesis that the upcoming campaign will provide an opportunity for the further consolidation of labor and democratic forces. With a view to this, the CPC decided to give the New Democratic Party (NDP) "critical support" in the upcoming elections. This was accompanied by the stipulation that this "will not be critical ideological support," but "critical campaign support," which has been made necessary, as W. Kashtan pointed out, by the fact that "the only possible guarantee of an NDP victory is a mass movement headed by the working class and the Communist Party's proposal of the program needed to surmount the neoconservative pressure of the government."

As an alternative to the Progressive Conservative Party government's policy of economic integration with the United States, the Communist Party proposes the independent economic development of the country, based on

the use of its rich raw materials and natural resources, the maximum development of the processing industry, and the establishment of broad trade and economic relations with all countries.

The so-called Meech Lake agreement—the constitutional agreement between federal and provincial authorities which made it possible to settle the protracted constitutional crisis that was caused by Quebec Province's refusal to subscribe to the Canadian Constitution of 1982, was discussed at length at the congress. In the opinion of the Communist Party, the constitutional agreement which gave Quebec the status of a "distinct society" and considerably expanded the rights of provincial governments, has not settled the nationality question because it ignores the right of the French-Canadian nationality to equality and national self-determination. Besides this, the CPC believes that this agreement could weaken the central government, "Balkanize" the country, and (in combination with the free trade agreement with the United States) promote the infiltration of the Canadian economy by American capital.

Some key issues—for the Communist Party and for all of Canada—were discussed at the congress. There is no question that peace is the most essential condition for the implementation of the congress slogan of "Survival and Sovereignty." In connection with this, delegates pointedly criticized the military policy of the conservatives, envisaging the buildup and modernization of the country's arms and armed forces, including the plans to acquire nuclear submarines, increase Canada's contribution to NATO, participate in the modernization of the NORAD system, and coordinate Canada's military policy closely with Pentagon strategy. The congress focused attention on this matter and appealed for "action to turn Canada into a nuclear-free zone, the continuation of the struggle to stop tests of cruise missiles in Canada and to abolish the White Paper on Defense, a fight for the demilitarization of the North and the Arctic, and attempts to rally all peaceful forces round the Canadian Alliance for Peace and its campaign in defense of peace."

As an alternative to the conservative government's policy of military integration with the United States and its plans to build up Canadian military potential, including the further militarization of the North and the Arctic, the Communist Party proposes a break with the "cold war" heritage and the consistent pursuit of an independent foreign policy line in the interest of stronger peace and common security.

In its resolution the congress drew the important conclusion that the growing potential of peaceful forces, especially the socialist countries, is capable of neutralizing the threat posed by imperialism and stopping the world's slide toward the edge of the nuclear abyss. Delegates made special mention of the innovative, ingenious, and consistent policy line of the USSR in international affairs and the significance of the new political thinking.

Delegate B. York from the Province of British Columbia discussed the peace movement in Canada. The new political thinking the Soviet leadership has demonstrated in international relations, he said, is giving Canadian peace activists more energy, new hope, and a second wind. "Today," he said, "now that the enemy image is gradually being erased, we must not reduce our contribution to the struggle for peace in the belief that this is a matter only for the socialist countries, but, rather, make a greater contribution." York appealed for more sweeping actions against the nuclear menace and noted the perceptible increase in the number of young adults in the peace movement.

When Executive Secretary G. Flowers of the Canadian Peace Congress addressed the delegates, he discussed the peace congress' plan to hold a conference in Canada in 1989 on the demilitarization of the Arctic and the North. More than 90 national peace organizations and movements and many peace organizations in the NATO countries have responded, he said, to the proposal of the Canadian Peace Congress.

Delegates discussed the state of the national economy in detail and analyzed the "neoconservative onslaught" on the socioeconomic gains and democratic rights of the laboring public and the party's duty to mobilize this public for a counter-struggle. Delegate F. Wilson from the Province of British Columbia underscored the need to mobilize the labor movement, which represents a tangible force capable of stopping "free trade" and the deregulation and privatization of the economy.

The discussion at the congress proved that Canadian communists are deeply interested in the processes of perestroika in the USSR and its international implications.

"The successful accomplishment of perestroika and broad-scale democratization in the Soviet Union and the current processes of the reinforcement and improvement of socialism," the political resolution of the congress said, "are giving it a new image—the image of dynamism, openness, and development. These changes will have an increasingly profound effect on workers everywhere, especially on the Canadians who regard socialism as a viable alternative to the crisis-ridden capitalist society. Our party wishes the Soviet Union and its people success in the accomplishment of this great historic task, which is having a profound effect on the international situation and on the struggle for peace." Delegate F. Weir's statement that the perestroika and democratization in the USSR today are the most important development in the international communist movement since 1917 was heartily applauded.

Delegates responded with warmth and great interest to the message to the congress from the CPSU Central Committee and to the speech by the head of the CPSU

delegation, K.N. Brutents, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

During the debates the congress delegates tried to decide how the Soviet experience could be related to the practical work of Canadian communists and what they could borrow from the perestroika in the CPSU's work. The majority agreed that Canadian communists should arm themselves with greater openness at all levels of the party, criticism and self-criticism, and the realistic assessment of the strong and weak points of party work and the party leadership.

In their speeches the Canadian comrades noted that the interest in perestroika and the tremendous popularity of M.S. Gorbachev are witnessed not only among leftist and democratic forces but also in the broadest segments of the Canadian public.

After stressing the importance of perestroika for the future of socialism and its influence in international affairs, the Communist Party went on to say that the "absolutely" different conditions in Canada "do not allow for the mechanical or automatic" use of the experience of other countries. "We must always remember," the resolution stresses, "that there are no models, that each country embarks on the road to socialism with a view to its own specific circumstances and guided by the common laws of social development."

Congress delegates paid special attention to questions of party affairs and party construction and the party's attempts to establish contact with broader sociopolitical groups in the country.

In accordance with the goal of a younger party leadership, significant changes were made in the composition of the Central Committee and Central Executive Committee, whose members now include experienced and young communists, who are striving to introduce new ideas into party strategy and tactics and find new solutions to the vital issues of the present day. The new general secretary of the party is 44-year-old George Hewison, a man well known in labor-union circles, and William Kashtan was elected chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Canada.

In his speech at the congress, Hewison stressed his desire to revitalize the party and intensify its work in mass organizations and his loyalty to party traditions and the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. In particular, he said: "I would like to see greater concern for party construction, for the reinforcement of the party in the workplace, and for the consolidation of its industrial nucleus." It is clear, however, that party construction "will demand not only the correct policy line but also its correct implementation." "The main result of our congress," he went on to say, "is the unity it has demonstrated with regard to party policy. Congress delegates were unanimous in their views on the

struggle for peace, regarding it as the main area of the work of communists. They had no differences of opinion regarding the need to constantly fight against reactionary neoconservative forces. All congress delegates favored the intensification of party propaganda work among various population strata."

Congress delegates noted that the dramatic reduction of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism as a result of socialism's new image will give the party much greater opportunities for work in labor unions and mass democratic movements.

Hewison and other speakers made special mention of the positive role of labor unions. In particular, they mentioned their leading role in the struggle against the agreement on free trade. They also analyzed the role of other democratic movements. In particular, they said that women's organizations have a strong voice in the movement against conservative policies: These organizations have been joined by 3.5 million women, which is much higher than the number of union members.

In his closing speech, Hewison stressed the need to attract young members: "We must pay attention to youth and constantly increase the number of young party members." A special congress resolution on youth mentioned the need to involve young people in the political struggle that is now being launched throughout Canada. The resolution stressed the importance of youth organizations and the student movement. "The key to success," it says, "consists in the expansion of support and the reinforcement of the influence of leftist forces, especially the Communist Party and the Young Communist League, among youth."

Unfortunately, the tremendous amount of work communists are performing in various organizations and movements, as the congress ascertained, has not led to any substantial augmentation of party ranks yet. The party must strengthen the reconstituted party organizations in the Atlantic provinces, develop work in rural areas, consolidate the party's influence in industry, restore the system of party education, arrange for the widespread distribution of communist publications, and strengthen the Young Communist League.

Canadian communists believe that urgent problems in party construction can be solved by improving the work of party clubs (or primary party organizations), expanding intra-party democracy and, what is most important, conducting purposeful, systematic, and patient work in mass democratic organizations. The attainment of current objectives will also necessitate the payment of closer attention to party ideological work, especially in connection with such issues as the combined struggle for general human and class goals, the growth of mass democratic movements, and the relationship between the struggle for democracy and the class struggle.

The results of the debates on questions of party construction were summed up by delegate F. Goldspink from the Province of Alberta, who said that "a stronger party is the key to solving all of its current problems."

The congress approved several resolutions and political directives, some of which pertain to new spheres of party activity. The resolution on native ethnic groups, for example, obligates the party to establish a central commission on the affairs of native ethnic groups to "analyze, study, and aid in the coordination of political work with native ethnic groups."

A special resolution on poverty and the homeless asks Canadians to demand a higher minimum hourly wage, the augmentation of welfare payments to the poverty level, and a program for the establishment of shelters and temporary housing "so that not one person will remain unassisted."

Congress speakers appealed for a broader struggle against racism, anti-Semitism, and discrimination and stressed that the rise of neoconservatism in the world has created hothouse conditions for the growth of various reactionary forces. The congress called for solidarity with the people of Central America, for a just peace in the Middle East, for the liberation of Leonard Peltier, for the support of the world youth and student festival in the DPRK in 1989, for freedom and democracy in Turkey, and for a demilitarized Arctic.

The work of the congress testifies that the Communist Party of Canada is conducting a vigorous search for new approaches to the masses, is seeking ways of solving the urgent problems of the party and the country and of expanding political influence, and is persistently striving to augment its ranks.

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Book Reviews

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[Reviews by N.O. Samonova of book "Makroekonomicheskoye prognozirovaniye v SShA" [Macroeconomic Forecasting in the United States] by A.P. Yermilov, Novosibirsk, Nauka, 1987, 270 pages; by M.V. Yershov of book "Tri tsentra imperializma: sfery ekonomicheskogo soper-nichestva" [Three Centers of Imperialism: Spheres of Economic Competition] by A.M. Sutulin, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1987, 200 pages; and by L.A. Akhmechet (Ufa) of book "V poiskakh 'drugoy Ameriki' (iz istorii progressivnoy literatury SShA)" [In Search of "the Other America" (From the History of Progressive U.S. Literature)] by B.A. Gilenson, Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1987, 317 pages]

[Text]

Macroeconomic Forecasting in the United States

The most important prerequisite for the maintenance of the relatively stable development of the market economy during the period between cyclical recessions is the timely provision of all economic links with as much information as possible about current and anticipated supply and demand patterns in three markets—goods and services, securities, and labor. The collection, analysis, and distribution of this information are the essence and purpose of economic forecasting, because the rapid and reliable provision of businessmen and the government with information about the state of affairs in the economy will determine the commercial activity of the former and the timely and judicious regulating activity of the latter. A.P. Yermilov describes the methods and indicators used in the United States for the analysis and forecasting of the state of each of these three "epicenters" of possible upheavals in the economy at various levels—the firm, the sector, and national production as a whole. This field of economic forecasting has recently been a matter of increasing interest to researchers in the West and in the socialist countries, where economic forms of management are being developed. In this context, A.P. Yermilov's book warrants special consideration.

Three Centers of Imperialism: Spheres of Economic Competition

This work contains a retrospective analysis of the subject matter and a detailed discussion of the distinctive features of the interaction of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in the economic sphere in the 1980's. The author reveals all of the ambiguities of the traditional belief in the United States' loss of influence in international affairs. The United States, whose scientific and technical leadership could be said to have been historically determined because the technological revolution and the establishment of high-technology industries took place there earlier than in other countries, still occupies a fairly strong position in the computer and aerospace industries. At the same time, its rivals, especially Japan, are crowding it out of such fields as the steel industry and the production of some chemicals, radio and video equipment, semiconductor chips, and personal computers.

Because of several internal (the slower growth of labor productivity) and external (the rise in the exchange rate of the dollar before 1985) factors, American products are much less competitive in world markets. As a result, the U.S. share of world exports fell to an unprecedented low in 1985—9.1 percent (Japan's share had increased by 1985 to the same figure—9.1 percent). The negative balance in U.S. trade increased even more dramatically. In 1986 it was estimated at 173.6 billion dollars.

It is completely obvious, the author logically concludes, that the international economic and, to some degree, political influence of the United States is undergoing gradual erosion in comparison with the influence of Japan and Western Europe.

In Search of "the Other America" (From the History of Progressive U.S. Literature)

The author presents an interesting analysis of little-known episodes from the history of American literature and of the work of the progressive writers who have tried to counter various apologist stereotypes with accurate portrayals of life in "the other America," the one outside the bourgeois establishment.

He discusses the works of honest writers and journalists (L. Steffens, E. Caldwell, E. Winter, and others), including journalists who were in our country during the years of the Great Patriotic War, who told their countrymen the truth about the Soviet people. After examining literary developments in the 1970's and 1980's from the standpoint of humanitarian ideals, the author arrives at the valid conclusion that the progressive tradition in American literature, in spite of all difficulties, is still alive today.

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