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Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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CONTENTS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Gen Army Lobov Chosen as Candidate From Central Asian District 135 [V. Osipov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Feb 89]	1
Platoon Commander Calls for Glasnost on Excess Numbers of Officers [V. Tokarev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Dec 88]	2
Proposal of Militia-Based System Discussed [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 2, Jan 89]	2
Law on Conscientious Objection Considered	9
Soviets Urged to Support UN Resolution [Bruno Koppeters; XX CENTURY AND PEACE No 1, Jan 89]	9
Lenin Decree on Religious Exemption Printed [XX CENTURY AND PEACE No 1, Jan 89]	10
Letters to Editor Discuss Issue [XX CENTURY AND PEACE No 1, Jan 89]	11
Military's Place in Society Considered [V. Yu. Balabushevich, A. A. Sipko; XX CENTURY AND PEACE No 1, Jan 89]	11
Maj Gen Surkov Chosen as Candidate From Leninakan [O. Falichev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Feb 89]	13
Struggle Against Anonymous Complaints [V. Polezhayev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Feb 89]	14
Reader Commentary on Proposed 'Officers' Assemblies' [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Feb 89]	16
Latvians Disrupt Anniversary Festivities	17
Pacifists Stage 'Unsanctioned' Procession [B. Sebyakin; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 25 Feb 89]	17
Nationalists Disrupt Official Commemoration [A. Ye. Vasilenok; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 25 Feb 89]	18
Lt Gen Boyko reports to GLAVPU Buro on Belorussian MD Restructuring [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Feb 89]	20
Letter Defines Participation, Time Frame of Military Democratization [V. Gribanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Feb 89]	21
Candidate Suggests Committee on Defense Questions Under USSR Supreme Soviet [V. Urban; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Feb 89]	22
Col Gen Kalinin Interviewed on Election Day [N. Kalinin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Mar 89]	23
Lt. Gen Novozhilov Supports Opponent [P. Kochnev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Mar 89]	25
Lt Gen Kuzmin on Successful Election [M. Ziyeminsh; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 APR 89]	25
Proposal to Use Armor Units for Road Construction [A. Nastsev; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 13, 1-7 Apr 89]	26

WARSAW PACT

Joint GDR-USSR Exercise Announced [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Apr 89]	27
---	----

ARMED FORCES

Col Gen Lobov Faults Level of Tactical Training, Discipline, Officer Education [V. Lobov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 1, Jan 89]	28
Lt Gen Ovchinnikov Commemorates Army-Navy Day, 1989 [A. Ovchinnikov; SELSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 Feb 89]	32
Central Financial Directorate Responds to Proposal on Economic Work [S. Korennoy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Dec 88]	34
Narcotics Abuse in Military Considered [A. Ruchkin; AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA No 2, Jan 89]	35
Demographics Have 'Forced Widening of Draft Criteria' [T. Tubinene; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 18 Jan 89]	36
Force Reduction Leads to 'Surprise' Retirement of Medical Officers [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Jan 89]	38
Discussion of Development of Military Sociology [Yu. Deryugin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Jan 89]	38
Kolkhoz to Pay Conscripts While They Serve [S. Melnychuk; RADYANSKA UKRAYINA, 2 Feb 89]	40

Problems in Interethnic Relations Discussed [V. Krysko; <i>KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL</i> No 6, Mar 89]	40
---	----

GROUND FORCES

Discussion of Use of Laser Small-Arms Train-Fire Simulator [A. Ageyenko; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 26 Feb 89]	45
---	----

AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Air Defense Herald: Index of Articles for 1988 [<i>VESTNIK PROTIVVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY</i> No 1, Jan 89]	46
Moscow Air Defense District; 2-Day Gathering for Civilian Journalists [V. Yanelis; <i>LITERATURNAYA GAZETA</i> , Feb 22 89]	55

NAVAL FORCES

Ministry of Defense Statement on Submarine Sinking [KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Apr 89]	58
More Details on Efforts to Save Submarine [P. Ishchenko; KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Apr 89]	58

STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

Lt Gen Zhilnikov Commemorates Missile, Artillery Troops Day [VOYENNYE ZNANIYA No 11, 1988]	60
---	----

CIVIL DEFENSE

1989 Training Program Plans 'Significant Reduction' of Training Time [A. Ryakhov; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, No 11, 1988]	63
Open Letter to Ryzhkov on Failings in Civil Defense Since Chernobyl [A. Krivoshekov; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA No 1, Jan 89]	65
Civil Defense Overlooked in Cooperative Movement [I. Vakula; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA No 1, Jan 89]	67
New Training Program: Coping with Peacetime Disasters [A. Khaav; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 28 Jan 89]	68
Critique of Armenian Defense Following Earthquake [V. Kuzmin; <i>KOMMUNIST</i> , 29 Jan 89]	70

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Mod R&D Organizations Switch to Khozraschet, Self-Financing [A. Plotnikov; KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Mar 89]	72
---	----

DOSA AF

Round Table on Problems in Pre-Draft Training in Estonia [MOLODEZH ESTONII, 24 Jan 89]	73
Meeting of Coordinating Council of Military-Patriotic Organizations [O. Zapertov; KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Feb 89]	75

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Low Number of Turkmen Officers Explained [SOVET TURKMENISTANY, 2 Dec 88]	77
Officers' Schools Advertisements	77
Engineering, Chemical Troops Officers' Schools [KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Jan 89]	77
Engineering, Chemical Troops Officers' Schools [KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Jan 89]	77

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Western Development of Battlefield Computers, Robotics Examined [L. Migunov; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, Nov 88]	79
U.S. Naval Strategy in Pacific [Ye. Nikitin; KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Jan 89]	80
Comments on Western Weapon Systems	82

Belgian Multiple Rocket Launcher [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 Mar 89]	82
Modernization of Battleship Wisconsin Completed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 Mar 89]	82
Statement on Presence of Su-24 Bombers in Libya [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Apr 89]	82

AFGHANISTAN

Response to Sakharov on Shooting of Trapped Soldiers [N. Cherginets; TRUD, 12 Mar 89]	84
Legality of Intervention, 'Murder' of Amin Questioned [L. Shcherbaty; XX CENTURY AND PEACE No 1, Jan 89]	85
Legality of Afghan Action, Concept of Internationalist Duty Questioned [MOLODEZH ESTONII, 25 Jan 89]	86

**Gen Army Lobov Chosen as Candidate From
Central Asian District 135**

*18010406a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Feb 89 First Edition p 1*

[Report by Lt Col V. Osipov, Central Asian Military District, under the rubric "The Pulse of the Preelection Campaign": "When the Program Is Realistic"]

[Text] The election campaign is entering a new and extremely important phase. The district preelection meetings and registration of the candidates for people's deputies of the USSR have ended in the districts, and the meetings of the candidates with the electors are now beginning.

Our report is on one of the last district preelection campaigns.

Three candidates were nominated for people's deputy of the USSR in Ayaguz National-Territorial Electoral District No. 135. They were Amantay Aytmurzanovich Dogalakov, director of the Zhanasemeyskiy Sovkhoz, Vladimir Georgiyevich Gorban, chairman of the Sovkhoz 40 let Oktyabrya, and Army Gen (this rank has just been conferred upon him) Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov.

All three are extremely worthy people. A. Dogalakov and V. Gorban are young and vigorous specialists with a good grasp of their job, who enjoy great prestige in their labor collectives and their rayons. The farms they direct are proceeding confidently along the path of improvement.

Army Gen V. Lobov is also well known and respected here. He was nominated as candidate for people's deputy of the USSR by the collectives of the Ayaguz Meat Combine and the Narynskiy Sovkhoz, as well as the soldiers at one of the garrisons. Vladimir Nikolayevich, recent commander of the Central Asian Military District, has frequently visited the local areas and was elected a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet from here. He has done a great deal to carry out the mandates of the electors. Several apartment buildings, a school and an infectious disease hospital have been built in the rayon center, for example. The electors knew how to value his thoughtfulness and responsiveness and his interest in the needs and concerns of the people.

It was the district preelection meeting. Around 400 representatives of the workers had gathered at the Railway Workers' Cultural Center in Ayaguz. They came from the 11 rayons of Semipalatinsk Oblast, which belong to the electoral district. Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov was given the floor.

Presenting his program, he stressed the fact that he would vigorously implement the party line of strengthening peace and security and maintaining the national defense at the level of prudent and reliable adequacy,

promote in every way the restructuring processes underway in the military, strengthen discipline and order in the military and enhance the prestige of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In answer to questions from the electors on his attitude toward matters of developing agriculture, the candidate deputy said that he wanted to see life and working conditions on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes improved significantly within the next few years. And the fact that new approaches are needed for providing the rural workers with everything necessary is apparent from the situation which has developed in the rayons making up the electoral district. There is a shortage of many things here—electric power, housing, schools and medical facilities—and the situation with respect to water supply and telephone installation is bad.

The candidate national people's deputy received a fervent response from those present at the meeting to his proposals for improving the ecological situation in the region, improving the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and their preparation for military service, and providing war and labor veterans and the soldier/internationalists with everything they need.

"I see my main job," he said, "if given the deputy's mandate, as one of carrying out the will of the people and protecting their interests."

Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov's platform made a big impression on the participants in the meeting, including, one would assume, the two other candidates for people's deputies of the USSR. In any case, both A. Dogalakov and V. Gorban, who subsequently took the floor, said that they considered Gen V. Lobov to be a competent and worthy candidate and were therefore withdrawing their candidacy. They suggested that what they had proposed in their preelection programs be included in his.

Speeches by the participants then began. Specific and important mandates were given to the candidate deputy. They expressed approval of party policy in the area of military organizational development, the performance of our Armed Forces, reliably protecting the Soviet people's peaceful labor, and the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan, where the soviet fightingmen honorably fulfilled their patriotic and international duty.

The vast majority of votes at the district preelection meeting were cast for Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov to be registered as the candidate for people's deputy of the USSR from Ayaguz National-Territorial Electoral District No. 135.

Platoon Commander Calls for Glasnost on Excess Numbers of Officers

18010437 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Dec 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Senior Lieutenant V. Tokarev of the Far Eastern Military District, entitled: "Letter to the Editor: Full Glasnost is Necessary".]

[Text] The forthcoming reduction of the Armed Forces is talked about as an element of perestroyka in the Army and Navy. In my view, it is actually this way: the decrease in the number of troops demands a more attentive relationship to cadres, an increase in their responsibility, etc. And as it happens perestroyka demands exactly that from us.

Together with that I am writing and can not hide a feeling of anger in connection with my own fate. It has developed that, having served in the Army for 13 years (9 of them as a platoon commander), I must think about retirement...

When I entered military school, I was prepared for many difficulties. And I believe that school hardened me, making it possible for me to withstand those difficulties. But it turned out that I was not prepared to withstand one difficulty of artificial origin. It is that the number of officers in the Soviet Army (I am talking about this in terms of our district) exceeds the number of duty positions necessary for the normal growth of the officer corps. The question arises, why do we annually accept into the military schools, thousands of young fellows, of whom a good half (and, perhaps, more) after 3-4 years following graduation will be counted in the ranks of the prospectless.

To me, a platoon commander, it is difficult to forecast. To all appearances, the outcome of the situation which has developed is simple; there will be a reduction of the officer corps. I arrive at that conclusion from the fact that our [district] has tens of officers without official duties and [still carried] on the TO. And the troops have not even been completely withdrawn from Afghanistan! The chief of the cadre organ said that roughly the same situation exists even in the western [military] districts. It is precisely for that reason that for me the question of a promotion or transfer to another unit in the coming year (or two or three?) cannot be resolved. What is to be done, indeed?

Having lost the prospect of service growth, the officer (incidentally, the expression "prospectless" [besperspektiv] is very, very offensive. It was given birth at some official level, possibly even in the cadre organs.) begins to fulfill his duties without that fervor, which so impresses a senior chief, and [the officer] becomes a candidate for retirement. Is it not wasteful to lose specialists so rapidly.

Dear Editor! Would it be possible, with the permission of the Ministry of Defense to publish the following data: how many officers in each district at the present time can not be moved to a higher level assignment (and therefore, receive a regular promotion in rank) as a result of an absence of vacancies? And what do the cadre departments of the districts plan to do to correct this situation? It seems to me that complete glasnost on this question is a simple necessity so that rumors about "influence" [blat], corruption and other negative phenomena do not develop.

Proposal of Militia-Based System Discussed

18010191 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 2, Jan 89 pp 18-25

[Series of letters to the editor: "While the Danger of Aggression Still Exists"]

[Text] "In the fall of last year, I was passing through the capital. I found a curious article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Lt Col A. Savinkin in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI titled "What Sort of Army We Need." I was surprised that the author, in discussing the need for reforms in the armed forces, tried to prove the advantages of a regular-militia system, which could, in his opinion, even avert fascist aggression. It would be interesting to know the point of view of other scholars on this issue as well." Respectfully yours, Sr Lt V. Yakushev.

* * *

There have been many letters on this topic in the editorial mail. Interest has grown of late in academic and social circles and in the mass media in questions of the organizational principles of defense. Such publications as OGONEK, NOVOYE VREMYA, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI have repeatedly addressed military problems in their features over the last year. The discussion concerns the direction in which restructuring should proceed in the army and navy, the necessity of military reforms, the expediency of the organizational development of the armed forces based on regular-militia principles etc. Some authors, and this concerns the aforementioned Lt Col A. Savinkin in particular, see a "certain disjointedness in the mutual relations between society and the army" and the "state and political alienation of the army from the people in these or those periods of our history..."

The editors appealed to several social-studies scholars, commanders and political workers with the request to express their opinions on these issues.

Why Confuse the Problem?

The Soviet Army has always been and naturally always will be the 'flesh of ones flesh' of its people. The unity of the army and the people is one of the honored traditions of Soviet society and one of our advantages inaccessible to capitalism. The army has always served its people and the cause of socialism with faith and verity over all of the more than 70 years of the history of the Land of the Soviets.

One cannot agree with the assertion of some authors that the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism supposedly were always in favor of replacing standing armies with a universally armed people. "Moreover," asserts, for example, A. Savinkin, "they advanced this requirement in the context of both democratic and socialist transformations." Why offend the classic authors? They were consistent dialecticians, which allowed them to look at phenomena comprehensively, in all of their interconnections. That is first. Second, the essence of the problem was important for the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism: how to defend reliably the revolutionary gains of the proletariat. And they extracted the form of the defense, like the forms of organizational development of the army, from the specific historical circumstances.

Assertions that they were developing guidelines for a militia organization for the army at the 8th and 9th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congresses, at the very height of the civil war, are imprecise. The party resolution on military issues at the 8th Congress says that when class struggle is transformed into civil war, the slogan "people's militia" is devoid of sense. True, a resolution was adopted at the 9th Congress for a militia system as an acceptable form for military organizational development. But by the 10th Congress it was emphasized that under the prevailing conditions, it was impossible to convert to a militia system and that agitation for it was incorrect. As for the territorial-militia formations that were instituted by the military reforms of 1924-25, they were rejected as being outmoded to the extent of the increasing complication of combat equipment and technology and the worsening of the international climate. A return to the territorial-militia system does not seem possible now, in my opinion, or else the question arises of how to train the pilots, sailors, missile troops, PVO soldiers and even motorized riflemen in such formations.

Assertions that the line of regular-militia organizational principles was artificially broken in the 1930s also do not correspond to the historical truth. A. Savinkin writes in particular that "the Stalinist political regime, under conditions of 'barracks socialism,' needed a regular, performing army. The repressions against the people ruled out relying on popular, essentially territorial-militia formations." This does not correspond to reality, to put it mildly. The regular Red Army never came out

against its own people. They had just one relation to the repressions: they were themselves the target of those Stalinist repressions. Why slander our already bitter history?

The opinions of the aforementioned author relative to the fact that the transition from a regular militia to a regular army had a tragic effect in the Great Patriotic War are even more contrived. Yes, the beginning of it was unsuccessful for us. Without the aim of deeply uncovering the causes for these failures in the initial period of the war, I will just say that our failures were not rooted in the fact that the army was insufficiently a militia. Quite the contrary, the bitter taste of the defeats in the first months of the war had to be suffered because our army was insufficiently a regular one. After all, we had to confront a mobilized and technically better-equipped fascist military machine with experience in combat operations. We can only regret that the transition from a regular-territorial to a regular army was accomplished here only in 1936, while universal military obligation was instituted just in 1939. We did much before the war with fascism. But much also remained unfinished both in the sense of equipping the army with combat equipment and the combat training of its personnel.

Military social scientists must undoubtedly reflect on the score of improving the organizational principles of Soviet defense. But this matter requires a serious, responsible and competent approach. Otherwise we will only become confused and fail to provide clear and precise answers to the questions posed by life. —Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Professor Maj Gen V. Samoylenko

* * *

What is the Essence of a Militia System?

Features on the armed forces in the civilian press are eliciting an equivocal and contradictory reaction among military readers, ranging from indignation that many authors, not privy to operations at the highest echelon of the USSR Ministry of Defense—or else simply military affairs at all—dare to transgress the commandment of the sapient minnow—"don't show yourself"—to delight in some non-standard ideas.

The attitude toward such features, in my opinion, can be a sort of litmus test for Soviet servicemen, making it possible to determine the extent of restructuring of their consciousness. In the pre-restructuring period, it was impossible even to imagine that a little-known journalist or, say, a rank-and-file instructor at an institution of higher military education could permit himself to "dare to give his opinion"—the more so to express it publicly—on a problem that has since time immemorial been considered the prerogative of at least the General Staff. Restructuring has straightened people out. I involuntarily recall an episode from the biography of K.

Marx. Reflecting on the inferiority complexes of those who were at the lower levels of the social hierarchy, Marx sympathetically and mutinously quoted in "The Holy Family" from a revolutionary newspaper that came out in France at the end of the 18th century: "The great seem great to us because we ourselves are on our knees. Stand up!" The restructuring in our country has made it possible for Soviet people to gain faith in their worth. It is namely in that context that I consider some features in the press to be examples of the maturity and profundity of the spiritual restructuring in the army.

It is well known that the right of final solution to this problem belongs to the highest authorities, but in making a decision they are not without interest in knowing the opinions of those whose fate is immediately affected by the processes that are transpiring in the army. And the fact that they trouble many is no secret. After all, the last USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation was adopted on 12 Oct 67, since which radical changes have occurred both in the USSR and abroad. Our military doctrine, which places chief emphasis on qualitative parameters of the organizational development and training of the armed forces, was published not so long ago. Its defensive nature requires, on the one hand, ensuring a reliable defense with a regard for the nature of the military threat and, on the other hand, the execution of defensive measures within the bounds of strict sufficiency, not urging on the arms race, but rather restraining it in every way possible.

Some feel that the central link in the impending changes in the armed forces should be a transition to a regular-militia army. As for a regular army, everyone knows what you are talking about. What is the essence of a militia army?

The term "militia" initially signified an organization of armed people whose chief purpose was to maintain the internal stability of state power. After the appearance of permanent, regular armies (roughly in the 15th century), the militia, manned voluntarily rather than on the basis of military obligation, was employed primarily to preserve social order in the interests of the ruling classes. The oppressed masses frequently created their own popular militia to counter this militia. That is what happened in the time of the Paris Commune (1871), the Russian Revolution of 1905-07 and the revolutions of February and October 1917.

In the opinion of the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism, a militia army is an armed people, a military organization of the people and for the people. It is created voluntarily, on the basis of the participation in it of citizens serving in the places of their permanent residence and trained in short-term courses (assemblies), where possible of an outside-the-barracks type under conditions close to their everyday labor. These traits of a militia army were recorded in the decree "On the Military Question" that was adopted by the 8th RKP(b) Congress.

Proceeding from the socialist ideal, which contains as one of its most important components the affirmation of peace among peoples, the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism considered a militia system for the army more historically progressive and meeting the interests of peoples. First of all, its upkeep is less burdensome for the people (after all, each age group of the population is involved in military service for a shorter period of time, combining productive and military activity).

Second, a militia army is more closely tied to the people. Openness, its lesser isolation from productive labor collectives and the absence of a spirit of so-called "corporate mentality" that is inevitably characteristic of a regular, permanent army to this or that extent facilitates the more active reinforcement of the unity of the militia army and the people.

Third, the presence of a militia army does not invoke the face of the enemy in the consciousness of the population of other countries, since it is entirely obvious that such an army is intended for defense and not for attack, for the protection of its own country and not for aggression... It was namely these merits of a militia army that were taken into account by the party in developing a program for military organizational development in our country. Feeling that it was impossible to convert to a militia system immediately during the years of civil war and military intervention, the 8th RKP(b) Congress noted in the resolution "On the Military Question" that "we are in no way breaking with the program of a militia as such."

And what are the detrimental qualities of a militia system? In the event of premeditated or forced participation in combat operations, an irregular, militia army as a rule proves to be less combat-capable than a standing regular army. The high professionalism of a standing army is difficult or, most often, impossible to compensate for fully by other factors, including a high spirit of patriotism.

But a militia is not inferior to a regular army just in methods of combat operations. The more complicated combat equipment and weaponry becomes, the more difficult it is to master it under a militia system of staffing the armed forces. As early as in 1924, M.V. Frunze noted that under the conditions of the confrontational opposition of two socio-political systems, "there can be no discussion of a complete rejection of regular units for us for a long time." Developing that idea, he emphasized that "in any case, matters will stand as such for all of the types of weapons which by their nature require more prolonged and more careful military training." That was true then. It is even more correct under contemporary conditions, when combat equipment has been improved immeasurably, and its maintenance and utilization require high professional knowledge, abilities and skills.

The combination of militia and territorial principles of manning the armed forces does not facilitate the reinforcement of combat readiness of the army in such an enormous country as ours, with its varying populations densities, differing strategic military significance of individual regions and multi-territorial composition of the population. An extra-territorial principle of manning that makes possible the successful formation of military units in the necessary amounts through young men called up from various regions of the country is more suited to the USSR. Such a method of staffing also favors a strengthening of the internationalist education of the soldiers.

Priority in manning the army, in my opinion, should be given to the principle of a regular system in a combination of regular and militia principles. It is namely a standing regular army, distinguished by high professionalism, that should comprise the foundation of the defensive might of our country. Only such an army is able to master the weaponry and combat equipment completely. It is namely this army that could where necessary take the first strike of an aggressor and deal him a shattering repulse. —Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Professor Maj Gen (Res) N. Tabunov

* * *

It Must Be Economically Substantiated as Well

In analyzing the features of authors inveighing for army reform, your attention is involuntarily drawn to the fact that some of them consider this issue seemingly outside of time, or in any case without a profound regard for existing realities and the chief purpose of our armed forces. A relaxed depiction of the current degree of military danger to the USSR can be clearly discerned in some features. And after all, one of the cornerstone principles of the new political thinking is a strict regard for objective reality. It consists of the fact that major groupings of NATO and the Warsaw Pact currently confront each in Europe alone. Over twelve thousand American nuclear warheads are aimed at targets in the Soviet Union. The United States has moreover never rejected—and today does not reject—the first use of nuclear weapons since it has adopted them. They do not support our proposal and do not take on the obligation not to be the first to begin conventional wars either.

It must also not be forgotten that, having concluded a treaty to destroy medium- and short-range missiles, the United States and NATO are persistently developing programs to compensate for their striking power through modernizing other types of nuclear weapons and increasing conventional high-precision weaponry whose striking power approaches that of nuclear weapons.

Under these conditions, it seems dangerous to create an illusion among Soviet people of the lack of probability of aggression against the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries and thereby affirm throughout society, and

especially among the youth, an erroneously relaxed attitude toward service in the armed forces and the defense of the Motherland. The issue stands thus: the threat of nuclear war has not been removed. The arms race continues.

It could be said that we can't see "past our own nose," that we don't want to see the future prospects, as if there were no restructuring or new political thinking. Naturally, it is useful to think about the future of our armed forces. But this must be done on the basis of profound political conclusions. It is essential in particular to realize the principle of defensive sufficiency as a concrete tool for reducing the level of strategic military parity. It is important to keep in mind herein that the principle of sufficiency itself is a comprehensive concept. It includes political, military and economic aspects simultaneously. Only mutual political agreements between the USSR and the United States and the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on balanced large-scale reductions in arms and troops can be fundamental to the implementation of this principle to the full extent. The INF Treaty was a good prelude to this.

On an intrinsically military plane, reasonable sufficiency, relying on the appropriate political agreements, signifies that structure of the armed forces of a state that will be sufficient to repel possible aggression but insufficient to wage offensive operations. The monitored withdrawal of nuclear and other types of offensive weapons from borders with the subsequent creation of reduced-arms zones and demilitarized zones along the borders between potential adversaries could be the first step toward this. In principle it is necessary to bring matters to the dissolution of military blocs and the elimination of bases on foreign soil along with the return home of all troops located abroad.

Only as a result of this defensive sufficiency will the socio-economic sphere of the life of our society genuinely begin to be profoundly affected: the size and structure of the military budget, the scope of military production, the number of personnel in the army and navy and the procedure for manning the armed forces. That is why current proposals for converting our armed forces to a militia system could be entirely justifiably classified as an attempt to put the cart before the horse.

The rejection of purely quantitative treatments of the concept of "strategic military parity" is new in political thinking. In a number of instances we earlier agreed to "rules of the game" foisted on us and followed the United States, chasing them in many quantitative indicators of an arms race they had unleashed and whipped on. The United States wanted to exhaust us economically along that path in intentional and premeditated fashion.

When we speak of reasonable sufficiency, in the face of all the importance of the quantitative aspect of strategic parity, its qualitative aspect moves to the fore: the

impossibility for the offensive (attacking) side to avoid a shattering answering strike. The effectiveness of our defensive organizational development today should be determined primarily using qualitative parameters. That is why the USSR has gone in for the elimination of quantitative asymmetries in the correlations of individual types of arms and groupings of forces, reducing them on a greater scale than our probable adversaries.

The conclusions of the advocates of a militia army are also exceedingly doubtful. Insofar as these conclusions include economic ones, we will reflect on some of them.

A militia army signifies that service in it is completed by place of residence. The financial upkeep of such local formations will naturally require the appearance of republic and other autonomous military budgets. The actual situation today is moreover such that in the absence of local spending on defense, the budgets of our union republics will have an aggregate deficit of 11.2 billion rubles in 1989.

Financial support for even the intrinsically socio-economic development of the union republics is accomplished to a considerable extent by increasing deductions from all-union taxes and income, the scale of which will comprise 76 percent in 1989 versus 65 percent in 1985. The Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Tajik SSRs will receive 5.9 billion rubles in the form of subsidies from the all-union budget to cover their own planned expenditures in 1989.

As we see, under such conditions the formation of local budgets for defense is extremely difficult, to put it mildly. —Doctor of Economic Sciences Col N. Karasev

They Don't Choose Where They Serve

In 1924 Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze perspicaciously noted that under the conditions of the confrontational opposition of two socio-political systems, it was too early to reject regular units. Developing this idea, he asserted that "in any case, matters will stand as such for all of the types of weapons which by their nature require more prolonged and more careful military training."

The conclusion was correct for the time, and it is all the more so for contemporary conditions, where military equipment is immeasurably more complicated and its support and utilization requires great professional knowledge, abilities and skills. In short, only a regular army can ensure reliable combat readiness. I am surprised that some specialists, including military ones, have not noted this obvious connection.

The theory consolidated in the charter of the Popular Front of Estonia elicits doubts: to serve by place of residence... Good, there will be no shortage of volunteers, let's say, in the European part of the country. What

about the Asian spaces east of the Urals, where just 20 percent of the population of the USSR lives? Who will be put into stations along the coastlines? Hire them in the thickly settled European part? For a decent "recompense"? Excuse my sharpness, but after all, we are not hiring watchmen for the granary, but people called upon to defend the Motherland. Such "rationalism" could cost dearly. That same moral spirit, that moral beauty that distinguishes the Soviet soldier from others bearing arms should give way to cold calculation? I will not argue that the material situation of army and navy personnel must be improved. Maj Gen A. Vladimirov expressed this in exceedingly detailed and constructive fashion in one of the military journals, by the way.

The soldier's patriotic and internationalist duty... Does it have an equivalent in precious metals? No. Did my "Afghan" comrades-in-arms really go on raids for hard cash? Was it really mercenary considerations that impelled my combat comrade, Pvt Boris Yermolov, who had undergone a most serious lung operation, to seek permission to return to his own unit? And the Babin brothers? When the eldest—Vladimir—fell, the commanders decided to send Aleksandr to the USSR from Afghanistan (so that the parents could preserve one son). He refused and fulfilled his duty as an internationalist soldier to the end.

No, they don't choose where they serve, they are carried where the security interests of the homeland demands. We cannot be of two minds here. —Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Col N. Kravchenko, student at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze

For Sobriety in Evaluations and Judgments

An overall view of our revolutionary history affirms that the practical implementation of this or that political policy in the realm of defense is always associated chiefly with the actual correlation of forces in the world and the degree of aggressiveness of the militarist circles of imperialism. V.I. Lenin directed attention to this more than once. "To have a serious attitude toward the defense of the country," he noted, "means to prepare thoroughly and to have a strict regard for the correlation of forces." The topical nature of Lenin's idea is confirmed by the actual experience of the organizational principle of the militia that is being referred to by certain authors, committing, in my opinion, an exceedingly widespread error therein—regarding the past not from the point of view of its realities, specific features and possibilities, but from positions of conformity or non-conformity to their own preferences.

We turn to the materials of the 10th RKP(b) Congress. Its decree on the military issue states in particular that "The forms, methods and rate of transition to a militia

depend entirely on the international and domestic situation and the duration of breathing spaces..." And further, extremely notable: "The agitation of some comrades for the actual dissolution of the current Red Army and the immediate conversion to a militia is incorrect and dangerous in practice at the current time." A considered evaluation of the disposition of forces at a crucial stage of the development of history allowed it to conclude that "in the near future, the foundation of our armed forces should be the current Red Army, where possible reduced through older age groups and with a greater proletarian and communist composition." A partial conversion to militia formations was permitted only for some regions (Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals) and only for infantry and cavalry.

Political realism and sobriety in evaluating the disposition of forces in the international arena affected the nature of military organization later as well. Convincing testimony to that was the conversion from a mixed system of military organizational development to a unified standing regular army.

The turn to this form of army organization was dictated not by voluntarism or an artificially broken policy of regular and militia organizational development, which was, according to the assertions of some authors, supposedly not implicit within the framework of "barracks socialism," but rather by a serious growth in the military danger from the strike forces of imperialism. And fascist Germany first and foremost. A mixed system for the development of the armed forces under those conditions could not ensure the security of the country. A large and well-equipped army that has confidently mastered all means and methods of armed struggle and is ready at any moment to give a decisive repulse to the aggressor was needed for this. It had already become clear at that time that the personnel of the territorial units, during their time at assemblies, were in no way able to study the new combat equipment and, most importantly, learn to employ it in battle. The territorial units were moreover stationed in places where Red Army members lived and worked, and not where the prevailing strategic military situation required.

In this context I would note that these drawbacks could not help but be reflected in the general level of readiness of our armed forces for the war against fascist Germany.

Party policy in the military realm was constructed adapting to the principles of a concrete historical approach and the necessity of ensuring reliable security for the country in the postwar period as well. Not everything here has gone smoothly, of course, but it cannot fail to be seen that we have in practice taken into account the many years of experience in our defensive organizational development this time. This points out once more the continuity of the Leninist policies of the CPSU in the realm of defense.

The constructive foreign-policy activity of the CPSU and the efforts of the fraternal socialist countries and broad world peace-loving society are leading to the affirmation of the new political thinking and have made it possible to push back the immediate military threat. The situation in the world remains complex and contradictory, however. We have not yet been able to create a reliable political mechanism for blocking the sources of aggression. The NATO plans for "up-arming" and "compensating" along with the general thrust of the militarist programs based on which the military organizational development of the NATO bloc is accomplished point this out unambiguously. Under these conditions the CPSU has concluded that the reliable restraint of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism is possible based on both a balance of interests and a balance of forces.

As we see, under contemporary conditions priority is granted to concrete realities. —Candidate of Historical Sciences Col A. Khromov

* * *

A Realistic Approach is Essential

I think that those advancing the concept of a restructuring of our army on the regular militia principle and asserting that only such an army is capable of averting war and repelling aggression are moving far from the realities of the current military and political climate in the world, the level of contemporary scientific and technical progress and the missions performed by the Soviet armed forces.

I can agree to a certain extent with the author of the aforementioned feature that it is expedient for a socialist state to have a relatively small, technically well-equipped and professionally trained army. But this depends to a decisive extent on the real military and political situation in the world arena. If the process of detente in international tensions that has begun develops successfully in the future as well, large-scale agreements on reductions in both nuclear and conventional weapons are evidently possible in the near future, which will permit reductions in the size of the Soviet armed forces on a parity basis. Our country has set an example in this regard once again, by the way. CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Comrade M.S. Gorbachev has declared from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly the unilateral decision of the Soviet Union to reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men over the next two years. This new peace initiative by the Soviet Union was met with understanding and approval by the general public of the whole planet.

The army of a socialist state, regardless of its size, should undoubtedly be a well-organized organism, flexible, mobile and suitable for the interests of armed defense of the peaceful labor of the people. And the statement of V.I. Lenin that modern troops are one of the best

specimens of organization is exceedingly topical today. And this organization is good because it is flexible, able to give unified will to millions of people at the same time.

A militia army does not have a permanent military organization. But if there is no organization or hierarchy of subordination, spontaneity, irresponsibility, drifting and losses of time, even anarchy, are inevitable. Is this conceivable under contemporary conditions and with the current means of armed struggle?

Furthermore, the most important merit of the regular militia army, some authors feel, is its maximum convergence to productive labor, the possibility of non-barracks military service, the non-burdensome nature of such an army to society in a material sense and even... the high patriotic spirit of the personnel.

These conclusions are very doubtful in both a military and an economic sense.

Productive labor by a defender of the Motherland almost rules out his high-quality military training. The practice of the life of the troops is visible testimony to this.

An analogous picture is also drawn with non-barracks training of soldiers. Many years of experience both in our country and in other states demonstrates the ineffectiveness of non-barracks training of armed defenders. Such a system of training under contemporary conditions requires enormous expenditures of human and material resources. Prevailing military technology and new methods of waging battle and conducting operations, after all, require the creation of special training centers in every city and town, the equipping of a teaching and methodological base and highly qualified professional specialists in non-barracks refresher training.

The adaptation of young people to military service seems exceedingly doubtful under such a system. Difficulties are inevitable with deployments outside the barracks, the attitude of production collectives toward separations of future soldiers from their basic work or training etc.

In other words, the proposed restructuring of the army on regular militia principles, in my opinion, would represent a step backward in military affairs and does not meet the realities of our time or party requirements for raising the qualitative parameters of defensive organizational development. —Doctor of Economic Sciences and Professor Col I. Yudin

The Source of Danger Remains

The Soviet Union has existed surrounded by the military bases of the United States for over 40 years: more than 1,000 major military facilities and bases are positioned along the land and maritime borders of the USSR and

the other countries of the socialist community. The threat to our national security is augmented by the potential capabilities of American strategic aircraft and aircraft-carrier strike groups. A special program of combat duty of airborne strategic bombers called Giant Ring, for example, has been worked on by the armed forces of the United States in Global Shield type exercises since 1979. About 30 percent of the B-52, B-1B and F-111 aircraft are involved in its execution. The routes that the carriers of nuclear weapons patrol are the same as those for combat deployment. The maneuvers near the borders of socialist countries by troops and naval forces of the armies of NATO, the United States and Japan are difficult to distinguish from the actual deployment of armed forces. These facts testify eloquently to the fact that the military threat is preserved, and its source is the aggressive policies of the imperialist states. Can we really inveigh for a weakening of the defensive capability of the country in this climate? Political detente, after all, is unfortunately not being supplemented by military detente. Only our country has taken steps of goodwill.

Unfortunately, not all are evaluating this situation in suitable fashion. Pacifist sentiments are moreover being incorporated into public awareness by some public organizations and mass media, and the vital necessity of the strict fulfillment of the constitutional duty of Soviet citizens to defend the Motherland is being called into doubt. It is difficult to explain such provisions of the draft document "General Program of the Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring," for example, as the introduction of a labor obligation (?) for youth that do not wish to serve in the army due to their convictions, the abolition of basic military training, no drafting of students and the creation of national military formations among others. We should not lapse into illusions of an immediate, near, universal and lasting peace in forming our defense awareness, although I emphasize that some trends in the formation of a non-nuclear world have already been noted. —Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Lt Col B. Molostov

An Old Song in a New Key

Remember Demyan Bednyy: "You'll find tea and bayonets in the Red Army..." Until recently it seemed to me that these words remained in the past. But no. No few voices are singing it today. All right if the soloists are of a tender age, so to speak—since after all, it is estimable husbands, solid men with a wealth of life experience, who take up the verse "The Bolsheviks will manage without you..." And many considerations guide the authors of features in mass publications: economic, political, aesthetic.

What is happening? The last nuclear warhead on Earth has been dismantled? All the NATO generals have requested retirement en masse? That hasn't happened yet, the evil designs with the coordinates of our cities still

reside in the electronic brains of the various Tridents and Titans over there; can we really sound the all-clear in such a climate? And serving at half strength is impermissible. The armed defenders of the Motherland are obliged to maintain constant combat readiness and seek persistently high results in combat training, service and discipline.

I recently addressed these words to conscripts of the Proletarskiy Rayon of Moscow. I often have occasion to have such conversations with student contemporaries and young plant workers at the request of the capital reserve soldiers' council, as well as by the dictates of conscience. They have great sympathy and trust in our "Afghan" brother. They understand that army service is a matter of state importance. But pacifist sentiments are putting down roots in the youthful environment from time to time. Or else a primitive egotism among young people is being manifested which they frequently cover up with an "authoritative opinion." Here Adamovich said something, there someone wrote something about the army in YUNOSTI, an academician proposed in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA that... In such cases I want to recall the wisdom of the ancients, who reasonably advised: leave the books and consult with reason.

The author of an article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in particular proposes that we reflect on the topic of whether militia military formations can be considered useful for productive labor in the national economy as well. Under the conditions of modern scientific and technical revolution in production, true professional workers who have dedicated themselves entirely to some specific field are required more and more. People who know neither how to work at the plant nor how to serve in the army are hardly suitable. Most likely you get neither good soldiers nor qualified workers out of them. Both the national economy and the combat readiness of units and subunits would suffer simultaneously as a result.

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Law on Conscientious Objection Considered

Soviets Urged to Support UN Resolution

*18120070 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE
in English No 1, Jan 89 pp 34-37*

[Article by Bruno Koppeters: "Believers and Military Service"]

[Text] In March, 1987 the UN Human Rights Commission adopted a resolution which recognized the right to refuse to do military service in peacetime as the legitimate right to freedom of opinion, conscience and religion. Included in this resolution was the recommendation to all UN nations to introduce an alternative civil

service. The resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The Soviet Union abstained. A welcome surprise for many, since, earlier, the Soviet Union was always against such steps.

Several versions were used to explain the present position of the Soviet Union. Some observers considered that to prevent a serious blow at its prestige, the USSR tried to avoid isolation during voting. Really, a considerable part of the international peace movement considers the right of individuals refusing to serve in the army for religious convictions as an important criterion for evaluating the present reforms going on in the USSR. Others tried to find the explanation in the reorientation of Soviet policy in the sphere of security as well as in the new policy of glasnost. Soviet Peace Committee officials expressed the hope that new agreements on conventional armaments control are possible. That would make it possible to demobilize tens of thousands of people of call-up age, both in the East and the West, and people refusing to do military service could hope to get legal status. It is thought that the Soviet Union, by abstaining during voting, was adopting a wait-and-see policy, taking into account the possible development of events in this direction.

In any case, the resolution of the UN Human Rights Commission has become an important event for those people in the Soviet Union who refuse to serve in the army because of their pacifist views. For them this was an important step in the restoration of the right which the pacifist groups received in Soviet Russia after the October Revolution. On January 9, 1919 the Soviet government (Council of People's Commissars) issued a decree granting alternative civil service and even, under certain conditions, exempting completely from military service all religious pacifists.

Promising Beginning...

The adoption of this decree meant that the Bolsheviks recognized the establishment traditions in Russia of rejecting violence. Pacifist sects (Mennonites, Adventists and Dukhobors), separate members of Protestant religious communities (Baptists, for example) and followers of Tolstoy's teaching, "non-resistance to evil by violence" were bitter opponents of the militarism of the tsar government, and Lenin always considered them the Bolsheviks' allies. After the October Revolution, pacifist groups formed the United Council of Religious Communities and Groups which strived for legal recognition of the right to exemption from military service for religious convictions. Lenin agreed.

The tolerant attitude must strengthen the social basis of the new regime. There were also economic reasons for the union with pacifist sections. For example, the Mennonites were not only a large sect (with over one hundred thousand members) but also a wealthy one. Soviet Russia sustained serious losses during World War I and Civil Wars and could use profitably their technical experience

in agriculture. More than that, this decree did not contradict Marxist criticism of religion. Lenin did not approve of the religious concepts behind rejections of violence but he did not consider that suppression was a suitable means in the struggle against such ideas. The doctrine which proclaimed the rejection of violence, as was stated then, mainly reflected cultural backwardness. Lenin supposed that this "reactionary" doctrine would gradually disappear during the revolutionary reconstruction of the whole social structure.

After the Revolution, the legal system in Soviet Russia was in disarray which was a considerable obstacle to observance of the decree. People's courts and military authorities did not always fulfill its requirements. Many people exempted from military service were imprisoned and some of them even executed. Nevertheless, thousands of persons of call-up age had the opportunity to take advantage of this decree during the first postwar years.

...Destroyed by Stalin

From the beginning of the 20s there was conflict between the Soviet government and the United Council of Religious Communities and Groups which had the right to exercise certain influence on the whole procedure. That government accused the Council that, apart from protecting those exempted from military service, it abused its proxy by counterfeiting documents and launching pacifist propaganda. It was stated that such actions undermined the Soviet system. Later, the Council was removed from participation in the procedure. From 1923, only members of the pacifist sects which were against military service before the October Revolution had the right to do alternative service. Separate pacifists from other religious communities (for example, Baptists) did not have that right.

Stalin annulled the right to exemption from military service once and for all. In the eyes of Stalin, pacifism was not only reactionary, it must be rooted out by all possible means. More than that, the sects remained closed communities and, as such, did not meet the requirements of the state structure worked out by Stalin. Agricultural cooperatives formed by the members of religious sects and followers of Tolstoy's teaching, which in the early 20s still received the support of the Soviet government, also did not correspond to the policy of collectivization of agriculture introduced by Stalin. In the 30s, many members of the sects were driven out from villages and deported to Siberia or to the barren lands in the North. Many of them were deprived of their property and died because of the hard conditions of life. Religious and cultural peculiarities of pacifist sects were considerably lost due to these repressions. At present, Soviet Christians adhere to pacifist traditions as before. Individuals who refuse to serve in the army are given

long-term prison sentences. Apart from pacifists-Christians, the USSR peace movement also includes people who refuse to serve in the army for other, non-religious reasons.

It is unclear whether the new Party leadership headed by Mikhail Gorbachev is going to recognize the right of exemption from military service. The position of the USSR, which abstained during voting in the UN Human Rights Commission, is perhaps the first positive step in the restoration of the rights of people who refuse to serve in the army, rights they received after the October Revolution. In 1989 the UN Human Rights Commission will resume its work on the problem of exemption from military service. I would like to believe that the Soviet Union will not abstain during the voting, but support unambiguously the right of people to refuse to serve in the army.

Lenin Decree on Religious Exemption Printed 18120070 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 1, Jan 89 pp 34-37

[Text: "Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on Exemption From Conscription for Religious Convictions"]

[Text]

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on Exemption From Conscription for Religious Convictions

1. Persons who cannot, because of their religious convictions, be called up, should be granted the right, by a decision of the people's court, to do, instead of military services, sanitary service, mainly in hospitals for infectious diseases, or some corresponding socially useful work of their choice.

2. Passing its decision on the replacement of conscription with another civic duty, the people's court sends an inquiry to the commission of experts of the Moscow United Council of Religious Communities and Groups about each particular case. The decision of experts must take account of the fact that certain religious convictions rule out military service and also that this person is acting sincerely and conscientiously.

3. The United Council of Religious Communities and Groups, by a unanimous decision, has the right to apply to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to exempt a person completely from conscription without replacing this service with another civic duty, if the inadmissibility of such replacement, from the religious or personal point of view, or that of sectarian literature, can be proved.

Note: The right to institute and conduct proceedings to exempt a certain person from conscription is granted both to the conscript and to the United Council of

Religious Communities and Groups. Moreover, the latter is also granted the right to apply for the case to be tried at the Moscow people's court.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin), Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Kursky, People's Commissar of Justice

V. Bonch-Bruyevich, Business-manager of the Council of People's Commissars

Secretary: L. Fotiyeva

January 4, 1919, Moscow, The Kremlin

Letters to Editor Discuss Issue

18120070 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE
in English No 1, Jan 89 pp 34-37

[Letters to the Editor]

[Text]

Alternative Service

I write to you with a feeling of sincere friendship and respect. We in Finland observe with interest the life in your country and positive changes that have are taking place in the Soviet Union. [as published] I'm worried about the fate of those young people who refused to serve in the army due to their religious or moral convictions and who get prison terms because of that. They say that they can be imprisoned up to for seven years....

As far as I know, in Poland a law is under discussions which envisages three-year alternative military service for adherents to philosophy of non-violence which prohibits them from serving in the army. Discussions on the possibility of introducing such alternative services are going on even in Hungary and the GDR. I also want to mention—with all my respect—Articles 3 and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which proclaims the right to life, freedom and security of all as well as freedom of thought, conscience and faith.

For all who regard your country with best feelings—I also belong to them—it will be a great joy to know that you also have an alternative non-violent service, this gives us hope.

I ask you to do the best to fulfill this goal.

Sincerely yours,

Lisa Toivanen Turku, Finland

'We Are Not Allowed to Kill'

I write to you to tell you of my concern for a young Estonian, and to ask if you would try to help him. His name is Taavi Kuusk. He was charged with "Evasion of

regular call-up to active military service" and was sentenced to 2 years and 3 months imprisonment in a strict regime corrective labour colony. This young man is a Jehavan's [sic] Witness and has refused to do military service on conscientious grounds.

I wonder whether perhaps you could start a discussion in your journal about whether there should be a right to conscientious objection? And whether an alternative form of non-military service could be provided for genuine conscientious objectors? In Britain, in the last war, they sometimes worked as ambulance drivers and stretcher-bearers.

Perhaps I might mention that my daughter, Jane Kantish, recently translated a collection of Tolstoy's religious writings. It was published by Penguin publishers. I remember his account of a peasant who refused to do military service in the Tsar's army because "God forbids it. We are not allowed to kill." (I share his belief myself.) Perhaps Tolstoy's ideas would form an interesting starting point for a discussion of conscientious objection?

But, please, will you try to help this young man, who surely should be seen as a prisoner of conscience?

Yours sincerely,

Kantish Colchester, Great Britain

Military's Place in Society Considered

18120072 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE
in English No 1, Jan 89 pp 25-27

[Article by Lt Col V. Yu. Balabushevich and Lt Col A.A. Sipko, teachers of Marxist-Leninist philosophy: "Professionals' Opinion"]

[Text] A round-table conference on the subject army and society is of exceptional importance, and necessary for our socialist society and for the army. Many people, naturally, are interested in this subject. However, we would like to make some remarks about the nature of the discussions started by the magazine XX CENTURY AND PEACE, and about the nature of some similar publications in the central press on this problem.

In their arguments about the army a number of participants in the discussion use not so much scientific notions and categories, as the terminology of everyday consciousness. Although departure into the sphere of emotions is outwardly effective, it doesn't bring us closer to finding out the truth which, as A. S. Pushkin put it, is "stronger than the tsar" and the striving for which must unite all of us.

The impression is that a negative attitude to the army, its people and military service, is becoming today just as fashionable literary and journalistic method as the interpretation of evangelical themes. At the same time the

army is becoming an object of so-called "ricocheting criticism". Some participants in the round-table conference (as well as the authors of a number of publications in periodicals) focus attention on the army as a source of social evil and additional social problems in socialist society (lack of spirituality, reduction of educational level, economic difficulties, militarization of certain spheres of society's life and so on). Given such logic, there is no wonder that the blame for cases of cheating in trade is put on school teachers of mathematics. Doesn't it reveal the fear of frank criticism of the political system in socialist society, concrete steps and decisions of the political leadership at various levels of power? Of course, it is simpler to concentrate criticism only on the army as one of the social institutions. But still unchanged is the provision that the army is a copy of society: real contradictions and problems of society are at the same time the contradictions and problems of its army. What are the "frontal" attacks on the army based on? Methodological miscalculation or incompetence, or perhaps the political situation? It is hard to say, but one thing is certain—this is a peculiar indication of the lack of still genuine socialist pluralism of views in our discussions, fear of calling a spade a spade.

We professional servicemen are against a return to the old state of affairs when the army was a zone beyond criticism. But, at the same time, we cannot ignore attempts to counterpose socialist army to socialist society, presenting it as a kind of conservative force.

All criticism should be constructive and not build on the oversimplified scheme of some youth "champions": "There will be no war all the same", "Military people are idlers", "The army must be disbanded!"

Over the past few years considerable changes have taken place in the economic, social, political and spiritual spheres of Soviet society. These changes (of course, in combination with foreign political factors) are what determines the nature and orientation of further development of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is obviously necessary to set up a scientifically substantiated theoretical model of the modern socialist army and to provide a clearcut concept of its reform. Taking into account the special "ticklish character" of the problem of ensuring the country's security, it would be erroneous to act according to the well-known principle: "Let's first get involved in a battle, then we'll see..."

It seems necessary to continue serious theoretical study of the role and place of military potential in the structure of a socialist state's joint forces. These conclusions must become the methodological basis for concrete steps of political leaders to take decisions on the priority of economic, political, ideological, diplomatic or military means of ensuring the country's security in one or another concrete historical situation.

In the near future, both the theory and practice of Soviet military development must be modified in accordance with the realities of the modern military-political situation, reflected in today's Soviet military doctrine. In our view, the starting principles of Soviet military development must be:

a) guaranteed defence against outside attacks; b) reasonable sufficiency; c) economic effectiveness; d) political expediency.

The problem regarding the structure, numerical strength and the way of manning the Armed Forces calls for thorough study. What will be the army of the future? A mass-scale, regular army? Will the militia or militia cadres system of manning be recognized as the most optimal? Will the issue of a professional army recruited on a voluntary basis be put on the agenda? One thing is certain—whichever model is accepted as basic (it may be emphasized that this choice depends not only on our subjective desire but also on existing realities—economic, political, ideological and so on), it is necessary to take into consideration several principles:

—between peace- and wartime (the threatening period) there are differences in the numerical strength of the army, and in structure;

—hence the need to preserve and improve the system of military training of the working people, no matter what concrete bodies and organisations this task will be assigned to (the forms of this work that have taken shape today are frequently ineffective and cumbersome);

—the education of Soviet people must include as an integral component the shaping of clearcut ideas about the role and place of the army in the life of socialist society, about the objective need for using military means of assuring the country's security (you can take or leave the term "military-patriotic education", the crux of the problem remains unchanged).

Calls have been made rather frequently of late to start dismantling our military and defensive structures unilaterally, almost as a "goodwill" gesture. But let's recall the old truth: "Politics is the art of the possible". Any running ahead in politics may lead to unpredictable consequences. It is unwise to mix up the period of military-strategic balance, of the outlined tendency towards the elimination and reduction of some types of offensive weapons, with the period of disarmament as an all-embracing irreversible and simple international process. It is inexpedient to mix up a certain, natural stage in changing the army (its qualitative and quantitative parameters) with the tendency towards its complete disappearance as a social institution. It is not reasonable to accept the negative emotional perception of militarism as sufficient argument that the army is unnecessary in modern concrete-historical conditions.

We must be realistic about today's political situation, still far from that state of world community where use of the military could be fully ruled out. We still have the source of war—imperialism, and of military threat—classes, states, social groups pursuing a policy of material and ideological preparation for a new world war. The fact that to win in a world nuclear-missile war is impossible is perceived by them as a temporary phenomenon, the way out of this situation is being sought through further improvement of weaponry. Giving up the "image of the enemy", the abstract image of "Americans", "Germans", "Englishmen" and so on we must see the real political forces opposing mankind's striving to live in peace, and aspiring to "freeze" the state of its political and economic estrangement.

Wishful thinking—the striving of present prospects for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free, non-violent world is unfortunately characteristic of some of our authors. Consequently, serious analysis of the realities of the nuclear-missile epoch is being replaced by rhetoric. The question of the possibility of using the army in the struggle for power inside the country (although the term "struggle for power" in a socialist state may even shock certain people) is interesting and timely from the viewpoint of promoting the process of democratizing our society. But the use or threat of force in the process of changing political leadership is reality confirmed by facts from our history. In this case the army becomes the subject and at the same time the object of political struggle. Obviously, what really matters is not so much the army and its definition, as the presence or absence of an effective democratic mechanism for replacing the higher echelons of power. Of principled importance is also the creation in society of a moral and psychological atmosphere restricting the spectrum and possibilities of using the army inside society for political purposes. Perhaps it is worthwhile keeping for internal purposes special armed formations like the "workers' militia" or "national guards", with a clearly defined constitutional status.

There is another point we find it hard to agree with. Among certain circles of creative intellectuals it has almost become a sign of good form to accuse military people of "militarization of thinking". This is absolute nonsense. Professional military people, owing to the specific character of their activity, soberly conceive the likely consequences of a modern war. Besides, the way of thinking depends more on the brain rather than on the military uniform or civil dress worn. Indeed, relapses into militarization of political thinking have taken place in our country. But what are their sources? Maybe, in the first place, in the administrative-bureaucratic machine which took shape in the 1920s-1930s for well-known reasons, and which functioned till the mid 1980s. Precisely this machine generated power impulses in home and foreign policy.

In conclusion, we hope to continue the discussion on the pages of our magazine, and to become acquainted with the broadest range of views on this subject.

Lieutenant-Colonel V. Yu. Balabushevich,

Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Sipko,

teachers of Marxist-Leninist philosophy Novosibirsk

Maj Gen Surkov Chosen as Candidate From Leninakan

*18010393a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Feb 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Lt Col O. Falichev, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Candidate From a 'Special Region'"]

[Text] Leninakan.... I recalled it as damaged by a terrible natural disaster, in heaps of ruins. And now with the chief of the political section, Guards Col M. Surkov, we were driving along one of the main streets of the center, Shirakitsi. Mikhail Semenovich [Surkov] with a sharp and, I would say, proprietary view spotted the changes which had occurred in the appearance of the much-suffering city. The stores were operating, the traffic lights were flashing correctly and the striped batons of the GAI [State Automotive Inspectorate] traffic police were being waved on busy intersections.... Now on the site of the destroyed residences and administrative buildings were clear sites ready for construction.

"The rebirth of Leninakan is one of the main points in my pre-election program," said Mikhail Semenovich, continuing the long-commenced conversation.

From the pre-election agitation leaflet: "Colonel Surkov, since the very first day has headed the political leadership of the troop units in the area devastated by the earthquake. He personally organized the reception of first aid from the "outside world" at the Leninakan Airport. Upon his initiative in the city they set up a method for informing the public over the loudspeaker system as well as the regular publishing of an informative reference bulletin which described the rescue work.... Surkov was concerned with the feeding and warning of the people, the assigning of equipment and personnel to clear the rubble as well as the locating of missing persons and burials....

I recall well those days when we, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents, quickly flew off to the disaster area in order to describe to readers its scale and the role of the troops in eliminating the consequences of the earthquake. And the first person to greet us at Leninakan was the chief of the political section, Col Surkov. At that time, night and day seemingly became mixed up in his office located under the low sloping arches of the former fortress. With heavy eyelids swollen from a lack of sleep, pale but full of decisiveness and readiness to act, he conducted meetings, answered phone calls and traveled out to various areas of the city to clarify the situation.

From the report of Col Surkov to the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy:

- During the period of evacuation and rescue work we have removed 39,710 persons from under the ruins;
- Medical first aid was provided by the military medics to more than 6,000 victims;
- Six tent cities were set up for the public with 27,640 tents being set up and made available as well as 11,000 stoves;
- Some 146 tons of bread were handed out to the public and 300 tons of food used to prepare meals....

Surkov's proxy, Lt Col S. Ustyanov, at a meeting of the personnel which put up his candidacy as a USSR people's deputy for the Leninakan-Shirakskiy National-Territorial Electoral District No. 396, said to those assembled that Mikhail Semenovich was born several months after the victory [of World War II] in Chelyabinsk in a worker family. He began work at the age of 15 as a fitter at a plant. Later he served in the army with regular service in the rocket troops and this he completed as a battery master sergeant. In 1968, he joined the ranks of the Communist Party. After completing a combined-arms school, the young officer was appointed to the position of deputy company commander for political affairs. His further service was carried out in the Leningrad Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Moscow Military District where, in particular, he served in the famous Guards Taman Motorized Rifle Division. Now he was in the Transcaucasus.

His subordinates had done an enormous amount of work in the disaster area. But primarily in Leninakan. For this reason it was no surprise that Surkov was put up precisely here as the sole candidate for the superior state body of the nation.

"Why did we put up a military man?" was the question posed to me by the party bureau secretary of the Leninakan Meat Canning Combine, Konstantin Mikhaylovich Kavazyan. "We traditionally have had close ties with the local garrison. The earthquake merely affirmed the strength of these ties. Surkov had helped us previously. We feel that he will properly defend our interests in the future. He has a good deal of experience of working in the local soviets as he was elected to the village, rayon and city ones...."

From the pre-election program of Col Surkov:

- To raise the prestige of military service, to fight for the legal and social protection of the officers.
- To justly resolve the nationality problems in the region.
- To strengthen the unity of the Army and people.

Many good words were also said about Surkov by the chief of the political section in the border detachment Lt Col V. Manko, by his subordinates, by the first secretary of the Leninakan party gorkom M. Mkrtchyan and many other people whom the candidate deputy had met. Many knew him personally. And primarily due to his talks on republic television where he explained to the public the questions related to the introduction of marshal law, where he set out his views on the nationality problems and debated with the well-known public affairs writer Zorn Balayan. Precisely since then Surkov's office phone number had become well known throughout the republic. Up to 600 calls came in in a day. The telephone heated up but on the other hand nationality passions died down....

...We were returning from Leninakan late at night.

"It is a pity that there is not enough time in a day," said Mikhail Semenovich thoughtfully.

But in his mouth this well-worn phrase did not then seem so banal to me.

From the Editors. When the material was being prepared for publishing, it was learned that the candidate for the USSR people's deputies for the Leninakan-Shirakskiy National Territorial Electoral District, Col M. Surkov, had been awarded the rank of major general.

Struggle Against Anonymous Complaints

*18010393b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Feb 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent V. Polezhayev: "The Slanderer Changes His Last Name"]

[Text] On 2 February 1988, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted an ukase in accord with which written appeals from citizens without indication as to last name, data on residence, work or place of study are to be considered anonymous and will not be reviewed. The ukase was adopted in the aim of strengthening the fight against anonymous slander. Has it succeeded? An analysis of the editor's mail over the last year indicates that although there are slightly fewer anonymous letters, the anonymous writers, alas, have not disappeared. They continue to live and flourish. In truth, they often are not the same people as before. They are also "restructuring": each letter now is signed, as a rule, with a clear last name....

Recently I had to investigate three such letters which came one after another. It was necessary for it was hard to assume that these were anonymous as they had been so adroitly delivered. It seemed that each of the letters

could serve as serious grounds for an article in a newspaper as there were instances of abuse, a sound line of argument, an authoritative tone and sincerity. And each had a clearly distinguishable signature with a return address indicated.

Here is one of them "signed" by the secretary of the unit Komsomol committee. "In our regiment," the letter states, "there is a subunit under the command of Sr Lt S. (the last name is given) and which year after year is considered the best, exemplary and a model. So be it! But the entire regiment works for this subunit. And last time all the forces and reserves were thrown here to keep its good name...." And then came more facts.

It was not particularly hard to find out that the secretary of the unit Komsomol committee the name of whom was at the bottom of the letter had not even the slightest connection with the noted letter. The facts had been turned upside down and were distorted. With good reason it is said that slander is like soot: if it does not burn, it at least leaves a mark. While an investigation was underway, the persons mentioned by the slanderer were under the shadow of suspicion. There were difficult days for Sr Lts V. Stotskiy and S. Siver, Maj S. Solokhin and Lt Col V. Botivskiy.... A disgruntled somebody was ringing his hands in satisfaction.

It was a rather extraordinary story. But together with other similar instances it shows that the anonymous letter writer who has subsided with the start of the times of glasnost has still not given up and has not abandoned his unworthy methods and procedures. Involuntarily the question arises just how much leeway can be given to an anonymous letter writer in the dangerous, wearying game forced on us by him? For whom is this advantageous? What outcome do we expect?

In the criminal code there is an article which provides for a rather severe punishment, including imprisonment for a period of up to 5 years, for the dissemination of slanderous fabrications which demean another person. But in order for the slanderer to receive his due, it is essential to establish his identity. Whose duty is this? It is felt that the workers of the law enforcement bodies should be the first to do this. But the procurator's offices have enough problems without the anonymous letter writers. And the persons ready to assume the role of a "private detective" do not have either the legal rights or the appropriate experience. This circumstance creates that atmosphere in which the slanderer and falsifier feel in charge. Without feeling the strict attention of the law, he is convinced of his invulnerability and, as they say, blossoms in full color.

Some time ago KRASNAYA ZVEZDA received a letter at the end of which was the signature: "Troop Unit Communist I.I. Panyukov." The letter was full of concern and alarm giving "flagrant" facts and all sorts of violations and abuses and mention was made of the "sense of duty" which had guided the author. But then during a check....

The fellow servicemen of Maj I. Panyukov, having become acquainted with the contents of the letter, were perplexed as Maj I. Panyukov, an honest and highly moral person, could not have written the false opus which defamed the entire collective. Maj Panyukov himself was more than amazed as he knew nothing about the letter to the editors. Having read it, the officer was upset for a long time.

And then it was possible to establish that the slanderer had been Maj. E. Makhitko. He had written the letter several days before being discharged into the reserves in the aim of defaming Maj Panyukov and seeking revenge against him for principledness shown in conducting a party investigation of a personnel case as a result of which A. Makhitko was expelled from the CPSU.

How was Makhitko punished for his baseness? In the political section they said that the unit's officers showed disdain to him. Was that not too mild? For an anonymous letter writer disdain is water off a duck's back. So it turned out that the slanderer who had attacked numerous persons was unpunished. He was safely discharged into the reserves and left. But such patience and lenience is nothing more than the encouraging of the anonymous letter writer. It is not to be excluded that another creation begun by poisonous tall tales will come from his pen.

The anonymous letter writers spare no one. On the contrary, their procedures and methods are marked by particular craftiness. They are not concerned that their provocations can lead to severe consequences. In attacking from behind someone else, they at the same time "get two birds," that is, they poison the lives of those persons whose names are put on the letters as well as those whom they slander. An anonymous complaint wounds the heart or at least for a long time remains a source of bitterness in one's soul. As a rule, the slanderers "execute" persons who are active, energetic and creative and who have no time to waste on protest complaints and traveling up the line of command with a demand to cleanse them of the dirt of the slanderers. Very enticing for the "human hunters" is the person of a leader who acts not according to the standards and for this reason does not fit partially within the framework of the instructions and orders. On the other hand, there are usually no autonomous letters about the idlers and parasites and that is quite characteristic.

Since Lt Col N. Novikov assumed command of one of the lagging military repair enterprises, the moral atmosphere in the collective has begun to change for the better. Discipline has been strengthened, labor efficiency has risen and advanced experience has begun to be introduced more actively. A well-trained, competent, energetic and involved man, Nikolay Vladimirovich [Novikov] has been able to unite the men and the enterprise has pulled out of its slump.

However, not everyone in the collective liked the success. There were the dissatisfied who found the changes not to their liking. They were silent at the meetings and did not openly voice their claims or shortcomings noted in the leader's activities. On the contrary, they were the loudest in applauding his actions and they smiled in a friendly manner when meeting. But little by little they found grounds to thwart him and jam things up. For the fact that he was very demanding, he did not indulge them and was very demanding for misdeeds. Then the anonymous letters began arriving.

From the results of last year, the military enterprise was again among the leaders. For the third time and now in perpetuity, Lt Col N. Novikov received the challenge Red Banner of the district military council. Soon after this, a third commission met to study the next complaint "signed" "by a group of communist workers." The investigation ended with the recognizing of the letter as provocative. The men breathed easier but Nikolay Vladimirovich was sent to the hospital with...a heart attack.

And again the question arises of how is such a thing possible? Possible in a time of glasnost, complete openness and a pluralism of opinions. Some reply as follows: we are too patient and indulgent of covert and outright demagogues. Others point to a different reason: it is entirely a question of not having eliminated the bureaucrats and the suppressors of criticism. Still others see the root of the evil in both.

Yes, no letter is like any other. One leader even now may try to "bury" an acute alert about disorders and abuses under the pile and then win back the "complainer." But during the years of restructuring a good deal has already been done. In many troop collectives conditions have been established whereby retribution for criticism is virtually impossible. Incidentally, in investigating the letters with false signatures, I discovered that the servicemen whose names were used in signing the letters were precisely those persons who spoke particularly often from the rostrum and took up the most troublesome problems and disclosed the shortcomings. None of them was persecuted for the criticism and all three are in good standing.

We live in the times of glasnost. We are working so that glasnost becomes a trouble-free system. Courage is required for an open, principled discussion. And no matter how cowardly and dishonest persons try to cloak themselves as seekers of the truth, they will never become this. It is possible to fight for the truth only by using worthy methods.

Reader Commentary on Proposed 'Officers' Assemblies'

18010406b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Feb 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Officers' Assembly: What Should it Be Like?"]

[Text] The discussion of this subject, begun with an interview by our correspondent with the director of the team engaged in developing the draft statute on the

Officers' Assembly (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 January), evoked a lively response from the readers. A study of the mail has shown that they all unconditionally support the actual idea of the Officers' Assembly as an effective tool for democratizing army and navy life. "What has been initiated is needed," writes Maj V. Kostin of the Leningrad Military District, for example. "The assembly will contribute to the development of the officers, especially the young ones. It can also be a means of our social protection, a mechanism for affirming the best traditions, the honor and dignity and the prestige of the officer's rank." Many letters began this way.

The authors of many letters expressed concern, however, that the Officers Assembly not become merely a formality. "It is enough to legally establish not the election of its chairman, for example, but his appointment, to ruin a good idea. What is supposed to be a democratic body would then automatically become a punitive weapon for the commander, and only a shadow of the former concepts would remain..." believes Maj A. Stadnik of the Belorussian Military District. His position is shared by Col (Res) N. Marshin of Leningrad, Lt. V. Smolyakov with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Capt 3rd Rank A. Riskin of the Baltic Fleet and certain other letter writers.

Here is one more question which troubles many. "Why officially restrict the range of experimental testing of the statute on the Officers' Assembly?" asks Col V. Smirnov of the Kiev Military District. "Since the decision has been made, let three districts and two fleets be the subjects for gathering the necessary information, but assemblies must be set up in all the others as well. The coffer, empty as of now, can only be enriched from the experience."

Unfortunately, it is impossible for us to name all those who are interested in the matter of whether there is to be an Officers' Assembly. Furthermore, the discussion is continuing. We shall try to publish some of the letters. The rest will be turned over to the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, where the draft statute is being completed.

And now, the readers have the floor.

On the Question of the Chairman

I believe that the chairman of the Officers' Assembly should be the most highly respected officer with the necessary organizational qualities. A commander (or chief) must not be the chairman. Not because he is not trusted, but because otherwise the assembly would lose its democratic meaning. Furthermore, the commander already carries a heavy load of public work. As a rule, he is both a member of the party committee and leader of the officers' Marxist-Leninist study group, and is frequently also a member of the city (or rayon) party committee and a deputy in the local soviet.... Experience has shown, for example, that when commanders (or

chiefs) intervene in the functioning of the comradely courts of honor, this results in a situation in which there is nothing left for the public to do but accept the opinion of the command element. This nullifies the social significance of discussing a serviceman's infraction. This is why the comradely courts have not really taken hold in the military collectives. Incidentally, they should be regarded as an organ of the Officers' Assembly.

The results of my dissertation research have shown that many appeals (approximately one third) by servicemen to higher authorities and their complaints are not a result of refusals to satisfy their requests, but deviations from service ethics: tactlessness, thoughtlessness and rudeness on the part of commanders and chiefs. This confirms the belief that commanders would not be interested in raising [certain] topical issues in the assembly. (Col V. Kapranov, candidate of historical sciences, instructor in the Department of Marxism-Leninism at the Military Academy of Chemical Defense imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko)

And What if You Get a Busybody?

I believe that it is absolutely inadmissible to discuss everything pertaining to the commander in the Officers' Assembly. It is unsuitable even to cast a shadow on him, if we are thinking of the future of the Armed forces.

I have had to defend this opinion more than once in arguments with comrades. They say that the commander must render account before his subordinates and be equal as an officer in the assembly.... But what do the traditions tell us? Long ago an officer who slandered his commander was hauled through the gates on a cart, and his name was crossed off the regimental roster. Incidentally, a decision on this matter has been adopted in the Officers' Assembly. Today, however, if a busybody should turn up in the regiment, literally everyone would fear him. Including the commander. And any attempt to straighten out a subordinate would be assessed as persecution for criticism. Sometimes entire groups enter into a dispute with the commander. How could even a strong person fail to flinch in this situation? But the Officers' Assembly could become a real force for justice in such cases.

I am convinced that in the Officers' Assembly the commander should have one role, that of a wise mentor.
(Capt V. Danik)

Excerpts From Letters

I feel that it is impossible right now to say what the Officers' Assembly should be like. We young people simply have nothing to use as a comparison. I therefore believe that such an assembly would be acceptable in any form today. Life and experience will tell us what to consolidate and what to discard. We will then be able to make certain amendments to the statute. (Gds Sr Lt A. Pankov)

Here is a specific example. Lt Col A. Beloded is one of the most respected officers in our unit. Even the officers in charge had this to say about him. A breakdown then occurred in the training process. And things went from there. Beloded had come to be a poor officer. And all because a senior chief gave him that evaluation. The man had not changed in any way, however. He was just the same, had become even more demanding and exacting of himself....

This would certainly be one of those cases in which the Officers' Assembly could come to a person's defense.
(Maj N. Chevagin, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany)

It Needs Its Own Charter

We have a real fear that something like a hierarchy of ranks could take root also in the assembly: commander, senior, junior.... We believe that each officers' assembly should work out its own charter, which would define all the details of its functioning. Among other things, in our opinion, an officer could be refused acceptance into the assembly if, as an example, he had discredited his rank. And he could be suspended from it for a certain period. Penalties such as the loss of a one-time military award and certain benefits might be applied. (Maj A. Gavrilenko)

Are Things Clearer, Then, 'at the Top'?"

The Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense replies to a reader:

This was the headline for a letter from Lt Col Iskumenko, published on 29 January. "You write," the letter stated, "that the plan for the Officers' Assembly was distributed to the units, but I and all of the officers I know only learned about it from your article. How is one to discuss something he does not really understand?"

Col Gen A. Mironov, deputy chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, has reported to the editors that additional steps have been taken to see that the draft statute on the Officers' Assembly is provided to all of the officer collectives. The document was centrally published and distributed all the way to the regiment, the ship and the military educational institution.

Latvians Disrupt Anniversary Festivities

Pacifists Stage 'Unsanctioned' Procession

18010539 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
25 Feb 89 p 4

[Article by B. Sebyakin, LATINFORM correspondent:
"Our Army, a People's Army"]

[Text] By tradition, it is not just the military who consider this their holiday. Actually, it is hard to find a family that is not connected in some way or other to the

Soviet Armed Forces. Some have a son serving, in others the father was a soldier, and in still others the grandfather was in the war... Not to mention the many military dynasties in which the profession of defender of the motherland has become a legacy. Therefore, it is natural that the Soviet Army and Navy Day is celebrated widely.

On the morning of 23 February, a laying of wreaths and flowers at the Eternal Flame took place at Bratsk Cemetery in Riga.

Soldiers were formed up in strict alignment along the tree-lined lane. Funeral music was playing. Generals and officers—representatives of the staffs of the Red Banner Baltic Military District, the border district, and the Riga Naval Garrison—approach the Eternal Flame in mournful silence.

The anthems of the Soviet Union and the Latvian SSR are played, and an artillery salute is fired. Then Lt Gen F.M. Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District, and Lt Gen O.V. Zinchenko, military council member and chief of the district's political directorate, placed a wreath at the Eternal Flame. Representatives of the border guards and sailors also placed wreaths.

A.P. Klautsen, first secretary of the Riga Party Gorkom, and A.P. Rubiks, chairman of the Riga Gorispolkom, placed flowers at the Eternal Flame as a token of remembrance of Soviet soldiers who have died.

The military funeral ritual concludes with the solemn passing of the honor guard.

A number of other events dedicated to the 71st anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy also took place that same day. Flowers were placed at monuments to V.I. Lenin, Latvian Red riflemen, and liberator-soldiers, and also at fraternal graves of Soviet soldiers.

The commander of the military district and the chief of troops of the border district met at a hospital with soldiers who were wounded in Afghanistan.

With the brass of the trumpets sparkling and playing marches and army songs as they moved, the military bands and columns of soldiers passed along the central streets of the Latvian capital.

A reception was held at the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee, to which Komsomol activists of the Army, Navy, and Border Guards were invited.

On this day, passing along the streets, you could see for yourself that the slogan "The people and the Army are one" was not mere words for the majority of the residents of Riga. Here passers-by urge a picketer carrying a sign insulting the Soviet Army to come to his senses.

Here an elderly woman says in a trembling voice that if someone dares defile the soldiers uniform, she would take it as an outrage on the memory of her husband who died in the war...

Under the slogan of unity of the Army and the people, a column of participants passed in the holiday procession organized by veterans of the Armed Forces and Interfront. There were hundreds of transparencies with the words: "Invincible and Legendary," "The Soviet Army is our pride, Afghanistan is our pain," and "Shame and contempt for the instigators defiling the honor and dignity of the Soviet Army!" Having begun their journey from the monument to V.I. Lenin, the demonstrators went to Victory Square, where a large rally was held, with up 100,000 participants.

Despite the fact that it was festive, those who spoke talked not only about the Army, their attitude toward it, and the need to cherish the memory of fallen heroes and strengthen military-patriotic education. They raised problems of international relations, discussed the political situation in the republic, assessed the draft law on language, and sharply criticized manifestations of extremism and nationalism.

Meanwhile, several hundred young people under the flag of the pacifist movement took part in an unsanctioned procession at the center of the city. They were expressing their negative attitude toward service in the Soviet Army, which they consider an occupation army. Several dozen people at the Liberty Monument made the same accusations of participants in the mass demonstration taking place.

By tradition, at 2100 hours, multicolored fireworks lit up the skies over Daugava. The festivities concluded with a festive salute.

Measures dedicated to the 71st anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy also took place in Daugavpils, Līepaya, Yurmala, and other cities of the republic.

Nationalists Disrupt Official Commemoration

*18010539 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
25 Feb 89 p 4*

[Editorial by A.Ye. Vasilenok: "A Double Standard: A SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA epilogue to a commentary by the 'Novosti' program on the festive procession and rally in Riga dedicated to the 71st Anniversary of the Soviet Army"]

[Text] The telephones at the editorial office have again been ringing off the hook. Those who took part in the rally are indignant at the assessments they heard on the television. Those who know about the rally only from what they heard from TV commentator A. Mirlin are perturbed by the examples he gave of the "demonstrators' aggressiveness." So, where is the truth? Perhaps, those who participated in laying the flowers and in the

procession and rally did not notice something? Were the intentions of some of them really not peaceful, or are we again encountering the unhealthy infringement of perception that periodically affects the workers of Latvian television?

In order to obtain objective information, we turned to those who as part of their duty were maintaining public order that day. Here is what N. Goncharenko, deputy chief of the city Administration of Internal Affairs, had to say:

"Every year on 23 February, we see festive processions on the streets of Riga. This time, as you know, veterans of the war and labor, participants in Interfront, and all those who responded to their call to join the festive demonstration participated in it. We estimate there were about 100,000 people in all. The posters which the demonstrators carried were in support of the Soviet Army and the policy of perestroika, with appeals to strengthen friendship between the Latvian and Russian peoples. Some of the slogans expressed the people's attitude toward the draft law on languages and toward the elections of USSR people's deputies... There were no abusive attacks on the part of the demonstrators at all; they proceeded peacefully.

"Those who decided to use every means possible to disrupt the procession of columns and darken the procession of columns behaved themselves altogether differently. Back before the procession started, about 100-150 people organized a 'stop-action' in order not to let the 'army of occupiers' past the Liberty monument. Basically, these were members of informal associations who for a long time now have been picketing the buildings of the republic's Council of Ministers and headquarters of the Baltic Military District. They carried posters which were clearly provocative in nature: 'Liberators? No! Just soldiers who were rescued. If America and England had not given us products and the American patent on what we called the 'Katyusha,' the Russian nation would not exist.' 'There was a good reward for 'good' work in Latvia in 1940 and on 22 June 1941. In 1940, it was Siberian exile. In 1941, it was Salaspils, Rumbula. Each according to his deserts!' 'The Russian brigandage in the Afghanistan adventure suffered defeat. Ha! Ha! How do you put it, you wanted Riga, but got a fig!' (The style and spelling are the authors.)

"These people were in an extremely aggressive mood and shouted anti-Soviet slogans. Incidentally, that is when the incident occurred with the taxi that was traveling along Padome Boulevard from Krasnyy Baron, making a right turn on Lenin Street. Those who blocked traffic were trying to stop the vehicle and were hitting it. Two citizens taking part in the 'stop-action' were injured. This incident is being investigated. We do not believe the taxi driver violated any traffic laws.

"A GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] vehicle was sent to clear the roadway and the way past the monument. However, the crowd attacked it and began pushing it off the roadway. A certain L. Kruminya behaved most aggressively. We did not deem it advisable to use physical force to clear the way, since there were many elderly women in the crowd, which had already reached 1,000-1,200. Therefore, the column was directed along another route, after forming a corridor from members of the militia. But those who did not want the people to participate in the demonstration found any crack in this human corridor to kick and push those going past. They tore a transparency from one of the veterans and struck him with the pole. The identity of the offender has been established. The military musicians had a particularly bad time. Insulting shouts and cursing were constantly heard from the crowd.

"However, the demonstrators did not give in to the provocation; what's more, they called upon the hooligans to change their mind and join the procession. The students of the Latvia State University 'distinguished themselves.' They willfully bound themselves to members of the voluntary public order squads and impeded passage of the columns. They had to be taken by force beyond the cordon. Incidentally, the students of this educational institution have another 'distinguished' act to their credit: A. Ankraus, a second-year student in the chemical faculty, hung a black flag from out a dormitory window. An administrative report has been drawn up on him. For violations of rules for conducting rallies and processions, and also for identity verification, 24 people were turned over to the militia; the issue of administrative responsibility is being decided with respect to 5 of them."

Now you can judge for yourselves. In the TV commentator's interpretation, when some wave provocative transparencies around, this is a demonstration of the personal freedom; when others wave red banners, this is an uncivilized act. When some shout "down with the army of occupiers!", this is the free will of the people; when others scan toasts in honor of the Soviet Army, this is the savage roar of the crowd. Of the wide range of epithets that television has bestowed on the demonstration participants, we can subscribe to only one: This truly was a demonstration of strength. That is because the many thousands of people in the column did not respond to the insults with insults, to the blows with blows. This is evidence of the good will and strong unity of the people.

And the day before the procession and rally, the leadership of the informal associations announced over the same television station that their members would not take part in counter-demonstrations. If this is not hypocrisy, then they themselves need to find out who it was that was involved in the provocations. Otherwise, how can we believe leaders who do not enjoy authority in their own organizations and do not know what is going on behind their backs?

**Lt Gen Boyko reports to GLAVPU Buro on
Belorussian MD Restructuring**

*18010409a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Feb 89 First Edition p 2*

[Report under the rubric "In the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy": "Master Political Methods of Leadership"]

[Text] The Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy discussed the work performed by the Belorussian Military District to implement the directives set forth at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference for the mastery of political methods of leadership by political organs and party organizations. Lt Gen N. Boyko presented a report.

It was noted that the district political directorate is systematically implementing the restructuring concepts, rejecting methods based on administrative pressure and making room for initiative and creativity on the part of the Communists. The main efforts are focused primarily on organizational work performed directly in the political organs and party organizations and on the training of the cadres and the aktiv.

The fulfillment of decisions coming out of the 27th party congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and the key tasks involved in enhancing the combat readiness, training and organization in the forces and the strengthening of military discipline are at the center of attention of the district political directorate, political organs and party organizations.

Considerable attention is being given to political leadership of the restructuring of the ideological work, which is closely linked to the life and missions of the units and subunits. Unconventional forms of vital communication between the Communists in charge and the people are becoming established, and the forms of political training, political and indoctrinational work are being enriched.

The democratization of internal life and the strengthening of ties with the masses occupy an important place in the work of the political organs in their leadership of the party organizations. The now completed report-and-election campaign showed that most party organizations have been strengthened politically, acquired new experience in working among the masses of servicemen, taken and passed a serious test of maturity in the course of the restructuring. New methods are being mastered for exerting party influence upon the Komsomol and other public organizations.

As it masters the political methods of leadership, the political directorate attaches proper importance to the matters of implementing the party's cadre policy and enhancing the role of the political organs and party organizations in this matter.

The work being performed by the political directorate is having a positive effect with respect to improving the work style and methods of the political organs, party committees and bureaus, enhancing their prestige and stimulating sociopolitical and service activity in the Communists.

At the same time, it was pointed out at the session that the directives set forth at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference with respect to mastering the political methods of leadership by political organs and party organizations of the Belorussian Military District are still not being implemented with adequate purposefulness and persistence. This applies primarily to certain formation party sections, party committees, and bureaus of primary party organizations. What is needed most is a more thorough grasp of the theoretical basis, the essence and the practical implementation of political methods of leadership. The best experience in exerting political influence upon the processes involved in training and indoctrinating the personnel and stimulating the work in the key areas is not always efficiently summarized and introduced. Examples of a creative approach to the assigned job by specific Communists and of vital, daily contact between the party organizations and the non-party servicemen are inadequately publicized.

The Bureau of the Main Political Directorate has ordered the district political directorate to take steps to enhance party influence with respect to ensuring that the important missions facing the forces are carried out well. The fact was stressed that the political method of leadership calls primarily for concentrating all efforts on the implementation of party decisions and the indoctrination of command and political cadres with a sense of responsibility for the practical implementation of its military policy. Relying on the Communists and on the party organizations as the political nucleus of the military collectives, we need to work tirelessly to get closer to the individual, devote daily attention to the political, military and moral indoctrination of the servicemen. It is important to intensify the processes involved in democratizing the sociopolitical life of the military collectives and to enlarge the role of party information.

It was recommended that the political directorate, political organs, party committees and bureaus proceed more resolutely to reject methods of working with people based on administrative pressure. Acting through the Communists, they are to strive to implement the demands set forth at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference with respect to having the troops at a high level of combat readiness, primarily by means of the quality indices for their combat training, their mastery of the weapons and combat equipment and the strengthening of military discipline. The performance of each party member and candidate member must be assessed on the basis of his personal contribution to the restructuring.

It is important to further improve political leadership of the processes involved in renewing the ideological work, enriching its substance, raising its ideological and theoretical level, strengthening its linkage with life and

eliminating formalism and tutelage. The political organs and party organizations are expected to take into fuller account the heightened interest of the servicemen in the history of our homeland, the party, the people and the Armed Forces, and the specific features of international relations in the military collectives. They must also react promptly to manifestations of pacifist sentiments. They should stimulate the role of the Communists in the councils of officers' and other clubs and Lenin rooms, and increase the contribution of the cultural and creative means of motivating the servicemen to accomplish the missions facing them.

The political organs need to take a new approach for defining the main directions in the work of each primary party organization as the lead political force, based on the specific circumstances and the missions being performed, and delve more deeply into the processes of internal party life. It is important persistently to perfect the work style and methods of the party committees and bureaus as agencies of collective leadership and to give daily attention to the mastery of the art of political work in the masses by the aktiv and all of the Communists. Operating through the Communists and political organs, the party committees and bureaus are expected to thoroughly enhance their influence on public organizations and institutions, on the development of initiative in them, democratic principles and glasnost in their work.

The Bureau of the Main Political Directorate directed the attention of district political organs and party organizations to the need to continue consistently to implement the directives set forth at the 19th All-Union party conference with respect to cadre policy. They need to concern themselves with the ideological and theoretical strengthening of all categories of cadres, to verify their capacities on the practical level and to influence selection and placement through the democratic mechanisms and active participation by the primary party organizations. In this large and responsible job it is important to rely on the Communists on the permanent certification commissions. Attention was directed to the practical tasks involved in the certification of officer cadres and to the need for careful and thorough consideration of cadre issues during the reduction of the Armed Forces.

It was recommended that the district political directorate take additional steps toward a more thorough study, together with the apparatus of the political organs and the unit political workers and party aktiv, of the basic principles set forth at the 19th All-Union party conference on the restoration of Lenin's concept of the CPSU as the society's political vanguard, and the tasks set forth there with respect to the restructuring of party work and the renewal of the party's internal life and its forms and methods of working in the masses. There must be an organic linkage of theoretical and practical professional training for the political cadres and the party aktiv. The secretaries of party organizations who retain their positions must be given specific, daily assistance.

Mastering the art of organizational and indoctrinational work with people in the specific situation in each military and labor collective, the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate stressed, is at the core of political leadership today and will determine our success in making the restructuring processes irreversible.

The Bureau of the Main Political Directorate recommended that all political directorates and political organs of the forces and fleets analyze the fulfillment of the directives set forth at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference with respect to mastering political methods of leadership and to take the steps necessary to invigorate this work.

Letter Defines Participation, Time Frame of Military Democratization

*18010409b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Feb 89 First Edition p 1*

[Letter from Maj V. Gribov, Belorussian Military District: "Not For the Sake of Fashion..."]

[Text] Many things are changing in our life as a result of the restructuring. This is apparent also in the military, where a reduction is underway, new general military regulations and other documents relating to the restructuring of army and navy life and its democratization are being worked out. Essentially the entire military is discussing a draft statute on the Officers' Assembly... Despite the great attractiveness of the idea of thoroughly democratizing the life of the military collectives, it seems to me that we have not yet totally defined what this means. One even has the impression at times that if democratization deadlines were set, the most zealous individuals would report its completion ahead of schedule.

Experiments have become "fashionable" (confidential telephones, voting on leaves for soldiers, and so forth), for example, which, it seems to me, if not actually undermining the sole-command principle, at least erode the commander's prestige.

I am convinced that we need to begin by precisely separating real democratization from the game of democratization....

In my opinion, we should interpret the democratization of military life as direct participation by the army (in the broad sense of the word) and the collective army intellect in the shaping and amendment of the laws governing that life. I have in mind participation at the stage of discussion of the problem and adoption of a decision, of course. After it takes effect, there can be no question of any sort of vacillation. This is the area in which we need to look.

Essentially it is a matter of implementing the principle that if you do not want to err, consult the people. We are presently most frequently guided by the principle that if you do not want to err, leave everything as it is. I am

convinced that there are things we need to change and restructure, things which we need to discuss honestly. The army has not accumulated just experience and glory during the years of its existence, after all, but also unresolved problems. And today the doors to the "upstairs" need to be opened to army public opinion. Any important issue affecting every officer needs to be started by bringing out opinions and proposals on the matter from all of us: the army Communists, Komsomol members and nonmembers.

Candidate Suggests Committee on Defense Questions Under USSR Supreme Soviet

*18010413 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Feb 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Urban under rubric "Pulse of the Election Campaign": "Fifteen Questions About the Army Were Asked a Candidate at the District Election Meeting"]

[Text] I have had more than one occasion to attend meetings of that nature in past election campaigns. There was no difficulty foretelling how they would begin and how they would end. The scenario of one "chosen person" for one place usually went without a hitch.

Then there is today's actual struggle for deputy mandates. Now, no matter how much one would like it, it is impossible to build forecasts as to how the discussion will go in a district election meeting. For example, nine candidates were nominated at the same time in Voroshilovskiy Territorial Electoral District No 6 of the city of Moscow. Each of them went through a real "examination" at the meeting, which began with questions for the delegates.

It is understandable that when the electors realized their opportunity to influence the outcome of elections, they asked acute and unexpected questions. The aspirants are often placed on the spot and receive still more "minuses." How can it be otherwise?

Nevertheless, a certain system can be seen, and it is immediately apparent when a military candidate for people's deputies of the USSR appears on the rostrum. Here, as the saying goes, it is as clear as crystal.

One of the nine candidates in that same Voroshilovskiy District is Col V. Titov, an instructor at the Military Engineering Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev. By the way, he is the only one who was nominated not by production collectives, but by residents at their meeting. At that time he succeeded in "besting" 14 rivals. His program was distinguished by its realistic nature and its addressing of people's needs and wants, and it found support among them.

I chatted with Valentin Ilich before the beginning of the district meeting. It turned out that he had made the last refinements to his platform just the evening before and

had discussed them with residents of the rayon who were his confidants. Problems of the Armed Forces also were reflected in the program. In particular, he assumes that it is necessary to establish a commission on defense questions in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The concept of Army and Navy development under new conditions must be elaborated.

It can be said that the officer presented his own opinion and the behests of electors, but questions came thick and fast primarily about the Armed Forces (15 out of 21). Here is a chronicle of a few points of this unique "hotline."

"Do you believe that it is necessary to have a law relieving students of service in the Army for a period of study?"

"It is considerably more advantageous for the Army to receive a specialist who is already trained."

"What is your attitude toward establishment of a professional Army?"

"Then I have a question for you: How much must a soldier be paid for him to become a professional?"

"What is your attitude toward young people who refuse to serve because of their views?"

"It seems to me that these are shortcomings of our civic upbringing. Try to picture yourself in a person's shoes who has to rise up under enemy fire. To do that already is greatness of spirit, and it shows up in service as nowhere else."

It stands to reason that the answers are summarized, but sometimes it reached the point of discussion. Valentin Ilich withstood a difficult test. Unfortunately, not all military candidates succeed in this, although, as I noted, questions essentially always repeat themselves. For now we are still having a hard time getting used to the new situation; the experience and culture of polemics are not simple to comprehend. On the whole, however, lessons nevertheless are being learned. It is important to begin.

I spoke with delegates of several district election meetings. The fact that a special decision now is being prepared concerning the call-up of students for active duty and that they will be granted a deferment for the period of study was a revelation to some of them. There was also talk about a "volunteer army." There were also many incompetent opinions. The reality is that an all-volunteer army will require an increase in funds for its upkeep by 5-8 times.

Glasnost in the person of Col Titov went without a hitch. He also expressed his viewpoint concerning the notorious hazing of new conscripts.

One can understand people's alarm over negative phenomena in the Armed Forces. This is why competent explanations and truthful information are needed, but it is also impossible to be silent about something else: that now it is fashionable to criticize us in the military. This also showed up during the present election campaign. The Army needs no defense against criticism; there is only benefit from criticism, but...

In the district election meeting in Voroshilovskiy Rayon I was personally jarred by a remark at the "open microphone." The officer has a good program, the person said, no argument, but still why must we elect a military person; we need political figures. Judging from the reaction, the audience did not support the speaker, but still it left an unpleasant aftertaste. Another delegate called the officer a "dependent person," albeit with reservation.

In my notes I do not plan to examine the arguments of Col Titov's opponents. It is only that a strange feeling will not leave me. Is that why we now are debunking the past, in order to again, cloaked in new postulates, categorize politics as the prerogative of the elect? It turns out that the other people must again withdraw to the background of political life. True, the delegates reasonably decided that each of the proposed candidates had the right to run in the election, and that is how they voted. Everything will be decided once and for all on 26 March by the residents of Voroshilovskiy Rayon themselves.

Valentin Ilich has serious rivals. I will mention only a few of them. There is Yu. Afanasyev, rector of Moscow State Historical Archives Institute, and well-known historian and writer R. Medvedev. L. Shurygina, a department chief in Polyclinic No 79, and Yu. Kozlov, a teacher in School No 85, enjoy great authority among rayon residents.

Without predicting the further course of events, we will note that the struggle ahead is difficult and one must be ready for anything. Both Titov's "team" and the candidate himself will have to work. By the way, not everything went well for his confidants at the district election meeting. For example, more cliches than businesslike agitation showed through in the speech by a representative of Titov's "team."

Well, it is not easy to engage in politics, especially if you are going through such universities for the first time. Politics demands a serious attitude.

Col Gen Kalinin Interviewed on Election Day
18010474a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Col Gen N. Kalinin, USSR People's Deputy elected from the CPSU CC, Commander of the Moscow Military District, by Lt Col S. Pashayev]

[Text] On the eve of the elections for the territorial and national-territorial districts our correspondent Lt Col S. Pashayev met with USSR People's Deputy from the CPSU CC, Commander of the Moscow Military District, Col Gen N. Kalinin.

[Pashayev] Nikolay Vasilyevich, first of all I wish to congratulate you on your election as USSR People's Deputy at the CPSU CC Plenum.

[Kalinin] Thank you.

[Pashayev] We have all attentively followed the debates of the candidates and have analyzed their programs and speeches with interest. But now the electoral campaign has come to an end and the people elected from public organizations and future deputies are faced with a large amount of work, during which they will have to translate their promises into concrete actions. I should like to know how, with which particular steps you personally intend to begin your deputy work?

[Kalinin] I should say that I shall not only have to begin work, but continue some as well. The fact is that I am the deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet where I represent the interests of the voters of Bashkiriya. But, of course, the work of a USSR people's deputy, especially one elected from the Communist Party, has special responsibility. This is a qualitatively different level of authority and duty.

What takes priority for me, a military person? First of all to contribute to the implementation of the points of the 19th All-Union Party Conference concerning reorientation of defense construction toward mainly qualitative parameters. We must keep in mind that this is not a local or one-time action. It will be necessary to scrupulously work out at various levels a complex of measures directed toward improvement of the organizational-staff structure of the troops and their technical supply and increasing the effectiveness of alert duty and the discipline and responsibility. This work has already been started.

[Pashayev] But does all this depend on you?

[Kalinin] A lot of it, in any case. It is important to agitate the people, to encourage them to work in a new way, and, the main thing, to create the necessary conditions for this. It seems to me that we can put significant reserves to work if we grant real independence to the unit commanders in the planning and organization of combat and political training, increase the role of political agencies and the staffs in the life of the troops, strengthen their influence on the training process, and more persistently introduce advanced practice in the organization of combat training. Including using new methods and modern technical means.

I emphasize that in solving all these problems I as a deputy and commander have people to rely on. Under the conditions of perestroika, which is in progress in the Armed Forces, people are beginning to work with confidence and the most energetic, active, resourceful, and responsible officers and warrant officers are making themselves known. For this is their time; today they have

the opportunity to realize their potential more completely. Of course such people must be taught and motivated and supported. My idea is to gather them together in an informal meeting, give them the opportunity to speak frankly, complain about the problems that are bothering us military people, and express mature ideas. And, of course, we must help to realize them. For example, I do not think that all of us are working in the ideal way.

[Pashayev] But will some leaders not perceive this as an encroachment on the principle of one-man-command?

[Kalinin] I do not think so. Even the most inveterate conservatives must learn a great deal from the example of the party which published the announcement of its electoral commission concerning the results of the voting and thus again convincingly proved its readiness to live according to the laws of perestroika. So under army conditions glasnost and democracy are needed more than ever before. They do not contradict one-man-command; on the contrary, they reinforce it. Therefore, in the future we shall continue to increase the authority and effectiveness of general meetings of military servicemen, and to activate the work of public soviets, people's control, courts of honor, and women's councils. We shall pay more attention to the opinions of party and komsomol organizations as well as military collectives when nominating officers.

Of course other problems concern me as well. As a deputy I intend to come out decisively in favor of activating military-patriotic training and for the development and adoption of an effective law on youth, which raises point blank the question radical improvement of the preparation of boys and girls for service in the army and the responsibility for this work, including that of the army itself.

[Pashayev] Today the public is seriously concerned about the negative phenomena that have become apparent in recent years in army and navy collectives. There have also been cases of non-regulation relations in units of the Moscow military district. What can be done and is being done in this connection by the MVO command and yourself personally in order to impose order and get rid of that notorious dedovshchina?

[Kalinin] In my opinion, the word "dedovshchina" does not reflect the essence of this critical social problem. At the basis of it lies not the differences in the ages of the military servicemen, or in any case that is not the main factor. Let us recall that this problem was first defined when in our society along with the loud declarations of the triumph of collectivism there began a process of separation of people, a cult of pressure and individual well-being began to take form. And according to this psychology, the only way to live better than others was at the expense of others. And this applied to service as well. It was at that time that the degrading name "greenhorn" came into being. But as a result, entire groups were made

to oppose one another. First according to time in the service—then it was easier to prove one's mythical privileges, but now it is also according to the national-territorial indicators.

As with any other complex sociopsychological ailment, it is not easy to fight against nonregulation relationships without eliminating the underlying causes. Today officer personnel must fight as hard as they can against this.

[Pashayev] Have you managed to halt to growth of the number of accidents?

[Kalinin] We have. The situation is beginning to get better. But in order to reinforce this tendency, it is necessary to eliminate the conditions under which these negative phenomena are possible—the separation of the people from combat training, the lack of control, and the interruption of classes. In other words, we must bring the life and activity of the troops strictly in line with the requirements of the regulations. But this is not enough. Following the example of their fathers, in recent years youth have learned to remain silent and avoid conflicts, to put it crudely, not to stick their neck out. Therefore, we must use the entire arsenal of educational means to restore and awaken in youth a sense of their own dignity, courage, and readiness to put a stop to any offense. The young soldier must be made to believe that in his commander, political worker, and comrades he will always find understanding and support, participation and assistance.

[Pashayev] A decision has been made for a unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men. What problems associated with this step bother you as a deputy and commander?

[Kalinin] People who have devoted their lives to the military service, who have wandered through distant garrisons and posts, have a right to count on not losing out from this situation. We must take into account their interests, needs, and demands as much as possible. The most crucial problem today is housing. The Ministry of Defense has already developed concrete measures for providing apartments for discharged service personnel. We have also received the corresponding assignment. But we must look at things realistically; we cannot get by with our own forces alone, without mutual understanding, and without assistance from party and soviet agencies.

Another problem bothers my colleagues and me to no less a degree: how can we carry out the complicated and responsible tasks assigned to the Armed Forces with the forces and means left to us. We must take into account the fact that the situation in the world is still complicated and contradictory. Of course our peace initiatives and the steps we have taken to meet our partners have made a strong impression in the world community, but so far no steps have been taken to meet us half way. All this makes it incumbent on us not to weaken but to maintain

our vigilance and through our labor and our service to provide reliable defense capabilities for the country and combat readiness and combat capability of the Armed Forces.

[Pashayev] Nikolay Vasilyevich, are you not aware from others' words of those problems, primary social ones, that are bothering military servicemen and their families? What concrete measures have been earmarked for the near future for solving them?

[Kalinin] I must say that on the whole in our district we have created fairly good conditions for the life and service of the soldiers. Practically all the combined units and smaller units have their military installations and training facilities corresponding to their work. But the living conditions for the officers, warrant officers, and members of their families actually leave something to be desired. In Moscow alone we have thousands of people waiting for apartments. The situation is no better in other cities and villages. There are not enough kindergartens, schools, medical institutions, cultural facilities, or work places for the wives of servicemen. I think that, displaying a real interest in army problems, the central press should also discuss them in an open and unprejudiced way. We should think together about what can be done.

As concerns the district command, when forming the plan for construction for this year we looked for additional possibilities of partially eliminating the arrears. It was decided to invest some of the funds initially intended for other facilities in the construction of housing and social, cultural, and domestic facilities.

As the USSR People's Deputy from the CPSU I shall try to do everything possible to more fully carry out the orders we have received from the voters. I recall that they were speaking about the need to develop a law on social protection of military service personnel. I am deeply convinced that we should have such a document, and in the form of a law.

[Pashayev] Do you have any wishes to express to the deputies who will be elected on Sunday?

[Kalinin] Only one wish—to support perestroyka with deeds, without delay, and to begin friendly joint work for solving the problems that have accumulated in the country.

Lt. Gen Novozhilov Supports Opponent

18010474b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Mar 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Maj P. Kochnev: "Two Decisions of the General"]

[Text] Even before the beginning of the voting it was clear that the people gathered in the district pre-electoral meeting would give preference to the Commander of the

Far Eastern District, Lt Gen V. Novozhilov. And indeed the other candidate for people's deputy—an associate of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of Peoples of the Far East, Candidate of Historical Sciences Yevdokiya Aleksandrovna Gayer—did not gather the required number of votes. It would seem that Novozhilov should have been glad about his victory in the difficult and stressful pre-electoral struggle. But, asking for the floor, Viktor Ivanovich unexpectedly offered to support the alternative candidacy of the representative of the indigenous nationalities of the area.

Why did he do this? It would seem that it was not merely because he respected this woman as a scholar and a fighter for improving the life of the Far Eastern residents and protecting the area's ecology. And it was certainly not because he wanted the voters to think of him as such a gentleman. The communist Novozhilov simply knew that certain voters, including representatives of Gayer's resourceful group, thought that he, the general, voted for his opponent on the authority of the army, in his capacity as commander, as if there was a large number of pre-election papers, increased agitation, and so forth. But he had become accustomed to being honest all the time so that people would not feel the slightest lack of confidence in him. And he thought: let the voters be convinced once again that they were not wrong to entrust to him the right to single-handedly continue the fight for the mandate of deputy.

But I recall a case in training when one of the regimental commanders, who had, incidentally, just been appointed to this post, responded to Lt Gen V. Novozhilov, who at that time was First Deputy Commander of the district, by saying that his decision was better. Those in attendance perked up their ears: how would the general respond? Novozhilov himself fell deep into thought. But then, smiling, he said:

"Yes, you are right, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel. I agree with your decision."

Having evaluated the state of affairs, the graduate of the General Staff academy had the courage to admit his mistake in the presence of quite junior officers...

Lt Gen Kuzmin on Successful Election

18010486 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lt Gen F. Kuzmin by Lt Col M. Ziyem-insh under the rubric "USSR People's Deputies Have the Floor": "Lt Gen Kuzmin: The Ideas of Restructuring Must Win Out"]

[Text] Lt Gen Fedor Mikhaylovich Kuzmin, the Commander of the Baltic Military District, has become a USSR People's Deputy from the 706th Lenin Electoral Okrug. For the time being, he is the only People's Deputy

from among servicemen on Baltic territory. Two candidates—Lt Cols V. Alksnis and V. Shurupov—have to go through another round of elections.

Our correspondent met with Lt Gen F. Kuzmin yesterday and interviewed him.

[Ziyeminsh] You had to campaign for a deputy's seat immediately after you were appointed to your present post. Would it be appropriate to mention that many of your competitors and opponents stressed the fact that, they say, you do not know the situation and regional problems and, therefore, to entrust a people's deputy seat to such a person does not make sense. Such opinions were even expressed in a local newspaper and in other mass information media. As we now see, the voters did not concur with this argument. They could see for themselves how quickly the commander of troops sized up the situation, identified the "sore points" and developed a constructive preelection program.

[Kuzmin] I express my sincere gratitude to all voters who voted for me. I see this fact as an important indication of trust in us—military people. For, in fact, the voters had an opportunity to make a choice. It is enough to say that when I entered the preelection contest the list of candidates for people's deputy in our election district numbered 20 persons. Then it was reduced to 10...

[Ziyeminsh] I was personally able to be present at the district meeting in the club of the Riga "Straume" plant, and I witnessed how, after a stormy 9-hour discussion of the programs of the candidates, preference was given to the district Commander...

[Kuzmin] Let us first make a slight correction to that statement. The preference of a majority of the votes was not shown for the district Commander, but for the party platform of restructuring. Because I, as a commander and a Communist, proceeded in my preelection campaign on the basis of the Appeal of the CPSU Central Committee to the party and to the Soviet people. I told my voters straight away that I will direct my main efforts in practical work to fulfill the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the victory of the ideas of restructuring in the implementation of a Soviet defensive doctrine, and the transition to qualitative parameters in the training of troops. So that my success in the campaign for a deputy's seat is, first and foremost, a victory for the policy of our party and the policy of perestroyka. I think that this victory was also helped by the fact that I, as a commander, was able to react swiftly and properly in the preelection campaign to all mandates of the voters, and to their letters, requests, and complaints. I received from 10 to 15 letters daily, not counting the questions asked me at meetings with the voters in labor collectives, of which

there were very many. I tried to respond to all requests and desires. In addition to everything else, I gained valuable experience of work with the masses that will be useful in future deputy activities, and which I will try to pass on to my subordinates.

[Ziyeminsh] And the last question. Your preelection campaign was under the continuous scrutiny of the local mass media, and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA also wrote about it. How do you evaluate these publications?

[Kuzmin] I understand what you want to say. . . No, there were not only one-sided and biased publications and statements aimed at me. The republic newspaper CINA, for example, resolutely came to my defense. If my memory does not fail me, the article was called "One Must Also Lose With Dignity." This conclusion was made with respect to certain statements by my opponents at a district preelection meeting. I extend my warmest thanks and gratitude to the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA collective, which supported my candidacy during the course of the entire election campaign. Owing to these publications, I receive many warm and sincere letters from a wide variety of voter categories. At the same time, I understand clearly what responsibility lies on me from now on. I want to assure my voters that I will apply all my energies and knowledge to justify the great trust that has been shown me and to carry out fully the mandate that has been given me.

Proposal to Use Armor Units for Road Construction

18010492 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 13, 1-7 Apr 89 p 1

[Article by A. Nastsev of Mogilev entitled: "Tanks... They Will Build".]

[Text] The decision on the reduction of the armed forces and combat equipment, taken by the leadership of our country, is unconditionally correct. Now it is necessary to think a bit how much more correct it would be to use the reduced combat equipment for peaceful purposes.

It seems to me that it would be logical to reconfigure tank battalions into engineering-construction [battalions] and to use them for the construction of motor vehicle roads in the country. Indeed it is completely possible to utilize tanks as graders, bulldozers, bridge-builders and pipe-layers.

This, in my view, would permit us in short order to solve the pressing road problem. And other things [would be resolved]—that solution to the question would permit us to escape the moral costs and social tensions connected with the necessity of retiring officers to the reserves without [their] having served the established term for retirement with pension.

Joint GDR-USSR Exercise Announced
18010559 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Apr 89 first edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the Fraternal Armies"]

[Text] During the period from the 15th to the 21st of April on the territory of the German Democratic Republic in the region of Treuenbrietzen, Essen, Cottbus, Sennhuettendorf [as published], and Teupitz with the agreement of the government of the GDR a joint military exercise of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the National People's Army of the GDR will be

conducted with the purpose of improving field training of the troops and working out questions of command and control and cooperation.

Formations and units of the ground forces and air forces will be included in the exercise. The total number of troops participating in the exercise will be 18,500.

In accordance with the document of the Stockholm Conference, observers from all of the government-participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have been invited to the exercise by the government of the GDR.

**Col Gen Lobov Faults Level of Tactical Training,
Discipline, Officer Education**

*18010411 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 1, Jan 89 pp 12-18*

[Article by Col Gen V. Lobov: "High Quality—The Main Criterion of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] I can say in all conscience that, at a surprising and very critical time, we, the communists of the Army and Navy, are living and working with all of the Soviet people. The conclusion of the 19th Party Conference on the need to ensure the effectiveness of the defense organizational development primarily through qualitative parameters with respect to both equipment and personnel determines the content and direction of the work of commanders, staffs, political organs, and all servicemen.

The aim of emphasis on qualitative indicators of defense organizational development, notes Army Gen D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, is not to build up the military might of the armed forces, and this should be emphasized with all certainty, but to maintain this might at a level that precludes military superiority over us and guarantees reliable protection of the peaceful work and peaceful life of the Soviet people.

In the past training year, Army and Navy personnel accomplished tasks defined by our new military doctrine, which has a clearly pronounced defensive nature. Restructuring of the command and control system and of operational, logistic, and technical support was carried out. The professional expertise of servicemen was improved in classes, at ranges and airfields, and during tactical exercises and sea cruises. Many commanders, political workers, soldiers, and sailors demonstrated an increased level of combat training and increased their ability to operate confidently and knowledgeably in modern defensive operations and battles. New types of weapons and combat equipment have begun to be used more effectively.

By right, the initiators of socialist competition in the branches of the armed forces were on the right flank here. Thus, in the Strategic Rocket Forces, the unit commanded by Lt Col N. Ulyanov earned the title of excellent. About 36 percent of its personnel are excellent-rated in combat and political training. More than 56 percent of the servicemen are specialists with increased proficiency ratings. According to results of the past year, the thrice-decorated guards tank regiment commanded by Gds Col Yu. Pakhomov received the title of excellent in the Ground Forces. The time needed to bring the regiment to combat readiness was reduced, tactical and weapons proficiency of personnel improved, and during exercises and training sessions the servicemen hit the majority of their targets with the first round. Almost one out of every four servicemen here is excellent-rated in

combat and political training. Communists have a leading role in this (44 percent of them are excellent-rated in combat training). There are also specific achievements in other units and formations, and on ships.

But, certainly in our time, which demands great individual output from every communist, we must talk less about what has been achieved and more about what has been omitted, about unused reserves for increasing the quality of combat training and, consequently, increasing combat readiness. And let us be frank: We have quite a few shortcomings. Perestroyka has highlighted them quite clearly. Thus, for example, all is not well with socialist competition. Its effectiveness is substantially lowered by formalism and superficial leadership. The end-of-training-period performance evaluation showed that certain excellent-rated soldiers and whole military units did not completely fulfill their obligations and did not achieve the objectives planned for them. Such phenomena are the echo of our recent past, when pretense was first and foremost in combat training, and the main, essential thing—teaching what was needed in combat—was shunted aside as secondary. Satisfactory results in training were considered to be quite sufficient, and they sometimes did not affect promotion of officers. Frequently, the commander who was promoted was not the one who was handling combat training better, but the one who prospered in other areas, say, in organizational development by administrative means.

We will face up to the truth: In some units, underestimation of the role of combat training, lack of a daily struggle to carry out the daily routine and training schedule, and failure to include all personnel in training has also resulted in a deterioration of the state of military discipline. The most diverse theories are now being devised on how to strengthen order in the Army and Navy. There are discussions about micro-groups and other psychological phenomena. But for some reason, the simple truth, repeatedly proven in practice, is hushed up: In order to have firm discipline, troops must be occupied with what they are intended to do, that is, combat training, to prepare themselves to defend the fatherland.

The Soviet Armed Forces have entered into a truly historical and very crucial period. Speaking at the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, stated that in the next 2 years the Army would be reduced by 500,000 men and that conventional armaments would also be substantially reduced. Taking this into consideration, the main thing today, as I see it, is that communists of the Army and Navy must step up their activity, act decisively and with initiative, and translate the party directives on strengthening the country's defense into a language of specific practical deeds for increasing quality.

Much in resolving today's urgent issues depends on commanders. The commander is in charge of the combat and political training of all personnel, of a subunit, unit, or ship. He plans the training and assigns tasks to his subordinates; organizes socialist competition; improves the professional knowledge and training expertise of officers, warrant officers and sergeants; assists them in conducting exercises and training sessions; and supervises. He studies and introduces into practice everything new and progressive that helps to increase the effectiveness of training and indoctrination. Consequently, it is with the commander and with the increase in his responsibility for training subordinates that perestroika must begin in every military unit.

The process of perestroika taking place in the armed forces and the purely defensive nature of our military doctrine force us to take a fresh look at many established forms and methods of training officer cadres at military schools. New approaches to the training of future officers are required as the forces receive new, high-quality models of weapons and combat equipment. Only in this way can we expect high job performance results from them. Up to now, you see, the situation has been a paradox. Tanks, aircraft, and missiles are being improved, automation and electronics have come to help man, but year after year training results of many subunits, units, and ships do not rise above satisfactory. Hence, the conclusion that the methods of combat training are obsolete and, if I may put it this way, are on its last legs. And naturally, it is time to improve it or change it.

Thus, the problem of increasing the training expertise of officers is, very likely, the most acute problem today. The sources of it are in military educational institutions where future officers are given minimum training even in elementary methods procedures. However, it is in the VUZes that improvement of work with personnel must begin, because that is where the future of the Army and Navy is being formed. Therefore, it is completely understandable that urgent measures are required which are directed at making military educational institutions a center for consolidation of progressive combat training methods and a unique scientific laboratory for improving training expertise. This is how I see the place of military educational science in restructuring the combat training system and re-orienting it on qualitative parameters.

Every commander teaches his subordinates. There is deep meaning in this principle. The commander's degree of preparedness and his ability to command on a scientifically sound manner the forces and assets entrusted to him can also be judged by the successes of subunits, units, and ships in combat training. But, tell me, why is it today we sometimes encounter situations in which a particular commander of a regiment or formation suddenly "fails to live up to expectations?" No, not because the appropriate chiefs, personnel bodies, political bodies, and party organizations did not take sufficient care

or did not take something into account. Although, of course, anything is possible. I personally see something else as the cause: He was not taught. The officer was not fully taught how to command a battalion, regiment, or division. The military schools and academies provide excellent theoretical knowledge but, let us be frank, poor practical skills, without which it is difficult to count on positive actions in a given situation. So we must place greater emphasis on the practical aspects of officer training. Subsequently, this knowledge and these skills must be actively honed and developed.

We cannot help but see that a whole generation of military personnel has grown up in our country, having been brought up to make lowered demands of themselves, having come to believe too much in the power of administrative methods, and not having deeply investigated the internal causes of the negative processes that are occurring. The tenacity of the stagnant phenomena today is explained by the fact that many leaders try to carry out new tasks by old methods. The main thing is not understood by everyone, namely, that perestroika is not concerned with individual issues but with all spheres of activity; that it requires a change of thinking and development of a new, more responsible and demanding approach to the matter; and that all of us together and each individually must add to our work. Now unlikely that any communist leader can say that he has already renewed his work style and that everything he does corresponds completely to the spirit of the times.

The party-assigned tasks of restructuring the Army and Navy assume such a high level of intellect, erudition, competence, and party devotion to the profession that the search for and selection and advancement of gifted people, and their education and training are becoming a most important political necessity. "The Central Committee," emphasized Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, "is firmly counting on the Army personnel and the Soviet officer corps in carrying out the tasks of strengthening the defense capability of the state."

Successful completion of the combat training mission is only possible with a high-quality training process. Life urgently demands that we raise the prestige of tactical training as the basis of field, tactical flight, and naval training of ground, air, and naval forces. Tactics as the art of the conduct of battle is the main criterion in determining the evaluation of subunits and units. The ability to competently carry out the assigned mission with the least loss of men and equipment—this is what must determine the level of a unit's or ship's war-fighting capability.

At the same time, experience shows that almost all tactical training is conducted in a predictable pattern, according to earlier rehearsed variants and on familiar terrain. For example, during live-fire exercises, commanders seek only one objective: to hit the target and get the percentage of hits required for a positive evaluation.

They actually ignore tactical questions. Training exercises, as a rule, are concluded on the cease-fire line. Can we really reconcile ourselves with this? Of course not. I think that a lot here depends on the political bodies and party organizations. It really must be admitted that they still rarely intrude into the sphere of professional combat training, and at times their influence on how some communist leader carries out his party and military duty is unjustifiably low.

And how times have we, at the most varied levels, talked about and now talk about the need to take a firm course toward overcoming once and for all vulgarization and connivance, eradicate formalism in training, and put an end to tearing personnel away from training! But what is actually happening? In the Baltic Military District, say, over the course of 4 months, a large number of soldiers were attached to prepare courses for the command staff. The outward effect of having done this was considerable. During the autumn inspection by the USSR Ministry of Defense, unit personnel who worked on the courses achieved poor results. And this is natural.

Of course, troops are obliged to carry out certain constructive administrative work, and there is no way around this. But there should be moderation so that combat readiness does not suffer. What is more, the administrative plans dropped "from above" even play into the hands of some unscrupulous commanders. Using them as cover, like a shield, they do not trouble themselves with performance of duty and do not concern themselves with organizing the training and educational process.

Today, planning also demands more energetic and continuous improvement. The results of the last training year show that fulfillment of tasks in all aspects of training is often not precisely coordinated in combat training plans, and a sequence in teaching from the simple to the complex and in developing teamwork and coordination of subunits and units is not being observed. Taking this into account, it is obvious that we need to give unit commanders the opportunity to demonstrate independence in planning, with the main feature being that they are required to become flexible, efficient, and purposeful in achieving a high but certainly realistic result, and toward the use of each minute of training time for combat training.

Unfortunately, while calling for this everywhere, for some reason we do not ponder where and why we squander not only hours but whole days and weeks. Take, for example, an elementary calculation. We sometimes lose 1.5-2 hours on moves from the classroom to the park and from the park to the barracks, coordinating various matters, dressing and redressing, and equipping personnel. Is this really normal? No, of course not. That is why it is so important to approach formation of the daily schedule in a very rational manner. To plan, let us say, one training day only in the classroom, another in the field and training facility, a third.... In short, we need

a weighted, comprehensive approach. However, this contradicts the requirement of the regulation to some degree. But why do we need to blindly hold to those regulations that are obsolete and have lagged behind life?

The position of senior officers is also important here. I know from my own experience how much their knowledge of the actual state of affairs locally and their ability to offer practical assistance to commanders, staffs, and political bodies means during restructuring. Certain senior officers and commanders are still enamored with exhortation and dressing down, instead of offering real assistance. Naturally, this is much easier than to search for, find, and introduce new training methods and forms, and to be an innovator.

This is no simple matter, the restructuring of one's own consciousness formed through the years. The CPSU is persistently striving to see that perestroika is accomplished simultaneously from above and below, and obliges every communist, above all the leader, to begin it with himself, with stepping up his political and official activities, and with increasing responsibility for the assigned job and for end results. But it is especially important here that real assistance is given to a person who has embarked on this path, not just help for show. Genuinely comradely human relations are its foundation. There is no room in this for boastfulness, arrogance, permissiveness, and spinelessness. They are based on consideration for the individual, fairness and adherence to principle, exacting requirements and strictness, mutual respect and candor. The main thing in all of this is the job.

Whereas before, when weapons and equipment were relatively simple, an explanation, a demonstration, and practice were effective training methods, now, with weapons becoming more complex, it is necessary to study theoretical problems in more detail. Both the professional training of specialists and the condition of the training facilities are being taken into account equally in combat training of unit and ship personnel. In this regard, I would like to touch upon the issue of introducing computer technology into the combat training.

Modern computer technology is not only a means of improving administrative activities, but is also a powerful tool for increasing the quality of combat training. For example, with the aid of computers we can model complex processes and any type of combat operations that we cannot recreate using conventional methods. Moreover, a set program can complicate the battle picture only after successful completion of previous assignments. Thus, using computers for troop training is a real opportunity to achieve a new qualitative level of combat training with significant economy of men, equipment, and time. Unfortunately, our personnel's lack of preparedness for a qualitative technological leap and

lack of desire of a some of them to recognize the advantages of computerization in military affairs is impeding this process considerably.

At times, we do not use our training facilities much better. In recent years, military units are being equipped with such technical training equipment as movies, television, projection and sound reproduction equipment, monitoring and teaching equipment, and complex training simulators. However, these expensive training assets have not been assimilated into all large and small units. Although it has been demonstrated that, with mastery of their use, especially film-coupled simulators, the consumption of vehicle resources, ammunition, and fuel and lubricants decreases significantly. At the same time, the intensity and quality of training increase sharply. Compared with combat equipment, simulators provide the opportunity to conduct exercises more skillfully and graphically, to monitor actions of subordinates, to reveal errors made and uncover causes and their results in a timely manner, and to train a large number of personnel simultaneously.

Of course, the transition of the Army and Navy to new training facilities entails significant expenditures of resources and time. However, technically re-equipping the combat training process can already be implemented today if the potential of the technical creativity of officers and warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers is set into motion. A broad creative expanse is opening for them in the improvement of training facilities.

However, we also cannot get by here without paradoxes. The recently held All-Army Conference of Inventors and Innovators demonstrated that only one-fifth of the fine ideas capable of significantly improving the quality of training and increasing our combat readiness actually find an application. Why so few? Well, on the one hand, it is because we still have commanders who look on any innovation as additional trouble for themselves—you see, you have to go through the chain of command, "fight your way through," and not everyone is up to this. On the other hand, many people sometimes simply do not believe that we can somehow overcome the routine and inertia of bureaucrats. Thus, during the conference, journalists became acquainted with the fate of one invention which underwent testing in Afghanistan. Life itself proved people's need for this invention which, alas, could not make headway for several years. When they suggested to its creator that he discuss all of his creation's ordeals in the press, he categorically refused; he said this would only harm the matter, and his invention would be shelved.

Yes, talent does not have an easy time. At times, it is defenseless before bureaucrats. Especially today. Because the modern bureaucrat is more educated and, if you will, more skilled, better acclimated, changes his colors more easily, and therefore interferes more with business. Any of our best ideas can be drowned in demagogic phrase-mongering. I think much here

depends on the position of the political bodies and party organizations. Is it not really their job to help a person discover his creative capabilities and direct them in the required direction, and finally to defend what is new and progressive, what was born in the collective, and give it a start in life?

Increasing the quality of combat training is also inconceivable without a precisely functioning system of monitoring and verification of execution. It permits commanders and staffs to have a complete idea about the existing state of affairs in subordinate units and sub-units, and simultaneously helps to instill in personnel efficiency, good organization, and a sense of responsibility for fulfilling their military duty. In practice, however, some commanders get carried away with numerous conferences and issue written orders on any occasion, instead of taking an interest in specific organizational work locally. It is characteristic that recently, in spite of all kinds of appeals and orders, total correspondence has noticeably increased. Much of the energy of the administrative staff is being expended on this paper avalanche, and it is creating great difficulties in the work of subordinate administrative agencies. The flow of commissions is not subsiding either. A week has not gone by, for example, without a commission from a higher body doing work at the guards motorized rifle division commanded by Col V. Vysokov. Has this helped to increase the unit's fighting strength? No. The professional skill of the motorized riflemen is not higher than that of soldiers of other units.

It is time to hold people personally responsible for work among the troops. Of course, political bodies and party organizations of directorates, departments, and services must take a more principled position in this matter. How did a particular communist leader help to improve the quality of the training process in the units and formations he visited? What did he specifically do locally in order to eliminate the shortcomings he uncovered? I think that communists can and must ask these and other questions of their party comrades. The times are such that we cannot just record shortcomings and be a casual observer; we have to roll up our sleeves, work conscientiously, and do our job.

Orientation toward qualitative parameters in combat and political training—this is the renewal of all of our work that most directly affects such an important problem as how to strengthen military discipline. There can be no good results without good organization and proper order. But in order to increase the quality of the training process and bring order within the forces, all of us, commanders and political workers, need to understand: Perestroika is conducted through people. Hence the importance of treating them properly, adherence to principle and justice, understanding and honesty in relations. Now moral assistance and support mean so much, and the value of a kind word that inspires a person is increasing so much! All of this talk about the human factor is meaningless without real humaneness.

Life has shown that the social sphere is very closely tied to the problem of activation of the human factor. All supervisory personnel, from the bottom to the top, are responsible for implementing social policy, and the ability to resolve social issues is one of the main criteria of their professional and political maturity. However, we must admit that not everyone adequately passes the test of these criteria. Some military personnel demonstrate a lack of consideration for social problems and an intolerable disregard of their subordinates' vital needs and requirements. But you see, these problems, needs, and requirements have a direct effect on peoples' attitudes toward their jobs. That is why indifference in organizing routine administrative tasks, feeding of servicemen, medical services, and clothing supply is inexcusable today.

An unconditional guarantee of social justice is called upon to help overcome stagnation and decisively increase qualitative parameters. Unfortunately, there is still quite a bit of unfavorable criticism in connection with shortcomings in personnel policy. At times, personnel are studied poorly, and the unprincipled approach to assignments, as a rule, leads to serious consequences. Irresponsibility and thoughtlessness are also inexcusable here. I believe that much here depends on the position of the political bodies and party organizations, and their ability to analyze the circumstances that are holding back perestroika, to approach scientifically the study of the phenomena impeding it, and to develop the necessary measures to eliminate them. Recently, many political departments and political organizations have taken a constructive stand and are actively helping commanders to resolve in a qualitative manner complex combat training tasks and create a healthy moral climate in military collectives. But there is still much, much more to do here.

High quality of combat training is a priority affair of every Army communist. This is the dominant theme of all our concerns in the new training year. The processes of perestroika in the Army and Navy are gaining strength, throwing off the remnants of the stagnant period, and gaining, organizing, and rallying all that is new and progressive. These processes are acquiring tangible forms and are already producing the first reassuring results. The future is beyond perestroika in the Army, and it is becoming irreversible.

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Lt Gen Ovchinnikov Commemorates Army-Navy Day, 1989

18010457 Tashkent SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
23 Feb 89 p 3

[Article by Lt Gen A. Ovchinnikov, Member of the Military Council, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red-Banner Turkestan Military District: "Born of Revolution"]

[Text] The Soviet People are marking the 71st Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. We celebrate this

glorious date under conditions of labor and political enthusiasm at the implementation of the historic decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The Message of the CC, CPSU "To the Party and the Soviet People", the decisions of the January (1989) Plenary Session of the CC, CPSU, and the country's far-flung campaign for elections of the Peoples' Deputies of the USSR are the inspiration for new achievements of the Soviet people.

The Party's course of intensification of production, the enhancement of material prosperity and culture of the people, the deepening of socialist democracy and glasnost, the strengthening of the foundations of the Soviet way of life meet the vital interests of every Soviet person.

The Armed Forces live by the same thoughts and deeds as the Soviet people. Closing their ranks around the Communist Party, unanimously supporting its domestic and foreign policy, the soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces and the Red-Banner Turkestan Military District see their duty in reliably standing guard over the great attainments of our people, and the southern borders of the beloved Motherland.

The birth, growth, and development of the Soviet Armed Forces are inseparably linked to the name of V.I. Lenin, and to the activities of the Communist Party. The historic merit of Lenin is that he substantiated the need to defend the revolutionary gains of the workers, and developed the military program of the proletarian revolution, the teaching of the defense of the socialist Fatherland. He pointed out that "Every revolution is only worth something if it is able to defend itself."

The victory of the Great October provoked the malice and hatred of internal counterrevolutionaries and international imperialism. They acted in a united front against the Land of the Soviets. In the exceptionally difficult conditions of the Civil War and the foreign intervention, without the necessary practical experience, the party began to create a mass, regular, strictly disciplined Army, an Army of a new type, the first in the world called upon to defend the interests of the workers.

And such an army was created. Its first units, having just been formed on the basis of Lenin's decrees, in February 1918 joined battle against the German interventionists threatening Petrograd, and crushed them at Pskov and Narva. With the active support of the broad masses of workers, under the leadership of the Bolshevik party, the young Red Army thrashed the White Guard hordes of Kolchak and Denikin, Vrangeli and Yudenich, Krasnov and Kaledin. It pushed the foreign interventionists from its soil.

The victory over the enemies of the revolution made it possible for the Soviet people to begin performing the tasks of historic world significance, the construction of a new society of workers and for workers. The country

raised itself from the ruins, through the will and efforts of the people, guided by the Communist party. The Red Army developed and became strong along with it.

However the imperialists did not let up. And in following years they more than once tried to test the fortress of the Soviet State and the combat capacity of its Armed Forces. Provocations on the Chinese Eastern Railroad, battles with the Japanese samurai at Lake Khasan and on the territory of the MPR at the Khalkhin-Gol river, engagements with the White Finns in the Karelian Isthmus, all these armed onslaughts by enemies of our socialist state ended ingloriously for them.

History bestowed little time for strengthening the defense capacity of the country fully. But the Soviet people created the decisive prerequisites for successful defense of the Motherland. Stalin's cult of personality, and the related violations of socialist legality, did much harm to the cause of strengthening the defense capacity of the country and the combat might of the Army and Navy. Thousands of Soviet people and military cadres were subjected to unjustified repressions. Among them such outstanding military leaders as V.K. Blyukher, M.N. Tukhachevskiy, A.I. Yegorov, and others. Including also commanders of the troops of the Turkestan Military District at various times, V.S. Lazarevich, A.I. Kork, and P.Ye. Dybenko.

The Great Patriotic War was a harsh test for the Soviet people and its Armed Forces. In the great expanse from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, the Fascists delivered a strike of unprecedented power. Suffice to say that by the start of the war 190 fully mobilized divisions were drawn up at our western borders. In this grouping there were 5.5 million soldiers and officers, more than 4 thousand tanks, more than 47 thousand guns and mortars, and almost 5 thousand combat aircraft.

The entire country was locked in deadly battle with the enemy. At the call of the Communist Party, the Soviet people arose in defense of the sacred borders of the Fatherland. The Party conducted broad explanatory work, and conveyed to the profound awareness of every citizen of the Land of the Soviets the fact that the war forced upon us was the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people, for freedom and independence of the socialist Motherland. It would decide the fate not only of socialism, but of all human civilization.

In these years four of five Communists were in the forces or defense enterprises. Everywhere, party organizations were at work, in the soldiers' trenches, in partisan detachments, and underground, and Communists inspired the troops with an impassioned word, and by personal example. Three million Communists perished in battles with the Fascist invaders. More than five million people joined the party in those heroic years.

Noted M.S. Gorbachev, "Lenin's party became the fighting party, merged into one with a embattled people. In the most difficult military segment of our history, it was up to its enormous responsibility for the fate of the Motherland and led the country to Victory."

The victory was won thanks to all the peoples of our multinational Fatherland. The workers of Soviet Uzbekistan also wrote a bright page in the combat annals of the great battle. Glorious sons and daughters of the republic fought bravely, making a worthy contribution to the defeat of the Fascists. The Party and government highly appreciated their soldierly exploits. For heroism shown in battles to defeat the Hitlerites, more than 120 thousand Uzbeks were awarded orders and medals, and tens became full recipients of the Order of Glory. More than 800 Turkestan soldiers became heroes of the Soviet Union, and four, T.Ya. Begeldinov, L.I. Beda, S.D. Luganskiy, and I.F. Pavlov, were twice awarded this title.

Six fearless eagles repeated the deathless feat of Nikolay Gastello. Twelve soldiers, like Aleksandr Matrosov, covered with their bodies the fire-spitting gunports of enemy pill boxes. Eighteen were eternally entered in the rolls of military units.

For more than 43 years now the Soviet people have been living under conditions of peace. Great changes have occurred in this time in all social spheres of the country. But the dialectic of development is such that the achieved goals impose on the Party and the Soviet people even more complex and responsible tasks. Perestroika, begun at the initiative and under the leadership of the party, is intended to impart to socialism the most up-to-date forms, corresponding to the conditions and to the needs of the scientific-technical revolution, and to the intellectual progress of our society.

As is stressed in the election Message of the CC, CPSU, "To the Party and the Soviet people", "We have no other way. And we will firmly follow it, continue the creative quest, persistently implement the large-scale plans of conversion, and accelerate progress."

The process of perestroika is also deepening in the Armed Forces. Main attention in the work of commanders, political organs, party and komsomol organizations is concentrated on attaining qualitative indices in troop training in accordance with the goals of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

This is in strict accord with our defensive military doctrine and is based on the principle of defensive sufficiency. As is pointed out in the document "On the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member Nations", "While promoting the implementation of disarmament measures, the Warsaw Pact Member Nations have been forced to maintain their armed forces at a composition and at a level such that they will be able to repel any attack from outside against any member nation of the

Warsaw Pact." As long as there exists a threat of encroachment on the achievements of socialism, the Soviet state and our allies have no other way but to qualitatively improve their armies and navies.

Realization of the principle of defensive sufficiency presupposes an unswerving reduction in the levels of military confrontation with observance of mutuality, equality, and equal security. Guided in all ways by this principle, the Soviet Union has decided on a unilateral reduction of our Armed Forces. The program of this reduction was described by M.S. Gorbachev in the Organization of the United Nations on 7 Dec 1988. The volume of reductions, the nature of the structural reductions of our Army are determined on the basis of a thorough analysis of the correlation of forces of the two opposing military-political alliances: the organizations of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO bloc.

This approach to the status of the country's combat capability raises new questions of troop training, and demands of all Turkestani soldiers that they step up their efforts to raise the quality and effectiveness of their combat training, and strengthen discipline and observance of regulations. The troops of the district have everything necessary to perform these tasks: first-class equipment, and personnel who are highly-qualified and endlessly devoted to the cause of the party and people. The high ideological-political qualities and level of morale and aggressiveness are testified to by their daily practical work. From the results of last year, the troop collectives headed by officer Communists A. Andreyev, V. Borov, Yu. Starov, N. Senshov, and M. Kazachkom achieved the best results.

On 15 February of this year, the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan was concluded. Not a single Soviet soldier remains in that country. I want to especially stress that the soldier-patriots and internationalists honorably performed their duty of honor. Thousands of them were awarded combat orders and medals for their heroic deeds performed on Afghan soil, and the bravest were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Their names now rank with those of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War.

For us the memory of those who died the death of the brave in Afghanistan is sacred. Party and Soviet organs and military commissariats are obliged to see to it that the families of the dead, the disabled, and the wounded are surrounded by tireless care and attention.

The Turkestani soldiers greet the 71st Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces by actively performing the tasks of raising perestroyka, heightening vigilance and combat readiness, resolute strengthening of discipline, and support of a healthy morale atmosphere in the military collectives. Communists and komsomol members are in the vanguard of the struggle for perestroyka, the finding and use of new reserves for further enhancement of combat readiness of units and subunits. They set the

example of an implacable attitude toward deficiencies and omissions, and perform their soldierly labor with full exertion of efforts. The young soldiers compete with troops who are outstanding in combat and political training, the highly qualified specialists.

Honored citizens of the republic, veterans of war and labor, military internationalists of the reserve, fellow Turkestani service members! Please accept from the Military Council and the Political Directorate of the district heartfelt congratulations on this All-Peoples holiday, the 71st Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Central Financial Directorate Responds to Proposal on Economic Work

*18010383 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Dec 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Response by Gen. Maj. S. Korennoy, Directorate Chief, Deputy Chief of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, "The Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense Responds to the Editors"]

[Text] The Central Financial Directorate has examined the proposals made by Guards Maj. V. Zharkov in the letter entitled "For Whom is the 'Alienation' a Secret?" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Oct), and reports the following with regard to its substance.

In accordance with the Interior Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, in addition to classes in combat training and political indoctrination, service members are called upon for tasks of maintaining weapons and military equipment, refitting and improving parks and installations of the training facilities, tidying up military bases etc. An inspection and maintenance day is held every week for this purpose. Other tasks are also inevitable (unloading rail cars with fuels, propellants, food, etc.).

To carry out the tasks of constructing small and simply engineered installations using local resources, in accordance with the governing documents commanders of operational and tactical formations are permitted to create special subunits and teams composed of service members who have served on active conscript duty for no less than one year. Five days a week the personnel of these subunits and teams are called up to perform construction work, and one day a week attend classes on combat training and political indoctrination.

Since the conscript service members are on full state subsistence, they are not authorized any additional wages for performing these tasks.

The sending of service members to work in organizations and enterprises of the domestic economy can be done only by decision of the USSR government or the USSR Ministry of Defense. In this case the USSR Ministry of

Defense refunds all expenses related to sending personnel to the work, and the service members, in authorized cases, are paid an additional financial remuneration.

Narcotics Abuse in Military Considered

*18010512a Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA
in Russian No 2, Jan 89 pp 14-15*

[Interview with V.A. Serov, worker from the Directorate of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice and RSFSR Honored Jurist by Lt Col A. Ruchkin: "An Alarming Trend"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text]

[Ruchkin] The problem of combating "white death," as drugs are often called, in our nation is becoming alarming. The announcements of the mass information media show an alarming trend of an increase in the number of drug addicts in the Soviet Union. Is this also reflected in our Armed Forces?

[Serov] The number of persons using narcotics began growing in our nation from the end of the 1960s. This trend has been maintained until recently. For example, according to the data published in the press, in 1984, 111,000 such persons were recorded in the Soviet Union and 131,000 already at the beginning of 1988.

Everything occurring in our society is naturally reflected in the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, drug abuse is no exception. Some 75 percent of the drug addicts are young persons under the age of 30. Some of them also enter the army. Thus, in 1987, an exceptionally severe crime was committed by servicemen from the Interior Troops of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Yagmurzhi and Matsnev. Due to drug addiction, they endeavored to divert an aircraft to the Ufa Airport and killed four persons. In the course of the operation against the bandits, Matsnev was killed. Yagmurzhi was condemned to execution by a military tribunal.

[Ruchkin] A drug addict with a weapon in hand. It is hard to imagine anything more dangerous....

[Serov] As yet, there are no grounds to say that drug addiction has seriously contaminated the army ranks. At the same time, we must also not underestimate its potential danger. Under civilian conditions, the appearance of a man on the job in the state of a narcotic or toxic intoxication is a major infraction of labor discipline and grounds for the abrogation of his labor contract. Under the conditions of army service, this is all the more inadmissible and dangerous. Any servicemen spotted using drugs are strictly ordered to be removed from any duties involving the standing of alert duty, guard duty or the operation and maintenance of combat equipment.

The penetration of drug use into the army has a negative impact on the combat readiness of the troops and negatively influences the state of military discipline. The

inability of a drug addict to resist a dependence upon drugs often impels him to commit crimes. Let me give examples. Sn Spadnyy who had used drugs before induction into the army contrived to secure drug-containing medicines from the sick bay. Pvt Atkin sold drugs to soldiers and persuaded his fellow servicemen to use them. Both servicemen were condemned by a military tribunal.

[Ruchkin] Vasily Arsenyevich, in this context could you not describe the legal measures to combat drug addiction? How are they being applied to servicemen?

[Serov] Sociopreventive and organizational measures are primarily important in combating drug addiction. These involve the broadening of explanatory work, intensifying the efforts for early detection of the instances of drug use, improving the providing of medical aid to drug addicts, measures to prevent the illegal use of narcotic medicines and so forth.

There are also legal measures of a medical, administrative and criminal nature. The law has established that drug addiction patients are obliged to undergo treatment. The criminal law measures for combating drug addiction extend completely to servicemen. Under criminal proceedings they punish: the illegal purchase or keeping of large amounts of narcotics without the aim of selling them or their consumption without a prescription from a physician, illegal manufacture, purchase, storage, transporting or mailing them both without the aim of selling as well as in the aim of selling, and equally the illegal selling of narcotics; an inclination for their use and, finally, one of the most dangerous crimes related to drugs, the theft of narcotic agents.

[Ruchkin] If a person voluntarily seeks medical aid and voluntarily admits to the illegal purchase, keeping, transporting or mailing obtained and already consumed drugs?

[Serov] In such an instance the law provides for the releasing of him from administrative and criminal liability. This is an extremely important provision.

[Ruchkin] A last question. What are the areas of the prevention of drug addiction in the Armed Forces?

[Serov] Such prevention is provided primarily by a system of organizational and indoctrinational measures. They are aimed at preventing the penetration of drugs into the troop units, the active disclosure of persons who have consumed narcotics prior to service, as well as explaining legislation on responsibility for infractions involving drugs. The military commissariats must be the first barrier on the path to the penetration of drug addiction into the army milieu. Unfortunately, they sometimes find this task beyond them. It is very important to block off the channels for the penetration of drugs into the troop units. Such channels include the selling of

drugs by civilians, mail parcels, the bringing back by servicemen from leaves, theft from the medical stores, pharmacies and military medical facilities.

The tasks of preventing drug addiction in the army can and should be carried out with a clear understanding on the part of all the servicemen of the seriousness of the problem and with the daily cooperation in this work by the commanders, political workers, medics, judge advocates, the party and Komsomol activists and the entire army community on the basis of extensive glasnost.

In one of the publications your journal has already raised this alarming problem. We feel that attention to it must not be lessened.

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Demographics Have 'Forced Widening of Draft Criteria'

18010416 Vilnius KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 18 Jan 89 p 2

[Interview with Lt Gen N. Ter-Grigoryants and Col V. Uteshev by T. Tubinene; date and place not given: "So, What Did Happen with Our Army?"]

[Text] This question was asked in the newspaper before. The republic's residents were troubled by the tragic fate of Arturas Sakalauskas, though not only by it. Why have all of these cruel improper relationships appeared in our army? What is their source? And what are we, the society and parents, to do to make sure that such tragedies would not occur with our children in the future? Colonel K. Golubev, chief of the political department of the republic's military commissariat, answered these questions in KOMYAUNIMO TESE, No 210, 3 February 1988. Today we continue this discussion with Lieutenant General N. Ter-Grigoryants, deputy chief of the main staff of the ground troops, and Colonel V. Uteshev, senior inspector of the political directorate of the ground troops.

[Tubinene] We are coming to discuss problems existing in our army more and more. The drug addiction, the drunkenness, the "dedovshchina."

[Uteshev] Do you really think that all of those things originated in the army? Consider these phenomena more deeply. The people who come to the army do not come right from the cradle—they are 18 years old, already rather far along in their development. Educated, trite as this may sound, by the family, the school and the streets. Take a look at how young people live in the residence halls of vocational-technical schools, tekhnikums and institutes. And cast your eye over the school cafeteria. The older ones take breakfast money from the younger ones, and crowd them out of the serving line. Are these not the rudiments of "dedovshchina"? Recently I had the fortune to meet with conscripts from Kaunasskiy Rayon at the republic induction center. I asked them:

"As you make ready to enter the army, what are you preparing yourselves for?"

"To endure the first half-year, and to command others for the rest of the time."

"Is this something you really want to do?"

"Not at all."

"Then why are you preparing to serve precisely in this way?"

"The older ones treat the younger ones badly both in secondary school and in vocational-technical school. Why should things be otherwise in the army?"

[Ter-Grigoryants] We of course should not use the "civilian" origin of all these evils as an excuse. When the young man comes to us, the army should educate him—though frequently we find it necessary to reeducate him which, as we know, is more difficult.

We have instituted the following procedure in the armed forces: Commanders and political workers of all ranks talk with each novice individually. They ask him to report any humiliations or beatings, should they begin. For those who fear that such communication with commanders could make things even worse, there is a special box at unit headquarters in which the individual could drop his anonymous complaint. Military medical personnel are given highly strict orders to report any bruises, injuries and wounds they find on servicemen that were clearly not accidental. "Risk groups" containing servicemen who had run-ins with the police and who exhibited unhealthy interests in civilian life are being defined. Individual work is being done in the units with these groups. The units are trying to establish communication with the parents, asking them to communicate to commanders the particulars of the soldier's pre-army life, his character, his habits, and perhaps his transgressions. Many parents are understanding of these efforts, and they send us candid letters. But there are also those who remain deaf. These are the "difficult" families as a rule.

[Tubinene] A decision was made a few years ago to significantly widen the criteria for fitness to serve in the armed forces. Persons with some physical shortcomings and ex-convicts now often serve. Could this also be at the root of many of the army's improprieties?

[Ter-Grigoryants] We would like the army to call up only decent, conscientious, highly educated people. But unfortunately the demographic situation in our country is such that there came a time when we had to widen the call-up criteria. Today, in connection with the significant armed forces reductions we anticipate, we will propose tightening the call-up criteria. The emphasis will probably be laid on calling up fewer numbers of VUZ students, the sick, and persons with a record.

Of course, the army could handle things in the following way: If someone does something wrong, send him to court. If someone is discovered with a pill or with a needle mark on his arm, take him to the military tribunal. It is easy to maintain discipline with the rod, but who needs it? What we need to do is nurture a conscious attitude toward one's duty. And this is not very easy.

[Tubinene] Yes, the situation in the army is slowly changing. Evidence of this can be found in a letter from soldiers serving in a certain unit in Maritime Kray. Here are a few lines from this letter, which ends with 18 signatures. "Improper relationships and ethnically motivated pranks by the majority of the military builders are flourishing in the subunits.... We appealed to the subunit commanders to transfer us to another military district where we could continue our military service. But the subunit command has not responded to our request.... Most military builders are causing us humiliation...."

[Uteshev] We checked out this letter. A special commission visited the indicated unit. Some facts stated in this letter were confirmed during the inspection; consequently the military procurator's office initiated criminal proceedings. An investigation is underway, and the guilty will be punished. In general, no such signal coming to us from the local level remains without attention. Such letters, you see, provide active help to restructuring in our units.

[Tubinene] Our editor's office continues to receive letters filled with indignation, mistrust and pain. Parents, friends and relatives complain that representatives of other nationalities are persecuting 18-year-old Lithuanian soldiers in the army.

[Uteshev] It cannot be said that Lithuanians are the only ones being mistreated. Armenians, Georgians and Kirghizians can make the same complaint as well. The problem lies not with nationalities—it is differences in education, character, way of life before the military, and the level of internal culture that play the decisive role. We have recently been seeking ethnic conflicts as the causes perhaps a little too often, forgetting that we have long been unified into a single community—the Soviet people. Yes, A. Sakalauskas's story is a tragic one, forcing us to think about many things. But I have been in the army for over 30 years, and in all of this time, this is but the second case in my memory where one Soviet serviceman has killed a group of his fellows, including blameless ones. But on the other hand I know of dozens of cases where servicemen of different nationalities have saved each other's lives under extreme conditions, risking their own, and sometimes even sacrificing it. Consider how many times officers have saved confused novices in their first attempts to throw a live grenade, or who have thrown themselves over one, protecting all from the explosion with their own bodies. At such moments, the individual thinks not at all about national differences. I spent two and a half years in Afghanistan,

and not once had I encountered manifestations of national frictions or "dedovshchina" in the limited contingent of Soviet troops. When new recruits went out on their first combat patrol, the "old soldiers" advised them to stay back a little. International crews of infantry fighting vehicles functioned as a single machine in a combat situation.

[Tubinene] Would creating territorial formations based on national origin solve the nationalities problem in the armed forces in the USSR?

[Ter-Grigoryants] This would mean that Lithuanians would serve only in Lithuania. But all young people are called up into the army with regard for their occupational, physical, intellectual and other data. For example a person over 170 cm tall cannot serve in the tank troops. And graduates of electronics *tekhnikums* are required to go into aviation. In a word, a person must be given a job in accordance with his capabilities. And once this is so, then units of all of the armed services and branches of troops must be located in Lithuania. From motorized rifle units to naval units. But this is impossible, and unnecessary as well.

[Tubinene] Readers often ask in their letters whether or not it would be better for young Lithuanians to serve in the Baltic republics. This, they say, would preclude many illnesses which a change in climate might bring on. And there would be no need to spend the extra money to send people to Central Asia, or perhaps to the Far East.

[Ter-Grigoryants] This is a somewhat simplified view of the army. What if it became necessary for such a formation to fight in a different climatic belt? It would not be able to, because it has not been acclimatized. The Soviet Union's border is 60,000 km long, and every citizen of the USSR is obligated to know how to defend each kilometer.

[Uteshev] In the first stage of restructuring it became fashionable to reject everything. But where are the concrete proposals? Recently I met with students of Vilnius State University. With ones who want to study in the military department, understanding that men need to know military affairs. They tell me that they do not like the way things are being done in the military department. What things specifically, I ask. The only proposal they offer in their reply is to shorten the training sessions and conduct them after graduation from the university.

Restructuring is proceeding in the armed forces as it is throughout the whole country. We are pleased with the interest being shown in the army and in its people, because this interest attests to the people's desire to see their army as a truly professional, monolithic and humane one. And therefore we are prepared to consider all proposals submitted to us in our work.

Force Reduction Leads to 'Surprise' Retirement of Medical Officers

*18010355b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Jan 89 First Edition p 1*

[Letter by Col Med Svc S. Zagorodniy, and Col Med Svc G. Lugovskiy: "May a Computer Discharge Doctors?" and responses by Col V. Bugrimenko and Maj Gen Med Svc V. Fadeyev]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents received this letter: "Dear comrades! Several days ago instructions on discharging officers into the reserves in 1989 were sent to personnel of the Kiev Military District military hospital. According to this order, in the first six months of the year dozens of officers assigned to the hospital are to be discharged, the majority of them department chiefs and leading specialists, many of whom just reached or are reaching 50 years of age. More than half of the candidates and doctors of medical sciences are to remove their shoulder boards.

"We understand that our sudden discharge (since many had had their terms of service extended) is a result of the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces. But this is what we wish to direct attention to. Many of us were called up into the army in the 1960s. This was following the well known reduction of the armies by 1,200,000 men. At that time, without the authorities particularly listening to our opinion, we were told that the homeland and its armed defenders required us doctors. We went down the difficult path of becoming military medical personnel, and served in areas that now have become hardship areas, but were not so at that time.

"Considerable forces were also invested in achieving the high reputation of the Kiev Military Hospital. And now they are so decisively parting with us!

"In so doing it is not being taken into account that some do not have 25 years of service, and others will not obtain the pension that they could have obtained.

"Let us say a few words about the specific nature of our work. A hospital specialist, and even more so a department chief, obtains the corresponding position and reaches the required skill level by 40-50 years of age. If the majority of leading specialists are discharged almost simultaneously, and among them those who have unique experience in restoring the health of patients following the accident at the Chernobyl AES [atomic electric power plant], and that of our soldier-internationalists (these are primarily colonels of medical service N. Bezlyuda, V. Gachkovskiy, and S. Chekirda), the skilled medical assistants in the hospital will be, figuratively speaking, guillotined, decapitated.

"In general, we are not merely speaking about ourselves; we will not be without work. Representatives of city medical establishments are already calling on the hospitals with applications for specific officers being discharged into the reserves. But, we are far from indifferent to the situation that will take shape in the hospital following our discharge. We believe that one must not take a campaign-like approach to deciding the fate of officers, especially not that of skilled specialists."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Col A. Polyakov, asked the competent officials for explanations. We cite their responses.

Col V. Bugrimenko, department chief, district cadres directorate:

"In preparing the plan for discharging officers we were fulfilling directives of the Main Cadres Directorate. A computer gave us the names of officers who were turning 50 this year. They were marked for discharge."

Maj Gen Med Svc V. Fadeyev, chief of the district medical service:

"I can react only negatively to the plan for swift discharging of a large number of highly skilled leading specialists, not only of the district hospital, but also of the medical service as a whole. Apparently, I will have to explain and prove that discharging 50 year old candidates of sciences is not only a blunder for the district, but also a loss for the Armed Forces."

FROM THE EDITORS. Let us recall that Army Gen D. Sukhorukov, deputy USSR minister of defense for cadres, in a discussion published on 14 January, emphasized that highly skilled specialist cadres, including doctors and candidates of sciences, are to be viewed individually, and decisions on the terms of service of such specialists are to be made with consideration for retaining scientific capabilities.

And in any case, no computer should put an end to the destiny of an officer, or decide the fate of people and matters.

Discussion of Development of Military Sociology
*18010355a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Jan 89 First Edition p 2*

[Interview of Col Yu. Deryugin: "A Fact for a Report or a Scientific Forecast"]

[Text] Our correspondent met with Col Yu. Deryugin, candidate of philosophical sciences, and presidium member, Soviet Sociological Association, and asked him a number of questions on the development of military sociology, and on the organization of the socio-psychological service in the Armed Forces.

[Correspondent] Yuriy Ivanovich, the fate of sociology took shape no less tragically than the fate of genetics. For long years this science was virtually under lock and key. The word "sociology" itself until comparatively recently was removed from scientific use. How did you interpret the discussion of the question of sociology at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session, and the resolution approved in that regard, and what do you associate with this?

[Deryugin] It was, to be frank, a remarkable event. Soviet sociology received, if it can be so expressed, most favored status. This became possible solely due to restructuring, and the policy of glasnost and democratization of our society.

I would not be exaggerating to say that, without sociological science, society resembles a blind man. Its role is especially great today. Each decision made in economics, social policy, and other spheres of life, and each new step in restructuring inevitably, in one way or another, affects people's social interests. To know and most completely take into account public opinion; obtain accurate information on the state of affairs, and on the needs, interests and behavior of various social groups in diverse situations; forecast the influence of their behavior on social processes—these are the tasks of sociology. And military sociology and psychology, in turn, are called upon to contribute to finding an effective solution to key problems of improving command and control of the Armed Forces, activating the human factor (without which today fulfilling the tasks facing the army and navy is simply impossible), and improving the effectiveness of personnel training and indoctrination. Military sociology and the study of public opinion must make a substantial contribution to rooting out negative phenomena in the multinational military collectives, and to strengthening discipline and law and order.

[Correspondent] From what points of departure will military-sociological research begin in the future? Is it necessary to begin from nothing?

[Deryugin] Not entirely so. Despite the fact that military sociology developed with difficulty, it nonetheless has some experience. This concerns both research methodology and methods, and practical results. It is known that military-sociological studies were carried out in the Red Army back in the 1920s.

[Correspondent] What can you say about military sociological studies in our day? Have there been positive changes?

[Deryugin] Undoubtedly. First, they have become closer to the lives and problems of the troops. Studies encompass the sphere of the formation and uniting of military collectives, uncovering the causes, conditions and mechanism of non-regulation relationships, and of problems of internationality relations in the army and navy, etc. With the appearance of the Center for the Study of

Public Opinion of Military Personnel, at the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, broad opportunities appeared for systematic study of the frames of mind of the personnel, the views of servicemen, and the degree of their real participation in restructuring. Secondly, the attitude itself toward sociological studies has changed. A need for them began to be felt. The recommendations of sociologists are being listened to, and to a greater extent than before they are taken into account in making managerial decisions.

[Correspondent] Does this mean that already today it can be said that we are obtaining the desired benefits from conducting sociological studies?

[Deryugin] I consider such an assertion premature. Sociological studies thus far are giving us merely snapshots, and of varying clarity. Most often we obtain a kind of confirmation expressed in figures, or illustration of those aspects of life that have already been revealed in everyday practice. We are obtaining, figuratively speaking, a fact or a picture for a report. We are not yet penetrating to the deep social strata.

[Correspondent] If one considers the essence of the CPSU Central Committee resolution, one cannot help but note that it affirms a systematic approach toward solving problems associated with the development of sociology.

[Deryugin] Conditions are also being formed for creating such a system in the Armed Forces. The social-psychological service in the army and navy is to become its basic element. Already now most active work is underway to create it.

[Correspondent] Where, in your view, are the main points for applying the forces of military psychologists right in the subunits?

[Deryugin] First of all it is in the primary military collectives. Here the opportunities for the psychologist are very great. As a specialist he can actively help the commander and political worker reveal intra-collective ties, go to the immediate micro-groups and their leaders, give recommendations for individual work with persons with unstable psyches, and forecast possible negative phenomena associated with the psychological situation in the subunit. An important sphere of his work is shaping the moral and psychological confidence of the soldier in emergency situations.

[Correspondent] Precisely such a situation took shape recently in Armenia as a result of the destructive earthquake. I know that you went there as a member of a group of military psychologists. If it is not a secret, for what purpose?

[Deryugin] It is no secret at all. We went there for the purpose of studying the psychological staunchness of the personnel participating in saving the victims and eliminating the consequences of the disaster. And, although our studies are not concluded, already today I can say with full confidence that the psychological and physical staunchness of the majority of soldiers is high. The numerous examples of true heroism and courage displayed there, and the endurance and capacity for work of all the personnel, convinces me of this.

[Correspondent] And what is the field of activity of the military sociologist?

[Deryugin] The sociologist works in the sphere of social relations. His task is to hold his hand on the pulse of public opinion and the moods of the personnel. The value orientations and attitudes of the personnel, and their interests and needs, must be in the field of vision of the sociologist. He is called upon to assist the commanders and political organs to understand the dynamics of the social processes taking place in the army and navy environment. Under his direct control is an entire complex of questions associated with the social aspects of military labor, and the leisure time of servicemen. And how necessary today are the recommendations of the sociologists on work in multinational military collectives!

Today military scientists are faced with numerous problems associated with improving the theory of military sociology, defining its place and role in the system of social sciences, and developing the priority direction for social studies in the army and navy, both basic and applied.

[Correspondent] Much attention is paid in the CPSU Central Committee resolution to sociological education and training cadres of sociologists. How do prospects look in this field in the army and navy?

[Deryugin] The present stage of the development of the Armed Forces poses the task of raising the sociological and psychological-pedagogical confidence of all officer personnel. Specific steps aimed at solving this task have been outlined. A military sociology department is being created at the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin. The course, "Military Sociology," is being introduced in all faculties of the academy, and in military-political schools. Elective classes on the special course, "Fundamentals of Military Sociology," will be organized at USSR Ministry of Defense higher educational institutions.

The activity by the military department of the Soviet Sociology Association is also of definite assistance in the creation of the social and psychological service, and in solving other tasks that are being placed on the agenda today.

Kolkhoz to Pay Conscripts While They Serve
18010542 Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian
2 Feb 89 p 4

[Article by S. Melnychuk; "Salary for the Soldier"]

[Text] Mlino, Rovno Oblast (RADYANSKA UKRAYINA correspondent). A general assembly of the Chervoniy Promin Kolkhoz has adopted an unusual resolution: to pay 50 percent of their salaries to boys serving in the Soviet Army.

Former equipment operators Bohdan Narusevych, Petro Kovalchuk, Hryhorii Rybak, Andriy Tkachuk and Ihor Huz are already receiving payments. The kolkhoz anticipates that the boys will return to the village upon completing their service.

Problems in Interethnic Relations Discussed
18010536 Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH
SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 89 pp 59-64

[Article by Candidate of Psychological Sciences Lt Col V. Krysko: "In Keeping With the Laws of Military Brotherhood"]

[Text] In the era of perestroika going on in our country every person is pondering many problems to which he previously did not pay much attention for various reasons. The issue of development of inter-nationality relations is one of them. The dynamics inherent in the initial stage of formation of our multinational state were lost to a considerable degree and undermined by abandoning the Leninist principles of national policy, violations of the rule of law in the period of personality cult, and the ideology and mentality of stagnation. Many commanders and political officers noted the appearance of contradictions in inter-nationality relations long before the mid-1980's. At times, we concealed the tension in the relations of soldiers of different nationalities because it was accepted that in our country, in the Armed Forces, there are not and cannot be any distortions in this matter.

I remember how I was sent to a subordinate unit in 1974, while still on the staff of the political department of a formation, in order to sort out a conflict between soldiers of the Azerbaijani and Armenian nationalities. At the time, the reason turned out to be simple. An old-timer offended a young soldier, and the latter sought protection from his fellow countrymen.

Certainly, the skill of unifying multinational military collectives comes with experience. After all, inter-nationality relations are quite varied and multifaceted, and they call for a profound consideration of the actual practice of all officers in the small unit. Every commander and political officer will be able to regulate these links more confidently if he analyzes the situation emerging in the collective continuously and comprehensively,

organizes prevention measures, conducts internationalist conditioning with clarity of purpose and all times, and take care to create an adequate moral and psychological environment and ethical atmosphere. This may be aided by the following considerations.

Opinion 1. What peculiarities of a military collective should be taken into account with a view to uniting servicemen of different nationalities?

As a rule, the composition of military collectives is multinational. Due to the peculiarities of military activities, they differ greatly from similar civilian (production, student, and other) multinational collectives. Inasmuch as in the latter the sphere of interaction and communication of their members is mainly restricted to mutual relations within the framework of labor activities, in military collectives the servicemen not only discharge their professional responsibilities shoulder to shoulder, but eat, spend their spare time, and sleep together. The customs, traditions, norms of behavior which greatly influence the relations of soldiers are manifested with the greatest intensity exactly in the course of the daily round.

A change in the statistics of multinational [composition] at the unit-small unit level is a characteristic peculiarity of modern military collectives. An analysis of the demographic situation as it affects the army shows that in recent years the share of representatives of the native nationalities of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Transcaucasia has been growing noticeably.

Military collectives are also characterized by a considerably greater degree of intensity of inter-nationality communication. There are many more representatives of various nationalities in them than there are in civilian collectives. On occasion it happens that a person encounters representatives of a particular nationality for the first time, and is not prepared to communicate with them in some instances. Data from sociological surveys show that the scope of inter-nationality communications in the armed forces increases by a factor of 4 to 10. Naturally, this requires that every serviceman overcome additional psychological difficulties.

Here is a typical situation. In a confidential conversation, Private V. Ivashkevich, drafted from Belorussia, said that he first met Chechen and Ingush only after he joined the army, and did not appreciate until much later what a peculiar kind of people they were. Representatives of these nationalities did not behave as all other young soldiers. They were peppery when they were made to wash the floor or sweep the rooms. They took offense when they were criticized for this. Private V. Ivashkevich admitted sincerely that, knowing nothing about the customs and traditions of the Chechen and the Ingush, he allowed himself several tactless blunders with

regard to them. This, in general, should not have happened. After all, in the Caucasus mostly women do the so-called "dirty work." By virtue of tradition, many men consider participation in it personally degrading.

It is also necessary to take into account the peculiar situation of a certain segment of representatives of non-Russian nationalities whose command of Russian is poor, and who join multinational military collectives every year. They experience certain difficulties communicating with their fellow servicemen, studying service documentation and relevant manuals.

Military collectives are staffed with people in the same age bracket among which the internationalist traits of consciousness are inculcated most intensively given skillful work. However, it should be remembered that maximalism, jumping to conclusions, categorical and straightforward judgments, the lack of life experience, sociopolitical maturity, and discretion are characteristic of young people. This is why conflicts among soldiers of different nationalities are often unwitting in nature, and are brought about by the past way of life, and circulating stereotypes.

Joint service by representatives of many nationalities of our country, their continuous communication among themselves in the process of military activities do not necessarily mean that this or that military collective becomes truly internationalist. To this end, it is necessary to work systematically and with a clarity of purpose on uniting soldiers of different nationalities into a real collective. Unfortunately, at present many officers are facing difficulties in solving this task. This is due to an entire array of causes. One of them is the absence of special subjects in the course of study at military educational institutions which would contain specific methods of leading multinational military collectives in particular. This is why at present many military academy graduates turn out to be virtually helpless when they encounter socio-psychological phenomena arising among representatives of numerous nationalities at the very outset of their service. Data of sociological research show that only as late as 4 to 5 years into their officer service do commanders and political officers gain some knowledge of the national and socio-psychological peculiarities of their subordinates, and accumulate minimal experience in practical regulation of inter-nationality relations.

In many units and formations, discussions and sharing of experience in the actual regulation of inter-nationality relations are held only on an occasional basis. Also, many senior commanders pay too little attention at present to teaching young officers about the methods of studying national peculiarities of their subordinates, the forms of work with representatives of specific nationalities, and directions for preventing negative phenomena arising on national grounds. We cannot ignore the fact

that thus far very little literature has been published which could be used as aids in activities aimed at unifying multinational collectives.

Opinion 2. How does one study his subordinates, representatives of different nationalities?

Unfortunately, in the matter of inter-nationality relations the personality sometimes remains sort of in the background for many officers. Cases of non-regulation relations are frequently discussed with many servicemen at the same time rather than with every specific person. Meanwhile, in 90 cases out of 100 a conflict between two representatives of different nationalities which later acquires a greater scale is the reason for the non-regulation relations.

A small-unit commander should approach every soldier under his command as a person on whom the nature of inter-nationality relations depends; he should know the soldier very closely, have a clear idea of his individual traits, especially the national-specific ones, and build upbringing work on this foundation. The complication here is that the officer should be a good expert on national peculiarities of numerous representatives of the peoples of our country who serve in the small unit entrusted to him. Not one of them can be offended even in small things. This is no simple matter by any means.

In a unit of the Baltic Military District, Senior Lt V. Khamidullin, of the Tartar nationality, was posted as a repair company commander. This circumstance accounted for his closer communication primarily with soldiers drafted from the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. There is nothing unusual about it, because the Tartars are very close to Turkic peoples in their ethnic characteristics. Naturally, Senior Lt V. Khamidullin established mutual understanding faster with Uzbek and Kazakh soldiers. However, the officer did not take one circumstance into account. Soldiers drafted from the Caucasus accounted for a majority of personnel in this company. They noticed that the senior lieutenant began to go easy on representatives of the peoples of Central Asia, and at times defended them even in the case when they were not entirely right in their actions.

Prerequisites for a conflict situation emerged in the small unit. The dissatisfaction with such attitude on the part of V. Khamidullin began to fade into enmity toward the Central Asians on the part of representatives of the Caucasian nationalities. Only timely measures allowed to alleviate the situation. Had the officer been aware of the heightened self-esteem of a majority of soldiers in his company, had he taken this circumstance into account in due time, and, mainly, had he structured his communication with all of his subordinates correctly this would not have happened.

Often the knowledge of national-psychological traits of soldiers is not the only issue. Professional competence of the commander and political officer plays an important

role. Conflicts on national grounds may be avoided if they have a stable tradition and skill in educational activities, if they affirm regulation order in the small unit, and maintain proper disciplinary practices.

A different situation emerged in another small unit commanded by Lt N. Pikalov. Having assumed command of a platoon consisting of fresh recruits right after his graduation from an academy, the officer noticed that several soldiers of the Kirghiz nationality kept to themselves, almost did not communicate with fellow servicemen, and did not show vigor in military activities. Unlike them, representatives of the Caucasian republics were distinguished by heightened initiative, and established contacts with other soldiers quickly and easily. Without giving it much thought, Lt N. Pikalov twice rebuked the Kirghiz soldiers in front of the rank for their "poor" adaptation to the army environment, and the effort to set themselves apart from fellow servicemen through communication among themselves. As a result, these soldiers became even more restricted to their group, and one of them committed a disciplinary violation. Why did this situation arise? Largely due to the fact that the platoon commander had a poor idea of the peculiar mentality of representatives of Central Asian republics for some of whom a longer period of adjustment within a multinational collective is characteristic.

Work on studying the soldiers of different nationalities should begin with a preliminary familiarization of commanders and political officers with the morals, customs, and traditions of numerous peoples of our country. It is good if the officer is geared toward this while still at the academy. In this case, by the time he comes to a small unit he already forms an initial notion of the forms of behavior of his future subordinates, their possible response to specific indoctrination measures, and accumulates his impressions of the possible way of invigorating the service actions of his subordinates. On the basis of the knowledge acquired, the young officer will put his observations in order, add to them as a result of personal experience, and, if needed, change them directly in his platoon or company.

The example of actions by Senior Lt N. Ivanchishin shows how individualized approach to subordinates should be implemented. While still an officer-cadet at the Novosibirsk Sixty Years of October Military-Political Combined-Arms Academy he started a notebook in which he summed up the information gleaned from the books on the national-psychological peculiarities of soldiers. When assigned to a company, he started a file of personal traits cards for every servicemen. Along with an analysis of biographical information, the level of moral-political, special military, intellectual, and willpower traits of soldiers, the card included information on the national-psychological peculiarities of the soldier. As observation of the soldiers went on, these data were generalized, expanded, and improved. Measures of conditioning specific soldiers were planned on the basis of the cards, and individual work was carried out.

The battalion commander frequently shared his personal considerations on situations emerging in the inter-nationality relations of soldiers with Senior Lt N. Ivanchishin, analyzed in a comradely manner whether the younger colleague was proceeding correctly or incorrectly, encouraged him to further study the national peculiarities of servicemen not only through practice but also through publications in periodicals, and special research.

Studying soldiers drafted in different regions of our country is a continuous process, which is constantly improved, and by no means dies down at times. This is a very painstaking job which one must settle to. In the absence of it there may be no efficiency in the subsequent pedagogical impact on the soldiers-representatives of different nationalities. If the knowledge of national traits of soldiers in a small unit by the commander is modest or, worse yet, such that certain frictions emerge between him and the personnel on these grounds then a phenomenon arises and begins to spread which the specialists call mutual alienation. Its consequences are very dangerous. They can bring about a deterioration of the sociopolitical environment in the small unit, the lack of mutual understanding between the commander and his subordinates in the course of carrying out the tasks of military service.

Naturally, a biased attitude toward representatives of some nationalities and, conversely, giving privileges to others are not admissible. An officer is always obligated to be strict and fair with every serviceman regardless of his nationality, and conditioning work with regard to him cannot be restricted to one-time measures.

Opinion 3. What are the reasons for the emergence of non-regulation relations on national grounds, and what needs to be done if the latter have occurred?

Conflicts are a consequence of an improper attitude by soldiers of one nationality to soldiers of another. Up to one-quarter of [cases of] non-regulation relations occur on national grounds. Reasons for these conflicts vary.

Paradoxical as it is, young people coming to the army very frequently anticipate the presence of inter-nationality tensions in the Armed Forces. There are serious grounds to state that in the process of military activities conflicts are possible between soldiers of the Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalities. Experienced commanders and political officers determine the nature of mutual relations developing between these soldiers upon the arrival of fresh recruits in the unit (they may have already been formed en route to the place of service), and attune them to lengthy joint activities in the interest of achieving combat objectives.

Certain conflicts do not acquire national undertones because, say, Brazauskas and Seitov, or Dzhamalov and Voskanyan "have incompatible character traits" (though

this does happen), but because the regulations are frequently trampled on: the instruction process proceeds with violations of the regulations; there are many shortcomings in the organization of service; the day duty detail discharges its responsibilities poorly, and so forth. It appears that one should look for the cause of mutual enmity in the absence of strict order in compliance with regulations.

Experienced commanders and political officers work not only with their collectives but with every individual servicemen of a particular nationality, look primarily for the best traits in him, and on this basis neutralize the negative character traits manifested in the initial period of service. On the basis of respect for the personal dignity of every soldier, the level of demands on him can be also increased gradually, and his moral and ethical improvement may be encouraged in this manner.

The unification of soldiers within groups of fellow countrymen increasing from one year to the next is the cause of most conflicts on national grounds. Having initially emerged as a form of protection from non-regulation relations on the part of servicemen of other nationalities, it has gradually developed into a mode of adversarial resolution of all problems which they have. Previously, servicemen of one nationality accounting for a minority in some small unit could not counteract the remaining majority, whereas at present the situation is different. Regardless of how many of them there are in a particular platoon, servicemen of one nationality unite with their fellow countrymen within the entire unit or military settlement. When one of them is wronged the group of countrymen comes to his defense. Experience shows that there are no conflicts if soldiers and sergeants well-versed in internal political events who went to college before coming to the army or held high status in labor collectives become informal leaders among, say, soldiers of the Caucasian nationalities or draftees from Central Asia—provided, of course, that commanders take care to promote their prestige, and turn them into fair leaders of national countrymen groups.

In the course of surveying soldiers of several units of the Odessa, Baltic, and Far Eastern military districts an interesting fact came to light. In response to the question "If a conflict occurred in your presence between your fellow countryman and a soldier of a different nationality, and the former would be definitely wrong, whose side would you take, and what would you do?" almost all representatives of Slavic nationalities made statements to the effect that they would take the side of the soldier who is right, and would try to resolve the conflict amicably. At the same time, almost all servicemen drafted from the Caucasus and Transcaucasia made unambiguous statements: "the fellow countryman is always right," and any actions in his defense, including physical force, are possible. Soldiers representing nationalities native to Central Asia and Kazakhstan assumed a position similar to that of representatives of Slavic nationalities in response to this question.

I have not quoted this fact just in order to attract attention to it. On the one hand, it is necessary to shape a correct public opinion with regard to such manifestations which are alien to us. On the other hand, the power of this opinion should be used in order to completely root out both the non-regulation relations on national grounds themselves, and incorrect ideas about them which in a certain manner are reflected in the national consciousness of individual soldiers.

In the interest of preventing conflicts, it is necessary to develop the moral-political stability of multinational collectives of soldiers with regard to manifestations of nationalism and national self-conceit. It is important for both the commanders and subordinates to view conflicts as phenomena incompatible with the life and activities of Soviet soldiers. To this end, it is desirable to reveal to the personnel the sources which have served as the course of conflicts, and conditions which have promoted the spread of them. Only in this case may an environment of intolerance of unfairness in inter-nationality relations be formed in a multinational military collective.

Opinion 4. What are the directions of uniting multinational military collectives?

Primarily it is the regulation of moral and psychological climate. It is achieved through adjusting the value orientation of the collective in the way of taking into account and changing the public opinion of microgroups and the point of view of individual soldiers on national issues. Commanders and political officers should strive to bring into compliance with the regulations the moral norms and principles which servicemen of different nationalities are guided by in their behavior. It also appears important to create in every small unit a system of prestige goals in the service, and service and assignment prospects for every serviceman.

Internationalist conditioning holds a special place in unifying a military collective. The commonality of the historical fate of our nations on the path of revolutionary transformations of society in the interest of the working masses is its foundation. Joint labor binds and unites soldiers of all nationalities not by itself but through the awareness of participation in the joint defense of the achievements of socialism.

The entire system of combat training and service by soldiers in a regiment, the entire arrangement of life and daily round of a multinational collective promote internationalist conditioning, and, on this basis, the unification of military collectives. Inasmuch as previously such inspirational statements were received with condescension, at present the task is for them to be implemented in the life and activities of soldiers of different nationalities through words rather than deeds.

Long-lasting retention of customs and traditions associated with the way of life of every individual nation within the scope of its influence is characteristic of a

national mentality. V. I. Lenin cautioned that the carriers of prejudice in the national issue are marked by false tendentiousness, bias, and blind obedience to traditions. In his opinion, national prejudices emerging at the level of everyday consciousness penetrate the convictions of people deeply, and acquire the power of a consciously assimilated experience; this is why a man does not see the falsehood, he is sincerely convinced that his understanding and actions are correct. This needs to be taken into account. The great leader called for "attentiveness," "concessions," pedagogical tactfulness with regard to representatives of all nationalities in [the process of] instilling internationalist traits.

Commanders and political officers should not only be aware of the prejudice still actually existing among representatives of some nationalities but also carry out painstaking work in order to reduce the desire for it without offending the soldiers in the process, and without infringing on their national dignity.

The assignment of personnel to small units taking into account the national affiliation of soldiers is one of the prerequisites for uniting multinational military collectives. It is efficient only when the principles of individualized approach to the selection (of sergeants, specialists, the aktiv), compliance by candidates with the specifications required, as well as the principle of proportional representation of soldiers of all nationalities among different categories of personnel in basic military service are observed.

Certainly, the above opinions on the prerequisites and directions for developing the multinational military collectives, their unification, and conditioning in the spirit of requirements called for at present by the times, the very nature of processes, including national, under way in society and in the army do not embrace the entire scope of problems solved by commanders and political officers of small units in regulating the inter-nationality relations by soldiers. The main goal of these considerations is to show the ways of solving some problems associated with the manifestation of the national factor in the life and work of Soviet servicemen, and to reveal the logic behind such work.

[Editorial note]

This article is recommended for use in the system of commander training when studying the topic "Psychological and Pedagogical Foundations of Unifying Multinational Military Collectives."

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Discussion of Use of Laser Small-Arms Train-Fire Simulator

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[Article by Lt Col A. Ageykov: "The Semiautomatic Rifle, the Laser and... 'Elephant Ears'"]

[Text] The forces have begun receiving the standardized simulator of small-arms fire and personnel destruction.

...I was the first to be "killed." I first felt my eardrums pressed by a sharp, continuous signal, however, which filled my head with noise. I then saw that the AK-74 in my hands was still. The "elephant ears"—red and visible within a radius of 800 meters—immediately flapped against the back of my head. At that point I realized that if this were an actual battlefield, I would no longer exist. Here, in the training subunit, my opponent had illuminated the sensors on my chest or head with a laser beam, but on a battlefield the enemy would have put a round through me. This thought disturbed me greatly.

This was the first time I had been in such a situation in my almost 20 years of service. And the laser simulator of fire and personnel destruction was "to blame." The 7-kilogram "gadget" does not look like much: a laser emitter, a receiver, power units, information and simulation processing, target destruction—but it has a powerful psychological effect. And not just on me, I learned.

From the area command post I observed a battle between two motorized rifle squads. With binoculars I could just barely make out two members of the gun crew. The rest were dug in, hidden among the pockmarks on the firing range, and one could only guess as to how they were advancing to meet the hypothetical enemy. Apparently none of them wanted to return from the "battlefield" with "elephant ears."

With the adoption of this simulator in the training, the motorized riflemen will indeed have to learn what to do on a battlefield far more seriously and in circumstances more closely approximating a combat situation. Linear tactics will have to be abandoned completely, for example. They will have to learn how to bound from one position to another, using the combat experience acquired in Afghanistan. There is every indication also that the servicemen will have a different attitude toward camouflage.

Now, about how the device works. If the range to the target has been fed into the firing simulator with an accuracy of plus or minus 100 meters and the sighting is correct—the front sight is trained within the outline of the waist-up target dummy—the laser beam will illuminate certain of the sensors (two or three on the chest, one on the chest and one on the head, one or two on the back, one on the head). This activates the target destruction simulator: the firing simulator disengages, the audio signal is activated for 3 seconds, a signal light goes on and a colored band is exposed on the headgear. If the range to the target has been fed into the firing simulator with an accuracy of less than plus or minus 100 meters, or if the training is incorrect, a "miss" is simulated by an intermittent audio signal lasting 1-2 seconds.

The simulator can fire both blank and electronic rounds. In the former case the rate and type of fire fully correspond to the organic type, and the simulated basic load is determined by the number of blank cartridges. In the latter case the rate of fire in the "automatic fire mode" ranges from two to four simulated rounds per minute. The simulated basic load is 128 rounds.

At the present time only one training center is equipped with these laser simulators. Other military districts should begin receiving them by the end of this year. We have to start thinking right now about how to keep the new training device from lying around in some depot. Modern and effective as it is, the main thing is the efficiency with which it is used in the forces.

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[Text]

**Index of Articles Published in VESTNIK
PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY for 1988**

"Report on Plenum of CPSU CC".....	11
"Decree of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 30 September 1988 'On The Reform of CPSU CC Commissions and Reorganization of the CPSU CC Apparatus in Light of Decisions of the All-Union Party Conference'".....	11
"Report on the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet".	11
"Speech by Deputy M.S. Gorbachev".....	11

Lead Articles

"Is the Training Not Easy?".....	3
"A Calendar Date in Red".....	4
"Victory Day: There Is No Day Dearer".....	5
"The Party Forum".....	7
"Getting Down to Business Is Now the Most Important Thing".....	8
"The Communists Have an Important Test Ahead"....	9
"Restructuring Concepts and Experience".....	10
"Guarding the Gains of Socialism," V. Silakov.....	2
"To New Heights in Combat Readiness," I. Tretyak...	1
"The Main Element of the Restructuring at VUZs," N. Shpakov.....	9
"At the Forefront of the Renewal".....	12

27th CPSU Congress: Questions of Theory

"Motivate to Take Action," A. Andreytsov.....	7
"Improving Socialism—Continuing and Developing the Cause of October," K. Vorobyev.....	1
"The Crucial Factor in the Acceleration and Restruc- turing," M. Shakhov.....	7

Toward the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference

"That Same Element...," A. Andreytsov.....	6
--	---

"Etiquette and Principles," V. Biryukov.....	5
"Demonstrate Initiative, Be Absorbed in the Job," S. Vasilyevich.....	6
"Heroic Pages in Our Party's History".....	6
"Lessons in Principle," V. Gromov.....	4
"General Party Conferences".....	2, 3
"Delegate to the 7th All-Russian [Conference]," V. Sternin.....	4
"Demandingness," Yu. Cherepanov.....	6
"Special Questionnaire 'Everyone Needs to Work Harder'".....	5, 6

**A Word to the 19th All-Union Party Conference
Delegate**

"Work Without Waiting For Instructions".....	8
--	---

Party Conference Decisions—a Guide to Action

"Both a Right and a Duty," V. Biryukov.....	9
"The Sphere of Responsibility," A. Galunov.....	12
"Priority to Quality Indices," V. Osmolovskiy.....	10
"On a Personal Question," N. Poroskov.....	9
"Feel the Pulse of the Times," V. Timchuk.....	11
"With the Criteria of Political Maturity," A. Chayka.	10
"The Restructuring Is Testing Everyone," A. Chernny.	8

In the Ranks of the Homeland's Defenders

"Enthusiastic," V. Amirov.....	2
"Greetings, Native Land," V. Biryukov.....	8
"The Officer's Personal Contribution," V. Bogachev...	2
"At the Center of Attention—the Family," T. Bunto...	2
"Forestall With the Attack," S. Dmitriyev.....	2
"With Efficient Methods," L. Dubanevich.....	2
"The Engineer's Medal," I. Yelkov.....	2
"The Pilot's Navigation Training," V. Zaytsev.....	2
"Life's Motto," A. Zakharov.....	2
"Workdays of the Party Committee Secretary," V. Zvezda.....	2

"According to the New, Comprehensive System," V. Krasnoperov	2
"Whom the Times Select," A. Kulakov	2
"There, Beyond the Clouds," S. Matveychuk	2
"The Elector's 'Sailing Directions,'" V. Mokryshev	2
"The Instructor's Speech," I. Morozov	2
"Concerning Oneself With the Soldier," S. Riznyk	2
"A Year Later," G. Ryabokon	2
"The Optimal Technology Is Required," A. Sikorskiy	2
"The Commander's Responsibility," A. Stetsenko	2
"Pipeline Repair," Yu. Sukhochev	2
"The Test of the Firing Range," S. Tokalenko	2
"Demandingness—Personal," M. Trebin	2
"A Celebration of Army Talents," T. Turovets	2
"Mayorov Is Mayorov," A. Khorobrykh	5
"Specialists of the Air Force Engineer Service: Flight Safety," A. Tsikunov	2
"Restructuring the Training of Military Engineers," A. Chelpanov	2
"The Heights of Colonel Zakharov," A. Shashkov	2
"The New Equipment—Great Possibilities," V. Shvakov	2

The Homeland Rewarded Them

"His Love Is the Sky," V. Blagonravov	8
"Loyal to duty"	3
"The First Sergeant," N. Grebnev	8
"For Combat Merit," O. Milchakov	5
"The Yurtanov Brothers," V. Chertkov	5
"A Good Track," V. Chertkov	1

From the Chronicle of the Air Defense Forces' Combat Glory

"One of the First," V. Burov	2
"The Enemy Did Not Catch [Them] Unaware," M. Vasilyev	2

"The Year 1944"	1
"The Year 1945"	2
"Covering the Caspian and the Volga," P. Grekhnov	2
"Antiaircraft Gunners of Revolutionary Leningrad," N. Muratov	2
"In a Single Combat Formation," P. Skorodenko	2
"Medical Support for the Air Defense Forces During the Great Patriotic War," G. Khorovets, A. Kupryanov and Ye. Nazarenko	2

Alert Duty

"Responsibility For an Infraction," A. Bilokon	8
"The First Mark—Maximum Attention," A. Vishnyauskas	1
"A Breakdown Can Be Avoided," M. Daniels	10
"Technician, Remember!" E. Dmitriyev	3
"In a Spirit of Great Responsibility," A. Zaytsev	6
"A Sense of the Forward Edge," V. Lichmanov and V. Zuzlov	9
"The Readiness of the Motor Vehicle Specialists," V. Palekha	11
"The Operations Duty Man: Readiness For Action," N. Poroskov	5
"Work For the End Result," V. Rudak	12
"Drill For the Command Post Crew," Ye. Suslov	7
"If the Border Is Nearby," O. Falichev	4

For Firm Regulation Order

"The Commander's Legal Sophistication," V. Bobrenov	6
"Guard in Every Way," A. Bogdanov	7
"Step Up Searching in the Indoctrinational Work," E. Goncharov	1
"Renewing Views and Approaches," P. Grinyuk	11
"And the NCOs Became a Reliable Support," I. Ivanovskiy	10
"Demandingness and Tact," V. Kravchenko	4
"Guard duty—a Combat Mission," V. Pudov	3

"The NCOs Are My Support," V. Sorokin 12

Socialist Competition

"Developing Diligence," V. Amirov 4

"Mastering the Standards," G. Belostotskiy 11

"The Commander Sums up the Results," V. Boldyr.....5

"The Squadrons Compete," V. Brazhnikov.....8

"Stimulating Activeness," S. Viktorov.....7

"Formally and to the Point," A. Voynov.....6

"A Vital Need," I. Letinskiy.....5

"But What Lies Behind the Duties," I. Konoplya.....1

"On a Higher Scale," N. Kochetov 12

"Do Not Seek Justifications," N. Moshkin.....9

"Evaluating the Effectiveness of Scientific Work,"
I. Rok.....3

"Summing up the Results in the Department," G.
Svechnikov 10

Attention: Advanced Know-how

"Accelerated Training of Operators," A. Agafonov.....11

"Out of the Prison of the Old Patterns," V. Dobrynin.9

"An Operator—in Two Weeks," N. Leontyev 12

"In the Presence of Interference," A. Maydanik 1

"Signals Are Assistants," V. Makarov.....10

"Making Maximum Use of Simulators," R. Mekhov...6

"Separated From the Unit," N. Oleksenko.....7

"Inspection and Maintenance Work on the New
Aviation Equipment," Yu. Rozhkov.....5

"Flight Beneath the Sea," M. Smoligovets.....4

"Using electronic computers," L. Tishchenko 1

Combat Training

"Including Combined-arms Training," A. Agafonov....3

"The Missileman's Responsibility," R. Akchurin.....11

"Time to Act," V. Andreyev 8

"On the Takeoff," A. Andreytsov and A. Strelnikov .11

"Aerial Combat Tactics," O. Anisimov 10

"The Surprise Inspection Revealed...," S. Antipin 9

"The Criterion of Efficiency—the End Result," V.
Arkhipov.....10

"It Is for the Youth to Continue the Traditions," F.
Bashkirov.....8

"Fire Interaction Among Battalions," V. Bogatyuk.....5

"Evaluations Vary," Ye.Bondarev.....6

"The Priority of Combat Training," A. Bizhev 1

"The Effectiveness of the Tactical Air Exercise,"
A. Budnikov 1

"The Agency of Combat Command and Control—
the Command Post," I. Vislous.....6

"A False Target on the Screen," V. Goryachkin.....12

"Organizing a Drill for Weapon Operators," I.
Grabovoy.....6

"The Best Weapon Operator," M. Daniels 4

"On the Path of Maturation," A. Dvinyaninov.....5

"Flight Critique in a Flight," V. Dekker 3

"Mastering Formation Flying in the Stratosphere,"
S. Dmitriyev 12

"The Battalion's Readiness for a March," G. Dobrov.4

"The Instructiveness of a Tactical Exercise," M.
Dobush 11

"The Commander's Shoulder," V. Zdanyuk.....1

"Circumspection in Flight," A. Ilyasov.....11

"The Interception Controller in Extreme Situations,"
O. Kalinin.....12

"For the Drills, Combat Intensity," S. Kalmykov.....1

"What the Excellent-rated Should Be," I. Kuleshov.....7

"At Night in Difficult Weather," V. Larkov.....1

"Using Reference Signals," N. Litvinchuk.....9

"Enhancing the Effectiveness of Flight Training," N.
Litvinchuk 12

"The Visual Observation Post," I. Lymar	8
"Reliably Guard the Homeland's Sky"	2
"The Brief Tactical Exercise in the Battalion," N. Nikolaychuk	9
"When it Is a Multiple Target at Low Altitude," N. Nikonenko	6
"The Evaluation Must Be Specific," N. Petrov	7
"Attention: 'False Target!'" V. Popov	3
"The Commander Gave the Order," N. Poroskov	1
"Why it Is Noisy on the Air," N. Poroskov	11
"A Section Functions in the Unit...," S. Redzinya	5
"With a Landing at a Different Airfield," V. Rybkin ..	5
"Intercept Using an Automatic Control System," V. Rybchak	7
"The Ability to Direct," G. Ryabokon	4
"Using Rigid Criteria," G. Ryabokon	9
"For Combat, for Victory," V. Samsonov	5
"The Methods Council in Search," V. Sviridov	6
"Planning the Officer Training in the Unit," V. Sedelnikov	10
"Whom to Entrust as OIC of the Command and Control Post," E. Semyanov	3
"According to the New Regulations," G. Serov	7
"In a 'Contaminated' Area," V. Sizov	8
"For Air Traffic Control—Good Quality," A. Sobolev ..	1
"The Training of Young Air Crewmen" I. Tarasov	6
"Independent Quest," I. Tarasov	9
"Inspection—as Though at the Front: Methods, Quality of Execution," I. Tashkinov	3
"The Main Criterion Is Quality," I. Teterev	12
"The Weapon Operator Makes the Decision," K. Timonov	8
"On the Efficient Distribution of Official Duties," Yu. Fadeyev	4
"Somewhere in the Far East," V. Khabarov	4

"A High Rating: What About the Skill?" V. Chagovets ..	7
"The Test of the Range," A. Shashkov	8
"The Mark of a Leader," A. Shashkov	10
"Overcoming the Height," A. Shashkov	12

For flight Safety

"The Ground and the Sky of Colonel Kuzminov," A. Andreyev	12
"The Forgotten Element," A. Andryushkov	8
"The Pilot in the Trainer," A. Govorunov	4
"The Boundaries of Complex Relations," V. Dikumar ..	5
"An Inspector Pilot Visited the Unit," V. Chebanenko	10

Antiaircraft Combat: Problems and Opinions

"What Is New in Information Support for the Air Defense Forces," N. Boki and K. Stolbov	3
"On a Unified Approach For Defining the Combat Capabilities of the Forces," G. Gerasimov and A. Silkin	3
"Selecting Positions for Low-altitude Radar Equipment," F. Kolomojets	9
"Two-way Modeling of Aerial Combat With Electronic Computers," N. Mazurenko	11
"Modern Weapons and Tactics," F. Neupokoyev and A. Pushik	1
"Assessing the Air Situation," F. Neupokoyev	5
"The Criteria of Effectiveness for a Radiotechnical Grouping," L. Oleynikov	7
"Comprehensive Power Simulator," I. Zhelezkov	12
"Athletes of the Air Defense Forces: World Record Holders," V. Malanin	9
"Among the Winners of the All-Army Competitions," V. Romanov	9
"Virtuosos on Ice," A. Shelukhin	10

Party-Political Work

"Responsibility Is Confirmed With Deeds," Yu. Barinov	4
---	---

"Changes—in Your Hands," D. Belokopytov and V. Ishchenko.....	8
"In an Atmosphere of Openness," A. Berezin	7
"Shakey Authority," V. Borovyak	6
"Learn Democracy," V. Burulev	7
"What We Shall Take With Us on the Road," M. Grishchishin	10
"One of the Brothers," N. Gutaulyak	9
"Your Duty, Komsomol Member," V. Dvurechenskikh.....	5
"In Creative Search," O. Zolotarev.....	11
"The Beginning of Service as an Officer," A. Ivanenko.....	9
"Increase Demandingness, Develop Democracy," P. Kovalev	10
"At the Crucial Stage," V. Kuzmichev	3
"The Propagandist, Key figure in the Ideological Process," A. Maksimenko	5
"No Higher Duty," N. Moshkin.....	3
"Fill the Words With Deeds," N. Moshkin	7
"The Authority of the Conscience," N. Moshkin	12
"A Matter For Every Day," A. Panarin.....	9
"He Not Only Can; It Is His Duty," S. Poltorak.....	11
"Considering the Opinion of the Communists," V. Polyakov	4
"Begin With the Komsomol," S. Takyuvos	6
"We Are Developing Reliable Sentries of the Homeland's Sky," A. Usoltsev	4
"Closely Linked to Life," V. Fomichev	7
"Establish Glasnost in the Party Work," A. Chayka.....	1

Reports And Elections in the Party Organizations

"The Vanguard's Role Is Expressed in Deeds,"	11
"The Rule For Every Day," V. Bogdanov	11
"Orientation Toward Deeds," A. Dvinyanikov.....	10
"On the March of the Restructuring," V. Chernykh	1

To Assist the Propagandist

"The Armed Defense of Socialism: a Historical Necessity," V. Vovk.....	9
"The CPSU's Technical Military Policy," A. Kiselev.....	12
"Combining Public and Personal Interests," V. Klimov	10
"Radical Economic Reform: Concepts, Categories, Laws," V. Chibisov	7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

Equipment and Weapon Maintenance

"Occupation—Military Fire Fighter," A. Bogdanov	4
"We Publicize Technical Knowledge," G. Butmalay ..	12
"Faster and Without Mistakes".....	3
"With the Help of Computers," V. Vasilenko.....	3
"The Computer Helps the Commander," V. Vasilenko.....	7
"Prevention of Preconditions: the Quality of the Analysis," I. Dzekalo	10
"Motor Vehicle Service: the Organizational Aspect," Yu. Izotikov	8
"Various Opinions and the Technology of Command and Control," Yu. Izotikov	12
"Causes of a Personal Nature," Ye. Kirichenko.....	7
"An Old Dilemma and a New Problem," V. Kishkurno.....	8
"How Many Spare Parts Should We Have?" V. Kozlov.....	9
"Calculating Reliability During Maintenance," V. Kozlov	11
"For the Daily Servicing—Good Quality," L. Kulitskiy	10
"Troublesome 'Trifles,'" L. Kulitskiy	5
"Through Spatial Signal Selection," Yu. Losev, A. Popov and A. Chertousov.....	11
"Special Equipment in Repair," V. Malikov and V. Mokryshev	4
"Dyanmic Rotor Balancing With Elektronika Micro-computers," A. Manshilin and N. Semirov	9
"Training Rigging Specialists," A. Melyantsov.....	5
"Seek New Approaches," G. Novikov	7

"Technical March Support," N. Penzin.....	6
"Find the Vital Element in the Matter," A. Plotnikov.....	8
"Power Electronics Semiconductor Instruments".....	3
"The Technological Schedule Sets the Pace," P. Samuelson.....	12
"For Centrifugal Babbitting of Bearings," V. Semenov.....	11
"With the Help of Microcalculators," V. Sitnikov.....	8
"No Task More Important," A. Strelnikov.....	8
"A Nonstandard situation," Ye. Suslov.....	4
"Checking Fuel Quality," D. Fedorov.....	6
"The Group Became an Excellent One," V. Cherepkovskiy.....	5
"Organizational Repair of Aviation Equipment," A. Yurchenko and N. Semenikhin.....	1
"Recommended for Adoption".....	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
"Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR: a Time For Radical Change".....	4

Military Educational Institutions

"Individual Work in the Lower Classes," V. Andreyev.....	7
"The Computer and Training Quality," I. Begmat.....	7
"The Department's Indoctrinational Work: Restructuring Experience," S. Belkovskiy.....	6
"Computers: on the Path of Adoption," V. Boyko and V. Mazhnikov.....	11
"Control of Cognitive Activity," V. Vorona.....	1
"The Effectiveness of the Training Work," V. Gane.....	7
"Protect the Honor From Youth on," B. Deganov.....	9
"Using Active Training Techniques," A. Dilanyan and G. Lozhkin.....	5
"Measuring Equipment: Phased Training," A. Klimantavichus.....	1
"We Are Instilling Commander Skills," G. Korneyev.....	4
"Tactical Training of Cadets in Lower Classes," M. Kripinevich.....	10

"Not Just an Engineer, but also an Indoctrinator," A. Kuzmin.....	3
"Using the Methods of an Innovative Teacher," V. Kurin.....	8
"On the Path to Science," S. Kurnosenko.....	6
"Choosing the Vocation of a Military Engineer," A. Kucharov.....	11
"Radioelectronics: the Specific Features of Studying Circuits," A. Kushch and A. Korolkov.....	4
"Dialog Training Programs," A. Mogolin.....	11
"Is an Exam Necessary?".....	6
"On the Path of Intensifying the Restructuring," A. Polyakov.....	8
"Shape Your Own Self," A. Polyakov.....	12
"Don't Lose the Thirst for Knowledge," S. Poperechnyy.....	5
"With a Specific Example," V. Poryvkin.....	5
"Officers' School: Problems and Opinions," V. Poryvkin.....	10
"For the Weapon Operator's Skill," S. Potitov.....	12
"An Adaptive Program for Training Operators," V. Pudovkin.....	12
"The Seminar—With the Game Method," V. Rubtsov.....	8
"The Military Science Conference," Ryabokon.....	6
"Computerizing the Training Process," G. Svechnikov.....	4
"We Have a Target!" V. Sviridenko.....	3
"Assessing the Laboratory Class," S. Sekatskaya.....	1
"On the Work of Groups of the Military Scientific Student Society," I. Seliverstov.....	1
"The Demonstration Room of the Physics Department," A. Chervova.....	3
"The Cadets Have Laboratory Work," P. Shumskiy.....	4
"An Exam Is Not a Lottery".....	7
"Occupational Selection at the School," I. Yakovlevich.....	9
"Toward Greater Independence," V. Yanush and I. Bursov.....	10

Tomorrow, Into the Officer Ranks

"The Effectiveness of OJT," S. Voynov.....	1
"The Course of the Day-off," A. Golovchenko and M. Rudenko	6
"Is He Prepared to Serve in the Forces?" A. Gumenskiy	10
"A Year Later," Yu. Danik	11
"Looking the Truth in the Eyes," A. Danilin	9
"To the Call of the Heart," A. Kurbashnov	12
"Your Position," A. Lapkin.....	5
"With Your Personal Example," O. Morozov	7
"Following the Paths of Fathers and Grandfathers," A. Petrovich	4
"What Makes the Training Group Strong?" A. Poplevko.....	3
"The Problems Remain...," A. Poplevko.....	11
"Improve the Work of the Scientific Groups"	8

Pedagogics and Psychology

"Reconstructing' Character," V. Vdovyuk and V. Gerasimov	6
"A Small Group, Big Concerns," V. Davydov	4
"The Commander's Personal Example," E. Utlik	10
"The Study and Development of Character," N. Fedenko	12

In the World of Science and Technology

"Artificial Intelligence: Problems and Prospects," B. Gerasimov.....	1
"Expert Systems: Principles For Setting Them up and Their Area of Application," B. Gerasimov.....	5
"The Operating Principle of the Radar Station of the Antiaircraft System," N. Kutyyev	3
"Prospects for the Development of Air-defense Radar," S. Leonov	9
"Aerospace Craft—Equipment of the Future," B. Skrebushevskiyh	11
"In the Higher Latitudes," S. Yakubovskiy and S. Leonov	7

The Economics of Unit Administration and Support

"Diligence in the Large and the Small," V. Amirov.....	1
"Our Health," Yu. Dmitriyev	9
"The Proprietary Eye of the Patrol," A. Kabanov	8
"The Military Trade System is 70 Years Old," Yu. Kamdin.....	11
"A 'Peaceful' Position," V. Kokhtachev	6
"From the Restructuring Position," V. Martynenko	7
"Be Active and Vigilant," V. Martynov.....	10
"Every Unit Has Reserves," G. Pirkov.....	5
"Financial Matters," V. Romanyuk	12
"Problems of the Motor Vehicle Specialist," A. Rybchinskiy	9
"In the Interest of the Consumers," N. Sadovnik	7
"Reserves of the Food Service," N. Telyanov	3
"Preserve What Has Been Prepared," N. Telyanov	9
"In a Spirit of Thrift," V. Yalinich	4

Our Consultations

"Certain Questions of Compressor Station Maintenance," L. Zakrevskiy	6
"Vitamins," M. Ignatyev	4
"Diagnostics and Repair," I. Romanovskiy and P. Rybak.....	12
"Repair of Parts With the Build-up Method," N. Smetannikov.....	10
"Repair of Power Cylinders: the Sealing," A. Teslev and V. Pleshakov	7

Culture, Daily Life, the Family

"Wait a Moment...," T. Bunto	10
"Esthetic Development of Cadets," V. Vakolyuk and Ye. Pozdnyshev	8
"Concern for the People at the Fore," V. Voronin	6
"Within the Framework of the Festival," Ye. Gorenkov	3
"Stage Buffs," Ye. Kuderkina.....	12

"In Friendship With a song," T. Turovets.....5

Sobriety, the Norm of Life

"See Everyone, Influence Each," L. Verbitskiy 11

"Know How to Prevent Trouble," N. Moshkin.....5

"Able to Lift Himself up," N. Nikolayev.....3

"Prevention Is the Main Thing," I. Petrishchenko.....1

"On the Path of Change," M. Smyslov.....9

"Belated Insight," A. Shashkov 7

History and Traditions of the Air Defense Forces

"Artillery Supply Agencies of the Air Defense Forces During the War," A. Artamonov and A. Kavun 12

"Members of the Military Science Society Fought," Yu. Banko.....4

"The City and the Station Under Its Wing," V. Bashkurov.....6

"May the Memory Be Preserved in the Heart," V. Beydin.....5

"They Loved to Fly," V. Biryukov.....12

"Landmarks on a Glorious Path" 7

"Interacting in Combat," P. Grekhnev 11

"Television in... Blockaded Leningrad," N. Zavgorodnev.....4

"From a Photographic Chronicle of the Air Defense Forces" 1, 2, 7

"Above the October Railway," I. Inozemtsev.....1

"The State Defense Committee: Reorganizing the Air Defense Forces During the War," N. Komarov 9

"The Anniversary of the Museum of the Air Defense Forces," A. Nikonov 4

"A Battery Volley," V. Saltanovskiy 6

"Anxious," V. Samsonov 8

"At the Origins of the Air Defense Forces," Ye. Timofeyev.....7

"Antiaircraft Gunner Mayboroda," N. Tyurin 5

"In the Same Ranks With the Heros," A. Khorobrykh.3

"Meetings With Katrich," N. Shtuchkin.....10

"Dash Toward the Fire," N. Shtuchkin 7

"The Valorous Heart of the Falcon," K. Yakovlev 5

The Word of a Veteran

"At Any Cost," A. Artemov 10

"Persistence," V. Burov 6

"Protecting Kiev," G. Danilov.....4

"Ingenuity Helped," F. Kolesnikov.....9

"Be Proud of Your Occupation," B. Mikhaylov.....6

"Reconnaissance Flight," N. Shtuchkin.....5

"Thank You, Beloved Son!" N. Shtuchkin 1

"Four Meetings," N. Shtuchkin.....12

"A History of the Aviation in Badges," I. Vilchur" 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11

On the Fronts of the Ideological Struggle

"On Certain Stereotypes of 'Psychological Warfare,'" V. Ambarov 4

"Myths and Conjectures," V. Gobarev 8

"Arguments' of the Falsifiers," V. Larin.....2

"Don't Defend, Attack," S. Lysenko.....4

"There Should Be no Compromise," V. Podlubnyy...11

"Aggressive Manifestations of Materialism," A. Shakhov 3

8 March Is International Woman's Day

"Voluntarily Recognized," R. Bobkov 3

"Our Concern Is Bringing up the Children," T. Dormidontova 3

"The Order of Valeriya Khomyakova," D. Chenakal ..3

"Honor For Labor," A. Shashkov 3

5 May Is Press Day

"Protecting the Leningrad Sky," L. Kocherga 5

25 July is Inventor and Rationalizer Day

"The Enthusiast," A. Zotov 6

31 July is USSR Navy Day

"Photographic Coverage" 7

21 August Is USSR Air Force Day

"In the Stratosphere," V. Leontyev.....8

On USSR Constitution Day

"Patriots and Internationalists," G. Ryabokon 10

In the Foreign Armies

"Non-reuseable Dropped Jamming Transmitters,"
Ye. Klimovich 5

"Dirigibles in the Formation," Ye. Klimovich 8

"Unmanned Aircraft in NATO Plans," A.
Manachinskiy 1

"Detecting Low-Flying Targets," A. Manachinskiy
and V. Chumak 10

"Cruise Missiles and Combatting Them," A. Man-
achinskiy and V. Chumak.....12

"Aerospace Plan: Reality and Prospects," V.
Nazarenko 4

"Combat Employment of the ADATS System,"
Yu. Radkovets.....11

"Preparing Digital Maps for the U.S. Aerospace
Attack Forces," V. Simonov 3

"Combat Stress," V. Simonov 7

"Combat Training in the U.S. Strategic Air Com-
mand," A. Tarnovskiy 9

"On the Element of Surprise in Military Operations,"
M. Shelekhov and A. Pavlov 6

Foreign Military Technology

"The American F-15E 'Eagle' Fighter" 6

"The Shipboard 'Sadral' Antiaircraft Missile System".5

"The MX Rail-based ICBM" 8

"The AGM-136A Air-launched Cruise Missile" 12

"The E-2C 'Hawkeye' Long-range Radar Spotting
and Guidance Aircraft" 4

"The K. Mk1 'Tristar' Tanker" 7

"The FB-111A Strategic Bomber," 9

"The 2000 N 'Mirage' Tactical Fighter" 3

"The French 530D 'Super' Cruise Missile" 11

"The AS-30L Air-to-ground Guided Missile" 1

Criticism and Bibliography

"A Time of Development," V. Beydin.....1

"On the Courage of the Air Defense Fightingmen,"
M. Bolshakov 11

"Protecting the Volga Region," I. Korbach 8

"The Armed Forces of the USSR Since the War,"
V. Lavrentyev.....2

"Loyal Sons of the Homeland," V. Lavrentyev 10

"Cruel Experience," A. Sinnikov.....12

"Aircraft Armament," A. Strelnikov 6

New Books 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11

Press Survey

"The Guideline—Parameters of Quality".....12

"The Magazine *Morskoy Sbornik* is 140 Years Old,"
G. Shestakov 3

"Gaining Height," V. Obukhov.....8

Literary Pages

"The Last Sortie," A. Volf 8, 9, 10

"We Do Not Have the Right to Let Them Down,"
Yu. Kirillov 2

"And it Snows....," N. Poroskov 12

"Higher Than the Very Clouds," M. Ryabykh 6

"Arise Early," K. Yakovlev 1

"Dear Readers!" V. Chichev 12

Reports

"The Veteran Received the Report," A. Agafonov 5

"The Commander's Reliable Assistant," V. Alieyv 12

"The Literary Association Is at Work," A. Alimkulov.10

"Contrasts," V. Andreyev 5

"A Meeting With Veterans," A. Belov 2

"The Guardsmen Distinguished Themselves at the Range," A. Bizhev	11
"The Flight Commander Attacks," V. Blagonravov.....	7
"They Demonstrated Courage and Initiative," V. Blagonravov.....	10
"Dedicated to the Anniversary of the Komsomol," V. Borshchov	10
"Evening of Questions and Answers," I. Vdovichenko.....	1
"Good Fruits of the Restructuring," L. Verbitskiy.....	10
"With a Knowledge of the Job," A. Viktorov.....	2
"Serves as an Example," G. Gaydukevich	5
"I Am Proud of My Commander," A. Govorunov	6
"Always High Up," A. Goncharov.....	6
"In the School Museum," N. Grevnev.....	2
"The Russian Song Enchants," N. Grevenev	3
"To Loyalty to the Homeland," V. Gubernatorov	11
"Recommendations Based on Analysis," G. Druzhinin.....	2
"Gaining Altitude," G. Druzhinin	4
"The Duty of Those Out Front," G. Druzhinin	4
"In the Main Direction," G. Druzhinin.....	5
"Afghan Awards for the Fightingmen/Internationalists,"	7
"Using the Methods"	9
"The Antiaircraft Gunners Met," F. Kolesnikov	12
"Scientific Methods Conference," A. Korolko.....	5
"Prepared for a Feat," V. Maksyutenko	6
"An Unforgettable Meeting," I. Martynyuk.....	5
"In a Nonstandard Situation," O. Milchakov.....	6
"A Meeting of the Party Aktiv," V. Mikhachenko.....	8
"An Assembly of Komsomol Workers," N. Moshkin.....	4
"Awards for Military Athletes"	8
"A Scientific-Technical Conference"	12

"Our Guests Are Military Journalists From Fraternal Bulgaria"	2
"The Way it Was' Is Not Suitable"	11
"Individualizing the Training," T. Nechayeva and A. Shlyakhova	9
"An 'Oscar' for Our Army Man"	1
"Surveying the Cadets," L. Okhtileva and N. Nedbayev.....	11
"For the Officer Training," V. Pokrovskiy	2
"Not a Single Precondition"	12
"By Stringent Criteria"	2
"The Cadets Have a Tactical Military Game," A. Uzhanov	3
"Continuing the Traditions," V. Khabarov	1
"The Job Fears the Master," V. Kharaberyush	2
"Ask and We Shall Answer," V. Chertkov	8
"Readers' Conference"	10
"Under the Leadership of Scientists," N. Shershnev	2
"Sponsors of a Children's Home"	9
"Follow-up on Our Articles"	3, 4, 5

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Moscow Air Defense District; 2-Day Gathering for Civilian Journalists

18010401 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Feb 89 pp 1, 12

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent V. Yanelis report: "23 February—Soviet Army and Navy Day; It All Starts on the Ground"; first two paragraphs are LITERATURNAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] It is our tradition to honor soldiers on this day: those who bore arms to defend our Motherland from enemies in the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War; those who fulfilled their international duty by protecting the Afghan revolution.

We are giving veterans due credit by informing the readers about how the country's modern air defense soldiers carry out their duties.

The military is becoming more communicative. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Army and the people are truly united only when the people know what the Army is doing, on what it spends the people's money, how it is supported, and the interests and concerns it has. For many years we too often accepted the statement that "our armor is strong and our tanks are fast." Now we seem to be discovering Army realities for the first time.

An act of trust the Army holds for the press was an invitation extended journalists to a two-day "muster" organized by the Moscow District Air Defense command. One can correctly suspect that the PVO [Air Defense System] still feels guilty about the incident of 28 May 1987, when amateur pilot Rust of the FRG slipped through the PVO in his sports airplane to land near the Kremlin. Journalists were given the opportunity of seeing for themselves that something has been accomplished in the somewhat more than 18 months that have passed since that sad day, in that the new command authorities have drawn the necessary conclusions. The system guarding the aerial borders of the Moscow zone has been improved and rendered more reliable; combat subunit commanders now enjoy greater responsibility and freedom. About this we had heard. But what did we see?

We saw an airfield where a fighter-interceptor regiment is based. On this clear, sunny day, MiGs kept taking to the sky two at a time at intervals close to that of metro trains. Somewhere in the distance, beyond the limits of visibility, there were aerial combats that we could follow by watching the movements of glowing dots on radar screens.

"This is an average workday," commented Major General of Aviation O. Anisimov, the district PVO air chief. "Not one ounce of window dressing. Nevertheless, we still fly too little; limited resources and other factors are hindering professional training of our pilots. Over a year's time they fly only a half or a third as much as, say, American pilots. We are trying to overcome this shortcoming. We are exerting efforts to become skillful at flying at low and extremely low altitudes—something we did not previously encourage due to the high risk. However, we must learn how to do this, since assumed targets fly at extremely low altitudes."

In the unit there are a club and several stores offering very modest selections of goods. The salary of young officers is quite small, if one takes into account the rate of inflation. Also not in their favor is the fact that their wives often do not work. In addition, in officers' families—even young ones—there always are children. As a comparison, a dump truck operator working in the neighboring enterprise earns half again as much. On top of that, the truck driver does not experience seven Gs of loading and does not risk his life every day. I say this only on the basis of social justice. For if society considers

it necessary to maintain a modern and powerful army, it must pay the servicemen for their work in relation to its social significance, labor input, and degree of risk.

The following day we visited a surface-to-air missile unit. We were warned that we could photograph only that which is permitted. (I do suspect that everything has been photographed from space.) We were told that no journalists had set foot upon the area.

We saw white, pure snow. A concrete runway with a brick extension. A virgin forest. Quietness prevailed. There were humps of command posts, palms of powerful radars, positions concealed by ramparts, and missiles. Missile launch is controlled at the command post. In the event a command post is knocked out, the missiles are launched directly at the launch positions.

A command post is similar to an island in the sea. It is stocked with water, food rations, radioactivity decontamination equipment, and diesel-powered generators—in a word, it can exist self-sufficiently many days if necessary. We saw a long, narrow corridor and small room compartments and felt the heat emanating from electronic devices that occupied much of the space. Computers take on the task of working out all target parameters and, in a word, serve the targets on a silver platter. It seems that there is little for humans to do—simply select the target sought and press the button. There is no problem when there are two, three, or even ten targets. But what about 30? Some of them could be false or extraneous indications, but the most dangerous one could give just the faintest echo on the screen! In general, that is the main difficulty.

Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Arsenyev said: "You still do not leave when you come off duty. You must make sure that the platoon has completed all the tasks called for in the daily routine, check the equipment, etc. Toward evening you go home and fall into bed. Come morning, again duty. You saw for yourself what is involved—a crowded, enclosed place; constantly keeping your eyes on the devices; one situation after another. All the time you are worried: God forbid that an error should occur. Even when you are free for several hours, you do not leave the unit, since something may come up all of a sudden."

At the time of the breakthrough of the "Pine," the conclusions that were made immediately afterward affected the highest strata of armed forces leadership and produced the effect of a cold shower. Following was a reevaluation of the equipment, facilities, and structure of the air defense system, and more.

However, as is often the case with us, people were left in second place. Officers and enlisted personnel manning radars and surface-to-air missile sites require better conditions, particularly housing. That fact also was not kept from us. In addition, all is not well concerning the daily tours of duty.

One of the officers (who requested that his name not be mentioned) said that a large number of personnel has been loaned out to perform unimportant work. One of them is playing soccer somewhere on the Army team; two others have been detailed to fill minor clerical staff positions; one is raising pigs on the unit's subsidiary farm. (The unit has plans for the pigs after they are fattened.) Nevertheless, the crew is supposed to function as if it were operating at full strength.

Perhaps in the two days we saw and heard somewhat more than our hosts had intended. I believe that they will not hold that against us. Be that as it may, I recalled a simple truth: If we want our sky to be free of gaps through which another "adventurous peacemaker" could slip, we must realize that everything starts on the ground: extremely fast fighters and high-velocity missiles; morality and irresponsibility; cowardice and courage; proficiency and amateurism. Sooner or later these qualities show up in the sky and cause us to experience feelings either of pride or insult to our national dignity.

In the evening of the second day, as the visit was coming to a close, we met with Colonel General of Aviation

Vladimir Georgiyevich Tsarkov, commander of the Moscow District PVO. He stressed that the district troops are guarding the air space over an area in which there are 50 million inhabitants. Hundreds of aircraft are flying at any one time. Under these conditions, it is no easy task to keep the sky under lock and key, so to speak. But it must be done. This is the reason for the PVO's existence.

In general, these two days yielded a fairly informative discussion. That should be the case more often. It is well that the visit took place on the eve of the military holiday, since everyday matters should be discussed even on holidays.

P.S. According to information furnished the editors by informed sources, on 28 May 1988 (the anniversary of Rust's flight) three light aircraft attempted to repeat the West German amateur pilot's experiment. None were able to penetrate the USSR air space. LITERATUR-NAYA GAZETA will attempt to provide additional coverage at a later date.

Ministry of Defense Statement on Submarine Sinking

18010623 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed statement entitled: "From the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy".]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy report that on 7 April a fire broke out on a nuclear-powered torpedo submarine, located in neutral waters in the Norwegian Sea. The submarine was raised to the surface. The crew conducted a courageous battle for the survival of the ship for more than five hours. However, the measures taken by the crew did not succeed. The submarine sank in an area to the south-west of Bear Island at a depth of 1,500 meters. There were human losses.

With a feeling of sorrow the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy express deep condolences to the family and friends of the deceased. The bright memory of these true sons of the Fatherland will be preserved forever in the hearts of the soldiers of the Army and Navy and of all Soviet people.

More Details on Efforts to Save Submarine

18010567 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank P. Ishchenko, correspondent: "Without Soiling Military Honor"]

[Text] A mournful list, 42 names, 42 destinies cut off as a result of an accident and the demise of an atomic submarine. What sort of people were these military seamen, how did they behave in this hour of trial?

Eighteen officers, 12 warrant officers and 12 seamen died. The bodies of 19 were delivered to Severomorsk aboard the atomic missile cruiser "Kirov": Warrant Officer 1st Rank T. Burkulakov, captains 2d rank O. Avanesov and V. Babenko, Captain 3d Rank S. Malyakin, captain lieutenants N. Volkov, S. Nezhtin and M. Smirnov, Senior Lieutenant S. Markov, lieutenants I. Molchanov and A. Shostak, warrant officers Yu. Brodovskiy, M. Yelenik, S. Zamogilnyy, S. Nakhalov and S. Chernikov, Petty Officer 2d Class S. Golovchenko, seamen A. Grundul, V. Kulapin and R. Filippov. The rest—8 officers, 7 warrant officers and 8 seamen—either perished together with the ship or drowned after the submarine's demise.

Those who died kept their honor clean before the motherland, before the military oath. Even though water is everywhere, there is nothing more terrifying aboard ship than a fire. And especially aboard a submarine. The first losses aboard the stricken atomic submarine occurred while fighting the fire. The first among the first was,

from all appearances, Senior Seaman Nadarm Bukhnikhashvili—a damage control mechanic who was in compartment No 7 at the time of the fire.

Warrant Officer V. Kolotilin, who was the duty officer for the aft compartments, died in compartment No 6. He was the one who activated the special firefighting system. The warrant officer managed to report that fluid leaks from the hydraulic system had appeared in compartment No 6. But he did not have enough time to communicate that a fire had started in this compartment.

Captain 3d Rank A. Ispenkov, who managed to start up the diesel generator, fought for the ship's survival to the end. Although he was notified to abandon ship several times, he never did respond....

The situation grew more and more complex. The fire made its way to the pumping station in compartment No 4. Naturally the pump had to be shut down. This meant cessation of the circulation of water from the reactor through the steam generators. Then followed another alarming report: The submarine's movement control panel had caught fire. This was now compartment No 3. It was in this swift and irreversible way that the events developed toward their tragic end. Especially in the compartments that had to be sealed off.

At the time of the fire the reactor's automatic safety system was activated as required. After that, everything was decided by the clear, competent actions taken by Igor Orlov. He lowered the shim rods all the way in order to seal off the reactor completely. Despite the emergency, all of the pumps used to cool the reactor core worked trouble-free. Captain Lieutenant Orlov survived. He was able to abandon ship literally a few minutes before it went down. While at the central post he was able to check the instruments, which showed that the reactor had cooled down. The reactor is designed in such a way that there is no danger of its disintegration even at the depth at which the sunken vessel is now located.

The crew fought for the vessel's survival in the most difficult conditions. There were explosions in the compartments in which the fire was raging. It may be assumed that these were the regeneration tanks [banki regeneratsii] blowing up. Cables passing through the hull melted down, meaning that water could enter through the holes. Cracks may also have appeared owing to the sharp temperature difference and the explosions. Nonetheless the crew did not abandon ship until the submarine began turning over. The seamen plunged into the cold, stormy sea.

Crewmembers remained alive inside the submarine until the very last moment. Including ship commander Captain 1st Rank Ye. Vakin, who returned inside the pressure hull to check once again if everyone had abandoned ship. And he did find some people inside who had been unable to make their way topside for various reasons. These were Captain 3d Rank V. Yudin and warrant

officers A. Krasnobayev, S. Chernikov and V. Slyusarenko. It was not until the submarine had descended to considerable depth that they and the commander attempted to use the rescue craft carried aboard the submarine. Only one was able to save himself in this way—Warrant Officer Slyusarenko, who later described the last minutes of the life of his comrades.

It was after the submarine settled to the bottom that Captain 3d Rank Yu. Maksimchuk, the submarine's deputy commander for political affairs, lost his grip on the rescue raft. "He sank before my eyes," Captain 1st Rank B. Kolyada recalled bitterly. "But no one could help him. Anyone who let go of the raft sank immediately."

Even on the raft, hypothermia took the lives of the submariners. Such was the death of Captain 1st Rank T. Burkulanov, chief of the division's political section, who came along for the ride. Himself exhausted by the evacuation, Burkulanov was able to help Captain 1st Rank Kollde onto the raft, thus saving his life.

As had been reported earlier by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, three of the rescued died from hypothermia aboard the submarine tender "Aleksey Khlobystov." These were Captain Lieutenant S. Nezhutin, Lieutenant I. Molchanov and Seaman A. Grundul.

They say that fate can't be deceived. But Seaman A. Korytov did just that. The casualty list I saw at the headquarters of the Northern Fleet on 8 April initially contained 43 names, including Korytov's. But later on it was verified by the submarine tender that Korytov was alive. The list decreased by one person.

I am writing about the circumstances of the deaths of far from all of the submariners. Much is still being verified and checked. But it is already completely clear that they all died honorably, like real men, without soiling military honor. There was no cowardice or panic. It was a battle, a hard battle for the life of the ship and the crew, which ended in the demise of body but not of spirit. Not of steadfastness and courage. Incidentally, the submarine was awarded the "Komsomol Member" title just before leaving for the sea.

Yesterday I described the concern that has been shown for the rescued members of the crew of the sunken submarine. I would also like to say something about how the people have responded to the anguish of the families of the deceased submariners. Voluntary contributions of money and of assistance to these families arose spontaneously in the Northern Fleet. A bank account was opened in the submariners' garrison for the money. I saw a list of the casualties indicating their family status. Many of the notations were similar: "Wife, two children," "Wife, two children".... Meaning that the rubles donated by seamen, warrant officers and officers as a supplement to that which will be paid by the state will not go wasted.

Even today there is a song being sung in the Northern Fleet that was written by the seamen themselves after another submarine accident that occurred many years ago, also with human sacrifices. The list of nuclear submarine accidents alone, including the present one, totals four. The song ends with these words: "Our missile fleet, our submarine fleet, our atomic fleet pays honor to its deceased heroes." So will my article.

From the editor. A farewell mourning ceremony for the deceased was held yesterday in the submariners' garrison.

**Lt Gen Zhilnikov Commemorates Missile,
Artillery Troops Day**

18010385 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 11, 1988 pp 6-7

[VOYENNYE ZNANIYA Interview with Lt. Gen. D. Zhilnikov, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Strategic Missile Forces: "RVSN: People and Missiles"]

[Text]

[VZ] Comrade Lieutenant General, the Strategic Missiles Forces are the youngest branch of the Soviet Armed Forces. Please tell us when and why they appeared.

[Zhilnikov] The resolution to create the RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] was adopted in December 1959 (thus next year this branch of the Armed Forces will mark its thirtieth anniversary).

At the end of the Second World War, it became clear that mastery of the internal energy of the atomic nucleus and other innovations in science and technology, which opened up unprecedented prospects for the progress of mankind, would be used by reactionary quarters of imperialism to create weapons of mass destruction. The subsequent course of events confirmed these fears. In the summer of 1945 the U.S. tested the atomic bomb, and in August of that same year American strategic aviation subjected the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to atomic bombardment.

In the winter of 1946, W. Churchill delivered his sadly famous speech in the American city of Fulton, where he called the capitalist world to a 'cold war' against the Soviet Union. In Western countries an arms race unprecedented in history was begun, anti-Soviet military blocs were put together, and military bases were constructed close to our borders.

At the basis of this adventurous policy were dangerous illusions of American and other western leaders, hoping that the Soviet Union, weakened as a result of human and material losses inflicted in the war with fascism, would submit to dictates from across the ocean. The U.S. considered the atomic monopoly the main factor of the power pressure on the USSR.

As early as the end of 1945, American militarists had developed a plan for a surprise nuclear attack on our country. At the time plans were to drop atomic bombs on 20 Soviet cities. A plan approved by President H. Truman in 1948 set the time for the start of the aggression, before 1 April 1949.

In this complex and tense international situation, the Soviet country and its people were faced with the task of creating, in a very short time, their own nuclear weapons and modern means of delivering nuclear munitions to the target. While setting out to resolve this problem, the

USSR did not abate the struggle to limit the arms race. In 1945 it was the first to propose destroying nuclear weapons, and submitted a draft of the relevant convention in the U.N. However the Soviet initiatives were rejected by Washington and its allies.

Remember, a group of most experienced physicists, headed by Academician I. Kurchatov, were working to implement the uranium program. In December 1946 a Soviet atomic reactor was activated. Less than a year later the announcement came that the atomic bomb was no longer a secret to our country. In August 1949, the USSR produced an atomic explosion. This meant the elimination of the American monopoly on nuclear weapons, which had been dangerous to the cause of peace. The means of delivering atomic weapons to the target were developed in parallel. Soviet military-theoretical thought gave preference here to guided ballistic missiles, as was dictated by the specific features of our geography.

This work was carried out by design collectives, the leading among them being KB, which was headed by the outstanding scientist S. Korolev. We relied primarily on the rich experience of national rocket construction. The names of our pioneers in jet propulsion, our creators of missile-space systems are widely known—K. Tsiolkovskiy, F. Tsander, N. Tikhomirov, B. Petropavlovskiy, Yu. Pobedonostsev, M. Tikhonravov, V. Glushko, N. Pimogin, M. Yangel, A. Isayev, G. Babagin.

In July 1946, at a base of one of the Guards Mortar Regiments, the first missile unit was formed. General Major of Artillery A. Tveretskiy became its commander.

On 18 October 1947, the Soviet Union successfully carried out the launch of the first long-range guided missile, and in August 1957, it tested the world's first intercontinental multi-stage ballistic missile.

The development of nuclear missile weapons here, including strategic weapons, radically altered the military-political and strategic situation in the world. The U.S. was deprived of its former geographic inaccessibility and military invulnerability. However, ruling quarters of imperialist states stubbornly continued their adventurous policy "from a position of strength" and "brinkmanship".

By the late 50s and early 60s, the U.S. had a large number of strategic bombers-nuclear platforms at its disposal and had surrounded our country with a network of military bases. Intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered submarines with intermediate-range missiles became part of the armament of the American Air Forces and Navy. Allowing for this, the CC, CPSU and the Soviet government decided it was necessary to set apart the strategic missile weapons in an independent branch of the USSR Armed Forces

[VZ] How did the Missile Forces develop, and what are they like at present?

[Zhilnikov] The tense world situation dictated high rates of development and activation of RVSN installations. This whole process proceeded under the strong leadership of the CC, CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Ministry of Defense. The leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state and prominent military leaders dealt with the questions of forming the Missile Forces. M. Nedelin, K. Moskalenko, S. Biryuzov, N. Krylov, and V. Tolubko were Commanders-In-Chief of this branch of the Armed Forces. In 1985, General of the Army Yu. Maksimov became the Commander-In-Chief of the RVSN.

The entire country and the army and the navy spared no effort to activate the units and subunits of the Strategic Missile Forces in the shortest time periods. The best that our industry could produce was sent there, the most educated, experienced, and most proven service members of other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces and arms of service became missilemen. This process proceeded in an atmosphere of high patriotism. All the soldiers understood the importance of their work to strengthen the security of the Motherland, strove to more quickly master the new combat equipment, and staunchly overcame the inevitable difficulties of development. In the units they fought for the right to be the first to carry out a practice launch, and to assume alert duty. The missilemen of the unit commanded by officer G. Mikheyev won.

Since that long-ago time, for almost three decades, at the precisely designated time, a solemn ritual has been held in the RVSN garrisons, and is concluded by the distinct and strict words of the combat order: "For the defense of our Motherland, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, assume alert duty!" The combat crew members and crews relieve one another, but the will, the thoughts, and the actions of each missileman are subordinate to one thing—that the combat equipment and all the subunits be in continuous combat readiness.

Now the RVSN is equipped with modern missile complexes with maximal automation of all processes of their use and combat application. Modern missile weapons are not only missiles. They are a system of the most complex equipment and instruments supporting launch readiness, in which the highest attainments of science and technology are embodied.

The main means of strategic missile weapons are their enormous destructive might, accuracy in hitting targets, practically unlimited range of action, capacity to deliver strikes simultaneously against many strategic targets, to successfully overcome the countering action of air and ABM defenses, and to perform their assigned tasks in the shortest possible times, the independence of combat application from weather conditions, season, or time of day. All this allows the RVSN to deliver a retaliatory strike on an aggressor under any conditions. The Strategic Missile Forces, together with the strategic forces of

the Navy and Air Forces, comprise the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet State, and are the main factor deterring aggressive aspirations of imperialist reaction.

A special measure of responsibility is the sense of service of strategic missilemen, the romance of their work. Our soldiers take pride in the fact that the Motherland has entrusted them with these most powerful weapons, and strive to justify this lofty trust.

[VZ] Special trust and lofty responsibility must then impose the corresponding demands on the missilemen?

[Zhilnikov] Yes, the missileman must know a lot, know how to do a lot, and possess strong will and excellent physical toughness.

The hard combat and political training, the large volume of work on the most complex equipment, its routine inspection and maintenance, repair, assurance of normal conditions of operation, and much else. The practice launches of missiles is a state examination of combat readiness and maturity. Finally, alert duty, never interrupted for a moment, in underground installations, in complete isolation from the outside world, in a constant state of waiting for the order, and in constant readiness for precise, flawless actions. And doing this day to day, month to month, year to year. Such service is not for the weak in spirit or body. Indeed, there are no weaklings in the Missile Forces. Service in the Strategic Missiles is a heroic deed, the heroism of everyday soldierly labor.

The path of formation of the missileman is one of hard combat training, tactical training sessions under conditions maximally close to combat, for which the units and subunits have created complete training facilities. These are genuine training-laboratory complexes, making it possible to reproduce any situation that the missilemen might encounter in battle. A system of professional selection of specialists has been developed and inaugurated. But the missilemen study not only in the classrooms and in the simulators. The field training and at the launch positions is humming, and its crowning moment is participation in practice missile launches. The tradition here is this—missiles are launched only for marks of "excellent".

In the Missile Forces, as everywhere in the Armed Forces, we are restructuring in all spheres of Army life, overcoming the stagnation phenomena. After the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the situation in the units and subunits is one of increased exactingness and activity of all categories of service members, and the search is under way for reserves for further enhancement of combat readiness.

A special feature of the current stage of life and work of the missilemen is their participation in implementing the Soviet-American Treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles. Our partners from across the ocean have no grievances against us, they note the precise work and the strict execution of treaty clauses.

Incidentally, the question is often asked, what will happen to the cadre service members of the RVSN after the destruction of a whole class of missile weapons. I believe there is no need to worry about their fates. Officer-missilemen and warrant officers are highly trained specialists in all respects. And they can be certain that the knowledge, mastery, and experience of each of them will find due and complete utilization.

[VZ] So, missilemen are educated people, literate, tough... Still, how are missilemen made, where are they trained?

[Zhilnikov] Missile equipment is complex, the service of missilemen is demanding. And in order to be up to these requirements, knowledge is necessary, labor, work for its own sake. Whoever is ready for that, he can become a missileman.

Almost all officers of the RVSN have higher military or special education. Most have graduated from higher military command-engineering schools, where they are given high general education, special, and military training. Information about where these academies are located and how to get into them may be obtained at the military commissariat at one's place of residence.

Warrant officers also have a high level of training. They are educated at special training institutions, and the terms of their admission are also provided at military commissariats.

Soldiers and sergeants must have a general or special intermediate education, and have studied in or graduated from institutions of higher learning. Missilemen are distinguished not only by a high level of training, but also by their conscientious attitude toward their military duty and the exemplary performance of their duties.

Among the troops they know the missile unit commanded by Lt. Col. N. Ulyanov. The initiator of socialist competition with the motto "Selfless military work, exemplary service, and highest discipline—our contribution to the cause of defending the Motherland", this military collective is distinguished by its constant focus on a high ultimate result. For a number of years the soldiers have been winning the title of outstanding unit. This year too they confidently move toward that goal.

Among us the names of DOSAAF alumni PFC A. Khristich, Pvts. A. Limanov and F. Sachanyuk are well known. They all are rated excellent in combat and political training, rated specialists, and always precisely execute their duties. Working under special conditions, they have shown bravery and displayed high proficiency and endurance. The best specialist in the unit is Sgt. V. Lontionov. A thoughtful and demanding commander, he ably trains and indoctrinates his subordinates, and participates actively in public life. Sgt. A. Akhmedzyanov enjoys deserved prestige among his fellow soldiers. The Komsomol leader of the subunit is always in the vanguard in service, in discipline, and in public affairs. Many other such soldiers can be named.

Missile units and subunits have rich combat traditions. Many of them were formed on the basis of units and formations of the Soviet Army that became renowned in battles for the Motherland. One of our units has five combat orders, and has had 45 Heroes of the Soviet Union. Another traces its military affairs back to the Civil War—the renowned cavalry regiment of the First Mounted Army. On the battle streamers, next to awards for exploits on fields of battle there are combat orders for the mastery of equipment and for military successes in peacetime.

Eternally entered on the rolls of missile units are the names of many soldiers who performed deathless exploits in the Great Patriotic War. Among them, the commander of an artillery battalion, Capt. B. Khigrin, self-propelled gunner Sr. Lt. A. Kosmodemyanskiy, a bomber crew consisting of Jr. Lt. I. Chernykh, Lt. S. Kosinov, Sgt. H. Gubin, infantry men Lt. A. Pokalchuk and political officer P. Gutchenko.

The missilemen take pride in their regimental colleagues who have performed exploits in peacetime. Everyone in the units knows the names of Pvt. D. Bushuyev, Lt. V. Basov, warrant officer A. Kalinin, and Sgt. V. Babichev.

The missilemen, as all Soviet soldiers, are devoted to their Motherland and the Communist Party, support and approve of its domestic and foreign policy, constantly improve their military proficiency, and vigilantly guard the great attainments of socialism.

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1989 Training Program Plans 'Significant Reduction' of Training Time

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[Article by Col. Gen. A. Ryakhov, Deputy Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR: "The Principle—Stage-by-Stage. The Responsibility—Personal"]

[Text] The quest for more effective ways to train the populace in civil defense, begun under perestroika, has continued in the past training year. Its diverse forms and methods were prompted by an experiment in independent study of CD subjects by white and blue collar workers and kolkhoz employees carried out in republics, krays, and oblasts.

This question is creatively answered at the Donetsk Machine-Building Plant imeni Lenin's Komsomol of the Ukraine, at the Mozhaysk Printing combine of the Moscow oblast, and at the POs [production associations] "Standart" and "Baltiyskaya Manufaktura" (Tallin).

Selflessness and high professional skills were demonstrated by non-militarized formations participating in the removal of snow drifts in the Crimean and Odessa oblasts, the removal of the consequences of floods in the Azerbaijan SSR, the Krasnodar Kray, and the Chita oblast, of a hurricane in the Turkmen SSR, and of railway accidents, including ones involving potent toxic and explosive materials (cities of Yaroslavl and Arzamas).

Overall one could say that the training plans were accomplished. However the rates of perestroika in training of the populace are slowed by shortcomings, in a number of areas of a chronic, stagnant nature. A significant part of the leadership has still not drawn conclusions from the lessons of Chernobyl. For example, there have been no changes in the Buryat ASSR and the Chita oblast. As before, the basic reason that many CD courses in the Altay Kray failed to accomplish the plan was class absences. In the Voronezh Oblast, the result of the irresponsible attitude of some officials to their duties and their sense of impunity was that the experiment in independent study of the subject was allowed to drift, and essentially failed.

One cannot but be concerned by the fact that a number of ministries and departments are cutting back the CD training of managers and specialists of the domestic economy, and that CD departments are being eliminated in academic institutions for skill enhancement. Unfortunately, it is typical that the leadership and administrative organs recognize the need for perestroika, but nevertheless have not been able to clearly define its main directions and have not marked out a specific program of action as applied to local conditions.

So what will comprise the core of the activity of all CD levels in the coming training year?

First of all, the introduction of a new system of study. On its basis, the level of readiness of the administrative organs, formations, and all the populace for successful execution of protective measures in emergency conditions of peace and war should be truly enhanced. Toward this end, the training organizers are obliged to clarify precisely the requirements for the quality and level of training at the new stage. Each resident will study the methods of defense against natural calamities, accidents, disasters, as well as modern means of attack, but of course in a differentiated manner. Here we should observe a stage-by-stage principle of accumulating knowledge and skills, allowing for local conditions, public activity, age, state of health, and education.

CD chiefs of all levels have been granted the right partially on their own to determine the subject matter of the training and procedures for conducting the classes—the training measures should be organically combined with the planned tasks—and to promote their execution. Training forms are envisaged that will ensure that blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz employees are torn away from their work as little as possible: independent study of CD subjects (self-tuition), and for certain categories of the leadership, taking of examinations without attending lectures.

It is important that each training organizer feel a personal responsibility for the state of CD training in the work area assigned to him, and each citizen, for his personal training. We assign an important role in this to party and public organizations seeking to raise the effectiveness of civil defense propaganda.

The proposed principle of stage-by-stage accumulation of knowledge makes it possible to reduce from 35 to 15 hours the volume of training of the leadership directly at the installation, since subjects that duplicate training in the courses are eliminated. This same principle makes it possible to abandon the 20-hour program of training of formations, leaving only special training in a volume of 15 hours. Here 9 hours are assigned for practicing the subjects, and 6 hours for special subject matter, as determined by the relevant CD chief of the installation or the territorial CD organ. Commanders in the training groups will work together with subordinates under the leadership of the CD chiefs of staffs and services (senior specialists). They themselves will handle individual subjects related to the use of equipment, aggregates, and mechanisms in the conduct of rescue and other urgent tasks.

The newly created formations are an object of special concern to CD chiefs and staffs. Potential accidents, disasters, and natural calamities characteristic of a given region, safety measures in the conduct of practical work, methods of rendering self- and mutual first aid in the event of a burn or exposure to potent toxic materials, all this should be allowed for in the organization of their study.

As before, the training of formations should end with a TSU [Tactical Special Exercise] (duration up to 8 hours), which is done during complex exercises and sessions at installations.

Beginning in 1989, training of blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz employees not belonging to formations will be carried out every year, in a volume of 12 hours. This will include both independent study of CD questions, regular training sessions under the leadership of one's immediate supervisors, and periodic planned classes in training groups, conducted by the leaders of the corresponding structural subunits, engineer-technical workers, or other specially designated persons.

In order to provide help to blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz employees studying a CD subject independently, consultation points will be created at installations, equipped with the necessary materials, literature, and study and visual aids in accordance with the subject matter. The procedures of their operation will be determined by the CD chief of the installation, and officials of the installation staff, the most prepared commanders of the structural subunits, and activists will be called upon to be consultants. The workers of the staff or CD courses of the rayon (city) will hold one or two-day assemblies with the leaders of the classes and the consultants. During the classes and training sessions themselves, they will work through the practical measures provided for by the CD plans of the installation, during which special attention will be paid to actions following possible accidents and natural calamities.

As we see, a significant reduction in the training time is a characteristic feature of the new training system. This is first of all a natural result of the introduction, in particular, of the principle of stage-by-stage accumulation of knowledge, and a more clearcut definition of its volume and the skills necessary for each category of trainees, depending on the CD obligations imposed upon them. Secondly, under conditions of perestroika, when the State Enterprise (Association) Statute is in effect, it is more expedient to make the organization of training more flexible, closer to life and conditions, i.e. to grant the right to the relevant leaders of labor collectives to themselves determine the subject matter of the classes, the forms and methods of their conduct (independent study or in organized groups), and themselves establish the time for the study of programs (working or non-working time). This will make it possible to pull blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz employees away from productive work as little as possible, something that is especially important for collectives operating under new conditions of management.

At the same time, a reduction in the volume of training should not be construed as a weakening of requirements regarding the level of knowledge and skills. On the contrary, it presupposes a multiplication of efforts, an

increase in the responsibility of the leaders and the trainees themselves for the organization and results of training, for the use of all opportunities and reserves to enhance its effectiveness.

For the training of the populace not occupied in production and service spheres, reliance is put on independent study of training and methodological aids, CD booklets, and civil defense radio and television broadcasts and films. Specific information on direct participation of the populace in CD measures at one's place of residence (actions following warning signals, locations of shelters, issue points for individual protective gear, evacuation assembly areas etc.) can be learned at consultation points in the quarters and utilities organs, in recreation and reading rooms, classrooms, and CD protective structures. It is recommended that employees of quarters and utilities organs, officers and sergeants in the reserve, veterans of war and labor and other activists who have undergone the necessary training be called upon as consultants. In a rural locale, the organization of such classes and consultations is a job for the rural (village) soviets, with enlistment of trained civil defense activists.

The training of young students will be organized according to present programs. Most important in the training of VUZ students is to instill in them the skills of practical actions as future commanders of formations and chiefs of CD services in the elimination of the consequences of accidents, disasters, and natural calamities. The students of secondary and special academic institutions are trained for performance of CD measures according to their type of specialty, allowing for the specifics of production, and students of general schools and professional-technical academies, for able application of protective methods in extreme conditions, and the rendering of self- and mutual first aid.

The procedure for preparation and conduct of complex exercises at major installations of the domestic economy, and of complex training sessions at medium and small ones, has not changed. In the general schools and secondary professional-technical academies, they are conducted annually on CD Day. But also during the exercises and training sessions, they should first of all practice the measures to protect people and material property from the consequences of accidents, disasters, and natural calamities. When the training questions (stage) of exercises are planned, they should be tied to the execution of domestic economic plans, and in the summarizing of results it is mandatory to calculate their economic impact.

A special role in the enhancement of the level of training of the leadership and command personnel will be assigned to CD courses. Beginning in 1989, their work will be organized in accordance with the requirements of the introduced "Regulations on Civil Defense Courses". In the new training year, it will be necessary to clarify upcoming plans (for 3-5 years) on the makeup of courses, with allowance for changes that have occurred in the

administrative-territorial and branch organs of management, the levels of the domestic economy, and in the structure of the formations. This will make it possible to bring the number of courses and the manning level of the instructor staff (masters of production training) in strict accord with the established number of students and the volume and regularity of their training.

Much still remains to be done also in the restructuring of the training and methodological work. As before, the problem is to convert republic, kray, and oblast CD courses into genuine training and methods centers. In order to intensify the training process and raise the interest of the students, beginning in 1989 the courses will shift to a differentiated makeup of training groups (allowance for CD training, time in the occupied position, etc.). Most important in repeat study—more deeply to study the most important questions of CD organization, and to acquaint oneself with the latest attainments of its theory and practice. By decision of the chiefs of courses, the time periods of study by these groups may be reduced. For more prepared students, provision has been made for taking the test without attending classes.

The effectiveness of course work directly depends on quality work by the instructor staff. The CD chiefs and staffs running the courses should raise their standards in the selection and training of instructors and masters of production training.

Successful training of the populace is impossible without effective CD propaganda. At the current stage, the most important thing in its content is explaining to USSR citizens the essence of measures taken by the CPSU and the Soviet government to restructure civil defense, its orientation toward execution of protective measures under peacetime conditions. It is also necessary convincingly to explain to the populace how important it is for each independently to study CD questions, to be ready for able and confident actions in emergency conditions that may arise. For this it is necessary more broadly to utilize round-table discussions, question-and-answer meetings, debates and contests, meetings with CD veterans and participants in the elimination of the consequences of accidents, disasters, and natural calamities.

Experience confirms that where constant attention is paid to improving training facilities, classes are conducted in a more organized manner, and their return is higher. There is no end of work here. One of the trends is the transition from creating and using traditional training- method and visual aids of a general illustrative type to those that reveal the special actions of the CD forces and the populace as applied to local conditions, that help to assimilate the techniques and methods of conducting rescue and other urgent tasks in the event that emergency situations arise that are characteristic of the specific installation and the particular region.

The transition to the new system of training is one of the stages of civil defense restructuring. This is intended to raise it to a qualitatively new level of readiness. And the orientation toward those who have already taken a step forward will help us to achieve successes more quickly.

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Open Letter to Ryzhkov on Failings in Civil Defense Since Chernobyl

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in Russian No 1, Jan 89 p 1

[Open letter to Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov by A. Krivoshlykov, assistant to the general director of the civil defense association]

[Text] Moscow Oblast—Dear Nikolay Ivanovich!

As a civil defense worker, I am deeply concerned about the fact that the process of perestroyka is taking place extremely slowly in our system. Almost 3 years have passed since the events at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. Have any organizational measures or legislative or normative documents been adopted during this time? Unfortunately, we know nothing about this locally. Meanwhile, to be frank, the attitude of leaders of ministries, departments and enterprises as well as party, soviet, trade-union, Komsomol and other organizations toward civil defense has not changed and is not in accordance with the spirit of the time.

Civil defense tasks, especially in peacetime, have recently been expanded and more and more enterprises are going over to cost accounting and self-financing but everything here remains as it used to be. There have been no serious changes in organizing the training of the population, formations, and workers and employees or in material and technical security and the forms and methods of carrying out defensive measures.

There is quite a lot of talk about the drawing up of legislative, directive and normative documents. If this is so, then why, in drawing up these documents, do the people "on top" not consult with those "below"?

Before making critical decisions, the party and government consult with the people. Is it necessary to depart from this tradition in the case at hand? And why are the civil defense decrees of the directive authorities not published but reach the organizers of civil defense work in the interpretation of civil defense staffs? Hence the different interpretations, conjectures and confusion that remind one of playing with a faulty telephone.

I am convinced that no normative document can replace the Law on Civil Defense. It must clearly formulate the duties and measure of responsibility of citizens and leaders of all ranks for the performance of defensive measures and the system for the participation of ministries, departments and public and other organizations in

rescue and other urgent work to eliminate the consequences of natural calamities, accidents and disasters. As long as civil defense is without rights, there will be no change in the negative attitude toward its problems on the part of managers of facilities in the national economy, rayons, cities and oblasts. And not just of managers.

It is necessary to make the corresponding addenda in the Law on the State Enterprise (Association) and in the Law on Cooperation that regulate the actions of enterprises and institutions in questions involving the protection of labor collectives. It is also necessary to introduce articles in the codes of labor laws of the republics that juridically legalize the leave of workers for civil defense measures.

A sudden change in the consciousness of some managers was noted after Chernobyl and other accidents, disasters and natural calamities. But the problem is that the resolution of questions in civil defense is nevertheless being postponed. It is difficult to blame anyone for this, because there is no legal responsibility of citizens of the USSR, including managers, for the state of civil defense and for the failure to participate in its measures.

I think that another reason for this situation is found in the organizational structure of civil defense in the USSR. As you know, any manager is the civil defense director of the enterprise under him. The organizing, executive and monitoring authority is the civil defense staff—one or at best several regular workers or, in the worst case, people performing duties under several posts or as a social load.

The unified system "manager-civil defense director" is preserved up to the republic level. In the scope of the state, the civil defense director of the USSR is a deputy minister, even though it may be in the defense ministry. What is its juridical status and what legislative act secures its legal position? The idea was expressed of removing the country's civil defense from the USSR Ministry of Defense, putting it under the head of state, as has been done in most foreign countries. But it remained just an idea and that is a shame!

Now about the role of staffs. In the army structure, this is an active administrative agency with tremendous powers and the chief of staff is second to the commander. In the national economy, there is no authority with fewer rights than the civil defense staff. What, for example, can the chief of staff of a city do? Virtually nothing. In any question in economic work, whether it be the outfitting of an administrative center or the reproduction of some document, he must really bow down to the manager of the facility. But, under the new conditions of management at any enterprise, every kopeck counts and every working hand is important.

Nor must one forget about remuneration of labor. Many chiefs of staff for civil defense of enterprises have a higher salary than the chief of staff of the rayon civil defense. I am not talking about ordinary staff workers, who are in the category of low-paid workers.

I think that to change the existing situation in civil defense all chiefs of staff for civil defense must, in the first place, be regular personnel. In the second place, they must officially be assistant managers. And, thirdly, the rights of the chief of staff must be legalized.

In addition, I am inclined to support the proposal on the elimination of the civil defense staff as such (what kind of staff is this under civilian conditions?) and to turn its functions over to sections (committees) that are organically part of the office for the management of production. This can be a civil defense section at the enterprise, a section in the ispolkom, etc. and the section (committee) head must be the assistant manager.

This is where, in my view, there must be a fundamental restructuring of civil defense, both in the affirmation of a legal basis and in the change in the administrative structure. If we want to talk seriously about civil defense, we must go beyond half-measures that expand civil defense tasks and obligations of workers without giving them more rights.

There are many unresolved problems in civil defense. An extremely acute problem is that of protecting the population. Whereas this question is resolved in some way in production, it usually is not at the place of residence. Formerly dwelling houses were built with well-equipped basements that were relatively easily converted into shelters against radiation. In contemporary houses (and even in children's institutions), there is no provision for them and neither is there any provision for protective structures in microrayons, whereas in a number of foreign countries it is forbidden to build dwelling houses without shelters. So the civil defense staffs have to take inventory of basements, cellars and the like.

Things are no better in regard to the provision of the population and formations with the means of individual protection and instruments. At the present time, civil defense is primarily equipped with obsolete GP-5 gas masks. In training, we were once shown the latest gas masks, the GP-7. Why are they not being introduced everywhere? In accidents with SDYaV [expansion not given], intelligence must determine their concentration but most enterprises have no instruments of the type UG-2.

As the years passed, the training of people in civil defense became formalism of the purest sort. It is probably necessary to pay more attention to it in educational institutions and to teach it just as they teach mathematics or Russian. Then people will come to production who are familiar with the elementary questions in civil defense and who are capable of putting on a gas mask, of preparing a cotton-gauze bandage, or of taking skillful action in response to warning signals. And at the enterprise, it will be sufficient to learn the special features characterizing the given production system (for example, in the form of instruction when people first come to work, etc.).

And why not organize unique universal education in civil defense through radio, television and the mass press?

Nor is the material and technical provision of civil defense measures what it should be. The main thing is that there is no centralized supply of record-keeping materials, which are in chronic short supply. You cannot buy such specific items as field cable, binoculars, telephone sets, radio sets, power sources for DP-5 instruments and other needed means. It is necessary to act under the principle "necessity will find a way."

Unfortunately, there is no uniform planning documentation. Every region has its own form. I encountered civil defense plans in the form of albums and the form of paste-in sheets of different sizes. Their content is quite varied and everyone puts together current documents in accordance with his own strengths and abilities. Why not issue a collection of forms of civil defense documents, as has been done in the USSR Armed Forces? This would greatly facilitate the work of staffs but would in no way restrict their initiative and creativity.

Alas, reference material is also inadequate. Some recommendations are hopelessly obsolete, others (in particular, the manual on assessing the consequences of the effect of SDYaV) are impossible to find, and still others are so technical (for example, "Methodical Recommendations on the Determination of the Chemical Danger from National Economic Facilities and Zones of Possible Chemical Contamination Around Them") that only a limited group of persons can use them.

As we see, the charge of renewal in civil defense is by no means working at full strength. For this reason, we cannot remain silent about what is hindering this. I am expressing the thoughts of many of my comrades and colleagues selflessly serving the cause of civil defense. And the earthquake in Armenia also revealed many unresolved problems in the organization of civil defense and the training of staffs and formations.

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Civil Defense Overlooked in Cooperative Movement

18010420b Moscow VOYENNIYYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 1, Jan 89 p 32

[Article by I. Vakula, chief of staff for civil defense of the Odessa "Ukrorgreklama" PRK RPO, under the "Looking at a Problem" rubric: "In the World of New Realities"]

[Text] The cooperative movement in our economic and social life has not yet become an everyday phenomenon. From day to day, however, there are more and more new small and rather large cooperatives and associations of these cooperatives. Nevertheless, there are not yet any instructions about the performance of civil defense in

them. As though the elements, accidents and other calamities will by-pass the cooperatives and they will have no reason to protect themselves. So will they need civil defense there?

"Without a doubt!" thinks I. Vakula, the author of the article being published, chief of staff for civil defense of the Odessa "Ukrorgreklama" PRK RPO [expansion not given]. The editor's office is using his material to open a new rubric and is inviting readers to participate in a conversation on the most acute and pressing problems in civil defense and in the discussion of questions demanding immediate resolution.

Indeed, the process of the formation and strengthening of cooperatives is growing all the time and their share in the national economic balance is increasing. And there will be more and more people in them from year to year. There is no doubt that they must make their contribution to general state defensive measures but labor collectives must know the means of protecting against weapons of mass destruction and strong toxic substances and skillfully fulfill civil defense standards. For this purpose, they need means of individual protection, teaching materials, the necessary documentation and clear plans of action.

Who will deal with this? The cooperatives are not yet registered in the territorial civil defense staffs and nothing is foreseen for them in civil defense. But it is certainly time for this!

The first thing that is needed, in my view, is to set forth clear objectives on the performance of civil defense in cooperatives and on the planning and implementation of protective measures. The Law on Cooperation in effect since 1 July 1988 stipulates that the cooperatives can establish departments, shops, farms, workshops, studios, stores, etc. Many of them, in essence, are the same national economic facilities, and depending on the number of workers and the significance of production activity, it is necessary to determine in what category they belong.

I think that most will be facilities that stop production work when there is a threat of enemy attack. Some of them will move their functions to a rural area, especially those that work in the trade and food system. Under these same criteria, evidently, they must also work out civil defense plans—some for wartime and peacetime and others for peacetime only. It seems that for the latter there is no sense in establishing any formations except specialized commands or units to eliminate the consequences of natural disasters and accidents.

Some thought should be given to those who continue their work in the rural zone. It is obviously necessary to specify their civil defense status. Those with their own production buildings should establish the functions of independent facilities with the resulting civil defense obligations.

It is evident that cooperatives established on the basis of production enterprises and institutions or leasing their premises must be included in civil defense plans developed by these facilities with the rights of a shop or production section and all protective measures must be implemented in the scope of the primary production. It is quite possible that, in resolving these questions, they will be guided by the instructions of the corresponding departments and associations, in whose system the cooperatives are included organizationally and upon whom they depend in their production work. As for educational measures, including different doctrines, I propose that they be implemented in accordance with recommendations and programs now in effect.

Initially, of course, it will not be easy for cooperative chairmen to cope with the obligations of the civil defense directors in their facilities. Most of them will not be fully prepared for this role. But this can be corrected; territorial civil defense staffs and courses can take on the appropriate training.

The cooperatives, at least the larger ones, will clearly need a worker available for civil defense—a senior engineer or engineer. For small cooperatives, the version of having one of the cooperative employees combine—for a certain supplementary payment—the duties of planning civil defense measures, monitoring their performance, and reporting is obviously acceptable. For enterprises under self-financing, the question of the introduction of a regular position for a worker to help the chairman in civil defense on a daily basis can be easily resolved, for they will find the resources for this purpose.

Something else is more difficult. That same Law on Cooperatives states that the soviets of people's deputies and other state agencies monitor, within the scope of their competence, the observance by cooperatives of existing legislation on questions involving labor protection, safety technology, production hygiene and sanitation, fire safety, combatting animal and plant diseases, and the protection of natural resources and the environment. All of this is very close to the tasks of civil defense and is directly related to them in many positions.

It is too bad that the law is silent about the problem of protecting people in the event of natural calamities and production accidents. The explosions in Arzamas and Sverdlovsk and accidents in other places showed that a mishap does not choose who is in its path. It is therefore necessary to see to it that the chairmen of cooperatives become aware of the fact that they bear full responsibility not only for production work but also for the safety of their subordinates and for their preparedness for action in the event of natural disasters and accidents that can happen to them in production or to their neighbors.

One must not simply monitor but also establish a certain material base for this and provide the cooperatives and their family members with the necessary means of protection, etc. This means that the question of protecting

these small labor collectives must be included in the overall planning of measures to be carried out by territorial civil defense staffs.

Concern about the life and health of citizens is our primary task. And, in resolving it, we have no right to assign to cooperatives the role of stepchildren. It is necessary to be more active in including them in the system for general training in civil defense so that it will more effectively cover the whole country and the entire population without any exceptions.

From the editor's office. We imagine that the problem raised by I. Vakula is of concern to many and it is clear that one cannot ignore it. How are the questions of the protection and training of workers in other regions of the country being resolved? What do they think about this in the staff of the USSR Civil Defense?

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New Training Program: Coping with Peacetime Disasters

*18010400b Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 28 Jan 89 p 3*

[Article by A. Khaav, department chief; deputy chief, Civil Defense Headquarters, Estonian SSR: "If Disaster Strikes"]

[Text] The earthquake in the Armenian SSR; the accident at the Chernobyl AES; snow drifts in Odessa Oblast; flooding in the Azerbaijan SSR; a hurricane in Turkmeniya; accidents at a number of economic facilities and on railroads involving extremely hazardous toxic substances and explosives in Yaroslavl and Arzamas; all this has shown convincingly that loose ends in the resolution of civil defense tasks can cause human suffering and material losses in peacetime.

Analysis of the causes of fire breaking out at the Orusk Peat Combine, an accident at the Vilyandi Dairy Combine, and a number of incidents on republic railroads compel all of us to take a critical look at the state of civil defense to determine the shortcomings of technical equipment at facilities and ascertain serious omissions in training the populace to take action in the event of natural calamities, accidents, and disasters that may occur in peacetime. The training system that has developed over the last few decades does not adequately deal with these shortcomings.

The search for more effective forms and methods of training the populace in civil defense began as early as the 1988 training year. Independent study of civil defense subjects by laborers, while collar workers, and kolkhoz workers was approached experimentally by the TShPO imeni V. Klementi, Tartu Experimental Plastics Plant, Kokhtla-Yarve Mechanization Administration of the Stroymekhanizatsiya Trust, Narva Personal Service Production Administration, Saku sovkhov, and others.

Starting in 1988, all heads of civil defense at facilities were granted definite freedoms to select topics of instruction for supervisory personnel, civil defense units, and the populace to give them more specific instruction in actions to be taken under extraordinary conditions in peacetime. These tasks were accomplished creatively and good results obtained by the following: the Sangar factory in Tartu; Rapla Production Association for Manufacturing and Technical Supply of the Economy; Yygeva Grain Combine; the sovkhoses Adavere, Yygeva, Kuuste; the kolkhozes Payuzi, Yarvakandi, and Kadyurand; Kekhtas Model Sovkhoz-Tekhnikum; ERSPO Commercial Base in Tartu; Tartu Zoological and Botanical Scientific Research Institute; Data and Computing Center of the ESSR Minkhleproduktov; Republic Radio and Television Broadcast Center; Tallinn Intercity Telephone Station of the ESSR Minsvyazi; and many others. Economic accountability, self-financing, and other changes which have come about in economic activities at these facilities have not been a hindrance to attaining success in civil defense training.

However, the intended rate of adoption of perestroyka has not been applied universally. There are some facilities where an irresponsible attitude held by officials relative to civil defense has resulted in long-lasting shortcomings that have manifested themselves in lack of elementary knowledge and skills associated with protective measures to be taken under special peacetime conditions (Yarvakandi tekhazed combine, the sovkhos Kokhtla-Yarve).

The new civil defense training year started on 2 January. The main feature is the introduction of the new training system, which has as its goal the raising of the readiness level of supervisory personnel, civil defense units, and the entire populace relative to successful accomplishment of protective measures under special peacetime and wartime conditions.

The new system is based on a differential approach to organization of training. It grants significant leeway and rights to all civil defense supervisors in their choice of study topics and the forms and methods to be used, providing for step-by-step progress along with coordinating the training measures with production tasks. A number of forms of instruction proposed (self-study, giving credit for tests passed without compulsory attendance) makes it possible to reduce to a minimum the amount of time spent away from production activity by officials, laborers, kolkhoz workers, and white collar workers. The introduction of the step-by-step method, that is, the discontinuance of parallelism in the study of subjects in schools, VUZ's, and civil defense courses, and the elevation of qualifications make it possible, starting as early as 1989, to reduce the amount of facility training administered supervisory personnel from 35 to 15 hours and drop separate instruction for supervisory personnel and the 20-hour training for the civil defense rank-and-file, thus leaving only joint training for commanders and the rank-and-file at the 15-hour level, of

which six hours will be devoted to special subjects to be decided by the particular civil defense supervisors concerned. Civil defense supervisors and headquarters are requested to pay particular attention to newly created civil defense units to enable them to operate effectively in areas possibly contaminated by extremely hazardous toxic substances as a result of accident, disaster, or natural calamity typical of a particular area. Tactical exercises with other civil defense units will not be held every year; they will be conducted during integrated exercises and facility drills.

Commencing with the forthcoming training year, yearly training of laborers, white collar workers, and kolkhoz workers will be shortened from 20 to 12 hours. With these hours as a limit, the particular civil defense supervisors involved will order planned exercises to be carried out either independently, together with all laborers, white collar workers, and kolkhoz workers, or with some of them. Persons studying civil defense subjects independently will receive assistance at consultation centers to be set up. They will be drilled in practical measures and actions to be taken in the event of accidents and natural disasters.

Starting this year, all persons not working in the production or service sectors will study civil defense independently. Civil defense activists functioning as consultants in the consultation centers at rural (settlement) soviets will advise persons relative to their involvement in civil defense, based on their place of residence.

All persons in the new training year are to become familiar with the changes in alerting the populace in case of an existing or imminent threat. The fact is that starting in 1989 the principal method of alerting the populace in case of accidents, disasters, and natural calamities will be by radio or television. The populace will be given a signal to turn on their television sets and radios by the sounding of sirens, factory whistles, and motor vehicle horns. The sounding of sirens and interrupted operation of whistles and horns will constitute the civil defense signal "Attention Everyone!" Upon hearing the signal, all persons are to turn on their television sets and radios immediately, listen to reports to be issued by local organs of authority or civil defense headquarters, and take appropriate action.

In general, there is a complex of new tasks to be resolved relative to civil defense training for the new training year. This is necessary within the framework of the considerable reduction in training time, which is of importance to collectives operating under the new conditions of economic management.

In this connection, the reduction in amount of involvement should not be interpreted as a relaxation of requirements relative to level of training. On the contrary, it is assumed that supervisors and trainees themselves will heighten their responsibility for the organization and results of instruction and for raising their effectiveness.

Since the new system grants considerable freedom to the respective labor collective leaders in choosing the time, form, method, and subjects of instruction, the result is greater flexibility and adaptability to local conditions and needs and increased acceptability by the populace.

The change to the new system is one of the directions taken by perestroika relative to the republic's civil defense. Practical implementation will make it possible to raise the entire civil defense system to a new level of readiness for action under extraordinary conditions.

Critique of Armenian Defense Following Earthquake

18010400a Yerevan *KOMMUNIST in Russian*
29 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by correspondent V. Kuzmin in the column: "Observations by a Journalist": "Civil Defense: Lessons Taught by the Earthquake"]

[Excerpt] In September of 1987 the Bureau of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee passed a decree stating, in particular, the following: "Considering that Armenian SSR civil defense is responsible for rescue and other emergency operations in cleanup work following disasters and natural calamities, the civil defense headquarters of the Armenian SSR is charged, along with interested republic ministries and departments and city and rayon soviets of people's deputies, with submitting to the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers by 1 April 1988 suggestions relative to creating territorial nonparamilitary quick-response civil defense units, to include their number, organizational structure, and equipment."

The suggestions were accepted and units formed. However, the units' arrival at the disaster area on 7 December was considerably behind schedule, in spite of the strictness of the order. So much for quick response.

It may seem strange at first sight that there has been a decreasing amount of attention paid to civil defense organization, training people in even elementary skills relative to rescue operations, and rendering first aid to victims of accidents and natural calamities. However, this is not so strange. In the Law on State Enterprise (Association) there is no mention whatsoever of a leader's responsibility for safety of people and property. Since this is so, and since economic accountability has taken hold, civil defense is now considered to be a burden, one associated with expenditures, at that. That is why various excuses have been used to curtail and do away with the already downgraded training program. There is a joke circulating. The same man kept attending civil defense training in the same subject held on various days. Could it be that there were several men with the same name, not just one man? No, he was a plant janitor. He attended the first session in place of the director; the second, the chief engineer; the third, the chief manufacturing engineer.

We know only too well how such jokes end.

What is civil defense? We can see with our own eyes how it has degenerated: from a matter until recently referred to in lofty speeches as a nationwide interest, to an activity typically carried out by Soviet Army units. Is that so? I think not.

If you ask five residents of Yerevan what they believe civil defense to be, you will hear something like the following. Two out of the five will say that there was a time when they were being taught to properly don gas masks and set splints, that is, they felt involved in civil defense. Three will answer that civil defense refers to soldiers belonging to specialized units.

Let us visit the people indicated by the majority.

We are in Leninakan. This is a fortress, built a century and a half ago. It was not harmed by the earthquake. We see tents, cleanliness, and military order. A sign at one of the tents reads "OG GO"—"Civil Defense Operations Group," which is headed by Colonel General A. Ya. Ryakhov, deputy chief of USSR civil defense. Not yet sixty, he has climbed the difficult stairs of military service, starting out as a private.

Let us enter the tent located alongside, the headquarters tent. There is a map of Leninakan. Entered on it are several zones, with a civil defense regiment stationed in each zone. Where did they come from? From Yerevan, Donetsk, Volgograd, and other places. The first to arrive in the disaster area were reserve soldiers of the Yerevan and Tbilissi civil defense regiments. Out of the ruins they pulled 1,176 persons, 139 of them alive. The soldiers and officers of these units labored without sleep and rest, saving people, rendering first aid to victims keeping them warm, feeding them, and sending them to medical facilities. A group of reserve servicemen headed by Reserve Captain M. Gevorkyan, a military training officer at Razdan School No 5, pulled out 42 persons from the ruins of a scientific research institute. M. Gevorkyan in removing some rubble found an unconscious woman whose leg was jammed underneath concrete plates. Mkhitar Aramovich applied a tourniquet and, to save her life, himself amputated her crushed leg. Georgian soldiers headed by company political worker Reserve Lieutenant G. Ivaneshvili extracted 37 persons from the ruins of a textile factory. Many examples of this kind can be cited.

Let us visit the Donetsk regiment—one of the best, according to headquarters. The commander, Colonel V. N. Zhdankin, said that regimental personnel must clear away the ruins of 132 buildings and truck out almost a half million tons of demolished structures. I was able to see for myself that much was accomplished: cleared sites and the first construction start of a new building, a symbol of a truly Armenian city being resurrected.

"In our planning we assign a regiment to nine sites," said Colonel General A. Ryadov. "The arithmetic is simple: There are three battalions in a regiment and three companies in a battalion. Just multiply three by three. However, this works only if modern equipment is available. Without it we can do nothing. We now have powerful excavators, cranes, lift trucks, and dump trucks. With what did we arrive? That was the trouble."

The general did not mention that even now not every regiment works on nine sites and not all the equipment that was requested came to Leninakan. However, he is apparently pleased that half the equipment was delivered—that gives them a chance to do something.

However, in Spitak, where civil defense is headed by Lieutenant General V. F. Mosenko, deputy commander of the North Caucasus Military District, this fact is mentioned. It would be foolish not to mention it, since everyone knows that the soldiers are doing the work largely manually. The Gosstroy of the Armenian SSR, which was obligated by a commission resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo to provide the civil defense soldiers with 24 bulldozers, 12 excavators, 12 lift trucks, 40 dump trucks, and other equipment, is in no hurry. None of these items has been delivered.

The soldiers are not unoccupied, of course. Now their workday ends at eleven in the evening, whereas previously they worked around the clock. All around there in Spitak, however, there are operating about 60 organizations belonging to various ministries and departments, but they enjoy holidays—the same as if they were doing their regular work—and there are KamAz trucks and cranes standing idle. A paradox? An actual fact.

Why did the civil defense units arrive mostly on the fifth and sixth days after the earthquake? I ask this question to start my final remarks.

The answer to the above is disappointingly simple: They could not arrive any sooner.

A civil defense regiment consists of—until lightning strikes, as they say—several hundred soldiers and officers and their poor equipment, that which Soviet Army ground troops discard as unnecessary and obsolete. We may say that this kind of unit would be of little use in Leninakan.

Thus, when lightning did strike—when the terrible earthquake occurred—mobilization of the regiments was initiated and personnel strength increased by several times. I make the remark in passing that the hasty call-up of reserves involved people such as barbers and artists, who had nothing to do in the ruins. I just wanted to fit that in here. Mobilization did largely call up "registrants"—people needed for the work. They included bulldozer operators, crane operators, drivers, and miners. This required a day or two. Another day was needed for "acclimatization," as they say in the military. Another day or two for transportation to the disaster area. This is your answer to the question of why the civil defense soldiers lost time.

Could it have been otherwise? It could have.

Imagine a regiment at full strength, one not reduced by several times, provided with standard, i.e., modern equipment. One that consists of soldiers in compulsory service trained in carrying out rescue operations and rendering first aid. One that immediately set out to render aid as soon as the SOS alarm is sounded, possibly even employing aircraft.

I can see where someone may raise an objection: Is it not needlessly expensive to maintain such troops and deprive the economy of costly equipment? First, these troops can work as construction units, thus justifying the expense of their maintenance. Second, just now they are costing us quite a bit. Take the Donetsk regiment in Leninakan, for example. It is made up of miners who have left their workplaces. At their present location they receive their regular wages, travel allowances, and free food consisting of the enriched mountain ration. Add it all up—it amounts to quite a bit.

The above is not my opinion, by the way. It is the opinion of specialists. They have made many suggestions for reorganizing the civil defense troops.

I do understand that the resolution of these problems goes beyond the boundaries of the republic. In the age of glasnost, however, the general public should be made aware of the state of our civil defense. That is why I decided to write this article.

Our ignorance, lack of skill, and poor organization relative to protection from natural calamities are associated as it turns out with often unrecoverable losses. Economic accountability, which would appear to leave no room for expenditure of funds for instruction and drill, does not seem to apply here. There can be no talk of accountability in this, if it does not provide for our safety.

Mod R&D Organizations Switch to Khozraschet, Self-Financing

18010509a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Mar 89 p 2

[Interview with Col I. Shumskiy, deputy head of one of the directorates of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Maj A. Plotnikov: "Do You Wish to Live Well? Then Work!"; the scientific research, design, engineering and production organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense have been converted to full cost accounting and self-financing]

[Text] [Plotnikov] Answering the questions of our correspondent was the deputy chief of one of the directorates of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Col I. Shumskiy:

[Shumskiy] The previously existing procedure for the financing of military scientific research institutes has been altered by the USSR minister of defense in the aims of improving their operations. What is the essence of the restructuring in the economic mechanism of military science?

Now the funds for supporting scientific organizations will not be provided. From now on they must meet their own scientific-technical and social development using money obtained by selling scientific developments. Prosperity will depend upon their profit. That is the first thing.

Secondly, now a contract will be the basis of relations between the scientific organizations and the ordering directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Thirdly, a system of contractual prices has been introduced for the scientific and technical products. What does this mean?

Before starting the work, a scientific research organization agrees with the customer on the price for this. The cost of the labor of the scientific co-workers depends upon the effectiveness, quality and dates for executing the orders. Here the exceeding of expenditures on development, for instance, of a certain article, in comparison with the contractual price and made by the executor without the agreement of the customer is to be compensated for out of the executor's own funds. And money saved will remain at the disposal of the scientific organization.

[Plotnikov] The leadership of the scientific organizations is, of course, interested in this. What about the rank-and-file employees?

[Shumskiy] They are also interested in the effective search for new, nontraditional solutions to scientific problems. With the converting of the scientific organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense to full cost accounting and self-financing, new wage conditions will be introduced for their employees. For example, they will be paid a percentage surcharge for continuous employment within the amounts effective in the USSR Ministry of Defense. Moreover, the chiefs of the scientific research organizations are permitted to set, increase and reduce salaries of subordinates within the limits of the wage fund considering the quality and promptness of the work performed. With the agreement of the trade union committees, the chiefs of these organizations will also set the amounts of monetary bonuses for employees who merit these. As you can understand, all of this can be implemented only as the necessary funds are acquired. In a word, if you want to live well then work.

[Plotnikov] Hence, one might expect that the military scientists and designers will earn more effectively?

[Shumskiy] In order to answer this question time is required. At least 6 months. But even now it can be said that positive shifts have been spotted.

Round Table on Problems in Pre-Draft Training in Estonia

*18010500 Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian
24 Jan 89 p 2*

[Unattributed article: "How to Get Out of the Rut?"]

[Text] Yesterday began the month long campaign of mass defense work. On its eve a roundtable discussion was held in the DOSAAF Central Committee, at which questions of preparing youth for army service were discussed.

[S. A. Smirnov, retired rear admiral] The present month's campaign of mass defense work is dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. The days of mobilization of the revolutionary forces of the people, and of the heroic defense of the gains of Great October, became the days of the birth of the Red Army. There are a sufficient number of examples of the heroism of the Soviet Army today as well. The soldiers toiled courageously to eliminate the accident at Chernobyl. They were the first to come to the aid of the victims of the earthquake in Armenia. I was especially touched by an item in the newspaper, "We Will Remember Their Names." A doctor at a military hospital did not leave his post, and assisted the population, although he had already learned about the death of his own two small children.

And how many examples of the heroism of Soviet soldiers and officers can be attributed to the period of the Great Patriotic War. Can this possibly be forgotten?

Unfortunately, many are forgetting. Nowadays it has become almost the fashion to put our Armed Forces in a bad light. I am saying this not for the purpose of saving the honor of the greatcoat. Let us examine things without emotions. Yes, restructuring touched even a "forbidden zone," the army. It is necessary to rid ourselves of the sore points in the military environment as well. These include non regulation relationships among military personnel; bringing order and culture into the barracks; changing the term of service for VUZ graduates; and deferring student callups. And it would not be a bad idea to adjust the conditions of service for married personnel, and to grant them annual leave, and so forth. It is necessary to do all this, and to find solutions that are to the benefit of the military, and of those called up for active military service.

But I am also speaking about something else. It is necessary to look calmly into army problems, and not relish in "unpleasantries." The sensational novel by Yuriy Polyakov, "Sto dney do prikaza" [One Hundred Days Until the Order] was the subject of the most polarized points of view. In my view the author revealed one of the acute problems of army life, which was sharply manifested in the years of the stagnation, the problem of the "dedovshchina". What do I see as the main shortcoming of the novel? Material about a local situation was generalized to global proportions, and frightens the

inductee and his parents with its portrayal of barracks hooliganism. The position of an ironic observer, and the total lack of constructive proposals, is not the best method of solving the problem.

[Col N. Ya. Redko] I have with me letters from Ryazan. They are from student A. Tiganik, of the Higher Airborne Military School, and from a soldier from Chita. The student (a native of the village of Loks) writes about his days as a student, his comrades, everyday life, and his service warmly and with humor. One senses that he found himself in this army environment.

The soldier from Chita wrote his parents in Taydeskiy Rayon that the "dedy" [second year inductees] hassle him in his service, that there is no place to wash, and so forth. We received several official answers from the military unit command. A letter by the battalion deputy for political affairs, Vasilyev, expresses amazement: "I see Urmas all the time. He leads the soldiers' orchestra. And not once have I heard complaints from him."

[S. A. Smirnov] I want to complete my thought about the novel "Sto dney do prikaza." Its rational kernel, in my view, is that Yu. Polyakov sees in the "dedovshchina" something profound, inherent not only to the army. Non-regulation relations do not emerge suddenly, at once, in the military collective. The army is a copy of society. A young man comes into the army already contaminated by shortcomings and the bacillus of "non-regulation" relations as a headstrong person in civilian life. You ask the rayon military commissariat: Are there drug addicts among the inductees? There are. True, in the majority of cases it is those who have not yet become chronically ill. And what about the "informals" of various shades? There are enough of them. And six months after they have had their training, it is necessary to entrust to these youths, who are not fully socially and morally mature, modern weapons and a combat post. And what if we are talking about the rocket forces or a border outpost? Can you imagine what responsibility is placed on each combat crew or detail? How much effort commanders and political officers must put forth to see that they do not fail. And the conclusion suggests itself: We are all equally responsible for preparing young people for military service: members of DOSAAF, the komsomol, and journalists, and not only the military commissariat.

In the last two years, unfortunately, the ratio of negative materials about the army in the press, and positive, well-disposed ones has been approximately 10:1. In publications in MOLODEZHI ESTONII ("Aty-baty, Shli Debaty," 3 November 88), SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA ("Schet v polzu gumanizma," 9 December 88), and others, the topic of relations toward initial military training of pupils and students is discussed. The demand by hotheads about abolishing NVP [initial military training] in educational institutions is premature, and harmful. Full disarmament of the modern world is still far off. Extremist statements by "informals" about

the "harmfulness" of military service very quickly find listeners. In the past this practically did not exist. There are those who try to explain this phenomenon as pluralism of opinion on the advisability of service in Soviet army units and navy ships. Territorial forces? Yes, the advocates of this point of view would not object to separating our armed forces by national barracks, so that these forces would protect the borders of their own republic. And who would defend the Kurils, Sakhalin, or the Polar Region in case of necessity? Would it be those nationalities that live there? In my opinion this is not pluralism, but the most real anti-constitutional action, requiring not merely moral censure.

[E. A. Naydel, outstanding educator of the Estonian SSR] In the educational institutions of the republic, difficulties arose with organization of initial military training. Military-patriotic measures are not being carried out in many schools. It is a cause of concern that the success rate and discipline in NVP lessons have declined. In some schools in the republic, Vyru No 1, Tartu No 1, Tallinn No 8, No 24, No 36, No 49, No 56, and others, they have begun to take off the walls displays about initial military training, and the history of the USSR Armed Forces, and to eliminate the rooms of combat glory and the military offices. Needless to say, "valid" reasons have been found. The number of combat glory corners on the history of the Estonian Rifle Corps are also being reduced. In Tallinn Intermediate School No 36 expositions devoted to Yelena Varshavskaya, who fell in the battle for the liberation of Tallinn, were taken down. And all of this is being done under the pretext of humanizing the modern educational system.

We understand that initial military training of students needs restructuring. At recent seminars the military instructors of intermediate educational institutions in the republic made proposals for changing the NVP program. Beginning in the next school year it has been proposed to hold NVP in senior classes for two hours a week, and conclude the program with six day field exercises. And in graduating classes it is proposed to have one hour per week, and at the end of training to conduct sports days. With girls we are now holding classes only on medical training and civil defense.

[N. Ya. Redko] What kind of defender of the homeland do we need now? The answer is found in the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: "From now on defense organizational development is to be oriented primarily at qualitative parameters, both with respect to equipment and military science, and in personnel training." And, following the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces, the tasks of strengthening the country's security are a matter of current interest. Consequently, "qualitative parameters" are taking on decisive importance in training draft-age youth. They are decisive in NVP lessons, and in defense-sports health camps. Considerable funds, by the way, have been allocated for organizing them. Last year more money was allocated, but some local ispolkoms did not put it into effect. The well known

resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, Central Committee, Communist Party of Estonia, and Estonian SSR Council of Ministers on preparing youth of pre-draft and draft age for active military service have not been implemented. As before, the material and technical base of NVP is weak. Whereas Lithuanian educational institutions have 58 percent of their school supplies and equipment, in our republic they have only 12 percent.

[N. N. Malasay, Great Patriotic War veteran] Some activists in the young people's informal associations have gone as far as to say that callup of students into the army is an "anachronism of Stalinism and the period of stagnation!" These literate students ought to glance more often at the map of the country, at the outline of its borders. How many kilometers is it from the Kurile range in the east to Taran Cape in the Baltic? And everywhere it is necessary to post patrols of border guards, day and night. A huge country has a large army; only recently there are rather a lot of people desiring to receive a deferment from callup.

[E. A. Naydel] I was able to listen to a report by M. D. Popkov, chief of the Ground Forces Political Directorate, which cited examples from the service of our fellow countrymen. The number of violations of military discipline have doubled. One day five Estonian soldiers stated that they did not understand the commands. It is true that when an interpreter was found it turned out that there was not need for this. However, it is a fact that many of our inductees have poor knowledge of the language of international communications. Can you imagine the position of a battalion commander who has soldiers from various nationalities? And the officer is forced to send such soldiers to the unit welfare farm. There general workers are always needed. The work is not complicated, and is mainly done with a hoe and pitch fork—"take more and fling it farther." Instead of mastering a prestigious specialty in two years, which will be useful in civilian life as well, he actually is serving out a term as a laborer.

Those who do not concern themselves before the students reach the army about the dual-language capability of inductees, in my opinion, should bear administrative and party responsibility.

[V. P. Vorobyev, deputy chairman, DOSAAF Central Committee, Estonian SSR] We might graduate from DOSAAF school an excellent specialist, but this is still not enough. A military thrust in his training, as it is customary to say, is needed. The youth must be morally and physically prepared for the trials of army life.

In order to satisfy the requirements of the army and navy for the "qualitative parameters" that we spoke about here, it is necessary to develop continuously the material and technical base, and the pedagogical skill of our permanent party. They have sufficient technical knowledge, but not all are brought to the level of an instructor.

Despite the complex situation, last year DOSAAF training organizations fulfilled the plan for preparation of specialists for the army and navy. The average elimination rate was six percent. That is rather high, but it is necessary to take objective reality into account. Many of our students are also still studying in PTUs [vocational and technical schools], and, of course, not all can withstand the dual load.

[E. A. Kirsimiyagi, deputy chairman, DOSAAF Central Committee, Estonian SSR] Any of us who went through the severe university of the army had personal experience concerning how difficult it is to go directly from school, or from the work bench, into the military. We remember how hard it was to keep one's head, not give up in the obstacle field, or collapse from exhaustion during the forced march. It is easier for those who have had good physical training.

During the period of the month-long campaign of mass defense work, city and all-union competitions will be held in eight types of sports. The campaign began on 21 January with a meeting between young people and well known sports figures and trainers, where the results of the sports year were summed up and quizzes were organized. At the end of January we are preparing a joint measure, involving the DOSAAF collective and the Pandivere Industrial Association, with the best sports figures in the republic in military-technical types of sports.

[Kh. V. Yygi, deputy chairman, DOSAAF Central Committee, Estonian SSR] Each holiday has its personality, and its special features. This campaign is being carried out in the spirit of the decisions of the 19th CPSU All-Union Conference, and the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Estonia.

Yesterday in the Tallinn officers' house the campaign was opened on the topic, "All Types of Soldiers' Weapons." Veterans of war and labor, of the USSR Armed Forces, Osoaviakhim-DOSAAF, and soldier-internationalists took part in the meeting with young people from schools and vocational and technical schools.

In these days winter sports festivals of draft-age youth are being held in the rayons and cities throughout the republic. In a few days a military relay race is starting from the building of the Estremrybflot Production Association.

On 26 January, and 17 and 24 February, from 1500 to 1800 hours, the Tallinn radiotechnical school invites youth to an open door day. Those who so desire will be able to sign up for radio circles. And the Tallinn naval school is expecting guests at these same hours on 27 January, and 10 and 17 February.

On 8 February a get-together is being held at the Sailors' Club for inductees on the topic, "Are You Ready, Inductee, for Military Service?" Also here on 28 February there will be a competition of wall press materials devoted to the campaign.

The situation in the republic truly is not a simple one. We are only learning to work under the conditions of restructuring, and are seeking new ways of communicating with young people. It is hard to get out of the well-worn ruts, and to reject stereotypes in our thinking and work, but it is necessary.

Meeting of Coordinating Council of Military-Patriotic Organizations

*18010394a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Feb 89 First Edition p 1*

[Interview by Yevgeniy Stepanov with Sr Lt (Res) Oleg Zapertov: "A Concern of Real Men"]

[Text] From 21 through 25 February, a meeting will be held in Moscow for the members of the Coordinating Council of the All-Union Association of Military-Patriotic Associations Under the Komsomol Central Committee.

We offer for your attention a conversation between a student from the Journalism Department of the Higher Komsomol School, Yevgeniy Stepanov, with the leader of the association's work group, its, to use army terms, chief of staff, Sr Lt (Res) Oleg Zapertov.

[Stepanov] Oleg, let me begin, possibly, in not a completely "diplomatic" manner. But I have heard that the name of your organization is impressive but for now there has not been much in the way of action...

[Zapertov] My comrades and I have also heard such criticisms. In part they are just. But our association is a young one. The idea of establishing it arose in 1987 at the All-Union Assembly of Reserve Military Personnel in Ashkhabad. Later assemblies were held in Minsk, Gorkiy and Novorossiysk and here the areas of our activities were examined. The Komsomol Central Committee became the founder of the association. At present we have registered over 3,000 clubs and associations in the military-patriotic area. Each club has approximately from 30 to 100 members.

We have already established our own aktiv. They are principled, responsible, courageous persons. The character of a majority of them was shaped on the dust-covered lands of Afghanistan. Incidentally, 14 of the former internationalist soldiers have been put up as candidates as USSR people's deputies under the Komsomol quotas.

[Stepanov] Hence the main area of activity for the association is the military indoctrination of the youth?

[Zapertov] Yes. This above all else. Because here, we feel, there is a great deal of work to be done. It is a sacred undertaking and formalism, indifference and verbosity have obscured it. What can we say if some are even embarrassed to use the word "patriot".... Some young persons are endeavoring to avoid military service. The prestige of the officer profession is declining.... Who will defend the motherland?

Another important area in our work is to help the former internationalist soldiers. Also the families of those who lost their lives in Afghanistan. Here there are problems and more problems.... For resolving them there must be not only human involvement but also, to put it completely frankly, money. And we still find ourselves with our hand out.

[Stepanov] But didn't I hear that you have opened a bank account?

[Zapertov] Yes. No. 700959 in the USSR Zhilsotsbank [Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development]....

[Stepanov] They say that they are also establishing cooperatives of the former internationalist soldiers?

[Zapertov] That is true. For example, the Leningrad Shuravk. We will also involve in cooperative activities the reserve personnel who are disabled and find jobs for them.

[Stepanov] But certainly in order to establish even the most essential cooperative, more money will be required....

[Zapertov] I feel that we will find the money. We are already receiving the first transfers to our bank account. For example, from the residents of Moscow specially for the Rus Rehabilitation Center.

We are also relying on support from the Soviet Peace Fund. It has already allocated 12 million rubles for building a rehabilitation center in the city of Alma-Ata and 8 million for the construction of a housing project for disabled soldiers in Odessa. Recently there was the all-Union campaign of "Trade Unions to the Aid of the Internationalist Soldiers"....

The help from our founder, the Komsomol Central Committee, also promises to be important. I would also like to voice the kindest words for the USSR Ministry of Defense. It is turning over written-off equipment, training equipment, simulators and visual aids to the military-patriotic clubs. In a word, many are ready to help us.

[Stepanov] On your desk I see many references and lists of all sorts. In a word, paperwork....

[Zapertov] I understand the hint. Are we not going to become bogged down in bureaucracy and be turned into another "paper" office. We will do everything to resolve the key questions on the spot employing the reserve military councils. We will only be aided by this.

[Stepanov] A little about yourself....

[Zapertov] I was in command of a subunit in Afghanistan after completing the Tashkent Higher Tank Command School. That was at the very start. We were among the first to go in.... Later on, I was wounded...severely.... In a word, now I am just in the reserves.

But everything is going normally. Now my comrades and myself have a great goal in life. To indoctrinate real citizens and patriots of their motherland.... This gives us strength.

Low Number of Turkmen Officers Explained 18350403

[Editorial Report] Ashkhabad SOVET TURKMENISTANY in Turkmen 2 December 1988 carries on page 4 a 2000 word interview with Lt Col I. Ya. Tkachenko, chief of the military department of the TSSR Military Commissariat, headlined "Beloved Fatherland" in which he discusses the low number of Turkmen in the Soviet military's officer corps. "In 1986 133 youths from local nationalities entered a higher military school, the number was 164 in 1987 and 175 this year. At the same time, 124 of these youths abandoned their studies in the higher military schools. Thus, only 0.5 percent of youth from our republic become officers. According to this data, we stand in one of the last places in the country. This year only 3 men from Krasnovodsk Oblast entered military schools; as for Bakherden and Ashkhabad Rayons and Buzmein City only 1-2 were accepted into military schools." Asked whether poor Russian knowledge was the primary reason behind these low numbers, Tkachenko answered that "poor knowledge of Russian is creating problems for them."

Officers' Schools Advertisements

Engineering, Chemical Troops Officers' Schools
18010375 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jan 89 First Edition p 2

[Article entitled: "For Those Who Are Selecting a Profession: The Military Schools Invite You".]

[Excerpts] [N.B. All schools are listed. Honorary titles have been removed from the Schools names.]

Engineering Schools

Kaliningrad Higher Engineering School of the Engineering Troops (236022, city of Kaliningrad, 22, obl.);

Kamenets-Podolskiy Higher Military-Engineering Command School imeni Marshal of Engineering Troops V.K. Kharchenko (281900, Kamenets-Podolskiy, Khmel-nitskiy obl.);

Tyumen Higher Military-Engineering Command School imeni Marshal of Engineering Troops A.I. Proshlyakov (625028, city of Tyumen, 28).

Term of Study—4 years (Kaliningrad—5 years).

All types of modern engineering vehicles and sapper equipment are assimilated, and a significant amount of educational time is devoted to the study of chemistry, explosives and electrical engineering.

Those completing the command schools are given an all-Union diploma with certification as an engineer in the maintenance of wheeled and tracked equipment; engineering [certification] or—mechanical engineering.

Chemical Troops Schools

Tambov Higher Military Command School of Chemical Defense imeni N.I. Podvoyskiy (392011, city of Tambov, 11);

Kostroma Higher Military Command School of Chemical Defense (156015, Kostroma, 15);

Saratov Higher Military Engineering School of Chemical Defense (410037, city of Saratov, 37).

Term of Study—4 years (Saratov—5 years).

Cadets of these schools study organic, inorganic and analytical chemistry, physical-chemical methods of analysis, and special equipment among the armaments of the Chemical Troops.

Graduates of the command schools are given an all-Union diploma with a certification as an engineer in the maintenance of chemical defense equipment; as an engineer—or as a chemical-engineer.

Military Motor Vehicle Officers

Ryazan Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering School (390014, city of Ryazan, 14);

Chelyabinsk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering School imeni Marshal of Armored Troops P.A. Rotmis-trov (454029, city of Chelyabinsk, 29);

Samarkand Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering School imeni Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR (703056, city of Ussuriysk, Primorskiy Kray);

Term of Study in the command schools—4 years (Engi-neering—5 years).

Cadets of these schools study all makes of motor vehicles and motor-tractor equipment and receive a certificate of the right to operate category V, S and D motor vehicles. Graduates of the command schools are given an all-Union diploma with a certification as an engineer in the maintenance of motor-tractor equipment; as an engi-neer—or as a mechanical engineer.

Engineering, Chemical Troops Officers' Schools
18010375 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Jan 89 Second Edition p 2

[Article entitled: "For Those Who Are Selecting a Pro-fession: The Military Schools Invite You".]

[Excerpts]

Missile Forces Officers

Perm Higher Military Command-engineering School of the Rocket Forces imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuykov, (614015, city of Perm, 15);

Rostov Higher Military Command-engineering School of the Rocket Forces imeni Chief Marshal of Artillery M.I. Nedelin, (344027, city of Rostov-on-the-Don, 27);

Serpukhov Higher Military Command-engineering School of the Rocket Forces imeni Leninist Komsomol, (142202, city of Serpukhov, 2);

Kharkov Higher Military Command-engineering School of the Rocket Forces imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union N.I. Krylov, (310056, city of Kharkov, 56);

Krasnodar Higher Military Command-engineering School of the Rocket Forces, (350090, city of Krasnodar, 90);

Kazan Higher Military Command-engineering School of the Rocket Forces imeni Chief Marshal of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov, (420025, city of Kazan, 25);

Saratov Higher Military Command-engineering School of the Rocket Forces imeni Major-General A.I. Lizyukov, (410082, city of Saratov, 82, obl.).

Term of Study in these schools—5 years.

Cadets of these schools study existing models of missile systems and the methods of their combat use, computer technology, automated control systems and communications equipment.

Graduates of the schools are given an all-Union diploma with a certification as a mechanical engineer, a mathematical engineer, a ballistics engineer, a systems engineer, a radio-electronics engineer, or a computer engineer.

Communications Officers

Kemerovo Higher Military Command School imeni Marshal of Communications Troops I.T. Peresypkin, (650020, city of Kemerovo, 22.);

Novocherkassk Higher Military Command School of Communications imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, (346418, city of Novocherkassk, 18, Rostov oblast);

Poltava Higher Military Command School of Communications imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union K.S. Moskalenko, (314036, city of Poltava, 36);

Ryazan Higher Military Command School of Communications imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov, (390032, city of Ryazan, 32);

Tomsk Higher Military Command School of Communications, (634056, city of Tomsk, 56);

Ulyanovsk Higher Military Command School of Communications imeni G.K. Ordzhonikidze, (432013, city of Ulyanovsk, 13);

Kiev Higher Military Engineering School of Communications imeni M.I. Kalinin, (252149, city of Kiev, 149);

Stavropol Higher Military Engineering School of Communications imeni 60th Anniversary of the Great October, (355028, city of Stavropol, 28, of the Kray).

Term of Study in the command schools—4 years (Engineering—5 years).

In the process of the training the cadets study all modern forms of communications—radio, radio-relay, multi-channel, tropospheric, etc., and the rules of their use in various types of combat operations. Aside from that, automated command and control systems, and computer equipment are studied in the engineering schools.

Those completing the command schools are given an all-Union diploma with a certification as an engineer in the maintenance of signals equipment; in the command schools—as a radio engineer, an electronic communications engineer, an electronic equipment engineer, or a mathematical engineer.

Western Development of Battlefield Computers, Robotics Examined

*18010386 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 11, 1988 p 28*

[Article by Colonel L. Migunov, candidate of technical sciences, and Yu. Lizko, candidate of technical sciences, in the column: "Conventional Weapons in the Nuclear Age": "Computers and Robots Join the Battle"]

[Text] Fierce combat is being waged in the battle sector. Space satellites are watching enemy movements and dispositions of forces. Advance warning aircraft are observing the air space. "Flying platforms" equipped with radar and infrared sensors are monitoring the skies and surface near the forward edge of the battle area. The data collected are immediately transmitted to automated centers where they are processed, evaluated, stored, and retransmitted to command posts and fire control posts.

Cruise missiles fitted with a terrain recognition guidance system are launched. They destroy bridges, road intersections, railroad stations, seaports, airports, and traffic control points. Missiles carrying shaped charges are launched from remotely controlled aircraft which are monitoring the routes of advance of enemy armor. Each missile is launched a short time before an aircraft flies over a target, which is identified by a smart computer. Other missiles are discharging mines over the enemy's route of advance. Acoustic and seismic sensors activate and point them at predetermined targets.

Small crewless vehicles operating directly on the battlefield are searching for hidden enemy firing points, illuminating them with a laser beam, and issuing commands for their destruction by missiles. Enemy weapons, also illuminated by lasers carried by remotely controlled aircraft, are destroyed from the air by homing missiles and rockets.

Crewless combat vehicles similar to self-propelled artillery guns equipped with smart computers are set into motion at the command post. Each one carries an automated fire control system which first selects the most dangerous targets, then issues a signal to fire the weapon. Advancing behind them are remote control tanks.

Impressive, is it not? This is not an excerpt from science fiction; it is a description of a possible future war recreated on the pages of reputable military journals published in a number of NATO countries.

Entirely realistic steps have been taken to make the militaristic dream a reality. In November of 1983 the U. S. Department of Defense announced a program of creating artificial intelligence. The sum of 600 to 700 million dollars was budgeted for this purpose.

There are three projects: creation of a robotic ground transport equipped with a computer; a "second pilot" system for combat aircraft; and a naval combat planning and management system. A series of tests and demonstrations for the period to 1990 has been set up to develop the capabilities of self-propelled robots. According to the foreign press, about 100 types of ground combat operations have been identified as most feasible to employ self-contained or semi-self-contained robotic transport means.

According to foreign information media, in the making are smart missile guidance systems and automated loading devices. Also under development are robots functioning as infantry, target designators, reconnaissance scouts, observers, sentries, security patrols, and tank destroyers. In addition, since the latter part of the 1970s the U. S. Air Force has been conducting a program to develop highly efficient tactical means for countering armor.

Thus, the Cyclop precision attack weapon performs conical scanning as it is lowered by parachute. After an infrared homing head detects a target, the system fires a charge to destroy the latter. The EDAM homing mine, upon landing on the ground by parachute, automatically aims itself at moving tanks and fires two precision attack weapons. The WASP air-to-surface guided missile is provided with a two-mode radar seeker employing a pulse-type millimeter-wave radar. The seeker's equipment includes a smart computer which enables the system to perform independent target search, identification, and destruction.

Foreign countries are displaying a great deal of interest in creating highly automated SAM systems capable of operating independently and without human intervention to detect, identify, and fire at targets, and reload the launchers.

The first steps in this direction are the Siam SAM systems. The missile employed is completely self-contained. It operates independently to detect targets in the vertical take-off sector by means of a radar seeker, executing a rotary motion. Upon detecting a target, rotation ceases and a surface-to-air missile is pointed at the target. A sustainer engine is then started to propel the missile toward the target. In close proximity to the target, an infrared seeker takes over guidance from the radar seeker.

The ARMY TIMES reports that the U.S. is also developing the new E-SAM surface-to-air system which is supposed to incorporate elements of artificial intelligence. The assumption is made that a human crew will not be required. This type of short-range SAM system is slated to be provided with a small missile guidance system that includes a high-efficiency computer featuring a 100 Mbyte memory to be located in a special helmet-mounted sight worn by a gunner.

The foreign press notes that in the above systems an attempt is being made to apply the "fire and forget" principle.

The U.S. is especially interested in the design of self-propelled robotic systems amounting to infantry robots that could perform the more dangerous tasks in combat. For example, there has been an announcement of the Odex-1, a six-point robot called a "functionoid." Weighing 170 kg, it can "walk" on broken terrain at a fair rate of speed and carry a load of up to 815 kg. It is capable of changing its height in the range from 80 to 160 cm. With a pace measuring 80 cm, it can climb an inclined plane and change direction in response to commands. The functionoid is provided with sensors and a smart computer. A 24-volt aircraft battery supplies power for one hour of continuous operation.

Experts are of the opinion that future functionoids will be capable of carrying out a wide variety of tasks. Thus, to emplace a mine, it will dig a hole, set the fuze, and cover over the mine with soil. It will overcome fortified positions, blow up such positions, conduct fire at enemy personnel, supply fuel and ammunition, evacuate wounded from the battlefield, and accomplish other tasks. Under development is a mobile robot that will perform guard duty.

Feasibility studies are in progress to employ robotic combat vehicles to counter tanks. Experts have described an armored self-propelled robot that will destroy tanks; they point out that its design is made possible by existing technology. Provided with missiles fitted with an infrared seeker and remote control power plant, it will additionally feature a radar and associated smart computer capable of detecting and identifying a target. Each machine is estimated to cost a quarter million dollars.

The foreign press has published information on testing of an American robotic observer offering analytical capability. Its purpose is to guard oil fields, air force bases, and other large areas. Having the appearance of an armor-clad gun, it is provided with efficient sensors, a smart computer, and sufficiently powerful armament: two machineguns, a grenade launcher, and a recoilless gun. The robot costs \$200,000.

Also under development in the U.S. is a mobile patrol robot mounted on a wheeled chassis intended for guarding building interiors. It features shortwave, infrared, and ultrasonic tracking apparatus and an alarm rated at 125 dB. The robot is capable of locomotion on a preassigned path at speeds up to 7 km/h, with a turning radius of about one meter. This "watchman" does not open doors or climb stairs, but this shortcoming has been overcome: An announcement claims that a robot possessing a "hand" is capable of opening doors.

The list of robotic systems endowed with artificial intelligence applicable to military purposes could be extended. However, even the information presented above makes it clear that the scenario described at the beginning of this article is sufficiently real for the very near future if not today.

Although the war ideologues point out that the new generation of robots and smart computers is intended to carry out the more dangerous battlefield tasks, it would be a serious mistake to ascribe the creation of these devices to humanitarian motives. The explanation is simple: There will be an acute need for robots in the coming decade due to a shortage of youth under the age of 21 serving in the Armed Forces. The "humanitarians" also reason that crewless weapons will be less costly to their militarism compared with trained crews, etc. Military business apprentices are continually receiving and offering new orders and ideas.

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U.S. Naval Strategy in Pacific

18010433 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
19 Jan 89 Second Edition p 3

[Captain 1st Rank Ye. Nikitin: "Old Postulates of the 'New Strategy'. 4. The U.S. Navy in the Pacific Ocean"]

[Text] The first European to enter the largest ocean of our planet under favorable weather conditions, the Portuguese navigator Magellan gave it the name of Pacific. Subsequently countless ships have perished in the ocean depths, not only because of its harsh disposition, but also in many brutal wars. It is still troubled there in our day, primarily due to the expansionist policy of the United States of America. In the limitless expanses of the Pacific Ocean, the U.S. is attempting to give orders as if it were an "American lake", say the inhabitants of coastal countries and islands.

According to the figures of their commanding admiral, D. Dzheremay [transliteration], the Pentagon maintains naval forces in the Pacific Ocean which number 250 warships, 2,000 aircraft, and 275 thousand service members. The seven aircraft carriers (more than 600 aircraft, of which 250 can carry nuclear weapons) form the foundation of the striking power of these forces. In the western part of the ocean, close to the USSR's territory, the grouping of American naval forces amounts to around 50 combatant ships, more than 1,200 aircraft, and some 150 thousand service members. Here the Pentagon does not conceal the fact that the "strategic mission" of the American Navy consists not only in blockading the Soviet Navy in its bases. As the WASHINGTON POST notes, there are more far-reaching goals—"the destruction of Soviet strategic nuclear submarines, the destruction of Soviet bases, and invasion of the USSR."

American forces are growing in numbers and improving in quality. Indicative in this regard is the buildup of potential of nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines [SSBNs]. Thus the numerical strength of SSBNs of the 17th Squadron based in Bangor (Washington state) annually increases by one or two units. At present the squadron includes eight submarines. Each has 24 C-4 Trident-1 missiles on board, equipped with nuclear warheads with ten MIRVs each. But starting in late 1989, the capabilities of the American SSBNs in the Pacific Ocean will become even greater: the submarines will begin to be equipped with D-5 Trident-2 missiles, which will have three times the yield of the Trident-1.

The surface ships, including aircraft carriers and surface boats equipped with Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles, are another threatening element of the U.S. Pacific Navy. According to a report in the journal NUCLEAR TIMES, by 1990 the number of warships in the Pacific Ocean zone capable of carrying nuclear Tomahawks is supposed to increase to 50. Powerful nuclear warheads, high accuracy, and great operating range—all this practically turns the cruise missiles into strategic weapons systems.

Characterizing the combat might of the "far-flung American military empire", the American UPI news agency stresses: "Military aircraft and special naval tactical formations armed with cruise missiles, which are capable of delivering a nuclear strike against targets located at a great distance, are patrolling between Hawaii, Japan, and Okinawa, where 22 thousand Marines are ready for quick deployment by air to regional "hot spots". The use of cruise missiles, according to the plans of the American admirals, will allow carrier-based aviation to deliver strikes against ground targets as well (naval bases, airfields, command posts, etc.) and against strategic submarines at sea. Says former U.S. Navy Commander in the Pacific, Admiral S. Foley, "The goal of this strategy is to hit the bowman before he can loose an arrow."

Postulates of U.S. Pacific strategy, and views on the use of the Navy, are constantly being adjusted and supplemented with new tenets. For example, in recent years this was expressed in the active assimilation of the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, primarily the Bering and Okhotsk Seas and the regions east of Kamchatka, in the interests of combat use of air assault and missile task groups (AAG, MTC). Views are correspondingly being revised on the use of the U.S. Third Pacific Fleet.

Earlier its chief mission was the preparation of ships and units to pull alert duty in the western part of the Pacific Ocean as part of the 7th fleet force. Now according to the Third Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Hernandez, "In connection with the growing demands on the Navy in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, the role of the Third Fleet has grown in importance to that of the other fleet forces. We intend to step up our activity in this region."

And they are stepping it up. In order to heighten the effectiveness of leadership of the forces operating in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, a 3rd Fleet mobile staff has been formed. It is indicative that its staff includes naval officers of Australia, Great Britain, Canada, and a liaison officer from the Japanese Navy.

The numerous joint military exercises and maneuvers are yet another graphic testimony to the Pentagon desire to draw other countries into their militarist ventures. In the Asian Pacific region (APR) they are generally held with the participation of the armed forces of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Canada. Last year around 45 warships were involved in the "Rimpac-88" maneuvers, including two aircraft carrier assault groups, more than 200 aircraft, and more than 50 thousand service members of these countries. During the maneuvers, which were held far to the north, all the way up in the Aleutian Islands, joint actions were practiced involving delivery of strikes against ground targets, combatting surface ships and submarines, blockade of straits, the landing of amphibious assault forces and other missions.

So it was in the recent past. Now in the practice of international relations there are growing indications that "Cold War" stereotypes are dying away. But even under these conditions, the growth of activity of the American Fleet does not cease. According to data in the foreign press, extremely large "Pacex", maneuvers are planned for the Fall, in the Bering, Okhotsk, and other seas of the Pacific Ocean. Four carrier groups of the 3rd and 7th Fleets, more than 500 aircraft, including strategic bombers, a Marine division, and two or three divisions of ground forces will take part in this unprecedented demonstration of military might.

Against this background, what a contrast is the unilateral restraint practiced by the Soviet Union! Our Pacific Fleet will conduct only exercises of a strictly defensive nature, in recent years only in regions bounded by the waters of the Okhotsk and Japan Seas, and in the Pacific Ocean at the approaches to Kamchatka, i.e. in direct proximity to the USSR's coast. The delivery of strikes against targets on the territory of other countries is not practiced.

Fantasies concerning the offensive nature of the combat training of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and its infrastructure, disseminated by American propaganda, are used to cover up their desire to maintain and strengthen even more the network of bases created by the Pentagon, enmeshing other countries of the region and arousing public protest in them. Here the "special importance" of the Soviet fleet's logistic and technical support base in Vietnam's Camranh Bay is touted from all angles. The uproar in this regard increased especially during the recent American-Philippine negotiations on the bases of Subic Bay and Clark Field. But when the USSR offered to give up the base at Camranh if the U.S. would agree to eliminate its bases in the Philippines, the Americans started backpedaling, as they say. The U.S. began to

speak of their inequality, saying that the bases in the Philippines have much greater strategic importance than the base at Camranh, and that therefore there could be no talk of abandoning them. By the way, in Manila even at the governmental level they acknowledge that the American bases do not protect the Philippines from anything or anyone.

While on a visit to the Soviet Union, U.S. Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci stated that the United States needs a large navy and military base to defend its lines of communications, trade, and commerce.

However Admiral W. Crowe, the commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific zone, spoke of a different purpose: "The only opportunity to demonstrate if we work well or badly is to start a war and see whether we win or lose, but wars do not occur that often. It is devilishly hard to work under these conditions." The admiral's complaints about the "devilish difficulties" gain even greater weight if one considers that he now occupies a most important place in the structure of the U.S. supreme military command, chairman of the committee of the chiefs of staffs.

One reliable test of the true tasks of the U.S. Navy might be Washington's response to USSR proposals aimed at lowering tension and normalizing the situation in all Pacific Ocean regions. Favorable conditions have now been created for this purpose. Especially if one considers the new and important initiatives reported by M.S. Gorbachev in his U.N. speech, which are everywhere seen as a new and powerful impetus to the disarmament process.

Comments on Western Weapon Systems

Belgian Multiple Rocket Launcher

18010452 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Mar 89 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article entitled: "In the Arsenal and on the Ranges: System for Salvo Fire".]

[Text] According to the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW the Belgian Firm FZ is producing a 40-tube 70-mm multiple rocket launch system (RSZO) [Raketnaya sistema zalpogo ognya] the LAU-97 on a wheeled and on a tracked chassis. One of the variants of the system is mounted on the chassis of a two-axle (4X4) motor vehicle and has the following tactical-technical specifications: a crew of three, combat weight of 5.35 tons, a maximum range of fire of 8 km, duration of fire of all rounds of 6 seconds, 360 degree traverse, vertical elevation—from 0 to 55 degrees, maximum speed of 100 km/ph, and a fuel range of 900 km.

Included in the weapons suite of the LAU-97 is the NURS [expansion unknown], which may be outfitted with 13 types of rounds, including single shaped charge rounds, cassette rounds, anti-personnel, illumination and practice rounds.

Last year 18 wheeled LAU-97 were delivered to the United Arab Emirates.

The Firm FZ has developed a new motor, which is being tested by the English and West German Air Forces to determine the advisability of its use with 70-mm unguided aviation rockets.

Modernization of Battleship Wisconsin Completed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Mar 89 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed article entitled: "In the Arsenal and on the Ranges: For the Iowa Class Battleships".]

[Text] As reported in the journal ARMED FORCES, following modernization, in October of 1988 the battleship "Wisconsin", the fourth and last ship of the "Iowa" class, built during the Second World War, has rejoined the US fleet. During the repairs on the "Wisconsin" launchers for "Tomahawk" cruise missiles and for Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Vulcan-Phalanx 20-mm artillery systems and a modern electronic suite were installed.

The press has reported on the work to further increase the combat capabilities of the "Iowa" class battleships. In particular for the main (406-mm) guns, which have a range of 38 km, a 330-mm sub-calibre round (which will make it possible to fire on targets out to a distance of 70 km) has been developed, as well as the Mk146 cassette round with the M46 shaped charge—fragmentation warhead and an electronically timed fuze. It is possible that in the mid 90's the Mk146 round will be additionally equipped with 46 SADARM precision targetting anti-tank warheads.

Statement on Presence of Su-24 Bombers in Libya

18010617 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Apr 89 First Edition p 5

[Statement by USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "On Soviet Bombers in Libya"]

[Text] A TASS diplomatic correspondent posed the following question to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

In recent days, reports have appeared in the American mass media, with reference to official sources, about the Soviet Union's delivery to Libya of Su-24 bombers, which have an operating radius supposedly enabling these aircraft to reach the territory of Israel without refueling. This is being put forth as an action destabilizing the strategic situation in the Middle East. What is the actual state of affairs?

Answer: In accordance with contracts concluded earlier, the Soviet Union has delivered several Su-24 aircraft. This is an aircraft that by its combat capabilities is designed to carry out missions at very short range and is not capable of carrying out strategic missions. Moreover, its combat radius is less than that of aircraft delivered to Libya several years ago.

Thus, the delivery of these aircraft does not signify either a quantitative or qualitative buildup of arms and cannot change the overall correlation of forces in this region.

What draws attention is the fact that this propaganda campaign over the "Libyan bombers" coincided with the

arrival of Israeli Prime Minister Y. Shamir in Washington. The "Libyan threat" is clearly supposed to draw attention from finding out the cause of what is interfering with real progress in a Middle East settlement.

The Soviet Union does not hide its concern over the continuing arms race in the Middle East. We favor reducing the level of military confrontation there. USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Shevardnadze expressed specific views on this account during his visit to the Middle East in February of this year. These problems must be solved, and must be solved seriously, through negotiations. Resorting to propaganda exercises is not the path that should be followed in this so highly explosive region.

Response to Sakharov on Shooting of Trapped Soldiers

18010520 Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Mar 89 p 1

[Article by N. Cherginets, writer, holder of the Order of the Red Banner and Red Star (Minsk): "Who Shoots His Own?"]

[Text] I shall say at the outset that I have never believed that the accusations and persecution to which Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov has been subjected in recent years have been fair. And I was very glad when justice was restored with respect to him. Moreover, many of his ideas and suggestions regarding the restructuring of our social and political life find favor with me. I like them because of their moral and humane basis.

So it was even more painful when I read in our press the announcements that in an interview in a Canadian newspaper, the OTTAWA CITIZEN, A.D. Sakharov said that in Afghanistan Soviet helicopters were shooting our soldiers who had fallen around them so that they could not be taken captive.

This is not true, Andrey Dmitriyevich! I was in Afghanistan for 3 years. At this time I shall not go into the political problematic surrounding this war which, thank God, is behind us now. But I was there and I cannot let pass any untruth about it—my memory of those who died will not allow this; I am moved to action by a sense of elementary justice without which there can be no mention of a moral regeneration of our society. So I know what it is to be in combat when surrounded, and I want everybody to know what I am going to say, even those who paid attention to you in Canada.

I recall a battle southeast of Kabul on 20 June 1984. We managed to evacuate the dead and wounded soldiers from the battlefield. But the medics did not manage to render first aid to the wounded because the command point was surrounded by the enemy. We were running out of shells and nobody could break through to help us. The rebels had set fire to the grass that surrounded us on three sides right up to the area where the command point was located. And then on an order from Gen A. Sergeyev the Soviet helicopters of the Kabul helicopter regiment came to our assistance. The pilots tried to get near to us several times but the enemy's heavy fire and the thick wall of smoke made it practically impossible for them to land their vehicles on the tiny pad. But they did it anyway. Seven circling helicopters took the fire while the eighth landed, gathered up the wounded, and took off. After them came another one which gathered up the dead and also took off. The rest continued the battle at an altitude of 20-30 meters and helped the armored group to come to our aid. I do not know whether the boys who were saved by the helicopters will have anything to say. I repeat that this was on 20 June 1984 southeast of Kabul in a green area not far from the kishlaks of Sakhakh and Myakhel.

I can give many cases like this. Yes, there were cases where the Soviet subdivisions had to draw artillery fire and I have also had occasion to experience this cruel law of war. Although rarely, it sometimes happens that in the darkness in the mountains someone opens fire in the direction of their own people. I recall an inaccurate bomb dropping when several bombs were dropped near our positions. Of course it is twice as terrible to die at the hands of your own compatriots. A careful investigation was conducted for each case and the strictest measures were taken against those who were responsible. But did the helicopter pilots deliberately shoot their own men when they were surrounded? Is such a thing really possible? Apparently somebody slipped Andrey Dmitriyev this provocative "information" for only one purpose—to take advantage of his authority to cast a shadow on the Soviet soldier. Possibly the academician was guided by humane motives, but in the end they turned out to be inhumane.

I still have a photograph of our chaps who died—a senior lieutenant and 17 soldiers.

On 4 September 1986 they set out in 13 KamAZ trucks to get gravel for the construction of a school. They were forced from the road and outside Kabul they got caught in an ambush. The rebels destroyed the convoy and took the boys captive. They tried to take them with them. But with their hands tied the boys lay on the ground and would not take a step! Then the rebels carried out their usual bloody slaughter: they cut them and then killed them; they stuck them with needles and then killed them. They threw one of the boys whose hands and feet were bound on a stack of straw and burned him alive. These are facts which cannot be refuted. As concerns the helicopter pilots, they are the ones who, having landed to look for the convoy, saw it but did not open fire so that, God forbid, they would not kill their own people, but only reported the coordinates to the ground forces. Alas, they were too late... this was, I repeat, on 4 September 1986 to the west of Kabul not far from the kishlak of Isakkheyl.

I have these photographs. I am ready to turn them over as soon as the scholar requests them. I am ready to give the names of the pilots who risked their lives to save the Soviet fighting men who had fallen while surrounded. I can give many names of those who gave their lives to save their comrades-in-arms.

The army had a policy: whenever one of our servicemen died or was wounded there was an official investigation and any commanders who did not do everything possible to avoid even one loss were held strictly accountable. I can give the names of commanders who held high posts in our army who, at great risk to their own lives, broke through to help their men who had fallen while surrounded. These include Gens Yu. Yarygin and P. Grachev, Cols Ye. Bocharov and A. Volkov, Lt Col A. Kinzerskiy and many, many others. And when our

soldiers have been surrounded they have always been confident that, regardless of what turn the battle may take, someone would hurry there to help them.

...In the spring of 85 in the province of Kunar an airborne company was destroyed. The rebels surrounded the section of ground in a thick ring. They had even managed to create an air defense system around the periphery of their position. The combat began at 1100 hours and by 1600 hours it was clear that neither our subdivisions nor the Afghan subdivision would manage to come to their aid. The command sent one group of helicopters for the airborne subdivisions and another was sent into battle—not to shoot their own men but to divert the forces of the enemy, which was greatly superior in numbers, from the rapidly fading company that was surrounded. The helicopters literally hung over the rebel positions and fired point blank. But the enemy was strong that day; there were too many rebels armed with the most modern weapons. And the drugs were doing their work. The enemy did not count their losses; a tasty morsel was in front of them—a surrounded company.

When it became clear to those who were surrounded that the matter was nearing a tragic outcome, where hand-to-hand combat in which one person would have to fight 30 rebels could not be avoided, and this meant that it was possible that there would be prisoners, the company commander began to ask the helicopter pilots to open fire on their own positions. But then none, listen, not one of the pilots could carry out this desperate request...

Of course this battle can no longer be discussed by the Sr Lt Vladimir Zadorozhnyy who, when an American grenade flew into his trench spun like a top, did something that probably not every soldier could do—he covered the grenade with his body. Lance corporal Aleksandr Koryavin cannot discuss this battle either. He shielded Lt Andrey Ivonin while he was dressing his wound. They cannot discuss this because the title of Hero was conferred upon them posthumously. But I hope this battle can be discussed by the helicopter pilots who took the fire of the rebels and the airborne troops who managed to come to their aid anyway. Those who came out of the battle alive, of course...

I wonder what Col Oleg Kucherenko thinks about A. D. Sakharov's statement. Breaking through the lines in his MI-8, he destroyed the rebel heavy machine guns and recoilless weapons, landed his vehicle under heavy fire, and, having taken a group of surrounded soldiers on board, by some miracle took off. It is not difficult to guess what is felt in the soul of the holder of the orders of Lenin and the Red Banner, Col Vladimir Kopchikov who along with his subordinates also broke through enemy lines and gathered up the living and the dead. And it was not in order to shoot their own brothers that Capts Sergey Blokhin and Mikhail Sarychev, risking their own lives, at night under fire landed their vehicles on one wheel on a mountain top, but in order to deliver the wounded to the hospital...

"The helicopter operators shot their own people..." Cold, cruel words. As if they were not people at the controls. And, after all, this impersonal accusation assumes the character of an accusation directed against the helicopter pilots—both the ones who lived and the ones who died. And then it seems that it was for the sake of "work" that the helicopter pilots Heroes of the Soviet Union Maj Vyacheslav Gaynutdinov, Maj Yuriy Grudinkin, and Capts Vyacheslav Kuzminov and Aleksandr Sadokhin died... This is how far the blasphemy can go.

My second book about the war in Afghanistan comes out this year. It tells about both of those who fought on land and those who fought in the air—the helicopter pilots. In the book I write about death and captivity and the parents who waited for their injured children and those whose sons will never come home. The very logic of what I saw and experienced suggested the title of the book—"Sons." Because our soldiers were sons for those who commanded them and for those helicopter pilots who, sometimes at the price of their own lives, saved them as if they were their sons by blood.

I know that all kinds of things happened in the Afghan war. But there was not a single commander who could give the monstrous order to shoot his own men. And I cannot imagine a single Afghan vet who could follow such an order.

I hope that Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov will give their due to those misinformers whom he so unquestioningly and irresponsibly believed. And that the question of who shot whom will not go unanswered.

Legality of Intervention, 'Murder' of Amin Questioned

*18120071 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE
in English No 1, Jan 89 pp 28-29*

[Article by L. Shcherbaty: "Educational Club?"]

[Text] I want to share some ideas about the preservation of world peace.

About military training of the younger generation and its preparation for military service in our country.

L. I. Brezhnev had proclaimed at a Party congress that our army is the best school for young people. This policy also continues in the period of perestroika. Youth of pre-military age put on lovingly the soldier's uniform, already used by others, live in the barracks, march in formation and master with enthusiasm the art to kill, as it was shown, for example, on April 30, 1988 in the first programme of the central TV, in the topic "The daring seven or...attack".

Or, let's take the interviews published with understanding and sympathy, granted by young people who served in the army and who assure that the army has made them

real men. However, it is a very interesting mechanism for shaping people! It is time to ponder what there is in store for our boys in the foreseeable future if an agreement is reached with potential opponents on a serious reduction of the army and armaments. Who will educate them if not the army?

It is clear that it's a long way to guaranteed general peace and the country needs efficient army. This is a forced, grim and sad necessity. But what is the use of the cult of barracks, military drilling and parading? Do the above mentioned TV programme and similar mass, general measures contribute to the creation in the world of an idea about the USSR as a peace-loving state.

And the praising of the bloody Afghan fighting fraternity. It is true that many Soviet soldiers and officers in Afghanistan fought courageously and quite a number of them were killed. But our leaders have not yet proved to the people that sending of Soviet troops in December 1979 and the murder of the then Afghan leader Amin and his close relatives, that immediately followed this event, were based on international law and that military invasion and direct participation in the civil war were not a tragic mistake. Isn't this why soldiers-internationalists are now praised for their deeds and urged to educate the raising generation to keep the powder dry for future international fighting campaigns?

About the rights and freedoms of a person in the country and in the world, their links with military security.

They say that one must respect the right of each nation to the choice of a socio-political system, that in the world there are different systems of human values, that one mustn't, under the cover of slogans about human rights, interfere in the internal affairs of other states.

Everything is correct at first glance, but there are such absolute human values as life, freedom, striving for happiness, truth, kindness, mercy. These values must be respected by all states, all political regimes. There is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, practically acknowledged by the entire world, and other international agreements on human rights. Their observance is not the internal affair of one state or another.

Besides, extremely dangerous for world peace are the violations precisely of political rights and freedoms of citizens. Not in South Africa, Chile, Paraguay or, say, in Albania or North Korea, but in the USSR, the USA and the People's Republic of China. Of course, the international community cannot be indifferent to racism in South Africa or the atrocities of dictatorial regimes of Pinochet and Stroessner. But let's put it frankly that South Africa or Chile cannot seriously (even if their leaders wish so) threaten universal peace. But the great powers are something different. If the peoples of the USSR and the USA—countries with huge military potential—don't use quite

informally political rights and freedoms, if they fail to really exercise control over their political leaders, universal peace will be extremely unstable.

Therefore, people of the world are not indifferent to how the superpowers observe the political rights of citizens, whether the citizens of these countries can really influence the policy of their governments. Hence, the observance of the citizens' rights in those countries is not the private affair of their governments and peoples. Accordingly, foreign demands on the observance of the above mentioned rights and freedoms cannot be regarded as unfounded interference in other people's internal affairs.

Our universal peace unsteadily rests on the mutual fear of opposing military blocs of the all-destructive might of nuclear weapons. Well, what will happen if nuclear weapons are destroyed or its stocks considerably reduced? In that case universal peace will be able to rest only on mutual East-West confidence, only on general respect for human values, on absolute respect by superpowers for elementary political rights and freedoms of their citizens, on rigid control over the state policy, and enlightened public opinion.

L. Shcherbaty

Borislav, Lvov region

Legality of Afghan Action, Concept of Internationalist Duty Questioned

18010506 Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian
25 Jan 89 p 2

[Letters to the editor: "Our Incessant Pain"]

[Text] A young man lived in the village of Rummu, Kharyusskiy Rayon. He attended elementary school and a tekhnikum, and played sports. He was a true friend and a good son... It came time to join the army, and he ended up in Afghanistan. He served honorably and fought courageously. And he died... Our correspondent A. Babin's feature-story, "From Eternity to Eternity," about Roman Sidorenko was published in MOLODEZH ESTONII on 27 October of last year.

Afterward, the editorial office received a letter from Roman's parents. It was perhaps somewhat unexpected in content for those not familiar with Gennadiy Konstantinovich and Aleksandra Mikhaylovna.

"Dear Editor!

Official propaganda presents the matter as if our sons, who have been called up for military service and sent to war in Afghanistan, are fulfilling their "internationalist duty" there, being soldier-internationalists, that is, volunteers. That they are allegedly helping the Afghan people to resist foreign intervention in their internal

affairs, thereby also defending our southern border. However, the whole course of events in Afghanistan very convincingly proves that this is not at all the case.

First of all, one must directly and definitely say that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, our sons were sent to Afghanistan not in accordance with their personal desires but in accordance with orders. Even our military authorities themselves do not deny this fact. But on what legal basis was this done? Neither the USSR Law on Universal Military Service nor the USSR Constitution, which is the basis for this law, gives them the right to forcibly send our sons to a war that has nothing at all to do with defending the fatherland. As concerns participation in the civil war of the Afghan people on the side of the Kabul authorities against the insurgent army of the feudal and clerical circles of Afghanistan, this is an absolutely voluntary matter for each citizen of our country and not an "internationalist" or any other kind of "duty." But the military authorities embarked on the path of violence and arbitrary rule and made our sons and us, their parents, hostages of the Afghan war.

Secondly, none of us, not to mention 18-year-old boys, has nor can have any sort of "internationalist duty" to Afghanistan or to any another country in the sense in which propaganda and the military authorities place it, using it to conceal their violence and arbitrary rule.

The propagandistic concept of "internationalist duty" is absurd, since it goes beyond common sense and logic: Can anyone, without demagoguery and lies, explain when our sons managed to become indebted to Afghanistan, and yet to such a degree that they had to pay for it with their lives?

Defining the concept of internationalism, V.I. Lenin wrote: "Internationalism is in fact one thing and only one: selfless work on developing the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's country; supporting (with propaganda, sympathy and materially) the same struggle, the same policy, and only it alone, in all countries without exception." There is no mention in Lenin's words about any kind of "duty." He does not even write about internationalist assistance, but precisely about support, and understanding that even this word may be too broadly interpreted, he deciphers it—support with propaganda, sympathy, and materially.

To what degree of immorality and cynicism does one need to sink, having changed the Leninist understanding of internationalism through a false concept of "internationalist duty," in order to force our young boys to pay for it with blood! This is appalling!

The press is now accusing Stalin of elevating demagoguery to the level of state policy. And really hasn't demagoguery about the "internationalist duty" been now elevated to that same level of state policy in our country? It has.

The military authorities took our son away from us secretly and in an underhanded manner. They hid their intention to send him to Afghanistan from us and from him. He prepared himself for service in the army, played sports, and we were happy for him. We did not seriously think that they could forcibly send him to war instead of to service in the army. We did not believe that the military authorities could send untrained 18-year-old boys to war. This seemed unbelievably preposterous and unnatural to us, and therefore unreal, too. The press was stubbornly silent about all of this (even now, it is silent about this barbarism). Propaganda is doing everything it can to make it appear that our sons went to Afghanistan voluntarily. We were once again convinced of this after your newspaper published A. Babin's feature-story "From Eternity to Eternity." Although we have talked with the author numerous times on the theme of "voluntariness" of going off to the Afghan war, emphasizing that there was no other way out for our boys (Afghanistan or an article of the Criminal Code), he nevertheless conveyed the false assertion that our son went to Afghanistan as a volunteer.

A coffin containing the body of our son arrived in Tallinn on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, but we still do not know why he was killed in Afghanistan (we regard as blasphemy the mocking sentence in his killed in battle notice about how he "fulfilled his internationalist duty") and who specifically is responsible for his death and the deaths of all of our sons in general in this country.

We believe that our letter has great social significance and therefore propose it be published in the pages of your newspaper. If you do not find it possible to do this, we ask that you let us know the reasons preventing this.

G.K. Sidorenko A.M. Sidorenko"

From the editor:

We decided to publish this letter after prolonged doubts. Of course, these doubts are connected not with a negative attitude toward glasnost and pluralism of opinions, but with the fear of troubling the inconsolable grief of many mothers and fathers. Nevertheless, we decided to fulfill the urgent request of Gennadiy Konstantinovich and Aleksandra Mikhaylovna, having first shown the letter to those who, in our view, have something to say in this regard.

A. Kiris, Estonian SSR Minister of Justice:

Any foreign policy decision can be right, or it can also be wrong. In this sense, an appraisal of the action of 1979—the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan—is given: The troops are being withdrawn. As far as the legal side of the issue is concerned, I do not see a violation of the law here. The USSR Constitution, write the letter's authors, "does not give the right to forcibly send our sons to war...." But, you see, the Basic Law also

does not prohibit sending military subunits wherever the state leadership deems it necessary to send them (unlike, let by the way, the constitutions of a number of foreign countries). So, I reiterate, there is no violation from a formal point of view. The moral side of the issue is another matter. And here I understand and share the feelings of the letter's authors.

Sr Lt G. Dolzhikov, Roman Sidorenko's former commander:

The political leadership, and not the military authorities, made the decision to send a limited military contingent to Afghanistan. The duty of the military, from marshals to privates, is to carry out orders. I do not want to discuss that decision, but I will say a few words about volunteering. Thus, Roman did not simply want to, he burned with desire to go to Afghanistan. He himself frequently told me this. And he was not the only one. The fact that he hid this desire from his parents is entirely natural for a loving son.... Do you know what our most serious punishment was? Dismissal from going out on missions. One soldier dismissed by me (for sleeping at his combat post) literally knelt in front of me: Punish me in any way you want, he said, only not this way.... And it is easy to understand his condition, especially in those minutes when comrades were returning after completing the mission and were reminiscing and discussing details. Thus, the majority of them wanted to go into battle, and those who did not want to take risks we did not force to, but assigned them to internal service... Such was the atmosphere; but Roman, through his impetuosity, stood out even against this background. I can confirm this by one more episode which was not in the special feature about him. When we had to send him to a rehabilitation center in the rear for 45 days when he was sick with jaundice, he did not show up at the aircraft and hid...

A fellow-student of mine, who served in the training regiment for a long time, told me about it in detail. "Training" is divided into three categories. First are those who categorically did not want to serve in Afghanistan; second, those who were indifferent; and, third, and most numerous, were those who sincerely wanted to go to Afghanistan. Of course, the training period for soldiers should probably be a little longer; however, even 6 months was sufficient to master the required skills. Of course, that is if the lad himself strove for this, and especially if he arrived at the "training" sufficiently prepared. (Alas, this was not often the case: the preparation of youth undergoing pre-conscription training for military service is simply oppressive. However, this is already another problem.)

I. Zhivilova, mother of Andrey Zhivilov who died in Afghanistan (our newspaper also told about him):

I do not think that this letter has much social significance. What is more, I would have withheld it from publication altogether. It is painful for us, parents of those who died in Afghanistan, to read this. Understand,

I sincerely believed in the need for our troops to be there, and when word arrived about my son's death, my grief was mixed with a sense of pride: He had fulfilled his internationalist duty. And now, when voices are all the more frequently crying out that all of this was in vain, I relive the grief. Glasnost is glasnost, but it would be best if they would keep silent about Afghanistan. This is painful, believe me... Did Andrey want to go there? Possibly. But in any case, it would never have entered my mind, unlike other parents, to try to prevent this in any way: An oath is an oath, and one must be true to it to the end. His first letters were cheerful and patriotic. But later, from time to time a question began to creep in: "Why am I here?" All the same, I never had any doubts that he was needed there.

It is not for me to judge how advisable our leadership's decision to send troops to that country was, but I would like to support the Sidorenkos in one thing. Anyway, it was probably necessary to send volunteers who had already finished their service (I'm sure they could have found such people), but not 18-year-old boys, barely torn away from their mothers. I just cannot agree with the tone of the letter, which is so aggressive. Although I, too, understand their feelings, possibly more than others, but what is this for? What is its purpose? In order to name "those specifically responsible?" Oh, if only this could raise our sons from the grave....

The Editor's Point of View:

It is probably true that there were quite a few young people who wanted to test themselves, of their own free will, through Afghanistan. A sincere, pure desire.... And most of them handled the experience with honor and proved themselves courageously in this country, and many heroically. We lost thousands of lads in the Afghan war; even more returned to their homeland wounded and maimed, having fulfilled their internationalist duty. Loyalty to duty.... This is a quality which is generally characteristic of our people. Therefore, this is all the more reason why the state should be responsible to society, including to those of its sons who have returned from Afghanistan. And when facts are brought to light (and, in our republic, this happens) that former "Afghan fighters" encounter the callousness and heartlessness of bureaucrats while attempting to take advantage of legitimate benefits, there is no justification for this.

We think that an appraisal of this action (as with any other) of our country's previous political leadership is nevertheless necessary. No matter how strict it would be, it cannot and should not detract in the least from the value of the heroic deeds of our fellow-countrymen in Afghanistan. They are both our pain and our pride.

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