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
Political Affairs

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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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Kezbers on Coexistence of Party, Other Social Organizations

18000412a Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 21 Jan 89 p 4

[Interview with Ivar Yanovich Kezbers, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee secretary, by E. Govorushko and A. Kamenev: "In Order To Wage a Political Struggle It Is Necessary to Move out of the Trenches"; date not specified]

[Text] Riga—Perestroyka has changed the sociopolitical situation in the country and hence the conditions in which the party organizations have to operate. A reform of the political system is under way, encountering, incidentally, opposition from conservative forces. And one of the new realities is the various public organizations that are actively pushing their own programs, sometimes not aimed at supporting perestroyka in everything, but often at a re-examination of the very principles of socialist statehood. This kind of situation has taken shape, in particular, in Latvia; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA has written about this on more than one occasion. Is the republic party organization ready for vigorous political activity under these conditions? This is the theme of a conversation between our special correspondents and Ivar Yanovich Kezbers, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee secretary.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] Almost 4 years ago the party, or more precisely its best forces, called "Enough!" Without perestroyka catastrophe was inevitable. It is time to come down from the rostrum and do some work. And in Latvia, as in many regions, a powerful impulse was also felt from below, seen in the birth and activation of numerous public formations—these "children of perestroyka." We know that you have no lack of them...

[Kezbers] These are rather the "natural children" of the party and soviet apparatus, the Komsomol, the trade unions, DOSAAF, the society for the preservation of nature and monuments, and the organs of people's control from the times of stagnation—all those who were reluctant or unable to get down to business. They are the natural reaction to many of the urgent problems, including political problems. And even more to the fact that perestroyka is not proceeding as rapidly as might be desired, and that in some places it is encountering either hidden or open opposition, and sometimes open sabotage. I am convinced that it is precisely reaction to the idleness that has been so prevalent both in the past and now that people who are socially and politically active have emerged to set their own position and program for action in opposition to the general apathy. And this, of course, has also facilitated the course toward democratization and the development of glasnost.

It is understandable that in these short but stormy periods we have not managed to cope with all problems. Some public formations sincerely want our help. Others, intoxicated with the process of democratization, are

reluctant to face the reality and are making unacceptable demands and advancing unacceptable programs. But we must not brush this aside, and we must clearly recognize that the "children" have been born and will grow. We must talk with them in normal human language and not just brandish our fists. And we must still learn to predict and accept the far from simple processes that are taking place, and the increase in public activeness. The time has finally come to sweep aside everything that was born not in offices but on the squares. But it has been difficult for us to come to an understanding of the fact that from both the political and undoubtedly also the legal standpoint, any public activity must be recognized if, of course, it is not at variance with the interests of socialism and, of course, the country's Constitution.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] You talk about the need for close cooperation with the various movements and formations. How do you see it? How does their structure in the republic seem to you?

[Kezbers] Some are numerous and organized, like the People's Front of Latvia or the International Front of the Workers of Latvia (SOVETSKAYA KULTURA has discussed these public movements in the article "The Line of the 'Front.' From Confrontation to Consolidation" in the issue of 6 December 1988—author's note), and have already presented themselves as a serious sociopolitical force. Others are considerably less numerous but much more... how would one say it? Impatient. The Environmental Protection Club is becoming actively politicized. Many youth associations and clubs have emerged, and not only in the leisure sphere. The Student Union and the Union of Schoolchildren are now in the organizational stage...

But there are also others, as, for example, the Helsinki-86 group or the Movement for Latvian Independence, whose program is not simply antagonistic toward the republic communist party but even antisocialist.

Our attitude toward all these public movements is unambiguous and principled: everything that is useful for perestroyka we welcome and support in every possible way, although I must say honestly that it would be quieter without some of them. We need the efforts of the People's Front, Interfront and the other movements and associations whose activity is aimed at accelerating perestroyka in the economy, developing democracy, and strengthening our socialist system. But all the extremist slogans like "Latvia for the Latvians" and all who are at variance with the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference do not enjoy our support, and we have repeatedly stated this. We cannot permit a split in society on any of these principles, national or social. And we shall fight against extremism in any form, opposing it with the active and, the main thing, constructive position of the communists, of whom, incidentally, there are many in the People's Front and Interfront. We do not have the right to leave unanswered any political slogan that is unsupported by a constructive program. Juggling

with sometimes extremely dubious slogans and tendentiously interpreting the unambiguous milestones in the history of our republic is dangerous. History must be comprehended and the lessons drawn from it, so that there is no repetition of past, and sometimes tragic errors (and what errors!), but they must not be used for the purpose of exacerbating the domestic political situation.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] However, all of this remains just declaration if the republic communist party just (to use an apt expression) sits in the trenches and, as before, avoids sharp political discussion, as has repeatedly happened at numerous meetings in the last 18 months, and fails to engage in specific political work, and if it delays perestroika of the economic mechanism in the republic, and if the initiative in solving any urgent question is taken not by the republic communist party central committee but by some other public organization or association. For this, you will agree, is what has already happened. It was not you but the creative unions that beat the alarm about the national language. Neither have you spoken on the question of extensive methods in management and their consequences. And Memorial Day for the victims of the Stalinist deportations and repressions was first marked in the republic not at the initiative of the party or soviet organizations...

[Kezbers] It cannot be denied that we have really been unprepared for the explosion of political activeness by the people. Of course, this can be explained by the fact that under the conditions of pressure on any kind of different thinking, party workers learned, so to speak, or more accurately, simply had no need to learn to conduct political work, and they got out of the habit of or simply did not know how to debate and even less make operational decisions to eliminate any kind of deformation—social, economic or cultural, not to mention political. They also did not know how to conduct themselves in unusual situations and so, to be candid, we also lost the initiative and sat in the trenches in a defensive position.

Yes, there is a real link between the problems that have taken shape in our republic against the backdrop of issues in interethnic relations that were supposedly resolved long ago. And now a multitude of unexpected questions have appeared and we have simply been unable to provide answers, and have lost the initiative.

Yes, there is something to be said here. We did not know what was staring us in the face, but they could see it in the various presidiums. Artistes and artists and writers are known and people listen to them and believe them. They do not know us. And even though we were there at the primary meetings we preferred to stand off to the side: "it is recommended" that some particular person "not speak," that some particular person not appear, that someone not be given the opportunity to speak. In general we were incapable of engaging in political discussions. We had to learn this science.

We recognize, however, that it is easier for alternative movements and associations: they have not engaged in management and economic activity, have not made mistakes, have not turned any elections into a farce in voting for only one candidate. They actively take advantage of our mistakes and build their work on them.

But, of course, it is much easier just to criticize. The Riga Cement and Slate Plant is polluting the atmosphere, for example—close it! The Slokskiy Pulp-and-Paper Combine is killing us—close it! And we would like to close all these harmful production facilities. But we have a concern here: how to compensate for the manufacture of a product as essential as cement, or paper that is in such short supply? If we close down a production facility without thinking about reserves, or if we upset construction or the publication of books, we again come under the fire of criticism. But none of our opponents is suggesting other solutions—closed production cycles or waste-free and safe technologies.

Yes, and in particular cases it is necessary to close down plants or alter what they produce, not to construct a nuclear power station, if the technology or the site are deemed unsuccessful. In Sweden, where I worked for several years, there are eight nuclear power stations on line, and new ones are being built. This means that there is another solution: waste-free, ecologically clean and safe technologies. What are needed are funding and time. But our opponents are so impatient. And, incidentally, they are in no rush to offer their services in drawing up new programs. Closure without alternatives is not a program. It is much easier to play the role of pike in a river in order to keep the carp awake. I, for example, would very much like to ask that same People's Front a specific question about, say, housing construction or the ecology. Let it draw up an economically sound program and help to implement it. I give you my word, if this happens I shall not criticize but help in every possible way. Noisy slogans are one thing but a specific economy, without which no policy can be realized, is quite another. We are ready to cooperate in solving all these problems.

But be that as it may, we must move on to discussion and explanation without camouflaging our program and position or our view of any particular problem. And decisions must be made. Otherwise, in the future, too, we shall lose much of the initiative even though we know that some particular question will come up notwithstanding. And we cannot always expect that to be prompted from below.

For example, agreement was reached on routing trains with dangerous chemical freight around Yurmala, but people were not informed of this; we must once again take counsel with them and work things out. And take the fate of the national flag—the red-white-red flag—which has recently been declared to be a cultural-historical attribute. In Lithuania the national flag has already been recognized as the official flag. We still have to decide this. I was brought up under quite a different flag

but this does not mean that I must oppose a national flag. A ban on that flag will lead to no good. Remember how we fought about Christmas and Ligo Day, but these holidays have long since lost their religious significance and have become popular holidays. And the red-white-red flag is a symbol of the people and its recognition will not return us to a bourgeois system; it is recognition of a significant milestone in the history of the Latvian people. For in Poland and Czechoslovakia, which, incidentally, recently marked the 70th anniversary of their own statehood, the national flags in no way symbolize something bourgeois. And is it worth artificially tearing out and remaining silent about a period of the 20 years in the life of the people and the republic, namely, the Twenties and Thirties? It means that we should not postpone a decision on this question, waiting for some movement to declare that the national flag is the official flag, otherwise we shall again be led by the bridle. Ah, no! I can hear it all: let us get together again, seek advice. Just as in Sweden: when they want to frustrate something they set up a commission and begin "discussions." Do we not have enough of this?

In general we can no longer sit in the trenches but must in all matters look around for an idea and seize the initiative from our opponents.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] But is there someone to look at these ideas and take the initiative? You will agree that among party workers there are not so many real political workers and many of them are simply clerks, not fighters but executives. And the last accountability-and-election campaign showed that the authority of the party committees and their workers has been largely lost, and that many raykom and gorkom secretaries have no concept of political leadership and are therefore only leaders according to some schedule of appointments, in accordance with the armchair that they occupy.

[Kezbers] Alas! this is so. Moreover, we have seen that many of our workers directly miss the administrative methods of leadership. And it is even beyond their power to use them unless they receive instructions from us to satisfy their unquenchable thirst. They do not lack for instructions and recommendations! It is simply a horror! For one really must be a politician! You have the strategic lines of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference and you orient yourself on them and decide on the tactics for your own rayon or city. For you will not read it in the newspaper... And it is not such a rarity for our party workers to possess only the usual stock phrases and cliches. And in a political discussion or political struggle with them you will not win, and even a defensive parapet will not keep them out; all that they can do is wreck things.

And so everyone must think for himself and not wait for an invitation to the central committee to get his instructions. We must be accumulators and generators of ideas

and programs, the organizers of major political campaigns, the people who work on the fundamental problems, and we must not engage in trivial matters. To remain in one's earlier position means to accept defeat.

During the last accountability-and-election campaign we lost more than 30 secretaries, including 9 first secretaries. Previously this would have been considered a major extraordinary event and we would have thundered it across the entire country. Today this is merely a subject for in-depth analysis, for perestroyka in work with cadres, for reviewing the present image of the leader. And, finally, for recognizing that the elections are a struggle in which each candidate offers his own ideas and programs. The time of automatic voting that was used to cover appointment to some post is over.

We foresaw the change in cadres and the losses. But they turned out to be even more painful. The failure of some caught us unawares. But should these events be dramatized? For this is the way it had to be. And it would be easy and simple to explain everything by the activeness of alternative groups and unofficial bodies, and the People's Front. The losers were themselves to blame. They did not have a clear and precise program of action that communists in the rayon could support. They hoped that the central committee would stand up for them as it had repeatedly in the past. But the People's Front of Latvia, whose ranks include, as you know, many communists, called for support for those who had a constructive election platform and who enjoyed authority. And they won. This was a serious lesson for us.

Be that as it may, quite new party leaders have now emerged here, leaders who did not appear on the lists of reserves but rather became leaders in their own rayons. True, some people think that we have a serious minus here, namely, that they are not familiar with apparatus work. But is this such a big minus? Because for someone who is thoroughly familiar with it and who was shaped during the notorious period of stagnation and worked during that period, it is more difficult to abandon the tried but largely compromised forms and methods of work, whether it be party, economic or political work. Of course, all of us, not counting the veterans, must rely more on the new people, the people who are out of the ordinary and who think and act in a non-standard way, because it is only with new ideas that it is possible to move ahead.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] Even when talking about past years you are all the time saying "we," "ours" even though...

[Kezbers] I understand, do not go on. In fact my time spent as a secretary has been just over 2 months. So how can I divide things into "before me" and "during my time"? Because for the people with whom I talk and enter into dispute were not there for me before my appointment. For them I am a secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] And you became a secretary...

[Kezbers] Quite unexpectedly. My expertise is in law. By profession I am more of a journalist even though my candidate degree is in jurisprudence. It has come about that in my 44 years I have changed my work several times. I was in Komsomol work, then in the state committee for radio. For several years I did diplomatic work, in Sweden, as I have already said. I was chief of the republic State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. For some years I worked as deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. I returned to Riga where it was suggested that I head up the State Committee for Culture that was being set up. I just managed to get to know people and work on the initial concept for developing the sector when I had to pass on my business to maestro Raymond Pauls. Incidentally, he was the first non-party minister in our government.

And at that plenum I was opposed by an experienced party worker and I was not elected unanimously; it was a 3:2 ratio in my favor. How do I explain this? I think that 60 percent of central committee members preferred me only because they were expecting non-standard work, assuming that once I was in apparatus work I would not be a very big "expert"... In general you have to justify the trust placed in you. And I immediately proposed that the second candidate to head up the central committee ideological department, for of course, we need his experience. I think in general that it is possible to increase activity in working on new ideas and concepts.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] To judge from everything, you have ideas enough, and not only you...

[Kezbers] As you say. But anything and everything can be subverted by excess. Constructive ideas are more complicated. For example, during the recent discussion of draft laws the associates of our academy institute of philosophy and law were unable to help us: no fresh ideas, no new initiative. There was merely agreement on almost everything in the drafts. And even the approach was strange: what is there to discuss? they said. They can see things better in Moscow. But the Duma of the People's Front of Latvia invited young and quite strong jurists, who were incidentally communists, and they offered an entire package of proposals, many of which were adopted by the session of our Supreme Soviet and then taken into account in the final version of the laws.

Our political experts and theoreticians are lagging behind practical work, failing to keep up with life's rapidly changing currents, and are unable to analyze what is happening, not to mention predicting any given sociopolitical situation. Today we would very much like to define from scientific positions the degree of stability and viability in our two fronts—the People's Front and the International Front. And we would like to approach

criticism of extreme positions in many of the public associations from a position of scientific prediction. We are still somewhat weak in this area.

Today, however, it is clear that it is dangerous to underestimate the possibility of the emergence of sharp political, social and national conflicts. It must be recognized that the growing national tension is obvious. And hotbeds of that tensions exist not only here in the Baltic or the Transcaucasus but also in a number of the major cities of Russia. No, we did not think that the first steps in democratization expressed in asseveration of glasnost and human rights and freedoms would lead not only to democratic but also nationalistic and chauvinist and even fascist groupings. It has been like letting the genie out of the bottle. They have done much harm to perestroika. And in the confrontation with them it is very important to discern what is rational in the other movements, and not to wreck them. In order to overcome the negative phenomena, both relapses into the period of stagnation and those born out of the present stormy processes, what is required is not only great effort but also the time, without which we shall not accomplish much.

One thing can be said for sure: perestroika and the democratization of society mean hothouse conditions for the operation of the party and its apparatus and indeed for each communist, and the sooner each of us grasps this the better the outcome will be. Today there is only one way to state the issue: either you are a politician or you are hiding behind the scenes.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] We have already said that there are too many executives among party workers. Today the forms and methods of work are changing and new people are coming in. They are politicians. And what does this mean? For today, politicians also include those who do not hold political posts.

[Kezbers] This is true. Take writers and journalists—the most real of politicians. A politician is a person who does not reject dispute in order to defend his position through argument; who adopts and maintains a different viewpoint if it is constructive. He is a person who has a theory and has done practical work in the political struggle, who is competent in matters of current policy and in social and economic questions. I, for example, am not an agricultural specialist but if I cannot formulate the general principles of our agrarian policy I shall be unable to explain why given our 84 statistical kilograms of meat per capita in the republic we have empty stores, and I shall be unable to formulate the prospects for the development of the leasehold contract or my own viewpoint on the problems of farmers and leaseholders; I would have to be retired. And immediately.

The situation today in the republic demands party and state control over the activity of the various public movements and preservation of their constitutional nature. I believe that we now need the kind of policy that

would insure reasonable compromise between further growth in the political activeness of the masses and the maintenance of law and order and the impermissibility of violent forms to resolve conflicts.

The tasks associated with perestroika are complex, and there are many obstacles. Finding solutions for some problems gives rise to other more complicated problems. What is needed is an in-depth, well-considered strategy, but we have no time to work on this calmly for we must also resolve numerous current and quite specific questions. But there is nowhere to retreat. And so the political worker today cannot work half-heartedly. And here I must say that it is the journalists and not alas! the theoreticians who are helping the party worker to stay in the mainstream of events, analyze the situation and discern the best way ahead. And I do not understand those who from the various rostrums pour down a direct hatred on journalists and newspaper people, almost accusing them of being to blame for the complexities with which we must grapple. It is not the journalists who are to blame for the difficulties. And it will be more difficult; we are moving toward elections that will be held in quite new conditions. We need an election platform with which the party will go to the elections. To the point, we have entrusted two groups of experts to work on this platform. We shall look and compare and select the best model or create a new one on the basis of what is proposed.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] An election platform?.. You will agree that there is something unusual in this.

[Kezbers] Possibly. We must grow used to it. An election platform is now very necessary. We must provide clear-cut and specific assistance for our candidates to work on the program with which they will go to the voters and which they will defend when they have become deputies. Moreover, the republic communist party must be ready during the course of the election campaign and during the elections themselves for any kind of unusual situation. Because the earlier approach is today quite unacceptable, it has completely compromised itself. And, indeed, how could it be otherwise?

I remember how the raykom secretaries and candidate deputies asked us a question before their meeting with voters: where is the "blank." We used to make extensive use of notebooks that the common folk called "blanks." They contained many common phrases, and between the phrases there was space to write in the positive and negative examples for a particular rayon or enterprise: five for praising, three for criticizing, and that was that. Everyone hustled about. Then the person appointed speaks using a "blank" that his candidate has never before set eyes on...

This was organized profanation of the election process. Now the politically mature voters give us no chance to employ this measure. But we, the party, leading perestroika in society and social relations must attune ourselves not to measures but to struggle, and struggle

against quite active radicals who make unacceptable demands, and people who are very active in their unwillingness for change and perestroika. Today the election meetings are attended by people uninvited on the official lists, anyone who so desires, and they include not just the supporters of the candidate who has been nominated. And the "blanks" are now no good, just as not everyone agrees on the candidate. And therefore we will recommend really worthy people, even if they are inconvenient for us, as long as they are active and have their own concept for improving things. And there is more: we have "images" of them. So that everyone will know what they are, what their path through life has been, what their world outlook is, what position they have taken on particular issues, what their programs are, what their family is like. Candidates must speak on radio and television and in the press, give press conferences and engage in debate. If someone is up for election, say, in a rural district, he goes there not for just a day, as previously, but for 2 or 3 weeks, with a mandatory team of consultants and experts who help him right there, and amend or even work on his program to solve the rayon's urgent problems, the program that he will defend in the interests of his electors.

I can imagine how difficult it is to be a candidate for Ventspils, which is now experiencing an ecological tragedy—a plant to produce ammonia has been located there. The city is very sick, practically poisoned. Many newborn infants come into the world with some pathology; I know this not from the reports but because my sister works in a maternity unit there. And if he is counting on success a candidate must propose a set of realistic and urgent measures to resolve the crisis, along with a long-term program supported by the authority of the state. His election platform must be such that it would enable us to seize the initiative, and it should be unexpected, even shocking. And his opponents, of course, will not be sitting on their hands.

The election struggle, for it is indeed precisely a struggle that we wage, is unity of initiative and action. And this must be clearly recognized if we want to bring perestroika to victory.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] Unfortunately, the almost 4 years of perestroika have shown that our economic mechanism and the financial and planning system are creaking as they turn, and are not advancing political or even economic initiative...

[Kezbers] And herein lies the greatest difficulty for us party workers. We must demonstrate unity of word and deed already today, but what is happening is that we just make promises, and this affects trust in our word, no matter how fiery it might be. We may appeal to the leaseholder for a long time, but if he is not convinced that the land will be passed to him and his successors for use in perpetuity for a particular annual payment, as today it is done gratis for the sovkhoses and kolkhozes, the new farmer will hardly become the true master of

that land, just as he has never been the true master on kolkhoz land. He must have guarantees that must be provided by the ruling party.

In short, it is not possible to rely long on an empty ideology. But we simply do not listen; not the Gosplan, not the country's Council of Ministers, not the various ministries. But we could do a great deal, for example, to define measures to change our lives for the better. After allowing for inflation growth, we can add, say, 10 percent to wages by way of compensation. Other measures could be implemented. We cannot make purchases abroad, we have no foreign currency since the industry now operating in the republic provides exports of only 15 million dollars. Shamefully little. Although our entire industry exports considerably more.

To the point: dollars. When the People's Front of Latvia advocates Latvia's admission to the United Nations I think not so much about the political impossibility of this action but rather the economic inexpediency: UN

membership will cost 5.5 million dollars a year! Is this not a lot for our ministry of foreign affairs to raise our flag twice a year on the flagstaff in New York?

But these are just words. In order to make words and deeds as one, in order to implement our policy we need economic sovereignty and full republic cost accounting. Work on these concepts and their realization must proceed with maximum glasnost; we must overcome the obstacles along the path with all the people. Only then shall we retain their trust in our political initiatives...

[Govorushko, Kamenev] ... which, to judge from our conversation, will not happen if we just sit in the trenches. And because...

[Kezbers] Quite right. And then I repeat: in order to wage the political struggle we must get out of the trenches.

[Govorushko, Kamenev] So, we wish you success.

**CPSU CC Ignores Letter Written by Children of
Repressed Party Functionaries**

*18300230a Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No 44, Nov 88 p 6*

[Letters, under the "ABC's of Glasnost" rubric: "By Right of Conscience"]

[Text] In OGONEK No 25 for June 1988, a letter dated 14 February 1966 was published under the new rubric, "ABC's of Glasnost." The letter, signed by 25 prominent figures from Soviet science, literature and the arts, spoke out against the attempts which were then being made to partially or indirectly rehabilitate Stalin. It is well-known that this letter, addressed to L.I. Brezhnev, was supported by 13 other figures who are well-known in our country, who sent a new letter to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. Among these were A. Alikhanov, V. Dudintsev, I. Ilinskiy, V. Muradeli, S. Smirnov, G. Chukhray, I. Erenburg, and others. However, Brezhnev and his cohorts from the "very pinnacle of stagnation," had moved further, creating an atmosphere which made for approval of Stalin's arbitrary rule, his administrative-command system, and his lordly bureaucratic methods of running the country, the party and every individual collective. This they had to do in order to cover up their own arbitrary rule, corruption, embezzlement and bribe-taking. In the centenary year of celebration of Lenin's birth, by Brezhnev's order a memorial was placed next to the Kremlin wall at Stalin's tomb. And the hopes expressed in the above-mentioned letters, that "re-examination of the decisions of the 20th and 22nd Congresses on the question of the personality cult would not take place," were dashed. A new cult and new tyranny were becoming increasingly entrenched in the country.

And after all, sufficient time had passed for the policy to be weighed and changed. That is just what the letter from the children of the party members unjustly repressed by Stalin called for. The idea of writing it appeared in the very same period which gave birth to the letters from the 25 and 13 prominent figures. Preparation of the text was entrusted to me, and the signatures were gathered under a letter from Petr Yakir and myself. In all, three copies had been signed. One was sent to the CPSU Central Committee; I sent one to historian Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, who was at that time working on his book, "Let History Judge;" and P.I. Yakir kept one copy. As far as I know, the two last signed copies were confiscated during searches at Medvedev's and Yakir's place. The original copy, signed by 42 comrades, remained at the CPSU Central Committee. At that time Yakir and I were phoning the secretariat of the party central committee almost every day; we wanted to believe that truth would win out and that the ideals of the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses would be victorious. About a month or two after we sent the letter to the CPSU Central Committee, we received the explanation that all the secretaries of the party central committee were familiar with the letter, and that they would send us an answer. However, no reply was received from the CPSU Central Committee at my address, which

was given as the return address, nor at the address of anyone else who had signed the letter; and the campaign to "restore the political reputation" of Stalin and his methods of ruling the country and the party spread more and more widely throughout the country.

But it could have been worse. I am confident that the letter we sent to the CPSU Central Committee, just as other letters on similar questions, set up certain barriers in the path of resurrecting Stalinism; they served to formulate public consciousness, and prepared the way for the time which we now call perestroika. The fate of the 42 comrades who had affixed their signatures to the aforementioned letters varied. Several of them are no longer among the living. I have preserved only a typewritten text of our letter, which I am sending to the editors of OGONEK. I hope that it can be published, and that it will be of value to our history and to the new generations of the Motherland of the October Revolution who study history.

Respectfully,
L. Petrovskiy,
CPSU member since 1962.

**TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
From the Surviving Children of the Communists
Unjustly Repressed by Stalin**

24 September 1967

At the present time the "merits" of Stalin are being propagandized from rostrums, in the press, and on radio and television. In fact, this represents political revision of the resolutions of the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses.

We find this alarming. And not only because our parents and we ourselves, just as millions of other people, had become victims of the criminal machine created by Stalin. It is hard for us to comprehend that at one time the masses were cruelly deceived into approving tyranny.

This must not be repeated. Resurrection of the past places the ideals of communism in jeopardy, discredits our system, and equates the deaths of millions of innocent people to a natural phenomenon.

Any attempts to whitewash the dark deeds of Stalin are fraught with the danger of repeating the terrible tragedy of our party, and that of our entire nation and the communist movement as a whole.

The tragic events in China once again oblige all of us to work out guarantees against repetition of such catastrophes. Only the whole truth about all the crimes of Stalin and his cohorts is capable of giving rise to the movement, the feelings and the public indignation which can eliminate all the consequences of the Stalin personality cult, and make it impossible for cults and tyranny to rise anew.

How, after all that our people and the whole international communist movement have lived through, can one praise Stalin? This hinders our progress, weakens our ranks, undermines our strength, and makes the achievement of communism unattainable.

As we celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution, we must come forth under party banners which proclaim the immortal name of Lenin, the utmost of democracy and collective leadership, and social self-rule. Such banners represent the best monument to the people who were killed by the hellish machine of the personality cult. To this day certain of them are unjustly stigmatized, and the names of others are apt to be forgotten. History will return them to the party and the people.

The monument promised by the 22nd CPSU Congress for the victims of tyranny should be raised up now, on the eve of the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet State. During the days of celebration the fighters for a world October Revolution will be with us. Their numbers are countless: from the prominent party leaders to the common soldiers of the revolution. But there is no room for the name of a despot on the party banners.

We ask consideration for everything stated herein, and that our letter be considered an integral part of the struggle for communism. We hope that this letter will help forestall an unwarranted error.

P. Yakir, L. Petrovskiy, A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, Yu. Larin-Bukharin, Yu. Vavilov, I. Pyatnitskiy, N. Yenukidze, A. Boki, S. Radek, I. Shlyapnikova, A. Gast'ev, Yu. Aykhenvald, M. Ivanov (Kalinin), Z. Serebryakova, G. Akulov, S. Stankova (Osinskaya-Obolenskaya), V. Terlin, G. Poleshchuk (Muralova), S. Fedorova, V. Schmidt, G. Krapivnyanskiy, T. Bayeva, I. Yakir, A. Vsesv'yatskaya, Yu. Sapronov, Zh. Zonbert, V. Blyumfeld, N. Pochinshchikov, N. Popov, N. Demchenko, V. Shvartshteyn, Yu. Kim, G. Troitskaya, A. Dimze-Berzin, T. Smilga-Poluyan, L. Zavadskiy, S. Svetlov, A. Berzin, L. Bogoraz, K. Belotskiy, S. Genkin, and Yu. Zhivlyuk.

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Shubkin Calls for Publishing Official Data on Stalin's Victims

18300230b Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No 44, Nov 88 p 7

[Letter to the editor from Prof. V. Shubkin, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Restore Justice"]

[Text] My father, Nikolay Feoktistovich Shubkin, a non-party member, was for many years a teacher of language and literature in the Altay; he had been teaching literature since the days of the pre-revolutionary gymnasium, and later taught in the secondary schools. In 1937, father was arrested by the organs of the NKVD. To all of our queries about his fate, we received the standard

response: "Ten years without right of correspondence." In 1956 I received a certificate from the presidium of the Altay Kray Court, stating: "The decree of the Altay Kray NKVD Administration Troika of 25 September 1937 with respect to Shubkin, Nikolay Feoktistovich, has been repealed and the case is closed." But in May of 1955 I had been issued a death certificate, I-BYu No 001605, indicating that Shubkin N.F. had died on 19 March 1944. But the place of death had been simply crossed out on the certificate, as if there were no such place.

I would like to make special mention of the date of my father's death. As we stood in the endless queues at various windows at the NKVD, where they allegedly provided information about those who had been arrested, we who stood there were convinced that, "Ten years without right of correspondence," meant the firing squad. Could one then believe the official death certificate, which affirms that Shubkin, N.F., died in 1944?

Prominent Soviet demographers have told me about the attempts undertaken by our home-bred falsifiers of history—Stalinists—to switch the dates of death of those who were shot to other years, and to the war years in particular, in order to whitewash Stalin, in order that it did not appear that too many people had perished in the years 1937-38. There, they said, they could all be written off to the war.

It is the political and moral obligation of the organs—which have in their possession all the relevant archives, and which know the people who were directly involved in conducting the mass repressions—to conduct extensive investigations in order to finally provide answers to the questions which have been disturbing millions of Soviet people. Did the formula, "Ten years without right of correspondence," signify the firing squad? When did our parents and relatives, including Nikolay Feoktistovich Shubkin, actually die? And where are their graves?

They should also publish the names of everyone who sat on the troikas, who conducted the investigations, who passed the sentences. They deserve criminal prosecution, but right now the last thing we need is thousands of new court cases. However, their names should be stated also, and not only the names of Vyshinskiy, Ulrikh, Matulevich, and Rychkov, those who meted out punishment from the highest echelons of power.

Finally, the numbers of those annihilated by Stalin and his henchmen during the period of collectivization should also be stated—as well as the numbers of those annihilated and tormented in the prisons and camps in the years 1937-1938, when not only dozens of people from the political leadership, of which the press reports from time to time, but also millions of workers, peasants, intelligentsiya, party-members and non-party members perished.

To restore justice on their behalf and on behalf of their parents and relatives, who for decades have been subjected to persecution, belittling and discrimination, is our moral and civil duty.

And the last thing: In speaking about a memorial, we should support the millions of Soviet people who are demanding the erection of memorials to the victims of Stalin's terror—and not only in Moscow, but in other cities as well, and at all places of mass execution and burial—as an eternal reminder of retribution, that truly no one will forget, and that nothing will be forgotten.

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Khrushchev's Activities Reexamined
18300231a Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 20 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by Oleg Volobuyev and Sergey Kuleshov: "The Two Colors of Time"]

[Text] Each stage of perestroika forces us to turn again and against to history. The gaze into the past is focused on a range of problems to be resolved by Soviet society and the associated assessments of the activities of political leaders of preceding decades. A special place among them is occupied by N.S. Khrushchev who at the 20th CPSU Congress initiated the struggle against the personality cult of Stalin and who in the mid-Fifties and early Sixties tried to accomplish a number of reforms. M.S. Gorbachev referred to this at a recent meeting with young people of Moscow and the Moscow area. He remarked that much of what we are now doing began there at the 20th and 22nd party congresses, and he appealed to us to think about why the major and far-reaching decisions outlined at that time failed and turned out to be emasculated and insubstantial.

Personality

Public opinion about N.S. Khrushchev is sharply split: attitudes toward him are most often either sharply negative or particularly positive. For more than 20 years has been taboo: his name was hushed up and no objective assessment was made of the activity of the third leader in the chronology of the CPSU. Even his funeral was a family affair at the Novodevichye cemetery, with no official ceremonies or condolences. In Brezhnev's memoirs Khrushchev was not even mentioned. It was as if the 10 or more years in the history of the country and the party associated with this CPSU Central Committee first secretary had never been.

And so Khrushchev and "his decade" is remembered in different ways. Those whom he freed from the hell of isolated life in the camps or in exile, those to whom he returned the good names of their parents and relatives not only refer to him with gratitude but also gather on his birthday or bring flowers to his memorial in the Novodevichye cemetery. Those who today are fighting for perestroika, those who all their lives have understood

the need for changes, think about the late Fifties and early Sixties as the time of the first stirrings of the process of the movement for the renewal of society and about the unrealized hopes of those times. For people who maintain their belief in what they learned in the Thirties and Forties, Khrushchev was a hateful subversive and destroyer of the ideals close to their hearts. In the ordinary consciousness of many, Khrushchev was an incompetent party and state leader who compromised himself with endless promises, total cultivation of corn, the confiscation of livestock from the kolkhoz farmers, and many other ill-considered measures.

The assessments of Khrushchev's personal qualities, first and foremost his intellectual powers, are also ambiguous. In 1946 after meeting with the Ukrainian Communist Party first secretary the writer Aleksandr Fadeyev made the following entry in his diary: "His charm lies in the integrity of the folk character. His mind is also a mind of the people—broad and practical and full of humor... And although he is a Russian it would be difficult to find another such leader for the Ukraine." In 1987 Professor John Galbraith of Harvard University, an economist of world fame, recalled Khrushchev, whom he met during the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, as a man of charm, good with language and a well informed political leader. The writer Vladimir Tendryakov holds a diametrically opposed view of Khrushchev. In an article published in the journal NOVYY MIR he stated that "in and of himself Khrushchev was stupid in an artless and euphoric way, stupid on the Russian scale..." In general, the lucky fool Ivanushka of the Russian fairy tale.

Turning to Khrushchev's personality, the Sovietologist Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov writes that Stalin's successors, who chose him as CPSU Central Committee first secretary, regarded Khrushchev as a "muzhik," a "gawk." But he "turned out to be a very great sphinx," who for 10 years ruled a great state while having the reputation of being "Ivanushka the fool," but with "the head of a genius muzhik." Behind Nikita Khrushchev's coarse worker-peasant, simple exterior was hidden a quite complex interior. His energy and boldness, the practical bent of his mind, and his broad "muzhik's nature" impressed many people. Khrushchev started his working life early and by the time he was 14 was already working in the plants and mines of the Donbass.

He often referred to his working youth and, it seemed, not without pleasure. Khrushchev joined the Bolshevik Party in 1918 and he took part in the civil war, and on its conclusion found himself in economic and party work. From 1925 he was a raykom secretary, and from 1927 he was in the apparatus of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Stalinskiy (now Donetsk) Obkom. He was elected as a delegate to the 14th and 15th congresses of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). In 1929 he enrolled for training at the Industrial Academy and was then promoted to leading party work (as a party raykom secretary in Moscow city, and then in the Moscow Gorkom). At the 17th All-Union Communist

Party (of Bolsheviks) Congress in 1934 he was elected as a member of the central committee, and from 1935 he headed the Moscow city and oblast party organizations as first secretary. Except for a brief break in 1947, for almost 10 years, from 1938 to 1949, Khrushchev was first secretary of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, and from 1939 was a member of the central committee politburo.

During the Great Patriotic War Khrushchev was a member of military councils for the Southwest Sector and the Southwest, Stalingrad, Southern, Voronezh and 1st Ukrainian fronts. He ended the war with the rank of lieutenant general. In 1976, Konstantin Simonov, who was in the same hospital as Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskiy, wrote down that marshal's characterization of Khrushchev: "Khrushchev was an energetic and bold man who was always there among the troops, never stayed too long at the headquarters and command posts, and tried to see and talk with people, and it must be said that people loved him."

The shaping of the personality of the future first secretary thus took place during the stormy Twenties, while his shaping as a political figure occurred with Stalin's people in the Thirties. Both decades left their imprint on him. Khrushchev belonged to the generation born out of the October. The October opened up for the metalworker, as it did for many other workers' and peasants' sons, a path through life filled with the highest purpose—to build a new socialist society the like of which had never been seen on earth. The civil war and the Twenties were his real political school. They honed his natural intellect and taught him independence and boldness in decisionmaking and instilled in him his world outlook. The Thirties and Forties taught him, on the one hand, a sense of scale and the ability to control people and affairs and deal with power, and on the other, to bow before power, to administer, to eliminate danger while hiding his own face and his own true thoughts and feelings.

Stalin's death released him, as it did the other members of the Politburo, of the fear for their own lives. A struggle for the utmost power lay ahead, and he was regarded as emerging as victor in this struggle, even though at that time he was not even the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Khrushchev was the initiator and organizer of Beria's arrest. He managed to recruit other members of the Presidium to his side and he succeeded in convincing the then chairman of the Council of Ministers, Malenkov, of the need to conduct the action against Beria. Beria's liquidation strengthened Khrushchev's position and in September 1953 he became CPSU Central Committee first secretary. In February 1955 he replaced Malenkov with Bulganin as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Khrushchev was confirmed in the role of top leader.

They say that when after Khrushchev had already fallen from power someone asked him what he saw as his most significant service, he answered that it had been destroying Beria. Not in unmasking the personality cult of

Stalin, not in the major improvements he initiated in the life of the kolkhoz peasantry, not in the "housing revolution" (mass industrial housing construction), but in liquidating Beria.

At first blush this service seems incommensurate with the others listed. But if we think about it perhaps Khrushchev was right to think so. And when in his memoirs "Through the Eyes of a Man of My Generation" Konstantin Simonov, who devoted many pages to the evil figure of Beria, rightly notes that Beria was the embodiment of "what is most cruel, tragic, violent and dirty," he nevertheless is mistaken when he suggests that "the very era was ended with the death of Stalin." No, it was not the death of Stalin in March that was "the end" of that era, but July 1953 with the end of the reign of Beria, which could have become a profound and baneful alternative to the admittedly inconsistent yet irresistible democratic purging from the regime of Stalin. A new stage had started in the life of Soviet society.

The Reforms

For a decade, up to October 1964, as CPSU Central Committee first secretary, and from 1958 the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Khrushchev made transformations that embraced various aspects in the life of Soviet society. These transformations were characterized in the national economy by attempts to move away from purely administrative management methods, from constraint in considering the material interests of workers, and from rigid centralization by sectors, to the organization of economic life first and foremost on territorial principles. Quite a lot was done in the social sphere to improve the national well-being: a basic change was achieved in the life of the kolkhoz farmers, housing construction was developed broadly, and the sizes of minimum pensions were increased. Under Khrushchev the first blow was dealt against the administrative-bureaucratic system, which reeled but recovered and brought down its erring son.

Khrushchev in the position of head of the party understood that the new approaches he had nurtured toward international and domestic problems would be difficult to accomplish without a powerful "blow" Stalin-style. It was impossible to reform the country without breaking through Stalinism.

Khrushchev's report at the closed session of the 20th CPSU Congress devoted to criticism of the Stalin personality cult entailed some risk. The first secretary could not fail to understand that he faced a struggle against the Stalinists who for a long time had occupied eminent positions in party and state. As Khrushchev later said, at the 20th CPSU Congress the unmasking of the Stalin personality cult "... was an inner moral imperative and obligation for the party and its leadership." He also explained at that time that "on the eve of the 20th Congress the question was the following: either the party openly and in Leninist style condemned the errors and

distortions that had been permitted during the period of the personality cult of I.V. Stalin and rejected those methods in party and state leadership that had become a brake on any advance, or within the party those forces that were chained to the old ways and opposed everything new and creative would have come out on top." That was how acute the question was.

The 20th CPSU Congress approved the provision of Khrushchev's report on the Stalin personality cult. In March the content of the report was made known to party members. Everyone everywhere was talking about it.

In and of itself the Khrushchev report was not deeply analytical. It offered a psychological portrait of Stalin as a political figure who was distinguished by a lust for power, cruelty, distrust, intolerance, suspicion and vindictiveness. The report cited instances of unjustified repressions, violence against eminent party and state figures and persecution of their families. This was all like a shocking thunderclap in the atmosphere of public life.

Today many correct opinions have been expressed about the need to publish the report. Yes, it must be published, more as an act of historical justice than a shift in thinking about the past. For in the time of perestroika the public consciousness has greatly advanced. Both in terms of information, and even more conceptually...

Less than 18 months after the 20th Congress the question of which path to follow was again raised. Frightened off by the developing unmasking of personality cult, the "old Stalinist guard" decided to oust Khrushchev from the post of first secretary. Knocking together an arithmetical majority, in June 1957 Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich tried to implement this plan at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. However, the Plenum meeting at that time supported N.S. Khrushchev. The attempt to present the party with a fait accompli of the removal of the first secretary through a "palace coup" failed. We note that this was the first time that those in opposition were not repressed immediately after their defeat, nor later.

At the congresses and central committee plenums under Khrushchev for the first time after a long interval there was serious discussion of questions such as enhancing the independence, role and importance of the soviets, observance of legality, restoring democratic norms in internal party life, transferring a greater number of state functions to the public organizations, and socialism and the freedom of the individual. These and other issues of democratic development were raised as practical tasks that required resolution.

At the 22nd CPSU Congress it was said that proletarian democracy was being transformed into national socialist democracy. In the accountability report of the CPSU

Central Committee first secretary at that congress the main landmark was formulated: "Of all the values created by the socialist system, the greatest is the new man..."

As the result of a series of socioeconomic reforms implemented from the end of 1953, from the CPSU Central Committee September Plenum on, which was devoted to measures to further develop agriculture, rapid growth was observed in industrial and agricultural production. The USSR started to produce almost one-fifth of world industrial output. In 1957 the world's first artificial Earth satellite was launched. In April 1961 the Vostok vehicle was put into circumterrestrial orbit with the world's first cosmonaut, Yuriy Gagarin, aboard. The Soviet Union had opened up the space age for mankind. Young people in the Komsomol responded with enthusiasm to the appeal to take part in the opening up of the virgin lands. There was an obvious social upsurge similar in some ways to the Twenties.

Khrushchev, and evidently other members of the Presidium who were prisoners of oversimplified ideas about social processes and moreover had an inadequate sense of and feeling for the actual reality, decided to announce that the task lying immediately ahead was that of building a communist society in a very short period historically. Speaking at the 23rd CPSU Congress, Khrushchev said "the random movement of the masses has given birth to utopian theories about some future golden age," but that the representatives of utopian socialism were remote from the reality when they marked out the paths for their ideals. Criticism of utopian socialism was essential in order to emphasize the realistic nature of the plan to build a communist society in the main over a period of two decades—an insignificantly short period by any historical yardstick. And indeed, in the ideas about ways to build socialism there was much that was reminiscent of things that Stalin had said in his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR."

Today we already know from the press that the proposal to including in the CPSU Program statistical materials on the country's economic development and the course of economic competition in the international arena evoked great disputes: calculations of the rates of economic development in the USSR and the United States were taken, as the expression is, "from the ceiling." And there was no reason to be surprised if we remember the self-sufficing statements of the first secretary in the accountability report to the 22nd CPSU Congress: "Many politicians in the West sometimes say: 'we believe in the achievements of your industry but we do not understand how you will correct the situation in agriculture.'"

"When I talk with them I say: 'Just wait, we will just show you with agricultural production too.'"

And how!... In 1962, following adoption of the new Party Program, prices rose for meat and meat products and milk. The next year started, 1963, and the country experienced serious food difficulties: the lines formed for milk and bread. Grains imports from abroad increased. Many things affected this: collectivization of personal livestock, reductions in the size of personal land plots, and the oft-discussed but flourishing planning of agricultural production in the spirit of the "surplus-appropriation system," and the command-administrative method in the leadership of kolkhozes and sovkhozes and lack of interest on the part of the worker in increasing income because of the commercial shortages. But throughout the food crisis of 1963-1964 it was clear that it had never been analyzed by economists and historians.

In October 1964 a CPSU Central Committee Plenum released Khrushchev from his duties as first secretary and member of the Presidium. Preparations for this decision were made while Khrushchev and Mikoyan were on vacation. The key figures in the preparations for this "palace coup" were Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Shelepin. Everything went without a hitch. The people accepted calmly and even with satisfaction the retirement of the leader who had recently been exalted in the press. The party apparatus even more so. Division of the obkoms and raykoms into industrial and rural sets and the permanent reforms had engendered a feeling of dissatisfaction and uncertainty. However, not only the party apparatus but also a quite extensive circles in the party and people were not ready for changes. Most had failed to recognize the need for major changes. The ideological stereotypes were still strong.

And what remained of the failed "Khrushchevian" reforms? To be objective, quite a lot did. The rural population was no longer "second-class." It was precisely with Khrushchev's reforms that the rural population's living standards had started to rise steadily. Some peasants started to live in good homes, had a sufficiency, and to dress town-style (and with the latest fashions); the kolkhoz farmer gained the right to possess a passport (something that he had not had under Stalin since he was not a full citizen), and started to feel that he was both a person and a city dweller. There were also changes of a radical nature in pension benefits and in housing construction. Elimination of secret reprisals outside the courts and the introduction of new legal legislation and a new criminal code can in some sense be regarded as a definite step in the direction of asserting the norms of socialist legality.

After he was retired Khrushchev started to work on his memoirs. He dictated them into a recording machine. The tapes containing the text were given to his son. Rumors about Khrushchev's pursuit were "leaked" to "top people" and caused anxiety there. And then the scandal broke. The objectionable memoirs were published in the West. When it became clear that Khrushchev had nothing to do with the text being passed

abroad, demands were made on him to refute it. A statement appeared over Khrushchev's signature in PRAVDA in which it was said that the memoirs had not been printed here or passed to foreign countries. The memoirs cost Khrushchev two heart attacks and in September 1971 he died.

"Materials" belonging to the disgraced former "first secretary" were "arrested" (just a 10 years before in 1961 Khrushchev had "arrested" the manuscript of Vasilii Grossman's novel "Life and Destiny").

Paradoxes

As a type of political leader Khrushchev was the direct opposite of Stalin. Stalin's was a personality oriented on an idea, as it were, outside the man, on an idea abstracted from real human life. And no matter how humanistic the idea itself might have been it was embodied in the personality of Stalin and his deeds, and became the exact opposite in terms of specific people and groups of people and ultimately all the people. It called to mind directly the aphorism of the German philosopher Joseph Dietzgen, who said that any truth taken to extreme becomes its opposite, an absurdity. Stalin shaped himself as a superman. It was not by chance that used to talk about himself in the third person: Comrade Stalin. And a superman is no longer a man.

Khrushchev did not regard his words as divine and he did not weigh them as some kind of treasure before speaking "to people." He was distinguished by an excessive loquacity and, to be candid, was simply garrulous. And here he won out decisively over the calculating laconism of his terrible predecessor. In general, Khrushchev's inherent quality of being down to earth made him too ordinary a man in people's eyes when contrasted with Stalin.

Like Stalin, Khrushchev could be erratic. Erratic as almost everyone is who has gained great power over people. He was also coarse and impatient and ruthless. He was different. But by nature he was nevertheless human and, given all his personal flaws, he had precisely this essentially humane nature.

Both Khrushchev's personality and his actions were very contradictory. The human mind does not like paradox; it strives to remove contradictions, and the simplest way to do this is by absolutizing one aspect. And when talking about Khrushchev it is impossible to avoid the paradoxes.

Let us start with this: although he fought against the Stalin cult of personality he himself was not free of Stalinism. According to his son, Sergey Nikitich, he recognized only two evaluations: "ours" and "not ours" (remember "who is not for us is against us"); he knew, as did all of Stalin's entourage, only one form of interrelationship—the command-administrative relationship; he

was, naturally, prepared to resort to coercion and even arbitrary rule if he believed that the interests of public affairs so required. Thus, while condemning the repressions under Stalin, Khrushchev more than once played the role of organizer in campaigns against people who thought differently (as, for example, in the case of Boris Pasternak after publication of "Doctor Zhivago" abroad).

To use the words of the poet Andrey Voznesenskiy, Khrushchev "always suppressed the Stalinist within him—the 'black stone'" (a reference to Khrushchev's two-colored tombstone). Some of the personal qualities and acts of the "Great General Secretary" (the reign of Stalin) were unacceptable to Khrushchev, but in some things he continued to be praised. Stalinism (arbitrary leadership and voluntarism) as inalienable parts of it) was always seen through the lineament of a progressive reformer.

Fate was kind to Khrushchev. He was constantly being pushed "upward." And he had no time for studies. In 1922-1923 Khrushchev, who had only a primary education, studied at a workers' factory in Yuzovka. And he did not graduate from the Industrial Academy (he had wanted to become a metalworker). The searching man who was Khrushchev was also unable really to gain access to culture. And the main thing, of course was not that he pronounced, for example, the word "communism" in a strange way, like "communishm." Like Stalin he had a striking conviction of the strength of his own mind and his infallibility of judgment and broad knowledge, and also a desire to learn everything, stemming from his shortcomings in the cultural sense: writers, scientists, engineers, agronomists. He linked the status of "leader" with this.

His knowledge in one thing and lack of knowledge in another and the lack of any comprehensive, scientific approach to the resolution of national economy problems, and the exaggerated idea of his own capabilities and achievements fed the practice of voluntarism at all levels.

Khrushchev's greatest mistake was his failure to understand the importance of democracy in the broad meaning of the word. The need for structural political reforms and internal party democracy, and plurality of opinion and glasnost were not recognized by the "reformer," who had failed to throw off the Stalinist ideological blinkers. People who were close to Khrushchev have admitted that he was afraid that at another thaw might result in a catastrophic flood.

The paradoxes of Khrushchev were the paradoxes of combining in one man remarkable energy, initiative and persistence with egocentrism and lack of culture. He also went through an evolution in the post of leader—"pink

to red to black." He spoke out against genetics and tried to draw nearer to Lysenko... There were also the persecutions of creative thinking and the wild swings from one side to another.

Himself a product of a particular era, a particular social and political medium, Khrushchev wanted to overcome its laws and smash it mainly using the same methods. To break the bureaucracy while acting bureaucratically. To dethrone the Stalin personality culture while refusing to abandon the creation of his own culture, although without the mass repressions but also in a quite bloody manner.

So Khrushchev also "failed to break through" to the people, even though he tried: he traveled to the enterprises, spoke to the workers, met the intelligentsia. He was hostage to the apparatus, to the administrative machine that grinds or discards innovations that do not bring the spent system anything with which to instruct and regulate the tenor of life.

The problem of change in Soviet society has rested on the mass human consciousness. Radical changes in the economy, in party and state structures cannot be effected by acts of will, as Khrushchev tried to do it, if it is impossible to rely on an adequately developed public consciousness in broad strata of the population. Implementing reforms using administrative methods under conditions in which authoritarianism is preserved in the leadership of the country and party is even more impossible unless the leader enjoys proper authority.

Khrushchev did a great deal, showing in his actions against the Stalin personality cult something much more than personal strength or weakness. Something that cannot be measured by removing the body of the dethroned "father of the people" from the Mausoleum. For it was a matter of the direction of the historical process and of its inner, objective logic. An irreversible advance had been made in the public consciousness at all levels—historical, ideological, sociopsychological and moral.

Philosophy Journal's Stand Against Stagnation Recounted

18000442 Moscow *SOVETSKAYA KULTURA*
in Russian 26 Jan 89 p 6

[Article by Leonid Grekov: "Not All Philosophers Were Silent"]

[Text] In analyzing the situation in the past decades, we did not spare critical remarks addressed to social sciences in recent times. Philosophy came in for criticism as well. "The queen of sciences" was criticized for dogmatism, for rigid patterns enforced for many years and dating back to the years of the personality cult, and for all kinds of things.

The figures of M. Mitin and other official leaders in philosophy have somehow obstructed all movements of philosophical thought for many people. One author noted in passing that "the philosophers only scolded others or said 'yes' to superiors; in a word, they were having a good time." He added: "Let them have a good time or be silent..." However, our philosophy could not be reduced to Mitin alone. Did not somebody embark on considering the troubling problems facing humanity in the second half of our century? Obviously, the pick-up in social thought in the second half of the 1950s could not bypass our philosophy as well. New times called for new people. They were the ones to search for ways of overcoming the past and investigate spheres of scientific knowledge which were new for our science. Was this an easy task? This is a rhetorical question. After all, at this time the calls to carry on the discussion with more vigor and to struggle against scholasticism came into a sharp conflict with attempts by the officialdom of scientific and ideological establishments to force new results into the procrustean bed of bureaucratic guidelines. A fresh idea was frequently tested not by practice but by an available ideological instruction. The struggle became quite dramatic at times. Innovative philosophers, those who took risks and displayed intellectual initiative did not have an easy time. Fierce criticism followed by severe disciplinary decisions befell many of them. E. Ilyenkov, B. Kedrov, P. Kopnin, Yu. Meleshchenko and other scientists were the first to breach the philosophical redoubts of stalinism. They did it and exposed themselves to fierce blows in return. The advocates of the cult also dished out a lot to V. F. Asmus, "the master of philosophical culture." This is why it would be useful to examine the past yet again in order to find out how complex the path of our philosophical science has been. What lessons can we learn from it?

A new chapter in the history of Soviet philosophy began after the 20th CPSU Congress. The time came for its initial successes, primarily in the research of philosophical issues in natural sciences, where the dominance of scholasticism was particularly pronounced, and the yoke of ideological tags and natural philosophy fantasies was heavy. Time itself called for a broad discussion on the philosophical issues in biology and first of all genetics. After all, progressive scientists understood that proponents of Lysenko would not yield without a struggle. This meant that scientific development would be blocked for many years to come.

At present, the phenomenon of Lysenko is researched from many angles. This is correct. We should understand the reasons for which the huge growth of this quasi-scientific malignant tumor became possible. Today, it is all the more important to appreciate the efforts of those who challenged lysenkoism first. Readers know about the intricacies of the struggle against it from the books of Granin, Amlinskiy and Dudintsev. However, these books are only about natural scientists. Philosophers are still being customarily "picked on" for the ideological protection of the "people's academician." Yes, some of

them deserve it! Mitin and Beletskiy made a great effort in order to help Lysenko destroy his enemies. However, is it just to give "credit" for this to all our philosophers?

We should recall that resuming the discussion with "the people's academician" did not become possible until the second half of the 1950s. At the very least, the destruction of genetics needed to be stopped, the very right of this science to exist needed to be won in battle, this-branch of science needed to be cleared of ideological tags. The honor of many scientists needed to be restored. At the time, the forward-thinking philosophers formed a united front with the genetics researchers.

The journal VOPROSY FILOSOFII played a major role in destroying Lysenko's monopoly. It was the one to publish the first articles of those who did not agree with Lysenko. It is important to recall the article by N. Dubinin "On Physical, Chemical and Mathematical Methods in Studying the Issues of Heredity" published in 1957 which openly defended the positions of genetics and caused furious protests by the not-yet-toppled "transformer of nature." Even at that time, the editors made their choice and clearly outlined their position. Philosophers, primarily B. Kedrov and I. Frolov, also resolutely embarked on the path of struggle against lysenkoism. The discussion on genetics helped philosophy regain its honor.

In the 1960s, the journal continued to argue vigorously against the proponents of the pseudoscience and carried on an open, public struggle, despite Lysenko's people still being in strategic control. Historians of science are aware of articles by B. Kedrov, I. Frolov, S. Alikhanyan, B. Astaurov, N. Dubinin, V. Ryzhkov, S. Shvarts, B. Efroimson and other authors who came out in favor of normalization in our scientific thinking and showed the unsoundness and pseudodialectics of Lysenko's concepts. These were the years of a vigorous accumulation of forces, of shedding many taboos. Finally, they began to write truthfully about the situation in Soviet biological science. As a result, genetics was restored to its status after almost 20 years of being defamed. The brand of infamy was removed from it, and its real achievements were described truthfully. Credit was given for major achievements by its leading figures abroad—Mendel, Morgan, Veisman—and inside our country—N. Vavilov and S. Chetverikov, N. Koltsov and N. Timofeyev-Ressovskiy... The idols of agrobiolgy were also dis-crowned, though not outloud, because rigid ideological controls interfered. Let us note that the journal was still headed by Mitin, the author of the notorious formula "Lysenko is the Michurin of our time." However, he could no longer arrest the movement underway in the community of philosophers.

As is known, the "Club of Rome" began to operate in the late 1960s. Global issues facing mankind were already on our doorstep as well. However, most scientists simply

did not hear this alarm signal, this imperative of the time. Someone had to be the initiator, and philosophers were the first to perceive this imperative.

Those who were the first to raise global issues met with a hostile reception. A segment of philosophers also interpreted these issues, new to our science, as yet another attack on the marxist class approach. The proven thesis about abstract humanism was put forth. An entire decade of hard work was needed in order to establish new priorities. The journal VOPROSY FILOSOFII became the intellectual center around which the forces of scientists rallied who appreciated the need to solve problems of vital importance to the future of world civilization.

Somebody called discussions and "roundtables" of the journal "philosophical Kapitsa meetings." At the time, everyone new about Academician Kapitsa's seminars, where a sort of collective thinking aloud was practiced, where any ideas, even the "weirdest" ones, were allowed in an informal conversation. After all, science cannot develop without this kind of unrestricted free thinking, especially now, when the most significant discoveries and the broadening of the boundaries of our knowledge of the world occur exactly in the borderland of various sciences. An informal club of sorts of scientists from different branches of science formed around the journal. This is where they talked aloud for the first time about ecology, the ecological crisis, the responsibility of scientists for the condition of the environment. The publication of "roundtables" succeeded in drawing the attention of broad circles of the general public to these issues.

As any new undertaking, the study of global issues caused attacks by traditionalists and dogmatists. Unfortunately, many initiatives of the journal were in vain, but this did not slow down the editorial board. The voice of Academician Kapitsa calling on "cultural forces of all countries" to unite in order to find a way out of the ecological blind alley lent powerful support to this school of thought. The idea of a common home for ensuring the survival of human civilization permeated the atmosphere of philosophical discussions at Volkhonka Street. Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa said: "I am convinced that the need to resolve global issues on an international scale will be a favorable influence on solving the problems of peaceful coexistence and disarmament. People will begin to feel that they live in the same apartment, and that all of mankind has the same enemy, the forthcoming global crisis, which we should start fighting in unison."

These pronouncements by the scientist of world renown shocked some ideologues. Indeed the scientist was against the formal spirit in the works of many leaders of our philosophy at the time. He was against the multitude of quotations and scholastic rhetorics. However, Kapitsa responded and got vigorously engaged in active work when he saw that a philosophy journal addressed serious issues and that his ideas on the responsibility of scientists for the

fate of civilization were passionately shared here. He published his articles on the burning contemporary problems in this very journal, VOPROSY FILOSOFII.

The main issue, the issue of man, of his existence and development in the environment of scientific-technical revolution was, after all, raised. In essence, at issue was not only the social future, but the very existence of man as a natural being. This is exactly how the editor-in-chief of the journal mapped out the problem. At that time, the issue of dialectics in the relationship of class and general humanity interests was raised in the journal for the first time. Certainly, nobody was up to formulating it as it is now—with general interests of humanity given priority. However, the incorrectness of the very contrasting of the class and general humanity elements was stressed unambiguously. It goes without saying that in the early 1970s this conclusion was regarded as almost an attack on the fundamentals of marxism.

Discussions in the journal were a definite breakthrough, but they inevitably exposed the insufficient level of ecological knowledge, the lack of preparedness by our science for assessing the actual situation in that sphere. Many people were not prepared to discuss the issue of responsibility by scientists, the role of philosophy in working out value orientations in an environment of rapid technical and technological development and the ecological crisis. Many were sincerely astonished by the very fact of raising these issues and believed that they were a distraction from "pure philosophy." Meanwhile, one of the major Soviet philosophers, A. F. Shishkin, started talking about "the ethics of a scientist" as early as the 1960s, but his voice was not heard then. This topic could be brought up to date significantly in the process of its treatment by VOPROSY FILOSOFII in the 1970s.

The discussion "Science, Ethics, Humanism" sponsored by the editor-in-chief assembled well-known scientists. In a free discussion, Academicians B. Pontekorvo, V. Engelgardt, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. Volkenshteyn, the famous biologist Prof A. Malinovskiy discussed a purely philosophical topic—the issue of the relationship of scientific truth and values, and asked the sacramental question of human existence—are genius and villainy compatible? Philosophers made equally pointed judgments. Academicians B. Kedrov and T. Oyzerman, Full Member of the Academy of Arts M. Lifshits, M. Mamardashvili, V. Mezhukeyev, N. Motroshilova and A. Solovyev, little known at the time (at present, readers and audiences know them well) were active participants in the dialogue on the ethics of science, on a new understanding of it in our time which is rich in discoveries.

The topics of scientific discussions in the pages of VOPROSY FILOSOFII were so varied that we have to restrict ourselves to a mere enumeration of the acute problems discussed. These were social and biological

factors of human development, social and philosophic issues in education and upbringing, interaction of natural, social and technical sciences, interaction of science and art in the era of scientific-technical revolution, issues of demography and many others.

At present, there is not an editorial board of a newspaper, journal, a radio or TV channel which does not sponsor "roundtables." However, at that time, the philosophy journal was almost the only publication to use this democratic form of work. The renunciation of postulated truths and the monopoly on opinions were too complicated. It was difficult to even acknowledge social dialogue and the need for a variety of opinions instead of the one "set once and for all." The best minds of our philosophy and science were drawn into the scientific debate on the issues of scientific cognition and social practice. Physicists and biologists, geologists and geographers, legal scientists and sociologists, historians and psychologists, writers, journalists and politicians took part in "roundtable" conversations. The experience of "Kapitsa's philosophical meetings" helped in shaping the humanist orientation of the science of philosophy, inspired those who advocated the idea of priority of humanistic values as the foundation of the future dialogue on the future of civilization. An entire generation of philosophers who have now assimilated the principles of new thinking was brought up on this experience.

Understandably, quite a few people did not like such activities by the journal. This was an infringement of group ambitions, narrowly interpreted interests of many functionaries in the philosophy guild. Unprepared for the new intellectual initiative, they were unwittingly forced onto the sidelines and unwittingly lost the position of leaders they were accustomed to... Others were upset by the discussion itself, by its democratic tone... To be sure, discussions went on not only in the journal. The Department of Philosophy and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences held several meetings as well. However, a different atmosphere prevailed there; compliance with the ideological shouts prevailed. Say, a discussion on the books by P. Kopnin "Philosophical Concepts of V. I. Lenin and Logic" and "Leninism and the Dialectics of Social Development" (head of the authors' collective V. Kelle) ended up with authors being literally picked to pieces, as they say, in the spirit of good old times.

There were attempts to foist a discussion of this type on the journal. They hoped to snub the editorial board and put it in its box. They counted on turning the journal back into the rut of guild interests through vigorous measures, on slowing down the process of cooperation between philosophers and scientists, on returning to the times when philosophers took ideological commands. A forcible action was called for, and it was carried out.

In June 1974, the issue of the operation of the journal was discussed by a meeting of the specialized learned council of party VUZes. What happened at Sadovokudrinskaya Street where the Academy of Social Sciences was located at the time? Alas, the conversation was

reduced to giving a good wiggling. It is truly paradoxical that scientists who are called upon in the line of their professional activities to blend philosophy and politics organically and vigorously use the potential of philosophy in solving political problems did not discern the profound political significance of new directions in the work of a philosophy journal.

One after the other, the speakers voiced their unhappiness with the journal not following the line of covering the fundamental problems of marxist-leninist philosophy. There were also rebukes of a political nature: allegedly, the journal did not dwell on the specifics of the principle of party interpretation.

Members of the editorial board and employees of the editorial office listened with bitterness as the things they were proud of were defamed: "the roundtables" were called an unnecessary innovation interfering with theoretical investigations. "The space of the journal cannot be crowded with furniture of different kinds"—this is how one of the speakers put it trying to be funny. Incorrect assessments were also made of publications by famous Soviet and foreign natural scientists, a very important form of work for a philosophy journal.

A very narrow concept of the mission of a philosophy journal was at the root of criticism. Essentially, the opponents contrasted excessively two main aspects of philosophical activities—specific philosophy tasks, which can only be handled by philosophers-specialists, and the tasks which were handled together with scientists—representatives of social, natural and technical sciences. VOPROSY FILOSOFII had traditionally cooperated with physicists, biologists, geographers who were attracted to philosophy and sought in it answers to the methodological and worldview problems of their sciences. This cooperation did not benefit natural scientists alone. In turn, philosophy tapped the mighty intellectual energy of progressive natural sciences. This is the main thrust of the union of philosophy and natural sciences bequeathed by Lenin. However, the opponents did not want to see this.

The main rebuke, however, involved the lag by the journal in researching the fundamental issues of philosophy. Basically, it was barely masked camouflage—they simply wanted to force the journal into a narrow rut of "pure thinking" despite this road leading to the isolation of marxist-leninist philosophy from science and bringing about stagnation. One got the impression that the critics did not know or did not want to know that the circulation of the journal exceeded the number of philosophers in the country almost threefold and that the journal had actually become the forum for more than just the community of philosophers. Broad circles of the academic party intelligentsia, workers and students took great interest in it.

However, this popularity was not welcome, the same as the plurality of opinions and respect for the point of view of the opponent. Certain individuals wanted very much to restore the principles of ideological denunciation and confrontation to the death. It is also true that the core of those taking the floor consisted of major Soviet philosophers who always showed interest in the journal, published their work in it, but for various reasons did not manage to adapt and began to fall behind. They shifted the blame for their own shortcomings to the journal quite eagerly and even passionately. However, the conflict was not rooted in ambitions alone, or even mostly in ambitions. The roots went considerably deeper. The trend towards dialogue and cooperation inevitably came into conflict with the course towards a total ideological confrontation, with the concept of irreconcilability and incompatibility of various philosophical teachings. The affirmation of new ideas ran into a strong barrier thrown up by those who held fast to the ideological system created in the years of the cult of personality and stagnation, who opposed any critical look at reality. Unfortunately, scientists from the Academy of Social Sciences coopted to the editorial board shortly before the discussion did not help and lend their hand at this difficult time.

A decade and a half have passed since, but "the battle of Sadovo-Kudrinskaya Street" is still remembered. It is easy to figure out now that it became one step in an extensive campaign which included an attack on NOVYY MIR and Tvardovskiy. The objectives were similar, the main one being to bring about a retreat to old ideological lines. Unfortunately, this worked with writers, but not with philosophers. To be sure, VOPROSY FILOSOFII continued to defend its course. However, the blows inflicted on the journal did not pass without a trace. In early 1977, the management changed. V. Semenov, little known to philosophers and journalists, took over from I. Frolov who disturbed the philosophical calm.

The element of stagnation enveloped the activities of the editorial board slowly but surely. V. Semenov did not manage to either suggest a new concept or defend the hard-won initiatives by the journal. The famous American researcher—Sovietologist Loren Graham put it very precisely: "In 1977, Semenov took over from Frolov as editor-in-chief of VOPROSY FILOSOFII; he attempted to carry on the series of 'roundtables,' but he did not succeed in preserving their previous intellectual vitality."

"Department of Things Unneeded"—this precise definition by a character in the novel by Yu. Dombrovskiy may be applied to the past decade of our philosophy. At present, we can only deplore the opportunities lost and the fact that fruitful segments of our philosophy for years had to struggle for their right to exist, that a dash to the new turned out to be undesirable.

Certainly, it is difficult and maybe even impossible to move on without discussions and polemical zeal. However, disputes according to the norms accepted in a civilized society are one thing, and battles with injuries and traumas, when forced retreats turn out to be a defeat for science and society, are quite another. Had the scientists and cultural activists not been hampered, had positive initiatives not been stifled artificially, had obstacles not been thrown up in the way of broadening the spheres of our knowledge of the world, all our society would have won, and socialism would have won...

As it were, history does not know what the subjunctive mood is. Everything will gradually be sorted out as time goes by. Perhaps, other "blank spots" in the history of Soviet philosophy should be covered now, and talented philosophers subjected to vicious criticism and victimized should be written about. The path of scientists who boldly challenged the forces of stagnation and stood by their convictions needs a special narration. They were real spiritual heroes. They did not have it easy, but many of them stood fast and won a moral victory. We should talk about the harm inflicted on Soviet philosophy by some discussions of the late 1960s—early 1970s. We must finally learn to draw conclusions from our own bitter experience.

Philosophical thinking develops in different dimensions, but it always moves between two poles of sorts: at one of them, it remains in close contact with realities of contemporary life, at the other, it generates "blueprints" of the social and spiritual structures which may become the foundation for the development of culture in the future (in this reference, see V. Stepin, "The Lessons of Brighton," KOMMUNIST, 1988, No 16, p 57). Philosophy is both the quintessence of the available spiritual culture and the conceptual core of the culture of the future. Ideally, these two poles should be involved in permanent harmonious interaction. Actually, one side more often grows at the expense of the other. Throughout the past decades, it was mostly the intellectual initiative in philosophy that suffered in our country. Many attempts at breaking through into the future were not given support, and were suppressed by the forces of conservatism and slowdown.

Philosophy has now entered a time of renewal. A conceptual reconstruction of the entire building of philosophy is taking place right before our eyes. However, attitudes to the shifts underway vary. Active proponents of perestroika are marching in the same ranks with developers of "the new wave." They are waiting for new ideas. They are prepared to receive them, assimilate them profoundly and carry them out. However, many individuals view these ideas with open hostility regarding innovations in philosophy as "the abandonment of fundamentals" and even "revision."

The new always runs into opposition, a vigorous breakthrough also gives a new impetus to the forces of slowdown—apparently this is the law for any movement. At

present, the same as in the past, we are witnessing a complex picture in which different trends are interwoven in a quaint and contradictory manner. How can we figure it out fast, how can we separate the grains of new

thinking from the weeds, from obsolete and newly-tailored patterns and stereotypes? Answers to these questions are not found through speculation. They are given by life itself, when the new asserts its position in action.

Reports-Election Meeting At Moscow Writers Organization

18000299a Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 47, 23 Nov 88 pp 1, 7

[Unsigned article: "Solved and Unsolved Problems: Reports-Election Party Meeting of the Moscow Writers Organization"]

[Text]"While my colleagues on the party committee and I were preparing this report, aside from reporting on the work accomplished over this short period, we attempted to answer the three eternal questions of the Russian intelligentsia: "What is happening? Who is to blame? What is to be done?"

You have to agree that party committee secretary Anatoliy Zhukov began his speech in an unusual way. Getting ahead of myself, I will say that many speakers spoke of the need to distinguish this report from those delivered in previous years. Of course, it contained more of a critical spirit, that is hardly surprising these days; however, its most essential characteristic was the endeavor to put forward a number of constructive proposals for their comrades to discuss.

The answer to Zhukov's third question is embodied in the word "perestroyka." The speaker emphasized that "our literature steadfastly and actively prepared the way for perestroyka and now is supporting it with all available forces." The first priority goal of the party committee's work has been consolidation of creative forces and creation of a creative atmosphere conducive to deeds in the writers' organization of the capital. A. Zhukov recalled the general meeting on "View of Literature," the meeting of the party committee to discuss implementation of the decree "On improvement of working conditions of creative unions," the plenum entitled "Writer—publisher—book seller—reader," the meeting of active party members on the topic "On increasing the ideological/creative and administrative role of public [not directly run by party or state] committees, councils and discussion groups in light of perestroyka and expansion of democracy," meetings to elect delegates to the 19th All-Union party conference and discuss the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee. The party committee has been seriously concerned with the instruction of communists within the system of party education. A new approach is required here and the party committee proposed one involving the open discussion of topics which truly interest writers.

The report also spoke honestly about what, for one reason or another, the party committee had not yet succeeded in doing.

Of the 532 party members in the Moscow Writers Organization, 331 are of retirement age. Approximately the same proportion holds for writers who are not party members. Naturally, issues related to living conditions are very important to them if they are to continue their

creative activity. The housing problem is very urgent—there are more than 200 families in the queue, which is moving only slowly. As always the issue of publications is critical. The secretariat of the board of the Moscow Organization sent the appropriate agencies a detailed proposal for a journal for the capital, but there is no guarantee that one will be established during the next 5-year plan. The issue of cooperative publishing houses has also not been resolved. All this inhibits the publication of new works and certainly does not foster consolidation of creative forces.

A. Zhukov presented a proposal for discussion by the party committee and the secretariat—involving joining the social-creative and journalpublishing structure in a single creative and journal publishing association.

"Look at the structure of our writers' organization—it consists of associations based on literary genres. Look at the journals: they have the same departments of prose, poetry, social and political writing, criticism, etc... If a creative association devoted to prose or poetry that had its own editorial department in a journal and publishing house were to discuss, let's say, the manuscript of a new collection and approve it, then they could immediately place part of the work in the journal, and the whole manuscript could go out to be published. And there would be no drawn out proceedings lasting for years."

In conclusion, A. Zhukov emphasized that the appropriate resources for restructuring the writers' organization must be available if they are to facilitate the productive work of Moscow writers. I will cite the most important of the proposals voiced from the platform. The entire Moscow Writers Organization should be put on a cost accounting basis (I. Strelkova). We should attempt to publish books at the authors' expense with the help of the Moscovskiy Rabochiy press (D. Yevdokimov). Writers should be grouped not according to genre, but according to aesthetic, spiritual and other tendencies and interests (T. Gaydar). Literature needs various, including opposing, points of view (V. Bondarenko). The proposal of the poets section of the party bureau on the reorganization of the Moscow Writers Organization should be considered (S. Zolotsev). A number of problems which must be solved by the secretariat were raised by V. Kobenko. Nothing good can be accomplished without mercy. A completely new way of conducting discussions in the print media is needed (A. Markov). The solution of the housing problem is not a caprice, but an urgent need closely linked to the capacity to work (T. Polikarpov). An independent association of children's writers is needed (V. Golyshkin). We should study the experience of the Union of Theatrical People with respect to pensions. We must prove to the higher ups that we need our own Moscow writers' publishing house. We must call a special conference for considering the pressing problems of the USSR Writers' Union (P. Aleshin). We must devote more attention to work of writers from the fraternal republics or works written in languages other than Russian (Faik Mamed). We must break up the journals

currently published in enormous editions and create others from them that compete with each other in publishing worthwhile works of contemporary writers. We must work to give the Moscow writers organization a republic-wide status without waiting for the next congress of the writers of the USSR. We should consider it a matter of honor to immortalize the names of guiltless Moscow writers repressed various periods—there are more than 640 of them (Al. Mikhaylov). We must devote more attention and respect to each member of the writers organization (Yu. Galperin). We must think not only about our personal affairs, but about the affairs of the entire country, ecology, culture, preservation of monuments (T. Ponomareva). Modern literature is occupied by searching for answers to the most essential questions of existence. It is essential, along with publications of "returned" works, to publish those of currently active writers (V. Gusev). We need new print organs, but not for "special interest groups", this will only introduce unnecessary dissent into the writers' environment (P. Kirichenko). The "Fate of Man" club unites lovers of truth fighting against various sorts of injustice. We must be steadfast in attaining the goals set before us (L. Belyayeva). Translators are worthy of great attention (N. Aroseva). The Writers Union of the USSR is aware that far from all the most essential problems have been solved, however, we are working for their solution. The process of restoration of justice is irreversible and this is relevant to many writers whose lives were ruined in the past. The experiment with cost accounting in the Moscow Writers Organization is extremely interesting, we must support its inception; of course, only after first giving it careful thought and and consideration. The same approach must be used for the problem of providing pensions to the members of the USSR Writers' Union. If the Moscow Organization considers that it is necessary to hold a special conference of the Writers Union, we must find out the opinion of all the other writers organizations of the country and do what the majority wants (V. Karpov).

Answering a note concerning the director of the Sovetskii Pisatel publishing house, V. Karpov reminded the audience that the selection commission selected six out of 21 candidates. The one whose personal qualities and previous work experience is most appropriate to this serious position will become director.

In conclusion, it can be said of this reports-election meeting of the Moscow Writers Organization, that although what might be described as "overly heated" speeches were heard from the tribunal at times, the overall tendency was constructive. To restructure the life of the creative organization so as to achieve a state where each of its members, communist and non-communist, feels himself to have social security and to be a true participant in the resolution of each issue relating to the activity of the Moscow Writers Association, and, in the final analysis, so as to create a wholesome atmosphere facilitating the creation of the sole thing for which the Writers Union exists—books which will be read—this

goal was formulated in the report and supported by the majority of speakers. Many barriers must be overcome, and a great deal must be given up in order to attain this goal.

A new party committee staff was selected. A. Zhukov is again secretary.

The deputy director of the Department of Culture of the CPSU Central Committee, V. Yegorov, was present at the meeting.

Increase In Authors' Royalties Detailed
18000299b Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 20 Dec 88 p 8

[Interview with V. Bogatov, deputy chairman of the Board of the All-Union Agency on Authors' Rights by I. Kartashova: "Authors' Fees: The New System"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has ratified a decree entitled "On a Rate Schedule of Authors' Fees for Publication, Public Performance, and Other Forms of Utilization of Works of Literature and Art."

Our correspondent asked the deputy chairman of the board of the All-Union Agency on Authors' Rights, V. Bogatov, to comment on this important document.

[Kartashova] What made it necessary to review the previous document setting the size of authors' fees?

[Bogatov] The previous document has long been in need of radical alteration. The principles governing computation of authors' royalties for publication of literary works have not been reviewed since the 1940s.

[Kartashova] How was this document prepared?

[Bogatov] After the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers ratified the decree, "On the improvement of the working conditions of creative unions," the organizations and departments involved—the USSR State Committee on Labor and Wage Issues, the USSR Ministry of Finance, the State Committee on Publication, Printing, and Book Selling, the State Committee on Radio and Television, the creative unions and the All-Union Agency on Authors' Rights—in coordination with the Councils of Ministers of the union republics and the USSR Gosplan, developed and submitted to the government proposals to significantly increase the rates of royalties, compared with the rates currently in force. Based on a joint draft, the USSR Council of Ministers ratified the new decree.

[Kartashova] What does it contribute to the schedule of payment for creative work? When will it be put into force?

[Bogatov] There is only a very short time left to wait. Starting on 1 January 1989, the size of fees for publication of literary works will be increased by an average of 25 percent, and payment for musical works will increase by 10 percent, payment for public performance of dramatic works and concerts will increase by 20 percent. The royalty rates for recording and taping certain types of musical works has been increased significantly..

The sum of the author is paid when a record is issued has increased a great deal.

The rates of royalties for social and political writing has been raised considerably. New rates have been set for translation of artistic prose, and for the publication of poetic works.

Authors will be remunerated for reprinting of all forms of literary-artistic, musical, musical-artistic and other works at a rate 70 percent of the fee for the first publication. Thus, when works are republished, the number of times they have previously been reissued will not matter. It should also be mentioned that the maximum amount of royalties payable to the authors of dramatic and musical-dramatic works for their public performance has been altered.

Composers of programs consisting of symphonic and vocal symphonic works will receive 7 percent of the box office take (instead of 5). For all other types of concert programs, composers will receive 2.5 of the box office take (i.e., 0.5 percent more than previously).

[Kartashova] The creative workers are undoubtedly interested in the following nuance: if a contract was signed this year but the work will come out next year, how will the authors' fees be computed?

[Bogatov] The new royalty rates will be introduced starting on 1 January and will apply to payments the right to receive which began after 31 December of this year, with proportional increases of rate stipulated for contracts concluded earlier. However, payment schedules will not be revised for sums already paid out.

[Kartashova] Our readers have asked a number of specific questions in their letters. Here is an example: will an artist receive more for an exhibition?

[Bogatov] Unfortunately this decree does not apply to payments to artists.

[Kartashova] Will the system of payment when a film is shown on television be altered?

[Bogatov] As far as I know, the USSR Union of Cinematographers is preparing a proposal on this matter.

[Kartashova] Will payment for circus programs change?

[Bogatov] No, the new decree does not apply to circuses. When a circus program is performed, its author will receive, as before, 0.5 percent of the box office take (not including money for attractions and pantomimes that charge an additional fee.)

[Kartashova] Royalties are paid for songs on radio and television only when they are [first] "purchased" Will there be any sort of change to this situation in the future?

[Bogatov] For the present, the situation with regard to payment for songs, and also other published works presented on radio and television, has not been altered. In this situation, the law that gives the media the right to include a work on a program without paying royalties is still in force; however, the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers have asked that the existing situation be reviewed.

[Kartashova] In your view is the new decree completely adequate?

[Bogatov] When the draft decree was being prepared, the All-Union Agency on Authors' Rights proposed a basic change in the system for determining the amount of authors' fees for publication of works and for recording based on the profitability?? of the edition. This proposal was rejected, not because it was bad, but because the publishing houses, for example, have still not put their work on the new basis of cost accounting and self-financing. In addition, the demand of the publishing houses for paper is still not being satisfied, there is insufficient printing capacity, and there is no efficient way to calculate the number of copies of a published edition sold. However, in the process of discussing these proposals of ours, many people came to the opinion that, after some time has passed, we should return to the question of a royalty system based on completely new approaches and seriously reanalyze the existing situation.

[Kartashova] How is the All-Union Agency on Authors' Rights preparing itself for the moment the new decree is put into force?

[Bogatov] First of all, the agency must put the new rates and rules for computing royalties into practice for public performances of works in the theater, concerts and other organizations. This is because we are the only ones collecting authors' royalties for public performances.

Academics Examine Rights of Individual in 'Rule-of-Law' State

18000368a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 89 p 3

[Roundtable discussion, conducted by Ye. Zhbanov and Yu. Feofanov: "Rights of the Individual in the 'Rule-of-Law' State"]

[Text] Whatever area of law is being discussed—whether the structure of authority, the democratization of the political system that has recently been the object of nationwide discussion, or the criminal or electoral legislation that is currently being discussed nationwide—all these things, in one way or another, comes into focus in the problem of the rights of the individual and their reliable guarantee. Because this determines the goals and essence of the socialist rule-of-law state. That is why the organizers of the roundtable—the Yuridicheskaya Literatura Publishing House and IZVESTIYA newspaper—recommended to the scientists that, without coming down off the path of high science, they turn to the paths of the practical construction of the rule-of-law state, when the law is converted from a servant of the administration to the master.

In order to begin the discussion we proposed a specific situation that has been broadly publicized. Persons who were suspected of major thefts at the "waste-paper field" were arrested. The legally established periods for maintaining them under guard before trial expired, and they were released, with written notification that they must not leave the area. They immediately began to renounce their original confessions. On the one hand, there was no proof, and hence there was no blame and no criminal. The law triumphed. But on the other hand, who had triumphed if undiscovered criminals had been released?

It was with a discussion of this situation that the discussion began. At such time Doctor of Legal Sciences (Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences) V. Savitskiy, by his reply, immediately posed the problem on a broader scale: "The defense of the individual's rights is the keystone of the rule-of-law state."

Freedom of Each Is Freedom of All

[Moderator:] The persons who usually come before the court are people on whom serious suspicion has fallen, for whom evidence has been collected for what would appear to be the commission of criminal acts. But evidence is not yet a final conclusion. It is still necessary to prove the acts. Unfortunately, the sentence is actually made often prior to the sentencing. How does one preclude this from happening in the practical situation?

O. Temushkin, doctor of legal sciences (USSR Supreme Court): It is necessary to reorient the activities of the agencies that are currently called the law-enforcement

agencies. As in any civilized country, they must protect, first of all, the individual's rights. In our society these agencies have been deformed and changed into punitive ones.

At the present time, when we are building a rule-of-law state, investigation has encountered complications. Previously things used to be simple: you arrested a person, kept him as long as you wanted, and beat so-called confessions out of him. Moreover, the person could be kept under guard as long as you wanted. Currently nothing has changed. For four or five years the case involving the notorious Adylov has been under investigation—soon it will be possible to include it in the Guinness Book of Records.

Why, then, do people in court renounce their own confessions? First, they are arrested hurriedly, and then the admissions are obtained, but there is nothing with which to make them binding.

V. Savitskiy: Actually, a voluntary confession can be made binding, but one obtained under pressure cannot.

O. Temushkin: I would never make a verdict solely on the basis of the defendants' confessions. True, courts have finally begun doing that, and they should—they have begun giving verdicts of "not guilty." That, of course, does not please certain procurators or certain officials, especially those who have interfered unceremoniously in legal proceedings.

Here is an example. A. Vaksberg's article "Stormy Applause" mentioned the case of Babayev and Kuliyeu, who were sentenced to death by firing squad in Azerbaijan. Ye. Smolentsev, who at that time was deputy chairman of USSR Supreme Court, protested that the verdict was not legally valid. But the protest was not taken into consideration. I want to lift the curtain slightly. G. Aliyev, who at that time was First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan [AzCP], used his own influence and made repeated telephone calls to L. Smirnov (now deceased), who at that time was chairman of USSR Supreme Court and to other administrators of law-enforcement agencies. I was an involuntary witness to one such conversation: it was an unceremonious demand not to interfere in the Babayev case. The "telephone law," alas, had its effect. The people were executed by firing squad.

V. Savitskiy: Yes, the problem of protecting the individual's rights are, I daresay, the keystone of the rule-of-law state. And I would begin with this aspect: the state's responsibility to the individual. Whereas previously every step taken by a person was linked with his responsibility to the state, now it is necessary to pose the question of reciprocal responsibility—the state's responsibility to the individual too. Moreover, in a dispute between the state and a citizen, I feel that it is necessary to give the preference to the individual. For example, the period for keeping a person under guard expires. There is

no extension. What is the prison chief supposed to do? That very day, immediately, he should free the individual. That is an elementary decision, one that is democratic and the only possible one. This is a specific example of the priority direction with respect to the individual. But in our society, according to the law, when the period expires the prison chiefs only inform the procurator, after which the procurator must issue the order.

The Legal Foundation Is Important

[Moderator:] The status of a person who has been detained, who is under investigation, and who is charged as the defendant is still a partial item. In order to build a rule-of-law state, an overall concept of that status is needed.

V. Narsesyants, doctor of legal sciences (Institute of State and Law). The problem of guaranteeing the freedom of the individual is a fundamental one in the concept of the rule-of-law state. But this is only part of the concept. In isolated form this problem is theoretically on the wane. Today we have a situation when we are dealing with the changeover from the system of administration by fiat to a system of a rule-of-law state system. Therefore the question arises: within the confines of what kind of situation are we speaking about the guarantees of the rights and freedoms of the individual? Our history, as well as common sense, indicates that there simply cannot be any such guarantees within the confines of a system of administrative fiat which was not built on legal principles and which does not proceed from the principle of law. Our jurisprudence has its Lysenko and even a more harmful individual, Vyshinskiy. The law, in the broad sense on which the guarantees of the individual's rights and freedoms are built, must be recognized as the principle of all social relations. What does that mean? We must change over from volitional norms to legal ones, to the recognition of law as the basic form of social relations. It is only in that construct that one can talk about the reciprocal obligations of the state and the individual.

In our society the prejudice has formed: strong authority is the state, and a universally mandatory norm is the law. Actually this is not so. The state is the sovereign form of public authority, a form that has been extended to the entire population and to the entire territory, and no other authority can compete with the state authority.

On the other hand, the law is simply not a mandatory norm. The law is the principle of equality, of equal rights, it is the direct opposite of a principle of equalization, the adherents of which compute who earns how much, and who has more money in the savings bank. This is an expression of an antilegal mood: the law has its system of symbols—the scales of justice. But the scales exist not so that things will be identical for everyone. The scales exist to assure that everything is measured by the single, overall scale of formal equality.

In our situation, the legal guarantees themselves need guarantees. Because they cannot be made real by improving the work performed by various links in a system of administrative fiat. This will not produce anything.

Question from the floor: Your basic idea is that, until the system of administrative fiat leaves, no matter how much we talk about the guaranteeing of rights, they still are not guaranteed. What should we do then—wait? Or should we ignore the existing norms?

Narsesyants: I certainly do not mean that we should not observe the existing norms. Definitely not. But reliable legal guarantees can exist only where the system itself exists on legal principles.

L. Mamut, doctor of legal sciences (Institute of State and Law). I would like to support the ideas that have been expressed here. Making judgments about the rule-of-law state and failing to deal with the strategy of carrying out radical political reforms means talking idle. I agree with the thesis that has been expressed, to the effect that the creation of a rule-of-law state means a complete break with the management of society by administrative fiat. In many published works about the rule-of-law state it is precisely this context that for reason is put in the background. The discussion deals with very important, interesting, but also sometimes derivative and partial questions. The root of the matter is that our state cannot become a rule-of-law state while it is in the condition that it is in now.

The highest legislative agency in it did not possess complete authority. The entity that possessed the highest authority through a period of seven decades was a structure outside the state—the party, or, rather, the party apparatus. And no one conceals that fact. It has been mentioned in party documents. Throughout the 70 years of our history, the question of making a line of demarcation between the functions of the party and the functions of the state has been posed. The question has been posed, but the problem remains. And until the monitoring of law enforcement transfers over to the state, there can be no discussion of any sovereignty of state authority.

V. Zorkin, doctor of legal sciences (Higher Legal School, USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]). I think that it would be one-sided to think of the socialist state as being only a state of legality. That alone is not enough. Because the laws will be different, including those that break the law.

The rule-of-law state has two aspects. The first is the legal aspect; if there is no legality, then everything else is eroded. The second is judicial proper: the law [as a system] must stand behind each [individual] law. If this does not exist, the rights of the individual are violated. The most serious violations occurred in the 1930's. But let us take today's situation. What we are dealing with is

not the tendencies of *perestroyka*, but the post-*perestroyka* tendencies. Let us take as an example the Law Governing the Enterprise. It is being eroded with the aid of departmental normative acts.

Or take another example. A decree is promulgated by a higher authority. Do you think that it goes into effect immediately? No. Until the minister issues the order, the law actually will not be in effect in the department. And the order—most frequently in the form of supplemental instructions—nullifies the decree. The pyramid of legality is destroyed. It is necessary to make the same demands to the state will that that will makes to citizens. Otherwise the state withdraws from legal circulation.

V. Vlasikhin, candidate of legal sciences (Institute of United States and Canada): In the sphere of criminal justice we have proclaimed the presumption of innocence, but the individual himself frequently has to prove his innocence himself. But in the sphere of everyday and administrative relations he is forced to do that constantly.

I specialize in America. I lived for a year in that country with a visitor's card only. In interactions with institutions and officials I gave only my first name and last name. Because the presumption of trust exists there. Period! But in our country a person still has to have a heap of papers. A passport and an identification card are not enough: you also have to have all kinds of various statements.

Of course, laws are also broken in the United States. Nevertheless, the state's rights in the sphere of criminal jurisprudence are limited. Here is a specific example. If the proof was obtained by deviating from the legal procedures, for example, if the arrest warrant is prepared incorrectly, on that basis alone the case is closed. American justice has absolutely no knowledge of the institution of further investigation. And the practice of releasing people under bond evolves from the assumption that the person must be chiefly allowed to remain free until the trial. This is what the Americans call "a model of proper legal procedure," when it is better to release ten suspects than to incarcerate one innocent person.

Creating an Independent Court

G. Maltsev, doctor of legal sciences (Academy of Social Sciences): We encounter the violation of legality and we say, "This shouldn't happen in any state!" Well, comrades, all of us are reducing the importance of the problem! When we talk about a rule-of-law state, we must raise the plank much higher: we are dealing with the strategy of legal development. We must study the entire series of questions in order to create that kind of law with which the system of authority turns its face to the individual.

Putting the law above himself, I feel, is the citizen's basic right.

Another feature is the existing of legal institutions to give the people control over the government. This control must be unceasing. A rule-of-law state is also differentiated by the institutions that permit immediate and direct popular legislation. I have in mind at least referendums.

The system of protecting the individual's rights begins with the legislation. It is precisely there that the right of the individual is formed. Therefore it is necessary to speak of the priority of the interests of the individual at the very stage of the creation of laws. And there is something else. A system of protecting the rights of the individual must be created. What is it made up of? First of all, the legal responsibility of the person who is encroaching upon the interests of the citizens. Immediately there arises the problem of creating a procedure for protecting the violated law. It is precisely for this reason that legal protection must extend to absolutely all the citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms. Our pension laws, for example, still do not have any legal protection. And, in general, by no means all the constitutional rights are protected by the court. The legal system must be put above the administration.

We also need a system for correcting the law. If there are laws which become obsolete very quickly, then there also those which, from the very beginning, are subjected to criticism. In the process of the legal reform, it would be good to establish the institution of the partial determination by the court with respect to the law. The court, when resolving a definite case, see the imperfection of the law. Why does it remain silent? The attitude taken toward the law should not be as though it were something authoritarian. Otherwise the law can be changed from a blessing to an evil.

V. Savitskiy: I would like to support the thesis of the exceptional role that must be played in a rule-of-law state by court authority. The fact of the matter is that officials are afraid of the court. The counteraction of the court to many antidemocratic actions would be too strong. Meanwhile, in France, for example, a female retiree, through the administrative court of Paris, initiated a suit against the president of the country. And she won the case. The president submitted. This is both testimony to the law and the triumph of the law.

Power and the Law

V. Grafskiy, candidate of legal sciences (Institute of State and Law): I would like to make several comments with regard to positions that have already been expressed. There is little realism in the position when we say that the state will be qualitatively new, will be unprecedented, will be completely different from what it is now. In history there have never been any changes without succession. The question consists in what heritage we will be renouncing.

V. Narsesyants: What do you mean by "realism"? Do you mean the system of administrative fiat?

V. Grafskiy: No, realism in that the strongest of our three authorities is the executive authority. The force of the system of fiat consists in the fact that the executive authority acts in the name of the state. It is not the legislative or the judicial, but the executive authority that runs the show. That's a reality.

Obviously, the protection and defense of citizens' rights and freedoms are the concern not only of the state, but also of society as a whole. This is what is called social protection. For example, concern for the sick, the elderly, and the orphans. This concern cannot be placed only on the state. And I would have difficulty saying which is more important, the legal or the social guarantees. For a person, his entire way of life, the entire social environment, are the guarantees of his rights. Our sociologists carried out a survey and came to the conclusion that approximately 70 percent of the factors that provide a person with comfort in his life, are of a social nature, rather than legal.

In conclusion, I would like to quote a phrase that was used by Madison, a founder of the American Constitution: "People are not angels." No laws will fill in for the cultivation of human relations.

V. Zorkin: In this sense also, one can turn to the sphere of economics. The economy, speaking in general, is the coordination of wills in the process of commodity-monetary relations. In our country an order, a command, is in effect. Legal science has taken the step of considering the needs of the administrative-fiat system. Thus an attempt was made to make incompatible things compatible. Because in the unlimited nature of administrative authority the legal guarantees of the individual disappear. But what does it mean to limit authority from the legal point of view? It means making the Constitution inviolable.

V. Savitskiy: I would like to discuss the role of public opinion as a guarantee of the irreversibility of *pere-stroyka*. Unfortunately, my statement will be made in pessimistic tones, because public opinion has not yet played this kind of a role. The article in the Constitution that stipulates two possible guarantees for the expression of public opinion—the discussion of very important questions of life, and the referendum—has proven to be split into two parts. The first part has been legalized, if only formally; the second—the referendums—is only a declaration.

V. Narsesyants: Mention was made just now of the nonrecognition by the fiat system of the legal principle that the citizen and the state are equal. Functionaries in this system only talk about the supremacy of the law. But that cannot be if a law is not legal, and the law cannot be

legal so long as the agencies that promulgate it are not based on legal principles. It is not simple that legal nihilism exists among our fellow-citizens. We have state legal nihilism.

V. Zorkin: In this sense we are not dealing even with a rule-of-law state, but about legal socialism in its broad aspect. Here too the legal culture of society is a very important guarantee. Without that there is no soil in which seeds can sprout. Consequently, the tree will not grow. The tragedy of our history is in the lack of genuine legal culture. And from this point of view one cannot feel that the violation of the rights of the individual is only the malicious intent of malicious individuals.

One Specific Question

[Moderator:] However, history attests that the role of "malicious individuals" in history has been very great. In this regard, then, scientists are faced with a question which everyone is now talking about. The responsibility borne by those who tortured and killed during the years of mass repressions.

G. Maltsev: You have given us the problem of responsibility for crimes that were carried out in response to an order. People have argued about this at all times—in antiquity, in the Middle Ages, and at the Nuremberg trial. I dream of a kind of law that would contain norms in accordance with which a crime committed in response to an order would not be free from responsibility. But a large number of regimes, armies, etc. would be destroyed immediately. A system that requires superdiscipline is sustained by orders, and an order is not discussed, but must be executed. Certain jurists state that the executor is not responsible for the order, excluding, of course, special sadism—the so-called excess displayed by the executor. I dream of norms that would not free a person from responsibility. That is, every individual must think: if, by virtue of the order, the blood of innocent persons is shed, should I execute it? How to formalize this juridically is question No. 2. At the present time, failure to execute an order is practically suicide.

[Statement from the floor:] There is a liberal point of view—the duty of civil disobedience.

[Statement from the floor:] There could also be this formula: if the norm is not legal, it should not be executed.

[Statement from the floor:] It would be absurd to proceed from the premise that orders can be unlawful.

[Statement from the floor:] It is necessary to seek a general law. It is impossible by a specific instance to overthrow an existing principle. The general rule can be only in this form: everything that is unlawful must be prevented from going into effect.

[Statement from the floor:] Principles must also be inflexible and irreversible relative to their effective periods.

No roundtable discussion, not only one that lasts several days, is capable of dealing with all the problems of the rule-of-law state. And that was the situation here: we presented the scientists with a narrow topic: the guaranteeing of the rights and freedoms of the individual in the state. But the discussion covered a much broader area. Well, that's only natural. Therefore it is difficult to sum up the results. But is it really necessary to do so?

The roundtable discussion was conducted by IZVESTIYA and Yurizdat. So, instead of a formal summation of the results, an idea was born: the participants in the discussion, the scientists with a large amount of experience in their own branches of law, as they leave the discussion, will create a compendium—a book that will state fundamentally and within the capabilities of each one individually the most acute and most urgent problems of building a socialist rule-of-law state.

Inspector Recounts 15-Year War on Organized Crime

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[Interview with Vladimir Ivanovich Oleynik, deputy head of RSFSR Procuracy Investigative Division, conducted by Aleksandr Radov: "Band, Gang and 'System': The Lessons of Inspector Oleynik, Who Has Fought Organized Crime for 15 Years"]

[Text]

"I Demand That You File a Case Against Me!"

Some people merely speculate about our Soviet mafias, attempting to determine whether they actually exist or whether they are not really there at all, but Vladimir Ivanovich Oleynik has for no less than 15 years had to work with them, or rather against them. And though he has had many professional successes (among them the skins and furs case in Kazakhstan and the "Tregubov Case" in Moscow) nevertheless he asks himself: is there any need to continue this quixotic struggle?

He reasons thus: we are not opposing organized crime the way we should, so it opposes everyone. Most of all—and with rabid hatred—those brave individuals (and, note, not just in law enforcement organs) who challenge its omnipotence. In this regard Oleynik is perhaps organized crime's most detested enemy. All these years he has never been able to let down his guard: this is war!

...In the corner of the telegram a stamped note reads "Addressed to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference." Below is the text, which I feel must be reproduced here:

IN THE MID-1980'S REPUBLIC PROCURACY PROVOKED MOSCOW UNJUSTIFIED REPRESSIONS AGAINST COMMUNISTS IN OFFICIAL POSITIONS IN ALL AREAS DURING THREE-MONTH PERIOD THOUSANDS OF COMMUNISTS WOUND UP IN DUNGEONS OF SOVIET BUCHENWALD MANY COMMUNISTS DIED AS A RESULT OF TORTURE HUNDREDS WERE CRIPPLED TORTURE ORGANIZED BY PROCURACY INSPECTORS OLEJNIK ANDREYEV RUSSKIKH KURBATOV STEPANYUK NITSA PERTSEV AND DOZENS OF OTHER CRIMINALS EXECUTIONERS FORCED TO RELEASE THOUSANDS OF COMMUNISTS WITHOUT BRINGING THEM TO TRIAL... THE RAYKOM DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT PERSONS UNDER INVESTIGATIONS ARE BEING TORTURED AND KILLED AND THAT FOR THIS PURPOSE THERE ARE SPECIALLY CONSTRUCTED CHAMBERS I REQUEST THAT THE CONFERENCE PRESIDUM ALLOW DELEGATE RAYKOM SECRETARY.....TO VISIT WITH ME INVESTIGATIVE ISOLATION CELLS I WILL SHOW ENTRANCES CONCEALED BEHIND POLISHED SHIELDS LEADING TO MEDIEVAL CELLARS WHERE TORTURE CHAMBERS FOR COMMUNISTS ARE LOCATED MY ADDRESS MOSCOW...

After all the disclosures that have poured down on our aching heads in recent years one wants so much to believe these, particularly since they were addressed by X. to the 19th Party Conference (he signed his real name to the telegram, but I will not give it, so as not to transform him into an idol of the darkest forces in our state). And especially since the subject is justice, which is precisely the area where there have been problems. I also have not the slightest reason to doubt that the person who sent this telegram is sane and mentally competent. And if that is true, then what is going on? Could a rational human being lie so monstrously?

Obviously this maneuver was calculated to play on the common notion that people would lie about some trivial matter but not on such a gigantic scale (this thinking has been most notably exploited by the Khlestakovs and the Goebbels).

The national procuracy reacted to the telegram addressed to the party conference in its customary fashion: "the incidents described did not occur." One would think that Oleynik would have been happy (they had come to his defense, albeit damning him with faint praise), yet he was so irate that he wrote a report to the republic procurator in which he demanded three times: file a criminal case against myself and the other inspectors named in the telegram. (One week later Inspector Andreyev submitted a similar request to the General Procurator.) Let completely independent jurists thoroughly investigate the matter, naturally visiting the scene: the "medieval cellars" and the "torture chambers"—let them investigate every single point in X.'s

terrible accusations. And if we are guilty, then punish us with the full force of the law. But if these things are a lie, then try X. for slander and provocation.

I am fairly sure that if X. was a lone individual and had acted at his own initiative Oleynik would have tolerated him and not even have paid any attention to him. But he could sense a tremendous and plainly sinister force behind him. It was that force that Oleynik wanted to challenge.

Well, what about the third option? Vladimir Ivanovich thinks that it is the most probable: in their usual efforts to avoid conflict and find compromises that will not harm their own interests the heads of the procuracy, the majority of them appointed during the years of stagnation, will very likely let the matter drop. In that event Oleynik is prepared to opt for submitting his resignation...

This is not the first time in his life that this has happened. Two years ago, i.e. at the same time that the verdict was handed down against N. P. Tregubov, the head of Moscow Glavtorg [Main Administration for Trade] and simultaneously the "godfather" of a criminal "system" involving tens of thousands of officials, and that verdict upheld by the higher courts, Oleynik felt like it was his lucky day. Dozens of other cases stemming from the Tregubov trial had already been filed. These promised to strike a blow at the mafia (at least within the Moscow food trade system) from which it would probably never recover. But it was precisely at that auspicious moment that this "big shot" (as he was called in militia slang) or, officially, the RSFSR Procuracy's senior inspector for especially important cases submitted his first resignation, making it clear that he was doing so in protest.

Of course he was weary of the personal insults. But his protest was not directed at specific individuals, but rather at the entire Administrative System, which had proven its cynical lack of humanity to him personally on numerous occasions. He felt this most keenly at moments when it seemed that there was simply no hope. It was that way when he spent two years roaming around Moscow without an apartment, sleeping in train stations for months at a time; he was ill for six months after catching a grave infection—brucellosis—"in the line of duty"—and it appears that this disease will be with him until the day he dies; he literally led a life of poverty together with his family of three generations, for whom he was essentially the only breadwinner; he did not know how to shake off the vile slander (supposedly he had owned a Volga and later resold it); he protected himself against the "avengers" as best he could, expecting to meet death around every corner.

I am not exaggerating on that last point. Even eight or ten years ago he was already well aware that he was being stalked. At first he got warnings over the telephone, saying that if he did not stop bad things would happen to his wife and his daughter. He shrugged off the warnings;

what else could he do? Then the first punishment followed: almost at the same time his wife lost her job and his son-in-law was fired. Oleynik was disheartened, but he kept on doing what he had been doing. Now there began a series of dirty tricks and traps that are almost classic for mafiosi in every country. All together they would provide enough material for a detective novel. The last time he was once again saved by the purest good luck. This is how it happened: noticing a sticker bearing the trademark of Glavtorg, which he had challenged, on the trunk of his battered Zhiguli he had no idea that it was a calling card from the next life. He realized it too late, after the left front wheel of his car spun off as he was driving along, causing the car to veer into oncoming traffic. One of Glavtorg's operatives, vassals or hired men had carefully loosened the lug nuts. If he had been going 10 kilometers an hour faster they would have successfully sent him to join his ancestors...

I give him credit: he did not tremble or start having second thoughts. The idea of changing jobs because his was deadly dangerous never entered his mind. He would have kept on taking risks if each time he had seen that some good came of it. But that was the problem: he could not see that he was having any effect...

Not for the sake of his own pleasure or benefit. Because there was always something more important to him than personal offense: the very concentrated public indignation, the insistent, nagging pain of his tormented homeland.

At this point I would like to emphasize that his protest, a completely social protest, was directed not only and not so much at his own procuracy as at the country's entire law enforcement system. It is bad enough that many people within that system are not "catching mice," that they have made a mockery of the principle of inevitable retribution. But it is even more bitter to see how, in dealing with cases of a more or less major nature, involving not amateurish individuals but well-organized professionals of the criminal world who also possess high-level "entree," this system often shirks its responsibility, demonstrating either cowardice, or a lack of principles, or helplessness. Even in cases where a criminal network has already been exposed and all the evidence against it is there and needs only to be dug out, the law enforcement system often does not want to get involved. As a result many of the people that inspectors have managed, through selflessness and at great risk, to catch in the act are taken out and released, for reasons unknown to anyone, without any justification whatsoever given and, of course, without a trial!

This is not fantasy. Of the 2,000 workers in the Moscow food trade network who have been investigated (at least half of them high-level officials!) and whose involvement in major, i.e. multimillion-ruble, cases of embezzlement and theft are beyond any doubt, only eight percent were ever put on trial. The remainder received a *de facto*

pardon. And of the 97 individual criminal cases and materials put together and transferred from the republic procuracy to the Moscow city procuracy only two actually came to trial. But even that is not all: the investigative groups, assembled with great difficulty, that had acquired some experience dealing with organized crime have now been completely disbanded. Officers transferred from the KGB at Andropov's initiative for the purpose of fighting corruption in the militia have been repeatedly removed from internal affairs organs. So it is no wonder that Oleynik is saddened or angered when the mafias, particularly those operating within the trade network, have found intentional or unintentional accomplices. It is a fact that there is not a single bribery case in process by any Moscow procuracy at this time, although bribery remains a part of life in the capital. There is confirmation of this in a recent (19 September 1988) issue of IZVESTIYA. Andrey Fedorov, the chairman of the country's first cooperative cafe, located at 36 Kropotkinskaya Street, bitterly complains: "You are probably also aware of instances of cooperatives being subjected to extortion at every turn. Interesting, isn't it? It was assumed that the cooperative movement would supplant the 'shadow economy,' yet cooperatives' dependence on officials has produced the opposite effect—it has created another 'branch' of it. Why do we not open our eyes to this fact? Is it not time for law enforcement organs to pay attention to this?"

This recalls the way Tregubov, who was not even slightly repentant and did absolutely nothing to aid the investigation of his case, once spitefully exclaimed to Oleynik during one interrogation session: "It doesn't matter! Today you get us. The time will come when we get you back!" Has that time arrived?

Insights

Oleynik is from the Urals. He grew up in the drought-plagued Orenburg steppes and was a daredevil even as a child. An early-forming sense of justice forced him to reconsider a choice that he had already made: he had thought that he was born to be a radio technician. He spent all his early years with a soldering gun in his hand, but the day before he was to leave for the Sverdlovsk Polytechnical Institute everything suddenly changed and he was drawn to Perm, at that time called Molotov, where he decided to enter the Law Department. That was in 1954.

Later there would be the 20th Party Congress and the short-lived Khrushchev "thaw" that nonetheless succeeded in arousing democratic stirrings. A naturally gregarious individual with an inclination to lead, he dove headfirst into the diverse forms of, if not people's power, at least people's participation, which in those years had not yet become excessively bureaucratized: people's control, militia assistance brigades, the city's satirical newspaper. It was perhaps then that he came to

believe that if the people are not roused nothing can be accomplished; victories by the apparatus are empty or even, as is often the case, Pyrrhic victories...

After graduation from the Law Department he worked in the northern Urals as the assistant procurator at a huge camp comprised of many colonies. It was there that he began to get the insights that would later lead to an understanding of the sinister world of organized crime. Above all he saw that what was happening there had nothing to do with reeducation. It was simply punishment. And endless torments, both for the spirit and the flesh! And, perhaps saddest of all: this was the place where contacts were made that would later form the basis of criminal networks on the outside. Later, while investigating a case of banditry committed by a former internal affairs officer, he visited a penal colony reserved for members of the militia. He was horrified to see intensive sharing of criminal experience, trading of effective methods of efficient, i.e. "safe," crime, selling of criminal and protection contacts and formation of criminal syndicates. But was anybody using the camps as a starting point for investigation?

After the north he worked in the sweltering south as a rayon procurator and later, in Frunze, as a republic procurator-criminologist. It was there that he noticed how the crooked operators got in contact with criminals, and they in turn got in touch with the bureaucratic apparatus. That was how the System originated.

But during the first years he dealt with small bands. Somewhat later he clashed with more sinister formations, gangs, which he investigated one after another while the law textbooks shrilly attempted to prove that banditry had been completely and irrevocably eradicated from the country! As he compared the bands and the gangs he realized that they were evolutionary stages. From banditry the path led straight to the mafia. And what is a mafia? Politicized crime which makes use of the representatives of authority and their official powers for its own ends. In this sense the mafia is the offspring of the state system, because it thrives on the faults of that system. Jumping ahead, I asked Oleynik:

[Radov] What is beyond the mafia? What stage?

[Oleynik] Beyond the mafia? The seizure of political power by the criminal world.

This is not as incredible as it seems. Have not such things already occurred, though only within individual regions? I am thinking about not only Uzbekistan under Rashidov... When a criminal gang undertakes large-scale operations that require protection and stability it begins to recruit state officials or, taking the opposite tack, begins to infiltrate the state structure with its own people. It does this cunningly. It not only buys ready-made, morally formed—or rather, morally decayed—individuals, it also thinks about the long term and cultivates young,

promising individuals with a "clean" record. Then it waits until they assume key positions in society from which they can be of service to their "alma mater."

However, the following also happens: the mafia cannot wait long, so it attempts to further individuals' careers. Oleynik saw in Karaganda how quickly a mafia is able to move its loyal people higher and higher; he went there with Inspector A. V. Chuzhuk and KGB officers to investigate the skins and furs case. During the years of stagnation one was not permitted to write about the case or to discuss it publicly. It compromised the authorities woefully...

[Oleynik] Just imagine two jurists (Dunayev, the former head of a legal consulting office, and Epelbeym, head of the Criminal Law Department at the MVD Higher School) together with Snopkov, a resourceful economic manager, building new facilities and producing new products with tremendous efficiency; allowing half the goods to be sold illegally. You can judge the scale of their operations by the fact that valuables worth 1.5 million rubles were confiscated from them alone. They sought out a thoroughly "downtrodden" major at the rayon militia division and worked out a contract with him: they would pay him 8,000 rubles a month to warn them of danger. Plus they promised him that within a maximum of 12-18 months he would become deputy chief of the oblast militia administration. They did not entirely succeed in keeping their promise, but at the time of his arrest their major had already become deputy chief of the oblast Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation and all indications were that he would rise higher.

...Thus it is what you might call cadre work that differentiates a mafia from the preceding stage, a gang. These high-level protectors receive the lion's share of the take. They are not paid for specific actions or services, but in advance, so as to cover any eventuality. The upward flow of money and other valuables is one characteristic trait of a mafia. For example, of the 750,000 rubles embezzled by Sokolov, the former director of the Yeliseyevskiy Gastronom Store, and his deputies, they kept a "mere" 350,000 for themselves. What happened to the rest? It was these payoffs that insured the whole all these gentlemen and permitted them to go on extorting and robbing for 15 years virtually without risk.

As for the structure of the criminal "systems," they are characterized by a graduated system of spheres of influence and connections. They are almost like a mirror image of the official administrative structure: sectors, associations, organs of local authority. Take the trade network for example; in it there are five levels, the lowest of which is the stores. Every level is covered with a sort of "security umbrella" comprised of officials responsible for in-house and outside monitoring who have a negligent, incompetent or dishonest attitude toward their official duties. Or of other administrators who have been bribed by their "proteges."

"Petrikov (Tregubov's first deputy—author's note) assumed that Tregubov had guessed that he was receiving bribes from trade workers; in 1976 he began bribing Tregubov to keep his corruption quiet, support him and protect him in his work and help him get a different apartment. Petrikov handed Tregubov bribes in the latter's office the sum of 1,500 rubles prior to the holidays of 1 May and 7 November in the years 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980 and 1981. In 1978, on Tregubov's 60th birthday, Petrikov gave him a 5,000-ruble bribe. In the 1976-81 period Tregubov received a total of 20,000 rubles in bribes from Petrikov." (excerpt from the sentence)

Another surprising and very dangerous characteristic of mafias, and particularly of those involved in commerce, is the highly refined nature of their nerve centers. Oleynik ran into this every time he had to untangle a crime network. When he got to the top level as a rule he found there very intelligent and extremely businesslike individuals. They are much more dangerous than the types described in Shukshin's "Energichnyye lyudi" [Energetic People]. And head and shoulders above them in terms of intellect. Very smart people.

[Radov] Are they intelligent because that is precisely the kind of people a mafia hires?

[Oleynik] Yes, above all it recruits people of intelligence.

[Radov] Therein lies a highly vexing paradox. The legal economy still in many cases continues to have a disdainful attitude toward talent and intellect, yet the thieves' economy likes, values and attaches significance to these things. Could that be why criminal firms are so super-profitable? Like, for instance, the one in Karaganda?

[Oleynik] Exactly! Rudolf Rudolfovich Zhaton, of French background, was one of their shop supervisors. He has worked well and fastidiously his whole life, and he expects the same of his subordinates. His illicit shop, from which one-half of the goods were shipped to the black market, won the title of 'communist labor shop' on more than one occasion. There really was discipline there; there were progressive workers and shock workers, red banners were awarded, and lively party meetings were held. Yet all the while the criminal stream flowed parallel to all this. What do I mean stream—it was more like a raging river!

And how was discipline maintained there? People jumped at the chance to work there and held on to their jobs with all their might. And not because progressive work methods were employed there, though that was true. And not thanks to the well-organized social, cultural and domestic services. It was simpler than that: everyone there had an opportunity to steal. A seamstress could sew a fur cap and take it home with her. The foreman could make himself a whole coat. And in

addition to their official salaries people received additional pay according to their rank for sewing black-market goods that were made on the side.

[Radov] And no one protested, no one refused to take part in this illicit production?

[Oleynik] No one. Never. Not the non-party members, not the Komsomol members, not the party members. And unfortunately this is not an isolated case. The same thing often occurs wherever underground production is set up.

Here is another absurdity. In the beginning the mafia organizers invested their own money to set up a super-productive shop where none had existed before and to do so as quickly as possible.

[Radov] I read in the case file that Dunayev invested 18,000 rubles out of his own pocket.

[Oleynik] Yes, Dunayev, and others.

[Radov] Were they taking a risk? Could they have lost their money?

[Oleynik] Certainly! But they skillfully predicted events years in advance. They did not plan on remaining in operation for five years, as was actually the case, they planned on operating for decades. They undertook to establish new production under the noblest pretexts and on the basis of official documents, citing the resolution on the development of local trades that had been adopted just prior to that time. After that our "heroes" paid large bribes to acquire luxurious imported equipment earmarked for serious production sectors and managed to get state enterprises to train their cadres quickly. And instead of the familiar behind-schedule construction that is virtually universal today they could build, equip and put a highly modern production line into operation within three to four months.

[Radov] That is to say, they took full advantage of state centralism, and high-level party documents, and the central allocation system! Amazing—something that just will not seem to work for positive ends functioned remarkably well in this case. That is the tremendous power of "greasing the wheels." Could it be that this rusty economic mechanism that we curse was designed for that?

[Oleynik] It looks that way. And bear in mind that they were not just dealing with petty officials. But I cannot pursue that subject any further in view of the presumption of innocence. A luxury office at the Hotel Metropol was constantly maintained for the convenience of Dunayev and Co. Their hosts treated them not only to culinary

masterpieces, but also presented them with very expensive gifts and parasitic courtesans and "coincidental" winnings at cards. When Dunayev came to Moscow he always rode in a Chayka belonging to one of the union ministers.

Also typical is the fact that they immediately began to expand the scope of their operations: they opened up one branch, then another, then a third.

[Radov] Vladimir Ivanovich, if they had not been stopped would there now be an all-union mafia firm?

[Oleynik] That was their plan. They purchased mansions in Moscow and outside the city for that purpose and were preparing to establish a major production facility here, in the Non-Black Earth Zone, but they did not succeed in doing so...

[Radov] For what purpose? Solely for the sake of wealth?

[Oleynik] At first I also believed that, and asked in surprise: "Lev Mikhaylovich"—I asked Dunayev—"why did you need so much money?" To myself I was thinking: wasn't it because of greed? But he replied: "No, that is not the most important thing. In the circles in which I move every person has a price. We are all economists and analysts; we see right through everybody. Even if I do not tell someone like myself how much I am worth he will 'size me up' and accord me respect in proportion to his estimate."

[Radov] That was what got him started: having a price?

[Oleynik] Yes, a price. Secondly, the level of one's material capabilities determines the circle of one's patrons and the importance of one's business connections. He said to me: "I do not intend to flee to the West or to the East. I want to realize myself as fully as possible in my homeland." The third thing was that all the people who work for them stay with them only if they get paid.

[Radov] A little bit more and we will make him a "hero of our times." Still, what is their ultimate goal? If they have any...

[Oleynik] Power and power alone!

[Radov] Power over whom? The broader the better?

[Oleynik] Unlimited power! Power as an end in itself! Power at every level...

[Radov] But in such a way that it does not become a burden? Or does not even the burden of power daunt them?

[Oleynik] That is an interesting question. Snopkov, who was one of them...

[Radov] The one from whom a half a million was confiscated, as well as several hundred thousand from his three lovers, not counting gold and jewels?

[Oleynik] That one... He was the son of a kulak, but not one whose lands and property were seized by mistake; he really was an exploiter. He once said to his wife: "Hey, Nastya, do you want to become a Supreme Soviet deputy in this election? Even if you don't, I need it like a hold in the head—I've already got so many things on my mind!" That was at the beginning of the 1970's. Later the Snopkovs did not refuse, realizing that this could prove to be the most reliable "security umbrella..."

[Radov] And how did official power suit them? Did they want to be in charge, or did they interact as equals?

[Oleynik] At that time they were just trying out power. They did not yet have their people in key positions. At that first stage the most important thing for them was money. But later they had to look out for their people in order to keep them supplied with resources and keep them from being exposed. That was when it became necessary to train apparatchiki with favors, treats and money. And it was in this period, beginning in 1978-79, that they took root, acquired capital and assured themselves of a reliable cover.

[Radov] Was that when they became all-powerful? Were they indeed all-powerful?

[Oleynik] They were. I will give you an example. It was related to me during an interrogation session by Petrikov, Tregubov's first deputy, the one who had lured him into the mafia. Following the Moscow Olympics orders were bestowed on a large group of Moscow trade leaders. This was shortly before the whole pack was exposed. The awards ceremony was supposed to be held at the Moscow Gorsovet. But Sokolov—the director of the Yeliseyevskiy Gastronom Store, who was subsequently shot—was outraged: "What do you mean, at the Moscow Gorsovet?" But neither Tregubov nor Petrikov could change that. "No, you cannot," Sokolov told them, "but I can! I will arrange for us to be given our awards in the Kremlin!" And, indeed, they were presented with the awards in the Kremlin. This was obviously the result of skillful exploitation of the ignorance of the people who shook hands at awards ceremonies. As Petrikov later recalled, Sokolov strode across the courtyard of the Kremlin like he owned the place, with a Polaroid camera around his neck. He took a picture of everyone and immediately handed them color photos. And everyone was grateful to Sokolov.

Without Sokolov we would still be in the dark about many things and the Tregubov case would not have been tried. It was his confession and his active assistance in the investigation that helped expose the Moscow trade "system." When we opened the Glavtorg case we already were aware that there were regular criminal ties between 757 specific individuals, from store directors to the

heads of trade in Moscow and throughout the country and the heads of other sectors and departments. A mere 12 of these individuals testified that bribes totalling 1.5 million rubles passed through their hands.

The Roots and the Crown

[Radov] Vladimir Ivanovich, organized crime is to all appearances a legacy of the Brezhnev years, is it not? Or even the essence of those years?

[Oleynik] It plainly is!

[Radov] And it is connected with all their other sinister traits: degeneration of power and a lack of monitoring over and principles in the use of power?

[Oleynik] Yes, but the roots of this go back to the late 1920's, when a sharp divergence between words and actions arose in our state. It was not simply a case of "I say but I do not do." It was more complex: "I say one thing, think another and do something else altogether..."

[Radov] But when did the present stage begin?

[Oleynik] With the words "do it" and "make arrangements." This started appearing at the beginning of the 1960's. How did it work? There would be a call from Moscow to the outlying areas, saying: we are coming to inspect you, we will be there at such-and-such a time, you arrange things! And arranging things meant wining, dining and providing lots of other pleasures. A job, fishing, maybe even girls. That was the sort of demands made of directors, and many subordinates who were dependent in every way had no choice but to comply.

[Radov] And they themselves exploited this situation of mutual complicity. Then the unthinkable happened: in broad daylight, almost unconcealed, thousands upon thousands of "good guys" started shamelessly embezzling, robbing the country. Today I wonder: why did the people not rise up, not put a stop to this corrupt bacchanal? They were bewildered, and they were not sufficiently well organized. And there was another matter: state property, both present and future, was not regarded as belonging to them. This was a result of the great alienation of state institutions from the citizenry. These institutions had begun to exist as if for their own benefit, for their own pleasure, shutting themselves off from many social problems and not inquiring into the situation of honest workers, who were having a much harder time than dishonest and dishonorable people.

States die when they cease differentiating between good people and bad people. This was said in the 4th century B.C. by the ancient Greek philosopher Antisthenes, and it is still timely and exact. Our state came close to the brink by rejecting good people and gathering bad people around itself. Does it come as any surprise that for so long no one seriously opposed the dark forces?

[Oleynik] Let's discuss distortions in monitoring. Somewhere I read that currently there are 350,000 people employed in departmental control organs. In spite of this huge army of monitors quite a few people continue to steal and embezzle. At a recent briefing one of the heads of the Moscow Internal Affairs Administration reported that of 58 salespersons in vegetables stores checked out by test purchases 57 shorted their customers. That is terrible! Extrapolating from this figure, tens of millions of people in this country are working dishonestly and participating in small- or large-scale embezzlement. How can this be stopped? And take into account the fact that this is not being done by lone malefactors, but rather by the soldiers of an invisible army which it is unbelievably difficult to expose and destroy. Perhaps even impossible to do so! And the problem is not just that there is a well-established structure, reliable "security umbrellas," chains of interdependence founded on the fundamental principle of the mafia world: "nothing comes for free!" This comes about thanks to the two chief sources of unearned income. The first source is systematic deception of the public through short-weighting, erroneous calculations and diverse manipulation with goods, including forgery, misrepresentation of quality categories and price increases... The second source is all types of embezzlement or unlawful use of state property, of which the form most likely to go unpunished—with regard to the trade system—is the writing off of sums owed to the state by citing "natural loss" or so-called "customer forgetfulness." That does of course occur, but the incidence thereof is being exaggerated by a factor of ten! On a nationwide scale this amounts to hundreds of millions if not billions of rubles appropriated by the mafias. There is also the illicit sale of stolen goods. As a rule these goods are sold at a separate counter of a store or by a street vendor. Another old standby in the trade network is the artificial creation of "shortages" so that "quiet" revenge can be taken against "disobedient" sellers. There are sources like these—hundreds and hundreds of them—in every sector of the economy.

In this system the basic "moneymaker" is the salesperson, who is forced to steal, since the "system" keeps a tight rein on him. But he is only allowed to get rich without retribution if he sends a portion of the take up the ladder to the heads of departments or sections, who in turn pass it on to the directors and their deputies. This is not the latter's sole source of income. They have a monopoly on the application of "natural loss," which is the most guaranteed channel of mafia enrichment today.

The same means are used to build relationships with higher-ups and suppliers. Unwritten price lists exist to facilitate transactions. For example: store directors pay between three and five kopecks for every kilogram of meat delivered from cold storage.

And that is the way it is from top to bottom, or vice versa. As we can see, the mechanism is an extremely simple one, but it functions inexorably. Just look at what it yields. Filippov, the director of the Novoarbat'skiy

Gastronom Store, testified in court that over a 10-year period he received 171,300 rubles from his subordinates, of which he passed on 84,642. Over a 14-year period beginning in 1970 Ambartsumyan, the director of the Dzerzhinskiy Fruit and Vegetable Office, received 405,000 rubles and passed on 51,000. And that is just within the limits of the materials examined in that particular case.

The keystone of this embezzlement system is the rayon trade organization for trade in food products. It was stated at the Tregubov trial that whereas an appointment as a store director cost 10,000-15,000 rubles, regardless of the store's sales volume, the job of raypishchetorg chief could often fetch two or three times as much. This is also due to the fact that the deputy chairmen of rayispolkoms who oversee trade have militia under their jurisdiction, and this permits them to "link" the operations of these two branches in an illegal manner. This is why the trade system is often able to "appoint" all its own "watchdogs."

Reorganization of the trade system has repeatedly served to facilitate more efficiently "collection" of bribes. For example, Glavtorg was made separate from Glavmosplovodoshchprom [Moscow Main Administration for the Fruit and Vegetable Trade]. The criminal directors of associations are eager to collect a cash tax from all the managers of vegetable and fruit stores so that they can pay off corrupt administrators higher up. This "bribe distribution system" was greatly facilitated, as Ambartsumyan testified in court, by the work of a number of experts employed by the trade and industry chamber. For a bribe they lowered the category of imported goods—apples, oranges, bananas, tangerines... This allowed everyone who employed their "expertise" to net several thousand rubles per freight car load. That is why some directors of fruit and vegetable warehouses are not eager to see proper vegetable procurement and storage established. Furthermore they actually attempt to empty storage areas containing scarce items, doing everything in their power to destroy quality fruit, later writing it off to spoilage and dumping it...

[Radov] That explains a great deal. It will be difficult to establish order in the supply of food to the public without tackling organized crime. And what good are the journalists' raids by which we attempt to prevent losses in the fields, during loading and in transit... Futile: the sharp operators will destroy the goods anyway, reckoning in a cynical and inhumane manner!

[Oleynik] It is not news to anyone that much of the trade system is based on bribery. Bribery is so firmly established that we can only change it by all working together; no one working alone will succeed. The "system" has kicked out or sent to jail people who have tried to mend their ways.

Ordinary salespeople know all this, but by no means all of them do anything about it. They know how much value is placed on protective or defensive actions: warnings about the possibility of visits by commissions or auditors, failure to reflect violations and abuses in monitoring and auditing documents.

There has been a great deal of that in the Moscow trade system since somewhere around 1965. This was facilitated by clever neutralization of organs for combatting embezzlement of socialist property and speculation, which were strictly oriented toward the petty details of criminal cases. Toward the end of the 1960's the mafia infiltrated the state apparatus and law enforcement organs. So that by the end of the Brezhnev years there was a tightly-knit network of the criminal "system" throughout the country with a "collective leadership" encouraged by members of the apparatus who had sold their souls. Its goal was to acquire unlimited power by plundering state property and robbing the people, using political demagoguery all the while. They were counting on the Brezhnev-Shchelokov period lasting forever.

We were able to find out a great deal thanks to Sokolov's confession. No, do not think that I am justifying him in the slightest: he had many dark deeds on his conscience. But I did not see then and still do not see any point in giving Sokolov the death penalty. And it was carried out as quickly as possible. As if someone were in a hurry to prevent testimony that could be damaging to them... Yet Tregubov and Petrikov, who were both the products of the "system" and its leaders, were given lighter sentences, even though they did not confess to anything.

So what happens? During the investigation I was forced to remind my subordinates of the Law: a sincere confession and active assistance in investigation are to be considered mitigating factors in sentencing. Yet the exact opposite was the case: they were deemed aggravating factors!

How can we punish those who confess to the maximum while encouraging people who stubbornly refuse to confess by giving them lighter sentences?

[Radov] In this year's sixth issue of your official journal SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST I read the following in a letter from N. Nikolayev concerning organized crime: "...Experience shows that the first blows (against the mafias—author's note) only shook them at first, putting some criminal groups into a state of shock. Many of them ceased their operations for a while. However, as the experience of struggle against organized crime in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenia, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Moldavia and other regions has shown, we have not yet touched its deep roots; we have merely crushed the front ranks. Furthermore, now that it has recovered and restructured (a kind of 'restructuring' is underway in the criminal world as well), organized crime is launching a counteroffensive, changing some of

its tactics yet not renouncing its old, tested methods: blackmail, intimidation, bribery and even such extreme measures as murder (in Turkmenia, for example)."

The offensive against the mafias has not even begun, yet we are sounding retreat. N. Nikolayev continues: "...there have been 'wishes,' 'hints' and 'appeals' that the offensive be turned aside, claims that we have supposedly already 'stirred up enough trouble.' Have we really done enough?

[Oleynik] I am often visited by trade workers after they have completed their sentences. They tell me that the things they used to do were kid stuff in comparison to the things going on now. Indeed, the criminal world today is operating cockily, cynically and with seeming certainty that no one can stop it. I was recently visited by the director of a food store. He said to me: "Vladimir Ivanovich! Why does a butcher need to give short weights or misrepresent the grade of his meat today? That is no longer necessary, because there are two virtually legal means of doing the same thing. The first is to sell meat wholesale to a dishonest cooperative; the seller makes a three-ruble profit on every kilogram. The second method is to kindly allow the meat combine to deliver money to the store instead of meat. With a little extra thrown in, of course. That way the butcher saves a lot of trouble; he does not need to both with cutting up the meat and selling it."

Real life is full of cases like these, yet they are seldom dealt with by the militia, the procuracy or the courts.

[Radov] Other problems on a massive scale have also come into being with the development of the cooperative movement. This has already been spoken of at the highest level. Cooperatives have artificially been placed in a framework where they have to bribe and please both local officials and industry officials. The appearance of cooperatives has excited those officials' greedy instincts. They say to themselves: let's demand exorbitant prices and try to keep from giving the cooperatives anything even at that... People come to our editorial offices with situations like these. Recently a group of energetic young people undertook to establish a new type of cooperative, a social one. After camping on rayispolkom doorsteps to get permission they found out that a "tax" had already been established: a bribe of 100 rubles for every square meter of space allocated to the cooperative.

[Oleynik] Justice must not be caught napping! Since Tregubov's time the size of bribes has increased by a factor of from three to five. Indeed, the scale of bribery could increase in connection with cooperatives, which are dainty morsels for every breed of extortionist, both bureaucratic and criminal. If we close our eyes to this we are putting a lot at risk. Remember what Lenin said: "...If there is such a thing as a bribe, if this is possible, then one cannot speak of politics. In that situation there is not even the beginnings of politics, in that situation one cannot make policy because all measures will remain

unrealized and will produce no results whatsoever." Carrying this idea further one can conclude that as long as there is bribery there can be no question of fundamental restructuring, including restructuring of the law enforcement system.

Yet the phenomenon which we face is broader and more terrible than ordinary bribery. We are faced with corruption. What is that? It is the degeneration of power and exploitation of its capabilities for the sake of personal enrichment. But there is no such concept in the Criminal Code and no corresponding statutes that would punish corruption. Dishonest officials know this and make use of it. The courts regard corruption as merely the acceptance of bribes. The law also contains no concept of a bribe, thus allowing the courts and the procurators who oversee the courts to interpret the giving of gifts any way they please. The following judicial proceeding also exists: if the investigation cannot answer the question of for what specific thing a bribe was given that means that it was not a case of bribery. Merely a gift, for example. As a result of this procedure a multitude of corrupt officials who receive bribes merely for serving in the capacity of "security umbrellas" manage to weasel out of a conviction. Thus, at the present time the law is unarmed in the face of organized crime. It was written to deal with the activities of lone criminals or small bands but has difficulty standing up to mafia networks.

But the law itself is not really the main problem. Today not a single court is technically capable of trying a case involving the smallest groups of mafia operatives. Most often what happens is so-called "case splitting." As a result the person giving a bribe or committing embezzlement is often tried in one case while the recipient of a bribe is tried in another. An absurdity arises: both individuals, who are essentially defendants, are transformed into "witnesses for the prosecution" with regard to each other. Quite honestly, "case splitting" most often occurs not on technical grounds, but instead on ideological grounds: so as not to frighten the public. A huge case is fragmented and as a result the members of the mafias' nerve center go unpunished. Usually it is the middle level that has to bear the responsibility. And this more than anything else contributes to the impossibility of eradicating the mafias.

We must also take into account the fact that when people talk about mafias they tend to see them only in the trade network, and only in Moscow trade at that. But that is not true at all. In addition huge shipments of unaccounted-for illicit production are being shipped to the trade system from enterprises in light industry, local industry, the food industry and other industrial sectors. Profits are being made by both the suppliers and the buyers. Thousand upon thousands of illicit businessmen are involved in this. Do you remember the speech given at the party conference by Kabaidze, a renowned economic administrator. He said that he could get by without the ministers. I can believe that. But could he get along...

[Radov] Without the criminals?

[Oleynik] Without the illicit businessmen... Or think of it like this: without the middleman. Today one can make the rounds of thousands of offices and come away empty-handed. But a manager needs only approach some crooked operator and he can get anything he wants! I do not know about Kabaidze's case, but most often...

[Radov] Don't you feel that all the members of the various criminal "armies" are somehow drawn to each other?

[Oleynik] Today we are seeing a tendency toward a coalescence of all types of mafias, the purely criminal ones blending with the "white-collar" ones, and so on.

[Radov] On a basis of mutual services?

[Oleynik] That most of all! The criminal mafias serve the others as racketeers, i.e. extortionists. The criminal mafias have very harsh laws. In them you find all the things we had heard of, say, only in Italian political films. They have their own courts, banks and mutual assistance systems and a whole hierarchy of subordination and status symbols. They have their own circles or clans, "families," if you will. Outstanding among these are the ones in Dnepropetrovsk, Moscow, the Caucasus and Uzbekistan. Incidentally, judging by criminal cases the Dnepropetrovsk "family" has recently taken control of Moscow and Leningrad. Bitter clashes have resulted. We do not see them or hear about them, but they occur constantly. Only in a nightmare could one conjure up all the things that are going on quietly today. There are cases of people disappearing. I have even found out that people have been paved over with asphalt... Anything can happen!

What Is Lacking? Opposition!...

"There is not enough of it," Vladimir Ivanovich asserts. "Law enforcement organs frequently adhere to the principle that this is not happening because this sort of thing just does not happen. Some chiefs of law enforcement organs do not want to acknowledge the existence of mafias for two reasons. Firstly, because people may ask them: and where have you been all these years? And the second reason is that unfortunately there are still people in the militia, the courts and the procuracy who themselves facilitated the development of these forces."

While working on the Glavtorg case Oleynik got hold of documents indicating that much of what was going on within the Moscow trade network was known in many of its details to the heads of the country's MVD at that time, many years before the republic procuracy launched its investigation of the Tregubov case. Oleynik himself saw reports and the action taken on them. Including some from Shchelokov himself. What sort of actions were these? "Comrade X.! For you information." We can add one more crime to all those committed by

Shchelokov and his inner circle: for many years they relinquished not only Moscow but the whole country to plunder by the Sokolovs, the Tregubovs, the Sushkovs... It was at that time that the state became covered with a continuous, dense network of mafias.

The holes made in the Moscow trade "system" by the Sokolov and Tregubov cases were filled back in almost immediately. Time has shown that mafias have little trouble repairing "mid-level" breaches (it was from the middle level that several dozen operatives were seized) by successful recruiting more and more new "troops." What can be done about this? Is it even possible to combat the mafias? Is there a realistic chance for victory?

[Oleynik] What have the methods of struggle applied over the past decades achieved? It was as if we mowed a lawn, cut it down, and then turned around only to see that it had already grown up in weeds and grass again. We mowed it again. And so on, endlessly. A Sisyphean task! Sidorov, in many ways worse than what came before, grew up, came along to take the place of Petrov, who had cheated people and taken bribes. Someone else will be there to take Sidorov's place. To prevent this we must till the soil deeply, turn it up so that the roots will shrivel under the frost and the hot sun. And it would not hurt to use herbicides, i.e. new means and methods of struggle. Plus the plowman needs to throw the roots out of the field! Instead of tossing these bad roots out of the field, in today's trade system they are often transplanted to fertile new ground, to a new section. Then they grow up again and again surround themselves with their former companions. The distinctive symbiosis of weeds-/bribery takes shape again. Should we plow again?

No, in this situation we need a state act which would pardon once and for all basically honest trade workers who are not lost to society, who were lured into this criminal "system" for many years on account of objective and subjective circumstances but have now come to their senses, repented, reconsidered and become aware of the consequences not only for themselves but for society as well! What am I talking about? Neither major nor minor thefts can happen without the rank and file operatives, and according to our estimates there are very many of them around the country. Not just salespeople, but also drivers, waiters, cooks, etc. For example, a driver who systematically makes five trips and writes down 10. For which he receives bonus pay. Part of the extra money goes to the person who accepted his padded account, and to the person who let it slip by...

Of course they are afraid—afraid of being punished! And the ones who set up this "system" are well aware of this and use fear to keep their hold over people. They say: you talk, and you'll go down with us!

Thus I propose to pull these rank-and-file workers out of the clutches of the sharks in the "system," take that fear away from them. How? Let the state pass a law stating

that any individual involved on account of circumstances or by free will who subsequently realized that he cannot continue to do these things may come to Soviet authorities and say: here is everything I stole, take it (or have me pay it restitution), but I stole along with so-and-so. I am breaking with them and I no longer want to or am able to keep doing these things! And then the authorities will believe that person and absolve him of criminal responsibility, party organs will do the same with regard to strict party responsibility, and the administration will do so with regard to job-related penalties.

This alone will allow us to pry millions and millions of petty servants loose from the "systems." Then the mafiosi will be left exposed, commanders without an army. Remember what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said in a speech he gave in Leningrad: we are giving people time to reconsider... So why not apply the same principle in this area as well, the area of organized crime?

[Radov] But it is quite clear to me that not only judicial means will be required to pry this criminal army away from its lieutenants and generals. Without serious economic measures that allow people to earn money honestly without resorting to theft, embezzlement and deceit the mafias cannot be beaten. But I am talking about this (about economic measures for combatting economic crime) for the benefit of the readers; that is a topic for a separate discussion. At the present time this mob of people who follow orders remains hostage to organized crime.

[Oleynik] But in any event radical measures are required. The ulcer has already become malignant—neither therapy nor lectures, especially not the latter, can save the social organism. Half-measures yield the opposite effect. Our law enforcement system has not always performed its duty to society as it should have. This is very convincingly attested to by the fact that all the mafias exposed so far have been exposed thanks to the KGB. Virtually 100 percent of the time. Starting in Kirghizia, then the "Pirozhki Case" in Sverdlovsk, the Okean Firm, the Svet, Kaskad and Tadzhikistan stores, the Krasnodarsk, Rostov and Uzbek cases, the Sushkov case, the huge Glavtorg case. Why has the MVD not yet started exposing organized crime in such a major way? There are many reasons for that, but that is another topic...

In its role of protecting state security the KGB is forced to deal with many mafia-related cases.

But whereas the KGB is capable of exposing an ulcer of this type, it cannot investigate it: its investigative apparatus cannot spend much time working on "other people's" cases, and for some time now the KGB has as far as I am aware been cutting back on its participation in "domestic" investigations. I understand that; it is more logical for the KGB to worry about its own spies.

But if we approach this matter from the state's standpoint, this is in fact a matter of state security, because thousands of spies cannot harm the state as much as our own domestic crooks.

The things exposed in the Moscow food trade network are only a tiny part of organized crime's efforts to embezzle national property, to mercilessly squeeze dry their most important source: the people's wealth. Here there is unity among the various types of criminal. About what? About the sources of theft, of their physical and moral depravity. The robber uses violence, the dishonest businessman deceit, short weights and extortion. People who are afraid of losing their positions are hampering exposure of the connection between the criminal world and business ("white-collar") crime. And they cannot be brought to justice, despite the bloody consequences of their actions, or rather of their inaction.

[Radov] Readers write: it is time to think seriously about establishing a new Cheka in this country, one that would be designed solely to combat organized crime! People are going so far as to say things like that... Evidently out of despair and lack of confidence in the existing organs of justice.

[Oleynik] Indeed, extreme measures are indicated. Up until now efforts have been limited to the formation of a new initiative group or working group, a public council, a commission, etc. No, we will not crush such a serious enemy like that. But let us assume for a minute that a new Cheka were established, that it were created using morally impeccable individuals. New inspections begin, a new round of violence... Basically let's not pin our hopes on new organizations but instead on the existing ones, on ourselves, especially since the struggle against the mafias will require thousands and thousands of "civilian" specialists: economists and bookkeepers, technicians and even mathematicians.

[Radov] But for starters we need to see that our government departments, which for decades have encouraged the "honest criminals" by granting them very liberal standards for writing off goods, finally make an effort (and with public monitoring—they will not do it of their own accord!) to close up all the loopholes exploited for the purpose of "legal," non-punishable enrichment. You and dozens of your colleagues can easily point out those loopholes.

[Oleynik] Incidentally, back in the years when I was working on the skins and furs case I learned that on special orders from Dunayev and Co. a prominent jurist and doctor of sciences (due to the presumption of innocence I cannot give his name) worked out a "theory of misappropriation," i.e. demonstrated the most effective and safest methods of accumulating wealth. Now science needs to work in the opposite direction, but for many, many years now serious science, economics in particular, has not dealt with the subject of business crime. The scientific departments that used to exist as

part of the Combatting Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation system were shut down under Shchelokov or later. We had to fight blind against what are perhaps our country's most cunning enemies. How can we continue doing that? Yet we still are not as familiar with the true situation in the criminal realm as we should be. Thus far in the era of glasnost we have been granted generous access to partial figures for certain cities and even regions, but only with regard to individual types of crime. Overall statistics are still being tenaciously concealed. Even the "big shots" of the all-union and republic procuracies do not know, for instance, how many recidivist crimes occur in this country. Yet they can see with their own eyes that many times the courts will remove the high-class Ivanovs from completed investigation files while letting the plain old Ivan Ivanovich stand trial. That is, people who have no one to intervene for them are put on trial. No one at a court meeting, no one in the invisible realm where "telephone law" rules. We still must work to ensure that everyone is equal before the law and before the court!

That is what incenses Oleynik most of all. He realizes that this is not just a struggle for social justice, it is a struggle for restructuring itself!

What does this former "big shot" and present deputy chief of the RSFSR Procuracy's Investigative Division, this Vladimir Ivanovich Oleynik, want? What concerns his younger colleagues? Not their pay, though it is rather modest for the people upon whom all our hopes rest. Not even comfort in their work place. Incidentally, all of society's neglect of inspectors is eloquently summed up by the flights of stairs that one has to climb to get to their offices. Currently the number of vehicles allowed the Russian Procuracy is being cut, as in other departments. Guess who they are being taken away from? Right: from the inspectors. The higher-ups rode in the past, and they will continue to ride. Now the "big shots" are puzzling over the question of how they are supposed to transport case files, since they are categorically forbidden to carry them over public transportation. No, it is true that they do not fret about the material aspects of their lives, although I know that they are poor and wander about not knowing where they are going to find a place to live, even though we know that there is always someone around who would be willing in an instant to slip them a thousand, or maybe even a million.

They only have one request: do not set limits, do not accuse us in advance and without proof of having an inclination either to condemn or to acquit, do not try to punish us simply because we are guilty of unearthing the truth. That is what they demand: you call us investigators, so let us investigate, let us get down to the real motives and causes. Then judge for yourself whether to condemn or to acquit...

I know for a fact that the time is not far off when we are going to be forced to tackle the mafias in a revolutionary, radical way instead of with half-measures. The people must not be afraid to rise up all together in this struggle. What other way is there? Otherwise they will not be vanquished.

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Moldavia Confronts AIDS Problem

18300226 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 26 Nov 88 p 4

[Article by N. Dubina: "AIDS: The Ring Tightens"]

[Text] In June of this year mankind crossed the tragic hundred thousand mark in the number of people infected with AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome), an as yet incurable disease of viral nature. The new enemy of the human race first proclaimed itself seven years ago in San Francisco. Since then the disease has spread to all continents, affecting most countries of the world and acquiring the character of a pandemic. More than 100,000 patients is the number officially recorded in 138 countries. To gain an idea of how many people are actually infected that number should, in the view of the World Health Organization, at least be doubled...

In our country, according to the very latest data, there are 81 carriers of the virus. The situation is similar to what it was in France in 1981. Today France has more than 3,000 patients and hundreds of thousands infected. We are, alas, not lagging behind the West in the rate of growth of this indicator.

We do not live on an island. Let no one think that events occurring today in Tanzania, or even in Leningrad or Odessa, are incredibly far away and therefore unthreatening. AIDS has arrived in Moldavia, AIDS is here, and its every new move is unpredictable. The purpose of this article is not to scare the credulous reader but to enlist the help of knowledgeable people to comprehend a situation that requires swift and exact solutions.

Are we prepared for them?

The Kishinev laboratory of AIDS diagnostics belongs to the domain of the Republican Sanitary Epidemiologic Station and occupies a wing of a separate building: white, hushed, where infinite care is displayed in handling the "scourge of the 20th century." In equipment and training of its personnel it is ahead of many similar laboratories of the country and, I was told, quite up to the tasks facing it. The equipment is mostly imported and expensive. The diagnostic kit (or test system) is also expensive—180 tests cost 210 rubles—but Soviet-made.

What is a diagnostic kit? A polystyrene slide with tiny depressions in which drops of the tested blood serum are deposited together with the test components. The blood of three or four people is tested at the same time, although

the procedure would require testing each one separately. It is necessary to economize, because the products of the Antigen plant of the State Medical Biotechnology and Immunopreparations Administration near Moscow are in short supply. There had been another supplier, the Vektor facility, but it was closed down because test kits were flawed.

My guide at the laboratory is its manager, Candidate of Medical Science V. Dmitriyenko. She takes a plastic packet from a factory packed carton: "These are microscope slides with antigens of the AIDS virus. We handle them like infected material." Although the slide is sealed she rubs her hands thoroughly with alcohol after holding it.

AIDS is known to be transmitted in three ways: sexually (homo- and hetero-), through blood, and from an infected mother to her future child. Dmitriyenko told me that since the publication of the decree "On Measures to Prevent Infection With the AIDS Virus" all foreign citizens visiting Moldavia for more than three months must take a mandatory annual test. But here is a hardly pleasant piece of information: since the beginning of the year nine foreign students whose blood was found to contain HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) have been deported from the country. It can hardly be assumed that they all lived here like hermits and did not seek the favors of local indiscriminating "chicks"...

Is there any guarantee, I asked, that one cannot get infected with HIV through donor blood? There is some, Valeriya Dmitriyevna said. All donor blood goes to an AIDS diagnostic laboratory where it is thoroughly tested.

From an interview with V. Dobryanskiy, deputy minister of health of the Moldavian SSR, chief state sanitary physician of the republic.

"Are there any specific features of our area that require heightened vigilance with regard to AIDS?"

"Undoubtedly. Despite the fact that we don't have extensive tourist ties, large ports, or get donor blood from other countries. But for many years Moldavia has been leading the country in venereal diseases and is somewhere in the middle of the drug addiction tables; as for how many prostitutes we have, although no one has ever counted them, I think there are quite a few."

"As far as I know, the USSR Ministry of Public Health has defined the groups of people who must take mandatory AIDS tests. Our ministry has added several more "risk groups" to that list. What groups? Are they tested in such a way that we can say that these channels have been closed?"

"Our list includes, besides foreign citizens, persons who came into contact with AIDS patients and virus carriers, etc., women certified to have their pregnancy terminated, Sovtransavto drivers, and people who had a

veneral disease less than five years ago. Although the list is fairly long and well thought out, there is at present no 100-percent guarantee that the blood of all these people has been, or will be, tested for VIH antibodies in the nearest future. In all these groups we must test 600,000 people annually, but in 10 months of this year we have tested only 370,000."

"What is the reason for this?"

"Firstly, this work only began in May 1987, shortly before the decree 'On Measures to Prevent Infection With the AIDS Virus' was passed. That was when the first AIDS diagnostic laboratory in the republic was opened (today, besides Kishinev, there are laboratories in Beltsy, Komrat and Tiraspol). Secondly, as happens all too frequently in practical medicine, we have shortages. Not only of test kits, but of ordinary test tubes, rubber stoppers, gloves."

"And this at the very outset? What will happen if tests have to be expanded?"

"We'd like to know ourselves. Factories of the USSR Ministry of the Medical and Biological Industry which manufacture diagnostic kits are already keeping all 380 laboratories of the country on starvation rations. What this can lead to was graphically demonstrated in the case of the Leningrad woman O. Gayevskaya. Her blood serum had been tested for HIV, but the result was negative. Why? Because the test was carried out simultaneously with the sera of four other persons, which could not but affect its quality in the most tragic way. Yet the union ministry's regulations 'legalize' testing by the 1:10 method, precisely because of the shortage of test kits. Here in the republic we have managed to keep a 1:3 ratio, but is it right to create the possibility of mistakes at the very outset of a test? It is difficult to even predict what our industry's sluggishness may be fraught with in this case."

"The question which concerns us all is: What AIDS tracks lead to Moldavia? I posed this question to G. Sandul, chief of the department for especially dangerous infections of the Republican Sanitary Epidemiologic Station."

"One 'trace' may have been left by a foreign student of the preparatory department of a college in the capital, who then moved to Lvov to study. Last year he was found to be a virus carrier. However, we do not know where and when he got infected. Another far-reaching track leads to a frivolous young woman from Frunze village, Oknitsa Rayon, who moved to Belorussia. She led a wild life like, incidentally, her husband. They both provided a wealth of material for epidemiological investigation. One more track extends from Odessa Oblast to Slobodzeya Rayon. We have already begun an investigation there. The results for all involved have so far been negative, but tomorrow a serological shift could well occur in the blood of anyone of them..."

"You probably encounter difficulties of an ethical nature in your investigations?"

"As always when invading someone's personal life. We try to do this discreetly, but even so an unexpected visit by an epidemiologist has the effect of a bolt from the blue. We look for ways to alleviate the situation: after all, an AIDS virus carrier cannot be isolated like a leper. Let the person at least know the danger that threatens him and those around him and act accordingly. We thereby control the situation..."

"In general, the situation is extremely complex. There was, for example, the case in Moscow of the person who was tested anonymously, then when the doctor told him over telephone that he was infected he disappeared without a trace in the huge city. Can one guarantee that he behaved honorably and did not set out to take revenge on everybody? Or another example. When Olga Gayevskaya suddenly died Leningrad newspapers published her picture, and the number of callers at the anonymous test station swelled several times over."

That's how things stand with AIDS... The first impression after all the interviews with people familiar with the problem is that there are even more questions and unclear issues. Indeed, can the purity of donor blood be guaranteed if it is not tested with absolute reliability? Can one fully trust precinct doctors when most lack a sense of awareness with regard to AIDS? (take the case of O. Gayevskaya, who had visited a clinic 23 times over a period of seven months with obvious symptoms of a fatal disease, and much the same has already happened at a Kishinev clinic, with the exception that the patient is still alive.) Who can say for sure that the Leningrad woman was the country's very first AIDS victim if even the blood of chronic patients is never tested for HIV and the level of diagnostics in the medical system is at times catastrophically low?

Yes, industry must be reoriented to finally start producing adequate quantities of condoms and disposable syringes (both of which are virtually nowhere to be found, despite endless promises). But it is also necessary to reorient our mentality to stop seeing the availability of syringes as a powerful factor luring the population at large into the sin of drug addiction. Yet that is precisely the "customs-house" logic of the union health ministry, which has strictly decreed that all over the country syringes be sold only by prescription. This only abets AIDS...

Yes, it is necessary to reorient our mentality, not only on the departmental scale, but at the level of every individual person. So that someone's plain carelessness would not threaten the health of many (in Nisporeny Rayon alone three manicure parlors out of four were closed down after inspections because of dirty instruments. And the sanitary epidemiologic service is capable only of spot-checking).

Yes, AIDS requires precise performance of their duties by those who hold our health in their hands, but is that all? It's not much of an exploit to die of one's own ignorance! Yet it is precisely ignorance and the carelessness it breeds that is the cause of the unpopularity of the anonymous test station opened in the outpatient section of the Republican Clinical Hospital (buses numbers 9 and 13 to Kubinskaya Street, phone 52-64-42, reception hours from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m.). Incidentally, here is a question to the Moldavian Health Ministry: Why is it staffed only by a nurse, with no qualified consulting physician? Or does everyone already know everything about AIDS?

There are serious claims to the all-union ministry. In Moldavia data are processed at a computer center [IVTs] from which not only leading medical establishments of the republic but rayon hospitals as well receive detailed information about every new advance of HIV. Now computerized processing of AIDS data is being introduced all over the country, but it is already apparent that all the information will settle in the central agencies. There are no provisions for the reverse flow of current information. And now we have the first result: Workers of the Kishinev laboratory of AIDS diagnostics have no idea how they compare with others, who works better, and whose ideas could best be urgently adopted. Instead of a clenched fist there are nervous fingers...

Prostitution, drug addiction, low public morals: nowadays no one pretends any more that "it can't happen here." We have it all. We have finally acknowledged the existence of the disease. How are we to treat it? Among other things, with knowledge. By comprehensive inter-departmental information of public health and MVD agencies, public rejection of unhealthy, to put it mildly, lifestyles which are doubly immoral in the conditions of an AIDS pandemic, by the normal unwillingness of any person to personally shorten his life.

Here are the symptoms which epidemiologists think merit an AIDS test:

- swollen lymph vessels;
- significant weight loss with no apparent cause;
- recurrent fever;
- persistent diarrheas;
- frequently erupting skin pustules or boils;
- herpes blisters.

And one last question to the chief sanitary physician of the Moldavian SSR:

"What is your assessment of the current state of affairs with AIDS?"

"It is getting more tense, exacerbating, and still not fully understood.

"Professionals are not pessimists, they simply state facts.

Health Ministry Official on High Infant Mortality

18300199 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Dec 88 p 3

[Interview by V. Kramova with Professor V. Kulakov: "Two Watermelons In One Hand..."]

[Text] Is there anything more important than the birth of a healthy child? Emphatically no. But why then is the problem of the health of future mothers and their newborn still so far from being resolved? Although we proclaim, "All the best for children," we continue to live only in the present, giving priority in actual life to adults. As a result, more than 50,000 babies die annually without receiving adequate medical care. We lose children before they reach one year of age 2.5 times more frequently than in the US, Great Britain or the FRG, and five times more frequently than in Japan.

We are still afraid to speak out loud about sexual ignorance among the population and the shortage of contraceptives, thanks to which more than 23,000 girls under the age of 17 terminate undesired pregnancies and the Soviet Union leads developed nations in the number of abortions per thousand adult women: to 5.6 million live births every year there are 6.8 million abortions.

These and other problems were discussed in an interview with Professor Vladimir Ivanovich Kulakov, Doctor of Medical Science, director of the Ministry of Health's All-Union Scientific Research Center for Mother and Child Health Care.

[Kramova] For many years we have concealed, and sometimes even distorted, statistical data about infant mortality and the number of abortions, although, thanks to information supplied by the World Health Organization, they were apparently known?

[Kulakov] Indeed, such information was not published not only in the open literature but even in special publications. All articles were duly edited and numbers were excised from the text. They were replaced with words like "over," "less than," "more than," etc. As a consequence even experts had no clear idea of infant mortality rates.

It was not only they who lacked information, but party and government agencies as well. But when we spoke of the catastrophic state of affairs in this field many considered our alarm to be unjustified. The situation became so serious, however, that it drew the attention of

the CPSU Central Committee's Party Control Committee. Administrative measures were taken. Some executives were punished and resolutions and memos were issued to various departments. However, no constructive steps were taken to rectify the situation.

Today we openly discuss these rather intimate problems, which affect us all. And there have been some tangible changes over the last year or so. They are reflected in a slow but steady drop in infant mortality. The trend is obvious despite stricter statistical criteria.

[Kramova] The criteria for evaluating a newborn's viability used in the Soviet Union differ significantly from those long applied in other countries. According to WHO classification, a fetus weighing 500 grams is considered viable after a 22-week pregnancy. In the Soviet Union its weight must be 1,000 grams after 28 weeks. Does the reason for stubbornly refusing to adopt WHO standards not lie in the fact that our children's wards are poorly equipped to care for low-weight infants? Or is this done to "improve" the statistics?

[Kulakov] We are not misleading anyone. In the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries these criteria differ somewhat from those adopted by WHO. At the same time, in our country all infants born with a weight under 1,000 grams must be cared for and registered seven days after birth. In the Baltic republics, Belorussia, the Ukraine and some RSFSR oblasts infant mortality approximates figures for such developed countries as the FRG, US, France, and others. But in Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia it is still as high as 45 to 55 per 1,000 newborn. This boosts the national average.

In all developed countries infants who die in their first week account for 65-70 percent of the total infant mortality rate; in areas with unfavorable conditions they account for 30-45 percent. The balance represents mortality after the first week and up to one year of age. Infants die mainly from respiratory, infectious and congenital diseases. Mortality is frequently due to poor hygiene standards.

[Kramova] Or lack of them. In Azerbaidzhan, for example, almost half the maternity homes have no running hot water or plumbing. In all the years of Soviet government, it was stated at a meeting of the Ministry of Health collegium, only one maternity home was built there with more or less normal conditions and the only disinfection chamber in the entire region. The region has one of the highest mortality rates among mothers and newborn infants due to infection. The situation is no better in many areas of Central Asia...

But you still haven't answered the question: Why are WHO criteria still unacceptable to us?

[Kulakov] I repeat that we are doing everything for the survival of babies with low natal weight, we strive to bring them up to normal weight and condition. But,

unfortunately, we are poorly provided with the equipment needed to care for such infants. We have neither monitoring equipment nor Soviet-made life-sustaining equipment without which it is impossible to fight for their survival, while Hungarian equipment we have been buying does not maintain the required temperature and is not equipped with automatic sensors.

We have to purchase from abroad dosage sensors for droppers, without which it is impossible to perform infusions for newborn infants, and needles for intravenous injections. We still do not have enough disposal syringes, even for children's wards. Their manufacture has begun, but it will probably take several years before supply meets our needs.

To reduce perinatal mortality it is necessary to preclude or at least reduce the possibility of intrauterine infection of fetuses and newborn infants. In 1988, the Ministry of Public Health took an extremely important step towards the resolution of this problem by organizing immuno-enzyme test laboratories for rapid diagnosis of both bacterial and viral infections in 25 regions of the country. The Health Ministry's Central Administration for Mother and Child Care wants us to become an academic methodological and research center for the resolution of this important problem. So we have much hard work ahead.

[Kramova] As is known, there is an acute shortage of diagnostic equipment in the country. In this connection it is especially alarming that some factories which manufacture medical equipment refuse to fill orders which they regard as unprofitable. Thus, the Krasnogvardeyets plant refuses to make inexpensive medical instruments which require considerable labor input. In this case moral duty has come into conflict with economic management on a cost-accounting basis. Obviously, it is necessary to find a way out of this situation...

[Kulakov] Speaking of financial and technical support for our services, I would like to note that we have a situation in which a newborn infant is as it were outside the law, because his maintenance is virtually not financed in any way. The only statistic is the mother's bed, as though there was no newborn child. True, at present we are allocated 1 ruble 50 kopecks per patient per day instead of 90 kopecks. But the main problem still remains unresolved: It is virtually impossible to purchase the entire range of medication we need from the pharmacy administration. If we ask for 100 vials of antibiotics we get 50 or 60. Many of our problems would seem to be so elementary that it is absurd to draw attention to them. But the resolution of our main task—reducing infant mortality—is closely linked with such "trifles."

Here is one example. For decades we obstetrician-gynecologists have been dealing with hospital infections in maternity homes. But even though the need to use disposable linen has been proven long ago, until just recently we were

allowed to write off reused linen only after 3 to 5 years. Only now have we finally been allowed to destroy this threadbare linen after 18 months. Since then we almost immediately began to get reports of a decline in cases of infectious diseases in obstetric institutions.

[Kramova] Writing in PRAVDA, you complained that in 30 years of practice you never received a flawless Soviet-made instrument which could help prevent the death of healthy infants during birth. Indeed, for decades obstetrics and pediatrics were stepchildren of the public health system. Cardiology, microsurgery and ophthalmology have advanced tremendously, though success in those fields was achieved not without the help of "golden" equipment and thanks to the personal drive and energy of "crew" leaders. Knowing of the sorry plight in your area, of the depressing state of gynecological clinics and maternity homes, did you and your colleagues sound the alarm and pound on the doors of offices where the fate of allocations and redistribution of funds is decided by people far removed from the prosaic aspects of childbirth?

[Kulakov] You are right, we were so afraid, so ashamed of discussing these problems, as though they were our personal affair. But, unfortunately, even now, after sharp criticism in the press, we don't always meet with support and real help when we appeal to many party and government representatives. For instance, here at our center we have still never been visited by representatives of city party agencies, even though we have countless organizational and purely administrative difficulties.

[Kramova] Do you have specific proposals, a program for reorganizing the mother and child care service or, as it unfortunately happens all too often, so far all you have are numerous specific complaints about shortcomings and unresolved problems?

[Kulakov] Our plans? In cases when infertility is due to some illness of the wife or husband, or sometimes both, some childless couples will be treated at our center using state-of-the-art methods. They include the method of so-called extracorporal fertilization of the human ovum. This involves fertilization of the ovum outside the body, sustaining it in a culture medium for one or two days, and then transplanting the embryo to the woman's uterus. Our center has mastered this method. The first 17 babies have been born, and 20 pregnancies are in progress.

We are providing scientific and methodological guidance in introducing another method of infertility treatment by artificial insemination with sperm from the husband or a donor. It is already being employed in more than ten major cities, notably, Moscow, Leningrad, Tbilisi, Tashkent, Kharkov.

We have offered to help set up 16 scientific-practical infertility treatment programs called "Motherhood." Treating an infertile couple costs 6,000 to 8,000 rubles, the

treatment takes 8 to 10 years, and it is successful in only 10 to 20 percent of all cases. Under our program diagnosis and treatment will take 1.2-2 years and will help 50-60 percent of the patients to have children. That means thousands of viable and very much wanted children.

We have asked the Ministry of Public Health to allocate hard currency for us to purchase hormonal preparations and equipment. But so far matters have not budged. Unfortunately there are so many things to buy, from highly sophisticated ultrasonic echo recorders to vacuum test-tubes with needles to collect blood. At the same time we have undertaken to save money by increasing staff efficiency with only minor increases in numbers. We have also suggested providing the base for opening a clinic along the lines of the eye microsurgery MNTK and using the earned hard currency to acquire the equipment we need. Thus, whereas currently the treatment of infertility (and we have about seven million couples suffering from this ailment) costs the country an astronomical sum—around 10 billion rubles a year—tests and treatment according to our methodology would cost one-quarter of that. However, despite our convincing arguments, attempts to establish businesslike contacts with the organizations responsible for the manufacture of equipment for our sector have been unsuccessful. The reasoning is that we lack skilled experts and it is not profitable to manufacture medical instruments.

Family planning services could be organized at no great special costs, just by integrating the public health services which are already in place to provide medical assistance in birth control. Taking into account that an induced abortion costs 25 rubles at the very least, family planning could eventually yield substantial savings in the public health budget.

The absence of due attention to the problem on the part of executive agencies, coupled with the sexual ignorance of the population, has resulted in a situation when induced abortion has become the prime method of birth control in the country.

[Kramova] It is no secret that people are as fearful or bashful as nuns to utter words like "abortion," "contraceptives" or "sex" in school or in the family. Perhaps it would be worth borrowing the experience of many countries where booklets on sex education and condoms can be bought everywhere, even at newspaper kiosks. Today, with the spread of AIDS, such means of protection are publicized all over the world openly, without hypocritical coyness, as the main hope for preventing the spread of the disease. At the same time we rely on two small factories manufacturing products whose quality cannot reliably guarantee protection from either pregnancy or the virus. Besides, their output is laughable: some four condoms per every male per year.

[Kulakov] We have just bought a consignment of contraceptives from Hungary, and the company has provided us with an excellent booklet on their use published there in a large printing. This would seem to be a simple problem, but we at the Mother and Child Care Center have no right to have publications of our own, and it is hard to find a typographical base in the country. As a result our proposals remain unrealized and to this day the USSR does not have a single meaningful popular pamphlet on contraceptives.

[Kramova] But again, what is the good of booklets if it's impossible to do what they recommend?

[Kulakov] Indeed, it is hard to buy the necessary contraceptives. Take, for example intrauterine devices manufactured by the Kazan factory. They do not meet present-day requirements and discredit a method that is recognized worldwide. Now, after much preparation, intrauterine devices with additions of copper are being manufactured. They do not have the shortcomings that characterized the earlier ones. But we are already concerned that the pilot consignment might remain the first and only one, because it is taking several years to introduce the first prototype.

Hence the great prevalence of induced abortions. In several union republics the number of such operations is increasing steadily. Every year hundreds of women die from abortions...

[Kramova] At a time when nine scientific research institutes and 15 obstetrics and gynecology departments are engaged in research on abortion problems? But are the postulates enunciated by our scientists always realistic, do they always take into account so to say the urgency of the moment?

[Kulakov] A Turkmenian proverb says that one can't hold two watermelons in one hand. For many years we have lauded large families, we have encouraged and rewarded the heroic labor of women who bore ten or more children. But experts know only too well that a woman's organism exhausted with frequent childbirths cannot cope with such an incredible burden. Many children born at intervals of 18 months to two years are both physically and mentally underdeveloped.

In Bukhara Oblast, for example, the interval between childbirths of more than half the women was less than two years, and every fourth woman has had two deliveries in one year.

In general, can a modern working woman raise five or more healthy children, taking into account that 30 percent of the 9.4 million people employed on harmful jobs are women or that 270,000 women perform arduous manual jobs?

[Kramova] Thus, we have approached the main point: there is no interconnection between the links of a closed chain—a woman's health, pregnancy and childbirth, raising children. A serious statesmanlike approach is essential. In future, apparently, all these stages can to some degree be supervised by a family doctor, who will know a family's hereditary faults and be able to anticipate possible complications. But today the situation is that some 30 percent of all infants are born with some pathological defect. Moreover, they land in situations which are, to put it mildly, less than comfortable. Post-natal pediatricians, for example, are convinced that an infant separated from its mother several minutes after birth is depressed, cries, and loses weight sharply. In other countries this factor is, I think, reckoned with...

[Kulakov] We often hear complaints that in a maternity home a woman is isolated—she cannot be visited by her husband or relatives—that we take babies away from mothers to another ward, sometimes to another floor. But the standard design of our maternity homes is entirely different from similar clinics in other countries, where a woman is placed in a separate ward with her baby and her husband, who can even be present during delivery. Everything necessary is provided to ensure thorough care for mother and child and monitor their condition, and there is no danger of transmitting an infection. We, too, shall live to see a situation in which we will be only too glad not to separate a happy family. We are greatly concerned with all these problems, which demand immediate action.

[Kramova] The traditional method of saving a pregnancy in the event of habitual abortion—reducing mobility for several months—is ineffective and not unharmed. But for several years already doctors in Riga have been successfully employing a simple and very effective method: When a spontaneous abortion is imminent the woman is given an injection of the husband's lymphocytes, an immunological reaction occurs, and as a consequence women who have had up to 18 miscarriages bear healthy children. I know that many doctors are skeptical about this treatment, although they have not come up with convincing arguments against it.

[Kulakov] I would like to note that the immunological method of treating habitual abortion by injecting the spouse's lymphocytes was developed at our center back in the latter 1970s. At present workers of the clinical immunology laboratory and the spontaneous abortion department are not only employing it extensively in their clinical practice and introducing it at other institutions, but also conducting thorough scientific research to determine the molecular-cellular mechanisms of this effective method of treatment. More, in the next few months the center will be ready to submit new scientific data on the use of immunocytotherapy in other areas of obstetric and gynecological practice.

[Kramova] I would like to return once again to the problem of termination of pregnancy. Many abortions in our country are performed illegally. Often this is due to

the indifference of doctors and violation of the law that a woman may have the operation performed wherever she desires, regardless of place of residence. After all, women make this agonizing and sometimes tragic decision for a variety of reasons and may not want their relatives or colleagues to know of it. In an effort to preserve confidentiality they take the risk of having an abortion not in a hospital. Each year more than 600 women die of abortions, most of them criminal. They may also be induced to do this out of fear of pain, to which hospital doctors are frequently indifferent, treating women who come for abortions with scorn and sometimes even "instructive sadism," as if to say, after suffering the pain you'll think twice before coming again.

[Kulakov] Incidentally, the Health Ministry has issued a ruling allowing later abortions: up to 28 weeks if it is for medical or social reasons. This will substantially reduce criminal abortions.

A decision has been adopted to improve the geographic distribution of specialized wards, and additional positions have been established for anesthesiologists...

There is one more important aspect: solution of the problem of family planning is impossible without qualified medical-genetic consultation. Almost 200,000 children are born every year with hereditary pathologies, and one-quarter of all pregnancies are spontaneously aborted due to genetic causes. The Health Ministry has issued four regulations on the organization of medico-genetic consultation services, but there is still a shortage of experts in this field. The country needs 7,000 to 10,000 geneticists, but currently there are only 2,000. Intrauterine diagnosis requires special reagents and ultrasonic instruments which we purchase abroad.

[Kramova] Still, in Yaroslavl, Kharkov, Ivanovo and several other cities there are active "Marriage and Family" services. In Kharkov they began by setting up a well-equipped medico-genetic consultation center; now they also travel to rural localities for tests to determine high-risk groups, using expensive equipment. Specialized wards have been set up in oblast and rayon hospitals. The ultimate purpose, according to the Kharkov people, is to reduce child mortality.

[Kulakov] We have just about the lowest standards of medico-genetic consultation services in the world. But nevertheless, I am convinced that we are capable of quickly setting up a regional network of medico-genetic consultation services and training doctors with a sufficiently broad outlook and professional alertness.

[Kramova] To what degree is the recently noted growth of addiction to drugs and other controlled substances affecting the new generation?

[Kulakov] Currently there is a trend towards more premature births and low-weight infants. Take smoking. A single cigarette a day during pregnancy reduces the weight of the fetus. More children are born with deformities due to the effects of drugs and other controlled substances on the central nervous system. One has to see those paralyzed infants, doomed to be bedridden for life, to fully realize the guilt of their parents. As a rule they are left in children's homes, doomed to a lifetime of suffering.

According to pediatricians, child mortality is two to three times higher among alcoholic women. When one witnesses the heart-rending scenes of a mother's first sight of her underdeveloped, sick infant, and we explain that the cause of this was her own or her husband's behavior during pregnancy—drugs or alcohol—one wishes that those who would tomorrow conceive another deformed creature after swallowing or smoking some vile substance could see the results of this.

At present 40 percent of our appropriations for health services are allocated for mother and child care. Many industrial plants have begun to assume patronage over maternity homes, and a number of vacated premises are being made available for maternity homes. We have purchased 25 laboratories for intrauterine diagnosis of the fetus from the United States and dozens of diagnostic centers are being set up all over the country. They will test both adults and children. Negotiations are being conducted to set up joint enterprises with Finland and Italy for the manufacture of medical equipment, including for pediatric needs.

LiSSR: Brazauskas Speech at 70th Anniversary of Soviet Power Celebration

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[Speech by Lithuanian CP First Secretary A. Brazauskas at 70th Anniversary Celebration of the Establishment of the Lithuanian CP and Proclamation of Soviet rule in Lithuania, 16 December 1988: "On the Path of Revolutionary Struggle, Creative Labor, and Perestroika"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! Our dear guests!

Today we are solemnly marking a celebrated historic anniversary. Seventy years have passed since those memorable days when the Communist Party of Lithuania was formed, and Soviet rule was proclaimed in Lithuania.

This holiday is very dear to us. It testifies to the difficult struggle of many generations of people for the noble ideals of socialism, to their decisiveness and selflessness. This inspires us to live with a purpose and to spare no efforts in working for the good of the Motherland.

Permit me, in the name of the republic leadership, to sincerely congratulate those of you taking part in this solemn session; those who were tempered in the crucible of revolution and on the front lines of struggle and labor; the veterans, workers, peasants, intellectuals and young people, and all the people of Soviet Lithuania, on the occasion of this celebration. I wish you all creative energy and unity, good health and personal happiness.

It is a particular pleasure for me to report that, on the eve of our present celebration, Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev telephoned, and asked to pass on to you and to all citizens of the republic his heartfelt congratulations from the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, the national government, and from himself personally, on the occasion of this celebration. Comrade Gorbachev gave high marks to the socio-economic and cultural achievements of Soviet Lithuania and expressed his firm conviction in the fact that the communists and workers of the republic would continue to participate in the revolutionary renewal of our society; and he wished everyone good health and every success in the great and important cause of perestroika.

We have not come to this day empty-handed; we possess a solid foundation for more effectively achieving fundamental revolutionary changes in all spheres of life. The policy of perestroika outlined by the Communist Party, and especially the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, have aroused the political activeness of not only individual people, but also broad strata of the republic's population, and it has become the cause of their lives. Party and social organizations and labor collectives have become increasingly impatient with everything that has outlived its days and is hindering perestroika; at the same time they have backed up with

specific deeds their desire to accelerate the socio-economic and cultural development of the republic. All of this strengthens our conviction that a great deal will change for the better.

We are living in a dynamic and contradictory times. Among some people this gives rise to alarm or even a longing for the quieter times of the past. But is this really acceptable? What good is a communist or a non-party member, who out of fear of difficulty backpedals and takes up a position of passive observer? That is not in keeping with civic virtue. Therefore let us firmly state to ourselves and to everyone else: the times of stagnation and apathy will never return! There are no alternatives to perestroika! The times have issued an authoritative summons to act decisively; for there is truly an enormous amount of work to do.

Many people, and especially innovatively-thinking leaders at all levels, figures in the arts and sciences, and many of those taking part in the Lithuanian movement for perestroika, are now openly raising many urgent questions on improving the ecological situation; on republic sovereignty—especially to provide it economic independence; on improving national relationships; on elevating the intellectual culture; and others. And we cannot but approve of this concern on behalf of society, and its aspirations.

During the long years of Stalinism and the stagnation, a great many difficulties and complex problems have accumulated. And the fact that the people are openly and passionately discussing them and are trying to understand their sources and ways to overcome them, establishes the proper prerequisites for societal renewal. We are with those who are truly concerned about the fate of socialism and the success of strengthening social justice; those who are for inculcating national self-awareness and self-expression; and those who are for creating a democratic Soviet society.

It goes without saying that, being realists, we cannot fail to recognize that our path will hardly be strewn with roses. Quite often we encounter inert and passive thinking, a lack of political culture, and irresponsible actions. Perestroika is delayed both by those who have a mistrustful attitude toward the changes taking place and do nothing for the good of the people, and those who think that the expansion of democracy and glasnost are simply a convenient pretext for promoting more and more maximalistic demands. Both the former and the latter are for us totally unacceptable.

The life and the fate of Lithuania and its workers is the main, the fundamental concern of the republic party organizations. We realize the enormous responsibility bestowed on all of us in this regard, and how much we have to do in all areas of activity. But what can be nobler

than selfless labor for the good of the Motherland? Can our sacred duty to the generations of the past, who made such a difficult and complex journey in their lives, really not inspire us to do this?

There cannot be more than one answer. The Motherland is like our mother. She is not only generous and kind to her children; at the same time she demands our concern, our sincere trusteeship. Those who continued the cause of the Great October Revolution, and created the first communist organizations and Soviets in Lithuania, never forgot this. And we, their descendants, who are destined to complete great revolutionary transformations, must never forget this either.

Vintas Mitskyavichyus Kapsukas called the 1918-1919 revolutionary events in Lithuania the Lithuanian October. However prior to that time the workers of Lithuania still had to endure a great deal of sorrow, poverty and suffering. And it was only the Great October Socialist Revolution and the ideas of its leader Vladimir Ilich Lenin that presented to them the possibility of social and national liberation.

It is to the credit of the communists of those times that they, understanding the situation and desiring to help the workers, began to energetically unite and organize the struggle for a better life. The first communist organizations in Lithuania were created by local revolutionary social-democrats, and the Lithuanian communists who had returned from Soviet Russia: Karolis Pozhela, Ignas Gashka, Aleksandra Drabavichyute, Vladas Bashkis, and many others. Honest people, dedicated to the revolution, banded together in these organizations. Operating in the underground, in the difficult conditions of an occupational regime, they carried out a great deal of ideological-political and organizational work.

The situation of those times demanded the unification of party organizations. And this work was successfully carried out by the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.

This was 70 years ago, in Vilnius, which was caught up in revolutionary spirit. At that time, 1 October 1918, because of exceptionally difficult conditions, only 34 communist delegates, representing about 800 party members, were able to come to the first congress. However, this in no way diminished its significance.

This congress was exceptionally important because it united all party organizations operating in our region at that time into a unified whole; it formed the Communist Party of Lithuania, outlined the basic goals and tasks of the party, adopted program documents, and elected the leading organ of the party—the Central Committee.

We can also be proud of the fact that the Lithuanian Communist Party was one of the first communist parties established at that time in the world. It had close ties with the Leninist Russian Communist Party, and in 1921 had become a separate section of the Communist International.

From the very first days of its activity, the CPLi had taken decisive steps in order to unite the forces of workers struggling for freedom. On 8 December 1918 its Central Committee in Vilnius formed the Provisional Revolutionary Workers and Peasants' Government of Lithuania, a representative of which was Vintas Mitskyavichyus-Kapsukas. Zigmas Aleksa-Angaretis, Kazimir Tsikhovskiy, Semen Dimanshteyn, Aleksandras Yakshyavichyus, Konstantin Kernovich, Pranas Svotyalis-Proletaras and Ayzik Vaynshteyn-Branovskiy became members of the government. These were revolutionary communists of high personal culture and firm ideological convictions, who were devoted to the interests of the workers. Their names are forever inscribed in the glorious pages of the history of Lithuania.

To the extent that the workers in the cities and villages were engaged in revolutionary activities, the CPLi called upon them to take power into their own hands. The first to do this were the workers of Vilnius. On 15 December 1918 they proclaimed the Soviet of Workers' Deputies the sole authority in the city. Pranas Edukyavichyus, a figure in the revolutionary movement, was elected as the first chairman of the Soviet. In short order, Soviets were set up in Kaunas, Shyaulay and Panevezhis as well.

In those stormy days, the Manifesto of the Provisional Revolutionary Workers' and Peasant's Government of Lithuania was being prepared. We all know this document well, and we cannot but remember it with respect. The Manifesto of 16 December 1918 proclaimed the rule of the workers and the peasants in Lithuania and outlined specific landmarks for the formation of a Lithuanian Soviet Republic. The date indicated in the Manifesto, 16 December, is the day of birth of Soviet rule in Lithuania.

We often remember another date as well—22 December 1918, and not without reason. It was on that date that a decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia, signed by Lenin, recognized the independence of Soviet Lithuania. On 24 December of that year the All-Russian Central Executive Committee approved this decree and noted that the fact that Lithuania had belonged to the former Tsarist Empire in no way obligated it. These two dates are also historic and fateful, for it was then that the sovereignty of the recently-proclaimed Lithuanian Soviet Republic was made legitimate.

Today we are quite often amazed at the comparative rapidity at which many of the workers of Lithuania mastered the ideas of Soviet rule. However, one must not forget that at that time a great deal of political enthusiasm reigned among the exploited masses of the cities and villages; that these ideas, which were energetically spread by the communists of Lithuania, corresponded with their aspirations and interests. All of this provided good results. In late 1918 and early 1919, organs of revolutionary power had already been operating in Vilnius and

Kaunas, in Shyaulay and Panevezhis, in Mazheykyay and Telshyay, in Kupishkis and Rokishkis, in Ukmerge and Utene, and in other parts of Lithuania.

The revolutionary workers and soldiers not only created, they also stubbornly defended the organs of the new rule against foreign interventionists and the armed forces of the Lithuanian bourgeoisie which were being organized. The Red Army, in whose ranks many Lithuanians were serving, was of great assistance to them in this cause. One of its important contributions in early 1919 was the liberation of Vilnius, the capital of Soviet Lithuania, from the Polish military clique.

Representatives of the bourgeoisie declared at that time, and some people are saying now, that this was an occupation of Lithuania. V. Kapsukas disclosed the unfounded nature of such interpretations. He clearly indicated that the Red Army had been invited by the provisional workers' and peasants' authorities, and that "this Red Army did not at all interfere in the internal life of the country." We have no reason not to believe the words of V. Kapsukas.

At present it is hard to even imagine the difficult conditions in which the organs of Soviet rule in Lithuania had to operate at that time. After all, not only were there not enough skilled cadres and experience, but there was economic ruin everywhere, and there was a constant danger of armed intervention. Therefore we are filled with great admiration for the decisive actions of the Soviet organs in carrying out the revolutionary transformations, in improving the material situation of the workers, and in raising their culture.

Soviet rule united the workers of all nationalities—Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, Jews and Belorussians—for creative work. All citizens, regardless of their origins and nationality, acquired identical rights. And conditions were established under which all nations might satisfy their own national, social and cultural needs.

People's commissariats were instituted in order to provide better leadership over building a new life, and on 20 January 1919, a special state organ was created—the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy. This promoted more active formation of the socialist economic structure, founded on public ownership of the means of production, and helped resolve many urgent economic problems, and others.

A great deal was done for the cause of raising the educational and cultural level of the workers, and especially the younger generation, and for preserving artistic values. Decrees were issued, in accordance with which private schools were transferred to state administration, education became universal and free of charge; the school was separated from the church; and instruction

was introduced in the students' native language. A great deal of attention was devoted to expanding the system of educational institutions and for strengthening their material base.

On 13 March 1919 the government led by Vintsas Mitskyavichyus-Kapsukas issued the Decree on the Restoration of the Vilnius University. This was an important event in public life, which some people are now trying to hush up. It vividly demonstrates that the Communist Party and Soviet rule were concerned about the development of science and about the training of skilled cadres.

The revolutionary government strove to recruit the best forces of the creative intelligentsia to work on improving the culture. Invited to the leadership of the historical-ethnographic museum was one of the most prominent Lithuanian cultural and social figures, Dr. Yonas Basanavichyus; named as director of the museum of applied arts was the artist Vladas Didzhekas. Genuine opportunities were created for many cultural figures of that time to make use of their creative mastery.

Soviet rule actively strove to distribute cultural values among the working masses as widely as possible. I will cite just one document published at that time. In the appeal of the People's Commissariat for Education to the workers of the republic it says, "Let every one of us in whom there is life and breath, after finishing our daily work, spend an hour or so treating our minds to new knowledge; or our souls and hearts to the theater, music and dance; or to a good book, which will awaken our minds and make us happy." You read these words, and the question automatically arises: Were they not written for today? They are truly very timely for our day as well.

It goes without saying that not everything went smoothly for the communists of the republic. The Lithuanian CP, just as other young communist parties of that time, committed a lot of mistakes, especially mistakes of an ultra-leftist nature. Now, when we are able to examine the past more objectively and critically, they are more easily seen.

I think the greatest mistake was that the landlords' estates were not distributed to the landless peasantry and those with little land. These peasants had a great thirst for land, and for them, it goes without saying, at that time the establishment of Soviet rule would not have been acceptable—creating people's farms or communes on the landlords' estates, retaining large-scale agricultural production. This served as the social base of the revolution. This, as is well known, was also utilized by the bourgeoisie. Its representatives promised to give land to everyone who would voluntarily enlist in the bourgeois army. Part of the land-poor peasants and farm workers believed them.

As V. Kapsukas and certain other leading officials of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic acknowledged, mistakes were made in resolving the national question as well. In their actions, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government of Lithuania took into consideration the multi-national composition of the region's populace, and strove to ensure the equality of nations. However, they did not always do this decisively and consistently. The fact that the leading communists of Lithuania did not fully appreciate the consequences of tsarist oppression and the yoke of the German occupation forces on the consciousness of the Lithuanian people was particularly damaging to the situation.

Broad sectors of the populace, and especially the intelligentsia, were striving to set up a separate, sovereign Lithuanian state. The ideas of national rebirth and restoration of national statehood, propagated by AUS-HRA and VARPAS ["Dawn" and "The Bell," socio-political-literary magazines of a liberal-bourgeois nature], which were expressed in concentrated form in the act of 16 February 1918, had a profound effect on the consciousness of many people. And not to see this meant to make a mistake, as was the failure to consider the right of national self-determination proclaimed by V.I. Lenin, which also envisages the freedom to set up an independent state.

As they began to operate, the Lithuanian CP and the Soviet Government of Lithuania did not promote the slogan of creation of an independent Soviet Lithuania. And although they tried to do this somewhat later, in order to seize the initiative from the bourgeoisie—representatives of which were actively proclaiming their striving to establish a sovereign Lithuanian state—they did not succeed.

In the Fall of 1919, bourgeois statehood was affirmed in Lithuania. Why this took place is widely known. This was brought about both by the mistakes of the Soviet authorities, and especially by the circumstances leading to the defeat of the Red Army on the Western Front, which changed the correlation of armed forces. Soviet Lithuania, although it was combined in a unified socialist republic with Soviet Belorussia, was unable to defend itself.

There has been a great deal of passionate debate on how to rate the state which was formed in Lithuania after Soviet rule was put down and Soviet statehood was destroyed. Although discussions on this extremely complex and sensitive question will no doubt continue in the future, one can even now firmly assert, that the restoration of the Lithuanian state, even though the bourgeoisie was predominant in that government, was nevertheless a progressive phenomenon in the history of our region. For the Lithuanian people this signified an end to 120 years of national oppression, and was in many respects an important beginning for new development. In this respect the aforementioned act of 16 February takes on

its true significance. This was a document which stimulated the aspirations of the Lithuanian people for restoration of national statehood, and aroused hopes for its actual implementation.

The peace pact between Soviet Russia and Lithuania of 12 July 1920 signified international legal recognition of the Lithuanian republic and marked a new stage in the relationships between the two neighboring states. This historical document embodied Lenin's principles of peaceful co-existence.

Numerous people can still remember how Lithuania developed further, and what sort of problems it had to solve. That was a hard, and often tortuous and thorny route. Some who traveled it continually slipped and fell; others acquired wealth on the way. However, we are obliged to look at not only that side of the question.

In spite of many extremely unfavorable conditions, the average annual increase in gross industrial productions for the years 1920-1940 amounted to 6-7 percent. Nor was the growth slowed by the economic crisis of 1929-1933. With the implementation of land reform, the last vestiges of feudalism were uprooted, and the way was cleared for the development of small-scale capitalist agriculture. The export of agricultural products and semi-finished goods as well as lumber from Lithuania, permitted achieving a balance in foreign trade and the purchase of the raw materials and equipment which they needed from abroad, although quite often under unfavorable circumstances.

A great deal was accomplished in the area of developing education, science and culture. In the years between the wars, the Kaunas University imeni Vitautas the Great, conservatories, an agricultural and veterinary academy, and other scientific and academic institutions were established. A national intelligentsia was established, and the general educational level of the people increased. Fruitful work was also carried on in the area of development of the Lithuanian language. Lithuanian literature, theater, fine arts, music and architecture achieved significant successes.

There is no need to deny all this. On the contrary. We must discard as completely unfounded the established stereotype, that the Lithuania of that time was, allegedly, merely the patrimony of Smetona [a "bourgeois counter-revolutionary"]. We must acknowledge that the talented and work-loving Lithuanian people had carried out a great deal of work in those days as well.

It goes without saying, one need not go to extremes. Whereas in the past it was frequently asserted that everything was bad in the bourgeois Lithuanian republic, neither should we under any circumstances indicate that everything was splendid then.

The fact that there were no democratic traditions of government in the region had an effect on the political development of Lithuania. Soon disappointment set in even among some of those who had actively fought for an independent state, who sincerely believed in the establishment of a democratic Lithuania with a flourishing economy and culture. In spite of their desires, after the military coup of 17 December 1926, the authoritarian regime of the Tautininkai [Smetona's followers] was set up. Objective analysis indicates that in the Lithuania between the wars, there was truly genuine reason for dissatisfaction among the workers in their struggle for a better life, and for their political rights and freedom.

Let us recount only a few manifestations of this struggle, and its brightest pages. At the end of February 1920, a soldier uprising took place at the Kaunas Garrison, and at the beginning of September 1927, an anti-fascist uprising occurred in Taurag. At the end of August 1935, a peasant uprising took place in Suvalikiai and Dzūkiai, and in mid-June 1936, a general political uprising of the workers of Kaunas occurred. Can we really suppose, without burying the truth, that all these actions in the revolutionary struggle lacked an objective basis? The workers were struggling, for there was a real basis for this, and they did not shed their blood in vain. Lithuanian communists, working in the masses, were truly far-sighted and to a large extent made this struggle more effective. If favorable soil had not existed, their ideas would not have borne fruit.

We must also acknowledge the fact that the revolutionary struggle of the workers in the Lithuanian republic had great socio-political meaning. It was a very important factor of social progress.

Only the naive could think that the ruling circles of Lithuania took a liberal attitude toward this struggle, or were favorably disposed toward it. In the years 1919-1940, the bourgeois courts passed judgment on over 3,000 people and administratively punished about 7,000 revolutionaries and anti-fascists. An absolute majority of those repressed for political motives were accused of belonging to the Communist Party. The bourgeois regime handed down the death sentence to a considerable number of those fighting for the worker's interests; and many other progressive people—workers, peasants, intelligentsia—were subjected to continual persecution. We will always pronounce with respect the names of Karolis Pozhela, Yuožas Greyfenbergeris, Kazis Gedris, Rapolas Charnas and all those who thought like them, who fell in the unequal struggle at the hands of the hirelings of the bourgeoisie.

Today it is especially bitter to recall that many of our best leaders, comrades-in-arms of the communists of Lithuania, were lost—but not in the revolutionary struggle. In the 1930's many of the members of the government, and a good number of other honest communists, fell victim to Stalin's terror.

The majority of the Lithuanian communists were people of a tragic fate. No matter where they lived and worked—in the bourgeois Lithuanian republic or in the Soviet Union, seized by Stalin's terror—they lived under constant suspicion and unfounded accusations, and the threat of physical annihilation. However, they never lost their faith in the correctness of the path they had chosen. Honor and glory to them for worthily bearing the banner of revolution, stained with the blood of their comrades-in-arms!

The period of 1939-1941 was one of the most complex in the life of Lithuania. This was a period of profound historical changes, contradictory political maelstroms, and tragic events. Unfortunately, with time, it came to pass that analysis of the social processes of that time have become, I would say, overly-ideologized; and with the current clash of various interests it is now rather difficult to present an objective view of them. However, we must strive to do so. Historical truth, no matter how bitter, must win out.

During the restoration of Soviet rule in Lithuania, support for the internal situation was far from unanimous; owing to factionalism and weak leadership on the part of the ruling circles, the struggle of the republic's workers, under the leadership of the Communist Party, was more effective. It goes without saying that this was truly an important factor; however, they would not have been able to guarantee major social changes by themselves.

For many years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union at that time with respect to Lithuania were uncritically and incorrectly evaluated. The time has come to look at history with our eyes open.

The pacts of 23 August and 28 September 1939, signed by representatives of the Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany, already showed that the leadership of both countries was looking at international relations through the prism of power, and considered Lithuania an object of trade. Moreover, as the further course of events showed, these pacts established the real foundation for Stalin and his cohorts to exert naked pressure on the government of the Lithuanian republic, and for foisting their will on them.

On 10 October 1939, the government of Lithuania signed an agreement on the transfer of Vilnius and Vilnius Oblast to the Lithuanian Republic, and a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union. In the process of concluding this agreement, the dream of many years of the Lithuanian people—to return their historic capital of Vilnius—collapsed. However, the stationing of a 20,000-man contingent of the Red Army, not only in Vilnius and its surrounding area, but also in other places in the republic, was cause for great alarm. On 14 June 1940, the government of the Soviet Union at that time handed the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs a note, which

contained a demand to change the government of the Lithuanian republic and for permission to introduce additional units of the Red Army.

The introduction of additional units of the Red Army, carried out under the auspices of the aforementioned note, violated the sovereignty of Lithuania. This was a manifestation of Stalinist diktat and tyranny. At the very same time we, of course, must see the other side of the question as well. Under the conditions of those times, these units did not allow Western states to interfere in the revolutionary events in Lithuania, and they formed a barrier to the ruling circles of Hitler's Germany, preventing them to utilize it as a military and economic beachhead in preparation for a "blitzkrieg" against the Soviet Union.

As a result of the actions of the revolutionary forces and the broad anti-government opposition after introduction of the additional units of the Red Army, the Smetona regime fell. On 17 June 1940 a new government was established in Lithuania, headed by the active anti-fascist and well-known public figure Yustas Paletskis, which entered our history books as the Popular Government. It did a good deal for democratization of the life of the republic and organized elections to the Popular Sejm.

The decisions of the Sejm are also well-known to everyone: they provided the legal foundation for the restoration of Soviet rule in Lithuania, and set out the landmarks for the socialist transformation of society. At the request of the Sejm, the extraordinary 7th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 3 August 1940 accepted Lithuania into the Soviet Union with the rights of a union republic.

By rights one can say that today no one doubts the veracity of these facts. Only their interpretation varies, which is conditioned by the position and value orientation of the various interpreters. What can one say in brief about this question?

In the exceptionally complex historical situation of the years 1939-1940, when the fate of the Lithuanian people was being decided, the CPLi and its tested and far-seeing leader Antanas Sniechkus confidently spoke out for close ties with the Soviet peoples, and for the entry of Lithuania into the Soviet Union.

History has affirmed the correctness of this position. Only as a part of the Soviet nation could the Lithuanian nation survive, and in fact did. It survived, and along with it, the people. East Prussia was no more. It was erased from the face of the Earth. Lithuania exists. And it always will!

Lithuania—it is we, all of its people. As we are, so will it be—our Motherland. Thus, let us give some thought to the fact that important conclusions must be drawn from all of that which was and which now is.

Is it proper to depict the path which we trod in building socialism in rosy hues? There were all things along that path—creation and destruction, ups and downs, sincere friendship and diktat, joy and sorrows, humanism and blood. And a great deal here was predetermined not only by the socio-political conditions but also by the actions of specific people.

Lithuania became a constituent part of the Soviet Union at a time when Stalin's regime had become firmly rooted. From the very beginning this had a severe impact on creative labor. A great deal had been done then in the years 1940-1941 to lay the foundation of socialism in the republic, for the benefit of its workers. And nevertheless many of the principles and methods of the administrative-command system which had been formulated at that time in the country, were within the first year of existence of Soviet rule carried over to Lithuania. And what is more, all of this was introduced here when at the same time attempts were made to create an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Distrust was expressed even to Lithuanian communists who had come out from the underground. At the end of 1940, more than 500 underground communists were refused party documents.

The Lithuanian lands were flooded with blood and tears. Testifying to this are the multitudes of graves, which increased in the war and the post-war years. All decent people were profoundly shocked by the horrible crimes committed in Raynyay, Pravenishkes, Panevezhis and other places in the first days of the Great Patriotic War. And can anyone remain indifferent at the mere mention of the evil deeds of Hitler's usurpers and their stooges at Paneryay and Kaunas Fort IX, at Alitus and Novo-Vilna, and in almost all the cities, towns and villages of Lithuania? We shall never forget that during the war years more than 370,000 peaceful citizens of the republic were annihilated. And how many victims fell in the deadly fight for freedom! Over 80,000 Soviet troops of various nationalities gave their lives, liberating Lithuania from Hitler's yoke. Death raged and rivers of blood flowed in the post-war years as well. In the critical struggle of opposing political and class interests, many people were led astray and perished. Many of those who participated in the armed underground also committed severe crimes. More than 25,000 of the republic's citizens, including more than a thousand young children, were killed by those who called themselves "soldiers of freedom."

There is no place in Lithuania where one cannot find burial mounds of people who perished innocently. They call everyone strictly to account—not only the Hitler and Stalin regimes, but nationalism as well. Although we have already done a good deal to perpetuate the memory of the fallen, we are sparing no efforts to bring new dimensions to this noble cause. Everyone who is worthy of due respect must be given it. We must not skimp on kind words, nor on attention and help to the grey-haired war veterans, and to every person who assisted in the survival and rebirth of Lithuania. We shall do everything

to ensure that their lives will never be overshadowed with misfortune. This is the cause of our culture, our self-respect and our conscience.

There is nothing that could justify the mass deportation of citizens of the republic to remote regions of the country, which began as early as June, 1941. Those were unconstitutional and inhuman acts. Unfortunately, after the war, as we all know, they began anew—moreover, on a grander scale. All of this shows the true face of Stalin's regime.

It is no use trying to put into words all the scorn and the burdens, the bitterness and the pain, and everything that those totally innocent people bore, who traveled the icy roads of exile. Their tales of what they experienced and what they endured make one's heart ache.

As everyone knows, the republic government has taken decisive measures directed toward restoring historic justice. The appropriate decrees have been adopted in accordance with which all those who suffered innocently in the years of the Stalin regime have been rehabilitated. As much as possible they were also compensated for their material and moral losses. However that is only a beginning. This work must and shall be actively continued.

We spent a great deal with no hope of return, and we lost a great deal in the difficult war and postwar years. But the Lithuanian people and Lithuania itself have never been a straw in the wind. The actions of the troops of the 16th Lithuanian Division and the partisans, and the struggles of the many defenders of the people—party, soviet and Komsomol activists—for a new life, show how great and how strong is the life-force that was bestowed on our workers. And although not everything has gone smoothly with them; although the postwar activists committed quite a few mistakes, we have no moral right to say that their path was a mistaken one. The vivid memory of those who at the height of their powers perished from enemy bullets for socialist Lithuania does not permit us to think thus.

In the war years and the postwar period an especially heavy burden fell to the lot of the leadership of the republic. And they coped with it honorably. We will always have feelings of profound respect for Antanas Sneckus, Yustas Paletskis, Moteyus Shumauskas, Mechislovas Gedvilas and to many of their comrades-in-arms; to everyone who worked long and fruitfully and continues to do so for the good of Lithuania.

History is made by people. But you see, certain people, taking this as their starting point, at times attempt to cast a shadow on entire generations of people whose fate it was to live during the Stalin regime and the stagnation years. This is not the proper approach. Blanket accusations will change nothing. What is needed is a concrete and business-like analysis of the situation. And this indicates first of all that at that time far from everything was dependent upon

the republic party organization and its leaders. At that time a command-bureaucratic machine, which fettered the forces of socialism and hindered social progress, operated on a nation-wide scale.

We shall never forget how the proponents of the Stalin regime at the center tried to sow distrust for the local national cadres, and even to the leaders of the Lithuanian CP; we shall never forget the crude methods of rule by orders and decrees which they resorted to, contrary to socialist legality. It was namely by their commands that serious mistakes were made, both in the collectivization of the republic's agriculture, and in evaluating the historic and cultural heritage of the Lithuanian people, and the creativity of certain figures of Lithuanian Soviet culture. And they continued to exercise leadership by methods of pressure from above. Everyone is aware of the negative effects that this brought about.

The economic system based on strict centralization, highly regimented labor, and assignments of a directive nature, has not created the necessary stimuli for accelerating scientific-technical progress, and production has begun to lag in a technical sense.

The development of ecologically-dangerous branches of industrial production has intensified the negative effects on the environment and on man. The nature-preservation measures taken were not comprehensive and effective enough, owing to which society is justifiably disturbed. Obvious harm was also caused by the excessively regulated activities of agricultural collectives, by micro-management and a tendency toward gigantomania.

It is well known how difficult it was in those times to develop our national culture. There were all sorts of distortions of socio-political development; a decline in the prestige of aesthetic and moral values; there were bureaucratic attitudes which crushed talented individuals; and there were many other negative phenomena of which today we can all speak aloud, such as the sharp spines thrust into the wounded souls of the artists, which either made them apathetic, or encouraged them to swell the ranks of production of mundane culture. The fact that during the time that these extremely unfavorable conditions prevailed they managed to create truly valuable things should be all the more precious to us. Unfortunately, even today we do not fully appreciate this. Even the names of Lenin Prize laureates, Gediminas Iokubonis, Eduardas Mezheylaitis, Jonas Avizhyus, Vitautas Chekanauskas and others, are today still spoken too timidly. Is that not why they are not included in certain new plans?

There is no doubt about it—Stalin's regime and the stagnation have left exceptionally heavy marks on the culture of the Lithuanian people, just as on other peoples. In literature and fine arts, in music and architecture, theater and movies—everywhere, there are many signs of this. And how vexing it is to think, that vital questions of

the development of national relations and historical consciousness have hardly ever been resolved actively and properly, and that in Lithuania, the Lithuanian language has been relegated to the role of a stepchild!

It goes without saying, that the blame for all these negative phenomena cannot be laid to union-level diktat alone. There have also been quite a few people in the localities who feel no responsibility to history for the state of affairs; who do not wish to disturb their own peace or upset others, have pandered to the authors of unsuitable directives and instructions, and to erroneous orders. More than one of them has made a career of indulging his higher-ups. This must not be repeated!

Comrades! In spite of the administrative-command system of administration and control, the hypertrophic centralization, the manifestation of subjectivism and voluntarism and other departures from Lenin's conception of socialism, which have prevailed throughout the country and inevitably took root in our republic as well, the years of Soviet rule in Lithuania were nevertheless years of noteworthy economic development for our region. The economic potential of the republic has developed dynamically with the acceleration of socialist productive relationships as a whole. Suffice it to say that the average annual increase in basic national-economic assets in the years of Soviet rule amounted to 7.6 percent, and the growth of their productive part, to 8.0 percent. On the average, industrial production has shown annual growth of 9.5 percent.

In spite of gross distortions of Lenin's principles of cooperation in collectivization of the rural area and mistakes in agrarian policy in the period to follow, Lithuanian agriculture has also followed the path to progress. Currently our farmers are producing gross agricultural output that is approximately 2.5-fold larger than in 1940. In terms of intensiveness of animal husbandry, Lithuania occupies one of the top spots among the other union republics.

Bearing all this in mind, we would like to take the opportunity on this holiday to show proper appreciation for the services of our workers and peasants. In view of all the difficulties they have gone through, I think it would be proper to say that they have accomplished a genuine feat.

However, the periods of Stalin's regime and the stagnation gave birth to a multitude of problems in the economy. Since April 1985, when the party commenced the revolutionary restructuring of the nation, the time has come to resolve these problems as well.

The landmarks for this enormous work were outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The workers of Soviet Lithuania are steadfastly laboring to free the economy of our region from the clutches of the administrative-command system of control, and to more rapidly overcome the tendency for stagnation,

which for long years prevailed in all the basic sectors of the national economy. This task is not among the easiest, but certain optimistically-oriented results are already making themselves known. The national income, industrial and agricultural production, and socialist labor productivity are growing faster in this five-year plan than the plan envisaged. Since the start of the five-year plan, contracted obligations for delivery of industrial production to consumers have been fulfilled steadily at a level of 99.8-99.9 percent, and productivity has increased exclusively by virtue of gains in labor productivity. Workers in other branches of the national economy are also coping successfully with five-year-plan tasks.

But these initial positive achievements should be seen as merely the beginning of those great matters which remain to be accomplished. First of all, everything must be done to better satisfy the day-to-day needs of the populace, in order that every one of our people might more fully enjoy the material benefits of perestroika.

It was precisely for this reason that it was especially stressed at the 19th All-Union Conference, that while carrying out the long-term strategic tasks for developing the economy, we must immediately solve the urgent problems of improving the public welfare as well.

The most urgent problem in the life of our society today is the food problem. True, our republic has for a long time been among the first of the many union republics in terms of the basic indicators for intensification of agriculture. While we are proud of this, we have now noticed that undesirable phenomena have begun to take root in our agriculture. And they did not crop up today or even yesterday. Agricultural production assets are accumulating from year to year, and the entire material-technical base is continually growing stronger. Incidentally, the yield of grains, potatoes and other crops have not been stable, and for the past ten years now they have, in essence, not increased. The same situation prevails in the fattening of cattle. The growth rate of animal products is gradually declining. All of this not only has an effect on the economic effectiveness of agricultural production—but most importantly, it prevents improvement of supplying agricultural products to the public.

A situation has come to pass which demands radical and urgent measures, and qualitatively-new economic decisions which will ensure truly effective use of the mighty production potential that has been established in the rural area. Decisive changes must be made in the productive relationships in the countryside, and we must move quickly to abolish those ineffective forms and methods of organizing production which prevent our peasant from feeling that he is the true master of the land and other means of production and the fruits of his own labor. The main direction is—to introduce more boldly the new methods of management, which were proposed

at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, to which Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has recently, steadfastly and often called our attention. At the same time we must continue to encourage farmers in every way to develop their private subsidiary farms, and set about more extensive restoration of individual farms, and principally in those areas where the terrain is more complex, and where there still are farmsteads. In other words, the party calls for upholding the principle that all forms of socialist management have the right to existence and development, which objectively bring man into closer contact with the land and other means of production. We must actively undertake all this even now.

A second extremely critical problem which defines the well-being of our people is supplying them with manufactured goods. We have created in Lithuania a major production complex for modern consumer goods, with the capacity to supply many of them to the citizens of Lithuania; but the greater part is sold beyond the bounds of the republic. And this production potential is not being utilized to greatest advantage either. Above all, it needs to be renovated and that is already being done. More than two-thirds of the capital investments in the current five-year plan are being directed toward modernization of existing enterprises. At the same time, enterprises of all industrial branches are to increase their contribution to the production of consumer goods. This is the main means for overcoming the shortage of goods and for putting an end to the diktat of the producers. At present this diktat is chiefly manifested in the production of low-quality goods, in the unjustified increase in retail prices, and in the reduced production of inexpensive goods in small lots. These and other distortions have become rather widespread, and are having a negative influence on the vital interests of our people. Therefore, we must do battle with them by all possible means. We see our duty here principally in increasing in every way the responsibility of the commanders of production for the matters entrusted to them, starting with the minister and ending with the administrators of enterprises, shop foremen and section and brigade supervisors. Having set ourselves the goal of producing things that are of advantage not only to the producer but to the consumer as well, we cannot avoid adopting measures of administrative influence, and strict state and social control. We must admit that today we still do not have enough of that control. At the same time we must make fundamental improvements in the study of consumer demand, and must introduce a procedure by which the production of consumer goods would depend entirely on demand, in order that demand would become a truly keen regulator of production.

We must not become self-satisfied or rest content with the successful fulfillment of plans for retail trade turnover and the relatively large size of the goods turnover, with respect to average per-capita consumption in the republic. A situation has evolved in which these indicators do not provide a true picture of the actual level of satisfaction of the needs of our populace. In recent times

an increasing amount of goods which are in demand do not fall into the hands of the local populace. And the sale of a number of products by coupon has not made radical changes in the situation. We shall be searching for additional means of overcoming the difficulties which have sprung up.

A great deal remains to be done in improving the operation of the trade and domestic services network. It is still a frequent phenomenon, that stores are not regularly supplied with goods in everyday demand, and very often with goods which are in sufficient supply; that trade and domestic services enterprises are not open at times convenient to the public; and that not enough attention is paid to the individual.

One of the most critical economic and social problems is—providing apartments for the populace. Every year we build more than 30,000 apartments. But this does not satisfy the demand. In the cities alone, more than 143,000 families are still waiting for an apartment. Many of the citizens still do not have a separate apartment, and people are living in poor, emergency housing conditions.

Under such conditions it is very important to rhythmically carry out tasks for letting out and operating apartment buildings, and to avoid storming the plan at the end of the year. Unfortunately, we have been unable to avoid that this year, and the planned annual tasks are being fulfilled with difficulty.

Insufficient attention is being paid to housing construction at one's own expense. Associations, enterprises and organizations are building few houses, although they have considerable capability to do so.

Individual construction comprises almost one-fourth the program for housing construction. Unfortunately, about 5,000 individual houses which had been planned for the three years of the five-year-plan, will not be built.

The greatest hindrance for this is the lack of building materials and skilled workers. Next year it is planned to sell to the public 50 percent more cement, 7.0 percent more bricks, and almost 25 percent more lumber than this year. More reinforced concrete articles will also be sold. But just who is preventing the local organs of power to more energetically allocate sectors of land for construction of individual housing? We hope that the local Soviets and their executive committees, enterprises and organizations, are mobilizing all available financial, material and labor resources to solve the housing problem. That is the urgent demand of the times.

A very complex ecological situation has come to pass in the republic, which is cause for great concern on the part of the party organization and our entire society. The time has come for not only raising ecological problems by various means, but also to take urgent, radical, practical measures to solve them: to bring a halt to pollution of the water supply and the atmosphere; and to

put a stop to denuding the land of vegetation, and forest land especially. All of this requires considerable capital investment; but there is no alternative: they must be sought out. Purification plants and other nature-preservation projects must become the chief construction projects of the republic. Decisive measures must be taken to ensure the purity of food products and for health preservation. Chemically-dangerous and biologically impure agricultural products and foodstuffs produced from them must not reach the public's tables. In short, we are obliged to closely tie-in the interests of the national economy and the ecology everywhere, and must forestall all violations of their interaction and dialectical unity.

And so, we are faced with great and qualitatively-new tasks for further economic, social, cultural and spiritual development. Accordingly, for their successful resolution, qualitatively-new social conditions, and new means and methods of management and control of the national economy and social production are needed. Life's experience has shown that creation of a new economic mechanism and putting it into operation is possible only under conditions of economic independence in the republic, and under conditions of consistently strengthening the sovereignty of Soviet Lithuania as a whole.

In order to achieve economic independence for the republic, we must be principally concerned that every national-economic unit from top to bottom operates under conditions of total economic accountability. At the present time the majority of the enterprises and organizations in the republic are doing just that. Beginning in the new year, all enterprises and organizations in the sphere of production will be switching to total economic accountability and self-financing.

A concept for the economic independence of the republic has already been worked out through the joint efforts of scholars, economists and industrialists; however, this concept reflects on the whole only the relationships between the republic and the union-level organs. We must now focus attention on perfecting the management of the entire economic mechanism within the republic at the city and rayon level. Competent working groups have already been formed for this purpose, and are due to present suggestions on these questions as well in the near future.

We hope that economic independence for the republic will permit maximum mobilization of the republic's economic potential, stimulate the initiative of the scientists and all other people taking part in the process of production and control, better satisfy the needs of the republic's national economy and the public, and provide a more significant contribution to the development of the all-union national economic complex.

Comrades! The revolutionary restructuring of society, begun by the Communist Party, demands reconsidering the role of the Party. The journey traveled by the

Communist Party and the people has not been an easy one and has at times been tragic. On this journey there have been both victories and distortions; there have been mistakes which have hindered the nation's progress for decades, mistakes which have had tragic results and which have done great moral and ideological damage.

In all the previous years, the party organization of Lithuania has operated actively; it has tried to solve the tasks of socialist construction; and it has mobilized the citizens of the republic to complete them. Many communists and non-party members, economic leaders and specialists, scientists and cultural figures, have honorably fulfilled their party and civic duty. These efforts and sacrifices on the part of communists of many generations have not gone for naught, and no one will ever be able to blot that out. In nearly 50 years, Lithuania has been fundamentally changed, and it has achieved significant victories, the chief of which is the fact that our people have begun to live better, and that there are clear prospects for creating an even-better life.

The Communist Party, while trying to solve the complex problems of the revolutionary restructuring of society, is restoring Lenin's norms for party life, and the concept of the party as the political vanguard of the working class and the entire Soviet nation. Today there are nearly 210,000 communists in Lithuania, united in nearly 5,800 primary party organizations. One-fourth of the communists work in the main sectors of industrial production, and 46,000 are trying to solve the problem of food production along with all the farmers. The ranks of the Lithuanian CP contain many highly-skilled specialists, scholars and creative intelligentsia. This mighty potential, along with the skillful employment of the aroused public activeness, and the positive actions of the trade unions, the Komsomol, "Sayudis," the Lithuanian perestroyka movement, and the cultural and other public associations of our people, will create the necessary prerequisites for successful solution of the problems of perestroyka in all areas of economic, political and social life.

It goes without saying that great efforts will be required. But after all, we have accumulated a wealth of experience in building a new society; and there is a many-thousands-strong detachment of skilled cadres, and a powerful cultural, scientific and technical potential. But do the labor collectives, and the party and social organizations have the required energy? We are convinced that they do. The Lithuanian people, who have along with the other nations trod a difficult and complicated path, will honorably continue the crusade for revolutionary renewal. They have the strength and the wisdom to do so. In this we have no doubts whatsoever. And our comrades and friends believe it as well.

From the perspective of 70 years, the path taken can be clearly seen—its straight parts and its curves, its ascents and descents. At the same time we believe, and we see, that socialism has many potential capabilities, and

bright prospects are opening on the path to building and improving it. We hold in our hands the real conditions not only for accelerating socio-economic progress, but also for raising the popular welfare, for developing the national culture, and for bringing up the young people. We only need more solidarity and organization, decisiveness and energetic actions. Lithuania can be, it must become and it shall be the most flourishing Soviet republic!

Revised Draft Law on State Language of Estonia Published

Resolution, Law on Status of Estonian
18000365 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 9 Dec 88 p 4

[Decree of Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet on Status of State Language in Estonian SSR, and Law of Estonian SSR on Amendments to Constitution (Basic Law) of Estonian SSR, both issued 7 December 1988 by 9th Session of Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, and signed by Chairman A. Ryuytel of Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and Secretary V. Vakht of Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium]

[Text]

Decree of Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet on Status of State Language in Estonian SSR

The proposals submitted to the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Estonian SSR by labor collectives, public organizations, and citizens during the nationwide discussion of the draft Law of the Estonian SSR on Language support the acknowledgement of the Estonian language as the state language of the Estonian SSR.

Proposals have been submitted regarding the inclusion of a corresponding statement in the Constitution of the Estonian SSR and the ratification of the Estonian SSR Law on Language.

During the discussion there were also some objections to the acknowledgement of the Estonian language as the state language and some criticism of certain articles of the language bill.

On this basis, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

1. That the report of the head of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's working group on the status of the Estonian language, Deputy E. Pyldroos, on the work connected with the proposals and remarks submitted during the nationwide discussion will be taken into account.

That the draft Law of the Estonian SSR on Language, revised as a result of the nationwide discussion, will be acknowledged as a document corresponding in essence

to the statement in the Constitution of the Estonian SSR defining the status of the Estonian language as the state language and providing legal guarantees for the use of the state language, Russian language and other languages in the Estonian SSR. Deputies of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet will inform their electors in detail of the Estonian SSR Law on Language. The ratification of the Law on Language will be postponed until the next session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet on 18 January 1989.

2. That the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers will plan the financial, material, technical, and organizational measures needed for the implementation of the Estonian SSR Law on Language.

3. That the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will:

Secure the drafting of a statute on the commission for language protection and the enforcement of articles 4 and 12 of the Estonian SSR Law on Language;

Publish the revised and supplemented bill of the Estonian SSR on language and will submit it to the next session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet in January 1989.

4. That the State Committee of the Estonian SSR on Public Education will settle all questions connected with the training and advanced training of teachers of the Estonian language quickly and efficiently.

Law of the Estonian SSR on Amendments to Constitution (Basic Law) of Estonian SSR

The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

1. That Article 5 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Estonian SSR will state:

"Article 5. The state language of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic is the Estonian language.

"The legal guarantees and procedures for the use of the state language of the Estonian SSR, the Russian language, and other languages are stipulated in the Estonian SSR Law on Language."

2. That the earlier text of Article 5 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Estonian SSR will be the second paragraph of Article 9.

Public Debate Summarized

18000365 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 10 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by V. Bezzubov, Tartu State University, and M. Khint, Tallinn Pedagogical Institute: "The Working Group on Language Has Completed Its Work"]

[Text] As we know, the previous draft law on language was submitted for nationwide discussion on 30 October. During the discussion the Supreme Soviet Presidium and other republic agencies received over 10,000 letters, signed by more than 300,000 people. Around 290,000 supported the draft law as a whole and 19,000 were opposed to it. There was spirited discussion of the draft in the press. Experts helped the working group keep up with the great abundance of extremely important materials by efficiently collating all proposals on various articles of the draft law. Specific proposals and remarks on the wording of some passages were of special value to the working group. Extreme points of view were not taken into account (on the one hand, the proposal that the status of the Russian language not be mentioned at all in the law and, on the other, the proposal that the law on language be declared unconstitutional).

The worries of the people who speak Russian essentially revolved around three or four problems. Most of the objections had to do with articles 20 and 22, the imprecise wording of which could suggest the intention to set legislative limits on the possibility of obtaining a higher education or vocational training in the Russian language. Of course, this intention did not even enter the minds of the members of the working group, but we must admit that we did not have a completely clear understanding of the issue of the vocational education of Russian-speaking youth. Now, after the republic conference of public education personnel, many things have fallen into place. Our little republic is simply incapable of offering parallel education in two languages in all fields, as several letters suggested. This would lead to a reduction in the number of specialties in republic academic institutions, and this would be most injurious to young Estonians. After all, those who are fluent in Russian are able in principle to choose from among more than 800 VUZ's in the country, but only the boldest and best-educated Estonians can do this. It is clear that we will continue to have parallel groups in many special fields, but something else is also obvious: Russian groups will not solve the problem in themselves. Without intensive language studies, the parallel processes of "Estonian-language" and "Russian-language" education will perpetuate the undesirable division of specialists along national lines. In view of this fact and in view of the position taken by the conference of public education personnel, the commission included two possibilities in the statement on specialized education in the Russian language in the second paragraph of Article 22: academic groups receiving instruction in the Russian language, as they do now, and the intensive study of the Estonian language by lowerclassmen and

their subsequent inclusion in the system of Estonian-language instruction. Obviously, the capabilities of higher academic institutions and current events in the republic will be taken into account in this process. No one has the right to order Russian-speaking youth to continue their studies in the Estonian language until the Estonian language is taught in our Russian schools.

Many of the letters were reactions to the articles discussing the language to be used at rallies and meetings. In the old and in the new revised draft, the speaker is free to use the language of his choice, but this must be accompanied by translations into Estonian or Russian when necessary.

There were complaints about the statements regarding the language of internal clerical records and the excessive regulation of the language of correspondence between organizations. These remarks were taken into account in the revised draft. It does not stipulate any specific dates for the transfer of business correspondence to the Estonian language in regions with a predominantly non-Estonian population. It acknowledges the logic of correspondence in Russian between Russian organizations.

The dates for the enactment of the law are not as rigid as in the original draft. The right of each individual to communicate with any official establishment in Estonian or Russian will be guaranteed first—within a year. The knowledge of both languages (with the prescribed degree of fluency) in trade and services will be required within 2 years. Some of the stipulations of the Law on Language will not go into effect for 4 years.

The republic Council of Ministers must allocate the necessary funds for the implementation of the Law on Language and must draw up a list of the specialties and jobs in which bilingualism will be required. Requirements regarding bilingualism will be different in different occupations: It is completely understandable that a physician will have to know the language better than a postman, who can certainly get by with the minimum. Obviously, the knowledge of a second language cannot be required until the conditions for learning the language have been established.

The draft Law on Language will give Estonian the status of the state language and will give the Russian language all of the necessary legal guarantees. From the legal and political standpoints it would be fundamentally impossible to secure the Russian language's status as the language of international communication on the governmental level because, in the first place, the language of international communication must be chosen by people voluntarily and, in the second place, this kind of legislation would make bilingualism compulsory for Estonians on a unilateral basis: In other words, the study of Estonian would remain a matter of the conscience and personal wishes of each individual, while sufficient fluency in Russian would be required of everyone, including Estonian children treated by a Russian-speaking physician. Unilateral bilingualism is undemocratic at the

very least—and this is acknowledged by the overwhelming majority of the republic population—because it would give the Estonians no chance to conduct their daily affairs in their own language within their own territory.

Therefore, the new edition of the draft Law on Language presupposes the need for bilateral bilingualism—obviously, within reasonable and feasible limits. It also offers extensive opportunities for the use of languages other than Estonian and Russian for national cultural development. There will be no discrimination against any language, although the Estonian SSR is understandably incapable of guaranteeing the official use of all of the languages of the citizens living within its territory.

The working group responsible for drafting the law did this work in the sincere hope of adhering to the principles of democracy.

Text of Revised Draft

*18000365 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 10 Dec 88 p 3*

[Revised draft Law of the Estonian SSR on Language; first five paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] The state language of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic is the Estonian language. In Estonia, in the native land of the Estonians, the Estonian language is the object of special state concern and is under the special protection of the state. The legislative declaration of the status of the Estonian language as the state language will lay a solid foundation for the preservation and development of the Estonian people and their culture.

In the Estonian SSR each individual and each establishment, enterprise, and organization will have the right to use the Estonian language in oral and written forms.

The Estonian SSR will secure instruction in the Estonian language and its scientific study in Estonia and will support Estonian language instruction and scientific studies outside Estonia.

The Russian language is discussed in this law because of its unionwide significance and because it is the language most frequently used as a native language after the Estonian language in the Estonian SSR.

The status of the Estonian language as the state language will not affect the civil rights of people with a different native language. While protecting the Estonian language on the state level, the Estonian SSR will acknowledge the inalienable right of citizens of any nationality to develop their native language and culture and the equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of their native language.

Article 1. The state language of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic is the Estonian language. The procedures for the use of the state language of the Estonian SSR and other languages are stipulated in the Estonian SSR Law on Language.

The Private Individual

Article 2. The private individual within the territory of the Estonian SSR will have the right to conduct business and communicate in Estonian in all government institutions and state administrative agencies and in other establishments, enterprises, and organizations.

This will also apply to the government institutions and state administrative agencies and other establishments, enterprises, and organizations conducting business in other languages.

Article 3. The private individual is also guaranteed the ability to conduct business and communicate with government institutions and state administrative agencies and other establishments, enterprises, and organizations in the Estonian SSR in the Russian language.

Private individuals will conduct business in other languages in accordance with their abilities and the purpose of their activity.

Article 4. All administrators and employees of government institutions and state administrative agencies, public organizations, the law enforcement system, agencies for the maintenance of public order and investigative agencies, medical personnel, journalists, service, trade, and communications personnel, the employees of rescue services, and others whose professional duties bring them into contact with private individuals will have to meet professional language requirements. The knowledge and use of the Estonian language and the knowledge and use of Russian and other languages will be compulsory in line with requirements set in accordance with Article 37 of this law.

Compliance with professional language requirements will be a preliminary condition for the conclusion and renewal of labor contracts with these individuals.

Article 5. Administrators will communicate with their subordinates in the language of their choice and will not be obligated to surpass the professional language requirements of their jobs.

Article 6. In trade and consumer services the service personnel must use the language of the customer's choice, within the bounds of the professional requirements set in accordance with Article 37 of this law.

Article 7. The disparagement of the language chosen by a private individual for communication or the creation of obstacles to impede the use of this language will be prohibited and will be punished in the cases envisaged by law.

Government Institutions and State Administrative Agencies

Article 8. Government institutions and state administrative agencies of the Estonian SSR will conduct their business in the Estonian language. Sessions and working meetings of government institutions and state administrative agencies of the Estonian SSR will be conducted in Estonian and the minutes or proceedings will be recorded in Estonian.

The legal documents of government institutions and state administrative agencies will be ratified and published in the Estonian language, and translations of them will be published in the Russian language.

Local government institutions and state administrative agencies of the Estonian SSR may conduct their business in Russian in accordance with Article 36 of this law.

Article 9. The correspondence of government institutions and state administrative agencies of the Estonian SSR outside the republic will be conducted in a language acceptable to both sides.

Article 10. Government institutions and state administrative agencies of the Estonian SSR will use the Estonian language in written communications with one another and with establishments, enterprises, and organizations located in the Estonian SSR. Government institutions and state administrative agencies of the Estonian SSR can use the Russian language in written communications with local government institutions and state administrative agencies conducting their business in the Russian language in accordance with Article 36 of this law.

Article 11. Government institutions and state administrative agencies of the Estonian SSR will use the Estonian language in communications with private individuals in the Estonian SSR and the Russian language or some other language to communicate with persons not fluent in Estonian.

Government institutions and state administrative agencies of the Estonian SSR will secure the private individual's ability to conduct business and communicate in the Estonian and Russian languages and to receive documents in the Estonian and Russian languages, depending on their purpose and the wishes of the individual. Communication in government institutions and state administrative agencies in the Estonian SSR and their issuance of documents in other languages can take place

depending on the goal of the activity and the abilities of these institutions, with a view to the ethnic composition of the local population and the requirements of inter-ethnic communication.

Establishments, Enterprises, and Organizations

Article 12. The Estonian language will be the language of the internal business conducted by establishments, enterprises, and organizations located within the territory of the Estonian SSR.

The continued use of the Russian language to conduct business for a specific period will be approved upon the receipt of a petition from the establishment, enterprise, or organization in the procedure established by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The issuance of job-related information in the Estonian language will also be guaranteed to employees, and internal documents in the Estonian language will be accepted from them. Subdivisions of these establishments, enterprises, and organizations will have the right to conduct business in the Estonian language. Business can also be conducted in a language other than Estonian in accordance with articles 20 and 25 of this law.

Article 13. Technical documents received by these establishments, enterprises, and organizations from outside the Estonian SSR can be used in the original language.

Establishments, enterprises, and organizations in the Estonian SSR can only issue technical documents in a language other than Estonian at the request of the client.

Article 14. The correspondence sent outside the Estonian SSR by establishments, enterprises, and organizations within the Estonian SSR will be conducted in a language acceptable to both sides.

Article 15. Establishments, enterprises, and organizations located within the Estonian SSR will use the Estonian language to communicate with one another and with government institutions and state administrative agencies of the Estonian SSR.

Establishments, enterprises, and organizations conducting business in Russian can communicate with one another in Russian.

Article 16. Establishments, enterprises, and organizations will use the Estonian language to communicate with private individuals in the Estonian SSR and the Russian language or some other language to communicate with persons not fluent in Estonian.

Establishments, enterprises, and organizations in the Estonian SSR will secure the private individual's ability to conduct business and communicate in the Estonian and Russian languages and to receive documents in the Estonian or Russian languages, depending on their purpose and the wishes of the individual.

Article 17. The intra-republic reports and financial documents of establishments, enterprises, and organizations located in the Estonian SSR will be written in Estonian.

Legal Proceedings

Article 18. The Estonian language will be used in pre-trial correspondence and legal proceedings in the Estonian SSR. All of the individuals involved in legal proceedings who are not fluent in Estonian will be provided with translations of all legal materials in their native language or in another language acceptable to them.

Pre-trial correspondence and legal proceedings can also be conducted in another language in special cases with the consent of all of the concerned parties.

Education, Science, and Culture

Article 19. The Estonian SSR will secure education in the Estonian language throughout its territory.

The Estonian SSR acknowledges the equal right of all of its citizens to receive a public general education in their native language.

Article 20. Citizens of the Estonian SSR will have the right to attend monolingual (as regards the language of instruction and education) pre-school establishments and general educational schools.

Non-Estonian pre-school establishments and schools can conduct internal business in their native language.

The administrators of pre-school establishments and academic institutions and instructors and educators must be fluent in the language of instruction and education in their establishment.

Article 21. The Estonian SSR will secure the teaching of the Estonian language in all academic institutions and academic groups using other languages, regardless of their departmental jurisdiction.

All students of higher academic institutions who are not fluent in Estonian will be taught the Estonian language.

Article 22. Citizens of the Estonian SSR will have the right to receive a vocational and technical, secondary specialized, and higher education in the Estonian language in all of the specialties taught in the Estonian SSR.

Graduates of Russian-language schools in the Estonian SSR will be guaranteed continued education in the system of vocational and technical, secondary specialized, and higher education by the presence of Russian-language academic groups in accordance with the needs and abilities of the republic and by intensive instruction in the Estonian language during the initial period of vocational training in the Estonian language.

Article 23. The Estonian SSR will secure the right to submit scientific works, including those written to fulfill the requirements for an academic degree, and to defend them in the Estonian language.

No obstacles will be erected in the Estonian SSR to impede the choice of a language for scientific publications. Dissertations for academic degrees can be defended in other languages acceptable to the academic council in the corresponding field of knowledge.

Article 24. The Estonian SSR will secure the priority development of the Estonian-speaking culture will simultaneously supporting the cultural activities of other nationalities.

The distribution of information to the general public in the Estonian language should be secured in each city and rayon of the Estonian SSR.

The Estonian SSR will secure the priority publication of printed works in the Estonian language.

The Estonian SSR will secure the existence of radio stations and television channels for programs in the Estonian language and the accessibility of these programs in all parts of the Estonian SSR.

The Estonian SSR will secure the translation of movies, video films, and other audio-visual works for public consumption into Estonian.

Comprehensive information about the Estonian SSR will be presented in the Russian language on television and radio and in the press.

This law does not regulate the use of languages in the practice of religion and the performance of religious rites.

Article 25. National cultural associations in the Estonian SSR can conduct internal business in their own national languages and issue publications, official information, and documents in their own native language.

National cultural associations can work with existing government institutions to initiate the organization of pre-school establishments, schools, and cultural establishments functioning in their own native language and the issuance of periodicals in their own native language. They will have the right to organize extra-curricular educational undertakings in their native language.

Article 26. Speeches at various kinds of meetings and conferences in the Estonian SSR will be made in the language of the speaker's choice. Comprehension will be secured by translations.

The languages of international and inter-republic undertakings and matters pertaining to translation will be decided by organizing committees.

Names and Titles

Article 27. The Estonian language will be used for place names in the Estonian SSR. The only exceptions will be names chosen for historical and historico-cultural reasons.

Each place in the Estonian SSR will have one official name. It will be recorded in the letters of the Roman Estonian alphabet and can be translated into other alphabets in accordance with the rules established in the Estonian SSR.

Article 28. Each citizen of the Estonian SSR of the Estonian nationality will have a first name (or several) and a last name (single or hyphenated). Additional elements will be used only at the request of the citizen. The first and last names of the individual will be written in the Roman Estonian alphabet and can be translated into other alphabets in accordance with the rules established in the Estonian SSR.

Estonian citizens of other nationalities will be named in accordance with their national traditions; for official purposes, they will have to have at least a first name and a last name. The names of citizens of other nationalities will be written in accordance with established rules in documents in the Estonian language.

Article 29. The international spelling of the names of places and people in the Estonian SSR in the Roman alphabet will be identical to the accepted spelling in the Estonian SSR.

The international spelling in the Roman alphabet of the names of means of transport, buildings, structures, and other objects officially named with an Estonian word or proper name and written in Roman letters in the original will be identical to the spelling of these words or proper nouns in Estonian texts.

Article 30. The details of the proper usage of names and titles are stipulated in the Law of the Estonian SSR on Names and Titles.

Symbols and Information

Article 31. Official lists and forms used in the Estonian SSR will be printed in Estonian, and the Estonian text can be accompanied by translations.

Lists and forms in other languages can be used in accordance with articles 12, 20, and 25 of this law and in correspondence sent outside the Estonian SSR.

Article 32. The text of seals, postmarks, and stamps must be in the Estonian language, accompanied by translations when necessary.

Article 33. The text of signs, announcements, notices, and advertisements intended for public consumption should be written in Estonian. This can be followed by a translation

or transcription, in print no larger than the print of the Estonian text. The translation of texts will be carried out with a view to the requirements of local inhabitants and of inter-republic and international communication.

Announcements, notices, and advertisements pertaining to national cultural associations and schools and inter-ethnic communications can be in other languages.

Consumer information in the Estonian language should be provided for all goods sold in the Estonian SSR.

Article 34. Sets of registered symbols in the Estonian SSR can contain only Roman letters.

Enactment of the Law

Article 35. Articles 2, 3, 11, and 16 of this law will go into effect within a year, articles 6, 10, 15, 17, 31, 32, and the third paragraph of Article 33 will go into effect within 2 years, and articles 5 and 34 will go into effect within 4 years after the passage of the law.

Article 36. In the case of local government institutions and state administrative agencies where business has been conducted in the Russian language to date and where the overwhelming majority of the population of the administrative territory is not fluent in Estonian, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium can postpone the enactment of the first paragraph of Article 8 of this law until there has been a change in the linguistic situation in this territory.

This provision will not apply to the capital of the Estonian SSR, Tallinn, and its rayons.

The local government institutions and state administrative agencies mentioned in the first paragraph of this article will have the right to communicate in Russian with one another and with establishments, enterprises, and organizations conducting their internal business in Russian.

Article 37. Article 4 of the law will go into effect sequentially in the 4 years following its passage.

Lists of the specialties and occupations covered by Article 4 of the law and language fluency requirements for different specialties and occupations will be drawn up by the language protection commission of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and approved by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium at the same time that the commission decides the procedure of certification and the dates of enactment. Language instruction will be secured in line with the procedure established by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers.

Oversight and Responsibility for Observance of the Law

Article 38. Administrators of government institutions and state administrative agencies and of establishments, enterprises, and organizations in the Estonian SSR will be personally responsible for the fulfillment of the requirements of this law within their jurisdiction.

The officials and employees listed in Article 4 of this law who are found guilty of the deliberate violation of the law will be held accountable in the manner stipulated by law.

Article 39. The language protection commission of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will oversee the observance of this law.

Estonia Passes Law on Repression Victims

Text of Laws

18000377a Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 18 Dec 88 p 3

[Texts of laws on extrajudicial repressions, and amendments to Estonian criminal code]

[Text]

Law of the Estonian SSR on the Extrajudicial Mass Repressions in Soviet Estonia During the Period 1940 - 1950.

The extrajudicial mass repressions of the period 1940 - 1950, which caused irreparable harm and suffering to the people, were a manifestation of the Stalinist violence, tyranny and lawlessness.

In accordance with the CPSU Central Committee decree, a review of the state of affairs with regard to persons who suffered in the mass repressions is being conducted under the supervision of the courts. In the last year alone hundreds of citizens have been rehabilitated in the Estonian SSR. However, this work is proceeding slowly. A procedure for compensating victims for damage to property is required as additional legal regulation.

In order to alleviate the injustice committed and restore the honor and dignity of people who were the victims of extrajudicial mass repressions, and to petition for compensation for moral, physical and material harm caused, and also in order to create trust among the people that violence, tyranny and lawlessness shall not be repeated, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees as follows:

1. To condemn totally and without reservation the extrajudicial mass repressions committed in the period 1940 - 1950 in Soviet Estonia and to deem them acts against the law and against humanity.

2. To rehabilitate, with all the legal consequences stemming from this, all persons deported for special resettlement. To rehabilitate persons repressed by decrees of the Special Tribunal, using procedure as provided for by legislation.

3. To propose to the Estonian SSR Procuracy that it review statements and reports on the mass murders and other acts against humanity committed in Soviet Estonia, and resolve questions concerning the initiation of criminal proceedings and prosecution under criminal law. The results of the review of materials and of the investigations shall be made public.

4. The Estonian SSR Council of Ministers shall act as follows:

1) devise by 1 March 1989 procedure for compensation for damages caused to persons who were victims of the extrajudicial mass repressions. Proposals on differences in the application of civil and labor legislation with regard to rehabilitation shall be examined in the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;

2) in support of popular initiative, perpetuate the memory of the victims of Stalinism in the Estonian SSR;

3) compile lists of persons repressed on an extrajudicial basis and establish procedure for providing notification of rehabilitation and publicizing rehabilitation;

4) take steps to guarantee the safekeeping of documents reflecting the mass repressions and other acts against humanity committed in Soviet Estonia.

5. To approve the draft of a USSR law "On Extrajudicial Mass Repressions During the period of Stalinism" and submit it on the basis of article 113 of the USSR Constitution as a legislative initiative for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed] A. Ryuytel, Chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

V. Vakht, Secretary of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Tallinn, 7 December 1988.

Law of the Estonian SSR on the Introduction of Additions to the Estonian SSR Criminal Code.

The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees as follows:

To make the following addition to the Estonian SSR Criminal Code (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ESSR No 1, 1961, item 3) as article 198(1):

"Article 198(1). Destruction of, damage to or concealment of documents reflecting mass repressions or other acts against humanity

"(1) Destruction, damage or concealment of documents reflecting mass repressions or other acts against humanity committed on the territory of the Estonian SSR during the period 1940 - 1950—"shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a period up to 6 months or by corrective labor for a period up to 1 year.

"(2) The same acts committed by an official shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a period up to 1 year with or without deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities for a period up to 5 years" [Signed] A. Ryuytel, Chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

A. Vakht, Secretary of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Tallinn, 7 December 1988

Report by Supreme Court Chairman
18000377a Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 18 Dec 88 p 1

[Unattributed report on speech by Ya. Kirikal, chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Court, at the 9th Session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet 11th Convocation: "On the Extrajudicial Mass Repressions in Estonia During the Period 1940 - 1950"]

[Text] Esteemed deputies, Assessment of the Stalinist mass repressions is unambiguous: they were illegal acts against humanity. This was also stated at Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 11th Plenum. Proceeding from this, the task for the legislator in the republic is to rehabilitate the victims of the mass repressions within the limits of his competence.

The drafts of the laws that have been circulated among you were born out of controversy. The group of deputies to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet elected in Tartu in cooperation with scholars from the law department at the Tartu State University, drew up draft legislation that was published in the newspaper EDAZI. Unfortunately, it contained no legal mechanism to achieve the aims set. In parallel with this, a working group on the extrajudicial mass repressions set up under the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was also acting.

There was no controversy about those deported for special settlement in 1941 and 1949 either within the working group or with agreeing the draft with the scholars: it had to be full rehabilitation for those deported. Although even here there is a legal problem: the legal bases for deportation for special resettlement were established by legislation of the USSR. Here, we gave due consideration to the fact that control over the legality of the deportations rested with the republic organs, and hence the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet was competent to make decisions about the rehabilitation of those

deported. Already on 7 September 1988 the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers abrogated the decree on the deportation of the kulaks and members of their families, and rehabilitated them.

The most serious controversy arose in connection with those repressed on the basis of decrees by the Special Tribunal—the extrajudicial organ that imposed criminal punishments.

There is no doubt the the Special Tribunal was not in accordance with the USSR Constitution and was illegal. In 1953 the Special Tribunal was abolished and the right to abrogate its decisions was granted to the USSR Supreme Court, and in 1957, to the supreme courts of the union republics. During 1956-1958 many of the decisions of the Special Tribunal were reviewed and we rehabilitated more than 1,000 citizens. In addition, another 3,200 families of those deported were rehabilitated. But then this work came to a halt.

Last year we continued it. Today we have rehabilitated another 200 citizens. But this situation satisfies neither the law enforcement organs nor the citizens. Consequently, it is necessary to organize a review of the cases of the victims of the mass repressions so as to insure their rapid rehabilitation. This is why the need arose to resort to the procedure of legislation initiative to the USSR Supreme Soviet in order to resolve the issue fully. A union republic is not competent to resolve this through its own decree.

The working group on the extrajudicial mass repressions has drawn up three draft legislative enactments:

1. A draft Estonian SSR law on the extrajudicial mass repressions in Soviet Estonia in the period 1940 - 1950;
2. On an addition to the Estonian SSR Criminal Code with article 198(1) on responsibility for the destruction of, damage to or concealment of documents concerning the mass repressions or other acts against humanity;
3. A draft for a USSR law on the extrajudicial mass repressions during the period of Stalinism.

The concept of these drafts is that a legal assessment be made of the extrajudicial mass repressions and in order to create in people a sense of conviction that tyranny, violence and lawlessness can never be repeated, and to submit a proposal to recognize in a USSR law that the extrajudicial mass repressions of the Stalinist period were crimes against humanity, providing for responsibility for crimes against humanity in the criminal legislation that is drawn up.

The Estonian SSR law would rehabilitate all those deported, with all the legal consequences stemming from this. In terms of numbers the Estonian SSR law will mean the rehabilitation of another 11,000 people.

During work on the draft, due consideration was given to the fact the the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers and Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium must devise and clarify procedure for compensating victims with respect to property damages. A number of complex problems exist here stemming from the fields of civil and labor law.

It is also important to establish procedure to provide notification of rehabilitation. The addition to the Estonian SSR Criminal Code stems from the desire to guarantee the safekeeping of archives and other documents concerning the mass repressions.

Resolution of issues outside the competence of the Estonian SSR are included in the draft of the USSR law. Here, due consideration has been given to the fact that the CPSU Central Committee has set up a commission to work on these problems, headed by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member A. Yakovlev. The conclusions of this commission must be taken into consideration.

I believe that the draft laws distributed to you are now legally correct and can serve as a basis for the adoption of laws.

I know that already today many would like to have done with the consequences of all the extrajudicial mass repressions and restore social justice. Unfortunately, it is not possible to do this without moving outside the framework of the legal competence of the Estonian SSR. But today's decisions affect at least 11,000 people. No legislative enactment can compensate those deported for their moral and physical suffering, bring them back to life or make proper redress. But we are able to return to those people and their children and grandchildren their good name, honor and dignity, and create a legal basis for providing compensation for damages as to property. This is expected of us and it must necessarily be done. Thank you for your attention.

Supreme Soviet Discussion.

18000377a Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 15 Dec 88 p 3

[ETA report: "The 9th Session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet 11th Convocation. The Innocent Victims Must Be Rehabilitated. The Discussion on the Report of the Estonian SSR Supreme Court Chairman Ya. Kirikal on the Extrajudicial Mass Repressions in Soviet Estonia During the Period 1940 - 1950"]

[Text] The heavy legacy of the Stalin era is still affecting our life. One shameful page of the time of tyranny and lawlessness was the mass extrajudicial repressions in Soviet Estonia during the period 1940 - 1950, when thousands and tens of thousands of people were deported without trial or investigation for special resettlement, whence many never returned. The honor and

dignity of the innocent victims of tyranny and lawlessness must be restored and their descendants compensated insofar as is possible for the moral and material damages sustained. Expressing the will of the electorate, this is precisely how the question was posed by the deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet.

We are building a legal state, deputy I. Aleksin said in his statement, and this means that we must assess the tragic events of the time of personality cult. The accounts from the reign of Stalin (I do not say Stalinism because that word is somehow associated in a bad with with the words "Leninism," "Communism" and "Marxism") have still not been finally settled. And it is still to early to think about burying this subject in oblivion. New crimes are being made public all the time. This spring we learned about the tragedy played out in the Kuropaty forest near Minsk. Stalin's assistants shot down at least 30,000 people there. This is matched by the evil and mass repressions of 1941-1949 committed on the territory of Estonia. During the 1940's the republic lost about 15 percent of its population. Many of those losses were connected directly or indirectly with the Stalinist terror.

The mass deportations of 14 and 16 June 1941 and of 25-27 March 1949 were particularly serious. In the summer of 1941 some 10,205 people were sent from Estonia for special resettlement, including 5,103 women and 2,150 children aged under 14 years. In March 1949 it was planned, actually planned, to deport 22,326 people. It was not possible to fulfill that plan in full because 3,075 men managed to hide, so it was necessary deport an extra 339 women and an extra 908 children. It is clear from the report by Kumm, who was at that time the chief of the Estonian Committee for State Security, that in addition to the 22,326 people, another 1,906 families were planned as a reserve. And after the men went into hiding, from that reserve 1,323 families were deported. Just think how they strove to fulfill the plans! As a result, only 8 percent of those deported were men aged 20 to 49 while the rest were children, women and old people.

In addition to the two main actions there were several other on a smaller scale. The most significant occurred between 1 and 3 June 1941 on the islands of Saaremaa, Khiumaa, Mukhu and Vormsi.

Special resettlement is a criminal penalty and only a court is empowered to impose it. And the extrajudicial mass repressions were carried out on the basis of lists compiled in executive organs and the so-called special tribunals. Thus, even the most elementary legality was lacking. The mass repressions must be considered crimes against humanity. This was exactly the decision reached by the Tartu city soviet of people's deputies. It was based on the principles of international law as defined in UN documents. Recognition of the extrajudicial mass repressions as crimes against humanity signifies their condemnation at the state level and confirms that such crimes are not subject to limitation of responsibility by virtue of time elapsed, and it also provides

a basis for regarding their victims as people who suffered moral, physical and material harm from those crimes. This would also be an important guarantee insuring the irreversibility of perestroyka.

I propose that in the material distributed to you, after the words "totally and without reservation condemn the extrajudicial mass repressions of the period 1940 - 1950 in Soviet Estonia" the words "and deem them a crime against humanity" be inserted.

Let us just consider: why in general do we need a law on the extrajudicial mass repressions in the Estonian SSR in the period 1940 - 1950? This was the question posed by deputy E. Savisaar in his statement.

First and foremost we need to qualify legally what really happened at that time. What happened must be expressed in legal language. And we are talking about a crime.

Second, it is necessary to create an opportunity in principle for us to be able to initiate criminal proceedings against the perpetrators.

Third, it is essential that the former victims and their descendants realize that ultimately justice triumphs. Once we condemned the fascist mass repressions, and this means that the time has come also to condemn the Stalinist repressions.

Fourth it is necessary to create the kind of legal standard that would become the basis not only for today but also for the future.

Unfortunately, present legislation does not fully achieve these aims. The issue is found in paragraph 1, where the repressions are called illegal and inhumane acts. But this is only a moral judgment that does not have legal meaning.

The mass repressions must be qualified as crimes against humanity, as was expressed in the proposal of the previous speaker and as has been set forth in the draft law published in EDAZI. It is necessary to show clearly that it is a question of a crime, and moreover of the kind of crime that has no statute of limitation under international law.

Usual criminal legislation does not have retroactive force. Only if we qualify the mass repressions as a crime against humanity shall we be able to apply this law in practice. A crime against humanity is the official term in international law that needs no clarification either abroad or here. The term is applied not only in international but also Soviet law. Just recall the numerous court cases of which everyone is aware that took place in Estonia in the Sixties. The attitude of the Soviet Union to this term has always been unambiguously clear and we have no reason to muddy the waters. I am introducing two proposals into the draft law.

In paragraph 2 where those to be rehabilitated are listed, to the deported should also be added those persons who were repressed by a decision of the special tribunals, and also the victims of mass murders. The second proposal on paragraph 2 provides that persons repressed by decision of the special tribunals should be rehabilitated under a legislative procedure. This proposal should be excluded. I believe that this amendment is particularly important for the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia who arrived here to take up permanent residence later. I know several Russians living here for whom the fates of their fathers and mothers the decisions of the special tribunals played a decisive role.

I am also introducing a proposal not only to review in paragraph 4.1 the procedure for compensating for losses caused to victims but also to introduce privileged social security.

In conclusion permit me to express the opinion the adoption of these amendments are of great importance.

What, fellow deputies, do the people living in Estonia expect of us? This was the question posed by deputy E-A. Sillari to those present. They expect that with the decisions made today we shall take one more step toward the restoration of the truth.

One of the most tragic events of the recent past for the Estonia people was the deportations of 1941 and 1949. For the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet commission on legislative proposals there is not the slightest doubt that those deported for special resettlement in 1941 and 1949 must be fully rehabilitated. It is our duty, insofar as it is today possible, to compensate people for their suffering. It is necessary to restore the honor and dignity of the victims and provide compensation for the harm caused them. The people must be given an assurance that violence, tyranny and lawlessness shall never be repeated.

The commission has therefore unanimously approved the decision to submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet a legislative initiative to adopt a USSR law on the extrajudicial mass repressions during the period of Stalinism. This law should make clear and state unambiguously that the extrajudicial mass repressions during the period of Stalinism must be condemned without reservation and deemed a crime against humanity. The USSR Supreme Soviet has the right to do this. It falls within its competence.

I believe that the legislative initiative of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet will be met with approval not only in our republic but also beyond its borders because it was not only Estonians but also all the peoples of Soviet Union who suffered.

Many of the victims of the mass repressions of the period 1940 - 1950 in the Estonian SSR and their descendants live in Tallinn. The years spent in resettlement caused

irreparable loss in the normal tenor of life. Their native places perished. The result has been a lasting bitterness to this day, apathy, political dissatisfaction, and tension in interethnic relations.

It would be advisable to draw up a comprehensive program to really heal the wounds inflicted by the repressions. This is not only the performance of a duty by the state but also a major step toward political stability, consolidation and optimism. This was written by a man who himself lived through those brutal years.

Today I propose adoption of the law in the form submitted. Many people expect this. And we should do this. I also have a proposal to set forth paragraph 2 of the Estonian SSR law changing the words "to deem rehabilitated" to read "rehabilitate."

I am not a deputy, said Estonian SSR procurator L. Urge, and therefore I was not proposing to speak today on this issue, but the seriousness of the problem forces me to do this.

For the first time the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet is exercising its constitutional right and is making a legislative request to the USSR Supreme Soviet. And this assumes major responsibility and absolute juridical and political correctness. If we want to rehabilitate thousands of people in the immediate future it is necessary to adopt the laws now being debated in the editorial version that was approved late in the evening the day before yesterday by the commission on legislative proposals.

The republic's law enforcement organs and the republic's entire public has for a whole year been consulting with their own consciences in the matter of restoring the honor and dignity of the victims of the extrajudicial repressions.

The consistent work carried out in accordance with the law has born fruit. All those repressed as kulaks have been rehabilitated. Work continues daily on rehabilitation of other people. However, we are simply physically unable to bring this work to a conclusion. I therefore beg you from the bottom of my heart to vote to adopt these laws. What has been undertaken must be brought urgently to a conclusion, and it is essential that calm and a sense of security be returned to our home.

The draft law submitted by a group of deputies of the Supreme Soviet from Tartu and the corresponding reference material were published in the newspaper EDAZI on 6 October, deputy T. Laak announced. There is therefore no point in dwelling on those documents in more detail.

Why was that proposal submitted? In order, finally, to provide a principled assessment of the extrajudicial mass repressions as relapses into Stalinist tyranny and lawlessness. They are recognized as crimes against humanity in the decisions of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 11th Plenum.

Second, in order to alleviate to some extent the injustice that was done and to restore the honor and dignity of the victims of the mass repressions and provide compensation for material harm.

And third, and perhaps most important of all, because our people need a sense of assurance that the kind of violence, tyranny and lawlessness that occurred during the time of the extrajudicial mass repressions in Estonia in the period 1940 - 1950 can never be repeated.

All these purposes are set forth in the preamble of the draft law that has been circulated among us.

In the actual resolution section, however, many questions have been left hanging in the air and contain certain internal contradictions. In proposing that this issue be placed on the agenda I was guided by the draft law that was approved by the commission on legislative proposals. Unfortunately, this draft has not been made available to the deputies and they were given a quite new, different draft.

Through its legislative activity the Supreme Soviet is striving for application of the principles of a legal state in our society and political life. So that what is today hampering us in rejecting the ambiguity and relating to what occurred in accordance in plan targets for deportation, and even the overfulfillment of the plan by deporting women and children, may be deemed a crime. It so happens that we simply do not have any limit on the truth and we are writing that truth into the draft union law. At the same time, our draft law qualifies these actions as illegal acts. What are illegal acts? They are acts that are at variance with the law, but the law does not establish responsibility for them.

In paragraph 2 of the draft law in the version presented to us, we pass over the circumstance that the so-called special tribunals set up in 1934 never had any constitutional right to engage in the performance of the administration of justice, and this is even more true today. Their activity was unconstitutional and hence invalid. What a paradox: invalid, but what evil stemmed from it!

In fact, we cannot set the task of rehabilitating those repressed by sentence of the special tribunals as a legislative procedure or within the legislative procedure envisaged because neither the cases nor court sentences relating to those persons legally exist, and hence they must simply be deemed rehabilitated. Of course, this interpretation has nothing in common with attempts to

expunge the guilt of the perpetrators of the crimes. The degree of their guilt and punishment should be established under legal procedure.

In our opinion all these problems and contradictions are resolved by the draft USSR law "On the Extrajudicial Mass Repressions of the Period of Stalinism" as submitted by the group of deputies from Tartu. I therefore fully support the proposal to approve the draft USSR law "On the Extrajudicial Mass Repressions of the Period of Stalinism" and its submission for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet as a legislative initiative.

With regard to the Estonian SSR draft law "On the Extrajudicial Mass Repressions in Soviet Estonia During the Period 1940 - 1950," I propose that the draft legislation submitted to us for consideration be opened up for public debate and that we return to the matter on 18 January.

With regard to the serious problem of the urgent rehabilitation of all those repressed, I believe that a resolution on this matter should be adopted without delay.

No one can have any doubt the lawless acts perpetrated during the period of personality cult should be condemned, said deputy V. Poryvkin in his statement. Neither is there any doubt that socialist legality should be restored and all those condemned without cause rehabilitated.

Much work has been done on this draft and there has been well-argued debate because the problem is a really acute one and is evoking much justified emotion and indignation. In my opinion the draft submitted by the commission on legislative proposals is the most acceptable. Many changes may be made to it but but I would like to touch on one question of principle that in my view arises in connection with the proposals made by comrade Savisaar.

There is no doubt that all those exiled must be rehabilitated, particularly the children, women and families. This is clearly reflected in this draft. With regard to those convicted by special tribunal. Unfortunately, it is impossible to agree with the demand to rehabilitate everyone. No matter how much we might want to. Why? First, this kind of sweeping rehabilitation is also unlawful. For this is precisely how we must regard the freeing of a criminal from responsibility as rehabilitation rather than by amnesty of some other enactment. For example, why must we today rehabilitate the Vlasov people, whose hands are stained with blood? As an old soldier and a deputy today I cannot agree to this. We have discussed this issue in the commission for legislative proposals and ultimately it agreed with our conclusions.

Let me offer another example. I have with me material concerning the someone condemned by special tribunal. Voldemar Kustasovich Yakovets, an inhabitant of

Yygeva, was sentenced to 25 years. This is what happened to him. In July 1941 together with his friends he had attacked a Red Army man from an aviation unit of the Red Army and he personally had killed him. In the autumn of 1941 he took part in the shooting of soviet activists Bauman and Graune. In October 1941 he reported four Soviet paratroopers who had stayed overnight to the German forces of occupation. In the morning they were shot. Two months later he again invited a group of Soviet paratroopers to stay overnight, fed them, and in the morning handed them over to be shot. In 1947 he took part in bloody acts of terrorism against peaceful inhabitants. I make no mention of theft from state and cooperative enterprises. He has served his sentence. But I think that rehabilitation for this man would be a new unlawful act. I therefore propose that comrade Savisaar's amendment be rejected and the draft submitted be approved.

Deputy Kh. Eller opened his statement as follows: The issue being discussed today obviously troubles all of us. Some directly, others indirectly. I was 8 years old when the open tarpaulin-covered vehicle arrive at my father's home and carried off schoolchildren from the Nittim family who were staying with us. Our family was not touched.

When we discussed the question of the repressions on Khiyumaa we were very serious and very careful. The present draft laws are not only legal documents but first and foremost political documents and, I would say, moral documents. I would like us to have the strength and intelligence to rid tens of thousands of people of the heavy burden that they have been carrying for decades. I therefore propose that the deputies vote in favor of the draft proposed by the commission. Why am I trying to achieve this? I know how the lawyers can twist the articles so that what we today declare to be rehabilitation may a month later be disaffirmed and the heavy burden laid on people again. In the opinion of most jurists in the republic and the members of the commission on legislative proposals, the proposed text is absolutely correct from a legal standpoint.

T. Laak was mistaken when he said that the draft distributed to deputies was not considered by the commission on legislative proposals and that no one had edited it. A vote was taken at 2000 hours on 5 December and the draft was adopted precisely in this version. Only one error crept in. In paragraph 3 the words "deem rehabilitated" were written but it had been decided to use the expression "rehabilitated." This is the opinion of the members of the commission for legislative proposals. I ask you to support the proposed draft and then the question can finally be resolved.

I would like to express three ideas about the draft laws being discussed, said deputy K. Kimmel.

First, I was a member of the working group under the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium engaged in preparing the initial drafts of the documents being discussed. Unfortunately, many of us were not invited to the meetings of the commission for legislative proposals at which these documents were worked on. The draft submitted to the session contains significant differences from certain of the working group's viewpoints.

At the last meeting of the working group I proposed that Stalinism be condemned as an inhuman ideology that in an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust propagated lawlessness and repression and that had nothing in common with the principles of scientific communism. This proposal was supported by members of the working group. But this proposal is not in the draft presented to us. I believe that excluding condemnation of Stalinism from the draft will soften the assessment of the tragedy that Stalinism brought for the Soviet people. In my opinion it is impossible to offer a true assessment of the events of that time if the chief inquisitor and his misanthropic ideology are not condemned. I therefore propose that a corresponding provision be inserted in the draft all-union law that we are about to submit for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. We have nothing to lose in fighting for this. For someone will surely introduce it. It is a demand of the times.

In connection with the above I propose a new formulation for the title of the USSR law, namely, "Liquidation of the Inhumane Consequences of Stalinism." At the same time I propose that paragraph 1 of this draft law be formulated as follows: "Totally and without reservation to condemn Stalinism as an inhuman phenomenon that involved unlawful and Stalinist mass repressions incompatible with the principles of socialism. To deem the mass repressions perpetrated upon innocent people as a crime against humanity."

Second, I propose that the word "extrajudicial" be excluded from both drafts since it narrows the scale and volume of the Stalinist repressions and makes it impossible to rehabilitate morally many of the victims of Stalinism. The fact is that many people were illegally suppressed by military tribunals while others were condemned by judicial organs and even the USSR Supreme Court. At first blush this was done within the framework of the law but essentially many show trials involving political accusations at that time were indistinguishable from those considered by the special tribunals. The more so since it was a matter of indifference to the sentenced person whether it was a court of a special tribunal.

And third: I consider it my duty to draw the attention of deputies to paragraph 2 of the Estonian SSR draft law, which concerns questions connected with an entire series of enforceable enactments of all-union organs and ukases of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium now in force. I fully support the desire to rehabilitate all those who were exiled but let us do this in accordance with the law so that no one may entertain doubts as to the legal competence of

our decisions or that they will actually be realized. For this it is essential that the first two words of paragraph 2, "deem rehabilitated" be replaced with the word "rehabilitate." There are no complaints about the remainder of the content of the draft law. I propose that the documents be adopted in the form in which they were submitted by the commission for legislative proposals.

I was not intending to speak today, said Estonian SSR minister of justice A. Kuris, but since the range of problems is become heated I shall set forth several ideas.

In fact, the issue being discussed today is very important and as we resolve it we must give due consideration to the fact that other republics will be watching us. Mass repressions were also carried out in Lithuania and Latvia and in other republics in the European part of the USSR, and also in the krais and oblasts of inner Russia. It is not therefore happenstance that the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission, of which comrade Kirikal has already spoken, is engaged with these issues.

Taking these circumstances into account, a law that we adopt today will probably attract very great attention. I support comrade Urge in that the decision we reach must be legally correct in both form and essence. At the same time we must satisfy the quite justified desire of 11,000 people to be unconditionally rehabilitated. It is obvious that the disputes are resulting increasingly from the assessment of the extrajudicial mass repressions. This is the first paragraph of the draft submitted by the commission for legislative proposals. Here, we must give attention to world outlook factors. The first is that the decisions on conducting the mass repressions were made by all-union organs and, unfortunately, some of them remain in force to this day.

Second. Why the draft of the decision is so splintered. Some must be rehabilitated immediately, others under established legal procedure, while for yet others the Estonian SSR Procuracy can do this, and so forth. This means that the repressions differed one from another. Some people were deported without any legal justification, except for those who have been rehabilitated by corresponding act of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers. What fell within the competence of our republic has already been done. There is more. Some people were repressed by the so-called special tribunals. The special tribunals were unconstitutional bodies but at the same time their activity was based on a decision of the USSR Central Executive Committee and USSR Council of People's Commissars dated 5 November 1934. In such cases there was at least some kind of investigation and certain materials were compiled, and it is on the basis of those materials that the cases are now being reviewed and rehabilitation implemented under a legal procedure.

The third category is people who were repressed under a legal procedure that was in fact a violation of the law. Legal procedure has been established for their rehabilitation. The least number of problems are connected with them but it is clear that they cannot be rehabilitated wholesale.

I doubt that it is possible to qualify all these acts as crimes against humanity. We know from history that only twice have such acts been qualified as crimes against humanity. The international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo deemed inhumane the crimes of fascism against peaceful populations during the war years. Is the republic Supreme Soviet competent to make this kind of decision about the actions we are discussing here, and call them crimes against humanity? I do not think that it is, and to be accurate from a legal standpoint, even our contribution to a draft all-union law is also inaccurate. Obviously this should be done by some legal body when an assessment of this category of actions has been made.

I propose that we adopt the drafts in the form in which they have been presented by the commission for legislative proposals.

I would not agree with the proposal from deputy Kimmel on the addition to the draft of the all-union law. Obviously we cannot resolve all the issues connected with Stalinism and its consequences using this law. There were many consequences and they are seen in various spheres but right now we are talking about the extrajudicial mass repressions. Let us stay on the subject.

We cannot resolve the question of omitting the word "extrajudicial" from the draft since there is a law covering the rehabilitation of those repressed under a legal procedure, and rehabilitation of victims through the courts has already been in the main completed. At the same time, the review of these cases continues under established legal procedure.

As a member of the commission I personally have studied the draft law, said deputy R. Rustlaan. I have three proposals for you.

First, the law should be adopted in the form in which it has been presented by the commission for legislative proposals. Tens of thousands of people expect this today. There is no person or family in Estonia that was not affected in some way or other by the Stalinist mass repressions.

Second, there is no doubt that the draft law should be seen as a legislative initiative to be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

I propose that the proposals made by the Tartu deputies be restored to the draft resolution. This is at paragraph 3 subparagraph 4. The beginning of this should read

"restore and make public materials available in the republic on the extrajudicial repressions"; it will then be easier to arrive at subsequent decisions.

Estonian Academician Criticizes PRAVDA Coverage of Republic Events

18000421 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 27 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by M. L. Bronshteyn, academician of the ESSR Academy of Sciences, delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference: "What is Happening in Estonia?"]

[Text] Dear Viktor Grigoryevich!

Recently more and more frequently my friends have been writing and calling me from other republics. Alarmed, they ask: "Is it true that in Estonia the dominant positions are held by extremists and nationalists who wish to separate the republic from the Union, is it not dangerous to live there, is the border open, and so forth?" I ask: "Where did you get such mistaken ideas? They reply: "We are reading PRAVDA and other central publications." I read them too. Estonia does not escape the newspaper's attention. Just recently at the end of November and the beginning of December there appeared on the pages of PRAVDA a conversation with a deputy of the ESSR Supreme Soviet V. Koltakov entitled "Why I Voted Against," and articles by an academician of the ESSR Academy of Sciences G. Naan, "Head Over Heels," and the editor-in-chief of the magazine EESTI KOMMUNIST L. Annus entitled "Pluralism Inside Out."

I can agree with the estimates of certain facts given in these articles. Yes, adjustments to the Estonian SSR Constitution were made hastily. Not everything in them goes without question. In particular, I am critical of the formulation pertaining to state ownership of production capital in the republic. I have encountered fairly irresponsible statements and publications in the local press. I shall simply note that extremism and national intolerance are condemned by the majority of the republic's population, the leaders and members of social movements, and the creative intelligentsia.

The path to consolidation and a reasonable balance of interests is still complicated and contradictory. Thus there was great chagrin about the results of the constituent conference of the Combined Council of Labor Collectives (OSTK) on 30 November 1988 in Tallinn. There appeared in the republic two organizations that represent the interests of labor collectives of the Estonian SSR, which are separated mainly in terms of departmental (under Union or republic jurisdiction) and national indicators in spite of the common economic programs which are directed toward practical implementation of the idea of republic cost accounting. Now a good deal is being undertaken so that the policy proclaimed by both associations of consolidation of the labor collectives will be implemented. This is a complicated and difficult

process. But the reader will not find an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of it on the pages of PRAVDA. And partial truth creates a distorted picture of reality.

Dear Viktor Grigoryevich, I remember well your well-argued statement at the 19th All-Union Party Conference in support of glasnost. But why does glasnost turn out to be one-sided on the pages of PRAVDA? In PRAVDA as, incidentally, in other central publications they did not publish the complete text of the decisions of the extraordinary session of the ESSR Supreme Soviet. There was no space on the pages of the newspaper for the statement, say, of the deputy of the ESSR Supreme Soviet with the arguments "Why I am voting in favor" (it was published only in the local press). And yet there were many more of these deputies. With this interpretation of the subject the PRAVDA reader cannot understand the words of M. S. Gorbachev, who in his speech at the meeting of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, critically evaluating the corrections to the ESSR Constitution as contradicting the existing USSR Constitution, emphasized that many problems raised in Estonia actually do exist and must be resolved.

What are these problems about? Where did they come from? One must understand that the tension that has arisen in the interrelations between the republic and Union agencies is not the result of the malicious machinations of "bourgeois nationalists" or forces against restructuring (although they can take advantage of the existing tension for their own purposes). This tension is the result of contradictions in our internal development which were revealed at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the 27th Congress, and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The return of administrative-command methods, the excessive concentration of material and financial resources at the disposal of the central departments, and the degrading of local and republic agencies of Soviet authority led to serious and sometimes catastrophic economic, ecological, and social consequences which had an effect on international relations. Our Union press is overflowing with examples of the departmental robbery. They were brought up by almost every deputy speaking from the podium at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

Acting in the local areas as representatives of Union interests, the branch ministries and departments have essentially ceased being actual bearers of these interests. The narrow departmental approach, whereby the specific goal is to increase the production of a given kind of product (whether it be metal or pulp paper, electric energy or fertilizers) at any price, not only rules out integrated and balanced development of a given territory; its final result is the retardation and halting of economic and social development of the country as a whole with a sharp increase of limitations on resources.

Here one must take note of another extremely important aspect of the problem: under the conditions of a multinational country unresolved or incorrectly resolved economic and social contradictions necessarily must be reflected in international relations.

Let us try to understand the psychology of the indigenous resident of our republic—the Estonian. There is the threat of an ecological catastrophe in the land where his ancestors have lived for thousands of years (and the threat would have become a reality of the corresponding Union ministry had not begun planned extraction of phosphorites). As a result of the extensive development of industry and the corresponding importation of work force from other regions of the country, the proportion of Estonians in the republic's population has been steadily decreasing: 90—80—70—60 percent. And if this tendency were to continue it would be possible to predict when the indigenous residents would become a national minority in their own land. The sphere of application of the Estonian language has been steadily decreasing. The Estonian people could hardly have expected such consequences when in 1940 they linked their destiny to that of the Soviet Union. This is why there arose such a strong desire for self-preservation, the desire to become the full-fledged masters of their own land and not followers of the will of the central departments, the desire to protect and preserve the union republic's right to sovereignty which is established in the USSR Constitution. And this right, if one looks at the problem more deeply, does not stand in contradiction to the interests of the USSR as a whole. Our common home, the Soviet Union, can become strong and flourish only under the condition that all the republics become strong and flourish and their peoples have a higher degree of independence and responsibility for the state of affairs in the local areas. And the natural division of labor, the normal exchange of products of labor activity, and the integration of efforts and means to solve the most important common economic and political problems within the framework of the Union will make it possible to combine and multiply our efforts for the purposes of our common flourishing. Such are the general tenets of the Leninist national policy which guided the republic party organization during the period of preparation for the 19th All-Union Party Conference and after the adoption of its most important resolutions directed toward democratization of economic and political life.

The republic's population has linked the solutions to economic, social, and national problems to the realization of the idea of regional (republic) cost accounting. Its correct interpretation and implementation opens up the possibility of consolidation of the interests and efforts of all of the republic's population and the direction of the common efforts toward a higher standard of living and balanced development not separately from other republic but on the basis of mutually advantageous, equivalent exchange and acknowledged participation in the solutions to the most important Unionwide programs. I wish to emphasize once again that the concept of cost accounting we have developed has nothing to do with a closed economy. Our basic interests consist in functioning within the framework of Unionwide division of labor and, correspondingly, the Union national economic complex. We have no thought of replacing the Union administrative-command system with a republic one.

Economic independence and responsibility should be given first and foremost to all enterprises operating on the territory of the republic, regardless of the department that has jurisdiction over them. But the republic must have the possibility of regulating economic, ecological, and demographic processes on its territory. The appropriate economic and legal regulators are being developed at the present time.

Now I shall allow myself to discuss the decisions of the extraordinary session of the ESSR Supreme Soviet which evoked such serious differences of opinion. What has been said above largely explains their adoption. Frankly, a number of points of the published draft of changes and additions to the USSR Constitution were perceived by the majority of the republic's population as a denial of the status of sovereignty for the Union republics which is established by the USSR Constitution and the policy of the 19th All-Union Party Conference of strengthening economic and political democracy. Their possible interpretation again made it possible to strengthen the role of the Union departments and impede the realization of the principles of republic cost accounting. Hence the sharpness and rapidity of the reaction. And the Communist Party of Estonia would have ended up isolated from the majority of the republic's population and would not have performed its task of consolidation of all the healthy forces and isolation of the extremist elements that made the demand to separate from the Soviet Union if it has not taken account of the justified fears of the people. In this extremely critical and strained situation in the republic certain corrections were made to the ESSR Constitution which were directed toward strengthening the economic (mainly natural resources) and political sovereignty of the republic.

The greatest arguments were associated with the change of Article 74 of the ESSR Constitution which is formulated as follows: "The law and other normative acts of the USSR go into effect on the territory of the Estonian SSR after they are registered under the policy established by the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet." This decision contradicted the existing USSR Constitution. But here one cannot but note the problem that exists. What is to be done when differences arise between Union and republic agencies. It should not be brought to the point—as some hotheads suggest—of separating from the Soviet Union. That is, there should be some constitutional form for reaching an agreement. We hope that this will be found. Of course one must not absolutize the republic's sovereignty. Some of the rights, naturally, must be turned over to the Soviet Union. But it is also natural to have the mutual rights and responsibilities appropriately formulated in a Union agreement.

I note that the unprecedentedly active discussion in the country of the draft of the Law on Changes and Additions to the USSR Constitution made it possible to develop democratically a much better text of the law. Many critical remarks, including those made at the extraordinary session of the ESSR Supreme Soviet on 16

November 1988, were taken into account in the final text. As a result of the discussions corrections were made in 32 of the 62 changes and additions to the Constitution. Other problems related to the interrelations between Union and republic agencies and also the strengthening of the sovereignty of the Union republics will, as we know, be resolved in subsequent stages of the constitutional reform.

Within the republic large differences of opinion arose in connection with the publication of the first variant of the draft of the Law on Language which establishes the state status of the Estonian language and measures for protecting it. A number of ill-considered points of the draft evoked legitimate objections from the Russian-speaking population. At the present time they are considering a reworked draft of the Law on Language which stipulates that measures for legal protection of the national interests of the Estonian population, their cultural, and their language (and these are needed) will not lead to any encroachment on rights or discrimination, including linguistic discrimination, against the Russian-speaking population of the republic. The Russian language is the language of international communication in our Union and the second most important language in the republic—it will be given an official status and protection on the territory of the Estonian SSR. In particular, guarantees and economic insurance are provided for obtaining education in the Russian language, including higher education, at least within the limits of the republic's possibilities. Therefore in the linguistic sphere as well the protection of the legitimate interests and rights of the Estonian people will not lead to national isolation and separation, which are fatal to any people.

I consider it necessary to discuss another PRAVDA article. This is the article by the corresponding member of VASKhNIL, V. Miloserdov, "Investments and Return From the Region" (6 December 1988). The author is concerned about the low return from capital investments in agriculture. The author sees the way out of the situation in the development of commodity-monetary relations and the changeover to principles of regional cost accounting. All this is correct. But why does this article evoke protest from us? Again it is partial truth and distorted reality. Figures are given from which the inexperienced reader draws the conclusion that there is unjustified distribution of resources to the advantage of the Baltic republics and to the detriment of the Russian nonchernozem zone. From the figures that are given it follows that the Union supposedly stands to lose from selling grain to the Estonian SSR and purchasing animal husbandry products from the republic. The same kind of injustice is supposed to be found in the distribution of subsidies to retail prices for meat and dairy products. According to V. Miloserdov's figures, the city dweller in the Lithuanian SSR receives more than twice as many of them as the city dweller in the RSFSR does. And the "just" conclusion follows: They are living high on the hog in the Baltic republics while the rest of the country suffers.

But the figures are deceitful. And it would not take much for a specialist to show that they are, to put it mildly, slanted. First of all the material and technical resources in agriculture in the Baltic republics, particularly in the Estonian SSR, were acquired not with state funds but with money earned by the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The higher levels of intensiveness of production and management also brought about a relatively greater capital-output ratio. Incidentally, this capital is being purchased at prices that are constantly increasing, and they are increasing more rapidly than the effectiveness of the mechanisms is. Is this not one of the main reasons for the inadequate effectiveness of the growing capital investments in agriculture? For in the country as a whole during the past decade the growth of investments in agriculture exceeded the growth of production by a factor of 5, and in this same Russian nonchernozem zone it was even accompanied by a reduction of agricultural production.

Now about the deliveries of grain to Estonia. They annually amount to about 43 percent of the need for them. But Estonia delivers to the Union supplies 40-45 percent of the meat and dairy products that are produced. In principle, such an exchange should be considered normal. Because of natural conditions the production of grain here costs more than the average for the Union by a factor of 1.4-1.5 and it costs almost twice as much as it does in the southern regions of the country. But we expend half the quantity of grain units per 1 kilogram of meat and dairy products. We were grateful to the Union government when, taking into account the extremely unfavorable weather conditions in the ESSR in 1988, it considered it possible to sell the republic an additional 320,000 tons of concentrated feeds. But can this be regarded as gratis assistance? After all, in that same year of 1988 the prices of mixed feeds increased sharply, but the republic, as usual, is delivering meat and dairy products to the Union supplies at the lowest prices in the country. For example, the average sales price (taking increments into account) of 1 kilogram of milk to the state in 1986 was 46 kopecks for the farms of Moscow Oblast and 34 kopecks for the Estonian SSR. I shall not even use as an example certain farms of the Russian nonchernozem zone which sell milk to the state at 1 ruble 30 kopecks per kilogram. Yet in terms of capital availability the farms of Moscow Oblast are quite comparable with those of the Estonian SSR. They belong to the same zone of specialization. They purchase mixed feeds, technical equipment, fuel, mineral fertilizers, and construction materials at the same prices. And as an agrarian economist I have been repeatedly asked by Estonian farmers: why is there such a large difference in the levels of procurement prices, which undermines our interest in increasing the production and delivery of products to the Union supplies? I have repeatedly asked this same question of the USSR Gosagroprom and Goskomtsen.

And, finally, about subsidies. Naturally, if the Baltic republics produce and deliver to the Union supplies more of all animal husbandry products per capita, they will also receive per capita relatively larger sums of

subsidies for covering the difference between the procurement and retail prices. Incidentally, taking the relatively low procurement prices into account, these sums of subsidies per unit of animal husbandry products produced in the Baltic republics are the very lowest. But if one is to believe statistics, the highest sums of subsidies per urban resident purchasing meat and milk at low prices are paid by the state in Moscow. For, according to statistics, here the average annual consumption of meat is more than 140 kilograms per person. But again the figure is deceptive. Any Muscovite will tell you that a considerable proportion of these subsidies along with the meat, sausage, butter, and cheese are distributed among neighboring oblasts. And they import these products from us.

Why am I writing all this? Not in order to reproach or offend the Russian farmer. I understand the good intentions of V. Miloserdov—an ardent patriot of the Russian nonchernozem zone. But the Estonian and Lithuanian farmers should not be blamed for this region's problems. They were all separated from the soil by the "father of nations" and those who carried out his will. But in the Russian nonchernozem zone this process began somewhat earlier and went somewhat deeper. And no investments in the Russian nonchernozem zone will help if the farmers themselves do not take charge of the land. The general direction is toward finally overcoming the administrative-command system and reviving Leninist principles of cooperation as well as developing consistent cost accounting and the rental and family contract. The correctness of this path is confirmed by the experience of a neighbor of the Baltic republics—Pytalovskiy Rayon in Pskov Oblast. Incidentally, in this rayon a large amount of work for introducing the rental contract is being done by a hereditary Estonian farmer—the former deputy chairman of the ESSR Gosplan, V. Rozenberg. Of course special investments are needed in the Russian nonchernozem zone. But not thoughtless distribution of scrounged state funds and credit, but investments for programs developed by independent experts for restoration of neglected farms and regions.

Let us return to the Estonian land. What is happening here? I think that the most precise and concise answer was given by M. S. Gorbachev during his visit to India: "Restructuring is taking place in Estonia." The process is complicated and contradictory. There are too many obstructions from the past, real and imagined differences in the interests of social and national groups dragged down by the burden of mutual indignation, misunderstanding and emotions. But there is a process of consolidation of all healthy forces and movements around the program of restructuring set forth by the party. Forms of public agreement are being sought and found on the platform of accounting for the national interests of the Estonian people, equal rights before the law and protection of all citizens of the republic, consistent democracy and increased economic effectiveness on the basis of regional cost accounting, and expansion and deepening of mutually advantageous ties with all Union republics.

As I was completing this letter I received news from Armenia that shocked all of us. The Estonian people along with all others sympathize deeply with the sorrow of the Armenian people and are sending to the fraternal republic medical workers, builders, and material and monetary funds. Incidentally, for the information of the correspondent N. Krivomazov (see PRAVDA 13 Dec 1988): an airplane loaded with medications, physicians, and warm clothing was sent from Tartu to Leninakan as early as 9 December. Many families in Estonia are prepared to accept Armenian children if necessary.

Therefore in response to my friends' questions "What is happening in Estonia?" I answer: "Come and take an unprejudiced look for yourself. The borders are not closed nor will they be!"

Sincerely,

M. L. Bronshteyn

I request that the honorarium be deposited in the fund for assistance to those suffering in the Armenian SSR.

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