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# **Soviet Union**

***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES  
No 3, May-June 1988***

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# Soviet Union SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 3, May-June 1988

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## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 3, May-June 1988

### Duty of a Scientist, Duty of a Citizen

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(signed to press 16 May 88) pp 3-6

[Editorial: "The Duty of a Scientist, the Duty of a Citizen"]

[Text] Time moves quickly. Particularly at present, when in our nation socioeconomic changes and a fundamental restructuring of social life are picking up speed. What just yesterday seemed almost impossible is presently becoming a reality and becoming part of our daily lives. How long has it been since there was such passion about the selection of leaders? Now this idea has become the law. Fresh in our memory are the times when cooperatives and services for the public provided by individual labor activities were viewed as a deviation from the principles of socialism. Presently, the number of cooperatives is increasing. The times which have brought us so many events and hopes began in April 1985. The 19th All-Union Party Conference was devoted to an analysis of the first practical results as well as to the elaboration and clarification of the further strategy of restructuring.

The preparations for the conference again clearly showed that restructuring draws its vital forces from precisely the human factor and the social sphere. It calls for knowledge, the intelligence and experience of each and for finer human qualities. The main idea of what is happening is to create living conditions worthy of our people, changing their social appearance and sense of self as well as liberating the potential energy of the masses. The main goal of restructuring "is to fully restore in the eyes of all the enormous importance of socialist values the main one being a focusing on the man of labor" [3].

One of the most important implements for the profound changes in the social sphere is seen by the party in an active social policy. Its main goals are to actually increase the material and spiritual standard of living of the people, to provide dependable social guarantees for the rights and freedoms of the citizens, to consistently carry out the principles of social justice as well as to strengthen the sociopolitical bases of our society. At the same time, the concrete steps in these areas create the necessary prerequisites for successful economic development and for the effective functioning of the institutions of socialist democracy. They must provide support by the broad strata of workers for the progressive changes being carried out by the party and state in all spheres of social life. The bases of current social policy have been elaborated in the documents of the 27th Party Congress, as well as the January, June (1987) and February (1988) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. The new course envisages a sharp strengthening of the economy's social orientation, its decisive turn toward satisfying the

diverse needs of the population, the priority development of the social sphere, in a word, the establishing of those conditions and guarantees which would help realize the diverse interests and requirements of the Soviet people and raise their social protection to a new qualitative level. The first, but very important steps, have been taken in this direction. A radical reform has been started in the economy and national economic management as well as a restructuring of the public health and educational systems, the construction of cultural facilities has revived, the current laws are being revised and new ones are being drafted, the doors of offices have been opened in the state institutions and the law enforcement bodies are ridding themselves of the scab of abuses and corruption.

What are the first results and how must social policy be structured in the future? These questions for sociology are presently becoming primary. However, as of now it is carrying out its mission of supporting social policy unsatisfactorily. In the interaction between science and practice, the old approaches and mechanisms coming down to us from the period of stagnation are still strong. Dogmatism and rushing forward in theory, the gap between word and deed, the ignoring of many negative trends in social development and the bureaucratizing of administration—all of this has doomed social policy to inconsistency and to a significant degree it has trailed behind the problems. One has merely to recall the miscalculations and flaws related to the extensive distribution of the so-called limit. The replacing of scientific criteria by ideological rote, bureaucratic subjectivism and the lack of democratic control from below over the adopting of decisions were some of the main reasons for the inacceptance and rejection of recommendations from sociologists by managerial practice. For instance, for 20 years now scientists have been affirming the need for integrated development of territories and considering in adopting in economic and urban development decisions the life cycles of the different population groups and the particular features of its sociodemographic composition. Only recently has the idea finally been heard by the administrative bodies. Incidentally, we are still a long ways away from its practical realization.

Certainly it would be wrong to represent things as if the low contribution by sociologists to social policy has been caused exclusively by the fact that the scientific recommendations have all been pigeonholed by the high executive offices or that specialists have been permitted to discuss the decisions only after their approval but rather due to the existing ideological taboos such a discussion has developed into commentaries in figures on the directive documents rarely accompanied by the timid pointing out of bottlenecks and acute problems. Unfortunately, many, many sociological developments which make claim to solving major socioeconomic problems have not touched upon any interests or, moreover, have justified an inertia in social policy in sketching out real social processes in excessively optimistic tones. Such a method of backing up decisions has done major damage

to sociological science. At present, when the unjust bans and obstacles against a constructive discussion of problems have been lifted, and when the time has come for the sociologists to take their "Zubry" [Diehards] and "Deti Arbat" [Children of the Arbat] out of their desks, it turns out that there are not many studies which meet the demands of the times. Here it is not merely a question of interesting ideas and approaches but rather concepts which could underlie specific social programs and decisions.

Of course, the research projects in the area of social policy must not be carried out in a vacuum. The sociologists have worked hard in the area of an empirical study of social processes. But in order to make maximum effective use of this scientific holding, new original theoretical ideas and concepts are required. First of all, it is essential to clarify what the object of social policy actually is. Presently, it is usually designated by the rather extensive concept of the "social sphere" (here they often incorporate not only various social processes but also communities). Clearly out of inertia stemming from the times of stagnation, the social sphere as before includes only living and domestic conditions, family and marriage relations, the problems of public health, social security, cultural and leisure activities, that is, they come down to the consumption and reproduction of the population. Such a view is not only the theoretical justification of the notorious residual principle but also actually reduces social policy to distribution, as only one type of interests—consumer—is recognized for individuals in the given instance. In the past, such an approach actually sanctioned the establishing of the system of official and unofficial privileges for the various social groups.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism raised the question differently. At the center of their views of social development stood man understood as the creator of his own life in its various social forms. "Man," emphasized K. Marx, "is the basis of his own material production just as he is for any other carried out by him. For this reason all those circumstances which impinge on man, this *subject* [principal] of production, modify to a greater or lesser degree all his functions and types of activity" [1]. Social policy should be primarily stimulating. Its task is not merely to give (to distribute material and spiritual goods between groups) but to create—including by the means of distribution—the prerequisites for the growth of social activeness. Only through the interested and aware involvement of the workers themselves in all affairs of society is it possible to realize the humanistic ideals of socialism.

At present, sociological science no longer has the right to limit itself to stating the material and sociocultural requirements of people, to describing their way of life or fixing value guidelines and the plans of life. Interest—this is what is the true engine of active social policy. For this reason, it is essential to focus attention on an analysis of the different social and territorial communities as the subjects [principals] of activity. In a word, it is essential

to work out an integrated notion of the social processes as a system of activities of the social subjects [principals] which find themselves in diverse and dynamic economic, political, spiritual and national relations.

The radical reform in the economy and management must activate personal and collective interests. At present, a healthy socialist entrepreneurship is very important for us. Without this we cannot shatter the mechanisms of inhibition and achieve acceleration. At the same time, it is essential to be clearly aware that under certain conditions, individual, private interests can enter and do enter into contradiction with the social ones and that the natural social differentiation brought about by the principle "the higher the end result of labor the more income" can lead to a deterioration in the situation of certain population groups. Such a situation is completely real if socioeconomic effectiveness is reduced to the benefit of individual collectives and producers. This sort of economic technocratism is just as dangerous as naked administrative methods. How is it possible to achieve an optimum combination of individual, group and social interests? Where is that boundary beyond which economic effectiveness begins to diverge from social justice? These are all cardinal questions for social policy. And the sociologists should provide an answer to them.

At present, it is clear that in addition to strengthening economic guarantees, a most important role is played by a further deepening of democracy and by the development of self-management. For in these processes, social interests are most completely and consistently embodied. It is impossible to achieve high economic results without providing all an equal access to material and spiritual goods. It is impossible to democratize relations in one's collective without democratizing society.

It is essential to rethink the very place of social policy in management and the forms of its realization. It is no secret that in the past this was based chiefly upon administrative-command methods and that various classes, social groups and strata were viewed only as the objects of control. In such an approach (and not only in the major miscalculations) one must search for the reasons for the failure of many social initiatives as well as the negative socioeconomic and political consequences of taken decisions. Presently, a great deal is said about the need to carefully consider the diverse interests and requirements of the people. How can this be achieved in practice? Certainly not merely by so detailed regulation of what is possible and what is not. We know to what such "consideration" leads. An active social policy is a democratic policy: both in terms of goals, in terms of content and in terms of methods of implementation. Precisely the interested attitude of workers in certain decisions and not an adaptation to them turns a social program into an instrument of change.

The direct and active involvement of the workers in carrying out a political course was viewed by V.I. Lenin as one of the main conditions for success. His instructions "we should follow the life, we should grant free freedom of creativity to the masses of people" [2] sound just as pertinent today as they did during the days of October. At present the nation has over 30,000 independent groups and associations [4]. Social policy will be effective when it reaches the set goals and when the numerous strata of the workers, primarily in the form of social organizations, become the subjects [principals] of its implementation along with the administrative bodies. The strength of social policy lies in the fact that it is a method of having people realize their potential and interests. "At present only through democratization," emphasized M.S. Gorbachev, "is it possible to fully incorporate the human factor in the profound changes in all aspects of society's life and in the real processes of control and self-control" [3].

The practical implementation of such an approach raises a series of major problems for management. How fully are the diverse social groups aware of their actual needs and interests, how consistently are these expressed in concrete decisions and planned measures, what is the attitude of the population toward these decisions and measures, to what degree are the masses subjectively ready for action, and what can be the consequences of implementing the plans and ideas? Sociologists must also work on all these questions. And here it is impossible to get by merely by studying public opinion. The main and most difficult thing is an analysis and forecasting of the dynamics of social processes, including the elaboration of scenario and standard models for their development considering possible control actions. In other words, the sociologists should offer several versions of decisions which will be discussed by the administrative-management bodies and by the public. The obligatory involvement of the workers in taking and carrying out decisions is the basic element in the mechanism which ensures the turning of the management system to science, on the one hand, and effective social supervision over the work of the scientists themselves, on the other.

Of course, the above-outlined program can scarcely be implemented immediately. Sociological science primarily is not ready for this. It would be much more realistic to start from social expert evaluation of the decisions which have been prepared. For a detailed assessment of large-scale projects, it is essential to have collaboration between the sociologists and the representatives of the other areas of social sciences including philosophers, economists, jurists, historians, demographers and psychologists.

Equally important now is the greatest possible support and development of work on social engineering, the introduction of social and organizational-managerial innovations and social technologies. The experience acquired here will serve as the basis for sociological

support for large-scale socioeconomic programs. But above all, this work is of great independent importance. The time is over when on the spot they lived only for executing the directives of the center. The processes of democratization, the growth of independence and responsibility require that in each region, city and collective they steadily search out their own ways for resolving both specifically local as well as general social problems. Here the sociologists should have their own weighty word to say.

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3. *Pravda*, 19 February 1988.
4. *Ibid.*, 1 February 1988.

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**Radical Restructuring of Economic Mechanism—Basis of Self-Management of Labor Collectives**  
*1806001b Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, May-Jun 88 (signed to press 16 May 88) pp 7-16*

[Article, published under the heading "Toward the 19th Party Conference: Sociological Support for Economic Reform," by N.I. Alekseyev: "The Radical Restructuring of the Economic Mechanism—The Basis for the Self-Management of Labor Collectives." Nikolay Illarionovich Alekseyev, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, section head at the Sociological Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and author of the monographs "Dialektika truda pri sotsializme" (Dialectics of Labor Under Socialism) (1979), "Ekonomicheskiy eksperiment: sotsialnyye aspekty" (The Economic Experiment: Social Aspects) (1987) and others. Our journal has published his articles "Relationship of Social Factors Determining Attitude Toward Labor" (No 3, 1975) and "On Strengthening Economic Independence of Production Brigades" (co-author, No 1, 1986)]

[Text] Our research indicates that "a predominant majority of the workers, engineers and managers want and can work better, more intensively and with better quality." This is impeded by the obsolete wage systems, the limitations in carrying out economic maneuvers, the cumbersome management system and the immunity for incompetent and erroneous decisions. These shortcomings, characteristic of all national economic levels from the brigadier to the ministerial, should be overcome in the course of the fundamental restructuring of socialist production relations. But how soon will this happen?

How consistently will the new ideas be carried out? Do the planning bodies have enough decisiveness and boldness in presently working out all details of the restructuring, all its numerous acts, instructions and provisions which actually have greater force than the laws themselves? Finally, do the workers themselves have enough energy to carry out the economic reform in our country and for quickly and sharply raising socialist management to a qualitatively new and immeasurably higher level?

Unfortunately, the workers in many sectors have still not been aware of substantial changes in the organizing of their production activities. There have not been noticeable changes for the better either in the quantity or the quality of consumer goods. As before, interruptions have survived in supplying the public with food products and in many regions meat and butter are distributed through the enterprises and organizations by coupons. The research carried out in the Section for Social Problems of Intensifying Social Production at the ISI [Sociological Research Institute] of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the author's leadership at enterprises which even in 1987 had converted to the self-financing and self-management conditions<sup>1</sup> also did not disclose qualitative shifts either in the actual behavior of the labor collectives or in the mood of the people. What were the reasons for this? What are the sense and content of the profound processes impeding a radical restructuring and a renewal of socialist production relations?

**Results of the first year.** The major evaluation indicator for an enterprise's operation under the conditions of the large-scale economic experiment, as is known, was declared to be not the increase in the production volume and not the percentage of the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plans but rather the production of a high-quality product needed by the consumer, in the agreed upon assortment, at the established time, in full accord with the contracts and schedule orders, that is, with social needs which had acquired precise quantitative and qualitative parameters. However, in fact little had changed. Because the very accounting for the fulfillment of the contracts and schedule orders was of a tentative nature, it was carried out not by piece, not by actual months and days, but rather in terms of the total value of the dispatched product in a running total until the year's end (having shut down the work of its consumers in the first and second quarters, but having dispatched the products to them in the third and fourth, the enterprise was considered successfully fulfilling its obligations) and because many enterprises operated without having, due to the fault of superior management levels, neither the basic raw materials, the preassembled articles or the labor or financial resources for the planned production volumes.

As of 1 January 1987, converted to the conditions of self-financing and self-management as the next, wider and deeper experiment were enterprises now of five major USSR national economic sectors: petrochemical, motor vehicle, instrument building, chemical machine

building and light industry. Did the new conditions have a positive impact upon production efficiency? How did the labor collectives begin to work, gaining, seemingly, freedom to manifest independence, initiative and responsibility for their activities? Here are just a few figures answering these questions.

Over the past year the enterprises of the five ministries converted to the conditions of full economic accountability failed to deliver to their consumers product valued at 2.3 billion rubles (in 1986, 1.7 billion rubles), having paid over 1 billion rubles in penalties for the nonfulfillment of their delivery obligations and another 520 million rubles for various penalties and fines for other violations. Naturally, this led to a sharp deterioration in the financial position of many enterprises. While on 1 January 1987, the overdue liability on short-term bank loans and reciprocal payments between the economic organizations reached almost 1.5 billion (1,459,600,000), then 10 months later, this had risen by a whole billion rubles, reaching 2,406,000,000 rubles. The enterprises which had been converted to self-financing conditions spent much more money than had been planned on producing the created product, losing over 700 million rubles just in the increased costs. Regardless of the receipt of additional incentive surcharges for the produced product of almost 440 million rubles, they were unable to make ends meet. All the ministries which had been converted to the conditions of this experiment did not receive the planned profit. While at the enterprises that had not converted to full economic accountability, the growth rates for the production volume were 4.1 percent, under the conditions of full economic accountability they were just 2.5 percent. While under ordinary conditions labor productivity rose by 4.3 percent, under the experiment conditions by just 3.6 percent. In comparison with 1986, the growth rate of labor productivity accelerated by just 0.1 percent (at the remaining industrial sectors by 0.5 percent).

Let me immediately point out that these major losses and shortfalls running into hundreds of thousands and millions of rubles had virtually no impact on employee wages at these enterprises. Wages even increased by an average of over 3 percent, as had been planned, reaching 203 rubles. At the enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Light Industry which suffered the greatest losses, employee wages rose even above the planned amounts. This comparison alone makes it possible to draw the indisputable conclusion that the so-called "full economic accountability" to which the enterprises of the five sectors had been converted was again incomplete, curtailed, castrated, that is, not economic accountability but rather a variety of it, for it did not include in its chain the main and most decisive link, that is, the human factor, the incentive of the workers for good work and without which economic accountability cannot be termed economic accountability, provide any noticeable rise in labor efficiency and provide a noticeable acceleration in the movement of social production.

But why under self-financing conditions which seemingly would inexorably make economic accountability real and complete, was it as before formal and incomplete, while the remuneration of the labor collectives was poorly linked or completely unlinked with the end results of their production activities?

**Not production methods are to blame but rather the ideology of planning.** Let us closely examine Table 1 and study its headings and figures. What do they show?

**Table 1: Reply to Question: "How balanced is the production plan approved by the ministry and issued to the enterprises as state orders with the real material, labor and financial resources of the enterprise?"/**

Is the plan balanced...		Basically balanced	Not balanced for individual and secondary indicators	Not balanced for main indicators	No reply
With production capacity of your enterprise	A*	72.2	8.5	16.8	2.5
	B	47.2	25.0	19.4	8.4
With material resources, received allocations for raw products, materials, preassembled parts	A	33.7	35.6	26.6	4.1
	B	25.0	27.7	38.9	8.4
With financial resources	A	61.7	14.6	13.6	10.1
	B	55.6	16.7	19.4	8.3
With labor resources	A	61.9	12.1	16.1	9.9
	B	50.0	19.4	22.2	8.4

\* A—Under conditions of large-scale economic experiments; B—Under conditions of covering of costs, self-financing and self-management.

While previously only one-third of the enterprises had plans balanced for the material resources, in 1987, it was only a quarter (out of the total surveyed). While during the course of the large-scale experiment, the plan conformed to the enterprise production capacity in more than 70 cases, in 1987, just in one-half. While previously the labor resources were sufficient to carry out the plan in 66 percent of the enterprises, last year it was only in 50 percent. As a result, the acuteness of the problems related to supplying the enterprises with raw products, materials and semifinished products did not lessen, but increased and became even more torturous than before. In this situation a majority of the enterprises had one concern, that is, by any means to carry out the imbalanced and unrealistic plan and for this reason they did not have to give any thought to carrying out the schedule orders at the established dates or satisfying consumer requests.

The traditional explanations for this chronic and severe illness in the national economy include the unrhythmical operation of the enterprises, the mismatching of dates for the delivery of raw products and the dispatch of finished products, the poor operation of transport and now even the capriciousness of the state receiving bodies. These no longer satisfy anyone as they cover only the external aspects of the phenomenon and they themselves require explanation. Ultimately, the main reason for the convulsions and spasms in the work of the various national economic sectors, on the one hand, is the excessive centralization of planning, the predominance

of administrative-directive management methods, the unbelievably complex system for the indirect effect of the producers and leaders on the movement of their production and due to which this production becomes uncontrolled and alien to them, and, on the other, the lack of a direct material interest on the part of all the management bodies in the work of their subordinate enterprises, the divorcing of their wages and prosperity from the successes of direct production, the discrepancy in the interests of the "tops" and "bottoms" in the end results of their labor and well-being upon the conditions of direct production, and the incompetence, hurry, lack of thought or foresight on the part of individual elements and officials will inevitably cause chain reactions of stoppages and shut-downs, jerks and halts in the movement of social production.

The individual leaders at the Kharkov Tochpribor [Precision Instrument] Scientific Production Association, the Penza Khimmash [Chemical Machinery], the Minsk Motor Bike Plant and others understand this well and have posed as the most acute problem having a disrupting effect on production not poor supply but rather "the existing procedure for working out and approving the production plan." Usually the leaders of the enterprises relate all their problems to the planning methods. Now a majority sees the root of the evil in the erroneous planning ideology, in the incorrect understanding of the place and role of the plan in the mechanism of managing the socialist economy and in the underestimation of

authentic social requirements and needs as the main engines of material production. A comprehension of this by an ever-larger number of economic managers is still another indisputable proof of the need for a profound restructuring of the current economic mechanism, for a maximum broadening of the independence and responsibility of the inferior production elements and for developing democratic principles on all levels of the national economy. But what is actually happening?

**Under the pretext of concern.** Under the conditions of the large-scale economic experiment, the enterprises were officially given six main (evaluation) indicators. In actuality, there were more, but officially there were six. Now, what about under the conditions of self-financing: Seemingly it is clear that there should be fewer. Nothing of the

sort has happened. They have now doubled! The enterprises converted to self-financing conditions in 1987 were given 12 main indicators! These are: product output in physical terms, the sales volume, the quotas for the annual product renewal, the growth of labor productivity, profit, the quotas for foreign exchange earnings, the completion of fixed capital, the completion of production capacity, the completion of housing, the completion of sociocultural and service facilities, the growth rate for commodity product (calculated) and the production of total product in cost terms.

Which of these should be approved and which not? was our question to the managers. And although all the indicators have already been approved, that is, they have the force of a directive, they still voiced their opinion (see Table 2).

**Table 2: Reply to the Question: "Which of the listed main indicators of the five-year and annual plans for the enterprises and associations, in your view, should be approved and which should not be approved?"**

Main Indicators*	Approve	NotApprove
Production of main product range in physical units	58.3	40.6
Volume of product sales in accord with concluded contracts (orders)	50.0	50.0
Average annual renewal of produced product	—	100.0
Growth of labor productivity	50.0	47.2
Profit	80.0	19.4
Gross receipts	11.1	88.9
Completion of		
Fixed capital	27.7	72.2
Production capacity	44.4	55.6
Housing	30.6	66.7
Sociocultural and service facilities	25.0	75.0
Calculated increase rate of commodity product	16.7	83.3
Production of total product in cost units	16.7	72.2

\* A portion of the respondents deferred answering for certain positions.

As can be seen from the table, a majority reject the old administrative restraints. Why rigidly plan, for example, the completion of housing or sociocultural and service facilities when the labor collectives are vitally interested in their fastest completion? But to be concerned with providing the enterprises with everything necessary for building these is in no way superfluous. This is much more difficult than setting a figure for the completion of housing, than turning it into a directive and let it go at that, in maintaining the appearance of concern for worker needs.

The same was approximately true for a majority of the other indicators. Instead of the planned organization of production there was the customary administrative approach and no personal responsibility for the figures sent "down" as obligatory directives. The completion of production capacity and fixed capital? Each enterprise is

interested in this.<sup>2</sup> But why is the completion of production capacity essential if the already existing is not utilized? And what if it were better to reconstruct the enterprise on the basis of modern scientific achievements? Oh no, just the completion, otherwise we will punish, label, defame and fire! This is what these unnecessary indicators show which are approved by the superior levels. Incidentally we would point out that while the plans for completing new production facilities as a whole are fulfilled by 80-90 percent and even more by individual ministries, the plans for technical reequipping and reconstructing of the enterprises in the first half of 1987 were fulfilled as follows: by 34 percent in the Minneftekhimprom [Ministry of Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry], 42 percent in the Minkhimmash [Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building], 44 percent in the Minpribor [Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems], 34 percent in the Minavtoprom [Ministry of

Automotive Industry] and 38 percent in the Minlegprom [Ministry of Light Industry].

Of course, we must not tolerate these old paradoxes of administrative-type management under the new conditions. But they become completely intolerable when they are extended to fundamentally new forms and methods of production management, that is, to the economic norms. How is the administrative approach manifested here? What unpleasantnesses does this entail?

**The norms are seeming and the dictating real.** The main problem is that in actuality the economic norms do not exist. The economic norms issued to the enterprises operating this year under self-financing conditions are nothing more than the quotas from the approved five-year plan. Let us assume that for an enterprise in 1987 they planned to transfer 40 rubles to the state budget out of every 100 rubles of profit. Hence, the deduction rate from profit into the state budget will equal 40 percent of the profit. Some 9 percent of the profit was to be deducted into the material incentive fund and hence the rate of the material incentive fund will equal 9 percent and so forth. These norms do not place on the enterprises any social demands (standards) but merely set in a new form both the results of the hard labor of the leading collectives and reinforce the unjustified benefits for those collectives which have clearly become the parasites of the economy. Those who worked well and earned a large profit in the future will cover the losses of others who feed off of society and subsequently will live at the expense of the labor of others. Both earnings and bonuses, as before, are not linked to the end results of operations and 99 percent depends upon the approved rates, schedules and salaries and only 1 percent on the increase in the product volume (the notorious gross).

Here are some specific examples. The Odessa Elektronmash [Electronic Machinery] PO [Production Association] and the Bashkir Orgtekhnik [Office Equipment] PO were given the same rate for the capital payment of 2 percent, although in the former profitability was 41.2 percent and in the latter 22.5. In 1988, Rosselmash [Rostov Agricultural Machinery Association] will pay 2 percent for its capital while the Radiator Plant in Orenburg will pay 6 percent. Here the former will deduct 23.7 percent of the profit into its social development fund [FRP] and the latter just 16.4 percent. Rosselmash will turn over just 8.4 percent of its profit to the ministry while Radiator will deliver 50 percent. The rate for the formation of the FRP at the Velikiye Luki Experimental Polymer Machine Building Plant is 7.9 percent, and at the Baku Oil and Gas Field Equipment Plant it is 90.2 percent. At the GPZ-3 Association (Ministry of Automotive Industry), the rate of profit deductions to the budget in 1987 is 4.2 percent and for the ministry it is 46.1 percent.

A group of specialists headed by A.V. Siginevich from the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, having analyzed these and many other facts in a report submitted to the USSR Gosplan reached the following conclusion: "In assessing as a whole the existing practices for forming the rates in converting the enterprises to full economic accountability on 1 January 1987, it is essential to emphasize their complete inapplicability for the conditions of true self-financing. The individualization of the rates conceals the real state of repaying expenditures at the enterprise and creates the appearance of self-financing. At inefficient enterprises the understated rates create an illusory notion of the workability of the economic accountability approach and do not mobilize the labor collectives to seek out reserves for overcoming the low efficiency of their enterprise. The existing situation with the rates is particularly dangerous in the fact that it discredits the idea of self-financing and undermines the faith of a broad range of workers in the actual possibility of a radical restructuring in the economic mechanism."

What sort of radical restructuring can there be if even the external picture of the customary economic management mechanism remains as before? Everything is regulated, monitored, set and standardized from above as it was before and as before it is impossible to take one step forward without the petty interference and control of the superior bodies. From 11 to 14 standards are set for each enterprise which has converted to the self-financing conditions! What sort of independence can there be in employing the assets left at the enterprise after the deductions paid to the nation's state budget if it is established that out of 1,000 rubles of cost accounting income 200 must be sent to develop production, 300 for housing construction, 400 for an increase in wages, 100 for management wages and so forth. What remains of independence? It is just like soap bubbles glimmering in the light but leaving a blank spot in the first contact with reality. There is no reason to think and reflect, one has merely to obey blindly without forgetting to repeat that you are doing all of this completely independently.

We asked the economic leaders to state how obligatory are these norms, to what degree they are sound and optimal from the standpoint of the enterprise's interests. It turned out that only three norms were recognized and supported by the economic leaders: the payment for production capital, deductions from profit into the state budget and deductions from profit into the local budget. These are the soundest, although in certain instances, our respondents felt, are overstated. These payments, being low previously, were turned into norms, they did not touch the collective's interests, they left the previous practices fixed but gave them a new form in which the achieving of an understanding of what was happening became even more obscure for the uninitiated.

**Table 3: Reply to the Question: "Do the amounts of the economic norms set for your enterprise provide an optimum realization of those tasks for which they were introduced? Are all these norms, in your view, essential?/"**

Norm...	Amount of Given Norm for Your Enterprise			Given Norm Not Required
	Optimum	Clearly Understated	Clearly Overstated	
Payment for production capital Deductions	61.6		24.5	13.9
From profit to state budget	55.6		38.9	5.5
From profit to local budget	66.7		16.6	16.7
From profit to centralized funds and ministry reserves	36.1		55.0	8.3
Formation of fund for development production, science and technology				
From profit	44.6	36.9	5.6	11.1
From amortization	52.8	38.9	2.8	2.8
Formation of fund for sociocultural measures and housing construction	33.3	58.4		8.3
Formation of material incentive fund	46.5	47.2		8.3
Increase in total (or planned production personnel) wage fund	22.2	52.8	2.8	22.9
Wage fund for managers, engineers, technicians and other white collar personnel	9.3	30.6	3.8	58.3
Ratio between increase in average wages and increase in labor productivity	30.6	35.6	2.8	33.3
Maximum level of commodity inventories per ruble of product (work, services) sales volume	36.1	22.2	3.6	36.1

The remaining norms which should ensure the interests of the labor collectives and create conditions for the development of production, the social sphere, management and self-management are considered unsound and evoke doubt and mistrust. Here the closer the norms are linked with the material interests of the collectives, the more dissatisfaction with them. Thus, the norms for the deductions into the production development fund are considered understated by 38.9 percent of those questioned, into the material incentive fund by 47.2 percent, in the wage fund by 52.8 percent and in the fund for sociocultural measures by 58.3 percent. Can such answers be uniformly considered as stemming from collective selfishness, the selfish nature and uneradicated mercantilism of people?

**A unity of interests—a unity of actions.** We feel that the question is much more complicated. Of course, when material interests are involved, people thoroughly assess all the immediate and more distant consequences of the innovations being proposed to them. But is this really bad when the workers and particularly the managers carefully analyze the possible development of production? The problem is not in personal interest, but that due to it the insufficient soundness of the introduced innovations is much more acutely disclosed, in this instance, the economic norms, their imperfections and shortcomings are apparent, their disadvantageousness

for the workers, that is, the opposing of personal and collective interests to the interests of the entire state and society. This is what these data show above all.

Certain economists and planners assume that in the process of improving the economic mechanism it is essential first of all to defend the interests of the state, as this is the main thing for the triumph of a planned economy, for strengthening and developing public ownership and for the success of socialism. Only here for some reason they overlook that having ensured the defense of state interests, they have encroached on the labor collectives and individual workers who because of this let up and then sharply reduce labor productivity and cause not apparent but real damage to the state and society.

One can speak of the true defense of the interests of society, the labor collectives and individual workers under socialism only when these interests are reconciled and coordinated, when they do not contradict one another but rather comprise an organic social unity within which they are relatively independent of one another.

The data of Table 2 persuasively indicate that: 1) the number of norms set from above is clearly superfluous, 2) their amount in many instances is unsound, 3) in being established by the ministries, they do not weaken but rather preserve the administrative-directive nature

of production planning and management under the conditions of self-financing and, consequently, the initiative and independence of the enterprise as before is fettered.

With the aid of economic norms it is possible to make the management mechanism even more rigid, directive and bureaucratic and further separating the interests of the participants of socialist production even more than the current mechanism. At the same time, precisely with the aid of economic norms the management system of the socialist economy can be made truly both democratic, flexible and accessible to everything which brings benefit. This is possible: 1) when instead of many, one main norm is set, 2) when this main norm has an objective, independent, sound, nature immune to subjective interpretations and 3) when it, in providing the reliability of centralized national economic management, at the same time offers complete independence to the collectives in carrying out the tasks confronting them.

In our view, such properties can be assumed by the familiar norm of the payment for production capital, 1) when it includes all the currently operating types of deductions into the state budget, 2) if its amount will be set for a group of kindred enterprises and not individually, 3) it will be sufficiently high to satisfy all the urgent needs of the nation and 4) if the remaining portion of income is left at the complete disposal of the enterprises.

**Old obstacles under the new conditions.** The production relations in which the enterprises converted to the self-financing conditions operate would seem qualitatively different than under the conditions of the large-scale economic experiment but the difficulties experienced by the labor collectives are the same. This became obvious to us from the replies to the question: "What, in your opinion, are the main difficulties and obstacles on the way to improving the developing the physical plant of your enterprise?" In first place was the answer: "It is difficult to prove to the ministry the need for the modernization and reconstruction of the existing shops and production lines while they are producing products within the plan limits." Secondly was "the necessary material and financial means for the modernization and reconstruction of the shops are not being promptly allocated." Thirdly "it is difficult to involve the design institutes in the work in preparing the technical specifications and then the construction and installation organizations." Characteristically, 2 years ago these difficulties were given in the same order by the enterprise leaders working under the conditions of the large-scale economic experiment. In actuality, this means that the old content has been kept under a new form and under the new concepts of "self-financing," "covering of costs" and so forth in actuality the old administrative-directive management mechanism is being reproduced and this clearly is not viable at the present development level of our nation.

Here are the specific figures. Using their own funds the enterprises which in 1987 converted to the self-financing conditions are covering their expenditures on erecting new production-end projects by a total of 75 percent in the Minneftekhimprom, by just 48 percent in the Minkhimmash, by 85 percent in the Minavtoprom and 58 percent in the Minlegprom. The situation is approximately the same in housing construction: internal funds often comprise the smaller portion of the required investments. Amortization deductions, and these entail billions of rubles, as before to a significant degree are taken away from the enterprises. Here is our self-financing! We have already become accustomed to the fact that in our economy, all laws and concepts have a certain incomplete significance, a truncated sense and distorted essence: formal economic accountability which has nothing in common with economic accountability; money which is not money and now self-financing which, in taking a closer look, is not this. Finally, when will all the economic laws, like its concepts, begin to be used without distortion, misconstruing and misinterpretation?

An important element in the self-financing system is the broadening of independence in solving social and service problems for the labor collectives. But this, as the questionnaire showed, operates only in words. As before, the housing construction volumes at a majority of enterprises satisfies just 20-30 percent of the actual needs for housing. As before, a half of the enterprises, having allocation limits and funds, cannot find the contractors, building materials and equipment for erecting the housing. As previously, only a few of the strongest enterprises can resort to building by the direct labor method.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Main Directions of Accelerating a Solution to the Housing Problem in the Nation" of 17 April 1986 and which ordered the ministries and departments to convert from 1987 to normed methods for planning housing construction was not carried out by the sectors which converted to self-financing. The planning of housing construction for their enterprises under the new conditions was carried out in the old manner, on the basis of the existing capital investment practices for these purposes. In the course of the questionnaire we endeavored to ascertain at least the attitude of the economic leaders to the normed methods of housing planning. One quarter of those questioned found it difficult to give an assessment, 30 percent were against, but around one-half supported the uniform sectorial standards for allocating capital investments for housing and cultural-service construction. What should lie at the basis of these standards? How should they be figured? A majority (52.8 percent) was in favor of the following version: per person on the housing list at an enterprise or the gorispolkom (rayispolkom). We feel that such an approach is completely acceptable if we establish uniform rules for the entire sector for placing persons in line for housing and strictly adhering to these, until the housing conditions for the employees of the different enterprises and sectors will be equalized. After this it is possible to move on to a more

universal principle of allocating funds for social and service facilities and, in particular, for housing from the centralized sources calculated per worker employed in the nation's economy. Even now the advisability of such a method for forming the sectorial standards is supported by 22.2 percent of those questioned.

Just three enterprises or 8.3 percent of those questioned was in favor of allocating funds on a per capita basis. From our viewpoint, however, this is the most just principle. But its realization will be possible on a higher development level of our society than at present.

At the well-known meeting held at the CPSU Central Committee in 1985 for accelerating scientific and technical progress, M.S. Gorbachev said: "...Certain ministries, even with the aid of the State Labor Committee, the Ministry of Finances and at times the Gosplan are capable of so 'swaddling' the independence of the enterprises and so interpreting the decisions of the Central Committee and government that after all the departmental recommendations and instructions, a hash is made of these principles in practice" [1]. This was said in relation to the carrying out of the large-scale economic experiment. However, as the given facts show, all that was said can also apply to the current restructuring of enterprise management. The fear of granting the labor collectives true independence, the desire to restrict their initiative and entrepreneurship and, hence, responsibility by numerous norms, the half-heartedness and timidity in carrying out fundamentally correct decisions are lethal for the question of intensifying social production. Such a policy discredits the very idea of self-management in the ideas of the managers and all the working masses, and undermines the confidence of people not only in the possibility of a rapid restructuring of their labor activities but also the very principles of this restructuring. How many times have good, correct and just principles been proclaimed on the highest levels and then have remained unrealized and not carried out! This is why in converting the enterprises to the new operating conditions it is important to take this danger into account, not to repeat the previous mistakes, but rather boldly, consistently and completely carry out all the fundamental ideas, provisions and views of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (1987), the decisions of which should be not in words but in deeds a turning point and a great historical marker in the development of our economy.

#### Footnotes

1. This research was carried out under a request of the state planning bodies and the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1985, 1986 and 1987 at 16 enterprises of the Mintyazhmash [Ministry of Heavy Machine Building], the Ministries of the Electrical Equipment Industry and Light Industry in Belorussia, the Ukrainian Food Industry and the Lithuanian Local Industry. A total of 4,000 workers were questioned and 2,300 engineers and technicians, with a 15-20 percent

sampling for the main shops of the surveyed enterprises. Then almost a thousand managers were questioned about the new management conditions at 211 enterprises (175 under the conditions of the large-scale experiment and 36 under the self-financing and self-management conditions).

2. Here are some quantitative parameters of this interest according to data of the USSR Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee]: the wear on fixed productive capital in industry rose from 30 percent in 1975 to 42 percent in 1986. While in 1980, some 16.3 percent of the metal-cutting machine tools was over 20 years old, in 1986, the figure was already 21.1 percent of their total number. While in 1980, 7.2 billion rubles were spent on repairing them, in 1986, the figure was already 10.1 billion rubles, that is, the increased outlays for these expenditures rose by 40 percent. At the same time, the number of newly installed metal-cutting machines in the percentage of their total number over this same time did not increase but has gradually declined (press release No 249 of 24 August 1987).

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**Economic Awareness: Guidelines and Prejudices**  
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[Article by Zh.T. Toshchenko, V.E. Boykov, V.N. Ivanov and T.A. Kudrina: "Economic Awareness: Guidelines and Prejudices"; the authors are employed at the AON (Academy of Social Sciences) under the CPSU Central Committee. Zhan Terentyevich Toshchenko is a doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and leader of the Chair of Ideological Work. Vladimir Erikhovich Boykov is a candidate of philosophical sciences and docent. Valentin Nikolayevich Ivanov is a doctor of philosophical sciences and deputy chair leader. Taisiya Aleksandrovna Kudrina is a doctor of historical sciences and professor]

[Text] The radical reform in the national economy has acutely raised the question of the state of the social awareness of people under the specific conditions of the present stage in the revolutionary renewal of society. This problem was the subject of an all-Union sociological study conducted in May-June 1986 by the Chair of Ideological Work at the AON under the CPSU Central Committee together with scientific and party workers from Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Voronezh, Kaliningrad, Krivoy Rog, Sverdlovsk, Krasnodar Kray, Kustanay, Orel and Saratov Oblasts. Some 4,075 workers and kolkhoz members were questioned from the main national economic sectors along with 934 party, soviet, trade union and economic workers of the oblast, municipal, rayon and primary levels. In addition, an expert evaluation was conducted on the state of affairs in 323 labor collectives, the decrees and work plans were analyzed at 18 CPSU raykoms and 25 party committees as

well as over a thousand publications on economic questions in 50 local newspapers. The sampling aggregate was determined primarily by establishing proportional representativeness of all the main national economic sectors. Then we employed a quota sample for the most typical enterprises and mechanical random sample.

In addition to the mentioned, in the course of the study a number of particular problems was resolved: we ascertained the degree to which persons were informed, the economic literacy of the workers, kolkhoz members and leaders, and their interest in the main problems of accelerating socioeconomic development; we ascertained the degree of labor and sociopolitical activeness of the workers. There was the individual problem of studying the most acute questions related to improving the style and methods of party leadership on the questions of effective use of the acceleration factors.

Before moving on to a direct exposition of the obtained results, let us briefly take up the theoretical concepts which guided us.

The role of social awareness in the period of socioeconomic renewal does not grow automatically but rather as a result of purposeful ideological work carried out in an organic linkage to organizational and economic activities and to daily practice. One of the indispensable conditions for its development is an objective and realistic analysis of the thoughts and feelings of people. Here the methodological guide was the admonishment of V.I. Lenin "to soberly follow the actual state of awareness and the preparedness of precisely an entire class (and not only its communist vanguard), precisely all the working masses (and not only their leading people)" [1].

A man cannot live or work without having his own opinion on those processes in which he is involved as a worker of material and spiritual production. Precisely an aggregate of all the elements inherent to any form of social awareness is characteristic of that area in which is involved with the development and functioning of economic relations and with the improving of production management. Moreover, the sphere of economic relations and all economic life is assuming ever-greater importance for a man and for his self-awareness as the creator of historical progress [3].

Unfortunately, for now there is no precise scientific concept of studying economic awareness or a clear understanding of those patterns which underlie its functioning and development. How widespread are the historically obsolete stereotypes of economic thinking, what is the relationship between the supporters and opponents of the new economic mechanism and between those who want to work at full force and those who have remained under the thrall of "jacking up pay" and overreporting? It is impossible to answer these and analogous questions without thorough sociological analysis. In our research we have proceeded from the view that the questioning of

the workers and kolkhoz members will permit the gaining of an idea on the so-called ordinary awareness which is a product of peoples' perception of the economic reality surrounding them and at the same time an inner facet of labor activity, while the replies of the leading personnel—the organizers of production activity, the economic and vocational training and labor indoctrination—can analyze the role of economic awareness in management. The influence on economic awareness of not only the subjective but also the objective conditions was examined, as has already been pointed out, using the methods of expert evaluation of the state of affairs at the enterprises as well as content analysis of the party documents and press materials. The information assembled in this manner provides an opportunity to characterize the object of investigation from different approaches.

One last preliminary comment. In defining the most general approach to examining economic awareness, we would clearly state that we are concerned with its socialist type and this reflects the collectivist relations inherent to Soviet society and economic practices aimed at increasing the well-being and satisfying the needs of the Soviet people. For this reason, one of the main tasks in the research is to determine the degree of maturity for the given type of awareness and the level of its adequacy to the demands of socioeconomic development at the present stage. For this reason at the center of attention was the really functioning economic awareness which contains progressive components but which is also not free of stereotypes acting as anti-incentives of progress and factors of inhibition.

What did the research show?

As a whole, the economic awareness of the workers was characterized by a positive attitude and by a focus on supporting the changes outlined by the party. This was apparent, in the first place, in the high assessment which the respondents gave to the efforts aimed at restructuring the national economy: in the opinion of 27 percent of the workers and 34 percent of the kolkhoz members, in their collectives there is an active intensification of production. Secondly, around 43 percent of the kolkhoz members and 30 percent of the workers feel that the measures undertaken to improve production efficiency have been effective. Some 37 percent of those questioned note the strengthening of the economy measures and 28 percent note the better use of technology and equipment. Thirdly, a majority of the respondents (62 percent) recognize that among the changes occurring in recent years, the most essential progress has been made in strengthening labor discipline. Although the share of noted positive shifts in the other areas of labor activity is still not very great (respectively 21.3 and 28.8 percent of the persons questioned pointed to an improvement in labor conditions and the organization of labor and 19.7 percent to the improvement in wages), it can be concluded that the process of organizing labor has become more dynamic and this has been reflected in the awareness of the people.

The positive attitude of economic awareness is particularly apparent in the readiness of the respondents (88 percent of the rank-and-file workers and 82 percent of the leaders) to work with even greater endeavor. Some 90 percent of those questioned were confident of a real opportunity to improve the quality of the work and the product produced in their collectives. This is all the more important as only 37 percent of the workers felt that they are realizing their abilities sufficiently fully.

The desire of the people to make their own personal contribution to the common undertaking provides a historical chance to change the situation in production, to utilize the creative potential of social awareness, to turn it into a material force and create all the conditions so that those who have realized the inadequacy of social demands and their own endeavor can realize their own views and creative ideas.

In noting the generally positive characteristics of economic awareness, it would be wrong to ignore a number of contradictions inherent to this at the current stage of restructuring. It is a question primarily of a certain caution and mistrust which had gathered in human memory. The broad masses of workers in our nation have repeatedly responded to various appeals with a sincere desire to carry out the designated plans, however they frequently had to abandon the good intentions. This circumstance cannot help but tell on the perception of the current changes. According to data of 1987, 41.6 percent of those questioned described the course of restructuring in the nation as successful and 9.3 percent as not producing any results. Some 20.1 percent of the respondents spoke about the successful development of restructuring in the labor collective but almost 40 percent did not see any changes. In other words, the people rather highly regard the changes as a whole for the country but at the same time as yet are very skeptical of the state of affairs in that collective where they are working. Such a discrepancy in judgment is fraught with undesirable consequences as without seeing positive changes directly on the job and in his labor activities, a person over time will also doubt the possibility of realizing the tasks raised on a nationwide scale. This, in turn, threatens a drop in the social mood, disappointment and passivity.

The successful implementation of the planned fundamental changes to a significant degree depends upon how clearly each worker sees those real problems which restrain or impede the normal course of restructuring. As the research has shown, here there are large gaps. Thus, over one-half of those questioned could not with sufficient certainty name the most important economic tasks confronting society as a whole and the labor collective, in particular. The importance of accelerating scientific and technical progress was mentioned by only one out of every six workers and kolkhoz members.

The involvement of workers in carrying out urgent socioeconomic problems lags particularly seriously

behind the demands of life: only 20 percent of the workers and 33 percent of the leaders see acute and immediate questions for the development of their production.

In such a situation one can scarcely count on the active participation of the workers in carrying out the ideas of restructuring as it is impossible to fight for what you do not know. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the economic education which should help in understanding the actually existing production problems brings benefit only in 10.2 percent of the cases. Even 21.2 percent of the persons questioned pointed out that knowledge in the economics area would help them solve individual questions on the job. Just 8 percent of the respondents had a good understanding of the economic processes occurring in the nation, six percent did in their city or rayon, while 20 percent did in the economic problems of their labor collective. Around one-third of the employees describe the corresponding knowledge as average and the remainder as poor.

This contradiction is all the more significant in that there is a disruption in the relationship between the actual level of informativeness and the desire of the people to know more about the economic life of society. The correctness of such a conclusion is confirmed by the following data: 76 percent of the respondents showed interest in the problems of the nation's economy and 87 percent did in the economic problems of their collective.

As far as the awareness of a majority of the workers, the restructuring had encouraged far from all to take decisive actions. This is explained by the fact that acceleration has not yet gained the necessary speed and has not mobilized the profound reserves of the human factor, that is, the interests of the people. As a consequence of this and as a result of the leveling in wages, the relationship between the results of labor and its payment has been obscured and an attitude has developed toward public property and the material incentive funds as if they were "no one's." The obtained data shed some light on the existing situation: 60 percent of those questioned doubted that an improvement in their work would involve an increase in earnings while 37 percent doubted that a worsening would "hit the pocketbook"; 70 percent do not link the successes or shortcomings in the production activities of their collectives with the corresponding solution to social questions.

Of course, errors of the past are reflected in such statements. However, at present many of these have not been overcome. Thus, although 89 percent of the workers and kolkhoz members pointed out that the problems of improving the productivity and quality of labor at their enterprises are discussed, only one out of five sees a concrete benefit from such measures. The restructuring of the economic mechanism is often carried out hurriedly and in a formal manner. More than one-half of the workers and kolkhoz members had submitted, in their words, proposals aimed at improving the work of their

collectives but only in 7 percent of the cases had these proposals been implemented. It is not surprising that just 25 percent of the respondents counted on an attentive attitude to their opinion.

An analysis of objective information, the statistical data and planning indicators show that it is still too early to speak about a substantial improvement in the production activities. Although many of the surveyed collectives did overfulfill the plans for the total volume of commodity product, they earned a profit and increased the output per worker, however, for such indicators as better quality in the produced products, a reduction in manual labor, the increased technical level of production, the return on investment and the equipment shift factor, the successes are still insignificant. At one out of two enterprises there are large losses in working time due to violations of labor discipline, personnel turnover surpasses 10 percent, the brigade forms of organizing labor have been poorly developed, just individual brigades have been converted to cost accounting, and only one-third of the enterprises has carried out proper work to improve the skills of the workers or kolkhoz members, to better product quality and strengthen economy.

Under these conditions, economic awareness does not set out with sufficient clarity those costs which are primarily related to the action of the human factor. Ensuring proper economy is judged very low (just 20 percent of those questioned admitted that the corresponding work was being carried out in their organization), as before mismanagement reigns in many labor collectives, obsolete and ossified forms of socialist competition are employed and the facts of the embezzlement of socialist property are discussed far from everywhere.

The gap which was disclosed in the course of the research between the high level of a positive attitude of lively economic awareness of the people, the desire for activities of change and their actual involvement in solving the problems of acceleration is very dangerous. History knows of many examples when revolutionary slogans were not backed up in organizational terms and the sincerity of the zeal of the masses was replaced by apathy and indifference.

The task in the present stage of development for Soviet society is to ensure authentic democratization in all areas of our life on a basis of economic interest, competence and professionalism. The workers from the various management levels should be examined not only by the superior bodies but also by the workers. The masses, in turn, will learn, as V.I. Lenin foresaw, to use the right to choose their own leaders, to test them out and when necessary change them.

Judging from the materials of the research, new tasks are still frequently resolved by old methods. The party and economic leaders have difficulty in mastering the science of democracy, they respond tardily to the requests of the

workers, and do little to actively involve them in management. The party, trade union and Komsomol organizations and the economic leaders have not gotten rid of their mania for useless meetings and the habit of acting upon instructions. The figures speak for themselves. The tenacity of the party organizations in improving economic activities and the strengthening supervision by the administration over the carrying out of decisions on restructuring questions were noted, respectively, by just 21 and 15 percent of the respondents.

The people are profoundly concerned by what significantly turns ideas into a material force, that is, the unity of word and deed. The absence of such in the activities of the party organizations was indicated by 34.2 percent of the rank-and-file workers with 49 abstaining from an opinion (among the leaders, respectively, 55 and 24.7 percent), in trade union activities, respectively, 40.4 and 42.2 in the first group and 70.2 and 26.4 in the second; in the activities of the administration 47.1 and 38 percent in the first and 65.9 and 13 percent in the second category of those questioned. Among the main reasons for such a situation, they mentioned the poor organizational work in carrying out the adopted decisions.

The idea of restructuring on the spot as yet is little embodied in real changes in the production management system and in the economic and social life of the workers. Here we can observe a contradiction which has appeared particularly in assessing the processes occurring on the job: the views of the leaders on the changes in the conditions, the organization and incentives for labor were 10-18 points higher than among the workers and kolkhoz members. Of course, such a discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the leading personnel spent a good deal of force, energy, knowledge and ability and that this had a positive effect on the production situation. However, the given circumstance was not adequately reflected in the awareness of subordinates. Under these conditions, the gap between word and deed can be reproduced on a new basis even with certain positive shifts. It must be stated with regret that only 16 percent of the leaders questioned considered the requests of the workers in taking managerial decisions. At the same time, considering the opinion of the rank-and-file members of the labor collectives on all questions of improving production is a guarantee not only for a real strengthening of the unity of word and deed but also a reflection of this in the economic awareness of the workers and kolkhoz members.

One of the restraining factors in acceleration is the slow restructuring in the activities of the social organizations as well as the maintaining of stagnant phenomena in the style and methods of leadership. Affirmative changes in the work of the party and trade union committees were pointed out only by 25 percent of the employees. The remainder admitted that these organizations as before are characterized by a mania for meetings, excessive paperwork, and the divorcing of word and deed. For the work of the party committees for every nine positive

views there was one negative one (the remainder pointed out that there were no changes), while in terms of the economic managers the ratio of judgments was, respectively, 6:1, for the trade unions 4:1, and for the Komsomol workers 2:1. It is noteworthy that the workers noted shifts for the better in social life 1.5-2-fold more rarely than did the rural workers.

The subjective assessments of the role of the party organizations in restructuring are confirmed by an analysis of the party documents. Just 26 percent of them are of a comprehensive nature (that is, they include economic, organizational and ideological aspects), but a majority of them basically touches on production questions. The measures set out in them are not focused on using the creative potential of the individual. An insignificant portion of the examined documents takes up new problems raised by life (the development of democracy, the participation of workers in management and the broadening of glasnost), and one out of three merely duplicates previously taken decisions. Around 40 percent of the adopted documents is not sufficiently concrete, they are short-term (planned for several months of work), and only 16 percent of these shows innovative methods while a majority duplicates the standard work forms. It has been ascertained that 22 percent of the decrees and plans envisages the carrying out of mass measures, 60 percent are not focused on considering the specific categories of individuals. Only one out of seven decisions is aimed at organizational and indoctrinational work in the brigades. Production problems are the concern of just 36 percent of all the decrees and work plans adopted in the surveyed CPSU gorkoms and raykoms and primary organizations. In other words, the party committees are far from always acting as political leadership bodies and this has been reflected in the critical assessment of their work.

In the course of the research, attempts were made to ascertain whether or not the assessment of the actual role of the communists in solving production questions has changed in social awareness. The obtained data make it possible to assert that a slight shift has occurred: only 19 percent of the respondents pointed to increased labor activeness and responsibility by the CPSU members. In our view, this question merits discussion at the forthcoming 19th Party Conference, for the leading role of the party is realized through the leading role of each of its members.

Judging from the expert evaluation of the state of affairs in the labor collectives, in approximately one-third of them such democratic institutions as brigade councils, meetings (assemblies), people's control groups and so forth function comparatively actively. It has been established that where the development level of self-management is sufficiently high, a majority of the economic, organizational and ideological tasks is carried out, as a rule, successfully. The opposite picture has been disclosed at enterprises where the administrative style of leadership is predominant.

As the obtained data indicate, many leaders underestimate the role of the human factor in intensifying production. Thus, only 10 percent of them pointed to the importance of improving intracollective relations and 16 percent to the necessity of involving the workers in management. Respectively, 23 and 32 percent were in favor of increasing the level of economic literacy and strengthening ideological conviction. More than one-half of the leaders could not provide any answer to the question concerning the forms of worker involvement in managing the affairs of the collective and just 15 percent of them viewed the proposals of the rank-and-file workers as the starting point for adopting one or another management decision.

The revolutionary nature of restructuring requires new thinking and new, dynamic methods in the activities of the leadership personnel. "Restructuring," commented M.S. Gorbachev, "is a revolutionary process, for this is a leap forward in the development of socialism and in the realizing of its essential characteristics. From the very outset we have been aware that time is short. It is very important not to 'idle' at the start, but rather to make up for the lost, to break out of the clutches of conservatism and shatter the inertia of stagnation" [2].

Under present-day conditions, there has been a particular increase in the demands placed upon such leadership qualities as professionalism, organizational skills and the ability to provide effective labor indoctrination. It was proposed that the industrial workers and kolkhoz members assess their immediate leaders including four men, work superintendents, section chiefs and farm heads precisely from this viewpoint. Some 36 percent of those questioned positively viewed the indoctrinational abilities, 44 percent the organizational ones and 47 percent the professional ones. The share of those who positively described the entire range of qualities needed by a leader was 27 percent.

Of enormous importance for successfully resolving the accumulating problems are improved political and economic studies and organizational support for the restructuring. Neither a material interest, entrepreneurship or the ability for more intense work stems automatically from the economic relations. Any economic reforms should be supplemented by the appropriate ideological and organizational work.

As the research materials show, the effectiveness of the means of ideological work as yet leave much to be desired. Only one out of every nine rank-and-file worker of those involved in an economic education (43 percent of the number questioned) commented on a great practical benefit of the exercises for their labor activity; 21 percent admitted that study helped solve individual questions; the remainder considered this a simple waste of time. Among the leadership personnel, more than 70 percent feels that they need to improve their economic knowledge, however only 23 percent point to a major real benefit of the studies for practical activities.

The local press is not fully involved in the restructuring of economic awareness. Only 33 percent of those who filled out the questionnaires mentioned the local and large-run newspapers as sources of information on economic life. An analysis of the materials in the city, rayon and large-run papers disclosed that the role of the human factor in intensifying production was not sufficiently brought out in the articles on economic questions; this was only one out of ten instances. Extremely few articles (less than one-fifth) were devoted to criticizing economic life.

The benefit from visual agitation means is also low. Thus, 37 percent of the respondents could not explain what problems this agitation has raised, although 90 percent admitted that there is visual agitation in the collectives.

The positive attitude of the people to change as yet is not supplemented by specific ideological work. The mobilization of workers to specific actions is frequently replaced by the ordinary "gross" approach both to the people and to solving urgent problems. There are many measures, there are also numerous persons engaged in preparing and carrying them out but the actual man is somehow dissolved in such a broad "scope." Concreteness, contact with life and with the real practices of the labor collective and the nation are the main demands on party and ideological work.

The research has disclosed one other set in the behavior of people which must be taken into account: they are not satisfied by assurances that at some time things will go well. Today, to a larger degree than previously, the broad working masses want that the improvement in their situation not be deferred to "later on" but rather be carried out immediately.

Thus, the readiness of people to participate in the restructuring is rather high. At the same time, in social awareness there still are strong elements of prejudice and a fear that the planned measures will not change the personal life of the workers for the better. In the course

of the research we have encountered a situation where the realization of the Marxist tenet on turning people into a social force has been distorted.

The economic awareness of the rank-and-file workers in a certain sense has been inhibited. Here a definite role is played by a pragmatic approach, an infatuation of a significant portion of the leaders with technocratic, voluntary leadership methods and their lack of high economic training and a profound understanding of social and ideological problems. The rectification of the situation can be aided, in our view, by training and retraining the managers, the national economic specialists, and by shifting personnel between the party apparatus and the scientific centers (such experience has been gained in certain socialist countries); by a bolder promoting of social scientists and promising young scholars to party work.

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The USSR Goskomstat [State Statistical Committee] Reports:

#### The Sale and Prices of Agricultural Products on City Markets in January 1988\* (for 264 cities)

Types of Products	Sold		In Rubles, Kopecks/Kg	Percent	State Listed Prices of Zone II
	Thousand Tons	Percent			
		to Jan 87		to Jan 87	
Potatoes	33.1	106	0-71	116	0-10
Fresh cabbage	8.6	104	0-71	103	0-20
Onions	8.2	113	0-63	85	0-50
Green onions	1.1	120	3-08	97	0-50
Beets	2.0	97	0-83	100	0-15
Carrots	8.5	111	0-70	96	0-25
Fresh cucumbers	0.3	216	6-31	100.7	3-00
Fresh tomatoes	0.3	194	5-61	91	2-00
Garlic	1.3	118	3-77	92	2-00
Parsley	1.0	118	4-25	110	1-50

The Sale and Prices of Agricultural Products on City Markets in January 1988\* (for 264 cities)

Types of Products	Sold		In Rubles, Kopecks/Kg	Percent	State Listed Prices of Zone II
	Thousand Tons	Percent			
		to Jan 87		to Jan 87	
Fennel	0.5	148	3-72	99	2-50
Apples	26.1	102	2-36	127	1-50
Beef	3.8	99.8	5-01	104	2-00
Mutton	0.4	118	5-05	104	1-90
Pork	6.7	111	4-59	103	2-10
Pork suet	1.9	122	4-22	102	2-40
Butter	0.05	108	8-16	101	3-60

\* The sale of agricultural products on the markets as a whole rose by 10 percent, and here by 11 percent for vegetable products and by 7 percent for livestock. Prices over this period rose by 6 percent.

**Public Opinion in Administrative System**

18060001d Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, May-Jun 88  
(signed to press 16 May 88) pp 24-29

[Article, published under the heading "Democratization of Public Life," by B.A. Grushin: "Public Opinion in the Administrative System"; Boris Andreyevich Grushin is a doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and deputy director of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Socioeconomic Questions under the AUCCTU and the USSR Goskomtrud (State Labor Committee). He is the author of the books "Ocherki logiki istoricheskogo issledovaniya" (Essays on the Logic of Historical Research) (1961), "Svobodnoye vremya. Aktualnyye problemy" (Free Time. Urgent Problems) (1967), "Mneniya o mire i mir mneniy" (Opinions About the World and the World of Opinions) (1967), "Effektivnost massovoy informatsii i propagandy: ponyatiye i problemy izmereniya" (Effectiveness of Mass Information and Propaganda: Concept and Problems of Measurement) (1979), "Massovaya informatsiya v sovetskom promyshlennom gorode" (Mass Information in a Soviet Industrial City) (1980, co-author), "Massovoye soznaniye" (Mass Awareness) (1987) and others. He has published several articles in our journal including "On Two Approaches to Studying Public Opinion" (No 4, 1982) and "The Structure and Composition of Social Awareness" (No 4, 1983)]

[Text] The main problems which confront our society in the sphere of the functioning of public opinion, and not merely confront but demand an immediate solution, are the problems primarily of a strictly practical sort. And in no way because the theorists are completely clear that they possess complete answers to all the questions. Would that it were so! In the examined area of sociological knowledge, the situation is bad since the very initial, base definition of the phenomenon of public opinion up to the present has aroused acute scientific disputes among the specialists (this, incidentally, has not pre-

vented them in many countries of the world from daily carrying out completely dependable and highly effective measurements of this phenomenon). No, it is not a question of disputes, it is a matter that public opinion, no matter how the theorists interpret it, and no matter how they resolve questions about its various strong and weak points, unfortunately, in Soviet society still does not hold its proper place and does not play—precisely in practice!—that role which by its very nature it is called upon and long should play in the entire system of socialist social relations, including (and primarily) in the system of social management or administration.

This is particularly apparent in our days in the life of a society which has set out to accelerate its socioeconomic and sociopolitical development and has encountered significant difficulties on this path. The nature of the difficulties is extremely complex and is linked to the action of many factors. And one of these, in my view, is that the extremely well thought out program for the renewing of socialism is not being carried out sufficiently consistently in certain areas. Of course, the process of the revolutionary changes set by the 27th CPSU Congress is a process of enormous complexity, a process designed for the historical long run, that is, it is not a single-time but rather consecutive solution to the problems which have accumulated in society. However, among these are those which do relate to the fundamental premises and to the most important component elements of the changes being programmed and for this reason should be involved in things not tomorrow but right now, or to put it more accurately, should be included from the very outset, from even yesterday.

Among these, and among the very first, are precisely the fundamental changes in the conditions and mechanisms for the functioning of public opinion in the nation, a

most important component and at the same time a dependable guarantee for the further deepening of socialist democracy and the development of the people's self-government. Without fearing to exaggerate, it can be said with every reason that the active search for effective mechanisms for the functioning of public opinion, the effective forms of its involvement in the life of society as a whole and in the processes of social administration, in particular, is presently—from the viewpoint of the ultimate destiny of restructuring—an equally important area of theoretical and practical work as is the widespread (both in science, in experiments and in the activities of all levels of the social organizations) search for effective management mechanisms. At the same time, this is still not clearly recognized in all its importance by our theory and practice. In speaking largely and justly about activating the human factor and about the need to involve the broad masses of the people in the restructuring process, we mention here only most generally the "increased role" of public opinion without any detailing of precisely what is meant, without a desire to clarify in what manner the designated "increase" should be brought about or what must be specifically undertaken so that this did not remain a mere good intention.

How, one might ask, can one explain such an attitude toward public opinion which is respectful in words but does not bother with deeds? The question, let us say frankly, is not an easy one. Here, in truth, the respectfulness is more or less understandable. Both in light of the fact that in our Constitution, and precisely in Article 9 where it is a question of the main areas for the development of the political system of Soviet society, direct mention is made about the "constant consideration of public opinion" [3] and, particularly, in light of the current situation when the problem of a qualitative improvement in socialist democracy and the active unleashing of the initiative and energy of the masses in all spheres of society's life has been put on the agenda. And as for the lack of hurry in changes in practice, here things are much more complicated, as this phenomenon is based upon a multiplicity of factors, including those which arose not yesterday, not the day before yesterday, but go back to the distant and remote history and even the prehistory of our society.

Obviously, here we would mention first of all the established traditions of administration which do not consider it necessary and for this reason are unable to turn for advice to public opinion or moreover take it into account in one's policy. V.I. Lenin, as is known, in a most decisive manner acted against these antidemocratic traditions, in constantly pointing out their perniciousness for Soviet power and in every possible way emphasizing the need for the broadest development of not only representative (here constantly linked with the authentic participation of the people and carried out under their authentic supervision) but also diverse forms of direct, immediate democracy. As is known, however, subsequently these traditions made headway, having given rise to numerous examples of bureaucratic-volitional

management which did not feel the need for public opinion, or, as A. Strelyanny described this a "cavalier" management [6], in spurning Lenin's ideas. And here also we must further put the generally rather limited (and at certain relatively recent stages in our history simply nullified) opportunities for a free, public expression of opinions and moods existing in society, that is, those situations which are lamentably known to us all and which Yu. Nagibin in a surprisingly apt, vivid and precise manner defined as "dead muteness" against a background of stormy "idle talk and glorification" [7]. Moreover, in bearing in mind the mentioned factors, one cannot but mention the weaknesses of the public itself which was forced to tolerate the more than humble place assigned to it in the life of society as a whole and its individual subdivisions as well as not sufficiently aware of itself, its real strength, and its numerous rights and possibilities including those set out in the USSR Constitution. In truth, today the public is in motion, it is actively getting to its feet and we see the proof of this in the powerful flow of critical and constructive judgments which pour off the pages of the newspapers and from the television screens, in the rise of numerous social—formal and informal—organizations and movements; in the very promising experience of the initiatives of the Union of Cinematographers. However, with all of this public opinion is certainly not just the journalists and writers, not only the leaders of enterprises and cultural workers and not only the production activists and scientists. Public opinion is the entire mass of people engaged in society in one or another activity and having on the question of this activity (and certainly on everything occurring in society as a whole!) their own views and judgments. And it is easy to realize, without in any way playing down the importance of all the shifts and changes presently observed, that we are still as before far from formulating and activating *such* public opinion and *such* a public.

To put it briefly, the heritage which we presently have in terms of the real (objective and subjective) status of public opinion in society cannot help but be assessed very critically. The interests of restructuring and the strategy of acceleration demand a decisive overcoming of this. And the most important step on this path is precisely a sober, realistic assessment of the situation as well as an awareness of the need for fundamental changes in the given sphere, and an awareness precisely by the public and—obviously primarily—by all the subjects [principals] of administration operating on the inferior, middle and superior stages of the social hierarchy. Today, everyone should clearly realize that "proper homage" to public opinion is not the demonstrating of "good tone" brought about by political fashion in administrative practices or not merely the manifestation of our goodwill, our sincere subjective aspirations showing a respect for democracy. No, the roots here are much deeper. They lie in the qualitative changes in the objective role of public opinion which have occurred recently in all types of modern (and we would point out not only socialist) societies and they are linked to the law of

history discovered by Marx according to which "together with the soundness of historical action there will be...the growth of the volume of the mass the concern of which it [historical action] is" [1]. And precisely here, beyond any doubt, lie the fundamental bases for the abrupt rise observed everywhere in the 20th Century in the role of the masses of people, and their stronger participation in the mechanisms of economic, social, cultural, political, ideological and other types of administration and management. Certainly to the degree that the masses are evermore involved in the various social processes be they production, cultural or political, on an active basis and as the objects of social action, their voice more and more, by necessity and objectively, that is, independently of the ideological tenets of the various forms of political rule, and as well often contrary to these tenets) gains the importance of the most essential factor in the processes of social administration, including decision-taking by the institutions of power.

Of course, under different economic, political, national, ideological and other conditions operating not only on a worldwide scale but also within individual societies, including our own, the state of affairs could develop differently. As a result, presently in a number of situations, one can observe how the public is powerless to change anything in the conduct of the corresponding administrative body—precisely in contrast to long ago times! Such disregard always leaves its trace, ending sooner or later with various complications in the administrative mechanisms, without even mentioning the general deterioration in the state of affairs in the corresponding spheres of social life. For this reason, no modern effective administration—if it actually endeavors to be such—cannot help but consider the existing new historical reality and, as a result, poses the task of analyzing and considering the mood of the masses for the various levels and ranks of politicians, administrators, scientific experts and generally everyone employed in its sphere. Of course, what is so characteristic for the present world as a whole should be a hundred-fold more characteristic for a society on the banner of which is written: "Socialism cannot be introduced by a minority party. It must be introduced by scores of millions when they learn to do this themselves" [2].

Bearing in mind the fundamental conditions for the "normal" functioning of public opinion which ensure its effective involvement in the administrative processes, sociological theory points up primarily two aspects: in the first place, the completeness of expression of this opinion, the public (open) representation of all its sectors and subunits using all the channels available in a society; secondly, the guaranteed incorporation of the public in the mechanisms of authority and in the processes of preparing, adopting and implementing decisions.

The attention presently being given by the party to the problem of glasnost as well as the first significant practical steps in this area create a favorable situation to put an end to the above-mentioned "muteness." In opening

all channels for an expression of requests, opinions and attitudes of the masses, the administrative bodies ultimately gain that essential component of social information without the consideration of which any, even the most intelligent solution to them cannot count on unconditional success. Certainly only in this manner the opportunity arises to recognize the most important characteristics of the subjective world of people (aside from all else, they are called upon to be precisely the future executors of the adopted decisions!). These are: the state of their requirements, interests, expectations and views of the world; the degree to which they are informed about various problems and events of reality, including the very decisions and initiatives by the party and the state; the degree to which they understand the designated problems and events, decisions and initiatives; the nature of their attitude toward these "subjects"; finally, the degree of their readiness to participate in overcoming the existing difficulties and in implementing the programs worked out. In referring to all of this, truly priceless information, the subjects [principals] of all levels of social administration gain a real opportunity to optimize literally all the steps of their activities, starting from the elaboration of the goals and directions of social development, including the necessary adjustment in the movement to these goals and ending with a definition of the effectiveness of the obtained results. Here, in my mind, the following aspects assume particularly important significance:

- 1) The effective ascertaining of urgent problems (the "evils of the day") which arise in the various areas of socialist construction in the aim of promptly attracting to them the attention of the party organizations, the state bodies and the broadest public;
- 2) The establishing of the range of proposals existing at a given moment concerning the ways and methods for resolving various problems and the elaboration of the most acceptable and effective measures;
- 3) Determining the level of the creative activeness and initiative of the masses in the aim of their further development, and for more broadly involving the public in all types of social activity, including the administrative and management processes;
- 4) Determining the degree of conformity of mass awareness to the standards, values and images accepted in society, that is, measuring the effectiveness of the ideological and indoctrinational work carried out by the party and the state in the aim of further improving this.

In a word, the granting of the opportunity for public opinion to speak out, to express its position freely and completely on all questions concerning it—both within the context of the individual subdivisions of society (primary collectives, enterprises, institutions, cities, regions and so forth) as well as on a society-wide scale as a whole—is capable of having a very strong impact on the forms and methods of social administration, in

qualitatively altering its character and fundamentally increasing its effectiveness. Simultaneously with the movement in this direction there will also be a strengthening and development of the public itself, its self-awareness, strength and responsibility. However, in order for both to become a fact, it is essential to ensure the public expression of the entire, the complete, not the partial, not the truncated spectrum of opinions and attitudes existing in the society (or any part of it). "Clearly, the time has come," pointed out M.S. Gorbachev at the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "to set to working out legal enactments which would guarantee glasnost. They should...provide the workers with a real opportunity to voice their opinion on any question of public life" [4]. This proposal merits the most decisive support and the most important guarantee for its realization should be, of course, the final abolishing of the very fact that there exist such "zones," "personages" and "subjects" which are outside the public statements of the people generally, and likewise those numerous barriers which impede if not completely exclude the promulgating of "undesirable" (that is, to the disliking of one or another administrative body or specific leader) viewpoints. Any opinion on any question is precisely how theory fundamentally poses and resolves the question. And precisely in this manner it should be posed and solved in the practice of socialist democracy. Otherwise, the truth about the actual state of the "minds and hearts" in our society with inexorable inevitability will again be doomed to a perfidious half-truth or an outright untruth, and again society will see itself in a distorted, although embellishing mirror, and the administrative bodies will adopt decisions doomed to failure.

At the same time, as was already pointed out, a public expression of all the sectors of public opinion existing in a society in and of itself does not yet ultimately ensure the effective involvement of the public in the processes of social administration. The model proposed here by the popular television program "12th Story," where everyone makes himself heard with equal loudness and then goes home having resolved nothing, clearly cannot be adopted here. Certainly, at present it is a question of not merely glasnost but rather qualitative changes in the system of socialist democracy as a whole certainly not only with the unleashing but also the complete use of the initiative and energy of the masses, including the broadest development of the effective forms of democratic self-management. And this means that the public should constantly feel and see that they closely heed the public voice in all instances, as a minimum, and that its position is closely examined by the administrative bodies and without fail, in one way or another, in one form or another, are considered in the process of preparing and adopting decisions. Finally, in many situations the public and only the public possesses the right to hand down the final "verdict" on various questions of social life.

In other words, it is a question of actually including public opinion in the mechanisms of authority operating

in a society. This presupposes the elaboration of numerous, including legislative, measures which would, on the one hand, provide for the introduction into social life of diverse effective forms and methods for the involvement of the masses in administration and, on the other, would guarantee an interested and responsible attitude toward the public's position on behalf of all subjects [principals] of party, state and economic leadership, without exception. The Decree of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee includes a broad program for moving along this path and this includes, aside from all else, a significant strengthening of the impact of the workers on the selection of personnel and the supervising of their work. This includes: the introduction of the electing of production leaders; the granting of decisive powers to the meetings of the labor collectives in reviewing production and social questions; a further improvement in the Soviet electoral system toward a more effective than hithertofore participation of the masses in the electoral process in all its stages [5]. However, it is essential to bear in mind that all of this is merely a beginning and that many difficulties must still be surmounted in order to ultimately alter the attitude toward public opinion in the power structures, and in practice to prove to all the administrative workers and bodies that public opinion is not a "poor relative" and not a "petitioner from outside" but a subject [principal] with full rights and powers in administrative activities and that it is not a "contractor" but a true ally, not a regrettable impediment in their work but, on the contrary, an important factor and mechanism for a qualitative improvement in its efficiency.

Bearing in mind this entire very complex set of problems, our social theory and practice must presently conduct a broad search linked to disclosing and adequately assessing the entire range of possible modes for the involvement in administrative processes of the voice of the masses, and realizing both the consultative and supervisory as well as the directive (in the event of direct democracy) functions of public opinion. As experience indicates, the range of such forms can be very broad: from the direct, full incorporation of the public's position in the contents of the decision being taken to one or another indirect consideration of this position as a background or condition for implementing the decision. Particularly as the "vox populi," as is known, is not always the "vox dei."

And here we approach one other important condition for the "normal," that is, effective interaction of public opinion and the administrative system operating in the society, that is, the necessity of setting up a special, professional study of the requests, opinions and moods of the people. As the results of the sociological research conducted by us indicate, a majority of the workers in the administrative bodies is sincerely convinced that without any special study, merely on the basis of immediate experience of the direct and indirect contacts with the people, they are fully informed on the true state of public opinion concerning all the questions of the life of

society, the region and the enterprise. Certainly this is an error and an illusion which is fraught with numerous negative consequences, including in the administrative sphere. Having heard the impressive lesson of truth presented at the 27th Party Congress, out of inertia we continue to use the customary formulas: "The Soviet people consider...", "The inhabitants of our city are united to a man...", "Our collective is convinced...", "This is not essential to our consumer (viewer, reader and so forth)..." At the same time, it should be clear to everyone that with such a strict approach (and only such an approach is presently presupposed in the administrative system) each of these formulas can be viable only in the instance that behind it—and each time!—there will be a dependable, adequate measure of the actual state of public opinion. Such a measurement, as theory and practice show, can be carried out only by the forces and means of science based on a tested methodology.

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#### Ethnosocial Differentiation in Estonian Urban Population

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[Article, published under the heading "National Relations," by A.V. Kirkh, P.E. Yarve and K.R. Khaav: "Ethnosocial Differentiation in Estonian Urban Population"; Aksel Voldemarovich Kirkh is a candidate of philosophical sciences and a senior scientific associate at the History Institute of the Estonian Academy of Sciences and a permanent contributor to the journal. Priyt Elmarovich Yarve is a candidate of philosophical sciences and a sector head at the same institute. Kaarel Rometovich Khaav is a candidate of psychological sciences and a senior science associate at the Party History Institute under the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party. Both authors are appearing for the first time in *Sotsiologicheskoye issledovaniya*]

[Text] "The further flourishing and integration," "the triumph of internationalism"—such words were resorted to most often during the period of stagnation in assessing nationality relations. Such an ideological set justified the inertia of controlling minority nationality processes and at the same time opened up scope for subjective decisions. As a result in this sphere many major problems built up. For resolving them it required new theoretical and practical approaches. "Nationality policy at the present stage," emphasized M.S. Gorbachev, "is a very major concern for us. We must be concerned with it in all areas—in theory and in practice. This is a most fundamental, vitally important question for our society" [1].

What are the particular features of the nationality processes in Estonia and their relationship to the republic's socioeconomic development? We would like to take up one of the aspects of the question, the ethnosocial differentiation of the urban population. Precisely here in recent decades the most substantial changes have occurred influencing minority nationality development.

The dynamics of the republic's nationality composition in recent years has been determined chiefly by two processes: by migration from other regions and by a natural increase in the indigenous population. While the former is constantly growing, the latter has declined (in 1978-1985, it showed a minus sign). This was reflected primarily in the number of Estonians. In 1959, they were 75 percent of the republic's residents, in 1979, they were 64 percent, and in 1986, 61 percent. Among the urban population, the share of Estonians presently does not exceed 50-51 percent (in 1959, 61 percent, in 1970, 57.5 percent and in 1979, 54 percent). But behind the average indicators are significant territorial differences. For example, among the residents of the capital, Estonians are less than one-half, in Kokhtla-Yarve they are one-quarter and in Narva only 5 percent. At the same time, in the republic there are several towns where the number of Estonians reaches 85-90 percent.

The accelerated migration was brought about by urbanization and by the extensive development of industry. In recent decades new jobs have been constantly established in Estonian industry and construction. The intra-republic migration could provide them only partially with personnel while the basic demand was covered from persons moving in from other regions. As a result, in a number of the sectors of the republic economy there has been a sharp decline in the proportional amount of the indigenous population. In 1983, the number of Estonians employed in construction declined by more than 7,000 persons in comparison with 1973; in the oil-shale industry they comprise only one-fifth of the workers, in the machine building, power engineering and pulp-paper industry just one-third, and at the enterprises producing building materials and in light industry they are two-fifths [2].

In a word, due to economic and demographic factors, the nationality diversity of the republic's employed urban population has intensified, and in particular, in Tallinn (for more detail see [3, p 36]). In our opinion, the main ethno-social differences in the structure of the employed population are determined by a differentiation along the axis "predominantly physical—mental labor and sex—age."

According to the data of the last census in the cities, the share of Estonians declined and there was an increase in the proportional amount of representatives from the

other nationalities, primarily the Russian-speaking population (this includes not only Russians but all of those who in their daily life use Russian predominantly). This process has gone on at a particularly rapid pace among the youth of Tallinn (see Table 1). At present, it is more and more actively encompassing the next age group of 30-39 years. An argument in favor of such an assumption is the fact that from 1971 through 1987, the number of persons of nonindigenous nationality increased by almost 100,000 persons in Tallinn, from 161,000 to 258,000 [4]. The increase occurred basically due to migrants among which there was a predominance of middle-aged persons.

**Table 1: The Share of Persons of Indigenous and Nonindigenous Nationality Among the Employed Population (Data of 1979 Census, Calculation by Authors), /**

Sociodemographic Groups	Estonians	Representatives of Other Nationalities*
<i>Tallinn</i>		
Males, including of age	45	55
16-29 years	33	67
30-39 years	50	50
40-49 years	50	50
50 years and older	52	48
Females, including of age	50	50
15-29 years	43	57
30-39 years	54	46
40-49 years	52	48
50 years and older	55	45
<i>Urban Settlements</i>		
Males, including of age	51	49
15-29 years	43	57
30-39 years	53	47
40-49 years	52	48
50 years and older	58	42
Females, including of age	52	48
15-29 years	45	55
30-39 years	55	45
40-49 years	52	48
50 years and older	59	41
<i>Rural Settlements</i>		
Males, including of age	83	17
15-29 years	74	26
30-39 years	88	12
40-49 years	85	15
50 years and older	87	13
Females, including of age	85	15
16-29 years	81	19
30-39 years	85	15
40-49 years	89	11
50 years and older	86	14

\* Around three-quarters of the group is made up of Russians and a third of it is indigenous residents of the republic.

As for the ethnosocial differentiation by the nature of labor, here one can speak about a clearly expressed specialization of the Estonian and non-Estonian population, in any event in Tallinn (see Table 2). Estonians predominate only in individual vocations involving physical labor (among the garment workers, drivers and trade workers) and virtually in all vocations involving

mental labor. The nonindigenous Russian-speaking residents, on the contrary, are employed predominantly in physical labor and among the vocations involving mental labor their share is substantial only in the group of engineers and technicians. It is worthy of note that an analogous ratio between the representatives of the indigenous and nonindigenous nationalities was disclosed in Tashkent by L.S. Perepelkin [7].

**Table 2. Index for Participation of Estonians and Representatives of Other Nationalities in Various Types of Vocational Activity (Tallinn, 1979)\***

Vocational Groups	Estonians	Representatives of Other Nationalities
<b>Predominantly Physical Labor</b>	0.92	1.07
Machine building and metal-working workers	0.79	1.19
Textile workers	0.83	1.16
Garment workers	1.10	0.90
Construction workers	0.78	1.20
Railroad workers	0.51	
Workers		1.45
of motor transport, including urban passenger	1.03	0.98
trade and public dining	1.10	0.91
communal economy and consumer services	1.02	0.98
<b>Predominantly Mental Labor</b>	1.11	0.90
Leaders of enterprises and their subdivisions	1.49	0.56
Engineers and technicians	1.0	1.0
Medical workers	1.04	0.96
Scientific workers, instructors, teachers, workers in preschool institutions	1.34	0.69
Workers in art	1.74	0.33
Specialists		
trade, public dining, procurement, supply and marketing	1.19	0.83
planning and accounting bodies	1.16	0.86

\* Index (it is sometimes termed the "association index" [5]) is calculated in the following manner: the share of the representatives of the given nationality in the vocational group is divided by the share of this nation in the employed population [6].

The sharp decline in the number of indigenous residents is characteristic not only of Tallinn where they are only one-third of the population. A similar situation has developed in the Northeastern Region of Estonia. The rapid growth of power engineering and the shale chemical industry in Narva and Kokhtla-Yarve has required many new working hands. There was not enough of them on the spot and, as is usually the case, personnel was recruited in other areas, in the given instance the neighboring oblasts of the Russian Federation. The use of extensive methods for running the economy brought about not only negative economic and ecological consequences. In the Northeastern Region, the Estonians ended up in the role of a national minority. The traditional nationality situation survived only in the medium and small towns of the republic. Here there was a predominance of uniform-nationality labor collectives and intercourse between nationalities was carried out in Estonian.

have endeavored to answer this question in relying on the results of two studies carried out in the republic. In 1981, associates from the History Institute of the Estonian Academy of Sciences questioned the employed population of Tallinn (n = 1,440 persons) and in Rakvere (n = 1,000 persons). In 1986, the Party History Institute under the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party conducted a representative study of the urban population. In Tallinn, 533 persons were questioned, 408 in the area of Kokhtla-Yarve and 422 in the other towns and urban-type settlements. In both instances, the sample was a quota one.

The obtained data show that in Tallinn the population groups of indigenous and nonindigenous nationalities did not differ substantially in terms of social position, income and educational level. Nevertheless, this situation was perceived contradictorily by the Estonians: as just from the socioeconomic viewpoint but not conforming to expectations in the area of nationality development. The problem is that for the indigenous inhabitants

How did the designated processes reflect in the nationality awareness of the different population groups? We

Tallinn is the center of nationality life. Here is concentrated the flower of the intelligentsia and working class. For the Estonians, Tallinn serves as the apex of the social and sociocultural hierarchy. But the representatives of other nationalities view it as one of the possible places of residence and employment. Of course, the ethnic aspect plays a definite role in the choice of one or another city but here usually socioeconomic motives are predominant.

What are the reasons for the contradictions between the sociocultural and economic development of Tallinn? These are predominantly the prevalence of narrow departmental approaches over the interests of the city as an integrated social organism, the extensive growth of industry and the falling behind of the social infrastructure as well as the absence of a clear social policy. As a consequence of this there has been a weakening of social ties and an increased feeling of alienation among the residents. Problems, let us say directly, are presently characteristic of many large cities. But in the given instance there are also specific problems. As a result of the intensive spontaneous migration which has been ongoing for a quarter of a century, in Tallinn there has been a reduced sphere for the use of the Estonian language. This, naturally, evokes dissatisfaction among the indigenous residents, particularly the older-generation people who know only Estonian. They frequently cannot explain themselves intelligibly to a physician, a policeman, a salesperson, a postal worker or to representatives of other vocations among whom are many Russian-speaking migrants. The fact that the housing conditions of the migrants, as a rule, are better than among the indigenous Tallinn residents is perceived very harshly and from the standpoint of internationality relations [3, p 363].

Naturally, the relations between the nationalities are internally differentiated. We have endeavored to disclose the differences existing here, using the results of 1986 research. In the course of it a system of indicators was constructed characterizing the main components of nationality self-awareness, linguistic community and the ethnocultural orientations of the Estonians and Russian-speaking residents of the republic. By the aggregating of 95 initial features (answers to questions), 19 indexes were formed and by these a typologization was carried out. Using the method of automatic classification 7 types were established in the subaggregate of Estonians and 6 in the Russian-speaking subaggregate. In both instances, by unification 3 typological groups were obtained. They are completely representative for describing nationality relations among the urban population and, what is particularly important, they reflect the relationship of subjective and objective factors.

Characteristic of the first type of Estonians (42 percent of those questioned) is a readiness for frequent contacts with representatives of the other nationalities and a high intensity of such contacts. The respondents comprising the given group possess a developed self-awareness of their nationality and inherent to them are high cultural

activeness and a great interest in the culture of the other peoples in the nation. At the same time, many of those questioned were concerned by the state of nationality relations in the republic and their development prospects. They were particularly concerned over the fact that the proportion of Estonians in the republic population was steadily dropping.

The respondents in the second type (35 percent) did not show profound interest either in their own or in the culture of other nations. Contacts with the representatives of different ethnoses were frequent but were of a superficial nature. Inhabitants of Kokhtla-Yarve Rayon predominate in this group.

The next group (23 percent) basically comprise the residents of Tallinn and the small towns. Among these respondents there is a heightened sense of nationality [minority] self-awareness. Interest in the culture of other nations is lower than in the first two instances. Representatives of this group are basically in contact with fellow tribesmen and for this reason rarely use a second language. It should not be excluded that such relative exclusiveness is caused by the rarity of contacts with representatives of the other nationalities in the labor process. At the same time, "the attitude toward labor is for the Estonian the main criterion for assessing the other people and representatives of different nationalities.... Such an attitude gives rise to the opinion of the cautiousness of Estonians in contact and this frequently does not correspond to reality" [8].

In the group of the nonindigenous Russian-speaking population, the first type (28 percent) is made up of persons with high cultural activeness and showing great interest in the local culture and the culture of other Soviet peoples. The representatives of this type have mastered Estonian and frequently are in contact with Estonians, they know well the traits of their national character and take a clear-eyed view of the state of nationality relations.

The largest in number is the second type with 37 percent. The respondents comprising it have a poor knowledge of Estonian, they have a poor understanding of the national features of the Estonians and show virtually no interest in their culture and history. It is worthy of note that many respondents from this group are indifferent to the history and culture of their own and other peoples in our nation. The designated type is represented chiefly by the residents of Kokhtla-Yarve and Tallinn.

The respondents in the third type (35 percent) show definite interest in the culture and history of the Estonians and other Soviet peoples. However, without a knowledge of Estonian, the persons questioned in the given group have a limited circle of contacts with the indigenous residents. In intercourse between the nationalities they are guided by abstract notions of internationalism.

The significant changes which have occurred over the last 30 years in the nationality composition of the Estonian population and the increase in socioeconomic problems brought about by the extensive development of the national economy and by the bureaucratization of management—all of this could not help but be reflected in the nationality self-awareness of the main ethnic groups. In a multinationality environment a violation of the principles of social justice and oversights in the socioeconomic sphere assume an ethnic tint. The Estonians perceive the existing problems more sharply. This can be seen not only in the actions of the local intelligentsia [10]. Among the youth dissatisfaction at times assumes extremist forms and often it ends as pessimism over the question of the development of the Estonians as a socialist nation.

The representatives of the different peoples living in the republic are aware of the existing nationality situation not so acutely. In part because they feel that the existing state of affairs is natural and partially due to an insufficient knowledge of the local culture. Obviously, the poor familiarity with the latter, on the one hand, and a definite separation from the home nationality culture, on the other, give rise to the illusion of the absence or secondariness of nationality problems. In actuality, they are the same for both and equally concern each participant in nationality relations. This was taken up at the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party: "...Living in our republic are the representatives of many minority cultures and we in our policy of internationalism give little consideration to this. Possibly it would be correct to set up cultural centers in Tallinn or another city, for instance, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Armenian and so forth. This would strengthen the natural right of the peoples of these nationalities to be involved in their own cultural milieu and would also serve to provide closer acquaintance of our republic's residents with the cultures of other peoples" [10].

Interest in culture and history has increased sharply at present. The realization is spreading evermore widely that the spiritual component of life is not only valued for itself but also has economic consequences. Our analysis shows that the uniformly optimistic approach which has prevailed for a long time for nationality development has brought about a sharp intensification of uncontrollable processes and to heightened tension in nationality relations. Nationality policy should be an inseparable part of economic and social policy.

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**Joint Labor in International Collectives**  
*18060001f Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE*  
*ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, May-Jun 88*  
*(signed to press 16 May 88) pp 35-37*

[Article by V.M. Gaskov: "Joint Labor in International Collectives"; Vladimir Mikhaylovich Gaskov is a candidate of economic sciences and senior science associate at the International Scientific Research Institute for Management Problems. This is his first appearance in our journal]

[Text] In the course of the reform in foreign economic activities in the CEMA member nations, direct economic ties have been growing and the number of joint production enterprises and associations has been increasing. International collectives are developing within these and here specialists from different countries work side by side. They often differ in terms of the level of technical, economic and sociocultural development and this gives rise to a number of problems which are acutely felt, experienced and often complicate the production association.

We have examined the mechanisms of interaction between collaboration partners within the joint Mongolian-Soviet Erdenet Production Enterprise located on Mongolian territory. The sample was made up of around

40 percent of the number of international brigades at the joint enterprise (450 persons), equally from both countries. A special method was developed and this was based upon the mutual assessment by the partners [1]. As a result, the stereotypes of reciprocal intergroup perception were ascertained. The respondents evaluated the main traits in the production behavior of their colleagues, their orientation and values in the labor sphere [2]. Here we assumed that the judgments of the reciprocal behavior differences between the partners to a greater degree than ideas on similarity would comprise stable stereotypes of intergroup perception.

It was determined that in the process of the perception of Soviet partners by the Mongolian participants, there was a predominance of the so-called mechanism of "personal identification" [3]: of the 33 investigated traits of production behavior, 29 were viewed by the local workers as

inherent virtually to an equal degree (a divergence within limits of 10 percent) to both the Soviet and Mongolian colleagues. The Mongolian respondents noted a noticeable difference in the partners only for four items: more punctilious; independent (capable of acting independently and decisively); possessing greater over-all culture and breadth of knowledge; focused on high earnings. At the same time, the assessments by the Soviet specialists of their partners differed substantially from their own self-evaluations in 30 instances out of 33 (see Table). Thus, in the opinion of the Soviet specialists, the involvement of their Mongolian partners in production life was almost 1.5-fold less, while the Mongolian workers themselves in assessing this quality virtually identified with the Soviets (a difference of 10 percent in the assessments).

**Table: Traits of Production Conduct of Soviet Workers (in Self-Assessments and Partner Assessments)\***

Traits of Production Conduct	Self-Assessment of Soviet Workers	Assessments of Mongolian Workers
Punctiliousness in deeds	8.2	5.3
Ability to act independently and decisively	8.3	4.8
Intolerance of shortcomings	7.8	4.8
Responsibility, ability to keep one's word and precisely carry out duties	8.8	5.2
Efficiency, discipline	8.7	5.6
Ability to think logically and take well-conceived decisions	8.1	5.1
Results of work	8.3	5.9
Dedication to work	8.4	5.6
Desire to consider partner's interests in joint work	8.2	6.1
Desire to bear equal responsibility for jointly taken decisions	8.5	5.4

\* Measurement scale from 0.0 to 10.0.

It turned out that the Mongolian workers identified themselves with the Soviet ones for 12 out of the 20 base values of production activity. At the same time, the Mongolian partners viewed themselves as oriented at job promotion, increasing earnings, prestige work and participation in decision taking and as possessing a low feeling of collectivism and not striving to improve skills. In turn, the Soviet specialists felt that the Mongols more than the Soviet workers tried for high wages and promotion, but here their dominant interests were directed to the family and everyday sphere. In the reciprocal views of the value orientations both partners coincided only on the fact that the Soviets to a greater degree than the Mongols endeavored to participate in preparing and adopting production decisions. A majority of the reciprocal assessments of value orientations did not coincide and in terms of the orientation toward higher wages, job promotion and skill improvement were even contradictory.

At the same time, in the course of the joint work by the partners, there were active processes of their mutual adaptation and interinfluence, and as a result of this both the models of conduct and the value orientations changed. The trends of the change in value orientations of the local personnel could be traced by comparing them

in three groups: the Mongolian school children, students at a PTU [vocational-technical school] and employees at the joint enterprise. In the compared age categories, no noticeable change was recorded in the intensity of such values as "important, diverse and independent work," "the opportunity to instruction, the complete use of knowledge and abilities" and "the possibility of promotion up the career ladder." These data confirm our results on the still low motivational involvement of the Mongolian workers in the sphere of production activity and on the insignificant linkage of their life plans with work at the enterprise. At the same time, we recorded a greater desire to participate in decision taking, for a dedication to work and for better cooperation.

Under the conditions of the poor relevancy of the self-evaluations and the contradictoriness of the mutual evaluations, it is possible to consider as dependable those particular features of production conduct which were noted simultaneously by both the Soviet and Mongolian partners. Thus, the assessments of differences in the stereotypes of reciprocal perception indicate that the Mongolian workers prefer (and this was confirmed by their Soviet colleagues) a more authoritarian

style of management and a high degree of collectivism in production life in its various manifestations. Thus, the designated differences between the large groups of Soviet and Mongolian workers were substantial and can hypothetically be viewed as sociocultural ones.

Although the changes in the value orientations of the local workers are largely linked with the involvement of youth in production life, nevertheless many of them arose under the impact of joint work with Soviet partners, in accelerating the formation of a new industrial type of local personnel. The obtained results show that a number of types and traits of production conduct as well as interests, value orientations and the moral standards of partners from different countries are permanently reproduced under the conditions of their national economy and ethnic and sociocultural milieu. This, on the one hand, sets the limits of mutual adaptation for the participants in joint labor and, on the other, indicates the need to prepare the personnel for working with certain partners and organizing an international exchange of experience in the system of production activities.

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#### In Search of a Viewer

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(signed to press 16 May 88) pp 47-53

[Article by T.A. Klyavina and S.P. Khrshanovskaya: "In Search of a Viewer"; the article was written from the results of a questionnaire of RSFSR theater leaders; the authors are employed at the Leningrad State Institute for the Theater, Music and Cinematography imeni N.K. Cherkasov. Tatyana Alekseyevna Klyavina is a candidate of art history and sector head. Sofya Petrovna Khrshanovskaya is a candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate. Both are published for the first time in our journal]

[Text] A theater experiment is underway. Its results and the ways for renewing the theater are being widely discussed by the public. What model or models were not

selected, and the success of realizing those that were will depend largely upon the ideological and artistic aspirations and views of those who stand at the head of the theater collectives.

In the aim of learning the opinion of theater workers the Leningrad State Institute for the Theater, Music and Cinematography imeni N.K. Cherkasov within the program of the Sectorial Sociological Service of the RSFSR Ministry of Culture conducted a questionnaire of the main producers and directors of 166 dramatic and young viewer theaters of the RSFSR (the sample did not include the collectives of Moscow and Leningrad). In December 1986, at the regional repertory and touring conferences in Gorkiy, Irkutsk, Chelyabinsk and Krasnodar, they questioned 282 persons or 90 percent of the leaders heading peripheral theater collectives. Of this number there were 73 main producers and 74 directors of the republic, oblast and kray dramatic theaters, 20 main producers and 21 directors of the TYuZ [Young Viewer Theater], and 49 main producers and 45 directors of the city theaters. Among those questioned men comprise 90 percent, with 95 percent having a higher education. The average length of employment of the respondents in the cultural institutions was around 20 years. Some 57 percent of the leaders had been working in the given theater at least 5 years (35 percent, 2 years). Two out of three of the main producers and one out of three of the directors had previously been actors. Thus, the participants of the survey had been involved in the theater virtually all their working life, in changing positions, specialties and cities. This provides grounds to consider the opinion of those specialists questioned very competent.

The questionnaires were named as the organization of the study did not make it possible to provide anonymity. All those who replied signed the questionnaire, they showed interest and many requested a sociological study of the audience of their theaters.

#### A Theater Olympus

Of primary interest was the assessment by the specialists of the state of theater art in the nation. The questionnaire, in particular, contained a request to name the contemporary Soviet producers whose creative quests seem the most significant to the respondents. We wanted, in the first place, to learn what creativity (or what type of artistic search) is presently the guideline of professional awareness; secondly, to ascertain the group of producers who in the professional milieu are considered the leaders of the theater process. Some 90 percent of the research participants answered the question. The list compiled by us included names (a total of 23) mentioned as a minimum on three questionnaires. A leading group was established the representatives of which by the number of votes greatly outstrip the others. The group was comprised of the following producers (the figures designate the percentage of collected votes):

M. Zakharov	38	R. Sturua	13
G. Tovstonogov	33	A. Efros	10
L. Dodin	20	A. Goncharov	8
A. Vasilyev	18	V. Fokin	4
O. Yefremov	15	G. Trotyanetskiy	4

From 3 to 8 persons named P. Monastyrskiy, E. Nekroshyus, A. Borisov, A. Shapiro, V. Kokorin, V. Morozov, V. Shrayman, R. Vityuk, K. Ginkas, R. Israfilov, Yu. Yeremin, M. Salimzhanov and M. Tumanishvili.

The given list is also indicative from the geographic viewpoint. Moscow was represented by 10 persons, Leningrad by 2, the Union republics by 4 and the Russian peripheral theaters by 7. In the latter instance, just one, G. Trostyanskiy (at that time the chief producer at the Omsk Dramatic Theater), received over 10 votes. Such a small number is explained more not by the absence of interesting artists in the Russian theaters but by a lack of information about their work. In the given context, the question arises of just how effective are the presently held numerous festivals and reviews? They should acquaint not only the broad viewers with the theaters but also submit to judgment by specialists works on the leading edge of artistic search. Certainly, the propagandizing of the best in the activities of the peripheral collectives is extremely important for the theater process as a whole.

What else is striking here? This is the discrepancy of opinions between those questioned and the official "table of ranks" of the producers. In any sphere of creativity, professional judgments to one or another degree do not coincide with the rather inert system of official leadership. However, it cannot help but be pointed out that in the given instance the degree of discrepancy in the assessments is extremely great. One might mention a whole series of decorated and honored main producers the names of whom were not mentioned at all in the questionnaires.

The producers who comprise the leader group are the authors of the best, in the view of the respondents, productions. The corresponding question was answered by 205 persons (72 percent).

The most popular was the performance "History of a Horse" produced by G. Tovstonogov and it was mentioned by 32 persons. In second place was "So We Win!" by O. Yefremov with 25 votes, in third place "Brothers and Sisters" by L. Dodin with 24 votes (see the table). From 1 to 4 percent of the votes was received by the productions of A. Borisov, A. Goncharov, Yu. Yeremin, V. Kokorin, Yu. Lyubimov, P. Monastyrskiy, E. Nekroshyus, V. Fokin, P. Fomenko and G. Yanovskaya. It is not difficult to notice that the list of the best is made up chiefly of productions on the Moscow stage. Theater Russia is represented very poorly and among the few here they mention the productions of the Omsk, Yakutsk

and Kuybyshev Dramatic Theaters and the Irkutsk TYuZ. The designated situation again is largely explained by the poor familiarity with the best works of the local theaters.

Which writers' plays did the persons questioned want to see on their stages? Some 227 persons (80 percent) replied to this question. They mentioned around 60 names. Most frequently (at least on 3 questionnaires) they mentioned the following writers and playwrights: V. Rozov (23 percent), A. Dudarev (22 percent), A. Gelman (21 percent), M. Shatrov (20 percent), V. Arro (14 percent), A. Galin (12 percent), L. Petrushevskaya (11 percent), M. Roshchin (10 percent), L. Razumovskaya (10 percent), M. Varfolomeyev, R. Solnetsev, V. Dozortsev and V. Merezhko (6 percent each), E. Radzinskiy, A. Volodin and S. Lobozerov (5 percent each), A. Chernitskiy and S. Zolotnikov (4 percent each), M. Karim, I. Drutse, V. Gurkin (3 percent each), A. Kazantsev, V. Slavkin, A. Misharin and Yu. Mirosnichenko (2 percent each) and A. Abdullin, G. Borovik, I. Dvoetskiy, E. Graginskiy, L. Zorin, N. Pavlova, T. Minnulin, A. Kosenkov and S. Kokovkin (1 percent each). In considering that 20 more names were mentioned once, it can be hoped that there will be a diversity of playbills of the Russian theater. We would also point out that in the choice of the authors and subjects the respondent did not give preference to anyone and there were no adherents of exclusively the "new wave," public affairs of production dramaturgy. One other noteworthy fact. In recent years, in terms of the number of attendances, the plays of B. Ratser and V. Konstantinov have led (11,000 performances in 5 years!). In the course of the survey, just one producer expressed a desire to attend any performance of these.

A majority of the respondents wanted to see on the stages of their theaters performances of works by well-known writers. Some 199 persons replied to this question. Around 20 were against adaptations. From modern Soviet literature, there was the greatest interest shown in the creative work of B. Mozhayev, Yu. Trifonov, F. Abramov, S. Zalygin, Yu. Bondarev, Yu. Nagibin, V. Shukshin and B. Okudzhava. The most popular author was Ch. Aytmatov. One-quarter of those answering the question hope to bring his prose to the stage.

The list of works which attracted the attention of the respondents consisted of two unequal parts. In the first are scores of novels and stories by Ch. Aytmatov, V. Astafyev, V. Rasputin and B. Vasilyev; in two questionnaires out of three mention was made of one work by these authors. In the second part, are over a hundred well-known and little-known works. In the first instance, each book received from 5 to 40 votes and in the second, 1 or 2.

As for Russian classical literature, it turned out that the prose of F. Dostoyevskiy evoked the greatest interest. Some 7 percent of those replying wanted to see his works on their stage. Nine persons here mentioned the novel "The Devils."

List of Most Interesting Modern Performances  
(Number of Those Pointing to Given Performance)

Name of Piece and Producer	Producers	Directors	Name of Piece and Producer	Producers	Directors
<b>M. Zakharov</b>			<b>O. Yefremov</b>		
Dictatorship of Conscience	11	9	So We Win!	11	14
Juno and Avos	8	11	Silver Wedding	6	3
Three Girls in the Blue	6	--	Uncle Vanya	4	--
An Optimistic Tragedy	5	1	The Seagull	2	--
The Thief	2	--	<b>A. Vasilyev</b>		
Let Us Experiment	--	2	The Adult Daughter of a Young Man	14	--
Revolutionary Etude	2	--	Hoopla	12	2
Tyl	1	1	Vassa	2	2
<b>G. Tovstonogov</b>			<b>R. Sturua</b>		
History of a Horse	18	14	Caucasian Chalk Circle	10	1
Philistines	2	1	Richard III	11	2
Quiet Don	1	1	<b>A. Efros</b>		
The Last Visitor	1	1	Tartuffe	2	2
The Death of Tarelkin	--	2	On the Bottom	2	--
<b>L. Dodin</b>			<b>G. Trostyanetskiy</b>		
Brothers and Sisters	16	8	War Does Not Have a Woman's Face	8	1
Home	11	6			
A Short One	4	3			
Mr & Mrs Golovlev	3	2			

The preferences and desires of the main producers and directors provide grounds to feel that they are oriented at high art. If one could mentally free oneself of all the circumstances preventing the theater leaders from realizing their ideas and plans, then from the replies an image of an ideal theater would arise the traits of which could be found on the pages of various directive documents. The participants in the survey support all the demands presently placed on the theater. This idyllic picture dissipates like a mirage when we turn to data on the realization of creative programs. The discrepancy between the desired and the actual is great. Here is how the main producers and directors judge the work of their theater: 6 percent feel that virtually the entire repertory corresponds to the desired, 39 percent feel the creative compromise is insignificant, 43 feel the repertory is largely compromised, and 12 percent, unfortunately, feel that virtually the entire repertory is a tribute to circumstances.

**Antiworlds**

As we see, the attitude of a majority of the leaders to the results of their own activities is rather critical. However, the unforeseen does not end with this. A comparison of the replies by the producers and directors of the same theater (and among those replying there were 109 such pairs) showed that in one-half of the instances the parties take an opposing view to the creative activities of their collective.

Thus, a paradoxical situation arises: the main producers and directors are oriented as a whole to the same thing, that is, the better examples of artistic culture and nevertheless hold different positions on the common undertaking. It must be said that the clashes within this "duet" are as old as the theater itself. They are due to the fact

that the latter is simultaneously both an art and a spectacle, where the personality of the creator is just as important as the viewer. However, at present, when our theater is beset with many troubles, when its artistic and moral authority has declined, the designated contradiction between the leaders has exacerbated. Let us endeavor to understand just what the objective reasons for the conflicts are.

We have analyzed 14 factors related to creative organizational problems of activity, including: satisfaction with the repertory of one's theater, the attitude toward it by the republic ministry of culture, the local party and soviet bodies, the mass audience, the demanding viewer, the critic, colleagues, the mass information media, the possibility of electing the theater artistic council, as well as opinions on the relationship of the subjects and artistic level of the performances. Only the polar viewpoints on the designated questions were considered disagreements. When one of the leaders voiced a definite opinion and the other did not reply or marked the point "hard to say," such a pair of replies was viewed as agreeing. We proceeded from the view that a person not having any clear opinion on a certain question would more easily accept another's viewpoint.

Let us turn to the results. Of the 109 pairs of main producers and directors for all positions the answers coincided in only 6.4 percent of the pairs. There was one difference in the questionnaires in 18.3 percent. For two or three problems, the opinions of 45 percent of those questions did not agree, and 23.9 percent for four or five problems. For the remaining 6.4 percent of the pairs, the answers did not coincide for any of the positions. In extrapolating the obtained data for all theater Russia, it can be said that at present the main producer and director do not have a common platform in more than ten theaters. Most often these are "good-bad" theaters.

In the press and on various levels of management they speak constantly about the fact that the main producer should have an understanding of the economic aspects of theater work while the director should consider the creative and artistic questions. At the same time, the research has shown that in assessing the activities of the theater, the producer and director are guided, as a rule, by completely different criteria. The former is all powerful on various aspects of the creative process per se. This, for example, includes the available dramatic material, the professional level of the group, the balancing of its composition and the necessity of working on "required" performances. If the main producer is satisfied with the repertory, he feels that his activities would be highly regarded by the critic and an exacting viewer. The attitude toward the theater on the part of the mass viewer, all levels of administrative bodies and, even as strange as it may seem, colleagues has virtually no impact on self-assessment. One other circumstance is striking. In determining the "guilty parties" of the unsuccessful work and in analyzing the conditions of success, a majority of the producers ignored such a factor as the interests of the mass viewer.

And for the directors this factor is the most significant. They measure the conformity of the desired and actual repertory by the requests and tastes of the designated category. The view of the director on the broad audience is rather realistic. The public is conceived in its eternal duality: as an incentive for the theater process and simultaneously as its brake. Another characteristic trait in the assessment by an administrator of his theater is its essential dependence upon the opinion of the superior levels such as the ministry, the local party and state bodies. As a whole, the situation is as follows: the producers are oriented at circumstances within the theater while the directors aim at external social views.

Of the 14 parameters established by us, only one, the opinion of the critic, was equally important both for the main producers and the directors. The designated fact requires explanation. Only one-quarter of those questioned was satisfied by the attitude of the critics to their theater. Over one-half expressed dissatisfaction with this in a sharp form, and primarily with the quality of the materials published and with the growing fawning to taste and amateurism. Like it or not, theater workers demonstrated that for many, many local artistic collectives criticism is a concept that is most often conditional. Does this not show that the declared importance of criticism in actuality is an unique myth of professional awareness?

#### A Bureaucratic Syndrome

The contradictions in the approaches of the main producer and director on the main questions of theater life are the natural result of dual power in management, dual power based upon an artificial separation of the artistic and economic aspects of the question. Only at first glance does it seem how it is easier to lead. Yes, it is more convenient from an office and calmer for those who do not understand the elementary questions of the theater and cannot distinguish a reprise from an enterprise. In actuality, the designated situation constantly gives rise to a desperate struggle of groupings in the company, to infinite complaints and commissions. Merely the towns, last names and specific grounds for the conflicts change. And this is inevitable when in more than one-half of the theaters everything is going well from the standpoint of the main producer and badly from the viewpoint of the director. Or the reverse!

Curiously, even the directors recognize the situation of parity leadership as unviable (this can be seen from the results of research recently conducted in Moscow [1]). Some of them wrote in the questionnaire: "I feel that over the long run the producer should be the only leader of the theater." This was indirectly confirmed also by the answers of administrators to the question of shortcomings in the system of vocational training for the producers. One-fifth considers it essential to have a fundamental improvement in the training of the latter in the area of theater economics. We would point out in passing that of the 140 producers, this notion was shared only by two

persons. And indeed, in working out a creative strategy for the theater, to ignore at present the production and financial aspect means to knowingly doom the collective to vegetating, including in creative terms. The economic thinking of the producer should become a unique bridge between art and production.

But who then will be the main leader of a theater? In our view, this question should be settled considering the specific situation in the collective and, most importantly, in the context of a fundamental reorganization of the entire structure of the internal theater management. In the course of the theater experiment, the model of an elected artistic council with the right of a deciding vote has been developed. In light of the above-given facts, such an approach seems unproductive to us. Yet another, a third force, is introduced into the theater organism with its specific goals and criteria of creative activity. Is this not a lot if one considers that even with two leaders a theater is beset by contradictions? The innovation threatens to end, and for certain theaters has already ended, by having the collective completely closed off in its own strictly internal questions.

The current organizational structure of management in a theater is incapable of ensuring a creative nature for the theater process in all its elements. Our research confirms the correctness of the public proposals to introduce the institution of artistic leadership of the collectives. Incidentally, if one takes a close look one can see that certain theaters presently live in just this manner. As yet, these are the first timid sprouts of a natural form for the theater. They must be supported first of all.

### **The Theater Begins at the Box Office**

No matter how acute the leadership problem is, its solution is not an end in itself but rather the means to change the relations of the theater with the audience. The most objective and dependable, but presently the most disregarded, criterion for the activities of a theater is the attitude of the public to it. At present, the main director is dissatisfied and, possibly, justly so with everything around but he himself is used to putting the audience exclusively in the director's department. Is there any other approach which more distorts the nature of the theater?

Some 37 percent of those questioned were not satisfied with the attitude of the mass audience to their theater. The specialists complain of unpreparedness in the theater public and chastise it for passiveness and omnivorousness. Well, the audience has in fact changed. However, does this mean that high art can no longer shape and satisfy their needs? As is known, the latter [art], aside from all else, fulfills recreational and amusement functions. Of course, an emphasis on these warps the perception of the theater viewer. Undoubtedly, the ideal is a harmonious balance of the functional and artistic aspects of the performance. At the same time, one cannot help but consider the fact which has been fixed by

professional awareness that a change has occurred in the requirements of the mass audience. At present, an orientation to leisure and amusement prevails. Free time research shows that the progressing specialization of labor has entailed a change in the nature of leisure and in it there has been a growing role for types of activities contributing to the psychophysiological release of the individual. "If one overlooks the art history stereotypes," writes K.E. Razlogov, "it is apparent that the very nature of production under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, the increased emotional and intellectual stress (plus the domestic difficulties) lead to an increased need for balanced rest and amusement. Here it is a question not of the warping but rather the transforming of the functions of art under the impact of the new conditions of its existence in society" [2]. At the same time, our research has shown that the theater leaders often perceive the orientation of the mass viewer toward recreation as an encroachment on the high goals of art. One out of two directors and one out of three main producers remain convinced that performances for ordinary consumption and performances for establishing the authority of the theater can be prepared with a varying artistic level. Some 40 percent of the specialists do not conceive of the theater's repertory as an integrated creative portrait of the collective. In conditionally speaking, they ahead of time make a distinction between what will all the same be "swallowed" by the viewer (for the plan) and that portion of the repertoire which is designed to affirm professional authority ("for art"). In such a situation should one be surprised that precisely the amusing performance has become a synonym of theater vulgarity and tastelessness.

Theater criticism and the statements by cultural leaders have contributed strongly to the downgrading of the entertainment theater. In spite of this, the audience as before are generous in their attention to it while the people in art consider entertainment as that portion of their activities which is better to overlook. If it were not for the statistics, one could remain fully confident that our stages are dedicated strictly to serious art.

In our opinion, the theater leaders must not abandon the entertaining performances but rather make of their settings a "second grade" art, in making use of the demand for recreation and amusement. The paradox is that among the most popular stagings mentioned by the specialists there is a predominance of performances which precisely are an example of the unity of authentic entertainment, as well as a high spiritual and civil content. The producer quests of M. Zakharov, judging from the admissions of those questioned who are leaders of the theater process, are aimed at establishing precisely such a theater. To a definite degree the necessity of such an approach is recognized by the respondents themselves. Some 65 percent of the producers and 54 percent of the directors agreed with the judgment that it was possible to judge the artistic level of a theater from the quality of an amusing performance.

Professional awareness has very high regard for the artistic and social mission of the theater. But this view has been constructed outside the "feedback" system and, for this reason, is significantly of a speculative and declarative nature. The contradiction between the conviction in the high calling of the theater and the complex, varied attitude of the public to it gives rise to dissatisfaction and disquiet among the leaders. They want changes and renewal. At the same time, this interest coexists with caution and even conservatism. In protesting against the "imposition" of the theater on the people and the idea of cultural services, specialists in their daily activities remain largely the prisoners of the bad practice of the theater's "social parasitism." The overcoming of this psychological set is one of the most difficult and painful problems in the modern theater process.

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#### Recent Trends in Soviet Birthrate

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[Article, published under the heading "Demography" by A.G. Vishnevskiy, S.Ya. Shcherbov, A.B. Anichkin, V.A. Grechukha and N.V. Donets: "Recent Trends in the Soviet Birthrate"; Anatoliy Grigoryevich Vishnevskiy is a doctor of economic sciences and chief science associate of the Commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences for the Study of the Productive Forces and Natural Resources. He is the author of the monographs "Demograficheskaya revolyutsiya" (The Demographic Revolution) (1976), "Mirovoy demograficheskiy vzryv i yego problemy" (The World Demographic Explosion and Its Problems) (1978), "Vospriizvodstvo naseleniya SSSR" (Reproduction of the USSR Population) (1983, co-author) and others. Our journal has published his articles "Passion and Matrimony" (No 2, 1986), "Two Historical Types of Demographic Behavior" (No 6, 1987) and others. Aleksandr Borisovich Anichkin is a junior science associate at the Institute for Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Our journal has published his article "Demographic Policy in France" (No 2, 1987). The remaining authors are employed at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Systems Research. Sergey Yakovlevich Shcherbov is a candidate of technical sciences and senior science associate, Vladimir Alekseyevich Grechukha is a science associate and Natalya Vladimirovna Donets is a junior science associate. They are being published for the first time in our journal]

[Text] The first half of the 1980s was marked by a certain rise in the birthrate indicators. Its over-all coefficient in

1986, that is, 20 births per thousand of the population, was the highest over the entire period since 1963. The coefficient for the over-all birthrate of 2.46 children per woman of a hypothetical generation in 1985-1986 reached the level which had not been achieved since 1971-1972, and if one does not count the brief rise in the coefficient at the beginning of the 1970s, since 1965-1966.

Specialists, however, are aware that both designated indicators are imperfect (the former due to the dependence on the age composition of the population and the latter upon the shifts in the birth "calendar") and do not always correctly reflect the actual birthrate trends. A more accurate notion of the true measurements is provided by the age coefficients, however the existing series of such coefficients, unfortunately, are not sufficiently long so that their analysis makes it possible to judge the transformation of the age curve of the birthrate and, most importantly, leads to an assessment of the most adequate indicator of the occurring changes, that is, the number of children born by one or another age by women of different real generations.

The birthrate trends in the USSR to a decisive degree are determined by the transition to a new historical type of population reproduction and which has been termed the demographic revolution or demographic transition. The transformation of the birthrate age curve, its "rejuvenation," is one of the patterns of such a transition. It is manifested in the fact that the intensity of child-bearing in the older procreative ages (45-90, 40-44, 35-39, 30-34 and even 25-29 years) is dropping and this decline is greater the older the age, while in the younger ages (20-24 and 15-19) is growing. This trend has been manifested differently in the various republics and in the various periods of the designated time segment, from the end of the 1950s to the mid-1980s.

This was expressed to the least degree in the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan, where the transition to the new type birthrate has still not gained force and where the changes characteristic of a majority of the republics appeared later, at the end of the 1960s, in the 1970s, and in certain instances were not generally apparent with sufficient certainty. With significant growth in the 1960s (which probably was caused, at least partially, by better counting), the birthrate coefficient at an age of 15-19 years has not grown here, as in the other republics, but has declined, and sometimes very significantly. From the second half of the 1970s, one cannot speak about the growth of the coefficient in the age group of 20-24 years (only Kirghizia is an exception), rather there is a trend toward a certain decline in the indicator. At the same time, in Central Asia as yet there has not been a drop in the birthrate at the age of 25-29 years, and here it still remains on a very high level, higher than a quarter of a century ago. But, as a whole, the changes in the age coefficients of the birthrate in a majority of the republics conform to the general, universal model for the transformation of the birthrate curve during the period of the demographic revolution.

At the same time, from the end of the 50s there have been particular changes in the age coefficients of the birthrate and these have occurred against the background of the general trends. Particular attention has been drawn to the two rises in the age coefficients. The first is observed in the second half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. This was characteristic primarily for the republics with a low birthrate and involved predominantly the young maternal groups, particularly the group of 20-20 [sic] year-olds. In the interval between 1965-1972, the rise in the coefficient in this group (from the minimal to the maximal) was 20 percent in the Ukraine, 24 percent in Belorussia, 38 percent in Lithuania, 37 percent in Latvia (between 1966-1975) and 28 percent in Estonia. In the RSFSR, the growth began later and was weaker but here also it was 11 percent for the first half of the 1970s.

The designated increase occurred in the generations of women born during the war and postwar years and can be explained by a significant improvement in the marital situation of these generations in comparison with the preceding ones. As was pointed out by I. Iilina in the designated generations there was a much higher proportion of women who married young. For instance, while among the women of the generation of 1931-1935 only 18.3 percent had married for the first time by the age of 20, and 23.9 percent of the generation of 1936-1940, for the generation of 1941-1945, this indicator was already 30.8 percent, and 28.5 percent for 1946-1948. By the age of 23, in these same generations, respectively, 51.6, 61.9, 65.5 and 66.1 percent had married for the first time, and by age 25, 71.7, 78.2, 80.4 and 81.2 percent [2].

The second rise in the age coefficients of the birthrate became apparent at the beginning of the 1980s. In contrast to the former, it had little impact on the younger maternal ages. In the republics with a low birthrate, its level in these ages, as a rule, increased, but the growth was caused by a maintaining of the trends existing in the 1970s and not by the appearance of new ones. Only in Moldavia and Georgia as well as in a number of republics with a higher birthrate (Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia) was there a noticeable acceleration in the growth of the intensity of child-bearing among women of 20-24 years of age, beginning from the end of the 1970s. But this time the growth making it possible to speak about a change in the trends was observed in the groups of the middle maternal age. The rise in the birthrate was particularly important at an age of 25-29 years and not so significant but still noticeable in the group of 30-34 years. The contribution of these groups to the increase in the over-all birthrate of the conditional generations between 1980-1981 and 1985-1986 was 2.3-fold greater than the age group of 20-24 years.

The second feature of the current rise in the birthrate is the much higher share than in the previous rise in the second and third births with a lower share of both first births as well as subsequent births after the third. This shift is observed in all the age groups and indicates

substantial changes in the procreative behavior of the population and not in any of its structural characteristics.

**Table 1: Share of Sequential Births in 1971 and 1986, %**

Children Born...	Total		Including for Mothers at the Ages of			
			20-24		25-29	
	1971	1986	1971	1986	1971	1986
First	43.1	38.7	69.3	57.5	27.3	22.2
Second	26.5	35.4	23.3	34.4	40.6	45.7
Third	12.5	13.6	5.4	6.7	15.1	19.2
Fourth and subsequent*	17.9	12.3	2.0	1.4	17.0	12.9

\* Including those whose sequence of birth is not known.

Demographers with good reason have linked the current rise in the birthrate to the measures to strengthen state assistance to families with children as provided by the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted on 22 January 1981 [1]. Of particularly important significance was the introduction begun in 1981 of a partially paid leave for caring for a child until it reached the age of 1 year and additional leave without pay until reaching the age of 18 months (this was carried out by regions of the country and ended in November 1983). But these measures do not explain all the facts. They do not explain, for example, the mentioned instances of the increase in the birthrate among women of 20-24 years which began in 1978-1979.

As of now the further fate of the increased birthrate among the median maternal ages remains unclear. Here a protracted increase in the indicator is improbable. As yet the question is moot whether the rise in the first half of the 1980s will be replaced by a new decline or will the level reached during these years be relatively stable.

Thus, for an extended time now in the USSR there has been a profound transformation in the age curve of the birthrate. How are these changes telling on the ultimate number of children born by each generation of women? In order to answer this question, we have employed the method of restoring the cohort indicators from the existing data on the age birthrate of conditional generations as described by L. Henry and in Soviet literature by B.Ts. Uralnis. The obtained results have been given in the appendix. What do they show?

As was pointed out above, for the older age groups of the population in all republics there has been a protracted (although disturbed by fluctuations) decline in the birthrate. However, in the two younger age groups, this decline, as a rule, has not been observed. On the contrary, in many of them, particularly in the republics with a lower birthrate, there has been a steady rise in the

intensity of child bearing at an age up to 25 years. Correspondingly, as follows from the tables in the appendix, the total number of births by age 25 from generation to generation in this group of republics has been increasing. In 6 republics with the lowest birthrate (RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic Republics), in the generations of the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, by age 25 not even one child per woman was born. Beginning with the generations of the second half of the 1950s, the situation began to change and presently such a situation is observed only in Lithuania and Latvia, although here too the indicator is growing. The number of children born by age 25 has also increased noticeably in Moldavia and Georgia. For the remaining republics, typical are fluctuations showing actually a relative stability of the indicator, and in certain instances it is definitely declining (Azerbaijan, Turkmenia). As a whole, at present, in a majority of the republics the mothers of the two junior age groups are bearing only one-half or even substantially more than one-half of that number of children essential for a simple replacement of generations.

For republics with a lower birthrate, the main question is whether this increase in the birthrate in the junior maternal ages can compensate for its reduction in the senior ones. This question, in turn, splits into two parts. In the first place, it is essential to understand what is that general trend which is formed as a result of the restructuring of the birth "calendar" from generation to generation. What is happening with the birthrate of the real generations: is it dropping, rising or can no clear trend be traced in the change of its level? Secondly, regardless of what the current trend is in the over-all birthrate of the generations, it is essential to judge whether the decline in the birthrate in the senior ages is being compensated by a rise in the junior ones to a degree sufficient to guarantee the simple replacement of generations.

The answer to the first part of the question is difficult due to the fact that the required statistical data exist only for a limited time segment and it is still too early to judge the result of the procreative activities of the generations of women presently passing through their fertile ages. Nevertheless, certain judgments can be made. In particular, there is a relatively long series of data on the birthrate of real generations in the Ukraine, particularly if one takes the number of children born not by 50, not by 40 and not even by 35 years of age, when under conditions of a low birthrate the procreative activities of a generation although not over, is close to ending, so that its final result is almost predetermined. The number of births per woman in the Ukraine for a number of generations has changed little and then, starting from the generations of the 1930s, the indicator noticeably declined. Subsequently, the decline halted and the indicator has more or less stabilized.

The birthrate trends for real generations in the other republics with a low birthrate have recently had much in common with those observed in the Ukraine: a certain rise, in comparison with the minimum number of births by age 35 in the generations of the 1940s and then relative stabilization. This provides grounds to assert that in the republics with the lowest birthrate at present one does not observe an obvious trend toward a decline in the birthrate of the real generations.

Now let us turn to the second part of our question: is the decline in the birthrate in the senior maternal ages being compensated for by a rise in it in the junior ones to a degree necessary to ensure the simple replacement of generations? The answer to this question is still negative. That level of the birthrate for the real generations of women where it has now stabilized or, possibly, which it has now reached as a consequence of a weak trend toward a rise, is completely insufficient to ensure the simple replacement of generations. With the current level of mortality, each thousand women should give birth to 2,150-2,200 children for this. But, as follows from the tables in the appendix, in eight Union republics the number of children born by each thousand women by age 35 is much less. In knowing the birthrate level in ages over 35, it is difficult to assume that even under the best conditions this number can achieve the amount necessary even for the simple replacing of generations.

For the remaining seven Union republics, the question of narrowed reproduction as yet has not come up as here the replacement of generations is more than ensured. At the same time, in certain of them and primarily in Armenia, the number of children born is declining rapidly from generation to generation and in the rather near future can approach the limit of simple reproduction. There is also a decline in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In the Central Asian Republics, the situation is less clear. For the generations for which albeit tentatively one can judge the result of their procreative activities, this still remains relatively stable. If one judges from the number of children born by age 35, then in some instances there is a trend toward a certain increase and in others toward a certain decline. But the decline in the birthrate in the senior maternal ages (after 35) is clearly gaining strength. And since the contribution of these ages to the over-all result of the procreative activities of the generations in Central Asia is still very significant, a further decline in this in principle cannot be compensated for by a rise in the birthrate in the junior ages, particularly as here at present it is rather high. For this reason it is most probable that in the near future in Central Asia the same phenomena will be felt which are presently observed in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, namely: a noticeable decline in the total number of children from generation to generation.

**Table 2: Number of Children Born by Age 40 (USSR, per 1,000 Women of Each Generation)**

Generations	Number of Children	Generations	Number of Children
1935-1939	2253	1944-1948	2093
1938-1942	2158	1945-1949	2103
1939-1943	2000	1946-1950	(2113)
1940-1944	2142	1947-1951	(2145)
1941-1945	2173	1948-1952	(2148)
1942-1946	2183	1949-1953	(2153)
1943-1947	2136	1950-1954	(2159)

In conclusion, let us recall that the republics with a lower birthrate are responsible for 80 percent of the nation's population, in other words, the nationwide indicators for the birthrate are decisively determined by what is presently happening in these republics. Of course, the contribution of the republics with a still high birthrate must also not be underestimated. The table of the appendix shows that as a whole for the USSR, the number of children born by women by age 35 is below the norm for the simple replacement of generations. But due to the republics with a high birthrate, the contribution of ages over 35 years as a result of the procreative activities of the generations on a nationwide scale is not so slight as to be disregarded. This can be seen from the evaluation of the final number of births by age 40. If one assumes that over the next 5 years the average birthrate coefficient for the USSR at an age of 35-39 years will be constant and equal to 0.9 percent of the average for the previous 5 years (the decline in the indicator over the 2 previous 5-year periods was approximately this), that is, it will be 28.4 percent, then we will obtain the results shown in Table 2. The indicators in parentheses have been obtained by an extrapolation considering the assumption made and here the error cannot be significant.

Thus, already by age 40, the number of children born by women of the younger generations on a nationwide scale is approaching that which is essential to ensure the simple replacement of generations and possibly such a situation will last for some time to come. But sooner or later, the decline in the birthrate in the republics where it is now high (in particular in the senior maternal ages which happens first) will inevitably jeopardize even the simple replacing of the generations. This threat can be prevented only by increasing the intensity of childbearing in the younger ages (basically under 30) in the republics with a low birthrate level.

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**Express Information**

**Distribution of Mentionings of Soviet and Foreign Sociological Problems in the Newspaper Pravda, Percent of Total Number of Mentionings in Each Group (Data of L.N. Fedotova)**

Groups of Problems	1971		1986	
	Sociology in USSR	Sociology Abroad	Sociology in USSR	Sociology Abroad
General Problems of Sociology	79	21	71	29
Social Forecasting	60	40	0	100
Sociology of Individual Social Subsystems	89	11	8	72
Public Opinion Polls	0	100	89	11

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APPENDIX\*

Number of Births as Average Per Woman in Real Generations  
for USSR as a Whole and for Union Republics

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age						
	20	25	30	35	40	45	50
1935-1939	0.0780	0.9045	1.5990	2.0395	2.2530	2.3040	2.3080
1936-1940	0.0920	0.9160	1.5960	2.0315	2.2325	2.2790	2.2830
1937-1941	0.1055	0.9195	1.5830	2.0045	2.1880	2.2305	
1938-1942	0.1195	0.9300	1.5785	1.9875	2.1575	2.1975	
1939-1943	0.1460	0.9590	1.6030	1.9995	2.1590	2.1960	
1940-1944	0.1720	0.9600	1.6035	1.9930	2.1420	2.1770	
1941-1945	0.1760	0.9740	1.6345	2.0245	2.1725	2.2105	
1942-1946	0.1480	0.9410	1.6265	2.0205	2.1825		
1943-1947	0.1205	0.9105	1.5900	1.9745	2.1360		
1944-1948	0.1135	0.8985	1.5725	1.9330	2.0930		
1945-1949	0.1185	0.9380	1.6055	1.9470	2.1025		
1946-1950	0.1275	0.9785	1.6360	1.9705	2.1305		
1947-1951	0.1345	1.0040	1.6585	2.0035			
1948-1952	0.1385	1.0000	1.6435	2.0060			
1949-1953	0.1445	1.0115	1.6395	2.0110			
1950-1954	0.1520	1.0335	1.6520	2.0205			
1951-1955	0.1600	1.0435	1.6660	2.0475			
1952-1956	0.1620	1.0390	1.6750				
1953-1957	0.1620	1.0260	1.6925				
1954-1958	0.1665	1.0395	1.7235				
1955-1959	0.1715	1.0580	1.7480				
1956-1960	0.1750	1.0640	1.7760				
1957-1961	0.1785	1.0785					
1958-1962	0.1835	1.1065					
1959-1963	0.1970	1.1385					
1960-1964	0.2045	1.1405					
1961-1965	0.2050	1.1535					
1962-1966	0.2030						
1963-1967	0.2080						
1964-1968	0.2125						
1965-1969	0.2160						
1966-1970	0.2180						

\* The table has been calculated on the basis of the birthrate coefficients for 5-year age groups (15-19, 20-24, ..., 45-49) for two adjacent calendar years (for example, for 1958-1959). The data for the USSR have been taken starting from 1954-1955, but since the authors did not possess data for 1955-1956 and 1956-1957, the birthrate coefficients necessary for calculation at an age of 15-19 years for these years were obtained by interpolation. The same method was used, due to the absence of data, for the birthrate coefficients at an age of 15-19 years for 1959-1960 and 1960-1961, for all the Union republics. This, certainly, could not in any way substantially influence the results of the calculations.

RSFSR

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.1420	0.9230	1.4680	1.7680	1.8660	1.8850
1940—1944	0.1400	0.8940	1.4310	1.7240	1.8160	1.8345
1941—1945	0.1380	0.8895	1.4370	1.7280	1.8220	1.8435
1942—1946	0.1360	0.8750	1.4565	1.7565	1.8660	
1943—1947	0.1065	0.8220	1.3940	1.6900	1.8095	
1944—1948	0.1050	0.8195	1.3835	1.6615	1.7815	
1945—1949	0.1135	0.8480	1.4005	1.6630	1.7790	
1946—1950	0.1235	0.8865	1.4265	1.6865	1.8090	
1947—1951	0.1275	0.9080	1.4470	1.7215		
1948—1952	0.1300	0.9035	1.4360	1.7355		
1949—1953	0.1365	0.9140	1.4295	1.7355		
1950—1954	0.1415	0.9355	1.4415	1.7415		
1951—1955	0.1485	0.9425	1.4525	1.7675		
1952—1956	0.1545	0.9475	1.4770			
1953—1957	0.1575	0.9385	1.5045			
1954—1958	0.1640	0.9390	1.5135			
1955—1959	0.1695	0.9550	1.5215			
1956—1960	0.1725	0.9605	1.5480			
1957—1961	0.1780	0.9735				
1958—1962	0.1850	1.0040				
1959—1963	0.2040	1.0355				
1960—1964	0.2135	1.0345				
1961—1965	0.2180	1.0465				
1962—1966	0.2180					
1963—1967	0.2235					
1964—1968	0.2305					
1965—1969	0.2345					
1966—1970	0.2345					

Ukraine

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939-1943	0.1405	0.8730	1.4085	1.7140	1.8105	1.8285
1940-1944	0.1480	0.8535	1.4040	1.7020	1.7925	1.8100
1941-1945	0.1560	0.8830	1.4460	1.7395	1.8305	1.8495
1942-1946	0.1635	0.9040	1.4780	1.7655	1.8615	
1943-1947	0.1485	0.9055	1.4815	1.7655	1.8670	
1944-1948	0.1295	0.8725	1.4420	1.7125	1.8160	
1945-1949	0.1215	0.9220	1.4925	1.7555	1.8565	
1946-1950	0.1255	0.9500	1.5060	1.7600	1.8635	
1947-1951	0.1390	0.9870	1.5375	1.7955		
1948-1952	0.1495	0.9690	1.4995	1.7725		
1949-1953	0.1570	0.9600	1.4810	1.7620		
1950-1954	0.1655	0.9795	1.4915	1.7615		
1951-1955	0.1755	0.9895	1.5005	1.7780		
1952-1956	0.1805	0.9750	1.4835			
1953-1957	0.1825	0.9580	1.5030			
1954-1958	0.1870	1.0035	1.5710			
1955-1959	0.1940	1.0245	1.5805			
1956-1960	0.2015	1.0165	1.5745			
1957-1961	0.2075	1.0210				
1958-1962	0.2135	1.0645				
1959-1963	0.2295	1.1055				
1960-1964	0.2390	1.0925				
1961-1965	0.2415	1.0950				
1962-1966	0.2390					
1963-1967	0.2460					
1964-1968	0.2750					
1965-1969	0.2555					
1966-1970	0.2560					

Belorussia

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.0810	0.7790	1.4435	1.8150	1.9320	1.9530
1940—1944	0.0840	0.7780	1.4505	1.8060	1.9120	1.9320
1941—1945	0.0865	0.8150	1.5010	1.8440	1.9480	1.9705
1942—1946	0.0895	0.8255	1.5140	1.8550	1.9635	
1943—1947	0.0800	0.8260	1.5025	1.8370	1.9545	
1944—1948	0.0720	0.7970	1.4590	1.7645	1.8815	
1945—1949	0.0690	0.8770	1.5345	1.8295	1.9405	
1946—1950	0.0730	0.9165	1.5530	1.8380	1.9495	
1947—1951	0.0790	0.9405	1.5625	1.8465		
1948—1952	0.0825	0.9355	1.5450	1.8410		
1949—1953	0.0840	0.9265	1.5160	1.8210		
1950—1954	0.0980	0.9385	1.5185	1.8095		
1951—1955	0.1120	0.9385	1.5245	1.8245		
1952—1956	0.1175	0.9375	1.5245			
1953—1957	0.1180	0.9340	1.5580			
1954—1958	0.1225	0.9810	1.6255			
1955—1959	0.1275	0.9970	1.6200			
1956—1960	0.1315	0.9915	1.6165			
1957—1961	0.1350	0.9915				
1958—1962	0.1400	1.0130				
1959—1963	0.1530	1.0440				
1960—1964	0.1570	1.0250				
1961—1965	0.1610	1.0330				
1962—1966	0.1560					
1963—1967	0.1580					
1964—1968	0.1610					
1965—1969	0.1640					
1966—1970	0.1640					

Uzbekistan

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.1915	1.4065	2.8900	4.0415	4.7150	4.9015
1940—1944	0.1860	1.4130	2.7390	3.8525	4.4660	4.6400
1941—1945	0.1810	1.4450	2.8680	3.9940	4.6060	4.7860
1942—1946	0.1755	1.3925	2.8305	3.9510	4.5555	
1943—1947	0.1235	1.3760	2.8140	3.9120	4.4845	
1944—1948	0.1170	1.3675	2.8445	3.8980	4.4320	
1945—1949	0.1360	1.4425	2.9455	3.9580	4.4885	
1946—1950	0.1510	1.5260	3.0320	4.0050	4.5185	
1947—1951	0.1560	1.5365	3.0045	3.9635		
1948—1952	0.1590	1.5590	2.9905	3.9105		
1949—1953	0.1770	1.6270	3.0355	3.9520		
1950—1954	0.2085	1.6865	3.0455	3.9555		
1951—1955	0.2270	1.7120	3.0745	3.9900		
1952—1956	0.2130	1.6660	3.0170			
1953—1957	0.1995	1.6115	2.9305			
1954—1958	0.1995	1.5860	2.9235			
1955—1959	0.2005	1.5850	2.9740			
1956—1960	0.1955	1.5635	2.9705			
1957—1961	0.1890	1.5795				
1958—1962	0.1860	1.5990				
1959—1963	0.1770	1.6035				
1960—1964	0.1765	1.6170				
1961—1965	0.1615	1.6295				
1962—1966	0.1605					
1963—1967	0.1705					
1964—1968	0.1690					
1965—1969	0.1755					
1966—1970	0.1845					

Kazakhstan

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.2420	1.2800	2.1390	2.7570	3.0740	3.1550
1940—1944	0.2355	1.2210	2.1100	2.7190	3.0115	3.0850
1941—1945	0.2290	1.2375	2.1450	2.7610	3.0445	3.1185
1942—1946	0.2225	1.1885	2.1245	2.7455	3.0290	
1943—1947	0.1610	1.1155	2.0515	2.6495	2.9275	
1944—1948	0.1490	1.0975	2.0380	2.5920	2.8560	
1945—1949	0.1485	1.1095	2.0445	2.5565	2.8115	
1946—1950	0.1510	1.1370	2.0475	2.5280	2.7775	
1947—1951	0.1505	1.1520	2.0430	2.5245		
1948—1952	0.1465	1.1460	2.0260	2.5065		
1949—1953	0.1470	1.1620	1.9780	2.4760		
1950—1954	0.1500	1.1790	1.9690	2.4775		
1951—1955	0.1520	1.1650	1.9595	2.4705		
1952—1956	0.1490	1.1555	1.9625			
1953—1957	0.1435	1.1300	1.9415			
1954—1958	0.1480	1.1410	1.9830			
1955—1959	0.1545	1.1695	2.0560			
1956—1960	0.1635	1.1955	2.1115			
1957—1961	0.1680	1.2185				
1958—1962	0.1765	1.2345				
1959—1963	0.1885	1.2810				
1960—1964	0.1940	1.2995				
1961—1965	0.1980	1.3220				
1962—1966	0.1970					
1963—1967	0.1945					
1964—1968	0.1940					
1965—1969	0.1950					
1966—1970	0.1975					

Azerbaijan

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.2150	1.4970	2.7360	3.5655	3.9570	4.0390
1940—1944	0.2085	1.4135	2.5790	3.3635	3.7085	3.7745
1941—1945	0.2025	1.3990	2.5675	3.3440	3.6580	3.7225
1942—1946	0.2035	1.3290	2.4725	3.2560	3.5545	
1943—1947	0.1900	1.3210	2.4775	3.2415	3.5265	
1944—1948	0.1855	1.2860	2.4385	3.1570	3.4220	
1945—1949	0.2100	1.3520	2.5190	3.1910	3.4405	
1946—1950	0.2335	1.4005	2.5955	3.2355	3.4680	
1947—1951	0.2505	1.3810	2.5590	3.1700		
1948—1952	0.2355	1.3255	2.4510	3.0415		
1949—1953	0.2125	1.3085	2.4215	3.0070		
1950—1954	0.2040	1.3000	2.3870	2.9460		
1951—1955	0.1855	1.2625	2.3235	2.8765		
1952—1956	0.1455	1.2020	2.2195			
1953—1957	0.1200	1.1525	2.1440			
1954—1958	0.1120	1.0955	2.0820			
1955—1959	0.1070	1.0740	2.0650			
1956—1960	0.1005	1.0735	2.0700			
1957—1961	0.0950	1.0625				
1958—1962	0.0915	1.0370				
1959—1963	0.0875	1.0480				
1960—1964	0.0910	1.0495				
1961—1965	0.0940	1.0750				
1962—1966	0.0905					
1963—1967	0.0855					
1964—1968	0.0885					
1965—1969	0.0935					
1966—1970	0.0990					

Lithuania

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.0720	0.6750	1.3475	1.7405	1.9040	1.9470
1940—1944	0.0770	0.6765	1.3890	1.7760	1.9300	1.9710
1941—1945	0.0825	0.7070	1.4040	1.7760	1.9240	1.9635
1942—1946	0.0875	0.7345	1.4240	1.7875	1.9400	
1943—1947	0.0810	0.7625	1.4330	1.7920	1.9500	
1944—1948	0.0785	0.8000	1.4645	1.8000	1.9595	
1945—1949	0.0780	0.8500	1.5115	1.8250	1.9735	
1946—1950	0.0780	0.8935	1.5675	1.8860	2.0330	
1947—1951	0.0835	0.9095	1.5825	1.9090		
1948—1952	0.0950	0.8955	1.5475	1.8835		
1949—1953	0.1040	0.8865	1.4910	1.8340		
1950—1954	0.1120	0.8935	1.4760	1.8035		
1951—1955	0.1175	0.8935	1.4755	1.7995		
1952—1956	0.1160	0.8790	1.4710			
1953—1957	0.1115	0.8570	1.4815			
1954—1958	0.1120	0.8840	1.5295			
1955—1959	0.1115	0.8855	1.5365			
1956—1960	0.1105	0.8700	1.5395			
1957—1961	0.1170	0.8630				
1958—1962	0.1255	0.8850				
1959—1963	0.1365	0.9305				
1960—1964	0.1380	0.9525				
1961—1965	0.1205	0.9600				
1962—1966	0.0985					
1963—1967	0.0990					
1964—1968	0.1025					
1965—1969	0.1105					
1966—1970	0.1160					

Latvia

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939-1943	0.0840	0.6565	1.2040	1.5330	1.6480	1.6755
1940-1944	0.0915	0.6500	1.2245	1.5475	1.6610	1.6870
1941-1945	0.0990	0.6510	1.2365	1.5435	1.6550	1.6820
1942-1946	0.1065	0.6905	1.2830	1.5800	1.6985	
1943-1947	0.1060	0.7125	1.2950	1.5835	1.7115	
1944-1948	0.0950	0.7330	1.3090	1.5840	1.7150	
1945-1949	0.0880	0.7845	1.3645	1.6330	1.7600	
1946-1950	0.0920	0.8180	1.3875	1.6580	1.7875	
1947-1951	0.1065	0.8440	1.4000	1.6795		
1948-1952	0.1260	0.8645	1.4065	1.7035		
1949-1953	0.1365	0.8775	1.3945	1.7110		
1950-1954	0.1350	0.8890	1.4090	1.7190		
1951-1955	0.1355	0.8850	1.4065	1.7170		
1952-1956	0.1330	0.8740	1.4035			
1953-1957	0.1335	0.8635	1.4365			
1954-1958	0.1360	0.8830	1.4805			
1955-1959	0.1380	0.8995	1.4870			
1956-1960	0.1400	0.9015	1.4900			
1957-1961	0.1460	0.9185				
1958-1962	0.1560	0.9640				
1959-1963	0.1760	1.0000				
1960-1964	0.1885	0.9960				
1961-1965	0.1600	0.9755				
1962-1966	0.1925					
1963-1967	0.1935					
1964-1968	0.2200					
1965-1969	0.2110					
1966-1970	0.2190					

Moldavia

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.1700	0.9590	1.6525	2.1080	2.2840	2.3195
1940—1944	0.1820	0.9285	1.6055	2.0335	2.1865	2.2180
1941—1945	0.1935	0.9450	1.6195	2.0260	2.1765	2.2105
1942—1946	0.2055	0.9885	1.6715	2.0690	2.2270	
1943—1947	0.1655	0.9825	1.6870	2.0855	2.2510	
1944—1948	0.1270	0.9000	1.6250	2.0120	2.1845	
1945—1949	0.1095	0.9290	1.6785	2.0630	2.2495	
1946—1950	0.1110	0.9655	1.7030	2.0960	2.2920	
1947—1951	0.1310	1.0380	1.7605	2.1650		
1948—1952	0.1450	1.0495	1.7325	2.1380		
1949—1953	0.1455	1.0350	1.6850	2.0985		
1950—1954	0.1405	1.0335	1.6770	2.0875		
1951—1955	0.1445	1.0325	1.7010	2.1380		
1952—1956	0.1495	1.0220	1.7170			
1953—1957	0.1530	1.0160	1.7530			
1954—1958	0.1620	1.0795	1.8580			
1955—1959	0.1665	1.1200	1.9160			
1956—1960	0.1710	1.1385	1.9760			
1957—1961	0.1755	1.1590				
1958—1962	0.1850	1.2225				
1959—1963	0.1960	1.2655				
1960—1964	0.1975	1.2390				
1961—1965	0.1735	1.2230				
1962—1966	0.1600					
1963—1967	0.1825					
1964—1968	0.1980					
1965—1969	0.2070					
1966—1970	0.2130					

Kirghizia

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939-1943	0.2015	1.3160	2.4860	3.4690	4.0835	4.2680
1940-1944	0.2025	1.3470	2.4700	3.5565	4.0690	4.2370
1941-1945	0.2040	1.3955	2.5825	3.8380	4.3355	4.5045
1942-1946	0.2050	1.3580	2.6020	3.8750	4.3330	
1943-1947	0.1200	1.2130	2.4595	3.6390	4.1060	
1944-1948	0.1110	1.1800	2.3595	3.2960	3.7515	
1945-1949	0.1190	1.4220	2.4875	3.2140	3.6505	
1946-1950	0.1400	1.4995	2.4990	3.2020	3.6270	
1947-1951	0.1630	1.5055	2.4690	3.1630		
1948-1952	0.1675	1.4920	2.4190	3.1225		
1949-1953	0.1680	1.4745	2.4880	3.2345		
1950-1954	0.2045	1.4835	2.5525	3.3015		
1951-1955	0.2140	1.4630	2.5240	3.2750		
1952-1956	0.2025	1.4065	2.4480			
1953-1957	0.1940	1.3345	2.3940			
1954-1958	0.2035	1.4675	2.6015			
1955-1959	0.2095	1.5355	2.7285			
1956-1960	0.2105	1.5605	2.8065			
1957-1961	0.2100	1.6485				
1958-1962	0.2080	1.6390				
1959-1963	0.2060	1.5795				
1960-1964	0.2030	1.5670				
1961-1965	0.2050	1.5705				
1962-1966	0.2040					
1963-1967	0.1995					
1964-1968	0.1920					
1965-1969	0.1925					
1966-1970	0.1930					

Tajikistan

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939-1943	0.1305	1.1115	2.5875	3.8525	4.7385	5.0580
1940-1944	0.1255	1.1930	2.5315	3.7755	4.6195	4.9295
1941-1945	0.1210	1.2435	2.6015	3.8445	4.6585	4.9855
1942-1946	0.1160	1.2145	2.5880	3.8225	4.6050	
1943-1947	0.0990	1.3970	2.7990	4.0200	4.7890	
1944-1948	0.0995	1.4240	2.8915	4.1090	4.8610	
1945-1949	0.1270	1.4330	2.9285	4.0885	4.8395	
1946-1950	0.1545	1.5505	3.0740	4.2015	4.9575	
1947-1951	0.1645	1.6045	3.1200	4.2450		
1948-1952	0.1750	1.6350	3.1330	4.2520		
1949-1953	0.1855	1.7235	3.2230	4.3360		
1950-1954	0.2005	1.8080	3.2690	4.3885		
1951-1955	0.2175	1.8610	3.2950	4.4235		
1952-1956	0.2220	1.8260	3.2830			
1953-1957	0.2055	1.7695	3.2265			
1954-1958	0.2045	1.7855	3.2635			
1955-1959	0.2105	1.7665	3.2935			
1956-1960	0.2055	1.7470	3.3145			
1957-1961	0.1960	1.7520				
1958-1962	0.1925	1.7155				
1959-1963	0.1895	1.7255				
1960-1964	0.1850	1.7210				
1961-1965	0.1805	1.7520				
1962-1966	0.1760					
1963-1967	0.1750					
1964-1968	0.1880					
1965-1969	0.1835					
1966-1970	0.1820					

Armenia

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.1880	1.3415	2.2780	2.7115	2.8340	2.8545
1940—1944	0.1850	1.3090	2.1300	2.5320	2.6405	2.6595
1941—1945	0.1820	1.3130	2.1575	2.5605	2.6675	2.6895
1942—1946	0.1790	1.2705	2.1795	2.5775	2.6835	
1943—1947	0.1745	1.2875	2.1895	2.5560	2.6580	
1944—1948	0.1965	1.3025	2.1545	2.4940	2.5920	
1945—1949	0.2290	1.2955	2.1155	2.4215	2.5180	
1946—1950	0.2365	1.3145	2.1155	2.3970	2.4945	
1947—1951	0.2295	1.3050	2.0820	2.3625		
1948—1952	0.2210	1.2925	2.0290	2.3040		
1949—1953	0.2225	1.2835	2.0040	2.2860		
1950—1954	0.2060	1.2770	1.9625	2.2535		
1951—1955	0.2060	1.2890	1.9510	2.2525		
1952—1956	0.1940	1.2720	1.9155			
1953—1957	0.1865	1.2605	1.8860			
1954—1958	0.1955	1.2090	1.8410			
1955—1959	0.2010	1.2165	1.8700			
1956—1960	0.1980	1.2195	1.8810			
1957—1961	0.2000	1.2470				
1958—1962	0.2085	1.2850				
1959—1963	0.2065	1.3335				
1960—1964	0.2465	1.3945				
1961—1965	0.2250	1.4075				
1962—1966	0.2290					
1963—1967	0.2435					
1964—1968	0.2590					
1965—1969	0.2770					
1966—1970	0.2850					

Turkmenia

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.1975	1.5555	3.1190	4.2935	5.0495	5.3190
1940—1944	0.1935	1.5405	2.9215	4.0875	4.8585	5.1085
1941—1945	0.1890	1.6020	3.0615	4.2565	5.0160	5.2720
1942—1946	0.1850	1.5885	3.0695	4.3085	5.0120	
1943—1947	0.1300	1.5490	3.0545	4.2635	4.9515	
1944—1948	0.1185	1.5485	3.0870	4.2350	4.8865	
1945—1949	0.1410	1.4970	3.0115	4.1220	4.7495	
1946—1950	0.1635	1.5270	3.0220	4.0420	4.6510	
1947—1951	0.1690	1.5115	2.9870	3.9790		
1948—1952	0.1570	1.5235	3.0080	3.9915		
1949—1953	0.1615	1.5315	2.9775	3.9515		
1950—1954	0.1675	1.5530	2.9620	3.9455		
1951—1955	0.1630	1.5440	2.9135	3.9115		
1952—1956	0.1460	1.4755	2.8520			
1953—1957	0.1360	1.4200	2.8290			
1954—1958	0.1345	1.4150	2.8430			
1955—1959	0.1255	1.3760	2.8445			
1956—1960	0.1160	1.3485	2.8670			
1957—1961	0.1040	1.3395				
1958—1962	0.1020	1.3215				
1959—1963	0.1090	1.3160				
1960—1964	0.1030	1.2950				
1961—1965	0.1080	1.3110				
1962—1966	0.1125					
1963—1967	0.1070					
1964—1968	0.1030					
1965—1969	0.1005					
1966—1970	0.1020					

Estonia

Year of birth of generation of women	Number of Births by Age					
	20	25	30	35	40	50
1939—1943	0.1005	0.7545	1.4125	1.7340	1.8510	1.8740
1940—1944	0.1040	0.7640	1.4170	1.7265	1.8375	1.8590
1941—1945	0.1075	0.7650	1.4195	1.7240	1.8340	1.8580
1942—1946	0.1110	0.7715	1.4250	1.7380	1.8610	
1943—1947	0.1040	0.7875	1.4180	1.7225	1.8505	
1944—1948	0.1035	0.8270	1.4440	1.7230	1.8515	
1945—1949	0.1085	0.8940	1.5095	1.7825	1.9110	
1946—1950	0.1135	0.9295	1.5400	1.8170	1.9420	
1947—1951	0.1145	0.9440	1.5570	1.8430		
1948—1952	0.1260	0.9515	1.5585	1.8615		
1949—1953	0.1345	0.9630	1.5210	1.8330		
1950—1954	0.1505	0.9820	1.5350	1.8320		
1951—1955	0.1580	0.9850	1.5445	1.8430		
1952—1956	0.1575	0.9895	1.5655			
1953—1957	0.1565	0.9805	1.5715			
1954—1958	0.1595	0.9855	1.5830			
1955—1959	0.1675	0.9980	1.5890			
1956—1960	0.1730	1.0100	1.5955			
1957—1961	0.1795	1.0175				
1958—1962	0.1860	1.0360				
1959—1963	0.2050	1.0685				
1960—1964	0.2160	1.0655				
1961—1965	0.2190	1.0365				
1962—1966	0.2075					
1963—1967	0.1960					
1964—1968	0.2075					
1965—1969	0.2210					
1966—1970	0.2200					

Foreign Panorama

In a majority of the developed capitalist countries a paradoxical situation has developed. ON the one hand, around 13 percent of the young men and women completing schools does not receive any vocational training and joins the ranks of the unemployed. On the other, many jobs requiring skilled personnel remain vacant. As research shows, 5 percent of the industrial enterprises is suffering from an acute lack of skilled workers, and 16 percent for engineers and technicians. Rapid technical progress, structural changes, as well as fluctuations in international trade substantially impede the forecasting of manpower requirements for the essential specialties. At the same time, certain trends will, in all probability,

be dominant. One of these can be formulated as follows: "Less muscle and more intellect." The number of jobs will decline in the ore mining industry, in metallurgy and in textile production. The number of white collar personnel in banking and insurance will decline. Personnel directly employed in shops will decline and, respectively, the number of those carrying out research and experimental design developments, maintenance, marketing and market studies will increase. Under these conditions, an enterprise can no longer remain a simple "consumer" of the vocational training system and restrict itself to a passive role in the educational process. It should participate in this. The price of inaction is too great.

Information of the International Labor Organization

Assessment by Workers of Possible Change in Earnings, %

Factors in Production Situation	Can Drop	No. Change	Can Rise (in rubles)								No Reply	Rank*
			to 30	fr 30 to 40	fr 40 to 60	fr 60 to 80	fr 80 to 100	fr 100 to 120	over 120			
Receiving prizes in socialist competition	—	15,8	70,2	8,8	1,8	1,7	—	—	—	1,7	1	
Rise in category	—	24,6	45,6	22,8	7,0	—	—	—	—	—	2	
Overfulfilling norm quota	12,3	15,8	40,3	17,5	8,8	3,5	1,8	—	—	—	3	
Reduction in number of workers	3,5	22,8	35,1	22,8	5,3	3,5	1,7	—	—	5,3	4	
Overtime and holiday work	7,0	31,6	45,6	10,5	1,8	3,5	—	—	—	—	5	
Rise in labor productivity	3,5	36,8	40,4	12,3	5,3	1,7	—	—	—	—	6	
Introduction of rationalization proposals	3,5	42,1	36,8	8,8	—	1,8	—	—	1,7	5,3	7	
Economic expenditure of raw products, materials	—	49,1	40,3	3,5	—	1,8	—	—	—	5,3	8	
Development of new equipment, production methods	3,5	49,1	24,6	14,0	—	1,8	—	—	—	7,0	9-11	
Rise in product quality	3,5	54,4	24,6	14,0	1,8	—	—	—	—	1,7	9-11	
Transition to progressive output standards	5,2	42,1	33,3	5,3	—	1,8	—	—	—	12,3	9-11	
Precise observance of production discipline	10,5	43,9	29,8	5,3	1,8	1,7	—	—	—	7,0	12	
Conversion of brigade to cost accounting	12,3	36,8	28,1	7,0	—	1,8	—	—	—	14,0	13	
Output of new types of product	7,0	56,1	17,6	10,5	—	—	—	—	—	8,8	14-16	
Better use of equipment	—	66,7	24,5	3,5	—	—	—	—	—	5,3	14-16	
Combining jobs	7,0	61,4	22,8	3,5	1,8	—	—	—	—	3,5	14-16	
Surpayment: for vocational skill	1,8	61,4	21,0	5,3	—	—	—	—	—	10,5	17	
for labor conditions	1,8	70,2	14,0	7,0	—	—	—	—	—	7,0	18	
Average values	4,6	43,4	33,0	10,1	1,9	1,4	0,2	—	0,1	5,3		

\* Ranking values relate to distributions of answers on possible increase in earnings.

**How Much Can One Earn?**

18060001i Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, May-Jun 88  
(signed to press 16 May 88) pp 68-70

[Article, published under the heading "Facts, Commentaries, Notes (From the Sociologist's Desk)," by T.M. Ponikarova and V.S. Dunin: "How Much Can One Earn?"; the authors are employed at the National Economy Academy under the USSR Council of Ministers. Tatyana Mikhaylovna Ponikarova is a candidate of economic sciences and senior science associate. This is her first appearance in *Sotsiologicheskiye Issledovaniya*. Vladimir Serafimovich Dunin is a junior science associate. Our journal has published his articles "Quantitative

Assessment of Activities of Line Leaders in a Primary Production Collective" (No 4, 1978, co-author) and "The Effect of the Limit" (No 3, 1987, co-author)]

[Text] The effectiveness of the wage policy depends primarily upon to what degree its principles are understood by the workers and encourage an increase in their labor contribution. How do the workers view the reorganization presently being carried out in this area? We have endeavored to answer this question in relying on the results of sociological research conducted by the National Economy Academy. In August 1987, 500 workers were questioned from five machine building enter-

prises in Kuybyshev. The sample of the brigades was quota and within them the selection of respondents was random. The survey was conducted during a period when the enterprise was preparing widely to convert to the new wage system. One other important fact. The research conducted subsequently at the production associations of AvtoZIL [Motor Vehicle Plant imeni Likhachev], the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant imeni V.I. Lenin and a number of other enterprises produced virtually analogous results.

The main principles for policy in the wage area were formulated in the decisions of the June (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU "On Improving the Organization of Wages and Introducing New Wage Rates and Salary Scales for Workers in the Production Sectors of the National Economy" [1]. The main tasks are to provide a direct linkage of earnings with the work results, to eliminate wage leveling, to strengthen the material interest of the workers in mobilizing the existing reserves and introducing modern equipment and product types, to widen enterprise independence in expending the wage fund and encourage operations with a smaller number of personnel on the basis of full economic accountability and self-financing.

We endeavored to convert the designated problems into the language of a real production situation and established 18 parameters influencing the amount of earnings. How did the workers view these? First of all, one is struck by two circumstances (see the Table). In the first place, a portion of the respondents assumed that under the new conditions earnings could decline. A majority though was convinced of their own forces or, by tradition, felt that without their "due" they would not remain or were skeptical of the possibility of positive changes. Thus, from 16 to 70 percent of those questioned (depending upon the specific indicator) felt that with an improvement in operations earnings would not change. Secondly, the expectations of the workers were extremely meager. From 14 to 70 percent was hoping to receive an increase up to 20 rubles, or from 20 to 40 rubles (from 3 to 23 percent of the respondents). Considering that the average monthly wage of those questioned was around 250 rubles, the claims, to put it frankly, are minimal.

What are the reasons for the designated situation? First of all, the workers take a sober view of the technical level of production and its organization. Obviously, with the existing state of affairs here they cannot expect "mad money." The set of the respondents was influenced by the mechanism operating at the moment of the survey and which sets firm limits in the amount of earnings for different vocational-skill groups and these limits are in no way determined by the over-all work results of the subdivisions and the enterprise as a whole. Such leveling trends cover even the brigades operating on cost accounting with their coefficient for labor participation.

Finally, in the mind of many persons questioned, stereotypes of "barracks communism" have become deeply rooted. From the viewpoint of such ideas a desire to earn more generally and, in particular, more than others around is a private-property instinct and an attempt to set oneself into opposition to the collective. The principle of "not being different" developed in people over the decades and in order to break this one must have the most efficient organization of wages. A restructuring of the individual's psychology is essential.

Now let us examine to what degree what factors can influence earnings. The most stable are: a rise in the skill category, the better employment of equipment, the economic expenditure of raw products and materials, the winning of prizes in the socialist competition. In these instances, none of those questions pointed to the possibility of a decline in earnings. The presence of such stable elements in the material incentive mechanism is particularly important as these ensure the development of long-term trends in encouraging labor. There is a different question of to what degree the given list meets the demands of the times. But more about this later.

The greatest opportunities for increasing wages (over 80 rubles) come from the introduction of innovation proposals, the overfulfilling of the standard quotas and a reduction in the number of employees. However, only individual persons (around 2 percent of those questioned) pointed to such an opportunity. Consequently, the stimulating effect of the listed parameters is still limited. Moreover, these are viewed in a traditional manner as a method of "forcing out" and not earning remuneration. The respondents did not link direct earnings with end results. It is worthy of note that in first place among the choices (82 percent) was the factor of obtaining prizes in the socialist competition, namely that element of the economic mechanism which has been particularly strongly infected with formalism and where numerous noneconomic and administrative managerial elements are present. The permanency of the traditional notions of "setting unwarranted pay and bonuses" can be seen from the fact that 61.4 percent of those questioned noted overtime and holiday work as a factor for increasing earnings.

Another large group of factors for increasing earnings is comprised of those which were noted by at least one-half of those questioned (a rank of from 7 through 18). Here the following circumstance causes particular concern. Little important were questions of great importance for the restructuring of the economy and, in particular, machine building: the introduction of new equipment and production methods, the production of new types of articles, and improved product quality. The respondents had low regard for the possibilities of commending innovative activities, although up to 30 percent of the workers are involved in this. In a word, the new wage system does not encourage the workers, at least on a verbal level, to accelerate scientific and technical

progress. For now, this system cannot change the traditional attitude toward such important elements of the production process as the precise observance of production discipline, the better utilization of equipment and the transition to progressive output standards.

The research has shown that the new organization of wages is not perceived by the workers as a system capable of fundamentally altering the existing situation. For now it is not oriented at making earnings directly dependent upon the labor contribution and results of the collective's activities. Why? Primarily because the preparations for the transition to the designated wage system has not been accompanied by the complete introduction of new management principles. Furthermore, regardless of the fact that wage leveling and excessive bonuses and pay are condemned everywhere, they for now remain the only "practically tested" wage principles well familiar to the workers. And for this reason, like it or not, they serve as the basis for assessing the proposed measures. It can be assumed that in converting to the new wage rates and salaries, many shortcomings in the current wage system will be reproduced. A rise in the amount of the wage rates (salaries) will be viewed as an equal and natural addition to earnings. Its validity will again be judged outside the dependence upon the individual labor contribution.

For overcoming the wage-leveling stereotypes, explanatory work is essential. However, the main condition is to actually make the level of earnings dependent upon the labor contribution and results of enterprise operations. Here we must not fear a possible and, in a number of instances, inevitable differentiation of wages. The sooner interest is aroused the faster we will realize the principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor."

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#### Foreign Panorama

In the developed capitalist countries, the unemployment level among women is double that of men. In Belgium, this ratio equals 17.9 percent and 8.6 percent, in Italy, respectively, 17.8 and 7.4 percent and in Greece 11.6 and 5.1 percent. In Australia, the FRG, the United States and Japan, the difference is less than 2 percent. Only in Ireland, Finland and Malta is unemployment of women lower.

International Labor Organization Information

#### Notions of Tenth-Graders on Happy Marriage 18060001j Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, May-Jun 88 (signed to press 16 May 88) pp 71-72

[Article by A.S. Krasovskiy: "Ideas of Tenth-Graders on a Happy Marriage"; Anatoliy Stepanovich Krasnovskiy is a candidate of philosophical sciences and a senior science associate at the Scientific Research Institute for Pedagogics under the Belorussian Ministry of Education. He is the author of the book "Budushchiy muzh i otets" (The Future Husband and Father) (1986). This is the first time he is published in our journal]

[Text] In 1985, a survey was conducted in Minsk on 600 tenth-graders, young men and women. We were interested in their attitude toward family life. First of all, we were struck by the fact that one out of three respondents was experiencing difficulties in contact with persons of the opposite sex. Here a major role was evidently played by the "infantile" sets concerning relations between the sexes. Thus, 45 percent of the young men admitted to only "male" friendship and 10 percent of the girls, on the contrary, to only "female."

The data of numerous studies indicate that reciprocal love between bride and groom is not the only reason for entering marriage. However, satisfaction with family life is significantly higher in those couples the marriage of which was concluded out of love [3; 7]. A majority of the respondents (90 percent) agreed with the assertion that marriages out of love are the happiest. However, a more detailed analysis of the value orientations of school graduates shows that far from all share a notion of love between future spouses as the most important condition for establishing a lasting and happy family. Approximately 40 percent of the tenth graders accepted this judgment unconditionally, 47 percent felt that reciprocal love was desirable in concluding a marriage, while 13 percent were convinced that love has no bearing for establishing a family. The rather "prosaic" attitude of those questioned toward love is also seen from the fact that 48 percent of the young men and 35 percent of the young women expressed their disagreement with the assertion "the importance of love can be put in the words of A. Blok: 'Only a person in love has the right to the name of man'."

The obtained data coincide in principle with the results given by S.I. Golod who studied the reasons for entering marriage: around 40 percent of the married males and 50 percent of the married females concluded their family union out of love while in the remainder other motives predominated [1, p 26]. Consequently, the sets of the school graduates as a whole adequately reflect the actual motivation for choosing a marriage partner.

A predominant majority of those questioned realize that a feeling of duty is the most important quality of a real family person. Virtually all the tenth graders (99 percent) agreed that "having concluded a marriage, a person

should be responsible not only for himself but also in terms of the family and be concerned with its members." Just as unanimously, the respondents shared the following opinion: "A person who does not keep his word and is irresponsible toward his deeds is an unreliable mate in family life." And they reject the view that "I am impressed by families in which the spouses lead a free way of life and do not burden themselves with family cares."

However, when it is a question not of an abstract family member but rather their own qualities, then the demands noticeably decline. Thus, 13 percent of those questioned recognize that they "would prefer to live without concerns and unencumbered by any duties." One out of four young men and one out of seven young women, in their estimate, were endeavoring to live so that they would be responsible for nothing. Almost 45 percent of the young men and 30 percent of the women avoided giving promises to others and taking on any obligations.

There is one other contradiction between the notion of what should be and their own conduct. A predominant majority of those questioned did not doubt that "man and wife are primarily loyal and dedicated friends" and that a future mate in life would be above all a friend who would share their views and convictions, however at the same time, upon the admission of 25 percent of the young women and 15 percent of the young men, they did not have true and loyal dedicated friends. Often the difficulties of establishing friendly relations were caused not only by the lack of an ability and skill of communicating, but also by egoism and a reticence to understand others as well as following their own interests [3]. At the same time, the research shows that the egoist establishes a family, as a rule, on the basis of mercenary considerations [4], and this, in turn, determines the style of behavior in the family where there is an absence of a moral basis which would reinforce the marriage and family relations.

The results of the survey indicate that not all the young men and women possess a developed sense of collectivism. Thus, one out of every ten respondents felt that "in contact with others a person always pursues his own interests and searches for gain and usefulness for oneself." One out of four does not agree that "in his deeds a person should be guided primarily by the interests and needs of the collective and only then think of his own interests and desires." It is worthy of note that such views are also apparent in actual conduct. According to the self-estimate of 42 percent of those questioned, they did not experience joy in the event of the success of fellow classmen and did not feel empathy for the errors of comrades.

Some 96 percent of the young men and women responded positively to the judgment "the husband (wife) is a person you can always understand, with whom you can always discuss your concerns, problems and

doubts." However, in this question there was a contradiction between the notion of what was necessary for permanent, happy partner relations and their own conduct. Thus, according to the admission of one out of every five respondents, the opinion of others (for example, fellow classmen) was of least interest to him, and one out of four suffered from loneliness and did not find understanding even among close friends. It is not surprising that precisely these students had a low assessment of the prospects of encountering a loved person in the future. Some 55 percent of those who assume that they will never love anybody consider themselves alone.

One of the most conditions attributing to mutual understanding in family life is the ability of the spouses to make concessions, to find compromises in disputed and conflict situations as well as critically assess their own errors and confusion.

The results of a number of studies make it possible to consider that the problem of compromise in a modern family is among the most acute. Thus, according to the data of S.S. Yelistratkina [5], around 75 percent of the men and women compromise rarely and very rarely with their spouses. Analogous information has been obtained in surveying divorcing couples. Some 27 percent of them replied that they never made compromises and 60 percent only sometimes [6]. The refusal to make any compromises whatsoever, the inability and reticence to recognize their errors and shortcomings frequently became the reasons for marital conflicts and act as an unique catalyst for the process of disharmony in family relations [2].

Unfortunately, many young men and women (respectively, 20 and 15 percent) feel that it is impossible to compromise in family life since this, supposedly, leads to subordination and inequality. One out of four of the questioned young men and one out of six of the young women did not intend to change their habits, even if these were not to the liking of their spouse. In other words, compromise is perceived rather as an undesirable quality which impinges on personal dignity. Characteristically, 43 percent of those questioned rarely, in their words, concede to their fellow classmen and peers and never recognize compromises.

Thus, in the course of the research we discovered a rather clearly traceable contradiction between the notions of young people about the necessary qualities for a family man and their own behavior. In a majority of the young men and women, basically adequate knowledge had been developed on the most important moral and psychological bases for family life, however this knowledge often did not correspond to the real moral and psychological qualities of the students themselves as future spouses and parents.

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### Engineers

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[Text] The theme of the technical intelligentsia has constantly been present on the pages of magazines and newspapers. The literature about engineers is very extensive. However, over the last decade, the nature of the publications has changed and the texts are losing their former optimism, the successes and accomplishments are noted feebly, more and more rarely the authors express pleasure over the increase in the number of the engineer corps and the reader can no longer remember by how many times we surpass the United States in this area. There has also been a change in the artistic literature. The heroic aviation designers of the postwar tales and the purposeful public technocrats of the 1960s have been replaced by the faceless host of ITR [engineer and technical personnel] comprising the indispensable background to current daily life. The omnipotent Engr Garin has given way to the mysterious and highly intellectual biopsychologists. The engineers have jumped from science fiction novels into humor and

anecdotes. In the public mind of the 1980s, the image has formed of a "poor engineer," a simpleton and failure. The "technician" now seemingly embodies a new type of Philistine, a person in all regards mediocre.

### A Free Apartment and Firewood for the Entire Winter

The engineer was not always "poor" and at one time this word had a proud ring to it. In the mass mind for a long time the status of the technical specialists in prerevolutionary Russia had been viewed as sacred. An in actuality, too often a comparison with those times leads one to serious reflection. In the 19th Century, there were few engineers. According to the 1897 industrial census, at the plants and factories in the European part of the nation there were just 957 graduated Russian technicians (the form employed in the statistics at that time) [7]. They earned approximately 10-fold more than the most industrious worker, they had a free apartment, a class rank, a uniform, a carriage, a servant and were provided with firewood for the entire winter. Engineer positions were a "cozy spot" which brought a number of "sub rosa" income [8].

In the eyes of the "factory people" an engineer was not merely respected but he was honored and feared. There was an abyss between the workers and the specialists and this was both social and cultural. Certain engineer professions that were new for Russia were considered exotic. For example, a railroad engineer in the last century was a figure who was "fashionable and as romantic as a hissar. Something like a cosmonaut today." [9]

The technical VUZes of those times were famous for their fine general education preparation. The students studied music, dancing and fencing. A. Loranskiy in "Istoricheskiy ocherk Gornogo Instituta" [Historical Essay on the Mining Institute] has written: "The largest part of the students entered the Corps (that is, the Mining Cadet Corps.—O.K.) not in the aim of completing the full course and emerging as mining officers, but chiefly in order to obtain a good general gymnasium education....in a word, the Mining Corps was the best of the St. Petersburg "noble boarding schools," but it was not conspicuous as a special higher institution of learning for mining" [10]. In the second half of the 19th Century, the competition to enter the technical VUZes reached seven persons per place (calculated from [11, p 113]).

The acute shortage of technical specialists at the end of the century was one of the reasons for the democratizing of the system for their reproduction: many technical VUZes and polytechnical schools, which were previously only for the privileged, were declared open to the representatives of all classes. In the 1890s, at the St. Petersburg Technological Institute, over a third of the students were the children of the bourgeoisie, the nongentry intellectuals and merchants; at the Kharkov Practical Technological Institute, the students coming from unprivileged classes comprised 57 percent (calculated from [11, pp 107-130]). The relative accessibility of the engineer profession increased its attractiveness in the eyes of the simple people.

The mining engineers held a particularly honorary position in society. Aside from high salaries, they also had other distinguishing features such as military-type uniforms and their own system of titles (that is, a Table of Ranks) and they were generally considered the equal in rights to the military ranks and had all their privileges [12].

The industrial revolution which began to gain strength at the beginning of the 20th Century had a great influence on the status of the engineer intelligentsia. A characteristic fact. In 1908 alone, more patents were issued to inventors than in 1905-1907, taken together. The growing wave of inventions put the engineer at the center of social expectations. They were ascribed certain gifts and talent (and not only skills and intelligence). Public opinion created a certain aura of mysteriousness around this figure depicting him as a creator who could create something out of nothing.

Incidentally, the opposite ideas were taking shape at the same time. The relatively rapid development of industry and at the same time the unstable political situation gave rise to antitechnical moods in the masses. The fear that they would enslave people by the mechanisms they created assumed an eschatological hue. In the educated classes of society they began speaking about the coming dictatorship of machines and the need to strengthen the social responsibility of the inventor. A new type of literature arose and developed rapidly: science fiction, with the chief character being an engineer. The first works of such sort are full of evil descriptions. For instance, the titles: "The Fatal War of 18??," "The Gift of Satan," "The Last Martyrs" and "The Struggle of Worlds" [13].

By the start of World War I, the technical specialists along with the military formed the most influential group of experts close to governmental circles.

A system of vocational associations arose and these were to contribute to successful vocational activities as well as unions which defended the interests of the specialists as hired workers of intellectual labor. The Russian Technical Society which existed for 50 years had the greatest authority among these. At the beginning of the 20th Century, such associations published several-score special journals the pages of which discussed not only technical but also social problems.

The increased prestige of the profession of an engineer was accompanied by the spread of the ideology of technicism. The recently hazy contours of the professional ethos gradually assumed institutional forms and were set down in the by-laws of the associations and in the decisions of the engineer congresses. In their midst ideologies appeared which endeavored to establish the role and place of the creative inventor. The most vivid example of the technocrat thinker of those times was P.K. Engelmeyyer. He penned many works on the philosophy of technology and the problems of an inventor's creativity [14]. The author ascribed to the engineer almost a messianic role in the restructuring of the world. The latter was conceived of as a

mechanism which could be controlled by man and its adjustment and improvement should be carried out on principles of universal rationality and utilitarianism.

At the same time the skies over the Russian engineers were not completely cloudless. Domination by foreigners, 93 percent "practical workers" (calculated from [7]) and the bureaucratic obstacles on the path of introducing technical innovations—these were just a few of the sore points in the industry of prerevolutionary Russia. Let us not forget the VUZes which graduated technicians trained to dance and defense but unable to draw [8, p 294], the concessionaires who refused the services of Russian specialists and the torments of the inventors. Let us quote the words of one of them: "If you wish to deprive yourself of honor and make yourself a rascal in the eyes of society, then be first of all a citizen of the Russian Empire and make some invention which has an exchange value" [15].

### The Turning Point

The imperialist and then the Civil wars shook the economy to its foundation. Very many engineers were unemployed. The best-off specialists left the nation or joined those fighting against Soviet power. The arrow on the barometer of social status and prestige turned 180 degrees. From a respected, prestige group of professionals, engineers became bourgeois specialists, the so-called "bourspets," individuals who were menacing and alien to the cause of the revolution. They before, in acting on behalf of the capitalist, had objectively been in opposition to the workers. Now the workers handed down a "vote of no confidence" to the old specialists and subjected them to political ostracism. The matter did not end with declarations. The fierceness of the class struggle at times overflowed into fierce repressions against the engineers (V.I. Lenin has written about this [1, p 350]).

In commencing the great work of building a new life, the party was aware that without specialists socialism could not be built. It was essential to win them over and to overcome the mistrust of the masses in them. At the same time, many measures of the new regime caused protest in the technical intelligentsia. The Decree on worker control was perceived adversarially as this sharply limited the powers not only of the plant and factory owners but also the managers and engineers.

In December 1917, Lenin pointed out that the best representatives of the intelligentsia and the educated people were abandoning the bourgeoisie and the wreckers and coming over to the side of the workers [2, p 198]. In 1918, the largest industrial enterprises were nationalized and all the technical and administrative personnel declared themselves on the side of the young republic. Severe measures of coercion were applied against the wreckers. A year later, the Bolshevik Party concluded that the period of acute struggle against the old specialists and which had been caused by their wrecking was ended [3, p 135]. During this period, Lenin's policy came

down to the following main aspects: 1) The unmerciless suppression of counterrevolutionary intrigues; 2) a considerate attitude toward those who worked conscientiously; 3) indoctrination of the workers in a spirit of tolerance of the specialists, and the overcoming of "ignorant self-conceit" that it would be possible to build socialism without using and drawing on their experience and knowledge. In accord with this approach, measures were taken aimed at increasing the material interest of the engineers in active labor. In 1919, regardless of the chaos and hunger, the specialists were switched to a special status and special rations were introduced for them including "simple," "strengthened" and "academic." The most prominent scientists and engineers were released from any social obligations. Housing conditions were improved [Ibid.].

Of course, with the paucity of resources it was impossible to completely rectify the situation. The well-known sociologist at that time Yelena Kabo wrote about the situation at the beginning of the 1920s: "During these years the budget of a soviet worker (including the industrial white collar worker.—O.K.) was reduced to a minimum, beyond which hunger started" [13, p 3]. According to the data of G.S. Pollyak, the monthly average per capita income in a white collar family at the beginning of 1923 was 10.4 rubles(!), and in addition to this he received 3 rubles worth of products in kind [17]. Many in order to feed their families were forced to sell their belongings. In Moscow, 90 percent of the white collar workers (including engineers) lived in communal apartments and 2 percent had only a "corner," that is, a part of a room (calculated from [16, p 72]).

Under the conditions of the NET [New Economic Policy], the material status of the engineers gradually began to improve. Unemployment declined. In 1923 alone, the wages of specialists rose by 52 percent (although the increased prices for food products "consumed" a significant portion of the increase) [16, p 22]. But this money scarcely sufficed in order to satisfy the most elementary requirements.

The appearance of the engineers also changed. While previously they in every possible way emphasized their professional affiliation, now the main desire was not to stand out from the masses, to merge with them and to mimic the worker. The military uniform was replaced by a Russian blouse and "light orphan's trousers"; the peak cap with an emblem was replaced by a traveling cap.

In the literature of those times, engineers figured as comical persons who inevitably suffered a defeat. In the urban folklore works appeared which belittled the "bourspets":

Engineer (so-called)  
Burned his face with steam.  
It's a shame for us, fellows,  
That it didn't go all over [18].

Here one need not say anything about the prestige of the profession.

But even during those difficult years, V.I. Lenin saw a bright future for the intelligentsia: "We still cannot see to it but we should, whatever the cost, see to it that the specialists, as a special social stratum which will remain a special stratum in the future until we have reached the highest degree of the development of a communist society, would live better under socialism than under capitalism, both in terms material and legal, and in the fact of comradely collaboration with the workers and peasants, and in ideological terms, that is, in terms of being satisfied with their work and in an awareness of its social value...." [1, p 351]. However, the immediate future was to be different.

#### "Specialist-Baiting"

After the death of V.I. Lenin, a disdain began to be cultivated for the old specialists. "Specialist-baiting" was how in public affairs in the 1920s and 1930s they called the campaign of criticism and in fact persecution of the engineers. In the press, including in the professional periodicals, notes regularly appeared that under investigation were so many engineers and technicians who had violated safety rules and who had carried out their duties negligently. Throughout the nation there were political trials with scores of defendants such as the Shakhtinsk case and then the trial of the Promparty [Industrial Party] leaders. Criminal justice in the given instance was a means for manipulating mass awareness. A mistrust on the part of the workers of the specialists trained in prerevolutionary times became an important, although an infamous result of the willful Stalinist Themis.

The "Shakhtinsk case" was heard before the USSR Supreme Court in the summer of 1928. Among the 53 defendants who even before the trial had been declared to be members of an enemy organization, a predominant majority was comprised of engineers and technicians. The results of the trial even merited a discussion at the July (1928) Plenum of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee which, in particular, stated that "in a number of places there has been blind trust in the bourgeois specialists."

The experience of organizing the show trials year after year continued. The trial of the Promparty (25 November-7 December, 1930) was accompanied by outright hysteria. Some 1.2 million Muscovites marched by the House of Unions where the trial was soon to be held. In unity the demonstrators demanded the "counterrevolutionary rabble be executed!" The trial was reported on by Mikhail Koltsov himself the reports of which were

printed by the newspapers from issue to issue. The author bristled with noble indignation: "There is no sympathy as the sons of the traitors have broken with them and in loud voices of juveniles demand the execution of their fathers. There were no political ideas only the hope of money earned for espionage...." The court bowed to the "will of the people." Five of the main defendants who were prominent specialists were sentenced to execution. However, the Presidium of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] reduced this greatest punishment to 10 years of imprisonment. The fabricating of the accusations can be seen, for example, from the fact that the "head of the Promparty," Prof L.K. Ramzin, was soon released. But not because of legal but rather purely engineer grounds as being in prison, L.K. Ramzin had solved a number of important technical problems. It is worthy of note that he subsequently became a winner of the Stalin Prize, a holder of the Order of Lenin and the Labor Red Banner [19].

In just 10-15 years, only recollections remained of the professional prestige of a technical specialist. He was replaced, using the expression of Ilya Ilf, by a "fear-weakened engineer."

The persecuting of the specialists was a consequence of the general policy carried out by I.V. Stalin and which was based on the thesis of exacerbating class struggle during the period of building socialism. In words and in the speeches of the party and state leaders "specialist-baiting" was seen as a negative phenomenon. In actuality, an accusation of harmfulness hung like the sword of Damocles over each engineer. At the April (1928) Plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee and Central Control Committee, the view was voiced of providing a "proper rebuff" to the sabotage elements of the bourgeois specialists and strengthen control over their activities. The communist economic workers were criticized sharply for blindly believing the "bourspets." The enterprise collectives were urged to be vigilant and to "punish mercilessly" and so forth [3, pp 708-713].

In 1931, Stalin dotted the "i's" in his definition of the political stance of the bourgeois specialists: "Some have caused harm, others have concealed evil doers, a third group has washed their hands of it and observed neutrality, while a fourth has fluctuated between Soviet power and the wreckers." Furthermore: "There are and will be wreckers as long as we have classes and as long as there is capitalist encirclement [5, pp 69, 72].

In accord with such logic, in technical problems they began to see political unreliability and in an accident the betrayal of the cause of socialism. The policy of "specialist-baiting" was supported primarily among the backward and least educated part of the working class, the representatives of which continued to view the engineer intelligentsia as the servants of the rich.

The possibility of a conflict between the old specialists and the new leaders which took over the helm of industry was concealed in the very structure of management. The Ninth RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress closed a dualistic form of managing the plants and factories: a specialist as the actual leader of the enterprise was assigned to help the administrative director from the workers [3, p 167]. At that time, the separating of power into technical and political was a forced measure.

The very existence of the socialist republic depended upon how its economy would develop. This demanded that people dedicated to the cause of the revolution stand at the helm and they would have to be capable of successively carrying out the principle of primacy of policy over economics. But among the engineers there were few such persons. At the same time, it is impossible to efficiently direct industry without a knowledge of production. The promoted workers did not have the appropriate training. The director had to manage but this was far from always the case. A specialist had all this knowledge but was constantly under suspicion and this was maintained by appeals to vigilance and rumors about the conspiracies of engineers in the aim of blowing up or sinking something. In such an atmosphere even the employment of professional vocabulary was perceived by none-too-clever persons as political intrigue. A director who considered himself a fighter, but now on a new, economic front, and accustomed to the terse phrases of a military order and standard political views in a conversation with specialists found himself to be a person who had fallen into an alien land without a knowledge of the language and behind everything unclear saw a threat. In a word, each management choice was balanced between the necessity of professionally resolving specific production and technical problems and revolutionary enthusiasm. More often preference was given to the latter.

By the start of the 1930s, the principle of one-man leadership began to be established in industry. The Decree of the VKP(b) Central Committee of 10 April 1930 sets the view: "The enterprise directors under present-day conditions of industrial reconstruction should not only be the general leaders of the enterprise but must also direct the production methods" [4, p 197]. Thus, one of the reasons was eliminated for the conflict between the leaders and the specialists and at the same time, interference of the non-professionals into technical questions was officially approved. This same document contained an appeal for the more energetic removal of wrecker elements from the ranks of the ITR [Ibid., p 199].

Suspicion of the specialists gradually assumed a very generalized form and was expressed, in particular, in disdain for glasses and a hat. In accord with such logic, any appearance of erudition and professionalism, caution in judgments and neatness—all of this was viewed as symbols of the counterrevolution and wrecking. The ambivalence of the mission of the technical intelligentsia

which was to lead the workers and at the same time was subjected to an indoctrinational effect from them greatly complicated the adaptation of the old specialists to the new conditions.

What was the response of the engineer to the campaign of "specialist-baiting"? Being under conditions of constraint and pressure, they, like any group, joined together. This was apparent primarily in the establishing of various professional associations. During the first years of Soviet power, the public organization "Technology for the Masses" was established along with numerous regional societies of technicians, architects, draftsmen and mining engineers. The All-Russian Engineers Unit which was established in the summer of 1917 was turned in 1925 into the All-Russian Association of Engineers. However, its fate was the same of many societies the activities of which did not correspond to the policy being carried out at the end of the 1920s of standardizing the forms of social life and strengthening administrative and bureaucratic control. The association was judged to be a hothouse of wrecking and anti-Sovietism and for this reason was disbanded. Scientific-technical societies were set up instead in 1929 under the AUCCTU [21]. The last professional organization of engineers ended existence in 1937. The more than 50-year absence of engineer associations in the country involved a loss of many traditions of group ethics and culture. Their reestablishing should be aided by the Union of Engineer Societies which was organized in February of this year.

### Red Specialists

The struggle for a new, people's technical intelligentsia began from the very first days of Soviet power. Workers, peasants and party activists were sent to the VUZes for further training. Over the period of 1918-1921, over 3,500 workers and over 2,000 peasants were appointed to leading technical positions, not counting the state system [20, p 9]. In 1928, a decision was taken to double the proportional amount of engineer and technical personnel in industry and bring the share of workers among the students up to 65 percent. Each year the "party thousand" was sent to the technical VUZes [3, p 749]. In the aim of quickly satisfying the needs of the economy for specialist personnel, the length of instruction in the new type of technical VUZes was shortened to 3 or 4 years [Ibid., p 746].

The mentioned measures quickly began to bear fruit and the number of graduating technical specialists noticeably increased. The socioclass composition of the student body changed fundamentally. At the same time, there was a sharp drop in the level of vocational training. According to the information of a contemporary, "the specialists who during these years graduated from the technical school (VUZes and technical institutes) were not of major value; at best they required a thorough 'resmelting' in the plant forge as well as academic retraining in line with the technical reequipping of the

entire national economy" [20, p 78]. At a meeting of the Moscow VKP(b) organization, I.V. Stalin said: "We are poorly training the personnel in our technical VUZes, we are poorly training our red specialists. This is a conclusion which we cannot avoid" [6, p 59].

The situation was exacerbated by the circumstance that more and more practical workers were coming into engineer work. Their number grew by a more rapid pace in comparison with the increase in the number of graduated specialists. Thus, at the July (1928) Plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee, it was pointed out that there was "an abnormally high percentage of 'practical workers' in technical positions (30 percent)" [3, p 744]. Nevertheless, 2 years later their share was now 48.4 percent [20, p 121].

The acute shortage of lower and middle-level leaders determined the nature of the demands made on the higher school. The goals changed and an universal type engineer with good general educational background gave way to the operational engineer for some specific sector. The purpose of such a reorientation was understandable as it was essential to train the specialists quickly and from persons who were far from always adapted to study in a VUZ. Moreover, the faculty was extremely small in number and diverse in composition and to cap it all it was regularly subjected to purges.

The new engineers from the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s differed from the old ones not only in the level and nature of their training. They were a professional group with a completely different social make-up. Under the conditions of the growing cult of personality and the forming of the administrative system, the incentives for activity changed. The realization by the engineers of their main mission of developing new technical ideas more and more frequently encountered insurmountable barriers. Competitiveness, entrepreneurship, and a desire to reduce the cost of goods—these catalysts of the inventor's thought—were replaced by a command, by orders and total control. Planning understood as a cult of the directive took away initiative. The rigid economic centralization mixed in with the policy of intimidating the masses involved a hostile attitude toward innovations. In such instances the engineer was turned into a wordless executor of orders handed down from above. "Initiative is punishable" was the motto we have inherited from those times.

The actual length of the working day for the ITR during the years of the first five-year plans was 12-14 hours [22]. The well-known specialist in psychotechnics, Prof N. Smirnov, in 1925 wrote: "An engineer generally does not require any particularly good health, any advanced physical qualities, but he should possess the ability to overcome sleepiness and show the ability to work with a rather long lack of time to sleep" [23]. However, regardless of the overloading of the technical specialists and about which much was said in the press of the 1920s and 1930s, they were criticized for sociopolitical passivity.

Here is a typical syllogism of a new Soviet bureaucrat, the representative of the large tribe of enthusiasts of organizing diverse measures: "What? You must take care of business in office hours? Ah, ha. Hence, social work, in your opinion, is not important? Comrades, how can this be regarded if not an antisocial action?" [24].

If dilettantes and ardent social workers were in power, it was difficult for the professional. The cult of competence became a thing of the past and it was replaced by political reliability. The ideology of technocracy, the homage to rationality, professionalism and gain were gradually lost in the fight against the class enemies and professional pedantry gave way to "public zeal (the term used in public affairs of those years).

"I have been admitted to an engineer faculty."

As strange as it might seem, industrialization was inconceivable without the people who could run the equipment. Regardless of the above-indicated costs, the situation gradually began to change for the better and the personnel of technical specialists again began to gain prestige. This was aided, in the first place, by the acute shortage of highly skilled engineers. Secondly, by the change in the social appearance of the intelligentsia and by the turning of it into a people's intelligentsia with deep roots in the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry. An important role was also played by the accessibility of higher education for the industrial enterprise workers who more and more saw the opportunity of continuing their career in engineer activities.

The measures by the Soviet state to establish a "red" intelligentsia gradually lead to a change in the attitude of the masses. At the very end of the 1930s, the label of enemies and wreckers was removed from the specialists and a policy was carried out of a differentiated approach to them, depending chiefly, upon social origins. But, of course, the decisive factor was industrialization which objectively raised the role of engineers in society. Rapid industrial development brought about a number of new engineer specialties and helped in the romanticization of this profession. Thus, the rapid development of aviation made legendary not only the figure of the pilot but also the aviation designer.

The prestige of the engineer professions was particularly high in wartime. Precisely during these difficult times, the nation, as never before, needed innovation and talented specialists who would ensure the rapid development of new equipment. In order to encourage the influx of fresh forces, engineer labor in the 1940s was particularly encouraged with high monetary awards and honorific decorations. A. Tupolev and A. Mikoyan, A. Yakovlev and S. Lavochkin, M. Kalashnikov and N. Makarov became people's heroes. Even now their names are very popular among the people. Thus, according to the data of a study carried out in 1987, those questioned consider S. Korolev, A. Tupolev, A. Yakovlev and M. Kalashnikov the best-known modern Soviet engineers.

The dynamic development of industry during the first postwar decade as well as the great attention given to specialized and secondary education by the party and state created the objective prerequisites for high prestige of the engineer profession. Memorable to all who lived in the 1960s was the debate about "physics" and "lyrics" which ended in favor of the former. The precise sciences were proclaimed to be a matter more worthy of a real man than the humanities. The sociologist V.N. Shubkin, in referring to data of a study conducted by him from 1962 through 1969, wrote: "The professions requiring a knowledge of mathematics, physics and engineering have the highest prestige among the youth." Furthermore: "This is not a 'fashion' but a real and permanent trend" [25].

In the 1960s, the most important factor in the increased prestige in the technical specialties was the developing scientific and technical revolution. The world's first nuclear power plant was built in our country, the world's most powerful passenger jet aircraft was developed, and the first manned spacecraft was launched. Seemingly, Soviet scientists were about to master the secret of thermonuclear synthesis and lasers promised miracles of new technology. It was believed that full mechanization and automation even in the 1960s and 1970s would completely replace manual labor. All these tasks confronted the engineers. The future depended on them. To reach such vast goals, a decision was taken to significantly increase the graduating of engineer personnel. While in 1940, the VUZes trained 24,200 specialists for industry and construction (or approximately 20 percent of the total number of graduates), in 1960, the figure was 95,200 (28 percent) (calculated from [27]).

Precisely during the 1950s and 1960s, many of those mechanisms for forming and reproducing the engineer intelligentsia were established which still exist. The demand of the national economy for specialists was determined by adding up the requests of the enterprises and institutions (which has now led to the overproduction of engineers in certain specialties). The main proportions were established for the graduating of engineers for the various national economic sectors (in recent years these ratios have changed insignificantly). Courses and programs of instruction were established in the VUZes and technical schools and in their majority they have survived safely until the present. At that time the process of the reproduction of management personnel drawing on the engineers became a developed and continuously operating channel for socioprofessional mobility. The "gross" for engineers brought political dividends as this was one of the many points for which we had "caught up with and outstripped" America. But a greater number of graduating specialists did not lead automatically (and could not lead) to a qualitative shift as their training left much to be desired and the problems of employing the specialists were gradually aggravated.

#### Who Are They All?

The activities of an engineer in their essence contradict bureaucratic interests as a bureaucrat establishes the rule

of instructions while the engineer breaks these, in assuming to improve the equipment and production methods; a bureaucrat endeavors to control absolutely everything while the engineer invents and modernizes, he creates something that is fundamentally new, thereby complicating control; for the bureaucrat this is the status quo and for the engineer change and diversity.

In this bifurcated world of loud words and plain actions, the integrity of the engineer's mission is destroyed: with one hand the bureaucrat creates a paper inventor-engineer while on the other, a real overseer engineers. Bureaucracy struggles secretly and openly against innovators. It penetrates the very citadel of new developments, the scientific research institutes, conducting destruction and pogroms there. The bureaucrat has endeavored to select from science as many faceless executors as possible in which the handful of "idea generators" is lost.

The passion of the bureaucrat for total standardization in fact ends up with the stratagems of unaccounted for hierarchies, careful regulation ends up as confused official duties and petty interference as a flourishing as the art of intrigue. Everything has become mixed together: title, position, profession, education, specialty and calling. What is an engineer who does not have a special education? Is an engineer also a young girl after tenth grade who can type and do office work? Or the secretary of a Komsomol raykom with the rudiments of a chemical technician? Or a taxi driver with a diploma from the MVTU [Moscow Higher Technical School]? In the crowd of officials we have lost our notion of what an engineer is. The engineer himself does not remember this as among the 950 ITR questioned at the Moscow Industrial Enterprises, only 7 percent(!) in the column of the questionnaire "Your Profession" wrote "engineer"; 40 percent did not reply; the remainder mentioned the sector in which they worked. Does not the given fact bespeak the destruction of professional self-awareness and a warping of the notions of people on their social role? The turning of the engineer into a mass profession inevitably leads to the growth of heterogeneous phenomena: not only the natural division of labor is extended but also the social stratification of a group. Three strata of technical specialists are formed and these differ noticeably in their position in the power structure. The lower-most and most numerous stratum of ITR comes very close to the working class in many parameters of its vital activity, social origin, way of life, working hours and conditions. In this stratum there is a marginal subgroup made up of foremen. They are recruited largely from the workers and are in close and regular, job-determined contact with them. The regular engineers and foremen have incomes that are approximately equal to the incomes of the industrial workers and often their earnings are less. We would point out that a trend toward a relative decline in the earnings of the ITR has remained unchanged for 50 years. In 1935, the earnings of the ITR were 236 percent of workers earnings, 175 in

1950, 133 in 1970 and 110 in 1986 (calculated from [28]). It is worthy of note that two-thirds of the designated group consists of women and this is an indirect proof of its low prestige.

The leaders of industrial enterprises comprise the second status group of graduated engineers. And, finally, the third echelon of engineers are the "fist-fighters" (N. Shmelev) who are regularly delegated to the superior levels of power for filling out the ranks of the "functionaries" and "bureaucrats." The fact that there is a significant proportional amount of technical specialists (by education) in management has left a definite imprint on the nature of the political decision taken and on the strategy of socioeconomic transformations. Without considering this, it is impossible, for example, to understand the entire range of factors giving rise to the residual principle for assigning resources to sociocultural measures. Something else is striking. In serving the political doctrine of the sacredness of the existing social structures and the inviolability of the authority of superior leaders, the technocrats in the drive for power very often disclose antitechnocratism, that is, common sense is sacrificed to principle, rationality is replaced by abstract ideals and sober calculation by enthusiasm.

The policy of the merging of organizational and technical functions in industry has become the reason for the impeding of the internal vocational dividing of specialists into managers and "pure" engineers. Correspondingly, there is now a rather contradictory notion of the engineer's mission which previously was understood as the ethic of "limited responsibility" (R. Merton). The semifunctional nature of a modern engineer has given his activities the trace of ambiguity. He is perceived as a person engaged in something to do with equipment.

The eroding of professional self-awareness has also been aided by the elimination of the professional (in the initial sense of this word) associations and their printed organs; by certain replacing of the ideals of professionalism with the values of sociopolitical activeness and so forth. Where there are no ethics and culture of labor, the prestige of a profession is reduced to the concepts of "scarcity" or "income." And since there has long been no real scarcity of engineers in a majority of the traditional specialties and their income is lamentably known, then there is no prestige to speak of.

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Will the engineers be able to break out of the bureaucratic morass which fetters any innovation to reach the firm ground of professionalism and entrepreneurship? Will they be able to recover their former positions of, if not the most prestigious, at least a respected profession? Our historical excursion persuades us that the status of engineers in a society is an unique barometer of its state.

A healthy, dynamically developing society respects its innovators, it encourages their creative activities, it awaits and greets innovations and invention; a sick one thirsts for quiet.

It can be said with confidence that measures like the regular increase in salaries of 10-15 percent does not change the situation in principle. As long as the problem of "introduction" remains when the consumer of the offered innovation avoids it at all costs and gives in only to the pressure of a directive, as long as this mechanism of bureaucratic inhibition is not replaced by one where the market forces the producer to reduce the cost of a good and improve its quality, until then we will have the engineer in his current form. As long as the enterprises have an interest in inflating the staffs the "overproduction" of engineers and technicians is inevitable. As long as our economy is not restructured, we will feel the internal professional imbalance of specialists. As long as the "conservative syndrome" is alive in society, the bureaucrat can look with disdain at the innovator.

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#### Time, Ideas, Fates

180600011 *MOSCOW SOTSILOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, May-Jun 88*  
(signed to press 16 May 88) pp 83-84

[Unattributed introduction to the following three articles: "Time, Ideas, Fates"]

[Text] In each thinking man an awareness of the linkage of times lives perpetually. In remote Akatua on the grave of the Decembrist Mikhail Sergeevich Lunin (1787-1845), one of our contemporaries set up an iron plate with the inscription: "To the veteran of the war against Napoleon from a veteran of the war against Hitler."

It is told that very many people who are in no way inclined to sensitivity have been brought to cry by this inscription. But what is most important here? Human memory stretching over a century and a half. But not only. Time is that "divine judge" which is not "susceptible to the clink of gold" and which "knows thoughts and deeds beforehand." Time pays proper due to each. Lunin is remembered as he actually was, a noble hero from Russian history.

It is possible to mislead an entire generation, but it is impossible to deceive the historical memory of the people. However, attempts at times are made here. For example, I.V. Stalin believed that it is not worth fearing the court of history as he had outsmarted it. The memoirs of A.T. Rybin, a fragment of which is published here, states the following judgment of the "leader of the peoples" about himself: "When I die, much rubbish will be piled on my grave but time will sweep everything away." (This episode was not included in the journal's version of the memoirs.) Alas, even tyranny is in no way boundless.

In preparing the manuscript memoirs of A.T. Rybin for press, the editors acquainted the well-known Soviet historian, Academician A.M. Samsonov, with these. In a talk with one of the members of the journal's editorial board, Aleksey Mikhaylovich [Samsonov] had high regard for the heuristic importance of the document and, in particular, pointed out that in studying the still unpublished memoirs of G.K. Zhukov and other well-informed figures of the era, one frequently encounters the mention that I.V. Stalin was very concerned, particularly in the last years of his life, with how he would be viewed in the eyes of coming generations. Motivated by a desire to win an unconditionally affirmative assessment in following generations, I.V. Stalin masterfully directed the process of creating a myth about himself. Here everything was put to work, including such cheap devices as, for example, the episode with the line at the bus halt described by A.T. Rybin. Such a "leader" was a wonder! How many times had he passed by such lines in his armored limousine! But now he halted. But there was more at work here. This extremely perfidious, cruel and ambitious man never did anything out of reasons of the heart. And now his vehicle was halted for a completely definite purpose. I.V. Stalin now had personally set out to create a legend about the "great friend and leader." The discrepancy of the flow of all sorts of glorification to the real traits of his personality, A.M. Samsonov went on to emphasize, was a fact of history....

Being now at the crossroads of historical paths, we now are looking particularly closely at the past and at the persons of past decades. Successful advance is inconceivable without a thorough analysis of the path covered.

Growing stronger day by day, the April winds are blowing over the nation. The general line of society's socio-economic development has been set, but variations are possible in carrying out the specific tasks. And, as always in a situation of choice, the lessons of the past assume particular value and they become a dependable guide by which we test tomorrow. We have no greater capital than the experience of our predecessors. In turning to them for advice and support and in endeavoring to understand the sources of their errors, we presently raise many questions. Social sciences, including sociology, must eliminate all the blank spots and answer all the questions.

The editors do not share those assessments of I.V. Stalin's personality to which A.T. Rybin adheres. But the path to the truth is impossible without an analysis of the entire aggregate of facts, all casts of opinions and all viewpoints.

The methodology of the search for scientific truth has been formulated in the widely known party document, the report of M.S. Gorbachev, "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues." Here is what is said about the decades when Stalin's cult of personality was forming: "It is essential to assess the past with a sense of historical responsibility and on a basis of the historical truth. This must be done, in the first place, due to the

enormous importance of those years for the destinies of our state and the destiny of socialism. Secondly, because these years are at the center of long discussions both in our country and abroad, where along with the searches for the truth, attempts are often undertaken to discredit socialism as a new social system and as a real alternative to capitalism. Finally, we must have just assessments of this and all others periods of our history, particularly now, when restructuring is getting underway. This is essential not in order to settle political scores or, as they say, to render someone's heart but rather to pay proper due to all the heroic that existed in the past, and to draw lessons from the errors and mistakes."

From here stem the tasks directly addressed to our journal. The editors see one of these in a sociological analysis of the documentary materials of previous years, in reconstructing the social processes of those times on a strictly documentary basis, and in ascertaining the characteristic features and typical traits of social development then. In other words, the maximally generalized data without fail should be supplemented, in our view, by a careful analysis as to how various sociological ideas were realized in practice, in what manner and with what result they were reflected in concrete human fates. The time has come not only to declare but also to actually put mankind at the center of sociological knowledge.

We propose, in particular, transforming such considerations in the new section of the journal: "Time, Ideas and Fates." At present, this rubric, as they say, is making its premier.

The intention of the editors is simple. Personal documents and other information of this sort, we feel, are a completely apt component in a sociological journal. In the history of sociology, instances are known when precisely information of a memoir sort becomes the basis of research. Moreover, in studying the life of Polish emigres in the United States, the sociologist U. Thomas and F. Znaecky have specially inspired the appearance of such a document. At their request, a Polish peasant wrote a detailed, 300-page autobiography.

We are attempting to involve in discussing the problems the attention which has particularly heightened after the appearance of the novel by A. Rybakov "Deti Arбата" [Children of the Arbat], other books and publications in the periodical press.

Certainly, a document addressed to the readership of *Sotsiologicheskoye issledovaniya* should unfailingly excel in particular social importance, uniqueness of information gained without fail "at first-hand."

The new rubric will scarcely come to be without the active help of readers. The editors are counting on your good advice and constructive proposals. Send us memoirs, diaries, letters, minutes of meetings, photographs and other materials which, in your view, most vividly reflect the past and which clearly embody the signs of the times.

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**Bodyguard Defends Stalin's Personality, Behavior**  
*18060006m Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE*  
*ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, May-Jun 88 pp*  
84-94

[Article by Aleksey Trofimovich Rybin, personal pensioner who in the 1930's served in the NKVD organs, including in the subdepartment which provided security for the members of the government. After that he was military commandant of the Bolshoy Theater: "Alongside I.V. Stalin"]

[Text] Rybakov's novel "Children of the Arbat" asserts that Stalin feared his own people and for that reason the special services closed off all passageways when he drove along the Arbat. That is a fabrication. Stalin was completely free from a sense of fear. He could take off along any unguarded road and stop where he wanted and talk with people. He did that especially often during the war and after it.

Along with my coworkers I. Chernyayev and I. Kozhevnikov I bore responsibility for guarding the Arbat and the Mozhayskiy Highway when Stalin drove along them. We were never given the task of closing off all the passageways in the Arbat. Indeed that would have been impossible for every house, beginning with No 2 through No 54 and from No 1 through No 55, had passageways or entryways.

Usually Stalin drove along the Arbat at a speed of 30-40 kilometers an hour and along Bolshoy (now Myaskovskiy Street) and Malyy Afanasyevskiy lanes even more slowly—10-15 kilometers. The drivers V. Kartsev, A. Krivchenko, P. Mitryukhin, and N. Tsvetkov among others attest to that.

I have repeatedly heard that Stalin supposedly was desperately afraid of terrorists and that the furniture in his office was arranged in such a way that a person who intended him harm could not hide behind it and that the curtains were for the very same reason short, at the same level as the windowsill. I asked the former commandant of Stalin's dacha I. Orlov to comment on these rumors. This is how he answered me: "I rather than Stalin arranged the furniture. I also hung the curtains. We shortened them so that they would not keep the heat from the radiator from entering."

The memoirs written by N. Kirillin, V. Tukov, I. Khrustalev, and other officers of the guard are kept in my personal archives. <sup>1</sup> Many episodes of Stalin's contacts with working people are known to me from oral stories. Incidentally, Stalin often expressed his displeasure to Lieutenant General N. Vlasik, chief of the guard, and reproved him for excessive zeal and playing it safe: "Why do you hide me in railroad sidings? I want to sit in the car where all the people sit."

It was before the war, on the festival day of Whitsunday. Stalin was preparing to go to Gorki-vtoryye. Vlasik was gone somewhere. N. Kirillin asked for permission to get into the car. Stalin nodded his agreement. "Somewhere near Zhavoronok," Kirillin recalls, "an old woman of very venerable age met us. Hunchbacked and leaning on a cane she shuffled along the side of the road. Suddenly Stalin said: 'Invite the old woman into the car, we'll take her to her house.' The automobile stopped. I went up to the old woman and said to her: 'Little mother, Comrade Stalin invites you into his car, we're going the same way and we'll take you to your house.' The old woman looked at me somewhat strangely and said: 'Little son, are you in your right mind?' At that moment Stalin threw open the car door. The old woman saw him and crossed herself: 'Lord, is this really Comrade Stalin? Iosif Vissarionovich?' 'The very same. Don't be shy, get in the car and we'll take you to your house.' As we drove along Stalin asked where the old lady was heading and where she had come from. She answered that she had been at church and was going back home—she had a farm. 'And what kind of farm do you have?' 'I own a cow and chickens.' 'But who helps you, or do you take care of things by yourself?' 'My daughter and granddaughter help.' When the old woman got out of the car she bowed to us and crossed herself for a long time."

A multitude of examples of Stalin's manly behavior during the Great Patriotic War could be cited. Here are only a few.

During the enemy air raids on Moscow Stalin continued to work at the Sovnarkom [Soviet of People's Commissars] but more often at his nearby dacha. There were no bomb shelters there, the guard associates N. Altshuler, A. Ishmetov, and D. Zherebyatye confirm. Sometimes during the raids Stalin accompanied by B. Kuznetsov would go up to the solarium on the roof and watch the density of the fire of our antiaircraft artillery from there.

Naval antiaircraft guns posted around the dacha covered it from the air. Repulsing the enemy's raids, they at times set up a constant cannonade. And "work" was found for the guard associates too: they shot flares from submarine guns.

As is well known, by mid-October 1941 a very serious situation had developed on the Western Front. The German troops had breached our troops' defense and were heading toward Moscow. In these exceptionally dramatic conditions Stalin, unlike certain of his comrades-in-arms, did not lose his head. S. Kashevarov, the guard who stood at the post near the Kremlin office, recalls: "In those days the Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not show any nervousness and was calm. But Beriia, Malenkov, and Kaganovich had clearly lost their self-possession and become extremely confused." Sometime in the night of 15 October Beriia called a conference of secretaries of the capital party raykoms in the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] building. Former first secretary of the Sverdlovskiy

Raykom of the VKP (b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Ilya Novikov recalls: "The conference was a short one. Beriia said: 'The link with the front has been severed. Evacuate everyone who's unable to defend Moscow. Distribute the food from stores to the population so that the enemy doesn't get it.' After we returned to the rayons we did just that—we arranged to distribute the food. Riots arose on the streets because of that."

But how did Stalin behave? On the evening of 15 October he intended to go to the nearby dacha in Kuntsevo. General V. Rummyantsev, who knew that the dacha was mined, undertook to talk him out of it by every possible means. Stalin silently listened and turned to his driver M. Mitryukhin: "We're going to the dacha." Accompanied by I. Khrustalev and V. Krutashov the Commander arrived at the gates of the dacha. There and then it became clear—the gates were closed and the dacha was mined. Stalin stared at Commandant I. Orlov and ordered: "Clear the mines in two or three hours, but now stoke the stove in the small cottage. I'm going to work there."

On the morning of 16 October Stalin accompanied by General V. Rummyantsev as well as V. Krutashov and N. Kirillin set off for the Kremlin. In the streets crowds of people were lugging food from the stores. Seeing this picture Stalin got out of the car (on Smolenskaya Square). Muscovites immediately gathered round him and began to applaud. The more daring began to speak of riots in the city. Someone asked: "Just when will the Red Army stop the enemy and drive him from our land?" Stalin answered: "The day when there will be a holiday on our street is not far off." Then the Commander proceeded to the Kremlin where he conducted a conference which is described very well in the memoirs of the former People's Commissar of the USSR Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin.

On 17 October Stalin accompanied by Colonel N. Kirillin personally checked the militia and military posts near the Borodino Bridge. In October and November 1941 he talked with Muscovites on Kaluzhskaya Square, Zemlyany Bank, and Gorkiy Street.

On 15 October Beriia, Malenkov, and Kaganovich recommended that Stalin evacuate to Kuybyshev. A special train which stood on the siding behind Krestyanskaya Gate was prepared for this purpose. In addition, four planes stood ready at one of the airfields. They included Stalin's personal plane piloted by air division commander Colonel V. Grachev. I happened to be among the guards who protected these planes and the special train. In the first case my subordinates Yu. Korolkov, A. Susanin, and A. Zhukov, among others, were on duty; in the second—N. Altshuler, A. Belekhov, P. Lozgachev, V. Tukov, and I. Khrustalev.

But Stalin did not intend to surrender Moscow nor to show up near the special train or at the airfield. This is how the events in those days unfolded. The commandant

of the distant dacha S. Solovov had already managed to move some things to the special train. Stalin noticed his efforts and asked: "What kind of move is this?" Solovov answered: "We are preparing to evacuate to Kuybyshev, Comrade Stalin." Stalin calmly but firmly said: "There will be no evacuation. Everyone will stay here until victory." On the night of 16 October he gathered his associates N. Kirillin, M. Starostin, V. Tukov, I. Khrustalev, and the driver A. Krivchenkov together for instructions. He again repeated: "I'm not going anywhere from Moscow. You all will stay with me."

When V.M. Molotov was still alive, I showed him P. Proskurin's novel "Imya tvoye" [Your Name]. At the start of the second volume of this novel it says that on 19 October 1941 Stalin intended to leave Moscow. He arrived at the train standing on the Rogozhsko-Simonskiy Siding and for about 2 hours walked along the platform agonizing over whether he should go or not. To that Molotov answered me: "In October 1941 Stalin did not intend to leave Moscow. He sent me to Kuybyshev for 3 days to check personally on how the diplomatic corps was getting settled. Three days later I returned to the capital."

After the Teheran Conference Stalin visited Stalingrad which had been destroyed to its foundations. He looked at the streets and the headquarters of Field Marshal Paulus. The driver A. Krivchenkov recalls that in a narrow thoroughfare between piles of stones and smashed enemy materiel the automobile suddenly collided with a Model M car driven by a woman. Stalin ordered us to stop and got out of the car. Seeing him the woman became frightened and began to cry. "It's all my fault," she wailed: Stalin calmed her: "Don't cry. It's the war not you who's to blame. Our car is an armored car and didn't get damaged and you'll fix yours."

At that time mountains of German helmets lay in Stalingrad. Looking at this impressive picture Stalin said: "And there used to be heads in those helmets."

In the summer of 1946 Stalin went to the south. In Orel he decided to take a walk through the city, which was in ruins. Hundreds of people accompanied the leader, clambering through the ruins. On one of the streets a woman carrying pails suddenly appeared before him. V. Tukov recalls that she threw down the pails, clasped her hands, and began to cry. Then she embraced Stalin, wailing: "Dear Comrade Stalin, can you really be walking along our streets?" He answered the question with a question: "Will you really not allow us to walk along the streets of your city?" The woman continued to wail: "If it weren't for you, Comrade Stalin, we wouldn't have conquered the cursed enemy. Thank you for that." "Thanks to you. The people conquered the enemy, not me."

On 17 July 1949 Stalin went to the dacha in Semenovskoye. It was raining. A bus stop appeared just about in the middle of the road ahead. Several people crowded together at it. The car came alongside the bus stop and

Stalin ordered the car to brake and turning to V. Tukov who was accompanying him, he said: "Sir, the people are getting wet in the rain, let's give them a lift to their houses. Invite them into the car." Tukov went up to the people waiting for the bus and on behalf of Stalin asked them to get into the automobile. But no one moved and everyone looked at Tukov with suspicion. He had to go back and report: "They're not coming to the car." "You did a bad job of inviting them, you don't know how to talk with the people." Stalin got out of the automobile, went up to the bus stop, and started a conversation. Since there was not enough room, two trips had to be made. At first the passengers were reserved, but then the conversation became lively. Stalin asked about country life and they were glad to answer him. They talked about the war. Iosif Vissarionovich told about the death of his son Yakov. One of the passengers, Galya Yudina, shared her grief—her father had been killed at the front. (A short time later Stalin gave Galya a school uniform and a student briefcase). Besides Galya Yudina Sveta Zakharova, Vitya Koshkin, Zina Mustafayeva, Nina Khrustaleva, and the teacher Yekaterina Andreyevna Kuzina took part in the conversation.

Another retort to Rybakov concerns the relations between Stalin and Kirov. I cannot agree that they were cold relations. Here it is not appropriate to talk simply of friendship but of deeply felt relations, which I personally witnessed. I repeatedly had occasion to see them together at the nearby dacha, in the south, and during the games of "gorodki" (Stalin played in a pair with a kitchen worker Kharkovskiy and Kirov—with Vlasik). It was obvious that Stalin and Kirov were bound by very deep feelings. Upon learning of Kirov's death, Iosif Vissarionovich suffered an enormous shock. Along with Molotov he left for Leningrad immediately. Military subdivisions from the special-purpose division and couriers V. Rumyantsev, N. Kirillin, S. Kuzmichev, and S. Makeyev accompanied them. Within 2 days Stalin had grown gaunt and dark. He went up to the coffin, embraced the dead man, kissed him, and said these exact words: "Farewell, my dear friend. We will avenge you."

This is my opinion: Kirov's guard was very badly organized. The matter reached the point of betraying the interests of the party and the people. Nikolayev, future killer of Sergey Mironovich, was detained twice at the gates of Smolnyy as a clearly suspicious individual, but he was freed on command from above without their managing to make a search. On the fateful day of 1 December 1934 Nikolayev, who had a gun on him, sat on the windowsill in the corridor for more than two hours waiting for Kirov. Who put the pistol in the murderer's hand? (Firearms were very strictly controlled in those years, I know that very well). Why was there no guard in the corridor of Smolnyy and why was there no bodyguard, who was obliged to shield the leader from a treacherous bullet, with Kirov? The criminal lack of control of Yagoda and the chief of the Leningrad UNKVD [Administration of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] Medved and his subordinates led to this tragic outcome.

The investigation of the case of Kirov's murder was conducted in such a way that not one of the witnesses remained alive. They died on the road in a car accident. Only an old driver who gave confused and very contradictory testimony from which nothing could be understood was left.

Here is a third retort to Rybakov. In the novel he asserts that Stalin asked Kirov to write a book about his leading role in the revolutionary movement in the Transcaucasus. Kirov refused. Beriya wrote the book.<sup>2</sup>

All this is very unlikely. Stalin did not like it when people lauded him. We find confirmation of this in the books by the pilot G. Baydukov, the plane designer A. Yakovlev, and Marshal G. Zhukov. On the eve of the Potsdam Conference Stalin said literally the following to the latter: "Don't plan on setting up any honor guards with bands there. Come to the station yourself and bring those you consider essential with you." And here are lines from the memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel V. Tukov: "After the war Stalin watched a film in the Kremlin. There was an episode in the picture where people were applauding the leader and shouts of 'Hurrah, Comrade Stalin!' were heard. Iosif Vissarionovich immediately turned to the chairman of the Committee for Cinematography Bolshakov: 'I don't want to see any more salutations and shouts of "Hurrah Comrade Stalin!" in films.' Another film, this time a documentary, showed Stalin getting out of a plane at the Moscow airfield. Stalin became exasperated and said: 'What unpardonable hack-work. That didn't happen.' Beriya and Malenkov tried to persuade Stalin that it was essential to history. His answer was the same: 'Please spare me such history.'"

Let us now turn to Beriya's book about the work of the Transcaucasian organizations of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party]. Stalin did not ask him to write this book. I knew Beriya's courier Colonel Sarkisov very well, and repeatedly asked him about the preparation of the manuscript and about going to the sites to clarify the facts of the underground activity of the Transcaucasian Social Democrats and Bolsheviks. In response he would smile and wave his hand: "We didn't go anywhere." Materials on the history of revolutionary work in the Transcaucasus had been collected by old Georgian Bolsheviks without Beriya. Upon learning of this, Beriya appropriated this work for himself, published it under his own name, and presented it to Stalin as a surprise. I was familiar with this information from the indictment in the Beriya case. The document was read aloud to us for two hours, and I remember the episode with that book very well.

What was characteristic of the 1930's? False denunciations. Many anti-Soviet elements, careerists, and simply slanderers began to get even with people they did not like. In this way, in addition to arrests on a legal basis the innocent were also oppressed. Suspicion became a sign of the times. It even affected me personally. It happened this way. In 1935-1936 I was working in the secretariat of

Sergo Ordzhonikidze. At that time a certain Vinokur was the head of Glavvagonprom [Main Administration of Railroad Car Building Industry]. At first he was part of the opposition and then he began to fluctuate and disagree with Pyatakov. The opposition decided to eliminate him. Late one evening a driver by the name of Rybin took Vinokur to the station. Soon the chief of the main administration was found dead near the railroad bed. Someone had thrown him from a commuter train. Two NKVD associates appeared suddenly at Sergo's secretariat in connection with this crime. Without thinking for long, they arrested me, took me to the Lubyanka, and put me in a cell. I was there for an hour and then two. And then the door opened and they took me under escort to the chief of operational affairs Pauker. After a short interrogation it became clear that the only thing was that I had the same last name as the dead man's driver; they let me go in peace.

Another incident almost ended very sadly for me. To make the essence of the matter clear, I must make the following comment: in 1930 the trial of the so-called industrial party was underway. One of its founders L. Ramzin<sup>3</sup> was sentenced to a long prison term. But Ramzin was freed ahead of schedule for inventing a continuously operating industrial boiler and given a high governmental award—the Order of Lenin. The designer often came to Sergo Ordzhonikidze's office hours. In one of these visits in the presence of my associates I spoke warmly of this man. A casual friendly reference proved to be sufficient cause for a letter to the NKVD party commission which said that Rybin was praising the enemy of the people Ramzin. I was immediately taken before the shining eyes of the party commission for an investigation of the circumstances of the affair. That is how "accomplices" of enemies of the people were created.

After the death of V.R. Menzhinskiy (1934) G. Yagoda became the chairman of the OGPU [Unified State Political Administration at the Council of People's Commissars] collegium. He remained at this post until 1937 and thoroughly clogged the OGPU apparatus with alien elements. Former White Guards and people from privileged backgrounds turned up in leadership posts. Our boss, for example, was Gintsel, who was a baron in the past. Such people were not interested in observing revolutionary laws and put pressure on associates to start up as many new files as possible. There were also simply petty tyrants in the OGPU. A certain Ofitserov comes to mind. He was in the habit of taking associates accused of misdemeanors to the basement, supposedly to be shot. On the last level of stairs Ofitserov would usually touch the victim with the muzzle of his Mauser in the back and mutter evilly: "Get out of here, scum. If you block things again, I'll shoot you."

Time passed. Yezhov took the place of Yagoda, who was arrested and sentenced. He proved to be a profligate and drunkard. But how could Stalin know that? G.M.

Malenkov, who bore responsibility for the party's cadre policy, knew and L.M. Kaganovich knew, but none of them dared to let Stalin know.

Speaking of the mechanism of repression, we must not ignore such a sinister organ as the "troika." They were set up in all the republics, krays, and oblasts. The "troikas" were given the task of stopping the hostile sallies of the kulaks, all kinds of anti-Soviets, wreckers, and saboteurs. Each of them included the first secretary of the party obkom, the chairman of the obispolkom, and the chief of the UNKVD. The "troikas" took the place of the courts. They operated like this: a file was made against a person based on a denunciation or on the initiative of officials. Then came the inquest, witnesses' testimony was gathered, and the suspect was interrogated. The leader of the UNKVD signed the indictment and sent it for ratification to the oblast procurator. From him the file came to the "troika's." They were the ones who committed the illegal actions which Stalin had nothing to do with. Despite the fact that he was busy, he stood for observing the laws. For example, he had to investigate a great deal in order to eliminate the false accusations against M.A. Sholokhov. There is no doubt that such major military leaders as V.K. Blyukher and M.N. Tukhachevskiy were repressed by Yeshov with the knowledge of the People's Commissar of Defense K.Ye. Voroshilov. If an honest person proved to be a member of the "troika," Stalin was usually on his side. We find confirmation of this in the memoirs of A.S. Chuyanov.<sup>4</sup>

There was no more malicious person in Stalin's entourage than Beriya. All the people I talked to, the couriers and dacha commandants, characterize him as essentially a provocateur. He was a boor, foul-mouthed, and an innately nasty person. After he became head of the NKVD, he began to set up an apparat which was slavishly loyal to him. Kapanadze, Ignatoshvili, and Gulst took key positions in managing the government guard.

From the memoirs of A. Afanasyev, an official of the government guard: "Beriya was in the habit of coming to the dacha when Stalin was not there and walking through the rooms. He was always looking for shortcomings in us in order to compromise a particular associate, to get him fired, and to assign a person he liked to the position that had opened up.

"On Stalin's desk was a small transistor radio which he used often. Suddenly after one of Beriya's visits the radio turned up missing. The disappearance was quickly discovered and the suspicion, as things go, fell on the guard. An investigation had to be conducted and that upset Stalin. We turned everything upside down but the transistor was not found. Not until some time later was it found near the dacha in the snow. Only Beriya could have thrown the radio in the snow."

Provocative reports regarding Stalin's personal security came from the NKVD one after another. The commandant of the Semenovskoye dacha S. Solovov tells about it: "As is well known, the dacha's territory was shelled by enemy mortars in 1941-1942. And then in the middle of the war a supersecret report came from the NKVD that said that a mortar shell had fallen near the dacha at one time and not gone off. In addition, the report said, it was not impossible that an 'infernal machine' had been laid underneath the foundation of the dacha. I knew very well where mortar shells had fallen during the battles. I relied on myself and on the guard. But I had to inform Stalin of the NKVD report. He said: 'Well, let's go look for it.' Armed with a mine detector I probed around in the ground for metal objects. Stalin walked beside me and even tried to walk in front of me. As I expected, we did not find anything."

The commandant of the dacha Petr Lozgachev testifies: "Stalin was hospitable. He fed himself any old way, but he always fed guests until they were absolutely full. Once he called me into the hall and asked me to prepare a main course of burbot livers for his guests, members of the Politburo. I answered: 'Comrade Stalin, you ask me to catch burbot in the reservoirs of Moscow Oblast, but there are none. And if we do catch five or six burbot, their livers won't feed everyone.' To this Stalin answered: 'Well, if there aren't any, what can you do.' Beriya was sitting at the table and immediately stepped into our conversation: 'I'll get some burbot.' And in fact in a week he brought us 30 burbot. But even then we knew that Beriya was crafty and treacherous. I asked the doctor to analyze all these burbot. It turned out that the fish livers were contaminated with white blotches and the doctor forbid using them for food. Meanwhile Stalin called me in and said: 'You see, you couldn't get any burbot, but Beriya did.' I answered that Beriya had gotten the burbot from the reservoirs of Leningrad Oblast rather than Moscow Oblast. And the main thing—the livers of these burbot were contaminated with white blotches and had rotted. The doctor would not allow them to be used for food. Stalin was surprised: 'That can't be. Bring them here and show me.' I arranged the livers on a tray and brought them to Stalin. He looked at them and said: 'Throw it in the garbage. You can't trust that good-for-nothing.'

"Or here is another incident. Everyone knew that Stalin's teeth were bad. He avoided eating hard food. Once I received some pears from the warehouse which, as ill luck would have it, were very hard. Stalin told me about it in Beriya's presence. I had to report: 'These were the only pears that were in the warehouse, Comrade Stalin.' Beriya intervened in the conversation: 'They must be guzzling the good ones themselves and palming these off on you.' I wished the earth would swallow me up. 'I have excellent pears,' Beriya continued. (He was supplied from the same storehouse as Stalin.) Silence reigned. I stood petrified. And suddenly I heard: 'Go to Beriya's place and bring all of his pears.' Stalin's order was carried out. The pears brought from Beriya's place turned out to be exactly the same."

A man's personality is oftentimes more clearly revealed by everyday details, some words let fall suddenly, or everything that daily life is made up of rather than other behavior. I would like to reveal several of these details here.

A portrait of V.I. Lenin hung on the wall in Stalin's office. A small lamp burned above the portrait round-the-clock. In this way, the deep respect of the occupant of the office for his predecessor was revealed. A bust of Ilyich stood in another room. Stalin always took this bust with him on vacation; usually when he went to the south he asked the commandant of the dacha I. Orlov to put the bust in a prominent place.

From the memoirs of S. Solovov, the former commandant of the dacha: "I worked with Stalin. It was difficult but instructive. Belov worked as the commandant before me. He was the brother of the military man who was directly connected with M. Tukhachevskiy through his work. Stalin said: 'You will work under Belov for seven months. When everything in our fairly large household is clear to you, you'll be alone.' He asked Belov to give work at his own discretion.

"The household was indeed enormous. The garden plot alone was 16 hectares. We provided meat, fish, vegetables, and other food for Stalin personally and for the guard and even supplied some of the harvest to Moscow stores.

"There was not even one instance where Stalin raised his voice or yelled without thinking.

"I will tell about the first blunder which I made. Stalin arranged his writing materials on his desk himself. Everything lay in an order known only to him. Once the maid Shura was cleaning the office and rolled the writing articles in a deskcloth and then laid them out again, and of course got them mixed up. I heard Stalin coming. He went into the office, coughed, and wheezed. So I thought something was wrong. And in fact he called me and pointed to the desk with his hand and said: 'I know you're not to blame for this, but you're to blame for not instructing the maid how to clean the desk in the office.' As a result, I was always present during the cleaning. Stalin was somewhat volatile, but he did not bear a grudge and he was kind in a fatherly way."

I. Orlov: "Stalin worked day and night all the years of the war. He usually woke up toward morning. I often found him at 0600 hours sleeping on the trestle bed under the staircase leading to the second floor or on the porch. He slept without undressing, in his coat and shoes. He covered his face from the sun with his military hat. It is surprising that he survived the war. His feet hurt from rheumatism (that is why he liked to pace up and down his office) and angina and hypertension and oxygen deficiency often bothered him. The war aged him a great deal and he turned grey.

"He could not stand appeasing answers like 'whatever you say, that's what we'll do.' In such cases he would usually say: 'I don't need that kind of advisors.' I frequently had to argue with him and defend my opinions. He liked that. His usual words were: 'Well, all right, I'll think about it. I'll give you my answer tomorrow.' Then he either agreed with me or he remained of the same opinion."

V. Tukov: "Of course, in the war years Stalin lived without his family. Apparently, for that reason the guard associates became part of his circle of contacts in his leisure hours. At times he would gather us together and tell funny stories from his own experience. Sometimes he would give advice on some question of life. For example, once the leader of the Mongol people Kh. Choybalsan gave Stalin a marvelous fox fur. He gathered us together and asked: 'What shall we do?' Someone proposed giving the fur to Svetlana<sup>5</sup> for a collar. Stalin did not agree with that: 'It's not fitting for her to have it.' It was ultimately decided to make a hat with earflaps. Stalin wore it one or two times."

I managed to gather unique material on the last days and death of Stalin. I think that the circumstances related to his death are in themselves very eloquent.

On 27 February 1953 the ballet "Swan Lake" was being performed at the Bolshoy Theater. Retired Colonel N. Kirillin testifies: "At 2000 hours Stalin appeared in the government box. He remained alone until the end of the performance. After the performance he asked the director of the theater to convey his gratitude to the artists. From the theater Stalin went to his nearby dacha where he usually worked until 0300 hours.

"On 28 February, after watching a movie in the Kremlin, Beriya, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin came to Stalin at his nearby dacha. He was in Kuntsevo until 0400 hours on 1 March. Courier Colonel Khrustalev accompanied the guests."

On the evening of 1 March special messengers M. Starostin and V. Tukov, assistant to the commandant of the dacha P. Lozgachev, and N. Butusova from the service personnel were with Stalin. P. Lozgachev recalls: "Beginning with the evening of 28 February the guests were served only grape juice until 0400 hours on 1 March. As for fruit, it was always on the table. At 0400 hours on 1 March Stalin was alone and called us and said: 'I'm going to bed and I won't summon you. And you lie down and rest.' Stalin had never given us such instructions before. On 1 March each of us went about our own business in our own work area. At noon the guard noticed the absence of any movement in Stalin's office and rooms. This put everyone on guard, but at approximately 1830 hours a light was turned on in the office and in the common hall. Everyone sighed with relief and assumed that some one of us would now be summoned. But the summons did not follow either at 1900 hours, at 2000 hours, or at 2200 hours. The guard

began to get worried, because Stalin's schedule for the day had been clearly disrupted, although that day was Sunday. Usually the schedule was not changed on days off. At 2230 hours the guard began to suspect something was wrong. Starostin, the senior associate, began to insist that I go to Stalin's rooms. But I answered, you go first, you're senior. So we squabbled and deferred to one another and each was afraid to go to Stalin's rooms without being summoned. I took some letters and with heavy steps set off to report. I went through one room and the second, but Stalin was nowhere to be seen. Finally I looked into the small dining hall and saw before me a horrible picture. I froze on the spot and my hands and feet refused to obey me. On the rug near the desk lay Stalin, somewhat strangely lying on his arms. He was not yet unconscious, but he could not speak; he had completely lost the power of speech. But he obviously had heard my steps and he raised his hand weakly as if beckoning to me. I ran up to him and asked: 'What's wrong, Comrade Stalin?' In response I heard something like 'dz' pronounced in an unintelligible way. On the floor lay a pocketwatch of the first Moscow plant and the newspaper PRAVDA. On the table was a bottle of mineral water and a glass.

"I immediately summoned Starostin, Tukov, and Butusov on the smoke phone [dymophone]. They came running right away and one of us asked: 'Shall we put you on the couch, Comrade Stalin?' In response the latter weakly nodded his head. We laid him on the couch in the dining hall by our joint efforts. We immediately started trying to call Ignatov at the KGB, but he proved to be cowardly and passed us along to Beriya. The need arose to move the sick man to the large hall. All of us did this together and we laid Stalin on the ottoman and covered him with a rug. It was obvious from everything that Stalin had gotten cold and he had apparently lain in the dining hall without help since 1900 or 2000 hours. I remained to stand guard near the sick man."

M. Starostin recalls: "I immediately called Malenkov and reported on the misfortune with Comrade Stalin. Approximately half an hour later Malenkov called me and said: 'I haven't found Beriya. Look for him yourselves.' Another half hour passed. Beriya called: 'Don't say anything about Stalin's illness and don't call anyone.'"

P. Lozgagev continues: "I sat by myself near Stalin's sickbed. I was incredibly sad. A sense of helplessness oppressed me. Starostin ran in and yelled, call the bosses, Lozgagev. But who should be called when everyone who needed to know knew about Stalin's illness? This night was a terrible and agonizing one for me. Toward morning my temples began to turn grey. I continued to stay near Stalin by myself. 0200 hours passed and there was no help for the sick man from anyone. At 0300 hours on 2 March I heard a car approaching the dacha. Finally the doctors to whom I could hand over the sick Stalin had come. But I was mistaken. It turned out that Beriya and Malenkov had arrived. Beriya craned his head and

growled at me in the hall. Malenkov's shoes were squeaking. He took them off and, holding his shoes under his arm, came in in his stocking feet. The comrades-in-arms stopped a little ways from the sick man and stood silently for a short time. Stalin began to snore loudly at that moment. Turning toward me Beriya said: 'Why did you panic? See, Comrade Stalin is fast asleep. Don't cause a stir and don't bother us and don't upset Comrade Stalin.' I began to try to persuade them that Comrade Stalin was seriously ill and needed an ambulance. But his comrades-in-arms did not listen to me and hurriedly left the hall. Beriya fell to rebuking Starostin and from the stream of foul language only one sentence was printable: 'Who appointed you fools to look after Comrade Stalin?' With that Beriya and Malenkov left.

"The clock struck 0400, 0500, 0600, and 0700 hours. There was absolutely no medical help for Stalin. All this began to look like treachery.

"At 0730 hours Khrushchev arrived and said that doctors from the Kremlin Hospital would be coming soon."

V. Tukov recalls: "I called Molotov and told him what had happened with Stalin. Molotov said: 'Call the members of the Politburo and tell them about Stalin's illness. I'll come now.'"

P. Lozgagev continues: "The doctors came between 0830 hours and 0900 hours and among them was P.Ye. Lukomskiy.<sup>6</sup> The doctors were very worried and their hands were shaking. They could not even take off the sick man's shirt, they were so worried. They cut it off with scissors. After examining the sick man the doctors made their diagnosis, brain hemorrhage. They began the treatment procedures—injecting camphor, applying leeches, and giving oxygen. There was no talk of surgical intervention. What surgeon could take on the responsibility? Besides, Beriya inspired fear in the doctors with the sinister question: 'And do you guarantee Comrade Stalin's life?'"

"On the second day Vasiliy Stalin was informed of his father's illness. He came with topographic maps, assuming that his father would arrange an exam for him as an aviation chief. Svetlana was also summoned to her sick father."

From the memoirs of V. Tukov: "Vasiliy Stalin appeared at the dacha drunk and began to yell from the threshold: 'You scum, you destroyed my father!' Some people bristled at him, but Voroshilov tried to convince him: 'We are taking all measures to save the life of Comrade Stalin.'"

The whole country found out about Stalin's illness. Calls began to come into the dacha more and more often from well-wishing doctors who asked to come to Stalin and assured that they would cure him. They even called from other countries. One well-wisher proved to be especially

persistent. Ultimately Beriya came to the phone. Without beating around the bush he asked the persistent so-called doctor: 'Who are you? Are you a provocateur or a bandit?' The person on the line obviously understood whom he was dealing with and hung up the phone.

2, 3, and 4 March passed. Stalin got worse and worse. One time he tried to open his eyes and began to move his lips. But nothing could be understood. There was talk about some kind of savior from a democratic country but the savior did not in fact appear. On 5 March Stalin's pulse began to fall. Beriya went up to the sick man: 'Comrade Stalin, all the members of the Politburo are here. Say something to us.' Voroshilov pulled him aside by the hand and said: 'Let someone from the service group go up to him; he's more likely to recognize them.' I. Khrustalev went up to him. Stalin was living his last moments. The doctors gave him some strong injection. Stalin's body shuddered. About 10 minutes passed. The sick man sighed deeply and died."

Various rumors are circulating about Stalin's death. I heard from some comrades (from Georgia in particular) that he was poisoned. That did not coincide with reality. Stalin was very ill. He often complained about his legs. From time to time he felt very giddy. V. Tukov told how when he would go up to the second floor in the Kremlin with Stalin, Tukov would have to follow Stalin so that he did not fall. And oxygen deficiency also tormented him a great deal. According to the testimony of I. Orlov, tracheotomies had to be done at the dacha so that the air circulated freely. Hypertension and its constant companions strokes and paralysis should be added to this. In later years he himself repeatedly complained: "Damned old age has caught up with me." Stalin had a primitive attitude toward his own health. He always dined at different times. It could be at 1500, 1700, 1900, 2000, or even 2200 hours. He did not like to be treated by doctors. Sometimes his secretary Poskrebyshv, a medical assistant by education, would give him different tablets. That was all the treatment he received.

Literary recording by V.A. Popov

#### Footnotes

1. I gave some of these documents to the USSR Central Museum of the Revolution to keep.

2. This refers to the brochure "On the Question of the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in the Transcaucasus." This footnote and others that follow are editor's notes.

3. Leonid Konstantinovich Ramzin (1887-1948) was a Soviet heat engineer, participated in developing the GOELRO [State Commission for the Electrification of Russia] plan, was director of the All-Union Heat Engineering Institute (1921-1930), and was laureate of the USSR State Prize.

4. Aleksey Semenovich Chuyanov (1905-1977) was the first secretary of Stalingrad Obkom and Gorkom of the VKP (b) in 1938-1946. He was the author of the memoirs "Na stremnine veka. Zapiski sekretarya obkoma" [In the Rushing Waters of the Century. Notes of an Obkom Secretary] (Moscow, 1977) and "Stalingradskiy dnevnik" [Stalingrad Diary] (Volgograd, 1979).

5. S.I. Alliluyeva is the daughter of I.V. Stalin.

6. Pavel Yevgenyevich Lukomskiy (1899-1974) was a Soviet therapist and specialist in heart and vascular illnesses and electrocardiography. He was subsequently an academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences (1963), Hero of Socialist Labor (1969), and laureate of the USSR State Prize.

#### Beyond Morality, Beyond the Law

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, May-Jun 88  
(signed to press 16 May 88) pp 95-101

[Article by, V.P. Maslov: "Beyond Morality, Beyond the Law"; Vasilii Pavlovich Maslov, doctor of legal sciences, in the past was a worker of the military tribunals and a military lawyer. He is the author of publications on the problems of ensuring legality and law and order, including the books and pamphlets "Pravovaya propaganda—deystvennoye/sredstvo preduprezhdeniya/pravonarusheniy" [Legal Propaganda—An Effective Means for Preventing Infractions] (1965), "Peresmotr ugovnykh del v poryadke sudebnogo nadzora" (The Review of Criminal Cases in the Procedure of Court Supervision) (1965), "Pervichniy voynskiy kollektiv" (The Primary Military Collective) (1979) (co-author), "Sotsialnaya aktivnost voinskikh kollektivov" [Social Activeness of the Military Collectives] 1986, co-author, and others. He appears for the first time in our journal.]

[Text] In his article "Next to I.V. Stalin," A.T. Rybin began with polemics over the assessment of Stalin's personality by A. Rybakov in the novel "Deti Arbat" [Children of the Arbat]. I will not endeavor to judge the artistic merits of the novel. That is a matter for specialists. I would merely say that the novel has been written on a very painful subject. The criticism by our party of Stalin's personality cult did not eliminate and could not eradicate in a single swoop the thought stereotypes and standards of conduct of millions of people which were alien to Marxism-Leninism and which accumulated over many years. The image of the thoughts and the image of the actions coming down to us from the past, make themselves felt in the economy, science, culture and in all spheres of life of Soviet society. The CPSU at its 20th Congress and then in the well-known decree on overcoming I.V. Stalin's personality cult and its consequences had its say on the incompatibility of the personality cult with the theory and practice of socialism. Seemingly the return to the old is impossible. However, several years

have passed and the pendulum of sociopsychological mechanisms has begun to swing back to the time when they formed Stalin's personality cult.

We are well aware of the consequences of the personality cult at present, primarily in the area of social psychology. In order to be certain of this, one has merely to open up recent issues of newspapers and journals or engage someone in conversation about the 1930s and 1940s. The overcoming of the consequences of the personality cult and the reestablishing of Leninist standards of social life, party and state leadership are not an easy matter. Here it would be difficult to overestimate the role of the scientists, primarily historians, legal scholars and sociologists. Fiction can also do a great deal. Proof of this is the novel "Deti Arbata." But not only this. The equal to it can rightly be considered the novel "Novoye naznacheniye" [The New Appointment] by A. Bek as well as other works by Soviet writers. In returning us to the past, they teach the reader to draw lessons from it, they shape an activist position in life for the individual, they sharpen our vision, they make it possible to see the vestiges of the personality cult and give us strength in combating any of its manifestations.

The novel "Deti Arbata" has evoked sharp disputes, in a word, it has not left people indifferent and this in and of itself contributes to the moral purification of our society. For me, as a jurist, I would particularly like to note the following: the book has definitely contributed to increased legal awareness and to the legal sophistication of the Soviet people as well as overcoming the defects and anomalies encountered here. I am profoundly convinced that precisely the legal awareness of people suffered particularly greatly from Stalin's personality cult.

Judging from the responses in the press, the reaction to the novel "Deti Arbata" has varied. A.T. Rybin is among those who clearly do not like the novel. This is not surprising. What do his memoirs represent? Before us is a stream of conscience the basic features of which were determined by the atmosphere of the repressions during the 1930s and 1940s and the fact that the officer served for many years in the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] bodies headed by such gloomy figures as Yagoda, Yezhov and Beriya.(1)

Personal complicity and close acquaintance with the people who provided the security of I.V. Stalin—all of this has left an imprint on the ideology of the narrator. Here one can feel also the circumstance spotted at one time by the poet:

Face to face  
A face is not seen.  
it is better at a distance....

Irrespective of the viewpoint and subjective aspirations of A.T. Rybin, his memoirs have, in my view, extraordinary value. I will risk proposing that this document will be returned to again and again not only by the present but also future historians, social psychologists,

jurists, political scientists and representatives of other disciplines studying Stalin's personality and the times when he stood at the helm of the party and the state. The author also provides rich material for sociological analysis as well as a moral and psychological reconstruction of events.

Obviously in the course of the literary editing of the text, certain features of the original and which were very essential to the dispassionate researcher were lost. Such losses are inevitable in journal publications. However, it is perfectly apparent that the main thing in the text of the memoirs remained, that is, the vital position of the narrator and his devotion to the "ideology of Stalinism."

The article by A.T. Rybin merits the closest scientific reading. I, for example, did not immediately understand the mentioning of the light which constantly burned next to the portrait of V.I. Lenin. Or the scene with the old woman who, upon getting out of Stalin's car, stood for a long time on the road, looking after the distancing vehicle and crossing herself. A very expressive picture!

As a jurist, I was first of all interested in those places in the memoirs which bear on the law and jurisprudence and which force one to reflect on the sources of the personality cult, on the sociopsychological mechanism of its formation, on the reasons for the survival of "the ideology of Stalinism" in our days and on the place and role of coercion and punishment in establishing a situation of nonresistance, inferiority and the dependence of a person upon the powers that be. In other words, everything that was characteristic not only for the period of Stalin's personality cult but also the period of stagnation and what is not so simple to alter now, at present.

**Is the murder of S.M. Kirov given in the novel "Deti Arbata" persuasive?** From the article "Next to I.V. Stalin" we can see that its author does not accept the version that Kirov was murdered upon Stalin's instructions. This version does not belong to A. Rybin. The supposition was voiced immediately after the evil attack on Sergey Mironovich [Kirov] but, certainly, at that time no one dared to verify the soundness of this version and those who did endeavor to discuss it were accused of anti-Soviet agitation and were suppressed. This was one of the first criminal trials in the 1930s involving multiple defendants. It became an unique prelude to the mass repressions of 1937. Incidentally, after the 20th CPSU Congress, this trial was first reviewed under judicial supervision. There was not a single valid accusation.

What happened in Smolnyy on that fateful day of 1 December 1934? The answer to the question should be provided by the justice bodies. An investigation established that upon assignment of an underground counter-revolutionary group which supposedly existed in Leningrad, the murder was committed by one of its members, Nikolayev. However, an analysis of the court documents indicates that this reply is unpersuasive. This was stated from the rostrum of the party congress. Then again there

was the version of Stalin's complicity in the murder. Are there any grounds for such a version? There are. And to verify this now is a matter not only for justice. Both historians and writers will have their word. A. Rybakov has undertaken an attempt at a psychological analysis of the collision which had arisen between Stalin and Kirov. Certainly, as is right for a writer, he solved this problem by artistic means. I agree with the critic A. Latynina who writes that A. Rybakov has taken a large artistic risk, in investigating the causes of Kirov's death. Nevertheless, the analysis was very persuasive. According to the logic of the subject, A. Latynina correctly points out, Stalin, in removing Kirov, was pursuing two goals at the same time: to eliminate a political rival and free his hands for total terror [7].

At the same time, one must not disregard the particular features of Stalin's personality, and in particular, his vengefulness, his envy of Kirov's popularity and his reputation as the party's tribune and a natural political leader. For example, one can judge Stalin's true attitude toward Kirov from the evidence of A.I. Mikoyan. Soon after Kirov's move from Baku to Leningrad, an article appeared in *Pravda* containing an attack on "a responsible worker." Certain details unambiguously pointed to who was had in mind. Another time Stalin organized a discussion before the Politburo of an article by Kirov published in 1913. In the elections to the leading party bodies at the 17th VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress, just three delegates voted against Kirov and almost a hundred-fold more against Stalin. Having learned this, he demanded that the final minutes give the same figure for him, three votes [8]. You will agree that a person who did not shy from falsifying the voting results of the superior party body was capable of many unjust deeds. Incidentally, with good reason very fierce repression was then unleashed against precisely the delegates of the 17th Congress. Just of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee voted by the 17th Congress, almost three-quarters, or 70.5 percent, perished [9].

**How did Stalin's personality cult come about?** At present, more and more evidence is appearing that in the party there were forces who promptly saw the rise of Stalin's personality cult and endeavored to oppose this. However, at that time (and incidentally, at present) it was not so easy to draw a line between the party's concern for the authority of its leader and a personality cult per se. In the complex domestic and international situation in the mid-1920s, some persons out of ignorance, as a consequence of the miscomprehension of the essence of Marxism-Leninism, and others motivated by careerist aims, began intensely to put Stalin on a pedestal, to create the myth of his infallibility, and raise him to almost divine rank. The legend of the "great friend and leader" began to develop at the end of the 1920s. At first, the establishing of Stalin's cult was carried out by ideological means.

In 1929, Stalin turned 50. This date was employed for his unrestrained praise. The initiators and organizers were persons from around Stalin who in one way or another

had risen with his aid. Stalin was called the "best Leninist" and "the most faithful and best student of Lenin" [10, pp 135, 68]. Contrary to historical facts, the witnesses of which had been the Old Bolshevik Guard, in the different versions the notion was carried out that Stalin was the only faithful and consistent supporter of Lenin and had always stood with him at the head of the party. In this manner the idea was established that now Stalin was the highest and unchallenged authority. Here are typical statements by L.M. Kaganovich: "His (Stalin's.—V.M.) most significant and characteristic trait was that during all his party and political activities he had never abandoned Lenin, he never strayed either to the right or to the left but firmly and unswervingly carried out the Bolshevik sound policy" [Ibid., p 39]. A.I. Mikoyan: "During the life of V.I. Lenin, Comrade Stalin, being one of his students, was, however, his sole, most reliable assistant...he was the only one of his students who was able to master perfectly this art of revolutionary strategy and apply it in party leadership" [Ibid., pp 118-119]. M.I. Kalinin: "On the eve of October, Stalin was one of the few with whom, along with Lenin, solved the question of the insurrection, concealing this from Zinovyev and Kamanev" [Ibid., p 20]. K.Ye. Voroshilov: Stalin "was one of the most outstanding organizers of the victories in the Civil War," "the only person whom the Central Committee moved from one fighting front to another, choosing the most dangerous and the most vital place for the revolution" [Ibid., p 44].

The same spirit was sustained (and it is clear by whose hand it was written) in the official greetings of the VKP(b) Central Committee and Central Control Council. "The best Leninist, the senior member of the Central Committee and its Politburo.... Of the immediate students and co-workers of Lenin, you were the most steadfast and consistent Leninist. Never all your activities did you deviate from Lenin either in your theoretical fundamental positions or in all practical work" [Ibid., p 9].

Unfortunately, singing in this same chorus were the voices of those who would soon realize where the party and nation were being led by this "finest Leninist." For example, S. Ordzhonikidze: "Stalin was and remains a loyal student of Lenin. There was never an occasion when he differed with Lenin. Lenin knew with whom he was dealing" [Ibid., p 112]. A.S. Bubnov: "Among this main core of our party, Comrade Stalin was the finest of the finest" [Ibid., p 124].

In reading such lines written just a little more than 5 years after Lenin's death and after his "Letter to the Congress," one experiences a feeling of bitterness and perplexity. At the same time, one understands that A.T. Rybin's views of Stalin are the imposing of official myths put into circulation at the end of the 1920s.

Gradually, political measures began to be employed for establishing the cult ideology and later repressions were also employed. Characteristically, in the given regard was the criminal case tried in Moscow in 1935. Among the

defendants were several party workers who had participated in October. One of them stated before the court that his guilt as a party member consisted in the fact that he did not understand the importance of the developing cult of Stalin's personality for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and for developing the international communist movement. This, he said in court, explains his disrespectful responses about Stalin. From the materials of the criminal case it can be seen that the accused in an unofficial situation allowed himself some belittling comments addressed to Stalin. He could do nothing else. But this was enough to qualify his actions as anti-Soviet and expose him to a very severe penalty. If one looks at the "case" outside the hysteria over the "enemies of the people" and outside the atmosphere of suspicion and fear, the legal assessment of the situation leaves no room for doubt. At present were flagrant arbitrariness, the flaunting of the underlying principles of justice and state construction. Alas, it would be possible to give a great number of such facts. Legality at that time was almost completely replaced by illegality. Memory recalls precisely this "case" merely because I was struck by the vocabulary of the accused. He said out directly "Stalin's personality cult." It was, I recall, 1935. Consequently, even then the phenomenon was recognized and qualified in completely the same manner. Let me give a very eloquent proof of a contemporary:

We live without feeling the country beneath us.  
Our speeches are not heard at ten paces.  
Only heard is the Kremlin mountaineer,  
The murderer and persecutor.

An indicative fact, these verses were written by O.E. Mandelstam in 1934.

As was already pointed out, the danger that the assertion of the authority of the party and its leader could under certain conditions lead to negative consequences was felt even when the myth was just developing. The prominent party leader D.Z. Manuil'skiy in an article dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Stalin, in assessing the attitude of the masses to him, asked the rhetorical question: "What is this cult of personality?" The author noted a similar version and endeavored to present Stalin as the inspirer and expresser of the successes of socialism and the vanguard role of the party. "This is one of the major regular demonstrations of the dedication of the international proletariat and the Soviet proletariat to the great Leninist party.... Stalin embodies all that is best, all that is dispersed in the class called upon to reform the world" [Ibid., pp 66-67]. I will not take it upon myself to judge whether the author believed all of this sincerely or whether his rhetorical question contained a concealed rebuke and a warning which certainly is not excluded by such a development of events. However, objectively such a statement helped to strengthen Stalin's positions for it actually protected the "faithful Leninist" from possible rebukes of excessive extolling of his services. Incidentally, in 1929, the question was still publically discussed, although within rigid ideological limits. Seven years later, a person who dared bring up this subject even among close friends risked his head.

In being captivated by the myth of Stalin, people are inclined to remove him from criticism using a simple device. Supposedly, it was not he who perpetrated the illegality but rather dishonest workers from the NKVD bodies at the center and on the spot. An ordinary man, supposedly, under Stalin remained an ordinary man and could, if he wanted, actually resist the repressions. As an example, the article's author refers us to the First Secretary of the Stalingrad Party Obkom A.S. Chuyanov. But is this example persuasive and can one accept it unconditionally? In no way. A.S. Chuyanov, in having Stalin's confidence, actually lifted the punishment from many completely blameless citizens. However, the scale of the repressions was such that even the first secretary of an obkom could not in any substantial way resist it. As proof let me give just one fact. Several years ago, I happened to be the chairman of a State Examination Commission at the Volgograd Higher Investigatory School of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. Possibly, even now, the old police officer, Docent Yu. Cherepanov, is still working there. He told the following story. His father, A. Cherepanov, the secretary of a party raykom, was executed as an "enemy of the people" and after the 20th CPSU Congress was rehabilitated. At the end of the 1960s, in working as an investigator, Yu. Cherepanov decided to become familiar with his father's "case." It turned out that the court investigation lasted just 5 minutes. This was completely enough to hand down a sentence of the "highest measure of social protection." This occurred in Stalingrad Oblast during the time that A. Chuyanov was the first secretary. No, the machine which ground up human destinies was sent full-speed ahead by the Kremlin mechanic and he alone completely controlled it.

A.T. Rybin endeavors to prove that Stalin was just. As is seen from the article, in a number of instances he could actually be attentive to one or another individual. This is also known from other sources. But it is also a fact that Stalin most often was driven by motives far from aspirations for justice. V.I. Lenin described him as "too coarse." V.I. Lenin saw many serious flaws in Stalin as a political leader and even considered it essential to inform the next party congress of these [1]. Virtually each of these traits is the antipode of justice and humanity.

For a social psychologist, the text of A.T. Rybin is a most interesting document. The distance of the narrator and his colleagues from the "object" was minimal. As he came to understand the personality of the "leader," it differed little from the notions of those who never saw him at all and those who now attach the portrait of the generalissimo to the windshield of a motor vehicle.

**The sources of stagnation must be sought in the 1930s.** An inevitable consequence of Lenin's personality cult was the neglecting for long years, in essence until the 27th

CPSU Congress, of Lenin's theoretical heritage on the questions of democracy and glasnost. The position of V.I. Lenin was always completely clear here: "Without closing our eyes to the truth, to give ourselves the most accurate report on the state of affairs" [2] (see also [3, 4]). F.E. Dzerzhinskiy was an equally zealous supporter of glasnost. As if answering the current opponents of glasnost, in 1923 he said that correct analysis of economic reality in using tables and graphs for visibility, the taking up of the results of such analysis in the press, of course, also provides material for our enemies and the White Guards "for they will say that Soviet power does not know how to manage." But glasnost and the open discussion of shortcomings are indispensable. All of this, in the opinion of F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, "was the start of any opportunity to struggle" [5, Vol I, p 405]. In turning to the economic workers, he pointed out that if we conceal our failures, if we do not analyze them openly, then we will remain impotent [5, Vol I, p 404]. "We are weak in that we make mistakes but we are strong in that we recognize them and endeavor to rectify them" [5, Vol II, p 369]. In March 1926, F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, as they would now say, held a press conference. The party and soviet press, he said during the talk, should help the economic workers overcome difficulties and at the same time put "them under a bell-jar, in recording instances of a neglectful attitude toward the people's money and cases of inadmissible wastefulness" [5, Vol II, p 422]. He was a supporter of increasing the role of the worker collectives in production management. "We should not fear that the working masses at a production meeting will flick us on the nose for what happens and sometimes for what has not happened" [5, Vol II, pp 458-459]. In a word, during the life of V.I. Lenin and in the first years after his death we had already formed and partially actually tested a concept of socialist management of state and society's affairs and based upon the principles of socialist democracy and broad glasnost. Stalin also very frequently was in favor of democracy and a free exchange of opinions. But these were merely declarations by an experienced manipulator of mass conscience and who replaced democracy by personal power and actually returned the nation to "military communism." The directive methods of economic management gave rise to very painful failures, particularly in agriculture. Certainly, there were people who protested and publically criticized the procedures which had been instituted. And what happened? Then the whole political scene would have immediately come under such criticism.

When I was in military service, I worked as the deputy chairman of a military tribunal on the Northern Front. During a visit to one of the submarines, the Zampolit [deputy commander for political affairs] told me that serving with them was Sn N. Smirnov, an outstanding man in military and political training and candidate member of the CPSU. He was born in 1938 and on the questionnaires had written that his father, previously a kolkhoz chairman, had died.

"Recently the sailor approached me," the political worker continued, "and informed me that he had heard that his

father had been repressed. However, the mother and elder sister denied these rumors. Nevertheless, he wanted to find out what had happened to his father and whether he had been the victim of unjustified repression?"

I invited the sailor to come see me. In a talk he confirmed his desire to learn the truth about his father. "Do you have to know?" I asked him. "Of course, you can check. But what happens if it turns out that he was rightly suppressed? Do you need to know this?" "That as well," he replied.

The navy tribunal requested the criminal case of the sailor's father. In the file were just 30 pages. It turned out that in October 1937, V.A. Smirnov had been arrested and 5 days later, on 12 October, had been executed upon a decision of a three-man court for antikolkhoz propaganda. From a superficial interrogation of the accused and two witnesses, it looked as though V.A. Smirnov, in working as the kolkhoz chairman, had criticized shortcomings, he had endeavored to defend his independence, he acted against unsound interference into his administrative and economic activities on the part of the representatives of the local authorities. In a word, he publicized the errors of the rayon leadership as well as his own and sought ways to eliminate the shortcomings. And for this he paid with his life.

**The combating of opportunism or the abandoning of Lenin's heritage?** Until recently, historians and jurists have avoided the struggle which was waged in the 1920s around the concept of a state of law. At the same time, this was of fundamental importance. Advanced long before the victory of October, the concept of a state of law was aimed, as its supporters figured, at restricting or even better nullifying the arbitrariness of the management personnel and ensuring the supremacy of the law. In 1915, the well-known Russian jurist S.A. Kotlyarevskiy wrote: "Theoretically there is no necessary contradiction between a socialist state and a state of law" [11, p 340].

It turned out, however, that the socialist state was unable to become a state of law, although precisely in it, proceeding from the essence and purpose of it, there were all prerequisites for establishing the supremacy of the law and completely excluding the arbitrariness of administrative personnel. One such prerequisite was Lenin's teachings about the state. But precisely this did not eliminate those who were wagering on Stalin's personality cult. The socialist legality and the cult of personality are incompatible.

In order to weaken legality and establish the cult of personality, the admirers of the "leader of the peoples," in taking advantage of the struggle over the concept of a state of law, attacked the theoretical principles formulated and completely worked out by V.I. Lenin. Even in the work "On the Principles of Leninism" (1924), Stalin excessively exaggerated the violent aspect of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In November 1929, L.M.

Kaganovich gave a report "Twelve Years of the Construction of the Soviet State and the Combating of Opportunism." Having accused the supporters of the concept of the state of law of opportunism, in his extensive report he attempted to prove that the demand of strictly observing the Soviet laws was contrary to Leninism. This action by Kaganovich meant that Stalin and his supporters had set out to abandon and falsify Lenin's heritage. There followed the defeat of the supporters of the concept of a socialist state of law. Soon thereafter A.Ya. Vyshinskiy emerged on the legal scene, a person capable of justifying theoretically any violations of legality and taking a personal part in any unjust court.

The political assessment of Stalin in our history, as contained in the report by M.S. Gorbachev at the ceremony devoted to the 70th anniversary of October requires further scientific study. The report provides the methodological guidelines for a social sciences analysis of the age, the complete study of the mechanism of the forming of the cult of personality and the involvement in this process of various socioprofessional strata and groups and political structures. "In defending historical truth, we should see both the indisputable contribution of Stalin to the struggle for socialism, the defense of its victories, as well as the major political errors, arbitrariness committed by him and those around him and for which our people paid a great price and which have had severe consequences for the life of our society" [6, p 21].

No responsibly thinking sociologist, even if he adhered to views far distant from Marxism, would dare assert that the cult of personality is inherent to socialism as a social order. From the sociological viewpoint, Stalin's cult was a mystification alien to socialism of the role of the individual in history. The comments of A.T. Rybin are all the more noteworthy in that they, contrary to the author's will, confirm the very fact of such mystification and to a certain degree answer the question of how this was done and what were its results.

#### Footnote

1. G.G. Yagoda (1891-1938)—General Commissar of State Security and USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in 1934-1936; N.I. Yezhov (1895-1939?)—General Commissar of State Security and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in 1936-1938; L.P. Beriia (1899-1953) from 1938 headed the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and then was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

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10. Stalin, "Sbornik statey k pyatidesyatiletiiyu so dnya rozhdeniya" [Collection of Articles on the 50th Anniversary of His Birthday], Moscow-Leningrad, Gos. Izd-vo, 2d Edition, 1930.

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#### Must the Past Be Stirred Up?

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[Article by I.V. Bestuzhev-lada: "Must the Past Be Stirred Up?"; Igor Vasilievich Bestuzhev-lada is a doctor of historical sciences, a professor, and sector head at the Institute of Sociological Research under the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is the author of the monographs "Krymskaya voyna. 1853-1856" (The Crimean War. 1853-1856) (1956), "Borba v Rossii po voirosam vnyemney politiki. 1906-1910" (The Struggle in Russia on Foreign Policy Questions. 1906-1910) (1961), "Okno v budushcheye" (A Window to the Future) (1970), "Poiskovyye sotsialnoye proenozirovaniye" (Exploratory Social Forecasting) (1984), "Normativnoye sotsialnoye proenozirovaniye" (Normative Social Forecasting) (1987) and others. A permanent contributor to our journal]

[Text] On 9 December 1987, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published an article by D.A. Volkogonov entitled "The Stalin Phenomenon." I read it, as they say, at a glance. And then I studied it as a scientific tract. The author approached the "Stalin Phenomenon" from ideological positions, as a philosopher, writing in the given case in the style of a philosophical public affairs letter. Involuntarily a desire arose to see just how the same phenomenon would appear from the position of a historian or sociologist.

As it turned out, I had long been acquainted with the muse of history, for around 40 years; I had known sociology for around 20 years. During this time I had happened to reflect often on the "Stalin Phenomenon," I had read all that could be read on this and, finally, had spoken with many knowledgeable persons who could quite justly be described as experts. In essence, for a score years I have been conducting a survey by a method of so-called informal interviews with strict anonymity of the respondent and, for understandable reasons, without writing down the results. And I know that within the people there is an inexorable desire to understand what happened in the history of our country in 1922-1953.

One other circumstance: a significant portion of the above-designated time interval occurred in my own life, including in rather mature age. In other words, one could speak fully of a method of included observation.

All this is said in order to make clear that the several articles that I have written on the subject touched upon here as historical sociological writing has been the fruit of not a fleeting impression but rather many years of reflection and, to a certain degree, research. In truth, informal. This is why the memoirs of A.T. Rybin for me are not simply the curious memoirs of a curious man but one other proof of the expert. Albeit a very unique one.

In one of the works on the "Stalin Phenomenon," I attempted to clarify what social groups and for precisely what reason favored if not the cult of personality at least Stalin's "cult of memory," openly consider themselves as his heirs and with more or less fierceness fight against critical comments addressed to him, without mentioning the desire of restoring historical truth. It has turned out that there are at least six such groups which are very different and to a certain degree are opposites by their nature. Let us now list them by order.

1. Quantitatively the most insignificant group consists of persons who have besmirched themselves with direct involvement in Stalin's lawlessness. At present, they are doing everything possible to cover over the trail.

2. A portion of the former co-workers of the institutions which in the eyes of the people embodied the mass repressions and related crimes. Although personally in no way tied to the mentioned crimes and in essence in no way differing from the other officials, they zealously are in favor of Stalin's "cult of memory" in order, in their understanding, to save the "honor of the uniform."

3. A portion of the participants of the Great Patriotic War who feel it essential to preserve Stalin's "cult of memory" because of the official slogan "For the Motherland, For Stalin!" which actually was initiated in the troops from above, from the army's Main Political Directorate but with which our troops rose to the attack in the face of death, and both parts of the slogan merged together in their minds.

4. A portion of the middle-aged and elderly persons who have been unable to withstand the enormously strong shock which was caused in them (including in the author of these lines) by the revelations made at the 20th CPSU Congress. For them the preserving of Stalin's "cult of memory" is a sort of question of principle, because any way else, in their opinion (profoundly erroneous) would question the sense of their life. However, it has seemed, clearly there is nothing in common between the crimes of Stalin and the feats of the Soviet people in the 1930s and 1940s.

5. A group of persons of all ages (down to Komsomol, inclusively) who in one way or another have reached the conviction that under no conditions should one wash one's linen in public. Ordinarily in confidential talks they willingly admit the inadmissibility of the cult of personality and condemn Stalin's lawlessness but feel that "for the population" there must be different information which would directly exclude even a hint of any problem—only accomplishments and nothing but accomplishments.

6. The group of persons also of all ages and indignant over the fact of what we briefly term stagnation. However, they see the way out of stagnation not in restructuring (a radical economic reform and the democratization of society) but rather in a return to the times of the "boss" who instilled order with an iron hand. These people the external distinguishing feature of whom often is a portrait of Stalin boldly hung up in a room or on the windshield of a vehicle do not know or do not want to know that in the times of Stalin everything was the same as it was in the time of stagnation. Only, for understandable reasons, not of such a scale.

In examining the memoirs of A.T. Rybin, we can clearly see one of the social outgrowths of the cult of personality (in truth, one with roots deep in the centuries): the relationships of the "boss" and a "man" personally loyal to him. Precisely because of personal loyalty, the "man" endeavors to represent the "boss" in the best light regardless of how the "boss" was in fact and what role, even the most tragic and most evil, he played in the life of his family and his people. As a historian, I have read many such memoirs, and these in no way are an exception.

The author depicts Stalin in everyday life as a "simple man" and sketches him in in the pinkest hues. A.T. Rybin, probably, could not even conceive that he is not alone in being in close everyday contact with Stalin and is not alone in writing memoirs about this. As a comparison, let us take the book by Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Allilyeva. She was in no way hostile to her father and, on the contrary, even endeavored to present him in a favorable light, only doing this not so uncircumspectly and endeavoring to still observe a certain objectivity. And what do we see? A person with a very heavy character who, when he had reached unlimited power, in the direct sense of the word became a petty tyrant: he

broke the lives of those around, he led his wife to suicide and maimed the life of his son and daughter. We see a person who holds everyone around in fear and trembling, beginning with his "associates" and ending with the security chiefs of which he treated capriciously. On this score the book gives numerous proof.

A.T. Rybin is moved by the story of his fellow worker how Stalin took an old woman to her home in his car. He is not at all interested in the fate of many millions of such old women after the first 4 years of individual rule (1929-1933), when agriculture was completely ruined, millions of peasant farms were devastated and then millions of people perished from starvation. Or the fate of millions of other old women who in vain endeavored several years later, to find out about the fate of their near ones. Suspicious social Daltonism. Incidentally, also the outgrowth of the cult of personality.

As if something ordinary, the author relates how he was twice arrested for something. And he considers the groundless mass repressions of those times as completely natural. The boss is the lord, if he wishes he punishes and if he wishes he reprieves. Characteristic is the episode quoted in the memoirs: they "take off" the commandant of Stalin's dacha with the entire "guilt" of this man being that he was the brother of a military man who was directly involved in service with Tukhashevskiy. He is replaced by a man equally dedicated personally to the "boss" and who describes to the third "personally dedicated person," the author of the memoirs, how "difficult but instructive" it was for him to serve the "boss." None of the three shows even a shadow of doubt as to the justice of what had happened, without mentioning the fate of Tukhachevskiy and the other military leaders who shared his fate. Personal loyalty is a striking social phenomenon. Incidentally, bureaucratic centralism is based precisely on this and on nothing else.

A.T. Rybin is also touched by the story of a fellow worker how, in 1946, in traveling to the south, Stalin got out of his vehicle on a street in Orel which was lying in ruins, and encountered a woman who began lamenting: "If it were not for you, Comrade Stalin, we would not have overcome the damned enemy. Thank you for this." To this the leader reasonably commented: "Thanks to you, the people conquer the enemy and not I." He, in truth, did not have enough time to add that prior to the war he had decapitated the nation and the army, he had exterminated virtually all the political leaders and military chiefs capable of thinking independently (that is, not merely "personally dedicated") and then, in being left without intelligent advisors, took a number of erroneous decisions, having put the army under enemy attack and for which we had to pay a dear price in much blood.

In the memoirs of all the "personally dedicated" without exception the extolling of the one to whom the author is dedicated occurs by playing down the immediate circle of the "boss." Virtually all the "associates" of Stalin mentioned in the memoirs of A.T. Rybin, such as Beriya,

Malinkov, Kaganovich, Yergoda, Yezhov and Voroshilov are presented in an extremely unseemly light. There is no doubt about it, these persons cannot evoke sympathy. But then the question: How could such people make up the immediate circle of such a wise and penetrating man? Let Yergoda and Yezhov disappear one by one, but still the remaining were near Stalin for many years! Incidentally, Yezhov (a "debauchee and drunk" in the author's words), according to other sources, was an old close associate of Stalin's and his appointment was accompanied by an noisy propaganda campaign which would have been inconceivable without the knowledge of the "boss."

A.T. Rybin asserts that Stalin could not be involved in Kirov's murder because "cordial relations" existed between them. But according to the evidence of V.A. Volkogonov, the relations between Stalin and Bukharin were even more "cordial." They were close as families! However, this did not prevent.... So who was guilty of Kirov's murder? The official version was that "enemies of the people" (for which they were executed in thousands). There is a different version based upon the famous words of the ancient Romans "who would benefit"? Here the trail leads directly to Stalin. The author holds a third version: the negligence of Yagoda and his Leningrad subordinates was to blame. But Yagoda for almost 3 years after Kirov's death remained one of the most trusted persons of Stalin! Something is fishy here.

Molotov is sketched in in colors which differ sharply from the other "associates." But certainly we are well aware that in terms of his moral qualities he in no fundamental way differed from Voroshilov, Malinkov, Kaganovich....

Certain judgments by the author cannot help but evoke an ironic smile. For example, the supposed negative attitude by Stalin toward glorification addressed to him and well known from the books of Feuchtwanger and Barbusse. The author gives many quotations on this score. But were Stalin's words sincere and not hypocritical? Certainly he had merely to simply hint of his actual desire (any desire) and the "personally dedicated" would immediately carry out the will of the "boss." And what did we see and hear just before Stalin's death? He, don't you see, was indignant over the flattery of the cinematographers. But the "Fall of Berlin" which had been playing for months in all the nation's movie houses? Can one conceive of anything more flattering? At the same time, it is also known that no such film ever appeared on the nation's screens without the knowledge of the General Secretary.

In the memoirs of A.T. Rybin is there any information of interest to us? There is. For example, the information of an eye-witness concerning the atmosphere which reigned at Stalin's dacha (the vocabulary, the habits, the level of

culture of its inhabitants and visitors). Exceptionally great is the value of the description of Stalin's death, where the author rises to the height of a well-done movie script.

Stalin's personality is extremely contradictory, as was pointed out in the report of M.S. Gorbachev dedicated to the 70th anniversary of October. We should see both his contribution to the struggle for socialism as well as his serious political errors, arbitrariness, the most real crimes on the grounds of the abuse of power and for which the people paid a great price and which told negatively on subsequent social development. It must not be forgotten, in particular, that after Lenin's death a majority of the party and state leaders united precisely around Stalin, and no one else, against Trotskiy who was pushing for a personal dictatorship. Or that Stalin maintained discipline in the work of the higher military and civilian administrations and nipped in the bud any disputes between the military leaders during the Great Patriotic War (as a military historian I can give evidence that this was extremely important for victory over the enemy; innumerable are the disasters which such disagreements brought in the history of wars and military art, including in the thousand-year history of Russia). One could probably give a number of other such examples. However, objectivity, as is known, is not the same as objectivism. In drawing in all aspects of a social portrait of a historical figure, his fundamental assessment is also essential. Such an assessment was provided in the report of M.S. Gorbachev at the celebrating of the 70th anniversary of October: the guilt of Stalin and his close associates in the mass repressions and lawlessness was enormous and unforgivable. This is a lesson for all generations.

People frequently ask: Why is so much attention being given recently to the revelations linked to Stalin's cult of personality? Why stir up the past when there are enough problems now? As a historian and sociologist, I assert that this is being done for the sake of the past as well as for the sake of the present and future.

For the sake of the past because the shades of our ancestors call for historical justice and because we ourselves in time will move into the past and in just the same manner will call for the honor and conscience of successors. Persons who are deaf to this call lose their human appearance. Finally, if we ourselves do not do this, then our successors will do this without fail and then how will we appear in their eyes, before the judge of history?

For the sake of the present because much of what arose during the years of the cult of personality still survives and much of this must be overcome with great difficulty; without a sober assessment of the past we are impotent in solving urgent problems of the present.

For the sake of the future, because the neglect of the lessons of the past creates a danger of repeating what has happened before.

In the historical sciences there is a discipline known as source sciences. Its first admonishment is a critical attitude toward sources. Toward any of them. Including memoirs. This applies fully to a study of sociological documentation. In comparing various documents and in critically examining each of them, we come closer both to the historical truth and to sociological soundness.

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**Property Space and Latent Dimensions**  
*18060001p Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE*  
*ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, May-Jun 88*  
*(signed to press 16 May 88) pp 105-112*

[Article, published under the heading "Theory and Methods of Data Analysis," by G.V. Kanygin: "Property Space and Latent Dimensions"; Gennadiy Viktorovich Kanygin is a candidate of economic sciences, a science associate at the Institute for Socioeconomic Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Leningrad), and a specialist in the application of mathematical methods in sociology. Our journal has published his article "A Comprehensive Assessment of the Efficiency of Engineer Work" (No 1, 1983, co-author)]

[Text] Typologization is defined in the literature as a method of scientific cognition "based upon a divisioning of the studied aggregate of objects into groups with this divisioning possessing certain properties" [1, p 8]. An essential element in typologization is the forming of generalizing concepts which ensure a transition from the simple comparisons of objects to evermore complicated and integrated ones. The criteria of simplicity or complexity as well as the methods of realizing the generalization stem completely from a theoretical concept, or more precisely a special sociological theory which describes a certain object area [2; 3].

Any socioeconomic typologization has content and formal aspects. The former is disclosed in the sociological theory while the second is realized by various mathematical modeling methods. Moreover, there is a certain "intermediate link" which is part simultaneously of the structure of the theory and the corresponding formal models. The notions of the researcher on the latency of sociological variables act as such a link.

It may seem that the notion of latency cannot be incorporated into the problems of the model aggregation (the transition from the contents of the problem to the model), since traditionally this is linked with the categorical basing of socioeconomic indicators [2]. In our view, the orientation of searching for the bases of socioeconomic indicators solely in the content aspect of the

typologization problem overshadows the initial assigning of the model ideas. With typological structures, this means that the model aggregation can unreliably pass on the specifics of the subject description of the object. In practice, such a discrepancy is most often realized in the following manner. A researcher, in constructing a theoretical typology, indicates a set of simple features as well as a generalizing quality in overlooking here the use of the rules of transition, or, in other words, the content aggregation. A mathematician correlates the set of qualities with the initial formal concepts and sets the criteria for the formal aggregating. The model generalization obtained as a result is viewed as an analogue of theoretical typologization.

The concretizing of the ideas about latency make it possible to link various conceptual means serving typologization. Here the main problem is in translating the essence of the content problem being solved into terms allowing a clear mathematical interpretation. Such an approach is the basis for employing formal methods in typological structures. "As such a large data array has succeeded in being represented in the form of a small file, this provides grounds to hope that a certain pattern has been disclosed determining the essence of the phenomenon; the more strongly it is possible to 'compress' the initial information the greater the grounds for such a hope" [3, p 72]. This initial hypothesis which is attractive to many specialists often has served as the source of inadequacy of the typological constructs. The latter has been linked by us primarily to the transition from the concepts of the subject theory to a system of formal indicators and in addition with the invalid identification of the model and content procedures for constructing the generalizing characteristics.

We are focusing attention on the latency concept, since it not only incorporates the basis of the individual socioeconomic characteristics but is also a practical means for uniting the set of indicators into an integrated system.

The very concept of latency is long known. In the works of P. Lazarsfeld [4, 5], the reasons have been disclosed for incorporating latent structural analysis of internal characteristics of socioeconomic phenomena in their external expression into the practices of applied research. Here the starting point is the establishing of a link between the observable and unobservable characteristics obtained on the basis of studying the object by the means of subject theory.

The introduction of the linkage appears attractive from the viewpoint of subject theory because this linkage can be interpreted as a method for explaining the external manifestations of a certain quality through concealed or latent reasons. The latter consideration is used in introducing the axiom of a local dependence which sets the relationships between the present features and the latent variable [4, p 17]. In the course of further constructs the linkage is concretized and here a number of assertions is

introduced which by their content are assumptions (suppositions) of the method. These serve as the main tool for "tuning" the latent analysis to the contents of the problem being solved.

At the same time, these assumptions, in being linked with an independence axiom and through it to the latent notions, for the description of a socioeconomic object presupposes the employment of the notion of space. In designating the aptness of using space as a means for describing a social object as a hypothesis essential for successful modeling, I would like to point out two particular features of it: in the first place, the universally accepted obviousness of this hypothesis and, secondly, the fundamental nature of the assumption contained in it.

In the extensive literature on the problems of constructing socioeconomic indicators, space (property) [frame reference] is interpreted as a set of characteristics and their values. With such an approach it is essential to turn to additional information, for example, to theses concerning the stability of the data, their reliability and so forth [see 2, 6, 7]. Regardless of the extensive nature of the exposition of the theses, the initial concept itself, in our view, has not been completely analyzed and this has led to an insufficiently sound transition of the spatial abstractions from the sphere of precise sciences into the humanitarian ones. Conditions are created post factum whereby it is difficult to escape from the framework of the initially adopted position and establish a ground-work for it. Characteristic of a majority of the corresponding procedural research has been a situation where, in the words of the authors, "an analysis of the reliability problem has been commenced by us at the point when the initial variables and features have already been established and isolated" [2, p 17].

The relationships set out force one to seek other grounds for the initial introduction of spatial concepts into the area of sociology and economics. At present, the main justification for their employment is the analogy between the physical space and the range of characteristics of the social object. Its essence is that in both instances, in describing real objects, the mathematical concept of space is employed. The line of argument here is as follows: if a point in physical space is described by a set of coordinates, then in the same manner employing psychological tests or certain socioeconomic parameters (income, education and so forth), it is possible to describe any individual. For any word on a book page, for example, there is an appropriate abscissa and ordinate. On this basis the conclusion has been drawn of the possibility of describing a socioeconomic object through its property space [8, p 40].

This argument, in our view, is extremely vulnerable. In the first place, it is essential to clarify the coordinate description of the point at which the physical space is modeled by a mathematical analogue. And although the soundness of modeling is in no way disputed, however it should be created not on considerations about the

apriori suitability of spatial abstractions but rather on the proven conformity of them to the real object, in the given instance, to physical space. Secondly, the very conformity of the description to the object occurs and, consequently, is verified within a certain problem. In the designated example the ordinary substitution of the word on the book page can serve as such a problem. The "natural" achieving of this goal is carried out by certain specific actions, that is, a set of efforts leading to the desired result.

Along with the natural method the same result can be achieved, if we know the pair of coordinates for the designated word, however the corresponding actions are different (in the designated example, search and analysis are absent). This difference in actions with the coinciding of their result is crucial for introducing spatial abstractions, when a second (decomposition) description of the object is created identical to the initial within the set problem (in the example, the letter image of the required word).

A decomposition description is completely apt for many natural scientific studies, as the latter in a majority of instances are not tied to a social object. But if the concept of space is employed in socioeconomic disciplines, then the analogy indicated in the given example is not persuasive due to the nonidenticalness of the two ways of describing the object of research. In actuality, place of birth, employment, family status and other coordinates of property space [frame reference] which with any degree of detail describe the object at the same time are insufficient, for instance, in signing an employee to a vacant position, for taking a decision on entering a marriage and other practical actions which are of interest to the sociologist. For this reason, although the socioeconomic objects possess a range of diverse parameters formally characterizable as space, this does not mean a methodological justification for such an interpretation.

In sociology and economics, the possibility of a decomposition study of an object based on a system of indicators has been linked by us with the content property of the object of study which we have termed spatial expressiveness. Clearly the judgment on the presence or degree of absence of this property is formed chiefly by the conceptual apparatus of subject theory, since at such a stage of modeling the mathematical procedures were not yet developed. Precisely this property distinguishes the socioeconomic objects from the object of research by natural scientific disciplines.

The use of coordinate abstractions for depicting social phenomena, relationships and so forth can be understandable, if one takes into account that all human activity occurs in physical space and because of this the possibility of the existence of "nonspatial" objects is perceived in modeling as something distant from the tasks of practical value. The analyzed feature of employing the concept of space, in being termed by us the first

aspect of latency, is inherent not only to typological constructs, since it is not directly linked with the process of generalization, but rather serves as an element in establishing the mathematical modeling methods. The second aspect of latency is an assumption essential for the soundness of the aggregating whereby an important role is played by the concept of the content aspect of typological analysis while the third concerns the question of how complete is the depiction of the object and its linkages in the instance of employing latent methods.

In modern research, the concept of "content" is viewed chiefly from two viewpoints which also determine its scope. In the first place, from the position of a social scientist investigating a certain cross section of socioeconomic reality. In this instance, typologization—the explanation of the conceptual apparatus, a description of the content standing for a unit of the obtained structured aggregate and other aspects—itsself is a fragment of a more general theoretical scheme. If one examines such a theoretical construct from the viewpoint of the subsequent model, then the content constructs should first of all determine the choice of characteristics used in the modeling as the basis. Examples of the content positing of the problem in this instance could be the works oriented at a comprehensive examination of socioeconomic processes [9]. Secondly, the content aspect of research can also be viewed from the standpoint of the methods employed in it. In this instance, one understands a verbal description which, on the one hand, can be interpreted in terms of practical actions and, on the other, finds a simple expression in the initial ideas about the model (the variable, the generalized indicator or graph). Such an understanding of the content aspect of the problem is characteristic for works devoted to formal methods employed in socioeconomic research [3, 10].

A characteristic feature in the understanding of latency in the works of mathematical concern is a reference in the initial definitions to a reduction in the number of initial characteristics due to the latent nature of the phenomenon itself and the following declaration of rules for this reduction (criteria or formulas of aggregating). If latency is employed in the constructs of subject theory, it is apparent in various verbal descriptions of the object of research. Here, such terms are employed as side, aspect, variable, problem, quality, type and so forth behind which stands the process of constructing generalized concepts of particular socioeconomic theory. Here for the latency of the ideas it makes no difference whether the researcher moves from simple concepts to generalizing ones or vice versa, and in the content description of the socioeconomic aggregating problem, there is no indication as to the rules of generalization by the means of theory which could be uniformly interpreted in the model.

In literature, the property of the latency of descriptions is traditionally linked to the natural expression of the studied phenomena and this serves as the main reason for introducing such a notion. (1) Let us analyze this

thesis using the example of the parallel—content and model—aggregating within a socioeconomic problem being solved. In this instance, the latency property relates to both forms of aggregating and, consequently, it makes sense to speak about the formal latent characteristics and their content analogues. From such a viewpoint, the content characteristics are the actual result of the formation of the generalized concepts of subject theory using heuristic means. In other words, the content latent characteristics are typologization by means of the conceptual apparatus of content theory. This is the first aspect of latency.

However, with the designated scheme of typological constructs, one can clearly see a number of assumptions essential for their realization and this requires a look at its second aspect. The main one among these assumptions is the hypothesis of the fundamental agreement in the criteria of the formal and content aggregating. In actuality, if the generalization in the model is made using mathematical methods, then the rules for converting the initial variables into generalizing characteristics are well known, but this cannot be said about the content aggregating which employs a heuristic mechanism for creating new features. Because of the undoubted importance of the congruity between the content and model formation of type one must apriori declare the fundamental adequacy between them.

Thus, typological analysis as a means of linking the content and formal aspects of a socioeconomic problem is carried out using three key aspects: the concepts of latency, the formal criteria of the aggregating and the choice of the initial variables.

On the basis of all that has been stated, it can be concluded that this concept of latency has two important aspects for practical employment, the first of which—the assumption of a spatial description—is viewed by us as a prerequisite for typological analysis and the second—the identifying (essential agreement) of the content and formal criteria of the aggregating—we consider as the basis of typologization.

Many researchers have proposed than an orientation at employing mathematical methods in social sciences in following the examples of natural sciences is scarcely completely justified. The basic point of criticism for the latent schemes of mathematization in such instances is the notion of the contextual causality of the sociological conclusion. The presence of a very link between it and the mathematical methods of typologization is indisputable, since the contextual causality noticeably changes the entire system of views on the content aspect of the problem being solved and this, in turn, determines the method of employing the model.

The thesis of the contextual causality of a sociological conclusion has been developed within the context of the phenomenological school of sociology. In the notion of its supporters, in an applied form, in particular, it shows the

fallaciousness of employing mathematical methods for describing a social object [12]. The essence of contextual causality is that “a sociological interpretation scheme includes, along with a verification model, unformalized and often nonreflective (and in this sense ordinary) notions, knowledge and experience of the researcher and which in the aggregate comprise the context of the scientific conclusion in sociology” [13, p 28].

Agreeing with such an understanding of contextual causality is the delimitation of the components in the process of obtaining sociological information whereby “the object of research is not reality in itself which exists independently of the observer but rather a system consisting of the object (in the classic sense) and the observation conditions by which we understand the aggregate of measurement procedures, including the methods and means of measurement as well as the observer per se (the researcher) linked to the observed system” [14, p 41]. The authors of the quoted work, I.S. Alekseyev and F.M. Borodkin, correlate the contextual causality of a sociological conclusion and its subject [principal] with “the principal of complementarity” the idea of which was drawn from physics. G.S. Batygin, in agreeing as a whole with the validity of the “contextual causality—observation conditions” relationship, has pointed out that this relationship can be understood without resorting to the “principal of complementarity” which without sufficient justification has been borrowed from the arsenal of physical concepts [13, p 30].

It may seem that the “principal of complementarity” in sociology bespeaks a disparity in the mathematical modeling methods for the individual researchers who, in studying the same object, form their own notions in different socioeconomic indicators. However, the main idea of the “principal of complementarity” is not one of recording obvious particularities but rather in emphasizing their common basis. The various data on one and the same social object often mean not the “complete vision” of this object by different researchers but rather an essential inaccuracy of description characterizing each variation of the data. It is impossible to avoid this inaccuracy by “improving” the empirical information by traditional methods which presuppose an independence of the data from the procedure of their obtaining (in particular, from the subject [principal] of the research).

In linking the contextual causality with the subject [principal], we base ourselves on the above-stated considerations concerning the latent bases of typological analysis and which make it possible to isolate in the contextual causality (or the gathering conditions) the data of the two unequal parts. We view the main part as the spatial inexpressibility of the social object which leads to the notion of the need to include an expert in the over-all typologization scheme as this ensures a greater flexibility of the description impossible within the traditional employment of coordinate abstractions.

In other words, the limited nature of reflecting social objects in employing the "natural scientific" procedures forces one to incorporate in the modeling scheme the appropriate "supplement" which is the researcher himself.

The second component in the context of information gathering is determined by the incompleteness of the description, by the unavailability of scientific data, by the random errors and other attendant aspects of any applied research which, although capable of noticeably influencing the results, are fundamentally removable within the limits of modern typological constructs. The socioeconomic data, as a portion of the constructs of subject theory, also includes the aspect of subjective causality and the aspect of randomness inherent to the stage of the information gathering. This quality of data characterizes them as a single whole due to the fact that any of the features of the description possesses the designated properties. For this reason it seems insufficiently persuasive to us to make a division into object and subject parameters as done in the already quoted research [14]. However, it seems equally less valid to us to view the second aspect of information gathering as the basic expression of the specific features of a sociological measurement [7].

The combined analysis of contextual causality and latency and the ascertaining in the latter of two relatively independent assumptions make it possible to conclude that contextness can be viewed as an attempt to lift the model constraint contained in the first postulate of latency. Thus, to employ the context approach in modeling means to recognize the presence of spatially unexpressible objects and endeavor to depict them using nonmathematical means.

The latency concepts as well as consideration of the contextual causality are the chief approaches to establishing the mathematical procedures of typologization and, in being in a definite opposition, have a different scientific impact on the typological constructs. This is due to a number of circumstances. In the first place, the latent terms have an old history of genesis and improvement and they are widely found among scientists employed in the area of applied research and this cannot help but tell on the method of contextual causality. Secondly, the elaboration of the latent schemes makes it possible to create concrete methods for an analysis of socioeconomic information while a criticism of ignoring contextual causality carried out within the phenomenological tradition is predominantly nonconstructive. However, it must be remembered that at the beginning of their development the latent concepts also had a philosophical nature which was problematic for a quantitative expression [4].

Finally, the third, most important aspect of the disparity between the two approaches: the context line of argument claims a substantially broader depiction of the ties

of the social object with reality in comparison with the latent methods, as it is aimed at constructing a richer system of invariants of the studied object.

The analysis made of the conceptual apparatus linking the content and formal aspects of typologization forces us to assume a cautious position on the question of employing mathematical methods in modeling a social object. On the one hand, the traditional latent typologization is carried out without the proper basing of the employed mathematical concepts. On the other, within the spatial concepts, consideration of contextual causality by the subject [principal] of the research obviously provides an opportunity for more adequate modeling. In this instance the persons incorporated in the model are the model along with a certain formalized system. Such an approach is already hard to term mathematical, although it is based on the extensive use of formalized constructs. As an example, in our view, one might mention simulation modeling [15]. Characteristic of it is the desire to construct a formal model which in its properties would correspond as well as possible to the language of subject theory. For this reason it is important, in bringing out the shortcomings of formalization, to broaden its capabilities, even if they to a certain degree are conventional.

On the level of the practical employment of the proposed approach, we must turn to the question of the adequacy of the typological modeling and endeavor to isolate the most promising areas for the development of the mathematical means of typologization. In the event of a typological description of a social object, the adequacy of the modeling is determined, in the first place, by the expressibility of the conceptual constructs of subject theory in coordinate abstractions and, secondly, by the conformity between the content and formal aggregating. For the correctness of the entire typological model, it is important to see to it that the proper correlativity is achieved in both instances. However, with the abandoning of unconditional latency as the basis of the typologization, the practical realization of the designated congruity occurs differently. While in the first instance the essence of adequacy consists in the possibility of a coordinate representation of the social object and is determined by the researcher using heuristic means, in the second the increase in adequacy is related to the improvement of the formal criteria.

The designated difference determines the degree of conditionality in the examined criterion of adequacy and thereby makes it possible to isolate the mathematical aspect per se. The conformity between the formal and content aggregation consists in the assumption that the problem of selecting the initial concepts has been solved in the model. However, its solution is not interpreted as a description of the social object through the coordinate characteristics in the natural scientific sense but rather relates to the heuristic means of subject theory. Here of

prime significance is the expressiveness of the subject language in the terms of the model and the inverse interpretation plays an auxiliary role.

In the applied problems of socioeconomic typologization, there frequently are obvious content considerations which show that the method of translating the initial terms into generalizing ones depends upon the sense of the integral expression. In noticeably simplifying the situation, it can be said that between the concepts of subject theory there is a relationship which is manifested differently in the various groups of studied objects. For example, the notion of the socioeconomic effectiveness of the labor of workers in being formalized with the aid of a typological model develops considering the various aspects of labor activity for a regular worker and a student [16]. For this reason the model is considered adequate if by its means it is possible to express the relation between the concepts of subject theory. In other words, the criterion of the adequacy of modeling lies in the conformity of the relation between the analogues and the concepts of the theory.(2)

The employment of the proposed criterion for the model procedures of typologization leads, first of all, to the demand of the nonlinearity of the aggregated dependencies and the aposteriority of their mathematical form. From the entire arsenal of modern mathematical procedures employed in applied research, this requirement is met best by an approach to aggregating involving algorithms of automatic classification [3].

#### Footnotes

1. In this context it is interesting to point out that in works on sociological measurement they employ rank, metric and other scales in addition to the latent [see 11].
2. We should point out that the criterion is formulated without the assumption of latency and for this reason we have no grounds to treat it on the level of homomorphism [17].

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### What Should the Journal Be?

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[Sociological Conference Reports published under the heading "Chronicle of Scientific Life"]

[Text] Roundtable materials prepared for publication by T.Z. Protasenko.

The tasks confronting the journal *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* were the subject of a roundtable discussion held in January of this year in Leningrad by the editor-in-chief of the journal, A.V. Dmitriyev. Participating in the discussion were co-workers from the Institute for Socioeconomic Problems under the USSR Academy of Sciences, A.V. Baranov, O.B. Bozhkov, V.B. Golofast, B.Z. Doktorov, P.N. Lebedev, L.A. Kupriyanov, M.N. Mezhevich, B.D. Parygin, V.R. Polozov, T.Z. Protasenko and G.I. Saganenko. Also joining in the discussion were co-workers from other sociological centers including B.I. Maksimov (Lenpoligrafmash [Leningrad Plant for Printing Equipment]) and I.P. Yakovlev (Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M.I. Kalinin).

A.V. Dmitriyev: At present, the journal is working under conditions where as a whole the elaboration of the all-encompassing concept of restructuring has been completed. The social scientists possess an important document, the report of M.S. Gorbachev on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution [1]. This is a concentrated expression of our prospects. The Soviet social scientists must not only deepen the concept of restructuring but also work out its individual questions and areas. For now, we say a great deal about the restructuring but little is aimed at specific research and practical proposals. In society qualitatively new processes are occurring and these can be continued in the next few years. These processes, including social ones, are related to the changeover of a large portion of the industrial enterprises to repayment of costs, self-financing and economic accountability. The main thing is that this transition is occurring under extremely painful conditions, when both the old and the new mechanisms are operating. There will be rises and, possibly, falls. It is natural to assume that these economic problems can have direct bearing on the quality of life of the workers and on their conduct. Not only many enterprise leaders but also the middle level of management is not ready to convert to economic accountability. With the broadening of self-financing and the covering of costs inevitably the problem of reducing the number of employees arises. The sociologists and economists are virtually unprepared for such a turn of events. However, Hungarian experience has shown that these tasks can be carried out.

It must obviously be admitted that for the leaders of a majority of enterprises, sociological illiteracy is characteristic. Considering this, we must be in the front ranks of the researchers and popularizers of sociology and we must constantly help the economic bodies in resolving social problems. Certainly the human factor is assuming evermore significance and mass awareness is being emancipated. Under these conditions, when people are expecting a quick return from the reforms and a noticeable improvement in well being, elements of social extremism may appear and outbursts of national hostility are possible. We are aware of the events in Kazakhstan, the Baltic and Nargornny Karabakh and there the situation is not presently normal. Many social scientists have not been prepared to work in such a situation. For example, many research projects and the problems which exist in real life are a great distance apart.

The journal *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* in recent years has published many pointed articles and has generally tried to move away from "academicness." At the same time, boring materials are being printed which are also written on a low professional level. There are plans to change much but this is difficult to do all at once. The journal reflects the results of sociological research and if they do not produce interesting results, then the publication is devalued. But if the author brings up a timely subject and presents it in a professional manner, then such material will be published. Most often the typical situation is encountered where the sociologists sketch in the picture of one or another phenomenon and confirm it by certain data of applied research. Neither are there hypotheses, nor conclusions, nor recommendations. The files of the editors are stuffed with such materials. What we need is serious fundamental studies recording significant trends in Soviet society. The results of research which delve into individual "painful" problems are also essential for us. The articles by sociologists from the ISEP [Institute for Socioeconomic Problems] are basically devoted to research methods. These have been done rather skillfully. But when the ISEP was set up, it was assumed that valuable results would be obtained by linking economic and sociological research. We are still waiting for this.

The first demand on the articles being sent in to the editors is assisting the restructuring in our nation, including in the social sciences; the second is professionalism in preparing the material; the third is exposition which is accessible for the mass reader. We must fight for the reader, introducing, in particular, a certain concern for today. The times demand this.

V.R. Polozov: It would be a good thing on the pages of the journal to return to a discussion of the subject of sociology, its place in the system of social sciences and its relation to scientific communism, primarily because for many of our party bodies the subject area of sociology is unclear.

**A.V. Dmitriyev:** From my viewpoint, the holding of such a discussion at present is ill-advised. The last discussion of this problem did not produce anything. There are different viewpoints on the subject of sociology. For example, one of them is that sociology does not exist at all but there are merely applied studies on individual sciences. Another viewpoint proceeds from the notion that there are three levels of hierarchy in sociology: historical materialism, middle-level sociology and concrete or applied sociology. The third is based on the fact that sociology has its own subject in the social community. Finally, a fourth viewpoint comes down to reducing all sociology to an applied science. For now this is the only result of the previous debate. All the supporters of one or another viewpoint stubbornly defend their own and for now do not intend to change their views. For this reason, a debate of this question is presently useless. We must seek out concrete objects of research.

**M.N. Mezhevich:** The basic subject of the journal articles should be the social problems of restructuring. Sociologists cannot overlook the processes occurring in society including democratization, the new economic reform and the unusual forms of social activity. But the main subjects of sociological research are still in the sphere of social awareness as precisely here all the remaining problems are integrated. The negative trends in social practice have given rise to the appropriate convictions, sets and standards, and if it is not considered that the distorting processes in social awareness possess a certain independence and time is needed to eliminate them then one is overlooking one of the most important levers in controlling the restructuring processes. Sociologists have already carried out the first measurements from which it is clear that society is in a new phase of development. The expectation of changes, hopes and doubts encompass all strata. The constant studying of these attitudes is the main task of the sociologists.

**G.I. Saganenko:** It is impossible to avoid a discussion of the subject of sociological science. This is not an abstract debate. Our serious problems have been largely caused by a miscomprehension of the essence of sociology and its role in society. For example, the director of the leading, one might say, the only sociological institute in the nation V.N. Ivanov thus describes sociology for the broad public: sociology is a science studying the subjective attitudes of people and as a whole this is the investigation of public opinion [2]. But who should examine the phenomena and problems of social life, find the forces standing behind them and set out the value picture of a society? The public affairs writers? For now it is they who are concerned with this and not us. Of course, both public opinion and social attitudes are important components in the social whole but is this all of it? The empirical weapon of the sociologist is not just surveys. As of now journalists are also involved in an integrated analysis of the individual fragments of social reality (documents, publications and so forth) and they do this in a most professional manner (look at the brilliant sociological portrait of the driving forces of inhibition by Andrey Nuykin [3]).

There are many problems of the interaction of restructuring and sociology and I will take up just one, the necessity of the development of sociological thinking in our society both among the broad strata of the population as well as in individual categories of persons responsible to a greater or lesser degree for the fate of people and for the fate of society, including the sociologists themselves. Developed sociological thinking is the ability to understand the problems of social life and distinguish the political, economic and moral aspects in this. If the corresponding system of thinking and social vision are not developed but merely the people are urged to be active, then with all the best intentions we will end up in a blind alley.

**O.B. Bozhkov:** I would like to support G.I. Saganenko as I feel there is a most acute scarcity of the theoretical and methodological analysis of the problems with which sociology is concerned. For this reason, a definition of its subject is presently one of the most acute practical questions. We are persuaded of this not only by the constant collaboration with industrial sociologists in Leningrad but also by contacts with the plant sociologists of the Urals and the middle zone of Russia. The industrial sociologists conduct research and work out questionnaires. But the questionnaires themselves and all the activities of their authors in essence have no bearing on sociology. The discussion should help not only to define the subject of sociology but also to destroy the fantasy image of the sociologist which has come into being in mass awareness at present, including under the influence of precisely these activities.

In truth, there is the opinion that the subject of sociology was already defined in the course of the discussion held in the 1960s. But we recall how this occurred: this was a one-sided game when those who thought differently were simply labeled deviationists from Marxism. In actuality the debate ended with a compromise: sociology was identified with historical materialism and with "truncated" historical materialism (that is, sociology did not gain independent status), but then the right to existence of the so-called middle-level theories was recognized. The presently widespread image of the sociologist as a man with a questionnaire, a narrowly pragmatic, utilitarian approach to research, a system of requesters possessing a monopoly on the research results—all of this is the fruit of the compromise which led sociology away from solving many fundamental questions of social development.

In his comments A.V. Dmitriyev said that the journal materials should be based upon sociological research. On this question I share the viewpoint of T.I. Zaslavskaya who feels that the name of the journal does not reflect its essence. But of course it is not an issue of the name. It would be a bad thing if the editors understood by sociological research exclusively the applied and empirical works. The journal should be an organ of sociology generally.

**A.V. Dmitriyev:** It is impossible to move away from concrete research toward endless speculation. Banal truths are often proposed as general theoretical studies.

**G.I. Saganenko:** The question of the subject of sociological science is not so academic as may seem. It is a question not of abstract theorizing on abstract concepts but rather a general sociological concept of social reality and social development and on an analysis of the integral picture of our society. Sociological theory should link many levels of analyzing social life and not those which have long been ascribed to sociology. It is a question of the reciprocal relation of social philosophy, social policy and the theory of social organization and development, that is, right up to the real problems of present-day life. It is essential to be concerned with the construction of a general sociological theory and at least set out the outlines of how social ideas, development, institutions, mechanisms, problems, objects (including groups), the structure, the way of life and so forth are brought together in a common social organism.

**A.V. Baranov:** Today the most interesting thing is investigating those social processes which are occurring in our society. And how completely the researchers are able to reflect these processes determines the contribution of our sociology to world science. The magazine should also look with new eyes at current reality. What groups, for example, will need social protection in the course of the new social processes? Pensioners? Children? In our country they have always been under the protection of the state and its social system. Who should defend the interests of the innovators and the production pacesetters and how? If the present is seen in a new light, how else can one look at the past? As well as the future? We do not have social indicators of development and there are no guidelines which could be used in planning and forecasting for an extended period. Without this it is impossible to ascertain the image of the future and this is one of the central problems in sociology.

**B.D. Parygin:** I am also concerned by the problem of defining the subject of sociology, although for the journal this, of course, is not the main thing. In the first place, we should put the analysis of our diverse reality. Unfortunately, the level of work done by sociologists is still significantly lower than the one with which our public affairs analyze reality. The questionnaires which study the attitude of the public toward restructuring indicate a steady psychological unreadiness for changes in certain groups or a whole series of positions. Possibly this is explained by the lack of experience under the new conditions but clearly this is not all of the matter. The hope that a feeling of being the master will develop in each person may not be realized. The new economic mechanism does not lead automatically to this as a self-restructuring is essential.

**V.B. Golofast:** First of all, I would like to say that the editors have clearly underestimated the degree of the crisis in sociology and social sciences generally. Certain

situations on the pages of the journal are treated as a given and not as an indicator of crisis from which a way out must be sought.

In analyzing social policy under the conditions of restructuring, it is essential to bear in mind that the reform in the economic mechanism leads to an elimination of the departmental sociological services at a majority of enterprises. These services have long been in a crisis state, and while previously the solution was seen in uniting them within the ministry, at present, when the internal departmental services are also being eliminated, this is excluded. It must be realized that under the conditions of restructuring there will be a redistribution of functions, interests and resources in a direction of activating the territorial social services. There were a number of them previously but now new ones are being organized: centers to combat alcoholism, job placement bureaus, a service for helping the elderly and so forth. Many of these are being set up on self-supporting and philanthropic bases. However, up to now these services are not viewed as a single system or as the basis of social policy.

Recently much has been said about the "revolution of expectations." Our research provides grounds to pose the question even more acutely: linked to restructuring is what can be conditionally termed a "cultural revolution." It started much sooner and restructuring merely intensified the processes. Isn't information on subscriptions to periodicals the biggest sociological study of last year? (Our journal has been in a good position as subscriptions have increased by almost 1.5-fold.) This is a very important political event which has not yet been assessed.

I would like to support those colleagues who feel that the sociological journal cannot close its eyes to the existing problems within our profession. Debates on these are inevitable and should be reflected on the pages of the journal.

Among the shortcomings of the journal we must mention the absence of the constant reviewing of the special literature. For example, the book of E. Fromm was published but *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* ignored the fact while *Novyy mir* reacted.

**V.R. Polozov:** The state of affairs in the structure of social sciences causes serious concern. There has long been a debate on this question. Political scientists cannot go into an auditorium or write an article and simply say something that is directly opposite to what they said yesterday. It is essential to review the relationship in the structure of social sciences, the interaction between them and assess whether historical materialism is capable of carrying out the main role.

A sociological journal cannot avoid the questions of social protection. We are speaking about constitutionally guaranteed rights, but what happens in practice? The

level of satisfying needs is determined by affiliation with departments and sectors. The picture is very motley and it has arisen historically. Our great oversight has been that we gave social problems to the economists.

There must be a strong economic lever for social protection. People are expecting a rapid improvement in their lives. But if we cannot solve the problem of the agro-industrial complex and provide incentives for labor, then there will not be the expected changes. A 25- or 30-ruble increase in wages is still not an incentive. And precisely the sociologists should draw attention to these problems. We must not link all hopes of eradicating negative phenomena in our life solely to the economy as this would be incorrect. There must be a readiness to assess the consequences of the economic reform (for example, the release of manpower). This process has been studied in previous years but now sociologists should work together with economists on a comparative analysis. An analysis of social consequences in the sphere of the economy is as essential as air.

**L.A. Kupriyanov:** The task of sociology is to search out the ways for the social support of the occurring revolutionary changes. This applies primarily to optimizing the social processes involving the carrying out of the economic reform. The contradictions which inevitably arise here between society and the state, between society and the individual, between classes and social groups must be resolved in the interests of man. The means for achieving this must also be found by sociological science which can carry out these tasks having resurrected in a new quality the idea of social planning and by having established the ways to actual self-administration of the people under conditions of complete democratization. An analysis and generalization of social development in the socialist countries can help Soviet sociologists in carrying out these tasks.

**P.N. Lebedev:** After the 27th CPSU Congress, much was said about the necessity of carrying out a strong social policy and on strengthening the social orientation in economic development and so forth. The heightened interest in this problem disclosed an essential gap in our sociology, that is, the failure to study the mechanism for forming and realizing social policy and primarily its subject [principal]. Sociological research in this area should encompass, first of all, the manifestation of activeness by different strata of society (including the activities of informal groups); second, the official channels for forming and realizing social policy, in particular, the corps of deputies (its capabilities of representing the interests of various strata of the population on all levels of the state hierarchy), as well as the local, republic and central administrative bodies. As recently conducted research has shown, the deputies, for example, are often not concerned with the interests of the voter but rather the enterprise which put them up.

**B.Z. Doktorov:** Under the new conditions one can particularly feel a need to analyze the organizational structure of sociological science itself. The small enterprises

which operate on cost accounting and which work to conduct sociological research, as well as the cooperatives are not merely a neutral "addition" to the existing academy, VUZ and sectorial sociology. One should sooner speak about the establishing of a new system for the functioning of sociological science, about new mechanisms for linking it to practice, and about a reallocation and clarification of functions for the representatives of the various scientific communities. Increased effectiveness of recommendations from the scientists and greater prestige for sociology will be a positive consequence of the forecasted trends. At the same time, "scientific business" can lead to an undesirable commercialization of academy science, to a loss of its primary focus on fundamentalism in developments and to a departure from the profound, essential traditions of Russian and Soviet academicness.

At the same time, the sociologists must decisively abandon dogmatism and the illusoriness of their constructs and conclusions. A short-sighted distorting of the concept of a class approach and party loyalty in an analysis of social phenomena has become one of the factors for reduced potential in the theoretical research and for narrowing the scope of empirical search and has opened up prospects for unjustified optimism in assessing the achievements of society and its immediate prospects. The abandoning of "maneuvering" (the term of V. Ovechkin which brings together three concepts: regulation, maneuvering and obscuring) should allow the sociologist to master the new thinking.

**B.I. Maksimov:** It has happened that sociology today acts basically as a research science. Its second function which is constructive-planning has been completely unrealized. The demand for this is great, particularly during the period of restructuring. At present, it is not enough to investigate one or another phenomenon but a practical solution must also be proposed. And not merely in the form of recommendations which more often are a range of good intentions. It is essential to have entire projects and social engineering. And there must be more effort to inculcate them into practice. We turn over the introduction of the research results to the managers assuming that they will do everything. But we do not introduce the ideas and indeed no one does.

The presence of a large detachment of plant and other sociologists working directly in the organizations does not solve the problem of social engineering, as these sociologists themselves are focused, primarily, on the concrete research and if the social engineering techniques are created then these are of local significance. The procedural questions of social planning are not worked out at all. "Rabochaya kniga sotsiologa" [The Sociologist's Workbook], a fundamental work of 500 pages, gives just two paragraphs to recommendations and does not mention planning at all.

In such a situation it is very important to raise for discussion the problem of a constructive approach in

sociology on the journal's pages. Within the Northwestern Division of the SSA [Soviet Sociological Association], a volunteer laboratory has been organized for social planning. The working out of the first project "Encouraging Free Time" has shown the great timeliness of such activities by sociologists and the interest of the potential users of the plans.

**I.P. Yakovlev:** We must have sociological analysis of the informal associations and activities from the viewpoint of studying the ordinary form of social awareness. I would also like to see a discussion of the problems of higher education and science on the pages of the journal. In the publications taking up the work of the SSA sections and other sociological centers, I would like to see not only critical comments but also certain results of the work done by sociologists solving various problems.

**T.Z. Protasenko:** Our reality requires not only a new view but also new diverse methods of studying this reality. A majority of the researchers has seemingly forgotten that in addition to questionnaires there are observation, an analysis of documents and letters, profound unformalized interviews and biographic methods. The professional sociologists cannot be satisfied by results received on the basis of standardized methods. These do not encompass the entire diversity of the forms of social life. For this reason the materials based completely on commentaries of percentages (20 percent and 80 percent there) are so boring and for this reason the infatuation of sociologists with the abundantly quoted current affairs is so marked.

The journal is no exception. Articles in which the authors employ original research methods are encountered extremely rarely. The methods of a formalized survey which were very popular in the past when a person was accustomed to bureaucratic self-description have led to a situation where people are unable to express either their own state or the objective state of affairs. All society must now learn to speak again. Sociology cannot remain on the sidelines of this process. While during the years of stagnation it was impossible to widely employ qualitative methods, at present it is the very time to discuss on the pages of the journal the problem of studying the new reality. It is time to abandon the depressing descriptiveness in percentages.

In the journal we would like to see sociological methods designed for the plant services and gain information about just commenced interesting studies in order to be able to get in contact with the authors.

**A.V. Dmitriyev:** I would like to thank all those who participated in the work of the roundtable for their interesting comments, proposals and criticisms. I am hopeful that our collaboration will be continued directly on the pages of the journal.

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## Joint Session of Scientific Councils

In March, a joint session was held for the scientific councils of the Institute for Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The main speakers—Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof V.N. Ivanov and Doctor of Legal Sciences, Prof V.P. Kazimirchuk—took up the questions of legal support for the restructuring of the social sphere of Soviet society. Sociologists, V.N. Ivanov pointed out, have disclosed an on-going trend for a deterioration in the material status of pensioners due to the increased prices. The recently appeared data require a more profound analysis of the concept of deferred payments, the elaboration of scientifically proven criteria or the social protection of persons and rational employment of the population. The rise and development of joint stock enterprises shows a certain lag of legislative activities from practice. Many ineffective laws are still being passed (for example, on prostitution and the combating of unearned income). At the same time, new forms of economic and social life are not gaining legal support. Speaking in the debates were Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.Z. Rogovin, Doctor of Legal Sciences R.O. Khalfina, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.G. Korobeynikov and Doctor of Legal Sciences V.S. Nersesyants.

## Meeting of Armenian Plant Sociologists

A republic seminar of plant sociologists was held recently in Yerevan. It was opened by the Chairman of the Armenian Division of the SSA, Prof L.M. Karapetyan. Giving important papers at the seminar were the lecturer of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party A.A. Tatevosyan, the scientific secretary of the Institute for Philosophy and Law under the Armenian Academy of Sciences, G.A. Pogosyan, the senior science associate at the institute, V.A. Mirzoyan, the docent at the Yerevan Polytechnical Institute, E.A. Kyuregyan and others. Participating in the work of the seminar were members of the editorial board of the journal *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, G.S. Batygin and V.A. Popov. A television broadcast "Restructuring and Democracy: The View of a Sociologist" was prepared using the materials of the meeting. At a roundtable of the editorial staff of the republic journal *Po leninskomu puti*, a discussion was held of the problems of forming new sociological thinking. Journalists and plant sociologists participated in the discussion.

## Conference on the Family and Social Milieu

By K.A. Shchadilova

Participating in a coordinating meeting "Family and the Social Milieu" held at the Olympian Youth Center were sociologists, ethnographers, pedagogues and psychologists. They discussed the program and armamentarium of the research "Family in the Ideas of Modern Man" (authors M.S. Matskovskiy, G.A. Zaikina and Ye.V. Foteyev). The discussion was beneficial and made it possible to revise certain existing approaches to studying the modern family and was an incentive for a more profound analysis of the problem.

A majority of those attending agreed with the program's authors that it was essential to study public opinion about marriage and the family. However, should the social stereotypes be the subject of investigation? Here it was not possible to establish an unanimous position. Some felt that, in the first place, the stereotypes are already known and, secondly, a knowledge of the existing ideas is far from always capable of forecasting the conduct of people. Others pointed out that the stereotypes are unconscious determinants of behavior and important elements in the spiritual world of the individual. In addition to this of great importance is the very fact of the differentiation of the stereotypes of social awareness depending upon socioprofessional, demographic, individual and group characteristics.

In linking the cognitive value of the study chiefly with the possibility of employing the research data for working out recommendations on improving family policy, certain participants in the discussion here doubted the necessity of augmenting the knowledge per se. However, the viewpoint reflecting a pragmatic approach to the practical significance of the scientific research was not supported. It was reemphasized that the prognostic function of science can be realized only with the presence of fundamental research. The more completely knowledge about contemporary ethical standards and stereotypic concepts in the area of family and marriage relations, the more soundly one can forecast the development of the complex processes characterizing this sphere of social life.

In discussing the armamentarium of research, two circumstances were clearly set out: in the first place, in applied sociology they still have not elaborated clear criteria by which the researcher, in solving one or another problem, can select the type and form of question and as a result the specialists acting as experts make mutually exclusive or nearly irreconcilable comments; secondly, the procedural demands on the constructing of the question often limit the cognitive opportunities of the latter and sometimes emasculate its essence.

Interesting judgments were voiced on the question of the specific features in the current stage of the development of family and marriage relations. In particular, it was emphasized that there is the very widespread viewpoint

according to which the evolution of the family is interpreted as a transition from an authoritarian (traditional) one to an egalitarian (modern) one clearly oversimplifies the actual state of affairs. The evolution of marriage and the family is not a linear process, although a family union based upon democratic principles to a greater degree meets the present socioeconomic conditions, while the mainstream in the transformation of this area of social relations will obviously not be the development of a certain single "ideal" type of family but rather a widening of the forms and styles of family life.

The discussion of the fundamental problems for family sociology was continued at the roundtable "Blank Spots in Family Sociology." Judging from the name, it could be assumed that here they would bring up those aspects of the question which have not yet attracted the attention of scientists. However, the discussion assumed a somewhat different turn: the debate developed chiefly over the question of the present state of family sociology as a scientific discipline. It turned out that the problem is not that certain questions have not been taken up in the scientific literature but rather many important methodological approaches have not been worked out and this characterizes the level of the self-awareness of the science and its cognitive opportunities. It must be stated that we still do not have an integrated sociological theory of the family.

One of the most urgent tasks is the elaboration and systematization of a conceptual apparatus and the delimitation of terms. At present, one would scarcely be so bold as to clearly define where the difference lies in such concepts as the stability and permanency of a marriage or, for instance, the quality of a marriage and its success, what is a young family and what family must be considered incomplete. In using these categories, the authors are basically guided by intuition and common sense and proceed predominantly from the practical tasks of the research. There must be strict scientific criteria which make it possible to overcome the terminological confusion. A dictionary on marriage and family problems would, in particular, be a real benefit.

The nonelaboration of the theoretical bases of family sociology prevents an objective assessment and strict scientific interpretation of the empirical data. To move on to a thorough analysis of the assembled information and to the constructing of explanatory concepts on this basis is extremely complex due to the weak methodological base. This is the main reason for the existing situation.

A majority of empirical family studies have been carried out within the context of a structural-functional approach which has clearly exhausted itself. In what way can we move forward? The time has come to turn to an integrated approach, however the question of how to do this still remains open.

### Contest of Young Scientists

In December 1987, on the basis of the Central Section of Young Sociologists of the SSA under the USSR Academy of Sciences, an All-Union Association of Young Sociologists was organized. The main task of the association is

to help young scientists in improving their skills and to involve them effectively in scientific research activities. The first specific steps have been set. In May 1988, the association together with the State Pedagogical Institute imeni V.V. Kuybyshev, the Volga Division of the SSA and the Kuybyshev Komsomol Obkom held a seminar for young scientists on the methodological and procedural problems of studying the youth. In December 1988, together with the Institute for Socioeconomic Problems under the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Leningrad Division of the SSA and the Council of Young Scientists and Specialists under the Komsomol Central Committee, the association organized an all-Union seminar school "Problems of the Socioeconomic Development of Large Cities." At the sessions of five sections they plan to discuss the prospects of modern urbanization, the ways for carrying out the economic reform under the conditions of a large city, the employment of mathematical methods and computers in investigating socioeconomic processes. Together with the All-Union Association of Young Sociologists, the SSA has announced two competitions. One of them is for the best program of sociological research. The rules for this competition were published in the previous issue. The second is for the best article in the journal *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*. It is possible to test one's forces in all types of writing and prepare material for any journal heading. The contest works will be judged by juries which include prominent Soviet sociologists and editorial workers. The authors of the best materials will receive money prizes: 150 rubles for first place, 100 rubles each for the two second places, and 50 rubles each for the three third places. The materials for the competition running up to an author's sheet [40,000 printed characters including spaces] should be sent to the address: 610083, Sverdlovsk, Lenin Prospect 51, Urals State University, Chair of the Theory of Scientific Communism and Sociology, Secretary in Charge of the Competition, G.M. Vokhmentseva. On the competition materials one must give the name of the work and on a separate sheet the last name, first name and patronymic, year of birth, place of employment, position, work and home address and telephone. Group articles may also be sent in for the competition.

#### Soviet-Italian Seminar

By F.R. Filippov

A Soviet-Italian seminar "Training, Retraining and Advanced Training of Personnel Under the Conditions of Scientific and Technical Progress" organized by the AUCCTU and the General Italian Labor Confederation

(CGIL) was held at the end of November 1987 in Arrichio, near Rome. It was a continuation of an analogous meeting held the year before in Moscow.

One of the main places at the seminar was taken up by the question of the inevitable reduction in the number of jobs due to the changeover to production methods requiring few or no personnel. In the opinion of one of the leaders of the CGIL, L. de Carlini, neither the enterprises themselves nor the government, but rather the trade unions should take over the solving of this problem. The same path, he feels, should be followed in the socialist countries, protecting the rights and interests of the workers released from the production sphere. The leader of the Soviet delegation, the Secretary of the AUCCTU, K.T. Turysov, emphasized that the socialist management system possesses objective opportunities to avoid unemployment, to organize the planned reallocation of released workers and their training and retraining within the unified system of ongoing education which has been set up in the USSR. The Soviet state together with the trade unions does solve and will solve the problem of full employment in the interests of both society as a whole as well as all groups of workers, although here, naturally, very difficult situations may arise involving, in particular, the need of shifting personnel to other enterprises as well as to new sectors of the economy.

The problems of scientific and technical progress were examined at the seminar in a broad sociocultural context. L. de Carlini, A. Bondioli and other Italian participants in the seminar pointed out that the information revolution is turning culture into mental capital which should be transformed into production capital. In this context the Italian scientists raised the question of overcoming the gap between general and vocational education, between school knowledge and production requirements, between production and general culture in a man, including the style of life, the structure and content of leisure. Such an approach to the problems of education was also supported by the Soviet participants who described the essence of the reform in general educational and vocational schools, the restructuring of higher and secondary specialized education in the USSR, the strengthening of the humanities in the Soviet system of instruction as well as the overcoming of the technocratic "slant" in it.

In the course of the discussion certain demographic problems were touched upon which are common to both countries, namely the change in the age composition of the population, the increase in the number and share of pensioners, and the greater economic burden on the working-age generations. These questions were raised, in

particular, by G. Altieri who drew attention to the relative decline in the number of students and the surplus of teachers in Italy, as well as the decline in the growth rate of the educational level of the population. She also emphasized the necessity of strengthening investments into "human capital," bearing in mind the growing demand for a higher type labor force than at present. In this context Altieri took up the "unpleasant jobs" which do not require a high educational and skill level but necessarily remain in society. The problem arises of filling the jobs involving such types of work.

Speaking on the increased role of the trade unions in protecting the rights and interests of the workers and in resolving problems involving the mobility of workers under the conditions of scientific and technical progress were M.T. Vaugani and S. Magnani and the National Secretary of the Metallurgical Workers Federation G. Bolaffi. The chairman of the joint trade union committee at the AvtoVAZ [Volga Automotive Plant] Association, V.P. Peresybinskiy, described the activities of the trade union organization under the conditions of economic accountability as well as its involvement in solving social problems. As the practice of hiring school graduates at the association's enterprises has shown, they are not yet sufficiently trained for production work and do not have an understanding of the demands not only made on vocational knowledge and skills but also discipline and organization.

A co-worker from the Institute for Economic and Central Research of the CGIL, S. Megniagi, told about the results of research conducted at six enterprises. This shows not only a drop in the proportional amount of workers in production but also their growing isolation, the greater division of labor and interests between those employed in "strategic production" and those who service it. In the opinion of the speaker, the trade unions must make an effort to ensure contacts between the various worker groups and their unity in the struggle for their interests. Having pointed out that the firms prefer hiring school graduates to fill the jobs of departing workers, Megniagi emphasized that at present new demands are being placed on the level of their competence in the area of information sciences and computers. The Soviet delegation was granted an opportunity to visit a highly automated enterprise of the Fiat firm in Termoli as well as meet with the trade union activists from Abruzzo and Campagna Provinces. The contacts of the Soviet and Italian trade unions on urgent social problems involving scientific and technical progress are to be continued.

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#### The USSR Goskomstat Announces

In January 1988, the state statistical bodies conducted a spot check on the presence of illegal reporting at 193 trusts under 20 ministries in the construction area. The

check showed that the ministries were not taking the required measures to convert to predominantly economic methods of management. The wasteful practice of collecting data not provided by state reporting, by the ministries and main administrations is continuing and here the volume of illegal reporting has increased.

They discovered around 650 forms of illegal reporting containing 1.3 million indicators calculated per year, while according to the results of a check on the first half of 1987, there were 610 forms with 1.2 million indicators. Over 56 percent of this volume of reporting is requested by the ministries and 35 percent by the main administrations. Facts were established of collecting a number of forms of illegal reporting turned up and cancelled by the USSR Goskomstat in 1987.

As in 1987, there was the collecting of daily, weekly and 10-day information. Gravivanovostroy [Main Ivanovo Construction Administration] daily collects data for each trust on the movement of workers, output per worker, the execution of earthmoving, the laying of asphalt, the number of piles driven and for each construction administration, on the work of motor transport and the carrying out of the work volume. Diverse weekly and 10-day information is requested by the personnel of Glavsmolenskstroy [Main Smolensk Construction Administration], Glavverkhnevolzhskstroy [Main Upper Volga Construction Administration], Glavivanovostroy, and Glavpriokstroy [Main Oka Construction Administration]. The collecting of cumbersome reporting does not help to improve the state of affairs in the work of the ministry. In 1987, 11 main administrations out of 26 did not fulfill the contracting plan.

In October 1987, a large amount of illegal reporting (35 forms with 36,000 indicators) was detected in the Sibtekhmontazh [Siberian Technical Installation] Trust of Glavkhimmontazh [Main Chemical Installation Administration]. Regardless of the cancellation, of this reporting they continued to employ 15 forms with 22,000 indicators. Moreover, two new forms were introduced. Co-workers from the personnel department of the main administration have shown particular curiosity about the affairs in the trust. At their request, each month the trust reports how many workers it has, how they are combating drunkenness and alcoholism and quarterly on how its workers are observing the standards of conduct in everyday life and society.

Cumbersome illegal reporting has also been turned up in the Union republic construction ministries (265 forms with 738,000 indicators). The amount of illegal reporting has increased sharply in the Kirkhiz Gosstroy [State Construction Committee], as well as in the Armenian, Georgian and Uzbek Ministries of Construction.

### Argument Not Only About Terms

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[Article, published under the heading "Reflections on a New Book," by Yu.B. Leontyev, V.P. Lozbyakov and V.S. Ovchinskiy: "Arguments Not Only About Terms"; the authors are Candidate of Legal Sciences Yuriy Borisovich Leontyev, junior science associate at the VNII MVD SSSR [All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs] and police captain. This is his first article in *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*. Viktor Pavlovich Lozbyakov is the deputy chief of the Moscow Higher Police School of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], police colonel. He is the author of the book "Administrativno-pravovyye mery preduprezhdeniya prestupnosti" (Administrative-Legal Measures in Preventing Crime) (1978, co-author). Our journal has published his article "Glasnost as a Condition for the Effectiveness of Legal Propaganda" (No 2, 1987). Vladimir Semenovich Ovcheinskiy is the deputy section chief of the VNII MVD SSSR and police major. He is a permanent contributor to the journal]

[Text] The attention of sociologists, jurists and all persons concerned with studying social problems today, as never before, has been focused on the search for scientific publications on drunkenness, drug abuse and parasitism. But if all these words appear on the cover of a book, there is a desire to read it more quickly and analyze it more quickly.

Precisely such a feeling arose in us in becoming familiar with the book by R.M. Gotlib, L.I. Romanova and L.P. Yatskov "Sotsialno-pravovyye i meditsinskiye aspekty borby s tuneyatdstvom, pyanstvom i narkomaniyey" [Sociolegal and Medical Aspects of Combating Parasitism, Drunkenness and Drug Abuse] [2]. The aim of the monograph is "on the basis of criminological and medical research, to make a worthy contribution to elaborating and implementing an integrated and scientifically based system for preventing...these negative phenomena as a specific aspect in managing social processes" [2, p 259]. The authors have done this as the book, on the basis of a thorough analysis of interesting empirical materials, has provided a detailed sociolegal and medical "portrait" of the designated forms of pathology. There can be no doubt as to the starting thesis: the designated antisocial phenomena "exist not in isolation, but are mutually interrelated, they cause one another, they complement and feed one another" [2, p 4].

It would be possible to give other concepts which we completely share. But obviously those to whom the book is targeted will be able to do this properly themselves. We would prefer to reflect on the problems which, in our view, are the most disputable and require additional analysis. In a number of instances our reflections go beyond the limits of the reviewed book.

Terms. Let us begin by tradition with the conceptual apparatus. The position of the researcher, his approach to solving the problem as well as the over-all logic of the entire work depend largely upon the clarity and completeness of this apparatus. Unfortunately, in a number of instances the authors have made elementary mistakes here.

Thus, in referring to the work of Yu.M. Tkachevskiy [3, p 14], the authors state: "In the definition of scientists, drug abuse is the amoral and protracted gravitation of individuals to toxic substances or narcotics, the properties of which they have discovered accidentally or as a result of intentional searches for a calmative action causing a state of euphoria" [2, p 17]. Having distorted the far from indisputable statement of A. Poro (in the primary source) not an amoral but rather abnormal infatuation; a state of euphoria or "dinalia" and who is not a jurist and having ascribed universality to his viewpoint of the problem, the authors have made a methodological mistake. This is all the more strange as the terms, as a rule, carry not only a special professional component but also a legal one and are the area not so much of the medics as the lawyers and sociologists while the term "drug abuse" is defined primarily from medical-legal and social positions [4, pp 9, 11].

From the viewpoint of the designated criteria and considering the legal nature of the work, it is valid to define drug abuse as a socially dangerous phenomenon expressed in the illegal consumption and other illegal actions involving narcotics and over which a special international legal and domestic supervision has been established [5, p 5].

The given definitions include a differing sense which cannot help but influence social practices, and in particular, the activities of applying the law. If one proceeds from the definition of the authors of the reviewed book, then the measures of legal action must be applied to all persons who would seek calmatives.

Even more questions arise when the authors endeavor to define the essence of parasitism. The impression is created that they, in speaking about this social pathology, do not make a distinction between the professional criminal, a member of a hired brigade (moonlighter) and a demoralized "classic" parasite. Such an approach arises from the theoretical premise that with parasitism "a certain group of people exists at the expense of extracting unearned labor and falls out of the sphere of collective socialist production" [2, p 4]. Seemingly, everything is correct in this thesis, but that is only at first glance. The authors consider a distinguishing feature of parasitism to be the "dropping out" of the sphere of collective production. But, what if it is a question of individual labor activity or private initiative? Proceeding from the concept of the authors, this activity also "drops out" of collective production and expresses "self-seeking aspirations and distorted needs." This, it turns out, is why the moonlighter has fallen into the category

of parasites. This is why the authors on the law concerning individual labor activity see only that it is aimed "at strengthening responsibility for the most dangerous types of existence on unearned income, systematizing financial and tax supervision over individual labor activities, and mobilizing all healthy forces in society for an uncompromising struggle against any manifestations of social parasitism [2, p 4].

Social parasitism is linked to crime in a dual manner. On the one hand, it acts as a part of crime (in the form in which it is expressed in Article 209 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and the corresponding articles of the criminal codes of the other Union republics) and, on the other, as a "background" phenomenon for crime (persons who are not employed anywhere and are not studying commit a significant number of thefts, robberies and assaults; among them are many speculators, users, foreign exchange dealers, alimony defaulters and violators of the passport rules). Social parasitism varies from "ordinary parasitism" (the refusal of socially useful labor) to parasitism as an element of a criminal way of life (a "criminal professionalism") which includes the existence by means criminally gained [6].

The moonlighter who "invests" in the building of a cow barn (pig sty, vegetable storage facility and so forth) from sun up to sun down and who does not during this time imbibe a single drop of alcohol (not to mention narcotics) in no way fits into this scheme. Here if we observe a discrepancy between the measure of labor and its wage [7], then this is not an indication of parasitism but rather a consequence of violating distribution relations and the stagnation phenomena in the economy.

There is the different matter of a recidivist who has never worked in his life (a "thief" in the law) who skims the cream from crimes organized by him but which are committed by others. This is a social parasite in the pure form. Often the professional criminal is very far from drugs and alcohol, he is clean-shaven, dresses fastidiously, is surrounded by beautiful women, stays at "deluxe" Intourist hotels and.... In no way fits in the general portrait of a social parasite as sketched by the monograph's authors. For this reason the slogan that the "sponger sooner or later becomes an alcoholic or a drug addict" goes up in smoke [2, p 19].

**What about a parasite?** The dispute over terms is not an idle one. The direction of social policy depends upon its correct solution. At its basis should lie a differentiated approach. The essence of this is that, in developing and supporting an effective productive labor by the moonlighters within the law, to decisively thwart the parasitic existence of professional criminals and provide prompt aid to persons who cannot adapt in the labor collectives. Even now with confidence one can forecast the very complex social situation in job placement for this category of persons with the transition of enterprises to the covering of costs and self-financing. Under conditions where a direct dependence is set between the collective's

income level and the effectiveness of its work, one can scarcely expect the problem to be solved as it was solved prior to the economic reform: the section foreman took the "job-hopper," the drunk, the parasite or the released criminal in hand and bring him to the personnel department of the enterprise.

Why was such a solution to the problem possible? The authors of the monograph, in our view, correctly formulate the conclusion that "various types of unstable persons, loafers and previously convicted persons prefer working at...small enterprises, where production discipline is low and there is the opportunity of engaging in 'under-the-table' jobs or in direct embezzlement of materials" [2, p 76]. For persons fond of the "easy life" there was a real, objective opportunity to find a "quiet corner" for oneself, even under the condition that the personnel departments were very unwilling to hire a "undesirable contingent" for the collectives [2, p 157].

Our research (V.P. Lozbyakov and V.S. Ovchinskii) carried out in Moscow Oblast at the end of the 1970s has shown that even within one administrative rayon, the drunks, "job-hoppers" and parasites could find work where attention was not paid to their deviant behavior. Under the pressure of the shortage of labor resources, parasitic attitudes sprouted and the prestige of conscientious and high-quality labor began to decline. "The violation of the linkage between the measure of labor and the measure of consumption," pointed out M.S. Gorbachev, "which became virtually the key element in the inhibition mechanism, not only checked the growth of labor productivity but led to a distortion of the principle of social justice" [1, p 14].

But let us return to the reviewed book. What solution was proposed by the authors in considering the "gravitation" of parasitically inclined persons to small enterprises? They consider it essential to resolve the question...of the structural reorganization of such enterprises [2, p 77]. However, we feel that it is not a question of enterprise size. Under the conditions of the economic reform, self-financing raises as the chief criterion the degree of enterprise profitability. Then it will be clear what enterprises must be consolidated and where the number of employees must be cut back.

Not conforming to the spirit of the economic changes is the proposal by the authors to establish definite benefits, primarily of a production nature, for the enterprises and organizations set up as base ones for providing jobs for parasites [2, p 158]. Such proposals are a stereotype of the old approaches. The high degree of social protection of a man in our society has been transformed into parasitic attitudes. There is the major question mark whether one should encourage such attitudes under conditions where "restructuring raises the plank of social responsibility and exactingness" [1, p 26]?

The new economic policy also provides new ways for solving social problems, including the combating of parasitism and drunkenness. Obviously, a certain portion of the drunks and "job-hoppers" under the conditions of rigid economic demands will be forced to change their way of life. Some of the current parasites will find themselves in individual-labor and cooperative activities while a certain portion can shift from an asocial group into a criminal one. Society should be prepared for such social stratifications.

**From where does this come?** Obviously, in order to combat the negative social phenomena, it is essential to know their sources. In discussing drug abuse, the monograph's authors write that it "chiefly finds adherents among the representatives of the criminal world, particularly those who have spent time in places of incarceration" [2, p 79]. In their opinion, the parasitic elements

and the owners of criminal haunts "entice young girls and juveniles who because of drug abuse lose their positive qualities inculcated by the entire way of Soviet life" [2, p 18]. There is a grain of truth in these statements, but only a grain. We would like to analyze the question deeper.

In examining the subculture where deviant conduct prevails, it is essential to point out that it represents an odd combination of countercultural formations from the negative traditions and habits spread in the family and domestic milieu, the rules of conduct of the "criminal world" and the values of bourgeois mass culture and fashionable youth trends. Alcoholism, drug abuse and toxic substance abuse, as elements of the negative subculture, are engendered by the interaction of these formations (Table 1).

**Table 1: Degree of Influence of Countercultural Formations on Drunkenness, Drug Abuse and Toxic Substance Abuse**

Countercultural Formations	Drunkenness, degree			Drug Abuse			Toxic Substance Abuse		
	Strong	Average	Weak	Strong	Average	Weak	Strong	Average	Weak
Negative traditions and habits of family and domestic milieu		+							+
Traditions and habits of "criminal world"			+			+			
Values of bourgeois mass culture and fashionable youth trends						+			+

Naturally, the given scheme very conditionally reflects the sources of forming the elements of a negative subculture. At the same time, it does point to the need of a differentiated assessment of the effect of the various factors and consequently the carrying out of preventive measures. With the seeming closeness and external similarity of alcoholism, drug abuse and toxic substance abuse, their sources must be sought in different countercultural manifestations. Thus, while the widespread nature of drunkenness is largely determined by the influence of a negative family and domestic milieu, by drinking traditions which have become established there and stereotypes of human contact [8, p 60], for the spread of drug abuse and toxic substance abuse to a large degree the "impetus" has been the fashion of the pseudoromance of the criminal world and in recent decades the fashion of the foreign youth images of "mass culture." Possibly, the "outburst" of drug abuse in the mid-1960s in our country was largely determined by the fashion of the "protest subculture" the carriers of which were the imitators of the hippie [9, p 78]. The influence of the fashion also explains the widespread toxic substance abuse among young people who consider themselves "heavy metalists," "rockers" and "punks."

This conclusion is confirmed by data that 77.1 percent of the drug addicts became addicted under the influence of other persons, basically friends and acquaintances. Usually the introduction occurred in the company of hedonistically inclined youth [10, pp 51-53]. The sources of such a form of conduct lie in the models of bourgeois mass culture and within which various methods are

propagandized for escaping from reality: the creativity of the rock ensembles, printed products, video films and so forth.

The dependence of the choice of the model of behavior upon the influence of intragroup stereotypes is very significant for understanding the processes of drug addiction or alcoholization as elements in the negative subculture. As was correctly pointed out by V. Bratus, "What is important is not the 'high' in and of itself, but precisely the 'group high'" [11]. There exists one indispensable condition for the activities of an informal group. The activities should be extreme, although for just one parameter, either prohibited, either superfashionable, extraordinary and going beyond the limits of the generally accepted, or dangerous and risky. Alcohol and particularly drugs are particularly suited as prohibited and risky. They are the symbol of protest against the generally accepted. "For this reason there is now such a great danger that drugs will be turned into a part of youth culture" [Ibid.].

It is possible to create a scheme of mechanisms for the intragroup acceptance of certain elements of the negative subculture, proceeding from the estimates of the parameters significant for the group. Here we have chosen a limited set of parameters which can be extended. For example, in assessing the probability of the existence of such elements of the negative subculture as drug abuse, toxic substance abuse and alcoholism in the informal youth groups, we have taken as the basis the very significant criterion for the group which is the *degree of extremism*. A ranking is given according to a 3-point scale (Table 2).

Table 2: The Degree of Extremism With Drug Abuse, Toxic Substance Abuse and Alcoholism

Conditions	Consumption of Narcotic, Psychotropic Substances, Degree			Use of Toxic Substances, Degree			Consumption of Alcohol, Alcohol-Containing Substances, Degree		
	Strong	Medium	Weak	Strong	Medium	Weak	Strong	Medium	Weak
Accessibility			+	+					+
Legal assessment	+								+
Negative moral assessment	+				+				+
Irreversibility of effect on central nervous system	+			+					+
Prohibition	+					+			+
Extravagance	+			+					+
Pseudofashionable	+			+					+
Risk of acquiring	+					+		+	
Assessment of group orientation to subculture element	7	—	1	4	1	2	—	6	2

Obviously, the degree of extremism as an element of the "intragroup attractiveness" has a peak in consuming narcotics, an intermediate position is observed with toxic substance abuse and noticeably declines in the consumption of alcohol.

At the same time, certain elements which influence the modeling of the negative subculture can reciprocally compensate for one another. For example, the inaccessibility of drugs is compensated for by false notions of extravagance, by a desire to stand out and so forth. But the accessibility of domestic chemical products in the aggregate with the notion of their affect on the central nervous system, the absence of a negative legal assessment multiplied by the extravagance and the unusualness of their employment operate as catalyzing factors. Precisely this, in our opinion, explains the spread of toxic substance abuse in the youth and adolescent milieu. In comparison with other methods of intoxication (drug addiction primarily), the given substances possess a number of "advantages" in that they are considered less dangerous (although in reality they often cause irreversible harm to health), they are much more "socially acceptable" since they do not have a negative legal assessment and, in addition to this, are comparatively accessible.

The consumption of alcohol in terms of the degree of the extremity of the element in the negative subculture is the least attractive. With this form of intoxication, riskiness, the "tickling" of nerves, the conformity to the super-fashionable manner of conduct and so forth hold an intermediate position.

It can be assumed that informal associations of juveniles and youth, in being oriented at the examples of bourgeois mass culture, an extravagant manner of conduct, and an extremeness of actions represent a "risk group" as the carriers of such elements as the negative subculture which are drug abuse and toxic substance abuse. Conversely, the informal groups which maintain the stereotypes of a traditional "classic" behavior with a

lesser degree of risk and extravagance (superfashionable-ness), significantly more often are "programmed" to employ alcohol as a psychostimulant for passing leisure time within the group. Considering the designated factors, the preventive and counterpropaganda work should be carried out.

**The multifaceted syndrome of "prohibition."** Let us take up a problem which in the reviewed book is not examined for a number of objective reasons. After the publishing of the monograph, by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 22 June 1987, criminal liability was introduced for the repeated consumption of drugs within a year after the imposing of an administrative reprimand without a prescription by a physician. Previously similar criminal law standards existed in a number of the Union republics. The authors refer to this [2, pp 58-59], however they do not voice their attitude on the given legislative rulings.

Here many questions arise. It is essential to consider the possible negative consequences of introducing this criminal law standard and which can exceed the expected social benefit. Among these one must put a possible increase in the number of persons who have criminal proceedings instituted against them and have been condemned (particularly adolescents and youth), their concentration at places of incarceration together with drug addict criminals, the natural transmission of "knowledge" about drugs and so forth.

These and a number of time-distant consequences still await their assessment by scientists. However, even now the actual combating of drug abuse, in particular among adolescents, is difficult because of one circumstance. It is a question of applying to persons who have reached the age of 16 and are drug addicts coercive actions under the conditions of medical and rehabilitation preventoria as established by the Ukase of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 6 August 1986.

This is of exceptionally important significance in the fight for the juveniles for whom ordinary measures of persuasion and indoctrination are ineffective. The treatment, reindoctrination and training of the young people who have digressed, the struggle for their moral and physical health are the main task of the medical and rehabilitation preventoria. It is also important that the employment of the given measure, although providing a court proceeding, does not entail a criminal record with the corresponding legal consequences.

At the same time, the presence of the two described standards in the system of legal measures to combat drug addiction, in our opinion, is illogical. Let us explain why. In the first place, refusal of treatment is most often apparent in the reticence to give up the use of drugs. An analogous situation arises in the consumption of drugs after treatment. However, it must be remembered that it is a question of sick persons. In the event of detecting this fact within a year after the imposition of an administrative reprimand for the consumption of drugs (and this is obligatory with the first discovery) it is no longer a question of remission for compulsory treatment but rather the reinstating of the criminal case, in particular under Article 224<sup>3</sup> of the RSFSR Criminal Code (and the corresponding articles in the criminal codes of the other Union republics).

Secondly, the inner logic needed for the effective employment of disciplinary or punishment measures in the given instance has been violated. For example, the repeated consumption of drugs which has not developed into the stage of an illness, the so-called experimentation, involves criminal liability. At the same time "habitual drug addicts" who are objectively in the stage of social neglect and moral degradation are not given such a severe legal assessment. There is an inadequate application of legal measures considering to whom they are directed. Even in the 18th Century, the jurist and educator Cesare Beccaria wrote: "Punishment for a crime cannot be considered just (or what is the same thing, necessary) until the law employs the best means accessible to the nation under the given conditions for preventing a crime" [12, p 354].

But still the prohibitive syndrome is enticing. Often it reflects the slogan of "immediately putting an end" to alcoholism, drug abuse, parasitism and prostitution. Its supporters propose "limiting," "closing down" and "incorporating new articles in the criminal code." Of course, prohibitions are indispensable. The state is forced to work out a mechanism for protecting its citizens against the plague of drunkenness, drug abuse and prostitution. But in introducing any prohibition, we must carefully measure and weigh everything. Unfortunately, a number of the introduced prohibitions and restrictions strikes out not against the alcoholics, drug addicts, prostitutes and parasites but rather against ordinary citizens who are forced to stand in line for hours for champagne for the New Year's table (tradition is so strong) and who must

abandon confectionery items with poppy seed (since the plantings of this plant are prohibited under the threat of criminal punishment). Young women must glance around in entering a hotel or, God forbid, the dormitory of foreign students. Because it is very easy to hear the word "prostitute" addressed to you. The problem is that administrative liability has been introduced into legislation for prostitution while no legal ruling has been given on the phenomenon itself. At the same time, an alcoholic by the "help" of one or another liquor store can enter without difficulty and out of turn receive the desired bottle. In an extreme instance he can get by with perfume, shampoo or dishwashing liquid. And the drug addicts, in the absence of poppy, learn rather quickly to distill ordinary drops into a strong-acting drug. As for the professional prostitutes, the amounts of fines set for them are laughable and the doors of the Intourist hotels and foreign-currency bars are open as before.

The struggle against different types of social pathology are a very complicated matter. "The problem will not be solved by administrative measures alone" [1, p 101]. Here the main thing is not to become distracted by the result of the moment but rather to work on the fundamental questions. Flexibility is essential: if a legal standard does not bring about an effect, it must be promptly abandoned. Here there is no compromising of the law and it is much worse if the unjustified prohibition (particularly criminal) continues to be in effect.

These are the thoughts the reviewed book aroused in us and we are grateful to its authors for this.

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Basic Indicators for the Activity of Cooperatives  
for the Union Republics (on 1 January 1988)

Union Republics	(1)	(2)	(3)
RSFSR	7 326	69,7	168,2
Ukraine	1 843	24,0	47,8
Belorussia	787	8,2	11,2
Uzbekistan	550	10,1	19,6
Kazakhstan	452	5,3	11,5
Georgia	594	7,4	19,6
Azerbaijan	320	2,6	8,1
Lithuania	503	5,9	12,7
Moldavia	286	3,8	7,0
Latvia	246	5,2	9,7
Kirghizia	199	1,9	4,0
Tajikistan	177	1,8	4,2
Armenia	263	4,3	15,1
Turkmenia	119	1,1	2,7
Estonia	256	4,5	8,3
USSR	13 921	155,8	349,7

Number of Cooperatives on 1 January 1988

Union Republics	(1)	Including:					
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
RSFSR	7 326	2723	1627	1428	157	442	949
Ukraine	1 843	848	311	385	14	167	118
Belorussia	787	366	97	115	—	61	148
Uzbekistan	550	212	177	89	49	21	2
Kazakhstan	452	181	131	48	—	77	15
Georgia	594	135	120	247	49	22	21
Azerbaijan	320	91	93	39	43	13	41
Lithuania	503	187	79	180	16	30	11
Moldavia	286	109	56	56	21	10	34
Latvia	246	90	50	57	1	17	31
Kirghizia	199	52	74	53	2	17	1
Tajikistan	177	63	66	25	—	11	12
Armenia	263	59	46	120	15	15	8
Turkmenia	119	39	41	24	3	10	2
Estonia	256	168	39	22	—	26	1
USSR	13 921	5323	3007	2888	370	939	1394

Key:

1. Total Cooperatives
2. In Consumer Services
3. In Public Dining
4. In Sphere of Consumer Goods Production
5. Cooperatives Producing Confectionery and Baked Goods
6. In Sphere of Procurement and Processing of Secondary Raw Materials
7. In Other types of Activity (Construction, Transport, Trade and so forth)

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