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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

19980127 132

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-89-002

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26 January 1989

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Gareyev On One-Man Command, Democracy
18010159 Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
No 20 1988 pp 2-5

[Interview with Deputy Chief of the General Staff M. A. Gareyev: "One-Man Command and Democracy"; first paragraph is SOVETSKIY VOIN introduction]

[Text] The invigorating spirit of perestroika has touched upon many aspects of army life and democratization has become one of the noticeable phenomenon. However its appearance has not been met in the same way in all locations. Democratization has unavoidably attracted a number of problems that have to be resolved. Our conversation with Deputy Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Colonel General M. A. Gareyev is about this.

[Editor] One-man-command is one of the pivotal principles of military leadership. Comrade Colonel General, what do you think, does democratization in army life contradict one-man-command.

[Gareyev] Obviously in order to understand the essence of the problem, you have to look at its sources.

Vladimir Ilich Lenin felt that centralism was one of the most important conditions for the Armed Forces' military preparedness. Leninist ideas about centralism are echoed in decisions by the VIII Party Congress which indicated the need for the "systematic" construction of a centralized army whose unity of organization and command was the only way to guarantee that we achieved the best results with the fewest sacrifices. The principle of one-man-command is inseparable linked with centralism and the interests of maintaining high military discipline and organization in the Armed Forces.

V. I. Lenin wrote that "there is definitely no fundamental contradiction between Soviet (i.e. socialist) democracy and the use... of the authority of individual people." He was always a proponent of collective leadership and extensive democracy when discussing and developing party and state decisions, but at the same time he demanded that collective leadership and democracy be combined with personal responsibility for the accomplishment of party decisions, with leadership steadfastness and with discipline in the execution of assigned tasks.

V. I. Lenin said that any major machine industry and transportation "cannot function correctly if there is no unity of will linking all the workers available into one economic body that works with the correctness of a watch mechanism."

Under contemporary conditions when our country is undergoing intense perestroika and renewal in all aspects of its society, the comprehensive development of democracy is taking on paramount importance, for only extensive creativity by the masses and their energy and initiative can successfully resolve the problems facing our party and state

at the contemporary stage. But during these times as well, clear and firm leadership, especially under extreme conditions, makes complicated execution possible. Imagine, for example, carrying out such tasks as rapidly constructing a dam with a large number of people and equipment, extinguishing a fire or many other examples that can be accomplished only when the leader issues clear commands and these are carried out precisely by those taking part in the work process. Only this can guarantee that the collective will successfully carry out the activity. If there are conversations and disagreements in these situations, it is obvious that they can lead to no good and the ensuing disruption of the work organization will damage the entire collective and democracy itself.

Such conditions are very characteristic in the activities of the Army and the Navy.

The very specifics of military service, especially in combat situations, demand the highest degree of organization, unity of action and firm command and control of the troops. V. I. Lenin stated it clearly. "Irresponsibility covered by references to collective leadership is a very dangerous evil... which in military affairs more often than not unavoidably leads to catastrophe, chaos, panic, the absence of clear-cut authority and defeat."

He envisioned introducing the institution of military commissars during the Civil War as a temporary, forced measure under difficult, extraordinary historical conditions. This was a time when there were not enough ideologically hardened command personnel who were dedicated to the revolution and he had to bring in military experts from the old army, a time when hostile elements could penetrate into the Red Army. These military commissars played an enormous role during the Civil War in educating personnel and entire masses of Red Army soldiers and strengthening the moral-psychological spirit of the troops. They thus created the conditions for the introduction of one-man-command in the mid 20's.

While noting the great services of commissars during the Civil War and their role during the post-war period, M. V. Frunze at the same time noted that the main function of a commissar "which boiled down to their role as the 'eye of the Soviet State,' under the influence of the naturally developing events soon expanded and our military commissar was transformed into an organizer and administrator. This process was unavoidably linked to the well-known derogation of the rights and functions of the commander, especially when the latter was not a party member. And here is where the opposite side of the coin crops up and the commander gradually loses the most valuable property of any good commander—the will and the ability to make independent, fast decisions. According to a lot of information this phenomenon became rather usual for the Red Army."

There were attempts to revive the institution of military commissars later (in the 30's and at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War), but life forced us to give this up

every time. And the Leninist understanding of one-man-command as the only correct arrangement for military work and as the most advisable method for commanding and controlling forces remains unshakeable even today.

But one-man-command does not contradict democratization. According to decisions by the 27th Party Congress, recent CPSU Central Committee Plenums and the 19th Party Conference democracy must be developed and intensified throughout our entire society, to include within the Armed Forces. A strict and careful account of the specifics shows no situations that would hinder the further development of democratization.

From their very beginning the Soviet Armed Forces were conceived as the most democratic army in the world. It is another thing that, for various reasons, the democratic foundations in the Armed Forces have not always been utilized to their fullest.

It is understandable that in a combat situation (and consequently in training as well) the commander does not always have the time and the opportunity to explain to every subordinate why it is necessary to immediately attack the enemy in one situation and to move to the right or left to avoid them in another. Therefore, the interest of accomplishing the military mission, best employing the efforts of the entire military collective in a coordinated manner and safeguarding the lives of people demands absolute subordination to the will of the commander and the execution of his orders.

However, in cases where it is possible the commander must not only order, but also explain and convince his subordinates what they are to do and how they are to do it so that all personnel carry out the assigned mission conscientiously and enthusiastically. This is the reason that democratism and one-man command are not mutually contradictory.

It is also important to take into account the fact that one-man command in our Armed Forces is based on the party foundation, a foundation that is one of the manifestations of democratism. The commander-communist relies on party and Komsomol organizations and directs their activities. A real one-man-commander must set the example of exceptional responsibility, must selflessly carry out his own military duty and must be morally pure and close to his people, be strict and demanding in the service, but at the same time attentive to his people's needs. He must carry out all of his responsibilities in accordance with established laws and regulatory requirements without allowing any misuse of his own service position.

[Editor] In your opinion, in which spheres of army life is democratization appropriate or even necessary? What path is democratic change taking in the Army and Navy—from "above" or "below," through orders or by quietly being born in military collectives.

[Gareyev] Democratization must penetrate into all aspects of life and Armed Forces activities (while taking into account the specifics of military service). This requires that we greatly improve the mechanisms guaranteeing that officials develop increased responsibility for the social consequences of their activities, that personnel policies undergo perestroika, that glasnost be expanded as officer personnel advance through the service and that all communists develop a fundamental party principle. This must be expressed first and foremost by senior officials being able and constantly attempting to counsel subordinates, consider their opinions and rational recommendations, develop initiative and extensive creativity at all levels. This is the only way we can interest, activate and include all soldiers in the general work and consequently most fully use the so-called human factor.

Even the feudal and bourgeois armies of Peter I, Suvorov and Napoleon considered it necessary to assemble a military council and take counsel with subordinate commanders, inspire them and explain the goals and missions of the upcoming undertaking before every campaign or battle. This is even more important in revolutionary and socialist armies.

During the Civil War M. V. Frunze and other military leaders felt that they had to not only issue operational directives or military orders, but also send the troops a specific order or appeal addressed to all Red Army soldiers explaining the goals and missions of the upcoming operation or battle. And this practice existed during the Great Patriotic War.

Under contemporary conditions we have to restructure and increasingly democratize the work methods used by military councils, party and Komsomol organizations, officer councils, VUZ [institutions of higher education] councils, courts of honor, personnel assemblies, scientific conferences and meetings, sports committees and People's Control Groups, club and library councils, women's councils and other social organizations. It is very important that commanders who are leading troops be able to rely on their staffs and party organizations and do everything to stimulate the activity, independence and creativity of servicemen during exercises. And this democratization must not be formal. The main thing is that every communist, Komsomol and soldier display sincere interest and responsibility for the state of affairs in the unit or subunit and have the ability to not only express his opinion, but also really influence the state of affairs and actively take part in the accomplishment of assigned tasks.

In recent times it has become more frequent for commanders and other senior chiefs to hold meetings (as a rule, in an unconstrained environment) with personnel as a result of which the problems and needs of the servicemen that were raised were subsequently solved in a well-founded, operational manner. Special attention is being focused on getting commanders, political workers and other senior chiefs and staff officers at all level closer

to the junior ranks of officers, soldiers, sailors, sergeants and sergeants major, not because of their duty, but because of their internal desire to do so.

In addition, no one in the Army and Navy is free from criticism for abuses and neglects in their service. All aspects of military life except orders from commanders and chiefs are subject to discussion and criticism. In my opinion, democratization must be developed both "from above" and "from below" by activating the initiative and independence of all categories of servicemen, especially in the lives of party and Komsomol organizations.

Our military press has been called upon to play an important role in expanding glasnost and democracy.

As USSR Minister of Defense General of the Army D. T. Yazov has indicated, "intense democratization has penetrated the combined arms regulations." Order in subunits, units and on ships and relationships among servicemen, all of which have been organized strictly in accordance with regulatory requirements, guarantee respect for the personal worth of individuals and create favorable conditions for their comprehensive development. Regulatory order guarantees that the rights and freedoms granted every soldier and inseparably tied to the responsibilities assigned to him will be realized.

In this regard, every time senior chiefs violate the rights of servicemen, they are violating the requirements of regulations and are consequently committing gross disciplinary violations. And cases of individual soldiers and sergeants who have no objections to talking about their rights and democracy during meetings, but have disrespectful attitudes toward one another and allow individuals to humiliate and lower the human dignity of fellow servicemen, are totally intolerable and shameful for our army. Such facts demand immediate reaction not only from commanders and political workers, but especially from military collectives themselves.

[Editor] Does the requirement "a chief's order is law for subordinates" remain unchanged? Is the process of democratization not having a negative affect on the soldiers' execution and their personal responsibility and isn't this undermining the basis of military discipline in the end?

[Gareyev] The requirement "a chief's order is law for subordinates" remains in force as long as there is military service. Absolute subordination to the will of the commander is the basis for discipline and organization. Conscientious military discipline and obedience cannot be displayed in and of itself under combat conditions if the entire system of military education does not train soldiers for this during times of peace. And the command method of control will remain basic in the Army and Navy.

The French military writer A. Blondel wrote, "Take one hundred thousand men, give them weapons, uniforms and ammunition and you still do not have an army. Train them to use all the means to protect themselves

and destroy the enemy and assume that they are brave and strong: you will have one hundred thousand soldiers, but still not have an army. If one feeling inspires them, move them to the enemy and perhaps they can gain an instantaneous victory, but on another day they may go to pieces, for they are still not an army." What do they still need to become a combat ready army, he asked and answered: they are lacking discipline which is the only thing that transforms a crowd into a threatening giant.

Despite the obviousness of such assertions, there has not always been a common approach to the many elements of military discipline in revolutionary forces and among revolutionaries in general. There were many outstanding military figures during the French bourgeois revolution and American Civil War, the Paris communes and the Civil War in Russia who were noted for their talent, courage and other military abilities. Many of them, however, while recognizing the importance of a military education in principle, suffered from elements of false democracy in their practical activities and at times underestimated the need for the rigid and strict development of military education, especially in questions of military discipline and organization. For example at the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] Congress in 1919 such famous figures from our party as A. S. Bubnov and K. Ye. Voroshilov were on the side of "military opposition." While defending the elective appointment of commanders, the methods of arbitrariness and the optional aspect of absolutely carrying out orders, proponents of "military opposition" essentially were against the party line which called for the creation of a regular, centralized, guided and disciplined army. Their point of view lost and it could not have been any other way. Only an army that is held together with strong military discipline can defeat such a strong opponent as faced the Red Army.

M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, I. P. Uborevich, V. K. Blucher and others of our military leaders were military figures who really understood the importance of military education and discipline. Their revolutionary character, simplicity and democratism in their contact with subordinates did not stop them from being inflexible and severely demanding when it came to military discipline. In condemning the methods for propagating discipline as existed in the tsarist army where mechanical obedience ruled and was enforced through the extensive use of repression, intimidation and assault on the soldier's human worth, they explained that discipline in the Red Army had to be maintained at the conscious level, with an complete understanding of the importance of military duty.

Now as to the second question—a military organization, especially under contemporary conditions, is a specific organization requiring from its members special precision, exactness, execution, self-control and speed in the execution of commands and instructions. If every serviceman thoroughly understands and consciously interprets the need for all of this and commanders and

political workers are able to skillfully combine the force of an order, when necessary, with convincing the soldiers and having a spiritual closeness with them, an order and democratization will only complement one another. This will not only not undermine the foundation of military discipline, but will further the solidarity of collectives and increase their military capability.

[Editor] We are now electing factory directors, workshop chiefs and brigadiers. We are already seeing examples of a democratic approach to solving purely service problems in the army now: for example officer fitness reports are often discussed at party meetings. What will the next step be?

[Gareyev] Elections are at the foundation of the life and activities of party and Komsomol organizations, officers' meetings and courts of honor. We could obviously expand the use of elections in fitness commissions and departmental management personnel in VUZ departments (with subsequent approval of the commanders and institution and academy chiefs). Life will lead us to the other steps.

[Editor] What can we do to guarantee democracy "in word and deed" in the army and what legal and moral norms can be used to defend a soldier who has made use of his right to glasnost if his word is contrary to the chief's opinion?

[Gareyev] The rights of any serviceman, to include the democratic use of "word and deed," are guaranteed by the strict observance of laws, regulatory requirements and orders that regulate military service. A Soviet man retains the rights of a Soviet citizen after being called into the ranks of the Armed Forces, as they are guaranteed by the USSR Constitution and party and state documents. Any communist, Komsomol member or serviceman has the right to express his opinion at party, Komsomol or officer meetings and meetings of subunit personnel. Regulations allow a serviceman to send written suggestions about facts causing damage to the Armed Forces, not only to his immediate superior, but to his senior chiefs, up to and including the USSR Minister of Defense. Communists and Komsomol members (and 90 percent of the Armed Forces fall into these categories) can appeal to all party agencies, including the CPSU Central Committee, about all problems, to include infringements of their rights and democratic norms.

The legal education of military personnel and their clear knowledge and stringent observation of the rights as defined by regulations and the responsibilities of all categories of servicemen are taking on great importance as glasnost and democratization expand.

It is especially important that we raise the pedagogical level of the officer corps and their example in observing moral and ethical norms. And it is also just as important to elevate the personal responsibility of sergeants, starshina, soldiers and sailors to that by making full use of all

of their constitutional and regulatory rights and democracy they are intolerant of demagogics and illegalities and remember that all of their activities, words and deeds must first and foremost be filled with the concern for strengthening the combat readiness of units and subunits upon which depends that which is sacred to all of us—the security of our Motherland.

[Editor] Many outstanding military leaders and military figures of the past have been noted for their democratic feelings. In light of contemporary tasks, how would you assess their opinions on this issue?

[Gareyev] Actually, many outstanding military leaders and military figures were noted for their democratic feelings and their closeness to their officers and men. This was especially characteristic of A. V. Suvorov, M. I. Kutuzov, M. V. Frunze, G. K. Zhukov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, K. K. Rokossovskiy and others. This was determined not only by their person peculiarities, but also by objective and fundamental need. It is impossible to simply order and formally command people in war and even more impossible in peace. One has to be able to get people to follow you and convince them of the necessity of one action or another. Otherwise the best decisions and plans will not be carried out.

M. I. Dragomirov was the model in this area. He not only displayed a closeness to people (as commander of an infantry division, chief of an academy and district commander) in practice, but also conducted intensive research and developed scientific foundations for commanding military collectives and developing high moral and combat qualities in soldiers.

M. I. Dragomirov's services first and foremost include the fact that he, and D. A. Milyutin, did a lot to revitalize Suvorov's military legacy and his views on military training and education for troops, view that had almost totally fallen into oblivion in the 19th Century. Dragomirov also carefully studied military knowledge and methods of training forces in the Russian and foreign armies and, while fiercely fighting stagnation and routine among a significant part of the officer corps and generals of that time, he attempted to generalize and introduce into the forces the most advance experiences and make the process of training and educating troops close and understandable to soldiers. He put special attention on the fact that the entire system of military service was not to suppress man, but to elevate his human dignity. He considered the most important task of officer-educators to be transforming a recruit (inductee) into a soldier without breaking him as a man, and doing everything possible to develop the soldier's mental, strong-willed and moral qualities.

He attached critical importance to officers setting a personal example in selflessly carrying out their military duty. He stressed that the command had to be the effect of knowledge, but could not in itself give knowledge.

As a rule, outstanding military leaders were noted for their ability to combine the highest level of exactingness with concern for people and respect for the troops subordinate to them. Actually the combination of intense respect for man with a high level of exactingness is the primary principle of military education. A lack of exactingness in peacetime is very expensive in war. Many centuries of experience teach us that the greater the demand in terms of combat reality and exactingness in peacetime, the fewer the losses and greater the victories under combat conditions. Only, unfortunately, this old truism that everyone knows and that is manifested in war begins to grow dim during times of peace.

The excellent military education skill displayed by Suворov, Frunze, Zhukov and other outstanding military leaders was that they were able to dispel that fog during times of peace and were able to clearly see and show their subordinates the only true goal of military education—to carry out one's duty with honor during times of war. When they made severe demands on their troops during military education and training, it was tempered by their high level of concern for the interests of the Fatherland and their humaneness, democratism and real respect for man in their highest and most gratifying sense.

[Editor] One final question, one of a personal nature. Comrade Colonel General, you have subordinates. How do you personally see democratizing your relationships with them.

[Gareyev] It is difficult to talk about this subject on a personal level. It is easier to give advice and recommendations and more difficult to carry them out yourself.

But if we are talking about my opinions, throughout my service I have been intolerant of bureaucraticism, red-tape, over-cautiousness, lack of initiative, unscrupulousness and carelessness, regardless of where they were manifested. I prefer extensive, constant contact with those who directly carry out the work. This gives me the opportunity to not only pass on my experience and teach people the best way possible, but to inconspicuously learn for myself about other officers. Life shows that every man, even those who are not very able and who have a lot of shortcomings, has certain properties which appear in no one else. The task of the manager is to accumulate and skillfully utilize all of this positive potential, but one is not always totally successful in this.

We should also keep in mind that developing the conditions for respectful and democratic work depends not only on senior chiefs, but also on the subordinates and the entire collective. Carelessness and negligence in work, problems that at times are covered by demagoguery and a disrespectful attitude toward seniors, make not only democratization, but normal work in general difficult in a collective. Democratization is a reciprocal

process that assumes that every person is responsible to the collective for accomplishing the assigned tasks and also assumes an exacting attitude not only to others, but to oneself as well.

Lebedev Denies Existence of Defense Opposition to Cuts

LD2212153488 *Moscow Domestic Service in Russian*
1045 GMT 22 Dec 88

[Feature: "New Soviet Initiatives in the Area of Conventional Weapons—Opinions and Assessments" presented by journalist Aleksandr Korshunov]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Korshunov] On 7 December there was an unprecedented breakthrough, in the dominant opinion, in disarmament philosophy itself. Negotiations on conventional weapons received a powerful stimulus. Today I would like you to hear how it is assessed by representatives of various social systems. My first interviewee was Major General Lebedev, deputy chief of the Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

There is no question that the latest Soviet initiatives are on such a large-scale that it is already very difficult to reject them out of hand or use the old diplomatic formula that they still need analyzing. But nevertheless certain political circles and mass media of Western countries are making attempts to draw from them some political benefits for themselves. Namely, allegations are circulating that there exists in the Soviet Union some sort of political opposition group of the military leadership and that allegedly our military circles are dissatisfied and did not want these cuts. What can you say about such assertions?

[Lebedev] I must say that all questions connected with the weapons cut are worked on by the leadership of our country in close association with representatives of the Ministry of Defense. For this reason there is no basis for saying that there is some sort of opposition within the Ministry of Defense to the decision of our government. Perhaps it is only those who do not want there to be progress in reducing armed forces and weapons—and there are such forces in the West—who are dreaming up these arguments. [passage omitted]

[Korshunov] Another question is interesting to many people today. What will happen to the units being cut? Will they be destroyed or put into storage?

[Lebedev] There is no question that some parts will be scrapped, but many types of armaments can be made useful in the national economy, in particular tractors, various sorts of fuelling equipment, and many means of transportation. They will be successfully utilized in our

national economy. Moreover, this will be visibly demonstrated to observers from other states, so that the public is aware of it. I think the public will also demand that Western states for their part take some similar steps. [passage omitted]

[Korshunov] Unfortunately, we are clearly missing another participant, or more correctly, the views of people representing the country to which the Soviet initiatives were in fact addressed. The point is, that when this program was first initiated, I requested the American Embassy in Moscow to express their attitude to our new proposals. We also wanted to ask about a lot of things; for example, what the Americans might say about the possibility of steps in response, and how they view the problem of equalizing the imbalance in those types of conventional weapons in which the United States and NATO have a clear advantage, such as in naval weapons, on-deck and strike aircraft, and antitank weapons. But, alas, there was no conversation. It only remains to be hoped that it may take place in the future.

Akhromeyev on U.S. Threat, Army Restructuring
PM1301171589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 14 Jan 89 First Edition pp 1,3

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev by S. Kosterin, under the rubric "Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev Answers Questions From SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Readers": "The Army and Restructuring"—date and place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Looking through the list of questions that had been selected in advance from the editorial mailbag for our conversation, the marshal remarked briefly: "Fine, I can answer all this. But a very important question is missing from this list. With your permission, I will raise this question first. Let us put it like this: Is there a military danger and threat to the Soviet Union today?"

We Cannot Be Addressed From a Position of Strength

[Akhromeyev] So, do this danger and threat exist and, consequently, do we need our Armed Forces, and what form should they take? I think the answer to this question will clarify a great deal in the polemics and disputes we now have in our country, especially as you hear people express the opinion that there is now no military danger and threat to the Soviet Union. I am convinced that this opinion is wrong.

The Soviet Union and its allies are sincerely trying to improve their relations with the United States and other states in the North Atlantic alliance. A great deal has been done in this direction in the last 3 years. Soviet-U.S. relations have improved as a result of the talks between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan; the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-

Range Missiles has been signed and ratified, and has entered into force; talks are being held on reducing strategic nuclear weapon; and the drafting of the mandate for talks on reducing arms and armed forces in Europe is near completion. The Soviet Union's unilateral initiatives are well known. Tension has been eased as a result. The military danger and threat has been reduced in the world as a whole and for the Soviet Union. There is no question that all this has enormous significance.

But something else is also happening. Leaders of the U.S. Administration and the Pentagon still repeat, month in and month out, that they are pursuing a policy of strength in relation to the Soviet Union. Recently, for example, the leader of the U.S. Administration said: "From the very beginning, our administration has tried to conduct a policy toward the Soviet Union that is based on realism, cogent dialogue with the Soviets, and—and I emphasize this point—on strength...." The same is said by the leaders of the future administration, which will soon be coming to power. U.S. Defense Secretary F. Carlucci never tires of repeating, month in and month out, that the United States' main enemy is the Soviet Union. True, they must be given their due—U.S. state and military leaders often follow up the claim that the Soviet Union is their main enemy with the remark that the United States has no intention of unleashing a war against the Soviet Union.

We take statements by U.S. state and military leaders seriously. After all, these are representatives of a great power who are speaking. But we take a no less serious, responsible attitude to the United States' practical actions in the military sphere. They are as follows.

The United States has a total of 2,130,000 regular armed forces and a national guard and reserve of 1,160,000—which makes 3,290,000 in all. The majority are stationed in U.S. territory, where they are not monitored by anyone in any way, as at the moment no accords on cuts and inspections apply to them.

In Europe and the adjacent seas and oceans, the North Atlantic alliance keeps a group of 3.5 million personnel on a state of alert (more than 600,000 of whom belong to the United States).

During the forties and fifties, the United States deployed hundreds of its military bases on the territory of other countries surrounding the Soviet Union and stationed more than 500,000 men at these bases, with various arms.

What is the point of this? Could we regard all this as a potential military threat to our country and our allies? We could. We military people are obliged above everyone else to take all this into consideration. It is precisely these armed formations that the United States uses to pursue the policy of strength toward the Soviet Union of which it so often speaks.

I would like to be understood correctly: I am not an advocate of military confrontation [protivoborstvo]. It is necessary to continue acting along the avenue of reciprocal reductions of nuclear, space, and conventional arms. Whenever possible, we must also embark on unilateral reductions. I would like to emphasize: The decision to reduce our Armed Forces by 500,000 men, announced by M.S. Gorbachev in his 7 December UN speech, is perfectly correct and justified from both the political and military viewpoints. It was thoroughly considered from the military point of view. The Soviet Union's defense is reliably guaranteed in the new conditions that have developed in 1985-1988.

In this context, the question of reducing defense spending was justifiably raised. The Soviet Union's actions in this period provide proof and example of how the military danger and threat can and must be reduced by political methods. I am in favor of patient talks, of finding acceptable solutions in the future. But, in order to pursue a peace-loving and independent policy, the Soviet Union also needs military strength. Of what magnitude should it be? This depends, apart from anything else, also on the forces and degree of readiness available to the United States and the North Atlantic alliance.

The Soviet people firmly intend to pursue restructuring in the country exactly as conceived by the CPSU. There must be confidence that nobody can interfere with our choice.

Therefore, there is no special need to speak up against some—not all that innocent and naïve—claims by some figures about the supposed disbandment or 50-percent reduction of our Armed Forces. As a Communist and military man, I am against such a moral demobilization.

M.S. Gorbachev said in his report to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: "...Have the imperialist sources of aggression and wars disappeared, by any chance? No, we do not forget the threat to peace posed by imperialist militarism, and we believe that there is still no guarantee that the positive processes now under way are irreversible..."

We would be correct in saying that the situation developed for the better in the second half of last year, but full guarantees of irreversibility are still lacking. It must be aimed for with joint efforts.

War Would Be a Catastrophe for Mankind

[Kosterin] Comrade Marshal, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee adopted the Pact states' military doctrine in 1987. The Soviet Union has its own military doctrine. What is its content?

[Akhromeyev] Indeed, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee adopted a new defensive doctrine in the summer of 1987. Each state that has signed the

Warsaw Pact developed its own national military doctrine based on it. We elaborated the Soviet defensive military doctrine. It has a military-political and a military-technical aspect.

A summary of its military-political aspect: The Soviet Union does not intend to be the first to attack anyone; it will never, under any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons; it does not consider anyone its potential enemy; and it has no territorial claims against anyone.

Not just the political, but also the military-technical aspect of our doctrine is important for practical work by us military men. Its content is a definition of the military threat against our country and our allies on the basis of an assessment of the military-political situation. It is not all that difficult to define: The military leadership of the United States and the North Atlantic alliance itself names the Soviet Union as its main probable adversary.

Of course, if the United States and its allies were to pledge, just as we have done, not to be the first to launch war under any circumstances, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the situation would be much calmer. But so far they have refused to give such a pledge. We must bear this in mind.

The military-technical aspect of the doctrine also examines the following question: What kind of aggression should we be ready to repel? Taking the North Atlantic alliance's position into account, the answer is this: We must prepare to repel a possible aggression using both nuclear and conventional arms.

A kind of paradox emerges. There is an agreed statement by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, adopted in Geneva in 1985, that a nuclear war must not be fought under any circumstances because it would lead to a catastrophe for mankind. This is obvious to everyone today. At the same time, however, official military leaders of North Atlantic alliance states declare that, under certain circumstances, they could be the first to use nuclear arms. This means that we are forced by circumstances to prepare to repel aggression using both conventional and nuclear arms.

It is obvious that quite a few people, including Soviet people, would disagree with this conclusion of mine. But this is the harsh reality of the present. In this context, another very important question logically arises: What sort of armed forces should the Soviet Union have to ensure its security?

A complex question. Thanks to the intense work of the Soviet people and the peoples in the fraternal countries, we have achieved military equilibrium in nuclear forces with the North Atlantic alliance states and an overall military equilibrium. But it cannot be said that we have always acted in an irreproachable manner while resolving this task. Unfortunately, we resolved some questions from the positions of military confrontation. Not all

opportunities were utilized for reaching agreements to ensure that the sides' armed forces and armaments were at the minimum necessary level. Of course, we were not the main culprits in the arms race, but we must admit to part of the responsibility for it.

The Soviet Union's foreign policy line elaborated in 1985-1986 corrected these shortcomings. In line with the 19th all-union party conference decisions on shifting to qualitative parameters in building the Armed Forces and with the new defensive doctrine, today we are restructuring our Armed Forces, bringing them to a state whereby, in terms of their quantity and quality, they are capable of resolving the task of reliably repelling a possible aggression. And nothing more.

A series of important decisions have been made on this issue, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke about them in his UN speech on 7 December 1988.

A Formation That Is Reliable Through Its Cohesion

[Kosterin] The USSR Armed Forces are an important component of our society. Their link with the people is indissoluble; the building of the Armed Forces is the people's own cause. It is a rare family that does not have some connection with military service. A revolutionary restructuring is under way in the country, and glasnost and socialist democracy are being established. What forms do these processes take in the Army, if I may refer to our Armed Forces in that way for the sake of brevity?

[Akhromeyev] As an old General Staff worker who served there for the last 15 years, let me say first of all what the General Staff and the central apparatus in general are doing for restructuring in the Army and Navy.

For all of us the most important documents are the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th all-union party conference and the decisions of CPSU Central Committee plenums. The concrete military-political documents setting forth demands on the Armed Forces are the new defensive military doctrine and the CPSU Central Committee resolutions on strengthening military discipline in the USSR Armed Forces, improving political and military education, and strengthening the political awareness and morale of personnel.

The General Staff, the Main Political Directorate, and the directorates of branches of the Armed Forces are developing the defensive military strategy, the art of operations, and tactics. They are organizing their practical implementation in the training of higher command personnel and commanders of staffs, political organs, troops, and naval forces. They are also organizing the restructuring of the Army and Navy on the basis of defense sufficiency—that is, they are elaborating measures such that the Army and Navy are at the minimum necessary levels [chtoby armiya i flot byli minimalno neobkhodimymi], but are constantly ready to rebuff possible aggression.

Much work is in progress to give our Armed Forces a defensive character. The decision to reduce the Army and Navy by 500,000 men also requires great creative efforts and organizational measures from the supreme military organs of management. Much work is required if it is to be implemented in a well organized way and without any decline in combat readiness.

All these are problems of military-political significance. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have entrusted the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense with their fulfillment. All this work is being done collectively, on the basis of wide discussion and the elaboration of the most correct decisions, in an atmosphere of democracy and respect for the opinion of the workers taking part.

What I have mentioned is only a part of the work that concerns the top echelon. In the Armed Forces as a whole, under the leadership of commanding officers and political workers at every level, continuous work is in progress to restructure and improve the quality of combat and political training, strengthen military discipline, improve the educational and material base, and improve everyday arrangements for personnel.

There are many difficulties facing us, as well as our society as a whole, in the course of restructuring. We have no ready formulas; we are finding them in the course of practical work.

[Kosterin] We are building a state governed by the rule of law on the principle of the universal and equal responsibility of everyone before the law. Is it necessary, in your view, to draw up a Law on the Defense of the USSR?

[Akhromeyev] A Law on the Defense of the USSR is currently being drafted. It will be submitted for examination by our supreme organ of power—the Congress of People's Deputies.

Why has the need for such a law arisen? The duties of the Armed Forces to the people and state are defined by the USSR Constitution and there are a number of other legislative acts that reflect important defense issues in one form or another. But it is evidently right, in the course of building a state governed by the rule of law, to adopt a fundamental law on the country's defense reflecting the main questions of responsibility for the Motherland's defense and the life and activity of the Armed Forces, which would be binding both on the Army and Navy and on all other organs and departments of our state.

[Kosterin] We have recently encountered proposals concerning the supposed advantages of the "volunteer principle" in forming the Army, with paid volunteers, so to speak. What is your attitude to views of this kind?

[Akhromeyev] Our Armed Forces are formed in accordance with the principle of universal military service. I

believe this is the correct principle for our conditions. It was introduced after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. I cannot understand why certain comrades are coming out against universal military service. I regard the volunteer principle of forming the Army and Navy and the emergence of "paid volunteers" as unacceptable for the Soviet Union. In some countries, by virtue of their specific geographical location, such armies exist, but only in peacetime. In wartime those countries, too, introduce universal military service.

The "volunteer" principle also contains a violation of social justice. All citizens should prepare for the defense of the Motherland. Moreover, a mercenary army would cost our people far more than it costs at present. We must reckon with this, too. Those comrades who propose the introduction of the volunteer principle in manning our Armed Forces also fail to take into account the many other difficulties that arise in putting this principle into practice.

[Kosterin] We also know of claims that our defense spending in peacetime is considerable and must be reduced. How can you combine the principle of reliable defense of the Motherland with the normal development of our national economy and with increasing the people's prosperity?

[Akhromeyev] I have already spoken about that in part. The Soviet defensive doctrine provides for a reduction in military spending. The reduction of the Armed Forces by 500,000 men provides simultaneously for a reduction in spending on military needs. We military men understand the need for such measures and participated actively in the preparation of the decisions that were adopted.

It is necessary to continue to carefully monitor the military-political situation. As the military danger and threat decline, new decisions can be adopted. The two things are indissolubly linked...

[Kosterin] Excuse me, Sergey Fedorovich, let me interrupt you. We recently saw and heard in one of our television news programs that the United States has created an "invisible aircraft," invisible to radar, costing fabulous sums. One naturally feels concerned: Reducing military spending is necessary, but let us not lag behind...

[Akhromeyev] We keep a fairly attentive eye on the state of military hardware in the world and take steps to be up to whatever level of development is necessary. And not everything depends solely on the scale of military spending. You must also spend resources economically and skillfully. We work in close collaboration with our scientists and workers in the defense sectors of industry. Much depends on the organizational work of officers, the mastery of combat hardware by personnel, and the quality of combat training.

We Are Involved in a Common Cause

[Kosterin] The Army is not just the sentry watching over our peaceful labor, it is also a builder. It is involved in our national economic process...

[Akhromeyev] That is true. Military subunits take an active part in eliminating the aftermath of natural disasters or accidents. Military units' actions in the Armenian earthquake zone are an example of this. Soldiers were among the first to come to the aid of the Armenian people. Tens of thousands of servicemen have been involved in saving people in trouble. The soldiers, sergeants, and officers have acted selflessly, regardless of the dangers. It was so during the cleanup after the accident at the Chernobyl AES, where our troops are still involved in work even now. Generally speaking, military units are the first to arrive on the scene of an accident. Indeed, this is our duty to the Soviet people. In peacetime and wartime, troops are defending their people.

The Army is actively involved in tackling tasks in the national economic sphere too. Military units carry out a number of planned economic tasks. Every year they participate in the harvest; tens of thousands of trucks and servicemen are allocated to the task. The Armed Forces are currently involved in building highways in the northern part of the country and in the RSFSR's Non-Chernozem zone: in the Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kirov, Kostroma, and Perm oblasts and in Udmurtia. It is big work of national importance—the Army's participation in developing the Russian Non-Chernozem zone. We approach it very seriously.

It must not be forgotten that the Armed Forces provide our youngsters with a profession. Every year hundreds of thousands of young men become reservists. They return with the skills they have learned during service, as drivers, mechanics, signalers, electronics engineers, and other specialties in short supply in the national economy. The Army and Navy temper young people physically and morally. As a rule, army tempering has a favorable influence on a young person's future life and activity.

[Kosterin] As is known, the Army is a constantly self-renewing organism, if only as a result of the annual draft. But in what way does the officer corps change? There is much talk among the people at the moment about its rejuvenation, a phenomenon the military jokingly calls "greening." Who are they, the new commanders?

[Akhromeyev] The backbone of the Army is the officer corps, and the ensigns as well. They are mostly young people. Some 80 percent of our officers are under 40. Nearly all Soviet officers have higher education. Some 3-4 percent of the officer corps is replaced annually. Army service has never been easy. It is not easy serving as a soldier. But it is even harder being an officer. He is responsible for the constant readiness of a subunit or unit to carry out tasks both in peacetime and if the "storm breaks." He is responsible for the training and education of subordinates. This responsibility cannot be made to fit neatly into an eight-hour working day. An officer is ever ready to go from the west to the east, from the north to the south to serve. And his family with him. Command activity requires an officer's every last effort. He

must always be prepared to act in the most difficult situation. The profession of being an officer means dedicated service to one's socialist homeland.

[Kosterin] So-called nonregulation relations are often mentioned in the press and in literature. At the same time, the Army is, perhaps, the best educator of young people. Youngsters become men in the Army, they appreciate the responsibility they have to the people, and they are entrusted with formidable combat weapons. Naturally, even certain manifestations of nonregulation relations—bullying—sometimes cause great anxiety among Soviet people. What is your view of the problem?

[Akhromeyev] The press and literature, and parents who have sent their sons into the Armed Forces often touch on this problem, and rightly so. Unfortunately, in the past 15-20 years, nonregulation relations—a phenomenon that is impermissible in our Army—have become widespread. I have served in the Army for 49 years and I know that the phenomenon did not exist 25-30 years ago. The fact that it has appeared is the fault of the officers, the leaders of the Army. We overlooked this phenomenon that is alien to our society and allowed it to develop into a serious problem.

The leadership of the Armed Forces, commanders, and political workers have adopted a number of measures in recent years to sharply reduce and then totally eliminate nonregulation relations. In the past 3 years the incidence of this has been reduced by 40 percent.

In order not to excuse, but eliminate this alien phenomenon altogether I believe that everyone must combat bullying: in the Army and in schools, in vocational and technical colleges, and in institutes. In short, common efforts are needed.

[Kosterin] Often the opinion is expressed that the presence of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in the Republic of Afghanistan and their combat actions in defense of the April Revolution in that country were a tragic mistake and the sacrifices were in vain. The international duty that Soviet soldiers took upon themselves has been questioned. What can we say in reply to this to the thousands of fathers and mothers of our soldiers who died carrying out their international duty, to the soldiers who are still serving in the Republic of Afghanistan? What was and what is Afghanistan to the Army?

[Akhromeyev] I think the full answer to this was given at the 19th all-union party conference. At that conference Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed on behalf of the party and people profound gratitude to the soldiers and officers and civilian specialists—to all those whose lives were affected and who were burned by the flames of that war. The decision to withdraw our troops from the Republic of Afghanistan was a reflection of the wisdom and the new political and moral experience accumulated over the years of revolutionary restructuring.

The soldiers, sergeants, and officers courageously carried out and are carrying out their international military duty. In that sense we have again received confirmation of the lofty moral and combat qualities of our Army, of the fact that our young people are worthy replacements for those who routed the Hitlerite aggressors in the Great Patriotic War. I am sure that the Afghan people, too, duly appreciate and will appreciate in the future the Soviet soldiers' mission in Afghanistan.

Discipline Is No Obstacle To a Person of Talent

[Kosterin] In readers' letters you come across the opinion that the Army levels people's abilities down through "blind" obedience to orders, and that it virtually kills talent. Is that so? What opportunities are there in the course of service to maintain a person's individuality and develop his abilities? How, with your experience, do you answer this question?

[Akhromeyev] I completely disagree with the contention that the Army kills talent.

The originality of the Army consists in strict obedience and the unfailing obligation to execute orders. But in the Army we do seek to ensure that ability and talent are displayed when an ordinary soldier, sergeant, or officer carries out the tasks confronting him and that the development of subordinates' abilities and talents is ensured. This is necessary not only during war. If in peacetime officers are to train a serviceman or a military collective and create a combat-effective military subunit, they must be intelligent and tactful, love people, bear a sense of responsibility to the people, and possess talent.

Military service, if treated as a vocation and carried out conscientiously, to a high standard, and with full commitment, will not bar the way to talented people, whether ordinary soldiers or officers.

My own service convinces me that this is true. The Army is everything for me. I joined as a 17-year-old. I donned my sailor's greatcoat on 1 September 1940. I began the Patriotic War as a junior commander and ended as a tank battalion commander. I entered the armored troops' academy 7 years after graduating from school and experiencing the war. I graduated from the academy with a gold medal. Most officers are such. Military discipline has never cramped the abilities of ordinary soldiers, sergeants, or officers, the manifestation of these abilities in practical work, nor crushed them as individuals.

[Kosterin] Sergey Fedorovich, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA readers would like to learn a bit more about you as a person. How do you spend your spare time, what do you read, what are your hobbies, if you have any....

[Akhromeyev] I have had a passion for military service all my life and a desire to do more. When I was a regimental and divisional commander, the main thing

was to keep these in readiness to carry out any task. I have worked 15 years in the General Staff. That work demands full commitment.

I was brought up on the Russian classics, on Valeriy Bryusov, Aleksandr Blok, and Vladimir Mayakovsky. I love the writers of my generation, the works of Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, Mikhail Isakovskiy, Konstantin Simonov, Yuriy Bondarev.... I enormously respect them, their work, and their honesty and service to the Soviet people.

Stalin's Hitler Pact, Conduct of War Slammed

PM0206160388 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 18 May 88 p 3

[First part of Ernst Genri article: "Reply to One Who Did Not Answer. Continuing a Topic Raised 23 Years Ago in a Letter to I.G. Erenburg"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction; boldface as published]

[Text] Would it have been possible to prevent Hitler's accession to power and thereby deliver mankind from the horrors of World War II? Was the tragic chain of defeats for the Soviet people at the initial stage of the fascist aggression inevitable? These and other questions connected with the role of I.V. Stalin in our history are being discussed widely today. E. Genri, the well-known publicist who has made a great study of modern history, examines them in this article presented to the reader. This time, however, it is not just an article but the continuation, as it were, of his letter sent long ago to I.G. Erenburg—back in May 1965. That is, 23 years ago. It was recently published for the first time in the pages of the magazine DRUZHBA NARODOV (No 3). An editorial foreword pointed out that, although the letter is of a personal nature, the magazine editorial board deemed it possible (with the permission of E. Genri himself) to acquaint readers with it, "bearing in mind the great public interest aroused by the facts cited in it and by the conclusions drawn by the author," as well as the fact that the letter's existence was made public in the recently published new chapters of I.G. Erenburg's memoirs.

In the letter, which is in the form of a polemic, the author reproaches I.G. Erenburg with underestimating Stalin's negative role at various stages of Soviet history. Of course, readers might have different views on this question—as on others touched on in the published article—to those of the author, whose conclusions quite possibly will not be regarded as indisputable by everyone.

It was suggested that I write something unusual: an afterword to my letter to Ilya Erenburg, which I sent him 23 years ago and which went unanswered. The letter was sharply critical of I.V. Stalin's policy and condemned the positive attitude toward it of Erenburg himself. I pondered, and came to the conclusion that I was obliged to accept the invitation.

Of course, it is not so easy to write on this topic a second time, when both Stalin and Erenburg have long been dead. A personality cult does not exist in our country, but has the subject been forgotten? Evidently not.

Many people still await a convincing explanation that is comprehensible to everyone.

They might ask: Why stir up the past and reopen old wounds which have not quite healed over yet? Is it not better to consign everything to oblivion, rouse ourselves, and move on cheerfully, having put an end to sharp and painful arguments?

No, it seems to me that it would be frivolous and incautious to do this. The cult of Stalin caused too much harm to our society over one-third of a century to be able to forget it so easily. Such a thing is not expunged from our life and thoughts of its own accord. As experience teaches, easy paths in general are not given to us Soviet people, and we need to learn and understand everything and think it through to the end. Only then will we free ourselves from the oppressive burden which has weighed us down for so long. V.I. Lenin never allowed dangerous wounds to be left unhealed.

History itself, the final arbiter, also clearly demands the same of us. History has its own laws. Sooner or later it almost certainly exacts a price for serious political mistakes in the past and for covering them up, and it does not accept excuses for delaying over urgently needed changes. Who among the older generation in Europe has not noticed this?

It would probably be too solemn to say here: History knows how to avenge. But it undoubtedly remembers a great deal, particularly when we ourselves forget. It has a very long memory and does not yield to blandishments. It reminds either ourselves or our children and grandchildren—which, if they are not prepared, is still worse—of everything.

Why do we get this? We have already been through enough in the century which is coming to an end, and we have stood for too long at particularly dangerous crossroads. We have won with blood the right to live and struggle without unnecessary losses and quarrels in the course of our gigantic building. I will say once again, for this is very important: It is very unwise, as we have all long been well, too well aware, to joke with history in our age. In the last fourth of the 20th century it has become too strict.

This is why I am writing my "second" letter to Ilya Erenburg, although he is dead, and I am writing again with regard to his extolling of Stalin more than 30 years ago. I do not know whether he himself always believed in what he wrote and said then about Stalin and his policy,

but this is, rather, a question for a psychologist, and I will not undertake to resolve it. I always valued Erenburg highly for his uncommonly mighty pen and his erudition.

It seems to me that he should not have elevated Stalin. I will say more: By glorifying Stalin he pushed the historical truth away from readers who believed in him. As an honest writer and the Soviet Union's greatest journalist he did not and does not have that right.

In our days we must argue with the utmost honesty on such topics or better keep quiet, for otherwise, as already stated, the historical truth will exact a price. And which of us is prepared to allow this? We know what this would mean for the country this time.

It is now possible—and extremely necessary!—to argue freely. Under conditions such as now, incidentally, Erenburg himself, I am absolutely certain, could have done incomparably more for his country than he did in his lifetime.

I only want us to speak the **whole** truth in this argument, taking account of the facts which have come to light.

Is there any need to emphasize that it is harmful and stupid to consider, as Stalin evidently did, that the sheer, blatant evil in his domestic and foreign policy could be transformed into good in the twinkling of an eye, his eye? Such transformations do not happen, and Stalin was no magician. Lenin never worked in that way.

The first of the most important questions is this: Did we need to conclude the "nonaggression" pact with Hitlerite Germany 23 August 1939?

I raised this question in my first letter to Erenburg. In the pact we and the Nazis pledged—and I cite verbatim—"to refrain from any violence (Hitler refrain!—E.G.), any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, both separately and jointly with other powers." A straightforward and, as it were, sacred pledge. A very important document which seemed to ensure the USSR's security for certain. An achievement of genius by Stalin? That was how almost everyone understood it at the time. That was how they were ordered to understand it.

But did Stalin have the right to believe it?

This is the crux of the matter. This is the whole point. For in this way he virtually entrusted to a raving fascist our country's whole fate and whole future and, indirectly, also the whole future of the international workers movement. Is this a specific example of the magic transformation of Nazi evil into "good" at the personal wish of a man in the Kremlin?

Did Hitler fulfill the "nonaggression pact"? Or did he deceive in a most base manner Stalin and, together with Stalin, the entire Soviet Union?

He did deceive. Hitler mocked Stalin. Stalin piously believed Hitler right up until the **last** day and refused point-blank to believe all our friends and plenipotentiaries abroad who warned him with precise data of the German Armed Forces' accelerated anti-Soviet preparations, as Sorge, the heroic Communist and underground worker, for example, did at the cost of his own life.

Was Stalin a great politician? Or a naive child? Does a leading politician have the right to think and decide like a child? If so, it is a curse on his country.

It has been firmly established that, after Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the pact 23 August 1939, Hitler continued building his huge Wehrmacht without any respite, with all vigor, and at an accelerated pace. Against whom? Against France and Britain? Oh no, he knew that he would encounter no special difficulties in West Europe, as ultimately was the case. What the Nazis were preparing for was denoted in the "Barbarossa Plan," which they adopted 1 August 1940—a plan directed right against the Soviet Union and aimed at routing the Red Army and seizing Moscow.

This was the chief, most important thing for them, not the taking of Paris and the flight of the British from Dunkirk. It was for **this** that Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow.

We know that in May 1941, 1 month before the attack on the Soviet Union, Rudolf Hess, a very close associate and Hitler's former secretary, was urgently sent by air to Britain to reach agreement with it on lasting peace and even, maybe, on a joint struggle with Germany against the USSR.

Let us ask again: Was Stalin a great politician? Or a dim-witted dilettante? He cannot have been both. Moreover, as it later became known, he respected Hitler for his cruel nature, which had something in common with his own. Something else is also known—Hitler also treated Stalin with personal understanding for the same reason.

Let us recall the giddy speed with which the Germans some time later captured Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Rostov, and the approaches to Moscow and with which their troops were later moved to the Caucasus. Who among the older people does not remember this?

Let us recall who was to blame for the Soviet troops' serious defeat on the Kharkov salient in the spring of the following year, 1942, when the fascists resolved to reach Stalingrad—and did so, continuing to move "like lightning." All this happened before the eyes of millions of Red Army men. What must they have thought to themselves, despite Stalin's highfalutin statements and despite Erenburg's brilliant articles? Stalin was a great strategist?

Was it really so incredibly difficult to get to the bottom of Hitler's secret strategy? Let any leading marshal or experienced military historian of ours answer this question.

Incidentally, was the class approach to strategic analysis employed under Stalin, as Engels employed it in his time?

For the Soviet Union was now being opposed not by any chance, temporary adversaries but—in the headquarters, at least—by deadly enemies, rampaging fascists. Hitler was a cunning madman but, as a thinking person, he was fundamentally a petit bourgeois. V.I. Lenin invariably took such things strictly into account during the civil war.

The pact with Hitler was Stalin's biggest and essentially criminal miscalculation, one which jeopardized the USSR's very existence in 1941 and several times after that. It is quite impossible to forget and forgive this too. In point of fact, Stalin understood nothing of chief importance then and, as it turned out, played into fascism's hands.

But it cannot be said that no one in Moscow at that time understood this either. This was sometimes claimed, but it is absolutely false. At the Central Committee session before the signing of the treaty with Ribbentrop serious objections were raised by M.M. Litvinov, who at that time no longer had a direct bearing on our diplomacy. Stalin disliked him, as well as Chicherin, probably because he [Litvinov] understood international affairs 100 times better than he did. True, Stalin was later obliged, nonetheless, to send Litvinov, as the best of all our diplomats, urgently to the United States, to Roosevelt, and this time, overcoming himself, he was right. It is impossible to repudiate exceptions even in Stalin's case.

Here, however, I again wish to say something about my addressee, Ilya Erenburg, who is no longer with us. How could he, an uncommonly knowledgeable expert in international affairs and generally an intelligent man, how could this publicist with a big name stand up for such a flawed policy at such a time? Was he really just afraid to express himself differently? I certainly do not want to believe that.

There is no doubt, of course, that our failures and breakdowns during the war years were very seriously influenced by other causes which were, however, rooted in that same policy of Stalin's. It is sufficient to name his monstrous devastation of the Red Army's top command headed by Tukhachevskiy. I spoke of this in the first "letter to Erenburg." From a purely military viewpoint, and not just a political one, this too was a terrible blow to us with unparalleled consequences. Here too, as luck would have it, Hitler could have wished nothing better for himself.

I myself was not at the front, as I was working at our embassy in London at the time. But I pick up a witness—the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia published in 1963, that is, 10 years after Stalin's death (otherwise, of course, it never would have appeared in that form). It is a perfectly competent academic organ which can undoubtedly be relied upon. I cite it verbatim. By that time the

numerical strength of the Soviet Armed Forces had reached 4,207,000 men. The encyclopedia writes:

"All the plans (of Moscow—E.G.) were imbued with the single idea of defending the socialist homeland. However, owing to the incorrect assessment of the situation by I.V. Stalin, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, who took one-man decisions on the most important issues of state policy and defense, the implementation of those plans was not begun in good time.

"Things were unsatisfactory with the mechanization of the Army and the mobilization of the troops. By the beginning of the war the troops were armed chiefly with tanks of obsolete design and did not have a full complement of motor transport, and aircraft of new design had only just begun to reach the Air Force. The armed forces had not been put in a state of combat readiness, and positions directly along the western border had not been fortified over long stretches (see my first letter to Erenburg, which mentioned the razing of earlier fortifications in connection with the pact with Hitler—E.G.).

"I.V. Stalin relied too much on the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty and believed that Germany would not unleash aggression against the USSR. He regarded as provocative the data which was coming in on the preparation of a German fascist attack on the USSR....

"Serious damage was done to the USSR's defense by the unsubstantiated repression of military cadres resulting from Stalin's abuse of his power.

"Soviet troops in the border districts did not receive a timely order to deploy their forces and take up defense positions along the USSR's western borders, with the result that they were surprised by Hitler's attack. In the very first days of the attack the German fascist troops seized the strategic initiative over the entire Soviet-German front and began advancing deep into the USSR. Despite the heroism and very great fortitude and endurance displayed by the personnel, Red Army formations were unable to contain the enemy onslaught and retreated with heavy fighting and great losses."

Do such frank statements about Stalin's total inability to wage war surprise you? Of course—but not, I think, those who will recall when he studied military matters: during 1918-1920, during the civil war. The Red Army consisted at that time of comparatively small, poorly trained, and badly armed detachments, and roughly the same could be said of the White Guards. And it was not a modern army then. That was practically all that Stalin knew about military operations, although from then on his staff officers indefatigably fed him military lectures and even set him "examinations at an academic level."

He was now opposed by the world's strongest army, which had beaten the French and driven the British from the continent. At the beginning of the war he appointed to important posts venerable civil war figures who were

20 years out of touch with military reality, like himself. Thus, right at the start of the war he made Voroshilov, Budennyi, and Timoshenko front commanders, and they had emerged from the old civil war school. Not one of them was fit for war against Hitlerite Germany, and soon all three had willy-nilly to be dismissed. Stalin was almost too late in removing them.

They had to be replaced by other military chiefs, including people straight from the camps, such as, for example, Rokossovskiy, subsequently a marshal, who took Berlin together with Zhukov and Konev. As is known, Stalin hardly ever got on well with men such as Zhukov, and after the war he sent him to command the Odessa and Urals Military Districts. Stalin disliked such truly gifted military men just as much as he disliked Chicherin and Litvinov among the diplomats.

He was no great strategist. This was why Hitler was so sure that he would succeed in defeating the Soviet Union and then in capturing all of Europe and ending socialism. A great deal would have been lost then, if not for the Soviet people, who withstood everything and surmounted everything.

Looking calmly back now, it is not at all so easy to understand how the Red Army, after all the fatal mistakes and failures of Stalin's leadership, was still able then to switch to a victorious counteroffensive and take Berlin. Its strength really was redoubled by the Soviet soldiers' heroic patriotism and the Soviet people's unique sense of sacrifice.

Study Recommendations on November CPSU CC Plenum

18010275 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Dec 88 First Edition pp 2-3

[Unattributed article: "On the Path of Renewal of the Political System: How to Conduct Classes for Studying Materials of the November 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet Extraordinary 12th Session, 11th Convocation"]

[Text] A study of materials of the November CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet Extraordinary 12th Session, 11th Convocation is beginning in the system of political instruction for Army and Navy personnel. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the USSR Supreme Soviet Session, the Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution and the Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies which the Session adopted outlined priority measures and marked the beginning of the first phase of a reform of the political and judicial-legal system of Soviet society. They confirmed the deep interest of the party and Soviet government in harmonizing relations among nationalities and in sensibly distributing powers among union and republic bodies.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy recommends the following for making a detailed study of materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet Session and for mobilizing military personnel to fulfill their resolutions and the tasks facing the Armed Forces:

- Conduct interviews on these materials in Marxist-Leninist training groups for officers and generals;
- Explain resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and USSR Supreme Soviet Session comprehensively and intelligibly in the process of teaching social sciences in USSR Ministry of Defense higher educational institutions, in Marxism-Leninism universities, and in party aktiv schools;
- Set aside three classes each in the system of political instruction for warrant officers and of political classes with soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers and with Soviet Army and Navy employees for studying materials of the Plenum and the Session (set aside two classes of three hours each in political training groups where classes are held once a week). Organize and conduct the classes by the narrative-discussion method before the beginning of the training year. Bring in USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, party and soviet officials, and leaders and the ideological aktiv of small and large units and ships to conduct them.

An explanation of provisions of the report by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev "On the Sovereignty of the Soviets and Creation of a Socialist Rule-of-Law State" and of the adopted decrees and laws must be tied in closely with materials of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, with deputies' speeches, and with missions being accomplished by the unit, ship and subunit.

It is advisable to examine the following questions in political classes:

1. The program of radical renewal of the country's political system.
2. The significance of party and state documents adopted for strengthening the friendship and solidarity of USSR peoples and our Motherland's economic and defense might.

In brief introductory remarks it should be noted that the work of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and USSR Supreme Soviet Session was preceded by a productive and frank nationwide discussion of the proposed laws in an atmosphere of broad glasnost. This convincingly confirmed that the program of political and legal reform worked out at the 19th All-Union Party Conference found broad worker support. Representatives of the

most diverse layers of Soviet society expressed satisfaction over the fact that the proposed laws had been prepared in the spirit of the Conference's political aims and corresponded to the tasks of the first phase of a political system reform.

Millions of party members and nonparty persons and the representatives of different nationalities and nations took part in discussing the proposed laws. Over 300,000 constructive remarks and suggestions were made. It was proposed to clarify 32 of the 62 articles in the draft Law on Elections of USSR Deputies and 26 of 55 in the draft Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution. Considerations of the working group which included our most prominent specialists in the field of legal and political science were taken into account. A number of suggestions made by deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and of union and autonomous republic supreme soviets were included.

Adoption of the Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) and the Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies gave a green light to radical transformations of the political system.

In beginning an explanation of the first question, "Program of Radical Renewal of the Country's Political System," it should be pointed out that this program was set forth comprehensively and broadly in M. S. Gorbachev's report. It is important to reveal the place and role of planned transformations of the political system in the course of revolutionary restructuring and remind students of provisions of 27th CPSU Congress and 19th Party Conference materials concerning this problem. It should be pointed out in specific examples from the life of Soviet society that our successful progressive movement is inconceivable without eliminating the imperfection of political institutions and without a rebirth of the soviets as representative bodies of the people's power and self-government. Only in the combination of an economic reform with political transformations, democratization and glasnost is it possible to accomplish the tasks facing our society and the Armed Forces.

The propagandist must direct students' attention to the fact that a reform of the political system is an exceptionally complicated task and requires phased accomplishment. It is necessary to emphasize that within the framework of the political reform we also have begun a profound restructuring of the judicial-legal system and other tasks connected with forming a socialist rule-of-law state. The class instructor must explain to students the report's evaluation of the basic content of proposed laws and of those fundamental innovations which are called upon to create necessary conditions for unfolding socialist democracy and the people's self-government, and above all those such as congresses of people's deputies at unionwide and republic levels and a constantly functioning Supreme Soviet. It is necessary to reveal the powers of houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the new functions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The students' special attention must be drawn to the problem of authority being under control by establishing necessary guarantees precluding the possibility that any element of the state mechanism will escape the control of the people and their representatives. It is important to emphasize that the principle of being under control permeates the entire system of authority and government. Thus the Congress of People's Deputies itself acts as the country's supreme controlling authority. Control functions are fully inherent to the Supreme Soviet. The authority of the People's Control Committee has been strengthened considerably and the creation of a Constitutional Supervision Committee has been secured legislatively.

Then the class instructor should move on to an explanation of provisions of the report concerning the powers of union republic bodies and reveal a number of corrective amendments made to the USSR Constitution. It must be noted that although the entire set of issues connected with the status of union republics and with an expansion of their rights and capacities is proposed for consideration by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on Problems of Relations Among Nationalities, even today there has to be confidence that many of them can and must find a fair resolution specifically within the framework of restructuring by methods of democratic discussion and development of coordinated positions.

Then there should be a comprehensive examination of the problem of a cardinal renewal of the work of local soviets. One should show the soviets' role in accomplishing restructuring tasks and ways of reviving their sovereignty.

In speaking of a radical renewal of our electoral system it is necessary to note that the new electoral law has an important feature—it envisages elections of USSR people's deputies from single-mandate electoral districts with the nomination of several candidates. This procedure provides an opportunity for a real choice. The propagandist must convincingly show the way in which these opportunities can be realized, including under Army and Navy conditions. It is necessary to make students aware of the meaning of an innovation in our political life such as elections of one-third of USSR people's deputies from public organizations and the revival of Leninist traditions of the Soviet electoral system under new conditions.

In concluding presentation of the first question it is necessary to cover the set of radical changes which must take in the entire law-protection mechanism and legislation along the path of our society's movement toward a rule-of-law state. It is important that trainees understand that formation of a rule-of-law state cannot be a matter only of state and public institutions. It cannot be built without the active participation of all citizens and without an increase in the legal and political culture of all Soviet citizens and Army and Navy personnel. Therefore it is desirable for the propagandist to use specific examples

from Army life to show the interrelationship and interdependence of demands contained in the laws and of military discipline and combat readiness.

Going on to presentation of the second question, "Significance of Party and State Documents Adopted for Strengthening the Friendship and Solidarity of USSR Peoples and our Motherland's Economic and Defense Might," direct the personnel's attention to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum Decree "Measures for Carrying Out a Political Reform in the Sphere of State Organizational Development." This important party document sets the task of steadfastly implementing measures approved by the 19th All-Union Party Conference in the sphere of relations among nationalities and fullest consideration both of the specific interests of different nations and nationalities as well as of tasks of preserving and strengthening the most important achievement of the Great October—fraternal friendship of the Soviet Union's peoples. It should be noted that service in the Armed Forces must become a school of internationalism.

In revealing the content of the USSR Supreme Soviet Decree "Further Steps for Carrying Out a Political Reform in the Sphere of State Organizational Development," it will be proper to direct students' attention to the fact that the process of further steps to expand the competence of republics and eliminate excessive centralization in relations of the USSR and union republics at the same time presumes the state's retention of powers permitting it to ensure unity of legislative regulatory activities throughout the country's territory and fundamental issues of state, economic and social-cultural organizational development; to direct the country's economy as a single national economic system; to organize the USSR's defense; to represent it in international relations; and to decide other issues of all-union importance.

The group instructor must make students aware of basic provisions of the Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution, directing the personnel's special attention to articles revealing powers of USSR organs of authority in the sphere of defense, in the interests of protecting the USSR and the security of its citizens, and in case of the need to fulfill international treaty obligations of mutual defense against aggression.

In explaining provisions of the Law On Elections of USSR People's Deputies it is necessary to reveal new points in the organization and conduct of elections in our country and show that the adopted procedure for nominating people's deputies opens up an important stage in development of Soviet statehood on the basis of democratization and self-government of the people. Students should be told about servicemen's electoral rights and the procedure for their participation in the electoral campaign.

At the conclusion of the class it is necessary to emphasize that the nature of work of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet Session and adoption of new laws persuade us that our society has

begun practical work to carry out a political system reform. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum and USSR Supreme Soviet Session produced a powerful ideological charge. Army and Navy personnel welcomed their results and the adopted resolutions. Extensive work lies ahead to realize them. Army and Navy party members, Komsomol members, and all Armed Forces personnel must become fighters for restructuring, for our society's renewal, and for increasing the Motherland's economic and defense might not in words but in actions, and they must take part in the upcoming electoral campaign with high sociopolitical activeness.

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Final Stage of Party Electoral 'Campaign' in Armed Forces

18010278 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Dec 88 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Party Conferences: Political Bodies Give Accounts; Criticism Without Curtseys; A Time of Specific Actions and Deeds"]

[Text] The report-election campaign in Army and Navy party organizations has entered its final and very important stage—party conferences are under way. They will begin at the district, group of forces and fleet level in the near future. The conferences continue the serious and constructive conversation begun at report-election party meetings about ways to deepen the restructuring of party-political work, build up efforts, and realize 19th All-Union CPSU Conference aims toward qualitative parameters in Armed Forces training and toward strengthening efficiency and discipline.

Time places special demands on the present conferences. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum and USSR Supreme Soviet Session were held; they adopted the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution and the Law on Elections of People's Deputies and adopted

other important resolutions. New tasks which political bodies and primary party organizations of the Army and Navy are called upon to accomplish stem from these laws and resolutions. Under these conditions the need for mastering all forms and methods of political leadership and using them to influence the state of affairs in each collective gains special weight. Each party conference is called upon not only to generalize the best experience of party influence on the life and activities of subunits and units, but also to determine constructive measures for its further near-term improvement. Another feature of the conferences is the accounting nature of political bodies' reports. The political bodies receive an evaluation of their work "from below," which emphasizes their responsibility for direction of primary party organizations and for the status of party work as a whole.

Experience convinces us that the meaningful organization of conferences is determined long before they open. A truly Leninist exactingness and a direct and honest analysis of party life are achieved where political bodies do not allow secrecy in the preparatory period and where they go seek open council with party members and nonparty persons. For example, theses of the political department report were prepared with the participation of many party officials and activists in the unit where Officer A. Kiselev is political department chief. People had an opportunity to become familiar with the theses in party organizations. This permitted considerably enriching the report's content, making it the fruit of collective reflection and tying it in more closely with real life and all its complexities and problems. Opinions expressed in the preparatory stage later were supported and expanded in speeches by conference delegates. This allowed the political department to more precisely define its place in restructuring and in how to become a body of really political leadership and act creatively without constraining or substituting for other managing levels.

Such a creative, innovative approach deserves all possible support. Conferences must have an inherent atmosphere of exactingness and democratism and a strict and objective analysis of what has been achieved and of unresolved problems. Unfortunately, however, instances of a lightweight approach also have not been eliminated. Often political bodies' reports are detached from the life of party organizations and contain no detailed analysis of the restructuring experience. Proper attention is not given everywhere to the results of report-election party meetings in primary party organizations or to the work of party committees and party buros to improve various aspects of inner party life and ideological-indoctrination activity. There have been instances where conference delegates essentially avoided acute issues and did not join in the discussion. This showed up at the party conference of the unit where Lt Col A. Dmitriyenko heads the political department.

The entire course of the party conference must be a school of truthfulness, businesslike efficiency and concreteness for delegates and all party members. Political

bodies succeed considerably more often in raising the critical direction of conferences compared with past years. Acute dissatisfaction resounds over stereotyped forms of party influence on accomplishing tasks of the personnel's combat training. Deficiencies in party-political work to strengthen discipline and to overcome a lack of organization, laxity, the free-ride mentality and smugness are subjected to serious criticism. The conferences sharply condemn the administrative-pressure work methods of some political bodies and party organizations and adherence to diktat.

But it is impossible not to see that criticism and self-criticism bear a declarative character in a number of places. Often "smoothed-over" speeches are made from the conference rostrum. Critical remarks are addressed exclusively to higher echelons and the internal reserves and unused capacities of party collectives which conference delegates represent are analyzed extremely superficially. The task is to ensure that there is no empty talk at conferences. People expect not general reflections and calls for work in a new way from party-political bodies, but a graphic example in restructuring party work itself in light of demands of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The results of final inspections permit a determination from fundamental positions of the specific ways of strengthening ideological support of restructuring and building up party influence to overcome stagnant phenomena in combat and political training, strengthen regulation order, and unite military collectives.

Problems of ideological-indoctrination activity of political bodies and party organizations must hold a worthy place at conferences. It is necessary to uncover reserves for reinforcing renewal processes and to answer with all frankness the questions: To what extent are they directed at a specific person? How effectively do they develop people's responsibility for the fate of restructuring? More attention should be given to problems of instilling in servicemen a high culture of intercourse among nationalities.

Party commissions also give an account of their work at conferences. It is inadmissible for their accounts to bear a formal nature. The new make-up of party commissions must be chosen in accordance with democratic principles spelled out by the CPSU Central Committee Instruction on Elections of Leading Party Bodies. It is important to outline a specific program of work for ensuring the purity of party ranks and for the organizational-political strengthening of party organizations.

Party conferences in the Army and Navy are a demanding review of the work of political bodies and party organizations. The generalized experience and adopted resolutions must provide a powerful impetus for a further deepening of restructuring and for creating reliable guarantees of its irreversibility.

Criticism of Southern Group of Forces Political Directorate Conference

*PM2012125188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Dec 88 First Edition p 2*

[Article by own correspondent Colonel V. Kostko under the "Party Conferences" rubric: "Organization Bolsters Strength"]

[Text] This Southern Group of Forces party conference was different from previous ones. It took place in a new atmosphere in which the political directorate had to report back to the delegates on its work in implementing the 27th CPSU Congress decisions and the 19th all-union party conference and party Central Committee plenum directives. The grass-roots levels asked the political organ to be forthright in its assessments.

This was carried out incompletely. The political directorate failed to fully meet the proper criteria in its report or to examine shortcomings in its activity self-critically; this also affected the content of delegate speeches, which did little to analyze the work of the political directorate, its departments, or specific officers.

Another feature was that the problems of restructuring party political work were examined from the standpoint of the initiatives put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's address to the UN General Assembly session—initiatives that have received a broad response in the world—and in light of the new emphasis in military building. This line was clearly discernible in the reports delivered by Lieutenant General R. Gorelov, member of the Military Council and chief of the group Political Directorate, and Colonel A. Galay, secretary of the Political Directorate Party Commission, and in the speeches made by Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander of the Southern Group of Forces, and comrade delegates A. Gusev, L. Chukin, I. Ploskonos, and others.

The conference was addressed by Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

How, in what areas and by what means, should a political organ operate if it is to ensure via command and political cadres and party organizations that priority is accorded to the qualitative parameters of combat readiness? What specifically has been done and what still remains to be done to ensure that glasnost and democratization become a tangible part of the lives of military collectives, that communists become more active in seeking to overcome manifestations of stagnation, and that new approaches are introduced more energetically in the campaign for a high standard of organization, discipline, and law and order? These and certain other questions underlay all the discussion.

There has been progress in restructuring the political directorate's work. Political directorate officers are increasingly abandoning desk-bound work and doing

more work in primary party organizations to study the situation, help the grass-roots aktiv, and coordinate their own efforts on the basis of analysis.

The report, for example, devotes only one line to a targeted action such as the sociopolitical assessment of primary party organization secretaries. Whereas in the life of primary collectives the assessment has become an event that has in many places shaken the atmosphere of complacency, temporizing, and parasitism. On the other hand, experience worthy of attention has stood out more sharply in its beam.

Or the following: Composite groups of political directorate cadres are carrying out targeted work in laggard units and subunits; the firm line of enhancing the role of elected party organs is being pursued in carrying out cadre policy at local level....One could continue enumerating the specific steps taken in restructuring which are giving a return right now.

At the same time, as the conference noted, a considerable number of regiments and battalions still only muster a "satisfactory" grade. As Army General A. Lizichev observed in his speech, the group Military Council, Political Directorate and staff have not realized their full potential here. Stress is still being laid on intermediary mobilizing mechanisms instead of creating through concerted efforts a properly combative mechanism of organization and control. This is today's number one task.

Involving the lower links, particularly the battalion and regimental link, in restructuring is another very important thrust. That is where the demands on communists regarding combat training organization have been downgraded. Competition has yet to receive an invigorating new boost. People continue to be taken away from classes and combat training plans are breached. Without the elimination of these shortcomings it is impossible to enhance the qualitative parameters of combat readiness. Moreover, such omissions seriously affect personnel morale and discipline.

And figures giving food for thought were again cited. According to the results of the final check, 36 percent of the officers in the directorate of N Unit received an "unsatisfactory" grade in weapons training and 42 percent got that grade for driving. And people quite reasonably said: Surely you cannot be serious about achieving a qualitative new level until the solution of this problem is taken in hand. No matter what reforms are carried out in the upper echelons of the military leadership, they will not have the required impact if there is no radical restructuring at local level—in the formation, the regiment, the battalion, and the company. There is very broad scope for efforts to be applied here. And the primary party organizations must have the final say in it.

Third, as the conference observed, the three lessons of the 27th party congress—the lesson of truth, the lesson of practical action, and the lesson of developing activeness

and awareness on the part of the masses—have been blunted. Actual practice shows that while the first lesson has been learned to some extent, glasnost has still not reached the level which the party expects of us.

Restructuring and intensification of effort are still poorly reflected. This is particularly perceptible in organizational work. The group's troop training, discipline, and social, cultural, and consumer conditions suffer from this. All these omissions generally derive from bad organization, poor performance, and unsatisfactory monitoring.

On the subject of monitoring, we have many checks and inspectors today. But little practical benefit has been derived thereby to date. People cannot abide fuss and incompetent interference in their work. Ill-prepared checks quite often disorganize the work of regimental and battalion officers, and frequent flying visits by inspectors deprive them of independent thought and deed.

Practice confirms that the third lesson of the congress has been learned particularly badly. This concerns the development of activeness and awareness on the part of cadres and all servicemen. This directive demands greater contact with the personnel and well-considered answers to questions that worry people. It stands to reason that what is needed here are in-depth knowledge of party policy, convinced belief in its rightness, and a sound civic stance. Every communist must be so equipped, and all forms of political and party training must be geared to that end. Without it the party aktiv will be unable to overcome the barrier of passivity displayed by some officers or to encourage NCO's and enlisted men to "go over the top" and do battle against bullying and other negative phenomena.

The need to improve the personal example set by every communist and communist leader, in particular, was keenly raised at the conference. There are units, for instance, which show an increase in gross breaches of discipline. What kind of role for communists can one speak of here? Party-mindedness must show a real improvement in the way things are.

Today, speakers remarked, some forms of party work are in a state of crisis. Old approaches and the absolutization of certain desk-bound methods employed in an attempt to solve acute problems (conferences, sessions, and so forth) have resulted in some political and party workers' preparing "measures" rather than giving people job training and assessing problems, rather than the people who are tackling them. Those accustomed to tackling all problems by the sole method of issuing commands and applying pressure and who accommodate themselves to the powers that be while ignoring the interests of the men and the common cause must be brought into line. Stress must be placed on people who are creative, principled, and independent rather than those who are lacking in initiative and merely dutiful.

The conference discussed problems concerned with restructuring the party leadership of the Komsomol. A didactic tone and overadministration are still alive and well here. Stress was placed on the need to put political trust in young people and give them more independence and to take care to inculcate responsibility and a high standard of interethnic relations. Internal potential and links with labor collectives, scientific establishments, and public organizations in Hungary and with servicemen of the fraternal Hungarian People's Army are not being fully used to this end.

International education has and always will be an inalienable part of political education work, Major General of Aviation A. Gusev stressed in his speech. And he cited the following: On the day of the conference, military aviators had transferred more than R20,000 to the victims' aid fund in response to the disaster that has befallen the people of Armenia. Everything possible must be done to ensure that military service provides young people with a true schooling in internationalism.

The main point, the conference stressed, is that new organizational momentum is imparted to the whole restructuring mechanism. Lenin's dictum that organization bolsters strength must be borne in mind.

B. Stukalin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Hungary, took part in the conference's work.

Statement of Military Expenditures Urged
PM0401162589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov under the rubric "Political Observer's Opinion": "Finding Out About Ourselves"]

[Text] Soviet foreign policy has been inundated with praise from virtually the whole world. Last year it disarmed many skeptics and inspired even more those who linked their main hopes for the favorable course of world events with the successful progress of restructuring in the Soviet Union. The praise is merited. And there's no denying we like praise. That is a long-standing weakness. And long-standing food for international affairs journalists. We could now limit ourselves to this praise—so abundant is it and so tempting not only to look at but even to taste. But...

But by limiting themselves to the praise of others, praise which merges into boasting about themselves, international affairs journalists would be descending to the methods—and baseness—of the time of stagnation, betraying the spirit of restructuring which demands that we go forward, go deep, and go further. We must speak of the unresolved tasks—our people need a fundamentally different level of information, especially on those dominant salients of foreign policy where it is interwoven with questions of military building. In other words we

need a qualitatively new level of glasnost (and truth!) in the military field. Without it we cannot count on stable trust in our policy in the surrounding world. Without it, which is even more important, there would be no possibility of serious public discussion within our country on the expediency and priorities in state expenditure, on what proportion of this expenditure we can allow ourselves for building and maintaining the armed forces, and on the line which must not be crossed in this respect. Because beyond this line begins the process of the country's economic exhaustion and destruction and damage to national security, which is protected by no means merely by the might of the armed forces but also by the overall power of the state and society, the orderliness and balance of the economy, and the standard and quality of life of the people, on which the strength of their patriotism also directly depends. These are all fundamental questions. They are being urgently put on the agenda by the course of political reform. Without their discussion the work of the new Supreme Soviet elected in the spring, which must, not for the sake of form but in earnest, be invested with full powers of control over the powers' executive organs, is inconceivable.

To illustrate the degree of concealment which still remains I shall cite what are in my view two striking examples. One of them is contained in the words of E.A. Shevardnadze. In an interview describing a recent meeting of the aktiv of Foreign Ministry workers, the foreign minister recalled that 2 years have elapsed since the readiness to make public our state budget was announced (that is to make public military expenditures and not only the Defense Ministry budget announced in the press—S.K.). The projected deadline is approaching, "the minister said. "We should provide information on what has already been done in this field and what still has to be done." What is preventing them? The minister was rather evasive in his explanation of the specific complication. But in a general way he noted the "stagnation-era vice" which arose at the time when the distance between word and deed was enormous and in no way wanted to be reduced." He said: "This vice is the 'practical workers' sometimes placid attitude toward statements at top level: Statements are all very well, they say, but as for fulfilling what has been announced—we'll see what happens..."

I recall that a commitment to make public our real total military expenditure was made by the Soviet leadership in 1987 to the world community, at the UN General Assembly. Its fulfillment is connected with calculations complicated by the intricate and in many respects criminal system of price formation, with the scattering of orders for arms round a minimum of 15 ministries. And perhaps to a decisive degree it is connected with the fact that no one has seriously calculated what this could cost by proceeding even in peace time from a principle doubtful even in war: We shall not be stinting! It is not from Soviet but from U.S. publications, from the words of U.S. Defense Secretary F. Carlucci, that we can hear

that during a visit to the United States a very eminent Soviet military leader admitted that even he did not know the USSR's genuine military expenditure. And I think that was the real truth and not an attempt to protect a military secret. Can there be any more eloquent illustration of how the "housekeeping" was managed—and still is managed—in our fatherland? In the absence of real data, for many years when meeting foreign colleagues Soviet experts tried to prove that the R20 billion of our declared military expenditure could entirely ensure parity with the \$300 billion released for the Pentagon. In the absence of real data, people abroad, without any "help" from us, excelled in trying to estimate what percentage of the Soviet GNP—twice as much or four times as much as the American 6-7 percent—is eaten up by the military budget.

My opinions and bewilderment are not new. Similar views can be encountered in our press. But I am not afraid of repeating myself. We must hit this spot again and again. This spot and this wall which, as E.A. Shevardnadze's words attest, is hard to break through. We have no right to speak of the victory of the new thinking until this wall has been broken through, until we have overturned this pillar of old and backward thinking—irrational obsession with secrecy, whose reverse side is lack of control and lack of accountability to one's own people. Yes, that is what is under discussion, that holy of holies of the bureaucratic administrative-edict system. The commitment to proclaim the true size of military expenditure was not only made to the world community. It should be a commitment primarily to our people. If they are indeed the masters of this land, if we want to assert the people as the true owners, there is no doubt of their right to check how the economy is being managed through their fully empowered and properly elected representatives. To check where the wealth they have worked to make is going, to check on the real expenditure for one of the largest items. This would be an elementary and at the same time great victory for developing democracy—and ordinary common sense.

The same premise also fully applies to the second example which prompted me to write these notes. In the field of practical affairs attesting to fundamental changes in our foreign and military policy the half-million strong reduction in the numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces announced by M.S. Gorbachev from the UN rostrum can, in terms of its boldness and importance and the impression it made on the world, only be compared with one thing—the Soviet agreement to the "zero option" regarding medium-range missiles and, moreover, the promotion of the "zero-zero" option which extended the accord with the United States to shorter-range missiles. The weight and conviction of the new unilateral measures is recognized by nearly all serious objective politicians and military figures.

But here again is that selfsame aspect which undermines the thoroughness of the analysis of these measures in the Soviet press and prevents their propaganda—propaganda in the good sense. We do not know the total

numerical strength of our armed forces although in the West, in the United States, the numerical strength of national armed forces is announced regularly—down to the last man—and in China, for instance, it is also known. We do not know what proportion of the total number of our tanks is made up of the 10,000 tanks which are being cut back and how many Soviet armored divisions will remain in East Europe after six of them have been withdrawn. We do not know, and they do know, albeit only approximately, but this is an approximation which, as former experience shows, comes close to accuracy. And here we journalists and political scientists are continuing shamefully to bypass this aspect in our comparative analysis of our truly important deed while the other side—Western journalists and expert scholars—are overemphasizing this aspect, praising the Soviet Union but at the same time stressing that the Warsaw pact's superiority over NATO in terms of armed forces and conventional arms in the European theater remains. And Colonel General V.N. Lobov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces general staff, resorts to that paradoxical system of formulas which is still considered justified: "Even according to Western estimates the reductions will be about 10 percent of the total potential of our armed forces." Even according to Western estimates? But according to ours? More or less? The same? V.N. Lobov avoids a direct reply.

People may say to me: You are knocking at an open door, we already recognize these problems. I shall reply that merely recognizing their existence is not enough. Until they are resolved the door remains closed. This restrains trust in us in the outside world and, I repeat, the main thing is that it prevents the rational management of affairs in the country, the rational mobilization of forces and resources for restructuring.

There are gratifying reports that major advances in this field are no longer far away. May god grant that to be the case. On the threshold of our new parliament we must again prepare the social ground on which there could be formed and could arise fully empowered representatives of the people, representatives of a new type with the knowledge and ability to ask, representatives who would finally be able to implement Lenin's wish about people, who would not take a word on trust, and who by virtue of their responsibility to the people will demand a precise account and full information in everything. We must finally find out about ourselves, know ourselves.

Gen Army Kochetov Selected as Candidate

18010353 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian published on 6 January 1989 in the first edition on page 1 a 50-word article by Colonel V. Slobodskiy which noted that the Tamanskiy Division imeni M.I. Kalinin unanimously selected the Commander of the Moscow Military District, General of the Army K. Kochetov, as a candidate for election as a USSR People's Deputy.

Army Officer on Regional System of Volunteers *PM1100170200 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English* *No 2, 8 Jan 89 p 4*

["Letter to the Editor" from Captain Sergey Khrapko, Far-Eastern Military District: "Soldier Is a Profession"]

[Text] I was very excited reading "What Kind of Armed Forces Do We Need?" by Lt. Col. Savinkin, Cand. Sc. (Philosophy). At long last comes the realization that the reform of the economy and the political system should be followed by a military reform!

While Lt. Col. Savinkin advocated conscripted army, I'm for the Soviet Armed Forces built on a regional system of volunteer professionals. Here are my reasons.

The Armed Forces depend primarily on the prevailing modes of warfare which change with the development of the means of production.

The Red Army of the times immediately after the 1917 Revolution, the Soviet Army of the cold war period and the Soviet Armed Forces in the epoch of the "common European home" have to be different.

I think an army based on officers, non-commissioned officers and privates volunteering to be professionals either for a life-time or for periods specified in their contracts would be in the interests of our society.

I don't think it is necessary to form ethnic units as was the case in the 1920s—Lettish regiments, Belorussian territorial rifle divisions, a special Yakut rifle company. A better policy would be, to my mind, to set up regional formations. Ethnic problems can't be solved by the contraposition of different nations. This is obvious in the army. When trying to get to the bottom of any conflict involving men of different nationalities, the reasons always appear rather insignificant at first. For example, some take as personal offence some swear words, some think others are too hard on their fellow countrymen, etc.

Talking to a Georgian or a Russian involved in a breach of discipline, I catch myself thinking that this would not have happened if the Georgian or the Russian were born and lived in Georgia and served in the same military unit in Georgia, not thousands of miles from it. Familiarity with the language and customs would have helped the Russian avoid the conflict. And officers of different nationalities living in the Georgian Republic, being graduates from local military schools, would find it much simpler to relate to the men under them.

The approved Soviet budget has a deficit of 36,000 million roubles. Is it affordable today to move recruits and those who finished service in the army between the country's European and Far-Eastern parts twice a year? On which scientific data did they base the contention that "serving far away from home, a soldier would be a

better defender of the whole country"? Greater attention to economic aspects should be paid as regards the Armed Forces, not just the economy.

Cuts in the Soviet Armed Forces have been announced. These are unilateral cuts. But cuts in the number of personnel should be compensated for by qualitative changes which should be started immediately.

I can't claim that my ideas and observations constitute a theory of future changes. I'm merely an officer of the

political department of a military unit. And a young one at that. So I would like to know what competent scholars, experts and, of course, ranking members of the USSR Defence Ministry think about a military reform.

At any rate, a military reform is not the concern of the USSR Defence Ministry alone. And it is not so much its concern, as that of our entire people.

Captain Sergey Khrapko, Far-Eastern Military District

General Staff Official Defines 'Defense Sufficiency'

PM2312110988 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Dec 88 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Major General Yu. Lebedev, deputy chief of an Armed Forces General Staff directorate: "Confidence Will Strengthen Security. USSR Armed Forces General Staff Representative Comments on New Soviet Peace Proposals"]

[Text] The troop reduction announced for the European part of the USSR and the territory of our allies—the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary—unconnected with talks under the Vienna meeting mandate, together with the substantial reduction in the Soviet troop grouping in the Asian part of the country, constitutes an effective step on the way to strengthening stability in interstate relations. The idea of building our Armed Forces on the basis of the defense sufficiency principle and the invitation to NATO countries to embark on this path not in words but in deeds are confirmed by our state's unilateral steps.

Of course, this principle must be realized on a mutual basis. But the peace action of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries, whose depth and scale still have to be fully realized in the West, appears all the more significant and weighty.

In adopting such a bold and responsible decision, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his speech from the UN rostrum, our country will maintain its defense capability at the level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency. But what is the essence of the principle of defense sufficiency?

It is, above all, that the composition of the Armed Forces confined to certain limits, the quantity and quality of their arms, and the level of combat readiness strictly accord with the extent of the military threat and ensure military equilibrium and strategic parity between the opposing sides. A reasonable limit of defense sufficiency is the level necessary to ensure a guaranteed repulse to an attack and a crushing rebuff to an aggressor under any conditions of war unleashed by him. At the same time, this rules out the possibility of carrying out surprise or major offensive operations. The upcoming reduction in the USSR Armed Forces and arms takes full account of the peculiarities of the defense sufficiency principle.

The withdrawal of six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and also of formations and units such as landing-assault and river-crossing units will serve to reduce the surprise factor, as well as the risk of war as a whole. An unambiguously defensive structure will be imparted to the other divisions still remaining on our allies' territory.

It is known that simultaneous provision is being made for sizable reductions in armed forces and arms in the European part of the USSR, as well as in the strength of

the military grouping in the Asian part of the country. Naturally, this question occurs to the Soviet people: Will this not lower our motherland's defense capability, and will we not have to backtrack?

The reduction in the strength of our Armed Forces by 500,000 men and in the volume of conventional arms by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 aircraft has been strictly weighed and is commensurate with the defensive potential of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries. As a result, there will be a significant reduction in existing imbalances, but it may be said with confidence that all this will be carried out within the framework of the existing approximate equilibrium between the military forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

M.S. Gorbachev's UN speech drew attention to the fact that the first glimmers are to be seen in the world attesting that security can be ensured by reducing arms on a compromise basis. The realization of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles and the attainment of better mutual understanding with the states of Europe and Asia offer examples of this. All this, as well as the active line of the USSR, the other socialist states, and the entire progressive world community, enables us to hope for irreversibility in the process of movement toward a nuclear-free and nonviolent world. The reduction in our armed forces will undoubtedly require qualitative improvement in their training and instruction so as to maintain their combat readiness at the proper level.

When adopting decisions of fundamental importance, we naturally weighed the volume of the reductions and the qualitative changes to the structures of USSR Armed Forces units and formations on the basis of a careful analysis of the correlation between the two alliances' military potentials. At the same time we in no way underestimated the threat posed to us and our allies by the NATO bloc's powerful military groupings. Everything possible will continue to be done to ensure that no one is tempted to encroach on the security of the USSR and its allies.

Naturally, the arms that are reduced must not be used in the future for the purposes which they serve now. This means that they will be eliminated. However, we must not forget the possibility of using military hardware in the national economy. Therefore such possibilities will also obviously be envisaged when implementing the plans for arms reduction measures over 2 years, which are now being drawn up.

As for cutting personnel, this is a very sensitive issue, since it is connected with human destinies. This applies particularly to officers. This question was examined carefully at the USSR Defense Ministry. When resolving it, account will be taken of officers' length of service in the USSR Armed Forces, their housing provision, and,

of course, their professional qualities. Questions of finding employment for them will not be overlooked either. Speaking as a whole, an individual approach to officers and NCO's is envisaged, taking account of the interests and needs of each person.

The new Soviet peace initiatives and their reality concretized in terms of deadlines and volumes cannot fail to be assessed in the West as a significant step in the cause of disarmament. They are an example of the military-technical substance of the Soviet Union's defensive doctrine and, despite their unilateral nature, give rise on a moral plane to the need for a matching [adekvatnyy] response from the West. This could be manifested in the NATO countries' adopting a constructive stand at the upcoming talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, desisting from plans to compensate for arms reductions, and incorporating naval forces in the talks.

'New Thinking' Requires Maintenance of Qualitative Parity

PM0401102089 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Jan 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by lecturer Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Colonel V. Strebkov under the rubric "From the Standpoint of the New Thinking": "Military Parity Yesterday and Today"]

[Text] As the world public's response to M.S. Gorbachev's program speech at the United Nations shows, the new political thinking that is being actively developed by the Soviet Union is winning more and more supporters. There is wide support for such features as the demand to preserve civilization from nuclear annihilation, respect for the peoples' right to a free choice of their own destiny, the recognition of the impossibility of a military solution to interstate disputes and the importance of seeking a balance of interests, and the need for cooperation between all peoples and states, regardless of their sociopolitical system, to resolve mankind's global problems.

Even this brief enumeration shows that the new thinking is increasingly ruling out a policy aimed at achieving military superiority and excluding the desire for diktat by force. That is why we have reason to assert that the implementation of the idea of the new thinking is, objectively, closely connected with the maintaining of military-strategic parity (equilibrium) between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Why? Because this parity is the opposite of military superiority. Today, with common human values coming to the fore in the development of civilized relations between peoples, a substantial part of the balance of interests of the sides lies in actual parity, because one's attitude to one's partner is a reflection of one's attitude to oneself. And the sides' capacity for finding a balance of interests is a condition of mankind's survival and progress.

These circumstances have focused attention on the problem of military parity both in the Soviet Union and in the West. Different and sometimes even opposing views are expressed. A large proportion of scientists and political and military leaders acknowledge the historical role of parity in ensuring international security. But the opinion also exists (among some Soviet scientists, as well as others) that the attainment of parity by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact with the United States and NATO was probably a mistake on our part.

I would like to put forward here my own view of this problem. It is well known that the idea of creating a comprehensive system of international security, put forward at the 27th CPSU Congress, covers various spheres: military, political, economic, and humanitarian. By virtue of the fact that each of them is more or less autonomous, in a given historical situation one or another factor may come to the fore. Nonetheless all aspects of international security should be considered as a whole, in their interrelationships.

Military-strategic parity was achieved between the USSR and the United States in the seventies. The Soviet Union was forced to do this by the aggressive imperialist policy in the postwar period. By unleashing an unrestrained arms race, imperialism created an extraordinary situation around us and our allies. The military threat was ever present for us.

Could the Soviet Union and its allies have failed to respond to this? Of course not. We needed strategic parity in order to secure our interests and those of our friends. And we secured it. "But, in concentrating enormous resources and attention on the military aspect of opposition to imperialism," it was noted at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, "we did not always make use of the political opportunities that opened up, as a result of fundamental changes in the world, to ensure the state's security, lessen tension, and promote mutual understanding between peoples. As a result we allowed ourselves to be dragged into the arms race, which could not but affect the country's socioeconomic development and its international situation."

The leveling out of the correlation of military forces between the USSR and the United States had far-reaching consequences. The American leadership embarked on the path of talks with the USSR on balancing the level of the two countries' nuclear missile arms. In my view Washington would not have started talking to us on equal terms were it not for that historic achievement of ours. Western assessments confirm this. "Washington's recognition of the USSR as a great power equal to the United States," H. Sonnenfeldt, a figure in the Nixon administration, noted, "came only after it had demonstrated its ability to take its place by force."

But something else is also true. The balance was disrupted in the system of factors that form the basis of our

security. Political means, which have enormous potential—we see this clearly today—have not been fully realized. Equilibrium is maintained mainly through military aspects of security.

In economic, scientific, and technical spheres we do not have parity with imperialism. In the mid-seventies we began to lag behind the United States in the rate of growth of gross national product, and in recent years in the rate of growth of labor productivity as well. According to assessments by some of our economists, in terms of the population's living standard the Soviet Union is among the states ranking between 50th and 60th in the world. This is not appropriate to our potential and our needs either materially or spiritually.

In order to resolve the situation that had arisen, a change of emphasis was certainly needed. This is our creed: Political problems should be resolved solely by political means. And in giving them priority, we should substantially lower the level of military confrontation. And here it is not only we who should act, but also the United States and NATO, which unfortunately have not yet renounced the "strategy of deterrence" and "modernization" programs.

And another factor. A lowering of the level of our purely military potential should be accompanied by a corresponding growth in the country's economic, scientific, and technical potential. The systematic approach to our security requires this.

Thus military-strategic parity is an objective necessity, not a historical error. Consequently the important thing is not for us to abandon it and for it to disappear. What is important is this: How should we understand parity today?

In the literature on this problem, the quantitative interpretation of parity predominates (comparing the number of warheads, delivery vehicles, tanks, ships, and so forth). Where did the absolutization of the quantitative aspect of parity lead? It led to a situation where we often attached excessive significance to one particular means of armed struggle that had appeared in the West. As if that system would suddenly disrupt the measure of the reasonable in the correlation of forces between socialism and imperialism. And people did not always stop to wonder where that measure lay.

Defining parity in terms of the number of military-technical systems prompted an increase in the arms race and led to a level of confrontation where the might of the nuclear missile systems of the United States and the USSR alone is capable of destroying all life on earth more than once. But that is crazy!

It is not a question of the quantitative approach, but of the qualitative approach to military equilibrium. This means that we must move away from evaluating the correlation of forces by the number of warheads, delivery vehicles, tanks, ships, and so forth toward evaluating the combat potential of the opposing sides' military-technical systems. This approach to military parity requires, first, that parity be regarded as a correlation of the sides' strategic potential that offers the opportunity to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike. According to experts' calculations, the unacceptability percentage is assessed as the loss of 60-70 percent of industry and about 30 percent of the population. (Naturally, these hypothetical figures are purely conditional, because this takes no account of political, social, moral, and psychological aspects.) Today such damage could be inflicted by less than 10 percent of each side's strategic warheads. In effect, mountains of surplus weapons rise above the so-called "reasonable measure."

Second, the qualitative approach enables us to see parity as closely linked with reasonable sufficiency for defense. The concept of "reasonable sufficiency" enables us to overcome the narrow, one-sided (quantitative) interpretation of parity. Military equilibrium has a comparatively wide dynamic range. This is indicated by the Soviet Union's decision to reduce its Armed Forces unilaterally in the next 2 years by 500,000 men, as well as many thousands of tanks and guns and hundreds of aircraft.

At the same time parity is a two-sided equation, and the measure of reasonable sufficiency is defined not only by us, but also by the other side's actions and its degree of awareness of common human interests.

And, third and last, the quantitative approach to parity requires the creation of an integral system of strategic stability on the basis of military equilibrium.

In essence strategic stability means not only unwillingness to, but the impossibility of unleashing military conflict given a specific historical correlation of forces between the sides. As parity falls to lower and lower levels, on the basis of the balance of interests and reasonable sufficiency for defense, there will be a corresponding increase in steadiness and stability in relations between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO as a whole. The policy of strength will give way to political and legal means of settling the problems that arise.

This is a complex process. But the high assessment throughout the world of the ideas and proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations is encouraging. Parity should not be synonymous with superarming. Parity is historically necessary, but in light of the new political thinking it should be set at the lowest acceptable level.

**Maj Gen Kukhareno: Fighter-bomber Crews
Weak Against Air Defense**

18010354 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRSNAYA
ZVEZDA of 21 Nov 1988 published in Russian on page
one an article by Guards Col. P. Belenin entitled: "Combat
Training: Quality, Effectiveness, THE COMMANDER

WAS THE LEADER". The article is followed by a 50-
word commentary written by the Deputy Commander of
Aviation of the Warsaw Pact's Southern Group of Forces
in Hungary, Major General V. Kukhareno. The General
expresses concern over the "insufficient experience" of
fighter-bomber flight crews in the Southern Group in
overcoming enemy air defense systems providing "direct"
protection to objects.

Yazov Speaks at GSFG Party Conference
LD2412013888 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 23 Dec 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The 19th party conference of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany was held today in Wuensdorf in the GDR.

[Correspondent V. Mostovoy] The Army Communists discussed the results of the work done by political-command cadres, party organizations, and the entire personnel to fulfill the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th all-union conference and the party Central Committee decisions on defense matters. Taking part in the conference was Army General Yazov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of defense of the USSR. In his speech, he said, inter alia:

[Begin Yazov recording] The Army and Navy are being restructured along the lines of the all-party policies. It should be noted that the restructuring processes are evident today in the group of forces in Germany as well. The activities of the military soviets and of the leading political-command cadres are now more concrete and businesslike. Democracy and glasnost are becoming established in the servicemen's collectives and party organizations are becoming more active and combative. On the whole, reactions to shortcomings are now sharper. It must be stated bluntly, however, that the new elements in the activities of political-command cadres and party bodies, engendered by the restructuring, have not yet produced any perceptible improvement in the overall results for troop training and reinforcing discipline. In day-to-day life, one comes across instances of irresponsibility, placidity, formalism, and bureaucratism, which are not being given principled assessments in the party organizations. The main reason for this is that many have yet to realize that the restructuring means, above all, a new quality of work by each individual person in the work entrusted to him. Many today feel as if they are at a rally, not realizing that a new stage in the restructuring began long ago—a stage of intense practical work, a stage of concrete action. It is fairly common to find people who have learned how to talk in a new way, but work the old way, that is, without due responsibility and initiative. Such people are prisoners of inertia, routine, and placidity. The principal substance of the restructuring in the Armed Forces is the implementation of the demands made by the 19th party conference which call for giving priority to qualitative parameters in military construction. What is it that makes up our daily round in military construction? It's combat training. The orientation towards qualitative parameters concerns all sections of the Armed Forces and every Army and Navy Party organization. What we need today is a sharp change in people's psychology and a decisive struggle against the deep-rooted habit of tackling all issues on the basis of quantitative rather than qualitative parameters.

Lenin's behest 'Better less but better' is topical today as never before. [end recording] [video shows Yazov addressing a hall full of uniformed servicemen]

Yazov Concerned for Morale After Troops Cuts
PM2612133188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Dec 88 Second Edition p 2

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Colonel A. Vasilets, Lieutenant Colonel I. Kosenko report under the rubric "Party Conferences": "Restructuring Requires Action"]

[Text] As has already been reported, a party conference has been held in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The report—delivered by Colonel General N. Moiseyev, chief of the group's Political Directorate—and the speeches by Communists B. Snetkov, A. Mityukhin, A. Prygunov, A. Tkachenko, V. Semeryak, K. Shapkin, V. Agafonov, G. Kobuk, V. Telyechko, and others analyzed the work performed by the group's Political Directorate, party commission, party committees, bureaus, and Communists in the course of restructuring. A principled, critical discussion took place in a highly businesslike atmosphere of exactingness.

At the same time it is impossible not to remark that certain speeches were in the nature of "self-reports," and that the criticism had no target. Individual speakers—air crew delegates in particular—were insufficiently self-critical in evaluating their work to strengthen discipline.

Army General D. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, took part in the work of the conference and also spoke at it.

After remarking on the specific feature of the times in which the conference was taking place, the defense minister dwelt on foreign policy issues. He said that restructuring and the new political thinking are today determining the entire foreign policy activity of our party and state. Convincing confirmation of this was Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's recent speech at the United Nations. The Soviet initiatives have literally rocked the entire world. They are filled with great vital force and meet mankind's innermost aspirations. Their chief aim is to put an end to the era of wars and confrontation.

However—the defense minister stressed—many political figures in the West have greeted the Soviet proposals, including the decisions on reducing the USSR's Armed Forces, in an ambiguous fashion. Some people have designated them propaganda, others promptly urged their own countries and peoples and their allies to keep their powder dry—and their powder magazines and their nuclear arsenals intact.

The disarmament process and the movement toward a nonnuclear and nonviolent world have not yet become irreversible and are encountering powerful resistance.

Under these conditions the chief task for us Army Communists remains that of maintaining the combat readiness and combat capability of the Army and Navy at a level ensuring the prevention of war and the reliable repulsion of possible aggression in any circumstances.

The announced reduction in the Armed Forces should be viewed in unbreakable unity with the realization of the 19th party conference guidelines on the priority of qualitative parameters in military building.

As has been announced, six tank divisions will be withdrawn from the groups of Soviet forces in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and will be disbanded. Airborne assault [desantno-shturmovyye] and a number of other combined units [soyedineniya] and other units will also be withdrawn, including assault crossing [desantno-perepravochnyye] units, along with their armaments and combat equipment.

The Soviet forces stationed in these countries are being reduced by 50,000 men, and their armament by 5,000 tanks.

Under these conditions, Army Gen D. Yazov said, it is essential to resolve all the tasks set with still greater persistence and responsibility, so as to exclude the lowering of combat readiness and ensure a high degree of organization and discipline.

The paramount task is to display the maximum concern for people, for the fate of each officer and warrant officer and their families. It is important not to permit in the troop collectives, particularly the officer community, sentiments of pacifism and of a lack of prospects.

Of course, psychologically speaking the reduction is not a simple factor for the Army. It is necessary to do everything possible to prevent errors and hasty decisions. I want to emphasize—and this must be explained profoundly to everyone—that the reduction in the officer corps will be effected via those personnel who have completed the established term of service.

Great problems of a truly revolutionary nature are today being resolved by our party in the sphere of internal policy, the defense minister stated. The decisions adopted by the 27th congress and the 19th CPSU Conference are being realized: Via economic accountability and self-financing the economic reform is gathering strength, the process of the democratization of Soviet society is growing, and a socialist rule-of-law state is being established. The 28 November 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the subsequent extraordinary 12th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation transferred the implementation of the reform of the political system to the plane of practical realization.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet session condemned extremism and separatism, demagoguery and nationalism in all their manifestations and hues, and clearly and unambiguously advocated the unity and friendship of the USSR's peoples. The future lies not in isolation, not in division and confrontation with one another, but in mutual respect for interests, in friendship and mutual assistance.

The events currently taking place in Armenia speak cogently of precisely this. The whole country has responded to the calamity which has befallen the republic. Soviet soldiers were among the first to go to its aid. Army Gen D. Yazov dwelt in detail on the scale and nature of this aid, emphasizing that the servicemen's participation in eliminating the consequences of the natural disaster is yet further evidence of the unbreakable tie between the people and the Army, and of the international character of our Armed Forces.

Next the defense minister focused on an analysis of the course of restructuring, and in the group of forces in particular. In the activity of the military councils and the leading command and political personnel, Army General D. Yazov said, the approach is now more specific and businesslike. Democracy and glasnost have become firmly established and the activeness and militancy of the party organizations are increasing. On the whole the reaction to shortcomings is now keener.

However it must be said bluntly that the incipient innovation in the activity of the command and political personnel and in the activity of the party organs which has been engendered by the restructuring has not so far led to any appreciable improvement of the overall results in the training of troops and strengthening of discipline. In everyday life one has occasion to encounter instances of irresponsibility, complacency, formalism, and bureaucracy which do not come in for a principled assessment even in the party organizations.

What are the reasons for this? The main reason is that many people have still not grasped the fact that restructuring means above all a new quality of work by each person in the sector entrusted to him. Even today some people feel as if they are merely at a rally and have not realized that a new stage arrived long ago in restructuring—the stage of strenuous practical work and specific action. The phenomenon has become widespread whereby a person learns how to say things in the new way but works in the old-fashioned manner, that is, without due responsibility and initiative, remaining in the thrall of inertia, stereotypy, and complacency.

The main content of restructuring in the Armed Forces is the implementation of the demands of the 19th party conference concerning guaranteeing priority for qualitative parameters in military organizational development.

In units and subunits this is achieved primarily by the high quality of combat and political training. It is necessary to achieve the unconditional fulfillment of all training plans and syllabi, the rational use of training time, and to increase the meaningful content of each study and training session.

This applies to all elements of the Armed Forces and to each army and navy party organization. A sharp turn is required now in the psychology of the men, and also a resolute struggle against the ingrained habit of tackling all issues on the basis of quantitative rather than qualitative parameters. Today, V.I. Lenin's precept—better fewer, but of better quality—is more topical than ever.

If a look is taken from these viewpoints at the specific work in the group's forces, it is impossible to overlook the fact that in many respects restructuring is faltering. What has the final check shown? Behind the overall positive results some very serious shortcomings have also been brought to light.

In the work methods of the management organs there is a lack of businesslike efficiency, specificity, and responsibility for the actions of the troops under their control. Some generals and officers lose their heads when the situation changes and their practical skills in preparing an operation or battle, or in controlling troops during combat actions are inadequate. The standard of methodological skill of the commanders remains low and there still persists the urge to oversimplify the situation and to make conditions easier for those undergoing training. The lack of planning in work and the postponements of exercises and study sessions are having an adverse effect on the organization of the units' life and are engendering unhealthy sentiments among the officers. The diversion of personnel from combat training is still excessive.

The main reason for the shortcomings is the low degree of responsibility on the part of some officials for the work entrusted to them. I would say, the minister stressed, that their attitude toward their post is one of overreliance on others to do the work. Take a look at the kind of facts you encounter. An officer may be in command of a regiment or a division for a year but then he picks up a map and is unable to report the procedure for organizing the defense or waging battle in his defensive zone. It is impossible to reconcile oneself to such an attitude toward matters.

The commander of a division, regiment, battalion, or company has no right to say that his conscience is clear if he knows that his subordinates are unable right now to carry out a combat assignment. This is not just his service duty, it is his party duty, too. Unfortunately we have not heard here of examples where the party organization has strictly taken to task a Communist for an irresponsible attitude to his chief obligation—to be ready for battle.

As before, questions of strengthening military discipline are acute issues. This also applies fully to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The CPSU has pointed out that a radical improvement in military discipline has not been achieved. It is necessary to proceed from this premise in practical work and seek the unswerving fulfillment of the party's demands.

Success is impossible without ensuring strict regulation order in each unit and subunit, the stepping up of work with the men, the enhancement of the effectiveness of all forms of educational work, and above all through targeting it at the specific individual.

The fact that the parents of servicemen frequently make complaints about such facts to various higher agencies eloquently attests to the acuteness of the problem of strengthening discipline, including the eradication of nonregulation relations. Everyone must realize that this is an issue of great political significance, a question of the Army's prestige and of the Soviet people's trust in the Army. And everything must be done to preserve and strengthen such trust.

In certain units of the group of forces the efficiency of the struggle against drunkenness has waned. Lawbreaking on the basis of drunkenness has not only not declined; it has even increased in a number of places. In some places the decision, in accordance with which the sale of brandy and dry wines has expanded somewhat, has virtually been regarded as a retreat from the course of combating this social evil. Everyone must realize that the struggle for a sober way of life will not be taken off the agenda.

Problems of interethnic relations in the military collectives need the closest attention these days. The events in Armenia and Azerbaijan and in the republics of the Soviet Baltic region confirm the danger of underestimating internationalist education. They cannot fail to affect sentiments among the servicemen, too, who have been drafted from those regions. It is essential to tune into these sentiments sensitively, to prevent their development in an unfavorable direction, and to avert their negative impact on the internationalist cohesion of the personnel. Today interethnic relations are an area for special attention. Internationalist education must be a constant process and be profoundly thought out.

A task of paramount significance is that of intensifying the education of the personnel in a spirit of internationalism, of friendship with the working people of the GDR, and of combat brotherhood with the servicemen of the National People's Army.

The officer has always been and still remains the key figure in the solution of all these tasks. In working constantly to enhance the political tempering, the moral, pedagogical, and legal standards, and the professional competence of the officer cadres, we thereby safeguard their authority and strengthen one-man command—that

is how the question must be formulated today. It is important to teach the military cadres to work under conditions of glasnost and democracy.

In the struggle for strong discipline and for guaranteeing a vanguard role for the Communists, the strength, adherence to principle, and the influence of the party organizations are not being utilized in full measure. Many of them do not devote themselves properly to the nurturing of CPSU members and candidate members. For this reason the number of Communists against whom party proceedings are taken is not declining. Everyone must properly grasp the fact that if the primary political organs and the party committees and bureaus of the units' party organizations do not work in the new style, taking a concrete, responsible, and creative approach, then it is senseless to expect success. The primary party organization is the leading political force, the political nucleus, the vanguard of the military collectives.

One has had occasion repeatedly to see for oneself the inexhaustible potential of the army party organizations. They permeate the entire fabric of our military structure. They constitute a great force and therefore the process of restructuring must be deepened precisely here, above all on the path toward enhancing the activeness and militancy of the primary organizations, party committees and bureaus, and of the Communists and enhancing their vanguard role.

I particularly want to stress the importance of our work with the army Komsomol, D. Yazov said. Substantial adjustments need to be made in the party leadership of the Komsomol, taking into account the recent speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the young people of Moscow in connection with the Komsomol's 70th anniversary. The very approach to work with young people ought to be decisively altered, the pedantic tone and administration by injunction must be abandoned, greater independence must be given to young people, and interest must be shown in Komsomol initiative. The Komsomol aktiv must patiently be taught the practice of working.

In a few days the new training year will begin. All the plans have already been put to bed and all the syllabi for the training of the troops have been approved. Ahead lies much complex work which requires the maximum composure, discipline, and responsibility on the part of all army Communists.

Today, as the times demand, the discussion at the conference is proceeding on a critical plane and those specifically to blame for shortcomings are being named. But we know that many remarkable Communists—commanders, political workers, and officers of the staffs—are at work in the group who are selflessly fulfilling their duty, working with a high degree of responsibility and furthering restructuring by their deeds. And all this inspires confidence that the tasks facing the group's troops in the new training year will be fulfilled.

The delegates of the GSFG party conference unanimously supported the proposal of the primary party organizations of the group's troops that M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, be nominated as a candidate from the CPSU for the people's deputies of the USSR. The proposal that Colonel General N.A. Moiseyev, member of the Military Council and chief of the GSFG Political Directorate, be nominated as a candidate from the CPSU for the people's deputies of the USSR was also supported.

General Lebedev Interviewed on Army Cuts
PM1912091588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Dec 88 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Major General Yu. Lebedev, deputy chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Markushin under the "Topical Interview" rubric: "Reduction of the Army and Defense Capability"; date, place not given]

[Text] [Markushin] Yuriy Viktorovich, the Soviet leadership's decision to carry out unilaterally a major reduction in our Army in 1989-1990, announced from the lofty rostrum of the UN General Assembly by M.S. Gorbachev, was undoubtedly a carefully gauged move. It aroused an unprecedented response in the world and has been supported by the Soviet people. However, you also hear questions. The following, in particular: Will the equilibrium between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic bloc be maintained now? After all, we are talking about not just two or three divisions but a contingent equivalent to the Bundeswehr.

[Lebedev] The troop reduction on which we are embarking unilaterally is indeed a very substantial one. However, judging by certain statements in the West, its scale and depth have not yet been realized by everyone. I have in mind primarily the political and moral aspects of this impressive step. At the same time Soviet people should be in no doubt that this decision has been thoroughly thought out. The Soviet state's defense capability will not suffer as a result of the reduction because this is a question of a balance of forces in a qualitatively new situation; specifically, in conditions in which a defensive character is being imparted to our Armed Forces.

[Markushin] Why have we decided to reduce the Armed Forces by precisely 500,000 servicemen, 10,000 tanks, and so on?

[Lebedev] These figures were not chosen at random, of course. Much painstaking work went into them and all the positions were carefully considered. They are based on our assessment of the Army's defense capability after the reduction, that is, its ability to conduct successful defensive actions in the event of aggression. At the same time, there is another question here—our ability to safeguard in every way the people affected by this

reduction. After all, of the 500,000 servicemen affected, virtually 1 in 6 is an officer. The reduction will also affect warrant officers. They must all be provided with work, housing, and so forth. Everything in this respect has been thought out. But that does not mean that great organizational measures will not be necessary. We must be ready for that.

[Markushin] Is a reduction of the military budget to be expected?

[Lebedev] The USSR advocates such a reduction. Its proposals on this score have been set out and are on the negotiating table. Unfortunately we have not received a reply from our opponents. The Soviet Union awaits that reply.

[Markushin] What reaction has NATO Headquarters given to the recent Soviet initiatives?

[Lebedev] The NATO leadership has treated them very seriously this time. In any event, no one has ventured to call them mere propaganda. That is understandable. The Soviet Union is going to remove troops from the line of contact between the two opposing groupings. These are tank formations, airborne assault formations, and river-crossing systems. NATO will have less concern about the potential ability of Soviet troops to mount surprise offensive operations, although we have never had nor could have had intentions of that kind. At the same time it cannot be said that the NATO members have changed their views to any degree. They still talk about the Warsaw Pact's "great superiority."

[Markushin] The Western press has reported possible NATO proposals to reduce each side's tanks to 10,000. What might the Soviet leadership's reaction be?

[Lebedev] The Soviet Union is always ready to examine any arms reduction proposals. M.S. Gorbachev has made that point many times. It goes without saying that the Soviet side's approach to the examination of what is proposed will be serious. We have no intention of harming our own security. The USSR's stand in this respect is firm and principled.

Lebedev Briefs Press on Troop Reductions
LD2212125188 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1209 GMT 22 Dec 88

[Text] Moscow, 22 Dec (TASS)—The unilateral reduction of 500,000 men in the Armed Forces, announced by the Soviet Union, as well as the withdrawal of tank units and offensive weapons from the countries of Eastern Europe represent the start of a practical implementation of restructuring in the USSR Armed Forces on the basis of a defensive military doctrine, Major General Yuriy Lebedev, representative of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, said here today.

Addressing a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists, he stressed that the Soviet Union will withdraw from the GDR, the CSSR, and the Hungarian People's Republic entire military units and all their materiel. He rejected claims by certain Western press organs that, allegedly, in reducing its troops which are now in these countries, the Soviet Union intends to withdraw from them only auxiliary subunits, such as railroad or agricultural subunits. The six tank divisions subject to withdrawal will be disbanded, and their military materiel, including the most up-to-date tanks, will be scrapped, except their engines, which are planned to be used in the national economy, he said.

As regards auxiliary materiel—tractors, fuel servicing trucks—they will also not be destroyed, but will find a use in various sectors of the economy. Altogether on the territories of the countries of Eastern Europe and in the European part of the USSR, the Soviet Armed Forces will be reduced by 10,000 tanks.

General Lebedev reported that the USSR Defense Ministry is now drawing up a timetable for transferring servicemen to the reserve connection with the announced reductions. The task is to provide them with work and accommodation. The main problem is in providing housing for those officers transferred to the reserve, as the elimination of the aftermath of the earthquake in Armenia will require considerable efforts and material resources in the near future to restore the destroyed towns and villages.

Having made the decision to reduce its armed forces unilaterally, Yuriy Lebedev said, the USSR is counting on positive steps in response from the NATO countries in order to make the structure of their Armed Forces truly defensive in character. He expressed the hope that the new Soviet peace initiative would help to create favorable conditions for the start of talks on armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, and also for the talks on strategic nuclear weapons, and on banning chemical weapons and nuclear tests.

Moiseyev Replaces Akhromeyev as Chief of Staff
PM1412163588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Dec 88 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Colonel General M.A. Moiseyev Is Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR First Deputy Defense Minister"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has appointed Colonel General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister.

Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev was born in 1939 into a worker's family. He has been in the Soviet Army since 1958. He graduated from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy in 1972 and from the General Staff Military Academy in 1982. He has been a regimental, divisional,

and army commander and a district chief of staff. Since January 1987 he has been commander of the Far East Military District. He is a deputy in the Khabarovsk Kray Soviet of People's Deputies.

Chronicle

The USSR Council of Ministers has appointed Colonel General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev has been relieved of the duties of chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister in connection with a transfer to other work.

Shevardnadze States Soviet Position on Chemical Weapons

PM0901084589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the International Conference on Chemical Weapons in Paris on 8 January: "Doing Away With Chemical Weapons Once and For All"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted].

Can we now, in the knowledge of all this, not spread openness to the same degree over all military chemical production, which has, like the pathological secretiveness, also been inherited from the past?

[Passage omitted].

As for the Soviet Union, we will complete in the near future the construction of an installation for the destruction of chemical weapons, and we will immediately proceed at that installation with the elimination of the chemical weapons stocks which we possess. And we will begin to do this even before the conclusion of the convention.

At the same time, the Soviet Union declares its intention to become an initial participant to the convention and calls on other states to do the same.

Having taken the path of chemical disarmament, our country has a vital interest in seeing the observance of a ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of stockpiles of them, as envisaged by the convention, implemented under effective international supervision [kontrol].

The convention must include a provision for inspection on demand [inspektsiya po zaprosu] of any site or facility in the shortest time and without right of refusal. We accept the idea of an "open invitation to inspect," on the

understanding that the inspectors will have access to all sites and facilities subject to verification without restriction, except residential buildings.

[Passage omitted].

From this high rostrum, I would like to state on behalf of the leadership of my country that the Soviet Union:

—while possessing chemical weapons, has never used them, even in its most tragic moments;

—is not producing chemical weapons;

—does not have chemical weapons beyond its national territory;

—proceeding from its principled attitude toward chemical weapons, has never transferred them to any other state;

—has declared the extent of its stocks of such weapons;

—will begin, in the current year of 1989, the elimination of the stocks at an installation especially constructed for this purpose.

The Soviet Union advocates the most stringent international verification, including on-site inspections without any right of refusal, and is ready to do everything possible and necessary for the conclusion of a convention in 1989.

The Soviet Union believes that particular importance should be given to the nonproliferation of chemical weapons. In line with this goal are steps to remove the chemical threat, which can be undertaken on the basis of coordinated measures by the states of individual regions. Therefore, we support the proposals of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and of Bulgaria and Romania, on establishing chemical weapons-free zones in central Europe and the Balkans respectively.

We call on countries not participating in the Geneva protocol to join it, and on participants not to allow it to be eroded, as this undermines the moral and political intolerance of chemical weapons, which to this day reliably holds in check the use of this most barbaric means of mass destruction.

In solemnly confirming its Geneva protocol commitments, the Soviet Union will strictly observe the ban on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons laid down in this document. It is prepared to continue taking part in strengthening the conditions laid down by this protocol.

We support the idea of investigations by the UN secretary general into cases of the use of chemical weapons, no matter where. In our view no one should have the right to refuse the holding of such investigations on his territory.

In time this function could be performed by an international verification agency, which, as we have proposed, would operate under UN auspices.

Chervov Discusses Components of Military Budget

*LD0601181089 Moscow World Service in English
1510 GMT 6 Jan 89*

[Text] The speech Mikhail Gorbachev made at the United Nations on 7 December has remained in the focus of world public attention. No wonder: The Soviet leader announced a unilateral reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces by half a million men. At the same time the Soviet Union is to slash tanks, artillery systems, and combat aircraft. The Soviet Armed Forces are assuming a defensive character. Will the reduction of army and armaments lead to a reduction in the Soviet military budget? We have taken the question to (?a) chief of the General Headquarters of the Soviet Armed Forces, Colonel General Nikolay Chervov.

I repeatedly told Western audiences that within a couple of years we will make public the structure of our military budget, he said. We have some difficulty spelling out the budget because market prices haven't yet shaped in this country. It differs from the military budget of the United States and those of the other NATO countries. The official worth of the Soviet military budget is R20 billion. But let's see what kind of budget it is. It is the Defense Ministry's budget, intended to support the personnel. That's what the 20 billion boil down to. As for arms and military equipment, they are taken into account in any but the Defense Ministry's articles. [sentence as heard] When we balance the national budget, Gen Chervov said, including the military budget, in market prices, then we will be able to compare it with the other nations' military spendings. But, anyway, both the reduction of medium- and shorter-range missiles under the Soviet-American treaty and the large-scale reduction of conventional arms and armed forces that Mikhail Gorbachev made public at the U.N. will undoubtedly slash this country's military budget. Mind you, the budget of the nation, not the Defense Ministry's budget. As a matter of fact, this is one of the aims of the reduction.

We not only take an interest in scaling down armed confrontation or reducing the war threat, though this is probably the main thing. But we also admit we need money to carry out the grandiose economic programs that the restructuring envisages. That's why the question of whether the reduction of army and armaments will lead to a reduction in the Soviet military budget must get

a clearcut answer if the unilateral Soviet action will ensure visible reduction in the national military budget within the few years to come, said Col Gen Nikolay Chervov.

Ground Forces CINC on New Regulations

*PM2212145788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Dec 88 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with USSR Ground Forces Commander in Chief Army General Ye. Ivanovskiy, USSR deputy defense minister, by Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev: "What the New Regulations Will Be Like"; date, place not given]

[Text] [Pashayev] There have been many queries in the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA mailbag about the new general military regulations: Have they been elaborated, when will they be approved, why have the drafts not been widely discussed... What do you have to say on the subject?

[Ivanovskiy] The readers' concern is understandable. After all, it is more than 13 years since the current regulations were approved. In that time—particularly in the past 3 years—there have been many changes in our life. In particular, the Armed Forces' organizational structure is undergoing refinement, demands for combat readiness and discipline have increased, and the democratization process is actively under way. A whole series of new legislative acts has appeared. All this, naturally, dictates the need to elaborate new general military regulations.

And it must be stressed that we are talking not just about the odd, isolated amendment or addition to the existing formulas. What was required was the elaboration of totally new provisions which will regulate the life and service of Army and Navy personnel in the next few years. In so doing we have sought, of course, to preserve the long experience of an Army that has operated in accordance with regulations in various conditions and has carried out various tasks, not to lose all the valuable elements in the existing regulations, and to stress that the democracy that is being established presupposes and is based on a high degree of discipline, awareness, and responsibility on the part of the people performing their military duty. We are the special commission (I am its chairman) that is coordinating all work on the preparation of the draft regulations.

I can say that the drafts are essentially complete. Obviously, they can soon be submitted for approval, taking into account the decisions made at the extraordinary 12th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation.

As for discussion of the drafts, I have to say that, as far as I know, never in any country have documents of this kind been the subject of a national referendum, which is

what some KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers are advocating. Nevertheless, by and large their elaboration has been conducted on a democratic basis. During the 3 years—and that is how long the preparation has taken—the draft regulations were twice sent to all USSR Defense Ministry central apparatus administrations and to the forces, up to and including combined units. The commission received around 8,000 comments and suggestions in all. A considerable number have been incorporated in the final version, which was examined and approved at the USSR Defense Ministry collegium.

[Pashayev] Which of the proposed changes to the regulations will be of most interest to those who will soon be observing them in life and in service?

[Ivanovskiy] There are many changes. It is proposed that the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces include, for example, a new section, "General Provisions," which will set out the demands of the USSR Constitution as applied to the Armed Forces and the general concepts of military service and internal order. On the basis of the realities of the military-political situation, the continuing threat of war, the new Soviet military doctrine, qualitative improvements in military activities, and the harsh lessons of the past, the draft regulations pay considerable attention to matters of increasing vigilance and combat readiness and improving the organization and conduct of alert duty. A new chapter—"Alert Duty"—is proposed.

Hitherto the general military regulations have defined servicemen's duties in detail, but they have not indicated, not specified their rights. Now the draft has a section setting out the general rights and duties of citizens.

As far as the duties of commanders or other immediate superiors are concerned, it is proposed that it be particularly emphasized that in the leadership of multinational collectives commanders (superiors) must rigorously observe the fundamental demands of Lenin's nationalities policy and show special concern for strengthening friendship and fraternity between servicemen of different nationalities.

The draft regulations particularly stress the priority importance of combat and political training. It says that it is the "basic ingredient of the day-to-day activity of servicemen in peacetime." And it is stressed that "classes and exercises must be conducted without indulgence and oversimplification in order to ensure high-quality training of servicemen in modern warfare." The draft points out that commanders guilty of keeping personnel away from combat and political training classes without the permission of the regimental commander will be disciplined.

In connection with the personnel organization changes, the duties and subordination of a whole range of officials have been clarified. In view of proposals that have been

made (including those in the press), it was deemed advisable to include in the commander's (superior's) general duties a provision relating to nature conservation.

[Pashayev] The fundamental changes also affected other regulations, no doubt?

[Ivanovskiy] Indeed, the choice of new types of incentives and penalties required particularly careful consideration, for example, when preparing the draft Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces. In particular, it proposed that the incentive of priority leave of up to 24 hours should now be envisaged for soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers and the early conferment of senior warrant officer and senior ensign ranks on warrant officers and ensigns. For officers—an entry in the unit roll of honor and conferment of the next military rank up to colonel and captain 1st class inclusive, one step higher than the military rank stipulated for the position held. Subunit commanders also have broader rights in the matter of giving their subordinates incentives.

As for disciplinary penalties, the "admonition" is abolished for all categories of servicemen, as being of no practical use. At the same time, the draft includes a new penalty—"reduction or deprivation of military specialty skill rating." It is also stipulated that soldiers can be assigned to a detail without waiting their turn; not only a service detail (except for guard, watch, and alert duty) but also a work detail. And it is proposed that the use of this form of penalty should again be granted to young commanders as well, including section commanders.

It is envisaged that senior officers will not now be subject to guardhouse confinement.

It is proposed that the USSR Armed Forces Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties should have two new chapters: "Garrison Military Vehicle Inspection" and "Features of the Organization and Conduct of Guard Duty Using Security Devices and Security and Fire Warning Signals."

The draft regulations also include a whole series of new provisions intended to instill in personnel relations of friendship, cohesion, and genuine comradeship, improving servicemen's everyday life, providing them with regulation types of food, and making them healthier. It is envisaged that the unit should have, in particular, a sports room (area). Considerable attention is devoted to the elaboration of provisions on security measures, whose violation leads to extremely grave consequences in modern conditions.

In connection with the greater number of Army and Navy posts being occupied by women, accepted for active military service on a voluntary basis, the draft new

regulations include additions determining the features of the organization and conduct of internal, garrison, and guard service by women servicemen.

It is proposed that a number of provisions which have ceased to have any significance should be removed from the regulations and that some obsolete terms and concepts should be changed.

In general, it seems to me, the new regulations will help increase the Armed Forces' combat readiness, strengthen military discipline, and promote the active implementation of the party's principle that the effectiveness of Soviet military building should be ensured predominantly by qualitative parameters both with regard to equipment and with regard to personnel.

Military Leader Reviews Year's Activities
LD3112175088 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1015 GMT 31 Dec 88

[From the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] In the pre-New Year edition of our program: "The Soviet Armed Forces—Results of Combat Training," we bring you a conversation with Colonel General Grigoriy Fedotovitch Krivosheyev, a deputy chief of the General Staff. [passage omitted]

The year 1988 in the life of the army and fleet. Our correspondent's conversation with Col Gen Krivosheyev began with that issue:

[Begin recording] [Krivosheyev] In the year now ending the Armed Forces engaged actively in operations and combat training and improved their combat readiness. In addition, a number of major exercises subject to advance notification in accordance with the Stockholm conference of 1986, were conducted.

[Unidentified correspondent] By this you mean the exercises in the south and the Baltic exercises, don't you?

[Krivosheyev] Yes indeed, precisely those exercises. The positive changes in the international situation that have occurred in recent years, the change from the principle of superarmament to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, have introduced qualitatively new elements in military construction and military policy. Let me recall the most important of them: In accordance with the Geneva agreements of 1987 [as heard], the first stage of the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from the Republic of Afghanistan has been implemented. As is known, half of our troops have already been withdrawn. In connection with the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of their medium and shorter range missiles coming into force from 1 June 1988, the elimination of those missiles, launchers, and ancillary structures and equipment

has been taking place. Up to today, 520 missiles, or 28 percent of the total number, have already been destroyed. Total elimination will be completed by the middle of 1991.

Servicemen of the armed forces also made a certain contribution this year to the implementation of national economic tasks. It is sufficient to say that dozens of motor transport battalions—in which many thousands of servicemen and 30,000 vehicles worked—were formed, just for the transportation of agricultural products, this year's harvest. All together, over 22 million tonnes of agricultural cargo, including 8 million tonnes of grain, were transported by them. I would say that Soviet servicemen participated actively, with great enthusiasm, in implementing the state program to build and reconstruct roads in the RSFSR Non-Chernozem Zone. Around 20,000 kilometers of roads in 10 oblasts of the Non-Chernozem Zone will be built during the 1988-1995 period by road-building subunits formed specifically for that purpose. Around 7,500 units of equipment of various types have been allocated for this from the resources of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The USSR Armed Forces have actively participated in overcoming the consequences of accidents, catastrophes, and natural disasters in various regions of our country. Around 3,000 units of equipment are now operating in the region of the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Sixty-eight units and establishments of the USSR Ministry of Defense with a total number of around 20,000 men and 7,000 units of equipment, have been brought in to eliminate the consequences of the earthquake on the territory of the Armenian SSR. I must say that the government commission has given the most difficult jobs in that region to the Army.

[Correspondent] I have been in Armenia, and the following part of our program will be about that very subject. I have seen what officers and men are doing there; so, of course, that is very hard and selfless labor.

[Krivosheyev] Yes, I've been there too. We brought in a number of new units there for the quickest possible restoration. Our servicemen also directly participated in eliminating the consequences of the accidents in Arzamas and Sverdlovsk. Military construction units are carrying out a large volume of work in building national economic facilities. And another thing: 43 years have passed already since the conclusion of the Great Patriotic War, but explosive objects are still being unearthed and destroyed by our servicemen. For example, this year around 100,000 pieces of ammunition have been destroyed, and 350 mobile groups and detachments totalling over 2,000 men have been brought in for mine clearing.

[Correspondent] And what lies ahead for our Armed Forces in the new year?

[Krivosheyev] There are great tasks for the Armed Forces in the new year. The Army and Navy will engage in planned operations and combat training, improve their combat readiness, and strengthen combat cooperation with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries.

An important event for the USSR Armed Forces in 1989 will, undoubtedly, be the start of their significant reduction, the decision on which was announced by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly. In the next 2 years the USSR Armed Forces will be reduced by 500,000 men. Conventional arms in the European part of the USSR and on the territory of our European allies will be cut by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft. In this process, the Soviet troops situated in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland [as heard], and Hungary will be reduced by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks.

Six tank divisions will be returned home and disbanded. Assault landing formations and units and a number of others, including assault crossing units, with their arms and combat equipment, will also be withdrawn. All the Soviet divisions remaining on the allies' territory will be reorganized. A significant number of tanks will be withdrawn from them, which will give those formations a purely defensive orientation.

Armed Forces in the Asian part of the USSR will be reduced considerably. By agreement with the Mongolian People's Republic Government, a significant proportion of the Soviet troops situated there will return home. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Afghanistan will be completed in February 1989. The destruction of medium and shorter range missiles will be continued. All shorter range missiles will be eliminated by the end of 1989.

The Armed Forces will continue their involvement in the elimination of the consequences of the earthquake in Armenia. Around 50 different construction units and establishments are being formed and sent there to build various facilities.

[Correspondent] What you have said is, more or less, well known to me and our listeners. But here is a question that interests me and, I think, our listeners as well. What will happen to the officers from those units that are subject to reduction or disbandment? Just imagine: A senior lieutenant, a captain or a major, aged 28 or 30. Where are they going to go?

[Krivosheyev] The Ministry of Defense is already working seriously on this matter. The officer corps will mainly be cut by dismissing those who have served the term specified in the USSR Law on Universal Military Service and reached the age limits for active military service, as well as those who have the right to a pension, and other organizational measures. This will, of course, require a considerable displacement of officers. The process will be conducted according to a plan, under the supervision

of the General Staff, the Main Cadres Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Staffs of the branches of the Armed Forces. There will be cuts in the number of officers in all branches of the Armed Forces in the necessary proportions, proceeding from the requirements of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Correspondent] Grigoriy Fedotovitch, you are a colonel general. Did you serve as a private in the army?

[Krivosheyev] I entered the service in 1949 as a soldier in the town of Biysk.

[Correspondent] And you probably did guard duty?

[Krivosheyev] I did guard duty like all soldiers.

[Correspondent] Well that is understandable, you were young then. That is why I would like to remind you that on 31 December there are tens of thousands of young men—soldiers, officers, and sailors—going on guard duty. And while we civilians and you military men in your free time will be seeing in the New Year, these people will be standing guard in their shearling coats at launching sites and protecting the borders. What would you like to wish them on New Year's Eve?

[Krivosheyev] I'd like to take this opportunity of wishing a Happy New Year to the Army and Navy servicemen who are reliably standing guard over the Soviet people's peaceful labor and the gains of Great October. Happy New Year also to Soviet Armed Forces veterans, participants in the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, internationalist servicemen, workers, and office staff of the Soviet Army and Navy. Dear comrades, may your wishes come true in the new year; may it be a year of stable peace, new successes, and changes for the better! May it be a rich, joyful, and happy year! [end recording]

Letter Calls for College Deferments

18010309p Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 51, Dec 88 p 3

[Letter from A. Davydov of Moscow to the Editors of NEW TIMES in a collection of letters under the title: "Glasnost: A Matter at Issue."]

[Excerpt] Perestroika in the Soviet Union is arousing sympathies worldwide, particularly because it is destroying the "enemy image." Not only do people sympathize with us. They also support our concrete steps toward enhancing the cause of peace.

The cuts that have been announced in our armed forces and armaments can only be welcomed. It is to be hoped that other countries will follow suit. The reduction of conventional armaments will increase the prestige of our country and open up possibilities for future progress, as it will provide the additional means so badly needed to catch up with the highly industrialized nations.

I would like to raise one other question in this connection. Hasn't the time come to reintroduce draft deferment for students at colleges with military departments? The need for such a measure is pointed out by scholars and leading figures in public life. But no practical steps have so far been taken.

Post-Draft Combined Arms Training Reconfigured
18010283a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Dec 88 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col V. Kulish, department chief of Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate: "For Young Replacements"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Mandatory combined arms training is being introduced for all young replacements in the new training year, which as we know will begin in the Army and Navy on 2 January 1989.

Col V. Kulish, a department chief of the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate, tells about its objectives, program, and the procedure for organizing it.

The introduction of combined arms training for young soldiers, sailors and military construction personnel regulates the orientation of young replacements. In principle such training also was the practice earlier. It has been called different things at different times—the young soldier's course, soldier's or sailor's basic training—but its objective has been the same: to give the young person who has donned a military uniform the basic impressions of service. The present change is not simply a replacement of titles, however, it is a qualitatively new level of work with young replacements. It is no secret that the orientation of soldiers and sailors in different branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms often was subordinated to their own narrow, specific missions. A knowledge of the fundamentals of contemporary combined arms combat often was ignored. Such trends showed up especially among military construction personnel.

From now on the orientation of young replacements will be accomplished under a unified program providing for a study of the fundamentals of tactics, weapon and drill training, and general military regulations.

Combined arms training in training units, schools, detachments, combines, teams, and naval receiving units and half-units will become a component part of the training process for preparing NCO's and enlisted personnel who are specialists.

Training with young replacements coming directly into combat units will be accomplished as part of non-T/O subunits each time in two flows: from 1 December and from 2 January, and in the summer from 1 June and 1 July, depending on time periods of the replacements' arrival and the manpower acquisition of these subunits.

Prior to this young soldiers, sailors, and military construction personnel will work on improving basic military training received earlier in schools, vocational-technical schools, DOSAAF organizations and so on.

It is prohibited to send personnel to T/O units for performing official duties without going through the complete combined arms training course. Depending on specific conditions, appropriate officials are given the right to extend combined arms training, combining it with the work of young soldiers, sailors and military construction personnel on authorized equipment and with practical acquisition of skills in their future specialty.

Fulfilling a basic weapon training exercise and taking the military oath concludes the combined arms training.

Preparation for Census in Armed Forces
18010283b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Dec 88 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col Yu. Borgunov: "On the Eve of the Census"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The next All-Union Population Census will be held in our country in January 1989. Active preparations for the census are under way in the Army and Navy. This work now has entered the final phase.

At the editors' request Col Yu. Borgunov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Census Bureau, tells about it:

First of all I will note that the census will make it possible to obtain data for drawing up economic and social development plans for the 13th Five-Year Plan and the longer term, and conducting a scientifically grounded demographic policy, which is a very important part of the state's social policy.

In the Armed Forces the census will take in service members, military construction personnel, Suvorov and Nakhimov students, preinduction-age youths enrolled in military band, and civilians living on the closed grounds of military units or establishments of military districts and fleets as well as in Soviet forces abroad. The necessary organizational measures have been carried out and agitation-propaganda and explanatory work has unfolded in all regions. Instructor and counting sections have been established and house lists and family lists have been compiled in large and small military units and military posts.

In accomplishing these tasks USSR Ministry of Defense Central Census Bureau officials studied the state of affairs locally and gave practical assistance in the current year. On the whole this work can be evaluated positively,

especially in the Leningrad and Baltic military districts, the Central Group of Forces, Moscow Air Defense District and the Northern Fleet.

The unit where Lt Col N. Reunov is non-T/O census director prepared well for the census. Transportation and the communications equipment have been prepared and primary and reserve census-takers have been designated.

Without awaiting instructions from above the unit where Lt Col V. Sharygin is commander and Maj Ye. Grebnev is senior instructor briefed officers, warrant officers, Soviet Army employees and their families on census sheet questions. Privates and NCO's are well informed about the time periods, importance and procedure for holding the census. Reference desks with thematic literature have been set up in each reading room.

Unfortunately, however, matters have not been organized in such a way everywhere. There still are serious claims against the work of staffs and political bodies of some large and small units where the training of personnel being used in the work of conducting the census has been poorly arranged. Agitation-propaganda work has not been developed as the moment requires. Coordination has not been arranged everywhere with local state statistics agencies.

Steps now have been taken to remedy these deficiencies and the situation definitely will be corrected in order for the upcoming census to be held at the necessary quality level.

General Staff's Lobov Assesses Troop Cuts
PM1612191988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
17 Dec 88 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Colonel General V. Lobov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by A. Gorokhov: "Proceeding From the Principles of Defensive Doctrine. Colonel General V. Lobov, First Deputy Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, Answers Questions by PRAVDA Correspondent"—date, place not given]

[Text] [Gorokhov] First of all, Vladimir Nikolayevich, let us remind readers of the essence of the decision the Soviet Union made to unilaterally reduce our Armed Forces, which was announced by M.S. Gorbachev in his 7 December UN speech....

[Lobov] Our Army's numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 men in 1989-90. The volume of conventional arms will also be reduced in that period: The Armed Forces will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft. There will be six tank divisions withdrawn from the groups of Soviet forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, as well as assault landing and assault crossing formations and units with their

arms and combat equipment, of course. The numerical strength of personnel in the group of Soviet forces in Germany and in the central and southern groups of forces will be reduced by a total of 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks. There will also be reductions of certain units in the European and Asian parts of the USSR: 450,000 men and another 5,000 tanks.

[Gorokhov] Virtually all readers' letters received by PRAVDA during the days since the Soviet leader's New York speech contain the question: To what can the volume of the planned reductions be compared?

[Lobov] They can probably be evaluated this way: 10,000 tanks are equivalent in armament to approximately 30 U.S. tank divisions, while the reduction of the personnel's numerical strength by 500,000 would be comparable to the numerical strength of the entire FRG Bundeswehr.

[Gorokhov] Consequently, as I see it, we intend to reduce the troops that are in the immediate vicinity of the borders of NATO countries and that are capable of conducting active offensive operations.

[Lobov] Yes, you are correct. In addition to all this, the remaining divisions in these groups—the group of Soviet forces in Germany and the central and southern groups of forces—will be reorganized: They will "lose" a sizable quantity of tanks. In other words, the divisions will be given a purely defensive structure. I am convinced that this step, even though it does not completely eliminate military tension in Europe, will at least reduce it considerably.

[Gorokhov] Therefore, the forthcoming reduction will be the first practical step in the transformation of our Armed Forces in line with the adopted defensive military doctrine.

[Lobov] This is indeed so. In this context I would like to draw attention to the following fact. The Soviet Union certainly did not embark on such major unilateral reductions simply because the West is stubbornly disseminating fabrications about "the Soviet military threat" or the "threatening offensive structure" of our forces, especially those presently on the territory of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. It is a matter of consistently implementing political decisions that have been made. We are reducing and reorganizing our Armed Forces guided by the new political thinking and the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine—in other words, we are demonstrating in practice the unity of the political and military-technical aspects of the military doctrine of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty states.

[Gorokhov] We have probably reached the main question, the main problem perturbing our readers, many of whom personally create and, generally speaking, pay for those selfsame expensive weapons we are planning to reduce. I assume that the tanks to be reduced will include

not only obsolete models but also the latest ones. Obviously, exactly the same could be said about artillery systems and aircraft. Therefore, I would like to ask as someone whose profession is the defense of the fatherland: Will the planned unilateral reduction not affect our country's defensive capability?

[Lobov] No, it will not affect it. The Armed Forces have and will continue to have sufficient men, equipment, and weapons to protect the motherland against any encroachments.

The main point, in my view, lies elsewhere: in the more profound appreciation by many countries and many peoples of the immutable fact that security in the nuclear and space age cannot be ensured by endlessly increasing arms. Only their reduction paves the way to genuine security. Of course, some 10-15 years ago, when the NATO countries, headed by the United States, built their relations with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states solely on the basis of hardline confrontation—the basis of the mythical idea of attaining military superiority—how could we have talked about any major, let alone unilateral, reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces? Of course not. But a qualitatively new model for ensuring security on the planet is taking shape today. That is why such constructive steps have become possible. We hope that our example will be followed by the Western countries. After all, it is necessary to practically consolidate the process of easing international tension, the process of the demilitarization of international relations, the process of deepening mutual trust in a complex sphere like the military sphere.

Naturally, the volume of reductions and the nature of structural changes in our Army are determined on the basis of a thorough analysis of the correlation of forces between the two alliances, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. After all, the real threat posed by powerful NATO groupings remains unabated. This is why, when 10,000 tanks and 500,000 personnel were "taken away" from us, we were told: Nobody is relieving you of responsibility for the country's security! This is exactly what was said at the 19th all-union party conference, which focused attention on qualitative approaches in defense building.

[Gorokhov] Let us now discuss the social aspect of the question. Many people can remember, and I myself saw, the reduction of our Army in the early sixties, when hundreds of thousands of officers were simply thrown out on the street. It is easier with ordinary soldiers, but what about career men—warrant officers, officers, and generals? What will happen to them? Judging by our mail, our readers are also greatly concerned about this....

[Lobov] I agree, the reduction of the officer corps, tens of thousands of men, is far more, immeasurably more complicated than that of enlisted men. That is precisely why the 2-year schedule has been devised as the optimum period for carrying out the necessary measures.

The General Staff has elaborated a detailed plan for implementing the Soviet Government's decision. It takes into account the negative aspects of the reduction of our Army in the sixties. What specifically can I tell you? The warrant officers, officers, and generals who have served the term established by law and are entitled to a pension will be considered first for transfer into the reserves. In general, the utmost sensitivity and scrupulousness must be demonstrated on this issue. Everything possible must be done to ensure that not a single officer, warrant officer, or their family suffer either moral or material harm and that their rights are fully observed. We are confident that local party and soviet organs will not stand back from tackling this difficult social and political task.

Nor let us forget that the officer corps consists of highly skilled cadres. Their wealth of practical experience and knowledge, I am convinced, will find a fitting use in the national economy. We think that many types of the military hardware that are due to be scrapped could be fully utilized in the national economy. I have in mind, for instance, vehicles, cranes, tractor trailers, mobile generators, river crossing facilities, and so forth. Who if not military servicemen transferred into the reserves could work with this equipment? On the whole, I think, the economic effect of the planned reduction of our Armed Forces will be considerable. And we will feel this fully in 2-3 years or so.

At the end of this conversation I would like to stress that we have just one concern—the country's security must be guaranteed. After all, no one has taken from the Soviet Armed Forces the task of protecting the socialist fatherland....

Colonel Suggests Expanded Draft Age Range
PM1101113989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Jan 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel A. Ruts-koy: "The People Have an Army"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted explaining that the author wants to answer the mass media which recently have been seeking "to cast a shadow on our armed forces." He cites examples of servicemen's bravery, but acknowledges that instances of cowardly behavior are sometimes encountered]

Among other things, there is "hazing"—barracks hooliganism—in the army. I myself have encountered this shameful phenomenon and struggled against it. I know this struggle is being waged everywhere in the Armed Forces. After all, we officers are also fathers and our children also serve in the army. So that in this case our concern, pain, and anger are common and nationwide. But let's discuss the following point together.

I read in one newspaper the bitter words of a mother who wanted to look into the eyes of the officer whose subordinates had humiliated her son. I agree with her. The commander is indeed responsible for everything in the collective entrusted to him, for every man. But, after all, the person who humiliated her son also has parents, who raised him. There was the teacher in the kindergarten, the class leader at school. And why do we seldom speak of the role of the pioneer and Komsomol organizations and the atmosphere that reigns in many rural vocational and technical colleges? A young man spends 18 years preparing for service and being formed as an individual and serves for only 2 years. Yet in the army he must be turned into a soldier, trained in a military speciality, and tempered physically. There is no point in concealing the fact that many of those who join the military ranks at first cannot even chin themselves. Is there much time left for purely educational work? And often the young men must not only be educated but reeducated. This, as I have frequently had occasion to convince myself, is far harder.

Let's talk about the following point. Are there drug addicts among draftees? There are. Heavy drinkers? They exist. Men with criminal records? There are also enough of them. In addition to these, other, not entirely socially and morally mature young men are drafted into the army. How many are there of them in all? I don't know. But you have to work with every one....

It must be frankly admitted that the army is not doing all its work in many respects. There are both objective reasons, some of which have been mentioned above, and subjective reasons. We are not shirking responsibility, we welcome just criticism, and are grateful for it. But you will not help matters by belittling the importance and prestige of the officer in an offhand manner and blaming him alone for every trouble. It is necessary to consolidate the forces of the army and of those departments and organizations that are involved in training young men for army service and educating them. A constructive approach and a collective quest are needed.

Perhaps one way out is for our sacred concepts—"military duty, honor, patriotism, comradeship" and much else—not to be written off into the "reserve," into "retirement," but to be filled with the wind of restructuring and developed at a qualitatively new level? Especially now that a substantial reduction of our armed forces lies ahead.

Let's take drafting into the army. Understandably, there are so-called demographic problems here. Objectively. But nevertheless is it not better to expand its age range from 18 to, for instance, 25? So that it is not only men of the same age but also technical college and institute graduates who serve in the platoon, company, or squadron. Then, in my view, those who now usually act in the role of "hazers" would not take the role of informal leaders. People would be drawn to more mature servicemen who had graduated from a VUZ or technical college. There would also be people to promote from their ranks to junior commander posts. Education (and that means authority), life experience (not a youth but a man), and a man with higher education is hardly likely to allow "hazing." I also suggest that the teaching of aesthetics, ethics, pedagogics, and psychology be expanded in the military academy programs. The broader the officer's purview, the more rapidly he will be able to find a common language with his subordinates. ...The people have an Army—an inalienable element of the socialist social organism. For many generations of Soviet people, military service has become a school of life, a school for forming responsibility, courage, and patriotism, has taught them to adopt an active life stance. The clean air of restructuring is helping today to boost the martial and political activeness of the men in military uniform. The Army and Navy public's reaction to negative phenomena is increasingly acute and an atmosphere of mutual respect, openness, and businesslike criticism and self criticism is being asserted increasingly noticeably in the military collectives. And in this I see a guarantee of the further raising of the Armed Forces' combat readiness and the growth of its prestige.

Admiral Gromov on New Training Tasks for Navy
PM0501160089 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Jan 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Admiral F. Gromov, Commander of the Northern Fleet, by Captain 3d Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's permanent correspondent with the Northern Fleet: "Combat Training Requires Reorganization"—date, place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Captain 3d Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's permanent correspondent with the Northern Fleet, asked the commander of the Northern Fleet this question: "What does the reorientation to quality parameters in training mean for naval seamen?" Admiral F. Gromov replied:

[Gromov] The defensive military doctrine presupposes the principle of reasonable sufficiency of armed forces and armaments. On this basis, and also in light of the forthcoming considerable reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces on a unilateral basis, it is obvious that combat training requires reorganization with a view to achieving a new quality.

In this connection, in the course of planning for the new training year in our fleet, attention was focused on ensuring that combat training forms the basis of all the activity of naval forces. Without resolving this task we cannot seriously expect to ensure the attainment of quality parameters in combat readiness.

As for specific avenues of work, I would like to highlight three. First there is the further improvement of personnel training, in connection with which we must greatly increase the role and place of training at bases. So-called base exercises using comprehensive simulators will be introduced widely. These exercises will enable us to train ship combat crews and control organs better. The exercises will not be abstract in nature; they will have a very specific thrust—in line with the tasks that the ships will have to tackle on their next voyages. Ships will put to sea only when the crews have done everything necessary at base.

In the new training year unit commanding officers are to be given more opportunities for the autonomous planning and organization of the ships' combat training depending on the level of training and efficiency of the crews and the level of their fulfillment of combat training courses. As a result considerable time is gained, and this time will be used for the thorough rehearsing of those questions that are most relevant to each ship. The daily

routine has been revised everywhere for the same purpose. In its present form it gives more time for studies, training sessions, and exercises than before.

It is proposed to do much to enhance the role of headquarters. They should decisively reassign their efforts from the functions of evaluation and recording to the functions of providing assistance. The effectiveness of headquarters operations will be assessed not by the number of evaluations carried out and observations made in the course of them, but by the real state of affairs in the units and on the ships. New demands are also made with regard to evaluations carried out by higher-ranking headquarters. These evaluations should not disrupt the daily routine of those under evaluation, upset their combat training plans, or divert commanding officers and specialists from their work unless it is strictly necessary. An example is set by the special groups currently being set up in the fleet, designed to monitor the fulfillment of combat exercises at sea. These groups will be headed by me and the deputy fleet commanders. They will include officers from the directorates and sections. The existence of such groups will, among other things, mean that we do not need to take people away from their on-the-spot work.

Moreover, a flagship combat crew for submarine entry into torpedo attack has been set up in the fleet. It is led by Rear Admiral V. Poroshin, deputy commander of the fleet for combat training and chief of the combat training directorate. The combat crew will rehearse tactics and train commanding officers of units and ships to carry them out.

A second area of our activity to ensure quality parameters in combat training is to improve the tactical training of ships' commanders and all personnel. Thus, considerably more bilateral exercises are planned than in former years, and both sides have an equal interest in success. This approach will doubtless lead initially to a decrease in the success rate (according to evaluations) in the fulfillment of combat training tasks. But in the end the personnel's skill will increase.

Finally, more attention will be devoted to increasing the readiness of weapons and hardware for use. The maintenance training of personnel and the prompt execution of maintenance work and repairs between voyages—that is how we hope to achieve high technical readiness of weapons and hardware.

We have every reason to suppose that the training measures planned for the new year will give the fleet a powerful boost in combat readiness and improving the quality of combat training.

Dep Commander of SRF Discusses Continuing Threat to Peace

18010286 Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Nov 88 p 1

[Interview with Lt. Gen. A. Volkov, deputy commander, Strategic Rocket Forces, on the occasion of 20 November, Rocket Forces and Artillery Day; place not specified; first paragraph is TRUD introduction]

[Text] Lieutenant General A. Volkov, deputy commander of Strategic Rocket Forces, answers questions put to him by the editors of the newspaper TRUD.

[TRUD] Rocket Forces and Artillery Day ranks high on the list of remarkable holidays celebrating the combat glory of the Soviet Armed Forces. As we all know, it was established to commemorate the feats accomplished by artillerymen in the Great Patriotic War.

[Volkov] Yes, that is so. The inspiration was the date of 19 November 1942. That was when the powerful fire of thousands of artillery weapons, mortars, and rocket launchers heralded the mighty offensive near Stalingrad. With the appearance and adoption of nuclear missile weapons, the holiday has since 1964 been celebrated as Rocket Forces and Artillery Day. It was then that the aggressive aspirations of the more highly developed capitalist nations left no room for doubt. Our country's security interests demanded the adoption of urgent measures relative to creating new weapons and reliable means for delivering them to the target. This led to the initiation of an enormous effort involving large research, design, and engineering forces.

A huge contribution to the creation of the first Soviet nuclear charges was made by I.V. Kurchatov, the prominent Soviet scientist. Academician S.P. Korolov headed work on new models of rocket weapons and the design of powerful multistage rockets. An important landmark in the development of Soviet rocket design was reached in 1957, when the intercontinental ballistic missile was tested in the USSR. A factor contributing to the successful resolution of the task posed by development of space rocket technology was the self-sacrificing labor of research and production organizations headed by outstanding scientists M.V. Keldysh, V.P. Glushko, N.A. Pilyugin, M.K. Yangel, A.M. Isayev, G.N. Babakin, and others.

[TRUD] Rocket troops are armed with highly complex modern equipment. How are they trained to achieve the required combat skills? What is the nature of their peacetime service?

[Volkov] Rocket weapons are crew-served weapons. Only coordinated actions by all members of combat crews and subunits and each man's ability to carry out his duties flawlessly and in a timely manner can guarantee successful accomplishment of a launch.

A major aspect of combat training of rocket troops is instruction of duty-shift personnel, especially combat

crews. The rocket troops train them on newly-designed computerized integrated simulators. Special devices make it possible to monitor the operator's responses, that is, make an objective determination of the level of mastery attained by personnel—by each crew and the individual crew member.

We can cite many examples of flawless conduct of operational readiness. For instance, in a recent competition for best subunit, the winners were troops belonging to a unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Ulyanov. In this connection, I am proud to cite Captain V. Pozdeyev, Senior Lieutenant A. Makhinenko, Senior Warrant Officer F. Berezin, Senior Sergeant I. Naumov, and Private S. Kononov.

However, service in the rocket troops entails more than maintaining operational readiness. The military collective is a complex organization. Commanders and political workers must find ways to cope with many challenging situations under difficult time constraints, especially during an influx of new conscripts.

We have started to devote more attention to the special nature of multinational collectives—the majority of military units and subunits. A proper cultural and political approach and comradely interaction make it possible to break down language barriers and achieve a deep understanding of the traditions and peculiarities of life style followed by other nationalities. Under the conditions of the developing democracy and glasnost and increasing social activity of people, many problems are being resolved in new ways. Thus, public opinion is taken into account in awarding commendations for distinguished service, selection for promotion, distribution of material items, and in many other situations. This does not mean that all is well, of course. Not everywhere, especially on remote posts, are housing, living conditions, and opportunities for cultural development up to standard.

[TRUD] In the rocket forces the major share of responsibility for maintaining a high level of operational readiness is apparently shouldered by officers. What can you tell us about the lieutenants of the 1980s as compared to yourself as a young officer?

[Volkov] I became an officer in the middle of the 1950s. Upon graduating from the Ryazan Artillery Command School, I was appointed platoon leader, then battery commander. From 1960 to the present I have been serving in the rocket forces. I commanded a subunit and a unit and served in other assignments.

In recalling my years as a lieutenant and the time when the rocket forces were coming into being, I must say that that period was difficult. We had to assume our duties in uninhabited places and live in tents. We also had to take on a multitude of organizational and technical difficulties. There were no precedents. And—no one had any experience! We—young officers—received the most reliable support from combat veterans. In those years in the rocket forces there were quite a few of them still serving.

Today the average age of the rocket forces officer is 28. Virtually all officers possess a higher education and good technical training, thus making it possible to qualify for operational readiness duty and be in a position to successfully master the secrets of military skills in a minimum period of time.

[TRUD] By now everyone knows that implementation of the INF Treaty concluded by the USSR and USA is in progress. What problems does this pose for you?

[Volkov] Representatives from many countries witnessed the explosions in the vicinity of Kapustin Yar and Saryozek heralding the start of the process of eliminating intermediate-range and short-range missiles. The elimination of an entire class of missiles presents missilemen with a new responsibility: to do everything they can to worthily accomplish the mission of implementing the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- Range and Short-Range Missiles.

At the same time, we are not entertaining any illusions of an immediate and lasting peace. Stark reality is not conducive to complacency and reduction of combat readiness. It is not our place to exhibit smugness and carelessness. The strategic rocket forces have a deep understanding of the tasks entrusted to them and are devoting all their abilities, knowledge, and energy to the main goal—maintaining the formidable weapons at a constant state of high combat readiness. With implementation of the treaty in progress, we are attempting to retain regular personnel and highly qualified specialists. The case of each officer and warrant officer is being given careful consideration by military authorities and cadre elements. Nevertheless, complex modern rocket technology demands a steady influx of new personnel. In this connection, I should mention that many youths, wishing to devote their lives to the Armed Forces, are entering rocket forces service schools. Thus, rocket weapons are being entrusted to skillful and reliable hands.

Chemical Troops Chief: "No Stocks or Forward-based Toxic Agents"

*LD0501124289 Moscow TASS in English
1211 GMT 5 Jan 89*

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS—It is believed in the Soviet Union that the forthcoming conference on chemical weapons, which is to be held in Paris and to deal with 1925 Geneva protocol, should focus its attention on the problem of concluding a convention on a universal ban on chemical weapons at an earliest date, said Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich. Lieutenant-General Kuntsevich is deputy commander of Chemical Troops of the Soviet Armed Forces.

According to existing data, about 20 countries now possess chemical weapons, the scientist said in an interview with TASS diplomatic correspondent Vadim Biryukov. Juridically, only the Soviet Union and the United States have stated that they possess chemical weapons. Only the Soviet Union announced the ceiling of chemical weapons stocks, which amount to not more than 50,000 tons of toxic agents, in December 1987.

"It was expected in the Soviet Union that the United States would likewise announce a ceiling of its stocks of chemical weapons, but that did not happen," Kuntsevich said. "Meanwhile, according to existing estimates, and with old stocks taken into account, the United States really possesses a stock of 100,000 tons of chemical weapons."

Of much importance is the circumstance that the Soviet Union keeps the stocks of its chemical weapons exclusively on its own territory. "This means that there are no chemical weapons on the territories of our allies for the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and that the Soviet Union

has no stocks or forward-based toxic agents," Kuntsevich pointed out. As far as NATO is concerned, this military and political bloc possesses stocks of forward-based toxic agents. They are stored mainly in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The storing of chemical weapons on the territory of that country which is at the line of contact of the two blocs is fraught with a serious danger.

"If a conflict with the use of conventional weapons breaks out in the area—this is, of course, only a theoretical supposition—the stores of toxic agents on the FRG's territory would be within the zone of hostilities and may be hit," Kuntsevich went on to say. "As a result, a cloud of toxic agents would start moving to affect, first of all, the positions of NATO armed forces. When NATO's chemical sensors begin to detect them, they would not be able to tell whose toxic agent that would be, NATO's or Soviet. A very dangerous situation, even the start of a chemical war may ensue."

If NATO countries remove the U.S. chemical weapons from the FRG, thereby the proposal on making Europe a zone free from chemical weapons would be automatically implemented, and an important step towards concluding a convention banning chemical weapons would be made. At present virtually the entire Europe is only under U.S. or NATO 'chemical umbrella', Anatoliy Kuntsevich said.

The U.S. double-faced stand is one of [as received] obstacles to the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. "On the one hand, Washington takes part in the talks on concluding such a convention and, on the other hand, the production of chemical weapons in binary version is being practically conducted across the ocean, which in prospect will considerably complicate a solution to the chemical weapons verification problem," Academician Kuntsevich said in conclusion.

Lithuanian Civil Defense Changes Explained

LD2912112888 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian
1246 GMT 2 Dec 88

[Statement by (Boris Aleksandrovich Yumashov), head of the Vilnius Soviet Rayon civil defense headquarters]

[Excerpt] Civil defense in the republic has reached a new stage in its development. For the first time a qualitative task has been set for civil defence: reliable protection of the population, not only during wartime but also during peacetime, from the consequences of industrial accidents, catastrophies, and natural disasters.

It is impossible to resolve this task without a sharp increase in the qualitative preparation of all civil defense trainees and without setting up and improving the material and educational basis of civil defense.

Training wings, civil defense training centers, training classrooms, studies, and civil defense stands are the fundamental requirements for setting up a civil defense educational and material basis at national economic installations.

It has been established, in accordance with the demands of the civil defense headquarters of the republic, that each installation of national economy where 300 or more people are employed the following civil defense facilities must be set up: a training center, 2-3 units of the entire training wing, training classrooms at a rate of one classroom for 10-15 training groups, and civil defense display boards in every shop, department, or team.

In places where the number of employed people is less than 300 people, 1-2 training places, one classroom for each 10-15 training groups, and civil defense display boards in each shop, department and team, will be established.

Using the example of the "Komunaras" machine-tool factory we can be graphically convinced about the positive influence of enhancing theoretical knowledge and practical skills in the process of training leading personnel, non-militarized formations, and workers and employees, in their solutions of civil defense tasks.

Earlier the "Komunars" machine-tool manufacturing plant was mentioned on more than one occasion as an installation where the question of civil defense was not given adequate attention. [passage omitted]

Ryzhkov 19 Dec News Conference, Armenian Earthquake

PM2112144188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Dec 88 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[TASS report: "Restoration Is the Second Stage. News Conference in Yerevan for Soviet and Foreign Journalists"]

[Excerpts] As has already been announced, a news conference was held 19 December in Yerevan for Soviet and foreign journalists. The following took part in it: N.I.

Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; N.N. Slyunkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; Yu.D. Maslyukov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Yu.P. Batalin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and S.G. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee.

N.I. Ryzhkov opened the news conference.

Some 12 days have elapsed, he said, since this disaster—one of the most terrible earthquakes in our country—took place. You know how many casualties there were and how much damage. Much data will be amplified further but it is already clear that it is a question of tens of thousands of deaths and billions in material losses.

This earthquake is in itself unprecedented for the Transcaucasus. Armenia lost approximately 8 million square meters—more than one-half—of the housing stock in this region. Almost 514,000 people were made homeless. Many industrial and agricultural enterprises have been completely destroyed or suffered substantial damage. Considerable sections of railroads and highways have been put out. Bridges and lines of communication have been cut and public services have been completely disabled.

The deaths constitute the most serious and irreparable loss. There is as yet still no final earthquake casualty figure. Some 23,700 people have been brought out dead in the last few days from under the rubble. Some 15,252 people have been rescued. And 10,380 have been hospitalized. By the evening of 18 December 5,200 people had been released from hospitals and 4,843 people were undergoing treatment. [passage omitted]

Then N.I. Ryzhkov and the other members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission answered correspondents' questions.

[Passage omitted]

Question from "Mayak" radio program correspondent: Isn't it advisable to create "rapid deployment forces" and support points in the country's seismic zones?

N.I. Ryzhkov: On this occasion there was very little time to discuss questions of the future. There has been virtually no time at all to spare. But nevertheless, as we are in the thick of these events and can see the consequences of the natural disaster and assess realistically the pluses and minuses of our rescue work, we believe that there are very many positive elements, in particular, in our mobilization of all our country's efforts and resources—yet at the same time we can also see the shortcomings. When

the acute phase has passed and the work has taken on a normal rhythm, these problems will have to be considered very seriously. I believe that it is not even a question of setting up rapid deployment centers for just, say, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. A rapid deployment system with both scientific and technical and production potential must be set up in order to ensure that there is equipment, medicine, and transportation in reserve which could be enlisted at any time to eliminate a particular accident situation. As soon as we arrive in Moscow we will instruct the appropriate services to begin elaborating such a system. Yesterday I even asked my comrades working abroad to gather all the information on this question.

Question from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: At your previous press conference you spoke about the Army's role during the first stage. What significance does the commission attach to this role during the second stage?

N.I. Ryzhkov: I have already said that more than 20,000 officers and men from troop subunits and 10,000 civil defense troops are now working in our republic. Of

course, their functions will change. They are now clearing rubble, tomorrow they will begin preparatory construction work, and then construction itself.

[Passage omitted]

Question from TASS journalist addressed to D.T. Yazov: What is your opinion of the role played by our servicemen in dealing with the consequences of the earthquake?

D.T. Yazov: I would like to point out that it was the servicemen who were the first highly organized group of people to enter the battle against the elements. They cleared obstructions, despite the fact that some of the military servicemen's own families were among the victims—there was a full complement of servicemen in the city. With their help we were able to efficiently organize feeding centers and set up the tents available. Then, following instructions from N.I. Ryzhkov, a large number of tents were airlifted in. Military servicemen helped to set them up in population centers and transported bread and other food to cities, settlements, and villages. I believe they fulfilled their tasks with honor.

[Passage omitted]

Pre-Draft Training Facility Taken Over by Artistic Group

18010288a Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
11 Nov 88 p 2

[Article by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent S. Aslezov: "Easy Entrance to Training Facility"; first two paragraphs are SOVETSKIY PATRIOT introduction]

[Excerpts] The telephone rang in the correspondents' station. The caller identified himself as a technical sports club instructor at the BelavtoMAZ and said: "Come here as soon as you can. Instruction in NVP [basic military training] is about to begin, but the plant training facility is closed. On top of that, it has been taken over by ... artists!"

I must confess that the news took me by surprise. Who were these artists? Why did they take over the place? We all know that the plant training facility is one of the best in the republic, not only in Minsk. Even all-union NVP seminars were held there. Nonetheless, what I saw and heard confirmed that an attack, well thought-out and organized using virtually all the rules of military science, had led to an actual storming and capture of rooms intended for training induction-age youths.

Similar attempts were made in the past, but they were fought off courageously by S. Kandybovich. A participant in the Great Patriotic War and a reserve colonel, Semen Stepanovich had from the very beginning directed and done much for the formation of the facility and organization of basic military training for plant youth. He even told the artists—the name given to the artistic design group of the plant's design department: "You will take over this place only over my dead body."

The above was expressed on an emotional and passionate basis, of course. However, time and age did their bidding, and Kandybovich retired. He entrusted the keys to the training facility to the DOSAAF plant committee. Upon learning that Kandybovich was no longer working, the artists launched their assault - they demanded that the keys be handed over to them. The DOSAAF committee refused, of course. They then formed an "assault group" headed by design department Deputy Chief G. Staskevich. They relieved the charwoman of the spare keys, opened the door, removed the old locks, and replaced them with new ones.

This is the kind of "art" inflicted on the youth NVP training facility! Now, to justify his action, G. Staskevich uses the enterprise managers as an excuse, claiming that he was given permission to take over the rooms. It is true that such an order was given by BelavtoMAZ Deputy General Director for Facilities V. Zhigalo. In addition, G. Staskevich is able to show an order signed by BelavtoMAZ Association General Director M. Lavrinovich on as early as 26 February of this year. To put it mildly, he contradicts himself. In the document there is no mention

of vacating the training facility. According to the proposed plan, also approved by the general director, the artistic group was to **occupy the same building**, confined to two small rooms. However, the enterprise administration permitted the DOSAAF plant committee to make its home in these rooms. Then the artists used cunning to take over the rooms.

V. Zhigalo and G. Staskevich insist that there is no one to teach in the plant. They claim that young people arriving from secondary schools and vocational and technical schools have already undergone their basic military training. I agree that the general educational level of youth is rising and that this does much to facilitate the task of training preinductees while they are employed. The MAZ training facility is the only one in the entire capital oblast, not only in the city. Thus, could it be that the working youth's NVP has outlived its usefulness?

Not at all! Military registration desk workers told me that in the plant there are 43 preinductees who for various reasons have not had NVP. In addition, the facility should be used to train preinductees from the bearing plant and the Minskpromstroy Association totaling 70 to 80 persons. The facility in reality is to serve the entire city.

Now this turn of events. How could this happen? In attempting to answer this question, I cannot help but recall how some comrades with whom I held discussions during my investigation into the conflict, the same V. Zhigalo in particular, spoke of the training facility as belonging to the DOSAAF, and, this being the case, why not let the DOSAAF take care of the matter. This simply cannot be so. This misunderstanding is apparently due to lack of knowledge of the situation and of the documents that set the rules and regulations for NVP.

Yes, the defense society does actively participate in basic military training of future defenders of the motherland. Incidentally, it was plant DOSAAF members who acted in the spirit of glasnost to raise the alarm over the training facility takeover. And they are absolutely right: training for military service is not only a social matter; it is primarily a state matter.

The USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation has a basis in the Constitution. It specifically states that managers of enterprises are responsible for training for active military service to be administered to all youth of preinduction and induction age. [passages omitted]

Nevertheless, that is not the nature of the problem. The fact remains that on the eve of the beginning of training, preinductees were left without a roof over their head, groups had not been formed, and the facility commander and platoon leaders not selected. Thus, the enterprise administration, whether it desires to admit it or not, placed basic military training for youth outside the law.

This is happening not just anywhere: this is the renowned Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant.

The NVP situation would have been different, had the soviet of people's deputies' ispolkom of the Minsk plant rayon managed more purposefully. Unfortunately, the attitude that was adopted is conciliatory. The response made by rayispolkom Deputy Chairman G. Petrovich alludes to the fact that the administration of the motor vehicle plant, of the largest enterprise in the rayon, is slow to respond to directives issued by the local organ of power. Since little attention is paid to the rayispolkom, the rayvovenkomat does not hold NVP for plant youth in high regard. There is no other explanation of why Military Commissar Yu. Mikhaylov and his deputy, A. Puchek, were unaware of what was transpiring and did not exercise control, did not make any checks, did not help organize basic military training for plant youth.

I turned for comments on the artists' "raid" to Ye. Shulyak, a reserve sergeant and former tank driver, presently a forging shop brigade leader at the Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, and Hero of Socialist Labor.

"The training facility is closed?" repeated Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich. "This is the first I hear of this. I do not think that our general director, a reasonable and far-sighted man, would commit such a thoughtless act. This must be some kind of misunderstanding. Each preinductee should learn at least the ABCs of military science. My own experience as a tanker taught me that he who has had basic military training has more to offer the motherland, the Army, his unit. He is quick to take his place in the ranks."

All our conversations and discussions were summarized by E. Podolyak, plant party committee secretary and a reserve officer.

"This is a case where special interests have taken precedence over state and social interests, over how plant youth is to train for service in the Army and Navy. We are studying the problem. The actions of all those who are involved in the unauthorized takeover of the training facility will be reviewed from the standpoint of principle. I believe that justice will prevail."

Well, the position taken by the leader of the plant's Communists deserves as much support and approval as possible, for it is indeed one of principle and party spirit.

Slowness of DOSAAF Restructuring in Some Ukrainian Oblast Organizations

*18010288b Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
13 Nov 88 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Verification by Glasnost"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Glasnost broadly applied to the activity of DOSAAF committees is the best gauge for

making judgments on how well committee leaders are doing their work. The same may be said of leaders in educational and sports organizations. Glasnost in their activity promotes maximization of successes attained in military and patriotic education of trainees and sportsmen and serves as a tool that can be used to prevent formalism. [passage omitted]

Glasnost is the best means to check on execution of decisions made and employ reserves to carry out mass defense, educational, and sports activities. It is at the same time a highly important component of the organizational work of DOSAAF committees and of their exerting an operational influence on eliminating shortcomings, particularly formalism and inertia.

Plenums of DOSAAF committees are presently in session in many defense organizations. Under discussion are the results attained in practical work relative to carrying out the resolutions of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. With the 2nd Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee as an example, plenum participants are attempting to analyze past experience and employ criticism and self-criticism to ascertain the causes hindering the development of initiative and independent activity in the operation of defense society organizations.

For example, the plenum of the Ukrainian DOSAAF Central Committee was held in a businesslike manner. Criticism and self-criticism in the report and debates was pointed and dealt with fundamentals. It was indicated that in the Donetsk, Transcarpathian, and Lvov oblast defense organizations and in sections of the republic DOSAAF Central Committee, the progress of perestroyka is agonizingly slow. Cases persist where committees' apparatus are doing the work of elected organs, which contradicts democratic principles.

It is notable that the plenum participants, adhering to the main issue, discussed the draft resolution and made substantial corrections and additions. As a result, it is characterized by specificity and permeated by a spirit of high exactingness on the part of committee leaders and of all elective body members relative to the effectiveness of their work.

An important aspect promoting strengthening of glasnost is regular contact between committee heads and members and their presidiums on the one hand and DOSAAF members of labor collectives on the other.

A good situation obtains when members of elective bodies report on their activity to defense organizations. This kind of glasnost makes it possible for defense society members to maintain awareness of the work of those in whom they place a great trust—serving as their representatives in governing bodies.

The time has passed when the most critical and urgent problems relating to the functioning of organizations were discussed in secret, behind sealed doors of managers' offices. Today the more difficult problems must be unhesitatingly submitted to public opinion.

Glasnost is the tool which is used to test the committee leader's maturity in the DOSAAF, educational, or sports

organization. Let us recall the words of V.I. Lenin, who stated that glasnost is the sword that heals the wounds it itself inflicts.

Finally, glasnost is needed by everyone—the same as bread or air; without it there is no progress, and there cannot be, on the road to renewal.

**Vinogradov on Implications of U.S.-Spanish
Defense Agreement**

*18010279 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Dec 88 First Edition p 3*

[Military-political commentary by V. Vinogradov: "New Agreement, Old Problems"]

[Text] Talks between Spain and the United States have been going on for more than a year and a half over a new treaty between them in the sphere of defense. Now it has been signed in Madrid.

The previous five-year Spanish-American agreement on friendship, defense and cooperation, the term of which expired on 14 May of this year, gave the United States the right to have three air bases, one naval base and five communications stations as well as almost 15,000 servicemen on Spanish territory. During the talks the American side tried to use a policy first of pressure and then of entreaties to bring matters down to a symbolic reduction of its military presence and retain all its bases on the Pyrenees Peninsula.

Just what does the new eight-year agreement provide? It guarantees the United States further use of two air bases at Zaragoza (northeastern Spain) and Moron (in the south), a strategic naval base at Rota (on the Atlantic coast near the entrance to the Mediterranean) and five communications stations. The Pentagon is being deprived of the air base at Torrejon-de-Ardoz since it is obligated to remove, over a three-year period, the 72 F-16 fighter-bombers based there which are capable of taking aboard nuclear weapons. The overall strength of American troops in Spain will be reduced by one-third and is to be a little over 9,000 military personnel.

The new agreement also contains a point which prohibits the United States from "bringing in, stationing and storing" nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, Washington succeeded in getting Madrid to pledge to refrain from queries about the presence of nuclear weapons aboard American Navy ships when they enter Spanish ports and territorial waters. This point of the treaty already has evoked powerful protests of leftist political parties and broad public circles, which rightly believe that such a provision creates a condition for nonobservance in practice of Spain's nuclear freeze status.

After Madrid and Washington finally have signed the new agreement, the natural question arises as to just where the United States intends to place its 72 "Spanish" F-16 fighter-bombers which form the U.S. Air Force 401st Tactical Wing. Judging from everything, these aircraft are to be transformed from "Spanish" to "Italian," since the Pentagon is categorically undesirous of removing these nuclear weapon platforms from Western Europe and already has its eye on one of the bases in Southern Italy as their new station.

It is indicative that NATO also adheres to the American point of view regarding the further fate of the F-16's. Not only that, it even intends to help the Pentagon carry out the costly operation which the transfer of 72 aircraft will become. As the Italian newspaper IL SOLE/24 ORE reported, NATO will allocate \$320 million for these purposes.

And so the signing of the treaty in Spain engendered problems for Italy. The plans of Pentagon and NATO generals are causing very serious concern on the Apennine Peninsula. Not only opposition parties in Italy, and above all the Italian Communist Party [PCI], but also prominent representatives of the Socialists who are part of the ruling five-party coalition, have spoken out against such an intent of the Pentagon and NATO. For example, Socialist L. Lagorio, chairman of the Parliament Chamber of Deputies Defense Commission, expressed fears that the transfer of F-16 aircraft to Italy may have a "negative influence on the good relations established between East and West."

A document drawn up by representatives of the PCI and a group of leftist independents is noteworthy in this regard. The draft resolution proposed by them and approved by the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission contains an appeal to NATO to begin talks with the Warsaw Pact Organization on a reduction in conventional arms in order to avert the transfer of American F-16's to Italy. In advancing the draft resolution the PCI and leftist independents noted that the Soviet Union had come out with the very same initiative earlier. It reduces to not stationing F-16's in the Apennines, and as an answering measure the USSR will remove its similar equipment from forward base locations in Eastern Europe.

The Pentagon has been given three years to redeploy its aircraft from Spain to Italy. Well, this may be enough time to come to an agreement and turn these nuclear weapon platforms out of Western Europe entirely.

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