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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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INTERETHNIC RELATIONS: TOWARD THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

Time of Crucial Decisions

18060005a Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 89 (signed
to press 20 Feb 89) pp 9-15

[Article by V.I. Mukomel: "Time of Crucial Decisions": Vladimir Izyavich Mukomel is a candidate of historical sciences, senior science associate at the Central Scientific Research and Design Institute for Urban Development. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] Central Asia today is an intractable knot of different socioeconomic problems. Their sources lie not only in the difficulties common to the nation and brought about by the protracted period of stagnation, but also by the specific development of the region.

The situation is extremely complex: the rapid growth of the population and its further concentration in the labor-surplus rural localities impede an increase in social labor productivity. In the mid-1980s in agriculture this was already lower than in the previous decade and in industry rose by one-half the rate than the national average. As a result the gap between the economic development of the Central Asian and other republics has become further deepened. While in 1970, produced national income per employee in Central Asia was 83 percent of the general Union level, in 1979 this indicator had declined to 75 percent and at present to 66 percent. On a per capita basis, the produced national income at present is 52 percent of the general-Union [2, p 40; 16-20]. For this reason virtually all the deductions into the state budget from the turnover tax and the income tax remain in the region [2, pp 43, 46]. The gap in the level of socioeconomic development in Central Asia and the other republics in essence is compensated for at the expense of the latter [the other republics]. Merely in order that by the year 2000 this gap does not exceed the current one, national income should rise at the unprecedented rate of 13 percent per annum. But its labor productivity increases at the same rate as an average for the nation, the number of persons not employed in social production will reach one-third of the working-age population [3]. In Uzbekistan alone, up to the year 2005, it is essential to create 3.5-4 million new jobs and this will require from 80 to 100 billion rubles [13].

In the opinion of specialists, the problems of socioeconomic development in Central Asia are caused by a surplus of labor resources in rural localities. Against the background of the growing shortage of labor resources in the other regions of the nation, the task has been set of their most efficient utilization either in the region itself or outside it. The latter way is problematic for a whole series of reasons: the poor adaptability of the migrants from Central Asia and the extremely significant scale of migration. Finally, in the movements between the republics a majority is made up of representatives of peoples from the Slavic group who are originally from cities and, as a rule, the most skilled workers leave the region. But most importantly, "people are not raw material and equipment which can be moved from place to place at one's discretion. The freedom of maneuvering human resources is sharply limited by the unique way of life brought about by old national traditions" [4, p 89].

But the difficulty is not even this: the labor resources of the rural localities do not meet the demands of modern production. In Central Asia where "in the next few decades the basic increase in the nation's population and labor resources will be concentrated and where the demand of agriculture for manpower will be declining, the involvement of people in the nonagricultural sectors and generally in labor activity of the modern type or attracting to other regions of the nation can be impeded by the insufficient sociocultural, territorial and professional mobility of the younger generation and their poor ability for adaptation under unusual conditions" [5]. As T.I. Zaslavskaya feels, "on the social level the redistribution of workers between the sectors, enterprises, vocational and professional groups, regions and cities of the nation can involve numerous difficulties. Intensifying the processes of the movement of labor obviously will require a marked rise in the territorial and labor mobility of the personnel and psychological adaptation of those groups of workers which historically have been marked by great stability" [6].

The problem of the adaptation of the indigenous population to modern production is a central socioeconomic problem in the development of the region. Individual researchers have proposed increasing the efficient utilization of the rural labor resources by locating labor-intensive types of production in rural localities. Hence it is an issue of adapting production to the current situation. In our view such a solution to the problem is unacceptable since it would mean the preserving of the population in the villages and were to contribute to strengthening the backwardness in the skill and professional training of the rural inhabitants of a region as well as the low efficiency of social labor.

Under present-day, evermore complex production conditions, the quality of labor resources plays an equally important role as their quantity. The human factor in economic development is no propaganda slogan but a reality of the hardening demands placed on a worker who is involved with complex equipment. But what

question can there be of an adaptation to modern production when a majority of the Central Asian population is rural and is employed in agricultural manual labor. And a significant portion of the increase in rural inhabitants has occurred precisely here. In 1951-1982, the Central Asian village was responsible for more than one-quarter of the natural increase [7, p 86]. With a decline of 9 percent in the nation's rural population over the period from 1959 through 1968, in Central Asia, it rose by almost 2.1-fold. For the sake of comparison: in the developing countries the analogous indicator has increased by 1.5-fold [9, p 144].

One of the most vulnerable elements in the socioeconomic development of the region is urbanization, the current rate and scale of which have helped to preserve the obsolete forms of the territorial organization of society. Over the last decades, the share of urban inhabitants in the Central Asian republics has virtually stabilized. Since 1970 in Turkmenia it has remained unchanged and is 48 percent, while in Tajikistan, one can even observe a decline from 37 percent to 33 percent [16, pp 374, 375, 377].

In essence, the entire insignificant increase in the proportional amounts of the region's urban population in the 1970s (from 38 to 41 percent) came from Uzbekistan where there was the mass renaming of rural settlements as urban ones. The number of towns in the republic over this time increased by 2.7-fold; almost 40 percent of the towns which arose in the nation appeared on the map of Uzbekistan [8, p 82]. In individual oblasts of Tajikistan and Kirghizia, the urban population is under 20 percent.

The particular features of the reproduction of the population in the Central Asian republics in a distorted manner is reflected in the region's urbanization. The rural localities have accumulated enormous and rapidly increasing human resources. The situation is clearly abnormal. If it will continue in this manner in the future, by the beginning of the next century our Central Asia will become one of the least urbanized regions of the world [9, pp 146, 160, 174].

Urbanization in Central Asia is one of the most vulnerable elements in the socioeconomic development of the region over the long run. With the maintaining of the current rates of urbanization, social problems will inevitably be exacerbated in the area of job placement, the availability of housing, public health, education and so forth; these will be caused by the localizing of the population in the rural locality. Urbanization is irreversible and its low rates at present are the prologue for high rates in the future. And this means that even the next generations will encounter the problems of adapting the rapidly multiplying rural population in Central Asia to the constantly more complex technology. Does the way of life of the rural inhabitant correspond to those demands and the level of production which this technology requires?

The rural environment is not only the traditions of peasant culture, the feeling for being the master of the land and the patriarchal family. This also means both poor skills and a limited range of contacts. Protectionism and tribalism, nationalism and chauvinism and adherence to Islam under the pretext of "national tradition"—all of this as well is the product of the rural environment and an outgrowth of the rural way of life.

Urbanization in Central Asia is an obvious retreat from the traditional, "classic" model of urbanization when the demand of the industrializing town for a labor force encouraged the for-the-time-being increasing efflux from the countryside. According to this scheme, urbanization coincides in time with a "demographic transition" from the traditional type of the reproduction of the population (a high birthrate and a high morality rate) to a modern more economic one (low birthrate, low death rate). Since the decline in the birthrate is delayed in comparison with the declining death rate, the natural increase in the population increases sharply. At the same time the mobility of the population, primarily the rural, also increases. As a result, the city more than absorbs the entire natural increase in the rural inhabitants.

Urbanization of the industrially developed capitalist countries followed this pattern and it has also been characteristic for those republics of our nation in which the transition to a modern type of population reproduction has been carried out (RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). A distinguishing feature of the "classic" urbanization is the coinciding in the time of industrialization whereby there is a sharp increase in the need of the city for manpower¹ and also a "demographic transition" providing the potential for the growth of the urban population.

Accelerated industrialization in Central Asia (in 1928-1937, industrial production in Uzbekistan increased by 5.7-fold, in Turkmenia by 6.5, in Kirghizia by 14 and Tajikistan by 26-fold [10, p 26]) to a significant degree was the result of the influx of skilled workers from the other republics. "The first stages in the industrialization of the Central Asian region was carried out largely by the labor of regular workers and specialists coming here from the European RSFSR, from the Ukraine and from Belorussia. Industrialization and urbanization touched the indigenous nationalities comparatively less" [11].

"Industrial expansion" did not touch the sphere of the application and character of labor or the way of life of the basic stratum of local inhabitants. The region's industrialization determined the development of the population which as before was oriented to different, nonindustrial types of labor.² The given circumstance as well as the lack of the required professional, skill and educational training impeded the involvement of the indigenous population in industrial production. In recent decades the situation has changed but up to now migrants from other republics play a major role in the forming of the working class in the leading sectors of the

region's industry. For example, in Dushanbe, only 8 percent of the working youth has come from Tajik villages while 19 percent has come from other republics [12].

With a surplus of manpower, the Central Asian cities are strewn with announcements of vacant jobs predominantly in industry. In becoming urban dwellers, yesterday's rural inhabitants are in no hurry to fill out the ranks of working class as a majority endeavor to get into spheres such as petty trades, public dining, services and hand production, that is, what in the developing countries is sometimes termed the informal sector.

The urban way of life is being slowly introduced into the awareness of the people who, having abandoned the countryside, in no way have given up the customary views, standards and ideas. Rather widespread is a situation where the purpose of moving to the town is a desire to earn enough for the wedding of one's children or for building a house for the young even if the children are still under age. Naturally, in such instances the migrant views his departure as temporary and does not endeavor to take on different sets and values. In other words, the people leave their homes not out of a gravitating toward urban conditions but really quite the contrary, in order to better realize the ideals of a traditional, that is, rural way of life. Moreover, the rural migrants constantly introduce elements of the rural way of life into the urban lifestyle. The urban way of life influences the scale of values of the rural inhabitants, particularly in the material sphere with the traditional indications of sufficiency being replaced by modern "urban" standards. Moral values also change. In particular, the prestige of education arises and there are definite shifts in the area of marriage and family relations. However, the traditions are strong and the standards and views developing over the centuries are extremely persistent. Hence an inclination for agricultural labor and an orientation to large families and low mobility.

In taking on the external attributes of urban life, the inhabitants of the Central Asian countryside often experience no need for a change in psychological views and this in our mind greatly explains their low mobility.

Ethnic traditions are also of enormous significance. As research has shown, the prosperity of the rural family depends upon its size [14, p 91]. The traditional family and the traditional system of upbringing, on the one hand, impede a decline in the birthrate and, on the other, keep the youth in the rural locality.

In commenting on the specific features of the region, at the same time it must be admitted that the socioeconomic changes here have not occurred without a trace. Thus, in the 1970s, mobility among the Uzbeks rose by 2.7-fold, among the Kirghiz by 2.8-fold, the Tajiks by 1.7 and the Turkmen by 2.6-fold [15, p 10]. The Kirghiz at present are one of the most mobile ethnic groups. The

situation in Uzbekistan has improved somewhat and here the migration out of the countryside was around one-half of the natural increase; in Kirghizia and Turkmenia, respectively, 27 percent and 16 percent [7, pp 84, 85]. All the same, the intensity of the movement of the indigenous population within their republic and the Central Asian region is approximately half the amount of the Russians. According to estimates of specialists, the mobility of the Central Asian indigenous nationalities is approaching the level which was achieved in Russia more than five decades ago [7, pp 76, 82].

Fundamental measures are essential aimed at sharply intensifying the region's urbanization pace. Only in passing through the crucible of the city do the rural labor resources learn how to adapt to the difficult conditions of modern production. And such adaptation is impossible on the basis of obsolete equipment and production methods, outside the development of the sectors which determine scientific and technical progress. Only with their introduction do the competence and intelligence of the worker and his skills rise and the territorial and professional mobility grow stronger.

What has been said does not mean that we must copy the production structure of the other republics which are ahead of the Central Asian region by industrial development. As was rightly pointed out by V. Kostakov, "the interests of production intensification and the social development of the nation require extensive construction of food and light industry enterprises in these regions" [4, p 89]. The main thing is that production should without fail be modern, technically well equipped and complex. This is an essential prerequisite for industrialization and which at the time in essence did not involve the indigenous population of Central Asia. The intensification in the region is identical with completing industrialization [4, p 83].

Industrialization and urbanization are very important conditions for the accelerated socioeconomic development of the region. But clearly these conditions alone are not sufficient as the high growth rates of the population can become a major impediment on the path of social changes.

Since 1970, the population of the Central Asian republics has increased by 1.6-fold, with an annual rise of 2.7 percent. (In 1986, the natural increase was 31 persons per 1,000 inhabitants and the birthrate was 38 persons.) The natural increase and the birthrate have been set on the "Third World" level, and here it is a question of just Africa as in Asia, Latin America and as a whole for the developing countries the designated indicators are much lower than in Central Asia [9, pp 144, 146, 160, 174]. At the same time, here a transition to a modern type of reproduction has been noted. Demographers have noticed a decline in the birthrate: in Tajikistan, for example, the average number of children born to a woman over her life has declined over the last 20 years

from 5.87 to 5.60 [21, p 48]. For a comparison we should point out that in a majority of the developing nations an analogous decline took just a few years.

We should also mention such an aspect of the problem as the prosperity of the population under the conditions of its high growth rate. It is still easier to raise a healthy child, to feed and cloth him and give him an education in a small family. Recognition of this fact has led to the carrying out of an active demographic policy of controlling the birthrate in the developing countries. A demographic policy is also being carried out in the Central Asian republics. However, it is aimed not at improving the quality of life of the population but rather encouraging its quantitative growth. And this is in a region where, in the expression of one demographer, a father with few children is as laughable, in the view of those around him, as one with many children in some areas in the European part of the nation.

Is such a policy necessary?

Usually its advisability is explained by the fact that on a large portion of the nation's territory, the birthrate is just on the brink of ensuring the reproduction of the generations and under these conditions Central Asia is virtually becoming the sole source of an increase in the population over the long run.

Even now the Central Asian republics are responsible for one-third of the entire increase in the nation's population and one-fifth of all the earth's. However, natural questions arise: Is it reasonable to impede the objective process of a transition to a modern type of the population's reproduction? Here had we not replaced the goals of regional development (an increased level of prosperity for the Central Asian population) by incorrectly understood goals of national development (ensuring expanded reproduction of the nation's population)? Are not the gains illusory with an increase in the labor resources which are little adapted to modern production and do not possess sufficient vocational and skill training? Can we further tolerate a deepening in the gap in the socioeconomic development of Central Asia and the other territories? Should the other republics compensate for this gap and should they "pay" for the future increase in the population in Central Asia? Would it not be more logical to encourage the birthrates in these regions using these funds? There are more questions than there are answers....

It must be directly recognized that the demographic policy carried out in Central Asia has largely met neither the needs of the nation nor those of the region. The Ninth (1988) Plenum of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee stated with complete certainty: "Such rates of demographic growth largely outstripped the economic and social development of the republic. The contradictions are becoming evermore apparent between the high

increase in the population, the labor resources and the low level of the efficiency of social production, between the needs for social goods and the real opportunities for satisfying them" [1].

Demographic policy in Central Asia requires changes. In our view, it must be refocused from encouraging the birthrate to control and here the accent should be shifted to family planning. The necessity of a gradual transition from a large family to a medium-sized family "is becoming perfectly obvious" [13].

It would be naive to assume that there are pat formulas for a new demographic policy in the region. But, as a question for reflection: Why not encourage the birth of only the first two or three children? Why not give the entire amount of assistance completely to them or introduce a regressive scale of aid instead of the current progressive one? (A rise in the mobility of the indigenous population remains another very important aim of demographic policy.)

Urbanization, industrialization and an active demographic policy are the key prerequisites for the social development of the Central Asian republics. The successful implementation of socioeconomic policy is also impossible without a restructuring of the traditional, eurocentric notions concerning its goals and the ways of achieving them. Recognition in words of the specific features of social development in one or another region is frequently accompanied by the desire to treat them all in the same manner. Intoxicated by the successful development of Central Asia, we have overlooked the failure which socioeconomic policy in this region has begun to produce. The burden of illusions weighs down the burden of changes. Without revising the traditional notions, without a sober assessment of the social accomplishments and without the regionalization of social policy, there can be no further progress. It must be admitted that the Central Asian republics which for decades were a beacon for the Third World nations may well themselves turn to their experience, in particular in the sphere of demographic policy.

Footnotes

1. The nation's urban population over 1926-1939 increased by 2.7-fold, the number of workers and white collar personnel (1929-1937) by 2.5-fold, including by 2.7-fold in industry [10, p 24].

2. It was precisely in this period that there was a gap in the pace of urbanization in Central Asia and the other republics: even in 1913, the share of the urban population in the nation was 18 percent, in all of Central Asia it was 19 percent, and in Uzbekistan, 24 percent. In 1940, respectively, 33 percent, 25 percent and 25 percent [16, p 378].

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DISCUSSIONS

Strikes in USSR: New Social Reality
18060005b Moscow SOTSIOLGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 89 (signed to press 20 Feb 89) pp 21-36

[Roundtable discussion written up by A.I. Kravchenko: "Strikes in the USSR: A New Social Reality"]

[Text] Soviet legislation—neither before nor at present—has prohibited and does not prohibit strikes. Recently in the nation there were several instances of "establishing the attitudes" of the labor collectives with the enterprise administration in the spontaneous form of not showing up for work. In a discussion with an APN [Novosti Press Agency] correspondent, the Chairman of the AUCCTU S.A. Shalayev pointed out that such actions were caused by the labor conflicts of individual groups of workers. For example, the drivers of municipal buses in Kishinev demanded an increase in wages. In other instances the reason was unsatisfactory working and leisure conditions, administrative-pressure methods of leadership and a reticence to heed the opinion of the collective. In other words, a strike in the USSR had become an empirical fact. Sociological science cannot divorce itself from studying a new social reality. On the agenda was the task of working out a state legal procedure which would clearly define with precisely what violations of the labor agreements and after what sort of preliminary examination of them it was possible to resort to a work stoppage.

From sociological science, society has the right to expect a thorough analysis of labor conflicts, the reasons for their occurrence as well as practical recommendations.

Discussing the problem at the editors' roundtable were: V.I. Baydin—worker from the Proletariy Production Association; G.P. Degtyarev—candidate of philosophical sciences, sector head at the Scientific Research Institute for Labor; V.P. Kazimirchuk—doctor of juridical sciences, professor, deputy director of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences; A.V. Lipskiy—junior science associate at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Yu.P. Mador—doctor of historical sciences, senior science associate at the Institute of the International Workers Movement Under the USSR Academy of Sciences; A.K. Nazimova—candidate of economic sciences, head science associate at the Institute for the International Workers Movement Under the USSR Academy of Sciences; G.A. Pogosyan—candidate of philosophical sciences, scientific secretary at the Institute of Philosophy and Law Under the Armenian Academy of Sciences; V.M. Yakushev—candidate of philosophical sciences and senior instructor at the Academy of the National Economy Under the USSR Council of Ministers.

The discussion was led by A.I. Kravchenko—candidate of philosophical sciences and scientific consultant for the journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA.

[A.I. Kravchenko] Sociological science, like social sciences as a whole, is just beginning to approach the problems related to strikes. There are virtually no special theoretical and empirical studies. Nor can one speak about results expressed in specific formulations of draft laws or in the form of administrative recommendations. Of course, it might be argued that in the recent past strikes and unsanctioned meetings were a subject closed to the public and science. In a word, the subject of research seemingly did not exist. That was the case. Nevertheless, the given circumstance does not lift responsibility from scientists. Let us recall that the problem of labor conflicts has been studied by sociologists. I have not counted but I am fairly confident that a bibliography on the question would number over a hundred titles and extensive empirical material has been accumulated. Certainly during the period of stagnation there were ideological and administrative restrictions on an adequate interpretation of the obtained results. But the explanation depended largely upon the methodological positions.

Unfortunately, in their mass sociologists have followed a path of least resistance. For instance, conflicts between the workers and the administration were studied in detail and extensively. However, these were analyzed predominantly from the viewpoint of the sociopsychological climate, the motivation for labor and the style of management. These are all important problems. But they have their roots in social interests. If at one time we

devoted more attention to the corresponding questions, I feel today in scientific terms we would have advanced faster and we would have a sounder basis for constructive practical proposals.

Furthermore, by the nature of his activity, a sociologist on the job must disclose areas of social tension in the collective and propose ways to resolve arising problems. At present, the client for such studies can be not only the administration but also public organizations such as a trade union. If this is the case, how can he help resolve the conflicts? Certainly he should first of all be guided by the law. But within the framework stipulated by the law he has the right of choice and this will be determined not only by the scientific view of the situation but also by civilian position. In a word, it is a question of the scientist's professional ethics.

[G.A. Pogosyan] From our school desk we learned that strikes were a form of class struggle for the proletariat in the Western countries. In his "Economic Manuscripts of 1861-1883," K. Marx commented: "Strikes occur largely either in the aim of preventing a drop in wages, or forcing an increase in wages, or in the aim of setting the limits of a normal work day."

Why and for what purpose do strikes occur in our society, where power belongs to the people and the factories and plants belong to the state? Are not the workers striking against their own power? The stereotype which has become rooted in our conscience about a strike as a purely capitalist phenomenon, prevents us from correctly understanding and assessing the given phenomenon. Until recently, many felt that drug addiction and prostitution did not exist in our nation and have appeared only now. Our social awareness is reminiscent of a patient who, having learned that he is severely ill, loses his presence of mind and repeats in amazement that yesterday he was quite alright.

In order to answer the posed questions, it is essential first of all to "inscribe" a strike in the new economic thinking and which must reflect the new realities in current society, provide a correct explanation for this phenomenon and find effective methods for preventive intervention. Certainly a strike by its essence is an economic microinfarct. Only outright malevolent persons can be happy with strikes.

The strikes which occurred in July 1988 in Yerevan were an exceptional event. A professional sociologist, I was interested in the social dynamics of the phenomenon, the character and types of conduct of the people, the motives and goals of their actions. For many reasons in such a situation it is impossible to conduct a poll. For this reason, the method of involved unstructured observation was chosen. Thus, I ended up in a dual situation: as the executor of a professional role and as a participant in the strike movement. The ethics of a scientific method required a neutral assessment and an outsider's view.

But the aims of the strike required active social involvement. From my own practical experience I was convinced that the contradictoriness of the role in no way impeded the work since as a whole the attitude toward those who were not striking, particularly among the intelligentsia and white collar personnel, was extremely tolerant. In actual terms in the course of the work carried out, three levels were established on which the research was done: directly in the labor collective, the city and the central square in the evening during the mass meetings.

Let me endeavor to draw certain generalizations. The strike in Armenia was not of an economic nature but rather an interethnic one. There was no doubt that it caused serious damage to the region's economy and again convinced one that under the conditions of economic integration a chain in one link entails greater and greater losses along the entire chain with stoppages of the equipment and labor force and the nonfulfillment of the plan quotas. I estimated that the economic loss caused to the nation and the republic by the strike ran into the many millions. The argument is persuasive because it is simple. It is far more difficult to answer the question of against whom were the workers striking? Here the main question is do we always fully consider all of the direct and indirect consequences of bureaucracy, corruption, bribery, protectionism and the other "flowers of evil" which flourished in the period of stagnation? Is it possible to consider these phenomena normal while a strike is viewed as a completely unacceptable, abnormal element of social life, if one considers that the latter is caused by the former and is directly against it? The deformation of socialism involves a sharp dissatisfaction of the masses and this can and will be expressed not only in meetings and demonstrations but also in strikes. There are possible situations when precisely this will be the most effective of all the available means of combating bureaucracy. We must not declare all strikes as illegal and running contrary to the interests of the people. Each specific case must be viewed separately. The party has called the people to fight against bureaucracy but we forget that the people in essence are disarmed in this fight. It is a long and not always effective undertaking to fight against bureaucracy with complaints and letters to superiors. There must be a mechanism which will allow the people to feel the entire fullness of their power.

As a social phenomenon, a strike is a rather complex and involved process. It has a nonlinear motivation structure. In addition to the basic interests there are also attendant ones (personal or group) from the desire to settle a score with someone to a desire to display emotional energy and unmotivated aggression in the street, to let go, to express built-up dissatisfaction with everything, to violate prohibitions which have aggravated an individual for many years.

Democratic management, if it is actually democratic, establishes conditions for developing open forms of protest such as a demonstration and a strike. The situation stands as follows: either we drive the social ailment

deep inside and produce an Orwellian schizophrenic society or we discover the abscess and give some thought to methods of treatment. In truth there is the danger that the illness is seriously neglected and the patient is incurable. In such instances, physicians disclose the truth, in calming the patient. And then one way remains: to return to the first variation. What choice will society make?

[Yu.P. Mador] Before talking about a choice, let us decide whether a strike is possible in the socialist countries? Until recently such a posing of the question was considered provocative. However, over a number of years similar facts have accumulated in China, Yugoslavia, Poland and, finally, in the Soviet Union. The necessity has arisen of thinking through the untypical. A new sphere of activity has opened up for sociology and this is the analytical and comparative research. Here much is still unclear and the attempts appearing sporadically in the press at generalizing and conceptualizing events are more of a preliminary nature and often suffer from a polemical excess.

A strike or stoppage (these are identical concepts, synonyms, but the former as terser and more meaningful, seems preferential to me) is a specific offshoot of the capitalist method of production and represents a proletarian means of economic combat and social protest. In the sociological sense, this is a variety of social action and namely an action by a collective of workers who jointly determine that very possibility of the labor process, that is, they either halt it, they resume it in spite of the will of the individual or the collective capitalist and this is aimed at altering the social situation. Such a change can be limited to concessions of an economic, social and political nature.

The strike arose in Western Europe virtually simultaneously with the appearance of the new formation, approximately in the 14th Century and became established during the time of the Industrial Revolution at the end of the 18th Century and the beginning of the 19th. Over the hundreds of years of its existence and as a permanent attribute of capitalism, the strike assumed numerous forms and functions and has continued to alter even now, when fundamental structural shifts are occurring in the world economy. However recently one can observe a decline in total strike activity (expressed in the number of strikers, the number of lost days and so forth). This is explained by the consequences of those same shifts: by mass stagnating unemployment, by changes in the skill structure of the working class, by migration and the dispersion of workers in the cities and by the skillful social policy of the bourgeois government.

When against this background the issue was raised of strikes in the socialist countries, for some the question might arise: Does not the strike change its, so to speak, specific attributes for the formation? But doesn't such a

positing of the question show not so much the boldness or perspicaciousness of a man as it does his misunderstanding of the nature of the phenomenon.

In ordinary parlance and sometimes also in the scientific literature, the term "strike" is applied to actions which are far removed from the workers movement and within which it arose. The assumption is made that any breaking off of routine activity caused by an external reason or inner counteraction can be termed a strike. In this sense then the Athenian women (in the play by Aristophanes) went on strike something more than 2,500 years ago. But if strict definitions are not adhered to, then room is opened up for the manipulating of the term. In actuality, the term of strike has given both to the refusal of the feudal present to serve the lord (a strike of the rural proletarians) as well as actions by the medieval presence against the feudal lords and even the halting of work in building the pyramids in Ancient Egypt. But even if one does not go far back from modern times, then here we would have to include student unrest and actions by capitalists such as lock-outs which are called "manufacturers' strikes." In Russia such arbitrary use of the terms was favored by the particular features of the presence of the appropriate words in the Russian language. Thus the verb "bastovat" [to strike] (from the Italian basta or enough)—in the sense of the refusal to do something or act in a certain manner—even from the times of Pushkin and Lermontov while the verb "staknutsya" [to strike] (in the sense of reaching an agreement for a counteraction) long before. The terms "zabastovka" and "stachka" [strike] as applied to worker actions became established in the language of the press in the 1870s.

It seems that when worker actions in the socialist nations are designated by the customary words of "strike" or "stoppage," whether one likes it or not their distinction from the capitalist prototype is hidden. In a developed socialist society (developed in fact and not in the work of obsequious theorists), a strike does not occur merely because there is an absence of capitalist exploitation, the antagonism between capital and labor but also like exploitation, there is bureaucratic tyranny. However, we still do not have such a society, as has become clear. For this reason both strikes and strike-like actions can be a real fact. Such a sober and farsighted practical man as V.I. Lenin assumed that under Soviet power (in his works of 1920-1922), there was the possibility of two types of strikes: 1) at enterprises of the concessionaire capitalists and 2) at the nationalized enterprises. In the first instance, this was a struggle against the unrestrained appetites of the capitalists who had escaped from under state control, a struggle supported in the event of the reasonableness of the strikers' demands by state power (for example, aid in the form of assistance). But if the demands of the workers were not reasonable, then the leaders of such a strike "must be summoned to the soviets and given a good dressing down, emerging lint as if from the bathhouse." In the second instance, this was a protest against the bureaucratic distortions of state power itself. However—and this was also pointed out by

Lenin—the strike struggle was not organic to the new society and merely arose with the political immaturity and cultural backwardness of the workers.

Thus, the role of a strike in capitalist and socialist societies differed fundamentally. In the first instance, this was a weapon of the class struggle and in the second the method for fighting against distortions in the system of managing production and the state. Under the conditions of a developed socialist democracy, the grounds for such actions, naturally, would be sharply restricted and disappear. From this it followed, in particular, that such strikes basically are not antisoviet or antistate but anti-bureaucratic. With an optimum running management apparatus, labor conflicts either do not arise or, in arising, these are quickly resolved on the basis of a compromise.

However, in actuality we have seen that in certain instances strikes are not merely a labor conflict aimed against the bureaucracy. Such actions frequently take on all the external forms of a developed strike; they even employ such an aggressive form as a strike involving the occupation of the enterprise (an "occupation" strike). Here, incidentally, one can clearly see the opposing nature of the Western and socialist strikes: within the former this is a form of struggle against the closing of an enterprise, a cutback in jobs and the curtailing of production and in the latter, on the contrary, the strikers do harm to the economy (which is already limping) and afflicts the key sectors of industry and transport at their weakest points. And this happens when the workers have sufficient opportunities to seek economic and social improvements by democratic means. The extremism is explained by the fact that the intentions of the organizers of the strikes (for example, in Poland) include a change in the nation's political status. If behind the back of the strikers stand those who are working for a "Poland without communism," then one can speak about conservative and reactionary strikes.

The phenomenon of reactionary strikes is rather well known from the history of the worker movement. For example, along with the strikes aimed against racial discrimination and segregation, there have also been strikes "for racial purity" of trade union ranks and along with revolutionary strikes there have also been monarchical or even those prepared by the secret police agents (in Russia at the beginning of the 20th Century). Of recent example, there is the strike in Sri Lanka organized by the chauvanistic organization of the Sinhalese against the Timils. At the dawn of the existence of the Soviet state there were strikes with a minus sign including the "go slows" at the plants of Petrograd in February 1921 and which occurred against the background of the Kronshadt Revolt and had the nature of strike revolts. Their social base was recent migrants from the countryside (a predominant portion of the regular proletariat had perished on the fronts of World War I and the Civil War or was scattered throughout the nation). The situation was so serious that a state of siege was declared in the city.

Strikes or strike-like actions in a socialist society have often assumed a conservative or reactionary tint possibly precisely as a consequence of their nonorganic and alien nature to the given system. They are taken over with comparative ease by antisocial or extremist forces. It must be recognized that the very shortcomings of socialism serve as the objective basis for this. We must not foster the illusion that in the period of authoritarian rule, the workers did not have a need to strike. During the periods of the deformation of general-citizen and particularly worker rights of man, strikes were extremely rare for the prospect of repression was too obvious (let us recall the rebellious strikes of the "political" prisoners known in the literature). It is a paradox but the liberalizing of society in maintaining bureaucratic coercion makes it possible to express one's dissatisfaction more openly, including in the form of a strike. Precisely due to the contradictoriness of the current situation, the strikes often end up the object of manipulation by various extremist forces. Their goal is to upset the economy and undermine the stability of the state. I want to emphasize that in contrast to the West, where conservative and reactionary strikes have held a very insignificant place and have never defined the appearance of the worker movement, strikes in a socialist society often show a tendency—as recent events indicate—for a degeneration into the object of manipulation by outside forces. Strikes under socialism in essence are devoid of both an immediate (improving the standard of living of their participants) as well as longer-range, strategic prospects (a change in the social system). If certain strike leaders in Poland have endeavored to restore capitalism, then this, you will agree, for proletarian actions in a socialist country is at the least an absurd goal.

In order to avoid the indiscriminate listing of all actions in the same category of reactionary or antistate, it is essential to rely on a concrete analysis of events and which would establish whether in the given instance there is a fight against bureaucratic distortions, errors and inadequate management or not. Personally, I favor the strengthening and development of socialism by different, nonstrike means.

Under the conditions of perestrojka, when a new thinking and a new view of the world are being searched, one can see particularly clearly both the inadequacy of a strike to our society as well as the danger of its degeneration into an antidemocratic weapon. But the solution to the question lies in developing the democratic mechanisms for resolving conflicts and in a dialogue and in a mutually advantageous compromise. The reconciliation system in a bourgeois society, in often having been employed to split the unity of the strikers and subsequently deceive them, under our conditions could become an organic part in the mechanism for involving workers in management.

[A.K. Nazimova] We live in times when we must now consider as a reality phenomena which up to now were

considered inherent only to the capitalist world: inflation, crises, organized crime and processes of social corrosion. Here we must also put the acute conflicts at enterprises, including worker strikes.

The myth that a worker under socialism is the master of production for a long time prevented a recognition of the existence of differences in the interests within the production collective, the heterogeneity and in a number of instances the opposition of motives for the activities of the executors and the administration, the collective and the state administrative bodies, including the possibility of a clash of interests and a strike as a means for resolving such conflicts. The influence of the workers on a change in their social status should be ensured by participation in the public administrative bodies. However, within the existing economic mechanism only the state in the form of the ministries, the departments and the enterprise administration remained the real effective master. The involvement of the workers in management largely was of a fictitious nature. For this reason social work was frequently carried "upon order" (it is no accident that the term "social load or burden" has become widespread) and was often viewed as an obligatory step in job advancement.

Understandably, the tasks and sense of social activity remained external and the activity itself became an instrument for achieving different goals not related to this activity. If one averages the data of sociological studies, it turns out that around 60 percent of the workers participate actively in social work (here an equality sign was put between it and involvement in administration). At the same time, the workers themselves had a very low view of the effectiveness of the activities carried out by the social organizations. Thus, in the mid-1970s only one-third of the workers questioned at Leningrad enterprises commented that their social work brought any real benefit. In assessing their own social view, only one-sixth of the workers both 10 years ago and today consider themselves to be the bosses who actually influence the state of affairs in the collective.

In having extremely limited opportunities to influence management decisions and in encountering the ban on strikes and the severe penalties against the violators, the workers express their attitude toward shortcomings on the job predominantly by invisible means such as holding up productivity, increasing the number of absences without leave and poor production discipline. The most widespread means in the struggle to raise wages and improve working conditions and social benefits was personnel turnover. To the degree that the personnel shortage (in fictitious) was intensified, the effectiveness of such a method of pressurizing the administration increased. In truth, both society and the enterprise as well as the workers themselves suffered major losses. Outright conflicts and mass protest actions were extremely rare and if they did occur information about them did not reach the press.

The prospects for the development of social activeness have been broadened in line with the economic reform and the process of democratization. But what place can strikes assume under the new conditions?

As we convert to complete cost accounting, for the workers and white collar personnel there is an evermore obvious dependence between the results of their labor and the level of production organization and management efficiency and the development of self-management puts both under the control of the labor collectives. Moreover: with the appearance of cooperatives and "individual-owned enterprises," the possibility for the employment of labor is increased. All of this to a certain degree negates the necessity of strikes.

However, the transition to the new management conditions is going on not so quickly and not so painlessly everywhere. On the one hand, the establishing of effective cost accounting and self-management is being impeded as the reforms are carried out inconsistently, the introduction of the new mechanism goes on with the survival of obsolete prices and centralized methods for allocating resources while the approaches inherited from the time of stagnation have not been overcome in wages. On the other hand, the expectation of major changes has given rise to the demand and hope for a serious improvement in living and working conditions. The broadening of glasnost and democracy has made an awareness of new opportunities a real fact. The monotony of human existence has been disrupted and the new political atmosphere has provided an unprecedented impetus for social activeness, including in nontraditional forms. Worker clubs have appeared (for example, "Worker Initiative" at the Leningrad Krasnaya Zarya NPO [Scientific-Production Association]), meetings and assemblies have been called upon initiative "from below" (let us recall the events at the Yaroslavl Motor Plant in December 1987), and collective demands are being advanced to improve labor conditions and wages (as was the case at Kotlas). At the same time, we have become aware of the inability of certain organizations (primarily the trade unions) to represent the actual interests of the workers, to conduct talks with the administration and achieve solutions which satisfy both parties.

The exacerbation of conflicts at the enterprises has led to strikes. For the first time after more than a 50-year break, society has learned about them from announcements in the Soviet press. Yes, for many decades we did not know about strikes (although in the absence of glasnost the fact that we "did not know" in no way meant that strikes did not exist).

In the process of the democratization of social life, we have moved from unanimity of thoughts to pluralism of opinions, we have recognized the right to dissident thinking and have incorporated an entire spectrum of independent social movements and organizations in the political process. The democratization of production management has also raised the issue of the need to work

out principles for approaching a method whereby the workers can protect their rights and interests including a "limited strike." Let me immediately stipulate that I view the question of a "limited strike" at an enterprise as an extreme method for resolving production conflicts between the workers and the administration and I do not have in mind the "general strikes" in Stepanakert and Armenia. These have a fundamentally different basis and require special analysis.

The experience of the first strikes has shown that the workers are acutely aware of the link of their own interests with the perestroika in the economy and social relations. There has been the complete unpreparedness and often the inability of the administration to eliminate the tension and when things have reached the point of a strike, they are unable to effectively find a constructive solution. The first (and often the only) response is to resort to a repressive system, to threats or direct sanctions against the activists. Another method of the leadership is demagogic promises which are clearly unattainable (for example, to compensate for a loss in wages regardless of the failure to meet the production quotas). Sometimes a ministry may allocate funds from its own reserves for social needs or for the technical reconstruction of the enterprise. What is this—an act of charity or saving the honor of the regiment?

As any recently arising phenomenon, a strike requires analysis within the categories of the new political thinking. For to lead social processes and restructure the political system means to find a place for this phenomenon, to understand the sources of conflicts arising in production, to promptly activate the mechanism for resolving them in order to prevent the use of a particularly sharp weapon, the strike. In being double-edged, this entails losses for society, for the enterprise and the workers, although in and of itself a strike is one of the forms of the modern democratic process and, since there will be more than enough pretexts for the occurrence of conflicts in production, it is essential to legislate a procedure for resolving them and ensure the right of the workers to strike. Equally, protection should be provided for public interests against ambitious demands.

Soviet legislation in this area has certain gaps. In truth, the Constitution and the republic labor law codes do not ban strikes. At the same time, a well-known lawyer has seen strikes as a violation of the constitutional duty of each citizen to work. Such an explanation seems more like a casuistic contrivance, if one recalls the instances of strikes described in the press. The workers were fighting precisely to change the conditions and organization of labor which prevented effective and highly productive work. It would be better to draw attention to the opposite side of the scale, that is, the absence of a legal mechanism for resolving production conflicts (representation of the parties, the role of trade unions and other public organizations, the methods of conducting talks and the powers of the local and central authorities). Equally acute is the question of incorporating in management

skills the habit of working out counterproposals, to find persuasive arguments, to compromise, and to seek a constructive way out of labor conflicts whenever possible in the early stages and, when necessary, in the course of a strike. There should be schooling in democratic or partnership conduct for the trade unions and those worker organizations which must ensure order and discipline at the striking enterprises and achieve support for the demands of the workers on the part of the public and the mass information media.

[A.I. Kravchenko] I do not agree with the thesis of Alla Konstantinovna [Nazimova] that a strike, if I have understood her correctly, is the manifestation not merely of social activeness but also a feeling of being the master which is being reestablished in our workers. Strikes exist both in capitalist and socialist enterprises. But under capitalism a worker is not the master of production. And what about under socialism?

A real master or boss will never strike at his enterprise. This is absurd. He has other ways of resolving the problems. A strike is the plight of the suppressed. Let us not be afraid of words. Suppression in the social sense is the debasing of human dignity and limiting the standard of living to a minimum of social goods. If this becomes a mass phenomenon, then we must speak about the conditions of existence for an entire class, conditions beyond which an individual cannot go as long as he remains the representative of the given class.

Suppression in the economic sense is exploitation, that is, the appropriation of unpaid labor and not merely the employment of the labor force. Such appropriation can be expressed, for example, in the employment of collective means (equipment, materials, transport and so forth) for personal purposes. The abusing of an official position and the "free" erection of garages, summer houses or vacation houses for the leadership are one of the indicators of the covert exploitation of labor in the sphere of production and distribution. Another equally important indicator is underpayment for harmful working conditions, the unjustified reduction in wage rates and overtime.

I feel that sociology should formulate a new conceptual language which reflects the new reality of not the unidimensional but rather the multidimensional world of labor. Previously, this was expressed through the concept of "turning labor into the first vital requirement," "establishing a communist attitude toward labor," "raising demands," and "the all-round development of the individual." In social conscience these formed a linear, closed model of socialism which in no way reflected, as is now clear, objective reality.

Organized crime, corruption which encompasses a significant portion of the administrative system, youth criminal bands which terrorize the population of many cities—this is also the reality which should be studied by sociologists. Here also we must add the alienation of

labor, covert exploitation, the commodity nature of the labor force and hired labor, the limited private entrepreneurship in the form of individual and cooperative activities, joint-stock and mixed enterprises and, finally, strikes. Clearly in the near future unemployment will become a component part of the "problem field" of sociological science.

However, I want to argue against hurried generalizations. The alienation of labor, exploitation and strikes exist under socialism as an empirical fact but they in no way should express the essence of the new social system. We as yet simply do not know what should express its nature. The serious deformations of socialism which began under Stalinism and have continued during the years of stagnation have closed off to the scientists the opportunity to discover what real socialism is. The model of a classless, socially homogeneous society has now turned out to be not the ideal of the future but rather the theoretical heritage of the dogmatic past. In the real model of socialism from the period of the NEP which we now term Leninist, there were also strikes, the alienation of labor, bureaucracy and private entrepreneurship. This is an historical fact.

If socialism is a multidimensional model of the world, it certainly comes as no surprise that coexisting together will be direct social labor, state planning of the economy, a truly socialist attitude toward labor, inflation, social alienation and deviant conduct. The impetus for movement also can be found in the struggle of opposing principles.

Strikes occur predominantly at weak, poorly organized enterprises and in ecologically dangerous and politically unstable areas. They are not to be found where things are well organized.

In other words, they show up our shortcomings. Is this really bad? Let us recall Lenin's viewpoint that it is essential to simply close down the unprofitable and poorly organized enterprises. Why create superfluous centers of tension?

[V.I. Baydin] The press has been unwilling and has provided extremely little information about strikes. Nevertheless, an analysis of even such material makes it possible to draw definite generalizations. With the transition to the new management conditions, the first to respond to the reform were drivers and in the most diverse regions, in particular in Klaypeda, Chekhov and Yeysk. The conflict at the Yeysk PATP [Passenger Motor Transport Enterprise] matured gradually, the drivers repeatedly drew the attention of the leadership to the bad situation in the collective, but no improvement followed. Then on 11 May 1988, not a single bus moved. The straw which broke the camel's back was the issuing of pay which was much lower than in previous months. This was the result not of the enterprise's transition to

the new management conditions but rather the irresolution of old problems (organizational, production, financial and social) and the inability of the leadership to use the benefits of cost accounting and self-financing.

I would like to point out that the bus drivers possess a clearly expressed feeling of their own dignity stemming from the specific working conditions. At the same time, they are in an economic dependence upon the leadership and technical servicing. Finally, there is the increased responsibility (moral, material and even criminal) for the passenger. The nature of the job imposes a definite imprint on the socioprofessional appearance of the drivers and impels them to more decisive and categorical methods of struggle for their rights.

Let me give one other fact. On 19 December 1987 and 20 January 1988, the newspaper KUZNETSKIYE RABOCHI announced a conflict at the Santekhlit [Sanitary Engineering Casting] Plant. The essence was that the bathtub firers had intentionally reduced output in converting to the new wage conditions as serious violations had been made in the normative documents. The workers did not immediately shift to decisive measures and initially they had tried to attract attention to their problems by other methods, for example, they appealed to the plant trade union committee, the central committee of the sectorial trade union, to the newspapers and even to the court and procurator's office. The instigator of the "silent strike" (as the actions of the firers at the plant were christened) A.M. Deryabin refused his wages for several months preceding the conflict. (He had to resort to such a measure because they endeavored to accuse the firers of money-grubbing.) And what happened? Deryabin was dismissed and some of the leadership was given a severe reprimand. That was the end of it and virtually nothing had changed.

It has long been known that the introduction of new wage rates does not automatically bring about an increase in wages. There must be a range of measures along the entire production chain. But the workers have not wanted to wait for the major changes and they have been interested only in higher wages. Is this the disaster or fault of the workers? More likely the former since work under the new conditions has not been supported either economically (the control figures of the five-year plan have been kept, and wholesale trade in the means of production is absent) nor by explanatory work (economic training for the workers and a "school of self-management"). Precisely the "school of self-management" is essential since the new management conditions assume that wages will depend on ourselves and not the ministry which aims, regardless of the quality of the work and profitability, at "adding" money merely to fulfill the plan according to the "gross."

In addition to the above-listed forms of protest, in the working class the understanding is maturing of other methods of establishing the ideals of perestroyka. For example, at the Leningrad Krasnaya Zarya NPO, a

Worker Initiative Club has arisen under the leadership of the electrician Tyagushev. The remaining task here is to discover shortcomings in the organization and technology of production and participate in their elimination. The activities of Worker Initiative have sharply polarized the attitude in the collective. The critical actions by the club members initially caused a negative response on the side of the administration and trade union committee and alarmed and drove off a significant portion of the workers from the club. Clearly an activist position in life is still perceived as something abnormal and even dangerous. Intelligence is more dangerous than stupidity.

[G.P. Degtyarev] If we have already lost the traditions of settling labor conflicts, then why not borrow all that is valuable from foreign experience?

Demagoguery comes cheap and its political consequences are more costly. For entire decades we considered strikes to be part and parcel of capitalism. And all of a sudden the wheel of history has made an unexpected turn. Now we are taking a look at foreign experience for a legislative settlement to the strike movement. Labor conflicts, it turns out, also exist in our country but we do not know how to resolve them.

Therein lies the benefit of Western experience and what it can teach us. For example, there is the unwritten but obligatory rule according to which the co-chairmen of the conflict commission and these are the representatives of the state, the entrepreneurs and the strikers, sit side by side thereby ensuring direct contact, equality and sincerity even at the most critical moments of the dispute. In working on a solution to common problems jointly, they are all inclined to consider themselves sooner partners than hostile sides. Even the very atmosphere of the talks—confidential and at the same time business-like—do not predispose the sides to extreme actions. The spirit of partnership gives a constructive and not a litigious nature to the talks.

In the event of a strike conflict, decisions must be made not by a simple majority of votes. When unanimity is reached, secret balloting is scarcely needed. But if relations are taut, then it is not excluded that "line crossers" may not be found on either side. The end of the discussion becomes uncontrollable and the favorable outcome of the labor conflict is jeopardized.

Also undesirable are public sessions of commissions. Of course, it can be felt that such sessions are of educational importance. However, a private discussion of the conflict is more predisposed to frankness and to the reaching of agreement.

Western experience indicates that the resorting to an official state arbitrator for eliminating differences of opinion, as a rule, causes even greater irritation and mutual discord among the representatives of the parties. Here they usually do not make a serious effort to achieve a peace, fearing that with an official investigation their

proposals will be turned against them. Moreover, in feeling responsibility to those who elected them, the parties assume an obligation to win the disputes at whatever the cost. The demand of official arbitration to halt a strike drives the differences inside and, in being unvoiced, they become an additional risk factor. Only the appearance of well-being is achieved with one or two strikes being prevented but the differences built up gradually and it only takes the slightest spark for them to burst out with renewed strength. Here the overcoming of differences usually becomes and extremely difficult undertaking.

Rational arguments "pro" and "contra" do not always lead to a common solution. In addition, it is essential to know the attitude of each of the disputing sides and the rules of a diplomatic game.

It is extremely hard to obtain such information officially. For this reason in the event of labor conflicts it is important to resort to the institution of mediation in the form of a conciliation committee or a third-party judge. Three types of mediators are known: a widely-known person from outside, a nongovernmental counsel or an institution related to one or another government body.

Friendly mediation is one other element in the mechanism of the voluntary settlement of disputes. In differences which have grown into a conflict, both sides always endeavor to achieve domination and this means the attaining of opposing and mutually exclusive goals. Each of the parties has a covert desire "not to lose face" and, as a consequence, a tenacity in defending its position. Here the right to this is recognized by both conflicting parties. They do not exclude the probability of a row, and if it is inevitable, then there must be a delicate form which facilitates the retreat from the occupied positions without detriment to one's own dignity. Even if at the very outset of the conflict none of the proposed methods of retreat seems acceptable, sooner or later a moment arrives when one of the parties will be ready to concede if it is possible to "maintain face."

The appearance of mediators shows the readiness of the disputing parties to moderate the differences. Often the mediator has merely to simply propose that they sit down at the discussion table, exchange opinions and a general solution to the disputed question is found. The presence of a tactful mediator makes it possible for each of the parties to feel that it is moving toward a reconciliation but is not surrendering to the enemy's position.

Only when all diplomatic means have been exhausted and mediation has not aided is direct intervention by the governmental bodies required. How broad are their powers? The most moderate is intervention where the disputants are forced to enter into talks regardless of their will and desire. The hardest is the adoption of laws which oblige the disputing sides to remand to the courts

the case concerning the difference before obtaining permission for the strike. In truth, the legislative practice of forced intervention shows its low results.

We do not employ any of these means. Even compulsory intervention should occur on a precise legal basis but there still is no strike law. Nor can one speak at all about diplomatic channels for resolving labor conflicts. The level of labor disputes and the strike movement in our nation is on an extremely low level. In actual terms it is just forming although attempts to create it were undertaken even in the 1920s. The problems of strikes were analyzed theoretically and the mechanisms and procedures for resolving them were set up. But, under the conditions of the administrative-command system, when any manifestations of "disobedience" were suppressed unmercifully, this tradition did not undergo development. Social scientists, in endeavoring to provide an ideological basis for repressive practices, denied each and every contradiction (except for dialectical ones, in truth, understood in a very unique manner) and proclaimed our society to be a society of conflict-free development and unclouded flourishing. But in the second half of the 1980s, the realization began to grow stronger that contradictions and conflicts were inevitable. These showed progress and not regression and contributed to the manifestation of the human "ego," the self-awareness of the individual and his activist position in life. Unfortunately, by this time many achievements in the domestic conflict-resolving practices had been lost. For now there is a prevalence of methods of suppression, appeals for reconciliation and the intrigues of instigators and "irresponsible elements." Completely no consideration is given to the sociopsychological aspects of strikes. Can we regain what has been lost?

[V.M. Yakushev] The reason for the increase in the number of strikes is the broadening of commodity-monetary relations.

At present, we must take a new look at the strike movement. With the conversion to full cost accounting, the financial prosperity of a collective develops differently. And often this depends not so much upon the collective itself as upon the management conditions and the sectorial affiliation of the enterprise. A market mechanism is oriented at monetary incentives. The person who has an opportunity to increase the prices for his products lives in clover. But in the fishing industry, for example, prices are fixed, although the cost of sea-going trawlers has recently increased by several-fold. The wholesale price for fish products has remained as before and the enterprises have begun operating at a loss. This has told negatively on higher wages (although here at times are the hardest working conditions). Here is an additional factor for you for dissatisfaction.

The workers can see that their earnings do not rise in the same proportion as in the sectors with better conditions. We also observe similar processes in the coal industry

and ferrous metallurgy. At certain mines the workers have halted work (the so-called temporary work stoppages) until their demands are satisfied. The questions of improving nutrition and domestic conditions are resolved in this manner. Previously, this was done differently but now with the aid of strikes. Now it is much harder for the leader to work. It turns out that he must work for the collective, in securing additional goods by any means (by increasing prices for the products and ultimately at the expense of the consumer and the state).

The increased prices for food products and shortcomings in supply also contribute to the strike movement. The cooperatives as yet are unable to plug all the holes and actually empty the state pocket rather than improve the life of the public. Funds are being pumped from one vessel into another, from state trade into cooperative. Those working at state enterprises are naturally indignant. Another factor is the uneven development of the regions. Areas with highly developed heavy industry and weak agriculture are under harder conditions. At times under self-financing conditions an oblast is unable to feed itself while previously specialized, simply speaking, one-sided development was required from it and priority was given to the production of the means of production. Agriculture fell seriously behind. The workers felt that the more they worked the less they received.

The forecast for the future is not auspicious. The negative trends which favor strikes and most importantly the growing role for market elements in the economy will survive. It is possible that strikes will continue and the position of the working class will deteriorate.

[A.V. Lipskiy] I do not agree that previously strikes did not exist and now, with the development of commodity-monetary relations, they have suddenly arisen.

It turns out as if under the conditions of a planned economy with the development of administrative-command management no pretexts or the very fact of strikes existed in the USSR. Such a thesis of Vladimir Makarovich [Yakushev] seems unconditionally wrong to me. The absence of strikes and the keeping silent about them are different things.

In actuality, if one takes a look at history, then strikes are an essential accessory of commodity-monetary relations. However, I would not put these two circumstances in a direct dependence. The examined phenomenon is related primarily to the political and social organization of society. The latter, certainly, is ultimately determined by economic relations. At the same time, here the most important role is played by the forms and methods of realizing the interests of the principals.

Clearly a strike is the consequence of a clash of interests. If the problem is viewed precisely from this viewpoint, it is discovered that the years of stagnation were a period of a rise in social tension. Such tension was rarely ever

allowed to escape in the form of strikes. The administrative system skillfully prevented or blocked such attempts. However, this does not mean that there were not other methods by which the principals defended their interests. In truth, these were realized predominantly in a distorted form and, consequently, with an enormous cost both for society and for the principals themselves. The workers were eliminated from participating in decision taking on vitally important questions for them. Nevertheless, they applied pressure—and very successfully—on the administration in the aim of satisfying certain demands. We have merely to recall the still present phenomenon of wage leveling. The brigade leader or foreman was to provide a certain amount of earnings, let us assume, 250 rubles a month. Otherwise during the following month, the workers would merely fail to meet the plan or would refuse to carry out essential functions which were not provided under the position duties. In the aim of increasing their earnings, the workers were idle, for example, during the first 10 days in order during the third one to work on overtime at higher rates and so forth. These and similar “tricks” stand in the same row as strikes.

In a word, the small number of outright strikes during the years of stagnation was “compensated for” by the extensive use of other methods of worker pressure on the administration. But even this is not the main thing. To strike, if you wish, was not advantageous. As I have already pointed out, under the conditions of the administrative-command system, many social interests of the workers to a significant degree were realized in a distorted form, in the form of privileges. It turned out that some could use the special buffet, others allowed themselves shoddy workmanship and here obtained their complete bonuses, still others were paid only for the fact of being present on the job, and all of us were certain that the state would feed us. Could we strike against our own privileges? It would have been naive to expect this. We had either to rise up against such a system as a whole (and this is the purpose of perestroika) or be left with seeking individual benefits without going beyond the assigned limits.

It was difficult to give up the existing system both from the socioeconomic viewpoint and psychologically. I feel that this—along with the low political culture and the absence of the habit of participating in management—was one of the reasons for the not always adequate response of people to the inevitable difficulties of perestroika. A just dissatisfaction with shortcomings and with the violating of social justice at times could develop into a strike where there was no need to resort to such extreme measures.

Dissatisfaction can be manifested in other forms. The workers can work poorly, violate production and technical discipline and leave the enterprise. Although the question may be debated of whether all of this can be considered forms of protest or not. In actuality the reason can be poor leadership, housing conditions or

insufficient worker skills. A majority of the violations of discipline is committed by persons with a low general educational level and, respectively, with low productivity. A study of letters to the newspaper TRUD indicates that the workers express dissatisfaction with working conditions (25 percent of the letters in 1972-1976), the organization of labor (26 percent), earnings and the standard of living (20 percent), management and the organization of production (16.5 percent) and trade union work (6.6 percent). All of this refutes the viewpoint of V.M. Yakushev.

[V.P. Kazimirchuk] Even now the lawyers are prepared to propose specific recommendations related to strike legislation.

As a lawyer, let me say that at present there is probably no more urgent problem than carrying out the political rights and freedoms of the citizens (the holding of assemblies, meetings and demonstrations) as well as the resolving of social conflicts. Nor have we yet eliminated the urgency of their constitutional and legislative settlement or the preparing of a new legislative enactment about strikes. Unfortunately, our nation has not such experience as for a long time there prevailed the theoretical presumption that under the conditions of the moral and political unity of a socialist society, the causes of social conflicts were absent. This was based upon a negation of the possibilities of the stratification of society and changes in its social structure. The unidimensional model of socialism ignored a class analysis of social processes. The scheme of "working class—kolkhoz peasantry—intelligentsia" in essence meant a full conformity between the economic base, the political and legal system. But the real structure of society without fail gave rise to contradictory interests of the different social strata and groups and the possibility of their clash. And this required new approaches and new legal solutions.

It is possible to speak about a concept for the legal settlement of strikes only in the instance that we decisively abandon our previous ideological stereotypes. A strike was explained primarily by such social factors as the functioning of society on the principles of private ownership and a market economy and a constant conflict between the entrepreneurs and the hired workers. But from this correct fact an incorrect conclusion was drawn on the impossibility of strikes in a socialist society. At the same time, both theoretically and historically a strike must be viewed as one of the effective instruments for eliminating social tension. If one recognizes reality, that is, the presence of labor conflicts in our nation, then one must also recognize those methods of resolving them which have come into being historically.

The legitimization of the right to strike is an indication of a society's strength and the development of democracy but it in no way means anarchy, since a recognition of a right is only the possibility of employing it, but a possibility within strict limits of the law and under its protection. A strike is an extreme measure in a chain of

preventive measures and methods for reconciling interests. However, before this measure can be used, it is essential to establish a procedure for seeking out agreed upon arbitration decisions and a procedure which would prevent extreme forms of conduct, in particular, work stoppages.

The essence of the legal regulation of a strike is not only and not so much in a recognition of the very right in principle but also in working out clear rules which guarantee its realization. Incidentally, such an approach ensures the defense of the prevailing system of relations and not its destruction. Moreover, recognizing the right to strike will remove the halo of democracy and social justice from the bourgeois system and the possibility of contrasting the democratic capitalism and "totalitarian" socialism which prohibits strikes and deprives the working class of its age-old rights. Certainly while the bourgeois system has been able to use the methods of settling the strikes struggle and has lessened its intensity in recent decades, socialism, in possessing immeasurably greater opportunities in the sphere of social policy and social administration, has not been reasonable in fearing a recognition of this very right. Strikes, as is known, existed both in the Stalin period and in the years of stagnation. But they were harshly suppressed and the public was not informed about them at all. This can scarcely be recognized as an effective method of social administration.

The spontaneous strikes in Stepanakert and Yerevan prove that the absence of a suitable legal framework for the conditions of conducting strikes and a procedure for organizing it have actually reduced a labor conflict resolved according to the rules of labor arbitration to strikes with a political focus. The latter are aimed at putting political pressure on the state and this is prohibited by the legislation of all countries. In other words, they are not strikes from the viewpoint of the law. The elaboration of the appropriate legislation presupposes not only the right to strike but also responsibility for illegal actions. An "illegal" strike is a precise legal description of those collective actions which are not in accord with the established procedure and for this reason are directed at weakening the socioeconomic system and undermining legality.

Let me point out that the right to strike formally exists in all the developed capitalist countries. The exception is Australia and here the system of compulsory resolution of labor conflicts excludes a strike. A similar right has been proclaimed in the constitutions of France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Spain and Portugal and is recognized as derivative and stemming from the constitutional right to association (West Germany, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg) or is specially stipulated in legislation (the United States and New Zealand). But in all such instances the right to strike is supplemented by numerous prohibitive and restrictive provisions. In permitting "legitimate strikes," and these

include chiefly economic ones, foreign law considers the most widespread forms of the struggle of the working class as "illegal."

Among the socialist countries, the right to strike is granted in the legislation and is governed juridically only in Poland and in particular by the Law Governing Trade Unions of 8 October 1982 (Section V) "Collective Disputes. The Right to Strike." In the PRC, it was granted in the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions, however in the new wording of the PRC Constitution (1983), the right to strike is now absent. The same can be said about the GDR.

What main principles in the legislative regulation of strikes should be worked out by us? First of all, a strike as a voluntary collective refraining of the workers from performing a job can be organized only in the aims of defending the economic and social interests of a given labor group. This means the inadmissibility of strikes which have a political nature. Secondly, a strike should be preceded by compulsory arbitration, that is, the involvement of a special body which is concerned with resolving disputes concerning labor claims and conflicts.

It is advisable not to adopt an independent enactment concerning strikes but rather make this a component part of the Law Governing Trade Unions being prepared or include this as a supplement to the Law Governing an Enterprise (Association). Here one can provide a sufficiently detailed definition of the right to strike following the example of the Polish Law "Governing Trade Unions." In other words, to establish a list of organizations and institutions which are not to be given the right to strike (for example, to workers in the enterprises of the defense and food industries, to firemen, prison personnel, to certain categories of state employees and to workers in the sphere of consumer services, transport and communications). A strike is to be announced only after the approval of it by a majority of the labor collective and the approval of the superior trade union body. Voting on the question of a strike like the very participation in it should be strictly voluntary and no one can be forced, whatever reasons might be given. Participation in a legal strike should not be viewed as a violation of labor obligations and certainly should not entail any sanctions against the workers. At the same time, measures are required for administrative and criminal liability for organizing and conducting illegal strikes. Certainly special stipulation must be made that the conduct and participation in a strike does not release a person from criminal liability for the violation of current laws, for example, the illegal seizure or use of state property, or preventing the enterprise leaders from performing their duties. Thought must also be given to a measure of responsibility for individuals who direct the strike, if the strike has been organized contrary to the existing legislation, for instance, imprisonment or a monetary fine.

These are the fundamental considerations concerning the legal provisions for a strike. If they are approved then lawyers can begin a detailed study of the question.

[A.I. Kravchenko] A civil society cannot develop without broadening production democracy and hence the right for collective defense.

In summing up the results of our discussion, I do not want to put a final period and consider the question closed. On the contrary, it, I might hope, might serve as the start for sociological work in this area.

Undoubtedly, a strike is a component part of the subject of the new scientific discipline of economic sociology, for it represents a form of the mass conduct of people in the sphere of social production (in the privately owned and cooperative sectors as well as in the "shadow economy" we have still not encountered the strike movement). It is wise to examine how this question is settled abroad. In particular, American sociologists consider strikes in the sphere of "industrial relations," assuming that this is a form of relations between the worker and employer, a sphere of a collective agreement and relationships of the trade union, the management and personnel of the enterprise. On the contrary, a conflict on the job which can serve as an impetus for a strike but does not come down to it is a subject of a different discipline of "human relations." These are relations between the leader and the subordinate, between groups of persons or individuals. In other words, a sphere not of socioeconomic but actually sociopsychological, interpersonal relations. A participant in the conflict acts in a completely different status and carries out other social roles than does a participant in a strike, although these can be the same individuals.

The two scientific disciplines—"industrial relations" and "human relations"—have different subject areas, frequently different methods of research and, of course, dissimilar conceptual schemes making it possible to analyze reality. Usually they are the concern of different specialists and although there are numerous sociologists among them, however in the sphere of "industrial relations" the accent is put on legal, economic and political sciences while in the area of "human relations" it is primarily on psychological ones.

Unfortunately, in our social sciences there is no such delimitation. As a result, our industrial sociology has been reduced exclusively to social psychology which ignores the sphere of sociopolitical contradictions. The discipline of "industrial relations" cannot occur in our country since the subject of the research—civil society and the state of law—did not exist.

Civil society, that is, the political independent activity and independence of the public in the political, cultural and social spheres, is closely linked to production democracy. The elections of leaders on the job have become the main if not the sole manifestation of it (the

problem of the cost accounting independence of the enterprises does not count as this relates to a different, not the sociopolitical but rather the socioeconomic sphere). But the spectrum of the manifestation of industrial democracy is much broader. This includes, for instance, the choice of the methods of the legal protection of the right to labor. In a majority of the developed countries, the rank and file executors can within the court contest unjust decisions by the management, bring suit, demand compensation for a deterioration of working conditions, vocational stress or production injury and the payment of pension benefits. Of course, the workers of a socialist enterprise also have many rights. The question is rather one of realizing these rights. Persecution for criticism is punished by law in our country also because it has become a mass phenomenon. But only a few go to court and win their case.

Conflicts between the management and industrial personnel exist in any industrially developed society. And for all intents and purposes, the right to strike is an indicator of the maturity of this society.

Over the decades we have proclaimed that the goal of the new society is the material prosperity of the people. But in actuality the residual principle has prevailed in assigning funds for the development of sociocultural measures and everyday life. As a result there is an acute shortage of food products and a lack of consumer goods in a majority of the cities, there are social conflicts among people, there is the housing problem and often repugnant working and leisure conditions.

There are, as we see, objective prerequisites for the social dissatisfaction of the public and this can be expressed including in the form of strikes. The material well-being of managers which has often been acquired by illegal means such as the abuse of official position, protectionism, bribery, the consumption of collective funds (building materials and transport) for personal purposes (private dachas, closed departmental distribution agencies, vacation homes, hotels and so forth) are possible only due to the greater accessibility of the channels and means of power for them. The corporative associations which often assume an extreme form (organized crime, clans) arise on this basis. In this instance the defensive interests is of a group nature and is extremely effective. Here also are the bribing of officials, persecution for criticism and dismissal without grounds.

The struggle against a bureaucratic grouping is an extremely difficult thing. Complaints from the workers concerning a director often go to the same director or commissions are set up which essentially change little. If the fight against departmental-managerial solidarity is ineffective for one loan, the reprisals for such actions are almost always very tangible including persecution and dismissal. Under these conditions only one alternative arises, that is, collective solidarity of the workers who are objectively defending public interests.

The editors thank the participants of the roundtable for their work and hope that our discussion will be continued considering the responses of readers.

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EMPLOYMENT, PERSONNEL TURNOVER, ORGANIZATION OF LABOR

Who Remains in the Waiting Room?

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[Article by I.Ye. Zaslavskiy and M.V. Moskvina: "Who Remains in the Waiting Room?"; the authors work at the Scientific Research Institute for Labor. Igor Yefimovich Zaslavskiy is a candidate of economic sciences and sector head. Our journal has published his article "Social and Professional Ideas of Moscow School Children" (No 3, 1983, as a co-author). Marina Valeriyevna Moskvina is a junior science associate. This is the first time she appears in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA.]

[Text] The converting of enterprises and organizations to full cost accounting and the introduction of new wage conditions have created prerequisites for curtailing the number of personnel and for increasing labor productivity. Sampling research indicates that the scale of the actual release of workers has risen from 2 percent to 5-7 percent. Thus, in Belorussia, they plan to discharge 200,000 persons or 6.2 percent of those employed in material production. Such a cutback will be achieved by several technical-economic and social measures. As an illustration, let us refer to the experience of the Belorussian enterprises which operate under the new conditions. The increased technical level of production has provided a 12 percent cutback in personnel, the reorganization of the management structure has produced 16 percent, the improvement in the production processes, the organization of production and the rationalization of jobs have provided 31 percent and the improvement in labor norming 41 percent. At the same time, it is clear that the policy in the employment area is determined not only by economic and technical efficiency. It should also help to realize the principles of social justice and, equally importantly, be organized considering the existing features in the way of life of the different population groups, their value orientations and plans of life. The first experience in dismissing employees shows that the interrelation of economic and social factors is precisely one of the worst bottlenecks. For an analysis of the arising problems, let us turn to the results of empirical research.

Castling

In 1986-1987, co-workers of the Scientific Research Institute for Labor Under the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] conducted sociological research at 55 enterprises, organizations and institutions where there had been the actual releasing of employees. The research covered enterprises in machine building, the chemical, light, food and local industries as well as the building materials industry, transport and communications, construction and the agroindustrial complex. Almost 4,000 persons were questioned (around 5 percent of the total number employed), including 2,217 of those who were not involved in the dismissal measures and 1,636 who were to change their place of employment in addition to 105 enterprise leaders concerned with the dismissal and job placement of employees. Moreover, a study was run on the activities of the local bodies involved in the management of labor resources.

The basic categories of employees were represented relatively equally among those who had to find new employment. In the group of manual and white collar personnel there was a predominance of males (approximately 60 percent) and persons 20-49 years of age (over 70 percent). More than one-third had a primary and incomplete secondary education, while around one-half had a general secondary and one out of five a specialized secondary and higher education. The share of experienced employees was rather significant (50 percent), with their length of employment running 20 and more years; the job biography of 12 percent of those questioned had commenced 15-20 years ago, approximately the same amount some 10-15 years before while 16 percent had been employed from 5 to 10 years. The share of those who had worked from 1 to 5 years was around 9 percent while novices (with a period of employment of under a year in the national economy) was approximately 1 percent.

The results of the research showed: in actual terms dismissal operated as a form of redistribution of labor resources within the enterprise. Some 68 percent of the workers remained within its walls. A majority of them was offered one or two jobs analogous to the previous one, while 60 percent of the mentioned category began to perform new duties without preliminary retraining and 34 percent underwent a course of on-job training.

An important factor is that the basic portion of released personnel was made up of workers (from 57 percent at the enterprises of Irkutsk Oblast to 90 percent in Uzbekistan). The share of ITR [Engineers and Technicians] averaged around 10 percent and white collar personnel 4 percent. The cutback involved primarily workers employed in basic production and representatives of the mass professions: lathe operators, fitters, grinders, welders, equipment operators, operators of compressor units and so forth. In part, their release was caused by

increased labor productivity. The personnel reserve created here, as a rule, was used for filling newly created jobs, for manning second and third shifts and for developing the nonproduction sphere of the enterprises. Far from accidental is the fact that the leaders (82 percent) viewed the adopted measures as a source for satisfying a portion of the "internal" demand of the enterprises for manpower. If there is no such possibility and necessity, then, in their opinion, by release it is possible to rectify the situation at enterprises located in the given area. A portion of the leaders (18 percent) felt that the workers released as a result of introducing the achievements of scientific and technical progress must be found employment by transfer to enterprises in the same sector.

In a word, the production commanders are still being guided by considerations which are remote from the maximum economic and at the same time efficient use of labor resources. What are their concerns? Dismissal, the leaders feel, is above all a method for getting rid of unconscientious workers and violators of labor discipline (some two-thirds of the experts voiced an opinion), of those engaged in inefficient manual labor (around 60 percent) or those employed not in their specialty (36 percent). The rank-and-file workers also took an analogous view of the situation. A significant portion of those who came within the cutback viewed the latter as dismissal upon the initiative of the administration particularly as among those dismissed were not only violators of labor discipline but also persons who were not fully covered by a guarantee of employment (temporary workers, persons who had reached pension age and others). Furthermore, the experts felt, the release should cover workers of low skills, those who work under harmful and heavy working conditions, white collar personnel performing routine duties as well as persons employed temporarily or under special limits. Thus, they proposed getting rid of that portion of the labor collective which is its sort of socioprofessional "ballast." This is indirectly confirmed by the following fact. Dismissal under the mentioned scheme makes it possible, in the opinion of the leaders, to satisfy only 25-50 percent of the demand for lacking personnel.

At the same time, the given results show that in the measures relating to dismissal they have not been able to bring together into a single whole two fundamental tasks—a rise in production efficiency and an increase in the effective use of labor resources and this tells negatively on the solution to each of them. How can the situation be rectified? There must be a fundamental revision in the entire system of managing labor resources at the enterprises and in the nation's regions.

The organization of wages existing at a majority of enterprises orients the workers primarily at protracted employment at one place, and only later at vocational-skill promotion as well as inter- and intraregional moves in accord with the needs of the national economy. The allocation of housing, free trips, the amount of payments

from the public enterprise funds and the consumer services for the members of the labor collectives depend chiefly upon the length of employment in the given organization.

Labor legislation operates in the same direction as this not only encourages extended employment at one place but to a definite degree prevents the planned movement of personnel beyond the enterprises. Certain groups of workers are given a guarantee of employment regardless of the effectiveness and quality of their labor. The situation is analogous with social security and pension support: these encourage loyalty to the firm. To put it briefly, the procedure which came into being during the period of extensive economic development for regulating labor movements as well as material and moral incentives for the employees runs counter to the task of raising the production and vocational-skill mobility of the personnel under the conditions of the intensification of the economy.

Although the examined enterprises have converted to the new management system, many principles of planning and management remain as before and the structure of social guarantees has also not been changed. In such a situation the regrouping of the labor force has begun to be restricted to the walls of the enterprises with the "released" personnel moving to vacant or newly created jobs while maintaining for the workers vocational status and wage level and the right to social security and services. Of course, it is far from always possible to achieve this, particularly with the introduction of the new wage conditions and the conversion to full cost accounting. Often such moves are accompanied by a deterioration in the working conditions and by greater labor intensity. In a word, social reconstruction has not always been sufficiently reinforced by organizational-technical and vice versa.

Substantial changes have not come about as a result of the measures to release the personnel. In the opinion of those questioned, relations within the collective have virtually not changed (64 percent of the answers). In truth, positive shifts were still noted: productivity and wages as well as skills have become higher and working conditions have improved. At the same time, many have noted a deterioration in the production situation related to an increased percentage of rejected products, greater labor intensity and tension in the relations between leaders and subordinates.

"Dead Souls" in the Event of a Cutback

The situation outlined above is largely determined by the fact that on the enterprise level sufficient incentives have not been formed to release the labor force. The quotas linked, for example, to converting to the new wage conditions and the dates for fulfilling them, as a rule, are set by directive and here on the sectorial or territorial level. The labor collectives deprived of any economic incentive on the given question have not shown any

initiative. Under these conditions the management has not endeavored to force events, having concentrated basic attention on the "violators." Moreover, not wanting to become involved in labor conflicts, many leaders continue to maintain inflated staffs (including in the event of any sort of diverting of collective members from the main activity). It has happened that the entire dismissal has come down to eliminating vacancies and a formal move. Many of those questioned, for example, did not even suspect that they had been "released" and redistributed.

The measures being discussed here have not been reinforced by effective incentives on the level of the individual workers. Virtually everyone who was shifted to other enterprises commented that they had lost in earnings. This factor was mentioned by 98 percent of those who were not satisfied with their new job. A transfer within the enterprise also rarely led to higher earnings. For many the increase in wage rates with the introduction of the new wage conditions actually compensated for the cancellation of additional payments or was accompanied by a reduction in the category or position.

Why have the workers tolerated and do they tolerate the above-described situation? The reader probably has already guessed that they did not want to leave the enterprise. Around 75 percent of those questioned pointed out that upon dismissal they were offered either to simply move to other sectors or change their specialty and take up a new job. It was recommended that the remainder independently seek work, retire on pension, request transfer to another enterprise or turn to the job placement bureau. Generally, a majority of the respondents were firmly convinced that in the future in the event of a cutback it would be possible to find a job at the home enterprise.

Such a situation, on the one hand, is the consequence of a certain formalism in the work with the personnel and, on the other, it is a substantial impediment on the path of increasing vocational and skill mobility, without which a structural reshaping of the economy and increased production efficiency are impossible. The following data show just how serious such attitudes are. Over two-thirds of those questioned agreed under any conditions to remain at their enterprise and were ready for any retraining. These chiefly were older-aged workers who had a protracted length of employment, with a secondary education and low skills. Among these we should particularly point out women of preretirement age as well as those who work in production with hazardous conditions in the aim of obtaining benefits. They are afraid of losing the existing social and domestic ties to the enterprise. Difficult problems confront the inhabitants of small towns and settlements. Usually it is hard for them to find a new job as the choice is slight. Dismissal and reassignment of workers in this group entails the greatest difficulties.

A transfer to other enterprises was considered possible by less than 15 percent of those questioned and particularly under the condition of maintaining the existing wage level and former profession. This opinion is supported predominantly by highly skilled workers who, when necessary, are prepared to master an additional specialty. Only 5 percent of the respondents voiced a desire to move to a different locality (city). The reasons were the prospects for professional growth and the possibility of working in the chosen specialty. Here young workers and specialists predominate. It is worthy of note that at the enterprises located in the labor-surplus areas of Central Asia, a readiness to move is 2-fold higher than the average in the sampling.

Moreover, in the event of a dismissal primarily specialists and white collar personnel move to a new work area. Thus, at a number of enterprises in Moscow Oblast, the share of them reached 90 percent of the total number of those subject to job placement at different enterprises. Incidentally, the mentioned group has a rather high proportional amount of pension-age persons (27 percent). With a cutback in staff they usually are forced to turn to the services of the job placement bureaus.

Vacancies and Claimants

Organizing the reassignment of personnel has clearly not been on the proper level. Among those questioned who changed place of employment, 57 percent were warned of the cutback 2 or 3 weeks before dismissal and only 4 percent had 2 or 3 months notice as stipulated by the enforceable enactments. Certainly many could not find a new job for a long time. Some 22 percent spent over 2 months looking although they also turned to the job placement bureau. Some 43 percent of those in the cutback did not seek any work at all.

One of the main reasons for the designated situation is the absence of proper coordination between the main elements involved in the management of labor resources on the spot: the personnel services at the enterprises and the job placement bureaus. For example, only 8 percent of those dismissed on the Central Asian Railroad found jobs through the bureaus and the bureau was completely on the sidelines in the reassignment of personnel on the Eastern Siberian Railroad. It is a noteworthy fact that there were three or four vacancies as an average for each person coming to the bureau, nevertheless to find a suitable place quickly remained a problem. The poor level of informing the institutions engaged in job placement concerning the situation at the nation's enterprises and the opportunities for personnel retraining told negatively on the prestige of the bureaus among the population. According to the research data, 95 percent of those questioned in the event of looking for new employment preferred to turn to the services of the enterprise personnel services or act independently (28 percent). Only 5 percent counted on the services of a bureau.

In many regions of the nation, the local labor bodies basically hold a passive position. Their contribution to the processes of the reassignment of employees has been limited to providing the enterprises with information on vacant positions and jobs. The personnel services have not received the main thing, active help in choosing the place of employment for personnel about to be released. We would also point out that in a majority of the small- and medium-sized towns, where particular complications arise, the local bodies involved in labor and social questions are completely absent.

Priorities on the Labor Market

Perestroyka in the economy and the social sphere also necessitates the elaboration of a new employment concept. The system for reallocating labor resources which developed in the 1930s through the 1950s and is currently in effect, in providing an extensive influx of manpower into newly created types of production and free jobs has exhausted itself. This system is oriented primarily at satisfying the need for low and medium skilled workers.

At present, a fundamentally different situation has arisen. The tasks related to the mass introduction of modern equipment and production methods and to the elimination of unprofitable obsolete types of production and cumbersome management structures presupposes also a new approach to the problems of employment, to defining its efficiency and establishing social guarantees. The priority areas here should be the systematic retraining of personnel (both workers and specialists), their increased skills as a condition for the efficient use of new jobs, and the planned exchange of personnel based on territorial cost accounting. In a word, it is essential to work out a model of socialist employment which would organically link together the tasks of increasing production efficiency, the realization of the principles of social justice and increased prosperity of the public. The guidelines for such a model include proportionality, the efficiency and movement of labor in the national economy and on this basis ensuring complete and rational employment of the concrete socioprofessional groups, including by alternating periods of work, training and guaranteed leaves as the socioeconomic conditions and the demand for labor change.

In the given situation, what problems require particular attention? Among the released workers, a significant portion will be made up of older-age persons, working pensioners and women with children. Their job placement involves a solution to a whole series of social questions. Among the elderly there is low vocational and territorial mobility, they adapt poorly to abrupt changes in equipment and production methods and spend a great deal of time on mastering the new methods and procedures of work. The lower educational level is a substantial impediment in the question of the vocational retraining of these individuals. Moreover, the loss of the former job entails a change in social status and this is a very

painful experience at an advanced age. All of this requires the elaboration of a special program for vocational guidance and retraining for the representatives of the mentioned group of employees.

At present, the regional problems of employment are extremely acute. In the labor-short areas of the nation, the release will make it possible at least partially to provide personnel for the service sphere and abandon the notorious limit. Certainly it is essential to broaden the scale of personnel retraining and organize the planned reassignment of personnel between the enterprises. The situation is more complicated in the labor-surplus areas. The forthcoming mass release from the production sectors will exacerbate an already difficult situation on the labor market. Full employment is to be ensured under the conditions of a very significant manpower reserve. The problem is exacerbated by the low level of professional skill and territorial mobility in a portion of the indigenous population.

We must have new approaches to regulating the spontaneous movements of employees between enterprises and regions (at present, approximately one-half of all the dismissals of employees in industry and up to 40 percent of the hiring comes from personnel turnover). Obviously, in the near future the total volume of labor movements in the national economy will not increase noticeably, but their structure will become significantly more complex and the motives and forms more diverse. In controlling these processes it is essential to consider the experience of controlling labor resources as acquired in a number of the nation's regions. For example, in Latvia job placement bureaus have been set up in all rayons of the republic, including in rural ones. They provide not bad information on vacant jobs, they keep account of employment and on this basis carry out effective work in the concrete groups of the unemployed population. The bureaus inform citizens on the job placement opportunities, they provide assistance in choosing a job and are engaged in vocational guidance for the youth. A person who comes here spends an average of 4 days in job placement and this is 5-fold less than in those instances when the search for work is carried out independently. With the aid of the bureaus, previously established vacancies were promptly filled with one-half of the persons discharged from the republic rail transport enterprises (in Belorussia, the figure was just 15 percent). Moreover, the republic bureau keeps a reserve for the promotion of personnel (leaders and specialists) considering the development prospects of production. At present, the enterprise personnel services employ the corresponding services more and more frequently.

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APPLIED RESEARCH

Means of Mass Disinformation

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to press 20 Feb 89) pp 55-59

[Article by Yu.G. Karpukhin and Yu.G. Torbin: "A Means of Mass Disinformation"; the authors are co-workers at the Academy of the USSR MVD. Yuriy Georgiyevich Karpukhin is candidate of legal sciences and senior instructor. Yuriy Grigoryevich Torbin is candidate of legal sciences and deputy section chief. This is the first time they appear in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA.]

[Text] On 2 February 1988, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Ukase "On Introducing Supplements to the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet 'On the Procedure for Examining Proposals, Statements and Complaints of Citizens'."

By this enactment, anonymous denouncers were put outside the law since now anonymous letters are not to be examined. An important step was taken along the path of eradicating an illness which for a long time beset society.

Nevertheless, we must still wait to breathe easier. The anonymous letters are prohibited but the problem has not been eliminated from the agenda. Authors have turned to the editors of a number of the central newspapers. It has turned out that the number of letters received without signatures has declined by approximately one-half and at present they comprise from 0.5 percent to 6 percent of the volume of the monthly mail. For example, in September KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA received around 27,000 letters, including 647 anonymous ones; VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, respectively, received 8,638 and 201. At SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, their share varied from 0.5 to 1 percent, while at IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA the figure reached 5 percent. From the evidence of editorial workers, there has been a sharp rise in the amount of correspondence signed by fictitious names or by the names of real persons (neighbors, acquaintances and so forth). Before this can be ascertained, such materials must pass through several hands.

Unidentified correspondents continue to besiege the internal affairs bodies. After the adopting of the Ukase the USSR MVD halted the previously existing statistical accounting of anonymous letters. For this reason it is difficult to assess the situation accurately. In the opinion of the co-workers with whom the authors spoke, there are 2- or 3-fold fewer letters without signatures (that is, approximately 2 percent of the total number of complaints and messages received). Nevertheless the count runs into the thousands.

What has been the response to such correspondents? The most diverse. PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA ignore it completely. The editorial offices of certain publications read all letters without exception, including the anonymous one. The latter are either put in the archives (and kept there for a calendar year) or are forwarded to the involved agencies for verification and resolution of the issue. In other editorial offices they record and examine the following: those which contain information on a committed crime or socially dangerous actions and these are forwarded to the competent bodies while the remainder are turned over to the "gnawing criticism of the mice." Letters written under fictitious names even after this has been established are still kept at the editorial offices like the correspondence of real persons. The question of anonymous letters as before has not left the pages of the press. For example, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA conducted research on such correspondence received by the newspaper in 1988 [1].

The anonymous letters received by the newspaper editorial offices concerning a pending or committed crime comprise a particularly serious problem. Journalists, in carrying out their civil duty, forward such letters (after registration) to the law enforcement bodies and this obliges the latter to view such materials as official documents. As before, nameless well-wishers alert the police and procuracy of terroristic acts which are supposedly being prepared and assumed attempts to take hostages for a ransom, hijack an aircraft and so forth. In considering the social danger of such actions, the law enforcement bodies are forced to examine such alerts.

In a word, while the Ukase has dampened the ardor of the anonymous letter writers, it has certainly not been the case for all. Why? We would like to make a number of considerations on this score, relying on the results of empirical research.

The Grave Diggers of the Truth

The authors made a content analysis of over 160 publications on the problems of anonymous letters to the central press over the last 6 years (including materials which appeared after the passage of the Ukase). We studied virtually all the materials which appeared on the pages of PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, IZVESTIYA, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, KOMMUNIST, MOLODOY KOMMUNIST and a number of other publications. Moreover, we also questioned co-workers from the law enforcement bodies and other agencies engaged in examining the anonymous letters.

What did the research show? Primarily, it showed the following: the decision not to examine the anonymous letters was an essential and timely step. According to the obtained results, in 72 percent of the cases, the facts found in the anonymous letters were not confirmed and

in 8 percent were partially confirmed. Only 20 percent of the statements contained the truth. According to the data of the USSR Higher Certification Commission, among the letters received here 98 percent are anonymous and in a predominant majority the facts set out in them are a fabrication [2]. Thus, the basic mass of anonymous letters represents a slander or a collection of false information. One can only be amazed how long an official channel existed in our nation for misleading the management bodies. Incidentally, if one gives it some thought, the designated situation fits completely within the policy of dressing up reality, playing down the shortcomings and establishing an atmosphere of lies and half-truths in society and which has been instilled since the times of the cult of personality.

Only a bureaucrat feels at home in the muddy flow of anonymous letters. According to the research results, the checks on the received alerts were made: from 1 to 3 times in 56 percent of the cases, from 3 to 10 times in 24 percent, and from 50 to 25 times in 9 percent and over 25 times in 11 percent. The record was 50 checks [3]. Clearly the existence of anonymous letters is advantageous for the bureaucrat. For him they create a field of activity and the possibility of showing his importance. In actuality, the investigation of such alerts entails significant material outlays and distracts many persons from their job. And what about the moral harm? Maimed careers, disappointment in others, undermined health and so forth—these can in no way be restored. The paradox is that the anonymous slander pays for none of this. Even if he has been caught, he cannot be forced by law to repay the material expenditures involved with checking on an anonymous letter. It is difficult to institute criminal liability against him. The law provides for such a step only if the fact has been established of the dissemination of knowingly false information. And it is virtually impossible to prove this.

With Malice Aforethought

The problem of anonymous letters in no way is exhausted by the introduction of legislation. This question must be viewed in a broader context of creating a state of law and establishing legal awareness in society. The anonymous letters are proof of the lack of this. And the reasons for the existing situation must be sought out in the 1920s and 1930s, when the thesis (in 1928) was advanced of strengthening class struggle as socialism was built. A broad campaign was commenced to increase vigilance and seek out enemies and this gave rise to an atmosphere of universal suspicion and fear and encouraged denunciations and false accusations. Since then for decades the press and public opinion have flirted with the incognito truth seekers, honoring the anonymous letters as "letters without signature" [4].

In the 1930s and subsequently, revelatory statements could be written not only to settle personal scores but also "unselfishly," so to speak, out of ideological conviction. A person at one time in his life had committed a

crime, or had not voiced sufficient certainty as to the success of the course being carried out or had merely behaved—in the author's opinion—improperly. At present it would be hard to say how many anonymous letters were among such materials. But the essence is not a quantitative relationship. The very alert or unmasking was the important thing. The enemy was named and this made it possible to act. Here is a very characteristic example. At the Fifth Leningrad City Party Conference held in May 1938, the following fact was given. The editor of the large-run newspaper of Lentransportyekt [Leningrad Design Institute for the Transport Industry] slandered one-third (!) of the local party organization. Certainly he ended up as his victims did: he was expelled from the party and unmasked as an enemy of the people [5].

The mass repressions and violations of socialist legality have become a thing of the past and are condemned by the party and the people. However, the psychology of seeking out and unmasking the enemy has sunk deep roots and has been supported by various ideological campaigns beginning with the fight against cosmopolitanism and ending with the condemnation of so-called private entrepreneurs. When the social portrait of an enemy is known, it is no problem to fit this image to a specific individual. But in the mass mind an accusation is shaped proceeding from speculative stereotypes. Let us take a typical anonymous letter. It is based upon abstract assertion-labels: the person lives with no visible means of support, he steals from the workers, he has become isolated from the people, he plays into the hands of others and so forth. Such a vocabulary is also encountered in overt actions. The anonymous letter writer in the given instance differs here in that, as a rule, he is pursuing selfish aims and, in fearing to be caught in this, does not sign the letter.

Incidentally, many anonymous letters are written in the aims of restoring the truth. The long disinvolvement of the workers in resolving vitally important questions for them and the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucracy established a principle in daily life that in encountering shortcomings an ordinary citizen should first of all inform the competent bodies of these and the officials would analyze everything. A man of the masses was indoctrinated in the ideology of combating shortcomings but he was not taught to overcome them independently. His task was to alert the superior officials of what had occurred. This was to be done anonymously not because the author feared the anger of the superior but because he feared being suspected of personal self-interest. Certainly the letter was written not for the sake of personal gain but on behalf of an offended people.

Certainly, one must not disregard the response of the administrative system. The infamous practice of turning over letters from the workers for a reply to those bodies which were criticized, the numerous instances of covering up, retribution for criticism and the protecting of discredited leaders—all of this also increased the number of anonymous letters.

At the same time, the anonymous letters to a certain degree could serve as an indicator of where things were going particularly badly in ensuring the interests and rights of the citizens. (In assessing the data given below, one must consider the following. We do not know precisely what criteria were employed in selecting the cases which appeared on the pages of the press. For this reason we are unable to determine the representativeness of the results.) According to the existing materials, some 16 percent of the anonymous correspondence involved the activities of consumer services and 9 percent the agricultural enterprises. An equal number of letters criticized the work of scientific research institutions and VUZes. Frequently the object of such alerts was the activities of medical institutions (8 percent), the party and soviet bodies (7 percent), the courts and procuracy, the trade and public dining enterprises and musical institutions (4 percent each), the internal affairs bodies and industrial enterprises (2 percent each). In addition to shortcomings (authentic or sham), the anonymous letters usually included specific individuals, the persons guilty of the oversights. From this viewpoint the picture is somewhat different. The largest number of complaints are relating to the employees of the service economy and rail transport (12 percent each), agriculture, scientific and medical facilities (9 percent each), VUZes, party and soviet bodies (5 percent each), legal and musical institutions and the internal affairs bodies (4 percent each). Among the persons who are the objects of anonymous letters, 20 percent are leaders. One out of every 10 alerts is caused by a scientific co-worker or a VUZ instructor. Many are caused by jurists and lawyers (8 percent each).

What is the subject of most of the anonymous letters? They concern supposedly committed crimes, the scientific errors of a specific specialist or the falsifying of research results by him, the abuse of official positions, unjust actions by officials, particularly the representatives of the internal affairs bodies, amoral conduct in everyday life or on the job, illegal enrichment, bribery, the unsatisfactory operation of enterprises, the illegal defense of a dissertation or persecution for criticism. As we can see, the accusations are substantial but their range is slight. Let us recall again that just 20 percent of the anonymous letters was confirmed.

Save Our Souls

The combating of anonymous letters is an element of general policy aimed at broadening glasnost and democracy, at strengthening legality and law and order as well as improving the moral atmosphere in society. At the same time, in our view, special measures are needed to prevent slanderous fabrications disseminated anonymously in an oral form (rumors, gossip, telephone calls and so forth) or in writing. In apprehending anonymous

letter writers and slanderers, their actions must be described not as a matter of private accusation in identifying persons for slander or insult but as a criminally punishable action provided for under Articles 130, 131 and 180 of the RSFSR Penal Code and the appropriate articles of the codes of the other Union republics.

In the aims of carrying out the provisions of the Ukase, it is essential to harden the measures aimed against anonymous slanderers. It would be advisable to incorporate amendments in the current legislation. In particular, slander disseminated anonymously (orally or in writing) must be considered a determining element (aggravating circumstance) under Article 130 of the RSFSR Penal Code. The punishment for such a crime should be imprisonment for a period from 3 to 5 years or a fine up to 3,000 rubles (to repay the material losses related to the findings of the author or the check). An insult spread anonymously (verbally or in writing) must also be considered a determining element under Article 131 of the RSFSR Penal Code. The punishment would be imprisonment from 3 to 5 years or a fine up to 3,000 rubles. A false accusation on the commission of a crime spread anonymously (verbally or in writing) must also be considered a determining element under Article 180 of the RSFSR Penal Code. The punishment would be imprisonment from 3 to 7 years with a fine up to 5,000 rubles. Article 29 of the RSFSR Labor Law Code and those of the other Union republics defining the conditions for abrogating a labor contract should be supplemented with a point with the following wording: "the dissemination on the job or in everyday life of anonymous information defaming the honor and dignity of Soviet citizens." With the agreement of individuals who have been the subject of an anonymous letter, publicity should be provided at the workplace or residence giving the information found in the anonymous letter and its refutation.

In supporting as a whole the provisions of the Ukase and sharing the sharply negative position in the public concerning anonymous letter writers, let us point out the following. In our opinion, it is essential to verify anonymous messages containing information about a crime which has been committed or is about to be committed. Such a measure conforms to the tasks of combating crime and, in particular, is justified by the circumstance that many people keep silent about infractions of the law, fearing retribution or revenge from the criminal or his accomplices. Such a check should be made by the police bodies using effective means (upon their own initiative or upon a ruling of the procurator, investigator or court). If the facts are confirmed, then the immediate discovery of the elements of a crime will be grounds for initiating a criminal proceeding.

Very frequently, behind an anonymous letter is an angry, aggressive person who has gone beyond the point where a moral decline commences. Here we should note a very indicative case. In 1978, in one of the Leningrad VUZes, various types of commissions began to be rapidly set up.

They were checking anonymous letters which were flowing in to the local and national authorities. Finally, the harassed leadership of the institute turned to the criminologists. Soon they discovered the secret fan of false accusations (all the complaints were not confirmed). He turned out to be the instructor at the institute, N.A. Andreyeva. Yes, reader, the very Nina Andreyeva. She had begun her "career" as an anonymous letter writer [6]. Here is a "principled" woman for you.

The main condition for the disappearance of the anonymous letters is increased legal awareness among the citizens and an improvement in the moral atmosphere in society.

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DEMOGRAPHY

Method for Determining Casualties in Great Patriotic War

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[Article by A.Ya. Kvasha: "On the Method of Determining Casualties in the Great Patriotic War"; Aleksandr Yakovlevich Kvasha is a doctor of economic sciences and professor on the Economics Faculty of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov. He is the author of the monographs "Problemy ekonomiko-demograficheskogo razvitiya SSSR" [Problems of the Economic Demographic Development of the USSR] (1974), "Demograficheskaya politika v SSSR" [Demographic Policy in the USSR] (1981), "Populyarnaya demografiya" [Popular Demography] (1985) and others. This is the first time he appears in our journal.]

[Text] What were the human losses of our nation during the years of the Great Patriotic War and the price of victory paid by our people for the defeat of Naziism? This question which is of great social and historical significance still remains open. The numerous attempts to clarify it cannot be considered satisfactory primarily due to serious methodological flaws.

Before examining those data and methodological difficulties which must be overcome for a reliable calculation of the military losses, let us first give several figures showing the substantial discrepancies. One of the first official estimates of 7 million persons was announced by I.V. Stalin in 1946 [1]. Some 15 years later, N.S. Khrushchev stated that the losses of the Soviet population during the war years were over 20 million persons [2] and since then different versions of the "structure" of this amount have been put forward. (Incidentally, often just the figure of 20 million is given and the addition of "more" is ignored.) In speaking at a press conference on the 20th anniversary of the victory, MSU I.S. Konev analyzed the structure of the losses not only in the army itself but also among the civilian population [3]. Later among the nonbelligerents, the losses were clarified for the Union republics and in certain instances also by age structure. As became clear, some 1.8 million children under the age of 16 perished in the war [4]. In Belorussia alone over the period of 1941 through 1944, the Nazis destroyed 1,409,000 persons and 378,000 were driven into Germany [5]. Analogous calculations have been carried out for the other republics, however we still do not possess full and reliable information on the military losses.¹

Such a situation is largely explained by the insufficient elaboration of procedural principles and proceeding from which the question was studied. Thus, neither in the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (1986), nor the encyclopedia "Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna 1941-1945" [The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945] (1985) nor in the Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary (1988) are there articles explaining the what one should understand as human losses. Only in the Demographic Encyclopedic Dictionary (1985) does the article "Military Demography" mention the content of the concept of "population losses in wars" [6]. This question is analyzed most thoroughly in the book by B.Ts. Uralnis "Voyna i narodnonaseleniye Yevropy" [War and the Population of Europe] [7], where the concept of "losses" is examined in the demographic as well as the military-operational and medical senses and in terms of the servicemen and the civilian population; the method of assessing direct and indirect human losses in a war is examined. However, for objective reasons the author was unable to analyze the state of affairs in our nation in detail as the work which is unique in terms of the scope of factual material and soundness was written during the first postwar years and was published with great difficulty only in 1960.

It should be pointed out that the concept of "losses" is not uniform in its nature (see [6]). It is possible to establish direct, indirect and losses, so to speak, of a secondary sort.

By direct losses one usually understands the number of persons (servicemen and civilians) who perished as a result of military operations and their direct consequences (for example, starvation); by indirect losses one

understands the difference between the actual size of the population on the date of the war's end (or close to it) and the one which could have been had there been no war. The secondary consequences manifest themselves in a deterioration of numerous sociodemographic processes.

The amount of indirect losses depends upon the concrete socioeconomic and economic conditions and, in particular, upon how massive was the induction of males into the armed forces, upon the specific features of their involvement in military operations, the opportunity for obtaining leaves from the army in the field and many other factors, including a deterioration in the living conditions and increased morbidity among the nonfighting population. It is also important on what level the birthrate was in the prewar years, in other words, what were the potential opportunities for its decline.

In the USSR, the general level of the birthrate in the prewar period was substantially higher than in many Western European countries. The mortality level was also higher as a consequence of a number of historical factors. This circumstance also makes it possible to speak about the great indirect losses but still they were caused above all by the unprecedented hardships of the war. The amount of these losses depends largely upon the initial data taken as the calculation base as well as the corresponding hypotheses. Thus, according to certain estimates, the figures vary from 20 to 26 million persons [8, 9, 17].

A particular feature of calculating the indirect losses for our nation during the Great Patriotic War is also determined by specific demographic development and which just over a historically short time from the start of the current century up to 1941 was severely effected by World War I and the Civil War, the starvation of the 1920s and 1930s, the enforced resettlements and mass repressions. And if it is recalled that the counting of the population was far from complete, then it becomes clear that there are no grounds to speak about a reliable base making it possible to extrapolate demographic trends for determining human losses in the Great Patriotic War. Moreover, the unreliability of single-variant estimates and their unique "spread" (particularly in terms of the indirect estimates) were inevitable.

As for the secondary consequences of the war which are predominantly of a sociopsychological nature, this has been the least studied group and, as a rule, is hard to assess in quantitative terms.

Here let us establish first of all the rise of disproportions in the age structure as a result of the mass loss of men and, as a consequence, disruptions in the processes of marriage and, hence, the birthrate in the postwar years. The affect of this factor lasts, as a minimum, until the women whose potential husbands perished in military operations leave child-bearing age.

Among the secondary consequences of the war are also a decline in the stability of marriage, an increased number of births out of wedlock and a large number of orphans. Finally, a war inevitably tells on the health of people and shortens their life expectancy. This concerns not only the participants in military operations who sustained wounds and concussions. A definite increase in the intensity of mortality and even its "rejuvenation" occur from persons who were children during the war and during the first postwar years. Even the children of persons who were born in the war, as a rule, do not excel in health and this can also tell on the level of morbidity and mortality in the population as a whole.

We must also mention the problem of the adaptation of former soldiers, particularly young persons who had not been able to acquire experience in life when returning to the new, peacetime conditions of life. For many, after demobilization this process was extremely painful and often was accompanied by rather serious social deviations. In one form or another, a similar psychological adjustment and a transition from wartime to peacetime conditions are experienced not only by the servicemen but essentially by the entire population. In a word, the consequences of the war, including the sociopsychological ones are diverse and still far from studied.

Let us now turn to the two main methods for assessing direct human losses suffered by our nation during the war years. Before examining just what these are, let us point out that it is impossible to determine the amount of losses without considering the particular features of each of the world wars. For example, during the years of World War I, the losses of the civilian population were comparatively slight and of the 3.4 million servicemen of the Russian Army who were taken prisoner and who lived on territories now part of the USSR, 3.2 million, that is, a majority, returned to the homeland [10]. In other words, in comparison with the conditions of the Great Patriotic War, the situation was fundamentally different.

Thus, what should one understand as the direct losses as a result of military operations? In order to answer this question, it is essential to establish first of all the period of time during which combat operations leading, so to speak, to a direct effect on the population occurred. This is very important since, as was already pointed out, the mortality rate not only of the servicemen as a consequence of wounds, concussions and illnesses, but also of the civilian population which experienced all the hardships of the war was higher than that of the nonfighting contingents. In our instance, this is a period from 22 June 1941 through mid-September 1945 (in order to simplify the calculations, the lower limit may be moved up to the beginning of 1946.)

Now as for who (more precisely, what groups of the population) can be considered as direct losses. Above all, these are persons in the Soviet Army and Navy who were killed on the battlefield and died over the designated

period from sustained wounds or various illnesses (mortality from illness, of course, is not always the consequence of military operations but the exacerbation of many ailments is often provoked by a war). Here also, we must include the servicemen who perished in fighting from the units of the system of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the Border Troops as well as certain other subunits guarding the rear of the troop contingents.

More complex is the question of where to put the losses of such categories as paramilitary formations of the internal affairs bodies (police, firefighters and so forth) as well as railroad workers who were considered mobilized during the war years. In our view, the fact that all these subunits were paramilitary makes it possible to speak in the given instance of losses of armed forces.

On the methodological level important is a definition of the losses of partisans (servicemen or civilians) and underground members killed in fighting or by repression. The unprecedented scope of resistance to the occupiers in the enemy rear and the involvement of enormous masses of the population in the struggle—as a total during the war years there were more than 6,000 partisan detachments in which over 1.1 million persons were fighting and over 220,000 underground workers [11], dictates the necessity of considering the direct losses of this contingent.

Of course, the given data, particularly that concerning the underground members (literally the entire people fought) are rather conditional. However, at the same time, since in the first 2 years of the war the partisans suffered heavy casualties in the fighting, their number, even though this is very difficult, cannot remain undisclosed.

The members of partisan detachments fought with weapons in hand and for this reason, it seems to us, here it is valid to speak about losses of servicemen. The losses of underground members, obviously, must be considered as the direct victims among the civilian population.

There is also the difficult problem of determining the number of prisoners of war who were killed.² In what category should these be put? We propose that these are direct losses of the armed forces. Here one other question arises: how can they be estimated since the number of Soviet prisoners of war, particularly, if one recalls such a reporting category as "missing in action," remains unclear. The fate of many servicemen is unknown even now. In 1941, records were kept far from always on the arriving reinforcements and under the conditions of the heavy fighting and encirclements it was simply impossible to establish what the fate of the personnel was and all the more place them in the appropriate lists of losses. Even now, we do not know how many there are who are considered "missing in action." The encyclopedia "Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna 1941-1945" [12] points out that in this category are servicemen for whom

there is no information concerning their location or death after their participation in military operations. According to the current legislation, a person listed as missing in action is considered dead by a court ruling no earlier than after 2 years from the end of the war. Thus, court statistics can provide some notion of the number of these persons. However, only a careful analysis of such statistical data makes it possible to assess their reliability. Here it is essential to consider those social and psychological difficulties involved in turning to the courts on this question in the first postwar years.

One other complex methodological problem impeding a definition of the amount of direct losses has been caused by the so-called double counting. The problem is that many of those who were taken prisoner could be listed as "missing in action." Some of them, particularly those taken prisoner in 1941, for various reasons could have remained at liberty (outside prisoner of war camps) and subsequently either joined the partisans or were killed by repressions as civilians. Often after the liberation of occupied territory, former prisoners of war, so to speak, "for a second time" were inducted into the ranks of the Soviet Army. It is also essential to know the amount of such "double counting," although it is very difficult to do this.

Finally, we must not forget that a certain portion of the prisoners of war (albeit a small one) went to serve the Nazis in various paramilitary formations and their death in fighting against the partisans and the Soviet Army was also a fact. It is also known that certain of these subunits came back to our side and a certain number of individuals again was called up into the army.

How should we consider the losses of those who served the Germans in the police of other armed formations and were killed in fighting against the partisans or the Soviet Army? Although these people were born in the USSR, I scarcely feel it correct to consider them (from the social viewpoint) in the losses of the Soviet people. At the same time, the given category must not be ignored in the balance calculations for the losses of population.

There is still one other circumstance related to the consequences of the war and losses. It is a question of military (more precisely, political) migration which was made up of former Soviet citizens who during the war ended up beyond the frontiers of the motherland and remained there for permanent residence. We would also point out in passing that in the first postwar years, as a result of the adjustment of the western and partially the eastern (Sakhalin Island) frontiers of the USSR, there was an intense exchange of population between our country and the countries bordering it. For example, the exchange of population between Poland and the USSR during the first postwar years involved over 3 million persons, and 2.3 million persons were repatriated from the USSR to Poland [16].

Under the conditions of the occupation regime, the civilian population suffered enormous losses from Nazi repression, hunger and illness. The lack of a count for the number of deaths on temporarily occupied territories does not make it possible to view the data on the death of civilian population as sufficiently complete. Moreover, "double counting" cannot be excluded here.

As is known, the Nazis drove the population, particularly the youth, into Germany for forced labor. The size of this contingent again has been assessed differently. The already mentioned encyclopedia [12] points out that 6 million persons were shipped from the USSR to Germany for forced labor, and by 1 January 1953, 5.5 million persons had returned home. A certain portion perished and another remained abroad for permanent residence. As was pointed out in the same encyclopedia, included in those deported were also prisoners of war along with civilians (predominantly the youth). But this is again "double counting."

Thus, assessments of the direct military losses by the method of generalizing the available statistical data concerning the total number of persons killed require a substantial adjustment. Particular attention should be paid to the possible undercounting of those killed in the units and among the civilian population as well as the "double counting." Hurry on this question can lead to great discrepancy in the values and as a result to incorrect conclusions.

Another widely employed approach for determining the amount of direct and indirect losses of the population during the war can conditionally be termed prognostic. This was worked out in detail by Soviet demographers and statisticians, primarily A.S. Semenova [13], I.G. Venetskiy [14] and B.Ts. Uralis [7]. The essence of this approach consists in calculating the forecast (more accurately, hypothetical) size of the population on the date of the nearest postwar census under the supposition that there had been no war. In other words, this is a variation of a calculation for a certain date, proceeding from a forecast of the future trends of the birthrate and death rate for the nation as a whole. The discrepancy between the calculated and actual size of the population according to the census data also provides the total amount of direct and indirect losses. Having excluded from it the possible decline in the number of births and the increase in "peacetime" mortality in the war years, we obtain the amount of direct losses. What problems arise here?

In terms of our nation, these problems can be arbitrarily divided into two groups: informational and methodological. Let us take up this in more detail. Ideally, in order to employ the mentioned approach to determining the total losses in a maximum correct manner, it is essential to possess reliable data on the total size and the age-sex structure of the population, best of all from materials of the censuses for the last prewar and first postwar year. It is also desirable to have reliable and dependable data on the dynamics of the movement of the population over a

protracted prewar period in order more accurately to assess the future of the demographic processes. The "farther away" from the beginning and end of the war data of the corresponding censuses, the harder it is to accurately assess the hypothetical "peacetime" trends of the birthrate and death rate during the war years, that is, the harder it is to answer the question of "what would have been were there no war."

As is known, prior to the Great Patriotic War, in 1937 and 1939, two national population censuses were carried out within the boundaries of the nation prior to 17 September 1939. The results of the first of these, including the data on the age-sex composition of the population, were not published. Moreover, it was only comparatively recently that they ceased writing about it as a "sabotage" act.³

As for the second mentioned census, its results (at least distribution by sex and age) were also not fully published. The materials of the 1959 USSR population census give only the total number (in 10-year age groups) of men and women according to the 1939 census, and the given data are often incompatible with subsequent censuses. For this reason it is difficult to employ directly these materials for assessing the wartime losses.

But this is not the only question. Even in having a detailed distribution of the population by age and sex within boundaries prior to 17 September 1939—and such information most probably does exist in the state statistic archives—it would have to be employed with great caution. In the first place, the results of the 1939 census would undoubtedly be influenced by the situation of tyranny then reigning in the nation and by the desire to confirm the thesis of a rapid increase in the population and to conceal the enormous human losses as a consequence of the hunger and mass repressions of the 1930s. In essence, the total size of the population was set "from above," and it merely had to be confirmed and distributed to the age-sex groups. In a word, the results of the 1939 census require a detailed verification.

It must not be forgotten that after 17 September 1939, the USSR included territories with a total population of 20.1 million persons, and the regions with a well organized population count (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) were responsible only for 5.8 million persons, or approximately 29 percent of the total increase. The basic mass of the increase came from the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia where the population count was not sufficiently reliable [18]. The annexation of these territories to the USSR was carried out under the conditions of the Nazi invasion of Poland, when, in fleeing from the occupiers, we were flooded with refugees and it was very difficult to determine their number and composition. Hence, on this level the data of the 1939 census require verification.

It is difficult to assess what could have been the trends of the birthrate and the death rate in the nation had there been no war, not only because there was a rather rapid decline in the birthrate in a portion of the Soviet territory even in the prewar period but also the rate of change in the death rate varied in the different regions. The problem also was that collectivization, hunger, the intensive migration of rural inhabitants to the cities and the compulsory resettlement of persons by the first half of the 1930s had not only disrupted the "normal" flow of demographic processes but had also led to an increase in mortality. As a result of the break-up of families, the number of births declined (although the "demographic ideals" clearly changed more slowly). During these years, there was a substantial deterioration in statistical accounting and births and deaths were far from always recorded. Reliable data on the number of births in the first half of the 1930s are virtually absent and there are only varying estimates. For example, according to the estimates of B.Ts. Uralis [15], while in 1930 on Soviet territory within its present-day boundaries the over-all birthrate coefficient equaled 41.2 per thousand and with a correction for infant mortality (the so-called coefficient for the effective birthrate) at an age of under 5 years of 29.3 per thousand, then in 1931-1934, the analogous indicators were 32.6 per thousand and 23.0 per thousand, respectively. Thus, information on the trends in the natural movement in the prewar years is insufficiently reliable and this substantially complicates a definition of the level of the birthrate and death rate over the long run under the hypothesis of the absence of a war. Nor are the data of the current accounting system under the conditions of the postwar chaos always reliable. It is no accident that the USSR Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee] (TsSU [Central Statistical Administration]) publishes indicators for the natural movement for the nation beginning with 1950.

Finally, a last comment. The age-sex composition of the USSR population is known only from the materials of the 1959 census, although in 1946 and 1948, on the basis of the electoral rolls, a count was run on persons 18 years of age and older. The need for these data is great, however they have been published nowhere.

At the same time, in possessing only the mentioned information, it is difficult to determine the size of the population even with the aid, so to speak, of "back counting": from 1959 to 1939 and this could also be one of the methods for assessing the population losses in the Great Patriotic War.

What has been said does not mean that the extrapolation method is completely unsuitable for calculating military losses. It is merely a question of the need for a cautious attitude toward the obtained results, the use of multi-variant estimates and a comparison of them with the "direct count" of losses. Moreover, it is extremely important to broaden the data base of this research, in

particular, to publish fully the data of the 1939 and 1959 censuses as well as the 1946 and 1948 population counts. In the history of our nation there should be no "blank spots."

Footnotes

1. For the author's estimates, see [19].
2. The fate of our prisoners of war is a complex and very often tragic problem. We have limited ourselves to examining only its historical demographic aspects.
3. Even the available meager data make it possible to regard very highly both the procedural level and the accuracy of this census. In the magazine OGONEK (No 51 for 1987 and No 18 for 1988), the articles of M.S. Tolets have been devoted to these questions.

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RESULTS, PLANS, CONCEPTS

Social Structure of Antiperestroyka

18060005f Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 89 (signed to press 20 Feb 89) pp 119-121

[Interview with Prof N.A. Aitov: "The Social Structure of Antiperestroyka"]

[Text] Recently Nariman Abdrakhmanovich Aitov, head of the Scientific Communism Department at the Ufa Polytechnical Institute, doctor of philosophical sciences, was awarded the title of Honored Scientist of the RSFSR. The editors asked him to share his ideas on the urgent problems of modern social development.

[Correspondent] As is known, you recently were very fruitfully engaged with the questions of the social structure of Soviet society. At present, substantial changes are occurring here. How would you assess them and what is their essence?

[N.A. Aitov] First of all, let me point out that, as before, there is a process of eliminating the essential differences between the working class and the peasantry, between the city and the countryside. It [the process] has involved the workers of mental and physical labor in its orbit. Under the influence of technical progress, the lagging social strata within the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry (the workers of unskilled or little-skilled labor) are dying out or declining numerically. The acceleration of technical progress and particularly the automation of production are creating better positions for the educated part of the youth as now social and professional advancement depends more upon knowledge than upon skills or experience.

According to data of an all-Union study conducted at the beginning of the 1980s under my leadership on the urban population's social structure, in the total number of questioned workers, the stratum of "intellectual workers" was 1.9 percent and among the youth it equaled 3.1 percent. At the same time, those employed in unskilled and little-skilled labor in the total number was 21.3 percent and among the youth just 16.9 percent. This means that the older generation has a lower educational level and is in a less advantageous situation than the youth. Possibly the acceleration of scientific and technical progress leads to the rise of descending social changes, that is, "anticareers" and instability in the socioprofessional status of the individual.

As for women, here two opposite trends are at work. The first is that as a result of the automation and mechanization of labor, professions previously considered purely male are becoming available to women (from the viewpoint of physical stress). Undoubtedly this fact facilitates social advancement and provides an opportunity to hold higher positions. The second is that the acceleration of scientific and technical progress requires frequent retraining and increased skills and this is particularly difficult precisely for women as they are still overburdened by household concerns. As was shown by career research conducted under the leadership of F.R. Filipov in Primorskiy Kray, women are 25 percent of the highly skilled workers and 70 percent of the low skilled ones. In Kirghizia, among low-skilled workers there are 3-fold more women than men; in Abkhazia, women are employed in skilled labor 2-fold less than the men.

[Corr.] For many years you have studied the regional breakdown of social changes in society. Certainly you have acquired serious empirical data making it possible to take a new look at those processes which are occurring here.

[N.A. Aitov] The overall rise in industry and the increased proportional amount of the working class and intelligentsia, according to all appearances, has led to a leveling out of the social composition of the regions. Thus, according to the data of the 1970 census, the greatest differences in the share of workers were between

Kazakhstan (68.1 percent) and Moldavia (36.3 percent), and in 1979, between Kazakhstan (68.0 percent) and Turkmenia (44.2 percent) [1].

There is a different matter of the differences between regions by standards of living. These basically depend upon the quality of management. During the period of stagnation, it was announced that the nationality question had been completely resolved and for this reason

neither a regional nor a nationality policy was carried out. At the same time, the differences between the regions (and correspondingly between the nations populating them) during this time increased substantially. In 1976, the maximum difference in terms of per capita trade turnover was between Estonia and Tajikistan (1,239 and 504 rubles), and in 1986, this had not only not declined but had even increased (1,802 and 656 rubles) [2; 3, p 458]. The Union republics now differ sharply in terms of the national income produced per inhabitant; in 1987, in the Ukraine, this was 1,953 rubles and in Uzbekistan, 1,119 rubles; in terms of the per capita value of fixed productive capital, for example, in Estonia, it equaled 7,712 rubles and in Tajikistan, 2,288 rubles (calculated by me from [3]). Undoubtedly, here one can feel not only the high birthrate in the Central Asian republics and the low one in the Baltic but also the insignificant capital investments into the labor-surplus regions. Let us assume, in the Baltic republics (with a population of 7.8 million persons) in 1971-1985, 61.3 billion rubles of fixed capital were completed while in Turkmenia, Kirghizia and Tajikistan (with a population of 12.3 million) just 48.3 billion rubles [ibid.].

At present, Central Asia has built up surplus manpower, chiefly in the countryside. The shortage of work leads to a situation where a very significant portion of the adult population either does not work at all or is employed only on his private plot (in Tajikistan, up to 25 percent of the able-bodied population [4]). One can observe a curious metamorphosis: the private farm has ceased to be a subsidiary one and it is the main one in the full sense. But, excuse me for the harshness, but certainly to a certain degree this is a petty bourgeois structure of the countryside. Work in the socialized sector does not suffice, technical progress is carried out with difficulty and in many oblasts of Central Asia industry has not developed at all. Thus, in Khorezm Oblast, industry employs just 4 percent of the able-bodied population and even building materials must be shipped in from outside [5].

[Corr.] Clearly not all the social groups and strata of the population take the same stance toward the extremely complex process of perestroika. Here unanimity does not exist and should not exist. Probably for the first time in history this circumstance is a pleasure for us. The picture of the social forces acting "pro" and "contra" to perestroika is a motley one. What, in your view, is the main thing here?

[N.A. Aitov] In actuality, certain social groups have existed for a very extended time (workers, kolkhoz members, intelligentsia, nonspecialist employees and inhabitants of the city and countryside) and their necessity rests in social relations themselves. Other strata are the offspring of this specific historical stage of development. During the period of the dominance of administrative-bureaucratic methods of management, leaders and executors were also independent social groups. The managers regardless of their subjective desires were united by objective interests and common to them was a desire to usurp management functions as it were on behalf of the people and on this foundation establish a system of illegal privileges. At that time the signs of the times were, on the one hand, lack of will and apathy and, on the other, protectionism, bribery and theft. The executors were also united by common interests, that is, by dissatisfaction with the plight prepared for them as "cogs."

At present, temporary social groups are also arising and they are united by their common attitude toward perestroika. It is a question not of the subjectively arising groups but rather those whose attitude toward technical progress was shaped objectively depending upon their actual status in the system of socioeconomic social relations. I am most of all interested in the strata which are inclined against technical progress and are able to put up active or passive resistance to it. These are above all groups of unskilled and low-skilled labor. The disappearance of old professions and the appearance of new ones means the necessity of retraining for them. But a low educational level and in many age and state of health do not make it possible for these persons to fully master the new equipment. The state compensates them for bad working conditions by payments which are higher than for highly skilled workers. This is why in eliminating the old professions the outsiders can lose in earnings and they may not be able to master a new, better-paid specialty. They are the first candidates for a cutback in staff with the fundamental reconstruction of the enterprise.

I began studying the question for job placement for released workers some 20 years ago. At that time, for 70 percent of the released workers the new job, wages and conditions were substantially better than the old one. Only for 10 percent of the workers did the situation deteriorate. This occurred under the conditions of stagnation and the extremely slow pace of technical progress, when over a year almost 550,000 employees were released [6]. However, they were all absorbed by the manpower shortage running into the many millions and a real danger existed only for workers with the lowest educational level, a primary one.

According to the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, by the year 2000, 80 percent of the presently existing professions should disappear [7]. But it is difficult to retrain for computers even workers with an 8th-grade

education and with less education this is simply inconceivable. Difficult times are coming for the 11.6 percent of the employed population which does not even have a complete secondary education (calculated from [8]). If it is considered that each year 300,000 students drop out of school (0.8 percent) and 200,000 from the GPTU [state vocational-technical school] (5 percent), and the number of repeaters in the schools has risen from 180,000 (0.5 percent) in 1984 to 467,000 (1.1 percent) in 1987 [9], then it turns out that the number of persons risking to lose their social status as a result of technical progress is very large. Of course, the acceleration of progress in the future means higher material prosperity for them. But an awareness of the remote future cannot replace the current losses. At present, when a worker in simple manual labor produces 600 rubles of newly created value in a year and receives a subsidy of 200,000 rubles on top of wages [10, p 66], then his material interests often are not linked to work at a state enterprise. Among workers in unskilled labor, 50 percent feel that the main thing is wages while among workers of highly skilled labor only 29 percent are such [ibid., p 125]. Such value orientations in no way contribute to the acceleration of technical progress.

In order to overcome the resistance of the unskilled and low-skilled workers, it is essential to set up a system for job placement, retraining and movement of the personnel to other jobs whereby the people would not lose anything. The same could be said about older engineers with insufficient VUZ training and who have not mastered the bases of programming.

The ordinary leaders are also an impediment to technical progress. The introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress is a very bothersome thing for them and it is not known what they will receive as a result of the reconstruction of the national economy. Or take trade workers. In retail trade, some 65.5 percent of all the employees are engaged in manual labor, and industry prepackages just 34 percent of the goods [11]. The secret is simple: with industrial packaging trade would be deprived of the possibility of writing off 0.3 percent of the volume of trade turnover for drying out and spillage. Understandably, technical progress is completely disadvantageous for the trade workers.

The population of the labor-surplus republics shows a particular attitude toward technical progress. At present, Dagestan has 170,000 unemployed, there are 121,000 in Checheno-Ingushetia, and 2,000-3,000 each in Kabardino-Balkaria and Northern Ossetia [12]. In the Central Asian Republics no count is being made at all. When there is not enough work, a person naturally will agree to any manual labor in agriculture including low-paid. Attempts to introduce mechanization are perceived in the given instance as an attack against the very heart. It is worthy of note that with a manpower surplus, new industrial enterprises are not being built here, while in

the labor-short Kalinin Oblast there has been a rush of requests from the ministries as the latter want to erect new enterprises precisely here....

[Corr.] What is the way out of this situation?

[N.A. Aitov] It is essential to eliminate the labor surplus in the Central Asian Republics, the Transcaucasus and Northern Caucasus by industrialization. Considering the particular features of the indigenous population of these republics (low migration mobility and a high birthrate), it would be desirable to build the industrial enterprises not in the cities but in the villages (all the more as, with the exception of the mountainous areas, here the rural settlements are sufficiently large). They could be small enterprises (affiliates and shops of large city industrial associations) with relatively simple equipment. At the same time, in the villages it is essential to organize GPTU for the representatives of the indigenous peoples. I feel that the labor surplus here is now one of the serious factors of resistance to technical progress.

[Corr.] I would like to thank you, Nariman Abdrakhmanovich, for the interesting talk. You have raised an important question and not all of its aspects are obvious now. The main forces impeding perestroika have still not been ascertained by the sociologists and we still are not speaking about a great deal. But things have gotten off dead center, positive changes have become irreversible and in the near future new, more detailed research results will certainly appear.

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