


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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ISESCO Action Plan on Education, Science

92AF0304A Rabat L'OPINION in French 12, 13 Jan 92

[Unattributed article in two installments: "ISESCO: 1992-2000 Medium-Term Plan; What Is To Be Done In Terms of Education and the Sciences"]

[12 Jan pp 1, 3]

[Text] We continue with our publication of the various segments of the medium-term plan devised by the Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [ISESCO] in the areas of education, the sciences, and culture, a plan that consists of strategies aimed at realizing the ideals, needs, and aspirations of the ummah [the Muslim world].

The first part was devoted to strategy in the area of education. As part of this effort we [today] offer the other areas as well as the medium-term strategy as it relates to the sciences.

The medium-term plan's projects consist of a series of steps aimed at:

- Establishing the educational system on a firm foundation based on the precepts, prescriptions, and values of Islam.
- Acting in such a way that educational systems help consolidate the ummah's cultural independence, strengthen its own identity, and demonstrate its unity and diversity.
- Turning the educational systems in the Islamic countries into indispensable tools to ensure the rebirth of the ummah and turning it into scientific and technological tools capable of helping to provide it with a scientific and technological foundation, which will allow it to escape from underdevelopment and dependency.
- Supporting the development effort of countries and regional communities in the Islamic world in the areas within the purview of ISESCO by paying particular attention to the spiritual dimension of development.
- Working so that all social strata in the Islamic countries have an equal opportunity to have access to formal and informal education.
- Unifying the basic principles that govern the education systems in the Islamic countries and, by consolidating them, to give prominence to those aspects most likely to favor cooperation between the different Islamic countries and regional communities.
- Strengthening Islamic solidarity to obtain better educational development by working for the modernization and the development of activities in various educational areas.

Education for All

This initiative draws its inspiration from the Hadith [sayings of the Prophet Muhammad]: "The acquisition of knowledge is the duty of every Muslim man and woman," i.e., a right and an obligation for individuals as well as communities. Thus it is the duty of countries and organizations to facilitate access to knowledge and grant equal opportunities to all social strata and to all citizens, children, or adults.

In many Islamic countries, people manage to read the Holy Koran but do not understand its precise meaning. Despite this handicap, it is not rare for these Muslims to convert other persons to Islam through their social practices. But when the latter inquire as to the meaning of the Holy Koran, they cannot assist them. This lack of clarity favors the recourse to third parties and feeds charlatanry and a certain form of dogmatism.

The activities anticipated as part of this initiative involve Islamic education and the Arabic language, with special attention being given to strata having the greatest need of these two disciplines, notably Muslims living in non-Arabic-speaking countries and Muslims who have emigrated to other countries. These activities constitute one of the special points of ISESCO's program in the area of education.

The activities anticipated as part of this initiative comprise the target for ISESCO's programs in the areas of competency. They in fact aim at providing an Islamic character for ISESCO's educational efforts.

This initiative proposes intensifying efforts with a view to bringing about an expansion of the educational systems in the Islamic countries both at the level of form and content, so as to bring them into the modern era while preserving their special features.

The objective of this undertaking is the creation of the right conditions for bringing together the different educational systems of the Islamic countries so as to benefit from the positive aspects of some of these systems and, in the last analysis, to generalize the pilot experience and unify standards.

The Sciences

The Islamic countries account for an area covering close to one-sixth of the earth's surface. The Muslim world is a vast, almost uninterrupted, strategically important intercontinental region stretching from Asia to Europe and Africa. Its coastlines, shipping routes, territorial waters, and maritime zones are very extensive. It is a rich world whose many resources remain unexplored and undeveloped.

For each country, human resources represent its most precious wealth. This resource—which is found in abundance in the Islamic countries—is growing rapidly, thus posing fairly serious problems in the areas of food, health, and housing. These problems can only be overcome if the human resources in the Islamic countries are

judiciously developed through a qualitative and quantitative development of the sciences and technology.

The importance of science and technology in economic growth and improvement in the human condition needs no further proof. Besides, due to the Koran's and the Sunnah's [the sayings and doings of the Prophet] injunctions, it is the duty of every Muslim to make use of their powers of observation, reasoning, and creativity with which God imbued man to acquire scientific knowledge and put it at the service of the well-being of humanity.

If the scientific accomplishments of Muslims have left a glorious page in the history of the Islamic world, it is nevertheless true that our current capabilities in the areas of science and technology are inadequate to lead to independent development. The Islamic world is faced with many problems and challenges, most of all, the product of exploitation, ignorance, and cultural subversion.

The piling up of prejudices against Islam, the strategic geographic location of Muslim countries, their large reserves of petroleum and resources of raw materials, and their low scientific and technological level make them vulnerable and exposed to exploitation by developed countries looking for easy outlets for their costly equipment and their technology. National defense budgets, always on the rise, impose additional constraints on the fragile economies of many Islamic countries.

Thus the need to put in place and expand the scientific and technological foundation of the Islamic world has never been more pressing.

Technology can only flower in a country if it is accompanied by a flowering of science. The transfer of technology from developed to developing countries of which we often hear does not truly occur as it should because this technology is not accompanied by the "know-how" and the "know-why" (the "how" and the "why" that stand for basic science) in the countries that import this technology.

The Muslim countries require an efficient scientific and technological infrastructure to solve their problems of food, housing, petroleum, energy, health, the environment, agricultural production, and industry. The Muslim countries need to expand their capacity and their research potential to solve their problems by themselves and among themselves so they can genuinely enjoy their independence. They must strengthen and improve the content, quality, and accessibility of education and create competent human capacities in the areas of science and technology. They must also expand infrastructures and working conditions capable of encouraging Muslim scholars and engineers to find remedies to the problems of their respective countries.

[13 Jan pp 1, 4]

[Text] Faced with various challenges and with implications in the strategic, social, and human areas of development and with technological changes in the West, the Islamic world, which has huge potential, must rethink its development initiatives and undertakings. Education, science, and culture, together with communications, make up the foundation on which a new strategy must be built.

Such a strategy has been drawn up by ISESCO in the form of a medium-term action plan, of which we print below the portions relating to science and culture.

Among the indicators used to plot the position of a country in the areas of science and technology, the following should be mentioned:

- I. Institutional structures: universities, research/development agencies, etc.;
- II. The number of people engaged in the research/development effort;
- III. Expenses for research/development
- IV. The number of publications cited in international journals;
- V. The technological structure: industry, measures to use licenses, customs regulations, etc.;
- VI. The information and documentation system;
- VII. International relations;
- VIII. The human factor: a sense of responsibility and "speed of task execution."

These indicators, taken together—and not individually—can be fairly representative of a country's scientific and technological rank and be used to define the objectives of its scientific and technological policy.

The disparities in scientific capacities currently in existence between the technologically advanced countries and the Muslim countries are huge. For example, whereas expenses in advanced countries in the area of scientific research reach 3 percent of their GNP [gross national product], no Muslim countries allots even so much as 0.5 percent of its GNP to scientific and technological development. In another area, if the number of scientists and technology experts engaged in scientific and technological research and development work is about 2,600 per million inhabitants in developed countries, it is below 100 per million inhabitants in the Muslim ummah! As a result, the Islamic world has become dependent on the advanced countries to satisfy their technological needs.

It is obvious that this situation must be corrected as quickly as possible, because a community as big as the Muslim ummah cannot allow itself to remain weak, vulnerable, and dependent on others for its vital needs.

Tasks To Undertake

The Islamic world must expand and consolidate its scientific and technological foundation. The Muslim countries must not only strengthen their national capacities in the area of science and technology but also collaborate in this area to put together a collective force with the nobility and the permanence of Islamic values and ideals. This approach must be prospective in such a way that it anticipates and therefore plans future scientific and technological developments, all the while making it possible to make the best use of the structures already in place.

Islam's great patrimony, the diversity of human and natural resources in the countries of the ummah and the commitment made by the Islamic nation to develop its capabilities and reduce the distance separating the Islamic countries from the industrialized countries, are just so many encouraging sectors. Unfortunately the scientific and technological capabilities of the Islamic countries are still on the periphery of the process of development. Concerted efforts are therefore necessary to break out of this impasse. To do so we must strengthen these capabilities and integrate them into the major socio-economic development efforts currently under way in the Islamic countries.

Objectives of the Medium-Term Plan

For the initiatives aimed at perfecting knowledge in the areas of modern science and technology to succeed and ensure the socio-economic well-being of the Muslim ummah, an improvement in scientific education at all levels and an expansion of scientific research are fundamental.

The objectives of the main scientific programs of ISESCO's Medium-Term Program, 1991-2000 are to:

- Increase the efficiency of scientific education at various levels whether this would involve the number of courses, their content, laboratory equipment, or the quality of the teaching;
- Expand scientific support services through staff training in relevant sectors such as the repair and maintenance of laboratory equipment, and the collection, storage, and retrieval of data;
- Allocate necessary support to undertake applied, basic scientific research in new areas of national importance;
- Encourage young, talented Muslims to major in scientific and technological subjects;
- Contribute to the development of highly qualified scientific and technological staff;
- Foster occasions for contact between scientific and technological cadres to exchange information and ideas and cooperate in research and development work; and support the institutions established for this purpose;
- Stimulate the development process by deriving maximum benefit from the findings of research work in the generation and implementation of appropriate technologies;

- Make the masses more aware of the importance of progress in the areas of science and technology so public opinion will be well informed and ready to support the national scientific and technological effort.

The main points of the medium-term plan are the subjects that determine the programs and the activities to be undertaken. Given the current and future ambitions and needs of the Islamic world in the areas of science and technology, the points of this plan are to:

- Perfect scientific and technological education;
- Strengthen scientific research and consolidate contacts and cooperation between Muslim scientists on the one hand and between Muslim scientists and the international scientific community on the other;
- Strengthen the training of qualified scientific and technological personnel;
- Support Muslim scientists and technical experts in countries with a Muslim minority;
- Promote environmental protection and a sensible use of natural resources;
- Ensure the dissemination of science and technology;
- Harmonize developments in science and technology with the elements of our true patrimony and with the Islamic thought and values system.

Main Programs

Taking the realities of today and trends upcoming in the areas of science and technology into consideration, the main programs, based on the lines mentioned above, have been proposed for the Medium-Term Plan, 1991-2000. These are:

Main Program A: Perfecting scientific and technological education.

Main Program B: Strengthening scientific research and an expansion of contacts among scientists.

Main Program C: Developing a qualified scientific work force.

Main Program D: Support of Muslim communities in nonmember countries.

Main Program E: Environmental protection and conservation of natural resources.

Main Program F: Science, technology, and society; examine the challenges of the 21st century.

Culture

As it enters the final decade of the twentieth century, the Islamic ummah has initiated a new phase in its continuous search for objective solutions to the problems of civilization and the challenges of the times which it confronts at every level. Whence the urgent necessity of creating a cultural and intellectual climate that will clear

the way for initiatives to energize civilization and liberate intelligent energies with a view to transforming Islamic identity socially, economically, and culturally, to readapt it to the characteristics of the ummah and consolidate the Islamic world's defensive capabilities, all the while affirming its presence on the international scene as a major player in the universal work of building and renewal.

The realization and the assumption of responsibility by ISESCO with regard to the ummah has led to a continual search for the means that can bring the Islamic cultural project to fruition at the level of the world and the Islamic communities. The foundation of this project is, in essence: a solid, homogeneous Islamic identity, a tight and dynamic cultural unity, an enlightened, open intellectual and cultural vision, and a large-scale, diversified cooperation among the Islamic countries and between them and the other countries, in every cultural area—with a view toward implementing a harmonious international Islamic cultural initiative in order to realize a noble objective, viz. a bringing together in diversity and a cultural unity based on a legitimate pluralism in attitudes and deeds.

Cultural Challenges

The consequences of colonialism and the long period of underdevelopment that the Islamic countries have undergone are at the root of the problems, which impede cultural action in the Islamic world. These problems, which are common to all the countries of the Islamic world, take various forms. Some are purely cultural, others are of a structural nature intertwined with several factors which, taken together, constitute the cultural crisis with its many dimensions with which we are acquainted.

The dual nature of education is at the top of the cultural problems from which Islamic countries suffer. This dual nature is due mainly to the multiplicity of educational systems, among which is a traditional one not adequately open to the exigencies of the present era, and another, modern one carrying certain negative aspects that conflict with the spiritual values of Islamic communities. This dual nature has given rise to conflictual ways of thinking and cultural allegiances, whence the identity crisis viewed, theoretically, as the source of all the cultural problems.

These cultural problems in the Islamic world are reflected, generally speaking, in the following ways, ways which put their stamp on cultural life, impede cultural action, and pose an obstacle to the activities of institutions which function in this area:

1. Illiteracy on a grand scale and its corollaries has been propagated, i.e., the absence of a cultural consciousness and the nonparticipation of the greater segment of the Muslim public in cultural action.

2. The conception of culture as a way of realizing material interests, and the neglect of its civilizing dimension as an instrument for refining taste, expanding the mind, and fashioning the personality of a living creature. This results in the absence of any influence by culture on the flowering of the individual and the group.

3. The incomplete knowledge on the part of Muslims of their respective culture, and the lack of cultural ties between them.

4. The absence of consensus on the concept of the Islamic patrimony, of its value, and of the means to ensure its use to become fully engaged in modern life.

5. The lack of vitality and dynamism on the part of traditional cultural institutions and the absence of support with respect to them, which prevents them from playing their role and taking the necessary initiatives.

6. The absence of coordination among the various cultural institutions in the Islamic world.

There has been a major drop in the number of readers in the Islamic world and, in consequence, a decline in the role of the book in education and training.

The thinness of resources for training in most of the Islamic communities is illustrated by:

a. An inadequate number of libraries, screening rooms, and cultural clubs proportional to the population.

b. The inability of publishing houses to satisfy the needs of the educated stratum [of society] and the inadequacy of dissemination activities at the level of countries and of the Islamic world.

The mediocre nature of cultural information disseminated by the press, radio, and television, which turns into a retrenchment on culture by the mass media, and a domination by political, sports, and artistic issues, to the detriment of cultural broadcasts and programs.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Editorial: U.S. Enemy Until Statehood Achieved

92AE0156A *Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI*
in Arabic 14 Dec 91 p 15

[Text] When the American administration insists on the conditions which it is imposing on the Palestinian people—especially the condition which denies the Palestinian people's freedom to determine its own destiny and establish a state on its land that was occupied in 1967—American fairness, crocodile tears over human rights, and keenness on international law and international legitimacy become meaningless expressions and nothing but a new fabrication of the art of lying, to which America has been accustomed historically. The American president and senior members of his administration—who have not stopped talking about the new international order, which is supposed to guarantee

political stability and human development without violence and bloody clashes—are making a major mistake by believing that the stability that they seek to achieve in the Middle East through their initiative can be based on denying the Palestinian people the exercise of its natural, humanitarian, legal right to self-determination on its land and to choose its future in full freedom, without conditions or political dictates.

Our Palestinian consciousness is the consciousness of a single people under the sky, the consciousness of the Palestinian homeland, the consciousness of the national identity, the consciousness of the national objective, the consciousness of the Palestinian regarding the expression of his right, and the consciousness of the PLO as a political entity. Our consciousness cannot be divided by American policy, American interest, or by the table at which our people's future is bargained over/negotiated. Rather, its denominator is freedom to choose its future, determine its destiny, and establish its state on the land of 1967.

The Bush administration, which talks about the sacred human right to life and freedom and to choose one's future without interference, has applauded and is applauding the exercise by Eastern Europeans and Soviets of their right to freedom and to choose their future democratically. The Bush administration, through the numerous conditions which it is imposing on our people, is depriving our people of this right. Its aim is to forcefully impose a situation and a future on our people against its will and political and national consciousness.

Worse than this, we are talking about a lasting, just solution, and stability in the Middle East Region!

What just solution, what stability?! The regional and international environment has enjoined our people to accept negotiations with American conditions, which the PLO has decided to accept at this time. This acceptance is a loathing, wary acceptance. However, it is not final acceptance. It is conditioned on the Palestinian consciousness regarding the ultimate establishment of a state on Palestinian land.

However, the Bush administration, which is enjoying the dark, gloomy "moment of the Gulf war" in the life of the Arab nation and the Muslim nation, is willfully and assiduously ignoring our Palestinian consciousness, without realizing—and it could realize—that no Palestinian, in an earnest moment, would dare accept American political stability if it was not in harmony with our Palestinian consciousness regarding our self-determination and the establishment of our state, regardless of the regional and international environment.

The experience of six days in Washington between last Wednesday and Tuesday, during which the American administration delivered a "slap" in the face to the Arab delegations, demonstrated that America has not changed its conditions for political stability in the region. In other words, it has not changed its condition that a Palestinian state is not to be established. We would be deceiving

ourselves if we concluded otherwise. America has imposed procedural and substantive conditions on the Arabs, including the Palestinians. But it is unwilling to impose conditions, even procedural conditions, on the other side in the conflict equation.

Washington's first signal before the start of bilateral negotiations was directed to the oppressed in the occupied territories, who read political events with their hearts and build delusions, at a time when it is more necessary than ever to renounce all emotions. These oppressed have brought to light a sad, pitiful struggle for chairs and status.

America is our enemy. America the initiator, America the mediator, America [the purveyor] of the deceptive slogan of "neutrality," the America of Bush, of the new order. America is our enemy until it withdraws the conditions that it has imposed on our Palestinian consciousness regarding our self-determination, the establishment of our state, and our freedom to democratically choose our future on our land. Until then, it will continue to be our enemy.

Article Denounces U.S. Partisanship in Talks

92AE0156B Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 14 Dec 91 pp 16-18

[Text] Regardless of whether bilateral negotiations begin on 10 December 1991 or on any other day, the political experience between 4 December 1991 and the day when negotiations begin prompts us to dwell on this experience to better understand the U.S. political initiative and all related issues, including U.S. earnestness, U.S.-Israeli relations, U.S.-Arab relations, and the future of the U.S. initiative in light of this experience.

U.S. Neutrality?!

It seems that the myth of U.S. neutrality, which was woven by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker during his eight trips to the region before the Madrid Conference and in Madrid, began to gradually unravel and come apart when it reached the first real station in the U.S. initiative to settle the Middle East conflict.

The Bush administration has followed two basic approaches in the implementation of its initiative:

1. Israel is America's friend. The Arabs (Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf countries) became Israel's friends after the war waged by the U.S. coalition against Iraq. The U.S. initiative proceeded, based on this common friendship under the slogan of "neutrality," to assemble the parties at the negotiating table, based on principles determined by the U.S. administration.

2. The nature of the long, complicated conflict has also impelled America toward a sponsorship role, for which it has adopted a policy of dictating to all of the parties. Under this policy, America dictates to each party based on the party's power. Thus, the dictate imposed on the

Palestinian people differs from the dictate imposed on Syria, on Israel, and on Jordan.

The Madrid Conference reflected the U.S. policy of dictating to all of the parties. Although the dictate [words omitted, possibly "was not"] neutral with respect to the conditions that were imposed on each party, the Arab delegations, including the Palestinian delegation, agreed to participate in the Madrid Conference and to convene the first meeting immediately after Madrid.

When the U.S. administration set 4 December and Washington as the time and venue for bilateral negotiations, it was basing itself on its "neutral" policy of dictating! The Arab states did not object, although they preferred Madrid or a European capital. Israel opposed the time and venue, albeit in a reserved manner, as reflected in its stipulation that negotiations be shifted from Washington to the Middle East at some stage in the near future.

The bets were that Israel would change its position—which set 9 December as the date for negotiations—at the last minute before 4 December. However, the pressure exerted by the imminence of 4 December did not change the Israeli position. Israel rejected the U.S. dictate, and the Arabs accepted it.

This situation was the first practical test of the policy of dictating adopted by the United States to solve the conflict. What was the outcome?

The Bush administration discontinued its policy of dictating and returned to its policy of "mediating between friends." In other words, it employed the first point of its policy, which is based on both "mediating" and dictating. It prevailed upon the Arab delegations, which had arrived in Washington pursuant to the U.S. dictate, to wait until the Israeli delegation arrived in Washington.

Thus, this first test of the Bush administration exploded the myth of neutrality adopted by the Bush administration to solve the Middle East conflict, because:

- The Bush administration renounced its policy of dictating the time and venue for bilateral negotiations, without pressuring Israel to attend negotiations.
- The Bush administration yielded to the Israeli position of rejecting U.S. dictates. Thus, U.S. neutrality is automatically governed by Israeli consent.
- America refraining from taking any measure as the result of Israel's rejection of the venue and time set by Washington, when the Arabs accepted that time and venue, exploded the myth of U.S. neutrality and impartial mediation.
- What would the U.S. position be if an Arab delegation had rejected the time and venue set by America?!

The answer is that negotiations would have begun between Israel and those Arab delegations willing to attend, and there would be no delay.

This first test shows that the myth of U.S. neutrality, which required Secretary of State Baker to make eight

trips to the region, has exploded in the first serious test for the Bush administration.

Partiality to Israel

After Wednesday, the myth of neutrality was laid to rest in favor of America's acceptance of the Israeli position or dictate. After Wednesday, it seemed that the Bush administration had clearly declared its partiality to Israel through the following:

- America continued its policy of dictating to the Arab delegations by pressuring them to wait in Washington until the Israeli delegation arrived.
- The U.S. State Department intervened with Arab delegations to accept 9 December as the date for negotiations, per the Israeli demand.
- The U.S. administration took numerous measures to prevent journalists from photographing the empty seats assigned to the Israeli delegation and to deny the Arab delegations press coverage to prevent them from exploiting the Israeli absence to bolster the Arab position.
- The international media, which is no doubt committed to U.S. and Western policy in particular, focussed on numerous issues unrelated to the negotiations in Washington, ignoring Israel's six-day absence.

The positions adopted by the United States during these six days in December, assuming that negotiations began on 10 December, are an inarguable reflection of U.S. partiality to Israel and consequently, of the end of the myth of "impartial mediator," which the U.S. administration promoted throughout the months following the start of its initiative to solve the conflict in the region.

The Arabs' rejection of 9 December and setting of 10 December for the start of negotiations, and America's agreement to the 10th, do not diminish U.S. partiality to Israel or Israel's dictating of its policy to the U.S. administration and the Arabs. Although what went on behind the scenes in Washington between the Arab delegations and U.S. administration officials has not been disclosed, the Arab agreement to wait until the Israeli delegation arrived involves a major concession on the part of the Arabs. In addition, the Arab delegations' failure to mount a protest to express their rejection of Israel's position reflects the Arabs' acceptance of the U.S. policy of dictating.

What Is Behind U.S. Position?!

America's full partiality to Israel, and the explosion of the myth of U.S. neutrality, as reflected in events of these six days, have raised a new question about U.S.-Israeli relations at present, compared to the past few months.

The U.S. decision to postpone for four months a decision on whether to grant Israel loan guarantees indicated that America would implement its policy in the region without regard for U.S.-Israeli relations. This, after

international and regional changes had affected Israel's position in the U.S. strategy regarding the Middle East and the world in general.

However, the U.S. position on Israel's rejection of the time set by the U.S. administration for the start of bilateral negotiations in Washington compels one to question whether the Bush administration can pressure Israel to accept a U.S. political solution.

The U.S. position on this requires an Arab re-examination of the nature of U.S.-Israeli relations. This re-examination should be based, in particular, on the implications of the end of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Arabs in the interest of America, and America's prosecution of a war to secure oil and to ensure that oil supplies do not fall under Arab control. All of these factors have led to a change in Israel's position within the U.S. strategy. Consequently, America is now willing to exercise pressure on Israel to compel it to accept a political solution.

America's refusal to pressure Israel into accepting the time set by Washington for bilateral negotiations, and the imposition of Israel's position on America and—more importantly—on the Arab parties, which waited in Washington until the Israeli delegation arrived—these developments overturn the above-mentioned view of U.S. willingness to pressure Israel, in favor of the traditional view that America will not pressure Israel, and moreover, that Israeli interferes in U.S. decision-making.

America's ability to pressure Israel is now in question after Israel imposed its position and rejected the U.S. policy of dictating to it. What is behind the U.S. position?

Given that America possesses all of the political, economic, and even military, cards for pressuring Israel, it can dictate its policy to Israel. However, it has refused to use these cards. It accepted Israel's rejection of the U.S. policy of dictating the time of negotiations, and it accepted Israeli conditions regarding the venue of negotiations.

This acceptance indicates to the Arabs that the U.S. policy of dictating is not directed at Israel, but only at the Arabs, and that the U.S. initiative automatically means Arab acceptance of Israeli conditions, i.e., of Israel's policy of seeking to impose a fait-accompli on the Arabs.

U.S. Seriousness!

The experience of "the six days" has not only tested U.S. neutrality, but U.S. seriousness as well, because:

- If America did not pressure Israel to accept the date for starting negotiations, which is solely a procedural, formal, or "logistic" matter, the possibility that America will pressure Israel to accept substantive matters is not in the offing.

- America's acceptance of Israel's rejection of the U.S. policy of dictating the time for the start of negotiations will result in America's acceptance of Israeli rejections regarding many substantive issues. & America's consent to the Israeli rejection of the U.S. policy of dictating means that the United States will agree to any future Israeli rejection. Israel rather than the United States will thus control the political process.
- The experience of the political process over the past several months shows that a solution to the Middle East conflict that is not based primarily on a U.S. and international political dictate is generally impossible. American acceptance of the Israeli rejection of U.S. dictates threatens to dissolve the political process, and it reflects America's lack of seriousness about solving the conflict.

This U.S. position indicates that U.S. seriousness, in the form of dictated conditions and political dictates, is directed toward the Arabs but not toward Israel. Therefore, the experience of the six days in December raises the question of how far the Arabs will go in accepting U.S. dictates!

The experience in Washington has shown that the Arabs, to date, consent to U.S. policy without the slightest protest. However, this consent is expected to collide with an Arab wall, given that continued acceptance of U.S. dictates will ultimately lead to acceptance of Israel's proposal for a solution!

Questions Surrounding a Final Solution

This experience raises a major question about U.S. policy on the Palestinian issue. Specifically, what is the U.S. policy on what the Palestinians view as a transitional phase [leading to statehood], but which the Israelis view as "autonomy?"

The Palestinian position, which is being represented by the delegation of the "interior" [occupied territories] to Washington, depends indisputably on the U.S. position. If America has agreed to autonomy as a transitional phase before a final solution, then it is closely guarding its vision of a final solution to the Palestinian problem and the Palestinian land occupied in 1967.

Given America's refrainment from pressuring Israel to accept the time set by the U.S. administration for bilateral negotiations, the big question is: If, on any pretext, Israel refuses to enter into negotiations (which are to be in the form of bilateral negotiations initially), will the U.S. administration pressure Israel to start negotiations?

Another big question concerns whether Israel would accept a U.S. dictate if an impasse is reached in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations over a final settlement, as expected.

If America has already agreed to the Israeli position on the timing of bilateral negotiations, America will also bow to Israel's position on a final solution.

PLO Security Apparatus Announces Executions

TA2701173592 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 27 Jan 92 p 11

[Text] Four youths from the village of Ra'y in the Janin district were murdered yesterday morning and their bodies were discarded near the junction leading to the village. The "Revolutionary Security Apparatus," which is the intelligence and investigative arm of the PLO, in Janin assumed responsibility for the murders.

Immediately after the murders, members of the "Apparatus" announced over a loudspeaker the execution of the four accused of collaboration to residents of the village. Sources in Janin reported that, on Saturday evening, the four men were abducted from their homes by masked assailants. They were interrogated and were later shot. There were signs of torture on the bodies.

The four, who were related, were identified as 'Imad Ibrahim al-Shaykh (18), Nadir Najib Sabiyah (22), Nasir Badr Jawbarah (23), and Ra'id Abu-Rashid Murshid (21). The sources reported that, recently, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] succeeded in arresting several "wanted" individuals in the area of Ra'y, and in exposing a ring of "wanted" people. The four were accused of having turned in the "wanted" individuals and having assisted the IDF in capturing other groups in the village.

Recently, security forces have recorded successes in the Janin area, which brought about the capture of many scores of suspects, including "wanted" persons. Defense sources estimate that these murders were carried out against the background of IDF successes and to deter residents from collaborating with the security forces.

ALGERIA**French Officials Comment on Takeover**

92AF0314D Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Jan 92 p 5

[Text] Questioned about the situation in Algeria in an interview broadcast by TF-1 on January 19, Mr. Laurent Fabius stated that in his view the Algerians had been given "a choice between two bad solutions"—the "appalling risk" of an Islamist victory at the polls and "another dangerous venture, a coup d'etat." The first secretary of the Socialist Party went on to state that "France must try to support the prodemocracy forces and help Algeria achieve the economic development that has eluded it, because that is the key to democracy."

The minister of defense, Mr. Pierre Joxe, interviewed the same day on the program "Forum Radio Monte-Carlo/L'Express," called for "caution in attempting to judge countries that gained independence very recently in cruel turmoil." "I believe," he concluded, "that the Algerians will find the path to their development, their rebirth, and their own democracy."

Mr. Raymond Barre, a guest on the program "Grand Jury RTL-Le Monde" also on Sunday 19 January, stated

that "it behooves France not to meddle in Algerian affairs." The former prime minister went on to explain, "We should let the Algerians settle their own affairs, while conveying the hope that this will be done with respect for human rights and without bloodshed, and that circumstances will soon change to allow the normal course of democracy to resume." According to Mr. Barre, "If a sudden wave of immigrants from Algeria were to arrive in France, we would be forced to close our borders."

Discontent Over French Response Reported

92AF0314A Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Jan 92 p 5

[Article by Jacques De Barrin, special correspondent in Algiers: "Resentment Toward France"]

[Text] The Algerian Government recalled its ambassador to France, Mr. Smail Hamdani, "for consultations," it was announced by APS on Saturday 18 January. The following day, it was made known by official circles in Algeria that the move was a "sign of irritation" in reaction to what they viewed as inappropriate comments recently made by French leaders.

A misunderstanding involving last week's visit to Algiers by the director for North African and Middle Eastern Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, Mr. Pierre Lafrance, contributed to the falling out between Algeria and France. "It was our understanding that he had come to see us, and we received him with the respect that is due a representative of Mr. Roland Dumas [France's foreign minister] whom we regard as a friend," a reliable source explained. But a communique from the foreign affairs ministry suggested that Mr. Lafrance had also met with Algeria's other political movements during his visit, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). "Some checking revealed that to be untrue," said the same source, but the erroneous account left Algeria's leaders puzzled, at the very least.

Much more serious from the Algerian point of view were the remarks made by Mr. Mitterrand last week in Luxembourg, in which he described the interruption of democracy as "irregular, to say the least" and urged Algeria's leaders to "repair the fabric of democratic life as soon as possible." Official Algerian circles contend that "this condescending tone is unacceptable" and express the hope that Paris will understand that "Algerian leaders are faced with concrete problems that must be solved in order to meet the needs of the population." According to these same circles, "If the electoral process had not been stopped, we would have been headed straight for a civil war. It is better to move against a political party now rather than a Parliament taken over by it. Besides, we feel that it is more important to relieve the population, even temporarily, of the specter of an Islamic state than to cater to the moods of the French political spectrum from Mr. Giscard d'Estaing to Mr. Mitterrand."

The Algerian press, for its part, has begun to target the "alarmist and paternalistic" analysts of the French media. In an editorial entitled "When the Gauls Are Worried," in its Sunday edition, the daily newspaper HORIZONS wrote that "the predicted massacre has not taken place."

The National Party for Solidarity and Development (PNSD), which received 48,208 votes in the first round of the legislative elections (0.36 percent of the total), has called on the High Committee of State to review and possibly break off relations with Iran¹, Sudan, and France, as well as with "all those who try to make problems for Algeria!"

Footnote

1. Algeria's ambassador to Iran was also recalled for consultations on Saturday. Algerian leaders had, for months, been disturbed by the Iranian regime's support for the FIS and were highly irritated by the strong criticism expressed in Tehran after the legislative elections were canceled. On Sunday, the Algerian press raised the possibility that diplomatic relations between Algiers and Tehran may be broken off.

ISRAEL

Sharon Gives Figures on Settlement in Territories
TA2301173092 Jerusalem MABAT in Hebrew
23 Jan 92 p 1

[Text] According to the estimate of Minister of Construction and Housing Ari'el Sharon, only NIS [New Israel Shekels] 850 million, or 15 percent of the total NIS 5.2 billion allocated for construction, road-paving and development in 1990-1991, was transferred to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza.

The minister of Construction and Housing estimated that, if the Americans refuse to grant Israel the loan guarantees which are intended to absorb immigrants, construction in the territories will not be impaired, while building sites in other parts of Israel will suffer, since Israel is not settling immigrants in the territories.

Sharon said that of the 403,000 immigrants who have arrived in Israel in the past two years only 4,000 have settled in the territories. Sharon said that the rate of apartment acquisition in Judaea and Samaria is among the highest in Israel and that the demand for apartments in these areas is growing. At the same time, the assistance granted by the Ministry of Construction and Housing to those living in these areas has grown, while this assistance has not come at the expense of other areas in Israel.

Sharon criticized what he defined as an attempt to describe the funds invested in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza as money coming at the expense of investment in industry.

Druze Propose Settlement in Territories

TA2601160092 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
26 Jan 92 p 1

[Text] Twenty-five post-IDF [Israel Defense Forces], Druze youths from the villages of Yarka, Hurpish, and Abu-Sinan recently approached Amana, the settlement organization of Gush Emunim, with the purpose of enlisting their assistance toward establishing the first Druze settlement in the territories. This was reported today in the Arab-Israeli newspaper AL-SINNARAH.

The paper discloses that the Druze youths wanted to establish the new settlement particularly near Janin, where Mufid Kan'an, a Druze from Yarka, was murdered last week while hunting.

The Druze approached the Moledet coordinator in the north, Uzi Bar, who directed them to Amana. According to the paper, Bar told them that Moledet would present them with support and advice upon the establishment of their settlement. The secretary of the local Druze councils, Salah Tarif, told the paper that this is a very disappointing move. "It is forbidden for us Druze to be extreme because this is not our way; the sect must act against radical elements within it," he said.

Immigration Figures for Jan Lowest in 2 Years

TA2901165392 Jerusalem MABAT in Hebrew
29 Jan 92

[Text] Only 6,500 immigrants will arrive this month in Israel; this is the lowest number of immigrants recorded in one month over the course of the past two years, and is even lower than the number of immigrants who arrived in Israel during the days of the Gulf war.

The rate of those applying to the Israeli consulate in Moscow to receive permission to immigrate amounts to only 150 people a day.

In a lecture before a conference for the Association of Soviet Immigrants, Uri Gordon, head of the Department of Immigration and Absorption in the Jewish Agency, said that the present deceleration in immigration will also continue in February.

Gordon noted that the crisis in employment and housing in Israel brought about the deceleration and low level in immigration, the likes of which have not been seen in two years. The news concerning negative repercussions regarding the difficulties of absorption coming from Israel to the republics deters many Jews from immigrating right now.

There is an acceleration in the private sector throughout the republics, and the creation of a new upper class which brought hopes of improvement and economic profit which is even contributing to some of the slowdown in immigration.

An increase in the immigration quota that was announced by western countries, and principally by the United States, is also a factor that prevents many Jews from immigrating to Israel.

Statistics on Arab Construction in Jerusalem

*TA2301173892 Tel Aviv HATZOFÉ in Hebrew
23 Jan 92 p 1*

[Excerpt] MK [member of Knesset] Yitzhaq Levi directed the attention of members of the Knesset to astonishing data on the matter of construction by Arabs within the jurisdiction of Jerusalem. According to Levi, thus far 1,500 homes in Jerusalem have been built illegally by Arabs from Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. These homes have been constructed without permits or supervision, basically with the help of family members, and in a hasty manner with the intention of creating facts in the field.

MK Levi complained that, despite the illegality of the construction, the municipality of Jerusalem has enabled the connection of the illegal buildings to the water network and that the Jerusalem Electric Corporation is connecting them to the national electric network. [passage omitted]

Tadiran Reports Profit, Recovery Accelerating

*TA0334384792 Tel Aviv INNOVATION in English
Jan 92 p 2*

[Text] The first three quarters of 1991 resulted in a net profit of \$23.6 million at Tadiran Ltd. This constitutes a major recovery: the very large company has been in the red for several years and lost more than \$46 million in January-September 1990 [as published].

An internationally acknowledged leader in the field of tactical military communications, Tadiran has also branched out into many related and not quite related fields. Over the years it developed very sophisticated telephone communication systems; one subsidiary is internationally known for its electronic intelligence and electronic warfare systems; another manufactured lithium and other high tech batteries; the group ran a printed circuit production and operates three computer software houses; and for many years it was a major factor on Israel's consumer appliance scene.

When the financial crisis struck, stringent remedial measures were adopted. Some subsidiaries and production lines not directly related to the firm's core business were sold off and others were closed down. That affected overall sales figures—\$534 million in the period under review, down almost one-tenth from a year earlier; however, the continuing operations expanded their sales by 5 percent.

The long term shift from defense to nondefense markets also is continuing. The former accounted for about 40 percent of all sales in January-September 1991, but management hopes to increase the civilian sector's share

to two-thirds of a growing total. To a significant extent, that is based on the application of military high tech to a variety of civilian applications.

Two other positive developments are indicative of Tadiran's basic strength: on the one hand, the company's annual sales now average \$104,000 per employee, compared with \$90,000 at the end of 1990; on the other hand, the backlog of firm orders on its books has reached a record total of \$700 million, reflecting the confidence and satisfaction of its major customers.

Profile of New Air Force Commander

*92AE0151D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 3 Jan 92 pp 8-9*

[Article by Ron Ben-Yishay and Ariella Ringel-Hoffman: "Long-Distance Flier"]

[Text] When Hertzl Budinger took off on his first long-range combat sortie at the beginning of the 6-Day war, most of the Egyptian Air Force had already been neutralized.

The remains of the Egyptian bomber fleet, a few dozens Tupolevs, were standing on a remote airfield in Upper Egypt. The Egyptians had moved them there in the assumption that they were thus taking them out of the range of the efficient action of the Israeli Air Force and keeping them in reserve for a counterattack.

The Air Force headquarters in Tel Aviv knew that if the Tupolevs took off, they could cause great trouble, and therefore it was decided to try to destroy them. The only aircraft capable of reaching Luxor with a reasonable bomb load, going into action, and returning was the old French Vautours. Budinger and his Vautours squadron comrades left on a sortie of hundreds of km fully aware of the fact that the fuel would barely suffice.

"There is a certain feeling you get when you cross the border for the first time and when what is under you is no longer our land," Budinger said about that maiden flight 16 years later in an interview for IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Radio. "The distance is great and it increases very fast, and all of a sudden you know that in fact you have in a way passed a point of no return. You are on your way to something that you do not yet know what it is. So much is unknown. Here, in one second, you will find out whether everything you have done until now was for nothing or was right. I always remember what I thought of being hit in such a remote area of Egypt, and the first thought that went through my head was it would take me about 40 years to walk home from here."

A few minutes later, Budinger's plane was hit. While he was bombing the Tupolevs on the tarmac, the fuel tanks on his Vautours were punctured by Egyptian anti-aircraft fire. Nevertheless, the dark, sparse pilot did not abandon his plane. He managed to glide to the Elat airfield, where he landed safely with tanks almost completely dry. A few

days later he took off on another successful long-range bombing mission over the H-3 airfield in Iraq.

In those sorties, Hertzl Budinger the fighter behaved the way he does now. A man of careful planning, patient execution, and stubborn dedication to his mission even if its completion requires a protracted, gray, and dispassionate effort.

The person who assigned young Budinger to the Vautours squadron 26 years ago knew what they were about. In those days no one yet talked of a "long-range strategic arm," but Budinger and his comrades laid the groundwork for it with those historic flights in the 6-Day war. The bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad and the attack on the PLO command in Tunisia some years later were the natural continuation.

Today, when Budinger is shouldering the burden of the Air Force command, one of his urgent missions will be to continue to develop the capability to operate deep in enemy territory. This time it is not a matter of one or two sorties by a small number of airplanes on a one-time mission, but of sustained and repeated action by many dozens of planes gathering information and attacking at a distance of hundreds and perhaps even thousands of km from their home bases in Israel.

The intelligence collected in the computers of AMAN [IDF Intelligence Branch] and the U.S. intelligence community points to the fact that if another war breaks out in the Middle East in the coming few years, it will not resemble anything in the past.

In contrast to the past, Israel's close-by and remote enemies will attempt to bring about its moral and military collapse in the opening stages. Syria, Iraq, and Jordan will be joined by remote Muslim countries like Iran, Libya, and even Algeria, which will try jointly to deal a strategic blow to its rear area.

They will dispatch long-range ballistic missiles with large, conventional and unconventional warheads and sophisticated warplanes capable of penetrating through air defense systems at a low altitude, in a bid to disrupt the mobilization of the reserve troops and to bring about a mass exodus of civilians from Israel's major population centers.

Western defense experts agree that if the Arab countries manage to carry out such a strategic coup, even if it is not 100 percent effective, they will succeed in forcing Israel into negotiations during which it will have to accept dictates harsher than it ever imagined in its worst nightmares.

The arm called upon to frustrate such a plan in the very first stages of the fighting is the Air Force. The force already has the capability to operate a combined system of passive-defense means while attacking missiles at their bases.

However, the picture emerging in the Middle East in the area of nuclear arms and missiles requires more than

what is now on hand. Just as it took the Egyptians and Iraqis by surprise in the 6-Day war.

Budinger waited more than four years for his appointment. In the meantime he finished with distinction an advanced course in administration at the Harvard University in the United States, won an undergraduate degree in business and economics from the Bar-Ilan University, competed against Ran Goren for the post of head of the Manpower Branch, lost and became deputy comptroller of the defense system, returned to compete for the command of the Air Force, and won.

When the decision was made in July 1991, the press wrote that patience paid. However, in the summer of 1987, when he ran against Avihu Bin-Nun and lost, Budinger needed much more than mere patience to believe that it was worth waiting for the next round.

Bin-Nun was then at the peak of his power and it was reasonable to assume that he would have a say in choosing a successor; equally reasonable was the assumption that Budinger would not be his recommendation. Budinger considered retiring and examined various job offers.

Rabin, who at the time served as defense minister, and David Ivri, his director general, thought differently. They asked him to remain in uniform; Budinger agreed, and in retrospect, he was right to do so, because in 1991, when the time came to choose a new commander for the Air Force, the Defense Ministry and IDF decision-makers had changed, and the situation was different.

Arens and Baraq looked for someone to ease the relations within the corps and with factors outside of it. Someone to do the job while keeping a low media profile. Budinger was almost a natural candidate.

It is said in the corps that Budinger's skills are in the areas in which Bin-Nun had his flaws. And the other way round. An examination of the list of Air Force commanders since its establishment shows that two succeeding commanders often were not cut from the same material, and each one of them gave the corps something different. After a stormy and impetuous commander, who imparted boldness and motivation to the corps by the sheer force of his personality, there almost always followed a quiet, thorough administrator who focused on consolidating the existing and absorbing the new elements. Weitzman followed Tolkowsky; Benny Peled came after Moti Hod; Avihu Bin-Nun after Lapidot, and so forth.

Budinger is not a member of any clique and never gathered a clique around him. His leadership is of the quiet kind and is based on professional ability and genuineness.

Budinger was born in Haifa in 1943. His father, a senior police officer who had immigrated from East Europe, and his mother, who was of Indian origin, raised three sons.

Budinger, a quiet, introspective child, grew up in Qiryat Motzqin. He went to the local Ahdut elementary school, and when his family moved to Tiberias in the wake of his father's new assignment, he stayed behind in Haifa with an uncle.

When his father was assigned overseas and his family went to join him, Budinger enrolled at the Military Academy affiliated to the Real High School. Generals Amnon Shahaq, Matan Vilna'i, Giora Rom, and Amram Mitzna were also students of the academy at the time, in lower grades.

At the Academy he was viewed as a good, but not prominent student. He was in the science track and liked mathematics and physics. He had above average physical skills and stamina, and distinguished himself with a sharp tongue and caricature drawings. Not all his classmates were delighted with the portraits he dedicated to them in the yearbook.

In 1961 he joined the army, where he volunteered for the flying school. In 1963 he earned his wings, first on the list of 40 graduates. Immediately following him on the list was General Ran Goren.

In 1982 Budinger was already a base commander. At the peak of the Lebanon war he was interviewed by Ya'aqov Agmon for IDF Radio. "Did you want to be a pilot while you were still playing with blocks?" he asked him. "Actually, yes," Budinger replied. "I was drawn a bit by books and movies, but especially by write-ups of the things the Air Force did in the Sinai Campaign in 1956."

Budinger said he started out in the Air GADNA [Youth Battalions] and that his decision was crystallized in high school. "Naturally, throughout I entertained certain dilemmas, whether to continue in this direction in view of the chances of success."

Agmon: "Were you afraid of not succeeding?"

Budinger: "Not really afraid. I am familiar with the percentage points and I know that they are low. But my love of the profession and curiosity were even stronger."

In 1964, when Budinger was already a Vautours pilot, his motivation and persistence were once again put to the test. During a live-fire target session, he came down low in order to ensure better hits. Splinters from the hit target flew into one of the engines and set it on fire. The second engine was faltering, too. He attempted an emergency landing at the Tel Nof airstrip.

"I simply knew I was going to be killed," he said later. "It is not that I did not care, but I decided that I was going to do the best I could not to get killed. I crossed over the threshold of fear and carried out only the necessary actions, which in the end is what saved me."

From a distance, one of the pilots said, it looked as if the whole affair was going to end in a crushed pilot and broken up airplane. It almost did end just like that. Budinger landed among the vine stocks in a vineyard

near Tel Nof and hurt his back. He was hospitalized. After recovering he spent a few months on the ground. But once the Vautours was repaired, it was Budinger who flew it on its first test flight. The customary "therapy" method in the corps.

By the end of the war of attrition and the Yom Kippur war he was already flying Mirages. His record in that war shows two downed MIG's. One day before the end of the fighting he replaced Avi Lanir, the commander of the Mirages squadron who was shot down by the Syrians, taken prisoner, and tortured, and who died in captivity.

Budinger's first staff job was in the Air Force Weapons Department. Benny Peled was the corps commander, and a long string of special developments were lying on various desks. The fruits of those developments were garnered by the corps almost 10 years later, when the pilots went out to destroy the Syrian antitank missile systems in Lebanon.

During that period, the Air Force absorbed and outfitted AF-15 and AF-16 airplanes; the department worked on the special specifications of their weapons systems. By the way, during the same period, the first specifications of the Arye were outlined, which later became the Lavi fighter plane.

Also during those years began the great contest between the Air Force, which wanted everything available on American shelves, and the Air Force Industry, which wanted to manufacture it and claimed that it could make whatever the Americans did not want to sell better and even cheaper.

Shim'on Peres was then defense minister, Al Shweimer headed the Air Force Industry, and Benny Peled, facing them on the other side of the table, had his work cut out for him. For the first time Budinger was exposed to the complex network of relationships between the army and the civil industries manufacturing equipment for them.

The experience he gathered during that period and later, when he was appointed to the professional advisory board of REFAEL [Weapons Development Authority] is one of the greatest assets that Budinger brings to the corps. The lessons of the Gulf War are nothing new to him.

Budinger was next entrusted with the command of the Flying Academy. He had a certain number of years of experience, a thorough familiarity with everything with wings at the time, a baby face, and natural charm. But above all, he had a desire to learn. He continued to learn even after becoming the commander of a large Air Force operations base.

Budinger was getting ready to go back to school. One Saturday he received a call from Asher Snir, then chief of the Air Force Staff, who invited him to his home. Snir, who at the time was already suffering with advanced cancer, told Budinger about his condition.

"He said he could not function anymore and that he was having strong bouts of pain," Budinger said in a talk with Nahman Shay. "At times he had to break off discussions. The next day he was going to tell the Air Force commander that he wanted to step down. He asked me to take over his job. It was a difficult request." Budinger agreed, gave up his studies, and became chief of staff of the Air Force.

A story circulates in the corps about a talented officer with a hot temper (his current rank is brigadier general), who used to make exaggerated use of the threat to hand in his key. The first time around Budinger explained his stand, the second he listened quietly, and the third he said it was all right as far as he was concerned, the lad was free to hand in his key. The lad did not, nor did he ever threaten again.

Budinger, it is said in the Air Force, may not flee from confrontation, but neither does the adrenalin race through his veins when there are conflicts. His friends say that in his quiet way, he can be stubborn about his position.

Hertzl Budinger is not the kind of person around whom legends are spun. No stories blossomed on command balconies about him, and flying cadets did not speak about him with awe. It took a while until they got to know him, said one subordinate who worked closely with him for several years. He followed the regular track, went from station to station, quietly, and was very loyal.

Within the Air Force he was not hand-picked, and reportedly, the first time that the race for the most senior post in the corps was mentioned was when he completed his tour as commander of the Flight Academy. That was the first time, said a very close friend of his, the issue played any role in his choices.

His access to the post of chief of staff earlier than scheduled brought him to the starting line four and a half years ago. In that round, Avihu Bin-Nun won and the Air Force thought the choice had been excellent.

In the present round was also Giora Rom, Ran Goren, and Eytan Ben-Eliahu.

The latter's chances were smaller from the start. The matter of the war of inheritance was thoroughly studied. A lot of dirty linen spilled out on the occasion.

Twice Budinger considered retiring. The first time after losing the race to Bin-Nun in 1987. The second time, when he competed with Ran Goren for the leadership of the Personnel Branch and lost to him. He told close friends he feared he was wasting his time.

He went off to pursue his studies and graduated with a considerable delay, when he was already a brigadier general and after 26 years in the army. During the same period he served as member of the board of advisers of REFAEL, a position that brought him into close contact with General (R) Moshe Gidron, comptroller of the defense system.

Gidron heard that Budinger was considering retiring. He thought that was a loss to the army and made sure he expressed his view in the hearing of the defense minister. We have to keep him in the service, he said. The minister—Yitzhaq Rabin at the time—and Chief of Staff Dan Shomron accepted the recommendation to appoint Budinger as Gidron's deputy. He was the deputy in charge of IDF affairs at the ministry (the comptroller also has a deputy in charge of the civil apparatus).

Budinger, who was taken by surprise by the offer, did not hasten to accept it. In the end, however, he decided to take the job.

Gidron said that Budinger had a splendid opportunity to know the IDF as it was at that time. It also gave him a good opportunity to become closely acquainted with the ministry leadership. It is said in the Air Force that that was also the very clear source of support for his appointment.

Hertzl Budinger—and this has been written more than once—was David Ivri's candidate. He was not the candidate who had Avihu Bin-Nun's support, and sources close to the chief-of-staff will testify that the latter authorized, rather than initiated the appointment.

In this connection let us also recall Budinger's stand on two of the most controversial developments of the air force industry—the defunct Lavi—whose death was not peaceful—and the Hetz [Arrow], whose future is still today very cloudy.

Budinger reportedly did not participate in the Air Force's struggle, led by Avihu Bin-Nun, against the Lavi. At the beginning he thought the Air Force could do with the U.S.-manufactured platforms. But that was before all those millions were sunk into the airplane. At the stage at which the talk was of winding up the project, he kept his counsel. He allowed himself an opinion only among friends.

What is happening with the Lavi, he said at the time, is like a boy who asks a girl out, they go to a movie, follow up with an elegant dinner, go home, take their clothes off, and do not go to bed.

He is allegedly supporting the Hetz project. At least as long as the development project is funded by the Americans and not out of the corps allocations.

It may be said that those facts played a considerable role in the decision on his appointment. The Air Force, however, tends to see more than a hint of slander in this conclusion. His honesty, they say, is not in doubt. Hertzl Budinger means exactly what he says. While Avihu Bin-Nun may have been too political, the corps hopes that Hertzl Budinger will not be too much the opposite.

The opinion in the corps is that Budinger will not lock horns with Ehud Baraq, as Avihu Bin-Nun did. He will achieve what is needed perhaps because he will not "threaten" Baraq.

"When all is said and done," said a senior Air Force officer, "each one of the candidates can be an excellent commander, but one of the advantages of rotation is that each commander brings to the fore his specific skills.

"Budinger will have a calming effect on the Air Force, which under Avihu was stirred up more than a little. Under him they will perhaps not play chess with a stop watch or train on eight forward speeds, but they will certainly get to where the corps should get."

[box on page 9]

In November 1986, two Air Force planes took off on a photo reconnaissance mission over the Golan Heights and Lebanon. Hertzl Budinger, at the time Air Force chief of staff, was the commanding officer in charge at the corps command position.

At that time the Syrians frequently sent up airplanes to intercept Israel's photo reconnaissance flights in the north. The intelligence estimate was that those were deliberate provocations designed to deter Israeli photo reconnaissance and keep us away from the vital Syrian military installations in the Golan Heights and Lebanon.

One of the assumptions was that at some point the Syrians may try to shoot down an Israeli photo reconnaissance plane. The matter was brought up in a discussion with Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, and in the end the Air Force was instructed to shoot down any Syrian planes that tried to hit the Israeli photo reconnaissance aircraft.

On the occasion of the photo reconnaissance sortie in question, too, it was feared that Syrian planes would attempt to attack ours. The dilemma he was facing was whether to call the reconnaissance planes back or whether to let them continue their mission and risk an involvement with the Syrians.

While the Syrian airplanes were swiftly closing in on the photo planes, Budinger had another consultation and came to the conclusion that the mission was to be brought to completion. He ordered the cover planes to approach the area. Minutes and seconds passed but, in contrast to previous experiences, the Syrian planes did not change direction and continued to approach. Budinger gave the order to shoot them down. The cover planes chased the Syrian planes and downed them over Syrian territory.

The political complications were unavoidable. Rabin formed an investigation commission which found that Budinger's decision had been correct in principle, although "There was room for greater deliberation on his part."

Budinger was cleared and Rabin gave him full support. Nevertheless, the "added sentence" in the conclusions of the commission clouded over a flawless career and served as a weapon in the hands of those who wanted to torpedo his appointment.

JORDAN

Libya Support Committee Ad Condemns U.S.

JN1601112192 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
16 Jan 92 p 24

["Political Statement" by the Central Popular Jordanian Committee in Support of the Libyan People, issued in Amman on 15 January—published as an advertisement in a box]

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful.

Key party, national, trade union, popular, and parliamentary figures, as they gather in the Amman of Arabism and Islam today to discuss a new link in the U.S. conspiracy against Arab and Islamic nations, would like to remind the masses of the whole Arab and Islamic nation that U.S. hostility toward this nation continues.

Today, this hostility returns in an uglier form. It returns in the fabrications and lies about sisterly Libya, and the determination to impose their will on our brother citizens there. There is no proof of the alleged accusation leveled against these brother citizens. The accusations, in the service of objectives that have become exposed to all, strike at another wing of Arabism and Islam, to destroy all utilities of the Arab economy wherever they may be.

The threats made against Libya come at a time when our masses in Iraq continue to suffer the effects of the aggression in the form of an economic, political, and military embargo. Therefore, O masses, your role in the confrontation is a historic one. This role was and will continue to be our hope for escalating this confrontation by economically boycotting the United States, and escalating the blessed intifadah, which is the spearhead of confronting the Zionist occupation. The presence of foreign forces in part of our Arab homeland constitutes a continuing threat to the entire Arab and Islamic nation. When the United States calls for international legitimacy, it is biased toward the Zionist occupation. Hence, it is dangerous for this nation to have the United States as an arbitrator in our fatal conflict with the Zionist occupation. This nation, through its characteristics and history which rejects hegemony and all forms of foreign domination, can rise anew to face this power that has become arrogance on earth. Let our masses unite and close ranks for the confrontation, face the aggression and resist any embargo imposed on any country in the Arab nation.

Ba'th Party Congress Election Results

JN1301091292 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 13 Jan 92
p 3

[Excerpts] Amman—The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Jordan concluded its general congress after electing a higher command for the party, and issued a final statement. [passage omitted]

The party's higher command, which was elected from 21 candidates, includes: pharmacist Taysir Salamah al-Himsi, secretary; Akram Salim al-Himsi, deputy secretary; lawyer Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Najdawi, the party's official and press spokesman; and pharmacist Khalid 'Arif, 'Abd-al-Majid al-Qarari'ah, Mansur Sulayman al-Jam'ani, Dr. Ahmad Irshayid al-'Abbadi, lawyer 'Umar Abu-al-Raghib, and Kamil Furayjat as members.

MAURITANIA

Increases for Economic, Social Programs Budgeted

92AF0272A Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French
31 Dec 91 p 2

[Text] According to RADIO MAURITANIE monitored in Dakar, Mauritania's council of ministers, meeting in a special session, adopted a general budget for fiscal year 1992 totalling 24,722,950,900 ouguiyas in revenues and expenditures and a separate consolidated investment budget of 17,395,000,000 ouguiyas.

In its broad outlines, the general budget, which is in keeping with the government's continuing policy of adjustment, reflects the special importance attached to the continuation of economic and social programs.

In social matters, the draft budget appropriates increased funding to the sectors of education and health which are termed "high priorities." The sectors will receive additional funds in order to achieve the school enrollment and basic health targets established by the government, it was stated. It also reflects the pay raises that are effective as of 1 January 1992 according to the terms of an agreement between labor and management.

With regard to political measures, the draft budget provides for the completion of the democratic process begun in 1986: It allows for new costs that will be incurred to ensure the proper functioning of constitutional institutions planned for 1992, it was announced.

In economic matters, investment expenditures are balanced among the various sectors and have been brought closer in line with the government's priorities, and offset items have been rationalized, it was reported. The budget continues to reflect a stabilization of budgetary expenditures in relation to gross domestic product (GDP) at the level of 19 percent. The corresponding figures will rise by 7.6 percent over fiscal year 1991, it was noted.

Spending for education and health will increase by 8.3 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively, it was reported. Total budgetary revenues will grow by 6 percent in relation to their 1991 level. In all, the 1992 budget will produce a surplus of 1.546 billion ouguiyas, the equivalent of 1.5 percent of GDP, which will provide for the repayment of Mauritania's debt not subject to rescheduling.

The broad outlines of the consolidated investment budget consist of a strict accounting of offset items and their reappropriation; the Mauritanian Government's concern for using its own resources to finance projects of great socio-economic impact; and an effort to achieve better programming of external financing, it was explained.

The consolidated investment budget for 1992 totals 17.395 billion ouguiyas. Of that amount, 34.9 percent is earmarked for rural development, 22 percent for industrial development, 18 percent for regional planning, 20.34 percent for human resources, and 4.6 percent for institutional development.

MOROCCO

Changes in Government-Opposition Relations Noted

92AF0306C Paris AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic
6 Jan 91 p 13

[Article by Benissa el Fasi: "Morocco: Change in Government-Opposition Relations"]

[Text] Rabat—The conclusion of the Moroccan parliament's fall session was tantamount to another occasion to underline the conflict between the opposition parties and the current Moroccan Government. This penultimate session of the parliamentary deputies' sixth term discussed the 1992 state budget law, which was opposed by five opposition parties, represented by either their parliamentary teams or by party representatives. A relative majority was able to pass the law despite the drawbacks for which it is faulted, even by some of the majority parties, who voted for the law in the general session after criticizing it in the specialized subcommittees and even in the lobbies.

It can be said that the opposition parties' language in the parliament was more sedate than ever before, especially since the opposition had tried to oust the government through the endeavor to withhold confidence from it, through subsequent [similar] attempts in the parliament, and through the press. The opposition found its legal support when King Hassan II said: "Why don't you oust the government any day you want, as long as the constitution supports you?" However, the new opposition tone indicates a turnabout in relations between the executive branch (the cabinet) and the opposition parties, which are still after Prime Minister Laraki's head, but in a less antagonistic manner.

When we look for the reason behind the calm between the two opposing sides, we find that it is rooted in the position that the Moroccan king has ceaselessly proclaimed and which he has recently reaffirmed, namely, to give the opposition an extended opportunity for the sake of true democracy. The monarch made his latest statements on this when he met with a parliamentary committee that had been assigned to investigate the

bloody incidents witnessed in a number of Moroccan cities last December. He also met with members of the Human Rights Council, who submitted a memorandum in this connection. King Hassan II stressed that the human rights issue in Morocco has been resolved after being discussed, interpreted, and debated at length. But he also noted social rights, i.e., the "right to a minimum economic standard and the minimum right to whatever can make the Moroccan a completely honorable and free citizen when he goes to cast his vote, because the voting card cannot fill an empty belly."

When speaking before two committees entrusted with defending human rights, the Moroccan monarch envisioned the future role of the Moroccan citizen in building a true democracy far from the administration's intervention, as the opposition says, and in establishing legislative and collective elections when the Western Sahara referendum is completed. The Moroccan monarch's address is understood to signify implicit criticism of the Moroccan administration and to be intended to alert it to the need to enter into a new phase when election time arrives. King Hassan II stressed that when the Moroccan citizen goes to the ballot box, he will not be carrying a card that will enable him to eat and drink, but a card that reaffirms his position in developing his country. This is the first time that King Hassan II has spoken critically of the administration, which has been criticized by the opposition parties and even by the ordinary citizen.

Opposition Parties Visit Tunisia, Libya

92AF0305A Rabat L'OPINION in French 26 Dec 91
pp 1, 3

[Unattributed article: "Concerning the Visit to Libya and Tunisia of the Joint Delegation of the Istiqlal Party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, and the Organization for Democratic and Popular Action: The Moroccan Sahara and the Building of the Arabic Maghreb at the Center of Discussions"]

[Text] On 17, 18, 19, and 20 December 1991, a delegation representing the Istiqlal Party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP], and the Organization for Democratic and Popular Action [OADP] visited Libya and Tunisia, at which time the representatives of the three parties presented to the General Congress of the Libyan People and the Tunisian political parties the note directed to the Maghreb's parties and organizations regarding the issue of the Sahara, this note focused on history and recent developments in our national cause as part of the building of the Arabic Maghreb.

In Tripoli the delegation was received by Commandant Major Abdesslam Jelloud, who was accompanied by Mr. Mahmoud Hamed Khafifi, the deputy secretary of the General Congress of the People, their meeting came after a preliminary meeting involving the latter together with the members of the general secretariat at the seat of the General Congress of the People.

At these two meetings the delegation expressed the solidarity of the three parties and that of the Moroccan people with the fraternal Libyan people in the face of the threats from the three Western countries with which it is confronted and stated that the Moroccan people, which supports the Libyan people, condemned and was opposed to any future act of aggression.

In Tunisia the joint delegation was received at the headquarters of the RCD (Constitutional Democratic Rally) by Mr. Chadli Naffati, the secretary general, to whom the group presented the note concerning the issue of the Sahara. A fraternal discussion took place on the subject of recent developments pertaining to this issue as well as on the subject of the means needed for the expansion of bilateral relations between the parties and between the two fraternal countries.

The joint delegation, accompanied by the ambassador of His Majesty the King to Tunis, was also received by Mr. Sadok Fayala, the State Secretary for Foreign Relations. The discussion focused on the issue of the Sahara and its repercussions on relations between African countries and on the means of solidifying these relations through a just settlement of our national cause.

While still in Tunisia, the joint delegation had a series of meetings with the heads and members of the executive committees of the Tunisian opposition parties. Involved were the Movement of Socialist Democrats, headed by Mr. Mohamed Mwaada; the Party for Popular Unity, headed by Mr. Belhaj Omar; the Tunisian Communist Party, headed by Mr. Mohamed Harmal; the Socialist Progressive Rally, represented by the adjunct secretary general, Mr. Rachid Khachana, acting in the absence of the secretary general, Mr. Najib Chabi; and the Democratic Unionist Union, headed by Mr. Abderrahman Tlili.

At these meetings the Moroccan delegation presented the note on the Sahara before studying issues of common concern on the national and regional level.

The work at these meetings, characterized by a spirit of responsibility, fraternity, and openness, resulted in the publication of a joint communique by the five Tunisian opposition parties and the three Moroccan opposition parties.

This communique stated the joint position of the three parties on the issue of the Sahara and the issue of democracy.

Similarly the communique emphasized the necessity of coordinating their actions on issues of common concern and referred to the building of the Arab Maghreb, current threats to Libya, and the embargo that has been imposed relating to Iraq's supply of basic materials.

The delegation, consisting of Mr. Abdelhak Tazi, a member of the executive committee of the Istiqlal Party; Mr. Abdelwahed Radi, a member of the policy committee of the USFP; and Mr. Hussein Kouar, a member

of the policy committee of the OADP, was accorded a warm welcome, in accordance with the traditions of the peoples of the Arab Maghreb.

Syria: Scientific, Educational Cooperation Strengthened

92AF0305B Casablanca LE MATIN DU SAHARA in French 31 Dec 91 p 6

[Unattributed article: "Morocco and Syria Strengthen Their Cooperation in the Area of Higher Education and Scientific Research"]

[Text] On Saturday the Minister of National Education, Mr. Taieb Chkili, returned to Morocco from Damascus, where he made an official visit at the invitation of the Syrian Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Mr. Kamal Sharaf.

Upon his arrival, Mr. Taieb Chkili stated that his conversations with the ministers and the rectors of the universities in Syria dealt with ways of strengthening cooperation between Morocco and Syria in the area of higher education and scientific research.

He added that he had reached an agreement on science between Morocco and Syria, and that two other cooperative agreements were signed between the Ahmed and Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah Universities and the University of Damascus and the Mohammed V University. Furthermore, a recommendation had been drafted pertaining to the exchange of students, professors, and researchers, the expansion of scientific research, and the participation of Moroccan and Syrian researchers in joint research projects of interest to the two countries.

The minister of national education added that he had contacts with Syrian officials on the subject of higher education and scientific research, and said further that the Moroccans and the Syrians expect that the agreements, which had been signed, will give new impetus to cooperation between Morocco and Syria in the area of higher education and scientific research.

Dependence on Oil Imports Reportedly Up in 1990

92AF0276B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 10 Jan 92 p 20

[Article by Mohamed Karim Labbene, consulting engineer]

[Text] Morocco continues to be highly dependent on outside energy sources. Casablanca has a particularly large appetite for energy: The industries of that region consume one-half of all fuels.

The ratio of energy self-sufficiency of a country or geographic region is a measure of its ability to meet its own energy needs.

It is a figure that indicates the portion of a country's domestic needs that is met by national production, taking its imports and exports into account.

By the same token, we can determine energy dependency, which is defined as the ratio of raw imports to primary consumption. A ratio in excess of 100 percent is indicative of re-exportation (such as refined products from imported oil) or storage of energy products. (See Table 1.)

Table 1. Dependency Ratios of Three Maghreb Countries (1987)

Country	Solid Mineral Fuels	Natural Gas	Oil
Morocco	58	—	106
Algeria	99	—	—
Tunisia	100	43	57

Source: United Nations; ENER DATA

In 1990, Morocco imported the equivalent of 9.7 billion dirhams in energy products, one-third more than in 1989. This sum represents nearly 28 percent of export revenues.

The demand for oil (5 million metric tons) accounted for more than three-fourths of total needs, and coal (1.8 million metric tons) accounted for 17 percent of all energy consumed. Remaining needs were met primarily by hydro-electric power (8 percent). (See Table 2.)

Table 2. Morocco's Changing Energy Balance (figures expressed in percentages)

Energy Source	1987	1990
Consumption		
Coal	19.3	18.4
Oil Products ¹	75.8	76.1
Natural Gas	1.0	0.7
Hydro-electricity	3.9	4.8

**Table 2. Morocco's Changing Energy Balance
(figures expressed in percentages) (Continued)**

Energy Source	1987	1990
Total	100.0	100.0
Domestically produced		
Anthracite	56.4	44.1
Oil and Gas	11	8.8
Hydro-electricity	32.6	47.1
Total	100.0	100.0
Energy Deficit (% of total consumption)	87.9	89.85

1. Excluding nonenergy products such as asphalt and lubricants.

Industry consumes 30.3 percent of this energy, and household consumption, which includes agriculture, accounts for 29.5 percent. Transportation alone accounts for 31.2 percent. It should be noted that Morocco's transportation sector currently relies almost exclusively on petroleum-based products.

The city that consumes the most energy in Morocco is Casablanca. Its industries use more than half of available

energy and its fleet of transportation vehicles is the largest in the country.

More than 52 percent of Morocco's industry and 38 percent of its transportation vehicles are concentrated in the Casablanca region, which represents 0.23 percent of Morocco's total land area and 12.6 percent of its total population. (Population density in Casablanca is 55 times the national figure.) (See Table 3). It should therefore come as no surprise that Casablanca is the largest consumer of energy. (See Table 4.)

Table 3. 1989 Profile of Casablanca

Measure	Casablanca	National Total	% of Total
Population (in thousands)	3,102	24,567	12.6
Area (sq. km.) ¹	1,615	710,850	0.23
Density (per sq. km.)	1,920.7	34.6	5,550

1. Data from MARA [Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform]

Source: Office of Statistics

Table 4. Energy Consumption in Casablanca

Energy Source	Casablanca	National Total	% of Total
Butane gas (tons)	193,944	542,921	35.7
High-grade gasoline (cubic meters)	131,868	399,777	33.0
Regular gasoline (cubic meters)	42,407	126,722	33.5
Gas Oil (cubic meters)	372,721	2,030,230	18.3
Fuel Oil No. 2 (tons)	871,158	1,950,720	44.6
Coal			51.0

USFP Deputies Comment on 1992 Budget

92AF0241A Casablanca AL-ITTIHAD AL-ASHTIRAKI
in Arabic 25, 26, 28 Dec 91

[Speech by Fathallah [Oulaalou] concerning the Prime Ministry's Budget: "Institution of the Prime Minister Doesn't Exist in Our Country"]

[25 Dec p 4]

[Text] On the occasion of the Prime Ministry's budget debate, and on behalf of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP] team, I will not discuss the prime minister or his actions, so much as the bases for the institution of the prime minister.

Traditions in democratic countries make it clear that the prime minister in those countries is always present, or

rather, is always a member of parliament. In our country, at least in this legislative body, experience shows that the prime minister is an absentee and has no connection with the Chamber of Deputies, neither in debate nor in responding to questions. We in the USFP ask whether we have the right to talk about all the ministers except for the prime minister? When can we talk about the prime minister? We have said that at least there will be an opportunity at the end of this legislative session, that is, during the debate over the Prime Ministry's budget, even though this budget is a modest one. This is natural. The prime minister, as I said, is an institution. I also said before that it is an absentee institution, and does not play the role entrusted to it by the constitution. Our prime minister never tries to develop this role. Consequently, he doesn't try to develop democracy in our country.

He is not only absent from the Chamber of Deputies, but also from all institutions: he is invisible to the press and journalists. He is absent from basic political concerns; absent from dealing with—at least in regard to public opinion—the issues of education, employment, investment, foreign relations, housing, culture, and so forth, while the prime minister in democratic countries pursues these portfolios, or rather, is the government's spokesman before public opinion regarding these matters. I shall try to explain the weakness of our prime minister as an institution through four points:

1. The absence of the entire government from the Chamber of Deputies, its efforts to marginalize the Chamber of Deputies, and through those efforts, to strike a blow at democracy.

In addition to the government's absence, as I mentioned, we note that ministers, in general, pay no attention to the Chamber of Deputies's work and are uninterested in it. This sometimes results in hindering the Chamber of Deputies's work and sometimes forces the government to change its position suddenly, because it was unaware of events in the Chamber of Deputies or its committees. Sometimes the government surprises the Chamber of Deputies with draft bills that have been kept pigeonholed (such as bills pertaining to engineers in this session). We note that it is as if the ministers forget their relationship with the Chamber of Deputies. As for oral questions [from the parliament], despite advance notifications, there is an insistence on ignoring these sessions or attending for the ministers to flee from heated debate on sensitive, timely issues, thus turning this debate into a technical discussion. We know that some ministers refuse to attend parliament for oral questioning sessions.

With regard to legislation, we can say that the government is responsible for the impoverishment of the legislative account in our country. If we exclude legislation of a financial nature (fiscal tax reform laws), we note an absence of legislation coming from the government in regard to reform in all sectors, whether economic, social, educational, or cultural.

At this point, we should note that the government's Secretariat General—which is connected with the government without undertaking its functions—and you ministers know that you complain to the deputies about the Secretariat General's inertia. This Secretariat General cannot work in an elementary and traditional way; we are near the end of the century. In any event, we consider this a basic hindrance because, if there is a technical hindrance, then the prime minister—at the bottom of it all—is responsible for it. We can understand the ministers' complaints about the secretary general's work (and this has been said even in committees), but it cannot be said to us that a law has been prepared, but the Secretariat General is sitting on it. We only recognize the prime minister, and the prime minister alone.

On the other hand, the government shares greatly in delaying and pigeonholing the motions of opposition deputies, and even those of the "majority." The USFP has made more than 25 proposals, and recently it was almost impossible for us to include two more proposals among them. This is unreasonable, intolerable, and unacceptable. Most of the time the reason for this is the government.

For 14 years, both in the previous parliament and this present one, the government was unwilling to study or to help the Chamber of Deputies to study these motions. The government strangles the parliamentary teams and strangles the opposition, limiting their initiatives, while employing every means to constrain and deceive, so as to stop—illegally—the opposition's positive initiatives. The government does not have the courage to explain the reasons for its rejection of opposition motions (such as in the field of general freedoms). If it did that, it would be useful, but this uncourageous freezing of initiatives can never be accepted.

Even with the "majority," the government doesn't coordinate its actions. I can say that I feel sorry for the majority. The government scorns the majority. This does not concern only the majority, but rather, it damages the Chamber of Deputies, since this situation creates embarrassment, disorder, and confusion in the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, when we talk about the "majority," we know that it has no quantitative nor qualitative influence within the government. This is a bad, undemocratic situation. Therefore, on many occasions, as occurred in recent weeks in the Finance Committee or in the "majority" press, we note increasing criticism.

When criticism increases from the opposition, it is natural, but when it comes from the majority, you ministers must have the courage to come here and ask for the Chamber of Deputies' [vote of] confidence. You have not asked for the Chamber of Deputies' confidence, as if you were answerable to the "majority," while the majority criticizes you. When you sense that all are against you, you must have the courage to ask for the parliament's vote of confidence. Just as we had the courage to present a request for oversight, you must have the courage to ask for parliament's confidence. With

regard to this fiscal law, you must ask for a vote of confidence from the Chamber of Deputies, so that you can feel assured and not just be ministers, but also officials who are to be trusted. In this way, you can advance democracy in our country. Just as the request for oversight shared in advancing democracy, we would like the government to have the courage to ask for a vote of confidence, so that you do not leave the "majority" to criticize you but then vote for you, because this is unreasonable.

2. The government lacks the qualifications that any government must have. Ministers, I will not hide from you. I say with all responsibility that many ministers who are unaffiliated with political parties, or even those with party affiliations, tell us in the committees that they will talk with us, but that they will not carry out any political action. These words are unacceptable and frivolous, because politics has an important concept of morality and because every choice is political. Governing is a choice, and the choice is political. When we alter a paragraph of the fiscal law, or when we change a tax rate, that is a political action. Therefore, this statement cannot be accepted.

Governmental practices, the government's relationship with the citizens, and the government's relationship as prime minister and ministers with the home front and abroad, prove that the government is not striving to carry out its responsibilities and missions. Here I turn to the prime minister—there is a kind of unbalance between the ministerial sectors. We know that within the ministerial sectors there are political, security, economic, social, training, educational, foreign affairs, preparatory, and technical sectors. Each sector has its own importance and dimension. It is assumed that there is a balance in the government's policy between these dimensions. It is assumed that the prime minister is charged with this balance. However, this is lacking in our country, and this hurts the country now and in its future.

Many of the ministries do not work, or do not work with any logic, which has made them absent. Naturally, there is a ministry that has become a supervisor inside the government for many tasks, but is impotent itself. Naturally, this is because it is unable to play the role of coordinator, starting from its dimension and logic. It has a specific dimension and a specific logic, but it cannot start from there to play the role of coordinator, assimilator, and unifier between the various dimensions. This damages even the progress of this ministry.

There are ministries whose tasks have been practically and legally reduced and, perhaps, have even lost the reason for their existence at times. There is a new ministry which, in recent months, has occupied an office building and still owns shares in state-subordinated companies. This cannot be accepted; it is outside the principle of a lawful state.

We have also observed that the government hides behind the establishment of advisory councils (such as the

Youth Council and the Human Rights Council, which has its advisory mission) in order to free itself from certain portfolios (the portfolios of employment, human rights...) which should be the government's tasks. Therefore, the prime minister is the one who must play the role of coordinator in this area, either internationally, or in education, or with regard to major problems such as unrest among the youth and the university, where it is as bad as it used to be. The prime minister must go before the public in order to play his role.

3. The government and the prime minister do not play a role in dialogue with the social activists. There is no doubt that we can clarify the meaning of this dialogue. The dialogue must not be just once a year or used for media consumption. Old pictures of the dialogue should not be broadcast when they have been rereleased several times even though they were outdated. The dialogue is a continual listening to demands. It is the constant search for solutions. It is the search for containing the problems before they grow larger. The dialogue is respect for unions on the level of daily practices. The dialogue cannot be the exception that only rules in periods of crises and difficulties, because at those times it loses its value.

Businessmen now wait for the fiscal law each year to learn what the government will be doing. Why doesn't the prime minister talk with businessmen throughout the year in order to learn—by virtue of the fact he must play the role of balancer—solutions to problems?

With regard to labor unions, why doesn't the government consider them in critical times? This only makes it difficult for the government to resolve problems.

4. The government turns its back on urban society. In today's world, urban society has become fundamental in all countries. It plays a basic role through its representatives, whether youth, women, or intellectuals. The country's credibility is in the drama of urban society.

Usually, this urban society is represented by associations that are basically independent of the government and political parties, because their concerns and interests are for issues that concern all of society in its daily life, or which society ponders with regard to its future.

One would presume that the government listens to urban society and to the associations that represent it, but this does not happen. There are associations that you help—note that we are for helping all associations—more than is necessary, especially since they do not, in fact, represent the problems of urban society, while there are marginal associations. I want to give three examples. In fact, I don't want to personalize things, but I must give at least three examples that have occurred in the past 15 days:

1. The Union of Moroccan Writers; We know it and are proud of it. We consider it the best cultural organization in Morocco. One can say that it is the most important cultural organization now in the Arab world. We know

its past and its present. We know the people who have led it: Dr. Hababi, Professor Ghellab, Professor [el Yabouri], Professor Berrada, and currently Professor [el Achari].

This association is well-known and respected in Morocco. In recent days, it wanted to organize a cultural forum (poetry and literature) in the city of Laayoune, to work basically toward using this front to defend our territorial unity and to mobilize all of us around that. The union contacted poets concerned with the issues of unity, and *al-Hasaniyah* poets who have the ability—from the cultural aspect—to praise this concept. The union contacted the government in order to ask for a little help in travel documents for some of the writers. The response was that the issue of the [Western] Sahara was an issue of sovereignty and that intellectuals do not understand it. They must stay clear of it, since the matter does not concern them. This response was a shock. Finally, the union contacted the municipality of Laayoune and arranged to hold the forum in Arabic and *al-Hasaniyah*. We believe that this hypocrisy is one of the most important of the hypocritical events that have affected the society of our brothers in the reclaimed areas, because calligraphy, poetry, literature, art, sports, and creative ability, Mr. Ministers, have a great capability to mobilize us for territorial unity. Political hypocrisy sometimes represents more than just political hypocrisy.

The Moroccan Writers' Union has, for 16 years, succeeded in closing the door to separatists within the context of writers unions, whether in Algiers, Damascus, Europe, Moscow, Latin America, or in the Afro-Asian world.

2. The second association is the Association of Moroccan Economists. This association's members include all university economists and anyone interested in the scientific study of economics, practical and academic. It includes members of all orientations. It boasts of its member ministers, or rather, among its founding members, who are often in the association's front office. They always help this association. At times, even the Writers' Union has received assistance from the government. All these associations don't need a great deal of assistance, because they don't have major expenses. They rely on donations. They ask for little, but in fact everyone—thankfully—helps them.

These days, as we know, the leadership of the Arab Maghreb Union [UMA] is his majesty the king. The Economists' Association contacted the government to ask to send a delegation to Libya, because a conference of Maghreb economists was to be held there. The answer was no. Despite that, the association went to Libya on its own resources and defended the [Western] Saharan issue. We said to the Libyans, and we repeat it now, that we are with them for better or for worse, and we respect the concept of Morocco in the Arab Maghreb, just as it has always been honored.

3. The Moroccan Human Rights Organization: This is an organization that we are proud of. When foreigners come to our country, like those who came last week, they visit the government, the Chamber of Deputies, and this organization. This is something that all Moroccans should be proud of, government and people.

Last week, the meeting of its branch in Casablanca was forbidden. Later, it wanted to organize a Moroccan training forum for human rights in Rabat. At first, it was told that it could use the mining school, but then was informed that that was not permissible. Later, the organization arranged the forum within its own resources.

These are the problems that I want to raise today, and which should be raised regarding the institution of the prime minister, through the fourth point I mentioned earlier. We tried to raise these problems when the request for oversight was submitted. We are not defending these associations, because they belong to everyone. Rather, we are basically defending our country. In fact, when we think about it, we discover that the solution is not in criticizing the prime minister, whom we respect, just as we respect the other ministers personally, but rather, the task is to reform the constitution in our country.

[25 Dec p 4]

[Speech by Abdelouahed Arrdi on National Defense Budget]

[Text] For 14 years, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP] has always voted for the national defense budget. This vote is within the context of the national consensus for our sacred causes, especially our territorial unity.

When we voted in favor, we knew and understood what we were doing. We were aware that the Royal Armed Forces [FAR] are the backbone, that they are the real means to enable us to stand up to our enemies and adversaries, and to complete our territorial unity.

The days and years have shown that this trust was appropriate because, for 15 years, the FAR, through their bravery, sacrifices, and resistance to our enemies, enabled the other government and popular institutions to carry on their work and their roles in the political field, in the economic field, and in the diplomatic field. This distribution and coordination of activities was overseen by his majesty, King Hassan II, as supreme commander and chief of general staff for these forces. Events have proved that the Moroccan people's sacrifices with regard to the FAR were justified. This policy succeeded for several reasons. The first reason is that a military strategy was drawn up, which can be summarized as building the security scenario. This strategy, which was devised and applied under his majesty's guidance, was an important factor in the success of our plan. The second reason—and the second in importance—is the skill and self-sacrifice of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and troops of the FAR in

defending our territorial unity. The third reason is the sacrifices of the Moroccan people for 16 years, and the people's contribution to the financing of the war effort. The fourth reason for this success is national unity, which is solidly behind his majesty the king, which also explains the success that our country has achieved.

We achieved these four goals thanks to the FAR.

Today, the FAR still has its daily duties in these circumstances. The FAR must continue to ensure the gains in our territorial unity, most especially in these critical times; diplomatically; politically; and militarily. The FAR must continue to maintain the citizen's tranquillity and property in order to prove and make clear, to foe and to friend alike, that Morocco is in control in all parts of the country and on all its territory.

The FAR today must also resist all attempts at infiltration by separatists. This resistance has a special importance, since it will show domestic and foreign public opinion that the dreams and claims of the separatists pertaining to the liberated territories are only illusions and have no basis in fact.

At the present time, we also note that enemies and adversaries are disturbed for one reason, which is that Morocco has achieved victories. We must all, and most especially the FAR, be vigilant and cautious.

As to the future, we believe that the FAR must guard the gains, and be prepared for the coming battle to complete our territorial unity. We want to complete our territorial unity by reclaiming Ceuta and Melilla by peaceful means, by dialogue with a friendly country, and with neighbors with whom we are bound by hundreds of years of dealing. However, that country should recognize that Morocco has the right to reclaim these two cities, because the age of colonialism is through.

Therefore, we can only achieve this goal by vigilance and, at the same time, by having credible forces with which to strike at our enemies. This is also a particularly critical stage for the entire world, most especially in our region, the area of the Arab Maghreb. In our Arab world, all Arab nations, most particularly our country, must have forces equal to events. Be that as it may, during the battle of unity and later, Morocco must have armed forces of the highest caliber. These efforts being made by the Moroccan people must be continued in order to make our armed forces of the future forces that have modern means, techniques, and technology, because this is a basic factor that must be added to courage, gallantry, and other capabilities. Technology and equipment are basic, and Morocco—after the battle of unity—must continue in this effort.

For all these reasons, we will again vote for this budget. Before concluding, I want to ask for God's mercy on behalf of my team, all the USFP warriors, and all Moroccans, for all the souls of our martyrs. We honor and reverse all those who fell on the field of the east, and all those who are now on the front lines defending our

rights. Most especially, we bow in respect and esteem to our FAR, the gendarmerie, the auxiliary forces and all national security personnel, because all Moroccans, with all their resources and means, participated in this victory. If we continue in this unity, we shall triumph over all problems and difficulties.

[26 Dec p 7]

[Report of speech by Mohamed [Harika] concerning the Ministry of Health's budget: "Absence of Governmental Policy in the Health Sector"]

[Text] In his discussion of the Ministry of Health's 1992 general budget, Mohammad el [Harika], member of the USFP's parliamentary team, emphasized at the outset that the government is destroying the social sectors and is attempting to cover its social shortfalls with dogmatic speeches aimed at downplaying the demands and leaping over the bitter truth.

He referred to the increase in the ministry's budget for 1992, which is an attempt to correct the serious weakness that has been building up for years, and which is aimed at enabling the ministry to achieve comparable percentages of accomplishments close to percentages achieved by other sectors. Consequently, this increase is a last-minute increase.

el Harika touched on clear examples of this failure, both in progress and equipment.

In the area of progress he noted that "we wanted health sector personnel to go on strike as a warning to the government that improvement and development of the sector cannot be done without attention to the workers. However, the 1992 budget gives no resources for that."

Later, el Harika touched on the deterioration of the health sector in our country through concentrating the most important equipment and specialized personnel in just two cities; the pressure that has been generated through the absence of health coverage; and the marginalization of the desert areas.

With regard to the first point, he emphasized that the most important equipment and specialties are located in Rabat and Casablanca, and that this produces serious pressure on the university hospitals there. However, the ministry is not thinking about establishing university hospitals in other cities.

el Harika stated that health coverage clearly is non-existent. He pointed out that the health sector will continue to exclude the poor from its consideration through demanding material compensation for treatment and through public hospitals' transferring patients to the private sector to conduct tests, due to a shortage of medicine and equipment.

With regard to the desert area, el Harika noted with disgust and disapproval the extent of the government's

marginalization and, within that, the Ministry of Health's marginalization of the rural village areas.

El Harika then turned to a discussion of the absence of any will or policy for progress in this sector, which is evident both in the legislative field and in the ministry's lack of coordination among the various components of the health sector (public sector, private sector, paramedical sector, and the cooperative sector) and the imposition of controls over these components. He pointed out that absence of a will and a policy for progress in the sector is also evident in the lack of effort for school immunization, immunization against diseases, and the prevention of job accidents. He called for the intensive use of the media for the purpose of health awareness.

In this context, he also made clear the government's lack of encouragement of scientific research in the medical field, research required for the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of National Education.

The absence of a will and policy for progress in the sector is also evident through the peculiar nature of the government's dealings with local groups, since no bilateral program has been developed nor any continuing and democratic dialogue opened with them. The government has been content to place additional health burdens upon them, even though the groups do not have sufficient permanent financial resources.

[28 Dec p 7]

[Speech by Mustapha Kerchaoui concerning the Ministry of Information's budget: "All Political, Social, Media Developments Necessitate Supreme Media Council"]

[Text] My team honored me when they delegated me once again to speak on their behalf regarding the government's media policy, on the occasion of the review and debate over the Ministry of Information's budget.

There are two ways to express views concerning the current media policy. There is the methodology that starts where the Moroccan media was five or six years ago, and compares that with the media's present status. This is a methodology that is not unuseful but, in my opinion, it is limited, circumstantial, and not conducive to increased progress and development.

There is a second methodology, which is to take into consideration what has or has not been achieved, looking to history and gazing into the future, placing the media within its age of development and connecting it with the technological, political, and economic ramifications that accompanied it. This method would look at the media as an industry; as a culture; as an instigator of political change, democratic modernization, domestic communication, dialogue, and an opening up to the outside world.

In the present circumstances, the methodology has imposed itself on us, both deputies and government. This helps us take a comprehensive, futuristic look at the

media, ascending through it to a level that understands the new questions that the media revolution is posing, in order to overcome problems and difficulties that the media puts on us and on others.

In order for me to present this as clearly as possible, I will begin by saying that the various positive steps taken by the media in our country during the past five years should not cause us to ignore the aspects of failure that could have been corrected, the negative aspects which should have been avoided, and the importance of the distance still to go before we enter the contemporary media circle.

Without raising issues that concern the media's future, one can limit oneself to documenting the abolishment of prior censorship over the non-governmental press, to the direct or indirect assistance received by the press, to the limited assistance received by journalists for transportation and housing, and to a number of publications that are published or come from abroad.

One can say that the abolishment of prior censorship does not mean the abolishment of all censorship, i.e., subsequent censorship, and censorship through control of the news agencies and through preventing easy and organized access to the news. One can also say that the last five years were marked by the dismissal of three journalists from their jobs, the suspension of three newspapers, the forcing of two magazines to cease publication, and the trial of three daily newspaper editors. If we continue in this same vein, we can say that the financial cover allotted to subsidize the press only amounts to 10 centimes [one-hundredth of a dirham] of assistance per newspaper copy sold, in addition to the distribution of grants that are not based on any particular standards or publicity.

We should note that the media has not known any legal reform throughout this period, either in the profession of the press, radio, or television, despite the existence of a proposed law that we have submitted and which has been pigeonholed for 14 years. We should also note that, unless we discuss the country's vital issues, they are never aired on radio or television. Moreover, we must also point out that journalists have to seek out the government's viewpoint regarding fundamental national and regional issues; otherwise, they would not discover it. It is as if it is the only government in the world that has no views on current events. Moreover, unless we talk about the lack of a government media policy vis-a-vis the Arab Maghreb and vis-a-vis the Arab world, and the lack of well-known government plans within regional and international organizations concerned with media affairs, this also will not be discussed.

However, despite the importance of the positive aspects noted, and the rejected negatives, the economy dictates that discussion be confined to the debate between the government and the opposition to show the clash of viewpoints, as if it were a temporary political conflict, while the media should be raising fundamental issues

concerning democracy, sovereignty, cultural independence, and bilateral and international cooperation based on equality and equal opportunity, just as it should be raising the role that it could play in the field of scientific research, stimulating national industry, and stimulating artistic and cultural creativity.

The leap forward made by technology and the media today resembles historical events such as the invention of the alphabet in ancient times, or the invention of the printing press in the Renaissance Age, but that does not allow us to give short shrift to media problems within the context of a narrow geographical, political, and intellectual look. On the contrary, this is a national, political, and economic challenge that we will not allow to be shielded behind ready-made answers from any quarter whatsoever, nor with prepared ideas that express themselves either in grumbling or superficial criticism. Three factors increase the seriousness of this challenge:

1. The media industry and its distribution have become the fulcrum of the interweaving of powerful capital, advanced industry, and advanced scientific research for the purpose of dominating the world market, which even transcends borders and towers over nations. In the face of the media's technological revolution, a country's national borders have disappeared or are near extinction.

2. The widening gap between the countries of the South and North will increase because of the northern countries' ownership of institutions concerned with distributing media pictures. This will cause the South's subservience to the North as concerns media, which is more dangerous than direct colonialism, and will cause the South's independence in political decision-making to be nonexistent or very limited, and continually threatened.

3. After the collapse of the Communist camp and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, talk began about the so-called new world order. This order will not only be political or economic, but also media. From now on, it is clear that this order, which is based on an idea that the political world is one, the cultural world is one, and the media world is one, will impose its media oneness on the world, especially the Third World. However, it is the American media industry in particular, and Western media in general.

Signs of this media hegemony have become clear today. The four major news agencies, which are American, English, and French, distribute 80 percent of the daily news, as opposed to 20 percent for Third World countries, which have 70 percent of the general population. American-supplied films range between 50 and 90 percent of the total. In the last two years, CNN has been the primary news source throughout the world, through which all heads of state, governments, and embassies follow world events, and through which both Bush and Saddam simultaneously followed the course of the Gulf war.

In light of a challenge of this magnitude, the national media no longer concerns just the Ministry of Information alone, not just the government alone, but it attracts the attention of the entire Islamic world [ummah] and all its forces, from several points of departure, the most important being:

1. We have not only an unbalanced and unequal deluge of news from the strong side to the weak side—which is the issue that caused a heated debate in UNESCO in the 1980s, and which was raised by the so-called new media order—but also this issue has become a threat to the sovereignty of nations and people, because of the control by a single media system. Very soon, it will be impossible to stop it or prevent its penetration of space and its entry into our homes, because space is filled with satellites, and receivers reach into the countryside as well as the cities.

2. The direction of the American administration, in the context of defending its custom-made principle, the principle of free exchange, is toward dealing with the media as it deals with other products and services, i.e., to refuse to put a protective measure around media production, even on the basis of exception, as agreed to when the basic element of national identity is dangerously threatened, as Europe knows.

3. The tendency of the Third World consumer is toward foreign media material, especially television. He has a taste for the foreign product, not only because the national product is poor and insignificant, but because the foreign product transports him from place to place, and gives him an opportunity to dream and escape from the deprivation and harshness that his life demands. That is one of the reasons for the outstanding success of American serials, such as "Dallas," "Dynasty," "Top Model," and "Santa Barbara."

In the face of the perils that threaten national sovereignty because of the media technological revolution's one dimension, and in the face of the possibility of exposing the personality, conscience, and the national culture to extinction, number of voices have raised warnings in UNESCO, in Europe by governments and intellectuals, and especially from Canada, which is America's neighbor and close partner. Canadians ask: How can Canada last if its dreams and legends and heroes are American? How can you maintain your country's sovereignty if your news about world affairs comes from America?

One can only point out three reactions to this concept. The first is easy, and can be summarized by those officials who say that this is exaggerated. The second believes that control over this development is possible, either by withdrawing into oneself or by protective measures. However, are these two choices the only possible ones, or is there another choice? Possibly this would involve creating a new media policy, which would

define its content, its mechanisms, and means of financial and human implementation through collective dialogue. In the USFP, we believe that a modern media policy should be collective and democratic. That would allow our country to avoid falling either into indifference or into self-incomprehensiveness and to prepare it to interact with the times without forsaking sovereignty or fearing for the components of national identity and personality.

The Moroccan citizen is a media person by instinct. If the Egyptian asks his Egyptian brother when they meet, *Izzayak?*, and the Syrian asks a Syrian *Ash lunik*, the Moroccan's question for another Moroccan is, *Ash akh-barak?* ["What's your news?"] In view of the importance of the news in Moroccan life, our society is a communicating community. We Moroccans lived with a form of communications before this form became the modern theory of some societies. However, the communications with which we lived were made by the citizen himself, through markets, festivals, mosques, public baths, and the city's radio. This is one of Moroccan society's special qualities in terms of the media. The second quality in this same field is that contemporary media, since its appearance in Morocco in the latter part of the century at the behest of [word illegible] initiative, which tied news to reform, confirms that the first draft constitution was sought by some enlightened men for our continually-threatened Morocco. This was seen in the newspaper LISAN AL-MAGHREB [Mouthpiece of Morocco] in 1908. The third special quality is that the Moroccan citizen is earnest, serious, and has vision. Therefore, he is able to distinguish between the media and deception, news and propaganda, the true report and the one with a ulterior motive, the trivial and the serious. The fourth special quality is that the Moroccan citizen is realistic, calm, and self-possessed. Accordingly, he wants to know the real truth. He rejects being given a false picture of the situation. Searching for media truth, the Moroccan citizen goes to the sources of foreign information, written, audio, or visual, whenever possible, expressing his search for the truth, which he looks for in the local media.

We believe that one cannot draw up the essential elements of a new media policy without considering these four special qualities, starting from them and defining their roles, so that the group of principles required may be crystallized. They would be headed by the following:

- embody the media's importance in strengthening communications, both among components of the community, and between the community and the state;
- constantly develop the media as a tool for dialogue, an engine for democracy, and a stimulant for multi-party politics and cultural diversity;
- insure media independence and its neutrality as spokesman for the nation's highest interests, maintain freedom and integrity of journalists, and provide them with decent living conditions and every means to perform their jobs without pressure or force;

- surround the media with legislation that embodies its significant status, and ensure ways for it to perform its role so as to attract the citizen to it and share in forming an aware, responsible public opinion; and,
- establish a kind of transparency in the media, to enable it to illuminate the country's various affairs.

In fact, these are only general guidelines directed toward the need to review the activity of the various official media elements so that they may enjoy credibility, effectiveness, and the minimum need for independence. If these characteristics are required for all media, then there is a special characteristic needed for news agencies, radio, and television. News agencies as a primary news source cannot be effective and credible unless they pursue their work with objectivity and neutrality, more than being concerned for follow-up, initiative, and priority. The BBC is the world's best example of serious purpose, objectivity, and independence, strictly obligated to the conditions of contemporary media, guaranteeing credibility and influence for any media element that pursues its work in this spirit. British radio and television are protected by the British Parliament, with guaranteed private revenue contributed directly by the citizens, so that British radio and television can be independent, whether vis-a-vis the government or private capital. They do not fall under the latter category, as does the press, which has its independence based on its role as the fourth estate.

By nature, media independence, especially in developing nations, is still the object of debate stemming from historic and political circumstances, part of which is related to the stage of gaining independence, with the media's responsibility to defend and maintain that independence; and another part related to the ideological struggle that used to divide the world. It sheds light on the media's role in reflecting plurality, enriching dialogue, and contributing to the development of democracy. In light of this new thesis, the media's lack of independence and objectivity impedes the development of democracy, destroys plurality, and makes society appear to be living in a crisis of intellectual recession.

In light of certain issues in the media today, we are evaluating media policy and practice in Morocco. Starting from this evaluation, we believe that writing a new media policy has become an urgent necessity; a policy in which the working person is given preeminence; along with advanced technique, reform, reasonable guidance, and scientific, industrial, and artistic mobilization under the auspices of freedom, independence, and objectivity.

The need to write a new media policy requires reorganization. Just as the political leap forward in the world required new organizations to deal with it, and just as the economic leap forward worldwide required reorganization, so then it is natural for the modern media leap forward to require reorganization, which could form a framework for balance between the options, methods, and organizational models.

Does any television suit Morocco: public or private, commercial or locally-produced? Would any radio be suitable for the country: popular or obscure, educational or recreational? Would any news agency contribute to the development of information, free or censored? Would any journalist give the country new information, independent and free, to organize itself socially and union-wise, free of the official who has no initiative and makes no effort? Is there any viewpoint on professional differences in the government office or journalists' union? Who decides to suspend a newspaper: the judge or the executive authority? Who determines television and radio's programming: the legislative authority or the executive? Is there an open, legal press subsidy, or is it done without any clear standards? Is the support to the press done only to keep it going, or is it also for exploitation? Are there months when it is allowed and months when it is disallowed? Who takes the initiative in proposing laws and organizational measures, or thinks about revenue and types of training?

This is a lot of questions, as you can see. Certainly, appropriate answers for them will require serious, collective discussion, since decisions cannot be on an individual basis in the same old framework, or by old methods that continue in the direction that the media has rejected. We are on the verge of the 21st century, which will be fundamentally different from this one. On the other hand, the Moroccan citizen has become aware that there are those in the media who think they are good for Morocco, but who are primarily a concentration of political and economic power. However, all indicators prove that the media must be based on democracy and participation. If the government truly believes in liberalism, then the truest area for conscious and enlightened liberalism is the media. Therefore, we have called for and are demanding the establishment of a supreme media council, which would be a framework for dialogue and comparison between the options that the media's technological leap forward has raised. It could consider the country's need for effective media that reflects the life of the Arab *ummah* and stimulates democracy.

On behalf of a democratic media that supports freedom and human rights, we call for a representative media council to supervise the media and originate the new media policy that our country needs. This was our public request yesterday, and we confirm it today.

[28 Dec p 7]

[Speech by Fathallah [Oulaalou] in Parliament's final session]

[Text] Mr. Speaker, fellow ministers, my fellow deputies: During our debate over the 1992 budget, we highlighted the fact that the budget was inadequate for the country's current economic and social problems and, more than that, this budget is inadequate for the level of crucial pledges and entitlements that await us.

In fact, the 1992 budget, like its predecessor, confirms the 10 years of hesitancy and stagnation in the field of investments, growth, and employment. That is to say, the 1992 budget itself disregards what the people expect from any budget and from any government. We are seeing here the fiscal creations that the government devised to form a source of confusion and disorder that we do not need now, since both emanate from purely financial concerns. This is evidence of the government's poor political sensitivity.

The policy followed since 1983 (what you would call the structural formation policy) was gradually applied with a [poor] attitude that a balanced and closer look would have overcome. It ignored the social directions and democratic dimension, as well as the need to pursue reforms on a level that would move the country forward and reorganize society. It is a policy aimed only at bearing down heavily on investments and fixing expenditures, i.e., whatever increases the burden on the masses in the village and in the city, as well as on the vital social sectors. This has led to a widening of disparities in the distribution of wealth and income. Consequently, the result has been increasing unemployment, poverty, and spreading the spirit of frustration and hopelessness among the citizens, especially the youth.

This policy has led to marginalizing the Moroccan economy and the impoverished groups, and to making the middle classes poorer. This is reflected by the delay in the building of democracy. Therefore, we shall vote against this budget.

However, we shall not stop at this, because there is a fundamental and sacred cause that brings together all Moroccans, as it has brought them together throughout the history of this nation. This is the issue of national territorial unity.

Not long ago, we faced a separatist plot aimed at dividing the nation. The scheme was colonialist. Today, we face with the same force and determination another colonialist scheme. Those who plot against our national territorial unity continue to work to internationalize this matter artificially.

In light of the changes that today's world is seeing, we are increasingly convinced that defending territorial unity does not only start from invariables, principles, and history, but also, its purpose is to defend the country's future, the fate of the Arab Maghreb, and the establishment of this important regional group's position in the Arab strategy to confront various challenges.

In the Moroccan people's unified position, we note the historic role that the resisters and the army of liberation, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces, have played and are playing today, protecting our territorial unity and inviolability. We emphasize our pride in the success of the defense strategy drawn up and followed by the armed forces for the past 16 years under the direction and direct guidance of its supreme commander, King Hassan II, with the constant support of the Moroccan people. It is a

strategy that has made our country today capable of resisting any plot that threatens our nation.

Three Challenges To Face Future

Therefore, it is of considerable importance that we now think about the future, so that we can prepare to study the latest budget in light of the current legislative session. We should think about the future and call for the doors of hope to be opened.

Thinking about the future is thinking about three interlocking challenges. They are challenges which include basic issues that we must deal with during the coming year, the year of this budget, and they are firmly connected with the problems of national territorial unity.

First Challenge Is Growth

1992 is the last year in the series of foreign debt reschedulings, a practice that this country has done repeatedly over the past 10 years. This necessarily means that debt-restructuring costs will rise again. Additional obligations might occur that again will not allow us to use our financial resources and whatever wealth we have for development and for an attempt to get out of the cycle of poverty and backwardness. Therefore, we emphasize that officials must strive to find a suitable solution to the debt problem, so that it does not continue to be a heavy burden on our shoulders and on future generations. The solution requires abolishing a large part of the debt—the Arab part. In this regard, our diplomatic and political measures must move forward, relying on the spirit of Arab solidarity as an effective weapon to end the horror of indebtedness and its danger to us.

Development Is Reform of Instruments of Progress

It is not reasonable for investments to remain stagnant, because we are in dire need of an investment rebound in order to stop the cycle of decline that has lasted for 15 years. The time has come for an economic take-off, which is a process that the public sector must drive, since the state has the necessary locomotive power for economic growth, as a prior condition for the national and international private sectors to join in the investment movement.

We cannot be satisfied with just the quantitative side of the growth process. Growth means reforming the instruments of progress. Consequently, the thesis is to combat waste, resist corruption, have concern for guiding the use of resources, and to make the use of pressure credible and serious. This will require officials to open up social dialogue and be committed to the results of that dialogue, along with constant monitoring of what the civilian community proposes.

Second Challenge

Our country must be prepared to face the major changes that the world is experiencing. These are events that we

are witnessing with our own eyes, seeing their rapidity and violence. It is unreasonable for us to remain spectator with our arms folded.

In the Asian world there is an economic leader that is consolidating its position and extending its influence to all corners of the world.

North America is trying to stop that economic monopoly and overcome its crises in order to keep that region on its strategic and diplomatic level.

Closer to us, Europe recently took a decisive step toward unity, so as to become the premier economic power and make Western Europe a unified political entity.

The new group from Eastern Europe has started to rely on its vast resources, attempting to attract revenues available from the West, so as to use them at the expense of Mediterranean and Third World countries.

To Improve Our Negotiating Strength

In the face of all these changes, we must take into account the eagerness of the Arab Maghreb region to join the race with our neighbors in order to obtain more democratic gains and more economic and social growth.

This is the world being born around us, a world in which all can compete to stake out forward positions in democratic, scientific, and economic development.

Third Challenge

1992 must be the year of democratic security. Democracy, as a system for society, is the only road to development. We therefore demand a democratic leap forward to allow Morocco to enter a new stage, which will reflect social and intellectual plurality. All parties must be independent of the administrative organization, which, in turn, must be neutral and outside political disputes. Democracy should be an instrument to guarantee economic and social growth for the country.

National Territorial Unity and Democracy!

Accordingly, it should be clear to everyone that we must link defense of our territorial unity with the struggle to correct the democratic course and establish a solid foundation upon which to base the trade-union institutions. Linkage was not born today, but all major historic achievements with whom Morocco has dealt throughout the century have recognized it, especially since the end of World War II. However, the special qualities of the end of this century are, more than any other time, imposing and consolidating the linkage between the national issue and the issue of building democracy.

Since 11 January 1944, the national movement, in coordination with the late Mohammed V, submitted demands for independence and democracy at the end of the war. The development of a nationalist awareness widened the national movement and established its principles in Moroccan society. It led the struggle for

independence, with the king's exile; moved the armed resistance movement into a position as the decisive element in restoring legitimacy to the nation and as a stage to announce independence and begin eliminating the colonial legacy.

However, 20 years later, Moroccans sense a disparity between political liberation and what should have been achieved in the area of building democracy. It is for historians to explain the reasons for this disparity that has led, in our opinion, to derailing the cycle of unifying the country. However, this disparity has not helped us to regulate economic and social policy.

In 1975, we were faced with a new challenge when we determined that Spanish colonialism was determined to enter into a plot to separate al-Saqiyah al-Hamra and Ouadi al-Dahab. A popular organization comprising all corners of the nation was mobilized. The International Court of Justice rendered its decision, and the Treaty of Madrid followed. Our southern regions were reclaimed. At that time, we again linked the liberation of national territory and unity with building democracy and firmly anchoring its traditions to govern a sound relationship between rulers and citizens.

However, no sooner had we entered the election cycles than the clear disparity became evident between the comprehensive national mobilization on behalf of unity, which is a constant, and the activities which forming union organizations and elected institutions entailed.

Therefore, the democratic experience in Morocco today has reached its limits. The weakness of this experiment is clear to all. It has curtailed itself and is incapable of continuing, in view of the major changes that Morocco is witnessing.

We find ourselves facing new demands, since 1992 must be a year to strengthen national mobilization to resist UN intervention in our domestic affairs. Popular, national mobilization must impose on the international level a recognition of the reclaiming of our Western Sahara until all brothers, friends, and foes recognize that Morocco is in its Sahara and will not leave it. At the same time, we must push democracy forward in order to strengthen our country and defend our future.

This Is Essence of Our Message

All this is happening, and the world is going through severe labor pains because of a new international situation in which only strong entities are respected, democratic entities.

This means that it is not in the country's interests to create any disparity between liberation and unity, and democracy. The world today is based on fighting with democratic weapons, as the best support for defense of national unity. The Moroccan has become mature and aware.

This explains the major political initiatives that the national, democratic political parties have established to fight [Saharan] nationalist mobilization, block the way to separatist expansion, and to rally all our Moroccan Saharan brethren, both for those who have stayed in the reclaimed Saharan region and who have accompanied its reconstruction and development, and those whom Spanish colonialism drove out and who were forced to settle in the northern area. Those persons today are prepared to return south in order to construct a human wall in defense of Western Sahara's Moroccanism. There are also those who fought in the 1970s that are forgotten today and have gone to Tindouf, and those for whom all Moroccans wait in order to embrace them. There were those who were intellectually and politically courageous, who returned to the nation, penetrating the barrier of separatism and disunion. Moreover, the initiatives of the three parties submitted for debate contained a dossier of the conspiracy which was devised against the unity of our country by all political parties in the four sister Maghreb areas, so that the Moroccan people could bear their responsibility to combat separatism in the region, in defense of its future.

On the other hand, the three parties' initiatives are aimed at pushing responsible, necessary political reform by amending the constitution and certain laws for the purpose of modernizing the political course; broadening the functions of the Chamber of Deputies; clarifying the mission of the executive authority; establishing true democracy; and creating appropriate political, legal, and organizational circumstances so that the coming elections will be free and honest. This is all within the context of respect for the teachings of the true Islamic religion. We must work to enrich the Moroccan culture, or rather, the Moroccan culture gives Moroccan ingenuity an opportunity to express itself. This is the essence of the message that we want to convey. We are studying the last budget for the current legislative session. It is a message for the future. It is a call for hope, a call for a democratic, strong, unified Morocco.

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Majlis Al-Shura Holds First Session

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5 Jan 92 p 4*

[Article by 'Isam Hashish]

[Text] The edict establishing the Omani Majlis al-Shura [Consultative Council] was issued last December, and yesterday its first session began its work by taking an oath to commit itself fully to working to meet the needs and demands of the Omani people.

The membership of the council consists of 59 members, each representing an Omani wilayah. They were chosen by the people and shaykhs of each wilayah without government interference, for the first time in the sultanate.

The council is presided over by Shaykh 'Abdallah Bin-'Ali al-Qutbi, the council president, who had previously been president of the former Consultative Assembly to the State throughout its last two sessions.

The session was devoted to procedural matters to decide on the two vice presidents and on members of the council office committee. It was decided that the council would continue its meetings this morning to appoint its members among the five permanent committees, to look into the draft of the council's 1992 budget, and to study a bill to continue work under the rules and the administrative and fiscal decisions of the State Consultative Assembly until the council's internal legislation is enacted in its upcoming sessions.

In yesterday's session, six members were nominated to run for the two vice-presidential seats. Voting resulted in the election of Salim Bin-Hilal Bin-'Ali al-Khalili and [Aflah] Bin-Hamd Bin-Salim al-Rawwahi to the vice presidential posts. They are former members of the State Consultative Assembly, which was active for 10 years (1981-1991).

As for the office committee, its members were chosen by recommendation. They are Ibrahim Bin-Muhammad al-Hana'i, 'Ali Bin-Hammud al-Busa'idi, 'Abdallah Bin-Hashim al-Maskari, Ahmad Bin-'Ubayd al-Ka'bi, and Salim Bin-'Abdallah al-Rawwas.

Shaykh 'Abdallah Bin-'Ali al-Qutbi, the council president, opened the first session yesterday with a speech in which he affirmed the importance of establishing the Majlis al-Shura. He said that its importance did not come from its being a more advanced establishment, following the success of the experiment of the State Consultative Assembly. Rather, it is considered a herald of the start of a new era in the course of joint national work, which goes along with the continuous development that Oman is seeing.

Al-Qutbi mentioned that the council, in affirming the new direction, had obtained broader authority in many fields, including the enactment of legislation, participating in preparing a development plan and following its implementation, making the citizens aware of development goals and priorities and the efforts that the state is making to implement them, helping in the efforts to preserve the environment and protect it from pollution, and bringing out the role of the citizen through feelings of collective responsibility.

Al-Qutbi said that this broad authority had been accompanied by a big change in how the council's various organizations operate, and it laid the foundation that determines how duties and responsibilities are carried out to achieve continuous coordination and constructive cooperation between the council and the government.

Al-Qutbi asked the members to apply themselves to their tasks with confidence, aware of the dimensions of this development and modernization.

In his speech, al-Qutbi affirmed that one of the first duties of the Majlis al-Shura members had to be the preservation of the gains that the Omani revival had achieved in bringing out the innate capabilities of the Omani people, developing their talents, and preparing them for more effort and giving.

The Majlis al-Shura will hold four sessions each year. Its second session will be next March. It will discuss several issues, most notably: working to achieve the state's strategy of diversifying sources of income so that oil will not be the only source of national wealth; self-sufficiency in national work by making national cadres qualified and training them within the framework of the "Omanization" plan; and issues of preserving the purity of the Omani environment and combatting all forms of environmental pollution.

It should be mentioned that the Majlis al-Shura, whose establishment was announced by Sultan Qabus last November, was granted broad authority and jurisdictions, more than had been granted to the State Consultative Assembly, whose activity over a 10 year period was considered a successful experiment that confirmed that Omani society was qualified to embark on a new experiment in the consultative field, with expanded responsibility and tasks.

Budget Said To Show \$644 Million Deficit

*92AE0158B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
6 Jan 92 p 10*

[Text] Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id, the sultan of Oman, authorized the sultanate's 1992 general budget, which sets total revenues at about 1.65 billion Omani riyals (about \$4.4 billion) and expenditures at 1.959 billion riyals, an increase of 53 million riyals over last year.

Estimates indicate that the current budget deficit will reach about 245 million riyals (\$644 million), which will be financed by issuing government development bonds (at 132 million riyals), and by balances of the reserve funds (163 million riyals), from which the value of short-term loans will be repaid.

Income from oil and gas exports will provide about 81 percent of the total estimated income in the budget, or 1.344 billion riyals (about \$3.5 billion). Total current expenditures are 1.529 billion riyals, investment expenditures are 409 million riyals, and the total of shares to support the private sector is 20.9 million riyals.

The Omani Government intends to stabilize its foreign debt by the end of 1995, which is the last year of the five-year plan on which work began in 1991.

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