

JPRS-UKO-90-001
8 JANUARY 1990



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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

KOMMUNIST
No 16, November 1989

19980129 093

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NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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KOMMUNIST

No 16, November 1989

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

Open Dialogue With People. M.S. Gorbachev's Remarks at Meeting with PRAVDA's Editorial Staff 23 October 1989

905B0010A Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 3-11

[Text] Dear PRAVDA members, I greet you and I am pleased to meet you. Please do not remind me that such a meeting is overdue. I am aware of it. Incidentally, I have wanted to have it for some time. This occasion has now come.

The first thing I would like to do is to introduce to you the editor-in-chief, approved by the party's Central Committee: Comrade Ivan Timofeyevich Frolov. I do not think it necessary to give you his biography and tell you what he has been doing. I believe that you are fully informed on this account. The only thing I would like to mention is this: in making this decision we proceeded from the fact that Comrade Viktor Grigoryevich Afanasyev, who dedicated to PRAVDA a significant portion of his life, should be replaced by a person who could be accepted and understood by the PRAVDA personnel. This is very important. Let me say frankly that we set great hope on Comrade Frolov and on our joint work with him. Our entire society must, as a result of perestroika, gain a second breath and emerge on the high road of socialist renovation. PRAVDA has both the resources and the potential for this, which must be used more fully. We are very interested, as we shall discuss somewhat later, for PRAVDA to intensify its work, comrades. Let me point this out to you frankly and bluntly, as a party member. This is necessary. It is needed by the party and the people, it is needed by our tremendous revolutionary project—perestroika. That is why I wish Comrade Frolov and all of you fruitful joint efforts and successes in your work.

I have known Comrade Frolov for a long time and have worked directly with him for the past 2 and a half months. I have a good opinion of his qualities both as a party member and a person. He has everything necessary to head a PRAVDA collective.

Let me repeat once again what I told Viktor Grigoryevich Afanasyev at the Politburo meeting. We expressed our gratitude to him on behalf of the party's Central Committee for his long and fruitful activities in PRAVDA and wished him success in his scientific work. We hope that as Central Committee member and academician he will make his contribution to that scientific area, which has a tall order to fill in our country. We have no doubts as to his party-mindedness, political qualities or support of our cause.

M.S. Gorbachev asked how the PRAVDA members and the party committee of the editorial staff reacted to the Central Committee decision. A.V. Chernyak, party committee secretary, Yu.A. Zhukov, the eldest PRAVDA member, and other participants in the talk explained that this was welcomed with understanding by the collective, as a natural process of cadre renewal. The following question arises: Is the replacement of the editor-in-chief related to a reaction to some recent publications? In the opinion of the PRAVDA personnel, a sharp political struggle is being waged in society. There are forces which, in pursuit of their personal interests, are trying to make use of even the slightest opportunity to cast aspersions on the party's leadership and the party press.

M.S. Gorbachev: Such a straight question demands a straight answer. The answer is no. Viktor Grigoryevich and we discussed the question of his departure several months ago, which means that the time to solve this problem was right and that the decision had already been considered. Naturally, we could voice some critical remarks addressed to PRAVDA and other mass information media. However, I must say confidently and without any strained interpretation that PRAVDA has firmly supported the party position. The process of changes in the work of the PRAVDA collective is taking place and, I believe, is following the right direction. As the Central Committee organ and as the most important means of promoting the positions of the Central Committee and of perestroika, this newspaper is seeking new ways and means of solving these problems. We can only welcome this. I think that a great deal more remains to be done in this respect. Today it is not a question of past breakdowns or errors, for you are engaged in the live work of journalism.

Any work, if it is creative, obviously has both successes and failures. What matters is the line, the basic position. In that sense PRAVDA stands on firm party positions, the positions of perestroika. In my view, the newspaper has done tremendous work to prepare public opinion in accepting the innovative and revolutionary ideas of perestroika and the new directions in party activities.

For that which we are investing in perestroika is truly, in terms of its intents, revolutionary. Revolution within the revolution is what we call it. We thus wish to emphasize that, to begin with, today's perestroika is the continuation of the cause of the October Revolution. It is the confirmation, under the new historical circumstances, of the choice which was made in 1917 under the guidance of Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. On the other hand, the depth of the changes which are currently taking place and the renovation of our socialist society are of a revolutionary nature. For example, these changes affect ownership relations. They are aimed at surmounting the alienation of man from the means of production, from the products of his toil and, which is the most important thing, making him the real owner of the economy. Essentially, it is a question, through radical economic reform, of transferring the economic power to the

working people. This is first. Second, we would like to complete the task which was set by the bolsheviks: to eliminate the alienation of man, of the working people from the system. It is to this effect that we started the political reform. How is this process developing? In this area there is something for all of us to continue to think about. Unquestionably, however, here as well we have chosen the right direction: giving the power to the soviets and thus implementing the concept of rule by the people. Through democratization, through the revival of the soviets, and a reinterpretation of their role, today we want to make the individual the main character in perestroika and society. Therefore, in this sense as well truly profound revolutionary changes are taking place. We must also point out that we are facing what may be the most difficult task: the moral, the spiritual revival, the healing of society.

All of these are extremely extensive changes. The fact that, starting with April 1985, PRAVDA actively, in a party-style, joined in the propaganda and interpretation of the ideas of perestroika is of major political and practical significance. PRAVDA set the tone for all mass information media. Like the Central Committee, it is on the cutting edge. That is why we judge today the activities of the Central Committee, the Politburo and, the party as a whole, so strictly. Naturally, the party members also judge strictly and exigently the way our main party newspaper, the organ of the Central Committee, performs its role.

Obviously, the party members who work at the Central Committee and the other party agencies must occasionally feel a certain discomfort from the fact that today the people judge openly and freely of everything taking place in society and of the positions of party members, and even more so of those who are performing responsible functions in the party. I would think that you too feel this. You too receive such letters, some of which reach me, and which pertain both to the Central Committee and to PRAVDA. I think that this is an entirely normal process. I consider as a major gain of our time the fact that today there is a counterprocess operating from the top and from the bottom, and that there is feedback. This enables us, in shaping policy and in practical work, to take into consideration the moods, the processes taking place in society and, naturally, to convert them into political decisions and into the activities of PRAVDA and the other mass information media.

It seems to me that today we are getting rid of the complex that we must instruct everyone, give instructions, formulate truths as though this marks the completion of any political or ideological process or the organization of a project. It is perhaps for the first time after many decades that we look at perestroika, at the renovation of socialism as a natural process of the creativity of the masses. This, comrades, is the Leninist thought, the Leninist approach.

I would like to express a few wishes to the PRAVDA personnel on behalf of the Central Committee and on my own.

You know the stage we have reached in our work, we, the party, the party cadres and the party press. Behind us lies the very important stage of interpreting the society in which we found ourselves in the mid-1980s and of what was taking place around us in the world. This analysis was very important. Without what I could describe as a fearless, a harsh analysis, there would have been neither a policy of perestroika for our society nor a new thinking in the foreign policy which we offered to the world. It was necessary to understand, to interpret the condition of the party and the country.

I will not claim that we gained this understanding immediately. This can explain many omissions and errors which took place. Nonetheless, in its essential and basic features, this study led us to the policy of perestroika, the more so since the process of the analysis itself was democratic. This immediately influenced the mood in society and triggered a certain reaction and confidence in the party. At that stage the party felt quite strongly the support of the working people and its authority increased.

This was a period of scientific investigations and hopes and, I would say, a time of meetings and clashes. It was an interesting period. I do not know how the present period could be described and, obviously, we should not dwell on it. Today, when the concept of perestroika has encountered real society and affected the real interests of the people and when society is in motion, we felt that this is a particularly important stage. The future will largely be determined by the way we handle our present and the way we solve the problems at this stage.

On 13 October, at the meeting with the heads of the mass information media, I spoke of last summer's visit I paid to Leonid Maksimovich Leonov who was celebrating his 90th birthday. We had a short but interesting talk. I was amazed at the extent to which he was familiar with the details of what was happening in the country. This was not simply an array of data. It was knowledge interpreted through the wise and philosophical make-up of the person. In discussing our time and the searching in which we are engaged and how to solve the problems of perestroika and lead our society to the heights we envisage, Leonid Maksimovich expressed an interesting thought. The most difficult thing, he said, is the following: on the one hand, that which you are doing now will begin to define what our society will look like 100, 150, 200 or perhaps even 300 years into the future. Meanwhile, to search, to develop new ways of life and to master them must be accomplished in a very difficult situation, in a society with a great deal of problems which concern the people, which disrupt their normal living process, sadden and worry them. Such problems must be solved. They cannot be avoided. We cannot rely on the success of perestroika unless we are concerned with having our people as of now feel the results of

perestroika. This must be felt not only from the viewpoint of democracy and glasnost but also with confidence, the right frame of mind and real improvements in the people's life. As we solve such problems, however, we must not forget the main direction we have chosen by taking the path of perestroika.

Today, as I pointed out, we are extensively dealing with problems of a radical economic reform, including such major aspects as reshaping relations of ownership, something which should radically change the economic base.

In the words of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, it is thus that we are essentially achieving a radical change in the viewpoint on socialism, by reforming ownership relations and identifying the potential of socialist social ownership. This is a difficult process. Consider how interesting and, at the same time, conflicting was the process related to the implementation of the political reform. We can see that we chose the right direction. However, the process is developing in a conflicting and complex manner, which triggers concern within society. We realize that, as we engage in solving basic problems on a revolutionary scale, we must also be concerned with easing the burden of today's difficulties which are being sharply felt by the society. Today this is the main task.

We understand and feel the emotions of the people. We also understand the critical attitude toward the worsening of the socioeconomic situation and the atmosphere in society. We must solve these problems. We must ease the tension. This must be done immediately, within a few months, within the next year, year and a half. Another reason for this is that people from both the right and the left are trying to exploit this gravity of the situation.

You know, it is one thing if we are simply afraid of the fact that we took the path of perestroika too quickly or, conversely, if we are being criticized for advancing too slowly and urged to speed up, to almost start galloping. We could have tolerated this and reacted calmly. Now, however, the time has come to assess such statements. Why? Because both from the right and the left, and from extreme right and extreme left positions or, in a word, from both extremes, efforts are being made to generate confusion in society, disorient the people, and implant mistrust in our accomplishments and plans. I believe that opposing such attempts today is one of the most important tasks of the party and of our party press. The mass information media, the party press above all, must take to the people the meaning of what is happening in our society, so that no one would be tempted to accept irresponsible and very dangerous slogans.

We have already had the opportunity to discuss this topic and I would like to repeat this, for this is a dangerous area, comrades. The PRAVDA people must bear this in mind and engage in an open dialogue with the working people. The people must know that we support perestroika, that perestroika is in the interest of the people and that today the party Central Committee,

the Supreme Soviet and the government are making most energetic efforts to ease the gravity of the socioeconomic situation in the country.

When I say this, I hope that you understand that not everything depends on the tops (let us use this expression which combines all central authorities) although a great deal does. We must create the political, economic and legal prerequisites for the situation in the market and the financial area to be normalized. Today this is the most important matter. However, a great deal must be solved by the labor collectives themselves if the market is to become saturated with goods. Such goods are not produced in offices but in enterprises. That is why, naturally, it is difficult to hope for any success if people fail to understand this. All together we must create this with our own hands.

I came here from a meeting with a large group of our leading economists and major economic managers. At that meeting this was the main topic. I think that by rallying all scientific and creative forces of our society we shall reach the right decision in terms of improving the financial situation and the situation on the consumer market and intensify and continue the economic reform. I do not consider myself gullible. Nonetheless, as I analyze the existing realities, and the very conflicting and tense present situation, I look ahead with optimism. This, incidentally, was sensed also in the speeches of the scientists: we can stop the further development of negative processes and turn the situation for the better, toward healing. However, this will require energetic efforts. I have already said that we may have to take some unpopular steps. What does this mean? If such steps are needed in order to keep the situation under control and change it for the better, in the final account it is hardly possible to say that they will be unpopular, for they would be needed by the people, they would be for the people! I strongly urge today the PRAVDA people to concentrate on constructive work. We have already agreed that the situation is grave, that it is a difficult and complex situation. However, we can also see and note that the possibilities to resolve the situation exist. Such possibilities must be promoted through all the mass information media and PRAVDA must set the tone in such matters.

Some people will never go beyond the stage of holding meetings. A great deal of apprehension are being whipped up in the press and the journals and on television, but little is being written about the fact that a great many good things are already being accomplished. This applies not only to labor collectives but also to entire areas which are working successfully and obtaining interesting results. Today the session of the Supreme Soviet was addressed by Comrade Samsonov, director of the First Moscow Timepieces Plant. He quoted interesting data. With a virtually unchanged production area, the plant was able to increase the production of watches by nearly 100 percent, 80 percent of which are exported. Profits have increased, which has made significant increases in wages possible.

Or else here is another example. In 32 oblasts in the Russian Federation, the situation is changing for the better. The market is being filled with goods in areas in which the situation was very stressed. This must be written about and shown. Such processes must be seen. Many new people have assumed the management of enterprises, labor collectives, rayons, cities and scientific institutions. The people who have tied their lives to perestroika consider it as their own destiny. Such people must be displayed. The British have a saying: "Better light a single candle than spend your entire life cursing the darkness." I would make this saying the epigraph not only of PRAVDA but of the work of all mass information media. The people are already lighting such candles and one cannot fail to notice this.

Why did we undertake perestroika? To change the existing situation. How could one change without changing? Therefore, one must write about such changes. However, one must continue to write also about those who obstruct change, who stand in the way, who put spokes in the wheels. Perestroika is a dialectical process. I am not asking you to abandon your critical approach. No, accomplishments must be critically interpreted. This is very important to us. However, everything must be imbued with the main objective, which is constructive work, the idea of consolidation of the society and of rallying efforts in all areas. This is important today, when we are on the verge of making major decisions, the implementation of which will lead to major changes and will turn into major and good results for our country. I believe that this is being felt throughout the entire society.

Why is it that the topic of labor, patriotism and acting for the good of the fatherland sounds muffled in the mass information media? The people are making history. They live and make their contribution to the common cause of perestroika, contributing their hearts, their souls and their minds. How can one not write about it, how can one not speak about it? Our main character is the transformer. Today he has changed. He is not a sweet and easy-going person. He is rather an inconvenient person because of his demands and approaches to things. However, this precisely is the perestroika character. One must loudly speak about this perestroika character, about this person.

We are facing major political campaigns. They will have far-reaching consequences. The 28th Party Congress lies ahead. We must make sense of a great many things as we prepare for the congress. We must interpret perestroika, we must identify the stage we have reached and what we have gained. We must analyze errors and omissions and earmark the immediate tasks of the party which is the political vanguard. It seems to me that we have reasons to note that our entire society favors a strong party, a party which can be renovated faster and master its new role at the present stage of perestroika. The pre-congress period must decide a great many things and answer a great many questions.

We are hoping that by the coming spring we shall have drafted the programmatic document which must become the pre-congress platform of the party's Central Committee and the basis for a general party discussion. Later, the same document must be adopted as the programmatic party document at the congress.

Now, having undertaken to discuss the urgent measures to improve the financial market, next year's plan, and the laws related to reforming economic relations in all areas of the national economy, we have felt a certain lack of understanding which hinders us in formulating unified approaches which would ensure the successful solution of the problems of perestroika and would help us to achieve its objectives. What is happening? It seems to me that it is not so much a question of the fact that a search is under way, that these are complex problems which demand discussions and a comparison of views in order to formulate approaches which could become the foundations for a policy of practical action.

That is not the problem. It seems to me that the discussions were initiated on different grounds. That is why the process is advancing with difficulty. In addition to the concept of perestroika as policy aimed at the renovation of socialism, democracy, glasnost, enhancement of the individual and the humanizing of society, we are receiving ideas which suggest to us that we go back almost 70 years. It is as though the past 70 years had not existed, as though entire generations had not existed, as though nothing had happened in our society. Yet a great deal has been accomplished, even judging by the harshest standards. A tremendous advance toward the achievements of contemporary human civilization was made, despite everything that was tragic and dramatic, despite the deformations which complicated and slowed down the implementation of the socialist ideals. All of this did occur. Nonetheless, there are reasons to note that our historical path is a unique achievement of our time.

That is why, if we ignore this, we risk to make major errors and develop theoretical concepts which could yield different results.

In the pre-congress period we must engage in a broad discussion which would make it possible to draft a serious programmatic document which would give society confident prospects for the immediate future.

I do not even mention the fact that we must thoroughly consider all aspects of CPSU activities, as the time of the congress approaches. In a renovating society we need a renovated party which functions in accordance with and in the context of the changes which are occurring within perestroika and the democratization of society, a party which, in such an atmosphere, would successfully implement its role as political vanguard.

We must adopt a new approach to the accountability and elections campaign, the selection of delegates, the

shaping of elected party authorities; we must thoroughly discuss the ideas related to amendments to the party statutes.

Actually, all such questions are already being extensively debated. PRAVDA is among the newspapers which are actively contributing to the debates.

Equally important are the forthcoming elections, the organization of authorities in republics and the elections for local soviets. This is a most important political campaign through which we would like to complete the transfer of power to the soviets. Look at the big battles which are being fought in society even at the approaches to this problem, and the passions which are seething. The present discussion in the Supreme Soviet proved this yet once again, for the topic was amendments to the Constitution, to Article 13, which had to do with the electoral system. We organized a debate and assigned to the committees additional work on such matters and then once again submitted them for final discussion by the Supreme Soviet.

Society is showing great interest in the forthcoming elections for republic and local authorities. At this point I shall not go into the details of this matter. However, I would like to invite PRAVDA actively to join in their preparations. I think that this is another main topic for PRAVDA. Generally speaking, your main topic is preparations for the party congress and the political reform. This is very important to the life of the country, and for perestroika to advance, to gather strength.

You and I have discussed the role of the press. In this connection the topic of the responsibility of the press arises. I recently had the occasion to discuss this at a Central Committee meeting with the heads of the mass information media. I shall not repeat myself and I hope that Viktor Grigoryevich was able to report to the PRAVDA people the essence of the discussion.

V.G. Afanasyev: This meeting was extensively discussed with the editorial staff.

M.S. Gorbachev: Yes, we must surmount the negative features which have appeared of late in the mass information media. The Central Committee is very interested in the mass information media continuing to play an active, constructive and creative role. In my view the entire society is interested in precisely this. It is not a question of the fact that we, in the Central Committee, must radically change something in our approaches, for our position is based on the interests of perestroika, the interests of the people. The mass information media as well should continue actively to participate in this process. Now, however, when we have reached the stage of implementation of the concepts of perestroika, when society needs accurate guidelines, let me reemphasize that our press must not confuse the people. It must help find accurate solutions, approaches and answers on how to ensure the success of perestroika.

Today this is the most important thing. Therefore, all editorial staffs must forget their personal biases. I do not wish to imply that a creative person should lose his originality. He must have such an originality, for without it there is no active and interesting press. Every journalist must realize his potential and invest his soul in his writings. This is a fact. Nonetheless, the main meaning and the supreme sense of journalistic labor and creativity is to support our socialist values, to promote the ideas of perestroika and to assert positive and progressive trends and to firmly eliminate anything negative.

Indeed, parting with the past, with anything which was until recently our life, is no simple matter. It is not simple for us, it is not simple for any labor collective, family or individual. The process of surmounting the old stereotypes must be depicted realistically, as it is developing in life. This must be done with clean hands, with clean thoughts and, above all, with concern for our cause, for the fate of the country and the people. If this is present, comrades, everything succeeds. This does not need meetings or encouragements. All that is needed is an exchange of views in order to tighten up our thoughts and searches. Naturally, all creative collectives need this: a specific environment, a specific atmosphere.

However, let me reemphasize that a newspaper, any newspaper even the one aimed at a small circle of readers, should not be treated like some kind of patrimony. The press belongs to the public. It must serve the public. If today society is following the path of perestroika and renovation, it means that that is what our press must serve.

The leading criteria here are glasnost and democracy. They have lost none of their validity. In starting any kind of project we must ask how this promotes the interests of the people and socialism. Of late there are those who have tried to delete the second part of this formula—how this works for socialism. However, in this formula everything is interconnected. The party proclaimed firmly, clearly, and most loudly to its people, to the entire world: we shall remain loyal to our choice. We shall make perestroika and shall renovate our society on the basis of socialist values. This is our cause, our sovereign cause. We do not impose our perestroika on anyone. However we intend to carry it out according to our own ideas. This met with the support of the people. The people follow very carefully what is taking place in the country and the extent to which this is consistent with the socialist ideals which the people have preserved in their souls, their hearts and their minds, despite all trials. Both the party and the press must bear this in mind. We cannot change our nature and purpose. Neither the party nor the party press or our cadres who work in all areas—in the economic and social area and in the spiritual area, can change. Therefore, defense of the interests of perestroika is a very important topic for the party press.

At the Central Committee meeting with the editors I said: name any newspaper or journal and I will tell you its position from any one of its articles or issues on

matters of domestic or foreign policy and problems of cultural life. The result is that instead of a multiplicity of voices and glasnost we have a single voice without glasnost.

PRAVDA must promote the party line and the party position and defend it in its dialogue with the representatives of the other social movements, including all those who are interested in participating in such a debate. Some people have adopted objectivistic positions. I think that the time has come for our cadres—party and economic—and for our journalists to assume a firm position. Incidentally, society as well expects this. The people frankly say that they want to know what is the firm position held by every member of the country's leadership on the main, the vitally important, the fatal problems of perestroika.

In general, dear PRAVDA members, let me end with what I started: we must work harder. I believe that in this respect we, at the party Central Committee, can hope for understanding from our colleagues. I did not misspeak, we consider you our colleagues, our closest colleagues in the party cause. I wish the editor-in-chief and the editorial staff, the entire collective, success in their activities which are so greatly needed by the party and our society.

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PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Anatomy of Prices

905B0010B Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 12-20

[Interview given by Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Senchagov to KOMMUNIST correspondents A. Vasilyev and A. Ulyukayev]

[Text] Today the attention of the public is focused on the future of the economic reform, financial recovery and stabilization of the market. Economic scientists and managers and political leaders are offering a variety of assessments of the problems existing in this area and options for resolving them. KOMMUNIST will give them ample opportunity to present their views. Obviously, the views held by the new heads of general economic departments are of the greatest interest. Following are two interviews granted by V.K. Senchagov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Prices, and V.V. Gerashchenko, chairman of the board, USSR Gosbank.

Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Senchagov is a doctor of economic sciences and professor. He is the author of more than 100 articles and a number of books on problems of the development of the economic mechanism and its financial-credit aspects. He has spent some 20 years working in scientific research institutes, including those of the Ministry of Finance and the USSR Gosplan. He is a member of the International Institute of

State Finances. In 1987 he was appointed USSR deputy minister of finance. In July 1989 he became chairman of the USSR State Committee for Prices.

[Correspondents] Vyacheslav Konstantinovich, probably no specialist depicting the present economic situation in the country would risk to color it in rosy hues. A serious situation has developed, which requires daring and unusual decisions for its correction. In your view, what measures must be taken first of all?

[Senchagov] We are in a state of socioeconomic crisis. Its very circumstances demand of us cool judgment and a weighed approach to all problems and to take into consideration the experience of socialist and capitalist countries. What has changed in our life? It is the enterprise, the producer of material values, that has become the main subject of economics. This marked the first step leading to the creation of the new economic mechanism. However, even the codification of its legal status within an entire array of laws does not in itself mean a conversion to new economic management forms. Its normal functioning must be organized as well. That is why, in my view, a great deal depends on an accurate tax, interest and price policy, which will shape a production incentive system.

I would suggest a few stops, as an option. To begin with, we should reduce the tax pressure applied by the state on the producer, for otherwise the producer will have no incentive to increase production efficiency. Generally speaking, let me point out that in the Soviet Union the level of taxation in terms of the GNP is higher than in many other countries, exceeding 33 percent. That is why the task now is to lower taxes where the income itself is created and to raise taxes on individual income. This will enable us to solve many social problems and to redistribute funds in favor of less prosperous groups. However, we must act cautiously, for extreme measures could undermine labor incentive.

Greater attention should also be paid to regulating the entire monetary market, for today there is a great deal more money than there are commodities. How to withdraw surplus money from circulation? I see the solution in a new interest rate policy, which would encourage higher savings by the population. The average savings account in our country is not all that high: 1,500 rubles. Most account holders are people of average income. They could be encouraged to deposit their money in the bank and be more thrifty, by raising the interest they earn. Today it is ridiculously low—2.4-2.5 percent. On the other hand, however, some bank clients include people with very high incomes. Based on the principle of social justice, they should earn a lower interest rate.

[Correspondents] It is unlikely that everyone would agree with your idea, the more so since its implementation would require a strict income control system. Many capitalist countries have had to deal for quite some time with the conflict between the demands of the tax system and the confidentiality of bank deposits.

[Senchagov] Naturally, it would be naive to hope for a fast implementation of this suggestion. Nonetheless, I hold on to my view that the role of the interest rate is exceptionally high although other methods for controlling the money in circulation are possible as well. For example, the Gosplan could plan not simply the gross national product or the national income but mandatorily combine these amounts with the sum of cash or cashless currency. Another model could be adopted as well, in which the leading role would be assigned to the State Bank. The bank would determine the overall amount of money, set corresponding ceilings and regulate the activities of specialized and commercial banks. For the time being, however, it is unable to do so. It has neither cadres nor the necessary equipment to this effect. Whatever option we may choose, the main thing now is to eliminate the imbalance between financial and material resources.

[Correspondents] Like many other economists in our country, do you consider the budget deficit the main reason for our difficulties?

[Senchagov] Unquestionably, we must strive to eliminate the deficit. However, let us not forget the complexity of this phenomenon, the origins of which may be traced to the abnormal development of our economy, burdened by the extracting sectors and the defense complex. The economy is oriented primarily to increasing the means of production and group "A" industrial output which, incidentally, as early as the 1930s had triggered inflation and led to a rationing system. Our share of output in group "B" industry is lower than anywhere else in the world. For decades it has fluctuated in the 25-26 percent range, compared to 30-35 percent in the developed capitalist countries. For example, we still allocate for the development of light industry no more than 1 percent of our capital investments although this sector accounts for 10 percent of all accumulations.

It was with such an imperfect structure that we began the economic reform and the system of new economic rates was unable immediately to equalize it and to ensure a transfer of production and financial resources to the consumer sector of the economy. Therefore, I cannot agree with statements such as the fact that if within 2 years we would be able to eliminate the budget deficit all problems would disappear by themselves. To think so means to replace the material-object fetishism with a financial fetishism. There is nothing terrible in having a budget deficit as such. It merely means that expenditures exceed revenues. If major capital investments play a significant role in expenditures which, as we know, do not yield returns immediately, such a deficit becomes entirely natural. It is true that in our country it has long exceeded any sensible limits, and that we must reduce it. However, we must do so not immediately but gradually, for reducing the budget deficit entails not only benefits but losses as well. For example, it may freeze the construction of a major project which, therefore, would

release manpower which must be regrouped and re-assigned elsewhere. This will require more funds for cadre retraining, moving to other areas, opening new jobs and developing housing and other aspects of the social infrastructure. That is precisely why I believe that the process of elimination of the budget deficit should take no less than 5 to 7 years. Otherwise we would worsen our economic situation even further.

[Correspondents] The elimination of the budget deficit is not a self-seeking purpose. This process should be subordinated to the solution of an even more serious and important problem: the stabilization of monetary circulation. This could take a variety of directions. You named two of them: enhancing the interest rate policy and gradually reducing the budget deficit.

[Senchagov] Today the question has exceeded the limits of any real increase in the volume of production of goods and services. This volume is growing at the pace of 10-12 percent per year, compared to 3-4 percent in the preceding 5 year period. Could we achieve a balance only by increasing the growth rates of output in group "B" industry and ensure the fuller saturation of the consumer market in goods and services? In all likelihood, we could not. However, other steps are also available. We must develop a securities market and promote state loans more extensively. The Ministry of Finance intends to float a loan for 48 billion rubles among enterprises with available surplus funds. I do not tend to believe that this step will be rather simple. Today the enterprises prefer material resources to money as an all-purpose equivalent. As to "siphoning off" surplus money from the population, we intend to issue treasury notes. Naturally, both steps will increase the national debt which, this year alone, will be 400 billion rubles. Given the existing circumstances, I would give priority to another, a more flexible element in the securities market: stocks. This will make the link between invested funds and their returns tangible to every individual.

[Correspondents] If we were to analyze the price problems in a developed market economy, everything you said here would be precisely the foundation for price control. For the time being, however, the situation is different. It is characterized by a deformed price structure which distorts economic information and, at the same time, blocks any kind of perestroika in the economic mechanism.

[Senchagov] The current price system took decades to develop and contains all the faults of our development. It is inconsistent with production intensification tasks; it is alienated from the socially necessary outlays and, most important, it does not take into consideration the actual correlations in the consumer values of different commodities and the demands of the socialist market. Prices in the fuel sectors are approximately one-half those of global prices. This creates the illusion of inexpensive natural resources and leads our industry and foreign trade toward extensive increases in output and sale of energy carriers. Today production costs reflect only

one-half the outlays for social security; the other half, which is 30 billion rubles, is financed out of the state budget. The consequence is inexpensive manpower and reduced possibilities of installing new equipment. The partial consideration of outlays for social insurance in the prices substantially worsens the search of sources for solving the problem of pensions, which requires roughly 28-30 billion rubles.

As we know, prices are the main measure of the usefulness and efficiency of labor outlays to society, for which precise reason they must maintain the exchange equivalence among sectors and regions. In practice, this stipulation is violated. The level of profitability greatly fluctuates by sector and type of output.

The greatest distortion is that between purchase and retail prices. Their unity and interdependence have been disrupted. Food retail prices are much lower than purchase prices. The difference is covered by the budget as subsidies. According to 1988 data, state budget expenditures for compensating price differentials equaled 91.5 billion rubles.

The temptation is very big to restore the violated proportions in the price system in one fell swoop by including all so far ignored outlays in wholesale and purchase prices, eliminate subsidies and, correspondingly, increase retail prices. In my view, however, this requires a critical assessment and, given the existing circumstances, is virtually inapplicable.

[Correspondents] Nonetheless, we know that in the past 2 years extensive work has been done to prepare for a reform in wholesale and retail prices. Even the price lists for wholesale prices were drafted.

[Senchagov] Yes, this is true. However, the reform was planned as early as 1987 and the situation at that time was somewhat different. At that time it fit more easily into the economic mechanism in which direct mandatory methods played a leading role. The simultaneous review of prices under those circumstances did not disrupt the value correlations, let us say, between the kolkhoz sector and the state, and guaranteed against possible losses. Naturally, this was possible within certain limits, for there is no ideal system. The situation today is more difficult. Economic management in our country is no longer controlled by the state. There are cooperatives, the role of individual labor has increased, and stock holding forms of management are developing. Furthermore, many state enterprises are surviving today out of earned funds and operate on a self-financing basis. The number of owners is increasing. We have a different model and, consequently, we need a different price system, on which we now have started work. What to do with those price lists which were already drafted? I believe that they will come in useful.

It would make sense to use them to optimize enterprise plans. We would like to apply them somehow tentatively. Let the economists compute the indicators in old and new prices and see whether they are useful and see

the changes in profits. Actually, this will be a business game on a national scale providing that all participants obey its rules. Honestly speaking, however, I am not so certain that the committee will obtain accurate information. Those who will benefit from the new prices will keep silent while the losers will be shouting their losses loudly. However, such a "game" must be played: this would enable us, perhaps to a certain extent, to forecast the behavior of enterprises under the new conditions.

As to the new prices, I am concerned by the vast scale of the changes which will total 240 billion rubles, or more than 30 percent of the national income. Our economy has never been able to "digest" such an increase in wholesale prices. As confirmed by the 1967 experiment, this reform could affect retail prices as well. Therefore, it may be expedient to consider alternate choices in amending wholesale prices.

[Correspondents] How can we find a way leading to the development of a market price setting system given the present complex economic situation, when demand substantially outstrips supply?

[Senchagov] I believe that we should seek ways of combining fixed state or, as they are also known, list prices with contractual and commercial prices. For example, the state order may be based on the price list to which we add a commercial or contractual price but within a stipulated limit, i.e., it should not exceed the listed price by more than 20-30 percent. At that point we could combine the market mechanism for price setting with state control.

I recently presented this idea at a Soviet-Swedish roundtable. The Swedish economists doubted the need for a limit; in their view, its functions can be performed by the balance between supply and demand. However, in our country the imbalance is huge. Therefore, conditions exist for an entirely unjustified price increase. What is usually the reason for raising prices? Is it because a new commodity should cost more? To begin with, it is in order to generate sources for additional accumulations for purposes of expanding output. As the market becomes saturated, the price drops. That is the way it should be. However, we have no such mechanism in our country. That is why I think that for a while we need a limit. Gradually, we shall abandon it so that exclusively with the help of prices, to a far greater extent than now, we shall be able to control the correlation between supply and demand.

There is yet another option: to set fixed prices for the most important commodities and use contractual prices for the other. To a certain extent we shall try to apply this in the case of fruits and vegetables. Here as well, however, we must act very cautiously. What is stopping us is that this group of commodities has the highest price increase index.

One could also gradually amend wholesale prices and consider the possibility of reducing their overall increase; for example, in connection with the planned tax reform, we should in all likelihood abandon payment

for assets and thus ease the pressure of high production capital intensiveness in the extracting sectors applied on the overall profitability and price levels.

[Correspondents] Do you take into consideration payments for assets in a future price reform?

[Senchagov] As to natural resources, we are considering rental payments totaling 27 billion rubles. Naturally, however, this is not the best option. In itself, the use of a rental payment does not guarantee that we shall accurately be able to assess the value of the minerals. Strategically, possibly, the only realistic way is to develop share holding forms of ownership which will enable us to assess the efficiency of natural resources which will be quoted on the securities market.

However, it is still too early to speak of this. We do not have prices even for the land. Currently the Moscow City Soviet is trying to introduce payments per hectare and everyone is puzzled, for everyone has become used to the fact that land costs nothing.

As to water, in this case the main role should be played by expert scientific methods of assessment. We need consumption rates and prohibitive or penalizing sanctions should be applied should they be exceeded.

[Correspondents] Currently the question of the expediency of freezing prices is being extensively discussed. How to you feel about it?

[Senchagov] In my view, this is totally unrealistic. To pass such a law would mean to hinder the development of the entire economy. The fact that a reform of the entire price setting system in the country cannot be carried out as a one-time act is a different matter. It will require longer time, most likely the entire 13th 5-year period. The reform should be interrelated with steps aimed at strengthening the ratio between the quantity and quality of goods and services for the population and the amount of money in circulation, whether cash or cashless, the development of the new economic mechanism and gradually laying of the foundations of a socialist market and eliminating producer monopoly.

We must expand the list of goods for which the prices could be set by republic authorities. This will be based on the new approach to the sovereignty of Union republics and the broadening of their rights in defining regional sectorial production structures. We must more firmly undertake to use contractual prices more extensively.

The price reform should not lead to income losses for agriculture and the population. If this cannot be directly regulated through reciprocal profit and loss accounts, we must develop stabilizing insurance mechanisms.

Finally, in connection with eliminating the closed nature of our economy and making it part of the global division of labor, the new price system must be structured in accordance with world price ratios. It is not a question of directly adopting the prices charged at Western markets but only taking the price ratios into consideration. This

would enable us properly to determine the economic efficiency with which a given commodity is produced and promptly react to changing competition conditions.

Let me particularly mention retail prices. Their level and dynamics have a direct impact on the living conditions of millions of people. They define the consumer guidelines of the various social groups. I can well understand the concern of my fellow citizens, who literally every day face concealed or obvious price increases. The orientation toward profit as a criterion of efficiency and as the main source of self-financing revived economic life. However, under the conditions of disproportions it led many enterprises to take the easiest way out: raise their prices. According to our estimates, last year 30 percent of the increased profits in industry were the result of price increases. Naturally, to a certain extent this had to do with improving the consumer parameters of the goods. Most of it, however, was the direct consequence of the monopoly status of the supplier and his diktat and pressure on the consumer. This triggers justifiable indignation. We shall struggle against this process with all the ways and means at our disposal. However, the main prerequisite for regularizing the situation is to saturate the market. Remember how relatively recently the full set of all different models of refrigerators were available, priced at 160, 300 or 500 rubles. Therefore, the appearance of new expensive models was not considered a tragedy. Everyone could choose the type of refrigerator he could afford.

The scarcity on our market is the main reason for the fact that the state was forced to concentrate the entire burden of high prices on only 18 commodity groups as shown on table 1.

Table 1

Commodity	Rate of Turnover Tax on Retail Prices in Percent
Refrigerators	39
Motorcycles	33
Passenger Cars	64
Watches	49
Silk Fabrics	47
Hosiery	40
Textile Haberdasheries	53
Porcelain-china	40
Rugs and Rug Items	61
Wallpaper	30
Jewelry	71
Cosmetics	45
Tobacco Products	33
Vodka and Hard Liquor Goods	94
Brandy	75
Champagne	69
Fortified Grape Wines	62
Vegetable Oil	31

Let us consider new goods which could bring a major revenue to the budget, such as video recorders. Despite their high price—2,000 rubles—the turnover tax is only 1 ruble. The explanation is simple. Their volume of output is small, maintenance costs are high and financial returns low. Therefore, the main problem of prices is the fastest possible increase in the volume of consumer goods and the broadening of their variety. At that point, each one of them will bear its share of the financial burden, which will make it possible to lower the prices of the other groups.

[Correspondents] The State Committee for Prices should be keeping track of inflationary processes. Do you have at your disposal instruments which make it possible to evaluate the actual pace of inflation?

[Senchagov] Inflation in the Soviet Union has a specific nature. It consists of two components: the first is price increases in the consumer basket; the second is depreciation of the ruble as a result of the scarcity of goods. Together with the State Committee for Statistics we made some estimates. The index of average retail prices for the first 3 years of this 5-year period was 107 percent, including 111.6 percent for foodstuffs and 102.8 percent for durable goods. Meat and poultry increased by 4 percent; bakery goods by 22.3 percent; potatoes, 21.8 percent; vegetables, 18 percent; clothing and underwear, 13.8 percent; porcelain and chinaware, 4 percent; refrigerators, 10 percent; and television sets, 27.1 percent. In the past year alone overall prices have increased by 2.3 percent.

To what extent are these figures consistent with the true situation? These estimates cover only prices in state trade and the consumer cooperative. They do not take into consideration either the cooperatives or the market, not to mention the black market which, considering the scarcity of goods, plays a very important role in our life. That is why I believe that the real index this year most likely equals 3 percent. Bearing in mind that 4.5 percent is the growth of inflation based on monetary factors, manifested in the aggravation of shortages, you will have approximately 8 percent, which is what the people encounter in their daily lives.

[Correspondents] The question which excites everyone is that of agricultural prices. Here we note two diametrically opposed processes: one is a powerful pressure exerted by producers on state authorities to have their purchase prices raised, prices which play the role of wholesale prices, and an equally powerful and understandable wish on the part of the consumers to put an end to increases in retail prices. How do you assess the situation as a whole?

[Senchagov] Obviously, in this case we have an intertwining of the interests of the national economy with those of the agroindustrial complex, the working class and the peasantry. Today purchase prices are not a social yardstick of the economic expediency of labor outlays.

They are restraining the processes of production specialization in the different commodity areas. The imperfect nature of purchase prices is confirmed by the numerous markups which are so differentiated as to enable poorly working farms to live without a care and to develop, without generating any interest in lowering production costs. For the country at large, various markups amount to 40 kopeks per ruble of purchase prices, based on price lists. For some farms and even entire oblasts markups are significantly higher than the basic prices.

In the immediate future we must submit to the government options for new purchase prices which, if approved, would be enacted as of 1 January 1990. The main purpose of this action is to encourage efficient specialization in crop growing and animal husbandry. We hope to achieve this by introducing throughout the territory of the Soviet Union uniform purchase prices. They will allow us to see the real picture and will force many farms, rayons and oblasts to restructure their output and provide an impetus for the development of leasing and individual forms of labor.

This will inflict major losses to many kolkhozes and sovkhoses which are simply unable to survive without financial support. Therefore, it makes sense to use the experience of industry in which subsidies given to losing enterprises are being reduced with every passing year.

We shall have significantly to increase the rights of republics in setting their own purchase prices. Furthermore, except for deliveries to the Union stocks, contractual prices could be applied which may exceed the price lists by 20-30 percent. Naturally, such a ceiling should be introduced for both purchase and retail prices.

[Correspondents] What will be the range of the new purchase prices?

[Senchagov] Let me cite you from the computation in terms of rubles per ton:

Table 2

Commodity	Current Price	Planned Price
Grain Crops	193	226
Sugar Beets	56	61
Tobacco	4213	4853
Flax	1579	2500
Milk	557	544
Cattle	3108	3560
Pork	2562	2983
Mutton	2574	2880
Poultry	2353	2950

Currently a draft of new purchase prices is being completed in accordance with the considerations of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Agrarian Problems and Food Supplies. In this connection, such data could be refined.

[Correspondents] Farm income could be increased without raising purchase prices. It would suffice to lower prices of agricultural equipment and chemical fertilizers.

[Senchagov] It would hardly be expedient to do so on a mass scale. Agricultural machine building is one of the lagging sectors. Its profitability ranges between 15 and 17 percent, compared to 30 percent in instrument manufacturing. Currently the sector is converting to new types of commodities, for which reason it is experiencing major financial difficulties. Furthermore, we must increase the strictness of conventional parity in the intersectorial commodity exchange between town and country. The prices of combines will increase by 34 percent while grain purchase prices by no more than 17 percent.

[Correspondents] Speaking of the functions of the price setting authorities, their list should include the development of principles and methods for the implementation of a price policy and price control, analysis and forecasting.

[Senchagov] Control in particular. Our task includes the prevention of an unjustified price increase and confiscation of profits obtained by violating standards or disparity with technical and economic parameters of output. To this effect we are currently organizing an inspectorate in charge of price control. The new service will include 6,300 specialists.

As to forecasting: for the time being, this work is in its embryonic stage. However, we are already beginning to deal with it, for an accurate forecast is the foundation of a plan and the outline of future activities. The main thing is to organize the factorial analysis of the price levels and dynamics and to identify the patterns and circumstantial factors which appear. Every person who has anything to do with the economy must understand how prices are formed and be familiar with their anatomy.

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The Ruble Must Deserve Its Title

905B0010C Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 20-27

[Interview given by Viktor Vladimirovich Gerashchenko to KOMMUNIST correspondents A. Vasilyev and A. Ulyukayev]

[Text] Viktor Vladimirovich Gerashchenko is a noted specialist in banking affairs, well familiar not only with domestic but also Western credit-monetary theory and practice (he has worked for many years in our banks abroad). His concept of perestroika in the banking system passed a strict discussion at the USSR Supreme Soviet. That same discussion is the theme of the interview which follows.

[Correspondents] Our society is beginning to realize the role of money in economics and to understand that price

increases take place not only because of the poor work done by the Committee on Prices and that commodity shortages are not only the result of the poor work of the Ministry of Trade and the industrial ministries but that this is closely related to the fiscal economy. Nonetheless, it is becoming clear that all of these are also political problems. The monetary system in the country has been especially disrupted. However, since you have undertaken to deal with it, that means that you believe that the situation can be corrected. What do you consider to be exceptionally important from the viewpoint of strengthening the ruble in the immediate future?

[Gerashchenko] In principle, the problem of monetary circulation is a reflection of the condition of the economy in which it takes place. For a long time in our country both credit and monetary circulation were secondary elements, used in pursuing specific economic and political objectives. Hardly ever were the realities of economic management taken into consideration, hence the problems and difficulties in monetary circulation. Yet it is precisely they that are felt above all by the population, manifested through the shortage of commodities and services. If we do not limit credit through some factors of real value, the emission of credit and money contributes to inflation. Therefore, what should be considered above all, in my view, by theoretical and practical workers in the banking system is to determine the objective limits of credit and the real cost of money. We can resolve this by applying traditional banking methods and, with the help of a monetary-credit policy, try to help the economy (understandably, this will take more than a day to accomplish).

[Correspondents] Yet, to one extent or another, the Gosbank has always tried to pursue a policy of sensible restriction of credit resources. The reason that it failed was not because your predecessors did not realize that credit cannot be inflated without limits but because there always were sufficiently strong political factors which prevented this from taking place. This particularly applies to the conditions of our economy in which monetary processes have never been considered primary. In your view, to what extent today, bearing in mind the awareness that monetary problems have priority, does it become possible for the entire economic policy to be based on a firm ruble?

[Gerashchenko] This is a difficult question. It is hardly possible to speak of the acknowledgment that monetary problems have priority. Our difficulty is that for a long time we did not accept the objective laws governing commodity production. The principle of reaching the objective at whatever cost prevailed. Economic objectives behind which, to a certain extent, one always finds political objectives, must be based on the realities which develop in economic life. At this point the question of the accuracy of assessments arises, i.e., of setting the limit beyond which credit essentially stimulates inflation, the reason being that the government has certain obligations, including political ones, which dictate the need for one governmental expenditure or another. Our

possibilities of engaging only in expedient outlays and halting inexpedient ones is, first of all, a matter for economic recommendations and, subsequently, political decisions. Also important here are a definition of priorities and consideration of the time factor. For example, however much we may want it, we cannot in a single instant sharply curtail military expenditures which have been growing for many long years, for time is needed for the conversion of the defense industry.

[Correspondents] A feature of Western credit-monetary practices is the idea that the central bank, generally speaking, is not responsible for the economic policy of the government. It is responsible for monetary circulation and the level of inflation. Whereas in practical terms this is not always the case, in theory this is the most popular approach. The objectives of controlling inflation and restricting the amount of money in circulation may conflict with many other important objectives. However, they are autonomous, and the managers of the central banks firmly support such autonomy. From this viewpoint, what economic-political priorities should be supported by the Gosbank in order, if not to eliminate, at least to restrain the inflationary process?

[Gerashchenko] The problem, above all, is that in our country essentially credit plays an auxiliary role in economic life. As was the case when the old Gosbank was an institution for short-term crediting, essentially to this day this type of banking operations has been inherited by the specialized banks which, as in the past, continue to provide credit semiautomatically, i.e., difficulties in economic management or, let us say, a shortage of working capital or any slowdown in the convertibility process are all covered by bank credit. It is precisely this automatic reaction under actually different conditions prevailing in the individual economic sectors and the administrative methods for allocating resources and credit planning that lead to the fact that the banks are unable to pursue through credits a realistic and efficient economic policy.

Furthermore, in our country the system of interest rates is totally removed from realities which should operate under the current condition of the economy. Today the banks grant long-term credits at an interest rate of 0.85 percent, which is ridiculously low. Furthermore, this interest is actually paid out of the state budget. Therefore, enterprises short of working capital would turn to the government. The Gosbank would be issued the necessary instructions by the government and forced to provide 3-year loans at extremely low interest rates; meanwhile, payments for assets averaging 6 percent was introduced. This increased demand for credit.

Furthermore, the banking system acted quite arbitrarily with the population's funds. It paid a 2-3 percent annual interest. Now, however, when the funds accumulated in the Savings Bank are one of the basic sources of the country's lending capacity, and given the higher cost of living, which is being felt ever more sharply, we must pay interest on population or enterprise deposits, such as to encourage savings and, naturally, charge increasingly

higher bank interests for loans, lending such money on the basis of an interest rate which would cover the interest which the bank itself must pay plus the cost of its operations.

For the time being, however, our interest rates are artificially low and, essentially, do not help us to feel the real cost of money.

[Correspondents] In other words, you are in favor of increasing bank interest rates, which is necessary under the conditions which have developed.

[Gerashchenko] Yes. Naturally, such rates must be differentiated according to the loan terms.

The role of credit must be enhanced. Understandably, however, credit cannot fully eliminate budget allocations, the purpose of which is the development of major projects which serve national priorities.

[Correspondents] Do you believe that the problem of increasing interest rates on loans could be solved in the immediate future?

[Gerashchenko] In any case, all economic prerequisites to this effect exist. A high interest rate will help to reduce the enterprise demands for loans. By charging a higher interest, the banks will earn more and will increase their payments to the budget.

[Correspondents] When the Law on the State Enterprise was passed, a transition was contemplated in the calendar sequence of payments. Unquestionably, this step is quite strict and, in itself, sufficient for substantially changing the attitude of enterprises toward money. Judging by the steady increase in the past and in recent years of payment delinquencies, we clearly realized that this measure was not successful. This is probably one of the reasons for which credit has remained automatic. In your view, why did this take place, why is it that it is still easy for enterprises to obtain money?

[Gerashchenko] It seems to me that the calendar sequence of payments indicates a certain automatic approach, although it protects the interests of the partners of a given enterprise. Matters must be organized in such a way that each enterprise will aspire to settle its accounts without delays, find the necessary money within the enterprise or else obtain commercial loans. Each enterprise has its primary and secondary payments. The secondary payments may be postponed. In the case of the primary payments, the money must be found either within the enterprise or else borrowed: one must take a loan from the bank or be extended commercial credit (although in the West, for example, the portion of such credit is small). Many enterprises accumulate substantial funds and are prepared to participate in the monetary market, i.e., they can not only purchase treasury papers (the Ministry of Finance intends to float such treasury notes starting with 1990 to finance the budgetary deficit) but also to purchase stock from other enterprises, and make commercial loans, particularly to

its own business partners. This precisely indicates the availability of options in sources of financing.

[Correspondents] Organizationally we restructured the banking system and it is this reality that we must deal with. It is quite confused and even irrational. What happens now? Do we have to change it or try to instill some kind of elementary order?

[Gerashchenko] If we proceed from the need to develop commodity-monetary relations and a properly functioning market, the banking system should not be controlled by anyone. The banks must be guided only by banking principles and common sense, and have a sensible management which would be appointed by the stockholders, including representatives of state organizations. For example, in the leading French or Italian banks the state is the principal stockholder.

The question here is why, strictly speaking, should the central bank (in our case the USSR Gosbank) be guided by what other banks do? We should speak not of management but of regulating their activities through corresponding economic instruments, although perhaps the proper conditions to achieve this may not have become fully available in our country. Thus, our specialized banks were established on an entirely different basis. The situation of the Agroprombank and the Promstroybank is distinct in terms of customers, nature of assets and liabilities, and operational methods. If the clients of the Agroprombank are economically weak and unprofitable this does not mean that no loans should be made to any one of them, that they should be declared bankrupt and closed down. No civilized country with a developed monetary economy does this. A bank which issues the loan which becomes difficult to repay cannot simply write it off. It always tries to find, together with the customer, a solution to the developed situation.

We must not manage the banks but create conditions which would turn them into first-rate commercial banks. I believe that the principle of their specialization was considered regardless of the specific nature of the banking business, and without seeking the advice of specialists. The result was that a given department may have to observe the instructions of several banks.

Gradually the tangle of banking problems is being unraveled. We have reached the point at which each bank is given the opportunity to set up its own departments anywhere in the country if this is economically expedient.

A trend toward improving the efficiency and concentrating banking affairs may be seen throughout the world. Society, however, erects certain barriers to prevent a concentration from becoming a monopoly. Nor do we need such a monopoly. We have drafted banking legislation which is now beginning to be discussed with specialists. In our view, what is most important, as is the practice of all developed countries, is clearly to define the status, prerogatives and controls of the central bank.

I believe that currently we should not be in a hurry to draft a law which would regulate the banking system, as it may seem necessary on the higher levels. Such a system should develop by itself, it should take shape from below. This process is already under way. Some 190 commercial banks have been established. It is precisely their activities that provide good data for summation.

The Law on the State (Central) Bank should establish a two-level system in the banking area, in which the central bank will influence credit policy through its specific banking methods and a certain credit-monetary directive approved by the Supreme Soviet. In my view, under contemporary conditions such a directive should not be excessively strict. If the actual economic situation such as, for example, a rich crop, the deliveries of which require a loan, or if the additional production of timber and construction materials may require more credit resources than actually exist, the Gosbank could credit an emission of money but must take into consideration its further effect on the state of the purchase power of the ruble. Conversely, based on overall economic interest, in some cases the Gosbank could restrict the size of a monetary emission.

[Correspondents] Figures have been made public of the current emission and the emission planned for next year. Do you believe that a 10-billion emission would be sufficient? Is this figure realistic, considering the actual financial situation? On the other hand, is the planned reduction of emissions sufficient to initiate improvements in the situation?

[Gerashchenko] In this case, it would be more accurate to speak of a bank emission and distinguish it from emissions related to an increase in loans. Incidentally, in the past this was quite properly controlled as a whole, for wages were strictly controlled as well. Subsequently, commodity-monetary disproportions began to increase. In order to eliminate them increasing the availability of goods and services is not sufficient. We must also consider other methods, above all home buying. I believe that it is precisely home ownership that is the strongest economic incentive in any society.

In our country monetary circulation is frequently believed to be bigger than it actually is. In speaking of the amount of money in circulation, we must not ignore the fact that it should be sufficient to make steady payments possible. We have developed a biased attitude toward the circulation of money. It is believed that an emission of paper money is the root of evil, the prime reason for inflation. However, if we think of a situation in which the owners of savings accounts would prefer to keep their money under the mattress, we cannot tell them: there is no money. In such a case we must simply print money unless we are able to call in loans which were backed by savings deposits. Conversely, the introduction of electronic cash will not lead to any whatsoever improvement in the condition of the economy.

Inflation does not determine in the least the amount of bank notes. In this case we must speak of commodity-monetary imbalances, production and capital investments inefficiency, irresponsibility, and budget deficits. Respectively, this leads to the emission of unsecured paper money.

For that reason, a directive governing the size of an emission should not be so strict as to hinder us. In discussing whether a size of an emission is adequate or inadequate, we must realize that under present circumstances this is in the nature of a forecast. For example, if our income tax system does not work properly (in this area there are many questions, the first being whether this would hinder the growth of output in advanced science-intensive sectors and in construction) or else if there are breakdowns in the production of consumer goods and the trade plan turns out unfulfilled, the stipulated amount would be insufficient and corrections would have to be made. Let me reemphasize, however, that the problem does not lie in the circulation of bank notes but in the things on which we spend our money, what it is that we are crediting. If we are crediting inefficient production and lengthy construction, we are contributing to the inflation of the mass of money in circulation and, therefore, to the development of inflationary processes.

[Correspondents] In this connection, let us consider the budget deficit. One way or another, it is financed by the credit system. In your view, is the scale of reducing the budget deficit sufficient to stabilize the situation?

[Gerashchenko] The strategy of reducing the budget is correct. However, we must consider not only the condition of the budget in 1990 but also the national debt which has developed in connection with past budget deficits. The question arises whether we can afford such a debt of 400 billion rubles, loaned by the banking system, by using funds which include those of enterprises and the population, or else will it require a monetary-credit emission, with the help of the banking system?

In discussing the national debt, let us note, in general, that its existence is nothing terrible in itself. All countries have a national debt. The state wants to finance outlays which are needed by society, using the wealth which society has accumulated. This is done either through the budget or through loans. The bank gives a loan precisely to those people who lack funds, but on the basis of repayment. Therefore, the national debt as well must be potentially repayable. If we spend funds without thinking of the need to repay them, however, that is dangerous. Let me point out that the attitude toward the national debt in our country is changing, it is beginning to change. However, we cannot bring order in this matter instantly.

[Correspondents] Despite its entire financial and sociopolitical difficulty, any anti-inflationary program could be described as a set of relatively simple steps. It is your

job to formulate and defend such a program. How do you view its basic components?

[Gerashchenko] Above all, it is a strict credit policy which will be defined not only by the interest rate but also the considered and economically substantiated solution of problems related to the expediency of granting loans.

This is supported by the policy of the central bank's management. Such a policy must, above all, be aimed at reducing inflated investments in group "A" sectors. We must encourage loans for the processing of agricultural commodities and their transportation, with a view to eliminating losses, as well as the construction materials industry in order to encourage the population to build and, consequently, to save. Also related to this is a conversion to longer-term loans to the population for home buying, for up to 25-30 years. Reducing centralized expenditures for housing construction will contribute to improvements in the budget. Interestingly enough, the assets of 2.7 million American companies account for no more than one-quarter of the value of that country's housing. It is above all their houses that are the private property of Americans. This is largely linked to their incentive to work.

[Correspondents] Last year, when the draft resolution on the selling of housing was being discussed, one of the most pressing problems was that of new housing. At that time the population was hesitant to accept it. How does it seem to you now: Will the gravity of the financial situation and the obligations assumed by the budget to the credit system be sufficient to encourage this step?

[Gerashchenko] I would say that such a measure should be based not on the gravity of the situation but on the overall logic of socioeconomic rationality. Existing restrictions concerning house buying, in my view, are unsubstantiated. What creates difficulties is also the fact that in the discussion of this matter it is a question simply of buying and not buying on credit. That is precisely the reason for which it has been so rarely used so far. Also influencing the situation is our habit of having "free" housing and the unwillingness of the local authorities to sell housing for, in that case, how can they control the situation (to give or not to give is a question of power)? Nonetheless, in this case the problems are more closely related to objective circumstances, above all the underdeveloped nature of such a mechanism.

I believe that it would be wrong to limit loans to the construction of houses or garden cottages. Naturally, this aggravates some problems by increasing the monetary circulation or encouraging demand for construction materials. Conversely, this develops in the people a real incentive to save.

[Correspondents] Could our foreign exchange operations help to stabilize the ruble, and what is your view on the future gradual strengthening of the link between the ruble and the external foreign exchange market?

[Gerashchenko] The right steps have been taken to decentralize foreign trade and to increase the interest of enterprises in developing their export potential.

Nonetheless, we could point out that they are encountering existing price disproportions. Frequently it is difficult for an enterprise to determine whether selling a product on the foreign market is to its advantage, for after this the enterprise must repeatedly turn to the Ministry of Finance for a subsidy to cover the disparity between domestic and foreign prices.

We need further progress and new reforms. The question of the rate of exchange of the ruble arises. The realistic nature of the exchange rate is constantly encountering the question of the distorted nature of our internal price system. We have more than 2,000 foreign exchange coefficients and, therefore, more than 2,000 different rates of exchange of the ruble. To speak of establishing a realistic rate for the ruble without a price reform and without a normal taxation system is impossible. One cannot be separated from the other. The question of the true rate and, subsequently, of the convertibility of the ruble, including partial convertibility, is closely related to that fact.

Specialists are currently at work on the subject of a realistic rate of exchange and the convertibility of the ruble. In this sense as well consultations with our Western colleagues play a certain role.

[Correspondents] What is your view on possibly inviting specialists from the International Monetary Fund to help solve a number of technical, procedural and legal problems related to the development of market relations in our country?

[Gerashchenko] We have already established contacts with the IMF. However, the question of joining it is not all that simple, not only for economic and technical reasons, although both exist. Consultations are useful. However, it is not a simple matter for the consultant to become familiar with our specific system, to identify the heart of the matter and to understand logical developments. Naturally, consultations must be increased, and suggestions on the training of our specialists must be considered. However, this is not a panacea. We must solve our problems ourselves.

There is nothing shameful about learning, although we do have quite capable and knowledgeable specialists who could suggest unusual solutions. The question is frequently reduced to whether or not we are prepared to accept them.

[Correspondents] The question of the relationship between the banking system and society and with international financial organizations is made difficult by the traditional secrecy surrounding banking information. What steps are you planning to broaden glasnost in that area? Will the Gosbank publish its balance sheet, as is done throughout the world and as was done by our country in the 1920s?

[Gerashchenko] We are already engaged in such work and have already submitted a corresponding request to the government. We must distinguish between what is and what is not a state secret, the more so since frequently such secrets are open. Thus, data on our foreign exchange reserves have long been estimated by the International Clearing Bank in Basel and are public knowledge. Obviously, there is nothing to hide in this area and such secrecy hinders even us.

The question of the gold reserve is more difficult. However, here as well data secrecy is, generally speaking, fictitious. We sell gold on the world markets and the sales volumes are known. Satellites help others to assess our annual output. Naturally, a gold reserve must exist and be strengthened. Gold must be considered a commodity with all related consequences.

As to making bank balances public, I believe that we shall be ready to do so in a year.

[Correspondents] The central bank plays a special role in the monetary economic-structure. In terms of the specific nature of their tasks, the central banks are always in a state of conflict with other authorities. What can you say about this aspect of the matter, based on your new experience?

[Gerashchenko] It may be too early for me to judge, but we have established good business relations with the Ministry of Finance and the Gosplan. Naturally, different approaches always exist but agreements can be reached.

More frequently a lack of understanding could develop in our relations with other entities. For example, I categorically disagree with efforts to have the banking system controlled by the local authorities. This could undermine unity in crediting-monetary policy.

The credit-monetary system must not be territorially limited. To the economy monetary circulation is like the circulation of the blood. It is provided by the banks. Any isolation leads to a blockage of the vessels. The local authorities should control only a bank in which they own shares and to the extent of that ownership.

[Correspondents] The floating and selling of bonds for a 5 percent state loan is considered an anti-inflationary measure. How do you assess it and how do you conceive of the mechanism for its implementation?

[Gerashchenko] To a large extent the budget deficit has been covered, and still is, with loans. In this case improvements in the situation are related to the development of a monetary market, a market in securities. However, a monetary market, in its planned aspect, will not immediately solve all problems. For example, it is unlikely that everyone will rush to buy bonds.

Naturally, our strategy is one of creating a developed monetary market. Today the task of the banks is to develop perhaps a primary market for their customers. Its further development, in our view, is related to the

floating and marketing of additional notes by the Ministry of Finance and the enterprises and developing the principles of self-financing.

[Correspondents] Currently, under the conditions of a deficit and inflation, nonmarket barter deals are developing among enterprises and a variety of currency substitutes are appearing. According to some specialists, in order to improve the situation we should introduce a parallel monetary circulation in first-rate firm currency, something like the chervonets of the 1920s. What is your reaction to this suggestion?

[Gerashchenko] Yes, there will be cash substitutes. For example, today banks are limiting the amount of money they can receive from the cooperatives. The reaction is that the cooperatives are buying savings bank certificates and 3 percent state loan bonds which they use in their own operations as substitutes for cash. There is actually in the country a trade in foreign exchange enterprise funds and commercial credit in foreign currency.

The solution of such problems lies in improving the financial-crediting situation. The introduction of a parallel "first-rate" monetary unit is no solution. Its implementation would be actually difficult and, such currency would be unable to retain its first-rate status in the present unstable situation.

[Correspondents] Do methods for controlling the money in circulation change in connection with the development of a system of commercial banks and the establishment of new relationships between them and the central bank?

[Gerashchenko] Yes. Luckily, however, in this case we do not have to invent many new features. Such methods have been perfectly developed in global practices. It is a question of defining the coefficients of liquidity and establishing reserve requirements and setting ratios between attracted population funds and bank assets. Naturally, the specific ways of making use of such practices also need additional work.

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After the Allocations Schedule

905B0010D Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 28-36

[Article by Aleksandr Iosifovich Leshchevskiy, KOMMUNIST special correspondent]

[Text] The time to change the names of some forms of accountability of party committees may have come. For example, in the summary on membership increases the word "growth" is becoming increasingly inappropriate. Traditionally, in Tula Oblast every year slightly over 4,000 people were issued their candidate membership cards. Then, different figures began to appear in the reports: 3,710 in 1987, 2,615 in 1988 and 1,057 (first half of the year) in 1989. Meanwhile, figures about

people unwilling to join the party (had this ever happened before?) totaled, respectively, 34, 65, and 352. Something else which had never happened before: in the past 18 months the number of party members in the oblast has declined by almost 2,000.

A new attitude has also appeared among people about joining the party: expectation. According to Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Lebedev, party committee secretary at the Oktava Production Association, "I recently talked to members of our party committee employed at Shop No 5. I asked some of them to join the party. Their answer was, let me think about it. Such 'thinking' has lasted not a day or a week but 6 months. They want to see what will happen tomorrow." Similar moods were noted also by Boris Nikolayevich Goryukhin, party committee secretary at the Tula Armaments Plant. At that enterprise as well, in response to suggestions to join the CPSU, with increasing frequency, instead of the habitual "yes" or "no," the answers are vague and uncertain.

This requires interpretation. It is important to determine how the present trends will affect the future situation of the party and its influence on the life of society. Today the party organizations are operating in a very stressed atmosphere. The authority stemming from a ruling position, which helped a great deal in the past, has significantly changed, and the party word is occasionally losing its persuasiveness. Tried ways and means of work turn out unsuitable and the search for new ones is difficult. Under such circumstances, even the purely "technical" aspects of shaping the ranks of the CPSU assume political significance. Therefore, I believe, it would be worth looking at practical experience: What motivates the party organizations by suggesting to someone to join the party? In order to avoid taking on too much, let us limit ourselves to Tula's Tsentralnyy Rayon.

Its territory includes enterprises belonging to 45 different ministries and departments (currently, with a new sectorial structure, this figure has declined slightly). According to the population, it seems to have everything, from a maternity house to a funeral home. The rayon has 249 primary party organizations and 17,600 CPSU members and candidate members. It is a 15 minute walk away from the oblast center, which is the heart of the city—the building of the raykom—to the fortress. The time-weathered wooden homes in small gardens and the old fences are visible from the windows of the office of First Secretary Sergey Ivanovich Kazakov; one can hear dogs bark and roosters crow. A water pump on the street can be seen from the windows.

Rationing for detergent was introduced as of 1 June: 1 kilogram per quarter. Here this appears all the more unnatural, considering that the Novomoskovskbytkhim Association, which produces this newly scarce product, is in the neighborhood. The people of Tula have their air polluted but as to washing detergent.... There is absolutely no soap available in the stores and rationing it was impossible, for the product was unavailable. Patients in hospitals are getting such small bits of soap that one feels

like handling it with forceps. The urban transportation system is overloaded. Store shelves are half empty. The famous Tula gingerbread is a thing of the past.

The economic difficulties and the worsened quality of life are directly affecting the attitude of the people toward the party and the desire to join it. These are the external reasons. Internal reasons exist as well, which are the legacy of decades of allocations. For a long time the numerical growth of party ranks was identified with increasing the party's influence on the life of labor collectives. This growth was artificially stimulated by emphasizing the enrollment of workers. The difference between a person who had worked for 10 to 15 years at a plant and a boy who had just graduated from vocational school was ignored. If a person was a worker, that was fine. Preference was even given to the young: it was "through the Komsomol" that one more person had been recruited.

"Workers were sought wherever possible," recalls G. Nelyubova, instructor at the Tsentralnyy Rayon CPSU Committee. "Every year some 20 cooks would be accepted the moment their 'social status' was recorded. Young salesgirls were encouraged to join the party even after only 1 year on the job."

The allocation system dictated its own "rules of the game." Few people were concerned with the individual qualities or civic stance of the new members, as long as they did not get drunk, were not charged with truancy and behaved modestly in daily life. What mattered was the character reference. The person was pushed into the background, so that he would not bother others with his difficulties and concerns. Other things were more important. Interest in the person ended frequently the moment he received his party card. Here, for example, is what L. Zabneva, an official at the oblast trade management, who had been presented in her time with a medal "For Labor Distinction" and the Leninist Anniversary Medal, said in her petition: "I beg to be released from party membership, for in a period of 7 years I have not had any party obligations (other than to pay my membership dues); I did not attend party meetings either at Khlebtorg or at the trade administration. During that time no one within the party organization paid any attention whatsoever to me, as party member: I was not summoned, I was not asked to do something, I was not assigned anything, I was not punished. I am of no use to the party and I am unwilling to be a ballast...."

Suffice it to flip through the investigation records of people who decided to leave the party to realize how many of them found themselves in the party by accident. It is precisely they who are today returning their party cards. In the first 6 months of this year, in Tula Oblast, 350 people dropped out of the party. How many of them did so after the halo over the heads of the former party and state leaders disappeared and after thieves and bribe takers carrying party cards had been exposed? Only two! What about the rest? Most of them are claiming poor health. They include some who have begun to supplement their

pensions by going back to work. Forty-three people openly stated that they are of no use to the party and consider themselves a ballast. Others have referred to difficulties with housing, the way they were pensioned off, or their indignation at the length of time they had to wait before they could be fitted with false teeth. A young worker, who was oblast soviet deputy, lost all interest in the life of his party organization after receiving an apartment and a telephone. In the past, a physician at the physical culture outpatient clinic believes, some positions required party membership. Since this is no longer the case, it becomes unnecessary to be a party members. Finally, a kolkhoz mechanizer was fired for showing up to work drunk and the party bureau secretary failed to take up his defense. He felt insulted at this type of injustice.

Are these the actions of people with convictions, who do not agree with the current party line or who have critical views about some past events? Were many people deceived during Brezhnev's time? We may not have been familiar with some details or with particularly "notorious" cases, but we nonetheless saw what was going on around us. The fact that in the course of such allocations all of these people found themselves in the party and are now leaving its ranks is no catastrophe. What is worse is something else: they contributed to the fact that the party organizations became "infected" with a passive attitude, which is affecting particularly painfully the present political situation. Here is an example of this fact:

In Shop No 5 of the Oktava Association, the workers issued an ultimatum to the administration: either improve working conditions or we stop the machines. Plans, formulated regardless of real possibilities had made it necessary steadily to increase the volume of output, leaving no time for the reconstruction of production facilities. Ever new equipment was being installed in the narrow premises, and the obsolete ventilation system was simply unable to cope. The dissatisfaction which was building up in the people turned, in the final account, into an open protest. The shop managers made it clear that the radical solution of the problem could be achieved only as follows: remove half of the machine tools from the shop and organize the work in two shifts. This solution was not liked, and one of the "temporary systems" was chosen instead.

What drew my attention to this story was the total lack of involvement of the party organization. The conflict split the collective into two camps: workers and members of the administration. What about the party members? They were unable (nor did they try) to prevent the outbreak of discontent. A frank discussion with shop managers could have taken place earlier, at a party meeting. Furthermore, even the "temporary solution" could, naturally, lead to an aggravation of the situation in the collective. However, the party organization was unable to settle the question which concerned the people. Nor did it become involved in the course of the sharp discussions. Perhaps it is precisely the party members who should have agreed to work the second shift, which was rejected by the majority of the workers. However,

not a single one among them was in fact willing to be "in the leading ranks" and "in the most difficult sectors."

"The worst legacy was the practice of staffing the party ranks—the loss by the party organizations of a work style and methods inherent in a political organization," believes Yu. Litvintsev, first secretary of the Tula CPSU Obkom. "They are dealing primarily with economic affairs and have mastered purely economic approaches to the solution of problems. Economic topics are discussed at party meetings. To a certain extent they have forgotten that they are political organizations. They have assumed dispatching functions instead of doing leading and guiding work."

Naturally, economic concerns are important and the party cannot isolate itself from them, the more so since in a number of cases no absolute separation is possible between economic and political problems. Take the lack of soap in Tula stores: is this an economic or a political matter? There is no person in Tula Oblast who could remain unaffected by the scarcity of soap. What about emissions from metallurgical and chemical enterprises, which harm the people's health? In what area of interest can they have been classified: ecological, social or political? Whether we like it or not, economic problems must be solved but with the choice of competent cadres and the formulation of a socioeconomic policy consistent with the interests of the people. It is precisely specific political programs and answers to the most topical problems of interest to society and extensive and open discussion of even the most sensitive topics that are expected of a political organization. If all of this is present, there also is the matter of prestige and the desire to become part of an organization which can and does accomplish a great deal. Otherwise everything becomes clear soon enough: life goes on and the given group of people exists as though outside it, in a world of its own. There is no faith in that group, there is no faith in what it proclaims. This is a natural human reaction.

"My loss of faith occurred in the same way that it has occurred and is occurring now among people on our educational level. It seems to me, in the majority of cases, it is as follows: the people live like everyone else, and everyone else lives on the basis of principles which not only have nothing in common with the catechism but is even mostly in conflict with it; such catechism does not become involved with life; it never clashes in relations with other people and within its own life it never has to deal with people; such a catechism is preached somewhere away from life and despite life." These are lines borrowed from Leo Tolstoy's *"Confession."* It seems to me that this helps to explain a few things in the current attitude toward the party.

"This attitude can be changed if the party organizations learn how to solve the troublesome problems," believes S. Kazakov, first secretary of Tula's Tsentralnyy CPSU Raykom. "We are trying to enhance our authority through specific actions."

Most of the enterprises and organizations in Tsentralnyy Rayon are small. Only 12 out of 280 labor collectives have the capability of building their own houses. The rest are forced to rely on the very limited centralized sources. The party raykom was able to find a way to concentrate the forces and facilities of all, and to involve all enterprises in solving this most pressing social problem. Through joint efforts, eight labor collectives located in the Skuratovskiy Settlement were able to develop their own construction section and have started building their first house. Another 37 enterprises have joined forces within another construction cooperative. They will build three residential houses. In order to supply the builders with bricks, the Oruzheynyy Plant and 16 other organizations have leased a shop from the Tula Bricks Plant and are reconstructing it.

Equally important is the fact that obligations have been clearly defined. The raykom formulates socioeconomic programs and their practical implementation and dealing with specific economic problems become the job of a specially created rayon state-cooperative association in charge of solving social problems. Its administrative apparatus consists of 16 people. All of them are well-paid skilled specialists, earning as much as 400 rubles monthly. The funds for this were provided by the council of directors and chairmen of the councils of the rayon's labor collectives.

The principle of concentrating efforts was applied also in improving population food supplies. Everyone is involved in building the rayon greenhouse combine on an area of 6 hectares, which will be significantly more profitable than the small plant greenhouses. One member of the rayon party committee bureau has been assigned to each microrayon. He regularly meets with the population of the microrayon, hears out complaints and wishes, and tries to help. Kazakov recalled that at the first such meeting only "a few old women" came to him; now there are quite a number of people of all ages and professions. Feedback has been organized as well: Sergey Ivanovich not only hears out the population but also describes what he has been able to accomplish.

I believe that such concern shown by the rayon party organization is enhancing its reputation in the eyes of the people and affecting the attitude toward it. Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich Chukin, brigade leader at the Tulas-troymashavtomatizatsiya Installation and Tuning Operations Administration, explained his wish to become CPSU member with the fact that now the party organization can help organize the work in their collective which has converted to leasing, and improve life in the rayon. Aleksandr Viktorovich Sakharov, machinist at the Oruzheynyy Plant, believes that by becoming a party member he will be able to be more useful and active in changing working and living conditions in his shop and in creating an atmosphere in which work will improve. In his view, the party organization alone can solve the most pressing problems facing the collective. Both Chukin and Sakharov have decades of labor seniority.

They are quite well aware of what is what in life and yet it is only now that they have decided to join the party.

A similar topic was discussed by a recent candidate party member, E. Zarechnev, chief of sector at the design bureau of the Oktava Association. Twenty years ago Eduard Borisovich applied for party membership but was not accepted due to the schedule of allocations. Now he has submitted a second request. "Now, within the rank of the party organization, one can really influence social life," he said. Is this a coincidence? Hardly.

It is equally no accident, in my view, that requests to join the party are now being submitted primarily by people who are consciously joining the party. This can be felt by the nature of the petitions themselves. The abstract cliché of "I want to be in the front ranks" is today virtually absent and so are statements, as though copied from others. "The decision to join the party matured in me long and firmly. Events of recent years, which are drastically changing life in the country and the party, have strengthened my aspiration to be in the ranks of the active fighters for the implementation of the objectives and tasks of perestroyka. I will apply in their implementation my entire experience and dedicate my entire knowledge and, if needed, I will wage a persistent and uncompromising struggle," V. Pronin, major in the militia, wrote.

The past, however, is desperately clinging to the present and hanging on. Frequently today's ills are the price one has to pay for yesterday's short-sightedness. The decision to abandon allocations was made in Tula Oblast after the 19th All-Union Party Conference. No special document was drafted on this topic, nor was one received. They summoned the party aktiv and agreed to put an end to such practices. Today party committees on different levels do not say who precisely should be accepted. They do not order investigations "for specific people." Substantial opportunities have become possible to eliminate the former distortions. For example, in some schools and medical institutions in Tula's Tsentralnyy Rayon the average age of the party members has reached 59-60. Where are the young?

It may have seemed that now, when restrictions have been lifted, teachers, physicians, scientists and engineers would flood the party bureaus with petitions. However, this did not take place. Work with people is much more complex and delicate than it was in the past and errors in such work are much more difficult to correct. If we tell a person that he is unsuitable for the party because of some kind of statistical parameters, it would be vain to expect of him to reapply. Several teachers at School No 20 in Tula's Tsentralnyy Rayon wanted to join the party but were prohibited because of regulations. Now they were offered this opportunity but, in turn, they refused. The point here was not one of insult. The past refusal triggered in those teachers a much more complex range of feelings, which influences their present mood. In

School No 31 as well a discussion with 12 teachers yielded little. Only one of them said that he will think about it.

Have we eliminated the lack of attention to the individual, as a result of the allocations? Is this a living, complex, individual, made of contradictions, and not a smooth referential unit of interest to the party organizations? How strongly we would have liked to say "yes." For the time being, however, such an interest has only been proclaimed by the party committees. That is not the same thing.

"As in the past, in accepting a new party member there is no discussion with him about his views, concerns, doubts and, finally, his own life," said V. Kuznetsov, head of the organizational department of the Tsentralnyy CPSU Raykom. "It is difficult to instill the understanding of the fact that it is precisely this that matters and not asking the standard questions as stipulated in the statutes and the program."

We have heard party workers say that the process itself of accepting new members is excessively obstructed by all kinds of formalities. Is it of such basic importance for the recommendation to be written precisely in violet ink? Who invented this? Would anyone be able to explain why there must be three recommendations and not, let us say, two or four? An engineer I know tried to take his picture for the party card wearing a jumper but the photographic studio refused. They claimed that such a photograph will not be accepted by the raykom. The subject had to wear a jacket and a tie. Why this attraction for a uniform? One could think that these are "petty" matters but we seem to be trying to suppress anything live with formalism.

This also applies to demands made of members at party meetings to interpret one or another paragraph of the statutes or stipulation in the program. At a time when semiliterate people were joining the party it made sense to know whether they could read said documents or not, although even then, I think, it was much more important not to memorize but to understand. What about now.... The audience becomes uncomfortable when such a test is given to a person with higher training. However, such is the rule, and it must be included in the minutes. Therefore, they divide the questions to be asked among them and frequently inform the candidate in advance of the questions he will be asked and then, when their turn comes, the people ask their questions and it is thus determined who can be a party member.

"I recently attended a party meeting at the Elegant Association," V. Kuznetsov went on to say. "A young working girl was being accepted from candidate member to full membership. It was the same 'system': an autobiography, followed by questions and then a vote. Did those who were in the hall care about what she had seen, thought about and understood during her candidacy and what had touched her? To this day we keep using,

whether pertinent or not, the words 'party comradeship.' Is this the way we choose our friends in life?"

I recalled these words by Vladimir Ivanovich in the course of our discussion at the Experimental Design Bureau of the former USSR Minuralsidstroy, which is one of the 18 organizations in Tsentralnyy Rayon dealing with sectorial science. Sergey Petrovich Yegorov, a young design engineer, refused to become a member of the CPSU in this small design bureau which, for quite some time, had not accepted a single new party member. He was conscientious and skilled and Chief Engineer O. Solovyev considers him to be the leading candidate for department chief. Sergey is an active person. In the course of the electoral campaign he managed a group of agitators and, according to Yu. Novoselov, deputy party bureau secretary, worked hard. Most of that work was done during his leisure time. If he failed to find someone at home, he took time off to locate him. Then, all of a sudden, at the end of his candidate period, "I shall not join the party," he said. Why?

Naturally, all those who should have talked to him did so: the head of department at the design bureau (who is also the party bureau secretary), the deputy secretary in charge of organizational work and the chief engineer. What was the result of the talks? Later, the secretary said: I do not know what happened to him. The chief engineer believed that it was the press that influenced Sergey's decision. The deputy secretary reported the following dialogue: "I asked him: you truly do not want to? 'Yes,' he said." Why insist, since he had thought about it.

Yegorov told the raykom party instructor something entirely different: "I feel that there is nothing that I can change. How can one live this way, when the ruble rules everything else?" He started saying that the aspiration to earn more is becoming the meaning of life of the people while the party organization remains unconcerned by this fact. He could not fight this alone. Naturally, Sergey could be blamed for the decision he had made. In this case, however, I was interested in the reaction of the others. I repeated his words to the management of the design bureau and their answer was that wages are not keeping up with increased labor productivity. They even named figures: 26 and 66 percent....

Abandoning the system of allocations has made the following question pressing: What to replace it with? What should the party organizations do: wait for Chukin, Sakharov, Zarechnev or Pronin to submit their petitions or else try to recruit the worthiest among them? Who specifically? Should this consideration be granted to all or should someone be given preference? On what considerations should this be based? Should the party organizations formulate a policy for the structuring of their ranks?

These are by no means simple questions. After the old approaches governing new party membership were dropped, as stipulated at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, some party officials have simply removed

themselves from this most important matter. If a person wants to become a communist and is suitable, we shall accept him. Why persuade him if he does not express such a wish? We have democracy. Such a superficial understanding of the democratization of party life could substantially affect the condition of the party organizations. What, to do? What could be used to replace allocations? Since theory does not provide an answer, let us turn to practical experience. Let us consider on what the people of Tula base their actions.

"I am a supporter of regulating the growth of party ranks," A. Firiyulin, first secretary of the Tula City Party Committee said. "There must be strict control in this matter. I believe that regulations should not make anyone indignant. A party has the inherent right to decide who should be accepted in its ranks. As it were, there is quite a lot of bandwagon jumping. We must not ignore this. Naturally, however, the former allocations—even if it costs you your life give two-thirds of the membership to workers—are inadmissible. What should guide us in our practical actions? We have chosen the following guideline: the structure of a party organization should be consistent with the social structure of the labor collective. You will agree that it is abnormal for a scientific research institute, for example, to have 80 percent of employees and less than 50 percent employee membership in the party. Furthermore, we must not coerce scientists to accept as CPSU members literally all workers at the institute."

These views are shared by many party workers in Tsentralnyy Rayon, although by no means by all. A somewhat different viewpoint is also quite popular: we should accept as party members anyone who supports the present political line and is prepared to defend it and to implement it. This was said by V. Kuznetsov, head of the organizational department of the raykom, and V. Goryukhin, party committee secretary of the Tula Arms Plant. Similar thoughts were also expressed by Yu. Litvintsev, first secretary of the Tula CPSU Obkom: "The social composition which develops in the party should not bother us. The ideological, the moral-political approach should be the basis for membership."

Gennadiy Mikhaylovich Novichkov, party bureau secretary of Medical Sanitation Unit No 7, is convinced that it is necessary to accept in the party above all those who, through their personal interests and active civic stance, could enhance the authority of the party organization. He personally tries to attract precisely this type of people. A. Barantsev, department head of the unit, recently noted that Aleksandr Viktorovich is not only a first-rate specialist but also a person who has a broader concept of his duty as a physician than stipulated in his official job instructions. For example, on his own initiative he organized an emergency center for dental aid. Now even in the middle of the night one can go to a physician. The high reputation he enjoys in his circle is no accident. The same could be said about another new member of the party organization at the Medical Sanitation Unit No 7, department head Tatyana

Vladimirovna Kalayeva. She is, as they say, a surgeon with a divine gift: she is the only one in Tula Oblast who can perform certain surgeries.

You will agree that such views on recruiting party members are somewhat unusual. The rejection of traditional views is obvious. Nonetheless, the past shows up here and there in the present complex searches for a new strategy for party recruitment. What should be abandoned and what should be kept in the future? Are all of yesterday's practices unsuitable? In the course of a discussion I accidentally found out that I. Fateyeva, head of the party registration sector of Privokzalnyy CPSU Raykom in Tula takes food every day to two party veterans who have trouble walking. Irina Nikolayevna assumed no obligations whatsoever; she does not file any reports on "work done," and does not speak of charity at public discussions. Helping people comes natural to her. Were those who, at the time of allocations, accepted for party membership a person such as Irina Nikolayevna Fateyeva wrong?

Again and again the topic of enrolling workers in the CPSU came up in discussions. "We are quite concerned by the fact that they come to us unwillingly," S. Kazakov admitted. Is this concern far-fetched? In creating the party, V.I. Lenin aspired to have the working class as its social foundation and to organize it "on an entirely clear and strictly class foundation..." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 14, p 80). The reasoning was that it was precisely that class that was the most revolutionary force in society. However, a great deal has changed in the country in the past decades, including in the area of industrial output. A person handling an electronically controlled machine tool frequently has not secondary technical but engineering training. We cannot fail to see the heterogeneous nature of the present working class even within a single large plant. All of this has led to discussions on its changed role in society, the "lack of worker status," and the passive attitude of the workers. People began to doubt whether it was all that important to give priority to workers in party recruitment.

To a certain extent, the recent miners' strikes answered these social science arguments. Yes, they caused a great deal of economic harm to the country, which was justifiably pointed out. However, if we recall the demands of the miners, essentially they were not against the policy of perestroika. Their main demand was granting the mines the rights of a state enterprise and economic independence. No other social strata expressed their discontent with the course of economic perestroika in such a sharp manner. Nonetheless, these miners displayed a sense of organization and conscious discipline. They firmly assumed power in the mining cities and settlements and secured model order in such a tense atmosphere. Is this not proof that the working class remains the most active force in our society? If such is the case, it is precisely this on which the party should rely above all, recalling in this case what V.I. Lenin meant by the concept "worker." "...The concept 'worker' must be such as to suit only those who in fact, based on their position in life, develop a proletarian mentality" (op. cit., vol 45, p 20).

My Tula interlocutors frequently recalled the old truth that there is nothing more practical than a good theory. A string of questions appeared in their minds, to which there were no answers in the works of social scientists or political experts. What does a political party mean today? What is its role and what are its functions? What type of society do we wish to create as a result of perestroika. Why are we embarrassed sometimes to rely on Marxist-Leninist methodology in the study of contemporary social processes? Has some part of that ideology become distorted? Which precisely? Could it be that we have not understood it fully? Finally, one must clearly determine what it is that we understand by "socialism?" These may appear to be purely theoretical problems. However, they directly influence the growth of party ranks as well. For example, G. Novichkov said that the lack of answers to such questions frequently repels, as he has noted, civically active people from the party. They prefer informal organizations in which everything is quite specifically and intelligibly formulated.

No one had propagandized Vasilii Ivanovich Baturin. He decided on his own to approach the party bureau secretary of the administration of Tulastroymashavtomatizatsiya, saying that he wanted to join the party. By that time he was already past 50 and had slightly over 4 years left before retirement: gas cutters are deservedly retired at the age of 55. What had motivated him to take this step? He explained it as follows: "I watched the congress on television and decided that the party must be helped." He explained that although now is a difficult time for the party, it is nonetheless doing good work.

Baturin is one of those people who, as they say, has his two feet firmly planted on the ground. He knows life well and life has not always treated him kindly. He told me from the heart that life was becoming increasingly difficult and that instead of relaxing after work he had to run around in search of food, which exhausts him both physically and spiritually. He sharply criticized errors in the implementation of the economic reform and complained that there were no improvements in the life of the people. Nonetheless, he approached the party bureau secretary precisely now, whereas during relatively "abundant times" he did not think of it. Why? He believed that the party is doing what is necessary and that the difficulties which have appeared on the commodity market are superseded by something which is bigger and more important. How did he intend to help it? Vasilii Ivanovich did not know how to answer this. He believed, however, that merely by joining the CPSU now this would be of some help.

I am confident that such will indeed be the case if the party organization would assign him work which he likes and which he can do, as would be the case with anyone who joins the party today.

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DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES

Party History: Development Conditions

905B0010E Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 37-46

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[Text] The science of party history, which is engaged in the study of the history of the ruling party or, more honestly speaking, which spends decades defending it, not only found itself in a worsening condition of crisis. It also had a negative impact on the situation in the other social disciplines. That is why the developing perestroika in party history science and taking it back to a strictly scientific path would, unquestionably, contribute to the development of the other social science areas.

Without claiming to encompass all pressing problems, the authors will try to answer two questions. First, why is it that so far party history science has been unable to develop its own scientific personality? Second, what combination of conditions is necessary in order to achieve a breakthrough in this scientific discipline?

"Science of Instruction" and Ideological Myth Making

Today the question which is asked quite frequently and justifiably is the following: How did it happen that CPSU history, instead of becoming a truly humanitarian discipline found itself in the position of some kind of politicized mutant: neither social science nor history? Lacking a set of political study tools, party history science was forced to interpret and comment on the entire array of social phenomena exclusively through the lens of CPSU policy. Instead of undertaking the scientific study of history, ideological incantations about "Marxist-Leninism in action and creative development" became its lot. Since the concept of the division of functions between party and state authorities, which was formulated as early as 1919, at the 8th RKP(b) Congress was never implemented, having assumed economic functions, the party actually became a party-state. It was the approval given to this political aberration as being the standard, as some kind of law of "party leadership," that actually shaped that discipline, which was assigned the duty of substantiating that which did not fit the Leninist concepts of the role of the party in the social process and which, in practical affairs, brought about severe negative consequences which became fully apparent only during perestroika.

Another very frequently asked question today is the following: Could the science of history be considered a

discipline if the scientific nature itself of its sources becomes questionable? It is by no means accidental that there is an actual lack of historical-party source studies. Essentially, it could not exist, for it presumed the scientific criticism of sources. The result was a real paradox: according to chronicles and ancient manuscripts the study of history sources could be carried out; however there were no sources whatsoever dealing with the party programs.

Bearing in mind the humanistic traditions of Russian literature, F. Dostoyevskiy wrote that all Russian writers came out of Gogol's overcoat. In the case of party historians who were quite remote from humanistic traditions, we should acknowledge that they came out of the "Short Course." It was precisely in that "workshop" that the uniforms of the detachment of propagandists of Stalinist policy were sewed. Anyone who stood out in a different uniform was considered a scout for the enemy force and the chance that this uniform would be changed for a concentration camp jacket was entirely realistic. Even later, in the 1970s, there was full justification for the then popular "black humor" joke to the effect that society, like a miner, can make only one mistake in life.

The question, however, is how could one seriously demand of party history to be a science in the full meaning of the term, if for many years materials not only of Central Committee sessions but even of raykoms were stamped "secret," and all references to such documents were forbidden? And if in archive storage areas vigilant controllers (by no means motivated by their own "ill" will) thoroughly checked any transcripts made by researchers? Any truth considered "negative" or any fact which described the "kitchen" of internal party relations was inevitably stamped unnecessary and removed from the notebooks submitted for censorship. Even a professional term—"noodles"—appeared as a result; that is what became of paper sheets after their ideological vivisection. May we be forgiven this slang term, but it is precisely such "noodles" that the social scientists kept "hanging on the ears" of the country's citizens. The prescription manual for such actions was drafted and refined starting with the second half of the 1920s. After Stalin's letter to the journal *PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA* and particularly after the publication of the "Short Course of History of the VKP(b)," the Stalinist concept of party history and authoritarian methods in guiding the social sciences as a whole were asserted in historiography.

However, it would be somewhat simplistic to reduce all the reasons for the situation in which party history found itself to the "Short Course." To a certain extent, this "catechism of the cult of personality," as was quite accurately described by a contemporary researcher, was largely the result of previous processes. As a whole, while showing proper respect for the publications of the start of the 1920s, we must nonetheless admit that as a scientific discipline party history science did not develop during

that time as well. Research was not based on the full array of documents. There was a selective, apportioned approach to their issuance and corresponding description. The newly developing historical party science became politicized from the very beginning, assuming the expository and frequently prosecutorial tone toward some people and events and apologetic one toward other. The fact that it had adopted as "scientific" instruments the terms and epithets which Lenin and his fellow workers used in specific situations and ideological debates, which frequently took place in an emotionally charged atmosphere but, naturally, never raised them to the point of absolutes, did not contribute in the least to the development of party history discipline precisely as a scientific type of history.

After the 20th Party Congress certain positive changes took place in party history science. The access to sources was broadened. Researchers paid greater attention to the study of the Leninist theoretical legacy and to the methodology of party history science. Work was enhanced in the field of historiography, source studies and party building. However, during that time as well party historians were nonetheless unable to surmount many of the old dogmatic concepts, stereotypes and cliches which had become firmly established in the people's minds. One could feel the separation of theoretical postulates from real practice. There was no interaction between the true and the merely proclaimed social experience in the life of Soviet society and in the science of party history.

Today the scientists must analyze more carefully the reasons for which, after the 20th CPSU Congress, the conceptual breakthrough was not followed up. Naturally, a great deal depended on the personal views and the system of political and moral guidelines of the leadership during the period of the "thaw." This refers, above all, to N.S. Khrushchev and his circle. As the social products of the preceding age, they were unwilling or, perhaps, unable to trust that the past would be accurately reinterpreted. That is why neither the CPSU Central Committee Resolution "On Surmounting the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" nor the report which N.S. Khrushchev submitted at the 20th Party Congress were able to break the back of the Stalinist party history studies. In criticizing the term "enemies of the people," said party documents actively used the term "enemies of Leninism." Furthermore, Stalin's guilt was reduced to the fact that he had allegedly allowed only "distortions" in the struggle against the real enemies of socialism and used in his own personal interests the results of defending the party's "general line."

The main factor which hindered the scientific and honest reinterpretation of the past was the inconsistency of the policy of reform itself, which was carried out between the end of the 1950s and beginning of 1960s. This is related above all to the fact that the Stalinist dogmata on the development of society were not eliminated. Obviously, it was no accident that in writing the fourth chapter of the "Short Course," Stalin omitted the law of negation of the negation. The main stumbling

block for virtually all of Lenin's fellow workers was the appeal of the dying leader of the revolution radically to review the old views on socialism, which prevailed immediately after the October Revolution. Logically, Lenin's last works developed the idea of a new model of party and state, stipulating above all the promotion of true collective leadership in the party and real social democracy. However, this fitted neither the concept of progress toward socialism through a "revolutionary" leap which had been established during the period of "war communism" (for it presumed a gradual, an evolutionary development of socialist changes), nor the authoritarian ambitions of various party leaders who had joined in the active struggle for power. Virtually identical concepts were applied also during the reform period of the 1950s and beginning of 1960s. As in the past, the communist ideal was considered a given, and the search for structural changes in the party and society was not backed by the development of a truly democratic mechanism for party and social life.

All of this could not fail to influence sociohistorical thinking. The latter was unable to reject the stereotypes of the past. The concept that the ruling party would assume all functions made it incumbent upon its historians again and again to substantiate the concept of the steady increase increase in the leading role of the CPSU. This made it impossible to reflect the actual dialectics of the development of party and society and to interpret the contradictions of the experience they had acquired. Life changed but the science which studied party history applied not an anticipatory but a catching up model.

The result of all this was turning in circles. We know that any unsupported radical change is fraught with a recoil. Inconsistent de-Stalinization developed into re-Stalinization during the period of "stagnation." No particularly profound analysis is necessary to prove this. Suffice it to look at all seven editions of the CPSU history textbook. For the sake of fairness we should take out of the safes of the directive-issuing organizations the galleys of the various alternate texts drafted by the groups of authors with the notes made by the authorities concerning the ideological and political areas.

Naturally, the simplest thing would have been to accuse the social scientists themselves, to make them the scapegoats, for all the misadventures in party history and the other social sciences. Without rejecting the general responsibility for what I and my colleagues did, we must point out that for a long period of time true science and real knowledge were simply considered unnecessary and, therefore, no one demanded them. Many were the constructive ideas and sensible suggestions which were "deleted" by editorial staffs and reviewers at publishing houses and journals! Many were the materials which, as they made their way "upward" were filed away!...

Naturally, it would be incorrect not to note the positive aspects which occurred during the period of the "liberal

spring" and even in the 1970s, for serious and conscientious scientists as well were at work. As a whole, however, their work reminded one of the efforts of a creative blade of grass to pierce through the asphalt of dogmatism.

In his June 1989 speech at the Moscow Higher Party School, G.A. Yagodin, chairman of the State Committee for Public Education, said that American secondary school students who were training in the USSR were amazed, more than anything else, at the attitude of their Soviet coevals about prompting. The Americans could not accept at all that a prompted answer is a normal phenomenon and not a harmful procedure which deprived the individual of the chance to mature properly. Yet both the study and, particularly, the teaching of party history had become for many years in our country an endless class lesson with prompting and instructing.

Ways of Solving the Crisis

The methodological principles and system-forming nodes, which have been "worked out" in studies on the general theoretical level should have long become in reality the bearing structures of the entire building of party history science. A great deal of accurate statements had been made on the principles of historicism and objectivity and the need to observe them. Yet, to this day, historiographic practices are quite far from applying said principles in their specific studies. For many years a sliding empiricism and departmental-regional ideological slogans prevailed in works on CPSU history, such as "party leadership... of industry, transportation and fishing... (based on the materials of a Union republic, an autonomous republic, an oblast, etc.)."

It is hardly necessary to especially prove that party history science cannot come out of its state of crisis without the development of a conceptual-category apparatus, which would adequately reflect objective historical processes. The new political thinking leads us to consider concepts which seemed axiomatic in the past and which, furthermore, had become a kind of verbal fetish, such as "party of a new type," "steadily increasing role of the CPSU," "monolithic unity" and "the full and definitive victory of socialism."

For example, let us consider the Bolshevik Party as a party of a new type. The assertion of this term in the "Short Course" was related to the Sixth Prague Conference; in the 1950s and 1960s it was shifted to the Second RSDWP Congress. The CPSU Central Committee Resolution on the 80th anniversary of the Second RSDWP Congress included a list of components of the concept of a "party of a new type," which, by then, were different from the stereotypes. According to them, the bolsheviks were strictly pitted, on the one hand, against the parties of the Second International and, on the other, the old Russian social democratic movement. This belittled the significance of the First Congress of the RSDWP and the entire experience in party building of the international social democratic movement. We should also consider

whether by using the concept of "new type" of political party we are not replacing essential characteristics with attributive features.

For a long time the concept of two models of a party was instilled in the social awareness: opportunistic and revolutionary. This violated the officially proclaimed principle of historicism, for it was not accepted that there were different trends within a single party. It was as though the parties belonging to the Second International were classified as opportunistic from the very first, and tending to betray the interests of the working class, although this was inconsistent with Lenin's views held until 1914. At the same time, from the very moment of their appearance, the mensheviks were classified among the petit bourgeois opportunistic parties and in Soviet historiography were pitted against the bolsheviks throughout the revolutionary activities of the RSDWP. Essentially, texts described the Social Democratic Party as though in three hypostases: the RSDWP itself, the bolsheviks and the mensheviks.

One of the sharp problems of party history science is that of party-mindedness and factionalism. In identifying the meaning and correlation between these two terms in his article "Notification on the Conference of the Expanded Editorial Staff of PROLETARIY," Lenin pointed out that "the party could encompass an entire range of shades, the extremes of which could even be sharply opposed to each other" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 19, p 6). In connection with the fact that throughout the entire time until 1917 bolsheviks and mensheviks were factions within the RSDWP, he emphasized that a faction is not a party. It is a group of like-minded people set up "with a view to influencing, above all, the party in a certain direction and promoting within the party its own principles as unadulterated as possible" (ibid., pp 6-7). Therefore, Lenin deemed possible the existence of different factions and trends within the party (presuming, naturally, that there would be sharp clashes among them), proceeding from the fact that in creating them their supporters have the legitimate right to promote their own separate interpretations of views and tactics.

The following question arises: Are we not continuing by inertia and in harmony with the dogmas included in the "Short Course," which, among others, was called upon "historically to substantiate" the processes of dealing with political opponents, to promote precisely those aspects in the history of our party related to the confrontation between bolsheviks and mensheviks? We selectively use some of Lenin's statements, and ignore other. For example, Lenin's work "One Step Forward and Two Steps Back" has long become in our country a basic aid in the study of the organizational principles of a party of a new type. However, should we not take into consideration the historical conditions under which this work was written, the gravity and complexity of the situation within the party, and Lenin's tremendous emotional investment? That which was written under circumstances of the passions seething in the political struggle

was adopted as a standard of Lenin's understanding of a number of basic questions of party life. At that time he argued quite heatedly and sharply but not with the enemies but with his comrades; he argued with a view to preserving the unity of the working class and its party. We stubbornly ignore the fact that "One Step Forward Two Steps Back" means "leaning the other way" in answer to the organizational excesses of the opponents; we ignore the fact that Lenin himself, in re-editing this work for reprinting in 1907, deemed it necessary to delete many polemical aspects it contained.

The development of a conceptual-category apparatus calls for a new approach to the sources which are the foundations of party history science. The periodicals have already discussed the principles governing preparations for the sixth publication of Lenin's complete collected works and the minutes of party congresses and conferences and Central Committee plenums. In this connection, objectively we believe that the time has come to publish precisely academic publications, i.e., those which contain the sum not only of the basic but also the preparatory materials. Furthermore, in our view, it would be expedient in the study of the history of the RSDWP and the RKP(b) to publish documents of other political parties and organizations which were active at that time.

One of the problems of party history science, which are assuming a leading position based on the priorities of the new political thinking, is the question of the "left bloc" Leninist tactic. Frequently this left-bloc tactic is reduced only to certain stages in the pre-October period of party history. Yet, in our opinion, this tactic had substantially broader chronological limits. As it changed, it also operated during the period of the socialist revolution and the years which followed. This was expressed in the fact that representatives of several parties became members of the All-Union Central Executive Committee and the Sovnarkom and became involved in the events which occurred in the Far Eastern, Tuva, Bukhara and Khiva Soviet Republics. Party history science has not paid the proper attention so far not only to the political but also to the social foundation of the "left bloc," or determined the trend toward cooperation among all parties which were members of the revolutionary-democratic camp. This problem includes matters which are becoming today topics of sharp discussions within our society. A professional historian cannot ignore them. Above all, this applies to a number of essential aspects in the establishment of a one-party system in our country. Let us consider the as yet clearly insufficiently studied slogan of the "homogeneous socialist government." It is interpreted in literature only as a means of removing the bolsheviks from power "peacefully." Yet discussions within the party on this matter should be considered precisely as discussions within the framework of the left bloc. Today we must not avoid the study of the speeches of a number of noted leaders of the Bolshevik Party (A. Rykov, G. Zinovyev, L. Kamenev, A. Shlyapnikov, V. Nogin and others) of November 1917, calling for a

coalition among all socialist parties. We need the unprejudiced study of such views which, for a long period of time, were comprehensively evaluated only as "the fleeing of a handful of cowards."

In this connection, today we cannot remain within the limits of the old paradigm of the bolshevik line toward the Constituent Assembly. We have become accustomed automatically to pit parliamentary against Soviet democracy as institutions belonging to opposite social systems. The view of the soviet as something entirely different, unrelated through continuity to parliamentary forms of democracy (the experience of the bolshevik tactic in the Duma as being precisely parliamentarian has obviously remained insufficiently studied) triggered in some bolsheviks a feeling of nihilism, explainable at the time of intoxication with the victory. Twenty years later, however, it became one of the ideological foundations of Stalinist despotism. The fact that the course of convening the Constituent Assembly was used by the counterrevolutionary forces for their own purposes does not relieve historians of the obligation to make a separate study of the question of the mechanism of the relationship between the ruling party and the state authorities under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship. As historical experience indicated, the danger signal, which was not heard by the bolsheviks in the cannonade of the Civil War, thundered after the volleys fired in Kronstadt. We would think that it is hardly possible to deny to all socialist parties the right to have their own view on democracy.

The now accepted method for the study of the development of the party and the formulation of its course, considered from the viewpoint of alternate approaches is of essential significance. To party historians this method is particularly difficult and, to a certain extent, disturbing, for it conflicts with categories which were dogmatically and formalistically interpreted in the past, such as "party unity," "general line," and "collective will." These categories simply had no place for alternatives, for any smack of an alternative was invariably considered exclusively as "deviation" or "opposition." It is clear today that the alternate approach, including the one adopted in the study of further periods in party history, is simply necessary.

We must also eliminate the established stereotypes concerning the so-called "opportunistic groups" within the party in the 1920s. The present study of sources indicates that despite many errors and blunders, we were dealing with normal alternate options and differences in the views held by communists on various problems which were facing the party along its revolutionary path. On this level it is hardly worth it to look for some political criminals in the then intraparty discussions which were taking place.

However, for the time being a number of historians are still unable to outlive the prejudices of the past concerning opposition platforms within the party (above all the "new opposition" and the "Trotsky-Zinovyev bloc")

and to take a more objective look at those events. Basing their views on the dominant features of the "overwhelming party majority" and its "general line," they correspondingly evaluate the actions of the opposition groups exclusively as an unprincipled struggle for leadership.

What can be said on this subject? The struggle for individual leadership unfortunately was waged by the virtually entire party areopagus ("the three," "the seven," etc.). The fact that discussions in the party were stopped initially with "fists" and then "sticks," to begin with, weakened the party itself and distorted its Leninist foundations and Leninist principles of activities. It was this and not the preservation of the misinterpreted "unity," which was by no means understood in its Leninist sense that gave the opponents of socialism their main trump card for a course which, in its Stalinist execution was proclaimed as the "general line," although it indicated a withdrawal from Leninism.

The views and positions held by L. Trotsky deserve a particularly serious and substantive discussion. We must bear in mind that Trotsky is one of the few political leaders who left a tremendous publicistic legacy which makes it possible to determine his conceptual development in close connection with the development of the Russian and global revolutionary process. Generally speaking, we must study not only that which divided Trotsky from Lenin, Zinovyev from Stalin and Bukharin from Pyatakov in the different stages of their political activities, but also that which united them. Unfortunately, even the most recent publications and articles retain the stereotypes concerning the Trotskyite theory of the permanent revolution, Trotsky's activities after returning from exile to Russia in 1917 and his positions on a number of basic political and theoretical problems of the building of socialism.

Let us note that Zinovyev, Kamenev and Stalin artificially inflated the contradictions separating Lenin's from Trotsky's views in the post-October period. It is no accident, in our view, that in 1926 Zinovyev acknowledged that the very term "Trotskyism" had been fabricated with a view to politically discrediting Trotsky. Nonetheless, to this day some authors tend to accept Zinovyev's 1923 views. We find quite incorrect attempts at tracing Trotsky's "antiparty line" to the alleged ties between members of his circle and anti-Soviet emigres. Why, one may ask, already expelled from the USSR, did he not develop any such contacts with White emigre circles? What prevented Trotsky from including in his sharp attacks on Stalin, which were already popular in the emigre press, the version that Stalin had been an agent of the tsarist secret police? He could have promoted this version had he not been reluctant, as early as 1923, to "build bridges" leading to the White emigres.

We should reject as faulty the very idea that some kind of sharp criticism of negative actions by some communists and their aspiration to formulate their own way which may conflict with the opinion of the majority mandatorily "pours grist in the mill of our enemies." Actually, it

is political sanctimoniousness and hypocrisy and the violation of the standards of democracy and moral values that pour such grist.

Glasnost is not simply one of the factors but the main, the mandatory prerequisite for the development of a scientific history of the CPSU. If there are secrets in physics, in the final account they are detrimental to that science. In party history secrets lead to the loss of the subject itself and harm, above all, the party itself. A ruling political organization without its accurate history... what could this be if not, to say the least, nonsense?

No one could or should prohibit the publication of documents found in the archives. No one has the right to hinder communists professionally dealing with the history of their own party to work in archives on any level. This fully applies to departmental archives as well.

In order properly to interpret the historical path covered by the CPSU it is exceptionally important to be familiar with the history of the origins of each party document. Today we are facing the sharp problem of the "moral obsolescence" of such documents. Why is there no system for their classification? Passions are seething today on the resolution "On Party Unity," which was adopted at the 10th RKP(b) Congress. Yet the Central Committee and the RKP(b) Central Control Commission Resolution on Party Building of 5 December 1923 was actually a step forward in the development of internal party democracy. Furthermore, how many CPSU Central Committee decrees have been passed but were not implemented during the period of stagnation? All of them are just as officially valid today since no one has revoked them.

This equally applies to other party documents. We have seen a radical reassessment of events related to the "great change" of 1929. Perhaps it is this type of creative approach, the rejection of dogmatism, that we find most positive and most promising in the party's present political course. We must also be familiar with whose views are reflected in each line of a party document in order not to become once again obedient propagandists operating according to the "at your orders" principle.

Unfortunately, to this day party historians have been unable to create a truly scientific "Chronicle of Party Organizations" from the time they appeared to this day. The result has been that they do not have at their disposal corresponding statistics which would make it possible to determine in their dynamics the processes of internal party life. Thus, the students of the pre-October period of the RSDWP do not have a clear idea either of the typology of the social democratic organizations (bolshevik, menshevik, conciliationists, unificationists, mixed) or the dynamics of their ranks and territorial deployment or else the numerical strength of organizations and parties as a whole, or else the social and national composition of the local organizations. It is perfectly natural for the lack of such type of basic factual data to create a great deal of confusion and, frequently,

to result in misrepresentations. Therefore, the formulation of a scientific program for compiling party chronicles and party statistics is one of the vital tasks in party history science, without which its full development leading to the truth becomes impossible.

It is essentially important and necessary to make use of the arsenal of research facilities which have been acquired and applied in related disciplines. Let us point out just one of them, i.e., the method of comparative analysis. Until recently party history students could not even conceive of the idea of questioning the fact that any party document was not the final truth. They either failed to take into consideration or deliberately ignored different approaches to the solution of tactical problems suggested, for example, by mensheviks or the bolsheviks' allies in the "left bloc"—the S.R. In the final account, this type of approach led to the fact that many-faceted and exceptionally complex objective processes were interpreted as being one-dimensional and simple. A consequence of ignoring alternate options of social development was the fact that the party's strategic and tactical course throughout its existence was depicted as being the only possible and accurate one, consistent with the needs of social development. The comparative method presumes a consideration of the history of the RSDWP as part of a system involving other political forces, and necessitates a comprehensive scientific expert evaluation of the accuracy of the various decisions.

One of the mandatory prerequisites for the successful development of party history science is its democratization. This presumes, above all, the elimination of monopoly. Let us recall the familiar Leninist concept that any monopoly inevitably leads to decay. Unlike other sciences in which different trends and schools develop, for a long period of time CPSU history was completely dominated by a single concept decreed "from above." Yet should not original viewpoints exist within the science of party history? In this respect should it be an exception? Let us recall that in the 1920s there had been textbooks on party history which were used on a parallel basis but which were distinct in terms of their approaches and evaluations. Under the conditions of democratization and glasnost it is important not only to revive the positive research of the 1920s but also to go further along the way of developing competing concepts and creating different trends and schools, as is natural in the development of any true science.

In developing the new concepts on CPSU history, particular attention should be paid to the critical analysis of party history publications. Such "inventory taking" is necessary, to begin with, in order decisively to reject dogmatic systems and remaining stereotypes and, second, for identifying some achievements in the study of various problems. In particular, we must determine the origins of a number of scientifically erroneous concepts and determine who created them, when and under what circumstances were they originated and consolidated within party history science. At the present stage in

its development, we must abandon the overall negative attitude toward foreign non-Marxist historiography and our underestimating of the achievements of foreign Marxist scientists.

Cadre training is a mandatory prerequisite for surmounting stagnation in the science of party history. The contemporary researcher must be quite well-informed in terms of sources and historiography. He must have mastered to perfection the scientific criticism of sources, the means of historiographic analysis, research orientation, information standards, and the latest methods for mathematical processing of sources. Priority is given to the creative development of the researcher, his independent thinking and independent judgments, and his ability to engage in debates with his opponents adequately and with the necessary arguments.

The time has come to distinguish between two concepts which have so far been considered synonymous: "history of the CPSU" and "party history science." The latter concept is, in our view, broader and more meaningful. It includes the histories not only of the RSDWP and the RKP(b) but also of other political parties which functioned in our country. Furthermore, it should be a question of the study of all political forces in our history. Currently the debate on whether CPSU history should be studied in VUZs is still actively taking place and appears to be nearing its resolution. We believe that we do not have to teach it as it was taught in the past. It is hardly worth studying it as suggested in the new order issued by the chairman of the State Committee for Public Education, for here it is a question of some kind of unnatural symbiosis of the history of the USSR, recent and most recent history, and the history of the international communist and worker movements. Are we jumping from a doctrinal to an eclectic discipline? ...In the technical VUZs, it seems to us, the history of the fatherland should be taught, possibly with a particular emphasis on the history of culture. As to the humanitarian VUZs and higher party schools, some of the material which was previously taught in the course on CPSU history should be reassigned among subjects such as party building and political studies. The remaining material should become a structural element of a new discipline—political history of the USSR. In our view, it should consist of the history of political movements and theories, study of political structures at crucial points of social development, revolutions and reforms, etc. Correspondingly, the range of studied sources should change.

Life itself necessarily faced the CPSU with the task of starting perestroika with itself. In this connection we should point out another still not abandoned instructionist cliché: demands that our history be put at the service of Soviet society. The science of history serves society by the fact that it provides an objective and independent analysis of the process of social development. Any other view reduces it to the status of a housemaid who obeys the orders of the "master." This fully applies to party history science, whose slogan should be Lenin's idea that "truth must not depend on

the person it should serve" (op. cit., vol 54, p 446). These words are the political imperative of the new thinking.

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PUBLIC OPINION

Can Philosophy Fall Lower Than Dogmatism?

905B0010F Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 47-51

[Article by A. Nysanbayev, head of the Department of Philosophical Problems of the Natural Sciences, Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor; and F. Suleymanov, senior scientific associate, Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent]

[Text] Looking at today's popular press, it may seem, on the surface, that we are on the eve of an age in which the world, in the words of Marx, will become philosophical, while philosophy will become worldly. Indeed, it has become intellectually fashionable to use the word "philosophy" in describing both globally important things as well as, unfortunately, things which are of short duration and obviously circumstantial. It is somewhat amazing that during perestroika the philosophical summation of spirituality has been almost entirely left to writers, scientists, actors, journalists or simply people with an active life stance, whose voices in numerous official, semiofficial and even informal discussions have stilled the few statements made by professional philosophers.

We can only be pleased by this. However, frequently in the heat of a somewhat one-sided argument, a general image appears in the eyes of the broad public of the Soviet philosopher as a hopeless curator of the spirit of conservatism and dogmatism, so much so that one begins to look both at one's colleagues and at oneself with a feeling of amazement.

Whatever our attitude toward such an image may have been, one thing is unquestionable: the barometer of public opinion indicates that philosophical thinking in our world is rising sharply, while the actual reputation of contemporary philosophy is clearly declining. We are particularly concerned with the situation of the young, in which increasingly the voice of the social science teacher who interprets the philosophical values of our society is being interrupted with the replica: "Do not teach me how to live; instead, help me materially."

Obviously, under these circumstances it is high time to have a serious discussion about professional problems related to Marxist-Leninist theory itself, toward which in our country, strange though it might seem, there also has developed a kind of residual principle. The fact that such a discussion has already been initiated, including in *KOMMUNIST*, is a pleasing feature, for there can be no rich spiritual life in a society which has not dealt with the

problems of its mass philosophy and with whether it brings to light profound values concerning the meaning of life and the personality area or sets guidelines for expressing itself in a changing world and expressing the world through its own changes.

Naturally, we notice an increasing revival in professional philosophical circles. However, if we look at the participants in debates, we unwittingly think of expressions, such as "a narrow group of such people," and frequently of the fact that they are "remote from the people." Furthermore, the views held by some of our colleagues remind us of those held by Hegel in some aspects. It is said that, to the offer to present his views in a popular publication in French, the great German dialectician proudly answered that this philosophy can be presented neither briefly nor popularly and even less so in the French language. However, since April 1985 there has been such a strong "intellectual uprising of the masses" that few people find such Hegelian argumentation convincing.

In terms of universal spirituality, philosophy must be neither exclusive nor elitist. Therefore, it should find a practical implementation not only in texts, or scientific debates on the fine points of one definition or another but, above all, in social life, in the personal way of life of the individual who assumes responsibility for the further destiny of our civilization. Vulgarizing and primitivizing the link between philosophy and life is very dangerous for here, as in any other area of universal human activities, professionalism determines the final success. The situation with professionalism in our philosophical science is, to put it mildly, no better than the situation in other material areas in our society. It is precisely this circumstance that, in our view, shapes the negative attitude of some people toward the dogmatized concepts expressed in textbooks, concepts which for decades were presented as the essence of Marxist philosophy.

Could it be that a high professional standard has simply not been reached in Soviet philosophy? In any case, that is probably what those who suggest that society and the individual should be interpreted without any kind of conceptual speculations but through a variety of technical models and systems believe. Essentially, such a conviction is shared by many students of society and man in the humanitarian areas, among whom the expression of "contemporary philosophy" occasionally assumes a condescending meaning.

What is taking place in Soviet philosophical science? Roughly speaking, the situation reminds us somewhat of a sport (may we be forgiven for this comparison by our respective colleagues who, in the quiet of their offices and reading rooms, have begun to forget that the word "philosophy," as Pithagoras confirms, was born in the sports grounds, in the stream of thoughts on the vanity of ordinary life). There have been, and still are today talented and trained philosophers in our country. However, on the scale of social needs they are clearly in short supply, the more so since many of them are totally

involved in strictly professional activities, removing themselves from the concerns of the outside world. Why is it not a sport? On the one hand, we have professional stars; on the other, we have "mass physical culture," i.e., something in which millions of people engage, people whose labor supports society.

What does physical culture have to do with it, we seem to be hearing indignant voices, considering that we are discussing problems of philosophy and considering that our society has invested tremendous efforts in the study of Marxist-Leninist theory? This is precisely the way it appears: indeed, millions of people, starting with the social science course in secondary schools and, subsequently, in a VUZ or in any other educational institution, master the foundations, so to say, of mass philosophical knowledge. Statistically, everything in our country seems to be in order: every year more millions of excellent or, at worst, satisfactory graduates come out of the numerous schools of different kinds, having fully mastered the "mass philosophy" course, as is eloquently stipulated in their certificate, diploma or any other such respected document.

All of this is fine, but here is a puzzle: Why is it that after the study of such "mass philosophy" there exists a no less widespread antisocial behavior among young people and not only among them? Where are the roots of the erosion of socialist and universal human values? Why is it that primitive hedonism becomes the ideal and the orientation in the life of a certain segment of youth groups? Finally, what is the reason for the terrible disappointments in life in our society as recently confirmed by partially declassified statistical figures of suicides among different age groups, which turn out to be significantly higher than in a number of Western countries? Could "mass philosophy," which has been studied or, most frequently, simply memorized, help to answer such questions which affect today virtually every thinking person?

No, we firmly answer! This is a philosophy, if we dare give it such a name, which by no means preaches any love of wisdom or any other dimensions of universal human spirituality, but no more than loyalty to prescribed dogmas, ignoring or eliminating any independence of thought by the individual, reducing man to a social clone, obediently obeying the orders of authoritarian social structures.

Yes, we were taught, in the name of the Marxist classics, to be intolerable of even the slightest possible doubts and to be hostile toward dissidence and simply toward non-standard views. However, strange times have come about: green young people are questioning that which was stipulated for decades in all textbooks without any change, and taught to students from the yellowing summaries of lectures to which a few new quotations were regularly added after each congress. Furthermore, the demand is raised of linking our ordinary philosophical

formulations to facts of life which remain totally unmentioned in the textbooks. The time has come to rally in the defense of our old values!

However, there also exists another conceptual view, which displays a different type of logic which is not hostile to dissidence. In philosophy, as in other spiritual areas, there is a polarizing between two opposite world-conceptual and world-understanding orientations. The former is considered adequate for solving all of our perestroika tasks; its logic is based on our "mass philosophy," which draws its sources from and has its historical roots in the "*Short Course of the History of the VKP(b)*," and whose "viability" was tested under the conditions of the period of stagnation. It is precisely such a logic that leads to the view that yes, dogmatism prevailed in society but we defended our conceptual and ideological values and now the horrible "post-dogmatic age" has arrived, which we cannot accept, for this means the destruction of principles, and scorn for truths which we zealously defended throughout those years. What indeed happens is that it is preferable to have the bloody cult and stagnation than the "age of postdogmatism" with its process of destruction of our previous values! Values are very serious things, but before determining which of the now rejected values had anything to do with the ideas of socialism, let us consider the features of the logic of "mass philosophy."

As we can see, in this case it is the method of reduction that operates, i.e., in simple terms, reducing what is complex to what is simplest and most accessible to the mass mind. The simpler it is the better, for it is easier to drill into the people's minds. As a result of the study of "mass philosophy," we obtain social atoms for which there is a black and white world and a hostile emptiness, all the rest being imagination, intrigue, etc. There are no shadings: those who are not with us are against us, for they have dared to question the universally accepted values, dressing and behaving differently, listening to a different type of music, and so on.

In other words, dogmatism is a universal conceptual characteristic of "mass philosophy," i.e., the very essence of the matter, expressed through reductionism, via the basic reduction of what is complex to what is the simplest and most primitive and rejecting what is unusual, nonstandard and frightening because of its novelty. Essentially, the logic which produces "mass philosophy" is the logic of the rejection of the huge and complex world of human spirituality, a logic of alienation, social myth-making and social stagnation.

How did such "mass philosophy," imbued with dogmatism, axiomatism and a spirit of scholasticism, spread in our society? What is the origin of such a spiritual phenomenon with arguments drawn from the late middle-ages? Where did it come from? It came from our philosophy textbooks, which had been reprinted for decades and which, as we recall, in the most stagnant years, at the Alma-Ata all-Union symposium on dialectical logic, the now deceased B.M. Kedrov described as

textbooks of "eclecticism and sophistry," based on the stereotype of "concepts-examples." It came from the textbooks from which millions of people mastered the foundations of Marxist-Leninist philosophy under the tireless guidance of a thousands-strong army of teachers, everyone of whom sacredly believed each individual formulation and demanded the same of his students. If something did not appear just right, the most daring of teachers would add, this was the fault of our classics, who had been unable, probably because of their tremendous workload, to write absolutely simple and true textbooks on Marxist philosophy with definitions formulated once and for all, for which reason some inaccuracies and even deviations from the quotations of collected works were possible, deviations which were becoming increasingly fewer with each new edition of the textbooks.

Let us look closely at the extent to which our "mass philosophy" coincides not with the letter but with the spirit of what the Marxist classics taught, the more so since some authors are increasingly trying, in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory, to draw a superficially effective analogy with construction, waving their arms and asking the rhetorical question of how can one erect a strong building of socialism if its theoretical blueprints themselves are unsatisfactory. It is no accident that suggestions of a most radical nature have been formulated in the popular press including that of teaching social science as part of natural sciences, motivated by claims of the heuristic lack of value or simply the collapse of our philosophical models of social development.

For the sake of greater clarity we should mention some discussions which are currently taking place in philosophical circles, the more so since the pre-crisis condition in the material and spiritual areas of our society, of which there has been frank talk only in recent years, evaporated the illusion of the high standard reached by contemporary social science theory.

Let us begin with the question of the theoretical legacy of our classics. Occasionally efforts are made to ascribe to them phenomenon of "mass philosophy" and the origins of the ideology of the authoritarian system of the cult of personality and the time of stagnation. Naturally, this is assisted by the canonized and dogmatized image of leaders and teachers of the world proletariat, who never knew disappointments and questions, a concept which was drilled into the masses for many decades. Were our classics not such icon-looking people, the virtual personifications of the class spirit, the messiahs of the proletariat! Such a religious image of the Marxists could have been painted by N. Berdyayev, but why have some of its elements been preserved in our social science textbooks?

The truth which the people needed about the founders of Marxism was deliberately converted into half-truth and, at times, also into a blatant social myth. Hence some people feel today a kind of shock when exposed to truthful historical information. The situation reminds us of Plato's myth of a dark cave from which a prisoner was taken out and into the light. However, the unaccustomed

brilliance of the sun made him feel sick and he lost his eyesight. Ideas are formulated to the effect that in the customary darkness, life may be harsh but the condition is tranquil and even better for people have become accustomed in the course of decades to dogmatism, cult and stagnation, while now, all of a sudden, the "terrible time of postdogmatism" has come, in which all of the caveman's "principles" are being destroyed! No, it would be better once again to give philosophy the quality of an ideological sledgehammer in order to drill into the mass consciousness the necessary dogmas and if, in the course of this process, the heads of those who stand out are broken, this is very good, for the others will immediately realize this and will keep silent. The main thing, however, is that we will have safeguarded our principles.

Let us recall that our doctrine appeared as the legitimate result of the development of culture and that the Marxist classics, the entire variety and originality of their theoretical vision of the problems of the world notwithstanding, merely continued the dialogue with the universal spirituality, a dialogue which had been going on for millennia, in the area of the practical embodiment of the ideas of humanism.

We see Karl Marx as the outstanding universal philosopher, the full wealth of whose works, to put it simply, we have still not mastered. A paradoxical picture has developed: all this time "mass philosophy" was preached in the name of Marx and on the basis of his quotations. However, although describing ourselves as Marxist, to this day we do not have in the Russian language the complete collected works of the founder of this doctrine. Why? In our view, the main reason is that the writings of Karl Marx proved to be on so many different levels which did not fit the framework of the permitted "mass philosophy," that during the period of the cult of personality some of them were simply not translated and not published out of fear that they may be "incorrectly" understood and that they may "cause ideological harm to the Soviet people."

Even in the mid-1950s, when the latest publication of the works of the founders of Marxism was undertaken in our country in the period of the "Khrushchev thaw," some of the works were considered "insufficiently mature" and were not published as part of that same edition, and only later, as ideological censorship became less strict were 11 additional volumes published, the latest of which came out in 1981.

This situation with which the specialists are well-familiar, led to the fact that generations of Soviet people were deprived of the possibility to study entire strata of the theoretical legacy of the founders of Marxism. Although in the 1950s and 1960s major efforts were made to revive the truly Marxist philosophical set of problems, for a long time—during the virtually entire period of stagnation—philosophical research on the most topical and socially significant problems raised by Marx was not encouraged, to say the least: the phenomena of social alienation and the self-alienation of the

individual in the different types of social systems, universal human spirituality and class values, the typology of the historical process and the individual, the social feeling and its transformed aspects, science in its global, social and individual dimensions, the Marxist theory of value and the individual meaning of life, the Marxist theory of education, the concept of the law-governed state, the phenomena of bureaucratization and many others.

Whereas in the West a large group of researchers, whom we uniformly labeled as revisionists, scrupulously studied the text of the founders of Marxism, asking, as we can see in the age of perestroika, by no means rhetorical questions, such as "what did Marx actually say?," or "what did Lenin truly say?" Our official philosophy, with its monopoly on truth, did not bother itself with a spirit of doubt. Some sad strange cases, well-known to the specialists, included the fact that original philosophical works by Soviet authors were published in miserably small editions if at all and, if a publication was not possible, individual interesting manuscripts were stored in the files of the Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences. This was probably an entirely "justified" decision, the moment any specialist dared to question the adequate translation into Russian of an entire array of key Marxist concepts, included in the officially published collected works.... or to give an original interpretation to the writings of Marx, diametrically different from the one preached by "mass philosophy." It was entirely "natural" that the best thing for such works was to be filed away or put in special storage where they could be studied by the "broad circles" of people interested in the theoretical legacy of the founders of Marxism. How is it possible, under such circumstances, to say that the "mass philosophy" which ruled for many long years, was truly Marxist and that the social values which prevailed for decades were totally consistent with the spirit of Marx's works?

The situation concerning V.I. Lenin's theoretical legacy appears to be significantly better. Here as well, however, major problems arise. As we know, the ideology of authoritarian power during the period of the cult of Stalin's personality, as also happened during the age of stagnation, aspired to link itself to death with Lenin. The continuity of this tradition was not violated, starting with the "*Short Course of the History of the VKP(b)*" and did not end until the recent times of stagnation, when all "historical speeches by the outstanding Marxists-Leninists of our time," under whose guidance our country was confidently marching toward the crisis, were immediately included in the multiple-volume series "*The Leninist Course*." The task of "mass philosophy" was to instill such an image of Leninism in the wide public consciousness which was possible only through reduction, i.e., through the primitivism, axiomatization and dogmatization of the fundamental views of the doctrine, converting them into an original social myth which totally ignored the specific study of specific situations. It is clear that under the conditions of glasnost,

humanization and democratization of society such a deformed and dogmatized image of our doctrine is unacceptable. Extreme positions appeared as well: thus, some journalists are trying to label Lenin as one of the founders of the ideology of authoritarian power.

Actually, as we can prove from their own works, the founders of Marxism opposed the cult of personality. They favored democracy and, contrary to the ideas of the various supporters of barracks communism, they were in favor of the power of the working people, which would take into consideration the interests of the different population strata. They were even less tolerant toward pseudorevolutionary demagoguery and toward any attempt at imposing the final truth and using "revolutionary phraseology" which would replace theoretical analysis with "communist" slogans.

The subsequent development of events, when the ideology of authoritarian power, instilled by the administrative-command system of the time of the cult of personality and stagnation, which precisely led our country to the brink of the crisis, is a different matter. Unfortunately, what happened was what Lenin had sensed: "It would be even more dangerous if we begin to adopt exclusively communist slogans.... You would make a tremendous error by trying to reach the conclusion that one could become a communist without mastering that which human knowledge has stocked. It would be a mistake to believe that it suffices to master communist slogans and the conclusions of the science of communism without having mastered the sum total of knowledge the consequence of which is communism itself" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, pp 302-303).

May we be forgiven for mentioning this warning issued by Lenin; ignoring later proved to be a fatal mistake: communist slogans began to be pitted against universal human spirituality which was filtered and released in strictly dosed out amounts. This was one of the initial reasons for the crisis phenomena in spiritual life.

Under the conditions of the sharp increase in social life of the centralized and bureaucratic principles, a social situation develops in which the new power structures of the command-administrative system gradually shape a corresponding type of spirituality and demand a subordination of values, the quintessence of which is "mass philosophy." Intolerance of dissident thinking and a purely military style of arguing with opponents, pinning labels and formulating political accusations and, subsequently, practicing physical destruction for the sake of the "supreme" values, raise the instructions of the leader into peremptory dogmas. These are the distinguishing features of dogmatism which all of us remember.

How could it be that something which claims the status of love of wisdom, the phenomenon of universal human spirituality, finds itself even below that level? It is our deep conviction that this is not possible! Furthermore, if under the conditions of the revolutionary renovation of

our society we acknowledge as adequate the logic which successfully functioned during the administrative-command system, to which man was merely an easily replaceable cog with the right ideological shape, regardless of any type of social efforts, the end result will be an impasse. Perestroyka means a radically new condition of our social development, the essence of which is surmounting and rejecting dogmatism and returning to the wealth of universal human culture and spirituality. The foundation of the new social thinking is dialectics as the logic for shaping conceptual, perception and practical guidelines in a complex and rapidly changing world of the end of the 20th century.

If we were asked to provide a very brief characterization of our time, we would describe it as a period of a sharp universal human dialogue, dialectical thinking in politics and the spiritual area, in economics and in global ecological problems, the solution of which will determine the very existence of life on earth. Our time is an age of conflicts of the mind, manifested in the concept of the dialectical vision of the world in the nuclear space age and the logic of dogmatic folly, the conceptual foundation of which is the mythology of the ordinary mind.

To us the conversion from the logic of the dogmatism of "mass philosophy" to an essentially different type of thinking is essentially related to rejecting the existing mechanism of the alienation of man from the world of universal human spirituality and a return to the logic of the founders of Marxism. Let us emphasize that from the time it appeared Marxist dialectics, like logic, was oriented toward the revolutionary-practical transformation of reality and the social life of man from the viewpoint not only of class-oriented but also of universal human values.

In the essentially new round in the historical spiral in the development of socialism, we are becoming increasingly convinced of the need to revive the spirit of creative investigation, which was inherent in the founders of Marxism, and to recall that the very foundation of dialectical thinking consisted not in the least of a monologue of repetitions of once and for all established truths but a social and humanistic dialogue and a mandatory consideration of past traditions and the identification of more distant conceptual orientations of mankind, which do not agree with the repetition of inviolable dogmatic ideas.

What is different between a dialogue and a monologue is that we not only listen but also hear the voices of supporters of other viewpoints and begin to get used to an essentially different type of intercourse the main feature of which is not stating simple and definitive truths as the final word, referring to quotations, but a consideration of all opinions, an interested discussion of conflicting viewpoints. It was no accident that from the rostrum of the 19th All-Union Party Conference the idea was voiced to the effect that our society is open at the present time to inner discussions, to the discussion of any problem and with all interested organizations and

the broad nonparty masses. This, however, is possible only by totally abandoning the logic of dogmatism and truly returning to the dialectical legacy of the founders of Marxism.

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Reactions to Journal Publications

905B0010G Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 52-63

[Text] STALEMATE

N. Volkonskiy, candidate of technical sciences, hydraulic engineer, Krasnodar:

"...No more than 2 cubic kilometers of water are needed to flow in the Volga-Chogray Canal to irrigate the deserts of the southern part of Astrakhan Oblast, Kalmykiya and the Stavropol area. Without this both humans and animals will perish.

"Those who have not seen this desert cannot understand the situation with water in the area! Water brought from afar in water tanks is issued to every resident according to a strict rate. In the winter the population is supplied with pieces of ice cut out of the frozen Caspian Sea."

A. Kudrin and A. Rakov, associates at the Niva Stavropolya Scientific-Production Association, Stavropol Kray:

"...The desertification which is taking place in Stavropol is, above all, a problem of human origin. It was caused by the mass cultivation of the lands which to begin with should not be plowed, and by cattle overgrazing. Both reasons fall within the production organization area: excessive assignments, based on productivity during bountiful years. We are being told that possibilities of developing agriculture in the kray are found in the development of new land and that this cannot be achieved without building the Volga-Chogray Canal. Perhaps, to begin with, we should bring order in the already existing irrigation systems and only then demand funds for new projects."

A. Vasilyev, KOMMUNIST special correspondent, Astrakhan-Stavropol-Elista:

The pause in the discussions which broke out subsequent to the publication of the resolution of the state expert commission of the USSR Gosplan and USSR Gosstroy on halting the building of the Volga-Chogray Canal may be described as a stalemate. The supporters of the canal and its opponents are standing still, as though fearing that any wrong step could lead to a defeat in this long dispute. Actually, this is only a surface calm. The problem vanished from the press and the television but specialists continued to argue and scientific opinions to clash as our mail proves. Nor do the construction people intend to surrender. New arguments have been sought, old arguments have been revised and leaderships have

been changed. Because of the negative public opinion which had developed, the Minvodkhoz, which held the leadership role for many long years, was forced to move to the background. However, the banner was taken up by the leadership of Stavropol Kray.

Hardly anything has been surprising in their views. Under the conditions of the establishment of regional cost accounting, the departments gained reliable and loyal allies in the senior personnel of many republics and oblasts. One can understand them: the implementation of any major project such as the Volga-Chogray Canal would make it possible not only to strengthen the economic base of the area but also, incidentally, with budget funds, to solve many social problems for which they lack their own financial resources. Now, however, the conditions have changed and the building of the canal, if possible at all, would be carried out on a solvent basis, i.e., paid out of customer funds. However, neither kolkhoz chairmen nor sovkhoz directors or else individuals of higher ranks would want even to hear that they would have to pay for this project. The produce which will be grown on the thus irrigated land will go to the state and, therefore, the funds for the canal should be state funds. Such was the general view.

It is unlikely that the people in the kray were unaware of the calculations of scientists and specialists who warned about the negative consequences of the commissioning of the Volga-Chogray Canal. From the tactical point of view, the canal would obviously yield short-term minimal result; from the strategic viewpoint, its consequences appear catastrophic. As it is, because of the bad condition of irrigation systems, salinization and flooding of the lands are actively spreading in the Stavropol area. According to some assessments, this is causing harm to the population of 200 settlements, which include 15 cities. The water has flooded basements; industrial structures are rotting and collapsing and so are homes. Nonetheless, the kray leaders believe that the canal should be built. Writing in STAVROPOLSKAYA PRAVDA, N. Yeregin, second secretary of the kray CPSU committee, said: "...There are no alternatives to the Volga-Chogray Canal; no one has suggested any other option as to how to supply water to a droughty steppe. We must bear in mind that the canal means not only the present of our kray but also, most importantly, its future, the economic, the social future of the Stavropol area."

N. Yeregin is not entirely right. There are other choices. Informal associations in Astrakhan Oblast, scientists in Kalmykiya and specialists in the Stavropol area itself are working on such options, not to mention the work of the interdepartmental commission, chaired by Academician A. Aganbegyan. According to the concept developed by the commission, the historically justified structure of the economy should be restored, based on cattle breeding for meat and sheep breeding for meat and wool, using the natural fodder facilities and grain grown on nonirrigated land. Such highly profitable low-intensive and ecologically compatible sectors of agriculture will help to develop in the area the necessary potential for the

solution of social problems. According to the scientists, the implementation of this option could be based on the General Plan for the Struggle Against the Desertification of the Black Lands and Kizlyar Pasture Land. Incidentally, this program calls for improving all agricultural facilities in the area and not only 4 percent, as guaranteed by Minvodkhoz, without the threat of ecological disasters and requiring not 4 billion rubles but 700 million, i.e., only 20 percent of the cost of building the canal. The laying of pipelines, using the huge reserves of ground waters at the Severo-Levokumskaya Deposits, and the installation of water treatment facilities, would also solve the problem of supplying this area with fresh water. Alas, all suggestions are being rejected out of hand because, in the opinion of the kray's leadership, they do not agree with planned assignments "issued from above."

The plan. The plan was and remains the main argument in the disputes concerning the canal. Whether it is a question of increasing crop growing output in the Stavropol area or increasing the cattle herds in Kalmykiya, the canal is quoted at all times as a necessary prerequisite for the implementation of state plans and assignments. Indeed, its strict Procrustean bed cannot accommodate any other variants. The answer to any alternative proposals, even very interesting ones, is always one: "No."

"No" to rebuilding the sturgeon population in the Caspian Sea, for if the canal would provide additional agricultural output, the same output could be obtained with immeasurably fewer efforts elsewhere in the country while the loss of the sturgeon would be totally unrecoverable.

"No" is the answer to the suggestion of eliminating the underproductive breeds of sheep and thus reducing the pressure on the pasture land. Yet, such a solution would require less fodder and the need for wasting billions in building the canal will be eliminated.

"No" to the suggestion of scientists to engage in broad phytoreclamation work, although the cost of rebuilding 1 hectare with this method would range between 70 and 163 rubles, while a reclaimed hectare would cost approximately 5,500 rubles. The supporters of the policy of "no" do not accept the simple idea that perhaps it may be more sensible for such a vast difference in funds to be used for the development of any other economic sector. The single answer they give is this: there is a plan and it cannot be fulfilled without a canal.

Actually, no other answer could be expected, for the main purpose has always been to build the canal for its own sake and by no means in order to struggle against the desertification of Kalmykiya or to upgrade, with its help, the productivity of pastures in the Stavropol area. Essentially, the canal has never been conceived of as a means of solving the socioeconomic problems of the region. The latter were necessary only to substantiate the need for a new huge construction project. Otherwise

now, when the total groundlessness of the project has been proven, forces and funds would have already been transferred to areas in ecological difficulty and extensive, and truly needed work would have already been under way, for the problems of the living conditions of the people in this area and its future remain, as in the past, acute.

This is probably also the result of our support of traditional decisions and the stubborn unwillingness to take into consideration the actual features of the area in laying the foundations of a territorial economic structure. If on the basis of a governmental resolution a given area has been ascribed to deal with animal husbandry, it is believed that its population neither has nor could have any other possibility. According to the logic of the new thinking, however, the population should, along with the population of other areas, oblasts and republics, have the right to choose its way of life and the possibility of independently organizing its own future.

If we wish our reform to advance, sooner or later we must accept the fact that the individual regions will, themselves, depending on their own natural resources and the present situation, choose the ways along which they could provide their own funds for the development of their economy and enhance the well-being of the people. At that point any liking of projects such as transferring the Northern rivers, the gas and oil chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast, the Volga-Chogray Canal, and so on, will disappear. Perhaps at that point we could even learn how to live according to our means, i.e., to use natural resources economically and thriftily, and balance human economic activities with nature. At that point, finally, the vicious chain of "projects of the century" will be broken, in which one tremendous construction project triggers another, and so on ad infinitum.

Meanwhile, everything is turning in circles. The reclamation workers insist on continuing with the building of the canal, promising to complete the work on the highest possible modern standards. "We shall line the canal with concrete and reinforced concrete in such a way that no moisture losses will come out of the canal," assures N. Shevchenko, chief of the Stavropolvodmelioratsiya Association. It is true that not a word is being said about how much that will raise the cost. We must assume by several hundred percent, for this is an expensive project. As in the past, the kolkhoz members will wait in long lines at the tankers to receive their daily "ration" of water. The shepherds will also worry about how to provide water for the animals, where to find fodder and what to do if there is another drought. Naturally, the desert is advancing. In Kalmykiya alone it is taking over some 50,000 hectares annually, same as it did a decade ago.

Unquestionably, some efforts are being made to change the situation. Substantial amounts of ground fresh water have been located on Stavropol territory and efforts are being made to rebuild the degraded pasture lands. The growing of wild grass seeds is being organized. However, all of this is taking place extremely slowly, always hoping

that the building of the canal will nonetheless be suddenly allowed, at which point all problems will be resolved instantaneously, with a magic wand. Or else, the sinister prophecy of reclamation building veteran and winner of the USSR State Prize V. Nekrasov is considered seriously: "...Nothing else is possible," he claims categorically. "We either do not build the canal and lose a huge area or else supply the dried up steppe with water from the Volga and systematically solve the national economic problems on the basis of future needs."

The formulation of the question is truly "radical:" we shall either have a canal or else all of us will die of thirst. If nothing is done this is obviously what will happen. Neither the state nor the individual areas have today the funds for such large-scale projects. Yet other projects are being discarded. However, adopting the big ones means leading the country to even greater poverty and chaos. Furthermore, the public would be unlikely to tolerate this construction project, described as "socioeconomically unjustified and ecologically dangerous." That is what leads to the development of a stalemate: public opinion can defeat the latest departmental plan. However, the departments are still sufficiently strong to fight for the implementation of their plans, by all means fair or foul.

And so, stalemate. The excavators have stopped. The columns of dump trucks which, until recently, so greatly "enlivened" the poor landscape of Kalmykiya with kilometer-long trains of dust, have disappeared from the steppe roads. A still green turbid slush is already filling up the open parts of the canal. Everything has stopped. The only thing still moving are the sand dunes covering the dead steppe. How long will this go on?

V. Agenosov, doctor of philological sciences, Moscow State Pedagogical Institute imeni V.I. Lenin:

V. Krutous. "Presumption of Historicism." KOMMUNIST No 11, 1989

It is more important than ever today to prove, on the one hand, the methodological relevance of the Leninist teaching of the party-mindedness of art and, on the other, nondogmatically, from the positions of historicism, to remove from this theory the accretions which were either of transient (temporary) nature or else were essentially anti-Leninist.

In my view, the author has dealt properly with both tasks, indicating that, as in the past, the artist is linked to politics and has a responsibility to society. The idea of civic-mindedness of literature is not a fabrication by Lenin but a tradition stemming from ancient Russian literature and developed by Tolstoy and Dostoyevskiy. Furthermore, the literature which has now been restored to us (from I. Bunin and Ye. Zamyatin to V. Grossman and A. Solzhenitsyn) proves that, in the words of Ilich, if an artist is truly great he cannot fail to be connected to some essential aspects of the revolution.

I am impressed by the principle chosen by the author of "Presumption of Historicism" in his analysis of the

article "Party Organization and Party Literature" in the context of the entire Leninist legacy and, furthermore, in the context of Marxist and world philosophical esthetic thinking.

Lenin could not conceive of party-mindedness as sectarianism. His entire struggle against Machism in the pre-October period, and the Proletkult in the post-October period prove this. In this sense as well I find interesting and fruitful V.P. Krutous' references to "Our Party's Draft Program," in which Lenin discussed the correlation between class and universal human features.

This applies to an even greater extent to Lenin's understanding of the specific nature of party-mindedness in art. The author justifiably notes that Lenin applied the principle of party-mindedness essentially to realistic literature and to representational-graphic art which dealt with contemporaneity; in art Lenin gave priority not to party membership but to the talent of the artist. Let us add to those of Gorkiy and Tolstoy, mentioned in the article, the name of A. Averchenko, whose collection of stories "*A Dozen Knives in the Back of the Revolution*," were characteristically noted by Vladimir Ilich as "a talented little book."

In accepting Krutous' principle of the context, one could also apply it to Lenin's articles of the Soviet epoch ("The Great Initiative," "A Small Picture Explaining Major Problems," and "On the Nature of Our Press") where, this time as applicable to journalism, Lenin spoke about the dual task of seeing the shoots of the new and the struggle against anything which hinders progress. Paradoxically, it is nonetheless a fact that these views coincide with the conclusions reached in Ye. Zamyatin's article "I Fear."

I find particularly interesting the author's analysis of the means of dogmatizing the Leninist doctrine: the use of the administrative-command system in literary affairs, and ignoring the Leninist idea that literature does not presume that the minority should obey the majority. In this connection, we find topical Engels' words cited in the article. To this day we all too frequently come across the desire to see in an art journal (or newspaper) the views of managers of various organizations whose organ that same journal (newspaper) may be, a attempts to "restrict or anathematize all that is unusual and conflicting or frightening in the complex spiritual world of the artists."

All of this is being done under the guise of party- and class-mindedness and criticism of bourgeois freedoms. Yet a truly proletarian, a party position encompasses the best which has been developed in bourgeois democracy and goes beyond it and not backward from that same democracy (as was ordinarily and still frequently the case in our life).

There are some things about which I could argue with the author of the article who claims, at one point, that the party-mindedness of the artist lies in the objective spirit of his works and subsequently and much more accurately

(and in accordance with Lenin's work "Socialist Party and Nonparty Revolutionism") writes that this is a quality of artistic world concept and creativity. The article by V.P. Krutous, as well as the editorial article of 2 years ago "The Call of Socialist Culture," have been included in the plans for practical training in Soviet literature of students at the Philology Department of Moscow's State Pedagogical Institute. I would like to recommend this article to teachers in secondary schools, many of whom are confused by the present stream of conflicting interpretations of the theory of party-mindedness in the arts.

A. Gorbachev, candidate of technical sciences, Moscow:

Ye. Gaydar. "Money Is Not Given for Nothing." KOMMUNIST No 8, 1989

To understand the reasons for large purchases, discussed in that article, necessitates a more detailed analysis of the development process in sectorial scientific research institutes. To illustrate this, let me mention the applied science in which I have been working for decades—electrochemical technology. Not so long ago it was difficult to obtain any assignment (today state order) for any kind of technological or research project unless one could prove that somewhere abroad there was a shop or even a facility working on that same technology. It was thus that on a centralized basis, even prior to the initiation of a project, a certain lag was built in. Subsequently, the project was developed more or less successfully (in some cases, projects worth tens of millions of rubles).

Who was responsible for end results? As a rule, everything was being done "comprehensively:" numerous coworkers were recruited, each one of whom was issued an individual assignment. Not only funds but responsibilities were thus dispersed, for the manager could always point out unfinished projects by one partner or another. Furthermore, individual failures were even considered an advantage. After long years of work with rare successes and frequent failures, someone in the ministry's leadership would express the idea of the need to purchase the entire project abroad. Naturally, such projects were not to be purchased from the developing countries. As a rule, we chose Japan, the FRG, France, the United States or Italy. The instruction was issued to draft a motivated substantiation for the purchase. Do you think that the collective of scientists opposed it? Not at all! During the preparatory stage of the substantiation, there were preliminary trips abroad to increase the knowledge of the purchasers. A company would be chosen and a contract would be drafted. The partners would welcome our travelers with their unobtrusive hospitality. To the general joy the purchase would be made, thus eliminating all of our own errors and unfinished projects.

It was roughly thus that the collective of the sectorial scientific research institute was shaped and trained. I do not mean that all purchases were wrong. Some of them

were successful, although this was quite infrequent. Above all, was this able to eliminate our lagging?

Difficulties at the first stage of the application of cost accounting are inevitable. The sectorial plants are familiar with their science and are in no hurry to finance it. The various departments try to protect their institutes from such difficulties by issuing them state orders. This is understandable for humanistic considerations but in addition to such "humanism," the ministries use this in an effort somehow to justify their own existence.

Let me merely caution the readers against the impression that I can see only the negative aspects of the work of sectorial scientific research institutes. Many of the applied scientists are creative individuals holding various positions, people involved in their work, honest and principle-minded. They need to be converted to full cost accounting now, and not sometime in the distant future. A reduction of the administrative apparatus should also take place now (overhead continues to increase). Each lost year means nonrecoverable material losses to the economy and moral losses to all working people.

G. Legenkiy, docent, Slavyansk Pedagogical Institute, Donetsk Oblast:

V. Kumarin. "This Intractable School." KOMMUNIST No 11, 1989

The article by V. Kumarin was a pleasant rarity in a theoretical party journal.

Many energetic and intelligent people, economists, economic managers and party workers who became people's deputies, and everything else in our society has started to move except for the secondary school. We have become so "economically minded" that we have begun to refer to the individual as the "human factor" and to consider him only through the structure of production projects, once that individual has become an adult. Before that he was the ward of a given department which was instructed by our society, forgetting the existence of the school, to solve all problems related to the education of growing generations.

We are ashamed of the fact that we engaged for such a long time in pseudocommunist upbringing. This had its reasons. However, we also had a truly communist upbringing. I believe that the blindness and deafness in our attitude toward treasures, such as A.S. Makarenko's pedagogical theory and experience, could bring about the collapse of all perestroika processes. I am not exaggerating: the juvenile crime rate proves that this can no longer be considered a joke.

In my view, the journal KOMMUNIST could and should continue to discuss the problems of the school not only because our pedagogy remains in a state of stagnation and must be "nudged," but mainly because Makarenko's legacy does not belong strictly to the public

education department but to our entire social system. It is the social system alone that could enhance this education.

For example, the school by itself will never be able to, nor should it, organize the socially productive work of the students. Its task is to organize their studies. When, finally, will economists, economic managers and administrators on different levels realize that without the participation of high school students in real productive toil no real cost accounting can be developed in public production and that by failing to put high school students to work, justifying this with cost accounting, they are thus displaying not only educational but also economic illiteracy?

Our children are born and develop as people in the microrayon created by the school. However, the question of such a microrayon as an educational environment and not as an uncontrolled place where students live, will be raised only when, in addition to schools, acting as educational institutions, there will be enterprises for children, shops which will be part of the system of the local industry such as, for example, for the production of consumer goods (which is sluggish now in our country).

The problem of the microrayon, however, is not one affecting a single department. Its further theoretical development and practical application should be the concern not only of educators but also of economists, sociologists or, simply, all educated people, for in building his little island in an ocean of deformed socialist relations, A.S. Makarenko acted not only as an educator but also as an economist and sociologist.

D. Averyanov, Zilair Village, Bashkir ASSR:

V. Travkin. "The Road to Oneself." KOMMUNIST No 12, 1989

I am a peasant both by origin and profession. For a long time I worked as an engineer in sovkhozes and, subsequently, in soviet and party agencies. For the past 10 years I have headed a rayon CPSU committee.

Although I live in Baskhiriya a great deal of what was described by the Kostroma author is as though occurring in my own rayon and heard by the population of our villages. These are problems of villages, regardless of where such villages may be located....

Although I share V. Travkin's hopes related to leasing the land, I would like to expand his idea by citing examples of our daily practical experience. This year in three rayon sovkhozes some 40 percent of the arable land was leased. Matters seemed to progress well: 1 year ago (last autumn) the sowing was completed and preparations were made for the harvest. Then, all of a sudden, we became confused: a number of farm projects had to be carried out (hay mowing) while the managers kept quoting the lack of tractors which were being used by the lessees. Farm life became paralyzed. The reason was the acute shortage of wheel low-and medium-power tractors.

For example, 10 years ago one of the livestock farms had 18 wheel tractors; today it has only eight but the volume of the work has not been reduced.

Most of the rayon consists of good pasture land. There are more than 30,000 hectares in hay alone. It is true, however, that the humus layer of the soil is thin and grain crops are weak. Grasses, however, are excellent. Four sovkhozes are located in this mountain-forest zone. One of them, with good land, is developing dynamically. Others, which are under worse circumstances, have a very difficult life. Naturally, leasing could save the situation. We urged that instead of, let us say, developing the Surenkiy Sovkhoz, an association of lessees be created and let them raise their own cattle and harvest fodder crops. Conditions for this were quite good. Why does a lessee need a Kirovets tractor, which costs many thousands of rubles? Such a tractor would bankrupt him in a single hour. What are needed are light wheel-driven tractors, but no more than 10 such tractors are being supplied to the rayon in a single year.

Private auxiliary plots account for one-third of the entire animal husbandry output of our rayon. Their output could be higher if proper equipment were available, such as the Vladimirovets, T-16M or T-40M tractors, which can be used in plowing the land, mowing hay and transporting it.

You should see home-made products created with the golden hands and bright minds of our fellow villagers from scrap metal. Any such home product could be produced serially. Where is the output of the numerous design bureaus, scientific research institutes or plants which should do this on a professional basis, on the basis of special assignments (for many of them exist for the sake of providing services to the countryside)?

Currently we are trying to establish relations with the tractor plant in Vladimir and we shall try to procure T-25A-model tractors for the private needs of the villagers. We shipped in some 10 such tractors in the rayon for here demand for this new model is greater than anywhere else.

Today we keep saying, a propos or not, that the peasant must be the master of the land! However, this must be supported with actions. This also includes the length of leasing, the very right to use the land and to inherit it. It includes the production of small-sized equipment with a set of the necessary attachments and the prices charged for such items. Yet our rayon consumer society received a caterpillar tractor for sale to the population. Its price is such as to discourage the people: one such tractor costs as much as 20 heifers....

A. Dyachkov, Chernogolovka Settlement, Moscow Oblast:

G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov and V. Loginov. "Obedient History or a New Publicistic Paradise." KOMMUNIST No 14, 1989

I read with great interest these "sad notes." It is difficult to find today in historical articles nontendentious and objective materials. This particularly applies to the interpretation of 1917-1921 events. The bolsheviks are being accused of all sorts of things, as though if they did not exist everything would have developed perfectly. Naturally, such views influence the moods of the people. I liked the statement by these three authors, for it is an effort objectively to interpret the events of those years. I wish that the journal would publish more frequently such weighed and considered materials.

A. Marchuk, doctor of technical sciences: A Course Toward Electric Power Industry

Although the draft new energy program has still not been made public, debates and arguments on its topic have been substantial. This is probably explained not only with the desire on the part of scientists and specialists to make their contribution to the formulation of its concepts. It is also the reflection of fears, entirely justified on the basis of past experience, that under the pressure of the interested departments, this project will successfully go through the discussion stage and become law. At that point it would be too late to make any changes. We publish in this issue responses to the article by A. Arbatov, doctor of economic sciences, "What Should the Energy Program Be" (KOMMUNIST, No 9, 1989).

It would be difficult to imagine a more adverse situation for the development of the new draft of the energy program: the recent Chernobyl accident, the ecological catastrophes in many areas and the stormy protest meetings opposing the building of electric power plants. The people have been fired by the characters in "Saying Good-Bye to Mother," and "The Sarcophagus," and expository articles such as "The Moaning of the Volga," "The Miner's Life," and "Zero Cycle," which helped develop in society a stable negative attitude toward the power industry although, on the other hand, no one refuses to use electric power, hot water and central heating.

Finally, perestroika needs energy. I would like to think that people, rejecting emotions and thoughtless extremism, based on common sense, would be concerned with the fatherland and their own good and will help to find the right solution to this difficult problem. Unfortunately, A. Arbatov has not succeeded in this effort.

Naturally, the draft program, and even the parts of it which were published, are vulnerable to criticism, as is our entire cumbersome outlay-based fuel and energy complex. However, this is what we have and cannot ignore and, like it or not, all computations must be based on our "wretched... economic reality," as assessed by A. Arbatov. His sentence is harsh: the program leads to social and ecological degradation and a distorted reproduction of the existing economic structure.

What is being offered as an alternative?

The alternative is a program based on an "essentially different methodological foundation," i.e., defining the amounts of energy consumption on the basis of the totality of the ultimate needs of society, minimizing the centralized production of energy, abandoning the principle of self-support in energy resources, limiting power supplies and upgrading production efficiency. It also recommends that we block the danger of the groundless expansion in the production of energy.

Let us try to understand the innovations introduced with such a methodology.

If by "overall end needs of society" we mean the necessary level of the national income, that is precisely the way the program defines the amount of the country's electric power consumption. The appeal to "minimize the centralized production of energy" means mandatorily limiting the generating of electric and thermal energy at major power plants within the Unified Power System of the USSR.

The principle of "maximal centralization," which was formulated by Lenin in 1920, in connection with the consideration of the draft GOELRO Plan, makes it possible, with minimal outlays, to obtain maximal results and to protect the environment from the emissions of numerous small boiler rooms. Thanks to the unified power system, by shifting the hourly peaks of the power load alone we gain more than 15 million kilowatts of capacity and save about 4 billion rubles annually.

Self-support in power resources is a great gift of nature which must be preserved. Why should we abandon it? It is not merely a question of the "myth of the important defense significance." It is simply that the scale of our power consumption cannot be compared to the amounts of power generating and use of power resources by our neighbors. Any national catastrophe or emergency in the country, such as the Armenian earthquake, the Chernobyl accident, and so on, or even simply a harsh winter or a breakdown in main petroleum and gas pipelines requires the immediate use of domestic power reserves.

As to recommendations to limit power supplies, this is a belated novelty. For many years there has been a shortage of petroleum products and of natural gas and coal for the population of the country. This is the second 5-year period in which coordinated and mandatory restrictions in electric power consumption during the winter peak hours have been in effect in our country, for the time being not affecting only the housing-consumer sector. Unfortunately, such restrictions will increase independently of the suggested "methodology" but above all because some 40 percent of capital assets have become worn out, the commissioning of new electric power plants has fallen seriously behind and capital investments in the development of electric power are being reduced. Under the pressure of public opinion the construction of the Daugavpils, Cheboksary, Nizhnekamskaya and Katun Hydroelectric Power Plants, the Crimean Nuclear Power Plant and other electric power

plants has been halted and the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant has been closed down.

Yes, assignments on energy conservation are not being implemented. In the absence of economic incentives, administrative methods prove to be ineffective. Therefore, I consider arguable the part stating that whereas the U.S. government was able rapidly to carry out a structural reorganization for the sake of saving energy, under the conditions of our centralized planned economy "such a task is entirely attainable." In the United States the structure was improved not by the government but by the market-governed economy which quickly reacted to price changes. Producers had to survive in the competitive struggle and they did. No such mechanism exists in our country and the efforts of the administrative system and propaganda turn out insufficient. In order to change the situation we shall have to increase the prices of energy resources and introduce economic incentives.

The suggested major reduction in the amount of funds to finance the electric power industry could disorganize the national economy and the social area, for a conversion to energy conserving technology in our country will require a renovation of the working part of the fixed assets and extensive capital investments and time. Meanwhile, a cold winter could start tomorrow and it is no joking matter.

The fears expressed by A. Arbatov concerning an unsubstantiated increase in the production of energy are totally unfounded. Energy is generated on the basis of consumption. It cannot be stocked (other than in the water reservoirs of hydroelectric plants and in nuclear power plants, which are merely a small emergency reserve).

It seems to me that improving our power production should begin by optimizing the fuel-energy complex, eliminating existing distortions favoring capital intensive fuel extracting sectors and giving priority to the most efficient and neglected part—the electric power industry.

The solution of the key problems of perestroika involves improving the structure of the national economy, accelerating scientific and technical progress, converting to a resource-conserving policy and, in the final account, improving the working and living conditions of the people objectively involved in the use of electric power and electric power technology.

We have failed to notice the extent to which the role of electric power has increased in the national economy. The mass multi-storied build-up of cities, the development of networks of subways and electrified railroads, the appearance of a nuclear power industry and a variety of electrical engineering technologies in round-the-clock and dangerous production facilities, and the extensive use of electronic equipment demand exceptionally reliable high-quality electric power and heat supplies.

Scientists from the State Scientific Research Energy Institute imeni G.M. Krzhizhanovskiy have found the

possibility, through electrification, to release by the end of the 20th century, no less than 5 million people from industry and agricultural production. The use of energy-conserving power technologies will save on high quality fuel by the year 2000 168 million tons of conventional fuel, compared with 1985. Extensive electrification can lower labor outlays by 50 percent in house chores and, taking into consideration the development of the service area, by a factor of 2.8.

Scientists from the Academy of the Communal Economy imeni K.D. Pamfilov have estimated that with total electrification of the home annual time savings per family of four members has been assessed at 1,400 hours or 4 hours daily. This is a tremendous reserve for the harmonious spiritual and physical development of Soviet society.

The overall economic efficiency of electrification in optimal ecologically acceptable scale is assessed, for the year 2005, at more than 100 billion rubles. This means that net returns per ruble of outlays for increased electrification will range between 50 kopeks and 1 ruble.

Nonetheless, according to a study, in recent years our lagging behind the developed capitalist countries in terms of the electrification coefficient (the correlation between consumed electric power and the entire amount of consumed fuel) has been growing. Somehow imperceptibly the clear Leninist objective of "electrification" was replaced by the loose concept of "power industry" or the "fuel-energy complex." As new economic sectors appeared and developed, increasingly the electric power industry was pushed into the background. Meanwhile, the opposite processes occurred in the Western countries. According to the 13th Congress of the World Energy Conference, it is precisely the electric power industry that predominates in the sectorial structure of outlays. The share of capital investments in developing generating capacities and electric power grids accounted for more than 50 percent in 1980 (as compared to 20 percent in the USSR) of all investments in the fuel-energy complex and could increase to 70 percent by the year 2000. State electrification programs were formulated in the United States and in France.

Meanwhile, signatures are being collected against the building of electric power plants in our country. Most undesirable, from the viewpoint of public opinion, have turned out to be nuclear and hydraulic power plants, the purpose of which is to improve the structure of the fuel and energy balance and the ecological situation in the country. We seem not to know what we are doing.

The public at large does not seem to have a clear idea of the consequences of reducing the share of these two most important components of the fuel and energy complex. It is only with their help that we can compensate for the shortage which is developing in the national economy of the ever more expensive organic fuel and improve the reliability of electric power supplies. This has been confirmed through numerous computations. Nuclear

and hydraulic—"nonfuel"—electric power plants allow us to lower the extraction of organic fuel and make more extensive use of electric power as the most efficient energy carrier and prime energy resource. It is difficult to overestimate the ecological effect of nuclear and hydraulic power plants, including the effect they have on human life. Robert Gale and the Czechoslovak scientist M. Mali have estimated, for example, that each billion kilowatt-hour of output of thermoelectric power plants takes between 100 and 226 human lives.

The French experience proves that starting with 1980, as a result of the extensive use of nuclear power, the amount of acid rain has been reduced by a factor of 6; nuclear and hydraulic power plants reduce the danger of the greenhouse effect and ozone gaps which concern today the entire public on earth.

There is a view that energy conservation can be achieved by eliminating the building of expensive nuclear and hydraulic power plants. To a certain extent this is true, for which reason the principle of the economic use of electric power and the need to lower the energy and electric power intensiveness of the national income is the foundation of the refinements made in the Soviet energy program. The assignments concerning the conservation of energy resources are quite substantial and difficult to meet. However, even these quite strict assignments will not eliminate the need to increase the country's energy potential.

Naturally, the possibility exists of conserving electric power through the simplest possible method: eliminating the basic disorder, wastefulness and irresponsibility, the method of "turn off the light as you leave." However, the amount of such savings is limited and can account for no more than one-third of the assignment and only if we display a high degree of conscientiousness. On the other hand, if we speak of a strong social policy and the need to enhance the living standard, the state should meet in full and steadily the growing needs of the population for electric power. Therefore, the living standard cannot be improved simply by economizing. Let me point out, for the sake of comparison, that in Norway, for example, where it is quite high, the per capita output is 26,000 kilowatt hours of electric power annually; it is about 12,000 in the United States, which is, respectively, higher than in our country by a factor of 4 and a factor of 2. Correspondingly, the disparity in domestic consumption is several hundred percent higher. Why do Ukrainian peasants or kolkhoz members in the Nonchernozem, who live next to nuclear power plants, have to purchase their own coal or firewood instead of switching on their electric furnace? Therefore, it is entirely wrong to pit the power industry against human needs, as Doctor Arbatov does.

"In my view electrification is the most important of all of our great tasks" (V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 40, p 156). It is still premature to consider this Leninist assignment as implemented. The principles of social orientation and

intensification proclaimed by perestroika, progressive changes in economic structure and a thrifty attitude toward nature demand that the high Leninist purpose of electrification be restored.

V. Danilov-Danilyan, doctor of economic sciences, professor, USSR Council of Ministers Academy of the National Economy: The Energy of Inertia or Inertia of the Power Industry

The energy program in its original and, obviously, new variants and all other planning and preplanning documents related to that sector are governed by the aspiration to eliminate the shortage of energy. It is the same aspiration that defines the criticism of said documents, provided at a great many expert evaluations and in the scientific and general press. Such attention is justified, for the scarcity is exceptional and the evaluation of losses from the failure to supply energy to the national economy are impressive. How did such a situation develop and is it not worsened by the steps which are being taken for the precise purpose of reducing the deficit?

For 6 decades the conviction prevailed in our country that the need for energy experienced by the national economy (as well as for other raw material resources) must be met at all cost: energy is not the final objective but a means for the production of other goods and the creation of favorable living conditions for the people. In other words, the need for energy must be based on considerations which are outside the realm of the power industry itself. This conclusion is right, however, only if it is a question of a "minor" element in the system, the development of which does not have a transforming effect on the structure of the system as a whole. The power industry, however, is not a "small" element but a huge subsystem of the national economy. Its development and functioning determine a great many things in the economy and social life, which makes it entirely sensible to ask: Is it not excessive? Does the power industry itself largely account for the need for energy?

In the past the "gross" development of the power industry had a positive impact on the economy as a whole, stimulating the then progressive production facilities in metallurgy and machine building. However, reliance on extensive growth factors in the 1960s and subsequently led to inevitable difficulties which were worsened by the carelessness, the rigidity of the command-bureaucratic management system and the increasing technological backwardness of industry.

Whatever mineral resource we may consider, subject to economic use—coal, petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, bauxites, phosphorites, and so on—locations are substantially differentiated in terms of quality features which are important in terms of exploitation: geographic location, mining-geological conditions, the natural quality of the raw material and other factors. Extensive growth is accompanied by the involvement of ever new deposits with declining economic efficiency. It is

common knowledge that such a decline could, in many cases, be fully compensated by scientific and technical progress. However, the technological stagnation which was noted in our country for the past 30 years did not make it possible to ease the situation. Increased energy outlays per unit of output became inevitable in virtually all sectors engaged in the extraction and processing of mineral raw materials, including in the power industry itself. However, this involved not only energy but also metal, cement, labor, etc. The production of steel from increasingly lean ores requires an increasing amount of energy and the production of energy requires an increasing amount of steel. Since the beginning of the 1980s economic publications have discussed this economic structure, the events within which are continuously reproducing a worsening scarcity of energy and metal. However, for the time being, within our economic practices this is a voice crying out in the wilderness. The best proof of this is the new draft of the energy program.

A. Arbatov as well writes about this vicious circle. However, he also seems to share some of the illusions of those he opposes. "Estimating the necessary amount of energy should be based on a consideration of the sum total of the end needs of society...."

The end purpose of any development (naturally, in the rather distant future) cannot be defined in terms of indicators of volumes of output of "products."

Under the domination of a planning system adapted to extensive development, the ways of defining the needs of the national economy for energy have changed. Initially, they included direct computations, for the planned volumes of investments and output in all sectors and benefits to the economy could be seen to a certain extent from the center. This was a major factor which concealed the basic faults of the command-bureaucratic management system. However, whereas at the start of the 1930s all major construction projects and enterprises could still be directly controlled, subsequently planning the needs for energy and other production resources began to be increasingly based on aggregate indicators of output, in accordance with the general concept of the balance method.

As the economy expanded and as the future became less clear in the study of long-term development, gradually the expected size of the national income was adopted as a basic indicator in computing the long-term requirements for energy. This figure was obtained through the extrapolation of those same aggregated sectorial indicators and their subsequent reduction. It would be difficult to find another computation method so poorly adapted to the specifics of intensive development. Furthermore, accounts based "on the need" projected for such a long period of time (15 or more years) generates the tendency of replacing the objective with the means of reaching it, and the use of the national income as a base. This actually leads to the preservation of the main sectorial proportions or, at best, to a sluggish development of the material structure of the economy. All sectors must grow

at a roughly similar rate: that is what such computations are actually based on. However, this is the familiar principle of "on the basis of achievements," and of "everyone gets what he deserves."

Is it not paradoxical that we begin by estimating needs?! No, it is not a paradox but an argument in favor of the fact that the official planning methods are essentially little different—regardless of the base, technology of computations, etc. In fact, they always support the existing economic inertia.

What is the present condition of our power industry? It is a huge economic complex, larger than any extraction complex in the world.... This is common knowledge. Something else is also no secret: high capital intensiveness, excessive running costs, inadmissible losses, huge ecological violations, adverse living conditions and an unsatisfactory social infrastructure in many areas supplying raw materials for energy. In the thermoelectric power industry we have obsolete equipment, low efficiency, and record-setting emissions of pollutants per unit capacity or unit of output. All of this requires huge outlays simply for keeping production in a satisfactory condition, without even thinking of expanding output. It is truly a huge monster with 100 mouths, demanding an increasing number of resources with which to grow even further.

However, national economic resources—above all labor, and capacities in construction and machine building—are limited. Where to assign them and how to distribute them? The answer was substantiated a long time ago with computations which are convincingly supported by worldwide experience: above all, they must be aimed at the conservation of energy and other resources in the production facilities which use them. Martin furnaces should be replaced by oxygen converters; the "dry" cement production method should replace the "wet" system; such changes are needed in all sectors. However, this requires modern control-measuring equipment, the automation of technological processes, and management computerization (not to mention basic computerization, which does not require "high tech" in the struggle against losses and unproductive expenditures, etc.). This means outlays for the basic renovation of machine building output and the development of information technology.

Naturally, our entire economic system needs energy (and metal); the entire tremendous inertia of the material structure indicates only traditional ways of satisfying this appetite and the stereotypes of economic thinking, determined by and reflecting such inertia, give a "green light" only to this way of thinking. Nonetheless, without a structural reorganization of our economy, which has the highest power intensiveness among the developed countries and metal intensiveness of output for virtually all items and, consequently, the national income, we shall be unable to solve the problem of the power industry. The production of energy and steel, compared

to the structure of the postindustrial countries is, in our country, unquestionably excessive.

I can anticipate indignant objections: we are behind in the consumption of electric power for domestic purposes and its share in overall energy consumption is low; there is a general shortage of all energy resources; sometimes we even lack heat, so what kind of surplus are you talking about?! Let us consider these questions separately, even though the people prefer to ask them without separating them, formulated as "one single major problem."

Electric power by itself is insufficient when it comes to increasing the availability of power for consumer use. In order to raise power consumption in the housing-communal sector to the level of the industrial countries, we need a revolution in consumption and a conversion to an essentially different living standard. In order to spend electric power at home in amounts considered normal in postindustrial countries, we need a different type of housing and eight to 10 times more electrical appliances. Unquestionably, we must aspire to achieve this. However, electric power itself is secondary in relation to other factors which determine this process.

The role of electric power energy within the energy complex and the economy as a whole must indeed be increased. Do we have, to this effect, to increase the extraction of petroleum, natural gas and coal? Precisely the opposite: the higher the share of electric power, the less we spend on prime energy resources per unit energy end use. However, the customary extensive approach is inadmissible in the development of this key subsector. To begin with, the reconstruction of many operating thermoelectric power plants would enable us not only to reduce emissions by at least 50 percent but also to increase the production of electric power by improving efficiency and, to a certain extent, increasing output. Second, it is high time to stop fighting the public on the subject of building of new power stations: the people object not to electricity but to poor power industry—technologically backward, ecologically dangerous, unreliable and demanding that we make sacrifices for the sake of giving it anything it may want. Does anyone assume that the Swedes, Canadians or Japanese would be thrilled to see next door to their home an ordinary Soviet thermoelectric power plant, not to mention one of the worst variety? In the course of the social reorientation of the economy, it is time, finally, most energetically to address ourselves to the people and not to consider them merely as consumers of electric power. Third, the energy program, as in the past, underestimates the role of so-called nontraditional sources. Centralization, starting on the level we have already attained, has not only positive but also many negative sides. In particular, ensuring reliability is becoming increasingly expensive. The use of solar and wind energy is not only ecologically impeccable and offers the possibility of developing autonomous sources with minimal operational outlays, but also is technologically developing quickly and, in

terms of capital intensiveness, has become entirely acceptable. We should not plan to remain behind in this promising area.

As to the lack of energy (which has already been mentioned but must be discussed again and again, for otherwise people simply will not listen), each additional ton of petroleum or coal, or each additional cubic meter of natural gas—it is not a question of measurement units or the level on the basis of which the additional amount for petroleum should be computed—takes away resources from the production of energy-saving equipment, as a result of which it generates less energy than is lost by preventing conservation. To understand this today requires no computations. Suffice it simply to recall the experience of the postindustrial countries.

A. Arbatov writes quite convincingly on this topic. However, it would be useful to add something else: unquestionably, the 1973-1974 petroleum crisis suited the long-term interests of the United States. In the 1960s it became clear that under the changed circumstances the dependence of the economy on the natural factor—taking into consideration the situation in mining and the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution—was excessive. It was not even a matter of importing raw materials but of excessive consumption, independent of origin. It was discovered that the correlation between the consumption of natural gas and the speed with which new developments were being applied, the economy was being adapted and reaction to the demands of the consumer was fast was not direct but inverse. It was the OPEC members which pressed the button of the crisis. They would have never done it had the United States not displayed benevolent tolerance without, naturally, making this obvious in the least.

Energy prices jumped but was this sufficient? Perhaps in the United States and in other developed countries the people started waiting for the market to do its work and to convert the economy to a new type of resource conservation instead of resource wasting? No, everywhere governmental programs for energy and resource conservation began to be drafted. As we know, the market is short-sighted and solves by itself structural problems through destructive economic crises. The incentives of the market are an excellent means of achieving a great variety of objectives but one should know how to use them. That was the concern, in terms of resource utilization, of the various organizations in the mid-1970s. The U.S. Department of Energy was interested least of all in the extraction of petroleum, natural gas and coal. Its attention was focused on problems of energy consumption, controlled through taxation, financial and credit benefits or penalties, an amortization policy aimed at encouraging changes in energy-intensive equipment, etc. The U.S. Department of Energy drafted an energy program the main purpose of which was to lower the energy intensiveness of the national income. Over the past 15 years it has been reduced by more than one-third; gross power consumption was initially stabilized and then began to decline slowly. Not only our

result but also our measurements, as stipulated in the energy program, cannot be compared with such steps.

Today we are facing a much more complex task than was faced by the United States 15 years ago, for our technological potential is lower, the condition of the power industry is worse and so is that of machine building. The economic mechanism has not been regulated. The true master of our economy is the inertia powering the huge production system. As long as we are unable to oppose it neither the enhancement of commodity-monetary relations nor the still timid demands for glasnost in the formulation and making of economic decisions or else expert evaluations could counter it.

"One should not expect any significant results out of increasing the prices of energy," writes A. Arbatov. This assertion will probably raise sharp objections. How can it be: it was precisely by increasing petroleum prices that the economy in the developed capitalist countries was restructured and a turn toward resource conservation started! If we were to raise the cost of energy would people finally begin to conserve it? However, after ceilings have been set for energy consumption and major fines stipulated for violating them, what will happen? The enterprises will calmly pay their fines and no one intends to save on energy. The fines themselves are an increase in prices but in a different form. Unfortunately, it is not a matter of prices only. That which perfectly worked under the conditions of a developed market, the effect of antimonopoly laws, reserve capacities in machine building and a developed centralized system for economic management, based on indirect regulation, would not necessarily yield the desired results under essentially different conditions. Let us try to analyze the connection between raising the prices of energy resources and energy conservation possible in our country.

We can save a great deal of energy with "small things"—by avoiding thoughtless losses, overconsumption and flagrant negligence.... This has nothing to do with prices, for even with the present prices the enterprises would have reduced such unproductive outlays had they been interested in lowering costs and achieving economic results. The current monopoly status makes it possible to shift all expenses to the consumers with no trouble. The level of energy prices is of major importance in replacing energy consuming with energy conserving equipment. Our capital goods market, however, offers virtually no energy conserving equipment. For example, for many long years steel smelting has been undergoing a modernization yet more than one-half of the steel is still being smelted in Martin furnaces, which are extremely energy intensive. In the absence of a suitably powerful machine building base, following the market principles of price setting would lead to the fact that the cost of the equipment would obediently follow the cost of energy if such equipment were to allow energy conservation. In the final account, and in no less than 15 years, this could lead to a reorientation in machine building, the saturation of the market with energy conserving equipment

and a drop in equipment prices. However, having become especially profitable as a result of higher prices, the power industry will not, naturally, impartially observe such events. Demand for energy has remained steady over a long period of time, for it is based on the very structure of the economy and the fixed assets or, in short, on inertia. Therefore, undoubtedly the extraction of energy resources will reach new levels while labor and capital resources needed for energy conservation may be totally lacking.

Naturally, a controlled market price setting offers unquestionable advantages compared to bureaucratically set prices and, in principle, the described scenario of possible consequences of increasing the prices of energy makes this assessment unquestionable. It is merely a question of balanced prices not being consistent with progressive trends in the development of the economy, whatever its structure may be, for any further increase in the capacity of the energy extracting sectors is not consistent in the least with our long-term economic interests.

Therefore, a movement toward balanced prices and market price setting practices should by no means be uniform in all areas, and the structural situation of our present economy has assigned to the power industry the role of an outsider under these conditions. Initially or, to put it better, simultaneously radical structure-forming steps should be taken. Therefore progress toward the market must mandatorily be synchronized with the conversion of the central apparatus to essentially new functions: regulating the market instead of suppressing it, and using the programming method not superficially, as has been the case so far, but properly. In its qualitatively new variant, the energy program should play a key role. The implementation of the program, naturally, should be oriented toward economic methods: the right distribution of assignments and ceilings and commercial relations between the center and the performers of state orders, which will ensure the implementation of the program.

Our as yet unformed market needs care and watching much more than the Western market which was established 300 years ago. Not only did we lack a proper market but also the practice of controlling it, for the command-bureaucratic system specialized not in regulating the market but suppressing it, which are entirely different things. The study of the development of commodity-monetary relations in the area of energy and their influence on the structure of the economy should become a mandatory part of the energy program. Naturally, this should involve not only analysis or control but also recommendations based on them.

The main shortcoming of the energy program is ignoring the fact that to a very great extent the means needed for solving the energy problems are outside the power industry. It does not take much imagination to go beyond the sectorial boundaries, beyond the strictly national economic approach. The further growth of the

extracting sectors within the energy complex will have an extremely adverse effect not only on the economy as a whole but also on the power industry itself, on electric power in particular, and on the possibility of solving the social problems of those who work in this complex, on the technological level of the production process. Today the increased extraction of energy raw materials and energy conservation are "two incompatible things." Energy conservation in the energy program and an energy policy must become the main features and not something which could be partially implemented today and seriously only sometime in the future.

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PAGES FROM HISTORY

October 1917: Features of the Image of the Revolution

905B0010H Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 64-73

[Text] Never before had there been so many discussions, talk or arguing in Russia as in 1917. This applied not only to the capital cities—Petrograd and Moscow—but also to the provinces where there were seething political discussions on city squares, parks, theaters and classrooms. The entire country, from plants and factories to soldiers' barracks, had turned into one endless meeting. There was no lack of ideas, slogans and appeals, each one of which backed by groups, trends and parties which believed that the fate of the fatherland depended on their own version: at that time the Russian political spectrum was extremely varied, numbering several dozen colors and shades.

Let us note that today most of us, as though suffering from daltonism, can distinguish, at best, no more than three or four colors. This is entirely understandable, for over many years all of us, with the exception of a small circle of specialists, were not only almost totally unaware of the parties which either opposed the bolsheviks or were not their allies, but it is only now that we can even find out about the great variety within the Bolshevik Party itself. Alas, we have become accustomed in our society and in all aspects of its life—politics, economics and culture—for the final word always to be that of the winner, "by right of strength," not to be discussed, whereas the losers, whether parties or individuals, to be silenced forever.... Initially, as L. Trotsky said, these were "pitiful units" and "bankrupts"—Messrs. Martov, Avksentyev, Chernov and Abramovich—who were sent where they would henceforth remain, "in the garbage can of history." Several years later the same fate befell Trotsky himself, who had sent them there, and many other participants in the October Revolution and, within a strikingly short period of time the "garbage can" was packed....

However, in the same way that in an argument one cannot establish the truth by hearing only one of the sides, in our studies, literature and art as well, where until recently only one voice could be heard, it was simply impossible accurately to reproduce the true picture of the history of the October Revolution and the post-October days.

Today we want to know the full truth of history and, therefore, to become familiar with the entire range of testimony of the greatest event of the century, whether that of friends or enemies of the revolution, its fellow travelers or participants who, subsequently, were "anathematized." Therefore, we believe, it would be expedient to submit to the reader excerpts from materials which had been published in our country or abroad until the mid-1920s but which were then withdrawn from the files of domestic history by the will of the defenders of the "exclusively accurate" but, in fact, truncated and extremely one-sided vision of the period of the October Revolution.

The readers will become familiar with the notes by S. Mstislavskiy, a noted personality belonging to the left-wing S.R.; N. Sukhanov, at that time a menshevik and member of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets; Counterrevolutionary General P. Krasnov; and bolshevik leaders L. Kamenev and V. Antonov-Ovseyenko. Such testimony, we believe, will give the reader an authentic political picture of what was taking place, strengthening our conviction of the legitimacy of the victory of the October Revolution.

These materials are a selection from the book "*Year 1917*" which is planned for publication as part of the new Lenizdat series "Features of the Portrait of Our Time," prepared by Doctor of Historical Sciences M. Iroshnikov and Candidate of Historical Sciences Yu. Shelayev.

Because of the limited size of a journal publication, we have omitted the expanded scientific-referential commentary. We have included only the necessary information on the memoir writers and the published memoirs.

S.D. Mstislavskiy. Five Days¹

25 October

The congress should have opened today: there has been a quorum for some time: toward the morning the mandate commission had already registered 663 delegates, a figure which exceeded all of our expectations, for the elections to the congress in many areas had been held in a situation of semiboycott by the right-wing socialist parties, which were familiar with the congress' agenda. Despite the quorum, however, the session did not open: the bolsheviks wanted, prior to the congress, to abolish the Provisional Government and thus face the congress with a fait accompli.

In turn, the congress factions were also in no hurry: they wanted to discuss most seriously, as required by our time, the developed situation and their further tactics.

Matters were particularly serious and pressing for us, the left-wing S.R. Despite the tremendous stress of "internal relations," officially the party was still one: there was only **one** faction present at the congress. Since "locally" the mood of the party masses was unquestionably more to the left of the leadership which had remained frozen in its February moods, we had a vague hope of taking the faction and, perhaps, even the **entire** party out of the hands of the Central Committee and involving it in the revolutionary events....

The Central Committee itself felt that the situation was not in its favor. For that reason, it did not accept battle on the main question: the attitude toward the transfer of power; it even silently acknowledged it, shifting the center of gravity of its concepts to the question of the composition of the future central government: our demand for a homogeneous government, i.e., one that would consist exclusively of **socialists**, was countered by the Central Committee with arguments in favor of that same "February coalition," arguments which sounded strange in the conditions of the already accomplished coup, even to "gallery" supporters. However, even this viewpoint was half-heartedly supported by the Central Committee: one could feel that they had no hopes concerning the faction as a whole and that they were firmly favoring a split. Nonetheless, throughout the day I still hoped to keep the faction entire: our opponents were too confused and the representatives of the right-wing and the center were quite helplessly muttering their objections.

I had to absent myself for an hour. Returning to Smolny, I saw that the right-wing and the left-wing were meeting separately. Ironically, the faction of the right-wing (now officially called "the right-wing") was chaired by that same Filippovskiy with whom I had shared the combat emergency during the first night of the revolution.

At 10:45 p.m., in the big acts hall, brightly lit by the huge crystal chandeliers, packed with familiar and unfamiliar people, finally the congress opened: there was no reason to postpone it any longer. The factions showed their feelings: it was known that the right-wing socialist parties, finding themselves in an insignificant minority, would withdraw from the congress, regardless of its program and tactics; on the other hand, "combat operations" in the city were also drawing to an end: the Provisional Government had been located in the Winter Palace and the palace was surrounded on all sides; the "Avrora" was already under its very windows and finally the Petropavlovsk guns were trained at the helpless walls of Kerenskiy's hearse.... The situation could have come to an end any minute.... It was no longer possible to strike back at Podvoyskiy and Antonov, who were protected by guns and machine guns....

On the basis of seniority, it was the menshevik Dan who opened the meeting on behalf of the old All-Russian Central Executive Committee. His introductory speech

clearly contained echoes of his memorial speech delivered less than 24 hours earlier in the "final" extraordinary meeting at the Tauride Palace:

"This is not the time for political speeches.... Our comrades who are in session at the Winter Palace are under fire...."

We could hear in his voice a dull resignation to fate. Unwittingly, breaking the tension, joyful and sparkling laughter spread through the ranks. Dan's words presented a vivid image of... women under guard at the Winter Palace, pressed against each other, their eyes shut, their faces as white as their shirt fronts, hanging around on the gold lacquered couches in the former imperial abodes. It was truly both ridiculous and disgusting....

"I motion that we proceed with choosing a presidium...."

Avanesov approaches, with a piece of paper in his hand:

"Lenin... Zinovyev... Kamenev... Lunacharskiy... Kolontay... Spiridonova... Mstislavskiy..."

Under the distant dull fire of the Petropavlovsk gun I stood up along with the remaining members of the newly elected presidium, on the hastily assembled platform bending under the weight of the people crowded on it.... Immediately, as though hitting a rock, a wave of happy and victorious tension sweeps over the shouting and clapping, seething, celebrating hall.

Kamenev takes over the chair from Dan. He too is happy and celebrating. It is as though he is wearing a "new," "dress" jacket, although it is that same old jacket, bursting at the seams that he has been wearing forever, always the same, for the past few months.

"Agenda:

"The organization of the system.

"War and peace.

"The Constituent Assembly."

"Anyone against?"

Once again we heard a dull distant blast which rattled the teeth of "Bundt" member Abramovich huddling behind the rostrum as though hit by an unbearable nagging pain.

"Objections!..."

"The representative of the Petrograd soviet has the floor."

The "opposition" does not listen to the speaker: behind the back of the chairman it interrupts the procedure with impatient and persistent statements, out of order. Kamenev, however, sympathetically nods, his eyes under heavy eyebrows laughing, writing down the "order" under the sharp ringing voice of the speaker and the bursts of applause.

The report finally ends. Martov takes the floor. As always his trembling white hand is pressed against his side. He is twisted, his eyes stare into space. He demands the peaceful solution to the initiated conflict. He is supported by "his people" and some of the "senior" bolsheviks demonstratively applaud him, waving their arms.

Then it is my turn, in the name of the faction.

It is difficult to speak, for now, faced with the fact of the coup, what is the meaning of all this, our considerations and insistence have been swept off and are part of the past....

Meanwhile the air outside the old walls is rent by the increasingly frequent shelling.... The tall window panes tinkle all together. There, beyond the columns....

"The Winter Palace is coming down. 'Avrora' is firing at it almost point blank!"

"O-o-o!" moans Abramovich, lying at the feet of a sailor, pale, waving his hands, his eyes with a crazy look. Responding to this pitiful moan, with a generous and uniquely reckless gesture, the Avrora seaman calms him down, with a loud whisper, hiding his laughter: "Those are blank shells."

Blank shells sufficed for such people—ministers and "strike forces."...

Once again there is a sinister hissing cutting across the hall with new statements from the "right." Hysterically, Abramovich asks the congress to go to the Winter Palace, where a group of members of the Bundt, who sent Abramovich to the rostrum, has decided to go "to die together with the Provisional Government." Both men-sheviks and the "right" which henceforth separate themselves from us, the S.R., and other "small" groups announce their departure from the congress.

The threat of a "front" and an "explosion of popular indignation" which is "inevitable as a result of this insane and criminal step" sounds ever more sharp and impudent, formulated by the S.R....

Whether they believe their own words or not, they are nonetheless trying to use mockery: "Rejoice, rejoice. Your victory will last 1 hour! How can you fail to see the finger of fate in the fact that Kerenskiy has sneaked through the armored cars and the lines set by the military-revolutionary committee and is the only minister to do so. This was the only person who was worth catching! Yet you let him escape. While here you are consoling yourselves with banging and whistling, he is already marching on Petrograd, at the head of those who are hastening "to save the revolution" coming from the front, troops loyal to the Provisional Government."

"The second... the third... the special... how many of them has Kuchin counted? Can he remember? ...In the suburbs alone, in Gatchina, Krasnyy and Petergof, there

are 40,000 bayonets backing Kerenskiy. What do you have? Look around, assess your forces...."

Behind the rostrum, against the gray freshly painted wall, I can see the sad shrunken figure of Martov approaching. Vaguely looking down through his twisted pince-nez, staring at the floor covered with cigarette butts, still stubbornly and naively waiting for his turn to present his "interpolation."

Instead of him, what comes is the decisive news: the palace has been taken. The entire membership of the Provisional Government has been arrested and taken to the fortress. Cadets and ministers were able to escape the lynch mob.

Hastily shaking off the dust off their feet, the Martov people leave the hall... to catch up with the Bundt and the S.R.... Our faction meets for a caucus. Once again I take the chair.

Actually, what is there to caucus about? The road is clear. The party—to the very last man—cannot, does not dare at this point leave, separate itself from the masses. If, as we expect it to happen, as we know it will happen, Russia becomes split into two irreconcilable openly hostile camps separated by a wall of barricades as a result of this night, we would not be revolutionaries if we had to ask where we stand.... For good or bad the arrow is ready to fly.... It is too late to push away the hand of the bowman and change his target....

One thing is clear: in days such as these it is only believers who can lead. Those who do not believe in the rightness of the path anticipated and initiated by the bolsheviks will, by their own actions leave the command bridge and take their place among the oarsmen.... That is what I thought about myself while the debates were taking place....

That is what I tell myself, as I greet in my final words the accuracy of the decision of the faction, when by overwhelming majority vote, after a short exchange of views, it resolves to remain in the congress....

N.N. Sukhanov. Notes on the Revolution²

The intermission has just ended and the session resumes. However, the deputies had not rested. The same lack of order prevailed. The people stood up and, craning their necks, were listening to the statement by Chairman Kamenev, who said with particular emphasis:

"We have received the following cable by telephone. The Winter Palace was captured by the forces of the Military-Revolutionary Committee. The entire Provisional Government has been arrested with the exception of Kerenskiy who was able to escape"...., etc.

Kamenev lists the names of all the detained ministers. At the mention of the detention of Tereshchenko, toward the end, the news was welcomed with stormy applause.

Clearly, the broad masses have been able properly to appreciate the activities of this gentleman for whom they have special feelings.

One of the left-wing S.R. came out with a statement of the inadmissibility of arresting socialist ministers. He was immediately answered by Trotsky. To begin with, now is not the time to discuss such trifles; second, we should not stand on ceremony with such gentlemen who kept in jail hundreds of workers and bolsheviks. Both statements were actually true. What was much more important was the political reason which was not mentioned by Trotsky: the coup d'etat had not been completed and every minister left free would represent the legitimate authority and, under the given circumstances, could become the source of civil war.... Nonetheless, it was the statement, i.e., mainly the **tone of voice** of Trotsky that made (even in Smolnyy) by no means a good impression on everyone. This new ruler was showing his teeth on the very first day on the subject of "trifles." No good will come of it.

Once again we had "extraordinary statements," all of them of a positive, a pleasant nature. The Tsarskoye Selo garrison was "firmly defending the approaches to the capital." The bicycle troops summoned against Smolnyy refused to serve the bourgeoisie.... The famous ensign Krylenko reported that the armies of the Northern front had set up a military-revolutionary committee recognized by Front Commander Cheremisov; the Northern armies will not march on Petrograd; Voytinskiy, the government commissar, had resigned.

All of these news were greatly improving the mood of those present. The masses are beginning to like the coup d'etat and are not only supporting the leaders and trusting them theoretically, but also practically approving their ideas and actions. They are beginning to feel that things will develop smoothly and well, that the horrors promised by the right do not appear to be all that terrible, and that the leaders therefore may turn out to be right in everything else. Possibly, there may be peace, bread and land.... Greetings to the military revolutionary committee of the Northern Front were welcomed with thunderous applause.

Suddenly, our Kapelinskiy shows up on the rostrum with the "extraordinary statement." For some reason this leftist faction member has been given the difficult obligation of announcing the withdrawal of internationalist mensheviks. Martov himself did not show up to explain this act.... Standing at the end of the hall, I had trouble hearing Kapelinskiy's words. Actually, what did he have to say? Most emphatically he said: since the suggestion of our faction to enter into talks with all socialist parties on the creation of a democratic system did not meet with the support of the congress, we shall leave the congress....

Naturally, after all that was happening, this did not make even the slightest impression on the assembly. As ill luck would have it, Lapinskiy, Martov's friend, member of

the faction of the Polish Socialist Party, said that that faction will remain in the congress and will work with it.

However, matters took a turn for the worse. Chairman Kamenev responded to the statement by Martov's group. He said: the congress has resolved unanimously to discuss, above all, precisely this question which the mensheviks-internationalists are raising so persistently. However, this unanimously passed resolution is not being implemented because the congress continuously keeps dealing with extraneous declarations; if the Martov people refuse to discuss this matter, it means that their reasons were not sincere and that their withdrawal had been decided in advance.

All of this definitively and rightly sunk our faction in the eyes of the congress. Kamenev completed our humiliation with his proper behavior: he suggested that the sharp resolution formulated by Trotsky against the S.R. and the mensheviks be withdrawn.

So, the thing was done. We left who knows where and why, having broken with the soviets, and involved ourselves with counterrevolutionary elements, having discredited and humiliated ourselves in the eyes of the masses and having undermined the entire future of our own organization and its principles. Furthermore, we left and thus entirely freed the hands of the bolsheviks, making them full masters of the entire situation and yielding to them the entire arena of the revolution.

The struggle waged at the congress for a single democratic front **could have** been successful. To the bolsheviks and to Lenin and Trotsky this was even more hateful than all the various "salvation committees" and the new Kornilov campaign waged by Kerenskiy, marching on Petersburg. The withdrawal of the "pure" freed the bolsheviks from this danger. By leaving the congress and leaving behind them the bolsheviks with the left-wing S.R. boys, and a weak little group of New Lifers, with our own hands we surrendered to the bolsheviks the monopoly of the soviet, the masses and the revolution. By our own stupid will we ensured victory along Lenin's entire "line" which I shall discuss subsequently.

I personally committed many errors and blunders in the revolution. The biggest and unforgivable crime which I deem to have committed is the fact that, immediately after the vote taken by our faction to withdraw, I did not break with Martov's group and did not remain in the congress.... I corrected my own personal error soon afterwards. In general, the situation changed quickly. To this day, however, I grieve for this crime of mine committed on 25 October.

Once again, the floor was taken by extraneous speakers. I remember a black-bearded seaman from the "Avrora," whose declaration triggered tremendous enthusiasm. He reported that "Avrora" had fired blanks.... Where did this fragment of a shell brought by Palchinskiy and identified by Verderevskiy as a shell from the "Avrora" come from? Who was right here, I do not know.

At the end of the session, despite the total havoc, the **mood** became substantially enhanced. Lunacharskiy read an appeal of the congress to the workers, soldiers and peasants. He was interrupted by strong applause. Actually, this was not an appeal. It was an official act of extreme importance, which gave shape to the political nature of the coup d'etat. Clearly, the authors had totally failed to assess its true significance, for in fact there was no other act. Its content, of course, should have been made public not only to workers, soldiers and peasants but also to the bourgeoisie, to the landowners, to friends and foes, to the entire population.

Without any political report, without any discussion or vote, the congress proclaimed in the appeal the following: "...Based on the will of the tremendous majority of workers, soldiers and peasants, and based on the victorious uprising of workers and the garrison in Petrograd, the congress assumes the power. The Provisional Government has been deposed. The authority of the conciliationist Central Executive Committee has been abolished.... The congress resolves: the entire power locally will be assumed by the soviets of worker, soldier and peasant deputies, who must secure true revolutionary order."

The "appeal" then presented the familiar program of the new regime. As to the army in the field and the further development of the war, until peace can be made, actually the appeal repeated here the views of the first revolutionary manifesto of 14 March: "The revolutionary army will be able to defend the revolution against all encroachments by imperialists, until the new government has succeeded in concluding a democratic peace."...

It was thus that the October coup d'etat was **politically** carried out and took shape. The appeal was adopted with two votes opposing it and twelve abstentions. The session was closed at 6:00 a.m.

In a dense crowd, the delegates come out of Smolny after their work, with the impressions and events of this universal historical day. The witnesses, participants and creators of such events passed in a thick crowd by the guns and machine guns mounted at the cradle of the "world socialist revolution."

However, no one was handling those weapons. The guards at Smolny were resting: there was no discipline. However, there was no need for guards. No one had either the strength nor the impetus to attack....

A cold winter dawn was rising over Petersburg.

L.B. Kamenev. Organization of the First Worker-Peasant Government in the World³

Dear comrades, it will be probably better if I describe to you the military side of the coup. In a few words I shall describe the preparatory political work which paralleled the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of the worker-peasant regime.

Naturally, Comrade Lenin played the main role in this work. Even while the democratic conference was taking place, Comrade Lenin considered the time ripe for the soviets to assume the power. Forced to live in clandestinity, he demanded of the party's Central Committee to take decisive steps to organize the uprising and to overthrow the Kerenskiy government. His demand became even more persistent in the course of the weeks of the approaching democratic conference. Finally, it was decided to hold a party conference together with the comrades from Moscow, to solve the problem of the uprising. Two such conferences were held: one at Comrade Kalinin's place in Lesnyy and the other in an apartment put at our disposal by Comrade Sukhanova. Lenin was forced to attend both meetings in disguise, wearing a wig, not to be recognized by Kerenskiy's spies. Both meetings were attended by 15 to 20 people. All those present subsequently became the most important leaders of the October coup d'etat. All of them were members of the party's Central Committee and the most active workers who, at that time, assumed the leadership of the Petrograd and Moscow soviets. At those meetings Lenin's viewpoint on the need to give decisive battle to the Kerenskiy government won definitively. A group of five was selected and instructed to assume political leadership of the initiated struggle. The five included Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Dzerzhinskiy and myself. The five met in different premises of workers, on the Vyborg side. At that time a military-revolutionary committee was already at work and heading the operations in Smolnyy, around which Comrade Trotsky had rallied the forces of the Petrograd garrison and in whose hands was the entire leadership of the preparations for the battle. On the night of 23 October, however, the events assumed such a decisive nature that it became necessary and possible to concentrate all activities in organizing the revolution in Smolnyy itself. That night, for the first time Comrade Lenin showed up in Smolnyy. However, this was known only to a narrow circle of members of the military-revolutionary committee and the party's Central Committee....

On that day, when the congress of soviets was scheduled to open, isolated clashes were already taking place on the streets between our revolutionary forces and Kerenskiy's defenders. To us it was entirely clear that not only the working population of Petrograd but also the entire Petrograd garrison was with us. It also became clear that the overwhelming majority of the delegates of soviets, present at the congress, were for us. We had to undertake the practical organization of the new system.

While the military-revolutionary committee, headed by Comrades Sverdlov, Uritskiy, Ioffe, Dzerzhinskiy and others, meeting on the third floor of Smolnyy, was controlling the seizure of all combat centers, assigning military units and commissars, and so on, and while Comrades Antonov, Podvoyskiy and Chudnovskiy were making preparations for the seizure of the Winter Palace, on the lower floor in Smolnyy, in the small room No 36, under Lenin's chairmanship, the first list was being

drawn up of people's commissars which, the following day, I made public at the congress. I remember that Comrade Lenin suggested that the new regime be known as the worker-peasant government. Immediately the decrees on land and peace, personally drafted by Lenin, were read and discussed. These decrees were adopted with virtually no debates or amendments; it was decided to abolish the old titles of ministers and replace them with people's commissars and the government, I remember, on my suggestion, would be known as the "Council of People's Commissars." At that same conference the first effort of reaching an agreement with the left-wing S.R. took place. They sent to us a delegation consisting of Kamkov, Karelin and, I think, Kolegayev, asking us what we intended to do. We told them that to us the question was solved and that we shall give the power to the congress of soviets and were ready to set up a government consisting of members of our party but that we were ready to give them several seats in the government if they would support us unconditionally. They refused, referring to the fact that this would cause a division within the S.R. Party, which they hoped to rally under the slogan of "Power to the Soviets!" This naive error was quite soon refuted by Messrs. Avksentyev and Chernov. After these talks we went to open the congress. I was asked to chair it. The congress opened at a time when there was fighting around the Winter Palace. We needed several minutes to read the statement of the right-wing S.R. and the mensheviks on their withdrawing from the congress, after which the floor was given to Comrade Lenin who read the decrees on peace and land, which were accepted almost unanimously.

The power passed into the hands of the soviets. The first government of workers and peasants in the world began its life. The Proletarian Revolution won.

P.N. Krasnov. On the Domestic Front⁴

The March Begins

On a pale dawn we marched toward Ostrov. Some 5 versts out of the city I came across squadrons from the Ninth Don Regiment, leaving the city and going to their villages. I stopped them.

"Where are you going?" I asked.

"During the night we received your order to pack up and go home," the commander answered.

"I did not give such an order. Turn back we are now marching on Petrograd and Kerenskiy is with us."

"What, Kerenskiy?" the commander answered amazed. The Cossacks who had heard me began to pass on the news to the others: "Kerenskiy is here, Kerenskiy is here."

It was then that Kerenskiy rode up. He greeted the Cossacks. The Cossacks answered him quite unanimously. There was no hesitation, and the squadrons began to ride toward Ostrov. We marched on. I had

nowhere to put Kerenskiy. My headquarters had been wrecked and I took him to the official building where I offered him tea and food while I left to issue my orders. Squadrons of the Ninth Regiment passed by and I could see curiosity on the faces of the Cossacks.

The news that Kerenskiy was in Ostrov spread throughout the city. A crowd began to gather in front of the building. Ladies came bearing flowers, as well as seamen and soldiers from the naval artillery battery which was deployed along this side of the Velikaya River, in the Ostrov suburb. I put guards at the door of the house and put on alert the entire Yenisey Squadron, which assumed positions in the long corridor which led to the dining room, and let no one pass. Committees were probably in session. However closely we watched to prevent outsiders from getting in many such outsiders gathered. However, the front seats were held by the committee of the First Don Cossack Division, the courageous Cossacks on whose faces there was only curiosity and no malice. The committee of the Ussuri Division was in an entirely different mood, particularly the representatives of the Amur Cossack Regiment, which included many bolsheviks.

I went to report to Kerenskiy that the committees were ready. Kerenskiy was asleep sitting on his stool. His face showed extreme fatigue. He woke up the moment I entered.

"Ah! Good. I will come right away. Then we could eat something," he said.

I had never heard Kerenskiy speak but had only heard enthusiastic references to his speeches and about the power of his oratorical talent. That is precisely why I may have expected too much of him. He may also have been quite tired and unprepared. However, his speech to the people he wanted to lead to Petrograd was lackluster in all respects. It consisted of hysterical shouts of individual and sometimes totally unrelated sentences. These were all worn out words and worn out slogans: "The gains of the revolution are in danger." "The Russian people are the freest people in the world,"... "this is the betrayal of the allies," and so on, and so forth.

The Don people listened closely. Many of them holding their breath, enthusiastically, with open mouths. From the back, from two or three places, shouts were heard: "Not true! That is not what the bolsheviks want!" The shouts came from a nasty looking round-faced Cossack NCO from the Amur Regiment.

After Kerenskiy ended there was rather weak applause. At that point the voice of the Amur NCO, full of malice, was heard:

"Have they not drunk enough of our soldier's blood! Comrades! You are faced with a new Kornilovism! Landowners and capitalists!..."

"Enough!... That will do!... Stop him...." The people up front shouted.

"No, let him speak!... Comrades! You are being deceived... This is a plan against the people...."

I ordered that the speaker be thrown out and told Kerenskiy to leave.

Kerenskiy was in a hurry to reach the station but news reached us from there that the coach had not arrived.

The crowd at the house where Kerenskiy stayed was growing. The officers reported to me that its mood was by no means friendly and did not advise me to send Kerenskiy without a guard. I went out on the street. Ladies with flowers were standing there.

"When will Kerenskiy come out?" they asked. "Ah, I have never seen Kerenskiy! Ask him to address the crowd."

"The bolsheviks want action," the people said in the crowd. "What do the soldiers need?" They want peace and he is again talking about war," the soldiers said.

"Let us grab him and deliver him to Lenin and that will be all."

"What about the Cossacks?"

"The Cossacks will do nothing."

I summoned from the station a mounted squad of the Ninth Don Regiment to accompany the automobile and ordered at the station a guard of honor. At about 1:00 p.m. we took off for the station....

We sat down in the coach and I ordered that the train start moving. The locomotive engines were whistling and maneuvering. Along the way there were soldiers from the Ostrov garrison, in increasing numbers. Meanwhile, we were sitting there not coupled to anything and not moving.

I threatened reprisals. In words everyone totally agreed but there was no action.

Esaul Korshunov, the commander of the Yenisey Squadron, who was the chief of my convoy, had been at one point assistant locomotive engineer. He undertook to take us. He took over the locomotive engine with two Cossacks and things started moving.

It was absolutely clear that voluntarily no one was willing to obey Kerenskiy's order, for no one knew who would prevail; "use force and we shall have an excuse that we did not act on our own free will."

Aware of the mood of the Pskov Garrison and, naturally, that Pskov had already been informed from Ostrov that Kerenskiy would be coming with the Cossacks, I ordered Korshunov to run the train without stopping, to take water before Pskov and to run through the Pskov passenger and Pskov freight yards without stopping, at full speed. I was right.

Finally, at around 3:00 p.m. we took off.

We stopped at Cherskaya Station. General Kondratyev, the chief of military communications, was expecting us. He asked that he be allowed to see Kerenskiy. I was present at the discussion. Kerenskiy accused him, shouting, of being slow with the trains. Kondratyev was totally subservient.

Kerenskiy instructed him about the units which were to be sent first. This applied to an entire army. Kondratyev agreed respectfully.

Colonel Popov, who was with me in the same compartment, and I, considered this a good omen. It meant that Cheremisov will join Kerenskiy, we decided.

There was a huge crowd of several thousand soldiers at Pskov Station. Half of them were armed. The crowd became excited and moved closer to the tracks as the train approached. I was on the platform; Korshunov with his courageous Yeniseys was driving the locomotive engine; the train speeded up and the station, thick with gray overcoats, remained behind us.

On the rare stops one could hear singing from the coaches. A late lunch was served. We could smell the Cossack food. A prayer was heard. There were no agitators. Everything was well.

Officers arrived with a train coming out of Petrograd. Squadron Commander Kartashov gave me a detailed report on the way the cadets were defending the Winter Palace, the mood of the garrison, which was hesitating, not knowing which side to take, meanwhile being neutral. Kerenskiy entered the compartment.

"Report to me, lieutenant," he said. "This is quite interesting. He offered his hand to Kartashov. The other stood at attention without shaking hands.

"Lieutenant, I am offering you my hand," impressively said Kerenskiy.

"Guilty, commander-in-chief, sir," clearly Kartashov said. "I cannot shake hands with you. I am with Kornilov!"

Kerenskiy blushed. He turned and left the compartment.

"Reward this officer," he noted to me as he passed by....

The train went on, through the cold darkness of the quiet September night. We passed Luga without stopping.... We were approaching Gatchina. Silence everywhere. The Cossacks were no longer singing. However, for some reason the steady rolling of the train gave us confidence of our success.

I nodded. The door to the compartment opened. I opened my eyes. Kerenskiy stood at the door with the political commissar Captain Kuzmin.

"General," Kerenskiy said to me solemnly. "I appoint you commander of the army marching on Petrograd; congratulations, general!..."

He added in an ordinary tone of voice:

"Do you have a field message pad? I shall write this order immediately."

Silently I gave him my pad. He left. Commander of the army marching on Petrograd! For the time being, what I had were six squadrons of the Ninth Regiment and four squadrons of the Tenth. The squadrons were understrength, 70 men each. A total of 700 horsemen, less than one full regiment. If one has to hurry, one-third of the horsemen falling behind, the combat force would be a total of 466 people: two wartime companies!...

An army commander with two companies!

This was ridiculous.... We were playing at soldiers! How tempting is this game with its rich titles and statements!....

A pale dawn appeared through the window. It was a gray depressing autumn day. The station building was painted red. Wet ash trees, covered with frozen berries. We were at Gatchina-Freightyard....

V.A. Antonov-Ovseyenko. Notes on the Civil War⁵

Mikhail Artemyevich Muravyev is to me one of the most memorable figures of the period of the revolution. His lean figure and short graying hair, and clear eyes always remind me of motion which follows the tinkling of spurs. He had a strong, warm and emotional voice. He spoke in a high style, which came to him naturally. Muravyev always lived in the thick of life and always acted selflessly. This zeal was his main attraction and the attraction to him of the soldiers' masses was unquestionable....

I saw him for the first time in the reception room of our party's Central Committee in the pre-October days. Energetically he walked into the office and Comrade Sverdlov whispered to me somewhat embarrassed: "This S.R. officer has come to offer his services. I do not know what to do with him, could he be trusted?" On a different occasion, Sverdlov said: "Muravyev could guess about our preparations but did not believe in their success. In his view, the forces of the Provisional Government are small but much more combat-capable than ours and much more steadfast." This remark revealed Muravyev's limitation: his strictly military outlook made him underestimate a fact of the greatest moral significance: the fact that the Kerenskiy movement had no vital grounds, which made even the most combat-ready troops non-combat capable.

Generally speaking, this daring adventurer was extremely weak politically. An excessive military viewpoint prevented him from being a good politician and poor political knowledge prevented him from being a good military man. Unquestionably, Muravyev would have played a major role in our revolution had he been better balanced and better politically indoctrinated.

The October events developed without Muravyev's participation.

When it became clear that Kerenskiy was mounting an offensive, Chudnovskiy, Dzevaltovskiy and I were assigned to organize the resistance to it (author's note: I must confess that this "triumvirate" was suggested by myself, not daring to assume singly the leadership of the defense of Petrograd although Comrade Lenin had urged me to do so).

I remember the futility of the effort to agree with those two comrades. I was particularly impressed by Staff-Captain Dzevaltovskiy....

All of our long-drawn proceedings were taking place in a premise only recently occupied by the district headquarters (despite my arguments, I recall, Comrade Lenin insisted that we move out of Smolnyy where we had all the necessary communications, to the district headquarters, which was unquestionably sabotaging our orders; this was a major error). From headquarters we could not establish proper communications with the districts and with N.I. Podvoyskiy's military organization which, for one reason or another, was not properly communicating with us. The orders which our triumvirate gave were being carried out exceptionally slowly.

Toward the morning the news reached us that Gatchina had been occupied by Kerenskiy and that he was threatening Krasnoye Selo.

Meanwhile, in the premises of the Central Committee or else in Smolnyy (I do not recall exactly) we were holding a conference with the "military" personnel. Here, opposing our "triumvirate," Comrade Podvoyskiy argued that we were incompetent and recommended that the job be given to the "military." I agreed with this decision made by the majority and said that I find it possible to continue with such work providing that I am supported by the entire "military." Podvoyskiy left and after a while returned reporting that by decision of the party's Central Committee he had been appointed commander-in-chief.

After expressing my disapproval of this appointment and saying that he would be totally unable to cope with this job I nonetheless immediately offered my services to Nikolay Ilich and was given the command of the Left Pulkovo Sector of our Petersburg positions. The right side at Krasnoye Selo was to be under Dybenko's command.

Pavel Dybenko, who had just arrived with an echelon of seamen, and I started driving toward Pulkovo. At the turn toward the gate our car broke down; we stopped the stylish car of the Italian Consul, asked him to step down and, ignoring his objections, took off in his car.

The situation at the headquarters by the Narva Gates, was one of total confusion: no communications whatsoever with the units which had occupied Pulkovo; no strict protective measures; the Red Guard Troops came and went as they wished; no information whatsoever was available as to what was taking place in the direction of the Pulkovo Heights. I drove to Petropavlovka and

obtained the promise that we would be given no less than one squad of artillery to assume positions at Pulkovo. We had artillerymen but had no horses. The guns were to be brought pulled by horses belonging to civilians. From headquarters we went to Pulkovo. Here I realized that the units of the Third Infantry Regiment, which were holding this elevation were quite unstable and could easily retreat in the general confusion; they had no idea of what was taking place to their right and could only hear bad rumors about what was taking place to their left. Their officers were not particularly sympathetic to the new regime and paid no attention to the mood of the soldiers. There were rumors to the effect that Tsarskoye Selo was already partially occupied by the Kerenskiy forces without any resistance.

The officers were preparing to withdraw the regiment to the outpost, to which I was opposed. Our decision was that it was necessary to replace these units sooner with strong artillery support.

Dybenko left for his own sector while I returned to the Narva Gates. On the road I met with groups of Red Guards who were running in different directions. I also came across a small group of soldiers from one of the guards regiments (I think this included Comrade Dashkevich).

At headquarters I issued a number of orders on establishing communications with the regiment on the Pulkovo Heights and on preparing to replace this regiment, as well as on organizing the artillery. I then hastily returned to Smolnyy, summoned by Vladimir Ilich. In Smolnyy I presented a detailed report to Comrade Lenin and told him that the left sector was very weak and that here there was a serious possibility of a breakthrough in the direction of the city. I was also concerned for the safety of the Nikolayev Railroad: it was necessary to strengthen Kolpino and secure communications with Moscow. We had to find the armored train we had promised to the Pulkovo forces and take it along the Nikolayev Railroad.

As it were, however, we were unable to locate the armored train, for despite the order we had sent it had been used by the Putilov Rayon Headquarters for its own purposes. Nor were we able to send reliable forces to Kolpino.

Once again I traveled to the Narva headquarters to organize matters. Here everything was gradually becoming relatively organized. Once again reliable units were sent to occupy the Pulkovo Heights. We were informed that seamen's columns were beginning to move.

The unexpected interruption of telephone communications with the city worried me. We were totally unable to communicate with Petropavlovka, for which reason I decided to go there in person to speed up matters with the artillery.

Four other men sat with me in the car. I fell asleep when, suddenly, a sharp movement woke me up. I opened my eyes under the loud shout of "out," and I saw in front of me a couple of cadets with revolvers pointed at us. The automobile was stopped near some kind of building and was surrounded by an armed group. My fellow travelers were being ordered to empty their pockets. Still not properly awake, I started doing so, but one of the cadets grabbed my hand: "Ah, pleased to meet you, people's commissar." I was then asked to leave the car.

I was taken under heavy guard into the building of the telephone station which had been seized by the mutinied cadets. "Look at him, he will be finished soon!" the people kept shouting. "Keep calm," a senior cadet ordered. "Well, mister people's commissar, has your little song come to an end?" mockingly asked someone. "Well," I answered, "it was a good song."

I was taken inside the building. In a small room a young officer looked me over quickly. The cadet whispered something to him. I was locked in with a group of scared people in a big room, where I immediately tried to take a nap.

However, I was soon brought out of my half-sleepy state by an inordinate noise. Doors started slamming, I heard steps and exchange of fire. I realized that a siege had begun.

"Let us barricade ourselves," I suggested to the other prisoners. They were indecisive. The noise became greater and we could hear fire shots. Then, suddenly, the doors opened and, pushing ahead a couple of cadets I saw the quite familiar figure of Williams, the correspondent for a socialist American newspaper, with Comrade Rotshteyn standing behind him.

"I am an intermediary and have an offer for you. The cadets would like to surrender to you providing that their lives are spared and no violence is committed against them," Williams said.

"I take responsibility for protecting their lives, let them drop their weapons," I answered.

There were 45 cadets but I did not see the leaders, who had fled.

The barricades came down and I could see on the other side an armed crowd including Comrade Starkov, heading it, carrying a rifle.

I calmed down the people with a few words and ordered that guards be assigned to take the detainees to the barracks of the guards navy crew. The crowd was angrily rumbling and threatening to deal with the cowering cadets. However, they obeyed and I had no difficulty in taking the detainees to the place, where I delivered them to left-wing S.R. Ustinov who had been appointed the representative of the People's Commissariat for Justice.

I was given a warm welcome in Smolnyy. It turned out that in exchange for my life the cadets had asked that 50

of their people, captured by the Red Guards, be released. The deal was accepted. "Is a good social democrat not work 50 cadets?" Comrade Lenin asked good-naturedly.

I learned that Podvoyskiy had been replaced by Muravyev. Muravyev was somewhat hesitant although flattered when I immediately suggested to him that he use my services in organizing the struggle against Krasnov. "You can help me deal with the political aspect of the matter," he said. He soon realized, hearing my military advice, that I could be useful also in purely military matters. Unaware that in the past I had been an officer, he expressed his astonishment at my knowledge of military affairs.

Muravyev worked like mad as commander-in-chief of the Petrograd District. Compared to the rest of us, he had the advantage that he was able to make officers work. He demanded that all of them return to their positions, gathered them in headquarters and spoke to them in a special way which they could understand and gave them great confidence. He set himself the task of making immediate use of all means of defense and of deploying in its positions the entire garrison. He was able to do this with few exceptions (I believe that it was only the Moscow Regiment that refused).

He was also able to accomplish a great deal in organizing the technical facilities. He was able to find horses for the artillery, somewhat to organize the engineering units, etc.

However, Muravyev's strategic capabilities do not account for Krasnov's defeat. Muravyev's plan consisted only of sending units in the familiar sectors, maintaining reciprocal contacts, and creating a strong defense line in front of Petrograd. The seamen and some Red Guards were to be the striking force.

Huge forces were brought into motion immediately after Trotsky became personally involved and led to the positions the Petrograd workers, inspiring their mass upsurge. The factory-plant sirens began wailing, as had already frequently happened during the Kornilov period, and immediately everything went into feverish motion.... Naturally, Krasnov's pressure, with its minute forces, had to collapse in the face of the bristling proletarian capital. The decisive blow against him was dealt by the seamen who pushed the Cossacks out of Tsarskoye Selo, hurling themselves into the attack.

When I (I believe on 31 October, old style) arrived in Gatchina with Muravyev, the Cossacks had already been removed. However, information was received that striking forces were advancing out of Luga.

Accompanied by a few comrades, I went to meet that strike force in Luga. However, its mood concerning the Soviet Regime turned out to be entirely peaceful....

Footnotes

1. S.D. Mstislavskiy (Maslovskiy) (1876-1943) was one of the noted leaders of the S.R. Party and, subsequently,

of its left-wing. He took part in the 1905-1907 Revolution. After the February 1917 Revolution, he became extraordinary commissar for the Petrograd Soviet. He headed a detachment of soldiers and seamen who arrested Nicholas II and his family in Tsarskoye Selo. He was a delegate to the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets and member of its presidium. He was a member of the First Soviet Peace Delegation in Brest-Litovsk. He participated in the Civil War. Subsequently he became a noted Soviet writer and author of the books "*The Rook is a Bird of Spring*," "*On the Eve. 1917*," and others. We have quoted here part of the chapter "25 October" from Mstislavskiy's book "*Pyat Dney*" [5 Days] (Moscow, 1922, pp 69-76), which came out on the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution and is virtually unknown to the contemporary Soviet readers.

2. N.N. Sukhanov (Gimmer) (1882-1940). Agrarian economist and noted journalist; he became an S.R. in 1903 and a menshevik in 1917. After the February Revolution he was a member of the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet. He was a member of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets and one of the editors of the newspaper NOVAYA ZHIZN. After the October Revolution he worked as an economist and editor of various periodicals. In 1930 he was expelled from the Communist Academy; in 1931 he was sentenced by the court as head of the so-called clandestine menshevik organization. He was sentenced a second time in 1939. The text published here is an excerpt from his seventh book "*Zapiski o Revolyutsii*" [Notes on the Revolution] (Berlin-Petersburg-Moscow, 1923, pp 217-222). In this book the author describes the proceedings of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Worker and Soldier Deputies, which opened on 25 October (7 November) 1917 in Smolnyy.

3. L.B. Kamenev (Rozenfeld) (1883-1936). Member of the RSDWP since 1901. After October, first deputy chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, second convocation, and subsequently chairman of the Moscow Soviet and deputy chairman of the Sovnarkom and chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense. Central Committee member (1917-1927) and member of the Central Committee Politburo (1919-1926), of the All-Union Central Executive Committee and the USSR Central Executive Committee. Expelled from the ranks of the VKP(b). Executed by firing squad in 1936. Rehabilitated in 1988. The text published here is part of L.D. Kamenev's memoirs "The Organization of the First Worker-Peasant Government in the World." The work was published in the "First People's Calendar for 1919 of the Union of Communes of the Northern Oblast" (Petersburg, 1919, pp 81-83).

4. P.N. Krasnov (1869-1947). Lieutenant General. In August-September 1917 commander of the Third Cavalry Corps. After the October Revolution, commanded forces marching on Petrograd for the purpose of overthrowing the Soviet system. Captured and released on his word of honor not to continue the armed struggle. In May 1918, elected ataman of the Don Cossacks. He

created the White Cossack Don Army and in May-August 1918 seized the power in Don Oblast. In January 1919 accepted Denikin's leadership but soon afterwards resigned because of conflict with the command of the Voluntary Army and left for Germany. He cooperated with the Hitlerites; he was captured and, after being sentenced by the USSR Supreme Court, executed. P.N. Krasnov's memoirs "*On the Domestic Front*," were published in 1922 in Berlin as volume 1 of a multiple-volume publication of the "Archive of the Russian Revolution," compiled jointly with I.V. Gessen. Reprinted in the Soviet Union as part of the work "*Revolution and Civil War as Described by the White Guards*," vol 2 "*Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya*" [The October Revolution] (Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, pp 55-59) from which this excerpt was taken.

5. V.A. Antonov-Ovseyenko (1883-1938). RSDWP member since 1903. In 1905-1906 he was one of the military leaders of the uprising in Poland and in Sebastopol, for which reason he was sentenced to death, commuted to 20 years of hard labor; escaped; since 1910 lived in France. He joined the mensheviks. In June 1917, soon after his arrival in Russia, he joined the RSDWP(b). He was one of the leaders of the storming of the Winter Palace and the detention of the Provisional Government. In the first Sovnarkom he was member of the committee on military and maritime affairs. He took part in the Civil War. He was a member of the republic's Revolutionary Military Council. Held state, military and diplomatic positions starting with 1920. He was one of L.D. Trotsky's supporters. He was repressed and posthumously rehabilitated. The text published here is an excerpt from chapter 4 of the first book of the three-volume work by V.A. Antonov-Ovseyenko "*Zapiski o Grazhdanskoy Voiny*" [Notes on the Civil War] (Moscow, 1924, pp 78-85), which immediately became a bibliographic rarity.

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Who is the Master of the Town?

905B00101 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 74-83

[Article by Tatyana Mikhaylovna Govorenkova, candidate of technical sciences, senior scientific associate, Central Scientific Research Urban Construction Institute]

[Text] Once again the interests of the restructuring and renovation of society raised the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets!" giving it a new meaning. At the latest revolutionary spiral of development, our country took a course of decentralization. This is a second such case in the history of the Soviet state, probably familiar to few.

Actually, today we speak a great deal about the fatal 1930s: the maimed lives, the genocide committed by the Stalinist regime toward its people, and the alienation of the peasant from the land.... The tragedy which afflicted

the cities in the country is known to few people. There is an explanation for this. For a long time discussing the mechanism of the structure of the Soviet system was prohibited and the system itself was considered an exceptional phenomenon which allowed no analogy with any foreign country or with domestic history. We were forced to forget a great deal. The majority of the people developed the impression that the Soviet system had remained unchanged since the revolution. Such is not the case.

The mechanism of management of the country and its cities, starting with 1917, changed, swinging like a pendulum between centralism and decentralization, continuing with the fluctuations which were characteristic of previous Russian history. These concepts, which make almost no sense to the contemporary citizen, were revived by perestroika.

On the level of common sense centralism and decentralization are clear concepts: centralism exists when the entire power is concentrated in the hands of the central government; decentralization occurs when most of the prerogatives are not in the hands of the central government. Actually, they are fictitious opposites which do not have any a priori merits or faults but which are needed by any type of state in its conflicting unity. Both centralism and decentralization are mandatory components in the exercise of power. They are particularly clear in countries with vast territories and territorial differentiations. The central and local system becomes a single state with the help of corresponding ties between them. The upper levels provide the meaning and integrality of the existence of the country and become particularly important during critical periods (war, revolution, economic, social or political crisis, or the existence of major discord among local areas). The lower strata are engaged in fragmented specific activities and their priority increases during the periods of restoration and development. The ties go in both directions: from the top downward (administration) and from the bottom to the top (self-administration). In most situations, therefore, centralism and decentralization is a matter of degree.

From this viewpoint, the starting history of the Soviet state may be described as follows: centralism at the initial stage of "war communism" (summer of 1918-1919); decentralization during the period of Soviet building and the NEP (1919-1927); Stalinist neocentralism (starting with 1928). Such a breakdown presents a unique opportunity to trace the changes in the role of the cities in the power system in order to interpret both positive and negative experience.

After the revolution the local soviets achieved full power in a matter of months. The concentration of the power in the center was created as a result of a peculiar combination of the need to defend revolutionary gains with the ideology of non-commodity socialism. "The republic is in danger!" At the First All-Russian Congress of Chairmen of Guberniya Executive Committees, which was held in July 1918, the local authorities supported a

course toward centralization and strengthening the superior soviets. The legislative functions were transferred exclusively to the center while economic problems remained with the local governmental authorities of the All-Union Sovnarkhoz, which were considered exceptionally important. They were given all regulatory rights over all local authorities and the right to "enforce their resolutions." The rights left to the local soviets were insignificant and were reduced to implementing the orders received from the center. This led to the elimination of most of them, including the city soviets. The most important among the remaining authorities on the guberniya level were not the soviets themselves but their executive committees. According to contemporaries, not only the revolution and the Civil War which followed it marked the beginning of the economic dislocation but, to a certain extent, centralism as well. Between 1917 and 1920 the number of apartment units was reduced significantly. The engineering systems of the cities were wrecked and many factories and plants stopped work. It was a catastrophe....

In the final account, the role which centralism and the lack of local self-management played in reducing the urban economy to a state of dislocation is not all that important. What matters is the ways which were proposed for rebuilding the cities. A solution to the crisis was found in the decentralization of management. As early as January 1919 the expediency of returning economic functions to the local areas was proclaimed. The remaining local authorities, represented by the Second All-Russian Congress of Chairmen of Guberniya Executive Committees, supported this resolution to which it added a suggestion of creating within it specialized economic authorities. By the end of the same year the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted an official course toward "vertical" and "horizontal" decentralization. The congress placed the soviets between the people's commissariats and the All-Union Central Executive Committee, giving them the right to invalidate the order of a people's commissariat should it block a local interest and to turn for the solution of disputes directly to the All-Union Central Executive Committee. This resolution allowed the soviets to defend their interests. At that time it was only to defend them, for soviets had no other rights as yet.

The restoration of local self-management required the clear definition of the units over which it had power. It was suggested that such units would be the relatively economically autonomous territorial communities, granting them, regardless of their size (guberniya, uyezd, volost, city, village) the single name of **commune**. Their economic activity was described as "communal economy" and the departments of the local soviets in charge of their management, commune departments. These terms were quickly accepted.

The new authorities of the local soviets began their existence with inordinate activity. The moment they were created they drafted a program for their functions: land structure, housing and road affairs, urbanization,

activities of the local transportation system, public use systems, etc. The implementation of this program began in the spring of 1920. The Main Administration of the Communal Economy (GUKKh), which was not a managing but a regulatory authority, was created in April.

By the end of the year the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets formulated a course for the country toward "Soviet building" and defined local self-management as agencies of the internal organization of town and country aimed at rebuilding the economy. The decentralization of management was not cheered. The slogan of those years, which was "All Power to the Soviets!" was implemented on the lower levels, through the efforts and persistence of the personnel of the local soviets and executive committees in the struggle against main administrations and people's commissariats, which were not surrendering their positions overtly or covertly. The main enemies of the communes remained the sovnarkhozes. Subsequently, the center of gravity of the struggle shifted to the komgosoors (state installations committees). Following their elimination, claims to manage the local soviets were intensified on the part of the Gosplan and the People's Commissariat of Health.

The process known as the "gathering of communes" developed slowly and with difficulty. The economic competence of the soviets increased essentially "horizontally," by transferring to them the functions of the local sovnarkhoz and labor and defense councils, as the latter were being closed down. "Vertical" decentralization was more limited. A number of functions were surrendered by the People's Commissariat of Land and People's Commissariat of Roads. The Commissariats of Health and Education did not surrender their managing privileges.

Problems related to the property and assets of the local soviets, needed to ensure the exercise of their rights began to be solved as of August 1921. This indicated the unquestionable influence of the NEP. The noncommodity form of relations of the preceding stage, with its mandatory distribution out of a common center, led to the destruction of the entire taxation system. According to the communal journals, in Moscow alone, during the period of the elimination of rental payments, 11,500 buildings, including 6,800 residential houses with more than 40,000 apartments in them became dilapidated and were totally unusable. The rent-free and no-ownership systems had done their work.

The restoration of the taxation system in 1921 as a result of the introduction of commodity-monetary relations into the socialist model of commodity-monetary relations was difficult both organizationally and psychologically, particularly the latter. Thus, punitive decrees in restoring rental payments were unsuccessful. The local soviets made "a King Solomon's decision" on the initial almost symbolic payment, with a gradual annual increase perhaps to the level of operational costs. This increase took place from 1923 to 1925. The level of

apartment rental payments was not reached. Such are the genealogical roots of the "most inexpensive housing in the world."

Income from the restoration of taxes and payment for services was also gradually transferred to the jurisdiction of the local soviets. The NEP led to the development in the local areas of a broad range of ownership systems: state, municipal, cooperative and private. The latter spread the widest in housing. The decisions of the local soviets to carry out the demunicipalization of housing was based on their repair and maintenance through leasing (up to 60 years for stone houses and 40 for wooden houses). The number of demunicipalized structures in the cities by 1924 ranged between 30 and 90 percent.

We hope that this "bookkeeping" enumeration of decentralization steps will not seem boring or unnecessary. For some readers this enumeration could be a lesson from the Soviet past. Decentralization at that time was complex and difficult. However, it was done by professionals whose individual steps were backed by an entity—the commune. The growth of the range of competence and means to exercise them did not in itself determine actual economic management. Budget-planning rights had to be granted as well.

The same ideological reasons which had contributed to the wrecking of the tax system and were preventing its restoration brought to life the decree on combining the state with the local budgets. The annual budgets of the guberniya executive committees began to be drafted after the introduction of the NEP. However, until 1923 long-term planning remained in the hands of the center. Starting with 1926 planning periods were extended to 3 years. The following year the problem of developing "general" plans for economic development for 10 to 15 years was raised. The Gosplan was to control the formulation of plans by the local soviets. A special decree was issued on the procedure for implementing the urban draft plan.

This little-known document, which is more of a legal than professional nature, was significantly different in terms of its content from current instructions and the SNiP [Construction Standards and Rules], which regulate the externally similar current activities related to "drafting regional planning" and "general city plans." Draft plans were developed not in the center or by a governmental institution but within the city itself by a task force chosen and paid for by the city soviet. One of its main features was the multiple-step approval, "from the bottom up" (today it is exclusively "from the top downward"), the purpose of which was to correct the draft in accordance with the conditions of increasingly higher-ranking communes. If we were to look for an analogy with the present, we should point out that drafts of regional planning did not precede but followed draft plans from uyezd (rayon) to guberniya (oblast) and,

further on, to the national level. After the entire coordination chain was covered, the draft went to the All-Union Central Executive Committee. The final approval gave it the force of law on which the city soviet could base its activities.

One of the characteristic features in formulating draft plans was the mandatory participation of the population. It was precisely a question of participation and not of playing at democracy. The existence in the city of a wide range of forms of activity and ownership triggered real interest on the part of the city soviet and the drafters of the plan and the intentions of "establishments, associations, societies and individual citizens." It was that circumstance which defined the interest of the people to participate in the formulation of the draft and codified their rights.

The process of "gathering of the communes" applied exclusively to the activities of economic managers. In 1927 the question of broadening the rights in political and administrative activities as well began to be discussed. PRAVDA started the debate and the campaign for the "revival of the local soviets." In December of the same year the All-Union Central Executive Committee issued a resolution on convening a conference on problems of Soviet building, the purpose of which was "to improve the work of the local soviets as authorities which organize the activities" of the multi-million strong masses of voters. The conference took place in April. In the autumn, at its session, the All-Union Central Executive Committee, 12th convocation, ratified the "Regulation on the City Soviets."

According to the regulation, the city soviets were the "supreme authorities" within the city limits and had all the rights and competences of the urban departments of the guberniya executive committees. At the same time, the decree "On the Formulation of Autonomous City Budgets" was promulgated. These two acts marked the end of the "Soviet building" concerning local economic activities, for a hierarchy of soviets was developed and steps guaranteeing their economy and the legal relations between them and the center were defined.

Let us not idealize the 1925 situation. Many problems remained unsolved. Many laws and organizations needed improvements and development. However, the foundations for the autonomy of the soviets had been laid, which enabled them to undertake active efforts to rebuild the national economy. The results, which are particularly interesting from the viewpoint of the present, were impressive. Between 1923 and 1927 the cities were rebuilt to their 1913 level. There was a significant relocation of improvements from the center to the outlying areas.

Between 1925 and 1926 87 percent of the cities had already drafted their measurement plans, on the basis of which the draft layout plans began to be formulated. Their main distinction was their variety. This included comprehensive zoning of territories based on a number

of features (Odessa), the development of second-rank centers (the radial plan for Stalingrad), garden cities (Yerevan) and "mandatory resolutions" on construction in Minsk, carried out in the traditions of the prerevolutionary school of planning regulations. The authors of the project were physicians, civil engineers, highway engineers and architects.

The cities engaged in extensive studies and investigations preceding the decision-making. A number of schools in the large cities were given a "communal slant." Moscow had a laboratory for special and psychological problems which was dealing with problems such as "urban life fatigue." In 1926 Rostov-na-Donu studied "the population's need for services" and drafted a 30-year plan on the subject. Leningrad made a survey of the population which revealed the paradoxical situation of the mass refusal on the part of the people to move to vacant apartments in the center after a flood had destroyed the worker districts.

The cities were developed such as to benefit their population. In 52 among them the building of water mains was undertaken and in 12 of sewer systems (including Leningrad where no such system existed until 1926); streetcar tracks were laid in 15 cities and special landscaping projects were carried out in six. Trash burning plants were built in two cities. It was during that time that the first bus and taxicab systems were organized; streets were paved, city lighting was provided in the suburbs, and clubs, kindergartens, nurseries and "children's centers," something we have been forgotten today, were built.

As stipulated in its initial draft, the Soviet city was amazingly varied and full of dignity and self-respect. It was a single entity, not only in the economic sense, for it was inseparably linked to its population, through whose initiative and trust it lived and developed. It encompassed a great deal of already acquired global and domestic practices, for which reason its ties to the past were unbreakable, unless we mean exclusively the preservation of monuments of the material environment. Furthermore, its creators strongly believed in their own forces and possibilities inherent in the new times. The fact that the results turned out different was not their fault. The names of these people have been forgotten and many of them ended their lives tragically. That is why it would be blasphemous to look for errors and blunders in the way they served the cities. They were able to achieve what mattered most. Perhaps for a short while, but the communes had been "gathered," and the soviets began to act like the real proprietors of the territories under their jurisdiction.

The soviet cities were not destined to live a long life. They were replaced by the so-called "socialist cities," the features of which directly depended on the Stalinist version of socialism and the ways of building it.

Unlike the previous restructuring of the power system, the reforms at the turn of the 1930s were not immediately and officially proclaimed. Their limits were unclear and loose. The end of Soviet building and the NEP and the beginning of the building of Stalinist neocentralism became strangely interwoven and difficult to separate and imperceptibly shifted from the former to the latter. The cities were still formulating plans for their further development for 10-15 year periods. However, a course toward socialist industrialization had already been charted, followed by that of "comprehensive collectivization."

The credit and tax reforms took place in the 1930s. They put the country's industry in an exceptional situation along with financing and subsidies. Is it amazing that by then the Communist Academy had sponsored two debates, the echoes of which can be felt to this day. The first dealt with problems of resettlement and land registration. This largely determined the fate of the Chayanov group and was related to the problems of collectivization. The second was related to socialist resettlement, which dealt with problems of accelerated industrialization.

The debate on socialist resettlement remains popular among the specialists who are studying the heated disputes between supporters and detractors of urbanization, claiming that that was its essence. This approach is superficial, for in addition to the two groups of debaters, there was a third, known as the "economists," which somehow disappeared during the first days of the debate. Furthermore, which is important to note, it had absolutely nothing to do with the actual problem of the density of urban settlements. It consisted of the conversion of Soviet cities—cities governed by the soviets—from being the most important part of the state to general state ownership.

The basic features of such a governmental city were formulated as a directive in the reports submitted by L. Sabsovich and A. Zelenko, which were the first for such authors, for previously neither of them had been listed among the major specialists in urban affairs. Both represented departments which had actively opposed the local soviets during the period of Soviet building: the Gosplan and the People's Commissariat of Health. One of them claimed that the "socialist city" is a city within the system of a single national economic plan. The other one developed the postulate that the "socialist city" is a city under the conditions of industrialization.

The former deprived the cities of their independent future, the concern for which was henceforth assumed by the state. The development, growth, stabilization, economic profile and loss or acquisition of functions, population migration and demography were all, according to the suggested system, to be set exclusively by the center and exclusively in the interests of the center. The second deprived the city of its property and budget autonomy. Henceforth, fixed withholdings from departmental funds

(the principle of a residual economy) were to be used exclusively in the interests of industry. Both remain unchanged to this day.

The local soviets were blocking the implementation of these principles. The conversion of the Soviet cities into "socialist cities" was possible only by destroying these authorities or else depriving them of their power. The elimination of the soviets was, naturally, not advertised, for which reason the ashes from the fires which still remain are so difficult to recognize. Thus, based on directives issued by the Moscow City VKP(b) Committee, the communal economy of the capital was to be decentralized in 1928 by reorganizing some municipal enterprises, both financially and juridically, into state trusts which were to be independent of the city. The logic was extremely simple: increasing the number of autonomous units meant decentralization. In fact, as parts of trusts, sooner or later the enterprises fell under the management of the central departments, which in fact took over the rights of the soviets. Parts were separated from the entity and activities from the places where they were occurring. The foundations of the type of relations which are still heavily preventing any effort to free oneself from the domination of departments were being laid.

The next step in the destruction of the soviets was alienating them from the population by eliminating the foundations on which the initiative of citizens was based: abolishing a wide range of forms of socialist ownership. In housing, for example, during that time personal property on leased structures virtually disappeared; numerous commissions assigned the task of identifying "class alien elements" among lessees appeared. In 1927 a special decree was even promulgated on rejecting cases on demunicipalization by the courts.

Gradually the cooperative sector was abolished. There was a "proletarianization of the cooperatives," which, henceforth, could operate only if they included a certain "proletarian nucleus." Committees for assistance to worker housing construction were closed down and their functions were distributed among different departments. Leasing and rent in the cities were simplified and subsequently abolished. We are familiar with attempts to create "kolkhozes" in the cities. The Committee for Standardization of that time, in addition to a section on standardization of items and household appliances, construction and public catering had a section for standardizing "social upbringing." Was it for making "the cogs" of society?

The structural changes which were carried out under the sign of decentralization also contributed to the destruction of the local soviets. In 1927, under the pretext of the struggle against bureaucracy and reducing the wage fund and bringing the apparatus closer to the masses, the General Department, which had been created in 1918 with a view to protecting the local interests from the diktat of departments and which had the right independently to appeal to the All-Union Central Executive

Committee, was closed down. As a result the apparatus came closer not to the people but to the central departments which thus obtained the possibility exerting unhindered influence on the various executive committee departments which became no longer interrelated executive authorities of the center.

The transfer of industry under the jurisdiction of the departments, the disappearance of the variety of ownership and the closing down of subdivisions which were responsible for coordinating the interests between the state and the local areas, and control by the party authorities, which turned into a diktat, all prove the actual killing of the soviets 2 years after the unadvertised reforms. One year later their autonomous economic activities were stopped. The departments of the communal economy of the local soviets were closed down. One can see in the closing down of such subdivisions, which had been created once for the "gathering of the communes" a certain sign of what is taking place today. The city communes were destroyed. The territory, the environment and the activities of the population became alienated from each other for at least half a century.

Since financing after the 1930 reform, under the dictatorship of industry, was focused in the center, the transfer to it of the planning functions was natural. Planning, starting with 1870, had been an exclusively local matter in Russia and was only regulated by the center. Until the beginning of the 1930s the departments had no such function. It had to be created. Ironically, for a while it was known as the People's Commissariat of the Communal Economy. Soon afterwards, however, it was given a more consistent name of "construction" and "architecture." The terminological double nature which has been retained to this day is still hindering the development of a professional understanding of urban phenomena. Indeed, it indicates that we are "building" and not "organizing" for the good of the population.

Private designing was officially banned. The People's Commissariat of the Economy created essentially new establishments: state design institutes. The planned implementation of projects, based on the conveyor belt principle, alien in terms of the project, and performed by specialists who were unfamiliar with the true local situation and were not interested in the functioning and further existence of the city, changed the very essence of this document. The plan-forecast became a plan-directive in which the local areas were given the role of performers. The overwhelming scope of the initiatives did not make it immediately clear that any independence in urban construction was fictitious. In fact, all of its activities were subordinated to the Gosplan.

As a result of the decentralization of the system during the preceding stage, in which the integrity of the local areas was dialectically pitted against the splintered nature of the departments, the system was changed into practically parallel departments with shifting priorities, in which the physical preservation of the soviets essentially played no role whatsoever.

A full understanding of what took place is impossible without turning to the popular slogan of that time, to the effect that "cadres decide everything." In order to ensure the acceptance and to instill in the mass awareness the theory of the "aggravation of the class struggle," a more clear division of society into "clean" and "dirty" was necessary. The purge of the apparatus of the communal economy from "class alien elements" was undertaken in the 1930s: specialists who worked for the city and land administrations and executive committees of soviets were expelled. What made the solution of this problem simpler was the fact that the majority among them had joined the party in the past but were now considered outside the law. Furthermore, many specialists who had loyally and professionally served the soviets, were unable to evaluate the changes in the situation—the gradual conversion from a "struggle against main administrations" to the struggle against the soviets—and continued publicly to defend their views.

The problem of training cadres for the new "urban construction" department assumed a particular nature. The impression is created that initially there were certain hesitations in choosing the "specific leadership" in designing (according to one of the then popular "six conditions" laid by Comrade Stalin). Thus, in 1931, it was exclusively "architects and foreign specialists" who were invited to participate in the competition for planning the capital's layout. However, there was not a single architect in the Committee for the Planning of Moscow. Actually, the "Shakhti Trial" and the "Industrial Party Trial" and the comprehensive closing down of all engineering societies in Russia significantly narrowed the range of choices.

The decision was made in July 1932 at a conference of the Moscow City VKP(b) Committee, held by L. Kaganovich with the leading architects of the country. It defined the leading role of the architect as the "specific manager" of the entire design process in the area of construction, regardless of its nature, and confirmed the right to architectural authorship. With this decision the ancient professional guild found itself classified as a member of the state officialdom. The Moscow "initiative" was gradually "taken up" and automatically extended to the "urban construction" institution. Positions of "chief architect" were opened in the cities as representatives of the governmental supervision over local construction, superior to the soviets.

The belief of the naturalness of the primacy of architecture, which has prevailed since then notwithstanding, the previous role of architects in the construction process was more than modest, as confirmed by prerevolutionary legislation and the absence of independent architectural departments in the communal economy. The least significant was the experience of architects in problems of planning. Actually, the tasks of the new department were so different from the practices of previous years that the old knowledge and experience could be considered nothing but a hindrance.

It was thus that from a relatively autonomous formation, the city became an appendix to industry. Crucified between people's commissariats-ministries, the Gosplan from above and the petty economic activities of the "trust-oriented" enterprises from below, which had fallen under its influence, it turned out unable to satisfy its population, the only type of community of which was the passport system which was introduced again during those same 1930s. Its choice as the main motor of the urban process and as the bridgehead of civilization was reduced to naught during subsequent decades.

The situation of the end of the 1980s is strikingly similar to the one which had developed at the start of the 1920s. However, let us not be hasty: in addition to similarities there also are differences. The perestroyka of the 1920s through decentralization took place from below, on the basis of local initiative. Support and control by the center, which had voluntarily-coercively surrendered a number of its privileges took place simultaneously in the course of its difficult struggle against the local soviets. The perestroyka of the 1980s was initiated from above. In the course of the center's loss of a number of functions, which were transferred to the party apparat between the 1940s and the 1970s, there was a simultaneous redistribution of power along all its levels, which has caused a number of specific difficulties. The task of converting the "socialist cities" into Soviet cities indicates, first of all, the "gathering" of their lost integrity and, second, freedom from their absolute dependency on the center and on the local party apparat. Finally, along with decentralization "vertically" and "horizontally," today we need partial centralization from below, by introducing in the structure of the towns a number of extensively "trust oriented" enterprises. The most vulnerable aspect in the solution of this problem is the lack of local initiative. Obedience and performance were valued in that area all too long.

In the perestroyka of the 1920s an extremely broad range of professionals played a great role: these were administrators, economists, financial experts and economic managers, who were the heirs of the Russian corps of city and zemstvo leaders. The perestroyka of the 1980s has specialists oriented toward the departmental work of the center, trained in the period of the long domination of administrative-command management, with experience and knowledge limited to this system and, therefore, as in the past, representing the departments and unwittingly or deliberately reflecting their interests. In the 1920s the creation of a wide range of forms of ownership, which encouraged the activity of the population, began practically "from scratch," unfettered by anything. Today we are as yet to surmount the universal "statification," expecting along this way a sufficiently strong opposition, some of which psychological. For even now, after the half-century long domination of the center, many people see the solution of any problem in creating one more department, while the bad experience of the past only strengthens the fear of acting without receiving instructions from superiors.

The past is both similar to and unlike our present. Having outlined the strategy and tactics of the 1920s, we must acknowledge that the tactical means used by our predecessors demand a cautious and considered application. The strategy of that time is a different matter. Today the population, its activities and its material habitat have been artificially separated from each other by the administrations of each one of them, by different departments. Therefore, we can claim that as in the 1920s, the basic strategy for the restoration of the cities is, once again, their "gathering." The **population**, which consists of specific different people, and their **activities**, including those based on their personal plans and intentions, as well as the **environment** in which they live and work once again must become a single entity with man as the central figure, with his uniqueness which, for such a long time was replaced by the standard "worker cog," something which is so simple that it was familiar to the managing institutions of the center, the Gosplan and the urban construction authorities. We must abandon the dictatorship of the "average:" city, apartment, school, hospital, resident, client, audience, eater and purchaser....

Having acknowledged the indivisibility and uniqueness of each element in the component of the city, we must take the next step by determining the need for unity of the urban economy, which will ensure conditions for survival and activities of man under an urban environment. Today the individual sectors in the urban economy are under different jurisdictions. It is important to understand that, as parts of the whole, these parts can either experience changes not only in their own merits and faults, but also as a result of the merits and faults of other parts within the same system. Thus, improving the work of passenger transportation helps to increase labor productivity at enterprises, and if such enterprises are taxpayers to the city, the income from them benefits transportation. Everything in the city is tied in a common knot of interdependence and the normal functioning of the entity requires the firm rejection of the dictatorship of departmental criteria of profitability in assessing the work of the urban economy in favor of the criteria of real improvements in life.

The "gathering" of the cities is a task of incredible difficulty. Its objectives would be inconceivable without creating in advance a center for "gathering," which should include population self-management, ties with superior management levels, all the way to the state level and with the lower management levels of parts of the city to be competent and have real rights. A mere enumeration would indicate quite accurately the fact that it is only the center of authority—the local soviet—that can become such an agency.

So, "All Power to the Soviets!"

In the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th Party Conference and, finally, the sessions of the First Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, this slogan was heard as a constant refrain. The

transfer of real power to the Soviets from departments and the party apparat was defined as the main trend in the country's political perestroika. It was precisely this task and the proclaimed course toward decentralization that are triggering, together, a hope for the reality of the transformation of the Stalinist "socialist cities" into Soviet cities, managed by the soviets themselves in solving internal problems and only regulated, coordinated and controlled by the central apparatus. Great attention was paid to the antithesis of a "strong center" and "strong local areas." The suggestion was repeatedly voiced that a "strong center" was the foundation for "strong local areas," ignoring the fact that the overall amount of power in its allocation remains constant and that the more power that is given to the center the less remains for the local areas. It was depressing to note that the demand for "strong city soviets" was not heard quite loudly and emphatically. Cost accounting and the autonomy of the individual farms and enterprises, problems of science, culture and education were discussed without mentioning the integrity and unity of the cities.

The concept of the "socialist city" has still not been eliminated. The acceptance of its distorted forms made the city into a politically and administratively invisible structure in the country. The question of city communes in the state headed by a party of communists has still not been raised.

How will the cities continue to live in the future? Who will become their true master?

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The Pluralism of the 1920s; From the History of Debates on Literature and the Arts

905B0010J *Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian* No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 84-93

[Article by Andrey Alekseyevich Kovalev, junior scientific associate, USSR Ministry of Culture All-Union Scientific Research Art Studies Institute]

[Text] Six decades separate us from the stormy and heroic 1920s. A great deal of what took place, what was accomplished and what was discussed at that time is now history. However, a great deal of written history has vanished without a trace, locked in closed archives and inaccessible publications. Even that which may appear to be well-known is occasionally interpreted in a distorted light and such distorted interpretations have become commonplace. Today, when historians face the task of writing the true history of the Soviet state and the Communist Party, specific historical truth, undistorted for the benefit of various temporary interests, becomes a vital need, while incompleteness and deformation of historical self-awareness become a major obstacle to social development. Unquestionably, the close study of the processes which took place in literature and the arts in the 1920s are important in developing the new type of historical thinking.

Regretfully, however, we must point out that some of the characteristics, conclusions and summations relative to the development of Soviet art and culture in the 1920s, formulated in the 1930s and 1940s, are gradually beginning to seem like real historical facts and are being accepted uncritically. Alas, this situation was noted even in the case of V.I. Lenin. The Leninist image was distorted, sometimes perhaps not deliberately, as was the case, for example, in the excellent motion picture "The VKHUTEMAS Commune," which was recently shown (true, after a great delay) as part of a television four-part serial. In the movie, which is based on good documentary material, the following event is shown: the actor playing Lenin, after the unanimous statement by the members of the commune that "we are fed up with Yevgeniy Onegin," adopts a stern expression on his face and issues what we qualify as a strict reprimand to the youngsters. In reality, judging by the recollections of one of the participants in that meeting, Vladimir Ilich "literally rocked with laughter." This was natural, for in a normal person such a mixture of youthful zeal and strange nihilism could only make someone smile. For the sake of fairness we must point out that in their majority the VKHUTEMAS students eventually rejected their adolescent nihilism and loved Pushkin, while their own "analytical" and pointless studies, which had amazed Ilich so greatly with their apparent senselessness, were successfully used in shaping the new life style—architecture, furniture, clothing design, porcelain goods, industrial design, and so on as, incidentally, did the author of said recollection about Lenin, S. Senkin. Actually, the children were good and Vladimir Ilich did not want to insult them in the least. Conversely, he emphasized that he knew little about futurism, for which reason he was not ready to engage in a debate on the subject.

Memoirs and brief statements by Lenin on the subject of literature and the arts which have been preserved reveal some features of the personality of the leader of the first proletarian state in the world which are exceptionally important for our understanding of this character. First was his awareness of the perception of the arts. According to Lunacharskiy, "Vladimir Ilich never formulated leading ideas based on his esthetic likes or dislikes." Whenever Lenin was simply "pressed against the wall," and asked to issue "instructions," with his inherent modesty he would say: "I do not understand anything of this, ask Lunacharskiy." Lunacharskiy himself, in the initial publication of his memoirs, did not strive in the least to present Vladimir Ilich's opinion as something absolute; furthermore, in an effort not to hurt other painters, he did not give the names of masters about whom Lenin spoke, referring to them only by their initial.

It is common knowledge, for example, that Vladimir Ilich himself had a negative attitude toward futurism which, at that time, encompassed a rather broad range of phenomena. On this basis, numerous studies of the arts and literature of that time have concluded that party policy in the 1920s and 1930s included an exceptionally

tense struggle against futurism and formalism and that the masters who were classified (frequently erroneously) as supporters of such trends were kept totally out of Soviet culture for a long time, referring in such cases to arbitrarily selected Leninist statements. It is somehow forgotten in this case that although Lenin may have made rather sharp statements as was the case, for example, on the subject of Mayakovskiy's poem "150 Million," these assessments were his personal views and not a reason for a punitive policy toward artists he did not like. It would seem strange today not to take into consideration the obvious circumstance that the personal taste of the leader of the world revolution was historically and socially shaped to the same extent as that of any other among his contemporaries. Actually, like most intellectuals of his generation, who were raised in the classical arts, Lenin simply did not understand the experimental forms of 20th century art. However, let us repeat this, this lack of understanding did not lead to direct penalties which would exclude the right of existence of one artistic trend or another. Alas, at a certain stage in the development of our culture, it was precisely the "administrative" viewpoint that prevailed, with all of its consequences. According to this viewpoint anything "strange" was to be peremptorily expelled and decisively destroyed. Without holding it against the tribune of the revolution, let us remember that Mayakovskiy himself was among those who demanded that one group—in this case futurism—be officially proclaimed as the official and strictly communist form of art.

After the futurists, much more serious claimants to monopoly in literature were the writers and theoreticians rallied within the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers—RAPP. Like the futurists, despite their different creative views, they did everything possible to be recognized as "the most proletarian" and, correspondingly, the only official group and, on this basis, to declare all other groups as being either "fellow travelers" or simply enemy, non-Soviet. Despite the persistent extreme proletarian phraseology of the RAPP, the party was unable to agree either with their claims or the claims of any other group to monopoly on cultural life, in precisely the same way that the futurists had been rejected, after they had tried to proclaim futurism as "state art." Let us note that, actually, the futurists had better reasons to believe in their exclusivity, for it was precisely they who, against the background of an almost comprehensive sabotage on the part of the masters of the arts, were the first to offer their hand to the Soviet system and to engage not only in organizing demonstrations and celebrations or propaganda, as did Mayakovskiy in "The Windows of ROSTA," but also in the real protection of the cultural legacy which, paradoxically, clashed with their own appeals to overthrow that same legacy. Just as firmly as had been the futurists' were the Proletkult's aspirations to autonomy and monopoly on culture blocked (in the familiar RKP(b) Central Committee Letter "On the Proletkult," dated 1 December 1920).

At all times there were more than enough candidates for monopoly in literature and the arts. The trends which claimed total superiority were by no means creatively sterile. Let us remember that V. Mayakovskiy was the leader of the futurists; S. Eyzenshteyn and V. Meyerhold worked in the studios of Proletkult; D. Furmanov and A. Fadeyev were among the leaders of the RAPP. However, the overall artistic standard of the works which were offered as foundations for proletarian art and the insignificant number of personalities and works which were granted this quality did not provide any real grounds whatsoever for positive conclusions.

Therefore, it was not a question of, let us say, futurists or RAPP being unable to contribute anything to Soviet culture. It was a question of something else: the mechanical reduction of the stylistic and topic range in literature and the arts and the fierce aspiration to reject and deny the right to life to anything which was not with them, to divide the leaders in literature and the arts into "clean" and "dirty," into right and wrong, and to formulate an a priori hierarchy based on an artist's affiliation with a "truly proletarian group." All of this was accompanied by pinning denigrating "class" labels, and attacks bordering on political police informing. Let us emphasize that a truly creative discussion can be fruitful for the arts if it does not lead to endless divisions and position shifting and if it does not accept impermissible means and methods.

In his arguments with the RAPP theoretician G. Lelevich, Vyach. Polonskiy, the noted critic of the 1920s, wrote on this subject that "we are arguing for the sake of finding common grounds for joint work and not for the sake of triggering the enthusiasm of nonparty "audiences" which will be pleased at the sight of fights among party members. Disrespect for one's opponent means disrespect for oneself; the use of "impermissible" methods means admission of one's own helplessness." The same thought is expressed in the statements by A. Voronskiy, the editor of the journal KRASNAYA NOV who tried, in the course of his editorial activities, to broadly depict all the best that existed in Soviet literature. During the time of debates with the ideologues of the journal NA POSTU, he wrote that "is it not clear that it is very easy to shout that someone is being prevented from doing something, and something entirely different when the simple yet blunt and touchy question is raised about things that have already been written and about artistic successes already achieved."

In frequent cases, from a discussion of the artistic or social value of a work, the conversation automatically shifted to the political area and dealt with the affiliation of the writer with one group or another, on the basis of which conclusions concerning his political good intentions were drawn. Art was being turned into a direct function of ideology: the actions of fictional characters were discussed as though being those of real people, and responsibility for their actions and thoughts were directly ascribed to the author of the work. Up to a point the accusations traded by the supporters of hostile

groups did not have the power of a "judicial decree," so to say and, as a rule, were not followed by "Organizational Conclusions," as became the practice starting with the end of the 1920s.

At this point a complex clash takes place. Unquestionably, a critic, literary worker and artist has the right to his own viewpoint and the right to defend what he supports and to struggle against that which he considers unacceptable and hostile. The trouble begins when an effort is made to consider an individual viewpoint as a mandatory directive, becoming a policy to be followed by everyone. Polonskiy and Voronskiy had their own clearly expressed viewpoints. They almost identically disliked futurism as art and, even more so, the theory of the LEF; they considered some creative trends as being "non-Soviet" (but not anti-Soviet!), and as those of fellow travelers. Nonetheless, as the editors of the biggest literary journals, they published both futurists and fellow travelers, such as V. Mayakovskiy, S. Tretyakov, O. Mandelshtam, S. Yesenin, B. Pilnyak, A. Veseliy, Ye. Zamyatin and many, many other. Therefore, the main line of opposition led not to the RAPP, the LEF or PEREVAL but to the extent to which or, conversely, the narrowness with which the possibilities of a given art were perceived. It was a line of protecting, supporting and promoting anything that was viable and real in art and opposing those who wanted to proclaim the interests of one group as being those of the state, and present matters as though neither state nor culture could have any other interests.

As early as 1921, in an official document, A.V. Lunacharskiy proclaimed: "Art is divided into a series of trends. The proletariat is only now developing its own artistic criterion, for which reason neither the official authorities nor the professional union should consider any one of them as governmental, but should comprehensively assist any new searching in the arts." The 1924 resolution passed at the 13th RKP(b) Congress stipulated that "...no single literary trend, school or group could or should speak out in the name of the party...." Finally, it was the 18 June 1925 resolution of the RKP(b) Central Committee "On Party Policy in the Field of Artistic Literature" that became the fundamental document on problems of the arts and literature. It was drafted by a special commission under the Politburo; it included M. Frunze, V. Kuybyshev, L. Kamenev, M. Tomskiy, N. Narimanov, A. Lunacharskiy and N. Bukharin.

The historians of Soviet culture are as yet to determine the role which Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin, the outstanding party and state leader, whose name, for a long time, was deliberately deleted from our history, played in its development. As a man of broad and comprehensive humanitarian culture, who wrote essays on Mayakovskiy, Bryusov, Goethe, and Heine, he was one of those strategists of the party's cultural policy who preached and promoted at a certain stage in the development of our culture the policy of tactful and careful attitude toward the masters of the arts and who struggled for the

fullness and variety of Soviet culture. Bukharin substantiated most extensively his views on the problem of cultural policy in his speech "The Proletariat and Problems of Artistic Policy," delivered at a literary conference held by the Central Committee in February 1925. Directly answering calls for "issuing a directive," he said: "Should we or should we not say that we are interested in problems, such as the development of a new style or of the coexistence of styles and the possibility of variety or the possibility of developing a synthetic form? Are we interested or are we not? We are interested. However, can we issue in this case directives which would cover everything? We cannot. If we cannot directly provide Politburo leadership, how can we accelerate such a development? Or else do you think that this will take place by the virgin birth of the proletariat? Have you thought about it? This can develop only in the course of the molecular process in which we shall provide a wide field for competition."

On the matter of the hegemony of proletarian literature, which was one of the postulates of the RAPP, Bukharin expressed himself as follows: "We live in a time in which we must say the following: 'first build and then receive,' and in any case the question of hegemony is formulated here differently than in the political area." In another speech at a conference convened by the press department of the party's Central Committee, he said: "...The cultural problem is distinguished from the combat problem by the fact that it cannot be solved by dealing a strike, using means of mechanical coercion. Nor can it be solved by a cavalry charge. It must be resolved by applying the combined method consistent with sensible criticism. Above all, there must be competition in the respective area of output."

Bukharin in no way denied the strictly creative possibilities and prospects of development of proletarian writers. "The fact that I may be abusing proletarian writers does not mean in the least that I potentially deny them the right to develop. It simply means the following: look around, do not be conceited, for that is the greatest danger."

He expressed in a concentrated fashion his suggestions concerning the theses of the resolution as follows: "We must include in the theses the fact that competition must be given maximally wide scope.... Let there be 1,000 or 2,000 organizations, let there be along with the MAPP and the VAPP as many circles and organizations as one may wish. Do you think that the Politburo should run after everyone and involve him in agitation work? ...As to specific questions and specific problems, in this case there should be maximum competition.... I am in favor of overall guidance and maximum competition."

It is easy to note that many of Bukharin's formulations were included, unedited, in the text of the resolution approved by the Central Committee: Item 7 (criteria of sociopolitical content and problems of form); Item 9 (on hegemony); Item 14 (on free competition), and others. Direct testimony of participants in the discussions—V.

Tertsov and Vyach. Polonskiy—who clearly named Bukharin as the author of the resolution, also indicate the great role which Bukharin played in drafting it.

M.V. Frunze unequivocally expressed his agreement with the views held by Bukharin: "In the part dealing with principles I fully support the views presented here by Comrade Bukharin and which, in my opinion, are entirely correct." In raising major objections to the LEF group, concerning the form assumed by their works, he deemed it necessary to emphasize that "the trend headed by Comrade Mayakovskiy is something my mind and heart find difficult to understand.... However, I consider it a fully legitimate aspect of our Soviet literature and I do not find anything anticommunist in that trend."

Vyach. Polonskiy, who formulated the theory of a "single literary front," which was the closest to the party line and which he developed in his article "The Literary Movement of the Revolutionary Age," in which the basic views on the policy of the state in the field of literature and the arts are briefly but accurately described, named the revolution a "charter of literature which brought some relaxation in the literary struggle." "This resolution," he wrote, "dealt a fierce blow at attempts to achieve hegemony through mechanical means." Similar views were expressed also by critics working in the other arts but rallied around the journal PECHAT I REVOLYUTSIYA, headed by Polonskiy: A.A. Fedorov-Davydov, A.A. Sidorov, Ya.A. Tugendkhold and others.

Most frequently, when we discuss the ways of development of Soviet culture in the 1920s and the polemics on this subject, as a rule we bring up literary materials and the arguments among literary workers and literary critics. Naturally, this has its reasons, for the 1925 resolution dealt with literature and subsequent official documents were based precisely on literary material. Nonetheless, in the other arts as well, painting in particular, similar processes occurred and the discussion was no less important and sharp. Here a claim to total domination was laid by the Association of Painters of Revolutionary Russia (AKhRR) which preached the idea of documentary or heroic realism.

The work of the painters belonging to this group was unquestionably needed and important and it was not for nothing that this group was described as the "promoter of the Soviet topic." Major masters were members of the AKhRR, such as M. Grekov, I. Mashkov, S. Malyutin, F. Bogorodskiy, A. Sokolov-Skalya and many others. However, inherent in the AKhRR activities were those same negative features: aspiration toward monopoly and immediately denying painters belonging to other associations the right to describe themselves as "revolutionary," and in principle classifying them as "fellow travelers." Even critics who liked the AKhRR were somewhat shocked by such a peremptory arrogance which was by no means backed by the quality of their work.

The "aggressive" policy of the AKhRR toward other groups of painters was further complicated, in addition

to ideological and artistic reasons, by reasons of an economic nature: the victorious group laid a claim to the few funds which the state could set aside for the development of the graphic arts. All of this triggered the dissatisfaction of painters who belonged to other artistic associations and who were also willing to work for the young country. In 1926 a number of artistic associations (OST, Makovets, The Four Arts, Life, and Society of the Young), inspired by the Central Committee resolution, addressed a letter to the VKP(b) Central Committee in which they pointed out the abnormal situation which had developed in the graphic arts and which included a request to intervene in this matter. The letter read: "In the interest of a normal and unrestricted development of this art, it would be fatal and culturally short-sighted to proclaim any one of these groups as representing the ...officially recommended course of development of Soviet graphic art.... Artists who are not members of the AKhRR consider themselves, ideologically, just as revolutionary as the AKhRR and wish to preserve in artistic creativity the freedom of seeking ways and freedom of formal differences and means of their skill which should not be eliminated to suit the dictatorship of a single trend which has been chosen for some strange reason."

The substantiation of this trend, which was approved in the 1925 resolution, was disputed both overtly and surreptitiously. The underlining of the difference was found in the fact that Bukharin's idea of lowering the intensity of the class struggle, on which the resolution was based, had narrowed Stalin's idea of the intensification of the class struggle in the course of building socialism. Today there is an active discussion among historians, philosophers and economists on the nature, reasons and consequences of this Stalinist thesis; we should emphasize that in the field of culture as well its consequences were exceptionally negative, not to mention the irreparable losses which were inflicted on literature and the arts. Here as well we find the origins of the polemics which became once again aggravated by the turn of the 1930s about what could be considered proletarian literature and proletarian art; it was precisely from Stalin's thesis that direct appeals followed for a class differentiation, separation from the nonproletarian elements, a purge in artistic societies, etc. Any creative discussion, which would be perfectly natural among artists and writers, was instantaneously transferred to the political area and one could hear ever more terrible and fictitious accusations. The impression was created that someone was deliberately involving in a fierce and exhausting struggle writers, painters and architects. It was as though some kind of darkness, a hallucination had taken over, and even A.V. Lunacharskiy, who always aspired to promote tolerance in polemics, suddenly amended his own principles by approving and supporting, among others, an article published in the journal RAPP, entitled "The Enemy," aimed against the theoreticians of the PEREVAL Group A. Voronskiy and D. Gorbov, although shortly before that he had characterized that same Voronskiy as "one of the best educated

and most profound representatives of our artistic or scientific-artistic communist world."

A situation developed in which, as the newspaper SOVETSKOYE ISKUSSTVO wrote, painters united within the OMKh, "the most skilled cadres of Soviet painters, began to feel themselves as 'criminals on the run;' ...time-serving, lack of talent and artistic platitudes blossomed particularly richly.... The overall tonality of creative searches declined sharply." Under those circumstances, the majority of artists and literary workers welcomed with tremendous inspiration and joy the VKP(b) Central Committee Resolution "On Restructuring the Literary-Artistic Organizations" of 23 April 1932. The hope arose of developing a calm and healthy working environment in which there would be no place for shameless defamations or slanders or else peremptory statements. However, although the most hateful figures of the RAPP camp had been removed from the surface of artistic life (obviously on instructions "from above"), the long-expected peace failed to come. Today, when we consider the history of the appearance of the Writers' Union and other creative associations, it is important also to take into consideration the overall atmosphere of life in Soviet society which, naturally, influenced life in the arts as well. All the suitable reasons exist to assume that RAPP dogmatism and methods were replaced by a new dogmatism and new ways of arm-twisting, which were perhaps not always so blunt but were no less cruel. The notorious "excesses," which were manifested most clearly in the process of agricultural collectivization, also took place, in a specific way, in the arts and literature as well. The honest word of the artist was increasingly replaced by acts of loyalty; the difficult yet fruitful struggle among ideas and trends was replaced by a dirty underhanded struggle, fraught with threats to honest artists; the real awareness of one's own place in culture was replaced by proud proclamations of one's own exclusivity.

The situation in the graphic arts was particularly grave. There was strict criticism of the so-called formalism. Virtually any serious painter was classified as a "formalist," and on such grounds, refused the opportunity to participate in exhibits and accept commissions. It was noteworthy that during the first stage in the struggle against formalism, the former LEF members, such as O. Beskin were particularly zealous; at the beginning of the 1930s Beskin published an article entitled "Formalism in Art," in which he pinned the type of labels which we have been unable to remove to this day. Charges of formalism turned into ideological and political insinuations. Actually, O. Beskin himself was unable to avoid a "conversion to the political level," and eventually lost his position as editor of the journal ISKUSSTVO. The debate which took place on the subject of literature and the arts was a legitimate reflection of the overall economic and political situation of the young Soviet state. It is obvious that both the views expressed by the leaders of the RAPP and the concept of party policy suggested by the supporters of a balanced line—Bukharin, Voronskiy

and Polonskiy—were closely related to the existence of different strata of party leaders within the party itself, who had joined the party at different times and had brought with them different historical experiences. The political leaders of the senior generation, who had the skill of polemics and of seeking sensible compromises and finding and establishing contacts with possible allies, were quite distinct, in terms of practical experience, from the young literary workers who had entered literature directly from the fronts of the Civil War. Initially they were mostly sincere and confident in their rightness and even almost naive despite the entire frightening intransigence and bureaucratic methods of managing the arts, which were features of the artistic situation which was to prevail later. Actually, we must point out that internal relations among these two forces were by no means all that simple and that their opposition to each other was not all that categorical.

The concept of the supporters of the consolidation of all phenomena and trends positive in terms of the Soviet system was extended above all to the representatives of proletarian literature. Thus, the novel by Yu. Libedinskiy "*Nedelya*" [The Week] (1923) which was considered by the RAPP as the standard work of proletarian literature, was published for the first time in the journal KRASNAYA NOV, headed by A. Voronskiy. (Characteristically, Voronskiy himself was described as the "Ivan Kalita of Soviet literature.") The first separate publication of this novel was sympathetically prefaced by N.I. Bukharin. Everything seems to indicate that the young literary workers, most of whom had recently returned from the front of the Civil War and had written their first works on the basis of the fresh traces of the great events, which frequently were their only outstanding impression of life, experienced significant difficulties in converting to the daily routine writing chores and, as a whole, simply to a life of peace (as we can see, for example, from the recollections of Yu. Libedinskiy himself and from many latter works by writers who participated in or were heroes of the Civil War). Many of them, furthermore, lacked simply the ordinary cultural knowledge and experience in literary work, so that aggression and suspicion of the "cultured" professional writers (or, perhaps, the "bourgeois" writers) were partially the consequence of this insecurity and typical emotional defense.

Had the social situation been different, ways may have been found for a "social adaptation," so to say, for reducing this intransigence. For a while the representatives of the old party intelligentsia were able to control the situation and to pacify the destructive energy of the "extreme zealots;" at that time there still were ways for ensuring the normal development of culture and society as a whole. Alas, the situation developed in such a way that the fierce social energy and social activeness of the youth were used to the detriment of culture and society. In this case we can speak of the tragedy of an entire generation of revolutionaries and communists, initially used in the group struggle as a "dark force" and then

mercilessly destroyed, thrown out of the political arena, when their intransigence and total inflexibility were no longer needed and were even threatening.

The fate of F. Raskolnikov is a characteristic example. A revolutionary seaman and a commander in the Civil War, as a playwright and literary critic, along with his RAPP comrades, one of whose founders he was in 1925, he sharply argued with N.I. Bukharin in the course of the discussion of the 1925 resolution, assuming an irreconcilable viewpoint on hegemony in proletarian culture, on the subject of "fellow travelers," and so on. In 1927 Raskolnikov replaced his old opponent Voronskiy as editor of KRASNAYA NOV; in 1929 he became the head of the Main Art Administration. By then, however, both the situation and the views of Raskolnikov himself had changed to such an extent that, after finally acquiring the real opportunity to formulate the "right class policy" in literature and the arts, he began one of his first speeches in his new position with a statement of the inadmissibility of bureaucratic methods in art. Soon afterwards he admitted that there was nothing more difficult for him than to keep banning and, after a while, he was honorably retired to diplomatic work. However, neither the views nor the actions of the "senior" political leaders and party critics were all that impeccable from our present viewpoint. Thus, in mocking some literary critics who "measure anything new and immediately determine to what extent a given individual has deviated from the standardized poet who is considered the model for present and future poets who claim to be in step with the age," N.I. Bukharin himself plunges in a rather mentorial article entitled "Evil Notes," in which he precisely computes the distance separating Yesenin from a truly proletarian poet.

Actually, this inconsistency was redeemed by the sufficiently democratic nature of the polemics, in the course of which participants in a discussion could speak out quite sharply without fearing any immediate "sanctions." The main source of the further difficulties should be seen not at all in the polemics but in the compromises which were accepted by the supporters of the "balanced line" and who, in the final account, without any particular reservations, accepted the division of all literature into "proletarian" and "nonproletarian," i.e., "fellow traveler," as suggested by the RAPP, which was fraught with the threat of tremendous losses. It led to narrowing the concept of "Soviet literature," and rejecting out of it many writers and artists whose works were a true contribution to Russian and Soviet culture; it led to promoting persecution and, finally, to the totally unjustified feeling of moral superiority on the part of writers and painters who, for one reason or another, were qualified as being "truly proletarian."

The main conclusion which we can draw today from the study of the sociopolitical situation in literature and the arts in the 1920s is that the quite extensive pluralistic forces, inclined toward consolidation and the unification of everything best in Soviet literature, were unable to

find and strengthen the necessary democratic mechanisms to protect themselves from those who strove toward total domination of the situation and the elimination of any dissident way of thinking. The dialectical contradictoriness of the situation should be seen in the fact that the truly democratic approach does not allow the use of undemocratic measures toward undemocratic forces. It would be quite sad if the lessons of the 1920s are viewed by us only as forays into history.

Today the study of the events of the 1920s is not only of scientific-cognitive significance. History becomes more relevant than at any other time and it is not accidental that questions of the pace of collectivization and industrialization is frequently discussed as though they are real problems of today; willy-nilly, academic historians ask themselves the academically "incorrect" question: "What would have happened if..." However, we cannot turn time back: that which took place in history can no longer be corrected (this does not make the culprits any less guilty); the job of the present historians is not only to collect and seek maximally objective information and the classification of previously unknown facts but also to offer their contemporaries the possibility of interpreting and applying historical experience.

Going back to the direct subject of our article—art and literature in the 1920s—we see that the main danger at that time stemmed from those who, although from the loftiest motivations, tried mechanically to restrict the range of the true, the real force or, to use the terminology of that time, of proletarian culture and to separate the pure from the impure, the loyal from the disloyal, and the just from the sinful.... If at the initial stage in the development of our culture, in its first decade, this viewpoint was actively promoted by certain circles, without becoming a comprehensive directive, virtually since the end of the 1920s such a "restrictive" position became the "general line." Today we can only begin roughly to understand the losses which such "hegemony" inflicted on our culture and, therefore, on worldwide, on universal culture. It is a matter here not only of "manuscripts which cannot burn" or paintings and sculptures concealed in repositories or else destroyed, and not shelved or even destroyed motion pictures but also poems, paintings and films which were not created, and the great ideas which were not implemented or else were not born....

Today, one may feel, we have no reason to complain for although retroactively we are rehabilitating the "excommunicated" writers, poets, painters and artistic directors, and their works are being returned to us. Gradually, culture is assuming the features of its lost integrity, although here as well rather strange conflicts develop, such as the argument on priorities as to who is more important to Soviet literature, whether it is Sholokhov or Gorkiy or else, conversely, Zamyatin or Platonov. As to the freedom of creativity of painters and writers—our contemporaries—it seems that today everything seems to be in order: bureaucrats are becoming clearly cautious when it comes to banning something in culture: exhibits

are being held in a great variety of trends, including one which, not so long ago, would have been the equivalent of ideological subversion; on the stages of satirical clubs, young people are loudly singing songs with lyrics which, until recently, would have been considered inconceivable. Naturally, to this day some people are not published, some paintings are not being purchased, and so on. However, even in this area the situation has changed, for those who are not being published or accepted in exhibits have been deprived of their main traditional privilege: to refer to some superior and peremptory grounds for prohibitions. It is true that a new variety of circumstances is appearing in which, it may seem, artists who are very successful and flattered by the mass information media are beginning to join the ranks of those who have been insulted and suppressed and are complaining about bureaucrats, while composers and writers whose highly valued works are gathering dust on bookshelves but who, as in the past, take up a great deal of broadcasting time, complain on the subject of the domination of mass culture or vanguardism. Those who have become accustomed to benefits are totally unwilling to part with their privileges, for which reason they resort to the well-tried methods for getting rid of all possible rivals by accusing them of being promoters of bourgeois culture. However, today this is not the main danger. There have been loud voices asking for a new redivision of culture, for a new restriction, this time based on the manifestation of, so to say, the national idea. Whereas in the 1920s the "truly proletarian" critics measured the amount of "truly proletarian" features within each poet or painter, today they are measuring the quantity of what is "truly national." Thus, "living classics" have already been nominated in the various cultures, among painters and writers, and any criticism addressed to them is occasionally proclaimed from high rostrums as suppression of and struggle against national culture. Naturally, the main gain of the present is the pluralism of opinion, which makes it necessary to acknowledge the right of existence of such a position as well. However, in this case we must not forget that all of this is by no means harmless and that already once such tactics prevailed in our history.

Unquestionably, today's pluralism to which our society is only becoming accustomed should be more profound and better realized than the one in the 1920s. However, there are matters which are particularly relevant under the present circumstances. It is a question above all of the **standard of debates**, respect for one's opponent and the moral inadmissibility of pinning labels and calling upon the authorities to put an end to the "opponent who oversteps the mark" in an argument. It is our duty to remember what this led to in the past.

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IN THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, ASPIRATIONS

Hungary: Priority of Reform

905B0010K Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 16,
Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 94-105

[Article by Sergey Vladimirovich Kolesnikov and Yevgeniy Vasilyevich Shashkov, *KOMMUNIST* special correspondents]

[Text] Four days in October of 1989 became a major landmark in Hungarian life. In the evening of 7 October, delegates to the MSZMP Congress, after intensive discussions adopted, by majority vote, a declaration on the nature of the party, which marked the establishment of the Hungarian Socialist Party. The change in name is not reduced to removing one letter from the by now customary acronym. A left-wing socialist organization has appeared on the Hungarian political stage, an organization of a new type, which synthesizes the traditions and values of the communist and socialist movements and the ideas of social justice and human rights. "In the history of our country a period related to the name of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party has ended," the declaration passed at the congress emphasizes. "The concept of socialism which existed so far of the Stalinist-type system exhausted all of its social, economic, political and moral reserves. It is unable to be in step with global developments. It is this that concludes the history of the MSZMP as the government party. In order to achieve the broad and radical renovation in the socioeconomic and political areas it is necessary to establish a new party on its basis."

The founding of the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] and the dramatic nature of the congress, the tense debates among the supporters of different platforms and changes in the lives of a number of active participants in political life have all become objects of close attention on the part of Hungarian society and the world press which was represented more extensively than ever before in Budapest during those days. The congress has triggered a great deal of interest among Soviet communists as well. This interest is entirely understandable: How will the reform processes develop in a neighboring socialist country, what are the prospects for the renovation of global socialism, and will the ties which bind our countries and parties with traditional political and economic alliances weaken? All of these questions inevitably arose in our own minds, as correspondents for this journal at the congress.

Past the 'Point of No Return'

During the long years of "stagnation," talks about reform in Hungary appeared in the Soviet press as hints of the need for change in our own reality of that time. Whether it was a question of plentiful shelves, sensible

farm management or market possibilities, one could see behind all this a debate on the ways of changing the Soviet economy.

The Hungarian reforms, which were initiated under the leadership of Janos Kadar in the mid-1960s marked, along with the initial attempts at economic change in the Soviet Union, the start of a difficult and conflicting process of change and of surmounting the deformations of socialism and its command-bureaucratic model. It was a difficult process with its periods of acceleration and backpedalling. The MSZMP slogan of "those who are not against us are with us," encouragement of private enterprise and developing an original model for large-scale agricultural production, as well as changes in the party's work style, were major contributions to laying the foundations for the future renovation of socialism and helped the consolidation of Hungarian society on a new basis. However, the practical implementation of the economic reform in Hungary coincided with the political situation of the end of the 1960s and turn of the 1970s, the growth of conservative trends and the overall "cooling off" in the European socialist "home," which narrowed the possibilities of taking an independent path. The very promising beginning of the reforms increasingly lost its dynamism and for some 15 years obstructions blocked more or less intensive moves. The situation in the economy left something better to be desired. The country's foreign debt in convertible currency continued to grow; inflation increased and the living standard declined.

This situation was essentially the result of domestic reasons and errors. Such was the conclusion reached at the May 1988 All-Hungarian Party Conference (its proceedings were described in detail in *KOMMUNIST* No 16, 1988). Above all, the reasons for the situation were that the economic reform was not paralleled by a political reform, by a real renovation of the party. The aggravated economic contradictions were largely the consequence of problems which had accumulated in social relations and in the functioning of the system of political institutions. This meant that the people were losing their confidence in the ruling party and that social tension was rising.

"The forces supporting the party reform clearly realized that the problems which would determine the fate of the people would be difficult to solve without the internal renovation of the MSZMP and the reorganization of the system of political institutions. Such aspirations were substantially helped by the fact that in 1985 a turn was made in CPSU policy, and by the development of reform process in many other socialist countries," emphasizes the document "Lessons From the Historical Path," which was adopted by the congress. According to the Hungarian comrades, the changes in the USSR did not, all by themselves, provide a stimulating influence on the situation in Hungary. They revealed the groundlessness of claims popular in past decades to the effect that the reasons for the static nature of the Hungarian reforms was exclusively the "conservatism of Soviet policy,"

which restricted the freedom of economic and political maneuvering. Arguments broke out on the way of assessing the existing situation in the country. The May Conference provided the only possible answers to the questions at that historical moment. The conference radically—by almost 50 percent—renovated the senior party leadership and undertook the radical restructuring of life in the country. This was based on the relatively slow and gradual progress on the path of reform, which was to take between 8 and 10 years.

This made the headlong acceleration of events over the past 16 months all the more difficult and unpredictable. The formulation of political decisions took place under the circumstances of a time pressure and clearly fell behind the growing changes in the society. Here is a typical example: in "catching up" with the processes of politicizing of the masses and the creation of new alternate sociopolitical movements and associations, in no more than 8 months after the conference, the initial viewpoint on the possibility of continuing to make changes within the framework of a single party system was revised. Here as well the mastery of the new realities and their "resmelting" into a specific party policy already took place under conditions in which major alternate forces were becoming organizationally shaped, such as the "Hungarian Democratic Forum" and other political organizations.

The economy as well continued to encounter substantial difficulties. Priority was given to problems of employment. The number of unprofitable enterprises increased. No radical steps could be taken in the area of improving the production structure; the new law on economic associations did not begin to function at full capacity. Increasingly, the view was being expressed in party circles to the effect that the May Conference had not formulated a clear program of action to deal with economic and ideological problems. Differences intensified within the MSZMP and its leadership on key problems of politics and in assessing the historical path of the party. The clashes which intensified as the date of the congress approached led, last summer, to the formation of new leading MSZMP authorities—a political executive committee and a presidium, the membership of which was a compromise, which included the new party chairman R. Nyers, general secretary K. Gros, M. Nemeth, the chairman of the council of ministers, and Minister of State I. Pozsgay.

One of the critical situations which broke out in the party and Hungarian society was the publication of the conclusions of the MSZMP Central Committee Subcommission on Historical Problems On the Nature of the Events of October 1956. Unlike their evaluation, which had prevailed for more than 30 years, as a counterrevolutionary mutiny, the documents published in the party's theoretical journal *TARSADALMI SZEMLE* spoke of a popular rebellion against the Stalinist model of socialism. Even though the document emphasized the heterogeneous nature of the objectives and aspirations of the forces which had taken part in the tragic events, such

a sharp turn in assessments could not fail to become a kind of catalyst for the tempestuous processes in the social awareness and the reinterpretation of customary ideological concepts and values.

The discussion within the party was also stimulated by the basic decision to have real freedom of platforms within the MSZMP. This meant the right of party members to express their views, to coordinate them and jointly to act and struggle for gaining a majority. At the same time, it was pointed out that the organization of platforms was not the equivalent of the creation of factions bound by internal organizational discipline.

On the eve of the MSZMP Congress several platforms had been formulated, reflecting an entire range of views on the future of the country and the ways of party activities. The supporters of reform rallied under the banner of a radical political restructuring and fundamental changes in the model. "Middle" positions were held by the movement "Rally for the Renovation of the MSZMP." Extreme "left-wing" views were defended by the representatives of the United Marxist Platform and the Ferenc Munnikh Society. The process of shaping the platforms continued in the course of the election of delegates to the congress and during the party congress itself.

A three-way political discussion was initiated before the congress to coordinate the interests of the representatives of the MSZMP, the "opposition roundtable" and many newly created political parties and mass social organizations. The purpose of the talks was to reach a compromise in the creation of the necessary political and legal conditions for a peaceful transition to the establishment of a democratic law-governed state and a search of ways to resolve the social and economic crises. Thanks to the constructive position held by the delegation of the ruling party, political agreement was reached on a number of important draft bills. The difficult process of coordinating interests, some of which were diametrically different, is continuing.

What determines the growing speed of development of events in the life of the MSZMP despite the repeated attempts at calming the situation down?

There is a concept in aviation known as "point of no return." After this point has been crossed there is no way to go back, one must fly toward the point of destination. We believe that the radical social forces were trying to cross this "point of no return" as quickly as possible in the course of the reform process in order to eliminate halfway measures and possible back movements. Also important, obviously, was the significance of the external factor, the international conditions affecting changes in the Hungarian economy and policy. In answer to our question concerning the attitude of the supporters of the reform toward the concept of the renovation of socialism, as formulated by the CPSU, I. Pozsgay said: "Soviet perestroika is a good wind filling the sails of Hungarian reforms which support the course of the

Soviet leadership. That which is currently taking place in the USSR is creating a firm backing for changes in our country."

The initiators of the reform conceived their task as making full use of the chance offered by history and not losing the opportunity of completing a radical and comprehensive reform, and organically making Hungary part of the context of general European and general civilizing processes.

The Price of Democracy

In frequent cases, external features of political events may have a great impact on their content. The business-like atmosphere at the Budapest Congress Center, the strict order in the hall, a presidium consisting of three members—"speaker," secretary and chairman of the procedural commission, and bundles of yellow sheets in the hands of the participants in the congress, each one of which gave the right to a 15 second replica or statement, the long lines at the microphones which were placed directly at the entrances, and the sharp debates not only in the hall but also in the lobby, and conferences during the night by representatives of the platforms were all proof that this congress was truly democratic. It also had its unique drama, based on most complex compromises.

On the morning of 6 October, 1,256 of the 1,279 voting delegates had registered. More than 80 percent of the delegates had never before attended a party forum. Invitations to participate in the work of the congress were issued also to a number of mass sociopolitical associations, including opposition parties and organizations.

One of the characteristic features of the congress was the fact that its participants, in addition to belonging to territorial groups, were also rallied (providing that there were no less than 12) on the basis of platforms. On the first day of the forum, there were eight such platforms recorded; the number subsequently rose to 10. Nine of them numbered between 30 and 60 members. The largest was the platform of the "Alliance of Reform Supporters." By the time the congress opened, it rallied 464 people; at its end, after it was joined by the members of several other platforms, it already numbered some 800 people.

We consciously provide such a detailed enumeration of those who were elected to the congress and those who attended it. The point is that on the eve of the opening of the forum and in the course of its proceedings there was a great deal of discussion to the effect that this was a congress of "caucuses," of "semiexecutive sessions," and there were hints that the election of delegates had not been entirely democratic, for few delegates turned out to be workers. We asked this question of Ye. Kovacs, the elected member of the presidium of the MSZP and formally MSZMP Central Committee secretary. Here is what he thought: "In no case should we question the legitimacy of the congress' resolutions. The point is that we have never had a more democratic system for the

election of delegates. The congress delegates are fully legitimate and the overwhelming majority of the party members voted precisely for those people to attend the congress. The discontent probably comes from some circles. However, the discontent will not come from the workers."

Here is yet another opinion expressed by a guest of the congress, M. Bihari, member of the movement "For a Democratic Hungary." "This congress is unparalleled in terms of its openness, frankness and intensity of discussions."

Indeed, such discussions developed on virtually all the items on the agenda which were debated, in connection with the study of the state of affairs in the country, the adoption of the programmatic declaration and the party statutes and the election of its leading authorities. Although an entire bundle of materials had been distributed among the participants in the party forum, containing an evaluation of the most important events of recent months, and the political processes, the party leadership made verbal additions to these documents.

The debates began as early as 5 October, on the eve of the opening of the congress. Until late at night the representatives of the delegations discussed procedural matters. At the first morning session, however, the discussion on this matter broke out once again. Of the four options the delegates chose the one which called for holding debates in three stages. The task of the first was to define the objectives, nature and concepts of the program and the principles governing party activities. The question of a new party name was to be decided as well. The plan for the second stage called for a discussion and adoption of a programmatic declaration and party statutes and immediately after that holding elections for leading authorities. In the course of the third stage, resolutions were to be passed on topical political problems, suggestions and appeals. The delegates formulated (also after stormy discussion) the procedure for electing individuals to leading positions: by majority vote the congress resolved that nominating candidates for the position of party chairman and voting on the candidates would take place on an individual basis while the election of presidium members would be based on electoral slates.

Unquestionably, the main and fundamental debate at the congress was that of the future of the party and about whether the MSZMP would continue its activities or whether a new party was needed. Party Chairman Rezso Nyers was the first to address the delegates, substantiating the need for the creation of a new organization.

Karoly Grosz, MSZMP general secretary, emphasized in his oral supplement to the accountability report submitted for the Central Committee, the need for renovating the party rather than creating a new one. He cautioned against attempts maximally to accelerate the course of reforms without thinking of the cost of such acceleration.

As the debates developed, differences in the views on the party's future, not only among the leaders of the MSZMP and the representatives of the various platforms but also among the individual delegates, became clearly apparent. No one questioned the need for a radical renovation of the MSZMP and everyone was in favor of reform. However, the extent and radical nature of the approaches differed. Some were ready to stop at renovating the existing MSZMP. Others such as, for example, Imre Pozsgay, MSZMP Central Committee Presidium member, favored the founding of a new socialist party.

The next morning, after intensive debates, the agreement among the representatives of the four platforms on the fact that the new socialist party would become the heir of the MSZMP was announced.

The subsequent debates confirmed that this idea had been maturing in the minds of most delegates although, naturally, there also were those who opposed it. After the lengthy discussion by the editorial commission of the resolution which proclaimed the establishment of the MSZP, and after its substantiation was presented to the delegates in another address by R. Nyers, the number of hesitating delegates diminished even further. At 8:22 p.m. the results of the vote showed up on the information board: the motion on establishing the MSZP passed by majority vote, with 159 against and 38 abstaining. The announcement was welcomed in the hall with applause.

However, the struggle among different positions, views and approaches continued until the very last minute of the congress. On the demand of one of the delegates, four of the most noted party leaders had to speak at a closed session and explain their personal positions prior to the election of leading authorities. The discussion preceding the adoption of the MSZP Statutes was exceptionally stormy. The vote was conducted by individual paragraph, on the basis of alternate suggestions and amendments. Particularly sharp debates broke out on the concept of retaining the right to the creation of organizations at the place of work of party members. In the final account, the delegates approved the paragraph in the draft statutes according to which primary party organizations could be established within the framework of the existing laws in accordance with organizational principles they find suitable (however, the session of the State Assembly, which took place by the end of October, passed a law which prevented party activities at places of employment).

One of the problems which excited the party members the most (as reflected in the press, and in the letters and telegrams addressed to the congress) was the following: Will the MSZP retain its class nature as the party of the working people?

Naturally, in this case the best thing would be to ask the delegates engaged in production work, particularly those who supported the creation of the MSZP.

In an intermission between plenary sessions we talked with one of them, 32-year old J. Papp, shift chief at a plant for communications equipment in Kaposvar, Somogy County. He said that he had voted his conscience in favor of the MSZP. His view, he specified, is that this was the party's final chance, its last credit of trust. If the party would once again turn from a servant of the people to its master, and if once again priority is given to "worker representatives driving Mercedes," he would never trust it again. As to the word "worker" which had disappeared from the party's name, he had no trouble with that, for the resolution on the creation of the party stipulates that it rallies individuals who earn their living through honest toil. The fact that one letter had been dropped did not prevent it from remaining, as in the past, a party of the working people and from preserving its Marxist theoretical foundation and left-wing socialist trend. All of this does not allow the party leadership to alienate themselves from the party mass on which the party is based.

A variety of suggestions were formulated from the rostrum. The best of motivations, we believe, were guiding, for example, the party members of Zala Province when, on the eve of the congress, they entirely abolished the apparatus of the provincial and rayon committees and undertook to implement the duties of party officials on a voluntary basis. T. Kiraszi, who now heads the provincial party organization, proudly described this fact. However, would it be possible to perform in this manner the forthcoming tremendous amount of work throughout the country? The answer to this question is problematic. Naturally, the apparatus of the new party will be significantly reduced, by approximately 70 to 80 percent according to some projections. However, without a professional, competent and efficiently working machinery controlled by the elected authorities and party members, as the Hungarian comrades say, it will be impossible.

How to ensure unity, which is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of any organization, and even more so for a political party, even if it describes itself as a "union of platforms" and rejects connections with the previous organizational principles? (Incidentally, the greatest organization and the most "monolithic," in our view, was the meeting of like-minded supporters of the reform, which we attended.) How will the various trends within the party coexist and what is the meaning invested today in the concept of unity? I asked R. Nyers, the MSZP chairman.

"As to party unity, it is above all a question of the need for all of its members to implement the party program, the statutes and the other party documents," he said. "That is precisely the way I understand unity. Furthermore, it seems inadmissible to me to have any clashes among platforms and trends. This would be an indication of divisions, of contradictions within the party. Platforms should not be mutually exclusive or repel each other. As to the formulation of equivocal tactical and even strategic programs, they must be debated before their adoption. A variety of views must be expressed but

only until a final resolution has been passed on the matters. Furthermore, I have believed in the past, and still do, that efficient political activities are possible only with debates, with a free exchange of views."

At what cost was the compromise reached, which made it possible to preserve the party as an influential force under the conditions of a multiparty system and prevent its breaking up into small groups? For the time being it is difficult to answer this question. However, generally speaking, is it right to try to determine the cost of such compromises, the final price of which is democracy?

Ways and Means

Hungary is rejecting the dogmas and myths of the past. However, the process of rescuing socialism from deformations is not so simple as it may sometimes appear. It is relatively easy to abandon symbols or concepts which trigger negative associations. It is much more difficult to deal with obsolete concepts and antihuman stereotypes and the mentality of administrative-bureaucratic dependency, which have become part of the very fabric of the social system. It is equally difficult in this case to avoid the "mirror" approaches, the simple "change in labels" wherever dialectics, the synthesis of values and the thorough selection of that which has justified itself in the experience of socialism and that which must be firmly rejected, are needed.

This was what R. Nyers discussed at the congress. He stated that the socialist movement needs a party of a new type. The new party cannot be communist, for it is broader than a communist party and should represent and encompass the interests of the working people. However, it cannot be social democratic either, for it cannot be based exclusively on the realpolitik of the present but needs long-range objectives. The party chairman said that Stalinism must be thoroughly rejected and that it was not one of the alternatives of socialism but an error which used methods alien to socialism. The MSZMP tried to reject the dictatorial and antiparty model. However, the practice of uncontrolled leadership and the one-party system created, according to the speaker, prerequisites for new errors. With the advent of the new times came the end of the historical role of the MSZMP, said R. Nyers in summation. Now a new party is needed, which will be the heir but not the simple extension of the MSZMP on the political level.

A variety of opinions clashed in the discussions on the objectives and nature of the party's future, including among the views held by the different platforms.

"The historical responsibility of this congress is the creation of a socialist party with leftist views," said A. Agg, the representative of the Union of Reform Supporters. "We also need an organizationally new party, which will accept democratic socialism along with the opportunity for becoming a major political factor in the future."

"We must not duplicate either Eastern or Western models but go back to the positive features of the traditions of Hungarian People's Democracy," was the view of the supporters of the national-democratic platform. In the opinion of the representatives of the platform, it is necessary to proclaim the development of a multisectorial market economy, structured on the basis of the equality of the various forms of ownership but, nonetheless retaining the predominance of public ownership.

The essential concepts concerning the nature of the new party and the objectives and means of its activities were reflected in the basic decisions adopted at the congress: the resolutions on the MSZP, the programmatic declaration and the statutes of the MSZP, and the document on the lessons drawn from the historical past. The party's support of the socialist and communist values, the attractiveness of which even Stalinism could not suppress, was emphasized, above all support of the freedom of the individual, free social manifestation of the will, self-management, real collectivism, social solidarity, justice, equality of opportunity, social protection and the universal values of the development of mankind: humanism, freedom and democracy. The new party, the congress delegates said, will be a party based on the historical traditions and values of the people, having inherited the best aspirations of the Hungarian progressive forces and the ideas of homeland and progress. It will be a party of people who live from the income from their toil, petty entrepreneurs, and fellow citizens of Hungarian and other nationalities, rallying within its ranks members of the different generations.

"Our objective is democratic socialism, which we intend to achieve in a peaceful people's democratic way, preserving the activities of society and the economy," the programmatic statement of the Hungarian Socialist Party reads. "This will enable us to avoid the worsening of the crisis. It will create conditions for national revival and for reaching the level of global development. The way to surmounting the crisis goes through the release of the energy of society and the competitive cooperation among forces which feel responsible for the destiny of the nation."

The concept of "democratic socialism" is not an entirely customary terminology in the practices of the socialist countries. We asked for help in understanding its interpretation the members of the MSZP leadership. In his answer I. Pozsgay emphasized that in his view democratic socialism is closer to the European socialist movement and the leftist European traditions than to the ideas of communism. The MSZP rejects the possibility of a dictatorship of the proletariat. It does not proclaim as its basic principle the leading role of the party and democratic centralism.

Here is what E. Kovacs answered, in comparing the Hungarian with the Soviet concept: "Its essence is that without democracy and freedom there can be no socialism. However, because of different traditions and

characteristics of our two countries, naturally there may be different solutions which affect above all the specific mechanisms. Thus, we are following the path of creating a multiparty system whereas you conceive of resolving the problem within a one-party framework. In the economic area we favor a market economy with mixed ownership which, at least in form, is distinguished from what you are saying, although it does not affect the essence of the matter, for today the share of state ownership in Hungary is no lesser than it is in the Soviet Union. Therefore, I believe that such distinctions—albeit significant—are based on a common concept."

Understanding the political and socioeconomic program formulated by the congress is important in order to understand the Hungarian interpretation of democratic socialism. The socialist nature of the social system, according to the programmatic declaration of the MSZP, calls for giving priority to the free development of the collective and the individual, and the elimination of the alienated, bureaucratic and excessively centralized exercise of power. The system of political institutions of democratic socialism includes, above all, the democratic law-governed state, created on the basis of broad national consensus and the use of forms of direct democracy, such as referendums and popular initiatives, the balanced distribution of power and the prevention of its excessive concentration. The programmatic declaration of the new party sets the principles of parliamentary democracy, the separation of the powers, civic freedoms ensured by the multiparty system and the competitiveness among the different political trends.

In the economic area, the reform in ownership must become fundamental in the conversion to democratic socialism. In the course of its implementation, according to the creators of the program, the number of forms of social ownership will increase. For example, part of the state property may be converted into municipal property in which ownership functions will be implemented by local self-management authorities.

As understood by the MSZP, the characteristic feature of the economic concept of democratic socialism is the acknowledgment of private ownership as an intrinsic condition of economic growth. "In a modern economy cooperation among all forms of ownership is intensifying. This organically includes private ownership within the system of public ownership; it ensures maximal returns not only to the owner but to the economy as a whole. The significance of a given form of ownership can be determined only on the basis of the extent of its efficiency to the benefit of the entire society," the programmatic declaration reads.

At the Congress Center we met with congress delegate Professor Cz. Czák, rector of the Karl Marx University, and asked him to comment on the programmatic principles governing the activities of the new party in the area of economics.

"We are aspiring to the creation of a 'comfort society' in which the person will live comfortably," he said. "The only way to achieve this is through a market economy. We are struggling against impoverishment and not against enrichment. We are asserting the moral values of the market, such as the aspiration for cooperation, trust, reliability and preserving the good reputation of the producer. By abandoning the illusions of the past we are restoring respect for constructive toil and promoting thrift as a virtue. We must create a modern, stable and flexible financial system and achieve the convertibility of the forint."

The discussion which developed on the rather original limitation of the concept of "market economy" by adding the word "social" led to a characteristic discussion. How, some said, could this be? The market is the market what conditions could apply to it? Others objected, saying that there is no market in its pure aspect. The modern state and the market economy reciprocally presume and limit each other. The same approach is included in the MSZP programmatic document.

Another objective of the party is for the distribution of income under the conditions of intensified individual interest effectively to encourage the production process and, at the same time, to ensure an acceptable living standard. The MSZP favors social aid to workers in enterprises which have fallen behind in the competitive struggle, the development of a cadre retraining system and the opening of new jobs. However, the boosters of progress in all social strata are people who are willing to take a risk, who seek new ways, and who are well educated. They legitimately should earn more for their efficient activities. "This does not conflict with the principle of social justice and equality of opportunity. Furthermore, it lays a real material foundation under it," the programmatic declaration states. "We are aspiring toward the implementation of the type of sociopolitical, economic and distribution model in which the foundation for a proper coexistence is the industriousness of the citizens and a social security guaranteed by the state."

The party has also formulated a broad program of measures in the area of social policy and the development of science, culture, education, health care and environmental protection. These priorities will be increasingly promoted, for science, intellectual achievements and innovation are becoming the main sources of prosperity and growth catalysts throughout the world.

The new concept offered by the party to society is precisely aimed at making the urgent changes needed for the adaptation of Hungary to global developments. It is precisely here that we find the profound reasons for the appeal of reformist party forces toward synthesis between socialist and communist values and the experience of world civilization and their readiness to adopt and master those values from the arsenal of the social democrats and the humanists of the past which were able to prove their stable character. "The constructive roots

of the party may be traced to the basic ideas of Marxism," the congress noted. "Nonetheless, the party remains open to any new scientifically substantiated concept and calls for joining its ranks anyone who supports its political program regardless of differences in views."

What Will Happen Tomorrow?

A single answer is given to this question in today's Hungary: tomorrow there will be parliamentary elections. It is true that the precise date has not been set as yet. According to preliminary data they will take place in February-March of 1990. We would be sinning against the truth by saying that the entire country is already influenced by this event. To the various political parties, however, today this is indeed question number one. After amending the country's constitutions, last October and, subsequently, after the definitive adoption of the new Fundamental Law in 1990, the exercise of the values of civil democracy and democratic socialism will be legislatively guaranteed. The entire political system will be based on the principles of democratic parliamentarism, i.e., a political arena will develop in which the MSZP will compete along with the other parties. A great deal will depend on the efficiency of the electoral program of the Socialist Party.

The legacy of the MSZP has been a difficult one. On the eve of this congress commentators and participants in public opinion surveys assessed the chances of the MSZMP in the forthcoming elections for the state assembly at ranging between 10 and 30 percent. One could argue about the objective nature of such forecasts. However, we must not ignore the fact that the representatives of the opposition parties are already now organizing meetings and going from house to house in their cars and skillfully promoting their ideas. The MSZP is as yet to engage in such activities. A major step in this direction has already been taken, judging by the party documents adopted at the congress. In our view, they are quite attractive to the left-wing progressive forces in Hungary, by those who firmly support a leftist way of thinking. There are many leftist forces in the country. However, they must become reorganized. It is true that another viewpoint exists as well, according to which the reformist trend of the MSZP could lead to the loss of many reliable supporters among the former members of the MSZMP. What if they abandon the MSZP as potential voters?

This is a serious question. The best argued answer to it we heard from the already mentioned worker delegate J. Papp. The creation of the MSZP will become a kind of litmus paper for all left-wing forces in Hungary, he said. Take as an example the party members in our plant's primary party organization. I believe that some 25 percent of the workers who were members of the MSZMP will immediately join the new party. Many of those who hesitate will have to have the objectives and tasks of the MSZP explained to them, along with the significance of the congress, at which point they too will

submit requests for membership. A rather significant percentage of our communists, who had long wanted to drop out of the MSZMP but feared that this would be taken as a challenge, will use the creation of the MSZP as a convenient pretext for joining no party whatsoever. Obviously, something similar could occur within the other organizations as well. Numerous people, particularly managers, had previously joined the party for self-serving considerations, for party membership guaranteed their position. The new party offers no guarantees, so why should they join? The processes which are taking place in our country will be a major test for such people. In other words, 720,000 members of the MSZMP would not be the equivalent of 720,000 votes cast for the candidates of the party in the parliamentary elections.

The main task today is to rally people in action, to rally around the party all progressive left-wing forces in the country and achieve party unity. The MSZP realizes that a change in labels, resolutions or decrees will not enhance the party's authority or earn votes. Authority can be gained only through actions, through practical actions.

We read particularly closely the concluding section of the MSZP Programmatic Declaration, entitled "Our Place in the World." The objectives and tasks it formulates and the trends and approaches which are earmarked will greatly determine tomorrow's relations with the parties of other countries and, to a large extent, the entire outside world. Let us frankly say that as far as relations with the CPSU are concerned, the continuity of the course will be preserved. The document notes that the Soviet Union—Hungary's main partner and ally—is also engaged in implementing radical reforms. The similarity of the aspirations of the two countries strengthens the hope that relations between them will be truly equal and develop into the type of voluntary cooperation among countries which have freely chosen their own social system. In this context, the declaration states, relations with the Soviet Union will remain the basic element of Hungary's foreign policy.

In his conversation with us, R. Nyers, the chairman of the MSZP, said: "During the congress it was repeatedly pointed out that our party favors cooperation with the other communist parties, including the CPSU. I am expressing not only my own personal opinion but also the opinion of the delegates to the congress and the party's leadership, by stating that in the future as well the MSZP will continue to strive toward the intensification and expansion of such cooperation with the CPSU. Naturally, we shall aspire toward cooperation with the other communist parties as well. However, I do not believe that we shall be able to achieve this easily in the immediate future. As to cooperation with the communist and worker parties in CEMA-member countries and the Warsaw Pact, the MSZP will seek new reformist ways to accomplish this."

The party's programmatic declaration emphasizes that the MSZP wants to bring down the walls separating the different trends both in Hungary and abroad. It is ready to engage in equal cooperation, free from ideological barriers, with socialist, social democratic and radical leftist trends.

The MSZP considers relevant an internal reform within the Warsaw Pact and its democratization and strengthening the defensive nature of the military doctrine and hopes that in the future, during this very century both NATO and the Warsaw Pact will become redundant and will be simultaneously disbanded. The delegates addressing the congress noted that they would like to see the Warsaw Pact less as a military than a political organization.

As to economic cooperation with the West, in the long-term, according to some members of the MSZP leadership, the purpose of Hungary is to join the EEC as an associate member. On this subject, one of our colleagues in the press center of the congress, a Canadian journalist, joked: "Some other countries as well would like to jump from a moving Moscow passenger train to the Brussels Express. To this effect, however, one must be well-prepared." The programmatic declaration has a specific formulation of this idea. The cornerstone of our European policy, the document stipulates, is the principle of inviolability of state borders. However, we are making efforts to remove the "economic" boundaries. Without any reassessment of our system of economic relations we cannot hope for the Hungarian republic to become part of the process of global development.

Such aspirations are fully consistent with the idea of building a "European common home." The Soviet Union and the majority of Eastern European countries are equally interested in establishing close and painless contacts with the Western global economic system.

These, however, are all plans for the future. Today the MSZP is merely at the start of its difficult trip.

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THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

Diversity of the World and the Shaping of Mankind

905B0010L Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16,
Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 106-114

[Article by Nodari Aleksandrovich Simoniya, doctor of economic sciences, professor, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations]

[Text] One of the characteristic features of the contemporary world is its unusual variety, its many-sidedness. In recent decades the world community has been

increased by a large number of young sovereign states. The picture of formative development has become substantially more complex as well: never before has mankind had such a variety of countries, not only affiliated with different systems but also at different levels and phases within the same system. The trend toward a multivariant social development is increasing. These are legitimate phenomena and, in principle, are within the stream of the overall civilizing progress of mankind, enriching its content and increasing its variety. However, their development, encountering the forces of inertia and conservatism and manifestations of obsolete imperial and great-power thinking and xenophobia, creates sharp problems without the identification and elimination of which the world may find itself on the brink of a monstrous catastrophe. In this connection, the problems which require today close attention today and a more profound study, free from the previous dogmatic concepts, include that of the structural development of human society.

The shape of the structural development imbues the entire fabric of the historical process. Throughout the earth, however, in the various areas and countries on the planet, this structural process is developing unevenly (both in terms of the geographic location of the different social systems as well as the individual phases within each one of them). Consequently, the various parts of the world do not become involved in the universal stream of historical development at the same time and in the same manner. As we know, initially the epicenters of the structural evolution of mankind were found in the East. They later shifted to ancient Greece and Rome. For a long time they remained in Central and Western Europe, and so on. It was only with the appearance of capitalism that the type of production forces and means of communication appeared which enabled it to function as the first universal form of social development, subordinating to itself, "surrounding" and involving in the main stream of global development (although by no means transforming them totally) all other regions and, in this sense, making the historical process universal albeit heterogeneous.

K. Marx and F. Engels pointed out in their "German Ideology" that it is precisely large-scale industry that made competition universal and created means of communication and a contemporary world market. "It was the first to create a universal history, for it put the satisfaction of the needs of a civilized country and individuals within it dependent on the entire world and destroyed the former naturally developed isolation of the individual countries" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 3, p 60).

The areas in which the new system developed never simultaneously encompassed the majority of countries on earth, as a result of which, as mankind developed, the transition from one system to another left a significant number of countries outside the fairway of social progress, in areas of secondary and tertiary models, with various types of transitional or intermediary political

structures. This meant that on the global scale the different countries and nations (and even parts of nations) steadily coexisted with each other in different historical time dimensions.

Such a situation created the opportunity for the enrichment of countries with a higher structural order to be "nurtured," among others, also by plundering or exploiting other nations. Furthermore, the uneven social, economic and political development of nations triggered in some the feeling of superiority (real or imaginary) of their own system over other and the aspiration to impose upon other nations their own model of social system and to "bless" them with their own way of life and, even more frequently, to assert their domination. The entire history of relations between the West and the Afro-Asian world is a clear illustration of this fact.

The various phases of the capitalist system—its birth within feudalism, development after the first bourgeois revolution and, finally, its maturity—differently affected the destinies of the peoples of the East. The phase of the birth of capitalism prepared merely the prerequisites for the great geographic discoveries. At that time it can be said that the Eastern countries did not even suspect that a new epoch was beginning. They lived as they had in the past. The phase of establishment of (early) capitalism already brought about substantial changes: trade and colonial expansions began. However, for the time being these were only the embryos of the future colonial division of labor. The traditional production methods in Oriental countries remained essentially untouched. The establishment of a global market was of a relative nature. Communications between East and West could have been described as being of a "contact" nature, carried out only through the system of the merchant cities. The first merchant nations developed later, in the 17th and 18th centuries: Holland, and then England. The then rulers of Oriental countries were obtaining only most general and, obviously, quite vague information on the existence of a different world, a world of "red-haired barbarians" and of a different period (by no means conceived as "new"). In short, on a global scale there was a parallel coexistence of social systems different in terms of content and nature.

More substantial and even basic changes occurred during the second phase of capitalism. Colonial expansion assumed a qualitatively new aspect (as a result of the industrial revolution in the West, which determined the new role of the colonies). At that point an increasing number of Oriental countries found themselves "girdled" by the military-political domination of the Western colonizing countries and part of their populations and territories became involved in the colonial division of labor. However, even that part of the population of Oriental countries was still not living in the new age but, so to say, around it and because of it, i.e., it was living within the framework of the colonial age. The actual involvement of a narrow stratum of the population of the colonial and semicolonial Orient in the new

period began only with the shift of capitalism to its monopoly stage. Starting with the end of the 19th century a national capitalist system developed here and the "awakening" of the Orient occurred. However, the broad population masses continued to live under conditions either of a traditional or a colonial system. Therefore, during that period of universal history the Oriental countries lived simultaneously as though in three separate time dimensions.

The social development of the Oriental countries became even more complex after they gained their political independence. The model of "catching up development" imperatively dictated the need to include (for the time being partially and superstructurally) a fourth time dimension: most recent history. All of this created within these same societies a situation of profound structural crisis and heightened conflict and, on the international level, the problem of their integration within the world community, based on the freedom of choice (on the socioeconomic, political and cultural levels).

In October 1917 the "weak link" in the universal global process of bourgeois structural development broke. However, when the bolsheviks came to power, many of them did not consider this event as a kind of self-seeking or isolated factor in the establishment and development of a new, a socialist system. The Russian Revolution was given as an example, as the "spark" which would ignite a world conflagration, or else as an impetus which would trigger a new wave in the global revolutionary process, the main events of which were to take place in the epicenters of the capitalist system. Thus, in June 1920, when the hopes of the bolsheviks for the immediate spreading of the global revolution were still alive, V.I. Lenin wrote about the "topicality" of the task of "converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from national (i.e., existing in a single country and unable to influence global politics) to international (i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat in at least a few advanced countries, which could have a decisive influence on the entire global politics)" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 165). As we know, such hopes were not to be realized, and Soviet Russia had to start alone its transition to socialism under the conditions of a capitalist encirclement.

The unjustified absolutizing of the pitting of the "two systems" against each other (at that time a second "system" simply did not exist!) took place significantly later. The Stalinist variant of socialism was proclaimed the point at which the new structural development was to be started all over again, on a global scale. The scientific substantiation provided by Marx, Engels and Lenin of the birth of the future communist system stemming from developed capitalism at its final phase was simply ignored, while the broad and comprehensive Marxist understanding of the global revolutionary process began to be identified only with the political movements and events which were either the direct or the indirect consequences of Stalinist policy and the impact of the

Stalinist model of socialism. Anything which was not consistent with the Stalinist ideals and concepts of socialism was labeled opportunism, social imperialism, etc., and rejected or, whenever possible, even physically destroyed.

This caused tremendous harm to the creative intensification and broadening of the framework of the true global revolutionary process. Efforts were made to subordinate its development to the interests of the real "governmental socialism," which greatly discredited in the eyes of global public opinion many revolutionary forces and provided an opportunity for the appearance in the West of the stereotype of the "hand of Moscow," which was sought everywhere, even in countries in which a spontaneous liberation movement had broken out.

In fact, the communist system could not claim at all to having become universal. It was at its initial, its starting stage. The main potential of this system was still developing within the highly developed capitalist societies where the natural historical processes of the birth of scientific and technical, socioeconomic and political structures and prerequisites of the future society continued to take place and accelerated. Unless its potential has been displayed, we cannot speak of the universality of a new, a communist system.

Incidentally, in our desire to emphasize the basic differences between socialist and bourgeois revolutions, we frequently ignore the important fact that at all times the establishment of a new system has taken a long time. Even within the framework of the primary model of capitalism, the time gap between the revolutions in the Netherlands and in France was 180 years. Furthermore, in the Netherlands, the country which was the first successfully to make a political bourgeois revolution, in the course of subsequent decades the mechanism of socioeconomic obstruction functioned, as a result of which the real formative breakthrough of global significance occurred only 50 years afterwards, as a result of the bourgeois revolution in England.

The constant postulating of the importance of the Stalinist model of socialism and the existence of the global socialist "system" demanded some kind of new proof. Proof was sought essentially in the "geographic" and "mathematical" areas, i.e., along the line of the territorial expansion and numerical increase in the number of countries in which, according to the "leader of the nations," Stalinist models of socialism were to be duplicated.

The military-power aspect played an important role also in shaping the Stalinist foreign policy strategy after World War II. The "socialist camp," pitted against the "capitalist camp," made its appearance in speeches and publications, and the global economy was "theoretically" divided into "two separate economies." Capitalism was uniformly presented as the "path of suffering of the nations," while the march of "state socialism" was depicted as cloudless and triumphant.

Such schematism (unfortunately not only theoretical but also practical) conflicted with the variety of historical traditions and the real conditions which prevailed in the countries of the "socialist camp," which had been denied the freedom of choosing alternatives for a transition to socialism by Stalinist dogmatic ideological puritanism, in which any deviation from his model of social development was considered a withdrawal from the "foundations" of Marxism-Leninism. This not only led to a certain aggravation in relations with the nations of various countries but also laid the beginning of the phenomenon of "excommunication" of dissidents, publicly anathematizing them and classifying them as anti-Soviet and opponents of Marxism-Leninism, based on an interpretation which had become strictly monopolized. Yugoslavia, which turned out to be the first victim of such a policy, found an alternative niche in the nonaligned movement. "It was precisely the imposition or duplication of a single model which, furthermore, was by no means impeccable, that became the reason in the past for many difficulties in the development of global socialism. We have firmly learned this lesson," M.S. Gorbachev noted in his speech to the Chinese public in May 1989. In analyzing the technology of the outbreak of contradictions between countries which followed the same direction in their development but which had different national specifics, he said, among others, that "two or three erroneous decisions, which ignore the interests of the partners, and the attempts to impose upon partners one's viewpoint, carrying reciprocal hurts to the next levels of development, including the political one, and raising ideological arguments and differences to the level of conflicts between governments, and therefore between countries which were friendly in the past, builds a wall of suspicion and mistrust." As we know, China itself had suffered from such great-power feelings in the period of the so-called "cultural" revolution.

Naturally, the military-political unification within a single and, above all, uniform camp and the administrative centralizing of economic efforts within it harmed national sovereignty and strengthened isolationist trends and separation from the rest of the world and, in fact, led to the actual lagging of this group of countries, for it deprived them of the nutritive juices of the international division of labor, and the possibilities of making extensive use of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and of the experience of the more developed countries. On this level our country suffered losses which were possibly greater than those of many other, because for nearly 60 years we stubbornly ignored the applicable Leninist behests.

To this day we are suffering from the inertia of this approach and from the lack of understanding of the specific nature of the processes of integration within the framework of the system of countries building socialism. Those specifics are largely determined by the particular nature of the start of a new structural development. On this level we believe that we have not considered sufficiently profoundly the meaning of the following Leninist

words about our revolution, expressed in January 1923: "...We did not begin with that end, ...our political and social coup d'etat turned out to be the predecessor of the cultural coup, of the cultural revolution which we are facing to this day" (op. cit., vol 45, p 377). (We must bear in mind that in this case Lenin gave the "cultural coup" a broad civilization meaning, covering a great variety of aspects of social life, including the standards of economic activities.) Since then a great deal of the aspects of the new structural development were initiated, unfortunately, "not from that end." This also applies to the problem of socialist integration after World War II.

Unlike Western Europe, which took a full century and a tremendous amount of energy to develop integration processes and a European market and only then began to structure this within governmental-organizational framework, by virtue above all of the peculiarities of the specific historical situation, the European socialist countries initially emphasized military-political integration and only then began to intensify their economic relations which, naturally, is encountering major objective difficulties. Furthermore, the choice of ways and means of integration was largely not the result of the gradual growing and creative investigation but of decisions imposed from above. However, political decisions on integration, even those made on the highest possible level, cannot in themselves replace real economic processes.

Therefore, the policy of socialist integration needs today an updating of its internal mechanism and the elimination of the vestiges of the "siege" mentality and the command-administrative system, converting to strictly mutually profitable economic methods of reciprocal relations. This will also reliably eliminate the possibility of any damaging of the national interests and the national sovereignty of the individual socialist countries.

In this respect, the question arises of the interconnection between restructuring the mechanism of socialist integration and the process of creating a "European home." Obviously, this restructuring should not be pitted against or made a preliminary condition for the integration of the CEMA members within the "common European home," or within the global community as a whole. History has simply allocated no time for such pedantic consistency.

Today relations among countries within the socialist community are being systematically cleansed from the Stalinist vestiges and the Brezhnev legacy—the so-called concept of "limited sovereignty." Such relations are now based on a spirit of mutually profitable cooperation and strict noninterference in reciprocal domestic affairs. The events which are taking place today in Hungary and Poland clearly confirm this fact. Poland, in particular, gave us an example of political realism and readiness for historical compromise for the sake of the supreme interests of the entire Polish people, displayed by its leadership. It is true that the opposition in Poland, which was given the opportunity to form a cabinet, is as yet to prove

that it is truly democratic, should the Polish people subsequently wish to amend its present choice. In any case, another major challenge was hurled at the West, which prides itself on its democracy: would the rulers of any developed capitalist country and their allies show in the future the same type of tolerance and feeling of responsibility to their nation, should the development of objective circumstances and the will of the people once again put on the agenda, let us say, the question of an equal coalition government consisting of communists and socialists?

We interpreted the question of the future global social progress in accordance with the view which predominated in our country of the universality of the process of the new structural (communist) development. The more time passed the more it began to be considered in an extremely narrow sense, only from the viewpoint of the elimination of capitalism and the immediate transition to socialism. However, since in accordance with the dogmatic Stalinist interpretation of evolutionary socioeconomic and political processes which lead to the birth of socialist systems within the highly developed capitalist countries were not taken into consideration as a rule, the main attention was focused on the "promising" periphery, as it then seemed to many people, i.e., the "third world" zone, the more so since the general conditions for a transition to socialism in that world seemed somehow more similar to our own variant of development, and therefore much better understood by our political theoreticians and practical workers.

For the sake of fairness we must point out that the postwar events in the third world provided some reasons for believing that the global revolutionary process in our time seemed to be shifting its main direction and would develop above all in the Asian, African and Latin American continents. As we know, immediately after the war, within the broad wave of the national liberation movement, there was a rather strong series of people's democratic revolutions and movements, headed by the communist parties, which led to the establishment of the PRC, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Korean People's Democratic Republic. It is true that all other numerous attempts to duplicate this model of revolution under the circumstances of bourgeois-oriented governments which had been established in Asian countries had failed. This should have been a somewhat sobering feature. Indeed, by the mid-1950s, there was a process of discarding illusions and recognizing the potency and merits of the national bourgeoisie in the struggle for liberation from foreign rule.

However, such pragmatism was of short duration. Already by the end of the 1950s the phenomenon of the noncapitalist way or, as it was subsequently described, of a socialist orientation developed and, starting with the 1960s, once again a wave of unrestrained euphoria welled. Looking back, today one is unwittingly astounded by the arrogance with which we assumed at that time that, having the most advanced revolutionary doctrine, we were the only ones who could accurately

explain and scientifically predict the course of the socioeconomic and political development of the countries belonging to the former colonial and semicolonial periphery. Among others, we predicted that it was too late for capitalism to develop in those countries in the three continents, for which reason national liberation revolutions would not end with attaining political independence but, with objective inevitability, would develop into socialist revolutions, and that the socialist future of those countries was not distant but would take place within the life of one or, at most, two generations.

It was on such a conceptual basis that hundreds of books and articles were published and innumerable dissertations defended. As a result, the mentality of the "revolutionary wave" sunk roots in our science and politics. It seemed to us that in the global confrontation with capitalism we would be able drastically to change the correlation of forces in the world, considering the steadily increasing number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America which had chosen a socialist orientation (let us recall the concept which was endlessly repeated at political and scientific fora of the changed correlation of forces in the world in favor of socialism and democracy). However, true historical experience proved that this "revolutionary wave" was as costly as an internal national economic change and that temporary tactical successes related to its extensive growth had their reverse side of dispersing the revolutionary potential and preventing its qualitative strengthening and, occasionally, even a certain discrediting of the ideas of socialism as such. Furthermore, the experience of the previous decades had indicated that reinforcing the nucleus of the new system through the mass inclusion of countries with presocialist socioeconomic systems did not contribute in the least to the acceleration of the overall course of the global revolutionary process but drew the attention away from the vital tasks of a profound structural reorganization, and updating the principles and mechanisms of establishing truly socialist societies in this initiative-minded group of countries. In short, historical experience once again reminded us of the folk wisdom of "better less but better" and the Leninist idea that the victory of the new system can be ensured only by achieving a higher standard of labor productivity, i.e., a higher socioeconomic quality and not merely a quantitative "wave" of political victories.

Doubts as to the absolute accuracy of our foreign policy course toward the developing countries developed during the 1970s and beginning of 1980s, particularly as the number of countries with a failed socialist orientation increased, and also in connection with the huge economic and political difficulties which the countries which had followed that path began increasingly to encounter. However, the most sobering experience was brought about by Afghanistan.

In the preceding decade we were convinced to such an extent of our own rightness that we could not even conceive of the fact that by instilling in peoples which had become free from colonial yoke (or, rather, to the in

left field of their political vanguard) the idea of the inevitability of the only true way (in fact the only model of the only way) of development we were dogmatizing their path. We totally abstracted ourselves from the genesis of national liberation movements and the fact that in the developing countries the concept of social progress and the revolutionary process are conceived of much more broadly and comprehensively because of the specific nature of their historical development we already mentioned.

The decisive, the crucial historical stage of the national liberation movement began, as we know, in the second half of the 1940s, above all as a result of the defeat of fascism in World War II and under circumstances of the broadened framework of the new structural development, which created the possibility of an alternative: a socialist orientation for the young independent countries. However, this possibility was not of a universal and absolute nature and in the case of dozens of developing countries a relevant problem to this day is that of making a choice among the many options offered by the capitalist way.

The latter circumstance was ignored from the very beginning in the West as well. Ever since the West realized the inevitability of the collapse of the colonial political system, persistent efforts were made to impose upon the liberated countries its own concepts of social development. The absolute majority of these recommendations could be reduced to a single denominator: Westernizing, i.e., duplicating the "classical" way of Western capitalist development.

The tradition to believe that it is precisely Soviet foreign policy that is structured on a strictly class basis became firmly established in Western historiography, although this was by no means always the case. The fact that the foreign policy of the developed capitalist countries pursued and still pursues class (bourgeois-class) objectives of strengthening and expanding the global capitalist system and keeping the developing countries as the periphery of the system, is deliberately ignored. Yet the postwar decades are crowded with innumerable examples of the way the West, the United States above all, tried not only through its unceremonious advice or economic pressure but also through armed force (let us recall Suez, Indochina, Grenada, Nicaragua, Panama, etc.) to instill its "democratic values" and "way of life," and export its concepts of domestic and foreign policy which was to be adopted by one developing country or another. Meanwhile, many of these countries which, like India, had long chosen their own capitalist way, are defending their national autonomy and sovereignty and are aspiring to achieve economic independence without limiting themselves artificially in the choice of their partners in cooperation, which triggers the displeasure and, frequently, the imposition of various sanctions on the part of the American administration.

In this case it is a question of a specific group of countries in the world community which, by virtue of

historical reasons, fell substantially behind in their social development. The entire course of universal progress of these countries leads them into a headlong involvement in the processes of internationalization and integration with the global community. Nonetheless, they remain transitional societies whose social and economic structures are not distinguished by an organic integrity and homogeneity. In addition to a nucleus of contemporary national structures, we find here vestiges of traditional relations (including primitive-communal and feudal), on the one hand, and substantial strata of residual colonial or neocolonial structures, on the other. It is also entirely obvious that despite the entire commonality of contemporary historical tasks, each one of these countries has its "individual face:" it has conditions which are specifically historical and separate objectives for each given stage of development and specific methods and means of achieving them.

The heterogeneous socioeconomic, political, national-ethnic, religious and other structures characteristic of the developing countries predetermine the fact that the solution of the problems existing in these countries will be accompanied by social stress and profound crisis phenomena. Perhaps the task which faces the global community in this connection is not that of imposing upon the developing countries any given status quo or the "freezing" of their social and national processes which make their own way with objective inevitability, but preventing the involvement of such processes within the global rivalry between the two systems and thus turning them into fuses which could detonate global cataclysms or, perhaps, a general apocalypse, but that of ensuring the type of international atmosphere which would maximally ease crises in the developing countries and would contribute to the faster and less painful resolution of internal and regional conflicts and to restraining the arms race.

We believe that the time has come to abandon the stereotype of traditional thinking according to which strength means superiority and ability to impose one's will on others, and to realize that governments, like individuals, act under historical conditions created by previous developments and that this given feature of the world must be accepted (including by the developing world) as such, instead of ignoring it or attempting to make it fit one's ideas of "justice" and "right." Peoples and governments in any country have the right independently to decide what precise model they will choose in adapting themselves to the global realities and what precisely and from whom they will be borrowing and how this borrowed feature will be synthesized with the local structures and national values.

Therefore, the lessons of history prove that the structural development of mankind has always been uneven. The coexistence among different socioeconomic systems and the variety of transitional structures are objective realities in the world in which we live. This state of affairs will remain, as is now obvious, over a long period of time, in the long-term historical future.

Our inflated concepts of the immediacy of the universal spreading of a new socialist formative development are a thing of the past. On the other hand, the hopes of the reactionary Western circles to the effect that October 17 was merely a "curious incident" an "eccentricity," as V.I. Lenin ironically said, existing on the periphery of the capitalist system, have been abandoned (see op. cit., vol 40, p 303). Also failed were the attempts to eliminate socialism from the face of the earth by the force of arms. The historical stage of the breakthrough and firm establishment of the new system replacing capitalism was completed and legitimized on a global scale. Its development has entered a qualitatively higher stage.

Increasingly, the mass consciousness is accepting the view that in the competition between socialism and capitalism victory cannot be achieved through war which would lead to the death of civilization, and that the age of peaceful coexistence between the two different trends in formative development is inevitable and, essentially, has already started.

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The New Programmatic Document of the Socialist International

905B0010M Moscow *KOMMUNIST in Russian* No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 115-121

[Text] The latest 18th Congress of the Socialist International, which was held in Stockholm, assumed a very important position in the crowded international political calendar of 1989. This is entirely explainable.

To begin with, this was a kind of anniversary congress of the international social democratic organization, which rallies more than 80 member parties, some 30 of which are now heading national governments or else participate in them. Timed for the centennial of the Second International (to which the Socialist International traces its beginning) and the bicentennial of the French Revolution, as conceived by its organizers, the purpose of this congress was to demonstrate the close tie between the universally significant legacy of these two most important events in global history and the tasks of the contemporary social democratic movement.

Second, the Stockholm forum became the most representative forum in the entire history of the Socialist International: it brought together some 600 delegates, observers and guests from more than 120 parties, movements and organizations. The range of guests was wider than ever before, including envoys of the PZPR, MSZMP, the Italian Communist Party, the African National Congress, FRELIMO, the PLO, and others. Also attending the congress were representatives of the CPSU. Their presence at the Stockholm forum is an indication of a new quality of relations between the CPSU and the Socialist International, which have been aggressively developing in recent years.

Finally, what seems to be the basic significance of this 18th Congress, is that it adopted an entire packet of programmatic documents for the Socialist International, reflecting the aspiration of the social democrats to play the role of a truly international movement both in terms of outlook and practical activities, and provide its own answer to the global challenges of the end of this century and submit its own plan for the development of the world in the 21st century.

Noteworthy among the documents adopted at the congress is the "Declaration of Principles," the abridged version of which is published here. Essentially, this constitutes the new program of the Socialist International, developed with a long-range view in mind, to replace the one which was adopted in 1951 in Frankfurt. Although it proclaims the support by the parties which are members of the Socialist International of their traditional values, principles and obligations, nonetheless the declaration reflects the unquestionable evolution of the views of the social democratic movement on a wide range of social and, above all, international problems.

The updating of the conceptual arsenal of the Socialist International is particularly noticeable in comparing the Stockholm document with the Frankfurt program; the former was adopted at the peak of the cold war and imbues the spirit of confrontation and intolerance which prevailed at that time. The new "declaration of principles" is characterized by an entirely different tonality consistent with the moods, expectations and hopes which are strengthening in the global community as international relations improve.

A distinguishing feature of the document is the concentrated attention paid by the social democrats to the global processes of our time, above all those of securing peace, international safety and disarmament, and the development of a dialogue and partnership between East and West. Starting with the end of the 1970s, these problems have become firmly part of the priority concerns and interests of the Socialist International, and its efforts to eliminate the threat of war and normalize East-West relations and to settle regional conflicts have earned it the recognition of the world public. Our party as well gives a positive rating to such Socialist International activities. "We ascribe great importance," read in this connection the greetings of the CPSU Central Committee to the 18th Congress, "to the actual contribution of the Socialist International and its parties to eliminating difficulties... on the way to reducing armaments and strengthening international stability."

Those who will study the declaration will notice the views held by the Socialist International on global problems, such as ecological safety, North-South relations, disarmament and development. The substantial space assigned to them in the declaration is the result of a major turn which has taken place in recent years in the activities of the social democrats concerning problems of universal human significance. It is no accident that their

resolution was described at the congress as the "new mission" of the labor movement and the Socialist International.

Naturally, we do not agree with all the stipulations of the new program of the Socialist International. This is natural, for the two branches of the labor movement—communists and social democrats—retain their ideological originality and their own assessments of a number of social phenomena. We differ with the social democrats. However, it is precisely this that encourages us to find out more about each other in the interest of the joint search of answers to the challenges of our time.

In the view of our party, such a dialogue with the international social democratic movement could offer the world very important ideas which are essential to the way we shall enter the 21st century.

From the 'Declaration of Principles' of the Socialist International

The idea of socialism, the declaration stipulates, has captured the imagination of the people the world over. It has contributed to the appearance and successful development of political trends. It has decisively improved the lives of the working people and has had an impact on the course of events in the 20th century.

However, the justified satisfaction which we feel in connection with the implementation of many of our objectives should not prevent us from realizing the present dangers and problems. We realize that we must solve key problems and that this can be achieved only through joint efforts, for the survival of mankind increasingly depends on the joint efforts of the peoples the world over.

Contemporary economic, technological, political and social changes reflect a process of profound transformation of our world. The main question is not whether there will be changes in the future but who will control this process and how. The socialist answer to this is simple. This process must be controlled by the peoples of the world, resorting to the method of the more advanced democracy in all areas of life: political, social and economic. From the viewpoint of the socialists, political democracy is the necessary structure and the mandatory prerequisite for achieving other rights and freedoms.

Global changes offer tremendous opportunities, as follows:

Internationalization of the economy and broad access to information and new technologies which, if kept under democratic control, lay foundations for the creation of the type of global community which will be better suited for cooperation;

The technological revolution can and must be used to ensure the protection of the environment, create new jobs and provide means of freeing people from routine work rather than for the shameless imposition of undesired idleness;

Freedom, equality, security and prosperity can be achieved within the framework of a democratic global society, on the basis of acceptable and humane democratic structures.

However, many contemporary trends also trigger unprecedented threats:

The spreading of destructive technology leads to the establishment of a dangerous balance of fear in which the necessary guarantees for the safety of mankind are lacking;

As a result of the uncontrolled growth of cities and industry, the worsened condition of the biosphere and the inefficient use of the most important resources a threat to the physical conditions for life on earth is created;

Malnutrition, hunger and death threaten entire areas and social groups in the South, despite the fact that the world has sufficient natural and technical resources to feed itself.

The reorganization of the social and economic structures is at least as dramatic and has as many far-reaching consequences as the conversion from free enterprise to capitalist corporations and to the colonial order in the period which preceded World War I. The social consequences of such changes—unemployment, regional decline and destruction of social structures—affected not only the poor but all working people.

Real progress was achieved after World War II in areas such as decolonization, the development of governments of universal prosperity and, of late, the taking of the first encouraging steps in the field of disarmament. However, still remaining is the age-old injustice, the blossoming of racial and sexual discrimination; as in the past, the opportunities available to an individual are predetermined by the area and class in which he happens to be born.

In the face of such basic problems, the Socialist International, as in the past, sets itself the task of democratizing economic, social and political structures on a global scale. It combines the traditional struggle for freedom, justice and solidarity with strong support of the cause of peace, environmental protection and development of the South. All of these problems require common answers. To this effect the Socialist International seeks the support of anyone who shares his principles and obligations.

Democratic socialism, we read in the section describing the principles of the social democrats, is an international movement for freedom, social justice and unity. Its objective is to achieve a peaceful international structure in which it will be possible to strengthen the basic values and in which every person will acquire the opportunity to develop his own qualities and talents, benefiting from the guarantees of human and civil rights in a democratic society.

Freedom is the result of individual and joint efforts, which are two parts of a single process. Every person has the right to be free from political coercion and to act in accordance with his own personal objectives and individual possibilities.

Justice means the elimination of any discrimination against the individual as well as equality of rights and opportunities. This requires compensation for physical, mental and social inequality and freedom from dependence either on the owners of means of production or on those who hold the political power.

Equality presumes that all people are equally valuable and is a mandatory prerequisite for the free development of the individual and for social progress. Equality is indivisible from personal freedom.

Solidarity has a comprehensive, a global nature. It is the practical expression of the commonality of mankind and a feeling of compassion for the victims of injustice. In our age of unprecedented interdependence between the individual and the state the principle of solidarity assumes particular importance, for it is necessary to the survival of mankind.

The social democrats ascribe equal importance to such fundamental principles. They are interdependent and each one of them is mandatory for the existence of the other. Unlike this position, liberals and conservatives emphasize the principle of personal freedom to the detriment of fairness and unity while, according to the communists, they have ensured equality and solidarity but have done this at the expense of freedom.

The idea of democracy is based on the principles of freedom and equality. The social democrats try to ensure equal rights for all races, ethnic groups, nations and religions. Today such rights are being seriously discussed in many parts of the world.

Naturally, different forms of democracy may exist. However, one can speak of democracy only if the people are granted, within the framework of free elections, the possibility of choosing among different political alternatives; if they have the possibility of changing governments by peaceful means on the basis of the free manifestation of popular will; if the rights of individuals and minorities are guaranteed; and if there is an independent judiciary based on the supremacy of the law and behaving objectively toward all citizens. Political democracy is an intrinsic element of a socialist society. Democratic socialism is a steady process of social and economic democratization and of strengthening social justice.

The rights of the individual are of fundamental significance to socialist values. Democracy and human rights are also the essence of the power of the people and are an irreplaceable mechanism with the help of which the people can control the economic structures which have

dominated them for such a long time. In the absence of democracy a social policy cannot conceal the dictatorial nature of a government.

There can be no question of the fact that the different structures create original institutional forms of democracy. Whatever form it may adopt, whether national or international, democracy should be such as to guarantee all the rights of the individual and of the organized opinion of minorities. From the socialist viewpoint, by its very nature democracy is pluralistic. This pluralism is the best guarantee for its viability and creative potential.

The social democrats have followed different ways leading to the definition of such values. Their origins rest in the labor movement, the national liberation movements, the cultural traditions of reciprocal aid and social solidarity which exist in many parts of the world. They are also enriched through the variety of humanistic traditions.

However, although cultural and ideological differences exist among them, all socialists are united in their views according to which a peaceful and democratic global society must combine within itself the principles of freedom, justice and cohesion.

In the years to come, the national struggle for democratic centralism will highlight differences in policies and in approaches to legislative activities. This will be a reflection of the historical differences and the pluralism of the social structure. The socialists do not claim to have a prescription for the creation of a society which cannot be changed, which cannot be subject to reforms or to further development. The movement, whose objective is democratic self-determination, will always find a place for creative solutions, for each nation and each generation must define their own objectives.

The freedom of the individual and the observance of the basic rights in society are necessary prerequisites for guaranteeing the human dignity of all people. These rights cannot substitute for each other and cannot be pitted against each other. The socialists defend the inalienable right to life and physical safety, the freedom of convictions and the free expression of opinions, freedom of assembly and protection from torture and destruction. The socialists support the idea of freedom from hunger and poverty, real social security and the right to work.

Peace is a mandatory prerequisite for the implementation of all of our hopes, the declaration asserts. It is a fundamental value in which all political systems are interested and which is needed by human society. War destroys human lives and the foundations for social development. A nuclear catastrophe could put an end to human life as we know it.

A durable peace cannot be guaranteed through the potential of nuclear threats or a conventional arms race. That is why we need disarmament and new models of general security. We must not simply achieve military

stability on the lowest possible level of defensive armament systems but also create a situation of reciprocal political trust. This can be achieved through the joint implementation of plans related to our common future and the revival of peaceful competition among countries with different political, economic and social structures.

Peace means something more than the absence of war. It cannot be based on fear or ephemeral good will in relations between superpowers. We must eliminate the main economic and social reasons for international conflicts by establishing justice on a global scale and creating new institutions for their peaceful resolution.

The creation of a new international economic and political order is a most important contribution to the cause of peace. This includes respect for national sovereignty and the right to national self-determination, resolving conflicts through talks and halting supplies of weapons to warring parties. Global and regional systems for cooperation and peaceful solution of conflicts must be created throughout the world. They could be organized by the United Nations and expanded through agreements between the superpowers.

Peace within the individual countries is just as necessary. Resolving conflicts by force destroys the possibility of development and respect for human rights.

The militarization of relations between Southern states has created a major threat to the future of mankind as well as tension in relations between East and West. The social, economic and other reasons for conflicts in the South must be eliminated. It is unquestionable that all the wars in the past 40 years have been waged in that part of the world.

The social democrats reject the type of global order according to which there is an armed peace between East and West, with constant bloodshed in the developing countries. Peace-making activities must be aimed at putting an end to such confrontation. Europe plays a unique role in this process. For decades Europe was the most likely arena of an armed conflict between East and West. Today it could become an arena for the creation of an atmosphere of reciprocal trust and restraint.

Peace initiatives require the cooperation among different socioeconomic systems and countries in the implementation of plans aimed at strengthening confidence and disarmament, ensuring justice in the South and protecting the planet's biosphere. At the same time, they must participate in the peaceful rivalry in areas such as the production of material goods, social security and international aid. Any society should be ready to learn from any other. Trade, talks and cooperation must become the standard governing relations among different systems. Opportunities must be created for the open and frank exchange of views, particularly on problems of human rights and peace.

Cooperation between East and West in the common struggle for narrowing the gap between North and South

and in defense of the environment are, most likely, the areas in which the greatest potential exists for fruitful activities aimed at strengthening international solidarity, regardless of boundaries and affiliation with different blocs.

A separate section of the declaration deals with relations between North and South and the ecological problem.

The process of acceleration of internationalization or globalizing international relations, the document reads, has been characteristic of recent decades. The petroleum crises, fluctuations in currency exchange rates and collapses of stock markets directly affect the economies of all countries in the world, both Northern and Southern. The new information technology contributes to the dissemination of mass culture throughout the world. Financial decisions made by multinational corporations may have instant as well as far-reaching consequences. National and international conflicts create a growing number of refugees, a phenomenon which is assuming a continental and intercontinental scale.

Furthermore, the process of globalizing the international economy has dealt a strike at the bipolar division of the world which existed during the time of the cold war. New industrial powers have developed in the Pacific area as well as in Latin America; rapidly developing countries have appeared, which only of late have encountered difficulties. New international powers have also appeared, such as China and the nonaligned movement. Interdependence has become reality.

On the global level, the economic crisis and a conservative deflationary policy have led to the fact that in many economically developed countries once again mass unemployment has appeared. Furthermore, this has had a destructive influence on the poor countries. Such phenomena have destroyed the export market, aggravated the indebtedness crisis and reduced to naught the progress which had been achieved. Such a regress of the South, combined with the need to service the huge debts, has blocked huge potential markets for the North. The decline in the living standard of countries-debtors has become a factor which intensifies unemployment in the lending countries.

The reorganization of the global economy should lead to an increase in the number of strong Southern countries. This will contribute to the development of both South and North. The programs for stimulating the economic and social development of the South can and must become a means of stimulating the global economy as a whole.

The preservation of the apartheid regime in South Africa is not only a crime against the majority of the population of that country but also a factor undermining the economy of the frontline states, which adversely affects the entire continent. Here, as in the other areas, the struggle for human rights and democracy goes hand-in-hand with the struggle for economic and social justice.

Africa and Latin America are facing particularly sharply the problem of the intolerable debts, which hinders capital investments and imports which are necessary for the development and the creation of jobs for a rapidly expanding population. Global steps to ease the burden of indebtedness are a mandatory prerequisite for progress. This must be the main objective of cooperation between East and West in the search for just relations between North and South.

Solving the ecological crisis is one of the most important and fundamental tasks on a universal scale. Since the destruction of the environment recognizes no national boundaries, environmental protection must be international in nature.

We favor joint international activities with a view to replacing ecologically harmful processes and products with alternate ones which contribute to the preservation of the environment. Technological transfers from Northern to Southern countries must not turn into an export of ecologically unacceptable systems or toxic emissions from economically developed countries. An international system for early warning must be developed for the detection and prevention of ecological threats and catastrophes which exceed the framework of national boundaries.

The technological revolution which has already started in the industrially developed countries will substantially change the condition of the environment and the structure of management of resources in the life of the present generation. Furthermore, the consequences of such changes will be felt on a global scale. Microelectronics, robotics, military technology and biotechnology, added to inventions which we can as yet not even imagine, will change the way of life of individuals and social structures throughout the world.

Technology is not simply a target of objective scientific studies or inanimate machines. It always develops in accordance with specific interests and human values, whether visible or concealed. It must be kept under social control in order to reduce to a minimum the threat of uncontrolled development of events and to prevent the appearance of socially unacceptable consequences.

Social progress demands and stimulates technical progress. We need a technology adaptable to the different circumstances and specific conditions and levels of development which prevail in the North and the South. A substantial transfer of respective technologies and basic technological knowledge must take place between North and South.

Agreements on disarmament among the superpowers will contribute not only to rescuing the planet from the threat of destruction. With such agreements, the resources which are now being wasted on thermonuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons could be used for the implementation of programs for the economic and social development of the South.

Some of the substantial funds which can be saved by the industrially developed Western and Eastern countries as a result of disarmament agreements should be used to set up an international fund which will ensure the safe forward development of Southern countries.

A considerable part of the declaration deals with the concepts of the social democrats on how to ensure peace and prosperity on the planet in the 21st century.

Recent events, the document notes, have made achieving political, economic and social democracy on a global scale more realistic than ever before.

Today the concept of democratic socialism is based on the same values as when it was founded. However, such values must be formulated critically, in accordance with past and future experience. For example, practical experience has indicated that in itself neither private nor governmental ownership can guarantee economic efficiency or social justice.

The social democratic movement continues to support socialization and social ownership within the framework of a mixed economy. It is obvious that in connection with the internationalization of the economy and the universal technical revolution the importance of democratic control increases. However, public control of the economy is an objective which can be achieved through a variety of economic measures dependent on both time and location.

Such measures include a democratic, universally acceptable and decentralized production policy; social control over investments; defense of social and public interests; participation of the working people in joint decision making on the level of companies and industries, as well as participation of trade unions in the formulation of national economic policy; self-governing cooperatives of workers and farmers; state enterprises with democratic forms of control and management whenever it becomes necessary to give the government the possibility of solving priority social and economic problems; democratization of global financial institutions and of the economic system, which would make possible the participation of all countries in their activities; international control over and supervision of the activities of multinational corporations, including giving the trade unions international rights in dealing with such corporations.

There is no single or definitive model of economic democracy and the various countries have the possibility of engaging in daring experimentation. The main principle is obvious: there must be not simply official legal control on the part of the state but also real participation in economic management by the working people and their associations. This principle must be applied on the national and international levels.

In a society thus structured and supporting the idea of true economic and social equality, the market could and should function as a dynamic way of encouraging the use

of new developments and determining the overall economic needs of the consumer. We must not allow the market to be dominated by big business, which can manipulate it through disinformation.

The democratic society must compensate for the shortcomings which exist even in the best planned market system. The state must regulate the market in the interest of the people and see to it that technology be used for the good of all working people; this must be manifested in increasing the free time and expanding the opportunities for the development of the individual.

Education, the declaration further states, is a decisive factor in the development of a modern, democratic and tolerant society. The main role in the education process should be played by values such as freedom, social justice, solidarity and tolerance. Cultural variety enriches society and does not threaten it. Cultural monotony threatens freedom and democracy.

Inequality between men and women is one of the most frequently encountered forms of oppression in human history. It appeared almost as soon as man developed as a species and to this day has been preserved in virtually all socioeconomic system.

In recent years there has been a new outburst of feminism both within and outside the socialist movement. This has led to the appearance of one of the most important social movements of our time. In particular, the renovation of feminism took place because women in the leading countries with a developed social system realized that despite progress achieved in many areas, they continued to be in a subordinate position in professional and political structures.

The Socialist International supports the struggle waged by women for equal rights and opportunities throughout the world. Progress has been made in some countries whereas in other the struggle for equality is only beginning. Equality and justice for women is the most important element of a just and peaceful universal structure.

The increased interdependence in the world leaves little space for contradictions and clashes among supporters of fundamentalist views. The cause of common survival and development demands cooperation and civilized forms of settling arguments, even among antagonistic political forces and ideas. That is why we reject and condemn any forms of religious and political fundamentalism.

The Socialist International supports all efforts aimed at the reorganization of society in the socialist countries through its liberalization and democratization. The same support should be given to the development of decentralized market mechanisms, the struggle against bureaucratism and corruption and, above all, for the assertion of human rights and political openness as important elements of a dynamic and progressive society.

Detente, international cooperation and peaceful coexistence provide the necessary conditions in which the most promising of today's initiatives could be successful. The Socialist International strives toward the development of the standards of international dialogue. All sides must cooperate and display mutual trust when their basic interests coincide, and engage in an open and frank discussion whenever it is a question of the rights of man, democracy and pluralism.

In order to create new jobs and prosperity throughout the world we need an ecologically balanced development. A growth which is not aimed at solving ecological and social problems conflicts with progress, for it harms the environment and leads to the loss of jobs. The market system alone cannot ensure reaching the social objectives of economic growth. The legitimate function of a democratic economic policy consists of stimulating a development which offers opportunities for the future and improves the quality of life.

In order to achieve these objectives on a global scale, the creation of an entirely new international economic order is necessary. Such an order could reconcile the interests of industrially developed and developing countries. A basic reform of financial relations should create conditions for international economic cooperation. A more equitable international economic order is needed not only because of considerations of solidarity, but also for the sake of creating a more efficient productive and balanced global economy.

In the matter of international debts, priority should be given to writing off the debts of the poor countries. In order to ease the burden of foreign indebtedness of the developing countries, coordinated international efforts are vitally necessary.

Inequality and dictatorship are enemies not only of human rights but also of real development. We cannot consider social and economic democracy a luxury affordable to the rich countries only. Such democracy is needed by any country if it wishes to advance in its development. That is why the strengthening of democratic socialism in the South is of such decisive significance.

The elimination of poverty in the South is also a project for the North. It can be assisted through disarmament, and through the prosperity and jobs in developed and developing countries. This aspect is of key significance to the strategy of the socialists in their approach to broad economic changes at a time of crisis and of a transitional period on a global scale.

In a period of fast internationalization, the final part of the declaration stipulates, the social democrats cannot achieve their objectives in a few countries only. The destinies of nations living in different parts of the world are more closely interrelated than at any other time.

Although the Socialist International rallies movements which have a long national history, it is not a supranational centralized organization. It is an association of independent parties which profess common principles and whose members wish to learn from one another and jointly act in the dissemination of socialist ideals in an interrelated world.

The objective of the Socialist International is to facilitate this effort to strengthen solidarity and cooperation. However, it takes into consideration the fact that there are different ways for asserting the basic values of pluralistic democratic socialism in the individual countries. Each party affiliated with the Socialist International bears independent responsibility for the implementation of its resolutions in its own country.

The task in the international arena is to initiate the creation of a new global democratic society. We cannot allow blocs, countries and private corporations to shape the political structure of the planet which, in such a case, becomes a by-product of their egotistical interests.

Strengthening the United Nations is an important step in the establishment of a new democratic global society. A consensus reached by the leading countries makes peace-making and peace support initiatives possible.

It would be unrealistic to assume that justice and peace can prevail on a planet in which many millions of people live today under conditions of basic inequality, merely clinging to life, while a small group of privileged people live in a way that others cannot even dream about. Thanks to the struggle which the socialists have waged in the countries where capitalism was born, successes were achieved in creating systems for social security and for asserting the principle of solidarity which, in turn, made possible the broadening of democracy in the individual countries. Similarly, activities aimed at eliminating international inequality will become a most important step on the way to a democratic global community.

No one imagines that this ideal could be achieved quickly. However, the building of a pluralistic and democratic world based on the principles of consensus and cooperation is a necessary prerequisite for further human progress.

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CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

Old and New in Party Work

905B0010N Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16,
Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 122-126

[Article by V. Markov]

[Text] Today the acceleration of perestroyka within the party itself—the renovation of the ways and means of its

work and, partially, its organizational structure and the thinking of party cadres—has become urgently necessary. Under this situation, it is particularly important for the live experience of party committees and organizations to be interpreted more extensively and comprehensively and compared with the theoretical concepts of Marxist-Leninist science which have been confirmed by practical experience, so that the ideas and conclusions born in the course of the innovative activities of organizations and committees which are solving the problems of perestroyka daringly and creatively become accessible to all. A certain contribution to this matter is provided by the books and pamphlets on party building published by Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury. In this case we have in mind the series of pamphlets "Party Worker Library" (16 titles for 1987-1989) and several books which were published outside of this series but are topically related to it.

The very names of the pamphlets in the series enable us to trace the changes in approaches to the interpretation of problems of party work. The titles for 1987 (as well as the predominant manner of presentation) instill confidence in the firm well-being in all sectors of party work: "The Communists Set the Tone" (V.P. Velichko); "Ideological Work on the Level of Contemporary Requirements" (T.I. Zhdanova); "The Power of Ideological Influence" (V.Ye. Titov); "Measure of Confidence" (I.N. Dyakov); "Important Acceleration Factor" (R.S. Bobovikov); and "Harmony of Labor and Recreation" (I.Z. Borisova). These titles do not reveal which among them provide a practical and specific study of realities or search for a solution of difficult problems, or pamphlets which present a situation of idyllic tranquillity and which have retained from the times of stagnation the habit of embellishing the actual state of affairs....

Obviously, it would be wrong to judge works written in 1987 with the yardstick of 1989, for it is difficult for publishers to keep up with the pace of social change: occasionally even the most refreshing thoughts and daring experiments quickly become obsolete. The readers of this survey should bear in mind this circumstance before considering some evaluations excessively strict.

For example, the pamphlet by V.P. Velichko which, as a whole, is meaningful, and interesting, includes an obviously "anticipatory," in our view, claim according to which the party committees in Belorussia, it turns out, have already "made the work style of the party organizations consistent with contemporary requirements" (p 7). On the same page, however, we notice also an indirect refutation of this claim: it describes the "contemporary" style of party work, involved in current economic affairs and still not having developed political methods which are so greatly necessary in party work. There is no question here of the party committees engaging in investigations using specific political work methods in the economic area.

This shortcoming is inherent in other pamphlets in which the role of the primary party organizations is somewhat pushed into the background; the authors discuss essentially economic and production matters while covering strictly party work briefly and not all that specifically.

There is also a typical (particularly for the 1987 publications) tendency to idealize the actual state of affairs and to "report" that the requirements and standards which would be desirable (and are as yet) to be implemented have already been established. "The process of democratization," writes V.P. Velichko, "presumes the existence of a uniform system of moral requirements. Such requirements, which have been instilled in every (author's emphasis) communist and nonparty working person, are being implemented in their moral behavior and labor activeness" (p 40). Today, probably, the author would not have written this.

Another typical shortcoming we could name is idealizing the forms of work: for example, the authors enumerate methods such as discussion with cadres, reports, certifications and practice training. As long as they are used, that means that everything is in order. Nothing is said regarding the practical results of the use of such forms and the way the party organizations participate in such projects.

Incidentally, not all pamphlets in that series need a "time correction." For example, I.N. Dyakov's pamphlet "Measure of Trust" seems entirely timely. This is partially the merit of the author but some of the credit goes to the topic: it is a question of party cadre work based on the resolutions of the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the stipulations of which, in our view, remain totally relevant although they are being mentioned undeservedly rarely. Furthermore, experience available to the Krasnodar CPSU Gorkom, which is described by the author, was gained prior to the plenum.

In a certain sense the "seal of eternity" (naturally, relative) may be stamped on the pamphlets by A.A. Chistov ("Thrift is in the Field of Vision"), V.Ya. Bondar ("Contemporary CPSU Cadre Policy: Leninist Theoretical Foundations"), N.S. Burmistrov ("How to Draft Party Documents"), all of them published in 1988, and B.Ts. Badmayev ("Psychology in Party Work," 1989); the chosen viewpoint and selection of problems and the presentation of such publications are such that they could be reissued in the future as well.

The titles of the 1988 publications indicate new approaches or, at least, a search for the same. In addition to the pamphlets by Chistov, Bondar and Burmistrov we named, the series includes "Thoughts on Perestroika" (S.V. Karnaukhov); "The Raykom Under the New Conditions" (A.M. Ilin); "Party Organizations and Scientific and Technical Progress in the Countryside" (I.N. Russu); and, in 1989, in addition to the pamphlet by B.Ts. Badmayev, the pamphlets "The City is the Master

of its Destiny" (B.D. Gulua); "Criteria of Perestroika" (V.K. Foteyev); and "Party Committee and School" (V.P. Razinkevich).

Unfortunately, (as happens in publishing) the title does not always provide an accurate idea of the content of the pamphlet or its trend. In my view, such is the case with the pamphlet by T.I. Zhdanova. Ideological and educational work is described there as the relationship between the educator (party committee, ideological worker) and the target of education. This is the old and unrealistic approach! The natural consequence is a tone of admonition and the proclamation of lofty objectives and good means without any relation to the life of the former or the ability to create and use the latter, i.e., phenomena which one would think, the author appears to oppose. The appeal which is included in the title is backed in the text primarily by accurate general concepts. Here is one such statement: "Increasingly, ideological and political-education work is being concentrated on developing in the working people qualities such as the wish and ability to work in a new way, to achieve high end results, and the aspiration to assume responsibility. A significant role is assigned to maximally combining education with life and individual work, and to informal and frank dialogue with the people, eliminating verbal cliches and edifications. Every person, regardless of his position, must work creatively. He must seek and find daring solutions and display autonomy and initiative" (pp 3-4).

Ah, here we have this "every person" (similar statements may be found also on page 4 of V.Ye. Titov's pamphlet)! One can easily recognize here the seemingly accurate and customary old yet essentially erroneous concepts. "To work creatively and to seek and find daring solutions and to display independence and initiative" are not in the least **mandatory "for every person"**: every citizen of the USSR has the right to work; however, he **must** work, if he is able-bodied, conscientiously and with discipline but no more than that. According to the CPSU Statutes, every party member must display independence and initiative. It would be quite sad (and is) to demand "the search for and finding of daring solutions" of an incompetent person, particularly one who has influence, or power, big or little. This has happened in our country in the past and we cannot say that it has been totally eliminated.

Naturally, in this pamphlet as well one could find a description of minor bits of useful experience and find out what was done and how it was done 2 or 3 years ago at the Leningrad party organization. The pamphlet is useful in this respect as well. Furthermore, the idealizing of reality is by no means its only feature. We find in said pamphlet by V.Ye. Titov the following: "An atmosphere of universal search was established" (p 11); "unskilled labor is becoming a thing of the past" (p 16). I believe that reporting this as having been achieved is premature.

Probably the obvious "gap" between life, as we see it on a daily basis, and party-political work as is presented in

some of the pamphlets, is not the fault of the authors or, rather, not their exclusive fault. It constitutes the influence of the actual alienation from life which developed in previous decades: a disparity between social reality and its official interpretation, the increased formalism in party work methods, and the officially approved vocabulary which strengthens the wall separating reality from its paper and newspaper perception and depiction. In condemning this gap we must recall that the psychological perestroika is difficult and by no means affects exclusively said authors, for to one extent or another this is a job facing (in the future as well) all of us.

Let us note that the topic of the necessary psychological perestroika has been depicted in the pamphlets and books of Politizdat quite extensively and in a variety of ways although, true, with different levels of substantiation. Useful scientific information can be obtained from the pamphlet by B.Ts. Badmayev, although this topic is not the specific object of consideration in the pamphlet. The pamphlet provides interesting descriptions of cases in life and comments on them (pp 22-29), author's thoughts about communist boastfulness (pp 33-34) and suppression of criticism (pp 34-41), as well as some recommendations on awakening the creative thinking and perestroika in the mentality of the party worker (pp 61-63).

The psychological restructuring of people is most closely related to restructuring of social conditions, social relations in particular. Without directly formulating this summation, V.K. Foteyev defines in his pamphlet (and proves with a study of practical cases) perestroika criteria in party work which cover both. This involves a critical and self-critical attitude toward the work (which, naturally, is fully manifested in public opinion and in debates), the standard of work to mobilize the party members and labor collectives for the strict implementation of plans, and radical restructuring of ideological work, thus giving it an aggressive nature and promoting the vanguard role of party members.

The organic interconnection between education and changes in social conditions of activities are mentioned in the pamphlet by V.P. Razinkevich, who discusses extensively the attention which the party organization in Slonimskiy Rayon in Belorussia paid to material and organizational conditions for the implementation of the school reform. He accurately emphasizes that "perestroika in public education is viewed by us as radically changing the views on the student" (p 41), listing among the primary requirements for changing the sociomoral atmosphere in the schools "the development of democratic principles in the activities of Komsomol and Pioneer organizations in the struggle against excessive organization and formalism" (p 16). In this context psychological perestroika becomes an important sociopolitical task and is one of the examples of the meaning of political methods in party work now undergoing renovation.

Restructuring the mentality means also changing views on conducting any socially significant project and

changes in practices themselves. "The greatest difficulty of perestroika," the author writes, "is found in our way of thinking which was shaped in the past. Today the majority of our cadres, at least in words, support accurate political and ideological principles.... But then the moment matters reach the point of their implementation, it turns out that we intend to implement them through the old methods" (pp 50-51).

A detailed analysis of the consistent implementation of such a major socioeconomic experiment, which inevitably leads to changes in our way of thinking and in the conditions and method of party work, is found in the pamphlet by B.D. Gulua, a former first secretary of the Poti Gorkom, Georgian Communist Party. The success of this experiment is due to the fact that the economic, social and organizational problems were resolved in close interconnection and in accordance with the changes in the spiritual situation of labor collectives. Having set up a territorial intersectorial association (TMO), and concentrating within it the economic potential of the city, and having strengthened the material base of the local soviets, the Poti communists blazed the first path for territorial cost accounting, which is gradually becoming reality on the scale of the entire society. With the help of TMO the gorkom freed its hands from the current production affairs which to this day is still overburdening the party authorities; it relieved economic and soviet cadres from petty supervision, concentrating primarily on political and organizational measures (see pp 59-60). Unfortunately, the nature of the latter is not specifically described although many people could have benefited from already available experience in this area.

Generally speaking, the study of practical experience is of the greatest interest and applies even to works which could be classified as "average," or "routine." It is precisely the different assessments of practical experience by the authors of such works and the different emphases in its analysis that lead to the conclusion that in the organization of party work, precisely today, we can notice a certain turn in relations between primary party organizations and superior committees. We are profoundly convinced of the fact that the time has now come decisively to upgrade the role of the primary party organizations, the practical implementation of this radical stipulation in the CPSU Statutes of which all of us are familiar but which has frequently merely remained on the declarative stage: the primary party organizations are the foundations of the party. Without them we cannot solve the problem of enhancing the activities of all party forces and converting the current forced liability (obsolete standards and methods of internal party work) into an asset, eliminating that part which is the ballast and acts even as an obstructing force.

To a certain extent differences in views on this matter are clearly based on the view of the author: his affiliation with a unit of party work which stands above the primary level. Thus, A.M. Ilin (first secretary of the Neftegorskiy Rayon CPSU Committee, Kuybyshev Oblast), in

describing the practical experience of his committee, writes that "the managers of soviet and economic authorities obtain from the party raykom that which cannot be obtained anywhere else: political training and the ability to assess on the basis of party positions the importance of their work and extent of personal responsibility for assignments and the ability to predict the political results of the decisions they make" (p 17). Assuming that they cannot obtain this "anywhere else," is this good? Lack of faith in the possibility of the primary party organizations and in the forces of the party members themselves confirms, in my view, the fact that the raykom (obviously, it is not the only one in this case) is poorly promoting an increase in the activeness, autonomy and responsibility of the primary party units which, if we look at the statutes, should be able to give the party members all that which is mentioned by the author.

In his book "*Dolg i Dolzhnost'*" [Duty and Office], L.G. Kletskov, first secretary of the Grodno Obkom, Belorussian Communist Party, a most experienced and authoritative party leader, the author states that in the restructuring of party work "the decisive role is played by the bureau and by the party gorkom and raykom secretaries. It is they who are the main promoters of new developments in life" (p 23). This view appears insufficient and the author himself indirectly confirms this by pointing out that particularly important in the work of raykoms is "the aspiration to enhance the combativeness of the primary and shop party organizations and party groups, to reach every party member, and to show high exigency toward cadres and concern for upgrading the efficiency of organizational and political work" (p 6). Clearly, it is simply impossible to solve these problems without the autonomy and initiative of the primary party units, for which reason "combativeness" must not be interpreted merely as the readiness to carry out any decision or instruction issued "from above." At the same time, the author recognizes that "as yet no efficient system of work with the primary party organizations has been developed" (p 7) and that "the process of perestroika in the primary party units in matters of organizational and political work is still taking place extremely slowly and is frequently reduced to discussions about perestroika rather than specific projects" (p 32). Who is responsible for this if the decisive role is that of raykoms and gorkoms? Is it not their obligation to help the primary units with information, organizational methods and cadres and to share their concern by providing better conditions for their work and eliminating the numerous difficulties (and occasionally rightlessness) and the inertia which develops as a result? Why do the personnel of party organs to this day frequently call for reports on the implementation of resolutions and issue new instructions rather than help to organize not "current projects" but the development of criticism, a comradely atmosphere and a spirit of party comradeship, independence and responsibility? These questions, as everyone realizes, are rhetorical.

The pamphlet by I.N. Dyakov we mentioned holds a different view, which can be traced in his conclusions based on the experience of work with cadres in a new style. The members of the elective agencies and the apparat personnel and the cadre reserve seriously consider the views of the "lower strata." For example, no reserve is organized without the recommendation of the primary party organizations and labor collectives. Cadres are chosen publicly and openly, which reduces to a minimum the possibility of violating the principles and standards of party cadre policy. Furthermore, the work of the personnel of the apparat is organized in such a way that they must spend no less than one-half of their working time working with the primary party organizations. "It is precisely in that area that we must concentrate our efforts," the author notes (p 9).

Does this formulation of the matter harm the authority of gorkoms and raykoms or belittle their role? Not in the least, for they do not remove themselves at all from the solution of cadre problems but deal with them systematically, on the strategic level, so to say, without restricting but, conversely, even expanding their field of activities.

We find in this area an interesting presentation of the experience of the Krasnodar Gorkom, which had to surmount the heavy legacy of the "notorious" Medunov. It had become clear at that time that almost one-half of the "managers of enterprises and organizations in the city did not have their work controlled by the city and rayon CPSU committees. This particularly applied to cadres in trade, public catering, consumer services, administrative authorities and higher educational institutions" (p 5). How risky lack of control in this area can become is something known to ordinary citizens who were the victims of a variety of abuses. The party cannot distance itself from cadre policy. The broadening of glasnost and control over work with cadres, as practical experience confirms, not only enhances the political activeness of party and nonparty masses but also strengthens the authority and influence of gorkoms and raykoms.

Problems of reviving ideological and theoretical party work are discussed extensively in the book by V.A. Bobkov "*Vozrozhdeniye Dukha Leninizma*" [Revival of the Spirit of Leninism] (1989). It is true that this author interprets this pressing need as a "return to the past, to Leninism" (p 3), thus allowing paradoxically the possibility of unequivocal interpretation of his appeal. Naturally, this is a question of going forward toward Leninism enriched with the creative analysis of the contemporary problems on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology.

The author has concentrated his attention on problems of party building, which, in his view, is the most neglected sector of theoretical work, and on the new phenomena in party life, formulated as a result of perestroika. Each concept summed up in the book is backed by one or two (or even more) examples, analyzed

in adequate detail and seeming quite convincing. The author clearly singles out problems which require a scientific substantiation and urgent practical solution, which are also supported by the study of specific factual data.

The book "*Sindrom Nepogreshimosti. Kak s Nim Borotsya?*" [The Syndrome of Infallibility. How to Fight It?] by T.S. Bondarenko (1989) is saturated with extensive factual data. This is an interesting book although a great deal of it is familiar to the readers from articles in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. It is true that, combined within a single book, we find, it seems to me, an excessively "thick" selection of negative types of party and soviet personnel. No one can object to even the sharpest criticism of shortcomings and abuses and to retelling the story of the fall of previously successful cadres. This is necessary and, unfortunately, will remain necessary for a long time to come. However, I believe sterile the exaggerated approach by the author in summing up all the histories he presents: in the book, as the preface shows, "it is a question of an apparat mentality" (p 8) exposing the "omnipotence of the apparat and its alienation from the actual processes which take place in life and from man, ...a degeneracy of cadres" (p 9).

A somewhat light-hearted approach may be noted in the summing up conclusions based on the situations described and in the assessment of the phenomena under consideration. For example, in the chapter entitled "Many-Faceted Arrogance," we find a number of sharp evaluations of specific manifestations of the bearers of this disgusting feature. However, the prescription recommended by the author of not being "amazingly patient and tolerant of manifestations of rudeness and a bad attitude toward us" (p 18) is obviously inadequate. Yet, looking at the social meaning of this phenomenon, the conclusion which literally imposes itself is that the most reliable means against such arrogance is the comprehensive development and strengthening of relations of socialist comradeship both within the party and throughout society. Unfortunately, here and in the majority of the books covered by this survey, this radical task is being discussed too briefly.

The publishing house and its editors, as we may see, are actively looking for authors and for new approaches in covering such topical and vitally important problems. Most of those efforts have been successful. Work in this direction must be continued in the course of the preparations for the 28th Party Congress, with even greater energy and purposefulness. Such efforts are worthwhile.

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Short Book Review

905B00100 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 126-127

[Text] A.V. Meliksetov. "*Pobeda Kitayskoy Revolyutsii. 1945-1949*" [The Victory of the Chinese Revolution,

1945-1949]. Nauka, Moscow, 1989, 181 pp. Reviewed by N. Yermoshkin, candidate of historical sciences.

The publication of this book is timely: the interest of the public at large in China in general and its revolutionary history in particular has increased sharply. There is great interest in this history which should help us better to understand the present of our great neighbor in its entire conflicting complexity. In a number of most important aspects (the sociopolitical structure of the CPC, the nature of the political system, the characteristics of political standards, the correlation between national and social aspects in the Chinese Revolution, etc.) this work intensifies and broadens our concepts on the mechanism of sociopolitical development in the PRC.

Nonetheless, this is a book about contemporary China. It deals with the history of the Chinese Revolution. It is written objectively, respectfully and, to a large extent, in a new style. The author was able to accomplish this thanks to the publication by the turn of the 1980s of a significant number of documents from Chinese party, state and military archives, which have broadened our concepts concerning specific events. Important among the sources are also previously unknown works by Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Chou Enlay, Chen Yun and other leaders of the CPC, the recent publication of which has supplied historians with extensive material.

The study is focused on the 1945-1949 period, which was a decisive stage in the struggle waged by the CPC for power within the overall context of the Chinese Revolution. The author justifiably treats the Chinese Revolution as a single process of modification of feudal China after its "discovery" by the capitalist powers in the mid-19th century, the major political landmarks of which were the victory of the Sinkiang Revolution of 1911 and the victory of the people's revolution of October 1949. In characterizing as a whole this revolutionary process as one of national-liberation, the author identifies its final and decisive stage, 1945-1949, as the stage of the national democratic revolution. This approach has been supported by a number of Soviet and Chinese historians (such as Hu Sheng), although others consider it to be socialist or people's democratic.

The decisive significance of the 1945-1949 period to the outcome of the Chinese Revolution has always been acknowledged both by Soviet and Chinese historiography. However, it was precisely that period that remained the least studied. Clearly, this largely determined the sharpness of the political struggle in postrevolutionary China. In this respect the work under review constitutes a definite step forward.

Let us note, above all, the intensified study by the author of the political and military strategy and tactics of the CPC, which largely predetermined the victory of the communists over superior Kuomintang forces. The author properly emphasizes the political flexibility of the CPC and the skillful combination of military with non-military means of struggle against the Kuomintang and

the ability to rally around itself all true patriots. It is precisely the establishment of a single national front and the ability of the Chinese communists to seize from the Kuomintang the national flag that became one of the decisive reasons for the victory of the revolution. The concept of the single front is interpreted in this work in a broader sense (compared to the traditional approach of our historiography). The author considers it above all a policy of essential socioeconomic and political concessions to all socioclass forces which could be rallied (albeit temporarily) around the slogan of national liberation.

He believes that the accurate assessment by the Chinese Communist Party of the national factor as decisive in terms of the fate of the Chinese Revolution (an assessment which was developed after a protracted and complex internal party struggle) was what led to the successful choice of strategy and tactics. However, nor should we ignore the fact that the substantial exaggeration of this approach, which was already manifested during the period under consideration, could have turned in the future (and indeed did turn!) into a predominance of chauvinistic trends in the CPC leadership.

The chapter which discusses the agrarian problem, which has always played an important and, one must say, equivocal role in the processes of China's revolutionary development, has been written in an interesting and largely new fashion. The author concludes that the view of the agrarian problem as decisive in terms of the destinies of China's revolutionary development was incorrect. Essentially, it has always been a subordinate problem in terms of the tasks of national liberation and, subsequently, of the country's social restructuring.

The author pays great attention to the study of internal party development within the Communist Party itself, on which the victory of the revolution largely depended. In adopting a considered although quite critical view concerning the activities of Mao Zedong, the author tries to provide an objective assessment of the historical role which the "ideas of Mao Zedong" played, considering them, for that time, the embodiment of the national expectations of the Chinese people. In our view, he justifiably believes that the largely utopian socialist ideal of Mao Zedong, which was the pivot of his ideology, did not prevent the victory of the national democratic revolution but could have and indeed became an obstacle on the way of its successful completion.

In analyzing the entire set of problems related to the final stage of the Chinese Revolution, the author traces the development of two trends in the ideological-theoretical and political struggle: the utopian and the pragmatic-realistic. The clash between these two trends runs through the entire spiritual and political development of 20th century China and is related, as the author justifiably notes, to Sun Yatsen. The separation of these trends took place, as a rule, not between political parties but within them, which is what made the ideological and political struggle particularly complex and which largely

explained the specific nature not only of the confrontation but also the cooperation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang. In the contemporary course of the leading group, headed by Deng Xiaoping the author sees the embodiment of the second trend.

The work under review will, unquestionably, be met with interest not only by Sinologists but also by the wide range of readers. However, it is not free from shortcomings and gaps, and the style is uneven. Thus, for example, the author raises the important problem of the influence of the "Soviet factor" on the development of the 1945-1949 Chinese Revolution and speaks of the contradictory influence of the Stalinist model on China. However, this interesting and largely new formulation of the question has not been developed. It is not backed by sufficient actual and analytical data.

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Subscription Refusal

905B0010P Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) p 127

[Text] As the readers will remember, the subscription campaign for our journal began this year with an annoying misunderstanding ("Ceiling on the Rayon Scale," *KOMMUNIST* No 12, 1989). However, even during the final days of October, several complaints of precisely the same nature were received from various Moscow rayons. Once again our associates V. Nekhotin and Ye. Khokhlov investigated. The facts were confirmed. Thus, the chief of communications section No 413 on Solnechnogorskaya Street, reported that they were instructed not to accept subscriptions for a number of party publications, including *KOMMUNIST*. One of the numerous telephone reports and orders constantly received by postal workers was dated 25 August: "No subscriptions to *KOMMUNIST* for 1990 to be accepted." It was only after a series of telephone calls to Soyuzpechat that the error was cleared. Yet in the catalog of periodicals, under section No 007, on No 2 Khoroshevskiy Proyezd, the item with the name of the journal was quite neatly inked over. "We do not know whether *KOMMUNIST* will be published next year or not," the people complained to us. "We have become totally confused...."

Naturally, time will be needed for the postal department to straighten out its problems. We believe, however, that the city CPSU committee and its ideological section should not remain unconcerned, for this is a question of party publications.

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Chronicle

905B0010Q Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 16, Nov 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) p 128

[Text] "What, in your view, should be the essence of the statutory, constitutional and legislative concepts concerning the role and place of the CPSU in the renovated political system? How can the thesis of the vanguard role of the party be implemented on the levels of the primary, rayon and city party organizations? Could a multiple party system develop on the initiative of the CPSU? What is the position of the journal concerning the cooperative movement?" These and many other problems were discussed at a meeting between members of the *KOMMUNIST* editorial staff and propagandists from the Timiryazevskiy Rayon in Moscow. A lively conversation took place within the framework of the city-wide discussion on problems of party democratization and the renovation of the ways and means of its work. The participants in the meeting expressed critical remarks and made constructive suggestions on improving the content of the journal; views were exchanged on topical problems which are in the center of public opinion.

The editors were visited by a delegation of the Argentine Communist Party. P. Echegaray, the party's secretary general, A. Fava, ACP chairman, and F. Edelman, ACP Central Committee Political Commission member, were interested in the work of the journal at the present stage in perestroika and discussed its international aspects and prospects.

KOMMUNIST was visited by a delegation of party workers from the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin, headed by B. Lindner, member of the party's board. In the course of the talk the basic trends in the activities of party organizations in implementing the CPSU platform "The National Policy of the Party Under Contemporary Conditions" were discussed.

J. Kase, editor-in-chief of the CZCP Central Committee journal *NOVA MYSL* was a guest of *KOMMUNIST* within the framework of the plan for interparty exchanges. In addition to Moscow, he visited Uzbekistan. Problems of the work of mass information media and the participation of journalists in the occurring processes were discussed in the course of the meeting and the talks. Also considered were problems related to intensifying the interaction between party publications of the CPSU and the CZCP.

In accordance with the plan for intraparty exchange, P. Nikicel and K. Kostin, senior associates of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee ERA SOCIALISTE, are visiting the Soviet Union. They had talks with the editors of *KOMMUNIST*, at the Leninskiy Rayon CPSU Committee in Moscow, the party committees of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov and the Krasnaya Roza Textile Combine. The Romanian guests also visited Leningrad.

Maria Louisa More de Castro, deputy director of the journal *CUBA SOCIALISTA* was the guest of the editors. She studied the work of the Soviet mass information media under the conditions of perestroika. The Cuban journalist visited Kiev and talked with personnel of the journal *KOMMUNIST UKRAINY* and the newspaper *RADYANSKA UKRAINA*. An exchange of views was also held on expanding and enhancing cooperation between *KOMMUNIST* and *CUBA SOCIALISTA*.

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Publication Data

905B0010R Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 16, Nov 89

English Title: *KOMMUNIST*, No 16, November 1989

Russian title: *KOMMUNIST*, 16 (1350), Noyabr 1989

Editors: N.B. Bikkenin (editor-in-chief), A.I. Antipov, E.A. Arab-Ogly, B.S. Arkhipov, K.N. Brutents, Ye.T. Gaydar, I.A. Dedkov, S.V. Kolesnikov, O.R. Latsis, V.N. Nekrasov, Ye.Z. Razumov, N.N. Sibiryakov, Yu.A. Sklyarov, V.P. Trubnikov, P.N. Fedoseyev, S.F. Yarmolyuk.

Publishing House: Izdatelstvo "Pravda"

Place of Publication: Moscow

Date of Publication: November 1989

Signed to Press: 25 October 1989

Copies: 905,000

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