


JPRS-EER-91-153
11 OCTOBER 1991



JPRS Report



East Europe

19980202 081

DMC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

East Europe

JPRS-EER-91-153

CONTENTS

11 October 1991

ALBANIA

Democratic Party Paper on Attack on VOA Officer	[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 21 Sep]	1
Buqi Sees Cooperation as Key to Economic Reform	[ZERI I POPULLIT 21 Sep]	1

HUNGARY

MDF Cultural Chief Kulin on Media Debate	[VILAG 4 Sep]	6
Hungarian Satellite TV To Reach Minorities	[UJ SZO 27 Aug]	6

POLAND

Election Scenarios, Chances of Coalitions Viewed	[POLITYKA 21 Sep]	8
Role of Senate in Democracy Debated	[RZECZPOSPOLITA 16 Sep]	10
August Economic Indicators Discussed		13
Unemployment Statistics	[RZECZPOSPOLITA 11 Sep]	13
Industry, Prices, Trade	[RZECZPOSPOLITA 12 Sep]	14
Minister Optimistic on Prognosis for Farmers	[TRYBUNA 31 Aug-1 Sep]	15
Glemp Stresses Church's Apolitical Role	[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY 15 Sep]	17

YUGOSLAVIA

Former Minister on Croatian Government Mistakes	[GLOBUS 13 Sep]	20
HDZ, City Leaders Blamed for Baranja Occupation	[DANAS 10 Sep]	22
Participation of Serbs in Croatian Assembly Urged	[VJESNIK 28 Aug]	25
Croatian Leader on Outdated Sovereignty Concepts	[DANAS 10 Sep]	28
Slavonia, Baranja Crisis Staff Chief Interviewed	[VJESNIK 28 Aug]	31
Views of Croatian, Slovene Military Experts		35
Air Force Role	[DANAS 10 Sep]	35
Croatian Strategy Scored	[DANAS 10 Sep]	37
Petroleum Shortage Causes Increasing Problems	[EKONOMSKA POLITIKA 16 Sep]	40

Democratic Party Paper on Attack on VOA Officer

92P20018A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE
in Albanian 21 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by Bashkim Trenova: "Political Criminal Attack"]

[Text] The media have reported a horrible political criminal attack in the vicinity of Fushe-Kruje. En route from Tirana to Kruje, the well-known American of Albanian origin, Dr. Elez Biberaj, chief of the Voice of America [VOA] Albanian desk, and his wife and the well-known journalists Mehmet Elezi and Qemal Sakajeva were subjected to terrorist attacks aiming at their physical annihilation. Their car was hit and overturned by two unidentified persons in a car without a registration plate.

The horrible act was not the work of an amateur or an accident. The circumstances, the place chosen for the act which permitted the perpetrators to disappear without a trace clearly prove this. And so do their persistence in the shameful mission entrusted to them, the coldbloodedness with which they carried out the crime and their departure after assuring its "successful" execution. The arrival of the police three and one-half hours after the event is another element which proves that this was a planned act with clear aims and objectives which it is in the interests of specific forces in high circles of the government, to conceal.

The target of the crime shows its political character. The fact that the car which they used had no license plate cannot be hidden. Cars without license plates have been circulating in Albania for only a few months. The authorities are not concerned about this. Why? Because people use them for theft, murder, a variety of vile acts, for political and ordinary prostitution, for creating insecurity and anarchy. It is hard to believe that our country is so powerless that it is unable to prohibit their circulation. This cannot be. A powerful black hand has paralyzed the activity of the organs of law and order in this direction, a state above the state, a fortress of national genocide and massacre which serves as a law above the law—the state security forces, or rather, a select guard of these forces whose reins, unfortunately, continue to be maintained as the final bond by the former party elite and the reinvigorated monists.

The Albanian is not in the habit of betraying a friend and ambushing him. When a friend is given the word of honor of an Albanian it is like the word of honor of God. There is the proverbial expression: "The Albanian would even slaughter his son for a friend." But the infidels, who destroyed the homeland, destroyed the individual of our land, and sold its spirit to the demon communism, have not been and are not apt for anything other than demonic acts, like their whole government and their whole being. In the history of Albania, there was only one similar case, unique in this territory. During the Zog regime, two Americans were killed in Mamurras. There

were various versions of these murders. Various versions can arise today. Regardless of this, regardless of any possible alibis, one thing remains indisputable—the direct or indirect responsibility of the security forces, by means of infiltrated agents, for the attempted assassination of Mr. Biberaj, his wife, and the journalists Mehmet Elezi and Qemal Sakajeva. The monist political mafia can accuse democracy. This is its favorite refrain. But democracy is not killed by its children but by its enemies. Communism, like Lucifer, in its entire history and everywhere, has eaten the heads of its children.

These days, when democracy is triumphing with sure steps in Albania, when it demands the eradication of communism once and for all, the decayed roots of communism are desperately trying to wreck the road that is being opened to the Albanian people. The cryptocommunists rooted in the state security organs try to sow doubts and insecurity within and outside the country, to isolate Albania once again from the world of its true friends, to return it to the kingdom of crime, injustice, and absolute arbitrariness.

The bitter incident near Fushe-Kruje, after the savage murders of our children and youth in Tirana, Shkoder, Durres, Kavaje, and elsewhere, proves that the monistic powerholders have not abandoned their weapons because they, like all regressive forces in history, cannot be reconciled to their wretched fate and cannot voluntarily leave the government and the political scene as its dominating force. Their renewal recalls the fable of the wolf, which, in order to slaughter the lambs, puts on their skin. But they notice the mistake. Our people, treated by them as a herd of animals, is an alert people. It knows fables and the tragic reality. It cannot fail to be vigilant and decisive on its road, for the conclusive victory of democracy in Albania, for the burial of communism and its beloved weapon, the state security forces. In Albania, you cannot play with burnt cards.

Note from the editorial board: While we were going to press with the above article we learned that the car and the driver who caused the "accident" have finally been apprehended. We hope that the investigation office will work with honesty and speed to bring to light the truth about this political criminal attack.

Bufi Sees Cooperation as Key to Economic Reform

92P20006A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
21 Sep 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Ylli Bufi, chairman of the Council of Ministers, by television journalist Alfons Gurashi; place and date not given: "Comprehensive Cooperation Which Paves the Way for Economic Reform"]

[Text] [Gurashi] Mr. Prime Minister, for some time, the media have been talking about the aid which will be given to our country in overcoming economic difficulties. Much has been said and is still being said about the assistance which will be given by the Italian Government. But, one might say, some anxieties are coming to

light. First of all, when will we see this aid in our shops? Second, the day before yesterday, the aid arrived in Durres and so did the soldiers from the rear guard of the Italian army. This is a psychological moment. Third, in the framework of this assistance, what do the agreements which we have concluded with the Italian Government represent?

[Bufi] First, let me thank you for your initiative in conducting this interview. Public opinion has to be educated in regard to this aid which is coming from various societies, firms, and states.

One of the most important pledges of our government has been and still is to obtain the financial assistance of the European Community in overcoming this difficult economic and financial situation and, what is more important, in initiating economic reform directly in all economic structures. Without obtaining financial assistance, it is difficult to overcome this situation and it is difficult to initiate real reform.

You asked what the agreements which we recently signed with the Italian Government represent. In order to inform our public opinion about these agreements, I would like to emphasize some of their aspects:

First, the most important agreement is the agreement on food. It is a matter of supplying food for all the people in the country, in quantities which are larger than current consumption. While in previous, more or less stable, periods—I am thinking about that limited food supply system—the highest consumption was about \$20-25 million worth a month, the monthly food aid from the Italian government alone is estimated at approximately \$30 million. This aid will continue for three months, until the assistance from the European Community begins.

The second agreement pertains to credits for obtaining raw materials, for the resumption of work in the efficient sectors of our economy. For this purpose, the Italian Government will give raw materials worth more than 60 billion lira.

The third important agreement deals with the unblocking of Italian banks and of the Italian Securities Institute (CACE). This will enable the various Italian firms to receive financial support from the banks and from this institute to begin investing in Albania. This institute will provide for this purpose the equivalent of \$50 million prior to the end of the current year.

In the framework of the cooperation plan between our two countries, the Italian Government will also provide funds for beginning the construction of some priority projects in a three-year investment plan. For these projects, \$30 million will be given for 1992; \$40 million, for 1993 and \$50 million, for 1995. In this manner, opportunities are created for beginning investment projects in Albania, for setting up the first work sites, and for creating new jobs, which are so highly desired by all.

Other agreements were signed with the Italian Government in the fields of culture and education, and for supplying the police forces with various technical equipment and materials.

[Gurashi] Something else, Mr. Prime Minister, at this time, the people are more interested in food aid, so what can you say about this, keeping in mind the agreements signed with the Italian Government.

[Bufi] I told you at the beginning that it is a matter of food supplies which will be approximately 30 percent higher than our current consumption. I will give you some figures. The needs for some key articles during the second half of this year are as follows: For sugar, our rationed consumption is calculated at about 29,000 tons, while the aid given amounts to 44,000 tons. For rice, 13,000 tons are needed and the aid amounts to 14,000 tons. Some 20,000 tons of food oil are needed while the aid will amount to 27,000 tons. The needs for powdered milk—which we did not obtain from import before and which was always produced domestically, but which, for this period, is being supplied by import—were calculated to be about 6,000 tons. But, in reality, about 9,000 tons will be obtained. We had provided, in our plans, for the production of 14,000 tons of meat, but, with aid, it will be possible to obtain 18,000 tons of meat. Such figures also exist for other main items, such as wheat and flour. The needs for wheat for the second half of the year were calculated at 270,000 tons, but the assistance which Italy and the European Community will provide will give us more than 350,000 tons. Also we expect to receive 100,000 tons of flour.

Therefore, from these figures which I stated, it is understood that the food aid is such that it makes it possible to ensure a normal supplying of the market and, what is more important, makes it possible to begin the reform process.

[Gurashi] I would like to pause here. This problem was treated more or less in the conference on the new economic reform which was held in Tirana a few days ago. Its conclusion—you were at the meeting—was that the reform should begin immediately, but that some support, some foundation would be necessary. If I am not mistaken, Dr. Pashko said that the Italian aid, planned for a year, anticipated this reform and we mentioned the assistance which the European Community would be giving next year.

[Bufi] The problem is as follows: For a long time, we have been talking, for example, about beginning privatization, which, undoubtedly, is the linchpin of reform. But privatization cannot be achieved without the liberalization of prices; in turn, liberalization of prices cannot be carried out if we continue to supply the market with food articles with coupons [tallonat]. Therefore, the coupons must be eliminated and prices must be liberalized if we want the privatization to begin and continue with success.

[Gurashi] Mr. Prime Minister, the people are anxious about the elimination of coupons and there are various opinions: Some people say that it is good to eliminate them; some say that if we eliminate them we will have nothing.

[Bufi] We will not hurry to eliminate coupons, without obtaining food. We will obtain the food and then we will remove the coupons. According to the calculations which economists have made, with the quantity of food which will come from Italy and from the European Community as well as with the other assistance and the contracts which our foreign trade enterprises have received, it will be possible for us not to have any perceptible rise in prices. At any rate, even in the case of a rise in prices, in the final analysis, the rules of the market economy will operate and a possible increase in prices will be accompanied by an increase in wages. All the regulations of the market economy enter fully into operation and into play.

I said that the Italian Government has given assistance for three months but reform cannot be carried out in three months. You should keep in mind the fact that the Italian aid will be supported by aid from the European Community.

A meeting of representatives of our government with representatives of the EC countries which will participate in providing aid to Albania concluded yesterday in Brussels. The aid which the European Community will give, including the Italian aid, aims at getting Albania through the winter as well as creating possibilities for Albania to begin the reform on a large scale. This is how the aid from the Italian Government and the EC are viewed. The continuation of financial assistance will be provided next year by international financial bodies, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank, etc.

This is why we can say that the financial support which is necessary for our government to overcome the difficult situation and to begin and execute the financial reform has been prepared.

[Gurashi] Surely this large quantity of aid will present difficulties in regard to its distribution. What is the meaning of the agreement signed between our government and the Italian Government on the participation in this operation—as the Italian media called it yesterday—of an Italian rear-guard contingent?

[Bufi] The problem seems very simple and very nice when one thinks that food aid will be coming, but, at the same time, one of the great concerns of our government is how we will make it possible for this aid, these food supplies, to be realized as concretely as possible, in order to ensure, simultaneously, a regular supplying. But, at the same time, we must not forget that we also want to carry out a reform. Therefore, in such a delicate situation, such a difficult situation, in which all structures are in flux, it is difficult to achieve both aims at the same time—both privatizing the shops and supplying them on

a regular basis. The matter is difficult for another important reason. You are aware that up to now, food in our country was supplied by agricultural, livestock, and industrial production structures in 26 districts in the country. Alongside these production structures were transportation and distribution structures.

Now everything is changed. You are aware that food production in the country has fallen to low levels and now all the food will be provided from two points: Durres and Vlore. The existing structures for production, transportation, and distribution are no longer used. We are faced with the following alternatives: either we take the motor pools of all the transportation trade enterprises and bring them to Durres and Vlore or we build a new structure which will make it possible to ensure the rapid transporting, handling, and distribution of all this food aid. The first alternative seemed to us to be unsuitable, so we thought that we would have to set up another system of logistics for the distribution, handling, and transportation of food. The one which was chosen required Italian technical assistance to carry out, with the most appropriate means, the unloading process at the port and the distribution of the food to its destination.

[Gurashi] Has this procedure been used by the other major European countries or by the United States in other countries?

[Bufi] It has been used in many countries for emergency assistance. In general, military units are used to ensure speedy and certain distribution and to ensure that goods arrive at their destination.

I must tell you something. By exerting its maximum effort, our port has been able to handle up to 1,000 tons of goods a day. Now food alone will amount to 1,500 tons, in addition to the regular load handled at the port. Therefore, it is obvious that the unloading and dispatching of these goods would be impossible if only our existing means were used. Therefore, it is essential that we receive other technical means to carry out this operation. For this reason, we made an agreement with the Italian government for technical assistance in transporting, unloading, and distributing food supplies. The agreement between our countries is a technical agreement, not a military agreement, for the purpose of unloading these goods. This is the practice of many countries which are involved in the providing of emergency aid by rear guard military units.

For this reason, it was agreed to create two goods distribution centers, in Durres and in Vlore, equipped with technical means for loading and unloading, for emergency assistance, etc. I am confident that, as a result of the measures which we are taking, this system of logistics created in cooperation with the Italian Government to handle this large amount of goods will be successful. You have been informed that a government commission has been set up, with the participation of all the ministries, headed by the Ministry of Trade and Tourism, an interdepartmental commission, and we

have sent a representative of the government into each district. The first contingents of food will begin to arrive on 24-25 September. Of course, we will begin with the districts which are closest to the ports, while keeping in mind the need to satisfy the urgent requirements of other districts. In this way, we expect to satisfy the food needs in all the districts with the first contingents of aid within 15-20 days.

If this system of distribution were to be carried out by private firms, I would have been pessimistic and I would not have thought that it could be carried out successfully. I learned this from the experiences which we had recently with some foreign ships, which private transportation and distribution firms had hired. There were many delays and the goods did not arrive at their destination.

[Gurashi] And now there is another worry, lest perhaps in the framework of all this aid which is coming to our country from the whole world a kind of exclusivity be given to Italy. Opinions have been expressed in the opposition press, and perhaps by individuals, to the effect that an Italian protectorate is being set up in Albania.

[Bufi] I think that we should not have such a worry. A short time ago, after the exodus, I sent a letter to several prime ministers of various countries of the world—France, the Netherlands, Germany, the president of the Common Market, Jacques Delors, the prime minister of Italy, and American Secretary of State Baker. The purpose of the letter was to obtain the necessary political and economic assistance to successfully build democracy in Albania. The promise of our government was not only to the Italian Government but this promise was directed toward the other states in the European Community and the expression of this policy, of this promise is the Brussels meeting in which the 36 states of the European Community will give their assistance in providing aid to Albania. The aid which the EC will give is very important.

I would like to say that Italy has special merit because it is providing the first concrete assistance up to the time that the EC mechanism is put into motion. But Italy has also tried to coordinate its activity with the other EC countries. France, Germany, Greece, etc., are involved in the aid given by the EC. Switzerland and the United States will also provide aid. Therefore, it is not a matter of exclusivity or of an Italian protectorate. I think that in the situation of rapid developments in Europe, with the integration of all countries in the European family, when walls are being destroyed, there is no reason for such anxiety, especially in light of the policy which our government is following to obtain the necessary aid from all the countries in the international community.

Recently we were informed of our acceptance in the European Bank and soon we will be accepted in the IMF and in the World Bank, those strong financial bodies which are not dependent upon Italy, America, or any

country, whatever it might be, but on the totality of all countries in the international community. I think that there should not be any kind of anxiety about judging political or economic exclusivity. During this period, the government has been concerned about making contact with various firms in order to eliminate any sort of exclusivity. In principle, we have been for outlawing exclusivity in every type of agreement and every type of contract. Albania has a strong natural potential. It has resources which make it possible to ensure its rapid development, if investments are made, if foreign capital is invested, to put these resources into use..

Albania has a very favorable geographic position which makes it possible to get foreign firms to invest in the country. Therefore, it is not exclusivity or special agreements with various states but our riches, our natural resources which make foreign firms interested in coming to Albania. This is the basis for our developments; this is the basis for our reforms.

[Gurashi] So, Mr. Ylli, you are returning to Italy. You have been in Italy several times. The last time, you had contacts with representatives of various Italian firms. We saw you on television. Our experts went there and met with the representatives of these firms and talked about Italian interests in our country. Where do they want to invest in Albania?

[Bufi] We know that a number of Italian firms and firms from other countries have come to Albania recently. They had talks and signed contracts, but there was a certain element of restraint. Someone said that they are not convinced about what investments they would make. Of course, there are problems in this area. There is the obstacle of our management apparatus. Our procedures have often been bureaucratic but we are trying, more and more, to facilitate them.

[Gurashi] Has the legislation which has been approved so far by the People's Assembly given the green light in this area?

[Bufi] I would say that the green light is turned on but we cannot say that the legislation is complete. It still needs to be completed, especially in regard to the subject of taxes, the stipulation of profits which the state receives from these firms and also the security which foreign firms investing in Albania should have. One of the main obstacles, at least for Italian firms and also for other countries, is the lack of backing from the banks and their security institutes in Albania. Up to now, they have not had any backing. So, they have come, they have had discussions, and they have signed contracts, but without any financial backing, investments cannot be made. Now, in accordance with the most recent agreement which we signed in Rome, there will be financial backing and, therefore, it will be fully possible for private Italian firms to invest in Albania.

We have oriented the interest of foreign firms in investing in Albania in two main directions: first, to involve all our natural resources and riches; second, to

open up new jobs. You are aware that this is very important for the execution of reform because, first of all, we still have some unemployed and, secondly, the need for opening up new jobs will arise with the beginning of the reform. We will combine the law on social assistance with the opening up of new jobs, so that the pain of the reform will be less.

The projects which will provide new jobs are of interest. These include the construction of highways—Italian firms have prepared the study and design of the North-South highway and they are also preparing the new design for the East-West highway. Designs and agreements for beginning the reconstruction of the port of Durres, designs for resuming the reconstruction of the railroad, several tourism projects, as well as construction materials, food industry, and light industry projects.

[Gurashi] Please excuse me for interrupting you, Mr. Prime Minister, to say that workers are worried about how they will be paid. For example, you say that work on the highway will provide new jobs, but how will wages be paid by foreign firms? I say this because across from the television studio we have an Italian company which is taking care of the construction of the new Italian embassy. We note, with satisfaction, for the first time, that workers are working and the firm pays them 100 new leks a day for the time that they work.

[Bufi] What you have noted is correct and this will be happening at all construction sites and projects. At another time we said that when the reform begins, the existing system of fees will be eliminated and everything, from the wages of a minister to the wages of an ordinary worker, will be stipulated in a table. Only the wage fund

will continue to be centralized and with the financial resources which the enterprises will have, they will have the power to set wages as a result of an agreement with the trade unions, on the basis of economic effectiveness, and without such an incentive, the interests of the people cannot be stimulated to find the jobs which are most suitable for them.

[Gurashi] In the final analysis, this is the barrier which can be put up against the exodus, is it not?

[Bufi] It is essential and urgent, I might say, that along with ensuring that there is food, we also provide new jobs, as soon as possible. It is a serious commitment of the government to ensure that these construction projects begin as soon as possible in Albania. I am confident that this will be possible, with the agreements which we are making and with the climate which is being created in Albania for beginning the reform. You must realize that it is very important that the people feel the climate of reform, that is, they cannot stay home and read the paper all day and receive 80 percent of their pay. We are committed to examining possibilities by providing raw materials to eliminate the previous decision, the 80 percent one, because it is a decision which has asphyxiated the economy excessively. It has put everyone in a position of rest, in a position of a perpetual guarantee from the state, while not working. Such a situation is unacceptable under the conditions of reform.

[Gurashi] Mr. Prime Minister, I thank you in the name of the television viewers.

[Bufi] I thank you and I thought it was necessary that I have this talk to inform all our public opinion.

MDF Cultural Chief Kulin on Media Debate

91CH0939A Budapest VILAG in Hungarian 4 Sep 91
pp 6-7

[Interview with Ferenc Kulin, cultural expert of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and head of the National Assembly's cultural committee, by Bela Kerekes; place and date not given: "Interview With Ferenc Kulin"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Kerekes] Last week you made an unscheduled address to the National Assembly's plenary meeting, once again taking a stand on the issue of appointing vice presidents for Hungarian Radio and Television. As evident from your pronouncements, you take a strong personal interest in the outcome of this debate.

[Kulin] Just to avoid any misunderstanding, let me state that this fervor is not rooted in some kind of fanaticism. It is not that I decided to see to it that certain persons are appointed to these posts at all costs. What is behind the debate is one of the most crucial constitutional issues of the fledgling Hungarian democracy, namely that of unequivocally defining the competence of the president, the prime minister, and the relevant legislative committee. The two parties [the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)] entered an agreement, with certain elements of that agreement finding their way into the constitution, while others were left out. The fundamental problem is that the agreement behind the constitution, i.e. the intent which contributed to these modifying regulations, is no longer in effect. There would be no need to become entangled by legalistic interpretation, if governing and opposition parties could reach a consensus in parliamentary committees. But they cannot, because their antipathies prove to be stronger than their desire to reach an agreement. Suspicion and fear of the other's hidden intention are too powerful to overcome and create a consensus on practical issues. I am among the relatively moderate members of the democratic forum, yet I find that even my most straightforward and open initiatives bounce off members of the opposition. Probably because they are distrustful.

[Kerekes] Even though they have no reason to be ?

[Kulin] Of course not. Their initial position is that the government wants to control the radio and the television at all costs. They do not believe that MDF's policies are aimed at making these two media nonpartisan.

[Kerekes] What may have contributed to this distrust was the incident when you, acting behind the scenes, suggested to Miklos Haraszti that there should be an MDF and an SZDSZ partisan manager at the Television. I emphasize the fact that this was done behind the scenes.

[Kulin] The way I evaluated the situation at the beginning was this: The Television could be made nonpartisan

by locating an individual acceptable to all, who moreover would be considered incorruptible, and entrust the management of Television to his care. Soon we had to realize, however, that there was no such an individual. So I suggested that we declare that one of the managers would be pro-government, the other pro-opposition; but declare also that these are the only two kinds we can choose from. That was when I suggested to Haraszti that we should first arrive at an agreement among the parties. The next day he made that suggestion public. I had to realize that they [the SZDSZ] would not accept my suggestion, just as I could not accept theirs, which said that all nominations be made publicly. In my view, the liberalism of the SZDSZ on this issue is a doctrinaire liberalism: In questions of this nature, when we must take the personal rights of potential nominees into consideration, it is indeed proper to exclude the public during the initial period. We, deputies, were not elected in order to perform all phases of our work before cameras, but to give account of all of our decisions.

[Kerekes] Forgive me for this notion, but it appears to me that, in addition to wishing to teach at the university, there is a certain amount of passion driving you, reminiscent of Attila Jozsef [Hungarian poet, 1905-37].

[Kulin] It would be conceited of me to use such expressions. Undoubtedly, I cannot rid myself of a teaching tendency, even though I was always opposed to teachers. What I saw before me was never the curriculum and a group of young people that had to be educated; rather, I tried to share intellectual experiences with others, free of any didactic prescriptions. If they had inspectors at the university, it is doubtful that I would have retained my teaching post. Thus, even though I admire Attila Jozsef greatly, I must reject the notion that I wish to teach my people. I do not wish to teach them. I have only one aspiration: to stimulate the interest of others around me in things that I consider important. I can only exist in this somewhat inspired spiritual state.

Hungarian Satellite TV To Reach Minorities

91CH0938A Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian
27 Aug 91 p 6

[Article by Peter Jozsa including interview with Gabor Jasz, an electrical engineer who heads the technological development section at the Hungarian Program Broadcasting Enterprise; place and date not given: "Hungarian TV Program—For All of Europe"]

[Text] According to an announcement of Dr. Balazs Horvath, minister without portfolio in the Hungarian cabinet, made in Tirgu Mures [Marosvasarhely], at the second congress of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania—late this year, but not later than next year, programs of the Hungarian Television will reach Transylvania, Carpatho-Ukraine, and the Banat region. Hungary will make every effort to establish the legal and technological conditions for this as soon as possible.

At last, residents in the Szekely counties of Transylvania, the cities of Osijek [Eszek] or Nagybanya could utter a sigh of relief! The announcement brings the dream of decades closer to realization. Soon we will see the end of the romantic period, when thousands traveled from Cluj [Kolozsvár] to Banffyhunyard (where one could still receive Hungarian TV broadcast), in order to watch a soccer match. No longer will one have to drive to the Feleki plateau and wait there with a battery-operated TV set in order to catch the start of the "Panorama" program. At the same time, programs of the Hungarian TV will also reach those regions of Hungary where reception has been traditionally poor.

These are no great phrases, but the message has historical significance. Hungarians have arrived at the state of affairs that have been guaranteed by the closing documents of the [1975] Helsinki Agreement: the free flow of opinions and information. Aided by satellite relay, Hungarian TV will not only contribute to information about Hungary, and is important not only to Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin; it can broadcast its programs in the major world languages as well as the languages of Hungary's ethnic minorities.

[Jozsa] What do experts have to say about all this?

[Jasz] We take the pragmatic approach. We have been working on the problem for months now; recently we have received some bids from abroad, and we requested the ministry to support our research trips abroad. We feel that the best solution is for us to rent an entire satellite channel. Such a channel contains four to six bands, which means that, in addition to broadcasting our television programs, we could also relay those of the Kossuth, Petofi, and Bartok radio stations.

[Jozsa] What is the best offer, and how much would it cost?

[Jasz] We have preselected two of them: One of them is TELECOM II, which is a French state enterprise, the other is EUTELSAT. We consider the second to be the better choice. Not only because it belongs to an international, intergovernmental satellite communication

agency, but also because it better satisfies the three basic requirements. These are: good reception, favorable prices, and the use of a system that works well with existing European norms. The annual leasing fee, if we sign a three-year contract, is about 350 million forints. To be paid in hard currency, of course. We would also have to create conditions for the ground transmitting station, which would cost an additional five million dollars. But if a decision is made, Hungarian programs could be seen and heard throughout Europe.

[Jozsa] If that is the case, then the cost is not so great. There are several resources that could be mobilized for such a goal; perhaps even Hungarians living in the West would support such an undertaking. What are the conditions for receiving the programs?

[Jasz] The same as required by all other systems in use today. To obtain good reception in the Szekely region, for example, one would need a 1.5-1.8 meter diameter parabolic antenna, along with the requisite peripherals.

[Jozsa] In what used to be East Germany, plain-clothes investigators walked around the communities, and when they saw an antenna directed toward a Western station, they not only forced its owner to disconnect it, but fined the "ideologically ill-prepared" citizen. Could the same thing happen to antennas [in other countries] trained to receive Hungarian programs?

[Jasz] Not at all, because in the case of the EUTELSAT, for example, several satellites are located in the same position. In addition to the Hungarian one, nine other programs could be received from the same direction; among them the SatL, the 3 Sat, the SuperChannel, the TV5, or the EuroSport. And in time, obviously, there will be others.

[Jozsa] The frequency moratorium announced by Hungarian authorities does not apply here?

[Jasz] No, because we would broadcast our programs on frequencies that are already occupied. Permission is required for the operation of ground relay stations. However, if this causes any problems, we can operate such relays from one of the neighboring countries: Austria, for example; this is not prescribed.

Election Scenarios, Chances of Coalitions Viewed

92EP0014A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 38,
21 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by Adam Krzeminski and Wieslaw Wladyka:
"What Next After the Elections? A Great Coalition or
Small Interests"]

[Text] The election campaign is gathering speed slowly. The parties and miniparties have their fifteen minutes on television, and the publicity directors of each party are racking their brains to think how to ensure that the audience remembers their candidates. Not the program, but image and gesture, a bon mot and cockiness before the camera, are important. Let us nevertheless try to figure out what these elections are all about: What is the political context of our parliamentary elections, held both too late and too early at the same time. Too late, because the "war on top" has undermined the authority of the Sejm, the Senate, and any body one could choose, to the degree that, according to polls, the majority of society is searching for "authoritarian" institutions, if not for "uniformed" institutions (the Church, army, and police), longing for clear and orderly structures. Too early, because economic reform is at such a juncture when its virtues—strong currency, the end of a deficit economy—are equally strong as its faults—decline in production, unemployment, the crash of agriculture.

Submitting economic reform, at this moment, to what amounts to a referendum, for or against Balcerowicz's policies, could annihilate the foundations of a market economy and "real capitalism" which have been constructed, and push us onto the no-man's land of a thoroughly unclear "third way," a way which would be limited to printing money, stuffing the throats of groups and factories that scream the loudest for subsidies. This road has a sad end—a return to the economic state of two years ago—and would destroy the international prestige of the Polish reforms.

This is the general dilemma before the elections, in which some three dozen mini parties, with mostly anonymous leaders, will take part. If, however, Poland's basic dilemmas six weeks before the elections can be reduced to the basic question—yes or no to economic reform—then maybe it is possible also to bunch our parties, the "Polish flowers," into bouquets, so that the situation becomes clearer, not only in the future Sejm, but also as regards strategy for the near future. Let us then attempt to bunch together that which matches according to general attitudes toward reform. Then it will turn out that the situation is clearer than it seems; and the influence of voters, by means of choosing one or another orientation, will turn out to be real and significant. A great deal really does depend on these elections; this is why it is unfortunate that a great segment of society may not realize this, and may simply boycott the elections, while among those who do go to vote, many will decide based on his or her wallet, or on fear of the unknown.

The Return of Solidarity?

First, there is the question whether there is some power in Poland which can concentrate a some part of the dispersed and quarreling groups by appealing to their common political background, ideology, and common vision of government reforms. After the announcement in Sejm of a motion to dismiss Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's government, Adam Michnik wrote in *GAZETA WYBORCZA* that the breakup of the Solidarity fraction is irreversible, and that we are witnesses of the end of Solidarity. This view is logical, if we look at the processes which have taken place in Solidarity since 1989: the rise of the Center Accord; the war on top; the resignation of Mazowiecki government. But, on the other hand, cannot the opposite process be noticed today: the slow rapprochement of individual Solidarity fractions, to the point when forming a coalition of parties which come from Solidarity, like the Democratic Union, the Liberals, the Solidarity trade union, and the Center Accord, in the future Sejm, becomes a possibility.

The leaders of particular groups signalize such a readiness more often now; and the clear change of Center Accord language before the elections is a significant indicator. Let us pause at this hypothesis, and count the votes before the computers are turned on. What electoral potential can Tadeusz Mazowiecki, as the leader of Democratic Union; Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, as the leader of the liberals and the prime minister (befitting, as the head of government, from the so-called Kanzler-Bonus, meaning some natural privileges); the leader of Center Accord, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and others, count on today? We know that public opinion surveys are still not very dependable; that public moods can swing a few times before the 27th of October; that in foreign countries an error of 3 percent in prognosis turns all calculations of coalition upside down, and that, in our country, errors during the presidential elections reached 10 and more percent. But despite those facts, let us examine some basic variants.

The surveys say that the Democratic Union will keep Tadeusz Mazowiecki's electorate from the presidential election. Therefore it will have about 20 percent of the votes assured; this is supposed to make the biggest fraction in the parliament. The popularity of the prime minister, on the other hand, has raised the previously unknown party of liberals to the second position, among post-Solidarity groups, giving this party from 10 to 15 percent of the votes. Next, the Center Accord, as a party, brought Lech Walesa to the position of a president but in the spring of this year their popularity decreased from 5 to 9 percent. If we add to this coalition Solidarity as a trade union, which also participates in these elections; and if Krzaklewski could also obtain 10 percent, then the post-Solidarity groups could, not without difficulties, gain a majority in the parliament. The more so since there still stand in the wings tiny reserves of the "left," in the form of Labor Solidarity, Solidarity '80, the Polish Socialist Party; and on the right.... (No, on the right there

is no possibility that the nationalists would be inclined to cooperate or, what is more, that they would be accepted.)

The question remains, whether this political conditional arithmetic has any psychological or programmatic foundation at all; whether whose who spat on each other during the war on top will be able to sit at the same table during coalition talks. Can the programmatic populists from the Center Accord negotiate mutual "fundamental values" with the social-democratic wing of the Democratic Union, and with the liberals, who enforce a policy of strong currency? It seems that, despite the insults incurred in the near past, a real psychological rapprochement has already occurred; and also that a balancing of the reforms right after the elections should not be impossible, when it will be known who brings which electorate to the coalition talks. In this situation, that is, if Solidarity really wins the elections, we will have before us either the maintenance of the Bielecki government, or its modification, and the appointment of a new prime minister, continuing the reforms (the so-called second step), and retaining Poland's international prestige, both in Western financial circles and among our eastern and southern neighbors.

Antireform Opposition

Of course, it could turn out that these calculations are far too early; that the Solidarity coalition will not reach even 40 percent, or it will stop at about 50 percent; and it will face the problem of whether to try a minority government or to give up power and let happen what must happen (explosion of inflation, instability of the government), and eventually, to count on this, that in the next elections, society, exhausted and weak, will return to the reforms, this time in a worse economic situation and a worse international position? If the principle of trial and error has really replaced former ideological thinking, then such a solution is not excluded. Maybe society must painfully find out for itself that there is no other way. Maybe we have to give in to the shamans who promise golden mountains, and then we must be disappointed and return to the way of rational building of healthy economics through renunciation and social sacrifice. The point is that, in theory, responsibility for the future of our country and for the reforms would require that whole social groups must vote against their really not so exorbitant interests. In practice, however, an antireform coalition is clearly being formed. This includes, above all, Stanislaw Tyminski's Party X, the peasant parties, and all the dissatisfied who will vote for extreme right-wing parties which limit their program to two slogans: vote as a nationalist and as a Christian, no matter what it means; and those who will vote for left-wing parties like the All-Polish Trade Union Agreement (OPZZ). The common practice of throwing the Social-Democracy of the Polish Republic (SDRP) into the same pot together with Tyminski is for Cimoszewicz's and Kwasniewski's formation unjust, because in the present Sejm this party has many times proved its loyalty toward a government

which is not theirs. Nonetheless, its historical role, so it seems, is to sit on the penalty bench and civilize the opposition.

It does not seem that after the elections the (hypothetical) Solidarity coalition would be ready to invite the SDRP to complete the governing coalition. But because of the sense of responsibility for its genesis in the Polish People's Republic, and for the future of Poland, the SDRP, conscious of its contributions in the present Sejm and of the traditions of the Roundtable, can civilize and disarm the adventurous and populist tendencies in the future Sejm, not to mention almost fascist tendencies, which both the nationalists and the extremist shamans from Party X are inclined toward. But to do so, the SDRP must at least keep their 10-percent electorate and want to play a historical role in the future, which cannot only be taking care of orphans from the former Polish United Workers Party. Ten percent is very little, considering that the opposition groups can reach 50 percent. And if calculating the electorate of the post-Solidarity parties was risky, calculations of what results Party X, the peasant parties, or the whole right-wing minority will achieve, are nearly impossible. It does not seem that Party X can grab the whole inheritance after Tyminski. The winter success of the newcomer from Peru was a sign of belief in our only miracle worker, in "our millionaire" from America who would teach us how to make money. During the past months, neither Tyminski nor his party showed anything that would keep this myth alive.

It is then quite possible that the vast part of the Tyminski electorate will go to either a peasant party or to the OPZZ, or maybe to the Polish Party of Friends of Beer. In either case, even if the party will get half of that which its idol received, then it will still be a strong fraction, equal approximately to the SDRP and a peasant party. The remaining dozen or so percent of votes will probably go to the parliamentary minorities: the Christian-National Union, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, national minorities, Christian Democratic groups, the Democratic Party, etc.

A Short Breath

Our calculations are more a theoretical model than an algebraic equation, because there are more unknowns than accurate data. Nonetheless, it helps us to touch on the essence of the political dilemma, which is both a basis for the prime minister's proposal for special rights for a few months and a basis for the increasingly emphasized role of the president in directing the systemic reverse and the direction of reforms. The point is how to pass through the elections without derailing the Balcerowicz government and plans, even if the plans should be modified. Or how, while looking for support for further reforms in the new Sejm, and putting together a government which will be made of anything one can get, internally contradictory, handicapped, and not able to make decisions on its own—or somehow avoiding (conditionally and once only) a weak and divided Sejm—to create a presidential government, eventually even based

on a minority, to be able to get some time, at least a year, to push through further reforms, restructure and build the market economy. Some time—this could be half a year, maybe a year. Today one can hardly think about longer periods. Our politics for a long time will be characterized by a short breath; a race in time with material resistance, i. e. the inertia of state and economy structures and the habits of a society which does not want to give up the socialistic values of an overprotective state, and which does not immediately get in exchange the benefits of a Western country of prosperity.

During recent weeks, a lot was said about the danger from postcommunist forces, but they are not some hidden demons, not a make-believe conspiracy of the SDRP with the authors of the coup in the Soviet Union, but rather incomprehension of the spirit of reforms and the spirit of rights of a democratic constitution (which must only now be passed). So there is indeed homo sovieticus in all of us, controlled not by some demonic coup but by the habits of policy of drift and of ruling from the top. The reforms are not threatened by post-communists, but by lack of social acceptance of inequality, which is associated with social injustice and false egalitarianism.

One More Time

These elections, conducted at a bad time—too late and too early—will give us a certain clarity, and create a new psychological and political situation. First, they will end the demagogic, immeasurably dull, and unjust campaign against the Roundtable Sejm. The new Sejm will have a different mandate; if only a low voter turnout does not weaken it, or even call it into question. Extraparliamentary groups, and surely those centers of power which will have to quarrel with the parliament, will eagerly take propaganda advantage of this. And in general, it would not look too good if a Sejm chosen by a minority had to govern the majority—that indifferent, dissatisfied, rabid majority. The historical realities are such that only post-Solidarity structures will be able to continue the reforms. The others will not have the strength. At most, they can form an antireform force, taking advantage of the support of the growing army of dissatisfied.

By coincidence of past events and current conditions, the elections will be conducted in a way which will seem shady, if not offensive, to the average citizen. That citizen will have no chance of choosing wisely if he does not help himself by rejecting the chaff and the demagoguery. The elections to the Sejm come at a dangerous moment for Poland, when, as a result of the unsuccessful putsch in Moscow and the disintegration of the USSR, the attention of influential centers of opinion in the West has turned away from Poland toward Russia and the new states emerging from the USSR. After the elections, the international context will surely have, at first, little meaning for Poland; we will take care of our own affairs, and will be "provincialized," just like Ireland or Portugal. Then, however, it will turn out that we are not alone, that once again, in a new way, we live in limited

sovereignty, meaning that, in domestic politics, we will have to pay more attention to what our neighbors say about us, and how the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and—yes, even they—the new Soviet Union will see us, because our economic and political possibilities will to a large degree be the consequence of the West's program of aid for East Europe. Let us hope that that program is worked out quickly: Then our shamans of Independence, of Christian Loyalty to the People, of inflationary Social Justice, and of all the other slogans covered by the slogan "Balcerowicz must go" will turn out to be what they are: demagogic eyewash. However, in order to give ourselves a chance with the outside, we must reveal our internal energy as a society that knows what politics is for. Proof of this will be voter turnout: the higher it is, the more credible will be state policy. And proof will also be in whether a political formation, even if a coalition, that is capable of taking power and continuing the reforms, emerges from the elections.

Role of Senate in Democracy Debated

92EP0013B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
16 Sep 91 p 3

[Interview with Andrzej Stelmachowski, marshal of the Senate, by Jan Forowicz; place and date not given: "The Senate in Polish Parliamentary Democracy"]

[Text] From the viewpoint of the political system in particular, the most important package of laws brought up in the Senate concerned regional self-government, according to what Prof. Andrzej Stelmachowski, marshal of the Senate, told RZECZPOSPOLITA.

[Stelmachowski] We have also submitted a few legislative initiatives aimed at squaring accounts with the past. For example, our chamber of parliament instigated the drafting of a law to revoke sentences from the Stalinist period. The senators also presented a draft law aimed against *nomenklatura* groups. Some of these laws were transitional in nature. They performed their task to at least a certain extent. Finally, the Senate tried to create legal solutions to regulate the spheres of medicine and agriculture. The laws affecting the way medical treatment is organized have already passed through the Sejm's working stage and been returned to the Senate. For the moment the other drafts are "resting" in the Sejm.

Part of society considers some of the initiatives to be controversial. One example is the draft law on the protection of the unborn. I would treat this as an attempt to fight for certain humanitarian principles.

[Forowicz] Although the Senate as actually produced over a dozen legislative initiatives, it is generally equated with just one law, the antiabortion measure, which met with such resistance.

[Stelmachowski] In Catholic society our initiative was regarded as consistent with the moral sense of most

citizens. The 1956 law permitting abortion, let us recall, thrust on the Polish nation models which were foreign to it. This is the reason for our determination in the struggle for a different legal regulation.

[Forowicz] How do you know that this was the feeling of the majority? After all, the abortion issue has probably been more divisive in society than any other matter recently discussed.

[Stelmachowski] Let's not exaggerate. Besides, remember that a departure from principles, especially moral ones, is not the best way out. Protection of the human right to life is a major item in this catalog, and it is our duty, regardless of whether certain groups like it or not.

[Forowicz] Judgments also varied concerning attempts to use Senate resolutions to influence the course of foreign policy. What sort of resolutions, Marshal Stelmachowski, do you consider the most valuable today and which do you consider to be less successful?

[Stelmachowski] Resolutions on restoring diplomatic relations with Israel would be the first positive example. The government was very much afraid of the reaction from Arab countries, so the matter was thoroughly discussed in a Senate committee and then became the subject of a whole series of talks with the ambassadors of Arab states to sound them out. In receiving these visits I came to realize that the protests would be rather formal in nature, making it possible to move to carry out the plan to establish diplomatic relations.

Last year's Senate debate on Eastern policy was also very significant. This discussion unfortunately did not find a sufficiently resounding echo in society, but it had very strong repercussions abroad. Its intent was to change our relations with the Soviet Union. As a result, the government took up several issues that have not been resolved yet, such as removing units of the Soviet Army from our territory.

[Forowicz] Some commentators, especially those of the postcommunist press, have said that this Senate debate did more harm than good and that it resulted in a deterioration of trade relations with the USSR.

[Stelmachowski] There were other reasons for the deterioration in economic relations: the transition to the new system of clearings of accounts and the crisis in the USSR, combined with the exhaustion of reserves of those currencies.

[Forowicz] Wouldn't it have been better for the Senate to have limited itself at the time to chiefly legislative activities?

[Stelmachowski] This would not have been the proper tactic. I think that we did far better sometimes risking public opinion by attaching significance to unpopular issues. For example, condemning the "Vistula" drive brought about a lot of protest, but we did not think we would ever see any improvement in Polish-Ukrainian

relations unless we explained the causes and circumstances underlying these events and made a moral assessment of them.

[Forowicz] It is possible to come away with the impression that sometimes a spontaneous desire to emphasize convictions becomes more important than political realism....

[Stelmachowski] I think that a certain dose of morality should be maintained in politics. Parliaments should take the floor in cases where human rights are violated and come out in favor of just regulation of relations between nations.

[Forowicz] Are you not bothered by a sense of unfulfilled hopes placed in these initiatives? The local self-government system is not doing very well. There has been no drastic squaring of accounts with the past. The *nomenklatura* groups are doing quite well for themselves. One might ask whether this was to have been the outcome of the Senators' efforts.

[Stelmachowski] I think that in responding to such a question I should mention the most important aspect of the entire matter, the fact that democracy is only a group of instruments turned over to society, and it is society that either makes use of them or does not make use of them.... I am very fearful over the future use of the instruments of democracy. Most dangerous, in my judgment, is inadequate supervision of the institutions of democracy. And of the parliament, too! This supervision is as indispensable as the air we breathe.

This notion also applies to the local self-government body. Our sense of carrying out legislative duties would surely be greater if some sort of influential organizations of the public actually exerted supervision over gmina councils, their mayors, and so on.

[Forowicz] Speaking of parliament, you keep going back to the question of society's degree of commitment. Does this imply that the results of the work of present and future members of parliament are a function of the political development of society?

[Stelmachowski] Certainly, but we cannot foresee the rate of this development. The upcoming elections could be a lottery. This will be sort of a jump into the darkness, but we cannot avoid it, because otherwise we will never learn democracy.

[Forowicz] But within the lawmaker's soul is there no anger at the executive branch for unfulfilled hopes, if only, as in the case of the construction of the local self-government system, over the policy of excessive fiscalism, which has made it so difficult for gmina officials to get started.

[Stelmachowski] The senators considered it their duty to support the noncommunist government. In difficult situations people said: Let us allow him to introduce the reforms. Let us permit the premier to implement his own view of the future, but in many instances we had a

different view of the order and nature of the solutions applied. We have long been in disagreement over the agricultural policy that has been waged, for example. We expressed this fact in the resolution on the economic program for 1991. Unfortunately, agriculture did not proposed either a good program or a good implementor. Successive governments do not understand agriculture and do not accord it its proper function in economic life.

The Senate, therefore, pointed out that the government's directions in economic policy for the current year were overlooking the problems of agriculture, that there was barely half a sentence about agriculture in more than a dozen typewritten pages. Despite this fact, among the electorate I am seen as being jointly responsible for farm policy, but, at the same time, what is happening runs counter to what I would wish.... These are the dramas of members of parliament.

[Forowicz] Since we are already talking about the electorate and elections: The Senate has the reputation of being a chamber that works in close cooperation with President Lech Walesa. It proved this during the period of discussions over electoral law.

[Stelmachowski] We supported the Sejm, because we were aware of having gone to great effort to prepare an electoral law that was imperfect and was the result of compromises during the initial stage. We were pressed for time, after all. The situation changed after a presidential veto was announced. Elements of political struggle appeared between and Sejm majority and the president.

I think that many senators were disinclined to become involved in this sort of political struggle with the president. On the other hand, I think that they noticed that a battle had actually begun over the shape of the future constitution. These disputes revealed evidence of attempts to weaken the executive branch, and the senators felt this trend was dangerous from the viewpoint of our country's future.

Therefore, one should not view the relations between the president and the Senate in any way other than in categories of understanding what Lech Walesa is about. The president also tried to correct the electoral law, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the executive branch in the event that the electoral system gave an advantage to minor parties and led to a minutely divided Sejm.

[Forowicz] In most laws that are passed, though, the Sejm and the Senate engage in fruitful cooperation with one another. We can cite a rather typical example in a presidential project reviewed in the Sejm on extending the period for filing claims for repayment of improper benefits gained at the expense of the national Treasury. The "contract" Sejm ratified this law a year ago, with the clear support of deputies in the postcommunist groups. It was linked to the Senate bill entitled "Appropriating National Assets." Now these same forces, without hesitation, are promising to support an amendment, and

they are even proposing to extend the deadline for filing these claims beyond the president's limit.

[Stelmachowski] What I have said by no means implies that things have reached such a serious crisis that the government cannot function. No, it is functioning, and it is a good thing that everything still takes place within the confines of the law. On the other hand, in certain situations our position has differed from that of the Sejm deputies.... The Sejm and the Senate have come to agree even on very controversial matters. A good example is the exceptionally important law on political parties. The senators amended just about every article, and the deputies accepted the overwhelming majority of the changes.

In contacts between the Sejm and the Senate, the sparks most often fly when the two chambers review questions of jurisdiction in the laws. This happened recently, for example, in amending the regulations on the civil rights advocate, a bill that is basically neutral politically.

[Forowicz] The Senate is considered to be an oasis for long-windedness. There is a great deal of talk when most laws are examined. Marshal Stelmachowski, don't you have any way to exert greater discipline over the senators' statements from the floor?

[Stelmachowski] The Senate is far less garrulous than the Sejm. Please look at the plans for plenary sessions. We review more issues than the Sejm deputies and take less time doing it, but insofar as there is sometimes a lack of discipline in the discussion, that we sometimes become garrulous.... That is true. I have spoken with colleagues from other countries about unnecessary parliamentary oratory. I asked them: "What do you do about this?" According to the responses, there is no cure for this disease.

In chairing the deliberations, I have often had a different problem. Some senators taking the floor while the deliberations were being telecast pay more attention to the television more than to the matter at hand. But as time has passed the situation has corrected itself, and I have noticed that telecasting has mobilized the senators to formulate issues in a very concise way.

[Forowicz] The Senate has been restored in Poland after several decades of nonexistence, which means that it is practically starting out in many areas. Has the Senate made any interesting interparliamentary contacts?

[Stelmachowski] We have had a very great many official and unofficial contacts. Most of them have been through the intermediary of the Interparliamentary Union. We have often attended meetings in this forum with members of the Sejm. The parliamentary clubs have set up some very interesting meetings with foreign guests. The OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club], for example, has frequently invited members of parliaments from the so-called democratic movements in the USSR. I am convinced that maintaining free contacts with advocates of reform in the Soviet Union can be very important in

determining what future relations with the nations of the USSR will be like. I think—I keep repeating this—that we have neglected diplomatic cooperation with our neighbor to the east.

External political institutions finance three-quarters of senators' trips. They do not set any conditions, except for what are fortunately a very few demands that are sometimes quite awkward, for example, that the delegation consist solely of members that were freely elected at the polls, that is, senators alone.

But we should have numerous contacts not only with representatives of societies in economically developed countries but also with those from less wealthy nations, including countries outside Europe, if only so as not to make our policy and trade dependent upon a single group of countries. The parliament can participate in taking soundings of policy directions, but it must be very careful not to invade the realm of the executive branch. There should be just one foreign policy.

In the political struggle the argument of the costs of maintaining the Senate came up. They really are not great, and the modern electronic computer equipment that makes some people's eyes pop out is a gift of the U.S. Senate. Some things also come as the result of cooperation.

[Forowicz] The Senate also consists of offices and agencies to help the lawmakers.

[Stelmachowski] I consider the Center for International Studies, created at the initiative of Vice Marshal Andrzej Wielowieyski, to be one of the most important. This is a modest structure in terms of the personnel it has, but it has taken on some great experts. It has prepared very many valuable study materials used by others as well as the senators. It has sometimes proved useful to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, too. Several of its employees have transferred to the diplomatic service.

The Senate's Intervention Office has achieved very great successes. It receives a tremendous number of letters. This probably happens because the corresponding units created in other institutions to handle the complaints of simple people are not functioning efficiently enough. The office has filled the gap very actively, to the extent that I had to make it more moderate in this.

[Forowicz] In the course of this two-year term of office, has the Senate come to evolve its own personality yet, inasmuch as it is the chamber that after half a century had to reconstruct its appearance nearly from the beginning?

[Stelmachowski] The bicameral system of parliament serves democracy very well, especially in countries entering the phase of construction. The two chambers should be elected in different ways. In our country, the Senate tries to even out the imbalances that appeared in the Sejm after the elections favoring the great urban and industrial centers. The manner in which senators are

elected is sort of a way to give the voivodships an equal voice, regardless of their demographic and economic composition. The perpetually dominated minority here has a certain influence on the course of government affairs. Second, our chamber's nature has been very clearly delineated as the parliament's special court of second resort. There is no question that the Senate greatly enhanced the quality of the legislative process in the Polish parliament during the term that commenced after the elections on 4 June 1989.

August Economic Indicators Discussed

Unemployment Statistics

92EP0020A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 11 Sep 91 p III

[Article by A.K.: "Unemployment in August: Enterprises Announce Layoffs"]

[Text] As GUS [Main Office of Statistics] data suggests, the number of the unemployed in August increased by 101,100 persons, or 5.9 percent, compared to July, and it comes to 1,854,000 registered unemployed. This means that unemployment as the percentage of the total gainfully employed comes to 9.8 percent.

The highest rate of growth of unemployment was registered in the following voivodships: Czestochowa, Krakow, Bielsko Biala, Wroclaw, Radom, Skierniewice, Koszalin, and Gdansk. The following voivodships had the highest rate of unemployment, just as the month before—16.4 percent in Suwalki Voivodship, 15.9 percent in Olsztyn Voivodship, and 15.4 percent in Ciechanow Voivodship. In Jelenia Gora, Koszalin, and Lodz Voivodships, this statistic exceeded 15 percent, and in Ostroleka Voivodship, it was 14.5 percent.

The rate of unemployment continued to be the lowest in the following voivodships: Capital City Warsaw—3.6 percent, Krakow—5 percent, Poznan and Katowice—slightly over 5 percent, and Wroclaw—6.1 percent.

The number of unemployed graduates of schools above the elementary level came to 223,500 by the end of August. This means that there were 19,600 more of them than in July. This represents an increase of 9.6 percent. In total, graduates account for 12.1 percent of all registered unemployed.

Statistics concerning job offers filed by enterprises changed little. Compared to July, only 2,500 vacant jobs were added in August. On the average, there were 36 registered unemployed per one job offer in the country as a whole. Women have the hardest time getting a job—there are as many as 71 of them for one job offer. There are 23 men per one job offer. In many localities, no offers by enterprises have been filed with the job service for several months.

In August, 37,000 unemployed began working, or 1.9 percent more than in July.

Data from the enterprises indicate that personnel shifts, which will have a significant impact on the rate of unemployment in the immediate future, are still underway. In August, 4,200 enterprises announced group layoffs, which will affect a total of about 239,000 employees.

Industry, Prices, Trade

92EP0020B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 12 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by Piotr Aleksandrowicz: "Main Office of Statistics on the Economy in August: Recession Continues; Prices and Currency Are Under Control"]

[Text] As expected, no major changes occurred in the economy in August. As data released by the Main Office of Statistics on Wednesday indicates, industrial and construction output, as well as remunerations in the basic sectors of the economy, were approximately at the level they were in July. Exports declined somewhat, but the balance of trade improved nonetheless. The money supply insignificantly outpaced the growth of prices, which was small. Details follow.

Industry

Proceeds from the sale of products and services in industry were 0.5 percent smaller than in July and 21.9 percent smaller than in August of last year. However, insignificant growth of 0.2 percent compared to July of this year was registered in the processing industrial. Product sales increased in the fuel and power industry (by 4.2 percent), the lumber and paper industry (by 4.6 percent), light industry (by 4.1 percent), and machine building (by 0.2 percent). In turn, product sales declined in, among others, the mining industry (by 8.5 percent), metallurgical industry (by 7.7 percent), and chemical industry (by 5.7 percent).

Construction

Proceeds from the sales of basic products by construction and assembly enterprises were 0.3 percent smaller than in July of last year and 1.6 percent smaller than in August of last year. Eighty-three hundred apartments were commissioned, or 1,100 fewer than in August of last year and 1,500 fewer than in July of this year.

Enterprise Finance

The bulletin contains data for seven months. It suggests that the financial situation of enterprises continues to be very difficult in extensive segments of the economy. Gross profitability in seven months amounted to 6.4 percent, whereas the profit margin, or after-tax net financial performance, was negative and amounted to minus 1 zloty per 1,000 zlotys of proceeds in the economy.

Among others, the fuel and power industry, the iron and steel industry, the transportation vehicle industry, the

electrical products and electronic industry, the construction materials industry, the textile industry, and railway transportation operated at a loss. The financial situation of the chemical industry, nonferrous metallurgy, food processing, construction, trade, and enterprises of communal economy was the best.

Prices

According to the GUS, prices for industrial products were 1.3 percent higher in August than in July of this year and 41.1 percent higher than a year ago. Prices for construction work increased by 1.6 percent and 40.7 percent respectively.

Retail prices for goods and consumer services increased by about 2 percent in August, according to estimates by the Ministry of Finance. GUS data will be made available in several days. These prices are currently about 70 percent higher than a year ago.

Remunerations and Incomes

According to the GUS, the average remuneration in the six basic sectors of the economy came to 1,802,100 zlotys and was 0.3 percent lower than in July. Therefore, real wages dropped in August by more than 2 percent, but in July they increased by about 5 percent.

In August, the average wage in industry came to 1,794,000 zlotys—in the processing industry, to 1,670,000 zlotys, and in the mining industry to 2,619,000 zlotys. Average wages came to 1,963,000 zlotys in construction, 1,789,000 zlotys in transportation, 1,551,000 zlotys in communications, 1,621,000 zlotys in domestic trade, and 1,956,000 zlotys in the communal economy.

According to the preliminary data of the National Bank of Poland, incomes received by citizens from the establishments and enterprises of the socialized sector increased by 0.7 percent in August, whereas the payment of wages was 1.8 percent lower than in July. The payment of social welfare benefits remains at the July level. There was a seasonal increase of the farmers' income received from socialized consumers (by 18.8 percent) as well as the profits of the private sector (by 4.1 percent). A total of 52.6 trillion zlotys were put at the disposal of the citizens.

According to the National Bank of Poland, the citizens spent 46.8 trillion zlotys out of this, or 1.5 percent less than in July. The money supply increased by 5.8 trillion zlotys, including 4.0 trillion zlotys in savings and 1.8 billion zlotys in cash.

Currency

As reported by the GUS, the total money supply in August increased by 3.3 percent compared to July. The domestic currency supply increased by 4.2 percent. Therefore, the money supply increased by 1 to 2 percent in real terms. A graph which we publish below [not reproduced here] shows that the overall money supply

has been increasing in real terms virtually since March and April. However, a drop in January and February was so pronounced that the national money supply in real terms increased by only several percent counting from the beginning of the year. The total money supply in real terms continues to be somewhat lower than on 31 December of last year. This is certainly in line with the reduced domestic product.

According to the GUS, debt by virtue of loans to the economy and to the population increased by 2.9 percent in August. Therefore, the growth of the supply of credit was lower than the supply of domestic currency. This means that credit for the government sector, including for the state budget, undoubtedly continued to grow rapidly. Assuming that no significant changes occurred in foreign currency reserves, it may be estimated that net credit to the state budget increased by 4 to 5 trillion zlotys. In general, the currency still remained under control whereas the deficit of the government sector deteriorated. The need to finance this deficit markedly restricted opportunities for providing credit to the economy.

Foreign Trade

The positive balance of trade in convertible currencies came to \$116 million in August. However, this occurred due to a significant drop in imports while the export performance weakened somewhat. In recent months, exports and imports were as follows (million):

	Exports	Imports
May	\$1,211	\$1,060
June	\$1,165	\$ 969
July	\$1,045	\$1,046
August	\$ 974	\$ 858

To be sure, the level of currency reserves to date is undoubtedly maintained due to a positive balance of trade. However, the declining turnover of foreign trade promotes unfavorable trends.

Minister Optimistic on Prognosis for Farmers

92EP0716A Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
31 Aug-1 Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with Adam Tanski, minister of agriculture and food industries, by Halina Dowda; place and date not given: "Shouts Will Not Replace Support"]

[Text] [Dowda] Ministers of agriculture do not have an easy life. You are not the first minister to have his honor attacked. Once you said that belief in what you are doing makes you impervious to attacks. Belief is a doubtful criterion for evaluating success in agriculture policy.

[Tanski] Belief in the correctness of what I am doing has remained, but that does not mean that I do not at times feel the general depression reigning in the agricultural

community. In spite of what the public hears it is not the aggressiveness and the shouts of the representatives of the farmers that is dominating the countryside but depression and fear for the future.

I do not deny that these are hard times for the farmers. That is a fact. I take no satisfaction in the fact that I warned everyone. I did not promise that these would be easy, simple times; on the contrary, I said that these would be difficult times. However, the belief in what I am doing does not relieve me of self-evaluation.

The limitations that the minister of agriculture, every minister, encounters are immense. These limitations derive mainly from the already existing economic situation. There are, however, also difficulties deriving from the current economic policy. Breaking its general principles, however, threatens disharmony, which cannot be allowed. On the other hand, ongoing corrections in the policy that take the specific nature of agriculture into account are possible and necessary. An example is the customs duty.

[Dowda] That is a valuable admission. But are you not beating your breast for others' sins? The minister of agriculture is not in charge of foreign trade policy, and, as experience shows, he does not even decide within his own garden patch. And the farmers are paying for the import madness. It is one of the causes of frustration, for the loss of the sense of work in agriculture.

[Tanski] The imports about which we know cannot be called madness. For example, the imports of meat and slaughter animals during the first six months were only a few percentage points of domestic production. To be sure, the situation is difficult, but not hopeless, I explain to the farmers during meetings. Hope is a prerequisite for getting out of this depression. I do not hide things; I attempt to create hope.

[Dowda] Have you gained the enchanted rose?

[Tanski] Near the end of this year and in the next, the conditions for agriculture should improve.

[Dowda] Is that pre-election propaganda? Are you a candidate for the Sejm or the Senate?

[Tanski] None of these things. The prediction is based on several factors. First, the surplus of agriculture production is not permanent. It is a market phenomenon and will disappear. The balance of wheat will be decisive. The harvest, although predictions of disaster did not come true, will be about a million tons less than in 1990. Second, the foreign gifts have ended. Last year, they amounted to about 2 million tons of wheat. Third, the number of head of hogs is higher than in 1990, and the consumption of wheat must be increased. All this indicates that demand for wheat will increase and with it the price.

The question is: Will the market prediction be taken up by the State Grain Elevators and will it influence their behavior?

[Dowda] There is even a technical name for this action of price predictions on the market. A method known to West European farmers, tested in Poland in 1991. With meager results so far.

[Tanski] One has to start some time, otherwise we will not test its effectiveness. If there is to be a market economy, it cannot be manually controlled. And that is still being demanded of us.

[Dowda] Deputy Bugaj convincingly summarized the controversy over control. Between the extremes of the communist and liberal systems, he said, there are intermediate solutions that should be sought. It was as if a new tone was introduced when you announced a readiness to begin talks with the farmers' unions. There has been little readiness to understand the arguments of the other side and an flexibility in the government-farmer talks to date. The Sejm debate has also been called a wailing wall for the farmers. On the government side, one sensed a wall, even a fortification.

[Tanski] The lack of flexibility is not a strength but a weakness. But I cannot say that I am inflexible. For example, take minimum prices. The farmers' unions are demanding that minimum prices for several of the most important products be established. In our opinion, that is a return to the past and contradicts market rules. But we offered something else for consideration. What is expected of minimum prices? First, that the prices will guarantee a profit; second, that they will tell farmers what to produce. We are open and ready to talks about this second function. Thus, price predictions: The Agency for Agricultural Marketing announced predicted prices, in other words, indicative ones.

[Dowda] Even the name is the same, the union of farmers' circles announces indicative prices for wheat, slaughter animals, and milk each quarter.

[Tanski] Their method for setting them is unacceptable; the starting point is the cost of production. It must be the price; prices are determined by supply and demand. The elements of the system are predicted prices, intervention prices, and intervention purchases. Intervention purchases could play the role of guaranteeing a profit. And they could stimulate appropriate behavior by the parties in the market. The profit function of the proposed system depends on the financial condition of the Agency for Agricultural Marketing, in other words, of the state.

[Dowda] What is the reaction of the farmers' unions?

[Tanski] I do not accuse anyone of ill will. But in this area there has been no dialogue. As for my side, there was good will.

[Dowda] What caused the talks to be renewed only in the middle of the harvest? Both unions sent letters proposing talks to the prime minister and to the president.

[Tanski] The ministry prepared answers in their name.

[Dowda] They did not reach their addressees.

[Tanski] My attempt to begin talks with the unions was incorrectly understood. I was accused of wanting to divide responsibility for purchases. That was not the point; I want dialogue. I proposed working groups be formed.

[Dowda] Was the initiative not belated?

[Tanski] If the talks are joined with the harvest, they were belated. But I emphasize: That is not the point. There is a new economic year in front of us. The minister can change, but the problems will remain. I hope that talks begin. It is important that both unions want to talk.

[Dowda] There are already three representative unions; the branch unions have become independent. And there are the unions of the state farm workers.

[Tanski] And all of them together do not form an agriculture lobby, understood in the positive sense. Agriculture and forestry are special sectors of the economy that need particular solutions. In spite of the noise from various farmer groups, there is no pressure group of importance that has a plan. I am unhappy with some of the deputies on the Agriculture Commission—not for attacking me, but because they have not gathered other deputies around themselves. They have not created an agriculture lobby in the parliament. But again I emphasize, I am not interested in industrial favoritism. I am thinking of a lobby which is a group of people with influence on the course of events and who also understand the problems of agriculture. That will make it possible to conduct a dialogue against the background of the entire economy and in effect to construct a solution. It is not difficult to attack; we need mutual understanding and later to gain support.

[Dowda] A note of unhappiness? Successive governments have not been converted to agriculture, even after the order changed. Blindness, doctrinaire views? Agriculture saved Balcerowicz's program last year.

[Tanski] Here the unhappiness is not central. I think that everyone of good will, and I do not doubt the majority of my opponents are of good will, should make an effort toward mutual understanding. That is a prerequisite for developing a joint, compromise solution. Compromise is unavoidable. The 2.5-percent decline in total agricultural production forecast for this year confirms the tremendous adaptability of agriculture. It also shows the farmers' ability; they are able to manage even in extreme conditions.

[Dowda] How much self-support remains? The government draws erroneous conclusions from the farmers' behavior. The claim that since they are managing this well, change is dangerous. Some foresee that in the fall the farmers will begin to reduce the wheat planting.

[Tanski] I do not believe it; farmers behave like typical entrepreneurs; they want to produce.

[Dowda] But they want to know what to produce in order to be able to sell it. And the minister responds: We are not prepared to predict production.

[Tanski] That is true. A free market of 18 months is a not a basis for predictions. For example, supplies of milk and curd cheese declined by about 30 percent, but consumption a few percent. That is data from the family budget. The imports do not explain such a disproportion. Was there so much waste or was there so much used for animal feed? Nevertheless, we are making a global prediction for the new economic year.

[Dowda] Farmers themselves, however, must decide and bear the risk.

[Tanski] Farmers need particulars and not global predictions. What and how much to produce must be decided in the immediate surroundings of the farmers and not in the ministry.

[Dowda] You believe in the only proper agricultural policy. I long ago ceased believing in infallibility. As part of the only proper policy, restructuring agriculture has been announced and then loans for agriculture which are still not available.

[Tanski] They are included in the new, realistic budget. They will be preference loans given according to definite criteria.

[Dowda] They were to be an alternative for those farmers who want to resign from their farm. They are still a myth but are already "armored." In the EEC, the restructuring of agriculture was done during a period of prosperity and not during a recession. There was talk that other countries would help and that the EEC would end the illusions of agriculture.

[Tanski] The partners from the EEC do not want to hear our proposals on liberalizing the agricultural market, but negotiations are continuing.

[Dowda] It was experts from, among other places, the EEC in "An Agricultural Strategy for Poland," who discovered the so-called Eastern market for Polish food. Was it attributed to them by chance?

[Tanski] The agriculture policy of the EEC has produced a surplus of food. Since they have problems with sales, they defend themselves from competing Polish food. They did not have to discover the Eastern market for us; we know that for us it is a very important market. But they would be willing to help in transforming agriculture.

[Dowda] Reportedly they are prepared to pay for land excluded from production.

[Tanski] Until now, the agriculture negotiations have focused on liberalizing trade. Earlier there were declarations on help in restructuring agriculture. When differences concerning trade appeared, it became necessary to more closely scrutinize the proposal for help.

[Dowda] In the "Strategy," there is one dangerous assumption: that Polish agriculture produces too little food and thus imports are necessary.

[Tanski] Agriculture will be under market pressure. Consumers will force the scale of production. Now it is difficult, but this period of strong market disorder will pass. We cannot agree to a reduction in agricultural production as the price for help in transforming agriculture.

[Dowda] Then it is better to trade with Gorbachev?

[Tanski] Trade must be separated from politics. I hope that the declaration of intent to sell will change into a contract for the export of wheat and meat.

[Dowda] If the minister only hopes, then what is left for farmers?

[Tanski] That is not just a hope, which I have tried to indicate. There are realistic grounds that justify a careful optimism.

[Dowda] Thank you for your comments.

[Box, p 2]

Adam Tanski (age 45), minister of agriculture and food industries. An economist by training, by profession a financial expert specializing in agriculture. He came to the Ministry of Agriculture from the Finance Ministry; in the middle of 1990, he became deputy minister of agriculture.

Glemp Stresses Church's Apolitical Role

92EP0013A Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY
in Polish No 37, 15 Sep 91 p 3

[Interview with Jozef Cardinal Glemp, primate of Poland, by Zygmunt Rola in Gniezno; date not given: "Whatever Is Good and Polish"]

[Text] [Rola] Cardinal, you are the 80th archbishop of Gniezno, the 12th archbishop of Warsaw, and the 56th primate of Poland. Ten years ago taking over the Gniezno Archdiocese and the highest office of the Catholic Church in Poland, Your Eminence, you were able to draw inspiration from a tradition going back 1,000 years. What inspiration gave you the greatest strength in the days of September 1981?

[Glemp] The past is so rich that I am really unable to make a choice. I am wearing the cross of Mieczyslaw Cardinal Ledochowski, so my thoughts often carry me back to the period of Kulturkampf, to those experiences of the church which at that time, during the years of the partitions, freed itself from the administrative dependency imposed upon it. Historical analogies are always defective, but at the beginning of the 1980's there was a situation of resurgence just like in those times a century or more ago, and the actions of Polish primates had a

part then too. I thought then about Mieczyslaw Ledochowski, about the times of Archbishop Leon Przyluski, or, still before that, Bishop Michal Dunin. Their fate after all is brought to mind by the lives of cardinals closer to our own times, August Hlond and Stefan Wyszynski, including being imprisoned by the authorities of the day. But I also thought about the times of the Uprising of Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) on the threshold of the second period of independence and about what Greater Poland had achieved beforehand and afterward. We went through a very difficult period then, just as we did 10 years ago.

[Rola] What sort of hopes did Your Eminence have when you welcomed the outpouring of the aspirations for freedom at the beginning of the 1980's?

[Glemp] I had hopes of gaining that full independence that was being borne by patriotic Solidarity, which at the time had been expanded, but we were aware that what Solidarity represented would face tremendous odds blocking the way to the time of freedom, which we are now enjoying 10 years later.

[Rola] Your Eminence came out of the circle of people working most closely with Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, primate of the millennium. Didn't Cardinal Wyszynski's personality stand in the way of your making a place for yourself at the beginning of your own path?

[Glemp] Cardinal Wyszynski, unfortunately, left just when our road to freedom was beginning. Times changed. My relationship with the Great Precursor is very personal and warm. I learned a great deal from him: to look at the church, at the new Poland that was coming into being, at how to defend the issues of the country and the church. Cardinal Wyszynski was and is for us all a very rich model, as confirmed not only by his teaching but also by his attitude towards life. He knew how to forgive everyone. He managed to rise above his own sufferings, which were many. The greatness of this man therefore helped me, and he himself, when he left, believed that his successor would lead the church into new times. I therefore understood from the beginning that we all needed to have a sense of the changing circumstances, remaining faithful to the teaching of the church and the 1,000 years of our Polish tradition. In times of distress and affliction, and not only joy. Of course, we had to give up some of the methods of ministry we had been employing at the time, but the spirit remained the same. So there is not much of an analogy between our work today and the actions taken by Cardinal Hlond. I think about the Second Plenary Synod, about the eucharistic congresses, and about the rich, new form of the Holy Father's pilgrimages. All this comes out of a different social situation today and at the same time is tied in with it.

[Rola] Your Eminence has been one of Poland's major political leaders ever since you first became primate of

Poland. What sort of dangers did Your Eminence see just then, at the beginning, for the changes that were occurring?

[Glemp] In those days I was a person completely new to those areas I had to take over. I counted on the views of the council of bishops, which had rich experience consisting of the total experience of the various bishops. My attitude at that time came out of extremely varied circumstances. I realized that moments of great testing hung over our Polish fate. This awareness made it necessary to take unpopular steps. It was necessary to take a stand on the young people's strike and then on martial law. From the outset I was convinced that it would create a temporary situation, although a painful one, that the nation must live through calmly.

[Rola] This is the same sort of assessment as the one Your Eminence formulated in your first public address, after martial law was announced, 13 December 1981...

[Glemp] I have never considered myself to be a politician, and I do not feel competent to conduct political analyses, but from a pastoral point of view and from the standpoint of the gospel that I serve, I judge reality not in terms of immediate success but with a view to the service that the church owes the nation. I would like my position at the time that martial law was imposed and also later in other difficult situations to be understood and assessed in just this way.

[Rola] In a publication entitled "Jaruzelski," recently issued in Polish, West German historian Manfred E. Berger recently wrote: "In the West people often fail to understand that during martial law there were two opposing parties waging a battle to uphold Polish identity and maintain national independence."

[Glemp] Naturally, there has been tremendous evolution in the party's ways of thinking in the recent years of its existence. General Wojciech Jaruzelski was its spokesman, who tried to restore the national tradition. Changes in the mentality of many party members became more and more evident, but these changes were accompanied by the realization that although the socialist system lost its balance, it will endure, if it turns toward the society. I am not familiar with Mr. Berger's publications, but if he noted a patriotic current in the party, he was correct. This is proved by the discussions at the time, accounts of which you can find in the Polish press from those years.

[Rola] Your Eminence met with Wojciech Jaruzelski both before the martial law was announced, while it was in effect, and after it was revoked, also receiving him in Gniezno. How did that meeting come about, here in the cradle of the Polish church?

[Glemp] I extended the invitation at the time. I have no intention here of analyzing the very interesting changes in the personality of the general, whom I hold in esteem for his patriotism (despite the fact that this patriotism is of the communist variety), for his sensitivity to moral

problems, and for his sincere, very profound interest in the future of Poland, originating from Christian models with which his family surrounded him during his youth. I also esteem his attributes as a military man and respect him for the direction he gave the evolution in party ideology as the head of the party. I think that some sort of spiritual needs came into play in his acceptance of my invitation, as well certainly as memories from his youth, because the first time he came here was before World War II. I think that these same motives directed his steps to Jasna Gora. Of course, the general did not come either to Gniezno or to Jasna Gora out of devotion or for religious purposes.

[Rola] Looking over collections of the oldest manuscripts and incunabula at the Archdiocesan Archives, he said here in Gniezno that in this place he felt he could almost make tangible, physical contact with the roots of the Poles.

[Glomp] Yes, that was actually an expression of returning to the nation, to its traditions.

[Rola] But Wojciech Jaruzelski was and probably is today an advocate of the constitutional separation of the church and the state, but this position comes as nothing of a surprise to the church. Ledochowski, whom Your Eminence mentioned, one of the great primates, presented a similar position far away in Bogota, as apostolic delegate...

[Glomp] The times were different then. The doctrine of separation of church and state was not so called yet. It was unknown. It later came into being and evolved. After all, the strong definitions derive from the French Constitution of 1905, and it was only Lenin that made them prominent. I think that the term "separation" is awkward and confusing. When you speak about separation, you think about isolation, opposites. Today the idea of the autonomy of the ecclesiastical and secular sectors, their independence, and the tendency towards mutual interaction and cooperation has the most advocates.

[Rola] What threat then does Your Eminence consider the most dangerous for human freedom today in Poland?

[Glomp] What is threatening for a person today, what distresses a person, is the stirring up of thoughts and attitudes, having another person's own point of view foisted on one, people's desire to force their own political rationale on others. We notice this in parliamentary disputes, for example. The people in the circles of the old regime who were brought up according to totalitarian traditions and still think in the old way are undoubtedly a threat to freedom. They are unable to make a break with these traditions, and even if they bandy about words of democracy and equality, you can hear restrictions in the subtext stemming from the system under which they were brought up that did not work. Economic mistakes, we notice, are a threat to human freedom too,

though, this poverty which is arising out of the economic recession. A poor person cannot be entirely free. Freedom must ultimately have some relationship to objective truth.

[Rola] Could expansion of institutions of ministry in the secular environment also become dangerous? A chaplain was recently established in the national police with the standing of ministerial adviser...

[Glomp] If physicians, teachers, and scouts have their chaplains, then the faithful in the police can have it too. After all, this does not mean a chaplain is situated in police structures. Anyone who wants to can go to the chaplain, and nobody in the police that is not a believer needs to go to him.

[Rola] Does Your Eminence think that the program of building a modern liberal society in Poland can also be dangerous? Could it become a danger for the church too, as has happened in Western countries?

[Glomp] We certainly want to build a free society in Poland, and this means the possibility of the nation's realizing its deepest aspirations for itself. Poles who did not accept the Soviet model do not want the French or German model, for example, either. We can continue our own traditions, so we will fight the intentions that ideologues of various political minorities have announced to deprive us of our own national characteristics, which would help create a society and state using foreign models.

[Rola] We do not have to "parrot" the nations?

[Glomp] That is right. Let us try to emphasize and enhance everything in our country that is good, that is original, that is Polish. We do not need to duplicate foreign models or make the mistakes of other nations.

[Photo Caption, p 3]

In the July poll entitled "Social Approval of Activity in Public Life" conducted by CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center], Jozef Cardinal Glomp received the greatest acceptance rating from the persons questioned, 69 percent, 1 point ahead of Prof. Ewa Letowska. According to the net approval index (the difference between the percentages of positive and negative ratings) the primate was in second place (48 percent) behind the civil rights advocate (59 percent). Of the 11 persons rated, only these two figures in public life increased their net approval ratings since the June poll, Glomp by 7 percent and Letowska by 6 percent (compared to 16 percent for L. Walesa, 15 percent for J.K. Bielecki, and 13 percent for L. Balcerowicz).

Last July, Cardinal Glomp, with a net approval rating of 83.6 percent, was surpassed only by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who had 83.9 percent.

Former Minister on Croatian Government Mistakes

92BA0018A Zagreb *GLOBUS* in Serbo-Croatian
13 Sep 91 p 43

[Article by Zdravko Mrcic, former Croatian foreign minister: "Six Cardinal Mistakes"]

[Text] When one speaks of Croatia's role in seeking a solution for Yugoslavia, without which there is no solution to the Croatian drama either, it must be said that the citizens of Croatia, regardless of social standing and orientation, doubt the correctness of the way in which the affairs of state are now being conducted. Several major strategic moves mistakenly made by the country's present leadership have undermined the people's confidence in the competent negotiation and favorable outcome of the negotiations to resolve the Yugoslav crisis.

In almost all the basic segments of political life an approach has been taken that has serious consequences. We can anticipate, then, that the outcome of the next parliamentary elections will differ considerably from the outcome of the elections in April and May 1990. The following should certainly be listed among the main shortcomings of Croatian political strategy:

1. An authentic democratic political process has still not taken root even among the Croatian population in Croatia. As a consequence of the election system—which still has not been altered—one political party with a minority of votes in the election achieved strong domination in the Croatian Assembly, such strong domination that it has compelled the other parties to operate outside the parliament, not among their own members, but with the population (by taking part in defense efforts, by organizing voluntary projects, through protest and prayer assemblies, and other activity, but without true political "fieldwork").

Politics has been restricted to the party in power, which even in its own ranks has not established a democratic political process, but what has been happening is very reminiscent of the way in which business was done in the party that used to be the only one. In the Assembly, a docile voting machine was in operation right up until the session this August when resistance of a majority even in the ruling party, which voted against the proposed cabinet, resulted in formation of the democratic unity government, whereby the ruling party in the parliament has de facto passed over into the opposition.

2. The Croatian leadership has made serious mistakes on a number of matters related to Yugoslavia: (a) lasting tolerance of the SFRY Presidency, although Serbia has three votes on it thanks to the provinces, which on the other hand it itself does not recognize; it allowed replacement of the Kosovo representative on the Presidency in spite of the rejection [original reads "acceptance"] of the Croatian representative to be president; further concessions were made (observers were not sent into Croatia) in order to get the president elected, although it would

have been wiser to leave the Presidency paralyzed, when already—as we always knew, and was later confirmed—the Army was taking orders only from itself anyway; (b) the attitude toward the so-called reform program of the FEC [Federal Executive Council] which made it manifest that Croatia lacked a clear economic strategy; (c) the prolonged consent to participation in the Federal Assembly, with its Federal Chamber, which extended its own tenure twice; (d) the attitude toward the federal Army was full of loving hate, although since the first free elections and the breakup of the Croatian territorial defense there was no reason to doubt the true intentions of the generals, among whom the top military leadership had, and it seems still has, favorable treatment; in many cases, Croatian military personnel would lead the Army to the initial offensive positions; (e) the new government was not successful in supporting Kosovo even as much as was done before the free elections by the government of the Democratic Reform Party [SDP] (League of Communists); Kosovo fell with a whisper under the impact of the emergency measures, although the violation of human rights was for a long time the only comparative value which the Croatian Government had over the Serbian Government; (f) even before the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] the attitude toward B-H revealed a number of unclear aspects which have greatly clouded Croat-Muslim relations; the meeting in Karadjordjevo was followed by an escalation of Serbian aggression, which, beginning with the action in Plitvice, combined the activity of terrorists and federal military units in the capture of Croatian territory; (g) at a certain point, the discrepancy between the Croatian and Slovene strategies almost resulted in international recognition of Slovenia, with the danger that Croatia would remain in a truncated Yugoslavia, although our external allies were constantly demanding that the two republics coordinate their approach and actions.

3. Croatia's problems and interests were not properly defined, presented, and discussed with European and world political leaders and politicians. From the beginning of the new government, when the orientation was for foreign affairs to be conducted through emigre lobbyist organizations (such as the Croatian-American Association) or HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] officials in the emigre community up to the present time, when the call to the West is almost exclusively that it recognize the sovereignty and independence of Croatia, Croatian foreign policy has not been oriented toward seeking allies and toward reconciling Croatia's moves in Yugoslavia with what would be agreed on with the foreign partners. Croatia has not been helping its external allies to help it, and least of all has it contributed to this by virtue of the clarity of its position toward those issues related to Yugoslavia. Croatia has emphasized excessively the historical aspect of the crisis in Yugoslavia, and has done little to emphasize the mutual interest of Croatia and the principal political factors interested in the situation in the Balkans. The outside world will do for Croatia only what it can and what is in its interest. (It is sufficient illustration of this to mention

that Austria does not want Yugoslavia on its borders and that Albania has a vital interest in recognition of Kosovo as a republic.) Nor has the choice of certain people for positions of leadership in many foreign offices of the Republic of Croatia helped to advance Croatian interests with external forces.

4. The attitude toward the Catholic Church—which they have attempted to use, first of all, by using religious services in the media and attempts to turn religious services [original reads “orders”] and religious celebrations into political or party happenings—has also revealed a lack of respect for the contribution of the church (and other religious communities), particularly its moral and social teaching and activity, to cultural, economic, and political development, and particularly to the very maintenance of the Croatian people. A great deal of work and money both by the religious population and the clergy have been invested in the creation, work, and prosperity of Croatian Catholic missions in the emigre community for those missions to allow themselves to be put at the service of short-term political interests. “Render unto God what is God’s, render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s!” It is up to the emperors themselves, with the taxes that they collect, to resolve the affairs of state and political and economic issues themselves. In good times, it is well for the church to remain in the background, so that—as has been the case over 45 years since the war—in bad times it can go into the front line of the struggle to maintain the nationality.

5. The position and strategy toward the Croatian emigre community, which truly has been and remains an integral part of the Croat people, have displayed an intention to politicize relations between “homeland” and “emigre” Croatia. The basis of this relation ought to be common roots, patriotism, and family ties, not an uncertain political trend. One group of new activists has truly tried to privatize that relation. The attempt to unify cultural societies that have sprung up spontaneously has often pursued the purpose of imposing party tutelage on a very worthwhile popular movement.

6. The position toward the citizenry of Serbian nationality in Croatia did not assume that the posture of that part of the population has crucial importance both to Croatia and to Yugoslavia. The neglect or even trivializing of the Serbian minority in Croatia, a segment which has always known how to collaborate with Croatia’s rulers or occupiers (Vienna, Pest, the Mlets, prewar Belgrade, fascist Italy, the postwar party) behind the backs of the Croats, has brought water to the mill of those forces to which one would have liked to put a stop. The elected member of the Serbs from Croatia was not a member of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], but nevertheless the “Serbian” post of vice president of the Croatian Assembly was assigned to the SDS, not to the SDP. (We know how that offer backfired.) Printed matter on parchment and silk—which had no real constructive impact and which originated in certain declarations mistakenly made during the election campaign, along with the unsatisfactory representation of real,

experienced, and proven democrats in the top leadership of the state—gave provocateurs an opportunity to initiate a process which resulted not in marginalization of the militant, fifth-column, minority among the Serbian population in Croatia, but a weakening of the influence of the integrated majority within the Serbian population.

Instead of creating a climate of trust in the new government among all people in Croatia, which would have blocked any lasting tendencies that could have created a deep chasm between the Serbian and Croatian populations, a climate was created which facilitated a successful postelection campaign on behalf of confrontation of a large segment of the rural Serb population.

The Croatian leadership hoped that the issue of the Serbs in Croatia could be resolved by negotiations with Belgrade. All that was needed for a new arrangement of the Croatian state was simply to win over the Serbs in Croatia. Did not the man who recently more than any other Croat has opposed Belgrade imperialism, and that successfully, get the great majority of Serbian votes in the last elections? The question of a minority in any country can be resolved only by creating total democracy and by building a civil society based on the rule of law.

That is why there are quite a few Croats who anxiously await and follow the European conference on Yugoslavia, lacking conviction that there will not be wrong moves and decisions in that crucial process, which is the real internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis.

Nevertheless, the greatest shortcoming of the Croatian approach to the Yugoslav crisis can be seen in the lack of a true political initiative on the Croatian side to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. There have been only two worthwhile initiatives. The first was praiseworthy, although a bit late, the inter-Yugoslav initiative that came this March whereby talks began among the six republic presidents. It was ruined, unfortunately, by wrong moves, when on the eve of the first meeting in Split an attempt was made to work out a position with Serbia instead of with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second initiative, the international initiative, was called the “Rudolf Plan,” but once again, unfortunately, it was neglected and then forgotten.

A private initiative to preserve Yugoslavia, which foresees international recognition of the republics, but which is unacceptable to Croatia, because, first, it does not envisage individual, but group (Yugoslav) membership in the United Nations, and second, in spite of establishment of a military force on the basis of territorial defense (similar to Gorbachev’s later concept set forth after the unsuccessful coup in the Soviet Union), envisages that air and missile forces would be under “joint” command, has recently been circulating unofficially. In general, it would have to be said that that initiative is unacceptable, because it still insists on preserving some kind of Yugoslavia.

Because Croatia cannot expect to find and work out a solution for itself alone, but must seek a solution for the

entire Yugoslav crisis at the same time, we feel it would be worthwhile to adopt this plan, which includes the following:

1. simultaneous international recognition of all the republics making up the SFRY and seeking recognition;
2. establishment of peace, withdrawal of the aggressor behind the present internal borders, and complete disarmament of illegal local formations, which would be done under the effective surveillance and compulsion of the European Community;
3. regulation of relations with the newly recognized republics by means of temporary missions, but without establishment of diplomatic relations, is possible until mutual relations of the new states are regulated on the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Charter;
4. financial and other aid would at first be extended only to care for refugees and those who have been driven out and for their prompt return to their homes, as well as to solve the urgent problems caused by the devastation of war and for the country's necessary renewal;
5. organization of a conference of the newly recognized states under the sponsorship and supervision of the European Community, at which a peaceful division of Yugoslavia would take place by agreement, the balance sheet for the division would be drawn up, and war damages would be agreed to;
6. the immediate holding of parliamentary elections which would make it possible to ascertain the will of the citizens under the new political conditions, especially created by the aggression against Croatia;
7. leave any possible reassociation completely to the states that have been recognized and have gained their independence.

The advantages of this plan are as follows:

1. immediate establishment of peace and commencement of renewal of the economy;
2. time is gained necessary for the European Community to arrive at a consensus in its own ranks;
3. the independence of the new states in regulating their own affairs, whereby the federal Army, which represents the main obstacle to rapid resolution of the crisis in Yugoslavia, would be dissolved, especially through the issuance of separate currencies and in the absence of financing of the "joint needs" of Yugoslavia;
4. the absence of immediate establishment of diplomatic relations and extension of true economic aid would make it possible for effective pressure to be exerted to bring all the negotiating parties to accept regulation of relations on the basis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Charter.

The plan solves the burning problems, especially those caused by the war, but, because independence is guaranteed, sufficient time is left for a fundamental and peaceful resolution of all issues which have been neglected in the search for rapid solutions involving deals that do not go to the heart of the matter, but those issues will impose themselves sooner rather than later. The Croatian question has now pushed into the foreground, because the Serbian imperialists—and we know the fate of any imperialism, from that of Rome to that of Hitler and Stalin—have been trying to hastily cover up the Kosovo issue by subjugating Croatia and then all of Yugoslavia, which again, as it once was for Tito, could remain a protected reserve or interzone, for matters in which neither East nor West would meddle.

The basic problem of the Balkans, in the hope that no one will be able to revive a dead Yugoslavia, not even in the form of an "alliance of states"—there can, after all, be better associations of countries!—will be Kosovo and Bosnia if a fundamental and permanent solution is not found now. Time and the difficulties which it will bring will be the only factor that will erode the obstinacy of those who have thought that a policy of the *fait accompli*, assuming sufficient cunning, will prevail over respect for the right to human life by one's own measure and capabilities. Europe, which expects partnership from Islam, not a confrontation, will know how to take the opportunity to enrich itself with the Islamic approach to life through a people which will live in Europe in full political independence.

That same political independence must certainly be won for Croatia as well.

HDZ, City Leaders Blamed for Baranja Occupation

*91BA1152A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
10 Sep 91 pp 18-19*

[Article by Zoran Batusic including interview with Dr. Rudolf Emert, former president of Beli Manastir Opština; place and date not given: "Occupation of Croatia: Baranja Fell With a Whisper"]

[Text] When at one time Vojislav Seselj and Milan Paroski, singing in unison about an expanded Serbia at a Chetnik rendezvous in the Baranja village Jagodnjak, concluded that Baranja is "ancient Serbian land," that "no one, not even the Hungarians, may conduct archeological excavations here, because as soon as they dig up the land, they will come upon Serbian remains," that the Croats are "newcomers and Ustashi who have taken away other people's boundaries and are to be killed like mad dogs along the fence," the Croatian public shuttered, but it did not take the danger of the threat seriously enough. It seemed that this was just another contribution to the study of Serbian megalomania, paranoia, and Chetnik folklore.

When Baranja fell some 20 days ago with a whisper, the Croatian public shuttered again, became concerned, but

once again it does not seem to have taken seriously enough the dangerous nature of the situation and all the implications that follow from it. It is not completely clear to the population (except in Slavonia) what is actually happening in Baranja at this moment; a historical and legitimate mindset prevails (what are they doing, Baranja belongs to us!), and the occupation is viewed as something momentary, something that could not last long.

Under the Serbian Constitution

But what we have in Baranja is not just an occupation: Baranja is the first example of Serbia conducting the outright "accession" or Anschluss of a part of Croatian territory. The power of the minority Serb population, established by military bayonets, also issued its first "legal orders." To the effect that "the statutes of the Republic of Croatia have ceased to be valid on the territory of Baranja, and at the same time only the Constitution and legal statutes of the Republic of Serbia and the SFRY are recognized." An order was also adopted to confiscate movable and immovable property from enterprises headquartered on the territory of the so-called Republic of Croatia and Republic of Slovenia. "And, finally, the sinister culmination: "At the same time, the decision has been made to dissolve the employment relation and prohibit the return of all persons who took part on the side of the hostile forces or in their units and also persons who gave them support in whatsoever manner, together with members of their families."

Baranja is a region which for most of its history was under administration of neighboring Hungary. Its Slavic population (heirs to the Pannonians, similar to the Illyrians) were mainly assimilated after the Hungarians came in the ninth century; this ethnic pattern lasted up until the Turkish wars, when the entire region, at that time one of the Hungarian administrative divisions, was largely deserted. The Hapsburg reconquest in the 17th and 18th centuries also signified a resettlement of Baranja. It was colonized with Ikavian Catholic Croats from the vicinity of Srebrenice in Bosnia (1689-1713), and it was also colonized with Serbs during the Carnojevic resettlement. In the 1830's, it was also settled by Germans from Austria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and Bavaria. Along with the Hungarians, these peoples for a long time constituted the foundation of the Baranja ethnic mosaic.

The ethnic pattern of the population of Baranja as shown in the Austro-Hungarian population census in 1910 is also interesting and indicative. The Hungarians were the most numerous (let us not forget that this was a Hungarian administrative district at the time), they represented 40 percent; Germans were second most numerous with 27 percent, then came Croats at 19 percent, and finally were the Serbs, who represented only 12 percent. At the end of World War I, the Serbian army entered Vojvodina and Baranja. The Trianon peace, signed 4 June 1920, legitimized the collapse of the great St. Istvan Hungary, which lost the war along with Austria and

Germany. Vojvodina and Baranja (that is, that part of it which is within our borders today—that is, there exists the Hungarian part of Baranja) went to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The ethnic structure was disrupted, but not essentially—some of the Hungarians moved to Hungary, and Serbian "volunteers" and colonists from the interior moved into Baranja. Between the two wars, Baranja was administratively annexed to the Sabor "Srez" (utterly unnaturally, because no transportation connections over the Danube existed at all—Sabor had to be reached via Osijek, which took all of two days), but after 1929 it became itself a part of the Danube Banovina.

Slavs, but Which Ones

The wartime disintegration of the first Yugoslavia meant a Hungarian occupation for Baranja—at the end of 1941, it was annexed by the Hungarian state. The end of the war and the defeat of the Axis powers signified a return to the protection of the second Yugoslavia. A joint commission for demarcation of borders between the Republics of Croatia and Serbia was guided in that task, as Milovan Djilas, a member of it recently testified, by the ethnic principle—the essential criterion was which Slavic population had the majority in the particular area. In Baranja, the Croats were in the majority, and so that region fell to Croatia. The ethnic pattern of the non-Slav population has changed drastically—the communist persecution and genocide of Baranja Germans have resulted in the fact that they have almost disappeared from that area.

In the postwar period, new generations of Croatian inhabitants settled in Baranja, mainly from Zagorje and Medjimurje. The last population census, taken this year, shows the following situation: Among the some 55,000 inhabitants, Croats represent 42 percent, Serbs 25.5 percent, Hungarians 20 percent, while "others" represent some 20 different nationalities.

History and demography are one thing, and bloody reality is something else. Today, between 25,000 and 30,000 Croats and Hungarians (more than 50 percent of the total population) have fled or were driven from Baranja. Those who have remained have been subjected to the harshest terror—arrests, murders, robbery, and blowing up houses have been the order of the day. The fairgrounds in Vojvodina are overflowing with goods stolen from other people's houses and being sold for a song.

Did that kind of collective trauma have to occur? Did Baranja have to fall so easily? "No way!" is the categorical exclamation of Mr. Slavko Mestrovic, member of the Presidency of the HNS [Croatian People's Party]. "A large part of the responsibility for the present situation lies on the former opstina SDP [Democratic Reform Party] government. My Lord, what were they doing during that full year? No defensive preparations were conducted, they did not even dig any trenches. If they did not have enough weapons, they could at least have

attempted some kind of territorial defense. That would have meant a great deal psychologically to a terrified population. But when the defense did collapse, Mr. Emert, opstina president, should never have resigned. He could have fled to Osijek, but continued to be opstina president; this way, his resignation was like a surrender of authority to the army of Serbian expansionism and to the terrorists!"

The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] Seems To Be Sleeping

There certainly will be more debate on the question of responsibility for many actions. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to divide it between the structures in Beli Manastir Opstina and various "structures" in Zagreb. But what is disturbing at this point is the silence of the Croatian government concerning the situation in occupied Baranja. The first real case of violating state borders in postwar Europe and a situation in which the brutal aggressor (Serbia) has de facto annexed a part of Croatian territory, were not used for a diplomatic offensive abroad. From the military standpoint, a Baranja battalion was established to fight in the occupied area, but it seems not to have gone into action yet. The population has not been given official instructions how to behave toward the occupier. And all of this in a paradigmatic situation such as could (temporarily) happen to other parts of Croatian space as well.

In any case, it is high time that the government became seriously concerned. As it is, everything has fallen to the individual parties, which, although without exception they have wanted to operate through official institutions, sometimes have not been able for the simple reason that on questions of defense strategy and tactics and parrying the aggressor they have gone further than those same institutions. Thus, back on 26 August the HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance] issued a proclamation to citizens of Croatia in the occupied area in which, along with the conventional appeal for civil resistance and all forms of a boycott, it also called for armed resistance to the occupier, and it clearly defined any cooperation with the occupation forces as treason. The SDP is maintaining contacts with its members in Baranja and is working vigorously to organize various forms of opposition. According to Mr. Slavko Mestrovic, the HNS has already organized shock teams of three and five on the territory of Baranja which through armed combat and guerrilla tactics will destroy the occupier "wherever and whenever they come upon him." In answer to a direct question about whether he is maintaining contact with the membership in Baranja and whether any instructions whatsoever have been given for action, Slavko Degoricija told us that there had been no contacts whatsoever for 10 days or so and that there simply are no particular instructions to the membership in Baranja (we allow the possibility that such activity is actually being carried on by the Osijek HDZ, but obviously without knowledge of the headquarters in Zagreb).

It is clear that reconquering the occupied Croatian areas will be a bloody and lengthy process, and that regardless of the length or results of the peace conference in the Hague. But for that reason it is worthwhile to prepare all Croats and loyal citizens of Croatia in terms of politics, organization, military affairs, and psychology, and this is primarily the task of the Croatian government and its subordinate institutions. A stupid mistake by Skolska Knjiga in Zagreb, which in a fourth-grade textbook for the course "Nature and Society" published a map of the Republic of Croatia that did not include Baranja, can serve here as an admonitory reminder.

[Box, p 19]

Dr. Rudolf Emert: Against Tanks With Bound Hands

Dr. Rudolf Emert is a business executive and former president of Beli Manastir Opstina. At the height of the terrorist attacks, he submitted his resignation from that office and fled to an area under control of Croatian authorities.

[Batusic] Mr. Emert, can you tell us briefly what the situation was in Baranja during the period that preceded the occupation?

[Emert] The SDP took power in the democratic elections in Baranja. We formed an opstina assembly of 140 members, and, although some of the members changed parties during that first one-year term of ours, the SDP remained the most numerous. A sizable number, about 50, were independent candidates, while the other parties had fewer representatives. On several occasions, we debated the political situation and adopted three resolutions, and in each of them the opstina assembly declared that Baranja is an integral part of Croatia and that any attempt to change borders threatens civil war. We appealed for life together, which all the deputies supported, and emphasized that there are no reasons in Baranja for any nationality to speak about its being threatened or harrassed. We have taken pains to maintain ethnic parity in the bodies of government, and I say that the Serbian people in Baranja have no reason whatsoever to do what their extremists have now done. There was no activity by Serbian extremists in the opstina assembly; they mostly operated outside institutions. The political situation up to the last moment, I would say, until the tanks entered Baranja, was satisfactory, but after that it got steadily worse. They began mortar attacks on Croatian villages, terror set in and ended with the outright occupation. The handicap which we had was that under the new organization the opstina assembly did not have powers over forces of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], over the courts, the prosecutor's office, the health service, nor the secondary schools, all of that was vertically linked directly to the ministries, so that we thus in a way had our hands tied when it came to practical activity.

[Batusic] Does that mean that opstina structures were unable to do anything more significant in organizing Baranja's defense?

[Emert] In May, the tanks crossed into Baranja from Serbia. They took the bridge over the Danube, they deployed their units, and I think that Baranja was occupied even then. We had no effective weapons; there were no other units than the MUP regulars and reserves, there was no National Guard Corps [ZNG] in Baranja. It is a fact that the forces of the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] were so strong and superior that even with the greatest courage there is nothing that could have been done. The MUP simply had to withdraw from Beli Manastir so as not to repeat the case of Dalj; battles were waged near Mec and Bilje, but those forces were far, far too weak to overcome the occupying army. The observation that the Serbian extremists had "captured" Baranja is not valid, it was occupied by the Army. There was no real chance against its force, the judgment was that it was better to withdraw and organize than to expose the population to large-scale suffering without weapons or with weapons that can safely be referred to as out-of-date. We did not want a repetition of Dalj.

[Batusic] What has the situation been like in Baranja since the occupation?

[Emert] The Serbian extremists have been trying to take control of the situation by means of terror. They have been placing their people in enterprises, they have been drawing up lists of those who are "acceptable," there are large-scale firings. A certain "government" has been formed, exclusively of Serbs, they have been trying to organize some kind of life, they say they want Baranja to be "Yugoslav"; however, there is no life there for Hungarians and Croats, that is certain. The people who now hold power are hardly able to get the economy going. Livestock, processed meat products, wheat, flour, etc., are being shipped out of Belja. We still do not have verified reports about shipping out entire plants.

[Batusic] Is Baranja completely cut off at the moment, or do you have contacts with people, with your members, who have remained there?

[Emert] We have everyday contacts which I would not speak about for security reasons. There are activities aimed at putting an end to this economic occupation of Baranja and returning it to the protection of the Republic of Croatia.

[Batusic] Do you have figures on how the referendum ended up in Baranja concerning the vote for a sovereign Republic of Croatia?

[Emert] The Republic of Croatia was favored by 66 percent of all registered voters, and more than 90 percent of those who voted voted "for," but most of the Serbian population boycotted the referendum.

[Batusic] The occupation authorities have forbidden your return?

[Emert] Yes. But I do not care about that. I do not want to go back to that kind of Baranja anyway.

Participation of Serbs in Croatian Assembly Urged

91BA1091A Zagreb VJESNIK (VJESNIK U SRIJEDU supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 91 pp 3, 4

[Interview with Zivko Juzbasic, member of the government of Croatia, by Drazen Jambrovic; place and date not given: "Dialogue for Hope"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] Minister Zivko Juzbasic, member of the government of the Republic of Croatia, member and representative of the government's cease-fire commission, was present at scenes of war, has stayed in Osijek, has been in Dalj, Sarvas, Bijelo Brdo, Okucani, has attended meetings of the commissions and the government. Minister Juzbasic believes in the need for the return of Serbian representatives to the Assembly and their active participation in the resolution of all problems, as he believes as well in the constitutional-legal regulation of the position and the rights of the Serbian people in Croatia.

[Jambrovic] From your first day of work in the government, you have also been partly involved at scenes of war. What did you hear, what did you see?

[Juzbasic] The government has been very operational since the first day. Several ministers, including me, went immediately to the theaters of operation. Our task was to see on the spot what is actually happening, to listen directly to people, and to attempt, with representatives of the Federal commission, to achieve a concrete and effective cease-fire. After three weeks of work on that task I must say, unfortunately, that the results were minimal, but through no fault of the Croatian side. Not only was an actual cease-fire not reached, but the clashes intensified and new fronts were opened on the imaginary line of "Greater Serbia." It can be said openly: A just war, which has not been announced, is being waged in Croatia. Croatia is defending itself, it is waging a defensive war, it is not seizing someone else's territory and it is not encroaching into other republics.

I will long remember the sad pictures of those rich villages in which Croats, Serbs, Hungarians and others lived as good neighbors until recently. And now life has stopped in those villages. The most visible example is the village of Sarvas. There is no one to harvest the rich crop, hungry cattle roam and wander off, the roofs on almost all the houses are filled with holes from machine gun shells and bomb fragments, and the fall rains will begin soon. Townspeople, in order to save their very lives, have left everything behind and fled in all directions, some to Hungary.

[Jambrovic] Were you in Dalj?

[Juzbasic] Of 6,500 inhabitants in Dalj, there were about 2,500 Croats, and the rest were Serbs and a few people of

other nationalities. Despite provocations that came from elsewhere, no one objectively threatened the Serbs there, all the more so because they accounted for the majority of the population. However, a real massacre was carried out against the innocent Croatian population, primarily by terrorists from other places—armed civilians. We won't learn the real truth about Dalj for a long time yet, especially since the blockade of the area has not yet been completely broken, so access to medical, veterinary, and other humanitarian teams is forbidden. Psychologists, sociologists, psychiatrists, and other experts will have to answer why and how this mass massacre could occur, a real human cataclysm in a place where everyone lived well and harmoniously until yesterday.

Can this be explained and how?

Time for a thorough investigation will be necessary for the genesis of this crime to be seen. Dalj will remain as an example of the unscrupulous manipulation of a part of the Serbian people in these areas for the realization of the territorial pretensions of today's Serbian leadership. This is confirmed by the fact that of the 2,500 Croats in Dalj, a little over 150 people remain today. And the majority of them want to leave. A similar situation is also occurring in other local circles. Therefore, many places are becoming ethnically pure Serbian settlements, as wanted by Milosevic's greater Serbian policy. Many years of destructive propaganda in all media collected its great bloody tribute here. However, unfortunately, the example of Dalj is not an isolated one. I thought as an old partisan that, with our national battle of liberation, we had eradicated war among our people forever.

[Jambrovic] War for borders, some new borders, how do you experience that?

[Juzbasic] In Europe, as nowhere else in the world except for some island nations, absolutely fair borders do not exist, but the people have sensibly agreed to accept existing borders the way they are and not to clash any more about it. Because, the borders in present-day Europe, especially after 1992, when a new united Europe is being created, will in fact be administrative borders, places of the blending and living in proximity of people who will conduct themselves according to uniform rules.

Because of this, the fact that official Serbia is seeking a change of the current borders among our republics, and that because of this blood is being spilled in Croatia, represents a unique anachronism unprecedented in today's Europe. These people who are altering borders and seizing others' territories neglect the fact that our country is not an isolated island in a sea. According to this, everything that happens in our country has a direct reflection on relationships in Europe. Because of its own security, Europe must internationalize the conflict in our country: everything aspect of it, including sending its forces of peace and the speedy organization of an international conference on Yugoslavia. Escalation of the

conflict demands urgent steps by the European Community, because every further delay can have serious consequences both for us and for peace in Europe.

[Jambrovic] The Army secured your departure for Dalj. What do you say about its role?

[Juzbasic] I saw tanks dug in and tanks in the grain fields of this pretty and rich region, with gun barrels aimed at Osijek and Croatian villages. This astounded me and I asked myself many times—why and for what reason is this? The Army, in whose creation and organization I participated for 20 years, has always been trained to defend the country from a foreign aggressor. I'm sorry that the leadership of the Army has not followed political changes in the country and in the world more flexibly and has not adapted in a timely fashion, but has taken a stubborn stand on positions of the old, out-dated system. Therefore, the Army has come into conflict with everyone in the country, more or less, except for Serbia and Montenegro. Under current conditions the Army should assure peaceful changes in the country, since the wheel of history cannot be stopped. And the latest changes in the USSR confirm that best. But the Army would carry out that mission best if it would pull back into its barracks as soon as possible (the Brioni declaration is seeking this) and if it would go out into the field only at the request of legal organs of the government. I must say that there were not such great clashes in Croatia, with many victims, until the Army began to intervene, since it is almost regularly on the Serbian side, which it is also arming. In Slavonia I saw that Army units are located only in Serbian villages or next to them. We submitted that complaint to the commission for a cease-fire of the Presidency of the SFRY. It was to be expected that Army units in crisis areas be located in Croatian villages as well. In this way they could check more easily, together with control groups, cease-fire violations and the continuous attributing of responsibility for the conflict by one side to the other.

[Jambrovic] Why is a cease-fire not being achieved despite all the resolutions?

[Juzbasic] And how can a cease-fire be achieved when that is not in the interest of those who began this filthy war for annexing other people's territories? In realizing their goal, terrorists are not choosy about the means. Pictures of the terrible massacre of innocent people have circulated throughout the world.

After three weeks of almost continuous inspections of various places in the crisis area in eastern and western Slavonia, we came to the conclusion that further cooperative work with the Federal cease-fire commission should be ended. That was actually a futile task with minimal results. The resolution of the Presidency of the SFRY on the cease-fire was never implemented in its entirety. Something about the exchange of prisoners was worked out and that has now stopped. Ending the blockade of villages and of trade, restoring economic exchanges, the return of refugees, the repair of many

damaged agricultural facilities and buildings, the beginning of a continuation in the schools, and many other matters are now stalled. All this due to the fact that no one has been responsible for the cease-fire, because there is no effective oversight. Many armed civilians on both sides have evaded all controls, are getting revenge, are waging their own little wars. And some commanders of Army units are operating on their own, not respecting the agreements. The Army says that it opens fire only when someone else shoots at them first, but all these acts actually resemble real revenge. All this makes a difficult situation still more so.

In all crisis and other places where a mixed Croatian and Serbian population lives, it would be necessary to establish peace councils which would resolve all disputed questions of defense and the end of blockades of villages, the gathering of the harvest, medical and veterinary care, the reopening of schools, etc. I am deeply convinced that these peace councils would bring about positive results and in this way peace and mutual trust would gradually return. People in villages can best help themselves through a common effort. This statement is confirmed by many examples of people's solidarity under unfortunate circumstances that I have seen in the field, where there were no national, religious or any other barriers. This is particularly true of indigenous populations. As a man I would be happiest when peace returns as soon as possible to these pretty and rich villages of our Slavonia and Baranja.

[Jambrovic] You spoke about an exchange of prisoners. How is that being carried out?

[Juzbasic] Up to now we have exchanged about 250 people throughout the whole area of Croatia. This is a small and insufficient number, since many innocent people, seized in their homes and fields, await an exchange. However, that whole matter has stopped, partly because of the fact that the government of the Republic of Croatia does not accept an exchange under the principle of "everyone for all." Another principle will be agreed on for the exchange. Those who were caught with weapons will be exchanged for those like them on the other side, and civilians for civilians. Even greater is the problem of refugees, whose number has already climbed to 120,000 and is increasing every day. The government is devoting increasingly greater attention to this, as are humanitarian organizations, but the assistance of foreign humanitarian organizations must also be sought.

[Jambrovic] You are a Serb in the Croatian government?

[Juzbasic] Yes, I am a Serb in the Croatian government on the nonparty list. For now the only Serb that is a member of the government. Unfortunately, for the first time since the war, Serbs in Croatia have not been represented in the government of Mr. Mesic and Mr. Manolic. The justification that this is a one-party government can withstand criticism with difficulty. This has largely been the thrust of Serbian extremists and

Milosevic's propaganda which have exploited to the maximum all errors and oversights of the new Croatian government. However, the Republic of Croatia now has a multiparty government of democratic unity; this is a new element. All parties and nonparty people who participate in the government have thereby assumed the direct responsibility for the fate of Croatia. My entrance into the government represents, how shall I say, a bridge for the return of Serbian representatives into the institutions of the Croatian government. This also means that the leadership of the Republic of Croatia is willing and prepared to agree, with representatives of the Serbian people in Croatia, on all modalities of a common life and on a proportionate presence of the Serbian people at all levels of the government, according to European standards and, if necessary, with international guarantees. Because of this, it would be necessary for the Serbian representatives to return to the Assembly as soon as possible and actively enter into the resolution of all problems in this difficult crisis, as would the constitutional-legal regulation of the position and rights of the Serbian people in Croatia.

[Jambrovic] Do you support, then, the talks and agreements?

[Juzbasic] I am a man who has always supported dialogue, since while there is dialogue, there is also hope for an escape from the crisis. The door for a dialogue must always be open. In a multinational society everything must be resolved through a dialogue, seeking compromise. The whole of a man's life, from the family to the government society, is built on compromise. A realistic policy directed at the actual living needs of citizens is not founded on myths, illusions and national romance. Many forget this today, among whom are my wartime companions. Life changes quickly. Reality today is not the same as yesterday, and especially not as 20, 50 or 100 years ago. Some of our great truths, which life in the past has confirmed, have today become our great mistakes. We must have both the wisdom and courage to observe these errors and find ways of ridding ourselves of them, considering the new realities in the local and global setting. The real need now is to build a new society of free men through new perceptions. Here I would not want the error of my generation, to throw out with the bad trends many positive trends of the time, which we are abandoning, to be repeated. Revolutionaries of every type are always prone to this, to their own detriment. The revolutionary spirit of my generation can no longer consist of a hard-headed defense of some principles that life has refuted. We would have to have more wisdom in our years and accept the new realities, so that we do not live in different galaxies with our children and grandchildren.

I have always condemned the use of force in resolving political problems. Nothing is resolved through force, because even after much spilled blood, after the end of hostilities, you again have to sit down at the table and negotiate. The saying that the end justifies the means has always been strange to me, since many innocent people

have lost their lives because of it. Yet today Milosevic's greater Serbian policy is following that slogan, spilling blood in Croatia, materially setting us back whole decades, sowing the seeds of hatred, fear, and mistrust among our peoples. But it must be said that no one can divide Serbs and Croats in Croatia, since we are so mixed together in the areas where we live that it is impossible to draw some kind of boundary.

[Jambrovic] You believe, then, that Serbs in Croatia can and must resolve all their living, political, cultural and whatever other problems only with those with whom they live?

[Juzbasic] I believe it absolutely. That is my orientation in life. Some of my wartime comrades are attacking me because of this, considering that I have betrayed the Serbian people and the partisan struggle. They simply cannot permit a man to have a different opinion. It is attacked immediately and labeled in various ways. They adhere to their principle: If you don't think like me, then you are against me. I firmly believe that all those who attack me know themselves that this isn't the truth. Tomorrow they will be ashamed of such low blows and lies.

Serbs and Croats, for the whole time of the many centuries of life together, especially during the antifascist struggle, have proved their worth and maturity and do not need sideline coaches or anyone's preachers. However, the whole history of the Serbian people in Croatia in the 73 years of their common life indicates that the reigning greater Serbian policy has always used the Serbs in Croatia for its dark aims, pushing them into conflict with the Croats with whom they have lived in common for centuries. That is a foolish policy under which the Serbian people in Croatia are again suffering the most. Unfortunately, this is increasingly evident even today.

I would like my Banija people to hear these words and return to their homes and continue their peaceful life. There's no war in Europe, and there shouldn't be one in Yugoslavia either, or in Croatia. Everything can and must be resolved in peace, and not through force. Fifty years ago, back in 1941, many Croats from Zagreb, Sisak, Petrinja, Glina, Kostajnica, and Dvor na Uni came to Banija to defend our villages and our homes, together with the Banija partisans. Banija can never forget Capa, Marijan Cvetkovic, and many other known and unknown fighters—Croats, who came to Banija to share the good and the bad with us. Banija remembers well even today that the whole Bobetko family (mother, father and three sons), whom no danger threatened, nevertheless came from Crnac near Sisak to Banija to build, in a joint struggle, trust, brotherhood, unity, and freedom for all our peoples. Thus I sincerely believe General Janko Bobetak when he says that he would be the first to go into battle today if the Serbian people in Croatia were really threatened. However, Croatian houses are being burned and destroyed throughout Banija today, innocent people are being killed and massacred by the misled neighbors of Banija Serbs.

Stop further fighting, return peace to all our homes, think about the future of our children. Remove extremists who are leading you to ruin from your ranks. Choose your representatives who will discuss in detail, with the Croatian rulers, all problems of life together and immediately resolve them. Return to your workplaces, return the council members to the district assemblies, return your representatives to the Croatian Assembly and let a dialogue finally begin. That's how civilized peoples, whose standards we must respect, proceed.

[Jambrovic] Your message is a message of peace!

[Juzbasic] Peace, peace and again peace! Dialogue and compromise! Peace has neither price nor alternative. Let us create clubs of Serbo-Croatian friendship in all our mixed villages and cities, because we must again build trust, respect, and good neighbor relations from the beginning. Good will must exist both on one side and on the other, because we must continue to live together in these areas. All of us can be the losers in this dirty war. Let's not allow our children to go to war for any alteration of our internal borders, for the seizure of someone else's territories. We don't need either a greater Serbia or a greater Croatia. We need knowledge, we need computers, new technologies, new economic development, we need a peaceful, nicer, and richer life. If we want to join Europe, we must accept its guidelines and standards. Europeans don't need warring Balkan tribes. Therefore, I firmly believe that Europe will not permit Yugoslavia to become a bomb in its hands.

Croatian Leader on Outdated Sovereignty Concepts

*91BA1152B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
10 Sep 91 p 32*

[Article by Miko Tripalo, Croatian opposition leader: "Sign It or Forget the Whole Thing"]

[Text] The agreements to cease fire, to expand the international observer mission to Croatia, and to call a peace conference, which have been signed with the European Community, have brought hope that the Yugoslav constitutional and political crisis will be solved in a peaceful and democratic way. However, from the outset that hope has been accompanied by a sense of disbelief because of the attempts that have failed up to now and because the agreements reached previously were not adhered to. Indeed, the very way in which the agreement was signed by the Serbian and Montenegrin parties and also the statements made afterward are for arguments to skeptics.

The aggression against Croatia is continuing with still greater ferocity, areas are being cleared of Croat inhabitants, and Croatian cities and villages are being destroyed still more completely. Three key questions arise in connection with all this:

First, what is the importance of internationalization of the conflict, what would come from international recognition of Croatia, how can one evaluate the intervention of the European Community toward countries which are not its members, but most of which would like to become members as soon as possible?

Second, what is the role of the Republic of Serbia in escalation of the present conflict, and especially what is the Army doing and what does it intend to do and who actually is violating the cease-fire agreement?

Third, is there any possibility, and if so, what kind, for finding a platform and achieving a political agreement concerning relations on the territory of the state which up to now has been called Yugoslavia?

In connection with the first question, Van der Broek's statement sounded very crude on the eve of the agreement's adoption, when some wanted to alter it: "Sign it or forget the whole thing!" That statement, although it constituted an ultimatum, was completely justified, because all the talk so far between the republics has been sterile, immature, and lacking any feel for real negotiation. Real negotiation presupposes the presentation of arguments, yielding and compromises, but without abandoning certain vital interests and principles. Unfortunately, with rare exceptions, the recent multiparty democratic elections have not brought to the key positions in the republics and at the federal level mature and politically reasonable people, so that the expectation of any democratic agreement among them is a pure illusion. But probably that is the price which has to be paid to democracy in its first steps.

President Kucan and Minister Separovic have made statements to the effect that entry into Europe also signifies adoption of European order and behavior. I hope it is clear to them that they have at the same time expressed criticism of the conventional, outdated conceptions of sovereignty from the last century, which are still widespread in Slovenia and Croatia. This has not been realized by Milosevic, B. Kostic, the generals interested in Serbian expansionism, nor even a segment of the Serbian opposition, which sees intervention of the EC as intervention in the sovereign rights of another state, as imposition of someone else's will, and the like. The statement "Sign it or forget the whole thing!" respects the sovereign rights of all partners to the negotiations, including those of the Serbians and Montenegrins, because it allows them to make the sovereign decision whether to sign or forget it. But if they "forget it," then there is no entry into the European order, you remain isolated in the Balkans, and if you continue to try to take the territory of others by force (internal borders are inviolable and cannot be altered by force), you will be faced with a world force or a European force which will put them where they ought to be. And when you have made a sovereign decision to sign those documents, then you have to abide by the European order and respect the European mode of behavior. This situation also brings

definite changes in our Croatian conceptions of sovereignty, especially with respect to absolutization of the concept of "national sovereignty" we have had up to now. After all, from the legal standpoint Albania and Iraq are also sovereign, but Croatia does not desire that kind of sovereignty. That is, the sovereignty of a democratic state cannot rely on the omnipotence of one leader, one clique, or one party, but on the full democratic rights and freedom of equal citizens, on the particular rights and protection of the rights of all, including the ethnic minorities.

"Sign it or forget the whole thing!" means for Croatia, although at that moment the message was not directly addressed to it, that a sovereign decision is made for one or the other. In freely deciding to sign those agreements, Croatia committed itself that within the country and abroad it would behave in keeping with the "European order," which, we hope, it will very quickly be able to influence in a quite significant way. And here we come to the observation that this view does not threaten Croatia's sovereignty, but in the future the autonomous nature of its decisions is bounded by obligations which it has assumed by the placement of its signature.

It is in this same light that we can look at the desire for Croatia to receive international recognition. Croatia does not want war, nor does it reckon that it can bring someone to recognize it by continuing the war. It wants recognition, because that is its natural right and because it hopes precisely by that means to prevent a spread of the fire of war. In that case, opportunities would open up to us to call upon our friends to help us in ending the war and achieving territorial integrity (direct economic and military aid, the purchase of weapons, etc.) and to prevent the conquest of Croatian territories, the killing of the population, and the destruction of settlements by setting international mechanisms in motion, for example, those of the Security Council, and through direct military intervention (similar to the one in Kuwait).

Second, I am deeply persuaded that the main obstacle to achievement of peace and termination of the armed conflicts is precisely the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. The Stalinist basis of its ideology, the nonexistence of a program for its reorganization and to change its role in society, and also the absence of a conception for resolving issues concerning the status of officers and their families—have gradually led to a situation where the JNA has become an independent social force over which no one has control. The fact that it is serving Milosevic's Serbian expansionist policy signifies that it has lost both its people's and Yugoslav attributes. Without the Army as its striking force, the policy of Serbian expansionism would not have the chances that it has now.

I have participated from the outset in creating the armed forces officially referred to as the National Liberation Army of Croatia, but nothing has been left of that army—within the framework of the JNA. That is why we

face an army acting as an aggressor and occupier killing citizens of Croatia, helping the Chetnik hordes on Croatian territory, destroying our cities and villages, demolishing cultural monuments and shrines of our people. The excuse that they are only answering the fire opened by the Croatian side is an outright lie borrowed from Goebbels' well-known fascist devices. And even if it were true, can the response of an allegedly people's army be the destruction of Osijek and Petrinja, the destruction of villages, atrocities against the civilian population? It is obviously a question of war crimes, and those who commit them ought to answer for them.

We need to assist the internal disintegration of that kind of army by accepting all those who abandon it, by obstructing any kind of recruitment, by holding back any kind of material resources, by aiding the "Fortress of Love," and by exposing in our propaganda the linkage between that kind of army and the Chetnik terrorists. The alleged restoration of the arms of the Knin terrorists following the January decision of the SFRY Presidency to disarm paramilitary and illegal formations, as well as the present attempts to "resolve" this issue by integrating the renegades into the reserve corps of the Army, are only yet another confirmation of its character and the way in which it is evading the agreements that have been signed. Accordingly, an essential change in the present role of the Army and its immediate withdrawal into its garrisons is the only way to bring about chances for peaceful resolution of the present conflicts. We favor a peaceful resolution, but the consent and will of all the parties are necessary to that.

Third, as for the agreement on creating an association of sovereign states on the territory of Yugoslavia, there are less and less opportunities for that because of escalation of the armed conflicts, because of the strengthening of extremism on all sides, and because of the mistrust and hatred, which are greater every day. For that matter, such an alliance can be brought about among friendly states, not those which are at war. And the negotiations so far concerning the rearrangement of Yugoslavia into an alliance of sovereign states have been conducted without sufficient flexibility or feel for negotiation and compromise. It is not possible to give on the question of whether the republic possesses original sovereignty, nor on attempts to forcibly change the borders, but insistence on terminology and legalistic details instead of on the content of relations and on determination of possible tasks and powers of joint government bodies does not lead to any agreement.

Most of the authors in the legal discipline take the view that the members of a confederation are sovereign states, but there are major differences and disagreements as to the character of the confederation. The legal theorists who say that a confederation is an association of states, but not a state, and that is most of them, differ on the question of whether that association is a separate legal person separate from the legal persons of the confederated states. Some take the view that that association is

not a separate legal person, others again that that association does figure as a separate legal person, but only in the international area, while still others see that association as a separate legal person both in the international and domestic areas. Certainly, the confederation can be a separate legal person only if its members are separate legal persons, so that, assuming the priority of the member states of the confederation as entities in international and domestic law, the confederal association can be recognized as a legal entity on those matters and in that scope on which the sovereign member states have agreed and have freely, of their own will, entered into that association, from which they may also withdraw.

The most ideal would be if the republics, as sovereign states, could agree that their joint bodies assume those powers which the European authorities will assume in 1992. Along with the free flow of people, goods, and capital, along with European guarantees of human rights and the rights of minorities, that could be a practical solution. This also presupposes, of course, the right of every republic to international recognition and formation of its own armed forces. And when that confederal association is one day included in the European Community, its existence would become of no moment. To be sure, this does not mean that certain forms of regional cooperation would be precluded; even now they exist in certain parts of Europe. That would be the most ideal solution and probably the most painless one as well, but there is a well-founded doubt that that is feasible at the present moment. That is why it is more realistic now to strive to bring the armed conflicts to an end and to continue the democratic process of disassociation by agreement.

Adoption of "the European order and mode of behavior" gives still greater relevance to the obligation of fulfilling the Declaration of Parties which formed Croatia's Democratic Unity government. Procrastination in fulfilling those obligations cannot be justified in terms of the conditions of war, because it has already been proven that it is precisely the development of democracy that strengthens Croatian defensive capabilities and implements the principle that the defense of Croatia is the right and duty of all its citizens. In that sense, the following questions arise in particular:

- reconstruction of local crisis command centers and executive bodies of opstina assemblies by broadening them with representatives of other parties;
- abandoning the monopoly of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] over the news media, especially Croatian Radio-TV, which is contrary to all European conventions and becomes untenable in Croatia. In that sense, we need to stand in the way of the undemocratic methods of the Agency for Restructuring, which under the guise of professional financial intervention has been meddling in editorial and personnel policy and the survival of newspapers, which allegedly are not sufficiently predisposed to the HDZ

(the case of the "military" takeover of GLAS SLAVONIJE, attempts to conduct bankruptcy proceedings at DANAS, the attempt to take over SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, and so on);

- speeding up the measures announced by the prime minister to make Croatia truly a state with respect to social welfare. Those measures have to bring greater social security to both employed and unemployed, and then guarantee mechanisms whereby the workers influence decisionmaking. Likewise, more vigorous action should be taken against embezzlement and theft, especially those concealed behind the authority of official power. Even the Holy Father, the pope himself, has condemned the tendencies to replace real socialism with some kind of "wildcat capitalism" instead of a democratic society based on a multiparty system and a market economy with highly developed legislation on social welfare;
- adoption of the agreed platform and specific decisions for a political resolution of the status of other ethnic groups in Croatia, the Serbs in particular.

All of this would certainly increase the Croatian rating in Europe, although that is not the most important thing. Croatia must do this because of its democratic system, on behalf of the well-being of all its citizens.

Slavonia, Baranja Crisis Staff Chief Interviewed

91BA1091B Zagreb VJESNIK (VJESNIK U SRIJEDU supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 91 pp 3-4

[Interview with Vladimir Seks, chief of the Crisis Staff for Slavonia and Baranja, by Aleksa Crnjakovic; place and date not given: "Return of the Warrior"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] Going from a peaceful vice presidency in the Assembly cabinet to the battlefield is not just a "Pavlov reflex" for Vladimir Seks, chief of the Crisis Staff for Slavonia and Baranja, nor does it mean, as is claimed, the final fall of his political career. Because negative designations have been attached to this politician, it's no wonder that his departure for Osijek, for the "political commissar," is immediately connected with his "secret intentions": gaining Slavonian votes for some future political time. Specifically, he sought on his own to go to the scene of the battle; this, according to some, "is not normal."

[Crnjakovic] It's necessary to remind those who have forgotten, or didn't know, that you were the first to leave for the besieged Kijevo on your own initiative, and one of the few politicians to do so. Then you didn't take advantage—a real politician with high political ambitions would have—of the fact that the Army shot at the helicopter in which you were flying together with Luka Bebic, the current minister of defense. You assumed unpleasant tasks—again with your own awareness—from the departure to accompany the dead to Borovo Selo, to the funeral of the soldier who was a victim in the

Split demonstrations, where they didn't want to accept him even in the home of the deceased, or in Sobranje either.

[Seks] Let's not talk about it. From a current perspective that seems so distant and unimportant.

[Crnjakovic] You, Mr. Seks, have always been known as an advocate, even a chief of the "war option" within the ruling party; this was taken to be a great shortcoming of yours at a time when it was thought a turnabout could be achieved by peaceful means (despite the perception about the sick Serbian ambition for someone else's land). Have you now "come to your senses"?

[Seks] Is there a normal man who wants and recommends war? The point is simply that I proposed politically that the scenario that is now evolving would materialize and operationalize, or that an ethnic cleansing and smashing of Croatian territory would take place. I was certain that the Army would preserve this scenario and, for this reason I insisted not on war, but on a continuous strengthening of all defense preparations; this was perceived at the time as an identification with or recommendation of war. To recommend defensive preparations does not mean to recommend war.

[Crnjakovic] Analysts claim that we were late in preparing a defensive strategy, so it turns out that you were right. Does one exist now?

[Seks] Yes, the concept of planning and implementing a defense exists, and on several levels. I will explain Slavonia to you, as an example. A defensive strategy exists on a global level, therefore, on the level of the whole region—eastern Slavonia, from Nova Gradiska to Pozega. The military commands of the Corps of the National Guard, in coordination with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, have been charged with the defense plan. The defense of settlements constitutes another level, so staffs for the defense of sites have been formed. Volunteer detachments of the National Defense, which are organized by enterprises and institutions, constitute a third level. All three levels coordinate actions, some more and some less successfully. You know that many years have passed since the last war, and there aren't many people with experience, so it's gained "on the spot," on the battlefield, in combat operations. Clearly, there are also daily contacts with the Ministry of Defense, the command of the Corps of the National Guard, and the Republic Crisis Staff.

[Crnjakovic] You say that there are no people with experience, yet some generals are complaining that they have not been included in actions. For example, you are leading war operations, and you are not a military specialist.

[Seks] No, I'm not leading war operations, at least not alone, since there are military specialists around us here, educated men, whether we're talking about reserve, or fugitive officers, or young educated men. And we in the Regional Crisis Staff make certain political suggestions

which are also a necessary part of war operations. The word of military specialists, naturally and logically, is the final one.

[Crnjakovic] It is said how many capable young men have left their homes, together with wives and children; as examples, Dalmatians from the karst, who panic just at the sight of the plain, are defending flat Slavonia, and citizens of Zagreb are defending Banija. Are these stories true?

[Seks] No. The majority of the population has remained to defend their homes.

[Crnjakovic] Croatia is finally going on the offensive? With what? Are there sufficient weapons? Is there truth in the stories about a lot of money, which the population has collected at home and abroad, but no weapons? Is there truth in the stories about smuggling at the expense of others?

[Seks] Money has been collected, there are no weapons, at least not in the quantities in which they could be bought. Perhaps there were some dishonest operations, but they were not the main problem with this. Because of the embargo on arms imports and the strict control of trade and transportation in the Western countries, money could not be used. On this basis various rumors have been spreading, and many of them have been circulated, consciously and very successfully, by the Counterintelligence Service. When inquiries come from all sides, "Why isn't Croatia armed?," then this is a rather fertile field for rumors about embezzlements. It is very easy to spread disinformation on these premises, to seek the guilty party and his responsibility. So the Slovene will conclude how "Zagreb has weapons, but they are saving them for themselves." This rational part is forgotten: that Croatia was completely disarmed and that it could not legally buy weapons.

[Crnjakovic] Now it is easy to be a general, but tell us nevertheless whether they were late with timely purchases back when there was no embargo.

[Seks] Perhaps it was already necessary back in May of last year to devote greater efforts to these defensive preparations; I was inclined to it, I admit. However, don't forget that the purchase of arms at that time would have been still another blameworthy and burdensome factor for the Croatian government, at least as far as the Western world is concerned, which would have immediately said: "You support peace, democratic solutions, yet you buy arms secretly. That means your intentions are dishonest." From the very beginning arms could have been bought only "on the black market," and a legal, serious government can't get involved with smuggling.

[Crnjakovic] There's no use now in crying for what's been missed. Tell what the situation on the front is like, did Baranja really fall with a whisper?

[Seks] Baranja has not been lost, although some places have been temporarily occupied by members of the

communist Army and Chetnik terrorist groups that operate in a very coordinated manner with it. We're moving into a counteroffensive, we've set up military formations. There are people, there's high morale, and it still remains for these units to be fully armed.

[Crnjakovic] The partisans did not have mortars, rifles and guns, but they seized them successfully. Have you perhaps been able to take weapons from bases, of which there are unlimited quantities in every town?

[Seks] All internal approaches to the bases have been mined, and heavy weaponry would await such "robbers," so such actions would end with a huge number of dead on our side. They wouldn't think twice about destroying both us and the town. Don't forget that one-half of the total armored units that the Army has are concentrated in eastern Slavonia and Baranja!

[Crnjakovic] Not at all optimistic. Do we have a chance at all in an encounter with the Army's forces?

[Seks] Of course we do. The communist Army would certainly be able to cause huge destruction and high casualties; this, by the way, it's already doing. However, the crews must get out of the tanks sometime, go for food, water, fuel. If you destroy two tanks, the others in the column can't proceed. The infantry is standing behind them, and then they become clay pigeons for the population and combat groups of the guard. You know, it's now easy to shoot and destroy from afar, but there comes a time when it's necessary to go to a town, and then the Army becomes very vulnerable. You must know that the soldiers are still not attacking; we are only returning their first blows.

[Crnjakovic] And they're claiming that.

[Seks] Well, it's clear that they're claiming it; they need an alibi, like any aggressor. They still have the need to think up an alibi. Fabrication is in the logic of the aggressor, not only because they're weighing the opinion of the rest of Yugoslavia and the world to some extent, but because of themselves. Specifically, the lower military personnel must be indoctrinated; they must have a justification for an attack—so, they don't attack a friend, the enemy attacks, but if there is no enemy, one must be invented.

[Crnjakovic] You are the first in the Croatian defense forces who has done what the militarily uneducated masses have been recommending for months and what a military expert like Jansa did immediately in the Slovene war: interrupt the supply of the bases. Why has that not been done with all the bases in Croatia, and not just in Osijek?

[Seks] At my proposal, but in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, the flows of electricity and supplies to the Osijek base have been stopped. This was an answer to the war crimes that the Army carried out on the innocent population of Osijek. The action has shown itself to be very effective. Why has that not been done in

other places? Well, it will be done everywhere that local military forces attack the civilian population.

[Crnjakovic] Did you perhaps also mine the approaches to the bases, but from our side?

[Seks] Yes. Military units can move only when they are announced and with police escort and control.

[Crnjakovic] What are the military reactions?

[Seks] This action provoked rage, with constant threats and the posing of ultimatums: "We'll level Osijek to the ground if you don't obey!" The threats have not yet been carried out, as you know. I think it's because of fear too, since they realize they're in a trap. It's become a game of nerves.

[Crnjakovic] Are officers and soldiers fleeing from the bases?

[Seks] Every day. For example, on Sunday evening a Moslem fled from the military proving ground who is telling us how the soldiers shoot out of fear and despair even when no one is attacking them. A story was also interesting to us about a Macedonian who fled and who was astounded when he got supper and when we accompanied him home. And an officer constantly convinced them how they would be shot if they fell into the guards' hands! All that is a part of war.

[Crnjakovic] Why don't a lot of Serbs come forward publicly, even if the majority are on the "other side," and why don't you publish figures on the number killed on the terrorist side?

[Seks] The nucleus of the Chetnik groups has been exported, that's an indisputable fact. And how many Serbs from Croatia are on the "other side," no one knows exactly. Why don't we publish the number of slain terrorists and their identity? Well, it's unpleasant to say so, but it simply has to do with the fact that there are no "technical capabilities" for it. The issue is guerilla actions. Chetniks are in fortified villages and we do not stop for "cleanup operations."

[Crnjakovic] What do you say regarding the insinuations about your "return to Slavonia," that you will take care of and strengthen the Slavonian lobby at whose head you would stand?

[Seks] I sleep in an underground hall, and during the night between Sunday and Monday a shell fired from a 120 mm. military mortar fell only about 20 meters from my field cot. It isn't that I wasn't warned: That morning word was sent from the base that they would fire at me personally. They kept their promise. Therefore, to be the target every day, to lose my head, is not exactly a motive for obtaining a "base." Isn't the price a little too high, or if it's paid, irrelevant too? For goodness sake, they're destroying my city in which I've spent my life! Perhaps I must sit in the Zagreb cabinet, so I'm not accused?

[Crnjakovic] What is the morale of Osjecani after so many frequent attacks? Don't you feel abandoned?

[Seks] A month ago it was, I must admit, a pretty strong feeling of abandonment, since part of the people erroneously assumed that Zagreb had armed units and weapons, but that for some reason it didn't want to send them to Slavonia, preferring some other threatened regions. There were frustrated people seized by a defeatist war psychology. Now the mood is changing significantly, especially after war successes. And interestingly, no one can be an authority on his own on the battlefield; that status is attained. People don't want mere rhetoric any more, they feel it unerringly. These war times are not conducive to cheating. Instinct functions without mistakes.

[Crnjakovic] You mentioned war successes?

[Seks] We're tightly holding forward defensive positions, and I must tell you that the destruction of tanks has also had an effect on combat morale.

[Crnjakovic] When we speak about war successes and failures, the question is unavoidable, is there a basis for the fears about the inevitability of the amputation of Croatian territory?

[Seks] If it comes to an attempt at amputation, we would switch to urban and suburban guerilla warfare, the aggressor would get a Belfast with which he would see his way to the end with difficulty. The enemy would have to live in a tank; you will see that this is not pleasant. As soon as the soldier got out of it, he would be killed. Should solutions be sought through the force of weapons or the force of agreements? So, it is clear that we must strengthen the defensive forces of Croatia to the maximum, because we dare not ignore the force of weapons in war. I think that international recognition of Croatia will play an important role, and I think that it is inevitable. If the Yugoslav communist Army is termed an occupying force, then Europe would really have to assist Croatia. Political talks follow, but not at the level of trading in terror, rather only at the level of the constitutional recognition and the recognition of the territorial integrity of Croatia. There is no redrawing of borders!

[Crnjakovic] With regard to the fact that for a long time we will not be able to count on a peaceful coexistence for the members of the two peoples who are incurring so many individual wounds, especially Croats who were not so systematically and bestially destroyed even in the last war, is it possible that the population will be resettled?

[Seks] In Dalj, for example, it will be difficult for the Serb and Croat ever to be able to live next to each other. It would simply be a miracle. It's not out of the question that resettlement, as a real option, especially of those whose hands are stained with blood, will be discussed.

[Crnjakovic] Will they probably be sentenced for war crimes, although we are witnesses that terrorists are

exchanged for civilians who were purposely kidnapped as stakes for the return of Chetniks?

[Seks] I hope that the time of the functioning of a legal state will also come, although there are legal rules in war too, albeit war rules. The fact is that we have had to exchange terrorists for hostages for humane reasons. What all the prisoners' fates have been! See this notebook, it's full of horrible stories, individual confessions. For example, this group of guardsmen captured in Dalj. Members of the Army wounded them and the Army took them for interrogation to Belgrade, to the "Marshal Tito" casern, then returned them to Dalj, to the Chetnik prison! Right into the Chetniks' hands! They made them do everything! Some were beaten, were made to crawl, to beg. They lined them up and told them they were going to be shot, but they were really going to be exchange. And the case of the refugees from Dalj who hid in Senta and Apatin in Croatian houses, but the Chetniks came together with the Serbian police and collected them, and to this day we do not know the fate of those 17 people. Live people, prisoners, were put into cold storage with guardsmen who had been dead for three days. Ask them whether further coexistence is possible. Not one will answer affirmatively. We also have here a description of the case of the five Albanians, unlucky by chance, who were gathered up on the road. They were taken to Borovo Selo where they had one single task: to pull out shells stuck in mortars! That's the same as when you walk through a minefield, when you check at the price of your own head where the mine is. That's war, the dirtiest ever waged.

[Crnjakovic] The media war is having the same effects as the shooting war. You lost the Belje transmitting station. Will you be able to control informational activities?

[Seks] I must tell you that it was indeed terrible when Belgrade television was turned on and when the people of Osijek were subjected to three hours of terrible propaganda. Many imagined that the war was definitely lost and Osijek occupied. Nothing was done about the defense of the transmitting station, which only a very strong unit could have protected. The Army made possible the arrival of technicians from Belgrade. Now we have one transmitting station and relays which are being taken care of, but I think that they will also be the target of an Army attack in order to put the whole media area under control.

[Crnjakovic] What do you think the next Army moves will be?

[Seks] To cut the road at Okucani in order to divide Croatia in two and control it more easily. Then the whole area, up to Ilok, would be in the "pocket" so as to open a wide front from the Danube to Novska in order to disperse Croatian forces as much as possible. The Army has functioned this way up to now: arm the Chetniks, bring in the Serbian reserves in order to create strong bases capable of independent actions. The Chetniks

instead of the Army are occupying certain positions; that way a bridgehead is secured for taking Croatian territory. The soldiers dare not pass!

[Crnjakovic] You probably think that Bosnia will not be spared. Would the opening of new fronts help Croatia? Naturally, we don't want to benefit from someone else's misfortune, but this is reality.

[Seks] Naturally, the opening of new fronts—and this will follow—would alleviate the Croatian situation. Potential victims do not yet feel the seriousness of this inevitability. Otherwise, everyone is worried, understandably so, about his interests. We'll see what happens when the Army begins compulsory recruitment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. What is the aggressor waiting for, why not open a Bosnian front? They must "put Croatia in order" first.

[Crnjakovic] It is inappropriate, under these wartime conditions, to ask about the alleged putsch in the ruling party which you, again allegedly, organized. According to one theory, you lost and as the loser were sent to the front. However inappropriately, we are nevertheless asking [for your statement on this].

[Seks] There have been brutal, open, perhaps even uncontrolled clashes within the Croatian Democratic Society [HDZ] at its very top, various assessments and judgements about the past, the present and the future of Croatia have been made, and these clashes have been in keeping with the dramatic nature of the moment in which Croatia finds itself. However, the unity of the party leadership is firm. Me a putschist? That has been a constant theory which was launched at the very beginning of my political activities. There was constant talk about a conspiracy, a putsch with me at the head. I was, and still am, one of the leading people in the party, its vice president, and it would be natural, in an attempt to break up the leadership of the party, for things to start with me. In this way the breakup of the party would proceed from top to bottom and power would thereby erode. I was chosen for the criterion of "adversary" as a metaphor, as the personification of that other, opposition movement in the HDZ. It has always been necessary to stir up that story about disunity, a conspiracy, a putsch.... A lie repeated in some heads finds a reverberation. It would indeed be tragic, politically illiterate and, above all, stupid at this time, a tragic time for Croatia, for me or anyone else to resort to threatening both the authority and the constitutional powers of the president of the Republic and the government. It would be high treason. It would mean a breakdown in the functioning of power in Croatia at the most tragic time in its long history. It has been known how to take territory from Croatia, but it was always based on a provisory, temporary political and historical game of the "big countries." Now the danger of the loss of territory is so real: Serbia has indeed decided to annex our territory, its goal is Croatia, and only then the defeat of the Croatian government, and anyone who would put personal or party interests in the form of a threat to the unity of Croatian

policy and power would be a notorious fool or a great traitor. Do you think I can be either one?

Views of Croatian, Slovene Military Experts

Air Force Role

91BA1153A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
10 Sep 91 pp 20-21

[Article by Ante Barisic, M.A.: "Who Is Going To Discharge the Generals"]

[Text] On the eve of the opening of the peace conference in the Hague, Serbian irredentism in Croatia has faced its defense with the most difficult trials, repeating in a way the case of Vietnam, which experienced its worst devastation immediately before the peace conference opened in Paris, when the United States Air Forces literally plowed under the northern part of Vietnam by order of Richard Nixon, the President at the time. Operating on the assumption that "the Serbian people in Croatia must take their struggle to the end," the ideologues and operatives of Serbian irredentism, which is supposed to materialize in an imagined Krajina stretching all the way from Osijek to Zadar, say that all attempts have been in vain to achieve agreement and bring the conflict to a peaceful conclusion. The top leadership of Serbian irredentism in Croatia, just like the Yugoslav military junta, do not want to talk with the Croatian state and are accusing it of beginning the conflict, because allegedly it wants to achieve its political goals, just like Slovenia, by means of war rather than negotiations. The attempt is being made through intellectual acrobatics to equate the alleged determination of the Serbian people not to allow a Croatian state to rule in the Krajina at any price with the fact that the state of Yugoslavia today controls only the territory of Serbia and Montenegro. From the example of implementing the decision of the SFRY Presidency concerning transfer of military recruitment from the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] to those republics, the conclusion is reached that it is Croatia that is resisting Yugoslavia, which is followed by understanding for the fact that "now that portion where the Serbs live does not respect that Croatia." The only solution which the Serbian irredentists are offering is "cessation of the attack on the Serbs, because the Serbs are suffering, but so are young Croats." The Serbian ideologues grant amnesty in advance to the Serbian people for the crimes which the Serbian irredentists are committing in Croatia in their search to establish the alleged real aggressor. After the crimes that have been committed against the Croatian people, the Serbian irredentists continue to believe that this is not the worst, because at least there has not been a repetition of Jasenovac, Glinska Crkva, and so on. Because the Serbian people, according to their assurances, have been able to see beyond something like Jasenovac and begin a new life with the Croats, the suggestion is being made to the Croats that in their case they can also do this today. They issue benevolent reminders that the Croatian casualties today are nothing close to those Serbian casualties

in World War II, which obviously would be a measure of Croatian patience and respect.

Loss of Control

Serbian irredentism in Croatia hopes to achieve its goals with weapons and wars, goals which coincide entirely with the objectives of those who desire the preservation of Yugoslavia. Aside from identical objectives, the means for achieving them are also the only ones possible: military force and war. Following the defeat in Slovenia, that instrument—the Yugoslav Army—has been undergoing rapid transformation and, consistent with the goals of the fortified centers of political power we have mentioned, it is performing the final tactical and operational missions on the territory of the Croatian Republic. The suggestion here is that the Army should operate over the entire space of Croatia, not merely place itself between the parties to the conflict on grounds that it is preventing bloodshed and promising not to be the first to shoot. That is precisely the way the activity of the Yugoslav Army has spread in Croatia, just as in the case of Kosovo, on the eve of the peace conference in the Hague. The ultimate intention is for the garrisons and units to be sent from the peaceful areas, which is what Serbia and Montenegro are considered to be, to the threatened area of Croatia. In this way, the Yugoslav Army can at some future time play the entire role of custodian of some new Pax Jugoslavica which would come about following the peace conference, regardless of how long it might last.

If some third Yugoslavia is again to be established in that fashion, through international arbitration and by armed force, the transformation of that army needs to be completed.

The beginning is the order of Veljko Kadijevic for the complete cease-fire by units of the JNA, with the mandatory addition that they will not be the first to commence firing. If they are provoked, they emphasized, they will answer a bullet with a shell, and will respond to any challenge with all available weapons and guns. No omission of the conceited, morbid, and militant addition to the effect that so far only a minor portion of the military arsenal available has been used.

In the first five days following the signing of the EC memorandum in Belgrade, it became evident that the top leadership of the JNA was not controlling the units which were vengefully and unselectively firing on Osijek and then in the region of Petrinja and Banija, where officers at the captain level took things into their own hands. However, the coordinated effort to join the fronts in Slavonia with an authentic wartime operation of the Banja Luka Corps near Okucani and Nova Gradiska provides evidence that this was not simply a complete loss of control over certain units. The objectives of those operations refute the thesis of certain units getting out of control. It is rather a question of a desire to achieve short-term goals with cool military logic, connect the lines of the front, and inflict blows on the adversary in order to soften his political positions if only by inflicting

terrible property damage to the economy. The severing of important European highway and rail communications in Croatia, diverting them to Hungary and Serbia, rendering production impossible in important economic plants (the Sisak Steel Mill), the destruction of tourism, etc., are clear indicators that there is a plan for breaking the will to resist. Likewise, the conduct of war operations on the soil of Croatia is aimed at demonstrating that those parts of Yugoslavia which have been traditionally accused of colonial behavior are continuing to function even under wartime conditions without an inflow of money from Slovenia and Croatia. The fact that hyperinflation and general impoverishment are the only certain destiny of all in Yugoslavia does not worry them.

A New Model

The military operations which the Yugoslav Army is conducting in the area of Vukovar, Okucani, Banija, Lika, and Dalmatia indicate that the role of the infantry and mechanized armor units has less and less importance. The weapons and guns being used are outdated for modern warfare and correspond to an outdated type of nationwide warfare, as it is termed, based on the Chinese experience and raised to the global level in the high-sounding phrase of the victory of the world village over the world metropole. It is no accident that the hotbeds of war in Croatia are taking on the form of a fight of a countryside against the city, which is by definition a den of vice, symbol of evil, and source of frustration for rural areas. At the same time, in its rhetoric rural areas are the source of wholesome life, the custodian of the correct political orientation, and the original ancient communist values, impregnated with Serbian freedom-loving aspirations and the casualties that have fallen on their behalf. Those forces are supposed to be a pool of volunteers who will replenish the Yugoslav Army in the future. And that army will be numerically reduced, it will go from an army of draftees to a professional army, one that is numerically smaller, but technically much more modern and effective. As soon as the objectives of the Serbian irredenta are achieved with the old model of the Yugoslav Army, modified significantly, of course, after the crushing defeat in Slovenia, the entire present top military leadership will be honorably retired. The disaster of their army in Slovenia will be paid for subsequently by their displacement, by doing away with the old organization of that cumbersome army, which was based on mass use of mechanized armor units, with no great technical sophistication. Instead of General Marko Negovanovic, artillery officer in the same class from which Gen. Kolsek was removed, and which was trained in Zagreb, becoming the new federal secretary for national defense, as he had hoped, what will happen is that the present military junta will be displaced by younger, more professional, more civilized, and more determined officers of the Yugoslav Army with the rank of colonel. First of all, the military junta must redeem itself by finishing the dirty war which it began in Croatia, and it seems that precisely on the eve of the peace conference in the Hague it will be fighting its last battle, which is lost in advance.

It should be noted that the military structures working to remove the present top military leadership, which has been compromised, and to establish a new Yugoslav Army that is more professional and more technically competent, are concentrated by the nature of things in the ranks of the Air Force and Air Defense. The case of the interception of the Ugandan aircraft with its cargo of weapons and ammunition confirms the responsiveness and new quality of that branch of the Yugoslav Armed Forces. That is, the Ugandan aircraft overflew Belgrade, and the top military leadership probably knew about its cargo even before it flew into Yugoslav airspace from information supplied by some foreign government friendly to it which is enforcing an embargo against deliveries of weapons to Yugoslavia. As is well known, the aircraft landed at the Zagreb Airport, which was immediately closed, as were almost all other airports in the republic. The crisis that was brought about was used to compromise the Croatian Government, to demonstrate the force of a segment of a paratroop unit from Nis as the first true professional infantry unit for strategic use in the Yugoslav Army, but also as a demonstration of power.

The airspace is under the complete control of that army, just as Croatia's maritime exit to the world is controlled by the Navy. It is not without interest that electronic communications of all kinds are under the complete control of those same branches of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, the consequence of which is the possibility of controlling the media such as television, which would be done by taking over their transmitters. The Croatian Airline is flying out of the Maribor Airport, while over the battlefields in Croatia the Air Force is showering down with impunity what they say to be a very small part of their combat complement. It is very interesting that that same Air Force, which is taking control over the new Yugoslav Army as it evolves, is right now receiving 50 heavy and combat armored helicopters from the Soviet Union by way of compensation for some of the immense Soviet debts to Yugoslavia. When we bear in mind that the new defense minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, was commander of Soviet Air Forces before the unsuccessful putsch in Moscow, this detail could have particular weight for the further development of events, and it is no longer so important that Blagoje Adzic, chief of the JNA General Staff, was trained in the Soviet Frunze Command Staff Academy, not in France, as some have said in public. What is more, the "Zmaj" Repair Plant in Velika Gorica near Zagreb, which repairs supersonic aircraft and turbojet engines, which is a very lucrative business for the civilian and military sector, is being moved, according to certain reports, to Bosnia and Sarajevo, to become part of the UNIS chain.

Agrokomerc Is Funding Martić

The datum that recently SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina has actually been funded by Agrokomerc, which is developing broad and intensive business precisely in that region, reinforces the need to examine

once again the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the light of these facts. Mindful of statements we have recently had occasion to read, to the effect that four years ago the Cazin Krajina was waging its own war, which it lost in the case of Agrokomerc, and today has neither the strength nor the motivation to become involved in current struggles, we must ask whether this is not a radical turnaround. Also, the arrival of units of the Yugoslav Army from Slovenia in Herzegovina, the concentration of sizable mechanized armor forces on Kupresko Polje, and the severing of transportation and isolation of Dalmatia and Herzegovina from continental Croatia put forward the need for a new strategic evaluation.

The strategy of Croatian defense must take into account the new situation, beginning with the dynamic integration of the political, military, and economic approach, and realistically define its objectives, means, and intentions on that basis.

Croatian Strategy Scored

*91BA1153B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
10 Sep 91 pp 22-23*

[Interview with Dr. Anton Bebler, lecturer in the School of Political Science and Sociology of Ljubljana University, by Darko Pavicic in Ljubljana; date not given: "Croatia Does Not Know What It Wants"]

[Text] We imagined our interview with Dr. Anton Bebler, lecturer in the School of Political Science and Sociology at Ljubljana University and one of the most highly regarded civilian experts in military affairs and a key man in Slovenia's defense, in an office with all kinds of military charts, little flags, and arrows showing military developments both in our country and in the world generally. However, Dr. Bebler received us in the park behind the building of the Slovene Assembly in the center of Ljubljana, where in plain language he interpreted the situation in our country, especially the war in Croatia, the activity of the Yugoslav Army and its future role. He spoke from the position of a Slovene, that is, neutrally, without any sort of emotional fervor, but also without mincing words, from the position of a victor in the war which after Slovenia moved to Croatia.

[Pavicic] Your assessments of military events were largely confirmed during the war in Slovenia. How do you interpret the present military activities, especially as they concern Croatia?

[Bebler] The military forces had to concentrate on a region which was becoming hotter and hotter every day, and that was Croatia. So, they left Slovenia with the intention of strengthening the position in Croatia, increasing the number of military capabilities around Croatia, so that they could be used, if worst came to worst, to leave Croatia amputated, so that for that very reason it would have to consent to continuation of its life in Yugoslavia. But in the best case they would achieve consolidation of Yugoslavia which would be smaller only

by virtue of Slovenia. It is interesting that the more the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] withdrew from Slovenia, the higher the temperature rose in Croatia, and numerous conflicts spread. As though fire were being poured from one part to another part to reach the level of a true conflagration in Croatia, an authentic storm of warfare. There is no point at all making an analogy between Slovenia and Croatia now, although there are certain similarities. After all, the entire structure of the conflict in Croatia is essentially different; it lacks the elements that existed in Yugoslavia, or has very few of them.

[Pavicic] Exactly what are you referring to?

[Bebler] First of all, there is the large number of large-scale criminal acts—thrift, destruction of property, kidnappings for private, that is, economic reasons...the obstruction of highways. Slovenia had practically none of that unless it was a military objective at the moment or occurred in the course of the war, but in any case it was altogether different. This is crime which no one is preventing and which one side, even the alleged institutions of the state, is carrying out on its own.

And then you have terrorism in your case, which did not occur in ours. Terrorism such as the taking of hostages, intimidation of inhabitants so that they will leave their homes, their villages.... It is interesting that mortars are being used in Croatia as the principal weapon in that type of terrorism.

[Pavicic] What is being achieved by those mortar attacks? Are they meant more to have a psychological effect, or are they being used for their destructive power?

[Bebler] In Croatia, they are being used mostly as a terrorist weapon, as a means of intimidating the population, an instrument to impose "acceptance" of the new authority or simply to drive people out. That is why most of the mortar attacks take place at night, so as to affect people's psychology, in order to drive fear into their bones, to make them feel helpless, in order to prove to the people that their government, which ought to be protecting them, is unable to do so. And so that the people, thus rendered helpless, can either surrender or flee. It is, of course, more desirable for them to flee, because in that way the facts are altered, a quite different ethnic division is brought about in Croatia, and the preconditions are created for new ethnic borders.

This will be a unique war for the specific reason that mortars are the principal weapon. Mortars are especially suitable in this kind of war, because they can be used to attack inhabited areas over the positions of the Army, and that means under protection of military units, which are supposedly maintaining a buffer zone.

[Pavicic] That terrorism in Croatia is full of elements of civil war. So, once again it is not possible to draw parallels with the war in Slovenia.

[Bebler] It is a combination of large-scale armed conflicts and irregular conflicts which have not been arranged, armed violence with no plan, the conflict of one group of individuals against another group, and even conflicts between individuals. No one is leading those groups, so that it is easy to influence them with propaganda, and anyway this is uncontrolled violence on a large scale, violence between members of the two nationalities—the Serbs and the Croats. In that sense, this is civil war. What is more, there is also an element of civil war in the conflicts between personnel of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and National Guard Corps [ZNG] on the one hand, and Martić's people and territorial defense on the other, where the latter does exist as a formation. These conflicts between citizens of one and the same republic cannot be defined otherwise than as civil war. We did not have that either. The only place where certain parallels can be drawn with the conflict in Slovenia is the conflict with the armed forces of Yugoslavia.

In your case, they were expanded with the reserves of the JNA, which was not the case in Slovenia. We had only regular JNA units here, while in your case, almost unnoticed, those reserves have made the transition from what was legal and was operating in accordance with laws into armed formations of Serbian rebels. So, on the one side is the JNA, and on the other the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia. The units of the JNA are operating in the form of a variable coalition that reacts tactically from one end to the other and in various ways directs that coalition warfare jointly with the Serbian rebels.

The war in Croatia long ago exceeded the dimensions of events in Slovenia. The number of conflicts is greater, it is more highly complex, and in Croatia there are great differences between those parts where those two sides are clearly in conflict and behave toward one another as enemies on the battlefield, while on the other side there are several places where no action whatsoever concerning the garrisons on the territory of Croatia has been heard of. In Croatia, there obviously is still some kind of coexistence, even cooperation with the occupiers. After all, in your case they have only now begun to disconnect electricity, water, and so on (and then selectively). Accordingly, in Croatia there is almost normal coexistence, life together, between the belligerents.

Thus, it is possible for war to be waged and blood to be shed in one region, while in another region of Croatia life goes on quite normally, people sit in the little cafes, they walk the streets peacefully, and real war is far away from them. That contrast has negative consequences for both morale and the effectiveness of your overall activity against the aggressor. In Slovenia, there was an almost unified regime of blocking all the garrisons, a unified regime for cutting off electricity, water, food, and so on, to the garrisons. In Croatia, that was not nearly so well thought out and was far less unified.

[Pavicic] As a military specialist, how do you interpret the great difference between the resistance of the Croats

and that of the Slovenes? In your opinion, where specifically did Croatian policy go wrong?

[Bebler] I do not know the local conditions, so that some things are difficult to judge, but it seems to me that there has been no concept of warfare in your case. The Croatian leadership has obviously lived for a long time in the illusion that war could be avoided, that the JNA would never use armed force, that sovereignty could be worked out peacefully, that the separation of Croatia and the creation of a sovereign state would occur without a great risk. That illusion still exists and was evident, for instance, in the signing of the Belgrade Declaration.

In Croatia, there were grand illusions or mistaken assessments, if you like, about how far the Serbian rebels and Serbia itself would go, how far Milošević would go, and how far the generals would go. It seems to me that those assessments were unrealistic.

One big mistake of your leadership at the very outset was to allow the disarming of territorial defense. It is not true that the Slovenes were not disarmed because the JNA had a somewhat different attitude toward the Slovenes. The Slovenes were not completely disarmed because they were homogeneous, because the leadership, headed by Kukanj, when it learned of the disarmament, vigorously prevented it. To be sure, there was a risk, they were resolved to risk even conflict at that moment, but they were determined to remain at least partially armed. The Croatian leadership did not wish to risk a conflict, and thought that with its good behavior they could somehow bring the other side to behave well toward Croatia as well. This was an erroneous assessment of the other side's psychology.

The next mistake of your leadership was that it never attempted to use the organizational framework of territorial defense which you had and which you have been building for 20 years. That model was rejected in favor of building a new armed force and an army within the police so as to avoid criticism that laws were being violated. That was erroneous because this meant giving up the conception of the armed populace and those proposals that were made by General Ivan Rukavina.

At several points you have had to pay for adopting the conception of a professional or even mercenary army whose units would be moved from one end of Croatia to the other, instead of creating well-armed military units that would have been tied to the terrain, to the population. It is interesting, but the other side, the Serbian side, is far closer in the manner of its armament and mobilization of manpower, even in its conduct of warfare, to the tactics of the national liberation war, relying on the entire population and to a great extent on the fifth column wherever they are in the minority. I think that the very conception of your warfare was defective and is still defective, but it would also be difficult for any other conception to be good, for the simple reason that you are technically inferior and outgunned.

The side that is technically inferior has no other choice than to rely on the conception of conducting a people's war. In Croatia, neither one nor the other was adopted, and the consequences of falling between the two chairs have followed. In fact, there has been no strategy. To be sure, there is still some tactics at the local level, but there is no strategy in the sense of a plan that would reconcile objectives and capabilities. Nor have those objectives been clearly defined, because people do not know exactly what those objectives are, because there are several alternatives of what is being fought for, and then, clearly, there is no consistency between those unclearly defined goals and the means available.

[Pavicic] If you were an adviser on the Croatian war staff now, what methods would you use, what tactics would you resort to, how would you direct actions?

[Bebler] I would first demand a clear definition of objectives, adversaries, means, and the methods which are permitted and what is not permitted. When that is defined, all else follows: the same regime for operating against the entire enemy over the entire territory of Croatia. After all, it makes no sense at all to wage war in one place and to collaborate with that same enemy 5 km away.

To an outside observer, there does not seem to be any clear leadership in Croatia at the moment, it is not clear who is the commander in chief and in what manner he is exercising that command. Nor do there seem to be clear lines of command from the supreme command. People have no idea who that supreme command is, what role Gen. Spigelj has, and if he does not have a role, why did they get rid of him? And then there are no clear lines of command from the supreme command to the regional staff headquarters, from the regional staff headquarters to the units in the field. I have the impression that those regional barons of yours are frequently not following directives nor even orders from the top republic leadership. It is probable, then, that at least some of the criticisms of the JNA are valid to the effect that they are being attacked and provoked: because of poor discipline, not because there is malice somewhere in the top leadership, because those down below either do not have clear orders or they are left free to decide themselves what to do or simply to do something even against orders, for some local reasons, for revenge, who knows.

There is a lack of order and discipline within the entire Croatian Army. That at least is how it appears from outside. There are things which bother me and that I would not do. The biggest problem is that the Croatian leadership either does not understand or underestimates the political content of its overall activity. First of all, the autochthonous nature of the resistance or activity of the Serbs in Croatia was underestimated. And then the role of Milosevic was overestimated, there was an overestimation of the role of those who came in from outside, who certainly exist, but in the entire makeup of the Serbian rebels, I suppose, the great majority are Serbs from Croatia, not those who were infiltrated. It also

seems counterproductive to me to call them all terrorists and Chetniks. That has bad political consequences, because cramming all those people into one basket strengthens the homogeneity of their camp and prevents political differentiation among them. And that political differentiation is a precondition for seeking a political solution, without which that conflict cannot be resolved. It cannot be resolved solely in the military aspect.

[Pavicic] In Croatia, it is popular to expect a solution from outside, from Europe. Are there real chances that Europe will help us with military forces, and if it does help us, how would that be done?

[Bebler] That is another illusion. Europe will not help Croatia in that sense. It certainly will not send troops and it will not protect Croatia from its rival. Europe might possibly (there is one sentence to this effect in the Brussels Declaration) take up the question of international intervention and international mediation in the conflict. The reference here is above all to something similar to the action of the allies of the Western powers to the north of Iraq in order to protect the Kurd refugees. Most of the thinking, then, concerns some humanitarian operation, by no means a military operation in the sense of a fight against the JNA so as to defeat the JNA and the Serbian rebels.

It seems to me that that underestimation of the autochthonous nature of the Serbian rebellion in several regions of Croatia is the critical point where the position of the present leadership has proved to be mistaken. It was an unrealistic preconception that the problem of the Serbs in Croatia could be solved with the police. Or that it could be solved if the Army withdrew into its garrisons, because that is again an illusion on the basis of a paper that has been signed, to the effect that the paramilitary formations will be disarmed, that then the Croatian police will remain, that the Croatian police will go into those villages, that the Croatian flag will flutter, and everything will be fine.

Nothing is going to be the same in Croatia after this. I am thinking of many things, including relations between Serbs and Croats. Unfortunately, they are so spoiled at this point that it is valid to make a comparison with World War II when it comes to consequences of a psychological nature. Because this cannot be solved by force, by an army and police, I think that the strategy and tactics of the Croatian leadership are erroneous, because they ought to resort primarily to a political strategy in resolving that conflict, not a strategy based on the police of the MUP.

[Pavicic] What do you think the Army will do further on? Do you envisage in the future development of events a military involvement in resolving the crisis?

[Bebler] I think that is the objective of what the Army is doing, joined with the plans of the Serbian rebels, for all the territories of the Serbian enclaves where there are considerable numbers of Serbs to escape the control of the authorities of the Croatian state. Second, to take

strategic points, junctions, cities, railroad stations, riverports, like Vukovar, for example, that is, those points which link those enclaves in order to create some kind of viable territory of some "Serbian state." Now, the interest of the Army is in protection of those enclaves against the attack of the Croatian authorities, as the soldiers themselves say, "so as to ensure the freedom of the Serbian population in Croatia," but actually to maintain control over those key strategic junctions. And it does not matter whether it is called Yugoslavia or Srboslavia, the essential thing is to maintain that control. The military leadership obviously is determined never to allow those strategic junctions to fall into Croatian hands. Even at those places or in those areas where the Croats constitute a majority.

[Pavicic] Even if it involves a strong use of force?

[Bebler] Yes, that is clear. And what are the prospects? I think that the prospects are bad for Croatia. The expectations and statements of certain people who say that Croatia will simply win in the war and that the adversaries have no chances whatsoever, and that they only need to organize and everything will be accomplished, seem unrealistic to me. All this time, Croatia has been on the defensive, and that is again a mistake. The defensive in such a subordinate and inferior position is always a bad alternative for the weaker side. Given the maintenance of the present parameters and control of the JNA in the airspace, given control of the coast by the Yugoslav Navy, the maintenance of Yugoslav border troops, the ban on trade in arms—there are very few chances that the balance of power will change between the opposing sides and that there will be any essential improvement of Croatian armament and level of organization. Because of limitations of a technical nature, at least for the present, the Croatian forces simply cannot win and inflict a decisive defeat on the other side, they cannot establish their supervision and control by police and other authorities over the Serbian enclaves or even take away from the other side that region from which the Croatian population has fled. Unfortunately, there are no prospects for things to change essentially at the diplomatic table either, because the actual state of affairs in the field is in a way usually legalized in those negotiations. You can criticize me for looking cynically at all of this, but I do not see how the Croatian Government can obtain more than nominal sovereignty in those regions, for all the arguments and trump cards which it possesses.

Croatia has two possibilities, and both are bad: either in some fashion to reconcile itself to amputation and for the entire space to be taken away, not only in actuality (which is already the real state of affairs), but also as a matter of formal law, or to find a solution in which it will consent to the actual separation of those parts in the sense of local government, that is, in the sense not only of administrative authority, but also political authority over that entire region. To draw a parallel, something like the Aland Islands, the Finnish islands in the Baltic Sea which are Swedish, they have complete Swedish

autonomy, Swedish government, and the Swedish language. You will not find there a single Finnish civil servant waving his flag, and then there is not a single Finnish policeman or anyone, but in formal law and international law those islands are a part of Finland. The sovereignty of Finland is recognized, but at the same time they live their life and are somewhere between Finland and Sweden.

But any Croatian government that would accept something like that would, of course, expose itself to the risk of losing the next elections or of finding itself under strong pressure from the Croatian public. At the same time, according to what the leaders of those autonomous provinces are saying in Croatia, they will not accept any fashion of remaining in Croatia nor any kind of recognition of Croatia's sovereignty. Nevertheless, this is a terrain on which those two sides could find themselves—if on both sides there were some kind of coercion, not in the form of an armed force, but, say, in the form of economic restrictions imposed by the international community. Then both sides would be motivated to find some compromise solution.

In any case, that life together is something which you cannot avoid. I do not see how that problem could be solved by a large-scale resettlement of population or by drawing borders or creating regions that would be completely pure in the ethnic sense. That is difficult to do and would require many sacrifices, so that an institutional model has to be sought in which everyone would be satisfied, never completely, but to a large extent, in which both would feel that they are a part of the community and would benefit from it. That is the art of politics. How will your political leadership solve that? I hope that they will all abandon as soon as possible the hope of a solution by military means.

Petroleum Shortage Causes Increasing Problems

92BA0020B Belgrade *EKONOMSKA POLITIKA*
in Serbo-Croatian 16 Sep 91 p 10

[Article by D. Nedeljkovic: "Petroleum: Prices and Blackmail"—first paragraph is *EKONOMSKA POLITIKA* introduction]

[Text] Will the petroleum shortage paralyze the economy and halt the war? There is not even any petroleum on the horizon. What the price hikes achieve.

There is no longer any information nor any reliable source of news that can be believed, but judging from what the radio, television, and newspapers are reporting, the situation in Yugoslavia is approaching total chaos. It appears that the collapse will be caused by energy problems, especially petroleum and its derivatives. It is even possible that the oil shortage will succeed where domestic and European politicians have failed: in bringing about an end to the armed conflict. It goes without saying that the entire economy and all of life will be paralyzed in the meantime, that the crops will go

unharvested, fields will go unplowed and unsown, and that transportation will grind to a halt.

A few randomly chosen news reports that depict reality seem simply incredible, until only recently even inconceivable, as if from some other time and place. By official decree the Croatian government has confiscated 170,000 tonnes of petroleum purchased by the Petroleum Industry of Serbia. That petroleum can be transported to the refineries in Pancevo and Novi Sad only through the Adriatic pipeline, meaning that the tanker must be unloaded in Omisalj, on the island of Krk. Is it even necessary to mention that the port, the terminal, and part of the pipeline are located in the territory of Croatia? Or to recall that these two refineries established and financed the pipeline? Right now, of course, it is futile to lament the question of why the refineries have no alternative for the supply of raw material. It is perhaps worth noting for the sake of illustration that the transport of 100,000 tonnes of petroleum by rail would require a train 70 km long; there are neither enough tank cars nor adequate rail capacity for that type of transport.

No less amazing is the following news report—the oil pipeline at Sisak has reportedly been damaged in the armed conflict, but in such a way that the Serbian refineries will suffer the consequences, meaning that it is not able to transport petroleum. Some say that the problem is damage to one valve, which, if it is true, would require perhaps a couple of hours to repair. To make the situation even more amazing, it will take who knows how long to repair the damage, and a good part of the pipeline passes through threatened areas, and nothing has ever disrupted the work of the pipeline. Perhaps damaging the pipeline is a more efficient method than imposing additional taxes on the conveyance of petroleum? However, when one reads about the “patriotic attitude” of Ina workers who refuse to give petroleum products to the Army, the “seizure of storage tanks and pumps,” the “interception” of fishing boats for refueling, the threats to sink tankers on the Sava, and the maintenance of Croatian petroleum reserves abroad, one understands the actual dimensions of the impending chaos.

And even if these are all fabricated reports and events, even if everything can be returned to normal operation tomorrow, the petroleum situation is explicitly inauspicious and disturbing. Almost the only foreign supplier for the second half of the year would have to be the USSR. The president and vice president of the Federal Executive Council reached an agreement in Moscow on the import of 5.5 million tonnes, which is approximately what is needed through the end of the year. Petroleum experts hoped that at least 3.5 million tonnes would somehow arrive to cover the most urgent needs. Thus far, however, nothing has arrived, and there is little chance that the petroleum will be delivered anytime soon. Besides the problems with petroleum suppliers, things are now being complicated by damage to the pipelines, the plundering of petroleum, and the uncertain fate of other means of transport.

The purchase of petroleum on the spot market for dollars is also very uncertain, partly because of insolvency and the shortage of dinars and foreign exchange, and partly because of the physical impossibility of delivering petroleum to continental refineries. The refinery in Skopje has been idle for two months now, and the ones in Bosanski Brod, Pancevo, and Novi Sad operate a while, then lie idle a while, with prospects of the supply of raw material running completely dry. Nowhere is there any petroleum on the horizon. In view of all this, domestic production has become very uncertain, especially in those areas caught up in the war, and there is a continuous threat that ships, storage tanks, railroads, or roads will be mined or set on fire. The governments, from the Federal one to the republican ones, are in session almost continuously; the top people at enterprises have scattered throughout the world, but except for the continuous blackmail, the “measures and countermeasures” of clashing ministates, nothing concrete is being resolved.

To complete the petroleum paradox, one must mention the supply situation on the markets of the individual republics, if it is even possible to use the word “market.” The best supply situations over the course of this year have been enjoyed by Croatia and Slovenia, the republics in which there has been or still is genuine military conflict going on. The “peaceful” republics of Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro have often had to get by with shortages, lines at the pump, and empty storage facilities. Even if it were possible to explain this sort of situation with a detailed analysis, it would still be unclear why there are shortages, given the noticeable drop in consumption. It is patently obvious that there was no invasion of foreign tourists this year, that traffic has been sparse, the roads deserted, and that it is nevertheless risky to set out by automobile even to go a short distance. Apparently we have experienced a complete disruption of the normal supply system. In Serbia, for example, Ina no longer supplies the pumps that continue to bear its name (it is genuinely cynical when that is officially cited as the reason for the shortage), and those pumps have been “separated out” to a special enterprise. In Kosovo, where employees did not want to be “separated out,” receiverships have been introduced. Montenegro, which is supplied by the Rijeka refinery by sea, is no longer getting petroleum products from Croatia, and in parts of Croatia the suppliers have become the Belgrade and Novi Sad distributors. To say nothing of deliveries to the Army.

Is it any surprise that the price of gasoline and other petroleum products is steadily rising? The price of petroleum products went up again last week in Serbia based on a decision by the government, and they have become the highest prices in Europe. A liter of super gasoline in Serbia costs 30 dinars right now. The weak explanation given, that it is necessary to raise more dinars in order to safeguard foreign exchange and petroleum imports, only partially justifies the new prices. At the same time, there was an increase in the “social tax” rate and the road toll. Sticking to this type of gasoline, a comparison with

prices in other republics gives us the following picture: Croatia, 22.50 dinars per liter, Slovenia 23.20, Macedonia 21.70, Montenegro 23.70, Bosnia-Herzegovina 24.80. This trend is, however, temporary. There is no doubt that the other republics will follow the Serbian example, although it is unclear when and how much petroleum products will rise in price. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is certain that they will become more expensive soon, perhaps even before this article makes it into the readers' hands.

Does it even make sense to compare conditions and short-term price levels that have been brought about in this way with those in other European countries? And at what exchange rate for the dinar should comparisons be made? If we stick to the official rate, then several countries should be noted. The same type of gasoline costs 19.14 dinars per liter in Austria, 20.20 in Belgium, 20.48 in Germany, 20.70 in France, and 16.46 in Greece. The highest prices are in Italy, at 26.11, while the lowest are in Switzerland, at 16.24 dinars. If nothing else, then at least we are at the top of the list of European countries.

NTIS
ATTN: PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.