


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CONTENTS

29 November 1990

EAST ASIA

INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

Pacific Forum Rejects French Claims on Nuclear Tests [Hong Kong AFP 8 Nov]	1
--	---

AUSTRALIA

Officials To Inspect Johnston Atoll CW Destruction Facility [Hong Kong AFP 5 Nov]	1
Evans Wants International Chemical Arms Treaty [Hong Kong AFP 11 Nov]	1

MONGOLIA

President Reveals Soviet Forces To Withdraw by 1992 [Tokyo KYODO 13 Nov]	2
--	---

EAST EUROPE

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Meet 3 Nov	3
Signing of CFE Arms Accord 'Delayed' [Budapest Radio 3 Nov]	3
Accord Signed; Tanks To Be Stored [Budapest Radio 3 Nov]	3
CSFR Weapons Levels Detailed [Prague Radio 3 Nov]	3
Hungary's Jeszenszky Delivers Speech [Budapest Radio 3 Nov]	4
Jeszenszky Urges 'Common Solutions' [Budapest Radio 3 Nov]	4
Hungary's Antall Meets USSR's Kvitsinskiy [Budapest Radio 3 Nov]	5
Warsaw Pact Members Reach CFE Ceilings Accord [S. Zhirnikhin; Moscow TASS 3 Nov]	5

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Deputy Foreign Minister on Pact CFE Arms Agreement [R. Harencar; Prague TV 28 Oct]	5
CFE Chief Delegate Comments on Effect of Treaty [CTK 18 Nov]	6
Reservations on 1925 BW Protocol Withdrawn [SVOBODNE SLOVO 25 Oct]	6

HUNGARY

Chief of Staff Happy With Warsaw Pact CFE Arms Level [L. Borsits, et al; Budapest Radio 4 Nov]	6
Foreign Ministry Official on CFE Agreements [D. Meiszter; NEPSZAVA 5 Nov]	7
Hungarian 'Defense Concept' for CSCE Outlined [Budapest Radio 9 Nov]	7
Progress of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Noted [Budapest Radio 13 Nov]	8
Defense Minister's Announcement on Arms Reduction [MTI 16 Nov]	8
Defense Minister Details Unilateral Arms Cuts [MTI 16 Nov]	8
Missile Decision Called 'Political Gesture' [G. Keleti; Budapest Radio 16 Nov]	8
CFE Chief Delegate Discusses Agreement	9
Hungarian Reductions Noted [Budapest Radio 16 Nov]	9
Calls Results 'Favorable' [MTI 16 Nov]	9
General Discusses Soviet Troop Withdrawal	9
Notes Financial Disagreements [A. Annus; Budapest Radio 18 Nov]	9
Denies Blame for Slow Withdrawal [Budapest TV 18 Nov]	10

ROMANIA

Spokesman Comments on Warsaw Pact CFE Accord [ROMPRES 1 Nov]	10
Soviet Appeal To Cease Nuclear Tests Backed [ROMPRES 5 Nov]	10
Call for Balkan Contribution to Peace, Security [ROMPRES 5 Nov]	11

POLAND

Deputy Minister on Troop Withdrawal Talks With USSR [J. Makarczyk; Warsaw Radio 15 Nov]	11
--	----

LATIN AMERICA

CHILE

Spanish Role in Chilean FAE Project Confirmed [F. Rueda; Madrid EL TIEMPO 29 Oct]	12
Arrival of U.S. Nuclear Carrier Draws Protest [Madrid EFE 31 Oct]	13

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

IRAQ

Use of Medicine for Chemical, Biological Arms Denied [INA 9 Nov]	15
--	----

SOVIET UNION

GENERAL

Cosmonauts Speak Out Against Nuclear Weapons [P. Orlov; Moscow TV 26 Oct]	16
U.S. Defense Cuts Called Not 'Substantive' [V. Vinogradov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 1 Nov]	16
Restrictions on Arms Transfers to Third World Urged [V. Ovchinnikov; PRAVDA 2 Nov]	17
Petrovskiy Interviewed on Disarmament Issues [V.F. Petrovskiy; PRAVDA 10 Nov]	17

START TALKS

TASS Commentator Views START Negotiations [V. Chernyshev; TASS 14 Nov]	20
--	----

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Latvian Rayon Orders Skrunda Radar Station Closed [V. Zaitsev; TASS 1 Nov]	20
U.S. Anti-Satellite Weapons Development Viewed [V. Chernyshev; TASS 1 Nov]	21
UN Urges Soviet-U.S. Space Arms Talks [Ye. Menkes; TASS 15 Nov]	21

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Inspectors Visit Belgium for INF Inspection	22
Arrive in Country [S. Simonenko; TASS 30 Oct]	22
Teams Conclude Inspection [S. Simonenko; TASS 1 Nov]	22

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Shevardnadze Defends CFE Arms Cuts [Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA 25 Oct]	22
Leningrad Troops Not for Offensive Operations [PRAVDA 26 Oct]	22
Problems Continue With Troops Leaving Hungary [Moscow TV 2 Nov]	23
International Summit Ratifies CFE, CSBM Agreements	23
CFE Military Restrictions Detailed [V. Smelov; TASS 17 Nov]	23
Confidence-Building Document Adopted [V. Smelov; TASS 18 Nov]	23
Gorbachev Signs CFE Treaty [TASS 19 Nov]	24
TASS Commentator on CFE Agreement [V. Chernyshev; TASS 19 Nov]	24
Chief of Staff Notes CFE Cuts [O. Moskovskiy; TASS 19 Nov]	24
Envoy Praises CFE Accord [V. Smelov; TASS 17 Nov]	25

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Early Start of SNF Reduction Talks Urged [V. Chernyshev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 14 Nov]	25
--	----

NUCLEAR TESTING

Novaya Zemlya Chief Defends Notification System [I. Bentsa; IZVESTIYA 30 Oct]	26
Commentary Views USSR, U.S. Nuclear Tests [Yu. Solton; Moscow International 30 Oct]	27
Karpov Views Background of 24 Oct Nuclear Test [TASS 31 Oct]	27
Novaya Zemlya Test Site Described [Yu. Dmitriyev; TRUD 7 Nov]	28
U.S., British, French Nuclear Tests Criticized [TASS 15 Nov]	30
Mikhaylov Denies Report of Planned Urals Test Site [Moscow International 15 Nov]	30

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Concern Voiced Over Chemical Weapons' Incineration [S. Yufit; IZVESTIYA 3 Nov]	31
Talks With U.S. on Chemical Weapons Ban Viewed [V. Chernyshev; TASS 4 Nov]	32
UN Committee Discusses Chemical Weapons Ban [Ye. Menkes; TASS 15 Nov]	32

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Changed Soviet, U.S. Asian Policies Foreseen [Titarenko; Moscow International 10 Nov]	33
Reduction of Far East, Pacific Forces Viewed [Moscow International 10 Nov]	33

WEST EUROPE

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Woerner Calls For European Security System [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 30 Oct]	35
--	----

FINLAND

Defense Official Views CFE Impact on Finland [V. Santavuori; HELSINGIN SANOMAT 5 Oct] ..	35
--	----

GERMANY

No Quick Economic Gains Seen From Armaments Conversion [L. Koellner; Bonn AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE 31 Aug]	36
'Atlas' Details Economic Impact of U.S. Withdrawal [DER SPIEGEL 15 Oct]	43

PORTUGAL

Mauritanian Missile Threat Issue Resurfaces	44
Cited in Restraint on Gulf Crisis [O JORNAL 14-20 Sep]	44
Madeira Seen Target [O JORNAL 21-27 Sep]	45

SWITZERLAND

Schmiedemeccanica Denies Missile Technology Sale to Iraq [JOURNAL DE GENEVE 15 Sep] ...	45
---	----

INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

Pacific Forum Rejects French Claims on Nuclear Tests

*BK0811074490 Hong Kong AFP in English 0625 GMT
8 Nov 90*

[Text] Suva, November 8 (AFP)—The 15-nation Pacific Forum has rejected claims by France that the forum is softening its opposition to French nuclear testing in the region.

Forum Secretary-General Henry Naisali said here late Wednesday its concern over the environmental impact generated by France's nuclear testing was still very much apparent. He added that the forum's concern over nuclear testing was not new and its preoccupation with the safety of the tests was growing, contrary to French claims.

Mr. Naisali said the forum's position had been expressed to Philippe Baude, who led a French delegation to the 21st forum assembly in Vanuatu in August. A report by Mr. Baude to President Francois Mitterrand on Tuesday said the omission of any reference to opposition to French nuclear testing from the forum communique was "a clear enough" indication that relations between Paris and forum countries was entering a new phase.

While the communique did not specifically register a condemnation of France's 25 years of nuclear testing at Moruroa and Fangataufa Atolls it made a reference to it in section 27 of the resolutions. It stated that the forum heads of governments had declared that the Pacific Ocean and the islands in it should not continue to be used "as a convenient area for the development, storage, dumping or disposal of hazardous materials, including chemical weapons, particularly from outside the region."

Tonga's Foreign Minister Crown Prince Tupouto'a said at the forum meeting that it was not as critical of the United States incinerating chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll as it was of Paris. This was because the "French were testing weapons and the Americans were destroying them".

Mr. Naisali said the forum had also raised concern over the ratification by France of the South Pacific regional environmental protection treaty in July.

The French Ambassador to the South Pacific Henri Jacolin, however, had earlier told AFP that France, in ratifying the treaty for its three Pacific territories, excluded nuclear explosion experiments from its commitments.

AUSTRALIA

Officials To Inspect Johnston Atoll CW Destruction Facility

*BK0511151990 Hong Kong AFP in English 1445 GMT
5 Nov 90*

[Text] Sydney, November 5 (AFP)—Australian officials would join a team inspecting the U.S. chemical weapons [CW] destruction facility on Johnston Atoll early next year, officials said Monday.

A foreign affairs spokesman said from Canberra that Australia wanted to ensure the plant was environmentally safe. "The opportunity to take up the American invitation will be grasped," he said.

"The Americans are organising or inviting officials from Pacific countries to go there, which will include Australian officials.

"Australia and the South Pacific have been very concerned that anything that does happen is environmentally sound (and) is not going to provide any threat to the Pacific."

The U.S. Army will incinerate the chemical weapons stored on the island 700 nautical miles (1,300 kilometres) southwest of Hawaii together with thousands of weapons being shipped from U.S. bases in Germany.

U.S. President George Bush recently assured Pacific leaders that no more weapons would be shipped to the Coral Atoll, which measures less than one square mile (2.5 square kilometres).

The foreign affairs spokesman said: "We accepted the American argument that this was a one off thing."

The U.S. Army began test destruction on the atoll on June 30 and has so far destroyed more than 3,300 M-55 rockets and warheads.

Evans Wants International Chemical Arms Treaty

*BK1111144190 Hong Kong AFP in English 1423 GMT
11 Nov 90*

[By Robert Holloway]

[Text] Brisbane, Australia, November 11 (AFP)—Negotiations in Geneva for an international treaty to ban chemical weapons have reached a critical point as far as Asian and Pacific countries are concerned, Australia's foreign minister said Sunday.

Gareth Evans asked delegates to a regional seminar here to support Australia's call for a ministerial conference of the 39 negotiating countries. "It is crucial to send a message to Geneva," he said. "The security of this region simply cannot wait."

The two-day seminar, starting Monday, is the second organised by Australia since foreign ministers of 149 countries met in Paris in January 1989.

While Paris produced unanimity on the need to outlaw chemical weapons, differences remain on which chemicals should be banned, and what procedures are required to verify that a country is respecting the treaty.

Three countries from the region—Australia, Burma and Indonesia—are among 39 taking part in the Geneva talks.

The differences concern countries with sophisticated chemical industries, and those such as Iraq and Iran that could find themselves involved in a conflict involving the use of chemical arms. Australian officials at the seminar admitted that no Pacific island nation fell into either category.

But recently announced plans by the U.S. Army to destroy chemical weapons on Johnston Island, an atoll 1,130 kilometres (700 miles) southwest of Hawaii, have generated much unease among island countries.

Australia, which countered opposition to U.S. plans at the 15-nation South Pacific forum in Vanuatu in August, has offered to provide island states with scientific expertise and other help, Mr. Evans said. "No country should fear that at the end of the day it will be unable to adhere to the convention against chemical weapons," he said.

Delegates from some island countries said they might need help in policing a potential trade in lethal chemicals. Because the Pacific Islands are too small to be a market for narcotics—but could be a valuable transshipment point for smugglers—they might become a turning point for smugglers, the delegates said.

Mr. Evans did not spell out what assistance Australia might provide. But he said that the regional seminars had already become "something of a model" for other parts of the world including Latin America and "the volatile cauldron of the Middle East," where a similar meeting had taken place.

MONGOLIA

President Reveals Soviet Forces To Withdraw by 1992

OW1311080890 Tokyo KYODO in English 0700 GMT 13 Nov 90

[By Tim Johnson]

[Text] Tokyo, November 13 (KYODO)—Mongolian President Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat revealed Wednesday

that Soviet military forces and equipment will be withdrawn completely from Mongolia by February 1992, and indicated that the two countries are planning to amend their 1966 treaty of alliance. "In 1991, the (Soviet) combat troops will be withdrawn totally, and in the first month of 1992, the remaining hardware will be removed from Mongolia," Ochirbat said in an interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

Official sources said it appeared to be the first time that either Moscow or Ulaanbaatar has publicly revealed such a precise timetable for the total withdrawal of Soviet forces.

Ochirbat, who came to Japan to attend Monday's enthronement of Emperor Akihito, is the highest Mongolian official to visit here since diplomatic ties were established in 1981. Ochirbat said the removal of foreign forces from Mongolian soil will eliminate one of the main obstacles to his country's participation as a full-fledged member of the 100-nation Nonaligned Movement. He indicated the other main obstacle would be resolved when Mongolia does away with its formal alliance with the Soviet Union, saying, "both sides have agreed to revise, to look once again into the treaties and agreements signed in the past."

While Ochirbat did not specifically cite the 1966 bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty, he was responding to a question as to how Mongolia reconciles the principle of nonalignment with the articles in that treaty relating to a relationship of alliance.

Mongolia has traditionally relied on the Soviet Union as the guarantor of its territorial integrity against China. For the Soviet Union, Mongolia has served as a strategic buffer between it and China since its relations with that country soured in the 1960s. China, meanwhile, has opposed the presence of Soviet forces along its border with Mongolia, which at one point comes as close as 500 kilometers from Beijing.

In March 1990, the Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its combat units from Mongolia by the end of 1991, and said equipment support units would be removed some time in 1992. The forces, which stood at an estimated 55,000 soldiers in early 1989, are being withdrawn in line with Moscow's "new thinking" in the foreign policy arena, which has prompted the recent Soviet and Mongolian rapprochement with China. Queried on the percentage of Soviet forces already gone, Ochirbat said some 75 percent had left Mongolia.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Meet 3 Nov

Signing of CFE Arms Accord 'Delayed'

*LD0311120790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 3 Nov 90*

[Text] Istvan Kulcsar is on the line. He reports on the conference of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Budapest:

[Kulcsar] The signing of the document is delayed for the moment at the government residence at Szabadsag Hill. According to the original plans the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Polish Hungarian, Romanian, and Soviet foreign ministers should have signed an agreement on the upper limit of each of their countries' weapons at 1100 [1000 GMT]. The agreement will be appended to the treaty on the reduction of European conventional weapons and armed forces to be signed this month at the Paris summit.

Two of the six foreign ministers—the Czechoslovak and the Soviet, have not arrived in Budapest; Dienstbier due to health reasons, and Shevardnadze owing to pressure of work at home. They are represented by their deputies. The signing act is, of course, not delayed because of the absence of the two foreign ministers, but—as Foreign Ministry spokesman Janos Hermann has just said—because of technical reasons. I was unofficially informed that during the formulation of the agreement, the experts forgot about a matter of detail that cannot be disregarded, and this is what the negotiating sides are making clear at the moment. Thus, the signing of the agreement will presumably take place soon.

Accord Signed; Tanks To Be Stored

*LD0311171190 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1500 GMT 3 Nov 90*

[Excerpts] This afternoon in Budapest, high-ranking representatives of the diplomatic establishments of six countries signed the protocol which lays down the maximum level of armaments for individual countries. Istvan Kulcsar reports from the scene. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Who signed the agreement?

[Kulcsar] On behalf of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and (?Poland) it was the ministers, while on behalf of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia the deputy ministers signed. Shevardnadze and Dienstbier did not attend. Regarding Shevardnadze, the excuse was that he had a commitment, an engagement, at home, and as regards Dienstbier, he did not come for health reasons.

[Announcer] Did the participants accept this, or did they look for other political reasons behind the absences?

[Kulcsar] No, it is quite clear that there is no question of demonstrating. It is a joint agreement. This is not at

issue here. [passage omitted] The reason for the delay, we are told, is technical. This is almost true. Unofficially, I have heard the problem has come about because of placing in storage a proportion of the remaining tanks, which, by the way, is expensive. They now must agree on which country will store how many tanks. This was regulated in Prague last Sunday by the experts. So, it was this that had to be sorted out at the last minute. This is not some issue of high importance, or of principle, but it is more than a simple technical issue. This is just a leak, however, so I cannot say this officially.

[Announcer] What does storing tanks mean? What kind of arms reduction is that?

[Kulcsar] This does not mean that a good number of decommissioned tanks will be melted down. Part of those remaining are in an absolute [word indistinct] state, and a part of these go into storage. In other words, these are within the quota which remains. As far as I know, these can be used whenever they want them, but they are simply not needed all the time. [passage omitted] The debate focused on how many of these were to be stored in the various countries' territory. [passage omitted]

CSFR Weapons Levels Detailed

*LD0311192490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1730 GMT 3 Nov 90*

[Text] [Announcer] The representatives of the Warsaw Pact member states signed an agreement on maximum levels of conventional weapons in the capital of Hungary today. Tomas Borec, our Budapest correspondent, reports more in detail:

[Borec, in Slovak] The agreement was signed by the ministers of foreign affairs of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania; on behalf of the Soviet Union by Yuriy Krichinskiy, first deputy minister; and on behalf of Czechoslovakia by Robert Harencar, first deputy federal minister of foreign affairs.

The agreement determines the national level of conventional weapons and equipment for each individual state of the six, and it is in harmony with the total quota determined for the Warsaw Pact at the Vienna talks.

The signed agreement provides for Czechoslovakia a maximum of 345 combat planes—including air defense planes, 75 combat helicopters, and 1,435 tanks, as well as the total of 3,583 combat vehicles of different kinds, 1,150 pieces of artillery, and 50 (?bridge) tanks. To illustrate the numbers, it means that our number of tanks will be 7.2 percent of the total quota of the Warsaw Pact states, planes 5.1 percent, and artillery 5.8 percent.

The given numbers will come in force for the six Warsaw Pact states and 16 NATO states after an agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe is signed; the event is supposed to take place at the Paris summit during the second half of this month.

The signing of the agreement on national levels of conventional weapons and equipment was delayed today by almost four hours by a demand by the Soviet Union—in substance a new one—that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland store part of their weapons in special stores, as is allegedly supposed by the Soviet-U.S. agreement. The Czechoslovak delegation rejected this demand, which would require spending hundreds of millions of korunas. Nevertheless, in order not to put the signing of the main document in danger, it attached a statement to it which contains a proposal for a compromise solution.

This is yet another indication that although the talks concerned the quotas originally determined for the Warsaw Pact as one entity, its member states behaved as independent sovereign countries, acting above all on the basis of their national interests and new views on securing security in Europe.

Hungary's Jeszenszky Delivers Speech

*LD0311180790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 3 Nov 90*

[Report by correspondent Istvan Kuscsar on the meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Budapest on 3 November]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Geza Jeszenszky, [Hungarian] foreign minister, who as host delivered a speech at the signing [of the Warsaw Pact agreement on maximum armament levels], said that the agreement will not only bring about a large-scale reduction on our territory of the number of those weapons that can best be described as offensive, but that there will also evolve between the various states armament ratios that will guarantee a large degree of security to everyone. The Hungarian foreign minister cautioned against the states of the territory seeking security in unstable alliances, as they did between the two world wars. Instead of this, he urged the creation of an all-European security system.

In his reply, Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski highlighted that the agreement signed today is part of a long chain, the result of which will be a stable Europe.

In the afternoon the six foreign ministers and deputies were received by [Hungarian] Premier Jozsef Antall.

The statesmen held unofficial discussions among themselves as well. Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, for example, held an exchange of views with his Romanian colleague, Adrian Nastase.

The statesmen who had come to Budapest for the signing of the agreement briefed the international press at a news conference in the Hotel Intercontinental this afternoon. This news conference was still going on a few minutes ago.

Jeszenszky Urges 'Common Solutions'

*LD0311222790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 3 Nov 90*

[Report by correspondent Istvan Kulcsar on a news conference at the Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest on 3 November, including recorded remarks by Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] [passage omitted] Tonight the Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian foreign ministers held an international news conference. Our program was represented by Istvan Kulcsar:

[Kulcsar] In his introduction, Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky so to speak sketched the background against which the process of disarmament, of arms reduction, and today's agreement are to be seen.

[Begin Jeszenszky recording] In our territory—in Central and Eastern Europe—the indelible marks of two terrible wars live in people's heads and memories, and these two wars were in large measure waged in this territory. Since 1945, for nearly 50 years—half a century—now, there has been peace, which we are very happy about, but this peace was a peace founded on fear, and even at best it was only a peace based on the always uncertain balance of arms. Now, however, it is my conviction that we can create a stable peace, based on consensus. The reduction in armaments will not resolve the region's economic problems, but if the reduction in armaments does not occur, then the territory's economic problems will be unresolvable. [end recording]

[Kulcsar] After the signing ceremony and the festive luncheon, which was rushed through on account of the delay, the six statesmen were received in the parliament building by Premier Jozsef Antall. Speaking about this meeting, Geza Jeszenszky considered it necessary to highlight the following at the news conference:

[Begin Jeszenszky recording] Both Jozsef Antall and Mr. Skubiszewski, the Polish foreign minister, and I think my other colleagues as well, agreed that we are colleagues not only in our posts but also in our troubles, and that we must find common solutions to our economic and other problems, because the region's problems recognize no borders. [end recording]

[Kulcsar] In answer to the BBC correspondent's question, which was asked in English, the Hungarian foreign minister said, replying in English, that in his opinion the Warsaw Pact's military organization will cease to exist by the end of 1991. By the spring of 1992 at least the framework of an all-European security system will definitely evolve, which will make the Warsaw Pact completely superfluous.

In answer to a further question, Nastase, the Romanian foreign minister, said that in this he fully agrees with his Hungarian colleague. Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski voiced his opinion that the continuing existence of the Warsaw Pact political organization depends on the

member states, since it can be seen as a cooperational organization. Poland, he said, strives for the closest possible ties with the Soviet Union, for close relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the other states of the region. This however, can be realized even without the Warsaw Pact, and the latter will lose its significance in the new Europe.

Hungary's Antall Meets USSR's Kvitsinskiy

*LD0411030390 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2300 GMT 3 Nov 90*

[Excerpts] In Budapest representatives of the Warsaw Pact's six member states have signed the agreement that lays down how many conventional weapons the individual member states may keep. [passage omitted] After the signing, Jozsef Antall received all the guests and expressed his satisfaction that the Warsaw Pact representatives had signed the agreement. The Hungarian prime minister, in his office in parliament building, separately received Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kvitsinskiy whom he told our country wishes to shape a new kind of modern, correct, and realistic relationship with the Soviet Union.

Warsaw Pact Members Reach CFE Ceilings Accord

*LD0311195490 Moscow TASS in English 1907 GMT
3 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Zhirnikhin]

[Text] Budapest, November 3 (TASS)—The agreement on maximum levels of conventional armaments and hardware for Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in connection with the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe was signed here today.

An important step was made on the way to signing the treaty on conventional armaments, the preparation of which is now coming to an end in Vienna. The maximum levels of each type of armament for each country have been set. The Warsaw Treaty member states managed to settle this important package of problems within the framework of their consultation mechanisms, thus making a substantial contribution to the working out of the future treaty.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Deputy Foreign Minister on Pact CFE Arms Agreement

*LD2910112190 Prague Television Service in Czech
1830 GMT 28 Oct 90*

[Interview with Robert Harencar, CSFR first deputy foreign minister, and (Emil Antusak) and (Jiri Adamira), senior representatives of the CSFR Army General Staff, by unidentified announcer in the studio—live; Harencar

speaks in Slovak, and (Antusak) or (Adamira) speak once in Czech and once in Slovak]

[Text] [Announcer] A special commission of the Warsaw Pact held talks on disarmament in Prague yesterday and the day before yesterday [26-27 October] As we told you yesterday, this meeting, unlike the previous ones, was successful.

I now welcome to our studio Robert Harencar, [CSFR] first deputy minister of foreign affairs. Good evening. And (Emil Antusak and Jiri Adamira), senior representatives of the Czechoslovak Army General Staff. Good evening!

Mr. Deputy Minister, world agencies are attaching great importance to this agreement. Can you explain to us what, in fact, has been agreed on?

[Harencar] The aim of the agreement was to set ceilings for weapons and equipment for individual Warsaw Pact states, with the provision that after signing an agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe, they will be able to keep these ceilings. I would like to say that the talk proceedings were very demanding and thus we are very much pleased with the results. We are very pleased that we have managed, on the fourth attempt, to achieve ceilings about which there were very difficult negotiations indeed. We have agreed in our last round on the ceilings for tanks and the ceilings of artillery.

[Announcer] What was the role of Czechoslovakia during the talks?

[Harencar] We, in the Warsaw Pact framework, at present have the role of coordinator, thus we had to organize all these sessions. It seems that we have done this well; all of the delegations of the Warsaw Pact member states have expressed their praise to us.

[Announcer] I shall now turn to the representatives of the General Staff. What will this reduction mean specifically for the Czechoslovak Army?

[(Antusak) or (Adamira)] The results of the talks mean that the Czechoslovak Army will remove from its armament, will liquidate, more than 2,000 tanks and more than 2,000 artillery pieces, about 3,000 armored combat vehicles, about 60 planes, and 30 helicopters.

[Announcer] This means a considerable reduction. Will it be possible to insure the defense capability of the state with those numbers?

[(Antusak) or (Adamira)] In harmony with the new military doctrine, a new Czechoslovak Army concept is being prepared. In its drafting we have proceeded approximately from the numbers which are close to those which have been agreed on. The new concept envisages the creation of an army smaller in number but well equipped, and thus ready to insure the defense capability of the country.

[Announcer] I shall turn to the deputy minister again. Mr. Deputy Minister, the date for signing this agreement was set for 3 November. Does this mean that the Warsaw Pact summit will in fact take place on that date after all?

[Harencar] No. The Warsaw Pact summit will not take place. There will only be a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in Budapest on 3 November, and the agreement on weapons ceilings will be signed.

[Presenter] Thank you for the valuable information.

CFE Chief Delegate Comments on Effect of Treaty

LD1811232990 Prague CTK in English 1705 GMT 18 Nov 90

[Text] Vienna, November 18 (CTK)—Commitments arising for Czechoslovakia from the treaty on conventional armed forces cuts [CFE], initialled in Vienna by the heads of delegations of 22 Warsaw Pact and NATO member states today, were listed in an interview for CTK by head of the Czechoslovak delegation Ladislav Balcar.

Czechoslovakia can own a maximum of 1,335 tanks, 1,150 artillery systems, 2,050 armoured vehicles, 345 warplanes and 75 helicopters under the treaty, to be ratified at the Paris meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, starting tomorrow.

Among its commitments is to ensure the liquidation of weapons and hardware exceeding the set numbers and prepare for carrying out information and control measures.

The initialling of the treaty is an unprecedented step with far-reaching political and security effects, Balcar stated, adding that further talks on conventional armed forces would expand this positive process and that will also create the necessary external conditions for structural changes in the Czechoslovak Army.

Reservations on 1925 BW Protocol Withdrawn

AU3110083890 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 25 Oct 90 p 2

[Unattributed report in the "Just Briefly" column]

[Text] The CSFR representation in Paris passed onto the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs a document in which President Vaclav Havel withdraws Czechoslovak objections to the Geneva Protocol on the Ban of all Suffocating, Poisonous, and Bacteriological Mediums in Warfare. The protocol was signed in 1925 and the Czechoslovak Republic was one of the signatories. It requested, however, an exception if forced by the circumstances.

HUNGARY

Chief of Staff Happy With Warsaw Pact CFE Arms Level

LD0411133790 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0735 GMT 4 Nov 90

[Interview with Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, Hungarian chief of staff, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy by correspondent Istvan Kulcsar in Budapest on 3 November—from the "World Clock" program; passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Representatives of the member states of the Warsaw Pact signed an important document on Saturday. After the festive ceremony, Istvan Kulcsar interviewed several of the participants.

[Kulcsar] I asked Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief of staff, the following question: The ceilings have now been established for the armed forces of Eastern European countries—i.e., how many tanks, artillery batteries, and other traditional weapons they can have. Is this reassuring for Hungary from the aspect of having sufficient armaments remaining to repel a potential attack, or due to the fact that what remains in our neighboring countries is not disproportionately large?

[Borsits] *I can say frankly and with respect that this agreement ensures the retention of a sufficient quantity of force and means, and it stands the test of comparison with neighboring countries in a far-reaching way. If we look at the previous levels which we promulgated in January 1989—figures which are available to us—in comparison to that, the ratios will greatly improve in our favor.*

[Kulcsar] On behalf of the Soviet Union, alongside the chief of staff, it was Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy who signed the agreement rather than Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who, it was said, could not come to Budapest because of business at home. In view of the Soviet domestic situation, this was understood by everyone. I have asked Deputy Foreign Minister Kvitsinskiy about the future of the Warsaw Pact.

[Kvitsinskiy in Russian, with Kulcsar translating into Hungarian] *This depends on the way the members of the Pact shape this future. As for the military organization, we agreed in Moscow in June to gradually eliminate the military structures simultaneously with the evolution of the all-European security and stability structures. We shall decide, on the basis of the agreement by all participants, on the process of the elimination of these structures at the individual institutions. The political life of the Warsaw Pact will change in the same way as did the entire European situation. We shall place greater emphasis on consultations and political cooperation, and this cooperation will last in this or that new form as long as it is necessary. As to who will leave the military organization first—who wins in this respect—this is all pure speculation. Perhaps no one will win. In any case, we shall give the practical answer at the next session of the Political Consultative Council of the Warsaw Pact.*

[Kulcsar] Will this session which was originally scheduled for Budapest this weekend, but which was postponed, take place this year? I asked the Soviet deputy foreign minister.

[Kritsinskiy] *The date has not yet been determined.*

Foreign Ministry Official on CFE Agreements

AU0711085890 Budapest NEPSZAVA
in Hungarian 5 Nov 90 p 3

[Interview with David Meiszter, deputy state secretary of the Foreign Ministry, by Katalin Decsi in Budapest on 3 November 1990: "Hungarian Interests Have Not Suffered"]

[Text] [Decsi] What are the contents of the document that has just been signed?

[Meiszter] This agreement forms part of the treaty formulated in Vienna on the reduction of conventional forces [CFE], a treaty which limits the armed forces that can be maintained in Europe in five different categories (combat aircraft, attack helicopters, tanks, armoured carriers, and artillery.) First, the delegates decided on the forces that would remain on the entire area of our continent after the completion of reductions. Then, having divided this figure by two, they allotted two equal amounts to the groups of six and 16 states, respectively. The next task was for each group of states to divide the given amount among themselves. In other words, they established the maximum national quota for each country.

We succeeded in reaching an agreement after long negotiations, so we have now reached the stage where we could sign the agreement that would set these quotas. That will form part of the great Vienna treaty.

[Decsi] Did German unification influence the negotiations?

[Meiszter] Of course it influenced the negotiations because when we divided the European limit into two parts, the GDR was still an independent state. At the time, we still thought that the amount allotted to seven countries would be distributed in seven parts. After German unification, however, the so-called sub-limit allotted to this part of Europe was divided into six parts.

[Decsi] The agreement was originally made by two military blocs.

[Meiszter] I would say that when we began our work, we were still dealing with NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations; however, they soon continued between 23 (or 22) independent states. It was the Hungarian delegation who first pointed out that this agreement would only be durable if we also took national elements into account. Only then could we expect national parliaments to also accept the agreement; indeed, no body would sanction a collective pledge of duties unless it saw the clear outline of its own duties featured in the document. Thus, the negotiations

that had begun as a dialogue between two blocs turned into an exchange of views between sovereign states.

[Decsi] What would happen if the Warsaw Pact were dissolved?

[Meiszter] Nothing would happen, given that the treaty determines the duties of 22 states. After the negotiations, we decided that the structure that had already been established should not be changed, because that would mean returning to square one. Thus, the division into two groups of states remained, and that division happens to correspond to the NATO and Warsaw Pact lineup.

[Decsi] The treaty is going to be signed in Paris. What will happen after that?

[Meiszter] The negotiation process will continue after the summit because there are still several issues to be discussed.

[Decsi] Some people believe that "we sold our national security in Vienna."

[Meiszter] The negotiations were delicate because the security interests of all the countries were at stake; therefore, we treated everything that was said in Vienna with great discretion. I think that the Hungarian delegation acted in a gentlemanly way until the very end; we refused to talk in public about any issues which could have influenced the position of any of our negotiating partners. From that point of view, I think that some people are justified in thinking that our security interests may not have been represented in the best possible way. I can reassure everyone that once they see the figures, they will know that this was not the case. We gave Hungarian security interests the greatest consideration, and we secured these interests in the treaty. Indeed, compared to before, our situation has improved.

Hungarian 'Defense Concept' for CSCE Outlined

LD1011004390 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1900 GMT 9 Nov 90

[Text] Hungary has no image of an enemy, and she rejects any attempt to change borders by force. Ernoe Raffay said this at the plenary session of the CSCE negotiations in Vienna.

Speaking about the new Hungarian defense concept being elaborated, the state secretary said our homeland would like to shape an identical sense of security with the participants in the CSCE process, especially the neighboring countries. The size, battle order, and structure serve exclusively defensive objectives, Ernoe Raffay stressed.

Progress of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Noted*LD1311221590 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 13 Nov 90*

[Text] Our Veszprem correspondent, Gyula Horvath, reports that the last Soviet military unit has left Hajmasker. How far has the withdrawal of Soviet troops from our country progressed?

[Horvath] After the train pulled out from Hajmasker station, Colonel General Burlakov, commander of the Southern Army Group, held a news briefing in a suitable military tent set up near here. As he said, since March, 749 trains have left for the Soviet Union, accounting for 55 percent of the strength of the Southern Army Group here. Seventy-three percent of the offensive tanks have left. More than 65 percent of the Soviet artillery, more than 50 percent of the air force, and all the combat helicopters have left Hungary. The Soviet troops evacuated 16 military stations last year and 76 this year. The Hungarian-Soviet handover and takeover committee is keeping a record of assets totalling nearly 1 billion rubles—958 million transferable rubles, to be exact. Five thousand officers' apartments have been emptied in our country; at the same time, according to Burlakov, 4,500 of the officers have no apartment or house in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet general also spoke about the unsettled issues, noting that only 37 percent of the material stacks could be removed. He mentioned that there has been no Hungarian interest shown in fuel or storage space, therefore, Soviet foreign trade personnel will look for purchasers.

Defense Minister's Announcement on Arms Reduction*LD1611191290 Budapest MTI in English 1707 GMT
16 Nov 90*

["Announcement by the Hungarian Minister of Defence"—MTI headline]

[Text] Budapest, November 16 (MTI)—Having taken into account the results of the process of European detente and confidence-building, the changes in the relations of the two blocs, previously in opposition, and the processes inside the Warsaw Treaty, moreover in compliance with the basic principles of Hungarian defence policy, the Government of the Republic of Hungary has decided on the following:

All ground-ground [surface-to-surface] missiles and related appliances, capable of carrying military warheads, are to be scrapped from the arms stockpiles of the Hungarian defence forces, so further promoting the cause of peace in Europe and friendly relations with our neighbours.

The military organizations established in connection with these missiles and appliances are to be abolished or put on to other tasks, with due haste.

The Government of the Republic of Hungary is convinced that this measure of unilateral disarmament will contribute to the creation of good-neighbourly relations, free from suspicion and removing the sense of threat. The measure may also be received favourably by countries coming within range of the missiles—and finally, in wider terms, by the community of Europe at large.

The government thinks that the European process, with what should be its milestone next week with the summit meeting in Paris, can only steam ahead from now on, and bilateral talks be launched on further arms reductions and confidence-building measures.

With this unilateral step, the Hungarian Government anticipates the processes of 1991-1992, thereby hoping to be the catalyst for future talks and perhaps, for steps by other countries in the direction of unilateral disarmament.

Defense Minister Details Unilateral Arms Cuts*LD1611213390 Budapest MTI in English 1715 GMT
16 Nov 90*

[Excerpt] Budapest, November 16 (MTI)—Hungarian minister of defence, Lajos Fur, announced a package of unilateral disarmament measures on Hungary's part, in front of Hungarian and foreign journalists in parliament on Friday.

He said the strategic arms to be immediately withdrawn from the stockpiles of the Hungarian defence forces include nine launch pads and their 24 Scud-B Missiles, with a range of 280-300 kilometres, a further 18 launch pads and their 107 Frog-7 missiles with a range of 70-80 kms. These armaments will be destroyed on Hungarian territory.

From the peacetime Hungarian defence forces, 3,200 people were responsible for missiles, 900 of them officers and junior officers.

The current costs of maintaining the missile corps are 100 million forints per year, with their related activities requiring an annual 10-15 million forints. These sums will be put on one side from now on. Staff cuts will only affect 800 people, with the others being transferred.

Fur added that this corps was not in possession of nuclear warheads, only having the appliances for carrying them. [passage omitted]

Missile Decision Called 'Political Gesture'*LD1611194290 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 16 Nov 90*

[Interview with Defense Ministry spokesman Colonel Gyorgy Keleti by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Announcer] At today's briefing by the government spokesman, Defense Minister Lajos Fur announced that for the purpose of promoting European peace and a good relationship with our neighbors which is free of suspicion, surface-to-surface missiles capable of conveying warheads of mass destruction will be immediately dismantled from the units of the Hungarian Army.

Defense Ministry spokesman Colonel Gyorgy Keleti explains this. He replied to questions from our editor:

[Reporter] Does the announcement have military significance or political significance?

[Keleti] Both, of course, but I give priority to the political significance. Because the Hungarian Government has spoken now with very great respect about the agreement expected in Paris, and although it values this agreement very highly, it has made a political gesture because it is the unilateral reduction of a weapon-type which does not figure at the Vienna talks or at the signing ceremony expected in Paris next week.

[Reporter] Can we learn how many surface-to-surface missiles we had?

[Keleti] Strictly speaking, we had 27 launch platforms and 131 missiles.

[Reporter] People are interested in whether Hungary's defense might not weaken at such a time.

[Keleti] Not the defense of Hungary, because as I have said these are offensive weapons. In my view, the government is devoting special attention so that there exists the system of means appropriate for the Army's defense capability within the Army—for the independent military doctrine, which will, of course, take shape later, but the outlines of which are now appearing....

[Reporter, interrupting] Which is a defense doctrine....

[Keleti] ...and this is expressly a defense doctrine. We are preparing not for offense, but for the defense of our country's sovereignty and security, and exemplary decisions and disarmament resolutions of this type hopefully will elicit a reaction in neighbouring countries.

CFE Chief Delegate Discusses Agreement

Hungarian Reductions Noted

*LD1611101190 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0500 GMT 16 Nov 90*

[Text] Hungary has to reduce the number of its tanks by 40 percent and also its armaments, that is armored vehicles and artillery, but by a smaller amount. Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, leader of the Hungarian delegation participating in the Vienna arms reduction talks, said this in connection with the agreement which is to be signed in three days' time at the Paris all-European summit. The agreement states that Hungary can keep

835 tanks, 1,700 armored vehicles, 840 artillery pieces, 180 fighter planes, and 180 fighter helicopters.

Calls Results 'Favorable'

*LD1611203190 Budapest MTI in English 1732 GMT
16 Nov 90*

[Text] Vienna, November 15 (MTI)—The outcome of the Vienna talks on European military security will allow Hungary to cut its armed force in size and increase its efficiency, Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Hungarian delegation, told MTI's Vienna correspondent.

"For Hungary, it is important that the country is completely free in shaping its relations with the Warsaw Pact without jeopardising the implementation of the agreement," Istvan Gyarmati stated.

The minimum arms quotas the agreement stipulates for Hungary are 835 tanks, 1,700 armoured vehicles, 840 artillery devices, 180 military aircrafts and 108 assault helicopters. This enables us to considerably reduce the number of ground armaments, in keeping with the adopted army reform plan, while giving the green light for the development of military helicopters and the air forces which are essential for modern defensive operations," the ambassador said. [quotation marks as received]

Gyarmati also pointed out that the agreement, when implemented, would contribute to the emergence of sounder military power relations between Hungary and her neighbours than those brought about by the distorted army development adjusted to the offensive ambitions of the Warsaw Pact.

"The results from the Vienna talks are very favourable for Hungary. They are expected to lay the foundations for a new European co-operative security system which will help prevent a 'security vacuum' coming about in Central-East Europe after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.

"The new military relationship in Hungary's immediate proximity reduces the possibility of the country becoming the target of an external military attack. Hungary will be able to change its disadvantageous army structure stemming from her Warsaw Pact membership into a smaller but far more effective armed force suited more to defence purposes and the country's economic potential," Istvan Gyarmati said.

General Discusses Soviet Troop Withdrawal

Notes Financial Disagreements

*LD1811213190 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 18 Nov 90*

[Andras Gellert report]

[Text] General Antal Annus presented a report on the Soviet troop withdrawal to parliament this week. Following this, the Soviet ambassador expressed the view

that the Hungarian negotiating partners are trying to blame the lack of progress in negotiations about withdrawal on the Soviet partners. This statement also appeared in the Hungarian press. We asked the General his view on the position taken by the Soviet ambassador. The reporter is Andras Gellert.

[Gellert] First of all, General Antal Annus denied the supposition that disputes over the financial demands mean that the withdrawal of Soviet troops is not taking place according to plans.

[Begin Annus recording] There are serious disputes and differences of opinion over property rights and financial questions. We demand compensation from the Soviet partners for the damages resulting from neglect of the maintenance and renewals, which would have been obligatory under the leasing agreements, and to jointly assess the environmental pollution and the damages arising from this. [end recording]

[Gellert] The Soviet partner, however, as they said in their statement, does not want anything but the refund of money invested; this amounts to 50 billion forints. They also referred to the suggestion they made at the final stages of the negotiations on troop withdrawal, that the sums demanded for military bases could be compensated for by the Hungarian partners, through the creation of joint venture companies.

[Begin Annus recording] The Soviet partner handed over a list, which included the buildings about which they had ideas for joint venture companies. We asked the Soviet partners, on the basis of the list, to provide us with detailed economic information which will be examined by Hungarian economic experts. The Hungarian partners look favorably at these proposals, but we have not yet received this information. [end recording]

Denies Blame for Slow Withdrawal

*LD1811231490 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1900 GMT 18 Nov 90*

[Excerpts] "You have tried unilaterally to place the responsibility on the Soviet side for the lack of success of the talks connected with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops," said the Soviet Embassy in its statement reacting to the way Antal Annus briefed the Foreign Affairs Committee in parliament. The general asked to reply to this, and while he said that the technical part of the troop withdrawal is proceeding according to the agreement, there are disputes and differences of views in property rights and financial issues. General Antal Annus is before the camera and the microphone of "Newsreel". [passage omitted]

[Annus] General Burlakov held out the prospect that he would have several buildings dismantled if we do not repay the expenditures spent on these. I replied in a telegram, and also in a letter. I told General Burlakov that they must not do this, because, on the one hand, it is contrary to the agreements. On the other hand, it will drastically devalue the demands of the Soviet side.

The Soviet side says it wants to get back its expenditures. In my opinion, it will hardly be able to get back all expenditures, for the simple reason that not every building erected with the expenditures can be used economically. If a thing can not be utilized, then let it be seen that this is at the risk of the Soviet side. They ought to bear this.

The Soviet side has said that the Soviet Union is interested in a rapid solution, expressing the interests of both sides. Accordingly, we must insist on this consistently, because the way to an agreement leads through the reciprocal interests being considered.

ROMANIA

Spokesman Comments on Warsaw Pact CFE Accord

*AU0111214590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
2039 GMT 1 Nov 90*

[Excerpt] Bucharest, 1 November (ROMPRES)—In his weekly press conference held Thursday, 1 November Foreign Ministry Spokesman Train Chebeleu touched on the following topics:

The convention on maximum quotas of conventional armament and combat equipment to be ratified by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest on 3 November, will be signed, for Romania, by Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase. The Romanian delegations to the sessions of the Warsaw Pact special commissions for disarmament showed initiative in finding solutions acceptable to all parties. In compliance with this agreement, Romania is to cut its present stockpiles to less than half. In assessing its defense requirements and in adhering to this agreement, Romania has in view the new conditions in Europe, where the two alliances no longer regard each another as opponents, but on the contrary, they cooperate to strengthen mutual confidence and promote a new climate of understanding and cooperation. [passage omitted]

Soviet Appeal To Cease Nuclear Tests Backed

*AU0511194590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1649 GMT 5 Nov 90*

[Text] Bucharest, 5 November (ROMPRES)—Romania's Parliament welcomes with great interest the initiative of the USSR Supreme Soviet to launch an appeal for the cessation of all nuclear tests, reads that document approved by the Assembly of Deputies in its November 5 session after it had been adopted by the Senate on October 30, 1990.

The document expresses the conviction that the intervention of the other countries' parliaments and of the world public opinion will determine the states making nuclear tests to take measures for the total and general cessation of nuclear tests and for the concluding of agreements to guarantee the accomplishment of that desideratum, a major imperative of our times.

Call for Balkan Contribution to Peace, Security

*AU0511194690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1758 GMT 5 Nov 90*

[Text] Bucharest, 5 November (ROMPRES)—The Foreign Policy Commission of the Romanian Parliament proposes to the similar institutions of the other Balkan countries the organization of a meeting, either in Bucharest or in another capital city in the first decade [ten-day period] of December to discuss tangible modalities through which parliamentarians can stimulate the cooperation of the states in the area, to enhance their contribution to building a general climate of European peace and security.

This suggestion is formulated in a letter of the Commission Chairman Corneliu Manescu, approved in the Monday session of the Assembly of Deputies.

It should be mentioned that a proposal has been recently launched concerning the setting up of the forum for security and cooperation in the Balkans, which takes over and develops the traditions of the relations in the zone, placing them in the context of the new stage of the CSCE.

POLAND

Deputy Minister on Troop Withdrawal Talks With USSR

*LD1511200190 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1800 GMT 15 Nov 90*

[Interview with Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jerzy Makarczyk by correspondent Andrzej Siezieniewski in Moscow on 15 November—recorded]

[Text] [Siezieniewski] The first round of negotiations on the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish territory took place here today. They were conducted by Deputy Foreign Ministers Jerzy Makarczyk and Yuliy Kvitsinskiy. This is what the chairman of the Polish delegation told me just after the talks ended.

[Makarczyk] A moment ago, we ended the first round of detailed Polish-Soviet negotiations, above all, on a treaty for the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. In accordance with political decisions, the draft treaty was presented to the Soviet side two months ago. Today, detailed decisions were negotiated item by item. Our talks also concerned issues involving the transit of Soviet troops through Polish territory. We stressed that a treaty between states must also be concluded.

The legal basis for the entire, huge, unbelievably complex operation of withdrawing troops must be a Polish-Soviet international agreement. This agreement must encompass the principles and basis of the transit, as well as a whole series of detailed issues, such as transit routes, traffic safety, ecological issues, [word indistinct] everything that crops up.

Detailed discussions took place on the least damaging—since it is difficult to describe them as anything else—transit routes. Of course, maritime transport would be best. In the nature of things, it is limited. We place rail transport in second place, and road transport in final place, as a necessary evil only where it is not possible to use other means of transport.

Four working groups were formed. It was decided that Poland will present a draft treaty on transit to the Soviet side, which means that once again, the initiative is ours, and the next round of talks will take place in Warsaw at the beginning of December.

These are unbelievably complex problems for the Soviet side. We understand their difficulties, but at the same time, we take the clear position that for us the fundamental and primary issue is the conclusion of a treaty on withdrawal. Naturally, we understand the importance of transit issues in the European process. We see the need for harmonization. For us, the fundamental issue, which the Russians understand, is the issue of troop withdrawal.

[Siezieniewski] Mr. Minister, can we already speak of a deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland?

[Makarczyk] The Polish side maintains the position that was contained in the draft treaty on withdrawal, that is, the end of 1991. We will be able to give more details on this subject after the end of the second round of talks. We conducted preliminary talks today. In any case, our position is the same as that presented in the draft treaty.

CHILE

Spanish Role in Chilean FAE Project Confirmed

91ES0168A Madrid EL TIEMPO in Spanish
29 Oct 90 pp 47-53

[Report by Fernando Rueda: "Defense Ministry Knew About Sale of Spanish Bomb to Chilean Trafficker"]

[Text] Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen confirmed last week that he is working with the Spanish firm M.S. System on the development of the lethal FAE [Fuel Air Explosive] bomb. The Defense Ministry was aware of this business relationship, which TIEMPO uncovered last week.

The Defense Ministry had all of the data on the contract that the Spanish firm M.S. System signed with Chilean arms trafficker Carlos Cardoen, a contract that led to the sale of deadly FAE bombs to Saddam Husayn's regime.

CESID [Defense Intelligence Service] is in possession of the data on the sale of Spanish technology to Carlos Cardoen so that he could transfer it to Libya and from there to Iraq. Military espionage is charged by law with monitoring Spain's defense industry in order to prevent, among other things, certain technologically advanced Spanish weapons from reaching countries on the black list. The FAE bomb is among the weapons that cannot be exported to any country, and Iraq is a nation that the Socialist government has prohibited from receiving any of our arms. In spite of all this, as TIEMPO revealed in an exclusive last week, Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn will have Spanish weapons available for use against likely Israeli targets in the event that Western forces try to recover Kuwait.

Last week Chilean industrialist Carlos Cardoen confirmed through his official spokesman that he and the Spanish company M.S. System are looking into the possibility of developing and producing the FAE bomb in Chile. Ismael Vicuna, the general manager of Industrias Cardoen [Incar], said that the August explosions in Chile's Atacama Desert were tests of the MK82 and MK83 bombs, their purpose being to "compare their pressure curve with that of the FAE bomb."

Preliminary Stage

Cardoen's spokesman asserted that the new bomb has not been developed: "It is in a very preliminary research stage, so it is not in production or under development or even in prototype." The bomb that Vicuna is talking about is the one that they want to develop on the basis of the Spanish FAE bomb, but he did not mention the sale of the Spanish weapon, which has already been completed, Jorge Faundes reports.

According to the various sources that this magazine consulted, the Spanish connection in this multimillion-dollar arms deal has its origin in Explosivos Alaveses (Expal), a company headed by Eugenio Muniz and

whose manager is Manuel Gurrea. The company specializes in the manufacture of aerial bombs, artillery, and mines. In recent years its financial performance has been very satisfactory, because, according to the official version, it has had major multiyear contracts. Nevertheless, its current strength is not unrelated to the fine management that it has had in the 1980's, as several interesting "products" have combined with an intelligent international policy.

Middleman

Thanks to this combination Expal's stock rose sharply, and its weapons became notorious. Gomez Ulla Hospital in Madrid can provide strong evidence of this, as a number of individuals wounded by Iranian chemical weapons spent several months there. Spanish Army Colonel Manuel Dominguez Carmona visited Iran as part of a UN mission and saw for himself that the bomb containers belonged to Expal.

The company is now again in the news. It is the only one in Spain that has FAE bomb technology, because M.S. System, according to all of the circles we consulted, is an altogether unknown company that could not possibly, on its own, have the facilities for producing a bomb that only four countries in the world have.

For this reason, various sources feel that Expal could have used M.S. System as a middleman in selling the weapon abroad. In this case, Expal would have no legal liability, even if the channel used to export the bomb overstepped the bounds of the law.

According to the experts that this magazine consulted, this approach is customary, not exceptional in this type of deal. When arms companies, both state-run and private, think that they can do business with countries that are on the black list, they contract the services of middlemen and wash their hands of the transaction. At times the middleman companies themselves take the initiative, as their job is also to seek out buyers who cannot use legal channels.

M.S. System is the least known of such companies. Others, however, such as Gamesa and International Technology, which are similar to it, are very popular in arms-trafficking circles. According to investigators like Vicenc Fisas, the two companies have helped weapons manufacturers such as Santa Barbara to violate international embargoes. Some of these firms are in the habit of changing names, even every year, to prevent monitoring by intelligence services and to avoid investigative journalists. International Technology Equipment (ITESA) is headed by Luis Escalada Ruiz, who is among the most knowledgeable of men when it comes to the international arms trade.

Official Expal sources have officially denied that their company has contacts with Chile in general and with Carlos Cardoen in particular. They claim that "we're competitors and we have neither an accord nor pacts nor contracts."

Besides denying that they manufacture chemical weapons, they denied having ties with M.S. System. An investigation of this company revealed that no one knew of its existence and that it does not even appear in the business register.

Official Silence

The Defense Ministry is apparently not worried about the existence in Spain of a program to research bombs as lethal as the FAE or about their turning up in Iraq. Although Minister Narcis Serra initially acknowledged that work may have been done in this field in Spain, his only concern later was to deny that this was a nuclear weapon.

Defense Minister Narcis Serra feels that there should be no mention of the most secret programs and starts changing the subject when asked about them. Nevertheless, he has not gone so far as to deny the obvious: that the government-run National Institute of Aerospace Technologies monitored the tests that Explosivos Alaveses conducted in Spain on the FAE bomb; that the General Directorate of Weapons and Materiel (DGAM) contributed 48 million pesetas to the research into the weapon, and that the Defense Ministry itself handed over 125 million for its manufacture.

The government and its defense minister, Serra, have not explained either why they allowed the technology of a weapon paid for with public monies to leave Spain through "far from customary" channels.

Government sources have categorically denied that official permission to do business with Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen has anything to do with the release of Spanish hostages in Iraq, "because nothing has been given in exchange."

Investigating Cardoen

Sources in the General Directorate of Weapons and Materiel have told TIEMPO, regarding Cardoen's holdings in Spain, that they are aware of his share in Industrias Metalurgicas Estrategicas Cantabricas (IMECSA), which is headquartered in Pontejos, Santander. They assured us, however, that "there have been no official exchanges between DGAM and IMECSA for more than five years now."

Cardoen's company does not appear on the official list of businesses that work with the Defense Ministry, which means that it is not obliged to periodically furnish documentation on the jobs that it is doing and on its operations.

Moreover, it has not taken part in any public bidding in recent years, "and thus anything that it might be doing has nothing to do with us," the above DGAM sources add.

The fact that the Chilean arms merchant's Spanish company is not in the Defense Ministry's register has led Chilean circles to believe that it could be manufacturing

components of weaponry, mainly cluster bombs, which Incar, Cardoen's parent company, sells all over the world and which have made him a multimillionaire.

Carlos Cardoen, who is as famous as Armenian trafficker Dino Seferian, is not a man with whom one does business by mistake. Although it is not known whether it was the Spanish or the Chilean company that began the negotiations, there can be no doubt that M.S. System knew perfectly well that the only way to place its product overseas was by utilizing Cardoen's international network.

These contacts have enabled it in recent years to market its weapons and those of its "friends" in every country that is at war and in those that have been blackballed internationally. It is no accident that it has stable commercial relations with companies in Spain, South Africa, Israel, Brazil, and Arab countries like Iran and Iraq.

Its name cropped up in the intrigue surrounding the sale of arms to Iran, part of which is known worldwide as the "Irangate" scandal, in which U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North was a principal.

Its relationship with Iraq has been much more lively. In recent years it signed an accord with Saddam Husayn for the construction of two weapons factories on the outskirts of Baghdad. One was to produce aerial bombs and the other, fuses. When Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait on 2 August, the factories had not yet been completed. A few details remained, but Cardoen wanted to halt work in order to avoid the international censure that giving official aid to Saddam Husayn would bring.

The Iraqi leader authorized the departure of all Latin American citizens but prevented seven Chilean engineers who were working in the factories from leaving the country until the projects were completed. It was vitally important to Husayn to have as many weapons as he could, and he wanted Cardoen to fulfill their business agreement.

Several weeks later, however, the seven Chileans were authorized to leave Iraq. Officially there was no quid pro quo. Cardoen knew that if his men helped to finish the factories, no country, Spain included, would do business with him again, not even under the table. It could have marked the end of the agreement between M.S. System and Incar, the arms dealer's company.

But Cardoen convinced Saddam Husayn to allow his workers to leave. What no one knows is what the arms seller may have committed himself to in exchange for the lives of his men.

Arrival of U.S. Nuclear Carrier Draws Protest

*PY3110203190 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0126 GMT
31 Oct 90*

[Text] Santiago, 30 October (EFE)—The Chilean Committee for Disarmament and Denuclearization [Comite Chileno por el Desarme y la Desnuclearizacion] today

protested over the scheduled arrival on 31 October in Chilean waters of the USS Abraham Lincoln, a Nimitz-class U.S. aircraft carrier that carries nuclear weapons in her hold.

The committee contends that the ship's arrival "violates the principle of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America. It also indicates that the Chilean Government, as the host country, acquiesces to the presence of a foreign nuclear vessel within our territorial waters."

This pacifist group states that "the government and Congress must review and study the national policies

and regulations concerning the presence and passage of nuclear weapons through Chilean waters."

The committee noted that the U.S. Navy reported 383 accidents involving nuclear weapons during the 1965-1977 period and that U.S. aircraft carriers have been involved in 229 accidents between 1945 and 1988.

The CVN-72 USS Abraham Lincoln carrier was built last year and carries 20 F/A 18 fighters, 16 A-6E Intruder bombers, and eight S-3 Viking jet planes. It is scheduled to stay in the port of Valparaiso for five days before returning to its base in the Air Naval station of Alameda, California.

IRAQ

Use of Medicine for Chemical, Biological Arms Denied

JN0911112090 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1051 GMT
9 Nov 90

[Text] Baghdad, 9 November (INA)—An official spokesman at the Foreign Ministry today made the following statement to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY:

On 7 November, news agencies reported statements made by the chairwoman of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee and Finland's representative at the Council claiming that Iraq has imported large quantities of medicines to the extent that she fears they may be used in the manufacture of biological or chemical weapons. The Finnish representative said that although she had no evidence of this, she had some fears that this

has happened because Iraq has apparently ordered 10 years' worth of medical supplies.

Iraq categorically denies this overt, prejudiced allegation. It is known that pharmaceuticals cannot be stored for long periods of time, and that the expiration time for medicines ranges between one and five years. This unequivocally refutes the Finnish representative's claims from a scientific viewpoint. We also wish to point out that a number of states have not yet allowed Iraq to buy medicines, and that some of the orders made before 2 August 1990—the value of which was paid by Iraq—were not delivered by some states, particularly the United States of America.

This statement, which is based on clear fabrications, is designed to place additional restrictions on the export of medicines to Iraq—which is being done by some good people—and at absorbing the humanitarian anger against the U.S. measures to prevent medicine from reaching Iraq.

GENERAL

Cosmonauts Speak Out Against Nuclear Weapons*PM3110101590 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 26 Oct 90*

[Report by Petr Orlov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Orlov] Unusual topics crop up in the space-earth communications channel from time to time. This is what happened on this occasion.

Postponing their reportage on preparations for the space-walk scheduled for 30 October, their scientific work, and their state of health—which, incidentally, is fine—the crew deemed it their duty to state their stance on nuclear tests, including the latest explosion at our test site in Novaya Zemlya.

[Manakov] We support the initiative of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace on drafting a people's treaty outlawing nuclear weapons and their development, production, and testing. If the USSR Supreme Soviet, the legislatures of other nuclear powers, and the legislatures of countries that have the potential to produce nuclear weapons backed this initiative not just with words but with legislative actions, this would create a realistic chance of ridding our planet once and for all of the threat of nuclear winter and self-annihilation.

[Orlov] How can space contribute to this? This year our crews have tested instruments for the remote identification of sources of heightened radiation from orbit. It is known that instruments used to study remote galactic radiation could also be used to identify similar phenomena on earth. So that space backing for efforts to prevent a nuclear winter are not just empty words.

This, incidentally, applies also to preventing a lethal artificial summer. This week the Soviet meteorological satellite Meteor-3 was for the first time successfully linked up with the U.S. TOMS [Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer] apparatus. So far only on earth. [video shows operation] The objective of this project is to monitor the planet's ozone layer which protects it from ultra-violet radiation. We will keep you informed about this unique project to be launched in 1991.

U.S. Defense Cuts Called Not 'Substantive'*PM0211143990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Nov 90 First Edition p 3*

["Commentator's Column" by V. Vinogradov: "Well-Trodden Path"]

[Text] On the eve of their recess in connection with the coming elections, the House of Representatives and Senate adopted the final version of the bill on the country's military budget. It stipulates that U.S. military spending in the new fiscal year—which started 1 October, incidentally—will amount to \$268 billion (not counting the cost of Pentagon operations in the Gulf). If

one concentrates purely on the figures, this sum is \$18 billion less than requested by the Bush administration and \$15 billion lower than last year's military spending.

This year the U.S. Defense Department's budget request was painstakingly studied by various committees of both houses of Congress. And a number of legislators expressed the definite opinion that, under the conditions of the end of the "cold war," Washington could quite easily have embarked on substantive military spending cuts and opposed the continuation of such costly programs as the creation [sozdaniye] of the B-2 strategic bomber and the ATF fighter, or the further development [razrabotka] of SDI.

However, the Bush administration ultimately managed to defend what it saw as the most important military programs, although some of them have been cut back. Thus, the Pentagon has obtained \$2.7 billion for "Star Wars" (having asked for \$4.7 billion). The sum allocated for land-based ICBM's has also been cut. Although the administration had requested \$2.2 billion for the production and rail-mounting of MX missiles, the Pentagon will get \$680 million. A sum of \$202 million is allocated for the creation [sozdaniye] of Midgetman ballistic missiles. Under the bill the U.S. Armed Forces are to be cut by almost 80,000 men. But it was specially stipulated that the reduction in Armed Forces numbers should not affect the overall condition of U.S. troops.

In this respect the statement made by U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney the other day in Pittsburgh is of definite interest. As he put it, at a time when the "threat of a sudden global war has evaporated," the United States will "purposefully review over the next two to three years the basic premises on which its military power is based." In this connection he expressed the idea of adopting a "new scenario for the formation of the Armed Forces" and of focusing efforts on developing "regional military contingents" such as the grouping currently in the Persian Gulf.

In general, the views expressed by S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, prevailed in defining the cuts in the U.S. military budget. It was he who resolutely opposed radical cuts in Pentagon spending during the ratification of the final version of the military appropriations, citing events in the Gulf and the "modernization of Soviet strategic forces."

It is therefore no accident that certain U.S. legislators believe that the cuts do not wholly accord with the recent improvement in the international situation—that is, they could have been more significant. Thus, in the opinion of Senator W. Roth, the Pentagon's current budget does not reflect the "most impressive political changes in the Western world since World War II," and Congress failed to make the necessary cuts in full measure "owing to a still-prevalent 'cold war' mentality."

For his part, Senator T. Wirth expressed the opinion that the U.S. military budget had been adopted without taking account of such an important and undoubted

factor as the reduction in the "Soviet military threat." "We should continue," he noted, "to insist on cutting military appropriations at least to the average level prevailing before the Reagan administration took office."

In short, and summing up what has been said, it should be noted that, despite the positive changes in the international arena, the U.S. Congress has followed a well-trodden path: Instead of making substantive cuts to military appropriations, it has again allocated many billions of dollars for armaments.

Restrictions on Arms Transfers to Third World Urged

PM0611103190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Nov 90 Second Edition p 4

["My Opinion" article by PRAVDA Political Observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "Why Cast Boomerangs?"]

[Text] It never entered anyone's head that the end of the cold war could have undesirable side effects. But it is a historical paradox that the cessation of confrontation between East and West could give rise to a "threat from the South," if a wave of abandoned weapons hits the developing countries, fanning the coals of old regional conflicts and sparking off new ones. Yet each of them—as the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait illustrates—threatens to undermine international security, that is, they have a boomerang effect as far as we are concerned.

Even if military rivalry between the two superpowers becomes a thing of the past, it is doubtful whether the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America will smartly shrug off the cold war legacy: the confrontation mentality and the tendency to regard combat potential as the best guarantee of state independence and international prestige. The worldwide proliferation of mass destruction weapons is not a new problem. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the first barrier against this danger. It has been subscribed to by over 140 states, which have gained access to the peaceful use of the atom in exchange for a commitment not to produce nuclear warheads.

For all its flaws, a nonproliferation arrangement does exist in this sphere. Which, unfortunately, cannot be said of missiles. Participants in ongoing or potential conflicts, such as Israel and Egypt, Iraq and Iran, India and Pakistan, are capable of producing them. The consequences of the former tiff between Moscow and Beijing were a factor here, as well as the rivalry between Washington and Moscow. In creating its missiles Delhi used, in particular, Soviet technology, while Islamabad used Chinese. Therefore it seems to me desirable that the USSR and the PRC should subscribe to the "big seven" accord: In 1987 the United States, Japan, the FRG, Britain, France, Italy, and Canada jointly decided to restrict exports of missiles and the technology for their production.

But the "threat from the South" which could replace the East-West confrontation is by no means confined to nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. In mid-November the Helsinki process participants are to sign an agreement in Paris on the radical reduction of forces and conventional armaments in Europe. Thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, guns, and aircraft are to be withdrawn. What could be more gratifying, you might think. But serious analysts in the West are displaying concern about something that really should worry us, too, lest there be a "pseudoconversion;" that is, the transfer of this enormous mass of combat equipment to a Third World filled with contradictions.

Our long-standing opponents and recent partners have another cause for anxiety: First, the biggest reductions will fall to the lot of the Warsaw Pact countries and, second, it is the USSR and its allies that particularly need hard currency at the moment. Will the East be able to resist the temptation to put its affairs in order by selling tanks and guns? According to the forecasts, the annual volume of world weapons exports could again reach the record level of the early eighties: \$50-60 billion, compared with the current \$30-40 billion. I would hope that the relevant Soviet departments would be farsighted enough to avoid easy solutions which could be costly later.

Without questioning each state's right to individual and collective defense, it is time to devise precise rules governing the sale and supply of weapons and give them the formal shape of an international convention. The Soviet stance on this score is set out in a letter from the USSR foreign minister to the UN secretary general. In order to limit the flow of combat equipment from one region to another what is needed above all is glasnost. Moscow supports the idea that all countries submit annual data to the United Nations both on military budgets and on exports or imports of weapons. The register would aid the switch from superarmament to reasonable defense sufficiency, prevent the creation of offensive potentials, and stop the spread of the most lethal means of warfare.

Now that the cold war is over, it would be a good idea, I think, to create something along the lines of the notorious Coordinating Committee on Export Controls. Not to keep the West's scientific-technical achievements from the East, but to prevent the transfer of the arms race from the North to the South. Otherwise the great powers would not in fact be disarming but would be casting boomerangs at their own and others' expense.

Petrovskiy Interviewed on Disarmament Issues

PM1411095390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Nov 90 First Edition p 5

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy by correspondent Al. Stepanov: "Disarmament Is a Global Matter"]

[Text] The ongoing 45th session of the UN General Assembly in New York is actively discussing disarmament problems. A PRAVDA correspondent discussed our country's position on the fundamental question of international relations with V.F. Petrovskiy, deputy head of the USSR delegation and deputy foreign minister.

[Stepanov] Vladimir Fedorovich, on entering a peaceful period in its development, mankind is shedding surplus weapons. An unprecedented agreement between the USSR and the United States on a significant reduction of strategic offensive armaments is in the offing. Europe is on the verge of an accord on the radical reduction of military potentials and is prepared to embark in the very near future on the elaboration of qualitatively different principles for safeguarding regional security, which do not involve force. So is the era of confrontation a thing of the past?

[Petrovskiy] You are right, signs of positive change are appearing wherever the desire for dialogue and cooperation breaks through. The concept of a new internationalism, implying reliance on consensus, collective action, the primacy of international law, the mobilization of the potential of all multilateral mechanisms—regional and universal—with the United Nations playing the central role, is forming in the world community's consciousness.

But it would be a mistake to view today's world in a purely optimistic light. It is characterized more by Rembrandtesque colors, strong and bright, but, at the same time, severe and dramatic, filled with the entire gamut of objective reality. But this reality is Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait. So violence and war have not yet become a tragic thing of the past, but are still seen by some as a functional attribute of politics.

However, I am convinced that the international community is on the verge of being able to confidently look forward to a qualitatively new world order. The pioneers of the curtailment of the arms race—the USSR and the United States—are stepping up the pace dramatically. Bilateral Soviet-American disarmament has been moved onto the fast track. But the locomotive, no matter how powerful it might be, cannot develop the proper speed until the rolling stock behind it overcomes its inertia.

Therefore, the disarmament processes need to be globalized and embrace all categories of weapons, as well as all countries and regions.

It is not the first year we have discussed this issue at the United Nations. The current UN mechanism in the disarmament sphere must be brought into line with the times. Having finally shaken off the tendency to say things just for effect and the polemical rhetoric, the United Nations would be able to focus on the main issues and embark on real global disarmament measures, even if they might appear modest at the outset.

[Stepanov] If war is rejected as a political instrument, then logic suggests the following step—agreement on the

parameters of reasonable defensive sufficiency of military potentials. What possibility is there of reaching such an agreement?

[Petrovskiy] The path lies through a wide-ranging international dialogue aimed at giving military doctrines and, consequently, the military organizational development of all states an exclusively defensive direction.

This dialogue is already a reality in relations between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic alliance. With the upcoming signing of the Nonaggression Declaration between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, relations of military confrontation in Europe will finally become past history. But security can only be reliably safeguarded if the demilitarization processes extend beyond the confines of the European continent. It is necessary to make maximum use of the potential for regional approaches to eliminating the threat of war in Asian, African, and Latin American countries. The United Nations could become a kind of center for the globalization of defensive sufficiency, stimulating regional efforts. In our view, the UN special study of defensive doctrines could aid the quest for mutual understanding in this sphere.

[Stepanov] The Soviet Union has on more than one occasion expressed the belief that only the total elimination of nuclear weapons can guarantee lasting security for modern civilization. Has our approach changed?

[Petrovskiy] No. And we will continue to try to further deepen the process of nuclear disarmament and widen the sphere covered by it, bringing in tactical nuclear missiles in Europe and also naval tactical nuclear weapons. The talks we propose on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would initially involve the USSR and the United States, and other countries could join in later. In our view, the talks should cover ground-based tactical missiles, nuclear artillery, aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, and the nuclear components of these weapons.

No one seriously expects nuclear weapons to be done away with overnight. Only a stage-by-stage approach is possible. Why doesn't the United Nations, guided by a desire for practical action, launch a dialogue on possible stages of nuclear disarmament? At the same time, one might begin a discussion of ways of forming a deterrence system that would in the long term replace the security model based on mutual nuclear deterrence by force. The consolidation of the switch from declarations to practical action would be aided by a specific examination of the question of prohibiting the production of fissionable material for weapons manufacture.

The Soviet Union has already stopped producing highly enriched uranium and has published a program for decommissioning all its weapons-grade plutonium reactors before 2000. We attach considerable importance to the problem of the nuclear materials that are left over as a result of accords on nuclear disarmament. We appreciate the public's concern lest the very fact that the materials still exist leave the door open to their possible

utilization for military purposes. It is important to devise a proper control mechanism and carry out a scientific-technical study of the potential for their peaceful use. In our view, it is also time one asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to embark on an expert analysis of all these problems.

Global action definitely takes priority in the matter of preserving and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation setup. The Soviet Union intends to act resolutely from positions of support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which is to remain in effect until a nuclear-free, nonviolent world becomes a reality. It can only be replaced by an all-embracing international treaty on not recreating nuclear weapons once they have been completely eliminated.

We are disinclined to dramatize the fact that the fourth conference to examine the effect of the treaty ended without the adoption of a final document. As far as we are concerned, the main result of the conference was the fact that the treaty participants do not question the need to preserve it.

Global action is also needed today in order to bring to a conclusion the long effort to elaborate a convention on the elimination of another mass destruction weapon—chemical. We are convinced that the United Nations would be able to make a substantial contribution to ensuring the universality of the future convention that is being elaborated in Geneva.

[Stepanov] What else can be done to accelerate the Geneva talks in order to eliminate the chemical and bacteriological threat?

[Petrovskiy] We support the proposal to hold in the first half of 1991 a session of the Disarmament Conference at foreign ministerial level in order to remove the final obstacles to agreeing on a convention on chemical weapons. The efforts to eliminate the chemical threat are only just reaching a conclusion, whereas bacteriological weapons have already been "outlawed" by the 1972 Convention and this arrangement now needs strengthening. It would be facilitated by the holding of a third conference next year to examine the effect of the agreement. The Soviet Union believes that the elaboration of a special control mechanism, the guaranteed participation of all states in it, stronger trust and broader openness, and the elimination of worries concerning activities regulated by the convention could be the main ways to make the convention more effective.

[Stepanov] The war unleashed by Iraq and the threats from Baghdad of the use of the most modern and destructive types of weapons remind one of another serious problem—conventional weapon supplies. This question also requires a global solution, does it not?

[Petrovskiy] Our position on this aspect of disarmament was set out in detail recently in a letter from the USSR foreign minister to the UN general secretary. Confirming its willingness to limit sales and supplies of weapons

both quantitatively and qualitatively, the USSR proposes starting to move in this direction by creating a proper data bank within the UN framework. This measure would provide a better picture of the possibility of applying the principle of defensive sufficiency and on this basis embark on the priority reduction of surplus arms production.

[Stepanov] True globalization of disarmament cannot be achieved as long as naval armaments remain outside that framework. Surely, such principles as reasonable sufficiency and strengthening of stability, elimination of the capability to launch a surprise attack and conduct offensive actions, effective monitoring, and mutual openness should also apply to the situation at sea?

[Petrovskiy] Quite right. As for us, we confirmed at the United Nations our proposal to hold under the organization's auspices a multilateral meeting involving military experts from the major naval powers and other interested states. It would be expedient if it were to focus attention on the discussion of naval confidence-building measures. This question should also be focused on when examining naval issues at the UN Disarmament Commission. We support the Scandinavian countries' proposal on devising international standards for the safety of nuclear power installations on board ships.

[Stepanov] The open publication of information on military activities is becoming an increasingly important additional factor of stability and security as a whole. There was a time when our country was criticized—and rightly so!—for being "secrecy-mad." But this is apparently becoming a thing of the past?

[Petrovskiy] Indeed, our country has definitely set its sights on widening glasnost in military matters. Data on the numerical strength and main categories of USSR Armed Forces have been published and disseminated, at the United Nations, among other places. At the current session of the General Assembly information on USSR defense expenditure was presented in accordance with the standardized system of UN returns.

To make military openness a universal norm of international life, we propose that the measures of openness under UN auspices should envisage, in particular:

—the annual, voluntary submission by states of information to the United Nations on the numerical strength of their armed forces (overall and broken down into main categories—ground forces, air force, navy, and others); on the main categories of armaments (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters, large surface ships, including amphibious warfare ships, and submarines); on the numerical strength of forces outside the national territory; in the case of nuclear powers, information on ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, safety measures, and ground-based tactical nuclear missiles;

- the annual, voluntary submission by states of data to the standardized UN system of military expenditure returns;
- the heightened predictability of the UN states' military organizational development by means of ensuring public knowledge of the member states' military budgets.

In conclusion, I would say that what is chiefly required of all states today is realism, political courage, and a willingness to act decisively.

START TALKS

TASS Commentator Views START Negotiations

*LD1411145290 Moscow TASS in English 1416 GMT
14 Nov 90*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, November 14 (TASS)—Conservatives and liberals in the United States are now aglow with debating whether the U.S.- Soviet strategic arms reduction negotiations are a relic of the rapidly vanishing cold war.

U.S. chief negotiator in Geneva Richard Burt said, in an article published by THE WASHINGTON POST, that it would be a grave mistake to let the START negotiations recede into the background.

Burt believes that the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals is pivotal for strengthening strategic stability. Another potential result of the Geneva talks seems to be even more important. It can impose stiff restrictions on the quantity of strategic offensive forces and place them under a detailed mutual control of both sides.

Another idea of Burt's also rings true: Without the START treaty, considerable tension may develop in Soviet-American relations and a new rivalry may spring up in nuclear weapons. True, the American negotiator seeks to reduce the situation to the activity of one side. According to him, the Soviet Union continues to develop and deploy new strategic nuclear weapons.

This one-sided approach hardly conforms to reality. Has the United States cancelled a single of its numerous strategic plans? It is more objective to note that the future treaty would restrict both Soviet and American potential for building up their strategic forces.

The Soviet Union has long been calling on all nuclear powers to ban nuclear arms completely. It has repeatedly avowed its readiness to exclude nuclear weapons from any variants of defence sufficiency and build its Armed Forces without nuclear arms if other nuclear powers embark simultaneously on the same path.

The basis of the plan for the stage-by-stage reduction of nuclear weapons, with their complete elimination by the year 2000, was set out in the Soviet leader's statement on January 15, 1986.

The existing treaty on intermediate missile forces and the Soviet-American treaty on strategic offensive weapons, which is being prepared in Geneva, fit in organically into this plan.

Moscow has also proposed incorporating yet another, intermediary stage into its plan for building a nuclear-free world—a stage of minimal nuclear deterrence.

Those who believe that the START negotiations can be allowed to sink into the background, are in effect seeking to disrupt the dynamic nuclear arsenal reduction process or even to reverse it.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Latvian Rayon Orders Skrunda Radar Station Closed

*LD0111144590 Moscow TASS in English 1422 GMT
1 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaitsev]

[Text] Riga, November 1 (TASS)—The Kuldigsky District Council of People's Deputies in Latvia decided to close the space objects tracking centre at Skrunda settlement, 130 kilometers from Riga, capital of Latvia on November 20.

The radar station in Skrunda is one of eight stations deployed in areas along the USSR's border, which are prone to come under a missile attack. The radar system provides the Soviet Union's military-political leadership with prompt and trustworthy information about the possible threat of an attack and the missile-space situation.

The local authorities justify their decision by the station's alleged harmful impact on people and the environment and the violation of ecological standards. "These motives have no grounds whatsoever," Soviet Defence Ministry Spokesman Volter Kraskovskiy told TASS TODAY.

"The Soviet Union fixed the maximum permissible level of electromagnetic radiation at 10 microwatts per square centimeter, which is 20 times lower than the international standard. Control measurements made in the area of Skrunda showed levels of only 0.6 microwatts per square centimeter," Kraskovskiy said.

The true reason behind the decision to close the centre was disclosed during a meeting between a group of specialists headed by General Kraskovskiy and members of the Latvian parliamentary commission on defence and internal affairs.

At the meeting, defence ministry officials were told that district deputies acted in accordance with the declaration on restoring Latvia's state independence adopted on May 4. Under this declaration, the USSR Armed Forces are "occupation troops on the territory of the republic". The Soviet president is known to have issued a decree describing the declaration as invalid from the day of its adoption.

Kraskovskiy thinks that a solution to the issue needs to be sought at the government level. He believes that the closure of the radar station in Skrunda will weaken the monitoring of space. "The Soviet Union cannot allow this to happen due to security interests," Kraskovskiy emphasised.

U.S. Anti-Satellite Weapons Development Viewed
LD0111183190 Moscow TASS in English 1743 GMT
1 Nov 90

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, November 1 (TASS)—Development of anti-satellite weapons is continuing in the United States. According to the SPACE NEWS weekly, the U.S. Army has placed orders with the Rockwell International Corporation for new-type interceptor missiles to destroy "enemy" satellites. There is a programme to develop a system of anti-satellites weapons by 1995. They will include ground-based laser components.

Frankly speaking, it is difficult to grasp the Pentagon's logic. On the one hand, it agrees that there is no more cold war or any danger of a surprise attack, and, on the other, steps up the efforts to develop anti-satellite weapons. From the strategic point of view, such weapons are intended to preclude the other side's retaliation. Moreover, they create a danger to early warning and emergency communications satellites. Deployment of anti-satellite systems would undermine strategic stability at a time when top U.S. officials do lip service to its consolidation.

And one more thing. Development of anti-satellite weapons contradicts the strategy of "nuclear containment." In American interpretation its purpose is to make all sides refrain from attacking out of fear of prompt retaliation. And can there be any sense in reciprocal "containment" if one side strives to possess weapons capable of lessening the other side's chances to strike back?

One more thing is absolutely clear. The other side will be compelled to take similar steps to avert the danger of the other side's anti-satellite systems. Therefore, any steps to develop anti-satellite weapons are fraught with the danger of the arms race spreading into outer space. It is surprising that some people fail to realise the absurdity of all this in light of the current military-strategic situation.

The Soviet Union has long since offered the United States to conclude an agreement on the complete banning of spatial strike weapons, including anti-satellite systems. It also moved to scrap the already existing armaments of this type. But the U.S. Administration refuses to heed these proposals.

According to U.S. Deputy Assistant Defence Secretary Douglas Graham, the Reagan Administration had arrived at the conclusion that it is impossible to control anti-satellite weapons and that there are no control measures "meeting the interests of U.S. national security."

The Bush Administration got down to a "comprehensive investigation" of the problem, and although it is still under way, the conclusion has already been made that control problems are "unsurmountable."

The Soviet Union is of a different opinion. All difficulties linked with the banning of anti-satellite weapons can be overcome given the desire of both sides. This is even more feasible now that mutual trust has grown substantially between the USSR and the United States, between the East and the West.

UN Urges Soviet-U.S. Space Arms Talks
LD1511072690 Moscow TASS in English 0709 GMT
15 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations, November 15 (TASS)—The prevention of an arms race in outer space, a ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons and on the production of fissionable materials for weapons development are the subject of a series of draft resolutions adopted on Wednesday by the First Committee (political, security and disarmament) of the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

One of the draft resolutions reaffirms the great importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space. It is suggested that all states actively work towards establishing peaceful uses of outer space.

The Soviet Union and the United States are urged to conduct bilateral talks intensively and in a constructive spirit to ensure an accord at the earliest date to prevent an arms race in outer space.

A draft resolution that reaffirms the urgent need to reach effective international agreements as soon as possible on guarantees for non-nuclear states and on safeguards against the use or threat of the use of such weapons was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Inspectors Visit Belgium for INF Inspection

Arrive in Country

LD3010222790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1638 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Simonenko]

[Excerpt] Brussels, 30 October (TASS)—A group of Soviet inspectors arrived in Belgium today. In accordance with the clauses on monitoring the fulfillment of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF], they will carry out an inspection on the territory of the country. [passage omitted]

Teams Conclude Inspection

LD0111221190 Moscow TASS in English 2152 GMT 1 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Simonenko]

[Text] Brussels, November 2 (TASS)—The Soviet side on Thursday ended inspection in Belgium within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty.

Two groups of inspectors, including representatives from the Soviet defence and foreign ministries and industrial specialists, visited the European centre for cruise missile maintenance in Gosselies near Charleroi and a military base near Florennes.

U.S. nuclear missiles were moved from Florennes to the United States in December 1988. As for Gosselies, the U.S. side said there are no cruise missiles there.

Head of a Soviet group A. Kuznetsov told TASS that this was the fourth inspection in Belgium after the INF Treaty had been signed. "We are satisfied with the results of the inspection. Belgian and U.S. officials have done everything in their power to help our mission," he said.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Shevardnadze Defends CFE Arms Cuts

AU3010085190 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Oct 90 p 6

[NOVOSTI interview with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by Aleksandr Ignatov; place and date not given: "What Worries Me?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Ignatov] What worries you the most?

[Shevardnadze] Domestic instability of course. [passage omitted]. Almost everybody abroad supports us, because

we have developed a more civilized foreign policy. Our partners have stopped being afraid of us. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mikhail Gorbachev is a step that affirms confidence in us and signifies recognition from the world for our new peace-oriented way of thinking.

I think Europe is interested in the stability of the Soviet Union and our foreign policy. That is why they are prepared to cooperate with us. Many states are perfectly well aware of the conflicts that exist in our country, but they still decide to sign agreements with us.

[Ignatov] What are relations between the foreign service and the military like? As we know, Soviet foreign policy was recently subjected to criticism in the Supreme Soviet.

[Shevardnadze] Our relations are normal. Negotiations are a difficult process, especially when they pertain to such sensitive areas as defense and security. It is hard for us to give up our weapons and part of our military capacity. However, when we are engaged in negotiations we have to take account of other people's interests. In the past this was something that we were not particularly concerned about. That is why formulating our position sometimes takes too long. We discuss things at length, but this helps us to avoid mistakes and provides better guarantees.

People in the military say that we are cutting back on our weapons, but the West is not. On 17 October I held talks with U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney. He said the Pentagon is to receive \$18 billion less next year. Over the next four to five years, the United States plans to reduce its defense budget by at least \$180 billion. American forces stationed in Europe will be reduced by 40,000 men. The French and English will institute similar reductions in their forces. I would point out that the FRG will also significantly reduce the size of its forces.

It is not a question of a one-shot action. It is a process in which our interests and what is possible for us to accomplish are also taken into account. Let us say that we have 5,150 aircraft. Whether we have 100 fewer will not be of the slightest importance in relation to the total number. In my opinion, it is much better to give up the 100 combat aircraft and sign an arms reduction treaty.

Leningrad Troops Not for Offensive Operations

PM0211120590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 90 First Edition p 6

[INTERFAX report: "The General Can Be Believed"]

[Text] Leningrad—Colonel General Samsonov, commander of the Leningrad Military District, has stated at a meeting with representatives of the mass media that the district "no longer has any troops intended for offensive operations." The tank regiments have been eliminated and the number of guns in each artillery battery reduced.

Problems Continue With Troops Leaving Hungary *LD0211205290*

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 2 November, in its "Vremya" newscast, airs a two-minute Ye. Shirokov video report from Hungary, which was inaudible in part, on a meeting between journalists and the South Group of Soviet Forces.

The opening video sequences shows trains loaded with Soviet troops and military equipment at the Hungarian border. Shirokov says troop trains are crossing the border by day and night. "To date exactly half of the troops and military equipment have been redeployed to new locations."

At the meeting of the press with the Southern Group of Forces it was stated that Soviet forces have been allowed through everywhere without hindrance. The timetable has been fully adhered to.

There are, however, still unresolved problems; they include the local sale of 125,000 tonnes of material and technical supplies, which are due by agreement to be acquired by the Hungarian side. There is also the question of payment for the houses and installations that are being vacated. Previous military cantonments now stand empty in 23 Hungarian towns and settlements.

Shirokov reports there have been cases of defilement of monuments to Soviet forces at many locations vacated by garrisons. These acts of vandalism are frequently not being resisted by the local authorities. A Hungarian defense Ministry spokesman deeply regretted that such acts had occurred.

The accompanying video shows the meeting of journalists and military men of the Southern Group of forces and pictures of defiled Soviet monuments.

International Summit Ratifies CFE, CSBM Agreements

CFE Military Restrictions Detailed

*LD1711133190 Moscow TASS in English 1249 GMT
17 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, November 17 (TASS)—Participants in the Vienna talks today reached the final agreement on a treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE]. The treaty drastically slashes the arsenals of non-nuclear weapons of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to equal quantitative limits. It covers an area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The over 150-page agreement on conventional forces, which is an historic first, will be signed by the leaders of 22 Warsaw Pact and NATO member-states at the all-European summit in Paris on Monday.

The treaty envisages dramatic reductions in the two alliances' armories.

Each alliance will be limited to 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armoured cars, 2,000 attack helicopters, and 6,800 combat aircraft. At point are all combat aircraft, including front-line aviation, medium bombers, anti-aircraft defence interceptor fighters and training combat aircraft.

The national ceilings for the Soviet Union under the Budapest Agreement, envisaging limits on the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact member-countries, signed on November 3, are as follows: Tanks - 13,150, artillery pieces - 13,175, armoured vehicles - 20,000, combat aircraft - 5,150 and attack aircraft - 1,500. The Soviet Union retains over one third of the Warsaw Pact's combined arsenal of conventional arms.

The Vienna treaty specifies ways to liquidate the slashed military arsenals. The lion's share of them will certainly be destroyed, but part of the Soviet military equipment will be redesigned for peaceful uses. As many as 750 tanks and 3,000 armored cars will be converted to peace in the European part of the USSR.

The treaty has a provision on further talks covering, alongside other issues, work to set ceilings on the number of troops deployed by both sides.

The second stage of the talks on Conventional Forces in Europe will open in Vienna late in November

Confidence-Building Document Adopted

*LD1811105790 Moscow TASS in English 1047 GMT
18 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, November 18 (TASS)—A document on confidence building measures was adopted late on Saturday at the talks on confidence-building measures and security in Europe. The 1990 Vienna document will be included in a package of agreements to be approved by the all-European Paris summit, due to open on Monday.

The Vienna document combines a set of new confidence-building and security measures [CSBM] with the measures adopted in the document of the 1986 Stockholm conference, developed with due account of the accumulated experience.

The new measures envisage annual exchanges of military information, including the deployment of major arms and military equipment and military budgets.

The document provides a mechanism for consultations and cooperation on unusual military activities, cooperation with respect to dangerous incidents of a non-military character, contacts in the military sphere. It envisages notification about certain kinds of military activities and control over them, holding inspections and

the creation of a communication network for rapid transmission of military information and some other measures.

Gorbachev Signs CFE Treaty

*LD1911094290 Moscow TASS in English 0931 GMT
19 Nov 90*

[By TASS special correspondents]

[Text] Paris, November 19 (TASS)—A ceremony to sign the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the joint declaration of member countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO took place in the Elysee Palace today.

The documents were signed by heads of state from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. President Mikhail Gorbachev signed on behalf of the Soviet Union. The ceremony was attended by heads of delegations from neutral and non-aligned countries.

After the signing ceremony, French President Francois Mitterrand handed over the original texts of the treaty to Dutch Prime Minister Rudolph Lubbers, as a depositary of the treaty.

TASS Commentator on CFE Agreement

*LD1911150190 Moscow TASS in English 1426 GMT
19 Nov 90*

[Commentary by TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev: "Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces—TASS comment"]

[Text] Moscow, November 19 (TASS)—The agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was initiated in Vienna and signed in Paris at summit level. This is undoubtedly a historical event from the political and military points of view.

As to its political significance, it is absolutely clear that the document is based on new political thinking. As leader of the Soviet delegation at the talks Oleg Grinevskiy said, "the agreement is comparable to the collapse of the Berlin Wall".

"One more powerful obstacle has been removed from the road to European unity. The purpose of the Vienna talks—to prevent a massive surprise attack—has been achieved. The transition to a qualitatively new level of security and stability in Europe has been ensured," he continued.

The Vienna document was approved by all parties as an extraordinary and dimensional agreement on disarmament, concluded for the first time in history. The military significance of the agreement lies in the fact that it establishes a carefully checked parity between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty conventional forces throughout the continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

It envisages a real reduction of destabilising armaments possessed by the two alliances down to equal minimum

quantitative levels. The "ceilings" for both alliances are fixed at 20,000 tanks each, 30,000 armour cars each, 20,000 artillery systems each, 2,000 combat helicopters each and 6,800 war planes each. It is important that the agreement establishes tough control measures over its fulfilment, including on-spot inspection and exchange of detailed information.

Certain important lessons can be learned from the elaboration of the Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Firstly, there is a definite mutual connection between trust and the reduction of armaments. Decreasing suspicion between the two sides and the ending of the cold war have helped to reach agreement in Vienna. In turn, progress toward Vienna agreements contributed to changes in the military-political situation and helped enhance mutual trust.

Secondly, the agreement's elaboration within a historically very short period—20 months and 9 days—proves patently that complicated questions can be solved quickly if all the sides concerned are interested in practical results.

Of course, this first agreement was born amid disputes and clashes between different views. But the spirit of constructiveness and due regard for the interests of the counterparts helped launch the construction of a new detente.

The agreement stipulates further talks, devoted, among other things, to the numerical reduction and limitation of the armed forces of parties to the negotiations. Temporary parameters have also been determined. The second lap of the talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe will begin in the Austrian capital at the end of November. The disarmament process has been made more dynamic and it is important not to slow down these talks.

Chief of Staff Notes CFE Cuts

*LD1911152590 Moscow TASS in English 1512 GMT
19 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, November 19 (TASS)—"The treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe signed in Paris today is a watershed event on the road toward a political alliance of European countries within the framework of continental confederation. This is the first stone in the foundation of our common European home," Soviet Chief of Staff General Mikhail Moiseyevich told TASS.

"The treaty can well be described as the most far-reaching and comprehensive agreement in the world history," General Moiseyev noted.

He said that more than 120,000 units of various arms will be scrapped in Europe, liquidating a dangerous military confrontation. Under the treaty, each military

alliance will retain 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armoured vehicles, 20,000 artillery installations, 8,600 combat planes and 2,000 combat helicopters.

Moiseyev stressed that the quota for the Soviet Union have been set at 13,300 tanks, 20,000 armoured vehicles, 13,700 artillery systems, 5,150 combat planes and 1,500 combat helicopters.

"These arms levels are fully consistent with the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency and this country's defence doctrine and ensure the Soviet Union's dependable defence capacity," Moiseyev said.

According to him, the quota for the amount of armed forces, arms and military machinery proposed to East European countries also ensure security and territorial integrity of each state by national forces and meet the universal and equal security principle.

The treaty signed in Paris today, Moiseyev said, has a clear cut system of legal guarantees. Politically, these guarantees will be exercised through the newly created standing secretariat of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the CSCE standing bureau for election monitoring.

On the military level a conflict prevention centre will be set up, Moiseyev said.

He noted that the treaty forms a twosome with the document on confidence-building and security measures in Europe. "This is a political guarantee that confrontation will never again arise on the European continent and that the present positive processes are irreversible," Moiseyev said.

Envoy Praises CFE Accord

*LD1711145990 Moscow TASS in English 1435 GMT
17 Nov 90*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, November 17 (TASS)—It took participants in the talks on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 20 months and nine days to elaborate a treaty to slash drastically tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft, helicopters and armoured cars held by the Warsaw Pact and NATO on an area from the Atlantic to the Urals.

This is a record time, considering the magnitude and the unusual nature of the document on disarmament, which is an historic first among the agreements of this kind.

The treaty, which was finally harmonised today, will be initialled in Vienna on Sunday and signed by the heads of state and government of 22 countries at the all-European summit in Paris.

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, which ensures the transition to a qualitatively new level of security and stability in Europe, sets ceilings on the number of weapons the Warsaw Pact and NATO can hold.

Despite the constructive atmosphere and the careful attitude to partners' concerns prevailing at the talks of 23 states and, after German unification, at the forum of 22 countries, a pioneer treaty was born in pains.

"The treaty agreed upon in Vienna can be described as unique," Oleg Grinevskiy, Soviet delegation chief and ambassador at large, told TASS.

"Never before has such a vast amount of tanks, armoured cars, artillery pieces and aircraft been destroyed in a single, even the biggest, battle in mankind's history. The recent days of talks at the Hofburg Palace set a record of sorts here.

"Certainly, time will give a final assessment to our work. But if one is to speak about the treaty's political importance to modern-day Europe, it can be compared to the thunder of the collapsed Berlin Wall—this time on the line of military confrontation in Europe. The most powerful barrier to European unity has broken down.

"People often ask what will this treaty give to an ordinary Soviet man. One cannot limit oneself to a stereotype answer that, like other agreements on disarmament, it will enable the country to free funds to raise the people's living standards. The matter is much more serious.

"The treaty fundamentally alters all our life. The Soviet Union ceases to be a militarised state with all ensuing economic and social consequences. What is especially important is that the entire wealth of society can now be used to the benefit of the people rather than go to build the costly military machine," Grinevskiy stressed.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Early Start of SNF Reduction Talks Urged

*PM1411151190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 14 Nov 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Article by Colonel Vladimir Chernyshev, candidate of technical sciences: "Step Backward? On Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe"]

[Text] Doubts about the expediency of talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe have again been raised in Washington and the capitals of a number of other NATO countries. It is well-known that for a long time this problem sparked heated disputes in the North Atlantic alliance.

Soon after the signing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, the Soviet Union proposed starting talks on nuclear arms with a range of up to 500 km, but official Washington rejected this initiative "out of hand," as they say. As far back as April 1989 Pentagon boss Richard Cheney described the proposal for talks on tactical nuclear weapons as "a dangerous trap" and opposed their being held "in the foreseeable future." Moreover, the United

States announced plans for the modernization of ground-launched tactical nuclear missiles to "compensate" for the reductions in these missiles under the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

However, under pressure from events on the European continent, the NATO countries' position on tactical nuclear weapons also began to change. And finally the NATO summit in London at the beginning of July adopted a decision on starting talks on short-range nuclear forces [SNF]. The London declaration on the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance concludes that "as a result of the creation of new political and military conditions in Europe the role of the shortest-range substrategic systems will shrink considerably." On the basis of this conclusion the NATO countries' top leaders proclaimed in their declaration: New talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces (that is, tactical nuclear weapons) should begin immediately after the signing of the first treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe.

It might apparently have been said that an extremely difficult barrier had been surmounted. But now voices demanding the postponement of these talks are again being heard in the Western camp.

So what considerations are guiding the NATO capitals here? "Officials on both sides of the Atlantic," the American newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST wrote recently, "say that the need for these arms reduction talks has declined as a result of the development of political events. Only controversial nuclear policy problems which they would prefer not to tackle would arise in connection with such talks."

I believe that such an approach hardly testifies to a suitable interpretation of all the positive changes that have taken place in East-West relations. Let me remind you that the main argument used by NATO for several years in support of building up short-range nuclear arms amounted to the following: The West deploys this arsenal to deter a massive Soviet thrust into West Europe. But surely this thesis is obsolete today?

First, the very near future will see the signing of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe under which the two military-political alliances will have an equal quantity of conventional arms of a destabilizing nature. And substantially reduced maximum permissible levels for these weapons have been chosen. Second, the Soviet Union is pulling its troops and arms, including nuclear weapons, out of East Europe. Third, the United States has abandoned a number of provisions of the "flexible response" concept, which envisaged the use of short-range nuclear weapons, and announced its abandonment of plans to modernize its "Lance" tactical missiles and nuclear artillery. Fourth, the public of Germany, on whose territory the main arsenals of American tactical nuclear weapons are sited, are increasingly actively advocating their total withdrawal.

One other factor should evidently be stressed, too. The Soviet leadership has repeatedly stated that as soon as serious talks begin with NATO on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe our country would move to substantially reduce its tactical nuclear missiles on a unilateral basis.

There is no disputing that all the facts listed above give grounds for believing that a solid basis already exists for a serious and constructive discussion of questions concerned with reducing the nuclear confrontation at the tactical level. The Soviet Union is convinced that the phased reduction and then the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would promote a reduction in the war danger and the building of confidence. Taking account of the NATO countries' manifest unpreparedness to seek agreement at this time on the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the USSR has promised something of a compromise. As one of the intermediate stages along the path of phased nuclear disarmament it might be possible to elaborate specific parameters for minimum nuclear deterrence, also including tactical nuclear weapons. If the need to deter each other still exists as yet, this deterrence must be moved to the minimum level of nuclear arsenals.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Novaya Zemlya Chief Defends Notification System

PM0111113190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Oct 90 Union Edition p 1

[Report by Ivan Bentsa: "After the Explosion on Novaya Zemlya"]

[Text] Novaya Zemlya—A group of people's deputies from Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Komi Republic are visiting the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago. They were invited there by the military following the 24 October underground nuclear explosion.

The northern test range had been silent for almost two years, and this test—held, as before, in total secrecy—has angered people. After all, back in May the command gave an assurance that it would give local authorities prior notification and invite representatives of the public to the tests. However, the military rejected our complaints over this. Rear Admiral V. Gorev, chief of the nuclear test range, reported that, since information about forthcoming tests is secret, the military is entitled to give prior notification of them only to the top leaders of Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Komi Republic. But even they were not present for the test—they were both on official trips.

In the test range commander's opinion the other agreement with the deputies has also been fulfilled: Under a 20 June 1990 protocol representatives of the public should be invited to the test site two days after the explosion. This has been done. The inclement weather is

to blame for the fact that the guests were only able to fly in to Novaya Zemlya on 27 October.

Commentary Views USSR, U.S. Nuclear Tests

*LD3010204190 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 30 Oct 90*

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Excerpts] A report about the nuclear blast conducted in Novaya Zemlya last week was delivered at the Monday plenary session of the Soviet parliament. MP's confirmed their determination to work for a complete termination of tests by all nuclear powers, and favored tougher control over the Soviet nuclear program. Yuriy Solton makes these comments:

The public in the Soviet Union and Nordic countries protested against the nuclear explosion in Novaya Zemlya. It is quite possible that this will be the first and last blast in the Soviet Union this year. As for the future, not everything depends on this country.

I don't belong to those who stand for unilateral nuclear disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons remain and are modernized, their reliability must be tested and parity maintained, and this means tests will continue. It's a different matter if all nuclear powers declare a moratorium on explosions, but this hasn't happened yet. [passage omitted] I'm not calling for a competition in the number of blasts, of course, but in the present conditions the Soviet Union is forced to conduct a certain minimum of tests. [passage omitted]

It's fine that in the United States, nuclear explosions have also become less frequent, but to my mind, their number is still quite great. There's one more thing that worries me. United States Energy Department, that's responsible for the development of new types of nuclear weapons and their tests, in an official report, has suggested postponing by 10 years the decision on additional restrictions on American nuclear tests so as not to damage national security. If the suggestion is accepted we'll all have to wait till the beginning of the next century before any notable steps are taken to reduce nuclear blasts. However, with the current rapid course of international developments, I'm, sure this will happen much sooner.

In this connection I would like to draw your attention to the recent Soviet proposal to UN countries on the world parliamentary referendum on nuclear tests. I think the verdict of such an influential organization would affect the policies of nuclear powers and speed up the solution of the problem of a general and complete ban on nuclear tests. [passage omitted]

Karpov Views Background of 24 Oct Nuclear Test

*LD3110180590 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT
31 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondents Leonid Timofeyev and Oleg Polovko]

[Text] Moscow, October 31 (TASS)—The October 24 nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya was "the only one this year and there will be no others," Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov told a news conference here today.

Taking part in the conference were representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Defence Ministry, the Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering and the respective industry and the Soviet State Committee for Hydrometeorology.

Speaking about reasons for carrying out the test at this time, Karpov said that the test had been adjourned for nearly a year due to the Soviet unilateral moratorium. As a result, the term the nuclear charge could be stored had expired and its further storage could entail unpredictable consequences. This is why the decision was made to explode the charge this year.

The Soviet Union favours a ban on all nuclear testing, Karpov said. It is ready to work in this direction through bilateral negotiations with the United States, within the framework of the Geneva disarmament talks and at the conference devoted to amending the 1963 treaty banning tests in three environments, a conference scheduled for next January.

Karpov stressed that the Soviet Union was ready to follow yet another route—that of moratoriums on nuclear explosions, first on a bilateral basis with the United States, and then on an expanding basis, including all countries, as a provisional measure before legally binding agreements are reached.

"But we cannot promise at this point, with no plausible prospects for the moratorium or for the conclusion of agreement on a complete test ban, that the Soviet Union will unilaterally end all tests," Karpov said.

Speaking about the meeting on Monday with the ambassadors of the Nordic countries, Karpov stressed that the envoys showed understanding of the reasons that prompted the nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya. He supported the proposal voiced by the ambassadors to hold an international symposium to work out universal criteria for the approach towards underground nuclear explosions.

Asked if the Novaya Zemlya site was used because of the closure of the Semipalatinsk testing ground, participants in the news conference noted that no final decision had yet been reached concerning the functioning of the Semipalatinsk testing ground. The same applies to Novaya Zemlya.

Speaking about the programme for further tests, they said that presently there were no other nuclear charges on the Soviet testing grounds. New explosions will be planned for the future in line with the necessity of ensuring the country's defence sufficiency.

Speakers at the news conference stressed that respective ministries and departments have repeatedly informed deputies at all levels and the press that every nuclear test is carried out in accordance with the decision of the Soviet Government. The final decision is made by the Defence Council under the Soviet president. Specific dates are defined taking into account technical preparations for the test, weather conditions and the state of diagnosing devices.

Novaya Zemlya Test Site Described

91WC0017A Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Nov 90 p 3

[Article by Yu. Dmitriyev, TRUD special correspondent, in Novaya Zemlya - Moscow: "Test Site in the Ocean"]

[Text] Report from the Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test Base

Hills covered by thick crumbly snow come up to the bottomless light-blue bowl of the heavens. Silence. A boundless white silence. Only in the distance is visible a dark band of water - the Matochkin Shar Strait.

We are standing near the gaping dark entrance to a long tunnel, carved from the side of a huge mountain. A great number of cables and communications lines stretches out from here. We take several steps forward, and suddenly, a sharp hydrogen sulfide smell hits the nose. It seems that this is all that remains of a mighty nuclear explosion which rumbled in the depths of the hill the other day. A regular test explosion. The sole and final test this year.

Colonel V. G. Sofronov looks closely at the screen of a portable instrument, moves aside, makes measurements in various spots in the tunnel. Twenty, thirty micro-roentgens per hour. In one place, up to 40. But at the entrance to the tunnel, it is less - 7-10 micro-roentgens per hour.

"We have in Moscow, close to the Rossiya Hotel, we will say, numbers of 20-40 - quite common," says Vladimir Germanovich. "The same on Gorkiy Street, and Kalinin Avenue, especially near the buildings with granite facings..."

The strongly put together, young-looking colonel is a veteran of the test range. Almost his entire life has been connected with nuclear experiments. He put on shoulder straps right after finishing the capital's engineering-physics institute. His candidate's dissertation is also connected with this subject. He now heads the radiation measurements group at the testing range. We begin our story with this service, which is quite likely very typical of similar research centers, both native and foreign.

1. Time 'Ch'

This term is from military terminology. It signifies the beginning of a military operation, military exercise, or maneuvers. And it can be said that this operation, conducted on a distant arctic range, is super-military. In the deep, hermetically sealed, concrete-lined tunnel, there are atomic cartridges with a capacity of several tens of kilotons. It is girded by a great number of gauges specially developed for this experiment of the "Tunets" automatic radiometric system. The members of the state commission, headed by the terse Rear-Admiral Vladimir Vyskrebentsev, were in their own work places in mobile vans. It is Vyskrebentsev, remaining alone, who gave the command at the stipulated hour and minute to the duty change of the operators to turn on the blast's automatic system. And the ground under our feet rocked lightly, as if there was a mild sea ripple. And the white-domed hill scarcely jumped...

Fifteen minutes before the explosion, a dark green "MI-8" helicopter rose in the air. It was piloted by an old resident of these places, Major Vladimir Kungurov. Alongside him was Sofronov, dressed in high boots, a fur jacket, and a warm cap with ear-flaps. The helicopter flew around the hill, made several circles over us, and then, at the moment of the explosion, it literally hovered at some one hundred meters. Vladimir Germanovich personally took the air samples to find out whether the stream of deadly rays was escaping from the cave. They were not, thank God.

And at that time, ten of Sofronov's employees and assistants joined in the business: nuclear scientists, chemists, meteorologists, physicists... They instantly began to work on the data of the external remote-controlled automated system of the "Splav" radiation control. A flood of information literally began to fall. Not only from the depth of the tunnel and each of its fire-spitting corners, but from all of the adjoining sectors. In this flood is information about the charge itself, which had lain almost a year waiting for its fateful hour, about the subsoil and rocky stratum, and about the technical and physical parameters of the explosion. And about many, many other things that interest science, for which Sofronov's indefatigable group gives the richest material. People not in white coats, but in sheepskin coats and felt boots, akin to the regimental intelligence officers of the war years.

2. There Is Normal Weather On The Island

How often was this merry song recalled when we were sitting for several days at one of the airports outside of Moscow waiting for a flight to the testing site. A snow-storm, fog, the landing strip slippery with ice... We are not able to receive flights, the weather forecaster and flight control officer announced from the Novaya Zemlya airport. At last the Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy and Industry of the USSR, Professor V. N. Mikhaylov, who had been called by A. I. Lukyanov to travel at this time to a session of the Supreme Soviet of

the USSR and to give a report to the deputies on the reasons and necessity for conducting the tests, exclaimed, "There is good news from the weather forecasters! Let's go..."

We flew from rainy, slushy Moscow to the arctic winter. In Beluzhaya Guba, where the main small town of the test site had grown up, a sharp icy wind was blowing. It was only about 5:00 pm, but it was dark all around, but electric light flowed from the window of the five-story dining room and warm, comfortable hotel. The head of the test site, Rear-Admiral Viktor Gorev, a former nuclear submariner, briefly outlined the situation:

—In the airport, which was closed for four days due to meteorological conditions, urgent cargoes were piling up, including scientific gear, a large post, but mainly people - scientists and designers, participants in the experiment. Among the passengers is a small group of people's deputies and informal groups of our northern regions. They, like you, were granted the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the place with radiation background and ecological conditions.

Here at the airport, we are talking with Igor Shpektor, people's deputy from the Komi SSR and a worker in Vorkut. Together with his colleagues, he just signed a military document on the verification of radiation conditions in the region of the explosion. For greater persuasiveness, the delegation brought with itself a measuring apparatus and devices. It personally examined that in which it was interested. The military officers did not put any kind of obstacles in the way. On the contrary, they helped. They assigned ships, helicopters, and cross-country vehicles. They issued warm clothing. And what was the result? "A normal background. Radiation absolutely safe for the life and health of the people," declared Igor Shpektor to us. "Just as we recorded it in the document."

And how is the ecology? You see, Novaya Zemlya is a unique, almost exotic region. Blue lakes and fast mountain rivers, full of spawning fish. Renowned market birds, with an abundance of wild ducks and geese. Returning from the tunnel in a helicopter to the small town, we saw reindeer food and again, getting reindeer moss from the snow for food. Occasionally we met polar bears, running away from the sound of the propellers to the cliffs. And then our commander, officer Viktor Maslov, brought us down a bit. The helicopter hovered, in order to manage to impress itself on the master of the tundra. And more about one unexpected meeting. An outstanding reindeer with broad, beautiful antlers suddenly appeared at the place of the explosion, a hundred meters from the tunnel. He marched by us with an air of importance. Then, seeing the people, he stopped, pricked up his ears, apparently surprised that he was not alone in his snowy kingdom. We too were silent, giving the master of the region to understand that we are not laying claim to his lawful right.

But of course, all this is lyricism. I would simply like to emphasize that neither we nor the other visitors saw any reindeer "bald" from radiation or "scale-less" fish. At present, nature on the island has not been defiled, it seems...

I would like to say a few words about another topic. About the most difficult service in this top secret archipelago of our military, which the state has entrusted to live and work in improbably rigorous conditions, far from continental goods and the home hearth. For the 35 years of the test site's existence, they built accommodations and a scientific laboratory, and moorings for landing strips, dining rooms, baths, and a hospital on the permafrost. They themselves bake bread and protect themselves, clear the settlement and houses of fallen snow, when a blizzard has raged for week and it is impossible to leave the house without securing oneself with a rope. You will lose your way in a flash and then freeze to death.

They reduce their staffs so much that the senior officers themselves drag the cables, coils and transformers, climbing up the ice to the hill. And the head of the test station in the Severnyy [Northern] settlement, which is similar to the American "Mercury" center on the Nevada test site, Vyacheslav Strukov, a veteran of the fleet, has staff category - captain of the second class. Not even a colonel... I say this not in order to degrade any of the capital's authorities. Simply put, people serve here not for stars or for rank...

Then something should be said about civilians who find themselves here. On their shoulders are the same burdens and adversities, although they have not taken the military oath. I met the 53-year-old Yulian Pitsyk at the test site. He commands all the mine workers who have been dispatched from the southern land of plenty, the Dnepropetrovsk-ites.

Or the daredevils from the "Artikstroy" association, who are building bridges, crossings, dwellings and workers' complexes. Moscow engineer Vladimir Kovalev has headed the detachment of arctic builders for six years.

3. What Are The Explosions For?

We raise a question with some naive forthrightness. Is it good or bad to test terrifying atomic bombs under ground. Why explode with destructive force in nature? Lastly, why did it become necessary even in 1954 to move a military-sea armada to this formerly quiet and unknown corner of the Arctic Ocean, to which the author of these lines, then serving in the northern fleet, was witness? I remember the stunned Nenetskiy families of aborigines of the island, found in Arkhangelsk, Naryan-Mar, and Amderma, under the leadership of their president, the painter of his native region, Tyka Vylka. There were not many of them, it is true - in all, about one hundred four families. But people were deprived of their native shelter and the style of life they were accustomed to, although our government took care of their farthest destiny.

"It was strict necessity," says professor-atomic scientist V. N. Mikhaylov, a person who has lived here for many years. "We were not the first who exploded military atomic means. We were not the first who put the production of nuclear death on the conveyor belt. A reliable shield was needed. And we created it, it is true, at a very dear cost. Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya! It is not necessary to explain to people that this is so, what kind of wounds these are..."

What concerns our military is that they are the executors. As in the recent case at Novaya Zemlya, the decision on every specific test is taken by the highest political and state leaders of the country with the knowledge of the President of the USSR. The specific times of every test are determined by the technical preparation of the experiment, weather conditions, and the condition of the diagnostic apparatus. The decision is not taken until the weather forecaster tells every place the air flow is headed and whether a cyclone or anything similar is expected.

Hardly had the explosion gone off when ambassadors from the northern countries hurried to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs with inquiries and demands for explanations. Puzzled questions also sprinkled our parliaments and press. Why are we conducting tests? Why do we not notify anyone beforehand? These are, of course, reasonable questions. And they should be answered. Evidently it is necessary to draw up a corresponding mechanism and protocol of notification which observes the interests of the defense and security of the country. But this is the business of specialists.

And now some numbers. This year the USA has conducted seven nuclear explosions, including the last on 12 October in Nevada. France conducted four explosions, China - two. England does not intend to discontinue them. In the near future, judging by everything, new nuclear countries, such as Pakistan, Israel, and others will appear.

"The USSR was, and remains, a staunch supporter of the quickest attainment of a complete cessation of all tests of nuclear weapons and does not intend to retreat from this line," V. N. Mikhaylov said in conclusion. Soviet test sites have been silent for almost a year. The USSR hopes that this establishes a real opportunity for the beginning of a two-sided moratorium on nuclear tests with subsequent additions of other nuclear states to it. However, the USA, France, and China continued tests of nuclear weapons this year. In these conditions, a unilateral Soviet moratorium could effect the security of the USSR. In this connection, a decision was taken to conduct a test at the test site at Novaya Zemlya.

U.S., British, French Nuclear Tests Criticized

*LD1511182290 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1714 GMT 15 Nov 90*

[Text] Moscow, 15 November (TASS)—The press center of the USSR Ministry of Defense released the following statement today:

An underground nuclear test was carried out by France at its Pacific testing ground on 14 November. It is reported that the purpose of the test was to develop nuclear munitions. The very same day a nuclear device was exploded at the Nevada testing ground in the United States. The test was carried out in order to perfect a British nuclear weapon. A total of 22 underground nuclear explosions have already been carried out on U.S. territory on behalf of the British Armed Forces, in accordance with an Anglo-U.S. agreement, the previous one being in December of last year. Thus, so far this year nine nuclear tests have been carried out by the United States, five by France, two by China, and one by the USSR.

As is well known, the Soviet Union continues to favor an immediate and complete end to all nuclear tests. At present this is especially important because the continuation of testing could lead to the creation of third-generation nuclear weapons, which will be even more dangerous to strategic stability. However, the appeals and practical steps taken by the USSR have, unfortunately, not met with any response so far from the leadership of the other nuclear powers.

Mikhaylov Denies Report of Planned Urals Test Site

*LD1511141790 Moscow World Service
in Russian 1047 GMT 15 Nov 90*

[From the "Soviet chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] No one is planning to transfer the nuclear test site from Semipalatinsk to the Northern Urals. No exploratory work in this direction is being carried out in the Northern Urals region. Viktor Mikhailov, USSR deputy minister of atomic power and atomic industry, told Interfax this in an interview, commenting on the Voice of America report which provoked a protest meeting attended by thousands in the town of Sverdlovsk on 28 October this year. Clearly, noted Mikhailov, these rumors are based on the fact that we are planning to close the Semipalatinsk test site in the next few years. There are two test sites in the Soviet Union—one in the Semipalatinsk area and one on the Novaya Zemlya islands. According to Mikhailov, in the current international situation, two test sites for the Soviet Union is too much.

However, the Semipalatinsk test site will not be closed in 1991. It is planned to carry out two or three test explosions there of a force of up to 10 kilotonnes. In accordance with the bilateral treaty approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 9 October 1990 [as heard], experts from the United States will be invited to the tests.

In the future, an account of the significant scientific potential of its personnel, it is planned, within the framework of the program of conversion, to use this test site to carry out work connected with the safety of atomic

energy. Mikhailov also reported that it is planned to build a branch of the academic center for the training of specialists in the sphere of nuclear physics on the territory of the test site.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Concern Voiced Over Chemical Weapons' Incineration

PM0711094590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Nov 90 Union Edition p 6

[Letter from Dr. of Chemical Sciences S. Yufit under the rubric "From the International Departments' Mailbag": "Will Chemical War Begin in the Soviet Union?"]

[Text] In a certain sense this war is already under way. Every year thousands of tonnes of poisonous substances are discharged into the atmosphere, the land and the water are poisoned by chlororganic pesticides, defoliants, and herbicides, and effluent containing heavy metals completes the picture. And now, in the near future, a new spiral, a new stage of this war could await us. As frequently happens, it could arise from a perfectly noble aim—the need to begin destroying chemical weapons.

Now that Iraq is threatening to use these weapons, it is not out of place to recall that they make no distinction between people and animals, adults or children—they kill them all. And you do not need a computer to calculate for yourself how much V-gas, for example, is needed to kill 1,000 people: A lethal dose for one person is 0.008 of a gram (the tiniest drop!), and death comes in a few seconds. In a certain sense chemical weapons are even more terrible and vile than nuclear weapons.

And now, under the agreement on the destruction and nonproduction of chemical weapons signed by the Soviet and U.S. presidents, the elimination of lethal substances is to begin no later than 31 December 1992. And we have more than 40,000 tonnes of these weapons! Now I will proceed to the reasons that prompted me to turn to your newspaper.

First, all must know that the question of the destruction of chemical weapons concerns everyone. M.S. Gorbachev's speech in the USSR 21 June 1990 stated bluntly that the destruction of chemical weapons is "proving not easier but more complex than their production." But he did not say that it could cost billions of rubles to destroy these weapons. For example, the corresponding plant on Johnston Island cost, according to some estimates, \$1-2 billion.

The present state of the problem. The United States has conducted experiments on Johnston Island to destroy missile heads containing toxins. They incinerated 15 heads, and there were three discharges of neuroparalytic gases (see IZVESTIYA No. 244 for 1 September 1990). Johnston Island is an uninhabited atoll 800 miles from

the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific. But we have constructed such an enterprise in a densely populated area not far from Kuybyshev and the Volga! Fortunately, we have not managed to commission it—there was public opposition. There are no other plants in the Union. Consequently, in two years it is necessary to create an entire new sector of industry—plants and installations to destroy chemical weapons. Which path are we to choose for this?

Precisely this question faces the USSR Supreme Soviet. Parliamentary hearings have now begun on this problem. Almost 10 projects have been submitted to parliament. They all fall into two groups: One is based on the U.S. method, i.e. incineration. The other proposes using a method developed by our specialists: first rendering chemically safe, then destroying. This would use the methods and materials that are employed according to Army instructions for degassing toxins if used under combat conditions (God forbid!).

I urge journalists and readers not to let us take the U.S. path: It is terrible to imagine what even a single discharge of neuroparalytic gas would mean under our conditions—not on a desert island but in a densely populated oblast. And it is awful to even think what would happen if there were an accident while transporting toxins. And such accidents are—alas!—frequent.

Many public organizations in the United States, including such a one as Greenpeace, which is known for its uncompromisingness, are opposed to the U.S. method of incinerating chemical weapons because it is fraught not only with possible discharges but also with the formation of dioxins. Dioxin is such a poison that it is hard to imagine anything worse. It is dioxin which is still maiming Vietnamese children, and yet how many years have now passed since the Americans used the "orange" defoliant containing this substance in Vietnam!

Now there is talk (see IZVESTIYA 26 August 1990) of possibly buying U.S. technology (the logic is this—at least they have something, while we have nothing) or of creating our own plants to incinerate chemical weapons using the same method. And emissaries from U.S. firms are already offering their services in the construction of such installations. In my opinion, such construction would be not only an ecological disaster but also a financial one.

I am speaking not only for myself but also on behalf of a "green" organization—the Social-Ecological Union, which invited me to be their expert on this problem. At the same time, I wish to support our Army chemists: I am convinced that it is not we who must buy installations for the destruction of chemical weapons from the Americans, but they from us. Our chemists have created safer projects. They are ecologically cleaner and substantially cheaper. And if we are to speak of cooperation between our countries on this problem, it must be built on the basis of Soviet projects.

The public's demands are clear and specific:

- no giant plants for the destruction of chemical weapons;
- no transporting them around the country;
- toxins to be destroyed where they are stored;
- no projects to be adopted without independent expert appraisals;
- all stages of the work on the projects and the construction of installations must be monitored by the press and public organizations.

Luckily for us, we have very little of the toxin that is the "worst" to destroy—mustard gas (the very same that was used back in World War I), and it will be easy to cope with it. At the same time, for reasons known only to the military, they have brought all the lewisite—a substance containing arsenic—together in one place, and approximately 7,000 tonnes (!) of it lie near the population center of Kombarka, on the Kama. It could be thought that a new arsenic deposit had appeared on the geological map of the Soviet Union! We propose (and Army chemists have proven methods) to begin... exploiting that deposit. And, with the help of the Americans—they will do this both faster and better—to construct a plant to obtain arsenic and very valuable and costly preparations manufactured on the basis of it. To share the proceeds fifty-fifty. Such a plant would be a good platform and a good model for cooperation between our countries in resolving the problem of destroying chemical weapons.

Talks With U.S. on Chemical Weapons Ban Viewed

LD0411174990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1125 GMT 4 Nov 90

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, 4 November (TASS)—The first part of the 17th round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on a ban on nuclear [as received] weapons has ended in New York. At the center of the attention of those taking part in this round were a number of issues—amongst which, in my view, a special place is occupied by the preparation of a protocol on inspection for the agreement on the elimination and nonproduction of chemical weapons, signed by the presidents of the USSR and the United States in Washington on 1 June 1990. According to the clauses of this agreement, the preparation of this protocol should be completed by 31 December. The sides succeeded in achieving substantial progress in agreeing a draft protocol in connection with which there are good grounds for considering that work on this important, practical document will be finished within the time limit set.

Also touched upon were issues connected with cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of the elimination of chemical weapons. In particular, an

exchange of opinions took place on progress in implementing the Soviet-U.S. memorandum on understanding in relation to the bilateral experiment on monitoring [kontrol] and the exchange of data in connection with the banning of chemical weapons.

As is well known, the USSR and the United States have committed themselves, without waiting for the conclusion of a multilateral convention on chemical weapons, to beginning a reduction of their own chemical arsenals and eliminating the overwhelming part of them. Stocks of chemical weapons must be reduced by 80 percent and each side will maintain only 5,000 tonnes (that is, around 20 percent of the current chemical arsenal of the United States). The elimination will begin in 1992 so that there will be time for special elimination sites to be prepared.

To what does work at the current round of talks testify? First and foremost to the fact that Soviet-U.S. calls for a reduction in weapons are being reinforced by specific, practical steps. Another aspect is of no small significance either: cooperation between the USSR and the United States in this sphere serves as an example of what our countries can do to satisfy real demands in the sphere of security in the period after the end of the "cold war".

At the same time, attention must also be paid to the difficulties which both the Soviet Union and the United States are encountering in preparing for the mass elimination of chemical weapons. In our country not a single enterprise has yet been prepared for these purposes (a special factory constructed in Chapayevsk has been re-designated for educational needs at the instigation of the public). At the present time the United States has at its disposal just one complex designated for such a purpose (on Johnson Atoll, 800 miles from the Hawaiian islands), and moreover its production capacities are rather limited.

Thus, both countries are still faced with solving complex tasks connected with the location of the necessary enterprises for the elimination of chemical weapons. The fulfillment of this task is connected with a wide range of problems—from the purely technical to the humanitarian. At the same time, it is important to present the public with convincing proofs that such enterprises will not have a harmful effect on the environment.

UN Committee Discusses Chemical Weapons Ban

LD1511085390 Moscow TASS in English 0724 GMT 15 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations, November 15 (TASS)—The world's unanimity as regards the need [for] chemical and bacteriological weapons manifested itself in the delegates' approach to three draft resolutions that were submitted for consideration to the First Committee (political, security and disarmament) of the 45th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

All three documents, dealing with various aspects of banning the barbarous weapons, were adopted at the committee session by consensus, without voting.

One draft resolution welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to stop producing chemical weapons and to start destroying stocks of these weapons.

At the same time the co-sponsors of the draft resolution expressed regret and concern over the fact that a convention on a ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction had yet to be concluded.

Ending the production of fissionable materials for weapons development purposes and gradually switching stocks of these materials over to civilian use would be an important step towards ending and reversing the nuclear arms race, another draft resolution emphasises.

The committee also adopted a draft resolution banning the dumping of radioactive wastes.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Changed Soviet, U.S. Asian Policies Foreseen

*OW1111021790 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 0700 GMT 10 Nov 90*

[Commentary by Titarenko, doctor of philosophy and director of the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; read by announcer]

[Text] This Soviet scholar pointed out: The process of switching from confrontation to dialogue and cooperation in Europe has begun to be practiced at an increasing rate in Asia. It is first demonstrated by the fact that the confrontation between the USSR and the United States over the years is gradually becoming history. Many Asian-Pacific countries were involved in this confrontation in different ways.

A meeting of the leaders of the foreign affairs departments of the Soviet Union and the United States last summer pointed out that the USSR and the United States no longer regard each other as enemies, not only in Europe, but also in Asia, and that is why they could handle, according to new formulas, the issues of disarmament, security, and reduction of military presence in the Asian-Pacific region. We can say that the social and political powers in Asia have gradually come to understand that they can make use of the European experience of Helsinki.

This Soviet scholar noted the positive development of the dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul. It was a difficult but good start for the two Korean sides in reducing tension, strengthening mutual security, and easing residents' visits. As we all know, the permanent member countries of the UN Security Council have

achieved a common understanding on solving the Cambodian issue. The relations between China and Vietnam have progressed toward normalization. Pyongyang and Washington are making contacts. I think that in future, all these will lead to a change in the U.S. stance on the issue of deploying U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula.

Titarenko added: The USSR and the Republic of Korea have established diplomatic relations. He pointed out: However, this will not adversely affect the security of our old friend, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I wish to specifically mention the Soviet-Chinese talks on reducing their military presence along the borders. This is their realistic contribution to the specific process of disarmament in Asia. Also, it can serve as a precedent for other countries in this region. I hope that Soviet President Gorbachev's upcoming visit to Japan will be helpful in increasing mutual understanding in Soviet-Japanese relations. At an international conference in Vladivostok this year, Shevardnadze, Soviet foreign minister, spoke of the prospects of achieving cooperation and security in the vast areas of Europe and Asia.

Titarenko, the Soviet scholar, said in conclusion: I was talking about a new and civilized relations between the two continents, and between the two civilization centers of the world.

Reduction of Far East, Pacific Forces Viewed

*HK1211072190 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines
1300 GMT 10 Nov 90*

[Interview with Major General Nikolay (Buchiyev), deputy commander of the Soviet Far Eastern military district, and Rear Admiral Nikolay Zyachev, deputy chief of staff of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, by Valeriy Chebatariyev; place and date not given—comments in Russian fading into English translation; live or recorded]

[Text] [(Buchiyev)] The unilateral reduction of Soviet forces from the region, as announced two years ago, has almost been completed. After this decision was made, many changes dealing with the troops were made, such as the reduction of a large number of troops, and the dismantling of the army and its corps.

Meanwhile, talks continue on the issue of the demilitarization of the border between the Soviet Union and China. I believe the principle of military trust in the Far East should be further enhanced. Such a condition has resulted in further Soviet troop reductions in the Far Eastern military region.

As to the remaining troops in the region, the operational and combat training of Soviet troops in the region have been totally revised. Our military exercises today are mainly for defensive purposes. In the past, all military practices were likewise used for defensive purposes, and

new organizational methods were used for our motorized units, which were also strictly defensive. This concept lead to a reduction of Soviet forces in the region.[Zyachev] Reduction in the strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet continues, according to the plan set forth earlier. During the past five years, some 60 naval ships have been pulled out—these included large ships and submarines. The Pacific Fleet has also cut down its operations in a major part of the Pacific Ocean. The Soviet Union's military presence in Camranh Bay in Vietnam has also been greatly reduced. The remaining unit in Camranh Bay provides logistical support to Soviet ships.

However, naval activity in the region still presents problems. The major issue involved in reducing such naval activity is the need for total confidence and trust, which would involve reporting any naval military exercises carried out by other countries, and allowing these to be watched by foreign observers.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet has a (vast?) experience in these matters, but such action cannot be immediately implemented. [sentence as heard] Thus, I believe that a big step has been taken, beginning with a small step.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Woerner Calls For European Security System

AU0111140490 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Oct 90 p 2

["fy." report: "NATO Secretary General Woerner Calls For European Security System"]

[Text] Bonn—On Monday [29 October] NATO Secretary General Woerner said that the development of a new pan-European security system in which the Soviet Union is included as a partner is the Western alliance's central political task of the future. The new political situation in Europe requires an "extended" comprehension of security; the political and economic dimension must be added to the military one, Woerner said in Munich. The support for the political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union is an investment in peace and stability. Permanent political structures, confidence-building, increased cooperation, and the promotion of democratic development are necessary. Therefore, NATO will participate in the development of a new European security system, he said.

Long-term security is to be created by cooperation, military contacts, confidence-building, disarmament, and verification. Here NATO wants to be an anchor of stability for future structures which include the Soviet Union as a responsible partner "in the larger family of Atlantic and European states." The new structures will enable the Soviet Union to overcome the feeling of isolation, he said. This will result in better chances of success in the critical stage of the reform processes. "This, as well as the integration of the Central and Eastern European area into a new, free, and undivided Europe, is the central political task of the alliance, of which it cannot be relieved by any other organization."

Referring to NATO's concepts of the future pan-European architecture of cooperation and security, he said that the free, united Europe should be based on four pillars: the EC, the institutionalized CSCE process, the Council of Europe, and finally NATO, which Woerner called an unrenouncable basis of stability. Importance has to be attached to the relations between the CSCE and NATO on the one hand and the EC and NATO on the other hand.

In the opinion of the NATO secretary general, the increasing consolidation of the CSCE process into institutions is the "joint objective of all NATO partners." With the development of CSCE organs that should serve the exchange of information, the observation of unusual military events, the support of disarmament agreements, and the settlement of conflicts, a new chapter, which will change the political reality on the continent, will start, he said.

However, the conclusion that NATO will become superfluous in the long run must not be drawn from the consolidation of the CSCE process. This is wrong

because the CSCE can bridge former contrasts, but it cannot give security guarantees against future military risks, since the principle of unanimity impairs its capacity to act, he said. Woerner also rejected the idea that NATO might become superfluous because of the extension of the EC. A European defense community is still a long way, off and even if it is achieved, it will not be able to replace the transatlantic security alliance, he stressed. Therefore, the EC's security policy steps have to be coordinated with NATO, so that the military structure of the alliance can be maintained, he said.

FINLAND

Defense Official Views CFE Impact on Finland

91WC0009A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 5 Oct 90 p C1

[Article by Vesa Santavuori: "Pressure Close to Finland Will Grow at First. Weapons To Be Disposed of Are Old Equipment"]

[Text] Politically it is extremely positive that an agreement on limiting conventional weapons is finally going to be reached in Europe.

It is also good that the Soviet Union finally approves the "parity principle," namely that an attempt will be made to permit both force groupings in Europe exactly the same amount of conventional weapons, subject to restrictions.

The large numbers of tanks and other equipment to be removed are still somewhat misleading because the weapons to be destroyed are old, for the most part. The armaments that remain in use and new armament to be installed ensure that huge quantities of firepower will remain in Europe and near Finland.

The assessment of the effects of the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Agreement made on Thursday by Pauli Jarvenpaa, a special adviser in the Finnish Ministry of Defense, could be summarized in this way.

According to him, the undertaking of arms limitations in the CFE field by the military alliances does not mean a significant reduction in military force around Finland, nor does it make the question of Finland's disarmament timely.

Finland Can Still Benefit

From Finland's standpoint, the positive significance of the CFE Agreement could lie in the fact that, when the "overarmed" countries now reduce their armaments, and if Finland holds on to its present position, it will gain in strength a little bit relative to others.

This is the way Juha Harjula, a researcher at the Military Science Institute, sees things. Just a comparison with a "properly armed" Sweden shows that, even if Sweden cut its military expenditures in half, Finland would have

to increase its defense spending by 4 billion markkas per year to reach Sweden's reduced level. In Harjula's opinion, the most obvious positive significance of the CFE Agreement, however, consists of the exchange of information and verification of what makes it possible to build a network of political confidence.

"It may in the long run be a factor building up military stability in Europe," Harjula said.

Pressure Grows in the Periphery

In the initial phase of the CFE Agreement, military pressure in the European peripheral areas will actually increase when the equipment is removed from Central Europe. The weapons to be removed are scheduled to be destroyed relatively slowly, perhaps within seven to 10 years.

To await destruction, they will be shunted to the sidelines or to areas near Finland. There has been talk about the Karelian Isthmus, among other places. On Thursday, HELSINGIN SANOMAT received information from Central Europe according to which the Soviet Union intends to move as many as 500 modern tanks from Central Europe to the Leningrad Military District in the next few years.

The superpowers are also constantly producing new weapons that are more powerful than the previous ones.

It has been stated on a high level in Soviet military circles that this year, for example, 1,700 new tanks will be manufactured, and that the target by 1993 is 850 new tanks per year. In the United States at present, approximately 600-650 new tanks are manufactured per year.

Their strength is quite different from that of the weapons the CFE Agreement is removing, military experts note. Moreover, the agreement does not cover ammunition, huge quantities of which will thus remain in use.

Eternal Question

The final outcome will be that, when the weapons destruction in accordance with the CFE Agreement has been implemented sometime close to the end of the millennium, extremely modern equipment having enormous firepower will remain near Finland.

Will the CFE Agreement then increase the Finnish Defense Forces' need for appropriations? That is the eternal question, Pauli Jarvenpaa affirmed.

From the statement, one gains the impression that little Finland, with its relatively small economic resources, is condemned to an everlasting slow train with regard to modern weapons procurement in relation to the superpowers.

Jarvenpaa also does not consider it possible to buy the conventional weapons that are being removed cheaply for Finland's military use.

The CFE weapons to be destroyed may not be bought or sold after the agreement has been signed. Before the signing, which will occur in Paris in November, deals are possible at least in principle.

Part of the equipment will be shifted to civilian use in the Soviet Union, but foreign buyers would hardly be interested in the purchase of things like tank motors. They consume a lot of fuel, and their service life is extremely short.

GERMANY

No Quick Economic Gains Seen From Armaments Conversion

91WC0005A Bonn AUS POLITIK UND
ZEITGESCHICHTE in German 31 Aug 90 pp 23-31

[Analysis by Lutz Koellner, director of Bundeswehr Social Science Institute, Munich: "Economic Aspects of Arms Conversion"; first three paragraphs are AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE introduction]

[Text] *Disarmament and arms conversion are political decisions for which economists and financial experts can design short-, medium-, and long-term models. In an international comparison, the FRG is a relatively "harmlessly" armed country. It also represents the type of a highly developed old industrial country with its specific institutional rigidities and a perceptible inelasticity both of budget appropriations and enterprise decisions.*

Disarmament is not the mirror image of armament: the elasticities that are affected in the markets (including the credit markets) as well as in the macroeconomic aggregates such as saving, investment, liquidity, payments balances, currency discipline and others are not the same here as in the defense industry with its previous annual extrapolation. The military sector in the FRG is quantitatively small; there is no self-contained defense industry.

The share of services and specialized knowledge has risen both for the military and for the arms industry. It is difficult to apply this share for alternative production. Because of the small quantities and immobile budget policy, one cannot expect arms conversion to yield any rapid impulses that promote economic development in the overall economy.

I.

Whether disarmament and/or conversion is desired, is a political decision. Economic science can accompany this process with advice but it can mold it in only a limited way. In the course of conversion, private and public economic advantages and disadvantages arise that must be weighed against one another. The result of an economic analysis can thereby very well lead to unpopular political and social conclusions—for example, that one cannot expect any strong and permanent economic growth impulses from conversion on account of the meager aggregate economic quantities. Scholars should

not awaken any false hopes. They must have the courage to apply their specialized knowledge against political supremacy and doctrines. First some key words on the armaments industry and armaments financing in the FRG:

—The FRG does not have a self-contained armaments industry as in the time of the “cannon kings,” Krupp, Scoda, or Schneider-Creuzot. Mixed manufacture prevails. Tanks and locomotives, combat aircraft and Europea missiles as well as Airbus are produced side by side. There is no armaments branch but rather sectors of arms manufacture in different branches.

—Services are forging ahead everywhere; engineering and specialized knowledge have increased to an unprecedented extent in armaments manufacture as well, although here they do not amount to 30 percent as in the United States (including NASA and the like). Planning times have become longer not only because of the bureaucratization of procurement but also because the project plans for more and more complicated equipment are requiring more and more time.

—The FRG is a conventionally armed country, without NBC [Nuclear Biological Chemical] weapons, which complicates all comparisons with nuclear powers. The FRG is also a country with a split armament for three military services with joint cost centers whose importance has increased over time: logistics, maintenance and joint NATO tasks (NATO civilian budget, Central European Pipeline System, NATO infrastructure budget, etc.). Simple ordnance stands next to the Tornado or Leopard II.

—The share of material armament is small even when the term is applied broadly: DM12.8 billion or DM16.6 at the most; that is about 0.6 to 0.7 percent of the gross national product (1988). The share of military expenditures in the gross national product fell to under three percent, which may be considered a historical value since the last quarter of the 19th century.

—In fiscal terms, the proportionate share of military expenditures in the federal budget has become ever smaller since 1955/56. Initially it was 32 percent of the federal budget, whereas today it is about 18 percent. Social and educational expenditures as well as the so-called joint functions and their financing, on the other hand, forged ahead.

—In an international comparison, the FRG is a relatively harmlessly armed country; its armament began “late” and initially it was undertaken only unwillingly. Over more than 30 years, however, a high technological and military-technical level has developed, especially for major items of equipment and heavy weapons.

—The last-mentioned part of physical armament became more expensive, not because of any special inflationary tendencies but because research and

development as well as testing and the share of technical engineering services and the expenditures for maintenance increased continuously. Remember the 36 men who “look after” a Starfighter or Tornado pilot. In the case of the old M [Messerschmitt] 109 in World War II, it was said to be only four or six men. That is an indication of increased and fixed costs of logistics and maintenance.

—Finally, one must consider the personnel costs, which today are once again similar to those of civil servants in terms of the pay grades for long-term and career officers. That is a rigidity that is not very desirable within the defense expenditures. With its many social services, the Bundeswehr offers a kind of second social and educational system (career advancement, retraining, officer studies for young officer candidates and lieutenants, etc.).

Military expenditures are central state expenditures (civil defense is largely the task of the Lands). For the economist and financial expert, this is linked with the question: Do military expenditures as a macrofactor contribute to economic growth and economic development, even when their quantitative share in macroindicators is small? It may be considered proven that:

a) only in early stages of economic development do military expenditures make a real contribution to economic growth in that, for example, infrastructures are developed that also serve nonmilitary purposes (harbor dams, airports, roads, storehouses, hospitals). That is still discernible in some developing countries.

b) In advanced stages of economic development, the importance of military expenditures is reduced to the middle-term tying up of employment and consumer purchasing power. Major items of military equipment do not have any capacity effect of their own—tanks do not produce any new tanks—whereas it is a characteristic of the machine building industry, for example, that the building of machines leads to the building of other, different machines. New investments in the nonmilitary area create new capacities. Only “more” or “fewer” tanks, among other things, can be produced. “Counter-armaments” of a technical nature are at best supplementary investments and not investments with a capacity effect of their own.

c) Economics in the FRG—U.S. research is ahead of us here—has heretofore not been able to say unequivocally whether more and/or a qualitatively “better” military promises more social protection, behind which a “peaceful” economic development can proceed—an idea that was very well defined as early as Adam Smith. The calculation of the social costs of the strains through the military is still in its infancy in the scope of the overall national economic accounting. Linked with this are questions of the reorganization of the calculation of the social products. In the case of an automobile crash, assistance, tow services, the costs of hospital services and

other things are paradoxically registered as "production." Something similar happens with the disposal of garbage and the outlays for the elimination of environmental damage, although those are costs for the maintenance of the national product and the general well-being. It is certainly not correct to say that it was only through the Bundeswehr that the FRG became a true state entity with secure rates of increase of the national product. This must be countered with the event unique in economic history that the so-called "economic miracle" in the years 1948-56 took place precisely in a time without a military and even under occupation conditions with investment rates of up to 23 percent of the gross national product.

d) The highly industrialized countries tend to have growth rates that decline over time, especially when no new industrial or economic sectors arise. And it appears that even constant military expenditures have their share in such gaps in the economic development, above all in times of detente, when the argument that one needs strong military protection against other countries to guarantee a stable economic development loses weight. There is much to indicate that military-technical spin-offs and spread-over effects are continually overestimated. The specialization in the manufacture of today's weapons is very great. Up-to-date weapons are extremely unconvertible. En bloc, on the other hand, high technology is highly convertible and obviously very exchangeable in production. The closer one gets to the exclusively militarily usable final product, the more unconvertible it becomes.

II.

The conversion of part of central state expenditures takes place in the state budget as well as in the armaments industry. Since military and armaments expenditures have been state expenditures for 300 years, we can ignore other demand for handguns by agriculture and forestry as well as by smaller formations equipped with weapons (customs, border protection, and guard companies), for our considerations are macroeconomic in nature. We must see both pillars of conversion—fiscal and production economic—simultaneously, because they are part of the base upon which economic development takes place. Both changed or reduced state expenditures as well as changed state orders influence the volume and composition of the national product and contribute in different ways to economic growth.

In federally organized states, military or defense expenditures are central state expenditures. So they must be included in the central budget. Its fiscal performance is dependent upon both the financial system of a state and its elasticity in relation to changes in business conditions and upon long-term economic growth. The distribution of taxes to area authorities, tax rates and the distribution of tax receipts also indirectly determine the size of defense expenditures, whereby the financial compensation between the area authorities can alleviate tension between financial requirements and available financing.

Defense expenditures account for about three percent of gross national product in developed old industrial states. It is as much as six percent in nuclear nations. Whereas the share of physical armament in net industrial production is seldom more than two percent of total industrial production, the share of the employees in the military sector—including the armed forces themselves—in the FRG amounts to 3.5 percent (including the Bundeswehr civilian administration). The FRG expends no more than DM16.6 billion annually for armament, including the simple ordnance for each soldier. This amount includes the expenditures for rifles as well as the costs of about DM100 million for a "Tornado-MRCA." If 4 billion were saved on a one-time basis, this would be scarcely 0.2 percent of the gross national product. This small sector can, however, have substantial effects on the overall economy, because it is qualitatively enriched with much "specialized knowledge" and highly qualified hardware produced capital-intensively. This hardware in its final assembled form can be used elsewhere to only a limited extent. For this reason, conversion should begin in the earliest possible stages of production.

The share of defense expenditures in the federal budget has declined from about 32 percent (1956) to 18 percent (1989). In this respect, there has already been an internal budget conversion between various central state expenditures. Within defense expenditures, there has been an increase above all in outlays for maintenance, support, logistics (resupply) and command structures. Overall we are seeing an increase in services within the military sector. A linear conversion that involves all expenditure groups simultaneously affects different developments of individual parts of defense budgets. For this reason, generally a nonlinear reduction of defense expenditures is called for so that the reduced military sphere can maintain a structure suitable to its missions. It thereby becomes clear that conversion depends upon the previous armament structure as well as the relationship between personnel outlays and so-called material expenditures.

In the armed forces of all industrial nations, the annual expenditures for armaments have fallen below 25 percent of all defense outlays (it was still 40 percent around 1900). The personnel and incidental personnel expenditures (e.g., health and housing assistance) rose in the long term in the century to 45 percent or more. Thus the effects of shifts in military expenditures are dependent upon their structure. Since the armaments industry in the GDR does not produce any heavy weapons, the conversion that has begun there is taking place at a lower level than in the FRG. Here military technology is highly developed, especially in the building of tanks, aircraft and ships, less so for missiles and not at all in the case of NBC weapons, which the FRG renounced.

There has not been a parliamentary-democratic appropriation process for military expenditures in the GDR. The armaments industry and central state budget were understood as elements of a centrally planned economy. To the extent that there were incorrect decisions in

financing and armament and hence welfare losses for the society, they were the expression and result of bureaucratic central planning. There can also be incorrect decisions under democratic conditions for budget appropriations. They are based on parliamentary compromises, especially in the case of rapidly changing government coalitions. There may also be paradoxical decisions. With a view to the passing of the overall budget, half-hearted or contradictory decisions are made on individual positions. Thus, money may be appropriated for "public goods" (also including weapons) that no one wants so as to achieve community with other budget positions. Or individual appropriations for selected parts of military expenditures are not forthcoming, because no agreement can be achieved. When the "distribution battle in parliament" for public monies is fierce—and it has become fiercer in this century, because the state expenditures have increased—the unit quantities of major weapon systems may be reduced so greatly that the military mission can no longer be reasonably met. That will probably also be the case for the "Fighter 90" currently in development and testing. Then it is better to give up military expenditures of this kind altogether.

Two conclusions suggest themselves. First: in the GDR, conversion has a good chance of succeeding relatively quickly at a relatively low military economic level because of the fundamental changes in the economy and society. Second: conversion as a return of state expenditures to the private economy may—also as a function of the achieved level of economic development—contribute to a balancing out of existing disproportions in the economic development. Conversion in the sense of a balanced or unbalanced economic development is not automatically successful, however. It must meet so-called optimization conditions. The positive as well as the negative effects of conversion in the military sector must be carefully compared with advantages and disadvantages of nonpublic (consumption and investment) expenditures and balanced. Only a balance of all advantages and disadvantages permits one to make a judgment on the success of conversion.

III.

In the public discussion, generally only certain arguments for or against conversion are considered, whereby the connection with the overall economic development, its conditions and effects is usually not considered at all. The argument of the trade unions (despite the positive political attitude to it) that conversion eliminates jobs is only correct when in the medium-term more jobs are not created overall and when the loss of real income cannot be compensated through the secondary distribution (social security, etc.). Even during the medium-term, however, conversion must contribute to long-term economic growth or the growth of the overall economy flattens out. Conversion is then a success fiscally but not with respect to economic production or the overall economy.

In the case of structural changes in the political order such as those now taking place in the GDR, the long-term economic growth rates under new market and competitive conditions are an unknown quantity. Calculations of the successes and failures of conversion are then possible only in alternative scenarios. If a hastily introduced market economy fails in the short and medium-term, then neither can conversion make any contribution to raising the long-term path of economic development.

Here we are examining only the possible structure of such scenarios. To enrich them with data remains a task of empirical economics, which in turn makes use of statistics and estimates. If we assume that conversion can take place in the short, middle or long term, that it takes place in the central state budget as well as in production and the services sector and that conversion can occur fiscally as an internal shift within the defense expenditures (within the department) and within the overall budget—e.g., in favor of expenditures for education and ecology—or, apart from the budget, in favor of the nonpublic sector, then obviously numerous manifestations of conversion are conceivable. If one also assumes a further subdivision into reequipment, disarmament, and intensified conventional armament (all three forms can be brought about through international negotiations), this multiplies the number of conceivable cases many times over. Individual fields thereby attain unequal aggregate economic weights. For example, a short-term reequipment and disarmament in the defense sector in the form of new or less-needed handguns can be a relatively harmless process in comparison with the modification and/or abandonment of major weapon system (tanks, frigates, multipurpose combat aircraft). That is, because of its conceivably unequal structure, conversion may not only appear different in the overall economy but it may also exercise unequal influences on the further economic development measured in terms of monetary quantities. Just as in the case of the armament structures, conversion also appears in different quantities and qualities. Thus, arms conversion is not a homogeneous process.

Statisticians who want to fill out such a large number of assignments and dependencies (matrix) encounter not only the limitations offered by the traditional secrecy of military and especially procurement expenditures here but also two fundamental difficulties with numerical data. In the first place, almost all countries lack a satisfactory integration of military expenditures in a national economic account (which should not be confused with a central plan). It may be that after the changing of the political order in 1989/1990 such a macroaccount can now be set up in the GDR. Secondly, there are only incomplete so-called "input-output tables" for the military sector to be converted. This is understood to be a numerical presentation of outlays, for example, for soldiers, officers, equipment, buildings, etc. and the military protection provided by them. Here

there arise many evaluation and assignment problems, which, however, can mostly be resolved, as American economics shows.

The United Nations has done much in the last 20 years to make military expenditures comparable internationally. If one follows the special disarmament matrix developed by the United Nations—which, by the way, is completely incomparable with the systems of the defense budget of the FRG and of the GDR as disclosed—comparable and verifiable conversion steps can be introduced on its basis.

There are also process flow models and goal-oriented condition models in economic conversion research. Flow models proceed on the basis of a particular situation that is characterized by certain investment, consumption, liquidity, and foreign-economic tendencies. The model result is open. What is presented is the flow of an economic conversion process under given assumptions. Condition models are rather the opposite: they ask for indispensable and adequate conditions that must be met for conversion (or cyclical policy, foreign-economic policy, monetary policy, etc.) to be successful. It can be asked what conditions in the finance and tax system or in the credit and monetary system must be fulfilled to achieve an "optimum" budget or an "optimum" national product or an "optimum" growth path. Naturally the criteria for an optimum must be named. A special difficulty lies in the fact that the society's criteria for an "optimum" shift even because of the succession of generations, as can be seen, among other places, in the many parallel youth cultures or in the establishment of alternative political groups. No one can now say what in the coming middle period of the 1990's will be a "normal" and what will be an "alternative" political grouping.

Theoretically and in analytical terms, however, this set of problems with respect to an "optimum" is solvable, as has been shown in particular by the Anglo-Saxon "welfare economy." It is quite conceivable that conversion can be an instrument for the macroeconomic renewal of the "path of the golden age" of economic development. It is characterized, among other things, by a long-term tendency toward equilibrium between growth in productivity, income distribution and the bringing together of such production factors working in the overall economy as labor, capital, nature, organization, technology, etc.

IV.

The economic representation of a shift of state expenditures within the central budget or in favor of the non-public sector is by no means limited to the reference to the causes for the large number of conversion cases. There are functional relations between the values in the individual fields of the matrix. Since the military structures themselves (compulsory service army, volunteer/career army, militia, etc.) are unequal, stability-oriented conversion measures in the political world will, as a rule, be nonlinear just to establish similar military bodies that

can be the subject of further international disarmament talks. This can be linked in the model with the condition that the military apparatus must meet general preconditions for an optimum economic growth (that may be balanced or unbalanced), namely only to "produce" as much military protection as is appropriate to the threat situation, the world geopolitical situation, etc.

To see armaments conversion in the economic cycle and in economic development is just one point of view; another is that of military-strategic and defense policy. The respective viewpoints can certainly lead to different results. In the United States, for example, the connection between military expenditures and national security is a current notion that one can search for in vain in German financial management and economics. There are investigations that come to the result that "rich" countries (measured by real income per capita or by family income) are more able than poor countries to renounce part of their military expenditures. But rich countries with a mixed system between a public sector oriented toward welfare and a profit-oriented private sector are characterized by rigidities that hinder economic development as well as conversion. They include rigid wages and tariff agreements, institutional obstacles of agencies and bureaucracy, the reluctant risk-taking of large-scale industry, which demands (and gets!) guaranteed state purchases, and the addiction to established subsidies, especially in the case of expenditures for research and development relevant to the military. In any case, it can be shown that conversion—that is, disarmament—shows a different mobility (elasticity) "downward" than armament. Conversion is not the precise mirror image of armament in the opposite direction. The "downward" process presents obstacles of its own.

There are functional relations—the number of scrapped tanks, for example, depends upon the available financial resources—between the three mentioned periods and between the three forms of fiscal conversion as well as between conversion, disarmament and intensified conventional armament. To be sure, theoretically such functional relations can be isolated (what is the relationship, for example, between conversion and intensified conventional armament?) but beyond that one can imagine that there are, in turn, dependencies between bunched functional relations. In this way, one obtains an abstract network of "multiple independent" relations that are later enriched with data.

To be handled in a practical way (operationalization), such a complex interdependent system generally requires a practicable simplification, which economic theory calls "reduction of complexity." An example: the abandonment of a large-scale weapon system (destroyers, heavy tanks, long-range fighter bombers) can favor expenditures for other weapons within the department. In the short term but less in the long term: in 100 years, everything is convertible, including the entire automobile industry; there is no longer any cavalry either. In the long term, the conversion flexibility in the appropriation of military expenditures in parliament as well as that of

the armaments industry is not a constant value but changes. It has become less in this century, interrupted by eruptions as a result of comprehensive innovations that change all of economic life, as in the case of computer technology at the present time. Especially the conversion that departs from the budget can in the middle as well as in the long term show a tendency toward flexibility that is the same, less or greater than in the economy as a whole. Alternative products can possibly be produced more rapidly than weapons and without a large accompanying bureaucratic apparatus. Successful or unsuccessful conversion can stimulate or hinder economic development. So not just the scientist faces the necessity of recognizing and setting "weights" in a multidimensional network of relations. What is in each case the strongest tendency, for example, between liberating and alternatively compensating employment in conversion? Has the budget appropriation process in the 20th century become more flexible through the preliminary work in the specialized committees of parliament than many cumbersome decisions in large arms enterprises? Have the "life cycles" of large procurement projects of DM5 billion to DM50 billion, distributed over a medium period, developed in the long term with or against the business cycle, which usually lasts seven to nine years? It can be shown, for example, that in the long term the part of military expenditures of value in the business cycle has become smaller.

In addition to the connecting of individual fields of the matrix in and through a multi-interdependent system of relations, it must be made clear that the short-term analysis is static in nature and is rather more valid than the long-term analysis for an economic cycle conceived as closed. The long-term analysis generally understands short-term conversion processes as frictional losses in the larger framework of a larger overlying relation. Similarly, methods and instruments of the short-term economic analysis of conversion are different from those of the long-term analysis. The long-term analysis, however, does not result from a mere concatenation of many short periods: its viewpoint is broader from the outset. Every form of analysis has its own quality. The long-term analysis cannot, for example, say anything about the use of military expenditures in a particular business cycle. The examination of a medium period of five to seven years cannot shed any light, for example, on the monthly production of infantry ammunition.

If one looks at all of the conversion research so far, which did not develop in Germany until the last 10 years, two main tendencies since 1980 can now be ascertained: in the first place, through tedious work economists have been largely successful in fitting together the puzzle of secret statistical data on the military sector almost along side official statistics into a recognizable picture. Secondly, there are signs that it may also be possible to bring conversion as structural change into the theory, empiricism and policy of middle and long-term economic development.

Both trends allow one to expect substantial progress in conversion research. In the current state of conversion research, it can be said with great probability that conversion in developed industrial states is a process of the medium term. It can take about five to eight years before it will radiate permanent impulses to overall economic development. As for the situation in the FRG, one should not overlook the fact that prior to the upheaval in the Eastern Bloc in 1989/90 the government obligated itself for at least DM16 billion for the next five years (so-called liability commitments), which are legally binding relative to the armaments industry: a major rigidity factor in the conversion process.

V.

The relatively small quantities that are set into motion in a 25-percent conversion of major weapon systems, for example, now amount to about DM2.5 to 3 billion annually. If the defense budget is projected from the past, then it is quite possible that this will amount to DM3 to 4 billion within a few years. For 1991, however, the defense budget was cut by DM900 million—thus a conversion outside the department, for the total budget increased by 3.6 percent. If one includes ammunition, ordnance, light equipment, etc., then a conversion of 30 percent of the physical armament annually does not even reach the amount of the outlays of the federal government for development aid (about DM7 billion in 1990).

The disintegration of fortresses or the end of the cavalry in this century represent a long-term structural conversion in the military sector (surpassed in terms of cost, of course, by the production of armored vehicles, aircraft and missiles). The consolidation or disintegration of large training and maneuvering areas—as is now up for discussion in the territory of both the GDR and the FRG—can belong to conversion. Within the department, relatively much has had to be expended since the 1930's for the air force, which requires its own airports. Remaining are the barracks for the billeting of the soldiers. A militia army does not have expenditures for barracks to the extent that they are necessary for a conscript or voluntary army. Including the Bundeswehr administration (176,000 employees) and about 216,000 employed in the manufacture of armaments, there are currently about 870,000 people directly employed in the military sector; that is 3.6 percent of all working persons. In a long-term comparison since the founding of the Bundeswehr, however, the military sector in the FRG is small—in the overall economy as well as in an international comparison measured against the United States, the USSR or France, for example.

Conversion is quite possible in the case of structures and real estate. Civil and structural engineering can be transformed directly into civil defense structures, for example. Civil defense, of course, is primarily a matter for the Lands and conversion thereby affects the so-called vertical financial compensation between area

authorities. Parts of military facilities such as tank roads or air traffic control installations likewise permit a rapid conversion.

All conversion measures and projects, especially in the case of conversion outside the budget, are subject to a socioeconomic benefit measurement. If political priorities are set for conversion projects (health services, ecology, educational installations, civic educational work, etc.), then economic cost-benefit thinking decides the weight and sequence of the priorities. In welfare theory and policy, deviations from a scale of priorities represent "losses." It is thereby assumed that the conversion process cannot be left exclusively to the free market. The socioeconomic welfare loss is all the greater the more those making political decisions depart from the will of the voters. That was and is true for military expenditures and that is also true for future state-financed conversion projects. The problems in the measurement, use of resources and sequence of state expenditures are not set aside but merely deferred. Tax relief (such as "conversion write-offs" instead of "Berlin write-offs") can accompany conversion. To be sure, the medium and long-term conversion leaves behind a changed structure of the national product, which in the given financial system influences future tax receipts (and thus indirectly further conversion steps).

Intelligence and specific military communication can be converted rapidly. The telephone network of the Bundeswehr can either be integrated into the general network or it can be converted into a special catastrophe network. Military air reconnaissance can be transformed into weather and environmental information collection. Harbor dams, test areas and military parts of civilian airports can be transformed immediately. The closer one comes to the military "end product," particularly special vehicles and artillery pieces, the less convertible the military production will be, especially when arms exports are kept small. (They amount to about 0.15 percent of the gross national product of the FRG in 1990.) Parts of logistics can be converted quickly in the form of the freeing of previously military security zones—one thinks of the sudden opening of the "demarcation line" between the GDR and the FRG—modification of the NATO pipeline, etc. In other countries (e.g., the United States after the Vietnam War and Sweden in a conversion attempt in 1981-85), it has been shown that the transformation of the specially trained military personnel is easier than the civilian reapplication of career soldiers and longer-term servicemen without specialized training. An armed force with a high proportion of short-term soldiers and conventional armament is easier to convert than a career army that has also developed its own firm social values. The FRG therefore offers relatively good chances for conversion; a country such as the GDR, which did not produce any heavy weapons, certainly has even better chances.

There was already an indirect conversion through the educational reform in the Bundeswehr in 1970-73. Educational expenditures have increased since then within

the defense budget. Potential conversion personnel are being trained who will also go to the nonpublic sector after the end of military service, including with the help of supporting career development measures. Conversion within the department and conversion outside the budget have become linked here. In contrast, the "lifetime" career soldier offers fewer conversion chances, because his training and advanced training has a specific military nature.

It is not without reason that the political conversion debate has been oriented toward the large weapon systems: the NATO frigate NF 90, the "Fighter 90," and a possible Leopard III. This is the place of the large procurement expenditures that carry a lot of weight in the overall economy. All three of the named systems are currently controversial and development money that has already been spent is only partially convertible for alternative projects later. Unfortunately, the political conversion debate is being carried on almost without knowledge of the theory and empiricism of medium and long-term economic development. Thus, arguments are selectively linked, each of which is not false but inadequate for the analysis and control of macroeconomic conversion. The SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] and the trade unions stress the employment side of conversion and the fact that jobs should not be destroyed. The CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian social Union]—practically the entire air and space armament is at home in Bavaria—emphasize the necessity and freedom of policy decisions by enterprises. There has been no previous experience with conversion in the FRG. This calls forth the economists, who develop models and scenarios for different fiscally well-founded conversion cases in the short, medium, and long term with a view to the most balanced path of development possible.

The technical progress in the military sector is characterized by two tendencies (both tendencies appear more strongly in the United States, France and Great Britain as nuclear powers than in the FRG): in the first place, in the case of a greatly dispersed division of labor, the arms manufacture in mixed production with other goods and typical assembly-line manufacture in several stages through the increase of "knowledge services" (designers, engineers, planning management) is quite labor intensive. Secondly, over the long term the manufacture of armaments has become more specifically military—the so-called "spin-off effects" were thereby continually underestimated. Thus, conversion leaves behind a cemetery of knowledge and services (less of real production capacities), which must be "written off" macroeconomically. If an alternative production that promotes productivity and development takes the place of military equipment, then under favorable conditions the national product can be increased. But that does not occur automatically. To combat pests in agriculture and forestry, simpler aircraft and "spray guns" are needed than for the helicopter PAH 1 armed with missiles, which is currently being built. On the other hand, it is precisely

the helicopter that the military people—even after the experiences in the Vietnam War—see as indispensable for the new combat picture. According to experience, military technical progress is more expensive than average and the so-called capital coefficient (real capital to produced income or produced social protection) is relatively high. The work coefficient (number of employed to produced protection) is likewise high as a result of much design, planning and maintenance work.

In the manufacture of armaments, there are comparatively more highly specialized employees than in the rest of industry. Only the civilian aeronautical and space industry, to which the German air defense industry is obviously prepared to switch, offers a similar picture. The more structurally similar the sector to be converted is to the ultimately converted sector, the more smoothly conversion can proceed. A modification of the tax system and tariff corrections may favor conversion, as long as new state functions and expenditures (e.g., costs from the state treaty with the GDR) do not make tax reductions impossible. It is important to recognize that conversion is not an arbitrary process in an arbitrary situation of an achieved economic development. It effects elasticities of the markets (including the credit markets), of savings, of consumption and of overall economic liquidity. In general, these elasticities are more rigid in old highly industrialized countries than in younger industrial states. Hence conversion calls for a time requirement that may be about four to six years.

It becomes obvious that conversion is a structurally important process not only for the overall economy but also for branches and individual enterprises when one takes a look at the two fundamental forms of conversion that are beginning to become apparent in the FRG: in the first place, conversion can take place within an enterprise, especially in the case of pronounced preexisting mixed manufacture. It is possible, for example, to produce trucks instead of armored vehicles. Second, an enterprise or enterprise group can purposefully become smaller by giving up production relevant to the military and investing newly available assets in the capital markets, for example. Optimists among conversion researchers hope that through the credit markets at favorable interest rates the free market forces will be adequate to allow conversion to succeed in the market economy.

Here it becomes clear that conversion also represents a policy problem: How much initial aid—and in what form—should the state offer to allow the success of conversion outside the state sector? A conversion process has not yet really begun in the FRG and in the partially forced-involuntary conversion in the National People's Army of the GDR as well as in the GDR economy itself with its typically low productivity level. The economist must warn against hoping for quick successes that bring about a fundamental change of further economic development. Armaments conversion will be a theme for all of the 1990's.

[Box, p.3]

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Publications, among others: *Ruestungsfinanzierung: Daemonie und Wirklichkeit* [Armaments Financing: Devilry and Reality], 1969; *Militaerausgaben und Militaerstruktur in Deutschland* [Military Expenditures and Military Structure in Germany], 1980; *Militaer und Finanzen: Zur Finanzgeschichte und Finanzsoziologie von Militaerausgaben in Deutschland vom Dreissigjaehrigem Krieg bis zur Gegenwart* [The Military and Finances: On the Financial History and Financial Sociology of Military Expenditures in Germany from the Thirty Years' War to the Present], 1982; (editor together with Burkhardt J. Huck) *Abruestung und Konversion: Politische Voraussetzungen und wirtschaftliche Folgen in der Bundesrepublik* [Disarmament and Conversion: Political Prerequisites and Economic Consequences in the FRG], 1990.

'Atlas' Details Economic Impact of U.S. Withdrawal

91WC0011A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
15 Oct 90 pp 127-129

[Unattributed article: "Down to the Last Penny: For the First Time a 'Disarmament Atlas' Is Being Published in Germany—With Previously Unknown Details on U.S. Forces in the Federal Republic"]

[Text] Interior Minister Rudi Geil in Mainz displayed a lack of knowledge. Last month, when asked in the Landtag [land parliament] by Green delegate Gernot Rotter what would be the impact of disarmament and the resulting U.S. troop withdrawals on the status of orders placed with German companies, the Christian Democrat replied: "I don't know and I haven't tried to find out."

The minister, now nicknamed "Rudi Ratlos" [Rudi the Helpless], can be helped. In a soon to be published "disarmament atlas," peace researcher Burkhard Luber, 45, has for the first time compiled precise figures on American real estate and Pentagon contracts with FRG companies.¹ "Only in this manner," concludes Luber, "can the economic consequences of the troop reductions be seen in their direct, local ramifications."

Numerous expert groups in the Laender have been occupied for months with this same subject. As if taking turns on a weekly schedule, minister presidents are travelling to the United States in order to obtain exact figures from the Americans regarding "what they have here and what they are doing with us," as one member of the Mainz cabinet puts it.

Nearly all regional politicians fear that major economic losses will be added to the immense costs of reunification, if the military withdraws as a consumer and client from Germany.

In his researches, Luber did not draw on secret dossiers from the U.S. military, for example, but on official Pentagon sources. For instance, at regular intervals the U.S. Army and Air Force publish extensive lists of their land holdings in the United States and abroad, the "Inventories of Military Real Property." The computer printouts collected in book form are openly available. They include detailed information about the function and number of military installation buildings, going as far as the irrigation and illumination systems.

Also publicly available is a list of the contents and volume of contracts which the Pentagon has awarded German companies. In their "Individual Contract Action Report Master File of U.S. Federal Prime Contracts," the U.S. administration lists the relevant expenditures down to the last penny—a total of about half a billion dollars annually.

Among the 539 recipients of contracts from the U.S. Department of Defense are mainly service companies (251) and security services (27), construction companies (19) and food producers (15). Energy supply enterprises such as the Pfalzwerke AG in Ludwigshafen also make money from the U.S. military: They delivered power to the Yanks for \$12.416 million.

The Hunsrueck Municipal Association Rhaunen (\$87,000) profited from the Americans, as did the Heidelberg State Building Inspection Office (\$282,000) and the Frankfurt City Sanitation Office (\$518,000). In Nuremberg the U.S. military obtained milk and eggs worth \$1.454 million a year from Molkereizentrale Sued. The Gausepohl company in Dissen in Lower Saxony received a contract for meat, poultry and fish worth \$8.889 million.

But it is not only such large contracts that create economic dependence. For smaller firms, Luber calculates, "every U.S. dollar is worth twice as much."

The top cities profiting from the U.S. military are Munich (\$38 million) and Kaiserslautern (\$34 million). Among the 26 companies that do business with a volume of more than \$5 million, 11 are headquartered in small communities: Dissen, Niebuell, Bad Kissingen, Grafenwoehr, Crailsheim, Steinwenden, Maintal, Schwaebisch-Hall, Remseck.

Most U.S. military installations are located in the Rhineland-Palatinate: 255 of the total of 877 FRG installations are located in Helmut Kohl's home Land; Bavaria, Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg come next. The largest area occupied by the Americans is in Bavaria, followed by Hesse, the Rhineland-Palatinate, and Baden-Wuerttemberg.

By using his data, peace researcher Luber says, Germany's cities and rural kreise could produce "disarmament balance sheets"—with the goal of reducing economic dependence on the military. Special "conversion" offices, such as are meanwhile demanded by all parties in the Rhineland-Palatinate, because there is so little time, could be located in the municipalities to do this task.

But it turns out that Minister President Carl-Ludwig Wagner (CDU [Christian Democratic Union]) in Mainz is an obstacle to this. Only after weeks of hesitation did he inform the communities of the locations the Americans intend to leave. CDU state chairman Hans-Otto Wilhelm justified Wagner's policy of secrecy, which has been harshly criticized by the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany], the Greens and the coalition partner FDP [Free Democratic Party], thus: "Wagner served the Land by being silent."

Footnote

1. Burkhard Luber: "Abruestungsatlas. Chancen und Risiken des amerikanischen Truppenabzugs aus der BRD" [Disarmament atlas. Opportunities and risks of the U.S. troop withdrawal from the FRG], Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 98 pp, DM 14.80.

PORTUGAL

Mauritanian Missile Threat Issue Resurfaces

Cited in Restraint on Gulf Crisis

90ES1332A Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese
14-20 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by Lurdes Feio, Filipe Luis, and Isabel Oneto]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Missiles Aimed at Beja

But terrorism is not the only threat hanging over Portugal. According to military experts in strategy, the wave of reprisals that will be initiated by Baghdad against U.S. installations if there is war in the Gulf may include the launching of Iraqi missiles from Mauritania. Those missiles could penetrate Portuguese territory as far as the Grandola area without encountering any resistance, and, naturally, they would seriously endanger the base at Beja, where the Americans have facilities.

Recently published denials concerning the existence of Iraqi missiles in Mauritania are being viewed with skepticism by experts contacted by O JORNAL. Those experts say flatly that "there is no absolute proof that those missiles are not there or that they will not be installed there in the near future." They say: "The launch bases do, in fact, exist, and they are a real threat to the southern part of our country."

Our sources also say that North Africa represents a geopolitical threat to Portugal and that our country has

no means of defense against possible attacks from that region. "The strategic concept of national defense must be revised," they argue. That same position was also defended in Parliament last Tuesday by Socialist leader Jaime Gama.

Incidentally, the vulnerability of Portuguese territory has constituted one of the arguments used by military sectors against the government in their support of greater Portuguese involvement in the Gulf. "The fact that we are contributing such a small and inefficient volume of forces and equipment is a national disgrace and does not give us an image of neutrality. To all intents and purposes, Portugal is present in the Gulf and may suffer reprisals because of that fact," say military sources. [passage omitted]

Madeira Seen Target

90ES1332B Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese
21-27 Sep 90 p 2

[Text] O JORNAL has confirmed the existence of two SAM-class missile launchers and related equipment in Mauritania. They were supplied by Iraq at the end of 1989. We have also learned that the missiles are pointed at Madeira and Porto Santo, where an air base is available for use by the Americans. The missiles are located on the Atlantic coast between Nouadhibou and Nouakchott.

Military cooperation between Iraq and Mauritania began in 1987. It consists of training for Mauritanian officers in Iraq and Iraqi participation in joint exercises in Mauritania. Training in Mauritania has included practice exercises held on the Senegalese border, in the capital, and in Zouerate, the site of important iron mines on the border with Western Sahara.

Yemen and Sudan are the other countries where Iraq has military bases armed with missiles. Yemen's minister of foreign affairs, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dali, said recently in Rabat that he feared U.S. intervention to destroy those bases.

Saddam Husayn is strongly supported by the majority of the population in most North African countries, including Morocco. In countries such as Algeria, Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria—not to

mention Sudan and Yemen—people's voices are being raised in opposition to the Western presence in the Gulf. Egypt, however, fears the growing strength of nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists, and last week Hosni Mubarak's government banned travel by the fundamentalist opposition's leaders to Amman, the capital of Jordan. For his part, the Egyptian president has made 1,000 apartments in Cairo available to Kuwaiti refugees.

SWITZERLAND

Schmiedemeccanica Denies Missile Technology Sale to Iraq

91WP0014B Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE
in French 15 Sep 90 p 13

[Article: "Steel Delivery to Iraq: Schmiedemeccanica Rejects Accusations"]

[Text] Biasca—The Ticino firm Schmiedemeccanica in Biasca denies having provided Iraq with steel parts needed for the construction of uranium enrichment facilities and missiles. It claims that allegations broadcast on the Alemannian program "10 Vor 10" and published by various daily newspapers were based on sheer supposition and inaccurate technical data.

The two crates shipped by Schmiedemeccanica and confiscated by German authorities in Frankfurt last July contained cogwheels identical in construction and form to those the firm has delivered to numerous other clients, according to the Ticino-based company. The steel needed for manufacture of these parts was supplied by the client in Baghdad, a normal procedure when the quantity ordered is small, Schmiedemeccanica maintains.

The company said the steel was not subject to any import restriction, and the equipment shipped was forged in a conventional way in Biasca. It also claimed the steel was not treated thermically, the client having made no such request.

Finally, it said, the parts met the normal strength requirements for cogwheels used in machine construction. By contrast, the "maraging" steel mentioned by the media (which can be used, among other things, in nuclear installations) must be twice as strong. To get that strength, the steel must be treated thermically at special installations by experts, which is not feasible for the parts in question, according to Schmiedemeccanica.

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