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U.S.-Soviet Chemical Weapons Accord Viewed

OW1110233290 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
No 41, 8-14 Oct 90 pp 10-12

[Article by Yi Ping: "A Look at U.S.-Soviet Accord To Ban Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] A major result of the Soviet-U.S. summit held in Washington from May 31 to June 3 was the signing of an agreement between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons. It was the second arms-control agreement signed between the United States and the Soviet Union since the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The importance of this agreement is that it involves the elimination of an entire category of weapons.

Background

Both the Soviet Union and the United States made great efforts in developing and stockpiling chemical weapons during World War II and in the 1950s and 1960s. Each country's stockpile of chemical agents for use in a chemical war has reached 40,000 to 50,000 tons. Along with the increase in production of chemical weapons, chemical accidents in the United States have also increased. Most noted is a chemical accident which occurred in 1969 when the U.S. troops tested nerve gas at a United States testing site in Utah. The experiment killed 6,000 goats on a farm downwind of the testing site. The accident triggered a public uproar and hot political debate concerning the U.S. Government's policy on chemical weapons. As a result, then U.S. President Richard Nixon made the noted three-point statement declaring that the United States would stop producing chemical weapons.

Rumors also circulated about chemical accidents occurring in the Soviet Union although they were not often publicized. Obviously, the giant stockpiles of chemical weapons have become heavy burdens on the two countries and led to frequent criticism by the international community.

Multilateral talks on banning chemical and biological weapons began in late 1960s. In the 1970s, nicknamed the "detente decade," the United States and the Soviet Union held a series of disarmament talks including banning chemical weapons. In addition to attending the multilateral convention talks on banning chemical weapons, representatives from the two countries in Geneva Disarmament Committee held a round of talks each year and reported their progress to the committee. The U.S. Government suspended the talks after the Soviet troops invaded into Afghanistan in 1979. After resuming the Geneva disarmament talks in 1984, the two countries sent special delegations for bilateral talks and increased their frequency from one round to several rounds of talks for each year. The progress of the talks accelerated greatly. By the end of April this year, a total

of 15 rounds of talks had been held. The above agreement, with the exception of some details, was drafted during the last session of the talks.

Main Contents

The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons is composed of ten clauses. There are also two addenda. One is about measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons. The other concerns prevention of further proliferation of chemical weapons. The main contents of the agreement can be capsulized into the following points.

Destruction of chemical weapons: Each party begins its destruction of chemical weapons no later than December 31, 1992. By December 31, 1999, each party shall have destroyed at least 50 percent of its self-declared total quantity of chemical weapons. No later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, each party's total quantity of chemical weapons will not exceed 5,000 tons in terms of toxic agents. Finally, no later than the end of the eighth year after an agreement on the international convention on banning chemical weapons is reached and put into effect, the total quantity of each party's chemical agents for weapons should not exceed 500 tons.

After the agreement comes into force, the production of all chemical weapons shall be halted.

Inspection: Each party shall allow the other to inspect chemical weapons production facilities to confirm that production of chemical weapons is not occurring. Each party shall implement continuous on-site inspection of the other's chemical weapons destruction facilities and annually each side will inform the other as to its plan and practice of chemical weapons destruction.

Facilitation of the conclusion of multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons: The two parties will declare their intention to be an original party to the multilateral convention and cooperate with each other and with other states to ensure that all chemical weapons-capable states also join the multilateral convention. A special conference of parties to the multilateral convention shall be held at the end of the eighth year after the agreement comes into force, in order to determine whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding in the elimination of all remaining chemical weapons.

Nonproliferation of chemical weapons: Each party shall prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, institute export controls on the export of chemical products and coordinate such controls with other nations. Frequent bilateral consultations will be held to exchange the information about chemical weapon proliferation.

Reasons for Agreement

Why were the two countries who possess the largest chemical arsenals willing to give up their absolute superiority in the field? Experts who have participated in international arms reduction talks generally consider the following reasons:

First, chemical weapons are not an indispensable component of the U.S. and Soviet strategic deterrent. Their place in the U.S. and Soviet military strategy can neither compare with nuclear forces for counterbalance conventional weapons. The history of arms control has proven that it is easier to reach agreement in the field of unimportant arms.

Secondly, the use of chemical weapons is seriously affected by topography, time, weather and defence capabilities of each side. Their effectiveness, unlike that of other weapons, is unpredictable. This shortcoming greatly reduces their attraction as a weapon of choice.

Thirdly, chemical weapons possess a particular antipersonnel capability, which does not increase but, on the contrary, reduce their military significance to the superpowers. Experts including Soviets and Europeans note that if chemical weapons are used in a battle between big powers matching each other in strength, the side which uses them will consider the other side's retaliation. In a battle between large and small countries, it is not necessary to use lethal chemical weapons. Thus the opportunity to use chemical weapons is minute.

Fourthly, the United States and the Soviet Union worry about that the proliferation of chemical weapons will weaken their military strength. More and more small countries possess and even use chemical weapons and the United States and the Soviet Union cannot monopolize them, thus affecting their control over the international situation. Therefore, Washington and Moscow jointly need to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. In fact, when the United States and the Soviet Union destroy their chemical weapons, they will gain strength in their capability to control the international situation.

Remaining Problems

The action of the United States and the Soviet Union signing chemical weapons destruction agreements confirms the current trends in the international situation. It meets in part the desire of the world's people to abolish chemical weapons. It also helps to control the expansion of chemical weapons and promote the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons. Therefore, it is considered to be a positive step in the area of the world disarmament.

On the other hand, the U.S. and Soviet agreement is not "selfless." Observers can see its obvious questions and deficiencies:

First, the storage life of the U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles is half of a century now and the

effectiveness of these weapons has been greatly reduced. Even if they had not signed this agreement, they would have to destroy them, or risk the danger of toxic contamination due to leakage. Actually in the 1970s the United States built chemical weapons destruction test facilities and began testing the destruction of these weapons. In 1983 Washington also invited representatives from dozens of countries to inspect the facilities. The Soviet Union has built a destruction plant in Chapayevsk near the Volga River. In January of last year Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze declared at the Paris conference to ban chemical weapons that his country would immediately begin to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile.

Second, the United States and the Soviet Union stated in the provisions of their agreement that they would destroy the "declared" chemical weapons. However, who knows which or how many weapons they declared or have in reserve?

Third, the two sides did not mention the destruction of production facilities currently making chemical weapons, only stating that they would monitor and control production through onsite inspections. As long as the production facilities are in perfect working order, they will begin operation at any time.

Fourth, although the agreement stipulates that the United States and the Soviet Union will destroy their respective chemical weapons before the end of 1992 and reduce their total stockpiles of chemical agents to no more than 500 tons, total destruction of their chemical weapons has specific conditions. The agreement clearly suggests that by the end of the eighth year when the international convention on banning chemical weapons is enforced, a special conference of signatory countries be held to discuss whether the conditions for destroying all chemical weapons have been ripe. The conditions are that if all the countries possessing chemical weapons capability sign the convention, the United States and the Soviet Union will destroy their remaining 500 tons of chemical weapons. While judging whether a country has possessed chemical weapons capability or not, the United States and the Soviet Union have the right to veto. To put it bluntly, the two superpowers have the right to decide whether they are going to destroy all their chemical weapons. From here comes the logical question. When will humankind really live without the threat of a chemical war?

Article Views Chemical Deterrent in the Gulf

HK1510094590 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 41, 8 Oct 90 pp 32-33

[Article by Li Zuo (6849 0155): "The Chemical Deterrent Set-Up in the Gulf Crisis"]

[Text] Viewing the current Gulf situation as a whole, the two parties pitted against each other are the United States which possesses an absolute chemical deterrent and Iraq, the number-one chemical power in the Middle

East. Analysts hold that a chemical deterrent set-up, which has rarely been seen in the history of war, has presently been formed in the Gulf region. To compensate for its inferiority in initial battles, Iraq might use chemical weapons to repulse the "surgical operation" attacks by the United States and the latter will take chemical revenge on a limited number of targets in line with the policy of "actual combat plus deterrent."

On 2 April this year, the Iraqi president warned Israel that if the latter launched attacks against Iraq, Iraq would take revenge by using newly-developed binary chemical weapons. This warning serves to bring to light an important background point: Iraq has made public its own stance on chemical deterrent.

President Bush is aware of this in this Gulf crisis which is why he warned in his television speech on 8 August that Iraq would receive extremely severe punishment if it did use chemical weapons. According to a report by AFP on 12 August, Iraq was deploying chemical weapons in its bases. On 16 August, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney reaffirmed the country's tough stance that it will not take the lead in using chemical weapons but reserves the right to respond in like manner. In response to this, a report carried by (Kardicia) [ka di xi ya bao 0595 6611 6007 0068 1032], an official newspaper of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, claimed that Iraq was ready to use weapons with "large-scale destructiveness and strategic deterrent" to exterminate any aggressors. The report also emphasized: "All weapons with global destructive force and strategic deterrent in Iraqi armories will be put into use in order to defeat any aggressors." This was followed by a story that Iraq has deployed in Kuwait "Mercury [fei mao tui 7378 3029 5217]—B" surface-to-surface missiles which can carry chemical warheads and transferred some Americans to a number of chemical weapon factories and some other strategic points along the Iraqi border.

What is the actual chemical deterrent set-up on either side at present?

First, Iraq has a political prerequisite to deter its opponent using chemical weapons. The political and cultural background to the Gulf current crisis is by no means comparable to the Iran-Iraq War. Being faced with a military power pressing steadily forward, Iraq will, by holding high the banner of "a holy war" and under the excuse of "resisting aggression on its own land," deter its opponent with chemical weapons. Moreover, being a weak country itself, Iraq is confronting a strong opponent. If the United States was the first to launch "surgical operation" attacks, or took revenge of the same nature, this crisis would probably become a contradiction between Arab countries and the West. Under such a prerequisite, even if Iraq used chemical weapons, it would also win support from some Arab countries, especially from allies of the holy war. Second, Iraq has a military need to launch a counterattack with chemical weapons to alter the situation in initial battles. U.S. tactics are to avoid engaging in land battles with Iraq but

launch "surgical operation" attacks by adopting for the fourth time the air breakthrough from "Grenada Model." To Iraq this move by the United States can be said to stay clear of Iraq's main forces and strike at its weak points and the situation in initial battles would, therefore, be unfavorable to Iraq. Under such circumstances, it is most likely that Iraq would stage a chemical counterattack to psychologically deter its opponent and seize opportunities to reverse the situation in initial battles. During the 1982 Iran-Iraq War, Iraq launched chemical attacks on the Iranian Army in the (Harihum-lan) [har ji wu mu lan 0761 0679 3527 1191 5695] Region under extremely inferior conditions and, as a result of the attacks, the morale of the Iranian soldiers was greatly dampened and Iran's offensives crumbled. Since its first victory, Iraq has frequently launched chemical attacks. Third, the U.S. right to take revenge of "guaranteed destruction" has created conditions for containing its opponent from using chemical weapons and a deterrent situation with the two parties pitted against each other has therefore been formed. Over the past nearly 20 years since the the United States chose to adopt a policy of chemical warfare in the early 1970's and Reagan's "rearmament" in the early 1980's, the "flexible response strategy" by the U.S. Army has been further improved in terms of essence and immediate significance. This means to raise the limit of nuclear deterrent and, on the basis of defeating its opponent with its superiority in regular weapons, prevent escalation of wars in light of a "tooth-for-tooth" policy with limited deterrent in which "chemical weapons are countered with chemical weapons." The key point of this chemical deterrent policy is not to take the lead in using chemical weapons but to make public the reservation of the right to take chemical revenge, maintain a chemical counter-attack ability which is strong enough to launch rapid and effective counterattacks to the enemy's chemical attacks, and preserve a good chemical protection ability.

The Iraqi side may already be aware of this so, aside from going all out in strength disposition, Iraq has transferred some Americans to chemical weapon factories, a tactic to cause the United States to hold back from taking action against Iraq for fear of involving their own people. This shows Iraq's weak state of mind from not being in a superior position and its determination to cut off all means of retreat. As a result, a possible situation of "initial attack; revenge; counter-revenge; and larger-scale revenge and counter-revenge" leading to the formation of a deterrent set-up with the two parties pitted against each other.

In a general comparison of the chemical warfare abilities of both Iraq and the United States, it can be said that one side, though its weapons are limited both in number and quality, possesses combat experience in carrying out chemical warfare on its own land; and the other side, though lacking combat experience in tackling its opponent with deterrent of the same nature on an alien land, is in a predominant position with its weapons excellent both in number and quality.

Rapid progress has been registered in Iraq's efforts to develop chemical weapons, which began only a decade or more ago. The West holds that Iraq obtains its chemical weapons from two resources: purchases and self-production. To date, no authoritative statistics can be obtained on the types of chemical weapons and ammunition owned by Iraq. According to Western estimates, Iraq owns six types of chemical ammunition, including sarin, tabun, VX, mustard gas, Lewisite, and chloro-cyanide acid; four types of different caliber chemical artillery shells; and two types of missiles. The chemical weapons in the hands of the Iranian Army are concentrated in ground forces, of which the chemical warfare ability mainly depends on ground artillery and ground-based missile troops.

On the U.S. side, the West deems that the mustard gas and nerve gases currently owned by the U.S. Army totals about 31.1 thousand tons and total output for immediate use reaches about 2,700 tons. At present, the United States turns out 30 thousand tons of sarin annually while the annual production ability of other gases, such as chloro-cyanide acid and phosgene, ranges from 20 to 30 thousand tons. All the ground and air forces built up under the U.S. "Desert Shield" operation possess certain chemical warfare abilities. Under the circumstances in which the Iraqi side does not possess air domination, the chemical warfare ability of the U.S. Air Force will exceed that of the Iraqi side by a large margin. It is reported that since the United States resumed its production of binary chemical weapons in 1982, a complete system of short-, medium-, and long-range chemical weapons has been strengthened and perfected, especially the development of medium- and long-range weapon systems (such as Pershing II and medium cruise missiles) and binary VX "huge-eyed [ju yan 1565 4190]" cruise missiles. Though an agreement on medium-range missiles and another one between the United States and the Soviet Union on

prohibiting the use of chemical weapons have both been reached, and the "huge-eyed" cruise missiles have not yet been put into all-around production, it is nevertheless a peak period for U.S. chemical warfare ability and also an overlapping period for the United States in which old weapons have not yet been destroyed while new weapons have already been under development for nearly 10 years.

Analysts contend that regarding chemical warfare abilities, it can be said from an overall point of view that Iraq is in an inferior position; yet, upon a partial comparison, both sides can be said to occupy their own superior position. According to Western analysts, though a complete set of retaliatory plans in chemical warfare has been drawn up by the U.S. Army, it is the first time the United States will fight hand to hand on an alien land with a country possessing deterrent strength. During the period of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq accumulated rich experience in using chemical weapons to deter and defeat its opponent on its own land, which virtually makes up the distance between itself and the U.S. Army in terms of actual strength.

In recent years, the U.S. Army has made great efforts to enhance the defense and protection quality of its troops. According to the financial figures for fiscal year 1987-88 released by Stockholm's "World Armament and Disarmament" in 1988, \$91 billion and \$151 billion respectively were spent in 1988 and 1989 on the research, development, appreciation, and equipment for defense and protection—3.3 and 1.5 times higher than other spendings for those years. This is where Iraq's weakness lies, for the eight-year Iran-Iraq War made Iraq short of financial resources to take into account its self-building of defense and protection. Observers hold that Iraq would surely be in an unfavorable position with its defense and protection if a "tooth-for-tooth" attitude was taken against it.

KIRIBATI

President Opposes U.S CW Destruction Plans for Johnston Atoll

BK1610080690 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] The president of Kiribati, Mr. Jeremia Tabai, says the heads of Pacific Island governments are determined to express their opposition to the burning of American chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll to President Bush. Mr. Tabai said they would voice their opposition when President Bush held his Pacific summit meeting in Hawaii later this month. The heads of 13 independent Pacific island nations have been invited to the one-day meeting with the president.

Mr. Tabai, who is in New Zealand to receive an honorary degree, said the islands leaders would use the occasion to seek assurances that the United States would not use Johnston Atoll as a permanent facility to destroy all its chemical weapons. He said in his view, the chemical destruction could not be safe if Americans did not want to burn the weapons on the mainland and island leaders saw the use of Johnston Atoll as unnecessary.

SOUTH KOREA

Soviet Expert Proposes Nuclear Free Peninsula

SK1110030490 Seoul YONHAP in English 0243 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Excerpt] Seoul, October 11 (YONHAP)—A Soviet arms control expert, in a paper delivered at a seminar in Seoul, has proposed the removal of tactical nuclear missiles from South and North Korea and the establishment of a denuclearized zone on the Korean peninsula.

Aleksey Arbatov, head of the department on problems of disarmament at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), said Wednesday, "Removal of U.S. lance tactical nuclear missiles might be the first step to establishment of denuclearized zone on Korean peninsula. In response, North Korea would dismantle and eliminate its FROG [Free Rocket Over Ground] and Scud surface-to-surface tactical missiles."

The seminar on arms control on the Korean peninsula is hosted by the Korean Foreign Ministry's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS).

Arbatov said that setting up a chemical-weapons-free zone on the peninsula open to international inspection, making nuclear power stations subject to IAEA safeguards and chemical plants to international control inspections was needed to alleviate tension on the Korean peninsula [passage omitted].

NEW ZEALAND

Opposition Leader 'Hopeful' on U.S. Nuclear-Ship-Calls Accord

BK1010050690 Hong Kong AFP in English 0426 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Wellington, October 10 (AFP)—New Zealand's opposition National Party, leading in polls running up to October 27's general elections, is still hopeful of renegotiating a military alliance with the United States, party leader Jim Bolger said here Wednesday. But Disarmament Minister Fran Wilde claimed that statements Tuesday by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had blown the opposition's policy out of the water.

The ruling Labour Party, which banned nuclear-armed warships from New Zealand ports, effectively ending the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) alliance, has been attempting to make military relationships an election issue. National has endorsed the nuclear free policy, although claims it will be able to negotiate a non-nuclear pact with the United States once in government. The issue has, however, had a markedly lower profile than in two previous general elections.

Speaking after annual defence talks with Australia in Washington, Mr. Baker restated his country's adherence to its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its warships or aircraft. "Until there can be an understanding of that on the part of New Zealand, there will not be any opportunity to advance the defence and security aspects of our relationship and, indeed, no opportunity for there to be a dialogue between the United States and New Zealand on defence and security issues," he said.

But Mr. Bolger remained optimistic he could renegotiate a defence alliance with the U.S. "I have not the slightest doubt that we'll enter into dialogue and discussions and I'm very optimistic they'll have a positive outcome," he said.

Ms. Wilde said Mr. Baker's remarks proved that the U.S. will only renegotiate defence arrangements with New Zealand if the anti-nuclear policy is dropped. In a statement she said Mr. Bolger was not listening to New Zealanders who were telling him he could not hedge his bets, adding, "perhaps his colleagues could persuade him to listen to the American secretary of state."

Meanwhile Labour Wednesday released its defence election manifesto calling for a regional commitment, participation in peacekeeping forces and a continuation of the anti-nuclear policy. It pledged to keep defence spending capped at present levels. "Over the next three years the Labour government will consolidate its self-reliant defence and international relations policy and protect the integrity of its anti-nuclear stance," the policy said.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

'Informal' New York Meeting on PACT CFE Force Levels

AU0410085890 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 2 Oct 90 p 4

[CTK report: "On Structural Changes and the Vienna Talks"]

[Text] An informal meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of Warsaw Pact member states was held in the residence of the CSFR's permanent UN representative in New York Sunday evening [30 September]. The meeting was a part of preparations for the two-day CSCE ministerial meeting which opened in New York last night.

The ministers of foreign affairs of the CSFR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR and the GDR state secretary, who participated in a Warsaw Pact meeting for the last time, considered two main ranges of issues: structural changes in the organization and the Vienna talks on conventional arms.

As far as the first range of issues is concerned, the participants confirmed the results of the two preparatory meetings of government commissioners and noted the existence of an agreement of principle as regards the intention to disband the military structures of the Warsaw Pact and change its political structures. Some other issues, such as the composition of the proposed military consultative group or joint antiaircraft defense, remain undecided and will be discussed at a meeting in Warsaw in mid-October.

Eduard Shevardnadze, Soviet minister of foreign affairs, who spoke about the development of talks on conventional arms, briefed the participants on the results of his latest talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, at which the Soviet Union accepted a ceiling of 33 percent as the maximum share of one country (the USSR) in the total number of weapons in the region. All participants described this agreement as acceptable and welcomed the fact that progress has also been achieved on the issue of including the air force, including naval aircraft, in the planned agreement.

Certain disagreements persist on the issue of dividing the remaining shares in the overall arms ceilings between the other countries. The demands of some countries, particularly Bulgaria and Romania, still exceed the national limits. The Czechoslovak side presented a compromise variant, which will be considered by the Special Commission for Disarmament at its session in Prague on 9 and 10 October.

All delegations were called upon to come to Prague with a mandate flexible enough to permit the attainment of an agreement and the submission of this agreement in Vienna by 25 October at the latest. It was emphasized

that an agreement between the Warsaw Pact countries is an essential prerequisite for the convening of the CSCE summit, which is scheduled to be held in Paris in November.

Warsaw Pact Prague Meeting on CFE Force Levels**Disarmament Commission Session Opens**

LD0910102190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1000 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Text] A session of the Warsaw Pact Special Commission for Disarmament started in Prague today. For the first time, the former GDR is not taking part. In the course of a two-day session, delegations should set the maximum national levels of arms and equipment.

Agreement on Tanks 'Still Not Reached'

LD1010163890 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1600 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] The participants in the third session of the special Warsaw Pact commission for disarmament taking place in Prague have still not reached a final agreement on the limits for conventional weapons. The number of tanks is still being discussed. It is probably because it is this type of weapon that the highest political and military representatives of the Warsaw Pact will have to meet.

The delegations have already reached agreements on combat aircraft, helicopters, and combat vehicles, but in addition to tanks the issue of the number of artillery still remains unresolved.

BULGARIA

Deputy Foreign Minister on Prague Warsaw Pact CFE Talks

AU1210195190 Sofia BTA in English 1916 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 12 October (BTA)—Mr. Enyo Savov, deputy minister of foreign affairs, who headed the Bulgarian delegation to the third session which the special commission on Warsaw Treaty member states disarmament completed in Prague yesterday, today briefed the press on the proceedings of the meeting.

He stressed that the negotiations in Prague, as well as the previous two meetings of the commission were difficult. Various components of national security acquire increasing significance in the present conditions of weakening inter-ally relations in the Warsaw Treaty, he said. With the shift of focus on political cooperation and with the existing agreement in principle to disband the Warsaw Treaty military structure after the end of 1991, each of the countries is interested in securing an optimum amount of weapons for its national security in view of its specific interests, the deputy minister said.

At the forthcoming fourth session of the special commission, as well as at the meeting of the Political Consultative Council, Bulgaria will remain committed to its position on reasonable sufficiency for the country's defense capability.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Officials View Prague Warsaw Pact Talks on CFE Force Levels

AU0110125190 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech
26 Sep 90 p 1

[CTK report: "Unsatisfactory Results"]

[Text] Prague (CTK)—Nothing at all was agreed upon in Bratislava and the Prague talks were unsatisfactory. This is how S. Buchlovsky, director of the CSCE and Warsaw Pact Department at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, evaluates the outcome of the two recent meetings of the Warsaw Pact's Special Commission for Disarmament. The commission's assignment is to set maximum limits on the number of conventional weapons individual Warsaw Pact member states will be allowed to keep. An agreement between the Warsaw Pact countries is a precondition for the signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of Conventional Forces and Armament in Europe, which NATO and the Warsaw Pact are to conclude even before the all-European summit in Paris in November. Lubos Dobrovsky, spokesman for the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, remains optimistic. He is convinced that the Warsaw Pact countries will come to an agreement and that the Vienna talks on conventional weapons will be concluded in time and with success.

Soviet Troops, Family Members Leave Slovakia

LD0410223190 Prague CTK in English 2042 GMT
4 Oct 90

[Text] Bratislava, 4 October (CTK)—"A total of 56 per cent of Soviet soldiers and their family members have already left Czechoslovakia. The timetable of the withdrawal is being fulfilled in harmony with the agreement and we strive to accelerate it," Brigadier Svetožar Nadovic from the Ministry of Defence who is in charge of the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Czechoslovakia said here today.

Soviet troops from Komarno and Nove Zamky in West Slovakia and from Sliac in Central Slovakia will withdraw by the end of this year. A helicopter regiment will leave Vlkanova, Central Slovakia, in the course of October.

One half of flats vacant after the withdrawal will be used after reconstruction by the Czechoslovak Army. Others will be allocated to civilian organizations.

The Soviets are willing to pay for the ecological damage they caused after a hydrogeological research done. The

Czechoslovak Government earmarked 150 million crowns for this purpose. Czechoslovakia does not own the necessary technology and has been therefore offered help from the United States and the Netherlands.

Svetožar Nadovic condemned reports about the sales of weapons by Soviet soldiers as rumours.

Dienstbier on New York Warsaw Pact CFE Talks

LD0510155190 Prague CTK in English 1246 GMT
5 Oct 90

[Excerpts] New York, 5 October (CTK correspondent)—The UN General Assembly debate was dominated by the enormous changes in Central and Eastern Europe and by the Persian Gulf crisis, Czechoslovak Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier who took part in the two-week discussions told CTK here today. [passage omitted]

Minister Dienstbier said that he stressed at the consultative meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers that the countries must agree upon quotas of individual types of weapons. It is politically completely inadmissible to impede the European summit in Paris by the inability of Central and Eastern European democracies to reach an agreement as regards arms contingents, he stressed, adding that in contradistinction to other countries Czechoslovakia does not demand an increase of its quotas. The other countries' demands considerably exceeded the limit agreed upon for the Warsaw Pact.

The discussions must be completed by the end of October to prepare the treaty for signing at the Paris summit. Czechoslovakia as Warsaw Pact coordinator has submitted concrete proposals concerning the arms quotas and hopes that an agreement will be reached in Prague next week.

Defense Ministry Spokesman on Intra-Pact CFE Talks

LD1010160690 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1430 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Text] Our special military unit going to the Persian Gulf is presently being assembled in Slany, and it will wait there for a request from Saudi Arabia. According to information given to journalists in Prague today by Colonel Petr Tax, a press attache of the defense minister's office, right now 169 soldiers and officers are getting ready. He resolutely rejected claims that soldiers were being sent to the unit against their will, and he added that there are enough of interested people.

Col. Tax also briefed representatives of the mass media on results of talks of the special Warsaw Pact commission for disarmament. The alliance will have a total of 2,000 military helicopters, including 75 in our army. Of the 30,000 military vehicles, the Czechoslovak Army will have 2,050. Discussions on the number of tanks and artillery have not yet ended.

Deputy Foreign Minister on Prague Warsaw Pact CFE Talks

*LD1010205490 Prague CTK in English 1726 GMT
10 Oct 90*

[Text] Prague, October 10 (CTK)—Participants in the third session of a Warsaw Pact special session for disarmament here have not yet reached agreement on the division of tank limits which may prompt a summit meeting of the member countries' political and military representatives.

This was said at a press conference by Czechoslovak First Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Harencar today. He informed journalists that the delegations have reached agreement on combat planes, helicopters and vehicles. A stumbling block, in addition to tanks, is also the question of the number of artillery pieces.

The commission started its session here yesterday, for the first time without participation of the former GDR. It is held at the level of deputy foreign ministers and chiefs of staff. They should reach concrete results on maximum national contingents of conventional weapons. It is most important to reach an agreement to be submitted at the Vienna talks of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts so that they may be wound up in time for a conventional disarmament document to be signed at the Paris summit of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation at the end of November.

Mr Harencar told journalists that if agreement is not reached on the 450-590 tanks above the limit set for the whole Warsaw Pact, supreme political and military representatives will have to meet to solve the problem.

Czechoslovakia's military representative at the Vienna NATO-Warsaw Pact talks on conventional weapons Colonel Jiri Divis said "Czechoslovakia is not by any means the country which blocks the talks by its claims". It was announced earlier that during the second round of talks of the Warsaw Pact special commission for disarmament at the end of September Czechoslovakia cut its original demand by 150 tanks.

Svatopluk Buchlovsky, director of the Department for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Warsaw Pact of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, said that Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania "disagree with the number of tanks agreed upon by the USSR and U.S.A. in New York. We take the view that the USSR must further reduce the level to some 13,000 tanks". He said that the two super powers reached agreement on 13,300 tanks.

Jiri Divis voiced the view that the Soviet Union should be responsible for one-half of the total of about 500 tanks above the limit set for the Warsaw Pact, and the other Pact countries for the other half.

Asked whether the USSR blocks the talks, Robert Harencar said that "this is a matter of more countries, not only the Soviet Union".

The Czechoslovak first deputy foreign minister also said that the delegations have reached agreement on combat planes, helicopters and vehicles.

According to information from army sources, the Warsaw Pact will have a total of 2,000 combat helicopters. Out of the total, the Soviet Union will have 1,500, and Czechoslovakia will have 75.

The Pact will have an aggregate of 30,000 combat vehicles 20,000 of which will be in the Soviet Army. The Czechoslovak Army will have 2,050 of these vehicles.

Speaking about further program of the Warsaw Pact, Robert Harencar said that its consultative committee will continue talks on transportation of the alliance before the end of October.

A session of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest at the beginning of November should sign the final document on the national levels of particular kinds of weapons. However, it is possible that the Special Commission for Disarmament will have to meet at its fourth session which would have to be the last one, Robert Harencar said.

HUNGARY

Defense Official Supports Continued Army Funding

*LD0710110990 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0730 GMT 7 Oct 90*

[Interview with Ernce Raffay, Ministry of Defense political state secretary, by correspondent Jozsef Barath in Zakopane; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Representatives of three of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty—Hungarians, Czechs and Poles—met in Zakopane. This extra meeting provided the opportunity for our reporter, Jozsef Barath, to ask Ernce Raffay, political state secretary of the Ministry of Defense, what is the new defense conception of the Hungarian Army, and what are the financial consequences of its realization.

[Raffay] According to the old doctrines, the potential enemies were the German and the Italian Armies, certain parts of these. Now, we say there is no preconceived image of an enemy.

[Barath] Did those working out the doctrine not find new enemies in other directions either?

[Raffay] I want to emphasize that Romania and the Soviet Union do not count as enemies, or potential enemies, either. This means that there will be certain changes, for example, in the division of the Army, as well. Consider the present distribution of the Hungarian Army: If we travel through the country, we can see lots of soldiers in the Dunantul [west of the Danube], but we see hardly any soldiers in the Alföld [Great Plain]. All this

means, in our view, that an army somewhat stronger than the present one will be necessary. This must not, of course, be interpreted with exaggeration, nor should it be thought that we now wish to spend all the money of the country on the Army. At the same time, it must be recognized that certain parts of the current Army are equipped with largely obsolete equipment.

[Barath] Were any calculations made—approximately how much money would be needed, or how much will need to be allocated in next year's budget?

[Raffay] We imagine that instead of the nearly 40 billion forints which were allocated for this year so far, we would need about 77 billion forints. The position, in fact, is that a substantial part of this 77 billion, or the difference—let me not talk about detailed figures—is the result of inflation, another part is for maintenance and the continuous renewal of fairly obsolete military hardware, and for other similar factors.

What I would say is that in the present situation, in all the countries of the region—Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland,—even with difficulties and some retrograde steps, a democratization process is taking place; it now looks as if it is unnecessary to spend on the Army.

In my view, however, it is still necessary, because if we look at our history—if we only look at the history of this century—in theory, in various countries a return process or new developments could take place. The consequence of this would be increasing conflicts of interest between Hungary and other countries. We have to prepare for this.

In addition, if we do not develop the Army, technology will be reduced to virtually nothing. If the government decides in five years or 10 years that, for example, as far as possible a new air force must be established, we will be starting from zero. This would cost the country a great deal.

So what I believe is, though I know everybody does not agree with me, perhaps gradual development is the most rational solution in this situation.

CFE Envoy on U.S.-Soviet, Intra-pact Talks

*LD0910165990 Budapest MTI in English 1028 GMT
9 Oct 90*

[Text] Vienna, October 8 (MTI)—The results of last week's Soviet-American foreign ministerial talks on the European arms reduction accord, on almost all issues, is also in the national interests of Hungary, said Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, leader of the Hungarian delegation to the Vienna arms reduction talks attended by 22 NATO and Warsaw Treaty member states.

Mr Gyarmati was speaking to MTI's Vienna correspondent on Monday, after returning from New York, where he was a member of the Hungarian expert group at the foreign ministerial conference of the 35 countries that

belong to the Helsinki process. Mr Gyarmati is scheduled to attend an important session of the Warsaw Treaty disarmament committee, to open in Prague on October 9.

"The meeting between the Soviet and the American foreign ministers resulted in a breakthrough with regard to an agreement on European conventional armed forces. The sides agreed on all major issues. Their agreement opens up the road to concluding the treaty in November, which is a precondition to holding the meeting of the heads of state and governments of Europe, the United States and Canada, in Paris from November 19 to 21."

"I consider it particularly important that the Soviet Union also approved the Hungarian motion, under which no single country in Europe can have a greater than one-third of the total armed forces remaining in Europe after the reductions regulated in the treaty have been completed. It will thus be possible to significantly restrict the current excess of Soviet forces on the continent. Another major result is that the treaty will restrict the stock of fighter aircraft stationed in Europe. This kind of hardware is considered to be the most destabilizing factor among the five weapons' categories (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, fighter aircraft and helicopters) to be restricted."

Regarding the Warsaw Treaty committee session in Prague, Mr Gyarmati termed it important and pressing for the six countries to agree on what type of weapons and their distribution can be kept by individual East European countries following the fulfillment of Soviet demands.

Ministry Official on Intra-Pact CFE Force Level Talks

*LD1410152990 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0730 GMT 14 Oct 90*

[Interview with David Meitszter, deputy state secretary of foreign affairs, by Istvan Kulcsar; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The world press reported that the U.S. and the Soviet foreign ministers have basically agreed on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. The treaty is supposed to be completed by 19 November, the Paris summit. Last week in Prague, however, experts of the six Warsaw Pact member states, already without the GDR, held discussions on the details of this treaty. As far as we know, representatives of the smaller member states, such as Czechoslovakia and us, Hungary, argue the exclusive right of the Soviets. Now, is there an agreement or not?

[Begin recording] [Meitszter] There is an agreement, and there also is not. We have to agree on the reduction of several categories of arms, three of which—fighter planes, helicopters, and armored carrier combat vehicles—we have managed to agree on so far in connection with the

remaining national quotas. We were unable to reach an agreement on two categories: tanks and artillery.

[Kulcsar] The G-6 is obviously the reduced Warsaw Pact without the GDR. Why, however, is a separate agreement necessary at all when the U.S. and the Soviet foreign ministers have, so to say, already agreed?

[Meiszter] If I may, I would like to correct this news. The U.S. and the Soviet foreign ministers did agree, but not in all of the issues of the treaty to be concluded in Vienna; only some of the key issues of a Vienna treaty were agreed upon. This is one correction. My other correction is that it was two foreign ministers—that is, two country's representatives—who came to agreement in Vienna; however, a treaty which anticipates the agreement of 22 countries is under way. Thus, if any two sides agree anywhere, this agreement still has to be converted into the agreement of the 22 countries.

[Kulcsar] Is it not about the fact that today the Soviet foreign minister cannot speak alone on behalf of the collapsing Warsaw Pact or, let us say, of the six Warsaw Pact member states?

[Meiszter] That is it, certainly. The European order based on the opposition of the two military alliances has ceased; furthermore, this order has been gradually replaced by a new cooperative security order based on the agreement between sovereign European countries. One of its manifestations is the fact that although the foreign ministers of two countries which possess the greatest military potential agreed on something, it has not automatically become the agreement of the European countries.

[Kulcsar] If I understand it correctly, there is already an agreement on how many, let us say, planes or helicopters or tanks the Warsaw Pact member states can possess. Is there, however, an ongoing debate about how to divide this ceiling, this maximum figure, among the member states? Was this also discussed in Prague last time?

[Meiszter] Yes. The debate is going on over this. On the one hand, there is an agreement between the 22 countries on the extent of the army, in overall European relations, that can remain in their territory in Europe. That is what we call an overall European ceiling. There is also an agreement on how it should be divided between the two groups. Now we are in the phase where, within the collective ceiling, within the groups, the member states have to reach an agreement on what their national quota will be.

[Kulcsar] Can it be expected that they will manage to work out the agreement by 19 November?

[Meiszter] A large part of the agreement has already been completed. I could say that a considerable part of the dividing up, which is a very delicate process, is already behind, too; furthermore, I feel that at the next meeting, which will be held in Prague in two weeks, we will perhaps manage to come to agreement on the two [word indistinct] categories. In that case, I cannot see anything to prevent the final agreement from being completed and ready to be signed by around 15-18 November. [end recording]

POLAND

Council of Ministers Informed on Soviet Withdrawal

*LD1010053390 Warsaw PAP in English 2334 GMT
9 Oct 90*

[Excerpt] Warsaw, October 9—Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki informed the Council of Ministers here today about his decision to set up a government commission for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.

The commission is chaired by the minister head of the Office of the Council of Ministers and composed of ministers of foreign affairs, internal affairs, national defence and transport and maritime economy.

It will be the commission's task to coordinate actions connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and their transit from the former GDR. [passage omitted]

Onyszkiewicz Assesses Pact Disarmament Meeting

*LD1110043690 Warsaw PAP in English 2142 GMT
10 Oct 90*

[Text] Prague, October 10—Poland's Deputy Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz assessing the 3rd round of negotiations of Warsaw Treaty's Extraordinary Commission for Disarmament which ended in Prague today, said:

Quotas granted to us correspond with our demands, we received what we wanted to receive. I would rather not speak about concrete numbers at the moment, for they still may alter.

We will have less tanks than two years ago, but I am confident that my ministry will be able to justify the need to possess such a number of tanks.

PAKISTAN

Foreign Minister Calls for Nuclear-Free South Asia

BK1310114790 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 13 Oct 90 p 1

[By Shahid Saleem]

[Excerpt] Islamabad, October 12—The Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, has said that Pakistan wanted to make South Asia a genuine nuclear non-proliferation region and has put up proposals which should be properly attended to.

The Foreign Minister drew attention of the United States Secretary of State James Baker towards Pakistan's proposals already put forth for a long time during their recent meeting in the USA.

Both the leaders exchanged views on a number of important subjects of interest and concern to both the countries.

The Foreign Minister, who attended 45th session of United Nations General Assembly in New York on return to Pakistan said that he briefed Mr. James Baker on Pakistan's efforts to maintain dialogue with India and the efforts under way to resolve the Afghanistan problem and the present situation in the Persian Gulf.

He said that bilateral ties figured in the talks during which Mr. Baker expressed his concern regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme and its possible fall out on American assistance.

The Foreign Minister explained Pakistan's nuclear programme for peaceful purposes and assured him that Pakistan neither possesses nuclear weapons nor has any intention to make nuclear weapons. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan said that in this regard he drew his attention to Pakistan's proposals aimed at briefing about a genuine non-proliferation region in South Asia.

Talking about the Pressler amendment certificate, the Foreign Minister said that this is presently under review by the U.S. Administration. He said that high level discussions are going on between the two countries to resolve the issue. [passage omitted]

Fighter-Bombers Moved from CSFR, Hungary to Kola*90EN0903B Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
18 Sep 90 p 8*

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Low-Flying Attack Planes Moved to Kola"—first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] The Soviet Union has recently moved more air power from central Europe to Kola. This involves fighter-bombers and low-flying attack planes, according to the supreme commander in North Norway, Lieutenant General Dagfinn Danielsen.

In the early summer it became clear that for the first time the Soviet Union had transferred a regiment of fighter-bombers of the "Flogger" model to Kola where they will be permanently based. The regiment had just been pulled out of Hungary where it was previously stationed.

Lt. Gen. Dagfinn Danielsen, the supreme commander in North Norway, told AFTENPOSTEN that the Soviet Union seems to be continuing the line of transferring aerial forces that were previously stationed in Central Europe to the Kola area.

"We have observed that a squadron of 12-18 reconnaissance planes of the Su-17 model with the NATO designation of 'Fitter H' has also been transferred," Danielsen said. He believes these planes were moved from Czechoslovakia.

"Although the 'Fitter H' is primarily a reconnaissance plane, it also has a dual function because it can be armed and used to attack targets on the ground," said Danielsen.

In addition to these planes the Norwegians have also observed that an unknown number of low-flying attack planes of the Su-25 model with the NATO designation of "Frogfoot" have been moved to Kola. This is a type of plane used to attack targets on the ground, in order to give Soviet Army detachments direct support in their operations. The airplanes were used in the Soviet war in Afghanistan, among other things, but Danielsen believes the planes that have been observed on Kola come from Czechoslovakia.

"It is a new element that the planes are now stationed on Kola. We are noting the trend as a fact, but of course we don't like it," said Danielsen. He does not discount the possibility that the future will produce more surprises of this kind, as the Soviet Union must get out of East Germany as well as complete its withdrawal from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

But this means that a continuing modernization and buildup of Soviet forces is taking place near Norway's borders. This is not just a question of air power. At present the ongoing activity at Soviet shipyards shows no decrease in the production of new vessels for the North Fleet. In 1988 and 1989, the North Fleet was supplied

with 14 modern surface vessels and eight submarines. Western experts describe the large-scale program to scrap naval materiel that has been announced as a necessary measure to increase efficiency, rather than a step in arms reduction. It is also anticipated that the newest and largest Soviet aircraft carrier will be assigned to the North Fleet.

The same tendency is also true of the ground forces on Kola and in the Leningrad military district. There has been some reduction in the number of tanks, but otherwise there has been an increase in several important weapons and equipment for Soviet divisions in the area.

The large number of combat helicopters that can provide fire support for Soviet army divisions is of special concern from a Norwegian point of view. This helicopter force represents massive firepower and mobility, making it especially valuable in areas where communications are poor, according to the supreme commander in North Norway.

Access to Test Range on Novaya Zemlya Examined*91UM0011A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Oct 90 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Captain 3d Rank V. Maryukha, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Those Who Established the Procedures for Novaya Zemlya—Rejoinder to a Rejoinder"]

[Text] On 24 September of this year IZVESTIYA published the material by V. Filippov "Old Procedures on Novaya Zemlya." It discussed the fact that Yu. Guskov, chairman of the Arkhangel Oblast Soviet, was compelled to postpone his visit to Novaya Zemlya because of the fact that Rear Admiral V. Gorev refused to receive journalists traveling with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy. Referring to the opinion of Major General A. Koltunov, another RSFSR people's deputy, V. Filippov advised that the chief of the test range, as before, does not want to take upon himself the resolution of problems associated with Novaya Zemlya.

Apparently the IZVESTIYA correspondent did not take enough pains to look into the situation that had developed. Because the refusal to receive a delegation with such a composition was inevitable, and Rear Admiral V. Gorev did not have the right to assume authority he did not have.

The fact is, as it was explained to me in the Main Staff of the Navy, expropriation of the territory of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago for the needs of the Ministry of Defense was implemented on the basis of a USSR Council of Ministers decree. Today military control, which applies to everyone, is in effect on this territory.

In accordance with instructions currently in force (which, of course, are firm for the military command of

the test range), admission to the archipelago by outsiders is restricted. The exceptions are people's deputies of the country and of the RSFSR who have a right to be on the test range without special permission being issued by the General Staff, but only on administrative territory. As for the references to the fact that instructions on admission procedures stipulate the right of the test range chief personally to make the decision, then the quote in IZVESTIYA, attributed to Major General A. Koltunov, to put it mildly was not written in full. In the words of Captain 1st Rank V. Fedorov, deputy chief of one of the departments of the Main Staff of the Navy, the end of it reads like this: "only under emergency situations where there was a threat to people's lives."

Other premises of the journalist and his interlocutor are also not indisputable. Of course, it would be possible to establish an island soviet of people's deputies, but under the state of affairs existing today more resources would be spent on its support than on the resolution of the everyday problems of the "nonuniformed" population of the archipelago. If industry is developed on the island and a local budget is formed from taxes on enterprises, as IZVESTIYA proposes, then the best thing of all would be to build, well, for example, a mint. No matter what the coins were stamped from, they would be worth their weight in gold on the mainland. So it is hardly likely that the military will help in this. Just as with the installation of telephones on the Arkhangel land with the help of communications satellites, an agreement about which was allegedly reached with the command of the Plesetsk spaceport. One would think that the military has its own satellites and rockets, which they independently launch into outer space at the request of local authorities.

The nuclear test range on Novaya Zemlya has been silent for almost two years. What its future will be does not depend on the military, as some people would like to think. Decisions are made at the state level.

Journalist Visits Novaya Zemlya Test Range

91UM0004A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 3 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent I. Yermakov: "The Secret Archipelago"]

[Text] Novaya Zemlya—*After the establishment of the nuclear test range on Novaya Zemlya, entry into the world's largest military base with an area of 32,000 square kilometers was tightly closed to all outsiders, including journalists.*

But now, for the first time in all these years, in response to a request from the editorial staff the Armed Forces General Staff and the Main Staffs of the Air Defense Troops and the Navy gave an "OK" to a Novaya Zemlya visit....

The Situation

Several seconds of semidarkness, then our "An" emerges from the clouds. Below, the leaden grayness of the Bering

Sea. The ground appears suddenly. Barely sticking out of the water, it is as level as a table that painted in two colors—brown and green. Tongues of fjords cut deeply into this smooth surface and, together with numerous lakes, make it look like a lace shawl.

While still in flight over the island, I caught a glimpse of the launchers of a missile battery glistening in the sun. A major unit [soyedineniye] of Air Defense Troops is guarding the peace of the archipelago. Its zone of responsibility is the territory of one-fourth of all of West Europe.

It is difficult to call its operational alert duty tranquil. Of course, this is in my journalistic opinion. But Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Ivanov, the operations duty officer, did not see anything unusual in the situation on the day of our visit to the large unit's command post. Standing with a pointer at a large multimeter map board covered with numerous marks, he reported succinctly and factually: Two reconnaissance aircraft and one reconnaissance ship are moving along the border in the control zone; 13 satellites look after us from above; and, closer to the Kola Peninsula, exercises are under way to detect Soviet submarines.

An urgent report interrupts our conversation. Quite peaceful, but nonetheless alarming. A soldier at one of the remote "points" has a serious case of nephritis. A helicopter flies out to where he is. Vyacheslav Savchenko, deputy chief of the political department of the large unit, gave assurances that there has been no case yet of something unfortunate happening to someone because of a delay in medical help.

For these locations, this is of significance. Enormous distances (the length of Novaya Zemlya is almost 1,000 km) and a harsh climate (the temperature at times drops to minus 40 degrees, and the wind—the Novaya Zemlya bora—reaches 50 meters per second) are not easy conditions for carrying out work. In today's blizzard, you cannot see anything two steps in front of you. It is easy to get lost without leaving the garrison. And blasts of wind literally knock you off your feet. It has happened that it was necessary to stand alert duty for seven or eight days in a row in the headquarters of the large unit. Aleksandr Lutsenko, chief of staff of the air regiment, explained:

"From December to the middle of March the weather permitted the completion of only one and a half flight operations shifts from the air base. Blizzards packed the interior sections of the aircraft so solidly with snow that it was difficult to get in with a screwdriver. But operational alert duty was not curtailed—they flew from the mainland.

But we are not talking only of celestial problems—but of very terrestrial ones. The recent ukase on excusing students from service has created difficulties that have not existed, very likely, since the time of the war. No more than one-fifth of the compulsory service subunits remain. The personnel situation has also been aggravated by the massive evasion of call-ups for the Soviet

Army. Things have reached the point that the color guard post had to be combined with a similar post of a neighboring unit [chast] of the major unit.

Only the professionalization of military service will fundamentally change the situation. This is what everyone here thinks—from the youngest officer to General Mikhail Savich, the commander of the large unit. And he is even ready to perform with his unit in the role of pioneer experimenter.

Perhaps then the everyday problems will stop being eternal? Judge for yourselves: Is it really normal that 250 officers of the large unit cannot bring their families to their place of service for lack of housing. And it is all right if someone has his own corner on the mainland. But if not?

"It does not matter what happens to me," General Savich says without bravado, "to the family, it is a road to homelessness...."

Radiation

One of my first tasks on the trip was to draw an objective picture of the effects of tests on the ecology and life of the people who are in the immediate vicinity of the epicenter of explosions. The widespread version of the appearance of "balding reindeer" and "fish without scales" also threw oil on the fire. And why not? Air, surface, and underwater triggered bursts were conducted here repeatedly from 1957 to 1964. And to this day there are sectors on the territory of Novaya Zemlya with an increased level of radiation—about a milliroentgen per hour. On 2 August 1987, right after an underground blast, radioactive gases permeated the atmosphere. These facts are known from the speeches of leaders of the Main Staff of the Navy. And, naturally, they did not evoke any particular optimism.

But in fact things turned out to be somewhat more complicated. An incident related by Professor V. Chugunov, doctor of technical sciences and, in Novaya Zemlya terminology, a "tester," seemed to me to be very symbolic in this connection.

At one time, during the height of the "cold" war, speaking from a high tribune N. S. Khrushchev threatened the Americans with the detonation of a bomb of such force that every window "there" would be shattered. Soon after, V. Chugunov had occasion to fly on the next official trip by way of the little settlement of Amderma, which is situated 300 km from the test range. Spare glass windows were in readiness alongside each home....

This episode is characteristic also of our current ideas about the effects of nuclear bursts on the environment. There is no argument that radioactive radiation is very dangerous to health. But it remains to be explained—to whom, when, and where?

After surface nuclear bursts, the main part of the radioactive material is hurled into the stratosphere at an altitude of 10-50 km. It remains there for many months, dropping and spreading evenly over the surface of the entire globe.

All of this is fine, you will say, in theory. But what about in practice? At my request Igor Nizovtsev, assistant to the chief of the department of test-range radiation safety, conducted measurements of radioactivity at various points. And I became convinced with my own eyes that the level here does not exceed 10 milliroentgens on open terrain. Half as low as in Moscow!

There were also no cases here of dangerous radioactivity in the products of the wild game trade—birds, reindeer, or fish. And, incidentally, there are quite a few hunters and fishermen among the garrison residents....

Test range workers also related the end of the story of the "balding reindeer." In this regard, it seems that northern deputies made an inquiry, after which scientists arrived to meet with them. And they immediately "took the bull by the horns." You see, they say, we brought you a balding scientist. And they nod at a comrade. And now, you show us a balding reindeer.... As it turned out there was no such reindeer, and even an eyewitness could not be found.

It is noteworthy that many various kinds of legends exist about the Northern Test Range. Some people, for example, are worried about the fate of the native people of Novaya Zemlya, who have almost become guinea pigs for the military. But there has never been any kind of a native population on the islands. The Nenets reindeer breeders began to populate these places back in the 1920's. But in 1954, after the government decision to set up a test range here, they returned to the mainland.

A lot of suspicions also surfaced with respect to servicemen on Novaya Zemlya, who have allegedly been provided with special "clean" products and can therefore view the conduct of nuclear tests with such calm. I dropped by the local stores. There was a wide selection of canned goods on the shelves... from Gorny. A mean joke, of course, but a fact. What is more, the military commissary, which supplies the island, does not provide any privileges for Novaya Zemlya residents that differ from all other Arctic garrisons....

Problems

The residents of Novaya Zemlya have become accustomed to relying on their own strength. Especially since there are frequent situations here when help cannot be expected from anywhere.

The situation was particularly difficult last winter. During a blizzard a fire broke out in the water intake station, which supplied the "capital" of the archipelago—Belushya Guba. It is eight km from the settlement to the station, an hour's walk over a good road. But it took bulldozers three hours to pull the fire engines there.

The wheeled vehicles tipped over in the deep snow. They had to be raised upright manually. The station burned down....

There was drinking water in the neighboring garrison. But it was 14 km away, and through snow. Even the road could not be seen from inside the cabin of the vehicles. And officers, feeling their way with their feet, walked in front of each convoy with the valuable liquid.

But what about heating? There was an emergency reserve of water for one day. It was decided to build a new water intake station on the nearest island. It was done quickly. But the water froze in the water pipes. It was necessary immediately to melt the ice in the pipes with boiling water. The hoses for the boiling water were uncoiled immediately. But the seamen were in felt boots. To get soaked through at such temperatures would very likely mean pneumonia.

There were three among those present who were wearing high boots: Admirals V. Gorev and V. Vyskrebentsev and Captain First Rank N. Trotsko. There was no time for hesitation. They grabbed the hoses and went. There was enough heat from the boiling water for only about 20 meters of the water line. One sector was heated, and they went further....

The snowstorm raged over the island for more than a day. But the garrison held out.

Of course, all of this is in the past. And today Admiral Viktor Gorev, the chief of the test range, is troubled with other difficulties. With scrap metal, for example. There is so much of it scattered about—mountains of it. Metal does not last long here. And when it is worn out—onto the scrap pile. And this has been going on for almost 40 years.

"But it does not matter," says Gorev, "I have to serve five years here, and I have planned to eliminate the scrap heap in that period.... Of course, it was not easy. We gathered it from the whole tundra and brought it to the seaport. You cannot bury thousands of tonnes of metal in the ground. But nobody intends to remove it. I am prepared to give it away for nothing. You see, it can be of use to the country...."

Or, here is another matter. By the way, very unusual. After the Nenets people asked to be resettled on the mainland in connection with the establishment of the test range, the local cemetery was left without an owner. But recently Nenets elders asked Gorev: How are the graves of our relatives there? Do they need looking after?... The admiral did not forget the elders' query. He himself went to see, looked around, and outlined plans for improvements, which he monitors himself.... Although the admiral has enough concerns even without this. All of the problems of our society are reflected in a military collective like the sun in a drop of water.

Is this situation normal?

The struggle to "survive" takes away a lot of strength, adding only new gray hair. Not to freeze in the winter, feed the people, find a place where they can spend free time, and reeducate soldiers and sailors who arrive "to serve out" their compulsory service terms—I am confident that there is no other army in the world that has such a list.

People in uniform did not come here for the sake of personal pleasure. "The motherland ordered it" are not simply words, but the very reason that they are here. And their main task is operational training, not the mastery of areas of the country that are difficult to get to. But while the Union Supreme Soviet is pondering whether we need nuclear test ranges and a professional army, thousands of servicemen are paying for the time of dragged out wavering with their own health and family well-being. It is a paradox, but, in the meantime, the Soviet Army is treated like a stepchild by Soviet authority.

Shevardnadze Comments on CFE Discussion With Bush

91UF0020A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 3 Oct 90 p 3

[Article based on conversation with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by correspondent Ye. Ovcharenko; date not given: "What the Minister Needs"]

[Text] Some details of our correspondent's conversation with E. Shevardnadze.

Automatic weapons pointed straight at you do not make you feel like having a friendly conversation. But still we managed to exchange a few words. One of the police in bulletproof jackets guarding the approaches to the hall of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, where the meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and U.S. President Bush took place on Monday, kindly explained that he had in his hands a compact automatic weapon produced in West Germany. And in response to my question of what kind of aperture that was under the muzzle that looked like the shutter of a camera, with lightning speed he turned the weapon over in his hand and blinded us with a powerful burst of light. Guarding the president is serious business. Therefore, I hurried into the hall without making any abrupt movements—just in case.

This is what Eduard Shevardnadze had to say in the conversation that took place:

"At the center of attention was arms control. Everything related to preparation for the European summit meeting in Paris. For it to succeed it will be necessary to achieve results in the negotiations in Vienna [CFE], and today we noted that there are real possibilities of doing this. We also established that there are good prospects for completing strategic arms negotiations before the end of this year. It seems to me that several of the large problems could be solved while I am still in New York

and we could complete the work on the strategic offensive arms treaty during my visit to Washington at the beginning of October. If we do what we have planned, it will be possible at that time to settle on the dates for the U.S. President's visit to Moscow. We also discussed certain issues in bilateral relations and economic aspects, but not in detail. Of course we discussed the Persian Gulf problem in detail. We are prepared to work together to achieve peaceful regulation."

"Did your discussion of economic problems give you hope?"

"Mr. Baker's trip to Moscow, during which drafts and programs were discussed, was very important."

On that same day, an hour before the opening in New York of the meeting of foreign affairs ministers of countries participating in CSCE, the number of countries participating in it decreased by one. The ministers of six of the countries affixed their signatures to the declaration of the cessation of the rights and responsibilities of the four powers with respect to Berlin and Germany.

Speaking at the meeting of the ministers, Eduard Shevardnadze said that here in New York they had managed to find common approaches to the major elements of the agreement on reducing conventional arms in Europe. This opens up the way to conducting the European summit meeting.

In addition to completing the Vienna talks, the following tasks are related to it: formulation of a basic plan for developing common European security institutions and structures and developing declarations on new relations among the countries participating in the two military alliances.

What is the Soviet foreign minister lacking in New York? Time, of course, but it turns out that not the last thing is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA which, in his words, he reads regularly. Understandably, ministers are people, too, but still it was nice to know!

CFE Talks Plenary Session Held in Vienna 4 Oct

LD0410172490 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT 4 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, October 4 (TASS)—A regular plenary session was held today at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE], which turned from a forum of 23 countries into a forum of 22 after the reunification of Germany.

It was "Germany's Day," and head of the German delegation Ambassador Ruediger Hartmann, who was receiving congratulations on German reunification, became its hero. He made a statement, stressing that his country's foreign policy would be orientated towards

partnership and close international cooperation and that nothing but peace would come from Germany.

Hartmann pointed out that the New York meeting of foreign ministers had made "decisive progress on the problems remaining open," which are being discussed at the Vienna talks. This refers, in the first place, to the quotas and the setting of upper limits for tanks, artillery, helicopters and armoured vehicles, as well as the air force problem.

Speaking at a press conference here, Hartmann said that more than 50 percent of the text of the future treaty on conventional armed forces had already been coordinated. He expressed confidence that the document would be ready by the beginning of the all-European summit in Paris in November.

Representatives of Hungary and Belgium told the plenary session about the holding of reciprocal inspections of military facilities on territories of the two countries.

Last Nuclear-Armed Sub Scrapped in Baltic

PM0510140790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Oct 90

[Report by L. Yashina from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The last Soviet nuclear-equipped submarine in the Baltic has been destroyed [unich-tozhena]. Here is a report from our correspondent:

[Yashina] Today everyone has grasped that a further arms buildup is senseless. There will be no winners in a nuclear war. During his visit to Finland Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke of the Soviet intention to turn the Baltic Sea into a nuclear-free zone. During the past two years several submarines bristling with ballistic missiles have been destroyed. This is the last one: diesel submarine No. 467. And so the Baltic is nuclear-free. You see the crew's farewell ceremony on the ship. It was attended by representatives of local city authorities, the press, and a group of naval arms cuts observers of the Peace to the Oceans Committee.

Unfortunately we have so far reported only on what is being removed from our Navy. We would also like to know what ships, what cruisers, are being removed from other navies. Do you have any information to this effect?

[I.G. Smirnov, chairman of a public group of observers of USSR Navy cuts] Yes, we have concluded an agreement with a similar public organization in the United States—the Center for Defense Information—which is making a documentary on the withdrawal of a number of warships from the U.S. Navy.

The next stage is negotiations on naval disarmament, which are necessary. As we all know, there is a current positive trend in the world toward arms and armed forces reduction, and it is the specific task of our new committee—an organ of people's diplomacy—to focus

the attention of the world public on the need to include major powers' navies in the disarmament process.

'Breakthrough' on CSCE Security Issues Hailed

*PM0510094190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Oct 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by observer Colonel M. Ponomarev under the rubric "The World Today: Problems and Opinions": "Breakthrough"]

[Text] Anyone who has been to the northwestern regions of our country has certainly been struck by the huge quantity of large and small stones around the perimeter of cultivated fields. These are traces of a glacial period in the history of our planet. As they descended from the uplands of the Scandinavian ice sheet the glaciers carried boulders, stones, and sand. And then when they melted as the climate became warmer, they left them cluttering the whole surface of the earth. And plowmen had to work hard in order to clear the ground and make it suitable for cultivation.

Something similar can be seen today in the political life of Europe, a continent where many extremely acute problems of our time are concentrated. The glaciers of the "cold war" have been cluttering it for four decades. And now that they have just left the fields of Europe, they have left behind them obstructions of large and small stones.

This is particularly noticeable now that there is a little over six weeks to go before the Paris meeting. The summit meeting of leaders of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] states. The date of the conference has only just been finally decided—19-21 November. This decision was adopted Tuesday at the meeting of the CSCE countries' foreign ministers in New York.

Considerable obstacles had to be overcome before this decision was adopted. Probably the main one was a menacing relic of the period of confrontation and "cold war"—the mountains of weapons stockpiled on the continent. Representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO states spent much effort at their meetings in Vienna seeking ways to considerably decrease these mountains, if not get rid of them entirely. And considerable speculation about this appeared in the world press, including certain Soviet press organs. Pessimists claimed that the so-called "sufficiency problem"—the quantity of tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, and artillery that the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries could retain—was insoluble, accusing the Soviet Union of refusing to compromise and of making unduly high demands. They also doubted whether it would be possible to reach consensus about the "zones problem"—a regional division in Europe precluding the possibility of a dangerous concentration of arms in a single region and ensuring a balance of forces. Another stumbling block at the Vienna talks was the problem of aircraft or, to be

more precise, the question of whether the USSR's land-based naval aviation and the U.S. naval aviation based on aircraft carriers off the shores of Europe should be included in the total strength.

These are not invented problems. They really existed and partially continue to exist even today. But it is well known that the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe is of key importance for creating a new international security system. President G. Bush figuratively called this the "cornerstone" of such a system. And solutions were found—during meetings between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. President and secretary of state in the last few days in New York and at the meeting there among the foreign ministers of all the Warsaw Pact member states.

The specific accords on questions concerning the level of sufficiency and the zones problem are still not being spelled out. Clearly, the participants in the talks deem it necessary to finalize the text of the agreement unhindered by insufficiently competent critics. As for aircraft, it appears that the solution here is a judgment of Solomon, maybe not the best solution but the only possible one today: to remove this question from the purview of the talks at the present stage to reach an agreement on it at the ensuing stage. Incidentally, there has already been a precedent for this. That was how the USSR and the United States approached the issue of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles when preparing the treaty radically reducing strategic offensive arms. (In order to avoid returning again to this topic, I will say straightaway that progress on the question of strategic offensive arms was also achieved in New York. It was noted that there is a chance of completing work on this treaty before the end of the current year, and then it will be possible to agree the date of G. Bush's visit to the USSR, during which this treaty will be signed.)

It can also be claimed that work on preparing the other documents that are to be signed at the summit in Paris is also going successfully. The structure of a modern system of European security has emerged. The idea of creating a center for the prevention and resolution of conflicts entrusted with the task of dealing with both military and political aspects of security has been approved. It is planned to form an all-European parliamentary forum. The machinery for regular political consultations at various levels—state leaders, foreign ministers, and their special representatives—is being prepared. If decisions are adopted about this, a new atmosphere sharply different from the atmosphere of "cold war" times will emerge in Europe.

A contribution to this will be made by the declaration on relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, which is also to be examined at the November summit. The document is now being prepared on the basis of drafts submitted by the Soviet Union, the 16 members of the Atlantic alliance, and Hungary.

I think that the fact that those who are preparing the Paris meeting are concerned not only with current affairs and problems, no matter how important and complex they may be in themselves, is very important. After all, stones are removed from the fields not so that the fields can merely be clear, but so that they can be plowed and sown and eventually produce a harvest. The process is important in itself, of course. But the main thing is the result. And if we are to speak of this result in the political plane, it is stability and security for all Europe's peoples and the opportunity to cooperate in mutually advantageous interests.

This is why the elaboration of the main guidelines for the future development of the Helsinki process and the preparation of the next summit meeting of the CSCE states—"Helsinki-2"—is beginning right now. These guidelines are to be defined in Paris. They are called upon to point the way to still more radical changes for the better in the political climate of Europe. One of these guidelines is the second stage of the talks on conventional forces and arms in Europe, at which solutions must be found to the problems remaining unsolved during the first stage and the first steps must be taken along this road. It is also proposed to begin talks on eliminating tactical nuclear weapons.

Here I have to mention, if only briefly, the Soviet-U.S. joint statement "Responsibility for Peace and Security in a Changing World," which was adopted yesterday. It emphasizes that we are experiencing the period of the most profound changes in international affairs since World War II. Relations of confrontation between East and West are giving way to cooperation and partnership. The United Nations is rapidly becoming a genuine center for coordinated joint action, and the Security Council is regaining its decisive role in maintaining international security, in the peaceful settlement of disputes, and in preventing conflicts. In the United Nations and its specialized institutions and programs the USSR and the United States will attach special importance to seeking practical and multifaceted solutions to questions of international peace and security and to political, economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems.

The success achieved in recent days during the bilateral and multilateral meetings in New York and at the meeting of foreign ministers from the CSCE countries can, without any doubt, be described as a genuine breakthrough. The gloomy forecasts of the pessimists have not been borne out. The political will of the leaders of the European states, the United States, and Canada ensured this breakthrough. It is all the more significant in that it was made at such a difficult and complex time, when Iraq is not abandoning the annexation of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf region is increasingly becoming a powder keg that may blow up not only the Near East but the whole world. The leaders of most countries are now occupied with problems connected with this conflict. The foreign ministers of the CSCE countries could not ignore them either, and adopted a special statement at their meeting in New York.

The processes taking place in individual states also exert a substantial influence on the sphere of international life. There is no need to dwell in detail on what is happening in our country—the press, radio, and television incessantly tell us about this and we ourselves run up against it in our daily lives. But it should not be forgotten that other countries are also experiencing serious domestic problems. Thus the United States is faced with an unprecedented budget deficit. For the first time in many years, despite the Republicans' election promises, it has been forced to make a considerable increase in taxes.

It also cannot be forgotten that the stereotypes of the past not only live on but are still the mode of thinking for a very great many people. Here is just one example. An international symposium on the future of NATO has just been held in Madrid. Moreover, certain speeches clearly sounded notes of the cobwebbed bloc approach—maintain vigilance, delay "perestroika within NATO," and take advantage of the situation in order to "strengthen the West's defenses."

In these conditions what has been achieved on the threshold of the Paris meeting is particularly significant. It is also significant that the problem of reducing conventional and nuclear missile arms is not receding into the background. It remains among the first items on the agenda of Soviet-U.S. relations and international relations in general.

Shevardnadze, Baker Meet in New York

Discuss START, CFE Issues

*LD0510191390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1840 GMT 5 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondents Yevgeniy Menkes and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] United Nations, 5 October (TASS)—The latest working meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker got under way in New York today. This is their fourth meeting in New York in the past week and a half.

As the ministers told journalists earlier, the answers to a number of key questions concerned with talks on concluding a strategic offensive weapons [START] treaty have to be found at today's meeting. All issues to do with an agreement on cutting conventional weapons in Europe [CFE] as an essential condition for the pan-European summit meeting this November in Paris also have to finally be resolved.

Replying in advance of the meeting to journalists' questions as to whether this work can be completed today, the ministers suggested waiting for the end of the meeting. As Eduard Shevardnadze said, we are in serious mood, otherwise we would not have bothered to meet four times.

Further on CFE Discussion

LD0610042690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0400 GMT 6 Oct 90

[Text] On Friday evening, the New York round of talks between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker concluded. Later they issued a statement on the results of the dialogue. The ministers reported that solutions were found to all of the problems of the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. That is, the path is open for the conclusion of a treaty and, therefore, also for the successful holding of a meeting of the leaders of the European states, the United States, and Canada in November. The prospects for signing a treaty on the radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons by the end of the year have become quite realistic. Shevardnadze and Baker agreed to meet again in Washington in November.

Six-Hour Round of Talks Held

PM0510114390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent A. Shalnev: "Obstacle Overcome; Important Accord on Reducing Armed Forces and Arms in Europe"]

[Text] New York—On the conference table, among the mountains of notebooks and stacks of ordinary pencils sharpened to fine points, there lied a calculator. An ordinary pocket calculator. It turned out it was the main instrument in the work of one of the U.S. participants, who scrupulously calculated each option as it arose for resolving the problems which have proved to be the main ones at these talks—talks that continued for nearly six hours.

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Secretary of State James Baker and their small teams of experts spent half a day at this table in the Soviet UN mission's parade room. They were engaged for half a day in virtually just one point on the agenda of their meeting—the agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

At the end of the six-hour marathon journalists were told the result. "We have reached mutual understanding on all basic problems," Eduard Shevardnadze said.

The most important thing is that mutual understanding has been reached on the problem which gave rise to the greatest contradictions and which, it seemed only a few days ago, would ultimately simply be put outside the talks' frame of reference and put off "for later," for subsequent years. I have in mind the problem of aircraft.

E. Shevardnadze and J. Baker, relying on the aid of experts, including the expert armed with the calculator, were able to agree on specific figures for levels. As I understand it, the overall level for the Soviet Union was set at a little over 5,000 aircraft.

There is also an accord on the number of ground-based naval aircraft. But sources have asked that the exact figure not be cited yet.

It is true that one snag remains: the helicopter problem.

There are several other snags, which are also resolvable. And, overall, to judge by the statements of E. Shevardnadze and his U.S. counterpart, the agreement may be considered to have been worked out in principle. Ahead lie the United States' consultations with its NATO allies and the USSR's consultations with its Warsaw Pact allies. The aim of the consultations is to agree on the document which should be ready for signing by the heads of state and government at the Paris meeting in November this year.

According to J. Baker he does not predict any complications on the part of the NATO partners. Will there be complications from the "Warsaw" partners?

At the six-hour meeting in the Soviet mission there was not enough time for the other points on the agenda. They managed to touch very briefly on several problems of strategic offensive arms limitation. The main discussion will be on Friday, when Baker and Shevardnadze will hold one more meeting, the fifth this week. The meeting is necessary, the Soviet minister said, "to prepare the ground to complete work on the strategic offensive weapons treaty."

The meeting also produced a joint Soviet-U.S. statement on the United Nations. It may be understood that the statement, called "responsibility for peace and security in a changing world," was compiled earlier and was not the subject of special debates between the minister and the secretary of state. One of the most interesting elements of this document was the resolve voiced by both countries "to provide the United Nations with sufficient resources for its effective work through the prompt fulfillment of financial commitments to it." This phrase which, to all appearances, was provided with some difficulty by the U.S. Administration, which is experiencing very grave budget difficulties, means that Washington will now have to seek funds to extinguish its enormous debt of over \$0.5 billion to the United Nations.

Our debts are approximately one quarter of that.

Bush 'Happy' With Progress

PM0810142190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Oct 90 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[TASS report: "Good Prospects"]

[Text] Washington, 5 October—U.S. President George Bush has stated that he is "very happy with the progress" achieved during the third working session in New York between U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze in resolving the problems of cutting conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE].

"I want to recall," he said at a White House press conference, "that a CFE treaty will not be an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is a treaty which will be concluded by 22 countries in both the East and West. They must all be satisfied with the treaty's provisions."

G. Bush stated that the United States intends, together with its allies, to "conclude the treaty within the next month" to open the way for the Paris summit of the heads of state and government of the CSCE countries. The Paris summit is scheduled for 19-21 November.

'Decisive Breakthrough' Hailed

*LD0610111490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1900 GMT 5 Oct 90*

[Commentary by political observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] As we have already reported, during the New York meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State Baker mutual understanding was reached on issues relating to cutting armaments in Europe. Political observer Aleksandr Zholkver comments on these agreements:

[Zholkver] I shall point out first of all that the problems discussed in New York are pretty complex. After all, for decades it was thought that the security of states was ensured primarily by the number of tanks, aircraft, and ships they had. Then missiles and nuclear munitions were added. The question of the number of these, of all these levels and sub-levels, was discussed for many years at the Vienna negotiations. I frequently had occasion to be at the Hofburg Palace, where these negotiations were in progress, and see their ineffectiveness with my own eyes.

It was only just recently that it has finally been possible to shift the Vienna negotiations from a standstill and now to reach, in New York, a decisive breakthrough in the matter of real disarmament. This was reached, in my opinion, because a fundamentally new approach to the problem of security predominated. It now seems to be clear to everyone that one's own security cannot be ensured by excessive armaments which infringe upon the security of others. To say nothing of the fact that armaments cost huge sums of money. In our nuclear age, security in general can only be mutual, common. In New York, both at the meeting of foreign ministers of the 35 states and at the Soviet-U.S. talks, nonstandard inter-bloc agreements were worked out on all-European documents. For these, it is less important how many tanks and aircraft one side or the other will have. Incidentally, right up to the last few days the most contentious question was precisely that of aviation. Far more important is the creation of common European security structures, from regular meetings of heads of government of all the European states and their ministers of foreign affairs, to the formation of an all-European secretariat and a special center for prevention and settlement of conflicts in Europe.

We shall not, of course, get carried away by euphoria. In building a European home we are starting, as builders say, at square one, and as a rule that is the most difficult one. Yet during these very same days there has been the settlement of a question as difficult as the German question, which for decades exacerbated the situation in Europe. If the USSR and U.S. foreign ministers now also sign in New York a joint statement on responsibility for peace and security in a changing world, then I think one can state that the world really is changing for the better.

'Considerable Problems' Remain

*PM0810150390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by correspondent A. Shalnev: "Some Problems Solved, Some Remain: Hours of Marathon Talks Between USSR and U.S. Foreign Ministers Conclude"]

[Text] New York—Another round of multi-hour marathon talks was held in New York Friday between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. In the few hours that remained before the minister's departure for Moscow, they tried to resolve a series of problems which had resisted solution in previous rounds and which had made it impossible to enter the finishing straight—namely, the treaties on strategic offensive arms and conventional arms in Europe.

Were the attempts a success?

In the secretary of state's words, "Our day was successful and productive." The foreign minister added: "We are a little tired but the results are good."

The results are good primarily because one can now talk with almost total confidence about the prospect of signing a treaty on conventional armed forces and armaments at the Paris meeting of heads of state and government belonging to the Helsinki process. All the fundamental difficulties have been eliminated, including those which proved intractable at the previous meeting on Wednesday.

Without even waiting for this meeting to end, Oleg Grinevskiy, head of our delegation at the Vienna talks who was accompanying E. Shevardnadze on his trip to New York, flew back to Vienna to add the finishing touches to the treaty's wording.

On strategic arms, as the secretary of state noted, "We were able to make good progress." But, by all accounts, the progress was not so significant that it could be said after the meeting: We have a treaty!

Very considerable problems remain. As I understand it, the main one is the so-called "problem of the noncircumvention" of the future treaty. Our side is not opposed to the U.S. completion of its previously promised deliveries of Trident-2 missiles to Britain but we are opposed to the continuation of this kind of cooperation in the future

and to Trident-2 being followed by, for example, Trident-3 or air-launched cruise missiles.

The Americans are refusing to publicly make commitments which, as they suggest, would harm their "special relationship" with Britain.

Is there a way out of this impasse? There is, our delegation has suggested to me; it is possible to find an acceptable way to formulate the solution of the problem with a little thought. But on Friday, unfortunately, that formula was not found.

Without the formula, the solutions to other problems, particularly the problem of testing our SS-18 heavy missiles, remain in the air. According to my information, the Americans are ready to drop their demands for a limitation on the testing of these missiles on the condition that we make a concession to them on the question of "noncircumvention." But unless the missile-testing problem is resolved, the sides will not make progress on the question of the number of Soviet Backfire bombers. That, as I understand it, is our linkage.

On the other hand, the question of the nondestruction of missiles—to use the expression of the participants in the talks—has been resolved. Not all the missiles to be taken out of service will be destroyed. Some other peaceful use will be found for them, one which is more rational and economical. Facilities have to be launched into space so why not use the disarmed missiles for that purpose?

It is a striking fact that many years ago when talks were being held on strategic arms limitation (SALT-2), we suggested to the Americans: Let us not destroy our missiles. The Americans were categorically opposed to that. Then at the strategic offensive weapons talks, they themselves suggested: Let us not destroy them; let us limit the destruction to the delivery vehicles. This time we were opposed. Then we agreed, probably remembering the criticism in our country at the quite ill-considered [neprodumannyy] treatment of the missiles which were due for destruction under the agreement on medium- and short-range missiles.

Difficulties—and they are considerable—remain in connection with the strategic offensive weapons treaty. But, as E. Shevardnadze has said, "the final stage of the talks requires meticulous work. That is why there should be no surprise if we do not resolve all the questions."

There is a hope that this will be achieved in Washington, which the head of our Foreign Ministry will visit in November, as the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister agreed. Then, clearly, there will be a specific discussion on the timing of a trip to the USSR by President Bush in which it is planned that one of the highlights will be the signing of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

Supreme Soviet Acts on Nuclear Testing Treaties

Committees Back Ratification

PM0510093290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by V. Izgarshev: "In the Interests of Peace and Security"]

[Text] A joint sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions was held in the Kremlin yesterday chaired by A. Dzasokhov. It examined nuclear weapons agreements signed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

After studying the relevant materials and hearing reports from USSR Foreign Ministry and USSR Defense Ministry representatives, along with reports from experts, the people's deputies gave their findings on the two treaties and their protocols. They resolved to recommend that the Supreme Soviet ratify these important interstate agreements. They are the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests signed in Moscow 3 July 1974 and the protocol to it signed in Washington 1 June 1990. And the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes signed in Moscow and Washington 28 May 1976 and the protocol to it signed in Washington 1 June 1990.

USSR People's Deputies G. Arbatov, Ye. Velikhov, N. Petrushenko, V. Shabanov, and other comrades spoke at the sitting. They all pointed out that the ratification of these documents will serve to further stabilize international relations and serve the interests of peace and security for others in addition to our two countries' peoples.

'Stormy' Debates in Committees

PM0810155590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[IZVESTIYA parliamentary correspondent report: "Stormy Discussions Over Moratorium"]

[Text] A joint sitting of the International Affairs Committee and the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions was held at the USSR Supreme Soviet. The longest exchange of opinions revolved around the first item on the agenda: examining the question of ratifying the 1973 and 1976 Treaties on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. The United States and the USSR have observed these agreements throughout this period. The U.S. Congress ratified them not so long ago. Our turn has come.

One would have thought that the documents should not have caused such animated debates. Signed many years

ago, they have operated faultlessly. However, the treaties served as an excuse for deputies to discuss a number of other aspects of disarmament and arms control—and opposing opinions emerged among the parliamentarians in their assessment of these issues.

The speeches delivered by three speakers from the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and an independent group of experts set up by the committees revealed marked differences of position. No one objected to the ratification of the treaties. However, Lieutenant General S. Zelentsov assessed the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests declared by the USSR in August 1985—which, as is well known, lasted 18 months—as a failure, as a result of which new developments in the field of nuclear weapons were not approved, money was wasted to no purpose on idle workers and specialists, and many research programs were held up. In his opinion, had the ban on tests lasted longer, it would have seen the degradation of the country's scientific potential.

Academician G. Arbatov resolutely opposed this assessment of the moratorium. The moratorium, which the Soviet Union extended on three occasions, he said, contributed to creating the atmosphere which made it possible to hold the crucial USSR-U.S. summit in Reykjavik.

Ye. Velikhov, A. Ananyev, V. Falin, and others addressed the committees' sitting. Deputies were divided roughly into two groups which adhered to the following opinions. Some believed that most resolute steps, including unilateral steps, should be taken in the disarmament sphere. Their opponents objected to unilateral steps, which cannot convince anyone to follow an example and will only damage the country's security.

Despite their differences, both committees' deputies instructed the Supreme Soviet to ratify the treaties and urge the world's parliaments to completely stop nuclear tests.

With regard to other items on the agenda, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations briefed deputies on the balance of oil and petroleum products in USSR trade. "Black gold" is regrettably still virtually the only major source of hard currency. What is more, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations offers 55 states aid free of charge. This aid totaled 800 million rubles this year and is carried out in accordance with previous pledges. Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan are the largest recipients. However, the volumes of aid are dropping year by year.

Treaties Ratified

*LD0910150490 Moscow TASS in English 1457 GMT
9 Oct 90*

[Text] Moscow, October 9 (TASS)—The USSR Supreme Soviet (parliament) today ratified the treaties between

the USSR and the U.S. on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The Soviet lawmakers ratified the two treaties and protocols thereof after a stormy debate at the joint session of both chambers.

Ratification Resolution

*PM151051290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1*

["USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution"]

[Text] Decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet

On the ratification of the treaty between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests and the protocol to it and the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the protocol to it.

The USSR Supreme Soviet decides:

1. To ratify the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests, which was signed in Moscow on 3 July 1974, and the protocol to it, which was signed in Washington on 1 June 1990, and the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which was signed in Moscow and Washington on 28 May 1976, and the protocol to it, which was signed in Washington on 1 June 1990, and which have been submitted for ratification by the USSR Council of Ministers.

2. To endorse the text of the appeal by the USSR Supreme Soviet to the parliaments and public of the world. [Signed] Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. Lukyanov
Moscow, Kremlin, 9 October 1990

Impact of Asian-Pacific Policy Discussed

*SK1510010490 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 5 Oct 90*

[Commentary by station commentator Oleg Alekseyev; from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Excerpts] Respected listeners: More than once we have talked about Soviet programs concerning security and cooperation in Asia and the Pacific.

We want to remind you Gorbachev proclaimed that very program in his Vladivostok speech in the summer of 1986 and again in his broader and more detailed Krasnoyarsk speech two years later. Now, how is the program being put into practice?

Station commentator Oleg Alekseyev writes the following:

It is too early to say that the major strategic tasks of the new program concerning Asia and the Pacific have been completely fulfilled. Nevertheless, it is true this program has played a major part and served as an incentive for some positive changes that have already taken place or are being implemented in this region.

The policy on dialogue which Mikhail Gorbachev advanced in his Vladivostok speech should be made a comprehensive [word indistinct] capable of removing feuds and clashes in Asia and the Pacific. Such dialogues are gathering greater momentum than before. [passage omitted]

I would like to take special note of the unilateral measures the Soviet Union already has taken for military detente in Asia and the Pacific. These measures include removing medium- and long-range missiles from all over the Soviet Far East, reduction of the 200,000-strong Soviet Armed Forces in this region, and the measure to completely withdraw Soviet Armed Forces from Mongolia. I would like you to remember that the Soviet Union has made the commitment that it will not arbitrarily increase the number of its nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific.

As far as the cause of improving the situation in the Asian-Pacific region is concerned, the complete pullout of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in February 1989 is a significant event. It is natural to assume Soviet-Chinese talks aimed at mutually reducing military forces deployed along the borders between the two countries and at [words indistinct] will be a major factor in deepening this process. [passage omitted]

'Peace Monument' of P-2, SS-20 Parts Presented to UN

*LD0610131190 Moscow TASS in English 1220 GMT
6 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondents Yevgeniy Menkes and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] United Nations, October 6 (TASS)—A ceremony of unveiling a monument created by Soviet sculptor Zurab Tsereteli took place at the U.N. Headquarters.

Numerous diplomats, U.N. staff members and reporters gathered on the lawn in front of the U.N. Headquarters on Friday evening. They saw a new sculptural composition called "Good Defeats Evil."

Bronze St. George on a rampant horse kills two dragons with his lance. The artist has updated the image of the saint: Visitors noticed parts of missiles between the dragons' scales. They are the American Pershing-2 and the Soviet SS-20.

The missiles are real. They were prepared for destruction and handed over to the sculptor by Soviet and American military specialists.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze presented the monument to the United Nations as a gift on behalf of the Soviet Government and at the request of the author who was present at the ceremony.

Shevardnadze read out a letter from President Mikhail Gorbachev to the U.N. secretary-general.

The unveiling of "the Monument of Peace" at the U.N. Headquarters, which was made out of the remains of destroyed intermediate missiles, is a homage to the beginning of history's first real disarmament, the letter reads.

It is a symbol of new Soviet-American relations and a herald of a new period in the history of mankind. The United Nations is now irreplaceable, since it is assuming the role envisaged for it at its inception.

Let "the Monument of Peace" personify the unity of nations, mass movements and parties, scholars and men of culture in their efforts for the sake of peace and accord now and in future, the letter says.

U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar received "the Monument of Peace" on behalf of the United Nations.

He stressed the importance of positive changes in the world, including the relaxation of tension in Soviet-American relations. Cuellar praised the sculpture by Soviet artist.

Addressing the gathering, U.S. State Secretary James Baker read out a congratulatory message from President George Bush who pointed to the propitious time for unveiling the sculpture now that Soviet-American relations passed beyond containment and confrontation.

Indian Ocean 'Naval Arms Race' Deplored

*PM0910135190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[Article by correspondent N. Paklin: "Pakistani Nuclear Submarines in the Indian Ocean. Talks in Camera"]

[Text] Delhi—Citing Hong Kong's FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Indian newspapers have reported that Pakistan intends to buy a nuclear submarine from China. The transaction is not yet complete, however the secret talks between the two countries are at an advanced stage.

Reports indicate that this involves an improved version of the first generation of Chinese nuclear-powered submarines, built in the seventies. China has five of them. China intends to give Pakistan one of these. The price of the craft is \$63 million without weapons. In the opinion of the Hong Kong journal, China needs this money to

modernize its Navy—a program which has ground to a halt owing to lack of funds. There is another strategic aim. “If the Pakistani Navy can counter the Indian Navy, this will be to China’s advantage,” the journal writes.

The report of the impending Sino-Pakistani deal has aroused concern, if not alarm, in India. Experts from Delhi’s Institute of Strategic Studies said that it would result in a change in the “regional balance of naval forces.” In the opinion of Indian experts, the deal confirms the “close Sino-Pakistani cooperation in the military sphere.” At present the Pakistani Army has Chinese aircrafts and tanks in its arsenal while the Navy has Chinese warships. Pakistani and Chinese specialists are developing a new tank together and working on the modernization of Chinese fighters.

But the Sino-Pakistani deal also raises other problems. Is it lawful to supply third countries with nuclear-powered submarines, albeit without nuclear weapons? Are such shipments not in breach of the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? Is there a difference in principle between, say, a nuclear-powered icebreaker and an unarmed nuclear submarine, which can, however, easily carry both nuclear and conventional weapons?

These questions are by no means rhetorical for us: Not so long ago we leased India a nuclear-powered submarine on a long-term basis, providing the Indian crew with preliminary training. (I think that this was the first case in world practice). There is now talk of selling another Soviet nuclear submarine to India, the journal writes.

Soviet experts working in Delhi voice the opinion that a nuclear-powered submarine without nuclear weapons does not come under the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Nonetheless it is worth thinking about where nuclear submarines are concerned....

While beginning to expand their own naval presence, including nuclear submarines, Indian leaders would like to do to their utmost to restrict the Pakistani Navy. One of their arguments for this approach is the tremendous length of India’s sea border, the existence of islands far from the mainland, the vast maritime economic zone, and a major merchant Navy. These are compounded by accusations leveled at Pakistan, inter alia, of being the first country in the region to begin developing a submarine fleet. Attention is also drawn to the rapid increase in surface vessels within the Pakistani Navy in 1989-1990.

However, these arguments in favor of a naval arms race have not met with understanding in many countries adjoining the Indian Ocean. They are showing concern and beginning to expand their navies in turn. An alarming trend.

Greenpeace Protests at Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test Site

Armed Soviet Officials Board Ship

*LD0810114290 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1057 GMT 8 Oct 90*

[By Gavin Cordon, Press Association]

[Text] A Greenpeace ship was boarded by armed Soviet officials today after landing protesters near a Soviet nuclear weapons testing site, the environmental group claimed. Communications with the MV Greenpeace were cut after the 15-strong boarding party, armed with semi-automatic rifles, took control of the vessel. Moments earlier Greenpeace members in London, who were speaking with the ship by satellite telephone, heard the Soviet officials apparently breaking down the locked door of the radio room.

“We are outraged that the Soviet authorities have boarded our ship,” said Greenpeace spokeswoman Rebecca Johnson. London members have since failed to re-establish contact with the ship, which was drifting in the Barents Sea off the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya. The ship, which had six Soviet citizens on board including a people’s deputy of the USSR, was protesting at the resumption by the Soviets of nuclear weapons testing on the island. Last night the crew managed to land a four-strong party on Novaya Zemlya. They were trying to hike to the testing site.

Greenpeace said the party reached the shore despite the attentions of a Soviet icebreaker which had been trailing the vessel.

Flares were fired at the party’s inflatable speedboat and at one point the Soviet crew, thought by Greenpeace to be under the command of the KGB, threatened to open fire. It was shortly after this incident that the MV Greenpeace was boarded, initially by a group of five armed men from the icebreaker and then by the full boarding party.

Greenpeace activists were urgently trying to establish through the campaign’s Moscow office what had happened to the vessel and the landing party.

KGB Border Patrol Detains Ship

*LD0810123290 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1203 GMT 8 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov]

[Text] Moscow, 8 October (TASS)—The vessel Greenpeace, sailing under a Dutch flag, was stopped near the Novaya Zemlya islands today by a Soviet border patrol ship. Your correspondent was told in the Public Relations Center of the USSR KGB that the vessel has been detained “for deliberate violation of the state border of the USSR, refusal to obey the border authorities, putting people ashore in unidentified locations, and attempting

to enter an area closed to shipping." According to the USSR KGB, "in order to detain the vessel the border guards were obliged to fire warning shots. In the near future it will be escorted to the Kola Bay for a subsequent inquiry."

Greenpeace Crew Interviewed 30 Sep

PM0510134590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Sep 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA nonstaff correspondent Senior Lieutenant A. Bystrov: "Greenpeace in Murmansk"]

[Excerpts] The world-renowned Greenpeace ship recently put in at Murmansk. Its crew members are described as nature's intrepid champions. This is indeed the case in many respects. [passage omitted]

Last year the brave Greenpeace deliberately entered the special 50-mile exclusion zone for a Trident missile test launch from a U.S. submarine and spoiled these tests.

"Of course we did not avoid conflict," the crew members said. "Two U.S. ships attacked and even rammed us. There was a huge hole here in the side."

"Do crew members have any intention of taking any protest action against Soviet warships during their time in the Barents Sea," I asked 29-year old Eleonora O'Hanlon, one of the coordinators of the "Nuclear-Free Seas" program.

"What do you mean?" she asked in amazement. "Although this cruise in the Arctic basin is part of our program, it would be rude to respond to the chance we have been given to visit Murmansk and get to know your people by taking action of any kind."

During this time, the Greenpeace was visited by hundreds of Murmansk residents. The vessel—58 meters long, maximum speed 14 knots—was built in the Netherlands in 1959. However it looks new as a result of the crew's endeavors. It has a helicopter and two rubber launches, and is very environmentally friendly.

The Greenpeace crew is international with seamen from 10 countries. Vladimir Sukhoparov is from the USSR. Many people know several languages in addition to their onboard speciality and have a scientific education—they include a biologist, an ichthyologist, a specialist in radioactive waste, and so on.

"We will achieve our program's final goal," Greenpeace Captain Ulrich Juergens reckons. "Not straightaway, but we will achieve it. We have already won some victories: France has put a stop to nuclear tests in the Pacific, Europe has adopted a ban on dumping toxic waste in the sea, and a ban has been imposed on the import of sealskins, and thus hunting is being restricted. So nothing is impossible."

Interception of Greenpeace Ship

LD1010163290 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT
10 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow October 10, (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a news briefing here today about the recent interception by Soviet Border Guards of a Greenpeace vessel near the Novaya Zemlya islands.

The Soviet Union is well aware of Greenpeace activities and understands and supports its ideas and goals, Gerasimov said.

Soviet public organisations are actively cooperating with Greenpeace, taking part in many international actions organised by this organisation.

The Greenpeace ship happened to be near the Soviet shores when it was pursuing one such international action—comprehensive research of the ecological situation in the White Sea, Gerasimov said.

The ship visited Arkhangelsk and Naryan-Mar, where it dropped anchor to pursue previously agreed upon tasks. After that, however, the vessel "suddenly" changed course for Novaya Zemlya, and was intercepted, he said.

Soviet border guards boarded the Greenpeace ship and, in line with corresponding legal acts, sealed the ship's radio compartment, he said.

The Greenpeace crew thus were denied access to communications equipment until the end of the investigation. The ship's captain refused to obey border guards' orders and take the ship under escort to the Kola Peninsula. The guards had to tow the ship, he said. "According to our information, the Greenpeace vessel, towed by the Yenisey border patrol ship and escorted by the 26th CPSU Congress border patrol ship (the ship which intercepted the Greenpeace) will arrive near Murmansk later today or early tomorrow, depending on weather conditions," the spokesman said.

At the time of the interception, four crew members were on the high seas in a raft. They were also detained by Soviet border guards and taken aboard the 26th CPSU Congress ship, he said.

The Soviet Prosecutor's Office will investigate the incident on the spot, Gerasimov said.

Having stressed the "noble character of the Greenpeace mission," Gerasimov said: "There are laws that should be abided by."

He then disagreed with a Greenpeace spokesman present at the meeting, who tried to justify the Greenpeace voyage to Novaya Zemlya. The spokesman said that the movement had requested the required permission from the Russian parliament several months prior to the incident.

"Whether you submitted a written request or simply asked for it, the permission was not given. Soviet authorities on the spot, apparently, decided—no permission, no travel," Gerasimov said.

Asked about charges against the Greenpeace crew in Murmansk, Gerasimov said the Prosecutor's Office will probably charge them with violating Soviet borders.

Soviet Berlin Mission Blockaded

*LD1010143490 Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1334 GMT 10 Oct 90*

[Excerpts] Berlin (ADN)—Representatives of the environmental organization Greenpeace blockaded the building of the former Soviet Embassy in East Berlin this morning. As Robert Werner of the Hamburg Greenpeace office told ADN, the 20 or so young people are taking this action to protest the capture of the Greenpeace ship "MS Greenpeace" by Soviet naval units on Monday.

There has been no radio contact with the 40-strong crew of the ship, including people's deputies of the Supreme Soviet, since that time, Werner revealed. According to Greenpeace spokesman, the Soviet mission in East Berlin was trying to make contact with authorities in Moscow. Thus, embassy counsellor Mikhail Logvinov had told the Greenpeace representatives that at present the "MS Greenpeace" is on its way to a port in the Kola Bay under military escort. Furthermore, the ship's crew are to be prosecuted for border violation. Demands from Greenpeace that the crew members should be allowed to leave and that radio contact should be restored have not so far been met, Werner said. He will only believe the statements by the Soviet authorities if he can make contact with the captain, since so far various versions about the whereabouts of the ship have been in circulation.

As Logvinov told ADN following an inquiry, the Soviet Foreign Ministry is still trying to make radio contact, but it also has to involve the Supreme Command of the border troops for this. According to the Greenpeace spokesman, permission was granted by the Soviet Government for the "MS Greenpeace" to enter Soviet territorial waters. The embassy counsellor could not confirm Greenpeace's charges that the units were members of the Soviet secret service. [passage omitted]

IZVESTIYA Report on Incident

*PM1110134190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 3*

[Report by F. Ivanov under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "26th CPSU Congress Arrests Greenpeace"]

[Text] On 8 October the Soviet coast guard ship 26th CPSU Congress arrested the ship Greenpeace—belonging to the organization of that name—in USSR territorial waters.

Your IZVESTIYA correspondent was informed by the USSR KGB Border Guards Directorate that the Greenpeace

was in the Soviet ports of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Naryan-Mar between 22 September and 7 October. There were 34 people on board, seven of them Soviet citizens, including USSR People's Deputy Zolotkov. On 7 October, after leaving Naryan-Mar bound for Murmansk, Greenpeace deviated from its route and headed for the Novaya Zemlya islands. While sailing by Novaya Zemlya the ship entered USSR territorial waters.

The commander of coast guard ship 26th CPSU Congress repeatedly warned the ship about its illegal actions and violations of the USSR state border and in the end demanded that it leave Soviet territorial waters. The captain of the Greenpeace responded by saying that he did not recognize Soviet borders, and since there were Soviet representatives on the ship he could go where he liked.

All this entitled the coast guard commander to stop and arrest the ship. But it was not possible at the time, because a storm had blown up off the Novaya Zemlya coast. Around 0200 on 8 October, the ship broke off communications with the coast guard ship and made for the shore of one of the Novaya Zemlya islands. In doing so, it performed a dangerous maneuver, creating an emergency for the coast guard ship. At 0300 the ship lowered launches, which made for the shore. The Greenpeace captain did not respond to the coast guard ship's demands to stop what he was doing.

At 0415, the coast guard issued a warning by firing its machine gun, whereupon the Greenpeace came to a stop. In accordance with legislation, the coast guard commander put a five-man inspection party on the ship. The crew of the Greenpeace tried to prevent the group from boarding, so the border guards had to use grappling hooks to bring it alongside. Nevertheless, members of the crew detained the border guards group at the back of the vessel and would not let them enter the cabin area. Because of this, the coast guard commander decided to put two more similar groups of border guards aboard the Greenpeace. The captain of the ship and the crew continued to hinder the inspection, refused to present ship's documents, and soon shut themselves in their cabins and refused to have anything to do with the border guards.

In the end, with the help of USSR People's Deputy Zolotkov, it was possible to establish contact with the Greenpeace captain. The inspection group commander told him that he was arresting the ship in connection with the deliberate violation of the border, the refusal to submit to the border guards, and the landing of people in unspecified places. He also demanded a reply to the question: Is everyone on board? It turned out that four people had already landed on Novaya Zemlya. But, despite the fact that the "volunteers" lives were in danger in that totally uninhabited area, the ship's captain refused to say where they had landed and said that they were equipped for long-term survival in those conditions. According to the border guards, he displayed a fine knowledge of Russian—at least the dirty words.

The coast guard ship commander dispatched a search group to Novaya Zemlya, which found four people together with four rucksacks filled with dirt. The detainees were taken to the coast guard ship. The Greenpeace was then taken in tow by the coast guard ship Yenisey, because the Greenpeace captain refused to sail under his own steam.

At midday on 10 October, the ship reached the passage into Kola Bay, where it is expected at 2300 on 11 October. There were no casualties on board. When it arrives in Kola Bay the USSR Prosecutor's Office will start investigating the reasons for and circumstances of the ship's violation of Soviet laws. According to the border guards' information, there were no official requests to visit Novaya Zemlya either from the ship's captain or from the Greenpeace organization.

Ship Sails for Norway

*LD1310161190 Moscow TASS in English 1444 GMT
13 Oct 90*

[Text] Murmansk, October 13 (TASS)—The Soviet State Security Committee reported today that the Greenpeace ship, apprehended several days ago near the Novaya Zemlya Islands for the violation of the Soviet border, was expelled from the Soviet territorial waters after the investigation carried out by the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office together with Frontier Guard troops. According to the Greenpeace captain, the ship is steering towards the Norwegian port of Tromso.

Moiseyev Discusses START, CFE With Bush, Baker

*PM0910154190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 3*

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Blinov: "USSR-United States—Military Contacts"]

[Excerpts] Washington—The USSR Armed Forces General Staff and its U.S. equivalent—the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff—are jointly carrying out scientific analysis of the problem of maintaining international security and stability in conditions of profound reduction of military forces. Accord was reached on this during a U.S. visit by Army General M.A. Moiseyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of the General Staff. [passage omitted]

The chief of the Soviet General Staff was received by U.S. President George Bush—the U.S. press remarked that the meeting was far longer than the usual protocol "politeness visit"—and by Defense Secretary R. Cheney. In the course of the official talks with Gen. C. Powell an exchange of opinions took place on issues of military doctrine and the international situation. In a discussion of the Persian Gulf situation the Soviet delegation stressed the need to resolve the crisis that has arisen there through political means.

A significant place in the discussions was occupied by arms reduction issues. Noting the successful progress of the talks in Geneva and Vienna, M.A. Moiseyev voiced his support for the further widening of the disarmament agenda, in particular for its extension to the sphere of naval weapons, not yet covered by the talks. He also mentioned the need for a very early resumption of the talks on a complete end to nuclear weapons testing.

M.A. Moiseyev issued a clarification on reports that have appeared in the U.S. press of "a massive redeployment of Soviet military hardware from Europe across the Urals." In his words, hardware is being transferred from East Europe as part of the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the switch to a structure of "defensive sufficiency," and the implementation of the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men.

Reductions in troop numbers are being carried out in the Asian part of the USSR, and Soviet military units are being withdrawn from Mongolia. Military hardware will partially be used to replace the equipment of the remaining military subunits, and disengaged equipment will be eliminated or directed into the national economy. "We do not intend to stockpile military equipment. It will be destroyed according to the means which exist for this purpose," M.A. Moiseyev stated. "I am satisfied with this explanation," Gen. C. Powell told journalists.

Gen. M.A. Moiseyev and the delegation which he heads visited a number of military bases and garrisons on U.S. territory.

Supreme Soviet Appeals for World Nuclear Test Ban

Text of Appeal

*PM1610102790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13
Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4*

["USSR Supreme Soviet Appeal to the World's Parliaments and Public"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet has ratified the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

Reaffirming its commitment to stopping nuclear testing altogether, the Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that these two treaties, which now enter into force, cannot be seen as the final objective of efforts in this direction.

Therefore, the Supreme Soviet considers it expedient once again to call the attention of parliamentarians and the public across the world to the urgent need to put an early end to all nuclear testing as an important factor for enhancing the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union's initiatives and practical steps in this area are well-known. The USSR is prepared, at any time, to discontinue test explosions at its nuclear test sites and thus extend the 12-month pause in Soviet nuclear testing forever, once and for all.

For this to happen, it would be enough for the U.S. Government, either unilaterally or by mutual agreement, to discontinue its own nuclear testing programs.

The USSR reiterates its proposals for global nuclear disarmament. It is prepared to become a non-nuclear state if other nuclear powers do the same.

However important the policy of taking initiative and showing a good example may be, life demonstrates that the problem of nuclear testing has grown into a transnational one and, consequently, should be tackled by the joint efforts of the entire international community.

We are convinced that no single state, no single government, no single nation can ignore this call of the times.

A special role in this field belongs to parliaments and the public. Reflecting the sentiments of a broad spectrum of political forces and the desire of all people for a secure and peaceful life, they are duty-bound to come out for outlawing nuclear testing.

Firmly expressing itself for an early end to nuclear testing, the Supreme Soviet appeals to the parliaments and public of all countries but primarily to those states conducting nuclear weapons tests to take a clear and distinct stand in favor of the general and complete cessation of nuclear testing.

Parliamentarians will thus demonstrate real concern for the interests of voters and their aspirations.

The Supreme Soviet intends to inform the United Nations secretary-general of its position on this problem and counts on the parliaments of other countries to do so as well.

The path to a nuclear-free peace is not smooth, but it can be negotiated, and progress along it should be consistent and purposeful, without any reverses whatsoever.

Appeal Presented to UN

*LD1110082590 Moscow TASS in English 0755 GMT
11 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Maslov]

[Text] New York, October 11 (TASS)—United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on

Wednesday received a Soviet parliamentary delegation on a week-long visit to the United States.

They handed him an appeal from the Supreme Soviet to the parliaments and public of the world for a complete end to nuclear weapons testing.

Perez de Cuellar, saying he was deeply satisfied with the statement, stressed the important role it could play in efforts to stop testing altogether and reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles.

He said the United Nations would take urgent steps to support the appeal.

Perez de Cuellar also expressed gratitude to the Soviet Government for its policy towards the United Nations, which, he said, had helped inject new strength into the organisation. He added that Soviet perestroika had provided the principal stimulus to enhance the U.N.'s role.

Soviet delegation members later gave a news conference at the U.N. Headquarters on perestroika.

Speakers included delegation leader Genrikh Borovik, a member of the Parliamentary Committee on International Relations, Sergey Lavrov, a member of the Council of Nationalities Commission on Nationalities Policies and Ethnic Relations, and Valentin Minayev, secretary of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Economic Reform.

In addition, the delegation met the leaders of the Ukrainian and Belorussian delegations taking part in the 45th U.N. General Assembly session and attended meetings of the Security Council and the Economic and Financial Committee.

They had talks with U.N. secretariat experts on the Soviet Union's use of world experience to establish free economic zones and a market system.

"We do not want the Supreme Soviet appeal to be seen here as propaganda," Borovik told TASS. "It is an expression of Soviet legislator's will, and if their colleagues in the United Nations support the cessation of nuclear testing, many politicians that are still undecided will find it easier to make up their minds in favour of halting all nuclear tests."

If the United States accept our challenge, it will be possible to put an end to nuclear testing very quickly. If the Americans stop testing in Nevada, the British and the French will soon follow suit.

"Francois Mitterrand said recently that France would not like to be the last country to stop testing. China would hardly stay aloof either."

The Soviet delegation are now going to Washington to hand the parliamentary appeal to members of the U.S. Congress.

UN Chief Welcomes Appeal

*LD1210043190 Moscow TASS in English 2114 GMT
11 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations Organisation, October 11 (TASS)—U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar cordially welcomes the appeal of the Soviet parliament to parliaments throughout the world about the termination of nuclear weapons tests, official spokesman for the U.N. secretary-general Francois Giuliani said at a briefing today.

Perez de Cuellar described the appeal as a timely initiative. During a meeting with a Soviet parliamentary delegation on Wednesday he reiterated the U.N. stand on the banning of nuclear weapons tests, the spokesman said.

Krasnoyarsk Radar Dismantling 'in Full Swing'

*LD0910131190 Moscow World Service in English
1200 GMT 9 Oct 90*

[Text] The dismantling of the advanced radar station in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk is in full swing. At one time the station was a major sticking point in the Soviet-American talks on limiting antimissile defense systems. The building of the station cost hundreds of millions of rubles. Around 50 million rubles more will be spent on its demolition. In the meantime, when the veil of secrecy was removed, it became known that the station was to play a key role in the Soviet system of early warning about a missile attack.

Chernyshev Discusses Accord on Conventional Arms

*LD0910161390 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT
9 Oct 90*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Can the shortage of time help speed up the talks on disarmament? The latest events show that it can, given two conditions: positive relations between the participants in the talks and the sincere wish of the sides to reach an agreement.

In this case the participants in a dialogue meet each other half-way and advance compromise proposals, which result in a consensus.

Such was the case at the meetings between Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker in New York. They have been able to remove the main obstacles to the working out of an agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Numerical limits to the main armaments for the two military-political alliances have been set. Each of the alliances will be able to keep in Europe 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery systems, 30,000 armoured vehicles and

2,000 combat helicopters. The limit for military aircraft has not yet been set. But this delay is connected with the wish of the Soviet Union and the U.S. to debate the matter with their allies. There is no doubt that the decision will be made in a few days.

Another problem that has been causing serious difficulties at the negotiations is the "rule of sufficiency", setting the limit to armaments of each member-country of the alliances. There was a prolonged debate, but even this matter was finally coordinated in New York. Now each country participating in one or the other alliance can have up to 13,300 tanks, 13,700 artillery systems, 20,000 armoured vehicles, 1,500 helicopters and 5,150 military aircraft.

These arrangements open the road to the signing of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe at the summit meeting of countries participating in Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to be held on November 19-21 in Paris. This will undoubtedly be a historic treaty, the most important East-West treaty in arms control since the Second World War. It confirms the termination of the cold war and will help strengthen mutual confidence and stability in Europe.

Although huge political changes have taken place in Europe, the biggest military might in the world is still concentrated in it. There is now an opportunity to supplement political changes with revolutionary changes in the military area. The signing of the treaty will undoubtedly speed up the construction of a new, more stable European order, of a new collective security system.

Costs of Dismantling Krasnoyarsk Radar Assessed

*91UM0035A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 9 Oct 90 p 3*

[Article by military observer N. Panyukov in response to reader's letter: "Using a Sledgehammer on a Secret Installation"]

[Text] This "operation" will cost us hundreds of millions of rubles. And, after expending them, we will not receive anything, other than a pile of debris and a feeling of bitterness.

Complying with a treaty with the Americans, we are scrapping the Krasnoyarsk radar which was supposed to have gone into operation this year. It pains me to hear about this also because, in my time, I dedicated almost two years of my military life to the erection of this very same radar. Why did this new installation, which cost the country hundreds of millions of rubles of the people's money, end up being scrapped? How did the Americans respond to this step of ours? And, most important: Will the world be any safer without the Krasnoyarsk radar?

[Signed] V. Ivashov, builder. Sverdlovsk.

Through a gap in the wall, where there used to be a door, soldiers were hauling cumbersome cargo carts filled with all kinds of odds and ends, which until very recently constituted the "heart and nerves" of the radar. But now these condensers, which look like canisters, of which there are many, the heavy sections of cable with copper wiring that look like fat boa constrictors, the endless number of rustproof pipe fragments with shocking inscriptions, and all of the other things, in the words of the owners of the dismantled station, are nothing more than rubbish to be used as salvage or scrap metal.

"Yes, yes," sighs Lieutenant Colonel N. Soldatov, who heads the work here. "None of this is suitable any more for reassembly..."

Nikolay Pavlovich is one of the radar oldtimers. And, of course, he knows what he is talking about. Everything here was set up before his eyes. With difficulty and torment. Nikolay Pavlovich remembers 50 degree frosts and ordeals in getting the equipment ready. He simply could not watch how the gas cutters hack up the robot mechanical arm mounting (one of the more intricate units of a radar complex) with the fiery jet of a blowtorch.

"The work was awful.... Everything for the first time, everything by feel. I am not talking about material expenditures. Millions were lost before this robot began to 'run' with modules in the antenna field."

It is painful to watch the sledgehammer and the blowtorch on a spree at the expense of the keen and delicate creation of human hands. It is painful to watch how right before your eyes the hundreds of millions of rubles of the people's money invested in the radar are being turned into ashes. What is more, this dismantling, this "Sisyphean toil" will also not be cheap: According to the most modest calculations it will come to no less than 50 million rubles [R].

And questions cannot be avoided here. How did this happen? Why was something built which, as it turned out, should not have been built?

Of course, no one thought that within four years of the start of the radar site construction U.S. President Reagan would suddenly come out with the SDI program, and that the "Krasnoyarsk secret installation" would become the U.S. Administration's trump card in disarmament negotiations. However, this reasoning is not very comforting. Both because it does not make it any easier for the state treasury, and because the ABM (antiballistic missile) limitation treaty, as we know, already existed at that time, and, of course, it could have been predicted that its violation would not be greeted with "loud cheers."

Yes, naturally, we did not have any malicious intent. Yes, we began to build the radar near Krasnoyarsk and not in the Far North only because this was supposed to have been three times cheaper (in truth, the tightwad pays double). Yes, we do have arguments on this score,

that due to its technical characteristics the Krasnoyarsk radar cannot be considered to have all of the features of an ABM system... Well, what of it? The radar is being dismantled. And the money has vanished.

And how many similar installations with built-in doom have we created throughout the country? The Crimean AES [nuclear electric power station], the plant for destroying chemical munitions in Chapayevsk, the Mukachevo radar... You cannot count them all.

True, with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar this doom, I understood after consulting with specialists, was not entirely irreversible. Given the desire, it could have been defended nonetheless. And the main argument for this is that no matter how paradoxical it appears, the danger of nuclear catastrophe is not reduced but is increased as a result of the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar. For without it the northeastern missile-attack sector for our country remains virtually unmonitored.

The fact is that, in comparison with the radar, the so-called outer space echelon (several ESV's—artificial Earth satellite vehicles), gives a very low reliability of correct decisionmaking. Possessing the capability of monitoring the movement of missiles only in the boost phase when the jet engines are emitting heat, it also issues false alarms very frequently. The ESV's can interpret conventional man-made space objects that are deorbiting and falling into the thick layers of the atmosphere as ballistic missiles attacking us. There is no denying that it is a dangerous situation.

Nonetheless, this is the reality. And the dangers of errors in it will continue until such time as we replace the Krasnoyarsk radar with two warning stations, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. But this, the specialists believe, will cost not less than R2 billion. Where do we get this? And even given the resources it will hardly be possible to put these stations into operation any earlier than the year 2000. This, then, is the deplorable result.

The people working on the dismantling are puzzled as to why the Americans demanded that we pull down even the walls of the former radar.

"We should have told Bush and Cheney not to taunt us," a crane operator said angrily, interrupting operation of the controls for a minute. "Why remove eight floors from the structure?"

And if you consider that the USSR and the United States are not alone in possessing nuclear weapons, and that there is a danger of so-called unsanctioned launches from other regions, then you think to yourself: Is this dismantling not damaging to the whole world?

Incidentally, as B. Surikov, candidate of technical sciences and a senior consultant at the United States and Canada Institute, told me recently, American experts are also beginning to understand this. They are bewildered by the fact that the U.S. public did not receive timely

exhaustive information on the actual role of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Does this mean that our politicians and military specialists did not do their work right? It appears that they should have been more persistent in showing that the Krasnoyarsk radar was not so dangerous to peace that only one word should be pronounced: Destroy...

However, what is the point of blaming the politicians now? They had their own logic for their actions, and their own high idea and good motives: Once and for all remove whatever suspicions of us there might be and unblock one more obstruction on the road to normal relations between the USSR and the United States. It is possible that our politicians also counted on the infectiousness of a good example, calculating that the United States will also dismantle, or at the very least mothball, some of its own radars, for example in Greenland and Great Britain. Unfortunately, nothing came of this. And all the American radars, in contrast to our own, are continuing to carry out their service in good working order, and we, according to the official military-political strategy of "rivalry" now prevalent in the United States, continue in the meantime to remain their main enemy until the year 2000. An enemy that has to be economically exhausted and politically discredited...

While we are celebrating a "funeral banquet" for the Krasnoyarsk radar today, we cannot remain silent about how the dismantling of such an expensive installation is being organized, and about what the people are saying about this. It is bad that it is not entirely clear to this day: What will there be in place of the radar?

Various rumors are making the rounds: Some people are scaring taiga neighborhoods that there will soon be a housewarming here for a new prison, and some try to convince you that there are plans for the construction of a giant furniture combine here. But it seems to me that the most rational idea on this score was expressed by 75-year-old taiga resident Roman Yegorovich Nebylitsa, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. He lives in the taiga, not far from the radar operators' compound. The old man heard that the radar may be converted into a relay station.

"Then, they say, you will be able to hear Moscow and America over the receiver," Roman Yegorovich said pensively. "The old woman and I bought a good radio set, but all it receives is Krasnoyarsk. It is boring. Klavdiya and I are now left here by ourselves..."

It is sad, but as I understand it, it is fated that the hopes of Roman Yegorovich and Klavdiya Ivanovna, along with thousands of Siberians who dream of saturated airwaves, will not materialize.

"Representatives of the Ministry of Communications also came here 'to consider a relay station,' as did 'buyers' from other departments, but no one, apparently, really liked the 'commodity,'" explains Lieutenant Colonel V. Maksimov, acting chief engineer. "They sigh and they sigh, and they are all enraptured by this, as they

all say, 'miracle on the Yennisey highway,' but then they leave without anything. You see, it is a little far from civilization... At present, only the Ministry of Internal Affairs is not refusing. But does this ministry have enough imagination to put something other than a regular correctional labor establishment here?"

It is amazing... We are talking so much now about conversion. On this question we frequently waver over trifles. And here a multimillion-ruble facility is being left to the mercy of fate. Is it possible that excellent industrial premises are not needed by even one ministry for the organization of a new effort that would be useful to the entire state, and is it possible in the final analysis that no one needs an entire compound with multistory dwellings and well-built apartments?

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA is prepared to submit for public review, with the participation of foreign experts if necessary, projects for the reasonable utilization—within the framework of negotiations—of the "remains" of the Krasnoyarsk radar.

Write, call: 257-25-20.

Supreme Soviet Discusses Nuclear Weapons Tests, Development

*LD0910234190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1845 GMT 9 Oct 90*

[Discussion on nuclear weapons conducted between Deputy Mikhaylov, not further identified, and Marshal Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev at a joint sitting of both chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow on 9 October—recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified deputy] We have heard that the Americans could create a third generation of nuclear weapons. Let us suppose that they have the third generation today, that it already exists while we observe this moratorium. What do you and I—let us begin with us—what do we have to fear? You have been engaged in this for so many years. I understand that you are proud of your work, but have you ever thought that we possess the capacity to destroy each other many times over? You know this very well. That means that we, while idolizing the strategic balance, and you know this as well as I do, we do not know what to do with our chemical weapons now. We do not know what to do with our tanks. We do not know what to do with our missiles, and so on. Are you not afraid that in five years we will be stating that they will have the fifth generation while we will have the fourth generation? Then what?

[Mikhaylov] This is a very complicated and difficult question, and I will reply to it simply. Of course, it is not very pleasant that I have not been heard out here and you ask questions. We are prepared at any time, both myself and our specialists and scientists, to continue these debates. I will reply to you briefly.

A very simple scenario could be played out. I am convinced that no one will begin to fight with the second generation weapons which exist today. I am absolutely convinced. So why make third generation weapons? These are weapons whose global pollution will be 100 to 1,000 times less than existing ones; that is, weapons which will work not only against space targets, so-called weapons of directed or selective advantage, but weapons which will operate against targets on earth.

That means the temptation might arise, because, since there will be no global pollution, there will be the temptation to use them in any local conflict. That means the scenario might be as follows: Let us destroy the second generation weapons. I will say today that the Americans are posing the questions in precisely this way, including strategic offensive forces, but at the same time they are creating third generation weapons.

That is, the more progress they make in creating third generation weapons, the more content they are to go in for the destruction of second generation weapons under strict international monitoring, including by us. But in a few years time—and we, the scientists, are responsible to the country for this—we could be naked, unclothed. That is, they will have third generation weapons. The Soviet Union... [changes thought as voices from hall are heard], this is a very complicated question. I wanted to speak very briefly, but this is a very complicated question and perhaps requires major debates.

I have been asked how much one test costs on average here in the USSR. I can cite figures that show this is in the region of 1 million rubles.

[Akhromeyev] I did not wish to speak today, but the question has been raised here and it has been put in such a way as to say what does it matter when such a quantity of nuclear weapons has been accumulated? Let the Americans create a third, fourth, or fifth generation. We have such a lot that the USSR's security is ensured. That is not so.

The point is that the new generation of nuclear weapons which the Americans are now creating is aimed mainly at creating an antimissile defense for the country, at implementing the so-called SDI program. This consists of nuclear weapons which are small in size and yield and are intended to be used in space to hit missiles in flight. Just imagine that if the Americans develop such a system, if they develop such nuclear weapons which are small in size and yield and take them out into space and create a system with the aid of which they can, on a mass scale, destroy the nuclear weapons of the other side; then they will possess the same strike capacity as we do and, at the same time, they will protect themselves completely, or at least with a very high level of reliability, from our strike. Then the sides will be in a completely unequal position. Our side is quite naturally anxious that there should be no such inequality. I am replying to this question. This is a real danger.

On the other hand, comrade deputies, accusations are being made here against generals and non-generals, but the problem is this: The USSR is ready today to sign a treaty, to sign any document on the total banning of nuclear weapons testing. In 1985 I was in the post of chief of general staff when the question was raised of a unilateral moratorium. We accepted it. We were asked then—the country's leadership asked us. We accepted that moratorium and extended it four times. For a year and a half we did not carry out any tests. Today we are ready to sign a treaty and to ban them. The question arises: Who is to blame? Who is obstructing mankind from a complete ban on nuclear weapons? Is it us? For the sake of justice, this question should be answered.

I personally am interested in the country's defense capability, in ensuring that it is reliably guaranteed, that no one threatens us, that we can develop independently. That is what I am interested in.

U.S. Attitude on Nuclear Testing Criticized

LD1010145290 Moscow TASS in English 1432 GMT
10 Oct 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, October 10 (TASS)—The Soviet parliament ratified the two so-called "threshold" treaties in a 347-0 vote, with three abstentions. As expected, the ratification of the 1974 threshold test ban treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions treaty has passed unimpeded.

Nevertheless, consideration of the above treaties provided a pretext for a detailed analysis of important issues: how the nuclear disarmament process is progressing and what hampers it.

In particular, attention was paid to the fact that the U.S. Senate hedged the ratification of the "threshold" treaties with conditions which are in actual fact nothing more than an attempt to enable the United States to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons. Fears were also expressed that the new weapon was designed to have space applications.

Undoubtedly, all this caused serious concern in the Soviet parliament.

Of no less importance is another question: Where can progress be made? The "threshold" treaties, although unratified for many years, have been actually observed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

With the two countries' ratification, there is a chance for further advances at the nuclear explosions talks. It is well known that it had been agreed early in the talks that at the subsequent stages the sides must go over to coordinating further intermediate limitations on nuclear tests, in terms of yields and their annual number, on the road to the ultimate goal of a complete ban on nuclear tests.

The Soviet parliament on Tuesday endorsed an address to parliaments around the world asking them to promote the complete termination of nuclear tests.

Are other nuclear powers ready to support this initiative? I think that this question primarily concerns the United States. Admittedly, even American lawmakers are unable to answer this question. Some of them are clearly interested in moving forward. In mid-1989 a letter was sent to the White House signed by nearly 25 per cent of all senators and a third of congressmen. They urged the President to pursue a policy aimed at concluding with the Soviet Union an agreement on new limitations of underground nuclear tests.

This September the House of Representatives voted 234-182 for an amendment to the Defence Appropriations Bill which says that the United States should tell the Soviet Union about its intention to resume bilateral talks on the verifiable, complete ban on nuclear tests.

However, the American delegation is taking no relevant measures in this direction. An official report by the U.S. Energy Department, drafted this April, gives an idea of what the executive plans to do. It proposes that the question on whether the United States can impose additional limitations on nuclear tests without detriment to national security should be postponed another ten years.

Should the world community wait for the beginning of the next millennium to deliver the world from nuclear holocaust?

One would like to hope that the Soviet parliament's address will find a response in official Washington and capitals of other nuclear powers.

Concern Expressed Over Arms Race in Third World

*LD1110150190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Oct 90 First Edition p 3*

[Report by A. Balusov: "Risky Gambles. The Arms Race Continues in the 'Third World'"]

[Excerpts] In the past few days certain mass media sources in the Arab countries have reported that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar are reviewing their relationship with the Arab Military Industry Organization [AMIO]. An official report on its revitalization is expected in the near future. [passage omitted]

It is possible that the report on the readiness of four Arab states to breathe new life into the AMIO would not have attracted any particular attention if it had come two or three months before, or if the matter had only concerned those countries.

The decision by Egypt's former partners to change their relationship with Egypt at this time, after unsuccessful attempts by the Egyptians over many years to convince

them of the need to revitalize cooperation within the framework of the organization, testifies to the fact that a change in military and political guidelines is occurring in the region under the influence of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, when a real danger has threatened the oil-rich Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. As far as the consequences of such a decision are concerned, a broader view of things shows that what is involved here is a highly dangerous trend that has recently become widespread not just in the Arab countries, but also in the "Third World" as a whole. This trend is connected with the arms race that is gaining in force and speed and is embracing the developing countries.

The French journal LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE cites facts from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute which demand that this problem be looked at in a new light. At least 10 countries now have programs to develop ballistic missiles. They include Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and others. According to the institute's assessments, 12 "Third World" countries will acquire the possibility of manufacturing nuclear weapons in the next few years, or are trying to obtain the materials and resources necessary for this purpose.

A recent report from Brazil could not fail to draw the world community's attention in this respect. It follows from this report that that Latin American country has been carrying out work to develop nuclear weapons for some time now.

Do we need to talk about what the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and delivery vehicles could lead to? The events in the Persian Gulf are clearly demonstrating the consequences that mankind could suffer if new lethal weapons fall into the hands of arrogant, ambitious leaders, who are no rarity in the "Third World." The proliferation of state-of-the-art weapons is enabling developing countries to wage protracted, large-scale wars, creating preconditions for the emergence of "Third World superpowers" with their own particular spheres of influence and giving rise to new conflicts and new problems. [passage omitted]

In this connection it is probably time to start thinking about the creation of effective international mechanisms to monitor the nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and delivery systems. It is also time to think about determining criteria for defense sufficiency. USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze spoke about this in his address at the 45th UN General Assembly session. In the world of today, which is so interlinked and so interdependent, the level of armaments of a particular country cannot remain its own exclusive right and prerogative. This could cost the world too high a price. The arms game could turn out to be too risky.

Gerasimov Urges Nuclear Test 'Settlement'

*LD1010163990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1534 GMT 10 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 10 October (TASS)—[passage omitted] As Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, reported at a briefing today, as of September, 2,050 nuclear explosions have been carried out in the world, and over half of them—that is 1,080—have been carried out in the United States. About 714 have taken place in the USSR, 180 in France, 42 in the United Kingdom, and 34 in China.

Accordingly, this problem is to be tackled by joint efforts of the whole world community. Moscow is in favor of its immediate settlement.

IMEMO's Blagovolin Discusses CFE Prospects

*LD1110223690 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1256 GMT 11 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 11 October (TASS)—The talks between Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker in New York have demonstrated that the USSR and the United States are moving away from the traditional principles which demanded a scrupulous count of individual weapons units—and this is precisely the secret of their success. This is the view of Sergey Blagovolin, head of the department of military-economic and military-political research at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations [IMEMO]. Today, at the request of a TASS correspondent, he expressed his views on the prospects for the signing of an agreement on conventional armaments, in light of the recent meeting in New York between the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States.

After describing their agreement on the basic parameters of a future treaty as "a decisive step" toward the signing of the "Vienna-1" agreement, the Soviet expert singled out two points on which a mutually acceptable solution has been found as a result of the New York meeting: the question of the USSR's share of the total balance of armaments in Europe and the problem of restrictions on aircraft. According to Blagovolin, "A sensible compromise has been reached on both questions." Nevertheless, he added, "The important thing here is not the military and technical details. Baker and Shevardnadze made a political decision, not a military or technical decision."

According to Blagovolin, the "breakthrough" toward the signing of an agreement on conventional armaments (which is expected to take place next month in Paris) was also important because "the momentum which has picked up must not be lost now." In this connection he expressed disagreement with the views of a number of

experts who oppose the signing of a treaty on the grounds that, allegedly, it "has been prepared for a different Europe—the old Europe." "Europe," Sergey Blagovolin said, "has indeed changed fundamentally. In fact, now that a united Germany has been created, the number of participants at the Vienna talks has actually decreased. However, the agreement should be signed at this very time, because it will make it possible to radically change the psychological climate of military relations between East and West." "Therefore," the expert stressed, "any reference to the change in the number of participants in the talks and the emergence of so-called new technical circumstances would cast us a long way back." Furthermore, Sergey Blagovolin added, even now "we should be thinking about the shape of talks to which many have given the codename 'Vienna-2.'"

Obukhov, U.S. Envoy Discuss Chemical Weapons Ban

*LD1110203890 Moscow TASS in English 1829 GMT
11 Oct 90*

[Text] Moscow, October 11 (TASS)—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister A. Obukhov received U.S. Charge d'affaires ad interim John Joyce today. They discussed matters to speed up the coordination of a multilateral convention on a chemical weapons ban.

ICBM's May Be Converted for Civilian Use

*PM1510121790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Oct 90 First Edition p 4*

[Letter from reader and response by Major M. Arkhipov under the "Briefing for Readers" rubric: "Is It Worth Destroying the Missiles?"]

[Excerpts] It is well known that Titan-2 ICBM's are used in the United States to launch payloads into space and that it is planned to use MX ICBM stages in the future Taurus carrier rocket. Is similar work being carried out in our country?

[Signed] Senior Lieutenant L. Shimanovskiy

Major M. Arkhipov, senior officer of the press group of the chief of Defense Ministry space units, says: "[passage omitted] Our specialists are also carrying out work in this direction. At a difficult time for the country there is no point in destroying enormous material values by blowing them up or crushing them. The technical side of things requires that a number of structural modifications be made to the ICBM stages, and that a cycle of ground and flight tests be carried out to confirm the effectiveness of these modifications.

"Within the framework of the conversion of strategic offensive arms it may be that with us too new carrier rockets will appear which are capable of resolving scientific and national economic tasks.

Soviet 'Concerns' in START Talks Viewed

LD1510141390 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Commentary by Moscow military observer Colonel Vadim Solovyev]

[Text] The talks which the U.S. defense secretary, Dick Cheney, is scheduled to have with Soviet leaders here in Moscow can be expected to focus, among other issues, on cuts in strategic offensive weapons. Radio Moscow's military observer Colonel Vadim Solovyev comments:

[Solovyev] The negotiating parties must see to it that the future treaty be stringently complied with by the signatories. In the final analysis there is the key requirement which determines the very possibility of signing a treaty of this kind. Any chance of skirting agreement would give one side an advantage over the other and make the desired strategic balance on a worldwide scale much too precarious.

The Soviet Union sees quite a few reasons for concern. The American negotiators at the Geneva talks have been warned about the likely consequences of Washington's possible decision to transfer its submarine based D-5 ballistic missiles of the Trident-2 class to Britain. The Soviet side insists on ruling out this possibility altogether. In the meantime, it wants the combat potential of the missiles proposed to be transferred to Britain to be compensated for. The D-5 is a missile tipped with a nuclear warhead capable of splitting into eight separate ones; therefore, due attention should be given to its opposite number, the SS-18, at the Soviet Union's disposal.

Under the initial plan, the arsenal of these heavy inter-continental ballistic missiles was to be reduced by this country by half and the rest was to be mothballed. Now that strategic parity is being threatened by the nuclear missiles transferred by Washington to its allies, the solution is obvious—the already scrapped SS-18's should be compensated for by scrapping an appropriate number of Backfire [as heard] bombers in the United States. That's how Moscow sees a way of restoring parity.

Both sides have to work hard for agreement on that point and Mr. Cheney's visit to the Soviet capital opens up a good opportunity for that. After all, the future treaty's main goal is to scale down international tension and the degree of military confrontation.

U.S. Concern Over SS-23's Criticized

LD1510211190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1343 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, 15 October (TASS)—A noisy discussion on the Soviet-produced OTR-23 [SS-23] missiles, which are among the weapons of the armies of the GDR, the CSFR, and of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, has

again unfolded in the United States. A number of officials in Washington have made accusations against the Soviet Union. They say the USSR demanded during talks on medium and shorter-range missiles the elimination of the West German "Pershing-1A" shorter-range missiles, while at the same time wishing to remove from the equation the reduction of such missiles among its own allies.

As THE WASHINGTON TIMES reports, Maynard Glitman, the former head of the U.S. delegation at the talks on medium-range nuclear forces, stated that the elimination of shorter-range missiles among the weapons of the allies of the USSR and the United States is envisaged in the treaty on medium and shorter-range missiles.

What can be said about these statements being made in the United States?

First. The USSR has never insisted at the talks on the elimination of the West German "Pershing-1A" missiles. When the issue of strategic-tactical missiles was raised in Geneva, the problem of the nuclear warheads for these systems was also raised. The Soviet Union demanded in particular the elimination of U.S. nuclear warheads for the West German "Pershing-1A." I repeat, the U.S. nuclear warheads, but not the West German missiles.

Strange things happened with regard to the "Pershing 1A's" in 1987, which resembled a joke. Soviet diplomats kept saying at press conferences and in the press that the USSR did not insist on the elimination of FRG missiles, only the U.S. warheads for them. Meanwhile, U.S. officials, including the head of the U.S. delegation, Max Kampelman, pretended to be deaf, and protested indignantly in their public appearances against "USSR encroachments on the missiles of a third party."

The affair concluded when FRG Chancellor Kohl announced his decision unilaterally to eliminate West Germany's "Pershing-1A's" by May 1991.

Since it did not insist on the elimination of the missile installations of the U.S. allies, the Soviet side, naturally, did not raise the matter of eliminating the missiles of the GDR, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian armies, which were supplied to those countries before the start of the talks on shorter-range nuclear missiles (from 500-1,000 kilometres). It is important here to note that unlike the "Pershing-1A's," the missiles of these three countries did not, from the very beginning, and still do not have, nuclear warheads. Fitting these missiles only with non-nuclear warheads is stipulated in the agreements with Czechoslovakia and with Bulgaria, and indeed with the GDR, which has now become part of the FRG. In other words, these missiles and the conventional warheads for them have become the property of the three countries.

Second. In the case of OTR-23 missiles handed over to East European countries, there can be no talk of any violation of the treaty on medium and shorter-range

missiles by the Soviet Union. THE WASHINGTON TIMES is either misquoting Glitman in saying that the treaty provides for the elimination of the missiles of the USSR and U.S. allies, or Glitman has already forgotten the subject of the talks he conducted in Geneva.

On the matter of observing the agreement, there are other, genuinely substantial difficulties. The United States and the USSR were meant to eliminate their own missiles with a range from 500-1,000 kilometres 18 months after signing the treaty. That period has passed. However, "Pershing-1A" missiles are still on U.S. territory. The U.S. side claims that these missiles belong to the FRG. However, no proof of this, apart from the freshly painted inscription "FRG" on the installations, has been submitted to the Soviet side.

Military Spending Figures Submitted to UN

*LD1510211990 Moscow TASS in English 2102 GMT
15 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Mankes]

[Text] New York, October 15 (TASS)—The Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations two major documents setting out a detailed account of the Soviet military potential.

This is a realization of President Gorbachev's promise to publish, in a comparable form, data about Soviet military spending. Figures characterizing the Soviet military budget for 1989 have been transferred to the U.N. standardized accounting system containing information about military spending. They will be published.

At last year's 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly, the Soviet union announced its intention to make known to the United Nations, on an annual basis, the number and the main kinds of armaments at the disposal of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Figures characterizing the state of the Soviet Armed Forces on January 1, 1990 were transferred to the United Nations today, pending publication.

While presenting the documents, the deputy head of the Soviet delegation to the 45th session, of the U.N. General Assembly Vladimir Petrovskiy told a news conference here today: "The document will make clear to you that the Soviet Union adheres to high international standards of openness.

"The data we are submitting to the United Nations are comparable in the degree of precision with the data submitted to the United Nations by the United States and other leading countries in the military field.

"For the first time, the documents reveal the earlier classified information about the cost to the Soviet Union of the upkeep of land forces, the navy, the air force and other military forces, the cost of management and free aid to other countries, as well as of the supplies of

aircraft, missiles, nuclear warheads, ships, artillery pieces, armored vehicles and tanks to the Soviet Armed Forces.

"The Soviet Union's total budgetary outlays for military purposes in 1989 reached 77.9 billion roubles, Petrovskiy said. The Soviet military budget for 1990 was cut by eight per cent—to 71 billion roubles, he recalled. This step by the Soviet Union, apart from facilitating greater openness and trust, opens the possibility for further international agreed military cuts.

"With this in mind, we propose to hold consultations under the U.N. aegis to work out methods making comparable military spending by different countries.

"The Soviet Union has illustrated by action its readiness to promote openness as a universal norm of international life.

"We hope that other states will soon submit to the United Nations full information about international arms sales. We are confident that in its entirety this information will enhance the role of the United Nations as guarantor of stability in the post-confrontational world," Petrovskiy stressed.

Shevardnadze Addresses Supreme Soviet 15 Oct

Defends European Security Policies

*LD1510223590 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1840 GMT 15 Oct 90*

[Report on the address by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on the work of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 15 October—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Opening the joint session of the Supreme Soviet session today, Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov informed the deputies of the issues examined at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and has reported on the schedule of the parliament's work for this week. After that the deputies began to examine the question of the present international situation and the USSR Foreign Ministry's work to ensure the country's interests and security. Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze made a report.

[Shevardnadze] Today's processes and tendencies have demanded a very complicated and at the same time very tough schedule of movement by foreign policy. Falling behind means not simply falling away from the world's general current but also losing the opportunity to ensure our own interests in solving the problems that are vitally important to our state. I do not want it to be thought that this is forcing us to hurry and to adjust to someone else's timetable. We have not done this and do not intend to do it.

At the same time, however, one cannot ignore the fact that there is the objectively—I stress this—objectively

defined pace, the rhythm of international life we too should follow if we want to fully realize our interests. In the world much is being determined by the natural development and regular logic of events. The processes that have developed in Europe—whether it is the changes in its eastern part, the unification of the two German states, or the formation of new concepts about ways of ensuring European security—have precisely this objective, historically determined character. [passage omitted]

The Foreign Ministry is prepared to provide any explanations required, orally or in writing, on any questions, and to furnish relevant information and documentation in response to requests from the Supreme Soviet, committees, and individual deputies. First of all I can and must say this: The settlement with Germany could only be achieved, and was achieved, solely within the framework of the transition to a new model for the arrangement in Europe, one that differs substantially and qualitatively from the postwar arrangement. May I remind you that previously it was based on a split in Europe, on a military confrontation. Face to face, right next to each other, were forces having battlefield nuclear weapons at their disposal. Until the very recent past, Europe's security was in practice based on the doctrine of balancing on the verge of a war involving nuclear weapons. Acute conflicts would arise periodically over West Berlin. To reckon that the system of security that took shape in the years of the cold war was totally in line with our interests or guaranteed peace for our people would, therefore, either mean telling deliberate untruths or deluding oneself and failing to see the real dangers. A radical change in the military-strategic and political situation in Europe is being brought about by the German settlement. This means that a dispersal of troops is taking place, and after Soviet troops have been withdrawn from East Germany there will be no military stand-off anywhere in Europe. The numbers of Bundeswehr troops will be reduced substantially, to 370,000 men, and the numbers of U.S. troops in Europe will be reduced considerably. In November, at a summit in Paris, a declaration will be adopted—please note, this is a particularly important point—on new relations between states that are part of the military-political unions confronting each other, and which, as the draft says, will not view each other as enemies, will not be the first to use force or threaten force, will build new relations of partnership and stretch out the hand of friendship to each other.

The transformation of NATO has started and is being implemented. The strategy and doctrine of this bloc are being subjected to review, including the doctrines of flexible response and forward-based defense. The number of military exercises is being reduced. Talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will start. According to the treaty on the settlement of Germany, there will be no foreign military presence on the territory of the former GDR after the departure of Soviet troops; neither nuclear arms nor any other type of weapons of mass destruction will be deployed there. The renunciation by

a united Germany of the production, acquisition, and possession of such forms of weapons is confirmed.

According to the so-called grand treaty with Germany, which has already been initialed and which will soon be signed, the parties take upon themselves far-reaching obligations in the sphere of mutual security. Since deputies are raising the German question so intensively, I want to stress especially that apart from Germany's legal and treaty obligation to conduct its affairs in such a way that no threat to peace arises from its territory, we are also receiving material and physical guarantees of this: the low—in particular—the low numerical strength of troops and weapons, and the renunciation of the more dangerous kinds of weapons.

At the same time new all-European security structures are being set up. These are based on levels of troops and weapons throughout Europe which are consistently being reduced, and on broad measures to strengthen trust in the military sphere.

An all-European center to avert and regulate conflicts is being established—you recall that these initiatives on forming such a center have been repeatedly advanced by our leadership, in particular by our president in the course of various visits—which, by means of a special mechanism, will acquire the fullest possible information about the military activity of European states.

The institution of regular summit meetings and conferences of foreign ministers of CSCE participant states is being introduced. These conferences are acquiring the character of permanent institutions, of permanent mechanisms.

Other bodies of the Helsinki process will be created, too, including a secretariat and a parliamentary assembly. All these are not simply proposals, they are not simply ideas, but a draft agreed in New York by the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries participating in the Helsinki process.

The working out of a treaty on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe is now nearing completion in Vienna at the talks among 23 countries. Here one can talk about a genuine breakthrough, one can talk without exaggeration about a genuine breakthrough which has been achieved thanks to Soviet-U.S. cooperation and to cooperation with all our partners. During talks with Secretary of State Baker in New York the last obstacles have been overcome—the main obstacles have been overcome to the conclusion of a treaty. The levels of a major reduction of tanks artillery systems, armored fighting vehicles, aircraft, and helicopters have been established. In other words a firm foundation is being laid down for what we have been striving for since 1986 when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev put forward the idea of a common European home. This is being built and will be built, esteemed deputies, and if I speak about this, if I speak about this absolutely frankly and directly, if we cope with our internal difficulties we will be able to be worthy partners of others in this truly historic cause.

If internal instability does not undermine this process, then we shall have every reason to talk about moving toward a new civilization.

I know that questions have also occurred to deputies about how social problems linked with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany are being resolved. In accordance with the agreement between the governments of the USSR and the FRG which was signed in Bonn on 9 October of this year concerning certain transitional measures, Germany is making available a total sum of 15 billion marks to finance the temporary presence of Soviet troops, transport costs in connection with their withdrawal, and also the construction of housing for Soviet servicemen. This includes 12 billion as an outright contribution and 3 billion as an interest-free credit to be repaid in five years' time. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Not all of the deputies consider the almost hour-long speech by the head of the foreign affairs department exhaustive, and Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze had to answer many questions. A number of deputies put forward a proposal to limit themselves to the adoption of the resolution based on the report by the USSR minister of foreign affairs and make do with no debate, but this was not supported. Nine deputies spoke during the afternoon sitting. For the first time a serious, sharp discussion went on in parliament on all the fundamental directions of Soviet foreign policy. Deputy Petrushenko expressed the view that the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union are today guaranteed by means of unfounded, one-sided concessions. The speaker gave the examples of the thousands of millions spent on the withdrawal of forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the loss of the Krasnoyarsk radar station. The speaker complained that Army political workers cannot keep pace with the reshaping of political views, of the Foreign Ministry. [passage omitted]

Calls for Nuclear-Free Baltic Sea

*LD1510112590 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT
15 Oct 90*

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents]

[Text] Moscow, October 15 (TASS)—The Soviet Union could renounce the peacetime deployment of nuclear weapons on its ships and warplanes in the Baltic Sea and air space over it "on a permanent or temporary basis", Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told parliament today.

Explaining Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free Baltic Sea, he also suggested that Western countries, for their part, renounce "without any exception" visits by surface ships and submarines with nuclear weapons on board to the Baltic Sea and flights by air force planes with such weapons over it.

"We are convinced that such a decision would help further increase stability in Europe as a whole, especially in its north," Shevardnadze said.

He recalled that as a first unilateral step in this direction, the Soviet Union has pledged to destroy all ballistic nuclear missile subs known in the West as Golf's, which are deployed in the Baltic Sea, by the end of 1990.

"We have fulfilled this commitment: The last of such submarines was destroyed several days ago," Shevardnadze said.

Details Conventional Arms Limits

*LD1510200190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 15 Oct 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Announcer] What does the principle of arms sufficiency mean for our country? The figures have been given for the first time.

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] According to the treaty, the highest levels of sufficiency for one country in Europe will be established for the USSR. In other words, no one in Europe will have more arms than we do. I have in mind countries taken separately.

These levels look like this: For helicopters, 37.5 percent; for tanks, 33.3—if you are interested in the quantitative level, that is 13,300 units; for armored combat vehicles, 33.3—20,000 units; for artillery 34.3—over 13,000; for aircraft, 35 to 36 percent, or 5,150 units. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Deputy Minister Proposes UN Monitoring Agency

*LD1610075190 Moscow TASS in English 0711 GMT
16 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Maslov]

[Text] United Nations, October 16 (TASS)—The concluding decade of the twentieth century should become a period of joint creative activity, the co-development of states, and consensus on the key issues problems of our time, a decade of law and order and joint efforts to ensure its stability, Vladimir Petrovskiy, Soviet deputy chief delegate and deputy foreign minister, told the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

"The events of the past year, which finally buried the cold war and drew the line under the Second World War, convincingly showed that new political thinking, which is the basis of all foreign policy initiatives and actions by the Soviet Union in the age of perestroika, has become firmly established in the fabric of international politics," he said.

"What happened in the Persian Gulf is a serious warning to civilisation," Petrovskiy said. "At the same time this is an indicator of new political thinking's margin of safety.

"Suffice it to imagine what would have been the outcome if this had taken place during the cold war, when confrontational logic would have been applied.

"The Gulf crisis has become a sort of watershed in mankind's recent history: Only yesterday, an aggression would have had the potential of splitting the world into opposite ideologically-oriented camps and putting it on the brink of a new world war. Today it has only united mankind further on the basis of a commitment to international law and the goals and principles of the United Nations," Petrovskiy said.

On behalf of the Soviet delegation Petrovskiy proposed instituting a U.N. control authority that would monitor the implementation of agreements to ease international tension, to reduce arms and would follow the military situation in conflict-ridden areas.

"Such an authority, with space-based monitoring facilities at its disposal, could be set up as an auxiliary agency of the U.N. Security Council. It should be vested with the right to carry out on-site inspections," Petrovskiy said.

"This authority's conclusions would be brought to the notice of main U.N. agencies. In certain cases, the

authority's conclusions could be used by the world court, the importance of which should be sharply raised as one of key components in the strategy for a peaceful resolution of disputes.

"Openness and international control are the mainstays of the new peace structures that are being built," Petrovskiy said. "At the same time, and this has been vividly shown by the latest developments, the United Nations organisation, in order to be effective in the maintenance of peace, should also have at its disposal means to suppress aggression.

"This taken into account, the U.N. military staff committee should be transformed into an effective agency for cooperation. The Soviet Union suggested holding a committee meeting at the level of the chiefs of the general staff of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as is directly stipulated by the U.N. Charter, and discussing an entire range of organisational matters aimed at countering acts of aggression.

"At the previous session of the U.N. General Assembly, the international community designated the 1990s as the decade of international law.

"During the coming decade," Petrovskiy emphasised, "the United Nations organisation is called upon to take the central place befitting it as a 'university of cooperation' and a unique equitable mechanism for post-confrontation actions."

GERMANY

Company Said To Equip Iraq for Biological Warfare**DER SPIEGEL Report**

*AU0810153690 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
8 Oct 90 pp 148-152*

[Unattributed report: "We Have Surprises"]

[Text] On 14 May 1989 the firm Labsco GmbH and Co. KG in Friedberg, Hesse, received a telex from Baghdad. The Iraqi business partner of the Hesse laboratory equipment producer had the sender abbreviation "212202 MIDEF IK."

The telex was urgently awaited. Upon suspicious inquiries by a British subcontractor, the Hessians had investigated what the Arabs planned to do with the ordered goods—far more than 100 assorted items of serums, heating equipment, and drying closets.

The explanation was unambiguous. Baghdad confirmed that order A-3871 was "intended" neither "for test purposes nor for the production of chemical/biological weapons." The instruments and biological substances are used only for "examinations in the area of clinical hospitals."

The fact that the information could not have been correct can be derived from the sender: "MIDEF" is the abbreviation for the "Ministry of Defense" of Iraqi military dictator Saddam Husayn.

The order for the FRG producers is signed by high-ranking Iraqi military officers, who in fact are called "pharmacists" in the cynical terminology of the Baghdad Government. Most of them do indeed work in the department for chemical warfare.

According to intelligence service information, two of them even work in the state company "State Establishment for Pesticides Production" (Sepp). There Husayn has his internationally feared biological weapons produced. According to findings by the Swedish Sipri peace researchers the weapons are "a hundred times more lethal than the current chemical combat agents."

Now investigators of the Hesse customs investigation squad are investigating the deliveries from Friedberg. However, it has been impossible to find out how the biochemical equipment from order A-3871 was used in Baghdad.

The evidence that the products were used to make biological weapons is—if it exists—out of reach in Baghdad. In Friedberg the investigators only got the incredibly naive assurances of the deliverers.

"Never," Labsco managing director Juergen Huth says, did he think in connection with the order (value: 1.56

million marks) that the goods "could be used for anything other than in the area of hospitals." For him "it is still simply inconceivable, even today." He does now know the names of the officers: "I do not speak Arabic."

However, for years every expert has known that all over the world Saddam Husayn's purchasers are buying laboratory equipment, bacteria strains, nutrient solutions, and fermentation facilities for the development of bacteriological warfare. And obviously the Germans are good deliverers—as in the case of nuclear and chemical weapons.

Again the Hamburg company "Water Engineering Trading" (W.E.T.), which has already acquired a reputation with poison gas deals, is involved in the affair. The company delivered substances suitable for the production of biological weapons.

Information supplied by the German investigators about the involvement of the Hamburg company in the biological armament in Baghdad were discussed among the Bonn state secretaries as early as last year. However, the officials reacted as usual. Out of consideration for the already damaged image of German industry, the matter was kept secret.

The deal with W.E.T. was conducted via Sepp, which ordered incubators and culture media from the Hamburg company. W.E.T. manager Peter Leifer had the apparatuses purchased from a company in Hannover; the more important nutritive substances were ordered from Oxoid GmbH in Wesel on the Lower Rhine, which is now called Unipath GmbH. The company operates wholesale trade for bacteriological culture media.

W.E.T. ordered 48 uninoculated ferments, with which plague bacteria, for instance, can be bred after some treatment. Georg Fuellbrunn, the unwitting managing director of the Oxoid company in Wesel, was told that the delivery went to Nigeria. Fuellbrunn: "They did not say anything about Iraq."

The deliveries from Hamburg are one of the reasons that Husayn is now able to terrify the world with an arsenal of biological weapons.

According to U.S. intelligence service reports presented to the U.S. House of Representatives the week before last, the potential enemy in a war, Iraq, may be able to use a considerable number of biological weapons as early as the beginning of next year. These include the anthrax virus, which can cause life-threatening hemorrhages. Iraqi General Mondher Abdel Rahman [spelling as published] is already boasting that Iraq has "big and effective surprises for the Americans."

The despot's potential is already remarkable. Almost two years ago, the CIA reported that Iraq produces the highly effective food poison botulinus toxin in large amounts.

In biological weapons laboratories substances that may cause plague, cholera, anthrax, or typhoid fever were obviously developed with success. The bacteria can be

loaded into warheads or can be sprayed from planes. It is also possible to transfer the viruses to people via hosts such as ticks.

The Iraqi biological weapons laboratories cannot be found by means of satellite photos, in contrast to the poison gas factories. They are located in bunkers, where they cannot be seen.

Nevertheless, the Iraqi epidemic facilities have been located. Protected by a dense belt of missiles, they are located in Salman Pak, 35 km southeast of Baghdad, and in Samarra, more than 100 km north of the capital city—side by side with the chemical weapons facilities, which were constructed there with the help of the Pilot Plant company from Dreieich.

The U.S. intelligence services assume that the scientific interest of the Iraqi biological weapons research has recently turned more and more to the so-called mycotoxins. In particular the substances HT-2 and T-2, which belong to the trichothecenes, are coveted.

The Germans were also useful for the acquisition of mycotoxins. The deliverer was a certain Josef Kuehn from Neustadt am Ruebenberge in Lower Saxony.

In 1986 the merchant mediated the sale of about 100 milligrams each of the mycotoxins T-2 and HT-2 to Baghdad. Even in a highly diluted form, the toxins, which were developed by Sigma Chemie company in Oberhaching, cause cancer in humans. These substances are effective in extremely small amounts; in addition, they are heat-resistant and can cause death through contact with skin or when inhaled.

The export of mycotoxins, which German investigators discovered in 1987, did not have any legal consequences. According to an expert report obtained by the prosecutor general, the export of small amounts was not subject to the prohibition by the War Materiel Control Law or the Foreign Trade Law.

The delivery of nutrient media by W.E.T. and the many deliveries by Labsco were also exempt from the requirement to acquire permission. Only since 1 January 1990 has there been an export list for sensitive goods in the area of biological weapons.

In addition—as in the Labsco case—it is all too often impossible for German investigators to find out what happens with suspicious biological deliveries to Iraq.

Thus, the U.S. FBI has repeatedly drawn attention to a small company in Cologne, which distinguishes itself by frequent changes of managing directors and offices and has as its purpose trading, which is not so rare. It exports "objects of all kind as long as they do not require a special permit."

The Federal Office of Criminal Investigation and officials of the Cologne Customs Institute of Criminal Investigation started preliminary investigations, but so

far there have not been any results. The Federal Intelligence Service established contacts with authorities overseas, because there, a company with the same name is considered a cover organization for the Iraqis.

Often medical and military research cannot be separated. "Good and evil," Ralf Schrank, chief clerk of the renowned instrument producer Heraeus in Hanau, says, "are close to each other in biological laboratory work."

A Heraeus tubular furnace of the RO 4/25 type, which can be heated up to 1,100 degrees centigrade, was, for instance, delivered to Iraq via Labsco in Friedberg to Iraq. It is suitable for causing chemical reactions; however, it is also possible to burn highly toxic substances in it, even though not cleanly.

The order for the tubular furnace came from Baghdad University—but what does that mean? In a state like Iraq, biological weapons expert Oliver Thraenert says, "there is no clear separation between the Defense Ministry and civilian institutions." After purchase the product is perhaps "passed on to the Defense Ministry or to the military."

If the military were to use plague bombs in the conflict in the Gulf region soon, as they threatened, the Americans are badly equipped. Warships in the Gulf lack overpressure facilities ("positive air pressure"), with which biological combat agents can be blown out onto the sea after bomb attacks. In the view of experts, the use of biological weapons would make even the large U.S. aircraft carriers vulnerable.

However, a tank, of which more than 10 are already ready for U.S. soldiers in the desert, is suitable for biological warfare. The "Fox" tank is equipped with detecting sensors and is armed against any use of biological weapons.

It is also a German product.

Company Denies Charges

*LD0810185390 Hamburg DPA in German 1643 GMT
8 Oct 90*

[Text] Friedberg (DPA)—Labsco GmbH in Friedberg (Hesse) has denied supplying equipment for the production of biological weapons to Iraq. Kurt Schuessler, co-owner of the concern, said today in response to an inquiry that Iraq received through his company's mediation serums, drying chambers, and heating equipment worth 1.5 million marks. To his knowledge, the items serve only humanitarian purposes. The Federal Economics Ministry approved the delivery.

According to a report in the Hamburg news magazine DER SPIEGEL, the laboratory equipment supplied by Labsco serves the production of biological weapons. The State Prosecutor's Office in Giessen has not instituted investigative proceedings as the authority only learned about the allegations today, a spokesman said.

Businessmen Confess to Military Deals With Iraq
AU0810162290 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
8 Oct 90 pp 152-153

[Unattributed report: "Mustard Gas From Ahmad"]

[Text] There are pictures that grip even the investigators. One of those is the photo of a father who lies rigidly in front of his house in the Kurdish town of Halabjah after an Iraqi poison gas attack and keeps his child pressed to himself even in death. There are also close-ups of the burned bodies, strewn with ulcers, of Iranian poison war victims. These are documents that are appended to the files of a regular German criminal lawsuit.

The documents, filenames 21Js 352856/87, are in the Darmstadt public prosecutor's office. For three years the public prosecutors and the "Special Commission, Iraq" of the Cologne Customs Institute of Criminal Investigation have been trying to find out whether German companies have been building Saddam Husayn's poison gas factories.

Now the investigators have proof for the first time—confessions by two recently arrested FRG managers of chemical companies.

In detention pending trial in Hanau, Hesse, Peter Leifer, former partner in the Hamburg Water Engineering Trading (W.E.T.), confirmed to the public prosecutors what they had long assumed. The chemical facilities that W.E.T. delivered from Hamburg to Baghdad in the mid-1980's were destined for military purposes.

Many things added up: A large facility for tube fittings, for instance, which serves a clearly nonpeaceful purpose. The handling machines transport shells or 122 mm bombs. An entire factory for the production of preliminary products for nerve gases also reached Iraq.

Now the investigators also know how the deals were camouflaged. An instrument, which cost 7 million marks and was obviously developed for filling poison gas shells, was declared as a cooling container for powdered milk.

Engineer Ewald Langer, who, like five other managers, was in detention pending trial in Frankfurt on suspicion of having been involved in dirty deals with Iraq, also started to tell stories. In the past, Langer worked in the Pilot Plant chemical factory, a sister company of the Kolb Laboratory Equipment Company in Dreieich in Hesse and, on behalf of the chemical company he was often in Samarra, where dictator Husayn is building his chemical weapons.

Pilot Plant built six chemical factories in the desert. So far it was said that the facilities are completely harmless. They are said to produce pesticides for date plantations. They are allegedly completely unsuitable for the production of nerve gases.

Now Langer admits that by the mid-1980's intermediate products for combat agents were produced in Samarra. In particular one production facility was constantly retooled. After a few modifications it can be used for the production of nerve gases.

However, the entire complex was "not especially constructed" for something like that—fine points which are important for the imminent lawsuit.

Under the the Foreign Trade Law, it is important for criminal liability in exports whether the exporters simply ignored the martial use of their products, whether they knew of it, or whether they even intended it. And because complicity of one defendant may exonerate another one, accusations and defense from among the lawyers is confusing.

After his statements, Langer was released on bail—his knowledge might have been relatively harmless. Immediately afterwards, he was accused by alleged accomplices of having developed in Samarra a facility for the production of basic substances for the poison on behalf of the French company Protec, which is situated near Muelhausen.

The clearer the investigations make the involvement of FRG companies in arming the Arab Husayn, the more embarrassing the affair becomes for the FRG Government. In Bonn, the existence of German poison gas factories in Iraq has been denied for years with surprising chutzpah.

Even the presentation of satellite photos and a sound-image show of the Americans on the facilities in Samarra did not impress the FRG Government.

In 1986, when deliveries to Iraq were already on file, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in Pullach hired W.E.T. partner Leifer, who is now so ready to confess, as an informer. For almost two years, the authority now admits, the exporter provided them with information from Iraq.

The attempt by State Minister in the Chancellor's Office Lutz Stavenhagen to justify the employment of Husayn's trading partner after the event was revealing. "Informers who provided the BND with information," Stavenhagen said, were "very clearly told that in return for such information they cannot expect a closing of eyes, condoning, approval, or anything else."

The people responsible for the BND in the Chancellor's Office also seem to have seen something that they closed their eyes to.

In any case, in the chemical industry it had been discussed for years that there were some things in the deals with Iraq that were kept secret. At the CEM engineering society in Frankfurt, the experts became suspicious in January 1982, when colleagues from Kolb company asked them to provide them with the know-how for a large facility in Iraq.

CEM chief Joachim Schulz asked for licenses, desired products, amounts—and refused to fill the order: "For me there was no doubt that it was intended to produce nerve gases." Two years before the Americans provided the first clues, he told that to the builders of the facility in writing.

However, obviously unwittingly, in 1986 FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and FRG President

Richard von Weizsaecker strongly supported the suspected wirepuller of a great number of dubious Iraq deals—W.E.T. Manager Al Khadi.

Al Khadi was imprisoned in Iraq for economic crimes and should have been executed. At the urging of the BND, the politicians managed to get the manager of the so very cooperative company released.

In the meantime, the FRG Government, too, is better informed. An expert report, in which Swiss professor Werner Richarz analyzed what the factories that were delivered by Germany and have the Iraqi names of Ahmad, Ani, Muhamad, Iesa, Meda, and Ghasi can do is treated as confidential in Bonn.

Ahmad is best at producing Lewisite and, according to the scientist's calculations, it has already done so. Lewisite, which is also called mustard gas, is an old German weapon which can cause festering ulcers and blindness.

Ani and Muhamad are "suited for the discontinuous production of Tabun." Production allegedly started years ago. Tabun is a nerve gas developed by Germans in 1937 and causes a total loss of control over one's muscles. The victims writhe with cramps and convulsions, intestines and bladder empty uncontrolled, and death comes only after a few minutes through painful suffocation.

According to Richarz, Iesa, Meda, and Ghasi are suited, among other things, for the production of prussic acid, which is a bit out of date as a combat agent. Prussic acid, too, has a history in Germany: It was part of Zyklon B, the killing agent used in the Auschwitz concentration camp.

Aid to Iraq on Missile Projects Reported

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[Unattributed report: "With God's Help"]

[Text] Entrepreneur Holger Beaujean, 42, from Stutensee near Karlsruhe, is industrious like a true man from Baden. He is often already in his office at 0630 in the morning and sometimes he stays there until long after midnight. Within only a few years he founded two flourishing companies. He is also the person responsible for radiation protection in his own companies.

Such a man is known not only in his own land. The expert engineer for control and regulation technology was asked to come to Chernobyl in the Ukraine to build a decontamination station. The value of the order: About 1 million German marks [DM]. Color photos show him in front of the sarcophagus of the burned out reactor—souvenir photos just as in a family album.

In another photo he squats on the bank of the contaminated Pripyat River, which cools the power plant, and calmly holds a fishing rod in the water. "A person is exposed to more radiation in any aircraft," the expert says.

For a few weeks now Beaujean has been worried; the upward progress of the dauntless man seems suddenly to be over. The Federal Intelligence Service has a lot of material about him, and so does the Cologne Customs Institute of Criminal Investigation. The Karlsruhe Customs Investigation and Public Prosecutor Peter Zimmermann are interested in the deals of the clever entrepreneur. Investigators searched his offices, and a regular investigation procedure has been started.

Expert Beaujean is suspected of having helped Iraq in important missile projects. At the moment, the kind of security systems he allegedly developed for al-Falluja, which is crammed full of chemical facilities and missiles, is also being investigated.

The case, with the file name 52Js 224/90, is exemplary for the affair concerning German arms exports to Iraq. Like Beaujean, quite a number of other entrepreneurs tried to conclude dubious deals with the martinet Saddam Husayn, because they hoped for enormous profits.

Generally, up to 150-percent surcharges were calculated for deals with Iraq; in the case of sensitive projects, entrepreneurs who dared to accept the risk were permitted to double this margin.

Deliveries to the Middle East had been a profitable business for years. In 1982 German experts achieved a turnover of almost DM8 billion in Iraq. Last year, when the war between Iraq and Iran was over, the FRG still delivered—without illegal deliveries—goods worth DM2.2 billion. Thus, Germany was Iraq's most important partner within the EC.

This makes the great energy that newcomers such as Beaujean expended on the Iraq business understandable, since the struggle there is pursued with extremely tough means.

In December 1988 Beaujean established first contacts with influential Iraqis. At that time Havert Consult Project Engineering and Consulting GmbH from Neu-Isenburg asked him for help in negotiations with Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries. Nassr is a well-known address in the field of armament. Havert paid for the tickets for the engineer.

Before the flight the people from Havert made an agreement with Beaujean. It was agreed that he would conduct all further Iraq deals only with Havert because, as the company stated later, it did not want to "pave the way to the Iraqi market," Havert's "actual domain," for a potential competitor.

In August 1989 Beaujean canceled the agreement because it was "much too empty and vague to become legally effective."

Subsequently, both parties attacked each other like scorpions and Beaujean won. "Only as an aside" and "just to make things clear," he mentioned that his Iraq deals were not conducted via his engineering office, Beaujean Consulting Engineers, but via his second company,

Anlagen Bau Contor (ABC), which was founded at the end of 1988—thus, Havert's blow struck only empty air.

Beaujean's stakes in the business game were well placed. Within just a few months projects worth a total value of DM7,153,762 were planned together with Nassr State Enterprise, projects involving everything from valve test stands to laboratory equipment. For training on site alone Beaujean put DM1,000 per day and a man on the bill, excluding expenses.

The Iraqis were very interested in the versatile German engineer. Beaujean also is a nuclear power expert, an expert in the separation of the inert gas krypton. He worked in the nuclear research centers of Juelich and Karlsruhe. "I am known in the nuclear technology Mafia," he says self-confidently. He developed the flue-gas facility for the Wackersdorf nuclear recycling plant.

He is linked with the nuclear industry even in musical terms. The Chamber Orchestra of German Nuclear Engineers, the "Camerate Nucleare" (its symbol: a violin with electrons), which was founded in 1986, is still grateful to him for financial donations.

In the Iraq deal, too, Beaujean stuck to the rules of the game. In an appendix to his contract with the Iraqis he committed himself in 1989 to giving four Toyota cross-country trucks (four-wheel drive, air conditioning, turbo-diesel) for free.

In lieu of an oath he had to give assurances that "no Israeli components and no Israeli raw materials" are "used for the production of the goods," "as well as that no Israeli sources are involved with labor or capital."

The contract with Nassr was concluded for a project with the cover label 1728. In intelligence service circles this project is well known as a program for the acquisition of high-capacity missile drives.

As a result of this project, which has been pursued for years, the archenemy Israel has come within range of Iraqi warheads. Saddam Husayn's threat that "when the time of reckoning comes," he will use a new missile against Israel must be taken seriously also because of project 1728.

The only thing that is wrong is the dictator's claim that the weapon has been developed "with God's help." It was above all the Germans who developed new fuel and additional fuel tanks for project 1728. This resulted in a considerable increase in range, in addition to reducing the payload.

Investigations of the alleged participation in project 1728 have already been started against Bonn Inwako chief Friedrich-Simon Heiner and his Kiel partner Klaus Weihe. Leifeld and Company from Ahlen also came up on the investigators' scope because of this secret project.

Both the people from Leifeld and Beaujean had good contacts with the head of project 1728, a certain Dr. Sabha Modher [spelling as published]. The Iraqi, who is the director of Nassr, is the driving force of the armament

project; it is considered certain that the Israeli intelligence service Mossad has him literally targeted. Modher himself has made sure that Beaujean's employee Christian Tauber, who was detained in Baghdad, was permitted to return to the FRG unexpectedly quickly and unharmed in August.

For Modher, camouflage is part of business. He is known for preferring to issue so-called end-user certificates that pretend that deliveries of arms technology are destined for civilian projects, in the oil industry, for instance.

Beaujean's deals are obviously involved in projects in the area of fuel. The Karlsruhe public prosecutor's office has assigned an expert to evaluate the documents.

It is striking that in the plans "kerosene," "hydrazine," and "water" are flowing together and temperatures of 1,000 degrees are downgraded to 300 degrees centigrade. Beaujean's largest project for 1728, which is calculated at about DM3 million, for instance, was declared to be a waste water facility. The entrepreneur claims "not to have known" of any military use: "After all," Beaujean says, "everything was civil engineering."

Deliveries by Beaujean for a second deal with Iraq were shipped in July. The engineer has worked out a fire protection and gas warning system for al-Falluja, where, 50 km west of Baghdad, basic substances for nerve gases are produced in chemical factories that have been built with German help. Missiles surround the building.

The Iraqi strategists are certainly capable of learning, as is shown by Beaujean's deal with the Al Fao Establishment: They drew the consequences from an explosion in 1989. At that time, 700 people were reportedly killed in a disaster in the El Hilla [spelling as published] missile factory, because fire protection did not work.

Now the fire is blazing among the German exporters to Iraq. Investigations have been initiated against more than 30 companies, more than 40 enterprises are suffering heavy losses in payments because of the embargo. They are demanding—so far in vain—the payment of damages from the FRG Government. About 20 companies consider their existence in danger; Saddam's helpers are also in difficulties.

Havert company from Neu-Isenburg, which quarreled with Beaujean, reported to Bonn that it has had to practically cease business operations. If things get worse, the public prosecutor will also pay a visit—because of project 1728.

The company Graeser from Fischbachthal in Hesse, which mediated the deal for a cannon factory, which was declared to be a multi-purpose forge, to Ferrostaal of Essen, told Bonn that it is "considerably affected." At Graeser, too, there are indications of 1728; there the investigators discovered an important trail that lead to Beaujean.

CBV Blumhardt from Wuppertal, which had delivered hundreds of special transporters to Iraq during the Gulf War—with which the Iraqis transported their tanks to the front for their attacks—has now gone on the defensive.

The delivery of 75 so-called oil field low loader semi-trailers [Oelfeld-Tieflade-Sattelanhaenger] was agreed on for the second half of 1990. The parts for the special vehicles were "specially made." Now, as the company complains, they are "mostly" useless. The situation is "life-threatening."

Leifeld suffered the harshest consequences as a result of the 1728 case. The company, 99 percent of which belonged to four holding companies from the surroundings of the Matuschka group in Munich, was immediately sold to the Westfalenbank after the Iraq connection became known.

The fighter Beaujean is currently considering whether to sue the Federal Economic Office, which is responsible for the export permits, for damages: "They know all our projects and did not intervene," he said.

Local Economic Impact of U.S. Troop Withdrawals

AU1510143690 *Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German*
15 Oct 90 pp 127-129

[Text] Mainz Interior Minister Rudi Geil demonstrated ignorance. When in the Diet last month Greens Deputy Gernot Rotter asked him what effect disarmament and the resulting withdrawal of U.S. troops will have on the orders received by German companies, the Christian Democrat answered: "I do not know, and I have not tried to find out, either."

The minister, whom the Greens sometimes call "Rudi Helpless," can be helped. Peace researcher Burkhard Luber, 45, has for the first time compiled exact figures on U.S. facilities and Pentagon orders to FRG companies; these figures will be contained in a "disarmament atlas," which will be published soon. (footnote) (Burkhard Luber: "Disarmament Atlas. Chances and Risks of the U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the FRG." Georg Olms Publishing House, Hildesheim; 98 pages; 14.80 German marks) "This is the only way," Luber says, "to make the economic consequences of the troop withdrawal visible with its direct local effects."

This is precisely the topic with which many expert groups in the laender have been dealing with for months. Almost every week, minister presidents and laender ministers go to the United States to get from the Americans exact figures about "that which they have here and what they plan to do with us," as a member of the Mainz cabinet says.

Almost all land politicians fear that to the immense costs of unification will be added large economic losses when the military withdraws from Germany as a consumer and client.

During his research, Luber did not use secret dossiers of the U.S. military but official sources of the Pentagon. Thus, the U.S. Army and Air Force regularly issue a comprehensive inventory of the facilities they own in the United States and abroad, the "Inventories of Military Real Property." The computer printouts, which have been compiled as a book, are publicly accessible. They contain

detailed information about the function and number of buildings of military institutions, up to the respective water and lighting systems.

Also publicly accessible is a list about the contents and scope of orders given by the Pentagon to German companies. In its "Individual Contract Action Report Master File of U.S. Federal Prime Contracts," the U.S. Administration lists the relevant expenditures to the last cent—in total, about half a billion dollars per year.

Among the 539 contractors of the U.S. Defense Ministry are, above all, service companies (251) and guard companies (27), construction companies (19) and foodstuff producers (15). Energy supply companies, such as Pfalzwerke AG in Ludwigshafen, also earn money from the U.S. military: They delivered electricity to the Americans for \$12.416 million.

The Hunsruecker Verbandsgemeinde Rhaunen (\$87,000) profited from the Americans as did the State Civil Engineering Office in Heidelberg (\$282,000), or the Frankfurt City Cleaning Office (\$518,000). In Nuremberg the U.S. military purchased milk and eggs from the South Dairy Center at a value of \$1.454 million per year. Gausepohl company in Dissen, Lower Saxony, received an order for meat, poultry, and fish worth \$8.889 million.

However, not only such large-scale orders create economic dependence. Luber says that "every U.S. dollar is doubly important" for smaller companies.

The list of cities that profit from the U.S. military is headed by Munich (\$38 million), followed by Kaiserslautern (\$34 million). Of the 26 companies which conduct deals with the U.S. military that go beyond \$5 million, 11 have their seats in small towns: Dissen, Niebuell, Bad Kissingen, Grafenwoehr, Crailsheim, Steinwenden, Maintal, Schwaebisch-Hall, Remseck.

Most U.S. military institutions are accommodated in Rhineland-Palatinate: 255 of the total of 877 FRG objects are situated in Helmut Kohl's land of origin; Bavaria, Hesse, and Baden-Wuerttemberg follow. The largest areas are occupied by the Americans in Bavaria, followed by Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Baden-Wuerttemberg.

With the help of his notes, peace researcher Luber says, Germany's towns and land districts can draw up "disarmament balances"—with the goal of reducing the economic dependence on the military. Special "conversion offices," demanded in the meantime by all parties in Rhineland-Palatinate because time is of the essence, could take over this tasks in the towns on site.

However, Mainz Minister President Carl-Ludwig Wagner (Christian Democratic Union) proves to be an obstacle. Thus, only after weeks of hesitation, he told the communities where the Americans intend to vacate. Wagner's policy of secrecy, which has been harshly criticized by the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Greens, and the coalition partner Free Democratic Party of Germany, was justified by Christian Democratic Union Land Chairman Hans-Otto Wilhelm: "Wagner served the country with his silence."

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