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SOUTH AFRICA

Southern Africa Nuclear-Free Zone Sought

Linked to Nonproliferation Treaty Adherence

MB1909112190 Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY
in English 19 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by Mike Robertson: "SA 'is Lobbying for Nuclear-Free Region'"]

[Text] SA [South Africa] is pushing for all southern African countries to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and hopes to get U.S., UK and Soviet Support for a bid to make the region a "nuclear-free" area.

Since 1988 SA has come under strong pressure—particularly from the U.S.—to sign the NPT. This has been stepped up during recent months.

However, it is understood that SA has argued it could face a right-wing backlash if it signed the treaty without other southern African states giving a commitment to accede to the treaty.

In talks with NPT depositary states—the U.S., UK and the Soviet Union—SA has indicated willingness to sign the treaty if similar commitments are made by Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia.

During the past nine months a series of meetings have been held between SA officials and representatives of the other six African countries.

Representatives of the three depositary states have also held meetings with the countries concerned with a view to getting all seven in the region to sign the NPT.

In terms of the treaty, depositary states are countries in which a country joining the NPT deposits an instrument of accession.

Depositary states have an obligation to try to persuade non-members to sign the treaty.

During the meetings it emerged that most Frontline States did not want any decision on their part to sign the NPT to be seen in conjunction with a decision by SA to accede to the treaty.

Mozambique, however, deposited instruments of accession to the NPT on September 12.

This is seen by SA officials as a positive move and has raised new hopes that an arrangement can be reached whereby SA and the other countries identified will sign the NPT.

SA is looking to the U.S., UK and USSR for further assistance to bring this about.

Countries which sign the NPT have an obligation not to produce nuclear weapons.

Within 18 months they have to conclude a comprehensive safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

If SA joins, all its nuclear installations will have to be opened to IAEA safeguard inspections.

NPT member countries also agree to exchange scientific and technical information on a bilateral basis.

Proposal by Foreign Minister

MB1909191290 Johannesburg International Service
in English 1557 GMT 19 Sep 90

[Station commentary: "A Nuclear Free Zone"]

[Text] In a dramatic bid to put an end to African fears about South Africa's nuclear intentions, Foreign Minister Pik Botha has proposed a nuclear-free zone for southern Africa. He says South Africa is ready to renounce the development of nuclear weapons by signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, if other countries in the region are prepared to do the same. This would immediately create a nuclear-free zone in the subcontinent.

The significance of the offer lies in its demonstration of South Africa's desire to promote a regional dispensation based on nonaggression and economic cooperation. For other countries in the region it would be merely a symbolic gesture, since none would, in any case, be capable of developing nuclear weapons for many years to come. But is it known that South Africa has the ability to manufacture such weapons.

The South African Government has also given the assurance that it has no wish to use its nuclear capacity for any but peaceful purposes. Until now, however, the international security situation, particularly in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, has complicated the question of signing the Non-proliferation Treaty.

Last year's historic changes in Eastern Europe, and greater cooperation between the super powers, have made a reassessment possible. So South Africa is now ready to move on this issue. What would make it a truly worthwhile breakthrough for all of southern Africa, and indeed for all of Africa, would be a similar commitment from others in the region, so that it could be created as a nuclear-free zone.

That is what Minister Pik Botha has now proposed. There could be no stronger demonstration of the commitment of Southern Africa to cooperation for the good of all its countries, and peoples, than such an action by their governments.

Article Warns Against Use of Chemical Weapons*HK0509131490 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese
10 Aug 90 p 3*

[Article by Luo Qingcong (5012 1987 5115): "Guard Against the Threat of Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] With the efforts of many countries, some progress has been made in the present talks on prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union voluntarily exhibited their chemical weapons while the United States made public their chemical weapon destruction devices. Yet, all this has not brought about the light. The disposition and use of one weapon is determined by that weapon's military effects and also many factors, such as political and economic ones. The restrictions made in "talks" or "treaties" (if any) will only result in a new chemical weapon contest at a higher technical level. The destruction of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States means that the time for the renewal and generation change of chemical weapons has already come, and renewed chemical weapons will pose a more grave threat to world security.

The United States and the Soviet Union have discovered from their long-term nuclear confrontations that neither of them can destroy the other side with the nuclear weapons in hand. Therefore, since the eighties, military experts of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have conducted studies on strategies of how to defeat the other side with the use of nonnuclear force. After studying the military strategies of the Soviet Army and the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. Army and NATO found out that, with superiority in the number of conventional weapons, the Warsaw Pact would adopt an echelon attack strategy toward NATO. According to this, the U.S. Army decided in 1980 that, no matter whether in case of attack or defense, stress will always be laid on attacking the enemy's follow-up units in depth behind the enemy lines, which have not been thrown into the battle. This operational principle of "expanding the battlefield" was brought into the theory of "air-ground integration" in 1981. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact, in light of the fact that NATO lacks depth in its defense while defense in the rear area is relatively better, brought up "iron-fist tactics" which means that the "rapid-reaction troops" get into the zones in depth behind the enemy lines to occupy or destroy command and communications centers, and some major targets, such as nuclear devices, airports, and ports; and create a situation in which enemies and their own people, military and civilians are intermixed so that NATO is unable to launch nuclear attacks.

To realize the above-mentioned military strategies, new weaponry and equipment are needed as a guarantee. According to some Western military strategists, new weapons should meet four requirements: mobility, density of fire, saturation functions, and an ability to protect enemy's operational materials (equipment).

Chemical weapons possess a powerful antipersonnel capacity and their area effects are incomparable with other weapons. They can "permeate wherever there is a hole." As a result, with no protection device, shelters cannot be used to protect from gas. On the contrary, they will become places liable for gas to build up. In addition, because chemical weapons only function through toxins acting on the physiological process of life, and will do no harm to military installations, bridges, and appliances etc., they are of great importance to depth attacks with an occupation intention.

Another feature of chemical weapons is that they possess various kinds of military effects, such as lethality, incapacitation, harassment, quick results, and staying power, and they can be chosen for use according to strategical and tactical needs. For example, in order to stop follow-up troops from assisting or gathering, long-lasting toxins can be used to slow down their movements, or to make some important areas impossible for them to use. Under some complex circumstances, such as the one under which enemies and our own people are intermixed, incapacitating toxins can be used. Harassing toxins can be applied to find out whether or not there are enemies lying in ambush, and it can also be used to dispel enemies from strong fortifications to be taken. Of course, the power of chemical weapons will be greatly reduced on troops with protection capacity, yet a sudden use can still produce certain effects.

Regarding discharge systems, there are various kinds with chemical weapons, and different discharge systems can be adopted according to different needs. Flexibility and mobility in the use of chemical weapons are great.

Though nuclear weapons possess great power, they are often inconvenient to use when "depth attacks" are being carried out, or under the circumstances in which enemies and our own people, military and civilians are intermixed. Therefore, chemical weapons will occupy a distinctive position in the future weapon family. This may be one of the important reasons why the United States has declared its intention to continue its production of chemical weapons after ceasing production for 18 years.

CD Envoy Calls for Elimination of Chemical Weapons*OW2508020990 Beijing XINHUA in English
0130 GMT 25 Aug 90*

[Text] Geneva, August 24 (XINHUA)—A senior Chinese official called today for a comprehensive ban and elimination of chemical weapons, which he said is the basic critical objective of disarmament talks.

Chinese representative Hou Zhitong, speaking at the closing of the summer Conference of the Disarmament [CD] talks, said the discussions will resume and produce

new results as long as the fundamental aim and common basis of a comprehensive ban and elimination of chemical weapons are upheld.

He said this year's disarmament talks, held against the backdrop of great international changes, were expected by the international community to make new contributions to halt the [word indistinct] race and accelerate arms cuts.

Hou praised the summer conference for its valuable work and positive results. However, he said, all these are still far from the overall expectations and responsibilities.

He expressed regret that many agenda topics have not entered substantive negotiations and that the issue of nuclear disarmament, in particular, has not been a preferential topic.

The Chinese representative said the disarmament talks should operate under the U.N. charter, with equality, justice and mutual respect as their principles, and should not be marred by political or ideological differences.

The summer conference, which opened on June 12, was attended by representatives from 40 member nations.

Sino-Soviet Border Disarmament Talks Continue

*OW1109050990 Beijing Domestic Service
in Mandarin 0200 GMT 11 Sep 90*

[Text] The second-stage of Sino-Soviet talks on reducing military strength at the Sino-Soviet border areas began in Moscow on 10 September. At the first session of the talks, the Chinese side said it believed that the talks would yield specific results. The Soviet side stressed that this round of talks is a central link in the process of strengthening relations between the two countries.

The head of the Chinese delegation to the talks is Liu Guangzhi, deputy director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Department of Soviet Union and East European Affairs. The head of the Soviet delegation is Kireyev, chief of the Socialist Countries of Asia Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Scientist Proposes Space Nonweaponization

*OW1809021190 Beijing XINHUA in English
0144 GMT 18 Sep 90*

[Text] London, September 17 (XINHUA)—A Chinese scientist today put forward a proposal on the space nonweaponization at a working group meeting of the 40th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs being held in Egham, 24 kilometres southwest of London.

Professor Hu Side, vice-director of the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, pointed out: "The space nonweaponization is an urgent task for arms control."

At present, he said, only the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are able to develop space weapons system. Therefore, they must take the lead in making commitment and taking concrete measures not to develop, test, and deploy space weapons.

Now the space militarization has become a reality, he said, adding that the implementation by the United States of the strategic defence initiative program will certainly threaten the space with weaponization.

Professor Hu stressed: "It is imperative and possible to sign an international treaty that is verifiable on the prohibition of all types of space weapons. At the same time, efforts should be made to push forward the process of cutting down the strategic nuclear arms and limiting and prohibiting nuclear tests."

He noted: "The verification should be politically acceptable, technically feasible and economically bearable."

The professor described the most important measures of verification as to improve the convention on registration of objects to be launched into space and to carry out on-the-spot verification on the launching ground. He said launching should be permitted only after it is verified that no space weapons are on the vehicles.

He called on the scientists throughout the world to strengthen international cooperation and make peaceful use of space. He said it is imperative that countries in the world should join hands and make concerted efforts so that they can make full use of the world's material and human resources for the benefit of mankind.

NORTH KOREA

Paper Demands Nuclear Weapon-Free Peninsula

SK1509104390 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1009 GMT 15 Sep 90

["Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula Is Urgent Demand for World Peace"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, September 15 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN says in an article today that to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone at an early date is a unanimous demand of the world's peaceloving people and an urgent task of the times.

Noting that the Korean peninsula is a region fraught with the greatest danger of nuclear war in the world, the article says:

From long ago the U.S. imperialists set about the deployment of a large number of nuclear weapons in South Korea to inflict a nuclear scourge on the Korean nation. Subsequently, South Korea has now turned into the biggest nuclear arsenal in the Far East where more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons including neutron bombs called "devilish weapon of the twentieth century" are deployed.

As if it were not enough, the U.S. imperialists continue shipping into South Korea means of nuclear strike and, having worked out a plan to use nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, maliciously resort to nuclear threat and blackmail against our Republic. What must not be overlooked is that this year they have staged various aerial war exercises almost every day for a surprise preemptive nuclear attack on our republic from the air by massively mobilizing planes of the U.S. Air Force deployed in and around South Korea. Such war exercises may go over to a real war any moment.

As long as tensions persist and the danger of nuclear war remains on the Korean peninsula the world people can neither be free from the danger of nuclear war, nor peace and security of the world can be guaranteed.

The government of our Republic advanced a new important proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone in 1986 and has made strenuous efforts to carry it into effect.

In the later period we have put forward one new proposal after another to take practical measures for making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone and consolidating its status.

This notwithstanding, the U.S. imperialists are further reinforcing nuclear armed forces and stepping up preparations for a nuclear war in South Korea on the pretext of "protecting" South Korea from someone's "threat".

They must withdraw their forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea without delay, and the Korean peninsula must be turned into a nuclear-free, peace zone without fail.

SOUTH KOREA

Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula Urged

SK1809082590 *Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean*
16 Sep 90 p 3

[Editorial: "Converting the Korean Peninsula into a Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] Once again the nuclear danger in our country has come into question. Mankind's first realization of the formidable force of the nuclear threat came after an atomic bomb was dropped in Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945. Since then formidable nuclear might, however, has ironically been used as a means of keeping peace by deterring war.

As a result, the world has remained divided between people who excessively emphasized only one side of the truth. Sir Bertrand Russell, who during the fifties and sixties was the symbol of human conscience and was believed to be the highest intellectual, insisted on completely abolishing nuclear weapons; whereas Sidney Hook, U.S. pragmatist, was very emphatic about the role and function of nuclear weapons as a deterrence to war.

The government has recently called on North Korea to sign the nuclear safeguards accord through the voice of leaders of Japanese political parties, and the Japanese government is also reported to have expressed concern about the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear capabilities at the Soviet-Japanese foreign ministers' talks. North Korea's nuclear threat as such has begun drawing our attention after North Korea refused to sign the nuclear safeguard accord during the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] conference held last September in Vienna, linking it to the issue of converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. In particular, there have been several reports saying that North Korea seems to have facilities capable of producing nuclear bombs in Yongbyon, North Pyongan Province. It is true that North Korea has been using the combination of the existence of nuclear facilities, its refusal to sign nuclear safeguards accord, and its call for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone as a trump card in negotiations with South Korea over the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea.

In spite of all this, North Korea tries to make the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, an assumption based on weak, unverified circumstances, a precondition for its possession of nuclear capabilities, arguing that it should have nuclear weapons to counter what it claims is nuclear weapons deployment in South Korea. This is an expression of an unnecessary pride and a sense of independence as childish as the fretful attempt our

country once made to develop nuclear weapons as part of self-reliant defense effort to cope with the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces.

Therefore, taking this opportunity, we would like to urge the personages concerned from both the North and South of Korea to declare denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as the first step for relaxation of tension in this district. Denuclearization of not only the Korean peninsula but also China, Siberia, and the Japanese Islands is desirable. North Korea should sign a nuclear safeguards accord. It may be feasible for us to demand that the U.S. Administration withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea before withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Needless to say, we are not in the position of underestimating the dreadful killing and injuring power of conventional weapons out of excessive fear of the horrible total lethal capabilities of nuclear weapons. It is our hope that withdrawal of nuclear weapons would work as a

symbolic act of and as the first step for withdrawing and abolishing all weapons. Humankind, under a common cognition that chemical, biological, and radiological weapons are the most dreadful lethal weapons, made every effort to restrict the use of these weapons because they have indiscriminate mass killing and injuring capabilities compared to conventional weapons.

Although we are pursuing reunification as the supreme task, we do not want to use dependence on mass lethal weapons as a reunification method. We think that there is no reason why both North and South cannot reach an agreement on this point. However, the allegation that if only nuclear weapons were pulled out, all problems would be solved is not correct. On the other hand, one should not increase conventional weapons on the pretext of withdrawing nuclear weapons. We maintain that not only nuclear weapons but also factors justifying the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent power should be equally removed.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS**Pact Disarmament Committee Discusses Troop Levels 10-11 Sep****Hungarian Spokesman on Failure of Talks***LD1209161590 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 12 Sep 90*

[Text] The meeting of the Warsaw Pact special committee on disarmament ended in failure in Bratislava. Gyorgy Mika asked a Hungarian Foreign Ministry spokesman why this was so.

[Begin recording] [Mika] At this meeting they were discussing conventional weapons, more precisely the future of these weapons in the former socialist countries. Why did the Czechoslovaks make such a negative statement about this? Janos Hermann, foreign affairs spokesman, is on the line.

[Hermann] The reason for this, without doubt, is that the meeting ended in failure. This also corresponds to the evaluation of the Hungarian side. The task of the talks should have been for us to reach an agreement between the individual countries on the allotment, on the basis of maximum levels established for the whole of the Warsaw Pact, in certain conventional weapons and battle equipment categories, keeping in mind the principle of arms sufficiency. I would like to add that the lack of agreement between the Pact's six would definitely be a problematic factor and would impede the successful conclusion as soon as possible of the Vienna talks. For this reason, the decision was made to continue the talks on 22 September in Prague.

[Mikal] Is it known what the Hungarian stance in the next round will be? For example, how would Hungarian conventional armaments be affected by the establishment of a new weapons threshold?

[Hermann] We feel that the stance of the Hungarian delegation corresponds to the level of sufficiency needed for Hungarian security requirements. At the same time, I would also like to add that according to the Hungarian stance, no country is justified in demanding more than one-third of the level set for the whole of Europe. [end recording]

CSFR-Hungarian Proposal*LD1309175890 Prague CTK in English 1539 GMT
13 Sep 90*

[Text] Vienna, September 13 (CTK correspondent)—The Czechoslovak and Hungarian delegations to the Vienna discussions of 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact member states on conventional armed forces suggested here today that the limit of the future conventional military potential of individual states should not exceed one-third of the entire potential on the average.

Head of the Czechoslovak delegation Ladislav Balcar told a plenary session that no state in Europe should have in future more than 40 percent of its present conventional military potential, as proposed by the Soviet Union. All states speak today of ending the cold war, of growing confidence and cooperation. Czechoslovakia is firmly convinced that the building of security foundations for a new common European house should ensue from lower limits. The Czechoslovak and Hungarian delegations suggest the following limits for individual categories of conventional weapons possessed by the NATO and Warsaw Pact member states—12,580 tanks, 20,460 armoured vehicles and 12,560 artillery systems, he said.

Pact Disarmament Meeting Takes Place 22-23 Sep**CSFR Announcement***LD2009181490 Prague CTK in English 1511 GMT
20 Sep 90*

[Text] Prague, September 20 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry has announced that a session of the Warsaw Pact special commission for disarmament at the level of deputy foreign ministers will take place in Prague on September 22-23.

The session directly follows up the meeting of the commission in Bratislava on September 10-11.

USSR Position Viewed*LD2209183390 Prague CTK in English 1732 GMT
22 Sep 90*

[Text] Prague, September 22 (CTK)—A two-day meeting of the Warsaw Pact special commission for disarmament at the level of deputy foreign ministers and chiefs of general staff started here today.

The Czechoslovak delegation is led by First Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Harencar and chief of the General Staff, First Deputy Defence Minister Anton Slimak.

The participants will discuss the questions connected with the division of the Pact's weapons if a treaty on conventional forces in Europe in Vienna is signed. The session of the commission in Bratislava on September 10-11 ended without any concrete results. The Czechoslovak representatives claimed after the meeting that the Soviet Union wants to keep an inadequately high part of the Pact's contingent.

The session focused on solving two major questions—the setting of the level of sufficiency and of the maximum level of weaponry one state can keep.

Also discussed were new approaches to solving controversial questions concerning excessive demands of several states. In an attempt to help reach agreement, the

Czechoslovak side came with compromise proposals which were on the whole taken into consideration.

Commission's Session Ends

*LD2309143190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1400 GMT 23 Sep 90*

[Text] A session of the special Warsaw Pact commission for disarmament ended at the Cernian Palace in Prague today. The delegations of the member states, at the level of deputy ministers of foreign affairs and chiefs of the general staffs, discussed the maximum national levels of the individual types of weapons and military equipment.

Substantial concord of views was achieved, especially in fixing the numbers of planes and helicopters; on the other hand, an agreement on the quotas of tanks, armored carriers and artillery has not yet been reached.

All questions remaining open will be on the agenda for talks between the ministers of foreign affairs of these countries to be held in New York on 30 September.

Disarmament Session Praised

*LD2309211490 Prague CTK in English 1802 GMT
23 Sep 90*

[Text] Prague, September 23 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Harencar told CTK today that the two-day meeting of the Warsaw Pact special commission for disarmament which ended here today was a breakthrough.

Deputy foreign ministers and chiefs of staff of the Warsaw Pact member countries agreed in Prague on quotas of aircraft, helicopters and partially of tanks. A consensus was not reached on other types of weapons. The results of the meeting will be handed over by the delegations to the countries' foreign ministers who will meet in New York on September 30. Participating in the next meeting will be six delegations, as the participation of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic ended today, Robert Harencar said.

Harencar said that the session followed up the commission's fruitless negotiations in Bratislava on September 10-11. Czechoslovakia and Hungary elaborated specified proposals for the Prague meeting on the basis of which it was possible to reach agreement at least in several questions.

He said that the debate was very complicated at the beginning as the Warsaw Pact has substantially changed recently and every state now performs in quite a sovereign way. "The dictate of one country to the others is the past," he added. "Despite several moments, when there was a danger that no progress will be made in the negotiations, quotas of aircraft, helicopters and partially of tanks were agreed on thanks to goodwill, patience and concessions of all sides." In Bratislava, the participants did not reach agreement on 1,047 tanks, while after the session in Prague, there are only 450 tanks left to be

agreed on to reach the level agreed on in the talks on conventional disarmament in Vienna, Harencar said.

Representative of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army for disarmament Jiri Divis told CTK that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central Europe by the year 1994 will have a substantial influence on the change of the situation on the continent. "A new military situation will arise. All states around us now try to ensure their defence at the national level. Also our priority is to preserve the sufficient strength for the defence of sovereignty with the overall trend to reduce armament and transition towards a non-bloc policy. Our proposals and demands to preserve quotas of weaponry for our republic are justified and at the level of defensive sufficiency necessary for us," Divis said.

Fails To Resolve Tank Issue

*LD2409073990 Moscow TASS in English 0720 GMT
24 Sep 90*

[By TASS correspondent Vitaliy Yaroshevskiy]

[Text] Prague, September 24 (TASS)—Limits on individual types of weapons and hardware in the Warsaw Treaty armies were the principal item on the agenda of the Warsaw Treaty Disarmament Commission's two-day regular session here at the weekend.

Similar positions were evident on the determination of the number of aircraft and helicopters. On the other hand, agreement was not reached over the determination of the number of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery guns.

These issues will now be discussed at Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers' meeting in New York on September 30.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Last T-55 Tank Destroyed in Novy Jicin

*LD1909171590 Prague CTK in English 1625 GMT
19 Sep 90*

[Text] Prague, September 19 (CTK)—The last T55 tank out of 850 tanks which Czechoslovakia unilaterally pledged to liquidate at the beginning of 1989 was symbolically destroyed in Novy Jicin, North Moravia, today. Also present was Czechoslovak defence minister, Army General Miroslav Vacek.

Vacek told present journalists that final results from the Vienna talks on cuts in conventional weapons are now being awaited. Czechoslovakia originally had 4,500 tanks, of which 850 have been liquidated. The dismantling of other machines, including planes, will be very extensive. Also solved must be several ecological aspects as about 50 litres of diesel oil and other substances remain in each tank even after thorough drainage. Their paint is also poisonous, Vacek said.

Soviet Withdrawal From Southwest Slovakia Begins*LD2109144190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1330 GMT 21 Sep 90*

[Text] The withdrawal from Komarno, Nove Zamky, and Sturovo of further Soviet Army troops, which were part of the Irkutsk-Pinsk Division deployed in the southwest Slovak region, began on schedule today. According to the Soviet side, they will manage to bring forward by almost a whole month the 24 December date of the planned deadline for Soviet troops withdrawal from Komarno.

HUNGARY**CFE Envoy on Troop Levels Within Warsaw Pact***LD2309102590 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0630 GMT 23 Sep 90*

[Interview with Istvan Gyarmati, head of the delegation to the NATO-Warsaw Pact disarmament talks in Vienna, by Istvan Kulcsar; date not given—recorded; from the "World Clock" program]

[Text] [Kulcsar] Mr. Ambassador, it is said that the Vienna talks on military force cuts [CFE], the discussions of the 23, have come to a dead end.

[Gyarmati] That is true; that corresponds to the facts. No progress has been made on the issues that are decisive, from the point of view of the talks' success, for about two to two and a half months. I would mention first of all that we could not manage to make progress in solving the problem of the degree to which a country must reduce its forces in Europe. Right now this means only the forces of the Soviet Union, according to the sense of it.

[Kulcsar] As I know, Hungary has recently submitted a proposal with Czechoslovakia. What is its essence?

[Gyarmati] I would like to stress that a compromise proposal was made saying that this level, that is the level of forces that can be kept in one country in Europe, should be reduced by one-third in the 23 countries, or rather the 22, when the treaty is signed. In relation to the Soviet Union, this would mean that within the Warsaw Pact the Soviet Union would possess two-thirds of the forces of the six countries. We reckon that that would be largely enough for the implementation of the political objectives the Soviet political leadership acknowledges.

[Kulcsar] You mean enough for defense?

[Gyarmati] Yes, for it is a basic military rule that defense requires less force than attack. Thus, if someone possesses one-third of the forces in Europe it makes defense possible even—hypothetically—against all European countries. Politically, however, any such threat against the Soviet Union is out of the question.

[Kulcsar] What would this mean from our point of view? How many armored vehicles could Hungary have, compared to the present?

[Gyarmati] Fewer than the present number, by all means. Hungary has more than 1,500 tanks. This has no reality in either the military, political, or even economic sense. I think that the level of the Hungarian military forces should be set so that we could keep some 900-1,000 tanks; I should add that physically this will not be possible in the near future, as we already have fewer than 900 effective tanks.

[Kulcsar] What would this mean in relation to our neighbors, since they are at present also members of the Warsaw Pact, that is, they have obligations to it, too?

[Gyarmati] We have to accept, whether we like it or not, that these countries are much bigger than Hungary, and for this reason their military force will be bigger, too. Our aim in this treaty is to regulate the relations of our forces and those of our neighbors in such a way that none of those countries' military forces could mean a threat to Hungary.

[Kulcsar] Mr. Ambassador, from what you say it seems that on the one hand, the smaller countries of the present Warsaw Pact would be safe, and on the other hand, the Soviet Union should not feel threatened by the West. In contrast to this, the agreement in Vienna has been delayed. What is the main reason for this?

[Gyarmati] I think that Soviet internal policy does not make it possible for the political and military leadership to come to an agreement on what objectives to follow in Europe. I think that the political objective, integration into Europe, and the military objective reflected in the demand in Vienna, the preservation of the Soviet Union's military dominance in Europe, are incompatible. The Soviet Union will have to decide which of the two goals to choose. If they choose the first, then there will be an agreement and a new European security system will come into existence; if they choose the second, then there will possibly be no agreement and then the countries of Europe, among them Hungary, will have to find other guarantees for security.

ARGENTINA

Defense Minister on Gulf, Condor Missile

PY2209004390 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1255 GMT 21 Sep 90

[Text] Buenos Aires, 21 September (NA)—Defense Minister Humberto Romero has said that sending an Argentine military contingent to the Persian Gulf does not mean "hitching ourselves to the U.S. wagon." He also lashed out at the government of [former Argentine president] Raul Alfonsin for setting up the "Condor Missile" project with Iraq.

Romero said that Menem's decision is of the utmost importance because it "prompts a cultural change in Argentina in that it forces us to think in world terms, thus overcoming 40 years of seclusion."

In remarks published today in the newspaper EL CRONISTA COMERCIAL, Romero justified the shelving of the "Condor Missile" project that Argentina and Iraq were jointly developing.

The minister asked: "What would happen if Iraq threatened the entire world with a line of powerful Condor missiles that each bore the Argentine trademark?"

Romero also said: "The action by Iraq is serious for the whole world, not just because Iraq invaded another country but because it has the best military technology, especially concerning missiles."

Romero emphasized: "Argentina was cooperating with Saddam Husayn in this crucial matter until President Menem canceled the project that was initiated during the government of Alfonsin."

Romero said: "We were developing here, in our own territory, a strategic missile that involved foreign technology and was financed by a foreign country."

The minister described as a "mystery" the attitude of the government of Alfonsin and emphasized that "only now, with the conflict in the open can we realize the importance of what has happened and of the gravity of that strategic error."

Romero said that the mobilization of Armed Forces cadres to the Persian Gulf "allows them to enter the world of sophisticated military technology, operating beside the world's most advanced Armed Forces."

Romero said that, among its advantages, "morale is not unimportant, and it reminds" both military men and public opinion of "the essence of their calling, their raison d'être as soldiers: to defend their country and, during a foreign conflict, to defend the values in which their country believes."

BRAZIL

Army Studying Chemical, Biological Weapons

PY2109193090 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO
in Portuguese 20 Sep 90 p 21

[Report by Paulo Motta]

[Text] General Romero Lepesqueur, Army science and technology secretary, told O GLOBO last week that the Institute for Special Projects (IPE) of the Army Technological Center (Cetex) in Guaratiba, Rio de Janeiro State, will in the future carry out research in the area of chemical and biological warfare, beside its projects in the nuclear field.

"This does not mean we will manufacture chemical or bacteriological weapons, but we want to study their effects to develop antidotes, just as radiation must be studied to develop radiation protection," Lepesqueur said.

According to IPE Director General Nelson Querido, the Army nuclear project foresees the development of the so-called Experimental Irradiation Reactor (REI)—which uses metallic uranium as fuel, is controlled by pure graphite, and is cooled with air—with the purpose of mastering the technology of gas-graphite reactors, whose main example is the Modulated High Temperature Gas-Graphite Reactor (MHTGR), still being developed in several parts of the world. Cetex has a subcritical unit (in which nuclear reactions are studied), but the REI may yield as a by-product nearly 400 grams per year of plutonium, the key element in atomic bombs.

This plutonium, as well as the plutonium generated by the Navy reactor planned for the first Brazilian nuclear submarine, will not be under international safeguards—this means it will not be inspected—and it will be reprocessed with technology developed by the Institute for Nuclear and Energy Research (IPEN) run by the National Commission for Nuclear Energy (CNEN) in Sao Paulo.

The Army Science and Technology Secretariat was created in 1984. It has jurisdiction over the Military Engineering Institute (IME) and three centers: the Operational Evaluation Center, the Engineering Evaluation Center (which has a test facility in Restinga da Marambaia), and Cetex, which is subdivided into the Development and Research Institute, and the IPE.

The Army Science and Technology Secretariat has nearly 500 military and civilian scientists and experts, many of whom studied in the United States, France, and England. According to Lepesqueur, the objectives of this secretariat are to evaluate, prepare, and train human resources and to carry out research and development in three fields: doctrine, personnel, and above all, military materiel.

"We do not manufacture these items; we only develop and evaluate them. The Army may even use our projects in Imbel (War Materiel Industry) products, but our policy is to pass our technology to private companies," Lepesqueur said.

ISRAEL**Soviets Propose Regional Arms Control Talks**

TA2309101090 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 23 Sep 90 p 1

[Report by diplomatic correspondent David Makovsky]

[Text] The Soviets, concerned over proliferation of weapons in the Middle East, have for the first time formally approached Israel about proposed arms control talks.

The feelers were put out 10 days ago during a visit to Moscow by a senior Foreign Ministry delegation, officials said last night. "The Soviets tell us that they are worried about the quantities of the weapons in the region, and arms control is the best way to halt the current trend," said Yosef Govrin, Foreign Ministry deputy director general for Eastern Europe, who headed the four member delegation to Moscow.

However, the prospects for the success of any Soviet initiative remain murky, as Arab countries—with the exception of Egypt—have been unwilling so far to respond favorably to the idea of regional arms control.

The Moscow talks, the first between senior diplomats of the two countries since the Soviets severed ties in 1967, were a preparatory meeting for Foreign Minister David Levi's encounter with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze this week at the UN.

The Soviets suggested that conventional arms control talks could be preceded by the establishment of a "regional control center for reducing tensions" as a confidence-building first step between Israelis and

Arabs. This center could prevent accidents that could arise from misreading military maneuvers, the Soviets said.

Govrin told his Soviet interlocutors that Israel would study the proposal. Israeli officials believe the Soviet proposals are the brainchild of Dr. Sergey Rogov, a former Soviet official who works at the government-backed USA Institute and who spoke about arms control during a visit to Jerusalem early this summer. The Soviet delegation in Moscow was led by Vasilii Kolotusha, the head of the Middle East division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

The new trend of Soviet concern over Middle East arms control was already discernible in February 1989, when Shevardnadze gave a speech on this topic in Cairo after meeting with then-foreign minister Moshe Arens.

SUDAN**Sudan Denies Receiving Poison Gas From Iraq**

EA1509223090 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1430 GMT
15 Sep 90

[Text] Khartoum, 15 September (SUNA)—The [word indistinct] security source denied a report published in London by the OBSERVER on 12 August, quoting the Egyptian newspaper AL-WAFD, that Iraq had supplied Sudan with poison gas. The source stated that the information was part of the plot [words indistinct] published by some anti-Sudanese media, and that the Egyptian paper AL-WAFD was playing a leading role in this plot [words indistinct]. The source added in a press statement that these information [word indistinct] had earlier circulated reports that Iraqi jet fighters had arrived at Sawakin [60 miles south of Port Sudan] in a cheap attempt to cause animosity between Sudan and the fraternal and friendly countries and in an attempt to (?affect) Sudan's decision.

Ladygin Interviewed on START Talks, 'Open Skies'

LD1409134090 Moscow IAN in English 29 Aug 90

[Interview with Major General Fedor Ladygin, department head, General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, by Yuriy Lebedev: "What Is New at the Talks?"—press release]

[Text] Question: The Washington Post has reported that the Soviet-US talks on strategic offensive forces, (SOF) [START] in Geneva have recently been skidding due to the great number of differences. This raised doubts as to whether the treaty might be finished by the end of this year. Will you comment, please?

Answer: During the Soviet-US summit in Washington in June this year the sides reaffirmed their resolve to wrap up work on the treaty by the end of this year. The leaders of our two states charged their delegations in Geneva to speed up the work on the joint draft. Yet many problems, some of them very complicated, remain unresolved.

The Soviet side is not dramatising the "great number of differences" and, guided by the Soviet President's order, is doing everything in its power to help the Geneva talks gather momentum in the interests of the search for solutions.

Of course, such solutions should be mutually acceptable and lead to the practical reduction of the strategic nuclear capabilities of the sides, lessen the risk of a nuclear war and block the channels of the arms race.

We cannot agree to the "obsolete" Minuteman-2 and Poseidon missiles being used for orbiting space-based armaments or as targets during the test of SDI systems, something which the US is advocating, according to The Washington Post.

This would mean giving the green light to the use of the reduced armaments for accelerating the creation of space-based strike systems, which would open a new channel of the arms race. The use of "obsolete" Minuteman-2 and Poseidon missiles, as well as other ICBMs and SLBMs that are to be reduced, would speed up the work on the SDI programme, which in its turn would disrupt the organic connection between defensive and offensive strategic armaments.

The creation of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements in the US would undermine strategic stability and launch a new spiral of the arms race.

Yet we believe that solutions to the outstanding problems, even the most difficult, can and must be found before the deadline fixed in Washington. But our readiness to complete the drafting of the treaty by the end of this year presupposes a similar readiness of our partner.

It is clear that the Geneva talks will be greatly boosted by the September meeting of Shevardnadze and Baker, in particular it will help solve the problems mentioned by The Washington Post.

Question: The Soviet Union and China have held lengthy consultations on military problems, which has paved the way to official talks. Could you say a few words about the essence of these consultations and the aims of the future talks?

Answer: One of the results of Gorbachev's visit to China in May 1989, which opened a new stage in Sino-Soviet relations, was the sides' agreement to take measures to reduce their armed forces deployed on the border to a minimum corresponding to normal neighbourly relations.

The Sino-Soviet group of diplomats and military experts, established to carry out this agreement, started working in November 1989. It has done much to draft the agreement on the guidelines for mutual reductions on the Sino-Soviet border and for building up trust in the military sphere.

The agreement was signed by the sides' foreign ministers during Premier Li Peng's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1990. The sides have agreed to start talks on the realisation of this agreement in the autumn of 1990.

The talks are expected to discuss the types of armed forces and armaments to be reduced, to determine the geographical zones, parameters and the schedule of reductions. Under the agreement, the reductions should start with the offensive components, so that the units remaining on the border are restructured to fulfill only defensive tasks.

It is also planned to establish a bilateral mechanism for effective verification of compliance with the future agreements on mutual reductions and to draft effective measures for building up military trust on the Sino-Soviet border.

The beginning Sino-Soviet talks on military problems and agreements expected to be signed will be a major contribution to the development of Sino-Soviet relations on the principles of trust, neighbourliness and cooperation.

Questions: There were two rounds of the "open skies" conference held, with the last one ending in Budapest on May 10 this year. What did the participants in the conference achieve at these rounds? Will there be more rounds and when?

Answer: The initiative regarding the "open skies" concept was taken by the United States of America. The Soviet Union supported the concept as an important confidence-building measure. Naturally, this concerns those countries which will agree on a treaty basis to open their air space for unarmed aircraft flights to monitor military activities.

The United States, the USSR, Canada and a number of other countries have started joint work on the technicalities of this concept. This work is being done in the form of an international conference. The second round of the conference was held in Budapest in April-May of 1990. The participants produced a draft agreement, rather a voluminous document incorporating both agreed-upon and so far outstanding provisions.

The conference showed substantial differences of approach to principled questions. The US and other NATO countries are opposed to developing a single bank of data obtained as a result of flights. The Soviet side believes that it is precisely the development of a single data bank and free access to its by any party to the agreement would help strengthen the "open skies" regime.

Western countries do not agree with the idea that all the participating states should use agreed-upon data-collecting equipment having the same characteristics sufficient for attaining the purposes of the "open skies" regime. The on-board instrumentation proposed by them and its specifications make it possible to obtain more vast information than envisaged by this regime.

The United States and a number of other countries insist that the monitoring party use only its own aircraft to fly over the territory of the party under surveillance. In this matter, the Soviet Union adheres to a more flexible approach, where the party under observation would decide whose aircraft—of the monitoring country under surveillance or a third country—with appropriate agreed-upon equipment on board is to be used to survey its territory. It would be possible to establish a single fleet of aircraft for all countries.

The "open skies" conference has been adjourned to enable mutual analysis of the positions. A search is under way for their possible approximation. The schedule for finalising agreement depends on when all key problems are resolved without detriment to any of the sides. The conference will resume work as soon as appropriate conditions are prepared for this.

Baker Discusses START, CFE With Shevardnadze

Talks Follow German Treaty Signing

*LD1309112190 Moscow TASS in English 1037 GMT
13 Sep 90*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow, August [as received] 13 (TASS)—Talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker have just resumed in a Soviet Foreign Ministry mansion in central Moscow.

The ministers started their talks on Tuesday but broke them off on Wednesday to participate in the final "two plus four" meeting. The treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany was signed during the meeting.

The heads of the foreign policy agencies of the USSR and the U.S. are expected to continue to discuss the working out of an agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments [CFE] in Europe. A Central American settlement may also be discussed. Both these questions have been debated by experts in Moscow in the past two days.

Before the beginning of the talks, Shevardnadze told reporters that the results of the work of the experts on questions of the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe will be summed up today.

Baker added that the discussion of the gulf crisis, of strategic offensive arms and some other problems will be continued.

The talks began a one-to-one conversation between Shevardnadze and Baker.

CFE, START Time Pressure Noted

*LD1309153190 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT
13 Sep 90*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voitsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Excerpt] Moscow, September 13 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker today resumed discussions of the Gulf crisis in a bid to define more accurately the situation and international acts which can be taken in the situation that arises, a senior Soviet diplomat told TASS.

The diplomat emphasised that the ministers will discuss this problem, guided by the Helsinki agreements between the Soviet and U.S. presidents.

The diplomat said that the talks centre on problems of curbing conventional arms, primarily, "difficulties that arise in their settlement". The Vienna talks [CFE] is a very urgent issue because the deadline, by which the agreements must be drafted, is very close. The CSCE meeting at summit level will be held on November 19, he said. Therefore both sides are trying to find "refreshing approaches" in dealing with relevant problems. The diplomat singled out aviation and troop levels among them stressing that "the point at issue is not concessions but a reasonable combination of the interests of both sides, considering the current circumstances".

"This is not to say that positions should be abandoned. I think that both sides will take certain steps," he added.

Commenting on Shevardnadze's statement at a news conference in Moscow on Wednesday [12 September] that the USSR was going to make fresh proposals at the

Vienna talks in the next few days, the diplomat said they were likely to concern troop levels in Europe.

Asked if the treaty on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons [START] should be ready for the next Soviet-U.S. summit, the diplomat emphasized: "The question is posed in this way—the treaty should be elaborated. There is no direct linkage to the summit meeting. It is necessary to prepare and revise the document and then the presidents will decide whether or not to link its signing to a full-scale summit. The most important thing is that it was decided to settle the outstanding problems before the end of this year." [passage omitted]

'Confidence' on Meeting Deadlines

*LD1309172990 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT
13 Sep 90*

[Excerpt] Moscow, September 13 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Minister and member of the Presidential Council Eduard Shevardnadze had a final meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker today.

As was arranged before, they discussed major, principled problems. The conversation focused on disarmament issues. Shevardnadze and Baker compared various approaches to the settlement of problems blocking further progress at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons and the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE]. They based their arguments on confidence, expressed by the two presidents at their Helsinki meeting, that the observance of the schedule of the working out and signing of those documents is not only necessary, but also possible. Naturally, it should be understood that it is necessary to speed up work on the whole of the agenda.

Shevardnadze and Baker agreed, that the first thing they would do at their next meeting in New York would be to discuss problems dealing with the working out of a treaty on strategic offensive armaments [START] and an agreement on conventional armed forces. They are determined to insist on the coordination of the remaining issues. Participants in the talks have reached the time limit. [passage omitted]

Total Nuclear Test Ban Urged, Research Defended

*PM1409105990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Sep 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Prof. V. Mikhaylov, USSR deputy minister of Nuclear Power Generation and the Nuclear Industry, under the rubric "Competent Opinion": "Why the Country's Nuclear Test Sites Are Silent"]

[Text] The United States has carried out four nuclear explosions so far this year. France has also carried out four, and China has carried out two. At the same time our country's nuclear test sites have now been silent for approximately one year. An alarming situation. Is such a

political risk justified in our time? Stability in the world is founded on approximate parity between the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals. Our country's unilateral nuclear disarmament is a path to a U.S. monopoly. And any monopoly, particularly in such a sphere, is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the whole world community's political and economic relations.

Today the halting of all nuclear tests has assumed fundamental significance. The creation [sozdaniye] of third-generation nuclear weapons or so-called directed-energy weapons cannot be permitted. This evil "jinni" cannot be let out of the stage of scientific enquiry into the stage of full-scale development [razrabotka]. On the one hand, these weapons are to be 1,000 times less dangerous than existing ones in terms of global radioactive pollution, while on the other hand they are to be capable of hitting strategic enemy targets. It is precisely this that causes the alarm, since some excessively hot heads might be tempted to use them in any conflict.

More and more people in the world are supporting the demand for a nuclear test ban. At the same time there is very serious opposition from the West's nuclear powers. International discussions on this question are continuing more persistently today than ever. Within the framework of the new doctrine of defense sufficiency the Soviet Union has advocated and advocates now the immediate and total cessation of all nuclear tests. And it is not the Soviet Union's fault that nuclear tests are continuing. In 1985 we declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. In 1986 M.S. Gorbachev, our country's leader, put forward a program to create a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. However, our appeal was not heard in the United States, where 26 underground nuclear explosions were carried out during the period of the moratorium, including some for the purposes of creating third-generation weapons and weapons based on new physical principles.

In all 714 nuclear explosions have been carried out in the Soviet Union, including 499 underground blasts since the conclusion of the 1963 Moscow treaty. According to data in open publications, as checked by our national technical means of verification, in all approximately 1,080 nuclear explosions have been carried out to date in the United States, including approximately 750 underground blasts since 1963. France has carried out 180 explosions, Britain 42, and China 34.

Our country has two nuclear test sites—Semipalatinsk, set up in 1948, and the Northern site in Novaya Zemlya, established in 1954. In Kazakhstan 467 nuclear explosions have been carried out, including 343 underground blasts since 1963. On the Northern site—131 nuclear explosions, including 41 underground blasts.

Since 1963, 115 underground nuclear explosions have been carried out in various parts of the country for peaceful purposes at comparatively great depth and with a low yield, including explosions for purposes of creating

underground capacities, extinguishing fires on gas blow-outs, intensifying oil extraction, and sounding out the earth's crust on our territory in the large-scale search for minerals.

Does the Soviet Union need two nuclear test sites today? Taking the positive trends in the world into account, I think not. The country's Supreme Soviet must have its say on the periods for which the nuclear test sites are to function, on the principles of compensation for the degree of risk to people living in these areas and for the loss of access to the land used for test sites, with due regard for the geographic position and the geological structure of the sites' territory and the density of population in adjacent regions. However, the resolution of this important question is taking a long time, and perplexity and confusion are leading this problem into an impasse. I believe that it is necessary, first of all, to end nuclear weapon tests at the Semipalatinsk site.

Decisions on the country's annual nuclear programs, including nuclear tests, have to be adopted by a special commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions and approved by the USSR president.

Our test sites have again been silent since October 1989, while the site in the state of Nevada is continuing to function. It is true that the intensity has diminished somewhat, but it remains, I would say, at quite a high level. In practice, over the past five years our test sites have been silent for half the time.

Peremptory statements by public figures on radio and television, in the press, and from Supreme Soviet rostrums, and rallies and meetings of informal public organizations demanding a halt to nuclear tests are creating a public opinion in our country in favor of further unilateral steps.

There is no doubt that the majority of their authors have very sincere intentions to save mankind from nuclear disaster. However, in our country the center of gravity of the struggle for universal nuclear disarmament has shifted sharply in recent years toward virtually unilateral nuclear disarmament. Can our country afford to become a hostage to other nuclear powers' political ambitions? Because nuclear weapons today, if you consider the consequences of their use, are above all weapons of global politics. The voice of the professionals is being stifled by the chorus of public commentators on a sphere in which competence and caution are particularly important.

Under these conditions the fact that the population is unprepared to perceive objectively information about the nature and the special features of the radioactive and seismic situation, and is uninformed about measures to ensure safety, and the difficult social and domestic living conditions frequently lead to an emotional inflaming of passions over the country's nuclear test sites. It should be pointed out in this connection that Soviet specialists ensure the safety of underground nuclear explosions to a

standard not inferior to the U.S. standard and, as for the cost of carrying them out, this is one-tenth of what it is in the United States. And this cost makes up an insignificant proportion of the expenditure on nuclear arms. A situation has been created in our country in which any expression of criticism of the Soviet test sites is considered patriotic and progressive. And, as always in such instances, a number of public figures use it to enhance their popularity, frequently appearing also in the role of stage managers of mass demonstrations.

At the same time the United States and its NATO allies are continuing to improve their nuclear arsenal. A long-term program to modernize installations connected with the development and production of nuclear weapons is being examined. New, more sophisticated ways of managing this complex are being created. The safety, reliability, and efficiency of nuclear weapons over the next 20 years occupy a special place in the long-term program. Enhancing the safety of nuclear weapons in accident situations or in the event of unsanctioned access is regarded as one of the chief requirements in improving nuclear weapons, bearing in mind that they contain radioactive materials such as plutonium, uranium, and tritium. Underground nuclear weapon tests today represent the highest-priority experimental program of research and engineering work to improve nuclear weapons and create new types. Intensive work is being done to increase the targeting accuracy of nuclear-tipped warheads and to create weapons with enhanced survivability under conditions of defense against missiles and space weapons and for hitting targets buried deep underground. And these are first-strike weapons, you know! And this at a time when the NATO countries, unlike our country, have not adopted any pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Can the country's nuclear test sites stay silent under these conditions? In order to give the correct answer to this question, it is necessary to replace rhetoric, rallies, and meetings with the art of sober assessment.

We are all seeking to instill order in our own home, but not everything is turning out right here yet. There are many examples of this at every step. Our home is not alone on the planet, because we all live in a complex and dynamic world. In the age of nuclear and space technology, time and space in this world have been compressed to the utmost for each home.

There are still many parts of the world with an unstable political situation and extreme, aggressive sentiments, including some right on our borders. Certain "third countries" are working intensively on the creation of nuclear weapons. So the nuclear potential created at a difficult time for the country and its constant maintenance at a modern scientific and technical level are a guarantee of stable peace on our planet and, I would say, a guarantee of the success of the new thinking in talks on equal terms on the mutual limitation and ending of nuclear tests. It is a matter not of the number of missiles with nuclear warheads but of the country's scientific and

technical potential which can make a flexible response to other countries' possible achievements in this sphere. It is considerably more difficult to prevent the degradation of unique collectives of highly qualified professionals than to destroy everything. But today, frankly speaking, workers, engineers, and scientists need civic courage in order to preserve high responsibility and patriotism and not yield to the temptation of instant advantage, in the name of preserving our Union as a great community. I am convinced that our people will understand this.

Test Ban Group Assailed for 'Disinformation'

90SV0063A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 14 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by Colonel N. Petrushenko, USSR people's deputy: "0.34 Percent of the Truth—The Way I See the Future of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range"]

[Text] To be understood correctly, I want to make a stipulation right away: I am a confirmed supporter of the nuclear-free world view. This puts me on common ground with the chairman of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" public movement, USSR People's Deputy Olzhas Omarovich Suleymanov. It is another issue that puts us on different sides of the fence—our attitudes toward the fate of the Semipalatinsk test range, as well as toward the necessity of nuclear tests themselves.

I received another confirmation of the same opinion when I met with Academician A. Sakharov, from his words that "a complete ban on nuclear testing would be inappropriate here." I quote here from his last interview, known to our readers as it was published in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. It really seems strange that the president of an antinuclear movement is ignoring the opinion of a humanitarian who was so very realistic in his evaluation of the correlation of world forces.

Neither does he take into account other no less convincing facts, for instance the U.S. 10-year nuclear program, for the realization of which Congress has allocated \$250 billion. The last nuclear test in Nevada proves that the Americans are not going to put an end to the program. It was the fourth in a row and took place on 25 July of this year. And it is not the last in the series of tests.

It has already become obvious that O. Suleymanov supports the idea of a unilateral USSR moratorium on nuclear testing. But what do the country's leaders think about such ideas?

Where will we end up like that? In a dead end, maybe? Until this time the American side failed to respond to the USSR peacemaking measures with similar actions.

It looks as if Olzhas Omarovich stubbornly refuses to understand that closer contact with the test-range scientists would add momentum to the antinuclear movement

and would make it possible to take a new step toward creating a perfect mechanism for controlling nuclear testing.

All means are being used in the fight against the test range, including disinformation. How was it possible to come out with such monstrous and unsubstantiated accusations as human beings being used as guinea pigs? And how can one treat the fact that certain very active participants in the antinuclear movement, after completing prison terms for murder, immediately demanded compensation from the test-range scientists for their ruined health on the TV and in the press? Or here is another "revelation": After one of the explosions, thousands of children developed nosebleeds, and 70,000 Semipalatinsk residents lost their water supply. Unfortunately, all these tales get widely publicized, and it is understandable that they may cause indignation. Some groups of workers even send donations to the antinuclear movement bank account.

As for the radiation situation at the test range and its vicinity, let me state some facts here that so far few readers are aware of.

The radiation situation map has been declassified. Background radiation levels at the range and especially around it are within normal limits. This can be proven by data of the non-agency commission headed by A. Tsyba, and by the results of soil tests carried out by independent laboratories. The representatives of the antinuclear movement know all this quite well and have agreed with the researchers' conclusions. They have not attempted to disprove the information. And one more thing: Every month, employees of the rayon Sanitary and Epidemiologic Station send 150 samples of soil, water, and produce from the areas bordering on the range to be analyzed in the oblast laboratories. And if the 250,000 tons of hay mowed annually on the territory of the range are radioactive, as movement activists insist, why have the laboratories then never uttered a word of concern?

There is one more argument that Olzhas Omarovich resorts to: The sensitivity of the measuring gauges at the test range has been intentionally lowered. What can we do to respond to such a serious accusation? We need to appeal to the Leningrad Procuracy to sue the authors of the allegation. But the Procuracy is tired of unfounded accusations. Besides, the DRG-01T gauge used at the range by myself and other deputies was working quite well. It did not fail either in the Kremlin or at the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" headquarters, or in the plane that took us to Semipalatinsk.

What they are still hiding from the public is not the "small doses," as Suleymanov claims, but the fact that all test explosions result in only 0.34 percent of the radiation to which a human being is constantly exposed. This fact is in accordance with the data of a UN scientific committee studying the effects of nuclear radiation. Who is responsible for the other 99.66 percent? The balance is given to us mostly by Mother Nature, as well as by our

negligence. The results of a gamma mapping in Semipalatinsk are a graphic example of this. It was discovered that some streets there have a "background" hundreds of times stronger than that of the test-range wells. At the reinforcement plant, whose leaders had so strongly denounced the test range, they found reinforcement that is evidently radioactive. How can they hide all this?

As you know, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet deputies decided not to allow radioactive waste on the territory of the republic, a decision that can very easily be considered purely emotional. But the problem was expressed, and it will reappear many times yet. In Kazakhstan alone there are almost 80,000 sources of radioactive waste. What should we do? Should we build special grounds to bury it? But hardly anyone would feel happy living next door to such a site.

The results of the first stage in test-range history—the period of surface and air test explosions—are a different matter. These results can and should be made public. Only one thing remains unclear: Why does the printed organ of the antinuclear movement—the IZBIRATEL [VOTER]—fail to display such an initiative? Can it be that such information might be of a disadvantage to those who try to stir up emotions?

My conviction is that the revival of nuclear energetics is inevitable. But as it is being temporarily rejected at present, we have to do some serious thinking about doing away with people's nuclear ignorance. For that we have a powerful scientific potential and technological capabilities, which can ensure the safety of facilities generating ionizing radiation. There are several thousand such facilities in Kazakhstan. The test range is only one of them, and it is not any more or less dangerous than others. But, as with all of them, it needs to be treated with respect. It is a facility that with time can become the pride of the republic, just as the test range in Nevada is the pride of many U.S. citizens.

Vladimir Bogachev on Nuclear Weapons in Europe

*LD1709214190 Moscow TASS in English 2048 GMT
17 Sep 90*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, September 17 (TASS)—Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson told the congress of the Social Democratic Workers' Party in Stockholm that practical preconditions were now ripe for creating a new European peace order and called for the withdrawal of shorter range nuclear weapons from European territory.

The nuclear arms issue, as regards weapons with a range below 500 kilometers, has for a long time served as litmus paper to define with great precision the actual attitude of one or another country to disarmament.

After the Soviet Union and the United States signed the intermediate nuclear force treaty, the Soviet Union proposed holding talks on nuclear weapons with a range below 500 kilometers.

The United States categorically turned down that initiative. In April 1989, Pentagon chief Richard Cheney described the proposal to hold negotiations on shorter range nuclear weapons as a dangerous trap and declared himself against holding any such talks in [the] foreseeable future.

Moreover, Washington announced plans to modernise land-based shorter range missiles in order to compensate for reductions under the INF Treaty.

However, nothing lasts under the moon, as the saying goes. Under the pressure of developments in Europe, the U.S. stance towards shorter range nuclear weapons has undergone changes.

President Bush eventually said the United States was ready to begin negotiations on the fate of these weapons, but only after signing an agreement of conventional arms in Europe.

Washington officials hurried to specify that such negotiations should not aim at the complete elimination of shorter range weapons, as the Soviet Union had proposed.

Americans gave up some provisions of their flexible response concept, which envisaged the use of shorter range nuclear weapons in the early phases of any armed conflict in Europe. The United States has also renounced plans to modernise its shorter-range lance missiles and its nuclear artillery.

Nevertheless, the road towards negotiations on shorter-range nuclear weapons has not become much easier. Last June, NATO turned down the Soviet proposal to begin talks on shorter-range nuclear arms in Autumn of 1990, regardless of the time when the conventional arms accord may be signed.

While the Soviet Union withdrew 500 nuclear charges from Eastern Europe, the United States is working on a plan to deploy in Western Europe another 400 nuclear missiles, borne by F-15, F-16 and F-111 aircraft. Taking into account the range of these aircraft, air-to-ground missiles will be able to reach installations deep within Soviet territory.

The Soviet Union decided in 1990 to further reduce its shorter range nuclear forces in Europe unilaterally. It set no pre-conditions and aimed at creating favourable conditions for talks.

Moscow believes that a real opportunity is now offering itself for a radical reduction of shorter range nuclear forces in Europe. The realization of Swedish Minister Sten Andersson's proposal to withdraw shorter range nuclear weapons from Europe would be a major step towards stronger peace and stability on the continent.

Petrovskiy Outlines UN's Arms Control Concerns

*PM2009122190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4*

["Speech by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy at Meeting With the Press," place and date not given: "UN General Assembly Session Opens"]

[Excerpts] The United Nations is the central forum for multilateral diplomacy. Sessions of its General Assembly, which traditionally open on the third Tuesday in September—18 September this year—are called upon to sum up the political results of the year and to map out guidelines for the future.

First: The main thing that distinguishes this session from the previous ones is the unique situation in the world. Complications are accompanying the entry into a period of peace. Today the specter of destabilization has emerged in the Near East, tomorrow it may arise somewhere else. Nevertheless, mankind believes in the possibility of making peace permanent. After having unanimously advocated in November 1989, on the initiative of the USSR and the United States, an end to confrontation and cold war, the United Nations now has the opportunity to engage in creative work. [passage omitted]

Fourth. We expect weighty new decisions from the General Assembly. Taken together, they will firmly enshrine the emergence of the United Nations onto a plateau of cooperation.

The session will vigorously continue the process that has begun of the **demilitarization** of international relations. In this sense it is important to ensure that it helps to build up the existing momentum in the settlement of regional conflicts, in channeling them toward political solutions, and in lowering the level of military confrontation in various parts of the world.

A promising direction is UN cooperation with regional organizations for the maintenance of security. The reliability of peace is increased if they complement each other. The USSR and U.S. idea—you have probably noted it—of creating new regional security structures in the Persian Gulf region in the future is also no accident.

There will be no decrease in the attention paid to **disarmament** problems. The main aim here is for disarmament to globally embrace all categories of weapons and to ensure that all countries, including the developing countries, contribute to arms reductions.

Special emphasis at the session will be placed on the transition to the prohibition of nuclear tests and on nonproliferation in all its dimensions—nuclear, chemical, and missile.

The United Nations is elaborating a ramified system of international standards of openness in the military sphere. At the session the USSR will submit data regarding its military budget in accordance with the

standardized accounting system adopted in the United Nations. We are also taking part in elaborating under UN auspices an international register of conventional arms sales and deliveries. [passage omitted]

Bogachev Analyzes Future of NATO, Warsaw Pact

*LD1809210590 Moscow TASS in English 2054 GMT
18 Sep 90*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, September 19 (TASS)—The call of the Warsaw Pact member-countries for adjusting constructive interaction between the two military alliances in Europe in the interests of creating a new security system has met with favourable reception in the West.

During the NATO session in London, a proposal was put forth to work out a joint declaration, stating that the two alliances were not enemies.

Initiatives advanced by the two sides are beginning to bear the first concrete fruit—in Vienna, consultations have begun between representatives of NATO and WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] member-countries on matters relating to the joint declaration.

The Soviet side hopes that the new forum in Vienna will open channels for a new constructive dialogue, strengthen mutual trust and contribute to bridging the post-war rift in Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation bear joint responsibility for solving global problems in Europe and the world.

In their work, they should proceed from the fact that the stability of the situation in Europe can be secured only by political means.

Participants in the joint declaration, which is now being worked out, must confirm their intention to abstain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country and from any other actions incompatible with the aims of the principles of the U.N. Charter and the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

It is not ruled out that NATO and WTO will continue to exist for some time to come, perhaps even for a longer period than can now be foreseen.

The declaration under preparations should lay down in a legal form the transition from military confrontation to cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in maintaining stability.

During the Moscow conference of the Political Consultative Committee, WTO member-countries stated that the conditions were right for overcoming the bloc security system.

In this connection, they decided to begin the revision of the functions and activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation with the aim of turning the alliance into a political union par excellence.

NATO ministers, on the contrary, stressed at their meeting in Turnberry "the immutability of the alliance's basic traits." They stressed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation would remain "the cornerstone" in maintaining a new order in Europe.

As regards bodies created by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), they are expected to perform the functions transferred to them by NATO.

As regards bodies created by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), they are expected to perform the functions transferred to them by NATO.

The Soviet side favours more intensive, more effective character for the work of the 35 CSCE member-countries. There are no differences over the prospects for the development of the two alliances. However, both WTO and NATO member-countries have already arrived at the conclusion that confrontational tendencies of the past are no longer consistent with the spirit of the times.

A joint declaration by NATO and WTO on these matters will facilitate taking joint practical steps towards the full normalisation of the situation in Europe.

Stronger Trust Seen Between NATO, Warsaw Pact

*PM1909133590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Sep 90 First Edition p 3*

["Observer's Opinion" by Colonel V. Markushin:
"Result and Target"]

[Text] A new forum has started work in Vienna. NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives have started drafting a joint declaration which could formally define the nature of relations between the two alliances as partners in ensuring European security rather than as likely adversaries. Not only is the inclusion of such a fundamental question on the 23 countries' agenda the result of the path already traveled, it also serves as a target for the subsequent peace offensive.

Of course, certain analysts who claim that military tension is directly dependent upon the quantity of stockpiled weapons are right. But those who consider military tension is generated by political tension are even more right, in my opinion. That is corroborated by life itself. The era of Soviet-American confrontation is now a thing of the past and the attention paid by the public to Geneva and Vienna—the cities where the specialists continue their intensive search for ways of agreement on arms cuts, both nuclear and conventional—has somehow waned. It is not that we have ceased to desire

a world without weapons. But other complex topics and other lofty ideas are already coming to the fore.

The universal attention being paid to the political solution of the German question is a graphic case in point. For several decades the border between the two German states was a line of confrontation between the two large military groupings, equipped with the most advanced hardware and at a high state of readiness to go to war. There were no "more likely" adversaries. There were specific corps, divisions, and battalions rehearsing their combat tasks, pegged to specific terms of reference, year in, year out. The propaganda machine was well oiled....

But a comment current several years ago has now slipped imperceptibly out of use: Namely, that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish maneuvers and exercises from the real deployment of troops for the start of war. Although that is so, the former nervousness has disappeared, no sense of danger is being fueled, and mutual trust has strengthened.

All this is the result of a lofty policy, responsible statements, and bold political moves. One more such responsible statement is in the offing—the joint statement on behalf of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. When it is drafted, a time of substantial progress toward a new peaceful order in Europe will arrive.

Bogachev: Nuclear Test Ban Remains 'Elusive'

*LD2009134490 Moscow TASS in English 1316 GMT
20 Sep 90*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, September 20 (TASS)—The U.S. House of Representatives has declared for an immediate resumption of Soviet-American talks on a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests.

The amendment to the bill on military appropriations, adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives on Tuesday by 234 votes against 182, states that the United States should inform the Soviet Union of its intention to resume the bilateral talks on nuclear weapon tests. These talks could quickly lead to a treaty for a verifiable comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests.

The complete ban on nuclear testing would be the simplest and most effective measure for arms control.

The world community is faced with the task of reducing and eliminating nuclear arms stockpiles and of looking for the ways to prevent the replenishment of nuclear arsenals. Nuclear tests speed up the arms race. Their termination would stop the creation of new systems of weapons of mass destruction and would prevent upgrading old systems.

The Soviet Union more than once stated its readiness for any negotiations that would promote a universal and

complete ban on nuclear explosions. It is prepared to take any measures that would help achieve a mutually acceptable solution.

Moscow, for instance, proposed lowering the yields of test explosions and the maximum number of tests per year. For 18 months, from August 1985 through February 1987, the Soviet Union has been observing a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, urging the United States to follow suit.

The Soviet Union is prepared to resume a moratorium on nuclear explosions on a reciprocal basis with the United States. The Soviet Union has already substantially cut its programme of nuclear testing. There have been no nuclear explosions at Soviet test ranges for about a year.

There are now particularly favourable conditions for settling the question of nuclear tests. The cold war is fading into the past. The main obstacles with which the U.S. justified its refusal to agree to complete a ban on nuclear explosions have been eliminated.

Washington should no longer be concerned about problems involved in verifying the observance of a ban on explosions. The Soviet Union is prepared to accept any verification procedure. The Soviet Union and the United States have accumulated vast experience in monitoring arms control agreements. Experiments by Soviet and American specialists to verify yields of nuclear explosions were a success.

Many leaders of Western countries and numerous public organisations the world over now declare for a complete ban on nuclear testing.

Meanwhile the talks in Geneva have approached a stage where their further progress is complicated by differences in the final goals pursued by the sides. The Soviet Union sees the main task to be banning tests, while the U.S. side only seeks to work out measures to monitor their continuation. Spokesman for the U.S. State Department Paul Robinson recently said that tests ensure the reliability of nuclear arms, while nuclear arms ensure stability in the world. An end to nuclear explosions remains elusive.

Is not it time for the U.S. Administration to relate its stance on nuclear testing to present-day realities?

U.S. CW Withdrawal From FRG Aids Treaty

*PM2109102990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Sep 90 Second Edition p 4*

[Report by unidentified correspondent: "Farewell to Arms. U.S. Military Toxins Removed From FRG"]

[Excerpts] Bonn, 19 September—Two large U.S. transport ships left Nordenheim at the mouth of the Weser River last night on the long trip to the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. In their holds are special containers with 102,000 artillery shells primed with combat toxins.

Thus, all U.S. chemical weapons [CW] have been withdrawn from the FRG. Because there are no such weapons in the GDR, the forthcoming unification of Germany will not be burdened by the problem of chemical weapons.

As is well known, the shells were stored at U.S. Army stockpiles in the Rhineland Palatinate. [passage omitted]

The withdrawal of U.S. chemical weapons from the FRG is undoubtedly a notable practical step along the road to banning and scrapping the means of warfare and ridding Europe and the world of the potential threat they pose. The 102,000 shells are to be destroyed on Johnston Atoll.

Chernyshev on NATO Reductions in Germany

*LD2109125890 Moscow TASS in English 1241 GMT
21 Sep 90*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, September 21 (TASS)—Plans to reduce troops deployed in Germany are being announced in one NATO country after another. President Francois Mitterrand stated, during a meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl, that France intended to cut its Armed Forces in Germany by 50 percent during the first stage of troop reduction. Great Britain, Belgium and Canada announced a partial withdrawal of troops from Western "frontline defences" in Europe. Referring to White House information, a spokesman of the State Chancery of the West German Land of Bavaria said that about 60,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from the Federal Republic.

All these plans are to be welcomed. Bonn's declaration that the foreign military presence should be reduced in a future united Germany is very important. The forthcoming cuts can be regarded as a gradual NATO renunciation of the "frontline defence" concept, which envisages huge NATO military concentrations along the line between the two blocs.

Such a deployment of NATO armed forces has always alarmed the East, because it increased the danger of a surprise attack. The Soviet Union repeatedly offered to establish a zone of reduced military deployment along the border of the two blocs and to leave only defensive forces there. However, the West turned a deaf ear to these initiatives. But now Western leaders appear to recognise that "frontline" troops should be reduced.

The new unilateral NATO initiatives should improve the situation at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe. It should be recalled that the West refused to discuss reducing the numerical strength of armed forces from the very beginning of the talks. The first step to approximate the positions of all sides on this question was made by the United States. It moved to cut the numerical strength of Soviet and American forces to definite levels. The second step was the agreement reached between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl

on the maximum numerical strength of united Germany's armed forces, which means a reduction of the Bundeswehr and GDR National Army from a total of 600,000 men to 370,000.

NATO countries have now declared that they are prepared to discuss at the second stage of the conference the numerical strength of the armed forces of parties to the Vienna talks. But recent events have shown that contemporary realities do not fit into preset Western patterns. Life is making substantial revisions in the positions of the sides. And it is very important that this is realised in NATO countries. They not only realise it, but are making practical steps in this direction.

Limits on United German Armed Forces Viewed

*LD2109164190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0930 GMT 21 Sep 90*

[From the "International Situation: Questions and Answers" program, presented by foreign political commentator Yuriy Isayev, with political observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Excerpts] [Isayev] Our mailbag continues to contain many letters about the problem of the unification of Germany. I would even say that in connection with the fact that the final meeting between the foreign ministers of the two German states and the four powers of the anti-Hitler coalition took place in Moscow last week the number of such letters has risen. We have letters from Comrades Tyuterin, from the town of Orekhovo-Zuyevo; Artsebasov, from the town of Kuvandyk, Orenburg Oblast; Ryzhko, from Minsk; Gerashchenko and Tsiganko, from Kharkov; and many, many others. I have asked our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver to answer their letters.

[Zholkver] [passage omitted] I would like to dwell on the question which has been asked by our regular listener, war veteran Comrade Gerashchenko. He asks why we withdrew our proposal about the neutrality of a united Germany. I would not say that we withdrew it. It is just that in present conditions it did not meet with support. There were various reasons for this. Paris and London considered that German neutrality could spoil its close

economic links with France and Great Britain. Washington considered that German neutrality would complicate U.S. relations with Western Europe. Among the Germans themselves, many expressed the fear that a Germany that is not a member of any alliance could become a factor of instability in Europe.

Comrade Gerashchenko is concerned that it is proposed that a united Germany will be a member of NATO. However, one cannot but see that NATO has recently become something quite different. Comrade Gerashchenko himself reminds us that the NATO countries are preparing to conclude a nonaggression treaty with the Warsaw Pact member states. True, he remarks that a nonaggression treaty existed in the past between the USSR and Germany and was perfidiously violated by Hitler. But can one look only to the past?

The situation in Europe and in the world as a whole is totally different today. Let me remind you that at the talks in Vienna the representatives of the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are finishing off drafting an agreement on a considerable reduction of the armed forces and armaments of both alliances in Europe. And, in general, these alliances are increasingly actively changing from military groupings into political ones.

As far as directly concerns Germany, let me note that the treaty signed in Moscow by the foreign ministers of the six states limits the size of its armed forces to 370,000 men instead of the present 600,000. Moreover, Germany renounces nuclear and any other mass destruction weapons. Our troops will be located on the territory of what is now the GDR for the transitional period, until the end of 1994, and then no foreign troops will be stationed on this territory.

Now I will touch upon questions concerning our bilateral relations with the future united Germany. That same Comrade Gerashchenko asks whether Germany will pay compensation for the damage caused to our country by the war unleashed by Hitler. First of all, I shall note that there is no way in which compensation can be made for the death of millions of our fellow citizens. This was stated by FRG Foreign Minister Genscher in an interview with me during the meeting of the Six in Moscow. As far as concerns reparations for economic losses, these were paid in the past by both German states, in money, in goods, in vessels, and in equipment from dismantled enterprises.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Poison Gas Plant Plans to Libya Intercepted

AU1709093190 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
17 Sep 90 p 16

[Text] The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has prevented the sale of construction plans for a poison gas plant to Libya. Officials of the Cologne authority had observed the negotiations for the sale since spring. The Libyan Embassy in Bonn was offered files with plans of project "33/85," which in the mid-1980's had been sold to Iraq by the Hamburg company W.E.T. for about 20 million Deutsche marks. The factory, which is declared as a plant for the "production of pesticides," probably produces basic substances for the nerve gases tabun and sarin. At that time a W.E.T. employee put a copy of the files aside—the originals were impounded in a nationwide action in 1987—and left it with one of his friends in Hamburg as "pension insurance," who offered the papers to various organizations and countries. In the process of his activities, the man from Hamburg—in the view of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, he is an amateur who wanted to earn some money quickly—came to the attention of the investigators, who have now seized the files.

Genscher Welcomes CW Removal From FRG

LD2009153190 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1205 GMT 20 Sep 90

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has welcomed the withdrawal of U.S. poison gas [CW] from the FRG as a step on the path to a world free of chemical weapons. It is in harmony with the policy of the Federal Government "which is in favor of a comprehensive and worldwide ban on chemical weapons at the earliest possible date," Genscher stressed on Thursday in a letter of thanks to all involved, who "contributed with a sense of responsibility to a withdrawal without incident." "The FRG is now free of chemical weapons," Genscher stressed.

The minister addressed particular thanks to U.S. President Bush and to his predecessor, President Reagan, whose understanding and support made possible the early withdrawal.

MBB Said Main Supplier of Weapons to Iraq

Missiles, CW, BW Arms

AU2409114090 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
24 Sep 90 pp 32-34

[Unattributed report: "Hit With Roland"]

[Text] For weeks Bonn's diplomats in Washington tried to rebut U.S. criticism of German weapons deliveries to Iraq. Then they ran out of arguments.

In an urgent note on 7 September they asked the Foreign Ministry for "orders" on how the embassy should parry further attacks. "Detailed questions and harsh reproaches" against the German "merchants of death" are to be expected in particular from the "administration, Congress, and the public." Thus, the Senate will soon publish a list of 132 companies that have delivered to Iraq—among them are 68 companies from the FRG alone.

Bonn's defense, which was bureaucratically outlined in the summer in a "purchasing decree," was no longer sufficient. The "embassy would be grateful for additional instructions."

However, tricks and nice words cannot whitewash what German greed for exports has done: Hardly any other country has supplied Middle East despot Saddam Husayn so comprehensively with highly dangerous equipment for the production of nerve gases and biological weapons and with nuclear technology.

The poison gas scandal in particular may put a strain on German-U.S. relations. The U.S. intelligence services are bitter that their repeated information about dangerous German weapons deliveries did indeed arrive at the Chancellor's Office, but business went on as usual. The Israeli Embassy in Bonn also continuously sent information to the FRG Government.

One example was the Al-Rabitah poison gas plant for Libya's dictator Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi or the shipments of nerve gas facilities to Husayn. For three years the Americans and the Israelis bombarded Bonn with information about the factories in Iraq—only then were investigations initiated. It took another three years until the suspected poisoners were arrested.

The situation is escalating. The Federal Intelligence Service (BND) recently briefed the Americans about an alarming suspicion: According to a secret expert report by Swiss Professor Werner Richarz, the poison gas plants at Iesa, Meda, and Ghazi that were delivered by German businessmen can also be used for the production of prussic acid. The Ani and Mohamed large installations, which were built with German help, have already been "expanded for the synthesis of tabun." "Various documents" also prove that the combat agents "tabun and lewisite" are already being produced.

According to intelligence service analyses, Iraq is currently producing highly concentrated prussic acid. The poison is able to destroy the filters of gas masks. The Americans and British hurriedly started to improve their protective equipment for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons so that they can withstand filter killers.

Not only are individual firms such as Imhausen, deliverer to Al-Rabitah, destroying the reputation of the world's biggest export nation; the large concerns also have few scruples, but they have better cover.

A top address for the discreet deals is the arms company Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) in Ottobrunn. MBB is earning billions through the sale of war materiel to Iraq.

In the United States MBB is increasingly being targeted. U.S. experts judge the "alleged deliveries" of MBB for a "fuel air explosive" project (FAE) as "particularly critical," the embassy reported in a coded telex to the Bonn Foreign Ministry at the beginning of September.

The alleged project exists: FAE is some sort of gasoline bomb, which distributes its liquid content very thinly as an aerosol and produces a blast wave upon ignition that corresponds to that of a small nuclear bomb. The explosive was tested on the MBB test site in Schrobenhausen.

The "FAE warheads are extremely dangerous and destructive," says British technical expert David Saw—the ideal weapon to clear large mine fields or to use "against aircraft and troops in aircraft."

According to intelligence service reports, the Iraqis are the first Third World nation to have this MBB product. They got it via circuitous routes. The bomb was destined for Egypt—blueprints and test documents were all sent by MBB to the customer in Cairo. The Egyptians passed the documents on to Baghdad, which then immediately started to build the warheads.

MBB allegedly did not know of the Arab connection and claims to have left the project at the beginning of 1988.

Maybe, but the pattern is striking: Deliverers are primarily foreign companies or countries and the MBB experts remain discreetly in the background. With MBB know-how, Iraq developed, for instance, an intermediate-range missile that could reach Cairo, Tehran, or the archenemy Israel.

Again, it was a confusing game around the globe. First, the people from Munich successfully applied for the development of the Argentinian Condor 1 missile. When it became all too clear that the Argentinians were working on a military missile program, MBB had to cease cooperation as a result of pressure from Bonn and Washington.

However, MBB missiles experts secretly stayed in business. They resigned and were hired by Condor contractors of the Ottobrunn concern. Hidden behind a complicated conglomerate of small and letter-box companies, the former MBB people developed the Condor 2 missile with a range of about 1,200 km.

For years MBB has had close contacts with the companies of its former employees.

According to a BND report of 15 March, some of the former MBB employees are suspected of currently aiding Iraq—via Pakistan—in building up its nuclear technology. "The employees," MBB insists "left the company in a normal way and have not received any orders from MBB."

The German weapons company (6.27 billion marks [DM] turnover, 23,938 employees), which has belonged to Daimler-Benz since 1989, is a sort of Bavarian state company and can rely on its political friends.

The Free State is the second largest shareholder and holds almost 20 percent, and prominent Christian Social Union members have always been represented on the board of directors. For many years current Minister President Max Streibl had been head of the control body; at the moment Finance Minister Gerold Tandler represents the Bavarian Government.

When rumors crop up about the company, Tandler says: "Nothing is being hidden, nothing is being dragged out, everything that can be published is published." According to a company spokesman, in all those years there have "never been any investigations of MBB by public prosecutors, only checks and special checks."

The DM77 million participation in the construction of the largest Arab military research center in the Iraqi town of Al-Mawsil, for instance, where missiles, airplanes, and nuclear technology are being developed, is not a case for the Bavarian judiciary. While investigations are carried out of Bielefeld general agent Gilde-meister Projecta GmbH, the "most important German subcontractor" (Economics Minister Helmut Haussmann) MBB, without whom nothing could have happened in Al-Mawsil, remains unmolested.

Another example: Even though the export of combat helicopters to Iraq is not permitted, MBB became one of the most important helicopter suppliers for the Iraqi Army—and the judiciary did nothing.

According to investigations by the renowned British technical journal FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, Baghdad ordered 75 antitank and liaison helicopters of the MBB-brand BO-105 alone. During an operation in the Baseh Gorge in 1988, the helicopters were reportedly used to destroy Iraqi Kurds.

Sometimes, the helicopters are first sent around the world before they reach Baghdad. In 1988 MBB sold 16 helicopters of the BK-117 type to Iraq, "a multipurpose helicopter of the new generation, can be used for all purposes" (MBB brochure).

However, first the helicopters were sent to Philadelphia, to the helicopter corporate subsidiary. From there they reached Baghdad via Great Britain.

The FRG Finance Ministry, which is responsible for customs matters, thought that the roundabout way was strange. In a request for legal aid, Bonn asked the United States to explain the deal. The Americans did not find anything suspicious.

MBB claims that the complicated transport was made for "time, capacity, and economic (dollar exchange rate)

reasons. In addition, the helicopters are relief helicopters. The company stressed that combat helicopters were not delivered, "the relevant export regulations" have always been observed.

Maybe, but the alibi is not worth much: The miraculous transformation always takes place abroad. Thus, at the beginning of the 1980's, for instance, 24 helicopters of the BO-105 type were delivered to the Spanish company Casa. Casa equipped the helicopters with Swiss Oerlikon cannons and sent the aircraft to Iraq. The company leadership in Ottobrunn allegedly did not learn anything about it. The Spanish company, it was said, acquired export and licensing rights and acted "on its own responsibility."

Maybe, but at that time MBB held about 11 percent of Casa.

The most profitable MBB deal with Iraq is completely legal and is carried out via Euromissile, the German-French sales company which was founded in 1972 (MBB share: 50 percent). Via Euromissile, Saddam Husayn bought 5,000 antitank missiles and 166 missile launchers of the internationally coveted tank-cracker "Hot" and 4,564 units of the identical system "Milan."

Baghdad ordered 1,050 of the particularly accurate German-French "Roland" antiaircraft missiles. That order alone was worth about DM5 billion.

The system has already stood its test in the Gulf region. In the war against Iran the Iraqis shot large numbers of Persian pilots from the sky with "Roland." The Iranians flew U.S. combat planes—machines of the same type that are now used by the U.S. Navy in the Gulf region.

Government Investigating

AU2409120490 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1100 GMT 24 Sep 90

[Text] The Federal Government in Bonn is examining charges that the Munich-based arms concern Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm [MBB] is involved in the delivery of a new gasoline bomb to Iraq. The case is being examined in the Economics and Foreign Ministries, government spokesmen said in Bonn today. The suspicion against MBB has so far not been confirmed, they said.

MBB Denies Allegations

LD2409165690 Hamburg DPA in German 1522 GMT
24 Sep 90

[Excerpt] Ottobrunn (DPA)—The management of the Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH (MBB) in Ottobrunn, near Munich, has still no proof of illegal or unlawful procedures in the export of defense technology. "With that statement, the weapons manufacturer today reacted to the latest reports in the news magazine DER SPIEGEL on weapons exports to Iraq. The accusations made in DER SPIEGEL did not take into account the fact that the deliveries referred to took place during the war between Iran and Iraq, the statement says. All trade relations with Iraq were broken off at the latest after the UN embargo. They were old accusations against MBB, in addition to the accusation they had been developing a new kind of bomb.

MBB states that no new kind of bomb has been developed. The 'Fuel-Air-Explosive-Project' quoted in the report comprised studies of warheads used in guided weapons. "Studies and technical documents did not require authorization. Also, MBB did not pass on production documents or deliver a finished produce to the client, Consen/PBG, acting on behalf of Egypt. The studies were ended in 1988, MBB declared. DER SPIEGEL reported that the MBB product "which causes a pressure wave similar to that of a small nuclear bomb" had been transported to Iraq via Egypt.

MBB is not participating in the production of atomic, biological, or chemical weapons, the firm's statement says, of which the Daimler-Benz concern has owned a majority stake since 1989. The French firm Euromissile, Paris was "the authorized manufacturer of the guided weapon system Roland, Hot, and Milan referred to in the report as part of Franco-German contracts." MBB was a supplier to Euromissile. The company exported guided weapons "within French law as part of a treaty between France and Iraq."

MBB had not sold combat helicopters or armed helicopters to Iraq and "MBB helicopters were not converted to combat helicopters either." MBB refers to a licensing agreement with the Spanish firm Casa at the end of the seventies. Afterward, Casa concluded a contract with Iraq. Those Bo-105 helicopters "had, as far as we know, been equipped with weapons as they are used in the Spanish Army." With its deliveries MBB had not been one of the most important helicopter suppliers of the Iraqi Army; the majority of the helicopters used there are Soviet, French, and American. [passage omitted]

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