


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18 SEPTEMBER 1990



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JPRS Report

Arms Control

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ANGOLA

Army Chief Denies Claims of Chemical Warfare

*MB3008201290 Luanda Domestic Service
in Portuguese 1900 GMT 30 Aug 90*

[Text] The FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] chief of General Staff this afternoon categorically denied UNITA's [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] Lisbon claims that the Angolan Air Force has been bombing its bases in southeast Angola.

In a communique, the FAPLA chief of general staff reaffirmed the Angolan Air Force has never used chemical weapons, adding this has been proven beyond any doubt.

Moreover, since the resumption of the peace talks, FAPLA returned to an active defense stance to facilitate the ongoing negotiation process. In turn, UNITA has been stepping up its armed operations against the people and sabotaging civilian targets to try and secure advantages for the talks.

The communique issued by the FAPLA chief of General Staff concludes by noting it is no accident UNITA is making this claim now, adding UNITA is trying to confuse the public and paralyze the whole peace process.

NATO Multinational Armed Forces Viewed*HK3008021790 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 15, 1 Aug p 10*

[Article by Tian Li (3944 4539): "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Will Establish a Contingent of Multinational Troops"]

[Text] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit which ended in early July adopted a novel resolution: NATO is to scrap the "frontier defense" strategy and organize a contingent of multinational troops. It will be smaller in scale but more mobile than the existing NATO military organization and termed by the Western press "Pan-European troops" or "European troops."

It is known that the multinational forces are armed forces within NATO where its nature is concerned. Organizing such multinational forces is an important measure to reform NATO's organization and military system. The scale of the multinational forces will depend on the results of the negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe and the reduced Soviet military threat. Reportedly, the first step will be to form multinational army-level troops comprised of division-level soldiers from the countries concerned, and the second step will be to form multinational division-level troops. The United States will primarily provide the multinational forces with nuclear troops and rear-service units, while British and French nuclear troops will constitute a special component, protecting their own countries and all of Europe. The multinational forces will be deployed in Germany, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. France, Britain, and Germany will each hold the commander post in turn. The first commander will be a Frenchman, and Americans will not fill the post.

The tentative plan was put forward by U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney. The Pentagon held discussions on the project early this year. Cheney believed that given the sharp change in East Europe, the integrated headquarters under a U.S. four-star general will no longer suit the needs of times. Again, U.S. congressmen are opposed to sending a large number of troops to Europe, and the Soviet Union also calls on the United States to restrict the scale of future German Armed Forces. Under the circumstances, the Bush administration hopes to legalize the U.S. right to station troops in Europe through organizing multinational forces to ensure the United States will have a hand in the affairs in Europe and can safeguard its position as leader of the Western alliance. Therefore, the United States suggested building up a European multinational armed force in an attempt to readjust its relations with Europe. Cheney also tried to change NATO's existing organizational structure under which an army is composed of soldiers of a single country. Under the new system, divisions of different countries will be placed under a reorganized army command post. For instance, an army may be composed of a

U.S. division, a German division, and a British division. This system is the Pentagon's blueprint for future European multinational forces.

The U.S. suggestion about forming a European multinational armed force met with mixed reaction among heads of state and defense ministers of West European countries, who have different mentalities. Germany expressed firm support for the suggestion. The multinational forces will not only be deployed in Germany, but also in other West Europe countries. This will help Germany to improve its image. In addition, the formation of the multinational forces will be different from NATO and will help iron out the difference with the Soviet Union over the military status of a unified Germany and the promotion of German unification. A U.S. official source said: "West German leaders hope the United States will regard the formation of multinational forces as a means to assist the Kohl government."

Britain was not as enthusiastic about the suggestion, but it was not against it. The reason is: Britain will join the multinational forces and will take its turn in assuming the office of the commander, which will be beneficial. Again, Britain will strengthen its military cooperation with France in the related course, thus boosting its status in the European joint defense.

France was a little more enthusiastic about the suggestion than Britain. The reasons are: One, since it possesses independent nuclear forces and powerful conventional troops, it hopes it will become Europe's leader through joining the multinational forces in the capacity of a military power; two, by organizing such a multinational armed force, France will be able to station troops in Germany, thus containing the latter's military expansion.

People will soon witness the emergence of a new multinational armed force on the European Continent, one similar to the UN peace-keeping force (comprised of troops from many countries) but different from the existing NATO military set-up.

Article Warns Against Use of Chemical Weapons*HK0509131490 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese
10 Aug 90 p 3*

[Article by Luo Qingcong (5012 1987 5115): "Guard Against the Threat of Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] With the efforts of many countries, some progress has been made in the present talks on prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union voluntarily exhibited their chemical weapons while the United States made public their chemical weapon destruction devices. Yet, all this has not brought about the light. The disposition and use of one weapon is determined by that weapon's military effects and also many factors, such as political and economic ones. The restrictions made in "talks" or "treaties" (if any) will only result in a new chemical weapon contest at a higher technical level. The

destruction of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States means that the time for the renewal and generation change of chemical weapons has already come, and renewed chemical weapons will pose a more grave threat to world security.

The United States and the Soviet Union have discovered from their long-term nuclear confrontations that neither of them can destroy the other side with the nuclear weapons in hand. Therefore, since the 80's, military experts of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have conducted studies on strategies of how to defeat the other side with the use of non-nuclear forces. After studying the military strategies of the Soviet Army and the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. Army and NATO found out that, with superiority in the number of conventional weapons, the Warsaw Pact would adopt an echelons attack strategy toward NATO. According to this, the U.S. Army decided in 1980 that, no matter in case of attack or defense, stress will always be laid on attacking the enemy's follow-up units in depth behind the enemy lines, which have not been thrown into the battle. This operational principle of "expanding the battlefield" was brought into the theory of "air-ground integration" in 1981. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact, in light of the fact that NATO lacks depth in its defense while defense in the rear area is relatively better, brought up "iron fist tactics" which means that the "rapid reaction troops" get into the zones in depth behind the enemy lines to occupy or destroy command and communications centers, and some major targets, such as nuclear devices, airports, and ports; and create a situation in which enemies and their own people, militaries and civilians are intermixed so that NATO is unable to launch nuclear attacks.

To realize the above-mentioned military strategies, new weaponry and equipment are needed as a guarantee. According to some Western military strategists, new weapons should meet four requirements: mobility, density of fire, saturation functions, and an ability to protect enemy's operational materials (equipment).

Chemical weapons possess a powerful antipersonnel capacity and their area effects are incomparable with other weapons. They can "permeate wherever there is a hole." As a result, with no protection device, shelters cannot be used to protect gas. On the contrary, they will become places liable for gas to build up. In addition, because chemical weapons only function through toxins acting on the physiological process of life, and will do no harm to military installations, bridges, and appliances etc., they are, therefore, of great importance to depth attacks with an occupation intention.

Another feature of chemical weapons is that they possess various kinds of military effects, such as lethality, incapacitation, harassment, quick results, and staying power, and they can be chosen for use according to strategical and tactical needs. For example, in order to stop follow-up troops from assisting or gathering, long-lasting toxins can be used to slow down their movements, or make some important areas impossible for them to use. Under some complex circumstances, such as the one under

which enemies and our own people are intermixed, incapacitating toxins can be used. Harassing toxins can be applied to find out whether or not there are enemies laying in ambush, and it can also be used to dispel enemies from strong fortifications to be taken. Of course, the power of chemical weapons will be greatly reduced on troops with protection capacity, yet a sudden use can still produce certain effects.

Regarding discharge systems, there are various kinds with chemical weapons, and different discharge systems can be adopted according to different needs. Flexibility and mobility in the use of chemical weapons are great.

Though nuclear weapons possess a great power, it is often inconvenient to use when "depth attacks" are being carried out, or under the circumstances in which enemies and our own people, militaries and civilians are intermixed. Therefore, chemical weapons will occupy a distinctive position in the future weapon family. This may be one of the important reasons why the United States has declared its intention to continue its production of chemical weapons after ceasing the production for 18 years.

Envoy to CD Calls for Elimination of Chemical Weapons

OW2508020990 Beijing XINHUA in English
0130 GMT 25 Aug 90

[Text] Geneva, August 24 (XINHUA)—A senior Chinese official called today for a comprehensive ban and elimination of chemical weapons, which he said is the basic critical objective of disarmament talks.

Chinese representative Hou Zhitong, speaking at the closing of the summer Conference of the Disarmament [CD] talks, said the discussions will resume and produce new results as long as the fundamental aim and common basis of a comprehensive ban and elimination of chemical weapons are upheld.

He said this year's disarmament talks, held against the backdrop of great international changes, were expected by the international community to make new contributions to halt the [word indistinct] race and accelerate arms cuts.

Hou praised the summer conference for its valuable work and positive results. However, he said, all these are still far from the overall expectations and responsibilities.

He expressed regret that many agenda topics have not entered substantive negotiations and that the issue of nuclear disarmament, in particular, has not been a preferential topic.

The Chinese representative said the disarmament talks should operate under the U.N. charter, with equality, justice and mutual respect as their principles, and should not be marred by political or ideological differences.

The summer conference, which opened on June 12, was attended by representatives from 40 member nations.

SOUTH KOREA

European-Style Arms Control Viewed for Koreans

SK2808023290 Seoul YONHAP in English 0207 GMT
28 Aug 90

[All punctuation as received]

[Text] Seoul, August 28 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea is reviewing the possibility of applying the European model in arms control talks with North Korea, a high-ranking government official said on Tuesday.

The government sees inter-Korean arms control as a decisive element in reducing tension on the Korean peninsula and thinks it is desirable for the two parts of Korea to adopt the European arms control model, which it considers successful, the official said. The prime ministers of the two Koreas are scheduled to meet in Seoul on Sept. 4-7 to discuss ways of reducing political and military tension on the peninsula. The arms control issue, along with admission to the United Nations, is expected to be a major item on the agenda.

"We are considering applying the European experience to inter-Korean arms negotiations while keeping in mind our particular circumstances," said the official, who declined to be named.

European disarmament talks include negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As part of the review, the Foreign Ministry's Foreign Affairs and National Security Institute will hold an international seminar Oct. 10-11 on "Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: Relevance and Applicability of the European Model." Arms control specialists will present papers at the seminar and there will be debate between the specialists and scholars on inter-Korean arms control, the official said.

Foreign participants will include former Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Holst, who will discuss the lessons and achievements of confidence and security building in Europe; Jonathan Dean, a former U.S. representative to the MBFR negotiations, whose topic is conventional arms reduction negotiations in Europe—past, present and future; and Alexei Arbatov, director of the Soviet Institute of U.S. and Canadian Affairs, who will read a paper on arms control on the Korean peninsula from the superpowers' perspective.

Adam Rotfeld, director of the Stockholm International Peace Institute, will also give a talk, titled "Applicability of the European Arms Control Model to the Korean Peninsula," and James Goodby, a former U.S. ambassador, will read a paper, titled "Confidence and Security Building on the Korean Peninsula—the Agenda for Negotiations." Holst played a major role in the MBFR negotiations and Arbatov is regarded as an influential arms control policy-maker under Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

South Presents Arms Cuts Proposals to North

SK0509062490 Seoul YONHAP in English 0607 GMT
5 Sep 90

[Text] Seoul, September 5 (YONHAP)—Following is a proposal for arms reduction South Korean Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun made in his keynote address Wednesday at the inter-Korean premiers' meeting.

Measures for implementing South-North arms reductions:

- (1) Both the South and the North should transform their offensive military structure into a defensive one. As long as both sides keep their military forces organized and deployed for offensive purposes, it will hardly be possible to verify their commitment to peace nor to prevent another war. Accordingly, both parties should first reduce their offensive military forces. This is essential to preventing a renewal of war due to either a surprise attack or an all-out attack.
- (2) Both the South and the North should agree to possess equal numbers of troops and weapons so that a balance of military power can be maintained. This is because an imbalance in military might increases the danger of renewed war. Accordingly, the side with larger armed forces should first reduce them to the level of the other side to achieve an equilibrium. Both sides should then progressively reduce their Armed Forces by equal numbers.
- (3) Both the South and the North should reduce the number of their troops in accordance with reductions in their arms, while also reducing their reserve and paramilitary forces.
- (4) Both the South and the North should allow, without fail, the other side to conduct on-the-spot verifications and monitoring to ensure that agreed matters regarding arms reductions are implemented. Toward that end, the South and the North should form and operate a joint verification group and permanent monitoring groups.
- (5) The final reduced level of armed forces that both the South and North may maintain should be determined through mutual consultation in consideration of the military capabilities needed by a unified state.

TAIWAN

Spokesman Denies Reports of CW Material Sales to Iraq

OW0309195590 Taipei CNA in English 1604 GMT
3 Sep 90

[Text] Taipei, September 3 (CNA)—The Republic of China [ROC] has never sold arms to Iraq, nor has it provided material to produce chemical weapons [CW] to the Middle Eastern country, a government spokesman reiterated Monday.

Shaw Yu-ming, director general of the government information office, made the statement in response to a TIME magazine report which he dismissed as "completely groundless."

The latest issue of TIME, published Sept. 3, said in a report titled "The [words indistinct] Holds-For Now" that "according to White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, Iraq was getting around the [words indistinct] to obtain military materiel as well as supplies used in the production of chemical weapons."

"Other administration officials said other countries responsible include Libya, Yemen, Taiwan and South Africa," it added. [passage indistinct]

"It is completely groundless for TIME to [word indistinct] Republic of China on Taiwan as one of the

countries responsible for helping Iraq get around prohibitions on obtaining military materials and supplies used in the production of chemical weapons," Shaw said.

The government spokesman reiterated that the Republic of China Government, which is committed to promoting world peace and justice, has never and will never [words indistinct] arms or materials to produce chemical weapons to Iraq, "the country which blatantly used force to invade Kuwait in violation of international law."

The Coordination Council for North American Affairs, (CCNAA) which has represented the Republic of China's interest in the United States since Taipei and Washington suspended ties in 1979, has sent a letter to the magazine to correct the unfounded report, Shaw said. The letter sent by [name indistinct], director of the Information and Communication Division of the CCNAA office in the USA, was addressed to TIME magazine's "Letters to the Editor" department.

BULGARIA**Defense Ministry Denies Possessing Atomic Warheads***AU3108192490 Sofia BTA in English 1749 GMT
31 Aug 90*

[Text] Sofia, 31 August (BTA)—The Bulgarian People's Army has no and has never had any nuclear warheads, says an announcement of the Ministry of National Defence made available to the BTA. The announcement refutes the allegations of foreign politicians about the "presence of nuclear warheads in Bulgaria."

The Bulgarian Army has tactical missile launchers, including eight SS-23's with a range of 500 km. The launchers were delivered by the Soviet Union in 1986, they are Bulgarian property and are not covered by the provisions of the INF Treaty.

Bulgaria has made repeated formal announcements about these launchers. They are supplied with a definite number of conventionally-armed missiles, the announcement says.

The announcement was broadcast on television after U.S. Senator E. Jake Garn (Republican, Utah) made a statement describing the "presence of Soviet SS-23 missiles in Bulgaria as a problem in Bulgarian-U.S. relations."

Talks Held With USSR on CFE, CSCE Talks*AU3108191990 Sofia BTA in English 1831 GMT
31 Aug 90*

[Text] Sofia, 31 August (BTA)—Bulgaria and the Soviet Union held consultations in Sofia on the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] talks and on the talks on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Security in Europe [CSCE].

The Bulgarian delegation was led by Mr. Stefan Staykov, deputy minister of foreign affairs. The Soviet delegation was headed by Mr. Viktor Karpov, deputy minister of foreign affairs.

The two delegations included representatives of the two countries' Defence Ministries.

The Soviet delegation was received by General Atanas Semerdzhiev, vice president of the Republic.

National Security Council Discusses CFE Talks*AU0509131090 Sofia BTA in English 1152 GMT
5 Sep 90*

[Excerpt] Sofia, 5 September (BTA)—The National Security Council held its first meeting today. It was opened by Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic.

The council considered the position of the Bulgarian delegation at the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE]

Talks on the ceilings of the principal types of armaments of the Bulgarian Army. [passage omitted]

Semerdzhev Clarifies Stance at CFE Talks*AU0709184990 Sofia BTA in English 1738 GMT
7 Sep 90*

[Text] Sofia, 7 September (BTA)—Deputy President Atanas Semerdzhiev's briefing today clarified further the issues discussed two days back at the first session of the Council for National Security. It concerned matters related with the position of the Bulgarian delegation at the negotiations on Conventional Military Forces in Europe [CFE] about the admissible limits of the major categories of armaments of the Bulgarian forces approved at the session.

Atanas Semerdzhiev made it clear that the Bulgarian delegation was asked to work for the non-existence in Europe of zones with various degrees of security, for the establishment of the principles of equal security for all countries.

The deputy president of the Republic stressed that Bulgaria's geopolitical and geostrategic position are not given their due at the Vienna negotiations. There is an equality of the forces in the sub-region in which Bulgaria is and inequality in the country's zone of contact with NATO, Atanas Semerdzhiev said. He spoke in favour of a minimum military potential of Bulgaria which should not go below the level of the needs of defence.

European Security Issues, Warsaw Pact Reevaluated*AU1109202490 Sofia ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME
in Bulgarian 7 Sep 90 p 6*

[Article by Atanas Nastev, chief of the General International Issues department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "On Resolving External Security Issues"]

[Text] Over the last decades our country's external security was chiefly regarded as part of the Warsaw Pact members' collective security system and was primarily guaranteed by military and political means.

The newly emerged situation on our continent, however, subjects the reliability of such guarantees to doubt. Europe is in a period of crisis regarding the existing bloc security systems and new roads for a transition to new all-European structures guaranteeing collective security are sought after. The establishment of such structures, however, still belongs to the future. We can hardly expect the Warsaw Pact to preserve its present membership, especially after the reunification of the two German states.

Bulgaria is actively participating in the efforts to adjust the Warsaw Pact organization to the new requirements. Our alliance with the Soviet Union also evokes particular interest under the newly emerging circumstances.

There is no doubt that the USSR is further expected to play an important role in guaranteeing Bulgaria's external security.

The aforementioned factors determine a change in our approach and in the selection of our resources related to guaranteeing Bulgaria's external security. In this connection our own national resources are expected to play a particular role. A special place is assigned to Bulgaria's Armed Forces in this respect. The requirement of maintaining them at the level of reasonable sufficiency for the country's defense is irrevocable. It is determined by our difficult historic inheritance in the Balkans and by the still existing distrust and tension in Bulgarian-Turkish relations, but also by the considerable superiority of the Balkan NATO-members' conventional arms related to Bulgaria.

Along with this, a trend toward underrating the role of the military factor in international relations and our difficult economic situation require Bulgaria's active participation in the European disarmament forums, which applies in particular to the Vienna Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE]. The negotiations between states belonging to the two military-political blocs are aimed at establishing a solid and reliable balance of conventional forces and armaments reduced to lower levels and at the elimination of existing inequalities containing risks for security and stability.

The basic elements of our national stand on a future CFE agreement are as follows:

1. Bulgaria supports accelerated negotiations and the prompt achievement of a first agreement which should be signed at a summit meeting by the end of 1990.
2. The incipient disintegration of the bloc structures and relations requires a relevant reevaluation of continental and regional balances of military forces.
3. Incorporating in the treaty the possibility of deployment of armaments (even in relatively small quantities) from Central Europe, or from the rear areas to the flank regions is likely to undermine the efforts to establish a stable and reliable balance of forces reduced to lower levels in the Balkans.
4. Bulgaria insists on setting up ceilings for armed forces and armaments, not only in Central Europe, but also for the southern flank.
5. None of the sides should be entitled, or have the opportunity to prevail over others in the military sector, either all over the continent, or in individual sub-regions.

Mutually acceptable solutions of these questions are likely to considerably enhance the role of the future treaty related to the consolidation of security for all states participating in the treaty. We consider this treaty as the first cornerstone in building the future common European home. We insist that the second stage of negotiations immediately follow the signing of the treaty.

The process initiated at the Helsinki CSCE plays an important role in building the all-European structures of security. Within the framework of the Helsinki process, and at the summit of the 35 signatory states, expected to be held by the end of 1990, Bulgaria shall particularly strive to resolve the two following ranges of questions related to its national security:

- The adoption of really valid international, political-legal guarantees safeguarding the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of all European states as a basis for the future European security structures.
- Our country's integration with existing and emerging European structures and with the achievements of the developed countries, and European democratic and cultural values.

Some of the already existing West European organizations (such as the EC and the EEC) could become an integral part of the future all-European security structures, considering that they have accumulated valuable experience in integrating countries with different interests and social systems. The Eastern European countries' integration within them would contribute to their all-European image and provide additional guarantees for the stability and security of all nations on the continent. Therefore, Bulgaria adopts active steps for its gradual association with the activities of various Western European integration organizations.

Our country's development and the development of all European countries is entering a period of reassessment and of resolving crucial problems in the security sphere. It should be pointed out that broad international consensus on the crucial national security issues is required so that we may successfully cope with the tasks related to Bulgaria's role in the new Europe.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Still on Schedule

LD3008165190 Prague CTK in English 1543 GMT
30 Aug 90

[Text] Milovice, Central Bohemia, August 30 (CTK)—“The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia continues according to schedule”, Czechoslovak Defence Ministry press spokesman Major Marian Bozik told journalists today.

So far 36,742 soldiers have left Czechoslovakia, i.e. just under 50 per cent of all Soviet troops, and also over a half of the overall number of tanks and military hardware. The last train with military equipment is to leave in February next year, Bozik said.

He noted that the Czechoslovak Government has earmarked 80 million crowns for repairs on the buildings vacated by Soviet troops and 70 million for hydrogeological survey and soil improvement.

The spokesman denied reports about the sale of buildings by the Soviet side, which appeared in Czechoslovak newspapers.

In June, preparations for withdrawal began also at the largest Soviet military base in Czechoslovakia at Milovice northeast of Prague, where 11,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed. 21 tanks and 75 soldiers were prepared there to leave today and another four groups are to go in the next two days. The rest of the tank division is to leave by October 15.

Deputy Minister on Cutting Army by One-Third

*LD0509153990 Prague CTK in English 1401 GMT
5 Sep 90*

[Text] Prague, September 5 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Deputy Defence Minister for Education and Culture Antonin Rasek voiced himself at a press conference here today in favour of about-fifty-per cent professionalization of the Czechoslovak Army.

He added that full professionalization is at present impossible since it depends on modernization of the armed forces and especially on the economic possibilities of the country.

Antonin Rasek said that the numerical strength of the Army will be cut by about one-third, i.e. 69,000 persons which will bring the Army to a level comparable with other European countries.

Journalists were informed at the press conference that by September 1, 1990, as many as 9,380 career soldiers (i.e. 15.3 per cent) were released. 4,904 of them were generals and officers. 51.6 per cent people left the Army on their own request, 23.6 per cent of them did not sign the new oath, 18.5 per cent retired, 3.8 per cent were dismissed for incompetence, and 1.9 per cent for health reasons, seventenths of the overall figure were people under thirty.

Some 640 former army members dismissed after the crushing of the revival process in Czechoslovakia by a Soviet-led invasion on August 21, 1968, have returned to the Army.

Antonin Rasek said he favours cutting military service to 12 months (previously, it lasted two years, but was lowered to 18 months earlier this year).

Journalists were also told that twenty Czechoslovak officers will soon visit the military academy in Koblenz and others will go to the Bundeswehr to study its commanding and managing experience. Similar stays are being discussed with France and Britain.

Krakow Chemical Warfare School Liquidated

*LD0909181890 Warsaw PAP in English 1654 GMT
9 Sep 90*

[Text] Krakow, September 9—The Krakow-based Higher Chemical Warfare School has been liquidated as the first in a series of military schools that are expected to cease activity.

The school's staff has been offered posts in a higher military engineering school which is now being founded in the southwestern city of Wroclaw.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NVA Reportedly Researched Chemical Weapons

*AU2808094290 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
27 Aug 90 pp 55-58*

[Unattributed report: "Coffee Instead of Truth"]

[Text] The area in a forest near Koenigs Wusterhausen, southeast of Berlin, is as strictly guarded as the former GDR border. A double fence, barbed wire, and a fire sector surround the Military Technical Institute of the National People's Army (NVA). For decades, this is where the functioning of all the GDR's military equipment has been checked.

On a 1,500-hectare open-air area, surrounded by military installations of the Soviet Armed Forces, the military tested newly developed products. Here the NVA engineers even had enough room to detonate large-caliber charges.

The area with the highest security level, however, was an inconspicuous gray building on Schenkendorfer Road. Behind heavy iron doors with yellow-black markings were five chemical laboratories, which were independently secured by further double air-locks.

The experiments for which these laboratories are equipped—experiments with ultra-poisons—can be observed only from an anteroom through a bullet-proof window.

In the isolated building, NVA chemists worked with lethal combat agents for years. Equipped with top modern analysis technology of the U.S. computer company Hewlett Packard and basic materials, some of which came from the Darmstadt pharmaceutical concern Merck, the military chemists studied the effects of chemical weapons.

The real purpose of the military laboratories is still being covered up. Lieutenant General Karlheinz Mueller, long-standing head of the Military Technical Institute, which has 250 employees, insists that the military engaged in "completely normal research" in these laboratories.

Four chemists, Mueller admits, also produced chemical poisons "in our laboratories." Combat agents "in small amounts" were delivered by the NVA.

The secrecy in which the now-discovered high-security building is shrouded makes the assurances with which then GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer countered rumors about combat agents being produced in the East at the Paris conference on banning chemical weapons at the beginning of last year seem incredible: "We are not developing them, nor are we producing them."

Karlheinz Lohs, 61, head of the Leipzig research department for chemical toxicology, does not believe that the GDR synthesized combat agents only for testing purposes. The "dimension" of the laboratories "is far too big" for the GDR's requirement for testing, the combat agent expert says.

Combat agent expert Lohs learned only last month about the chemical activities of the NVA. "This opened my eyes," the chemist says, who was always received in the administrative building during previous visits to the Military Technical Institute. During the many technical talks we had, "they nicely served me coffee but not the truth," Lohs states.

Actually, the expert, who headed the elimination of old armaments on GDR territory until 1961, should have known the truth. He served the GDR Government as a scientific adviser for chemical disarmament at the international negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban.

In any case, the NVA had the necessary facilities for testing combat agents. The Chemical Services of the NVA, with their main seat in building number 9E of the Ministry of Disarmament and Defense in Strausberg, coordinated the entire defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In several industrial enterprises of the GDR, such as the Pharmaceutical Works State-Owned Enterprise [VEB] in Dresden, the NVA had chemical basic material produced in special departments. It is unclear whether this included combat agents. An international experts commission, which inspected the Schwarzeide Synthesis Works VEB in Cottbus Bezirk in 1987 to check whether it produced combat agents, did not find anything suspicious.

In Storkow in Brandenburg, the ABC [nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical] military used Europe's largest exercise area for simulated nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks. Bundeswehr officers learned at a recent visit that, from time to time, small amounts of real combat agents, such as sarin, were used during exercises.

An accidental find made by an amateur sailor from Hamburg last month when he landed on the Baltic Sea island Greifswalder Oie, might prove that combat agents were also tested in other places. In an abandoned NVA tower the hiker found documents about ABC exercises.

A training document was left over: "Explain the procedures in detecting nerve-damaging combat agents in dangerous concentrations." And a leftover "report sheet" documented an exercise of 24 February 1989.

According to this, the combat agent sarin and a radioactive radiation with a "dose rate" of 0.5 rem per hour was measured. This corresponds to one-tenth of the value permitted annually for a worker in an FRG power plant.

Of course, the sheet also refers to the use of harmless imitations. At exercises outside of Storkow, only "imitation combat agents" were used—as in all countries that practice defense against poison gas attacks, Colonel Rolf Buettner, chief of the Chemical Services, says.

Scientists like Lohs, however, consider it conceivable that in fact training in the GDR was more harshly oriented toward reality: "There was a dangerous excess of zeal among the military."

The know-how for combat gas was in demand internationally. Thus, NVA officers helped Iraq to acquire a complete exercise field for chemical combat units near Baghdad. Saddam Husayn's Middle East dictatorship, as well as Libya's head of state Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, sought industrial help from the GDR to build production facilities for chemical weapons.

In the mid-1980's, the GDR Foreign Trade Organization had the delivery of a large pesticide factory to Iraq examined. After examining the plans, the Leipzig research department for chemical toxicology recommended that the Leipzig-Grimma Chemical Installation Construction Combine VEB not accept the sensitive order.

Facilities for the production of the low-poison substance BI-58 can, after technically simple reequipment, be used not only for the production of insecticides but also for combat agents. "In the end, we did not make an offer," Foreign Trade Organization manager Hans Schneider claims.

The Stasi [State Security Service] itself obviously worked with ultra-poisons without the knowledge of the NVA military. In a former fire-brigade school in Berlin's Bohnsdorf District, near Schoenefeld Airport, "Civil Defense" was officially accommodated. There, specially treated steel grids for basement shafts were allegedly developed for defense against poison gas.

In fact, the strictly guarded building also housed a department of the Ministry of State Security. In insulated Stasi laboratories, in the middle of the residential area, intelligence service employees also experimented with the combat agent sarin. This is now confirmed by Colonel Wolfgang Trebesius, chief chemist of the "Scientific Center for Civil Defense."

The Stasi chemists reportedly had more than 400 grams of sarin, which is sufficient to kill tens of thousands of people. Trebesius claims that the experiments served precautionary measures against "chemical accidents" in industrial facilities, where "similar poisons" would be released.

The explanation of the civil defense man is hardly convincing. What is completely inexplicable, however, is

what the Stasi people wanted to do with the stocks of the nerve gas VX, which, to the knowledge of poison gas expert Lohs, were still stored in Bohnsdorf last year.

It seems conceivable to experts that the Stasi and the People's Police were dealing with tear gas or nerve gases to crush internal unrest.

"But the use of war poisons would be the absolute height of lunacy," Adolf-Hennig Frucht, 77, one of Lohs' colleagues from West Berlin and a physiology professor, says.

In the meantime, peace has entered the former military center in Koenigs Wusterhausen. NVA man Mueller recently had a new plaque fixed at the entrance: "Institute for Product Examination and Industrial Toxicology" as the company is now called.

In a new color brochure, with a map showing the route to the place, the "comprehensive facilities" are marketed for West German clients. The West Berlin FRG Office for Material Research and Examination soon wants to become a partner of the NVA poison gas headquarters.

On the freshly printed visiting cards, the old and new institute head Mueller now simply calls himself Professor Mueller—the lieutenant general has vanished.

Poison Gas Expert Views NVA Research

AU2808133790 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
27 Aug 90 p 58

[Interview with GDR poison gas expert Karlheinz Lohs by unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "A Kalashnikov in Our Backs"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] As a scientific adviser on chemical disarmament to the GDR Government, you have always stressed at international conferences that there was no chemical weapons research in the GDR. Did you lie, or were you lied to?

[Lohs] Science and I, as a researcher of the Academy of Sciences, were misused as fronts of a clever camouflage.

[DER SPIEGEL] What did you really know?

[Lohs] I did not know the real extent of research in this field in our country. It was only in talks in Defense Minister Eppelmann's Ministry that I was told: Mr. Lohs, initial investigations have shown that we did have chemical weapons research.

[DER SPIEGEL] Could it not be that research was confined to protective measures against ABC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] attacks—gas mask tests, for instance?

[Lohs] The most important poison laboratories in the Koenigs Wusterhausen military technology institute were much too large for a small country such as the GDR. In addition, all the types of ABC equipment and protective devices were known; they were taken over

from the Soviet Union. There was no reason for the GDR to carry out independent research, unless one wanted to offer the big brother something.

[DER SPIEGEL] What was the relationship with the Soviet Union?

[Lohs] Total isolation. To my knowledge, the USSR did not make available to the GDR forces any modern weapons of mass annihilation. The USSR's distrust had increased considerably in the last three years prior to the change. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's statement that there were no poison gas munitions in the GDR is credible for strategic reasons. In the event of a NATO attack, the Warsaw Pact expected that the GDR and the ammunition depots would be taken quickly.

[DER SPIEGEL] Did you have access to the chemical units of the Soviet forces in the GDR?

[Lohs] Once, in a military zone in Kapen near Dessau, we erroneously entered Soviet terrain. With our hands up and a Kalashnikov in our backs, we were led out immediately.

[DER SPIEGEL] Being a member of the Academy of Sciences, you were probably treated in a friendlier way.

[Lohs] Not at all. Our colleagues in Moscow did not give away anything in scientific research. That was a one-way street. Our Soviet colleagues researched all the classical chemical weapons and phosphorous acid compounds such as tabun, sarin, and VX.

NVA Reportedly Trained Iraqis in Gas Warfare

AU0509172690 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG
in German 2 Sep 90 pp 4-5

[Bernd Felgendreher report: "Poison Gas—We Were in Iraq"]

[Text] In the Iraqi desert, about 100 km northwest of the capital of Baghdad, elite soldiers of the dictator Saddam Husayn are guarding a secret camp of 20 square meters [number as received]. The facility is secured by several barbed wire obstacles; in front of them, missile batteries are dug into the sand. Here, Husayn's soldiers are being trained to survive a gas war. Nobody from the West has ever entered this training camp in the desert. It has a German name, however, Klein Storkow, because it is an exact copy of the Storkow training camp near Berlin, the training grounds of the "chemical services," as the ABC [atomic, biological, and chemical] defense units of the National People's Army [NVA] in the GDR are euphemistically called.

NVA officers showed Saddam Husayn's troops, which were the first to use poison gas in the war against Iran, how to protect themselves against poison gas attacks. The chief of the secret operation was NVA Major General Karl-Heinz Nagler (62), who until two weeks ago was chief of the "chemical services." Major General

Nagler is now retired. Nagler admits to BILD AM SONNTAG: "From 1975 to the conclusion of the operation in 1987, I was in Iraq several times." Playing down the importance, however, he says: "At that point, there were no indications that the Iraqi Army had chemical weapons."

NVA Colonel Rolf Buettner, who has been Nagler's successor since 15 August, also plays down the extremely sensitive training agreement between East Berlin and Baghdad: "We did not supply chemical agents to Iraq. Nor has there been any operational training. The Iraqis were merely trained in using the technical installations of the facility." However, he also makes this revealing statement: "Those who intend to use chemical weapons in an offensive way must first of all learn to defend themselves against such weapons."

Following a preparatory period of five years, the desert construction of "Klein Storkow" began in 1980—the same year that Saddam Husayn's murderous war against Iran began.

The NVA and the then SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] government knew at that time, without any doubt, that Iraq possessed poison gas weapons. Professor Karl-Heinz Lohs (61), GDR government adviser at the Geneva disarmament negotiations, says: "We have taken part in the Geneva negotiations since the early seventies. During the time at issue, the Iraqi use of poison gas weapons was reported and discussed in detail. There was always also a high-ranking NVA officer in the GDR delegation, who would surely have reported to his minister...."

Nonetheless, the two highest-ranking NVA gas officers allegedly did not know about this. Colonel Buettner told BILD AM SONNTAG: "I only learned about it unofficially in the Soviet Union in 1987. Western press organs were not accessible to NVA officers, as you know."

BILD AM SONNTAG asked NVA Colonel Buettner and retired General Nagler: Why was the poison gas project in the desert not discontinued as soon as it was clear that the Iraqis had used gas against Iran?

Buettner: "Our officers were not confronted with this issue. When we were fulfilling this task, at the instruction of our government, we could not have assumed that the Iraqis were preparing a poison gas war against their neighbor countries."

Nagler says today: "If we had known about this, we would have protested, and we would certainly have prevented the implementation of the agreement and the mission...."

BILD AM SONNTAG reporters were the first to visit the poison kitchen in Storkow, one hour's drive south-east of Berlin.

Between pine trees, there are seven hollow concrete columns in which radioactive balls are transported to the top by elevator; from there they contaminate the terrain

by nuclear radiation. In exercises, old T-34 tanks and MiG-21 fighters are sprayed with diluted mustard gas. In underground silos there are chemical agents—nerve gas, chemicals which destroy the skin, and so-called psycho-toxic agents—comparable to LSD—that are able to intoxicate attacking troops and put them out of action.

HUNGARY

Withdrawal of USSR Tank Division Completed

*LD2708220690 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1600 GMT 27 Aug 90*

[Excerpts] Today in Esztergom, Major-General Burlakov bade farewell to the last Soviet soldier. Thus, of the three divisions in Hungary, only two remain. Julia Torda reports.

[Torda] Thank you for your service; all the best, my dear friends. These were the words with which Maj. Gen. Burlakov bade farewell to more than 100 privates and officers who boarded the train in Esztergom today. With this, the main force of the Soviet Southern Army Group stationed in Hungary—the approximately 10,000-strong Budapest tank division—left Hungary permanently this afternoon. With their withdrawal, altogether 35 percent of the Soviet soldiers in Hungary, and around one-third of its technical and material appliances have left our country's territory. [passage omitted]

The rifle division in Szekesfeharvar, still stationed in Hungary, will commence moving out next Sunday; this will last until the end of the year. Following this, the withdrawal of the infantry division in Kecskemet will commence. This will be completed up to the expiry of the time limit of 30 June next year. [passage omitted]

Official on Central European Arms Cuts

*LD2608125190 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0630 GMT 26 Aug 90*

[From the "World Clock" program]

[Text] [Presenter] Several American organizations have proposed instead of an "iron curtain," a Central European "peace and freedom curtain" guaranteed by agreements. In our program last week, one of their representatives said to my colleague Istvan Kulcsar that he would like to know the Hungarian Government's position, too. Well, here it is. At the microphone of "World Clock," Foreign Ministry spokesman Janos Hermann gives his opinion on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from Central Europe.

[Hermann] We openly welcome every endeavor aimed at the reduction or long-term elimination of weapons of mass destruction threatening the future of mankind. In the proposal of (?Capital Clark) we can see a fine example of humans and citizens taking responsibility, when, by unifying their power, people responsive to the

great problems of human fate take active steps representing the common interests of us all. We hope that their voice will also be heard at the world's important, political decisionmaking forums.

[Reporter] What can the Hungarian Government do about the implementation of these aims?

[Hermann] We are actively taking part in the endeavors which are aimed at this. I think that a favorable atmosphere is taking shape in Europe, in the region we are most concerned about. Today several forums, within the established framework of negotiations, have been working to achieve results regarding military stability and security with new content. I would call to attention the Soviet-U.S. bilateral agreement by which the destruction of the two sides' medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles has been under way, not only in a single geographical region, but all over the world. In Vienna the 23 countries most closely concerned are holding talks on conventional weapons in Europe. We can only see the real value of their work clearly if we know that, in the

event of a war conflict, the conventional military potential accumulated in our continent would be able to cause destruction equal to that of weapons of mass destruction. We think there are good prospects that an agreement on large-scale arms reduction can be reached within a short time. This will also mean that in Europe the ability to launch large-scale and surprise attacks will cease. At these talks an agreement is also in process to the effect that, following progress in the area of the reduction of conventional weapons, talks should begin within the appropriate framework on the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons.

I would also like to mention that Hungary plays an active, initiating role in these talks. Altogether the efforts made within the scope of both the Vienna disarmament talks and the European security and cooperation process are aimed at the gradual creation of a new-style security system in Europe, viable in the long term, which will outdo the former security system based on the balance of forces of the opposing blocs.

BRAZIL

Dispute with U.S. Over Rocket Technology Exports

Official Says U.S. Withholding Motors

PY2708145290 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO
in Portuguese 24 Aug 90 p A5

[Report by correspondent in Sao Jose dos Campos]

[Excerpts] Lieutenant Colonel Tiago da Silva Ribeiro, 45, president of the Space Activities Institute (IAE), said yesterday that the U.S. Government is withholding in that country the structures [estruturas] of seven motors from the Brazilian Satellite Launching Vehicle (VLS) and is thus delaying the development of the Brazilian space program. According to Ribeiro, the motors have been delayed in the United States by orders of the U.S. Department of State since the end of last month. [passage omitted]

The budget for this year's rocket program has already been used up. The money that was received in March was totally spent by July. The Brazilian Commission for Space Activities (COBAE) is negotiating a budget supplement of 150 million cruzeiros to continue the project. The IAE has so far received only the equivalent of one-fourth of the 1.5 billion cruzeiros that it requested for 1990.

The prospects for 1991 look even worse. Congress is scheduled to discuss the approval of a budget barely covering 15 percent of the money needed for the VLS program in 1991. The project should cost over \$150 million before its conclusion at the beginning of 1994. The Brazilian satellite is scheduled to be launched by a foreign launcher before then. According to Lt. Col. Ribeiro, the launch should cost between \$18 million and \$20 million.

Arms Supply Conflict Viewed

PY2808180690 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 25 Aug 90 p 3

[From the "Notes and Information" page: "A Difficult Problem for Collor"]

[Text] The export of military equipment is a major foreign policy issue that President Fernando Collor has inherited from previous administrations. The matter involves the situation of the military supply industry, which directly affects the Brazilian Armed Forces, their doctrine for the use of troops, and their relations with civilians in the sector that could be called the "industrial-military complex."

This is a very delicate problem because it entails, in the first place, what could be called the Brazilian military doctrine. This doctrine suggests (and we say suggest because to a considerable extent it remains unknown to

the public and even to Congress) that it is not necessary to maintain the Armed Forces in a state of readiness for combat, but only to have the industrial capacity to supply them and to train them in case of a conflict. This doctrine has forced the Brazilian military industry to search for markets abroad, in which it could compete with the major and traditional suppliers of sophisticated or nonsophisticated equipment that could be purchased by Third World countries. Many of such traditional suppliers are western countries. The struggle to conquer markets has been hard, and the fact that the Brazilian military industry has opened markets in areas that the United States considers "dangerous," has strained Brazilian-U.S. relations. To put it clearly, relations also have been strained by the fact that the Brazilian Government has thus far adopted a dubious position regarding arms sales: When regarded as a simple and purely commercial transaction, the matter has been considered exclusively as pertaining to private companies. Like this the government cannot take any action, except to veto transactions that violate United Nations resolutions or that do not comply with a policy that is known to just a few people. However, whenever the United States has protested the fact that private companies are selling arms to countries that are considered "dangerous," the Brazilian Government has defended such transactions on sovereignty grounds, claiming that the world is divided into rich and poor countries, or even the Araujo Castro doctrine on the Soviet-U.S. joint dominion.

This is the background that should be taken into account to consider the U.S. Government decision to confiscate components of Brazilian rockets, in U.S. territory. The corresponding contract, which was signed with a private U.S. company, was canceled in May 1990 when there were no remote indications of the Iraqi conflict (the date of the decision to confiscate the components is unknown). This shows that the U.S. decision was not made within the framework of the U.S. defense policy or to comply with United Nations resolutions. Instead, the decision was made within the framework of the U.S.-Brazilian conflict, which this measure has aggravated [preceding word in italics]. The matter is even more delicate, because it is part of a set of actions that the U.S. Government has taken to prevent the proliferation of (chemical or nuclear) warhead carriers of any range, with launching bases in this hemisphere or in countries that are considered "dangerous."

The contract was canceled in May. The decision to confiscate the components followed thereafter. On 11 June, in a report to the House Arms Control, International Security, and Science Subcommittee, Richard Clarke, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs [name and position as published] said nothing on the subject. He mentioned, however, the Iraqi efforts to produce a large warhead carrier with its own technology or with technology purchased from the Argentines and from the Egyptians in the Condor II rocket. Clarke said that the United States had some success in delaying the development of the Condor in both countries. As for

Brazil, Clarke simply mentioned press reports and said: "The Brazilian Government has indicated that it is investigating the situation," that is, into Brazilian involvement in the development of rockets to be used by Iraq. Clarke's briefing took place in June, when the Collor administration was already in power.

The U.S. concern about Brazilian programs and projects, however, went even further. On the same day, in a briefing to the same subcommittee, Brad Gordon, assistant director of the Nuclear and Weapons Control Bureau of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was more explicit: "We hail the guarantee that Argentine President Menem has given that the (Conдор II) program has been suspended. In Brazil, parallel missile and space rocket launching programs continue. Recent high-level diplomatic talks on proliferation problems, however, indicate that there are possibilities for making progress."

Therefore, one of the following may have happened: either the Brazilian Air Force and Itamaraty were not aware of the cancellation of the contract in May—even after the confiscation that the U.S. Government ordered without apparent reasons—or they preferred to remain quiet. Anyway, that drastic decision has been made known only now. This reveals that either the U.S.-Brazilian conflict has been further strained, or that "high-level diplomatic talks" have failed. It is important to know now whether Washington wants clear definitions from the Brazilian Government regarding the missile and rocket program, regarding the Brazilian stance toward the situation in the Persian Gulf, or regarding what Brasilia wishes and is able to do as a contribution, however symbolic, to the military effort in that region.

If Brazil actually wants to join the First World and if it wishes to be heard by the "most important countries," it will have to assume the responsibilities that must be discharged despite the fact that its strategical resources are insufficient for an extra-continental action.

U.S. Release of Rocket Motor Casings Reported

PY0909011090 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 8 Sep 90 p 9

[Report by Paulo Sotero]

[Text] Washington—After President Collor de Mello blew his top, the U.S. Government a few days ago released for shipment to Brazil seven rocket motor casings belonging to the Aerospace Technology Center [CTA]. The casings had been held in Chicago since May. However, Washington suspended the license that it had granted authorizing thermal treatment of this sort of equipment in the future.

This issue, which prompted Itamaraty to harshly protest to U.S. Ambassador in Brazil Richard Melton, has caused serious tension between the U.S. Department of State and the Pentagon. Furthermore, it could not have come at a

worse time for Washington. At the very time when Washington is trying to mobilize the world against Saddam Husayn, the controversy over the Brazilian rockets has placed the Bush administration in a very embarrassing position because of the well-known links that past Brazilian Governments and retired Brazilian Air Force [FAB] officers have with the Iraqi missile program.

The State Department, which approved the release of the parts for shipment to Brazil, avoided commenting on the matter yesterday after its decision was made public by THE NEW YORK TIMES. However, an official source emphasized that the Brazilian rocket casings had nothing at all to do with the Iraqi crisis or the comings and goings of Brigadier Hugo Piva, the leader of former FAB officers at the service of Husayn. Over the last few weeks, U.S. diplomats have been telling O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO that the Brazilian Government seriously intends to participate in the embargo against Iraq.

The released components are part of the Brazilian space program. They had been sent to the Lindberg Engineering company for thermal treatment, which cannot be done in Brazil. These components are steel casings of a three-stage rocket that the CTA plans to begin testing in three years. Since missile technology is involved, the service had to be previously authorized by the U.S. Government.

In June, Lindberg Engineering informed the Brazilian Aeronautic Commission in Washington that the cooking of the components had been completed but that the components could not be shipped to Brazil because the U.S. Government had decided to review the license in keeping with the nuclear nonproliferation policy and the terms of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Several weeks of fruitless negotiations followed. The Brazilian Government argued that the rocket casings belonged to Brazil and should be returned irrespective of whether licenses were granted in the future. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government continued procrastinating, an attitude that implied questioning Brazil's official statement that the equipment in question was to be used for the Brazilian space program only.

According to a diplomatic source, two weeks after O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO made the problem public, President Collor took a hand in the matter. An official source who knew the story told O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO: "He got very mad at the way the North Americans were handling the matter, and he basically ordered that Washington be told that we are not a bunch of kids."

THE NEW YORK TIMES reported yesterday that the U.S. decision to release the casings was severely criticized by Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Projects for Nuclear Arms Control. "We should not export such items to countries like Brazil," Milhollin said. He believes that supplying rocket components to Brazil "is tantamount to giving missile technology to Iraq," and he mentioned the cooperation in this field between the two countries, cooperation that Brasilia denies.

INDIA

Minister Asserts Missile Program To Continue

*BK2808100890 Delhi Domestic Service in English
0830 GMT 28 Aug 90*

[Text] The minister of state for defense, Dr. Raja Ramanna, has said that no outside pressure will deter India from pursuing its missile system program. Replying to a question in the Rajya Sabha today, he said the domestic flight test of Akash missile has been successfully carried out and all its mission objectives have been fully achieved. He said we are at present concentrating on its production, and its delivery to our defense services will start soon. Dr. Ramanna said medium-range surface-to-air Akash missile system having a range of 24 km will enhance our air defense capability.

ISRAEL

Source Says Iraq To Have Chemical Missile Soon

*TA0909102990 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 9 Sep 90 p 4*

[Report by Dani Sade]

[Excerpt] Senior security sources said over the weekend that Iraq will probably soon have surface-to-surface missiles with chemical warheads.

"This means Iraq will have the capability of fulfilling its threats to cause its enemies—the multinational forces in Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel—heavy human losses if

there is war," a senior security source said yesterday, and added: "Iraq, however, also knows what the counteraction would be if such weapons were used in a Gulf war." Referring to Israel, he said, "We have made clear many times that our reaction to a missile attack with chemical warheads would be most painful to the Iraqis."

In response to a question on why there have been so many contradictory expressions by Israeli security elements about Iraqi's chemical warfare capability in recent years, the senior source replied: "There is a tendency to link the expressions to various situations. For instance, when there is a need for a supplementary defense budget, stress is placed on Iraq's chemical warfare threat, and when there is a need to reassure the people, it is pointed out that the Iraqis still do not have surface-to-surface missiles with chemical warheads.

"In practical terms, it is enough that the Iraqis have the technology. The actual link between the chemical substance and the missiles can be made within a very short time."

It will be recalled that Defense Minister Moshe Arens claimed during the panic about a possible gas attack on Israel that Iraq is incapable of dispersing chemicals over Israel using missiles and could only do it with the use of aircraft, but that the Israeli Air Force could deal with that threat.

Israel security experts said that the decision not to distribute gas masks to Israeli residents was, among other things, reached because of the evaluation that Iraq is incapable of fitting chemical warheads on its surface-to-surface missiles. [passage omitted]

Arms Proliferation 'Threat From South' Viewed*PM2808143890 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 34, 21-27 Aug 90 p 12*

[Article by Major General Vadim Makarevskiy: "The Threat From the South"]

[Text] The irony of the situation is that with time, the source of military threat to the Soviet Union will be less and less the traditional "possible enemy" and more and more the South. The threat from the South is what must worry us most. The threat from those to whom the Soviet Union has sold and continues to sell (or to be more precise, has given and continues to give as presents) state-of-the-art devastating weapons. No one can guarantee that a military conflict with the use of mass destruction weapons in the vicinity of Soviet borders will not affect, one way or another, Soviet territory. No one can guarantee that weapons once sold (or given) to a developing country will not later be used, deliberately or otherwise, against the Soviet Union.

In my opinion, it is necessary to reconsider as soon as possible the Soviet concept of weapon transfers to other countries. Political methods of settling regional conflicts are, of course, necessary, but to make them work, we must stem the mighty flow of weapons to the Third World. We must call on other weapons exporters to negotiate on a radical reduction in arms supplies, an embargo on exports of the most dangerous weapons and munitions (especially "dual purpose" types which can be used both with conventional and chemical or even nuclear loads). An international covenant on arms trade must be worked out similar to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Quick, resolute and efficient steps are needed. The Soviet Union supported the idea of establishing a register of arms trade and supplies as early as September 1988. The Soviet declaration to this effect is still in force, but exists only on paper. No progress has been made in the elaboration of such a register in the past two years.

The growth of military might and potential threat to peace from Third World arms importers is an objective reality. It is time to start thinking in earnest about how to avert the "threat from the South".

Chemical Weapon Destruction 'Example' to All*PM2908153990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2*

[Report by special correspondent V. Litovkin under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Correspondents on World Events": "The Same Security For All"]

[Text] An unexpected paradox: Whereas the production, stockpiling, and storage of chemical weapons was always a most closely guarded secret kept under seven seals, it suddenly transpires that it is impossible to destroy them

without the closest cooperation and openness between all those who only recently were calling each other potential enemies.

The very logic of disarmament has prodded us toward a clear and precise understanding: Security cannot be Soviet, American, or anybody else's, but only common—the same for all mankind. It was as if this simple idea formed the backdrop to the two day visit by U.S. specialists to the Soviet chemical facility built last year not far from the city of Chapayevsk in Kuybyshev Oblast.

The facility was created as a plant for destroying chemical weapons equipped with organophosphorus chemical agents, but because of protests by local residents it was converted by a decision of the country's government into a USSR Defense Ministry practice center for developing technology to eliminate chemical ammunition.

There are no chemical agents at the plant and there have never been any. Instruction and the development of technology are carried out on inert agents. But this process greatly interested the guests, and although they have already acquired a great deal of experience, they familiarized themselves in detail with the organization of work at our enterprise; put many questions to the specialists accompanying them from the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Defense; and photographed various installations, automated production lines, and subassemblies. And even in spare moments some of them asked the Soviet instructors to give them the opportunity of working a little longer at the control and instrument panels and in the laboratories or workshops. This opportunity was freely granted.

"I want to note the very high level of professionalism of the Soviet specialists accompanying us, and also of the personnel working at the plant," Dr. Robert P. Mikulak, leader of the U.S. delegation, said in an interview with IZVESTIYA's correspondent. "We saw everything that was of interest to us and received answers to all our questions.

"Our visit," he added, "is taking place within the framework of the agreement signed in Washington by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev and, I think, it will give us a good opportunity of finding common approaches to the problem of destroying chemical weapons. We have various methods of eliminating them, and such a frank exchange of experience and information facilitates better mutual understanding between the two sides."

I asked for his assessment of the plant's technological safety standard. The American answered that it is not easy for him to draw a definitive conclusion on this question after two days. After all, he is only one-half chemist and one-half diplomat, but the exchange of opinions with colleagues convinced him that Soviet specialists attach particular importance to making their

technology safe for people and the environment because this is a problem that worries U.S. scientists just as greatly.

"We will have a return visit to a U.S. chemical weapons destruction plant on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific," Doctor of Technical Sciences, Major General I. Yevstafeyev said. "And we will try not only to work out common approaches and a common language for carrying out future inspections on the progress of destroying chemical weapons, but also to employ the best practice of ensuring complete safety while doing so, and if agreement is reached then also to acquire U.S. equipment for eliminating chemical agents. Such talks are now in progress."

One security for all. The sooner this simple truth is grasped in the countries which use chemical weapons to frighten neighbors or threaten to use them, the more peaceful it will be for their peoples and for mankind as a whole. Soviet-U.S. cooperation in this sphere is a good example to everyone.

Communique Released on SS-20 Destruction Plans

*LD2808114590 Moscow World Service in English
1100 GMT 28 Aug 90*

[Text] The Soviet Union will destroy all its RSD-10 [SS-20 intermediate-range] missiles by the middle of next year. This has been disclosed in a communique by the center for monitoring the destruction of missiles. The center was set up in the Soviet Union in accordance with the Soviet-American treaty on eliminating this class of missiles. However, two missile launchers put out of action are to be transferred to museums in Moscow and Kiev, and one will be left at the destruction site in Kapustin Yar.

Conventional Arms Talks Progress Viewed

*PM2908131590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Aug 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Colonel V. Nazarenko: "Without Vacation Is How Delegations of 23 Countries Are Working at Vienna Talks"]

[Text] Toward the end of this year—19 November—the leaders of the countries taking part in the CSCE will gather for a summit meeting in Paris. By the time it starts—such is the political will of the leaders of the 35 CSCE countries—the treaty on conventional armed forces on the continent should be ready for signing. The delegations of 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states have been working in the Austrian capital since March 1989 on its draft.

Quite a lot has been done in 18 months. Suffice it to say that according to experts' assessments approximately one-third of the text of the treaty itself and half the

protocol on inspections are already ready. The agreement reached in June of this year between the sides on the levels of reduction for tanks and other armored equipment comprising the basis of the two military alliances' ground strength in Europe may be called the biggest success. These levels provide for the Warsaw Pact and NATO keeping 20,000 tanks each and not more than 30,000 armored vehicles, of which 18,000 will be infantry fighting vehicles and armored vehicles with heavy armaments (there should not be more than 1,500 of these) and the remainder should be armored personnel carriers.

It would seem that the breakthrough on the "tank salient" should have opened up an opportunity for the rapid settlement of other unresolved questions. But that has not happened. Moreover, counter to expectations the pace of work has declined. There is a threat that it will not finish in time. Time brooks no delay. That is why the participants in the Vienna forum decided to work "without a vacation." After a brief "technical" intermission concluding dialogue within the framework of the "Vienna-1" forum begins in Vienna's Hofburg Palace 27 August.

Indeed, how many complications and underwater reefs are contained in, for instance, a historically determined and natural process like Germany's reunification. It is proceeding at an accelerated pace and for that reason a whole series of problems is arising. One of them is how to achieve harmony between the setting of the level for the limitation on the numerical strength of a united Germany's armed forces and the talks process of the "23." A specific task has arisen—taking legal consideration of the accord between the USSR and the FRG on the reduction of the future German army's troops to 370,000 men within three to four years within the context of the Vienna talks. That is no simple matter. Germany's unification and its membership in NATO and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the GDR create a new military-political situation in Central Europe and raise in a different way questions concerning the balance of forces and interests of many states of this region. How to correlate these changes with the already existing conceptual framework of regional sublevels between the two groups of states taking part in the talks? It is clear that the answer to this question will require not only time but also inventiveness on the part of diplomats and military experts.

As we can see, the barriers on the path toward the speediest conclusion of the talks of the "23" are moved apart not by someone's evil will but directly by life itself, with its sometimes unpredictable turns. It is another matter that they complicate the disentangling of knots which appeared back at the early stage of the forum. For instance, the solution of the question of aviation has been dragged out. It has proceeded for a long time and with difficulty since virtually the actual start of the talks but, it is true, not without results. The head of the Soviet delegation, O. Grinevskiy, believes that recently a whole series of coinciding or essentially close elements have

appeared in the positions of the sides, making it possible to speak of a possibility in principle of reaching compromise solutions. At any rate in his opinion as of today there is sufficient clarity as to which path leads to the solution of this problem and which drives it into an even deeper impasse.

Thus, for instance, the NATO countries are insisting that the treaty encompass not only air force combat aircraft but also ground-based naval aircraft. The West believes that these aircraft's exclusion from the agreement would lead to the point where hundreds of naval combat aircraft would not be subject to reduction. In turn the Soviet Union believes that if naval aircraft are included in the catalogue of categories of arms to be reduced then a certain proportion of carrier aircraft should also be put under the "knife." Logical? Undoubtedly.

And nonetheless to this day no mutually acceptable solution has been found. Why? The point is that NATO, particularly the United States, has far more carrier aircraft than the USSR. And they are strike aircraft. You cannot discount it in a reduction of the blocs' combat aircraft. The Soviet Union's concern on this plan may be understood.

Where then is the way out of the impasse which has taken shape? It should be sought in the mandate for the talks from which it stems that naval forces are not a subject for examination at the "Vienna-1" forum. As is well known, back last year the Soviet Union suggested starting talks on the navies, but this initiative met with no support in NATO circles. The likelihood of reaching agreement on aircraft as a whole by the time the all-European summit starts will be slight unless the agreement properly reflects the USSR's geostrategic interests reflected in particular in the question of the level of limitation of air defense fighter-interceptors.

The Soviet Union proposes limiting the total number of Warsaw Pact and NATO combat aircraft to 4,700 each, establishing a separate ceiling of 1,500 fighter-interceptors. Here, of course, the level for air defense fighter aircraft should consist only of defensive aircraft and not of multiple-purpose aircraft of the fighter-bomber type. It is obviously within the framework of these conditions that we should seek a way out toward the mutually acceptable solution of the problem of combat aircraft.

As for combat helicopters, understanding has been reached on limiting these strike aircraft to 1,900 units and the text defining the concept "combat helicopter" may be said to have been basically agreed. There are differences on the question of establishing the level for artillery: NATO suggests a ceiling of 16,500 pieces and the Warsaw Pact a ceiling of 20,000.

The possibility of completing the talks on schedule also depends on whether questions of verifying the fulfillment of commitments for the implementation of the future treaty are successfully resolved within the next month or six weeks. Right now certain progress has been

achieved in the field of creating an inspection mechanism. But the sides' views still differ on a number of important aspects. Here we must cite primarily the problem of determining inspection quotas. The Soviet Union suggests proceeding from the number of facilities subject to verification. The West suggests proceeding from the number of arms to be reduced and the area of the territory of the signatory state. Essentially the area criterion establishes inequality between the participants. Thus, if one states has fewer armaments than another, by virtue of the "area factor" it will be obliged to accept a substantially larger number of on-site inspections.

Airborne inspections are designed to become an important component of the verification system. The sides' approaches toward the tasks of carrying out these inspections and their specific procedures largely coincide. The main difference is in the choice of the inspection aircraft. The NATO countries suggest using the aircraft of the inspecting state. The Soviet delegation has submitted for examination a compromise proposal whereby the right to choose the aircraft would remain with the state subject to inspection. That means that the person who carries out the airborne inspection can use an aircraft belonging to either the inspected or the inspecting side.

Discussion must be continued and a solution reached to the problem connected with the elaboration of a protocol on eliminating conventional arms and equipment. First of all we must determine how the military arsenals subject to reduction will be destroyed. Here all aspects—both technical and economic—must be considered. The task is to be certain as soon as possible about two basic questions: to agree on positions for reequipping part of the arms and equipment limited by the treaty for their further use for peaceful purposes and on the deadlines for destruction. The Soviet Union is prepared together with the other participants in the talks to gradually reduce the number of its combat aircraft, strike helicopters, and artillery systems to the agreed levels over two to three years from the moment the treaty enters into force. As for tanks and armored vehicles, here, considering the volumes of the reductions, more time will be needed—another two to three years. The NATO countries insist on the destruction of all categories of the sides' armaments in the region of their use within three years and have a negative attitude toward part of military equipment being made useless for combat before being destroyed at the final stage. We shall hope that the West will treat the Soviet position with understanding and will assess realistically the complexity of the tasks facing the USSR with regard to the destruction of conventional arms.

The concluding stage of the talks of the "23" will be a most real test for all delegations of the countries taking part, a serious check of the professional qualities of diplomats and experts and of their ability to display flexibility and constructiveness and to take sometimes difficult but necessary decisions. Time brooks no delay.

Nitze Remarks on Arms Control Examined

LD2908125990 Moscow TASS in English 1250 GMT
29 Aug 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, August 29 (TASS)—Paul Nitze, a former adviser to the U.S. President and the secretary of state, said in a recent WASHINGTON POST article that the Soviet Union and the United States should take more bold action to reduce strategic offensive weapons. The article proposes the complete elimination of ground-based strategic missiles with multiple warheads while reducing the total number of warheads on strategic missiles to 5,000 units.

What can be said about these proposals? In the first place, the desire to defuse nuclear confrontation is clearly positive. The Soviet Union has long been calling on nuclear weapons states to renounce these weapons completely. It has stated on more than one occasion its readiness to exclude nuclear weapons from any options of defence sufficiency and to develop its Armed Forces without reliance on nuclear weapons. However, this would only be the case if other nuclear powers embark on the same path along with the Soviet Union.

The basic points of the scientifically substantiated programme for the stage-by-stage reduction of nuclear weapons with their complete elimination by the year 2000 were set out in the January 15, 1986, statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The existing INF Treaty and the Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive weapons, currently being drafted in Geneva, fit organically into this programme. Moscow proposed to include in the programme of attaining a non-nuclear peace another intermediate stage—"minimum nuclear deterrence."

All this bears testimony to the fact that the Soviet Union will support proposals aimed at further reducing strategic nuclear arsenals. However, Nitze's proposals prompt a question: are they directed towards replacing reduction criteria that have been already elaborated in Geneva, or do they offer new criteria for the next stage of nuclear disarmament? This point has paramount significance.

Introducing new elements into the nearly finished treaty means significantly delaying its completion and returning to square one. Therefore the "new approach" proposed by the American expert can be considered only at the next stage of negotiations.

Speaking on the essence of these proposals, one can discern a desire to ensure unilateral advantages for the United States. Why should Nitze propose to eliminate only ground-based missiles with multiple warheads and leave aside sea-based missiles. It is known that most U.S. missiles are based at sea, while Soviet ones at land. Obviously, the rationale is that the USSR will have to

dramatically transform its strategic forces, "fit itself" into the American structure and spend additional money.

It would seem that if the need "to deter" each other remains, pending the complete destruction of nuclear weapons, this deterrence should be kept at a minimum level. But there should be no "double standards" in attaining such levels, and there should be equal security for both sides.

U.S. Chemical Arms Experts Visit Mothballed Plants

LD3008094390 Moscow TASS in English 0933 GMT
30 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Evald Kessariyskiy]

[Text] A delegation of U.S. experts visited this city in the Gorkiy region, the largest chemical centre in Russia, from August 25-30 under a memorandum of understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The two sides are involved in a bilateral experiment on verification and data exchanges as a way of preparing a multilateral convention to ban chemical weapons.

The experiment is part of a bilateral agreement to destroy chemical weapons and ban their manufacture, which was signed by the Soviet and U.S. President on June 1, 1990.

The U.S. visitors inspected special production facilities mothballed since the mid-1940's, which are to be dismantled in the near future, and studied chemical production at operating plants.

The delegation arrived in Dzerzhinsk from Chapayevsk, Kuibyshev region, the site of the Defence Ministry's training centre for destroying chemical warfare agents.

Karpov Views European Disarmament Moves

LD3108133190 Warsaw PAP in English 0956 GMT
31 Aug 90

[Text] Warsaw, August 31—Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister [title as received] Viktor Karpov, who also is the chief Soviet disarmament expert, had this to say about disarmament in an interview for PAP during his visit in Warsaw.

"I would say that the tasks of theoretical disarmament have finally become a practical need. I would like to stress the word 'need.' Objective conditions have also surfaced to implement this practical need through practical decisions.

"If all goes well, the next step will be the Vienna decisions on reducing armed forces in Europe which will cover tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, choppers and the airforce, in other words the key means of conducting war which can pose a threat to the security of

other states. At issue will be not only reductions but monitored reductions which will in fact create a new situation in Europe. A situation of greater confidence in combination with the confidence building measures which we are proposing currently within the framework of the meeting of 35 states. These undertakings will include exchange of information, limitation of military exercises, limitation of military operations and the establishment of an European centre which could gather all the information about the armed forces in Europe, about military maneuvers, plans of maneuvers and plans of expanding armies and at the same time would inspect, verify whether the sides are really fulfilling the agreements they had signed.

"We are currently advancing to practical action. My task is precisely to travel to all capitals of the Warsaw Treaty to take a look at extra possibilities, what we can do with other members of the alliance to solve problems of European security.

"It seems to us that it is very important to make use of new trends which have surfaced between the two alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. How did we perceive these relations in the past? Confrontation—two military blocs. One armed itself against the other and the more NATO armed itself, the more the Warsaw Treaty armed itself, and the other way around. At present there may be a possibility of acting differently: to lay the cards on the table and say: Let us see what is happening. Let us show ourselves data on how many troops we have. Do your formations pose a threat to our security and do ours threaten your security. If so, then we should agree on how to remove the danger. In other words to transform the structure of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in such a way to permit them to wage defensive operations and exclude the possibility of big offensive ones. I consider this as paramount. If we reach agreement on this matter than the whole setting of further disarmament talks will be one of eliminating offensive potentials. If we go along this road then I think that peace will be secured for Europe for long years to come.

"A new factor is surfacing nowadays: the unification of Germany. That is a very strong state emerging in central Europe which will practically be uncontested in the economic field in Europe. One must understand this. But there are indeed institutions of economic integration of Europe, there are integration blueprints, as goes for example the proposed creation of common legal space, common economic space, common human rights. We should take all of this into account because currently we see that the isolation which we, the Soviet Union, imposed on ourselves in relation to Europe, and with our help the countries of East Europe were also isolated, does not work in all respects. Integration is necessary within the framework of European progress. (...) all of this must be implemented. Just how is what we are presently pondering, guessing, and scratching our heads looking for ideas on how to organize this in our country. With difficulties, but we are trying to move forward.

"As goes for military blocs, I can say that they will exist as long as the blocs themselves do not come to terms on their disbanding. We think that in the current situation military blocs, even if they are not total anachronisms, are becoming out-dated. We favour gradually transforming the blocs, turning them from strictly military alliances into military-political ones, into organizations of more political nature. And subsequently their gradual watering down in an European security system.

"Regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe, we are holding talks with the FRG and the GDR geared at withdrawing Soviet troops stationed in the GDR within more or less four years. The issue of the withdrawal of American, British, Belgian and Dutch troops stationed in the FRG is somewhat unclear," the Soviet vice minister said.

Chernyshev Views Vienna Arms Cuts Proposals

*LD3108151790 Moscow TASS in English 1507 GMT
31 Aug 90*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, August 31 (TASS)—Participants in the just resumed Vienna talks on conventional arms in Europe face a complex but extremely important task—to ensure the completion of a draft first treaty in time for the European summit in Paris in November.

From this point of view, the plenary meeting on August 30 appears promising. Representatives of the two blocs made new proposals, which, it seems, are capable of removing some of the stumbling blocks on the way to an agreement.

NATO countries proposed including in the treaty under preparation a provision envisaging subsequent talks on cutting troops of the Vienna forum member-countries. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation announced its decision not to increase the present number of troops and called on the Warsaw Pact to follow suit.

Taking into account these proposals and the new situation in Europe, the Soviet Union has rescinded its earlier proposal to establish a collective level of troops at 700,000-750,000 men for each alliance in central Europe.

Such reciprocal steps at the negotiations will move the solution of the issue relating to troop reductions to the next stage, and thus save time at the present stage of the negotiations.

All grounds for concern, however, have not been removed. Unfortunately, developments in Europe run far ahead of the Vienna talks. With German unification, a united Germany's membership of NATO and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from central Europe, the military political situation in the region is changing dramatically. The regional sublevels for arms under reduction discussed earlier are already outdated. If viewed in the light

of the actually emerging situation in Europe, the previous accords leave 8,000 tanks in the west while hardly more than 4,000 will remain in the east.

Taking into account the change in the situation, the Soviet Union has proposed to bring down the upper plank of collective weapons for each group of countries in central Europe to the level East European countries will actually have. This would mean between 4,000 and 4,500 tanks, up to 6,000 armoured vehicles and 3,500 artillery systems.

According to the new Soviet proposals, these reductions could be synchronized with the Soviet withdrawal from East German territory.

In the emerging new situation, an increasingly important role belongs to the rule of arms sufficiency. This conclusion ensues from principles of political realism which take account of the actual correlation of forces.

Correction of the accords already achieved with due account taken of the changes in the military-political situation on the continent will surely take some time. People in the Soviet Union hope that Western negotiators will give a prompt constructive response to the new proposals from the East.

Foreign Ministry Welcomes German Army Cuts

*LD3108095290 Moscow TASS in English 0929 GMT
31 Aug 90*

[Text] Moscow, August 31 (TASS)—The following official statement by a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman was issued here today:

"Moscow has taken a note of identical statements by Lothar de Maiziere and Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the Vienna talks full-scale meeting on August 30, formulating the commitment by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to cut the armed forces of a united Germany, including the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, to 370,000 officers and men.

"These statements are welcomed here as forming the basis of an obligation, to be assumed by the GDR and the FRG on behalf of the future united German state as part of a final German settlement, to set a limit on the numerical strength of the German Armed Forces."

Defensive Purpose of BMEWS Radars Stressed

LD0109145190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1030 GMT on 31 August carries a 25-minute edition of the "Armed Forces and Society" program. It consists of a studio discussion on "systems guaranteeing the country's safety against nuclear missile and space attack." The discussion panel consists of Aleksandr Korshunov, presenter; Colonel General Vladimir Makarovich Roskovskiy, a representative of the supreme

command of the Air Defense Forces; Aleksey Arkadiyevich Kuzmin, general designer of ballistic missile early warning systems [BMEWS]; Valeriy Vladimirovich Butenko, a specialist and deputy chief engineer; and Viktor Pavlovich Badurkin, a correspondent for TRUD.

Korshunov sets the scene: "The question of tracking stations has become fairly painful recently. Especially as we know the story of the Mukachevo tracking station. Passions rose over the building of the station. The ecological movement claimed the station was dangerous to people's health. That is one aspect of the problem. The second, and probably more essential, is whether we need these stations and systems in present conditions when the reduction of overall tension in the world and the transition to new relations with the United States are considered generally recognized, and this is undoubtedly a plus."

Ropkovskiy says: "We are talking about powerful over-the-horizon radars [radiolokatsionnaya stantsiya nadgorizontnoy lokatsii] which are a constituent part of the system for monitoring outer space and warning against nuclear missile attack. The existence of this system and its constant improvement makes an essential contribution toward ensuring strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. The existence of such a system is also a reliable means against the accidental unleashing of nuclear war.

"People often ask whether the need to develop the powerful radars about which we are talking has not faded away in connection with disarmament, the warming of the international atmosphere, and the transition to a new defensive doctrine. Of course it is good that medium- and shorter-range missiles have been destroyed, but they are just three percent of the world's nuclear arsenals. People have many hopes connected with the 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive missiles. But nevertheless, even that will not resolve the basic problem because, first, it will not be the final elimination of offensive weapons, and second, new and more powerful and complete systems are being developed at the same time.

"Within the framework of the defensive doctrine the radars about which we are talking are, specifically, defensive weapons without which we cannot manage during the present stage of the development of offensive weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and space systems designed for military purposes. In other words, it is primarily the appearance of new types of ballistic missile in the United State's armory which is compelling us to modernize and develop stations."

Kuzmin explains how the systems work: "Since the World War II—which means for over 45 years—weapons have existed, which I would call 'weapons' in quotes, which do not fire but specifically guarantee conditions for the development of civilization and our life which avert war. In general, information systems which warn against missile attack and those which monitor outer space must be classified as weapons of

that sort. They are meant primarily to inform our government and supreme military command on everything which is happening in space, both near and far, so that the government can make appropriate decisions in the event of a real danger arising.

"What can we see with the help of these instruments, the radars which will be our principal subject today? Today these radars, information from which comes into the space monitoring system, perform up to 75,000 tracking operations on satellites or any space apparatus which come within their zone of coverage in space. You can imagine against such a background of the tens of thousands of practical targets which we observe continuously, we have to single out the possible appearance, generally speaking, of ballistic targets."

"It is a very difficult task. It is complicated especially by the fact that this information has to be super-reliable because you cannot just uncover something with some degree of probability. It is important not to make, to elaborate a false step, to elaborate false information. The most terrible thing for us is if we give our leadership incorrect information because the leadership has to make its decisions so responsibly. In the event of a mistake it could perfectly well lead to a worldwide nuclear catastrophe and the destruction of all civilization. Therefore we are obliged, above all, to provide reliable information. To put it in ordinary language, they have to see a five-kopeck piece at a distance of several thousand kilometers and to distinguish that five-kopeck piece from any other space apparatus, fragments, or waste."

Kuzmin continues: "We are obliged both to monitor space and to provide warning of a missile attack with our own resources from all possible sides. In other words, today, since they stopped construction of the Krasnoyarsk station, an unmonitored direction has indeed developed today in the northeast where its sector of responsibility should be. This is known and perfectly obvious to everybody. So as for the difficulty with developing new stations—I'll tell you later precisely why—Mukachevo in particular forms, generally speaking, what I would call a catastrophic problem for the country with regard in general to the western direction."

Roskovskiy outlines the background to the Mukachevo case: "Two very authoritative commissions were set up on the Mukachevo station, involving a large number of academics and representatives of the public. Both commissions came to the conclusion that this station is ecologically safe for the population. But I must say first how authoritative the second commission was under the leadership of Academician Yevgeniy Pavlovich Velikhov." He notes that 23 out of 42 members of that commission were scientists, while the rest were mostly teachers, doctors, and leaders of local authorities; and that its findings were approved by all 42. "This testifies to the unanimous conclusion and the correctness of this commission's findings."

"Nevertheless, after the signing of this document or material—the commission's conclusion—there was no stop to measures aimed at arousing the local population. Evidently this was connected with the fact that somebody was interested, very interested, in closing this station and not providing the opportunity to continue its construction."

Korshunov interjects: "In other words, a peculiar sort of ecological terror?"

Roskovskiy replies: "Yes, quite right. In this situation the first to make the decision to halt construction was the defense minister because the social and political atmosphere in the region had grown so intense at that moment that the only decision which could be made was this one, to halt construction. The passions did not abate after that. Distortions of the commission's findings began even, unfortunately, on the part of those scientists from Uzhgorod University who had once given their signatures to indicate their agreement with the findings."

Asked about the lack of media coverage of the commission's findings, Roskovskiy comments: "Evidently this is one of the causes: the fact that the full text of the commission's conclusion was not published and presented to the people on such a wide scale in good time. This again allowed those persons who had an interest in so doing to present information in a distorted form in the mass media, above all, and to confuse people. As is already known, an instruction to halt construction in this region came from the USSR Council of Ministers on 2 August this year."

"In other words," Kovshunov interjects, "we can say that in making that decision, they were evidently guided not by the commission's findings but by the public sentiments which had developed at that moment."

Roskovskiy says: "Quite right. I would say even more to make clear that things are far from fine in the Transcarpathian region on the ecological front. This is the result of the failure by the local authorities to take appropriate measures. The station is not yet functioning, it is still three years away from functioning. Nevertheless, this station has become a stumbling block and the focus of all the local population's dissatisfaction."

Korshunov then invites Butenko and Badurkin to describe the mood of the local population with whom they were in close contact during the construction of the Mukachevo station.

Butenko says there were numerous meetings with the locals and that they were given rather precise information on the aims and purposes, and the technical characteristics of the Mukachevo station. He blames the Rukh organization, a group which has now become the Ukrainian republican party, and another organization which "worked not to show the need for national defense and security" but in the first place waged a struggle so that the masses would support them.

Budarkin comments that it was not all that difficult for these organizations to win the support of the locals since the area is considered to be the "pearl" of the country and has marvellous natural resources, and that the concern of the locals to preserve that beauty is easily understandable, all the more so since it was just after Chernobyl and people felt they were not being told the truth all the time.

Badurkin continues: "This was the Ukraine. And at the time, moreover, there were rumors that the cloud had crept toward Hungary and Western Europe." He says the speakers, "whether they wanted to or not, gave cause for arousing such passions." "The point is that when work on the station was only just beginning, when construction was only just being planned, the residents were told practically nothing about what sort of station it was going to be, what it was for, and what goal it was to serve in the security interests of the state. And the main thing is that time was lost for a dialogue with residents. When construction was beginning on the site—and this is the problem with our whole country, this fondness we have for secrecy—it was announced that it was to be an Air Force repair base."

Roskovskiy says it is not a function of the Ministry of Defense and military designers "to try and persuade people; this is a job for the government and government departments above all, I think." Badurkin says people living near installations must have an idea of what goes on there. Roskovskiy agrees: "For otherwise we will be maintaining the myth that some sort of military department and defense establishment exists in its own right, and no one knows why these things are developed, installed, and built somewhere in the buses or forests, and that no one needs all that."

Roskovskiy says: "I think, moreover, that in some ways we've overtaken the Americans as far as glasnost is concerned. A recent case is known when the American CIA and the intelligence section of the U.S. Defense Department found out from open press reports details connected with the loss of the Komsomolets submarine which they had not dreamed of finding from other sources."

Aleksey Kuzmin says "now we are calling for the use of foreign experience, and in particular American experience in all our affairs." In the United States there exists a developing system for warning of missile attack and monitoring space analogous with the Soviet model. It has stations in densely populated areas as well. But the Americans have been involved in restoration of the environment disturbed by their stations, and in this sense we are following the Americans.

Everyone should be interested in the correct functioning of these stations, Kuzmin continues, in the U.S., in the USSR, and in China, for that matter. Cases of ducks being mistaken for missiles have been covered in the press. His personal opinion is that these systems should be integrated under the aegis of the United Nations.

Korshunov says there is also the aspect that besides the USSR and the United States there exist the new military powers such as Iraq, Israel, India, and Pakistan.

Kuzmin replies that this is a very significant factor. Political solutions reducing tension between the Soviet Union and the United States may be one party, but on the other hand the danger arises of a real appearance of nuclear missiles in many other countries. We must also control this, he concludes.

Grinevskiy Cited on Resumption of Vienna Talks

Comments to Pravda

PM0509092490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Sep 90
First Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent I. Melnikov under the rubric "Military Detente for Europe": "An Important Milestone"]

[Text] Vienna, 31 August—The participants in the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] crossed the threshold of the Hofburg Palace just like diligent schoolchildren ready for the first day of the school year. Two figures were the epicenter of a lively crowd of diplomats and military experts. I refer to the short, lean figure of Lothar de Maiziere, the GDR prime minister, and the corpulent and tall figure of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FRG foreign minister.

Moving on, I will say that the statements made by the guests from Berlin and Bonn were assessed here as a sign of sincere interest in the Vienna talks not just on the part of the governments of the two German states but also, in the long term, on the part of a united Germany. The statements were a direct link with the agreement recently reached in Arkhyz by M.S. Gorbachev and H. Kohl on restricting the numerical strength of the armed forces in the united Germany to a level of 370,000 men.

The Luxembourg representative delivered a statement on behalf of the group of NATO forces. It proposes that the treaty incorporate an article on subsequent talks, which would deal with the examination of further reductions in the numerical strength of all member countries' troops.

The Soviet representative also spoke. After the session, O. Grinevskiy, head of the USSR delegation, told PRAVDA's correspondent:

"All 23 delegations are aware of the proximity of the European summit and of the fact that a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe must be submitted to it. The last step must be taken by joint efforts. Taking into account the NATO statements made in the past few days, we are withdrawing our previous proposal on establishing a collective personnel level of 700,000-750,000 men for each of the groups of states in Central Europe.

"With the unification of Germany, its inclusion in NATO, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central Europe, the situation in this key region is changing radically. The question arises: Will the West not have 8,000 tanks here while the East only has 4,000 at best?"

"What is the way out of the prevailing situation? The Soviet delegation has submitted a proposal on lowering the maximum collective level for each of the groups of states in Central Europe to a limit that would meet the corresponding realities of the seven Warsaw Pact countries in the region. This could be a level of 4,000-4,500 tanks, up to 6,000 armored vehicles, and 3,500 artillery systems. Such reductions could be synchronized with the timetable for withdrawing Soviet troops from GDR territory."

In the situation that is developing, the role of the sufficiency rule is growing, the head of the USSR delegation said. We are proceeding on the basis that a secure and stable situation in Europe can be reliably guaranteed where the level of sufficiency for one country is not less than 40 percent of the overall strength of the two groups of states.

Izvestiya Interview

PM0509103390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with O. Grinevskiy, head of USSR delegation at Vienna conventional arms talks, by S. Tosunyan: "Vienna: Decisive Round"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Vienna—After a brief recess the participants in the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe have returned to Vienna. L. de Maiziere, head of the GDR Government, and H.-D. Genscher, FRG foreign minister, addressed a plenary session 30 August. The NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have submitted a number of new proposals. At the request of our Vienna correspondent, O.A. Grinevskiy, head of the USSR delegation at the talks, now describes the tasks and problems of the decisive round.

"The unification of the two German states is not only the realization of the German people's legitimate rights and aspirations but also a victory for political realism. The main thing now is that this process should be the prologue to the building of a united all-European community based on interdependence and cooperation.

"Of course, the creation of a single German state opens the way to the solution of many age-old European problems. But at the same time a qualitatively new situation appears which must unfailingly be reflected in the treaty that is being elaborated. At the talks between M.S. Gorbachev and H. Kohl an accord was reached on limiting the size of the united Germany's armed forces to 370,000 men. The GDR prime minister and the FRG foreign minister, who addressed the plenary session, made a statement consonant with this accord. The task

now is to give this statement a precise contractual-legal form. Luxembourg's representative, speaking on behalf of the NATO group at the first plenary session, made an interesting statement. The gist of it is that it is necessary to find the kind of solution which would not isolate the unification of Germany but would harmoniously incorporate restrictions on the size of its armed forces in the quantitative parameters of other states' efforts in this direction.

"Nor has the Soviet Union any objections to another NATO proposal—namely, to include in the treaty provisions on subsequent talks which in addition to other questions would discuss the reduction and limitation of the troop strengths of all the participating states at the second stage of the talks. The proposal not to increase troop strengths also accords with the Soviet political line.

The unification of Germany, its inclusion in NATO, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central Europe radically change the situation in this region which is so crucial to European security. A new situation is emerging. It turns out that the West, for example, will have 8,000 tanks in Central Europe while the East will have at most 4,000. Thus there will be a 2:1 imbalance in the West's favor.

"What is to be done in this situation? Pretend that nothing is happening and leave everything unchanged? Such an approach can hardly be called realistic policy. It would be fairer to lower the quantitative ceiling for each group of states in Central Europe to the level which the Warsaw Pact states there would actually have. This could be a level of 4,000-4,500 tanks, around 6,000 armored vehicles, and 3,500 artillery systems. The reduction to that level could be made to coincide with the quantities and schedule of the Soviet troop withdrawal from what is now GDR territory.

"As for the procedure for eliminating planes, helicopters, and artillery, that has already been virtually agreed. All that remains is the question of naval aircraft. The essence of the compromise on this complex question must be to take mutual account of the sides' concerns. In fact, the West claims that the omission of land-based naval aircraft would lead to the exclusion from the agreement of hundreds of aircraft and, possibly, to other planes' being switched to that category. But our concerns cannot be discounted: The other side has a large quantity of strike aircraft—deckborne—which have not been counted. Furthermore, these aircraft are based both on land and on ships. There is one way out—since naval forces were not included as a subject of the Vienna talks, the question of naval aircraft, including land-based, must be examined now. At the same time we are convinced that a satisfactory solution based on compromise can still be found. For the sake of a solution we propose the following compromise, for example: If NATO removes its proposal on the inclusion of naval aviation in the general level, we in turn would limit our Tu-22M aircraft outside the context of the Vienna talks on the basis of politically binding statements.

"A turning point is now approaching in the fate of the talks. The ideas that the participants have brought to Vienna after the recess will show whether we can complete work on the treaty in time for the Paris summit."

Third World Arms Proliferation 'Inspires Fear'

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by D. Yevstafyev: "Russian Roulette in the Atomic Age. Are We Not Doing Ourselves a Diservice by Giving Military Aid to Developing Countries?"]

[Text] The situation which has taken shape in the Persian Gulf has demonstrated to us that Third World countries are beginning to play an increasingly independent role in world politics. On the one hand this is good, while on the other we must bear in mind that it is by no means Iraq alone that cherishes hegemonist ends.

The new thinking has done what seemed impossible only recently. We have at last stopped looking at the United States through the notch on a rear sight, and our relations have acquired a civilized nature. You might think it is possible to breathe more easily. But no, it is not. As the events of the past two years have shown, the threat to the superpowers stems not only from each other's nuclear arsenals. One of the new and not yet fully understood sources of danger lies in the Third World. What is this threat? Without laying claim to an exhaustive characterization, I will attempt to outline some of its features.

The very fact that arsenals of arms which would be the envy of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been created in many Third World countries must inspire fear. But this is still not everything. Whereas previously the threat proceeding from developing countries was mitigated by the fact that it could only be a threat to the superpowers' interests and not to the superpowers themselves, now, in connection with the spread of missile technology, European states cannot feel safe. A considerable part of the territory of the southern Soviet Union is within the range of missiles like the Jericho (Israel) and the CSS-2 (made in China and now in Saudi Arabia's arsenal).

Another special feature of the situation is that the regional arms race is stimulated by local conflicts in the Third World. At the same time, whereas in Soviet-U.S. relations nuclear and missile weapons were designed chiefly for restraint and deterrence—in short, for indirect use—in the Third World they are patently created for direct use.

How has it happened that weapons capable of threatening not just the interests but also the security of leading states have ended up in the hands of Third World countries?

Until recently people mainly looked on the situation in the Third World through the prism of the Soviet-U.S. confrontation. There were periods when it was deemed

possible to pursue a policy of detente between our two countries while a most intransigent encounter was under way on a regional level. There were purely financial reasons for this in addition to political ones, since the Third World was a major market for arms sales. Unfortunately, weapons deliveries were for the USSR the chief means of penetrating developing countries. The search for "allies" throughout the world resulted in the Soviet Union being drawn indirectly (and, in a number of cases, directly too) into many conflict situations. It was to justify that policy that the concept of giving aid to "national liberation movements" and "anti-imperialist states" was invented. The splendid stucco moldings of ideological exclamations concealed a traditional globalist approach which was not commensurate with the financial, economic, and political possibilities. The partners became accustomed to the fact that they frequently did not have to pay for aid from Moscow, which contributed still further to the drop in our prestige. In fact, cooperation with many Third World countries has in recent years led to results directly opposite to those intended.

How is the situation in the Third World characterized now from the military-political viewpoint?

One of the most dangerous phenomena is the spread of chemical, missile, and potentially also nuclear weapons. For a long time it was thought that the developing countries' scientific and industrial potential would not enable them to create arsenals of this kind themselves. But that proved a mistake.

As for nuclear weapons, the first alarm bell rang the moment India tested a nuclear charge, which was subsequently called "peaceful." Naturally, the emergence of such a weapon in India could not go unnoticed, and Pakistan announced that the creation of deterrent weapons was a priority in its national security policy. Israel has probably become another Third World nuclear power—which it neither confirms nor denies.

But this is not all. If we speak of countries which international experts suspect of violating the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the list is quite long. There is Libya, Iraq, Iran, the DPRK, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil. How did these states acquire the raw materials and technology? Here we can say that developed countries—probably because they did not take seriously the possibility of the "nuclear club's" expansion—did not fulfill too carefully the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Still fresh in our memory are scenes on the "Vremya" program showing our country's successes in cooperation with "traditional" partners in harnessing the "peaceful atom." And the USSR was not alone in its delusions concerning the intentions of Third World countries. Individual components of nuclear technology were handed over by France, the FRG, Britain, and the United States.

Chemical weapons too are not a rarity in developing countries. The simplicity of production enables even the

most backward states to acquire arsenals of these "nuclear weapons for the poor," as they are called. Here too technology has been handed over. It was evidently thought that developing countries are incapable of producing sophisticated chemical weapons. Yes, this is so. But they do not need them. Hydrocyanic acid, mustard gas, and other substances that have come down from the times of World War I would be perfectly adequate. However, there is a tendency to create new models of chemical weapons. Iraq, for example, has announced that it has binary ammunition.

According to the most modest estimates, the arsenals of more than 10 countries contain chemical weapons. Let us name as examples Libya, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Egypt, and Vietnam. While fighting each other Iraq and Iran actually employed chemical charges. Only the targets of gas attacks were not military subunits but the civilian population. Some sources maintain that Libya also used such weapons in the war against Habre's forces in Chad.

In the Third World at present India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Vietnam, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, both Koreas, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia undoubtedly possess missiles. At the same time the arsenals of Iraq, India, Pakistan, and Egypt contain systems that may be classified as missiles with an operational-tactical range; and Israel, India, and Saudi Arabia possess intermediate-range systems.

Many countries have begun the flow-line production of their own missile technology. This means not only the strengthening of the potentials of the arms manufacturers themselves but also an increase in the sources from which it is possible, given the desire, to obtain such weapons.

Exports and reexports of weapons within a region are also becoming increasingly significant. Not just independently produced weapons but also those obtained from outside.

And here a considerable share of the responsibility lies with the developed countries. I am not inclined to pin the blame entirely on the Soviet Union alone, for in the past the United States got itself into a difficult situation when Iran was transformed from an ally into an enemy and the weapons supplied to it ceased to be a means of defending U.S. interests and began posing a threat to them. In the past we had an equally instructive experience in Egypt. From all this conclusions should have been drawn with regard to the fact that in the entire spectrum of interstate contacts ties along military lines are, as a rule, the most flimsy.

What is to be done? I am afraid that at present neither we, nor the Americans, nor other countries are ready to answer this question. The nature and character of the threat posed by the situation in Third World countries is so multifaceted that it will take a long time for effective neutralizing mechanisms to be created. But we must draw some conclusions right now.

First, the military must reconsider its whole approach to this problem. The trouble is that our defense policy was mainly geared to the hypothetical threat from the West, which could be realized only under very specific conditions. The threat from the East and the South is not hypothetical but very, very real. The events in the Persian Gulf have demonstrated that escalation can happen almost instantaneously. What is needed to counter it is an army capable of operating in any region. Incidentally, the Americans had already prepared to combat a threat to their national security from the south. The concept of "low-intensity conflicts" was officially made public back in 1986. Nicknamed "interventionist"—for which there were certain grounds—it is at least some means of containing regional threats, albeit by manifestly dubious methods.

Bulgaria Denies Presence of Nuclear Warheads

*PM0509134190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Sep 90 Second Edition p 5*

[TASS-PRAVDA report under the rubric "From Stream of News"]

[Text] Bulgaria, 3 September—In connection with information emanating from Western sources about the "presence of nuclear warheads in Bulgaria," the People's Republic of Bulgaria Ministry of National Defense has stated that Bulgaria does not have and never has had nuclear warheads. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has operational-tactical missile launchers at its disposal, including 80 SS-23 units with an operating radius of 500 km. They were supplied by the USSR in 1986, are Bulgarian property, and do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles.

Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test 'Rumors' Denied

*PM0509150690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 6*

[Feature incorporating reports by correspondent V. Shmyganovskiy and V. Litovkin: "Nuclear Test Range in the Arctic: What Lies Behind Norwegian Environmentalists' Protests"]

[Text] [Shmyganovskiy] There are persistent rumors circulating in Oslo that the Soviet Union has resumed underground nuclear tests at the Novaya Zemlya test range. The "exact" date of this act—4 September—and the yield of the explosive device—85 kilotonnes—are given.

Since the official Soviet authorities are neither confirming nor denying these reports, the environmental organizations Bellona and Greenpeace have joined the Norwegian Government's protests. They have stated that they are ready to set out aboard their ships to the test area, to take samples of air and water, and even perhaps

to disembark at the test range. One of Bellona's ships, the "Genius," is at full readiness at Kirkenes, in the north of Norway.

Frude Kholand, a representative of the organization, claims that the question of switching the tests from Semipalatinsk to the Arctic region has been decided and that this is a "provocative act."

Kore Tanvik, member of the movement Stop the Lethal Clouds From the USSR, stressed, speaking about the new expedition, that the years-long struggle to stop harmful discharges from the enterprises of the Kola Peninsula seems to have been won and an accord has been reached with Soviet, Norwegian, and Finnish organizations to neutralize them in the next few years.

"We have now found a new target—the island of Novaya Zemlya," K. Tanvin told the newspaper VERDENS GANG. Tanvik and another participant in the voyage, Fredrik Gauge, claim that, geologically speaking, the rock on Novaya Zemlya is very porous and that discharges could percolate through cracks in the earth, endangering every living thing in the Barents Sea. This, they say, will be the genesis of a new "ecological bomb" in the Arctic.

Let us not take umbrage at the actions of the Norwegian Greens: The country's northern provinces are quite close to the Novaya Zemlya region. In Norway there is even talk of the possibility of completely severing relations with our country if tests resume. Many organizations, including Norwegian trade unions, are warning about this. Nevertheless ties with Norway have, despite the unresolved problems between our countries, developed harmoniously on the basis of mutual trust since 1985.

Participants in the campaign under the slogan "We declare war on nuclear tests" claim that the USSR has not really suspended its tests on Novaya Zemlya. Thus, F. Gauge thinks that seven underground explosions were held there in the eighties, the last taking place on 4 December 1988.

The prospect of nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya worries the public not just of Norway but of other Nordic countries too. People here hope that clear answers will be given for these questions.

[Litovkin] Our correspondent asked the USSR Defense Ministry to comment on the articles in the Norwegian press. He was told that the reports of the resumption of tests at the Novaya Zemlya test range on 4 September and the yield of the explosive device and other data are not in accord with reality.

The right to decide to carry out such tests belongs solely to the USSR Council of Ministers and is defined by a Council of Ministers resolution. As of now there is no such resolution. And naturally no date for the resumption of tests has been set.

Nor is there a decision to switch the tests of nuclear devices from the Semipalatinsk test range to Novaya

Zemlya. The question of switching the tests is illogical [nepravomernyy]. There are two nuclear test ranges in the country. And if one of them is closed, the second will remain. And the complete cessation of nuclear tests, which the Soviet Union has frequently raised, can be carried out not unilaterally but on the basis of a bilateral agreement with the United States after the conclusion of the relevant treaty.

The last underground nuclear explosion at the Novaya Zemlya test range did indeed take place on 4 December 1988. But no impact on the environment whatsoever was recorded. Moreover, comprehensive radiation-environmental inspection of the territory of the test range and adjoining oblasts carried out recently by experts of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, the USSR Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation and the Nuclear Industry, and the USSR Defense Ministry showed that the radiation situation there is typical of the whole territory of the country.

The testers of nuclear devices have a very strict regard for the observance of environmental cleanness. After the promulgation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution "On Urgent Measures for the Environmental Improvement of the Country," in line with the instruction contained within it, the USSR Defense Ministry and Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation and the Nuclear Industry prepared a draft resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures Relating to the Conduct of Underground Nuclear Tests."

This document is to regulate the procedure for holding tests at the test ranges in the region of Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya. The proposed measures were discussed in the spring of 1990 at a joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees on Questions of Defense and State Security and Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources.

A resolution on these questions is to be adopted at the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Soviet-U.S. SCC Regular Session Opens

*LD1109183490 Moscow TASS in English 1618 GMT
11 Sep 90*

[Text] Geneva, September 11 (TASS)—The Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission [SCC] began its regular session here today.

The commission was established in accordance with the memorandum of agreement of December 21, 1972 between the Soviet Union and the United States to promote the implementation of aims and provisions of agreements between the Soviet Union and United States on limitation of strategic weapons and measures to lessen the danger of nuclear war.

Chemical Troops Officer on Efforts for CW Pact

*PM1209154790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Sep 90 First Edition p 3*

[Interview with Major General I.B. Yevstafyev, chief of a chemical troops directorate, by correspondent Major M. Pogorelyy: "What Is Going To Happen to Chemical Weapons"; place and date not given]

[Text] In connection with the likelihood of chemical weapons being used in the event of an armed conflict in the Persian Gulf area the view has been expressed in the West recently that work in Geneva on elaborating a convention prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of these weapons has virtually come to a halt. A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent asked Doctor of Technical Sciences Professor Major General I.B. Yevstafyev, chief of a chemical troops directorate, to comment on these assertions.

[Yevstafyev] Work on a draft convention is continuing in Geneva, although I am sure that the possible use of chemical weapons in the Near East would largely cancel out the efforts that the participants in the talks have made so far. All the parties involved in the conflict must be aware of this.

A large circle of participants are active at the talks, and naturally it is not easy to satisfy everybody's interests. According to Western data, around 20 countries around the world possess chemical weapons of one kind or another or the potential to produce them.

I do not think that a definitive agreement is achievable this or even next year. But a great deal of work has been done in Geneva to date and there are no grounds for pessimism.

[Pogorelyy] So there are good results to show as well?

[Yevstafyev] There have already been definite successes. I would primarily like to note the bilateral agreement signed by the USSR and U.S. presidents in Washington on 1 July (it will come into force after it is ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress). This document defines practical measures for a drastic—80 percent—reduction in the sides' chemical potentials.

[Pogorelyy] Could you talk in greater detail about the quantitative aspects of this agreement?

[Yevstafyev] The sides pledge to start destroying chemical weapons stockpiles not later than 31 December 1992 and to possess by the end of 1995 the capacity to eliminate at least 1,000 tonnes of combat toxins per year. At least 50 percent of stockpiles have to be eliminated by 31 December 1999 so that after the year 2002 the USSR and the United States will have left no more than 5,000 tonnes of toxins each. Incidentally the sides have agreed that if a future convention stipulates more stringent demands and timetables priority will be given to a multilateral agreement.

[Pogorelyy] An agreement has been signed. So will we be able to start eliminating chemical weapons in the USSR after it is ratified?

[Yevstafyev] A considerable number of problems lie in wait for us along this path. First it is necessary to create the facilities for their elimination, to determine how they are to be destroyed and where.

The Americans are already embarking on this process. They are going to eliminate their toxins primarily at the actual storage sites (with the exception of bases located in Europe). For us that option is unacceptable.

In embarking on the elimination of chemical weapons we consider it extremely important to take account of the psychological factor—people's views and feelings.

In the past no particular heed was paid to the "human factor." As a result the first such facility, near Chapayevsk, was converted by a USSR Council of Ministers decision into a training center since it failed to fulfill its original purpose. Close cooperation with soviet organs and the local public is essential.

The USSR Ministry of Defense is proposing the creation of a limited number of automated facilities—one or two, or a maximum of three—where chemical weapons could be brought from their storage sites to be destroyed. We consider it advisable for such facilities to be sited in sparsely populated areas away from zones of intensive agriculture. Incidentally, they cannot be infinitely remote from railroad lines or sources of energy and water.

[Pogorelyy] Judging by the amount of work to be done it will not be cheap to eliminate chemical weapons....

[Yevstafyev] It is indeed more expensive to eliminate these weapons than it is to develop and store them. Even the above-mentioned Chapayevsk facility, which has a relatively small capacity (it was envisaged that it would destroy up to 500 tonnes of toxins per year) cost 50 million rubles. Another factor is that 60-70 percent of the cost of a destruction facility goes on monitoring and ecological safety measures.

Overall we estimate that we are talking about several billion rubles. This alone emphasizes the need to adopt a state program defining the tasks of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of the Chemical Industry, the State Committee for Protection of the Environment, the Ministry of Railways, and other bodies. The Ministry of Defense has submitted a draft program to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Pogorelyy] So might U.S. experience and elements of their technology be utilized?

[Yevstafyev] It is somewhat easier for the Americans. First, the United States started tackling this problem much earlier than we did. Second, they have a substantial legislative base making it possible to rapidly decide questions relating to the elimination of chemical

weapons. Third, as I have already mentioned, the plan in the United States is for them to be destroyed at the actual storage sites. And almost half the U.S. stockpiles of combat toxins are concentrated in the arsenal at the Tooele base. So only chemical munitions stockpiled in Europe need to be transported. All the other storage and destruction facilities correspond in principle with the stringent requirements made of them.

As for the technology, we are convinced after making a comparison that there are rational elements on both sides. We regard as promising, for example, the option adopted in the U.S. Army of direct combustion of toxins at high temperatures. But there are also objective differences explaining variations in the makeup of the stockpiles. We have a predominance of Lewisite, which the United States does not have, not to mention mustard gas, sarin, soman, and VX.

[Pogorelyy] Igor Borisovich, were these problems discussed during the visits by Soviet specialists to the United States and American specialists to the USSR?

[Yevstafyev] Two of the three visits on each side envisaged by the Wyoming memorandum of 1989 have taken place. They have a different objective: working out a mechanism for monitoring the practical fulfillment of the agreement on the prohibition of the development and stockpiling of combat toxins. Whereas things are simpler when it comes to stockpiling and even production, you can imagine what it means to investigate all the chemical laboratories in a country!

In addition, the 1990 agreement is one of the first stipulating that any facility on the territory of a partner-state can be inspected without the right of refusal. As you will understand, this is extremely difficult from a technical viewpoint. There is also the problem of preserving commercial secrets, to which inspectors will have access, like it or not.

It has to be said that nevertheless definite experience has been gained: the visit by participants in the Geneva talks to Shikhany in 1987, their familiarization with our arsenal of standard munitions, the visit to Chapayevsk by U.S. Congressmen B. Stemp and L. Hopkins, the trial national inspections at chemical weapon storage and production facilities.

Incidentally, there was a meeting between U.S. congressmen and USSR people's deputies in August. A package of questions linked with the elimination of chemical weapons was discussed. I consider this very important since a solution to questions of their destruction is inconceivable without the participation of the legislative organs of the country and the republics (primarily the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], where all eight of our storage facilities are located).

[Pogorelyy] Nevertheless many of our readers are worried that chemical warfare might be possible today.

[Yevstafyev] I wish to stress that Iraq is a party to the 1925 Geneva convention banning the use of chemical weapons and is represented as an observer at the current Geneva talks.

But there is a definite danger that in the event of unfavorable developments and the evolution of the conflict into a military conflict chemical weapons could be used. Especially since, as experience shows, for a number of reasons the effectiveness of the use of combat toxins in the Near East is relatively great. But this same experience shows that the heaviest losses are incurred not by troops but by the civilian population.

Nevertheless it is to be hoped that reason will triumph and that people in both Iraq and other countries that have been dragged into the conflict are aware of all the extremely grave consequences of the possible use of chemical weapons. Apart from everything else, this also lowers the threshold of the use of other types of mass-destruction weapons, including nuclear weapons.

It is still not too late to bar the way to chemical warfare. Possibly sanctions against violators of international agreements should be worked out and a system of aid to probable victims of the use of chemical weapons should be determined. In any event, only by mobilizing the entire world public can the threat of chemical warfare be eliminated.

Pact Said 'Not Very Enthusiastic' on Arms Reductions

*LD1209203790 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 2039 GMT 11 Sep 90*

[Report by Bratislava Correspondent A. Samylin; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Great changes in Europe entail changes in the entire structure of the Warsaw Pact. The main task of this session is to determine who has to reduce weapons and hardware and in what quantities. The GDR will soon be merely an observer: the unification of Germany lies ahead.

But the other countries, as became clear, are not very enthusiastic about reduction. Each shows more concern about its future security. Warsaw Pact General Secretary Pan Matejka does not consider the meeting a particular success. True, it was possible to draw up a draft agreement, but filling it with figures was left for the next meeting in Prague. Time will tell whether or not this will be achieved. If not, obstacles at the Vienna talks may arise.

Shevardnadze, Baker on CFE Agreement, CSCE Summit

*LD1209201490 Moscow TASS in English 1954 GMT
12 Sep 90*

[By TASS correspondents Konstantin Wojciechowicz, Aleksandr Kanishchev, Sergey Ryabikin and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, September 12 (TASS)—German unification will undoubtedly facilitate the development of the European process and quicken the formation of European security structures, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told a joint news conference attended by the six foreign ministers after signing a German unification treaty in Moscow today.

U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker agreed with Shevardnadze and stressed that the treaty would make an important contribution to ending confrontation and tension. The risk of an armed conflict in Europe will recede into the past, he said.

James Baker was asked if the United States was willing to withdraw the consideration of [words indistinct] framework of the agreement on the reduction of troops and conventional arms in Europe in order to facilitate finalizing this agreement for its signing during the forthcoming CSCE summit in Paris in November.

He replied that the U.S. viewpoint was that it would be very important to sign this agreement in order to hold a CSCE summit. The U.S. position remains unchanged—it is advisable to hold a CSCE summit only upon reaching a conventional arms agreement, Baker explained.

The agreed provisions could provide the basis for major and important accords in the field of conventional arms, he said.

Noting that sides continued to differ substantially on the air forces, Baker pointed out that the United States would like to see these differences overcome in order to include the air forces in the conventional arms agreement. The United States favour [word indistinct] this agreement anyway, he said.

He ruled out the possibility of the U.S. unilaterally favouring the withdrawal of the air forces from the

framework of the agreement without preliminary consultations with its NATO allies.

Shevardnadze agreed with Baker in stressing that the forthcoming CSCE summit should focus on signing an agreement on the reduction of troops and conventional arms in Europe.

"A considerable path has been traversed, many problems have been solved, but many complicated problems still await solution," he said.

The Soviet foreign minister added that the dialogue with the U.S. Secretary of State, which began on Tuesday within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on these matters, will continue.

He also said that the Soviet delegation to Vienna talks would unveil new Soviet proposals one of these days. He expressed confidence that work to finalise the agreement on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe would be completed before the Paris CSCE summit.

Asked about prospects for cutting American troops in Europe to a level below that agreed to by the Soviet Union and the United States in Ottawa, Baker said that the United States had plans to continue discussions of the matter not only with the Soviet Union but also with its allies, as well as within the administration. This problem has not yet been solved, he said.

Shevardnadze confirmed that the Soviet-American dialogue concerning this issue would continue on Thursday, and would probably be dealt with during his personal conversations with James Baker.

Shevardnadze also spoke about the legal and financial aspects of Soviet withdrawal from Germany. He said these matters were being settled in a manner that was substantial and satisfactory both to the Soviet and German sides.

"We are discussing these issues in a quiet and serious atmosphere and the negotiations are nearing completion," he stressed.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

WEU Considers Arms Control Monitoring Satellites

90MI0195 Rome SPAZIO INFORMAZIONI in Italian
4 Apr 90 pp 2-4

[Excerpts] European satellites managed by a European agency to monitor disarmament in Europe. This is the goal of a recent symposium (entitled "Observation Satellites. A European Instrument to Control Disarmament Verification") organized in Rome by the Technology and Aerospace Commission of the West European Union (WEU) to evaluate the real prospects for any such initiative in view of the projects already underway within individual European countries. Leading figures from the political, military, and industrial world with an interest in examining the goals, means, and problems involved in the development of an entirely European satellite system attended the symposium. The system would be used essentially for the direct verification of arms control and disarmament agreements, but it would also be used to survey "hot spots" (such as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and North Africa) and to monitor ecological or natural disasters. This project (which, according to some estimates, would involve costs amounting to approximately \$1.5 billion for the satellites and approximately \$150 million per year for management activities) would be entrusted to an "ad hoc" European agency, the establishment of which was the topic of a recommendation submitted to the WEU Council. "This recommendation," Mr. Charles Goerens, chairman of the WEU Council, stated at the symposium, "involves, on the one hand, developing a joint organizational program of measures designed to verify the implementation of conventional disarmament agreements in Europe and, on the other hand, carrying out a feasibility study on the establishment of a European agency for observation satellites." Dr. Bruno Stegagnini, chairman of the WEU's Technology and Aerospace Commission, emphasized that such a satellite system is "a necessary instrument, through which Europe can overcome its dependence on the superpowers' information systems. Europe," he concluded, "must be politically capable of managing an independent instrument to monitor disarmament verification, and technically capable of developing such an instrument."

Some European countries have already been involved in these operations for quite some time. France, in cooperation with Italy and Spain, is developing the two Helios military observation satellites, which are expected to be operational and in orbit in 1993 and 1995, respectively. At the Rome symposium, General G. Bousquet, Engine Director at the French Ministry of Defense, described what may turn into a plan for the development of a European system for monitoring disarmament via satellite. The first step would involve the establishment of an agency that would use telesurveying images, exploiting the data collected by the French Spot and the American

Landsat satellites. Only in the second stage, Gen. Bousquet argued, could the go-ahead be given for the establishment of "a complete European satellite system to be developed and used within the framework of the agency." Finally, the third and last stage would involve expanding the system with an infrared and radar observation capability. This would ensure quicker access to information by improving the system's accuracy, regardless of the weather conditions prevailing in the areas under observation. [passage omitted]

The Position of the Italian Ministry of Defense

Italy's Defense Minister, the Honorable Mino Martinazzoli, was also present. Assessing the prospects for the development of an independent European capability in the field of military observation satellites, he recalled: "The French Helios program, developed jointly with Italy and Spain, represents the first concrete step in that it satisfies the domestic requirements of three member-states to have an independent capability." The eventual development of a program for the implementation of an evolutionary system open to cooperation with other European countries, the minister added, could be one of the possible solutions. However, an autonomous European satellite capability, which may be used to supplement the traditional on-site inspections envisaged by the monitoring system, raises the question of which agency should be responsible for the operations and results. The basic problem, therefore, Martinazzoli underlined, is not technical, but essentially political in nature, as it is closely related to the future architecture of European security. Supplementing the U.S. satellite system with an independent European satellite system could be considered unprofitable in purely economic terms if the North Atlantic alliance continues to be a general reference point for the European security system, even in the long run. However, it would become indispensable if West Europe and the WEU, which is the forum where security problems are discussed, were to assume more responsibilities and more effective roles. The problem is not a simple one that can be discussed within the WEU. Personally, the defense minister added, in principle I am in favor of establishing a parallel structure that would not be a complete alternative to the American one, which is consistently used by NATO. In particular, one must avoid the danger of separating two systems that should be oriented toward the same goal, namely monitoring disarmament treaties, predicting and managing political and military crises, and possibly providing assistance and control in ecological disasters.

"Italy," Martinazzoli emphasized, "has the technological and industrial potential to develop and manufacture a carrier rocket and reconnaissance satellites with the technical and operational features required to carry out surveillance missions such as those required by the CFE [expansion unknown] monitoring system or by the management of possible crises in the so-called outlying areas. Implementing such a project on an individual basis, however, would involve an unacceptable waste of resources. Consequently, European cooperation seems to

be the only path, implying economic unification as well as political integration and in the future, integration of security as well. This involves the capability and will to develop autonomous satellite systems," the minister concluded, "thereby reducing dependence on external satellites as well as providing an effective and obvious contribution to support the common interests of western security."

What Will the European "Spy" Satellite Be Like?

An interesting study of the possible technical and operational features of the future European military satellite observation system was illustrated at the Rome symposium by Dr. Andrea Pucci, managing director of Selenia Spazio. First, Dr. Pucci revealed the system's technical and operational requirements: 1) detection of physical objectives (fixed and semifixed installations, maneuvers by military vehicles, naval and land vehicles, aircraft); 2) detection and cataloging of electromagnetic wave sources; 3) resolution in function of the targets, on the order of tens of meters for fixed and semifixed installations and one meter for vehicles; 4) all-weather and day/night detection; 5) frequency requirements (less than seven days with optimal programmed vision, less than six hours on demand and for specific targets including lateral vision); 6) data processing and handling (transferring the data to the analysis center: real time or, at the most, within 30 minutes; data analysis time: unprocessed, 2.5 hours, processed, four hours); 7) system and data protection; 8) additional requirements for system flexibility (use of available technologies, simple and modular satellite systems, fast and inexpensive launch systems).

"Consequently," Dr. Pucci stated, "if we consider the technical specifications on the one hand, and the technological developments and conditioning factors on the other, the most likely hypothesis is a multisensor system, based on a constellation of medium-type satellites positioned in low circular or slightly elliptic polar orbits. In view of special operational requirements, the system would be integrated with small satellites, specialized in particular orbits, with short operating lives and very low costs (expendable satellites). The system would be equipped with suitable protective devices for the telecommunications/telemetry/remote control systems, communicating with a network of ground stations, and possibly supported by a DRS (data relay satellite) system managed by a single data controlling and processing center. The latter would be suitably located and provided with data processing and manipulation systems that are capable of integrating the information transmitted by a number of satellites and sensors in virtually real time." "A program such as the one described," emphasized Selenia Spazio's managing director, "is certainly feasible with currently available technologies and those being developed. It is also true, however, that it is ambitious, complex, and costly. Like all programs of this type and degree of complexity, it calls for two other elements in addition to the indispensable political decisions and the availability of appropriate financial resources. These are

a capable, competent, and efficient industrial system, and an agency responsible for managing the program that can understand, make decisions, govern, and plan. In my opinion," Dr. Pucci concluded, "this implies the establishment of a specialized agency within the WEU with a strong technical programming capability. This agency would be assigned the task of managing the program and the financial resources as well as managing the industries responsible for the development of the system."

Concern over Soviet Nuclear Test Plans for Novaya Zemlya

Norwegian Protest Planned

90P20113A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
3 Sep 90 p 6

[Unattributed article: "Bellona Ship Bound for Novaya Zemlya"]

[Text] The ship M/S "Genius," which is owned by the environmentalist group, Bellona, left Kirkenes shortly after 1200 Sunday bound for Novaya Zemlya. The ship will protest against the Soviet nuclear test explosions, but has not been granted permission to dock in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet authorities have also refused to allow "Genius" to carry out research while they are in Soviet waters. This includes use of geiger counters. The Bellona ship will therefore only take advantage of the right to so-called harmless crossing of waters outside the Soviet 12-mile limit.

According to Bellona a nuclear bomb will be exploded on Novaya Zemlya in September. The test area lies 90 miles from the coast of Finnmark.

M/S "Genius," with five men on board, therefore, has provisions [aboard] for a longer stay, says Frode Haaland of Bellona to NTB [Norwegian Wire Service]. He will not say how long the ship can stay around the Soviet island.

Nordic Foreign Ministers Meet

LD1209154490 Helsinki Domestic Service
in Finnish 1300 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] The Nordic foreign ministers have expressed their serious concern about the Soviet Union's plans to move all its nuclear tests to Novaya Zemlya. The foreign ministers unanimously decided to express their concern as soon as possible to the Soviet authorities. The foreign ministers of Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark today ended their meeting at Molde in Norway. In their final statement the ministers stated that the Nordic countries want political cooperation with the Baltic countries.

AUSTRIA

Two Firms Suspected of Supplying Iraqi Gas Plant

AU0709153690 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German
7 Sep 90 p 1

[Text] Vienna—Did two Styrian companies participate in the construction of a poison gas plant in Iraq? The laboratory equipment company Neuberger in Neuberg/Muerz and the Lenhardt Metal Construction Company in Bruck/Mur are under suspicion.

Both are accused of having acted as subcontractors for an FRG enterprise which reportedly built a nerve gas plant in Samarra in Iraq. Reportedly, mustard gas and the highly poisonous tabun, which Iraq used in the war against Iran, were produced in this plant.

The FRG company Karl Kolb and its subsidiary Pilot Plant built the plant. The Iraqi state enterprise S.E.P.P. (State Establishment for Pesticide Production) was the customer.

The Lenhardt Company denies that it was involved. It only supplied pipes, lines, and seals valued at approximately 14 million schillings, Director Lercher told VOLKSSTIMME.

But it is strange that the Darmstadt Department of Public Prosecution has different information. It is currently conducting investigations concerning the Germans involved, and the Lenhardt Company is mentioned in their file: The exports were carried out with the help of the companies Lenhardt and Neuberger. Right from the beginning, the plant was planned for the poison gas production, it was stated.

The Neuberger Company also claims that it did not know anything about the purpose of its laboratory equipment, the management stated. The supplied spare parts for the chemical industry were also unobjectionable, it was said. However, in a talk with VOLKSSTIMME, an employee of the enterprise remembers the customers: The Iraqi S.E.P.P.

And the ignorant management is placed in a bad light by yet another strange aspect: The name of one of its owners is Kurt Fraenzel. He is one of the main suspects in the legal proceedings in Darmstadt and was a representative of the Kolb Company.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Disarmament Impact Upon Bundeswehr Projected

90WC0109A Herford DER MITTLER-BRIEF No 2,
in German 90 pp 1-5

[Article by Major General Klaus Naumann. Text is reprint of address given at Bundeswehr Commanders' Conference on 12 June, 1990 at Fellbach; first paragraph

is MITTLER-BRIEF addition: "Limits and Disarmament—Implications for Bundeswehr"]

[Text] In the first instance, the topic requires going into detail on current issues with regard to disarmament policies, while at the same time indicating where efforts are still being made to reach solutions. In the second instance, an effort is made to make it clear to everyone what the consequences of arms control for the Bundeswehr will be.

Continuation of the Arms Control Process

For the sake of continuing the arms control process, an important consideration is the one dealing with the question whether arms control and disarmament can be a security policy task that has a character of its own. I have certain doubts whether this statement does justice to the political reality in Europe. The change in Europe that we wanted, one to which we made a meaningful contribution, by virtue of our steadfastness and our ability to defend ourselves, is one we did not achieve, as we had originally intended, by dint of arms control; rather, it is the result of the collapse of Communism as an idea and a practice on which to organize societies. Now it is arms control's turn to help render the change irreversible by dismantling inequalities and creating numerical parity as a precondition of widespread cooperation. For this reason, I do not see any outsider role for arms control as an engine of political change, and the events in all on-going arms control negotiations only confirm this. And yet, full agreement must be forthcoming for those who demand that Gorbachev's political thinking must be reflected in the Soviet Union's military capabilities, and we must take advantage of arms control to accelerate the process of overcoming the division of Europe.

The interconnection between disarmament and German unity is to be seen in this light. The dismantling of Soviet military domination and the complete withdrawal of the Soviets from Germany are the preconditions for a policy of broad-based cooperation with the Soviet Union. A great opportunity is found in this for the Soviet Union, which needs Western, and especially German, cooperation, and which has the opportunity to win the friendship of the Germans in this process. The suggestions made thus far by the Soviet Union are all aimed at imposing a special status upon Germany. Neither friendship nor cooperation can be reached in this way. Security concessions from the German side above and beyond those that have already been given, namely:

- refusal to use atomic, biological, or chemical weapons;
- recognition of secure borders;
- a ban on wars of aggression; are not needed by the Soviet Union for military reasons, but they are needed for psychological reasons.

In these areas it is possible to grant concessions to the Soviet Union, and, indeed, such concessions should be forthcoming to continue the arms control process

beyond the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] negotiations, and to play a role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]. The goal is the preservation of German security interests and paying heed to the security interests of Germany's neighbors and of the Soviet Union. For this reason, in the continuation of the arms control process, particular care must be taken that while fully applying the principles of Helsinki—equality, mutuality, and balance—arms control will be continued in such a way that the numerical parity that can be achieved as a result of the CFE negotiations can give rise to parity in terms of operative and strategic options, and thus stability can arise out of parity, while Soviet military power is further limited.

The fact that personnel, despite the problems of verification, can become the conceivable subject of negotiations, is completely self-evident.

One should also accede, as a matter of principle, to Western notions of what form the CSCE process should take. The CSCE can and must play a major role in dealing with and preventing conflicts in Europe. It is a complement to NATO, which never was an exclusively military alliance, and which should not be mentioned in the same breath with the Warsaw Pact, that instrument of Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO's task, as a collective defense alliance, remains the provision of protection against Soviet military power and the prevention of conflicts with the USSR. This is a political task of a high order. The CSCE cannot perform this task, but it can help prevent conflicts from developing and it can help control conflicts that occur in and around Europe. For this reason, the CSCE must be equipped to be an instrument of collective security and institutionalized as such. One must not forget, however, that organizations alone are no solution; they must be given the means of power to implement the solution of conflicts as well, or at least, to come to an agreement on mechanisms for smoothing them out. It is here that all known current proposals fall short of the mark, assuming they touch upon this topic at all.

It is therefore possible to summarize by saying that it will be our unaltered goal to continue with the disarmament process cautiously, and in such a way that from numerical parity, through a combination of reductions, limitations, and confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM], parity will be achieved in operational and strategic options, thus causing stability to be achieved. As a parallel measure, the CSCE process must be fleshed out and expanded to form a structure that complements NATO and extends across East and West. The problem in this case will be finding the mechanisms of conflict resolution.

The Consequences of Arms Control

The question that motivates most soldiers in a primary way, however, is what does arms control mean for the Bundeswehr and how does it operate?

Once a treaty has been concluded and a CFE agreement has been ratified, implementation is likely to occur between 1991 and 1994. For the Bundeswehr, this would occur on the basis of the West's proposal, beginning with those areas on which agreement has already been reached in Vienna, or for which agreement is immediately forthcoming, such as a reduction by circa 1000 tanks, 500 armored combat vehicles, and somewhat more than 150 artillery pieces. A reduction in personnel would go hand in hand with these other reductions; some units would be disbanded, others would be reorganized and reassigned to other tasks and other garrisons.

Taking as a point of departure the political declaration made by the [German] Federal Government and NATO that the West did not intend to derive any unilateral advantage from the reunification of Germany, that also means that the upper limits of a united Germany would be in keeping with those of the Federal Republic. This material reduction by nearly 50 percent, which was negotiated in Vienna, a reduction which no other country in Europe has surpassed, should gradually show even the Soviet politicians that Germany not only talks about security, it is ready to provide it as well.

In strategic terms, the CFE negotiations mean that the Soviet Union will lose its capability for a simultaneous attack throughout the whole of Europe. It could regain this capacity only after long-term rearmament. But not even an attack on Central Europe could be accomplished along a broad front any longer, given the forces immediately available; rather, a main strike involving frontal linkage of its own troops in secondary directions could be executed, and even this main strike could hardly reach the strategic goal of the Atlantic. In the face of such limitations to military capabilities, it becomes apparent what a gain in terms of security the CFE negotiations bring with them, provided the political singularization of Germany can be avoided, as well as relapses into nationalistic thinking on the part of the Western partners when it comes to questions of defense.

The following practical consequences result:

Warning Periods and Readiness Status

Even the political developments within the Warsaw Pact require new estimates concerning warning time, even though by the time the CFE-I agreement is fully implemented, military potential will continue to exist, albeit with a decreasing tendency. On the other hand, the urgency for broad-based preparations in the political, psychological-ideological, and economic spheres makes relative, to a pronounced degree, the duration of preparations for war which can be derived from the deployment of armed forces. Given a slightly altered duration for military preparations, the necessary non-military measures would probably begin weeks or even months before the outbreak of war, and presumably, they would be recognizable.

In the mid-nineties, and following the realization of a CFE agreement, an attack with strategic goals, with little

warning, would be completely implausible, at least in Central Europe. It is true that Soviet forces could be deployed rather quickly for purposes of "forward defense" in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, and then, once forces were massed, offensive operations having limited strategic goals in a strategic direction could be launched. For larger offensive actions, involving an entire theater of operations, months of military preparations would be necessary and they would involve the deployment of troops and the advanced posting of units from the region East of the Urals.

Thus far, NATO has made no concrete statements concerning warning times in case a strategic offensive should occur. And yet, the development that has been outlined gives us the possibility to adjust the degree of preparedness of our own forces on a continual basis.

Viewed in that light, the currently adopted levels of preparedness are just a first step, and the transformation from military presence to training troops will continue.

Operative Consequences

CFE results will have a long-term impact on the operational factors "forces" and "time." The factor "space," as a result of the expansion of German sovereign territory, will, in the near future, gain a new dimension, but it does not mean only greater depth of the area to be defended, but rather, above all, a larger area that is to be protected with fewer forces.

In the future, too, forward defense, in the sense of defense of the territory at its borders, will be the political goal and the military-strategic mission of defense planning. Nevertheless, the military transformation to date will have to be given due consideration. A cohesive defense in keeping with the layer cake principle will no longer be necessary.

An operative concept that takes the new situation into adequate account will have to proceed from the notion of an "adequate protection of the territory", in which the elements, "concentrated defense near the borders," "broad-based protective monitoring of less-threatened areas," "far-reaching protection of regions and objects," flesh out the bones.

An operative principle that holds a great deal of promise of success for the future seems to be the "counter-concentration" of friendly troops in areas subjected to heavy enemy attack.

The basic underlying thought behind this principle of "counter-concentration" is to hold mobile forces, capable of reacting, in the interior of the region, ready to throw against the troops concentrated in the enemy's main thrust, if developments warrant taking such action. In this way, the significance of strong, operative reserves with a strong impact, grows.

Such a concept means turning away from a cohesive, broad-based defense in keeping with current defense

planning toward a more pointed, situationally-related concentration of forces at the decisive site on the basis of scenario plans. Of course, the political and strategic command of forward defense in the sense of the defense of the borders while attempting to keep damage to a minimum may not be called into question.

From the German point of view, it seems particularly problematical that in the transition period in which Soviet forces are present on German soil, it will not be possible to deploy any NATO forces, but only German territorial forces beyond the present-day border between the two Germanies. The situation of having Soviet forces on NATO territory seems to be an extraordinary initial situation, the consequences of which will have to be discussed within the alliance. Crisis management and multinational forces, as a conceivable instrument, could gain in importance.

From what has just been said, it may be concluded that rethinking is necessary in the area of defense planning/defense conception:

- A defense plan in the common sense of the term, with a distinct assignment of defense regions is a decrepit one.
- Scenarios are necessary that are adapted to the enemy's options and permit reactions appropriate to the given situation; such plans will have to be worked out after the conclusion of a Vienna agreement.

This is the lowest, most operational level. It is the result of an examination of strategy that we worked out in the Alliance, and one that we want to influence in an active way. As we do so, we want to, and we shall, change concepts, but first we want to alter the contents where they no longer suit the present-day situation.

The structure and training of armed forces: In such an operational concept, troops that are available quickly are needed, troops that are suitable after an appropriate period of preparation:

- to protect the territory, the air space, and the territorial waters,
- to fend off local attacks,
- to defend the borders at key areas in case of major attacks,
- to support increases in the strength of the forces,
- to accept reinforcements,
- for use within the context of the Alliance.

In addition, forces capable of expansion for purposes of augmentation/reinforcement are needed, and these may be resorted to after longer periods of preparation. The further the implementation of the Vienna accord progresses, the greater the emphasis placed upon expansion forces.

Training and operations within the armed forces will have to be oriented toward the new situation.

Training in all types of warfare without closer orientation toward defense plans creates conditions that are totally new, because thinking must go beyond assigned defense regions.

The net result is greater demands on tactical and operational training of the leaders, as well as on mobile ability to command. In terms of training for the troops, however, the emphasis is placed upon the tactical level of units and formations, which must be inculcated in all types of combat.

The partial repudiation of pre-planned and coordinated defensive measures will require greater flexibility and improvisation, and the training of the future will bear their stamp to a greater extent. This also means that new modes of behavior in terms of exercises and a new relationship to assignments in terms of defense plans are necessary:

Knowledge of contingency plans is still necessary for a limited circle, but there are no exercises or instructions that are based on these plans. No political scenarios are required for exercises, but exercises with our allies, and practicing allied land-based/airborne operations will be necessary. The development of new degrees of readiness, with flexible build-up and dismantling of military capabilities is necessary.

Mobilization, transfer of reinforcements, and the rebuilding of armed forces will be complementary elements of crisis management.

New Tasks

New tasks arise out of arms control as well, however. Information exchanges and verification as a result of CFE and CSBM negotiations will involve considerable forces, but they will mean considerable gains in terms of transparency. The armed forces will have to become accustomed to the frequent presence of "armament inspectors" from other countries, and they will have to support them.

In addition, there is a new dimension of dialogue and cooperation with the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and with the Soviet Union. This is an important means of creating trust, to which the Bundeswehr can and should contribute with self-confidence and openness. The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries particularly want to learn leadership in a democracy, and we want to impress the Soviet Union by our openness and our achievements.

These inferences of the political change all the way to the implementation of the CFE agreement are a process that will take several years.

Continuation of Arms Control

Further inferences arise from the continuation of the arms control process, and, for us Germans, they arise particularly from the so-called 2 + 4 process. The details

cannot be predicted as yet, but let me presume to advance the following topics with regard to the continuation of arms control:

1. The negotiations on tactical nuclear forces, which, in accordance with a Vienna accord, are to be taken up immediately, will presumably lead to the elimination of all Lance systems and their Warsaw Pact counterparts by the middle of the decade.

2. Nuclear artillery in Central Europe will be dismantled in approximately the same time-frame as the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

3. In the area of conventional arms control, I do not expect any deep, additional cuts in the categories of materiel already available, but some reductions of the upper limits are a possibility. The problem will be against whom/with whom should parity be created, but I proceed on the basic assumption that one additional category of materiel will be either reduced or limited, such as bridge-building equipment or logistical capabilities.

4. I also expect reductions in the presence of field forces after a total withdrawal of the Soviets from Germany and Poland. This will apply to local units as well as those stationed in areas far afield. The scope of such measures, and the question, whether this should be the topic of arms control negotiations, are open questions for me. Presumably there will be more clarity for us Germans as early as this year, though it is clear to all concerned that the unification of Germany cannot be simply a fusion of the Bundeswehr and the NVA [National Peoples' Army]; rather, it must be unified German armed forces under the control and command of a Minister of Defense.

Deciding on numbers for the scope of the German armed forces requires a political decision. No such decision has as yet been made.

Prospects

From these inferences one can see that we are in the midst of a process that will have consequences for the planning of the Bundeswehr, but one for which no clear categories can be established in all details, because

- we have to await the outcome of the East-West negotiations;
- we must gain more clarity over mid-range and long-range changes in the USSR;
- from that knowledge, we must re-design NATO strategy, and from that, in turn, we must derive the corresponding basis of national planning.
- We must also consider decisions made by our allies regarding their forces in Europe, just as we must consider our own resources.

For these reasons, the picture just presented is a snapshot of the moment immediately following the CFE negotiations, a picture that shows that even now a great deal is

changing, a scene in which one is well-advised not to take any overly hasty decisions, whether in terms of planning, or arms control.

Similarly, there are no grounds for pessimism or worry. If, as a result of these developments, stability and security are assured in Europe, and arms control agreements are implemented in a manner that is faithful to the spirit of the treaties, that will represent a clear improvement, an improvement to which the Bundeswehr and our allies have contributed.

Limiting armaments, dismantling imbalances that already exist, and eliminating offensive capabilities are in keeping with our goals.

For the transitional phase, the concern of the moment is to maintain the capacity of the armed forces to fulfill the mission that has thus far been theirs, and to prepare for the future. As a result of credible transformation of our defense efforts within the alliance, it will be possible to secure the pathway that leads to further arms control measures, and the preconditions for greater stability involving fewer weapons are assured. For the soldiers in the Bundeswehr, however, it also means that their task remains unchanged: the defense of our country against external danger. Our legitimation is based on Article 1 of the Basic Law, and nothing found in these days of few conflicts can change that fact; these are times we have helped bring about by dint of our ability to defend ourselves and by virtue of arms control, and they are times that we want to preserve in a stable way.

BND Agent Involved in Chemical Supplies to Iraq

*LD2808131890 Hamburg DPA in German 1226 GMT
28 Aug 90*

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—A Federal Intelligence Service (BND) agent has allegedly been involved in supplying Iraq with chemicals and equipment for poison gas plants, according to "Panorama," the ARD [first German TV channel] television program and Suedwestfunk [television]. The BND man's double role has "now been confirmed internally by the Federal Government," an ARD prerelease said today. The agent's activity was also confirmed by a document in the hands of the investigating state prosecution in Darmstadt.

The accused is a Hamburg businessman working for the firm W.E.T., which is under investigation. He was arrested with five other businessmen on 17 August. Among them is also a German-Iraqi co-owner of W.E.T., whom the news magazine DER SPIEGEL has already referred to as a BND agent two weeks ago. That report was rejected at the time by the Federal Government.

According to "Panorama" the illegal exports took place between 1986 and 1988. The Hamburg manager had at the same time been a BND agent and was instructed, according to "Panorama," to supply the German secret service with information about poison gas production in Iraq. In March 1988 the BND parted company with him

"since his reports" had "allegedly been unproductive and false," "Panorama" said. Later, the BND tried to "cover up" the agent's activity. After the state prosecution had found a document on the premises of the supplier to Iraq which clearly proved that the businessman was working for the intelligence service, the BND demanded that the documents should be handed over. The state prosecution rejected the request as unreasonable.

Future German Force Levels Discussed at CFE Talks

Genscher Makes Declaration

*LD3008093490 Hamburg DPA in German 0844 GMT
30 Aug 90*

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Bonn/Vienna (DPA)—Addressing the Conference on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher today gave a binding declaration on future all-German troop levels. In so doing, he formalized the promise Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the Caucasus on 16 July.

The following is the text of the declaration:

"The government of the Federal Republic of Germany commits itself to reducing the armed forces of the united Germany within three to four years to a strength of 370,000 men (land, air, and naval forces). This reduction is to begin with the coming into force of the first CFE treaty.

Within the framework of this overall upper limit, not more than 345,000 men will belong to the land and air forces, which according to the agreed mandate, are the object of the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe.

The Federal Government sees its commitment to reducing land and air forces as a significant German contribution to reducing conventional armed forces in Europe.

It is assuming that in subsequent negotiations the other participants will also contribute to consolidating security and stability in Europe, including measures to limit troop levels."

Urges Quick Talks

*LD3008104290 Hamburg DPA in German 0837 GMT
30 Aug 90*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA) Addressing the plenum of the Vienna disarmament negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher today established the future binding troop levels of a united Germany, in agreement with the GDR, at 370,000 personnel. Genscher also urged that

the current round of disarmament talks involving the 23 nations be concluded as quickly as possible. It must be possible to present the results "ready for a decision" to the foreign ministers of the 35 CSCE states on 1 October in New York. [passage omitted]

A proposal made by Luxemburg to make a commitment to follow-up negotiations was expressly supported by Genscher. The foreign minister called for "the greatest possible intensification of the negotiations" in order to keep to the tight schedule up to the start of October.

This particularly applied to the difficult points of limiting combat aircraft and the restriction of military means to the level necessary for self-defense. In addition, a new package of trust-building measures is also expected in New York by the start of October. Genscher renewed his call for CSCE institutions, which should be created by the November summit of the 35 nations.

Fulfills Pledge to Gorbachev

*AU3008101190 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Aug 90 p 6*

[Report by "FY": "Genscher To Honor Pledge To Gorbachev In Vienna"]

[Excerpt] Bonn, 29 August—Before the participants in the Vienna disarmament negotiations in Vienna this Thursday [30 August], Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will honor a pledge that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl made to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on 16 June. Concerning the chancellor's statement that the forces of the unified Germany will be limited to an upper ceiling of 370,000 men in peacetime, the foreign minister will make a statement on the size of the future German Army and Air Force. The Navy is not being discussed at the Vienna negotiations. The German Navy at present consists of 33,000 personnel. On the basis of financial plans, the number of ships will be halved by the year 2000. Its personnel will be reduced to 25,000. On the basis of this minimum, Genscher might state that the future German Army and Air Force will not comprise more than 345,000 troops on active service.

Unilaterally establishing the size of the future German forces will not be an isolated act. It will be incorporated in a proposal that Jacques Reuter, the Luxembourg chief delegate, in his capacity as the NATO states' chairman of the day, will submit before Genscher takes the floor. According to this proposal, the negotiation participants will commit themselves in the first disarmament agreement, which is scheduled to be concluded now, to negotiate on the upper ceilings of their armies and air forces in subsequent negotiations. This keeps the German commitment from appearing as an isolated move. In addition, NATO will suggest that all countries bind themselves politically not to increase the size of their armies and air forces during the follow-up negotiations.

These follow-up negotiations will begin immediately after the conclusion of the first disarmament agreement. This agreement will probably be signed a week before the summit meeting of the 35 CSCE states begins in Paris. France as the host country has invited the 35 nations to hold the summit meeting on 19 November. It is the purpose of this summit to discuss the disarmament agreement.

Genscher's speech to the delegations in Vienna marks the beginning of the final act regarding foreign policy guarantees of German unification. Genscher's appearance in Vienna guarantees that the size of German forces will be bindingly declared before the foreign ministers meet for probably the last round of the two-plus-four negotiations in Moscow on 12 September. Their talks can only be concluded after the problem of the future size of the German forces has been clarified and has been officially introduced in the Vienna negotiations. The final document of the two-plus-four talks will then be submitted to the foreign ministers of the 35 CSCE states, who will meet for that purpose on 1 and 2 October during the UN General Assembly session. One day later, on 3 October, the unification of the two German states will be completed, and Germany's unity will be restored. [passage omitted]

De Maiziere Approves

*LD3008102190 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 0851 GMT 30 Aug 90*

[Text] Vienna (ADN)—The GDR Government is in complete agreement with the commitment to reduce the armed forces of a united Germany to 370,000 men over a three to four year period.

This was stated by GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere in Vienna today during the plenary session of the Conference on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE]. The GDR regarded an obligation of this nature on the part of a united Germany as an important German contribution to reducing conventional armed forces.

"This commitment by a united Germany is a confidence-building leap forward for a development in Europe that is universally sought," De Maiziere underlined. It was in line with the GDR Government's policy of making German unification the foundation for overcoming the division of Europe. It is in no one's interest to simply push eastwards the line that divided Europe into two military alliances. It was now important to overcome it as a whole and replace confrontation and the highest concentration of military means with cooperation and disarmament.

"The Vienna negotiations are part of the positive trends of the time. The agreement that has been under negotiation here for about 18 months will mean that the 300,000 or so weapons systems in the five weapons categories under discussion will be reduced by about

half," the prime minister said. A strict and comprehensive verification and information system, as well as wide-ranging confidence-building and stabilizing measures, would create additional security guarantees. In the reductions, a future united Germany will adopt the largest reduction quotas with the Soviet Union. The future German Army will not be a combination of the Bundeswehr and the former National People's Army.

"As for the area of the former GDR", De Maiziere stated, "it will have a special military status despite its inclusion in NATO. In line with the agreements between President Gorbachev and Federal Chancellor Kohl, it will be free of nuclear weapons, and the German Armed Forces on that territory will initially not be subordinate to NATO. These armed forces will not be capable of attacking, in terms of size, structure, and armament."

These decisions are an important step toward reaching the general aim of the Vienna negotiations and eliminating the capacity for surprise attacks and large-scale offensives.

"The treaty negotiated here will produce a huge flood of military data due to the stipulations on information and verification," the speaker said. "Dealing with this flood practically, in a way that makes it accessible to all those involved, will require a relevant all-European institution sooner or later. There is increasing awareness that a center for conflict prevention must be established. The GDR has proposed Berlin as the site for such a center. It would be symbolic for a city that was for decades a focal point of the Cold War to become a center for conflict prevention."

Missile, CW Technology Sales to Iraq, Libya Detailed

*AU1109145390 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
10 Sep 90 pp 112-118*

[Unattributed report: "The Tip-Off Hit the Bull's Eye"]

[Text] On 9 August, Jordanian businessman Sadeq Qadoumi [spelling as published] received an urgent letter from Germany. Kiel businessman Klaus Weihe wrote "I am very happy to be in contact with you again." An important cargo has to be forwarded to "our friends."

The man in Amman immediately knew that it would not be an easy cargo: 30.5 tonnes of steel pipes, a turning lathe, including spare parts, and "maybe a few more things" are a lot of stuff, if—which is obvious—they have to be taken to Iraq evading all checks. Weihe wanted to conclude the deal very discreetly (value: 653,851.66 marks): "Only from fax to fax."

On 12 August, Qadoumi gave his okay: "Cooperation is possible." Details were to be discussed at a meeting. The Jordanian asked for a large surcharge to cover risks: A fee of almost 100,000 marks, excluding transport costs, of course.

However, the shipment to the NASSR State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries, a department of the Iraqi War Ministry, will probably not be carried out. State prosecutors have discovered this deal through another Iraq-related case.

Investigations of Weihe were initiated in the middle of August, because, along with his partner Friedrich-Simon Heiner, of the Inwako GmbH company of Bonn, he is said to have provided assistance for Baghdad's missile project 1,728. With this project the Iraqis intend to optimize Soviet Scud-B-missiles technology through more efficient carrier systems.

For this purpose Iraq has bought components and know-how in the entire West, and particularly in the FRG. FRG Economics Minister Helmut Haussmann has confidentially told the economic committee that the companies involved are mainly "medium-sized German enterprises." Apart from Inwako and company head Heiner, who has meanwhile been arrested, Haussmann also mentioned the companies Havert Handelsgesellschaft GmbH and Heinrich Mueller Maschinenfabrik GmbH of Pforzheim.

According to the information of Western intelligence services, orders are still being received despite the embargo. Unless the state prosecutor happens to intervene, supplies continue via obscure channels. Only prices have gone up.

The Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the CIA, and the English and Australian intelligence services have informed the FRG Government at short intervals about shady German arms deals in the Middle East crisis region. The BND alone has supplied information to Bonn in this connection in 30 instances since August 1989.

Last week, U.S. Republican Senator Jesse Helms presented George Bush with a list of German companies involved in arms deals with Iraq. The senator basically based his information on the table that was published in DER SPIEGEL of 6 August 1990.

Yet Iraq is not the only partner in these negotiations. Only two weeks ago, the Chemical Industries Association warned some of its companies against "intermediaries and middlemen" who are currently buying primary products for nerve gas on behalf of Libya.

In a letter of 24 August it was stated that there is confidential information that emissaries of revolutionary leader Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi "are particularly interested in getting hold of thionyl chloride, phosphorus (III) chloride, chlorobenzene, chloroethanol, and sodium sulphide."

Even cases of German arms deals with Iran are increasing. The mullahs are also interested in setting up new poison gas kitchens. Via an Iranian state enterprise in Duesseldorf, Tehran has ordered 3,400 tonnes of thionyl chloride, a primary product for mustard gas. On

15 January, the U.S. Embassy in Bonn reported that a shipment of sodium fluoride, a primary product for poison gas, had been sold to Tehran by a West German company. After some diplomatic controversies, Iran declared it was ready to send back this cargo.

Iran is currently constructing a mustard gas plant. According to information in Bonn, the plant is being set up by a company from the Netherlands.

Investigators even suspect that a German businessman might have supplied Iran with the basic equipment for the production of bacteriological weapons. Yet, it has been suspected that Iraq also received that dangerous laboratory weapon. According to BND reports, a German company has supplied the incubators that permit the production of bacteriological weapons to Baghdad; according to tip-offs by the FBI, another company is said to have provided the necessary substances.

German export expansionism obviously does not stop at anything. The only thing that counts is profit. Virtually anything is delivered, ranging from a cannon factory to know-how for the nuclear bomb.

Only the intelligence services sometimes manage to make it possible for those in power to penetrate the almost impenetrable thicket of banned deals. In the course of its top-secret investigations the Pullach-based BND has maneuvered itself into a shady light.

At a secret meeting in Bonn last Thursday [6 September], Paul Muenstermann, the deputy head of the BND, admitted that its investigators are involved in the activities of German poison gas traders. In the years 1987-88 there were a great number of connections with people who were arrested three weeks ago because of their activities in Iraq.

According to information received by DER SPIEGEL, at least three of the alleged poison gas traders have temporarily cooperated with the BND. Manager Peter Leifer of the Hamburg Water Engineering Trading GmbH (W.E.T.) has been part of the BND staff in Iraq since 1986.

The man, who worked for the Preussag concern until the mid-eighties, supplied the BND with intelligence material on Iraq. The German-Iraqi al-Kadhi, another W.E.T. manager, is said also to have worked for the BND. However, the BND has denied that al-Kadhi was one of its agents. A new scandal, which might even affect people in Bonn, is emerging. The W.E.T. company has supplied Iraq with 58 tonnes of primary products for the production of the nerve gas tabun. In 1986, plants for the production of poison gas were shipped to the Iraqi city of Al Falluja. The planned daily production was 17.6 tonnes.

In Baghdad the Hamburg arms and intelligence dealers were highly respected as specialists. A four-member

W.E.T. delegation, headed by Leifer, was received by 14 Iraqi project managers for a four-day meeting in the middle of March 1987.

Even when the Darmstadt state prosecutor and the "Iraq Special Committee" of the Cologne Customs Criminal Institute were investigating W.E.T., at least Peter Leifer continued to work for the BND.

A high-ranking BND man told DER SPIEGEL that his organization needed Leifer "for collecting information." Yet, the "intelligence service does not identify itself with what people do outside this sphere. I think it is the same as if we were to penetrate the KGB. This does not mean that we accept the entire policy of this organization."

This case is a case in point for the complex interconnections between politics and the armament lobby. People deceive and intrigue. As soon as a new scandal is in sight all involved try to cover everything up. All that matters is somehow to get through it all.

"If we had had even a single clue," Bonn's Economic State Secretary Erich Riedl (Christian Social Union) states with agitation "if certain companies had declared their readiness to build poison gas plants in Iraq, they would not have had the slightest chance of even reaching the airport."

Yet the chronology of the poison gas case tells a completely different story.

In 1981, the Pilot Plant, a sister company of the Hesse-based company Karl Kolb KG, began to construct a poison gas plant in the Iraqi city of Samarra. In May 1982, an engineer of the Preussag concern told the German Embassy in Baghdad that this plant was intended for the production of poison gas at a later date.

His tip-off certainly had a powerful effect. When the Preussag man was on home leave a little later, he was suddenly sacked. Said the former Preussag employee: "My tip-off obviously hit the bull's eye." Besides, the chief in Baghdad was the then Preussag representative al-Kadhi.

Two years later, the CIA sounded the alarm, and THE NEW YORK TIMES reported at length about the German poison gas plants. For Martin Bangemann, of the Free Democratic Party of Germany, who was economics minister at the time, it was a clear case: Nothing but "professional jealousy" on the part of the Yanks.

Two so-called experts, whom Bonn sent to Samarra, failed to discover anything extraordinary. Washington bombarded the German economic attache with information. From 1984 onwards even the W.E.T. people were involved in the deals.

Finally in 1986, the Darmstadt state prosecutor opened an investigation. Finally, three weeks ago, seven managers were imprisoned because of the transactions with Iraq.

Now that even Riedl knows it, he still rejects any responsibility: "Once you are out of city hall, you probably know more."

The ritual of the politicians is as simple as it is phony: After the affair in connection with the Libyan poison gas plant at al-Rabitah, the FRG Government pompously announced that it would rigorously tighten the Battle Weapons Control Law.

Yet once the uproar had subsided, the strict passages of the draft law were again watered down, and the minimum penalty for illegal dealing with nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons was reduced from two years to one. Moreover, those who got involved in such a deal "unintentionally" may get away without punishment if what they did "furthered" the undertaking only "insignificantly."

Even the regulations on the production of chemical weapons were watered down. Until July 1989 exporting without a license plants that are "suitable" for the production of poison gas was banned. These regulations were extended and now, in order to fall under the export ban, such plants must be "particularly suitable."

With the current danger of a war in the Middle East, those calling for severer laws can again make themselves heard in Bonn—until things change again.

Not a big risk for the suppliers of controversial merchandise. A total of 37 preliminary investigations have been opened all over the FRG, involving more than 170 German companies. Only last Wednesday, a trial started in Hanau in connection with illegal nuclear deals with Pakistan. However, export controls are ineffective. And as soon as the controversial merchandise has crossed German borders, proof of illegal transactions is difficult to furnish.

What makes things even more difficult is the fact that it is easy to deceive the authorities. In the course of the court action taken against four former managers of the Rheinmetall arms factory of Duesseldorf, the judges noticed that export controls were "carried out—if they were carried out at all—half-heartedly and to the advantage of the industry."

A Freiburg businessman was only sentenced to a moderate term of eight months on probation, despite the fact that he had supplied nuclear technology equipment to Pakistan in 1985. The judges argued that the state control authorities made it very easy for him to commit this offense.

It is obviously the intention of the lawmakers to allow those who are involved in such illegal negotiations to get away so easily: Sanctions in the case of infringement of the Foreign Trade Law have so far almost always been fines, which were paid out of petty cash.

It is probably not a coincidence either that it seems to be impossible for the judicial authorities to come to terms with the arms scandals. Since several firms are usually

involved in a particular project, state prosecutors from different places begin their work without knowing each other. Usually everybody has to start from scratch.

The Society for Threatened Peoples has long been vexed by the sluggish investigations; this is why in the case of the MBB Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm company the society took matters into its own hands. "In view of the obvious reluctance to act of the criminal investigating authorities and state prosecutors" several members of the human rights organization forced their way into MBB warehouses near Munich last Thursday. The state prosecutor opened investigations on Friday.

The company, which belongs to the Daimler-Benz group, officially delivered helicopters for rescue missions and the transport of important persons to Iraq. Meanwhile, these helicopters were converted to helicopter gunships. The last part of the delivery to the Iraqi Air Force was due in early August—but it was halted by the embargo.

If one does land in court, there is no need to lose heart. Juergen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, industrialist from Lahr and supplier of the poison gas plant in al-Rabitah, Libya, received a relatively mild sentence of five years in prison. He may keep the profit from the illegal deal, which amounts to about 60.1 million German marks.

What Bonn likes to present as the individual act of a criminal enterprise is in fact a deal involving more than 40 companies. So far, no one apart from Hippenstiel has been punished.

Overshadowed by the events in Iraq, the next affair is emerging in the desert state: According to information obtained by the BND and by the British intelligence service, al-Qadhdhafi is planning at least two new poison gas projects.

A German businessman who has left the project reports that the plans for a facility in the desert town of Sabha also speak of "German suppliers." One trace leads to southern Germany. The public prosecutors in Ulm and Stuttgart have been investigating the companies Abacus, Libert Consult, and Rose Import-Export GmbH since March.

The three companies reportedly tried to export a highly sensitive computer control facility from Siemens (Teleperm M). Such a "measuring and control instrument for the automation of a chemical plant" was delivered to al-Rabitah years ago. The Stuttgart Rose GmbH is obviously a company for all circumstances. At a fair in Saudi Arabia, together with the Decotech S.A. office in Fribourg in Switzerland, it presented protective equipment against chemical weapons. Together with Lux Electric Engineering GmbH from Saarland, it is said to have tried to deliver navigation instruments to Libya.

Because of Sabha, investigations have also been made in connection with a subsidiary of the Thyssen concern.

According to a BND paper, it delivers hydraulic lifts for the subterranean poison gas plant. However, Thyssen denies any such exports.

Another discovery is still mysterious. This summer Western agents reported that al-Qadhdhafi was planing another poison gas plant under an old fort in Waddan, between the coastal town of Sirt and Sabha, which is 500 km from there.

Germans will probably be involved in this project, too. In Sabha there is already a napalm plant; at the beginning of the 1980's a missile center was established with aid from the FRG, and now the Libyans and their helpers are working on a new missile project called "Ittisalt."

According to information obtained by Bonn, Germans delivered remote detonators for mines to Tripoli, spare parts for the Abu Kammasch chemical plant, and coast guard boats with accessories. According to a BND report, some companies, unimpressed by the Imhausen case, sold spare parts for the al-Rabitah poison gas plant as late as the end of 1989.

Thanks to Western help in armament, the Middle East has developed into a powder-keg. The demand for weapons of all kinds is large. Two years after the end of the Gulf war, the old enemies Iraq and Iran are intensively searching for weapons. Experts estimate that both states will spend \$60 billion over the next four years for military materiel—obviously, an irresistible temptation for capitalists, above all those from the FRG.

The Arab states buy what is available. In Syria and Libya, motorized hang gliders—made in Germany, of course—are highly coveted. The ultra-light fire birds are used in guerrilla warfare against Israel.

On 30 November 1989 the United States informed Bonn that German gliders had repeatedly managed to reach Damascus. Last week, one of the builders of these gliders, Norbert Schwarze from the Muensterland region, had visitors from the customs investigation squad. This time, spare parts for Schwarze's gliders were allegedly sold to the Middle East via a roundabout route.

Parts for another exotic but far more dangerous piece of equipment also reached the Gulf via a tortuous route—for Saddam Husayn's super cannon. For years the martial regime has been working on the mammoth mortar with a range of more than 1,000 km. Photographs of U.S. spy satellites show that last year a small prototype of the monster weapon had already fired some shots.

On the basis of "impounded documents," the Bonn Economics Ministry told the Federal Association of German Industry in May that project number 839, called Babylon, comprises two guns, caliber 1,000 mm (barrel length 150 meters) and caliber 350 mm (barrel length 52 meters). Haussmann told the economic committee that there are indications that "a total of six German companies" had produced parts for this project.

The client is mostly the Technical Corps for Special Projects (Teco) from Baghdad. In official letters the company orders steel and pipes for the oil industry.

The striking thing is that for the alleged pipelines an unusual alloy of steel with high proportions of nickel, chromium, and molybdenum is ordered. The degree of hardness of this steel is 140; usually, steel with a degree of hardness of 80 is used for oil pipes.

The orders for the so-called Big Gun were placed in Italy, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the FRG. German investigators now believe that they are onto a hot trail: Saerstahl AG produced 40 tonnes of metal sheets and 14 tonnes of rings from this particularly hard special alloy, which were then exported to Iraq by the Duesseldorf Export-Union GmbH. Again, the customer is Teco, the alleged consignee is the oil industry.

The dimensions of the steel products from Voelklingen also indicate that they were destined for the super cannon project: The rings and roll-bent metal sheets, which were delivered to Baghdad before the embargo, have a diameter of more than 80 cm—the size of the gigantic gun.

Big Gun is being built in the Saad 16 military research center near Al-Mawsil. Here Saddam Husayn has meanwhile gathered 3,000 Western hostages in order to protect his pet project against a U.S. attack.

The Germans know their way around Al-Mawsil extremely well. Haussmann reported in Bonn that "militarily usable missiles or other armament products are being developed" in this armament facility. The Bielefeld Gildemeister-Projecta GmbH was the general agent for this. About 40 German companies were subcontractors. "The most important German subcontractor" was, according to Haussmann, missile and helicopter expert MBB.

Haussmann's State Secretary Riedl of the Christian Social Union will not be pleased to hear this. The coordinator for the German aviation and space industry is considered MBB's most influential lobbyist in Bonn.

For a long time Riedl denied knowing anything about MBB's participation in Saad 16. In September 1988 he stated in the Bundestag that the FRG Government does "not have any information in this connection." In fact, however, on the orders of the FRG Government, in 1987 MBB was no longer permitted to deliver anything to the Saad 16 project.

Riedl and some other Bonn politicians can count themselves lucky that they do not live in Vienna. Former Austrian Chancellor Fred Sinowatz and his former Interior Minister Karl Blecha, as well as former Foreign Minister Leopold Gratz, also claimed to know nothing: They allegedly did not know anything about illegal exports of cannons to warring Iraq.

However, their insistent statements were to no avail. The three comrades will be indicted for abuse of office, as the Justice Ministry has announced.

Hot Goods for Libya: Companies Whose Products, Plans, and Other Services Were Used for the Construction of the Poison Gas Plant in al-Rabitah in Libya, According to the Findings of the Investigation Authorities

From the FRG:

Planning, Construction, Transactions:

GfA Gesellschaft fuer Automation, Bochum; IBI Engineering, Frankfurt; Imhausen-Chemie, Lahr; Salzgitter Industriebau, Salzgitter.

Contractors, Subcontractors:

Alexander Wiegand, Klingenberg; Alfred Teves Klimatetechnik, Frankfurt; Berkefeld-Filter Anlagenbau, Celle; Bopp and Reuther, Mannheim; Brown Boveri-York, Mannheim; Calor-Emag, Ratingen; Digi Table Thielen, Essen; Eisenwerke Dueker, Laufach; Endress and Hauser, Maulburg; Exner Chemie-Ventile, Neuss; G.A.B. Neumann, Maulburg; GEA Wiegand, Ettlingen; Heinkel Elektro-Aggregate, Hamburg; Industrietechnik Kienzler, Vogtsburg-Achkarren; John Zink, Frankfurt; Kaemmer Ventile, Essen; Rhenus, Cologne (forwarding agency); R. Stahl Foerdertechnik, Ettlingen; Salzgitter Industrie- Elektrik, Cologne; Siemens, Essen; Schott Glaswerke, Mainz; Unielektro, Eschborn; Werner Hemmers Elektro-Schaltanlagen, Essen; Wilhelm Pesch Armaturen, Cologne-Godorf.

From Abroad:

Planning, Construction, Transactions:

IBI Engineering, Zug/Switzerland; IBI Holding, Zurich/Switzerland; Imhico, Zurich/Switzerland; Imhico, Vaduz/Liechtenstein.

Contractors, Subcontractors:

Capsulit, Milan/Italy; Cross Link, Antwerp/Belgium (forwarding agency); Etamoc, Montceau-les-Mines/France; IG Trading, Antwerp/Belgium (forwarding agency); Termindustria, Alba/Italy;

Companies whose chemicals delivered to Libya were suitable for the production of poison gas, according to the findings of the investigation authorities:

Atochem, Fos-sur-Mer/France; Chemische Werke Lahr, Lahr/FRG; Hoechst Italia, Rome/Italy; Kanematsu-Gosho, Tokyo/Japan; Saeurefabrik Schweizerhall/Switzerland; Sung Fai, Hong Kong.

Export Restrictions on Nuclear, CW Technology Tightened

Monitoring Proposal

AU2708143290 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG
in German 26 Aug 90 p 6

[Heinz Vielain report: "Office For the Protection of the Constitution To Monitor Certain Firms"]

[Excerpt] Bonn—Minister of State Lutz Stavenhagen (Christian Democratic Union) has proposed that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution [BfV] help prevent illegal technology transfers.

In a WELT AM SONNTAG interview, he said: "German exports of the type that have now become known following Iraq's poison gas threats must in the future be prevented on the basis of intelligence information."

Stavenhagen is responsible in the Federal Chancellor's Office for the three secret services, the BfV, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), and Military Counterintelligence (MAD).

According to Stavenhagen, the three types of higher punishments planned for perpetrators are not sufficient. He said that the public prosecutors must be allowed to intervene before export deals for the construction of secret poison gas plants or nuclear weapons are settled. "To that end, they need to have timely information of the type that an intelligence service can supply."

Asked whether companies will therefore in the future be monitored by the BfV, the minister says that the point here is monitoring "the black sheep that regrettably exist, and by no means the whole range of companies." Stavenhagen is convinced that business and industry also have an interest in "stopping such black sheep." He said: "This extremely small minority of entrepreneurs not only considerably harms the Federal Republic's reputation; it also harms German industry's reputation as a whole." Stavenhagen added: "The black sheep should be combated like terrorists, by intelligence service means." [passage omitted]

Authorization Needed

LD2708090290 Hamburg DPA in German 0810 GMT
27 Aug 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Federal Government has made the involvement of Germans in foreign projects concerned with missile technology subject to authorization. A relevant decree on the foreign trade law was presented in the Bundestag today. The obligation to obtain authorization holds for the development, manufacture, or testing of missiles as well as the components that are specially constructed for them and the computer programs that have been developed.

The Federal Government justified the decree as a consequence of the involvement of German engineers in missile projects in Iraq as well as in Egypt and Argentina. This had led to a "considerable disruption in the foreign relations" of the Federal Republic.

Exemptions to Decree

LD2708132490 Hamburg DPA in German 1203 GMT
27 Aug 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Cooperation by Germans in the development and construction of missiles abroad is to be

generally subject to authorization. The EC states as well as the United States, Japan, Canada, Norway, and Turkey, as well as the European Space Association (ESA) projects are excepted, it emerges from a further decree to tighten up the foreign trade stipulations that were published today in the Bundestag. The Federal Office for the Economy in Eschborn is responsible. [passage omitted]

Penalties Toughened

AU1309113390 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 13 Sep 90 p 4

["rei" report: "More Severe Punishment for Illegal Arms Sales"]

[Text] Bonn, 12 September—Breaches of the weapons export law are to become more severely punishable than recently planned. The mediation committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat decided in Bonn on Wednesday [12 September] to increase the minimum sentence for violations of the ban on the production and the spreading of nuclear and chemical weapons from one to two years.

North Rhine-Westphalia's Interior Minister Schnoor (Social Democratic Party of Germany) justified this measure by stating that a minimum sentence of one year is not in keeping with the danger posed by these weapons. For this reason, the stricter penal provisions of the original draft prepared by the government, which was watered down by the coalition in the Bundestag, must be adopted. It must also be possible to punish without restrictions perpetrators who act in a thoughtless manner. Punishment in the case of negligence was so far

only possible if the offense entailed "consequences that were not insignificant." The "science clause" will be deleted, which explicitly guarantees exemption from punishment in the case of the careless dissemination of special knowledge.

The mediation committee adopted amendments to the law package on data protection and intelligence services. The control rights of the commissioner for data protection in the public sphere are to be extended. In addition, data may only be used for the purpose for which they were gathered. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution must not have direct access to police computers.

PORTUGAL

Iraqi IRBM's Reported in Mauritania

PM0509134390 Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 1 Sep 90 p A3

[Excerpt] The Portuguese intelligence services were warned this week of the possible presence in Mauritania of surface-to-surface missiles supplied by Iraq with a range of 900 nautical miles—sufficient to reach Portugal. Mauritania, together with Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen, is an Arab country which has shown support for Iraq's stances.

According to a senior Foreign Ministry official, these missiles' presence, if confirmed, could "be a potential danger" in the event of an armed conflict breaking out in the Persian Gulf. [Passage omitted]

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